ISSUE 4 JUNE 2014 Crime, Violence and Community-Based Prevention in Honduras By Louis-Alexandre Berg and Marlon Carranza1 Introduction hoods are more affected than others, and how some have succeeded in preventing violence, can point Violent crime has emerged as a growing develop- the way toward effective prevention approaches. ment challenge, affecting large segments of socie- ties and taking a severe toll on economic develop- This note summarizes the findings of a study of ment. Estimates of the costs to developing country crime dynamics and prevention practices4 focused economies range from 3 percent to 8 percent of around a comparison of nine communities in three of GDP.2 The World Bank has begun to confront this the most violent cities in Honduras.5 The research challenge through an approach that balances justice revealed that while the transnational drug trade, and law enforcement with prevention efforts that ad- economic downturn and political crisis have deep- dress risk factors associated with violence. In many ened the effects of organized crime, some communi- high crime environments, however, development ties have prevented these forces from taking root in actors have struggled in the face of weak institu- their neighborhoods. The study identified practices tions, fiscal constraints and political resistance that that communities have pursued to prevent violence, slow down reform and threaten sustainability. Exter- through collective responses and by effectively navi- nal actors also tend to neglect successful practices gating state institutions. It also examined the capa- within societies that could serve as the basis for pre- bilities of communities, municipal governments and vention. In Honduras, the most violent country in national institutions that enable or constrain these the world as measured by its homicide rate of 90.4 responses. In the context of the World Bank’s Safer per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013,3 variations in the Municipalities Project in Honduras, this research level of violence across time and space suggests points to evidence-based approaches for preventing that some communities have successfully prevented violence at the community level. The findings also crime. In 2012, 65 percent of homicides were con- illustrate how focused examination of the dynamics centrated in five percent of urban municipalities, and of insecurity and the ways communities manage it in a small number of “hotspot” neighborhoods within can inform efforts to improve public safety in vio- those cities. Understanding why some neighbor- lence-prone countries. 1 Louis-Alexandre Berg is a is a Justice and Conflict Specialist in the World Bank’s Justice Reform Unit; Marlon Carranza is a PhD Student in cultural anthropology at the University of Florida. 2 The World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. p. 65; World Bank. 2011. Crime and Violence in Central America. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 3 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2013. Global Study on Homicide Data. Vienna: UNODC. 4 Louis-Alexandre Berg and Marlon Carranza. 2014. “Crime, Violence and Community Based Prevention in Honduras.” Wash- ington, DC: The World Bank. The study was conducted with the generous support of the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Pro- gram (BNPP). 5 The research was conducted in Choloma, La Ceiba and El Progreso. In each municipality, three neighborhoods were select- ed with similar income but varying homicide rates. The research included focus groups and interviews with community lead- ers, residents, and municipal officials, including with victims of violence. 1    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 How Has Violence Changed? drug routes through Honduras.8 The steeply rising crime rate in Honduras can be These trends have con- linked to a combination of risk factors that have tributed to two sets of “Here, we can see that evolved in recent years. The percentage of the changes in the nature there is a strong presence country’s population living in poverty increased from of violence from the of a cartel. I don’t know 58.3 in 2007 to 66.2 in 2012, following the global perspective of affected what it’s called, but they economic downturn, and Honduras has maintained communities. First, the operate through the gangs one of the highest levels of income inequality in Lat- youth gangs (maras) that grew up within this in America. Youth unemployment, which increased that previously domi- neighborhood. All of the from 4.9 percent in 2007 to 8.2 percent in 2012, nated neighborhoods gangs are part of this   along with limited access to secondary school and have given way to new group. The cartels have easy access to firearms have contributed to youth forms of criminal organ- succeeded in converting involvement in crime. Homicides overwhelmingly ization. The maras, the gangs into their drug involve youth and guns, with 83 percent committed which were driven by distribution arm.” with firearms and 62 percent of victims between the shared identity, local - Community Leader, ages of 15 and 34.6 The rise in homicides also coin- economic extraction Choloma cides with a sharp increase in drug trafficking. Pres- and control over territo- sure from law enforcement in Mexico and the Carib- ry, have either been repressed, coopted into trans- bean, combined with competition among trafficking national crime networks or eradicated. While they networks, has pushed the trade into Central Ameri- still maintain control over some neighborhoods, in ca. Honduras has emerged as the primary transit most areas they have been pushed out by organized country for cocaine from South to North America.7 crime groups seeking to established control over This shift deepened after the 2009 coup d’état, larger areas, or by vigilante groups who have target- which weakened state capacity, deepened political ed gang members while often forging their own links polarization and created opportunities for criminal to organized crime. As a result of competition for networks. As shown in Figure 1, homicides are con- control over lucrative drug smuggling routes, the en- centrated on the northern coast along the primary vironment remains fluid and constantly changing. Figure 1: Cocaine Trafficking Routes through Honduras (Source: UNODC 2013) 6 UNAH-IUDPAS (Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad). 2014. “Observatorio de la Violencia, Boletin Enero-Diciembre 2013.” Edition 32, February 2014. 7 UNODC. 2012. “Cocaine, Organized Crime Groups and Violence”; US Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2012. “Cocaine Smuggling in 2011.” 8 UNAH-IUDPAS. 2014. “Observatorio de la Violencia, Boletin Enero-Diciembre 2013.” Edition 32, February 2014. 2    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 The types of crime committed by unknown people from elsewhere. This “Although robberies are have also evolved, evolution has created new challenges for communi- against people here, people fueled by growing eco- ties and made collective responses more difficult. come from elsewhere, from nomic incentives. As Nonetheless, some residents still report that while other neighborhoods, they one resident noted, crime is all around them, they feel safe in their own   sometimes walk around “there are no longer block or neighborhood. This perception points to the armed and one can’t oppose massacres committed highly localized nature of crime, as well as to capaci- them.” –Youth, El Progreso during the clash of two ty of some communities to mitigate the effects of per- maras.” The violent vasive crime. turf wars between rival maras that resulted in homicides among gang mem- Why Are Some Neighborhoods More Violent bers and innocent bystanders have subsided in Than Others? many neighborhoods, replaced by targeted killing and organized crime with economic motives. Com- Within these overall trends, the characteristics of munities note a dramatic increase in the sale and each municipality and neighborhood affect the level consumption of marijuana and cocaine, including and nature of violent crime. La Ceiba’s position on among school-age children and youth. Extortion, the coast makes it a landing point for drug boats and assault and robbery have become so widespread, planes, resulting in intense competition for control of especially along transport routes, that they form part strategic locations. Choloma and El Progreso are of daily experience and are not even recognized as more affected by internal transit and the local drug out of the ordinary. trade. Crime in the latter two cities is exacerbated by rapid migration, transient populations and unemploy- These changes have contributed to an increased ment associated with their industrial zones. Cholo- sense of uncertainty and fear in urban neighbor- ma struggles with large urban slums and limited ser- hoods. Although many residents perceive that visi- vices for a rapidly growing population. Yet these so- ble forms of violence have declined as gang warfare cietal level factors do not account for the variation has decreased, violence has also grown more unpre- among neighborhoods within each municipality. As dictable. Unlike in the past when perpetrators were shown in Figure 2, while the highest homicide rates easily identified as gang members from their own are concentrated in neighborhoods with low – but not communities, crime has become more anonymous, the lowest – average incomes, even at this income 3    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 level violence varies significantly.9 Community Capabilities, Collective Action and Criminal Control Comparisons among communities with different lev- els of violence point to the role of community-level An important distinction among Honduran neighbor- organizations and their links to municipal and state hoods in preventing violence involves the fragmenta- institutions in shaping their ability to prevent vio- tion or cohesion of their internal organization and re- lence. On the surface, community organization and sulting capability to act collectively. Based on a institutional presence appear quite similar across mapping of community organization in each neigh- communities. In most neighborhoods, a community borhood, the study found that in less violent neigh- leadership board known as the patronato is elected borhoods, denser ties across organizations and sub- every two years and serves as the official liaison to groups enable community-wide initiatives, while a the municipal government. Residents join church stronger sense of community identity facilitates com- groups, sports teams, parents associations and munication and collective action. These communi- youth and women’s groups, and government pro- ties tend to benefit from stable residency that fosters vides a primary school and other basic services. Yet a shared historical narrative, effective leaders who a comparison of the neighborhoods at highest risk of bridge organizations, and dense social networks that violence found that the density and level of activity facilitate collaboration. Such attributes often emerge among community organizations appears to be asso- from structural factors like settlement and migration ciated with lower homicide rates, as shown in Figure patterns, geographic proximity to drug transit routes, 3.10 Qualitative research further revealed that their and the nature of economic opportunities. In some effectiveness depends less on their level of activity, cases, however, they have been cultivated through than on the nature of community organizations in two the deliberate efforts of municipal government or civil respects: whether they actively collaborate to organ- society. ize collective crime prevention measures; and how effectively they secure resources from the state. In many of the safer neighborhoods, residents organ- ize their own initiatives to prevent violence. Commu- 9 Average monthly energy consumption is used as a proxy measure for neighborhood income level. 10 Neighborhoods perceived as affected by violence were given a score based on the number and level of activity of com- munity organizations. 4    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 Two Forms of Violence Prevention: nity members exercise informal social control to pre- vent incidents of crime, and organize activities that Two neighborhoods with low homicide rates in El Pro- reduce risk factors. As one resident stated, “we stay greso reveal different forms of violence prevention. informed on what is happening in different sectors of One was established by agricultural workers with jobs in the neighborhood…whenever there are problems, the nearby banana plantations. Community leaders, whether they are natural disasters or violence, we who have been present since its founding, have fos- find out and try to be supportive among neighbors.” tered community-wide organization. Residents share a While in all communities neighbors assist each other neighborhood identity, describing each other as “warm, with a variety of tasks, in less violent communities humble people, who are ready to collaborate.” They their actions go beyond addressing immediate needs have adopted several crime prevention measures, from to community-wide responses. As organizations col- rehabilitating public spaces to banning the sale of alco- laborate, they facilitate communication and generate hol, and boast that gangs have never been present in shared norms. The result is consistent with the their neighborhood. The other was constructed in the “collective efficacy” – the combination of shared aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and settled by migrants. norms and collective action – that has been ob- Plagued by poverty, limited ties among residents and an served in other countries, but the types of organiza- absence of shared identity, the neighborhood came un- tion and forms of action are unique to Honduras.11 der the control of a notorious criminal group. Monitoring Importantly for violence prevention, community or- by this group prevents certain forms of violence—no ganizations already exist in most neighborhoods, outsider can enter without permission—but it conducts and the ties needed to facilitate action are relatively extortion and crime within and outside the neighbor- easy to achieve. hood. In general, however, Honduran communities have trended toward increasing fragmentation. Urban mi- connections among residents. Lacking a common gration, erosion of traditional practices, few commu- identity or neighborhood-wide networks, individuals nity-wide cultural activities, and the proliferation of only know members of their own church or organiza- Churches – every neighborhood contains several tion and rarely collaborate across sub-groups. This Protestant and Catholic churches – have weakened fragmentation limits the impact of violence preven- Community Crime Prevention Initiatives: Monitoring Suspicious Activity. Residents of less violent communities cited examples of robberies, assaults and other crimes prevented when neighbors monitored homes, businesses and schools and noticed suspicious individuals. Banning the sale of alcohol. Using favorable municipal ordinances, some patronatos have banned the sale of alcohol in neighborhood shops and bars. Enforcing such bans requires a high level of community organization and capability for collective action. Managing Public Spaces. Rehabilitating public spaces can eliminate opportunities for crime and facilitate recreational activities. More important than the space is the organization necessary to build it, manage it, and resolve conflicts around its use. In neighborhoods that lack such organization, rehabilitated spaces have been taken over by criminals. Resolving Community Disputes. Residents of communities with low levels of violence described the role of the patronato and informal leaders – pastors, youth leaders, or individuals – in resolving property, business or family disputes before they escalate. Organizing “at-risk” youth. In some neighborhoods, individual leaders identify and organize at-risk youth, most often through sports teams or church groups, and provide them with informal education involving positive values and self- discipline. Responding to Domestic Violence. Victims who freed themselves from abusive situations described the support of com- munity networks – their neighbors and colleagues – in encouraging them to take action, serving as witnesses, and providing financial and moral support. Employers played a crucial role in allowing them to take paid leave to appear in court. 11 On the concept of collective efficacy, see Sampson, R. 2012. Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighbor- hood Effect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 tion activities like infrastructure rehabilitation, sports shoulder the burden of building the basic infrastruc- and education, which fail to translate into community ture.12 A combination of pressures facing municipali- -wide efforts. Instead, residents rely on individual ties – including irregular fiscal transfers, centralized measures– staying home at night, avoiding certain resources, difficulty accessing credit, and absence of areas, or not carrying valuables – to reduce the risk data – inhibit effective planning and budgeting. In- of falling victim to crime. stead, most infrastructure and service improvements results from requests by the patronatos, who play a Some fragmented neighborhoods nonetheless main- central – and often exclusive – role in liaising be- tain low levels of violence as a result of coercive tween the community and the municipal government. control by a dominant armed group. The identity of Service-delivery often takes on either a political logic these groups varies, from criminal gangs, to secre- as patronatos who mobilize supporters are rewarded tive vigilante groups, to organized crime networks. with projects, or a financial one as patronatos or offi- Those that successfully push out or eliminate rivals cials exploit their position as the exclusive channel sometimes succeed in creating a partial sense of between commu- security as a result of the absence of turf wars. “When we come and convene the nities and the Some of these groups monitor everyone who enters community and say we are going state to line their the neighborhood, and do not allow outsiders – in- pockets. In most forward with a project…when we cluding police or other state officials – to enter with- neighborhoods, don’t receive a response, our out their permission. They sometimes protect mem- residents point to credibility begins to decay.” bers of their communities, as one resident noted: “if unfinished or non – Community Leader, Choloma someone is assaulted, they go to the organized -functional bridg- crime group, and they respond much more quickly es, sewer pipes, “The patronatos used to sell than the police.” While some forms of violence de- school buildings [publicly owned] properties and cline, however, others persist as these groups extort and other pro- kept the money … They began to local residents and business, violently intimidate ri- jects that color sell the properties once, again   vals, and carry out criminal activity in surrounding their perception and again, until the point that areas. of the state and there were properties with up to undermine vio- four titles, up to three or four own- Navigating the Institutional Landscape lence prevention ers … Now we don’t have a measures. school, and this is the result of Communities that have successfully prevented or these dishonest actors, of the first reduced violence have also demonstrated the capa- The inability of patronatos. They didn’t bother bility to obtain resources from municipal or national the national po- leaving a property for a park, for a state institutions, in order to improve neighborhood lice and criminal football field, for a church, for a infrastructure, access specialized expertise, or utilize justice system to health center, for a school.” social services. This capability is especially notable control violent - Community Leader, La Ceiba given the uneven presence of basic services in ur- crime further un- ban communities and the obstacles for many com- dermines residents’ confidence in the state. A com- munities to access the resources needed for preven- plex relationship to these authorities emerged from tion activities. Effective community organization can the research: many residents expressed their desire help, but their success also depends on the systems for greater police presence , but they have little faith for planning and service delivery by municipal and that the police will respond when called upon, or that national governments. reports will lead to prosecution. Residents are also deterred from reporting by fear of retaliation by crimi- The most direct contact for urban residents lies with nal groups, given widespread perception of links be- municipal governments, which fund and manage tween police and organized crime. Most victims of most infrastructure inputs and facilitates key ser- crime interviewed for the study chose not to report vices. Yet municipalities have only circumscribed their crimes to the police, and none of those who did authority over most services, like education, water, received a helpful response. Residents instead turn sewage, electricity and roads, despite their need to to armed actors – some of them criminal – to resolve 12 For a detailed description of such arrangements, see: The World Bank. 2013. Honduras Public Expenditure Review: Toward Restoring Fiscal Consolidation. Washington, DC: The World Bank 6    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014 public safety problems. prosecutors and “I worked in the “Star” factory judges to respond and they gave me permission Despite these challenges, some communities suc- to their specific [to go to court] and did not sub- ceed in securing the state resources they need to needs. Neither tract from my salary, this helped pursue prevention activities. The most successful community net- me a lot, and I had a colleague patronatos are those who are most persistent, have works, nor munici- who had the same experience the best personal connections to government offi- pal and state au- and encouraged me to report… cials, or both. They are more effective, however,   thorities could have I felt confident after I spoke to when they are backed up by an organized communi- succeeded without the chief of the investigative ty. Dense community networks tend to exert greater the support the police...then the judge asked pressure on the patronatos to deliver, and the in- other. Initiatives me what I wanted…” volvement of multiple residents seeking state re- that bring together – Woman, victim of domestic sources through various channels leads to a greater community, munici- violence, El Progreso likelihood of response. Improvements in municipal pal and national governance systems can also help, by facilitating efforts to respond more regular communication with citizens, and by to other issues, like school-based violence and drug mobilizing resources from national institutions. One consumption, hold similar promise in helping com- municipality in northern Honduras, Puerto Cortes, is munities secure the resources they need for preven- often cited for its success in reducing homicide rates tion efforts. through a combination of improved data collection and planning, effective revenue mobilization, target- Conclusion and Entry Points ed infrastructure investments, and efforts to coordi- nate with the police. In other municipalities, the cre- Despite overwhelming challenges, it is possible to ation of hotlines, public-private partnerships and prevent violent crime from the ground up. Since transparency committees have helped to improve neighborhood context affects where crime occurs access to services by providing multiple means and criminal groups take root, understanding this through which affected communities could resolve context can inform which approaches are most likely their grievances, and helping to link them with a to succeed. Prevention work at the neighborhood combination of local and national sources of support. level has tended to focus on features of the physical environment – like lighting and public spaces – that A striking example of effective state response – in facilitate crime. This research shows that the social cases of domestic violence – sheds light on the ele- and organizational environment also matters, and ments of institutional effectiveness in this context. highlights the salient features of community life in Several victims of domestic violence interviewed for Honduran cities. In neighborhoods that have re- the study spoke positively of their experiences seek- mained relatively peaceful, community organizations ing assistance. that reach across sub-groups and promote a shared “The police only come when there Support by sense of identity have helped to overcome fragmen- are deaths. They spend three or neighbors, com- tation, enabling communities to adopt simple but ef- four days riding around the neigh- munity leaders, fective collective measures to prevent crime, and borhood, and then we don’t see women’s associ- secure resources to sustain them. Although these them anymore.” ations and em- capabilities often result from historical factors, such - Woman, Choloma ployers helped to as settlement patterns, economic opportunities, and ensure that vic- entrenched social norms, they can also be fostered “I: Did you formally report the tims had the in- through targeted efforts to build community organiza- crime to the authorities? R: No, I formation, en- tions while working to address structural factors over   was afraid. I was afraid of those couragement, time. who were supposedly arrested. I and financial sup- prefer paying to reporting. Then I port they needed As the World Bank expands its support to prevent feel more relaxed, I don’t go to pursue their crime and enhance citizen security, evidence of local around thinking why did I report, cases. Municipal level practices can inform its approaches. Crime they will arrest them and investi- women’s offices prevention in these environments can pose consider- gate them and I will have prob- worked together able risks. In the face of transnational forces beyond lems.” – Man, La Ceiba with specialized any one government’s control, combined with incen- 7    JUST DEVELOPMENT JUNE 2014   tives for corruption, political resistance and institution- lizing resources from national-level institutions, while al weakness, external funding can have little impact encouraging them to invest in community organiza- and even do harm if it ends up in the wrong hands. tion and support national-level reforms. The pres- Efforts to reform police and justice systems have en- sures that have inhibited prevention efforts cannot countered resistance in many violence-affected coun- easily be overcome. Even for well-intentioned munic- tries, and in Honduras evidence of success at the na- ipal officials and community leaders, the incentives to tional level remains scarce. Nonetheless, experience politicize or divert municipal resources remain strong. in Honduras demonstrates that engaging with com- In Honduras, obstacles to reforming the police, justice munities can lead to tangible improvements. It also system, and local governance remain high as nation- clarifies the types of support to municipal and national al-level policymakers contend with competing visions institutions that can expand effective practices. and loyalties in the midst of deep political polariza- tion. Yet examples of success can be found among The research thus points to entry points for further local and national institutions, for example in respons- investment, with an appropriate dose of caution. Ef- es to domestic violence and in municipal planning. forts to strengthen community-level organizations in Examining these cases can elucidate ways in which ways that deepen intra-community ties and overcome engagement with actors at various levels – local, mu- fragmentation could enhance the sustainability and nicipal and national – can facilitate their efforts to impact of crime prevention programs. Such invest- navigate these obstacles, and to develop sustainable ment costs little, but requires embedding into pro- solutions to the realities they face. grams measures to systematically engage with com- munities. Support to municipal governments can help by building their capacity for more transparent munici- pal planning, communication with citizens, and mobi- 8