


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# Culture and Development in Africa



*Proceedings of an International Conference held at  
The World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
April 2 and 3, 1992*

Sponsored by



Environmentally Sustainable Development Proceedings Series No. 1

# **Culture and Development in Africa**

Ismail Serageldin  
June Taboroff, *Editors*

Alicia Hetzner  
*Editorial Consultant*

*Proceedings of an International Conference held at  
The World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
April 2 and 3, 1992*

Sponsors  
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## Foreword

On April 2 and 3, 1992, a major international conference was held at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. The topic was "Culture and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." The conference was sponsored by the Government of Norway, the Government of Sweden, The Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, and UNESCO. It represented an important event within the context of the United Nations World Decade on Cultural Development, which began in 1987.

The interim *Proceedings*, published in two volumes in October 1992, made available the papers presented and the major interventions made at the conference. The present, final *Proceedings* is a more complete version. It includes an introduction and an abstract of each presentation, and is being published simultaneously in English and French.

The deliberations at this conference were planned to encompass the status of taking culture into account in African development in the widest possible context. This conference was to be followed by two regional seminars in Africa that would narrow the focus to specific practical topics. The first regional seminar, sponsored by UNESCO, the World Bank, and UNICEF in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture of Cote d'Ivoire and hosted by the African Development Bank, took place in Abidjan from November 2 to 6, 1992. It was entitled "The Cultural Dimension of Development in Africa: Decision-making, Participation, and Enterprise." The second, planned for 1994, will focus on "Indigenous Management Practice: Lessons for Africa's Management in the 1990s." However, beyond its contributions to these follow-up meetings, the present conference stands in its own right as a self-contained body of work that should prove of enduring value to scholars and practitioners alike.

The editors wish to record here their deep appreciation to Alicia Hetzner for her invaluable assistance in bringing these volumes to publication, and to Frank Mancino and James McKinney for their tireless efforts in producing the document.

Ismail Serageldin

June Taboroff

## Introduction

Ismail Serageldin

Why do some countries, such as Japan and the East Asian "tigers," seem able to deal with ease with innovation and transformation while other societies suffer apparent rigidities? Even more striking is the change that occurs in the *same* society over time. Sometimes, after long periods of apparent stagnation, there suddenly emerges a newfound capacity to absorb the new and reinvent the past as China has done twice in the last half-century. All these manifestations invariably call to mind the need to study much more effectively those more elusive qualities of a society's reality that we call "culture."

Nowhere is this elusiveness more apparent than in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To many outside observers, SSA shows remarkable strength in terms of social solidarity and mutual support in the face of adversity. This capacity was amply demonstrated in the 1980s when the extended family support system was able to provide a social safety net during a severe economic crisis. On the other hand, the difficulty of various institutional models to be either adapted or adopted leaves these same societies unable to benefit more fully from the advantages of the economic incentive structures they put in place or to respond swiftly and effectively to a rapidly changing international economic landscape.

The causes of such phenomena are to be studied and understood in the context of a broadened analytical perspective that transcends economics, but does not abandon it. This broader analysis requires incorporating the social and political and institutional dimensions of the situation along with the economic dimension. Intuitively, a suitable framework for linking all these dimensions is found in the idea of culture broadly defined.

How broad should this definition of culture be? From a narrow perspective, culture can be defined as "...that complex of activities which includes the practice of the arts and of certain intellectual disciplines, the former being more salient than the latter."<sup>1</sup> But, as development practitioners, we must adopt a broader perspective, even if it is one in which the boundaries are still vague and the constituent parts rather ill-defined.

[Culture] comprises a people's technology, its manners and customs, its religious beliefs and organization, its systems of valuation, whether expressed or implicit. If the people in question constitutes a highly developed modern nation, its social organization and its economy are usually excluded from the

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<sup>1</sup> Lionel Killing, *Beyond Culture* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965, uniform edition 1978), preface.

## 2 Introduction

concept of culture and considered separately, although the reciprocal influence of social-economic and cultural factors are of course taken into account. When the word is used, in [this] larger sense, the extent of its reference includes a people's art and thought, but only as one element among others.<sup>2</sup>

The international community formally adopted this view of culture in the UNESCO-sponsored definition in the Declaration of MONDIACULT:

Culture . . . is . . . the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.<sup>3</sup>

Do we have an effective framework of analysis for such a broad view of culture and development? At present this is still sorely lacking. Indeed, the *raison d'être* of this conference was to take the discussions of culture and development a step further.

It is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa did succeed in putting the questions squarely before the interested practitioners. Culture matters. And to understand culture, we must understand both the present and the past. History matters. Furthermore, promising lines of investigation also emerged, even if we are a long way from achieving a synthesis between the rigor of current economic analysis and the intuitive and qualitative character of much of the current work on culture and development, or the highly localized quantitative work done in some anthropological field investigations.

The editors of these proceedings struggled with the lure of reorganizing the material and adding to it from material not formally presented at the conference. In the end, however, we made the decision to limit the material to that presented at the conference, which was deemed rich enough to warrant presentation by itself. The material is presented in the same sequence in which it was delivered at the conference because the logic of the original program provided a sensible framework for these explorations. Thus, the material starts from the broad sweep of the practical and conceptual challenges and moves to the methodological approaches to the state of current knowledge and empirical work to concluding reflections by the participants. We hope that readers will agree that this was a rich, and enriching, conference.

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<sup>2</sup> Lionel Trilling, *Beyond Culture* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965, uniform edition 1978), preface.

<sup>3</sup> The Declaration of MONDIACULT emerged from the World Conference on Cultural Policies, which was held in Mexico City in 1982.

## Welcoming Remarks

Edward V. K. Jaycox

Vice President  
Africa Region  
The World Bank

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*Effective development in Africa requires both a close collaboration between Africa and the international community, and a holistic approach. Quantitatively, taking specific steps in a broad-based strategy could yield an economic growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa of 4 to 5 percent per year. However, Africa would still require an additional \$7 billion of net inflow to the present \$12 billion in net transfers from its international partners. Furthermore, the \$18 billion in debt service per year must be reduced to a manageable \$9 billion. The qualitative dimensions of development are equally important. The World Bank adheres to the broad definition of culture given at the UNESCO Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico City in 1982, which launched the United Nations World Decade on Cultural Development: culture is "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions, and belief." It is important to move from the traditional, narrow definition of culture to the broader definition, and it is to bridge these two definitions that we are assembled.*

---

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the World Bank for what promises to be an exciting two days of inquiry and debate.

As the Vice President for Africa at the World Bank I have the privilege of working with a broad and diverse team of international specialists from all disciplines. We work closely with our African clients and the aid donors and international agencies to promote the well-being of the African people generally and the poor and the destitute specifically.

This close collaboration reflects a growing partnership between Africa and the international community to meet the challenge of significantly reducing poverty in Africa in the coming generation. Such an objective, laudable as it is, will not come about easily. It requires a *holistic approach to development* that tackles development problems on a broad front. After many debates during the 1980s there is now a broad consensus, both in Africa and in the international community, on the strategy to follow in the 1990s if Africa is to regain its rightful place in the world economy and if Africa's children are to have the better

#### 4 Welcoming Remarks

future to which they are entitled to aspire. The elements of this broad development strategy include:

1. People are both the means and the ends of the development process—human resource development and capacity building are priorities.
2. There is no alternative to continuous economic reform and adjustment.
3. Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to bring about improvements in human well-being.
4. Aggressive anti-poverty policies must go hand in hand with pro-growth policies.
5. Increased agricultural productivity and food security are essential, as are diversification and competitiveness of exports.
6. An enabling environment political and legal for individual initiative and private enterprise is fundamental.
7. The most efficient use of scarce resources is imperative, including a review and reduction of military expenditures.
8. *Empowerment* of people through good governance and accountability is vital.
9. Adequate population policies must be pursued.
10. A larger role for women is essential.
11. Immediate action on *environmental* issues is critical.
12. Regional economic integration is necessary.
13. Short-term measures must be embedded in a long-term perspective.
14. Adequate external financing and imaginative treatments of outstanding debt are necessary.

Such a development strategy could yield growth rates of 4 to 5 percent per year, or 1 percent per year per person, which with appropriate policies could be translated into 2 percent annual growth per person for the poorest segments of the population.

Such a strategy requires major efforts by both the African nations and their international partners.

During the 1990s Africans must, among other things:

1. Double the annual growth rate of agriculture from 2 percent to 4 percent
2. Double domestic savings from 11 percent to 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
3. Increase investment from 15 percent to 25 percent of GDP
4. Increase returns to investment to 20 percent

5. Double investment in human resources from the present 4 to 5 percent of GDP to 8 to 10 percent of GDP
6. Work towards halving fertility by 2020
7. Take urgent measures to stop environmental degradation.

For its part the international community must commit itself to provide the quantity and quality of external finance that would make such an effort bear the fruits expected of it: sustainable growth with equity and a significant qualitative improvement in the well-being of all African people.

Such financing will require increased efforts by the international community for Africa that go beyond the present projected flows of assistance and debt relief. It is an effort to which the World Bank is committed. To put it bluntly:

1. For the African economies to achieve their growth targets, they will need a *net annual inflow* of \$19 billion. This amount is after they make massive internal adjustment measures to mobilize domestic savings and to use resources efficiently.
2. Given current trends, expectations are that net transfers will be only \$12 billion, leaving an annual shortfall of \$7 billion that must be raised. While the foreign private sector *may* contribute some of these funds, its contributions are likely to come in the outer years. Net official development assistance (ODA) increases are needed now.
3. The \$18 billion current debt service must be reduced. Applying all the existing rules, including applicable Toronto Terms, will produce an annual reduction of about \$3 billion from 1991 to 1995. To keep debt service at a manageable \$9 billion per annum during the 1990s, an additional reduction of \$6 billion per year is required.
4. This increase of \$7 billion in net inflows and reduction of \$6 billion in debt service would produce \$19 billion of net inflow and \$9 billion of debt service, giving the figure of \$28 billion of flows per year. This \$28 billion represents 18 percent of GDP in 1990 but only 13 percent of GDP in 2000—in other words such flows *are* compatible with increasing self-reliance for the African economies.

These are but the *quantitative* parameters of the problem. We at the World Bank, like others in Africa and in the international community, are fully conscious of the *qualitative* dimensions of the development challenge. The all-important issues of institutional development, respect for human rights, the rule of law, governance, the credibility of a social structure that is capable of integrating the new as well as the old—all these are the quintessential, if

## 6 Welcoming Remarks

immeasurable, factors of development. It is to these qualitative dimensions that this conference largely addresses itself.

The issues of *culture* and *development* deserve wider scrutiny. From the outset we adhere to the broad definition of culture given by UNESCO's 1982 Mexico conference:

Culture . . . is . . . the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.<sup>1</sup>

I note that we are now in the fourth year of the *World Decade for Cultural Development*, an important international enterprise led by UNESCO. The many activities undertaken to date under the aegis of the Decade, however, have tended to maintain a split between what I could refer to as the "narrow" and "broad" definitions of culture.

Looking at the manifestations of culture in music, art, painting, dance, folklore, literature, and the cultural heritage is certainly important, and they constitute the core of a society's cultural identity. But we must also address the broader definition of culture: society's institutions, its legal system, its processes of governance, legitimation, and participation—all of that vast web of intricate links and transactions that define a society's character as well as delimit its pattern of economic development.

It is to bridge these two definitions that we are here assembled. I sincerely hope that our deliberations over the coming two days will bring us significantly closer to this objective. I note with delight among the participants distinguished theoreticians and practitioners in all fields: from economics to archaeology, from engineering to music, from history to religion. With such an array of talent, we are well on our way.

I must take a moment also to commend the true partnership that has characterized the preparation of this conference. Allow me to thank the co-sponsors who have made this gathering possible: The Government of Norway, The Government of Sweden, The Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO.

Allow me to thank even more the distinguished participants who have contributed their time and effort to share the fruits of years of thinking and reflection on these complex problems, especially the distinguished sons and daughters of Africa who, in addition, bring their own experience of the challenge of modernization in Africa to these deliberations. Among them I note our

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<sup>1</sup>Declaration of MONDIACULT: World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mexico City: UNESCO, 1982).

keynote speaker for this evening, Africa's poet and outspoken conscience, Nobel laureate Dr. Wole Soyinka.

It is therefore fitting that the opening remarks of the conference should be given by a most distinguished son of Africa, His Excellency Dr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization for African Unity for the OAU is much more than an intergovernmental organization. It is the embodiment of the Pan-African ideals of Africans everywhere, of their fight against colonialism, racism, and apartheid, and it is increasingly their common voice in international fora.

## Opening Remarks

Salim A. Salim

Secretary-General  
Organization of African Unity

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*Development is a global undertaking with multiple dimensions— economic, social and cultural—that influence one another. The cultural dimension is a long-neglected aspect of development; the challenge, therefore, lies in fostering a synergistic development between science and technology, and cultural values. Because a people does not commit itself to a development undertaking unless that undertaking corresponds to its deeply felt needs, people should be able to derive the means and motivation for their development, from their own cultural roots. Since African culture is universally acknowledged and appreciated, and since Africa is committed to its cultural heritage and values, the best course to aim at is a world in which specific cultures can develop yet in which the specific and the universal can merge, and be mutually strengthening and enriching. Africa itself must synthesize these values to ensure humane and equitable development. In this, the World Bank has a primary role in promoting policies that emphasize long-term growth and that put people at the center of development.*

---

Allow me to express my pleasure to be here with you today to participate in this important international conference. I would like to thank our host, Mr. Edward Jaycox, Vice President for Africa at the World Bank, and convey my personal appreciation to the organizer of this encounter, Mr. Ismail Serageldin, Director of the Bank's Africa Technical Department, for the invitation that he kindly extended to me to open this meeting.

It is gratifying to see so many distinguished personalities convening to reflect on the cultural dimension of development: a long-neglected aspect of the development challenge. The Organization of African Unity, the embodiment of so much of Africa's ideas and aspirations, takes pride in seeing so many distinguished Africans joining the international community in addressing this issue.

I am particularly pleased to be present at the conference because it is dedicated to Africa. It is evident that, at a time when the world is going through profound change, Africa cannot afford to remain on the fringes of such fundamental transformation without compounding the state of marginalization in which it already finds itself. Our continent has to effectively prepare its entry into the twenty-first century and occupy the position to which it is rightfully entitled. It does have the resources. It also does have the will! However, Africa needs the cooperation, understanding, and support of the international

## *10 Opening Remarks*

community at large and of the developed countries in particular to overcome its present economic difficulties and foster its development in keeping with its own identity and specificity. This is why the exchange of views in which you will engage today on culture and development, under the auspices of your prestigious institutions, is of relevance to the future of our continent.

In 1968 UNESCO proclaimed that "If man is at the origin of development, if he is the agent and beneficiary thereof, he should, above all, be considered as the justification and finality of development." UNESCO further declared that development must be viewed as a whole, and economic and social development as an all-encompassing undertaking to which education, information, and cultural progress provide essential inputs.

Since then, growing importance has been accorded to the cultural dimension of development. This was largely due to the realization that a people does not fully commit itself to a development undertaking unless that undertaking corresponds to its deeply felt needs. In other words people should be in a position to derive the means and motivation for their development from their own cultural roots. It should be underlined in this regard that even though economic growth is a fundamental determinant of development, it would not be proper to consider it as its ultimate objective. Indeed, to view development simply in terms of the linear increase in national income with the attendant capital accumulation, industrialization, urban expansion, technological progress, and integration within the world market would not fully reflect the real objectives of a human-centered development. Development is, therefore, a global undertaking with multiple dimensions economic, social, and cultural that influence one another. Indeed, each of these developmental factors is, on its own, multidimensional. Education, for instance, which involves the transmission of knowledge and values, is definitely a cultural process. It is equally an economic process in that, when seen from the labor market angle, it is an investment. There is also a direct relationship between culture and education, and democracy, in that it is through culture and education that democratic values are inculcated in society and sustained within it.

An exciting, healthy, although at times admittedly tumultuous, debate on democratization is now going on in our continent. We in Africa are most interested in this debate on democratization, coming as it does at a time when our continent is undergoing profound sociopolitical changes. Our interest is made more profound by the nature and structures of our countries. Africa is made up of states, which are young, fragile, and exist in enormous cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. Since these changes are inevitable and will have to be undertaken within this diversity, our interest is to see that these changes take place in an atmosphere of peace and concord. In my view the best guarantee for the peaceful transition we seek lies in building solid foundations to nurture and

sustain democratic systems in Africa. This is why it is my firm belief that greater attention should be directed at building democratic institutions and promoting a culture of tolerance that can effectively underwrite the democratic systems that we want strengthened and the form that these democratic systems take in Africa. Needless to say, the pace of change will have to be determined by the specific conditions and needs of each country and of each society.

The peaceful management of change in Africa is one of the major challenges facing our continent. This imperative assumes greater urgency especially now when, along with the agitation for greater democracy, our continent is going through an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions that threatens to raise the specter of chaos and confusion. To manage the change, Africa will need enormous resources, which, on its own, could be difficult to marshal. It will, therefore, be necessary for the international community to assist Africa in the management of the transition, particularly by providing added resources. For, indeed, the process of greater democratization in our continent cannot fully take root if it is not, in the final analysis, linked to the uplifting of the conditions of our people. Poverty breeds anarchy and is inimical to the development of democracy.

This assistance is all the more necessary when seen against the fact that the efforts made by African countries towards economic recovery and development have not met with a commensurate response from the developed world. Our continent continues to wallow in acute economic difficulties that are compounded by a particularly hostile international economic environment that is less and less accommodative to the interests of the developing countries, particularly those of Africa. The efforts of most African countries continue to be hamstrung by the huge debt burden, unfavorable terms of trade, and reverse resource flows. These factors have combined to wreak havoc to the economy of the continent. But also, we are most concerned over the diversion of attention and resources from Africa to other regions of the world. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, I have no doubt that these issues will be raised in the course of your deliberations. I am also confident that your gathering will not fail to stress that development must take a global approach and that the marginalization of Africa will not serve the interests of the African peoples. It will also not serve the interests of the international community at large.

Each society has its own distinctive system of values that constitute an important part of its culture. A society or community needs to harness and maximize the resourcefulness of its culture in a dynamic manner to develop harmoniously.

It is important, however, to stress that we live in an interdependent world within which each society or culture must strive to keep pace with scientific and technological progress. The challenge lies in determining the ways and means

## *12 Opening Remarks*

of fostering a synergistic development between science and technology, on the one hand, and cultural values, on the other. Technology does have cultural implications, and, when introducing new technology, due consideration should accordingly be given to the cultural values inherent in a particular society. We are all too familiar with development projects that have failed because they were superimposed on a cultural environment that was not conducive and therefore could not enlist the support of the people concerned.

The debate on the compatibility between cultural values and technological development is also directly linked to the issue of the compatibility between traditional and modern values. Some advocates of the latter contend that cultural values and traditions are obstacles to modernization. Rather, experiences in development, as in the case of Japan, clearly demonstrate that traditional cultural values and modernism are compatible and that a people can, certainly, achieve socioeconomic development in harmony with their beliefs and cultural values. Africa is proud of its rich and varied cultural heritage. Whether it be in the field of painting and sculpture, music and dance, literature or archeology, African culture is universally acknowledged and appreciated. This is, indeed, a reflection of the creative genius of the people of Africa; it is also Africa's contribution to universal culture and civilization. This Africa was able to do notwithstanding the oppression and subjugation to which its culture and traditions were subjected under colonialism.

Africa is as committed to modernity as it is to its cultural heritage and values. It can therefore ill-afford to replace its own cultural values by some so-called world culture to whose elaboration Africa was not given opportunity to contribute. Is it wise or indeed advisable for the world to share one and the same culture? Would a uniform culture not stifle creativity and genius and thus hinder human progress? Rather I choose to believe that it is possible to aim at a world within which common values can be shared while specific cultures develop and in which the specific and the universal can merge and be mutually strengthening and enriching.

The economic reforms undertaken in developing countries, and more specifically in Africa, very often on the advice of the donors, have to be viewed in light of this linkage between culture and development. These structural reforms, which are devised to ensure greater economic profitability and efficiency and a more effective integration of the economies of the developing countries into the world economy as well as a greater opening to trade and commerce, often generate social and cultural upheavals with the attendant destabilizing effect on the political situation in the countries concerned. In view of the volume of economic assistance that it provides and the influence that it wields in the international monetary and financial system, the World Bank has

a primary role to play in promoting policies that emphasize long-term growth and that situate the people at the center of the development process.

I am happy to note that, over the years, the World Bank has progressively pursued the human resources development concept based on the enhancement of human resources with a view to fostering growth and sustaining the campaign against poverty. The campaign against poverty and development assistance are, indeed, among the major challenges facing the international community. The human resources development approach, which is increasingly shared within the international community, seems, in my view, to be the most appropriate means of ensuring that the human resources available in Africa are liberated and used for development purposes.

The fact that the World Bank is organizing an International Conference on Culture and Development with special focus on Africa must be seen within the context of the Bank's commitment to this new approach to development. The Bank's growing interest in human resources development in the world was clearly demonstrated in its active participation at the Jomtien World Conference devoted to education for all. This was a reaffirmation of the primacy of education in development. In addition the Bank associated itself recently with UNESCO and other national and multilateral development institutions and agencies at a meeting organized in Paris, from 16 to 18 September last year, to deliberate on the issue of "The Cultural Dimension of Development." The meeting acknowledged the failure of most development strategies adopted over the last three decades due to the very narrow concept of development that did not take into account the diversity of cultures and societies in the world. The meeting, accordingly, recommended that UNESCO design and promote a new approach to problems of development based on an acknowledgement of the fact that development is rooted in sociocultural realities.

I would like to welcome this new approach and express the hope that this international conference will pave the way towards a wider and more encompassing concept of development in the world. I also wish to pay tribute to the World Bank and to all the other national and multilateral institutions for their respective contributions to development in the world at large and, more specifically, in Africa. I would like to urge them to continue with their efforts so that, together, we can build a better world in which peace and prosperity will be shared.

The subject of this conference does underscore a point that is sometimes forgotten in debates on culture and development. Africa stands at a political, social, economic, and cultural crossroads, caught as it were between the values of the Western liberal democratic tradition and its own traditional democratic and cultural values. The task for Africa, therefore, is to synthesize these values and ensure a more humane, balanced, and equitable process of development.

# **The Challenge of a Holistic Vision: Culture, Empowerment, and the Development Paradigm**

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*Clarity of cultural identity and its evolving continuity are essential to create an integrated and integrating cultural framework, which is a sine qua non for relevant, effective institutions rooted in authenticity and tradition, yet open to modernity and change. Cultural identity is essential for the self-assurance that societies need for endogenous development. Expanding the opportunities for the expression of people in these rapidly modernizing societies remains the only long-range solution to assist their cultural evolution. This space of freedom is linked to the issues of empowerment and governance.*

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My presentation deals with culture, empowerment, and the development paradigm.<sup>1</sup> It is an exploration of avenues toward which I hope that mainstream developmental thinking will be heading in the years to come. It does *not* represent the current thinking of the World Bank nor of other major development agencies. One day some of these ideas *may* be adapted and adopted in the work done by the World Bank.

## **The World Bank and the Development Challenge**

The World Bank is committed to development. It is perhaps useful to understand how the World Bank's view of development is a dynamic and evolving one that

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<sup>1</sup>A version of this paper was presented at "Evaluation of Development Strategies: Prospects for Growth in Africa in the 1990s," A Multidisciplinary Colloquium Series, held at San Francisco State University on April 19 and 20, 1990. This version also reflects elements of a speech entitled "Themes for the Third Millennium," delivered by the author at the First Meeting of the Inter-Agency Steering Committee for the United Nations' World Decade for Cultural Development, held at UN Headquarters in New York, January 23, 1991. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the World Bank or any of its affiliated organizations.

has responded with an ever richer array of concepts, instruments, and programs to the ever more complex reality of the development challenge.<sup>2</sup>

The Bank is an economic institution, but it does not deal with the abstract notion of economy, detached from the welfare of the human beings concerned. From its origins, the Bank recognized the need to deal with the welfare of the people of its member states. This truth is embedded in the statutes of the Bank, which define its purpose to be, among other things, "... assisting [member states] in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories" (Article 1, para. (iii)).

It is true that in the early years of its operation, the World Bank fulfilled this mandate by relying on identifying sound investments with high rates of return, promoting economic growth, and seeking the welfare of the citizens through the health of the economies. But even then, the Bank added new instruments to its arsenal. The key to understanding the Bank's evolution as well as the reality of its current programs is to understand the additive nature by which it works.

Thus, even within the same conceptual framework of the early years, the Bank consistently added new sectors to its field of involvement. But when we started lending for education in the 1960s, we did not stop lending for roads or power. When we added lending for programs targeted for the poor or added population, health, and nutrition to our concerns, we did not stop lending for agriculture and industry. In fact, the only direct form of lending that has been formally stopped by the Bank in all its years of operation has been lending for tourism projects, which were deemed to be better handled by the private sector.

Likewise, the Bank has been evolving its *concepts* for understanding and dealing with development issues. In the early 1970s a major debate within the Bank on the issue of poverty reduction and economic growth resulted in the milestone research on "Redistribution with Growth" and then-President Robert McNamara's call at Nairobi in 1973 for dealing with the problems of the global poor. But the fact that the debate in the 1970s focused on the issue of poverty

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<sup>2</sup>The World Bank's thinking is captured best by its annual thematic *World Development Report*. The last three, dealing with poverty (1990), economic development policy (1991), and environment (1992), are particularly relevant. See *World Development Report 1990: Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); *World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and *World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Individual publications emanating from the Bank by eminent staff members are also very important. See, for example, Michael Cernea, ed., *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

did not mean that the Bank stopped its work in the traditional infrastructure sectors of the past, even as it was adding new types of operations to support poverty reduction. Likewise, the 1980s saw the introduction of structural adjustment lending and sectoral adjustment lending, which for the first time provided quick-disbursing balance of payments support. This, however, was not at the expense of the poverty work of the 1970s. It was for the reason that poverty had become part of the Bank's "mainstream" work that the Bank's public discourse seemed to focus on the new, controversial, and debated aspects of its current work. Allow me to present this fact for your consideration: in 1978, perhaps the peak year of the Bank's discussion of "Basic Needs," and in 1984, perhaps the peak year of discussion of macroeconomic adjustment and trade liberalization, the Bank's share of lending to the "social sectors" remained virtually unchanged.

Thus, our discourse is not divorced from the reality of our work; it simply reflects the cutting edge of the present concerns as we try to cope with the ever more complex reality of the development challenge.

Indeed, the process of debating new concepts, shifting the paradigms of development, and internalizing these new ideas in the Bank's work are an essential part of how our institution functions and remains relevant to a rapidly changing world. I would venture to say that the 1970s saw the internalization of the concept of "poverty reduction" as an essential part of the Bank's mission. From that time on "poverty reduction" and "economic growth" have been the twin objectives that have guided the Bank's work. The 1980s have been the decade in which a sound macroeconomic environment and sound sectoral policies were recognized as essential preconditions for investment lending—a necessary *but not sufficient* condition for sound and sustainable development.

I submit that many of the initiatives underway today in the Bank that are well known to the international community, especially "Environment," "Women in Development (WID),"<sup>3</sup> and the "Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA),"<sup>4</sup> will be internalized in this decade. It is now impossible within the World Bank to deal with investment without considering environment. Likewise, in the future

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<sup>3</sup>See *Women in Development: A Progress Report on the World Bank Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990), and "Gender-Responsive Development," WID Unit Fact Sheet, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1992).

<sup>4</sup>See Ismail Serageldin and Michel Noel, "Tackling the Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa," *Finance & Development* (September 1990): 18-20; Tony Addison and others, *Making Adjustment Work for the Poor: A Framework for Policy Reform in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and *The Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa: A Policy Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: African Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, and World Bank, 1990).

it will be impossible to address development generally and poverty specifically without being sensitive to gender issues, and no one will be designing macroeconomic policies without thinking of their social dimensions.

Today, some of us at the World Bank are talking about *culture, empowerment, and the development paradigm*.<sup>5</sup> Some of us are grappling with these issues of cultural identity and empowerment of the people in relation to development, conscious of the fact that we are at the threshold of a complex and different vision of development, but one that promises an infinitely richer, and hopefully more effective, understanding of the realities of the development challenge.

We, like all of you, do not yet have satisfying answers to many of the problems that we recognize in seeking to operationalize this new vision. Indeed, much work lies ahead of us to *conceptualize, operationalize, and internalize* these ideas. In the long view of the evolution of the Bank's work, which I have described, these could well be termed *Themes for the Third Millennium*. The third millennium is at our doorstep, and we must move now to grapple more effectively with the seemingly stubborn obstacles to effective development in many parts of the world, especially in Africa.

### **The Cultural Dimension of Development**

The cultural dimension of development is the place to start this discussion. In dealing with development we must adopt a broad interpretation of the concept of culture. The UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Mexico City in 1982, adopted a declaration that stated:

Culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.

At the outset, I am happy to endorse this broad definition of culture and its direct link to development. Indeed from our own work in Sub-Saharan Africa, we have recognized that many of the long-term issues of development in Africa seem to be tied into the deep weaknesses of the institutional structures concerned with development.<sup>6</sup> Some would argue cogently that these weaknesses reflect the

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<sup>5</sup>See Ismail Serageldin, "Culture, Empowerment and the Development Paradigm," *Development: Journal of the Society for International Development* (1991): 88-90.

<sup>6</sup>See World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth; A Long-Term Perspective Study* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989). Also note *World Development Report 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), which addressed

absence of the cultural dimension. We in the Bank have started to focus on these issues in terms of capacity building,<sup>7</sup> human resource development, streamlining of administration, and economic liberalization. Yet, it seems to me that we should go further, and that the whole paradigm<sup>8</sup> of development needs to be refocused on two intertwined sectors of change: *promotion of cultural identity* and *empowerment of the people*. The first is unlikely to happen without the second, nor can empowerment be developed in isolation from the cultural realities of a society.

### Promoting Cultural Identity

Every region has cultural manifestations that strike deep responsive chords in the people. This occurs partly because they draw upon an authentic heritage that helps define the shared image of self and society that creates a collectivity. The clarity of that cultural identity and its evolving continuity are essential to create an *integrated* and *integrating* cultural framework. A cultural identity is *integrated* insofar as it provides a coherent framework within which norms of behavior are articulated and *integrating* insofar as it allows for the incorporation of new elements. Such a cultural framework is, I believe, a *sine qua non* to have relevant, effective institutions rooted in authenticity and tradition yet open to modernity and change. Without such institutions no real development can take place. Indeed, the lessons of failure in Africa frequently can be traced to the absence of such institutions.

More importantly, the absence of a viable cultural framework in this sense tends to translate into an absence of national self-confidence and social fragmentation with Westernized elites and alienated majorities.

All these points converge in the need to put "cultural identity" at the center of the development paradigm that should guide our actions. Let us talk about these alienated majorities, a great percentage of whom, especially in Africa, are *poor*.

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institutional development issues.

<sup>7</sup>See World Bank, *The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis and Development Management* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990).

<sup>8</sup>Among recent works dealing with paradigms see Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics* (New York: The Free Press, MacMillan, 1988).

## Poverty and Culture

Poverty has been defined in two ways.<sup>9</sup> *Absolute poverty* is the inability to secure the minimum basic needs for human survival according to standards so low that they challenge the adequate comprehension of most members of industrial societies. As many as one billion people in the world still live in absolute poverty.

The second notion of poverty is *relative poverty*. Variouslly identified as the lower 30 or 40 percent of the income distribution, the relatively poor may have barely secured the minimum basic needs but have such limited resources that they lack the means of adequate social participation. They are marginalized from mainstream society even though they may constitute a majority of the population.

Programs to fight poverty rightly have focused on eliminating absolute poverty and reducing the income disparities affecting relative poverty. All of these programs have been designed in monetary or physical terms. Allow me now to try to address the *cultural dimension of poverty*.

Culture is often considered an article produced by the elite for the elite. Yet culture as we are addressing it here is much broader. It is the collective output that defines a society's identity, its ethos, and its values. In this context culture is something continuous, something that relates past to present to future. It is also all-encompassing. All members of society interact with culture and participate in creating it. Adequate social interaction is a fundamental means of this participation.

Rarely able to participate in mainstream cultural activity, the relatively poor are forced into several, equally problematic situations:

1. Creating a distinct subculture, thus institutionalizing the folk-elite cultural dichotomy. This evolution is inevitable for the absolute poor for whom affiliation with the mainstream is clearly out of reach.

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<sup>9</sup>This section is taken from Ismail Serageldin, *Poverty, Adjustment and Growth in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989), 223-25.

There are many different ways to approach the measurement of poverty. See among them Paul Glewwe, *The Distribution of Welfare in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire in 1985*, Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Working Paper No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987); and Christian Grootaert and Ravi Kanbur, *Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Social Dimensions of Structural Adjustment: A Methodology and Proposed Application to Côte d'Ivoire, 1985-88*, Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SDA) Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990).

2. Remaining at the periphery of the mainstream culture, trying to associate with its myths, symbols, and codes while denying their own individual contributions to the national cultural milieu.
3. Experiencing the drift, anomie, and the self-deprecation associated with ultimate adoption of negative images of self and society, and the consequent problems. This is especially the case for the young, whose frame of reference and values are not well anchored in a coherent set of traditional beliefs and whose conditions and resources marginalize and prevent them from effective social participation.

These aspects are exacerbated by the general tendency toward semantic disorder among rapidly modernizing societies of the developing countries, which is caused by another set of considerations:

1. The accelerated pace of change implicit in the developmental process that shakes up the age-old, slowly evolving structure of traditional cultures in traditional societies. This accelerated change brings discontinuities and does not allow for the evolution of existing perceptions to cope with and internalize change.
2. The vast currents sweeping traditional societies, such as demographic growth, urbanization, partial education, and marginalization of traditional economic activities (farming and artisanal production).
3. The break-up of traditional units of community, such as village and extended family, with consequent loss of definition in "ligatures" and "options" (to use Dahrendorf's phrases from *Life Chances*).<sup>10</sup>
4. The overwhelming impact of Western culture, whose presence is frequently transferred only in its rudimentary, consumption-oriented behavior and technology.
5. The large impact of mass communications, especially through radio and television, with their twin effects of global exposure and rapid propagation.
6. The homogenizing efforts at building a national identity by using the mass media, political organizations, and the

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<sup>10</sup>Ralph Dahrendorf, *Life Chances* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

- school system, which narrow geographic and tribal lines of affiliation.
7. The inadequate adaptation of the education and training system to the opportunities of employment and the needs of self-employment in most developing countries.
  8. The rapid loss of authentic traditional cultural legacies, which are primarily orally transmitted, due to mobility and perceived lack of (short-term) relevance by the young.

The impact of all these forces on society is difficult to assess. In Africa the present ruling generation is the "hinge" generation—those who witnessed the transition from colonialism to independence. The next generation is the product not of the successful struggle for independence but of the incomplete struggle for "modernization" and "development." The success of this next generation of Africans in forging a sense of cultural continuity and authentic identity is essential if long-term developmental scenarios are to become reality. Yet this new identification of self and society cannot be achieved without integrating both the old and the new. Only thus can an "integrated" and "integrating" cultural framework be created.

Efforts at poverty alleviation, therefore, should include the broadened cultural dimension. This is not just for the benefit of the poor, but because without such efforts, the entire society and polity will be impoverished. Worse, without them the door would be open to less constructive tendencies of an ideologically charged populism with its degraded version of the popular and its appeal to inherently negative values.

Whether they are swelling the cities or being left behind in rural areas, cannot be excluded from the formulation of this new cultural framework if their creative talents and productive potential are to be brought to bear for the advancement of society as a whole. That very effort to reach out and include them in the momentous communal and national enterprise of development will reduce the deprivation and exclusion that are part of the definition of relative poverty.

### **The Role of International Agencies**

International efforts to assist in confronting this cultural dimension of development, such as this the UN's World Decade for Cultural Development, should be encouraged and supported. It is vital to highlight the importance of culture and the promotion of cultural identity, to recognize cultural identity as a *sine qua non* for the self-assurance that societies need to change and develop. This is the self-assurance required to create a cultural framework that is both integrated and

integrating, the framework that is essential to allow modernization to be something more than a veneer of Westernization.

But we must also recognize that adopting such a stance poses a wide array of problems that are extremely complex both for national governments that are trying to design and enforce such policies as well as for international institutions and bilateral aid agencies trying to help. Indeed, there is a down side to the positive aspects of affirming cultural identity and establishing a paradigm of development that is sensitive to the cultural specificities of each society. They can often lead to stereotyping and the perpetuation of negative and false images about peoples and groups. There is ample evidence of such misuse in the past. The 1954 Bantu Education Act in South Africa, whose text claims to be seeking to create a culturally sensitive and relevant educational system, was in fact an instrument for the perpetuation of apartheid—the separateness and subjugation of the black peoples of South Africa—even though it reads much as a liberal call for cultural sensitivity in educational programs might read.

Likewise, well-intentioned efforts of national governments to promote a sense of national unity and a modern state using a national education system with a language of instruction different from that of the local roots leads not only to a system that is demonstrably biased against the poor but also to the destruction of a significant part of the heritage of the original language, especially if it is part of an oral tradition. With the death of elders, large parts of that oral tradition are lost. Every death is like the loss of a precious library. It is the closing of a window on the past. It is a severance of part of one's ancestry and roots.

Undoubtedly, then, the issues of culture are complex and should be approached only with the greatest of care. But approached they must be, for it is in their culture that human beings become whole. It is here that societies find and define themselves. It is here that development is forged in the crucible of the minds of the people aware of their own selves and of their societies—cognizant of their past and their present and imagining their future. This is what development is all about.

Hence, expanding the opportunities for the expression of the intelligentsia of these rapidly modernizing societies remains the only long-range solution to assist the process of cultural evolution in the societies. A *space of freedom* for the intelligentsia—artists, academicians, journalists, politicians, technicians, religious leaders, and all those who would express themselves—is essential if constructive solutions are to be found. This *space of freedom* brings us to the issues of *empowerment and governance*.

### **Empowerment of the People**

Ultimately, the essence of development will find its manifestation, its reality, its meaning, in the extent to which the changing patterns and indicators that we monitor (for example, per capita income, life expectancy, infant mortality, school enrollments, and balance of payments) are translated into a real change in the ability of people to live fuller lives and to have power over their own destinies. This empowerment includes the power to express themselves to the full richness of their evolving cultural identities . . . . evolving by their own manifest *abilities* in response to their own wishes and aspirations.

The empowerment idea manifests itself at all levels of societal interaction. It is found in giving voice to the disenfranchised, in allowing the weak and the marginalized to have access to the tools and the materials they need to forge their own destinies. In allowing each and every household the possibility of becoming the producers of their own welfare, rather than consumers of others' charity. In allowing each household the unconstrained pursuit of the fulfillment of its members subject to the limits of the law and the unremitting discipline of the market.

This may sound like rhetoric. It is not. It is a fundamental and governing concept in how one approaches project design, institution building, cost recovery, and policy conditionality. *Projects* should be designed with the users or beneficiaries in mind. Their involvement should be a key in the design and their empowerment a key in the implementation. *Institution building* is more than designing organization charts, defining terms of reference, and drafting legislation. It is primarily a matter of ensuring that the institution is responsive to the real felt needs of the people whom it is intended to serve and is subject to their control. *Cost recovery* is more than a way of balancing the books; it is a means of giving *rights* to the purchasers of the service. *Policy conditionality* should seek to promote access to assets for the asset-less and to increase the return on the assets held by the poor and the politically weak.

Some may think that I am talking about Western-style democracy or multi-party parliamentarianism I am not. I am talking about *governance*, good governance, the form of which should be left to each society to develop in accordance with its cultural realities.

Let us talk about *governance*.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>The following section draws heavily from Ismail Serageldin, "Governance, Democracy and the World Bank in Africa" (Unpublished address delivered at the World Bank Legal Department Staff Meeting on Governance, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1990).

## A Debate on Form and Substance

First, it is important to recognize that while there are large overlaps between "governance" and "democracy," they are not the same.

"Democracy" connotes a representative form of government with participatory decisionmaking and accountability and the guarantees of human and civil rights without whose exercise the *political* system of democracy could not function. It does not connote "good government" or efficiency or lack of corruption, except to the extent that having the possibility to "vote the rascals out" acts as a rectifier of ineptitude or malice in government behavior. Democracy emphasizes universal suffrage and periodic elections as key features. It can be argued that it deals primarily with the "form" and not the "substance" of governing although advocates of democracy quickly point out that we know of no other "form" that has successfully delivered the substance and that this is one area in which "function follows form."

"Governance," on the other hand, does not presuppose a particular form of government but rather connotes "good government," in the sense of greater efficiency and rationality in resource allocation, an enabling environment, and lack of corruption. It emphasizes as its key features transparency, accountability, institutional pluralism, participation, the rule of law, and, implicitly, the guarantees of the civil and human rights needed for effective participation. Many of us consider these to be the "substance" as opposed to the "form" implied in discussions of "democracy."

Both of these general "journalistic" descriptions fall short due to lack of clarity on such key areas as the nature of the relationship between state and society and its constellation of interlinked concepts and issues of agency, instrumentality, legitimacy, power, and authority.

This address is not the place for a treatise on political science. Rather, let us agree that we can advocate *empowerment* of the poor and the marginalized

1. On the *global scale*, by giving weight to the needs of the developing countries versus the OECD countries
2. On the *national scale*, by giving voice to the poor and the disenfranchised.

Let us agree that such calls for *empowerment* and good *governance* do not necessarily prescribe a particular *form* of government and that such calls in and of themselves do not constitute political interference in the domestic affairs of our member states (which the World Bank's statutes forbid).

### **World Bank Action on Governance**

The four levels of problems with which the Bank must grapple in tackling the issues of governance are (1) *philosophical*, (2) *conceptual*, (3) *operational*, and (4) *statutory*. I have discussed these issues at some length elsewhere<sup>12</sup> and will not repeat these discussions save to emphasize that external interventions in support of good governance must be of the nurturing type, recognizing that good governance must be an endogenous phenomenon.<sup>13</sup> A tree cannot be made to grow by pulling on its branches!

What then can the World Bank do?

The World Bank can:

1. Engage in a major international dialogue on the issues of governance, as we are now doing
2. Launch a serious thinking effort focused on the philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of the issues related to governance and relying on specific country case studies
3. Systematically promote, in the context of its many operations, six areas of concern: *transparency, accountability, institutional pluralism, participation, the rule of law, and pilot and experimental approaches*.

Indeed, we can state that, without fanfare, many of the things already being done by the Bank in its current lending operations promote good governance in terms of transparency, accountability, institutional pluralism, participation, and the rule of law. True, these worthwhile objectives are pursued under different labels, but a significant start has already begun in each of these five categories. Likewise a beginning is being made on some pilot and experimental approaches. All of these approaches can promote empowerment of people, which I consider the key to promoting both culture and development. These six types of operational interventions deserve elaboration.

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<sup>12</sup>Serageldin, "Governance, Democracy and the World Bank in Africa."

<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of these ideas see Pierre Landell-Mills and Ismail Serageldin, "Governance and the External Factor," *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992), 303-52. For an abbreviated version of the argument see Landell-Mills and Serageldin, "Governance and the Development Process," *Finance & Development* (September 1991): 14-17.

### *Transparency*

Transparency is absolutely essential for any form of accountability and for understanding the factors that underlie any public decision. The information should be available to the public in a sufficiently transparent fashion so that both the costs and benefits of particular decisions and to whom such benefits accrue would be known.

Through its structural adjustment lending the Bank has promoted transparency by insisting on a consolidation of national budgets, by combining expenditures of parastatals with central government expenditures, and by spelling out the nature of subsidies. More needs to be done to bring in military expenditures and to consolidate central and local government expenditures, the latter being particularly important in certain areas such as health and education. When the true picture is seen, the issues will be cast in a new light. Here I again call your attention to the work done in the World Bank's *World Development Reports 1990 and 1991* on poverty and development policy respectively, and to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s *Human Development Report 1991* on restructuring public expenditures.<sup>14</sup>

### *Accountability*

For transparency to be truly useful, it must be linked with accountability. Accountability requires the appropriate political processes to enable the sanctions for failure to take place. We often think of this in terms of governments voted out of office for failures in macromanagement of the economy, and this is undoubtedly true and needed. But accountability is also *a frame of mind that should permeate all facets of socioeconomic life*. In parastatal reform programs the Bank's work is promoting performance contracts. Performance has to be measured against some agreed targets subject to some contextual assumptions. This is, of course, being done to some degree also at the macro economic level in the areas of debt service and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, but these are peripheral aspects monitored by the outside world. The key to real progress is *internal accountability within the country*: accountability that is both *systemic* and *systematic*. Much of what the Bank now does moves, albeit in small steps, in this direction.

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<sup>14</sup>The United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

### *Institutional Pluralism*

Nurturing good governance is inconceivable without nurturing institutional pluralism. By this we mean the nurturing of independent unions, chambers of commerce, professional associations, academic institutions, research centers, trade associations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all of which have their own views to express as well as access to instruments for mobilizing support for their views.<sup>15</sup>

The question of adopting a multiparty structure within the political domain will be seen by many as the ultimate manifestation of institutional pluralism. This transition has to be made with care. The United States has only two real political parties but countless institutions. Ultimately, in any society, it is the multiplicity of such institutions that is the saving grace against the evolution of the unitary structure that is essential for totalitarianism.

It is difficult within this realm not to address the issue of freedom of the press and the media. They are perhaps *the* institutions in which pluralism is most important. Perhaps the presence of numerous legitimated institutions and fora would involve endowing them with appropriate means of expressing their views. This in turn is likely to be a direct challenge to the existing state monopolies of the media and would place at the forefront of the agenda the issues of freedom of expression that inevitably accompany the birth and expansion of institutional pluralism.

The present weakness of many central governments and the poor record of state intervention as a tool for economic progress are, in reality, assets when it comes to promoting institutional pluralism. This pluralism is a means of sharing the burden of development and of ensuring necessary services that government structures and government budgets are increasingly unable to provide. The times offer an opportunity for forging a new pluralistic socioeconomic landscape filled with institutional structures that reflect the cultural specificities of each society as well as ideas that have been shown to be of universal relevance and appeal.

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<sup>15</sup>Robert Putnam's paper for this conference, "Democracy, Development, and the Civic Community: Evidence from an Italian Experiment," describes the critical importance of voluntary horizontal affiliations or organizations in a society. His data for Italy prove that the number and health of voluntary organizations in a country are prognosticators of the economic growth of that country.

### ***Participation***

Since 1985 much of the Bank's thinking has gradually reflected a changing perception of beneficiaries from passive recipients to active agents who must identify with, or feel ownership of, the projects and carry them forward long after the final disbursements. Subsequent work in different parts of the Bank has moved towards a greater recognition of the importance of the beneficiaries and their surrounding community as potential active agents of change who need to be understood, organized, and provided opportunities if lasting development is to occur. This move has been particularly pronounced in certain subsectors, such as population and rural water supply, in which the appreciation of peoples' own values and behavior and the involvement of their energies and resources has been particularly critical to project success. The legitimation of "beneficiary assessment," a largely qualitative method of "listening to the people," was another manifestation of this attention to people as actors, rather than passive recipients, in development.<sup>16</sup> In short "participation" is no longer a fringe concern but is practiced widely.

As we progress in the 1990s, the movement is toward a more holistic development vision in which the people in borrowing countries, at the various levels of the beneficiaries, the service providers, and the policymakers, all have to be understood on their own terms, within their own cultural parameters, and, in the case of the poor, given increased power to act on their own behalf. It is towards the reinforcement of indigenous institutions that will provide for the increasing empowerment of the poor within their own cultural reality that the next stage of the Bank's work on participation must move. A pilot program in collaboration with UNESCO is underway.

### ***The Rule of Law***

The rule of law is essential for order and predictability and requires an independent effective judiciary. Neither transparency nor accountability can be enforced without an independent judiciary to enforce the rule of law. The Bank is on strong grounds to insist *vis-à-vis* its member states that the systematic enhancement of an independent and effective judiciary is just as important as having clear sets of laws and statutory regulations and an open, trusted, and accessible litigation procedure. These are all essential parts of economic as

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<sup>16</sup>See Lawrence Salmen, *Listen to the People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Salmen, "Beneficiary Assessment: An Approach Described," Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Poverty and Social Policy Division, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, February 1992).

distinct from political management even though they are also essential for the protection of human and civil rights. Indeed, it is inconceivable that sound investments would come forward or that economic activity would flourish without such prerequisites. Without them economic transactions are likely to be severely curtailed or forced into an underground economy. It is equally clear that the rule of law is essential to provide that *space of freedom* so essential for the flowering of cultural expression and for the empowerment of peoples everywhere to develop their own societies in their own image.

### ***Pilot Experiments and Action Research***

The sixth area of the Bank's endeavor involves a proactive approach to undertake field research on these complex issues. It involves the launching of pilot experiments with the collaboration of national specialists, international NGOs, and sister organizations in the UN system as well as bilateral aid agencies. Among these one can name the collaborative venture with UNESCO in exploring the effectiveness and reality of spontaneous organizations in Benin, Cameroon, Guinea, and Togo. Another is the exploration, in collaboration with the Japanese aid agencies, of the applicability of "quality circles" in Burkina Faso. A third venture is collaboration with Makerere University in Uganda in researching and understanding informal institutions.

These efforts need to be pursued and others started elsewhere on the continent. I invite all those present to participate with us in exploring these issues, both in designing new experiments and in collaborating with the respective governments and national researchers in implementing them. Pooling the results of all this action research should immeasurably enhance our knowledge of some of these complex issues and assist us and those national governments concerned in dealing more effectively with the complex issues of culture and empowerment.

### **Conclusions**

What we have been talking about is a new vision of development. It is not the official view of the World Bank and not even (yet) a prevalent view in the World Bank. But it does represent part of the evolving World Bank thinking—a small, but an important part of that evolving thinking that goes beyond the economic and financial aspects of development, that goes beyond investments and outputs, and looks to a holistic view of development in human and societal terms.

Harking back to the declaration adopted at the UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mexico City in 1982, we note the following statement:

Growth has frequently been conceived in quantitative terms, without taking into account its necessary qualitative dimensions, namely the satisfaction of man's spiritual and cultural aspirations. . . . Balanced development can only be ensured by making cultural factors an integral part of the strategies designed to achieve it; consequently, these strategies should always be devised in the light of the historical, social and cultural context of each society.<sup>17</sup>

This is the holistic view of development that is being pursued by myself and some colleagues at the World Bank.

It is this vision, this holistic view, that we should be pursuing here today.

Will this view be radically different than the prevalent view? Will it add something? Will it bring "truth" replacing what today is "error"? Truth and vision are relative things. One vision of humanity is that we are nothing more than three buckets of water and a handful of minerals held together by some chemical reactions. While that scientific reductionist view of human beings is undoubtedly true at one level, it certainly misses the differences between a Mozart and a Hitler, an Einstein and a Mother Teresa or a Pol Pot. In fact it misses all the marvels that make human beings what they are. Reducing development to the measurable, quantifiable aspects of economics and finance is the equivalent of reducing society to three buckets of water and a handful of minerals. We need to go beyond that; we need to capture the uniqueness of every society. That unique wonder that humans as individuals and as groups forge together, and which we call society.

We in the World Bank want to participate in developing this holistic view of development, to put together this new paradigm. Not by slogans, not by easy rhetoric, but by the patient application of careful analytical approaches to build, block by block, a new structure on the foundations of the present one. To enhance current thinking until it is not just quantitatively more accurate but qualitatively better. This is a challenge. I and others with me in the World Bank are eager to work with you on this worthy challenge.

Let us rise to the challenge. Let us dare to be bold. Nothing is impossible, for we have seen that an intellectual, a man of culture, can go from being a dissident playwright in jail one day to becoming president of his country the next day. The world around us is indeed changing and we must dare to change along with it and to set down today the first markers on the road to the third millennium. We must move in this direction *now* if, as agencies nurturing

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<sup>17</sup>Declaration of MONDIACULT, UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, Mexico, 1982.

### ***32 The Challenge of a Holistic Vision***

**development, we are going to continue to contribute to empowering each nation and each community so that each can constructively assert its cultural identity and endogenously promote its own development an endogenous development in which each human being is given the opportunity and the means to achieve the full measure of his or her potential.**

## Democracy, Development, and the Civic Community: Evidence from an Italian Experiment

Robert D. Putnam

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*Today's philosophical ascendancy of liberal democracy is accompanied by growing concerns about its practical operations. What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions? For the past twenty-two years we have applied an empirical approach to a unique experiment in institutional reform in Italy. In 1970 the historically centralized Italian government was partially replaced with twenty regional governments. Identical on paper, these new regional governments were implanted in dramatically different social, economic, political, religious, and cultural contexts—a scenario tailor-made for a comparative study of the dynamics and ecology of institutional development. We found that what differentiates the more effective and responsive governments from the less effective were civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and voluntary associations. Historically, the South has been ruled hierarchically and autocratically for nearly a millenium, whereas the collaborative culture of the North was rooted in its voluntary organization after the Dark Ages into communes for economic cooperation and common defense. The new regional governments implanted in the North, with many pre-existing voluntary associations such as choral groups and soccer clubs, flourished while in the vertically organized horizontally fragmented South, they stagnated. Thus, civic traditions are a more powerful predictor of present levels of socioeconomic development than are past levels of economic development. Economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics. Although we are accustomed to thinking of the state and the market as alternative mechanisms for solving social problems, this study suggests that both states and markets operate more efficiently in civic settings that include social trust and cooperation.*

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Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail? This question, though ancient, is timely. As our tumultuous century draws to a close, the great ideological debates between liberal democrats and their adversaries are waning. Ironically, however, the philosophical ascendancy of liberal democracy is accompanied by growing concern about its practical operations. Women and men everywhere seek solutions to their shared problems—cleaner air, more secure jobs, safer cities. Few believe that we can dispense with government, yet

fewer still are confident that we know what makes governments work well. This essay (and the book from which it is drawn) aims to contribute to our understanding of the performance of democratic institutions.<sup>1</sup> Our method is empirical, drawing lessons from a unique experiment in institutional reform conducted in the regions of Italy over the last two decades. Our intent is broader and more ambitious, however, for we believe that the Italian experiment has powerful implications for those who are seeking to foster political and economic development in countries around the world, from Sub-Saharan Africa to Eastern Europe.

### **Introduction: The Italian Regional Experiment**

The statesmen who unified Italy in 1870 created a highly centralized nation-state, fearing, in the midst of social and regional fragmentation, that governmental decentralization was incompatible with prosperity and political progress. Over the next hundred years, however, centralized administration proved sclerotic, inefficient, and unresponsive, and in 1970 the Italian parliament approved a portentous reform, creating a nationwide set of twenty regional governments. This reform was, and remains, as Sidney Tarrow has observed, "one of the few recent attempts to create new representative institutions in the nation-states of the West."<sup>2</sup>

Each of the new governments was endowed with similar constitutional structures and mandates. After a struggle against diehard centralists, the regions obtained significant powers and substantial financing. By the late 1980s spending by regional governments accounted for nearly ten percent of Italy's gross domestic product. All had gained responsibility for such fields as urban affairs, agriculture, housing, hospitals and health services, public works, vocational education, and economic development. Despite continuing complaints from regionalists about constraints imposed by the central authorities and from critics of the regions about their administrative shortcomings, all the new institutions had acquired enough authority to test their mettle. On paper these twenty institutions are virtually identical and potentially powerful.

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<sup>1</sup>This essay and all included figures are extracted by permission from Robert D. Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), which provides a fuller account of our theory, methods, and evidence, as well as abundant citations to the relevant literature.

<sup>2</sup>Sidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," *Comparative Politics* 7 (October 1974): 36.

On the other hand the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts in which the new institutions were implanted differed dramatically. Socially and economically, some regions (particularly in the South) ranked with developing countries whereas others (concentrated in the Center-North) were already becoming postindustrial. Cutting across this developmental dimension were differences of political tradition. Neighboring Veneto and Emilia-Romagna, for example, had similar economic profiles in 1970, but Veneto was ardently Catholic whereas Emilia-Romagna had been controlled by Communists since 1945. Some regions had inherited patron-client politics more or less intact from the feudal past. Others had been transformed by massive waves of migration and social change that swept across Italy during *il boom* of the 1950s and 1960s.


The Italian regional experiment was tailor-made for a comparative study of the dynamics and ecology of institutional development. Just as a botanist might study plant development by measuring the growth of genetically identical seeds sown in different plots, so a student of government performance might examine the fate of these new organizations, formally identical, in their diverse social and economic and cultural and political settings. Would the new governments actually develop identically in soils as different as these? The answers to these questions are of importance well beyond the borders of Italy as scholars, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in countries around the world—preindustrial, industrial, and postindustrial—seek to discover how representative institutions can work effectively.

The central question posed in our research is this: *What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?* For the past twenty-two years we have closely followed the evolution of a number of these nascent regional institutions representing the range of economic, social, cultural, and political environments along the Italian peninsula.

The bases for our study were laid by our 1970 survey of twenty to twenty-five newly elected councilors in each of five diverse regions, ranging from wealthy Lombardy in the North to impoverished Basilicata and Puglia in the South, and from Emilia-Romagna, the buckle of central Italy's "Red Belt," to Lazio, dominated by its hydrocephalic capital of Rome. In 1976 we reinterviewed these people as well as an additional sample of councilors elected for the first time in 1975. (At the same time we added Veneto, heartland of traditional Catholicism, to the study so that our core sample of six regions represented the full range of the political, economic, social, and cultural diversity of the Italian peninsula.) In 1981-82 and again in 1989 we conducted additional waves of interviews with several hundred of our original respondents and their successors. In addition to this panel survey of regional politicians, four times over these two decades we interviewed nationwide samples of community leaders, journalists, businessmen, bankers, trade unionists, farm leaders, mayors,

and regional administrators and we carried out half a dozen national surveys with ordinary voters. In several rounds of field research we gathered and analyzed extensive documentary and statistical evidence on the regions' organization, budgeting, legislation, and administrative operations as well as case studies of territorial and socioeconomic planning in each region. Finally and most important for this essay we collected intensive and extensive quantitative evidence on the day-to-day institutional performance of all twenty regions, adding breadth and comparative perspective to the depth of our knowledge of the six core regions in our study. *Unless otherwise indicated, this essay draws on evidence from all twenty regions.* (Figure 1 presents an overview of our research sites.)

**Figure 1. Italian Regional Study, 1970 to 1989**



Our methods are borrowed in part from the anthropologist, the skilled journalist, and the cultural historian. Social science reminds us, however, of the difference between insight and evidence. Our contrasting impressions of governance in various regions must be confirmed, and our theoretical speculations disciplined, by careful counting. Quantitative techniques warn when our impressions, rooted in a single striking case or two, are misleading or unrepresentative. Equally important, by enabling us to compare many different cases at once, statistical analysis often reveals subtler but important patterns, much as a pointillist painting can best be appreciated by stepping back from the canvas. Our results satisfy the conventional tests of statistical significance, but more important, they also satisfy John Tukey's famed "interocular traumatic test." (Findings pass this test when they hit the researcher between the eyes.)

### Measuring Institutional Performance

We aspire to a multifaceted evaluation of each of the twenty Italian regional governments as a prelude to our investigation of the causes of institutional success and failure. The institution we want to evaluate is a representative government. Therefore, we need to evaluate both its responsiveness to its constituents and its efficiency in conducting the public's business. Any serious measurement of government performance must meet four severe tests:

1. It must be *comprehensive*. Governments do many things pass laws, spend money, deliver services, and manage their internal operations. Occasionally, governments move beyond such routines to aim at innovative reforms. Our assessment must encompass all these activities, both conventional and novel. Moreover, governments have responsibilities in many different policy areas including health, agriculture, public works, education, social services, and economic development. If it is to be comprehensive, our appraisal must assay all these fields.
2. It must be *internally consistent*. Different governments might simply be good at different things some the leaders in health care, others in road-building, some creative legislatively, others more effective managers. We must thus look closely at the concordance among our various operational measures of institutional performance. *If and only if* our varied indicators turn out empirically to rank the regions in roughly the same way will we be justified in speaking summarily of institutional success and failure.

3. It must be *reliable*. To be worth explaining in general terms, institutional performance must be reasonably durable, not volatile. If the same regions are well governed year after year, that suggests that performance turns on something more than a momentary constellation of political forces or the skill (or luck) of a particular incumbent.
4. It must *correspond to the objectives and evaluations of the institution's protagonists and constituents*. These are, after all, *democratic* governments, responsible to the citizens of the various regions. We must beware of imposing alien standards that are uncongenial to those constituents. We need carefully to compare our "objective" measures of performance with the views of voters and community leaders in each of the regions.

For each regional government, we seek to evaluate

- Policy processes
- Policy pronouncements
- Policy implementation.

Our composite measure of institutional performance is thus based on twelve diverse indicators.

1. *Cabinet stability*. Each regional government is led by a cabinet that must retain majority support in the legislature. Our metric here is the number of different cabinets installed in each region during the 1975-1980 and 1980-1985 legislative periods.
2. *Budget promptness*. Beginning in 1972, all regions were supposed to complete action on their annual budgets by January 1, the start of the fiscal year, but few met this target. However, the average delay varied considerably from region to region. Our metric here was simply this: On average, during the period 1979-1985, when was the budget actually approved by the regional council?
3. *Statistical and information services*. Other things being equal, a government with better information about its constituents and their problems can respond more effectively. Thus all twenty regions were rated according to the breadth of their statistical and information facilities.
4. *Reform legislation*. In three diverse policy areas economic development, territorial and environmental planning, and social services we examined the entire legislative output of—each

region during the period 1978 to 1984.<sup>3</sup> The topics of this extensive body of law ranged from urban zoning and kidney dialysis to inservice training for social workers and regional centers for industrial research and marketing. In each case we evaluated

- The **comprehensiveness** of the legislation, that is, the degree to which it addressed a broad or narrow range of social needs
- The **coherence** of the legislation, that is, the degree to which the various legislative initiatives were coordinated and internally consistent
- The **creativity** of the legislation, that is, the degree to which it identified new needs, experimented with new services, or created incentives for new forms of private initiative.

5. *Legislative innovation.* In Italy many legislative ideas tend to diffuse across subnational governments as an attractive innovation introduced by a relatively advanced council is picked up and passed in less advanced regions. We examined twelve diverse topics on which similar laws appeared in many of the regions including air and water pollution, promotion of fisheries, consumer protection, preventive medical clinics, strip mining regulation, hotel classification, and wildlife protection. Seeking to distinguish leaders from laggards, our metric is: On average, across these twelve domains, how soon after the first appearance of a model law was it picked up by a given region?
6. *Day-care centers.* One of the earliest and most successful policy initiatives undertaken by the new regional governments was the provision of publicly supported day-care centers. In 1977 the central government made substantial special funding for this purpose available to each region so that the "opportunity cost" to the region itself for the program was negligible. Our metric here is the number of regionally supported day-care centers in operation by December 1983, standardized by the population of children aged zero to four years.
7. *Family clinics.* In the health sector one important experiment, originally authorized by national legislation in 1974, was the

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<sup>3</sup>Professor Raffaella Y. Nanetti, University of Illinois at Chicago, carried out this portion of our project.

- family clinic. One useful measure of a region's ability to implement policy reforms is the number of family clinics, standardized for regional population, in operation by May 1978.
8. *Industrial policy instruments.* The widespread hope that the new regional governments could foster more rapid economic development was an important motivation for the institutional reform. One crude measure of the sophistication of each region in the area of industrial policy can be computed by noting which of an array of potential tools of intrastructural industrial policy the region actually deployed.
  9. *Agricultural spending capacity.* In 1977 the central government allocated substantial funds to each region for investments in agriculture, including irrigation, reforestation, livestock production, horticulture, and viticulture. A region's ability to carry out policy initiatives in this important economic sector can be measured by the fraction of the funds allocated to the region that the region actually disbursed as planned during the next three years (1978-1980).
  10. *Local Health Unit expenditures.* Financially speaking, the most substantial responsibility decentralized to the regions after 1977 was the national health service, including hospitals, clinics, and health insurance. The primary organizational innovation for implementing these new responsibilities, according to the national legislation of 1978, was to be the "Local Health Unit" (*Unità Sanitaria Locale* or USL). One measure of the readiness of each region to fulfill its responsibilities in this area is per capita USL expenditures as of 1983, five years after the enactment of the national statute.
  11. *Housing and urban development.* Beginning in 1971, and especially after 1978, the central government offered plentiful funding to each region to support subsidized housing (both public and privately owned), housing rehabilitation, and land acquisition for urban development. We gathered data on the ability of the regions to use these funds as measured by the fraction of the funds authorized by the central authorities that the region successfully disbursed.
  12. *Bureaucratic responsiveness.* To assess the governments' "street-level" responsiveness, we devised a highly informative

experiment.<sup>4</sup> In January 1983 Italian colleagues approached the bureaucracies in each region, requesting information about three specific (but fictitious) problems:

- The health department was asked about reimbursement procedures for a medical bill incurred while the inquirer was on vacation abroad.
- The vocational education department was asked about job training facilities for "a brother" just finishing junior high school.
- The agriculture department was asked, on behalf of "a farmer friend," for information about loans and subsidies for experimental crops.

In each case the quality and alacrity of the administrative response was evaluated. This experiment enabled us to construct a composite index of the responsiveness of three important agencies, comparable across all twenty regions.

Our list of twelve indicators is intended to reflect the diversity of things that modern governments do to and for their citizens. The differences in performance levels suggested by these indicators are, in absolute terms, quite remarkable: cabinets three times more durable in one region than another; budgets delayed by three weeks in one region, seven months in another; day-care centers and family clinics and agricultural loans and subsidized housing many times more common in one region than another despite equal access to funding; citizen inquiries answered promptly in some regions and not at all in others.

Even so, we began this research skeptical that such independent indicators of institutional performance would closely cohere, given measurement frailties, differences in regional priorities, and the multiple influences on any single institutional activity. Against this background we were gratified to discover a surprisingly high consistency among our twelve diverse indicators of institutional performance.<sup>5</sup> Regions that have stable cabinets, adopt their budgets on time, spend their appropriations as planned, and pioneer new legislation are, for the most part, the same regions that provide day-care centers and family clinics, develop comprehensive urban planning, make loans to farmers, and answer their mail promptly. On the basis of these twelve indicators, we have constructed a summary Index of Institutional Performance.

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<sup>4</sup>Professor Robert Leonardi, London School of Economics, conceived and directed this project.

<sup>5</sup>The 66 bivariate correlations among the twelve measures average  $r = .46$ . All but one of the 66 are in the correct direction, and two-thirds are statistically significant at the .05 level, despite the modest number of cases.

How stable and reliable is this assessment over time? Is institutional performance as we have measured it a durable feature of the regional governments, or do regions move randomly up and down the standings from year to year?

In the earliest years of the Italian regional experiment we had carried out a preliminary evaluation of the success of each of the new regions.<sup>6</sup> This preliminary assessment was based on performance indicators broadly comparable to those described in this essay, but the underlying data were drawn from the first legislative period and thus did not overlap with the data we have been assessing here. Nevertheless, a comparison of the two independent measures shows a remarkable stability in relative success.<sup>7</sup> For the most part regions that had scored well in the earlier evaluation rank at the top of the later, fuller Index of Institutional Performance, and laggards on the former were laggards on the latter as well. Differences in institutional performance, as measured here, are reasonably stable and thus worth explaining.

This summary index reflects comprehensive, coherent, stable differences in institutional performance. But are they consistent with the evaluations offered by the institutions' constituents? Or are standards for judging government so thoroughly idiosyncratic and pervaded by cultural relativism that our judgments and the judgments of Italian citizens themselves are unrelated?

Six times between January 1977 and December 1988, or roughly once every two years, we asked Italians, "How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the way in which this region is governed?" Thus we are in a position to compare our "objective" assessment of the performance of the regional governments with the views of their own constituents. Figure 2 shows the remarkably strong concordance between the two measures. Effectiveness and responsiveness—the two fundamental criteria for democratic government—turn out to be closely associated with each other. Regional governments that enact innovative legislation, implement their budgets as planned, build day-care centers, and answer their mail are more popular with their constituents than those that do not.

In short, some regional governments consistently have been more successful than others—more efficient in their internal operations, more creative in their policy initiatives, more effective in implementing those initiatives. These differences in performance have been stable over more than a decade. They are


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<sup>6</sup>For a detailed account of this earlier research see Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, and Franco Pavoncello, "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983): 55-74.

<sup>7</sup>The Index of Institutional Performance for 1970-76 and that for 1978-85 are correlated  $r = .78$ .

widely recognized by constituents of the regional governments. Some of these new institutions are working well, while others are not. What explains these differences in institutional performance?

**Figure 2. Institutional Performance and Citizen Satisfaction**



Citizen Satisfaction

Correlation:  $r = .84$

### **Explaining Institutional Performance**

It is best to begin a journey of exploration with a map. Figure 3 shows the level of institutional performance of each of Italy's twenty regions. The most striking feature of this map is the strong North-South gradient. In the words of a thousand travelogues, "The South is different." We shall return to this conspicuous contrast between North and South. However, if our purpose is not simply description, but understanding, this observation merely reformulates our problem. What is it that differentiates the successful regions in the North from the unsuccessful ones in the South, and the more from the less successful with in each section?

**Figure 3. Institutional Performance in the Italian Regions**




Figure 4, which arrays the Italian regions according to their degree of economic modernity and institutional performance, illustrates both the power and the limitations of this interpretation of our puzzle.<sup>8</sup>

Understanding the dynamics of institutional performance has long been of interest to comparative social science. Three broad modes of explaining performance can be discerned in the existing literature. The first school of thought emphasizes *institutional design*. This tradition has its roots in formal legal studies, a mode of political analysis that grew out of the ferment of constitution building in the nineteenth century. "It was widely assumed [by such analyses] that viable representative government . . . depended . . . only on the proper arrangement of its formal parts and reasonable good luck in economic life and institutional affairs; and that good structure would serve even in the absence of good luck."<sup>9</sup> In the contemporary era attention to the organizational determinants of institutional performance has re-emerged as constitution-drafters, management consultants, and development advisers devote much attention to institutional design in their prescriptions for improved performance. In our study, however, institutional design was held constant: all the regional governments had essentially identical organizational structures. Hence, however important institutional design may be in other contexts, it cannot account for the vast differences in performance among the Italian regional governments.

A second school of thought about the performance of democratic institutions emphasizes *socioeconomic factors*. Political sociologists since Aristotle have argued that the prospects for effective democracy depend on social development and economic well-being. Contemporary democratic theorists, too, have stressed various aspects of modernization (wealth, education, industrialization) in their discussions of the conditions underlying stable and effective democratic government.<sup>10</sup> Nothing is more obvious even to the casual observer than the fact that effective democracy is closely associated with socioeconomic modernity, both across time and across space. After examining the successes and failures of urban governments around the world, Robert C.

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<sup>8</sup>Economic modernity is here measured by a factor score based on per capita income and gross regional product, the agricultural and industrial shares of the workforce, and the agricultural and industrial share of value added, all in the period 1970-1977. These components are very highly intercorrelated (mean loading = .90).


<sup>9</sup>Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 98.

<sup>10</sup>Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

Fried and Francine Rabinovitz concluded that "of all the theories to explain the performance differences, the most powerful one is modernization."<sup>11</sup>

The wealthier, more modern regions of the North (concentrated in the upper right quadrant of Figure 4) clearly have a head start over their poorer counterparts in material and human resources. Yet the more closely one examines the patterns in Figure 4, the more evident are the limitations of this interpretation. The regions appear divided into two quadrants, the haves and the have-nots, with governments in the latter regions displaying consistently lower levels of performance. The marked differences in performance within each quadrant, however, are wholly inexplicable in terms of economic development.<sup>12</sup> Wealth and economic development cannot be the entire story.

**Figure 4. Economic Modernity and Institutional Performance**



Correlation:  $r = .77$

<sup>11</sup>Robert C. Fried and Francine F. Rabinovitz, *Comparative Urban Politics: A Performance Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980), 66.

<sup>12</sup>The correlation between economic modernity and institutional performance is  $r = -.02$  among the more developed regions in the upper right quadrant of Figure 4, and  $r = .11$  among the less developed regions in the lower left quadrant.

Economic modernity is somehow associated with high-performance public institutions—this much is clear. What our simple analysis so far cannot reveal is whether modernity is a cause of performance (perhaps one among several), whether performance is perhaps in some way a cause of modernity, whether both are influenced by a third factor (so that the association between the two is in some sense spurious), or whether the link between modernity and performance is even more complex. We shall return to these more complicated—and more interesting—questions later in this essay.

A third school of thought emphasizes *sociocultural factors* in explaining the performance of democratic institutions. This tradition, too, claims a distinguished lineage. In the *Republic* Plato argued that governments vary in accordance with the dispositions of their citizenry. In sixteenth-century Florence, reflecting on the unstable history of republican institutions in ancient times as well as in Renaissance Italy, Machiavelli concluded that whether free institutions succeeded or failed depended on the character of the citizens, their "civic virtue."<sup>13</sup> More recently, social scientists have looked to political culture in their explanations of cross-national variations in political systems.<sup>14</sup> Probably the most illustrious example of the sociocultural tradition of political analysis (and one that is especially germane to our study) remains Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.<sup>15</sup> Tocqueville highlights the connection between the "mores" of a society and its political practices.

To test the central thesis of the sociocultural school of thought, we want to explore empirically whether the success of a democratic government depends on the degree to which its surroundings approximate the ideal of a "civic community." But what might this "civic community" mean in practical terms? There are the central themes in the classic accounts.

- *Civic engagement.* Citizenship in a civic community is marked, first of all, by active participation in public affairs. "Interest in public issues and devotion to public causes are the key signs of

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<sup>13</sup>See J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

<sup>14</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990).

<sup>15</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Schocken Books, 1972).

civic virtue," suggests Michael Walzer.<sup>16</sup> Citizens in the civic community are not required to be altruists. Rather, they pursue what Tocqueville termed "self interest properly understood," that is, self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is "enlightened" rather than "myopic," self-interest that is alive to the interests of others.<sup>17</sup> The opposite of civic virtue is exemplified in the "amoral familism" that Edward Banfield reported as the dominant ethos in Montegrano, a small town in southern Italy: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise."<sup>18</sup>

- *Political equality.* Citizenship in the civic community entails equal rights and obligations for all. Such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency. Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners. The more that politics approximates the ideal of political equality among citizens following norms of reciprocity and engaged in self-government, the more civic that community may be said to be.
- *Solidarity, trust, and tolerance.* Citizens in a civic community, on most accounts, are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance. The civic community is not blandly conflict-free, for its citizens have strong views on public issues, but they are tolerant of their opponents. This fabric of social trust enables the civic community to surmount more easily what economists call "opportunism," in which shared interests are unrealized because each individual, acting in wary isolation, has an incentive to defect from collective action.<sup>19</sup>
- *Associations: social structures of cooperation.* The norms and values of the civic community are embodied in, and reinforced by, distinctive social structures and practices. Tocqueville

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<sup>16</sup>Michael Walzer, "Civility and Civic Virtue," in his *Radical Principles* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 64.

<sup>17</sup>Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, 145-49.

<sup>18</sup>Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958), 85.

<sup>19</sup>Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (November 1985): 481-510.

observed that "feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another."<sup>20</sup> Associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness. When "cross-cutting" groups have diverse goals and members, group interaction and cross-pressures tend to moderate extreme views. These beneficial effects do not require that the manifest purpose of the association be political. Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration.

More recently, an independent line of research has reinforced the view that associationism is a necessary precondition for effective self-government. Summarizing scores of developing country case studies, Milton Esman and Norman Uphoff conclude that local associations are a crucial ingredient in successful strategies of rural development.<sup>21</sup>

Lacking detailed ethnographic accounts of hundreds of communities throughout the regions of Italy, how can we assess the degree to which social and political life in each of those regions approximates the ideal of a civic community? What systematic evidence is there on patterns of social solidarity and civic participation? We shall here present evidence on four indicators of the "civicness" of regional life, two that correspond directly to Tocqueville's conception of what we have termed the civic community, and two that refer more immediately to political behavior.

- *Associational membership.* One key indicator of civic sociability is the vibrancy of associational life. Fortunately, a census of all

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<sup>20</sup>Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, 131.

<sup>21</sup>Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff, *Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Unhappily from the point of view of social engineering, Esman and Uphoff find that local organizations "implanted" from the outside have a high failure rate. The most successful local organizations represent indigenous, participatory initiatives in relatively cohesive local communities. See also David C. Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," *Public Administration Review* (September-October 1980): 480-511; John D. Montgomery, *Bureaucrats and People: Grassroots Participation in Third World Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 42-57; Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance, Civil Society and Empowerment in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Washington, D.C.: Africa Technical Department, World Bank, 1992); and the works cited there.

associations in Italy enables us to specify precisely the number of amateur soccer clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, bird-watching groups, literary circles, hunters' associations, Lions Clubs, and the like in each community and region of Italy.<sup>22</sup> Standardized for population differences, these data show that in the efflorescence of their associational life, some regions of Italy rival Tocqueville's America of congenital "joiners," whereas the inhabitants of other regions are accurately typified by the isolated and suspicious "amoral familists" of Banfield's Montegrano.

- *Newspaper circulation.* Tocqueville also stressed the connection in modern society between civic vitality, associations, and local newspapers:

When no firm and lasting ties any longer unite men, it is impossible to obtain the cooperation of any great number of them unless you can persuade every man whose help is required that he serves his private interests by voluntarily uniting his efforts to those of all the others. That cannot be done habitually and conveniently without the help of a newspaper. . . . So hardly any democratic association can carry on without a newspaper.<sup>23</sup>

Newspaper readers are better informed than non-readers and thus better equipped to participate in civic deliberations, and newspaper readership is a mark of citizen interest in community affairs. This, then, is the second element in our assessment of the degree to which political and social life in Italy's regions approximates a civic community.

- *Referendum participation.* One especially useful indicator of civic-minded political engagement in contemporary Italy is participation in periodic national referenda on such issues as divorce, wage policy, nuclear power, and political reform. Unlike many voters in ordinary Italian elections whose participation is often motivated by patronage, the primary motivation of the referendum voter is concern for public issues, perhaps enhanced by a keener than average sense of civic duty,

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<sup>22</sup>Alberto Mortara, ed., *Le Associazioni Italiane* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1985).

<sup>23</sup>Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, 134.

so that turnout for referenda offers a relatively "clean" measure of civic involvement. Citizens in some parts of Italy choose to be actively involved in public deliberations on a wide spectrum of public issues, whereas their counterparts elsewhere remain disengaged. As our third indicator of civic involvement, therefore, we have constructed a summary indicator of turnout in five recent national referenda.


- *Clientelistic "preference" voting.* Although turnout itself in general elections is not a good measure of citizen motivation, one special feature of the Italian ballot does provide important information on regional political practices. All voters in national elections must choose a single party list. In addition, however, voters can, if they wish, indicate a preference for a particular candidate from the party list they have chosen. The incidence of preference voting has long been acknowledged by students of Italian politics as a reliable indicator of personalism, factionalism, and patron-client politics. In this sense preference voting can be taken as an indicator for the absence of a civic community, the fourth element in our evaluation of the "civicness" of the Italian regions.

Across Italy's twenty regions, referenda turnout and preference voting are strongly negatively correlated one reflecting the politics of issues, the other, the politics of patronage. Citizens in some regions turn out in large numbers to declare their views on a wide range of public questions but forgo personalized preference votes in general elections. Elsewhere, citizens are enmeshed in patron-client networks. They typically pass up the chance to express an opinion on public issues since for them the ballot is essentially a token of exchange in an immediate, highly personalized relationship of dependency. Both groups are, in some sense, "participating in politics." It is not so much the *quantity* of participation as the *quality* that differentiates them. Political behavior in some regions presumes that politics is about collective deliberation on public issues. By contrast, politics elsewhere is organized hierarchically and more narrowly focused on personal advantage.

As our image of the civic community presumes, our four indicators are in fact highly correlated, in the sense that regions with high turnout for referenda and low use of the personal preference ballot are virtually the same regions with a closely woven fabric of civic associations and a high incidence of newspaper readership. Consequently, we can conveniently combine the four into a single Civic Community Index.


Figure 5, in turn, charts the levels of "civic-ness" of each of Italy's twenty regions. In the most civic regions, such as Emilia-Romagna, citizens are

**Figure 5. The Civic Community in the Italian Regions in the 1970s**



actively involved in all sorts of local associations literary guilds, local bands, hunting clubs, cooperatives. They avidly follow civic affairs in the local press, and they engage in politics out of programmatic conviction. By contrast, in the least civic regions, such as Calabria, voters are brought to the polls not by issues but by hierarchical patron-client networks. An absence of civic associations and a paucity of local media in these latter regions mean that their citizens are rarely drawn into community affairs.

**Figure 6. The Civic Community and Institutional Performance**



Even a casual comparison of Figure 5 with Figure 3 indicates a remarkable concordance between the performance of a regional government and the degree to which social and political life in that region approximates the ideal of a civic community. The strength of this relationship appears with stark clarity in Figure 6. Not only does "civic-ness" distinguish the high performance regions in the upper right quadrant from the laggards in the lower left quadrant, but even the subtler differences in performance within each quadrant are closely tied to our measure of community life.<sup>24</sup> In this respect the predictive power of the civic community is greater than the power of economic development. (Compare Figures 4 and 6.) The more civic a region, the more effective its government.

<sup>24</sup>The correlation between institutional performance and our measure of the civic community is  $r = .52$  among the twelve regions in the upper right quadrant of Figure 6, and  $r = .72$  among the eight regions in the lower left quadrant. Both are statistically significant ( $p < .04$ ).

So strong is this relationship that when we take the "civic-ness" of a region into account, the relationship we previously observed between economic development and institutional performance entirely vanishes.<sup>25</sup> In other words economically advanced regions appear to have more successful regional governments merely because they happen to be more civic.

Life in a civic community is in many respects fundamentally distinctive. We can deepen our understanding of the social and political implications of "civic-ness" by drawing on our surveys of regional politicians, community leaders, and the mass public.

- *Elitism.* Political leaders in less civic regions are drawn from a narrower slice of the social hierarchy, whereas the political class in civic regions includes more people from modest social backgrounds. Moreover, leaders in the civic regions are more enthusiastic supporters of political equality whereas leaders in less civic regions express skepticism about the wisdom of the ordinary citizen and even doubts about universal suffrage. Where associationism flourishes, where citizens attend to community affairs and vote for issues, not patrons, there too we find leaders who believe in democracy, not social and political hierarchy. Citizens in the more civic regions, like their leaders, have a pervasive distaste for hierarchical authority patterns. The effectiveness of regional government is closely tied to the degree to which authority and social interchange in the life of the region is organized horizontally or hierarchically.
- *Personalism and clientelism.* Relations between citizens and political leaders are much more highly personalized and clientelistic in the less civic regions. Citizens in less civic regions contact their representatives personally more often, and when they do, they talk about patronage, not policy. Regions where citizens use personal preference votes, but do not vote in referenda, do not join civic associations, and do not read

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<sup>25</sup>The partial correlation between economic development and institutional performance, controlling for the Civic Community Index, is  $r = -.33$ , which is statistically insignificant and in the wrong direction, whereas the correlation between the Civic Community Index and institutional performance remains highly significant ( $p < .0001$ ). The bivariate correlation between the Civic Community Index and our measure of economic development is  $r = .76$ . Statistical mavens will recognize the potential problem of multicollinearity here, but we later present additional evidence that distinguishes the effects of economic development and the civic community.

newspapers are the same regions whose leaders describe their regional politics as clientelistic, rather than programmatic.

• *Honesty, trust, and law-abidingness.* Citizens in the civic community, philosophers say, deal fairly with one another and expect fair dealing in return. They expect their government to follow high standards, and they willingly obey the rules that they have imposed on themselves. In such a community, writes Benjamin Barber, "Citizens do not and cannot ride for free, because they understand that their freedom is a consequence of their participation in the making and acting out of common decisions."<sup>26</sup> In a less civic community, by contrast, life is riskier, citizens are warier, and the laws, made by higher-ups, are made to be broken.

This account of the civic community sounds mawkish, echoing some long-forgotten high school civics text. Remarkably, however, evidence from the Italian regions confirms this vision. The least civic regions are the most subject to the ancient plague of political corruption, and leaders there are much more likely to describe their regional politics as corrupt. Citizens in civic regions expressed greater social trust and greater confidence in the law-abidingness of their fellow citizens than did citizens in the least civic regions. Conversely, those in the less civic regions were much more likely to insist that the authorities should impose greater law and order on their communities. Collective life in the civic regions is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, *you* are more likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling *their* expectations. In the less civic regions nearly everyone expects everyone else to violate the rules. It seems foolish to obey the traffic laws or the tax code or the welfare rules if you expect everyone else to cheat. (The Italian term for such naive behavior is *fesso*, which also means "cuckolded.") So you cheat, too, and in the end everyone's dolorous, cynical expectations are confirmed.

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<sup>26</sup>Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 179.

- *Powerlessness and unhappiness.* For all their personalized politicking, citizens of less civic regions feel exploited, alienated, powerless. By contrast with the more egalitarian, cooperative civic community, life in a vertically structured, horizontally fractured community produces daily justification for feelings of exploitation, dependency, and frustration, especially at the bottom of the social ladder, but also on somewhat higher rungs. Conversely, citizens in civic regions are happier with life in general than are their counterparts in less civic regions. In a series of nationwide surveys between 1975 and 1989, roughly 25,000 people were asked whether they were "very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead." The results show unequivocally that citizens of civic regions are more satisfied with life. Happiness is living in a civic community.

Many theorists have associated the civic community with small, close-knit, premodern societies, quite unlike our modern world—the civic community as a world we have lost. In its place arise large, modern agglomerations, technologically advanced but dehumanizing, which induce civic passivity and self-seeking individualism. Modernity, it is said, is the enemy of civility. Quite the contrary, our studies suggest. The least civic areas of Italy are precisely the traditional southern villages. The ethos of traditional communities must not be idealized. Life in much of traditional Italy is marked by hierarchy and exploitation, not by share-and-share-alike. The most civic regions of Italy—the communities in which citizens feel empowered to engage in collective deliberation about public choices and in which those choices are translated most fully into effective public policies—include some of the most modern towns and cities of the peninsula. Modernization need not signal the demise of the civic community.

We can summarize our discoveries so far rather simply. Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in these regions read eagerly about community affairs in the daily press. They are engaged by public issues, but not by personalistic or patron-client politics. Inhabitants trust one another to act fairly and to obey the law. Leaders in these regions are relatively honest. They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compromise with their political adversaries. Both citizens and leaders here find equality congenial. Social and political networks are organized horizontally, not hierarchically. The community values solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation, and honesty. Government works. Small wonder that people in these regions are content!

At the other pole are the "uncivic" regions, aptly characterized by the French term *incivisme*. Public life in these regions is organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally. The very concept of "citizen" here is stunted. From the point of view of the individual inhabitant, public affairs is somebody else's business *i notabili*, "the bosses," "the politicians"—but not mine. Few people aspire to partake in deliberations about the commonweal, and few such opportunities present themselves. Political participation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collective purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about democratic principles. Laws (almost everyone agrees) are made to be broken, but fearing others' lawlessness, people demand sterner discipline. Trapped in these interlocking vicious circles, nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy. It is hardly surprising that representative government here is less effective than in more civic communities.

This discovery poses two new and important questions: *How did the civic regions get that way?* and *How do norms and networks of civic engagement undergird good government?*

### Roots of the Civic Community

Tracing the historical origins of the civic community takes us back to the earliest years of medieval Italy. As Europe began to emerge from the anarchic violence of the Dark Ages, the preeminent social issue *the sine qua non* for all progress was to establish public order. Uniquely in Christendom, twelfth-century Italians invented not one, but two distinctive solutions to this problem, both destined to have far-reaching social, economic, and political consequences.

In the South Norman mercenaries built a powerful feudal monarchy, centered in Sicily and singularly advanced both administratively and economically. "At its zenith Norman Sicily possessed the most highly developed bureaucracy of any western kingdom."<sup>27</sup> With civil order came prosperity. "By the end of the 12th century, Sicily, with its control of the Mediterranean sea routes, was the richest, most advanced, and highly organized State in Europe."<sup>28</sup> Led by Frederick II, *stupor mundi* ("the wonder of the world"), the Norman kingdom became the very model for enlightened feudal monarchy.

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<sup>27</sup>J. K. Hyde, *Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: the Evolution of the Civil Life, 1000-1350* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 119.

<sup>28</sup>Geoffrey Barraclough and Norman Stone, eds., *The Times Atlas of World History*, 3rd ed. (London: Times Books, 1989), 124.

In its social and political arrangements, however, the South was, and would remain, strictly autocratic. The steep social hierarchy came to be ever more dominated by feudal barons, while at the bottom masses of peasants struggled wretchedly close to the limits of physical survival. Although in the next seven centuries southern Italy was to be the subject of much bitter contention among various foreign dynasties (especially between Spain and France), this hierarchic structure would endure essentially unchanged. The regime was to remain autocratic, no matter how enlightened its incumbent, and enlightenment would turn out to be much rarer than rapacity.

Meanwhile, by contrast, in the towns of northern and central Italy was emerging an unprecedented form of self-government. Like the autocratic Norman regime, the new republican regime was a response to the violence endemic in medieval Europe, for savage vendettas among aristocratic clans had laid waste to the towns and countryside in the North as in the South. The solution invented in the North, however, was quite different, relying less on vertical hierarchy and more on horizontal collaboration. The communal republics sprang originally from voluntary associations formed when groups of individuals swore personal oaths to render one another mutual assistance for common defense and economic cooperation. By the twelfth century communes had been established in Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, and Venice virtually all the other major towns of northern and central Italy rooted historically in these primordial social contracts. The emerging communes were far from democratic in our modern sense, but the structure of authority in the communal republics was fundamentally more liberal and egalitarian than in contemporary regimes elsewhere in Europe, including, of course, the South of Italy itself.

These political changes were part of "the burgeoning of associative life with the rise of communes, guilds, business partnerships . . . new forms of solidarity [that] expressed a more vivid sense of equality."<sup>29</sup> Life in the communal republics was permeated by new forms of horizontal self-help—guilds formed by craftsmen and tradesmen to provide mutual aid, neighborhood associations, parish organizations that administered the local church and elected its priest, confraternities (religious societies for mutual assistance), politico-religious parties bound together by solemn oath-takings, and "tower societies" formed to provide mutual security. This rich network of associational life and the new mores of the republics gave the medieval Italian commune a unique character precisely analogous to what we have termed the "civic community."

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<sup>29</sup>Marvin B. Becker, *Medieval Italy: Constraints and Creativity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 36, n. 32.

Intimately associated with the expansion of civic republicanism was a rapid growth in commerce. At the same time that the Norman kingdom in the Mezzogiorno was enjoying a new prosperity based on social and political hierarchy, the civic republicanism of the northern cities laid the foundations for one of the great economic revolutions in world history, comparable (according to some historians) only to the Neolithic emergence of permanent settlements and the later Industrial Revolution. At the heart of this revolution was the invention of *credit*.

Unlike the wealth of the Sicilian kingdom, based on land, the growing prosperity of the northern Italian city-states was rooted in finance and commerce. Banking and long-distance trade depended on credit, and credit, if it were to be provided efficiently, required mutual trust and confidence that contracts and the laws governing them would be impartially enforced. ("Credit" derives from *credere*, "to believe.") The institutions of civic republicanism, the networks of associations, and the extension of solidarity beyond the bonds of kinship that had emerged in the northern communes were crucial for this trust and confidence to flourish.

The basic fact in the economic history of Europe from the eleventh century onward was that savings were activated for productive purposes to a degree inconceivable in previous centuries. . . . It was the widespread sense of honesty, strengthened by the sense of belonging to an integrated community, quite apart from definite legal obligations, which made possible the participation of all kinds of people with their savings in the productive process.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, Italy had produced, not one, but two innovative patterns of governance with their associated social and cultural features the celebrated Norman feudal autocracy of the South and the fertile communal republicanism of the North. In economic and social life as well as in politics, both the monarchy and the republics had surmounted the dilemmas of collective action and the problems of collective life that still stifled progress elsewhere in Europe. But the systems that had been invented in the North and in the South were quite different, both in their structure and in their consequences. "Two different societies and ways of life here faced other."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700*, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1980), 198-99.

<sup>31</sup>John Larner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch: 1216-1380* (New York: Longman, 1980), 29.

In the North feudal bonds of personal dependence were weakened; in the South they were strengthened. In the North the people were citizens; in the South they were subjects. Legitimate authority in the North was vested in public officials responsible to the citizenry. Legitimate authority in the South was monopolized by the king, who (although he might delegate administrative tasks to officials and might confirm the nobles in their privileges) was responsible only to God. In the North the crucial social, political, and even religious allegiances and alignments were horizontal while in the South they were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and even trust—not universal, of course, but extending further beyond the limits of kinship than anywhere else in Europe in this era—were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue in the South, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy. In the Norman kingdom protection and refuge was provided by an autocratic sovereign or the strongest local baron. In the North security was sought instead through the more complex strategy of interweaving pacts of mutual assistance among rough equals.

As compared to the rest of Christendom, both regimes produced prosperity and efficient government, but the limits of the southern, hierarchic solution to the dilemmas of collective action were already becoming manifest by the beginning of the thirteenth century. Whereas a hundred years earlier the South generally had been reckoned to be no less advanced than the North, the communal republics were now pulling rapidly ahead, and the North's lead continued to widen for several centuries.

During the fourteenth century, however, factionalism and famine, the Black Death and the Hundred Years War began to undermine the spirit of the civic community and the stability of republican government. Moreover, the clamor of clashes among broader religious and military forces beyond the city walls echoed increasingly within the republics themselves.

Nearly everywhere, Guelphs, Ghibellines, and a hundred other clans struggled in constant intrigue and often bloody strife. Relying on mercenary armies, individual despots and their families gained political dominance. During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries additional miseries were inflicted on the peninsula as France, Spain, and the other ascendant powers of Europe fought their bloody dynastic duels in the Italian arena. The demographic and economic consequences of these foreign invasions, together with the devastating plagues and trade disruptions of the previous century, were especially traumatic for the communes of the North. By the seventeenth century all the cities of central and northern Italy had ceased to be republican or even, in many cases, independent.

Throughout Italy, north and south, autocratic politics were now embodied in patron-client networks. However, among the northern heirs to the communal tradition, patrons, no matter how autocratic, still accepted civic responsibilities. Something of the glorious experience of the communes, and of the social solidarity and economic activity that civic engagement had generated, survived in the Po Valley and Tuscany so that these regions would be more receptive to the first breezes of renewed progress, first cultural and then economic, that whispered along the peninsula in the second half of the eighteenth century. Despite the social and economic gloom provoked by several centuries of foreign depredation, pestilence, and domestic strife, the ideal of the *vita civile* persisted in the regions of communal republican traditions.

Meanwhile, the medieval heritage of governance in the South provided an enduring contrast. Corrupted by absolute power, king and barons became predatory autocrats. Government remained feudal and autocratic, tempered only by episodic, ephemeral rebellion. Authoritarian political institutions were reinforced by the tradition of vertical social networks embodying power asymmetries, exploitation, and dependence, in contrast to the northern tradition of horizontal associations joining rough equals in mutual solidarity. Patron-client politics in the South was more personalistic, more exploitative, more transitory, less "civil."

Despite the eclipse of communal republicanism in the North after the fourteenth century, as the democratic revolutions that were to sweep Europe in the nineteenth century approached the Italian peninsula, the discerning observer could detect the continuing regional differences of culture and social structure that had appeared in the medieval era seven centuries earlier. Those enduring differences powerfully conditioned how the various regions would respond to the new challenges and opportunities that loomed ahead as Italy achieved national unification.

In nineteenth-century Italy new forms of associationism and social solidarity began to sprout from long-dormant roots. "The first embryo of an associative process" was the mutual aid society, created by urban artisans and rural peasants to provide self-help insurance against the costs of sickness, accidents, old age, and burial.<sup>32</sup> At the core of the mutual aid societies was practical reciprocity: I'll help you if you help me; let's face these problems together that none of us can face alone. These new forms of sociability were directly reminiscent of the formation of the medieval communes more than seven centuries earlier with their fabric of organized collective action for mutual

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<sup>32</sup>Carlo Trigilia, "Sviluppo economico e trasformazioni sociopolitiche dei sistemi territoriali a economia diffusa," *Quaderni della Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli* (Milan), no. 16 (1981): 57.

benefit. Just as the earliest medieval self-help associations represented voluntary cooperation to address the elemental insecurity of that age—the threat of physical violence—so mutual aid societies represented collective solidarity in the face of the economic insecurities peculiar to the modern age.

At about this same time and often under the aegis of mutual aid societies, cooperative organizations also began to spring up among both producers and consumers. They were soon followed by nascent trade unions and then in the years just before World War I by several mass-based political movements, especially the socialists and the Catholic *Partito popolare*. Both the socialists and the *popolari* drew on the heritage of social mobilization, the organizational infrastructure, and the energies of the mutual aid societies, the cooperatives, and the labor unions.

Although mutual aid societies, cooperatives, and other manifestations of civic solidarity were established in all sectors of the economy and in all parts of the peninsula, they were not equally extensive or equally successful everywhere. In north-central Italy, mirroring almost precisely that area in which the communal republics had longest endured five centuries earlier (and in which the most civic regions would be found in the 1970s), the medieval traditions of collaboration persisted, even among poor peasants. By stark contrast an 1863 report concluded that in Calabria, a desolate land locked in the southern traditions of authoritarian rule (and destined to rank as the least civic of all the regions in the 1970s), there were "no associations, no mutual aid; everything is isolation."<sup>33</sup> The primeval mistrust that rent the social fabric in these regions was captured in innumerable proverbs:

- "Damned is he who trusts another."
- "Don't make loans, don't give gifts, don't do good, for it will turn out bad for you."
- "Everyone thinks of his own good and cheats his companion."
- "When you see the house of your neighbor on fire, carry water to your own."<sup>34</sup>

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
<sup>33</sup>As quoted in Piero Bevilacqua, "Uomini, terre, economie," in *La Calabria*, ed. Piero Bevilacqua and Augusto Placanica (Turin: Einaudi, 1985), 295-96.

<sup>34</sup>For these and many other examples see Carlo Tullio-Altan, in *La nostra Italia: Arretratezza socioculturale, clientelismo, trasformismo e rebellismo dall'Unità ad oggi* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1986), 27.

The South was not (and is not) apolitical or asocial. On the contrary political cunning and social connections have long been essential to survival in this melancholy land. The relevant distinction is not between the presence and absence of social bonds but rather between horizontal bonds of mutual solidarity and vertical bonds of dependency and exploitation. The southerner whether peasant or city-dweller, whether in the old kingdom of the twelfth century, the new kingdom of the nineteenth century, or the regional politics of the late twentieth century has sought refuge in vertical bonds of patronage and clientelism, employed for both economic and political ends. In the absence of horizontal solidarity, as exemplified by mutual aid societies, vertical dependence is a rational strategy for survival in an atomized society, even when those who are dependent recognize its drawbacks.

By the end of the nineteenth century the historical record begins to include statistical traces that allow us to measure with some precision these regional differences, not merely between North and South but among different regions within each section. The available nationwide quantitative indicators of civic engagement in this epoch include membership in mutual aid societies, membership in cooperatives, the strength of the mass-based political parties, turnout in the few relatively open elections before Fascism brought authoritarian rule to all Italy, and the longevity of local cultural and recreational associations. To explore the historical antecedents of "civic-ness" in contemporary Italy, we have combined these five indicators into a single index of nineteenth-century traditions of civic involvement.

Figure 7 arrays the almost perfect correlation between our Civic Community Index for the 1970s and 1980s and our comparable measure of civic involvement a century earlier. Despite the massive waves of migration, economic change, and social upheaval that have swept along the peninsula in the intervening decades, contemporary civic norms and practices recapitulate regional traditions that were well established long ago. Where Italians a century ago were most actively engaged in new forms of social solidarity and civic mobilization, exactly there Italians today are the most thoroughly civic in their political and social life. And in these very regions public life was distinctively civic nearly a millennium ago, with an equally impressive flowering of community life including tower societies, guilds, neighborhood associations, and other forms of civic engagement.

**Figure 7. Civic Traditions and the Civic Community Today**

Civic Traditions, 1860-1920

Correlation:  $r = .93$ **Economic Development and Civic Traditions**

In quantitative social science it is rare indeed to discover patterns as powerful almost mesmerizing as these. An important omission from our argument, however, will already have occurred to the prudent reader. In contemporary Italy regions that are civic are also healthy, wealthy, and industrial. That could easily mean, a skeptic might suspect, that the civic community is merely epiphenomenal. It is difficult today for poor, sickly peasants to engage in civic-minded participation, and so it must have been a century ago. Might not continuities in economic and social structure account for the apparent continuities in civic life? Perhaps the mesmerizing correlations are spurious. Economics matters, not civics.

The historical saga we have recounted casts some doubt on this claim because the long-term patterns of continuity and change are not consistent with any simple economic determinism. The civic regions did not begin wealthier, and they have not always been wealthier, but so far as we can tell, they have remained steadfastly more civic since the eleventh century. These facts are hard to reconcile with the notion that civic engagement is simply a consequence of prosperity.

For the period since Unification we can draw on more quantitative evidence to assess the notion that economic development is the cause or precondition for civic norms and networks. One simple empirical test is to compare two sets of predictions, using the same set of independent variables in each case:

1. Predicting level of economic development in the 1970s from development and civic involvement around 1900
2. Predicting civic involvement in the 1970s from the same earlier measures of development and civic involvement.

If the economic determinist is correct, economics at time 1 should predict civics at time 2. If, on the other hand, patterns of civic involvement have economic consequences, then civics at time 1 should help to predict economics at time 2. In principle, of course, both effects might operate simultaneously, implying some reciprocal influence between civics and economics. Both theories can be tested with pairs of multiple regressions, using civic traditions and a given socioeconomic variable as measured around 1900 to predict civic patterns and the same socioeconomic variable as measured in the 1970s.<sup>35</sup>

The results of this statistical horse-race turn out to be straightforward and startling. Civic traditions are a very powerful predictor of contemporary civic community, and controlling for civic traditions, such indicators of socioeconomic development as industrialization and public health have no impact whatsoever on civics. *Moreover, civic traditions turn out to be a more powerful predictor of present levels of socioeconomic development than measures of past social structure and economic development. In summary, economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics, better indeed than economics itself.*<sup>36</sup>

Figure 8 synthesizes our findings. Arrow *b* (the effect of economics on civics) is nonexistent, while arrow *c* (the effect of civics on economics) is strong—stronger even than arrow *d*. Moreover, arrow *a* (civic continuity) is very strong while arrow *d* (socioeconomic continuity) is generally weak. A region's chances of achieving socioeconomic development during this century have depended less on its initial socioeconomic endowments than on its civic endowments. Insofar as we can judge from this simple analysis, the contempo-

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<sup>35</sup>The results reported here draw on historical employment data from 1901, per capita income from 1911, and infant mortality data from 1901 to 1910, but similar results obtain with data from throughout the period between 1880 and 1920. The contemporary data are from 1977 (employment), 1987 (income), and 1977 to 1985 (infant mortality), but again the results are robust and do not depend upon the particular dates chosen.


<sup>36</sup>For a detailed presentation of the relevant statistical evidence see Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, chap. 5.

rary correlation between civics and economics reflects primarily the impact of civics on economics, not the reverse.

Civic traditions have remarkable staying power. Moreover, the evidence presented earlier in this essay suggests that it is contemporary civic engagement (arrow *e*), not socioeconomic development (arrow *f*), that directly affects the performance of regional government. We now see additional evidence that this effect is not spurious. On the contrary these results suggest that civic traditions may have powerful consequences for economic development and social welfare as well as for institutional performance.

To be sure, any single-factor interpretation of socioeconomic development is surely wrong. Civic traditions alone did not trigger (nor, in that sense, "cause") the North's rapid and sustained economic progress over the last century; that takeoff was occasioned by changes in the broader national, international, and technological environment. On the other hand civic traditions help explain why the North has been able to respond to the challenges and opportunities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so much more effectively than the South. This

**Figure 8. Actual Effects among Civic Involvement, Socioeconomic Development, and Institutional Performance in Italy, 1900s-1980s**



interpretation of North-South disparities within Italy has obvious implications for the parallel discrepancies between North and South globally although much additional research will be necessary to test these implications empirically.

During the last ten centuries—particularly in the last several decades Italy has undergone massive economic, social, political, and demographic change. Millions of Italians migrated from one region to another, more than nine million of them (roughly one-fifth of the entire population) in the fifteen years after 1955. Despite this whirlwind of change, however, the regions characterized by civic involvement in the late twentieth century are almost precisely the same regions in which cooperatives and cultural associations and mutual aid societies were most abundant in the nineteenth century, and in which neighborhood associations and religious confraternities and guilds had contributed to the flourishing communal republics of the twelfth century. And although those civic regions were not especially advanced economically a century ago, they have steadily outpaced the less civic regions both in economic performance and (at least since the advent of regional government) in quality of government. The astonishing tensile strength of civic traditions testifies to the power of the past.

### **Social Capital and Institutional Success**

Collective life in the less civic regions of Italy has been blighted for a thousand years and more. Why? It can hardly be that the inhabitants prefer solitary and submissive squalor.<sup>37</sup> Foreign oppression might once have been part of the explanation for their plight, but the regional experiment suggests that self-government is no panacea. One is tempted to ask in exasperation: Have people in these troubled regions learned nothing at all from their melancholy experience? Surely they must see that they would all be better off if only everyone would cooperate for the common good.

David Hume offered a simple parable that captures the essential dilemma that confounds rational public-spiritedness.

Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd labour with you today, and that you shou'd aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be

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<sup>37</sup>If proof were needed, our own surveys found bitter dissatisfaction with public life and private prospects in these regions. The notion sometimes expressed by outsiders that southerners enjoy their backward state that they prefer the kind of public life they have is contrary not merely to common sense but also to empirical evidence.

disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone; You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.<sup>38</sup>

Failure to cooperate for mutual benefit does not necessarily signal ignorance or irrationality, as philosophers since Hobbes have underscored. More recently, social scientists have studied this fundamental predicament under a variety of guises: *the tragedy of the commons*; *public goods*; *the logic of collective action*; *prisoners' dilemmas*. In all these situations, as in Hume's rustic anecdote, every party would be better off if all could cooperate. In the absence of a credible mutual commitment, however, each individually has an incentive to defect and become a "free rider." Each rationally expects the other to defect, leaving him or her with the "sucker's payoff." Thus, both rationally defect, confirming each other's melancholy expectations. If actors are unable to make credible commitments to one another, they must forgo many opportunities for mutual gain—ruefully, but rationally.

Yet, as others have observed, this theory proves too much because it *under*-predicts voluntary cooperation. To Hume's very example of uncooperative neighboring farmers, for example, we must counterpose the *aiutarella* (a traditional form of work exchange) long practiced by sharecroppers in central Italy, all the more puzzling in light of the compelling logic of collective action. "We should ask why uncooperative behaviour does not emerge as often as game theory predicts."<sup>39</sup> To resolve this puzzle, some hard-nosed theorists recently have turned to what Robert Bates terms "soft" solutions, such as community and trust: "In a world in which there are prisoner's dilemmas, cooperative communities will enable rational individuals to transcend collective dilemmas."<sup>40</sup>

Success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action and the self-defeating opportunism that they spawn depends on the broader social context within which any particular game is played. Voluntary cooperation is easier in a

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<sup>38</sup>David Hume (1740), bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 5, as quoted in Robert Sugden, *The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 106.

<sup>39</sup>Diego Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust?" in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 217, n. 6.

<sup>40</sup>Robert H. Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," *Politics and Society* 16 (1988): 398. See also Robert H. Bates, "Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Essay on the New Institutionalism," (Duke University, unpublished manuscript, 1992).

community that has inherited a substantial stock of *social capital*.<sup>41</sup> Social capital refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.

Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. . . . For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust. . . . In a farming community . . . where one farmer got his hay baled by another and where farm tools are extensively borrowed and lent, the social capital allows each farmer to get his work done with less physical capital in the form of tools and equipment.<sup>42</sup>

Social capital, in short, enables Hume's farmers to surmount their dilemma of collective action.

Social trust eases collective life in both the political and economic spheres. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. Social trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources—*norms of reciprocity* and *networks of civic engagement*.

The norm of generalized reciprocity I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that somewhere down the road you'll return the favor is a highly productive component of social capital. Communities in which this norm is followed can more efficiently restrain opportunism and resolve problems of collective action. Reciprocity was at the core of the "tower societies" and other self-help associations that eased the security dilemma for citizens in the northern communal republics of medieval Italy, as well as the mutual aid societies that arose to address the economic insecurities of the nineteenth century.

An effective norm of generalized reciprocity is likely to be associated with dense networks of social exchange. Any society modern or traditional, authoritarian or democratic, feudal or capitalist is characterized by networks of interpersonal communication and exchange, both formal and informal. Not all networks are identical, however. Some are primarily "horizontal," bringing together agents of equivalent status and power. Others are primarily "vertical,"

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<sup>41</sup>On the concept of social capital see James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 300-21, who credits Glenn Loury with introducing the concept. See Glenn Loury, "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences," in *Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination*, ed. P.A. Wallace and A. Le Mund (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).

<sup>42</sup>Coleman, *Foundations*, 302, 304, 307.

linking unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence. Networks of civic engagement, like the neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, and mass-based parties examined earlier in this essay, represent intense horizontal interaction.

Networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able cooperate for mutual benefit.

- Networks of civic engagement increase the potential costs to a defector in any individual transaction since by engaging in opportunism within one transaction he puts at risk the benefits he expects to receive from all the other transactions in which he is currently engaged, as well as the benefits from future transactions.
- Networks of civic engagement foster robust norms of reciprocity.
- Networks of civic engagement facilitate communication and improve the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals.
- Networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a culturally defined template for future collaboration. The civic traditions of northern Italy, for example, provide a historical repertoire of forms of collaboration that, having proved their worth in the past, are available to citizens for addressing new problems of collective action.

A vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. Vertical flows of information are less reliable than horizontal flows, in part because the subordinate hoards information as a hedge against exploitation. More important, sanctions that support norms of reciprocity against the threat of opportunism are less likely to be imposed upwards and less likely to be acceded to, if imposed. Only a bold or foolhardy subordinate, lacking ties of solidarity with peers, would seek to punish a superior. In the vertical patron-client relationship, characterized by dependence instead of mutuality, opportunism is more likely on the part of both patron (exploitation) and client (shirking). The fact that vertical networks are less helpful than horizontal networks in solving dilemmas of collective action may be one reason why capitalism turned out to be more efficient than feudalism in the eighteenth century, and why democracy has proven more effective than autocracy in the twentieth century.

Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. As with conventional capital, those who have social capital tend to accumulate more than they have, get. Successful collaboration in one endeavor builds connections and trust social assets that lubricate

future collaboration in other, perhaps unrelated tasks. Social capital is what Albert Hirschman has called a "moral resource," that is, a resource whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which becomes depleted if *not* used.<sup>43</sup> Trust itself is an emergent property of the social system, as much as a personal attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded.

For all these reasons, the creation and destruction of social capital is marked by virtuous and vicious circles. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being. These traits define the civic community. Conversely, the absence of these traits in the *un*-civic community is also self-reinforcing. Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles. Authoritarian government, patron-clientelism, and extralegal "enforcers" represent a second-best, "default" solution: through them, individuals can find some refuge from the war of all against all, without pursuing the impossible dream of cooperation. Force and family provide a primitive substitute for the civic community.

In other words reciprocity/trust and dependence/exploitation each can hold society together, although at quite different levels of efficiency and institutional performance. Once in either of these two settings, rational actors have an incentive to act consistently with its rules. History determines which of these two stable outcomes characterizes any given society. Historical turning points thus can have extremely long-lived consequences. History is not always efficient, in the sense of weeding out social practices that impede progress and encourage collective irrationality. Nor is this inertia somehow attributable to individual irrationality. On the contrary individuals responding rationally to the social context bequeathed to them by history reinforce the social pathologies.

## Conclusion

For at least ten centuries the North and the South have followed contrasting approaches to the dilemmas of collective action that afflict all societies. In the North norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement have been embodied in tower societies, guilds, mutual aid societies, cooperatives, unions, and even soccer clubs and literary societies. These horizontal civic bonds have undergirded levels of economic and institutional performance generally much

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<sup>43</sup>A. O. Hirschman, "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse," *Proceedings, American Economic Review* 74 (1984): 93.

higher than in the South, where social and political relations have been vertically structured. *Although we are accustomed to thinking of the state and the market as alternative mechanisms for solving social problems, this history suggests that both states and markets operate more efficiently in civic settings.*

This civic equilibrium has shown remarkable stability although its effects have been disrupted from time to time by exogenous forces like pestilence, war, and world trade shifts. The contrasting, Hobbesian equilibrium in the South has been even more stable although less fruitful. Mutual distrust and defection, vertical dependence and exploitation, isolation and disorder, criminality and backwardness have reinforced one another in interminable vicious circles.

When the regional reform was introduced in 1970, therefore, the new institutions were implanted in very different social contexts. Civic regions were characterized by a dense network of local associations, by active engagement in community affairs, by egalitarian patterns of politics, by trust and law-abidingness. In less civic regions political and social participation was organized vertically, not horizontally. Mutual suspicion and corruption were regarded as normal. Involvement in civic associations was scanty. Lawlessness was expected. People in these communities felt powerless and exploited. They were right.

Where norms and networks of civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for collective action appears bleak. The fate of the Mezzogiorno is an object lesson for developing countries today and the former Communist lands of Eurasia tomorrow, moving uncertainly toward self-government. For political stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital. Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the Mezzogiorno—amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation may be likelier than successful democratization and economic development.

The civic community has deep historical roots. This could be a depressing observation for those who view institutional reform as a strategy for political change. The president of Basilicata cannot move his government to Emilia, nor can the prime minister of Azerbaijan move his country to the Baltic. When he heard our conclusions, one able reformist regional president in an uncivic region exclaimed, "This is a counsel of despair! If you're right, nothing I can do will improve our prospects for success. The fate of the reform was sealed centuries ago." He was surely right that building social capital will not be easy.

On the other hand the Italian experiment suggests that this is an urgent task, for social capital is one key to *both* effective, responsive government *and* economic growth. Researchers and policymakers concerned about democracy and economic growth in developing societies must now be about the task of unearthing ancient shards of social capital that might be reassembled, as well as the task of nourishing new shoots of civic engagement.

## Taking Culture into Account: From "Let's" to "How"

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*With the failure of dependent development in Africa, many other countries in the post-Cold War world will want to know what kind of development does work. That we should take culture into account when discussing development has been known for at least forty years. What is not known is how to take culture into account, both scientifically (methods and data) and practically. In the 1990s "how" will take center stage: how might people in developing countries improve their lives by taking culture into account, and can social sciences, such as anthropology, provide practical help? Why, although people have studied culture for a century or more, don't we have well-developed theories, practical guidelines, and close professional links between those who study culture and those who make and manage development policy? This paper investigates four possible explanations: cultural clashes within academia; fear of the misuse, both scientific and practical, of cultural knowledge; the inherent difficulty of studying cultures scientifically, or the methodological difficulties of modeling and estimating culture-by-policy interactions; and the possibility that some success stories have been underpublicized. This paper recommends a renaissance of applied cultural studies through the consolidation and generation of knowledge about (1) how cultural diversity affects what people do and want; (2) how cultural factors interact with other variables in the "production" of development, good and bad; and (3) how culture itself is affected by various kinds of development and other factors.*

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### Déjà Vu?

Almost forty years ago in Paris some of the foremost social scientists of the day met to discuss taking culture into account in economic development.<sup>1</sup> Georges

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<sup>1</sup>This is a revised version of a paper presented at the International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa, Washington, D.C., April 2-3, 1992. The author is grateful for the support of the Arts and Humanities Division of The Rockefeller Foundation and the Africa Technical Department of the World Bank, without implicating either institution in the views expressed here. The author, an American, can be reached at the Department of Economics, University of Natal, King George V Avenue, Durban 4001, South Africa, tel. 27-31-816-2579, fax 27-31-816-2581.

Balandier was the rapporteur, and his notes on the five-day colloquium make fascinating reading.<sup>2</sup>

There were the reminders that become rituals on occasions like these. For example: "Culture" is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define; no matter what the definition, it is not something static and historical as previously posited but ever evolving and dynamic; usually not something unitary and uniform either but, metaphorically, a blend or a colloid or perhaps even something akin to multiple personalities. Differing cultures deserve respect. Too much has been made of the negative features of traditional societies and not enough of the positive, from which so-called modern societies can learn. Cultures manifest their own "configurations" of motivations and incentives, as a consequence of their "specific cultural capital." There are no necessary or sufficient cultural preconditions for economic development. Policies and economic systems adapt to culture and cultures to them, policies can change cultures, cultures have their own dynamic of change, and valuations of developmental ends and means are themselves shaped by culture. Indeed, or especially, "development" itself is a culturally loaded term, ready to succumb to ethnocentrism. And so forth. Alas, these prefaces to hard work, which are, of course, not merely scientific but are themselves freighted with cultural content and political correctness, occupied much of the conference's five days.

The distinguished, multicultural group of anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and sociologists at the 1954 colloquium was virtually unanimous on several points. The participants believed that broader and more interdisciplinary work in social science would help "us" understand economic development and cultural change. (Here and throughout, let us interpret this generic "us" generously, as referring not just to academicians or internationalists but to peoples throughout the world as we strive in myriad ways to accelerate, modify, or avoid "development" of various kinds.) And the participants agreed that scientific research on the interrelationships between culture and development would pay practical benefits. Such a multidisciplinary effort would, in the words of P. Gourou as rendered in Balandier's notes, enable a better understanding of adaptation, which would "multiply the cases of success and facilitate the job of modernization."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>"Etude comparée des motivations et stimulations économiques en milieu coutumier et en milieu 'moderniste' dans le cadre des pays dits 'sous-développés,'" Bureau international de recherche sur les implications sociales du progrès technique (BIRISPT)/6-/S.1/54 (Results of a colloquium organized by the International Research Office on Social Implications of Technological Change, International Social Science Council, Paris, March 1-6, 1954).

<sup>3</sup>P. Gourou, in "Etude comparée des motivations et stimulations économiques," 6-7.

This convergence of views was impressive. Let's call it the *let's* point, as in "Let's take culture into account." In particular, "Let's supplement the disembodied models of economics with the additional dimensions, the thick descriptions, the symbolic engines of cultural diversity." As Otto Klineberg put it, economic and "biological exigencies" operate in different "cultural systems and particular historical contexts."<sup>4</sup>

But the conferees were less impressive in saying *how*, as in "How should one take culture into account?" The "how" question has at least two interpretations.

One is *scientific*. How should multidisciplinary research on culture and development proceed? Vaguely, the participants foresaw cross-cultural data and interdisciplinary models that would improve explanations and predictions. Although some conferees cited examples in the right direction, they agreed that we were a long way from the needed data, models, and scientific cooperation across disciplines.

The other "how" question is *practical*. How should we take cultural diversity into account as we, for example, design participatory processes, set up systems of education and credit and health care, allocate resources, manage rural development or urban enterprise, negotiate international cooperation, and address a host of other real-life matters of importance, sometimes of life and death? About the practical how the conferees said little, apart from a few expressions of understandable squeamishness over cultural change and over the enormous and unprecedented responsibilities assumed by local, national, and international agencies working on "modernization."

The 1954 colloquium may be a kind of text for the topics that we will be addressing these two days. We, too, may find it hard to resist the temptations of invoking elementary reminders about "culture" and about "development," knowing that however often we hear those reminders many people go on behaving as if they never had. We, too, may find it enticing to call for more interdisciplinary research but without focusing on the hard work of the scientific *how*: that is, methodologies and data. And regarding the practical *how* question, we may find ourselves subject to such potent contradictory inclinations for example, to speak only for myself, both an acute perception of the urgent need for action to mobilize resources on behalf of the world's suffering and the gnawing cynicism that, judging from the past, "action" may have ill effects, both economic and cultural that on questions of culture and development we will be

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<sup>4</sup>Otto Klineberg, in "Etude comparée des motivations et stimulations économiques,"

content to remain critical rather than constructive, to rest on refrains like "Listen to the people" or "Hire more non-economic social scientists," and simply to admonish "Let's take culture into account" as if by itself this were useful advice.

### Why "How" Now?

In the 1990s I believe the issue of *how* to take culture into account will take center stage. Today's worldwide wave of democratic and free market reforms will fail to live up to optimistic expectations. Increasingly, people from societies as different as those of Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, and Latin America will be asking for help in learning from the mistakes and successes of others, help in adapting economic and political institutions to local conditions. Africa is a harbinger. The failures of "development" there have spawned a series of calls to take African cultures more fully into account.

### *Adapting Policies to Cultures and Environments*

". . . [B]uilding on the indigenous is the necessary condition for self-reliant development to which there is now no alternative," writes Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake. "The evidence is in: dependent development has failed. . . . To all appearances, the failure is irreversible."<sup>5</sup> The solution is to adapt policies and programs to cultural differences. "We build on the indigenous by making it determine the form and the content of development strategy, by ensuring that development change accommodates itself to these things, be they values, interests, aspirations and or social institutions which are important in the life of the people. It is only when developmental change comes to terms with them that it can become sustainable."<sup>6</sup>

Piet Buijsrogge agrees, in a book summarizing the lessons from more than twenty years of rural development through the Centre d'études économiques et sociales d'Afrique de l'Ouest. "We come to the conclusion that the structures and traditional values of different villages have been the point of departure of a dynamic of development, a conclusion that destroys the theory which affirms that the obstacle to development resides precisely in these structures and values of tradition."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Claude Ake, "Building on the Indigenous," in *Recovery in Africa: A Challenge for Development Cooperation in the 90s*, ed. Pierre Frühling (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1988), 21.

<sup>6</sup>Ake, "Building on the Indigenous," 19.

<sup>7</sup>Piet Buijsrogge, *Initiatives paysannes en Afrique de l'Ouest*, my translation (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), 25.

Or consider another variation of the theme of cultural roots. "We feel very strongly that for an effective transition, you need to maintain very strong principles," observes Dr. Ben Ngubana, a leader in South Africa's Inkatha Freedom Party. These principles should be based on "traditional black culture, including tribal structures and respect for the role of royalty." He decried the "appalling breakdown in the social fabric where black people have been thrown into an unstructured urban environment. . . . The very high rate of teenage pregnancies is an example of what happens when you get a breakdown of very fundamental value systems. . . . Blacks have to move, but their societies must remain intact, preserving respect, order, discipline."<sup>8</sup>

On a different level Western management systems and behavior must be adapted to African cultures, contends Ivorian Henry Bourgoïn, founder of the Centre inter-africain pour le développement de la formation professionnelle.<sup>9</sup> French scholar Alain Henry describes how a successful West African enterprise does just that, for example, by using a detailed manual of operations to fortify affective ties among employees and at the same time to limit those ties. Henry recommends "'inculturating' the principles of 'classic' management to adapt them to local particularities," a process he is investigating through case studies of successful African firms.<sup>10</sup>

### *Adapting Cultures to Policies and Environments*

One may think not only of the adaptation of policies and management to cultures but of the adaptation of cultures themselves. In his inaugural lecture in the chair in psychology at the University of Transkei, Q.T. Mjoli argued that "the most conspicuous characteristic of most Black areas in South Africa is their poverty and underdevelopment" and that "the main cause of this poverty and underdevelopment lies in some cultural factors which militate against creativity, productivity, and the like." He derives two alternatives. One option "to resolve the person-environment mismatch found in Southern African organizations is to Africanize the organizations themselves"—that is, to adapt them to local cultures. The other is to promote cultural change, "to westernize the Africans particularly

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<sup>8</sup>"Inkatha's Man Set to Bridge the Gap," *Sunday Tribune* (Durban), December 15, 1991, 15.

<sup>9</sup>Henry Bourgoïn, *L'Afrique malade du management* (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1984).

<sup>10</sup>Alain Henry, "La métamorphose d'un style africain: L'efficacité dans le respect des traditions ancestrales," my translation (Unpublished paper, Caisse centrale de coopération économique, Paris, April 1991), 1.

by attempting to change their personality and value structure mainly through appropriate training programs."<sup>11</sup>

Elaborating some themes also presented in his speech to this conference,<sup>12</sup> Kenyan political scientist Ali A. Mazrui's 1990 book "seeks to demonstrate that both *ideology* and *technology* are rooted in culture. . . . Certainly, differences in skills and technique are, on the whole, more basic than differences in income. And these skill differences are profoundly affected by *culture*."<sup>13</sup> He characterizes traditional African societies as "cultures of nostalgia rather than of anticipation," cultures that move slowly, value prestige instead of achievement, "impressive when judged by standards of charity and solidarity" but where "productivity and effectiveness are less than optimal."<sup>14</sup> The survival of this local culture has advantages and disadvantages. "On the negative side, rural culture may be in any case a culture of poverty and indigence. On the positive side, much of the countryside is the repository of what is authentic and distinctive in a particular society."<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, Africa has also tended to borrow the worst:

Africa as a whole borrowed the wrong things from the West even the wrong components of capitalism. We borrowed the profit motive but not the entrepreneurial spirit. We borrowed the acquisitive appetites of capitalism but not the creative risk-taking. We are at home with Western gadgets but are bewildered by Western workshops. We wear the wristwatch but refuse to watch it for the culture of punctuality. We have learnt to parade in display, but not to drill in discipline. The West's consumption patterns have arrived, but not necessarily the West's techniques of production.<sup>16</sup>

Cultural change will be needed; Mazrui's recommendation is that it be done slowly (and of course indigenously). "If the 'modernization' of the countryside could be delayed for another generation or two, it could give the society as a whole a better chance to choose a path of 'modernization' which

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<sup>11</sup>Q. T. Mjoli, "The Role of the Psychologist in Culturally Diverse Southern Africa," *Development Southern Africa* 4 (1)(February 1987), 7, 17-18.

<sup>12</sup>Ali A. Mazrui, "Development in a Multi-Cultural Context: Trends and Tensions" (Address given at the International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa at World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2-3, 1992).

<sup>13</sup>Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (London: James Currey, 1990), 1, 4.

<sup>14</sup>Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, 202.

<sup>15</sup>Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, 203.

<sup>16</sup>Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, 5.

would not be excessively based on 'Westernization.'<sup>17</sup> He leaves in the air how this might be accomplished.

"Assuredly," writes Daniel Etounga-Manguellé in a recent book about his native Africa, "revolutionizing our culture and thus our political culture—is the only way to obtain the desired change. To deny that is to accept that we be marginalized: not only in economic terms—that is clear!—but also in psychological and moral terms."<sup>18</sup> He identifies the "principal lacunae that explain our counter-performance in a world based on other values" as the lack of "a critical culture: that is, a system of digestion and assimilation of new cultural events that permit the popular (ethnological) culture to progress."<sup>19</sup> He also cites as African characteristics to be overcome "the jealousy, the blind submission to the irrational, the lethargy."<sup>20</sup> But his recommendation seems the opposite of Ali Mazrui's although both agree that any solution will have to be African. Etounga-Manguellé says Africa needs a "program of cultural adjustment" carried out by Africans that would transform their "mentality" to one more consistent with values in the rest of the world. As his paper for this conference indicates, Etounga-Manguellé is working on the ground to catalyze such rethinking and transforming within African organizations.<sup>21</sup>

Cameroonian Axelle Kabou discovers an intellectual conspiracy against recognizing what she deems the obvious cultural rejection of "development" in much of Africa. African cultures and mentalities are the main obstacles to development yet they never appear on the "long list of official causes of underdevelopment." Indeed, these mentalities, she points out, as well as the very idea of *underdevelopment*, have become taboos. The result of "thirty years of disinformation" is that words and realities no longer coincide, that Africans fail to face up to the need to become something new: authentically African but different from what they are now. Africans must understand the depth of their underdevelopment, which is not a matter of capital or resources but "inside the heads of Africans." For the Africa of the twenty-first century to succeed, it must

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<sup>17</sup>Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, 203.

<sup>18</sup>Daniel Etounga-Manguellé, *L'Afrique: A-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel?* my translation (Ivry-sur-Seine: Editions nouvelles du sud, 1990), 82. He cites B. Lussato and G. Messadié, *Bouillon de culture* (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1986), 22.

<sup>19</sup>Etounga-Manguellé, *L'Afrique: A-t-elle besoin d'un programme?* 72.

<sup>20</sup>Etounga-Manguellé, *L'Afrique: A-t-elle besoin d'un programme?* 72.

<sup>21</sup>Daniel Etounga-Manguellé, "Culture and Development: African Responses" (Paper presented at the International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa at World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2-3, 1992).

become rational and to do so first of all implies facing up to its deepest problems. Again, the "how" is left vague.<sup>22</sup>

Africa is an extreme case. Across the continent we discover a widespread perception of failure in development and the belief that cultural dimensions have somehow been left out of the equation. But Africa is not alone. Around the world, we hear similar themes—and, increasingly, we will confront a similar question: How might we do better by taking culture into account?

### An Agricultural Analogy

To put this question in focus, it may be useful to consider an agricultural analogy. Many factors go into a farmer's choice of crops to grow. Preferences and customs matter. Economic conditions, such as the prices of various crops and of relevant inputs, matter. Soil conditions matter. The farmer chooses the crops to grow depending on a number of factors operating simultaneously.

The farmer knows a lot about local soils. Yet she may benefit from additional knowledge: first, from more precise scientific information about her own soil conditions, and second, from scientific knowledge about the crops that grow best in different soil and climatic conditions. Moreover, as a result of scientific information and analysis, the farmer might choose to modify the soil conditions. She might, for example, use fertilizers or employ contour planting or intercrop.

Thus, the farmer might combine scientific information about soil-by-crop interactions and about techniques to "change" soil conditions with relevant economic analysis and her own preferences and values to (1) choose crops and (2) change soil conditions to do better according to her own lights.

Now the analogy I am suggesting says that "taking soil into account" resembles "taking culture into account." Culture is the symbolic soil in which development takes place. Consider Robert B. Putnam's fascinating example from Italy.<sup>23</sup> He and his colleagues show that the decentralization of government in 1970 was a policy that "grew" differently in different parts of Italy. The authors found that the cultural "soil conditions" were a powerful explanatory variable, particularly the extent of horizontal (or civic) associations as opposed to vertical ones.

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<sup>22</sup>Axelle Kabou, *Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement?* my translation (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991).

<sup>23</sup>Robert B. Putnam, "Democracy, Development and the Civic Community: Evidence from an Italian Experiment" (Paper published in this *Proceedings*); and his book with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

How should Putnam's finding be taken into account? Suppose we know that decentralized government will fare less well in some cultural settings than in others. What is known about ways to tailor decentralization to differing cultural conditions metaphorically, to change plant varieties depending on the soil? And what is known about ways to alter those cultural conditions themselves for example, about ways to foster the civic community?

Or take the fascinating categorization of cultural types offered by Aaron Wildavsky and his colleagues.<sup>24</sup> Suppose a given society is somehow assessed as having such-and-such a mix of Wildavsky's five cultures. What can one say about how to tailor, say, credit programs or school systems or public sector incentives or anti-poverty strategies, to the mix of cultural types? And what is known about how the mix of cultural types changes, including as a consequence of policy choices?

These examples raise general issues. Albert O. Hirschman has identified a paradigmatic tension in project design *trait-taking* versus *trait-making*. The former takes local attributes as given and builds projects around them. Trait-making, in contrast, makes changing these attributes one of the goals of the project. Whatever our choice, we will face criticism.

The dilemma of project design is then the following: if the project is planned, built, and operated on the basis of certain negative attributes of the status quo, taking them for granted as inevitable and unchangeable, it may miss important opportunities for effecting positive changes in these attributes on the contrary, it may even confirm and strengthen them. The achievements of the project would then be far below what they might have been, and the net result could even be negative from the point of view of some "social progress function." The project planners will stand convicted as persons without imagination who do not really believe in change and perhaps do not desire it. If, on the other hand, success in the construction and operation of the project is hinged to a prior or concurrent or subsequent change in some of

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<sup>24</sup>In addition to Wildavsky's paper for this conference, "How Cultural Theory Can Contribute to Understanding and Promoting Democracy, Science, and Development," see, for example, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1990). Going beyond the idea of a group having a single culture is crucial to Wildavsky and his colleagues: "[W]e suggest that the concept of political culture failed because it was assumed that a nation (or race or ethnic group or tribe) had a single political culture" (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*, 209).

the attributes of backwardness, the project's fate becomes a wager. If the wager is lost, preventing the needed change and jeopardizing the project's success, the project planners will be accused of ignoring local circumstances, traditions, and sociopolitical structure and of incorrigible naivete and lack of realism in general.<sup>25</sup>

Obviously, both trait-taking and trait-making may be involved, depending on the case; and obviously, applying this logic to cultures is a touchy subject. In the literature I have found plenty of pronouncements about the importance of respecting culture, some on the importance of changing culture. But I have found no formulation that would help us work through how to adapt a policy or process to given cultural endowments, how to change those endowments (with what costs and uncertainties), and how to balance the two.

### How Culture Matters

Taking culture into account is even more complicated than taking soil conditions into account. I find it useful to separate three ways that "culture matters."

(1)  $Utility_{C_i} = U_{C_i}$  (Development, Policies, Environment, . . . )

(2)  $Development = D$  (Policies, Environment, Culture, . . . )

(3)  $Culture = C$  (Development, Policies, Environment, . . . )

The first equation says that the social utility function under cultural conditions  $C_i$  has many dimensions—development, policy choices, the environmental conditions broadly construed, and other variables. The functional form of the utility function depends on the cultural conditions (including the possibility of different arguments in different cultures; we shall leave that in the ellipsis).

As an illustration let us turn to one argument of that culturally conditioned social utility function, Development. Imagine here some measures of economic or political development; we shall suppress our skepticism about measurement to make an analytical point. Equation (2) presents a production function for development. It states that development is a function of policy

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<sup>25</sup>Albert O. Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), 130-31. An even more general formulation concerns static and dynamic comparative advantage in a system with its own dynamic of change from causes outside one's scope of intervention. Should a country act as though its current comparative advantage—say, in raw materials or assembly industries—is permanent and build its economic strategy on its endowments and abilities as they exist? Or should a country try to *develop* a comparative advantage, in effect changing its endowments and abilities through investments, the restriction of imports, and other means? What is the optimal blend?

choices (such as type of democracy, degree and type of decentralization, and economic strategies), the environment broadly construed (including natural resources and international markets), "cultural variables," and others. One task of applied cultural studies should be to specify this equation, particularly the culture-by-policy interactions. How do the effects of economic and other policies depend on cultural conditions?

The third equation says that the cultural vector itself is a function of many things including policy choices, development outcomes, environmental conditions, and other variables. Culture is not static but subject to change. Some of these changes are planned; many are unplanned. Some can be avoided or slowed or speeded; others cannot. Many interesting questions again are empirical.

If we had such equations remember our generous definition of "we" how could we use them to make decisions? The economist's instinct is to choose policies to maximize utility, taking cultural conditions and other variables into account. But the equations show that the maximization problem would be a complicated one indeed. In particular, look at "Culture." It is at once a dependent variable in equation (3), an independent or moderating variable in equation (2), and a giver of meaning in equation (1), in the sense that the utility function itself depends to some degree on the culture. In making choices, we must take culture into account in all these ways.

Even though farmers know their own soil conditions well, they can often benefit from the analyses and advice of soil scientists. So, too, should people "participating" in the design of their own policies and processes benefit from knowing what choices tend to work under what cultural and other conditions and how cultures themselves change as a consequence of their choices. With such knowledge in hand, we could rethink the choice of policies with new richness indeed, we could *take culture into account*.

### **Cultural Studies: Why Is How So Hard?**

About these questions the social science literature is astonishingly silent, particularly in the past thirty years. It is a provocative exaggeration, but perhaps a useful one, to go further: the legacy of sociology and anthropology in this century might be described as *the promise of application in search of a how*.

In the 1920s Franz Boas and Marcel Mauss called for applied anthropology. Both envisioned something like culture-by-policy interactions, something like planned cultural change. In 1952 Margaret Mead led a team of authors in a UNESCO volume trying to apply anthropology to the problems of development; two years later Georges Balandier wrote two volumes on anthropology applied

to the current problems of Africa.<sup>26</sup> But this objective has been eclipsed in anthropology by another, more humanities-oriented goal one more critical in the deconstructionist sense. Worried by the involvement of their scientific predecessors in the colonial enterprise, which by the mid-1950s was of course the enemy; troubled by commingling with concepts of culture and race, which Nazism had discredited as useful analytical devices; imbued by a relativist agenda, perhaps now self-consciously combined with the seeking of one's own self through ethnographic encounter: with all this in mind, a new wave of anthropologists shifted the *problématique* of anthropology. Not only can "we" not judge another culture but also we should question our abilities even to apprehend it. The encounter between the Self and the Other took center stage. The early anthropologists' concerns with scientific description of *le fait sociale totale* and analysis of functional relationships in primitive societies was undercut by skeptical critiques of such "constructions" of reality. The new preoccupation was with the creation of scientific (or pseudo-scientific) authority as well as of colonial authority; and it was implied that somehow the two must be linked.

In this process, practical questions were submerged. The anthropologist could only call for the preservation of local cultures at least, until a new generation of feminist anthropologists asked whether sexual subjugation and genital mutilation were simply to be waved aside, indeed defended, in the name of cultural survival. Abuses of human rights posed similar problems.<sup>27</sup> But "development" was always placed in quotes, always the subject of prior analysis but seldom of practical, constructive, empirically driven research about how development might proceed better by taking culture into account.

Meanwhile, in the backwaters of the academic fields of social and cultural studies have arisen applied subfields. When one analyzes the frameworks and the cases of success claimed for these fields, one tends to find not the application of scientific models of culture, not the specification of culture-by-policy interactions, not even what Roger Bastide thought might be applied anthropology's contribution to science the chance to test and develop scientific theories under conditions of planned change.<sup>28</sup> Instead, one finds what might be called the ability to listen to what the poor say their problems are, what they

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<sup>26</sup>Georges Balandier, *L'anthropologie appliquée aux problèmes des pays sous-développés*, Fasc. I and II (Prepared for a course at Institut d'études politiques, Université de Paris (Paris: Les cours de droit, 1954-55).

<sup>27</sup>See *Human Rights and Anthropology*, ed. Theodore E. Downing and Gilbert Kushner (Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival, Inc., 1989), especially the articles by Clifford R. Barnett ("Is There a Scientific Basis in Anthropology for the Ethics of Human Rights?") and Sybil Wolfram ("Human Rights': Commentary").

<sup>28</sup>Roger Bastide, *Anthropologie appliquée* (Paris: Payot, 1971).

know and don't know about the solutions, and what they think they need. Maurice Bloch puts it this way: "Anthropology is of as much use in practical problems as almost any other social science, and no more important than common sense and the ability to listen to people. . . . I am still hoping that there will be some successful applied anthropology."<sup>29</sup>

If culture should be taken into account and people have studied culture scientifically for a century or more, why don't we have well-developed theories, practical guidelines, and close professional links between those who study culture and those who make and manage development policy?

I think I have uncovered several reasons, which I describe elsewhere.<sup>30</sup>

1. "Cultural differences" within academia between anthropologists and economists, and more generally between humanists and scientists
2. The fear that taking culture into account will lead to oversimplification, discrimination, and sins of commission even more damaging than the sins of omission that occur by not "taking culture into account"
3. The sheer scientific difficulty of specifying the ways that cultures and policy choices interact
4. A limited and I believe misguided notion of policy analysis.

### *Intellectual Cultures Clashing*

The first reason concerns what might be called intellectual cultures: people are addressing different questions for different reasons. Intellectual styles and methodologies, predispositions and political agendas, even something akin to personality differences: these imperfectly but significantly distinguish, for example, most anthropologists from most economists. (Table 1 summarizes some of the contrasts.) Bluntly, anthropologists have opted out of the major problems of development for reasons close to cultural.

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<sup>29</sup>Gustaaf Houtman, "Interview with Maurice Bloch," *Anthropology Today*, 4(1) (1988): 19.

<sup>30</sup>Robert Klitgaard, "In Search of Culture: A Progress Report on Culture and Development" (Unpublished paper, July 1991. Available from the Office of the Vice President, Environmentally Sustainable Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C.); "On Culture and Development," *Theoria* 78 (October 1991); and "What If We Knew All about Cultures?" (Paper prepared for the UNESCO Meeting of Experts on the Cultural Dimensions of Development, Paris, September 1991), a version of which was published in *Critical Arts* 6 (2) (1993): 49-67.

It was not always so, or not so stark anyway, which suggests historical factors are also at work. Indeed, they are: the critique of anthropologists' role in the colonial enterprise occurred after the breakdown of colonialism and with the onset of national liberation movements.<sup>31</sup> It was concomitant with a more general questioning of Western culture itself and a phobia of discussions of individual and group differences.

The current juncture is almost one of cultural opposition, with anthropologists and other students of culture aligned against economists and "developmentalists." Some aspects of the relations among these groups resemble intercultural hostility and distrust in which the minority group's identity is in part defined in terms of opposition to the (nonetheless envied) Other. This opposition leads to declarations of faith dressed up as scientific inquiry, to predictable stock roles and "texts." These may be understood in part as responses by marginalized people to a dominant culture.

Such an analysis of the culture of cultural studies itself—such a "deconstruction," such a sociological "explanation"—may have its uses, but it would be a terrible place to stop. Even if valid, it does not imply that communication and collegiality are impossible across intellectual cultures. Nor does it mean that anthropology and cultural studies could not provide much more of practical use. (It *does* mean we should be aware of our cultural differences.)

### *The Fear of Misuse*

Another factor discouraging practical application is the fear of misuse and misunderstanding. Many of this century's greatest crimes have occurred under the guise of taking culture into account. The fears applied to development remain unanalyzed, for the most part. To begin to unpack them, suppose we had perfect specifications of the three equations mentioned above, which show how culture simultaneously (1) affects the utility function for valued outcomes, (2) is an argument in the production function for things like economic growth and good government, and (3) is itself a dependent variable affected by policy choices and by factors beyond our control. If we knew all about these equations, how would we use this knowledge?

Elsewhere, I give many examples of the dilemmas of using such information in international development.<sup>32</sup> Analogies can be drawn to the use

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<sup>31</sup>Jean Copans, *La longue marche de la modernité africaine: savoirs, intellectuels, démocratie* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

<sup>32</sup>Klitgaard, *In Search of Culture*, and Klitgaard, "What If We Knew All about Cultures?"

of psychological information in personnel and educational decisions,<sup>33</sup> or to genetic screening in medicine. These various arenas of the application of scientific knowledge display similar categories of dangers, a morphology of misuse, for example, the possible contribution to stereotyping, Type I and Type II errors, and dynamic effects on group identities.

These problems immediately reveal that "taking culture into account" touches on central questions of what it is that we are trying to do with "development" and indeed with intellectual inquiry as well as on philosophical questions of what it *means* to "analyze a culture." And these problems in turn reveal an important avenue of policy research: how to prevent the misuse and misunderstanding of cultural knowledge.

### *Scientific Difficulties*

Yet another problem stands in the way of applied cultural studies: scientifically, it is too hard. Ideally, we want to specify and estimate our three equations, with an emphasis on the *interactions* among cultures and policy interventions, given a host of other variables in a dynamic system. Then, in one idealized framework at least, we would one choose policies to maximize social benefits defined in terms of the local cultures.

But we do not have anything approaching an agronomy like science of culture. Even beginning to fill out the three equations makes us realize how limited is our knowledge. Much past research went awry because it confused the three equations: it mixed up culture as an outcome variable, as a causal variable, and as an indexer of utility functions. Beyond that, the development of applied cultural studies faces grave difficulties in (1) defining variables, (2) data collection, and (3) empirical estimation. In particular, recent work in statistics and psychometrics shows that the search for policy-by-culture interactions is plagued by estimation problems that were underappreciated even fifteen years ago.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Robert Klitgaard, *Choosing Elites* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), especially chap. 3, and Klitgaard, *Elitism and Meritocracy in Developing Countries* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>34</sup>This is made clear in recent psychometric reviews of the aptitude-treatment interaction problem. See, for example, David Rogosa, "A Longitudinal Approach to ATI Research: Models for Individual Growth and Models for Individual Differences in Response to an Intervention" (Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 1990); James Jaccard, Choi K. Wan, and Robert Turrissi, "The Detection and Interpretation of Interaction Effects between Continuous Variables in Multiple Regression," *Multivariate*

*An Inappropriate Idea of Policy Analysis*

A grave error in the incorporation of anthropologists and indeed of social scientists in governments and aid agencies is to use them solely to plan and evaluate projects. Recent discussions of culture and development commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development, UNESCO, the German and Norwegian international development agencies GTZ and NORAD, and the World Bank have accepted this model and thought that the problem was how to gain more social scientific leverage on project design more clout through better questions and answers, more staff, more "policy guidelines."<sup>35</sup>

Many frameworks for such sociocultural analysis exist. Their utility in the design of development projects has proved disappointing. For example, in the U.S. Agency for International Development, my reanalysis of a flawed evaluation shows no significant relationship between the quality of the "social soundness analysis" and the eventual success of the projects.<sup>36</sup> Less dramatically, for technical reasons I find a flattering evaluation of social assessment in the World Bank unconvincing.<sup>37</sup> The experience of Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ) is typical. It has promulgated a list of "Socio-Cultural Key Factors in Development Cooperation," which is to guide "feasibility and impact assessment studies." The list has come under fire for several reasons, according to Hans-Dieter Evers. One is that the list of key factors is not

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*Behavioral Research* 25 (4) (1991); Lee J. Cronbach, "Emerging Views on Methodology" (Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, February 1990); and *Learning and Individual Differences: Advances in Theory and Research*, ed. Phillip L. Ackerman, Robert J. Sternberg, and Robert Glaser (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989). For similar statistical problems in the modeling of cognitive development, see *Cognition: L'individuel et l'universel*, ed. M. Reuchlin and others (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990); and Maurice Reuchlin and Françoise Bacher, *Les différences individuelles dans le développement cognitif de l'enfant* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989).

<sup>35</sup>See, for example, *The Socio-Cultural Dimension of Development: The Contribution of Sociologists and Social Anthropologists to the Work of Development Agencies*, ed. Michael Schönhuth (Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische, 1991), with discussions of these problems in the aid programs of Britain, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the World Bank; *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Cernea (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and David Gow and others, *Social Analysis for the Nineties: Case Studies and Proposed Guidelines* (Bethesda, Md.: Development Alternatives, Inc., December 1989).

<sup>36</sup>See the analysis of Gow and others in Klitgaard, *In Search of Culture*, 79-84.

<sup>37</sup>Conrad Phillip Kottak, "When People Don't Come First: Some Sociological Lessons from Completed Projects," in Cernea, *Putting People First*.

comprehensive indeed, that the very idea of key factors is objectionable. "I do not understand," writes Professor Evers, "why anthropologists in particular are so upset about the attempt that has been made at what Niklas Luhmann calls a 'reduction of complexity.' . . . The greater the need for comparison, the greater the need to reduce complexity. This is standard practice in social science."<sup>38</sup>

Perhaps to some academics the BMZ's list of key factors is not extensive enough, but in practice, Evers goes on, the key factors "are so broad and tend to cover all possible socio-cultural variables." The list has spawned "encyclopedic" reports, which are "too bulky and too difficult to digest." Consequently, at best these sociocultural analyses serve as useful background information; they prove "ineffective as recommendations for action."

Existing checklists of sociocultural variables do help provoke thought about cultural and other dimensions, but they tend not to help us think through the trade-off between trait-taking and trait-making in project design. Simply identifying an existing cultural constraint (if one can actually do so) does not imply that one should let that constraint be (nor that one should try to change it). More analysis is needed to decide whether to take the trait as given or try to make a new trait, and in this domain existing frameworks provide little help.

I have also reviewed many cases cited as successful applications of sociocultural knowledge in project design. In virtually every case the project's success can be understood in economic terms, without the assistance of cultural variables or of culture-by-policy interactions. Insofar as anthropology or other social sciences seemed to make a difference, it was through the ability to listen to people tell what they want and need and how they now go about getting it. Successful anthropology seems more a means of gathering data, a willingness to empathize, and a stance on behalf of the poor. None of the supposedly successful cases, in my opinion, evidences the application of theories or models of culture, the transfer of success stories from one context to another, or an explicit framework for analyzing cultural change.

### **The Pre-Scientific Usefulness of Cultural Studies**

I have argued that part of "taking culture into account" should mean understanding how "cultural dimensions" or "cultural diversity" enter into utility functions and production functions of various kinds, and how these dimensions and this diversity are themselves outcomes of a multivariate, dynamic system. And I have presented a conclusion based on my review of some of the anthropological

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<sup>38</sup>Hans-Dieter Evers, "Optimizing the Use of Social Science Know-How in Development Cooperation," in Schönhuth, *The Socio-Cultural Dimension*, 24.

literature: the literature has so far been of little help in this sort of taking culture into account.

But there are other ways in which anthropology and other social sciences might contribute.

### *Cultural Critique*

One contribution is the recommendation to begin activities aimed at "development" by first critiquing our own culture and ideas about development: our own preferences and capabilities, values and assumptions, ends and means. Anthropology hopes to "reposition" our horizons and "decenter" our perspectives. "We have, with no little success," writes Clifford Geertz of his fellow anthropologists, "sought to keep the world off balance; pulling out rugs, upsetting tea tables, setting off firecrackers. It has been the office of others to reassure; ours to unsettle."<sup>39</sup> The hope is to remind ourselves that "the Other" may see objectives and means differently; therefore, that prevailing ideas of, say, development should be reconsidered. This adds a useful dimension to what Geertz calls "size-up-and-solve social science."<sup>40</sup>

The thought can be extended: one critiques the tenets of social science. For example K.J. Gergen calls for "antagonistic theorizing" to challenge "dominant interpretative modes in society": "The generative theory is one that challenges the guiding assumptions of the culture, raises fundamental questions regarding social life, fosters reconsideration of that which is 'taken for granted' and thereby furnishes fresh alternatives for social action."<sup>41</sup> In generative theory, also called critical theory, the aim is not to collect facts, to construct scientific laws, or to incorporate cultural variables to improve interventions in real life. On the contrary, writes Jeffrey C. Alexander of contemporary approaches to the study of culture: "All start with an interest in meaningful rather than instrumental action and with a commitment to the autonomy of symbolic systems from noncultural kinds of determination."<sup>42</sup> Geertz, George

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<sup>39</sup>Clifford Geertz, "Anti Anti-Relativism," *American Anthropologist* 86 (2) (1984): 275-76.

<sup>40</sup>Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 22-23.

<sup>41</sup>K.J. Gergen, "Towards Intellectual Audacity in Social Psychology," in *The Development of Social Psychology*, ed. Robin Gilmour and Steve Duck (London: Academic Press, 1980), 261; the original is italicized.

<sup>42</sup>Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Analytical Debates: Understanding the Relative Autonomy of Culture," in *Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10.

E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, and other anthropologists connect the "new agenda" of their field with other aspects of postmodern sensitivity.<sup>43</sup> "Today culture has become a theoretically and politically contested terrain," writes Steven Seidman. "The most significant intellectual movements of the last two decades hermeneutics, symbolic anthropology, semiotics, structuralism and poststructuralism, critical theory, and feminism have placed cultural analysis at the center of the human and literary disciplines. The most significant political and moral struggles of our time, at least in the industrial West, focus on cultural issues concerning personal identity, community building, social legitimation and inclusion, moral order, and everyday ethics."<sup>44</sup> Culture is right in the middle of it all whatever such a thing might be that could be so placed.

I have found delving into this literature both exciting and frustrating—a valuable reminder but one that tends to stop there, and one expressed in ways that make me feel as if I were trespassing in an exotic culture whose mores and quarrels often make little sense. As a friendly visitor, may I offer a modest sort of cultural critique in the form of a practical suggestion? The literature contains many declarations that the prevailing vision of development or economics is not the only one, but the literature offers few constructive, detailed alternatives. Providing positive examples of alternative visions could help us work through urgent contemporary choices from multiple points of view, thereby stimulating creative rethinking and problem-solving.

### *Method*

Another possibility is that anthropology is above all a method ethnographic description. Renato Rosaldo relates this anecdote:

. . . [O]n a foggy night a short number of years ago I found myself driving with a physicist along the mountainous stretch of Route 17 between Santa Cruz and San Jose. Both of us felt

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<sup>43</sup>See George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

<sup>44</sup>Steven Seidman, "Substantive Debates: Moral Order and Social Crisis—Perspectives on Modern Culture," in Alexander and Seidman, *Culture and Society*, 235. Coauthor Alexander notes that contemporary theorists agree in their insistence that culture is not determined by anything else—for example, it is "autonomous" from social structure. But "approaches to culture differ from one another in describing precisely what such autonomy implies. . . . Finally, there is extraordinary disagreement over what is actually inside the cultural system itself" (Alexander, "Analytical Debates," 25).

anxious about the weather and somewhat bored, so we began to discuss our respective fields. My companion opened by asking me, as only a physicist could, what anthropologists had discovered.

"Discovered?" I asked, pretending to be puzzled. I was stalling for time. Perhaps something would come to me.

"Yes, you know, something like the properties or the laws of other cultures."

"Do you mean something like  $E = mc^2$ ?"

"Yes," he said.

Inspiration unexpectedly arrived and I heard myself saying, "There's one thing we know for sure. We all know a good description when we see one. We haven't discovered any laws of culture, but we do think there are classic ethnographies, really telling descriptions of other cultures."<sup>45</sup>

Ethnographic research is defined by the long-term, in-depth microstudy. In no other way can usable data can be gathered about, say, household allocations of time as well as money. (Surveys for such intimate information prove unreliable.) But other social scientists, and some anthropologists, argue that the results are seldom generalizable especially when anthropologists themselves emphasize that each village is different—thus detailed field studies turn out to be of little use to policymakers.<sup>46</sup> When Sol Tax published his study of ten years of analysis of the economic activities in a village of 800 Guatemalans, he asked an economist what she would have done differently with the data. "The considered reply was unexpected to me, yet wholly obvious," he reported." As an economist, she would not have spent years in a community of 800 people."<sup>47</sup>

### *Listening to the People*

Another role of applied anthropology is to be the champion of the voiceless, the advocate of popular participation in development projects. "Culture" may be the

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<sup>45</sup>Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon, 1989), 33.

<sup>46</sup>See the fascinating exchange between economist T.N. Srinivasan, "On Studying Socio-Economic Change in Rural India," and anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, "Small-Scale Techniques and Large-Scale Objectives," both in *Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists: Methodological Issues in Measuring Economic Change in Rural India*, ed. Pranab Bardhan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).

<sup>47</sup>Sol Tax, *Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Community* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute of Social Anthropology, 1953), iv.

preoccupation of the people on top in this discipline, but it isn't the game on the ground, where anthropology seems to mean something else altogether. "We look at behavioral practices, not culture I try to keep all such concepts out of our work," John Van Willigen of the University of Kentucky told me in an interview. "Anthropologists have often been put in the role of conduit, finding out what local perspectives are and communicating them to someone else. It's site-specific, seat of the pants, common sensical, not building a model or fitting it into a cultural theory. It's not very grand sort of a procedure, finding out what's happening, and telling others about it."

"It's nothing mysterious," Gerald Murray of the University of Florida explained to me. "Ethnography is just a fancy name for listening to people and recording carefully."

One may fairly ask what is specifically anthropological or cultural about working with and listening to the people. Participant-observers, writes the World Bank's Lawrence F. Salmen in his book *Listen to the People*, should possess skills that are "more anthropological in method and managerial in substance than those now practiced by most evaluators." His list of such skills includes experience with the management or operations of a development agency, familiarity with basic social science research methods and statistics, maturity to discern the relevance of information, openness and the capacity to learn, and "the ability to relate well to persons regardless of status." Despite Salmen's allusion to skills "anthropological in method," none of the techniques or attributes he discusses is necessarily linked to anthropology as a field of study.<sup>48</sup>

At the end of his description of his success in applying anthropology to a health project in Swaziland, anthropologist Edward Green admits that the two fundamental contributions to collect qualitative data and "to look at things from the perspective of tribal, or peasant, or marginal groups" are more methodological than substantive, and perhaps not remarkable at all. "Gaining a project-beneficiary perspective seems so obvious that it is scarcely worth mentioning. But of all the disciplines represented in overseas development work, anthropologists tend to be the most inclined and able through a combination of training, field experience, and perhaps certain personality traits to sympathize and empathize with the rural poor of developing countries."<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Lawrence F. Salmen, *Listen to the People: Participant-Observer Evaluation of Development Projects* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 104-06.

<sup>49</sup>Edward C. Green, "The Planning of Health Education Strategies in Swaziland," in *Anthropological Praxis: Translating Knowledge into Action*, ed. Robert M. Wulff and Shirley J. Fiske (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1987), 24.

A variant of the "listening" theme is to call for the participation of local communities in the design and implementation of policies and projects. Analyzing under what conditions and through what culturally appropriate mechanisms various kinds of "participation" might take place, with what benefits and costs, would seem a fascinating topic for anthropological and other research. The need to go beyond simply calling for "participation" is highlighted in a recent paper by Jonathan Rigg. He blames the failure of many rural development projects in Thailand on using participation inappropriately to "take culture into account." He underscores an implication of rapid change:

The problem is that village life and the aspirations of villagers in Thailand, and in all developing countries, are fundamentally different from those that existed as recently as 20 years ago. The bases upon which traditional village life and livelihood were founded are arguably incompatible with the modern, commercial world. With this in mind, drawing upon populist conceptions of rural life (even faithfully), and incorporating them into rural development strategies, may well be a blind alley with little to offer rural people who rarely (rightly or wrongly) wish to return to "the good old days."<sup>50</sup>

Existing village institutions, Rigg argues, often do not allow "the people" to make effective choices about their futures. Westerners have a culturally inappropriate model of collegial, egalitarian participation what anthropologist Polly Hill calls "a largely unconscious Golden Age fallacy"<sup>51</sup> which clashes with "hierarchical and paternalistic" village societies in Thailand. As a result, in ostensibly participatory programs, "projects are very rarely assessed in a democratic fashion, and the opinions and desires of individuals and cliques are extremely influential."<sup>52</sup>

Suppose in a particular case that Rigg is right. How *should* the local cultures be taken into account? What happens if a local cultural group, far from being the village democracy and egalitarian society Westerners tend to romanticize, is hierarchical, dictatorial, sexist, and unjust? Do we rely nonetheless on

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<sup>50</sup>Jonathan Rigg, "Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: A Lost Cause?" *World Development* 19 (2/3) (February/March 1991): 204.

<sup>51</sup>Contrary to the "sentimental belief" that egalitarianism reigns, or used to reign, in the villages of developing countries, Hill wishes to "insist that the findings of economic anthropologists invariable show that village inequality is pronounced . . . *no egalitarian ethos is put into practice in villages.*" Polly Hill, *Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 70-71; emphasis in original.

<sup>52</sup>Rigg, "Grass-Roots Development," 202-03.

its "culturally appropriate" mechanisms for decision? Do we try to introduce change? Do we support or aid only the local cultures and institutions that are deemed appropriate, leaving the rest to fend for themselves? Simple calls for participation do not face up to these dilemmas, and I have found little in the literature that provides guidance.

Extending the idea of participation and free choice in a different direction, several writers have observed that the freeing of markets and the extension of democracy allow cultural diversity greater expression. Not only do people of different cultures have the opportunity to choose among a wider range of alternatives, but the institutions that affect them may become more culturally relevant. For example, American economist Elliot Berg argues that free market reforms in agriculture are more culturally appropriate than many previous policies. ". . . [T]he private sector is 'authentic,' in a way that most other rural institutions are not. The government agencies and parastatals represent remote capitals, and cooperatives are often dominated by government. The intermediary class arises from the peasantry and has solid roots. It is durable."<sup>53</sup>

As in the case of popular participation, it is right to emphasize processes as well as policies. "Taking culture into account" means in part enabling different individuals and groups and different "cultures" to choose for themselves. The spread of democratic institutions, of market choices, of participatory management is to be welcomed on this ground among others. These processes of choice promise to allow differences in values and preferences and aptitudes to have latitude; or to put it another way, to avoid having others' values foisted on groups and individuals with no participation or choice at all.

But process, understood this generally, is not a sufficient answer to the question of cultural relevance. Many choices lie beneath notions like "democracy," "market," and "listen to the people." Many kinds of processes are possible under each; the choice among them may itself need to be culturally attuned. Are some mechanisms and procedures better suited than others for different cultures, tasks, and environments? Would not information about process-by-culture interactions be useful to people making such choices?

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<sup>53</sup>Elliot Berg, "Governance and the Sustainability of Agricultural Growth in Africa" (Paper prepared for the workshop, *Africa's Agricultural Development in the 1990s: Can It Be Sustained?* Arusha, Tanzania, May 15-17, 1991), 9.

*Cultural Interlocutors*

Another possible way to "take culture into account" is to use anthropologists as intercultural conduits. Coming from one culture but trained to penetrate another, they can serve as interlocutors telling them, telling us, what each other really cares about, is good at, can contribute.

This hypothesized capability might have several sources in anthropological work. It could stem from the anthropologist's having had a deep knowledge of some culture, perhaps the one at hand but perhaps any culture. It could come from the culture of anthropology itself, in which one is supposed to get along well with people unlike oneself. Or the capability could arise from knowledge of cultures, in the sense of perspective about different cultures and being able to put a particular culture in theoretical perspective. Dialogue is much easier for and with anthropologists, writes Roger Bastide, "because the anthropologists begin with the knowledge of cultures, ethnic or national, with their differences and their uniqueness. Whereas other social scientists are more caught up with human nature, which embodies the more general and the more banal."<sup>54</sup>

Michael Cernea of the World Bank says sociologists "should be able to criticize the econocratic or technocratic models that still govern development interventions in many agencies." But there is more: "First I believe that the anthropologist or sociologist carries with her or him a distinct professional knowledge about social organization, social structure, and social and cultural change that is sorely needed for sustainable development. . . . No other disciplines have more professional knowledge to offer about the social actors than do sociology and anthropology."<sup>55</sup>

This argument seems plausible. But it needs more than saying: it needs demonstrating. Cernea himself, perhaps the most eloquent advocate of applied sociology in development work, seems to swing between hubris and humility about the tools sociologists actually have available to carry forward the work he recommends. "Most damaging is the fact that the accumulated experiences of applied social scientists have not yet been systematized, conceptualized, and codified either by these practitioners themselves or by academic social scientists. . . . Anthropologists and sociologists have been busier advocating participation

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<sup>54</sup>Bastide, *Anthropologie appliquée*, my translation, 41.

<sup>55</sup>Michael Cernea, "Sociologists in a Development Agency: Observations from the World Bank," in Schönhuth, *The Socio-Cultural Dimension*, 28, 31. Cernea adds: "As insiders, we often observe that the cultural rhetoric of such agencies has been growing faster than their competence at acting on cultural issues" (Cernea, "Sociologists in a Development Agency," 29).

than working out social techniques for organizing it. But without the know-how to organize it, participation will remain a hot ideology lacking a social technology." He calls both applied anthropology and applied sociology "underdeveloped."<sup>56</sup> My own verdict would follow Cernea's but with less confidence that anthropologists and sociologists, or their sciences, are prepared to contribute to improved policymaking and management.

### *"Berlitz Anthropology"*

This wonderful term comes from anthropologist Christa Walck. She criticizes a superficial use of anthropology in the fashion of catalogues of customs that should be "taken into account." She laments books that simply cite examples of misunderstandings and misdiagnoses, which are "explained as failures to appreciate cultural differences . . . [this] might also be called 'Berlitz anthropology': anthropology 'explains' the strange and bizarre rituals that might impede business communication and relations."<sup>57</sup>

For example, a series of helpful books entitled *Culture Shock: Philippines*, or whatever the country, reviews for the business person the customs of various Asian countries. One painlessly learns something of the culture, just as one might learn a little of the language, because one understands that misinterpretations of many kinds lurk in intercultural encounters. In this sense taking culture into account means knowing when and how to give gifts, the importance of rank, or how to close a deal.<sup>58</sup>

### **Avoiding Oversimplification**

Another use of cultural knowledge in policy making is to avoid jumping to conclusions. For example, economist Thomas Sowell argues that it is mistaken simply to assume that group differences and inequalities are necessarily the results of discrimination or unfair public policies. In his forthcoming *magnum*

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<sup>56</sup>Michael Cernea, "Knowledge from Social Science for Development Policies and Projects," in Cernea, *Putting People First*, 3, 25. The "underdevelopment" point, echoing Allen Hoben, is in Cernea, "Knowledge from Social Science," 28.

<sup>57</sup>Christa Walck, "A Call for Collaboration between Business and Anthropology: A Business Perspective," *Studies in Third World Societies*, Publication No. 42 (Special Issue: Cross-Cultural Management and Organizational Culture, February 1990), 57, 60-61.

<sup>58</sup>For example Walck cites Kathleen Reardon, *International Business Gift-Giving Customs: A Guide for American Executives* (Janesville, Wis.: Parker Pen, 1981).

*opus* entitled *Race and Culture: A World View*,<sup>59</sup> Sowell traces the histories of different ethnic and cultural groups over the centuries, through migrations and conquests, as outcasts or assimilates, in their economic, political, and social lives. The result of twenty years of research, this feat of scholarship and synthesis demonstrates that cultural traits, propensities, and tastes are hardly permanent transformations can take place in a century or, for some attributes under some conditions, even a generation. Yet neither is culture a simple product of the environment it has staying power despite changes in economic, social, and ecological conditions. "A particular people usually has its own particular set of skills for dealing with the economic and social necessities of life and also its own particular set of values as to what are the higher and lower purposes of life. These sets of skills and values typically follow them wherever they go."<sup>60</sup> If one looks at various cultural groups in different countries and over time, one finds significant group differences in such variables as reputation for honesty, "work habits, perseverance, social cohesion, and law-abiding patterns of life,"<sup>61</sup> chastity, willingness to sacrifice to obtain an education, trust, and preferred types of employment.

Cultures are not merely customs to which people have a sentimental attachment or badges of "identity." . . . Cultures are particular ways of accomplishing the things that make life possible—the perpetuation of the species, the transmission of knowledge, the absorption of the shocks of change and death, among other things. Cultures differ in the relative significance they attach to time, noise, safety, cleanliness, violence, thrift, intellect, sex, and art. These differences in turn imply differences in social choice, economic efficiency and political stability.<sup>62</sup>

Because of these differences, groups differ in their economic and social choices and outcomes. Sowell certainly does not deny that discrimination and unfair policies are important; indeed, he documents them. But he does provide the reminder that cultural traits themselves may explain some of the differences.

This reminder is useful, but again we ask for more. What is known about how to tailor policies and processes to the cultural differences Sowell documents? And what is known about the ways in which these differences change over time as the result of policy choices now?

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<sup>59</sup>Thomas Sowell, *Race and Culture: A World View* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, forthcoming).

<sup>60</sup>Sowell, *Race and Culture*, 1.

<sup>61</sup>Sowell, *Race and Culture*, 148.

<sup>62</sup>Sowell, *Race and Culture*, 715.

## Preserving (Promoting) Cultural Activities

The second day of our conference deals with various ways to place cultural institutions and environments at the center of developmental activities. As many will no doubt note, there is a play on words and a potential confusion here, between "culture" as art, music, literature, and architecture and "culture" as a learned body of symbols, beliefs, and ways of life. Without delving into this fascinating and important class of concerns, I simply note it as analytically separable from the other ways mentioned above of "taking culture into account."

### "The Slap on the Forehead"

Surprisingly perhaps, many attempts to provide guidelines for sociocultural analysis simply list variables without saying how to take them into account. (The Appendix provides a few examples.) This is akin to a list of the various kinds or dimensions of soil types without saying anything about (a) which plants grow best in which soils (and under what other conditions) or (b) how to treat or change soil types (with fertilizers, irrigation, and planting practices).

Why, then, simply list the variables? A possible justification may be what might be called the slap-on-the-forehead effect. Merely to remind ourselves that certain cultural categories or dimensions matter may evoke the slap on the forehead: "Ah, yes, I would have forgotten that. And now that I think about those dimensions, it's clear that we should do X instead."

My impression of the lists in the Appendix is that they do indeed fulfill a useful function as a slap on the forehead. But for our concerns, a checklist could be the beginning of so much more: an applied cultural science that identifies *how* cultural dimensions interact with important choices.

### *Doing Better*

There are, then, many pre-scientific ways of "taking culture into account," many ways in which anthropology and other fields can contribute. Yet, consistent with the consensus at the 1954 colloquium and with the pleas of social scientists from Mauss to Cernea, we may wish for more. Too seldom nowadays does one encounter the idea that applied cultural studies can contribute theories and knowledge of cultural types or behaviors that, appropriately factored into policy making and management, would produce better outcomes. This is a shame, because the old anthropologists were right: culture does matter, in the sense that policies, management practices, and educational techniques interact with various cultural features of local populations.

To capture these interactions, we need a new wave of *applied cultural studies*. We need to work harder on *how* to take culture into account. The practical goal would be properly humble. In the first instance can we (where, to repeat, "we" means communities, schools, labor unions, business groups, and governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations, international agencies, and bilateral aid donors) do 10 percent better by taking cultural factors into account?

I believe we can. Let me venture an optimistic prediction about applied cultural studies. Because of the unprecedented economic and political changes the world is experiencing, in the coming decade the need to take culture into account will grow more evident, in part because these changes will fail to live up to expectations. Simultaneously and, I believe, independently, over the next decade in a variety of disciplines from political science to economics to business studies, our ability to model and measure cultural variables will progress. As a consequence I foresee by decade's end that "applied cultural studies," an interdisciplinary pursuit featuring vigorous contributions from anthropology and sociology, will play important roles in advancing international development.

What will it take for this prediction to come true? Earlier, I mentioned four reasons why anthropology and other social sciences have not fulfilled their practical promise. Something akin to cultural differences within academia has kept most students of culture in the roles of critics and complexifiers and away from applied science. A warranted fear of the misuse of cultural knowledge has led the best anthropologists and sociologists to prefer theory over application. The sheer scientific difficulty of measurement and estimation has stymied serious efforts to identify culture-by-policy interactions in a dynamic system of simultaneous equations. And a limited vision of policy analysis has confined the contributions of social scientists to the margins of old-style planning and evaluation.

Taking these reasons in reverse order, let me sketch some areas where I see prospects for advance, embedding recommendations as I go.

### **Recasting Our Conception of Social Science's Roles in Policy Analysis**

The use of the social sciences in government programs and foreign aid needs supplementation. To begin, we should encourage less not more pre-project planning with the flawed agenda of trying to foresee all the things that will happen and could go wrong. As currently practiced in aid bureaucracies, "social soundness analysis" does not work: it is costly; we lack frameworks to identify culture-by-policy interactions; and, most importantly, it reflects and endorses an unsound preference for planning as blueprint.

The new cultural studies should be proactive, not just reactive. Social scientists' attention should shift toward the generation of useful policy analysis. They can do this through comparative case studies and through more conceptual research on culture-by-policy interactions and cultural change. Students of culture should scour an agency's (a country's, a community's) experience for examples of things that work. These examples should be placed in a theoretical context so that we are helped to understand why they work and how the lessons might stimulate creative rethinking and problem-solving in a different setting. The new anthropology must help us understand what "different setting" means. What can be said, hypothesized, speculated about policy-by-culture interactions? Pedagogy-by-culture? Participatory process-by-culture?

Within a government bureaucracy or an aid organization the hope would be to affect those project ideas and policies that, according to the conception I have criticized, simply appear. By taking the organization's own processes and cultures as seriously as the agency does those of a village council, anthropologists would look for places to inject positive suggestions about what works, helpful ways of rethinking context, opportunities for cross-country learning, and chances to rethink the very aims being sought under rubrics like "private sector development." (The desired intervention probably would not look like the usual academic study of a given country, sector, or community.)

At an even more fundamental level government programs and foreign aid need different incentives.<sup>62</sup> Projects and therefore staff should be evaluated on results (which include learning, if it is valuable for later applications). In the new scheme I envision, an excellent project identification document or the successful "moving of money" will not count for much. What happens on the ground will. If such a revolution occurs, the roles of cultural studies will change in important ways. The incentives for social scientists will shift away from project planning and evaluation—although these activities will of course remain. The incentives will favor the generation of useful project ideas by means of comparative studies, utilization of local knowledge, and scientific research on culture-by-policy interactions.

### **Scientifically Documenting Culture-by-Policy Interactions**

Robert Putnam's work exemplifies both the careful analysis of policy outcomes and the empirical demonstration of the influence of cultural factors on those

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<sup>62</sup>Robert Klitgaard, chap. 7 in *Adjusting to Reality: Beyond "State vs. Market" in International Development* (San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth and ICS Press, 1991).

outcomes, with many other variables held constant. Putnam's research focuses on a particular aspect of political culture, namely the strength of horizontal versus vertical associations. We should encourage empirical work that examines other aspects of culture, such as the five categories provided by Aaron Wildavsky and his colleagues or the various dimensions discovered in questionnaire research by Geert Hofstede,<sup>63</sup> and that explores their interactions with policy choices and management techniques. The research proposed by Mamadou Dia in his paper for this conference is consistent with this suggestion.<sup>64</sup>

In this regard the data base of the Human Relations Area Files in New Haven would seem a valuable, virtually untapped resource. Over the next decade new studies may link the host of cultural variables contained there with new information about policy outcomes or participatory processes. A recent attempt to explain local variations in the adoption of cassava growing is a small but suggestive example.<sup>65</sup>

Of particular interest to anthropologists should be the exploration of interactions between participatory processes and cultures. How can culturally sensitive processes be created to mobilize and share indigenous knowledge, critique it, and supplement it with experience from other settings? What about culturally tuned processes to stimulate creativity and problem-solving at the levels of communities and bureaucracies? Notice a major conceptual step needs taking. We must now go beyond simple calls for "participation" and "listening" and identify how various methods for doing so interact with cultural and other local conditions. We must move from advocacy to applied science.<sup>66</sup>

In the modeling of culture-by-policy interactions, analytical techniques from other fields will prove stimulating. For example, consider psychometric

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<sup>63</sup>Daniel Bollinger and Geert Hofstede, *Les différences culturelles dans le management: comment chaque pays gère-t-il ses hommes?* (Paris: Les éditions d'organisation, 1987).

<sup>64</sup>Mamadou Dia, "Indigenous Management Practices: Lessons for Africa's Management in the '90s" (Paper presented at the International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2-3, 1992).

<sup>65</sup>Steven Romanoff, Simon Carter, and John Lynam, "Cassava Production and Processing in a Cross-Cultural Sample" (Unpublished manuscript, December 1991). On the Human Relations Area Files see "Special Issue: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Research: Theory and Method," *Behavioral Science Research* 25 (1)-(4) (1991), and Melvin Ember, "The Revitalization of HRAF and Comparative Studies," (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, November 1991).

<sup>66</sup>For a similar call to action see Michael Cernea, *The Building Blocks of Participation: Testing Bottom-Up Planning*, World Bank Discussion Paper 166 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).

models of aptitude-by-treatment interactions (ATI), recent research on corporate cultures, and new trends in economics.

The ATI literature provides guidance concerning both the promise and the statistical problems of modeling and estimating interactions between policies and cultures. Estimating interaction effects is plagued by different kinds of effects (on the rate of change, the immediate or starting level, the asymptote or equilibrium toward which the development in question progresses) or hybrids thereof, which may differ across cultural groups. Within-group effects may also cloud across-group comparisons. Linearity or even the inclusion of a multiplicative Aptitude x Treatment term in a predictive equation are likely not to prove accurate assumptions. Because it has a twenty-five year head start, the ATI literature can help us be more sophisticated and imaginative in modeling culture-by-policy interactions.

The business literature on corporate cultures is interesting for two reasons. First, the focus is on changing corporate cultures as well as on how to adapt management systems to existing cultures. Second, some writers have explored the "fit" between types of corporate cultures and the task environment in which a company has to work. There has been progress toward showing how cultural features that are appropriate for some business settings are not appropriate in others. Both points may inspire those working in other domains of applied cultural studies.<sup>67</sup>

The new applied cultural studies will exploit theoretical developments in economics. But not primarily in development economics, the subfield in which, as Vernon Ruttan has observed, "cultural considerations have been cast into the 'underworld' of development thought and practice."<sup>68</sup> In contrast, it is fascinating to observe, among economic theorists and within the so-called "new institutional economics," new perspectives on and appreciations of the importance

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<sup>67</sup>See, for example, Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, *Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982), and Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist* 45 (2) (February 1990).

<sup>68</sup>Vernon W. Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 39 (2) (January 1991): 276. In contrast to political science Ruttan says, "it would be hard to find a leading scholar in the field of development economics who would commit himself or herself in print to the proposition that 'in terms of explaining different patterns of political and economic development... a central variable is culture—the subjective attitudes, beliefs, and values prevalent among the dominant groups in the society'" (Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?" 276, citing Samuel Huntington).

of what might be called cultural factors. We may envision two developments for the decade ahead: a better economic theory of culture, in the functionalist sense of culture's uses and value, and a new appreciation of the ways in which the particular features of a culture matter for the efficiency of an equilibrium or a path. Regarding the second, David M. Kreps writes:

Earlier in the book, we complained that a weakness of game theory was that it took institutions (the rules of the game) as given exogenously, without explaining where the institutions come from. We can view transaction cost economics as giving us a bit of a lead on this, insofar as we maintain the hypothesis that institutions will be created with a general view toward minimizing transaction costs (or, more precisely, with a view towards maximizing the net benefits of transactions). But important pieces of transaction cost economics depend on the society in which the transaction is embedded—on the framework of laws and customs, in particular. . . .

Moreover, we may have a good intuitive feel for when equilibrium analysis is useful (on small pieces), but our feel depends on there being (roughly) common strategic expectations about how to behave in a particular situation, and we have much less handle on how to model where those strategic expectations come from or how they change.<sup>69</sup>

Robert Sugden's *The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare* studies the emergence of what might be called cultural norms,<sup>70</sup> as does Andrew Schotter.<sup>71</sup> Douglass North discusses the "path dependence" of economic growth, with paths based in part on "social attitudes and norms." He advocates the serious study of cultural norms:

One gets *efficient* institutions by a polity that has built-in incentives to create and enforce efficient property rights. But it is hard maybe impossible to model such a polity with wealth-maximizing actors unconstrained by other considerations. . . . Informal constraints matter. We need to know much more about

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<sup>69</sup>David M. Kreps, *A Course in Microeconomic Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 771-73.

<sup>70</sup>Robert Sugden, *The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

<sup>71</sup>Andrew Schotter, *The Economic Theory of Social Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

culturally derived norms of behavior and how they interact with formal rules to get better answers to such issues.<sup>72</sup>

We might imagine a research project involving economists and anthropologists (and other students of culture) that would look at thematic areas like trust, cooperation, informal mechanisms for enforcement of agreements, and the elicitation of preferences. Research might examine the transition from various traditional norms and mechanisms to more modern ones and the various hybrids in-between. The idea would be to see if programs and projects could be differently designed to take advantage of specific cultural mechanisms (or to change those mechanisms in appropriate ways), following the example of Parker Shipton's work on savings and credit mechanisms in the Gambia.<sup>73</sup>

### Facing up to Possible Misuses of Culture

The question of misuse, both scientific and practical, of cultural knowledge must not be overlooked. The fact is that cultural concepts have been abused. Cultural labels feed stereotypes, endorse a static and uniform view of "culture," even promote segregation. Many of us fear that taking culture into account will breed "culturalism." (There is a more philosophical fear, that of missing what culture means, as in the complaint that "A bunch of 'cultural variables' is not a culture.")

How might these issues be addressed and attenuated? One idea is to force ourselves to confront misuse through concrete examples. The case of South Africa, although extreme, may be a valuable instance. In the 1950s many white South African educators argued that education should be tailored to local cultures. This meant taking seriously language differences, likely careers, levels

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<sup>72</sup>Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 140.

<sup>73</sup>He suggests, for example, more thinking about savings programs instead of credit programs: "More broadly, planners in institutions wishing to assist Gambians to save resources should consider interventions in crop storage incidentally an approach low in recurring expenses or livestock health. The aim should *not* be to 'capture' local savings, but to augment and supplement them." He leaves the idea as one for further research, a recommendation with which I concur. Parker Shipton, *How Gambians Save—and What Their Strategies Imply for International Aid*, PRE Working Paper 395 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Agricultural and Rural Development Department, April 1990), 45. See also his "Time and Money in the Western Sahel: A Clash of Cultures in Gambian Rural Finance," in *Markets in Developing Countries*, ed. Michael Roemer and Christine Jones (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991).

of "ability," and cultural traits, they said. Using social science as well as political ideology, South Africa created different curricula and separate schools through the Bantu Education Act of 1953.

The logic has its contemporary appeal in other countries: education should, it seems reasonable to say, take account of cultural differences. (Versions of this argument are heard today in Milwaukee and New York and elsewhere in the United States, concerning African-American students.) But as we know, the Bantu Education Act fortified apartheid. Instead of tailoring education to students' needs, it tried to tailor children to a racist society's needs.

We might study this case of misuse with several questions in mind. First, on what scientific bases were policies on culture and education promulgated in South Africa in the 1950s? What was known (and not known) then about cultural differences among the various peoples of South Africa? What was known about culture-by-education interactions? What was merely posited?

Second, how did the Bantu Education Act evolve? In the 1950s and thereafter how was knowledge about cultural pluralism twisted to serve political ends? What were the various effects?

Third, consider one of the major issues that will face the future democratic government of South Africa. Should the new educational system take account of cultural pluralism? If so, how? What is the state of the current scientific evidence relevant to these questions? Given the misuses of the past, to what degree should culture and education interact? In what ways, with what checks and balances and provisions for student and parent choice?

If the fear of misuse is what consciously or unconsciously prohibits many social scientists from considering the cultural dimensions of policy choices, then facing that misuse squarely and indeed dramatically through an extreme case like South Africa may have several benefits. What are the major dangers of misuse (scientific, practical)? Once we are conscious of them and have analyzed them carefully, what steps might we take to reduce their likelihood or impact? Clearly, ethical as well as scientific issues are involved here. I believe that research about the misuse of culture is a necessary complement to the exploration of the positive ways that culture may be taken into account.

### **Overcoming Cultural Barriers within Academia**

I have found that anthropologists and other students of culture know more of practical use than they put into their writings—or perhaps even than they have made explicit to themselves. In interviews with anthropologists I have often discovered after overcoming a certain initial resistance that they are good at suggesting rules of thumb, issues not to forget, pitfalls to watch for, even empirical results from scientific studies that are relevant to practical development

problems. They also know a lot, although perhaps not systematized, about cultural change and resistance to change.

Like the Dogon, who do not know how much they know about the structure of their religion until probed, or you and I, who may not be able to describe a grammatical rule in English until a linguist teases it out of us via examples, anthropologists have some lore and some science that might be extracted—with a kind of anthropological approach. We might contemplate an exploratory study with twenty senior anthropologists from many countries as the "subjects." Like the village elders or key informants in ethnographic research, they would be interviewed in depth; hypotheses and models would be constructed based on their statements; and they would be confronted with the hypotheses and models to elicit a further iteration.

Another mechanism for exploring these issues could involve the authors and users of various lists of sociocultural variables, such as those in Table 2 in the Appendix. As noted above, existing lists say little about what we should do with the answers. Asking many experts on culture to push the how question, and to do so together, should yield exciting and useful results.

I am suggesting the use of some anthropological techniques—key informants, the elicitation of local knowledge—on anthropologists themselves, with the hope of kindling their own creativity concerning the applications of what they know. Perhaps this will be a way to break through some of the constraints of our own intellectual cultures that limit the application of cultural knowledge.

### *A Renaissance of Applied Cultural Studies*

This paper recommends the consolidation and generation of knowledge about (1) how cultural diversity affects what people do and want, (2) how cultural factors interact with other variables in the "production" of various kinds of development, some good and some bad, and (3) how culture (in various senses) is itself affected by various kinds of development and by other factors. The objective is not a complete model of human behavior, an all-foreseeing project plan, or a top-down imposition of what one group thinks is an optimal policy on another. Rather, one hopes to help people making their own decisions do better through a better understanding of the cultural dimensions of their choices.

As a prerequisite to this renaissance of applied cultural studies, we must go beyond proclamations of culture's importance, lists of cultural variables to include in project planning, "listening to the people," and cultural critiques. We need to take more seriously the scientific side of cultural studies: metaphorically, to fill out and specify the three equations discussed earlier.

In trying to stimulate applied cultural studies, we must begin with the reasons why applied social science on these subjects has been so difficult to create. The reasons include cultural clashes within academia, which we must understand and try to overcome in the same way as we try to create intercultural sympathies elsewhere; valid fears concerning the misuse and misunderstanding of culture, which we must address; and the methodological difficulties of modeling and estimating culture-by-policy interactions.

We must also consider new ways of combining cultural knowledge with decisionmaking at local and international levels. Our concepts of policy analysis and the roles of social sciences within it must be enriched, indeed experimented with. This will mean new research across disciplinary lines but also new *processes* of policy analysis and participatory management: for example, what might be called pedagogical experiences for decisionmakers at all levels, experiences that will "include" the cultural dimensions of development. The renaissance of applied cultural studies will therefore combine scientific advances with new methods for bringing what we learn down to earth.

**Appendix**

**Table 1. Some Stylized Differences between Economic and Anthropological Cultures**

The more modern, the better.	The less modern, the better.
Assume identical utility functions.	Assume (indeed celebrate) diverse utility functions.
One system can be said to be strictly better (more efficient) than another (Pareto preferred).	Cultural relativism precludes cross-cultural judgments of better or worse.
Everything is connected to everything else, as in a thermodynamic system.	Everything is connected to everything else, as in a language, a literary text, or a personality.
Individualist.	Sectarian (egalitarian).
Construct.	Deconstruct.
Marginal improvements.	Radical critiques.
Analytical; mathematical.	Holistic; literary.
Questions of degree: variables are continuous and cardinal. Fact and value can be separated.	Questions of type: "variables" are ordinal or binary. Fact and value cannot be separated.
Surveys (across localities, often cross-sectional, random samples).	Thick description (local, long-term, nonrandom samples).
N is important.	N is not important ("another country heard from").
Policy analysis: top-down use of model to enable individuals to create better outcomes.	Policy analysis: bottom-up process without preconceived model to enable a group to affirm itself (its meaning, confidence, solidarity).
Prescription: instrumental.	Prescription: listen, learn, reflect, leave nature as you find it.
Anthropology is: the description of preferences, capabilities, and institutions that affect contracts, information flows, and incentives—and how they change.	Anthropology is: a means for reconsidering meaning, person, authority; a commitment to stand up for diversity and autonomy.
Economics is: a science of choice built on simple behavioral assumptions leading to better predictions of social as well as economic phenomena.	Economics is: a view of the world and a language that oversimplifies to the extent that the most important features of life—even economic—are distorted or missed.

**Examples of Cultural Variables That Should Be Taken into Account**

Several authors have attempted to provide guidelines for cultural analysis. Anthropologist T. Scarlett Epstein provides the list in Table 2.

**Table 2. Epstein's List of Cultural Variables**

<u>Cultural Variable</u>	<u>Extremes of Possible Options</u>	
Unit of decisionmaking	Individual	Group
Ethos of social organization	Egalitarian	Hierarchical
Patron-client relationship	Situational	Continuous
Allocation of status	Achieved	Ascribed
Prestige criteria	Behavior	Expenditure
Kinship structure	Patrilineal	Matrilineal
Family organization	Nuclear	Extended
Marriage arrangements	Monogamy	Polygamy
Residence pattern	Patrilocal	Uxorilocal
Gender relationship	Equality	Subordination
Land tenure	Individual	Group
Factionalism	Interest-based	Kin-based
Colonial experience	Enlightened administration	Exploitative administration

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*Source:* T. Scarlett Epstein, *A Manual for Culturally-Adapted Market Research (CMR) in the Development Process* (Bexhill-on-Sea, England: RWAL Publications, 1988), 27.

In her manual Epstein provides half-page summaries of the two poles under each category, "concomitant social factors," and methods for obtaining information. For example, under allocation of status she includes:

**Status is ascribed** when it is allocated on the basis of criteria over which the individual has no control. For instance, men and women or different age groups or castes are assigned a different

status in society; political succession is often hereditary, for instance, for many African chiefs and village headmen.

**Status is achieved** whenever behavior determines or at least greatly affects social ranking. The Melanesian "Big Man" system provides a good example of achieved status.

**Concomitant social variables** to investigate include social mobility and entrepreneurship. Wherever status is ascribed social mobility is highly restricted and social change is likely to proceed more slowly. Traditional Indian castes exemplify societies that practice status ascription. Entrepreneurship may prevail to a larger extent in societies where status can be achieved. For instance, the Melanesian "Big Man" system is renowned for its entrepreneurship; potential "big men" always seek new ways of showing their abilities, which obviously also spurs established "big men" to be increasingly more entrepreneurial. By contrast traditional African chiefs or Indian village headmen, who occupy their positions on the basis of hereditary succession do not have to prove their entrepreneurship and are thus less likely to be innovative.

**Methods of enquiry** to establish how status is allocated involves checking on at least five past incumbents of important local political offices and their claims to their status as well as noting the existence or absence of local enterprises together with a few relevant group discussions.<sup>74</sup>

Similar comments are provided about the other categories, and then discussion of them stops. The rest of Epstein's manual concerns how to organize the needed research—for example, how to staff an office dedicated to such questioning. But there are no examples of such information being used, no operational description of the variables, no model for their combination, and above all no indication of how one would use such information in designing or managing a project or a participatory process.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>T. Scarlett Epstein, *A Manual for Culturally-Adapted Market Research (CMR) in the Development Process* (Bexhill-on-Sea, England: RWAL Publications, 1988), 29-30.

<sup>75</sup>Economist T.N. Srinivasan, commenting on papers by anthropologists and economists on how to measure change in rural India, says that an analytical framework "is essential in surveys or studies of socio-economic changes in villages. The notion that one can just barge into a village and 'observe,' without some prior theorizing about the nature of the socio-political-economic relations to guide the observation, is untenable."

### **Five Questions on Culture and Governance**

Other proposed lists of questions seem subject to the same reservations. Denis-Constant Martin's analysis of the cultural factors that influence the quality of a nation's government concludes with an attempt to guide research on "how culture preconditions the emergence of good governance." Martin warns that "[a]nswers cannot be derived from preconceived ideas brought in from outside. Instead, one can formulate a series of questions that might serve as a basic guide for further research, as suggested below."

1. What do people consider "good"?
2. How "good" is the law?
3. What are the most trusted and effective types of social organization?
4. How should those who seek good governance deal with the pervasive distrust of power and the state?
5. What will serve as the basis of local ideas of accountability?<sup>76</sup>

Martin comments on each question, then concludes his essay without indicating what one would do with the ensemble of answers were they available. No doubt he believes, and I agree, that considering these five questions would surface important issues that might otherwise go ignored.

### **Other Dimensions: Talcott Parsons and Mamadou Dia**

Other lists of key variables exist. Talcott Parsons identified five "pattern variables" in his structuralist-functionalist model:

1. Achievement versus ascription in the determination of status
2. Universalism versus particularism in value orientation
3. Specificity versus diffuseness in individual economic roles
4. Affectivity versus affective neutrality in personal or group relationships

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T. N. Srinivasan, "On Studying Socio-Economic Change in Rural India," in Bardhan, *Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists*, 246.

<sup>76</sup>Denis-Constant Martin, "The Cultural Dimensions of Governance," *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1991* (Supplement to *The World Bank Economic Review* and *The World Bank Research Observer*), ed. Lawrence H. Summers and Shekhar Shah (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, March 1992), 336-39.

5. Self-orientation versus collectivity orientation in political and economic roles.<sup>77</sup>

Mamadou Dia of the World Bank has recently launched and is beginning to compile results of a research project that includes the cultural dimensions of African management. Citing the work of French scholar Jacques Binet on "economic psychology" in fifty-six African tribes as well as his own personal experience, Dia identifies several key Western assumptions that probably are not valid for most African cultures and that, therefore, may account for the failure of many development projects.<sup>78</sup> Africans tend, in Dia's words, to:

- Favor conspicuous social consumption and income redistribution over accumulation and reinvestment. . . . Very little value is attached to self-control.
- Need ritual formality to reinforce commitment/obligation.
- [Prefer] compromise over litigation. . . . In legal as well as political matters, the Africans seek unanimity and are prepared to engage in interminable discussions to achieve it. . . . This is the complete opposite of the spirit that imbues western law, where the judge interprets the law and pronounces a sentence to which the parties have to submit willy-nilly.
- Value group solidarity and occasions of socializing [which] has generally led to attaching a high value to leisure and the attendant ability to engage in social activities. . . . Farmers' responses [to income incentives] are likely to be positive only if the expected increase of output/income will materialize soon, but also will be rather striking. . . . Time . . . horizons are still generally very short.

Dia suggests various ways that management systems might take advantage of these traits, and he wonders whether successful management innovations in

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<sup>77</sup>Cited by Vernon W. Ruttan, "Notes on the Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment: Are There Lessons for Development Economics?" (Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota, October 1990), 3.

<sup>78</sup>Mamadou Dia, "Cultural Dimensions of Institutional Development and Management in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)" (Unpublished manuscript, Capacity Building Division, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, October 1990). Among his references to Binet is Jacques Binet, *Psychologie économique africaine* (Paris: Payot, 1970). Dia's 13-country case study is entitled "Africa's Management in the 1990s."

Africa have done so. He proposes a multi-year program of research to verify the cultural or psychological "hypotheses" and examine successful management innovations.

### **Cultural Factors in Central African Rural Development**

A fascinating book from the Centre international des civilisations bantu (CICIBA) in Libreville, Gabon, attempts to highlight the cultural factors that impinge most on rural development.<sup>79</sup> The Centre has developed a long diagnostic checklist for "knowing the cultural elements of a local collectivity."

#### **1. History**

- Ethnic groups present in the collectivity.
- Inventory of kinship lineages in the territory (cartography if possible).
- Age of the groups. Inter-group relations (antagonisms and solidarities).
- History of relations with the administration.

#### **2. Social organization**

- Patrilineal or matrilineal?
- Precedence among relatives; the rights and precedence of elders of different lines.
- Obligations and "*reconnaissances*" that result from parental ties. What and toward whom?
- Rights of occupation of the land (cartography if possible).
- Rights over goods and their transmission.
- Status of women: their *prestations* [benefits], role, influence on decisions, rights over people and goods, and particular positions (midwives, healers).
- Status of youths in the collectivity.
- Specific status in the group of healers, blacksmiths, carpenters, artisans.
- Is traditional education (ritual initiations, wakes, stories, proverbs) still carried out?
- Traditional festivals and dances.

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<sup>79</sup>M. Bayona-ba-Meya and others, *Facteurs culturels et projets de développement rural en Afrique Centrale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989).

**3. Beliefs, rights, and customs**

- Beliefs in occult forces, divine or human; presence or influence of a religion of foreign origin; rapport between traditional and modern beliefs.
- Ancestor cult: how and on what occasions does it manifest itself?
- Rites and ceremonies (they are important to know because they reveal certain beliefs and form an integral part of socioeconomic activities).
- Customs (habits and their origins: agricultural, artisanal, medical, regarding food).

**4. Administrative, political, and associative structures**

- Traditional power (when, for whom, and in what domains is it exercised?).
- Modern power (how is it constituted, by whom? [persons of the same ethnic group as the collectivity?]; who makes decisions and how? with regard to what subjects?).
- External dependencies: alliances through exogamous marriage, socioeconomic dependencies. Relations between the traditional and modern powers (submission, coexistence, collaboration?).
- Associative life. Existence of spontaneous associations (rotating credit groups, work sharing). Participation of women? Of youth? Forms of modern association (cooperatives and their functioning: successes? problems? participation of women? of youth, peasants?). Their "leaders": reason? role? origin?

**5. Economic and technical environment**

- Traditional knowledge: plants, soils, medicine, minerals, cultural techniques, know-how. Occult forces and knowledge of biochemical elements (limits of knowledge with respect to science).
- Initiation and traditional transfer of knowledge. Organized by sex and the consequences thereof? Secrets and taboos.
- Division of labor (by sex and age). Agricultural. Domestic. What individuals and groups do (construction of houses, schools, wells, managing erosion.)

- Modern schools. Existence, frequency of attendance, results? Relations with traditional education? With peasant reality?
  - Innovations. Which have taken place? In what domains? Resistance and opening up? Reasons why?
6. Technical and "political" group formation [*encadrement*]
- Technical *encadrement*. Specialized *encadrement* through links with the polyvalent peasant (soliciting peasants—coordination). *Encadrement* through links with the role of peasant women? System of traditional communication and pedagogical intervention in group formation? Peasant group formation ("pilot peasant," "progressive peasant," "*animateur*").
  - Political *encadrement*. The political authorities (role? relations with traditional and modern powers?). Pedagogy and content of interventions? Popular participation? (motivations? results on development?).

Working through the checklist in a particular cultural area will, it is hoped, help to "develop a capacity of attentiveness and questioning, and to acquire a method for detecting the points of contact between development and culture."<sup>80</sup> In the text the authors summarize some of the features of central African cultures that affect agriculture, education, health, credit, and other development projects.

For example, in education the book suggests separating age classes—particularly young people and adults—and, in agricultural training, "the recognition of traditional chiefs of the land through the offering of a tribute." Respecting the elderly is emphasized throughout. Like Dia, the authors emphasize that "individual innovators are difficult to incorporate" in the group-oriented way of life. "Rural *animateurs*" who try to organize the people have failed, as have cooperatives. Women are the "surest choice" as administrators of money. But the book also warns against trying to change sexual traditions. And so it goes, until a chapter at the end "summarizes" Bantu culture by briefly noting the existence of certain features of belief and religion, social structure (for example, chiefs, social solidarity, the importance of clans, the influence of the elderly), and customs (for example, that taboos and a grand tradition of hospitality exist).

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<sup>80</sup>M. Bayona-ba-Meya and others, *Facteurs culturels et projets de développement rural*, 171.

The book gives little guidance about the use of such information. In particular, should one always be a trait-taker or does trait-making sometimes make sense? How do these cultural phenomena evolve?

### Are There Successful Frameworks for Cultural Analysis?

For several decades in the first half of this century Marcel Mauss taught a famous course on ethnographic methods. It stimulated and guided a generation of French anthropologists. Later, his notes were published as *Manual of Ethnography*.<sup>81</sup> It is a fascinating book, a hybrid of the daunting description of the proverbial thousand and one factual questions that need answering with Mauss's own comments, examples, and sermonizing on their meaning and importance. I doubt that anyone has collected for any culture all the data that Marcel Mauss recommended, but this ethos lives on in the goal of exhaustive description, which defines the profession even today. The question is, can one learn something useful about cultures more quickly?

The question is essential, and for some purposes almost any set of carefully designed questions will lead to greater insight. As the CICIBA manual says, the objective is to be more attentive to the melange of noneconomic variables that may matter. Yet the guidelines I have examined seem to fall short in their prescriptive applicability. Others have noted the same point. Consider, for example, this conclusion to a recent literature review on cross-cultural research concerning attitudes toward risk: "Risk researchers are often keenly aware of differences between prescriptive and descriptive sides of decision making. Yet we see relatively little research . . . that directly addresses prescriptive issues, by which we mean how one might better achieve a given objective on the basis of insights into cross-cultural risk-decision matters."<sup>82</sup>

In particular, the frameworks I have seen fail to address the issue of cultural change. It is one thing to describe cultural (and other) phenomena as they exist on the ground (and a fascinating question is how well this can be done in a reasonably short time). But then what? Should all such existing manifestations be preserved? Or should there be change? Can one provide guidelines for thinking through such decisions, and how one would proceed?

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<sup>81</sup>Marcel Mauss, *Manuel d'ethnographie* (Paris: Payot, 1947).

<sup>82</sup>Timothy J. McDaniels and Robin S. Gregory, "Framework for Structuring Cross-Cultural Research in Risk and Decisionmaking," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 22 (1) (Special Issue on Risk and Culture, March 1991): 120.

Perhaps the task, as R. Hendrickx puts it, is to provide "propositions relevant to introducing cultural change in a culturally acceptable fashion."<sup>83</sup>

I think it is fair to say that existing guidelines and checklists succumb to several defects. They are unrealistic in how much can be or should be known in advance, as opposed to learned and changed en route. They do not address how the desired information should be used once obtained; in particular, they fail to address the trait-taker/trait-maker feature of project design.

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<sup>83</sup>Comment in Bayona-ba-Meya and others, *Facteurs culturels*, 176.

## Discussant Remarks

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I have two handicaps in discussing these two rich papers. The first handicap is time. I like these papers very much, and I have been told that I have ten minutes only to discuss them. As you can see, these two papers are so rich, they raise so many theoretical problems that are very relevant to the developing countries that we should spend much more time to show how they can be applied to Muslim societies especially. The second handicap is that I wish I could discuss them in French and not in English because when I hear my two colleagues speaking so fluently, I feel handicapped compared to them. But I shall try.

First, I agree with the methodological approach to the problem that we are asked to discuss. Insisting on the anthropological approach to cultures is something that we urgently need. When we see how anthropology is taught in our universities, we can discover the gap between what is needed by all our societies, developed or undeveloped, and what we actually do in our universities and in our institutions of research. Most of the anthropological courses and teachings are purely descriptive, abstract, and indifferent to the concrete information needed by all economic and political decisionmakers in developing countries. Anthropologists and historians very seldom take part in discussions among political leaders and experts in economy and finance. This is a division in knowledge that has been imposed and accepted in our universities as well as in our political systems since the triumph of modern economy. In the eighteenth century, the age of reason, enlightenment imposed itself in political thinking and action; but this attempt had a short life and limited effect in political history. This holds true particularly and regrettably for developing countries after their independence. We saw Western experts in economics regularly consulted by the new political leaders, ignorant themselves of this domain, and imposing programs and orientations without regard to the traditional cultures and systems of solidarities prevailing in very old and deeply rooted societies in nomadic, pastoral, peasant, and mountain cultures. The result is a total rupture between, on one side, economists often sure of their theories and politicians motivated by their inclination to enjoy more power, and, on the other side, anthropologists and historians isolated by their scholarship. This rupture prevails in many Muslim countries, such as Algeria and Morocco, in which colonial regimes used

ethnography and anthropology as "scientific" tools to manipulate politically several ethnolinguistic cultural groups.

Another positive aspect of these two papers is that they show the difference between ethnography, which describes facts and features without any theoretical ambition, and anthropology, which shows the social, political, and economic mechanisms through which a society or a social group generates its meaning and its scale of values. Understanding this difference, we can move to a comparative study of several groups and social systems and attempt to evaluate the positive and negative results of different systems. In Italy the differences between the South, rooted in Mediterranean traditions, representations, and practices, and the North, more closely linked to the European system of economic production, are obvious but not yet correctly explained.

I wish Dr. Robert Putnam could continue his travel southward to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia all countries linked to the same Mediterranean culture and ethnological structures as Italy. The suggestive monograph presented on a limited part of Italy is useful but not sufficient to reach anthropological conclusions relevant to Mediterranean societies and reliable for any strategy of economic and social development today. For example, the opposition between the North and the South in each country has been dominant throughout recorded history and holds true today everywhere, especially between the European Mediterranean and the Arabic-Turkish Mediterranean. The rupture between the North and the South is not only economic and political but also cultural and academic. In the universities study of the southern and eastern Mediterranean regions is relegated to their departments of Oriental studies while study of the northern and western Mediterranean regions usually is integrated in their departments of history, which are concerned only with Europe. This situation, institutionalized even outside universities, tells a lot about the lack of interaction between culture and development, especially for countries that wish to reactivate their lost identities. We are at the heart of the issue discussed in this conference; the World Bank should care more to improve the *study* of societies for which economic development is a vital issue depending on Western cooperation. I point out studies similar to those carried on by Professor Putnam in Italy; that is why I urge him to encourage his students to undertake similar research on Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.

We need to move toward an applied anthropology seeking not only erudition and accumulation of information about sociocultural groups but also concrete criteria to suggest solutions for a development based on cultural history or new cultural needs emerging not only in the global society but also in several ethnocultural groups ignored, marginalized in the context of the Empire state during the Ottoman period, or by the nation-states. This marginalization or even elimination has happened frequently in many developing countries since their

independence (1960-1990). I have given many examples in my own writings of what I call *applied Islamology*.<sup>1</sup>

Algeria, Indonesia, Morocco, and Senegal are good case studies along the line suggested by Dr. Putnam, with whom I reiterate my agreement. Eventually, the reasons for failure as well as for success in these countries should be identified and put forward to enlighten the new policies initiated since the collapse of the "socialist," that is, communist, model and the "end of history," that is, the triumph of liberalism and the market economy.

It is not easy to initiate an applied anthropology in societies deeply affected by thirty years of improvised and irrelevant policies in their cultural, agricultural, social, and economic structures and functional mechanisms. A new overwhelming phenomenon appeared everywhere during this period and has totally changed the scale of all the problems: the unprecedented demographic wave. Sixty or seventy percent of the population, according to the country, are under thirty years old. These are fantastic figures when we consider all the consequences, demands, needs, and changes this shift has imposed on the societies. The sociological move from *popular* to *populist* expressions in religion, culture, politics, architecture, urbanism, and economy is evident everywhere in Algeria, Iran, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Zaire, and others. The concept of *populism* needs appropriate sociological analysis to provide the key to many discourses emerging in contemporary societies.

I have to point out again that this colossal phenomenon is precisely the one not correctly considered by politicians, not enough studied by scholars, not really recognized in its multiple dimensions by political parties, and seldom integrated, as a parameter, by economists who seek to include cultural *and* social dimensions in their strategies and decisions for development.

This new situation requires an ethno-socio-anthropology combining methods and questions of ethnology, sociology, and anthropology. Traditional or archaic populations coming from rural areas to large cities such as Baghdad, Cairo, Jakarta, Karachi, and Teheran are confronted by modern challenges and environment, unknown technologies and industrial activities, and lack of professional preparation and necessary training. Conversely, very young generations seeking jobs, the unemployed, are immersed in conservative, simplistic, and ideological beliefs presented as the "true," "authentic" Islam, which will assure salvation during this life and the next.

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<sup>1</sup>Compare my *Critique de la raison islamique* (Paris: Maisonneuve-Larose, 1984) and *Ouvertures sur l'islam*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Graucher, 1992).

This ideological manipulation of millions of young people shows to what extent cultures can have positive as well as dangerous, negative functions when the global societies are dominated or oppressed by a severe crisis of authority, political leadership, and economic activity. In many Muslim societies the crisis of cultural values, legitimacy, and legality is perhaps more dramatic than the economic regression. Wealthy countries may be able to help in improving the economy, but they cannot initiate cultural alternatives after the disastrous disintegration of the popular cultures and the urban traditional tissues as well as the old rural solidarities.

There is another dimension of the present crisis in Muslim societies. Muslim intellectuals who are open to modernity, liberal thinkers and writers, moderate politicians, skillful well-trained engineers and managers, scientists, and experts in all fields have been obliged to leave their countries and to display their knowledge and abilities in Western societies. Those who remain inside are doomed to inefficiency and discouragement. How can one initiate any development in such social and political conditions? How can the World Bank or other international institutions invest money in important projects efficiently when the cultural and social forces are so weak, isolated, and separated from the economic and political spheres?

There is no reliable answer to these questions without many explorations conceived, achieved, and published along the line I suggested of an ethno-socio-anthropology of contemporary Muslim societies. Scholars should stop writing irrelevant and useless books on "fundamentalism" and "radical Islam." Islam is a secondary theme and an illusory discourse that takes attention away from the burning, real issues. I have an ongoing debate on this issue with my orientalist colleagues. It is a scientific issue inseparable from its ideological bearings. This is why I am pleased to express my full support and agreement to my friend Ismail Serageldin, who has been striving for many years to focus the attention of the decisionmakers in Africa, in the Arab world, in Asia, as well as in the West, on all the issues I have mentioned quickly.

A conference like this one should be repeated in several developing countries to open a large continuous debate on professional training, systems of education, cultural initiatives, scientific research, and teaching in the field of social and human sciences—*les sciences de l'homme et de la société*, as we call it in French. The "human" sciences are particularly weak, uncritical, underdeveloped, and undertaught in Muslim societies, in which they are needed the most to improve the intellectual climate and to open the necessary exchanges with modern Western thought. For so many years strategies for development have been unbalanced, giving priority to economism and neglecting humanistic and ethical concerns even in Western European societies. We see clearly today the dramatic results of such a strategy for a hegemonic economy deprived of

## Development in a Multi-Cultural Context: Trends and Tensions

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*What is the proper sequence of development? Should the political kingdom precede economic recovery, or the opposite? Asians have pursued economics first whereas Gorbachev pursued glasnost before perestroika (economic transformation) and the Soviet empire collapsed. Pursuing economic recovery first may have worked in Asia due to cultural variables. Does Africa need cultural engineering, that is, purposeful use of culture for economic development? Beyond that, we need to pursue cultural development as a foundation of other forms of development, for example, enabling indigenous languages to become capable of diffusing and popularizing technology. In terms of multiculturalism, societies can be homogeneous, preponderant, or heterogeneous. Which type stands the best chance of becoming developed? Again, the answer is not either/or, but some level of national or societal, that is, shared culture would be helpful. Liberal capitalism and liberal democracy are the most important Western legacies in Africa. Capitalism may erode ethnic cleavages but create pockets of poverty whereas, in the short run, democracy may exacerbate ethnic tensions. Politically, Africans have responded more to sociocultural than to socioeconomic ideologies so it is important that the transitions to capitalism and democracy be well planned and take into account cultural variables among subgroups. Africa's culture of tolerance, both racial and ecumenical, and short memory of hate, should be preserved. Whether choosing to pursue political or economic development first, development inevitably must seek first the cultural kingdom. We must tap Africa's positive cultural tendencies and devise charters and constitutions to contain its negative ones.*

I am delighted to be given a role in this important conference, and I am doubly delighted that the World Bank has gotten increasingly interested in the relevance of culture to issues of development.

Colleagues like Ismail Serageldin have been in the forefront of this vanguard within the Bank, and I am sure that they deserve every encouragement. The Bank has at last been responsive, and it is to be encouraged in this direction.

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### **The Sequence of Development**

Much of the debate within Africa—and Africans also have difficulty in taking culture seriously enough in relation to development—has been between the weight to be given to political reform as against the weight to be given to economic recovery. Those of you familiar with the history of Ghana will remember Kwame Nkrumah's very famous dictum: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will be added unto it." He assumed the primacy of politics. The question has arisen since the middle of the 1980s whether or not the Ghanaian Jerry Rawlings has reversed the dictum to say: "Seek ye first the *economic* kingdom, and all else will be added unto it." There is certainly the special theoretical challenge called by Ghana in the mid-1980s as compared with the original Nkrumah position giving primacy to politics: Should economic recovery precede political recovery? Should economic liberalization precede political liberalization?

South Korea and Southeast Asia take the order of Jerry Rawlings as the basis of their strategies, that is, economic liberalization before political liberalization. They pursued the economic kingdom first. And it is possible to argue that the People's Republic of China has been doing the same, pursuing economic liberalization, the economic kingdom, without bothering very much at the moment with political liberalization. I once attended a remarkable meeting in Beijing attended by 2000 people in the Great Hall of the People. It was ostensibly a meeting of Third Worlders, but the Third Worlders were few and far between among these 2000 people. The topic was advertising. The participants were mainly Chinese on one side, and Westerners on the other, with Ali Mazrui thrown in to give it a "Third World" appearance. But the thrust of the idea was definitely to pursue economic liberalization. So will China thereby avoid the Gorbachev debacle? Gorbachev attempted to pursue political liberalization—*glasnost*—without real economic transformation—*perestroika*. The result was the collapse of the Soviet empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, the collapse of Gorbachev's own office, with a serious danger of the collapse of Mikhail Gorbachev himself.

Under these circumstances is it arguable that the People's Republic of China and Jerry Rawlings have got the order right—pursue the "economic kingdom" first? Well, at least this political and social observer is still not absolutely sure because it is just conceivable that the reasons why things like that worked in South Korea and in Southeast Asia were connected with cultural variables rather than purely with whether political liberalization was pursued first.

So if Nkrumah attempted to master the political kingdom, and Jerry Rawlings attempted to master the economic kingdom, with the applause of the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, do we now need a third Ghanaian messiah, a Ghanaian prophet who would urge, "Seek ye first the cultural kingdom, and all else will be added unto it?" Does Africa, in fact, need a kind of cultural engineering, purposeful use of culture for developmental and progressive purposes?

Taking cultural variables into account in pursuit of more overt economic development—that's one issue. The other is actually pursuing cultural development as a *foundation* of other forms of development—long-term policies of cultural integration, for example, the fostering of a common language, the imperative of language policy. Did the Japanese "make it," are the South Koreans "making it" because they paid attention to "scientificating" their indigenous languages, that is, making their indigenous tongues capable of becoming languages of technology so that diffusion and popularization of scientific concepts in the wider population through indigenous languages became a great aid towards creating a scientific culture? Should development donors contribute more towards helping Africa: (a) relate language to national integration, (b) relate indigenous languages to education so that they are used more extensively, (c) relate indigenous languages to the print media and the electronic media, and (d) relate indigenous languages to science and technology? In fact, among the continents, Africa is particularly dependent on foreign languages—imported European languages. I never get tired of complaining that while we never speak of French-speaking Asian countries and English-speaking Asian countries, we are always talking about francophone African countries and English-speaking African countries. In Africa the identities of our societies quite often are deeply wedded to the imported languages. So it is quite conceivable that we need major changes in the direction of language policy to reduce this excessive dependency. Now do we need to examine the consequences of the heterogeneity of our societies? And maybe the people of our countries are handicapped developmentally because diversity is too rich, too great.

### Degrees of Multiculturalism

I myself divide societies into (a) *homogeneous* society, (b) *preponderant* society, and (c) *heterogeneous* society. A homogeneous society is one in which over 80 percent of the population are in the same cultural tradition. A homogeneous society has a minimum of multiculturalism. A preponderant society is a society in which over 50 percent—not 80 percent but just over 50 percent—belong to the same cultural tradition. A heterogeneous society is one in which no cultural group is close to 50 percent of the population. Usually this is the most multicultural.

A question does arise that while homogeneity is not in itself a passport to development, does a homogeneous society stand the best chance of first-rank economic development? Or at least first-rank economic performance? Are societies that are heavily homogeneous especially well-placed to be not just developed—any society can, with a bit of luck, achieve some development—but stand a chance of being first-rank? Is that part of the secret of the "Japanese miracle"? Is it part of the secret of the Korean phenomenon? Is it part of the secret of the German phenomenon? Is it part of the secret of the Swedish phenomenon? Now obviously homogeneity by itself doesn't deliver. It needs a lot of other things as well. In Africa, in fact, the virtue of homogeneity has, at least in one case, been betrayed by other social and political vices. The homogeneous Somali have been economically retarded and politically devastated in spite of their homogeneity. So clearly we ought to be careful not to go too far with that particular "virtue" of homogeneity.

A preponderant society is one in which over 50 percent of the population belong to the same cultural tradition. Africa has both plural preponderant societies and dual preponderant societies. "Dual" societies are those in which only two cultural groups account for the overwhelming majority of the population. "Dual" societies in modern conditions very often are prone to political polarization. Outside Africa, Cyprus—Turk versus Greek; within Africa, Rwanda and Burundi—Tutsi versus Hutu. Outside Africa, Czechoslovakia—Czechs and Slovaks. Within Africa, arguably, Zimbabwe—Shona versus Ndebele. Outside Africa, Sri Lanka—Tamil versus Sinhalese. Iraq? Maybe—Arab versus Kurd. Algeria? Maybe—Arab versus Berber. Increasing polarization, certainly in the case of Iraq—the danger is there, although Iraqi society is more complex than normal duality implies.

A heterogeneous society is a plural society in which no cultural group is close to 50 percent. A large number of African countries fall into this category, in which there is no numerical winner. The heterogeneous society has a harder time entering the first league of economic performance unless one minority group usurps disproportionate power, as in South Africa. Historically, there was also the case of the Amhara in Ethiopia as one minority group who usurped disproportionate power. In this country, the Anglo-Saxons arguably also usurped disproportionate power and continue to do so.

Now although as a rule the homogeneous society may stand a better chance of first rank economic performance, the homogeneous society is not always in the first rank of invention and innovative stimulation. Again, I don't know how just or unjust we are to the Japanese when we say that they have been brilliant at technology but are not yet brilliant theoretical physicists—not enough Japanese Nobel Prize winners in the sciences so far. Homogeneous European

countries, such as Sweden, have been stimulated by the shared regional civilization of Europe as a whole.

Heterogeneous society, although handicapped economically in the way in which I have suggested, culturally may be well-placed. It is the most promising in cultural innovation because different groups possibly are stimulating one another. So is heterogeneous India likely to be culturally richer than homogeneous Japan? Is heterogeneous Uganda likely to be culturally richer than homogeneous Somalia? But even the cultural field does need efforts toward some level of national or societal culture—*shared* culture. Hence the issue I mentioned earlier of pursuing some kind of national languages policy.

### **Capitalism, Democracy, and Integration**

With regard to the impact of the West upon our societies in Africa, the two most important ideological legacies are perhaps the liberal capitalist legacy and the liberal democratic legacy. Liberal capitalist legacy in my sense here is ultimately a case of economic pluralism including the realization of economic initiative and very often the privatization of enterprise. Liberal democracy is the case of political pluralism including the realization of political initiative, the emergence of multiparty democracy. There has been a lot of activity demanding multiparty democracy in different parts of Africa. In my country, Kenya, there is a good deal of toughness going on right now.

Some of you may know I was in the midst of it in July. Ours was one tree in Kenya's forest of the struggle for democracy. One incident in the saga of Kenya's struggle. I arrived in Kenya from Nigeria. I had given my hosts in Mombasa, who had invited me to give a lecture, four topics, one of which was about democracy in Africa. They steered quite clear of it. They decided that was dangerous so they chose a relatively innocuous one. They chose "Religion in the New World Order." Now you would have thought President Moi's government would not regard that as threatening in any manner, but believe it or not, it was banned. The lecture was banned. When I was interviewed by the press in Kenya, I said, "Look, I've just come from a military government in Nigeria. In that society and their military government, I gave four lectures, two of which were on democratic issues. Not one of those lectures needed government permission nor was I denied it. Nor did I feel harassed over anything I had said in spite of my criticism of some aspects of Babangida's transition strategy. On the contrary, I had an audience with the head of state in Nigeria. Then I went to my country. I wanted to give a lecture in my *town* and it was banned. I wasn't able to give it."

A journalist said, "Okay, Professor, how about a press conference?" So I held the press conference, and this time I said, "President Moi, please step

down." I was very constructive: I gave him two years' notice. It should be planned democratization, and he should join the democratic force instead of opposing it. And in fact if he had done that, he would have served our country very well because it is going through a lot of agony right now. Instead I was roundly abused in Parliament and by ministers, and there was a serious question of whether I would be allowed to leave the country at all. Fortunately, the government decided to be rational, at least about my departure from the country, but not rational about other things.

One reason why I did think it was important to plan re-democratization is that re-democratization does have specific risks that have to be taken into account in preparing for it.

So capitalism and liberal democracy, a dual package from the West, have a direct impact on ethnicity, but an impact in altogether different directions. And ethnicity *is* a cultural phenomenon in Africa. So although capitalism has a lot of negative consequences in other areas, it may be good news for national integration and the erosion of ethnic cleavages in Africa. Liberal democracy, on the other hand, which I was demanding in Kenya, has a lot of virtues in other areas, but in the short run, it may be bad news for national integration unless suitable planning is undertaken because it can exacerbate ethnic tension.

So why is capitalism good news for national integration, culturally speaking? It engenders criss-crossing loyalties between ethnic loyalties and economic roles. It promotes class formation, which begins to erode ethnic allegiance. It promotes greater individualism and at the same time is at the expense of at least excessive ethnic allegiance. At its best, capitalism expands the national cake. The genius of capitalism in history, at least until now, has been production. No other system in human history has been more productive. So capitalism erodes sectarianism, and it promotes materialism and secularism. Now all these are factors that add up to good news for national integration. And yet capitalism is also exploitative economically. It very often creates selective areas of poverty. Purely on the issue of national integration, however, it is a more efficient way of building nations.

Why is liberal democracy, in the short run, bad news in Africa? Because multiparty rivalry heightens competitive ethnic consciousness, ethnicizes political competition, degenerates into physical political conflict, and sometimes heightens separatism. In African multiparty elections, unless precautions are taken, ethnic labels acquire more salience than either policy or ideology. An African voter under a liberal competitive system is a member of an ethnic group first and a worker second, or a bourgeois second. Kenya's veteran dissident, Oginga Odinga, did come to see me immediately after the press conference in Nairobi in July, thus politicizing my press conference even more. The last time he attempted to form a left-of-center party, calling upon all disadvantaged Kenyans,

"Follow me," and he looked to see who was following him, it was not disadvantaged Kenyans of all ethnic groups. It was fellow Luo of all social classes. Similarly, when he was alive in Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was left-of-center by the standards of that country, and when he attempted to mobilize Nigerians who were disadvantaged—"Follow me to a more just Nigeria"—and looked to see who was following him, it was basically not Nigerians who were disadvantaged of all ethnic groups. It was primarily fellow Yoruba of all social classes. Once again, it was the cultural messenger, rather than the economic message, who was commanding the votes. Africans have demonstrated that they respond more to *sociocultural* ideologies than to *socioeconomic* ideologies. Sociocultural ideologies are ethnicity, religion, nationalism, race-consciousness. These are real African responses in the political process. Socioeconomic ideologies are socialism, labor movements, class solidarity, peasant movements, labor unions, activism. These are relatively weak in Africa.

Although the sociocultural ideologies are important, they are sometimes provoked unduly by liberal democracy when it is not planned. What I call upon Kenyans to do is to embark upon changes that will take into account these variables, to make sure that, if they want to go capitalist, the terrible damage that capitalism perpetrates will be reduced while its functionality for national integration is retained. And at the same time, while Kenyans want liberal democracy, I call upon them to make sure that the experiment contains and restricts the disruptive tendencies of competitive liberal democratic systems within Africa while giving us openness, greater accountability of the rulers, greater participation of the ruled, and greater sense of fair play in the political system.

Now with regard to Nigeria—and Professor Wole Soyinka is here. He knows Nigeria far better than I do—in the past, whenever Nigeria attempted a constitutional liberal democracy, Muslims of the north, another sociocultural ideology, tended to gain. On the other hand, when Nigeria expanded the boundaries of capitalism, Christians of the south tended to gain. So on the basis of experience so far, the expansion of liberal democracy favored Muslims, and the expansion of capitalism, by breaking up marketing boards and increasing privatization, favors Christians of the south. A major reason is simply that Christians of the south culturally have developed greater skills in the game of modern capitalism than Muslim northerners had done. So when examining culture in relation to capitalism, differential factors between one cultural subgroup and another have to be taken into account, and societies must make sure that what happened to Nigeria before does not happen to Nigeria again, and does not happen to other societies. For with the first Nigerian republic, the country drifted towards a civil war. From 1960 to 1966 the country went multiparty pluralistic liberal democracy. The result was slaughter. The second time

around, 1979 to 1983, Nigeria went multiparty pluralistic liberal democracy again. The result was economic bankruptcy. Nigerians' two democratic experiments both have been disasters. One, a colossal human disaster, and the other, a monumental economic disaster. So whatever is going to happen from 1992 onwards with the Babangida experiment, it is to be hoped that it will take into account the previous failings and take precautions against them.

### **Africa's Culture of Tolerance**

Can you take the type of precaution that will tap the advantages of existing African culture? From the point of view of creating humane society, I think there are positive attributes that we should preserve and upon which we should build. One is what I call Africa's "short memory of hate." Sometimes we forget too readily, but it is a very important democratic resource. My Founder-President, Jomo Kenyatta, was imprisoned by the British and dismissed as leader unto darkness and death by the colonial governor. Kenyatta lived to become the leading Anglophile of Kenya, suffering without bitterness and remaining very fond of the British. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for nearly three decades, comes out, becomes an architect of black/white reconciliation, goes to beg white terrorists who are prepared to fast until death, "Please, please, don't kill yourselves. Please eat." This man, who had just lost twenty-seven of the best years of his life, goes to beg white terrorists not to fast until death. Where else but in Africa will you find this sort of thing?

You have Ian Smith, who let loose all sorts of devastation on the population of Zimbabwe. Then comes the ending of the unilateral declaration of independence, and this architect of terror becomes a member of Parliament and continues to abuse the new black government of the day of Robert Mugabe. Again, Africa's short memory of hate.

Black civil wars. Again, on the whole, we butcher each other like mad, but as compared with the Irish, we forgive each other much faster. And this is something we ought to preserve.

And then on race. I think Africans are people more sinned against than sinning. Nobody in this room will dispute that. Blacks as a people have been on the receiving end of racism. High toleration of racial mixture has been one manifestation of that. Jerry Rawlings, ruler of Ghana, half-Scottish, perceived much more as part of the Ewe fraternity rather than as a person who ought to be despised for being of mixed blood. Politicians in Ghana sometimes want to exploit the fact that his father was non-Ghanaian—not that his father was non-black, but that his father was non-Ghanaian—and that someone ought not to be head of state whose parents were not both native Ghanaians. That is a very different proposition.

Kwame Nkrumah wanted to demonstrate that Pan-Africanism was color-blind. So Founder-President gave Ghana a fair-skinned Egyptian for First Lady. And her sons are basically Arabic-speaking Ghanaians. Their first language is Arabic. And of the four presidents of Egypt since 1952, two of them—Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat, had black blood in them. They were criticized, especially Sadat, for many things, but their black blood was not one of them. Leopold Senghor, famous above all for the most startling of all forms of bigamy in Africa—he was married to negritude and a white woman. He was criticized much more for his views on negritude than for his dear wife. And clearly the Western world has failed to produce a head of state married to a woman of color, but if I am wrong, you will no doubt correct me.

And then Africa's religious ecumenism—the capacity to go beyond one's own religion. So families in Africa in which one brother is Catholic, one sister is Muslim, another sister is an Anglican, and the parents are followers of traditional religion—this is quite standard in many African societies. African religion is the most tolerant of the three traditions of Africa,<sup>1</sup> and tends to moderate the imported religions of Islam and Christianity. So, as I have said to World Bank audiences many times, religion is divisive in Africa only when it reinforces pre-existent ethno-cultural differences. All Ibo are Christian, all Hausa are Muslim, Yoruba are split between the two imported religions. That type of situation is a prescription for danger. But where religion does not reinforce Hausa-ness or Ibo-ness, it isn't as divisive as it is outside.

My favorite example of Africa's ecumenical culture continues to be Senegal, which not for five years, not for ten years, but for twenty years had a Roman Catholic president. A Muslim country—80 percent Muslim—for twenty years had a Roman Catholic president, and no demonstrations in the street demanding *jihad*. Nothing of the kind. They worked out a deal between the head of state and the religious leaders. And Senegal just happened to be one of the most open societies in Africa so it was not a repressive Roman Catholic throttling these Muslims. And now there is in fact a Muslim president of Senegal, but guess what? The First Lady is a Roman Catholic. Now I wonder when a candidate for president of the United States will have a Shi'ite Muslim wife?

Even as a tease, as you know, this country has had only one variation within Christianity, and that was John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, the only one we have had so far, and we're not even sure that he was elected. We know he

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<sup>1</sup>Consult Ali A. Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986) and Mazrui, "African Islam and Competitive Religion: Between Revivalism and Expansion," *Third World Quarterly* (London) 10 (2) (April 1988). Refer also to D.B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971).

became president, but the margin was so narrow and there was hanky-panky in Illinois, and Nixon was persuaded not to challenge. Kennedy has been the only Catholic president so far.

And there is still no Jewish president of the United States. The Jews have decided it is too risky to bid for the highest office in the land. For perfectly understandable reasons they have decided it is too risky. They do not want to release the demon of anti-Semitism. There are now as many Muslims as Jews in this country. They are, of course, much less powerful, less visible, but a Muslim president of the United States is not likely to happen during the years of my children. Maybe one of my grandchildren might make the attempt if he or she is American, but it is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. And here is Senegal, doing it in the reverse—a Muslim society with a Christian president for so long, and Tanzania, having a Roman Catholic, Julius Nyerere, also from 1961 to 1985, with no major demonstrations in the streets of Dar-es-Salaam demanding *jihad* payment, although Tanzania has a plurality of Muslims over Christians.

### **Conclusion**

Africa has a short memory of hate, demonstrated time and time again, both when we kill each other and forgive each other very fast; and when we forgive our oppressors very fast. We are also tremendously capable of non-racial approaches, and we are tremendously capable of the ecumenical spirit in situations in which religion does not reinforce pre-existing cultural differences.

And so, ladies and gentlemen, it becomes imperative in understanding what type of either economic development, capitalist or otherwise, or political development, liberal democratic or otherwise, will work to look closely at precisely these variables. Where they are dangerous and potentially disruptive, like the negative side of ethnic competition, we should devise charters and constitutions which contain them. Where they are positive, like the positive side of ethnic competition, and the democratic tendencies in racial tolerance and religious ecumenism, we should tap them for a wider spirit of humane culture. Above all, we should take into account that development inevitably has to include the cultural imperative—in Africa, as elsewhere, but in some sense above all in Africa. Yes, we do need to seek first the cultural kingdom—in the hope that much else will be added unto it.

## How Cultural Theory Can Contribute to Understanding and Promoting Democracy, Science, and Development

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*Only economies based on market institutions have demonstrated sustained economic growth. Achieving economic growth comes down to how to expand and control capitalism. Nations that reject competitive individualism cannot expect sustained economic growth. How do we institutionalize the only institutions known to deliver sustained economic growth? The three givens are (1) Democracy and capitalism tend to occur together. (2) Culture should not be equated with countries. (3) Cultures can never be eliminated because they depend on one another for their existence. Mary Douglas' "grid-group" typology makes cultural analysis more applicable to development and democracy. She joined the prevailing definitions of culture to an analytically more powerful synthesis by always attaching values and beliefs cultural biases to the social relations they legitimize. In the classifications of cultures she reintroduced (1) fatalism and (2) egalitarianism to the traditional (3) hierarchy and (4) individualism and created a genuine typology whose categories of cultures derive from common dimensions. To use cultural theory as a diagnostic tool for maintenance of democracy, both the absolute and the relative size of these four rival cultures must be appraised. To improve economic development, it is desirable to focus on cultural context through the cultural audit. Sustained economic development requires moving away from fatalism and monopolistic hierarchy to individualism working with inclusive hierarchy. Needs and wants are socially constructed; thus, constraints on development are located in the ways of life. Markets work because they are made up of distinctive social beings who, acting in a particular way and generating a particular set of beliefs, stabilize a way of life that emphasizes accumulation. It is time to turn from neoclassical economics to develop cultural instruments to uncover the institutionally generated motivations that work for and against economic growth.*

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This is one time when it is best to begin with the banal: Only economies based on market institutions have demonstrated sustained economic growth. While not all economies with market institutions have grown substantially over time, no nonmarket economy has passed this test. Without denying what no human being can deny, namely, that new, as yet undiscovered economic principles may one

day prove successful, right now, this minute, the question of how to achieve economic growth comes down to one of expanding and controlling capitalism.

Of course, nations and peoples can and do reject competitive individualism, the culture on which capitalism rests. That is their right. But then they cannot expect sustained economic growth.

There are many varieties of welfare-state capitalism. Choosing a capitalist economy need not lock a nation into a minimal state or, indeed, any particular size or pattern of governmental expenditure. Before considerations of how to dispose of the surplus generated by the economy may enter the picture, however, there has to be a surplus. So we are back where we started by asking what it takes to institutionalize the only institutions known to deliver sustained economic growth.

There is a purported exception or, more accurately, a bifurcation: There are those who claim that although communist command economies may not be good for sustained growth, they are good, perhaps best, for initiating industrial growth in a hurry. No one can doubt the world-wide evidence of economic growth in command economies from the 1950s through, in some countries, parts of the 1970s. Elsewhere I have analyzed how this was done as a combination of four factors: (1) the huge influx of workers, especially women, into the labor force, (2) better technology than in the pre-Second World War period, (3) great material intensity, and (4) foreign borrowing. But why imitate an economic system whose early spurt is part and parcel of its inevitable decline? Rather we should learn that huge rates of investment, which the command economies did achieve almost to their very end, are counterproductive (leading to long lines, lack of consumer goods, terrible quality, massive inefficiencies, and immense pollution) unless they are accompanied by institutions that offer incentives to choose among the most, not the least, efficient enterprises.<sup>1</sup>

It is one thing to observe the indispensability of markets for facilitating economic growth, however, and another to understand what it takes to generate and support such institutions. On a general social level we know what to say. Markets inculcate competition, and competitive institutions, properly devised, enable an economy to follow strong evolutionary lines of development: generate numerous diverse alternatives, reject the worst, select among the best, and those activities and actors that enhance growth will be favored. Simpleminded but satisfactory to a point.

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<sup>1</sup>See John Clark and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Moral Collapse of Communism* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1990); Clark and Wildavsky, "Why Communism Collapses: The Moral and Material Failures of Command Economies Are Intertwined," *Journal of Public Policy* 10 (4) (1991): 361-90.

The trouble lies in our inability thus far to make cultural advice operational. Whatever the faults of neoclassical economics (and the literature on these is exceeded only by that of its proponents), its practitioners can and do give operational advice that sometimes works. Whether they advise altering or establishing property rights to enhance incentives to perform, or suggest different types of actions, they have something precise (if not perfect) to say. The same thing, unfortunately, cannot be said of cultural analysts. Talking about somehow taking culture into account, uttering the undeniable truth that a people's way of life matters, does not tell anyone about who should do what about which things to enhance economic growth while retaining other important values.

My purpose in writing this paper is to take a step toward developing the kind of cultural theory that can be made operational. The essential point, which will reappear in various guises, is that *as long as cultures are equated with countries so that there can be only one culture in one country or region, no intellectual or practical progress can be made.* All that is accomplished this way is exchanging the term "culture" for the term "country." Only by pluralizing cultures, that is, by conceiving of cultures as diverse ways of life, can useful advice be given.

One more consideration matters to me. The reader-observer-practitioner I have in mind has noticed that the richer nations also tend to be democratic. Cultural theory explains why. I treat economic development and political democracy together not only because cultural theory shows why democracy and capitalism go together but also because I believe that self-government, broadly conceived, is morally desirable as well as materially profitable.

Before proceeding, I would like to illuminate two blind spots that stand in the way of promoting democracy and development.

### The Neglected Cultures

By far the biggest blind spot in political theory in general, and studies of economic development and political democracy in particular, is the failure to treat fatalism and egalitarianism as cultures (viable ways of life whose adherents share values justifying preferred patterns of social relations) on a par with hierarchies and markets.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Honorable, partial exceptions include Jo Freeman, "The Tyranny of Structurelessness," in *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies*, ed. Jo Freeman (New York: Longman, 1983), 202-14; and Andrea J. Baker, "The Problem of Authority in Radical Movement Groups: A Case Study of Lesbian-Feminist Organization," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 18 (3) (1982): 323-41, in that they recognize an egalitarian syndrome with problems of its own.

Respectable reasons exist for the neglect of egalitarianism as a subject for analysis by historians and social scientists. The "greats" of sociology and anthropology from Montesquieu to Parsons were concerned (consumed might not be too strong a term) with the movement from the collectivism-cum-hierarchy of the Middle Ages to the capitalism-cum-competitive individualism of modern market-oriented societies. But why, I ask, should contemporary social scientists follow their constricting example?

If possible, fatalism has suffered from even greater neglect than egalitarianism, the only full-length study known to me being Edward Banfield's classic, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, set in southern Italy.<sup>3</sup> Why study people who believe there is nothing they can do to improve their well-being? The most important reason is that fatalists comprise a culture, including their own preferred form of social relations—noncooperation—and their own cultural bias (or ideology or cosmology)—that since physical nature operates at random and human nature is unpredictable, the best thing is to stay out of harm's way.

No doubt disapproval of this way of life by practically everyone helps explain the neglect of fatalism, whose followers, in any event, try to keep themselves inconspicuous. My guess is that equality-minded political theorists are disinclined to offer fatalists a separate organizational status for two interconnected reasons: (1) they are loath to legitimize inequality as a genuine preference for anyone, and (2) they prefer to view fatalists as oppressed people who, when liberated and educated, will become active participants in an egalitarian collective. Hierarchists are distressed that fatalists fail to support the system, and individualists look down on fatalists as people who are unwilling to compete.

Yet the importance of fatalism for democracy and development can hardly be doubted. Fatalists are the people whose apathy makes some commentators believe that democracy, or at least a democracy based on extensive participation, is unfeasible. Fatalists are also the people others have in mind as the reserve army of the alienated, ripe for revolution against inegalitarian institutions. Are these the same fatalists? That each culture constructs a view of apathy favorable to itself is obvious from conflicts in the literature, hierarchists finding apathy to signify approval, egalitarians finding it to signify disapproval of the existing polity, with individualists saying people will participate when (à la Anthony Downs) they feel it is worth their while. These

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<sup>3</sup>Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958).

vastly differing views of fatalistic behavior make a huge difference in appraising designs for economic development.

It is commonly but wrongly stated that competitive individualism as a culture is opposed to cooperation. Not so. A glance at the vast technostructures of capitalism, to which Marx pointed over a century ago, is persuasive evidence to the contrary. Actually, it is fatalists who are opposed in principle to cooperation. Because they believe that the world works at random, fatalists see no positive point in working with others. Moreover, because they believe that human nature is unpredictable, fatalists worry that others will likely as not harm them. Hence they view cooperation as potentially dangerous.

Observe that the characteristics of what is called the culture of poverty — short time horizons, unwillingness to invest, lack of personal responsibility — are products of fatalism.<sup>4</sup> Why look to the future, as the saying goes, if "you can't outguess Mother Nature"? Why invest if you cannot trust other people? Why take responsibility if the future is unknowable and if other people are likely to try to do you in no matter what you do? Obviously, fatalism is compatible with neither development nor democracy.

In the next section I shall explain why I think cultural theory, based on the "grid-group" typology of Mary Douglas, adds sufficient variety to theorizing to make cultural analysis more readily applicable to development and democracy.<sup>5</sup>

### **A Cultural Theory Appropriate to Understanding Economic Development and Political Democracy**

Among Mary Douglas's contributions to social science, four stand out in my mind as especially important for understanding democracy as a polity characterized by alteration in office, capitalism as a mode of making resources grow, and science as a self-organizing system for expanding knowledge. I have begun with her continuing effort to (re)introduce egalitarianism and fatalism into social science both as categories of analysis and as ways of life with the same viability as competitive individualism and hierarchical collectivism. A second contribution is her separation of "culture" from "country" so that it is no longer necessary to treat everyone within a given geographic and governmental jurisdiction as if he

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<sup>4</sup>See Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Poverty of Distinction: From Economic Homogeneity to Cultural Heterogeneity in the Classification of Poor People," *Policy Sciences* 19 (1986): 163-99.

<sup>5</sup>Mary Douglas, "Cultural Bias," in Douglas, *In the Active Voice* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 183-254; and Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970).

or she shared the same values, beliefs, and preferences, for example, Adenauer and Hitler, Ralph Nader and Milton Friedman. Instead, with her grid-group typology, Douglas doubled the organizational variety in the social sciences (a) by adding egalitarianism and fatalism while (b) retaining individualism and hierarchy, and (c) placing both on the same matrix so these ways of life (and thus their contributions to democracy, development, and knowledge) can be compared at the same level of analysis.

Douglas's third contribution is to join the prevailing definitions of culture into a more analytically powerful synthesis. Most definitions conceive of culture as equivalent either to mental products—values and beliefs—or to material products—social relations, artifacts, and technologies. Douglas combines them by defining cultures so that values and beliefs are never left alone, suspended in mid-air, without anything to uphold them; instead, the values and beliefs, the cultural biases, are always attached to the social relations they legitimize. By joining justifications to relations, it becomes possible to attach functions to cultures instead of entire societies, thereby avoiding "function mongering," as it is called, as if all acts had positive consequences for the existing society. If functional analysis is impermissible—in the second section of *Cultural Theory* we show that all the masters of social science use functional analysis<sup>6</sup>—how would we compare the consequences of adherence to different cultures for the maintenance of democracy?


Her fourth contribution is the creation of a genuine typology in which categories of cultures come from dimensions rather than disconnected lists. (See Figure 1.) Saying that one observes the presence of a number of cultures is not as valuable as relating each culture to the others through common dimensions. Thus the group dimension tells us how strongly individuals are tied to one another, and the grid dimension tells us how constrained those individuals are by social norms.

To go further and actually say something about development and democracy, we need to state explicitly what Thompson, Ellis, and I call the requisite variety condition: Cultures can never be eliminated because they depend on one another for their existence. Thus egalitarians could not exist without inequalities produced by individualist markets and collectivist hierarchies to oppose; hierarchies would lose their rationale without individualist, egalitarian,

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<sup>6</sup>Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), 103-214.

**Figure 1. The Five Vignettes Mapped onto the Two Dimensions of Equality**



Source: Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), 8.

and fatalist disorders to overcome; individualists require a modicum of hierarchical order to stabilize property and exchange relationships; fatalists need the more manipulative cultures to get around, and hermits cannot separate themselves from a nonexistent society. This is to say that cultures exist as a set, some waxing, others waning, but never one alone. It follows that efforts to destroy rival cultures, such as the Soviet Union's near elimination of egalitarian and individualist forces, are bound to be counterproductive. The question, then, comes down to how much of which cultures is necessary, if not sufficient, to maintain a growing economy within a democratic polity?

Before this question can be put appropriately (I do not say "answered"), we must decide which of the several models of democracy, development, and

science we have in mind. If preferences come from cultures and if adherents of each culture construct a view they believe will strengthen their way of life and weaken others' (although they may, of course, be mistaken), to follow another lead from cultural theory, they are likely to craft different models of democracy, development, and science.<sup>7</sup>

### **Democracy, Science, and Development as Functions of Culture**

All models of democracy include competition for office based on civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. Beyond that, however, they differ according to the major criterion used to assess the degree to which there can be said to be democracy. In contemporary discourse among both political theorists and political activists, the basic split is between those who view democracy (a) as a process, a self-organizing system, to enable individuals to carry out their plans, or (b) as having a substantive purpose, namely, to increase equality of condition.<sup>8</sup>

A similar difference manifests itself among theorists of economic development. The individualist side sees growth as a byproduct of individual initiative. Egalitarians are less interested in development and more interested in (re)distribution. Hierarchists want growth but not so fast and so unbalanced as to threaten existing status differentials.

In weakly grouped cultures only individuals have purposes. Fatalists try to cope with the blows an unpredictable and hostile world rains on them by making themselves inconspicuous, and individualists seek to achieve their personal objectives with minimal state interference. The difference is that fatalists, whose followers feel constrained by outside forces they cannot control, believe they will be done in by any form of government, including the ostensibly most benign, whereas individualists, whose lack of group direction is accompanied by considerable personal discretion, are optimistic about self-government.

Friedrich Hayek adds a criterion of neutrality of decision rules so that legislation may not take from some groups to give to others. He is emphatic in stating that the rules are there to enable individuals to organize themselves, not

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<sup>7</sup>See Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1) (March 1987): 3-21.

<sup>8</sup>Augustus diZerega, "Democracy as a Spontaneous Order," *Critical Review* (Spring 1989): 206-40.

to give advantage to some over others.<sup>9</sup> His is the ultimate individualist position.<sup>10</sup>

It is the strongly grouped cultures that view democracy as having a substantive purpose. The egalitarian norm is greater equality of condition, that is, greater equality of resources than whatever exists at the time, no matter how egalitarian the existing distribution.

Hierarchies exist to maintain differentials. Inequality is their purpose. Stratification is their device. For present purposes we may distinguish two degrees of hierarchy: the inclusive variety, in which places are made for the most diverse groups, and the exclusive variety, very steep, in which those who are not in are out. Members of the inclusive hierarchy would favor something like Arendt Lijphart's model of consociational democracy characterized by endless bargaining, mutual vetoes, and quotas by religion, race, language, and other deeply felt distinctions to keep these diverse peoples together.<sup>11</sup> The exclusive hierarchy is incompatible with democracy because it will not accept the results of competition.

Exclusive hierarchies are also incompatible with development and science. The latter is self-evident in that a single repository of knowledge, unchallenged and unchallengeable, can neither generate new hypotheses nor support them nor overturn the status quo. Indeed, what made science possible in the West was the lack of an overarching hegemonic system able to quell dissent.

By similar reasoning we can see that narrow and steep hierarchies (as in the former command economies) impede economic growth. Unable to generate competing projects, they are also unable to discard the projects they have previously chosen. Harder than nails against opponents abroad or at home, exclusive hierarchies are incredibly soft against their own creations. Because they are so narrow and so exclusive, their creations, whether state bureaucracies or

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<sup>9</sup>Friedrich Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Hayek, *Rules and Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); and Hayek, *The Political Order of a Free People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

<sup>10</sup>See Augustus diZerega, "Equality, Self-Government and Democracy: A Critique of Dahl's Political Equality," *Western Political Quarterly* 41 (3) (September 1988): 447-68; and diZerega, "Elites and Democratic Theory: Insights from the Self-Organizing Model," *Review of Politics* (Spring 1991): 340-72, for a critique of Dahl's theorizing about democracy from the standpoint of an advocate of self-organizing systems.

<sup>11</sup>Arendt A Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

factories (in the former Soviet Union they were called *kombinats*) are microcosms of the whole. Getting rid of their creations is like doing themselves in. So they justify the adage "no failure, no success" by following the principle of negative selection: the highest state subsidies go to the poorest performing factories.

Inclusive hierarchies are more hospitable to competition, no doubt, because they are accustomed to accommodating fairly diverse groups. Nevertheless, left to their own devices, they will place fairly strict limits on competition. Their utility is to establish rules of procedure—property rights, legal predictability, rules of evidence—to aid in the emergence over time of better results.

For science to flourish, there have to be both additional sources of new ideas and restrictions on the ability of those in power to hold on to the status quo. For democracy to flourish, there have to be more than one party together with adherence to rules for getting into and out of office. For economies to grow, parallel provisions apply: there must be diverse sources of capital and opportunity to bid resources away from existing holders. Evidently, competition is the key process. But there must also be sufficient stability to maintain rules for competition—without collection of debts, for example, there can be no borrowing—and sufficient criticism of inequality to prevent the rise of monopolies that would eventually kill competition. Development, like democracy and science, is a pluralistic proposition.

### **Reconciling Support and Opposition through Competition**

If willingness to leave office is a key to democracy, then the idea and the practices of a "loyal opposition" are crucial. On one side the government is loyal to the opposition by its willingness to leave office; on the other the opposition is loyal to the government by waging its electoral campaign peacefully and by signaling its willingness to leave office if it loses. The two loyalties work together in what is hopefully a cycle of mutual reassurance. When party activists and other elites are disloyal to the idea of opposition, democracy often dies.<sup>12</sup>

More than one writer has observed that this compaction of opposites is difficult to reconcile. How might these apparently disparate qualities be reconciled and, more than that, be made to serve one another? The obvious solution is to have sufficient belief in competition to encourage leaving office, sufficient criticism to keep government responsive, and sufficient support to keep

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<sup>12</sup>See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), and John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review* 54 (February 1989).

government going. All three active cultures, then, are essential to democracy. But in what proportions?

In a follow-up to his famous 1959 article, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," in which he argued that economic development and democracy are mutually reinforcing,<sup>13</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset and his colleagues argued that adding new variables (like being a former British colony and more countries) strengthened the old conclusions.<sup>14</sup> Cultural theory, I claim, can add something to the explanation. The eleven communist command economies as they were in 1980 had half of the world's scientists and engineers but only two percent of the world's patents. The more individualism, the conclusion would be, the more creativity. However, if individualism were dominant over long periods, many citizens, unable to found networks of their own, might become fatalists so that competition would likely give way to some form of control. I conclude that without significant elements of egalitarianism to challenge inequality, without hierarchy to inculcate the norm that the parts should sacrifice for the whole, and without individualism to legitimize accepting the results of competitive elections, democracy is doubtful.

Thus, *political cultural* aspects of democracy will be conceived in a pluralistic manner. Stable democracy requires a willingness to *support authority*, a willingness to *oppose authority*, and a willingness to accept *alternation in office*. The principles are support, opposition, and competition.

### Cultural Theory as a Diagnostic Tool

Until now the application of cultural concepts to economic development has been monochromatic. On one hand culture has been conceived as mental products. Thus it has been said that poor countries should inculcate supposedly modern ideas such as rewards based on achievement. The social sustenance for sharing such perspectives has been left out. On the other hand cultures have been conceived as material objects. But the ideas, and shared values to legitimate them, have been omitted. What happens to application of cultural concepts, I have been asking, when shared values and patterns of social relations are brought together?

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<sup>13</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 69-105.

<sup>14</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, Ryoung-Ryung Seone, and John Charles Torres, "Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy" (Typescript, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1991).

Cultural theory may be used as a diagnostic tool: What is the problem in a country, region, or locality? Is something wrong, to put the question crudely, with its institutions or its people? Studies using the ethnographic methods of the anthropologists or the survey research of other social scientists could be used to do a cultural count. If there were a high proportion of fatalists, one might suspect lack of initiative, unwillingness to save, to defer gratification, to invest, or to otherwise cooperate with others. Economic institutions would take a lower priority because fatalists are unlikely to take advantage of them whatever they might be. Instead, people-changing would have to be given first priority.

By contrast, should studies and experience reveal high proportions of individualists—people who would respond to economic incentives, were they in place—a search for flaws in rules regarding credit or private property or insurance or information would be in order. Absent evidence to the contrary, I think the assumption should be that the people are all right but that their institutions are not.

Suppose there is a high proportion of hierarchically inclined individuals in a particular locale? It is still important to distinguish between inclusive and exclusive hierarchies because cultural theory leads us to expect exclusivity to be opposed to the competition for resources essential to economic growth.

The very idea of a crude competitive society has, from the time it was recognized, raised feelings of repugnance mixed with admiration. The difference is evident in contemporary nomenclature. Nowadays it is good to be an entrepreneur who creates new ideas and new jobs, but it is bad to be a selfish and greedy capitalist. Serving oneself alone has proved to be an idea of limited appeal. (Of course, advocates of individualism believe this is nonsense; capitalists, they claim, can prosper only if they meet other people's needs. We will not settle the culture wars here.) The idea of a caring collective whose parts willingly place its collective interests before their individual desires has had continuing support. But its implementation has been poor. How, then, the crucial cultural question may be put, join the creative and expansionist tendencies of individualism to the stabilizing forces of hierarchy?

There is nothing in individualist doctrine so far as I know that determines who the discrete competitors have to be. They could be lone individuals, as in very small businesses. But they could also be families, cooperatives, villages, whatever. There is, however, an impediment that must be discussed.

The experience with worker-owner business in what was once Yugoslavia illustrates the principle. The basic fault is that workers lose the value of their effort when they leave. Consequently, workers are tempted to "hollow out" these firms to get the greatest advantage from them. Were these self-same workers able to take stock with them, they would, instead, have an incentive to

build up the firm's assets. Yet stock ownership implies individualism. There may be ways of overcoming this apparent contradiction.

Corporate capitalism places hierarchies in competition with one another. Internally, corporations tend to be hierarchical. Externally, under capitalist conditions, they engage in competition. This combination of hierarchy and individualism is deemed insufficient, however, by those who wish government to go further in ameliorating the rough edge of competition. What to do?

On the one hand citizen support may be gained by welfare provision. On the other hand a principle of congruence whereby democracy is supported is lost, as Harry Eckstein argues, when the constituent elements of society are similar in form to government. The more competitive the economy, Eckstein's congruence principle implies, the greater the likelihood that competition in politics will thrive.<sup>15</sup>

Cultural context matters. It is not only the absolute but also the relative size of rival cultures that has to be appraised. Without going into that here (interested readers may consult *Cultural Theory*), it should be evident that a society of fatalists coupled with exclusive hierarchists would result in a different behavioral syndrome than were fatalists faced with strong individualists who insisted on and paid rewards for performance or with inclusive hierarchists who made a place for them.

### What Is the Solution?

Cultures can be viewed as solutions to problems. I shall illustrate this proposition briefly by reference to two perennial problems—free ridership and the prisoner's dilemma. Hierarchy and individualism are both solutions to free ridership in the form of people who benefit from the activities of others but who do not contribute because they believe that those with the largest stake will, in their own interest, do what is necessary. To counter this common concern, hierarchies impose dues or otherwise mandate contributions. Correspondingly, the limited liability company of individualist fame rigs the rules so that rewards, if any, are proportioned to contributions. Fatalists might well be tempted to free ride, but then belief that competition is harmful may also deter them. It is egalitarians who free ride because they meet the conditions Mancur Olson set out in his *Logic of Collective Action*: one person or group, one vote but highly

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<sup>15</sup>See Aaron Wildavsky, "On the Absence of Egalitarianism and Fatalism in Political Theorizing, or What Political Culture Can Contribute to Understanding Democracy" (Paper prepared for a Workshop on "Comparative Politics and the Democratization Process," sponsored by the National Science Foundation at the University of California at Irvine, December 6-7, 1991).

differential contributions.<sup>16</sup> The solution to the amelioration of the free rider problem, therefore, lies in reducing the strength of egalitarianism.<sup>17</sup>

The game called the prisoner's dilemma in which each prisoner is better off confessing first although both would be best off remaining silent, it should be understood immediately, violates the norms of the three active cultures. If the game is played in a hierarchical culture, the prisoners, even though they broke the law, should confess, thereby acting out the sacrifice of the parts for the whole that is the central norm of hierarchy. Egalitarians and individualists are strongly in favor of diminishing restraints on individual access to information. They would not willingly accept the restraints on communication built into the prisoner's dilemma. Fatalists would defect at once because they believe that cooperation will probably harm them. Reducing the proportion of fatalists, therefore, should also reduce common resource problems by diminishing the proportion of those seeking personal advantage through abandoning their collective commitments.<sup>18</sup> Obviously, it is important to understand how adherents to each way of life screen in some information and screen out other.

### **What Are Our Information Problems?**

Organization involves the continuous suppression of data. Otherwise, decisionmakers would be overwhelmed. The crucial question about information, therefore, is who will suppress what kind of information for which purpose?<sup>19</sup>

A central place in cultural theory is played by information rejection, which can follow any of four different styles: risk absorption, networking, paradigm protection, or expulsion. These can be related to different types of cultures. As theories of cognitive limits on rationality tell us, individuals confronted by bewildering arrays of data seek short cuts. The most important of these is the rejection of information (data useful or essential for decision-making) that does not fit our cultural identities. The kind of information rejected and the way in which it is rejected are different in each case. We need, in each

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<sup>16</sup>Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

<sup>17</sup>See Aaron Wildavsky, "On the Social Construction of Distinctions: Risk, Rape, Public Goods, and Altruism," in *Toward a Scientific Understanding of Values*, ed. Michael Hechter, Lynn A. Cooper, and Lynn Nadel (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press for the Russell Sage Foundation, forthcoming).

<sup>18</sup>Susan Buck, "Cultural Theory and Management of Common Property Resources," *Human Ecology* 17 (1) (1989): 101-16.

<sup>19</sup>See Aaron Wildavsky, "Information as an Organizational Problem," *Journal of Management Studies* 20 (1) (January 1983): 29-40.

instance, to ask what the information rejection is being used for. I, together with Michael Thompson, from whose joint work this section is drawn, will argue that these diverse uses reveal four distinct information-rejecting styles followed in four distinctive organizational cultures:<sup>20</sup>

- |    |                     |                |
|----|---------------------|----------------|
| 1. | Risk absorption     | Fatalism       |
| 2. | Networking          | Individualism  |
| 3. | Paradigm protection | Hierarchy      |
| 4. | Expulsion           | Egalitarianism |

The four styles and strategies are not derived from individual psychology but are culturally induced. They are reasonable responses to different cultural contexts to different ways of being caught up in the process of social life.

1. *Risk absorption* is practiced by people for whom "life is like a lottery," the fatalistic acceptance of a world that does things to you without your being able to do anything to it. "Strategy" is really too strong a word to use for the way of coping that is the appropriate response in this modality. Survival is what it is all about; there is little point in kicking against the pricks, and the tough-minded acceptance of all the risks that you are powerless to deflect and that, like it or not, cascade down upon you confers both realism and a certain measure of dignity. This social adaptation could be classified as *individualist survival*.
2. *Networking*. The entrepreneur's problem is the danger of too much data, and she needs some deck-clearing principles—some methods for filtering out the data she can do without and for retaining the information that is vital. Time is in short supply and, alas, even she cannot be in more than one place at a time. She has a massive personal network that connects her to a lot of important people, and she has, somehow or other, to shift the less important data to those who are toward the periphery of her network to leave herself the time and space to listen to the most important information, to listen to those nearer the center of her network. This social context, that of a very influential and very individualized person (an entrepreneur), is quite familiar to students of information technology. Wynne and Otway, for instance, have pointed out the rationality of her seemingly perverse preference for shifting the really vital discussion away from the formalized information-handling system and on to the

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<sup>20</sup>Adapted from Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Cultural Theory of Information Bias in Organizations," *Journal of Management Studies* 23 (3) (May 1986): 273-86.

informal old boy or old girl network.<sup>21</sup> I characterize this strategy as *individualist manipulation*.

3. *Paradigm protection* represents the closing of ranks by an establishment—by the upper tiers of a strongly hierarchical and power-wielding organizational form. Such organizational forms are not resistant to change itself (otherwise they would risk losing their power), but to those changes that threaten their hierarchical structure, causing information to spill out of its proper channels, shortcutting correct procedures and, worst of all, questioning the paradigm on which the whole pyramid rests.

Such information rejection (in hierarchies, as we all know, who has the right to do what, acting according to one's role and station, is as important as what is done) is often diffused and depersonalized—the unseen discards from the agendas of committee meetings and the sifting by shared assumptions that goes on in smoke-filled rooms. When it is forced out into the open, it is usually swathed in an aura of altruistic self-sacrifice. The appropriate strategy here is *collectivist manipulation*.

4. *Expulsion*. In contrast to an establishment that uses information to monitor and control threats to its power and influence, another sort of group—one with no hierarchy—takes a much more uncompromising and fundamentalist stand. A group having no internal differentiation has to concentrate all its defenses at its boundary, protecting the soft vulnerable "us" from the nasty predatory "them" by a total rejection of threatening information. Since such egalitarian bounded groups do not negotiate and refuse to compromise with the wider society, they cannot manipulate anyone except their own members (who, of course, do not see this as manipulation since it is what they voluntarily joined the group to do). Members of this sort of group sustain themselves with a *collectivist survival* strategy.

These vignettes of information-rejecting styles and of the social contexts in which they occur are only the tip of the cultural theory iceberg. They connect directly to the entire range of concerns that goes under the heading of "the new

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<sup>21</sup>Wynn and H.J. Otway, "Information Technology, Power and Managers," in *Information Society: For Richer for Poorer*, ed. N. Bjorn-Anderson and others (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982).

institutionalism."<sup>22</sup> They are consistent both with the strong program in the sociology of knowledge and with the sorts of arguments advanced in the new institutional economics, in which individualist, hierarchic, and egalitarian groups are seen as competing, yet complementary, arrangements for the handling of social transactions. Each has its advantages and its disadvantages; the concern is not with which one is right—that is a meaningless question—but with appropriateness. Which kinds of transactions are best handled by which kinds of institutional arrangements?

Each of the three active cultures—hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualist—generates corresponding inclinations to accept and reject information according to its perceived connection with supporting or opposing its way of life. This knowledge, in turn, tells us what kind of information is being rejected by whom. If government is the solution, it might set out to provide what is lacking. Better still, instead of altering the variables, government should manipulate the parameters—that is, encourage individuals and groups to figure out their own needs for information and how that might best be provided. A good example is the problem of grain collection in the former Soviet Union. Some say the denizens of these nations need better technology. Maybe. Since grain has been collected and stored for eons, however, a better idea would be to make it worthwhile to gather up and store grain and let the Russians themselves figure out what technology would be best.

### Why Don't They Do It?

Cultural theory can help analysts and activists better understand why other people confer different meanings and adopt different policies and try different modes of implementation than they do. Negotiating between an understanding of, in American parlance, where the various sides are "coming from" and an enhanced understanding of the forms of competition that enhance science, democracy, and development, cultural theory is an unused theoretical resource that could be of practical importance.

Cultural theory is a theory of social accountability; it is a theory about how people organized in diverse ways try to hold one another accountable. Cultural theory is also a theory of meaning, that is, about how people who share

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<sup>22</sup>See Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

different values justifying different patterns of social relations construct different meanings in regard to the same or similar objects of attention.

One might well ask whether there are a variety of ways of economizing.<sup>23</sup> If this supposition is false, then this paper is of no use, practical or theoretical. If it is true (or, more accurately, true enough), then the task of achieving economic development may be reconceptualized. No longer would it be desirable to focus only on a single culture and its way of life. Even if, as I have argued, a single culture is central to the achievement of science, democracy, and development, we now know that it cannot exist alone. Thus economic development depends not only on continuation of a single culture but also on cultural context. To know what that context is like, whether, for instance, any of the cultures are in short supply or are overstocked insofar as economic development is concerned, a cultural audit is necessary.

### **The Cultural Audit**

By conceiving of cultures as modes of organizing social life, each of which is found (albeit in different proportions) in every society, rather than as tribes or races or nationalities, much mischief is avoided.<sup>24</sup> There is no need to ask or answer harmful questions like "Whose traditions are superior?" Invidious distinctions of many kinds, from race to ethnicity to nationality, need not become the object of contention, seeing that each entity contains all the cultures.

A pluralist approach to culture also sidesteps (by rendering irrelevant) the alleged conflict between "tradition" and "modernity." If "tradition" means anything more than national or group history in all its particularity, including how things used to be done, it is a synonym for hierarchy. Similarly, "modernity," if it stands for anything more than being up-to-date, signifies individualistic culture. In short, "tradition versus modernity" stands for the overwhelming concern of social theorists with the movement from the collectivist hierarchy of the Middle Ages to the competitive individualism of industrial capitalism. But

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<sup>23</sup>A cultural theory approach to consumption is contained in Baron Isherwood and Mary Douglas, *The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption* (London: Allen Lane, 1979). Karl Dake and Michael Thompson are writing *Household Cultures*, a book on families that will carry this theory further with tests of propositions about who consumes what in which ways. (Available from Karl Dake, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 94720.)

<sup>24</sup>This section has been written with Karl Dake and Michael Thompson. Portions of it are adapted from Karl Dake, "Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk," *Journal of Social Issues* (Special Issue on Dealing with Environmental Hazards, ed. George Cvetkovich and Timothy Earle, in press).

it does no good to repeat the question—How to achieve substantial and sustained economic development?—in the form of an answer: Move from tradition to modernity. What is necessary to move away from is best expressed in cultural terms—fatalism and exclusive (one might say "monopolistic") hierarchy—and to move toward individualism in coalition with inclusive hierarchy. One objective is to diminish the fatalistic view that investment is doomed to fail ("You can't outguess Mother Nature") and that cooperation is counterproductive ("You can't trust human nature"). Because rule by exclusive hierarchies increases fatalism (people are not allowed to "make the rules that govern their lives") and stultifies development ("The center knows best"), it should give way to inclusive hierarchy ("My father's house has many mansions"). While hierarchy, by itself, changes too slowly to encourage economic growth, it serves as an essential companion to restrain and stabilize individualism. Hierarchy is essential to maintain order, to collect debts, to create rules for private property and economic transactions, and to maintain a sense of community.

We have deliberately not mentioned the culture of egalitarianism for this reason: a modest amount is indispensable to maintain political equality and to keep individualists and hierarchists honest, but a large amount is antithetical to democracy and development. The reason is that insistent demands for equality of condition exacerbate racial and ethnic conflict and redistribute resources before they have been obtained. The question is, how do we know how much egalitarianism or, for that matter, any of the four cultures there is? To find out, we recommend a cultural audit.

Most of the discussion on economic development has been at the macro level: social, political, and economic institutions have been considered, but little thought has been given to change at the micro level, nor of the links or bridges between the two. Yet it goes without saying that economic development requires the willingness to bid and bargain on the part of those who constitute the market. This apparently simple principle seems lost in economic models that assume that outputs (for example, economic growth, gross national product) follow directly from inputs (for example, fiscal policies based on unquestioned assumptions about how the world is and people are). Those who conduct research or design policy on such questions as the formation of market infrastructures or the privatization of centrally planned economies must inevitably bring their own models of institutions and processes to economic problems.<sup>25</sup>

Social scientists generally adopt a model of development that assumes that needs and resources constrain behavior through the requirement that people make

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<sup>25</sup>It is important to approach economic development at both the macro and micro levels. See Karl Dake, Diana Khapaeva, Ray Pahl, and Michael Thompson, "The Russian Change Makers," in which this distinction is drawn out (Typescript, 1991).

ends meet. Above the level of survival we believe that this is not so. Needs and resources are socially constructed. The conceptions of needs and resources are, in effect, supplied to the members of a culture, thereby enabling them to justify their way of life. The constraints on development are thus located in the ways of life, not in the needs and resources themselves.

Needs and resources have a certain social malleability; they are underdetermined by our own physiological properties and by the physical properties of the world in which we live. What, then, determines them? It is not the physical, but the moral constraints, the availability of reasons acceptable to others for adopting and sustaining a strategy, that limits and shapes our strategies for making ends meet. These strategies are shareable because they match the distinctive ideas of nature by which they are morally justified.

Allowing for the social malleability of needs and resources enables us to deduce four equally legitimate possibilities:

1. You can manage neither your needs nor your resources (fatalism).
2. You can manage your needs but not your resources (egalitarianism).
3. You can manage your resources but not your needs (hierarchy).
4. You can manage both your needs and your resources (individualism).

*Possibility 1 (Fatalism).* The individual who has no scope to manage his or her needs or resources really cannot be said to have a management strategy. His concern is to cope as best he can with an environment over which he has no control. The rational response if you find yourself at Possibility 1 is to hope that Lady Luck smiles on you—*survive by coping*.

This response is justified by a view of nature as essentially random. There are clearly plenty of resources out there, but the horn of plenty disgorges in your direction only when it is your lucky day. A matching response to the environment can be achieved only by adopting an attitude of fatalism. Putting first things first, fatalists construct a view of nature that operates without rhyme or reason to sustain and dignify their way of life. Little, if any, development will occur where fatalism is the predominant cultural norm.

*Possibility 2 (Egalitarianism).* Because you perceive resources to be fixed and you believe people can do nothing about them, your only available strategy is to decrease your needs to ensure a comfortable overlap. But it is no use doing this on your own. If resources are fixed and finite, then one person's gain is inevitably another's loss; to be effective, therefore, this need-reducing strategy will have to be followed by everyone. Little chance of that, you might think, but in an egalitarian and strongly collectivized social context individuals can all see the advantages of such behavior. For this to be rational behavior,

nature cannot be viewed as plentiful; it must be perceived to be strictly accountable. Only then can *resources be shared equitably* so that all count as one, and no one more than one. Abstemiousness and simplicity reinforce sharing. Indeed, those who support egalitarianism are less interested in development and more interested in (re)distribution.

*Possibility 3 (Hierarchy)*. If you cannot do anything about your needs, the only available strategy is to increase your resources; that increase requires resource mobilization. Individually, the members of such groups within a hierarchy have little manipulative ability; collectively (by working to rule, for instance, or by compulsory levies on members) they are able to increase their share of the cake as long as, in doing so, they do not overtake the groups above them. If this collective strategy is being pursued at all the different levels of the hierarchy (and it will have to be if the hierarchy itself is to remain in existence), the result is *differential maintenance*.

Most people, we suspect, will have little difficulty with the idea that you can manage your needs upward and downward. What may be more difficult for them to accept is that some people are not in a position to do this. But individuals whose lives are hedged about with all sorts of socially imposed prescriptions will find it very difficult to do anything to their needs; these are, in one way or another, just given to them by the hierarchy of which they are a part. Each person must spend according to the status ascribed to him or her. What individuals can do is work together collectively to raise their resources.

*Possibility 4 (Individualism)*. The entrepreneur is right in the middle of the turbulent stream of competitive individualism, where success comes to those who boldly and skillfully accept the risks—the opportunities—that present themselves there. Nature is cornucopian, but it is not freely available; it is controlled by skill. Individualists hold the idea of nature as "benign" so that if people are released from artificial limitations (like excessive environmental regulations and enforcement sanctions), there will be no limits to the abundance for all.

Individualism is not used here, however, in the sense of autonomous agents completely free from normative controls and constraints on behavior. Rather, individualists are viewed as social beings generating and stabilizing a form of social relations—creating social sanctions that defend their right to bid and bargain in self-regulated networks. When individualism is too weak, development suffers for lack of moral support; when individualism is too strong, the "big men," to use the language of New Guinea tribes, may create "rubbish men." For as long as individualism is strong, entrepreneurs can reduce their needs to save and invest more, and take risks to increase their resources.

These strategies for making ends meet are the only ones that contain views of economizing congruent with the models of nature that justify the

corresponding ways of life. Should egalitarians seek to expand resources, they could not justify sharing. Should hierarchies attempt to decrease needs, they could not maintain the differentials required to support graded statuses. Supporters of each way of life construct their ends to make their cultural biases meet up with their preferred pattern of social relations. Their behavioral strategies do what is most important to them—uphold and justify their way of life.<sup>26</sup>

Once we see how people can bring their resources and their needs together in different ways, we will be in a position to ask what is required for development to occur. Having put the very ideas of needs and resources back into different modes of social relations, we can approach economic development from what is usually considered the end: with the variety of individual producers and consumers. Why do different people want different things? And why do they produce the things they do?

### *Phase 1*

For the past two decades cultural theorists have been studying how competing cultures confer different meanings on situations, events, objects, and especially relationships.<sup>27</sup> Their argument is consistent with the theme being developed here—that consumption patterns, resource mobilization, and investment strategies are everywhere and always biased by legitimized social groupings, that is, by institutions embodied in everyday, ordinary interactions with family, friends, and peers.

More specifically, cultural theory accounts for the social construction of economic activity in terms of three linked domains that constitute a way of life: *social relations*, *cultural biases* and *behavioral strategies*. Hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist forms of social relations, together with the cultural biases that justify them, are each hypothesized to engender one of four distinctive ways of making ends meet. Cultural biases are defined as widely shared beliefs and values (that is, worldviews) corresponding to the different forms of social organization. The idea is straightforward: Adherence to a certain pattern of social relationships generates a particular way of looking at the world; adherence to a certain worldview legitimizes a corresponding kind of economic activity.

Taking this cultural approach to economic development requires "making cultural theory operational." A cultural audit of a region or a country calls for

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<sup>26</sup>Adapted from Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*, 39-53.

<sup>27</sup>See Douglas and Isherwood, *The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption*.

creative methodologies, potentially ranging from small studies of attitudes with brief interviews to large surveys and anthropological field work based on participant observation.<sup>28</sup> A set of measures is needed to gauge the relative proportions of hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians, and fatalists in a population. Such instruments would generate the foundation for assessing the roles of social relations, cultural biases, and behavioral strategies in economic development. And they would support comparisons with other social science approaches to these issues.

*Measuring social relations.* From the perspective of cultural theory, identity is mediated by an individual's social relations. Individuals who identify with groups that make economic decisions binding on all members will see themselves very differently than those who have weaker *group involvement* and therefore tend to make decisions that bind only themselves. Based in part on Durkheim's 1897/1951 concept of social regulation,<sup>29</sup> cultural theory maintains that identity is also shaped by the extent of *social prescription*, or "grid," constraining behavior in a person's life. According to this "grid/group" theory and method of analysis, as cultural theory is sometimes called, social prescriptions and group identity give rise to distinctive models of nature, specific types of rationality, and particular economic strategies that distinguish hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist ways of life.

We would develop measures of social relations related to these grid and group dimensions. The group measure would tell us how strongly individuals are tied to one another, that is, strongly for hierarchists and egalitarians, weakly for individualists and fatalists. Likewise, the grid measure would tell us how constrained these individuals are by social norms, that is, very constrained for fatalists and hierarchists, not very constrained for individualists and egalitarians.

*Measuring cultural biases.* In telling us that economic development is a social experience based on moral commitments to particular ways of life, cultural theory offers a testable set of hypotheses regarding environmental perceptions, cultural biases, and economic strategies. Hierarchically arranged groups are hypothesized to foster the model that nature is "perverse or tolerant."

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<sup>28</sup>Ideally we would prefer large random samples. However, we have shown that anthropological interviews are an effective means of cross-validating small studies of attitudes and consumption patterns. See Karl Dake and Michael Thompson, "The varieties of residential experience: A double-blind study of social relations, cultural biases and behavioral strategies in 220 British households" (Available from Karl Dake, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 94720, 1992).

<sup>29</sup>Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. (1897; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).

Nature, this view holds, is robust but only to a point. Sustainable development is the rational strategy in hierarchical culture because this policy takes advantage of the perceived resilience of nature but respects the limits as known by its duly certified experts. In this worldview the limits of ecosystems, and hence the appropriate resource conservation and development strategies, can be discovered only by experts. In economic policy, as in say, traditional tribal life, compliance with regulations is supposed to flow up the ranks of long-lasting institutions just as commands flow down.

Egalitarian groups—those with strong ingroup/outgroup boundaries but with prescriptions that do not vary by rank and station—espouse the model that nature is "fragile." Just as the experts-know-best approach to development justifies hierarchical social relations, so the egalitarian view that nature is ephemeral justifies equal sharing of resources perceived as finite. Egalitarian groups are often critical of the procedural rationality associated with hierarchy—who is allowed to do what with whom—and they advocate a more participatory approach to economic development based on equality of outcomes. In its radical form egalitarianism calls for preservation (tabooing) of nature with rejection of development as environmentally disruptive.

Likewise, cultures of fatalism—those with high levels of prescription but minimal collective participation—hold the model of nature as "capricious." Fatalists may have been excluded from the other ways of organizing social life: those who cannot compete successfully in markets, who cannot meet the minimum social standards of bounded and stratified groups, and who cannot muster the time, energy, or motivation for economic investment. Or fatalists may simply want to be free of well-wishers' influences. Either way, fatalists rationalize isolation and resignation to stringent controls on their behavior. "Why bother" is the rational economic policy for those who lack the self-regulation of individualists and the group solidarity of hierarchical or egalitarian collectivists. In contrast, individualists prefer a deregulated economic environment that leaves plenty of scope for the creation of wealth through individual initiative and personal skill.

We would design measures of cultural biases to inform us about the moral constraints (and supports) for development. Do individuals in the region believe that people should be rewarded according to their positions in society, or on the basis of merit? Should the government make sure everyone has a good standard of living, or concentrate its efforts on regional security? Is there support for capitalism, or general suspicion and hostility toward economic institutions? We have made substantial progress on measuring cultural biases in America and Britain (see Table 1), but we anticipate a significant effort in translating our measures for use in African contexts.

**Table 1. Cultural Biases Questionnaire: British Edition (Short Version)****Hierarchy scale**

I think there should be more discipline in the youth of today.  
 I would support the introduction of compulsory National Service.  
 People should be rewarded according to their positions in society.  
 I am more strict than most people about what is right and wrong.  
 We should have stronger armed forces than we do now.

**Individualism scale**

In a fair system people with more ability should earn more.  
 A free society can exist only by giving companies the opportunity to prosper.  
 People who are willing to work hard should be allowed to get on.  
 In this country the brightest should make it to the top.  
 If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should have the right to enjoy it.

**Egalitarianism scale**

If people in this country were treated more equally, we would have fewer problems.  
 The government should make sure everyone has a good standard of living.  
 Those who get ahead should be taxed more to support the less fortunate.  
 I would support a tax change that made people with large incomes pay more.  
 I support government efforts to get rid of poverty.

**Fatalism scale**

There is no use in doing things for people—you only get it in the neck in the long run.  
 Cooperating with others rarely works.  
 The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans.  
 I have often been treated unfairly.  
 A person is better off if he or she doesn't trust anyone.

*Source:* Karl Dake, "Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk," *Journal of Social Issues* (Special Issue on Dealing with Environmental Hazards, ed. George Cvetkovich and Timothy Earle, in press).

*Measuring behavioral strategies.* If beliefs about economic behavior are embedded in a few elementary forms of social relations, then in principle it should be possible to demonstrate the functional interactions among worldviews, social relations, and the behavioral strategies used to make ends meet. Of course, no single ideological or behavioral characteristic can be employed to assign individuals, groups, or institutions to cultural categories. A given person may participate in a variety of social settings, say, communal sharing (egalitarianism) at home, and individualism at work. Some persons or groups may hold contradictory beliefs as often as not (although we expect this to be more likely among fatalists). And situational factors surely play an important role in determining which forms of social organization prevail in which settings. Moreover, the "goodness of fit" in estimating cultural commitments from patterns of behavioral attributes may vary because the measurement tool and the classification decision are not one and the same, for example, how high does a score on individualism have to be before one is classified as an individualist? No doubt our endeavor in cultural classification is made more difficult by mixed cultural orientations, complex alliances, and evolving worldviews. Still, if worldviews and social relationships tend to covary, then with due consideration for different emergent properties at different levels of analysis, we should be able shed light on the interaction between sociocultural systems and economic systems.<sup>30</sup>

We would create measures of behavioral strategies focused on economic life. Is money saved? Are investments made? What constitutes a socially acceptable financial risk? Who is allowed to make which economic decisions? Is there always trouble with the creditors? Does one spend more or less than the neighbors—whether they be the next village, or the nearest nation-state? Answers to such questions would allow us to infer which behavioral strategy is being followed and by whom. For instance, political conflicts over such issues would reveal the organization of rights and obligations and underscore the economic interests in a community.

Phase 1 would allow for the design of instruments at each of these three levels of measurement—social relations, cultural biases, and behavioral strategies. A major part of the effort would be directed at developing research tools that are sensitive to the region under study.

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<sup>30</sup>Adapted from Karl Dake, "Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk" (*Journal of Social Issues*, in press).

## Phase 2

In Phase 2 a pilot study would be conducted.

## Conclusion

Cultural theory leads us to the expectation that markets work not because they are made up of autonomous agents free from the impediments of social sanctions but because they are made up of distinctive *social beings* who, in acting a particular way and in generating a particular set of beliefs, are able to promote and stabilize a way of life that emphasizes accumulation. Some—the energetic, the skillful, the adventurous, the lucky—are able to operate through the impressive personal networks to which this mode of social organization inevitably gives rise. Others—those less energetic, less skillful, less adventurous, less lucky—find themselves always at the peripheries of other people's networks and never at the centers of their own. This bifurcation—network centrality versus network peripherality—is, therefore, the normal state of affairs when group relations are absent or little developed.

Cultural theory goes on to show that a quite different bifurcation is found in the reaches of social life in which group relationships predominate and individualism is muted. Here it is the dynamics of group formation—boundary creation, internal differentiation, incorporation, exclusion—that continually separate the hierarchists and egalitarians.

If hierarchy is under attack—if that above all else is the nature of current economic transitions in many regions—we can now see that there are two quite separate directions in which it is being dismantled: one away from collectivized patterns and toward individualized ones (right to left of Figure 2); the other (from top to bottom) away from differentiated statuses and towards equalized ones.<sup>31</sup>

With measures of culture in place we will be well positioned to understand these dynamics of sociocultural change and hence to make empirically based policy recommendations to further economic development. Even now there is general agreement that fatalism, if it is large, should be decreased. It is also understood


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<sup>31</sup>The first will give us intensification of the individualism/fatalism bifurcation. The second will give us an increasingly critical and uncompromising rejection of economic individualism and withdrawal into egalitarian enclaves in which everything that is despised by devotees of the enterprise culture is celebrated and vice versa. See Michael Thompson, "The Dynamics of Cultural Theory and Their Implications for the Enterprise Culture," in *Understanding the Enterprise Culture*, ed. A. Ross (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 182-202.

that individualism and hierarchy have to work together for economic growth. This understanding, we believe, takes us further than we have been.

Neoclassical economics has served economic development well. But not everywhere and not well enough. By looking more closely at culture, at the institutionally generated motivations that work for and against economic growth, we hope to create cultural instruments for doing better.

**Figure 2. The Dynamics of Social Change**



*Source:* Michael Thompson, "The Dynamics of Cultural Theory and Their Implications for the Enterprise Culture," in *Understanding the Enterprise Culture*, ed. A. Ross (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 182-202.

## Indigenous Management Practices: Lessons for Africa's Management in the '90s

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*Given the poor performance of the public sector and weaknesses in local institutions related to economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must take a more critical look at which institutional arrangements are working, which are not, and why. Old assumptions need to be revised to recognize that political and administrative institutions are hybrids of tradition and modernity, that the vibrancy of the informal economy amidst the decline in the formal sector reflects the viability of selected indigenous arrangements, and that an idiom of local ownership and empowerment is implicit in whatever institutional changes are required to re-launch broad-based economic development. Institutions have always been central to the development process, but most of what is "known" tends to be highly aggregated: functioning factor markets, tenurial conditions in agriculture that give incentives and property rights to small cultivators, and effective governments with a commitment to economic development. But what do these concepts mean empirically in any given situation or country in Sub-Saharan Africa? Why not look to the relevant indigenous arrangements for clues as to how local communities define these concepts? Such an inquiry might lead to practical lessons for program and management improvement. We should examine the questions that cluster around the concepts of governance, participation, and accumulation. Through a variety of related empirical studies we must explore how sociocultural norms, behaviors, and incentives are linked to institutional performance.*

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Perhaps one of the single biggest hindrances to economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa is the poor performance of the public sector and chronic weaknesses in the local institutions.<sup>1</sup> But decades of efforts by national governments to turn this situation around, with help from the World Bank and other donors, have met with limited success. Recently, however, some observers

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<sup>1</sup>The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of the World Bank.

have come to believe that the problem might well stem from a failure of the traditional Western approaches to fully take into account the political and sociocultural values that influence economic decisionmaking. This premise runs counter to the main body of development literature, which tends to dismiss culture as either a neutral element or an obstacle to institutional development in technical innovations.

This essay—which emerges from personal experience and observations as well as findings of published and unpublished studies and research on the economic psychology of certain ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa—argues that traditional development projects have erred by focusing unduly on technical prescriptions, ignoring the need to adapt development assistance to the local cultural environment and ensure that Africans identify with such assistance efforts. The thinking behind this paper forms the basis of a study, "Indigenous Management Practices: Lessons for Africa's Management in the '90s," recently begun by the World Bank aimed at better integrating traditional cultural traits and incentives in the design and management of projects and programs. The study, a draft copy of which is to be circulated in late 1993 with the results of all the case studies, will (1) explore through eighteen case studies how sociocultural traits and incentives were linked to the success or failure of various projects and institutions, in both the informal and formal sectors, and (2) use the findings associated with success stories to better manage projects and reform programs dealing with institutional development and management. At this stage we do not profess to have a full solution to the problem but we would like to suggest an approach as part of the current debate on how best to help Africa build efficient and sustainable institutions and managerial capacity.

### **Why Culture Matters**

Traditionally, institutional development projects have been based on four key assumptions:

1. A *Eurocentric* view of the colonial heritage, which assumes that homogenous nation-states and appropriate modern public administrations were created during the colonial period. All that is needed is to manage them well.
2. A *technological* approach to institutional development and management, which assumes that Western methods and techniques of management are the only road to modernization.
3. A *mechanistic and linear conception of history* and "development," which assumes that every society must go through the same stages before it can achieve development.

4. An *ethnocentric approach* to culture, which assumes that any society has the same basic values and goals that characterize the "developed" countries, that is, spirit of enterprise, profit motive, material security, and self-interest. Countries not exhibiting such values and goals are viewed as primitive and underdeveloped.

The logical conclusion of these assumptions is that Africa's development must be stimulated from the outside, through transfer of culture, institutions, methods, and techniques from the industrialized Western countries; and that the colonial period has laid the foundation for sustainable development by leaving behind a legacy of homogenous nation-states and modern political and administrative processes and institutions. But the evidence to date strongly suggests that none of these assumptions is valid.

### Weak States and Strong Societies

The state and administrative framework inherited from the colonial period is a hybrid of political and administrative systems and institutions in which tradition and modernity co-exist. This is the result of a quadruple heritage from: precolonial times, the colonial period, Independence, and the post-Independence period.

During *pre-colonial times* Africa generally comprised either large empires—West, Center, and South—binding different ethnic groups under one hegemony, or smaller states identifying with a single ethnics—such as Ibo and Yoruba in Eastern and Western Nigeria. Despite the hierarchical system of traditional governments most of these entities were democratically governed through group representation at the center and village councils at the local level. The key operative concept for decisionmaking was consensus. The rulers had the authority but shared the power. Sheikh Anta Diop<sup>2</sup> describes the Kayor kingdom in Senegal, in which powers were effectively decentralized to the nobles, composed of seven ruling families who had legitimate rights to present candidates for kingship, and a number of powerful dignitaries (including captives) who worked as governors and court officials. The *burba* or king was chosen not simply based on birth but by three or four of the lords, themselves selected from among the many nobles. The selected king owed his enthronement, including his mystic empowerment, to these lords and reigned as long as he continued to please them. By holding the secrets of the cult, these lords controlled the "decisions" of the divine ancestors, who alone could give the king the mystic

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<sup>2</sup>Sheikh Anta Diop, *Civilisation ou barbarie* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1980).

powers without which he could not govern. So the kingdom was constitutional in being the product of ancestral characters projected in the local rule of law. This king then was not divine, but ritual. He was, first and foremost, a repository of ritual power.

Most historical monarchies in Africa, whether great or small, old or new, belonged to this basic type. They were political and therefore human, as well as ritual and therefore spiritual. Other examples are the Ebi concept of Yoruba society, the Mossi emperor, and the king of Dahomey. The differences in Africa remained generally of form and not substance. "Ritual" and "politics" marched hand in hand. The golden stool in the Asante and the sacred spears of central African kings symbolized the transformation of ritual power into the moral and political legitimacy to reign. Kings such as these, even when they reigned at the summit of strongly centralized systems, could not do as they wished. The exercise of power had to conform to the rules set by the ancestral charters. And most of these charters included "checks and balances to control the growth of centralized power." Gluckman describes the *barotse* (Central Africa) with penetrating insights into relations of power in which each position was balanced by another, including the king against his council.<sup>3</sup> This is similar to Al-mas Udi's description<sup>4</sup> of the kingship of the *zanj* in East Africa a thousand years ago. This is true of even those kingships, such as the *jukun* of Nigeria, that were cast as very autocratic. The point is that these societies, irrespective of their degree of centralization or social fragmentation, used kingship as a moral framework of binding force and unity. This framework, as Fortes reports of the Tallensi of Northern Ghana, was expressed in moral concepts or axioms "rooted in the direct experience of the inevitability of interdependence."<sup>5</sup> The moral order was robustly collective. This is the key reason for these societies' stability and self-confidence and the foundation for their specific social stratification and structural organizations. As a result of these checks and balances, group interests were preserved and permeated and guided local government and politics, decisionmaking, and even religion. Everyone participated, was heard, and accepted his or her responsibilities to the group and to one another. A key performance criterion of these traditional kings that generally distinguished them from post-Independence rulers was their obligation to assist their followers in need. While they might accumulate wealth, they invariably were expected to distribute it to maintain the general unity and equitable balance of the state.

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<sup>3</sup>Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959).

<sup>4</sup>See Basil Davidson, *Africa in History*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, McMillan Publishing Co., 1991).

<sup>5</sup>M. Fortes, *The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi* (Oxford: University Press, 1945).

Even in a kingdom as centrally organized as that in eighteenth century Dahomey, in which the king controlled most economic sectors and monopolized all trade with Europeans on the coast, it was mandatory for him to share his revenues at "annual customs."

When they arrived, the *colonial governors*, although aware of the existence of these traditional local governments, felt the need to create new states, institutions, and management systems as though none had existed before. The recasting exercise was launched at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, at which the colonial powers drew new frontiers separating African states.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, these new borders reflected more the comparative balance of the colonial powers and respective alliances in Europe than the existing traditional entities and ethnic bonds in Africa. Some ethnies were split apart: Ewe between Togo and Ghana; Somalis between Kenya and Somalia; Hausa between Nigeria and Niger; Soninke and Malinke between Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea, and Mali. In other places disparate and sometimes bitterly antagonistic tribes were thrown together, such as the expansion of Kabaka in neighboring kingdoms. All this resulted in a linguistic and cultural discord with high volatility and potentially implosive power. Instead of helping with the process of nation-building, colonization interrupted and set back the local process of consolidation initiated before. As a result, most of these lines on the map were generally ignored by the Africans. Divided ethnies continued to cross the borders and maintain their traditional social and economic ties. This was particularly facilitated by the existence of regional groupings: Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), grouping the eight territories of French West Africa and Togo; and Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF), grouping four territories of equatorial Africa plus Cameroon. It is only after Independence that most of these borders invented during the colonial period became significant and compelling.

This lack of indigenous foundation and related political and moral legitimacy was also visible in the *public administration* that was set up during the colonial period. The emphasis was more on extracting compliance and resources to meet the needs of the colonial Motherlands than on providing development-oriented services. This extractive mentality resulted in a highly centralized public administration that emphasized control and centralized power. While there are wide differences in the administrative heritages of the French, British, and Belgians, most were confined to the essentials: the provision of law and order and the exercise of ministerial responsibilities and taxation. The pattern of centralized authority has carried over to today with managers mainly intent on

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<sup>6</sup>J.D. Hargreaves, *The Prelude to the Partition of West Africa* (London: MacMillan, 1963).

controlling and micro-managing the individuals and organizations below them. Delegation of authority is seldom extensive, and the exercise of discretion by subordinates is generally discouraged. Political and personal loyalty and obedience were rewarded more than merit. Administration serves the law and the Motherland, not the indigenous population.

This public administration tends to be powerful, isolated, and locally alienating. The position of absolute power encourages the lack of responsibility and accountability to the people to be served. The isolation breeds lack of responsiveness and legitimacy. A related colonial legacy is the neglect of local self-government. Even where provincial or local government existed, genuine and autonomous local self-government was not permitted to develop. Public administration consisted essentially of layers on top that never came to grips with the political, economic, and social realities and problems of the local community. This underlying gap between the citizens and the administration and the personal politics that permeated it bred distrust, further alienation, and lack of indigenous legitimacy. But since colonization lasted only six to eight decades, it did not endure long enough to completely subvert and replace the four- or five-centuries-old traditional systems of governance and local administration.

Thus, with *Independence*, most of the African regions inherited a hybrid system in which "modern" governance and public administration systems were superimposed on traditional institutions and indigenous management system based mainly on ethnicity. The ambivalence was compounded by the revolution of rising expectations that accompanied the euphoria of Independence. Most Africans considered that Independence meant not only transfer of authority and power to local government but also transfer of wealth accumulated during the colonial period. The new regimes and central governments were seen therefore not only as inheriting an alien system but also as being facilitators of wealth redistribution. This is the dream of "life more abundant."<sup>7</sup>

Independence created the unrealistic expectation of a centralized government accountable for abundant wealth distribution and for raising everyone's consumption and living standards to the higher European levels. In contrast people's sense of dedication, identity, and accountability remained centered around local ties to the ethnic group, village, and family. A result of this ambiguity is that the resources of the central government were generally viewed as fair game for building ethnic bases and, by political leaders, as a base for creating an ever elusive political and moral legitimacy. This pattern was particularly acute in countries with a dominating ethnic group or in which two

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<sup>7</sup>Olusegun Obansanjo, *African Perspective, Myths and Realities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987).

powerful groups competed for power. This attitude has generated the deep ambivalence about accountability for national resources allocation. Patronage, graft, and outright corruption, sometimes linked to foreign-supported white elephants, are illustrations of this ambivalence. Where these occur, the country's welfare and economic growth assumes low priority. While strong central government control over the economy was justified at Independence on the implicit grounds of the need to ensure equitable share for everyone, it was ultimately misused to facilitate misallocation of resources by those at the center.

After thirty years of *Independence* and a worsening economic situation, disillusionment has set in. The promise of improved welfare and "life more abundant" from Independence Day never materialized. Or when it did, it benefited only the elite in power and their ethnies and friends, thus exacerbating inequity and ethnic tension. The combination of sharpened insecurities and ethnic competition over dwindling resources has eroded the already weak sense of national patriotism and reinforced state fragmentation. The need to band together with family and friends becomes a natural safety net. Thus, African leaders increasingly are losing the capacity to extract the support and legitimacy needed to exercise power. The layer of insulation and the benefit of the doubt given to the new regimes as a result of the euphoria of Independence have gradually eroded. New opposition groups, movements, and political parties are emerging and demanding more participation, democracy, and equity and in some instances a return to a more morally acceptable social order. "When will Independence end?" asked a disgruntled Senegalese farmer. As the concern for economic development increases, the administrative centralization and its accompanying lack of self-government prove to be major impediments, especially when ethnicity continues to play a growing role in shaping economic decisions for both individuals and government officials. Moreover, by the late 1980s the concept of sovereign and separate nation-states inherited from the colonial period is confronted with two serious challenges: first, it cannot accommodate ethnic group particularities in those states, and second, most of those states seem too small or too poor to be viable. It is becoming clear that the first order of business is to restore stability over an increasingly fragmented and volatile political and administrative environment and that regional integration is a must if Africa is to survive. How they cope or not with this dilemma of building good governance and redefining the role of the central administration within an ethnically divided society will determine the political and economic success or failure of most African countries.

### **Technology Transfer and Institutional Receptivity**

The lack of success of most traditional approaches to institutional development and public sector management (IDM) in Africa clearly shows the limitations of the *technological approach*. In fact it is now generally accepted that simply transferring some kind of know-how to Africa will not suffice. There must also be a high degree of national identification with the programs and projects—what is now referred to as "internalization" or "ownership." Past IDM projects and programs in Sub-Saharan Africa generally have been afflicted with an overdose of oversimplification. It had become an accepted postulate that Weberian or presumed Weberian rationalization and classical theories on efficiency could be successfully transferred without change or adaptation to these countries. As a result, most of these projects have generally been viewed as a process of transferring know-how from a more advanced to a less advanced culture. Superficially, this would appear to be its essence. New courses and curricula, new teaching methods, new techniques of personnel administration, new Organization and Methods (O&M) systems, new budget devices—all represented some kind of know-how, and all have been part of many IDM programs.

While the transfer of techniques is an important element of IDM, a view of IDM that is confined to the transfer of know-how and literal applications of technical prescriptions as universal panaceas overlooks the fundamental aspects of such help: the need to foster change and build sustainable and self-sufficient capacities and institutions. To be successful, development-oriented public administration and private sector development programs will have to consider how administrative means and management techniques may best be adapted to the particular political, economic, and social conditions and goals of the countries in which they operate. Some conditions will provide unique opportunities for experimentation; some are givens that must be accepted; and some are limitations that cannot be overcome. The new approach we are suggesting emphasizes the perhaps more crucial interaction of these functions and how they can be reconciled through a more participatory system.

### **Building from the Roots**

The remarkable vibrancy of the informal sector in Africa in the midst of the generalized economic crises and difficulties of most modern sector enterprises illustrates the *limits of the linear conception*. Against the background of a hostile environment and lack of government support, the success of most of these microenterprises is best explained by their ability to reconcile African social and cultural values and traditions with the need for economic efficiency. This indigenous system has enabled them to navigate through crisis and other major

economic difficulties. Their management is largely a family affair that relies greatly on informal and personal types of business relationships. For these entrepreneurs the circumstances surrounding economic acts are more important than the principles underlying such acts. Commercial transactions, prices, and terms of payment will depend more on the relationships between the operators and their clients than on the principles of supply and demand. There is one price for friends, one for family, and one for foreigners, especially tourists from the industrialized countries. Despite generally difficult odds these microenterprises will continue to play a major role in the African economies for two main reasons:

1. Through the family and tribal ties they maintain, they reinforce the group's solidarity and facilitate the redistribution of income—which, in the context of the extended family, constitute the essence of the group's stability and moral equilibrium.
2. They facilitate the "mirror" effect. In other words they give consumers the possibility of disposing of additional resources, enabling them to maintain previous higher living standards that they can no longer afford with their reduced means. In other words it allows them to live beyond their official means.

Unfortunately, even when they develop, these microenterprises rarely shift to more concentrated, more industrial and capital-intensive production functions. Their contributions to gross capital formation and to a solution of the employment problem has therefore remained, so far, minimal. Instead of deepening they tend to widen. The tailor who becomes a manufacturer of ready-made clothes does not employ more than ten or so friends or relatives; despite the development of his business, his sales system will remain unchanged, and his volume of business will not rise above a certain ceiling. Once he has accumulated enough excess funds, he will use these either in conspicuous consumption (for example, luxury houses, the latest car model, or several wives), or, if he invests, it will be in unrelated activities such as setting up other micro-enterprises (such as another fishery, a transportation enterprise, or a new shop). The tendency is toward multiple rather than intensive investments. It is because of this absence of technology and reluctance to deepen the level of capitalization that these types of enterprises remain confined to traditional market niches. The challenge is how to get them to play a substantial part in increasing output and employment while conserving the traditional family ties and informality that have made their survival and performance possible.

### **Getting the Prices Right and Giving the Right Prices**


The need to understand and take into account idiosyncrasies of African political and sociocultural structure is paramount if the development community is to help Africa reform, increase, and sustain the efficiency of its public and private sectors. It is the combination of both the sociocultural and technical-managerial elements of political and institutional development that will determine the quality and success of efforts in this area.

Binet's extensive research throughout the continent has fully documented key cultural values and traits of African economics' psychology.<sup>8</sup> These sociocultural values and the key behavioral traits described below were found to be representative of the economic psychology of a sample of fifty-six ethnic groups spread throughout Africa covered in Binet's extensive study.

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<sup>8</sup>Jacques Binet, *Psychologie économique africaine: Eléments d'une recherche interdisciplinaire*, Bibliothèque scientifique (Paris: Payot, 1970), 328-29.

Figure 1. Ethnic Groups Exhibiting Traits



- |               |             |              |              |
|---------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Ouolof     | 15. Dioula  | 29. Kirdi    | 43. Bapounou |
| 2. Serer      | 16. Lobi    | 30. Bamiléké | 44. Bawandji |
| 3. Manding    | 17. Mossi   | 31. Bamoun   | 45. Bandjabi |
| 4. Diola      | 18. Ebrié   | 32. Bassa    | 46. Basoundi |
| 5. Toucouleur | 19. Baoulé  | 33. Ngoumba  | 47. Balali   |
| 6. Coniagui   | 20. Agni    | 34. Ewondo   | 48. Bakongo  |
| 7. Foula      | 21. Ewe     | 35. Bané     | 49. Langba   |
| 8. Soussou    | 22. Mina    | 36. Boulou   | 50. Azandé   |
| 9. Sarakolé   | 23. Kabré   | 37. Fang     | 51. Babwa    |
| 10. Malinké   | 24. Somba   | 38. Pongwe   | 52. Bakete   |
| 11. Dogon     | 25. Fon     | 39. Adouma   | 53. Kamba    |
| 12. Bambara   | 26. Nago    | 40. Okande   | 54. Bashi    |
| 13. Songhay   | 27. Yorouba | 41. Bakota   | 55. Bankole  |
| 14. Haoussa   | 28. Ibo     | 42. Eshira   | 56. Kordofan |

Source: Jacques Binet, *Psychologie économique africaine: Eléments d'une recherche interdisciplinaire*, Bibliothèque scientifique (Paris: Payot, 1970), 328-29.

Moreover, our own experience in various parts of Africa and the findings of other studies and reports confirm Binet's work. Even so, two caveats should be made: (1) the findings should not be seen as representative of all ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, and (2) many of these characteristics exist in other regions of the developing world.

### **African Cultural Traits**

African economic psychology is generally characterized by powerful connections between objects, humans, and the supernatural. Although the emphasis put on each of these elements and the interrelationships among them can vary from one ethnic group or tribe to another, the quest for equilibrium with other human beings and with the supernatural is generally the guiding principle. The frontiers separating collective from individual preferences are often nonexistent or quite vague.

Among these groups self-reliance and self-interest tend to take a back seat to ethnicity and group loyalty—there are still thousands of ethnic groups on the continent. The main concern seems to be maintaining social balance and equity within the group, rather than individual economic achievements. Generally, the interest of the local and ethnic communities takes precedence over whatever the government may declare as national goals.

Typically, higher value is placed on interpersonal relations and the timely execution of certain social and religious or mystic activities than on individual achievements. The circumstances and sometimes the ritual surrounding the economic transactions are often more important than the principles governing these transactions. The value of economic acts is measured in terms of their capacity to reinforce the bonds of the group.

*Attitude toward savings and investment.* In Sub-Saharan Africa it might well be said that, in general, the only riches are those shared with—and socially visible to—the community. There is a social and mystical need for what Westerners may call "wastefulness." For example, among the Diola of Senegal L.V. Thomas observed the massacre of 750 head of cattle to celebrate a circumcision ceremony,<sup>9</sup> and it is not uncommon for poor, malnourished farmers to give away vast quantities of foods on the occasion of marriages, circumcisions, or burials. Some countries have even introduced laws to prohibit or limit extravagant expenditures only to see them broken by the advocates.

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<sup>9</sup>L.V. Thomas, "Les Diolas," *Memoires I.F.A.N.*, (Dakar: Université de Dakar, 1966).

Exacerbating matters is the fact that the extended family is always present and always likely to be imposing itself. When small in size, excess income is distributed first to close members of the extended family, then to the neighbors, and then to the ethnic tribe. Excess income, therefore, simply leads to more lavish consumption and a widening of the circle of those benefiting from the income redistribution. A corollary is that economic success in itself does not lead to upward social mobility. In fact if achieved outside of the group, it may even lead to social ostracism. In recent years intensified insecurities and conflict over dwindling resources have heightened the need to band together with people one can trust. State resources thus become fair game for ethnic groups and extended family to build their own basis of support and legitimacy through patronage or, sometimes, outright graft. Most of this wealth, however, generally ends up in conspicuous consumption, including luxury houses, monuments, latest car models, and lavish social festivities, instead of productive investments.

To what can these seemingly irrational behavioral traits be attributed? The need for security is a primary justification. The host who provides sumptuous hospitality and redistributes his wealth can expect to count on the beneficiaries in periods of need. A desire for prestige frequently provides a second reason. In some areas wedding guests may proudly pin bank notes on their festive dress, literally parading their wealth. Baoule funerals in Côte d'Ivoire are famous for their extravagant display of family treasure, such as jewels or gold dust. From the development perspective the problem is that this tendency—attaching little value to the self-control needed for saving—runs counter to the prerequisites for promoting private investment and African entrepreneurship.

*Attitude toward authority.* African society generally is very paternalistic and hierarchical. Little prone to individualism, it tends to be egalitarian within the same age group but hierarchical in group-to-group relations, with marked subordination of the younger members. Within each group individuals possess equal legal status and the capacity to perform specific acts, but a person wishing to go beyond his or her own circle can do so only with the permission of the father or some other authority, such as a tribal chief.

These paternalistic and hierarchical structures have often been regarded by Westerners—who highly value assertiveness, individual freedom, and responsibility—as running counter to productivity and creativity. But this is not always borne out by fact or history. First, in most rural areas the type of aggregation (lineages, kinships) and the size of the unit (large extended family or small nuclear one) will determine how land and labor are allocated. In addition if there is considerable pressure within the community or group for strict adherence to traditional, socially acceptable behavior, it may be difficult to induce isolated individuals to adopt innovations that tend to alienate them from

the society. For instance, work on certain days or at certain times may be forbidden in deference to bush spirits. In part of Burkina Faso the "chef de terre" has an absolute mystical power on all matters relating to land allocation and introduction of new farming techniques. In this setting it may be necessary to adopt extension methods that use the group as the focal contact point instead of individual farmers. This adaptation was successfully made in the introduction of the Training and Visit (T&V) in the Regional Development Organization in west Burkina Faso. Second, in Cameroon the Bamoun tribe, under a highly centralized and organized kingdom, has managed to create a flourishing architectural and artisanal tradition. A society founded on dependence and paternalism thus may prove just as creative as any other. Indeed, the impulse to bring oneself to the notice of the "prince" may be a more powerful incentive than self-achievement. Even if paternalism and dependency slow the pace at which an entire population changes and evolves, they need not hinder the ultimate progress, research, and economic development.

*Attitude toward commitment.* A promise or commitment—which is the manifestation of intention in legal acts—is no simple thing in the African context. The presence of several witnesses is a frequent requirement, and their roles generally go well beyond those of neutral bystanders. In some instances they may be expected to remember the facts should one of the parties renege or disappear. In other instances their presence and acquiescence—particularly if they are heads of family or village chiefs—are necessary to legitimize the act.

Loans obtained by pawning or pledging an object are also symbolic acts. But here the symbolic value of the pledge is more important than its mercantile value. Among the Boulou and the Fang tribes in Central Africa, for example, loans are granted in exchange for the pawning or pledging of an object of so little value that it could not possibly serve as security in the West—for example, a ballpoint pen might be pledged for a loan of 10,000 CFA francs. These pledges are accepted as evidence against debtors when disputes arise, but they primarily personify the debtor, who in a sense offers a part of himself as pledge, and having done so, can no longer go back on his word. One has only to look at the high rate of loan repayment in the traditional and informal financial system, compared to the unduly high percentage of nonperforming loans in most of the formal banking sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, to appreciate the importance of traditional ritualistic and social guarantees.

*Attitude toward decisionmaking.* The traditional judge in black Africa is more intent on reaching a consensus than litigating "by the book." In legal as well as in political matters Africans tend to seek unanimity and are generally prepared to engage in seemingly interminable discussions. In the same spirit the judgments handed down seek to establish a broad area of consent. There are even some countries in which customary procedures require that any dispute be

brought to an end by songs and dances, signifying that the two parties have agreed to maintain harmony and understanding. This is the opposite of the spirit that imbues law in the Western countries, where the court interprets the law and pronounces a sentence to which the parties have to submit.

*Attitude toward labor.* The tendency to value group solidarity and socializing has generally led Africans to attach a high value to leisure and the attendant ability to engage in rituals, ceremonies, and social activities. Indeed, an inadequate recognition of the social benefits attached to leisure, as well as the impact of traditional leadership and organizational patterns on labor availability, may lead to an overestimation of labor's supply.

The high value Africans generally attach to leisure has often been misconstrued by outsiders as "laziness." Simply put, in Africa these activities serve as a means of reinforcing social bonds, which are the foundation of its society. Thus, the marginal return of so-called unproductive labor, that is, leisure, is generally very high—that is, the benefits are more social than economic. As a result, farmers tend to adopt innovations only when the expected return on additional labor, measured in both social and economic terms, is likely to be substantially higher than what they are already receiving from the prevailing combination of leisure and productive activities. The size and nature of the farming unit, the seasonal nature of the farming practices, and the division of labor between women and men—who tend to have their own lands, their own crops, and special tasks—also play a role. Since women must do all of the domestic work on top of their agricultural tasks, they have very little remaining time that could be shifted to other productive activities.

### **A New Vision of Management**

The reconciliation of these traditional values with the imperatives of economic efficiency and accumulation building on effective indigenous management practices is, therefore, crucial to economic development. The new approach has to reconcile the two, sometimes contradictory, goals of accumulation (growth) and redistribution (equity). As is well known, economic growth is generally accompanied by social and economic inequalities and imbalances. In the African context, in which the concern with solidarity of the group takes precedence over individual success, the problem becomes one of finding a way either to minimize the impact of or to maximize the degree of tolerance for these inevitable imbalances during the growth stage. Experience tells us that such imbalances are best tolerated within the family context—that is, the success of some members of the family or tribe creates optimism and empathy in the others who expect, sooner or later, to profit from it through a "trickle down" or direct redistribution.

Other societies have successfully modernized without renouncing local customs, culture, or traditional values. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan are examples of economies that have achieved high levels of modern production and advanced technology while maintaining their unique national traits. Their experiences prove that acculturation is not a prerequisite to development, but rather the contrary: that whatever direction the development process may take, its success and sustainability will depend on how well it takes account of the needs and culture of the beneficiaries.

Accordingly, the principal focus of our study is to assess, through seventeen case studies, which indigenous management practices have been most successful and can be used to develop a more efficient and sustainable approach to: (1) effective governance and public administration, (2) participatory process in the design and implementation of projects and reform programs, and (3) more dynamic use of indigenous management practices in the informal sector with the need for efficient and competitive African entrepreneurship. In the remainder of this paper I will clarify the general framework and key issues to be addressed for each of those three main components of the study.

### **Redefinition of the Role of the State**

This section will deal respectively with the use of African cultural values to build (1) an effective governance and (2) a public administration that is more oriented towards development needs and services than control.

### ***Culture and Governance***

*Political and traditional legitimacy.* Without pretending to offer a full-scale solution or blueprint for all of Africa, we believe that useful lessons can be drawn from some imaginative and interesting approaches to effective reconciliation between traditional and modern political legitimacy in two African countries: Ghana and Botswana. Through the 1971 Chieftaincy Act *Ghana* was able to constitutionally establish a successful partnership between the modern central government and the traditional chiefs at the village and district levels.<sup>10</sup> The central government had the responsibility for the armed forces, the judiciary, the economy, and other national strategic matters while the traditional chiefs were responsible for all local family, land, and legal matters and safeguarding the cultural heritage and values. The Chieftaincy Act not only gave the constitutional

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<sup>10</sup>Neil Henry, *Washington Post*, July 27, 1990.

seal of approval to the power and influence of traditional authorities but also granted them the official rights and power to enforce customary laws.

The staged and popular selection of the chiefs also guarantees their political and moral legitimacy and their sense of accountability towards the local community. The general population elects 5,000 lower-rank village sub-chiefs who, in turn, select 168 paramount chiefs to preside over 200 central districts. The Act also established regional and national assemblies in which the chiefs interact with one another and with the central government to decide on regional as well as national issues affecting their respective communities. Through this highly participatory and consultative process Ghana was able not only to ensure genuine involvement of the population in the management of the local community but also to unify disparate ethnic groups. While central governments' fates waxed and waned as a result of coup or election, the traditional houses of chiefs have constituted reliable and sustainable institutional foundations capable of weathering political and economic crises. They have assumed such a growing importance that the government of President Jerry Rawlings is considering giving them one-third of the seats in the Ghanaian legislature. *Botswana* also offers an interesting case in which the political leadership has successfully reconciled both political and traditional legitimacy.

*Political transition and popular participation.* The relevant cases to be analyzed here are the national conferences (*conférences nationales*). They provide an interesting and innovative example of how some African countries were able to achieve democratic and peaceful political transitions building on traditional approaches to consensus building. To those who watched the proceedings of these conferences, the similarity is very obvious between them and traditional village-local meetings at which agreement is reached through a long, highly transparent process of debate and consensus building. While the process was started in Benin, the similarity was particularly striking in Congo, where at the end of the conference all 1,500 delegates solemnly took turns dipping their hands in the reflecting pool outside the assembly hall. This gesture was meant to symbolize not only washing away the bile that often marred the deliberations but also the national reconciliation. In terms of political liberalization and transition these national conferences constitute one of the most dramatic and popular political innovations in post-Independence Africa.

The model was replicated in several countries albeit with minor local nuances: Benin (the precursor) in 1990; Congo, Mali, Niger, and Togo in 1991. In other countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea) interest groups, movements, and opposition parties are also pressing for national conferences. The popularity of this model of spontaneous democracy derives from the fact that it is based on the traditional consensus building system in Africa and is therefore easily internalized by the

population. While the multi-party system has been called for and tested in several African countries, it is still generally viewed as a Western and colonial heritage. As such it has generally been considered an elitist and alien system without much cultural and moral legitimacy. The end of the Cold War has added another layer of confusion regarding the respective ideological identities of those parties. Many of them are in fact formed around an individual who draws his main support from a particular ethnic group, region, or interest group. The class-based parties so common in the West have yet to take hold in Africa. Furthermore, Obasanjo noted that the notion of tolerance of an opposition party is not germane to the African local political culture.<sup>11</sup> The opposing leader is viewed as an enemy to be rid of, not someone with whom to compromise for the sake of national interest.

As a result, even in countries in which it was genuinely tried, the multi-party system has not always led to political alternation. The ruling party has rarely been voted out. While it is too early to judge the merits of the national conference as an alternative to multi-party democracy, it is fair to admit that it has generally succeeded in achieving peaceful political alternation and more popular participation. It seems to constitute a successful, innovative, and internalized approach to political democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa provided the following three preconditions are met:

1. In view of the limited success of multi-party experience in Sub-Saharan Africa the present practice of using the national conference exclusively as a means of transition towards a multi-party system does not seem totally logical. It would seem to make more sense to build these conferences into a viable *alternative* to the multi-party system or at least one option in a menu of approaches (that includes a multi-party system) to democracy and popular participation. The menu would include these three options: multi-party democracy, national conferences as transitions to multi-party democracy, and national conferences as substitutes for multi-party democracy. Countries will choose the approach they feel most fitting for their particular circumstances, constraints, and stage of political development. Selecting the third option would imply holding periodic national conferences as a substitute to the multi-party electoral process and making the institutions created by these conferences (executive, legislative, and judiciary) permanent instead of transitory. This change would also require, among other things, rethinking the process

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<sup>11</sup>Obasanjo, *African Perspective, Myths and Realities*.

for selecting delegates at the conference to ensure not only more transparency but also adequate representation of all interest groups and movements (including political parties).

2. The selection of national conferences as an alternative model for democracy in Africa would also require using these fora to build consensus and commitment to not only political transition but also economic reforms. A key lesson learned from the limited country experience so far is that political transition without progress in the economic front will not be sustainable. The newly acquired freedom and the euphoria accompanying change in regimes and institutions will generally create unreasonable expectations that the new institutions and regimes will be able to perform short-term economic miracles. Proceedings of the national conference should therefore focus on the twin objectives of economic and political reforms and transition.
3. The Togo, Congo, and even Mali examples clearly demonstrate the need to get the army fully on board and committed to the consensus reached during those conferences. This issue needs to be resolved if the institutions created and the process put in place have any chance of restoring the political stability and national unity needed for economic development.

Finally, the ethnic and size problems of the existing nation-states raise the issue of how to reconcile the need for national and cultural identity with the need for wider unity with neighbors. Manifestly, *regional integration* constitutes an important key to the solution. But given the failures of previous top-down attempts at regional cooperation, including the East Africa community, Mali federation, and Senegambia confederation, this paper argues for a more gradual, bottom-up approach building on existing ethnic and economic complementarities.

### ***Building Development Administration***

Constructing a modern public administration system that is compatible with development aims, let alone facilitates them, is no easy task. The major aims are three: (1) to reduce the wage bill to achieve short-term fiscal stabilization objectives; (2) to ensure that the wage and salary structure as well as employment conditions are correctly used as incentives for greater efficiency of the public administration; and (3) to move from the rigid colonial service structures to one that is oriented toward development. Previous studies and research within and outside the Bank have generally focused almost exclusively on the first objective, fiscal stabilization. Experience proves that while cost containment is necessary, it is only one step in building a development-oriented administration. The second

While tenure practices may be theoretically for life, in actuality the level of responsibilities and pay may change whenever another political faction or minister takes over.

Another important characteristic of most civil service systems in Africa is the distinction and difference in rewards between technical and professional positions and administrative ones. In most countries technically trained specialists (in agriculture, education, or public health) generally prefer to stay in administrative posts in the cities to avoid serving in the villages. At the same time some high-level administrative positions are exclusively reserved for general administrators with heavy training in law and order and less in development-oriented public administration. This dichotomy has led to the constitution of administrative elites or superior administrative corps that often are neither development- nor action-oriented. They also are rarely representative of a socioeconomic, racial, or religious cross-section of the population. However, given their high bureaucratic leverage, their identification with and support of reform programs is crucial. In such circumstances work directed at improving the effectiveness and developmental orientation of these elite administrative corps is likely to be a major step in administrative reform to achieve qualitative and efficiency gains. In the socially fragmented context of Africa such a centrally controlled system may be politically dangerous since political stability is not great and local community development and participation are generally absent. Where qualitative changes are needed in the personnel policy, a centralized classification and pay plan may not be adequate. If high-level personnel are scarce, the question may not be whether they fit into the classification or pay plan or how compressed the system is, but what each must earn in return for his or her agreement to work for the government. A decentralized personnel system may be a *sine qua non* condition for plurality of forces, power, better governance, and participation. Overall, previous civil service reforms have mistakenly focused on personnel classification and pay plans to continue and even strengthen the colonial legacy of central control and formal bureaucracy. Their concerns were more with procedures, organizational structures, and systems than with the spirit and purpose of development. To bypass the system, individual personnel (civil service) agencies, although influenced by the British, French, or even American experience (Liberia), have generally found ways of developing plans to fit their own circumstances. A major reason for such multiplicity of plans is that the inherited system assumes a singleness of purpose and bureaucratic neutrality that does not exist in most African countries. Where is the political appointee to be placed? Where is the spot for the senile or the incompetent who cannot be fired? Political and welfare considerations influence the personnel system in Africa more than in many Western countries. Loyalty to the tribe and extended family still rules most personnel decisions. Civil servants tend to put the good of local

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and ethnic communities before whatever the government may "declare" as the national good. In this context national interests and civism are empty abstract concepts to be referred to only as nominal ways of building good external public relations. As one African head of state put it, "Holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument." As a result public accountability becomes weak. While everyone seems to agree that this political culture needs to be factored in if administrative and economic reforms are to succeed, agreement on how to do so is less clear. A frontal assault to eliminate tradition and social values surely will exacerbate the social and political stress. The Chieftaincy Act of Ghana as well as attempts at decentralization in Nigeria, Senegal, and other African countries may provide good case studies for new approaches.

#### ***A New Approach: Commitment and Internalization through Participation***

As described before, donors' approaches to development should become increasingly concerted and proactive. Since the economic crisis is so widespread and national savings are so limited, African countries now have to work out solutions with their creditors and potential lenders to be able to meet their debt commitments and finance their development needs. The development process becomes essentially a compact among three key actors: the country, which has to undertake reform programs capable of getting it out of crisis; and the creditors, with whom the country has to negotiate a solution to the debt problem capable of restoring its creditworthiness. This would clearly require schemes aimed at reducing the stock—of—debt, not simply rescheduling under classical terms. The last partners are the donors/financiers (including the creditors), who would provide complementary resources to finance transition costs as well as investment programs. The keys to the success of such a compact are not only (1) the quality of the program but also (2) an attitude or cultural change in donors to deemphasize leverage and adopt a more facilitative mode, and (3) greater commitment and internalization by the borrowers. For maximal internalization—or national identification with a program—three conditions must be met:

1. Commitment on the part of the political leadership
2. Commitment on the part of the "technostructure"
3. Acceptance by the population.

Commitment on the part of the *political leadership* will be at its maximum if the program can achieve optimal developmental impact without leading to major social and political upheavals. The comparison of the benefits of the developmental impact with the political and social costs of the reform becomes an important step in the process of designing these reforms. Some

people refer to this as appraisal of the social and political feasibility of the programs; it is simply an assessment of their realism.


Commitment on the part of the "*technostructure*" will be maximized if the executive ranks of the civil service have taken a very active part, or better, leadership in the design and implementation of these programs—in short, if they identify with the proposed reforms. Assessment of the availability and quality of domestic institutions, their absorptive capacity, and the assistance needed to strengthen them constitute the second major element in strengthening the internalization process. In these circumstances technical assistance should be assessed in terms not of substitution but of its ability to contribute to institution-building and technology transfer.

*Acceptance by the population* will be maximized if the expected benefits of the program are easily identifiable and quantifiable and can materialize shortly, and if the reform does not lead to drastic changes in the traditional social and cultural fabrics of the community. The feasibility study of the reform program at the design stage therefore requires detailed knowledge of the sociocultural environment and of the motives, propensities, and incentives underlying local decisionmaking. An assessment of the impact of adjustment measures on the most vulnerable population so that it can be mitigated also becomes extremely important in the maximization of the population's acceptance.

The major objective of the compact therefore is to rely on a spirit of cooperation to achieve the greatest possible sustainable developmental impact without major disruptions of traditional and social values. The quality of the projects and programs will be a function of both the substance (technical) and process (internalization). Figure 2 depicts how typical development assistance operations fit this new mode.

This new concerted approach should begin with a thorough assessment of all circumstances in which development management is to operate, especially the respective forces of stakeholders, and should take into account the relationship of development to political, economic, and sociocultural factors. A clear understanding and appreciation of the various types of groups based on ties of kinship, neighborhood, or age, and their usefulness in the process of innovation become prerequisites to the success of any development programs. Some of these groups may serve purposes that have little or no relevance to the desired change. Others may be rent by internal strife that may make it impossible for them to pull together. There may also be various types of leaders—some traditional, such as chiefs and lineage or neighborhood elders, and others emerging from newer types of organization, such as political parties and the military establishment. Once these are identified and the nature of their authority assessed, some may play an important role in mobilizing public support for the proposed change. Others, less inclined to innovation, may actually impede

**Figure 2. Typology of Development Assistance**



Q = F(I,C) where Q = Quality

change unless their opposition is neutralized. If old leaders never enjoyed much authority or have lost the basis for their former support and if new leaders have not yet emerged, special efforts may be required to discern which individuals in the society may have the capacity for leadership and the ability to command support for development efforts.

Once this assessment is done, the second assessment is the difficult decision as to what is transferable in the above special circumstances and how. At the very least, adaptation rather than outright transfer usually is needed. Questions of receptivity of the local environment and the timing of transfer and change with the many forces that can support change become crucial. Attention to these matters can help assure that the completion of such transfer is accepted and that it adapts progressively to local capacity building. In regard to many kinds of problems, however, adaptation techniques might not be enough. Innovation will also be required.

The purpose of the *Indigenous Management and African Entrepreneurship* component of the study is to capitalize on the strengths and potentials of the indigenous informal sector and management practices to develop a more efficient and productive private sector and African entrepreneurship. This nurturance of indigenous entrepreneurship could be achieved by diversifying the activities of these microenterprises into those that complement the modern sector. In this way the informal sector would expand to small- and medium-scale enterprises and industries and begin to operate according to a set of dynamics largely activated by effective demand from the modern sector. Beyond the traditional limited range of the most marginal activities (micro-retail or micro-services), the informal sector would then develop into an appendage of the modern sector. It would become an intermediate sector that would gradually fill the void left by the highly capital-intensive modern enterprises. Complementarities would appear in management, effective demand, sectoral linkages, and subcontracting arrangements. The ultimate goal of the new approach is to extend family solidarity to embrace both enterprises and the nation, to maximize the tolerance threshold for the disequilibrium that inevitably accompanies growth. Our initial thinking for the study is that the model should be built on five pillars:

1. *Strengthening incentives for accumulation.* If saving and reinvestment are to be encouraged, the constraints against them must be removed. The Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) provide a first option. Through group pressure and other mechanisms, such as required regular deposits and borrowing on a rotating basis, ROSCAs constitute convenient traditional financial institutions for those intent on saving. Another approach would be to make economic success a vehicle of social mobility and advancement. It would imply, for

instance, the creation of a special honorific distinction to be awarded only to economic enterprises and operators, public or private, that have made a noteworthy contribution to national production and accumulation efforts, preferably including recognition by the leader. This approach is similar to that followed in Korea, where an annual ceremony is held at which the head of state honors the business leaders who have done most to expand export activities. On occasion it has also been tried—successfully—in Africa. For example, ten or twenty years ago, a group of Bamileke chiefs in Cameroon allowed individuals dynamic enough to have built up personal fortunes to move up in the traditional social hierarchy by buying a title to nobility or gaining admittance to "secret" societies.

2. *Linking employee compensation to performance.* In encouraging greater accumulation, steps should also be taken to ensure equity and redistribution, which are necessary for the balance and survival of the group. Using schemes such as an employee stock ownership program (ESOP) and profit-sharing would give the majority of people of all social ranks and ethnic backgrounds the chance to share the benefits of greater productivity and accumulation, thereby enlarging the circle of those in a position to profit directly.
3. *Using traditional values as efficiency stimuli.* To promote a sustainable production system—one that can withstand and adjust to crises—it will be necessary to build on the local traditional values, as in Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries. Conflicts between superior and subordinate, for example, could be settled informally by relying on group or "family" intermediation, reflecting the cultural preference for compromise rather than litigation. In labor relations care should also be taken that Africans, used to ranks and regimentation of even apparently trivial details, do not feel somewhat left out because there are no precise guidelines. This might mean developing rules on meeting procedures to encourage more active participation.
4. *Using formalism and ritual to reinforce contractual bonds.* Since the strength of commitments and contractual obligations generally depends on the group pressure resulting from the formalism and rituals associated with the acts, managers should think twice before contemplating doing away with what Westerners have sometimes seen as incidental and purposeless intrusions of magic

or religion. Indeed, the absence of such features would only reduce the value of the parties' commitments.

5. *Using group dynamics to foster productivity.* Since group dynamics are important factors in raising labor productivity and enforcing discipline, thought should be given to adapting the *quality circle* concept, which is aimed at increasing the productivity of enterprises through small group dynamics. This concept is now well established and tested in Japan and more than fifty other countries, including many developing countries. It is currently being successfully adapted in Burkina Faso, with World Bank-Japanese financing.

### **Conclusions**

Adoption of this proposed new management formula in which efficient indigenous management practices are used, shareholding is democratized, and cultural values and traditions stimulate productivity as well as alleviate internal conflicts and labor problems should ultimately make it possible to expand extended family solidarity to the wider context of the enterprise and administration in Africa. In this way a favorable disposition toward improved governance and accumulation that would go beyond family, tribal, and ethnic boundaries could come into play. When an enterprise is state-owned, it belongs in principle to the entire nation, not to a specific ethnic group; and when it is privately owned, its shareholders and employees may be nationals belonging to different ethnic groups or even foreigners. This new communal bond within the enterprise would facilitate interethnic and intertribal solidarity and foster national unity, nation-building, and regional integration. It would also encourage greater tolerance for the foreign entrepreneurs or investors who share the destiny of the enterprise with their local counterparts.

## Discussant Remarks

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf

Assistant Administrator and  
Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa  
United Nations Development Programme

We are here in this rather unusual gathering to discuss a subject that is rather unusual for the World Bank, not only because Ismail Serageldin is a visionary but also because Africa welcomes a serious examination of its development record to identify approaches that go beyond those of the past that have left Africa, thirty years after independence and twenty-five years after development assistance began, at a higher level of poverty than it was when it gained independence. Is there a cultural dimension that has been missing in this experience? Have the development processes of the past ignored that ensemble of ideas, mechanisms, institutions, and artifacts that have explicitly or implicitly guided the behavior of the African people in a given group, country, or region?

The papers by Aaron Wildavsky and Mamadou Dia suggest that this is so. Professor Wildavsky presents a cultural theory that not only incorporates the *mental* products, values, and beliefs, and the *material* products, social relationships, artifacts, and technologies but also attaches them to the *social* relationships that they justify. These relationships are said to be based upon four organizational cultures, which he identifies: fatalism, individualism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. Each of these organizational cultures requires a specific and appropriate development approach to elicit an effective response. Yet there can be found in each and every one of our African societies all of these cultures; they are not mutually exclusive.

Fatalism can be associated with the concept of the impoverished masses who have little hope of change in the status quo. Individualism is accepted in the successes of the informal sector. Hierarchy, and the security and protection that it provides in society, is found in the various ethnic groups throughout African society. Egalitarianism is very characteristic of the communalistic way of African life. In this context, then, is it possible to find development approaches that address the multicultural groups and multicultural values consistently and simultaneously?

Professor Wildavsky also examines the linkages between economic development and political democracy, and by extension, the linkage between democracy and capitalism. He points to these linkages as "givens" that autonomously exhibit themselves once the society is acculturated to the values of these systems. Yet, in our African societies these coexisting systems pose a

dilemma that has its premise in indigenous cultural traits. For example, we often want to see the size of the economic pie increased through the work of capitalists and their capital, but we are often repelled by the individualism that the capitalist system tends to engender. In a similar vein we development practitioners have been made to believe that the struggle for development is based on a survival instinct, which in turn suggests that an individual attempts to mobilize the resources to meet his or her basic needs.

Professor Wildavsky suggests the interesting notion that the conception of needs and resources are in effect *supplied* to the members of each of the cultures in that society, supplied as a way of life itself—enabling them to justify their way of life. This cultural approach would seek to change the concept of needs and resources, a very tough task indeed given the ever-present demonstration effect with which both African and American societies are continually confronted.

I find myself in agreement with Mamadou Dia's paper that previous attempts within the development process to reform and strengthen public sector institutions in Africa have been based upon the faulty assumptions that development and development institutions are but a mirror of those concepts, values, and aspirations that characterize the societies of Africa's colonialists. Some theorists have even attempted to carry this notion further to challenge the very concept and definition of development as it relates to African societies. It is sometimes suggested that if, indeed, development is a measure of the degree of contentment or happiness or sense of security and community in the society, then life in many an African traditional society may well reflect a larger measure of development than that which applies in a polluted, crowded industrial city.

This notion, of course, is a dangerous and romantic oversimplification of development that may lead to the suggestion that African communities may require no more than a life of relative leisure and limited complexities as that which one finds in a traditional village. I am more inclined to the view that was put forth by Denis-Constant Martin in his contribution to the World Bank's 1991 Annual Conference on Development Economics that culture representing this ensemble of ideas of values, of traits, is neither static nor closed.<sup>1</sup> It is a loose and evolving framework that establishes the basis on which groups act and interact in society. It changes in response to the internal dynamics of groups, the external influences on them, and the interplay among these factors. In other words the quality of the culture of "development" derives from values that may vary from one culture in a society to another and from one period to another.

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<sup>1</sup>Denis-Constant Martin, "The Cultural Dimensions of Governance," *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1991*, ed. Lawrence H. Summers and Shekhar Shah (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).

Mr. Dia suggests that there is need in the development process to understand and take into account the idiosyncracies of each African political and social cultural structure in the design of administrative reform measures that seek to increase the efficiency of public service, a methodology that would give appropriate weight to African cultural traits, including prevailing attitudes toward authority and commitment, and savings and consumption. Here I think we need to be cautious, particularly regarding attitudes towards savings and consumption, so that we avoid what may be construed to be a rationalization or justification on cultural grounds of the excessive and conspicuous consumption and its corollary corruption that is practiced by the predatory institutions in Africa at the expense of the poor.

I like Dia's new vision of management in Africa, which stresses approaches that attempt to reconcile the goals of accumulation and redistribution through processes and systems that stress popular participation from the bottom up. I am not sure, however, whether national conferences—designed as a useful mechanism to address the pending civil strife that accompanies a political stalemate between the government and the governed—can become an institutionalized instrument of the exercise of political choice and participation. I would think that a more structured system of decentralized government in an exercise of political choice would achieve the same result with implications not only for political consensus but also for the building of sustainable development institutions along the lines suggested by the Dia paper, a case in point being the 1971 Ghana Chieftaincy Act.

In this connection civil service reform programs in African countries should perhaps seriously consider focusing less on the symptoms of bad government or management, such as a bloated urban civil service, and focusing more on the causes, which are rooted in an imported bias against the services rendered to the majority and to the rural population of the society. The new approach to development must indeed, as suggested by the paper, be increasingly concerted and proactive. In the short term it may be a valid theorem that the essential element of this process is to forge a compact among the three essential actors: the country, creditors, and donors. However, I suggest that a true internalization of commitment to development must come first from a pact between the government and its own people—those who govern with those who are governed. Without this precondition external partners will find themselves as they have in the past—playing fiddle to the wrong drummer. In turn African countries will find themselves continuously dependent both financially and administratively while their own human and capital resources seek safer haven abroad.

The new approach to more efficient management practices, based upon an appreciation of indigenous culture and values, must have as an overriding

objective a release of the energies, creativity, and ingenuity of Africans in their bid to take upon themselves the responsibilities for their own societies—the empowerment of the African person, which is something about which we have heard so much today. Governments must diminish to make way for the growth of African entrepreneurship. This idea is very much in harmony with the culture, values, and experience of the traditional African peasant.

**A Tribute**  
**(For Our First Literary Nobel, Wole Soyinka)**

Tijan M. Sallah

Economist  
 Agriculture Division  
 Middle East and North Africa Country Department II  
 The World Bank

Wole, October has a way of curling in the grass  
 And commanding the world to see black genius.  
 You have long been a griot, pedantic in nerve,  
 With a hands-on-plow view of our history.  
 You dig deep into the hieroglyphic of Ogun,  
 That warrior, who mixes metal with creativity,  
 Who restores rights, whose power overwhelms  
 Our earth. You have restored one more stone  
 To our black temple. Now we must celebrate,  
 For our earth respects the foot-to-foot  
 Celebration of life: The celebration  
 of Birth and Death; of failure and victory;  
 Of man rising without a wet-eye from a world  
 That taxes our continent more than  
 It spends on its soul-success.  
 Wole, October does not come to a black soul  
 With luck. Your genius is not Foreign Aid,  
 Or the log-rolling behind awards.  
 You earned your reputation like  
 A poor farmer earns his yam-crop. You earned it,  
 Against the fickleness of the sky,  
 Against the capricious will of locusts.  
 You earned it with a mind that is strong  
 And rich and imaginative as the  
 Numerous facets of Ogun. You earned it,  
 Against a sky that has turned white and clear,  
 Whose myopic eyes can see only the  
 Tallest gods in our literary farm.  
 On this October, Wole, we celebrate your genius.

## Excerpt from *Ogun Abibimã*

by Wole Soyinka

...  
 When, safely distanced, throned in saintly  
 Censure, the prophet's voice possesses you—  
*Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world et cetera*  
 Remember too, the awesome beauty at the door of birth.  
 Labour is holy—behold our midwives with  
 The dark wine and black wafers of communion,  
 Ministering to history, delivering the missing  
 Chapter of the text. Let the living mourn  
 Hereafter. But in this hour,  
 Since song is arduous task to grieving tongues  
 And drums must pause while hands are raised  
 To heal, and to rebuild;  
 Now is the hour of song, the hour  
 Of ecstasy on dancer's feet. The drummer's  
 Exhortations fortify the heart.  
 The clans are massed from hill to hill  
 Where Ogun stood, behold a million brows,  
 Dark bronzes from the kilns of Abibimã  
 A ring of steel against the sun, a throb  
 Of feet to the ancient cry of—*Sigidi!*  
 In time of race, no beauty slights the duiker's  
 In time of strength, the elephant stands alone  
 In time of hunt, the lion's grace is holy  
 In time of flight, the egret mocks the envious  
 In time of strife, none vies with Him  
 Of seven paths, Ogun, who to right a wrong  
 Emptied reservoirs of blood in heaven  
 Yet raged with thirst—I read  
 His savage beauty on black brows,  
 In depths of molten bronze aflame  
 Beyond their eyes' fixated distances—  
 And tremble!  
 Now, before sad spaces recreate the loss  
 Before the shields are frayed that would  
 Protect the frail, now is true need  
 Of song and lyric, of festal gourds,  
 Libations, invocation of the Will's

**Transubstantiation!**  
**Ogun in the ascendant—let us now celebrate!**

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*Source:* Wole Soyinka, *Ogun Abibimān* (London: Rex Collings Press, 1976), 20-22.

## Culture, Memory and Development

Wole Soyinka

Nobel Laureate for Literature

*Culture must be regarded as an expression of a total way of productive life. Forced population shifts or annihilation of communities with the consequent interruption of historical development have led Westerners to expect Africans to be cultureless receptacles for technology transfer or timeless laggards eternally rooted in "primitive" practices. If we sum up culture as "the precipitate—tangible and not so tangible—of the productive energy" of human beings, we enter a cultural process that involves the fashioning of relationships between a human being and his or her environment, both physical and societal. We thus can grasp the enormity of the crime against culture that is committed whenever a people (or a person) is yanked out of its organic, productive milieu and dumped in a contrived, alien environment, even under the most liberal dispensation, such as Nyerere's Ujamaa social experiment in Tanzania. Cultural continuity and cohesion aid communities in discovering and marketing new products and technologies. The most implacable measure of a people's cultural security or alienation is architecture, the synthesis of ideal and function. I support the human scale in opposition to the perpendicularism that has turned African capitals into impoverished imitations of New York or Chicago. Displacement, consumerism, Christianity, slave trade, Islam, gigantism—all have something in common. At one end each has a victim; at the other end, a profit-maker, extracting profit from human flesh or labor. Africa cannot avoid culpability in its own woes so reparation may be too strong a word and "debt" becomes questionable given the discourse above. The new world order should begin with the forging of a new relationship. I suggest not "forgiveness" but "annulment." In the same way, we also do not forgive, but annul, the past.*

Somewhere in the course of the "revolutionary" task of liquidating millions of "kulaks," transporting others to the wastes of Siberia and collectivizing both land and productive means in the cause of a radical vision of society, Josef Stalin is reputed to have woken up to, and lamented, the abysmal state of "culture" among the humanity he sought to transform. It led, according to one of his numerous biographers, to a short-lived change in cultural policy. While history was not rewritten to newly favor or rehabilitate the discredited classes, the existence of heroes in the Russian past was now acknowledged. The populace was encouraged to name their children after such heroes, the melodies and epics of ancient heroism were admitted into the repertoire of revolutionary songs and, as long as care was taken not to glamorize the immediate tsarist past in this exercise, the cultural achievements of Russian nobility—the architecture, artistic legacy and

acceptable models for social development. The Russian ballet was of course even further encouraged to dig further back into its heroic history and create uplifting spectacles out of this past.

What Stalin would have denied most vigorously—if any of his own compatriots had been sufficiently foolhardy as to make the proposition at all—was that the contemporaneous act of mass displacement was in itself, in addition to its obvious inhumanity, an act of cultural genocide. In other words, that specific cultures were being destroyed, indeed, eradicated in their totality by this enforced movement of peoples and indeed, prior to that, by the arbitrary imposition of a new productive system, an abrupt change that was inorganic and hostile to the existing modes of production. This example is invoked to remind us yet again that culture must be constantly recalled as an expression of a total way of productive life, one which encompasses more than the physical precipitations that are marketed or displayed as proofs of a cultural reality, the distinctive marks that separate a supposedly brutish existence from a "cultured" one. Applying that example of the Soviet Union to the histories of peoples all over the globe, is it not an irony that—given the known parallel histories of other peoples, histories of forced population shifts, of the total eradication of living communities and the transfer of their productive labor to alien, hitherto unheard-of lands—the question should even be raised for one moment, and the explicit injustice further compounded, by the proposition that such peoples were without a culture, without civilization, and therefore, undeserving of humane considerations? Yet this is an assessment that, however much it appears to be attenuated, still plagues the perception of the continent of Africa by much of the rest of the world. It dominates, however subtly, the trading relations that exist between peoples or, more accurately, that are imposed upon some by others. It affects the assumptions that are made today even in the realms of politics, certainly in technological exchanges—the so-called transfer of technology. Such transfers are made without consideration of the cultural receptacles into which technologies are forced, being presumed empty or indiscriminating. Equally does it affect expectations which exist even in the direct area of cultural exchanges. "Where are the grass skirts?" is a question which, even when it remains unuttered, lurks beneath the reception accorded a cultural event by the beholder from Western cultures, or a seeker of leisure in tropical climes.

This is no exaggeration. In a citation which inducted me into the Fellowship of a Western Academy of Arts and Sciences—I shall spare blushes by withholding the name of the country—I was startled to find my works summarized as expressing "in the vernacular English of his native country" the "folk-lore" of that country. This was in 1988.

Of course such expectations are fed, more often than not, by the African promoters of their own culture. The showcase that introduces you to the cultural

Of course such expectations are fed, more often than not, by the African promoters of their own culture. The showcase that introduces you to the cultural soul of many African countries in their foreign embassies can usually be guaranteed to consist of little more than raffia skirts, an ivory comb, a piece of decorative leather and of course the ubiquitous drum or two. Let me quickly add that these are not wrong in themselves and they do earn a definite place in the album of introduction to a people's culture. I am merely complaining that a more comprehensive or more representative picture can be provided—not even necessarily by photos of the oil rig or mine-shaft, but simply by a display also of the contemporaneous productive processes of the societies in question. Such as indigenous innovations in social development—original urban designs for instance,— architectural— heritage, archival— material, some technological breakthrough however modest, some product, of mineralogical research or indigenous pharmaceutical products. What, after all, is *ginseng* but a root, suitably packaged in legendary claims?

Now, when one makes a demand of this nature, the dismissive response can be expected: "But there is no scientific or technological feat that such nations can exhibit as theirs." And this only brings us back to my starting-point: the interrupted history of development is always certain to becloud the assessment of such attainments, especially when they are not manifested as monumentalist structures. Where they do exist in such form, examples abound where, given the undeniable, overwhelming presence of such fixtures, attempts are made to attribute them to the handwork of other civilizations, other human groups which have passed through, left their imperishable legacies and vanished, becoming obscured through the passage of time. Even the technology of bronze-casting has not escaped this expropriation tendency. Fortunately however, that particular form of cultural vexation decreases every day, as Amílcar Cabral conceded in his lecture, "National Liberation and Culture," nearly twenty years ago:

Nowadays, [he declared,] it has become a commonplace to assert that every people has its culture. . . . [T]he time is past when, in an attempt to perpetuate the domination of peoples, culture was regarded as an attribute of privileged people and nations, or when, out of ignorance and bad faith, culture was confused with technical skill, if not with the color of one's skin or the shape of one's eyes.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Amílcar Cabral, "Liberación nacional y cultura" (National Liberation and Culture), in Amílcar Cabral and others, *Liberación nacional y cultura : elementos para un debate* (National Liberation and Culture: Elements for Debate) (Medellin: Corporación Educativa San Pablo, 1977).

Problem of Values" reminds cultural supremacists of fallacious trends in the evaluation of cultures:

It is another fundamental of value theory that no final absolute can be advanced to support the values of one culture over another.<sup>2</sup>

What we do confront, in short, within the cultural discourse, are both the existence or accreditation of, then the valuation of cultural evidence. And the trend today is towards a recognition that cultural monumentalism, despite its evident visual attraction and prestige accretion in many instances, is only partially the story. My own concern leans towards culture, not as a static monumental concretization of development, but as its living, indeed, dynamic manifestation. Amilcar Cabral provides a useful but incomplete expression of this understanding of culture. In that same essay, he declares that

Culture, whatever the ideological or idealist characteristics of its expression, is (thus) an essential element of the history of a people. Culture is perhaps, the resultant of history, just as the flower is the resultant of the plant. Like history, or because it is history, culture has as material reality the environment in which it develops, and it reflects the organic nature of the society, which may be more or less influenced by external factors.<sup>3</sup>

Cabral writes of culture also as an indicative of the relations and type of relations "between man and his environment," "between man and nature," relations and types of relations "between the individual and the collective components of society."

Now I intend to avoid the controversial implications of Cabral's claims, such as in the above quote, the implicit question of which came first—the chicken or the egg. Equally distractive would be the language of Marxist materialism, which dominates Cabral's thinking in this lecture. If we simply fastened on the most direct expression that he has given culture, which can be summed up as the precipitate—tangible and not so tangible—of the productive energy of man, we enter a cultural process which involves the fashioning of relationships between his being and his environment, both physical and societal. We are thus able to grasp immediately the enormity of the crime against culture that is committed whenever man is yanked out of his organic, productive milieu and dumped in a contrived, alien environment even under the most liberal, mildly regimented dispensation.

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<sup>2</sup>Roger Sperry, "Science and the Problem of Values," in *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* (Autumn 1972).

<sup>3</sup>Cabral, "Liberación Nacional y Cultura."

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The *Ujamaa* social experiment undertaken in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere was thus a paradox of development. On the one hand, *Ujamaa* was evolved from certain principles of traditional social organization which had emerged through cultural evolution. On the other hand, violence was done to this obviously organic process by uprooting cohesive communities, relocating them in comparatively modernist villages where social amenities and access to centralized organs of development could be provided. The effect of this on the existing cultural security, itself a non-negligible factor and agent of productivity, was underrated. We are speaking here of a quantity beyond sentimental attachments. Centuries old and tested modes of production were abruptly interrupted; the result was, even in Nyerere's admission, not the developmental model it was expected to be. Let me add by the way that I was, and still am, a believer in the basic philosophy of *Ujamaa*; indeed, I eulogized it in a poem. That aspect of interrupting, in such an artificial way, the cultural cohesion of a community was however, one which remained for me, frankly, troublesome. We are saying, in short, that cultural continuity does aid communities in discovering, promoting and marketing magic roots called ginseng world-wide, even as that same continuity and cohesion enables the same societies to overtake industrialized countries in the production of electronic marvels and silicon chips or set up and operate steel-rolling mills.

Even more disastrous, and on a horrendous scale was that same relocation policy as executed by Ethiopia. Supposedly an answer to perennial, drought-induced nomadic routine of the far-flung sections of Ethiopia, it proved to be nothing but a copycat variant on the Russian model. It was a far less humane exercise than Tanzania's, lacking even the educative preparations undertaken by Tanzania, lacking even the compensatory amenities in the new settlements which Tanzania at least attempted to provide. Let us simply sum it up as a crime against humanity, undertaken in the name of ill-digested centralist notions of a scientific development process.

These tendencies to juggle human quantities in and out of organic contexts are not always related to concrete issues of social development; we know that often, the motivating factor is power or domination. Or perhaps we should concentrate on the goal of development after all, only this time, emphasize its exocentric direction. Ethiopia did, after all, relocate her displaced population within her own borders; so did Tanzania. In my essay, "Africa in the Contestation of History," I express the—I hope—incontestable view that the despoliation of the African continent through slavery, both of Arab and European participation, was an act which emptied a vast space of that continent of its

proper history.<sup>4</sup> This reality, I regret to say, has not been granted its rightful dimension even in scholarly treatment within contemporary consciousness, certainly nowhere near the extent which, by comparison, the Jewish holocaust still induces a flow of literature, films, television series, expositions, all exerting far-reaching contemporary influences of various kinds on the political and economic decisions of European nations. In my desperation to render the reality of this immense human voidage in a vivid image, I had recourse to the not-so-well-known ecological transformation of the once fertile Sahara desert. I wrote:

That little known geographical hiatus is calculated to have taken place some twelve thousand years— ago. I consider it complemented, in an age closer and more relevant to our present, by the far too understated hiatus in African history between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The removal of some twenty million people from any space is not a mere quantitative horror, it is an act which empties a living space of history. History— is an account of the self-producing processes of humanity—with all their reverses. Africa cannot therefore claim to have produced much of its own history during this period. And when we consider [and here we come squarely to the issues of development] to what end a continent was thus depleted, that end being to serve as the physical means of producing the expansionist, and industrialized history of others—we see quite clearly that the history of Africa during this period was, as a minus, the plus input into the reproductive history of others.<sup>5</sup>

For history, we need only read culture—Cabral himself recognized the contextual interchangeability of this—and the issue of development is rendered most explicitly. Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* has provided one of the most detailed expositions on the subject.<sup>6</sup> In our rudimentary science tutelage we learnt that matter is indestructible; it is merely transformed into forms of energy. The relations of the developed world with the undeveloped serve to remind us of this truism, and to emphasize the productive conversion, exocentrically, of that apparent vacuum that was hollowed out of Africa.

I must be excused for spending just a little longer on this theme. My purpose will become clarified towards the end. Again I quote:

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<sup>4</sup>Wole Soyinka, "Africa in the Contestation of History," in *Dubois-Nkrumah-Padmores Lectures* (Accra: Dubois Institute, 1991).

<sup>5</sup>Soyinka, "Africa in the Contestation of History."

<sup>6</sup>Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981).

I refer yet again to the instance of the former Soviet Union whose demographers have not failed to underline the effects, on the socioeconomic development of that nation, of the loss of a large part of its male population during the Second World War. This was a war which lasted only six years, however devastating were its effects at the time, effects which have certainly left their mark even till today. But we need look then with comparative eyes at a continent which experienced the loss of entire generations over a period of more than two hundred years, the process of attrition which settles into an unsettled way of life, and the location of this event in a time that, for the European world, was one of its highest industrial expansions. It is not possible to measure the consequences of a disruption of what would normally be an organic development, even a symbiotic one through contact—in different trading and other exchange relationships—with the outside world.<sup>7</sup>

In subscribing wholeheartedly therefore to the earlier cited proposition of the equality of cultures, we, on our part, must not get carried away. We must be careful not to concede that the cultures which the African continent has produced are necessarily the most humanly enhancing that they could have been, given a different historical course. Yes indeed, our Sheikh Anta Diops, the Basil Davidsons, and the Chancellor Williamses are more than commendable in expending their intellectual energies on the exposition of cultures that were produced by the continent, tracing their courses and highlighting their physical marks on the landscape. Nevertheless we must always insert that accusatory footnote of a truncation externally caused, and one whose developmental effects, as remarked in the case of the Soviet Union, are still very obvious in most areas of nation hood, especially in our relations with nations which are clearly more developed, whatever parameters of development we choose to apply.

Of course we could, if we wished, seek consultation in "quaint" cultural definitions which distinguish one society from the other. Even commerce is not without its cultural ornamentations, as tourists find, to their delight. Barter, or indeed, haggling is held to be a fine point of cultural practice, one in which an adept practitioner is held in high esteem. All over the continent, including the Arab world, a recognized foreigner who defeats a market trader in a haggling contest will be spoken of in terms of admiration, even by the defeated trader. The appearance of that champion in the marketplace would probably lead to expressions such as "*Ah Iya Titi, ya mura. Oko e mbo.*" ("Iya Titi, better get

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<sup>7</sup>Soyinka, "Africa in the Contestation of History."

ready, your conqueror is here again.") And of course we know that within certain cultures, the worth of a commodity is incomplete without its praise-song and metaphoric references—I once indulged in an essay on this very subject, dealing with the gastronomic commodities. I entitled it, aptly I think, "Salutations to the Gut."<sup>8</sup> It extolled the virtues, not merely of Yoruba poetry but its market cunning, since such poetry was guaranteed to arouse the curiosity of the potential consumer of any age or culture. From lyrical seduction, it is only one short step to material craving.

But how long was it, in retrospect, since the marketplaces of a supposedly "soulless" England resounded to just such targeted lyricism? Even today, a stroll through sections of the Covent Garden market, or the markets of East End London or Liverpool, will impose on the customers living successors of ditties such as "Hot Cross Buns," "Cockles and Mussels" and so on. A stranger would not understand the dialect but there is no mistaking the intent—something is being musically advertised, very much in the same way as in one's childhood along the dusty lanes of Iberekodo.

And Clothing? Skills? Crafts? Occasions? Personalities? Seasons? History? Ambitions? Relationships? Diseases? Well-being? Wars? Peace? Adventure? Productivity and Scarcity? Do the specific *cultural* elaborations—be they manifested as dance, ritual, ceremonies, speech ornamentations—of these mundane realities and experiences of man constitute impedimenta to progress and development in a contemporary world? There is quite a sizable body of opinion that insists they do. An impatient and even ideologically variegated body, from dyed-in-the-wool scientific materialists—a drastically shrinking body in recent times, admittedly—to the simply but coldly pragmatic, impatient with the cultural adumbrations of direct buying and selling—commodities should bear price tags, nothing more, all else is loss of productive time, inimical to the tempo of modernism and relevance. Whichever mode engages our empathy however, there is a submerged issue, rarely brought to the surface: has the consumer, within some cultures, become secondary to the commodity? Or put differently: who or what now exists for the other? In the present glorification of consumerist craving, the commodity has been elevated to a god in the most negative paganistic sense—something to be acquired, worshipped, possessed, eaten, or used and discarded. Are we being seduced into participation in a parody of the rites of renewal through consumption and ever more consumption? In the process we do know that, for us in the Third World especially, we become the consumed. By succumbing to hunger for the latest novelty, we paradoxically

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<sup>8</sup>Wole Soyinka, "Salutations Logos: to the Gut," in *Reflections; Nigerian Prose and Verse*, ed. Frances Ademola (Lagos: African Universities Press, 1962).

consume ourselves, and what is left of us is consumed in turn by the industrial machine which churns out the latest novelty, one which, to complete the cycle of illusion, is held up as the signpost of modernism, and therefore of a dynamic, contemporary world culture. Is this perhaps what is meant by development? Can the affected societies yet pause, and look inward into the character of their own cultures which, even though such cultures encourage the praise-songs of commodity, *never* advance the value of that commodity over the value of the individual and community. Cultures which regulate the commodity process by interrogating its effects on the community? Certainly in this aspect, the marketplace of Iberekodo is worlds apart from the supermarkets of Europe and America.

In the West, the Eastern visitor stereotype—based undeniably on observation—is the wide-eyed, incredulous being who stands in front of a Western shop-window. He has never seen such consumer items in his entire existence. Indeed, the totality of such items that she has encountered in a lifetime does not match what she is now staring at in a single shop window, and the street is of course taken up with unlimited replications of such luxury. The visitor scratches herself to ensure that she has not died, then woken up in paradise. The society into which this alien has stepped is, however, not merely at home with such goodies; every individual in that society now considers their acquisition the primary goal of existence. That is not all. The gospel of consumerist culture, where cravings are actually instigated by teams of market researchers—usually trained psychologists, through I prefer to call them psychopaths since their mission, as I hinted earlier, is to encourage their targets to develop an incurable dependency syndrome and consume themselves to death—that culture, in order to guarantee productivity at home, is vigorously exported. Entire generations of a totally different culture, and usually of less affluent societies, are inducted into this unequal exchange. Being usually the scions of privileged families, they gravitate into positions of influence on national economic policies and executive positions. Soon, the self-respecting youth dare not be seen without a Walkman. The hybrid shuts out the world and enters another world, so wrapped up in that world that he sometimes steps into the gutter or fails to hear the warning sounds of a speeding vehicle and crosses the road at a fatal instant. Mothers are encouraged to get their children hooked on powdered milk, mashed food substitutes, the so-called baby nutrients. The infants lose their accustomed resistance or immunity to certain ailments, an immunity which they once drew, organically, from the mother's milk. Toiletries and other forms of body enhancement are now legitimized only by their appearance in air-conditioned super-markets; the traditional unguents are deemed uncivilized; the marketplaces where they normally preside are uncultured. Feeding the foreign consumerist machine becomes a way of life for countries

The building style I refer to as "perpendicularism," need I point out, has begun to turn most African capitals into impoverished imitations of New York, Chicago or the antipodal Sydney skylines. I confess myself to be an unapologetic advocate of "small is beautiful" or, to be more imprecise, "the human scale." In a recent address to a chapter of the Nigerian Association of Architects, I was able to advance examples of my encounters with such town-planning delights which, barring one or two missing adjuncts, I would promote anywhere the a very quintessence of development—on a human scale. One came from the island of Martinique where I spent a few months some years ago—not, regretfully, indulging in the myriad delights of the tourist visitor but actually working—I was directing a play. However, I was able to utilize what free days I had to tour the island and visit the small towns outside the capital itself. One such town made a permanent impression on me, so heavy was that impression that, till today, I do not know the name of the town—which is not surprising. I never took the trouble to ask it, despite lunching there with some of the locals and even taking pictures with my hosts. Perhaps this is what a recent interlocutor of mine has called a "genetic" memory, as opposed to the factual. I am still consulting psychiatrists on the real significance of that novel condition. No matter, my response to the encounter with that retreat was—at last, a quintessentially developed human habitation!

Once again, I must remind you that I have already declared myself a foe of gigantism—and that applies most specifically to architecture. Yet I am no advocate either of rusticism or the extremes of pre-Raphaelitism. The expression "noble savage," even when given a contemporary context, gives off no illumination, in my opinion, about any desired state of man. So this brings me back to what I felt was missing with this idyll to be truly complete. It was simple really—it lacked any evidence that it did produce or reproduce a viable existence. The inhabitants—what did they actually *do*? What did they produce? Where were the structures of outlet for such products? I suppose even a weaving factory would have satisfied me. A brewery even, perhaps a small mine, a stone quarry, a radio or computer assembly plant—anything at all to provide just that base of productive interaction that would round off, totally, and dynamically, the existence of a development module. My mind contrasts that little town to a village in Northern Nigeria where solar experimentation has been developed to the extent that the entire village is now powered by solar energy, including its small cottage industries. Given just such a tiny fillip, that mini-town in Martinique would have represented for me, the enviable face of development in dynamic relation with a cultivated environment, and on a human scale.

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left in parenthesis. Let me provide elaboration through a negative diversionary tale.

We have in Nigeria, a truly phenomenal individual as far as Civil Servants go. He deals today with Finance and is generally known as "Triple A," for the obvious reason that his three names begin with "A." As the Finance Minister, and having inexplicably retained positions concerned with finance, budgeting and development for quite a number of years, surviving series of purges, he is one of the obvious whipping-boys for the economic woes of Nigeria. Recently, in a quite incisive lecture delivered by a former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, the General related an encounter with a foreign investor who had told him that the economic problem of Nigeria really did not have much to do with "Triple A" as with "Quadruple A." These quadruplets he then listed as Ajaokuta, Abuja, Aluminium and the Army. For those of you who do not know, Ajaokuta is the famous, or more accurately, infamous steel rolling mill set up in partnership with the Soviet Union since 1973. Aluminium is yet another heavy-repercussion metallic pipe dream. Abuja is the soured, arid dream of a symbol of national unity, situated in the center of the country and the exit valve from the heart of a national treasury. The Army is of course—the Army.

Waste shortens memory, I find. I would have made it a "Quintuple A" since it was the original "A" for Aerostat Balloon that ballooned, by imitation, into a veritable orgy of white elephants. But that U.S.A. communication escapade which sank, given the comparative weakness of the Naira today, nearly as much as the steel-rolling mills without producing even "busy" telephone signals, has been consigned to the elephant graveyard. The common attribute of them all is that they were dreamt big, built big, fed big and ballooned into veritable mountains of foreign indebtedness. You know the rest. The mountain heaved and groaned, and brought forth—no, not a mouse this time—it brought forth white elephants.

The Lords of the Jungle however, as ideologically separated (at the time) as the United States and the former Soviet Union, ensure that the safari trail is kept clear as they shuttle back and forth, smiling all the way to their banks. Their clients remain hobbled in a wilderness of indebtedness, while the nationals wallow in a morass of new cravings introduced by the production machinery of the affluent invaders. It is the ancient story of beads and glassware for invaluable resources, alas, only that the former are now manufactured on re-colonized terrain, and are paid for in bloated credit lines.

Within cultures, some values do proffer themselves naturally as antidotes to the acquisitive, consumerist keeping-up-with-the-Joneses development ethic. Such values do prevent a mindless embrace of the intruding values, combatively. This is as it should be, but of course we find, if we do not watch out, that we are

soon caught in a vicious cycle. So let us place before us the cautionary reminder which recognizes that culture has both its progressive and its retardatory features. The latter, unfortunately, are often to be found in the spiritual aspects of culture. Now this, I readily acknowledge, is a subject that tends to generate lots of heat and little illumination, even in the hands of supposedly objective scholars—be they social scientists, nuclear physicists, historians, or scientific materialists. We find that somehow, in the terrain of religion, some religions are considered more "scientific," less culture-bound than others. They occupy some rarefied terrain whose basic assumptions no one dare question under the threat of mortal sanctions. Such is the level of sacrosanctity claimed for themselves by such religions that even their most obvious self-contradictions are blithely passed off by their exegetists as evidence of the Divine Paradox. I can only testify that the indigenous religions within my culture do not breed a class of priesthood that lays claim to dictating the spiritual intuitions of every individual being, then proceeds from this platform to secure control over the mechanisms of mundane relationships—what we have already described as man's relation to his environment, and of the relation of the individual to other institutions of his society—in short, Culture.

I repeat my keen awareness of the predictable risks involved in this discourse, having been, in recent times, on the receiving end of some of the most reductionist summaries of some of my commentaries on this very real issue of our times. To make an example one of the most alarming: you must imagine that, having declared yourself an unrepentant pro-abortion choice advocate and thereby directly or implicitly, criticized the position of the Roman Catholic Church on the subject, you wake up to find that you have been tagged, not merely a hater of the Roman Catholic Church, but a hater of all Italians, since Italians, for better or worse, remain the landlords of the Roman Catholic See and what is more, because mass is still celebrated in Italian. Well, not exactly, but I hope that we can concede the linguistic difference as being such an indifferent one as makes no difference.

Let me therefore state quite clearly that I see the spiritual dimension of man, and therefore of religions, as being culture bound. In other words, I am persuaded that religion is only one of many inputs into the overall cultural geography of any society, not the other way around. Of course there is a religious culture, but it is a tributary from the comprehensive culture of an environment that we have already identified. The proof of this is direct, and tested.

Wherever an alien religion goes, it invariably takes on the cultural elements of the soil on which it attempts to grow. Indeed certain religious taboos remain, certain observances are not compromised with, but what we have described as the cultural precipitate of the new environment predominates.

Sometimes such resilience exists paradoxically underground, where indeed it remains most intense. The invading religion, which make strenuous efforts to extirpate those cultural manifestations it considers hostile to a total submission, resorts to measures that only further alienate the cultural determinism of the indigenes. The enforced change of names for example, remains part of the superficialities in most cases. Traditional observances are tailored to coincide with the imperialist demands of the invading religious culture; even modes of dress are conceded to convey overt submission to the new religion. Yet we find that indigenous architectural modes, for example, exert subtle to overwhelming influences even on the religious structures of the newcomer. The *totality* of the receptive culture remains therefore the foundation of the individual's relations to this new spirituality, and governs his voluntary, repeat, voluntary relations to the changing society. Proofs of this observation exist all over the world—from my own country, Nigeria, with its christian and moslem converts, and even taking into account the sanguinary face-offs of their fanatic sects—to Brazil, where the totality of the culture internalized by the incoming slaves triumphed over the impositions and attractions of christianized culture, aided the exiles in the retention of their authentic being, converting in turn even the latter generations of their spiritual oppressors.

The claim of any religion therefore to be more than a structure of spiritual intuitions, presided over by a priesthood with authoritarian ambitions that go beyond the strictly metaphysical, is therefore nothing but self-aggrandizement which leads, sooner or later, to the machinery of terror, and retardation of material development. What is being usurped by such claims is, in short, the territory of culture which, we admit, does not deny religion, is indeed open and eager to serve religion, but cannot ever be subservient to it, for religion is only one of the many of culture's tributaries. Art, another concrete manifestation of cultural disposition, is yet another tributary. So are the sciences, technology, diet or sport. Culture as a rounded, holistic precipitation of human productive intelligence, cannot be held in thrall by the ambitions of religion. This, let it be constantly recalled, is not a novel concept. Humanity has suffered far too many hideous wrongs as a result of this purblind disposition of powerful priesthood. Need we recall the fates of the likes of Galileo at the hands of the Roman Inquisition? Of Socrates the so-called preacher of impieties? Of Pythagoras and his disciples? Of Giordano Bruno and the rest of that company? Among many serious studies of the irrational processes of interaction between tributary and Source, Arthur Koestler provides us, in *The Sleepwalkers*, a—gruesomely

compelling account of this conflict of the scientific tributary of culture and its perennial adversary, that ever presumptuous co-tributary called religion.<sup>9</sup>

We need therefore to constantly reinforce our awareness of the primacy of Source, and that source is the universal spring of Culture. It is nourished by its tributaries, which sink back into the earth, and thereby replenish that common source in an unending, creative cycle. That one tributary proves more aggressive, domineering, more seemingly nourished than others does not transform its egalitarian quotient, especially as it can be proved to have been poisoned along its course, its passage often reddened with blood and suffering, and the boulders it erodes, and the trees it uproots along its course foul up its passage and impede the development of those who draw sustenance from its waters.

Let me hasten to deny that any of this is original thinking, nor is my introduction of the politics of religious culture into this discourse peculiar to my individual concerns. The series of dialogues held in Ota in Nigeria, under the Chairmanship of a former Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, titled "Farm House Dialogues," recently addressed the issue of religion within the democratic context.<sup>10</sup> And democracy, I trust, is universally accepted as a viable contender for one of the basic conditions for meaningful and progressive development in contemporary society. I shall deploy a passage from the December 1991 report to convey the convergence of the views of others with my own on the relation of religion to society and human affairs:

Given the pervasive and all important role and essence of religion in society, the question was posed as to when religion becomes a factor in human affairs. Religion, it was observed, developed as a result of the mysteries and incomprehension that pervaded certain events and aspects of human life. The insecurity of man's existence in an uncertain environment encouraged the emergence in society of individuals who claimed to be knowledgeable about the super-natural and who could pontificate on the mysteries of the world. It was in this context that mediums, priests and prophets emerged. The knowledge of mysteries and the super-natural gave the priest the clout over others and allowed him to wield tremendous political power.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Arthur Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe* (London, New York: Arkana, 1959).

<sup>10</sup>*Farm House Dialogues*, No. 19, "Religious Pluralism and Democracy" (held in Ota, Nigeria, December 6-8, 1991) (Ota, Nigeria: Africa Leadership Forum, December 1991), 3-5.

<sup>11</sup>*Farm House Dialogues*, No. 19, 3.

That section later continues:

In the opinion of this group, until cognizance is taken of the need to place religion in its proper place, Nigeria can not expect to seriously resolve the myriad of social problems confronting it. In fact, this group further argues that it was not simply a question of whether religion came before democracy. The issue was which of them occupied a higher place in men's minds and how can such a position be preserved for the ultimate end of national unity and national development. This led to the consideration of where in the human make-up is the locus of the religious pre-occupation—is it the head, the mind (or the heart) or the body. Participants were agreed that religion is a matter of faith. It is not, properly speaking, a development of science. As such, its focus of operation must be the human's mind.<sup>12</sup>

And an unnamed participant in the report refused to accept any link, however tenuous, between religion and democracy. The publication states that: The participant remained strongly convinced that whatever else society might need, it certainly is not religion. What society requires is, according to this participant, truth. Anything else is a puerile and futile diversion. The main issue consequently is to gear up effort towards liberating society from religion.<sup>13</sup>

My position, I think, is less extreme, coinciding with the consensus credited to the group—the need to place religion *in its proper place*, and that, I believe, is a legitimate undertaking, even an imperative, in the context of culture and development.

The Nigerian novelist and critic, G.G. Darah, has pointed out the difficulties one encounters in any discourse on development because the word attracts to itself, through a tradition of sociopolitical usage, considerations of material development near-exclusively.<sup>14</sup> We need only glance at the categorization of the split image of humanity embodied in the words "developed countries" and "underdeveloped," or latterly, "developing countries" to appreciate the reductionist tendencies of this expression. Development in this sense is manifested in factory productivity, a reliable communication network, technological mastery etc., etc. Darah therefore attempted, not too successfully I think, to substitute the word "enhancement" for "development," a compromise which was perhaps the inevitable result of attempting to define a common ground between culture and development. The word "enhancement" appears to me even

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<sup>12</sup>*Farm House Dialogues*, No. 19, 4.

<sup>13</sup>*Farm House Dialogues*, No. 19, 5.

<sup>14</sup>G.G. Darah, article in *Daily Times* (Nigeria).

more applicable to culture than development. Culture can be readily seen, in all the various aspects we have already touched upon, as both the means to, and proof of life enhancement. The common meaning given to development does, on the contrary, raise questions on this desirable goal—the enhancement of life. Does the assembly line "enhance" life? Things have improved, admittedly, since the sweatshops of the European industrial revolution. I have visited factories that bear no resemblance to those infamous Dante's infernos, modernized work-places that could now pass easily for heavy-gadget recreation spaces. Yes, even the factory line can be made *not* to degrade human existence, even enhance it, and perhaps this work "enhancement" would serve us to describe the common ground of both culture and development in their progressive mission to humanity. Speaking for the Third World near exclusively, how can this mission be aided? It is always useful to fix one's sights on significant calendar dates; it helps to focus the mind and imparts a purposefulness to grandiose projects. So, let us provide some form of deadline: how can this project be aided so that its effects are clearly manifested before the end of this century? Concretely that is, not by pious pronouncements nor indeed by a proliferation of encounters such of this.

Consider the following disparate items that have featured so far in this contribution and think for a moment about what they have in common: Displacement. Despoliation. Ajaokuta Steel Mills. Consumerism. Aerostat Balloon. Christianity. Slave Trade. Islam. Gigantism. Transfer of ecology. Unequal trade relations . . . and so on. Yes, they do have something in common. At one end of the linear context of each is a victim; at the other, the profit-maker, that profit being exacted from human flesh or labor as commodity of exchange. In contemplating a new world order, the prior world order, which the above relationship represents, cannot be totally ignored. The culpability of the African continent in its own woes is not to be denied; it has been made both implicit and explicit in this contribution and, the persistent indictments by our own writers and intellectuals over decades, indictments especially of that continent's criminal leadership are on every book shelf. Even the musical and plastic arts have not been silent. It is time however, for a humane look at the generation who are the blameless heirs of this punitive order. I believe that the burden of the past should be lifted from their shoulders.

The word "reparation" is perhaps much too charged, much too loaded, but there is, I believe, even from what I have said so far, a *prima facie* case to be made for the introduction of such thinking. But we need not be bound by the word. Let us simply confine ourselves to the issue of the load of foreign debts which the affluent world does *not* require for the enhancement of its present level of existence, but one whose very cloud darkens the horizon of the future for the Third World. I am a great believer in the view of development being itself inseparable from the courage to discharge one's responsibilities and liquidate

one's debts but, the word "debt" becomes certainly questionable in the context of that history which one can only partially narrate, but whose totality cannot be denied. The new world order need not wait until the mystical turn of this century. I believe it should commence, not by forgiveness, but with the forging of a new relationship.

We are mostly agreed—and events throughout the world make this clear, despite several ominous setbacks—we are mostly agreed that the envisioned new world order takes for its basis a democratic ethos, and a secular one. This is the unambiguous project with which I concern myself, and the credentials by which the Third World should be encouraged to benefit from the radical proposals which have been made by so many voices on many international fora. If the word "reparations" remains problematic, I suggest "annulment"—it has the attraction of echoing that "annunciation" of a new world order. Let all debts be, not forgiven but—simply annulled. Thus, we also do *not* forgive, but annul the past. The twentieth century may thus be kindly recalled in future history as—The Century of Annulment? It is a worthy *fin de siècle* consideration, and an ennobling project.

## Culture and Development: African Responses

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*Since the 1970s, in Africa the awareness of the importance of culture in development focused on reasserting cultural identity, believed to be threatened by the emphasis on economic development. One camp held that Africa will lose her unique cultural features through the intrusion of modern uses and behaviors alien to her values. The opposing camp called for a dynamic breakdown and reintegration that would synthesize tradition and modernity. The subsequent unprecedented economic crisis blared the failure of African development policies since independence. Every conceivable solution to development was tackled. It became clear that underlying cultural values must be questioned. My company, SADEG, conducts seminars on "cultural adjustment," in which participants identify the content of African culture as experienced in workplaces and how this culture interacts with organization and human resource and financial management in these enterprises. The groups define actions to eliminate observed, culturally indigenous constraints to development on both the individual and enterprise levels. The groups also facilitate dialogue among various categories of personnel in an enterprise. From this micro level the next step is to move to the macro level to work with governments. We will need funding to prepare case studies and to use television to help change people's attitudes. Our approach is to cure an African sickness identified by Africans with an African medicine prescribed by African doctors.*

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The last decade marked a turning point in acknowledging the importance of culture in the development process. Since the beginning of the 1970s a number of voices at UNESCO have been raised regularly that stressed the importance of the cultural factor in the social, economic, and political evolution of contemporary societies. Nonetheless, in Africa this awareness seemed to focus on reasserting cultural identity, which Africans, rightly or wrongly, believed was really threatened by the emphasis on purely economic development.

Therefore, in Africa for a long time the balance swung between two visions of the continent defended by two opposing camps. The first group held that Africa is the land of secular traditions. The champions of this view believed that the continent will definitely lose her soul if she renounces the unique cultural features that set her apart, that were jeopardized daily through the intrusion of modern uses and behaviors built on values alien to its people. The second group

opposed the first in that it brought together people although far fewer than the first group who strongly believed that a constructive breakdown that would bring about a dynamic realignment of tradition and modernity was of prime importance even though some of them were obsessed by a growing doubt about this. Were these opposite visions portraying a modern version of the famous tradition versus modern conflict? Not necessarily.

Culture is by its essence the foundation on which all societies build and, as such, the foundation of the prevailing social order. Therefore, none of the parties involved wanted to question the precarious balance of these societies, which were still traumatized by colonialism and living on the fringe of an economy whose philosophical assumptions (the role of the self, the destiny of human beings to dominate and transform the world) these societies did not share.

Then came an unprecedented economic crisis that blared the failure of the development policies implemented in Africa since independence. French agriculturist and writer René Dumont, a happy prophet indeed, had already heralded this failure in a book he published in the 1960s, *L'Afrique Noire est mal partie*.<sup>1</sup> This book helped arouse awareness among African elites and started the ordinary person to question the African ruling political classes' real commitment and capacity to promote a harmonious economic and social development in the continent.

This awareness took the form over the 1980s of the publication of a number of books by both African and non-African scholars—whose titles are more than evocative:

- *L'Afrique trahie : Essais*<sup>2</sup>
- *L'Afrique étranglée*<sup>3</sup>
- *La dimension culturelle du développement : Une étude conjointe Communauté Economique Européenne/UNESCO*<sup>4</sup>
- *Pour l'Afrique*<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>René Dumont, *L'Afrique Noire est mal partie (False Start in Africa)*, 2nd. ed., English trans. Phyllis Nauts Ott (New York: Praeger, 1969).

<sup>2</sup>J.C. Pomonti, *L'Afrique Trahie (Africa Betrayed)* (Paris: Hachette, 1979).

<sup>3</sup>René Dumont and Marie-France Motin, *L'Afrique Etranglée (Africa Strangled)* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980).

<sup>4</sup>Paul-Marc Henry and Basile Kossou, *La dimension culturelle du développement: Une étude conjointe Communauté Economique Européenne/UNESCO (The Cultural Dimension of Development: Joint Study of the European Economic Community and UNESCO)* (Lomé: Nouvelles éditions africaines, 1985).

<sup>5</sup>Edgar Pisani, *Pour l'Afrique (For Africa)* (Paris: O. Jacob, 1988).

• *L'Afrique, un avenir en sursis.*<sup>6</sup>

On the African continent every conceivable proposal, idea, and means to find the appropriate solutions to the development issues was tackled. It became clear that it was of primary importance to question anew the basic values, particularly that of culture. Let me quickly review African responses to this major inquiry into the interaction between culture and development.

Beyond the position portrayed at times in a somewhat provocative way in more recent books, such as *Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement? (What if Africa Refused to Develop?)* by Axelle Kabou,<sup>7</sup> a number of actions are underway in the field. This is clear proof that the Africans is this the exception that confirms the rule? seem to have committed themselves to be in the forefront of this new economic and political battle.

I would like to dwell particularly on the experience of my own consulting firm, SADEG INGENIEURS-CONSEILS, which conducts seminars on Cultural Adjustment. The first module of these seminars, entitled "The African Enterprise and Its Performance," builds directly on the book, *L'Afrique a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel? (Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?)*.<sup>8</sup> The target groups are executive directors of African enterprises, be they public, private, or parastatal. The module is designed for small groups of ten to twelve people, and takes place over four-and-a-half days.

The seminar's objective is to bring together a limited group of participants to reflect on the changes called upon for African society as a whole and particularly to find the means to speed the evolution of African enterprises to function in an environment dominated by an international competition that neither Africa nor its enterprises can ignore any longer. Participants are shown how to identify the content of African culture, as it is experienced in offices or workshops, and to formulate how this culture interacts with how the enterprises organize and manage their human and financial resources.

To achieve this objective, our module follows a four-point approach:

1. To make participants aware of the link between their individual performance and the performance of the enterprise in which they work

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<sup>6</sup>Alain and Edgar Hazoumace, *L'Afrique, un avenir en sursis (Africa: A Future in Delay)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988).

<sup>7</sup>Axelle Kabou, *Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement? (What If Africa Refused to Develop?)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991).

<sup>8</sup>Daniel Etounga-Manguellé, *L'Afrique a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel? (Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?)* (Ivry-sur-Seine: Editions nouvelles du sud, 1990).

2. To review briefly the fundamental principles of institutions as well as key management concepts that are universally applicable, and then identify the difficulties in putting these concepts in action in the African environment
3. To assess, on the basis of the conclusions of a previous cultural audit followed by discussions on a particular case study, the impact of the prevailing social culture on individual performances and as a group define actions to eliminate the observed constraints, that is, to define an action plan at the level of both the enterprise and individual executive
4. To facilitate, through informal dialogue during the seminar setting, communication among the various categories of personnel within the enterprise.

The first such seminar conducted by high-level African consultants was held at Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR), a mixed society,<sup>9</sup> and participants rated it as extremely beneficial.

Interest for these seminars is growing among a great number of West African public and private companies since the seminars seem to be a constructive contribution toward the necessity to change our management techniques and behaviors.

But, obviously, this module is only a partial response since we are working primarily with enterprises that are at the microeconomic level. Our next step will be to work with administration in the large sense, that is, with governments—the ministries and the central and provincial services—which, because of their weight and size, have a decisive role to play in the transformation of culture in African societies.

Of course, refinements of our approach are necessary mainly concerning the preparation of case studies that represent the diversity of the circumstances from one country to another. For this purpose specific funding will be needed, especially if we are to use the media, mainly *television*, which can be instrumental in changing people's attitudes.

Finally, after having listened yesterday to the recommendations made by Professor Klitgaard, I found that we in SADEG are just like Mr. Jourdain, a character of Molière, who was writing prose without knowing it: our seminar is, indeed, what Professor Klitgaard has called "Applied Cultural Studies."

The methodology we are trying to promote is based on a statement also made yesterday by Professor Arkoun that "Culture has also negative functions."

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<sup>9</sup>A "mixed society" is a company that is part government- and part privately owned, or parastatal. SIR is a mixed government and private oil refining company.

What we do first in the seminars is to *deconstruct*, that is, to recognize that African cultures sometimes do influence negatively the economic performance of our societies. After this first step we invite the participants to reflect and then discover themselves what needs to be done to change the cultural pattern, the bias.

In so doing, we not only state that the answer to our question "Does Africa need a cultural adjustment program?" is "Yes!" but we also indicate how to start to control the dramatic economic crisis our continent is facing.

Even if the statement may seem immodest, I would say that our experience is probably a first try to cure an African sickness identified by Africans with an African medicine given by African doctors.

**Appendix 1**

**General Action Plan Module**

Current Situation	Actions
<b>Fatalism</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient planning</li> <li>• Behavior patterns based on fears deriving from</li> <li>• belief in demonic forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Systematization of planning process</li> <li>• Training/awareness rousing</li> <li>• Break out of certain behavior patterns</li> </ul>
<b>Unwillingness to Hustle</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Absenteeism</li> <li>• Project can't be completed in time given</li> <li>• Information not available</li> <li>• Deficient organization and methods</li> <li>• Insufficient utilization of communications media</li> <li>• Inadequate foresight (maintenance)</li> <li>• Attitude to technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Penalties/internal regulations</li> <li>• Peer pressure</li> <li>• Make staff understand that time is money</li> <li>• Improvement of individual organization</li> <li>• Training/awareness-rousing measures</li> </ul>
<b>Indivisible Power and Authority</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Power used as argument (pulling rank)</li> <li>• Bad working relations (management-personnel gulf)</li> <li>• Supervision (rigid)</li> <li>• Personnel allowed insufficient discretion</li> <li>• Power of secretaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fairer promotion system</li> <li>• Management style to be adopted by all senior staff</li> <li>• Improvement of productivity</li> <li>• Identify pockets of resistance</li> <li>• Improve communication</li> <li>• Move progressively toward establishment of a quality circle system</li> <li>• Creation of a climate of confidence</li> </ul>
<b>Role of Individual in Community</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal initiative not appreciated (government)</li> <li>• Touchiness of individuals</li> <li>• Little curiosity</li> <li>• Little desire to excel</li> <li>• Lack of spirit of sacrifice and unselfishness</li> <li>• Aversion to risk</li> <li>• Fear (feeling of persecution, of being constantly watched)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More encouragement by management</li> <li>• Periodic review of distribution of evaluation criteria</li> <li>• Encourage individuals to speak out</li> <li>• Adopt a more appropriate management style (courage of convictions)</li> <li>• All say the same thing to employees</li> <li>• Organize periodic meetings on specific subjects</li> </ul>

*(Appendix 1 continued on next page)*

<b>Appendix 1 (cont'd.)</b>	
<b>Current Situation</b>	<b>Actions</b>
<b>Excessive Conviviality and Avoidance of Any Open Conflict</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflicts between individuals in the company or outside it</li> <li>• Practice of usury</li> <li>• Family conflicts</li> <li>• Family scenes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Action by company (rescheduling)</li> <li>• Avoid involving the company's image</li> <li>• Extension of leave</li> <li>• Utilization of supplementary credit</li> <li>• Availability of logistic facilities</li> <li>• Expansion of role of social service (problem of rightful beneficiaries)</li> <li>• Quarterly interest over five years</li> </ul>
<b>Miserable Homo Economicus</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal financial problems</li> <li>• Usurious interest rates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of mutual benefit society (education expenses, funerals, etc.)</li> <li>• Loans (for emergencies, etc.)</li> <li>• Social assistance fund</li> <li>• Assistance with home purchase (guarantee)</li> </ul>

## **Appendix 2**

### **Participants' Evaluations of the Seminar**

The first seminar on cultural adjustment arranged by SIR's management was well received by all.<sup>10</sup> At least, that was the general impression obtained from the evaluation session. And now that they have had some time to reflect on it, how do the participants rate the seminar?

#### **Mr. Bello Gnagne (Zone II Unit Chief):**

The seminar on cultural adjustment enabled us to take the measure of the problems of our cultural environment. These are the problems that, generally speaking, tend to make the performance of African enterprises mediocre. In the specific case of SIR we were able to determine how far we have come and what we still need to do. This led to a performance contract being drawn up at the end of the seminar. It must be stressed that SIR's management wants to ensure that the company is run today in a manner consistent with the standards of present-day society and taking the environment into account. To achieve this goal, it became apparent that awareness building was needed among the personnel, starting with the supervisory echelons in general. I believe this to be a good thing. The seminar was an enriching experience. It was also conducted in a good atmosphere. For me personally, it showed me how to manage my time properly and to do my job better. Finally, it showed us that SIR is very well managed.

#### **Mr. Julien Folquet (BDF):**

It was an excellent seminar. It was most enriching. It served to highlight the approach of SIR's management while also focusing on time management, delegation of authority and the role played by the individual in the company. The strength of the seminar is that the instruction is not purely theoretic but concrete and focused on our cultural behavior, not just on the

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<sup>10</sup>Appendix 2 is taken directly from "Cultural Adjustment: Some Participants' Assessments after the Seminar," *Tadji*, no. 328 (November 29, 1991), 10-11.

job in society in general. We must extend cultural adjustment to those round about us and even to our families: the line of conduct to follow and the behavior of each one in society. My assessment is entirely positive. The mixture of staff of different levels (directors, department chiefs, supervisors) made the seminar all the more interesting. I would like to encourage management to move in this direction. Those who attend do not have to be all of the same category. I would like to see seminars of this sort held very frequently.

**Mr. Aka Aman (Chief, Technical Research Department):**

It was a good seminar. I learned a lot from it that will enable me to correct a certain number of points about how I do things, both in SIR and outside. Altogether, the seminar is going to help bring about a change in behavior. It has enabled us to observe that quite a lot has been done in SIR, but a lot still remains to be accomplished. I would like this seminar to reach a certain number of persons. We can be sure that this sort of thing will continue to be organized for the line managers, but it also needs to be done down to foreman level. Those who took part in the seminar are agreed on this. SIR is a key component of Cote d'Ivoire's economy, and if it does well its entire environment ought to be able to benefit. This is therefore a seminar that ought to be held for everyone. We are placed in an environment. Now whatever the model, if the environment is not favorable the model looks ridiculous. This seminar ought to be organized for other companies. And even for our top management, because there is always a need for correction and adjustment. One must always seek to improve one's behavior. In other words, the seminar should be expanded to cover not just those working in enterprises but the country as a whole.

**Mr. N'doli Assanvo (Maintenance):**

This was a seminar that came at the right time. I found it most worthwhile. It taught me a lot. I think society can also benefit greatly both from its way of looking at things and the suggestions for setting about accomplishing a change in thinking. For my part, the seminar enabled me to identify the key values that will be able to make an impact in the team I lead. Cultural

adjustment takes place at the level of the individual because there must first be a change in the individual's behavior in response to the requirements of present-day enterprises. I think personal behavior has to be cultivated before collective behavior. Then we can really speak of cultural adjustment. This seminar taught me a lot because I see things quite differently now. I see my responsibility in the general behavior. If we want overall behavior to change so that the total focus will be on the objectives of society or the requirements of modern societies, then each individual will have to change and each person will have to contribute to this change. Going by what one observes from day to day, there is a lot more interest in this change today.

**Mr. N'zi Kablan (Chief, Maritime Operations):**

There are lots of things that happen every day that you just don't notice. It's always good during discussions when someone draws your attention to them. This seminar made us aware of certain things that affect all African society. We need to realize that our employer is paying us for work done. Work has to come first. This seminar points up the need for a change in behavior. One must make an effort oneself before requiring it of others. The seminar conveyed a number of lessons. I have to admit that with the personal input of the speakers, who certainly knew their stuff, we had some very lively discussions. I think the participants were most articulate. I would welcome this sort of seminar being put on frequently and for everybody. We must ensure that it is repeated.

## What Models for African Museums? West African Prospects

Claude Daniel Ardouin

Executive Director  
West African Museums Programme

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*West African museums must no longer imitate Western models but must become tools for improvement in their own communities. The material and nonmaterial cultural heritage is the basis that determines ongoing development and the future of African societies. Museums have never been considered dynamic development tools in Africa; yet recent tendencies have led to a redefinition of the museum's role in cultural pluralism, national development, democracy, and public education. Museums should incorporate urban and contemporary culture and have a more global approach to the cultural as well as the natural heritage. They should address problems of health, physical survival, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, and political evolution. This opens the way for Africa's museums to become institutions for knowledge, conservation, dissemination, and education. Museums must reorient their fields and methods of activities and even create new forms of museums. It is neither possible nor desirable to define precise models for West African museums because each locality is unique. To ensure that museums are not fringe institutions but are relevant and have a positive impact on national life, they need to be flexible in their activities and structures, be involved in their communities' lives, and communicate effectively with their different publics.*

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After several decades of economic "development" in Africa it is now clear that cultural parameters and processes are at least as important as the economic aspects of the evolution of African societies in a world of profound changes and crises.

Poverty, problems of physical survival, production, consumption, health, education, rapid urbanization, political change, the degradation of the environment and the destruction of natural resources can no longer be considered as separate issues. Nor can they be seen as consequences of "economic growth" (understood as the application of economic models from Western developed countries). Moreover, this type of growth, when it has occurred, has caused profound imbalances, which are not only economic, but cultural and social as well.

It has also become clear that cultural identities represent for individuals and communities "a reference point and criteria for the different individuals and communities for their self-identity on the basis of their history and environment"

and "constitutes an important factor in individual and social equilibrium."<sup>1</sup> In African societies today, undergoing rapid change and crisis and subjected to powerful external influences, this equilibrium is frequently destroyed or, at least, damaged.

In addition, one also begins to realize that the tendency to rely on models from "developed" countries to industrialize, build, organize medical care, and educate has often led in terms of the official policies and doctrines to leave aside or simply reject a considerable mass of local knowledge, technology, techniques, and know-how developed in their particular environment by different societies over time.

In this context the cultural heritage in its material and nonmaterial aspects acquires a new dimension. The concepts of "culture" and "cultural heritage" can no longer be considered as an intellectual mystification, nor can they be reduced to a "sprinkling" of traditional songs and dances. They are the basis that determines ongoing development and the future of African societies. Social and cultural history, in all its complexity and multiple dimensions, constitutes a sphere of knowledge and interrogation about the present and the future. Far from referring solely to the past, cultural heritage is an open and dynamic concept that also encompasses the present cultural patterns and evolution in rural and urban communities. It is the foundation of cultural identity, a memory bank and frame of reference, a source of knowledge that can help to solve crucial present-day development problems.<sup>2</sup> Taking the cultural heritage into consideration is now a vital need since the shortcomings of the classic "economic" approach have become all the more apparent. "To envisage a development policy without giving priority to the protection of the cultural and natural heritage would be to condemn the population of Southern countries, to live in amnesia and irreversibly sign away their future."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>International Council of Museums (ICOM), "Report of the Togo Workshop," in *What Museums for Africa? Heritage in the Future*. ICOM Workshops. Benin-Ghana-Togo, November 18-23, 1991 (International Council of Museums, 1992), 358.

<sup>2</sup>See ". . . the belief that patrimony contributes to the resolution of contemporary world problems" in Jean-Baptiste Kiethega, "Heritage and Contemporary Culture: Evolution of the Concept and Collections," in *What Museums for Africa?* 273.

<sup>3</sup>Philippe Garcia de la Rosa, "Protecting the Cultural Heritage: A Tool for Development," in *What Museums for Africa?* 298.

## What Prospects for Museums in West Africa?

Integrating culture and cultural heritage into the global vision of development introduces a new dimension into the activities of institutions concerned with culture. This context is increasingly shaping development options for Africa's museums.

As institutions inherited from the colonial period or based on Western models, African museums are commonly in an equivocal situation. Although they are generally considered obligatory it is honorable to have a "National Museum," just like having a national flag museums are rarely perceived as dynamic development tools. "These museums favored the past to the detriment of the future and too often portrayed a false image of history . . . museums were not involved with development."<sup>4</sup> They often remain foreign institutions, of little significance to communities and national cultural life.

However, over the past few years new movements and approaches have been developing that redefine the museum's role. As an illustration, at the meeting of African museum professionals held by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in Lomé in 1991, the museum was seen as a "tool for cultural pluralism, national development, democracy" and for "public education."<sup>5</sup> In addition to their role of safeguarding the traditional cultural heritage, museums should "incorporate urban and contemporary culture in order that the museum be more closely implicated in the lives of its potential publics and communities" . . . and that "the museum must have a more global approach to the cultural *as well as* the natural heritage" and address areas such as "problems of health, physical survival, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation and political evolution."<sup>6</sup>

These major orientations can open up the way for West Africa's museums to become institutions for research, conservation, dissemination, and education. That requires a reorientation and diversification of and methods of activities. New ways of communicating with the national public and even the creation of new forms of museums have to be found. The convergence of these lines of approach will be decisive for the emergence of new-model museums capable of having an impact on public life and national development.

### *Fields of Activities*

Presently, the following fields must be given a high priority.

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<sup>4</sup>J.B. Kiethaga, "Heritage and Contemporary Culture," 274.

<sup>5</sup>ICOM, "Final Report," in *What Museums for Africa?* 371.

<sup>6</sup>ICOM, "Final Report," 371.

### *The Cultural Heritage*

For museums cultural heritage is a vast realm that, so far, has received only fragmentary, superficial, and static attention. In this field an ethnographic vision that is ahistoric, if not downright folkloric, has long been dominant in museums. It must be replaced by a more complex and dynamic view of material heritage as a range of historical products created by the activity of different human groups or networks, in all their complexity and stages of development, *in the past and the present*. This activity is not static but dynamic, and it is related to communities or individuals that are not isolated but are constantly interacting and involved in complex relationships that are undergoing frequent redefinition. Human activity covers many fields social, cultural, artistic, scientific, religious, economic, and political that are not isolated either but are closely interdependent, with vague or uncertain boundaries.

An important point is that the tangible cultural heritage is not a range of isolated objects. It must be seen in its own cultural and social environment. These objects are related to one another and are the products of specific knowledge and technologies. They have their own histories and are also related to a history and a system of relationships among individuals and groups—which are often transmitted through oral tradition. In addition they may be related to folklore, ethics, rituals, gestures, and dances. Such aspects are expressed by language, sounds, gestures, and attitudes. This *intangible heritage* is inseparable from the material culture, which, without it, cannot be completely understood and may be distorted.

A multidimensional approach would enable museums at various levels rural, urban, regional, national, and transnational to study, preserve, and disseminate the cultural heritage. Through their collections the museums have a wide range of potential perspectives that have been used inadequately or incorrectly until now. Certain of these perspectives are, moreover, of short-term or medium-term urgency:

- *Archaeology.* The major part of archaeological research is carried out outside museums and is producing an increasing amount of knowledge about different aspects of the history of society. However, this knowledge is only accessible to a small number of specialists. It is not incorporated into school textbooks until much later and then only partially. It remains completely inaccessible to the public at large because the objects turned up by these excavations are only very rarely exhibited (the majority of them never will be) in museums or anywhere else. Few are used in education programs. Museums need urgently to take responsibility for the archaeological patrimony,

both in studying and in preserving it. They also need to communicate the historical and cultural knowledge which it embodies.

- *History.* Due to the dominant rigid ethnographic approach, museums have paid little attention to history in its various aspects—social, cultural, political, economic, scientific, and technical. Material culture, the collections—which are the *main subject and medium* of museums—no longer exist outside the archaeological and ethnographic context. Recent history, particularly political (colonial and postcolonial) history is limited to long texts and photographic reproductions taken from books and magazines. Postcolonial history is generally assimilated with contemporary politics. Yet, in every era, events, upheavals, and peaceful or conflictual relations have been carried on, experienced, and understood in different ways by communities or individuals. These experiences have then been expressed directly or indirectly in objects, which are then carriers of information, and memories as well. Cultural, social, economic, political, and religious history, as well as the history of science, arts, and techniques is linked to objects, to material culture, and to nonmaterial, intangible aspects. The material culture *is an important source of data on history*, just like oral and written sources. It is essential that museums use their collections to enrich our knowledge of history under a different light and to make it accessible to all, especially to those who share a common heritage. A good example is provided by political changes, some peaceful, some violent, now occurring in West Africa. Will museums participate in this history, or will they be content to display it in ten or twenty years through texts, reproductions, photographs, and newspaper clippings?<sup>7</sup>
- *Urban culture.* The tradition that museums are concerned only with "rural" ethnography has resulted in their ignorance of the diversity and rapid changes in social and cultural life and the material culture in today's urban centers. This approach also

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<sup>7</sup>In this connection it is interesting to note the project of the Natal Museum in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, "Collecting the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in Natal." The aim of this program is to collect and document three-dimensional artifacts, visual images, and oral testimonies of the anti-apartheid struggle in Natal: T-shirts, scarves, uniforms, badges, posters, banners, photographs, folk art, and human memories—all of which are extremely perishable.

relegates West Africa's rich precolonial urban cultures to the shadows. Museums must integrate urban cultures into their sphere of action to reflect the reality and dynamics of contemporary culture.

- *Contemporary artistic creation.* This is another important aspect that, apart from a few exceptions, has not received much attention from museums. It is urgent that museums systematically promote the contemporary artistic legacy and make it known and understood. Programs must be developed in various directions, particularly in research such as by recording artists documenting their works; creating documented collections; and increasing awareness and education, which also promotes the artists.
- *Technological heritage.* Through field research extensive data can be gathered on indigenous technology and know-how from the past that may now be threatened with extinction. Such information can be preserved and provide a basis for the development of handicrafts, small trades, and industries. Museums can play an important role as research centers, data bases, and exhibit areas.

### *Environment and the Natural Heritage*

The evolution of the natural environment is a vital issue for African countries and concerns the present and future of each society. Changes in the natural environment and ecological systems are linked to many causes, such as natural processes and human activities at local, national, and global levels. They are neither isolated nor uniquely contemporary. They are rather historical processes to be studied by different disciplines and have far-reaching effects on human life and culture.<sup>8</sup> Today, knowledge of the environment and natural resources, evolution of the natural environment, people's interaction with nature, and the effects of ecological changes on human culture are essential data for development. They must be studied, documented, and incorporated in a strategy of communication and dialogue with the public and the various communities. They should be integrated into formal and informal education and give rise to conservation programs. This field of study—documentation, information, and

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<sup>8</sup>For example, the degradation of ecological conditions in the Sahel in recent decades has brought about changes in ways of life and in technologies, together with the disappearance, in the most severely affected areas, of numerous individual and collective heritages, such as family property, sold for subsistence income.

education is important for museums and has not received much attention until now.

Museums should not limit themselves to the above fields but should also become involved in other areas of vital significance for the development of society: information on health problems, new "adapted" technologies, a up-to-date information on science and technology. At the same time the museum's strategic position for understanding of other cultures should not be forgotten.

### *Diversification of Activities and Types of Museums*

This approach does not call for the "universalization" of every museum but promotes the need diversification of the activities of museums according to their individual formats and programs *as well as* the development of networks of institutions operating at different levels and in different fields.

### *Types of Activity*

The diversification of museum activities should be structured along three principal lines: scientific research, conservation and protection, and dissemination and communication.

*Scientific research.* There is very often a gulf between museums and scientific research. Perceived and used as warehouses for exotic objects rather than as research centers developing knowledge, museums do not attract professional researchers, especially young ones, who are more tempted, rightly or wrongly, by careers in other research or teaching institutions. However, the museum's potential for activity and impact on public life can be realized only by developing a new approach to museum research. The museum's future is tied to the development of research programs about contemporary and past societies, history, art, archaeology, natural heritage and environment, and museum technical disciplines. The specificity of this research lies in:

- Its relationship to material culture and the *museum's collections*, which can be better understood, used, and conserved as sources of information and memory
- The link between tangible and intangible heritage, without which an understanding of the material culture is made difficult.

Without the support of data and information gathered by means of systematic research, the collections become mere arrangements of objects of limited interest, likely to receive no more than a casual glance. Research on material culture should increase our knowledge of Africa's social and cultural history by using new information sources which complement studies based on

oral or written sources. Such research is, moreover, an urgent necessity because of the rapid changes and upheavals these societies are experiencing. Special attention should be paid to areas in which ecological degradation has severely affected human societies and their cultural heritage, creating the need to safeguard that heritage through research. In general, museums' increasing participation in research will imply the development of internal research programs or the establishment of active links among museums and museum professionals and researchers in other institutions.

*Conservation and protection.* Field research, the creation and conservation of properly documented and managed collections, and of written, audio-visual, and iconographic data bases are all fundamental to the work of museums in conserving the cultural and natural heritage.

A second but no less important aspect concerns the museum's role in protecting objects *in situ*. While this field has not yet been developed, it seems to be the way of the future, offering considerable possibilities to involve the local communities as active partners with museums in conserving the cultural heritage. To protect archaeological sites, and objects belonging to families or communities, a flexible and diversified approach based on exhibitions, education programs, assistance to help the owners conserve and promote their patrimony may help create a situation in which the conservation of cultural heritage is no longer the "mission" (an impossible one) of a few specialized institutions, but is firmly rooted in the communities.

In fact, in the area of conservation and protection each museum, according to its size and internal functions, has considerable potential as a conservation center, data base, and partner for its publics.

*Dissemination and communication.* Dissemination comprises the activities, *intra muros* or *extra muros* by which museums can use collections (their own or loaned), research findings, and data to inform, educate, entertain, prompt to think, and engage their different publics. The range of activities is practically unlimited, including permanent and traveling displays, educational and cultural programs, audio-visual products, publications, meetings, and media events. Dissemination is an essential aspect of museum work and its chief *raison d'être* (since conservation is not an end in itself). Through dissemination museums can have a real impact on public life and development, acting as tools for education and the spread of knowledge, as spaces for information and reflection and for cultural contacts and leisure, and as conservation centers for cultural and natural heritage.

One particular perspective is a good example of the necessity and the urgency to develop this kind of activity in West Africa: the education of youth. Official education programs pay little attention to cultural or natural heritage. National and local material culture, ways of life, technology, traditions, and arts

all are practically ignored. What will be the cultural identities of these young people whose environments are wracked by social and cultural problems and changes? Today they are in school, but in a few years they will be the countries' social, cultural, economic, and political leaders. This question concerns not only the young students but also the hundreds of thousands of urban and suburban youth growing up outside the official system. This problem is crucial for the future and requires that museums assume their roles as informal educational institutions. They can supplement school programs and also, through diversified programs for varied young publics, help these youth to discover their cultural and natural heritage and appropriate their own cultural identities in all their diversity.

*Museums and National Publics: Communicating with the General Public or the Elite?*

Dissemination is a sensitive area that involves museums' ability to reflect the reality of their societies and to participate in the life of their potential publics. Strategies and methods adapted to the particular local context should be used to communicate with each public, instead of imposing models that may be appropriate elsewhere but in the context of West Africa must be handled cautiously or even rejected. Communicating with the public is crucial for the future of West African museums because it is the basis of their relationship with the different groups within each society.

More precisely, to establish efficient communication, museums must use national languages. It is impossible to arouse or maintain national visitors' interest in displays and cultural activities if they cannot understand the presentations. Museum-community relations are based on the museum's capacity to use the public's language. Finally, one should remember that a national language is a product, a vector of transmission, and an expression of a culture as well as a unique tool for understanding cultural identity and tradition.

Using a national language does, of course, create problems due to linguistic diversity, design, and methodology. These difficulties are not insurmountable but require a major effort by museums to innovate original programs and should not justify the easiest solution—for museums to rely solely on European languages.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>The marginal use, in certain cases, of national languages in the form of written texts and labels is not a solution since it reaches only the literate museum public.

*Types and Forms of Museums*

It is clear that this diversification in the approaches and activities of museums cannot take place in the present situation of a quasi-monopoly of "National Museums" that are state-controlled, bureaucratized, and set in their ways. New concepts, forms, and structures are indispensable if museums are to assume their full range of roles in relation to natural and cultural heritage and education. This is also needed if museums are to be integrated in and interact with their communities and reflect their realities.

Two main avenues to these ends should be considered: diversification and decentralization.

*Diversification of types of museums.* A single museum cannot cover all of the intellectual fields, in other words, fewer all-purpose museums.

*Decentralization at the regional and local levels.* Development of regional and local museums is the way of the future. Only this approach will enable the museum to truly interact with community members and become part of their lives. Conversely, only this approach will enable the community to be actively involved with the museum and use it for its own development. There is a need for museums other than state museums, organized and managed in various ways, whether on the basis of community or private management.

In addition the development of local museums may give rise to totally new forms of museums. It is by no means unthinkable that the current classic structure collections and displays centralized in a single area or even in one building will give place to other forms better suited to the individual local context.

Thus, in certain cases ancient cities for example the organization of a classic museum could run into problems, such as the refusal of local owners-families or communities of cultural patrimony to give up their property to the museum. Why not then consider a more flexible organization in which each community would retain its heritage under conditions set up and monitored by the technical staff of an assistance, documentation and coordination unit, with financial support from the local community, the state, or both? While this approach clearly raises some technical problems conservation, display, and public access, among others and others of a legal, financial nature, these problems do not appear insurmountable.

Whatever the options suggested by the different contexts, the future of museums lies in the diversification of types, the development of regional and local institutions, and flexible structures and methods.

## **Conclusion**

It is not essential, desirable, or even possible to define precise models for West African museums because each country, region, and locality is a specific case. To ensure, however, that museums are not fringe institutions but are relevant to their communities and have a positive impact on public life, they need to diversify their fields of action, be flexible in their activities and structures, be involved in their communities' lives, and communicate effectively with their different publics.

## Towards an Integrated Approach: Southern African Museums Map Out Strategies

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*Zimbabwe has taken action to protect its cultural heritage in an era of structural adjustment through the initiation of a national plan for development and ecotourism that will function through its National Museums and Monuments. With the assistance of UNESCO and the United Nations Development Programme, Zimbabwe formulated a 5-Year Master Plan for the development of monuments. Through its experience Zimbabwe developed a regional course in heritage management. In 1989 the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) Association formed an Association of Museums (SADCCAM) to bring together all regional institutions involved in the preservation, protection, dissemination, and promotion of their unique cultures and natural heritage. The SADCCAM constitution underlines cooperation among its members and other regional and international organizations, and facilitates the meaningful use of museums by publicizing their role in national development. Consistent financial support by the Nordic agencies and UNESCO was crucial in SADCCAM's formation and early survival, but socioeconomic and political stability are essential for its success. SADCCAM is developing revenue-generating programs, but so long as governments are cutting cultural programs under structural adjustment, donor agencies need to continue to protect cultural development programs.*

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Where there is not bread how can we say: let them have museums, instead! But you [museologists] will retort with reason, that this is a false alternative, that our cultures themselves are an infinite richness, whatever the level of economic development and what you produce is not bread *or* museums but bread *and* museums.<sup>1</sup>

In August 1991 an exhibition was launched in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city. It was an exhibition with a difference, an exhibition of pottery from nine countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all members of a regional group known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

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<sup>1</sup>S. Nagui, opening address, *ICOM '83* (Proceedings of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) General Conference, 1983), 7.

Appropriately, the exhibition marked the opening of the Third General Conference of the SADCC Association of Museums (SADCCAM), a body founded in 1989 to bring together all institutions involved in the preservation, protection, dissemination, and promotion of their cultural and natural heritage. Why pottery? Because it was a product of the soil and therefore a hallmark of national pride yet common to all nations, a symbol of the depth of time and traditions of Southern Africa from the second century B.C. to the twentieth century A.D. It was an example of stylistic similarity indicating the commonality of the peoples of the sub-region; yet it also presented striking differences peculiar to each cultural grouping. In essence the exhibition demonstrated finite richness in the diversity of cultures and reflected a simple but easily available essential commodity.

All these attributes were the driving force behind the formation of SADCCAM, whose constitution underlines *cooperation* and *collaboration*, but *not unification*. I shall dwell at length on SADCCAM and how we in the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe see our role in it.

Indeed, I am but carrying out one of the main objectives of the association: to ensure cooperation and understanding between it and other regional and international organizations in Africa and abroad and to facilitate the meaningful use of museums of the region by publicizing their existence and their role in national development.<sup>2</sup>

Allow me, however, to preface my presentation by noting very encouraging if related developments on the cultural front. Whether in emulation or reinforcement of SADCC or possibly by coincidence, in November 1991 (after our SADCCAM Third General Conference) the first-ever conference on cultural cooperation in the SADCC region was held in Arusha, Tanzania. Bringing together policymakers, museologists, writers, archivists, artists, and politicians, the conference's objectives were:

1. To coordinate cultural cooperation
2. To be a data bank of culture in the region
3. To facilitate allocation of the necessary resources and inputs to regional and national projects
4. To involve governments in the region in identifying, supporting, and implementing projects that emphasize the national and regional cultural dimension.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Constitution of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference Association of Museums (SADCCAM), Clauses 3(iii) and (viii).

<sup>3</sup>Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), *Culture and Information* (SADCC Cultural Conference, Arusha, November 25-28, 1991), 10.

It is pertinent that the conference reports, "This organization [SADCC Association of Museums] already exists and if SADCC supports its initiatives this could be a starting point for various museum programs in the region."<sup>4</sup>

The question is, "Why this flight from balkanization?" The common denominator for all countries is movement away from *poverty*. It is a poverty broadly defined; poverty in material wealth is but one of the elements. Otherwise, there is the poverty of ideas, knowledge, and culture. Referring to poverty, Hardroy put it more clearly: "The poor want to relive the history of their peoples and communities want to recount their lives. Necessity has reunited them."<sup>5</sup>

Security in numbers becomes an important adage. There is, therefore, the underlying *de facto* position: togetherness can produce both bread *and* museums.

Typical country reports of the conference on cultural cooperation read: "lack of funding for many cultural programs resulting in many cultural programs being shelved or many cultural projects half achieved"; "lack of trained personnel to formulate and execute arts projects and programs"; or "lack of coordination on cultural endeavors resulting in duplicating of effort and conflict."<sup>6</sup> Echoing these sentiments, albeit with greater emphasis, are the three General Conferences of SADCCAM held to date.

While these problems are largely endogenous and are fueled by our colonial past, perhaps more overwhelming are the exogenous forces. One need only contemplate the present socioeconomic realities in Africa. Economic structural adjustment programs (ESAPs) that seek to stimulate investment and liberalize domestic economic structures have been adopted or are being formulated in thirty countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. I cite none other than an official of the World Bank, Mr. Stephen O'Brien.<sup>7</sup> While part of the long-term aim of ESAPs is to generate employment, in the immediate- and perhaps medium-term their effects are opposite. According to *Zimbabwe A Framework for Economic Reform: 1991-95*,<sup>8</sup> the blueprint of the country's economic adjustment program, manpower in the public and parastatal sectors should be reduced by 25 percent. The effect on the cultural institutions is obvious. While

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<sup>4</sup>SADCC, *Culture and Information*, 43.

<sup>5</sup>Jorge E. Hardroy, "The Popular Sum of Knowledge and the Museum" (Paper presented at ICOM '86, Buenos Aires, 1986), 8.

<sup>6</sup>These phrases appear repeatedly in SADCC, *Culture and Information*.

<sup>7</sup>Stephen O'Brien, "Towards Effective Integration in Southern Africa," *Executive* 15(3) (Harare: Argosy Press, June 1991). 26-27.

<sup>8</sup>*Zimbabwe—A Framework for Economic Reform: 1991-1995* (Harare: Government Printers, 1990).

one may take heart in assurances that noncommercial parastatals with a social role for example, the National Museums and Monuments, the National Gallery, and the National Arts Council will continue to receive grants as part of the budgetary process, one cannot find comfort in the concluding remarks of that document: "However even in these cases [noncommercial parastatals] attempts at cost recovery will be made." One is here reminded of an article that appeared in an obscure newspaper, the *Poughkeepsie Eagle News* on March 6, 1929, "Hard Times Are Not Coming, Brother, It's Soft Times That Are Going."<sup>9</sup> Indeed that was the scenario during the Great Depression, a depression equated only to the recession we are all going through thanks to the world stage and the drought in the sub-region. If that is the tone, then our honorable Nagui's initial remarks "Where there is not bread, how can we say: let them have museums, instead!" are borne out.

Paradoxically, it is because there is no bread that we *should* have museums and similar institutions. This is not based on the Biblical pronouncement that man does not live by bread alone; it is based on our role as cultural institutions. At the Arusha conference this was aptly expressed by the keynote speakers. Because culture determined spiritual, material, intellectual, civil, and emotional features as well as the very direction and type of development and civilization, only culture could enable us to cope with the daily task of living in a hostile environment. In essence, when all else was enmeshed in the razzmatazz of material nothingness, cultural institutions were duty-bound to infuse sobriety. However, the task was too daunting to be handled by one institution or even by one country because the environment was pervasive. All this underscored the need for cooperative action for museums the answer was SADCCAM.

The SADCCAM agenda and areas needing attention were set out in the themes and sub-themes of the three General Conferences. The theme of the first conference, held in June 1988, was "Problems of Museums in the SADCC Region." Resulting from it was the call for:

1. Formation of a SADCC Museums Association and for a cultural policy for countries of SADCC
2. An inventory of cultural artifacts of SADCC
3. More financial and material support
4. More outreach and awareness programs
5. Standardization of documentation systems
6. "Balanced" training of personnel with the assistance of UNESCO and donor agencies

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<sup>9</sup>Cited in Susan Bertram, "Hard Times," *Museum News* (February 1983): 20.

7. Promotion of marketing in museums and development of archaeological sites.

The key elements at the inaugural conference were therefore the need for documentation, training, financial and material resources, and self-reliance programs.

The Second General Conference, held in Gaborone, Botswana, in June 1989, formally constituted SADCCAM, thus fulfilling the call of the inaugural conference. The theme, "Museums in Development: Prospects for the 1990s," was aptly summed up by the Executive Secretary of SADCC, Dr. Simba Makoni. In his opening speech he surmised that effectiveness of museum services in the region is substantially increased through bilateral and regional cooperation and that culture is an essential ingredient of development.

Major subthemes were:

1. Regional research programs
2. Educational programs
3. Environmental awareness
4. Services for rural areas
5. Training.

The major thrust of the second conference was to increase public awareness of the role of museums. Museums were implored to assist the populace to understand themselves and their environment. In this way the people's capacity to harness their environment to accelerate development was increased. However, any meaningful development was to embrace the culture of the people. In essence unless museums started viewing development as a cultural conception with perceptions shaped by culturally standardized codes, both the target audiences and the message would be missed. As P. Durkman, the then-Minister of Development of the Netherlands, said in February 1988, concern for the cultural dimension of development implies respect for the cultural heritage and cultural traditions of a nation or a people.<sup>10</sup> However, it was underlined that to play that role, museologists should understand their societies. Regrettably, this has not always been the case. While museums in the SADCC region indeed, in the developing world as a whole had to answer modern needs, they had to do so as institutions of cultural heritage. It was also noted that development should not always be viewed from the conventional social sciences perspective, that is, as a spontaneous process with one specific direction: *forward*. The danger lies in viewing development as part of modernization and growth. In essence development is not to be synonymous with accumulation of

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<sup>10</sup>P. Durkman, *ICME News* 11 (February 1988).

material wealth. It is in fact the spiritual, educational, and moral development areas in which museums are supposed to excel.

The Third SADCCAM General Conference was held in Bulawayo and Masvingo in Zimbabwe in August 1991. Namibia was present as the tenth member of SADCCAM. The acceptance of the association by the international community marked the maturity stage of SADCCAM. The President of the International Council of Museums (ICOM), Mr. Omar Konaré, now President of Mali, opened the Third General Conference, thus formally accepting the association as an internationally recognized regional body.

The theme of the 1991 conference was "Preservation of Our Heritage: A Challenge for the Nineties." The subthemes were:

1. Developing policies for the preservation of the heritage
2. Managing the heritage
3. Methods and techniques for preserving the heritage.

The theme was aimed at providing institutions with concrete strategies for preserving the natural and cultural resources, giving due weight to their social and economic roles. Coordinating heritage preservation at national and regional levels was the aim of the exercise. The significance of documentation and statistics in heritage management was highlighted. What was evident was that the social and economic constraints inhibiting heritage management programs had to be confronted.

As in the previous conferences the gravity of the lack of training was stressed. An important step was the agreement to appoint someone to carry out a feasibility study of existing facilities. These could be used for regional training. Museum education was another area stressed, and it was agreed that there was need for museum education centers for the sub-region. The matter was recommended for ICOM's consideration at the "What Museums for Africa?" Workshops ("Encounters") held in Benin, Ghana, and Togo. It is pleasing to note that the "Encounters" meeting held in November 1991 agreed to establish such a center in the SADCC region. The Third General Conference advanced another positive step when it took up the challenge of encouraging more self-reliance programs by increasing the revenues of institutions. The effects of the economic structural adjustment programs were explored, and the consensus was that by developing marketing strategies, as recommended by the First General Conference, institutions could reduce the impact of ESAPs. However, it was also noted that in countries in which institutions lacked a reasonable autonomous status, there was a danger that benefits would not accrue to such institutions but to central governments. The matter was again referred to the "Encounters" meeting. It was again a major success of SADCCAM that the "Encounters" produced a resolution calling for more autonomy of museums and cultural institutions.

The SADCCAM General Conferences have dwelt at length on how to generate financial resources. The case of Botswana was ably put forth by Ms. Catrien van Waarden, an archaeologist at Marope Research Station in Francistown, Botswana, in her paper, "Management of the Archaeological Resource during Intense Development,"<sup>11</sup> presented at the Second General Conference in June 1989. Botswana was experiencing an economic boom, with one of the highest annual growth rates in the world (approximately 12 percent) and large monetary reserves bolstering its program of building its infrastructure of roads, power, and water networks and expanding its industrial base through mining projects. This development, however, was threatening archaeological sites, and the task of enforcing the Monuments and Relics Act was becoming monumental. Because of the limited number of archaeologists available (highlighting the need for training programs), a program of contract archaeology was initiated a rare feature in Africa. The archaeologists carried out archaeology impact assessment studies and recommended proper courses of action. One of the important features of the contract archaeology program is that it was financed from the funds of the national infrastructure construction projects including salaries for staff, transport, excavation, laboratory equipment and supplies, as well as the production of reports. With careful administration some profit was made, and in this way an efficient archaeology resource management service could be developed.

Because of the impact on development, Zimbabwe's position, adopted by SADCCAM, underscored a broader aggressive approach to marketing in the following areas:

### **Financing Mechanisms**

Chapter 313 of the National Museums and Monuments Act empowers the parastatal to charge entrance fees to museums, monuments, and lectures. Lectures may be on various topics not necessarily related to museum work, and sponsorship varies according to interest groups and may be of a general or specialized nature. In the fiscal year ended June 1991, this activity generated \$188,214. Until April 1991 entrance fees were \$1.00 per adult and \$0.30 per child, but after April 1991 the fees were raised to \$5.00 per adult (non-Zimbabweans) and \$2.00 for Zimbabweans for every entry. The pricing was based on depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar against other major currencies and the need to promote domestic visitorship.

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<sup>11</sup>Catrien van Waarden, "Management of the Archaeological Resource during Intense Development" (Paper presented at the Second General Conference of SADCCAM, Francistown, Botswana, June 1989).

Debate has often been raised on the adverse effects of entrance fees, but experience has shown that "Free Entry" days such as International Museums Day (May 18) and World Tourism Day (September 27) do not necessarily result in high attendance. Similarly, the new increased entry fees did not reduce attendance as the following figures indicate:

**Table 1. Zimbabwean Museums Entrance Fees**

Month	1990	1991
	Revenues under Old Charge	Revenues under Increased Charges
May	\$30,489	\$30,928
June	25,207	26,390
July	22,132	30,843

Other sources of fees, such as hire of auditoriums, registered similar gains.

For a long time these curios, or indigenous crafts, have been the mainstay of "own resources" generated, with profits rising each year:

**Table 2. Yearly Profits Generated by Curios, 1989-1991**

Year	Amount of Profit
1989	\$ 56,196
1990	102,582
1991	112,835

The products for sale have primarily been basketry, earthenware, wooden and stone carvings, ornaments, traditional weaponry, and instruments. From 1988 to 1990 a survey was carried out to look into the types of curios currently

produced and to assess which artifacts could be made into replicas, thus increasing the range of curios.<sup>12</sup>

The survey revealed the enormous potential of curios, particularly in the development of rural areas. It was also recommended that National Museums and Monuments should develop product lines reflecting the operations of the parastatal and the cultural property under its control. The simplest of these were facsimiles such as clay figurines, ceremonial weapons, and soapstone birds. Reduced scale facsimiles could be converted into a variety of attractive jewelry made from brass, gold, or stone. A second transformation to capitalize on cultural property would be the production of posters, postcards, and slides while possibilities also existed for printing T-shirts.

An intensive investigation of the profitability of at least one product line focused on production of glass beads. Glass beads dating back to 850 A.D. have been located in parts of the eastern and central parts of Africa and like pottery are part of the SADCC regional culture. They play a significant ornamental, ritual, medical, and ceremonial role. Due to shortages of foreign currency, however, this tradition is in danger of extinction. The Development Technology Centre (DTC) of the University of Zimbabwe was tasked with carrying out a survey of the manufacture and market potential of glass beads. The study indicated that there was a heavy demand, particularly in rural areas and among foreign tourists. In one of the country's provinces, Manicaland, there was market potential for 300 kilograms of beads per month. In fact, since the 1970s women had been trekking down to South Africa for this commodity.

Using simple furnaces, beads could be manufactured using local silica sand, limestone, and soda ash from neighboring countries such as Botswana and Tanzania. Thus a dying tradition would be saved, and in so doing museums would be reinforcing one of the mission statements of such institutions—namely, preservation of cultural heritage. In the same vein rural development and job creation would result.

Another source of income is monuments-related tourism. There is a boom in world tourism, and the SADCC region is having its fair share. In 1991 Zimbabwe alone was expecting \$300 million from this source.

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<sup>12</sup>D. P. Collett, *The Heritage of Zimbabwe: A Masterplan for Resources Conservation and Development*, UNDP/UNESCO Project ZIM 88/028 (Harare and Paris: 1991).

### **A Master Plan for Cultural Heritage**

Experience elsewhere shows that increased tourism benefits cultural institutions.<sup>13</sup> To capitalize on this and with the assistance of UNESCO and the United National Development Program (UNDP), a Five-Year Master Plan for the development of monuments was formulated. The plan is based on the fact that Zimbabwe and its neighbors have a rich archaeological heritage with a strong tourist potential. The plan's major objectives are:

1. To develop specific archaeological and historical sites as marketed foci
2. To develop a strong heritage management infrastructure capable of preserving the heritage and presenting it as a resource
3. To generate enough resources to fund the statutory obligations of the parastatal and to make sites an important educational resource.

This plan drew heavily on local and foreign expertise to cover areas including conservation of dry stone walls (dry stone architecture is one of the country's richest heritages), marketing of cultural heritage, tourist-potential survey for monuments, production of archaeologically related facsimiles, and cultural heritage management.

From the range of these disciplines it is evident that the need to generate income was counterbalanced by the requirement to preserve and promote the country's heritage. The point to underscore is that the plan does not seek to create "Disneylands" but to reinforce academic integrity by educating the public about such sites in an entertaining and enjoyable manner. To achieve the latter, provision of adequate guide literature, use of electronic and other media, and setting up a visitor-orientation center are envisaged. Only in this way can public demand be satisfied and development of the spiritual being sharpening and broadening the intellectual faculties of the public be attained.

Naturally, substantive or technical inputs are required to put this five-year plan for 1992 to 1997 into action. Such inputs are in human resource development (training of archaeologists, photogrammetrists, conservators, and cultural resources managers), theme park development, archaeology, landscape surveying and architecture, marketing, vehicles and equipment, publicity and tourism, and education.

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<sup>13</sup>B. Capstick, *Museums and Tourism*, *International Journal of Museum Management and Curatorship* 4(4) (December 1985): 366.

The existing resources are inadequate for the boost effect required. The Government of Zimbabwe, UNESCO, and UNDP agreed to hold a major donors' conference in Zimbabwe from July 27 to 31, 1992, to raise the essential inputs. Crucial for the capacity building stage, the conference will bring together experts in the various fields as guided by the requisite technical inputs noted above. On the other hand donors with material and financial resources will attend with a view to making an on-the-spot assessment of the requirements for the implementation of the five-year plan.

This five-year plan and the donors' conference will be of lasting benefit to the whole SADCC region. The heritage encountered in Zimbabwe both resembles and differs from that found in other parts of eastern and southern Africa. For example archaeological sites with dry stone walls occur in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania. While the styles of the walls in the countries may differ, they exhibit similar problems to those of the walls found in Zimbabwe. Rock paintings also occur in a number of these countries. Similarly, rock paintings occur in Zimbabwe and a number of the SADCC countries.

The similarities in both the heritage and the problems in its management that occur throughout eastern and southern Africa provide Zimbabwe with an opportunity to develop a regional course in heritage management. At the Arusha SADCC Cultural Conference some of the projects that were proposed and endorsed included training of cultural resources managers. A suitable base for this facility exists at the Great Zimbabwe Conservation Centre, and limited training has been provided for staff from the Kenya National Museum. In 1990 the Centre hosted a three-month program funded by the Swedish Council for Research (SAREC). This brought together countries of the SADCC region with Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, and Somalia. Under the "Urban Origins Program," which seeks to carry out research programs in countries with a related archaeological heritage, the workshop dwelt on new micro-drill systems and pH tests in archaeology and on their contribution towards heritage management programs. The infrastructure built in terms of the Five-Year Master Plan is at the disposal of SADCC members.

### **SADCCAM's Contribution**

On a similar note SADCCAM proved that it could run sustainable workshops elsewhere in the region. In November 1991 a major workshop brought together museum directors and conservators from SADCCAM. With the assistance of the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the workshop developed a specific program of action for 1992 to 1995.

Highlights of the program include specific support for problem areas that were identified at the workshop. Among these are fumigants, infestation of collection, and insufficient data systems for conservation of artifacts. Subject to the availability of funds, targeted institutions will host the various themes, and problems will be practically eradicated. Thus, an institution that faces critical infestation problems will be assigned the necessary personnel and material resources while it also becomes a practical demonstration ground for participants from other institutions. On the other hand an institution that is strong in conservation may be targeted as a training ground for other member institutions.

Four years is a very short time for an organization whose mission is as wide and deep as that outlined in the SADCCAM Constitution. However, it is long enough for analysts to discern signs of failure or success. Born out of fear of failure, particularly in view of the demise of the Organisation of Museums, Monuments, and Sites of Africa (OMMSA), the new unit took all steps to avoid the pitfalls of that organization, which included the absence of a properly agreed constitution and the inaccessibility of the executive leadership. In fact, because of the connotations of the term "organization," "association" was adopted. Auguring well for SADCCAM is the fact that it was born out of "need" and not expediency. It was also a product of the universality of this "need" among the countries of SADCCAM, which is the reason it had been reluctant to accept applications from non-SADCC countries. With the continuation of positive developments in South Africa one is naturally looking forward to its participation in SADCCAM activities. Previous attempts by the South African Museums Association (SAMA) to merge with SADCCAM were turned down because the political situation was not ripe. In any case the *raison d'être* of SADCCAM is based on the parent unit, SADCC, whose Secretariat is charged with providing political guidance for all other arms of SADCC. When the situation was ripe, it was a pleasure to welcome Namibia, and one is also happy to note that SADCCAM has volunteered to assist Namibia to find its way in the museums field.

Countries like Zimbabwe have had the experience of dealing with the birth pains of the transition from the colonial system to post-independence systems. It is this shared experience that SADCCAM can also offer to a free South Africa. In essence one can say only that the four years of SADCCAM continue to be formative until the whole region is stable. One cannot lose sight of the fact that a politically and socioeconomically stable environment is a *sine qua non* for success. That Mozambique continues to be caught in the throes of a civil war has had serious detrimental effects on the development of the country's cultural institutions, museums included. Archaeological programs, oral history, and ethnographic work is confined to the capital, Maputo, because field

work is well-nigh impossible. These are some of the problems beyond the control of SADCCAM.

This paper concentrates on some of the areas that SADCCAM has successfully tackled or for which it has evolved strategies for solutions. Yet, invariably, many problem areas require concerted effort or support from catalyst institutions or individuals. The International Conference on Culture and Development in Africa, hosted by the World Bank and sponsored by the Governments of Sweden and Norway, The Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO is perhaps the proper platform to call for more support from these and other institutions. The unwavering financial support given by the Nordic funding agencies including DANIDA, FINNIDA, NORAD, and SIDA, as well as UNESCO was crucial in the formation and sustenance of SADCCAM. Time without end, and sometimes embarrassingly so, we have recorded our gratitude for this. An agency needs to be assured that it is investing in a lasting venture that will yield dividends. To ensure this, SADCCAM has an Executive Committee that guides the association and ensures implementation of programs between General Conferences.

An important step was taken at the 1991 General Conference, when permanent working groups were formed to operate between General Conferences in the following areas of specialization: Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, Training and Education, Art, Conservation, Documentation, and Museum Administration. These working groups will produce detailed reports of the state of art in their areas of responsibilities and present them to the SADCCAM Executive at least once a year and before the annual SADCCAM executive committee meetings. The SADCCAM Executive then will draw out of them relevant programs. This mechanism ensures continuity and stability.

While such efforts are underway and while an appeal is here made for external support, this paper also documents that SADCCAM is coming up with programs that can generate income to supplement government and donor funding. We are not oblivious to the fact that the maturity of any organization carries with it the responsibility to fend for itself. What we are saying is that we need the tools to do the job. Perhaps very important given this forum, I can end by saying that when central governments make cuts under the economic adjustment programs, donor agencies can assist by ensuring that cultural institutions do not bear the brunt. These economic strategies must allow for and protect cultural development programs. Indeed, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are in the position to see to that.

## Community Participation in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage

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*Involving people in cultural heritage conservation increases the efficiency of conservation and raises awareness of the importance of the past for people facing rapid changes in their environment and values. Those designing participatory projects must take into account people's attitudes toward cultural heritage, which vary according to the area, relations among ethnic groups, and external cultural influences. Participation can occur in different degrees: (1) increased jobs or development of local handicrafts, (2) consultation on local conservation activities, (3) design of a project component, or (4) project implementation and management. Developing participatory approaches in cultural heritage conservation is not easy, and involving communities in project identification, preparation, and implementation requires major efforts upstream. Such efforts can provide very positive results in the implementation of a project and its sustainability.*

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Conserving a cultural heritage is always difficult. In Africa weak institutional capabilities, lack of appropriate resources, and isolation of many culturally essential sites are compounded by a general lack of awareness of the value of cultural heritage conservation. On the other hand the dynamism of local initiatives and community solidarity systems, which are among the strongest in the world, are impressive assets. These indigenous forces should be enlisted, enlarged, and empowered to preserve and protect a heritage unique to the continent and of inestimable value to a wider realization of the development goals of the continent. Involving people in cultural heritage conservation increases its efficiency and raises awareness of the importance of the past for people facing rapid changes in their environment and values. This paper will first review the concepts of community participation in cultural heritage preservation and then review the design of participatory projects and related issues based on selected examples. According to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, cultural heritage can be separated into the intangible and nonmaterial aspects such as languages, customs, and religions; and the tangible aspects such as sites,

buildings, and artifacts.<sup>1</sup> To focus the presentation I will limit the discussion to issues relating to the material dimensions of culture.

### **Participation in Cultural Heritage Preservation: The Concepts**

There are many definitions of participation and many views of what participation should achieve. There is, in particular, a debate on whether participation should be (1) an end in itself, based on the assumption that people have a right to participate in any decisions that have an impact on their lives (the goal of empowerment), or (2) a means to improve project effectiveness. These two views are not contradictory; it is possible to consider participation both as an end and as a means to an end.

Regarding cultural heritage conservation, considering participation as an end in itself will mean that any conservation project in the field will have to involve the population in decisionmaking (and in other ways) as soon as the project has an impact on their lives. The issue here touches also on the ownership by the people of their own cultural heritage and the need to consult them on what is done to protect this heritage. This is an ethical question that can have important local implications. It is particularly important when the sites or the objects to be protected are still used by the people and have a role to play in their beliefs and values, such as symbols of religious expressions.

The second approach improving project effectiveness means that people will be associated with the project when it can increase the effectiveness of the project, for instance by reducing the costs or increasing the viability. Much has been written on the involvement of people at various stage of a project cycle. Evaluation of World Bank development projects has shown a very strong correlation between participation and good implementation and sustainability. The 1980 study on project sustainability by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank (a milestone in Bank thinking about participation) stressed the positive impact of participation on the long-term sustainability of projects.<sup>2</sup> It was based on the review of twenty-five projects, most in the agricultural sector. Many recent analyses of participation provide more evidence of its importance to sustaining development at the grassroots and national levels.

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<sup>1</sup>See Robert Goodland and Maryla Webb, *The Management of Cultural Property in World Bank-Assisted Projects*, Technical Paper No. 62 (Washington: World Bank, 1987), 4.

<sup>2</sup>World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, "Operational Policy Review: The Supervision of Bank Projects," Report No. 2858 (February 22, 1980).

(See work by Norman Uphoff,<sup>3</sup> David Korten,<sup>4</sup> Michael Cernea,<sup>5</sup> Samuel Paul,<sup>6</sup> and David Beckmann,<sup>7</sup> and the analysis carried out through the Bank-wide Learning Group on Participatory Development instituted in 1991 in the World Bank.<sup>8</sup>)

In his study on "Community Participation in Development Projects" Samuel Paul sees four levels of intensity in community participation: (1) information sharing: project managers may share information with beneficiaries to facilitate actions; (2) consultation: creating opportunity for direct feedback from the beneficiaries to the project managers, which allows interested people to contribute to the design of the project; (3) decisionmaking: a much higher level of participation in which decisions are taken by the beneficiaries by themselves or together with project managers; and (4) initiating actions: beneficiaries not only take decisions but initiate actions by themselves.<sup>9</sup> The level of participation will depend on how much the beneficiaries can influence the decisions concerning the project and how deeply they can be associated in its implementation.

Recent work on the protection of the environment has shown the central importance of increased people participation. A recent paper by Scott Guggenheim and Maritta Koch-Weser states four types of advantage resulting from the development of participation in the environment sector: (1) "They [participatory approaches] help planners and developers gain a better understanding of local knowledge and experience; (2) they improve project design and implementation

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<sup>3</sup>Norman Uphoff, "Approaches and Methods for Monitoring and Evaluation of Popular Participation in World Bank Assisted Projects" (Background Paper for Monitoring Mechanisms Discussion Group, World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, February 25-27, 1992). Norman Uphoff has published many other papers on this issue.

<sup>4</sup>David C. Korten, "The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Development: Changing Patterns and Perspectives," in *Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Bank: Cooperation for Development*, ed. Samuel Paul and Arturo Israel, World Bank Regional and Sectoral Study (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, November 1991).

<sup>5</sup>Michael Cernea, "The Building Blocks of Participation: Testing a Social Methodology" (Background Paper for Capacity Building and Consultation Discussion Group, World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, February 25-27, 1992).

<sup>6</sup>Samuel Paul, *Community Participation in Development Projects*, Discussion Paper 6 (Washington: World Bank, 1987).

<sup>7</sup>International Economic Relations Division, External Affairs Department, World Bank, "Strengthening the Bank's Work on Popular Participation" (September 5, 1990).

<sup>8</sup>Bhuvan Bhatnagar, "Participatory Development and the World Bank: Opportunities and Concerns" (Background Paper for All Discussion Groups, presented by the World Bank, World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, February 25-27, 1992).

<sup>9</sup>Paul, *Community Participation*, 4-5.

because they provide direct incentives for community members to participate in and maintain a resource management project; (3) they can complement and strengthen public sector institutions by taking over functions more appropriately handled at the local level; and (4) they can help resolve conflict over resource use."<sup>10</sup> To these important advantages we must add sustainability of the activities undertaken.

Supporting participation also has a cost. The development of participatory approaches often needs important investment upstream before or during the start-up activities. This investment does not generally provide returns immediately because it takes time to organize communities, to design consultative mechanisms that work, and to train the project managers in working with the local people. The benefits are often felt downstream, particularly in the sustainability of the project activities once the project ceases. For this reason it is often difficult to predict in advance the benefit that the participatory approach will provide. Participation also needs to be monitored and supported during project implementation. Establishing a learning-by-doing approach by which actions can be adjusted according to the feedback received from the beneficiaries while the project is being implemented can be central to the fullest success, but this often needs a completely different attitude towards project implementation than in top-down approaches. Developing people participation can also stir up conflicts in the communities or lead to elites getting more than their share. Governmental service workers often are neither trained nor organized to work with communities. Flexibility in project management will be needed to ensure proper adaptation of the project to the needs and views of the local communities. This will often require establishing special mechanisms for project preparation and implementation.

### *What Does Cultural Heritage Conservation Mean for the People?*

If people are to provide their time and resources, the activity has to have a value for them. Thus before starting any project the questions to be asked are: What is the value of cultural heritage conservation for the people? How does it improve their well-being? (Well-being is seen not only as physical but also psychological and spiritual.)

It is often said that pride and self-respect are essential ingredients for successful development because they motivate people to maintain social standards

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<sup>10</sup>Scott Guggenheim and Maritta Koch-Weser, "Participation for Sustainable Development" (Paper prepared for the NGO/World Bank Committee meeting, 1991), 3.

in front of other groups. Cultural heritage has a very important role to play in this respect. Robert Goodland and Maryla Webb explain the function of cultural heritage in the following way:

Knowledge and understanding of a people's past can help present inhabitants to develop and sustain national identity and to appreciate the value of their own culture and heritage. This knowledge and understanding enrich the lives of a nation's citizens and enable them to manage contemporary problems more successfully.<sup>11</sup>

A clear awareness of one's cultural heritage helps to achieve a sense of identity. The everyday beliefs and ways of doing things of a particular group become more understandable when the past is taken into account. It provides a time dimension to the understanding of the changes taking place in the everyday lives of the people. In his controversial book, *Nation nègre et culture*, Sheikh Anta Diop establishes close links between the ancient Egyptian civilization and Sub-Saharan African cultures.<sup>12</sup> His work clearly affirms the importance of a glorious past as an element of national pride.

If urban intellectual elites understand the above arguments showing the importance of a cultural heritage, the perception for the majority of the population and in particular many of the rural poor is more ambiguous. What people are interested in is their "living culture." Robert Klitgaard cites one definition of culture in his paper, "In Search of Culture: A Progress Report on Research on Culture and Development":

Cultures are particular ways of accomplishing the things that make life possible, the perpetuation of the species, the transmission of knowledge, the absorption of the shocks of change and death, among other things. Cultures differ in the relative significance they attach to time, noise, safety, cleanness, violence, thrift, intellect, sex, and art.<sup>13</sup>

According to this definition time has an important role to play in a culture (especially in the transmission of knowledge), but it does not necessarily mean that a value is given to what is old. A good example is the story of the destruction of the Mosque of Kong. Although different interpretations of this

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<sup>11</sup>Goodland and Webb, *The Management of Cultural Property*, 12.

<sup>12</sup>Sheikh Anta Diop, *Nation nègre et culture* (1956).

<sup>13</sup>Thomas Sowell, *Race and Culture: A World View* (forthcoming), 715, cited in Robert Klitgaard, "In Search of Culture: A Progress Report on Research on Culture and Development" (Unpublished paper, July 1991. Available from the Office of the Vice President, Environmentally Sustainable Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C.), 26.

event exist, it is said that the Mosque of Kong, at that time the oldest mosque in Côte d'Ivoire, was destroyed overnight by the inhabitants because they wanted a new mosque and the governor was opposed to having two mosques in the same town. What was important to the citizens was the living culture the possibility of having a bigger and more prestigious mosque. They set a higher value on this than on the old building. The same attitude can also be found with the value of objects. In some cultures what makes the value of a mask is the force that inhabits the mask more than the quality of the design or its age. Once a mask has lost its force, it becomes a normal object which can be sold or given away, even if it is extremely old and rare. But this is not always the case, and in his presentation Pierre de Maret mentions examples showing how traditional cultures can also value the past:

Oral traditions provide numerous examples of a relationship between material relics of the past and history of people. Integration of the archeological past into day-to-day living is also marked by the systematic conservation of chance discoveries of ancient objects. Some of these, like polished axes, pottery, bored stones and cross-shaped copper ingots, are incorporated into rituals as a sort of metaphor of the ancestor.<sup>14</sup>

*Markets.* An important factor needs to be considered to understand the change of attitudes about the past in the last fifty years in Africa: the penetration of the market and how it affects the perceptions of culture and, linked to this phenomenon, the rapid change in African social structures. The penetration of modern market economies has contributed to very rapid changes in attitude. Money became central to local economies. This had a first consequence on the trade of African art. With the recognition of the value of African art in the West at the beginning of the century, the demand for African objects became very strong, and trade of antiques suddenly became an important source of income for the people. This demand impelled the flight of African pieces of art to the West. Monetization of the economy also changed many behaviors at the local level, considerably accelerated the acculturation process, and had a very strong impact on values. Lawrence Cockroft describes these changes in *Africa's Way, A Journey From the Past*:

The rapid development of a money economy made a nonsense of the old links between the economic welfare of the community,

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<sup>14</sup>Pierre de Maret, "Phases and Facies in the Archaeology of Central Africa," in *A History of African Archaeology*, ed. P. Robertshaw (London: James Currey; Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1990), 109-34, cited in Pierre de Maret, "Archeological Research, Site Protection and Employment Generation: Central African Perspectives" (Paper published in this *Proceedings*.)

the chief, the ancestors and god. The individual had an unprecedented opportunity to acquire effective, if not formal ownership of land and to shake off traditional community obligations. Chiefs experienced a rapid decline in their powers of influence and control.<sup>15</sup>

This situation changed the people's attitudes towards many objects and art works that were often symbols of authority, power, and social structures inside communities. The changing attitude towards traditional cultures diverted many people to new values inspired by modernization and Westernization, many in turn lost regard for their cultural heritage, which they associated with backwardness and underdevelopment.

*Cultural diversity.* Cultural diversity also has an impact on people's attitude towards cultural heritage. Africa has a multitude of cultures and religions. Migrations have always been important in Africa; changes in territories and in the size of African kingdoms have meant that much cultural heritage material is no longer in the area of influence of the groups who produced it. Another issue is the influence of monotheist religions, Islam and Christianity. Their negative attitude towards traditional objects, those linked to traditional beliefs in particular, still has a very strong impact. To this day many Christians and Muslims tend to consider traditional objects and the religious sites of past cultures as pagan and threatening. Another issue linked to cultural diversity is the "tribal question." Some governments are reluctant to see the specific heritage of a group being emphasized especially if it shows higher attainment than the heritage of the group in power. Fortunately, this attitude seems to be gradually changing.

These attitudes have to be taken into account when participatory projects are designed. If people are to be involved, getting a sense of the way people consider cultural heritage in their region is essential from the inception of any project having to do with cultural heritage conservation. Education campaigns and raising awareness of the value of sites or objects is essential before a project starts.

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<sup>15</sup>Lawrence Cockroft, *Africa's Way, A Journey from the Past* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 84.

## **The Design of Participatory Approaches in Cultural Heritage Conservation**

### ***Institutional Capabilities***

Two key issues linked to institutional capabilities arise when participatory approaches are to be developed in cultural preservation. The first is the presence or absence of local intermediary organizations; the second is the particular weakness of governmental institutions in this area.

*Lack of intermediary organizations.* In many cases, participatory approaches rely on intermediary and local organizations. In his essay on "Capacity-Building for Participatory Organizations" Thomas F. Carroll insists on the importance of local organizations.<sup>16</sup> They are essential to support community efforts in a structured way, to create the institutional basis for discussion and decisionmaking among members of a community, and to organize implementation efforts. Intermediary organizations, with the necessary skills, experience, and flexibility, are also crucial to support local communities. Such organizations, local and intermediaries, are better known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Very few NGOs work in cultural preservation in Sub-Saharan Africa. This creates an institutional gap in implementing participatory activities. UNESCO networks (such as Club UNESCO) cover Africa, but they are generally weak. NGOs rarely consider the protection of cultural heritage as part of their mandate. In Latin America some organizations like the Interamerican Foundation and NGOs like the French/Swiss-based organization, Traditions for Tomorrow, are conscious of the central role that culture plays in a holistic approach to development and finance cultural projects. These projects focus mainly on non-material aspects such as local languages, traditional feasts, and festivals, but very few equivalents exist in Africa.

*Weakness of governmental organizations.* Using the participatory approach has implications for governmental structures in charge of cultural heritage preservation. Governmental structures have to adapt if they want to be more participatory. This approach generally involves decentralization and increased field level presence, specific training for staff to support local organization development, more flexible funding mechanisms and strengthened monitoring mechanisms, a less bureaucratic approach, and generally a revised legal framework. All this is difficult to achieve when services are already weak and chronically under-funded. However, in the long run such a reorganization can prove to be more cost-effective than the conventional approach.

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<sup>16</sup>Thomas F. Carroll, "Capacity Building for Participatory Organizations" (Background Paper for Institutional Mechanisms Discussion Group, World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, February 25-27, 1992).

### *Participation in Sharing the Benefits*

Many cultural heritage conservation projects involving participation are centered on sharing the economic benefits generated by the project. (This might be more appropriately considered as involvement rather than real participation.) Benefit-sharing can be realized by creating employment opportunities for the people of the area or by providing part of the benefits derived from tourism for development programs addressing community needs. When people share the economic benefits of a cultural conservation project, it has to be made clear that the opportunities open to them in employment and funding are linked to the quality of the conservation so that the local population can be committed to maintaining the conservation efforts.

Many site rehabilitation works can use local material and simple techniques allowing the maximum impact on local employment. Labor-intensive public works to rehabilitate or protect a site can provide local unskilled jobs. Small enterprises based in the communities can undertake some of the works and be given priority in the bidding process for local public works. This requires organization to ensure that such works are not carried out at times when the demand for labor is high; otherwise, this could have a negative impact on local production and local wages. Equal access to benefits should be given to men and women. Women often bear the costs of raising children and typically have little access to monetary revenue. Some public works can be effectively carried out by women.

Several projects financed by international development agencies use local people to carry out cultural preservation work. Protection of the desert cities in Mauritania, particularly the town of Chingeti, from the advancement of the sand dunes has been carried out through a Food for Work project supported by the World Food Program. The environment component of the Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development Project includes a US\$ 2.6 million program to finance the excavation and restoration of eleven archaeological and historical sites.<sup>17</sup> The major purpose of the program is to provide funds for the contracting of peasant labor to do the restoration work. "In this sense, the cultural patrimony protection program fits in with the overall project philosophy which is to direct funds to local communities for the purposes of poverty alleviation and rural development."<sup>18</sup>

Employment opportunities as guards, wardens, guides, and maintenance workers can also be provided to local communities. Once again it is important

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<sup>17</sup>World Bank, "Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development Project: Staff Appraisal Report" (1991).

<sup>18</sup>World Bank, "Mexico Decentralization," 35.

that the members of the community be aware that the jobs are related to effective conservation of the sites and that it is in their interest to help to maintain the sites.

If development of the site has an impact on tourism, the promotion of local handicrafts and local products can be a source of revenue for the local population. In this case specific components of the project to support local artisans through micro-credit, advice, and training can broaden the opportunities for sustainable employment around the conservation area. Employment in service industries offers important benefit to local communities. Such a component should be written into the project agreement. For example, in the Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development Project contracts have been signed between municipalities and the central ministries to ensure that tourist activities benefit the local population.

Part of the revenue generated by tourist activities, the entry fees to a site, for instance, can be earmarked for development activities undertaken by the communities. This approach is used by the Italian NGO, Cooperation with Developing Countries (COSPE), in the design of the Eco-Museum of Basse-Casamance in Senegal, an important center for tourism. The NGO decided to create a small museum documenting the lifestyle of the area population for the local population and for tourists.<sup>19</sup> The museum's objective is to increase awareness among the local population of the value of their own culture and heritage, create employment for the youth of the area, and improve basic health through the purchase of medicine from the profits of the museum. This approach works only when enough funding can be generated through tourism. Unfortunately, at the present time few historical sites in Africa attract enough tourists to generate substantial profits.

### *Consultation and Participation in Design*

Consultation with local communities or individuals can use local knowledge to understand the value of a site, a building or objects of cultural interest, or to get the views of the local population on ways the conservation of the cultural heritage will affect their lives. Full consultation can also ensure that the views of the people are taken into account in the design of the project and that they see the conservation work as in their own interest. Too often in the past the local population was not consulted on works carried out in their area. In some cases laws have been enacted without the population's understanding their purpose. It

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<sup>19</sup>Maria Donata Rinaldi, "Naissance d'un éco-musée en Basse-Casamance" (Senegal), *West African Museums Project Dakar*, Bulletin No. 2 (1991): 5-8.

is now becoming more usual to discuss a project with representatives of local communities early in the planning stage so as to understand how they perceive the project.

The same techniques used for assessing the perceptions and the views of beneficiaries in a development project could be used for cultural heritage conservation projects. The Beneficiary Assessment approach developed by Lawrence Salmen is an effective tool for this purpose:

Beneficiary assessment is a systematic inquiry into people's values and behavior in relation to a planned or ongoing intervention for social and economic change. This method draws heavily from the tradition in social science known as "qualitative research . . . that fundamentally depends on watching people in their own territory and interacting with them in their own language, on their own terms" (Kirk and Miller, 1989). Yet beneficiary assessment also includes direct observation, incorporating simple counting, and is expressed in quantitative terms.<sup>20</sup>

Consultation can focus on the way the community perceives the project and its impact on the livelihood of its members, the value it gives to the conservation of the site, the impact the project might have on the practice of religious or traditional activities of the community, and the priority needs of the community. All this information can be important input in the design. Consultation should be repeated at each stage of project preparation and implementation. In the conservation plan for the old town of Mombasa, in Kenya, for example, such consultation took place through an advisory committee made up of representatives of the various branches of the administration and included representatives from the local community such as elders from the Old Town and people from organizations such as the Friends of Fort Jesus and the Mombasa-Coast Tourist Association.<sup>21</sup>

The World Bank has made consultation with the local community compulsory in two categories of projects: involuntary resettlement and the design of environment assessment. Operational Directive 4.01 on Environment Assessment (EA) stipulates:

The Bank expects the borrower to take the views of affected groups or local NGOs fully into account in project design and implementation, and in particular in the preparation of EAs.

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<sup>20</sup>Lawrence Salmen, *Beneficiary Assessment, An Approach Described*, Poverty and Social Policy Working Paper 1 (Available from the Human Resources and Poverty Division, Africa Technical Department, World Bank) (February 1992), 1.

<sup>21</sup>National Museum of Kenya, *Conservation Plan for the Old Town of Mombasa, Kenya* (1990), 174-75.

This is important in order to understand both the nature and extent of any social or environmental impact, and the accessibility of proposed mitigating measures. An approach which has proven effective in many countries is to expand the initial inter-agency meeting into a "forum" or "scoping session" with representatives of affected groups and relevant NGOs.<sup>22</sup>

Whom to consult is an important question. Communities are generally far from being homogeneous, and the interest of the elders, for example, might not be the same as the interest of women or youth. Elders might best understand the spiritual or traditional values of a site; women will probably have a better understanding of the domestic implications of a project; while youth will be sensitive to new job opportunities. Beneficiary assessment is one way to ensure that these various views are considered.

Active participation in project design will go further than simple consultation, but it is often difficult. Although this was described in *Living with Wildlife*, the issues are relevant for any sector:

Achieving local participation in project design is difficult and time consuming, particularly if the objective is to bring the discussion down to the "grass-roots" level rather than just the level of local political authorities such as District Councils. . . . In Africa, where many communities have a tradition of consensus-building for decisionmaking, it may involve a considerable commitment of time and resources at a very early stage. This can be hard for a development agency or a central government to accommodate.<sup>23</sup>

Community involvement in the design is the best guarantee of the sustainability of a project. Various levels of involvement in the design can be considered. The community can, for instance, be most closely involved in the components for which it has a direct interest. A community can also decide on the way funds made available to them through sharing benefits can be used. Members can be presented with various alternatives and choose from these.

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<sup>22</sup>"Operational Directive No. 4.01: Environmental Assessment," *World Bank Operational Manual* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 3, 1991), 5, para. 19.

<sup>23</sup>Agnes Kiss, *Living with Wildlife: Wildlife Resource Management with Local Participation in Africa*. World Bank Technical Paper No. 130 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990), 11.

### *Implementation and Management*

Involving communities in the implementation and management of a project necessitates close supervision of the activities, capacity building at the local level, and a strong commitment from the communities. The involvement of communities will depend very much on the nature of the activities. If the community can directly derive some benefit from the activity, it might be well to have the community itself manage the activity.

One notable example of community participation is the creation of the Museum of Mengo in Burkina Faso.<sup>24</sup> This—museum, locally—called—"Yaab-roogo" or the house of the ancestors, originated on the initiative of French archaeologist Bertrand Gerard and the village chief. The region occupied by the Kurumba since the fifteenth century is rich in pottery produced by the first occupants of the land. However, the local people were selling the objects they found in their fields. The archaeologist, with the support of the chief, decided to build a house in the village in which he would deposit any relics he found and in which the villagers could deposit some of their findings thus ensuring that at least one specimen of each type of object would stay in the village. Slowly, the villagers recognized the importance of keeping these traces of their past; they were conscious that traditions were slowly disappearing with the deaths of the elders. The "House of the Ancestors" is now managed with the support of the Archaeology Department of the University of Ouagadougou.

Other examples are the rehabilitation of the town of Asilah in Morocco, where, on the initiative of the municipality, the population in a common effort restored the buildings and cleaned the town. The restoration of the Great Omari Mosque in Sidon, Lebanon, was also rehabilitated with the support of the community. This project followed the community expression of the desire to have the Great Mosque restored rather than to acquire a new building for worship. Both projects were awarded the Aga Khan Award for Islamic Architecture.<sup>25</sup>

These are but a few examples of the way in which a community can be directly involved in saving its heritage.

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<sup>24</sup>Bertrand Gérard, "Musée de Mengo" (Draft paper, 1990).

<sup>25</sup>For discussions of these two projects see Ismail Serageldin, *Al-Tajdid wal Ta'sil fi 'Imarat Al-Muitam'at Al-Islamiyya: Dirasa li Tajribat Ja'izat Al-Aga Khan Lil'Imara (Innovation and Authenticity in the Architecture of Muslim Societies: A Study of the Experience of The Aga Khan Award for Architecture)* (in Arabic) (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1989), 84-87 (on the Great Omari Mosque) and 88-91 (on the town of Asilah); and *MIMAR: Architecture in Development* 33 (December 1989): 26-27 (on the Great Omari Mosque) and 28-29 (on the town of Asilah).

## **Conclusion**

The development of participatory approaches in cultural heritage conservation is not easy, and involving communities in project identification, preparation, and implementation is not always feasible. However, it can have very important benefits for the communities by increasing or maintaining their awareness of the richness of their past, and for cultural heritage conservation by improving the sustainability of projects.

If cultural heritage conservation is linked to other projects concerned with environment preservation, infrastructure rehabilitation, or rural development, the chances of developing participatory approaches are stronger because the costs of local capacity building, consultation, and monitoring can be shared with other activities. Once a community is organized, and the structure for decisionmaking is in place, and the trust between the people and the organization in charge of the project is established, integrating new activities involving the participation of beneficiaries will be easier to achieve.

The example of the Museum of Mengo shows us that participation is above all a process by which a community can progressively internalize the goal of the project. The initiators of the project, government officials, donors, and NGOs became facilitators in this process rather than implementers. This means in many cases a very different approach and different attitude towards development. But it is more and more obvious today that cultural heritage conservation as well as any other development activity cannot be sustained without putting the people's views, attitudes, and values first.

## Public Education, National Collections, and Museum Scholarship in Africa

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*Few phrases have been used so much with so little definition as "cultural heritage" and "cultural patrimony." "Cultural heritage" is socially constructed and remembered systems of knowledge. Rightly selected, evaluated, and interpreted, things are invaluable for public education. Things speak simultaneously of history, technology, aesthetics, cultural practices, philosophy, response to and fusion with outside material and existential influences, and indigenous environmental conservation and management. The "Africa" that we "know" is an invention of external observers. Learning the practicalities behind why Africans made certain objects in certain ways turns Western prejudicial stereotypes into appreciation. Public education depends on the nature of museum collections. Museum collections must move from custodial care of objects to the power of the object to communicate, evoke, and encapsulate history. Museums also must begin to collect data to complement their collections of things. Cultural heritage thus must move beyond art or craft products to include nonmovable artifacts and the socially constructed knowledge to be found in craft or technological processes, including both traditional and modern urban technologies.*

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My first lesson in cultural preservation in Africa<sup>1</sup> took place in 1977 while I was engaged by the Compagnie ivoirienne pour le développement des textiles (CIDT) as a consultant in economic anthropology to study cotton and subsistence farming

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<sup>1</sup>The thoughts represented in this paper reflect the ideas discussed intensively and passionately with many colleagues in West African museums. My first encounter with museums in Africa occurred from 1978 to 1979 when as a researcher at the Institut d'histoire, d'art, et d'archéologie africains (IHAA) of the Université d'Abidjan I was asked by Dr. Victor Diabaté, my director, to work with him in secondment to the Musée national of Côte d'Ivoire. From 1982 to 1987 I directed the West African Museums Project (WAMP) of the International African Institute, London, which was created to provide assistance and funding to museums in fourteen West African countries. The dialogue that started fourteen years ago has greatly influenced my own ideas about the needs of African museums. These remarks are intended as a contribution to further dialogue.

among the Wan of central Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>2</sup> In the small village of Fotonou, where I was undertaking a survey, I found a wonderful hostess named Madame Georges Detoh. She not only provided my research assistant and me with room, board, and hot water for our baths, she also lavishly provided us with her opinions and knowledge.

One evening after work she talked of how life had been in the past and of the *things* that she kept to remind herself of past ways *things* she intended to pass on to her children. She got up, went into her modest house, and brought forth a bundle of the iron rods (*glo* in Wan, *sompe* in the local *lingua franca*, Dyula) that were used as currency and bridewealth prior to colonial rule, a heddle pulley for a narrow-strip loom, combs for carding cotton that dated from the early part of the century as well as a set of iron bars that were the traditional means of carding cotton, balls of indigo, spinning whorls, spun cotton, and woven narrow-strip cloth.

In a village and as a member of an ethnic group the Wan<sup>3</sup> that had stopped weaving some thirty to forty years previously, Madame Detoh singlehandedly hung onto an entire inventory of *things* that bore witness to a previous economy, a lost technology, and an almost lost history. In addition it then turned out she maintained in her fields crops that were formerly cultivated but, for most people, had long been abandoned in an era of monoculture cash-cropping. Notably, she continued to plant an old, "ancestral" type of yam (*sanyrekoko*, a variety of the *Dioscorea cayenensis* species)<sup>4</sup> and a traditional type of reddish cotton that had long been supplanted by the ubiquitous variety "Allen 75," introduced by the CIDT. Furthermore, she still maintained, pruned, and harvested the lianas that yielded indigo (*loli*; *Lonchocarpus cyanescens*), a traditional "export crop" that formerly was traded to the north in a series of overlapping and interlocking local economies.

In these things and in these practices was found one woman's partial definition of "cultural patrimony" or, if you prefer, "cultural heritage." For her the past was maintained thanks to the preservation of certain *things*.

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<sup>2</sup>On the Wan, see Philip L. Ravenhill, *The Social Organization of the Wan: A Patrilineal People of Ivory Coast* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1976); Ravenhill, *L'Economie d'auto-subsistance wan face au développement cotonnier* (Abidjan: Institut d'ethno-sociologie/Ministère de l'agriculture-C.I.D.T., 1978); Ravenhill, "Qui sont les Wan?" *Godo-Godo* (Revue de l'Institut d'histoire, d'art et d'archéologie africains) (Abidjan: Université d'Abidjan, 1978); and Ravenhill, "An African Tryptych: On the Interpretation of Three Parts and the Whole," *Art Journal* 47(2) (1988): 88-94.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Ravenhill, *Social Organization of the Wan*.

<sup>4</sup>Ravenhill, *L'Economie d'auto-subsistance wan*, 36.

I choose to begin my discussion with a "local" definition because in my experience no phrases have been so much used with so little definition as "cultural heritage" or "cultural patrimony" (*patrimoine culturel*). The content of this phrase is assumed as a given "We all know what we mean" yet, in practice the use of these words, whether in English or in French, tends to obfuscate real issues that must be critically confronted if the past is to be useful for the present and preserved for the future.

My image of that evening in Fotonou is always with me. It serves as a necessary antidote to the "definition" of African cultural heritage that is "read" all too often from the collections and exhibitions found in many national museums in Africa a "cultural heritage" inherited from the colonial past and all too often defined by difference, isolated aesthetic criteria, and folklore.<sup>5</sup>

Let us begin instead to think of "cultural heritage" as socially constructed and remembered *systems of knowledge*, always remembering the *things* that bear witness to knowledge that has been historically constituted. In addition to wonderfully artistic objects carved in wood or cast in metal, let us also consider other *things* that speak to us of other ways of knowing.

Consider, for example, questions of importance to the "environment" so recently discovered in the West. African cultures embody in themselves profound and systematic knowledge of the environments in which they exist. Again I think back to the two years that I spent in different Wan villages. In hindsight I think back to the ways in which Wan farmers/gatherers/hunters/craftspersons male and female, old and young related to nature or the "bush" (*yego*) that lay beyond the confines of the social world of the village (*kong*), and in my reactions I use a word from my own culture: "conservation." During my research I discovered two radically opposed ways of seeing nature: the *external* view of the national government and prospecting pedologists with their strident motto asserting "unused land belongs to the state," and the *inside* view that knew intimately every square meter of terrain, its ownership, its history, its current place in an ongoing cycle of fallow and cultivation, and thus its future potential. From the outside oil-palm trees (*u; Elaiés guiniensis*) were worthy of protection only if they were planted in a "properly" spaced and aligned grid; from the inside *every* palm tree or palm tree sprout was owned, protected, and "invested" for the future. Upon harvesting a cluster of palm-nuts, so essential for the production of cooking oil, one was expected to pull off a bunch of nuts and throw them back into the bush as seed for future trees. Any palm tree sprout, even if growing in

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<sup>5</sup>Philip L. Ravenhill, "The Passive Object and the Tribal Paradigm: Colonial Museography in French West Africa," in *How to Do Things with Objects: Contemporary Issues in African Material Culture Studies*, ed. Mary Jo Arnoldi, Christraud Geary, and Kris Hardin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, in press).

the very middle of an essential path, was to be protected by a cage of twigs and allowed to grow. The tree not only produced oil; once tall and difficult to harvest, it could be felled to produce palm wine, and when finally emptied of its wine, its rotting trunk could be seeded with mushrooms to enrich the evening "sauce" for rice or yams. These activities can be "read" from our cultural perspective as environmental *conservation* and *management*, a realistic understanding of the codependencies of human beings and nature.

The Wan have other "conservation" practices. The harvesting of deadfall or living wood to aliment cooking hearths is regulated by the draconian rule that in bringing firewood to the village, one can enter with only the amount of wood that can be balanced on the head or in the ubiquitous head-borne enamel basin; *never* can one augment one's load by tying together a bundle of logs. The precious worth of the environment and its uses are known: certain plants and animals are "kids' foods," which augment only the diet of children. *Ficus* trees yield the barkcloth traditionally used as insulating nighttime covers during the cold nights of the dry season; nonedible plants yield necessary dyes and other important resources for architecture and craft production. Further north on the Ivorian savanna the Senufo peoples practice another type of conservation: conservation of patches of primeval or gallery forest that contain species that are extinct in the neighboring grassy or wooded savanna. More typically described as "sacred forests"—for it is within them that are kept the "sacred" masks of the Senufo—these patches of thick forest cover maintain an otherwise extinct ecology; they are *sacred things* that maintain the past.

Traditional systems of knowledge are rarely codified and written down; they are implicit, learned by practice and example, rarely even articulated by the spoken word. They continue to exist as long as they are useful, as long as they are not supplanted by new techniques. They are far too easily lost. It is the *things*, the objects that come into being through these systems of knowledge, that ultimately become critical. The traditional "red" cotton may be lost, replaced by a foreign and homogenized monoculture, but in the cloth wrapper or *pagne* whose composition plays this natural ochre cotton off against white cotton or other threads dyed red or indigo, the past is effectively and affectively preserved.

### **Western Assumptions Regarding Africa**

It is worthwhile to reflect on our own prejudices and assumptions regarding Africa. Historically it is clear that the "Africa" we "know" has been an

invention of external observers.<sup>6</sup> It has been far too common, for example, in discussions of African economic development to read about the "African peasant" and his or her inability to understand the constraints of "modern" economies. It was comparatively late in our "discovery" of Africa that we began to avoid pejorative notions of indigenous "*mentalités*" and to appreciate and rationalize from our own scientific perspective the complexities and vocabulary of "farming systems" in the African tropics. Our prejudice *for* explicit, written systems of knowledge and *against* implicit, oral or verbally unarticulated systems of knowledge has quite clearly led us to misunderstand African ways of being and doing.

Another example of differing viewpoints can be found in the appreciation of African pottery. Seen from the point of view of the promoter of tourism, African pots are problematic because they are low-fired and hence somewhat fragile for safe transport internationally by the foreign tourist:

La cuisson faite à l'aire libre à basse température produit en effet des produits poreux inadaptés au transport.<sup>7</sup>

Yet we learn from Michael Cardew, the distinguished English potter, that:

The idea has been widely entertained by non-technical observers that the transformation of West African native pottery to the level of a "European" peasant industry, by the introduction of potter's wheels, kilns, and glazes, is desirable on economic and technical grounds, and could be effected by a competent man in a comparatively short time. *Both of these assumptions are in the present writer's belief largely incorrect....*<sup>8</sup>

He goes on to say that:

The native [pottery] ware...is always admirably adapted..to the uses for which it is intended. The porosity is an advantage for the storage of water in a hot climate [i.e., causing evaporation and thus cooling]. The open texture of the clay and the very low firing temperature...give it high thermal-shock resistance (e.g., it can be used for boiling water or cooking, over the direct flame

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<sup>6</sup>V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

<sup>7</sup>Claude Poli, *La Poterie artisanale* (Dossiers illustrés) (Paris: Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, 1983), 4.

<sup>8</sup>Michael Cardew, "A Preliminary Survey of Pottery in West Africa" (1950) in *Pottery in Nigeria* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Libraries/National Museum of African Art Branch, 1986), 2 [emphasis added].

of an open fire). In this respect *it is far superior to any more advanced ware with the sole exception of cordierite porcelain.*<sup>9</sup>

With the proper analysis the prejudicial stereotype is supplanted by an empathetic appreciation. The simple pot can now be described in proper technical terms and appreciated "scientifically" from a Western frame of mind. The dimpling of the lower part of the exterior surface of cooking pots by roulette or impressed net (or other) decoration can now be better understood. We are led to realize that:

This surface treatment increases their surface area so that they absorb the heat of the brewing fire more rapidly.<sup>10</sup>

By this time the reader is no doubt wondering whether what I am saying has anything at all to do with the announced title of this paper, "Public Education, National Collections, and Museum Scholarship in Africa." In fact it does. I am arguing that unless the concept of *cultural heritage* is properly defined and *appreciated*, African museums will not rise to the challenge of public education that confronts them. *Public education depends upon the nature of museum collections*, and these collections must be redefined and made to evolve through serious scholarship. Without this critical thinking museums will collect only the things that they have always collected.

### Museum Topics

It is undoubtedly hyperbole to state that the principal function of African national museums has been seen in Africa as *custodial*: to preserve the collections

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<sup>9</sup>Cardew, "A Preliminary Source of Pottery in West Africa" [emphasis added]. Cardew also observes that pottery production "is almost entirely in the hands of women" (Cardew, "A Preliminary Survey of Pottery in West Africa," 2) and notes that "Wherever and whenever the potter's wheel has come into use, pottery has become a trade, i.e., a whole time occupation for men. . . ." (Cardew, "A Preliminary Survey of Pottery in West Africa," 5). The change in gender-based divisions of labor due to the cash economy has also been treated by Mona Etienne in her discussion of the historical changes in cotton production in Côte d'Ivoire (Mona Etienne, "Women and Men, Cloth and Colonization: The Transformation of Production-Distribution Relations among the Baule (Ivory Coast)," in *Cahiers d'études africaines* 65 (17) (1978): 41-64.) For discussion of male and female craft productions and observers' prejudices see Marla Berns, "Male: Female/Art: Craft/Terracotta: Pottery" (Unpublished paper read at the African Studies Association Meeting, Baltimore, MD, 1990).

<sup>10</sup>D. Simmonds, "Pottery in Nigeria," in *Earthenware in Asia and Africa*, ed. John Picton (Colloquies on Art and Archaeology in Asia No. 12) (London: School of Oriental and African Studies—Percival David Foundation of Chinese Art, 1984), 64.

inherited from the past often collections that were constituted in the colonial past.<sup>11</sup> Yet it is instructive to look at museum collections and exhibitions in African museums to see both what *is* and what *is not* displayed for the delectation and education of their various publics. It seems to me that many topics and systems of traditional knowledge unfortunately have been excluded from the purview of the typical West African museum, that is, the sole museum that exists in the capital city.<sup>12</sup> One of these topics, evoked above, has been environmental knowledge, whether in terms of agriculture and "farming systems," ethnopharmacology, or the production and inherent technologies of all sorts of material culture, including architecture. The beauty, rationality, and cost effectiveness of traditional architecture are rarely presented in African museums, and elsewhere in many African nations one finds that low-cost straw-thatched, earth-mud architecture is inexorably replaced by pan-roofed, cinder block housing. The ancestral knowledge that has made possible the tripedal or quadrupedal earthen granaries of northern Ghana and neighboring countries has yielded forms that are not only beautiful but also highly functional:

Threshed grain in bulk acts like a liquid with respect to stress and flow, and the design of the granaries is, in effect, a hydraulic design, in the form of a giant pot.<sup>13</sup>

Another seriously neglected museum topic is history. Rare is the West African museum that attempts to deal with history through objects. Far too often history, if it is dealt with at all, is limited to a treatment in words and perhaps images. *The power of the object* to communicate, to encapsulate, and to evoke history is often neglected by museum staffs although museum visitors may themselves acknowledge it. In a museum seminar in Jos, Nigeria, in 1990 Justina Akata, Director of the National Museum of Colonial History in Aba, Imo State, spoke of the excitement felt by visitors who rushed into the exhibition hall to see the desk used by the British colonial District Commissioner; it was one of the rare *objects* in a museum heavily dependent on texts and photographic images.

The neglect of historical processes and transformations all too often has made African museums into "then versus now" purveyors of a quantum rather than a processual history. The precolonial past may be presented as the nostalgic

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<sup>11</sup>See also Ravenhill, "The Passive Object."

<sup>12</sup>My remarks are drawn from an intensive year of work in the Musée national of Côte d'Ivoire (1978-1979) and five years of work with the West African Museums Programme, which I directed from 1982 to 1987 and which is now directed by Dr. Claude Ardouin.

<sup>13</sup>Labelle Prussin, *Architecture in Northern Ghana: A Study in Forms and Functions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 48.

and perhaps useful "before" that contrasts with the unconnected "reality" of today.<sup>14</sup> This "history" has also most often been a local history as though there had been little contact with the outside world before the advent of colonialism. Yet the profound links that tied West Africa to North Africa and to Europe are ignored. Gold coins minted in North Africa that attest to the critical historical importance of West African gold production for North African, Mediterranean, and European economies,<sup>15</sup> although not rare in numismatic collections, are nowhere to be found in West African museums. Only rarely, in fact, are objects that came to West Africa from elsewhere displayed even though they may have changed history. One thinks, for example, of the Mamluk brass basins from Egypt that may have arrived in West Africa as early as the second half of the fourteenth century and that ultimately became the source of inspiration for the widely admired Akan brass ritual vessels known as *kuduo*.<sup>16</sup> Then, too, there are the enigmatic English ewers from the time of Richard II (that is, the fourteenth century) that the British discovered in Kumasi, Ghana, in the nineteenth century,<sup>17</sup> as well as the vast quantities of Rhineland jugs exported to the West African coast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and still in use for ritual libations.<sup>18</sup> One simple artifact of colonial history, also absent—at least in museums that I have seen is the stamped iron bracelet given to colonial conscripts to the French army during World War II. Citizen fascination with history is proved, however, by the enthusiasm demonstrated in Burkina Faso for the exhibition devoted to the history of two-wheeled transportation in that country as well as the steady interest shown by visitors in the National Museum in Lagos for the special exhibit of the limousine in which President Murtala Mohammed was assassinated.

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<sup>14</sup>Philip L. Ravenhill, "The Challenge of History," *African Arts* 23 (3) (1990): 1,6,8.

<sup>15</sup>See also Timothy F. Garrard, "Myth and Metrology: The Early Trans-Saharan Gold Trade," in *Journal of African History* 23 (4) (1982): 443-61.

<sup>16</sup>See also Raymond Aaron Silverman, "Akan Kuduo: Form and Function," in *Akan Transformations: Problems in Ghanaian Art History* (Los Angeles: Museum of Cultural History—UCLA, 1983), 12-13, and Silverman, *History, Art and Assimilation: The Impact of Islam on Akan Material Culture* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1983).

<sup>17</sup>Malcolm D. McLeod, *The Asante* (London: The British Museum, 1981), 134; McLeod, "Richard II, Part 3, Kumase," in *West African Economic and Social History: Studies in Memory of Marion Johnson*, ed. David Henige and T.C. McCaskie (1991); and James Anquandah, *Rediscovering Ghana's Past* (Accra: Sedco Publishing and Longman Group, 1982), 99.

<sup>18</sup>Anquandah, *Rediscovering Ghana's Past*, 93-94; and Arbelbide Cyprien, "Les Baoulé, leur résistance à la colonisation" (Uharte, no date, Mimeographed), 7.

African museums have tended to present the history that has been discovered through field archaeology in West Africa principally through works of art from such civilizations and cultures as Nok, Ife, Igbo-Ukwu, and *Djenné*. The approach has often tended to be aesthetic rather than historical, and the processes of urbanization, the integration of regional economies, the nature of agriculture and hunting, as well as other "lessons of history" that can be drawn from the archaeological record have been less adequately depicted. In large part this is due to reasons that lay beyond the museum: the general insufficiency of archaeological research, the *de facto* sequestering of archaeology as a university-based (and *not* museum-based) activity, and the destruction of the archaeological record both by accident and by intentional pillage.

### Cultural Preservation and Public Education

Let me continue to talk about archaeology while turning to more positive examples of the contributions that West African museums can make to both cultural preservation and public education. In 1984 the Musée national in Bamako, Mali, mounted a most provocative exhibition devoted to a "Survivance de l'archéologie malienne," which dealt with not only the history derived from archaeology including environmental history but also the critical issue of the ongoing pillage of archaeological sites. Alongside complete or reconstituted objects found in legitimate scientific excavations were shown the shattered fragments of terra cotta objects left on the surface by commercial pillagers working for the international art trade. The museum succeeded simultaneously in showing history *via* archeology, the history of archaeology itself in Mali, and the continuing destruction of national history when sites are pillaged.

The Musée national in Bamako is an instructive example of what can be achieved by the integration of research into other museum programs, that is, by the application of scholarship to public education through the use of collections. The former IFAN (Institut français d'Afrique Noire) research center *cum* museum had lost a significant part of its research potential when in the early years of independence the museum and research were split into separate institutions (the Musée national and the Institut des sciences humaines). Recognizing this fact and under the intellectual leadership of Dr. Claude Ardouin, in the early 1980s the museum sought to develop its own research potential. One of its first actions was a collecting mission to the interior Guimbala region in which acquisition went beyond objects to include a wide variety of data: not only textiles and related aspects of textile technology but also oral history, linguistic data, photographic images, and current economic data were collected. The resultant exhibition not only informed Bamakois and national and international visitors about a significant part of Malian "cultural

heritage"<sup>19</sup> but also informed them about the effect of the Sahelian drought on traditional economies and technologies<sup>20</sup> and the behind-the-scenes activities of the national museum. The history of the collecting mission, as well as the treatment, conservation, and storage of the collected artifacts in the museum, were also part of the exhibition didactics. Museology was thus made understandable to museum visitors. An interesting private sector adjunct to the exhibition was the quasi-permanence of a textile vendor, making available "museum-quality" textiles to the interested visitors who cared to "step outside."

This research, collecting, and exhibition and "small business" program later gave birth to an innovative research and documentation project on traditional crafts, technology, and culture. This program *Collecte et diffusion des données audio-visuelles*, or CODDAV, was modeled on museum object acquisition programs. It was conceived as an *acquisition* program for research data: the collection of information that complemented the *things* preserved in the museum collections storage. Thus the definition of "cultural heritage" was moved beyond art or craft *products* to include nonmovable artifacts and the socially constructed knowledge to be found in craft and technological *processes*. The initial collecting mission devoted to the textiles of one of Mali's five regions gave rise to a cooperative endeavor with the Fowler Museum of Cultural History at the University of California, Los Angeles, that has sought to research and acquire textiles throughout Mali, including the urban sector, for both museums.<sup>21</sup> What a delight to discover in Bamako an exhibition devoted to textile weaving, dyeing, and manufacture in the urban center of Bamako to find rubber gloves and galvanized buckets as examples of current textile technology.

The integration of urban crafts into the Musée national in Bamako has become exemplary. A provocative exhibition on the urban recycling of industrial produced materials, including iron, steel, electrical wiring, aluminum, and rubber, *Les Technologies adaptées et récupération des matériaux*, examined the nature of urban craftspersons who ingeniously transform urban cast-off products into things of significant use and celebrated the technological mastery evident in the objects on exhibition.<sup>22</sup> Traditional technology, artistry, and creativity are

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<sup>19</sup>See also Sarah Brett-Smith, review of *Tissage au Mali: Mission dans le delta intérieur* (Bamako: Musée national du Mali, 1985), *African Arts* 27 (2) (1985): 82-83.

<sup>20</sup>See also Claude D. Ardouin and Georges Meurillon, "La Perte de la technologie: le tissage de la laine dans le delta central du Niger," *Construire ensemble* 4 (1986): 3-7.

<sup>21</sup>See also Rachel Hoffman, "The National Museum of Mali-Museum of Cultural History Collaborative Textiles Documentation and Collections Project," *WAMP Bulletin* 1 (1990): 9.

<sup>22</sup>Philip L. Ravenhill, review of "Les Technologies adaptées et récupération des matériaux" (Bamako: Musée national du Mali, 1989), *African Arts* 22 (4) (1989): 77.

not neglected in this museum: the existential, historical roots of Malian culture are part of the Permanent Collection, yet the overall definition of *patrimoine culturel* that is perceived through the ongoing programs and exhibitions of the Musée national of Mali is ultimately far more expansive than that "read" in most West African museums. It is also far more "educational" for the museum's visitors.

The move toward this more expansive and more realistic definition of cultural patrimony a definition inclusive of urban culture—has been the result of applying critical thinking, in other words, informed *scholarship*, to the museum's mission. The inadequacy of continuing a custodial preoccupation with the folkloric collections inherited from and constituted in the colonial past has been supplanted by an intellectual quest for understanding of socially constructed systems of knowledge. Questions of cultural meaning and identity have been examined holistically, and the *things* kept by the museum have been complemented by the performances of traditional historians and bards the famous *griots* of Manding civilization for children and young people who gather in the front courtyard of the museum on certain evenings.

In the conference organized last November by the International Council of Museums, or ICOM, on the theme "What Museums for Africa?" one did not hear a radical call to abandon the museum *institution*. There was and continues to be an interest in the museum as the guarantor of the *things* that are so necessary to preserve for the future education of African publics. It is less the nature of the museum than the nature of its *contents* that is called into question. There is a real need to collect, preserve, and interpret *not* the generic, albeit fascinating, objects of a folkloric past but the *specific* objects, historically constituted, that bear witness to the systems of knowledge, both past and present, that must be preserved if history is to yield its lessons. This preservation needs to be more than a simple nostalgia for a lost past. It must preserve the *things* that can be subsequently confronted by museum visitors to produce a reflexivity and a critical understanding of both the cultural past and the present *things* that can confound and shock the visitor into a thorough examination of current cultural practices.

The "cultural" orientation of museums in Africa must be made to include a far wider range of *things* that preserve knowledge. Environment, history, technology, urban culture, and archaeology must also be represented in Africa's museums through objects. The challenge is twofold. First, those who undertake research in the above areas must be invited into the museum to communicate with national publics. The inherited model that opposes museum delectation to academic scholarship needs to be replaced by a model in which museums and their objects become critical arenas for communicating scholarship to national publics. Second, the inherited model of the single "national" museum in the

national capital must be augmented by a "local museology," in which smaller, local museums become critical venues for public education.

If one accepts that the museum can, and must, function as a place of learning a "school" then it is clear that these "schools" must be decentralized. One school per nation simply cannot suffice. Museums must become key institutions at the local level. The *things* that bear witness to systems of knowledge must be accessible to those who would visit and learn from them. Learning from the full range of objects that embody "cultural heritage" demands that the contents of African museums must evolve. "Culture" must be seen in its entirety: how men and women live in the world, how they use it, preserve it, and enjoy it for a better life.

### **Public Scholarship**

The university approach to scholarship has to be merged with the obligations of the public scholarship that motivates museums. As Neil McGregor of the National Gallery in London has argued

In a university, the pursuit of knowledge is its own justification. Museum scholarship, on the other hand, is circumscribed: it must keep as its focus the works in the collection, and it must justify itself by serving as a basis for better conservation and increased public enjoyment. . . .<sup>23</sup>

I would argue that the strictly academic model of university-based scholarship, in which essentially one publishes for a very restricted audience of academic peers, must be expanded to include the audience of concerned citizens.

How different it is to restrict one's words to the narrow confines of written academic archaeology addressed to international colleagues, as opposed to communicating *through objects* to a national public in a museum setting. The motivation is different, the means are different, and the goal is different—public education instead of peer approval. A professional journal read by peers outside one's country is different than a museum exhibition visited by schoolchildren and their nonliterate parents or grandparents. The conclusions may be similar—the same archaeological arguments may be at stake—but the means and the impact will differ radically.

I am arguing *for* a type of *public scholarship* that communicates through objects, a collections-based scholarship that uses *things* as the support of very serious messages. I am arguing that the museum preoccupation with "cultural heritage" must be properly defined. It must not fail to include the topics of

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<sup>23</sup>*The Guardian Weekly*, October 29, 1990.

archaeology, history, environment, urban culture, and modern culture that individually and collectively bear witness to the systems of knowledge that people have created and are creating in society knowledge that gives meaning to human existence. The museum in Africa, I am convinced, is a privileged arena for dialogue and communication. It allows *things* to speak, to bear witness to past experiences and future possibilities to cause the viewer to reflect on how things might otherwise be.

*Things* are powerful because they are inherently multivocal. They contain within themselves multiple messages. They can be made to speak simultaneously of history, of technology, of aesthetics, of philosophy, and of value, whether material or existential. They are like art: they make one think of other possibilities of existence. They stand in contrast to perceived realities and make one critically reexamine received wisdom.

*Things* are of critical importance in public education. Rightly selected, evaluated, and interpreted, they can become a prime means of public education and interrogation. These humble *things* can call into question the world that *is*, and they hold out the possibility of the world that *can be*.

A single *thing* can change the world. Properly presented and interpreted, a thing can be a witness, a provocation, a puzzle; it can confound in a way that makes reflection yield new answers to the solution of critical questions. The cast brass *kuduo* created in eighteenth or nineteenth century Akan society simultaneously evokes artistic creativity, environmental use, technological mastery, traditional cultural practices, and beyond local response to outside influence the fusion and symbiosis of contested ideas that have profoundly affected history. It demonstrates that change can be positive and evolutionary, creating new ways of doing and being.

In presenting *things* the museum presents systems of knowledge and also makes possible new ways of knowing. A *thing* can thus call into being new things, new creations that respond to new challenges. The past becomes a foil for the known present and the unknown future.

## Discussant Remarks

Alberta Arthurs

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In my response I will attempt to achieve three things: to comment on what the speakers have said; to put their remarks into the broader context of the conference theme culture and development; and to offer suggestions for further work that I believe should flow from our work together in this meeting.

In a recent article that he calls "Museums beyond Treasures and Traditions," Robert Adams, the head of the Smithsonian Institution in this city, writes that the evolving role and responsibilities of museums are to "address the present human condition in ways that will be intelligible, instructive and relevant to a broad and diverse public made up of many constituencies."<sup>1</sup> We are beyond the era of art or of objects for their own sake, or static presentations of past artifacts or collections as the data for disinterested study. "Many publics, many agendas, many criteria of accomplishment" are emerging now, says Adams; there is "a need for greater attention to how objects evoke ideas and are emblematic of social groups and settings."

This is still an essentially radical idea. It is not widely shared in the traditional museum community. Even in many of the alternative or smaller museums in the United States, there is an instinct to imitate the collection policies and presentation modes of the large established museums: to exhibit individual masterpieces of the European and U.S. experience, to present other traditions largely as curiosities, and to treat the public as passive, silent consumers of "curatorial products and interpretations."

I refer to this article by Adams for two reasons. I admire the Smithsonian's effort to press museums in new and public directions, to place collections in the context of their communities, to find truer ways of representing cultures through exhibition. But I raise it primarily to show how far ahead of us in these ideas are the professionals who work in African museums. Even Adams who pushes his peers with great imagination and intelligence cannot match the ideas offered by our speakers this morning as they describe their efforts in Africa:

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Adams, "Museums beyond Treasures and Traditions," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 135 (1991): 332-38.

- Claude Ardouin, who speaks of new dimensions, new—institutional systems, for West African museums, which—he tells us—must no longer imitate Western models but must become tools for improvement in their own communities
- Dawson Munjeri, who describes a national plan for development and eco-tourism that will function through The—National Museums and Monuments in Zimbabwe
- Alexander Marc, who describes the direct participation of African communities in gathering and preserving their own local traditions, their own histories
- Philip Ravenhill, who describes the redefinition of cultural heritage and the making of public scholarship that characterize African museums today.

All of these speakers offer evidence of large community purposes, the relevance of their institutions to social needs and changes, the activating of objects within local histories and by local populations.

What does all of this mean in the broad subject of our meeting: culture and development?

First, we learn that museums in Africa have vital roles to play in the resurgent interests of their communities and the identities of their peoples. Museums in Africa are going beyond the traditional mode of merely housing objects. They see themselves as active participants in the making of their societies and in collaborations, shared activities, with their communities. As agents in education and expression they are potentially very important intermediaries in the relationship between culture and development.

Second, in the instance of museums, as in other cultural instances, it becomes clear that there is much learning to be done, much reciprocity to be achieved, among African professionals and other professionals, among African peoples and other people. We are imbued with an idea of transfer. Perhaps there is some justification for that idea when it is technology and science that are being discussed between the industrialized world and less developed countries, between North and South. Perhaps in that realm there is an argument that goods or even ideas can be developed in one place and moved to another. But in the realm of cultural production, one-way transfer works less well. Historians, artists, cultural observers and theorists, social scientists, writers, are at par. They share the world; they do not divide it; their boundaries are porous; their influences are mutual; their transfers are two-way. There is in this sense an interesting disjunction between the terms "culture" and "development." Although we conventionally think of development as moving from North to South, we must think of culture differently it moves in many ways. It is unpredictable. It will not go in a single direction.

This disjunction, as I have called it, can be seen quite usefully as a *new paradigm* for the relationship between North and South. Perhaps it is time for the concept of development itself to become more reciprocal, more equal, more attentive to meaningful differences, less reductive in its values and assumptions. And perhaps the juxtaposition of culture and development will achieve this new paradigm, a new definition of what we mean by development. Surely this is what Ismail Serageldin's stunning lecture yesterday told us, and what Wole Soyinka said; and this is what our museum experts this morning are telling us as well.

The third idea concerning culture and development that emerges from these talks relates back to Bob Putnam's presentation yesterday morning, and it has to do, therefore, with choral societies, or to put it more broadly with the fundamental importance of civic and community associations in development. One way of referring to this idea is as the "civil society." The "civil society" is that sector in a free society between the government and the individual. In the United States we call it the independent sector, the not-for-profit sector; it includes civic and cultural institutions, universities, voluntary organizations; it also includes the press, writers and publishers, artists the agents of free ideas. In African countries today the civil society differs from what we know in the United States it includes more informal organizations: church groups, rural associations, cooperatives; and fewer large professionally organized agencies. Unlike in the United States, it includes profit-making, free-enterprise endeavors. It includes organizations that are professionally shaped but government-supported, such as museums, government-related agencies that have autonomous roles to play in their emerging democracies as they give voice to the realities and the diversities of their communities and ethnic cultures.

The cultural infrastructure in African countries is important in sustaining the "civil society," in providing critique and complementarity to official structures, and in providing fresh ideas and directions to development efforts. Writers, publishers, scholars, musicians, museums, the media, filmmakers all the actors within culture provide the visions, the voices, the diversity of ideas that are necessary if development is to take place successfully, with the understanding and engagement of the people whom it affects.

These are the three ideas related to culture and development that emerge for me from the discussion this morning: first, the important role of museums and other institutions in cultural discovery and definition; second, culture as a fresh configuration of development involving reciprocity rather than "transfer"; and third, the uses of culture in building the "civil society" necessary for development in free societies.

Before I go on to offer some concrete suggestions for further work that conference participants might undertake, I want to take a moment to illustrate our

that his significant *cultural* findings were an unexpected result of his *political science* study. We must applaud efforts to look for understanding in many disciplines and to involve a range of experts in the search for cultural findings.

3. Finally, we must provide support for cultural activities themselves. To strengthen community identity and tradition, to strengthen the heritages of the continent, and to strengthen the new voices, the smartest interpretations of contemporary Africa, cultural institutions are no luxury. They are urgently needed. If they are supported, cultural institutions will know how to comment, how to intervene, how to provide resources and voices for successful development. Showing us that fact has been the most important contribution of these panelists this morning.

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## Architectural and Urban Heritage: The Example of the City of Ouidah, Benin

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*Problems of identification of architectural and urban heritage—the cultural relativity of what is valued as heritage, the specificity of the building stock and value of the built heritage, land tenure constraints, and the agents responsible for operations—are explored in an analysis conducted by ORSTOM of the built heritage of Ouidah. Aspects that must be taken into account in Ouidah include its historical origins (a financial and trade outpost for the Kingdom of Dahomey with British, French, and Portuguese forts), anthropological make-up, economic activities (trade, particularly slaves), political and administrative heritage (French colonial), and household organization (compounds with earthen architecture and continuing influence of voodoo cults, villas). One powerful local constraint is that "conventional" heritage projects restore only buildings that are prestigious from a Western point of view. This is an especially troubling practice since such buildings are rare in West Africa and are not always the prime remembrances of local cultural practices. It is crucial to design a more ambitious action strategy that takes into account the specific forms by which the cultures of these societies are expressed.*

The identification of architectural and urban heritage, like its conservation, raises many questions in West Africa. The field is relatively new and is not always perceived in the same way as in the Western world. I have chosen to raise a few of these questions on the basis of an analysis of the built heritage of the City of Ouidah, Benin, on which we at ORSTOM have just completed a study.

I shall first describe the characteristic features of Ouidah's heritage and, on the basis of this example, discuss some problems of method. These problems, which also arise in many other cities, especially in West Africa, include the relativity of the concept of heritage, the specificity of the building stock and value of built heritage, the land tenure constraints, and the question of the agents responsible for mounting operations in this sector.

This work is a natural extension of a research project carried out on another historic city on the coast of Benin, Porto-Novo. As with the previous work, this study of Ouidah was conducted in response to a request by an urban planning unit in Benin responsible for implementing spatial development plans and operations in the cities. This agency, the Regional Housing and Urban Development Planning Studies Service (*Service des études régionales d'habitat et d'aménagement urbain*, or *SERHAU*), lacked a specialist to deal with the question of the built heritage; moreover, no work had been done on this question from the spatial planning perspective.

An agreement was concluded with ORSTOM to pool French and Beninese financial resources and personnel (researchers and technicians). A multidisciplinary team was assembled composed of architects, urban planners, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists.

### **Types of Built Heritage**

The City of Ouidah, which is situated near the west coast of Africa opposite Recife, Brazil, has a particularly rich history. Its development began with the slave trade in the seventeenth century. In its heyday in the seventeenth century, having become the financial and trade outpost of the Kingdom of Dahomey, it saw several thousand slaves a year pass through the British, French, and Portuguese forts. In the nineteenth century many former slaves or descendants of slaves came to Ouidah, mostly from Brazil, where they or their ancestors had been sent earlier by slave traders. These artisans and merchants assured the city's prosperity and built houses inspired by Brazilian architecture. With the disappearance of the slave trade Ouidah became an important palm oil trading market. European commercial enterprises were set up there during the second half of the nineteenth century. Although a secondary administrative center, with French colonization the city declined in economic importance. The more active traders emigrated to the colony's capital, Porto-Novo, and its port, Cotonou, which gradually became the economic hub of the country.

In addition to this eventful history Ouidah is rich in anthropological interest since, together with Abomey, the former capital of the Kingdom of Dahomey, it is the cradle of the vodoun or voodoo cultures. This religious system is still very much present today as is evidenced in the many temples.

Ouidah today is only a small town with a population of some 10,000. It remains, however, a memorial to the slave-trading economy that characterized an entire section of the African continent and of a religious system that is still very much alive along this coast and has spread to a whole region of Latin America.

Ouidah's heritage is particularly diversified, and the very term "built heritage" is somewhat inappropriate in that the cultural traits of society in spatial terms are expressed not only in architectural forms but also in modes of organization on the ground. Rather than establishing a morphological typology, we have adopted a heritage classification based on major function. Of course, some sites and buildings can serve several functions; in these cases we have taken the most significant function.

### *Economic Heritage*

The economic heritage goes back on the one hand to slave trading and on the other to the mercantile activities that were carried on in the city. Of the various forts in which the slaves were confined, the only one that remains is the Portuguese fort, which was recently restored under a project financed by the Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon. The other forts disappeared in the nineteenth century, having fallen into disuse. The fact that the Portuguese fort has survived, although radically altered, is due to the presence until 1960 of a Resident Representative of Portugal to Benin.

The slave-trading economy is evident both within and outside the city: the "Slave Route" from Ouidah to the sea is punctuated by sites that recall this activity. Moreover, this itinerary is utilized by one of the most important voodoo ceremonies. In addition the plant environment is particularly diverse, including woods, fields, lagoons, coconut plantation, and beach, and recalls the region's rural economy (fishing, plantations).

A few kilometers north of Ouidah, the village of Savi evokes the history of this region. This village was occupied by the Houéda tribe before its conquest in the eighteenth century by the Kingdom of Dahomey; this population later emigrated to Ouidah. Although all traces of the capital of the Houéda Kingdom have now disappeared, the village of Savi retains housing forms very representative of the rural lifestyle.

Since Ouidah's wealth was based for several centuries on trading, it is not surprising that many "commercial houses" were built there. Their style is not always clearly identifiable since it borrows from different influences. Nor is business always the building's sole function; it is common for part of it to be set aside as living accommodation. These buildings sometimes reflect Brazilian architecture, notably in their decorative motifs, and sometimes colonial architecture, in their internal organization and construction methods. They are located near the business centers (market) and along the main axes of the city. These "commercial houses" usually can easily be identified by the presence of an upper story.

With the gradual disappearance of mercantile activity in the city, most of these buildings were abandoned by their original owners. The remaining occupants have neither the means nor the desire to keep them up, much less to restore them. As for those that are empty, the climate and bats steadily destroy first the roofwork and then the support structures. Today, partly or fully occupied, they are severely dilapidated but imprint a particular landscape on the city.

### *Religious Heritage*

The voodoo temples are the most immediate physical expression of traditional religious practices. Their number and variety testify to the strength of these cults, which are perceived by the residents in different ways. While they serve as mnemonic reservoirs of social and cultural history, the anxiety that they arouse such as fear of poisoning or of being possessed has generated attitudes of rejection on the part of certain inhabitants who have for that reason preferred to leave the village. This tendency to leave is declining today.

The voodoo temples go back to cults that involve wider families or communities that often extend beyond the city. This hierarchy of believers is not necessarily expressed in the number or size of the temples: Ouidah's most important worship practices do not take place in temples of impressive size and spectacular architecture. Since voodoo ceremonies are generally conducted in intense secrecy, it is not surprising that the practices associated with them do not take place in the most easily identifiable locations, which have a primarily symbolic function. In other words a room in a compound (*concession*), a tree, or a corner of a wall can in some cases have a much greater value in a religious practice than the temple that is supposed to represent the cult.

The other religions present in Ouidah show themselves in more "classical" forms. The Catholic missions established themselves on the west coast of Africa in this city and in 1908 built a basilica that for a time functioned as a cathedral and, outside the city, a large seminary that still receives seminarists from a number of African countries. These imposing buildings are well maintained by a priesthood that is still very much present in this region. The city's Protestant church is less noteworthy. The presence of the Protestant religion is very small because French colonization fostered Catholicism. In addition to these structures there are buildings belonging to more autonomous churches, for example, "celestial" Christianity, which bear witness to the vigor of the syncretic cults present everywhere along this coast. These buildings are distinguished by brightly colored ornamentation and sometimes by mural frescoes and cement sculptures.

Islam, although very much present today along this coast, has not taken a strong hold in Ouidah. The Muslim community has always been small and, moreover, divided, a fact that explains the failure to complete the Great Mosque, work on which began in 1930 and which in its forms recalls that of Porto-Novo, which is of Afro-Brazilian inspiration.

### *Political and Administrative Heritage*

The City of Ouidah was never a political center, and there are hardly any truly political buildings to be found other than administrative premises. The domain of the "Yovogan," the Governor of Ouidah during the domination of the Kingdom of Dahomey, has disappeared. All that remain are the administrative buildings of the colonial era, most of which were built in an area to the west of the city and around the square of the French fort.

These buildings testify to the different styles of colonial architecture. At the beginning of the century the Europeans had large verandas built around the living accommodation core of their buildings to protect themselves against the climate. Along the African coast, where wood is abundant and suitable, they had local carpenters of Afro-Brazilian origin or, in the case of Benin, persons trained by them build latticework partitions, which are particularly characteristic, as at Grand Bassam in Côte d'Ivoire. At Ouidah the former Residence is the best example of this. The other buildings are notable for their wide verandas and their method of construction with imported materials, sloping roofs, and rooms of identical size. This same method is found in all Africa's former historic colonial towns and contrasts greatly with the traditional forms. The buildings of the 1950s are less original in terms of architecture: by that time verandas, which were too expensive in materials, had ceased to be built. Protection against the climate is provided by windows with sunshades and ventilators, installed in the main rooms.

These buildings, which often retain administrative functions, sometimes have a pejorative connotation: they symbolize the colonial era and more generally, as the Beninese say with a touch of disdain, the "old ways." Beninese officials today aspire to live and work in modern buildings. This taste for new construction is also fostered by the "indirect" benefits that can result from new building construction projects. At Ouidah a number of administrative buildings have been built recently while colonial buildings have been taken out of service and are deteriorating.

***Household Heritage***

**Concessions.** A quick look at the concessions, or land grant settlements, in Ouidah does not reveal any visible difference between these houses, some built of clay and others of durable materials, and those of other neighboring cities. Notable is the gradual abandonment of earth in favor of parpen (breeze block), a trend observable in all West African cities. Moreover, the poor condition of many old buildings is explained by the disappearance of the previous economic activities and the rejection of practices regarded as backward, such as earthen construction, in contemporary African society. Must we however conclude from this that housing in Ouidah is simply an illustration of the housing problems in African cities?

This analysis would be inadequate even if it were not fallacious. The concessions in Ouidah often have a heritage dimension not found in most of the other cities. This special feature is explained by the city's age and the importance of the voodoo cults. These concessions, described as "mother houses," are the places from which family lines are deemed to spring. They do not house all their members, who sometimes are dispersed for several generations, and today are more often than not occupied only by a few old people of the family who act as caretakers. However, on the occasion of family ceremonies, which take place on several days spread over the year, the concessions are occupied by dozens of representatives of the family line.

The link between a site and a family can be read in the concession in various ways. The most visible sign is the presence of rooms serving as temples in which the altars of celebrated and deified ancestors and those of the family voodoos are installed. In addition there are the courtyards reserved for ceremonies and the cemetery rooms in which formerly all the members of the family line were buried. This set of rooms and courtyards can occupy a large part of the concession and sometimes constitute an isolated space accessible only to priests and the initiated.

Today these buildings are "sanctuaries" rather than dwellings, in which the dead often outnumber the living occupants of the concession. When they now serve that function alone, these buildings are akin to the tombs in the cemeteries. The families pool their resources to maintain the sacred sites, that is, the worship rooms and cemetery rooms, and generally take little interest in the dwelling areas.

The social hierarchy within the city can also be read in the importance attached to these sites. The richest families have erected multiple-storied buildings for the ceremonies and tiled the funerary rooms while the poorest have merely set aside small rooms for this purpose. In both cases, however, the

rooms allocated to the dead are built with more durable materials and are better maintained than those intended for the living.

The family houses are not abandoned sites; on the contrary they remind all the members of the family line of the original unity resuscitated by the voodoo ceremonies. It must therefore be borne in mind that a large portion of housing in Ouidah is directed not to the living but to the dead, and any rehabilitation project must take this dimension into account.

This dimension is not uniformly present in all the concessions. The ones that serve this function are relatively few and are concentrated in the old districts of the city. Often other members of the family may live in these concessions and augment the number of living, a fact that cannot, however, cause the dead to be forgotten. In some concessions the past is less present: there are no family cemeteries or altar rooms, but there is nearly always a household voodoo temple and several altars erected in the courtyard that recall certain near or distant ancestors. Finally, a house empty of family and religious tokens and inhabitants is not necessarily unused: it may occasionally be occupied on the occasion of a family ceremony. Its state of abandonment is often only a sign of disagreements among the different branches of the family that left the village long ago and have not been able to reach a compromise for maintaining the ancestral home.

Raising the question of rehabilitation in this context is a delicate matter. To picture the situation, we could imagine we were dealing with a vast necropolis in which many houses are funerary monuments under indivisible ownership. While this is certainly an extreme view, it is no doubt better to overstate the problem here than to treat this funerary dimension as a secondary one which will disappear. In our opinion it is a primary dimension and one that is not necessarily pejorative and morbid. The example of the cemeteries in Cairo that today have become living areas demonstrates that cohabitation by the dead and the living is possible in different societies.

*Villas.* The villa differs from the concession by the existence of a building constructed at one time on the basis of a predetermined spatial organization and producing an immediately identifiable form. In this sense it is the result of the settlement in Africa of populations influenced by Western models.

At Ouidah it was the Afro-Brazilians who imported this method of construction and built houses that in form, layout, and decoration recall the practices of landowners in Brazil, practices influenced in turn by the housing models of the nobles in Portugal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This type of construction developed in Benin in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (until the 1940s) at a time when the Afro-Brazilians constituted a powerful political and economic group who elevated their lifestyle to the status of a model.

Building in this style was for a long time a fashion to which many Beninese turned. It resulted in an "Afro-Brazilian" style of housing, which is observable particularly in the coastal towns and villages. The development of this style was limited to decoration, the Africans having neither the desire nor the means to build imposing houses. It is not uncommon to find in a concession a building decorated with molding around the door and windows and faced on its main facade with a colored roughcast, generally in orange tones. The historic towns still contain many villas whose spatial layout can be traced back to imported models.

This building tradition was especially strong in the coastal towns, such as Ouidah, Porto-Novo, Lagos, and Lome, and is still very visible in the first two. Lome and Lagos have become capital cities, and the old rambling "barracks" gradually have been replaced by taller buildings. In a way it is the political and economic decline of the small cities that has made it possible to preserve this heritage. Similarly, it is often because of the lack of maintenance that we can still count so many of them today. It seems that this decorative practice disappeared around 1950; consequently, we were able to find in the city only a single artisan familiar with it, who, however, practiced it only when his father, also a mason, was officiating. If the people of Ouidah had not put up with physical deterioration of the facades and had made a habit of redoing them regularly, these architectural signs would have disappeared long ago. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that many facades are close to crumbling, and when the decorative motifs break, they are not replaced.

### Analysis of These Heritages

*Cultural Relativity of the Concept of Heritage.* The concept of heritage is culturally relative. In the "traditional" African societies it is *not* based, as it is in Europe, on the cult of physical objects whose value where appropriate, market value depends on condition and aesthetics. In the case of Benin it signifies above all a spiritual and family heritage recalled not by objects but by religious practices. The temples, like the family houses, are only *signs* and have no value in themselves. This helps explain the lack of maintenance, which is due also to the departure from these houses of the family heads and more well-to-do members. To find a "material" cult akin to Western practices in this field, we would have to look to worship of the dead, leading to the construction of generally well-maintained buildings.

Without doubt, Ouidah is, with Abomey, the Beninese city that most recalls, through religious practices, the traditional organization of society. While all the cultures of this region have developed the cult of the dead, the Fon society seems to be the one whose rituals are the most numerous, at least in Benin. This

fact explains their importance in these two cities, one the economic center and the other the political center of the old Kingdom of Dahomey.

There are two contradictory sides to the image of Ouidah as a representative of Benin's national heritage: a positive, valuing attitude alongside a negative, deprecatory attitude. The old Ouidans who migrated to the country's economic centers value their city and regularly attend family ceremonies. The association known as General Development Union of Ouidah (*Union générale de développement de Ouidah*, or *UGDO*) is a manifestation of this remembrance and of the feelings of solidarity that unite the Ouidans "of the twentieth century diaspora." However, there is no movement of return to town, for example by retirees; beyond these feelings of solidarity, feelings of rivalry and distrust persist that date back to old disputes between families and have an impact on, for example, land tenure.

Conversely, many Beninese of the younger generation today reject a past that recalls forms of subjection. By this reasoning Ouidah, which evokes memories on the one hand of slavery and on the other of the links of subordination existing through the cults in the families, can only be rejected. The central districts and by extension the town are symbols of all that is outdated and outmoded, and there are many who would like to see the traces of a painful past trivialized, after the fashion of the landscape of Cotonou. From this perspective it is easier to understand why degradation of the old residences and the temples is not perceived as a problem. This state of affairs, moreover, is not peculiar to Ouidah but is observable in all the historic towns of Benin.

The cultural representation of the heritage on the one hand and the perception of the past on the other are the two chief sociological causes of the deterioration of old buildings. This situation is not, however, irreversible. Rejection of the past is an attitude found in all societies at different times in their histories and one that takes more or less violent forms. The slave-trade and colonization periods, sometimes perceived as a continuum, continue to be rejected today as if they were too close. But little by little, their recession in time and, above all, new outside influences can foster the development of a certain detachment, to the point that a remote or even aesthetic view of the landscapes that evoke those periods may emerge. This is true, for example, of Brazilian society with regard to the slave-trading and colonization economy. In such a context a Western type of valuation of heritage directed to objects comes fully into its own and will develop all the more quickly as the country achieves a certain political and economic equilibrium.

### *Specificity of the Built Heritage*

*Cultural Heritage and Material Heritage.* In the Western world identification of the built heritage is based on the relationship existing between a site and either the event it recalls, as in a monument, or the practice it expresses, for example, "vernacular" architecture. This procedure is relatively difficult to apply in the case of African societies, especially at Ouidah.

Looking at the slave trade, we find that with the exception of the Portuguese fort, where little direct physical trace of slavery can be found (the only prerestoration building dates from the end of the nineteenth century), no other tangible item exists that can recall this activity. The slaves merely passed through, and the physical investments, such as enclosures and tents to shelter them until they were put aboard the slave ships, were reduced to the minimum. As for the traders themselves, few of them invested locally in the construction of housing. The slave trade, therefore, cannot be brought back to mind simply by the restoration of buildings.

The situation is even more complex when we consider the other dominant cultural trait in this society, the voodoo cults. The voodoo temples do not present any special features as buildings. Regularly rebuilt, the buildings are recent and do not possess original forms that could be valued aesthetically. On the contrary, sensitive to modern trends, the voodoo priests use contemporary materials, including cement, concrete, and sheet metal, to house the fetishes without giving rise to any particular style. A few astonishing items can, however, be found, such as altars dedicated to the voodoo of metal and war, Gou, composed of an assemblage of metal parts such as an automobile carburetor or a used sewing machine that evoke certain sculptures of contemporary Western artists, such as Tinguely. Nor does their location result from specific spatial rules. Most of the temples have been shifted several times in the city, for example, upon the appointment of a new priest. Finally, the temple is not often the site of the most significant rituals, the ceremonies; which take place in accordance with itineraries; in this sense they are not necessarily the most revered places.

These observations raise the fundamental questions of the value placed on physical signs in these societies, whether sacred (the temples) or profane (the concessions), and of whether the valuation as heritage of cultural traits need always take the form primarily, as in the West, of preservation and restoration of these material signs. For Westerners these societies shake loose a heretofore unquestioned "absolute" value, that is, the preservation and restoration of remnants of the past, and show that rather it is culturally determined.

*Spatial Morphologies.* We should first of all like to stress the extreme diversity of the built heritage identified in this city. The historic towns of Black Africa, and even more the villages, have often been appreciated for their spatial and architectural homogeneity, after the fashion of the supposed homogeneity of the social group that built them, often an ethnic group, for example the Dogons. Such homogeneity does not hold true for the coastal towns such as Ouidah, where historical events and social mixing have produced a great diversity of remarkable spaces: "native" earthen-construction architecture, Afro-Brazilian architecture, and colonial architecture, to mention only the major categories. Moreover, in the present case the "conventional" distinguishing criterion, ethnic group, is valid only in part, particularly as regards native sites; for example, one could to some degree regard the Brazilians or the Colons as particular ethnic groups. It is not possible to differentiate, in terms of housing, between the layout styles of the Adja and the Yoruba, the two large ethnic groups found in the region. From this point of view Ouidah society recalls more the Western urban societies, in which social groups of very different origins and cultural practices coexist. The built heritage in its diversity reflects this reality.

This observation leads us to the question of the existence of spatial or architectural models that influence these forms. It is clear that for "imported" forms of housing, precise reference sources exist that amount to models, for example, the houses of the elite in Brazil and the French catalogues of colonial architecture. The same does not hold true for the native earthen architecture, for example, a typical standard dwelling, for which it would be futile to try to establish a reference plan. The originality of this dwelling lies in the forms of arrangement it permits and its extensive, or evolutive, character organized on the basis of a few social and architectural principles, for example, the rooms always open on to interior courtyards, and a few construction constraints, such as room size that is limited by the use of earth and the quality of the wood. Moreover, this housing borrows elements from foreign stylistic vocabularies, as is evident from the presence of Afro-Brazilian buildings in some concessions.

In these circumstances it is impossible to define canons and a golden age of the genre as is conventionally done in the case of "traditional" architecture. While judgments differ with regard to imported architecture, it must nevertheless be stressed that its heritage value at Ouidah, from the aesthetic point of view, lies mainly in the borrowings that take place between Europeans and Afro-Brazilians. This situation produces an original architecture, neither Brazilian nor colonial, notable in the commercial houses.

Finally, this built heritage does not possess the customary value traditionally conferred on it, that of age. The oldest buildings in Ouidah are those built of durable materials by the colonial administration at the very beginning of the twentieth century, including the public buildings and the

basilica. The commercial houses also date mostly from that period (1900-1920) and have often been altered. Earthen structures have a useful life of a few dozen years at best, and then only provided they are regularly maintained. The practice is that when the walls are badly worn, the building is destroyed and a new one is built if the group feels a need for it. At Ouidah, owing to migration to the other urban centers, dilapidated buildings are often demolished as the population of the concessions grows smaller and smaller. Buildings constructed of mud bricks last longer provided the plaster facing and roofing are also maintained, which is not the case with most of them. It would not be far wrong to say that the present landscape of this town, whose growth has been very weak for a long time, is composed of structures dating in large part from 1950 to 1960. Age, therefore, is not a major criterion in heritage decisions at Ouidah. On the contrary the presence of a recent building is an indication of the dynamism of the practice carried on in it and of the occupants' investment in the site.

All of these observations concerning the difficulties of identifying and characterizing heritage in such a society obviously have a bearing on the measures one hopes to develop to recognize its value and preserve it.

### **Guides to Action**

The suggestions we propose here do not claim to resolve the contradictions stressed above. They aim simply to take them into account and stimulate discussion. Moreover, in addition to these cultural traits, modes of action are determined by certain social and economic constraints. One particularly severe constraint is the land tenure system in this city.

### ***The Land Tenure Constraint***

A precondition of any project for conserving buildings is that the possibility exists of intervening at the physical sites and therefore, before anything else, of identifying the persons responsible for or in charge of them. This prerequisite is far from being met at Ouidah.

As a rule in Ouidah it is extremely difficult to identify the property owners of a concession, which is usually either held in indivisible ownership or else *de facto* subdivided among a number of descendants without the related transactions being legitimized by any official deed. This situation, which is explained by failure to apply the successive official land tenure systems, presents a problem for developers but is to a certain degree normal for the inhabitants, who have at all times organized themselves based on their own rules. These rules are not always written down and are not based on the principles of Roman

law; "ownership" of the land belongs to the domain of mythical ancestors and the religious forces associated with them.

It might be thought that the situation is simpler when we are dealing with a villa, a genre that has a different origin and whose physical boundaries are more precise than in the concessions (whose perimeters are not always delineated physically), but this is not always the case. During our survey we encountered a number of cases in which a villa was claimed by several families without it being possible to resolve the matter. The same is true of certain unbuilt spaces such as the sacred wood of the town.

The existence of ownership disputes (in addition, the inheritors of portions of concessions often dispute their respective rights of way) must not be treated as an obstacle in Ouidah society. Moreover, these disputes do not stem from the economic value of the land, which is practically zero in this city of very weak growth, but are an expression of the social relationships and rivalries existing within that society, which is very inward looking. In these circumstances to try to resolve the conflict from outside by designating an official owner makes no sense and is likely to enlarge the dispute. Such a step can make any effective action impossible, which is what happened a few years ago when the administration sought to subdivide lands empty of dwellings to the north of the city.

Since a conservation policy cannot be implemented against the will of the inhabitants, especially when one desired outcome is to make them the executors of that policy, it is difficult to envisage giving priority to action relating to private sites. The necessary minimum conditions are the existence of a demand on the part of the family responsible for the building and an agreement within that family with respect to land ownership.

Action directed to public domain buildings would appear *a priori* to be easier but is hampered by the *de facto* lack of appointment of officials truly responsible for such property. For example, a building of the colonial era that we feel to be of architectural interest is occupied by three government agencies and is under the responsibility of a fourth. Each repudiates responsibility for managing the building which, although relatively well preserved, is deteriorating inexorably. Thus, before any conservation work is begun on a public building, it is first necessary to identify the authority that owns it and the one responsible for managing and maintaining it, such as the central government department or local government, and the links between these authorities, for example, the type of lease. More generally, to the extent that it has never been done, it is desirable to conduct a survey of the city's publicly owned heritage and take that opportunity to identify its owners and managing authorities in light of the existing needs and the specific features of the property stock. Only after such a survey has been done will it be possible to envisage, in a comprehensive way, measures to

recognize and preserve the value of particular buildings that are of heritage interest. The opportunity offered by the current process of setting up local government authorities, and therefore of defining their area of jurisdiction, should be taken to carry out such a survey.

These and other very practical reasons join the more sociological reasons described earlier for reconsidering the idea of assigning priority to buildings in the strict sense of the term, as is usually done. This position, which deserves to be debated, leads us to consider other types of actions.

First, steps should be taken to strengthen ongoing or completed operations that have been limited to simple restoration measures, such as the Portuguese fort, and offer additional settings that involve few activities.

Second, action should be directed to public spaces, such as streets, squares, and paths, which offer greater flexibility since such physical spaces, under central or local government authority, generally are devoid of buildings and thus more amenable to action.

The measures decided on must always be aimed at sensitizing the interest groups concerned: the general public, to stimulate the local interest in preservation that alone is capable of generating new approaches to buildings; visitors, to boost tourism; and finally, the decisionmakers, not all of whom are convinced of the value of this city's built heritage.

The need to meet these constraints narrows the conventional field of action and spurs us to devise more original approaches. We have chosen a project based on the placement of heritage signboards (employing the services of artists and established near the sites we have surveyed) in the belief that this activity can serve two objectives: to draw the attention of visitors to the existence of a heritage site that may not be recognizable as such from its physical features and, above all, to demonstrate to the occupants and the owner that it is worthy of interest and deserves to be valued.

### *Implementing Agents of a Heritage Policy*

Implementation of this course of action must be based on agents with the capacity to act, each at its own level. At the operational level it is necessary to define the project director or principal of each operation. In Benin this has traditionally been a central government agency competent in this area. Today the question arises whether this centralized government approach continues to be valid, especially at a time when local governments are beginning to be set up in Benin. However, these new decentralized agencies cannot be the sole answer to the shortcomings of the central government, particularly since they often lack human resources and the scant financial resources they can expect to be given are preempted by other tasks.

Consideration should be given to enlisting the services of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly under decentralized cooperation arrangements since they allow new categories of agents more sensitive to local life to be brought in. Here again, however, NGOs should not be used to replace other agents. The scope for action of entities of this kind is limited by their financial capacity while their personnel are oriented primarily to sensitizing and promotional tasks. Implementing large development projects needs to be handled through specialized executing entities.

There are many associations in Europe active in the heritage field, for example, "the vieux manoir" in France, which specializes in archaeological excavations and the restoration of historic buildings. In addition international excavation or restoration projects that use the services of volunteers have been developed in many countries. We believe that this potential can be harnessed in such projects in West Africa provided certain requirements are met. First, the specific features of the built heritage require that this personnel, accustomed to dealing with "conventional" historic sites, be properly trained. Second, care must be taken to ensure that using the services of a variety of organizations of diverse origins does not lead to mutually competing projects and to a negation of the role of the local authorities with the consequent absence of a project leader. Such fragmentation could rapidly deactivate the agents who are intended to spearhead a new, dynamic plan of action. In other words designing a new type of project should be an opportunity to avoid reiterating the transfer of external cultural action models, such as has taken place in certain cooperation and aid schemes.

### **Conclusion**

This paper needs to be read with care. It stresses local constraints on "conventional" heritage projects, which are based solely on the restoration of prestigious buildings, especially since such buildings are rare in West Africa and are not always the prime remembrances of local cultural practices.

It is more necessary than ever to design a more ambitious action strategy that takes into account the specific forms by which the cultures of these societies are expressed. These forms, while they may rule out turnkey projects, can foster a fresh approach to heritage, an approach that still centers fundamentally on the Western world and that deserves to be discussed when the question arises of exporting it from the West to other societies.

**Appendix**

All the architectural surveys during this study were done by Luc Gnacadja, a Beninese architect.

**Figure 1. Perspective view and plan at the end of the eighteenth century of the French fort, destroyed at the beginning of the twentieth century**






Figure 2. The Portuguese fort, recently restored by the Gulbenkian Foundation




**Figure 5. Cross-section and elevation of the Residence of the District Commander (*Commandant de Cercle*)**




Dating from 1900s, the residence is used as the official residence of the Urban District Chief.

**Figure 4. Location plan, cross-section, and elevation of the Catholic Basilica of Ouidah, built in 1908**




**Figure 5. Cross-section and elevation of the Residence of the District Commander (*Commandant de Cercle*)**




Dating from 1900s, the residence is used as the official residence of the Urban District Chief.

**Figure 6.** A commercial house in the city center with facades decorated in the Afro-Brazilian manner




**Figure 7. The Adjavon villa, built in 1922 by a rich merchant**




Undoubtedly one of the architecturally most original buildings in Ouidah, this villa bears witness to the talent of the builders of that time.

**Figure 8. Window decoration features, characteristic of the Afro-Brazilian style**



G.

**Figure 9. Plan view of the old districts of the city, indicating the buildings that illustrate Afro-Brazilian decorative features**



## Earth—The Once and Future Building Material: The Potential in Developing Africa

Neville Agnew

Special Projects Director  
The Getty Conservation Institute

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*Earth is humankind's oldest building material, and 30 to 40 percent of the world's population still live in earthen structures. Despite severe housing shortages in many African countries, governments often insist on building projects using expensive, often imported, modern materials. Earth is tragically misperceived as a "third-world" material. It is important to get the message to African authorities of the cultural and economic value of traditional earth structures. Julius Nyerere, Indira Gandhi, and Hassan Fathy advocated use of earth as a building material. The Getty Conservation Institute and other agencies are doing research on the preservation of adobe. CRATerre-EAG, and ICCROM are designing joint activities in training, research, documentation, development of standards, and technical cooperation in earthen architecture. The "Adobe 90" conference recommended the establishment of links between such groups and the construction industry to benefit new construction, especially in developing countries. The World Bank could lead through convening in Africa an international conference on earth as a building material, bringing together architects, town planners, local and national housing authorities, and the above organizations.*

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Earth is humankind's oldest material, and today it still is one of the most important global raw materials in the construction of dwellings. Various estimates have been made of the percentage of the world's population who live in earthen structures. It is likely to be at least 30 percent and possibly as high as 40 percent.

Africa, in particular, has a wonderfully rich earthen architectural heritage. As has been pointed out time and again, its vernacular architecture has evolved in different regions of the continent in different ways, but each has admirably fulfilled the needs of the people who built their dwellings and community buildings.

The magnificence of earthen cities, such as Djenné in Mali with its Great Mosque, has been well documented.<sup>1</sup> In complex communities like Djenné the form and function of the buildings and dwellings reflect the patterns of social and

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Pierre Maas and Geert Mommersteeg, *Djenné—chef d'oeuvre architectural* (Eindhoven: Université de Technologie, 1992).

religious life and family needs. Elsewhere, as in southern Morocco, the fortified villages (*ksar*) have declined with changes in the political structure of the country, and now many of the impressive feudal forts (*kasbas*) within the villages are dilapidated to a point of no return.<sup>2</sup> In the Casamance region of Senegal only a few of the famed impluvium houses remain, and they are mainly tourist attractions. Indeed, tourism in certain parts of the continent may be said to have "saved" residues of the traditional architecture. In the Transvaal the beautifully decorated, brightly colored houses of the Ndebele have long served as a source of tourism income.

Traditionally, self-reliance has been a feature of construction in earth, but unlike more durable building materials such as stone and fired brick, earthen materials are maintenance-intensive. Abandoned buildings slump back into the earth quickly, especially in wetter areas. In Africa few abandoned earthen architectural masterpieces have survived while the decline in the use of earth is accelerating.

Today in many parts of the continent there is a desperate shortage of housing. At The 6th International Conference on the Preservation of Earthen Architecture, "Adobe 90," held in New Mexico in 1990, a number of papers dealt with earthen architecture in Africa. As pointed out, for example, by Smail working in Zambia, the response to shortage of housing has been for government housing authorities to develop and construct model housing on the grid pattern using expensive materials like cement, glass, and galvanized sheet steel for roofing.<sup>3</sup> Such is the cost of these materials, often imported, that the average worker in parts of the continent needs thirty years' wages to pay for such housing. This type of housing is affordable only by companies for their employees. The inhumanity of many of these grim housing developments has accelerated the destruction of order and traditional social values as it has done elsewhere in the world.

The issues are, of course, complex and are also ascribable to population growth and migration of people to cities in search of work. But the social and economic cost of building in modern materials has been high, especially when coupled with insensitive and inappropriate architecture and town planning. No

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<sup>2</sup>Jean-Louis Michon, "Mud Castles (Kasbas) of South Morocco—Will They Survive?" in *The 6th International Conference on the Conservation of Earthen Architecture, Adobe 90 Preprints* (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Getty Conservation Institute, 1990), 99. Available from J. Paul Getty Book Distribution Center, Box 2112, Santa Monica, CA 90406, U.S.A.

<sup>3</sup>David Smail, "Retention of the Traditional Values of African Earth Architecture," in *Adobe 90 Preprints* (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Getty Conservation Institute, 1990), 122.

widespread attempts seem to have been made in township development to couple traditional designs and materials with other building material resources, for example, tin roofing, where available and affordable. Nor, Smail implies, have attempts been made to pattern township development on traditional, proven village organization. Instead, artificial township lay-out and Western housing design and materials requiring skilled workers trained in Western construction have been imposed. Aspects of self-reliance and opportunity for individual expression in architectural design and decoration of the finished dwelling have thereby been removed. Tradition is being destroyed.

Smail illustrates his point by comparing modern sterile housing plans in Zambia with traditional plans elsewhere in the continent such as Mopti in Mali, the Hausa house plan in the northern savannah region of Nigeria, and others further south in Botswana. The people of Botswana have for centuries been building dwellings similar to those of the Hausa in which women do all the building and crafting in mud. They collect the material, mold the blocks, erect the walls, and do the plastering and coloring. Furthermore, the women do maintenance on a regular basis.<sup>4</sup>

It is ironic that earth has enjoyed a resurgence as a fashionable building material not only in the western United States but also in the hotel industry for luxury hotels serving developed world tourists in many parts of Africa and also among city dwellers for their country retreats. It would seem important then to get the message to authorities in African nations of the value in both cultural and economic terms of traditional structures made of earth.

For five years the Getty Conservation Institute has been interested in earthen architecture from the view of conservation of historic and archaeological structures. In collaboration with the Museum of New Mexico and the United States National Park Service, research and field testing have been done in New Mexico at the historic site of Fort Selden. Using test walls, we are studying the use of chemical consolidants, structural stabilization of adobe walls, drainage, and sheltering for these types of structures. And while our interest is not primarily in new construction of housing, there are many areas of overlap. Other groups around the world have been equally active in these areas. CRATerre-EAG<sup>5</sup> in Grenoble, France, has collaborated with ICCROM,<sup>6</sup> in Rome, to undertake a long-term plan for the preservation of the earthen

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<sup>4</sup>Smail, "Retention of the Traditional Values," 122-24.

<sup>5</sup>Centre International de la Construction en Terre—Ecole d'Architecture de Grenoble (CRATerre-EAG), 10 galerie des Baladins, BP 2636, F-38036 Grenoble Cedex 2, France.

<sup>6</sup>International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), 13 Via di San Michele, I-00153, Rome, Italy.

architecture heritage the GAIA Project. The five-year collaboration between these two organizations has resulted in an integrated proposal for joint activities in training, research, documentation, development of standards, and technical cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

Other speakers at "Adobe 90," such as Kamamba from Tanzania, have stated that in developing countries like Tanzania policymakers and professionals have been promoting and advocating the use of modern building materials and consigning the vernacular architecture, earthen structures included, to village museums.<sup>8</sup> Kamamba corroborates Smail's point that modern building techniques and materials are often beyond the reach of the general rural population in Tanzania.

In China and elsewhere there is still a robust self-reliance in the use of building material, coupled with modern materials where appropriate.<sup>9</sup> The Chinese retain traditional styles, dwellings, and village organization and lay-out. By combining the old with the new better drainage of foundations, use of limited modern materials, galvanized sheet steel for roofing where it is cheap, admixtures of cement or asphalt emulsion in the mud for fabrication of adobe blocks, as used commercially in New Mexico it could be possible to achieve solutions to the problems of cost and minimize the negative social impacts of modernization in Africa. It is therefore important to retain the best of traditional self-reliance and skills of rural life and economies in Africa as they adapt to change.

The Laboratoire Géomatériaux of ENTPE has since 1982 carried out scientific studies on adobe, pisé (rammed earth), and earth blocks compacted with presses for developing countries to provide an alternative to costly materials such as concrete and steel.<sup>10</sup> This laboratory organizes technical training in France. It has cooperative programs with agencies in Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, and Indonesia, and has provided technical advice in countries such as Burkina Faso and Guinea.

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<sup>7</sup>Alejandro Alva and others, "CRATerre-EAG, ICCROM Long-Term Plan for the Preservation of the Earthen Architectural Heritage: The GAIA Project," *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 461.

<sup>8</sup>Donatius Msobwe Kamana Kamamba, "Cyclical Maintenance of Earthen Architecture as a Future Policy in Tanzania," *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 77.

<sup>9</sup>Hou Jiyao and Jia Weitung, "Earth, Culture, Architecture—The Protection and Development of Rammed Earth and Adobe Construction in China," *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 72. See also Ron Edwards and Lin Wei-Hao, *Mud Brick and Earth Building the Chinese Way* (Kuranda, Queensland, Australia: The Ram's Skull Press).

<sup>10</sup>Ecole nationale des travaux publics de l'état (ENTPE), 69518 Vaulx-en-Velin Cedex, France.

The Navapolos Centre in Spain likewise has been involved in international cooperation and implementation of earth construction.<sup>11</sup>

In the United States, as mentioned earlier, the resurgence of interest in earth as building material has brought with it some solutions to the problems of maintenance. At Taos Pueblo in New Mexico traditional techniques of re-mudding have been adopted; the New Mexico Community Foundation has effectively worked with rural communities on the repair and conservation of earthen churches of which some 1,500 exist in the state.<sup>12</sup>

In summary, then, one should ask why it is that there has been wholesale abandonment of the traditions of architecture in Africa. In 1977 then-President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania advocated the continued use of earth as a building material.<sup>13</sup> In 1980 Mrs. Indira Gandhi likewise advocated the adaptation of this old technology for India.<sup>14</sup> The great Egyptian architect, Hassan Fathy, devoted a great deal of his professional life to the use of earth. In his classic book, *Architecture for the Poor An Experiment in Rural Egypt*, he clearly delineates the problems of having the use of earth accepted by those in authority.<sup>15</sup> Fathy's remarkable design of the village of New Goura on the Nile, near the Valley of the Kings, was as much an architectural masterpiece as an endeavor to enhance the quality of life of the villagers. He addressed every aspect of life and needs of the community in his architecture by drawing on traditional styles, skills, and materials, including an attempt at providing water free of bilharzia (schistosomiasis), the endemic parasitic scourge of Egypt (and much of the rest of Africa). His book can still be studied with profit from an architectural viewpoint and to understand that without committed support from authorities such lone efforts seem doomed.

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<sup>11</sup>See publications of the Centro Navapolos, Centro de Investigación de Materiales y Técnicas Autoctonas y Construcciones Experimentales, Erhard Rohmer, Inter-Acción Chairman, Director of the Navapolos Center c/Rios Rosas, 30 4<sup>o</sup> dcha, 28003 Madrid, Spain.

<sup>12</sup>Nancy Armon and Sam Baca, "Churches, Symbols of Community: The Preservation of New Mexico's Adobe Churches," *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 143.

<sup>13</sup>Julius Nyerere, *The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977), cited in *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 80.

<sup>14</sup>"Taking an All-Round Attitude to Science: Interview with Indira Gandhi," *Nature* 285 (5761) (1980), cited in *Adobe 90 Preprints*, 80.

<sup>15</sup>Hassan Fathy, *Architecture for the Poor—An Experiment in Rural Egypt* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

### **Recommendations**

"Adobe 90"'s closing session discussed directions for the future. Sylvio Mutal, Peru's regional coordinator for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), stressed the need to establish links with the construction industry so that the body of knowledge gained through the study and preservation of existing structures might also benefit new construction with earth, particularly in developing countries. Yet the message *has not been propounded with sufficient force nor disseminated widely enough* in most parts of the African continent. It needs to be. An organization such as the World Bank could take the lead through, initially, an international conference on earth construction for Africa.

This paper points out the decline in a vibrant heritage of architectural use of earth in Africa. Without the political will to foster its use at local and national levels, the decline will continue. The author has heard it said casually many times that earth is seen as a "third world" material, symptomatic of poverty and lack of progress. This is a tragic misapprehension, and it is ironic that in other countries outside of Africa, including the developed ones, this stricture does not apply. Interestingly, in Australia, a country with only 200 years of built heritage one in which modern construction materials and techniques are typically used there is a small but flourishing earth construction industry. In addition some years ago the government of the state of Victoria in Australia developed a program of "sweat equity loans" to would-be home builders in earth to alleviate shortages in low-cost housing. Such efforts could be emulated and adapted for Africa.

What is needed is a more aggressive dissemination of the message of the value of traditional materials, architectural design, and urban planning not by endeavoring to stop the clock but to accept the best of the old with the best of the new and, if necessary, to meld the two for appropriate solutions to current problems. A meeting in Africa of architects, town planners, and local and national housing authorities to disseminate the message of the value of the old, with input from groups such as CRATerre, ICCROM, and others who are committed to the promotion of earth as building material and to its conservation, would be a beginning. A strong recommendation along these lines from this conference or the establishment of a working group to further affordable housing in Africa could spark the beginning of a resurgence in the use of traditional materials and designs in earth.

**Bringing Cultural Heritage into the Development Agenda:  
Summary Findings of a Report of Cultural Heritage  
in Environmental Assessments in Sub-Saharan Africa**

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*Recent Bank work on the status of cultural heritage in Sub-Saharan Africa has provided an overview of the relevance and importance of this resource as well as the threats to it. A range of policy and operational instruments are available to ensure that cultural heritage is protected in Bank work. Each country's Environmental Action Plan (EAP) is an important forum for integrating cultural resource conservation in national policy. EAPs are means to alert decisionmakers to the needs and opportunities presented by cultural heritage. The Environmental Assessment (EA) required for World Bank projects and the Operational Manual Statement and draft Operational Directive for Cultural Property are essential tools to conserve cultural heritage. The paper summarizes the Bank's project experience in cultural conservation and training needs.*

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My remarks concentrate on the policy implications of findings derived from my recent work on cultural heritage in environmental assessments in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past few years the World Bank has developed several important mechanisms to systematize the treatment of environmental concerns in its day-to-day operations: Country Environmental Action Plans (EAPs) and the less formal country environmental issues papers, environmental assessments (EAs), and free-standing environmental projects and project components. My purpose is to bring to your attention ways in which these mechanisms can be used to strengthen protection of cultural heritage and to overcome existing obstacles to adequate safeguarding. I will restrict my comments to the built environment material culture and only tangentially consider lifeways.

**Overview of Cultural Property in Africa**

I shall begin with a brief summary of the broad conclusions reached in my region-wide survey of cultural heritage issues. First, that Africa's cultural heritage is meager is a common perception in the Bank and elsewhere, albeit a

total misperception.<sup>1</sup> As this audience realizes, cultural property in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite insufficient research and data and a high degree of country variability, is substantial and widely distributed.

Second, African cultural heritage the long-term record is of global importance. It sheds light on global physical processes such as climate change and ecological adaptation. African archaeology can inform all of us about the history of humanity's impact on the environment in Africa, its use of natural resources, and its creativity in the arts and in the creation of societies. Every stage of human evolution took place in Africa. Africa's cultural achievements human evolution, independent invention of agriculture, long-distance trade, art (including ancient rock art that is some of the oldest in the world), urbanism, and metallurgy are attested to in many thousands of cultural heritage sites found throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Cultural heritage is a primary source for understanding strategies of human adaptation to and use of the environment.

Third, affirming the relevance of the history of Sub-Saharan African peoples is essential for Africa's present and future on both a psychological and practical level. Conserving and understanding Africa's cultural heritage are part of the quest for a sense of African identity. This view was well expressed by Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia at the 1987 inauguration of the Railway Museum in Livingston:

... [I]t is important that national identity is preserved. This can only be achieved through the preservation of those aspects of our society that are dear to us as a people our monuments and relics since they are witnesses of our history and of our past achievements. It is their presence in fact that gives each country a cultural soul and individuality. It is often said that the past is important because a sense of continuity is necessary to people and that the preservation of the Nation's heritage is necessary to the life of new men for whom they represent a powerful physical, moral and spiritual regenerating influence. The

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<sup>1</sup>Cultural heritage refers to sites, structures, and remains of archaeological, historical, religious, cultural or aesthetic value. This discussion focuses on tangible and immovable cultural property comprising archaeological sites, building complexes, architecture, monumental sculpture, painting, inscriptions, and other paleontological and physical remains left by human inhabitants and considered part of a country's cultural heritage. See *Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works* (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), and *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972). Ancient monuments, antiquities, relics, historic landmarks, historical sites, cultural patrimony, and cultural resources are also terms that also describe forms of cultural heritage.

preservation of national identity, therefore, is the first step towards regaining the Nation's creative and inventive abilities.

Archaeological remains, the physical remains of past human activities, constitute for many African countries the only objective source material for the study of their precolonial history. Traditional art forms are a reservoir of potent symbols to be put to new purposes. They are used by contemporary African artists who find original ways of incorporating them with new elements in the ongoing process of renewal. Archaeology may, in some cases, contribute to practical solutions on an everyday level where high technology has failed. Agriculture and mining are two sectors in which this is especially relevant.

Fourth, the cultural patrimony of Sub-Saharan Africa is threatened by destruction and deterioration. Loss of cultural heritage is often avoidable and is an impoverishment, not only for Africans but for all of humankind.

Fifth, development and the conservation of cultural heritage are not mutually exclusive. Economic development and the valuation of cultural heritage can be mutually beneficial. It is appropriate that President Kaunda made the preceding remarks at the commemoration of Zambia's railway. Many archaeological sites in Africa were discovered in the course of railway and road building, mining, water supply, and other infrastructure projects. In fact much of what is known about Africa's history derives from remains located on either side of major roadways and rivers or in coastal areas. Staff of development projects geologists, engineers, and even bureaucrats have made outstanding contributions to archaeology, paleontology, and ethnography in Africa. As Ann Stahl proposes in her paper for this conference, *archaeology is "the implications of development in long-term perspective."*<sup>2</sup>

Sixth, our picture of Africa's past is very incomplete, and research gaps are many. Archaeological visibility is the principal problem. Remains often are relatively inconspicuous. Inaccessibility of terrain and fragility of materials are factors that have determined the character of archaeological evidence and the extent of archeological research. (A striking example is the capital city of Buganda, a state near Lake Victoria, constructed entirely of grass, wood, and other organic materials and frequently moved. It was described in 1889 as "one of the great capitals of Africa," yet no archaeological evidence of it has come to light.) Lack of stratigraphic control has been a great obstacle in refining our understanding of Africa's past. At present the number of large well-dated artifact assemblages is inadequate for the late Stone Age. The recent Iron Age and how it relates to modern African societies is also poorly understood. Areas that are

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<sup>2</sup>Ann Stahl, "Valuing the Past, Envisioning the Future: Local Perspectives on Environmental and Cultural Heritage in Ghana" (Paper published in this *Proceedings*).

particularly understudied are the savanna and forest regions of West Africa and large parts of Central Africa.

Seventh, the changing nature of African culture must be taken into account when evaluating and planning for cultural heritage conservation. African societies have never been static or closed: they have always been changing, both exerting influence and being influenced by contact with other peoples, and 1991 was certainly no exception. Therefore, assessing Sub-Saharan Africa's cultural heritage means reflecting on its evolving situation. Only recently have colonial architecture and early industrial monuments such as markets and railways become of interest to preservationists. With the rapid growth of urban populations it is clear that planning for the preservation of urban culture will be necessary in the coming decades. Many art forms are now extinct they either are no longer made or are not used for their original purposes.

Eighth, political movements have influenced cultural perceptions to a large degree. The rise of African nationalism was accompanied by the pursuit of an indigenous past with which to banish the notion of "Savage Africa" and to bolster the pride of the newly independent states. In turn newly independent states in the process of state formation sought to suppress signs of ethnic identity. Consequently, few resources have been allocated to protection of cultural heritage. What will the tide of democratization that is now traveling across Africa mean for the region's cultural heritage?

Ninth, surprisingly little is known about site distribution in many Sub-Saharan African countries. In general sites have been found where archaeologists have looked.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, unexamined areas tend to appear archaeologically sterile while, in fact, this assumption may be simply due to lack of investigation. Geographical distribution varies considerably for each country. Areas that are now attractive for settlement often have a long history of site occupation. Sites tend to cluster along coastal areas, river systems, and major transport axes. Elevation also plays a role in many countries in the frequency of sites, as in the Cameroons, where sites are frequently located on hilltops. Central Africa Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comores, Congo, Equatorial Gabon, Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire, and Zambia is the least archaeologically well known part of the continent, especially its precolonial urban

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<sup>3</sup>In fifteen countries in western Africa for which a detailed listing was assembled in 1987 (Eric Huysecom, *Die archäologische Forschung in West Afrika* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1987)), some 5,000 sites (excavations, middens, grave mounds, shrines, towns, and ancient villages) have been enumerated. In Mali alone 874 sites have been noted in the literature. These figures should be seen as indicative only: many sites have been found but not recorded, and whole geographic areas have not yet been surveyed archaeologically.

history. The incipient stage of archaeology in most of Sub-Saharan Africa calls for a survey of most terrain in advance of construction, rather than assuming that lack of information is equivalent to lack of cultural property.

Tenth, the variety of forms of traditional architecture has only recently begun to be researched and appreciated. In areas like Mali and the Cameroons indigenous architecture is particularly rich in local adaptations to climate and available building materials. The cultural and symbolic significance of the historic built environment is key to understanding African culture. Yet in many Sub-Saharan African countries cultural heritage or town planning legislation does not protect even the most outstanding examples of traditional architecture. Countries should revise their legislation accordingly.

Eleventh, colonial architecture has received little attention. This genre spans Portuguese and other early European forts and settlements to the remains of nineteenth century colonization by European and Arab powers. As the pace of urbanization quickens in many African countries, historic urban centers are fast disappearing. Porto Novo, Benin and the forts of Ghana are examples of areas for which conservation plans have been proposed. Zanzibar and Mombasa are historic towns in which historic preservation efforts are underway. There are historic settlements throughout Sub-Saharan Africa that warrant conservation efforts.

Twelfth, material culture in Sub-Saharan Africa the rich traditions of daily life such as wood carving, basketry, ceramics, metalwork, textiles, costumes, musical instruments, and street signs is also subject to changing notions. As human beings' response to their new environment, particularly urban artistic expressions, material culture is a dynamic area of cultural heritage that must also be examined. These expressions will become the traditional art of the next generations. These art forms digest contemporary events and adapt to change and are thus a chronicle of Africa's contemporary identity. Works express a wide range of ideas: they may reinterpret inherited symbolic systems or propose a national identity forged by blending different ethnic motifs.

### *Institutional and Legal Framework for Cultural Property Conservation*

Let me now sketch the outlines of the institutional and legal framework for cultural property conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

*Regional coordination.* At the regional level coordination in cultural heritage conservation is carried out primarily through training programs, namely the West African Museums Programme (WAMP) and the Prevention in the Museums of Africa Training Program in Preventive Conservation (PREMA) program administered by the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Rome. Two Swedish

initiatives also should be noted: the Swedish-African Museum Programme, which has established links among thirteen Swedish museums and thirteen African museums (Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia (two), and Zimbabwe), and SAREC, which is training archaeologists from eight African countries and providing assistance for institutions, museums, and laboratories. Since 1950 the Institut fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN) has carried out research and documentation on ethnology, physical anthropology, archaeology, botany, physical geography, and paleontology in Francophone countries including Cape Verde, the Gambia, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The 1991 conference organized by the International Council on Museums (ICOM), "What Museums for Africa?" is perhaps the most recent effort at a pan-African approach to the role of museums.

*Institutional arrangements.* Responsibility for cultural heritage rests in a variety of ministries that may combine culture, education, information, tourism, protection (of nature and culture), youth, sports, and museums. Some countries (Djibouti, Liberia, Somalia) have no specific agency assigned to protect cultural heritage. Most national institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have the adequate financial and human resources to protect cultural property. The ministry of culture or its equivalent rarely has its own budget but is dependent on the central government. Financial allocations are usually very small, both for ongoing operations and capital investments. Trained staff are at a premium, and incentives to work in the public sector are minimal. The institution charged with the protection of cultural heritage is often one of the weakest governmental agencies. Clearly, analysis of the individual institutional issues in each country and appropriate restructuring are required if cultural heritage conservation is to be effective.

*Interagency coordination.* Coordination with other line agencies is often poor to nonexistent. Information on cultural heritage is often difficult to access, limiting its diffusion to other agencies. Typically, the ministry of culture is not involved in discussions or decisions on development or environmental planning.

*Museums.* In Africa it is the museums that have taken the lead in instituting programs for conservation and raising awareness of the urgent need to protect and conserve the continent's heritage. Other participants at our conference have spoken on this theme.

*Role of universities.* Universities play a decisive role in a number of African countries in disseminating, training, and carrying out research in cultural heritage. The teaching of archaeology began first in West Africa, followed by East Africa. Countries in which university courses were established during the colonial period (Kenya, Tanzania) now have a cadre of trained specialists. Other countries are only now developing local experts (Madagascar, Mali, and many others). Some countries still have no local experts in archaeology, museum

work, and architectural conservation. In more recent years small numbers of African post-graduate students have studied outside Africa in Europe and North America. But in the last decade university programs in African archaeology outside of Africa have tended to shrink, and there is cause for serious alarm for the future of the field. A short annual course on African archaeology at the Université Libre of Brussels, Belgium provides an introduction for university students (primarily European).

*Coverage and coordination.* In many countries the capital city or region or dominant ethnic group tends to monopolize the activities of the agency responsible for cultural heritage protection so that the cultural patrimony of other regions or minority groups is ignored. (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Niger seem to be among the exceptions.) Projects should explore opportunities to assist national institutions to expand their coverage to include a wider range of cultural traditions.

*Information systems.* Accessible information systems for cultural property in most countries are lacking. In many cases records on cultural heritage are difficult to locate because they are filed away in dusty museum storage areas. Rarely are they used by other line ministries in their project planning. *A comprehensive inventory of cultural heritage is perhaps the most essential tool in conservation.* Information systems for cultural property are easily applied and accessible; they prevent duplication of site designation and provide for dissemination of survey data and coordination of research. They would take into account security issues and the possible contribution of community participation. Indicative of the difficulty of access to information on cultural heritage is that the United Nations Environment Programme Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) does not have data on cultural patrimony in Africa. Improving gazetting,<sup>4</sup> inventory techniques, and accessibility is a priority in Sub-Saharan Africa.

*Research institutes.* A small number of research institutions exist in Saharan Africa including IFAN, the Centre international de civilisations bantu (CICIBA) in central Africa, and the British Institute in East Africa. They are important because they undertake research projects across national boundaries and publish monographs, regional syntheses, and journals.

*On-site training* is a problem in archaeology and conservation. Funding for archaeological investigation is extremely low, and as a result ongoing activities are few. For example, for all of Central Africa there are fewer than ten archaeologists who are actively doing research. Although almost every African country has at least one trained archaeologist and museologist, the need

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<sup>4</sup>Gazetting is analyzing information in regard to geographic distribution.

for trained staff is great. Conservators and trained managers are especially scarce.

*NGO and private sector capacity.* The private sector has done very little to support cultural preservation in Africa. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that support cultural heritage preservation are few. Two exceptions are the Sudan Archaeological Research Society, which was established to cover northeast Africa, and the Historic Preservation Association of Lamu, Kenya. In Sierra Leone a new NGO has recently been founded aimed at the protection of Bunce Island National Historic Site.

*International foundations* have contributed to conservation in Africa. The Aga Khan Trust for Culture is currently planning a historic cities project in Zanzibar. The Ford Foundation supported the conservation of Lamu. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have supported WAMP. However, the level of funding for Africa is low.

*Conservation of sites.* Site conservation and presentation have often been afforded low priority in Sub-Saharan Africa although there are good practice examples (Fort Jesus in Mombasa; Kilwa in Zanzibar, where there is some evidence of recent neglect, however; Gedi; and Olduvai Gorge in Kenya. The reasons for this are many. It may be a deliberate decision by the responsible agency that the site is too remote to attract tourism, too sensitive in that looting may follow its display to the public, or too costly in the long term to guard and keep the vegetation under control. Conservation of these sites and their presentation are often below international standards. Site museums usually contain few objects because of security problems. Minimal conservation takes place on nondisplay sites, which are often very remote and rarely visited. Lack of vehicles and financial resources often limits or even eliminates site inspection by the responsible government agency. An additional problem is that the archaeological research system does not include conservation work as part of the project scope.

There has been little demand from the respective ministries of culture that the archaeologists attend to conservation problems. In other countries (for example, Cyprus) the Department of Antiquities requires that each excavation team have a conservator and that conservation be an element of the site activity. Changes in government regulations on archaeological excavations to make explicit these requirements would help to address this need. Because tourism is not a major factor in most African countries (with the exception of Kenya and Zimbabwe), economic incentives are not present that would reinforce the value of properly conserved and presented sites.

### **Legislation**

Most Sub-Saharan African countries have legislation to protect cultural heritage, often of recent date even where reasonable coverage was inherited with Independence. Legislation tends to be concerned mainly with ethnographic objects, and to a lesser degree with site protection and control of excavations. Rarely is gazetting an explicit legal requirement although it is an important way to encourage the safeguarding of sites, whether in private or public ownership.

The effectiveness of cultural heritage protection legislation in Africa is generally low. A major problem appears to be to find the resources to enforce the legislation in the face of the strong demand for African art with the concomitant high prices and the expansion of urban and agricultural activities. Social and economic incentives to curb illicit trafficking in antiquities are often lacking. Many gazetted sites are built over or farmed. Historic stone buildings are demolished for building stone, especially in East Africa.

It is clear that solutions cannot be found solely at the level of legal fiat. As in other regions of the world, there may be a conflict between local and official national attitudes to cultural preservation. Malian or Ghanaian farmers "farming" their fields for archaeological artifacts are cash croppers who hunt and gather to the best of their abilities to provide for their families. If archaeology is undertaken in their fields, they will probably not benefit in any way, and the objects will be alienated from them and taken to the distant "national" museum, often to be relegated to a storage area. Changes in current practices, for example by creating museums that are responsive to local community aspirations, are needed to bridge the gap between local interests and national policy.

### **Overview of World Bank Operations in Africa**

I would like to turn now to a quick review of World Bank operations in Sub-Saharan Africa to give you a sense of the numerous ongoing programs and projects. At the end of Fiscal 1991 the World Bank's Africa Region portfolio comprised 641 projects in 45 countries. A total of 89 percent of the portfolio is investment projects, and 11 percent is adjustment operations. Total disbursements reached US\$2.8 billion, of which 29 percent are in the agriculture sector (185 projects), 21 percent in infrastructure (135 projects), and 15 percent in human resources (98 projects). Seven countries Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan were either under suspension or in civil war in Fiscal 1991. Despite the large sums invested in Africa, with the exception of the environmental assessment (EA) requirement, to which I will return, very little is being done proactively in Bank projects to safeguard cultural heritage.

### **What Can Be Done: Strategies for Integrating Cultural Heritage in Development Work**

With this brief overview of the extent and composition of Africa's cultural patrimony and of the legislative and institutional framework for its protection, I now turn to mechanisms to improve the status of cultural heritage: *Country Environmental Action Plans, Environmental Assessments, Environmental Projects or Project Components, and Training.*

#### ***Country Environmental Action Plans***

Country environmental action plans (EAPs) provide a strategic opportunity to evaluate the status of cultural heritage and identify ways to conserve and protect this nonrenewable resource. Planning for cultural heritage within EAPs is essential if the objective of integrating the natural and human environments is to be met. What then is an EAP? EAPs describes a country's major environmental concerns, problems, and the formulation of policies and actions to address the problems. The responsibility for EAP preparation and implementation rests with the governments. World Bank policy is to foster the preparation of the country EAP and to incorporate EAP findings and strategies into Bank work. The EAP is expected to become a continuing government process of environmental analysis and an integral part of developmental policy and investment decisionmaking. The EAP will be used by the Bank, as well as other donors, as a basis for dialogue with the government on environmental issues and as information for developing country assistance strategies. In most African countries comprehensive national environmental action plans (NEAPs) should include cultural heritage concerns.

National EAPs, or NEAPs, provide a matrix to address urgent needs in safeguarding Africa's cultural heritage. Effective cultural heritage conservation can be based only on an overall strategy that is tailored to each country's patrimony. Such a strategy would integrate cultural heritage protection into regional, rural, and urban development plans.

NEAPs are appropriate for bringing cultural heritage conservation into the environmental debate for three reasons: like cultural heritage, NEAPs are intersectoral; they catalyze coordination among sectors, agencies, and NGOs; and they mobilize financial support.

Cultural heritage is intersectoral, part of the African landscape and cityscape. It is located in a wide variety of ecosystems: high altitude ecosystems; tropical moist rainforest; woodland and savannah ecosystems; arid lands and deserts; mangroves, wetlands and estuaries; coastal ecosystems; and rich isolated island ecosystems. Cultural heritage occurs in both rural and urban contexts. It

is subject to negative impacts from agriculture, irrigation and hydropower, mining, transport, and industry. Environmental degradation, in particular pollution of waterways and air, deforestation, and erosion, also degrades cultural heritage.

EAPs require the cooperation and coordination of ministries and agencies to establish the institutional framework to deal with the environment. Lack of coordination between the government agency responsible for cultural heritage and other line agencies is one of the greatest obstacles for effective conservation. Typically, ministries of culture are isolated from policy areas and are not involved in discussions of environmental issues. This lack of input is demonstrated in the first group of EAPs, in which virtually no attention has been paid to cultural heritage issues.

EAPs help attract multidonor support. There is probably no country in Africa that has been able to allocate sufficient resources to ensure adequate stewardship of its cultural patrimony. Financing problems are chronic in virtually every country: budgets for operating expenses and capital expenditures are small, as is allocation for training. International support for cultural heritage in Africa has been weak.

*How to carry out cultural heritage evaluations.* To evaluate the status of cultural heritage for the EAP, a team would be formed composed of an archaeologist, an architect (or architectural historian), a museologist, and a conservation scientist. A cultural anthropologist might also contribute to the study. A mix of national and foreign expertise would be most likely to produce a comprehensive overview. External agencies, including research institutes and universities, should be contacted for support. The assignment would be to review the entire range of cultural heritage and to articulate priority issues. The team would begin by examining the national inventory of archaeological and historic places and other sources of information on paleontological, archaeological, historical, and sacred sites. They would also comment on the effectiveness of existing legislation and institutions. Data gaps, for example regions that are not yet archaeologically known or traditional architecture that is not documented, should be cited. Threats to cultural heritage, including pollution, would be investigated. The team would propose investment activities for the immediate, middle, and longer term.

Typically, such a review could be completed in three to six months. The relative inputs of staff time would be geared to each country's patrimony. In countries with a rich or unexplored archaeological heritage, the archaeologist would obviously take a large share of the staff time.

Incorporating cultural heritage concerns in the EAP process begins to address five major constraints to increasing the effectiveness of cultural heritage

conservation, all of which are also evident in varying degrees in other environmental areas:

1. The relative isolation and limited effectiveness of the agencies responsible for protection of cultural heritage, hindering their capacity to identify, plan, and implement conservation projects
2. Poor coordination of these agencies with other line agencies and the ministry of finance
3. Legislation and policies that are not conducive to conservation of patrimony
4. Lack of commitment from African governments to make heritage conservation a priority
5. Inadequate long-term funding commitments from governments, lenders, donors, and the private sector.

Linking protection of cultural heritage with the EAP process is an important way to bring the urgency of these issues to the attention of decisionmakers and to benefit from the strength of country commitment to environmental management.

Among the early outcomes of country environmental action plans are a paper I prepared for the Madagascar meeting on EAPS in 1991 and initial efforts in Ghana, Madagascar, and Nigeria to incorporate cultural heritage in the EAP process. There is a great deal of work to be done to reach the goal of having the examination of cultural heritage issues become standard procedure for all country EAPs.

### *Environmental Assessments: Project-Specific and Regional*

*Environmental Assessment.* The World Bank's use of Environmental Assessment (EA) to identify the environmental consequences of development projects and to take these consequences into account in project design is one of its most important tools for ensuring that development strategies are environmentally sound and sustainable. The protection of cultural heritage is an important objective of the EA process. The Bank's EA procedures require its borrower countries to undertake cultural heritage assessment in projects that are, as determined by experts, likely to have diverse and significant impacts on cultural resources.

The World Bank's 1990 Operational Directive 4.01, "Environmental Assessment," requires borrowers to prepare Environmental Assessments for all proposed projects or project components that may have diverse and significant environmental impacts. Environmental assessments for individual projects are essential to ascertain expected impacts on cultural heritage and to prevent its destruction or damage. An important part of the assessment is the screening for

potential impacts on cultural heritage, and if necessary the detailed studies needed to specify those impacts and prepare mitigation plans.

The potential adverse impacts on cultural heritage from projects range from total destruction (due to such activities as earth moving, deep plowing, and inundation) to damage (by vibrations, flooding, and air pollution) to alteration in the site or monument or its setting. Large infrastructure works, such as ports, roads, dams and irrigation work, and water supply and sanitation can damage or destroy cultural property. Agriculture, forestry, mineral development, pipelines (oil, gas, and water), reclamation and new land development, river basin development, thermal and hydropower development, and tourism are other project activities that may adversely affect cultural heritage. Both rural and urban development projects, such as electrification and construction of public facilities, can diminish the stock of cultural property and consequently should be carefully examined by the Bank before funding is granted for possible negative impacts.

The information assembled for the purpose of making cultural heritage impact assessments can be extremely useful in deepening and extending our knowledge of Africa's past. Development projects that have included archaeological surveys, such as the Volta Basin Project in the mid-1970s, the Kafue Dam in Zambia, and the Lesotho water project, have contributed greatly to African archaeology. The environmental assessment process provides an important opportunity for Sub-Saharan African countries to improve the knowledge and protection of their cultural inheritance.

To make full use of EAs, the findings must become part of the information base on cultural heritage. Of equal importance this information must be made accessible to project and government planners, thus requiring a suitable information retrieval system.

Project environmental assessments provide a tool for incorporating cultural heritage concerns into economic development. These assessments, however, will have a significant effect only if they are joined to a national policy that brings cultural heritage into planning for the environment. This policy should be based on the importance of preserving, studying, and interpreting archaeological sites, architecture (traditional and colonial), the arts (both urban and rural), and crafts (traditional and modern). Such a policy should also reinforce the institutions devoted to these tasks.

I refer you to the World Bank's Operational Directive 4.01 on Environmental Assessment and to my handbook, which is in preparation, for more

detailed information.<sup>5</sup> During the project planning phase it will be important for staff to take into account impacts on cultural heritage from the proposed project, analysis of alternatives, and a mitigation plan.

*Cultural Property Operational Directive.* Operational Directive 4.25, "Cultural Property" (under final review), is another important mechanism for safeguarding cultural heritage. It will require that the Bank assist in protecting and enhancing cultural property through its lending activities and avoid to the fullest extent possible its destruction or disturbance.

EAs are important for several reasons: they are a means to avoid adverse impacts and encourage proactive responses; they provide scope for information gathering and sharing; and they can raise awareness of the value and vulnerability of Africa's cultural patrimony.

The EAP and EA requirements, however, pose difficulties in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the countries of the region have little experience in evaluating the impacts of projects and programs on cultural property. They often lack the institutional capacity or coordination necessary to incorporate such evaluations into decisions on public and private investments. Furthermore, countries may not have appropriately trained staff to carry out the assessment of cultural property impacts, assessments that are further hampered by the scarcity or absence of data.

### *Projects: Translating Cultural Heritage Conservation Objectives into Development Activities*

For almost two decades the Bank has included cultural heritage conservation components in Bank-supported projects. More recently, the Bank has encouraged a proactive approach to cultural heritage conservation rather than simple avoidance of sites that occur within a project area. However, many opportunities to improve site security and sustainability have been missed, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, often for lack of information and institutional coordination. In Africa the Bank has done relatively little to date in its project work to protect cultural heritage.

Including cultural heritage concerns in the early stages of identification and planning stages of projects provides scope for innovative and responsive project design. In other regions cultural heritage components have been included in a number of Bank-funded urban, infrastructure, transport, hydropower,

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<sup>5</sup>June Taboroff, *Cultural Property in Environmental Assessments of Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, in preparation).

agriculture, and environment projects. Earlier tourism projects also included such components.

Programs and projects aimed at decentralization, as in Mexico,<sup>6</sup> strengthen institutions and develop institutional and human capacity to address cultural heritage issues.

Arguments of sustainability and job generation are central to well-designed cultural heritage project components. Linking the management of cultural heritage to the social and economic needs of people living in communities adjacent to archaeological sites or in historic settlements is probably the surest way of achieving sustainability. Looting and vandalism of sites can be greatly diminished if protection is shifted from an emphasis on patrolling by guards and penalties for illegal use by local populations to job generation through site improvement activities, or compatible tourism. The impact of cultural heritage activities on employment generation as proved in Mexico and Honduras<sup>7</sup> contributes to meeting the country's economic needs.

### *Training*

Emphasis on human resource development is crucial to the success of heritage conservation projects. Here, serious problems include high turnover rates of government staff and low pay of the public sector. A scarcity of local staff to receive training from technical assistance experts is a serious issue in Bank-funded projects.

Among the most severe training needs are for implementation of *environmental assessments* for selected university and research centers and NGOs as well as government staff; for management of sites and museums; for budgeting; and for training in conservation principles and methods. In many cases in-country training seems to be preferable to courses held abroad.

Training, however, is not a panacea. It must be tied to a long-term strategy to support the trained staff by improving their salaries or offering some type of additional benefits to keep them in their posts.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The previous remarks are offered as discussion points for overcoming the greatest obstacle: national policy that disregards cultural heritage. Only as an awareness of the value of cultural heritage to the society at large grows in such

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<sup>6</sup>World Bank, "Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development Project," Staff Appraisal Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991).

<sup>7</sup>As demonstrated in the World Bank's current Honduran Social Investment Fund.

actors as decisionmakers and World Bank staff will protection and preservation become feasible. In addition to the value to society of cultural heritage in nation building, there are compelling economic and financial arguments for cultural property conservation, including direct benefits from tourism (revenue generated from entrance to sites and museums, purchase of handicrafts, employment generation) and the benefits foregone due to loss, deterioration, or delay (Mauritius). In the final analysis *conservation depends on national government commitment*. The World Bank and other international agencies can only play a role in reinforcing the significance of the cultural dimension of Africa.

As Africa stands on the threshold of a new and uncertain chapter in its history, conserving its cultural heritage takes on greater relevance. A first step in this direction is to set up the *processes by which cultural property considerations are internalized in government, donor community, and local community decisions*. Success in conserving Africa's cultural patrimony can be achieved only by moving culture from the margins of folkloric vestige to a more central place on the economic development stage. Therefore, a cultural resource management strategy must:

- Establish the foundations for cultural property management through institution building and human resource development
- Develop operations that address urgent problems.

Without deliberate and concerted actions by national governments, implementing organizations, lenders, and donors, the outlook for the survival of cultural patrimony is bleak. This is a moment of opportunity in which creative responses are needed.

I recommend the following priority actions be taken by governments, with assistance where needed from the World Bank and other international agencies and NGOs, for improved cultural heritage conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa:

1. Carry out comprehensive national inventories of cultural property (this may be assisted by aerial photography). A critical examination of the definition of cultural property is needed in most countries so that largely ignored cultural forms such as traditional architecture and cultural landscapes are included. The format of these inventories needs review to maximize their ongoing information content and usefulness (including regular condition reports). Inventories are essential to establish salvage and conservation priorities. Archaeological survey should use the community as the first stage in information collection as community members often know where many of the important sites are found. The utility of community participation in carrying out an inventory, as in Mozambique, should be tested.

2. Build archaeological survey requirements into projects. Requiring archaeological survey in advance of any earthmoving project is the best way to avoid loss or damage to cultural property. Past failures to do so, as in Nigeria and many other African countries, have impoverished cultural property. By contrast, in Zambia archaeological investigations undertaken prior to construction of the Itzhezhi Dam considerably advanced an understanding of the history of the region. Surveys must become standard procedure, and country capacity to carry them out in a timely manner must be assured. (Training courses in survey techniques offered by universities and research institutes would help meet this need.) Employing trained archaeologists in line agencies, such as ministries of transport, agricultural or rural development, irrigation, public works, or urbanism facilitates quick responses to chance finds.
3. Governments should strengthen the in-country institutions responsible for cultural heritage protection. They must be allocated adequate resources including staff, equipment, and funding, and the authority to carry out their mandate of protection. Coordination with environmental agencies should be emphasized.
4. Ministries and universities in Africa and abroad should intensify training for archaeologists, art historians, architectural historians, conservators, curators, and museologists. This training would cover archaeological survey and excavation, scientific principles of conservation, research and documentation techniques, exhibition design, and business management.
5. National governments should establish site conservation projects for major archaeological and historic sites that include presentation and interpretation. Ministries of culture and archaeologists in Africa have paid scant attention to the problem of site conservation. National legislation on archaeological activity should specify site conservation standards.
6. Governments and the private sector should develop museums so that inherited art and cultural forms speak to their communities today. Development of acquisition policies, collection management, exhibitions, and educational programming are areas that require immediate attention. A number of African countries, such as Kenya, have good education programs in their museums that form a valuable extension of the public school curriculum, and this museum extension should be encouraged and developed.

7. **Governments and NGOs should examine alternative sources of financing cultural heritage conservation, including private sector sponsorship. Attention to financial sustainability of operations is essential for successful cultural heritage conservation projects.**

## Revitalizing Historic Cities: Towards a Public-Private Partnership

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*Any effort to restore and conserve historic cities must include renewal of the economic base, increase in investment, and revitalization of the economic and financial structure to both fund and maintain the restoration. To do so, adaptive reuse is a flexible approach, combining area conservation with preservation of individual monuments, upgrading, and some renewal. To surmount the interlocking regulations, competing authorities, fragmented ownership, and various laws and practices that impede conservation and revitalization, passage of a single piece of legislation could define the "Historic Area" and create a "Historic Area Development Corporation (HADC)," which would provide the framework for a new private-public partnership and generate tax revenues and return on investment. Mainstream development agencies should support projects to rejuvenate historic cities as a priority within the growing urban sector of developing countries because these projects protect humanity's cultural heritage, address pockets of persistent urban poverty, and attract private investment.*

Excluding some rare cases, such as Chinguetti in Mauritania or Suakin in Sudan,<sup>1</sup> most historic cities today are historic districts within larger modern cities.<sup>2</sup> Such historic cities are not only marvelous witnesses of our past, they are also parts of living organisms rapidly growing cities of enormous dimensions. The dynamics of rapid urbanization, shifting economic activities, and rising costs

<sup>1</sup>See Jean Pierre Greenlaw, *The Coral Buildings of Suakin* (London: Oriel Press, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), and Magdi Tewfik, "Suakin: A Unique Example of Arab Architectural Planning in Sudan," *The Arab City; Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage*, ed. Ismail Serageldin and Samir Al-Sadek with the assistance of Richard R. Herbert, Proceedings of a symposium held at Medina, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, February 28 to March 5, 1981 (Washington, D.C. and Riyadh: The Arab Urban Development Institute, 1982), 251-55.

<sup>2</sup>The preparation of this paper benefited from research supported by The Aga Khan Trust for Culture and from the work done by Professor Mona Serageldin, Harvard Graduate School of Design, to whom a special debt of gratitude is owed. The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to any of its affiliated organizations.

of urban land are putting serious pressure on old structures and an urban scale that do not easily accommodate modern transport technologies.

Furthermore, the social characteristics of these older districts have undergone dramatic changes. Patterns of invasion-succession of immigrant populations have been superimposed on decaying guild and ethnic neighborhoods. The rich and well-to-do have tended to escape the old historic cores of their cities (even when they retain businesses there). New activities such as warehousing have taken root. Old buildings have been subdivided for multiple families. Densities have risen to inordinate levels. Infrastructure is inadequate, and pollution threatens not only the well-being of the citizens but also the architectural and urbanistic heritage that makes these places special. Almost universally, this heritage is at risk.

Conservationists rightly have taken up the call for conserving the heritage embedded in historic cities. But the best-intentioned efforts and the most meticulous restoration projects are unlikely to succeed if the underlying conditions that led to this crisis state are not also tackled. This paper makes suggestions to tackle these underlying causes without ignoring the physical aspects of architectural design and restoration in culturally sensitive areas. The underlying causes, in my view, are the inadequacies of the institutional structure to facilitate modernization of the economic base while promoting social welfare and protecting the physical environment within a financially sound and sustainable framework.

### **Defining the Problem**

The starting point for a discussion among practitioners, scholars, and decisionmakers on matters pertaining to historic cities should be to establish a common understanding among the various interested parties about *key philosophical questions* that frequently remain not only unanswered but even unasked.<sup>3</sup>

First, *what are we trying to preserve?* A number of major buildings? The urban character? A way of life? Clearly, each answer will generate a completely different set of solutions.

Second, *why do we want to preserve whatever it is we choose to preserve?* Because it is part of our heritage? Then all citizens and in some cases

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<sup>3</sup>See among others Norman Williams, Jr., Edmund H. Kellogg, and Frank B. Gilbert, eds., *Readings in Historic Preservation: Why? What? How?* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1983) and Mohammed Arkoun, "The Meaning of Cultural Conservation in Muslim Societies," ed. Abu H. Imamuddin and Karen R. Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World* (Geneva: The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, 1990).

even the world at large should be made to pay for it. To improve the lot of the inhabitants of the old city? Or is it to generate a new resource to earn money from tourism? Again, depending on how these questions are answered, the types of interventions to consider, the pattern of finance required, and the way to implement them will differ.

And then, *for whom are we preserving?* Are the present users to be the prime beneficiaries of whatever intervention is to be made? Or the country at large? Or is it for the sake of generations yet unborn? Again, the responsibility for action and the type of intervention will differ depending on how these questions are answered. And unless they are answered, the parties will continue to talk at cross-purposes and confront administrative paralysis, if not outright opposition, when it comes to implementation.

Even after having confronted these questions, having identified the key actors, and having reached a common understanding of the basis for future action, we are inevitably confronted by a knotty institutional and economic problem. Because dealing with historic cities involves more than the restoration of monuments or the protection of an urban character, any effort to restore and conserve them must include adequate attention to the renewal of the economic base, an increase in investment, and the revitalization of the economic and financial structure. These are essential to enable both the payment of the restoration costs and the maintenance of the restored environment.<sup>4</sup>

### **The Social Dimensions**

The evolving social structures of historic cities are a topic deserving major study and reflection. A number of important studies have been done in recent years that highlight the complexities of this subject. For this paper I will mention only that the social dimensions of any proposed action or set of actions should be thoroughly explored and carefully integrated into the design of the interventions planned for historic cities. This paper will focus more on the institutional and economic aspects of such interventions.

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<sup>4</sup>See Ismail Serageldin, "Financing the Adaptive Reuse of Culturally Significant Areas," *The Challenge to Our Cultural Heritage: Why Preserve the Past?* ed. Yadhishthir Raj Isar (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press and Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 67-95; and Alfred P. Van Huyack, "The Economics of Conservation," Imamuddin and Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World*.

## **The Physical Dimensions**

Whether through restoration of historic buildings or constructing new buildings or upgrading the existing built environment, there is much to be done physically to reverse the degradation and blight threatening historic cities.<sup>5</sup> Much of this physical work is in upgrading basic infrastructure, which is not directly visible. But important as such infrastructure is, it is the new buildings and the restoration projects that have tended to fuel the most public controversy. A few words on the architectural challenge may therefore be pertinent before proceeding with the heart of this paper's proposals.

### *Architecture and Urban Design of a Special Kind*

The restoration of historic buildings poses certain technical problems,<sup>6</sup> but far more controversial is how to handle new building activity next to these monuments.<sup>7</sup> The essence of the *problématique* lies in the relationship between the old and the new, between the past and the future.<sup>8</sup> This relationship manifests itself at multiple levels:

- *At the level of urban townscape.* The historic areas are usually central to the overall structure of the city. How does a proposed building or development scheme relate to the old city and to the new? How does it blend with the surrounding traffic patterns and land uses?
- *At the level of scale.* The treatment of the spaces and buildings on or near a historic site must relate to the historic monuments, to the pattern of the old city, and to the larger modern geometry of the automobile and the high-rise.
- *At the level of texture.* Urban texture cannot be examined only in terms of scale and form. Forms reflect lifestyles of human beings and families. Their patterns of work and leisure, their

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<sup>5</sup>See among others Roger Kain, ed., *Planning for Conservation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1981); and Imamuddin, and Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World*.

<sup>6</sup>See Ronald B. Lewcock, "Conservation in Practice," Imamuddin and Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World*.

<sup>7</sup>This section parallels the arguments presented in Ismail Serageldin, "The Samarkand Revitalization," *MIMAR Architecture in Development* 41 (December 1991), 34-41.

<sup>8</sup>Diane Maddex, Alice M. Bowsher, and Sandra Baden, eds., *Old and New Architecture: Design Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1980).

social interactions and social rituals are all part of a living reality of which the built form is but one dimension.

- *At the level of architectural language.* The architectural language, in both scale and vocabulary, cannot merely copy the old style. But does it adapt to it or ignore it? How can creativity and imagination find expression while respecting the uniqueness of sites (next to historic buildings)? In other words does the new architectural language make a compelling statement? Does it *enhance* the historic environment to which it is being grafted? The Registan in Samarkand was built over two centuries. The Sher-Dor and Tila Kari Madrassas enhance the original Ulugh Beg Madrassa, creating a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Can we build today next to the Registan in a manner that will enhance it? <sup>9</sup>
- *At the level of dialogue between past, present, and future.* The historic heritage cannot be taken lightly in any composition. Yet, respect for the architectural heritage should not engender pale copies of its splendor.<sup>10</sup> Thus, can the new design find the right balance to link these three worlds? To separate them? To bridge them?<sup>11</sup>

Thus, from scale to materials to architectural language to functional uses at each level, linking the past to the future is at the core of any solution.

A successful design must fuse all of these, including siting, form, and scale, to create *a sense of place*.<sup>12</sup> An effective architectural statement is seldom achieved by slavishly copying the past nor by ignoring the regional heritage. It is at this juncture of innovation and authenticity that tradition and modernity meet and are resolved.<sup>13</sup> This is easier said than done. The paucity

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<sup>9</sup>Serageldin, "The Samarkand Revitalization," 34-41.

<sup>10</sup>Michael Graves and Gary Wolf, "Beyond Mere Manners and Cosmetic Compatibility," Maddex, Bowsher, and Baden, *Old and New Architecture*.

<sup>11</sup>Peter Blake, "The Architecture of Courtesy," Maddex, Bowsher, and Baden, *Old and New Architecture*.

<sup>12</sup>Louis A. Sauer, "Reinforcing a Sense of Place," Maddex, Bowsher, and Baden, *Old and New Architecture*.

<sup>13</sup>See Ismail Serageldin, *Al-Tajdid wal Ta'sil fi 'Imarat Al-Muitam'at Al-Islamiyya: Dirasa li Tajribat Ja'izat Al-Aga Khan Lil'Imara (Innovation and Authenticity in the Architecture of Muslim Societies: A Study of the Experience of The Aga Khan Award for Architecture)* (in Arabic) (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1989).

of successful examples of modern insertions in historic urban texture<sup>14</sup> attests to the continuing difficulty of developing an architectural language that can successfully speak to the present and the future without breaking its discourse with the heritage. The challenge is still there.

### **Adaptive Reuse: An Approach**

If a consensus exists around the answer to the key philosophical questions mentioned in the first section of this paper, and appropriate sensitivity to the physical and social dimensions of the problem exists, there can be purposeful movement towards a solution to the problems of the old cities. Such movement must concentrate as much, if not more, on the economic and social parameters as on the physical, architectural, and urbanistic aspects (including special consideration for the technical issues of conservation and preservation). In so doing, we can set aside the debate on "renewal versus upgrading," in which we have tended to favor upgrading based on the aspects of cost, displacement, and cultural sensitivity. *Adaptive reuse*, which combines area conservation with preservation of individual monuments with upgrading and some renewal, is a more nuanced and flexible approach.<sup>15</sup> However, to be successful, adaptive reuse should focus above all on a rejuvenation of the economic base of the old city.

For such an approach to work, it must bear in mind the socioeconomic as well as physical *linkage of the historic core with the rest of the city*. The area in question is indeed part of the overall city, albeit a special part, and we should look carefully at economic and infrastructural links. We must also consider the need for spaces outside the perimeter of the historic district if we are to reduce densities selectively by expanding shelter and commercial opportunities nearby.

Adaptive reuse should be accompanied by area conservation (not just single buildings), which focuses on the conservation of urban character as well as some monuments.<sup>16</sup> Urban character is defined by street patterns, the

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<sup>14</sup>A notably successful example is the Willard Hotel complex in downtown Washington, D.C.

<sup>15</sup> See Ismail Serageldin, "Project Finance, Subsidization, and Cost Recovery." The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Adaptive Re-Use: Integrating Traditional Areas into the Modern Urban Fabric*. Designing in Islamic Cultures 3. Proceedings of the Third Seminar in a Series...August 16-20, 1982 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, 1983), 92-102.

<sup>16</sup>See Charles N. Tseckares, "Design Considerations in Adaptive Use Projects," Maddex, Bowsher, and Baden, *Old and New Architecture*.

proportions of buildings (not necessarily their decorative elements), the variable age of buildings on the street, and activities in the streets a major determinant of urban character. Legislatively this means the control of new and offensive construction and the restoration and reuse of key buildings as appropriate.<sup>17</sup>

A successful application of total area preservation has been made in Bath, United Kingdom, and Sidi bou Said, Tunis. It should be noted, however, that Sidi bou Said involved mostly wealthy residents and was primarily touristic. The experience is not transferable to the *medinas* of Marrakesh and Algiers or old cities like Cairo and Lahore.<sup>18</sup>

But, whatever we do, we should concentrate on rejuvenating the economic base. This can be done by bringing in investments and creating jobs (subject to certain nuisance factors). To do this, incentives and proper institutional mechanisms are needed.

### Rejuvenation of the Economic Base

In earlier studies I have addressed in detail the kinds of activities that could contribute to rejuvenating the economic base of historic cities.<sup>19</sup> The most important would be the *tourist industry*. Hotels, entertainment, restaurants, shops, art galleries, craft shops as well as myriad microenterprises that accompany tourism would be the backbone of the new economic base. *Professional offices* of either individuals or associations such as lawyers, doctors, and syndicates as well as museums and cultural centers could be responsible users of renovated historic buildings within an adaptive reuse approach. Outstanding examples of this are found in Tunis,<sup>20</sup> where the offices of the Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Medina (ASM) are located in the Old City. Dar Lasram, a historic building in Old Tunis, has been turned into a cultural center. Such economic activity to rejuvenate the economic base should go hand in hand with an improved infrastructure.

Given the importance of this theme in my advocacy of adaptive reuse, it is pertinent to explore three promising options: tourism, services, and "high tech."

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<sup>17</sup>Christopher J. Duerksen, ed. *A Handbook on Historic Preservation Law* (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation and the National Center for Preservation Law, 1983).

<sup>18</sup>See Reza H. Ali, "Urban Conservation in Pakistan: A Case Study of the Walled City of Lahore," Imamuddin and Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World*.

<sup>19</sup>Serageldin, "Financing the Adaptive Reuse of Culturally Significant Areas," 67-95.

<sup>20</sup>See Jellal Abdelkafi, *La Medina de Tunis* (Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1989).

### **High Technology**

A third option, which is not sufficiently discussed given its promise, is "high tech." This option recognizes that many types of new economic activities do not require elaborate physical arrangements and can use quite small spaces. Adequate access to telecommunications equipment, power supplies, and relatively pleasant surrounding are sufficient for a wide range of modern services, including computer-related activities and academic think tanks. It is possible to imagine a number of high-tech service activities using old buildings and refurbishing their surroundings to match their needs and to maintain a suitable and enjoyable environment. This would preserve the urban environment and the architectural heritage while rejuvenating the economic base of the old cities.

### **True Obstacles: The Institutional Structures**

Designing a program that would promote such activities in the historic districts runs into the widely held perception that such an effort would be enormously costly and could never pay for itself. This is not necessarily true, as has been partially demonstrated by the successful examples of Mostar in Yugoslavia<sup>23</sup> and Asilah in Morocco,<sup>24</sup> both of which have won the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, in 1986 and 1989 respectively, and both of which cost the central government coffers very little.

The reality of the problem is elsewhere. It starts with the need to break a stifling combination of interlocking regulations, competing authorities, fragmented ownership, and counterproductive laws and practices. Most of these old cities have very small, fragmented parcels of land, making any effort at consolidation of significant tracts for decisionmaking, if not for outright redevelopment, very difficult. Public buildings tend to be leased monuments or linked to trust arrangements, especially in Muslim countries in which such

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*Urban Fabric*, 60-67.

<sup>23</sup>See Dzihad Pacic, "The Preservation of the Built Heritage in Mostar, Yugoslavia," Imamuddin and Longeteig, *Architectural and Urban Conservation in the Islamic World*; and Ismail Serageldin, *Space for Freedom: The Search for Architectural Excellence in Muslim Societies* (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture and London: Butterworth Architecture, 1989), 102-17.

<sup>24</sup>Serageldin, *Al-Tajdid wal Ta'sil fi 'Imarat Al-Muitam'at Al-Islamiyya: Dirasa li Tajribat Ja'izat Al-Aga Khan Lil'Imara (Innovation and Authenticity in the Architecture of Muslim Societies: A Study of the Experience of The Aga Khan Award for Architecture)*, 88-91.

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Religious Trusts (*Waqf*) have posed problems for efforts at physical restoration and economic renewal. Private buildings frequently are owned by absentee owners and inhabited by poorer families or squatters who are protected by rent controls and anti-eviction laws. This common arrangement creates incentives to destroy the structures and rebuild them, thus sometimes enabling eviction of the tenants. Few, if any, incentives exist to restore the buildings in a financially sound environment.

Furthermore, dense as these cities once were, they have become denser. The pressure of the growth of cities goes way beyond what the traditional fiber of the urban tissue can sustain, resulting in situations in which the basic infrastructure suffers from systematic overload and where low-cost sanitation technologies are unlikely to be successful. In my judgment the infrastructure of old cities tends to collapse when density reaches 400 persons per acre (1000 persons per hectare). Not only is the absence of adequate sanitation facilities contributing to pollution and an unhealthy environment, but it is also causing significant problems for the existing monuments and historic spaces, leading to their deterioration.<sup>25</sup>

Dealing with this complex web of issues confronts the problem of urban management. Again, fragmentation of responsibilities among multiple agencies municipalities, central governments, local government, *Waqf*, public works, and private parties leads to institutional paralysis and to the inability to marshal the resources, the administrative talent, or the political will to bring about the significant improvements required if these jewels of the world's heritage are not to be lost to future generations.

### **A Proposal: The Historic Area Development Corporation (HADC)**

One possible solution would be to create, through the passage of a *single piece of legislation*, a geographically defined *Historic Area* (designated conservation and action area), where the writ of a new *Historic Area Development Corporation (HADC)* would run unopposed. As will be shown below, such legislation would provide not only an effective and efficient means of dealing with the problems of revitalizing historic cities but also the basis for an equitable approach to sharing costs and benefits among interested parties. Such legislation would be the framework for a *new private-public partnership* and could also provide the

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<sup>25</sup>See Ronald B. Lewcock, "The Problem of Subterranean Water in the Old Urban Areas of Arab Cities," Serageldin and Al-Sadek with Herbert, *The Arab City: Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage*, 204-08.

means to surmount the many obstacles that presently impede any decisive action for the conservation and revitalization of historic cities in many parts of the world.

### *Outline of the Proposed Legislation*

The single piece of enabling legislation would have the following characteristics:

*Delimit an Historic Area.* A special "Historic Area" would be geographically defined and designated as a conservation and action area. Such an "Historic Area" would incorporate the key elements of the historic city area as well as sufficient interconnecting space to allow for a comprehensive and meaningful urban design in terms of land use, transport, infrastructure, facilities, and economic base. It should be large enough to capture the extent of the area needing conservation but small enough not to threaten the municipal authorities responsible for the entire city or to undermine the need to consider it a special case. Clearly, this selection is critical and has to be done based on detailed study of each case.

*Create an Historic Area Development Corporation (HADC).* An Historic Area Development Corporation (HADC) would be created to function within the geographic boundaries of the area defined as the conservation and action area. The HADC would have sweeping powers and would involve a unique structure described below. It would represent a *private-public partnership* and would give a voice to local residents as well as to outside investors. While having sweeping authority and power, it would also be held strictly accountable for the actions performed. The equity of the arrangements are discussed in connection with the proposed operating structure of the HADC.

*Define the mandate of the HADC.* The HADC would have the responsibility and authority for restoring all monuments, defining and enforcing all building codes and regulations to conserve the character of the historic area, and undertaking the mandatory review of all new construction within that area.<sup>26</sup> The HADC would also undertake the bulk of the infrastructure and commercial development within the designated area. In addition it would be responsible for the financial aspects of all these activities that aim at integrating land use, transport, residential-commercial construction, infrastructure, open space, landscape, management of services, and air-rights development.<sup>27</sup> It would

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<sup>26</sup>See William J. Tinti, "Design Review from a Legal Point of View," Maddex and others, *Old and New Architecture*.

<sup>27</sup>See Ismail Serageldin, "Organization and Finance of Projects to Upgrade Older Areas," paper presented at the Seminar on "Adaptive Re-Use: Integrating Traditional Areas into the Modern Urban Fabric," sponsored by The Aga Khan Program for Islamic

have financial authority to borrow without government guarantee and would be able to use some of these borrowings to provide working capital as explained below.


*Establish checks and limits on the HADC.* So sweeping a mandate must be subject to checks and limits to protect the public from rapacious or insensitive development and from abuse of authority. Such checks, however, should not stifle the HADC's ability to properly execute its mandate. Four specific checks or limits against the HADC's mandate should be considered:

- Protection or restoration of important monuments as well as review and approval of new construction would be undertaken by an expert panel of recognized international authorities, on which governmental as well as international agencies, such as UNESCO, and others might participate.
- Periodic review of the work would be presented to both the executive and the legislative bodies of the country in question at the appropriate levels.
- Periodic reporting and review of the financial affairs of the HADC would be undertaken by the appropriate public bodies by submission of the audited accounts of the HADC to the government auditors or their equivalents. The HADC would publish an annual report that would be available to the public and would include the audited financial statements of the HADC.

### *Proposed Structure for the HADC*

The idea behind the HADC is to design it like a modern corporation, or preferably like the "limited liability partnerships," which have proven effective in many large real estate development ventures (see Figure 1). These limited liability partnerships have vested the management of the enterprise in the hands of a designated "general partner" who may hold only a minority stake in the total partnership. The other partners have a limited liability and limited authority, and are constrained by various regulations from divestiture. The alternative is to design the HADC as a straightforward corporation with voting weighted by shares (allocated to the different parties as explained below). The limited liability partnership, however, would probably be more effective although both forms would represent a major improvement over current approaches.

**Figure 1. Historic Area Development Corporation**




A. *Partners in the HADC*

*The government*, as its share in the partnership, would bring to the HADC all the real estate that it controls in the area. This could include vacant lots, streets, and alleys as well as public spaces, public buildings, and other government-owned land. These landholdings could be significant. Just looking at *surface area*, we find that in *Old Cairo* government buildings account for 11.94 percent of the total land area while vacant lands account for another 8.94 percent of the area. Streets and alleyways account for 33.74 percent (Appendix 1). The figures for *Old Tunis* are not significantly different with government holding 16.74 percent of the total land use in built-up areas and an additional 11.8 percent in vacant land (excluding possible government claims in approximately 7.6 percent of the land use which is in undetermined ownership). Streets and public spaces account for an additional 11.5 percent in that example (Appendix 2). In *Old Delhi* circulation spaces accounted for 15.6 percent of the total, community facilities for another 14.9 percent, and open spaces for 18.7 percent (Appendix 3). All these examples show that an immediately significant government contribution can be made to the HADC with minimal, if any, additional outlay of cash from the government itself. Indeed, government could, without putting up a penny but by putting its assets at the disposal of the HADC, have a significant bloc of shares in the corporation (or limited liability partnership) to anchor the public portion of the public-private partnership.

*All of the remaining actors within the boundaries of the Historic Area* would become partners within the HADC with shares allocated to them in direct proportion to the commercial values of their holdings. *Tenants* could have a share approximated by the market value of their tenancy while *owners* would have the actualized market value of their property as the basis for their acceding to shares in the HADC.

*Religious Trusts*, or *Waqf*, *properties* within the Muslim countries of Asia and Africa, where many historic cities are at risk, pose a slightly different problem (Figure 2). Many of these properties tend to be historic monuments, and others tend to be nontransactional by virtue of being tied up in trust. Scholarly studies within the Islamic tradition underline the possibility of exchange, if not outright sales, of *Waqf* properties, whether of historic value or not. Hence, the *Waqf* authorities

Figure 2. Decisions on Handling Waqf Properties



would enter into a negotiation with the HADC to surrender the *Waqf* properties that are deemed of historic merit and value to the HADC. These properties would be listed as national monuments, and the HADC would seek to restore and upgrade them. The *Waqf* authorities would be compensated by public land *outside* of the historic district in a swap arrangement (*Istibdal* under *Shari'a* Law) to enable those swapped properties to come under the aegis of the plans of the HADC. *Waqf* properties not deemed to have historic value could be either treated the same way as the historic ones or the *Waqf* authorities could continue to hold title to them and be given the same treatment as other private property owners within the historic area.

*Private investors* would bring capital and know how to the venture. These investors should be structured as a single juridical person and should involve national as well as foreign partners; conversely, the national investors could choose to enter on their own as limited liability partners. The foreign investor would best be a corporate structure that could enter into contractual agreements under both international and national laws. This foreign investor would bring a limited amount of capital but primarily would bring in expertise and management abilities. They should help bring in hotels and tourist facilities of international repute. In the case of a corporate structure the foreign partner could be a minority shareholder and hold (under separate contract) the management responsibility for the HADC. In the alternative approach the foreign partner would become the managing partner of a limited liability-general partnership, in which all of the other partners would have shares equivalent to the holdings that they bring to the creation of the HADC structure.

#### B. *Nature of the Partnership*

Whether the structure of the HADC is closer to that of a limited real estate partnership than to an outright corporation or not, it is essential to ensure broad day-to-day authority to *the managing partner*, or the corporate *management*. In the limited liability partnership the managing partner should be the private investor. If that arrangement proves politically unacceptable, one could go to a straight corporate structure with the allocation of stocks and voting shares distributed among the partners in the same pattern as described above. However, in the latter case the foreign partner may very well have to be given an additional bloc of created stock equivalent to a goodwill value for its name and established record in management and expertise, and be paid by the

corporation for the management task that is expected of it. While such arrangements would be workable, the "managing partner" in a limited liability partnership approach appears preferable as being, on the whole, more efficient than the straight corporate model.

Start-up costs of the management could be refunded either from sold shares, or by direct payment by the shareholders, that is, an indirect levy, or by accrual of a priority claim against an escrow account, whose pre-agreed funding would have first claim on any earnings made by the HADC. The details of such arrangements can be worked out case by case. Every situation has its unique characteristics. Every society and every city is different.

### *Operation of the HADC*

Assuming that the HADC is now created and empowered with the legislative framework and the difficult part of sorting the assessments of the shares has been completed and contracted, the mandate would be given to the HADC management to prepare a plan of action. Such a plan should spell out the proposals for the physical administration of the historic area and of the buildings, and the proposed approach to the conservation and restoration efforts. This plan would have to be agreed upon. Public hearings and the testimony of an international panel of experts selected by the government and the HADC would be required before the plan would be authorized for implementation. This authorization would constitute the mandate of the HADC to physically intervene in all parts of the Historic Area.

The next step is to raise the funds to undertake the physical work. To that end, the following means can be employed:

#### *A. Vacant Land*

The vacant land that is immediately at the disposal of the HADC corresponds, in Tunis, to 12 percent (public) and 7.14 percent (private), or nearly 20 percent of the land use. In Old Delhi it would be some 6 percent (the official figure in 1970 was 18.7 percent, but two-thirds of that area was designated as parkland around the Jama Mosque in an area cleared by the Delhi Development Authority). In Old Cairo the open land accounts for 9 percent of the land use.

That vacant land constitutes an immediately available asset that does not involve any tenancy or any ownership dispute, nor does it require tearing down structures. The land would be effectively free and unencumbered by the enabling legislation. The HADC could use it for

collateral, against which borrowings from commercial banks could be undertaken to launch the project and provide additional working capital beyond what could be provided by the partners directly as cash payments.

An alternative worthy of mention is that should the HADC not wish to borrow using the open space as collateral, it could sell these parcels to developers who would agree to develop them in full consonance with the overall physical plan designed for the HADC under HADC's supervision. The revenue from sales would provide the working capital, and the increased tax revenue that would come from the development of the vacant lands would be an ongoing source of strengthening the tax base of the historic area and the revenue base of the HADC.

**B. *User Charges***

The HADC would, in fact, be in a position *to levy user charges* on all the improvements that it would introduce into an historic area, including linkages into infrastructure and connection charges. It could use other mechanisms of raising funds, such as sales, rentals, leases, or cost recovery measures for provision of services. No specific taxes are envisaged because this would require taxing authority that is not provided in the mandate of the HADC. Taxing authority an inherently public function would compromise the predominantly private character of the proposed HADC.

**C. *Stabilizing the Financial Position of the HADC***

The whole approach of the HADC should be to recapture the full value-added that the improvements will create in the area and to plow this back into the area, thus, over time, strengthening and consolidating the financial position of the HADC.

**D. *Upgrading Residential Buildings in the Historic Cities***

Rent controls have always been major obstacles to the improvement of buildings in historic cities since owners have no incentive to maintain or upgrade the structures because they cannot recoup their investment. Rent control laws are not likely to be circumvented easily, and it would be difficult to argue that the tenants within the historic area should be treated differently than the tenants living outside the boundaries of the

historic area. To overcome the obstacle of rent control, it is suggested that the "sharing formulae" that are now found in several countries in the Middle East be used and developed further. These existing, legally recognized formulae allow *the costs of improvements to be shared by the owners and tenants in accordance with a predetermined formula*. Where such regulations do not exist, arrangements could be made whereby a loan to cover the costs of the improvements would be made to the tenants and the owner. The tenants would designate the owner as their proxy to negotiate the loan. The owner negotiates the loan, if need be using the building as collateral. The tenants would then agree to pay their prorated parts of the loan in a fixed series of installments that the owner would collect in parallel with the rent. Nonpayment by a tenant would be defaulting on a commercial claim and allow the owner, as proxy manager for the "syndicated" loan, to seek redress for a financial obligation without any reference to the owner-tenant relations covered by the housing and rent-control laws.

The HADC would have little, if any, direct involvement with upgrading housing stock that is not listed as historic buildings. The HADC could provide technical advice to ensure the quality of the upgrading and facilitate the linkage to improvements, such as in infrastructure.

#### E. *Government Taxes*

Government taxes, which would increase in proportion to the massive improvements in the whole area, should go directly to improving the public facilities, schools and dispensaries, for example, within the Historic Area. It should *not* be siphoned off to other areas. This is essential for the success of the overall scheme because the quality of these public services which will remain outside the HADC's mandate should also be upgraded.

***Likely Returns on Investments***

That investments in upgrading the old city's infrastructure will have a positive Economic Rate of Return (ERK) is demonstrable from World Bank-financed projects. These can be significantly above the opportunity cost of capital as demonstrated in the case of Tunis (calculated in the early 1980s), which showed an Internal Economic Rate of Return (IERR) of 18 percent. Furthermore, the estimates of the IERR tend to be quite robust. The base case for Tunis was subjected to a sensitivity analysis with the following results:

<u>Assumed Case</u>	<u>IERR</u>
Base case	18%
10% increase in costs	16%
10% decrease in benefits	16%
10% increase in costs <i>and</i>	14%
10% decrease in benefits	
<i>One-year delay in benefits</i>	15%

**Source:** Ismail Serageldin, "Financing the Adaptive Reuse of Culturally Significant Areas," ed. Yadhishthir Raj Isar, *The Challenge to Our Cultural Heritage: Why Preserve the Past?* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press and Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 89.

As can be seen, even in the worst possible combination of a 10 percent cost increase *and* a 10 percent reduction in benefits, the IERR is still a respectable 14 percent.<sup>28</sup>

This, of course, could argue for direct government investment in that part of the rehabilitation of the historic city program. However, the indirect costs of such government intervention, such as dilution of the clear mandate of the HADC and the presence of two sets of contractors reporting to different institutional clients on the same site, incline me to argue in favor of *not* seeking government intervention unless the financing plan could not be completed without it. Maintaining the HADC proposal as sketched out would have the added attraction of underlining the philosophical essence of a good public-private partnership: government creates the "enabling environment" and then lets the private sector do as much of the work as possible.

### Impact on Poverty

In the cases for which we have detailed comparable data, the residents of the old historic cities tend to be among the poorer if not the poorest urban dwellers. In Tunisia the analysis for the Hafsia Project in the historic city showed that the residents of Hafsia were the poorest among the other poor districts in Tunis

<sup>28</sup>The Hafsia, Tunis project's projections were conservative. For comparison purposes, the returns on upgrading *next* to (not *in*) the old historic center of Sanaa, Yemen, calculated at the same time as the Hafsia project were around 24 percent and equally robust as shown by the following figures:

<u>Case</u>		<u>IERR Upgrading</u>	<u>External Sites and Services</u>
Base Case		24%	27%
Cost	+ 20%	20%	23%
Cost	- 20%	28%	33%
Benefits	+ 20%	27%	32%
Benefits	- 20%	19%	22%
Costs	+ 20% and		
Benefits	- 20%	16%	217%

Source: World Bank Calculations, Report No. 3642-YAR, December 30, 1981 (Unpublished).

(Ettadhamen and Kram-Ouest) as can be seen from Figure 3, which plots the income distribution curves for the three neighborhoods.

Thus, the involvement of all parties, international and national, public and private, in such an enterprise should also be part of a carefully structured poverty-reduction approach. Gentrification and displacement, if they do occur, must be accompanied by adequate compensation and assistance. The benefits that should accrue to the poorer residents should be protected from possible "hijacking" by the wealthy and the powerful. The government and international community's involvement would help ensure that the private sector brings its expertise and efficiency and earns a fair return on its investments but is not allowed to run rampant over the poor and destitute or to destroy the cultural heritage in search of quick profits.

### **The Case for Development Agency Involvement**


Projects aimed at the rejuvenation of historic cities should be supported by all the mainstream development agencies because:

- They are intrinsically sound investments.
- They have a major impact in protecting the cultural heritage for humanity at large. Cairo and Fez, for example, are on the world heritage list.
- They deal with pockets of persistent poverty in urban areas.
- They attract private investments.
- They help establish a new framework for public-private partnership a truly "enabling environment."

Development agencies, therefore, should support such interventions. International institutions can help together such a "package" involving national policy changes, institutional development, foreign direct investment (FDI), and sensitivity to culture and the poor in an economically and financially sound framework.

The risks of failure are no greater than those encountered in most urban slum upgrading projects that the World Bank and other donors have financed before and continue to finance. The novel features of the institutional structure (the HADC) and reliance on the private sector should in fact *reduce* the complexity of implementation although they could delay the start of implementation while the enabling legislation is put in place and the initial distribution of shares is made. But that potential delay is itself a guarantee of greater chances of success. By making the HADC a go/no-go condition, the donors and the foreign private partners are assured of the structure before they go in.

**Figure 3. Income Distribution in Three Tunisian Districts**



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Finally, institutions such as UNESCO and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) should be involved in every one of the issues surrounding the historic monuments.

### Concluding Remarks

Dealing with historic cities is difficult and demanding, but the unique cultural contribution they make must challenge us all to find workable solutions to this complex problem. The Historical Area Development Corporation, or HADC, is one suggestion that, I believe, deserves further attention. There are doubtless many others, but whatever approaches are actually adopted, it behooves development agencies to see the problem of historic cities as an important priority within the growing urban sector of developing countries.

*Appendix 1***Pattern of Land Use in Old Cairo<sup>1</sup> (ca. 1970)**

<i>Residential and Mixed Uses (Private)</i>		45.84 percent
Residential only	18.28	
Residential/commercial	18.56	
Residential/industrial	0.78	
Commercial	6.24	
Industrial	6.30	
Commercial/industrial	1.68	
<i>Public Buildings</i>		11.94 percent
Schools	3.54	
Other public buildings	5.50	
Religious buildings	2.32	
Listed monuments	0.58	
<i>Circulation (Public)<sup>2</sup></i>		33.28 percent
<i>Vacant Lands</i>		8.94 percent
Public open space	2.95	
Vacant	5.99	
<i>Total</i>		100.00 percent

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*Note:* Floor area ratio (F.A.R.) was around 3.0.

<sup>1</sup>Includes Darb Al-Ahmar, Gamalia, Bab Al-Sha'riya, and Boulaq.

<sup>2</sup>Includes Al-Azhar open areas and Al-Husain Square (which was then parking and is now a garden). If parking is excluded, this category would be 28 percent.

**Appendix 2**

**Pattern of Land Use in Old Tunis (Hafsia Quarter, 1982)**

<i>Streets and Public Open Space</i>		11.49 percent
<i>Community Uses</i>		9.41 percent
<i>Built-up Areas</i>		
	Private	35.84 percent
	Public	16.74 percent
<i>Vacant Land</i>		
	Private	7.14 percent
	Public	11.80 percent
	Unknown	7.58 percent
		<hr/>
<i>Total</i>		100.00 percent

*Note:* Floor area ratio (F.A.R.) (excluding cleared areas) varies between 1.6 and 2.5.

**Appendix 3****Pattern of Land Use in Old Delhi (1969-1970)**

<i>Residential (mostly private)</i> <sup>1</sup>	34.7 percent
<i>Commercial (mostly private)</i>	10.7 percent
<i>Industrial (mostly private)</i>	2.4 percent
<i>Community facilities (mostly public)</i>	14.9 percent
<i>Circulation (public)</i>	15.6 percent
<i>Open space (public)</i> <sup>2</sup>	18.7 percent
	<hr/>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0 percent</b>

**Note:** Floor area ratio (F.A.R.) varied between 2.0 and 2.5.

<sup>1</sup>Includes about 25 percent in open-to-sky courtyards.

<sup>2</sup>Includes (about two-thirds of the area) clearing by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) around the Jama' Mosque.

## Discussant Remarks

Joseph H. Kwabena Nketia

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The statement that was made about history is very important in relation to the conservation of historic sites. The main problem with sites and buildings for us in Africa is not their existence but their meaning and significance. When something loses its meaning, then it has a problem. History has pragmatic value in Africa. It is history and not just academic history, knowing about the past, researching but it is also related to the way we organize our lives. We Africans think that history has a meaning: it holds a key to the meaning of social institutions, to some of the values by which we organize our cultural lives.

When you look at traditional Africa, because our history tends to be unwritten, we have a complex referential system, in which certain units make reference to aspects of history. For example, when I was doing a collection of funeral dirges of the Akan people (my own people), I was surprised to find so many references to historical sites. Those historical sites related to the places where the people lived and migrated and to the things they considered important in their lives. The dirges will always remind people that a particular dead person hailed from a particular place, not where he is now, but some particular place in the past. The place of domicile was an important way of expressing the identity of the individual. It occurred to me while I was doing this work that it referenced so many sites that I did not know about, and of course for us these will be the sites on which archaeologists may work in the future. These are not just the sites where the people made tin and other things, but they are also the places where the people used to live. There may be problems in locating the sites or gaining access to them since permission must be obtained from their custodians. Therefore, it would seem that from that kind of material one could get a lot of information about sites that are significant or meaningful to local peoples. Of course, other sites will be important in terms of general history.

I am gratified that we have had papers presented at this session that focus on the cultural dimension of development processes related to the historical environment, in particular, historic sites, buildings, related artifacts, and cultural events regarded by people of every nation as their cultural heritage. We need always to explain who we are, and I think that the reference by the people is an extremely important one. What *the people* count as their cultural heritage should be given priority.

These places are not just places of the past but also places that focus on cultural action in group life. Ouidah is a good example of a place in which certain cultural events and certain rituals are performed, and they are the focus of cultural activity. When activity changes, and values change, of course, we find a diminishing of the activities relating to the place. But this phenomenon is typical of African life, and we are dealing with the cultural dimension of development so it is important to stress the relationship between historical sites and culture, and the people's way of life and their values.

We also had papers dealing with the indigenous architectural forms and building materials, which tend to be ignored in Africa but which are meaningful and within the means of low-income groups, particularly those in rural Africa. These forms and materials could be developed in different ways to complement or blend with the expensive forms that have become fashionable in African towns and cities. Neville Agnew's paper on mud architecture is very interesting. I want to remind you that in Ghana, for example, twenty or thirty years ago the Housing Research Institute tried twenty or thirty years ago to introduce lime cretes, an adaptation of mud architecture, and this was popularized by the social welfare community development. We tried to build up rural areas using this kind of material. But many things change, the economic situation changes. If I go to my village now and I hire people to erect a mud house for me, the whole village would stare at me because they do not expect a person of my "status" to erect a mud house. On the other hand if my grandfather wanted a mud house and he hired people to do it, they would congratulate him. So I would have a problem in my village. We Africans have conflicts in this area because sometimes when we go to a village, the best, grandest-looking building we can find has been built by the government, and around it is very insignificant housing. The government is a culprit in this because it has its own attitudes on what materials should be used. This is a delicate problem. We have proverbs that say that "The old rest stops were very good, but you should not stop there. You should create your own rest stops now because life is like a voyage." And many other proverbs say, "When times change, change yourself." In other words many people tend to think that culture is something created once and for all, but this is not so in Africa. Culture is continually being created and recreated, and it is important to bear this in mind in relation to our contemporary world. While old identities survive, new identities are being created all the time. It is important also to look at this problem when we are thinking of intervening in development in Africa.

There is also the question of restoration of old cities that have been abandoned and left in disrepair but that have cultural, institutional, and economic potential and could profit from rejuvenation at different levels. This is an interesting problem as Pierre de Maret has demonstrated, and I am reminded of

an attempt that was made in Ghana when Tema was built as a new port. We were not building a new city. In fact we were taking Tema, which was an old city, and rehabilitating it as a port. There were all kinds of problems because in the old city, the people had a shrine and the sacred objects, and it was very difficult for the people to leave there and go to the new place. But what is relevant is that Tema was developed by a Tema development corporation. In other words what is relevant is the idea of a private holding, a private enterprise, organizing the whole thing outside of government (of course, supported by government) and taking care of the layout, transportation, and all the things that were needed in the city. It seems to me that it was a good idea, and my mind turned to that when I read the suggestion in Ismail Serageldin's paper that we have an area of development that could be developed by a private corporation.

Monuments which played a role in foreign, commercial, religious, and imperial intervention and which contemporary historians, statespersons, and developers believe should be properly maintained as validations of history because of their economic potential as tourist attractions also need to be looked at. One of the reasons why these foreign buildings, castles, and forts sometimes are neglected is that they do not belong to the ethnic groups on whose territory they were built. They have no sentimental or emotional value or relationship to those who want to rehabilitate them. It would be a waste to create new meanings for them since the people always have a way of relating to buildings through rituals, celebrations, and festivals. One could invent something that would make these buildings meaningful. But that would mean that one must distinguish between historic sites that are local, that is, are related to ethnic groups and families, and historic sites that must now be recognized as national and within the purview of government. But the forts and the relics of the colonial period would become something that the government must take of, restore, and adapt for use.

I would like to make an important distinction between the two types of environments. One is a very sensitive environment. If you want to develop something in a historic area of an ethnic group or a lineage, you have a big problem because you cannot just go and use the land. In the nineteenth century Africans sent a delegation to England because we needed to protect our land. We have a right to protect our society; the idea lingers on. Even our governments, in West Africa at any rate, cannot just take land or intervene on land without permission of the local people who have some historical attachment to the land.

All the papers assume that each of these environments could be a focus of development by itself, or it could be a factor that must be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of development projects that require an infrastructure in proximity to a historic environment.

In other words there are three types of development. One is developing the old city, the site, as something in itself. The other is thinking of the historic site as a factor to be taken into consideration in the development of another project that requires that kind of site. These two types of development cause different kinds of problems.

The second type of development uses a holistic approach. All the papers emphasize this. But one must bear in mind the social, institutional, and economic implications of conservation, rehabilitation, and maintenance of personal environmental projects.

The third type of development focuses on the enhancement of the quality of life that relates to or revolves around historic sites. All the papers stress different things that we need to take into account to ensure that the human component is taken proper care of. For example, in the case of mud architecture, the argument is that this is a local material, cheap enough that people can afford. There is emphasis on minimizing the social impact of modernization. There is also emphasis on encouraging and fostering adaptive change and on linking management of cultural change to the social and economic needs of the people. In other words all the papers refer back to the people. It is not just the buildings, it is not just the environment, but also the users, the people, who need to be looked at.

I would like to draw your attention to two last points. One is the conference papers' emphasis on the need to harmonize the old and the new. This will be a constant need in African development harmonizing the indigenous and the foreign. And, of course, in all these there is the problem of the role of creativity in development. Development involves the creative imagination. It involves not only knowledge of the area but also creative imagination in the use of the information and its application to some particular problem. This creativity depends on individuals more than on organizations.

Second, the question of making the heritage of the past meaningful and reusable in the present seems to be implied in the papers. The question of separating theoretical study of history in Africa or theoretical knowledge of African history from the pragmatic, development-oriented study of issues also needs to be looked at. I think this is a distinction to be made. A suggestion was given that anthropology by itself is not enough; we get to know about Africa, but perhaps the whole area of applied research might be looked at. I can talk about this in my own field, music, where it is easy to make a distinction between theoretical knowledge of music and applied knowledge of music.

When it came to changing from a colonial kind of ceremony to a traditional African ceremony, we could do this because we could look at tradition and reuse it in a new way. That kind of example means that people should be sensitive to the relationship between the old and the new.

A number of suggestions have also been made about communicating development issues, involving a reaching out to the authorities so that they are made aware of what we are thinking, involving African universities in development issues. Not that universities are going to solve the problems, but they can contribute to the solutions by doing the preliminary studies of historical sites or of peoples so that knowledge is available for use. This need for outreach and communication must be continually stressed. It is very pleasing that we are having the opportunity to think and to talk about this at this conference. The next step is to sensitize people in Africa themselves about the need for thinking about all these ideas so that, arising out of that process, creative individuals might emerge and provide us with models of development.

## Archaeological Research, Site Protection, and Employment Generation: Central African Perspectives

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*Central Africa is undergoing a moral, identity, economic, and political crisis. To date, the cultural sector, whether preservation or production, has been the subject only of rare specific projects with minimal funding. The growing recognition of the necessity of taking into account the sociocultural dimension will mean a more significant role for social and cultural anthropology, and archaeology. In articulating traditional and contemporary structures, archaeology may reduce the dichotomy between tradition and modernity in Africa. In the gigantic area of the eleven countries of Central Africa, only one archaeology program is taught, few laboratories are equipped with basic apparatus, and the annual research budget is less than US\$20,000 compared with the multimillion dollar market generated annually by the sale of cultural artifacts. By implementing one good training program, surveying and monitoring the national and regional threats to cultural artifacts, raising funds and supporting archaeological research programs relevant to the inhabitants, and promoting awareness of the past cultural riches, Africa's past could be reintegrated into its present, laying down a much sounder basis for development.*

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Central Africa is presently undergoing what is probably the worst crisis of its very long history, and the toll is likely to be very high indeed.<sup>1</sup> In the absence of an immediate remedy one has to look for solutions in the long run, an alternative policy for the future.

The present catastrophe is at least as much a moral and identity crisis as an economic and political one. This is why even under such dramatic circumstances it is very important to consider carefully the issues that have been generally overlooked in the past: the cultural issues.

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<sup>1</sup> The author thanks Messrs. Olivier Gosselain, Aimé Manima, and Christophe Mbida for their suggestions and comments in the preparation of this paper.

For several years the necessity of taking into account the cultural dimension has been acknowledged by a growing number of development policymakers at least theoretically. However, to date, most of the development projects integrate this problem in only a very limited way. The cultural sector, whether cultural production or preservation, is the subject of specific projects only on an exceptional basis, and, in those rare cases, always with extremely limited funding.

Investing in culture is often considered a useless luxury that should be contemplated only after primary needs are met. This attitude overlooks the fact that every society, no matter how broad its economic and social problems, will keep producing and consuming cultural goods. Their quality and their impact cannot be evaluated only from a material point of view because they correspond to a deep and essential need in every human being. Generally, people are more interested in social than in economic benefits. This is also true in the Western world, except that in our society prestige derives often from financial power.

In fact culture matters much more than we acknowledge even in our own Western society. In Europe, for example, recent work on demography and the old anthropological structure of the family (the condition of women and inheritance practices) shows how much they conditioned the development process in the nineteenth century and emerging ideologies in the twentieth.<sup>2</sup> It has been held for too long that the problems were, above all, economic and that the social and cultural issues were a luxury. Recent evolution proves, in the North as well as in the South, how dramatically wrong we were.

### **The Relevance of Archaeology**

As recognition of the necessity to take into account the sociocultural dimension of development gains ground, social and cultural anthropology will have a more significant role to play. In most developing countries archaeology can be an important complement to anthropology and history. Moreover, it could be very useful in bridging the gap between those two disciplines. In the last three decades anthropology has been interested largely in a synchronic rather than a diachronic approach, dealing with the cultural rather than the historical process.

To have the necessary holistic and dynamic view of the ever-evolving relations between the social and the material environment, it is likely that the archaeological conceptual framework is often going to be more operational than the social anthropological one. So a greater integration of archaeological

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<sup>2</sup>Emmanuel Todd, *L'enfance du monde—Structures familiales et développement* (Paris: Seuil, 1984).

methodology will enhance the performance of anthropology in dealing with the latter's likely future challenges.

Archaeology may also help to articulate traditional and contemporary structures and thus to reduce the dichotomy between modernity and tradition. In few other parts of the world is this gap more pronounced than in Africa.

As very pertinently pointed out by Daniel Miller in the conclusion of his stimulating and, as far as I know, unparalleled paper on "Archaeology and Development":

The success of development lies to a large extent in the manner in which perceived traditional forms of society end up relating to the new modern structures that have overlain them. Many of the dichotomies that plague developing countries are based upon this conceptual-structural dichotomy. In countries where history is basically oral traditions and archaeological investigations, archaeology has a role to play that is perhaps larger than its apparent subject matter; it may occupy an important position in the interrelationship between traditional and contemporary structures.<sup>3</sup>

In fact Miller explicitly refers here to the concept of dualism used to emphasize the interrelationship of human beings, their culture, and the environment for two structures of a developing country: the traditional and the nontraditional. All the facets of these two distinct spheres are interwoven. Dualism has been criticized for its tendency to present traditional society as immobile and unaffected. However, as Miller points out:

It retains its value for the description of a conceptual dichotomy operating for the people of the area themselves, with what is perceived as traditional being regarded as an integrated whole, often known by a single term, such as "custom" in Melanesia, and contrasted with all recent forces affecting the society, which again may be known by a particular term. In fact, what is considered "custom" may be more a consequence of this conceptual dichotomy than of any similarity to the actual precolonial society a factor of particular importance in that "custom" may constitute the ideas of the past to which archaeology is seen as relating.<sup>4</sup>

Archaeology as a nontraditional activity that is concerned with resuscitating the traditional past could play a very significant role in facilitating the

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<sup>3</sup>Daniel Miller, "Archaeology and Development," *Current Anthropology* 21 (1980): 709-26, 715.

<sup>4</sup>Miller, "Archaeology and Development," 710.

reappropriation of the past by contemporary actors. The interest shown by educated people expatriate or national may help restore pride in the accomplishments of the past, promote self-confidence, and rebuild the shattered respect for traditional knowledge.

Whether for villagers or city dwellers, the realization of the great antiquity of some remains and artifacts and the establishment of a long settlement with many cultural achievements is a source of pride and self-confidence. It helps to overcome the feelings of inferiority and incompetence carried over from colonialism and reinforced by a Western-oriented education system.

In many developing countries, and especially in Black Africa, history has been principally concerned with colonial and postcolonial events. As pointed out by African historians themselves:

Historical research today is in crisis, as shown by the great gap that exists between historical discourse and political discourse. The present demands of society require a "history for development," a history that should be based on the preoccupations of the masses and the needs of the society as a whole. Similarly a true history in construction must be conceived not primarily from above, but as a set of relations focusing especially on the base, that is, on the interests, aspirations, and capabilities of the masses, who should be able to recognize themselves in this historical presentation, because they constitute the true historical actors of the country.<sup>5</sup>

The following quotation is also very symptomatic of the challenges faced by present African historians:

The problem of national integration is implicitly present in all national research. . . . It is within this perspective that ethnic history should be studied by anthropologists and historians. Although colonial studies on local populations were undertaken in order to administer them more effectively, they were also often related to the emergence of political consciousness and contributed to the political mobilization and awareness of ethnic groups. If today we question the criteria by which ethnic groups were identified, and can show their dynamic character[,] . . . that only increases the importance of understanding the forces of cultural or political mobilization that lay beneath such processes

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<sup>5</sup>Mumbanza mwa Bawele and Sabakinu Kivilu, "Historical Research in Zaire—Present Status and Future Perspectives," in *African Historiography—What History for Which Africa?* Sage Series on African Modernization and Development, ed. B. Jewsiewicki and D. Newbury (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986), 224-34, 234.

rather than relying on the extremely tenuous reconstructions of population movements on which many earlier analyses were based. . . . But if ethnic histories are fluid and illusory, the local features which underlie such cultural diversity as well as the broader factors which condition social perceptions and historical action must be understood as essential, features of the historical patrimony of the country, necessary factors to account for in the development of modern Zaire culture. It is the historian's task to seek an understanding of the nature of these ethnic transformations in the past; for ethnic identity, even in all its contextual subjectivity, appears to be one of the key elements of mobilization which cannot be ignored in modern Zaire, and is as important in the cities as in the rural areas.<sup>6</sup>

Ethnicity is indeed of central importance in the present struggle for democracy and a redefining of modern nations. The refusal to take into account cultural diversity for fear of tribalism has been a major political mistake of many regimes of postcolonial Black Africa, resulting in an upsurge of ethnic confrontation in the present struggle for democracy. As Mexico, for example, has understood very well with the Museo Nacional in Mexico City, one has to acknowledge and even advertise the national diversity as the components of a single dynamic nation.

In the absence of written sources prior to colonial times and with oral traditions that go back in history only a couple of centuries, African archaeology is emerging as the major source to reconstruct precolonial history. This role becomes more and more crucial as the old people responsible for oral tradition die.

In our modern world relics of the past often serve as important symbols: for example, the nineteenth century churches in every continent that imitated Gothic cathedrals to reinforce religious values, or the many public buildings in the West that mimicked classical architecture and sculpture to reinforce the historic depth of a new political or institutional system. The same process of legitimization is at work in school curricula, in which we trace our beliefs about democracy to ancient Greece and Rome.

As Rathje and Schiffer note:

The power of materials from the past as symbols of belief is surpassed by their power as symbols of cultural heritage. The legacy of Tutankhamen is obviously a national treasure of Egypt, a symbol of past glories and prestige and Egypt's long endurance

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<sup>6</sup>Mwa Bawele and Kivulu, "Historical Research in Zaire," 234.

as a nation. Most developing countries, in fact, are making the most of their past. The Museo Nacional of Mexico City is more than a museum of ancient relics to attract tourists; it is a symbol of the cultural achievements of the Mexican people, a reminder to Mexican and tourist alike that Mexico was a thriving center of civilization 2,000 years before Cortes and the Europeans arrived. In Mexico, the museum and archaeological sites are used as *classrooms* where school children go on field trips to touch their past. The findings of Mexican archaeologists constitute a cornerstone of national pride.

. . . Another such example is offered by former Rhodesia, which was colonized and has been controlled by whites since the eighteenth century. Because blacks native to the region were viewed as inferior, the ruins . . . of Zimbabwe . . . were attributed to white Phoenicians or to bronzed Ethiopians led by the Queen of Sheba, but never to the local populace. In the 1920s[,] . . . on the basis of the first systematic archaeological excavation, Caton-Thompson concluded that Zimbabwe was the result of a long developmental sequence and that it had been built by native blacks. It is no coincidence, then, that when blacks retook their dominant position in Rhodesia recently they renamed their country Zimbabwe.<sup>7</sup>

In the same vein one may also consider the relationship between archaeology and nationalism. In the 1950s African intellectuals grouped around *Présence Africaine* and under the leadership of Sheikh Anta Diop fought colonial alienation to restore African dignity and create the basis for an African revival.

As Holl summarized it:

. . . [T]o create national-self-consciousness, Africans had to study their past critically. This was done in three major steps. The first was to establish Ancient Egypt firmly as the cradle of almost every black African people. The second was to demonstrate the true nature of the links between a sample of African peoples and linguistic groups with Pharaonic Egypt while ascertaining the "negritude" of the latter's peoples. And the third was to consider Pharaonic Egypt as a centre of civilization

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<sup>7</sup>William L. Rathje and Michael B. Schiffer, *Archaeology* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), 365-67.

which exerted a tremendous influence upon Ancient Greece and consequently upon the whole Western world.<sup>8</sup>

These theories still enjoy great popularity throughout French-speaking Africa. Conferences on Egypt attract huge enthusiastic crowds, and the University of Dakar was named Cheikh Anta Diop University after his death in 1986.

But the connection between present-day peoples and vanished populations has also been used for more practical purposes. For example Opoku-Gyamfi used evidence from excavations in northern Ghana demonstrating there the emergence of food production to advocate self-sufficiency in food production today:

The agricultural revolution which was initiated brought wealth to the majority of the Kintampo industrial people. Wealth which we see reflected in their finely-made stone bracelets, rasps and their art. The "Kintampo culture" was indeed a unique phenomenon in Ghana's rise to prosperity. The tradition was really "Ghanaian" although it derived inspiration from outside. That they were able to feed much of Ghana with the limited tools at their disposal, is a mark of great cultural achievement which we must all be proud of.<sup>9</sup>

From a political point of view archaeology offers a unique opportunity to counteract the growth of tribalism by revealing that the cultural diversity was quite different in precolonial times and that, historically, many current cultures trace their origins to a common stock.

Most of the people living south of a line going from Douala to Mombasa speak a Bantu language. According to linguists, they all trace their origins to an area at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. Archaeological research corroborates this migration movement, which took place some 5,000 years ago. This kind of knowledge could dilute some tribalistic feuds and serve as a basis for a new and more positive Pan-Africanism.

For a long time archaeological research has been influenced mainly by the functionalist and positivist schools of thought. Archaeological explanation has often been based on technological adaptation to changes in the environment. This explains why, among social scientists, archaeologists have developed special concern for environmental studies. Furthermore, archaeological research

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<sup>8</sup>Augustin Holl, "West African Archaeology: Colonialism and Nationalism," in *A History of African Archaeology*, ed. P. Robertshaw (London: James Currey; Portsmouth, N. H.: Heinemann, 1990), 296-308.

<sup>9</sup>Y. Opoku-Gyamfi, "Operation Feed Yourself in the 2nd Millenium B.C. in Ghana," *Sankofa* 1 (1975): 79-82.

provides useful data on the evolution of the environment, the complex strategies used in the past to exploit nature, the origin of deforestation, and some major ecological trends.

The study of material remains has also led archaeologists to study the material culture of present-day ethnic groups, especially metallurgy and pottery making. Some lost technological know-how could be used profitably to deal with the present economic crisis, or to promote handicrafts.

### **The Endangered Status of Archaeological Research in Central Africa**

The boundaries of Central Africa are imprecise, but the region is usually considered to comprise Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, southern Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Zaire, and Zambia.

It is a gigantic area of over 6,500,000 square kilometers, equivalent to two-thirds of the size of the United States. Centered around the Congo/Zaire River but touching the Niger, the Nile, and the Zambezi basins, it is a major crossroads of the African past. The peoples of the region are mostly Bantu-speakers whose origin can be traced to northwest Cameroon 5,000 years ago.

During the colonial era Central Africa was divided among nearly all the colonial powers since the eleven modern states that now exist result from agreements made by Belgium, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and even Spain. *As a result of its colonial past Central Africa is politically more diverse than any other part of the continent; yet from its precolonial past it is more similar and coherent than any other region of Africa.* On the whole the colonial powers neglected the scientific study of their Central African possessions in favor of other regions. Only tiny Belgium, which did not have any other colonies, concentrated all her efforts on the Belgian Congo, a country seventy-seven times larger than herself.<sup>10</sup>

Following Independence, the development of archaeological research was hampered by a very unstable situation, as almost all the states in the area suffered civil wars or coups d'etat, if not both. Under these conditions the meager institutionally sponsored archaeology that existed came to a halt. Former colonial research institutes disappeared. In all Central Africa there was not one properly trained local to carry on research. Only a handful of European amateurs continued to do fieldwork whenever local conditions allowed. Zambia was the exception with the presence of one or two professional archaeologists at

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<sup>10</sup>Pierre de Maret, "Phases and Facies in the Archaeology of Central Africa," in *A History of African Archaeology*, 109-34.

the famous Rhodes-Livingstone Museum and at the National Monuments Commission.

The 1970s saw the development of archaeological research by a new generation of professionals working from an interdisciplinary perspective. The interest in archaeology aroused in Central Africa among both the authorities and intellectuals resulted in the training of local African archaeologists. Yet, at present for all Central Africa only about ten professional archaeologists hold archaeologists' jobs in their countries. Approximately twenty more are being trained, mainly in Europe. Over the last ten years fewer than thirty expatriates and nationals have conducted surveys and excavations in this vast area. In comparison with France, where professional archaeologists working on the French archaeological past number about 600, it would take 7,000 archaeologists active in Central Africa to achieve the same coverage! The vastness of the region, a poor road system, the thick vegetation, and in general the poor site visibility, as well as erosion and in many instances the rapid deterioration of organic remains, have hampered research. All these factors explain why Central Africa is archaeologically the least known part of the continent and probably the largest of the last unknown regions of the world.

Usually it is a country's ministry of culture that is responsible for the protection of cultural property. Finances and trained staff usually are lacking. Often the ministry exercises its influence on archaeological research through the channel of national museums, as is the case in Angola, Chad, Zaire, and Zambia. In the absence of a museum archaeological activities are conducted by professionals linked to the universities, as in Cameroon, Congo, the Central African Republic, and Gabon, or there is simply no local research team, as in Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, and Rwanda. In those countries the little research being done is carried out by expatriates during brief missions.

At a regional level in the last eight years the archaeology department of the International Center for Bantu Civilizations (CICIBA), Libreville, Gabon, has played a useful role by publishing a newsletter, organizing seminars and training sessions, and establishing a data bank for scientific publications and lists of radiocarbon dates. These initiatives have proved very useful in overcoming the isolation of local archaeologists. In this respect the hopefully temporary disappearance of the Pan-African Congress of Prehistory, organized every four years since 1947, is very unfortunate. It has not convened since 1983.

As far as teaching archaeology is concerned, besides a few prehistory courses in history curricula, the one program in all of Central Africa is being taught at the University of Yaoundé.

Some basic material for excavations are to be found in most of the countries under consideration, but very few laboratories are equipped with even

the more basic apparatus and documentation. Most of the faunal and floral analyses and all datations have to be conducted abroad.

A research budget is usually lacking or at the best very inadequate. A 1989 survey indicated that the largest budget was to be found in Zambia, with US\$1,500 annually!<sup>11</sup>

Needless to say, local African archaeologists are rarely able to carry out their own work. This leaves them very dependent on external financing, usually obtained by mounting joint expeditions with foreign archaeologists. Usually the latter find some support from their respective governments. But even through those agencies, money is scarce because the cultural sector is hardly considered a priority.

Except for the salaries of the archaeologists over the last five years, *an average total of less than US\$20,000 has been spent annually for archaeological research in Central Africa. For all of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa and some large expeditions on early hominids, one can estimate that annually less than US\$150,000 are spent for archaeological research, a miniscule amount in comparison with the multimillion-dollar market generated annually by the sale of African cultural artifacts in the industrialized world.*

Cultural legislation exists almost everywhere in Central Africa but is hardly ever enforced. Monuments and site conservation is virtually nonexistent except for some of the most famous of the old colonial buildings.

### **Archaeological Potential of Central Africa**

Considering the available means, it is hardly a surprise that archaeological research in Central Africa has remained sparse with large areas unexplored. Basic surveys have been conducted only in very limited areas: the Lunda, Luanda, and Benguela areas of Angola; north, northwest, eastern and central Cameroon; the Bouar region and the northeastern part of the Central African Republic; coastal and central parts of Congo; the coast and center of Gabon; Malabo Island; most of Rwanda; Lower Zaire and central Shaba; and one-third of Zambia, for a total of roughly 600,000 out of 6,500,000 square kilometers. Thus, the total area explored is less than 10 percent.

Since over 90 percent of Central Africa has never even been visited by a professional archaeologist, distribution maps usually reflect the accessibility of an area and the fact that major public works were undertaken and surveyed by

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<sup>11</sup>Bernard Clist and Raymond Lanfranchi, "Etat des structures de recherches archéologiques dans les Etats membres du CICIBA," *Nsi-Bulletin de liaison des archéologues du monde bantu* 6 (1989): 139-50.

archaeologists. This gives the impression that prehistoric inhabitants had a tendency to settle near paved roads, power lines, rail roads, bridges, and cities! For example, in Rwanda most of the Early Iron Age smelting sites have been discovered in a 15-kilometer radius around the headquarters of the National Institute for Scientific Research.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the lack of archaeological remains in an area does not generally mean that none exist but rather that no archaeological surveys have been conducted there. In fact in many areas the prehistoric site density is very high, reaching in some instances, as in Lower Zaire, more than ten sites per square kilometer.

In the few instances in which digging has taken place, due to lack of funding it has often been limited to test pits of no more than a few square meters. In the last twenty years no more than twenty-five excavations of more than ten square meters have been opened. Such small excavations usually do not allow the collection of enough data to be affirmative on the chronological sequence, let alone reconstruct behavior. Yet, based on the little that is known, it is obvious that many archaeological riches are to be found throughout Central Africa. Sites that relate human origins and early prehistory have been found at the border between Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire. There are also potentially rich deposits in southern Angola and Cameroon. We often speak of the African diaspora: one has to realize that it is very likely that all human beings now living are part of one or another of the African diaspora.

Stone Age sites are scattered throughout the region. Potentially the most interesting sites are caves, which are numerous in Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Zaire.

For more recent periods directly relevant to present-day inhabitants, the following topics deserve special study:

- The transition to sedentarization and food production in connection with "Neolithic-like" industries in Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, and Zaire, and the hypothesis on Bantu origins and the present distribution of the major linguistic families.
- In direct relation to the above topic, the origin and diffusion of major staple food crops like yams and bananas is turning out to be extremely important in fighting starvation. For example, archaeological research is crucial in elaborating a model of the diffusion and diversification of the banana in intertropical Africa

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<sup>12</sup>Pierre de Maret, "L'archéologie en zone bantou jusqu'en 1984," *Muntu, Revue scientifique et culturelle du CICIBA* 1 (1984): 37-60.

during the past millennia to identify areas in which bananas were, or are, intensively cultivated. This research should allow the discovery of cultivars of higher fertility and resistance to a new virulent leaf spot disease that reduces the yield by 30 to 50 percent, thus threatening the livelihood of millions of subsistence farmers all over the world. In connection with the preservation of the rainforest, it is important to understand the dynamic of human beings' adaptation to their environment and the adaptability demonstrated by the Bantu when they colonized the equatorial forest.

- The megaliths of Cameroon and Central African Republic.
- Coastal sites, especially shellmiddens on the Atlantic shore from Cameroon to Angola, as well as the river bank sites in the Central Basin to test migration routes and diffusion itineraries.
- The origins of metallurgy with the existence of very early dates for iron smelting in Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, and Rwanda.
- The little-known rock art in Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Zaire.
- The origins of complex societies in connection with state formation and trade networks to understand the emergence of the various ethnic groups and the present crisis. From this perspective the history of the famous Kongo Kingdom, which came in contact with Europe at the end of the fifteenth century, is of great interest to Angola, Congo, Gabon, and Zaire. These modern states have set as a major priority research on the prestigious past of Kongo and the related Teke Kingdom. The former capital of the Kongo Kingdom has been put on UNESCO's list of World Heritage.
- Both the study and the conservation of old colonial buildings, often "art nouveau."
- From a more theoretical point of view, the evaluation of oral traditions versus archaeological data and ethnoarchaeological studies in, for example, the symbolic field or the material culture. These evaluations could improve greatly our theoretical models and so be a significant contribution to archaeological science as a whole.

### **How to Promote Conservation and Valorization of Cultural Heritage**

The first problem is institutional. Although governmental or institutional backing is essential, most local archaeologists insist that the work be managed from

outside the country by a regional ad hoc agency or nongovernmental organization (NGO), and also probably more effectively, by institutional linkage with Western universities or museums. It is their opinion based on previous experience that this is the only way to channel the money to those who want to do the work. A systematic and continuous evaluation of the work should be organized by a "follow-up committee" with a mix of national and foreign expertise.

A data base on all known sites should be established and maintained, and systematic archaeological surveys must be organized. Interdisciplinary teams should be formed to survey and establish priorities for a fieldwork program with rescue excavation and the excavations of very significant sites to raise the governmental and local awareness of archaeology and cultural heritage.

Contrary to a commonly held view, archaeology arises not solely out of the colonial structure. The vast majority of the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa share with archaeologists a devotion to the past. Interest in the ancestors and the material relics of their existence started long before the arrival of Europeans. Oral traditions provide numerous examples of a relationship between material relics of the past and the history of people. Integration of the archaeological past into day-to-day living is also marked by the systematic conservation of chance discoveries of ancient objects. Some of these, like polished axes, pottery, bored stones, and cross-shaped copper ingots, are incorporated into rituals as a sort of metaphor of the ancestor.<sup>13</sup> So it should not be too difficult for archaeology to become meaningful both as part of the developing system and as part of the traditional attitude of respect for the ancestors' ways. Integrating development projects with conservation of natural and cultural resources at the community level should have a highly cumulative and synergistic effect. Some pilot projects should be launched.

One common international teaching program at the university level should be created covering most aspects of cultural conservation and promotion. It should be very selective, insisting on theoretical, practical, and ethical issues.

A good training program has to parallel as much as possible the various steps of archaeological work: initiation of the project, fundraising, planning, fieldwork, and analysis and dissemination of the results through publications, displays, and conferences. Training of technicians should not be overlooked.

As far as site protection is concerned, the situation is paradoxical. Threats to sites, often unknown, are very real. For example, on the Congo coast every year since 1988, between 1000 and 4000 hectares of savanna grassland have been converted into tree plantation. The result has been the destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites; yet ironically this disastrous conversion process

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<sup>13</sup>De Maret, "Phases and Facies in the Archaeology of Central Africa," 111.

has enabled archaeologists to realize the great archaeological potential of the area and to carry on rescue excavations. The almost complete lack of resources for archaeology thus turns what would be in any other continent a major archaeological catastrophe into a golden opportunity. The same is true in central Cameroon, where most of the very early village sites found recently in the rainforest were discovered thanks to their partial destruction resulting from road building.

It is clear that in Africa small archaeology teams should be monitoring major earthmoving activities, and a percentage of each project's budget should be allocated for surveys, archaeological impact studies, and rescue excavations, as is standard practice in the North. No international development agencies, with the exception of one European Community project in the northeast Central African Republic, and very few private companies are taking these actions.

I fully agree with Miller when he advocates:

... prevention rather than cure. Checks can be made periodically through ministries and local administrative bodies to ensure that information on possible threats to sites is received as early as possible. With wider publicity given to archaeology, the realisation that there is a possibility of uncovering local history may supplement any respect for the monument per se as a reason for their preservation. This publicity may be disseminated through the education system and directly to the employees of development corporations as well as to management, since it is the bulldozer driver himself who is likely to be the arbiter of a site's future. It should be emphasised that where sites are noted at an early stage in planning, their protection is rarely detrimental to the achievement of development aims. Archaeology is itself a clear example of imported technology and ideas, yet one of its major roles lies in countering a disastrous side-effect of the growth of the non-traditional structure, and it is precisely in that role that archaeology can have its most immediate appeal within the framework of traditional culture or "custom." While both the mechanisms and the results of prehistoric research may remain somewhat obscure, however one attempts to expound them, the need to save traditional monuments from imminent destruction and to counter vandalism strikes a responsive chord amongst the most respected members of the community.<sup>14</sup>

Another major threat to sites is looting fueled by the very high prices paid in Europe and America for African arts. There is no simple answer to curb

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<sup>14</sup>Miller, "Archaeology and Development," 713.

this major assault on the cultural heritage. One should work on adapting and enforcing legislation in African countries and in importers' countries, on training cultural ministry and customs agents, and on mobilizing local people, and press to excavate known sites before it is too late. Looting is a worldwide problem.

As pointed out recently in the *International Herald Tribune*: It is high time for the havoc to stop. What is buried underground vastly exceeds the potential capacity of all museums worldwide. Private owners would be needed to hold much of what comes out, particularly if 50 percent of it did not get destroyed in the savaging of sites. The problem is one of central and international agreements. Our global world is losing its cultural historical ecology even more quickly than its rainforest.<sup>15</sup>

The field of education also holds room for many initiatives:

- Multimedia pedagogic material (textbooks, slides, even small mobile "case museums" as suggested in Congo) incorporating local precolonial history.
- Surveys closely associating archaeologists, teachers, and children.
- Museum displays. A good example is the recent exhibit put together by the French Cultural Centers of Central Africa, "Aux origines de l'Afrique Centrale," which is touring the region. The European Commission with CICIBA has just funded a major program of field research by an interdisciplinary team to put together exhibits on traditional cultural production.
- Elaboration of pedagogic messages building on the examples of the past to promote a more conservationist attitude among the local population.
- Involving the media to encourage cultural heritage conservation.

Archaeological research as such is not likely to generate directly many job opportunities in the near term, although with the development of activities this sector could grow significantly in the field, in museums, and in universities.

But it is through the development of tourism and handicraft that cultural heritage can provide opportunities for employment and generate significant income. The natural heritage of Central Africa is by far not limited to the rainforest. If one develops cultural points of interest like old Kongo cities, prehistoric and painted caves, megaliths, national and site museums, musical and

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<sup>15</sup>Souren Melikia, "Buried History, Looting and Cultural Ecology," *International Herald Tribune*, January 25-26, 1992, 7.

dance performances, and handicraft, Central Africa has indeed much to offer the traveler who wants to leave the beaten paths.

By its interest in material culture and by the discovery of long-forgotten techniques or decorative motifs, archaeology could also boost the handicraft sector.

### **Conclusion**

Such is the state of archaeological research and cultural heritage conservation in Central Africa that any initiative will be very important and visible. I strongly believe that even limited means could have a long-term and important impact.

By implementing one good training program, by systematically surveying and monitoring the threat to cultural artifacts at the national and regional levels, by raising funds and supporting large excavation programs on major topics directly relevant to the inhabitants of Central Africa, and by promoting awareness of the past cultural riches, we could easily reintegrate the African past into its present and by so doing lay down a much sounder base for future development.

## Archaeological Heritage Management and Site Inventory Systems in Africa: The Role of Development

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Rice University

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*Archaeological heritage management (AHM) is a direct outgrowth of post-World War II development. In West Africa the two most troublesome aspects of AHM are basic site inventories (the fundamental data base) and training Africans to undertake AHM. Inventory methods must be radically restructured to ensure sufficiently high-quality data to merit the monetary investment. Special training to familiarize African archaeologists with computerized information systems, air photo interpretation, management theory, and conservation practice and methods is a priority. Policy recommendations to the World Bank and other international agencies are to fund an intensive 2-year training program for African students that will begin operating by 1994 (a sample course outline is provided); fund this training as an ongoing, integral part of development; ensure that these graduates are represented in the evaluation of all development projects in Africa; and ensure funding mechanisms for exchange of information and experience among archaeological management professionals through regional and international conferences and workshops. An AHM data base for West Africa can be built in ten years. As a result of these efforts, these will be years of unprecedented discovery.*

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Archaeological heritage management (AHM) has been a direct outgrowth of post-World War II development. The rapid pace of construction in Europe and North America in conjunction with the environmental movement of the 1970s led to the recognition of the archaeological record as a valuable, nonrenewable resource that requires protection and regulation.<sup>1</sup> New antiquities legislation was passed in many countries in Europe and North America in the 1970s. The wave hit Africa five to ten years later. My purpose here is to examine certain fundamental aspects of AHM in Africa today, focusing on West Africa, the region I know best, having conducted archaeological research in Ghana, Mali, and Senegal over fifteen years. Within this context I want to consider two topics that are widely identified as the most troublesome aspects of AHM in Africa today: basic site

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<sup>1</sup>H. Cleere, "Introduction: The Rationale of Archaeological Heritage Management," in H. Cleere, ed., *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*, *One World Archaeology*, vol. 9 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 1-22.

inventories, which constitute the fundamental data base for AHM, and the training of Africans to undertake AHM. After examining the way site inventory traditionally has been carried out in West Africa, I will argue that inventory methods must be radically restructured to ensure data of sufficiently high quality to merit the monetary investment required. I will also argue that the academic training of most indigenous archaeologists does not always provide them with the skills necessary for effective inventory and management of the archaeological heritage. Special training to familiarize African archaeologists with computerized information systems, air photo interpretation, management theory, and conservation practice and methods is essential. Funding for two years of AHM training for promising African students should be a priority.

Let me start by defining the archaeological heritage using the definition put forth by the International Committee for the Management of the Archaeological Heritage (ICAHM), a subcommittee of UNESCO's International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS): "The archaeological heritage is that part of the material heritage for which archaeological methods provide primary information. It comprises all vestiges of human existence and consists of places relating to all manifestations of human activity . . . together with all the portable cultural material associated with them."<sup>2</sup> Archaeological heritage management refers to "the protection and administration of archaeological heritage in its original environment and in its relationship to history and contemporary society."<sup>3</sup> Thus defined, AHM is a subset of Cultural Resource Management (CRM), which encompasses the wider set of cultural resources including oral traditions, historical buildings, cultural property, and the archaeological heritage.

Why should the development community be concerned with AHM? What justifies the significant expenditures of time and money that it undeniably entails? First of all, the past is directly tied into our cultural identity. Human beings see themselves as inheritors of tradition, and they construct their place in the world partly by identifying with and appropriating fragments of the past. Recent Western history nineteenth century England and France provides an excellent example in which growth of empire was accompanied by an unprecedented interest in the biblical and Classical past whose tradition those empires claimed. As part of this attachment to the past, actual pieces of it were moved

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<sup>2</sup>International Committee for the Management of the Archaeological Heritage (ICAHM), *ICAHM 1989 Charter for the Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage* (1989).

<sup>3</sup>M. Bjornstad, "The ICOMOS International Committee on Archaeological Heritage Management (ICAHM)," in Cleere, *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*, 72.

from Ninevah, Luxor, the Parthenon, and other sites to Paris and London.<sup>4</sup> For Africans, who experienced to varying degrees the loss of their past under colonialism, archaeology is a major component in, if I may borrow Wole Soyinka's words, "the conscious activity of recovering what has been hidden, lost, repressed, denigrated, or indeed simply denied. . . . For a people to develop, they must have constant recourse to their own history."<sup>5</sup> The archaeological heritage is a major, endangered, and nonrenewable resource for that history. Thus, many African countries have important national agendas tied to the archaeological heritage. It is also possible, and I would say necessary, to move beyond the limits of nationalism and consider the archaeological heritage as part of the global patrimony. It is, in Danish archaeologist Kristian Kristiansen's words, "part of the sum of knowledge and experience from which decisions for tomorrow are taken at all levels of society. It represents an irreplaceable contribution to what has been called the collective memory of mankind."<sup>6</sup> Academic archaeologists including myself who take a broad comparative view of the archaeological record for the information it provides on the different solutions people have devised to problems common to human society since its inception are particularly committed to this perspective.

Now that I have outlined some reasons why protection and management of the archaeological heritage are important both nationally and globally, the question remains of why international development agencies specifically should fund AHM in places like Africa. The most compelling reason is that the current sense of crisis in many countries over the disappearance of large chunks of the archaeological record is a direct consequence of development activities. I am suggesting that developers have a responsibility to address problems they helped create, however inadvertently, especially when these problems concern nonrenewable resources. The case is strengthened by legislation in many African countries concerning site destruction and mitigation procedures. In the absence of adequate national resources to implement this legislation fully, development agencies should take the lead in ensuring that the necessary investigation and mitigation steps to bring their agency in compliance with local laws are taken prior to project implementation. Moving from pragmatic and ethical considerations to ideological ones, I ask: If we understand that colonialism denied

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<sup>4</sup>N. A. Silberman, *Between Past and Present: Archaeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1989), 4.

<sup>5</sup>Wole Soyinka, "Twice Bitten: The Fate of Africa's Culture Producers" (Paper presented at the Conference on Development and Culture of the Africa Leadership Forum, Nigeria, October-November 1988).

<sup>6</sup>Kristian Kristiansen, "Perspectives on the Archaeological Heritage: History and Future," in Cleere, *Archeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*, 27.

African peoples their legitimate history, can we not see that by failing to fund archaeological heritage management, the net result is the same?

### Site Inventory Systems

There are many diverse components of AHM, including documentation, conservation, tourism, museum curation for archaeological objects, and education programs for the public; and all are essential. Logic leads us to the proposition, however, that discovery, identification, and recording of the archaeological heritage is fundamental to its management.<sup>7</sup> We cannot manage what we do not know exists. Article 4 of the 1989 ICAHM charter states unequivocally: "The protection of the archaeological heritage must be based on the fullest possible knowledge of its extent and nature. General survey is therefore an essential working tool in developing strategies for (its) protection. . . . Consequently, archaeological survey should be a basic obligation in the protection and management of the archaeological heritage."<sup>8</sup>

Sites have been inventoried for many years in West Africa. Colonial administrators put the first dots representing sites on the maps. The traditional approaches to site inventory that they used are still common in West Africa today. Traditional approaches use the *stop, look, and listen* method: stop and look at sites you see while driving along the road, and stop in villages and listen to people who can lead you to local sites. This approach is undermined by two fundamental and erroneous assumptions: that the qualities of size, monumentality, and visibility are reliably associated with the most significant or important aspects of the past, and that local informants know all the important sites in the area. There are many other reasons why these assumptions are wrong, but the single example of Olduvai Gorge, where a series of small, unassuming patches of eroding artifacts and bones provide stunning insights into the behavior of our earliest human forebears, is sufficient to illustrate their bankruptcy. Local inhabitants appear to have been unaware of the presence of archaeological sites in the Gorge when Louis Leakey first explored it in the 1930s, as we might well expect them to be, given the remoteness of the sites from them in both time and cultural significance. This situation has counterparts in Africa today anywhere living peoples have no current cultural labels or explanations for the scatters of artifacts and other materials that we can recognize as archaeological sites.

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<sup>7</sup>H. Cleere, ed., *Approaches to the Archaeological Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

<sup>8</sup>ICAHM, *Charter for the Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage*, Article 4.

While I view the stop, look, and listen approach as fundamentally flawed for the above reasons as well as others discussed below, the method can be useful, particularly in regions with high concentrations of monumental sites. If one is energetic, one can get a lot of points on the map this way, witness the best example of this kind of inventory achieved in West Africa: Victor Martin and Charles Becker's distribution map of the four most visible types of archaeological sites in Senegal (Figure 1): tumuli (earthen funerary mounds), megaliths, shell mounds, and large habitation mounds.<sup>9</sup> Information recorded for each site included approximate distance and direction to the nearest village or road; size; and presence or absence of copper, iron, skeletal material, or smelting debris on the surface. (I might also point out how extraordinary this inventory map is in the West African context. For many countries, including Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the number of known sites ranges from several dozen to a hundred or so.) These data are useful at very general levels and relatively coarse scales. If more specific issues are involved, problems become apparent, as we discovered during a 1988 resurvey of several tumulus zone sectors:

1. Because the villages originally used as reference points move every few years, a significant number of previously inventoried sites could not be located.
2. Because the original survey sought and recorded only certain kinds of sites, other kinds of less visible sites, such as the habitation sites we located in the course of fieldwalking (Figure 2), are not represented on the map.
3. The distribution of inventoried sites usually reflects more accurately the survey team's itinerary than it does the actual distribution of sites. For example, along Middle Senegal Valley (Figure 3), site distribution is concentrated within one kilometer of the two main roads (Figure 4). Restudy of the region illustrated in 1991, using what has been called the *gumshoe method* of survey, involving extensive fieldwalking, showed many more sites away from roads (Figure 4).


These problems lost sites due to use of transitory reference points and a lack of information on the actual range and distribution of sites in the area are common to traditional site surveys all over West Africa. In addition these surveys often fail to collect data relevant to one of the most important aspects of any human settlement: its environmental and geographical context. Normally,

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<sup>9</sup>Victor Martin and Charles Becker, "Vestiges protohistoriques et occupation humaine au Sénégal," *Annales de démographie historique* (1974): 403-29, and R. Van Chi, *Atlas national du Sénégal* (Dakar: Imprimerie nationale, 1977).




**Figure 3. Senegal and the Middle Senegal Valley**




*Source:* Susan K. McIntosh, R. J. McIntosh, and H. Bocoum, "The Emergence of Regional Polities in the Middle Senegal Valley" (Paper presented at the meetings of the Society for African Archaeology, Los Angeles, April 1992).

**Figure 3. Senegal and the Middle Senegal Valley**



*Source:* Susan K. McIntosh, R. J. McIntosh, and H. Bocoum, "The Emergence of Regional Polities in the Middle Senegal Valley" (Paper presented at the meetings of the Society for African Archaeology, Los Angeles, April 1992).

**Figure 4. Map of the 1990 Middle Senegal Valley Project study area showing previously inventoried sites and those located by intensive gumshoe survey**



**Source:** McIntosh, McIntosh, and Bocoum, "The Emergence of Regional Polities in the Middle Senegal Valley."

sites are not distributed randomly over the landscape but are preferentially located with respect to variables like elevation, soil types, landforms (levees), and distance to water. Collecting data in a way that permits us to understand these preferences permits us to draw up predictive models so that even if we have not been able to survey the entire region, the information from a representative subset of it allows us to suggest where sites are most likely and least likely to be located elsewhere in the region. The value of this approach for AHM in an incompletely known area, such as most of West Africa, is easily appreciated.

My main conclusion concerning traditional survey as it continues to be practiced in West Africa today is that it cannot provide the necessary data for effective and efficient management of the archaeological heritage. AHM needs accurate site location information; traditional survey often introduces inaccuracies of up to several kilometers or can lose sites entirely. AHM needs to know about *all* classes of sites present; traditional survey often concentrates on the most visible. AHM needs to know how sites are distributed over the whole landscape; traditional survey often ignores areas that are not close to roads or villages. AHM needs to understand sites in their environmental and geographic context; traditional survey usually does not record data on this context.

Beyond the shortcomings of traditional survey for creating a data base suitable for AHM is its even more disastrous consequences for understanding the societies that once inhabited these sites and how their ways of life, economies, and social organizations changed through time. This understanding is, after all, the ultimate goal of archaeology, and collecting data relevant to this goal surely must figure somewhere in the objectives of any site inventory survey. After all, if we do not want to learn about these past societies, why be concerned to preserve their material remains? At the regional or multisite level that we are discussing, archaeology seeks insights into the nature of societies by looking at site patterning in space and time. Patterning in space is critical: where one lives tells a great deal about how one lives. In Washington, D.C., for example, one's address tells volumes about one's economic circumstances, educational level, and even race. City dwellers have very different lifestyles and occupations than rural farm-dwellers. For the past also, scale and location of settlements provide basic data on how people lived and the nature of their societies. A pattern of tiny sites preferentially located on river banks, and *not* preferentially located with respect to arable land, immediately suggests a small society whose resource base was oriented towards the river (fishing perhaps) and not towards agriculture.

If we are to understand past societies, however, spatial data is only half of the picture. Time is the other critical dimension. The set of all archaeological sites within a given area represents many different periods of occupation by many different types of society. The trick is to figure out which sites are broadly contemporaneous, and separate out the settlement patterns belonging to different


periods. Consider this time travel analogy: say we are interested in looking at how settlement in and around Washington, D.C., has changed over the past 500 years, and we have five air photos, one each from 1500, 1650, 1800, 1900, and 1950 A.D. The problem is, they have been made into jigsaw puzzles, and all the pieces are mixed together and spread out before us. Once we figure out, by similarities in color and shape, which pieces go to which puzzle, we will see the total pattern for each time slice, and the differences among them will be striking because of the magnitude of the changes societies were undergoing during this period. We happen to know exactly what these changes were, but even if we did not, we could figure out major aspects of them from the settlement patterns and growth of the city alone. This is basically how the archaeologist operates. She uses the fact that style and form of artifacts shift through time to group together as broadly contemporaneous those sites with the most similar sets of artifacts on their surface.

Let me show you some of the results of this kind of work. Let us look at the Santa Valley on the central coast of Peru (Figure 5), which, in a classic gumshoe survey, was fieldwalked in its entirety by a survey team led by archaeologist David Wilson.<sup>10</sup> They located and inventoried 1,020 archaeological sites (Figure 5). (As a general guide to baseline costs this 750-square kilometer region was investigated in a single six-month field season using four field personnel for \$25,000.) Careful collection and study of surface pottery allowed Wilson to recognize broadly contemporaneous sites and plot site distribution at different time periods. Let us look at just three of these slices of time and see the extraordinary changes that occurred. At 400 A.D. settlement is concentrated on the irrigable valleylands and is especially dense upriver, where hillsides are steeper and defense is easier (Figure 6). The pattern of many small sites plus several large ceremonial centers, organized in at least three clusters separated by uninhabited buffer zones, suggests the presence of three chiefdoms. Four hundred years later, in 800 A.D., the settlement pattern has changed dramatically (Figure 6), with the construction of a complex road system leading to the adjacent valley and the establishment of many new settlements and administrative centers along the roads into the mountains. No uninhabited zones exist in the valley, and a single major administrative center now appears to control the entire region. A state system of political organization has emerged. Only 200 years later (Figure 7), the entire valley has been completely depopulated, especially the previously densely occupied upvalley sector. Geological and

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
<sup>10</sup>David Wilson, "Full-Coverage Survey in the Lower Santa Valley: Implications for Regional Settlement Patterns on the Peruvian Coast," in *The Archaeology of Regions*, ed. S.K. Fish and S. Kowalewski (Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 117-46.

**Figure 5. Lower Santa Valley, Peru**




**Source:** David Wilson, "Full-Coverage Survey in the Lower Santa Valley: Implications for Regional Settlement Patterns on the Peruvian Coast," in *The Archaeology of Regions*, ed. S.K. Fish and S. Kowalewski (Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 117-146.

**Figure 6. Lower Santa Valley at 400 and 800 A.D.**




400 A.D.



800 A.D.

*Source:* Wilson, "Full-Coverage Survey in the Lower Santa Valley."

**Figure 7. Lower Santa Valley at 1000 A.D.**



**Settlement pattern of late Tambo Real period.**

*Source:* Wilson, "Full-Coverage Survey in the Lower Santa Valley."

hydrological studies indicate that tectonic uplift altered the valley, dramatically reducing the amount of irrigable land.

This kind of survey is common in Latin America, parts of Europe, and the Near East with equally fascinating results. It has been rare in West Africa, where the gumshoe approach and the collection, study, and recording of surface artifacts have never figured large in traditional survey. Influenced by the work in Latin America and Mesoamerica, we did a gumshoe survey in the Inland Niger Delta of Mali, where thousands of mounds on the floodplain recall the tells of Mesopotamia<sup>11</sup>. After finding all the permanent sites on the floodplain and investigating them, which increased the number of known sites in the survey region from 9 to 282 and dramatically demonstrated the utility of air photos for site discovery in this region (Figure 8), we found that (a) all sites dated to the Iron Age; (b) sites occupied and abandoned by 900 A.D. were relatively few and were all in the deep floodplain, where people lived on large mounds surrounded by their rice fields; and (c) settlements occupied and abandoned between 1100 and 1400 A.D. were extraordinarily numerous, suggesting a major population shift from a population density that may have been ten times the present density (Figure 9). The total cost of this work in 1977 was less than \$10,000, illustrating that good methodology can produce copious results at minimal cost.



What I am demonstrating is the extent to which archaeological data must be multidimensional, representing numerous spatial associations as well as chronology, to be useful for both AHM and the academic discipline of archaeology. I have tried to give a sense of how rich the insights become when the data base is collected with sufficient rigor and detail. And I have maintained that traditional means of site inventory in West Africa usually have provided very little of the above. The policy implications of this for funding agencies are these:

1. Site inventories provide the fundamental data base for protecting the archaeological heritage. International development agencies must take the lead in supporting long-term national site inventory work as well as providing priority funding for surveys in areas slated to be affected by development projects. The publication of "The Management of Cultural Property in World Bank-assisted Projects" makes it clear that the World Bank's general policy is "to assist in the protection and enhancement of cultural properties encountered in Bank-financed projects, rather than

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
<sup>11</sup>Susan K. McIntosh and R.J. McIntosh, *Prehistoric Investigations at Jenne, Mali*, 2 vols. (Oxford: BAR, 1980).

**Figure 8. Regional map of Inland Niger Delta showing known sites prior to 1977; inset detail showing site distribution within 1977 survey region**



*Sources:* Regional map, Bedaux and others 1978, 92; inset detail, Susan K. McIntosh and R.J. McIntosh *Prehistoric Investigations at Jenne, Mali*, vol. 2 (Oxford: BAR, 1980), 379.

**Figure 9. Map of Jenne-jeno and its immediate hinterland showing sites occupied between 900 and 1400 A.D. (Phase IV) and those occupied between 1500 and 1900 A.D. (Phase V)**



leaving that protection to chance."<sup>12</sup> At the same time Goodland and Webb point out that adequate reconnaissance surveys of sites and other cultural property often were not conducted routinely or sufficiently early nor was cultural property rescue systematically integrated in World Bank-financed projects, effectively leaving protection of the archaeological and cultural heritage to chance.<sup>13</sup> The guidance and recommendations offered by Goodland and Webb in 1987 are first-rate. It was disturbing to hear some World Bank officials speaking at this 1992 conference as though they were unfamiliar with the contents of this publication.

2. National site inventories are complex data bases that must be computerized for efficient use. International development agencies should fund the acquisition of computer hardware and software and personnel training necessary to ensure efficient storage, retrieval, and manipulation of national site inventory data bases. Data base formats should be devised to anticipate the advent of powerful, computerized Geographic Information Systems (GIS) in coming years. These systems with their ability to store, retrieve, and analyze multiple data types referenced to common spatial locations will revolutionize archaeological heritage management in the next century.<sup>14</sup> One anticipatory change that should immediately be implemented is the use of Global Positioning Satellite technology to accurately locate all inventoried sites, thus eliminating the most time-consuming aspect of site survey.

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<sup>12</sup>Robert Goodland and Maryla Webb, *The Management of Cultural Property in World Bank-Assisted Projects: Archaeological, Historical, Religious, and Natural Unique Sites*. World Bank Technical Paper 62 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987), 17.

<sup>13</sup>Goodland and Webb, *The Management of Cultural Property*, 16.

<sup>14</sup>K. Kvamme, "Geographic Information Systems in Regional Archaeological Research and Data Management," in M. Schiffer, ed., *Archaeological Method and Theory*, vol. 1 (1989), 139-203; J. Farley, W.F. Limp, and J. Lockhart, "The Archaeologist's Workbench: Integrating GIS, Remote Sensing, EDA and Data Base Management," chap. 13, *Interpreting Space: GIS and Archaeology*, ed. K.M.S. Allen, S.W. Green, and E.B. Zubrow (London: Taylor and Francis, 1990); and I. Williams, W.F. Limp, and F.L. Briuer, "Using Geographic Information Systems and Exploratory Data Analysis for Archaeological Site Classification and Analysis," chap. 21, Allen, Green, and Zubrow, *Interpreting Space: GIS and Archaeology*.

3. Since site inventory surveys are time-consuming and expensive, priority for funding should be given to projects whose methodology promises a high return in terms of data base quality and utility.
4. Because archaeologists in many parts of Africa have little experience with the more rigorous inventory approach I have described, an international advisory committee or series of committees composed of archaeologists with experience in survey techniques, AHM, and computerized data base development should be formed (perhaps by ICAHM) to consult with archaeologists seeking international funding for site inventory survey. This committee could work with local archaeologists to help them devise survey strategies that are best suited to local environmental conditions and national priorities for archaeology, without compromising quality and broad computer-based utility in the resulting data set. The committee could also help evaluate computer hardware, software, and staffing needs and assist with budget proposals to international funding agencies.
5. Funding agencies should actively encourage the shift to more rigorous site inventory strategies by instituting review procedures as successive one- or two-year phases of the project are completed. An archaeological review committee of international composition should evaluate project progress reports and make recommendations concerning continued funding. The benefits of oversight and review are several:
  - a. Emerging methodological weaknesses can be identified and corrected before they affect later phases of the project.
  - b. Projects that spend much money but generate few useful results can be eliminated early.
  - c. Writing progress reports for a review panel of archaeologists obligates project participants to consolidate their results and make them available in a format useful for AHM. This requirement would discourage current tendencies to file inventory data in drawers where they remain unnoticed and unavailable for consultation.

### **Training**

I now turn to the issue of adequate personnel in more detail because it is an issue of fundamental concern. As Zambian archaeologist Francis Musonda points out,

the paucity of trained archaeologists is the primary reason why the archaeology of large areas of the African continent remains unknown.<sup>15</sup> Who is to accomplish the Herculean task before us of documenting Africa's archaeological heritage and developing strategies to preserve it before it largely disappears? For many West African countries it is somewhere between unrealistic and impossible to expect the few academically trained local archaeologists to accomplish all that needs to be done. In many cases they are already too burdened by administrative duties to do extended fieldwork anyway. And many within the archaeological heritage management community argue that AHM is so much more diverse than academic archaeology requiring general management, conservation, and grant-writing skills; knowledge of planning and decisionmaking processes and national administrative hierarchies; and familiarity with computerized information systems, in addition to knowledge of the archaeological record and its interpretation that traditional archaeology degree programs cannot prepare students adequately to undertake AHM.<sup>16</sup> The consensus solution among AH managers is an intensive training course that emphasizes all these skills. Building on ideas put forth by Hester Davis<sup>17</sup> and John Alexander,<sup>18</sup> I offer a view of what such a course could look like.

Essential components of the program are: intensive fieldwork components in a guided setting followed by practical application in the course of an independent project in the home country; computers integrated into the course of study at all levels so that the student emerges computer-literate; an internship allowing the student to see how the principles and skills she has been exposed to are integrated in an AHM agency; travel to various facilities that use satellite imagery manipulation technologies; familiarity with geographical information systems used for AHM; and exposure to a broad range of AHM case studies from both developing and developed countries. The goal is a degree holder who possesses not only the necessary practical skills for documenting, evaluating, and managing the archaeological heritage but also a broadly informed comparative perspective on how technology, law, and government serve these ends in different countries. I envision the people emerging from this program as important

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<sup>15</sup>Francis Musonda, "African Archaeology: Looking Forward," *African Archeological Review* 8 (1990): 3-22.

<sup>16</sup>Cleere, *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*.

<sup>17</sup>Hester Davis, "Learning by Doing: This Is No Way to Treat Archaeological Resources," in Cleere, *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*, 275-79.

<sup>18</sup>John Alexander, "A Suggested Training Scheme for Archaeological Resource Managers in Tropical Countries," in Cleere, *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World*, 280-84.

**Proposal for Two-Year Course Leading to a Master's Degree in  
Archaeological Heritage Management**

**Year 1**

***Fall Semester***

**Introduction to Computer Information Systems** A personal computer should be provided to each student upon arrival.

**Method and Theory of Archaeology** Includes computerized exercises in sampling techniques and artifact inventories.

**African Prehistory**

**Techniques of Archaeological Survey** Includes fieldwork component, use, and interpretation of air photos, surface collection, and recording of artifacts.

***Spring Semester***

**Management Theory**

**Techniques of Archaeological Excavation** Fieldwork and report writing.

**Preservation and Presentation of the Archaeological Heritage** Conservation and education programs, international case studies in heritage law.

**Tutorial** Covers grant-writing, studies of local government legislation and structures for AHM. Student prepares mock grant proposal with budget for survey and evaluation of a small area in his or her home country.

**Summer** Participation in university field school on a "rescue" excavation.

**Year 2**

***Fall Semester***

**Internship** Student works for three months in a federal, state, or private AHM agency.

**Group Tour of Major AHM Facilities:** U.S. Forest Service, Arkansas Archaeological Survey, Stennis Space Center (satellite imagery and archaeological applications).

***Spring Semester***

AHM survey and evaluation project in home country.

Student writes up and submits project report.

potential contributors to the shaping and improvement of their countries' AHM policies. Given that AHM must involve significant exposure to computers and to the AHM technologies that are most highly developed in the United States, in its initial phases this training program ought to be offered in the U.S. with a view to its transfer to an African university when the requisite trained personnel and technology are in place. A U.S.-based program would require intensive English language training for francophone and lusophone students.

While the specifics of such a program are open to discussion, the absolute priority that must be accorded to its creation and funding should not be. The First Symposium of the ICAHM in 1988, attended by over 100 delegates from 43 countries, recommended just such a specialized training program.<sup>19</sup> Specialized training is the surest and fastest way to address the pressing need in understaffed African countries for the trained personnel they need to document and preserve their archaeological heritage. There is no easy way around the dilemma of the archaeological heritage in Africa today, namely that the archaeological record in Africa is extremely rich, both quantitatively and in terms of the potential insights it offers for the understanding of the human condition, and it is disappearing rapidly forever under accelerating development. Both ethical and scientific considerations require that development agencies expend significant efforts to document the archaeological heritage jeopardized by their projects. Site inventory must play a significant role in these efforts. But merely injecting money for the necessary surveys into Africa will not solve the problem since the personnel necessary to accomplish the work frequently are not available in sufficient numbers and, in some cases, lack adequate training. Under these circumstances the results of funding may consist largely of adding fleets of Land Cruisers to the congested traffic in African capital cities. Funds for the training of AHM personnel *must* rank equally with project funding in priority because they are inextricably interrelated.

My policy recommendations to the World Bank in conjunction with other international agencies, such as UNESCO, for training are:

1. Take immediate steps to ensure that an intensive training program for archaeological heritage management personnel is funded and operating by 1994.
2. Fund the training of African students in the program as an integral and ongoing part of development expenditures in Africa.
3. Once graduates of the program are in place, insist that their voices be represented in all projects submitted for World Bank

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<sup>19</sup>C. McGimsey, "International Committee on Archaeological Heritage Management," *Journal of Field Archaeology* 16 (1989): 239-40.

and other development agency funding. Political turf wars are tough everywhere and nowhere tougher than in Africa. Agencies must protect their investment in these trainees by legitimizing their role and assuring that their voices will not be drowned out by entrenched interests, be they archaeological, museum-, or government-related.

4. Ensure funding of international mechanisms for the exchange of information and experience among archeological management professionals through conferences, seminars, and workshops on a global as well as a regional level.

With appropriate funding priorities accorded to archaeological heritage management by the World Bank and other international agencies, the timetable for achieving significant and meaningful progress towards building the AHM data base in West Africa need not exceed ten years. From my own experience in West Africa I predict that these will be years of unprecedented discovery and excitement because there are extraordinary things to be found in the African earth, and at present we have only a glimmer of what they might be.

## Valuing the Past, Envisioning the Future: Local Perspectives on Environmental and Cultural Heritage in Ghana

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*Two insights gained from research on technological and environmental change during the last five centuries have significance for rural development. The first is the decline of traditional technologies resulting from increased availability of manufactured, often imported, goods vis-a-vis the importance of these technologies during current crises. The second is the diversity of subsistence adaptations subsumed under "agriculture" and the planning problems that arise from the resultant misunderstanding of how rural peoples exploit their environments. The valorization of cultural heritage needs to be cleansed of the European legacy that delimited traditional and modern practices, hence "primitive" and "civilized," efficient and inefficient. One means to re-establish a pride of place and past in small towns and villages is to draw on and assist local expertise and initiative in development planning, particularly through local development associations. Another is to decentralize national museums to establish regional museums. Additional recommendations are to (1) encourage planners in the capital city to incorporate local perspectives and ongoing initiatives in development planning and (2) work at a dynamic balance between protecting and fostering cultural and environmental heritage and national development. Training should be conducted in the local setting drawing on foreign input as required.*

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My training as an anthropologist and archaeologist tempers my perspective on development issues in Africa. As an anthropologist, I focus on the local level, but with a view to understanding how societies are influenced by and respond to developments beyond their immediate horizons. As an archaeologist interested in the historical development of Africa, I am concerned with the implications of development in the long term.

Over the past decade I have engaged in research in a rural area of the Brong-Ahafo Region, Ghana. This decade, which began in desperate economic straits, has witnessed gradual improvement from a global economic perspective. During this period I have spent time primarily in villages in the Banda area interacting with rural farmers. Thus, my views on their nation state and its development priorities reflect these experiences as well as the concerns that

people in Banda have expressed about their future. Overwhelmingly, these are the pressing concerns of daily life.

The goal of this paper is to draw out implications of anthropological and archaeological research in Ghana that stress the importance of cultural and environmental heritage in the lives of rural peoples. Specific issues that I will address are the importance of archaeological resources as sources for understanding the past, the need to balance environmental conservation with needs of rural peoples, and the role of cultural heritage in development initiatives.

### **Technology and Environment: The View from a Village**

Popular visions of archaeology focus on spectacular finds of art objects or treasure. Less romance attaches to the sherds of undecorated pottery and other bits of latter-day trash that form the bulk of archaeological remains. It is these bits of refuse, however, that provide archaeologists unique insight into mundane aspects of daily life in the past. From the broken pots, bits of metal, and stone we gain insight into how people organized production. From the fragmentary bones and seeds we reconstruct past diet and strategies of environmental exploitation. From the remains of collapsed houses we learn something about how people organized their lives. As we explore sites occupied at different periods of time, we have the potential to address the long-term implications of these strategies.

Studies focused on technological and environmental change during the last five centuries should be of special interest for development studies. Two insights generated by these studies have significant implications for development initiatives in rural areas today. First is the decline of traditional technologies that resulted from increased availability of manufactured, often imported, goods and the importance of these technologies during contemporary crises. Second is the diversity of subsistence adaptations subsumed under the gloss "agriculture" and the planning problems that stem from resultant misunderstanding of how rural peoples exploit their environment.

### **Traditional Technology**

The importance of manufactured goods to rural peoples is manifested in the ubiquity of iron roofing sheets, cutlasses, cast iron cooking pots, plastic bowls, and commercial textiles in villages. All of these are substitutions for local solutions: grass thatch, locally smelted and forged iron, ceramic vessels, and woven textiles. Archaeologists have been concerned to document these disappearing craft traditions, primarily as a means of gaining insight into how they may have operated in the past. As a byproduct of these investigations,

however, they have often realized how vital these traditions are during times of national economic crisis. Several examples illustrate this point.

The importation of cheap sources of iron that could be reforged into tools contributed to the rapid decline of iron smelting throughout Sub-Saharan Africa during the last two centuries. Previously, the ubiquitous surface ores found in laterites, magnetites, and other iron ore-bearing deposits were smelted using a variety of different furnace types.<sup>1</sup> Approaches to smelting varied in different parts of the continent, some of which were distinctively African in derivation;<sup>2</sup> however, a common denominator was the pressing need for wood charcoal to fuel the smelts. Estimates range from 250 to 400 kilograms of charcoal as the amount of fuel required to smelt roughly 100 kilograms of ore.<sup>3</sup> Each kilogram of charcoal requires an estimated two kilograms of fresh wood.<sup>4</sup> In some regions smelting occurred on a scale large enough to contribute to significant deforestation.<sup>5</sup> Several archaeologists attribute subsequent technological modifications as a direct response to these fuel shortages. These include the development of more fuel-efficient furnaces and use of alternate fuels.<sup>6</sup> Destabilization of regional trade networks combined with the availability of alternate sources of metal (such as car leaf springs) during the early colonial period contributed to the rapid demise of smelting. Local smiths continued to forge iron tools from scrap metal, but this practice, too, declined as manufactured goods became readily available during the colonial period.

Potting, too, formerly was ubiquitous. African potters, mainly women, were proficient technicians who produced vessels to meet a wide range of daily

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Nikolaas J. van der Merwe and Donald H. Avery, "Pathways to Steel," *American Scientist* 70 (2) (1982): 146-55.

<sup>2</sup>Peter Schmidt and Donald H. Avery, "Complex Iron Smelting and Prehistoric Culture in Tanzania," *Science* 201 (1978): 1085-89.

<sup>3</sup>Nikolaas J. van der Merwe and David J. Killick, "Square: An Iron Smelting Site near Phalaborwa," in *Iron Age Studies in Southern Africa*, ed. N.J. van der Merwe and T.N. Huffman, no. 3 of the Goodwin Series (South African Archaeological Society, 1979), 90; and Schmidt and Avery, "Complex Iron Smelting," 1088-89.

<sup>4</sup>Nikolaas J. van der Merwe and David J. Killick, "Square: An Iron Smelting Site near Phalaborwa," 91.

<sup>5</sup>Candice Goucher, "Iron Is Iron 'til It Is Rust: Trade and Ecology in the Decline of West African Iron-Smelting," *Journal of African History* 22 (1981): 179-89; J.P. Warnier and I. Fowler, "A Nineteenth Century Ruhr in Central Africa," *Africa* 49 (1979): 329-51; and Michael Rowlands, "The Archaeology of Colonialism and Constituting the African Peasantry," in *Domination and Resistance*, ed. D. Miller, M. Rowlands, and C. Tilley (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 261-83.

<sup>6</sup>See, for example, Warnier and Fowler, "A Nineteenth Century Ruhr"; Rowlands, "The Archaeology of Colonialism"; and Schmidt and Avery, "Complex Iron Smelting."

needs: storage containers for grain and water as well as cooking and eating vessels. The marketing of cast iron vessels during the colonial period contributed to the dramatic decline in specialist potting although it continues to be practiced more than iron metallurgy. Potters can still be found in many villages throughout the countryside. In the Banda area three villages have an active potting tradition.<sup>7</sup> The women potters produce a variety of vessel forms that are marketed throughout the area. Even in this area, however, the archaeological record attests to the attenuated form of contemporary potting. Large, abandoned clay pits dot the landscape. Archaeological excavations document the decreased variety in both vessel form and decorative expression since the early nineteenth century.

Are these technologies and products simply quaint reminders of a past with no relevance to contemporary life? Events in Ghana during the severe economic downturn of the 1980s suggest otherwise. Archaeologists working in rural villages during this period witnessed the revival of traditional technologies and technological solutions to pressing daily problems. Merrick Posnansky conducted a decade of archaeological research around the village of Hani in the Brong-Ahafo Region during the 1970s. Part of the project focused on documenting local technologies, including iron-working, potting, barkcloth manufacture, and weaving as an aid to archaeological interpretation. At the time it appeared likely that some of these technologies would cease to be practiced. However, Posnansky returned to Hani on several occasions during the 1980s and reported on the resurgence of local technologies in the face of the desperate economic conditions during the period 1980 to 1984.<sup>8</sup> There was renewed activity by blacksmiths, potters, weavers, and even barkcloth made a minor comeback.<sup>9</sup> Further south in Ayirebi near Akyem Oda in southeastern Ghana, George Dei documented the importance of local initiatives and solutions for villagers' efforts to respond to the economic crisis of the early 1980s.<sup>10</sup> I witnessed a comparable resurgence of local solutions during 1982 while conducting dissertation research in the Banda area. I recall that the People's National Defense Council

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<sup>7</sup>Leonard Crossland and Merrick Posnansky, "Pottery, Peoples and Trade at Begho, Ghana," in *The Spatial Organisation of Culture*, ed. I. Hodder (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1978), 77-89.

<sup>8</sup>Merrick Posnansky, "How Ghana's Crisis Affects a Village," *West Africa* No. 3306 (1 December 1980): 2418-20; and Merrick Posnansky, "Hardships of a Village," *West Africa* No. 3506 (29 October 1984): 2161-63.

<sup>9</sup>Posnansky, "How Ghana's Crisis Affects a Village," 2419.

<sup>10</sup>George J.S. Dei, "Crisis and Adaptation in a Ghanaian Forest Community," *Anthropological Quarterly* 61 (2) (1988): 63-72; and George J.S. Dei, "Deforestation in a Ghanaian Rural Community," *Anthropologica* 22 (1990): 3-27.

(PNDC) Government played a role by encouraging people to substitute domestic products for imports that drained precious foreign currency reserves, and some people responded with a resurgence in the production of locally made soaps. Here, the government had to intervene, however, because of the excessive lye content of many of the soaps; the lapse of a previous technology required experimentation to reimplement it.

This resurgence of local traditional technologies should not be taken as a sentimental call to return to some idyllic precolonial period. The lesson for development planners is to recognize the wealth of technological expertise that exists within rural communities and the resourcefulness of rural peoples. Greater value should be placed by planners on local solutions to local needs, and perhaps extending and improving upon these. The colonial practice of devaluing local technology as traditional and "primitive" resulted in a perception, held especially among younger people, that Western technology invariably provides superior solutions.

### Labeling Economic Strategies

A second issue that has been raised by archaeologists and anthropologists is the problem inherent in the way we label economic strategies. Rural villagers in Africa are labeled agriculturalist with the implication that they make their livelihood through full-time cultivation. This glosses over the diversity of African rural adaptations, in both the present and past. Archaeological evidence underscores the integrated nature of food production with hunting and collecting activities over the last several millennia and demonstrates the fallacy of using the European model of a farmer who cultivates plants and raises domestic animals as a model for understanding African farming practices. It is not uncommon for wild animals to comprise the bulk of animal bones at an archaeological site occupied by plant cultivators.<sup>11</sup> In many instances it appears that people relied on a strategy of "garden-hunting" in which animals attracted to garden plots were the focus of passive hunting techniques (trapping).<sup>12</sup> This was often combined with seasonal exploitation of larger animals by groups of hunters. Equally, archaeologists working in rural villages during the 1980s stressed the crucial role

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<sup>11</sup>Ann B. Stahl, "Reinvestigation of Kintampo 6 Rock Shelter, Ghana: Implications for That Nature of Culture Change," *The African Archaeological Review* 3 (1985): 117-50; and Ann B. Stahl, "Change and Continuity in the Banda Area, Ghana: The Direct Historical Approach," *Journal of Field Archaeology* 21(1) (1994). (In press.)

<sup>12</sup>Olga F. Linares, "'Garden Hunting' in the American Tropics," *Human Ecology* 4 (1976): 331-49.

that access to wild plant and animal resources played in the ability of these villagers to cope with economic crisis.<sup>13</sup>

The reliance on hunting as a dietary supplement in the Banda area is affected by the presence of the Bui Game Reserve immediately west of the Banda Traditional Area. Established in 1971, the park serves as a wildlife refuge. Today, people in Banda are heavily reliant on fish from the Black Volta and domestic animals as sources of animal protein. Wild meat is a delicacy that is enjoyed primarily during the dry season. But changes have occurred in the last decade. As a result of the dry conditions during 1982 fish were in short supply. Many men engaged in part-time hunting and often hunted in the wildlife refuge. Wildlife officials were forced to conduct annual burning early to thwart the attempts of hunters to attract game outside the park by burning on its margins. Moreover, clashes have occurred between traditional authorities and wildlife officials over access to traditional shrines that are within park boundaries. Finally, more restrictive regulations on hunting imposed within the last several years have further limited the role of wild fauna in the diet. The implications for the nutritional status of local people, especially in a time of increasing population levels, is not known.

Perhaps the most dramatic change during the last decade is the decline of grasscutter or cane rat (*Thryonomys swinderianus*) as a result of intensified cultivation and overhunting. The growth of rural populations, as in Banda, has contributed to a decreased fallowing of agricultural plots, and, combined with increased exploitation of the rodents, has led to this decline. Rodents are an extremely important food source for many rural Africans.<sup>14</sup> The high fat content of grasscutter makes it an especially prized meat today,<sup>15</sup> and it is also common at archaeological sites.<sup>16</sup> Devos attributes the importance of rodents to rural peoples to several factors: the status of rodents outside the purview of game laws, their high birth rate which allows them to be exploited without

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<sup>13</sup>Posnansky, "Hardships of a Village"; and Dei, "Deforestation in a Ghanaian Rural Community."

<sup>14</sup>Emmanuel O.A. Asibey, "Wildlife as a Source of Protein in Africa South of the Sahara," *Biological Conservation* 6 (1) (1974): 32-39; Antoon DeVos, "Game as Food: A Report on its Significance in Africa and Latin America," *Unasylva* 29 (1977): 2-12; and François Malaisse and Guy Parent, "Rodents of the Miombo Woodland Area: A Nutritional and Ecological Approach," *Ecology of Food and Nutrition* 11 (1982): 211-16.

<sup>15</sup>Malaisse and Parent, "Rodents of the Miombo Woodland Area"; and Asibey, "Wildlife as a Source of Protein," 33.

<sup>16</sup>Stahl, "Reinvestigation of Kintampo 6"; and Stahl, "Report of Investigations at Makala Kataa."

significant depletion, and their sheer abundance in densely populated areas.<sup>17</sup> Many of the rodent species favored as food are attracted to fallow agricultural plots. Ecological studies demonstrate that agricultural areas show both a higher species diversity and a greater abundance than surrounding uncultivated areas.<sup>18</sup> Other studies document the temporary decline in rodent populations that accompany clearing and planting activities.<sup>19</sup> A recent Ghanaian government ban on hunting the grasscutter is intended to protect the species; however, it also affects the diet of "agriculturalists" who will be forced to find alternative sources of food.

Again, I raise these issues because they have potential importance for development initiatives. Preservation of rapidly disappearing species and ecosystems are pressing concerns. Establishment of ecological preserves is one potential solution, as are restrictions on human exploitation of threatened species. Equally, however, we have to recognize the potential importance of these species to the lives of rural villagers.<sup>20</sup> Much of the resiliency of rural people stems from their ability to exploit their surroundings to meet their needs. A ban on the exploitation of plants or animals that does not provide alternative resources for rural peoples is likely to meet with considerable resistance, often in the form of continued, if illegal, exploitation. Thus, a plan to establish a game reserve, for example, should consider the role of wild fauna in the diet of people surrounding the proposed park and work with local people to develop alternative possibilities. Further, national and international agencies might explore the feasibility of captive breeding of locally valued animals such as rodents.

I have commented on the role that traditional strategies (for lack of a better term) played in the ability of villagers to cope during the crises of the 1980s. What of economic recovery<sup>21</sup> how has it affected the lives of these villagers? In certain respects the lot of village farmers in the Banda area has become more difficult under economic recovery. Cash, and the need to generate it, again became important considerations. Once again, there were things that

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<sup>17</sup>Devos, "Game as Food," 2-3.

<sup>18</sup>M.J. Delany and W.D.K. Kansiimeruhanga, "Observations on the Ecology of Rodents from a Small Arable Plot near Kampala, Uganda," *Revue de zoologie et de botanique africaines* 81 (1970): 424.

<sup>19</sup>M.J. Delany, "The Ecology of Small Rodents in Tropical Africa," *Mammal Review* 2 (1) (1972): 17.

<sup>20</sup>Posnansky, "Hardships of a Village."

<sup>21</sup>The "recovery" was brought about by an infusion of International Monetary Fund funds. Since then, compared to the rock-bottom conditions that prevailed in Ghana from 1982 to 1984, the economy has improved.

cash could buy and the petrol and spare parts to ensure regular lorry travel between the village and market towns. Farmers in the Banda area formerly relied on yams, and to a lesser extent on cassava and maize as cash crops, all of which were staple foods in the area. The Brong-Ahafo Region supplies the majority of the yams consumed in Kumasi and Accra, and Banda formerly contributed significantly to this urban food supply. During the recovery period of the last several years farmers have turned increasingly to nonstaple cash crops such as tomatoes and tobacco that were fetching higher prices and could generate more cash. In 1986 tobacco was grown as a primary cash crop by a small number of local farmers. The shift to tobacco was encouraged by the Pioneer Tobacco Company; the company advanced farmers the supplies required to build drying barns, including blocks, timber and roofing sheets, as well as the seedlings and fertilizer required to produce the tobacco. These costs were recouped from the farmers' first three years' profits. By 1989 a significant number of Banda farmers were growing tobacco, and within a year the number of tobacco barns in the Banda area had increased ten-fold.

Reliance on tobacco to generate cash is proving a short-sighted, precarious strategy for Banda farmers. It has significantly altered the allocation of labor in households. Tobacco is a labor-intensive crop. Seedlings must be nursed; weeding is imperative; and once harvested, the leaves must be sorted and tied for drying. Women and children are primarily responsible for sorting and tying. Drying the tobacco takes three to four days, and fires must be kept adequately fueled throughout the day and night. Large amounts of wood are required to fuel the barns, and a tractor supplied by the Pioneer Tobacco Company is employed to bring wood from the surrounding area. Women complain of the increased difficulty in finding wood for cooking fires, and villages along the game park margins are especially hard hit. Pioneer Tobacco boasts of its reforestation scheme in which tree seedlings are planted to replace harvested woodland; however, a single individual is in charge of reforestation in the Banda area and has few resources to ensure that the seedlings are adequately maintained. Whole plots of seedlings have failed. It also remains unclear whether the tree species being planted will adequately serve the needs of local people. Reforestation schemes in other areas of the world have relied on fast-growing species, such as *Eucalyptus*, that prove useless as sources of firewood and building materials. Finally, the use of a tractor and plow to cultivate the tobacco fields may contribute to the long-term degradation of soils in an area where hoe cultivation is predominant.

The labor-intensive character of tobacco production precludes families from simultaneously growing food crops. Thus, cash raised through the sale of tobacco must be used to buy foodstuffs. Most troubling to me was the clear shortage of staple foods in Banda during the summer of 1990. So many farmers

overtly today than twenty years ago. There is a pressing need to counter this way of thinking.<sup>23</sup> I suggest that one means of accomplishing this is to foster a renewed pride of place, a pride of past not a universalized past for the nation-state, but a pride of place and past at the local level a pride of heritage that identifies the small towns and villages as good spaces to be.

One means of accomplishing this is to draw on local expertise and initiative in development planning. Numerous authors have referred to the importance of local associations in community development efforts.<sup>24</sup> The Town Development Committees established in the early 1960s under Ghana's first President, Kwame Nkrumah, are a continuing feature of village life and play an important role in mobilizing labor and resources. Even in times of severe economic crisis, these associations have managed to improve local conditions, devoting themselves to building roads, sanitation, and ensuring water supplies. The Town Development Committee in Banda was responsible for organizing the digging and maintenance of bore holes during the mid-1980s, and built a permanent structure to replace the pole and thatch junior secondary school in town. It began work in 1989 on a senior secondary school using communal labor and locally raised funds. This was initiated out of a concern that students were forced to leave the area to pursue an education, further contributing to the high cost of education and the rural-urban drift of the youth. The community is now anxious to establish a tile manufacturing facility to free members from reliance on increasingly expensive metal roofing sheets. Residents have identified potential clay sources by identifying clay pits formerly used by potters. They require outside technical assistance in constructing the kilns and modifying local building techniques to allow the use of tiles. It is at this point that they encounter structural impediments, usually involving finances. All of this progress has been accomplished through local initiative and resourcefulness. It has been a struggle, however, for these rural people to gain access to the technical assistance and outside monies that would assist them in making their communities better places to live and work, better spaces to be.

This endeavor to enhance pride of place and pride of past will require a rethinking of the kinds of history and archaeology that have been valued. From the nineteenth century history and archaeology labored under a progressivist model that envisioned history as a march toward "civilization." Areas that failed

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<sup>23</sup>See also Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Altered States," *The Wilson Quarterly* 15 (1991): 20-32; and Wole Soyinka, "Twice Bitten: The Fate of Africa's Culture Producers," *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 105 (1990): 110-20.

<sup>24</sup>Appiah, "Altered States"; Dei, "Crisis and Adaptation"; Dei, "Deforestation in a Ghanaian Rural Community"; and Posnansky, "Hardships of a Village," 2163.

overtly today than twenty years ago. There is a pressing need to counter this way of thinking.<sup>23</sup> I suggest that one means of accomplishing this is to foster a renewed pride of place, a pride of past not a universalized past for the nation-state, but a pride of place and past at the local level a pride of heritage that identifies the small towns and villages as good spaces to be.

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<sup>24</sup>Appiah, "Altered States"; Dei, "Crisis and Adaptation"; Dei, "Deforestation in a Ghanaian Rural Community"; and Posnansky, "Hardships of a Village," 2163.

to "progress" were "quaint" or "traditional" somehow outside time.<sup>25</sup> Although historians and archaeologists today reject this linear model of history, it has had a persistent effect on the way in which we value archaeological sites. Importance is accorded to sites named in ancient documents, or to sites that produce objects valued in the West as art, which contributes to the continued devastation of African cultural heritage by the illegal art market. Important as these sites are, the message to rural people is that their immediate heritage is somehow less valued.

One means of countering this message is to broaden the regional scope of cultural heritage activities. In Ghana establishing regional museums as part of the decentralization efforts of the government has been discussed. This could be an important step in enhancing a sense of value for cultural heritage among people in rural areas who have no opportunity to visit the national museum in the capital. Adequately funded and staffed museums in regional centers could become focal points for heritage activities and enable young people to gain appreciation for the skills of their elders. Archaeologists who have worked with elders in recording past practices report that village elders are pleased with the opportunity to enable young people to participate and view it as an instructional opportunity.<sup>26</sup> These are legitimate areas for expanded efforts in the area of development and cultural heritage.

### Infrastructure and Cultural Heritage

Thus, I suggest that cultural heritage issues are linked to development in tangible ways. Planning efforts that take issues of cultural heritage into account as integral parts of the planning process hold promise of greater long-term success. While cultural heritage should not be conceptualized as an entity preserved in artifacts in museums, museums can play a central role in facilitating awareness of cultural and environmental heritage. Government officials and development planners must value cultural traditions but avoid the temptation to treat these traditions as unchanging<sup>27</sup> and to bottle traditional culture in a museum. Museums should be linked in dynamic ways to institutions that nurture cultural production.

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<sup>25</sup>Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University, 1983).

<sup>26</sup>For example see Nikolaas J. van der Merwe and Donald H. Avery, "Science and Magic in African Technology: Traditional Iron Smelting in Malawi," *Africa* 57 (2) (1987): 161; Posnansky, personal communication, 1992.

<sup>27</sup>William Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History and Political Economy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, 1989), 1-14.

The newly independent nation of Ghana set an example for the rest of Africa in the early 1960s. An established museum and university provided a sound basis for cultural studies, and the educational system was the envy of many countries. The Cultural Center in Kumasi provided a model setting in which various forms of cultural production including music, weaving, potting, brass casting, and carving were practiced in a way that combined tradition with innovation. Changing political economic circumstances eroded this infrastructure both human and nonhuman. Many students were sent abroad funded by government scholarships with the expectation that they would return to take up positions in the museum and university. Most did not return or, if they did, were driven away by the worsening economic climate of the 1970s. The Kumasi Cultural Center suffered, with many of its areas closed and in decay, as did the National Museum. Not surprisingly, research was affected as the disparity grew between foreign expeditions with access to outside funds and Ghanaian colleagues reliant on local monies.

In archaeology, the field with which I am most familiar, this has reached a critical point in Ghana, in which there are a limited number of trained individuals, most of whom are involved in management. If cultural heritage is to play an important role in national development, which I would argue is crucial, foreign researchers and international agencies must assist African nations in developing cultural heritage plans and by providing training opportunities. To be effective, training programs should be local. Rather than undertaking the expense of sending individual students abroad, specialists should be brought in to conduct local training programs on conservation, curation, and field excavation. These programs should be tailored to the needs of the local constituency. Training programs could articulate with the government's goal of decentralizing museums. For example I am currently exploring the possibility of conducting a research-oriented archaeological field school for the Ghana Museum and University of Ghana students that would provide training in archaeological excavation and analysis. The training exercise could also yield a collection of material culture that would establish the basis of a local museum. The key to the success of such programs is that they be tailored to local needs rather than foreign research agendas. Furthermore, there is great potential to involve rural people in cultural heritage programs. In Banda I hired local students to assist in excavations at a nineteenth century site. Their involvement in this project, most of them for two summers, led to their recognition of the wealth of archaeological sites in their area and admiration for the skills of their forebears in creating such fine floors of houses and well-made pottery. Foreign research expeditions should be encouraged to articulate their research goals with a well-framed cultural heritage policy developed by government officials that enhances valuation of cultural heritage for rural peoples.

## **Recommendations**

Based on the foregoing, I offer the following specific suggestions for enhancing concern with cultural and environmental heritage issues in development planning in Africa:

1. To incorporate a local perspective in development planning and to recognize that a local perspective from the national capital is not the same as the local perspective of a rural farmer. There exists a pressing need to consider the implications, both short- and long-term, for the lives of people touched by a particular development initiative and to accommodate local needs and concerns. Specifically, planners must recognize the impact of environmental conservation on rural people's ability to meet daily needs, such as firewood and subsistence. Inability to meet daily needs in the rural villages translates into greater rural-urban migration.
2. To contribute to pride of place by incorporating cultural heritage issues into development planning. I favor local programs that foster recognition of the deep roots of traditional life but also the changing and dynamic character of tradition in the face of change. Such efforts include fostering of regional cultural centers devoted to both history and contemporary arts.
3. To acknowledge local initiative, resourcefulness, and expertise and to build on it in the arenas of agriculture, building, arts, and "crafts." This acknowledgement requires that we treat village craftspeople as specialists who combine entrepreneurial skills with technical know-how, some of which may have expanded market possibilities. Efforts should be made to assist local associations in their ongoing efforts to mobilize labor and resources. Development of the nation's infrastructure such as road building and water projects is taking place largely as a result of local initiative, but village associations are struggling for supplies and modest funding.
4. To balance preserving (a problematic term since it implies a static quality) and nurturing cultural and environmental heritage with national development. I stress the need for training conducted in the local setting, drawing on international expertise as required. Foreign researchers must be encouraged to cooperate in this training and to enter into dialogue with local officials regarding their needs. Setting priorities for cultural heritage issues should include rural as well urban areas.

I hope that my remarks are not taken as a sentimental call to return to the days of "traditional" culture; rather, I stress the need to incorporate local perspectives in the development initiatives that affect the lives of rural peoples. As Appiah has noted, Ghanaians, as well as other African peoples, are going about their lives despite the often chaotic political economic circumstances that condition them.<sup>28</sup> Development planning would profit by taking into greater account their perspectives and the ongoing initiatives already taking place within rural communities.

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<sup>28</sup>Appiah, "Altered States."

## Discussant Remarks

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I would like to thank our presenters for three papers that were not only intellectually stimulating but also operationally relevant to the cultural heritage work being conducted in the Bank and the Africa Region. My comments should also be considered in relation to two other papers that were delivered by Bank staff: one, June Taboroff's paper on "Bringing Cultural Heritage into the Development Agenda," and the other, Alexandre Marc's "Community Participation in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage."

I would like to raise some issues about how cultural heritage and archaeological site protection are being incorporated into the Bank's work, especially into its Environmental Assessment work. Those of you here who are Bank staff, and perhaps many who are not, know that these are major concerns of the Bank. In 1982 the Bank introduced an Indigenous Peoples Policy; in 1987 it established a Cultural Property Policy; and in 1989 it introduced an Environmental Assessment, or EA, Policy. The Bank has had several years of experience in incorporating the protection of cultural heritage into its lending program. A number of projects now have cultural heritage protection components, and early examples are discussed in a report by Robert Goodland and Maryalee Webb entitled, *Management of Cultural Property in World Bank-Assisted Projects*.<sup>1</sup>

Those of us who are working in this area realize that we are at the beginning of a learning curve, that we are only initiating this process of introducing cultural heritage conservation into Bank-financed projects. With our new EA Policy, we expect the scope of such work to increase.

There are three issues that we face, especially in the EA area. The first issue is that development itself is sectorally driven that is, development planning and programming are driven by the transport sector, the power sector, the agricultural sector. Many times we find that one sector does not know what the

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Goodland and Maryalee Webb, *Management of Cultural Property in World Bank-Assisted Projects: Archaeological, Historical, Religious, and Natural Unique Sites*. World Bank Technical Paper 62 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987).

other sector is doing. And many times we find that the environment, which crosses and influences different sectors, is not considered until late in the planning process. Thus certain sectors are considered at the front of the development planning process, and others, such as environment and cultural property, enter near the end.

A telling case of how this ordering causes problems is found in Pierre de Maret's paper in the example of the Congo coast, where 1,000 to 4,000 hectares of savannah were cleared for tree plantation, which led to the destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites. The only way to avoid this kind of permanent loss is to ensure that, at the planning stage of projects, environmental and cultural property specialists are at the same table with the planners. When the Minister of Culture is at meetings with the Minister of Planning, then countries will begin to incorporate cultural property concerns into the development process.

The second point has to do with Susan Keech McIntosh's discussion of the need for site inventories. A large amount of work is going on in the Bank and in Africa in natural resources inventories. In the 1980s geographical information systems, aerial photographic surveys, and agro-ecological zoning exercises became major initiatives of the international development agencies and many of the planning agencies in developing countries. Those inventories have been natural resource-driven. They have not been culturally driven, and maybe they do not need to be. It would be a relatively simple step, however, to use these same technologies and move from natural to cultural resource inventories. Nothing new needs to be introduced in the way of technology. All we need is to require that the basic inventories that we are carrying out now include a mapping of archaeological sites and other places of cultural or historic value. Human populations have their own folk or cultural cartographies. For a very interesting view of cultural cartography, I refer you to a book by British anthropologist Hugh Brodie entitled *Maps and Dreams*. This book describes the clash between the indigenous Indians' view of their own northern Canadian landscape as they had it organized into hunting territories and other places significant to their livelihood and religious beliefs, and the view of the Western energy and development planners who were mapping the territory to extract natural resources.

The third issue, which is quite complex but which we have to face, is the lack of trained personnel to pursue these tasks. One of our fears concerning the Bank's EA directive is that it will just create a growth industry for environmental consulting firms. That is, it would be very simple for us, in the process of implementing our own policy, to increase contracting of international consulting firms to satisfy the administrative requirements of Bank policies. We do not want to do that. Therefore, whenever EAs need to be done, and when they

incorporate cultural impact assessments, they should be done by developing country specialists.

The Africa Region has taken a lead in trying to assess what the national capabilities are in this area, and to ensure that every EA that we finance has a national counterpart working with an international firm. The region is also promoting workshops in EA and cultural property management to train local specialists.

Nevertheless, given the paucity of national specialists, we may need an entirely different model of environmental and cultural property protection in the African context. Ann Stahl suggests a model of how to do environmental and cultural property assessment in her paper, that is, we have to go to the local level to do environmental and cultural assessment, monitoring, and planning. In other words we have to bring local people into the process. In a region with a large rural population, a high degree of poverty, and a lack of well-established academic, scientific, and public institutions, we will never be able to carry out reasonable environmental or cultural property assessment without bringing local people into this process.

We have primary *health* care, and people are starting to talk about primary *environmental* care. We now have to talk about primary *cultural* care. We have to go to the local or village level and develop what we could call "cultural promoters," schoolteachers who teach science, for example, or maybe high school students who will do the work with professionals working with them. In this way we could respond to what Susan McIntosh, Ann Stahl, and Pierre de Maret are suggesting through creating a grassroots movement for purposes of EA and cultural property protection.

I would again like to thank the three presenters. These are very important papers, and I think we will use them for many months and probably years ahead here at the Bank.

## The Cultural Consequences of Development in Africa

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*Following World War II, Western social scientists began to view change and development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America through two main schools of thought: capitalist and Marxian. The latter was replicated throughout Africa. This paper looks at cultural change in Africa, identifies the forces responsible for maintaining cultural autonomy in postcolonial society, and examines whether the development process has helped or hindered these forces. The role and place of culture in development was not paid much attention by economists and other social scientists because they viewed development as a universal, unilinear history in which peoples move from agrarian to industrialized economies. If "modernization" was not visible, the countries were "undeveloped." In contrast, this paper emphasizes the material, institutional, and valuational bases of culture. It argues that African policymakers succeeded or failed in their implementation programs depending on the way they handled culture, religion, and ethnicity. So long as donors, development scholars, policymakers, and the larger society deny or ignore the relevance of these cultural factors, homegrown development deeply rooted in the history, culture, and psychology of African peoples will be stymied.*

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Since the end of the Second World War when Western social scientists began to look at the processes of change and development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many theories have surfaced regarding the nature of cultural change and the impact of these changes on human beings, their environment, and their social universe. There were basically two main schools of thought and each has many subdivisions based on emphasis given to particular variables or factors in a given cultural landscape.

The most dominant since 1945 has been the capitalist model developed by American social scientists who saw development in what came to be called then the "Third World" and now, increasingly, the "South," as a journey from agrarian ways of seeing and dealing with social and physical reality. To this school of thought the differences between the developed countries and the Third World or the South lie in the following variables: mental habits, fidelity to

primordial ways of looking at and handling "the economy of affection,"<sup>1</sup> lack of technological know-how to exploit natural resources, lack of sense of individuality, and lack of political and economic structures to deal with the problems of governance and capacity building.<sup>2</sup>

The rival school, which was basically Marxian, was exported by the former Soviet Union and China. Their approach to development was that the developing countries could liberate themselves from the grip of the "global capitalist stranglehold" only when they took the path of noncapitalist development. According to this school of thought, such a plan allows the developing country to preempt the rise of class struggle for the limited natural and other resources available to that society. In their view the developing countries could secure a brighter future only when they control the means of production in their countries and, through central planning, effect the desired changes in the welfare of the average citizens.

This model was replicated in various forms and guises on the African continent.<sup>3</sup> During the last thirty years of African independence we have heard of the *Consciencism* of the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,<sup>4</sup> the *African Socialism* of President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal,<sup>5</sup> the *Ujamaa* of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,<sup>6</sup> and the *African Humanism* of the recently

<sup>1</sup>Goran Hyden, "African Social Structure and Economic Development," in *Strategies for African Development*, ed. Robert J. Berg and Jenifer Seymour Whitaker (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 57-63.

<sup>2</sup>For some discussion of this school of modernization in the West see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1955); Lucien Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 1(3) (1961); Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

<sup>3</sup>This school of thought drew its inspiration from the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Neo-Marxist academics in the West who have developed variations of the Marxian argument about class struggle to explain the African situation. For an example of this point of view, see *Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, ed. Peter C.W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1985).

<sup>4</sup>Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (London: Pan-African Books, 1970).

<sup>5</sup>Leopold Senghor, *On African Socialism*, ed. and trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Praeger, 1964).

<sup>6</sup>Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* (East Africa: Oxford University Press, 1969); Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (New York: 1968).

defeated President Kenneth Kaunda.<sup>7</sup> Regardless of how one may feel about all these -isms of the African world, the fact remains that at the time of decolonization all the leaders around the Third World were groping, sometimes clumsily, sometimes skillfully, for answers to the question of economic development and social transformation. Each one was baffled by the new problems after the nationalist drive for independence; each of them looked for a model appropriate for his society; and each felt that he could shop around the world for models of economic development and then creatively put forth his own recipe for African rapid economic development. They were all encouraged in this delicate task by the authors of the different theories listed under the two contending schools identified above. According to Daniel Lerner, one of the great sources of inspiration for those modernizing elites of the Third World, the modernization process leads to "the passing away of traditional society."<sup>8</sup> Writing in the context of Middle Eastern societies, he concluded that what the peoples of this area accept as their old ways of thinking and doing things would give way to new mores. These new mores would alter the nature of the society. As old structures collapse under the weight of modernizing forces, the mindset of the descendants would similarly undergo radical and drastic shift. To Lerner and his colleagues in the field of modernization studies, modernization has a powerful way of impacting on a country and its people. It not only alters the physical environment by introducing heavy machinery and cutting down trees to make room for factories and plantations where raw materials are grown and then shipped abroad for profit, but it also effects mental changes in the way the modernizing peoples see and relate to their social reality.<sup>9</sup>

The purpose of this paper is threefold. The first is to look at the phenomenon of cultural change in postcolonial Africa. The second is to identify the forces responsible for the maintenance of cultural autonomy in the postcolonial African society and to examine the manner in which they have been aided or hindered by the development process. Working under the assumption that some social and cultural forces do not necessarily favor uncontrolled development because of the perceived negative consequences for their societies, this paper tries

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<sup>7</sup>Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free* (London: Heinemann, 1961); Kenneth Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa* (London: Longman, 1966).

<sup>8</sup>Lerner's argument is that traditional society gives way to forces of development. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*.

<sup>9</sup>For a United Nations reaction to the whole question of development and the theories identified with it, see the UNESCO publication entitled, *Different Theories and Practices of Development* (Paris: UNESCO, 1982). This document contains the analyses of the theories and practices of development by academicians from different perspectives and from different parts of the globe.

to understand the cultural consequences of development and the manner in which this phenomenon records the subtle and not-so-subtle battles between the advocates of the two above schools of thought. The third objective is to offer my conclusions regarding the cultural consequences of the development process in Africa.

### **The Nature of Cultural Change in the Postcolonial African States**

When we look at the recent history of Africa, starting with the wind of political change at the time of independence and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Marxist allies in Africa, we find that cultural change has manifested itself in a variety of ways. But before we proceed to the inventory of cultural changes identifiable in individual African countries, let us define our terms. What do we mean by culture and how does it impact negatively or positively on the economic development of African countries? In this paper the term culture is defined as a human enterprise that has three components, namely, the material base, the value base, and the institutional base. The material base of a culture embraces all material embodiments of the spirit and ideas of a particular society. The value base, on the other hand, refers to the total body of values that determines the relative significance of all things and all deeds within a given social universe. The institutional base refers to the processes and conditions that are instrumental in the self-definition and self-advancement of a given society.<sup>10</sup> Working with such a definition of culture, one could argue that the colonization of Africa was a serious challenge to African cultural autonomy. Not only did the Africans lose control of their political destiny, but they also find themselves violated in many other ways. But regardless of one's opinion about the historical record, the fact remains that colonial rule had ushered into Africa a trend of developments that many of the leaders were not clever enough to foresee at the time of independence.

When we analyze the impact of the colonial experience on the cultures and societies of African peoples around the continent, we see that the reactions from the African peoples vary from region to region and even from one part of a country to the other. These different reactions result from a number of factors in individual countries. Since political might has been the most critical factor in any transition from one form of government to another, it should not surprise us to learn that the imperial regimes of the colonial masters were autocratic and the

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<sup>10</sup>This definition of culture is borrowed from the discussion of the subject matter by noted Ghanaian philosopher William E. Abraham. See chapter 1 in *The Mind of Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

people over whom they ruled did not play any part in decisionmaking. The nature of the colonial state resulted in three types of roles that the colonial powers succeeded in creating for their African wards. In countries in which a tradition of kingship was known and practiced by the Africans, the colonialists not only seized power from the legitimate rulers but they established a new order that gradually undermined the political and cultural authorities of the traditional African leadership. Honored and accepted by their peoples because of their perceived roles as representatives of the ancestors and the spirit world, these traditional rulers gradually found their authority weakened before the very eyes of their peoples. Because they were increasingly dependent on foreign powers, these traditional African rulers became demystified, and like the naked emperor they became objects of derision among Africans no longer at ease under their leadership. Under French colonial rule, the traditional rulers who refused to play by the rules of the colonial game were booted out and docile collaborators put in their place. Thus, in much of the old French Empire in Africa it was not uncommon to encounter a person of slave origin claiming chiefly titles. This consequence of the colonial encounter was not only politically devastating but culturally unacceptable in many African circles. Hence the secret war between the overpowered defenders of the old regime and the beneficiaries of the new colonial order. This type of power transfer by virtue of serious and significant material and mental changes brought about by the colonial power, led to the enthronement of many faithful Africans in the service of the colonial power. Some of these new leaders within the colonial system were faithful servants of colonial officers; others were Africans drafted into the French army and later appreciated for their loyalty and service to France. This group of political actors in the colonial drama included many from British Africa, where the Lugardian arrangement called indirect rule served as a *modus vivendi* between African leaders and the European powers.<sup>11</sup>

This marriage of convenience between the colonial power and the weakened African leaders was in the early years confined almost exclusively to the rural areas of the French colonial empire. A different arrangement existed

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<sup>11</sup>"Lugardian" refers to Lord Lugard, the British architect of the indirect rule system practiced in colonial Africa and elsewhere. The system was first applied in Nigeria, in which chiefs were allowed some autonomy in the running of their protected territories. For interesting and useful discussions of the colonial policies and practices of the European powers see Robert O. Collins, *Problems in the History of Colonial Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970) and *The Transfer of Power in African Decolonization, 1940-1960*, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

in the four communes Dakar, St. Louis, Goree Island, and Rufisque where the people were supposed to be more "civilized" by virtue of their extended and direct exposure to French civilization and culture.<sup>12</sup> With respect to British Africa we can argue that, although indirect rule was different in many respects from its French counterpart, its impact on African society was still culturally detrimental to African autonomy because it took away political and economic decisionmaking until the very end of colonial rule.

The second political arrangement worked out by the colonial powers of France and Britain was the induction and incorporation of fairly well-educated Africans into the colonial government. This process of co-optation was developed to give *political space to Africans who accepted the colonial order in the first place and were willing to join the game of colonial politics with little or no reservations*. This acceptance of the colonial order had serious implications for the cultural questions of legitimacy and autonomy. By accepting the colonial order the Africans, regardless of their traditional claims, became willing or unwilling partners in the reshaping of their cultures.<sup>13</sup> Over a century the material, valuational, and institutional bases of African societies had begun to change. The demystification of defeated African rulers and the gradual enthronement of the Westernized Africans further complicated the processes of change. No longer the beneficiaries of indigenously organized and locally orchestrated changes, the colonized Africans became stepchildren to the foreign innovators. This mystique of the foreign man and woman of knowledge has serious implications for the postcolonial state. It created a pathological case of xenophilia, which values things foreign *not for their efficacy but simply because of their foreignness*. This negative consequence of development during the colonial period became magnified when power was transferred to the third group of political actors during the last phase of the colonial period.

This third group of Africans who entered the political system at the tail end of the colonial period were different from both the traditional rulers retained by the colonizers and the middle class leaders who claimed to speak on behalf of Africans prior to the eruption of the nationalist movements. Unlike the former

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<sup>12</sup>"Communes" refers to the four enclaves in Senegal in which Africans could obtain French citizenship.

<sup>13</sup>Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking Africa: The Social Basis of Ideas," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3(1) (May 1965): 1-33; Ali A. Mazrui, "The English Language and Political Consciousness in British Colonial Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 4(3) (November 1966): 295-311; Rudolf Von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and the Future of the Colonies 1919-1960* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1971).

they made little or no pretense of deriving legitimacy from the ancestors of precolonial days. Again, unlike the traditional rulers within the colonial system, they claimed familiarity with Western ways and clamored for the right to represent and speak for the masses of the new Africa. Unlike the Westernized collaborationist leaders of the middle period, the nationalists called for political, economic, and cultural independence. In their view the cultural authenticity (Négritude)<sup>14</sup> and the political unity (Pan-Africanism)<sup>15</sup> of the African peoples would never come about unless and until the control of the colonial state fell into their hands.

It was against this background that the first generation of African leaders came to power. It was in this context that charismatic nationalist leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, urged their fellow Africans to seek the political kingdom. In Nkrumah's view the African peoples would not exercise much influence in the world until they were in full control of their political systems. This attitude towards power had serious consequences for African development because it instructed Africans to accept the primacy of politics and to recognize the subordination of the cultural to the political.<sup>16</sup> In retrospect we can urge that the present state of affairs in the African countries is the result of this prevalent view among the governing elites of Africa. By linking the primacy of politics to the notion that things foreign are the highest status symbols, many of this

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<sup>14</sup>For discussion of negritude, see the following works by President Léopold Sédar Senghor: "Négritude and African Socialism," vol. 15 of *St. Anthony Papers* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963) and "Socialism Is a Humanism," in *Socialist Humanism*, ed. Erich Fromm (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Press, 1965), 53-67. For scholarly examinations of Negritude and of the writings of Senghor, see Sylvia Washington Ba, *The Concept of Negritude in the Poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Irving Leonard Markovitz, *Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude* (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1969); Janet G. Vaillant, *Black, French and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Samba Ka and others, review of *Black, French and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor*, by Janet Vaillant, *New York Review of Books* 37 (December 20, 1990): 11-12.

<sup>15</sup>For perspectives on Pan-Africanism see Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963); Jabez Ayodele Langley, *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973); Imanuel Geiss, *A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1968); C.O.C. Amata, *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986).

<sup>16</sup>See *Africa Must Unite*, in which Nkrumah forcefully and enthusiastically urges his fellow Africans to seek the political kingdom and unite their countries into a United States of Africa.

generation of leaders in Africa complicated the processes of social and cultural change in their societies.

Such complications led, and continue to lead, many Africans into this dark world of cultural alienation. They also undermine local cultural autonomy and create a state of cultural schizophrenia. These psychological and psychocultural pathologies have not been seriously faced by the African leaders and intellectuals.<sup>17</sup> As a result of the emphasis on the primacy of politics and because of the fascination with things foreign, cultural changes in many African societies are not always deeply rooted in the local soil or homegrown. The political dependency of the ruling elites, whether military or civilian, mortgages the legitimacy of the regime and weakens its ability to lead by example the multitudes of citizens who are much removed from the fashions and styles of living of the more developed countries. To understand the cultural consequences of economic development during the postcolonial period, we will now examine some examples drawn from several parts of the African continent.

#### **Development and Its Cultural Consequences in Postcolonial Africa**

In the postcolonial record of many African states the forces of development became more visible and their impact more favorably accepted by the general masses in the African continent because of both the new mood of self-confidence and the public's high expectations of development. Two things accounted for this state of affairs. The first relates to the noticeable change of attitudes towards the state. No longer seen as the instrument of foreign colonizers, the state now becomes a national cow whose milk is no longer diverted to the European metropole, and accessibility to it is open to those who support the new African rulers. The second cause is the African leadership's extension of the state function beyond the question of law and order. Forced to deal with realities of greater incorporation into the international free market system and determined to gain acceptance and recognition in the emerging global order, these leaders in the first generation of independence added a development component to their definition of role of the state. Thus, African leaders sanctioned changes in the material, valuational, and institutional bases of African societies. This decision to sponsor and promote changes in the material well-being of the masses has had both political and cultural consequences for their respective societies. Politically, the new leaders of independence could not effect changes in the lives of their fellow countrymen and women unless the people themselves enthusiastically

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<sup>17</sup>Recent attempts at understanding the cultural issues relating to the African condition are Ali A. Mazrui's *A World Federation of Cultures* (New York: Free Press, 1976) and *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (London: James Currey Limited, 1990).

embrace their leaders' program of action. Culturally, changes in the society could come about only when the agents of change and targeted objects of change are united. It is indeed in this realm of values that the agents of change face much difficulty.

In the African context culture is usually based on, if not defined by, one or all of the three religions in the continent. For us to understand the cultural consequences of development for Africans living in the postcolonial era, we must identify the three religions that exercise considerable influence among them. They are Islam, Christianity, and Traditional African Religion (TAR). Each of these three faiths embraces a large body of men, women, and children. The first two religions are world religions whose belief systems are universally shared with other peoples elsewhere in the world. Traditional African Religion, however, is unique to African societies. Although aspects of its beliefs may be shared elsewhere in the world, it is deeply rooted in African history, African psychology, and precolonial African political and economic thought. In many African societies the arrival and adoption of Islam and Christianity have not totally eradicated traditional African ideas. In fact in the African continent what Kwame Nkrumah called the three strands of thought exercise considerable influence on attitudes towards the world and changes within that world.<sup>18</sup>

By traditional African religion we mean the belief system developed in the old Africa that defines the nature of the universe for Africans and explains how, why, and when they come to this life and what they are expected to do here below in the sublunar world. Although there is no total consensus among all the ethnic groups in Africa, African students of religions and African political and social thinkers in the postcolonial period have identified a common denominator that subsumes all the essentials of traditional African religion. The role and place of this traditional religion in the development of Africa is not widely discussed among those working in development. The role of this belief system in the postcolonial African state is evident in four areas of life: (1) land tenure, (2) family planning, (3) relationship among elders, and (4) the concept of time and its impact on practical activities of people in society.

In examining the cultural consequences of development in the societies across the continent, social scientists found varying reactions to development, depending on which of the three belief systems exercises greater control in the lives of peoples within an African country. In the remainder of this paper we look into the cultural consequences of development in the four areas identified above. Assuming that social changes impact negatively or positively on a given

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<sup>18</sup>For Nkrumah's ideas on the matter see chap. 1 in *Consciencism*. See also John Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (New York: Grove Press, 1961); and Ali A. Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (New York: Little Brown Press, 1986).

culture, we analyze the problem from the perspective that any transformation of a social system directly and indirectly affects the material, institutional, and valuational bases of that society.

*Land Tenure.* Land tenure and land use in the old Africa were inextricably linked to the African's world view. Even though colonial rule and the material transformation that accompanied this experience in Africa changed some African attitudes towards land and land use, there is still strong evidence that traditional African beliefs affect the development of these lands.<sup>19</sup> In the postcolonial period many of the African leaders tried to advocate and advance some form of African socialism. Working on the assumption that the communalism of the old Africa was very similar to the tenets of socialism as developed in Europe, these leaders saw an opportunity for the rapid transformation of African society into African socialism by the effective manipulation of traditional beliefs. Hence the advocacy of African socialism by Kwame Nkrumah, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and Julius Nyerere. Although these men differ in their respective interpretations, they all agree that the old African belief systems provided the necessary arguments for the imposition of a socialist order in the postcolonial societies of their continent. Traditional African beliefs, they would argue, make it easier for them to convince their fellow Africans about the need for a socialist dispensation in the postcolonial period. Indeed, it was this kind of logic and thinking that led former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to assert that socialism was nothing new to the African and that the idea was already in place in his society long before the European set foot in the continent. But if these leaders argue that traditional African beliefs lend intellectual and moral support to their socialist claims, some evidence certainly shows that not everything about these belief systems agrees with or reinforces the kind of socialism advocated by the first generation of African leaders.

The question of land tenure and land use has remained a major bone of contention between traditionalists, who wish to maintain the status quo, and the modernizers, who are willing to take lands from peasants and give them to the rising petty bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie increasingly is drawn from the bureaucracies or the private sectors, which are increasingly dominated by the international capitalist system.

But if the modernizers are convinced that the small plots of land controlled by their peasantry could be better put to use through mechanized farming or through the creation of larger units of farms for the better endowed farmers, the reality of African societies makes it dangerous and unwise to

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<sup>19</sup>One of the earliest attempts to address the conflict of cultures among Africans on the verge of modernization was Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955).

advocate such policies. Two examples from recent African history illustrate the difficulties faced by African leaders in their drive to accelerate economic development and social transformation. During the early 1960s the government of the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana tried to give Accra a facelift by announcing a policy of urban renewal. This was designed to evacuate those Ghanaians who were living in a certain section of Accra that the government felt was unhealthy and unsafe. Since this area was classified by the colonial authorities during earlier times as "Crown Lands," that is, lands taken from the Africans during the colonial conquest and considered part of the British realm overseas, the Nkrumah regime thought that it could easily dislodge these inhabitants of the ghetto of Accra and build more attractive housing in the area. This decision of the government was resisted by the Ga-speaking people of the area, and a major political confrontation developed. The residents of the dilapidated area refused to move out on the grounds that the site was the place their ancestors were buried. Leaving such a piece of real estate is like walking out on one's spiritual protectors. This is a serious act of betrayal, and Africans who still hold on to their ancestral ways are quite reluctant to follow government action in this matter.<sup>20</sup> Writing on a group (the Lo Dagba) that shares almost the same belief system as the Ga people of Accra, Jack Goody offers this reflection on their attitudes towards the land and the ancestors: "As ancestors they continue to belong to the same property-holding corporation that they belonged to in life and are entitled to share in the gains that accrue to their descendants."<sup>21</sup> Because of this notion of property, the end of one's life here below does not terminate membership.

African politicians faced with the urgent task of building structures to bring Africa into the twenty-first century have to deal with these belief systems. Some have been able to maneuver their way through; others, either because of political sloppiness or due to lack of determination, have failed to minimize the role of traditional African beliefs in economic development.

The Nkrumah campaign failed to materialize because his government was overthrown before the realization of his urban planning campaign came to a successful conclusion, but another African leader faced the same challenge and won. This was President Léopold Sédar Senghor. In the early 1970s President Senghor was faced with a serious problem of appropriating land from the Lebu people of Dakar to construct a national project. Being the oldest residents of the city of Dakar, the Lebus traditionally have been respected by all Senegalese politicians in matters relating to land use in this part of the country. Even

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<sup>20</sup>See my "Religion and Development in Africa" (Paper presented at a symposium held at the headquarters of the African Development Foundation, October 1986).

<sup>21</sup>Quoted in Nyang, "Religion and Development," 5.

though almost all of them are today Muslims, elements of the old Africa still dominate their consciousness. When President Senghor decided to tear down their graveyard and use the available land for a national project, the entire community was up in arms. The Senegalese government was certainly on a collision course with this community over the appropriation of land belonging to them. Where Nkrumah failed, President Senghor succeeded. The Senegalese president defused the dangerous political dynamite by employing the old African technique of consultation with the elders. He secretly convened a meeting with all the major leaders of the Lebu people and convinced them not only with words but also with gifts. After having effected this scheme, the Senegalese president let the elders defuse the explosive situation for him. This was a major act of Senghorean diplomacy, for as he himself maintains in his poems, the African is closely tied to his land.<sup>22</sup> Bernardo Bernadi captures the spirit of the African with regard to his or her feelings and attitudes towards the land in the following words: "The ties with whatever spiritual power and with the ancestors, which the Africans sense through their land, are indeed mystical, but they are very real, to the point of causing deep emotion which may even become explosive and violent."<sup>23</sup>

This assessment of the African attitudes towards the land is deeply rooted in the African past. Policymakers throughout the continent have at one time or another faced some form of opposition or resistance to their policy of land tenure or land use. Although President Julius Nyerere wrote many articles and books defending his *Ujamaa* in the late 1960s and 1970s, significant evidence shows it is a total failure. The frank and honest president himself has admitted this sorry state of affairs in his country. Why did *Ujamaa* fail in Tanzania? Was it the result of African ineptitude? Or was it the result of the paradoxical situation that developed when a Tanzania professing self-reliance became the favorite beneficiary of international donors? The jury is still out on the real causes of failure in Tanzania, but I am inclined to make a tentative conclusion that a significant part of the failure was the coerced "villagization" of the *Ujamaa* experiment. Unwilling to pay adequate attention to the belief systems of the diverse ethnic groups of Tanzania and enthusiastically trumpeting the claim that all Africans share the communalist notions of the new leaders advocating socialism, the ilk of President Nyerere wittingly or unwittingly committed a serious blunder of moving peasants from their original homelands. Despite useful community facilities and services that were provided to these uprooted

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<sup>22</sup>Nyang, "Religion and Development."

<sup>23</sup>Quoted in Nyang, "Religion and Development," 6.

exposure to the Arab World made them amenable to the modernizing programs of the governments.<sup>25</sup>

Among African Catholics family planning and birth control have been received with mixed reactions. Devout African Catholics who listened attentively to the teachings emanating from the Vatican share the same attitudes of hostility to these practices as their co-religionists elsewhere in the Catholic world. Others who are less affected by the Pope's peripatetic lectures on birth control and family planning have tended to be receptive to the modernizing efforts of secular African governments. Because of this diversity of opinions concerning these two important issues in African society, it is too early to make a definitive statement on the role and place of religion in the African attempt at solving the ever-present problem of family planning and birth control.

Africa's religions also affect the nature of the relationship between the elders and the younger generations. In the old Africa the traditional religion provided for the submission of the young to the old and the respectful and gracious exercise of leadership by the elders. This pattern of leadership continued with some changes throughout the colonial period. What is significant about the postcolonial period, however, is the manner in which the privileges conferred upon the elders by ancient Africa are being subverted and gradually taken away by the young whose claim to privilege is largely due to their mastery of a foreign culture and a foreign language. This shift in African attitude, which is still restricted and limited by certain forces in African society, could augur well for the rapid development of African countries. However, such a development could be disastrous if the African leaders fail to create the necessary structures that would still reward old age but allow younger men and women with skills and knowledge to rise to the top without any hindrance. Muslims and Christians do appeal to their scriptures to support the position of the elders in their communities, but their deference to the old is very different from the old African feeling and attitude because they do not see the elders as the intermediaries between the ancestors and the younger members of society. In traditional African religions, older people are respected not just because of their age but also because they have a spiritual role in society. In contrast, in the Christian and Muslim religions older people are respected because of age only there is no religious significance given to age. Owing to these differences in attitudes, I assert that the role of religion in the definition and maintenance of the African sense of respect for the elders will continue even if Islam and Christianity effectively replace the traditional African religion. The reason for this assertion

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<sup>25</sup> "Arabisants" denotes Arabic-speaking students from Sub-Saharan Africa who studied in Arab countries.

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is that in both of these two traditions the elders are respected. Thus, the message of deference to and respect for elders is now translated into the languages of Islam and Christianity respectively.

But if land tenure, family planning, and respect for elders have remained issues to be dealt with by the African leadership in the postcolonial period, then the question of time and one's relationship with time becomes a more serious and demanding issue. In his controversial but widely read book on African religion and philosophies, Professor John Mbiti has argued that the African concept of time is different from that of the West. He claims that to the traditional African there were two components of time, namely *Sasa* and *Zamani*. The *Sasa* refers to the present and the *Zamani* to the past. Working with this scheme the Kenya-born theologian argues that this African conception of time affected the manner in which Africans dealt with history and society.<sup>26</sup> Although I have taken Mbiti to task in my *Islam, Christianity and African Identity*, in which I argued that the African does not have only a two-dimensional view of time, it should be stated that the diversity of the African continent makes it very important that students of African philosophy and African development take note of the different conceptions of time across the continent.<sup>27</sup> If one takes Mbiti's understanding of the African concept of time, then the question of planning becomes problematic. This is so because such a conception leads one to the feeling that planning for the distant future is speculative and does not have any immediate practical consequences.

When we look at the Islamic and Christian conceptions of time, we realize that these two world religions in their own ways have sanctioned human beings' activity on this earth. The Muslim should and must see the whole earth as a garden and a *masjid* (mosque). His or her relationship with nature is that of a *khalif* (vicegerent, or caretaker) who has the awesome responsibility of earning a living without endangering fellow human beings and without jeopardizing the ecological balance among all the elements in the world. Although Western scholars have described some segments of the Islamic faith as fatalistic, the Muslims believe in the reality of this life and the next. They pray daily for success in this and the next life. This belief in both the hereafter and a metatemporal day of judgment set the stage for a positive Muslim attitude towards benefiting from the good things of this world. It is in this context that one should read the most widely recited Muslim prayer, which calls on God Almighty to grant success in this life and success in the next. It is also in this

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<sup>26</sup>For elaborate discussion on these ideas see John Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970).

<sup>27</sup>See Nyang, chap. 1 in *Islam, Christianity and African Identity* (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984).

context that the Holy Prophet of Islam is daily quoted in the Muslim World as saying: "Live as if you will be here forever, but also live here as if you will pass away tomorrow." These two *hadiths* (sayings) of the Muslim Prophet graphically capture the Muslim conception of time, and Muslims who are neither deterministic nor fatalistic have acted out their role in human societies most effectively. One can argue that they have employed their religion to make the best of nature without necessarily inflicting damage to their ecosystem.<sup>28</sup>

The Christian faith also provides the African with a new conception of time. Like Islam Christianity teaches the African that there is a life after death, that one's post mortem existence will not be like that of the ancestors, and that one's deeds will be judged by the Creator. On the question of time the Christian African learns that there is a dimension beyond *Sasa* (the present), and history assumes greater significance because God Himself in the person of Jesus Christ came to this earth over 1900 years ago. This Incarnation of God makes this life important, and the individual human being has a mission to do good and to prepare his or her life for the hereafter. Acting upon the passages in Genesis urging man (Adam) to spread over the earth and multiply, Christians have taken the whole earth as their estate. As custodians they go about the business of making the best use of it. Imbued with the teaching that each person must work hard to earn God's grace and mercy and determined to lead a life of righteousness, the Christian faces the world with confidence and industriousness. This message of the Church has found its way into Africa, and the postcolonial Africans who had earlier been exposed to the teachings of the missionaries now entered the circles of the world community with a new understanding of the human being's role in the universe.<sup>29</sup> This new sense of self-importance and of unlimited opportunities here below has created an atmosphere of hope among the African Christians. The African Muslims, who share with these Christians a variant of the Abrahamic message, also look into the future with optimism. As a result of this state of mind in the new Africa, economic development will continue to receive overwhelming African support although there will continue

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<sup>28</sup>For a similar statement of the Muslim world view and its implications for development see *Friday Morning Reflections at the World Bank: Essays on Values and Development*, ed. David Beckmann, Ramgopal Agarwala, Steven Burmester, and Ismail Serageldin (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1991), 5-73.

<sup>29</sup>One of the earliest statements of the Christian (Catholic) position on development was Denis Martin's "Christianity and Development in Africa," *Cross-Currents* XL (1) (Winter 1965): 19-32. See also Joseph Blomjous, "The Church in a Developing World," *Cross-Currents* XX (3) (Summer, 1970): 287-300. For one of the earliest statements of liberation theology and development see Gustave Gutierrez, "Liberation and Development," *Cross-Currents* XXI (3) (Summer 1971): 243-56.

to be obstacles from obscurantist beliefs either from the Traditional African Religion or from reactionary interpretations of these two world religions.

### **Conclusions**

In concluding I would like to state four points. First, I cannot avoid recapitulating the main point raised in my analysis. The role and place of culture in the development of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America did not receive much serious attention among economists and other social scientists engaged in development programs. Conventional wisdom, represented by the late Daniel Lerner, argued for a universal, unilinear history in which societies move from agrarian to more industrialized economies. Such scholars contended that Africa, Asia, and Latin America are not as developed as the West because the peoples of these lands are still predominantly agrarian and the necessary conditions for the economic transformation of their societies are yet to be present. Furthermore, they argued that the functional differentiations that accompany the structural changes are prevented because of the persistence of traditional values. In the minds of these social scientists modernization has eluded most of these countries because neither their economies nor their peoples have undergone the necessary changes for the societies to be called modern. The continuing presence of primordial loyalties in the daily lives of these peoples militates against the emergence of a "rational" mode of social and economic existence. Owing to the pervasive acceptance of this logic of unilinear modernization, many of those writing about development in Africa paid little or no attention to the cultural consequences of development.

Another conclusion is that the definition of culture offered in this paper emphasizes material, institutional, and valuational bases of culture. Our application of it in the discussion on cultural consequences of development in Africa has led us to the appreciation of the multiple forces acting within the African physical and social environments. Our study demonstrates how the continuing vitality of certain traditional African ideas affects the implementation of certain public policy decisions. The examples drawn from Africa's religious experience show how and why family planning did not receive enthusiastic endorsement. The experiences presented here lead us to conclude that governments that are seriously committed to the development of their peoples must come to terms with local cultures. The only way out for them is to develop stronger appreciation of these local cultures and formulate policies in light of their new understanding.

The third conclusion of this study is that although local cultures do matter, conventional development theory still holds that development comes to an area in which the people have shed a great many of their old habits. This

"passing of traditional society" approach to development has been useful. However, it should be reiterated that its emphasis on the transformative powers of modern structures has tended to dismiss the utility and vitality of the old culture(s). As a result of this attitude no serious attention has been given to the study of traditional cultural values and their relationship to the development process. Our study shows how African policymakers failed or succeeded in their implementation programs because of the manner in which they handled the delicate issues of culture, religion, and ethnicity. From the evidence presented, we can conclude that development does have serious consequences for the culture of a society in transition, and the manner in which these consequences are handled depends largely on the agents of change and the degree of popular support their programs enjoy.

Finally, the cultural consequences of development in Africa do have political implications, and policymakers in the continent are sometimes aware of them. However, so long as donors and scholars involved in development studies deny or ignore the relevance of these cultural factors, chances are that Africans will continue to be the victims of a xenophilia that is reinforced by the political culture of the colonial and postcolonial periods. That is, the development process will be undermined by the present African preoccupation with things foreign without paying serious attention to the effective and meaningful domestication of the theory and practices of modernization. As long as these attitudes exist among the policymakers and the larger African society, chances are that any homegrown development that is deeply rooted in the history, culture, and psychology of African peoples will be stymied. The way out of this predicament is that, just as with their ecological systems, policymakers must develop a better understanding of their cultural landscapes.

## Culture, Management, and Institutional Assessment

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*The search for solutions to Africa's economic crises of the 1980s led to a reexamination of the roles of governments, institutions, and culture in growth and poverty reduction. The hypothesis is that culturally congruent approaches to managing development will lead to a more productive future for Africa. This paper is a complementary literature review and conceptual background to Mamadou Dia's regional research comprising eighteen country case studies, "Africa's Management in the '90s," and adds a discussion of institutional assessment. "Culturally congruent" means adapting management approaches to strongly held local norms and practices, including incentives, delegation, communication, coordination, and organization. Management of change means tapping into these practices and including the participation of those whose culture is being adapted (to) so that they become their own agents of change. These controversial hypotheses require long-term empirical research in the areas of culture and governance, participation and associational behavior, local organizational life, and an institutional assessment that can inform country operations.*

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The search for paths out of the economic crises of the 1980s across Africa has led some to reexamine the role played by governments, institutions, and culture in achieving growth and poverty reduction. In this paper I will turn to one overarching hypothesis: that *culturally congruent approaches to managing development may lead to a more productive future for Africa*. Work on this hypothesis is underway in the large (18-country) regional research study, "Africa's Management in the '90s," led by Mamadou Dia.<sup>1</sup> This paper provides a complementary literature review and conceptual background, and adds a discussion of institutional assessment.

Culturally congruent approaches or adapting management approaches to strongly held local norms and practices means, for example, attention to the way

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<sup>1</sup>See the study's concept paper by Mamadou Dia, "Indigenous Management Practices: Lessons for Africa's Management in the '90s." This paper is synthesized in his article, "Development and Cultural Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Finance & Development* (December 1991). See also his interview, "Afrique: Recoudre le ciel et la terre," *Le Monde*, January 14, 1992, commenting on the above article.

in which motivation, incentives, delegation, communication, coordination, and organization take place within a culture. Management of change requires connecting with these practices when introducing change. It also means that participation by those whose culture is being adapted is essential; "insiders" know how to recombine external ideas with locally valued behavior.<sup>2</sup> When they are positioned to participate in the change process, they become the interpreters and communicators; in short they are their own change agents.

As a corollary, I am arguing that previous efforts to impose foreign models of modern management frequently were ineffective for two reasons. First, cultural resistance often set in and generated rejection of the transplant when little or no attempt at understanding, and hence connecting to, strongly held local behaviors, norms, and institutions had taken place. Second, the Western practices imposed often were formalized (sometimes ritualized) models that inadequately reflected actual practice in their countries of origin. For example, colonial administrators brought their own idealized versions of "modern management" that often were dated, and perhaps no longer even practiced within the management systems of the colonial power. (Rarely, if ever, were they familiar with, and hence transmitting, state of the art business management practices.)

These controversial points will require background discussion and further explication. In the longer term they also imply the need for carefully devised empirical research before we know how to achieve culturally congruent management practices.

## **Background**

Managing development through culturally congruent approaches is a daunting challenge and raises many questions. How might this be done? Wasn't this issue raised earlier, for example, immediately after independence? Isn't the idea that culture and management are interrelated in fact a very old idea? What should we

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<sup>2</sup>Note the useful papers by Tom Carroll, "Capacity Building for Participatory Organizations"; Thomas Dichter, "Demystifying Popular Participation"; and Alexandre Marc, "Funding Mechanisms and Participation: A Brief Review of World Bank Experience and Related Issues" (Papers assembled by the World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, February 26-28, 1992). See also James Kearns and Turid Sato, "New Practices for Development Professionals," *Development: Journal of the Society for International Development* 1989: 4.

recall from those who raised this issue historically, such as, for example, Weber?<sup>3</sup>

On the question "Why now rather than when it was needed in the 1960s?" is in part because in the early halcyon days after independence, national leaders were very optimistic about their own abilities to walk in both worlds. Many of them were Western-educated and singularly skillful at combining within their leadership style abilities to communicate to a variety of ethnic groups. Later and into the late 1970s, all the factors that drove donors and recipients to structural adjustment and its many management problems have forced the issue to the surface in a new way.

To argue, as adjustment does, that investment projects cannot succeed without a solid enabling macroeconomic environment was to allow the equally compelling need for a macro-sociopolitical environment to come into view. In part structural adjustment lending and its process revealed or made more transparent the political economy and governing problems that had been long noted by others.<sup>4</sup>

The institutions needed to carry forward macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s were not, in all cases, in place. Getting prices right was necessary but not sufficient: having knowledge of those prices, access to markets, roads, and credit in order to take advantage of them was equally important.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, World Bank reviews of adjustment lending pointed repeatedly to the need for "ownership" and institutional development (ID),<sup>6</sup> but much that lies tied up within those terms has to be unbundled.

Second, donor documents discussing current problems often are heavier on description and prescription than analysis of *why* the underlying causal factors for the economic crisis in Africa. Disaggregating causes of socioeconomic problems are examined under different microscopes with different disciplinary

<sup>3</sup>See Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).

<sup>4</sup>This led, in part, to the World Bank paper, "Managing Development: The Governance Dimension" (Paper reviewed by the Board of Executive Directors, July 1991). See also Mamadou Dia, *A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Bank Technical Paper 225 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993).

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice*, ed. Joan Nelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Relatedly, Robert Bates, *Beyond the Miracle of the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Robert Klitgaard, *Adjusting to Reality* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991).

<sup>6</sup>Both RAL (Review of Adjustment Lending) I (1989) and RAL II (1990) made this point.

lenses. This is true in every field. Allergists, neurologists, and ophthalmologists, for example, do not agree on the causes of floaters in eyes. They all have, as Robert Klitgaard says, their own "cultures." So it is no surprise that economists, management analysts, and anthropologists, to say nothing of political scientists, disagree about why poverty worsened in Africa in the 1980s. Differing diagnoses mean different prescriptions. But all would agree that treating symptoms without treating causes is a mistake. This leads to a first, and inevitably controversial, cautionary note.

### Cautionary Note

Culture is a central part of people's lives. As Wole Soyinka has written, "Can anyone really add up: two oranges, three hoes, four traditional healers, two roadside mechanics and five beaded crowns? The answer we know is not sixteen. But their intrinsic and overt productive processes do offer insight into the lived culture of a society. Exhuming . . . we can deduce, reconstruct, a framework of that society's principles of reproducing itself, of sustaining and enhancing life. . . . Over the years, those objective products and their inter-related activities . . . implant aspects of their own contemporaneous being in a people's social psyche which sink into the very foundation of a people's culture."<sup>7</sup>

Precisely because culture is a central part of people's lives it—is—also (1) dynamic, changing, and sensitive; (2) only dimly understood by outsiders;<sup>8</sup> (3) often abused, manipulated, ignored; and (4) treated as an excuse or residual explanation either for why anything, or, conversely, nothing can be done. Julius Nyerere argued that African socialism would work because it was building upon the innate African culture of communalism (culture does everything). Similarly, businesspersons can be heard to argue that investments achieve less in Africa because the culture of productivity is not there (culture means nothing can be done). And, of course, there is the older, recurrent argument about whether or not there is a "culture of poverty."<sup>9</sup> In a more tragic "use" of culture propo-

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<sup>7</sup>Wole Soyinka, "Twice Bitten: The Fate of Africa's Culture Producers," in *Development and Culture* (Ota, Nigeria: Africa Leadership Forum, November 1988).

<sup>8</sup>Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* is an obvious exception. There can be no doubt that this Frenchman's ability to "see" that which even American intellectuals at the time were not "seeing" is especially noteworthy.

<sup>9</sup>This term was coined by Oscar Lewis and, in turn, generated a fierce debate over whether impoverishment led to a culture of poverty that mutually reinforced dysfunctional behavior that, in turn, exacerbated poverty. Much empirical work refuted this assumption (notably, Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality* (Berkeley: University of

nents of apartheid claimed that African cultures had to be "protected" hence separated from one another (the ultimate in the abuse of culture). Politicians from Belfast to Lebanon and Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia have had recourse at one time or another to ethnic mobilization and have used it as a form of cultural resistance to change.

The major cautionary note: To endeavor to "use" culture underpins approaches to social engineering. History is littered with the sad consequences of such efforts. Yet applied behavioral psychology has advanced the frontiers of what is possible in terms of social engineering. The problems and issues are many (and will not be addressed here). Suffice it to say that the issues not only involve arguments over technique and the state of the art, but also involve major normative arguments over who decides what, when, and how. Deciding to "use" culture is also a decision about how one grounds the practice of development management in social responsibility. These daunting issues cannot be resolved in this paper nor am I interested in social engineering. I am interested in socially responsible and effective management of development and hence in participatory processes so that cultural congruence can improve performance.

But even if one shares these cautionary notes and their normative biases how do we develop better techniques for culturally adapted management? Who are the intellectual precursors and what do we learn from them?

### **Why Culture and Management?**

One of the challenges often put to those who work on culture and management is: why retreat from classical "universals" into an area of great diversity and local contextual specificity? Just as macroeconomics can travel anywhere and be the same, is there no macromanagement theory and technology that can travel in the same manner? The answer to this challenge is both yes and no. Yes, there are some universal management characteristics. Management is universally about organization, institutional analysis, motivation, establishing incentives, and implementing decisions. And no, not all aspects of these processes, when they are disaggregated, function in exactly the same manner in different cultural contexts. The existence of techniques and concepts does not deny the salience of local cultural variation. All languages have verbs a "universal" characteristic, but verbs vary in each language. All humans have circulatory systems, too but no surgeon performs surgery without detailed information (X-rays and laboratory work) about the specific characteristics of the individual patient. Although management as a science has some basic units of analysis, improving managerial

and organizational performance requires removing the precise obstacles impeding performance; and these are culturally imbedded.

Interestingly, even some of the giants, for example, Max Weber, whose work might be cited as "universal," remind us *in their work* of its specific cultural context and that organizational and bureaucratic behavior is in part a function of cultural norms and behaviors. Weber was centrally concerned with the ways in which cultural values affected organizations and economic performance. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* details his explanation for Northern Europe's industrial revolution as it was to use a Bank expression "enabled" by the Protestant Reformation.<sup>10</sup> He viewed religion, central to culture, as a direct impact upon motivation and behavior.

Max Weber, the theorist of rationalization, was preeminently a cultural historian creating a framework for the analysis of cultural historical processes.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, his efforts at applying his approach to the impact of Islam, Confucianism, and Buddhism on Asian development are less compelling than his analysis of his own society.<sup>12</sup> Industrial development in Northern Europe, he argued, was made possible by the social and cultural changes that flowed from the underlying precepts in the Protestant Reformation. That reformation changed attitudes and behavior towards saving, work, and entrepreneurship and fostered attention to rationalism and individual effort.

Weber also pointed to one of the most prominent new features of industrial development, that of the modern organization with its meritocracy. This development, he predicted, was of long-standing consequence. Work structured by organizations would be forever different from that which had preceded it in the smaller, more personal, guild. It would be more impersonal, and people would be judged according to their abilities and performance rather than by lineage and birthright. This was, he argued, a fundamental shift. This change would afford opportunities to people who might previously have been excluded. Those arguments are well remembered, but it is too often forgotten that Weber also sounded an important warning: that over time, organizations, as their capacities for action increase, will encroach upon individual freedoms. Weber foresaw the dangers inherent in large modern organizations; he saw organizations as both inevitable and a long-term threat to liberty.

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<sup>10</sup>Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

<sup>11</sup>Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*. See also Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

<sup>12</sup>Bryan Turner in *Weber and Islam* (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul Press, 1974) examines at length Weber's argument that values grew out of the enduring social order embedded in the political, military, and economic nature of Islamic society.

Another candidate for providing the universalism sought in macromanagement may be thought to reside in the modern private sector corporation. For example, the once renowned book by Inkeles, *Becoming Modern*, points to the rapidity with which factories are able to impose "modern" values on traditional workers who are their employees.<sup>13</sup> Using empirical research, Inkeles documents the speed with which traditional workers eschew traditional values once they are socialized into factory work with its own norms. Herein lies an important paradox: strong organizations with strong organizational cultures are able to overwhelm individually held cultural differences. This point does not repudiate the importance of culture in management but rather underscores it.

Significant research has been done on organizational culture and its comparisons and contrasts in multinational settings. Perhaps best known is the work of Hofstede, whose research on a multinational business corporation with subsidiaries in thirty-nine countries points out that the subsidiaries were very unlike one another despite similar task environments, formal structures, and a shared strong company subculture.<sup>14</sup>

Every major business school has a curriculum on organizational culture an application at the micro level of the some of the larger arguments made about national cultures as they impact upon choices.<sup>15</sup> In the private sector there is no doubt about the saliency of organizational culture and its impact upon performance. It is empirically established as impacting directly on motivation, incentives, and work place behavior. Work by Kurt Lewin,<sup>16</sup> Edgar Schein,<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

<sup>14</sup>Geert Hofstede, "Hierarchical Power Distance in Forty Countries," *Organizations Alike and Unlike*, ed. Lammers and Hickson (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1979). Taking a different perspective, an interesting dissertation by Rogerio Pinto examining cross-cultural consultants with special attention to whether values predominate over organizational norms found that they do not. As Pinto says, "A possible explanation for this is that, while primary cultures remain somewhat protected from internalization trends, organizational cultures are being homogenized across cultural boundaries." Rogerio Pinto, "Cross-Cultural Consultation in Institutional and Organizational Development: Consultant Style and Contextual Adaptation" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, October 1981), 190.

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Craig Lundberg, "On the Feasibility of Cultural Intervention in Organizations," *Organizational Culture*, ed. Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, and Martin (London: Sage Publications, 1988); on the relationships between organizational culture and national culture see Monir Tayeb, *Organizations and National Culture* (London: Sage Publications, 1988).

<sup>16</sup>Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science*, rev. ed. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975).

and Lawrence and Lorsch<sup>18</sup> has resulted in a large subfield in management of applied behavioral psychology and organizational development.

Of course, when Mamadou Dia writes that cultural behaviors and attitudes determine performance, he is pointing to larger sociocultural behaviors than those to be found within specific organizations. Yet organizational culture does not develop in isolation from the dominant cultures within which it is embedded. On the contrary societies organize themselves differently for production. Part of the problem in Africa may be precisely that indigenous modes of organization have not had the standing and legitimacy that they need. The imported or inherited formalistic models came imbued with notions residual from the colonial experience. The claim "We're better because we're modern" displaced traditional modes of organization in the way that, for example, eating white bread or rice displaced eating nshima.

Traditional practices that "modern" management now considers very important, such as skills in achieving consensus, were not valued in early nineteenth century colonial administrative practices not unlike the way that Nestle formula displaced breast-feeding without any serious evidence of the health implications for the babies. The challenge for African managers is to identify components of their culture that can be built upon to have greater synergy in the workplace as a result of working with, rather than against, widely held cultural norms. The concept, for example, of reciprocity is found within many African cultures; it is also central to building teamwork, a widely held tenet in modern management.

Assessing corporate culture and learning how to integrate divergent corporate cultures during a major merger is the subject of major management work academically as well as a major part of operational work in the corporate private sector. Public sector organizations also have organizational cultures. (Even the most classical or neoclassical economists working at the World Bank would concede that the World Bank has its own distinctive culture and further, that it structures their incentives, affects motivation and productivity, and influences choices on a daily basis.) Recall Wole Soyinka's assertion "objective products and their inter-related activities implant themselves on people's psyches" and consider how organizations develop an internal language, norms, and behaviors that affect our capacities for communication, coordination,

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<sup>17</sup>Edgar Schein, *Organizational Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

<sup>18</sup>P.R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration* (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967).

delegation, and supervision. Organizational culture is ignored at one's peril if internal effectiveness is prized.

The problem here is that we know very little about African organizational culture. What can be observed is very wide divergence between the vibrancy of informal sector organization and formal sector organization. There has been too little examination of why that divergence exists and what has to happen to transmit the level of commitment to work and performance in formal sector organizations that is exhibited by informal sector organizations.

Mamadou Dia hypothesizes that there is greater vibrancy in the African informal sector precisely because the sector swims within cultural norms, builds on traditional saving and lending practices, and is based on a small family-sized scale (and often family-based employment) that takes advantage of the social obligations. That is not to say that there are no problems because there are. He points out that the problem with the informal sector is the lack of intensification of capital. Entrepreneurs in the informal sector invest by diversifying, not by intensifying; thus, their enterprises are relegated to smallness. Nevertheless, it is apparent that formal public sector organizations do not reflect the same kind of energy and commitment. Is this because they are not capturing any social synergy? Or have they been captured by an elite who are not interested in integrating them into the mainstream of a country's productive system? Or are they largely irrelevant since most of the real action goes on elsewhere in the economy?

Culture affects several components of how organization takes place as well as how members relate to leaders. Japanese principles of organization are at wide variance from American approaches to organization and leadership; more loyalty and more mutual commitment exist in the former while greater mobility in and out is expected in the latter. These relationships generally are found at very local levels as well as in more formal organizations. An account of life in Kefa village, Zambia, makes this point:

Kefa Mwale (headman and founder of the village) is a strong and active leader. Frequently he calls his people together for discussions, and he listens. But he also emphasizes that everyone who wants to live in his village (and only the headman is entitled to call the village "his") must cooperate with him and abide by his decisions. And people do that, at least most of the time. There is a saying: *Mfumu ya ndeu simanga mudzi* A bellicose chief does not keep a village.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Else Skjonsberg, *Change in an African Village* (Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1989), 17.

Implicit within this comment about chieftainship is that the historical African concept of reciprocity was, and remains, in force in the relationships between leaders and followers. Several such cultural concepts found across a variety of African ethnic groups are congruent with what currently is considered "modern" management. Helpful in this regard is a recent study of administrative behavior of five of Africa's most successful senior administrators. Leonard has captured the extraordinary skill of these leaders as they demonstrate agility in combining both traditional and modern organizational skills.<sup>20</sup>

Beyond Weber and beyond work on organizational culture, however, lies a different body of research in the field of institutional economics. Oliver Williamson, Joseph Stiglitz, Douglass North, and others make the argument that more explanation is available through institutional analysis. But they are similar to Weber in that they, too, start with analysis of the economic and social culture they define institutions as the rules of the game and merge their analysis of these rules with cultural political economy.<sup>21</sup> Robert Putnam's paper for this conference is in this tradition. And they have indeed developed credible arguments about the role of institutions in explaining economic performance. Their point is that institutions by which they mean norms, behavior, and organizations as these interact to create the rules of the game, a definition that clearly includes culture determine economic development.

The challenge is to see what these schools of thought add to our search for a better grasp of Africa's own management approach its own organizational principles hence the manner in which locally grown organizational principles may inform management improvements needed in both the public and private sectors in the future. To do this requires explaining a little about what we hope to do in the study "African Management in the 1990s" led by Mamadou Dia. I will then conclude with a discussion of the terrain to be covered in devising a useful technique for institutional assessment informed by this approach.

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<sup>20</sup>David Leonard, *African Successes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). This book details the life stories and managerial leadership of five leaders—Ishmael Muriithi, Dan Mbogo, Harris Mule, Charles Karanja, and Simeon Nyachae—within an analysis of administrative theory and its explanatory power in Kenya.

<sup>21</sup>Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). An especially interesting look at this perspective is available in the *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5 (2) (Spring 1991): 25-45, in which Joseph Stiglitz reports on a symposium on organization and economics, and Herbert Simon has a most useful article, "Organizations and Markets."

## **Indigenous Management: Lessons for Africa's Management in the 1990s**

The scope of the work needed covers such a wide canvas that not all aspects to be investigated can possibly be covered. Hence, thus far, there are three major components or topics within which work will proceed with every expectation that further work is likely to grow out of discoveries along the way. The goal is to deepen our understanding through empirical data of how culture impacts upon management and how professional African development managers (and those working with them) might become more effective in that context.

### ***Governance and Culture***

One of the most striking aspects of governance in Africa today is the ferment happening in very different parts of the continent. Given the rich diversity of Africa, the nature of the changes and the processes bringing them about are also different. The thaw in the post-Cold War period has surely spread to Africa. Governments that in the late 1980s had appeared to be largely unresponsive to their citizens and frequently more skilled at extracting resources for a small elite than at generating development for a large majority are being pushed and dragged into a new era. Local forces leading to this kind of change went far beyond local indigenous voluntary organizations other processes were also called into play, for example, the National Conferences held in Francophone Africa. While donors have been and remain concerned about the need for increasing openness, predictability, and accountability, changes from within have led to new possibilities.

The hallmark of the 1990s is the changing role of the state. States now are expected to be situated differently in their relationship to the private sector and their citizens. Less involved in direct production of goods and services, they need both to have a facilitating policy framework within which investment and production can thrive and, simultaneously, to be more adept at monitoring progress across sectors to skillfully introduce targeted policy interventions. These roles call for both different and more capacity. More capacity also is needed at both the center and the local levels. Yet this capacity is never to suffocate that which citizens are doing through their own organizations, associations, and groups. Holding to a facilitative role is exceedingly challenging for bureaucracy that by nature tends to encroach; hence there is an equal need for active associational and institutional development within private and not-for-profit sectors to counterbalance the public sector.

Accountability, transparency, and predictability do not happen because they are summoned forth in leaders' speeches. Ordinary people make them happen through effective participation throughout the society. In Africa local

leaders are recalling the traditional sources of accountability that predated colonial rule. They are also calling for more selective use of the institutional legacy of colonialism: what works should be kept, but that which does not work will be eschewed. Currently, what works are National Conferences with their own transparency. In some instances the press has flourished following free elections. And predating recent change, the informal sector has always survived the times. The question is whether and how to close the gap between informal sector entrepreneurialism and the formal sector atrophy.

One of the central parts in the changing role of the state and efforts to change patterns of governance is the role of the public sector. Hence efforts at serious and widespread public sector reform are not only needed but wanted and underway in many African countries. The challenge is to move away from that which was inherited from colonial administration and from the accumulated problems and sometimes ill-advised practices of the past three decades.

One of the more useful developments of the past decade has been the emergence of development management in the curriculum of university degree programs in many countries. With this have come many scholar/practitioners who see themselves as part of an ever-expanding network of development managers. The books and articles by these scholar/practitioners reflect diverse views but agreement about (a) the salience of people's participation in the change process and (b) the need to reorient administrative behavior and systems to be more client-centered.<sup>22</sup>

### ***Achieving Ownership: Participation and Culture***

This theme builds upon two assumptions: first, when people participate in decisionmaking, they bring with them their own knowledge about how their culture and social system can adapt to and advance change. There are an

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<sup>22</sup>For example many management institutes in Africa, Asia and Latin America communicate with one another and reflect much of this approach. There is now a group called the Development Management Network, which meets twice a year to work through cases emerging from hands-on experience by professionals within this group. For some of the relevant books by authors within this widely and loosely linked community see especially those published by Kumarian Press, the press of choice for this network. See, for example, the books by Frances Korten as well as David Korten, such as *Transforming a Bureaucracy*, ed. F. Korten and R.Y. Siy (Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1989). See also Moses Kiggundu, *Managing Organizations in Developing Countries* (1989) and Gelase Mutahaba, *Reforming Public Administration for Development* (1989). Earlier there was Coralie Bryant and Louise White, *Managing Rural Development with Small Farmer Participation* (Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1984).

enormous variety of ways in which people participate in decisionmaking in their local communities, in directly productive activities, and in their national settings. Perhaps one of the most damaging aspects of colonialism was the insidious way in which it internalized the idea that "traditional" equalled "not valuable." This equation challenged the very nature of legitimacy, thus weakening states and creating the potential for political anarchy.

Latent within many traditional practices were elements of accountability. This is not to say that all traditional practices had such seeds. Some traditional practices were authoritarian. But it is to point to the manner in which legitimacy is accorded and how a more organic process of change might take place in this, Africa's second major round of political development since the 1960s.

### *From Cultural Resistance to Cultural Congruence*

This theme addresses several issues lifted from the larger canvas of indigenous management practices. The first centers on culture and accumulation.<sup>23</sup> It focuses on individual behavior: What happens when economic performance generates social claims that place overwhelming burdens upon performers? Under what circumstances is wealth accumulation likely to lead to ostracism? How are alternative venues and opportunities generated?

The second subject concerns associational behavior: Under what circumstances are local spontaneous organizations developed? Have they an economic role? Can their scale or impact be regularized, increased, or institutionalized? With urbanization in Africa the growth of spontaneous organizations has quickened; with the information revolution, the possibilities for wider networks among many small groups and local organizations has certainly increased. This thickening web of local associational life provides an environment highly conducive to political and social change.

These three large topics culture and governance, participation, and local organizational life point to another need, the need for an institutional assessment that can inform country operations at a variety of levels. This subject worthy of major work in its own right now needs attention.

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<sup>23</sup>See, for example, Irma Adelman and Habib Fetini, "Culture and Transfers: The Lineage Levy in Senegal," (forthcoming under Africa's Management in the 1990s program. Available from Capacity Building Division, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.). Also relevant is the work of Alain Henry, Guy Tchente, and Philippe Guillaume-Dieumegard, *Tontines et banques au Cameroun* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1991).

### **Institutional Assessment**

It is indicative of the problem that in spite of the role and salience of institutions for development, the World Bank has no model widely accepted for undertaking what might be called an institutional assessment. While there is agreement about how to undertake, for example, public expenditure reviews or public sector management reviews, institutional assessment closely related to these other review efforts has yet to be institutionalized. Part of the issue is that there are so many other assessments that the Bank does undertake for example, environmental assessments and beneficiary assessments that one should rightly be concerned about the potential for "assessment fatigue" in borrowing countries.

The absence of an approach to institutional assessment, however, has not slowed down the amount of such work that the Bank already undertakes either directly within project or program lending, or indirectly within economic and sector work. The Bank has in many ways always undertaken institutional development work. In the earliest years some of that work was done implicitly without much reflection upon what institutional development could, or should, incorporate. More recently, the concern with institutional development has been more explicitly addressed. One such example at the macro level is the African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI), which led to the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), which explicitly addresses the building of policy-analytic capacity in both the public and the private sectors within African countries. The Bank has also lent support to the African-led global efforts at institutional development work such as the Global Coalition for Africa, with its ambitious strategies for institutional development. But most common are the multiple efforts that go on all the time within investment lending at the project level, where institutional change occurs as institutions are dismantled and others introduced.

Is there a case for the development of an approach to institutional assessment?<sup>24</sup> There is a growing demand for some useful, replicable, and readily communicable way of assessing institutional capacity.<sup>25</sup> One can argue

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<sup>24</sup>It should be noted that individuals within the World Bank have contributed to the field with their books and articles. See, for example, Arturo Israel, *Institutional Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

<sup>25</sup>One of the recommendations of the World Bank Task Force on Technical Assistance is that institutional assessments be undertaken to ensure best use of technical assistance. Furthermore, the African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) pointed to the need for institutional assessments as part of any country's capacity building program. At the World Bank Participatory Development Workshop on February 26-28, 1992, institutional assessment again surfaced as a recommendation to identify opportunities for

that the Bank could provide important intellectual leadership in the area of institutional assessment. Known for its ability to take on complex macroeconomic issues and lead the way in making them transparent, it might well consider exercising comparable leadership on institutional assessment. The Bank's work on policy dialogue, public expenditure reviews, public sector management reviews, governance, culture and management, and beneficiary assessment can arguably be said to give it the comparative advantage doing so.

While it might be that the *quantity* of institutional development work that the Bank does in this area has not been affected by the absence of institutional assessment, it may be that the *quality* of that work has been affected. For example, references abound to "the absence of ownership" or the "lack of political will" as if these were magic black boxes that cannot be unpacked. Often institutional actors and their roles remain obscure rather than become transparent within Bank reports. Meanwhile within the Bank, Handbooks, Operational Directives, and checklists abound yet institutional assessment is left to the inclinations and insights of staff working on projects. Fortunately, the general good judgment of the staff has meant that Bank work has fared well in spite of the relatively empty tool kit. Yet the absence of a generally accepted, Bank-wide model for how to undertake institutional assessment has costs. Too often, the unpacked "black boxes" of ownership and political will take their toll during the life of a project or program. Downstream institutional interventions often have fewer degrees of freedom because too little discovery or identification of alternative possibilities occurred at the feasibility and design stage.

If it were possible to achieve minimal agreement on a core list of components in institutional assessment and, given that list, to demonstrate the utility of a coherent approach, Bank Operations could call for the use of this instrument more predictably. What is needed is an elegant model for institutional assessment in which elegance is characterized by simplicity.

Given the focus of this paper, it is no surprise that I argue for an approach to institutional assessment that includes cultural variables. The search for cultural congruence should improve the effectiveness of Bank programming.

An institutional assessment especially one that is culturally informed and includes data on the array of institutions from the macro to the micro level needs economy in its coverage without loss of explanatory power. Clarity is needed about institutional roles, positions in inter-institutional relationships, influence, and capacity.<sup>26</sup>

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deepening and widening participation in development programs and projects.

<sup>26</sup>This challenge is before the subgroup on methodology of the Thematic Team on Institutional Development at the World Bank. One of the interesting papers before the group is Alain Tobelem, "Institutional Development in the Latin America and Caribbean

Unfortunately, this scope is broad. Take this issue of capacity; there are many measures of capacity. Different experts in development management devise their own measures. Getting agreement on a commonly accepted metric would be a daunting task. On the other hand experienced development professionals in Bank Operations must, and do, assess capacity all the time. Decisions have to be made about which organizations will be able to undertake new functions and which ones must be eliminated. Judgments are made using implicit and explicit measures during every aspect of the lending cycle.

Currently, assessments are of extant bureaus, agencies, or enterprises. An institutional assessment undertaken through a cultural lens would embrace many more sociocultural dimensions. This is less frequently done in the course of project design. The goal of such an assessment should be to better understand why some processes happen in a country while others do not, why some things work as they do, and why decisionmaking occurs as it does.

How might such an assessment be undertaken? What would it include?

### ***Basics in Institutional Assessment***

First, it is possible and sensible to inventory organizational and institutional characteristics of countries. A map is developed of the macro-level organizations and institutions (macro-sociocultural as well as macroeconomic organizations and institutions) and their relative degrees of authority and influence. This map includes their linkages and relationships to micro-level organizations and institutions.

The data needed in an institutional assessment is determined by the purposes for undertaking the assessment. This is a major point. The scale and scope of the assessment should be determined by its ultimate use. If the goal is to measure capacities within, for example, a specific sector as part of general economic and sector work (ESW), the scope is different than if it is to prepare a sectoral adjustment loan (SECAL).

Needed in a macro-institutional assessment are the following:

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Region: Lessons of Experience and Recommendations for Improvement," LATPS Occasional Paper Series no. 7, June 23, 1992. (Available from Public Sector Management Division, Latin America and Caribbean Technical Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.). It details an ambitious approach to assess ID capacity. See also Rogerio Pinto, "Frameworks for Institutional Analysis: A Methodological Review and Proposal" (Unpublished manuscript, April 1991, available from Capacity Building Division, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.).

1. Major national institutions public and private, formal and informal their power and influence in relationship to (a) central decisionmaking, (b) clients, and (c) one another. There will be cultural institutions as well as economic and political institutions.
2. Since by institution one means norms, behaviors, "rules of the game," and organizations, widely held patterns of values must be included within an institutional assessment. Religious systems, ethnic patterns, and the practices that grow out of widely held values are obvious institutions with widespread implications.
3. The Bank now has a Board paper on governance in which it identifies three major components as especially salient for the management of economic development: accountability, openness, and predictability (including the rule of law). Therefore, institutions within these components need to be included in the assessment.
4. Linkages between these national level institutions and their local level constituencies in provinces, districts, and villages warrant attention. The assessment should also include analysis of the web of actors and organizations linking the center with the smaller units of collective decisionmaking at the village level.

### ***Methodology***

1. The methodology for undertaking an institutional assessment will have to be multifaceted because the topics for inclusion are broad. A good first step is to prepare for the assessment by assimilating all other related assessments that may have been done, such as an environmental assessment or a beneficiary assessment.
2. The institutional assessment should be informed by related World Bank processes, notably, public sector management reviews, or ESW on decentralization.
3. The field work component of the assessment should combine participatory workshops, focus group interviewing, in-depth one-on-one interviewing, and, when possible, surveys.
4. Owners of a culture are the best interpreters of that culture. They not only are knowledgeable but also can provide clues about potentialities for adaptation. Hence, workshops tailored to elicit a high degree of their participation sharing their knowledgeability would be an important part of the discovery methodology. The question is how many such workshops are needed

- and which cross sections of population groups should be asked to participate. These factors would depend, in part, on the particular use to which the assessment might be put.
5. Focus group interviewing is a useful way to supplement, amend, and clarify information gathered from other sources.
  6. Unobtrusive indicators, such as cultural symbols in art and architecture, will have to be part of the data-gathering strategy since cultural patterns are sensitive concerns. Participant observation and careful listening to what is said in all fora are crucial.
  7. The institutional assessment should include social indicators that may have already been otherwise collected, such as numbers of languages spoken in the country, ethnography, and historical and current migratory patterns.

### **Conclusion**

This paper has ranged across three topics: (1) the relationship between culture and management, (2) the major study being undertaken within the Institutional Development and Management Division of the Africa Technical Department (AFTIM) of—the World Bank—on—indigenous management, and (3) institutional assessments. We have been painting on too large a canvas because each of these topics deserves much more exploration and refinement. Nor is there any way to synthesize thoughts on these topics since each is "work in progress" and each is at a different stage of development.

The theme, however, is a sense of opportunity about what may well be a new paradigm in development work. The contours of this paradigm are only beginning to emerge in the special environment of the post-Cold War climate. Yet one of the contours appears to be a new interest in a historic quest a better understanding of people's value systems and hence of the range of incentives that might be brought to bear to create a more equitable and productive future.

## **Cultural Dimensions of Conflict Management and Development: Some Lessons from the Sudan**

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*One of the main obstacles to nation-building in Africa has been internal conflict, which threatens national unity and frustrates economic and social development. This paper argues that culture is central to conflict and therefore must be central to conflict resolution and development. Culture in these respects can be approached from two interconnected perspectives: the cultural identifications of the parties, which usually involve ethnic competition for power and resources, and the institutional structures, techniques, and mechanisms for conflict resolution and development. The paper substantiates the linkages among these processes by analyzing the cultural dimension of the conflicts that took place in the Jonglei and Abeyi development projects in the Sudan between the Arabized-Islamicized North and the Dinka ethnic groups in the South. This 40-year-old conflict of cultural identities is a contest for the definition of the national identity between the Arab-Islamic model and Western-oriented secular model. Because the identity issues the political and economic factors—had not been adequately addressed before the two projects began, the indigenous people rejected the proposed development. In addition the projects were perceived as coming from outside. With their own culture fundamentally undermined, the people felt incapacitated and dug themselves deeper into dependency. The urgent need is to develop a formula that can politically, economically, socially, and culturally use the values and institutions of traditional societies to make them partners with modern science and technology. Africa has cornered itself into rejecting ethnicity as an organizing concept for nation-building. The challenge is to reverse this mindset so that ethnicities, which are African realities, are seen as the building blocks for indigenous, sustainable political and socioeconomic development.*

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One of the main obstacles to nation-building in Africa in general and the Sudan in particular has been internal conflict, which not only threatens national unity but also frustrates and retards economic and social development. Culture as a factor in conflict resolution and development can be approached from two closely interconnected perspectives. One relates to the identities of the parties to internal conflicts, which nearly always involve ethnic competition for power and resources. The other concerns institutional structures, techniques, and mechanisms for conflict resolution and development.

Cultural identification of the parties to a conflict or of a group whose economic and social development is under consideration implies the relevancy of culture to techniques and mechanisms. As "a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national ethnic or other groups and orient their behavior," culture connotes a defined group with a set of value-objectives, organizational structures, patterns of behavior in pursuit of the objectives, with outcomes and effects, all of which constitute a system.<sup>1</sup> In his opening remarks to this conference Edward V.K. Jaycox, Vice President of the World Bank's Africa Region, set a tone for "a holistic approach to development" and offered a broad perspective on culture based on UNESCO's definition that "culture . . . is . . . the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs." In his concluding remarks to this conference Henri Lopes, UNESCO Assistant General Director for Culture, warned against dichotomizing culture and technology and made the point that technology is part of culture. Given this broad definition, it is obvious that culture must occupy a central place in conflict resolution and development.

This paper attempts to substantiate the linkage between culture, conflict resolution, and development, building on the experience of the Sudan. In particular it will analyze the cultural dimension of the North-South conflict and relate the conflict to development projects in two areas, Jonglei and Abyei, both of which were conducted among the Nilotics, specifically Dinka ethnic groups. It is hoped that the insight acquired from these cases might shed light on the broader issues of the relationship of culture to conflict resolution and development. As Kevin Avrach and Peter W. Black recently observed, "the case-study method has particular benefits to each of the three contexts [cross-cultural, intercultural, and transcultural] in which cultural analyses are relevant."<sup>2</sup> To facilitate understanding of the issues in their appropriate context, a brief historical overview of the conflict is presented.

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<sup>1</sup>Guy Olivier Faure and Gunnar Sjostedt, "Culture and Negotiation: Approaches and Issues for Research," in *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes*, ed. Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1993).

<sup>2</sup>"The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change* 16 (1) (January 1991): 22-45, 40.

## Overview of the Conflict

North-South conflict in the Sudan is the culmination of a long process comprising Arabization dating back to the beginning of recorded history and Islamization starting from the seventh century in the North and resistance to assimilation in the South. While the North was undergoing Arabization and Islamization during these periods, mostly through the Egyptian connection, the South remained isolated, protected by natural barriers and the warrior Nilotic tribes, primarily Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk. From earliest recorded history and especially during the nineteenth century, however, this isolation was penetrated by the violent incursions of invaders from the North hunting for slaves, ivory, and gold.

Penetration from the North peaked during the middle of the nineteenth century, when a semblance of administrative control by the Turko-Egyptian rule of 1821 to 1885 enabled slave hunters and traders to recruit and deploy local armies for that purpose. Turko-Egyptian administrations' attempts to stop the slave trade only made it more organized and adventurous. It also won Mohamed Ahmed, the self-declared *Mahdi* (Redeemer), the support of the slavers for his revolution that ousted the Turko-Egyptian rule in 1885.

The British, who, with Egypt, reconquered the Sudan in 1898, administered the two parts of the country as separate and unequal entities. The North received more economic, social, and cultural development along Arab Islamic lines and was the first to become politically conscious and to spearhead the nationalist movement in collaboration with Egypt. For most of the Anglo-Egyptian rule the South was "closed" to outside influences and preserved in its traditional setting, modified only by the activities of the Christian missionaries, whose task it was to introduce Christianity and the rudiments of Western civilization, reflected in basic education and medical services. Whether the country would eventually be united or partitioned, with the South becoming a part of Uganda or Kenya, or an independent state, was left unresolved until the dawn of independence.

Only nine years before independence, specifically in 1947, under pressure from the North and Egypt the British abruptly decided to reverse their separatist policy and to evolve the country toward independence as a unitary state. From that time relations between the North and the South were set on a turbulent course. In August 1955, only four months before independence, violence erupted and spread rapidly as a result of the widely shared fear that independence was going to mean a change of masters from the British to the Arabs and could entail the return of the slave trade. The mutineers eventually were persuaded to lay down their arms by the outgoing British governor general, who promised justice. When the Northern parties also pledged to give serious consideration to the

Southern call for a federal system of government, the country united behind the declaration of independence on January 1, 1956.

It soon became evident, however, that the North was not intent on honoring the pledge for a federal constitution, but, quite the contrary, sought to impose Arabization and Islamization on the South in an attempt to achieve national unity through uniformity. There was even a serious call for the adoption of an Islamic constitution.<sup>3</sup> In response hostilities were reactivated under the leadership of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), better known as Anya-Nya, the name of its military wing, whose objective was the secession of the South and the establishment of an independent state.<sup>4</sup> In 1972, however, the movement agreed with the military government of Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri on a compromise solution, the Addis Ababa Agreement, that granted the South regional autonomy.<sup>5</sup> The agreement was negotiated on the government side by an official delegation, nearly all of whom were from the North but led by a Southern Sudanese Minister of State for Southern Affairs, the highly respected Abel Alier.

It was Nimeiri's unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement by dividing the south into three regions with reduced constitutional powers, and then, in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Ikhwan*, imposing the so-called September (Islamic) Laws that led to the resumption of hostilities in 1983 by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), whose declared objective is the creation of a new Sudan, united and free of racial, religious, cultural, or gender discrimination.

Two years after hostilities resumed, in 1985, Nimeiri was overthrown by a popular uprising. A transitional government coaxed the country back to parliamentary democracy within a year, but military rule returned on June 30,

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<sup>3</sup>Hasan Mudathir, the grand *gadi* [Judge] of the Muslim division of the legal system, submitted a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly recommending an Islamic constitution. See Francis Mading Deng, *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973), 22.

<sup>4</sup>Much has been written on the history of the conflict, but perhaps the most analytical and comprehensive work from a Southern perspective is Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981). Other standard references include Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1968), and Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974).

<sup>5</sup>For a detailed account of the Addis Ababa Agreement see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973).

1989, in a coup led by previously unknown middle-ranking officers proclaiming a "Revolution of National Salvation," which became even more rigorous in imposing *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and the Islamic agenda in close cooperation with the Muslim Brothers, politically reorganized into the National Islamic Front (NIF). As a result, the SPLM/SPLA and all the other political parties have now organized themselves into the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), whose objective is the overthrow of the fundamentalist regime, the restoration of pluralistic democracy, and the abolition of Nimeiri's "September Laws" although the thorny issue of the relationship between religion and the state remains unresolved and has been ambiguously deferred for the postulated Constitutional Conference.

### **The Cultural Factor in Conflict**

A pressing dilemma of nation-building in Africa is how to resolve the tension between, on the one hand, preserving and building on ethnic identities that have evolved over hundreds and thousands of years and provide the cultural resources needed for political, economic, and social development, and, on the other hand, transcending the cleavages of ethnic identification that tend to impede the realization of national unity and integration. The issue is particularly acute in the Sudan, where a crisis of national identity is at the core of the civil war that has raged intermittently for over three decades.

### ***Crisis of National Identity***

In its study of political development, the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics identified four forms of national identity crises: the relationship of geographical space and nationalist sentiments; cleavages in the social structure or class divisions that preclude effective national unity; conflict between ethnic or subnational identifications and commitments to a collective national identity; and psychological consequences of rapid social change and ambivalent feelings toward outsiders.<sup>6</sup>

By any of these criteria the Sudan is a country with an obvious crisis of identity. With a vast territory of nearly one million square miles, a relatively small population of just over twenty million inhabitants distributed into nearly 600 tribes with some 400 languages and dialects and a variety of religious

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<sup>6</sup>Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, and others, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). See also Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 63.

traditions that include Islam, indigenous beliefs, and Christianity in that order of descending proportions, the country is more an international entity and an elite conception than it is reflective of communal sentiments. As a long-time observer of the Sudan put it, Sudan "is one of the world's most heterogeneous societies."<sup>7</sup> In the words of another observer, "The Sudan is a classic example of a divided nation. It is divided by religion, by ethnic kinship, by region, by history. . . . [T]hough ruled for a century by a single power as a single country, its two main societies were deliberately encouraged to grow apart the North developing its largely Islamic traditions and Arab culture; the South emerging as a Christian-based, English-speaking region."<sup>8</sup>

Sudan's racial, ethnic, and cultural cleavages are more complex than this dualistic picture portrays, even though it is a useful starting point. Northerners who define themselves as Arab are in effect the result of mixing between Arab and African elements and the populations of certain areas in the North, notably the Fur of Darfur in the West and the Nuba of Southern Kordofan; the Beja in the East, although Muslims, are conspicuously non-Arab. Arabism is thus a loosely defined, fluid, and flexible concept, which is precisely why it is being postulated as a model for national assimilation or integration, the idea being to foster unity through uniformity. But because of the dominance of the Arab-Islamic North and its assimilationist orientation, Southern identity has largely been one of resistance to Northern domination and threat of assimilation, especially with the injection of Christianity, and elements of Western culture as features of a contrasting "modern" identity. With the SPLM/SPLA demanding the creation of a new democratic and secular Sudan, Southern identity of resistance is becoming more self-assertive in the contest for the national identity.

Although both sides claim to be accommodating in their postulated models of national identity, the contest is conceptualized in terms that are mutually exclusive or discriminatory, the sharp dichotomy being between Arabism and Africanism, and Islamic theocracy and secularism. Ultimately, the issues involved touch on the definition of identity, the application of that definition to the conceptualization of national identity, the dilemmas generated by the African-Arab dualism of the Sudan, and the conflictual competition for national identity between the forces of Arabism and Africanism in the North-South context.

Among the indicators of ethnic identity usually identified in anthropological literature are that the group is largely biologically self-perpetuating; shares

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<sup>7</sup>Peter Bechtold, "More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics This Time," *The Middle East Journal*, 44 (4) (Autumn 1990): 579.

<sup>8</sup>Colin Legum, Introduction to Beshir Mohamed Said, *The Sudan: Crossroads to Africa* (London: BodleyHead, 1965), 34.

fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms; makes up a field of communication and interaction; and has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.<sup>9</sup>

This definition according to Frederick Barth, supports "the traditional proposition that a race = a culture = a language and that a society = a unit that rejects or discriminates against others. Yet, in its modified form it is close enough to many empirical ethnographic situations, at least as they appear and have been reported, so that this meaning continues to serve the purposes of most anthropologists."<sup>10</sup>

While these criteria are accepted as objective indicators, the general tendency is to recognize self-identification with a particular group as the crucial determinant of identity. As Crawford Young put it, "in the final analysis, identity is a subjective, individual phenomenon; it is shaped through a constantly recurrent question to ego, 'Who am I?' with its corollary, 'Who is he?' Generalized to the collectivity, these become 'Who are we?' and 'Who are they?'"<sup>11</sup> Young qualifies the element of subjectivity by noting that "subjective identity itself is affected by the labels applied by others."<sup>12</sup> These labels may become internalized and accepted as part of the subjective sense of self. But as Young himself implies, there is more to the objective factors than their impact on subjectivity:

Cultural properties of the individual do constrain the possible range of choice of social identities. Physical appearance is the most indelible attribute; where skin pigmentation serves to segment communities, only a handful of persons at the color margins may be permitted any choice of identity on racial lines. . . . Language is important in delimiting cultural fields, but not necessarily permanent. . . . Religion is a relatively durable identity, which encloses its members within a framework of constantly renewed ritual affirmation of affiliation which is not easily shed, particularly in the case of the universal religions.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Frederick Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Differences* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1969), 10-11.

<sup>10</sup>Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 10-11.

<sup>11</sup>Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 20.

<sup>12</sup>Young, *Cultural Pluralism*, 43.

<sup>13</sup>Young, *Cultural Pluralism*, 43-44.

Race, the "stepchild of prejudice," is "based above all on conspicuous physical differentiation . . . which facilitates the stereotyping process."<sup>14</sup>

Writing on the Sudan, Nelson Kasfir notes that ethnicity "encompasses all forms of identity that have at their root the notion of a common ancestor-race as well as tribe."<sup>15</sup> Although he recognizes that individuals usually have multiple identities from which to choose, he qualifies that the choice "depends on the particular situation, not merely on the individual's preference." But he concludes that "though objective ethnic characteristics (race, language, culture, place of birth) usually provide the possible limits, subjective perception of either the identities or the identified whether objectively accurate or not may turn out to be decisive for the social situation."<sup>16</sup>

The racial anomalies of Northern identity, the identity crisis implicit in the pluralism of the nation-state, and the racial overtones of the Sudanese Arab attitude toward the more negroid South, all combine to make the cultural concept of Arabism particularly appealing to Northern Sudanese politicians, intellectuals, and scholars alike. In his statement to the 1965 Round Table Conference on the problem of the South, then-Prime Minister Sirr El Khatim El Khalifa observed:

Gentlemen, Arabism, which is a basic attribute of the majority of the population of this country and of many African countries besides, is not a racial concept which unites the members of a certain racial group. It is a linguistic, cultural and non-racial link that binds together numerous races, black, white and brown. Had Arabism been anything else but this, most modern Arabs, whether African or Asian, including the entire population of the Northern Sudan, would cease to be "Arab" at all.<sup>17</sup>

This politically motivated perspective, however, tends to conceal the sentiments of genetic heritage implied in the Northern Sudanese overemphasis on the importance of Arab genealogies, traced back to Arabia.<sup>18</sup> It could indeed be argued that the more doubtful the Arab identity in those who claim it, the more the need to assert it with emphasis. The point was graphically made by

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<sup>14</sup>Young, *Cultural Pluralism*, 49.

<sup>15</sup>"Peacemaking and Social Cleavages in Sudan," in Joseph V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Mass., and Toronto: Lexington Books and D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 340, 365-66.

<sup>16</sup>"Peacemaking and Social Cleavages," in Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking*, 340, 365-66.

<sup>17</sup>See text in Appendix in Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*.

<sup>18</sup>See, for instance, Lilian Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899-1961* (London and Khartoum: Ithaca Press and Khartoum University Press, 1981), 8.

Abdel Rahman El Beshir, former Commissioner of Refugees in an interview with the author:

Islam is a factor or a label that is always attached to Arabism. And the Arabic language of course. . . . Then you must belong to something [a known genealogy].<sup>19</sup> You must belong, say to the Abbasids [which means] that your great, great, great grandfather [original ancestor] is Al-Abbas, the Uncle of the Prophet, so that you are distinguished. Some of the Sudanese think of themselves as Ashraf [descendants of the Prophet's closest friends and associates]. This might be forced, but it gives them satisfaction. These are the things that are in the mind of the people: that you speak Arabic, the good language of the Koran, and you are from the Arab world which is the best nation God has created. Rightly or wrongly, this is the way people think. They find pride in this and in their origin, *asl*. The world *asl* is very important in the Sudan. If you want to marry, you should look for the *asl*. People think that way: How *pure* is this man? Is he contaminated or not? I am just explaining the way people think.<sup>20</sup>

Relating the notion of *asl* to color, Abdel Rahman El Beshir, a man of very dark complexion, noted: "Black is depicted in [Arabic] literature as something not good. That is why people say not black but brown and not black but green. Green in the Sudan means that their *asl* (origin) is not negroid." Indeed, Northern Sudanese meticulously avoid using "black" in describing the color of skin. G.D. Lampen wrote about the Baggara Arabs what basically applies to the North:

The Baggara tribes . . . are largely intermingled with black blood, due to their proximity to the black tribes of the Bahr el Ghazal. One sees a small proportion of light brown skins, but most of them are very dark. They are not insensitive to the possession of negro color and features, and accordingly they pitch the scale of colors low. No freeman is black (*aswad*); the darkest is *azrag* [literally blue]; a very dark brown is *akhdar* [literally green] or *ahmar* [literally red], while *asfar* [literally yellow] and *abiad* [white] are applied to persons whose color is still to our mind dark rather than light. It is noteworthy that the

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<sup>19</sup>This obviously implies that if you do not belong to "something," by which is meant a "known genealogy," you are "nothing."

<sup>20</sup>Interviewed by the author in The Hague, The Netherlands, 1990.

Arabs seem to recognize no shades of color outside this scale from dark to light.<sup>21</sup>

Ali Mazrui noted:

Disputes as to whether such-and-such a family is really Arab by descent or not, and evaluations of family prestige partly in terms of lighter shades of color, have all remained an important part of the texture of Sudanese life in the Arabized North and prejudices based on color have by no means disappeared.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the discrepancy between self-perception and discernible characteristics, not only do Northerners generally have no qualms about their Arabness, but Southerners, too, see no distinction between the subjective sentiments of Arabism and the objective indicators of racial identification among the Northerners. This was most emphatically stated by Dunstan Wai in a recent paper:

The vast majority of the Northern Sudanese . . . believe they are Arabs, they behave like Arabs, and they identify themselves with the Arab World. Therefore, they must be considered as Arabs. . . . Visible signs of ethnic differentiation are irrelevant. What matters most is the ability to claim and corroborate Arab ancestry. The vital criterion of identification is socio-cultural aspects of ethnicity, language, religion, and institutional practices. The so-called synthesis of Arabism and Africanism among the Northern Sudanese is a myth.<sup>23</sup>

In a taped interview Ambrose Riny Thiik, a former judge of the Sudanese Court of Appeal, saw the differences between the North and the South in racial terms, defined subjectively, even if unsupported by factual evidence. As he put it:

The problem is in the mind, is it not? Physically, there are no great differences. Yes, you will find very dark Arabs. But it is not a question of skin pigmentation or appearance. It is a question of what they are hung up with: In their mentality, they

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<sup>21</sup>G.D. Lampen, "The Baggara Tribes of Darfur," *Sudan Notes and Records* 16 (2) (1933): 97-118.

<sup>22</sup>Ali Mazrui, "Black Arabs and Comparative Perspective," in *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, ed. Dunstan M. Wai (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 47-81, 69.

<sup>23</sup>Dunstan M. Wai, "The State and Governance in the Sudan: A Cost Benefit Analysis," Notes for Discussion on *The Sudan* (Adare Manor, The Republic of Ireland, September 4-8, 1991), 3-4. Wai makes the same argument in *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan*, 19-20, 23, 119.

are Arabs; in their mentality, they are superior; in their mind, you the Black, the African, is *abd* [slave] and it remains to be so no matter what achievement you have accomplished. The feeling among the Blacks that this is unacceptable is expressing itself in terms of warfare and the rest of it.

There are, however, Northern Sudanese who are probing into this area in search of the common ground. The poet, Salah Ahmed Ibrahim, has a message to his fellow Sudanese in a poem addressed to a fictitious Southerner by the name of Malwal, dramatizing the Arab-African mixing that the North underwent through historical assimilation and that he sees as constituting a bond with the non-Arab South:

Malwal, before you deny me  
 Listen to my story of the South and the North  
 The story of enmity and brotherhood from ancient times  
 The Arab, the carrier of the whip, the driver of the camels. . .  
 Descended on the valleys of the Sudan like Summer rains  
 With the book and the ways of the Prophet. . .  
 Carrying his ambitions and his plates  
 And two dates and his ancestral tree. . .  
 A reality blossomed in the womb of every slave mother of a free man  
 The progeny of the seeds of your Arab ancestors . . .  
 He lies who says in the Sudan  
 That I am pure  
 That my ancestry is not tinted  
 He is truly a liar. . . .<sup>24</sup>

Salah's reference to "your Arab ancestors" when addressing the Southerner, Malwal, is, of course, misplaced since that genetic relationship is not recognized by the Southerners, even though in fact the South, too, has assimilated Arabs into its African mold. Indeed it is clear that in the perceptions of the Sudanese the divisive identity factors have to be subjectively racial and objectively cultural, both of which are rooted in culture as a conditioning factor. The tenuousness of Northern claims to Arabism in itself underscores the role of culture in cultivating self-perceptions so that even biological or racial claims are ultimately culture-bound. Culture becomes an over-arching social engineer that molds perspectives on identity, even on racial bases.

But even if the racial sentiments about Arabism and the prejudices associated with them are only subjective and not supported by objective factors, they have to be acknowledged in order to be invalidated as baseless. If the

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<sup>24</sup>Quoted in Deng, *Dynamics of Identification*, 69-70.

Northerners were isolated, their own self-perceptions, however racially based and baseless, might not be a matter of concern, but as their subjective view of themselves is projected to the nation as the model of national identity, it cannot be considered "a private" or an exclusive affair for them. The implications become a matter of public policy and the root-causes of the national identity crisis.

The crisis of identity in the Sudan is reflected at two levels. One is local to the North and entails the credibility gap between Arab self-perception and discernible characteristics, the result of the Afro-Arab integration. The other is the Northerners' attempt to impose their self-perception on the South. Because of this latter dimension and considering the overall value of national unity, it would be in the collective national interest for the North to bridge the credibility gap through redefinition of its self-perception to reflect the realities of the country at both the Northern and the national levels. This in essence is the challenge that all efforts at conflict resolution have evaded.

Rather than redefine the national identity to be more pluralistically and equitably representative, Northern elites try to resolve the crisis through assimilation; and the more they become aware of their own racial anomalies and the potential threat to their unjustified Arab self-perception, the greater their need to create uniformity. Some even go as far as preferring separation to preserve the integrity of the Arab-Islamic self-perceptions.<sup>25</sup>

The crisis is rendered even more acute when viewed in the context of an Islamic state. Professor Abdullahi An-Na'im opened an article with a quotation from the records of the debates of the National Committee for the permanent Constitution of the Sudan in 1968.<sup>26</sup> Reverend Phillip Abbas Ghaboush, the Christian leader from the Nuba Mountains, and Dr. Hasan Abdallah al-Turabi,

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<sup>25</sup>Abdel Wahab El-Affendi reports that the issue of separation was seriously considered by the Ikhwan, Deng, *Dynamics of Identification*, 149. He himself has advocated such a solution. See Deng, *Dynamics of Identification*, 76. See also his article, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa," *African Affairs* (The Journal of the Royal Africa Society) 89 (356) (July 1990): 388-89, in which he writes: "It is thus unlikely in the given circumstances, that the conflicting demands of the two major camps could eventually be satisfied within one state. . . . A multi-state solution may be the only way to measure what is left of that once much loved oasis, and could be the only substitute to an illusory 'united country,' like the costly fiction of Lebanon and Cyprus." When the present regime took over, its leader, Omer Ahmed Beshir, was reported to have declared its willingness to grant the separation, if that were the wish of the Southerners.

<sup>26</sup>"The Elusive Islamic Constitution: The Sudanese Experience," *Orient* 267 (3) (September 1985): 329-40, 329.

then-Secretary General of the Muslim Brothers, and now leader of NIF, had this exchange: A member, Musa Mubarak, posed a question: "The memorandum of the Technical Committee stated about the Islamic Constitution, that the head of state should be a Muslim. I would like to ask if non-Muslims can participate in the election of the President?" Hasan al-Turabi responded: "Nothing will hinder the non-Muslims from participating in the election of a Muslim President since the state considers both Muslims and non-Muslims as citizens. Concerning this jurisprudential issue (*mas'ala ijthadiya*) where there is no appropriate Qur'anic text, the entire issue should be left to the citizens in general because it depends on public interest. Nothing will prevent non-Muslims from participating in the election of Muslim President or to participate in Parliament to enact laws which are not provided for in Islamic *Shari'a*."

Reverend Phillip Abbas Ghaboush then intervened: "I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, can a non-Muslim be elected equally to be the head of a Muslim state?" Turabi was evasive: "The answer is clear, there are other terms of qualification, like age, criminal record, nationality and other legal conditions." The Chairman asked Reverend Phillip Abbas to repeat his question. "My question, Mr. Chairman, is the same one asked by my colleague, only the other way round. Is it possible for a man to be chosen as President in such a state if he is a non-Muslim?" Turabi was eventually forced to say, "No, Mr. Chairman."<sup>27</sup>

An-Na'im proceeds to elaborate on the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state according to traditional Islamic jurisprudence, which he contrasts with the more liberal approach of the school of Mahamoud Mohamed Taha, executed in 1985 by the Nimeiri regime for his opposition to its September Islamic Laws:

[S]cripturaries, such as Jews and Christians, for example, were allowed to live within the Muslim state only under the status of *dhimmis*, second class citizens laboring under a variety of civil and political limitations. Non-scripturaries, moreover, were not even allowed to live within the Muslim state. Unless covered by *'aman*, temporary safe conduct, non-scripturaries were required to be killed on sight. Even the only full citizen of the traditional Islamic state, the male Muslim, did not enjoy full freedom of religion as *ridda*, apostasy, was a capital offense.<sup>28</sup>

Elsewhere, Professor An Na'im categorically asserts: "Common perceptions of *Shari'a*, accepted by all factions of the political leadership of northern

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<sup>27</sup>"The Elusive Islamic Constitution," 329.

<sup>28</sup>"The Elusive Islamic Constitution," 336.

Sudan, in fact violate the fundamental rights of non-Muslims and individuals in general."<sup>29</sup>

It is, of course, unlikely that the traditionalist doctrine would be applied literally to the pluralistic conditions of the modern Sudanese state, and both the NIF and the present regime have rhetorically embraced the equality of citizenship. The Sudan Charter, which is NIF's conceptual framework for the constitution and which provided the basis for the federal framework adopted by the National Dialogue on Peace Issues organized by the regime several months after coming to power, provides for nondiscrimination on religious grounds.<sup>30</sup> But a cursory look at the Charter betrays the document as a clever ploy, offering equality with one hand and taking it away with the other. As Abdel Wahab El-Affendi so aptly observed:

The Sudan charter was . . . meant to impress non-Muslims inside and outside the country, and that is precisely where it appears to have failed. Its problem is that it abounds in contradictions that negate any concessions made in it. For example, it advocates the 'right to express one's religiousness [sic] in all aspects of life,' and opposes the 'exclusion [of religion] from any dimension of life.' At the same time it insists that 'none shall . . . impose domination, or commit aggression among religious individuals or communities.' This immediately raised the question of how could conflicting religious precepts be allowed full expression in all dimensions of life, while maintaining 'justice, equality and peace' as the charter hopes? The answer is obvious: in case of conflict, Islam must prevail.<sup>31</sup>

The proposed framework plans to reverse the previous legal formula in which the civil law, based on the English common law, was the general law, with personal matters, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, legitimacy of children and the administration of *wakfs* (Islamic trusts), left to the personal laws of the religious communities and, in the case of the tribal communities, to their

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<sup>29</sup>See also "Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Sudan," *Third World Legal Studies* (1988): 99-118; "National Unity and the Diversity of Identities," in *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*, ed. Francis Mading Deng and Prosser Gifford (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1987), 76.

<sup>30</sup>For the final report of the Dialogue, see The Steering Committee for National Dialogue on Peace, *Final Report and Recommendations* (September 9-October 21, 1989), the so-called *Red Book*. For the text of the Charter, see Deng and Gifford, *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*.

<sup>31</sup>Abdel Wahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal, 1991), 176-77.

customary laws which, for the Northern tribes, were a blend of custom and *Shari'a*. Under the proposed arrangement, *Shari'a* is stipulated as the law of the federal republic, but the states may exempt themselves "from the application of any legislative provisions of a purely religious character."<sup>32</sup> Otherwise "Personal laws affecting marriage, co-habitation, divorce, affiliation, paternity and inheritance, because of their particularity and impact on the family and its stability, are to be governed by the religion or customs followed by the couple."<sup>33</sup> Obviously, this reversal of the system is not perceived as imposing *Shari'a* on the non-Muslims within the federal framework, for it is stated that "Sudanese are equal in rights and duties before the law" and that "No distinction or discrimination shall be made between citizens because of their religion, ethnic origin or sex."<sup>34</sup>

Abdel Wahab El-Affendi's appraisal of the NIF's Sudan Charter is pertinent to the framework now adopted by the regime:

By all indications, this does not look like a promising solution. The basic contradiction in this position stems from its acceptance of the nation-state as the ultimate framework of its operation, with the attendant incorporation in an international system dominated by non-Muslim powers. If they accept this international system, then Ikhwan would have no option but to adopt secularism as the framework for building a shared political community with their compatriots. . . .

The other alternatives available to Ikhwan are either to develop an Islamic polity that would be sufficiently immune to international pressures (one could think of Iran and Saudi Arabia), or carve up a separate state for Muslims. The latter option would be more in line with original Islamic practice (the Prophet's migration to Medina) and would save Muslims from the dilemma of choosing between dominating others by force or being dominated by them.<sup>35</sup>

Judging from the response not only of the SPLM/SPLA but also of the opposition parties, the proposed framework appears to have been still-born. To be fair to the regime, it has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to negotiate its proposed framework with the SPLM/SPLA. But inherent in the positions of the parties to the conflict, especially with regard to their respective commitments to *Shari'a* and secularism, to which is added the contrasting emphases on Arabism and Africanism, the conflict appears to take on a zero-sum character. Perhaps

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<sup>32</sup>*Final Report*, 47.

<sup>33</sup>*Final Report*, 47.

<sup>34</sup>*Final Report*, 47.

<sup>35</sup>El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 177.

for that same reason, no conflict resolution effort has confronted this identity problem.

Even the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the first phase of the conflict that had lasted for seventeen years, did not adequately resolve the national identity crisis; it merely recognized the dualism of the country by granting the South regional autonomy that was seen by many as a form of separation within unity. The agreement itself was based on the asymmetry of relations between the North and the South. A system of autonomous participation cannot be said to be equitable. Although autonomy was the best solution then, it could not be a final remedy to the Southern grievances. As this author argued at the time, "It is hard to expect that Southern Sudanese will be content with regional participation only and not be concerned with major national and international issues affecting Sudan's identity."<sup>36</sup>

The formula carried the seeds of its own destruction; while the South occupied a corner of the country in relative isolation, it remained entirely dependent on the North, which continued to exercise remote, but effective, control over it. Had the situation continued to evolve peacefully, it was quite likely that the Southern sense of freedom embodied in the autonomy, dependence on the central government, and harmonious interaction with the center would have gradually led to the assimilation of the South by the North or to cross-cultural integration. But the initially remote control of the center, specifically by the President, became increasingly direct. The obvious outcome was that either the autonomy would be eroded and the country reintegrated in its power structures and processes, or the South would eventually react against the developments and violence would again erupt. In fact, both occurred: President Nimeiri gradually eroded the agreement and eventually abrogated it, and the South protested commensurately and eventually rebelled.

### *Conflicting Perspectives on Values*

Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by dividing the South into three regions, correlating them more or less to ethnic groupings, and by imposing *Shari'a* on the whole country. Since then, religion has assumed a central place in the North-South conflict. Religious perspectives and the moral and spiritual principles that they engender are therefore among the factors that both polarize the people and feed a mutual sense of prejudice and animosity.

Arabization and Islamization in the Sudan were predicated on the inherent assumption of the superiority of the Arab Muslims and the inferiority of the

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<sup>36</sup>Deng, *Dynamics of Identification*, 7.

African non-Muslims, especially "the heathens" who were "legitimate" targets of the slave trade. What most Northerners fail to realize even now is that the peoples of the South practice traditional religions with deep-rooted moral and spiritual values. They also fail to realize the degree to which these values have combined with the adoption of Christianity to give the South a strong counterforce against Arabization and Islamization.

The objective of all the major political forces in the North, particularly the Muslim Brothers, the Ikhwan, has been indeed to redeem the heathen folk in the South whom the concept of the modern nation-state has turned into potential "brethren." As one source intimates:

Like the rest of the educated [Northern Sudanese], Ikhwan only saw in the South the alienated, lost brother, who had to be retrieved through the spread of Islam, the Arabic language and better communications. This perception did not reckon with developments in the South, especially the rise of a church-educated elite whose self-perception was not that of oppressed victims of colonialism but of belonging to Western culture, which created them and shaped their perceptions in this very act of 'oppression.' This belonging was not just mythical, but was buttressed by the existence of Western-linked institutions (churches, schools, aid agencies), and economic, cultural, and political links with the West. When this new affiliation expressed itself in terms of demands for a federal status for the South, Ikhwan opposed the calls for federation.<sup>37</sup>

The assumption of a spiritual vacuum among the peoples of the South is, of course, due to utter ignorance of their traditional religious beliefs about which volumes have been written.<sup>38</sup> As is generally the case in traditional African societies, their religions largely aim at the well-being of human beings in a living society rather than at individual survival after death. While they embody a notion of continued physical existence in the underground world of the dead and a spiritual linkage of that world with that of the living and the powers above, their concepts in this respect are rather nebulous and, despite the similarities in other respects, tend to differ from the heaven and hell concepts popularly associated with Christianity and Islam. The focus of their concept of immortality is in this world, through procreation and agnatic lineage continuation, which lead to ancestral veneration. In the words of Godfrey Lienhardt, "Dinka fear to die

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<sup>37</sup>El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 148.

<sup>38</sup>See, for instance, the works of E.E. Evans-Pritchard on the Nuer and the Zande; Godfrey Lienhardt on the Dinka; Jean Buxton on the Mandari; and Charles G. and Brenda Z. Seligman on the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk.

without male issue, in whom the survival of their names the only kind of immortality they know will be assured."<sup>39</sup>

An important aspect of Nilotic religion is that God is perceived and approached through a structural relationship that links the living with their dead, particularly the ancestors and the clan spirits or deities. Nilotic religion is therefore structured in a manner reflective of their segmentary lineage system, which is autonomous to the level of the family and ultimately the individual. This allows for maximal religious freedom. In contrast, although Sufism lies somewhere in between, Islam is highly centralized.

Autonomous as Nilotic religions are, communal harmony is among their overriding values. Despite segmentation, this moral value is envisaged as ultimately embracing the whole of humankind and its environment, for, to the Nilotics, humanity is part and parcel of God's unified creation in its multiplicity. Respect for the inherent dignity of God's creatures defined in this all-embracing sense is one of the tenets of Nilotic religion and moral values. Conceiving the South-North problem as rooted in the ethnocentrism of Northerners and their underestimation of the worth of Southerners, Chief Thon Wai remarked, "Even the tree which cannot speak has the nature of a human being . . . to God . . . who created it. Do not despise it; it is a human being."<sup>40</sup> Contrary to popular Muslim perception, "The Dinka, and their kindred the Nuer, are by far the most religious peoples in the Sudan," to quote the Seligmans.<sup>41</sup> And this is translated into astonishingly high ethical standards:

God is held ultimately to reveal the truth and falsehood, and in doing so provide a sanction for justice between men. Cruelty, lying, cheating and all other forms of injustice are hated by God, and . . . in some way, if concealed by men, they will be revealed by him. . . . God is made the final judge of right and wrong, even when men feel sure that they are in the right. God is then the guardian of faith and sometimes signifies to man what really is the case behind or beyond their errors of falsehood.<sup>42</sup>

Chief Thon Wai reflected the Dinka view when he said:

Even if a right is hidden, God will always uncover the right of a person. It doesn't matter how much it might be covered; even if the covering be heaped as high as this house and the right is there, it will appear. It may be covered for ten years, and God

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<sup>39</sup>Godfrey Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 26.

<sup>40</sup>Francis Mading Deng, *Dinka Cosmology* (London: Ithaca Press, 1980), 171-72.

<sup>41</sup>Charles G. Seligman, *The Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1932), 178.

<sup>42</sup>Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience*, 46-47.

will uncover it for ten years, until it reappears. . . . If a man is not given his right, God never loses sight of the right.<sup>43</sup>

Major Titherington, for instance, wrote of:

. . . the higher morai sense which is so striking in the [Dinka]. Deliberate murder as distinct from killing in fair fight is extremely rare; pure theft as opposed to the lifting of cattle by force or stealth after a dispute about their rightful ownership is unknown; a man's word is his bond, and on rare occasions when a man is asked to swear, his oath is accepted as a matter of course.<sup>44</sup>

No one who comes in contact with Nilotic conduct in public gatherings or conflict resolution sessions can fail to be impressed by their high civil standards. Godfrey Lienhardt highlights this in his description of the Nilotic procedure of settling disputes:

One of the most decisive marks of a society we should call in a spiritual sense "civilized" is a highly-developed sense and practice of justice, and here the Nilotics, with their intense respect for the personal independence and dignity of themselves and others, may be superior to societies more civilized in the material sense. . . . The Dinka and the Nuer are a warlike people; and have never been slow to assert their rights as they see them by physical force. Yet, if one sees Dinka trying to resolve a dispute, according to their own customary law, there is often a reasonableness and a gentleness in their demeanor, a courtesy and a quietness in the speech of those elder men superior in status and wisdom, an attempt to get at the whole truth of the situation before them.<sup>45</sup>

In this context the attributes of the mediator, usually the chief or the leader in a broader sense, are pivotal. As Lienhardt observed, the spiritual leader is seen as "the eldest son" of God who represents men to the divine and mediates the divine to men:

This mediation of Dinka spearmasters and prophets, made possible by a combination analogous to that in the eldest son of the dual roles of son and father, is one of the most important concomitants, for Dinka social structure, of the attribution of transcendent fatherhood to divinity.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Deng, *Dinka Cosmology*, 154-55.

<sup>44</sup>G.W. Titherington, "The Raik Dinka," in *Sudan Notes and Records* 10 (1927): 159.

<sup>45</sup>Godfrey Lienhardt, "The Dinka of the Nile Basin," *The Listener* 69 (1963): 828.

<sup>46</sup>Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience*, 45.

It is in this area of moral and spiritual values that the Nilotics are particularly condescending of the Northern Sudanese, despite the paradoxical fact that as Muslims, Northerners hardly recognize the non-Muslim Southerners as having any spiritual value-system. The history of animosity between the two parts of the country and the series of promises made and broken or never intended in the first place have left the South with a deep disdain of Northern moral standards, and the Nilotes see this as racially and culturally inherent.

And indeed North-South relations have been characterized by promises made and dishonored. The low and high points in the relationship can be directly correlated to agreements and their breach. There are moments when agreements promised a mutually acceptable framework and were accepted and times when the agreements were dishonored and the North attempted to impose its Islamic Arab hegemony on the South, which then fell back to its violent resistance.

At the Juba Conference of 1947 the initial Southern reaction to the question of joining the national Legislative Assembly was for the South to be given time to learn the art and skill of government and observe the attitude of the Northerners before making up its mind on the issue of participation in national institutions or full unity with the North. However, on the second day of the conference a number of Southerners, mostly civil servants, reversed their position in favor of immediate participation in the National Assembly. They had been given "some sort of assurance or something like that" according to one Northern participant, the result of "a complete day's work," in which they "tried to pull together the different arguments and to give assurances to those who were doubtful about the future. We made the situation clear to them. And early in the morning we agreed that we should not talk in the meeting that day and that we should just announce that we had reached agreement and that was all."<sup>47</sup> But, as Mansour Khalid has observed, "successful as their manipulations were, [they] seemingly failed to perceive southern fears in their real perspective. . . . The North may have won a battle at Juba but certainly not the war."<sup>48</sup>

Another example relates to the declaration of independence itself. When in December 1955 Southern representatives proposed federation in the Legislative Assembly as a condition for their supporting the independence motion, Northern politicians once again manipulated their vote with a promise that was, in retrospect, never intended to be kept, as indicated by Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, one of the principal architects of independence, when he wrote that they

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<sup>47</sup>Sorrow Romley, quoted in Francis Mading Deng and M.W. Daly, *Bonds of Silk: The Human Factor in British Administration of the Sudan* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1989), 140-41.

<sup>48</sup>Khalid, *The Government They Deserve*, 94-95.

"encountered some difficulty in convincing the southerners" and therefore "inserted a special resolution to please them" by "pledging that the Constituent Assembly would give full consideration to the claims of Southern Sudanese members of Parliament for a federal government for the three Southern provinces."<sup>49</sup> A Northern Sudanese scholar and statesman has commented, "Sudan's declaration of independence, in the words of one of its authors, was thus a take-in: a fraudulent document obtained through false pretenses and subterfuge; that does no honour to the Northern political establishment."<sup>50</sup>

Yet another illustration is Nimeiri's agreement with the South, which he did not initially intend to keep and indeed eventually abrogated. Nimeiri unwittingly revealed his designs when he said to a technical committee that was considering the application of regionalism to the North that he could not understand the fear about separation resulting from the envisaged regionalism. He said, invoking the name of God to tell the truth, that when the leaders of the May 1969 Revolution had embraced the Addis Ababa Agreement, their secret plan had been to have the Southern rebels surrender their arms and, within two or three years, tear up the agreement when there would be no military threat from the South. He argued that, to their surprise, regionalism had worked so well that they now wanted to apply it to the whole country. The fear that such an arrangement might lead to fragmentation and possible disintegration of the country was therefore unjustified, he said.

When the threat from the sectarian political parties and the Muslim fundamentalists proved sufficiently serious, Nimeiri decided to reverse his Southern policy in the belief that the Northern opposition groups were more dangerous than the South and that the Southern potential to rebel had been effectively and decisively neutralized. Needless to say, he was wrong.

The implications of the cultural dimension and the implicit value-systems on the behavior patterns of individuals in conflict resolution will be pursued later with reference to President Nimeiri's and Abel Alier's roles as representative of Northern and Southern perspectives. As a general comment, however, it can be argued that if, as experience seems to show, negotiation for the South is a search for justice by identifying the truth with the help of mediators, reaching an equitable agreement on the basis of that truth, and holding to it, but for the North it is an amoral game of wits in which one aims at carrying the day in a tactical maneuver that alters with the changing climate, then the fundamental obstacle is lack of a common moral ground for conflict resolution. This indeed is a major crisis in North-South relations. The essence of it goes back to the degree to

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<sup>49</sup>Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, *Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Politics* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 57.

<sup>50</sup>Khalid, *The Government They Deserve*, 231.

which representatives of the conflicting identities recognize and respect each other as equals. Tragically, this has not been the case in North-South relations.

### **The Cultural Factor in Development**

As noted earlier, there are at least two ways in which culture is relevant to development. One is the determining role of culture in shaping the identities of individuals and groups with all the characteristics of values, institutions, patterns of behavior, and the resulting outcomes and effects; the other, also encompassed in the first, are the specific techniques and mechanisms employed in the development process. Since the structural framework of conflict is an overarching constraint to development and since conflict is equally influenced, if not generated, by the culturally determined identities of the parties, there is a circular connection linking culture with conflict, conflict resolution, and development. This linkage was sharply demonstrated in the Jonglei Canal and Abyei development projects, which were undertaken in the mid-1970s following the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first phase of the civil war in 1972.

### ***The Jonglei Canal Project***

The Jonglei Canal project aims at digging a canal from the tiny village of Jonglei on the Bahr al-Zeraf River to the confluence of the White Nile and the Sobat, a distance of 260 kilometers within the Southern Sudan. The canal is supposed to retrieve the water that flows into the sponge-like Sudd region, a 100,000 square kilometers of swampy land, where the water stagnates and dissipates through transpiration and evaporation. The retrieved water is to be channeled to Egypt and the Northern Sudan, where agricultural needs for water are escalating with population growth.

Although plans for the project began shortly after the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest in 1898 and evolved over the decades, implementation was frustrated by the 17-Year War (1955 to 1972) and was resumed only after the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. But its execution was again halted by the resumption of hostilities in 1983. The project is now fully embroiled in the conflict, and any prospects for its resumption in the future must be seen within the framework of an overall settlement to the conflict.

What needs to be underscored in the context of the Jonglei Canal project negotiations is that despite the truce in the North-South conflict resulting from the Addis Ababa Agreement, that agreement had not resolved the national identity crisis. The agreement only gave the South a nebulous "independence" or "separatism" within unity, with strings of dependency and the central government's ever-less-remote controls attached. The government's resumption

of the Jonglei Canal project with hardly any consultation with the South meant that the autonomy, much less the assumed "independence" or "separation" within unity, was in jeopardy. The popular reaction of the South against the project could therefore be understood as a defense of the regional autonomy that had just been won under the Addis Ababa Agreement. The remotely controlling hand of the North was conspicuously emerging.

News of the agreement between the Sudan and Egypt to resume the Jonglei Canal project was brought to the attention of the regional government by two central government ministers early in 1974. Abel Alier recalls that Yahya Abdel Magid, Minister of Irrigation, and Wadie Habashie, Minister of Agriculture, flew to Juba and informed him that it had become necessary to execute the Jonglei Canal Project. They gave several reasons for that decision. One was the expansion of agricultural development and the obligation of the Sudan to provide bread for the Arab world. Egypt also needed additional water sources for needed agricultural expansion and power output. "The Jonglei Canal Project was the answer. They then unfolded opportunities which the project would provide for the people of the area."<sup>51</sup>

Given the fact that the country had fought a civil war for seventeen years, the gist of which was a struggle by the people of the South to be recognized as a distinct cultural entity that should exercise effective control over its own affairs and resources, and considering that it had been barely two years since the war had ended so that deep-rooted suspicions still lingered, to decide on such an important project, which was to be fully within the regional borders, without prior consultation with the regional government except as a matter of information, was to risk provocation. Alier uses the word "consultation," but this was evidently after the fact. As one source observed, "Discussions on the canal project started in the early 1970s between the Sudan Government and the Egyptian Government and in 1974 the two Governments agreed to jointly finance the operations."<sup>52</sup> It is, however, apparent from Alier's account that the regional government had not been in the picture and was being briefed for the first time.

The Jonglei Canal Project was never formally negotiated between the central government the North and the regional government the South. What transpired was a spontaneous reaction in the South, triggered by the collective memory of the history of relations between the North and the South, a deep-rooted animosity, and a chronic suspicion justified by experience. Because the

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<sup>51</sup>Abel Alier, *The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured* (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), 197.

<sup>52</sup>Lazarus Leek Mawut, *The Southern Sudan: Why Back to Arms?* (Khartoum: St. George Printing Press, 1986), 69.

political environment in the North and, in particular, the attitude of the president in the wake of the Addis Ababa Agreement was favorable, Southern reaction was met with an understanding and responsive hearing at the center. But the process was by no means harmonious as Southerners felt that the autonomy they had just won by blood was being undermined and about to be repudiated by a joint Northern-Egyptian onslaught on the Nile.

Nonconfrontational, mild-mannered, and predisposed to cooperation with the central government, Alier geared the reaction of his cabinet toward acceptance of the project with low-keyed suggestions for revisions favorable to the people of the South and sensitive to the environment. A special meeting of the High Executive Council was convened for an exchange of views with the central government ministers. Among the issues of particular interest to the South that were discussed were those relating to opportunities for socioeconomic development that might accrue from the project. An all-weather road was to be constructed along the canal to link Malakal and Juba, reducing the normal steamer time by half. The distance from Kosti to Juba by steamer would be reduced by 300 kilometers. In addition the whole area would be linked by year-round river and road transportation systems. Above all, a comprehensive development of the area, which the South could not otherwise afford, would be financed by the central government and Egypt. In Alier's words, "Yahya and Wadie had put a persuasive case of multiple socioeconomic development for not only Egypt and the Northern Sudan, but for the South."<sup>53</sup>

For Alier the project was God-sent: it gave the South an opportunity of a leap beyond the peace accord into development, and it promised the Jonglei Canal area a bright future into modernity. And that was essentially the focus of his Cabinet's discussion with the two ministers from Khartoum. However, as developments would eventually show, it was not so much what the ministers revealed or what Alier and his Cabinet negotiated that would make the critical difference, but the popular reaction to the project and the manner in which Alier pragmatically played on both the central government and the Southern public to bridge the North-South gap. It was a case of identity conflict motivating the authorities to try to pacify the people by providing or rather promising development incentives.

The two ministers from the central government and the regional government agreed to proceed with the project on the understanding that it would be reviewed in the light of the point raised in the discussion. One of the suggestions that came out of the meeting was the establishment of a national body that would review the project from time to time to suggest plans and oversee

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<sup>53</sup>Alier, *The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 198.

development in the project area. Then development of the area was to be undertaken with financing from the central government and Egypt. That was the origin of the National Council for the Development of the Jonglei Canal Area and the Jonglei Executive Organ, which was to be its executive arm, both of which Alier was to dominate.

Again, to highlight the low-key manner in which this highly important project was undertaken by the regional authorities, it was announced in a press release, rather than in a statement by the President of the Republic or of the Region. When the news of the resumption of the Canal project was so casually announced, spontaneous opposition erupted that unravelled the depth of suspicion and animosity that had been lingering, despite the Addis Ababa accord. Massive demonstrations by students began in Juba, in which two schoolchildren were killed by the police, and spread to other towns in the South.

Critics of the project began to see the leadership of the Southern region as more aligned with Khartoum than with the interests of their people, a judgment that unfairly misconstrued Alier's tact as submissiveness. "The slogan was that the land [the South had] fought for was now given up for sale to the Egyptians by those who had now found places in the government."<sup>54</sup>

The demonstrators demanded that the head of the regional government should address them to explain the situation, but Abel Alier refused on the ground that it was "rather awkward for the government to be seen to carry out the orders of the school children."<sup>55</sup>

Collins on the other hand implies that despite the briefing of the central ministers, the regional government was not fully enough informed to be able to deliver a credible explanation, which meant that Alier needed time to gather adequate information to make a convincing statement. In Collins' words, "Abel Alier and his ministers were helpless, having no information about the Jonglei Canal other than gossip with which to refute the allegations which only made the

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<sup>54</sup>Robert Collins, *The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), 319-20 (quoting Hilary Logali). Robert Collins reports some of the graphic details of the rumours "conjuring up visions of the Arab incursions of the past, the attempt to assimilate Southerners after independence, and the imperialism of the present. To add fuel to the fire, environmentalists claimed that the Sudd would become a parched and barren land devoid of fish and wildlife, the livelihood of the Nilotes destroyed. The normal meteorological processes would be destabilized; there would be no evaporation, no clouds, no rain fall in the Sudan or Ethiopia. The Sudd would become a desert for two million Egyptian *fallahin* [peasants] to plough." Collins, *The Waters of the Nile*, 319.

<sup>55</sup>Alier, *The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 200.

latter seem more plausible."<sup>56</sup> Paul Howell and his coeditors corroborate Collins' observation, stating:

The decision to construct the canal was made in 1974, apparently without reference to the people through whose homelands it would pass, which thus sparked off anxiety and unfavorable reaction among Southern Sudanese sensitive to the right to manage their own affairs after 17 years of civil war which had ended only two years before.<sup>57</sup>

Quite apart from his predisposition to cooperate with the central government, Alier was over-optimistically convinced that the Addis Ababa Agreement had changed the relationship and that the Jonglei Canal offered the opportunity for both the North and Egypt to demonstrate their good will by supporting the development of the South. He made his case in an address to the Regional Assembly and the public in defense of the project. As he recalled, the Assembly was well attended, not only by members but also by spectators who were keen to know what the project was all about. "They wanted to know why the regional government would allow Egyptian peasants and army units to come to the South."<sup>58</sup>

The critical question was whether this would be to the benefit or the detriment of the area. In his government's view the balance was substantially beneficial to the area. As the government was committed to a policy of socioeconomic development of the South, it was prepared in its resolve to translate this policy into plans and programs "and it would lead, and if need be, drive people along that path even if they might not be willing to go along."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>Collins, *The Waters of the Nile*, 320.

<sup>57</sup>Paul Howell, Michael Lock, and Stephen Cobb, eds., *The Jonglei Canal: Impact and Opportunity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 48.

<sup>58</sup>Alier, *The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 204.

<sup>59</sup>Alier, *The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 204. Alier's actual words then were even more emphatic than his restatement in his book: "The regional government does not wish and nor will associate itself with politics that tend to maintain and perpetuate the present economic status quo in the Region. . . . We are [not] to remain as a sort of human zoo for anthropologists, tourists, environmentalists and adventurers from developed economies of Europe to study us, our origins, our plights, the size of our skulls and shape and length of our customary scars on our foreheads. . . . If we have to drive our people to paradise with sticks, we will do so for their own good and the good of those who will come after us." Abel Alier, *Statement to the People's Regional Assembly on the Proposed Jonglei Canal* (Khartoum: El-Tamaddon Printing Press, 1974), 20-21. Quoted in Collins, *The Waters of the Nile*, 321-22.

Judging from Alier's own account, the policy statement achieved its objective. Whether Alier had cleared his statement with the president or not, and in all probability he had, the moves of the central government conformed remarkably with his perspective. Nimeiri acted promptly to establish by presidential decree the National Council for the Development Projects of the Jonglei Canal Area under the chairmanship of the Vice President of the Republic and the President of the High Executive Council, Abel Alier, with the membership of the central ministers of irrigation, finance, agriculture, and planning. Included also were members of the regional and national assemblies from the canal area and regional ministers of finance, agriculture, health, education, wildlife conservation, and rural development. The council was provided with an executive arm known as the Jonglei Executive Organ. The commissioner of the executive organ, a Southern Sudanese, was appointed with the status of central government minister of state, authorized to conduct business with central and regional governments and with the Permanent Joint Technical Commission. The council was charged with formulating socioeconomic plans for the Jonglei area and the promotion of studies on the effects of the canal construction on the lives and livelihoods of the local inhabitants.<sup>60</sup>

With the vantage point of Alier's chairmanship of the National Council and the membership of many Southerners holding important elected legislative and executive positions, Southern input into the final formulation and implementation of the canal project was considerably enhanced and with that the interest of the South was better safeguarded.<sup>61</sup> Alier's discreet leadership and input operated to the benefit of the South without being visible to his Southern

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<sup>60</sup>Presidential Order No. 284, October 1974.

<sup>61</sup>In his statement to the regional assembly Alier said that in the past "the interest of the Nilotic population in the project was in the first place to guarantee the continuation of their subsistence economy. The task of the team [The Jonglei Investigation Team] was therefore to find ways and means to reduce or minimize the losses that would be imposed on their subsistence economy in the event of the implementation of the Equatorial Nile Projects. However, the idea of today is to go beyond the subsistence economies to meet the daily demands of life." Alier, *Statement to the People's Regional Assembly on the Proposed Jonglei Canal*, 11. Scholars have also argued that the new Jonglei Canal Project is significantly different from its forerunners. According to Mohamed Osman El-Sammani: "The Equatorial Nile Projects aimed at making water available for irrigation purposes in Egypt, and to some degree Northern Sudan. . . . The Equatorial Nile Projects did not take an interest in developing the inhabitants of the affected area but instead adopted a strategy that aimed at keeping the subsistence economy of the local tribes unaffected as far as possible." *Jonglei Canal: Dynamics of Planned Change in the Twic Area* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1984) 19.

constituency. As one observer has noted, although Jonglei was initially Egyptian in conception, "in the process of implementing the project its shape has been substantially altered by Sudanese opinions directly influenced by Southern politics."<sup>62</sup> The explanation given to the National Council on Jonglei for the belated but significant changes that the Southern Sudanese proposed and pushed through after the 1974 initial agreement to proceed with the project was: "We did not know of these additional benefits in 1974 because we did not have the knowledge to decide otherwise. Now we have the knowledge for a better decision and we should take it."<sup>63</sup>

It is obvious that the role of the South under Alier's leadership was never to challenge the decision to proceed with implementation of the canal project but rather to ameliorate its negative impact on the region and indeed to seize on it as an opportunity for generating development in the region. As Paul Howell and his coeditors of the Jonglei Canal have observed, the purpose of the various studies that were subsequently undertaken "was never to determine whether or not it was appropriate, locally, to proceed with the construction of the canal, for that was a decision that had long since been made. Rather, it was to investigate aspects of the local natural environment and its traditional exploitation, to comment on the likely effects of the canal on these and, in the light of those effects, to make development proposals for the future."<sup>64</sup> On the more fundamental issue of whether or not the project was sound, "the Sudan Government managed to override a strong Southern opposition to the canal digging."<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>M.O. El-Sammani, "The Jonglei Canal: The Evolution of the Project Model," in *North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa Agreement*, ed. Mom K.N. Arou and B. Yongo-Bure (Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1988), 409.

<sup>63</sup>El-Sammani, "The Jonglei Canal: The Evolution of the Project Model," 417.

<sup>64</sup>Howell and others, *The Jonglei Canal: Impact and Opportunity*, 6.

<sup>65</sup>Mawut, *Why Back to Arms?* 46. For some of the optimistic Sudanese evaluations of the project see M.O. El-Sammani, "The Jonglei Canal: The Evolution of the Project Model"; A.I. El-Maghrabi, "The Jonglei Canal," in *The Nile Valley Countries: Continuity and Change*, vol. 2, ed. M.O. Beshir (Khartoum: Pal Advertising and Printing Press, 1984), 31; and M.O. El-Sammani, "Socio-Economic Research and the Approach to Change in the Jonglei Canal Area," in Beshir, *The Nile Valley Countries*, 72. Elsewhere, El-Sammani observes, "It is unfortunate that those who advocate the status quo miss the essence of the Jonglei Canal project. . . . The Government aims at modernizing the Nilotes, through the implementation of the project. Hence the issue at hand is the transformation of the traditional communities to better social and economic horizons, and not the destruction of a traditional life." El-Sammani, *Jonglei Canal: Dynamics of Planned Change*, 50.

What need to be stressed are the dynamics of the interactive perspectives of the various actors and how they influenced the evolution and conceptualization of the project. The culturally rooted North-South conflict provided the setting. The regional government was not only amenable to the central government's desire to see the plan for the project proceed but also found in it an opportunity for generating development in the South. The popular opposition to the project in the South presented both an obstacle and another opportunity for persuading both the North and Egypt to take into greater consideration the interests and concerns of the Southerners. This in turn reinforced the negotiating position of the regional government to demand more for the South from the project.

By the time work commenced, the Southern agenda over the canal had risen considerably with open-ended prospects for further growth. As one Southern critic has stated:

In the propaganda stage of the project, all the good things one could imagine for a happy life were promised; modern model villages in the Canal area well-equipped with the basic human needs: clean drinking water, schools, health facilities, agricultural projects, and recreational centres, facilities that are not even available in the average Sudanese town. For the supporters of the Jonglei Canal, the Sudan has at last found the key to the solution of her major socio-economic problems.

However, all those attractions about the Jonglei Canal failed to win unanimous support for the project in the Southern Sudan.<sup>66</sup>

The people who would be affected by the canal project are the Nilotics—mostly the Dinka, the Nuer, and the Shilluk—who have been reported by anthropologists as conservative and resistant to development and to change in general. Their response to the challenges of modernization has recently demonstrated a surprising ability to adapt to changing conditions. Paul Howell and his co-editors have observed: "It is something of a paradox that these Nilotes are frequently regarded as conservative pastoralists, deeply resistant to change. Such a view is misleading, because Nilotic society is by no means unchanging. The recent history of Nilotic involvement in Sudanese politics, for example, bears testimony to their vigorous participation in both national and regional economic and political issues."<sup>67</sup> Their initial opposition to the Jonglei project was therefore not a resistance to development but a political action against feared domination and the fact that the South—had—been—disregarded in the decision-making. As the people who would be most affected by the canal, they had not

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<sup>66</sup>Mawut, *Why Back to Arms?* 50.

<sup>67</sup>Howell and others, *The Jonglei Canal: Impact and Opportunity*, 248.

contributed to its concept or design.<sup>68</sup> Given the fact that the Southern Sudan is among the least developed areas, not only in the Sudan but indeed in Africa, it is ironic that the Jonglei Canal construction and the Chevron Oil exploration and prospective exploitation, two of the major development projects in the country, were among the first to be targeted and interrupted by the SPLA war operations.

### *Abyei Development Project*

Ensuring the participation of the local population and tapping their resourcefulness was the idea behind the second case study, the Abyei development project, which, like the Jonglei Canal project, proved to be a step-child and victim of conflict and external dependency.

The Abyei development project and the Jonglei Canal project had two characteristics in common: They both added an economic dimension to negotiating the conflict of identities, but they were also constrained by the conflicts that had to be resolved before development could be implemented. They also depended on a technology-oriented approach to development that was basically extrinsic and not adequately integrated into the comprehensive cultural context.

The Abyei project was envisaged as a means of achieving two objectives. One was to implement ideas that had been formulated in a theoretical model aimed at a cultural orientation to development.<sup>69</sup> The other was political, aimed both at inducing the government to endorse the project and at providing an incentive for the Ngok Dinka to remain under the administration of Kordofan

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<sup>68</sup>John Garang, the leader of the SPLM/SPLA, wrote his Ph.D. dissertation in agricultural economics on the Jonglei Canal Project, which he supports with ambivalence, criticizing the development approach adopted in the area as merely one of improvement and protection instead of transportation. Rather than see the development of the Jonglei Project area as compensational, Garang believes that it should be seen in the context of the national development plan to make full developmental use of area resources. Thus seen, it would be part of the national economic objective of making the Sudan the bread basket of the Middle East and a granary for the world. Otherwise, the improvement strategy becomes only a case of ameliorating, managing, and perpetuating poverty. John Garang de Mabior, "Identifying, Selecting and Implementing Rural Development Strategies for Socio-Economic Development on the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1981).

<sup>69</sup>The study in point, a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation at Yale Law School, was *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).

in the North instead of joining their kith and kin in the South for which the Addis Ababa Agreement had stipulated a referendum that the government was not inclined to implement.

The project was therefore an attempt to generate development from within the cultural context utilizing a value-institutional system and to resolve the political aspect of the North-South conflict of identities for which the Abyei area was a microcosm. The project failed to meet both objectives for a variety of reasons. The principal ones were that (1) the expatriate experts who were invited in with foreign financial assistance and charged with the technical implementation of the project were oblivious to the cultural dimension and saw development almost exclusively in terms of appropriate technology; (2) the educated elite in the area suspected the project as a way of "buying" the Ngok Dinka with material rewards and undermining their political movement to join the South; and (3) the neighboring Arab tribes missed the conflict resolution objective of fostering Arab-Dinka unity, saw it as favoring the Dinka over them, and disrupted the project with violence.

The study on which the project was based had been conducted within the framework of the jurisprudential theory of law, science, and policy expounded by Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougall of the Yale Law School. The overriding policy objective of this framework was the promotion of a concept of human dignity, operationally defined in terms of the broadest possible participation in the shaping and sharing of values and with an emphasis on persuasive rather than coercive strategies.<sup>70</sup> Within that policy framework the study identified the dynamic roles under the traditional and the transitional systems, explored their indulgences and deprivations, correlated the positive and negative aspects of the system to those indulgences and deprivations, and suggested a strategy of transitional integration as a means of pacifying the situation, promoting justice, and mobilizing vital human resources for harmonious, culturally oriented development from within.

The overriding community value on which the system was structured was what Professor Lasswell termed the myth of permanent identity and influence, a form of immortality through procreation and the lineage system. The term "myth" was not intended to connote a derogatory notion of insignificance or fallacy since this concept had important practical implications for the society. The principles of permanent identity and influence in turn fostered communal unity and harmony in which individual and group interests were interrelated and balanced. Likewise, remembering the dead and perpetuating their participation

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<sup>70</sup>See the Foreword by Harold Lasswell to Deng, *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan*, xiii-xxi; see also xxix-xxxi.

toward the collective purpose of lineage continuity called for a high degree of respect for the dignity of every individual as a vital element in the collective chain of the lineage structure.

Around these values, society was organized and stratified on the bases of descent, age, and gender, with clearly differentiated roles for chiefs, elders, warrior age-sets, and women. The degree to which the role played by each of these categories lived up to the postulated ideals depended on the position occupied in the value-institutional hierarchy with the more advantaged reflecting a greater degree of conformity. But virtually all the members of the community shared a vested interest in the system, albeit in varying degrees, and therefore conformed to its fundamental tenets, especially as options were very limited, short of disaffiliation from the community, a radical move that was rarely used and only under severe conditions of disaffection.

While these values and institutionalized practices reflected features of the traditional society, education, urbanization, and the process of modern state-formation had already produced a new class whose values, expectations, and demands for modernization or development were pulling the society forward. The challenge for transitional integration then was how to reconcile these sets of values and institutions to be mutually reinforcing and productive. The strategy therefore envisaged the integration of the pivotal categories of participants, their goals or objectives, and their values and institutions to mobilize them for a balanced, culturally oriented process of development. The theoretical concepts involved were translated into an operational framework and a practical program of action. Measures were proposed to dispose both the traditionals and the moderns to appreciate their mutual contributions toward the envisaged development strategy.

Mobilizing both the traditionals and the moderns required incentives based on conferring or denying benefits, recognition, and celebration of accomplishments. Even the overriding myth of permanent identity was reinterpreted to be forward rather than backward looking. It was proposed, for instance, that beyond being perceived only as a means of perpetuating ancestral legacy through procreation, the concept could be much more progressive by fostering among the more influential participants, in particular the leadership, the notion that continued identity and influence even after death would depend largely on one's accomplishments in pertinent areas of development rather than merely through procreation. Since special religious and moral connotations were attached to that form of immortality, such symbols as monuments on the burial grounds of the accomplishing leaders lent themselves to such purpose. However, a modernizing notion of permanent identity and influence, it was argued, should not confer recognition only after death; it should instead honor achievements during one's lifetime while promising continued veneration after death. Such

symbolic indulgences as naming a law, a club, a scholarship, a school, a dispensary, a road, a cattle breeding center, an experimental farm, or any such development projects after a leader could ceremonially be conferred on those bases. The ceremonies could publicize the principle and be accompanied by such public festivities as dances, sports, and feasts. The other principles of unity and harmony, pride and dignity, and all the related values and institutionalized practices were subjected to a similar reinterpretation to release the energies of individuals and groups in a competitive and also cooperative productivity. The study was therefore a conceptual and operational framework for mobilizing representative forces of both tradition and modernization, including traditional leaders, elders, women, warrior age-sets, corresponding female age-sets, and the educated class in a comprehensive development from within.

Once the strategy was formulated, what remained was a political decision to make Abyei a priority area for development. The importance of Abyei as a meeting point between the North and the South and a contested area of great sensitivity provided the *raison d'être* for a project of integrated rural development. When it became evident that the government had no intention of allowing the people of Abyei to exercise the right granted them by the Addis Ababa Agreement to choose between remaining in the North or joining their ethnic and cultural kindred in the South, an alternative approach was proposed. If the grievances of the people of Abyei were addressed by granting them control over their local affairs and if, in addition, they were provided with basic services and a development program that would recognize and build on their distinctive cultural features, their aspirations would be satisfied and they might become reconciled to the positives of their historical bridging role between North and South. The idea for the project was well received at the highest political levels.

The program of action that was adopted stipulated the development of Abyei area as a symbol of national unity and integration. A ministerial committee, comprising cabinet ministers of such key central ministries as planning, finance, agriculture, health, education, transportation and communication, public administration, and of course, local administration was constituted to formulate a project of integrated rural development in the area and to supervise its implementation. Nine local government officers, one for every subtribe, all Northerners, were posted to the area under the leadership of a senior administrator, also a Northerner. The officers, competing among themselves and building on the competitiveness between the subtribes, were able to increase agricultural productivity and mobilize the people for self-help construction work in building or repairing school facilities. Since the team enjoyed the confidence and cooperation of the provincial and central government authorities, they were also able to do much by way of services. The mechanization of agriculture was introduced, and tractors were made available on a seasonal basis. Medical

facilities were upgraded from a dispensary to a health center, and a fully qualified medical officer was posted there under a six-month hardship rotation system. Elementary schools for boys were increased from one to three, a new school was opened for girls, and a junior high was established although it was temporarily located outside the tribe pending the construction of school buildings in Abyei. The minister of transportation and communication undertook to study the feasibility of building an all-season road between Abyei and the nearby Northern towns. The project seemed to ease considerably the tensions among the local inhabitants. According to the testimony of the minister of local government to the author, it was his ministry's most important project.

However, since the whole idea of the autonomy was that the educated sons and daughters of the Ngok Dinka should be involved in the administration and development of their own area, it seemed incongruent that the entire team be Northern. It was therefore argued that the head of the administration in the area and at least a number of the junior administrators should be from the Ngok Dinka. The minister of local government conceded, and Justin Deng Aguer was appointed assistant commissioner to head the administration of the area. Justin Deng was well qualified for the position. After years of government service he had studied law and economics in France. Back in the Sudan he was absorbed in the Southern Regional Ministry of Public Administration. With the cooperation of Regional President Abel Alier he was seconded to Abyei. A number of Ngok policemen and schoolteachers from the South were also transferred to the area. More from the area were expected to be appointed, trained in local administration, and sent to join Justin Deng.

Deng undertook the task with a deep sense of moral obligation and patriotic zeal. Using various traditional incentives, including the award of "personality oxen," he was able to stimulate constructive competition among the subtribes, age-sets, and individuals to increase agricultural productivity and tribal contribution to the construction of public facilities such as schools through self-help projects. He was particularly successful in giving the traditional Dinka sense of identity and cultural pride a modern relevancy that had been lacking. Singing and dancing, with some refinement in form and adjustment in substance, soon became a popular entertainment that gave Abyei a visible profile of cultural vitality. One composer, Minyiel Row, whose tape-recorded songs, rich with appropriate messages of culturally oriented development, had won a prize of a personality ox from Justin Deng, acknowledged the honor with verses of praise in which he created a myth about the circumstances of Deng's return to Abyei from France for patriotic duty.

For the same reasons that he became popular with the Dinka, Deng was viewed with suspicion by the Missiriya Arabs, who saw what they called the "Southernization" of the administration in Abyei as an anti-North turn of events

that was bound to work against their interest. They simply could not believe that the idea of developing Abyei as a symbol of national unity had been initiated by a Ngok Dinka to foster reconciliation and unity among the Arabs and the Ngok. Far from that, they took from the policy the aspect of Abyei's being a model of unity as an initiative by Northern leaders, the president and his ministers, to open up Abyei as a common ground for both the Arabs and the Dinka, a countervailing move aimed at checking Ngok aspirations for the South. Their zero-sum perception of the racial and ethnic conflict of identities ruled out any idea emanating from a Dinka that could benefit the Arabs. Ironically, the Dinka who sought to bridge the identity cleavage was seen by his people as a sell-out and by the Arabs as a clever adversary engaged in a ploy that was essentially anti-Arab aimed at "Southernizing" Abyei and eventually affiliating it to the South.

The pro-Arab security agents among the Dinka also saw in Justin Deng a threat to their position. Their fear was aggravated when Deng, believing in straightforwardness and administrative firmness, confronted them soon after his arrival, calling them opportunists who had enriched themselves at the expense of their own people's interests and warning them that their days were numbered with his assumption of power in the tribe. From that moment they were firmly opposed to him and everything he represented, and they did what they could to undermine his authority. These developments were compounded by the provincial authorities' resentment of Justin Deng's appointment by Khartoum and his close connections with the Ngok Dinka in the central government, which they viewed as undercutting their own authority.

A complex situation was created in which the idea of Ngok autonomy and development was espoused by the central government but covertly opposed by the provincial authorities and the Arabs who, far from supporting Justin Deng and the other Dinka officials in the area, worked to undermine and discredit them. The result was that, while Deng was successful in raising the morale of the Dinka and their sense of confidence, the support his Northern predecessor and his team had received from the authorities gradually diminished, and the development process came to a virtual standstill.

With the loss of momentum, the commitment of the central government to the development of the area was revived when the president was persuaded by influential ministers in the central government to reaffirm the project by pledging his personal support for it in an Independence Day speech on January 1, 1977, in Kadugli, the provincial capital of Southern Kordofan. He said: "I want the area of Abyei where the great Dinka and Missiriya tribes meet and coexist to be an example of the interaction of cultures. Abyei is to the Sudan exactly what the Sudan is to Africa. This project will be implemented under my personal

supervision in cooperation with all the institutions of the state, universities, and international organizations."<sup>71</sup>

The Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), which had been invited to assist with the implementation of the project and had sent to the area a team that had submitted a preliminary report, became actively involved at this point with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Six senior Ngok officials including a diplomat, an economist, an agriculturalist, a banker, a veterinarian, a wildlife ranger, and a journalist, were seconded to the project from their respective posts. Although reluctant because of their political reservations about the project, they all undertook the responsibility with a sense of patriotic duty to the area. The project manager, however, was an American recruited by HIID because of his experience with animal traction in Ethiopia.

Differences soon emerged between the theoretical work that had been postulated for the cultural and social contextualization of the project and the technologically oriented approach followed by the HIID team. HIID's approach to the development of Abyei was to search for the least expensive technology that would work in such areas as agriculture, health, water supply, transport, construction, and animal husbandry on the assumption that the financial and human resources available for the development of developing countries, especially such poor and remote rural areas as Abyei, were scarce. The American project manager was particularly set on animal traction, something even the educated Ngok Dinka opposed as too sensitive and culturally offensive.<sup>72</sup> Not only did the approach disregard the social and cultural dimension, which had been the main objective of the project in the first place, but it also tried to distance the project from the political considerations that had made it a national priority. Both HIID and USAID were in full agreement that the project be viewed from a purely developmental nonpolitical perspective.

The reason for excluding the political dimension of the project was never explained but presumably had to do with the sensitivity of the situation, fraught as it was with the potential dangers of Arab-Dinka, North-South crises that could, and eventually did, explode in violence. Divorcing the project from politics,

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<sup>71</sup>Quoted in Francis Mading Deng, "Crisis in African Development: A Social and Cultural Perspective," *Rockefeller Brothers Fund Annual Report* (New York, 1984), 7-18, 14.

<sup>72</sup>In his study of the Jonglei Project Area development John Garang de Mabior observed: "The conclusion, drawn from results of application of linear programming in the JPA that oxen technology is not appropriate to the JPA, is reinforced by results of interviews that show that the inhabitants of JPA are unlikely to adopt oxen farming." De Mabior, "Identifying, Selecting, and Implementing," 224.

however, meant that the political rationale of the project was not adequately explained to allay the fears of the Arabs that it had been intended to benefit the Ngok to their exclusion. That the North was to be the political beneficiary of the project was never realized by the Arabs.

The emphasis on the search for appropriate technology meant emphasizing the research aspect of the project which in turn involved a flow of researchers including senior scholars from HIID. The combination of the president's public endorsement of the project and field visits by research teams from the United States and Khartoum gave the project a profile that was not matched by the actual inputs and outputs. And with the rise in profile, Arab jealousies and hostilities mounted. So did the antagonism of the educated class, who were politically opposed to the project. Other Ngok Dinka factions also opposed the project as part of internal rivalry, seeing it as a potential advantage to the political assets of those who had taken the initiative and whom they viewed as adversaries. Combining these two grounds for their opposition, some of them went as far as intimidating the expatriate members of the research team from Khartoum University with threats to their security if they went to Abyei. Even the morale of those who had been seconded to Abyei began to fall with time. Subjected to the authority of the insensitive American field manager with whom they mostly disagreed, they became increasingly frustrated and restless, preferring to be allowed to go back to their original posts.

Ironically, as time passed, the differences between the American technological emphasis and the Ngok social and cultural orientation began to narrow as each side appreciated the validity of the other's perspective. Toward the end of the project the two points of view had come very close together and a spirit of genuine cooperation began to grow, especially as the HIID leadership replaced the field manager with another American who was far more sensitive and congenial to the Dinka cultural environment. It is also ironic that in the end the HIID search for appropriate technology led them to the conclusion that the traditional technology that the Ngok used in their agricultural production was the best suited to the soil and climatic conditions. Experts in animal husbandry came to the same conclusion about Dinka technology relating to cattle breeding.

Perhaps the main problem with the project was inherent in the attempt to solve the crisis of identity through material incentives. The priorities of the Ngok Dinka were clear: solve the political problem before addressing the economic needs of the people. The outcome of the project was the exact opposite of its intended result. Political problems over Abyei and the project itself continued to mount, erupting in a series of violent conflicts between the Arabs and the Dinka and among the Dinka themselves. With the compounding of all these problems and a negative report from donor-sponsored evaluation,

USAID eventually terminated its funding and withdrew from the project. Harvard also left. The project was declared a failure.<sup>73</sup>

As it was, the unresolved situation in Abyei continued to simmer until it eventually connected with the also fermenting conditions in the South and contributed directly toward the resumption of hostilities in 1983. Ngok youth are now fully involved in the civil war as members of the SPLM/SPLA forces.

Although many lessons can be drawn from the Abyei project experience, two need to be highlighted. One is that in a conflict situation involving fundamental issues that require a major restructuring of the context, it is almost futile to pursue development. Another is that for the least disruptive, indeed constructive, approach to development, it is necessary to balance culture and technology as closely interrelated structures and mechanisms.

### **Cultural Dynamics in Conflict Management and Development**

Although culture tends to connote patterns of group norms, mores, and modes of behavior, it is in essence a guide to action that ultimately is manifested at the level of the individual. It is the collectivization of individual behavior that in turn translates to the societal patterns. To give concrete illustration of this general proposition, two sets of contrasting cultural perspectives on conflict resolution and socioeconomic development are presented. The first covers the attitudes represented by Nimeiri and Alier as cultural personalities, and the second deals with the perceived roles of the traditionals and the moderns in the development process.

#### ***Nimeiri and Alier as Cultural Personae***

If culture is relevant to the identity of a defined group, it must also be assumed to be relevant to the individual in a particular context. Two personalities emerged in the 1970s as pivotal to the developments in North-South relations in the Sudan. These were Jaafar Nimeiri, the President of the Republic, and Abel Alier, initially Minister of State for Southern Affairs who became Nimeiri's Vice

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<sup>73</sup>A great deal has been written and published about the Abyei project, most of it by scholars involved in the project from both Harvard and Khartoum Universities. A comprehensive study, yet unpublished, involving the economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions is David C. Cole and Richard Huntington's *African Rural Development: Some Lessons from Abyei* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1983). The project is also the subject of Lual A.L. Deng, "The Abyei Development Project: A Case Study of Cattle Herders in the Sudan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1984).

President and also headed the regional government in the South. In this section the two are looked at closely in the context of conflict resolution negotiations and the Jonglei Canal.

Following the abortive Communist coup of 1971, his popular endorsement as the first elected president of the Republic, and his successful negotiation of the Addis Ababa accord, Nimeiri had emerged not just as a head of state but also as a powerful and popular leader, with a strong motivation to make the agreement with the South work. Abel Alier had been a close ally in Nimeiri's most significant accomplishment, ending the war in the South. For the same reason his own political assets were predicated on that achievement. He was also highly motivated not to alienate the president from whom he derived his own power and influence.

The two needed each other and were blessed or condemned to cooperate. But to what extent did they represent the two factions, North and South? More pertinently, did their attitudes, values, and images represent their Northern and Southern constituencies? The answer is a relative "yes" and "no," which would explain both the political crises associated with the project in the South and the relative success in resolving them.

Politically, a good case can be made that they did effectively represent the North and the South. The cultural dimension is more complex and nebulous. Individuals are the creatures of the acculturation process that goes back to the earliest years of life and throughout the process of education, both formal and informal. The influence of life on the individual operating within a given cultural context is another source of personality-molding. Naturally, the degree to which individuals reflect the salient characteristics of their cultural groups is dynamic and too varied to be gauged with any precision.

The mere fact that Nimeiri had successively changed political colors to win the approval and cooperation of virtually all the significant constituencies in the North indicates that he, at least in part, shared their objectives and values. If, as was explained earlier, the consistent Northern approach to the South has been to make promises that won the cooperation of the South but that either were not intended to be honored or were subsequently violated, then Nimeiri as a cultural personality represented the North. In fact he did this in two classic ways: concluding agreements that were not intended to be honored and dishonoring concluded agreements, the Northern pattern that Abel Alier had in mind when he added to the title of his book, *Southern Sudan*, the subtitle, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.

As for Alier himself, the first remarkable fact about him is his name, which in Dinka means "coolness." The second is that he is indeed known for coolness of temperament and style of cultivation or communication. It is worth recalling that a chief among the Dinka is a leader whose words are believed to express divine enlightenment and wisdom and form the moral point of consensus and reconciliation. To reconcile people, the chief should be a model of purity, righteousness, and patience. In Dinka terms he should be "a man with a cool heart," not hot-tempered or impatient.

If Alier was given that name because the elders had these attributes in mind and if in addition he was brought up with these attributes as value-objectives toward which he should be geared, then he certainly embodies those cultural values. But whether he was consciously acculturated toward those values or not, his personality certainly coincides with those attributes. And he brought them into full use both in the manner in which he negotiated the Addis Ababa Agreement and the skillful way in which he shaped the political dialogue on the Jonglei Canal Project, eventually reshaping it to cater to the development objectives of the local people.

The only tone in Alier's entire demeanor that sounded out of character occurred when he said to the regional assembly that he would drive people down the path of socioeconomic development with sticks if need be. But then he was clearly on the defensive against not only the patronizing past colonial policies of preserving the "primitive" cultures but also the weakness of his government's position for not having been involved in shaping the project had been exposed. He had to appear "tough." In this context it is revealing that he was initially reluctant to address the protestors allegedly because he thought it "rather awkward for the government to be seen to carry out the order of the school children," which, it must be conceded, was another quite uncharacteristic behavior on Alier's part.<sup>75</sup>

During a rapid process of change in which individuals and groups are poised at various levels of the transition from tradition to modernity perceived largely as Arabization or Westernization, the relevance of culture has to be understood in flexible terms. Certainly, it is not easy to quantify and qualify the proportions of cultural factors involved, but they are unquestionably there. What is needed is a sound understanding of the cultural context, both in form and substance, a sensitivity to the principal traits, and a creative gauging of the degree to which the culture is significant to the character and manner of individual and group actors.

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<sup>75</sup>Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 200.

### *Contrasting Models of Development*

Nilotic responses to the development crisis they have experienced reveal two contrasting models. The first, which is in line with traditional experience, is a postulate reflecting a process of change within the existing social order, with the generational dynamics of progress through a process of adaptation to changing circumstances and the new challenges they present. The second is the currently operative modernization model that tends to exclude traditional people and their value-institutional system as outmoded and irrelevant to the challenge of development.

Chief Arol Kachwol from Bahr el Ghazal articulated the philosophy behind the first model of internally induced and sustained development in these words to the author in a tape-recorded interview:

Mading, the world has been lived in for a long time. It is God who changes the world by giving successive generations their turns. Our forefathers, who have now disappeared, the way their world began and the way they lived, they managed the affairs of their world. Then God changed things: things changed until they reached us, and they will continue to change.

When God comes to change your world, it will be through you and your wife. You will sleep together and bear a child. When that happens, you should know that God has passed on to your children, borne by your wife, the things with which you had lived your life. . . .

So, the world goes on by the will of God; God, the person who created people and who changes things. You, our children, your fame began when you were chosen to go to school and learn. Here you are, you have gone far. You have left behind the country in which your mother was married. But you were chosen by your father to go and learn the words of other peoples. And in your search for knowledge, things happened.

For instance, is this girl, your wife, not from America? And you have brought her back to your country. . . . If you bear a child together now, in that child will combine the words of her country and the words of your country.

Man is one single word with God.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Francis Mading Deng, *Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 50; Deng, *Dinka Cosmology*, 51-52.

The exclusion model was forcefully articulated by one Ngok Dinka elder, Chol Adija, lamenting the manner in which the educated class of young people began to assume positions of leadership in the modern context and dismiss their elders as outmoded, with no meaningful contribution to make:

Educated youth have pushed us aside saying that there is nothing we know. Even if an elder talks of the important things of the country, they say, "There is nothing you know." How can there be nothing we know when we are their fathers? Did we not bear them ourselves? When we put them in school we thought they would learn new things to add to what we, their elders, would pass on to them. We hoped they would listen to our words and then add to them the new words of learning. But now it is said that there is nothing we know. This has really saddened our hearts very much.<sup>77</sup>

This model implies an approach that fundamentally undermines the preexisting cultural values, institutions and proven ways of pursuing the objectives of life. Instead of seeing these as vital and indispensable to the resourcefulness and productivity of the people, they are dismissed as outmoded and antithetic to progress. This inevitably fosters in the people lack of self-confidence, helplessness, and dependency on the outside world, even for the basics of life in their own context or environment. It is the lack of knowledge about local cultures and the consequential failure to appreciate their potentials for political and economic development that has aggravated the impoverishment of the modern nation-state in Africa. It has been the principal cause of the failure to tap and release the energies of the Africans, elites and masses alike, to make a sustainable contribution to the development process.

With the failure of the prevailing development paradigms, the dwindling of resources for foreign aid, and the worsening of poverty and humanitarian tragedies, Africa is being forced to fall back on self-reliance and more effective use of its resources, human and material. This should mean building on indigenous values, institutions, social organizations, and patterns of behavior.

Contrary to Alier's determination to drive the people down the path of development with sticks, the approach postulated here is that development should be perceived as a process of self-enhancement from within by improving on what the people have done for tens, hundreds, and perhaps thousands of years. People have always cultivated food; they could always do better by increasing the quality and quantity of their produce to yield a surplus that can be marketed to acquire cash for other necessities or values. People have always tried to increase the size

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<sup>77</sup>Deng, *Dinka C. mology*, 286-87.

of their herds, improve their quality, and protect them from disease; they could always do more with feeding, breeding, and disease control programs. People have always built dwellings appropriate to their environment; they could always improve the quality of their houses to provide for more space, lighting, ventilation, insulation, and protection against the elements. People have always endeavored to ensure their well being through various preventive and curative methods; they could always do better to prevent disease by improving the quality of their nutrition, their potable water, their sanitation, and of course their curative methods. People have always travelled and transported their goods on land and water; they could always facilitate the movement and goods by constructing country roads and using animals, bicycles, carts, or more mechanized vehicles. And there are always those whose exceptional drive has extended their horizons far and wide, innovators and adventurers who, more than others, explore, adopt, and adapt new ways to improve their conditions. Within this range and more, much can be done subtly and persuasively, building on the old, acquiring what is new, and cross-fertilizing them to enhance the quality of life.

That the models represented by the contrasting passages from Dinka elders coexist, even in the modern African, can be illustrated by an anecdote in the author's personal experience. With the publication of *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan*,<sup>78</sup> one of the author's brothers with medical degrees from prominent European universities wrote to congratulate the author, adding, "This is the immortality in which I believe," presumably dismissing the procreation-based notion of immortality in traditional society. Two years later, with the birth of the author's first son, the same brother wrote another congratulatory letter in which he fully endorsed the traditional notion of immortality, "Now you can die in peace." As was so eloquently emphasized in this conference, there is no clear demarcation between what is traditional and what is modern; they constantly interplay and are potentially mutually reinforcing and reproductive.

## Conclusion

This paper argues that culture is central to conflict (and therefore conflict resolution) and development, both by determining the identities of the people involved, as groups and individuals, and in shaping the techniques and mechanisms that they have evolved over a long period of trial, error, and success. Building on case studies from the Sudan, the conflict that has afflicted the country over the last three to four decades is explained as essentially a

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<sup>78</sup>Deng, *Tradition and Modernization*.

conflict of cultural identities competing for the definition of the national identity, the contest being between the Arab-Islamic model and the Western-oriented secular model. Although support for these models cuts across the North-South divide, it reflects that dichotomy.

The focus of this paper is not techniques for conflict resolution or management. Rather, the values that underlie the principles involved from the perspective of traditional African (Nilotic) society are outlined to indicate their likely impact and potential on the role of cultural representatives.

Development raises similar considerations of cultural identity and operational techniques. The Jonglei Canal and the Abyei projects are presented as cases involving political and economic factors in the development syndrome. In both the identity issues involved in the conflict had not been adequately addressed before the development agenda began. As a result the proposed development was fundamentally undermined and rejected. Equally significant was the manner in which development was perceived as a concept external to the indigenous population that had to be sought from external sources, ranging from the government to the outside world. With their empowering and reinforcing culture fundamentally undermined, the local population become incapacitated in their frame of mind and therefore dig themselves deeper and deeper into the trenches of dependency. The collective communal experience of hundreds and thousands of years suddenly becomes defunct and irrelevant.

Both in terms of conflict management and development, this paper argues that there is an urgent need to develop a formula that can politically, economically, socially, and culturally utilize the values and institutions of traditional society by recognizing them and building on them in a manner that reconciles them and makes them partners with the forces of modern science and technology, the magic tools of development. But that is easier said than done. Africa has cornered itself into rejecting *ethnicity* as an *organizing concept* in the process of nation-building. The challenge then is whether it is possible to reverse the mindset so that ethnic groups, which are African realities, can be seen as resources or building blocks that can provide a sound foundation for sustainable political and socioeconomic development from within.

The challenge for the Sudan, which is pertinent to most other African countries, is to define a framework involving an embracing concept of national identity that would allow these nations to build on the realities of their ethnic and cultural diversities, permit free interaction among various groups on the basis of unity in diversity, and thereby foster the evolution of the nation toward equitable integration. If identities determined on territorial or religious bases, which can easily be changed at will, are often sources of internecine violence, it is not logical to condemn ethnic identities, often also territorially based with a long history of existence, as outmoded and antithetic to progress, unless what is

postulated is totally outside the empirical framework. The formula must allow for individual growth within and beyond the confines of the group. This, indeed, is the essence of unity in diversity, culturally relevant resolution of internal conflicts, and self-enhancing development from within.

## Discussant Remarks

John Gerhart

Director of the Johannesburg Office  
The Ford Foundation

What the three very diverse papers by Sulayman Nyang, Coralie Bryant, and Francis Deng have in common is that whereas most of this conference is focused on the effects of development on culture, these three papers focus on the effects of culture on development. Each paper, particularly Francis Deng's, examines the failure of attempts at development that do not take adequate account of cultural factors and cultural diversity.

When someone was asked, "How do you put a value on culture?" he turned the question around and said, "Culture is the way in which we value everything else." I think this is a very useful guide for development planners because if one is not aware of the values of the culture with which one is dealing, one is liable to make mistakes. A Chinese proverb says, "If we don't know where we are going, we are liable to end up where we are headed." I think that what culture does for us is tell us where we are going. It tells us what is important in our own societies.

I think each of these papers in its own way implies the urgent need for recognition of cultural differences both within Africa and between Africa and other parts of the world and the intelligent recognition of these differences. Professor Sulayman Nyang recalls that, looking back on the last thirty years, it was incredibly naive for modernizers to think that modernization would be either uniform among countries or linear over time. Both the socialists, who wanted to create a new man, and the colonialists were mistaken about the durability of traditional culture. Samora Machel, the first president of Mozambique, said, "We must kill the tribe to build the nation," and that was a common goal at independence. Yet today, if anything, it is the other way around; the nation itself is in danger.

Coralie Bryant has talked about the importance of assessing, measuring, and recognizing cultural differences in public management. Francis Deng, with great eloquence, has given a case study of the disastrous effects of seemingly scientific development projects in the absence of resolution of cultural differences.

It seems to me there is an obvious conclusion to be taken from all three papers: the recognition of individual and group cultural rights is a cornerstone of democracy and therefore of development. This is clear whether we are talking about religion in the Sudan or language we should not forget that the Soweto

riots in South Africa began when Afrikaans was prescribed as the language of instruction in African schools; whether we are talking about land tenure, ownership, gender, or many other forms of development.

Second, the three papers imply that the only way to deal successfully with cultural diversity is through participatory structures at the institutional, the regional, and the national levels. This multi-layer participation is necessary to ensure not only the narrow effectiveness of projects but also the legitimacy of the development process at all, as in the case that Deng outlines.

Third, all three papers imply that accountability of public institutions must be to a diverse population, not to an elite nor to a geographical or regional section of a country. I just want to read one paragraph from Deng's paper that I think summarizes all three papers:

Africa has cornered itself into rejecting ethnicity as an organizing concept in the process of nation-building. The challenge then is whether it is possible to reverse the mindset so that ethnic groups, which are African realities, could be seen in reversed light as resources or building blocks that can provide a sound foundation for sustainable political and socioeconomic development from within.

This same theme has been echoed most recently in an article in the January 1992 issue of *Foreign Affairs* by Kenyan political scientist Michael Chege, in which he reviews the democratization processes of the past year.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, I would like to ask, "What does this mean for the World Bank, for the Ford Foundation, and for other development agencies that are engaged in technical or economic development projects?" It has several important implications, first, for staffing. We need historians, anthropologists, archaeologists, and humanities experts as much as we need economists and agrarian experts. Second, it means a much greater participatory process in planning itself. The days in which foreigners or even national elites can plan on behalf of local populations are over. We need to learn this very quickly. Increasingly, in field after field, we are recognizing the quality of local knowledge, of both an institutional and a technical type.

Two references were made this morning that I would like to echo. First, I would like to pay tribute to René Dumont, whose 1962 book, *False Start in Africa*, spoke about the inappropriateness of foreign structures for African development. It is terribly organized, but I think it is still the most relevant book

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<sup>1</sup>Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Special Issue 1992): 146-63.

ever written about African development. It is worth going back and re-reading.<sup>2</sup>

Second, in some technical fields like farming systems research, because the scientist needs a technical answer and a technical success, the scientist has been forced to alter the methodology to become participatory. Otherwise, his or her work is going to be sitting on the shelf. These fields therefore are somewhat ahead of the social scientists. To our embarrassment the agronomists have had for almost twenty years a whole new school of thought, which is the recognition of local scientific knowledge, the participation of farming populations who are clients in the design of technology, and the conduct of research off the research station in the farmer's circumstances. What in 1970 was a new idea farming systems is today a discipline of departments in universities, annual meetings, and professional associations.

In a sense what we need is for the management specialists to have their own farming systems research revolution in which they also incorporate local knowledge and local wisdom in their practices.

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<sup>2</sup>Rene Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

## Remarks

Timothy T. Thahane

Vice President and Secretary  
The World Bank

This session, perhaps, is more important than the previous ones because we have to focus on where we go from here. I remember one head of state who, when returning from abroad after having attended another conference, was asked by the press, "What happened where you were?" He said, "We met, we discussed, and we left for home." So I would like us to think about where we go from here, and in this context we will expect some input from many of you who are knowledgeable in the field.

To help us with some of the important conclusions that have been deduced from the papers and the discussions, we have four rapporteurs, and I will call on them in the order in which they appear on your programs: Oladipupo Adamolekun, Senior Public Sector Manager in the World Bank; Azim Nanji, Professor and Chair of the Department of Religion, University of Florida-Gainesville; Pierre Landell-Mills, Senior Policy Adviser in the Africa Technical Department in the World Bank; and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Division Chief in the Agriculture Operations, Middle East and North Africa, in the World Bank.

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In this closing session I want to make just a few comments. A process of changing any behavior has to begin somewhere, and it has to be continued through consistent pressure of raising awareness. Among the objectives of this conference were to sketch the horizons, review the literature, and see the extent to which culture plays an important role in the sustainability of projects, whether by the World Bank, by the government, or by any people. The second objective was to sensitize World Bank staff who are working on Africa about the need to take account of the cultural dimension and the cultural heritage preservation issues in their work. There is also a third one, which is to identify a work program for elaboration of the ideas addressed by the Conference.

I think that if we take these objectives and look at our experience over the last two days, the Conference has succeeded. But we need to then move forward and identify and agree on the respective roles of the different actors. I have identified at least four actors whom we may need to address in the coming months and years, regarding whom your individual intellectual personal inputs will be critical.

The first group I would like to identify is researchers. These are the people who scan the frontiers and bring their findings to bear upon the practical side or upon the theoretical framework that underpins our actions. Researchers in developed countries working on these issues that we have addressed have a role to play in collaborating with and encouraging African researchers who may be working in those fields in their home countries. Such joint research would help develop indigenous African research capacity as well as reduce the bias among external donors to always fund researchers from their countries only. Joint research at institutional levels between overseas universities and African universities also will help train researchers and develop a culture of research among African universities. It is my sense that within Africa the universities have not addressed some fertile areas of research such as culture and development, and traditions and social change. Even in the field of historical research, African universities have not developed the interest in nor the researchers who can investigate and write textbooks documenting their nations' histories.

The second group of actors is the international donor community, which has an important role not only in funding individual scholars and researchers but also in facilitating meetings of researchers and academicians working in the fields discussed during the Conference to exchange findings and identify new areas for research. As we know, African governments do not have many resources for basic programs and services, let alone for research. African researchers have to struggle to do their research. Even when they have achieved results, they cannot afford travel to regional or international professional meetings to present their findings. Foundations can provide invaluable assistance by sponsoring regional conferences in Africa and funding individual researchers as appropriate.

In addition foundations can play a role in the preservation of cultural heritage. We heard the experience of The Getty Foundation that could be shared with African researchers and universities. But there are other things that Pierre Landell-Mills identified, such as cataloguing of historical sites and computerization of findings and setting aside funds during project preparation for preservation of historical sites.

The third group of actors is the African governments. Two points could be made in this context. First, it is regrettable to note how little attention African governments have paid to the importance of preserving their historical treasures; to encouraging their institutions of learning to research, document, and publish their national histories; and to exploring the cultural dimension of development. The second aspect relates to participation a theme that was mentioned repeatedly by many speakers during the Conference. Participation in the design of projects by the beneficiaries, transparency of the processes and rules for governance, and accountability of African governments to their peoples are critical factors. African governments can be a factor for good or ill in the

achievement of the goals of improving the quality of life of their citizens. Improvement in the quality of life includes greater individual freedoms and a richer cultural life. It is therefore incumbent on all of us in international institutions and on the African continent to ensure that the issues of participation, transparency, and accountability remain at the center stage of the development debate. The institutions that are designed should be sensitive to the imperatives of participation. At the same time we must recognize that cultural pluralism means that different countries may have different institutions for government but that these institutions should be judged across the board by the degree to which they permit open and free participation by the people, are accountable to the people for their activities, and incorporate beneficiaries' participation in the design of projects that affect their lives. It is not a question of the form of government but of the need for all actors to be aware of the general concepts that are essential for long-term sustainability of projects.

Sustainability requires social internalization of experiences, especially in the organization and implementation of projects. Development practitioners must be aware of the customs and traditions that could be changed or strengthened to make development sustainable. Let us recall Ismail Serageldin's opening presentation on the interaction of three paradigms the intellectual, perceptual, and practical domains that determine societal developments. It is our responsibility to encourage a better appreciation and appropriation of research lessons on the part of our governments and the development community.

Finally, the fourth group of actors is the international development agencies, including bilateral aid donors. Given our financial and intellectual resources, we can do much more than we have done to promote a better understanding of the cultural dimensions of development and to preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the countries in which we operate. First, during project identification we should be sensitive to the identification of historical sites. Second, during project preparation some funds could be included for mapping and preservation of identified sites. Third, during project implementation we should be on the look-out for any historical or cultural artifacts that need preservation. Pierre Landell-Mills, June Taboroff, and Cynthia Cook have described what the World Bank is doing in this regard. Why can't these approaches be adopted by all donors?

From the Board of the World Bank I have seen an increasing sensitivity and awareness to the preservation of historical heritage as well as natural plant and fauna. Environmental assessments are required for most projects. In fact one major country has directed its Executive Director to oppose all projects for which an environmental assessment has not been circulated for 120 days before presentation of the project to the Board.

So change is going on. We need to internalize this change and make sure that it becomes part of the behavior of the operating staff and of the development practitioners. But this changed thinking also has to be part and parcel of the thinking of the beneficiary governments and their bureaucrats or public servants. I think that so long as projects are perceived as being "the World Bank's," success is not ensured since the people have not been involved. We have enough experience from the Operations Evaluation Department's looking at our projects over the years to show that noninvolvement of locals in the design and implementation of projects tends to lead to failure of the projects' sustainability. One can say many things about what the international agencies should do, but I leave that to Ambassador Lopes, who will be speaking to us about UNESCO, and to Vice President Jaycox, who will also address us on other operational aspects. But the challenge is out to all of us, having been made aware by the scholars and practitioners working in the field, to take in the message and apply it in our respective areas of work.

## **Rapporteur Remarks for Theme 1: Cultural Institutions**

Ladipo Adamolekun

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The World Bank

I will summarize the discussions and the content of the four papers in Theme 1 around five points. The first is that the authors of the papers are unanimous in justifying their focus on cultural institutions by invoking the argument that a holistic approach to development should include an emphasis on culture. My favorite passage is a quote in Dawson Munjeri's paper on Zimbabwe: "Where there is not bread how can we say: let them have museums instead! . . . What you produce is not bread *or* museums but bread *and* museums." This graphic summation of the linkage between culture and development is explored in the different papers.

The second point is that an attempt is made in one or two of the papers to link cultural heritage preservation directly to economic development. This link is seen from the angle of tourism-related activities, in other words, the museums and the sites that are preserved will be sites to be visited by tourists and also by nationals. In the process one can promote local arts and crafts and other local products, thereby creating opportunities for employment and revenue generation. Specific examples were mentioned, such as glass beads in Zimbabwe and pottery in some parts of western Africa. But there is a downside to this, which Philip Ravenhill calls "commercial pillagers working for the international art trade." In other words one has to be careful that in developing tourist-related activities, one does not expose this valuable cultural heritage to pillagers.

The more controversial example of linkage to revenue generation, which in the World Bank we call cost recovery or user charge, is increasing the fees charged for visiting the cultural sites. The natural reaction is to say that raising fees would drive away the poor or even the people who would normally go to the sites. Dawson Munjeri provides statistics I was surprised, I must say that show that there was no decrease in the number of visitors to sites and museums as a result of increasing fees. Maybe Zimbabwe is not typical, but at least its experience shows that we should not jump to the conclusion that an increase in fees will necessarily result in a decrease in visitors. Just one minor thought: one could also conceive of differential charges nationals to pay less, and tourists to

pay 20, 40 or 50 percent or even 200 percent higher (particularly if they are World Bank tourists) [laughter].

The third point is participation and public education, which was brought up in all of the papers in this session. Alexandre Marc's paper focuses sharply on participation. I am not going to give details of the first part of it, which is largely theoretical, but I will highlight a few of the concrete examples that he provides of community participation in the conservation of cultural heritage.

The example of Mengo Museum (Musée de Mengo) in Burkina Faso, which in its design and implementation was built jointly with the community, came across quite clearly. Another example was that of decentralizing cultural heritage sites to the regional and local levels, in addition to the national level. In other words the idea of a single national museum should be abandoned, and museums should be spread throughout a country. In fact without doing this, one cannot achieve effective participation. Ardouin and Ravenhill also stress this point.

Language was also emphasized as part of the discussion of community participation in the conservation of cultural heritage. It was pointed out that one cannot involve the local communities without developing the national languages. Given the linguistic diversity in many African countries, this leads to all the problems of developing languages.

Philip Ravenhill's paper discusses public education in detail. He clearly demonstrates the linkages to environment, archaeology, technology, urban culture, and history through objects, and public education, which in some cases can be related to participation. He cites the example of Côte d'Ivoire, where, because of the government's refusal to approve the building of a new mosque, a local community destroyed a historic mosque. This is an example of the failure to involve public participation leading to destruction.

The fourth point is the regional integration perspective in the preservation of cultural heritage. Munjeri and Ardouin adopt a regional perspective in their papers. The former reviews the experience of the Southern African Development Coordination Countries Association of Museums (SADCCAM) and the latter attempts an assessment of the West African Museums Programme (WAMP). Both authors emphasize the importance of collaborative efforts with particular emphasis on training. Sixteen West African countries are involved in WAMP while SADCCAM groups nine Eastern and Southern African countries.

My final point is the role of external actors. The SADCCAM initiative has benefited greatly from the support of Nordic countries, and this support is openly acknowledged in Mr. Munjeri's paper. In fact Zimbabwe, which is the headquarters of SADCCAM, has prepared a national Master Plan for cultural heritage preservation. This was sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), and I believe the Rockefeller Foundation is also interested in providing assistance for the implementation of the Master Plan. I think there is some beginning of outside interest in this area. However, I should mention that, overall, both the presenters and the discussants felt that external actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have not been sufficiently active in this area.

There are a few notable exceptions, like the Italian COSPE, which is supporting the Eco-Museum in the Casamance region in Senegal. Another example is the West African Museum Programme, which is the offshoot of, and sponsored by, an international NGO, the International African Institute. The World Bank has had a number of projects with cultural heritage conservation components over the past two decades. One example is connected to the work the Bank is doing in Mexico (and nothing says it cannot be replicated in Africa), the Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development Project.

Finally, Botswana offers the example of how the destruction that can take place through infrastructure development relating to roads, power, water and mining can be avoided if those responsible pay attention to archaeological and historical sites. The Botswana Government adopted a very interesting approach, contract management. The government contracted for archeological competence as an integral part of the project. Mr. Munjeri's paper demonstrates that this approach could be emulated by other countries.

## Rapporteur Remarks for Theme 2: Conservation of the Built Historic Environment

Azim A. Nanji

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One of Wole Soyinka's novels, *The Interpreters*, concerns a conversation between two people, one of whom is committed to tradition, the other to modernity, and a third observer who sums up the debate by saying that the ultimate purpose is to build a "dome of continuity" to build a bridge from one place to the other. But then Soyinka adds a significant line that says that bridges do not merely go from here to there bridges also look backwards. In some sense the theme of the conservation of the built historic environment has, in the four papers that were presented, dealt with this issue from a historical perspective, by showing that in Africa the conversation between cultural spaces the built environment and people has been an ongoing exercise for hundreds of years. A consciousness of cultural management, of cultural preservation, as an issue may be very recent, but the process has been evolving, as I am sure the archaeologists will remind us, for many centuries.

Some of the recurrent themes that cropped up in all four papers and relate to the larger issues that have been raised at this conference are relevant, and I will state them at the outset before giving you some case studies. One of the interesting issues was how recent our "mapping" of the issues is, that is, establishing a cultural as well as a general context within which to look at the question. In other words the political boundaries, the nation-state boundaries, that we deal with in an African context are all very recent in origin.

But the *cultural* boundaries that we must deal with have a much longer history, which often transcends the more recently established political and nation-state boundaries. Therefore, the relationship among all of the dichotomies that have been discussed at this conference in the last two days are reflected in the way in which we are beginning to map the whole issue of culture and, particularly, to identify the question of cultural heritage. We are in some sense forced to work with a new vocabulary but to be self-conscious about the questions that we raise concerning how we define choice and historical memory as it relates to the cultural preservation of the built environment.

This historical and cultural context is very well illustrated in Professor Sinou's paper, which documents the diversity of the existing cultural patrimony in the City of Ouidah in Benin. There was at one level a set of buildings related

to the beginning of slavery in that region in the seventeenth century. Subsequent buildings reflected the Afro-Brazilian sensibilities of people whose descendants had returned to that part of the world more than a hundred years later. Then there was the colonial intervention, which created its own heritage, and then the contemporary aspects, which relate back both to the religious environment and to the practice of voodoo but more to the administrative buildings that were set up. If a decision has to be made about how to deal with cultural heritage, Ouidah provides an excellent example. First, in fact what usually exists is a composite and not exclusively something that is defined by what Professor Sinou called the concept of a "golden age," which is distanced both in terms of time and space. Second, the critical issue of how a heritage is also something that speaks to the people who live in that particular region at a particular time is also very significant.

Another important aspect came up in a discussion related to some of the critical policies that remain uncharted, that is, the use of indigenous material and human resources. Neville Agnew's presentation on earthen architecture highlighted not only the notion of reviving the use of traditional materials but also sustaining the human skills the skills of craft, the skills of building that go with the use of earthen architecture. So one is talking about both the reuse of material resources and the human skills that constitute a resource that needs to be reactivated both by training and by recovering skills that may be disappearing.

On how a strategy may be devised to encompass not only a conceptual attitude towards cultural preservation but also a policy that would implement cultural preservation in development, June Taboroff gave us an overview of the World Bank's experience. She made the most interesting point that one has to view cultural heritage as capital. When one views it as capital, the plan of action that one implements sees the cultural heritage in relation to other development issues, not separately as a cultural phenomenon. She highlighted three areas of action for defining this process: a regional plan of action, a country plan of action, and a local plan of action with all three working together.

In the final presentation Ismail Serageldin brought us back to a very serious problem, the historical city. More than at any other time in the history of Africa, these historical cities have undergone an explosion of change. This change has been demographic and physical, but it has also been generated by processes of modernization that have crumbled the organic nature of these historic cities. He emphasized a public as well as a private initiative that would allow historic cities to be viewed as organic units of which some of the old linkages could be not only revived but also built on so that these spaces would not be abused but used constructively.

In summing up I will recall a story that is used by Jomo Kenyatta in *Facing Mount Kenya*.<sup>1</sup> One forgets that we have invisible as well as visible resources related to the environment and that African stories, African myths, constitute a resource for enabling us to understand the connections that exist. In describing the founding myth of the Kikuyu, his own group, Kenyatta recounts that after the creation of human beings, they are taken to a very high place. (Those of you who know Kenya will know that he is talking about Mount Kenya.) From that high place the human beings are asked to look down as far as the eye will go. They are told that they have a custodial role over whatever their eyes can encompass. It is important that this custodial role be played at the ground level. They have to descend and play out that role by creating a built environment that will be part of their culture, but there also exists a relationship between the built environment and the total environment of which each of them is a part and of which each is not an exploiter, or master, or mistress, but simply a custodian. I think this story is found in several African traditions, and these stories remind us that there is a choice to be made about what is to be memorialized and what is to be erased. That inherent conversation in Soyinka's story between past, present, and future means that what we memorialize, what we choose to preserve, is something we leave as a patrimony for future generations. Among all the things that we leave for them, it might be wise for us to decide that what we want to leave for them reflects not only a choice but also a commitment to the built environment. That way, when they remember what we left, they will respect and be pleased with it, not despise what we have left for them and erase it.

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<sup>1</sup>Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (New York: Vantage, 1965), 5-6.

## **Rapporteur Remarks for Theme 3: Development, Archaeology, and the Environment**

**Pierre Landell-Mills**

**Senior Policy Adviser  
Office of the Vice President  
Environmentally Sustainable Development  
The World Bank**

For many if not most of us who are not archaeologists, archaeology is viewed as useful in making us aware of our past but is not often seen as particularly relevant to today's development efforts. Moreover, I suspect that many of us have not thought of Africa as a continent rich in archaeological sites. What we were told in our session was that both perceptions are wrong.

Professor Pierre de Maret made a forceful case why those African and outsiders who are working in development should be very concerned about understanding the past. Through knowledge of the historical context we may better grasp how contemporary patterns of living have strong roots in the past. Moreover, for Africans, greater awareness of the achievements of the past could be a major source of self-esteem, which in turn is essential for self-confidence, especially self-confidence in using one's cultural heritage as a basis for the design of culturally viable development programs. Archaeology is a link between history and current social anthropology. Because of Africa's experience of colonization, the rupture between the past and the present is very great. Therefore, there is a need to bridge the gap. Oral tradition is one way. Knowledge of the origins of today's population groups and of the patterns of past migrations allow people to better appreciate the historical links between different groups. Thus, archaeology is crucial to arriving at a better understanding of the relations between people and their environment. Ethnicity problems are seen to be a recent phenomenon; however, archeology teaches us that in actuality many African ethnic groups derive from common origins in an area around Cameroon. Their common origin also can be seen in their having the same language roots.

Professor Ann Stahl drew attention to the importance of preserving knowledge of past technologies that tend to get lost but that often may still have relevance to today's inhabitants. She illustrated this cogently with the case of the Banda in Ghana, whose people reverted to long-abandoned technologies during the worst years of the economic collapse in the early 1980s.

The second important point that came out of our discussions is that Africa is rich in archaeological sites, but since the continent is largely unexplored by trained archaeologists, these sites are mostly unmapped and unrecorded.

Pierre de Maret told us that an astounding ninety percent of Africa's surface area has never been explored. The fact is that there are very many sites in Africa, but very few sites that are mapped, or if they are mapped, they appear to be near to existing settlements or existing roads. Thus, known sites do not provide a basis for estimating the total number of archaeological sites but rather indicate where people who are trained in identifying archaeological sites happened to have been. Where exploration has been carried out thoroughly, the starting point may have been half a dozen architectural sites that led to the identification of several thousand archaeological sites at the end of a few months of field work. Unless this kind of thorough exploration is done, we will have no idea what the real pattern of past living was. To imagine the vastness of the task, to map archaeological sites in an area the size of central Africa defined as the area from Cameroon to Zaire it is estimated that several thousand archaeologists are needed to achieve the same level of coverage as is typically found in Europe.

Professor Susan Keech McIntosh noted a number of common wrong assumptions:

- "What is visible is what is most important." This is called "the tyranny of the monumental." In reality there are myriad minor sites that are not known and not visible but that are the keys to interpreting the extent and nature of societies.
- "Villagers know of the existence of all the significant sites in their area." In fact villagers' knowledge is very incomplete; they tend to be aware only of recent sites. If this incorrect assumption were accepted, we would miss all those sites that are remote in time and space.

We need broad information to gain an overall view of the coverage of settlements and of their interrelationships in space and time. It is not good enough to simply put pins in maps, but there is a need for long-term site inventory work and training taking advantage of the best experience available worldwide. Currently, only \$150,000 is spent annually on archaeological work in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Development involves *physical construction*, such as roads and dams, which results in the destruction of many sites. But this destruction need not happen. Archaeological sites are a nonrenewable resource. With a little additional expenditure and greater awareness physical development can be turned into an archaeological opportunity rather than an archaeological disaster. At a minimum governments should be assisted in mapping sites that are to be destroyed during the construction of infrastructure. This requires foresight and advance planning.

What can be done to help preserve and make available Africa's archaeological heritage? In our sessions we identified a number of recommendations for preserving Africa's archaeological heritage:

1. Undertake an inventory of sites, giving priority to areas scheduled for development. This requires the training of staff and the provision of computerized data bases taking advantage of emerging modern techniques such as Geographical Information Systems and Global Positioning Satellites. The donor countries could assist by helping to train and employ local archaeologists as an integral part of development projects in which infrastructure construction is to be financed.
2. Incorporate in the education programs of African countries teaching about the countries' archaeological heritage. This means adding to the school curricula and making effective use of museums (the topic of Theme 1). It also means making effective use of the mass media by producing documentary programs.
3. To maintain the continuity between the past and the present, a point much stressed by Professor Stahl, efforts should be made to preserve the craft techniques that have ancient origins but continuing economic value today. The efficacy of such efforts was seen in her field work in the Banda area of Ghana, where people reverted to long-abandoned technologies during the worst years of the economic collapse in the early 1980s.

As part of a global responsibility to help in archaeological preservation, aid agencies were urged to provide funds within projects for:

- Training and capacity building
- Inventory explorations of sites to be destroyed by project activities. A small investment would have a very high "cultural rate of return."

Perhaps the essence of our session is best captured by the words of Kristian Kristiansen, quoted by Professor McIntosh: "The archaeological record is part of the sum of knowledge and experience from which decisions for tomorrow are taken at all levels of society. It represents an irreplaceable contribution to what has been called the collective memory of mankind."

## **Rapporteur Remarks for Theme 4: Economic Development: Culture as Cause or Consequence**

**Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala**

**Division Chief  
Agriculture Operations  
Middle East and North Africa Region II  
The World Bank**

John Gerhart's thoughts as discussant on the underlying theme of all three of our very interesting papers coincided with mine so I shall borrow extensively from his summary. The three papers focused more on the effect of culture on development than on the impact of development on culture. The basic theme of all three is that development that does not take account of the cultural base and of the cultural diversity of the peoples for whom it is intended is bound to be development that is not very successful. This underlying premise is brought out by Coralie Bryant in her paper: development that is culturally aware should be more productive development. The impact of culture on development is illustrated by some of the authors' comments during the session or in their papers. Professor Nyang, for instance, talked about the new African elites who have imbibed Western culture and who now see development in the context of consuming things from the outside and put consumption of external items be they technology or goods ahead of local items. This is one illustration of how the changes in the cultural behavior of people can in turn impact development within the country itself.

Professor Deng's paper illustrates the impact of culture on development with two projects in the southern Sudan, one of which is very well known the Jonglei Project. He describes how people who could have benefited economically actually stopped the process of development because they felt that their economic, cultural, and political aspirations had not yet been settled or taken into account, and they put these issues far ahead of the issue of economic development per se.

Two or three points emerge from the discussions that we had from these three papers. All three papers imply that democracy (and I link that more with participation of the local peoples an open, participatory society) is essential for development and for cultural diversity to thrive. In other words, in a society in which people are not allowed to bring their cultural underpinnings into the development process and to participate actively, you will have difficulties in having successful economic development. The problems with donor projects

often stem from the fact that many of the instruments that they use to implement their development projects are not very sensitive to this issue of participation. Some of the bilateral donors are way ahead of the World Bank on this issue, and I think the Bank is now coming to terms with the need to develop projects that are more participatory because even if you look at the economics of it, you can see that although there are costs to participation, there are definitely benefits in terms of sustainability of the projects.

Another point is that there must be accountability of public institutions not to a small elite that is governing the country, but to the people themselves. It is only when this accountability to the masses exists, if you want to use that word, that development can really succeed. This relates back to the issue of open systems, participation, and democracy.

One more point is that we might think in terms of reversing the mindset this comes from Professor Deng's paper concerning ethnic groups, which have been viewed negatively as tribalistic in the past, to see them as positive political and economic forces.

A theme that I picked up from several of the papers from throughout the conference is that perhaps one can selectively pick aspects of culture that are positive and use them to reinforce the development process and make it work better. For example, perhaps consensus-building, reciprocity, or other aspects could be picked up from the culture of the people and used positively to facilitate modern development and management processes. This may be, but Professor Deng began to sound a cautionary note which we did not really pick up on that culture has to be seen, in certain senses, holistically and that it may be dangerous to think in terms of picking one aspect or the other. I am not saying that we cannot do that, but I think we should be careful about this approach.

I have a personal comment. After looking at all these papers and listening to the discussion of the negative impact of either development on culture or culture on development, I am beginning to be amazed at the resilience of African culture. In spite of this onslaught of various systems on cultures most Africans have retained a large part of their culture and carry it with them wherever they go. I am really proud of that on a personal level.

Finally, I want to mention one issue that arose already in our session in a question: "Where will the Bank take all of this?" As the chairman said, it is all very well to come here and sit and talk, but what does it mean for the Bank? Is the Bank going to change the way in which it does projects? Is it now going to do them in a more participatory way? Will it now listen to the local people more when it does structural adjustment and see it from their perspective? These are some of the issues that I am sure people on the floor will be happy to discuss. I can only say that I am beginning to see positive signs that the Bank is indeed moving in this direction. This conference is an example of such a

move. Furthermore, the Bank has constituted a Participatory Learning Group, which over the next couple of years will try to learn lessons of experience from participatory and nonparticipatory aspects of Bank-financed projects and disseminate these lessons for use in the design and implementation of future Bank projects.

## The World Decade for Cultural Development

Henri Lopes

Assistant Director-General for Culture  
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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*In the beginning of the 1980s economics was considered reality, culture was something else. This conference is a milestone for the World Decade for Cultural Development, which began in 1988, because the World Bank is the first UN institution besides UNESCO to get involved in implementation of the Decade. Some here have referred to culture as versus science and technology. One challenge is to convince Africans that science and technology are part of their cultural heritage. Regarding cultural identity and cultural confrontation, Africa has to stop feeling sorry for itself and learn what can be learned from the outside. What is necessary is cooperation and solidarity. We also must convince decisionmakers that we have a theory for how cultural factors be used in practice. In the 1980s, as development focused on concrete realities, such as production, commodities, distribution, and training, and as massive foreign debt necessitated structural adjustment, the inclusion of culture as an important dimension in development fell by the wayside. Our task is, first, to convince decisionmakers that exogenous development strategies are not only misguided, but often counterproductive, and, second, to build consensus among all Africa's allies to include the cultural dimension in development. Traditional societies must also benefit from the useful aspects of modern culture. Our goal is that by the end of the World Cultural Decade in 1997, what we here know in theory the world will be able to learn in practice.*

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First of all, may I express my sincere thanks to the World Bank and in particular to Kim Jaycox and Ismail Serageldin for having organized this International Conference on Culture and Development. It is a great privilege for me to make the closing address on such an important occasion and more particularly at the end of such a stimulating exchange of views.

I hope I shall be forgiven if I go back in time a little way. At the beginning of the 1980s, mainstream development thinking not only in multilateral and bilateral agencies but also in many national development ministries did not leave much room for culture. Economics was reality; culture was something else. Economics was tangible; culture was intangible. The idea that culture could make an input to development strategies would have been considered very farfetched indeed.

Since this Conference is taking place within the framework of the World Decade for Cultural Development, I should like briefly to recall the origins of this Decade.

Initiated by UNESCO, the World Decade for Cultural Development was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly and is thus a United Nations Decade. This conference is a milestone for the Decade in that the World Bank, as far as I know, is the first institution in the UN system, apart from UNESCO, that has started serious implementation of the World Decade.

I would also like to emphasize that it is not a Decade of Culture. Kim Jaycox reminded you at the outset of this meeting of the wide definition of culture that is generally accepted today, and it is very important for us to keep this definition in mind at all times.

During these two days some of you have referred to culture not just *vis à vis* but almost versus science and technology. Let us not forget that, in our definition, science and technology are integral parts of culture. For Africa we have to emphasize that one of the challenges facing that continent, and which may offer possibilities for saving it, is to convince Africans that *science and technology are a part of their cultural heritage*.

Others among us asked the question: Which is more important, bread or museums? Museums are in many ways a fairly sophisticated expression of development. I would therefore prefer to put the problem another way: Which is more important, bread or song? Putting the question in these terms leads me to reflect on how it was possible for Africans to survive when they were deported from their lands to America and the West Indies. It is an assumption, not a theory, that they did not all go mad or die because they had the ability to sing. The songs of the Africans who were in the ships were indeed the bread that kept them alive.

Let me take another example. Looking around this room, we are in an auditorium of the World Bank. The Bank might easily have arranged this room without going to great expense. However, I see that the floor has been chosen with a certain taste there are even trees in the room. It is not luxurious, but it is more than pleasant. The assumption here, I think, is that the framework in which we work has a certain impact on the quality of our thinking and on the results of that thinking.

There is another aspect that we did not have time to go into of which I would like to give two examples that are important for our further discussions. One is the role of certain cultural and social attitudes in the field of economic management. I strongly believe that if we do not come to terms with the importance of family solidarity in Africa, we will not be able to solve the problem of achieving good management. In my country, the Congo, for example, during the colonial period, when a worker suddenly said to his boss,

"I have to go to my mother's funeral," the boss would say, "Well, go." A couple months or a year later, the same worker would come and say, "My mother has died." The boss would then say, "Look at these Africans. They are lazy laggards. How could you have two mothers?" This is a problem not of vocabulary but of culture. In my country you can have seven mothers. There is a word for "aunt" a word for your mother's sister that is a word like "little mother." If your father has different wives, they are your "mothers" also. If a friend of your mother is unable to bear children, and your mother gives her your brother or sister, this friend is also your "mother." So you see the problem of someone who is in charge of management and who has a duty to show his solidarity with all these people. There is some conflict with strict management as is learned in any university.

Another problem that was raised by Ismail Serageldin and by Neville Agnew was illustrated by a reference to mud housing. I think this is very important because there are a lot of houses in Africa that are built with cement and covered with corrugated iron, both of which are not only very expensive but also very ugly.

Once Africans become more aware of their cultural heritage and of the appropriateness of traditional skills and materials, they will build houses of mud bricks that will be cheaper and much more attractive.

A concept that has not been touched upon is that of cultural identity. Rather, the words themselves have not been used. Cultural identity is at the core of many presentations we have had, but perhaps some of us hesitated to say, "Let's not forget to continue to be African." Some raised the problem of cultural confrontation. As far as I am concerned, I think that now Africa has to stop feeling sorry for itself. Japan also has problems with the introduction of alien culture but the Japanese never have felt sorry for themselves. I think it is time to analyze the contradictions that exist in ourselves and in our societies and not be afraid to learn from the outside. Just because science and technology appeared in a certain part of the world does not mean that they belong to that part of the world. When Descartes said, "A-squared plus B-squared plus C equals X," this was not a French truth, nor was it a Dutch truth (since it was conceived in the Netherlands). It remains a truth for Africa and for Africans.

In this context I think the problem of language in Africa has to be seen in an unemotional way. I do not have time to elaborate, but very briefly let me say that French, English, and Portuguese are no longer foreign languages in Africa. They did not originate in Africa, but they are no longer foreign to us; they are African languages, and they belong to us. They have now become part of our culture. We can manipulate them, we can transform them. As a writer, I used to say that "I don't write French, I write *in* French."

We should not regret that in the debates during these two enriching days, there has not been much difference in the approaches of Africans and non-Africans. It is not necessarily a bad thing at all. It does not mean that we Africans are less African. It means that, beyond Africa, there are more and more people who are interested in Africa, and there are also people who are non-African who love Africa, and I think our task is to work with them. I also think that sometimes the views of those from outside are very useful and we would be very foolish not to heed them.

Many examples of African cultural heritage have been shown here. All of them were monuments. But we also have our sculpture, whose value was first demonstrated by Europeans Picasso, among others. Now our sculpture is valued more outside than inside the African countries. Indeed, Africans are frequently unaware of the real value of their artifacts, and many of our people who have a sadly low standard of living are selling important and precious objects of art very cheaply to outside buyers.

This was only to remind you of something that everybody already knows, but as the French say, "Open doors that are already open." It was only to emphasize the necessity of cooperation and solidarity. We are in a world of interdependence, and all that is required to move us forward is a spirit of solidarity.

Since the launching of the World Decade for Cultural Development in 1988, UNESCO has been paying particular attention to problems such as these that are part and parcel of the first and most important objective of that Decade, namely the cultural dimension of development.

The fact remains, however, that while many if not all of us in this room are convinced of the fundamental role that culture plays in the development of societies, we have not yet convinced the decisionmakers whether they be desk or field officers in our various agencies, or Ministers of Planning and Finance that we have a theory that can be put to practical use. In other words there is a vague, general acceptance that cultural values and practices are important; yet the fact remains that in reality, development projects are often undertaken as if in a vacuum or in a neutral human environment.

Why is this? How is it that such an obvious notion has for so long been left out of the development equation? And what can be done to set the situation right?

In fact perhaps we should not be surprised at all. In much of the world, and especially in Africa, development planning, as a conscious political strategy, has existed only for thirty years at best. In the beginning, moreover, the primary focus was decolonization; later, it was development "aid" often based on an idealized Western model (with the implicit assumption that development was somehow something we could do to, or for, others!).

It is really only recently that development strategies, and the development process itself, have become the focus for research. Over these past thirty years we have, of course, accumulated a good deal of information, and in many cases, even a certain degree of know-how. But much of this knowledge is fragmentary, and our understanding of how and why development sometimes works and sometimes does not is often itself more anecdotal than comprehensive. We are, to be frank, still far from being able to determine *beforehand* the eventual success of any given project.

At least in part on this account the 1980s witnessed an orientation away from what we might call "soft" development strategies to the more concrete realities of production, of commodities, of distribution of goods, and of manpower and training for practical tasks. At the same time the 1980s also saw the problem of massive foreign debt, and the attendant need for structural readjustment, come to a head. It was in this climate that the Strategy of the Fourth International Development Decade of the United Nations was conceived a strategy that, much to our dismay, did not include any significant reference to the cultural dimension of development in spite of our concerted efforts and in spite of the fact that it was, after all, the very Member States of the United Nations that conceived the World Decade for Cultural Development.

Perhaps the time was not ripe, or perhaps we ourselves were not sufficiently prepared. Whatever the cause, it brings us back to the point I made earlier that the practice of integrating cultural factors into development planning and project implementation is still far from common. But if we can now see better why this is so, we are still left with the question of how to set the situation right. This in turn brings me back to UNESCO's role as lead agency for the World Decade.

We see ourselves over the next few years confronted with a two-fold task. The first aspect that we must continue to address is to bring the message home to decisionmakers that, in the words of the World Bank, "Nations are like people; they grow from their roots." Development strategies that do not factor in the prevailing cultural mores and values of the target population are not just misguided they are incomplete and often counterproductive. But lest I be misunderstood here, let me hasten to add that culture is a sword that cuts both ways. While development in Africa must, of course, be based on and in the cultural traditions of the continent, traditional societies also must be able to benefit from the best and most useful aspects of modern culture sensibility to the environment, technical expertise and what is sometimes called "the culture of maintenance," and economic management and planning techniques to name but a few. In this sense culture in its broadest sense is no more a luxury than, say, capital investment or technology transfer.

This cooperation also needs to be *developed*. It became clear to me over the past two days that we at UNESCO are not alone in our efforts. It is very important that this whole family take up this idea, and I would like once more to say thanks to Kim Jaycox and Ismail Serageldin for having done that.

There are other agencies not represented here we are in contact already with USAID, Canadian CIDA, and British ODA, among others that are also intent on pursuing a broader, more human, what we have called a "cultural," approach to development. Alone, our efforts run the risk of remaining isolated and dispersed. In cooperation, however, we hope to create the synergy to accomplish together what each of us could never accomplish by ourselves. In a word we propose to work together with you and with others of a similar mind so that by the end of the World Decade for Cultural Development in 1997, what we in this room today know in *theory*, the world at large will then be able to learn in *practice*. The next step for us will be Abidjan in November, and I hope you will join us.

I cannot refrain from thinking about the words that were said here by a very wise man of Africa, Ali Mazrui. He told us, "Be cautious." He prevented us from simply saying, "Let's develop culture and the rest will follow." This is true. We have to stress the importance of culture, but let us not think that with the development of culture everything will be resolved.

So let me close by once again congratulating the World Bank for this happy initiative and by proposing that we very soon sit down together to decide what form this cooperation might take and what contribution UNESCO might make to the Bank's efforts to give culture its rightful place in development.

## Closing Remarks

Edward V.K. Jaycox

Vice President  
Africa Region  
The World Bank

It is always difficult to bring such an exciting debate to a close. Not only is it enjoyable to exchange views with such knowledgeable and experienced people, but also is it frustrating that so many important questions are left unanswered. Indeed, we have made but a very small step towards addressing this extremely complex issue a first effort at recognizing the link between culture and development. However, we should remind ourselves that the longest journey starts with one step. I believe that all of us who attended these two days feel encouraged that this step, however small compared to the vastness of the topic, was a determined one. Speaking for the World Bank, I believe that my colleagues and I are determined to continue struggling with these issues in the months and years ahead.

At the start of this conference Dr. Salim and I both expressed the importance of this qualitative cultural dimension of Africa's development challenge. Ismail Serageldin's visually rich presentation gave us a framework for dealing with culture in development, cogently arguing against the risks of ignoring the *positive* aspects of local cultures in pursuit of patterns of modernization that destroy local institutions *without* providing viable alternatives. Again, this was *not* a call to live in the past but rather an argument for an *integrated and integrating* cultural framework that makes modernization a truly endogenous process. He called for *a space of freedom* in which intellectual inquiry and expression go hand in hand with empowerment of people.

The pertinence of that argument was supported by Robert Putnam's impressive research on development and civic community in Italy. It is surely the most extensive and compelling empirical work done on this issue. But Professor Putnam tantalizingly left us bereft of answers to Professor Klitgaard's question: How do we move from "'Let's' take culture into account" to "'How' do we take culture into account?" Perhaps the "action-research" being undertaken by some of my colleagues will take us closer to the answer, provided we manage to sidestep some of the pitfalls that Mohammed Arkoun eloquently warned us against.

In the afternoon session Aaron Wildavsky and our own Mamadou Dia grappled with the issues of *values* and how they impact upon both institutional and societal development. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf brought an added measure of

down-to-earth pragmatism to the discussion. This question of values, however, remains another of these areas for which no clear and simple answers are likely to be found.

But our discussions on the first day were highlighted by our two keynote speakers. Ali Mazrui reminded us of the political transformation of Africa and how indeed one African cultural manifestation politicized ethnicity is clearly a risk to institutional pluralism, even as its positive aspects social solidarity need to be recognized and promoted. The future lies in building on these and other positive cultural society-wide issues.

Wole Soyinka, who was introduced by our own poet in residence Tijan Sallah, inspired us all. He reminded us not only that "history matters" but also that we all share a common humanity. I know that we all look forward to the publication of these proceedings to read and re-read his thoughtful comments.

Our second day, kicked off by Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, was rich in technical papers and detailed analysis. These clearly carry us a step further on the road to *how* to take cultural factors into account. One immediate manifestation of this is the preparation of a *Handbook for Cultural Heritage Conservation in Africa*, on which our environmental staff has worked long and hard. It will be available soon to staff of the World Bank and other development agencies.

The plenary discussion could not possibly do full justice to the rich material discussed in the four technical sessions, despite the excellent summary presentations made by the four rapporteurs. I therefore urge Ismail Serageldin to ensure that the full proceedings are produced rapidly, especially for the benefit of those of you who were crowded out of attending the session on "Economic Development: Culture as Cause or Consequence." But I must congratulate Tim Thahane for his excellent summation, which captured well the highlights of the discussions and distributed the responsibility for further follow-up among the key actors: researchers, donor foundations, governments, and international development agencies.

Tim, I promise you that we will do our part in addressing the ambitious agenda that you have assigned to us. I can assure you that we take to heart the truly central role that women play in society and that culturally sensitive development must also be gender-sensitive.

But it is our concluding speaker, Henri Lopes, to whom I turn with a plea. I was delighted by the thrust of your presentation, and I see clearly how this conference and its results will feed into the UNESCO-led World Decade for Cultural Development. My plea is to continuously reinforce the link between the "narrow" and "broad" definitions of culture that I mentioned in my welcoming remarks, for it is within the "broad definition" of culture that our concerns as development practitioners find substance and meaning. For we whose concern is the development of societies must be reminded that society itself cannot be

envisioned without a solid sense of cultural identity and its continuity through time. Cultural identity itself is evolving and changing certainly, but the change is best when it avoids "rupture" with the past in the name of a new start towards the modern.

I would like once again to express my thanks to the cosponsors of this conference the Governments of Norway and Sweden, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO who have made this event possible. We look forward to working with you again on these topics in the months and years ahead. We hope that this conference is just the beginning of a true partnership in promoting a more *holistic* vision of development.

I must again thank the participants, some of whom traveled far and long, for having so ably shared their insights and the fruits of their extended professional labors and enriched us all in the process.

However, grateful as we are for this personal enrichment, the challenge for us is to translate this into more effective, more sensitive, more perceptive, more far-reaching, more enabling, and more empowering support for the peoples of Africa.

Let us all commit ourselves to this from this day onwards.

## Appendix 1

### Towards Developing Tools for Integrating the Cultural Dimension into Development Plans and Projects

#### UNESCO Information Document

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

The "cultural dimension of development" is a concept that has emerged gradually over the past fifteen years, to a large degree as a consequence of studies carried out by UNESCO and some others in the interface of "culture and social affairs" and "culture and development."<sup>1</sup> The concept is intimately linked to the wider, anthropological definition of culture, which includes "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs."<sup>2</sup>

When it was decided that UNESCO should proclaim a World Decade for Cultural Development spanning 1988 to 1997, the cultural dimension of development came to be the first and most important of the Decade's four objectives, which are:

- Acknowledging the cultural dimension of development
- Affirming and enriching cultural identities
- Broadening participation in culture
- Promoting international cultural cooperation.

As compared with the other three objectives, the cultural dimension of development is also clearly the one that has implications far beyond the traditional cultural field. This is also the main reason that the World Decade for Cultural Development was proclaimed under the joint auspices of the United Nations and UNESCO: it is understood that the application of the first objective concerns most of the United Nations programs and specialized agencies and that

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<sup>1</sup>See Annex to this document. Persons wishing additional information may contact Maté Kovacs or Claude Fabrizio of the Secretariat of the World Decade for Cultural Development, UNESCO, 7 place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, France, (33) (1) 45.68.43.31/29.

<sup>2</sup>Declaration of MONDIACULT: World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mexico: UNESCO, 1982).

further development of this important concept would be a medium- to long-term undertaking in which the whole United Nations system should share.

By now, although there exists no fully consensual interpretation of what the cultural dimension really is, there seems to be a more and more general *recognition of its importance*. Various development strategies have been proclaimed and experimented with, and all have failed to achieve the goals set for them. Gradually, the shortcomings of strategies that are based primarily on economic and technical approaches to development problems have become apparent. There seems to be "an X factor," difficult to define and to capture fully, that has to do with "collective motivation" and that seems to have an important role in the success or failure of development projects. It would seem that when a project and the way in which it is executed strike the right chords in the collective subconscious of a people or a targeted group, it is the sign that one has managed to take the cultural dimension into account and made use of its mobilizing force. Conversely, and here the examples are more plentiful, when a project, both its intrinsic goals and the way in which it is implemented, is not in harmony with the cultural aspirations and values of the targeted group, it will probably fail to yield any lasting, positive effects. This is true even if the project turns out to be technically satisfactory. When there is mental rejection or indifference on the part of the targeted group, there is no dynamic, multiplicative development effect. Many concrete examples of this can be cited, most of which have to do with mistakes related to field projects in developing countries. But the phenomenon is not limited to development aid projects; the same experience has occurred in developed countries in which sometimes politically decided "reforms" meet with culturally conditioned rejection or at least indifference from the targeted groups.

To maximize development efforts, we want to minimize the risks of failure because failure means that money has been spent for nothing, work has been done in vain, and hopes have been frustrated. In some cases the overall result may even be negative. To avoid this and to maximize positive results is what "development strategies" are all about.

### **Development Takes Place at Different Levels**

If the adaptation of a project to its sociocultural context is important for its success, what then is the driving force that brings about development and that we have to temper and guide in the right direction?

Which are the really powerful factors that bring about major technical, economic, and social progress?

A historical study of major "development" events seems to indicate that the most spectacular "positive" changes all have been unplanned. They have had

to do with major discoveries, conquests, and migratory movements and are by their very nature unintended and therefore have not been linked to political programs or political decisions.

Between these major events, which have changed the course of the world, there is the undramatic, day-to-day building of the future, many activities of which contribute to what we generally understand as development, for example, better health care, improved educational facilities for schoolchildren, and a new infrastructure for tourism to create more jobs.

The first category, the "spectacular changes," by definition cannot be influenced through any deliberate actions to "adapt" them to the prevailing sociocultural pattern of a people or group. Not only would such an attempt be in vain, it would be nonsensical since the major, unplanned changes that have revolutionized the world have tended to overthrow existing value patterns completely and make way for new ones. These forces cannot be governed and hardly even tempered. Governments should be happy if they manage to deal reasonably with the consequences of these changes.

Therefore, there is no point in trying to introduce "the cultural dimension of development" as a new instrument with which to judge the suitability of the present road of humankind into the future. The objective of the integration of the cultural dimension in development is different: it is meant to prevent shocks or conflicts between traditional, "non-Western" cultures and societies and the culture of industrial societies, in other words, modernity. Its aim is also to trace the ways and means of compatibility and complementarity between them and to identify methods of introducing better standards of living among the populations of the developing world while trying to respect their previous lifestyles, value systems, knowledge, and know-how.

There is probably not much point either in trying to use the cultural dimension of development to test the viability of national long- or medium- term development plans (where they exist). Their goals belong to the political sphere, where collective dreams, personal ambitions, political prestige, and other such "irrational" factors have a decisive role to play. If the ruler of a poor country thinks that the creation of a national air force is the most important thing for the future of that country, he or she will do everything to achieve that, no matter what development experts say.

Thus, taking the cultural dimension of development into account will have a practical meaning only for the more undramatic, daily, often small-scale, development work. But on the whole, this is the level on which the international organizations and development banks and funds are operating. This small-scale, daily-life level is therefore of great importance to the entire United Nations system. If we can develop a methodology by which we can optimize the success

of projects through minimizing mistakes that result from lack of understanding of their sociocultural context, we will have achieved a lot.

### **We Need a Methodology**

How, then, should we go about developing such a "methodology"?

We cannot hope to develop any exact knowledge as to how cultural factors influence the result of a project in a given situation. The result of the complex interplay of factors technical, social, and cultural in a situation of *deliberate change* cannot be predicted. But this does not mean that nothing can ever be learned about these factors or that the outcome of a project is pure hazard. A comparison with another field of human activity may help to explain.

A hundred years ago or more nobody really cared to discuss whether the criteria for selecting and promoting chief executives whether for the public or the private sector, whether for civil or military purposes were the best possible ones. It was almost taken for granted that this process was based on power relations, family bonds, and adherence to ruling blocks.

But over the past half century much work has been done to detect the personal abilities and qualities that make a good chief executive and, more generally, people with supervisory and directing roles. We know now generally what set of qualifications and personal qualities are required for an individual to become "a good chief" and, conversely, why a person generally perceived as a hopeless director is a bad chief. But and this is the point this knowledge is never exact. Rather, it is a series of approximations based on collective experience. But human beings are infinitely complex, and a personal peculiarity perceived to disqualify one person may be perfectly bearable in another person whose complement of qualities is different.

However, this complexity does not preclude being able to establish certain *general rules*. If we want to be reasonably sure to have the right people in middle management, we should look for people who possess certain personal and professional qualities, and we should avoid promoting staff members who have sides to their personalities which by experience become problematic if they are charged with directing others. A company that tries to follow these general rules will minimize conflicts and will be reasonably efficient in its performance. Those who neglect these general rules will create management problems for themselves that will absorb time and energy from productive work.

### **How to Develop Practical Tools**

Since the World Decade for Cultural Development began in 1988, UNESCO has seen as one of its main tasks to help develop a methodology for taking the

cultural dimension of development into account for practical purposes, that is, develop the necessary *practical know-how* that still does not exist. Beginning in 1992, provisions to do this are included in the biennial program and budget of the Organization (1992-93).

The detailed plan for how to achieve this methodology is based largely on the assumption that it is possible to progress along lines similar to those indicated for "management development" as described above. UNESCO, therefore, has adopted a working hypothesis to synthesize empirical knowledge drawn from a multitude of case studies to arrive at "rules" for how the cultural dimension of development may be put to practical use. This working hypothesis also assumes that for each geocultural area of the world certain sociocultural factors are more important than others in playing an important role in a "situation of change." We also assume, as a working hypothesis, that these factors can be identified through empirical study and that such significant factors are limited in number, making it possible for us to address them yet not lose the overview.

If these assumptions turn out to be correct, it should be possible to establish, in principle, lists of sociocultural factors to be studied before a major project reaches the implementation stage to avoid mistakes and to take into account factors important for mobilizing popular support.

Much of the work to be carried out in a first stage is therefore, understandably, quantitative as much as it is qualitative. Evaluation reports, studies, books, and articles exist in many institutions, United Nations agencies, and bilateral donor agencies, and need to be studied to identify the cultural factors and patterns that condition development. Therefore, UNESCO needs the support from a network of selected key institutions in different parts of the world that take an active part in this type of research and development work. The Organization is presently making contacts with specialized research centers, nongovernmental organizations, and the research departments of intergovernmental institutions in charge of cooperation for development, including within the United Nations system. A meeting with experts from a number of such institutions will take place at UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, on September 7, 1992.

On the basis of these preliminary findings provisional practical guidelines will be worked out, but with the view first and foremost to *test* the first set of conclusions on field projects.

It is foreseen that the analytical work based on existing material should be carried out mainly in the biennium 1992-93. The following biennium will be marked by the experimental phase, during which the preliminary results will be tested in concrete situations. The third biennium, 1996-97, would be the period during which the assembled know-how is translated into practical tools to be used

for development planning purposes. All in all, the work plan comprises six years.

As was decided as early as October 1988 at an ordinary meeting of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), the other members of the United Nations family engaged in development work are called upon to participate, each in its own field, in this work. This is important, particularly when it comes to the experimental phase in which preliminary conclusions are to be tested on field projects. Several specialized institutions of the United Nations system have been invited to the September 7, 1992, meeting as explained above. An Inter-Agency Meeting will be convened by UNESCO in February 1993 to discuss the first draft of the methodological compendium.

## Annex

Several works have been published on this topic with UNESCO's assistance, while studies and research have been undertaken on specific technological developments, demography, urban development, communication, agriculture, food, and health. In 1991 UNESCO published two books on the subject in cooperation with the African Cultural Institute (ACI, Dakar): *Le sens de l'autre* by Dominique Desjeux and *Culture and Development* by Xavier Dupuis.

Another set of studies concerns the preparation and evaluation of development strategies at the regional, interregional, or world level. Some of these studies were carried out in preparing UNESCO's contribution to the framing of a new United Nations strategy for international development in the 1990s.

Case studies aimed at identifying the possible role of a cultural dynamic in technological, economic, and social changes have also been carried out in Algeria; Poona, India; the Kayes region in Mali; Guadalajara, Mexico; Sri Lanka; and Tunisia.

Experimental projects taking cultural components into consideration have been conducted in the Andean countries (joint use of traditional and new technologies in water supply), the Dominican Republic (rehabilitation of a slum district), Sierra Leone (educative popular theater for women), and Sri Lanka (enhancing cultural life in rural zones through light audio-visual media).

A series of advisory missions also have been carried out to incorporate cultural aspects in certain economic and technical cooperation agreements, including the Third Lomé Convention between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1984, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1984, the Lagos Plan of Action of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1985, and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) in 1985.

## Appendix 2

### Participants' Bio-data

**Ladipo Adamolekun**, a Nigerian national, is a Principal Management Specialist in the Capacity Building Division of the Africa Technical Department at the World Bank. He holds a D. Phil. in Politics from Oxford University. Formerly, he was Professor of Public Administration at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His research and publications focus on politics and administration in Africa. Dr. Adamolekun's works include *Sekou Touré's Guinea* (1976), *Public Administration: A Nigerian and Comparative Perspective* (1983), *Politics and Administration in Nigeria* (1986), and *Issues in Development Management in Sub-Saharan Africa* (1989). He also edited the Fall 1991 Special Issue of *Publius, The Journal of Federalism* on "Federalism in Nigeria: Toward Federal Democracy."

**Neville Agnew** has been Special Projects Director for the Getty Conservation Institute since 1991. He joined the Getty Conservation Institute in January 1988 as Deputy Director of the Scientific Research Program. Dr. Agnew came to the Institute from the Queensland Museum in Australia, where he headed the conservation section, which he was instrumental in establishing. Previously, his career had been in academic and research chemistry. Dr. Agnew's work in Australia was mainly on the preservation of sites, including fossil, maritime archaeological, and a nineteenth century penal settlement. Among his current research activities are a joint Getty Conservation Institute/New Mexico State Monuments project on adobe, the preservation of adobe sites by physical and chemical methods of protection, the development of stone consolidants in both laboratory and in field testing, and the development of means for preservation and protection of sites. He is in charge of Getty Conservation Institute special projects that include joint conservation work with the State Bureau of Cultural Relics in China at the ancient Buddhist cave sites of Mogao and Yungang, and projects in Africa, South and Central America, and Europe.

**Claude Daniel Ardouin**, a Malian, is a museum conservator, an anthropologist, and an historian. Since 1987 he has directed the West African Museums Programme (formerly Project) (WAMP) in Dakar, Senegal, which is affiliated with the International African Institute (IAI). Dr. Ardouin completed his university studies and earned his doctoral degree at the State University of Leningrad. From 1978 to 1980 he was Director of the Department of Ethnology of the Institute of Human Sciences at Bamako, Mali. From 1981 to 1987 he was Director of the National Museum of Mali.

**Mohammed Arkoun** is Professor of History of Islamic Thought at Sorbonne Nouvelle, University of Paris III. He served as an Assistant Professor at the Sorbonne from 1960 to 1969, doctor ès-littérateur at the Sorbonne in 1969, lecturer at Lyon University from 1969 to 1972, and professor of Arabic and Islamic Civilization at the University of Paris from 1972 to 1977. Dr. Arkoun was a Visiting Professor at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1968, the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve from 1977 to 1978, and the Papal Institute of Arabic Studies in Rome from 1978 to 1979. He has lectured in Europe and Northern Africa and has written many works on Islam, culture, and society, notably *Essays on Islamic Thought (Essais sur la pensée islamique)* and *For a Critique of Islamic Reason (Pour une critique de la raison islamique)*.

**Alberta Arthurs'** responsibilities at The Rockefeller Foundation, where she is Director for the Arts and Humanities, have included guiding the Foundation's grantmaking in international and intercultural scholarship and artistic experimentation and in fortifying institutions of the civil society, in both the United States and in countries of the South. Before joining the Foundation in 1982, she served for five years as President of Chatham College in Pittsburgh and has held academic and administrative positions at Chatham and at Harvard, Tufts, and Rutgers Universities. Currently a director of the Equitable Funds, Techno-serve, the Kenan Institute, and the Salzburg Seminar, she has served on the boards of a number of other not-for-profit and for-profit organizations.

**Coralie Bryant** is a Senior Institutional Specialist, Environment and Agriculture Operations Division, in the Latin America and Caribbean Department of the World Bank. Prior to this assignment, she was a Senior Management Specialist in the Institutional Development and Management Division of the Africa Technical Department and Senior Policy Analyst in the Bank's Policy Review Department. Before joining the Bank, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Overseas Development Council, where she directed a major project on southern Africa and edited *Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa*. Dr. Bryant was the co-director with Steve Arnold of the International Development Program at The American University for more than a decade. Author of three books and several articles and monographs, she has worked in developing countries on poverty policy, food security, institutional development, development management, urbanization, low-income housing, and participatory development. Dr. Bryant holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the London School of Economics.

**Cynthia C. Cook** is Principal Sociologist in the Environmentally Sustainable Development Division of the Africa Technical Department in the World Bank. She holds graduate degrees from Harvard University and the University of Denver and worked as a practitioner of development sociology in the private sector for ten years before joining the Bank in 1981. She has conducted field research in many parts of the developing world, but since 1985 her work has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa. Her current research concerns public participation in national environmental action plans (NEAPs), local participation in project environmental assessments, community environmental resource management, migration and settlement, indigenous peoples, and indigenous knowledge issues in Africa. She also contributes to the development of Bank operational directives and regional guidelines on social and environmental issues.

**Shelton H. Davis** is Principal Sociologist in the Social Policy and Resettlement Division of the Environment Department at the World Bank, where he is responsible for overseeing implementation of the Bank's policy on indigenous peoples. Previously, he was Senior Sociologist in the Environmental Assessments and Programs Division and in the Latin America and Caribbean Region's Environment Division. He earned a B.A. from Antioch College in 1965 and studied at the London School of Economics. In 1970 he received a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Harvard University. He has taught anthropology at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and directed the Anthropology Resource Center in Boston. Dr. Davis' field research has been in Brazil, Guatemala, and the United States. He was the author of a report for the World Bank's *World Development Report 1992* entitled "Indigenous Views of Land and the Environment." His publications include *Land Rights and Indigenous Peoples* (1988), *Witnesses to Political Violence: The Suppression of a Rural Development Movement in Guatemala* (1982), and *Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil* (1977).

**Pierre de Maret** is Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters and Professor of Archaeology and Anthropology at the University of Brussels, and an associate of the Royal Museum of Central Africa in Tervuren. Since 1970 his field work has concentrated on Central Africa in Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Zaire. He has lectured in many central African universities and started the Archaeology Department of the International Center for Bantu Civilizations (CICIBA), Libreville, Gabon. He has conducted a large feasibility study on the development of regional cultural cooperation in the Bantu world for the European Commission and is responsible for several projects on indigenous peoples in relation to the conservation of tropical forests. His interests are

focused on later prehistory, the Iron Age, ethnotechnology, applied anthropology, and museology.

**Francis Mading Deng** is Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Studies Program's Africa Project at The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Born in the Sudan, where he attended schools in both the African-Christian South and the Arab-Islamic North, he received a law degree from Khartoum University. He pursued post-graduate studies in the United Kingdom and the United States, obtaining a doctorate from Yale Law School in 1968. In addition to academic appointments in his home country and in several U.S. universities, Dr. Deng served as an international civil servant in the United Nations Division of Human Rights and as his country's Ambassador to Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States. From 1976 to 1980 Dr. Deng was Sudan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He subsequently joined the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as a Guest Scholar and was invited by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to be the first RBF Distinguished Fellow. Dr. Deng then returned to the Wilson Center as Senior Research Associate and was appointed one of the first Jennings Randolph Distinguished Fellows of the United States Institute of Peace. Besides his duties at The Brookings Institution, where he has been since 1989, he has been a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School on law and nation-building in Africa. Dr. Deng has authored or edited over a dozen books in the fields of law, anthropology, history, politics, and folklore, as well as two novels. His first book, *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan*, won the African Studies Association's 1972 Herskovits Award. Among his most recent books are a biography of his father, *The Man Called Deng Majok*; *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*; *Bonds of Silk: The Human Factor in British Administration in the Sudan*; *Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*; his second novel, *Cry of the Owl*; *The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan*; and *Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community*.

**Mamadou Dia** is Chief of the Capacity Building Division of the Africa Technical Department at the World Bank. Previously, Mr. Dia was Division Chief of Institutional Development and Management in the same department, Bank Resident Representative in Burkina Faso and in the Congo, Senior Loan Officer for several central African countries, and Principal Public Enterprise Specialist in the Africa Technical Department. Prior to joining the Bank in 1976, Mr. Dia occupied positions in the Government of Senegal, including Economic Advisor to Presidents Leopold Senghor and Abdou Diouf and permanent member of the Economic and Social Council. He also was general manager of the National Housing (OHLM), the National Railways Company (RCFS), and a mixed

Commercial Bank (BSK). Mr. Dia holds a B.A. in Economics from the University of Dakar and the Diploma in Public Administration from l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Senegal. He earned an M.B.A. from the Wharton School of Business and Finance, University of Pennsylvania. His most recent publication is *A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa* (1993).

**Daniel Etounga-Manguellé** is President of the Société Africaine d'Etude, d'Exploitation et de Gestion (SADEG). A Cameroonian, he holds degrees in civil engineering and political science from the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, a doctorate in Economics from the Sorbonne, and a degree in management from Harvard University. Dr. Etounga-Manguellé is a member of several international development committees including the Council of African Advisers to the World Bank. His latest book, *L'Afrique, a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel? (Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?)*, won the 1991 European Community Prize.

**John D. Gerhart** is Director of the Johannesburg Office of the Ford Foundation. Previously, he was Director of the Foundation's Africa and Middle East Programs. He holds a B.A. in History and Literature from Harvard College and a Ph.D. in Public Affairs from Princeton University. After joining the Ford Foundation in 1969, Dr. Gerhart worked as an economist for the Governments of Kenya and Botswana and then as Program Advisor in Agriculture for the Foundation in Eastern and Southern Africa. From 1980 to 1985 he was the Foundation's Representative for North Africa and the Middle East, based in Cairo. He is the author of numerous papers and reports on African agriculture.

**Edward V.K. Jaycox** is Vice President of the Africa Region of the World Bank. He received his B.A. from Yale University in 1959 and his M.I.A., specializing in African economic development, from the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, in 1964. Mr. Jaycox joined the World Bank in 1964 in the Young Professionals Program. He has served as an economist in the Transportation Division of the Projects Department and progressed from deputy division chief to director in the Transportation Projects Department. In 1976 he was appointed director of the Urban Projects Department; in 1979, director of the East Asia and Pacific Country Programs Department; and in 1984, vice president of the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office. He assumed his current position in 1987.

**Robert Klitgaard** is Professor of Economics at the University of Natal, Durban, South Africa. Professor Klitgaard has been Lester Crown Visiting Professor in the School of Organization and Management at Yale University, professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and the University of Karachi, as well as an economist at the RAND Corporation. His advisory work and research have taken him to twenty-five developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where he is particularly known for strategies to reduce corruption. His six books include *Adjusting to Reality: Beyond "State versus Market" in Economic Development* (1991), *Data Analysis for Development* (1985), and *Controlling Corruption* (1988) which has been translated into French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. *Tropical Gangsters* was named by the editors of *The New York Times Book Review* as one of six best nonfiction books of 1990. Professor Klitgaard holds A.B., M.P.P., and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University.

**Pierre Landell-Mills** became Senior Policy Adviser in the Office of the Vice President for Environmentally Sustainable Development of the World Bank in 1993 after having fulfilled the same responsibility in the Africa Technical Department. Educated at Cambridge University, he has devoted most of his professional life to the development of Africa. He worked as an economist in the Tanzanian Government Treasury from 1963 to 1965 and was the Government Economist/Director of Economic Affairs in the Botswana Government from 1966 to 1973. After joining the World Bank in 1973, he was at various times country economist responsible for Burundi, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Seychelles, and Swaziland. In 1976 he was transferred to the Department of Policy Planning. He was staff director and principal author of the *World Development Report 1983: Managing Development* and afterwards Division Chief for Operations for a group of francophone African countries. In 1989 he was the coordinating author of *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development; A Long-Term Perspective Study*.

**Jabez Ayo Langley** served as an Executive Director of the World Bank Group, representing twenty-one countries on the board, from 1990 to 1992 and was Alternate Executive Director from 1988 to 1990. A native of The Republic of the Gambia, he was his country's Secretary-General of the Government and Head of Civil Service from 1982 to 1988. He was also Secretary of the National Development Council, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development from 1974 to 1982, and Alternate Governor for the World Bank from 1975 to 1981. Dr. Langley holds a Ph.D. from Edinburgh University. His publications include "Employment, Human Resources and Adjustment in The Gambia" (1988), *Ideologies of Black Liberation in Africa:*

1856-1970 (1981), "Managing Rural Development in Africa" (1977), and *Pan-Africanism in West Africa: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes* (1973). He rediscovered and edited for Heineman in 1975 "The Blinkards," W.E.G. Sekyi's (Kobina Sekyi) 1914 satirical play, about Anglo-Fanti society in the Gold Coast, and has just completed for publication an anthology of Kobina Sekyi's philosophical, legal, and political writings from 1914 to 1950.

**Jean-Pierre Le Boudier**, a native of the Central African Republic, is an Executive Director of the World Bank representing twenty-four African nations. He received a Diploma in Agricultural Engineering from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agronomique as well as a Diploma in Development Management from the Institut d'Etudes Internationales des Pays en Voie de Développement, both in Toulouse, France. In the C.A.R. he was an engineer with the Planning and Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Rural Development; Deputy Director-General and Director-General of the National Cotton Company; Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry; and Minister of Planning and International Cooperation. From 1974 to 1976 he taught agricultural economics at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Bangui, C.A.R. From 1973 to 1980 he was a Member of the National Monetary Committee, and from 1978 to 1980 he was Governor of the World Bank for the C.A.R. Dr. Le Boudier entered the World Bank in 1981 as loan officer for the West Africa Programs II. He became an Alternate Executive Director in 1986 and an Executive Director in 1990.

**Henri Lopes** is the Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO, a post he assumed in 1986. A Congolese, Mr. Lopes was born in Leopoldville (today Kinshasa, Zaire) in 1937. He has an M.A. in History from the University of Paris. His career as a teacher led him to become Director-General of Education and Minister of Education in the Congo. After a term as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he became Prime Minister of his country. He joined UNESCO in 1982. A well-known writer of fiction, including short stories and novels, and poetry published in many languages, Mr. Lopes won the Grand Prix Littéraire de l'Afrique noire in 1972 for his collection of short stories, *Tribaliques*. He is the author of the words of the National Anthem of the Congo. He is a Member of the High Council of the French-speaking Community as well as of the Board of Governors of the Ecrans du Sud Foundation. Mr. Lopes was a member of the World Bank's Council of African Advisers from 1988 to 1990.

**Alexandre Marc** holds a doctoral degree from the Paris Institute of Political Science. He is a Senior Social Scientist in the Human Resources Division of the Technical Department of the Africa Region in the World Bank, where he works on social policy issues and on the design and implementation of social action

programs and social funds. As a member of the World Bank learning group on participation, he is involved in the analysis of participatory approaches. Prior to his assignment with the World Bank, he worked in many Sub-Saharan countries, including extended periods in Chad and Côte d'Ivoire.

**Ali A. Mazrui** is Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies and holds the Albert Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is also a Professor-at-Large at the University of Jos in Nigeria and at Cornell University. Born in Kenya, Dr. Mazrui obtained his master's degree from Columbia University and his doctorate from Oxford University. He served as Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan from 1974 to 1991 and as chair of the Department of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University in Uganda. He has lectured in many countries and is widely consulted on constitutional and educational reform. He is an advisor to the UNESCO General History of Africa project, UNICEF, and the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations. Dr. Mazrui worked to develop the 1986 television series "The Africans: A Triple Heritage," produced by the BBC and PBS, and the companion book of the same title. His other books include *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (1990), *Nationalism and New States in Africa* (with Michael Tidy, 1984), *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa* (1978, reprinted), and *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (1976).

**Susan Keech McIntosh** is Professor of Anthropology at Rice University in Houston, Texas, where she has taught since 1980. She received her M.A. from Cambridge University and her Ph.D. from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Since 1977 she has conducted research in West Africa with her husband, Roderick, funded by major grants from the National Science Foundation and the National Geographic Society. Results of this research have been reported in over forty articles, monographs, and reports. Dr. McIntosh was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University from 1989 to 1990 and is a contributing editor on West Africa to the *Journal of Archaeological Research*. She serves on the editorial boards of the *Journal of African History*, the *Journal of World Prehistory*, and *Antiquity*.

**Dawson Munjeri** is the Deputy Executive Director of the National Commission on Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe. He served as the Regional Director of the Southern Region, after serving as Deputy Director for the National Museums and Monuments, based at the archaeological and cultural site of Great Zimbabwe, from 1984 to 1986. Before 1983 he had been an oral historian and had commenced the first African Oral Tradition and History program of the

National Archives of Zimbabwe. He studied at the University of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), where he obtained a bachelors' honors degree in history in 1973 and a master of philosophy degree in history. He obtained a postgraduate diploma in information systems from the University of Wales. Mr. Munjeri has written numerous publications on museological and historical themes. He is a member of the Board of International Council of Museums of Ethnography (ICOM) and an executive member of the Southern African Development Coordination Countries Museums Association (SADCCAM).

**Azim A. Nanji** was born in Kenya. After graduating from the University of East Africa Makerere, he obtained his M.A. in 1970 and his Ph.D. in Islamic Studies in 1972 from McGill University. He also studied at Harvard University. Dr. Nanji taught at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia and then joined Oklahoma State University, where in 1982 he was appointed Professor and Director of the new Global Studies Center. He was Margaret Gest Professor of Religion at Haverford College in 1988 before taking his present post as Professor and Chair of the Department of Religion at the University of Florida. His books include *The Nizari Ismailis* (1978) and *The Religious World* (1982) as well as a forthcoming book on African religion and culture entitled *The Fruits of Two Wisdoms*. Dr. Nanji will serve on the Educational Consultative Committee for the 1996 exhibit in Washington, D.C., "The Arts and Cultures of the Islamic World," a joint project of the Smithsonian Institution and The Aga Khan Trust for Culture. He was a member of the 1992 Master Jury of The Aga Khan Award for Architecture and is a member of the Planning Committee for the Religion, Philanthropy, and Civil Society Conference, to be held at the Washington National Cathedral in 1994.

**Joseph H. Kwabena Nketia** is the former Director and now Emeritus Professor at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, and is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Theatre of Ghana. He is also Professor Emeritus at UCLA, Andrew Mellon Professor Emeritus in the Department of Music at the University of Pittsburgh, and in 1991-1992 was Langston Hughes Professor of African Studies, African-American Studies, and Ethnomusicology at the University of Kansas, Lawrence. He is a Fellow of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Science, an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, and a Member of Honor of the International Music Council (IMC). Dr. Nketia has served on the boards of directors of the International Folk Music Council, the International Society for Music Education, the IMC, the IMC-UNESCO "The Universe of Music: A History" project, and the UNESCO International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Humankind. His awards include the Order of Merit of the Government of

Ghana, the ASCAP Deems Taylor award for *The Music of Africa*, and the UNESCO-IMC Prize for distinguished service to music. A native of Ghana, Dr. Nketia received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of London in 1949.

**Sulayman S. Nyang**, Professor of African Studies, Howard University, Washington, D.C, stepped down as Chairman of the Department of African Studies in 1993 to take a sabbatical leave to write. Born in The Republic of the Gambia, he received a bachelor's degree in political science from Hampton Institute in Virginia in 1969. Dr. Nyang obtained a Master's of Public Administration and a Ph.D. in Government in 1971 and 1974 respectively from the University of Virginia. After serving as Assistant Professor and Acting Director of African Studies at Howard University, in 1975 he was appointed Deputy Ambassador and Head of Chancery of the Embassy of the Gambia in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He returned to Howard University in 1978 as Associate Professor of African Studies and in 1986 was appointed chairman of the department with the rank of full professor. Dr. Nyang has written and speaks extensively on Africa, and Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs. His most widely read work is *Islam, Christianity and African Identity* (1984). His latest publication, co-edited with Jacob Olupona, is entitled *Religious Plurality in Africa: Essays in Honor of John Mbiti* (1993). Dr. Nyang is particularly interested in African thought and religion and their implications for social and political change on that continent.

**Waafas Ofosu-Amaah** is a consultant for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Formerly, she was the Managing Director of WorldWIDE Network and Project Director of the Global Assembly of Women and the Environment. As a participant and rapporteur at the first African Women's Assembly in Harare in 1989, she assisted in drafting recommendations on women and the environment to be submitted to the African Environmental Ministers (AMCEN). She presented expert testimony to the U.S. Congress on women as environmental managers in the context of food and energy self-sufficiency in Africa. She has collaborated on the three subsequent Regional Assemblies of Women and the Environment and co-authored "African Women's Assembly: Women and Sustainable Development" and "Arab Women's Assembly: Role of Arab Women in the Protection of the Environment." A Ghanaian national, Ms. Ofosu-Amaah has experience in energy and environmental policy and law. Before joining WorldWIDE network, she was an associate at the Resource Dynamics Corporation, an energy and environment consulting firm; a consultant to United Nations agencies including UNEP and World Health Organization

(WHO); and a staff member at the Washington, D.C. office of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

**Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala**, a Nigerian national, is an economist and regional development specialist trained at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she obtained her doctoral degree in 1981. She joined the World Bank in 1982 through the Young Professionals Program and worked as an economist and senior economist for the agricultural sector in various countries in Asia and Africa. In 1989 she became Special Assistant to the Senior Vice President of Operations and in 1991 she became Division Chief, Agriculture Operations, in charge of the Middle Eastern countries. Dr. Okonjo-Iweala's research interests are in the area of rural financial markets, on which she has been published, and rural-urban linkages.

**Robert D. Putnam** is Gurney Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He served as Dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government from 1989 to 1991. A specialist in cross-national comparative politics and international relations, he is the author or coauthor of seven books, including *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1993), *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (1993), *Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits* (1988), *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (1981), *Comparative Study of Political Elites* (1976), and *Beliefs of Politicians* (1973). Dr. Putnam's articles have appeared in many domestic and foreign journals including *Foreign Policy*, *American Political Science Review*, and *International Organization*. He graduated from Swarthmore College in 1963, attended Oxford University's Balliol College, and received his doctorate from Yale University in 1970. After teaching at the University of Michigan for more than a decade, he served on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council before coming to Harvard as Professor of Government in 1979. Professor Putnam's current research focuses on the significance of "social capital" for economic development, democratic governance, and America's urban problems.

**Philip L. Ravenhill** has been the Chief Curator of the National Museum of African Art since April 1987. From 1982 to 1987 he founded and directed the West African Museums Programme (formerly Project) (WAMP) of the International African Institute. Based in Dakar, Senegal, WAMP works with museums in fifteen West African countries. Dr. Ravenhill obtained a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the New School for Social Research in New York in 1976 and was a full-time researcher in art history at the Institut d'Histoire, d'Archéologie africains of the Université d'Abidjan from 1978 to 1982.

**Salim Ahmed Salim** took office as Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in September 1989. He has held high public office in the United Republic of Tanzania including that of Prime Minister (April 1984 to October 1985), Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence and National Service (November 1985 to August 1989). From 1980 to 1984 he served as Tanzania's Minister of Foreign Affairs. After having been Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt from 1964 to 1965, High Commissioner to India from 1965 to 1968, and Ambassador to the People's Republic of China in 1969, in 1970 Dr. Salim was appointed Tanzania's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. During his 10-year appointment, he was elected President of the Security Council (1976) and President of the General Assembly (1979). Under his chairmanship from 1971 to 1979, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) played a key role in steering many colonies and non-self-governing territories to full sovereignty and independence. Dr. Salim was President of the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa in 1981 and the Paris International Conference against Apartheid in 1984. He did his undergraduate study at the University of Delhi in 1968 and obtained a Master's Degree in International Affairs at Columbia University in 1974. He holds three doctorates *honoris causa* in law from the University of the Philippines, the University of Maiduguri in Nigeria, and the University of Mauritius.

**Tijan M. Sallah** has been described as The Republic of the Gambia's leading young poet and writer. He joined the World Bank as a Young Professional in 1989 and is an economist in the Agriculture Division, Middle East and North Africa Country Department II. He holds B.S. and B.A. degrees from Berea College in Kentucky, M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and an honorary doctorate from the World Academy of Arts and Culture in Taiwan. Before coming to the World Bank, Dr. Sallah taught economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, and North Carolina Agricultural and Technical University. In addition to articles on economics, Dr. Sallah has published poetry, fiction, and critical reviews in *Black Scholar*, *Callaloo*, *Kentucky Poetry Review*, *West Africa*, and *Présence africaine*. He has published four books: *When Africa Was a Young Woman* (poems, 1980), *Before the New Earth* (short stories, 1989), and *Kora Land* (poems, 1989), and the most recent, *Dreams of Dusty Roads* (poems, 1993). He is editing an anthology called *The New Poets of West Africa* and serves on the editorial boards of *Poet* (India) and *African Commentary*.

**Ismail Serageldin** is Vice President for Environmentally Sustainable Development at the World Bank. Since joining the Bank in 1972, he has designed and managed a broad array of poverty-focused projects in developing countries. He

has worked extensively in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Educated at Cairo University and Harvard University, where he earned his Ph.D., Mr. Serageldin is an internationally published author on economic development, human resource issues, the environment, architecture, urbanism, the Arab world, Islam, and culture. His most recent publications include *Development Partners: Aid and Cooperation in the 1990s* (1993), *Saving Africa's Rainforests*, second edition (1993), *Friday Morning Reflections at the World Bank: Essays on Values and Development* (1991), *Poverty, Adjustment and Growth in Africa* (1989), and *Space for Freedom: The Search for Architectural Excellence in Muslim Societies* (1989).

**Alain Sinou** is both an architect and a doctor of sociology. He is a Research Officer at ORSTOM (L'Institut français de recherche scientifique pour le développement en coopération) and teaches at the Institute of Urban Planning at University of Paris VIII. For a number of years Dr. Sinou has worked on the issue of the architectural and urban heritage of West African cities. His principal publications on this theme are *Comptoirs et villes coloniales du Sénégal* (1993) et *Porto-Novo, ville d'Afrique noire* (1989).

**Ellen Johnson Sirleaf** is Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York. Prior to this she was Vice President and Director of Equator Holdings Company, a member of the Hong Kong Bank Group. She has served as Minister of Finance of Liberia, President of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Vice President of Citibank, Regional Office for Africa, and Senior Loan Officer at the World Bank. Ms. Sirleaf serves on the boards of directors of numerous African and international development institutions and was a member of the World Bank's Council of African Advisers from 1988 to 1990. Her most recent publication is *The Outlook for Commercial Bank Lending to Sub-Saharan Africa* with Francis Nyirjesy (1991). She holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Harvard University.

**Wole Soyinka** is the first African Nobel Prize Laureate for Literature. He was born and resides in Nigeria. A playwright, poet, novelist, and essayist, Dr. Soyinka is credited with inventing a new drama that revolutionized African theater through the fusion of his own Yoruba traditions with the Western. In the 1960s he founded the Orisun Theatre group in Nigeria, which trained actors and theater technicians. During his student years in London he both wrote plays *The Swamp Dwellers* (1973) and *The Lion and the Jewel* (1974) and performed at the Royal Court Theatre. A human and political rights activist, Dr. Soyinka was imprisoned for over two years by Nigerian authorities in the 1960s for his Biafra

sympathies during the Nigerian Civil War. This experience is described in his prison notes, *The Man Died* (1972). He has published more than twenty-two works, including the plays *A Dance of the Forests* (1962), *Kongi's Harvest* (1966), and *Death and the King's Horseman* (1975), the poetry collections *Ogun Abibimān* (1976) and *A Shuttle in the Crypt*, the novels *The Interpreters* (1965) and *Season of Anomy* (1973), the autobiographies *Ake: Years of Childhood* (1981) and *Isara* (1989), and two books of criticism, *Myth, Literature and the African World* (1976) and *Art, Dialogue, and Outrage: Essays on Literature and Culture* (1988). He has also produced films, *Culture in Transition* (1962) and *Blues for a Prodigal* (1984), and a record, *Unlimited Liability Company* (1983). Professor Soyinka has taught at the Universities of Ife, Cambridge, Yale, and Cornell. The 1986 Nobel citation describes him as one "who in a wide cultural perspective and with poetic overtones fashions the drama of existence."

**Ann B. Stahl** is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. Her prior post was at the Institute of Archaeology, University College, London. She studied archaeology and anthropology at the University of Calgary and at the University of California at Berkeley, where she received M.A. and Ph.D. degrees respectively. Her doctoral research focused on the transition to food production in West Africa and involved an analysis of Kintampo culture sites from central Ghana. Her more recent research combines archival, oral historical, and archaeological data to investigate patterns of change and continuity in the rural Banda area of west-central Ghana over the last several centuries. She is concerned with documenting changes that have accompanied increasing involvement in European imperial networks, including the impact of New World crops on the ecology of food production, implications of mercantile capitalism for local craft production, and changing forms of political organization and ethnic identity. Dr. Stahl's articles have appeared in *Ethnohistory* and *Current Anthropology* as well as in *Foraging and Farming: The Evolution of Plant Exploitation*, edited by D. Harris and G. Hillman.

**June Taboroff** has been active in cultural heritage management issues as a Cultural Resource Specialist in the Social Policy and Resettlement Division of the World Bank's Environment Department. She is currently residing in Britain while on sabbatical and continuing to work as a consultant for the Bank. She holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in architectural history from the Institute of Fine Arts of New York University. Her previous positions were research associate at the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Rome, assistant curator at the Negarestan Museum in Teheran, and researcher at the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

Dr. Taboroff has participated in archaeological excavations in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions.

**Timothy T. Thahane** is the Vice President and Secretary of the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). He served as the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United States from 1978 to 1980, as the Executive and Alternate Executive Director of the World Bank representing nineteen countries from 1974 to 1978, as Lesotho's Ambassador to the European Community from 1973 to 1974, and as Director of Planning, Central Planning and Development Office, The Prime Minister's Office, Maseru, Lesotho, from 1968 to 1973. His publications include *The Role of Institutions in Manpower Training and Utilization*, *Collective Bargaining Provisions in Major Manufacturing Industries in Canada*, *Lesotho: The Realities of Land-Lockedness*, *Developing Planning*, *The Impact of Major Factors of International Economy on African Economic Development*, and *International Labour Migration in Southern Africa*. Mr. Thahane is a member of the Board of the Centre for Economic Development and Population Activities, Washington, D.C., and of the Governing Board of the Centre for Research on the New International Economic Order, Oxford, London. He received his M.A. in Economics from the University of Toronto.

**Mamoudou Touré**, a national of Senegal, is Counsellor and Director of the International Monetary Fund's African Department. Mr. Touré was Minister of Economy and Finance of Senegal from 1983 through April 1988; this followed a period from 1981 when he was Minister of Planning and Cooperation, with responsibility for Economy and Finance added to his portfolio in 1982. Mr. Touré headed the Fund's African Department from 1967 until 1976, before he was called to serve as Special Adviser to the President of Senegal.

**Peter L. Watson** is Division Chief of Infrastructure Operations in the Sahelian Department in the Africa Region of the World Bank. He joined the Bank in 1974 as a transport economist. He was educated in Sheffield and at the University of Edinburgh. From 1970 to 1974, he was an Assistant Professor of Economics and a Research Associate in the Transportation Center at Northwestern University, where he taught courses in economic theory and the economic aspects of travel analysis and behavior. His research interests were in the area of travel demand analysis, including econometric models of travel demand, the value of time, and urban goods movements. Dr. Watson has written a book and numerous articles on these subjects.

**Aaron Wildavsky** was Class of 1940 Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Member of the Survey Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. He was also a Fellow of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and of the National Academy of Public Administration. Dr. Wildavsky wrote thirty-seven books including *Speaking Truth to Power*, *Searching for Safety*, and *Cultural Theory* (with Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis). The thirty-eighth, *But Is It True?* is being prepared for publication. Aaron Wildavsky died on September 4, 1993.

