48961 DARFUR DIMENSIONS OF CHALLENGE FOR DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND VOLUME JUNE 29, 2007 This program of work was led by Jeni Klugman (Lead Economist, World Bank and Task Team Leader). The overall volume was prepared by Jeni Klugman and Asbjorn Wee, and a team of lead authors responsible for specific chapters, namely: Nadeem Karmali (MDG), Vivek Srivastava (governance), Patrick Mullen (basic social services), Jack Van Holst Pellekaan (agriculture and rural development), Terje Wolden (infrastructure), and Magdi Amin (private sector development). Each chapter involved a broader team, which is acknowledged at the outset of each chapter. Ishac Diwan provided overall guidance and advice, and several colleagues and experts also contributed, including: Andre Nzapayeke, Asif Faiz, Eltigani Ateem, Dave Mozersky, George Banjo, Jeeva A. Perumalpillai-Essex, Andrew Cox, Olivier Mukarji and Bernard Harborne. The substantial support of the Governments of the Netherlands and United Kingdom is gratefully acknowledged. This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ABS Agricultural Bank of Sudan GAC Gum Arabic Corporation ACT Artemisin combination therapy GAM Global Acute Malnutrition ADB African Development Bank GDP Gross Domestic Product ANC antenatal care GER Gross Enrolment Rate ARI acute respiratory infection GFS Government Finance Statistics BCG Bacille Calmette-Guérin GIS Geographic Information System BEC Basic Education Certificate GNU Government of National Unity BHU Basic Health Unit GOS Government of Sudan CAA Civil Aviation Authority GOSS Government of Southern Sudan CAR Central African Republic GS Gezira State CBOS Central Bank of Sudan HFO Heavy Fuel Oil CBS Central Bureau of Statistics HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ CDC Centers for Disease Control Acquired Immunodeficiency CE-DAT Complex Emergencies Database Syndrome CFCI Child Friendly Communities HMIS health management information Initiative system CGA Chamber of General Auditing HR Human Resources CPIA Country Policy and Institutional ICA Investment Climate Assessment Assessment IDP Internally Displaced Person DGM Deputy General Manager IFAD International Fund for Agriculture CHC community health committee Development CHP community health promoter IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on CHW community health worker Development CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement IMC International Medical Corps CSO Civil Society Organization IMCI Integrated Management of Child DHS Demographic and health Survey Illnesses DJAM Darfur Joint Assessment Mission IMF International Monetary Fund DLC Darfur Land Commission IMR infant mortality rate DOS Department of Statistics INC Interim National Constitution DPA Darfur Peace Agreement IRC International Rescue Committee DPT diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus ITN insecticide-treated net DRDP Darfur Reconstruction and JAM Joint Assessment Mission Development Fund KCJ Kenyan Ceramic Jiko EFA Education for All LG Local Government EMIS Education management information LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress system LLIN long-lasting insecticidal net EmOC emergency obstetric care LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas ERMD Electricity Regulatory and MA Medical Assistant Monitoring Directorate MBB Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks ESIA Environment and Social Impact MCH maternal and child health Assessment MDG Millennium Development Goal EWARS Early Warning and Alert Response MFI microfinance institution Surveillance System MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey FAO Food and Agriculture Organization MMR maternal mortality ratio FCT Federal Chamber of Taxation MoAL Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock FFAMC Fiscal and Financial Allocation and MoE Ministry of Education Monitoring Commission MoF Ministry of Finance FGC Female Genital Cutting MoFNE Ministry of Finance and National FMHESR Federal Ministry of Higher Education Economy and Scientific Research MoH Ministry of Health FMoE Federal Ministry of Education MPP&PU Ministry of Physical Planning and FMoH Federal Ministry of Health Public Utilities MSF Médecins sans Frontières SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition MTRB Ministry of Transport and Roads & SBA skilled birth attendant Bridges SCOM State Council of Ministers MUAC mid-upper arm circumference SD Sudanese Dinar NA Native Administration SFC supplementary feeding center NCCER National Center for Curricula and SHHS Sudan Household Health Survey Educational Research SLA/M Sudan Liberation Army/Movement NCP National Congress Party SME Small and Medium Enterprise NCTE National Council for Technical SMoH State Ministry of Health Education SMS Safe Motherhood Survey NCWS National Committee for Wages and SNAP Sudan National HIV/AIDS Control Salaries Increase Program NEC National Electrical Corporation SPLA/M Sudan People‘s Liberation Army / NER Net Enrolment Ratio Movement NFC National Forest Corporation SRC Sudan Railways Corporation NGO non-governmental organization SSC Sudan School Certificate NHA National Highway Authority STI Sexually Transmitted Infection NIF National Islamic Front TA Technical Assistance NKS North Kordofan State TB Tuberculosis NLC National Land Commission TBA Traditional Birth Attendants NRDF National Reconstruction and TFC therapeutic feeding center Development Fund TFR Total Fertility Rate NSSF National States Support Fund UAE United Arab Emirates OCHA Office for the Coordination of UN United Nations Humanitarian Affairs UNAIDS United Nations Program on ORT Oral Rehydration Therapy HIV/AIDS O&M UNDP United Nations Development PC People‘s Committee Programme PCR Pupil-Classroom Ratios UNEP United Nations Environment PER Public Expenditure Review Programme PFM Public Financial Management UNESCO United Nations Educational, PHC primary health care Scientific, and Cultural Organization PHCC Primary Health Care Center UNFPA United Nations Population Fund PHCU Primary Health Care Unit UNICEF United Nations Children‘s Fund PLWA Persons Living With HIV/AIDS UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan PPD Plan Protection Department USAID United States Agency for PSCAP Public Service Reform, International Development Decentralization and Capacity VAT Value Added Tax Building Project VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing PTA Parent-Teacher Association WB World Bank PTR Pupil-Teacher Ration WBI World Bank Institute RED Rural Electrification Directorate WES Water and Sanitation RH Reproductive Health WFP World Food Programme RSS Red Sea State WHO World Health Organization TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ....................................................................................................................................................... I MAP OF DARFUR ......................................................................................................................................... II CHAPTER 1. DIMENSIONS OF CHALLENGE TO DEVELOPMENT IN DARFUR ............................................. 1 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES..................................................................................................... 1 B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................... 1 Pre-independence ............................................................................................................................ 1 Post-independence........................................................................................................................... 2 C. GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ..................................................................................... 3 Competition for Local Power .......................................................................................................... 3 Ethnicity, Politics and Development ............................................................................................... 4 An Emerging Vacuum of Local Governance ................................................................................... 6 Lack of Accountability and Transparency ....................................................................................... 8 Economic Development ................................................................................................................... 8 D. LAND AND COMPETITION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES .................................................................. 9 Evolution of Land Tenure Systems .................................................................................................. 9 Environmental Factors .................................................................................................................. 11 E. DIMENSIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT .......................................................................................... 12 Income-earning Opportunities ...................................................................................................... 12 Disparities in Key Poverty and Human Development Outcomes .................................................. 15 Basic Infrastructure ....................................................................................................................... 19 Inadequate Federal Transfers ....................................................................................................... 20 Weak Local Revenue Base ............................................................................................................. 20 Reliance on Federal Transfers ...................................................................................................... 21 Trends in Development Expenditure ............................................................................................. 23 F. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS .................................................................................................................. 23 G. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES.................................................................................................................. 24 Sustainable Natural Resource Management ................................................................................. 24 Land ............................................................................................................................................... 25 Addressing Isolation ...................................................................................................................... 25 Private Sector Development .......................................................................................................... 26 H. CONCLUSIONS, AND LESSONS FROM PAST DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ............................................ 26 CHAPTER 2. MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND DARFUR: TRENDS AND BASELINE .................... 29 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 29 B. DATA SOURCES AND CAVEATS ...................................................................................................... 30 C. DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT................................................................................................................ 30 Population ..................................................................................................................................... 30 Demographic Profile ..................................................................................................................... 32 Urbanization Levels and Trends ................................................................................................... 34 D. KEY MDG INDICATORS – LEVELS AND TRENDS ............................................................................ 35 Health ............................................................................................................................................ 36 Maternal Health ............................................................................................................................ 40 Nutrition ........................................................................................................................................ 42 Water ............................................................................................................................................. 44 Sanitation ...................................................................................................................................... 46 Education ...................................................................................................................................... 47 Gender ........................................................................................................................................... 53 Energy and the Environment ......................................................................................................... 54 E. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 56 CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................................... 57 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 57 B. UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN DARFUR ................................................................................. 58 C. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT FOR DARFUR ............................................................. 60 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations .............................................................................................. 60 Transforming Public Sector Management in Darfur .................................................................... 65 D. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT ............................................................ 69 Community Governance ................................................................................................................ 73 Service Delivery ............................................................................................................................ 75 Building Local Government Capacity and Legitimacy ................................................................. 76 Strengthening Civil Society and Demand-Side Accountability ..................................................... 78 Developing Multi-Stakeholder Delivery Systems .......................................................................... 80 E. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 81 CHAPTER 4. BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES...................................................................................................... 83 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................. 83 B. DIAGNOSTIC: EDUCATION SERVICES.............................................................................................. 85 Education System and Administration........................................................................................... 85 Teachers ........................................................................................................................................ 87 Schools and Classrooms................................................................................................................ 88 Textbooks and other Materials ...................................................................................................... 89 School Enrolment .......................................................................................................................... 91 Literacy.......................................................................................................................................... 94 Financing of Education ................................................................................................................. 95 Demand for Education .................................................................................................................. 99 C. EMERGING PRIORITIES IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR ..................................................................... 100 School Infrastructure ................................................................................................................... 100 Boarding Schools ........................................................................................................................ 103 Teachers ...................................................................................................................................... 103 Secondary Education................................................................................................................... 105 Vocational Training .................................................................................................................... 105 Education System Governance and Management ....................................................................... 105 D. DIAGNOSTICS: BASIC HEALTH, NUTRITION AND HIV/AIDS SERVICES ...................................... 106 Child Health and Nutrition.......................................................................................................... 106 Reproductive Health and Nutrition ............................................................................................. 109 Mental Health .............................................................................................................................. 111 HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis ........................................................................................................ 112 Overall Mortality......................................................................................................................... 113 Health Service Utilization and Access ........................................................................................ 114 Child Health and Nutrition Services ........................................................................................... 114 Reproductive Health and Nutrition Services ............................................................................... 116 Mental Health Services ............................................................................................................... 119 HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis Services .......................................................................................... 119 Disparities and Barriers to Access to Care ................................................................................. 120 Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation ................................................................................... 122 Health System Organization and Supply ..................................................................................... 123 Health Human Resources ............................................................................................................ 130 Health Care Financing................................................................................................................ 133 E. EMERGING PRIORITIES FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR ....................................................................... 138 Expand Access to High-Impact Interventions by Communities and Households ........................ 140 Improve Coverage and Quality of Facility-based Health Services ............................................. 143 Transition with the Immediate Recovery Program and the Role of NGOs ................................. 147 Address Maternal Mortality ........................................................................................................ 147 Develop Financing and Management of the Decentralized Health System ................................ 152 Prevent the Spread of HIV/AIDS ................................................................................................. 155 CHAPTER 5. BUDGET TRENDS AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT .................................................................. 158 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 158 B. DIAGNOSTICS ............................................................................................................................... 158 Budget preparation, Execution and Credibility .......................................................................... 158 Revenue ....................................................................................................................................... 165 Development Spending and Management Capacity .................................................................... 169 Development Planning and Management Capacity .................................................................... 172 C. EMERGING PRIORITIES .................................................................................................................. 172 D. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 173 CHAPTER 6. AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT ................................. 174 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 174 Sources of Wealth and Growth .................................................................................................... 174 Rural Areas and Agriculture Decapitalized ................................................................................ 175 B. DIAGNOSTIC: SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ............................................. 175 Population Growth ...................................................................................................................... 176 Climate ........................................................................................................................................ 176 Soils and their Mismanagement .................................................................................................. 177 Forests and Rangelands being Plundered................................................................................... 178 Firewood and the Dangers of a Free Good ................................................................................ 180 Potential for Liquefied Petroleum Gas........................................................................................ 182 Options for Household Energy Conservation ............................................................................. 183 National Forest Policy and Implications for Darfur ................................................................... 184 Water Supplies Plentiful but Variable and Costly ....................................................................... 185 Authority over the Management of Natural Resources and Land Rights .................................... 187 Emerging Priorities ..................................................................................................................... 188 C. DIAGNOSTIC: AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND, STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH................................. 188 Structure and Relative Importance of Darfur Agriculture .......................................................... 188 Status of Current Livelihoods in Rural Areas ............................................................................. 190 Potential Future Growth and Prospects for Improved Livelihoods ............................................ 194 National Macroeconomic and Agricultural Policies................................................................... 195 Vulnerability of Traditional Land Use Systems........................................................................... 196 Land Policy ................................................................................................................................. 197 Research and Technology Development ..................................................................................... 197 Isolation and Infrastructure ........................................................................................................ 198 Weak Governance........................................................................................................................ 198 D. EMERGING PRIORITIES: PROSPECTS FOR PRODUCTION AND, TRADE OF CROPS ......................... 198 Field Crops (Millet, Sorghum, Sesame and Groundnuts) ........................................................... 198 Gum Arabic ................................................................................................................................. 201 Livestock Production and Trade ................................................................................................. 203 Support Services .......................................................................................................................... 208 Summary Findings....................................................................................................................... 209 E. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 214 CHAPTER 7. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................... 216 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 216 B. DIAGNOSTIC AND CHALLENGES.................................................................................................... 217 Water and Sanitation ................................................................................................................... 218 Electricity .................................................................................................................................... 222 Urban Infrastructure and Municipal Services ............................................................................ 226 Transport ..................................................................................................................................... 232 Cross-Cutting Issues.................................................................................................................... 238 C. EMERGING PRIORITIES .................................................................................................................. 240 Water and Sanitation ................................................................................................................... 240 Electricity .................................................................................................................................... 242 Urban Infrastructure and Municipal Services ............................................................................ 244 Transport ..................................................................................................................................... 245 CHAPTER 8. PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT...................................................................................... 249 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................. 249 A Framework ............................................................................................................................... 250 B. DIAGNOSTIC: DARFUR‘S PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEXT ............................................................. 252 Historical Role ............................................................................................................................ 252 Impact of Conflict on the Private Sector ..................................................................................... 254 Investment Climate Constraints .................................................................................................. 256 Skills and Private Sector Capacity .............................................................................................. 265 Output and Product Markets ....................................................................................................... 270 Infrastructure............................................................................................................................... 271 The Role of good Governance ..................................................................................................... 274 C. EMERGING PRIORITIES .................................................................................................................. 275 Stabilizing the Private Sector – Short run Measures after Peace ............................................... 276 Expanding access to Finance ...................................................................................................... 276 Sustainable Delivery of Microfinance and Leasing .................................................................... 277 Improving Skills........................................................................................................................... 278 New Sources of Growth: Expanding Markets ............................................................................. 278 D. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 279 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 280 LIST OF BOXES Box ‎ .1: Devastation of Livelihoods due to Conflict ................................................................................................. 14 1 Box ‎ .2: The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) ............................................................................................................ 27 1 Box ‎ .1: Relative Deprivation in the Sudan ............................................................................................................... 36 2 Box ‎ .2: Key Nutrition Definitions ............................................................................................................................ 43 2 Box ‎ .3: Key Education Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 48 2 Box ‎ .1: State Revenue Sources ............................................................................................................................... 159 5 Box ‎ .2: Expenditure Classification ......................................................................................................................... 162 5 Box ‎ .3: Factors Behind Darfur States‘ Wage Bill Boom ........................................................................................ 162 5 Box ‎ .4: The Role of the Native Administration in Tax Collection ......................................................................... 167 5 Box ‎ .1: Classification of Production Systems by Swift and Gray ........................................................................... 178 6 Box ‎ .2: Agricultural Credit Models ........................................................................................................................ 209 6 Box ‎ .3: Prospects for Growth in Darfur‘s Agricultural Sector ............................................................................... 212 6 Box ‎ .1: Darfur's Blacksmiths .................................................................................................................................. 254 8 Box ‎ .2: Collateral Requirements and Darfur‘s Private Sector ................................................................................ 263 8 Box ‎ .3: Access to Informal Credit in Darfur: Nizam El Sheil ................................................................................ 264 8 Box ‎ .4: Non Governmental Skill Delivery Systems ............................................................................................... 267 8 Box ‎ .5: Cambodia's Rural Electricity Providers ..................................................................................................... 273 8 Box ‎ .6: Role in Climate Change Adaptation .......................................................................................................... 276 8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure ‎ .1: Comparative Human Development Rankings of Northern States and International Comparisons .......... 16 1 Figure ‎ .2: Wealth Distribution across States, 2000 .................................................................................................. 16 1 Figure ‎ .3: Proportion below the 40th Percentile of the Economic Status Index, North Sudan, 2000 ....................... 17 1 Figure ‎ .4: Trends in Progress against Selected MDG ............................................................................................... 18 1 Figure ‎ .5: Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1981 - 2004 .............................................................................. 21 1 Figure ‎ .6: Expenditure Shares of Key Sectors, 1998 - 2001 ..................................................................................... 22 1 Figure ‎ .1: Crude Mortality Rate (per 1000 per day) Amongst Conflict Affected Population in Darfur ................... 31 2 Figure ‎ .2: Population Pyramids across North Sudan, 1993, 2000 ............................................................................ 32 2 Figure ‎ .3: Population Pyramids across the three Darfur States ................................................................................ 33 2 Figure ‎ .4: Estimated Levels of Urbanization in Darfur with 3 Return Scenarios ..................................................... 34 2 Figure ‎ .5: Under Five Mortality Rates across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2015-MDG Targets................. 37 2 Figure ‎ .6: Infant Mortality Rates across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2015-MDG Targets ......................... 38 2 Figure ‎ .7: Proportion of Births Attended by Skilled Personnel across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2 2015-MDG Targets ..................................................................................................................................................... 42 Figure ‎ .8: FGC Prevalence Rates for Ever-Married Women across North Sudan, 1990, 2000, and 2006 ............... 42 2 Figure ‎ .9: Prevalence of Global and Severe Acute Malnutrition among Children under five, North Sudan, 2 2000 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 43 Figure ‎ .10: Prevalence of Global and Severe Acute Malnutrition among Children (6-59 months), Darfur, 2 2004-2006.................................................................................................................................................................... 44 Figure ‎ .11: Access to Improved Water Sources across North Sudan, 2000 and 2006 .............................................. 45 2 Figure ‎ .12: Main Sources of Water across North Sudan in 1990, 2000 and 2006 .................................................... 45 2 Figure ‎ .13: Access to Improved Sanitation across North Sudan, 2006 ..................................................................... 46 2 Figure ‎ .14: Type of Sanitation Facilities across North Sudan; 1990, 2000, and 2006 .............................................. 47 2 Figure ‎ .15: Net and Gross Primary Enrolment Rates across North Sudan, 2000 ..................................................... 48 2 Figure ‎ .16: Gross Primary Enrolment Data Comparison and Trends ....................................................................... 49 2 Figure ‎ .17: Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary School, 2000-2003 ........................................................................... 50 2 Figure ‎ .18: Pupil-Teacher Ratios (PTRs) and Share of Trained Teachers in Primary Education ............................. 51 2 Figure ‎ .19: Gross Secondary Enrolment Rates and Secondary School Loads, 2001 ................................................ 51 2 Figure ‎ .20: Levels and Rates of Change of Adult Literacy, by State and Gender .................................................... 52 2 Figure ‎ .21: Youth Literacy Rates across North Sudan, (aged 15-24) in 1990 and 2000 .......................................... 53 2 Figure ‎ .22: Household Fuel-Type Usage in North Sudan, 1990, 2000 and 2006 ..................................................... 55 2 Figure ‎ .23: Time Consumed Getting Wood in Darfur, 2004 .................................................................................... 55 2 Figure ‎ .1: Governance Indicators for Sudan (1998, 2005) ....................................................................................... 58 3 Figure ‎ .1: Total State Government Expenditures on Wages and Salaries ................................................................ 97 4 Figure ‎ .2: Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education vs. GDP per capita ........................................ 97 4 Figure ‎ .3: Primary Gross Enrolment Ratio vs. Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education .............. 98 4 Figure ‎ .4: Population per Public Sector Health Facility by Locality, South Darfur, 2005 ..................................... 125 4 Figure ‎ .5: Map of Public Sector Hospitals in Darfur, 2005 .................................................................................... 128 4 Figure ‎ .6: Coverage of IDPs by Public Sector PHC services, Darfur, 2005 ........................................................... 129 4 Figure ‎ .7: Long term Options for Darfur Delivery and Referral System ................................................................ 150 4 Figure ‎ .1: North Darfur: Actual Per Capita Revenue, 2000-2006 .......................................................................... 160 5 Figure ‎ .2: North, South and West Darfur: Actual Per capita Revenue, 2000-2006 (USD) ................................... 160 5 Figure ‎ .3: South Darfur: Broad Composition of Total Revenue, 2000-2006.......................................................... 160 5 Figure ‎ .4: North Darfur: Ministry and Locality Revenue (% of Total), 2000-2005 .............................................. 161 5 Figure ‎ .5: North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur States: Per Capita Expenditure Trends, 2001-2006 5 actual; (USD) ............................................................................................................................................................. 161 Figure ‎ .6: North Darfur: Actual Per Capita Expenditure, 2000-2006 ..................................................................... 163 5 Figure ‎ .7: North Darfur: Trends in Actual and Budgeted Expenditure, 2000-2006 (USD) .................................... 163 5 Figure ‎ .8: Share of Federal Transfers in State Revenues, (percent of total state‘s revenue) .................................. 169 5 Figure ‎ .9: Development Spending Share of Total Expenditures (2002-04 average) .............................................. 170 5 Figure ‎ .10: Per capita Development Spending (US$ 2002-04 average) ................................................................. 171 5 Figure ‎ .1: Traditional Farming and Land Use Systems ........................................................................................... 191 6 Figure ‎ .2: Average Farm Size and Livestock Ownership on Small-Scale Mixed Farms, North Darfur 6 (2005) ........................................................................................................................................................................ 194 Figure ‎ .3: Trends in Millet Yields for Three Darfur States (1981/82 to 2005/06) .................................................. 199 6 Figure ‎ .4: Floor Price (at Auction) as a Percent of Export Price (fob Port Sudan) ................................................. 202 6 Figure ‎ .1: Road Accessibility in Darfur (2004) ....................................................................................................... 218 7 Figure ‎ .1: Darfur – Historically High Concentration of Small Manufacturing ....................................................... 252 8 Figure ‎ .2: Distribution of Manufacturers by State and Sector ................................................................................ 253 8 Figure ‎ .3: Level of Business Closures in Nyala, 2006 ........................................................................................... 255 8 Figure ‎ .4: Poor Coverage Indicators ....................................................................................................................... 271 8 Figure ‎ .5: Informal Sector Filling the Service gap ................................................................................................. 271 8 LIST OF TABLES Table ‎ .1: Timeline of Famines in Darfur 1885-2001 .................................................................................................. 5 1 Table ‎ .2: Preliminary Estimates of Agriculture GDP per capita in Darfur (2000-2006) .......................................... 13 1 Table ‎ .3: Disparities in Regional Income (US$ per capita) ...................................................................................... 13 1 Table ‎ .4: Federal Transfers to Northern States 2000-2006 (Jan-March) .................................................................. 22 1 Table ‎ .1: Key Comparisons of Selected Indicators ................................................................................................... 29 2 Table ‎ .2: Characteristics of the Data Sources Employed and Referenced ................................................................ 30 2 Table ‎ .3: Population Estimates, 2000 – 2006 (mid-year estimates) .......................................................................... 31 2 Table ‎ .4: Demographic Profile of Darfur, 2003 (percent) ........................................................................................ 32 2 Table ‎ .5: Available Data on Millennium Development Goals, Most Recent Year ................................................... 35 2 Table ‎ .6: Immunization Coverage Rates (for one-year olds) across Darfur, 1990-2006 .......................................... 39 2 Table ‎ .1: Key Actors in Locality Governments – Allegiances and Reporting .......................................................... 71 3 Table ‎ .2: Staff Salary Disparities .............................................................................................................................. 73 3 Table ‎ .1: Numbers of Teachers and Pupil-Teacher Ratios (Public and Private Schools), ........................................ 87 4 Table ‎ .2: Numbers of Enrolled Students and Schools, Darfur, 2005-06................................................................... 89 4 Table ‎ .3: Numbers of Classrooms and Pupil-Classroom Ratios (PCR), ................................................................... 89 4 Table ‎ .4: Primary School Enrolment, Darfur, 2005 .................................................................................................. 91 4 Table ‎ .5: Estimated Primary School Enrolment, Darfur, 2000 ................................................................................. 92 4 Table ‎ .6: Random-Effects Logistic Regression of Whether a Child Attended School Last Year, Darfur, 4 2000 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 93 Table ‎ .7: Literacy Rates, Darfur, 2000 (%) .............................................................................................................. 94 4 Table ‎ .8: Random-Effects Logistic Regression of the Youth Literacy (ages 15-24), ............................................... 95 4 Table ‎ .9: State Government Expenditure .................................................................................................................. 96 4 Table ‎ .10: Pupil-Teacher Ratios and School Sizes Related to Required Village Sizes .......................................... 101 4 Table ‎ .11: Pupil-Teacher Ratios and School Sizes Related to Required Village Sizes .......................................... 102 4 Table ‎ .12: Crude Under-Five Mortality Rates, Specific Locations, Darfur ............................................................ 107 4 Table ‎ .13: Crude Under-Five Mortality Rates, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, .......................................... 107 4 Table ‎ .14: Prevalence of Acute Malnutrition, Conflict-Affected Children, Darfur, 2005-06 ................................. 109 4 Table ‎ .15: Reported Symptoms of Complications during Pregnancy, 1999 ........................................................... 110 4 Table ‎ .16: Reported Symptoms of Complications during Labor and Delivery, ..................................................... 111 4 Table ‎ .17: Reported Symptoms of Postpartum Complications, 1999 ..................................................................... 111 4 Table ‎ .18: Knowledge of HIV/AIDS, Darfur, 2000 (% women 15-49 years) ........................................................ 113 4 Table ‎ .19: Crude Mortality Rates and Proportion of Deaths Attributed to Injuries, all Ages, Conflict- 4 Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 (n = 4,099 households) ....................................................................................... 114 Table ‎ .20: Utilization of Child Health Services, Darfur, 2000 ............................................................................... 114 4 Table ‎ .21: Sources of Treatment for Under-Five Children with Cough (2001) and Ill Children among 4 Conflict-Affected Population (2005), Darfur ............................................................................................................ 115 Table ‎ .22: Utilization of Preventive Child Health Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005-06 4 (% under-5)................................................................................................................................................................ 115 Table ‎ .23: Availability and Utilization of Child Nutrition Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 4 2005 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 116 Table ‎ .24: Utilization of Contraception and Antenatal Care, Darfur, 1999 ............................................................ 117 4 Table ‎ .25: Services Received From Antenatal Care, Darfur, 1999......................................................................... 117 4 Table ‎ .26: Delivery and Postnatal Care, Darfur, 1999 (% of births in previous 5 years) ....................................... 118 4 Table ‎ .27: Type of Mental Health Support Deemed Beneficial, South Darfur, 2005 ............................................. 119 4 Table ‎ .28: Reported Access to Formal Medical Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 (% 4 of households) ........................................................................................................................................................... 121 Table ‎ .29: Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation, Darfur, 2000 ...................................................................... 122 4 Table ‎ .30: Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, ............................... 122 4 Table ‎ .31: Access to Protected Water Source, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 .................................. 123 4 Table ‎ .32: Public Sector Health Facility Numbers and Population Ratios, North Sudan, 2003-04 ........................ 124 4 Table ‎ .33: Ratios of Public Sector Hospitals and Beds by Population, Northern Sudan, ....................................... 125 4 Table ‎ .34: Estimated Public Sector Health Facility Numbers and Indicative Requirements, Darfur, 2005 ........... 127 4 Table ‎ .35: Health Workers per 100,000 Population, Northern Sudan, 2003 .......................................................... 130 4 Table ‎ .36: Reported Numbers of Health Workers, Darfur, 2005 ............................................................................ 131 4 Table ‎ .37: Health Workers per 100,000 Population, Darfur, 2005 ......................................................................... 132 4 Table ‎ .38: Reported Numbers of Health Workers by Locality, Darfur, 2005 ........................................................ 132 4 Table ‎ .39: Reported State Ministry of Health Expenditures, Darfur, 2001-05 (SD million) .................................. 134 4 Table ‎ .40: Reported State Ministry of Health Expenditures, Darfur, 2001-05 ....................................................... 134 4 Table ‎ .41: Budgeted Federal Development Transfers, Darfur, 2006 ...................................................................... 135 4 Table ‎ .42: Reported Federal Development Transfers for Health, Darfur, 2001-04 ................................................ 136 4 Table ‎ .43: Health Sector Humanitarian Assistance, Darfur, 2005 .......................................................................... 136 4 Table ‎ .44: Reported State Ministry of Health Revenues, Darfur, 2001-05............................................................. 138 4 Table ‎ .45: Indicative PHC Structure ....................................................................................................................... 144 4 Table ‎ .46: Minimum Theoretical Requirements and Reported Numbers of Health Workers ................................ 146 4 Table ‎ .47: Standards for Basic and Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care .................................................... 148 4 Table ‎ .48: What Skilled Attendants can do to Prevent and Manage Direct Causes of Maternal Mortality ............ 148 4 Table ‎ .1: North Darfur: Deviations of Actual Revenue and Expenditure relative to Plans, ................................... 164 5 Table ‎ .2: South Darfur: Deviations of Actual Revenue and Expenditure Relative to Plans, .................................. 164 5 Table ‎ .3. Federal Transfers to Northern States 2000-2006 ..................................................................................... 168 5 Table ‎ .4: Execution of Federal Development Transfers, January ........................................................................... 171 5 Table ‎ .1: Generalized Land Use in Darfur‘s Three States and Northern Sudan - 1998a/ ........................................ 179 6 Table ‎ .2: Number and Areas of Reserved Forests and Areas in Stages of Reservation (2003) .............................. 179 6 Table ‎ .3: Annual Firewood and Charcoal Consumption and Allowable Cut in Darfur and Other Selected 6 Regions in Sudan (‗000 cubic meters) ....................................................................................................................... 180 Table ‎ .4: Royalties and Taxes on Fuelwood collected by Forest National Corporation ......................................... 181 6 Table ‎ .5: Prices of Firewood in El Fasher Markets (2005) ..................................................................................... 181 6 Table ‎ .6: Prices of Charcoal in El Fasher Markets (2005) ...................................................................................... 181 6 Table ‎ .7: LPG Consumption in the Northern States (2002) .................................................................................... 182 6 Table ‎ .8: Costs of Kerosene and LPG in Darfur and Khartoum (SD per unit), 2006 ............................................. 182 6 Table ‎ .9: Useful Energy Cost of Different Fuels and Cooking Stoves in El Fasher, 2006 ..................................... 184 6 Table ‎ .10: Estimated Underground Water Resources in Darfur ............................................................................. 186 6 Table ‎ .11: Sudan‘s GDP, by Sector and Sub-Sector - 2000-2005 .......................................................................... 189 6 Table ‎ .12: Preliminary Estimates of GDP from Agriculture in Darfur, 2000 - 2006.............................................. 190 6 Table ‎ .13: Typology of Household Income Levels and Livelihood Systems in Darfur ......................................... 193 6 Table ‎ .14: Coefficients of Variation for Yields of Major Rainfed Field Crops ...................................................... 199 6 Table ‎ .15: Millet Productivity by Production Region over Different Periods ........................................................ 200 6 Table ‎ .16: Productivity Comparisons of the Four Main Field Crops Grown in Darfur (kilogram per 6 hectare) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 201 Table ‎ .17: Gum Arabic Purchases by Gum Arabic Company – Sudan and Darfur ................................................ 201 6 Table ‎ .18: Marketing Value Chain for Gum Arabic from El Obeid to Port Sudan ................................................ 203 6 Table ‎ .19: Estimated Livestock Populations in Darfur and Sudan, 2006 ............................................................... 204 6 Table ‎ .20: Estimated Number of Livestock Exported from Sudan (2001-2006) .................................................... 205 6 Table ‎ .21: Meat Exports from Sudan (2001 – 2006) .............................................................................................. 206 6 Table ‎ .22: Marketing Value Chain for Cattle from Nyala to Omdurman .............................................................. 208 6 Table ‎ .1: Identified Medium and Small Urban Centers Identified ......................................................................... 226 7 Table ‎ .2: Summary of the Status of Road Linkages in Nyala ................................................................................. 228 7 Table ‎ .3: Key State Roads in Darfur ....................................................................................................................... 233 7 Table ‎ .4: Airports in Darfur Region ....................................................................................................................... 236 7 Table ‎ .1: Manufacturing Enterprises in Darfur, 2003 ............................................................................................. 254 8 Table ‎ .2: Taxes on Livestock (SDD Per Head ........................................................................................................ 257 8 Table ‎ .3: Crop Taxes .............................................................................................................................................. 257 8 Table ‎ .4: Distribution of Banks in Darfur ............................................................................................................... 259 8 Table ‎ .5: Bank Financing by Economic Sector, Nyala City, 2003-2007 ................................................................ 260 8 Table ‎ .6: Bank Financing by Economic Sector, El Fasher City, 2003 - 2006 ........................................................ 260 8 Table ‎ .7: Financing by Islamic Mode for Banks in Nyala City, 2003 – 2006, Thousand SD................................. 261 8 Table ‎ .8: Modes of Financing for Banks in El Fasher City, 2003 – 2006, Thousand SD ....................................... 261 8 Table ‎ .9: Default Rate as a Percentage of Financing, Banks in Nyala City, 2003-2006 ........................................ 262 8 Table ‎ .10: Deposit by Type for Banks in Nyala and El Fasher Cities, 2003 – 2006 (Thousand SD) ...................... 262 8 Table ‎ .11: Technical and Industrial Schools in South Darfur ................................................................................. 266 8 Table ‎ .12: Distribution of Technical Education/Enrollment, North Darfur ............................................................ 267 8 PREFACE In anticipation of a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict in Darfur, the World Bank has begun to investigate the nature and extent of the development challenges facing the region, across multiple dimensions. The findings aim to re-establish a preliminary knowledge base, to help inform future development planning oriented to broad-based growth and attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. This work was initiated as part of the initial phase of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM), and following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The DJAM was based on a joint process with Sudanese counterparts, and involved a large team of international and national experts. However the DJAM was suspended in November 2006 due to the continued violence and insecurity in Darfur, which made it impossible to validate the work and establish broad-based support and ownership of identified recovery and development efforts. At the same time, the diagnostic work that was done is valuable, and it is against this backdrop that the World Bank, in consultation with international development partners, has decided to make its findings available in this report. The volume is structured as follows: Chapter 1 overviews the key dimensions of challenges facing development in Darfur, drawing attention to the importance of history and adopting a long term view, as well as cross-cutting issues. Chapter 2 pulls together the best available data to document levels and trends with respect to the MDGs. Chapter 3 is focused on what can best be described as the crisis in governance, chapter 4 explores the deteriorated access to and delivery of basic social services and chapter 5 looks specifically at the budget and weak fiscal management capacity. The final three chapters look at the factors constraining broad based growth –Chapter 6 presents the status of the traditional agriculture and livestock sectors, and highlights key obstacles to growth, while the last two chapters look specifically at the lack of access and infrastructure and constraints to private sector growth. Efforts have been made to consolidate the findings presented here and ensure that cross-cutting issues are appropriately reflected in the analysis. However, given that each chapter has been prepared by a separate team of experts, areas of overlap and inconsistencies between different chapters might still exist. It is important to underline that the findings and views, along with any factual mistakes, are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the World Bank, nor the donors that financed this study. While the report is broad-ranging, it does not purport to be complete. Rather, the aim is to present a preliminary diagnostic of the current situation and key challenges to development in Darfur, while stopping short of elaborating specific priorities and interventions. Among other things, the findings would need to be subjected to appropriately extensive consultations to solicit views on priorities and to underpin a future development strategy that could be instrumental in sustaining peace and prosperity to the people of Darfur. i MAP OF DARFUR CHAPTER 1. DIMENSIONS OF CHALLENGE TO DEVELOPMENT IN DARFUR Prepared by Jeni Klugman, Chris Johnson and Asbjorn Wee A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 The immense challenges facing Darfur reflect not only the repercussions of the current conflict, but a series of underlying factors that can be traced back over decades, if not centuries. Shedding light on the longer term, systemic challenges is the objective of the introductory chapter to this volume. The situation in Darfur is one vivid manifestation of underlying disparities in incomes and development outcomes across Sudan, which has been associated with the concentration of resources and power at the center. There are also natural and geographical factors specific to Darfur – in particular increasing desertification and periodic droughts and rapidly rising populations – but the adversity of the associated impacts largely reflects the role, or failure, of institutions to function in ways that were conducive to pro-poor development. 1.2 That marginalization and neglect alongside the dominance of the center are among the key underlying sources of the various conflicts in Sudan, including in Darfur,1 is not a novel concept – indeed it is now recognized in mainstream discourse in the Sudan. Commitments to equity and the reversal of entrenched inequalities are central to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Interim National Constitution (INC). The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Article 99 specifically recognizes the cumulative effects of underdevelopment, prolonged deprivation and conflict, and the need for measures to address these effects through an effective, transparent and accountable system for distribution of public resources. The term ―marginalization‖ has become an accepted part of the mainstream lexicon on Darfur. 1.3 In this chapter, we analyze the various sources of challenges facing Darfur under four broad headings: governance; land and competition over natural resources; income earning opportunities, poverty and human development outcomes; and the paucity of development efforts – within both historical and regional frames. Understanding the different sources of long term challenges facing Darfur will be crucial to reversal of the region‘s fortunes when peace comes. We draw on a large and rich literature of Sudanese and Western sources, as well as field assessments and discussions. The focus is explicitly limited to medium and long term factors. In particular, we do not look at the nature and evolution of the recent conflict on the ground but rather try to identify the deeper challenges that will need to be addressed in order to establish and sustain peace and prosperity in Darfur. B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Pre-independence 1.4 Established around 1650, Darfur was both a Muslim sultanate and an African sacral kingship, and heir to an old tradition of state formation going back as far as the twelfth century. 2 The region was prosperous by the standards of the time due to a stable and favorable climate for agricultural production and its strategic location along three major trading routes linking neighbors in the south and west with the Mediterranean Sea and Egypt in the north. Immigrants, particularly merchants and religious leaders, were encouraged to move in from other areas to 1 See Johnson (2003) and Deng (1995), for example. 2 O‘Fahey (2004). 1 meet the region‘s need for labor, and were often granted land as an encouragement to settle. Ateem (2006).and others have noted that increased migration also contributed to creating a tribally and culturally diverse but socially harmonized and politically integrated society of 65 tribes in the Sultanate, and the current ethnic make up still reflects this period. 1.5 The Sultanate expanded territorially through a mixture of assimilation and annexation, and groups were frequently brought under its control through intermarriage. Access to land and power was controlled through the traditional Hakura system (described below), which gave land rights and a de facto monopoly of political leadership to the local tribal leader in return for support and loyalty to the Sultanate. 1.6 The Sultanate maintained independence until its overthrow in 1874 by the Ottomans, under whose rule the trade in slaves from Southern Sudan flourished. The slave trade was associated with a gradual reduction in the importance of traditional commercial routes, as traffic was increasingly oriented toward central Sudan and along the Nile. This shift can be seen as marking the beginnings of the economic decline and relative underdevelopment of Darfur. 1.7 The Mahadiya rein which began in 1883, although lasting only 15 years, has been seen as a transition period from the relative calm and coexistence between the different groups in Darfur towards increased local competition and tensions. The Mahadiya, who were predominantly Arab, allowed Arab nomads to seize grazing land from settled farmers (predominantly Fur). When Ali Dinar seized power in 1898 and established the last Fur Sultanate, he drove the nomads from the settled areas, but the customary Hakura system had already been undermined and ethnic tension and competition over land increased. When the British conquered Darfur in 1917, the region was already facing mounting tensions. 1.8 The underdevelopment and marginalization of Darfur escalated during the period of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule from 1917 to 1956, when economic and political developments in Sudan were largely geared towards the needs of the British Empire. The majority of investments went into the development of the triangle between Khartoum, Kosti and Kassala for larger farms; of the 1,170 schemes that had been implemented by 1955 none were in Darfur. This had several significant consequences for economic activity and patterns in Sudan, including: the consolidation of new trading routes; concentration of investments in infrastructure and basic services in the ‗3K‘ areas; and development of human resources and administrative capacities focused on these areas. These policies left the rest of the country relatively underdeveloped, and data on services, for example, suggest that Darfur in particular went entirely neglected; Young (2005) cites figures showing that by 1941 there were 73 licensed midwives in Khartoum province, 59 in Gezira and none in Darfur, and as late as 1947 Darfur still had no provincial judge, no education officer and no agriculturalist. Post-independence 1.9 The trends in marginalization continued in post-independence period, and were deepened through the under-representation of Darfurians at the national political level. Not until 1968, for example, did Darfur get its first and only member of the Cabinet of Ministers - Ahmad Dereij - and it took 30 years for a Darfurian to become a member of the five-person Supreme National Council. The banning of all political parties and regional movements in 1969 had significant repercussions for Darfur, and elsewhere. Prior to 1969, most political parties had cut across ethnic boundaries and possessed a diverse ethnic base. However, the ban tended to encourage tribal and ethnic affiliations, both within the single party and more generally. Another development during the Numeri period was the set of legislative measures relating to land and 2 local government (detailed below), which eroded traditional systems of authority and land management. 1.10 The appointment of the first regional government led by a Darfurian governor in 1981 further polarized the political environment. Prior to 1981, all governors had been appointed from Khartoum, and had little local knowledge about the area they were set to rule. Commentators have agreed that the shift to local appointments had the adverse effect of increasing local competition for power and wealth. Harir (2007) and others have persuasively argued that public policies and revenues were increasingly used as tools by the local political elite to ensure support from their constituencies, and inter-communal conflicts acquired an ethnic dimension. 1.11 The period since the National Islamic Front (NIF)/National Congress Party (NCP) took power in 1989 did not bring prosperity to Darfur. The stabilization efforts that were needed to reduce triple-digit inflation to reasonable levels were successful at the macro-economic level, but the spending cuts and austerity had serious implications for development and social programs, especially in peripheral areas like Darfur. As documented below, there were reductions in public spending that reduced access to key services, and there was disinvestment in state-owned utilities. The longer term implications of deteriorated public infrastructure, damage to service delivery institutions and capacities, and eroded human capital loom large among Darfur‘s challenges. 1.12 The key political aspects related to Darfur in the post-1989 period are that the electorate in Darfur has been associated with different elements in the opposition – in particular the Umma Party, although NIF has also received a significant support from the area. The impact of the redrawing of the administrative boundaries in 1995 was also significant, and it has been argued that this division further fueled tribal and ethnic animosity through separating the large tribes – primarily the Fur – across three different states and turning them into a minority in each.3 1.13 While it is far beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the political developments of the post independence period we do devote some space below to understanding the political developments that have had an impact on governance. Broadly speaking, governance can be defined as the manner in which the state acquires and exercises its authority to provide public goods and services. C. GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC Competition for Local Power 1.14 Darfur has been dominated by various elites, with tribal chiefs, merchants and religious leaders traditionally holding great influence over political life. Broadly speaking, evidence suggests that settled groups have historically dominated nomadic peoples, although with shifts in political power this could reverse, as was observed by O‘Fahey (2004) for the period of Mahadiya rule in the late 19th century. It has also been argued, by Young (2005) and others, that this system of elite control was perpetuated through a deliberate policy of monopolizing access to education, which is supported by the fact that enrolment and literacy rates remained low. 1.15 More generally, political and governance developments in Darfur can be usefully observed in terms of tensions between ―modern‖ and ―traditional‖ systems.4 Such tensions have come to the fore when, for example, groups new to an area who sought to contest political power 3 Ateem (2006) 4 Harir (1994). 3 have called on citizenship rights – pursued through modern political channels - and set these against customary practices. For instance, traditional land tenure allowed for settlements of newcomers as long as they adhered to the norms of the host tribe and acknowledged their authority while new settlers could refer to the modern legislative framework to claim their rights as citizens. This could be applied in the context of access to land, rights of representation in parliament, and so on. Mohammed (1998) notes that the 1996 Rezeigat-Zaghawa conflict was of this type, stemming from the choice of the Zaghwa to contest Rezeigat power in two marginal constituencies in the El Daein elections of that year. 1.16 The attempts of various national governments to alter and replace the traditional governance structures are well documented, and one of the net results have been the inability of the latter to function as effective dispute resolution authorities. At the same time, the local administrations that were established by Numeri in the early 1980s were unable to tackle the mounting conflicts in Darfur, in the wake of increased pressure on the natural resource base and population pressures due to droughts and ongoing insecurity in neighboring Chad. Ethnicity, Politics and Development 1.17 Ethnicity is not a question of religion in Darfur, since virtually everyone is Muslim. Nor, despite popular misconception in the western media, does Arab necessarily equate with nomad and settled farmer with ‗African‘: the Zaghawa are not Arabs but are (or were) camel nomads and the Habbania are Arab (Baggara) but were described as ‗principally farmers‘ as early as 1905. 5 Rather, it is a question of identity – of how people define themselves – and thus (like the English class system) can be puzzling to an outsider, though clear to anyone who is part of it. Language is the most obvious marker – the difference between those who speak Arabic as their mother tongue and those who do not, but even here the difference is not absolute as some tribes have lost their original mother tongue and speak Arabic as their only language yet still do not see themselves as ‗Arab‘. Nor is it often understood that individuals and even groups can and do migrate cross ethnic boundaries. For instance, the main investment object for wealthy Fur farmers is cattle, which over time can lead to groups shifting livelihood focus and becoming ‗Arabs‘. After a few generations descendents will have an authentically ‗Arab‘ genealogy.6 1.18 Historical records suggest that different ethnic groups in Darfur generally lived peacefully together and that intermarriage was common. Being chiefly nomads, the ―Arab‖ tribes were traditionally less concerned with power struggles over regional leadership, although with increased education and with movements of some groups towards a more settled lifestyle this changed. The emerging Arab political consciousness has been traced back to 1974 in southern Darfur where the Arabs formed a sizable part of the population and became interested in occupying leadership positions. 1.19 Prior to the introduction of the regional government system in 1981, the dichotomy between ―Arab‖ and ―African‖ groups was limited to southern Darfur and competition between the two groups was largely peaceful. While conflict over natural resources was historically common among tribes, the Government authorities usually played the role of neutral arbitrator and guarantors for the fulfillment of the terms of locally determined settlements, given that they were largely detached from parties of the conflicts and more interested in maintaining status quo. 5 Morton (2004) 6 O‘Fahey (2004) 4 1.20 With the establishment of the regional government system the conflict patterns changed dramatically, as parties to the conflicts held the reins of power. Simple inter-communal conflicts tended to acquire a broader ethnic dimension, as shown by the Arab-Fur conflicts (1982-1989) and the Arab-Masalit conflict (1996-1999).7 In these cases more than 30 distinct Arab groups are reported to have allied and fought against the Fur and against the Masalit.8 The underlying factors explaining this shift are many, but are generally linked to the observation that the Fur had established a dominant role in the new regional government. Many of the Arab tribes were said to be opposed to this development, insofar as this was seen as a return to the Fur Sultanate and dominance of Darfur by the mainly settled Fur, eroding their access to grazing lands and water. 1.21 A major exogenous factor affecting these trends was environmental – the 1983-84-85 drought being especially critical, on which de Waal (1989) provides an excellent account. Table 1.1 gives a sense of magnitudes, drawing on different sources, and noting that systematic measurement of rainfall and population in Darfur began only in 1916. 1.22 Evidence suggests that recurring droughts in the 1970s and early 1980s increased ethnic tensions between the Furs and the Arabs through drastically changing traditional livestock migration patterns. While migrants had historically been temporary and relatively few in numbers, the droughts resulted in larger numbers of permanent displaced groups seeking new livelihood. The conflicts in Chad added to this by displacing large numbers of refugees across the border, many of whom shared ethnic ties with pastoralist Arab groups. These demographic developments tended to increase pressure and bring new conflicts to the surface. Table 1.1: Timeline of Famines in Darfur 1885-2001 Year Districts Examples of Cause Number Affected names 1885 **All Darfur Sanat Sita, Jano, War, forced No data 1890 **All Darfur Ab Jildai, etc migration, locusts, No data cattle disease 1900 *South-west Salim, Alabas War etc No data Mellit Um Mukheita Drought No data *Kebkabiya Siniin War No data 1910 *Dar Masalit (no name) War No data 1913-14 **All Darfur Julu, Um Sudur, Drought, War 300,000 killed in Wadai alone. Dulendor Large migrations of people (the Um Sider Zayadia left for Kordofan, many Berti moved southwards, and the Zaghawa to southern Darfur). 1917 South-west War No data 1920 South-west Kuburu, Ab Locusts Did not kill Dar Masalit Tokolai Suppression of Did not kill North Darfur Bedawita revolt Did not kill Ab Malwa Drought 1932 North & West Um Rotel, Locusts Did not kill 1937 Darfur Kadis Dakhal Locusts Did not kill Northern Darfur 1941-42 Central Saafar Mellit Locusts/drought Did not kill 1945 Darfur Ab Tokolai Drought Did not kill 1949-50 Northern Khafaltina, Um Drought Left people destitute 7 Harir (1994); Young (2005) 8 Ayyub (1992); Rabbah (1998) 5 Year Districts Examples of Cause Number Affected names Darfur Goldi, Um *North & Mukheita, Um West Darfur Regeba 1950 Dar Masalit Rujal Jafal Epidemic disease Left people destitute 1960 Um Kedada Meliss Drought Did not affect area at all Kutum- Abu Arba Drought Did not affect area at all Kebkabiya 1973 North & West Ab Sotir, Sanat Drought / Chadian 1.3 million people were drought Darfur Kruul refugees affected. 1983-84/ **All Darfur Sanat Ju‘, Drought 176,800 actual deaths, 95,000 1985-86 Reagan excess deaths 1990-91 North & Drought/tribal 21,000 in South Darfur & 18,000 South Darfur conflict people in North Darfur displaced by famine. 30,000 in South Darfur by tribal conflict 2000-01 Drought Source: De Waal (1989); Young et al (2005). Notes: *Famine that kills. **Other severe famines An Emerging Vacuum of Local Governance 1.23 Since the late nineteenth century, there has been a history of increased political control over Darfur by the center. This has been associated with poor regional and local government institutions and capacities and increased struggles for local control. 1.24 The breakdown of local governance is one of the defining challenges for Darfur, which has been compounded by the gradual deterioration of traditional governance structures, including in particular the Native Administration (NA). A local governance vacuum has developed over time, as traditional structures have been formally replaced by modern institutions that have proved inadequate in dealing with such basic issues as local dispute resolution and tax collection. Why this has been the case is a core question that has not been fully addressed in this paper, but evidence suggests that the process of ―modernization‖ has weakened and even dismantled traditional structures without providing viable alternatives. The net result is that by the 2000s local government institutions were largely seen as partial to certain groups, and hence not regarded as legitimately representative. 1.25 The traditional local governance system was not a colonial creation, but rather an extension of an ancient system developed by the Fur Sultanate, although the colonial regime transformed this for its own ends. Some chieftaincies have in fact existed for centuries—the Dimangawi of Zalingei is the eighteenth of his name, the Dadingawi of al-Fasher the fourteenth. Darfurians are also in general very conscious of and familiar with their history, and events of the eighteenth and nineteenth, not to speak of the twentieth, centuries are constantly recalled and used as markers to explain the present. 1.26 During the period of the Fur Sultanate, control of power and natural resources was maintained in a system which rested on a combination of wealth and alliance-building through intermarriage. Control was ensured through a loosely aligned administration in which day-to-day authority was exercised by lower levels – the district chiefs (omdas), paramount chiefs (Shartais, Nazirs) and the village headmen (shaiks). However the system was based on strict allegiance; whereby the Sultan could award and withdraw privilege. 6 1.27 The colonial approach tended to recognize and reinforce these existing local structures of governance. The system inherited by the Sultanate was codified, and chiefs ranked according their judicial functions (i.e. what punishments and fines they could assign, what areas of law they could administer). The traditional role of the NA in the allocation of land rights and sustainable management of natural resources was also kept largely intact, and traditional leaders were acknowledged to have authority to settle local disputes over land use. The NA was the arm of the colonial government at the district and sub-district level, collecting revenue and performing such state functions as law and order, land management and dispute resolution and dispensation of justice under customary law. While the British did not interfere too greatly or too frequently in the Chiefs‘ affairs, understanding that too much intervention was damaging to the traditional system, the strengthening of the NA did have longer-term effects on the traditional power structures, as it accorded more power to the lowest level of traditional authority, the Sheik Al Ard, which represented both tribal authority and the NA on the account of higher levels. There are different views about this arrangement, which can be seen as positive (e.g. O‘Fahey 2004) or as a colonial perpetuation of a feudal arrangement. Variants of this model of ―autochthonous‖ administration are found in different parts of Africa and often generically described as ―indirect rule‖ through the use of ―Native Administration‖. 1.28 However, the British did confirm appointments during the colonial period, and regularly placed titled tribal leaders on their payroll, a practice that was continued by subsequent governments. Some observers argue that this damaged the credibility of the traditional institutions and many of these leaders in the eyes of their tribal constituencies. 1.29 The British did not alter the geographic boundaries that were established by the Sultanate, and Darfur remained a province after independence, with the administrative capital in El-Fasher, which had been the sultanate's capital since 1792; indeed until 1980s the governor's residence was the palace of the last sultan. Only in 1994, as part of a more general decentralization effort, was Darfur divided into three states, each governed by a centrally appointed governor, appointed by the Ministry of Interior in Khartoum. 1.30 After independence, Khartoum tended to push to consolidate its control in the provinces. The Unregistered Land and Local Government Acts in 1971 were significant steps in this process, but even more so were Numeri‘s efforts to change and diminish the traditional role of the NA. Among the most notable reforms was the abolition of the top tier of the NA, which significantly reduced the powers of traditional leaders and left the tribal courts without teeth in their enforcement of customary law. Local councils were established as replacements but limited to purely administrative functions and underresourced (see below). 1.31 In effect, the abolition of the NA created a local power vacuum and a crisis of legitimacy whose effects have persisted since. Likewise the attempt to replace tribal authorities (traditionally responsible for handling local disputes, including between pastoralists and farmers over land) with government officials from outside the region created tensions, and even, some argue, a judicial vacuum. The performance of the local government has so far been poor, and further devastated by the low morale among civil servants, due in part to the low and irregular pay base, and in part because those posted to Darfur as members of the locality administrations had no roots or traditional affiliation with the people and were seen as neo-colonial administrators without any local support. 7 Lack of Accountability and Transparency 1.32 The governance problems in Darfur are not all unique to the west of Sudan. Political marginalization can be traced partly as a result of longer term practices at the center that has not allowed for appropriate demand side mechanisms for accountability in governance to develop. There has been very little transparency in government decision making, and the public has in general limited access to information on the generation or use of public resources (see the governance and budget chapters for more details). 1.33 Key dimensions of central control since independence can be highlighted as follows. President Numeri abolished political parties. All state Governors have been appointed by the central government, as are the majority of the senior civil service. Access to senior public service positions has been increasingly politicized since the late 1960s, and appointments are often subject to patronage and nepotism and based more on political and other loyalties than on merit and transparent criteria. This trend was accelerated with the appointment of the first Darfur governor in 1981 – a Fur - which resulted in ethnic interests becoming more prominent on the political agenda. 1.34 Accountability of Government – locally, regionally and nationally – has been consistently lacking. The one party system established by Numeri was a way of controlling public opinion, and the tendency was re-enforced during the 1990s through persecution and imprisonment of key opposition leaders. Civil society is also heavily regulated, and largely prevented from participation in political activities as part of the government‘s enterprise licensing process, which largely prevents civil society organizations that are working with service provision and humanitarian relief from engaging in advocacy work. On the executive side, lack of capacity in budgeting, planning, personnel management, and lack of responsiveness to the needs of the region due to weak participatory planning skills and understanding prevented broad-based participation in public decision-making. Economic Development 1.35 The historical and governance context forms the backdrop for a review of the economic marginalization and underdevelopment of Darfur. As noted already, the situation has also been fueled by environmental degradation and severe droughts, which affected patterns of access and need vis-à-vis natural resources and in particular water. 1.36 As a primarily agricultural and pastoralist based economy, access to natural resources are major sources of wealth and growth and central to daily life and prospects of most Darfurians. Different tribes have tended to specialize in different livelihoods, although many have diversified livelihood strategies. The best available information suggests that in 2004, approximately 60 percent of the population in Darfur were primarily farmers and most of the rest primarily pastoralists,9 although the significant recent urbanization and displacement obviously would have affected this picture. Traditional systems for management of natural resources have come under increasing pressure over time from a range of sources, including high population growth, conflict, national policy decisions, and major environmental shocks, as discussed below. 9 World Bank 2004 8 D. LAND AND COMPETITION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 1.37 Traditional livelihoods strategies in Darfur are based on mobility and dependency on multiple resource use in the face of low and shifting levels of rainfall, and disparate distribution of such key natural resources as dry season grazing lands and watering points. Traditionally peaceful and interconnected relationships were largely maintained between agriculturalists and pastoralists, with livelihood systems regularly extending over hundreds of kilometers and with flexible arrangements for sharing of fertile land, and mechanisms existed for successfully resolving the disputes that occurred. Through economic exchanges and frequent intermarriage, livelihood systems of different groups were intimately intertwined. 1.38 After independence, changing demographic patterns – in particular increased numbers and relatively larger concentrations in the southern parts of Darfur – have placed increasing stress on traditional livelihood systems. The population of the region increased from a reported 1.3 million in 1956 to an estimated 6.5 million in 2004 (see MDG chapter). This far exceeds a natural rate of increase, suggesting that immigration from Chad and from other parts of Sudan, is a major factor, although there may also be data problems, for example with respect to coverage of nomadic groups, especially in the 1956 census. 1.39 The impacts of changing environmental conditions along with a dramatic rise in the animal population have led to further strains on available land. Rising numbers of livestock has increased the demand for pasture and water, and as a result pastoralists had to change the seasonal migration patterns, as larger herds have tended to remain for longer time periods in southern Darfur before returning north. 1.40 The environmental degradation has been amply documented, and stems largely from a combination of mismanagement of soils and rangelands and increased incidence of droughts and natural disasters (see agriculture chapter).10 Consecutive droughts led to the adaptation of coping strategies among small-scale farmers, including area expansion of agriculture to compensate for productivity losses, which reduced the rangelands available for livestock. One example is the rangelands of Northern Darfur, which were particularly important as winter grazing areas but vulnerable to erosion if cultivated. Millet cultivation in these northern areas alongside increased stocking rates in the communal grazing lands resulted in the collapse of pastoral livelihoods in the north. 1.41 Each of these trends put a stress on the capacity of traditional systems to manage and cope with disputes over natural resource use. At the same time, as outlined above, the NA, which traditionally contributed to peaceful coexistence and sustainable use of natural resources, was undermined and abolished (though later notionally restored) and the local government structures proved unable to deal with the mounting numbers of disputes. Whether the NA would have been able to better manage these conflicts if left intact is a separate question, a historical counterfactual, which is beyond the scope of this volume (though for further discussion, see the governance chapter). Evolution of Land Tenure Systems 1.42 Land tenure arrangements in Darfur have evolved over centuries, and are largely based on an original system in which communal families were given usufruct rights to farmland based 10 On environmental degradation, see UNEP (2006); Hassan and Ibrahim (2006); Abdalla (2004); and Yagoub (2006) 9 on their needs, as long as it was regularly cultivated. When a family stopped cultivating the land for any reason it reverted back to the community and could be reallocated and utilized by another family. Under this system, the community leader (normally the village headman) was responsible for land allocation and for recognizing new occupants. 1.43 During the Keira dynasty of Sultan Musa Ibn Suleiman (1680–1700), a new system of granting land titles called ―hakura‖ was introduced. Hakura ranged from limited rights of taxation over people occupying a certain territory to full rights to collect taxes and religious dues. Administrative Hakuras were usually granted to tribal leaders and came to be known as a dar (literally meaning homeland). These confirmed communal ownership of land for a given group of people who usually make up a tribe or sub-tribe under a recognized leader. The Hakura thus in effect recognized and formalized certain groups‘ rights to land, and these rights were documented by way of charters, confirming the authority of the chief over his people and his right to manage the tribal land. Hakura rights were broad, but they could also be withdrawn by the Sultan if certain conditions (e.g. loyalty) were not respected. As such they reinforced existing systems of control over a given territory, with the tribal leaders serving as an extended arm of the Sultan‘s administration. The Hakura often confirmed the borders of the tribal land, thus proving an important written source for identifying user rights. 1.44 Historically, the Hakura system was inclusive in that everybody, if they respected its rules and institutions, could have access to land or other natural resources. The system included provisions for outsiders passing by, for groups who seasonally crossed a given territory, and for groups searching for temporary or more permanent accommodation. Internally, the Hakura represented a full system with a clearly defined hierarchy of rights (and corresponding obligations), ranging from the allocation of a specific plot for cultivation, to access to common territory. Secondary rights were frequently attached to primary rights, so as to grant access to water and trees. However, the titling system in effect gave sedentary tribes a huge advantage over those nomadic tribes like the camel herding tribes of North Darfur, who followed the seasonal migration patterns. The 1899 Titles to Land Act consolidated the notion of ―continuous cultivation‖, and thus paved the way for the dispossession of those who farmed rain-fed lands or grazed animals. As such, nomads became more dependent on obtaining and maintaining rights to pass through special corridors in farmed areas. Traditionally, this was managed by what became in the colonial period the NA, and organized through special arrangements between the leaders of each party and according to the customary rights that each side observed. 1.45 The Hakura system effectively managed the allocation of land among tribes and regulated access to and use of natural resources in harmonious ways during times of plenty, and maintained a complementary economy based on the exchange of water and access to pastureland for meat and dairy. However, in times of scarcity the system came under greater stress, with increased demand for access to grazing land and water from nomadic tribes, combined with the large population increases and allocation of fertile land for larger-scale agricultural production. 1.46 While not all land was officially awarded as Hakura by the Sultan, as far as tribal groups were concerned, the land they occupied effectively became synonymous with an administrative Hakura, whether recognized by an official charter or not. To distinguish the territories in the absence of charters, tribal homelands were frequently named after the associated tribe, e. g. Dar Zaghawa (land of the Zaghawa people) and Dar Rezeigat (land of the Rezeigat people). In addition to identifying land ownership, this ―branding‖ of territory based on tribal affiliation meant that, over time, the land became a symbol of group identity in addition to being an economic asset. 10 1.47 The Unregistered Land Act gave the Government control over all land that was not formally registered; and, in theory at least, made it available to all citizens. However, the administrative reforms associated with this legislation, most notably the abolition of the NA, resulted in increased tensions, as the old system was dismantled without a new system being in place. Similar problems arose elsewhere in Sudan, for example in Southern Kordofan. In partial recognition of land problems, the 1984 Civil Transactions Act did recognize usufruct rights of communities over land they occupied, but ownership remained with government. At the same time, national governments since the early 1970s have not fully implemented the land legislation in the face of tribes and local groups, so that in practice, different systems existed in parallel. Environmental Factors 1.48 Environmental factors, including droughts and desertification, help explain the changing land use patterns in Darfur over the past three decades. Changes in the local ecosystem forced changes in traditional livelihood strategies, for example, in migration patterns and expansion of farm areas to counter lower yields during dry periods. At the same time, the reduced effectiveness of natural resource management has tended to reduce carrying capacity and increased strain on the environment. 1.49 Darfur is characterized by short mild dry windy winters (December to February) and long hot rainy summers with adequate sunshine and great variations between day and night temperatures. The average daily temperature increase from north to south, but the normal temperature range is 20 – 36 centigrade. Humidity also increases from north to south and is particularly high in the Jebel Marra. 1.50 Rainfall in Darfur is low and more variable than in other states of Sudan, occurring during the summer and ranging between almost zero mm to 800 mm in the high rainfall woodland savannah in the southern parts of Darfur. Surface and groundwater supplies for domestic consumption as well as for crop and livestock production are uncertain. Low rainfall is associated with low and fluctuating productivity for virtually all crops, leads to degradation of the natural resource base. As an example of the variability of crop yields, the coefficient of variation11 for the yields of millet (Darfur‘s staple crop) grown under rain-fed conditions between 1981/82 and 2005/06 was 40 percent. 1.51 Over time, average rainfall has declined, and the pattern has changed to a shorter and less reliable wet season. Darfur, like most of Sudan, suffered a severe drought in 1984. Fortunately, there were good rains in 1985 and since, but full recovery of the vegetation has still not taken place. Increasingly, vast tracts of sandy soil with low water retention capacity exceed the smaller areas of more fertile soil deposits, and the light textured soils are losing their inherent fertility. 1.52 Darfur has the last remaining substantive forests in northern Sudan, despite the denudation of northern parts resulting from charcoal production and clearing for the expansion of agriculture. The decline in tree cover between 1998 and 2004 averaged 0.54 percent annually. While the remaining forests are large, the remote location of Darfur means a higher dependence on traditional fuels: almost one-third of all firewood used in Sudan is consumed in Darfur. 1.53 Farmers and herders have both resorted to non-sustainable land use and coping practices. These included cutting trees and over-cultivation of fragile soils leading to deforestation, desertification and declining yields. Over-grazing in turn has contributed to degradation of 11 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of a series. 11 pasture, while horizontal expansion of farmland has led to over-cultivation in fertile areas, and increased conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over grazing rights. It is estimated, for example, that the fallow period required to restore fertility has increased from 3-5 years to 12-15 years or more over the past thirty years, as a result of lower rainfalls and increased recurrence of droughts, as well as over-utilization of available farmland.12 1.54 Finally there has been a substantial indirect impact of elimination of sales tax on crops on the livestock sector. In 2001 the central government eliminated state taxes on sales of agricultural commodities sold by farmers because it was regarded as a disincentive to farmers to produce and sell a surplus. The states are currently compensated by the central government for reduced revenues through special allocations. Whether the states are receiving adequate compensation is not addressed here, but the removal of sales taxes changed the relative profitability of the livestock and crop sub sectors because livestock producers continue to pay production and sales taxes. The change in 2001 therefore distorted production incentives – favoring agricultural crop production over livestock production, favoring the expansion of cropping which will inevitably lead to increased environmental degradation as rangelands are converted to agricultural production. This trend will also reduce grazing areas for livestock production. The negative impact of the elimination of sales taxes on the environment and the livestock sub-sector needs to be examined further. E. DIMENSIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 1.55 Historically, Darfur was a prosperous region with a stable ecosystem based on the judicious shared use of natural resources and an economy relying on local and regional markets and trade. Over recent decades however, Darfur has lagged increasingly behind reported averages for Sudan which is reflected in the inequalities in incomes and human development documented below. These outcomes are associated with failures to invest in local development in the governance context outlined above. Income-earning Opportunities 1.56 Traditionally, Darfur‘s economic wealth stemmed from natural resources, and in the early 2000s livestock from Darfur accounted for about 25 percent of all livestock exports from Sudan (see agriculture chapter). Darfur was self reliant for food, and had active trading relations with other regions of Sudan and neighboring countries. 1.57 Although there are no official GDP figures by states in Sudan, staff estimates based on data from Ministry of Finance and National Economy show that agriculture (including livestock, crops and forestry) accounts for about 40 percent of GDP in all Sudan, with services making up about 32 percent and industry the rest (see agriculture chapter, table 6.11). However, these figures do not include large war affected and internally displaced populations, and as such should be treated with caution. 1.58 Table 1.2 indicates that per capita income from agriculture was about $60 per capita if one does not include the extraordinary high income in 2004 (see Table 6.12 in the agriculture chapter for more details). If other sectors (industry and services) are assumed to account for 50 percent of GDP then on the basis of these estimates per capita GDP in Darfur would be about $120 per year. This does not include remittances and hence estimates of income based on 12 Hassan and Ibrahim (2006). See agriculture chapter for more details. 12 expenditures would almost certainly be higher. This level of GDP per capita is similar to the average for rural Ethiopia. Table 1.2: Preliminary Estimates of Agriculture GDP per capita in Darfur (2000-2006) GDP per capita (USD) Crops Livestock Forestry Fisheries Total (Gum Arabic) 2000 32.2 11.0 0.2 0 43.5 2001 37.6 12.0 0.3 0 50.0 2002 46.0 16.8 0.1 0 63.1 2003 43.7 16.4 0.1 0 60.4 2004 55.4 31.8 0.3 0 87.7 2005 27.8 29.1 1.0 0 58.0 2006 30.3 32.7 1.7 0 65.0 Average 2000-2006 39.0 21.4 0.5 0 61.1 Source: See agriculture chapter 1.59 Historical trends in income earning opportunities in Darfur have been adverse. Droughts and demographic changes have contributed to the depletion of assets and impoverishment of households. Between the 1950s and 1980s, livestock perished, or their owners were forced to sell them at rock bottom prices during drought and famine years. For groups that were principally pastoralists, including the southern Rizeigat, their wealth was substantially reduced and in many cases completely destroyed resulting in substantial impoverishment. 1.60 Traditional farming systems in Sudan, similar to the majority of Darfur, have always been to locus of the poorest groups. The three major farming systems offer very disparate income earning opportunities. Data for 1999 show that traditional rain-fed farming areas accounted for about 56 percent of agricultural GDP and about 70 percent of the rural population; semi- mechanized areas produced 7 - 8 percent of agricultural GDP with less than one percent of the rural population; while irrigated areas produced about 22 percent of GDP from agriculture, where about 12 percent of the population resided. This indicates that those who live and work in large numbers in the traditional small-scale farming areas are substantially poorer than those in other farming systems. 1.61 Large regional income disparities in per capita income have been apparent across Sudan for some time (Table 1.3). Darfur‘s estimated average income, as reported by Young, was well below the northern states average – less than one-third of that of Khartoum in the late 1960s and about half of the middle and eastern parts of the country. Growth during the 1970s was also significantly slower than other regions; four percent over the whole decade compared to 20 percent in Khartoum and almost 10 percent in the eastern regions, for example. Table 1.3: Disparities in Regional Income (US$ per capita) Region Income 1967/68 Income 1982/83 Khartoum 236 283 Middle (including Blue Nile) 183 201 Eastern (including Port Sudan and Kassala) 180 195 Kordofan (including Southern Kordofan) 153 164 Northern Region 124 130 Darfur 98 102 Source: Young, 2005 13 1.62 In this context it is not surprising, that out-migration from Darfur, including via the Sudanese army became important, and demographically significant numbers were in Khartoum displaced camps, as well as in Libya, with the concomitant effect on remittances. 1.63 Clearly the conflict has incurred enormous damage upon the pre-war picture of livelihoods. While this is explicitly beyond the scope of this paper, we do provide a summary picture based on a recent UN/WFP report (Box 1.1). Box 1.1: Devastation of Livelihoods due to Conflict According to a recently completed report to the World Food Program in Sudan, the conflict in Darfur has devastated livelihoods in several ways. Darfur‘s natural resource based has been badly affected. Large- scale population displacement has resulted in environmental degradation, especially around camps and towns where natural vegetation is rapidly exhausted and there is severe pressure on water sources. Environmental degradation is also an issue where pastoralists are gathered in large concentrations, causing overgrazing and depleted water resources. Widespread loss of assets, including houses, livestock, agricultural tools and infrastructure, seed and food stores, has negatively impacted on the livelihood strategies of the rural population. In particular: o Livestock losses have continued as a result of looting, distress sales of animals, and lack of pasture and water. o Crop production – both of staple grains and of cash crops – has been badly affected due to the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and implements and because of the very restricted access to farmland for much of Darfur‘s rural population. Economic activity has been badly affected due to destruction of public infrastructure and widespread looting of development assets such as grain banks and revolving funds. In addition, labor migration has more or less stopped, and access to cash has been constrained by increased difficulties in sending back remittances Lastly, the destruction of human capital has been devastating. Many schools in Darfur are no longer functioning, or more commonly, families can no longer afford to send their children to school. This poses a threat to human capital in the longer term. Source: Buchanan-Smith, M. and Jaspars, S (2006) 1.64 The findings of the UN/WFP study are confirmed by the above staff estimates of agricultural GDP. During the pre-conflict period (2000-2004)13 crops were key to wealth in Darfur, and generated between 63 and 75 percent of the region‘s agricultural GDP. Following the delayed effect of the conflict estimated GDP per capita derived from crops declined from $55 per capita in 2004 reaching $30 in 2006. While crop output plummeted by almost half since the start of the conflict, livestock production having declined by about 9 percent following the first year of the conflict has since recovered beyond pre-conflict levels and in 2006 represented about 50 percent of total agricultural GDP. Despite the losses due to droughts in the 1980s, livestock numbers have increased steadily and by the mid 2000s Darfur accounted for about 20 percent of the cattle, sheep, goats and camels in Sudan (see agriculture chapter, Table 6.19, for more details). 1.65 Projections suggest that livestock could continue to generate about half of the region‘s agricultural GDP in the coming years. Obviously, given peace and security, crop production (mainly millet, sorghum and groundnuts) would be also expected to recover and contribute substantially to rapid agricultural growth. Hence there remains continued competition for land 13 Although the conflict started in 2004, in terms of agricultural season 2004 is considered a pre-conflict year due to the delayed returns of the previous season. 14 and grazing areas, exacerbated by the taxation arrangements which place a greater burden on the livestock sub-sector than on crop producers (see agriculture chapter for more details). There will be continued conflict unless these matters are resolved. 1.66 While the conflict in Darfur clearly hampered total agricultural production, there has still been significant growth in the sector. This is a reflection of the strength of agriculture in Darfur and its direct and indirect importance to livelihoods in the region, representing the main source of livelihoods for 80 percent of the population. Therefore any potential post-conflict growth will be based mainly agriculture, livestock and forestry. The impact of the agricultural sector for other sectors is also substantial. For example, in 2003 about 80 percent of industrial firms in Darfur were concentrated in sectors directly related to food handling, marketing and processing. The forestry sector will remain a key source of income and employment. Even much of the metal fabrication in Darfur is related to the manufacturing and servicing of agricultural equipment. 1.67 It is striking that pre-conflict industrial survey data suggest that Darfur was the second most industrialized region in the Sudan before 2003 – albeit way behind the first ranked Khartoum (see private sector chapter). Industrial activity primarily included small scale manufacturers involved in traditional industries focusing on post-harvest agro-industry (such as processing of edible oil from sesame, metalworking, Gum Arabic, tobacco, processing of ground nuts and livestock productions. 1.68 With the increasing population, the traditional sectors were unable to absorb new labor force entrants. The remote location and undeveloped economic structure of Darfur meant that off farm job opportunities were few. Several observers have noted that the resulting downwards spiraling poverty path largely affected the youth, who became increasingly disillusioned and disenfranchised. Observers have written about the sense of alienation among Darfuri youth, which can be seen as one manifestation of their poor integration into the formal economy. Unemployment was reportedly rife among Darfurian graduates, for example: Young (2005) notes that while Sudanese universities have graduated over 9,000 from Darfur since 1996, fewer than 600 are in formal employment. Disparities in Key Poverty and Human Development Outcomes 1.69 In terms of basic indicators of poverty, human development and incomes, the three Darfur states ranked among the most disadvantaged parts in the Sudan in 2002. For example, Figure 1.1 presents UNDP estimates based on a composite index of average income, literacy and life expectancy (the human development index) which allows a ranking of states to enable intra- and cross country comparisons. Each of the Darfur states was below the national average. 15 Figure 1.1: Comparative Human Development Rankings of Northern States and International Comparisons 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 HDI 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 a e S . D sa f A Sin fur ba da W Re dof r .K a n . K d an Zi g a ia N .N n do a K da r M oldo ia R zira e m S do f r M io p . B fan ar e o r ile . K a la l ile as ri o r rfu ta a a or rfu th L on v bw W her or Se N .D a . D il U g ol l-G n l-G u m n N .N .N to rra E r to t an ie ha E S W ud K S Source: UNDP Human Development Index, 2002 1.70 Any estimates of poverty incidence are only indicative at best, given the absence of recent representative data. It is nonetheless possible to calculate proxies which provide some sense especially of disparities suggests that in 1999/2000, the people of West Darfur were among the poorest in northern Sudan (comparable data for the south are not available).14 The method and results are detailed in the next chapter on MDGs (Box 2.1). In Figure 1.2, these quintiles are plotted for regions and states so as to facilitate an approximate comparison of wealth-levels across regions and states (estimates refer only to rural areas). This shows that each of the Darfur states had relatively more households in the bottom two quintiles and fewer in the top. Figure 1.2: Wealth Distribution across States, 2000 Wealth Distribution across States (2000) Poorest Second Middle Fourth Richest 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Khartoum Northern Nahr-al- Red Sea Kassala Gadarif Al-Gezira Sinnar White Nile Blue Nile Kordofan Kordofan Kordofan Darfur Darfur Darfur Northern South North West Sudan South North West Al- nil Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur Source: MICS(2000) 14 Kozel and Mullen (2003) 16 1.71 Regional disparities in economic status can also be illustrated using this economic status index. Figure 1.3 shows the proportion of the population estimated to be under the 40th percentile of the economic status index, with both the index and the ranking done separately for urban and rural areas. This cut-off was chosen because, given the experience of other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is likely that, at a minimum, 40% of the population would be considered poor if better data were available. In both urban and rural areas, West Darfur had among the highest proportion of poor households, while the proportion of poor households in North and South Darfur was also above the overall North Sudan average. Figure 1.3: Proportion below the 40th Percentile of the Economic Status Index, North Sudan, 2000 Note: Index estimated separately for rural and urban areas Source: 2000 MICS in northern Sudan. (GOS and UNICEF, 2002). 1.72 This picture pre-dates the escalation of conflict in 2003. The war has had major impacts on key indicators, with a massive loss of assets and associated increased poverty levels. However, in the midst of widespread suffering, the vast humanitarian effort has made a difference. For example, surveys showed that through mid 2006, the situation in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) and refugee camps was much better in terms of access to medical treatment, education, and safe water, than in most of the rural areas in Darfur. 1.73 While Darfur‘s adult literacy rate before the crisis was similar to the northern states‘ average, the region scored below average with respect to primary school enrolment and completion rates (see MDG and basic social services chapters). Overall estimated primary gross enrolment in 2000 was 50 percent, compared to 69 percent for North Sudan as a whole. The data also display large regional and gender disparities. Enrolment in North Darfur (72 percent) was well above South and West Darfur (41 and 46 percent respectively),15 while female gross primary enrolment was as low as 37 percent in South Darfur, and much higher (69 percent) in North Darfur (see Table 4.5 in the basic services chapter). Moreover primary school completion rates in Darfur were very low, estimated at 43 percent. 15 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 17 1.74 Low enrolment rates, as well as information from key informants, indicate that the cost to parents is a significant barrier to access to basic education (see basic services chapter). Aside from government salaries of teachers, spending on education comes from parents, mostly channeled through Education Councils (parent-teacher associations). This includes construction and maintenance of schools, as well as incentives for both government teachers and ―volunteer‖ teachers (not on the government payroll). Textbooks and school uniforms are purchased by parents. Although there are no official tuition fees, other types of official or semi-official fees include final examination fees (levied by the State Ministries of Education), admission fees (designed to pay for desks and benches and levied by the Education Councils) and operating cost fees (levied by the Education Councils). 1.75 Trends as well as levels are critical, especially in the context of the MDGs. Survey-based estimates for the 1990s suggest that primary gross enrolment rates remained fairly constant over the decade, with a slight improvement in North Darfur (see Figure 1.4). A similar picture is apparent when looking at key health indicators like births attended by skilled personnel. There has been a slight improvement over the 1990s, although far from sufficient to meeting the mark for 2015. The region is still far off-track in terms of meeting key education and health MDGs, due to the crisis, as well as the underlying lack of physical infrastructure, qualified staff, adequate financing and constrained local government capacity to deliver services. 1.76 On the other hand, pre-crisis indicators for infant mortality for Darfur compared well to other northern states. In 1999, infant mortality16 was estimated at 61 and 64 per 1,000 live births in North and South Darfur, and at 71 in West Darfur. Under-five mortality was estimated at 101, 96 and 105 per 1,000 in North, South and West Darfur respectively. This can be compared to the North Sudan average of infant mortality at 68 and under-five mortality at 104 (see Table 2.5 in the MDG chapter). Figure 1.4: Trends in Progress against Selected MDG Births Attended by Skilled Personnel Net Primary Enrollment Rate in North, South and West Darfur South West North 100 90 100 80 80 70 60 60 50 40 40 30 20 20 10 0 0 1990 2000 MDG:2015 1990 2000 MDG:2015 Source: Staff estimates from DHS 1990 and MICS 2000. 16 Infant mortality is the risk of death in the first year of life while under-five mortality is the risk during the first five years of life. 18 1.77 However access to public health services in Darfur was far below Sudan‘s average. A facility survey in 2003 found that the ratios of population per facility in Darfur were the highest of all the northern states. There were 345,000 people per rural hospital in Darfur, compared to just 33,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 109,000 in North Sudan as a whole. Similarly, there were 187,000 people for each Health Center in Darfur, compared to just under 7,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 35,000 in North Sudan as a whole. The ratio of population to Basic Health Unit in Darfur was more comparable to other parts of North Sudan, although still the highest at 14,000, while the northern states average was around 11,000 (see table 4.32 in the basic services chapter).17 The quality of health services was also limited by funding constraints, lack of qualified personnel, deficient infrastructure, and lack of access to medication. State Ministries of Health raise substantial revenues themselves, evidence of the importance of user fees. As discussed in the basic services chapter, like in the education sector, households face considerable financial barriers to access to services in the form of consultation fees and drug prices. Basic Infrastructure 1.78 Access to basic infrastructure in Darfur – like roads, water and energy – is extremely limited. This in turn reflects decades of under-investment, and failure to effectively maintain those investments which were made. The result has been to exacerbate Darfur‘s remoteness, so that the long distances to Khartoum and to Port Sudan are more costly and time-consuming, and to limit Darfur‘s competitiveness and growth prospects, as well as reinforce a popular sense of neglect. By road, mainly an earth track and impassable in the wet season, the distance from El Fasher to Khartoum is 1,250 km, of which a large section between En Nahoud to Um Keddada to El Fasher is yet to be constructed. 1.79 Darfur‘s road and rail infrastructure is poorly developed and what is there is in poor condition and/or damaged. Nyala has a railway connection to Khartoum and Port Sudan, but except for a few km of national roads between Nyala and El Geneina and Nyala and El Fasher, none of the main roads within the three states are engineered roads with pavements. All state roads are mainly tracks of varying widths with poor conditions during the rainy season when trips between towns can take weeks due to impassable wadis. 1.80 The lack of all-weather road network connectivity and the poor rail network connection to Khartoum and Port Sudan have limited the development of markets and growth opportunities. The relevant agencies, including the National Highway Authority (NHA) and the State ministries of national planning and public utilities (MNPPU), have not effectively maintained existing networks nor competed key bridges and roads sections. Unsatisfactory performance of the State Rail Corporation has been characterized by deferred maintenance of infrastructure and rolling stock, low equipment utilization and revenues, high staff costs and financial losses. 1.81 The national road network in Sudan is administered by NHA. The three Darfur States are combined into one NHA administrative entity with a regional office in Nyala and branches in El Geneina and El Fasher, which has tended to be understaffed and ill resourced. All other roads are considered state roads or tertiary roads under the MNPPU and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) respectively. Most roads are earth tracks, with no defined alignment and with drifts for minor water crossings. Roads tend to become impassable during and after rain. Traffic levels have collapsed during the period of conflict, but were always relatively low, even on national roads. 17 Sudan Federal Ministry of Health and WHO health facilities survey in 2003-04. 19 1.82 Water has been one of the main sources of conflict in Darfur, primarily with respect to pasture rights. The large livestock population puts large strains on available groundwater resources. With the introduction of semi-mechanized agriculture and irrigation schemes, as well as the expansion of rain-fed farming areas, created additional pressures, in particular along the seasonal migration routes. 1.83 Access to improved water and sanitation facilities in urban areas has came under increasing strain with the changed migration patterns and accelerated urbanization. In 2000, access to improved water sources for human consumption was 47 percent overall for Darfur – 31, 52 and 58 percent respectively in West, South and North Darfur – below the North Sudan average of 64 percent. 52 percent of households had a traditional pit latrine and about 8 percent a flush toilet, while 35 percent had no access to sanitation facilities, proportions that were comparable to North Sudan averages. The burden of collecting water is mostly borne by women and girls. The major reported constraints to obtaining clean water reported by conflict-affected populations in 2006 were insufficient water (59.9 percent), low quality of water (21.6 percent), and long distance or time to collect (20.0 percent).18 Inadequate Federal Transfers 1.84 The absence of public investment and development activity in Darfur is striking. Development spending was constrained by weak local revenue base, insufficient federal support and weak capacity. Federal support to the three Darfur states averaged about US$5 in 2001, which was half the northern states average. In this paper, a Public Expenditure Review (PER) conducted for the three Darfur States using the same methodology as had been utilized to assess other states in northern Sudan, found that all three states are facing significant constraints, as elaborated below, and outlined in further detail in the budget chapter. Weak Local Revenue Base 1.85 Revenue sources in the Darfur states fall broadly into two categories: Own revenue and transfers from the central government. Traditionally own revenue dominated, albeit at very low absolute levels. 1.86 Darfur states‘ own revenue has been static for many years and has not improved in parallel with the increased state government‘s responsibilities and assignments in the 1990s. Own revenue sources can be divided into three categories: (i) taxes on capital gains, rental, real estates, individual enterprise business, livestock, and state stamp duties; (ii) user charge fees for public services; and (iii) license fees (markets, trade, health, private education, etc). The weak performance of own revenue has been attributed to several factors, including limited economic activity – especially formal sector – associated with inadequate basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, and electricity and power), and the underdeveloped financial sector and weak service delivery performance, which makes taxpayers unwilling to fulfill their tax obligations. More recently, the conflict has seriously affected the main productive and trade activities, so that the Darfur states, especially localities, have lost substantial potential revenue bases. 1.87 Like many other states, the Darfur states also appear to have weak revenue collection capacity. However, the challenges appear to be somewhat worse in Darfur due to the significance of the traditional livestock sector and informal trade activity combined with weak infrastructure and institutional capacity to collect taxes. Localities rely upon traditional sources (like livestock) 18 WFP et al., 2006 20 that are also highly mobile and unstable. State officials cited the lack of technology and equipment, lack of enforcement capacity to punish tax defaulters, lack of data, and inadequate staff due to poor salaries and working conditions as major constraints. Some taxes were traditionally collected by the NA, and local government has been less successful in terms of tax collection. Reliance on Federal Transfers 1.88 Since 1995, Sudan has formally had a fiscal federal system, where financial responsibility for service delivery is largely decentralized, and transfers from the federal to sub-national levels are expected to play an important role. During the mid 1990s period of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, aggregate public spending was substantially curtailed and aggregate spending declined drastically as part of the effort to reduce the fiscal deficit (Figure 1.5). Figure 1.5: Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1981 - 2004 Government Revenue and Spending (% of GDP) 35 30 25 % of GDP 20 15 10 5 0 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Revenue Government Expenditure Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 1.89 As a result of the cut in overall spending, transfers to lower levels of government were minimal, and spending on priority sectors like health and education declined significantly. Between 1998 and 2001, public spending on education fell from about 18 percent of total expenditure to about 6 percent, while health shares went from 10 to 3 percent over the same period (Figure 1.6). 21 Figure 1.6: Expenditure Shares of Key Sectors, 1998 - 2001 Health 20.0 Education Water 16.0 Debt service paid 12.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source :IMF 1.90 Trends since 2000 show large overall increases in federal transfers – indeed a more than eight-fold absolute increase between 2000 and 2005. While the relative share of the Darfur states tended to diminish over the same period, from 16.3 percent of the total in 2000 to 13.5 percent in 2005, the absolute per capita amounts almost tripled, from above US$5 to about US$15 (Table 1.4). Table 1.4: Federal Transfers to Northern States 2000-2006 (Jan-March) State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Jan-Mar) USD millions 80.36 231.62 287.57 408.18 561.38 829.49 245.01 (in percent of total transfers) North Darfur 6.4 6.3 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.7 4.7 South Darfur 5.3 4.5 4.2 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.4 West Darfur 4.7 4.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.7 Greater Darfur 16.3 14.7 12.3 12.7 13.4 13.5 11.8 Khartoum 6.4 19.4 23.2 24.2 21.4 20.1 14.5 Gezira 22.9 16.4 18.0 16.6 18.1 18.0 14.0 Other (11) states 54.5 49.4 46.5 46.5 47.1 48.5 59.7 Source: National States Support Fund (NSSF). 1.91 As a result, as documented in the budget chapter, the share of transfers in Darfur states‘ revenue increased significantly, from about one-third of total state revenue in 2000, to about seven-eights in 2005. While much of this can be attributed to a dramatic increase in federal transfers, the absolute amounts of own revenue have tended to fluctuate during the same period, with an overall downward trend, which can be attributed to the factors noted above. The budget chapter also examines recent trends in allocations, underling the fact that the increase in transferred amounts has largely been absorbed by the State wage bill, and pro-poor investment spending at the sub-national level remains limited. 22 Trends in Development Expenditure 1.92 Given the strict public resource constraints, spending on capital investments on roads and other infrastructure has consistently received the lowest priority in Darfur budgets, as appears to be the situation found by the 2007 PER in most other northern states. Interviews with Darfur state ministry of finance representatives indicate that low development spending is caused by the crowding out of development spending by the payroll and the assignment for responsibility for development expenditures to the locality level, which is relatively resource poor. Moreover, findings show that development budgets have been the worst performing of the four chapters in all three states, which suggests additional flaws in the transfer system. 1.93 Prior to the conflict, in 2002, total state spending on development per capita was only about US$0.2, US$0.1, and US$0.1 in North, South, and West Darfur respectively, out of per capita spending amounting to US$10.60, US$5.30 and US$5.40 respectively. Development expenditure in the three Darfur states was also low compared to other northern states in 2002, although the PER identified significant variation across the different states. While other disadvantaged states still need to be reviewed, findings suggest that Darfur‘s low share of development spending may not be lower than other poor states in the North. F. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS 1.94 Trade, migrant labor, the effect of long running war between Chad and Libya, the Chadian civil war and wider pan-Arab ambitions of Libya have all had their impact on Darfur, and these factors constitute a very complex set of inter-linkages. While a full consideration is far beyond the scope of this chapter, it is useful to draw the main contours here. 1.95 Trade with Libya has long been part of the economy of Darfur, in particular through livestock exports and remittances from migrant labor. The oil boom of the 1970s, along with Libya‘s relatively open door policies, accentuated the importance of this northern neighbor as a source of remittances from migrant workers. However, successive tightening of regulations since the mid 1990s greatly reduced the options, and the May 2003 closure of the border between Darfur and Libya meant those still working there had difficulty getting their remittances back home. 1.96 Politics and foreign policy as well as trade have shaped the Darfur-Libya relationship, and various political groups within Sudan, as well as its governments, have looked to this direction for financial and ideological support.19 For example, Sadiq al Mahdi spent part of his period of exile in Libya, and the subsequent armed opposition to Numeiri was mounted from there. During the war with the south, the national government approached the Libyans to seek weapons to tackle the SPLA insurgency, and as part of this deal ended assistance to Habrè and closed the western frontier with Chad. Weapons went particularly to the Baggara. These weapons were utilized not only against the SPLA but also in local conflicts, which helped trigger the Fur‘s efforts in forming their own militia. 1.97 Darfur‘s other key neighbor, Chad, like Darfur itself, has been unstable for decades. Historically tribes based across border have been used by different groups to fuel conflict and since the 60s there have been groups of both Sudanese and Chadians crossing the border as part of various insurgent movements. This has been one of the main reasons for increase in small 19 Burr and Collins (2006) 23 arms in the area. As a result of the instability there have been an increasing number of Chadians settling in western Darfur. Chad‘s crisis is primarily an internal crisis of governance. 1.98 The relationship between Chad and Sudan has been one of shifting alliances, and Darfur has often served as a battlefield for conflict, due primarily to its large and unruly territory and fluid borders which prevent any real control. Both Habrè and Deby used the area to launch their campaign for power in Chad with the backing of the Sudanese Government, and the conflict has been further complicated by the fact that both Chad and Sudan traditionally have supported the other‘s rebel movements. G. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES 1.99 While future economic and social development in Darfur will be affected by various sectoral policies and investments, there are a number of issues and activities that cross over between various sectors. There are many of these cross-cutting issues. They will be covered in the sectoral chapters but they are brought together here to underline the fact that these are major challenges that will need to be addressed in an integrated way. The cross cutting issues covered here are sustainable natural resource management, land policy, infrastructure, and private sector development. Governance and accountability is a fundamental cross-cutting challenge of major importance, which is dealt with specifically in Chapter 3, and which will have a bearing across the board, from land policy through the delivery of services. Sustainable Natural Resource Management 1.100 The destructive private use of natural resources resulting from the breakdown in the communal management and stewardship of water, forests and forage, has exacerbated the chronic difficulties facing productive activities. One outcome is that forests, which are also the major rangelands used by livestock and wildlife, have been destroyed by the collection and intensive use of firewood for domestic and commercial purposes. They are a huge source of income. It has been estimated that the annual value of firewood and charcoal extraction from Darfur‘s forests and rangelands is about $760 million, which is much larger than the preliminary estimates of annual GDP from annual crops and livestock. The intensive use of forest resources has brought Darfur to an environmental and fuel crisis. It is on the verge of consuming more wood than is being replaced through natural forest growth. Urgent measures are therefore needed to ensure against the destruction of the last remaining natural forests in northern Sudan, to find a substitute source of fuel for cooking, and hence preserve the rangelands for sustained livestock production. Lack of success will directly or indirectly affect most households in Darfur. The agriculture chapter provides a diagnostic and suggestions for addressing this serious problem. 1.101 The other urgent issue relates to the intensive cultivation of soils that are not suited to such land use – often in the wake of the destruction of rangelands – will start a cycle of wind and water erosion ending in massive desertification from which there will be no recovery. This process has already taken place in parts of North Darfur and is likely to continue unless over- grazing and destructive cultivation cease. 1.102 Finally, water resources, though vast in the many aquifers beneath Darfur, are not adequate for the prospective draw down due to uncontrolled irrigation and a substantial increase in urban demand. In some of the most productive agricultural areas of Darfur, the water resources are the poorest. This presents a substantial challenge for the sustainability of intensive small-scale agriculture in areas such as Jebel Marra. 24 Land 1.103 As noted above, conflict over land has been the basic source of the conflict in Darfur. It can be traced back to the abrogation of customary land rights after 1970‘s, and will continue to exist so long as there are no legal structures that are broadly endorsed by both the authorities (various levels of government) and civil society including farmers and pastoralists. Land rights affect the attitude of land users to the sustainable management of natural resources and private sector development of land. A first priority after the cessation of hostilities will be the introduction of reforms to address these grievances over land and establish a new policy that will avoid future conflict over the authority to allocate land rights, and also allow the huge value that currently resides in Darfur‘s land to be used as collateral for investment in productive purposes. 1.104 The DPA recognized that a durable solution to the conflict needs to include securing the rights and access to land for the majority of people in Darfur. However, the institutional and regulatory framework is weak and requires reform in order to effectively address the underlying complexities. Structural constraints include: (i) the legal vacuum for the regulation of natural resources in absence of a State Land Commission; (ii) the multiplicity of initiatives to organize pastoralists, open stock routes, demarcate tribal lands and prepare land claims, which might create new realities on the ground that are outside of any legal system; (iii) poor coordination among actors and weak policy environment; and (iv) weak capacity of the range and pasture administration at state and federal levels which inhibits harmonization of these various initiatives. 1.105 While customary law has traditionally governed land use in Darfur and Sudan more generally, the 1970 Unregistered Land Act stipulated that all unregistered land was to be considered as the Government‘s property. In effect, this allowed the state to take customary land at will, if necessary by force and without compensation to the ―customary-title bearers‖. Also in the early 1970s, the national government proceeded to abolish the NAs and thus to strip tribal and customary authorities of their functions concerning allocation and management of natural resources and management of local conflict. The NA was formally reinstated in 1987, but was given a much weaker role as the national government intruded on the selection of its leaders. Addressing Isolation 1.106 Darfur‘s inequality compared to the rest of northern Sudan has been a key source of conflict and social tension, and needs to be addressed in order to sustain peace and reduce poverty. Key development gaps with respect to access to health, education, and basic infrastructure (water supply and sanitation, electricity, roads, etc) need to be addressed quickly in order to advance economic development, and large scale investments in these areas will also contribute to growth by creating jobs. This is particularly important in Darfur where the potential sources of economic growth are limited, and where the agriculture sector accounts for the majority of rural employment and income. 1.107 Darfur is indeed on the economic periphery, lacking the benefits of proximity as well as good connectivity to markets, intermediaries, information and skills. The distance from Nyala to Khartoum is 1,305 km by rail; from Nyala to Port Sudan it is 1780 km; and by ―road‖ from Khartoum to El Fasher is 1,250 km. The road and infrastructure that does exist is in poor condition and has often been damaged as a result of the recent conflict. Apart from aviation, the transport network is limited to a railway connection between Nyala and Khartoum and Port Sudan that operates on an irregular basis due to lack of maintenance and insecurity. The few kilometers of partly paved national roads that exist between El Fasher and Nyala and between Nyala and El Geneina are far from sufficient to meet transportation needs, and none of the other main roads 25 within the three states are properly engineered. Even the main road corridor connecting Darfur with Khartoum and Port Sudan (from El Fasher) is only about two-third finished. 1.108 Inadequate infrastructure is thus a major growth bottleneck, and while many of the challenges to infrastructure development in Darfur echo those in other Northern states, the magnitude and depth of the problems are larger. The vast size of the area and fragile and often unfriendly ecological conditions require particular demands on transport facilities, communications, and other infrastructure services, while at the same time, persistent lack of public investment has resulted in deteriorated access to services and income-earning opportunities for the population. Private Sector Development 1.109 Broad-based growth will be a precursor for sustainable peace through providing the population in Darfur with peaceful income-earning means. The distribution of investment and opportunities thus needs to be broadened so that more employment is created and more workers and families are vested in peace. The urgency of this task is even more apparent given the large number of expected returnees following peace, which are otherwise likely to swell the ranks of the urban unemployed. There is a clear need to expand employment, self-employment and industries that can absorb workers, including in the reconstruction and development of Darfur. For this, private investment is required. 1.110 An efficient private sector is needed to catalyze long-term investments by the private sector in public service delivery and environmental adaptation. Currently, however, the risks of doing business in Darfur are high due to a weak investment climate, lack of access to finance, an insufficient regulatory framework, and large transaction costs, which in turn prevent private sector growth from being ignited. 1.111 Of particular importance will be that private sector growth happens within the context of environmentally sustainable methods and policies. As explained above, the agriculture sector will be the main engine for growth in the foreseeable future, and will provide the private sector with most of its inputs. However, at present, environmental degradation prevents any meaningful growth from taking place, and with peace the pressure on existing forest and water sources are likely to increase with the return of large population groups. The private sector has a large potential for contributing to reduction of harmful practices, and the sector should look closely at innovative options and strategies. H. CONCLUSIONS, AND LESSONS FROM PAST DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 1.112 This chapter has sought to overview the major development challenges that face the people of Darfur. We have shown that these are mainly long term and structural in nature, and run from serious governance problems through physical isolation and environmental degradation. In concluding, it is useful to draw lessons from past development efforts in Darfur that were supported by partners. This is needed to help inform any future activities to promote sustainable growth and access to basic services. The prospect of new negotiations for peace would be an important opportunity to address these and related issues (See Box 1.2 on the status of the Darfur Peace Agreement). 26 Box 1.2: The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) The Darfur peace negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The agreement was only signed by the Government of Sudan and Minni Minawi‘s faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) – one of three rebel groups at the negotiations. Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur‘s faction of the SLM and Justice and the Equality Movement (JEM) both refused to sign. Although the hope was that the non-signatories could be brought in later – indeed a handful of individual rebel commanders have signed a Declaration of Commitment to abide by the DPA – the bulk of the rebel forces still remain outside of the agreement. Commentators have observed that the DPA was rejected largely because it failed to adequately address several key issues, including insufficient provisions for compensation, a lack of guarantees for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, and minimal power sharing. This has led to a negative reaction amongst many Darfurians, and insufficient support in Darfur to enable its implementation. In addition, the agreement said little about some of the core systemic causes of conflict in Darfur, such as issues of land and grazing rights. Instead, these questions were left to be addressed by the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDD-C), a more inclusive process that was to follow the DPA and build concensus on key issues. Overall implementation of the agreement by the signatories of the DPA has been proceeding slowly, with progress in some areas of the institutional arrangements. In particular, the Government has appointed signatories to fill most of the positions set aside in the agreement, including the appointment of the Senior Assistant to the President. The Government has also launched the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), the regional administrative oversight body created by the DPA, and most of the commissions and bodies envisaged under the TDRA. However, there has been little tangible change on the ground. The security and humanitarian situations have in fact worsened in many parts of Darfur since the DPA was signed, and a further splintering of the rebel movements and proliferation of armed groups have further complicated the conflict. There is now an ongoing effort led by a joint AU-UN mediation team to revive negotiations between the Government and the non-signatories. A roadmap for reviving the talks has been developed, indicating that new negotiations could begin in the latter part of 2007. At the time of writing it was not clear what role the DPA will play in future negotiations. While its text is clearly still relevant in many areas, all sides have accepted that negotiations will have to re-open and renegotiate some key areas of the agreement. 1.113 The very poor track record on development spending, that was documented above and which is detailed in the budget chapter, has gone hand in hand with very limited capacity in Darfur to plan and maintain development projects. Several development projects and programs were implemented in Western Sudan during the 1960s to 1980s with government funding and significant international support, with mixed success at best. 1.114 Development projects in Darfur often failed to meet their stated objectives. In general the reasons for failure can be divided into institutional and management, financing, technical, and issues of sustainability. Although some of these problems may be unique to Darfur, many have been common to projects in other parts of Sudan.  Weak management and inadequate institutional structures, as well as lack of broad-based consultations on the design and objectives of the activity. This often prevented local ownership from being deepened. Partly, this can be linked to weak project design and projects being based on the wrong assumptions, which either underestimated the complexities of working in remote areas of Darfur or the risks of elite capture.  Lack of realism on the financing side, where donors often viewed the Governments as a source of co-financing rather than as an equal partner in the 27 implementation, and federal-state differences in financing were neglected. The uncertainty of government and donor funds also meant that activities could not be planned properly. Adverse effects were also caused by unexpected exchange rate fluctuations.  Lastly, even when intended outputs were achieved, and projects completed and handed over to the authorities, sustainability was a real concern. Project resources were sometimes diverted towards other uses, and there are cases where entire projects were dismantled. Maintenance was a big issue, which was often not factored into the project design; support services for farmers and pastoralists and infrastructure investments would thus deteriorate once donor funding ceased to flow. 1.115 The above section clearly outlines the need for more in-depth analysis of the different sectors in Darfur, as well as significant cross-cutting focus, to enable a better understanding of the needs and implementation challenges. The rest of this volume will try to provide some initial diagnostic of each of the major development sectors, which could underpin further analysis of possible recovery and development priorities for Darfur following peace. The report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will highlight the current status and progress towards meeting the MDGs. Chapter 3 to 5 will look more closely at issues of governance and accountability, challenges to provision of basic social services, and budget and fiscal management constraints. Chapters 6 will then highlight the growth potential in the agriculture and livestock sector and point to specific environmental considerations, while chapters 7 and 8 will outline challenges to infrastructure and private sector development. 1.116 As pointed out in the preface, the following diagnosis does not purport to be comprehensive, and lacks both crucial information and sufficient input from local stakeholders. It does, however, try to make sense of the significant information and analysis that has been conducted by different partners, including government agencies, and quantify some of the challenge that will face those involved in efforts to create sustainable peace in Darfur, recognizing that this will only be possible through rapid and broad-based growth. 28 CHAPTER 2. MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND DARFUR: TRENDS AND BASELINE Prepared by Nadeem Karmali with H.E. Luka Biong Deng, Yousif El Fadil and Rahimaisa Abdula. A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 2.1 Social and economic inequalities and lack of development have been key drivers of the conflict in Darfur, and addressing these are central to the region‘s future peace and prosperity. However the exact coordinates of the economic and social baseline are not well understood. Data on Darfur in national statistics has previously been either aggregated into a Northern average or simply reported as missing. Although there has been a proliferation of reporting, especially by non-governmental agencies, since the start of the conflict there is a somewhat confusing array of numbers and samples being cited. 2.2 This chapter maps out a baseline of both levels and trends over time, using the metrics of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Once a baseline has been established, the chapter‘s focus shifts to assessing pre-conflict trends as well as more recent developments. Given the fluidity of the situation in Darfur, we focus more on longer-term trends than on day-to-day contingencies, in an effort to understand the dynamics driving key indicators. 2.3 Overall the data paint a picture of limited momentum through the 1990s in Darfur with some progress towards meeting the MDGs, but levels of access to basic services still far less than universal, and significantly lagging the better-off parts of the country (Table 2.1). The onset of the conflict has severely hampered the momentum, and in several key areas there have been major reversals. Any progress has been largely fuelled by the humanitarian programs. Thus the post-conflict challenge in attaining the MDGs is very steep. Table 2.1: Key Comparisons of Selected Indicators GOAL MDG 2: MDG 3: Promote MDG 4: MDG 5: MDG 7: Achieve gender equality and Reduce child Improve Ensure universal empower women mortality maternal environmental primary health sustainability education INDICATOR Primary school Female to male Under five Births Access to completion rate enrolment in mortality rate attended by improved water (%, 2001) primary and (per 1000, skilled health source (%, secondary school 2001) staff (%, 2000) (%, 2000) 2000) Darfur 43 61 100 50 47 SOSUS 2 35 250 5 27 Sudan 46 102 94 86 75 Chad 19 56 200 16 27 D. R. Congo 40 80 205 61 45 Uganda 65 89 124 39 52 Kenya 63 97 122 44 57 Ethiopia 24 68 172 6 24 Source: WDI, SOWC, HDR 29 B. DATA SOURCES AND CAVEATS 2.4 The main data sources used in this report are the 1990 Sudan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), the 1993 Sudan Census, the 1999 Safe Motherhood Survey, the 2000 Sudan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), and the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS), though some of the results from the latter-most survey are only preliminary at this stage. All of these sources covered the northern Sudan states, including Darfur, while the 2006 survey also included all of southern Sudan. 2.5 Throughout the task of establishing trends and constructing the baseline, judgments about sufficient sample sizes on schema were necessary. Samples sizes often precluded the calculation of relatively infrequent events such as maternal mortality, though for most other tasks the household surveys proved to be sufficient for state-level estimates. Since the DHS was conducted before the creation of the West Darfur State, 1990 levels could only be compared to 2000 levels at the regional, Greater Darfur level, though disaggregated 2000 North, South and West Darfur level data are available for almost all statistics – though to facilitate the examining of trends, region-level data are used. Sample weights were incorporated whenever possible when calculating averages to account for the sampling structure of the household surveys. Table 2.2: Characteristics of the Data Sources Employed and Referenced Data Source Year(s) Sample size Remarks (Darfur) HHs Indiv. Sudan Census 1992/1993 n/a n/a Covered all of Northern Sudan Demographic and Health 1989/1990 6,891 46,961 Pre-demarcation of West Darfur Survey (DHS) (1,405) (7,504) and pre-MDG Multiple Indicator Cluster 1999/2000 25,189 147,552 Pre-MDG, children Survey-North (MICS) (4,725) (24,882) anthropometric data poor Sudan Household Health 2006 24,046 146,723 Most results are currently Survey (SHHS) (2,967) (16,655) preliminary C. DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT Population 2.6 On the fundamental question of the number of people in Darfur, there is some uncertainty. This is due to the mobility of the population, the porous nature of the Chadian and Libyan borders, and coverage of the census. The last census in Sudan was conducted in 1992- 1993 and did not cover parts of Southern Sudan. Since current population and cohort numbers use this increasingly distant and incomplete baseline, these must be interpreted with caution. Since the conflict many humanitarian agencies have reported mortality numbers. The figures reported in Table 2.3 extrapolate from the 1993 census, while adjusting for conflict-related mortality using two recent sources.20 A very broad working approximation for the distribution of the Darfur population is that South Darfur constitutes about half of the total population, and North and West Darfur about a quarter each. 20 Hagan, 2006; CRED, 2005 30 Table 2.3: Population Estimates, 2000 – 2006 (mid-year estimates) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 North 1,456,395 1,503,000 1,551,096 1,581,737 1,596,888 1,625,227 1,661,859 Darfur South 2,762,319 2,859,000 2,959,065 3,060,331 3,153,959 3,242,679 3,342,235 Darfur West 1,576,172 1,614,000 1,652,736 1,687,697 1,579,675 1,516,048 1,537,967 Darfur Darfur 5,794,886 5,976,000 6,162,897 6,329,765 6,330,522 6,383,955 6,542,061 Source: Staff estimates using 1993 Census and recent mortality data. 2.7 The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been increasing since the onset of the conflict in 2003. January 2007 estimates of the number of IDPs stood at 2.06 million people, compared to 250,000 IDPs in September 2003.21 (Note that this is not the same as the number of people classed as in need of assistance, estimate for example by UNOCHA in January 2007 at 3.85 million people. 2.8 Our population numbers account for the differential increase in mortality across the three states, and are net of the reported population residing in neighboring Chad (Table 2.4). Not accounting for mortality changes and displacement obviously yields a higher population estimate of 6,972,168. This difference is due to the cumulative effects of an upsurge in mortality as well as the exclusion of those residing across the international border. 2.9 Mortality data from 2003 have been analyzed by Hagan (2006) and Guha-Sapir and Degomme (2005). The peak in mortality, according to both sources, occurred towards the end of 2003 and early 2004, as shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1: Crude Mortality Rate (per 1000 per day) Amongst Conflict Affected Population in Darfur North - H North - L West - H West - L South - H South - L 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Mar-03 Jun-03 Sep-03 Dec-03 Mar-04 Jun-04 Sep-04 Dec-04 So urce: Guha-Sapir and Dego mme, CRED, 2005 2.10 Most mortality surveys report upper and lower bounds for each state, which correspond to ―H‖ and ―L‖ in the graph. A series of nutrition surveys of ―conflict-affected‖ populations in 21 UNOCHA, Darfur Humanitarian Profile, January 2007 31 Darfur report annual crude mortality rates of 0.72, 0.48 and 0.36 for 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively (preliminary results).22 These fail to capture monthly and spatial fluctuations though they are representative of larger populations, and are below the emergency threshold of 1 per 10,000 per day. Nevertheless the situation is fragile. Demographic Profile 2.11 As a region Darfur is predominantly rural, and youthful (Table 2.4). Comprehensive population cohort sizes by gender are available only for 1993 from the census. Using the 2000 MICS of Northern Sudan, cohort size can be roughly estimated but given the structure and design of these household surveys complete representation is infeasible. The 1993 Census-based and 2000 survey-based population pyramids are shown in Figure 2.2 below. Table 2.4: Demographic Profile of Darfur, 2003 (percent) Annual Growth Cohort Sizes (% of total pop) Urban Population Rate <5 6-24 < 15 >60 North Darfur 3.16 20.0 17.0 47.0 44.6 4.1 South Darfur 3.41 21.3 17.0 47.0 43.7 3.6 West Darfur 2.37 13.2 16.0 45.8 43.7 3.6 Darfur 3.07 18.8 16.7 46.6 43.9 3.8 Source: Extrapolated from 1993 Census in WFP et al, EFSNA 2004 . Figure 2.2: Population Pyramids across North Sudan, 1993, 2000 N. Sudan Pop. Pyramid, 1993 N. Sudan Pop. Pyramid, 2000 75+ 75+ 70-74 70-74 65-69 65-69 60-64 60-64 55-59 55-59 50-54 50-54 45-49 45-49 40-44 40-44 35-39 35-39 30-34 30-34 25-29 25-29 20-24 20-24 15-19 15-19 10-14 10-14 5-9 5-9 0-4 0-4 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% Cohort Percentages Cohort Percentages Males Females Males Females Source: Sudan Census 1993 Source: Estimates from Sudan MICS, 2000 2.12 The 2000 MICS, even after incorporating sample weights, appears to under-report the cohort sizes for 15 – 34 year olds, especially for males. Reasons for this bias include out- migration to urban centers and under-representation of unmarried individuals. Nevertheless, by considering the female cohort sizes (which may be less sensitive to such factors as migration), the 22 WFP et al. 2004 and 2005 32 pyramid structure has risen slightly and the distribution has moved upwards which was perhaps indicative of lower fertility rates and increasing life-expectancies. 2.13 It is also instructive to consider the state-wise population structures across Darfur (Figure 2.3). The demographic pyramids for Darfur, like those for the Northern states overall, reflect a ―trimming-effect‖ of 15-34 year olds, which is of equal magnitude across genders. At the same time, there is a large bulge for the younger cohort. The 0-15 cohort share in Darfur was the largest across northern Sudan in 2000. 2.14 Among youth (15-24 years), only a small fraction - 11 percent, 13 percent, and 13 percent have completed primary school in North, South and West Darfur respectively, while 70 percent, 73 percent, and 69 percent of these youth have some primary education. The male share attaining ―some primary schooling‖ is about 10 percent higher than females in all three states. Figure 2.3: Population Pyramids across the three Darfur States North Darfur Pop. Pyramid, 2000 South Darfur Pop. Pyramid, 2000 75+ 75+ 70-74 70-74 65-69 65-69 60-64 60-64 55-59 55-59 50-54 50-54 45-49 45-49 40-44 40-44 35-39 35-39 30-34 30-34 25-29 25-29 20-24 20-24 15-19 15-19 10-14 10-14 5-9 5-9 0-4 0-4 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% Cohort Percentages Cohort Percentages Males Females Males Females Source: Estimates from Sudan MICS, 2000 Source: Estimates from Sudan MICS, 2000 West Darfur Pop. Pyramid, 2000 Greater Darfur Pop. Pyramid, 2000 75+ 75+ 70-74 70-74 65-69 65-69 60-64 60-64 55-59 55-59 50-54 50-54 45-49 45-49 40-44 40-44 35-39 35-39 30-34 30-34 25-29 25-29 20-24 20-24 15-19 15-19 10-14 10-14 5-9 5-9 0-4 0-4 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% 15% 10% 5% 0 0 5% 10% 15% Cohort Percentages Cohort Percentages Males Females Males Females Source: Estimates from Sudan MICS, 2000 Source: Estimates from Sudan MICS, 2000 33 Urbanization Levels and Trends 2.15 Prior to the conflict, the level of urbanization in Greater Darfur was about 18 percent, and was growing at an annual rate of 6.4 percent. With the onset of the conflict, mass displacement and increasing concentrations of people in IDP camps, the notion of urban Darfur has changed profoundly. To the extent that post-conflict planning must consider these more highly concentrated populations in terms of service delivery, updated estimates of ‗urban‘ Darfur are needed. Looking ahead, clearly there are inherent uncertainties about the future, but well- grounded estimates are needed. Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the levels and rates of urbanization, and illustrates three post-conflict scenarios. The sharp spike in the level of urbanization between 2003 and 2006 represents a classification of those residing in the IDP camps as ‗urban‘, on top of the underlying trend and accounting for conflict related mortality. Based on a hypothesis of peace in 2008, three return scenarios are modeled. The ‗low‘ scenario refers to a situation where few IDPs return to their place of origin, whereas the ‗high‘ scenario refers to the opposite case where a large portion of IDPs return and ‗medium‘ is an in-between scenario. From even the most optimistic return scenario the urban landscape of Darfur is certainly different than the past. Figure 2.4: Estimated Levels of Urbanization in Darfur with 3 Return Scenarios Low Medium High 50% 40% 30% % Urban 20% 10% 0% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 So urce: Staff Estimates using 1993 levels and rates o f urbanizatio n, and recent IDP and mo rtality data 2.16 Based on Sudanese and international experience, factors relevant to the rate of returns include: The centrality of security; the timing with respect to the start of the planting season; land occupation and land arbitration; the more fragile tenure of IDPs in Chad; overall reconciliation; access to water; the fluidity of the pastoralist population; compensation and, since a fifth of households within the IDP-camps are headed by women; gender.23 It is noted that the physical distance of displacement is relatively limited: most of the IDP-population is within 60 km of their area of residence, or about two-day walk. Experience from Southern Sudan24 suggests that incipient momentum is crucial to instilling confidence of potential returnees. 23 Emergency and Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, WFP et al. 2006 24 IGAD Regional Conference on Refugees, Returnees, and Internally Displaced Persons : Case Study Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs in Post Conflict Sudan 34 D. KEY MDG INDICATORS – LEVELS AND TRENDS 2.17 Across most indicators Darfur ranked amongst the least well-off regions of Northern Sudan, though southern Sudan lagged even further behind. However, more recently and with the onset of the conflict, Darfur‘s level has worsened, as has its state-wise ranking. Especially early- on in the conflict, contingent and day-to-day conditions had deteriorated. Essential indicators have since been revived by the service delivery efforts of humanitarian agencies, though the available data cannot express the fragility of the situation nor the uneven levels within the region. 2.18 Table 2.5 shows the available MDG data pre-conflict, except for the environmental series of indicators which are derived from the recent 2006 SHHS. Within Darfur, North Darfur leads across almost all indicators, while there is no clear ranking between South and West Darfur. Table 2.5: Available Data on Millennium Development Goals, Most Recent Year North South Darfur Sudan Sudan Source Total North South West MDG 1: Poverty and Hunger 1. % of households in poorest 40% of households ranked overall in Northern Sudan 40 - 51 53 46 58 A 2. Prevalence of acute child malnutrition (wasting) (underweight for height) (6-59 months) 14 - 12 23 12 9 A MDG 2: Education 3. Net primary enrolment rate 60 20 43 60 37 38 A/J 4a. Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 66 28 43 64 5 90 A 5. Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24) 78 31 69 76 71 56 A MDG3: Gender Equality 6. Ratio girls to boys in primary education (%) 94 40 71 74 77 59 B 7.Ratio literate females to males (% ages 15-24) 84 35 76 86 75 68 A 8. Share of women in non-Ag. wage employment - - 36 40 35 35 C/D MDG4: Child Mortality 9. Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 104 250 100 101 96 105 F 10. Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 68 150 66 61 64 71 F 11. One-yr-olds immunized against measles (%) 50 12 37 53 32 26 A/E MDG5: Maternal Mortality 12. Maternal mortality ratio (/100,000 live births) 509 1700 524 524 524 524 F 13. Births attended by skilled health staff (%) 57 5 69 55 33 F MDG6: HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB 14. Contraceptive prevalence rate 7.2 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.5 F 15. Prevalence of TB (per 100,000 per year) 90 325 G 16. TB cases detected under DOTS (%) 53 - MDG 7: Environment 17. Proportion of land area covered by forest 20 - I 18. CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 0.17 0 19. Proportion of population using solid fuels 64 94 98 98 99 97 K 20. Access to an improved water source (% of pop) 59 60 44 48 44 40 K 21. Access to improved sanitation (% of pop) 40 6 26 32 20 30 K Sources: A: MICS, UNICEF (2000), B: Federal Ministry of Education (FMOE) (2000 – 2004), C: UNFPA, (2000), D: CBS (2004), E: UNICEF Immunization Update (2003), F: Safe Motherhood Survey (1999), G: Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH), H: National Malaria Control Program, I: National Forestry Corporation, J: UN Starbase Database, K: SHHS (2006) 35 2.19 The first and overarching goal of the MDGs calls for the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; by halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day, and also by halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. However in Sudan we do not have recent data that documents either consumption or income levels across states or even regions. We nonetheless can estimate wealth rankings (Box 2.1). Box 2.1: Relative Deprivation in the Sudan Available data permit deriving a measure of socio-economic status by household. A wealth index is constructed by aggregating assets owned and housing characteristics such as whether any member owns a radio, whether electricity is used, the source of drinking water, the type of sanitation, how many rooms, and the type of materials used in dwelling construction. 25 Once a wealth-score is constructed for each household, these are assigned to a wealth quintile. These wealth indices facilitate comparisons of wealth- levels across regions and states. Figure A shows a regional representation at each wealth level with a population-share row to enable quick comparisons. 26 Figure A: Composition of Wealth Quintiles by Region across North Sudan, 2000 Darfur Kardofan East ern Khart oum Nort hern Cent ral Richest Fourt h Middle Second Poorest Pop Share 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% So urce: M ICS(2000) In 2000, almost one-third (31 percent) of the poorest households in Northern Sudan were located in Darfur, and a further 30 percent of the second poorest quintile were also in Darfur. Given that only 23 percent of Northern Sudanese population is in Darfur, this data thus clearly indicates that Darfur is the most impoverished region in Northern Sudan. In contrast, the Central region has 26 percent of the Northern Sudanese population, and a top-heavy income distribution in comparison with other regions. Note that this approach does not allow a comparison between sub-sets of states; hence this does not yield an unambiguous wealth ranking of the three Darfur states. Health Child Health and Mortality 2.20 In 1990, Darfur had the second highest under-five mortality rate (estimated using the direct method) across Northern Sudan. However by 2000 the value was on par with the northern 25 See Filmer and Pritchett (1998a) 26 The placement of Darfur as the leftmost region in the above graph serves to compare its composition by quintiles with its population share, and does not reflect the ordering of households within a quintile. Also these compositions depend crucially on population sizes and are not per capita estimates, hence the less populated Northern region has smaller compositions across all wealth quintiles. 36 average, though this is in part due to very modest gains elsewhere. However the preliminary results from the SHHS indicate that between 2000 and 2006 Darfur was the only region to have experienced a worsening child mortality rate. Furthermore Darfur faces one of the steepest challenges of all the regions to achieve the fourth MDG, which calls for a two-thirds reduction of 1990 levels of child mortality by the year 2015, and the under-five mortality rate is a key indicator. Since new states were created in 1992, data for 1990, 2000 and 2006 are aggregated across regions to facilitate trend comparisons, which are shown in Figure 2.5 below, where the dotted lines denote the rates required to meet the MDG target. Figure 2.5: Under Five Mortality Rates across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2015-MDG Targets Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan 200 160 120 80 40 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 So urce: DHS (1990), M ICS(2000) & M inistry o f Health (2006) 2.21 While the gains in Darfur through the 1990s were strong by Sudanese standards, there has been resurgence in child mortality in recent years, and significant improvement will be needed to get back on track toward the MDG target (Figure 2.5). The crisis in Darfur has significantly worsened child mortality as shown by numerous retrospective mortality surveys of conflict-affected populations. 2.22 Overall it appears that the humanitarian agencies have managed to rein in the alarming and runaway levels that emerged in 2004, and the under-five mortality rate in the camps has significantly improved.27 However, the situation remains precarious and mortality could escalate without the capacity provided by the humanitarian agencies. The Complex-Emergency Database28 has compiled child mortality figures from various agencies since the start of the conflict and reports child mortality rates in terms of per 10,000 per day. The conventional benchmark is that 2 per 10,000 per day is a humanitarian emergency. Throughout 2004 all levels were well above this threshold, and peaking at a massive level of 14 in West Darfur in mid- 2004.29 There is now a range of estimates from different surveys: In 2005 a large nutrition survey of the conflict-affected population found a child mortality rate of 0.79 deaths per 10,000 per day, while the corresponding 2004 figure from the same survey series was 1.04.30 Figures from 27 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 1, UN, December 2004 28 Available at http://www.cred.be/cedat/index.htm (accessed in December 2006) 29 Guha-Sapir and Degomme, 2006 30 Emergency and Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, WFP et al. 2004 and 2005 37 smaller surveys in October 2006 range between 1.1 and 2.1. The preliminary 2006 SHHS estimate is 118 per 1,000 live births. 2.23 For infant mortality, (the number of deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births) the progress of the 1990s was reversed in the 2000s. Figure 2.6 below shows the levels and rates of changes from 1990 to 2006 as well as the acceleration in progress required to meet the MDG target of halving child mortality. Figure 2.6: Infant Mortality Rates across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2015-MDG Targets Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 So urce: DHS (1990), M ICS(2000) & M inistry o f Health (2006) Immunization Coverage Rates 2.24 Immunization is a crucial dimension of access to primary health care and is a useful proxy for assessing levels and rates of change of child health. In the 1990s overall coverage rates dropped. Since the start of the conflict, numerous humanitarian agencies have boosted immunization efforts, especially in the camps.31 Only measles coverage rates had been computed from the SHHS at the time of writing, indicating an increase above their 1990 levels (Table 2.6). 2.25 BCG coverage rates across Northern Sudan fell between 1990 and 2000. Darfur lags the Northern average in both periods; dropping from 63 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2000 for Darfur.32 Polio, earmarked as a disease to be eradicated worldwide, has followed a similar pattern across the 1990s; with coverage rates for all three doses dropping from 41 percent to 36 percent in Darfur, and from 61 to 46 percent across the northern states on average.33 Due to the inaccessibility of some regions during the 2002 immunization campaigns, polio resurfaced in Sudan, and as of January 2005 there were 112 confirmed cases.34 With the help of the humanitarian networks in Darfur, seven intensive rounds of vaccinations were implemented during 2005, all of which reported high coverage rates. These efforts appear to have interrupted transmission of wild poliovirus in Darfur and prevented the occurrence of new polio cases.35 31 For state coverage graphs see Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 2610, UN, January 2007 32 MICS (2000) and Sudan DHS (1990) 33 MICS (2000) and Sudan DHS (1990) 34 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 10, UN, January 2005 35 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22, UN, January 2006 38 Table 2.6: Immunization Coverage Rates (for one-year olds) across Darfur, 1990-2006 Antigen Year Darfur North Sudan North South West Total BCG 1990 n/a n/a n/a 62.8 79.0 2000 69.3 41.3 34.6 48.8 63.4 DPT1 1990 n/a n/a n/a 61.8 76.4 2000 75.7 47.3 36.3 57.2 66.5 DPT3 1990 n/a n/a n/a 39.6 59.7 2000 51.6 24.8 12.3 30.7 44.1 Polio3 1990 n/a n/a n/a 40.6 61.3 2000 58.6 28.9 17.8 36.2 45.7 Measles 1990 n/a n/a n/a 47.8 61.2 2000 61.6 33.9 27.4 40.7 58.0 2006 79.3 48.8 57.3 58.7 73.8 36 Source: DHS (1990), MICS (2000), SHHS (2006) . Note that 2006 data is only available for measles immunization. 2.26 Measles vaccination rates fell over the decade; 48 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2000 in Darfur and from 61 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 2000 across Northern Sudan. Given the cramped conditions in which the IDPs live, measles is a major concern in Darfur. Coupled with the polio campaigns under the umbrella of humanitarian agencies, through successive rounds, this appears to have prevented a major outbreak of measles.37 The preliminary 2006 results from a nutrition survey reported that two-thirds of conflict-affected children between 9 and 59 months were vaccinated against measles.38 The 2006 SHHS data also show increases in measles coverage rates for one-year old above the 1990-levels. While both these findings reflect the impact of humanitarian activities, this casts a worrisome shadow on the post-humanitarian landscape in terms of sustaining health care access. 2.27 DPT coverage has also dropped significantly over the decade; from 40 percent in 1990 to 31 percent in 2000 and from 60 to 44 percent across Northern Sudan. The latest humanitarian reports suggest that after intensive DPT campaigns the coverage rate is now approximately 60 percent for one-year-olds among the populations receiving humanitarian assistance.39 2.28 Malaria is endemic to Sudan, especially during the wet seasons and is a leading cause of death of children. In Darfur in 2000 about 39 percent of children under-five slept under a bed- net, which is above the northern average of 23 percent. However only 2.4 percent of under-fives slept under net treated with insecticide. Given the high population densities amongst the IDP population, malaria is of great concern, especially during and after the rainy season between June and August. The humanitarian reports on Darfur suggest that malaria accounted for about 15 percent of mortality in 2004,40 which might be low due to poor rainfall that year. A new protocol has been enforced by the humanitarian agencies related to anti-malaria drugs and treated bed-nets. 36 For national trends see Review of National Immunization Coverage 1980-2005, WHO/UNICEF, 2006 37 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 23, UN, April 2006 38 Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment 2006 Preliminary Presentation (FOA, FMoH, UNICEF, WFP et al ) 39 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22, UN, January 2006 40 Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 1, UN, December 2004 39 HIV/AIDS 2.29 UNAIDS have estimated, based on a variety of sources, that the adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS is 2.6 percent across Sudan.41 Prevalence rates of 4-6 percent have been found in small scale studies in Northern Sudan among sex workers, sexually-transmitted infection (STI) patients, tuberculosis patients, and soldiers. There are no Darfur-specific surveys which allow for the estimation of the prevalence rates, although infection rates among small groups have been measured. FMoH reports that in 2004, 1.3 percent of TB patients in South Darfur were infected with HIV and prevalence among pregnant women attending antenatal care clinics in North Darfur was zero. Test results from blood bank donors in the three tertiary hospitals in the three Darfur states have found prevalence of between 0.5 and 3.3 percent. 2.30 Adult prevalence estimates for the countries neighboring Darfur are high: in Central African Republic (10.7 percent) and in Chad (3.5 percent). The conflict has introduced and further exacerbated the number of risk factors for spread of the disease; economic and social disruption, increase in poverty, fluid populations, violence, and presence of soldiers as well as armed groups. Rape associated with the conflict has been widely reported, putting victims at risk of HIV infection. In Darfur, AIDS awareness is very low: about 32, 35 and 20 percent in North, South and West Darfur respectively (see basic social services chapter for more details). 2.31 More recently, a survey in IDP Camps in El Geneina, West Darfur found that 56 percent of respondents had heard of HIV/AIDS, 32 percent had heard of HIV/AIDS and knew of two preventive measures, while only 6 percent mentioned condoms as a method of prevention.42 Preliminary results from the 2006 SHHS suggest that awareness rates have increased; the survey reported awareness rates in North, South and West Darfur of 63 percent, 65 percent, and 37 percent, while knowledge of 3 prevention methods has doubled in North and South Darfur, but has remained the same in West Darfur. These information asymmetries, especially between West Darfur compared to North and South Darfur, and also between IDP populations and non-IDP population within West Darfur are marked. The SHHS survey results about ‗complete HIV knowledge‘ also point to widespread misconceptions about HIV and its transmission throughout Darfur. Furthermore, contraceptive use is very low in Darfur; in 1990 25 percent of ever-married women in North Sudan had ever used a method of family planning, but this had dropped to 21 percent in 2000. In Darfur contraceptive use is extremely low, less than 5 percent had ever used modern contraception in 2000. Tuberculosis (TB) 2.32 WHO estimates that the annual rate of tuberculosis infection in Sudan is 180 new cases per 10,000 people. The disease is reported to be responsible for up to 10 percent of outpatient consultations and hospital admission in northern Sudan.43 Maternal Health Maternal Mortality 2.33 The fifth MDG is ―to reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.‖ However the large sample-sizes required to estimate maternal mortality ratios (MMRs) mean there are no such figures available at the state level in Sudan. There are 41 UNAIDS, 2002 42 North Sudan Situation Report, 31 March-6 April 2006, UNICEF 2006b 43 Sudan Health Status Report, World Bank, 2003 40 nonetheless some estimates available. The Safe Motherhood Survey reported a MMR of 524 for Darfur, while the average in the North was 509 in 1999. A study in IDP camps in West Darfur in 2006 provides some indication of the current magnitude of maternal mortality. It found that 14.7 percent of surveyed women reported the death of a sister during her last pregnancy, which is extremely high. The main reported causes of death were obstructed labor (27.2 percent), hemorrhage (40.4 percent), sepsis or fever (7.9 percent), and eclampsia (1.8 percent).44 2.34 More recent estimates suggest a worsening since 2000 in indicators correlated with the maternal mortality rate. For example, a nutritional survey series reported that 3.5 percent of mothers with children under-five were malnourished in 2006, compared to 6.2 percent in 2005.45 Birth Attendance by Skilled Staff 2.35 Given the difficulty of measuring maternal mortality ratios, the share of births attended by skilled personnel has been suggested as a useful proxy.46 While not an explicit MDG target, the target of 90 percent of births should be attended by skilled staff by 2015, was adopted at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1999. Skilled personnel includes doctors, health visitors, assistant health visitors, nurses, medical assistants and trained midwifes, however it does not include traditional birth attendants (TBA). Figure 2.7 shows the trends across the 1990s, and between 2000 and 2006, as well as the rates required to meet the proxy MDG for improving maternal health. It highlights the massive efforts that are needed in Darfur to catch up to national averages, let alone to meet the MDG-related targets. 2.36 TBAs account for the majority of the births not attended by skilled personnel; in 1990 26 percent of births in Northern Sudan were assisted by TBAs, compared to 30 percent in 2000. Darfur was the only region to have made positive gains on improving the number of birth attended by skilled personnel in the 1990s, although this was from a starting point way below other Northern states, and even then the gains were only modest. 2.37 From the preliminary 2006 SHHS numbers, all other regions have made substantial gains towards meeting the MDG; to the extent that the Northern region, in particular, has attained the 90 percent benchmark required. Yet progress in Darfur has slowed, and the drive required to attain the 90 percent target is substantial given the current levels and rates of progress. The situation may have worsened with conflict, though no concrete numbers are available. Given the scant availability of health care outside the humanitarian umbrella as well as the emigration of skilled individuals, the underlying capacity to meet this target has been diminished and once the humanitarian agencies phase out, this capacity will be further reduced. 44 Diaaeldin Ahmed, M, ―Reproductive Health Assessment in IDPs Camps: West Darfur State, Sudan,‖ American University of Beirut, UNPF and West Darfur Ministry of Health, April, 2006 45 Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment 2005 and 2006 Preliminary Presentation (FOA, FMoH, UNICEF, WFP et al ) 46 Graham et al, 2001 41 Figure 2.7: Proportion of Births Attended by Skilled Personnel across North Sudan: 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2015-MDG Targets Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan 100 80 60 40 20 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 So urce: DHS (1990), M ICS(2000) & M inistry o f Health Female Genital Cutting (FGC) 2.38 FGC is prevalent throughout most of Sudan though preliminary results from the SHHS suggest an incipient decline. The reported increase in prevalence in Darfur in the 1990s was from 65 percent to 83 percent, the largest increase in Sudan over the period. According to the SHHS however, prevalence rates in Darfur had fallen below 1990 levels (Figure 2.8). Figure 2.8: FGC Prevalence Rates for Ever-Married Women across North Sudan, 1990, 2000, and 2006 1990 2000 2006 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kordofan Darfur N. Sudan Source: DHS (1998), MICS (2000), Ministry of Health (2006) Nutrition 2.39 The three standard anthropometric indicators for child malnutrition are the prevalence of chronic malnutrition or stunting (weight-for-age), acute malnutrition or wasting (weight-for- 42 height) and the number of underweight (height-for-age) children. Unfortunately about a fifth of the children in the MICS have missing observations for children‘s ages, and the reported ages are clustered around focal ages. The MICS can nonetheless be used to describe the baseline, pre- conflict levels of acute malnutrition, which require weight and height measurements. Box 2.2: Key Nutrition Definitions Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is the percentage of children under five (or sometimes children between 6 and 59 months) with weight-for-height ratios below 2 standard deviations under the median of a reference population. Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) is the percentage below 3 standard deviations; so those classified with severe acute malnutrition are also part of those classified with global acute malnutrition and this distinction serves to provide information of the depth of malnutrition. 2.40 Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of GAM and SAM in 2000, with the SAM cases placed within and towards the top-end of the GAM numbers, since GAM by definition includes SAM. Both scores are sensitive to seasonal changes, and offer only a snapshot in time of levels of malnutrition. In 2000, only North Darfur within Darfur was above the emergency level of 15 percent, while South and West Darfur were amongst the lowest in northern Sudan. However, given these numbers should be interpreted with caution. Figure 2.9: Prevalence of Global and Severe Acute Malnutrition among Children under five, North Sudan, 2000 GAM SAM 25% 20% 5.9 5.8 3.6 3.0 5.7 3.4 5.1 15% 3.2 4.9 4.0 1.9 3.1 10% 3.6 2.1 2.5 3.8 5% 17.4 20.2 15.6 16.1 20.2 21.8 13.8 13.9 19.3 10.7 18.2 22.5 12.4 8.6 8.8 15 0% N.Kordufan S. Kordufan W.Kordufan Kassala Sinnar Al-Gazira River Nile Blue Nile Al-Gadarif N. Darfur S. Darfur W. Darfur White Nile Khartoum Red Sea Northern So urce: M ICS 2000 2.41 Since the conflict, detailed data on the conflict-affected population has become available. Figure 2.10 below shows the levels of GAM and SAM between 2004 and 2006 from the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA) series. 43 Figure 2.10: Prevalence of Global and Severe Acute Malnutrition among Children (6-59 months), Darfur, 2004-2006 GAM SAM Emergency Cut-off 25% 3.9 20% 1.4 2.5 15% 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4 10% 0.7 5% n/a 15.6 16.0 n/a 12.3 12.6 n/a 6.2 10.5 21.8 11.9 13.1 0% 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 North Darfur South Darfur West Darfur All Darfur So urces: Emergency Fo o d and Nutritio n A ssessment , 2004, 2005, 2006 (FOA , M o h, UNICEF, WFP et al ) 2.42 Although disaggregated data for 2004 are not available at the state level, overall levels of GAM and SAM appeared to fall in 2005, then increase again slightly in 2006. Across the three states, malnutrition figures are consistently higher and above the emergency cut-off value in North Darfur, while current levels in South and West Darfur are below the emergency cut-off. The 2006 SHHS data show the same ranking of states vis-à-vis malnutrition status. 2.43 A closer look at the large number of location-specific nutrition surveys across Darfur during the conflict, categorized by population status (IDP, IDP-resident, or resident) is available from the Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) at the Centre for Research of the Epidemiology of Disasters.47 The figures reported by various agencies depict large fluctuations of GAM and SAM across time and localities, with a general peak in both measures in 2004. These more localized results nonetheless agree with the EFSNA series trend of an overall improvement in GAM and SAM since 2004. Water 2.44 The seventh MDG is to ensure environmental sustainability and a key target calls to halve, by 2015, the share of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. The standard water indicator relates to an improved water source, where this includes household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collections. Unimproved water sources are unprotected wells, unprotected springs, vendor-provided water, bottled water and tanker truck-provided water. Unfortunately surveys formulated and designed before the MDG declaration use their own definitions that are rarely congruent with the MDG and for example, the MICS reports the share with access to an ―adequate water source‖, which is different from the MDG definition of an ―improved water source.‖ 47 Available at http://www.cred.be/cedat/index.htm (accessed in December 2006) 44 2.45 The available data suggest an actual worsening in access to this crucial resource in all the northern states of Sudan since 2000, except Northern State (Figure 2.11).48 The rates of access in the three Darfur states are below half, and also well below the reported northern Sudan average. Clearly a reversal of these trends is needed on a sustained basis to get progress towards the water MDGs on track. Figure 2.11: Access to Improved Water Sources across North Sudan, 2000 and 2006 2000 2006 100 80 60 40 20 0 Blue Nile River Nile White Nile N. Sudan W.Kordufan N.Kordufan Al-Gazira Al-Gadarif Khartoum Sinnar Kassala Northern Red Sea S.Kordufan W.Darfur N.Darfur S.Darfur So urce: M ICS(2000) & SHHS (2006) 2.46 The 2006 SHHS data, although preliminary, suggests that households in Darfur have amongst the lowest access rates in Sudan to improved sources of water. Access in marginally better in North and South Darfur relative to West Darfur. Figure 2.12: Main Sources of Water across North Sudan in 1990, 2000 and 2006 Piped In Public Tap Well River / Surface Other 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan So urce: DHS(1990), M ICS(2000) & SHHS (2006) 48 Note that the 2000 data are not as detailed as the 2006 SHHS data, especially in terms of whether wells are protected or unprotected, hence the 2000 series are upper-bound estimates at best, which may in turn overstate the extent of deterioration. 45 2.47 The household surveys allow a comparison of water sources across time and regions (Figure 2.12), which underlines that Darfur has not only low but also decreasing access to improved water sources compared to other northern states and a much higher dependency on wells. ―Other‖ water sources include springs, rainwater, water vendors (including tankers, or a cart with a small tank or drum), and bottled water. The disaggregated figures from 2000 show that most of the piped-in connections in Darfur are limited to North Darfur as are most of the protected springs and protected wells. In West Darfur half of the households have an unprotected well and a fifth of households in South Darfur obtain their water from vendors. In 2000 about 14 percent of households had a piped-in connection however by 2006 the number decreased to 3 percent, and this data is mainly for those outside the IDP-population. 2.48 It has been reported that the majority of village-cluster or town water yards and hand pump systems have been destroyed by the conflict.49 Coupled with systems that have outlived their lifespan and a weak maintenance capacity, the water situation in Darfur is very serious. The data confirm a substantial decrease in installed water connections. Low rainfall and IDP-induced water drilling are exacerbating the resource strain in Darfur. Water quality is another concern, though sound numbers are scarce, anecdotal reports suggest poor water quality across Darfur which often acts as a conduit for the spread of water-borne diseases. Sanitation 2.49 The seventh MDG includes ensuring access to basic sanitation, and the standard indicator for this target is the share of the population with access to improved sanitation. The consensus definition of improved sanitation has converged to including connection to public sewers, connection to septic systems, pour-flush latrines, simple pit latrines, and ventilated improved pit latrines. While not considered improved sanitation are service or bucket latrines (where excreta is manually removed), public latrines and open latrines. Since the MICS was pre-MDG it fails to distinguish these relevant categories and thus we are unable to decisively measure access to improved sanitation. Figure 2.13: Access to Improved Sanitation across North Sudan, 2006 100 80 60 40 20 0 Blue Nile River Nile White Nile N. Sudan W.Kordufan N.Kordufan Al-Gazira Al-Gadarif Khartoum Sinnar Kassala Northern Red Sea S.Kordufan W.Darfur N.Darfur S.Darfur So urce: SHHS (2006) 49 See Infrastructure Chapter 46 2.50 The recent SHHS 2006 survey does allow a comparison across states (Figure 2.13). Compared to the average across the northern states, Darfur has surprisingly high access rates to improved sanitation. However a closer look at the type of sanitation facilities paints a more sobering picture (Figure 2.14). Figure 2.14: Type of Sanitation Facilities across North Sudan; 1990, 2000, and 2006 Flush Pit Latrine No Facility Other 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan So urce: DHS(1990), M ICS(2000) & SHHS (2006) 2.51 The prevalence of ‗no facilities‘ in Darfur is at the high end for North Sudan, while in terms of trends it appears, as with the water sources data, that connected sanitation systems have almost been eliminated between 2000 and 2006. The number of households in Darfur reporting ‗no sanitation facilities‘ has increased between 2000 and 2006. 2.52 Field visits confirmed that most sewerage networks are confined to state capitals. The Localities that are responsible for the planning, implementation and management of sanitation services are severely financially and technically constrained.50 From the available data, almost 90 per cent of households with no sanitation facilities in 2006 were located in Southern and Western Darfur, whereas in 2000, 80 percent of those resided in North and South Darfur. This suggests a disproportionate increase in households in Western Darfur losing access to sanitation. It is also weak evidence that households in Northern Darfur have relatively better access to sanitation facilities. This latter conclusion may be due to the humanitarian efforts as agencies have began latrine construction, solid waste management and hygiene promotion within the camps and host communities of the IDPs, though there have been few efforts in rural communities.51 Education 2.53 In Sudan primary education is officially compulsory and free, commencing at age six and comprising eight grades. At age thirteen, pupils complete primary education by obtaining the Basic Education Certificate (BCE). After primary school there are two educational tracks available; three years of secondary school (subdivided further into either an academic or technical track) or two years of vocational training; neither track is compulsory or free. Entry into university requires the completion of the Sudan School Certificate, which is available through the secondary-school track. 50 See Infrastructure Chapter 51 See Health Chapter 47 2.54 In terms of measuring educational attainment and performance, the only metrics available in Sudan relate to participation and attendance data by gender and state. There are no measures of actual performance or test scores. The primary school population is estimated to about 1.1 million children aged 6 to 13 years. Primary School Access 2.55 The second MDG calls for all boys and girls to complete a full course of primary schooling. The three standardized measures of this target are captured in the net primary enrolment rate, the proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 or the primary completion rate, and the literacy rate of 15-24 year olds. However since age-related data are often scarce, gross enrolment ratios are often reported in place of net enrolment ratios. Larger GERs than NERs are indicative of delayed entry into primary school and/or frequent grade repetitions. By construction, GERs may exceed 100 percent. Box 2.3: Key Education Definitions Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) is the ratio of the number of pupils of official primary-school age who are currently enrolled in primary education to the total population of the corresponding cohort. Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) is the ratio of the number of pupils currently enrolled in primary school (regardless of age) to the total population of the corresponding cohort. Secondary School Loads is defined here as the population of the official age of secondary school students (14-16) divided by the number of secondary schools in the state. Literacy is self-reported ability to read a newspaper ―easily‖ or ―with difficulty.‖ 2.56 The net and gross enrolment rates across northern Sudan in 2000 (Figure 2.15) showed significant differences across states, with South and West Darfur bottom-ranked. There are statistically significant differences across the states. While North Darfur lies in the mid-range, on both measures the state is still some 20 points behind the top three states. By way of comparison, the average GER for Africa in 2004 was 87 percent, which exceeds the educational achievements of all but two Sudanese states. Figure 2.15: Net and Gross Primary Enrolment Rates across North Sudan, 2000 Net Gross 100 % 80 % 60 % 40 % 20 % 0 % El-Gadarif Kassala Sinnar River Nile Blue Nile N. Darfur S. Darfur N. Kordofan S. Kordofan W.Darfur White Nile Khartoum W. Kordofan Red Sea El-Gazira Northern So urce: Calculatio ns fro m M ICS(2000) 48 2.57 The MICS-based gross enrolment ratios and the Federal Ministry‘s annual Educational Statistics are broadly consistent (Figure 2.16), although data from the State MoEs for 2005 are above the FMoE series, with a pronounced discrepancy for West Darfur (see basic social services chapter). Figure 2.16: Gross Primary Enrolment Data Comparison and Trends 2000 MICS 2000 FMoE 2001 FMoE 2002 FMoE 2003 FMoE 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Blue Nile White Nile River Nile El-Gadarif Khartoum Sinnar Kassala Northern Red Sea W. Kordofan N. Kordofan S. Kordofan S. Darfur W.Darfur N. Darfur El-Gazira , So urces: Calculatio ns fro m M ICS (2000), FM o E Educatio nal Statistics 2001 2002, 2003 and Sudan CB S (2004) 2.58 The preliminary net enrolment estimates from the 2006 SHHS are 67.1, 56.3 and 46.4 percent in North, South and West Darfur respectively, which indicates that latter have experienced increases since 2000, while North Darfur‘s NER worsened over the same period. South Darfur had a particularly significant increase. Nonetheless, Darfur‘s state rankings remain among the lowest in the country, with West and South Darfur bottom ranked in Northern Sudan. So even if the precise magnitudes are uncertain the directions and rankings of states from this survey consistently underline the significant educational gap in Darfur‘s school enrolment.52 2.59 Data on education for the nomadic communities across Darfur is scarce. The MICS surveys‘ higher GER values perhaps indicate the exclusion of this group. In 2005 mobile education programs represented 6 percent of enrolled children, though the nomadic population is said to account for 30 percent of Darfur‘s population (see basic services chapter). Education for nomadic communities lags the statewide levels and represents an additional challenge for SMoEs. 2.60 Since the conflict, a third of the children in school in Darfur have enrolled in schools in IDP camps supported by humanitarian programs; children enrolled in camp schools are reported to number 239,000. These are both continuing students as well as students receiving education for the first time. Integrating these students into the formal education rubric post-conflict represents major challenge as the humanitarian programs phase out. 2.61 The enrolment numbers mask substantial gender disparities across most states. The fourth MDG calls for the elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015. An often cited indicator for this target is the ratio of girls to boys in primary education. Figure 2.17 plots the girl-boy ratios in primary school between 2000 and 2003 from the annual Educational Statistics publication in Sudan. 52 The MoE statistics include regular public schools, nomadic schools, private schools and IDP schools. 49 Figure 2.17: Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary School, 2000-2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% Blue Nile White Nile River Nile El-Gadarif Khartoum Sinar Kassala Northern Red Sea W. Kordofan N. Kordofan S. Kordofan W.Darfur N. Darfur S. Darfur El-Gazira , So urces: 2002 Series fro m CB S (2004) and 2000, 2001& 2003 Series fro m FM o E (2001 2002, 2004) 2.62 All data sources consistently show that West Darfur has the lowest girl-boy ratio averaging about 60 percent. The average girl-boy ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa is 83.6 percent, and therefore all three Darfur states lag well behind the continental average. The 2003 series is for the academic year 2003/4 and is therefore likely to account for the early effects at the outset of the conflict. Given that the 2003 enrolment ratios change only slightly compared to previous years, the decrease in the girl-boy ratio in North and South Darfur is alarming. While the slight increase in the ratio in West Darfur does cast doubt on the robustness of the data, the 10 percent drop is still indicative of the initial magnitude of the educational impact due to the conflict. Educational Inputs 2.63 Both teacher-pupil ratios and the fraction of teachers who are trained are useful measures to gauge the quality or effectiveness of primary education (Figure 2.18). West Darfur has the worst student-teacher ratio across all states, and coupled with one of the lowest fraction of trained teachers, the ratio of pupils to trained teachers in West Darfur is a massive 230. This is far worse than the average ratio in Northern states of 33 students per trained teacher. The series does not show a striking trend between 2002 and 2003, though the worsening in South Darfur is due to a drop of massive 1,000 teachers between 2002 and 2003. Again however, given that the available data coincides with the outset of the conflict and since it is not clear when various pieces of information were collected, caution is needed in interpretation. 2.64 In terms of teaching capacity and teacher quality, South and West Darfur rank amongst the lowest across Northern Sudan, though the data from North Darfur are close to average. The reported teacher numbers suggest a huge drop; the 2003 FMoE figure for the number of teachers in North Darfur is 8800, while the education chapter here uses a figure of 6779. There is anecdotal evidence that many teachers have either emigrated out of Darfur or have sought more lucrative employment in other fields within humanitarian organizations (see basic services chapter). So the incipient 2003 drop for South Darfur from the FMoE data is likely to be early signs of this same shift. 50 Figure 2.18: Pupil-Teacher Ratios (PTRs) and Share of Trained Teachers in Primary Education PTR 2002 PTR 2003 % Trained (2003) 50 100% Percent of Teachers Trained 40 80% 30 60% PTR 20 40% 10 20% 0 0% River Nile N. Darfur S. Darfur N. Kordofan S. Kordofan El-Gadarif Sinar W.Darfur Northern Red Sea Kassala Blue Nile W. Kordofan Khartoum White Nile El-Gazira So urces: 2002 Series fro m CB S 2004 and 2003 Series fro m M o E (2004) Secondary Education 2.65 Enrolment rates in secondary education are low in Sudan, and especially so in the three Darfur states (Figure 2.19). West Darfur has the lowest gross enrolment ratio as well as the highest Secondary School Load value; a value of 8000 for the latter implies that if the net enrolment ratio was 100 percent, then given the current stock of secondary schools, each existing school would have to cater for 8000 students.53 This hypothetical scenario of universal education is useful for comparing education gaps across states in terms of infrastructure-related capacity. Figure 2.19: Gross Secondary Enrolment Rates and Secondary School Loads, 2001 GER Sec. Schools Load 100% 10000 80% 8000 Secondary School Load 60% 6000 GER 40% 4000 20% 2000 0% 0 El-Gadarif Kassala Sinar River Nile Blue Nile N. Darfur S. Darfur N. Kordofan S. Kordofan W.Darfur White Nile Khartoum W. Kordofan Red Sea El-Gazira Northern So urce: M o E 2001 53 Secondary School Loads are graphed as Pupil-teacher ratios and may be misleading since the enrolment rates are very low. 51 Literacy 2.66 In terms of stocks and trends of human capital the overall literacy rates across states and gender as well as across time, if available, are telling of the underlying direction of general educational training, especially since historical school enrolment data before 2000 are poor. Figure 2.20 plots the literacy rate in each state in 1993 and 2000 across gender, and shows that there have been increases in literacy in almost all states over the seven year period, though the 2000 data are only for ever-married individuals and are likely to be biased upwards. Nevertheless rates have increased by about 10 percent in both South and North Darfur. But the most striking increase has been the female literacy rate. In all states where the literacy rate has increased, the blue line is markedly steeper than its counterpart. Even in West Darfur where the literacy increase seems modest at best, the slope of the blue line almost matches those of South and North Darfur. Figure 2.20: Levels and Rates of Change of Adult Literacy, by State and Gender 2.67 It is nonetheless still the case that about half of the Northern states lag behind the adult literacy average of 60 percent for Sub Saharan Africa. The 2006 preliminary results of the Darfur Emergency and Food Security Nutrition Assessment54 report a literacy rate of 53 percent for household heads in the conflict-affected population, compared to a Sub Saharan average of about 63 percent. This is below the 2000 figures for North and South Darfur, but equal to the corresponding 2000 value for West Darfur. This could be, on the other hand, evidence of the magnitude of skilled out-migration or brain drain from Darfur. Preliminary results from the 2006 54 Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment 2006 Preliminary Presentation (FOA, Moh, UNICEF, WFP et al ) 52 SHHS, which only collected female literacy data, show broad increases in literacy across all regions, with small decreases in female adult literacy in West Darfur. In the SHHS, it is notable that the increases in North and South Darfur are significantly smaller than the gains in other Northern states. 2.68 A closer look at younger cohorts shows similar patterns, Figure 2.21 shows the literacy rate of youth over time. Since new states were created in 1992 / 1993, a comparison is only possible across regions. 2.69 Over the decade to 2000, the youth literacy rate has increased by about half in both Darfur and Eastern regions, and the gains in Darfur have been proportionally shared between men and women. Overall the slopes across the two time periods are steeper for the younger cohort compared to the entire adult population and are higher for regions with lower 1993 levels, which suggest that the educational gaps may have been even wider during the 1990s. What remains true is that the shortfall in literacy is still too wide, and Darfur needs to significantly improve its capacity to deliver education to meet the second MDG which requires all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. At current estimates, Darfur seems the furthest from this destination among the Northern regions, and coupled with the loss of teachers and school disruptions, the challenge is even more daunting now than it was in 2000. Figure 2.21: Youth Literacy Rates across North Sudan, (aged 15-24) in 1990 and 2000 Total F M 100% M M M M M M F F F 80% F F F 60% 40% 20% 0% 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 Northern Eastern Central Khartoum Kardofan Darfur North Sudan So urce: DHS (1990) & M ICS (2000) Gender 2.70 The fourth MDG is to promote gender equality and empower women. Most indicators hide large gender disparities, with women suffering disproportionally from limited access to basic social services. However, as pointed out earlier, data and access to accurate indicators remains a serious constraint to more concerted efforts. 2.71 The educational gender gaps remain high in Darfur states, with ratios of girls to boys in primary education at 77, 74 and 59 percent in South, North and West Darfur respectively, compared to a Northern state average of 94 percent. In addition, educational opportunities in IDP camps are fewer for girls compared to in urban areas. 53 2.72 Female literacy rates are also lagging, as shown in Figure 2.20. Overall, the female to male ratio is about three-fourths, compared to an average of 84 percent in the Northern states. However, North Darfur nonetheless scores better than the Northern average at 86 percent, while West Darfur lingers far below at 68 percent. 2.73 There has been a persistent lack of comprehensive reproductive health services in Darfur, which has become worse during the conflict. In the last decade, the maternal mortality ratio in Darfur has been about 525 per 100,000 live births compared to 509 in Khartoum. The share of births attended by skilled and professional health staff ranges from 33 to 69 percent in West and North Darfur respectively, compared to a Northern average of about 60 percent. 2.74 Most rural women are involved in agriculture and animal production in the Darfur states although statistics do not show their contribution. The proportion of women in non-agriculture wage employment is estimated at 40 percent in North Darfur, and 35 percent in both South and West Darfur. However, it is estimated that the conflict has significantly affected income-earning opportunities for women due to widespread insecurity and an increasing number of female headed households. Women also bear the burden of meeting household emergency needs, as is described in the next section. Energy and the Environment 2.75 The seventh MDG is ensuring environmental sustainability, and one indicator of this is the proportion of households using solid fuels. Almost all households in Darfur rely on charcoal or wood as their main source of fuel (Figure 2.22). The disaggregated figures for both 2000 and 2006 by state show similar patterns as the regional data shown in the graph. Across the whole of Northern Sudan, households in Darfur are the most dependent on either charcoal or wood as their main source of cooking fuel. The 2006 SHHS survey included a wide range of possible options for cooking fuel including four separate categories of biomass – which accounted for significant response changes in Northern and Central states. Therefore even after considering the potential shortcomings of the 2000 MICS data, it is clear that households in Darfur still almost exclusively utilize unsustainable sources of fuel. This overdependence has increased since 2000 and poses crucial environmental questions that will need to be addressed. In addition, as documented in the agriculture chapter, deforestation is a major problem, as is desertification. 54 Figure 2.22: Household Fuel-Type Usage in North Sudan, 1990, 2000 and 2006 Gas / Electricity Charcoal / W ood Others 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 Khartoum Northern Eastern Central Kardofan Darfur N. Sudan So urce: DHS(1990), M ICS(2000) & SHHS (2006) 2.76 The 2004 Emergency and Food Security and Nutrition assessment (WFP et al) reports almost universal usage of wood or charcoal for cooking. Information about the source of fuel as well as the time it takes to get wood after the conflict began shows that almost half of the IDPs spent significant amounts of time collecting wood – more than the returnees and the never- displaced populations (Figure 2.23). Given the security concerns, especially for the women collecting the wood, these numbers are a real cause for concern. Figure 2.23: Time Consumed Getting Wood in Darfur, 2004 Purchase <1/4 day 1/4 to 1/2 day 1/2 day or more 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% IDP Returnee Never Displaced So urce: Emergency Fo o d Security and Fo o d A ssessment, 2004, (WFP et al) 55 E. CONCLUSIONS 2.77 Across most of Sudan, progress towards meeting most of the MDGs since 1990 has been too slow. The challenge for Darfur is even steeper, since the region started the 1990s already lagging the northern averages, and the recent conflict has compounded the rates required to meet the targets. Darfur scores well below the Northern Sudan averages on most indicators, although well above those for Southern Sudan. However, compared to neighboring countries the picture is mixed: The three Darfur states do much better than Chad and Ethiopia on most accounts, and have lower child mortality and better access to improved water sources than Uganda and Kenya. 2.78 The data paint a picture of some momentum through the 1990s in Darfur with limited progress towards meeting the MDGs, although with levels of access to basic services still far below universal, and significantly lagging the better-off parts of the country. However the onset of the conflict has severely hampered any momentum, and any progress has been largely fuelled by the humanitarian programs, which casts a worrisome shadow into the post-emergency scenario. 2.79 Adverse effects of the conflict are manifest. The 2003 education statistics show substantial drops in school enrolment for girls compared to boys (as shown by lower girl-boy ratios), and the same series showed a loss of a thousand teachers in South Darfur compared with the previous year. The 2006 SHHS preliminary data record large drops in installed water and sanitation facilities which matches anecdotal reports and accounts from field visits. 2.80 We have not been able to adequately explore the distributional aspects across localities and have inevitably overlooked the fragility of the current situation. Averages are useful but these important caveats must be borne in mind. Data availability and quality prevent a complete mapping of a baseline. Compiling comprehensive and reliable data is an important goal in the post-humanitarian framework, and needs to extend to income and consumption data. 56 CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Prepared by Vivek Srivastava with Mukhtar Al Assam, Hamid Nur, Bob Searle, Janelle Plummer, Waleed Madibbo and Christophe Ribes Ros. A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 3.1 The complex economic and political history of Darfur has resulted in an unprecedented level of marginalization of the Darfurian people, place and institutions. This both resembles and differs from other marginalized and peripheral areas of Sudan. Regions in the south and east55 also have lower levels and rates of development than Khartoum and nearby states. Historically however Darfur was characterized by its independence and political organization, distinct from other regions. The incorporation of independent Darfur into the Sudan marked a turning point in the political consciousness of the region  altering the traditional mechanisms of governance and then subsequently subdividing the regional configuration of Darfur into three states. This slicing up of authority was not one of devolution to the grassroots but one which consolidated a divide-and-rule ethos and “stretched the states meager resources thinly over a much inflated public sector that was unable to deliver basic services�. 56 3.2 The story of governance in Darfur is a story about governance in crisis. Most dimensions of governance are severely limited or eroded. The accountability and responsiveness of the Sudanese state in relation to Darfur, and the capability, accountability and responsiveness of the state and local governments in Darfur to its people are both minimal. Institutional checks and balances have failed, public sector management is ineffective and biased, political accountability is non-existent, the private sector struggles to operate in a non-transparent, monopolistic environment dominated by political interest. Decentralization has shifted responsibility but not improved service delivery, civil society and the media are heavily constrained, traditional leadership has been eroded and is in crisis, and citizen participation is limited to pockets and disenfranchised by existing bureaucratic elements. 3.3 The governance problems in Darfur and the factors that have brought Darfur to its current crisis are complex and multi-dimensional. So too will be any emerging solutions. Analysis of governance in Darfur requires detailed considerations of the national situation as well as the sub-national and local contexts of Darfur. Many argue there is no solution to Darfur without political settlement and reform in Khartoum. This scenario plays out in the arena of governance. It also requires a strong understanding of the difference and synonyms between governance in crisis and crisis in governance, the linkages to the CPA and the resolution of the conflict and governance in the south, and of the structure and peculiarities of transition from a state to ‗no-governance‘ to functioning arrangements consistent with the development of a legitimate governance. 3.4 This chapter aims to outline the current situation, and initiate thinking on possible priorities for the future. The World Bank‘s Good Governance framework is used as the starting point to capture relevant aspects. This includes the range of issues that contribute to good governance including public sector management, institutional checks and balances, civil society and the media, decentralization and local participation and the interface with the private sector. One of the dimensions of the framework is political accountability, which we do not explicitly cover in this chapter. While generic, this framework is still useful as a basis 55 And some large parts of the north bordering on Egypt. 56 Jooma, 2006. 57 for assessing governance issues in Darfur. We begin by benchmarking Sudan with respect to key dimensions of governance, which also introduces key challenges for Darfur. Then we focus on the potential for development of effective public sector management in Darfur. The crisis of local governance and civil society and key issues to be tackled  such as the lack of skills and resources, disempowerment of communities and the issue of NAs – is examined. Across each of these areas, some emerging priorities are highlighted. B. UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN DARFUR 3.5 By way of introduction and comparison, we review published indicators of governance for Sudan. These are sobering and worsening in key areas. In the Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996-2005, reported by the World Bank Institute (WBI), Sudan‘s performance is in the lowest decile of nations in most areas of governance. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the ranking and change in ranking of these indicators between 1998 and 2005: Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law indicators are all low and declining.57 Qualitative assessments highlight that these major areas of failure are applicable also to Darfur. Figure 3.1: Governance Indicators for Sudan (1998, 2005) 3.6 Similarly, the World Bank‘s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)  which measures economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management places Sudan in the lowest quintile, together with many of the fragile states of Africa. Disaggregated CPIA data shows low scores for rule based governance, and transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector, and the aggregate score of 2.6 places Sudan among the very lowest  69th (out of 76) countries  in the ranking of low income countries. 3.7 Turning to Darfur, the key constraints to be addressed, which are summarized here, and detailed below are: 57 The limitations on the use of these indicators and the standard errors are spelled out clearly in the WBI database. The data is likely to be robust in its distinction between the quintiles and extreme highs and lows. 58  Marginalization. There is broad consensus that marginalization and neglect of the periphery and the dominance of the center are central to the various conflicts in Sudan. Wide cross-country variations in development outcomes reflect the large differences in the allocation of resources across states and regions. The intergovernmental system of resource allocation has concentrated resources at the center and has distributed the relatively limited remaining resources inequitably and in a non-transparent manner. Consistent with the colonial practice, states along the Nile have benefited from this at the expense of others. Over time the marginalized areas have lost faith in federal governance and have demanded guarantees to ensure that they get their fair share. The story of Sudan‘s major civil wars and unrest is a result of discriminatory policies and poor governance. Certainly in Darfur, this has contributed to the escalation of the conflict and provided common cause for Darfurians. A more equitable sharing of resources and power are seen as necessary conditions for resolution of the problem.  Eroded Capacity and Low Credibility. As a result of being poorly funded and under-resourced, the capacity of sub-national governments in Darfur has been severely eroded over time. The problem is compounded by the politicization of the public services. Appointments to public office and the civil service have been subject to patronage and nepotism, often based on political and tribal loyalties. Those tasked with providing public services are very often not seen as working for the wider public interest. The governments (state and local) currently in place in Darfur are not representative.  Weak Mechanisms for Accountability. In the face of relatively repressive and non-democratic regimes, demand-side mechanisms of accountability have not developed adequately. The public has very limited access to information on the use of public sector resources and plays virtually no role in planning and budgeting for the use of these resources. Central control has been pervasive and even so-called ―Popular Committees‖ at the community level are instruments of the party/regime. Thus, credibility of all government organizations and agencies is low. 3.8 With the signing of the CPA (Jan 2005) and the DPA (May 2006), the Government has recognized that more equitable sharing of power and wealth are critical for stability in the Sudan.58 Fundamentally, however, the governance situation in Darfur has not improved. A basic theme of this chapter is that there are fundamental issues to be addressed before any such institutions are likely to make a tangible difference to governance in Darfur. There are also a host of issues that will need to be addressed if these or analogous types of institutions are to function as envisaged, including the following: How will these arrangements address issues of inclusion and representation as expected and, if not, what else needs to be done? Will these arrangements lead to real power sharing? How can the technical capability of the institutions be ensured? And so on. 58 Under the DPA signed in May 2005 between the government and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, several new institutions were outlined. These include: The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), Land Commission, Property Claims Commission, Compensation Commission, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, Demobilisation and Disarmament Reintegration, Darfur Dialogue, and Ceasefire Commission. Some have been notionally established. 59 C. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT FOR DARFUR 3.9 This section reviews various aspects of public sector management, with an emphasis on intergovernmental fiscal relations. This is emphasized here because: (i) equitable wealth sharing is central to sustained peace in the future; (ii) the decentralization vision of the INC and the peace agreements is in its infancy and needs to be established for all of Sudan; and (iii) the issues around civil service reform and public financial management are not very different in Darfur from the rest of the Sudan and have been addressed in greater detail elsewhere59. Without a robust intergovernmental fiscal framework, together with the capacity needed at the state and local level for making decentralization work, it will be difficult to sustain a peace that hinges on political and economic equity. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 3.10 An analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations needs to look at both parties to the relationships, that is, both national government structures as well as Darfur. The marginalization felt by the people of Darfur (and other parts of the country) has been affected by the traditional fiscal relations practices in Sudan. The fiscal transfer system in northern Sudan is undergoing very substantial changes as a result of the INC and the CPA, which aim to establish a more equitable, transparent and rules-based framework of transfers between the central government and the States, including through the creation of the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC). However, much remains to be done to implement the agreed arrangements. 3.11 Under the new set of institutional arrangements to manage intergovernmental fiscal relations in Sudan, the bodies operating at the central government level in 2006 – the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE) and the National State Support Fund (NSSF) – are expected to have less substantial roles and the FFAMC will become a major player once Presidential Decree 35 of 2006 is fully implemented. The roles of the three parties still need to be clarified. The FFAMC has expressed displeasure at the way the MoFNE has implemented its recommendations for 2007 and continued to involve the NSSF in the distribution to the States. Although Presidential Decree No. 35 identifies the NSSF, it is not clear what role it plays in the present architecture. The National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) was provided for in the CPA, and the DPA also provided for a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) with roles in the development planning and grant distribution area. None of these arrangements are clear at this time. Current Situation 3.12 Service delivery responsibilities. Clear allocations of service delivery responsibilities are necessary for a community to understand how governments work for its benefit. In the current circumstances of northern Sudan, and Darfur in particular, clear responsibilities are also needed so that the FFAMC can decide, in a scientific and fully comparable way, what the needs for funding of each government are – a function required of it under its Presidential Decree, the INC and the DPA. Included in this task is a clarification of the future roles of localities and Native administrations as the roles of the States will not be clarified sufficiently until these supporting elements of the public sector are also clarified. As stated earlier, the future role of the FFAMC in relation to locality financing must be decided and this cannot occur until their roles are delineated. 59 See, for example, Sudan: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, Joint Assessment Mission, March 2005. 60 3.13 Although the INC makes a very good start at delineating the functional responsibilities between the central Government and the States in northern Sudan, and between the central Government and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), it provides for concurrent powers in many areas and these may be problematic as the range, depth and complexity of government services increases in the future. There is also a need for further unbundling various aspect of functional responsibility such as policy making, service delivery, financing, etc. Clarification of the roles of governments will be an evolving aspect of governance over a longer term because service breadth and complexity will grow as fiscal capacity develops. However, even during the transition governments need to have clarity on their (emerging) responsibilities. As a result of this lack of clarity governments in Darfur are working together to do what they can, using ad hoc arrangements where necessary. In general, this has resulted in the ‗locality‘ level of government (and the Native Administrations) doing less than their mandated range of functions. In the future, the people and their governments need to have a more stable and definitive base on which to operate. 3.14 Revenue assignments and potential. Like the allocation of service delivery responsibilities, a community needs to know what level of government is imposing what taxes on it so that the people can monitor how their public sector is performing on their behalf. In northern Sudan and in Darfur in particular, this need is greater than normal because the tax collection arrangements are not always an indication of the level of government that imposes the tax and benefits from the collection. The State level of government has few collection responsibilities but still has substantial revenue authority. Revenue collected in the State is usually collected either by the State office of the National Chamber of Revenue, the national Customs Office, the localities or even the NAs. To undertake its task of assessing the relative needs of the Darfur States (and all other northern States) for central government funding, the FFAMC must have a firm base on which to make its comparisons. 3.15 The current arrangements allow for the central government Revenue Chamber to collect revenue for the States and localities, the localities to collect for the centre and/or the State, and the NAs to collect for both the State and the locality. The States, in fact, do very little tax collection. There is also insufficient clarity on what level of government (or individual) can grant tax exemptions. 3.16 As it has in expenditure assignments, the INC has made a good start at clarifying what taxes are to flow to the central government and the States, but those for the localities and NAs are left unspecified, and it makes no comment on the administrative arrangements for exemptions and collection. 3.17 The system of transfers that existed prior to 2007 was almost totally non-transparent, except for the Value Added Tax (VAT) sharing and the Agricultural Compensation Grants. It was complicated and non-transparent, and seemed to have evolved over time in an ad hoc way, and as a result of a series of politically-based bargains between the center and those representing either an individual State or group of States. The NSSF documents that purport to explain the bases of distribution appear to be largely irrelevant to the final outcomes. In fact, the allocations were made on non-transparent criteria and subject to suspicion and allegations of politically patronage. Although the State Governors (Walis) and Ministers of Finance were involved in the largely political process of determining the major transfers, the States had no real understanding of the basis of the transfers and had been unable to estimate their future receipts for budget purposes with any degree of acceptable accuracy. Lack of information relating to their transfers was a major reason why States budgets were not sufficiently accurate to use as management tools. 61 3.18 Development expenditure is a major element of intergovernmental fiscal relations in northern Sudan (and in Darfur in particular), and the paucity of development activity was an important indicator of the marginalization the people rebelled against. The management of development expenditure is not done solely through the fiscal transfer system and will need to be re-examined once the States and localities are given the greater degree of autonomy indicated in the peace documents. Although there may some change in 2007, till recently most of the development expenditure in northern Sudan were managed by the central government through the MoFNE. The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) 3.19 As envisaged in the CPA, the FFAMC has a key role in ensuring the effective operation of a reformed system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in northern Sudan, and therefore Darfur. Its establishment was first mooted by the CPA and its role and responsibilities spelt out in the INC. The DPA (Arts. 121 – 128) also identifies the FFAMC as a key institution for the wealth sharing aspects of the agreement. An interim Presidential Decree (No. 41 of 2005) giving legal status to the agency was followed by a more permanent Decree in 2006 (No. 35) and work is ongoing for the development of an Act to go before the National Legislature. 3.20 Using minimal resources, the FFAMC is operational and is active in preparing recommendations to the government on both the vertical allocation of resources between the federal government, the government of southern Sudan and the State level of government; and the distribution of grants between the States (with the grants to the southern States going through the GoSS). The FFAMC made fairly detailed submissions for the 2007 budget including the method and frequency of funds transfer to the States. Robust mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreed (legislated) procedures will need to be developed. Although Presidential Decree 35 of 2006 governing the operations of the FFAMC was passed in November 2006, the Commission still has very few staff and little office equipment. The Decree specifies the Commission‘s roles and responsibilities only in broad terms and needs further and more detailed consideration before the FFAMC has an appropriate legislative base. 3.21 At least some of the roles now specified for the FFAMC have still been undertaken by the NSSF. The NSSF is still active and appears to continue to operate as if the FFAMC were not in existence. In fact Presidential Decree No. 35 recognizes the NSSF and has provided observer status on the FFAMC. Key Issues 3.22 Service delivery responsibility assignments. After the completion of the peace processes and the election of the autonomous State governments, there will be need for all the northern States (including those from Darfur) to work with the central government to clarify the distribution of powers between levels of government – including the localities and the Native Administrations. The Darfur States will also need to decide on the powers of the Darfur Regional Authority and review their Local Government Acts (which are at present based on a ‗model‘ Act prepared by the central Ministry of Federal Government Affairs) to see that they truly reflect the required allocation of responsibilities to the localities and are consistent with the INC and the CPA. 3.23 Revenue assignments and potential. As well as giving each level of government a firm legal base for its revenue raising, development activities relating to this function need to clarify, specify and publicize the revenue collection and revenue sharing arrangements. There needs to be considerable effort put into developing databases that can be used to impose taxes 62 more effectively and the revenue collection staff need to be re-equipped and retrained in assessment, collection and recording skills. 3.24 With the greater independence of the States and localities after the elections, there will need to be a review of the operations of the National Revenue Chamber and decisions taken about what institutions collect (and give exemptions on) State and locality revenues. This may require the establishment of new institutions. Thought must also be given to the current practice of raising ‗Ministerial revenue‘ over which the Ministry retains control. This should be replaced with a policy of all revenue flowing into a State (or locality) Revenue Account so that all expenditures can be funded from the one source and better budget management result. This is a parallel to the development of the National Revenue Account that is to be recipient of all revenue raised by the central government (and subject to FFAMC distribution recommendations). There will also have to be regulations that govern the granting of tax exemptions and making sure the agency granting the exemption is the one that suffers the budgetary impact. 3.25 The fiscal relations framework. In relation to the fiscal relations framework under which northern Sudan, and thus Darfur, is to operate, much remains to be done to implement the agreed arrangements. Most of the effort needs to be at the central government level as it is the transfer providers that need to change most to conform to the new philosophy. The transfer recipients also need assistance however, as it is these governments that can best monitor the activities of the system and ensure fairness in the allocation of resources. 3.26 The funds transfer framework specified in the peace documents now needs to be expanded and defined through legislation to create greater transparency before its operation becomes internally inconsistent and confusing. In the longer-term, transfer mechanisms should be as simple as possible but be designed to satisfy fixed, pre-determined principles and have results that States can predict for budgeting and longer-term planning purposes. At present, the States in Darfur have had to complete and publish their long-term Development Plans without any idea of future funding flows, which makes their well-developed documents of much lesser value. 3.27 The way the MoFNE currently controls most of the public sector development activity in northern Sudan will need to change. Priorities for development must be centrally planned to the extent this is necessary but must be moved closer to the people so that the community is better able to indicate its needs and monitor the activities of its representatives in government. 3.28 Institutional arrangements. All the institutions involved in the fiscal transfer system established under the CPA, INC and DPA will need substantial support before they become fully operational. A firm legislative base for each of them will be necessary to ensure they know their roles precisely and can manage their interaction. Some work has been done on the legislative base of the FFAMC but, as mentioned earlier, more clarification and expansion is necessary. The new role of the MoFNE has to be specified and ‗owned‘ by the Ministry. The legislation under which the NSSF operates should be amended or abolished. 3.29 Looking ahead, a sharper and clearer clarification of roles with a firm legal basis and the development of appropriate technical capacity are the major areas of concern for the future operation of the FFAMC. The areas that need further consideration and/or clarification include: 1. The membership of the Commission. Is it too large at present with 32 voting members and 6 members with observer status? It is expected to make decisions by consensus and this is very difficult with such a large membership. 63 2. The Commission‘s independence. The FFAMC is required to be autonomous and independent, yet the Chairman is appointed by and holds office at the pleasure of the President. The Commission is funded from the GNU budget managed by the MoFNE, and has its funds flow through the Presidency. Under these arrangements, can it be sufficiently independent of the central government? 3. The Commission‘s responsibilities. These are outlined in general terms only at this stage and greater clarification needs to be given to the FFAMC‘s role in determining the coverage and total funds available in the National Revenue Fund; the monitoring role and how that role relates to the MoFNE and the National Chamber of Audit; the role of monitoring what recipients do with the funds transferred to them; and whether or not the Commission‘s distribution role extends to the localities within States. 4. The Commission‘s powers to enforce other agencies of government to provide it with data and information, and the penalties to be imposed for non-provision. 5. Greater specification of the philosophical basis for funds distribution (without legislating the criteria), so that the FFAMC can develop criteria appropriate to the philosophy. 6. The relationship of the FFAMC to other central government agencies, particularly the MoFNE, the various Development and Reconstruction Funds, the National State Support Fund and the Fund for the Sharing of Resources and Development of Northern States, so that appropriate and non-conflicting legislative changes can be made. 7. The role of the Panel of Experts after 2007 and the role of the technical secretariat of the FFAMC need to be clarified and codified to allow the recruitment and development of the secretariat staff. 3.30 Continuing technical support will be essential for the Members of the Commission, its staff and the Panel of Experts that is allowed for under the peace documents (and has been engaged under the LICUS Project) to provide advice. Particularly relating to its grant distribution and monitoring functions, it will be important that the Commission‘s clients understand its role and the principles on which it is to operate, and their roles in providing it with data and other information. This is particularly important for the States and can best be achieved through training and capacity building for State Ministers of Finance and their locality equivalents, and the staff of those organizations and the central government Ministries involved with grants. 3.31 Reliable data on a number of variables is needed at the level of states and localities if the FFAMC is to design meaningful formulas for vertical and horizontal resource sharing for these are to be implemented. Coordination between the FFAMC and the Department of Statistics (DOS) and development of capacity of the DOS to collect and generate data needed by the FFAMC are of critical importance in this context. 3.32 All agencies with an operational role in the fiscal transfer system will also need infrastructure support during their establishment or re-establishment phase. Thereafter, all institutions involved will need substantial technical support and capacity building for both their management structure and their staff. Legislative change may also be necessary because of changing responsibilities of some other institutions, but any need in this area cannot be detailed until after decisions concerning institutional arrangements have been finalized. 64 Emerging Priorities 3.33 The emerging priorities that will need to be addressed in order for intergovernmental fiscal relations in Darfur to become effective, responsive and accountable include the following. These are of course linked to the topics addressed below, especially local level accountability:  Service delivery responsibility assignments. Getting final decisions on the distribution of responsibilities takes a long time as new issues arise frequently. An important part of this process will be to ensure that the people of Darfur understand what their governments are responsible for, and hold their elected representatives accountable for the provision of services.  Revenue raising capacities. A better understanding of what revenue collection is occurring at each level of government, and what levels of government are benefiting from those collections, is needed. A database could be established, which would in turn provide governments in Darfur with better information with which to establish revenue collection procedures. Longer term initiatives should aim to enable the governments to establish fully effective revenue imposition and collection procedures that are well integrated and well understood by the people. This, coupled with the clarification of expenditure responsibilities, could be a major step in rebuilding people‘s confidence that government can work for their benefit.  The fiscal relations framework. It is possible that the confusing and variable arrangements that exist at present are contributing to the very low revenue mobilization, and therefore development expenditure, of the States and localities. They are certainly influencing the incentives facing different collection agencies. The revenue collection arrangements and procedures in northern Sudan are in urgent need of review and clarification. At present, units within the public sector do not have a uniform set of definitions to classify taxation, non-tax revenue, fees and charges, or transfers, which greatly confuses discussions about revenue- raising. At present, collection procedures and revenue sharing arrangements are not detailed in the INC, and also vary, both between and within States, and needs to be clarified. A database could be usefully developed to provide details of what are the collection and sharing arrangements in each locality (and NA) in each State. In general, the States and localities are increasingly relying on transfers from the centre. This has the advantage of bringing additional resources (see fiscal chapter), but at the potential cost of reducing the accountability of the sub- national governments to their people. If States and localities do not raise more of their own revenue, they will increasingly be seen as arms of the central government. It can be difficult to overcome the people‘s perceptions that government does not work for their benefit unless they see a direct relationship between paying taxes and receiving services and regional development.  Institutional arrangements. Assistance to address the wider physical and human capacity needs of the new institutions will be a priority. Transforming Public Sector Management in Darfur 3.34 Many of the issues relevant to transforming public sector management were addressed in the CPA JAM. Here we highlight and emphasize those issues that are of central importance to Darfur. The findings in this section draw on the ongoing PER being undertaken by the World Bank and the work done during the preparation of the MDTF- 65 funded Public Service Reform, Decentralization and Capacity Building Project (PSCAP)60, and are outlined in a separate chapter in this report. Current Situation 3.35 Structure of public sector. The public sector in northern Sudan is made up of the Federal Government, the State Governments and localities and in Darfur has important links with the Native Administrations. Except for the NAs, government is organized hierarchically, with States subject to central government legislation and localities subject to State legislation61. 3.36 While the NAs work closely with the States and localities, they are currently subject to central government legislation, although the INC (Schedule C, clause 34) gives the management of traditional and customary law to the States. This may indicate that NAs will, in the future, come under State control. There is some concern in the Darfur communities about the increasing number of local governments and the associated extra costs. If there is to be any further disaggregation of localities care will need to be taken to avoid further diseconomies of small scale and the resulting tendency to spend increasing proportions of resources on administrative overheads rather than actual service delivery. 3.37 Financial management. As might be expected, these skills are most developed at the federal level and least developed at the locality level. In general, however, the financial management of the public sector is not at international standards and there is considerable scope for improvement on all aspects of the budget cycle to ensure efficiency and accountability in the use of public resources. This becomes especially important as more resources are devolved to sub-national levels. To do this, public sector managers need higher levels of skill, better and more reliable information and modern systems. 3.38 In this context, the PER has found serious shortcomings, including that the limited nature of fiscal decentralization is an impediment to pro-poor objectives being achieved, and that budget credibility is a major problem, particularly at the State level (see budget chapter). Budget processes and procedures are a major limiting factor on effective resource allocation and use, state autonomy is limited, in part because of the high dependence of the States on transfers from the central government; and financial management at both the State and locality levels is very weak. Ongoing work on the PSCAP has also identified some of the major areas of deficiency in the current financial management in Northern Sudan as: lack of fiscal discipline; inappropriate allocation of resources; lack of clarity and relevance in financial management and accounting legislation; lack of precision and control in the budget process; lack of computerization; and outdated legislation and regulations on procurement. 3.39 Presently, the relationships of governments to the people in Darfur, and the Sudan more generally, involve only very low level of financial accountability. Neither the legislators nor the civil service are sufficiently accountable to those they serve. At all levels of government, there are indications of revenue that is not brought to account and expenditure that is not divulged to the community. Weak or absent institutions for accountability and transparency could hide corruption and decisions based on nepotism and party allegiances, as 60 The proposed PSCAP project includes support to central institutions associated with intergovernmental fiscal relations, public financial management at federal and state levels and aspects of human resource management at federal and state levels; many of the components of the project are highly relevant to Darfur. 61 There is currently an intention in South Darfur State to vary this structure to allow for urban cities and municipalities within Localities. 66 well as inefficient and ineffective government. Public information currently available does not meet the needs of transparency and accountability. 3.40 Human resources management. More than anywhere else in Sudan there is an urgent need to create a responsive, efficient and merit-based public service. All aspects need modernization and upgrading. As in other parts of Sudan, public employment is seen as a means of providing employment and patronage. The size of the public service is not based in functional evaluations and job descriptions and classification are largely non-existent. Recruitment, appraisal, promotion, discipline, etc. are not seen to be based on objective and transparent criteria and systems. Most civil servants have no relevant training. 3.41 Better human resource management would create greater efficiency and ensure the citizens of Darfur receive better services, even without additional funds being spent. Civil service numbers (or at least Chapter 1, wages and salaries expenditures) have increased at an unaffordable rate in recent years and better management is needed in the control and use of Chapter 1 expenditure. The increasing number of political positions has added to this expenditure, as has the statutory salary increases imposed on the States and localities each year by the central government. 3.42 Some of the major areas of deficiency in the current human resources management in Northern Sudan are loss of employees to the private sector; lack of training at all levels; poor performance appraisal; promotion on basis of seniority rather than competence; low salaries and poor conditions of employment (especially in rural areas); lack of control over an informal pay system used to supplement official salary rates; too much centralization in recruitment; and lack of merit as a basis for recruitment, promotion and salary level. 3.43 Project management. Project management is weak. Public servants at the State and locality levels in Darfur have little relevant experience and need to be able to engage effectively when reconstruction and development work commences. A start has been made with some training in this field undertaken by WBI but much more needs to be done. It is a necessary accompaniment to the increased project development expenditure seen as essential to the long-term good of Darfur and should be provided to both the State and locality sectors. Key Issues 3.44 Structure of public sector. The elections currently scheduled for 2008/2009 will see elected legislators at the federal, State and locality level. However the future roles of the State Governors (Walis) and Local Government Commissioners in a future Sudanese federal democracy are not yet clear. Are these officials to continue to be representatives of the central government (or Presidency) or are they to be executive arms responsible to the people represented by the relevant level of government? 3.45 The legislative base of all sub-national levels of government will also need to be re- examined to see that it mirrors the national objective as far as decentralization of authority is concerned. Before this can happen, however, decisions must be taken about the level of independence that sub-national governments are to be given. In particular, this will require a review of the roles and powers of the State Governors and the Local Government Commissioners. 3.46 Financial management. This needs substantial upgrading in many areas – for example, revisions to the chart of accounts, computerization, budget preparation, revenue and expenditure estimation, procurement, outcome monitoring and analysis, and auditing. Manuals and documents providing instruction to the civil service on how best to manage the 67 public resources need to be re-examined. The development of an IMF GFS-based62 functional presentation of all budgets has been underway for some time, and remains critical. 3.47 The management of development funding seems to be particularly confused and warrants early review. MoFNE and the State Ministries of Finance are expected to be the focal points of future change in this area, but training and other capacity building will have to extend to line ministries at both the central and State level, and possibly also to localities, depending on the degree of financial independence given the sub-national governments. 3.48 Another area of financial management that needs urgent attention across northern Sudan is revenue collection, exemptions and sharing arrangements. In all the States studied as part of the PER, there has been a gradual reduction in the importance of own-source revenues over the last 6 years. There is also a need to rationalize and control tax exemptions and have strict guidelines as to who can grant such exemptions. These issues have been discussed in some detail in the previous sub-section. 3.49 The scope of the PSCAP includes: revenue (cash) management; budget predictability; debt management; payroll and non-payroll expenditure control; efficiency in procurement; internal audit and the accuracy and timeliness of financial statements and budget reports. 3.50 Human resources management. Considerable training and the introduction of new management systems are needed in all aspects of human resource management. The INC gives the States (and localities) power to manage their own civil services. Exactly what this means will have to be decided and skills developed in the sub-national governments to manage this aspect of the new federal structure. 3.51 Along with the greater autonomy of the States and localities, there will need to be some reallocation of responsibilities for the payment of salaries. In time, it would be more appropriate if the salaries of all civil servants and ‗political‘ positions, such as Governors and Local Government Commissioners, were paid by the level of government they served. This is an important aspect of public sector management and clarification would help remove some of the confusion about whether the allegiances of people is to the level of government for which they work, or the level of government from which they are paid. 3.52 The scope of the PSCAP includes: a rewrite of all HR policy documents; a standardization of pay and conditions and the removal of the informal pay system; general and task specific training for a wide range of employees; computerization of databases relating to staff and other HR management; and a strengthening of the staff appraisal system to enable its linking to salary and promotion decisions. Emerging Priorities 3.53 Financial management. Because the basic approach to accounting that is currently in use is to present information on an economic basis (e.g. expenditure on wages and salaries) rather than a functional basis (eg. expenditure on health), the use of public resources is not readily identified. Changing to a functional basis of presentation, as is proposed by the federal Government, will increase the transparency of what governments are doing, thus making it easier for the people to hold them accountable. Combined with this, governments will need to make greater efforts to tell the people what they have done. In the past, the 62 The IMF‘s Government Finance Statistics (IMF-GFS) classification is that which nations use to present their public sector accounts for international analysis and comparison. It should eventually cover the whole of the public sector in Sudan so as to enable the compilation of a ‗whole-of- government‘ account. 68 emphasis has been on budget allocations rather than on the actual performance that has always fallen well short of budget. 3.54 Governments must see budgeting as a tool to manage their part of the public sector. At the same time, the budget should be the prime tool of accountability and be equally applicable to telling people what is planned and what has been achieved. Activities could aim to help governments in Darfur compile more realistic budgets, to work in closer co-operation with the people and make the public more aware of their actions, which in turn could lead to implementation of functional accounting, credible budgeting and a system of public information dissemination. 3.55 In relation to revenue collection, the Government of Sudan 2007 Budget Circular has drawn attention for the need to examine tax exemptions, do more tax auditing of VAT returns and budget on the basis of actual expected revenues and expenditures. These activities would also ease the introduction of a GFS classification and computerizing revenue collection management as well as the many other tasks. The PSCAP has identified various aspects of PFM including GFS classification; revenue (cash) management; budget predictability; debt management; payroll and non-payroll expenditure control; efficiency in procurement; internal audit and the accuracy and timeliness of financial statements and budget reports. 3.56 Human resources management. It is expected that initial interventions could expand on preliminary workforce data for states by separately identifying localities and designing a computerized database on which details of individuals can be recorded. Longer term efforts would develop these initial actions into a fully developed human resource management structure to ensure employees are treated equitably and ensure personnel records match salary records. These actions should produce best results for the community. The PSCAP has already identified a rewrite of all HR policy documents; a standardization of pay and conditions and the removal of the informal pay system; general and task specific training for a wide range of employees; computerization of databases relating to staff and other HR management; and a strengthening of the staff appraisal system to enable its linking to salary and promotion decisions. 3.57 Project management. Through the early recovery activities and the resultant increase in development expenditure, initiatives could help develop greater needs in the Darfur community for project management skills. These needs will continue to increase during the development period, as projects and programs expand. Through capacity building and technical assistance activities, these increasing needs will continue to be satisfied. D. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT „Local governance lies at the heart of the governance failure in Darfur‟. (Young, 2005) Current Situation Legislative Framework 3.58 The structure of local government in the Darfur regions has undergone a series of changes in the last decade, and further change is envisaged. Originally one state, Darfur was sub-divided into three states in 1994 with provinces and localities. Nearly a decade later, with the promulgation of the 2003 Local Government Act, local government was again restructured, making the provinces into localities and the localities into administrative units. As a result, today a hierarchical structure of governance in Darfur comprises 3 states, with 24 69 localities and 70 administrative units.63 Although many argue this created a ‗divide and rule‘ approach by Khartoum, in the field it was also noted that the state sub-division has stabilized with each state assuming a different identity. Within states (e.g. South Darfur) however the grouping of localities according to a rural/urban typology is being discussed. 3.59 In principle, a Legislative Council plays the primary legislative function in the locality, and also facilitates linkages between the executive body and the citizens. Constituted of 20 members (10 percent women) the council is intended to supervise planning, financial and management, review audits and provide control over the executive body. The Executive Committee of the council prepares recommendations for approval by the council for adoption by the executive apparatus. The Local Government Act allocates functions to the localities including the provision of services, the promotion of development and the supervision of these functions. Localities are responsible for the preparation of economic and social plans and the legislative councils approve the plans and budgets. 3.60 Localities are large organizations employing around 1000 staff. On average localities employ around 1,000 staff with a maximum of 2,000 in the larger town councils (South Darfur) and around 350 (West Darfur). Under the Commissioner is a Deputy Commissioner and line department heads for finance and administration; education; social affairs (health, social welfare and culture); agriculture and animal resources; urban planning and public works. All permanent staff on the payroll are paid by the state government against the localities‘ annual allocation. 3.61 A primary aspect of the current system is the politicallyappointed Local Government Commissioner. The management of Localities comes under the ultimate leadership of the Local Government Commissioner, a position which has the status of a state minister with both political and executive and financial powers at the locality level. A political appointee of Khartoum (approved by the President), the Commissioner ensures the connection of the locality to the state (through the Wali‘s office) and thence to the rulers of the nation responsible for all executive functions as well as security and political affairs. The Executive Director is the foremost civil servant in the localities. 3.62 Administrative units have been established within localities with the aim of delivering service closest to the community. In practice however these are chronically weak arms of the locality, a deconcentrated level of government, not one to which decision-making is devolved. Staffing varies; in Nyala, the Administrative Unit was represented by the health and education line departments. The capacity at this level of government is chronically low even in the cities; staff skills and experience are limited and the offices ill-equipped. 3.63 The People‘s Committee (PC) is the government agreed vehicle established at the village level with the view to citizen participation, to build links to the locality, encourage community financial contribution, provide public information, facilitate revenue collection and promote civic behavior especially in public health and sanitation. Although the legislation provides for representatives to be elected this is rarely the case, in the main the PCs are led by political appointees and they have little legitimacy to act as an interface with local government. Numbers vary, but these committees may represent between 2000 to 3,000 people, clustering villages in the locality. This is a very different concept in Darfur than in those localities near the Nile as clusters of villages can be spread over enormous distances, with very different needs and attitudes (O‘Fahey, 2006). 63 36 in South Darfur, 12 in North Darfur and 22 in West Darfur. 70 3.64 There is a massive gap between the theory and practice of the legislative/institutional framework. There is little evidence however that this hierarchical system of government and the interaction with citizens is working. While decentralization is an intention of the constitution and a key principle of effective governance throughout the country, Khartoum‘s dominance over finances to Darfur, the structural monopolization of the party over state resources, combined with a series of broken promises has led to a dysfunctional system with little financial or other forms of independence. The fiscal consolidation of the 1990s has had dire consequences on social services, nowhere more marked than in Darfur, which has suffered from serious neglect.64 In this environment, Darfur has suffered severe marginalization. 3.65 Friction between the centre and the state is extended into difficulties between state and locality. A tension between the state and the locality has arisen because of the lack of funds, the enormity of the task, the different status and allegiances, and problematic lines of reporting and management. Evidence suggests that constantly changing laws have not been taken up at lower levels of government. Ongoing changes in the laws without efforts to improve awareness have created confusion among administrators and given politicians leverage. Some administrators spoke of the Local Government Act as one which increased the powers at the centre. Table 3.1: Key Actors in Locality Governments – Allegiances and Reporting Position Reporting lines Comments Local Appointed by President on The role of the LGC in a future structure of Government nomination by Wali, has the status governance for Darfur needs examination  Commissioner of a State Minister) at present the LGC provides a mechanism for control by Khartoum over the localities. Local Appointed by President or Wali [ Paid by Khartoum through the State. Legislature Paid by Khartoum through the State. Executive Federal civil servant of the Appointed by Wali from a list prepared by Director Ministry of Federal Government. Khartoum, therefore allegiances to Khartoum and Wali as well as locality) Lower staff Civil servants managed by the Allegiance issues State Ministry of Local Government The LG Responsible to the Locality and the Administrative State Ministry responsible for their Units line staff function. Native Wali Depends on level, remuneration by Administration LG Commissioner government key issue in independence of Chiefs NAs. 3.66 Ultimately the democratic structure of local governance is threatened by the failure of government to (receive funds and) deliver basic services. The lack of political accountability is a critical issue as is the confusion between the executive and non-executive sides of local 64 Young highlights the origins of Darfur‘s marginalisation, stressing (i) failing institutions, including the judicial systems and policing which latterly appeared to favour certain groups. …in part due to the fragmented approach to administration, particularly the (mis)handling of the Native Administration; and (ii) Failing development, including education, health care, transport, veterinary and other services, which affect all of Darfur, but historically have affected different ethnic groups to different extents (Young, 2006). 71 government  there is constant overlap between the political and executive branches of locality government. The nature of government in Darfur has meant that many elected to the council are those familiar with local government – often paid administrative officials. The blurred lines between politicians and executive arms of the locality is a characteristic of local governance that is expected to continue i.e. locality staff will stand for election with the possibility of being elected to the council that manages them. 3.67 National revenues are not being translated into budgets that get to the people of Darfur. The fund flows are unequal and non-transparent. Localities (and states) are greatly dependent on transfers from the federal level to meet expenditure requirements in the 4 defined chapters (Chapter 1 wages; Chapter 2 goods and services; Chapter 3 investment; Chapter 4 development). These funds are very low by Sudan standards – although evidence suggests that they have increased in recent years. In the locality of Waha, for example, there has been no own revenue for two years, the delivery of services to the nomadic people of the locality is entirely dependent on grants from State government which have been unpredictable. 3.68 The finance problem is not only about the low revenue base, but the massive regional disparity compared with the rest of Sudan. The majority of funds go to recurrent costs. In North Darfur this is as high as 68 percent for Chapter 1 wages and salaries and 46 percent in South Darfur. As documented in the budget chapter, overall budget management is weak in all three states and in all localities. There is substantial deviation in what the budget proposes and the annual expenditures. There is a consistent tendency to inflate revenue transfers. The extent of deviation exceeds 40 percent, undermining the credibility of the budget as a policy and planning instrument. 3.69 The minimal expenditures that do reach the development budgets of Darfur are not allocated and spent according to the needs of the people. The low capacity of the localities throughout Darfur, and the low development budgets means that little planning is undertaken in practice. Evidence suggests that community participation is non-existent – there is no capacity and no projects in which to participate. 3.70 Even if the funds were flowing to localities, there is limited staff capacity to plan and undertake development activities. Evidence suggests that there is a lack of staff in key roles. The staffing of the localities is determined at state level through line departments. At present the capacity of government at the local level in Darfur is marred by the lack of skilled staff, the lack of management responsibility/capacity for staff, and the lack of any human resource capacity development strategy. The question of staffing is illustrated also through the low number of civil servants per capita (comparing poorly to other Sudanese states and very low compared with neighboring countries), and high level of vacancies (worse in West Darfur than the northern and southern states), caused by a lack if incentive to work in Darfur, and a lack of confidence that salaries will be paid. Key areas of core governance such as public financial management show glaring gaps, but there is also a severe lack of skills and competencies to plan, strategize, budget and monitor. Technical and managerial skills and experienced staff are not available to perform the roles that are envisaged for reconstruction. Line department staff often lacks the skills to work with communities, NGOs and private providers to build multi-provider delivery systems. As noted in the infrastructure chapter, there is an urgent lack of expertise for engineering and infrastructure development.65 As elsewhere, education and health workers represent a very large proportion of recurrent cost. 65 Staff from the state level supplement localities (e.g. in the urban areas, the MPPU is technically responsible for municipal services) but even at the state level, there is a lack of trained engineers, with over half those in post having no experience, and nearly all staff lacking basic training (See infrastructure chapter). 72 There is particularly a predominance of teacher salaries (estimated at over 60% of the civil service payroll, despite this being low and irregular and the teacher-student ranges from 1:30 in the north to 1:80 in the west). 3.71 Staff salaries are low from the Executive Director of the Locality down. The massive disparity between the politically appointed Local Government Commissioner and the Executive Director who receives one tenth of the LGC salary reflects the disparity between the centre and local government (see Table 3.2). Table 3.2: Staff Salary Disparities Staff Rank66 Salary Local government commissioner 500,000 plus >800,000 allowances Executive Director 50,000 plus >55,000 allowances Administrative Heads 30-40,000 plus >50,000 Municipal engineers 50% of engineer in private sector (see infrastructure report) Note: requires validation 3.72 Unsurprisingly, management at the local government level is weak, and there is great diversity in this capacity across the localities. There is no functioning personnel management system, no incentives to stay in Darfur, and a lack of transferability in an outdated HR system. Procedures emphasize upward accountability. While the processes adopted by local government are dominated by the centre, it is also reported that there is weak communication to state line ministries. The deficiency of government division of authorities, organization and funding flow system also reflect on the personnel quality and management issues. The reality for local government is worse than appears. It is noted that the IDP camps function outside this framework. 3.73 The challenge for Darfur governance is a challenge in Khartoum and in each and every locality. Correcting the causes of weak, under funded government is key to well- functioning local governance  and a vital aspect of this lies in the development of an equitable and transparent intergovernmental fiscal transfer system that provides Darfur with a chance. But while this report has argued that many of the issues are problems to be solved in Khartoum, the problems of local government in structure, systems, staffing and most of all management and leadership must also be tackled at the local level. The transformation is as much about capacity as it is fiscal; and it is strongly dependent on the opportunity created by the local government election slated for 2008. Community Governance 3.74 Although the People‘s Committees are the government prescribed ‗voice‘ of the people, and the tribal leaders have historically represented their tribes, in practice a range of different forms of community representation are emerging. The traditional leaders of Darfur in the Native Administrations, the emerging community-based organizations in the IDP camps, as well as the legislated People‘s Councils can all be seen as representative of the community. This situation suggests a state of flux in community structures that will depend on IDP returns and the reconstitution of civil society. A rapid socio-political assessment has been recommended to map community governance issues in the varying contexts of rural and urban Darfur, but there is a dynamic trend emerging in relation to community governance that promises significant locally-led change. 66 Taken from information provided in El Geneina. 73 3.75 Historically, tribal leadership  the Native Administrations  was a key part of local and community governance. While the role, functions and relationships between NAs has not been static by any means, Native (or tribal) Administrations idara ahliya, have played a key role in governing Darfur for centuries, being (formally) abolished most recently in 1971 and reinstated in 1985.67 Today, operating in an unclear legislative framework, there is thought to be some variation in the degree of effectiveness and authority they maintain. In some areas they are still considered to provide the organizing framework at the lowest level, linking villages to localities through a hierarchical structure of leadership, sheikhs, omdas, and ultimately chieftans at the locality level, in structures that vary by tribe. They continue to perform a number of government-allocated functions for security, conflict resolution, land allocation, tax collection as well as judicial and community leadership roles. The NAs have never played a development role and have no capacity to do so. 3.76 Since 2003, government intervention, the conflict, and the forced or natural erosion of authority have affected the traditional role of the NAs. Since the onset of the current crisis, some (not all) NAs have undergone a process of politicization and realisation. While much of this may be due to government intervention applied through the appointment and dismissal of leaders that undermined the legitimacy of many NAs, a number of other structural issues have affected their capacity to function. A key issue is the degradation of land that NAs have traditionally controlled (see rural chapter). Another governance issue is the dominating relationship of NAs over localities.68 One perspective is that the NAs undermine the development of democratic governance and accountability  since localities are constrained in the presence and there is little accountability within the non-elected NA system. At present, Chiefs are paid a salary by government, while sheikhs typically receive a portion of the tax collected. As such, Chiefs are de-facto administratively paid government staff, responsible to the Wali. 3.77 The lack of clarity around the future of the Native Administrations, their governance status and function, remains a key question for scholars, elders and the people of Darfur. It is not one however that can not be resolved through a rapid assessment such as what underpins this analysis. The early recovery period will provide the supporting framework for careful analysis, consideration and decision-making, linked with assessment of other community governance structures. It will also provide the opportunity to consider the impacts and success of parallel traditional structures elsewhere (e.g. Sierra Leone, Nigeria). 3.78 In many areas, the nature and scope of ‗community governance‘ is diverse and dynamic, it is not clear where it will settle. The current situation is thus one characterized by many, varied, and dynamic systems of representation and accountability. Citizens of Darfur living in IDP camps have developed a new hybrid form of community governance which seems both responsive and representative (including youth and women). The experience of Kalma camp suggests there is scope for considering new modernized community structures that adapt the NA structure into new forms of elected Community based organizations that are legitimate in the eyes of all the population and clearer recognition of the roles and functions best performed. It is clear that solutions will need to respond to the diversity of Darfur. 3.79 The issues of community governance are not only limited to representation. In the villages and towns there is very little ‗voice‘ of the Darfur people. Depending on location, and notwithstanding the empowerment of communities in IDP camps, civil society has been diluted or severely weakened by war and famine. The authoritarian nature of the Sudanese 67 Some argue that they dominated local government and either sat on decision-making councils or informally controlled them (O‘Fahey, 2006). For detailed history of the NAs, see O‘Fahey 2006. 68 Outside the main towns, where locality councils exist, their members are generally nominated by the tribal chiefs (O‘Fahey, 2006b). 74 state has all but eroded any citizen power that once existed. Government accountability is upwards, not to citizens. 3.80 The capacity and scope of NGO activity has also been impeded by government legislation which limits NGO activity to service delivery and sets heavy constraints on advocacy activities. Apart from the humanitarian work of NGOs, civil society organizations (such as Parent Teacher Associations) have declined. Some local NGOs are very strongly affiliated with the government while others are much more independent. The issue of GoNGOs (Government owned NGOs) and affiliation is of some concern in relation to national NGOs supporting displaced communities. In the event that IDPs start to return to their homelands, a number of informants pointed towards the issue of legitimacy – many local staff of INGOs and NGOs are thought to be reporting to government on security issues. The media has also been limited in its activities and there is little demand for a free press. Service Delivery 3.81 Service delivery in Darfur is in crisis as a result of consistent marginalization, massive under funding, and the impact of decentralization (see basic social services chapter). Years of neglect, under-development and systematic under funding have affected the localities in both physical and institutional terms. Poor performance means poor outcomes. The capacity of localities to meet obligations with respect to basic service delivery is and will continue to be limited until structural change in organizational, financial and staff capacity occurs. The concentration of service delivery in IDP camps and the lack of security in some areas have resulted in further disparities in access to basic services. 3.82 The structure of health and education service delivery has changed significantly during the crisis with humanitarian organizations taking a large role. Government maintains responsibility for service delivery for education and health, although this does not extend in practice to the IDP camps. The basic social services chapter provides detailed assessment of the current situation. In practice however, many services are delivered outside of the formal government framework through non-governmental partnerships. NGO engagement in Darfur contributes to the fact that some populations in the Darfur region have the very good coverage of service delivery. The NGO sector in Darfur comprises both international NGOs and national or local NGOs engaged in service delivery. Most, but not all these organizations have formed mutually beneficial partnerships that enable them to support basic services in IDP camps. International organizations are key sources of funding and (some) community mobilization, while local NGOs provide support in the distribution of food, the provision of basic services and some developmental support for livelihoods in IDP camps. 3.83 Service delivery in the IDP camps is off-budget and partly conceals the massive underinvestment of government. Despite the impacts of NGO support for basic services, the service delivery situation in Darfur is unsustainable. The underlying capacity of government for public provision remains very weak and relies on IDP residents being served through other channels. 3.84 The focus on humanitarian activities affects the profile of CSO skills. While there are scores of international and national NGOs undertaking important work in health, education, water/sanitation, food distribution, NFI distribution and protection, due to the huge humanitarian needs and the importance of being able to deliver as fast and as efficient as possible, INGOs have not been able to address the shortcomings of their local NGO partners. Consequently, local NGOs are thought to have lost some level of development capacity over the last decade as the overall focus on humanitarian aid has postponed their development as grass roots organizations involved in community mobilization. INGOs have however invested heavily in developing the skills of individual local staff and as a result there are well 75 trained local staff operating in Darfur – in particular in the areas of health and water and sanitation. Key Issues 3.85 Sustainable reconstruction of Darfur will be contingent on the development of a functioning local level of governance. Any short, medium and long term solutions must build, not further undermine, local government capacity to respond to the needs of citizens, must strengthen all groups within civil society to demand accountability and participate in reconstruction, and must create a dynamic platform of stakeholders contributing to service delivery. These actors, and their relationships must be gradually joined up  connected  into a functioning accountability framework, and be equitable and adequately funded to meet new constitutional obligations. Central to any effort is continued, targeted and responsive capacity building for all stakeholders. This capacity building effort should have a special emphasis on getting local government up and running, and empowering citizens and communities, and developing representative community leadership and organizations from existing or emerging structures. 3.86 The dovetailing of recovery and reconstruction will be essential, as will a consistency of vision. The possible strategic directions for recovery and reconstruction outlined in this chapter should be developed into a comprehensive and consistent framework of reconstituting legitimacy, reestablishing security and the rule of law, and rebuilding accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness. Building Local Government Capacity and Legitimacy 3.87 The development of local government in Darfur provides a window of opportunity for creating an accountable and people-oriented public sector in Darfur. Notwithstanding the role of the state level, the very weak, almost non-existent capacity of local government, while of great concern, also provides an opportunity for building new accountable institutions. All the people of Darfur have been affected by the conflict, including existing and potential civil servants. Developing new attitudes and organizational culture with downward accountability will be key. Setting the right processes in place in the first instance and providing the right type of support will be vital to achieving this objective. 3.88 Early recovery activities should focus on initial capacity building and training for state and local government. This could include efforts in areas to strengthen institutional capacity for democratic governance and rule of law and, to support early recovery, to strengthen personnel and financial information, enhance capacity in planning, budgeting and management, and local government capacity for funding, as well as initial support for DPA institutions. Preliminary support will be provided for a rapid socio-political assessment of community governance structures as well as strengthening participatory planning and management of priority service delivery in selected IDP camps  this will provide a clearer needs-based menu of activities. 3.89 Development of an enabling environment for effective local governance will be key to the successful reestablishment of accountable government institutions. Other parts of this report have outlined the state and national level reforms that are needed to enable local government to work for reconstruction and development. These include the development of an effective intergovernmental fiscal framework that addresses past imbalances in fiscal transfers, revenue collection and wealth sharing between the tiers of government; the institutional arrangements for a better fiscal transfer system; support for new DPA institutions 76 and support for public sector reform. Placing government in an appropriate enabling environment will be critical. 3.90 Functions and revenues assigned to localities (by the states) need to be clearly specified. The State Local Government Acts based on the Model Act circulated by the Federal Government need to be reviewed and checked for consistency with the INC and implemented. A key issue needing attention is the financing arrangements for localities and an understanding of their sources of finance – own revenues and grants. 3.91 Intensive activity will be needed with localities to build their own capacity and legitimacy at the local level. Notwithstanding the importance of fixing the operating environment in which localities must function, focused and intensive support to localities is vital. Developing legitimacy, apart from political legitimacy, is a matter of their capability to deliver  the services they provide. Reallocating this function or bypassing government structures does not help build local government or the stability that a strong local government and stable local economy can trigger. But this confidence and trust building is also a matter of how they deliver  the processes that they use to bring their constituents into the reconstruction process. To this end, the development of the localities‘ capacity to embrace community participation will be crucial. 3.92 Striking a balance between providing basic services, and providing services through the right channel will be a key challenge in the reconstruction of Darfur. A key challenge will be getting government to meet their obligations quickly and effectively. 69 A careful balance is needed: establishing a functioning local government able to deliver services, while not undermining the activities of NGOs and other stakeholders holding the ball. Best practice clearly suggests that the locality will not have to be the provider of all services, but the need to create and manage a multi-stakeholder platform for delivery is also a challenge. 3.93 Given the importance of local government efficacy to reconstruction, peace and security, a focus is likely needed on establishing the institutional, organizational and individual capacities required for the civil service to operate in its facilitating and coordinating service provision roles. Making localities work means getting the basics right, making the public sector work with an effective civil service  operating with effective management, eliminating functional overlaps and intervention, getting staffing policies aligned, modernizing administrative procedures and developing a competitive, transparent recruitment processes carried through to performance evaluation and promotion; improved integrity systems and accountability arrangements (see above). 3.94 There is clearly a need to build capacity of local government in all areas but it is necessary to prioritize and identify what matters most. It may be better to focus on sectors driving reconstruction (education and roads for instance), developing the accountability at the sector level from state to locality through a series of linked institutional changes. It may also be better to focus at the locality level on important shifts. Two area of focus that might be highlighted are finance and responsiveness/accountability, drawing attention to the need to link local government capacity building with the improvements in the flow of funds. 3.95 Government should be supported to redefine processes  to engage communities in decision-making and place emphasis on accountability. Notwithstanding the need for financial management reform and supply side accountability, efforts should be made to direct 69 Many NGOs and donors in reconstruction settings like to run parallel, off-budget services to help affected people quickly. They are generally very successful at improving coverage and outcomes. But this process does undermine government in performing its role. 77 accountability downward to the people through specific activities that enable government and communities to work together. Organizational and staff capacity (systems, processes, skills, incentives) to improve the accountability and effectiveness of local government for enhanced basic service delivery. Staff skills need to be built in participatory planning, budgeting and implementing, in working with communities. Local government capacity to engage and optimize partnerships with NGOs, donors and the private sector for improved service delivery should be developed. Approaches and targeted capacity building should be introduced to give incentive to staff to engage in community participation, gender awareness and a focus on accountability to citizens. 3.96 Establishing the demand-responsive processes envisaged would require a set of interlinked changes at the locality level, affecting leadership and management, structures, skills and organizational culture, that is:  The development of strong leaders and champions of reform. A post-conflict Darfur, the execution of democratic processes and the early recovery improvements will provide the opportunity for new representative leaders to emerge, and to be trained to take on the challenges.  Management skills are needed for good local governance. While it is recognized that Darfur suffers a significant brain drain to Khartoum and elsewhere, Executive Directors, often managing large urban localities, are under-skilled (and underpaid), affecting capability, accountability and responsiveness.  Understanding the implications of intra-locality structures will be crucial in the large localities. Nyala locality administers a population of 1 million. Defining the way existing line departments will introduce participatory processes will be key.  Identifying the changes needed to the staffing system and removing blockages to enable the development of an effective staff cadre means introducing flexibility of the system, developing incentive structures, getting the right person into the right job, and providing training opportunities for key process and technical issues; and  Inspiring attitudinal change in existing staff and developing the culture of community participation and demand-responsive approaches to reconstruction will be a primary challenge. 3.97 The development of an efficient locality level of government will differ across Darfur, and appropriate local solutions needs to be developed. Efforts should be made to give incentives to performing localities, while closing the gap of less skilled and capacitated localities. There is a concern that performance based funding will further marginalize the under-performers. It is clear that the worst localities have the biggest reconstruction challenge before them  the most displaced people and the most damage to rebuild. 3.98 In Darfur, the civil service is currently so under-funded, there is little money in the system, and it would seem important to predict the hotspots for corruption. Mitigating against corruption at the local level should be a key part of the reconstruction and development strategy. To this end, getting the enabling environment right is an important start: clarity in the regulatory framework, in organizational, procedural and management systems (e.g. focusing staff on outcomes not rules), all mean better results and less opportunity for corrupt practices to take hold. The importance of transparency cannot be overstated. Strengthening Civil Society and Demand-Side Accountability 3.99 The issues of low capability, accountability and responsiveness of local government are closely reflected in the weaknesses and constraints on civil society in Darfur. When peace 78 comes, recovery and reconstruction activities, together with devolution, can help provide the basis for participatory, demand-responsive development. Involving end-users and citizens in reconstruction is critical. The role of communities in reconstruction can vary both in terms of the degree of their involvement and the stage at which they become involved in the process. In the context of Darfur, all stakeholders must support users to become involved in governance and service delivery by promoting their participation. 3.100 Strengthening demand for accountability is critical to improved local governance. Localities will not have the incentive to perform if there is no demand for it to do so, but civil society needs to be strengthened to perform this role. Activity during the reconstruction period is a critical time for civil society to develop its role in governance. To this end building civil society capacity, and simultaneously rebuilding confidence and trust in government is a key priority. 3.101 A key step would be to develop a better understanding of civil society in Darfur. Understanding civil society is not the same as understanding civil society organizations. Identifying appropriate roles of CSOs, representative or otherwise, means first understanding civil society itself, its rural and urban, regional and ethnic heterogeneity, its composition, the role of men and women, its capacity, and changing nature. This is vital to ensure sound and inclusive engagement in the reconstruction process. A key aspect of strengthening civil society to play a key role in community governance will be inclusion, i.e. that all people are given space to speak and benefit from the reconstruction process. 3.102 It will also be important to understand what representativeness and legitimacy means in Darfur, including the role and status of Native Administrations. The earlier situation analysis has outlined a range of civil society organizations in Darfur. The early recovery stage will provide opportunity for the mapping of these structures and an analysis of the way they function, how they are adopted and accepted by communities. This information will be vital not only to understand more about legitimacy (who is represented, by which organizational types, who is marginalized etc) but also practically to understand what role different CSOs can play in supporting communities. Efforts to assess and establish a way forward in relation to the Native Administrations will be central to this task. 3.103 The oversight of an active civil society is essential, but it needs the capacity to play this role. With this knowledge it is also vital to elaborate on what role civil society is expected to play, to consider its capacity to perform this role, and to consider how capacity can be built. Efforts can then be made to build the capacity of community level structures with a view to their reconstruction role. Providing concrete activities is a vital dimension of capacity strengthening. The role of women needs to be emphasized. Current community structures have subjugated women, which means that targeted efforts will be needed to empower the voice of women. 3.104 Care should be taken to ensure participation is more than rhetorical. The success of participatory processes has often been called into question with many studies concluding that participation is not a genuinely participatory process. Institutional and attitudinal blockages hinder participatory processes being adopted in the hearts and minds of government. The reason for the lack of participation in practice is that the institutions and their staff adhere to top-down norms and traditional attitudes, there has been a lack of leadership commitment, and there has not been the organizational effort to create the structural change that is needed. Successful bottom up processes have failed to jump the boundaries of projects and still need to be mainstreamed. And there is little capacity at the local level to deliver services let alone take on processes with which they are not familiar or are not committed. 79 3.105 A focus on community participation in projects is not enough, civil society needs to get involved in holding government and other service providers to account. Building social accountability mechanisms will be critical in restoring trust and legitimacy, and to develop better targeting of interventions. In localities as they develop capacity, participatory planning and budgeting approaches should be initiated and institutionalized in localities Opening up the planning and budgeting process and conducting consultations around needs and priorities will enable Darfurian citizens to participate, advocate, and influence government priorities and spending. Support is needed to achieve this. Developing Multi-Stakeholder Delivery Systems 3.106 Initially, a significant proportion of basic service delivery will be undertaken by external agencies particularly the UN and international NGOs. While this gets services to the people and establishes some level of infrastructure (schools, clinics and water points) it does not produce a sustainable form of service delivery, or build confidence in local government. The problem of city government and the expansion of cities when IDP camps come under the scope of city administration is also a specific and important urban governance issue. 3.107 The key to sustainable service delivery and improved governance is to ensure local government is linked into the process from the outset, and that a gradual transition is planned and executed. The agency with ultimate responsibility for service delivery and the primary goal is sustainability and the stability that accompanies it. The means to this is the development of capacity of all stakeholders (government is not the only stakeholder with limited capacity for service delivery, so too is the local private sector, local NGOs and civil society); the development of trust (lost through years of neglect); and efforts to bring communities and government together. 3.108 A number of principles will determine the approach to service delivery and should be modified to suit the varying conditions and capacities. These include:  Community empowerment and community driven development.  Transition to local government oversight  establishing at the outset a framework for basic services (and other activities) that includes government, and where transparency and accountability are key.  Enabling a range of service providers with government as financer and supervisor, not necessarily provider.  Demand and supply side accountability. 3.109 Within a framework of accountability, accountability of NGOs is also crucial. Evidence clearly suggests that government is more willing to enter into accountability relationships if other actors do too. The NGO sector has for a long time not been held accountable for the impacts of its activities. There is little understanding of the cost-benefit of its activities, and little if any accountability to citizens, constituents or government. It is assumed that all NGOs are acting effectively and in the best interest of the people. Efforts in the recovery period should place checks on this approach and make NGOs, as service providers, part of the framework of accountability. 3.110 In the medium term, the goal must be to get local government up and running and taking responsibility for the delivery of basic services. Interim efforts must also uphold this objective. Efforts need to be harmonized and focused on this goal. Building a multi- stakeholder platform for service delivery means changing the government‘s identification with delivery, and encouraging non-state providers to fill gaps in a coordinated system. While some of this (such as policy and legislation, inter-governmental transfers) will need 80 support and reform at the national level, other change and new regulations can be developed locally. These might include for instance: good policy for leveraging private and community funding; increased clarity and a capacity development function; setting the framework for, and monitoring service standards for local governments to develop in the local regulatory context. 3.111 The community development fund approach enables local government to finance small projects identified by communities. The situation in Darfur however is more difficult as the capacity of local government is lower. Targeting can be improved by allocating block grants to villages to directly assess needs, and develop and implement community-based activities. 3.112 In the rush to provide services, caution is needed to ensure that service delivery systems and processes reduce the risk of corruption. Evidence suggests post-conflict settings are particularly vulnerable times where urgency takes precedence over formal accountability mechanisms (such as competitive procurement). Like other post-conflict settings, Darfur will be characterized by various ingredients that provide scope for corruption and once in place, corrupt systems are difficult to remove. 3.113 Monitoring is an essential part of establishing accountability but will be a challenge to weak localities. The monitoring of outcomes, as well as spending and activities, against plans, will be critical not only to donors wishing to see effective use of funds, but within localities to strengthen accountability and a results oriented culture. These present extensive tasks, outside the capacity or scope of local government. A monitoring strategy which involves local government and citizens, but does not over-burden, will be critical. The role of donors needs to be identified. Use of information (outputs, outcomes) to support results- oriented planning and budgeting and systematically identify gaps in quality, reliability and frequency is a first step to ensure reconstruction programs are effectively targeted. E. CONCLUSIONS 3.114 This chapter has documented the very serious challenges facing governance in Darfur. The story of Sudan‘s major civil wars and unrest is a result of discriminatory policies and poor governance. Certainly in Darfur, this has contributed to the escalation of the conflict and provided common cause for Darfurians. A more equitable sharing of resources and power are seen as necessary conditions for resolution of the problem. A multi-dimensional diagnostic underlined that the key constraints to be addressed as follows, viz.  Marginalization and neglect of the periphery and the dominance of the center, which are central to the various conflicts in Sudan. Wide cross-country variations in development outcomes reflect the large differences in the allocation of resources across states and regions (see MDG and budget chapters).  The intergovernmental system of resource allocation, which has concentrated resources at the center and has distributed the relatively limited remaining resources inequitably and in a non-transparent manner. Consistent with the colonial practice, states along the Nile have benefited from this at the expense of others. Over time the marginalized areas have lost faith in federal governance and have demanded guarantees to ensure that they get their fair share.  As a result of being poorly funded and under-resourced, the capacity of sub- national governments in Darfur has been severely eroded over time, and lost credibility. The problem has been compounded by the politicization of the public services. Appointments to public office and the civil service have been subject to patronage and nepotism, often based on political and tribal loyalties. Those 81 tasked with providing public services are very often not seen as working for the wider public interest. The governments (state and local) currently in place in Darfur are not representative.  In the face of relatively repressive regimes, demand-side mechanisms of accountability have not developed adequately. The public has very limited access to information on the use of public sector resources and plays virtually no role in planning and budgeting for the use of these resources. Central control has been pervasive and even so-called ―Popular Committees‖ at the community level are instruments of the party/regime. Thus, credibility of all government organizations and agencies is low. 3.115 In this context, fundamental and long term improvements in governance will be critical to a sustained peace. With the signing of the CPA and the DPA, and the passage of the interim constitution, the Government has recognized that more equitable sharing of power and wealth are critical for stability in the Sudan. Fundamentally, however, the governance situation in Darfur has not improved. This will be a long term endeavor. A basic theme of this chapter is that there fundamental issues to be addressed before any such institutions are likely to make a tangible difference to governance in Darfur, and that the emerging priorities will be far-reaching, from the operation of the intergovernmental fiscal framework, through to strengthening local accountability. One of the litmus tests of better governance will be better service delivery in localities, which is a topic addressed in the next chapter. 82 CHAPTER 4. BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES Prepared by Patrick Mullen, François Robert, Neghouha Mint and Eric Sarriot, with Ibrahim Eldasis, Mahmoud Musa Mahmoud, Saad El-Din Hussein Hassan, Abdulhafiz Mustafa Musa, Olivier Mukarji and Amel Eldehaib. A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 4.1 Improved access to basic services will be crucial in delivering peace dividends to the people of Darfur, and are needed to bring the region to par with the rest of Northern Sudan and making substantial progress towards achieving the MDGs by 2015. This chapter covers the basic social service sectors – education, health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS – and was prepared by a team of national and international experts. It presents a situation analysis with potential development priorities and strategic directions over the next five years. The findings are preliminary, and will need further validation once the situation allows. 4.2 Social service outcomes in Darfur have deteriorated dramatically overall since 2003, although the humanitarian operation has provided substantial services to some populations. Darfur today ranks as one of the most deprived places in the world. For example, pre-crisis estimates of child mortality in Darfur were comparable to or better than other northern states, but since 2003, more than 30 retrospective mortality surveys have been carried out in Darfur finding often dramatically high rates, in particular among conflict-affected populations. Crude under-5 mortality rates were estimated in 2005 at 0.85 per 10,000 per day among IDPs and 0.62 among resident populations. Nutrition surveys in 2004 and 2005 found prevalence of acute malnutrition among under-five children in conflict-affected populations of 11.9 percent and 13.1 percent respectively (see also the MDG chapter). 4.3 Geographic disparities are a defining characteristic of social service provision in Darfur. Primary school gross enrolment ratios are significantly lower than North Sudan and Sub-Saharan Africa averages. The State MoEs report that 760,000 children are currently enrolled in primary school, representing a gross enrolment ratio (GER) of 52 percent. At 42 percent, the estimated GER is lowest in South Darfur, which also has the largest population. The estimated ratios in North and West Darfur are 61percent and 59 percent respectively. These can be compared to an estimated GER for Northern Sudan as a whole of 62 percent in 2003, and to an estimated average GER for Sub-Saharan Africa of 87 percent in 2004. 4.4 Gender disparities are also large, and girls are significantly less likely to be in school than boys. In 2005, it was reported that 42 percent of primary school students were girls (46 percent in North Darfur, 42 percent in South Darfur and 40 percent in West Darfur), compared to the to the estimated Sub-Saharan Africa average of 46 percent in 2004. The reported primary gross enrolment rate for girls in 2005 in Darfur was 44 percent, compared to 59 percent for boys. The ratio of the GERs for girls to boys (gender parity index) was 0.75. 4.5 Darfur has suffered from low investments in its service infrastructure and has the lowest standards in Northern Sudan for availability of education and health facilities. Overall, in Darfur, there is one classroom for 49 students, already a high ratio, but this includes temporary classrooms such as tents and even trees. Considering only permanent structures, there is one classroom for 162 primary students in Darfur, indicating severe over-crowding, which has consistently been observed by field visits. Ratios of population per health facility in Darfur were the highest of all the Northern Sudan regions, with 345,000 people per rural hospital in Darfur, compared to just 33,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 109,000 in Northern Sudan as a whole. Similarly, there were 187,000 people for each Health Center in 83 Darfur, compared to 7,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 35,000 in Northern Sudan as a whole. 4.6 Similarly, Darfur historically had the lowest densities of skilled teachers and health workers in Northern Sudan. Lack of skilled teachers has resulted in large disparities in Pupil- Teacher Ratios, with 30 students to one primary school teacher in North and South Darfur and 80 students to one teacher in West Darfur. In the three Darfur states in 2003, there were 2.5 physicians for every 100,000 population, compared to the Northern Sudan average of 18.4 and the figure for Khartoum of 48.9. Large numbers of health workers are currently employed or supported by the humanitarian operation. 4.7 While war has had major impacts on key indicators, including through massive loss of assets and associated increased poverty levels, there are indications that some key social indicators have improved over the past years as a result of the vast humanitarian effort. For example, surveys showed that through mid 2006, the situation in the IDP and refugee camps was much better in terms of access to medical treatment, education, and safe water, than in most of the rural areas in Darfur. 4.8 There is widespread acknowledgment that urgent and sustained efforts are needed to improve and ensure access to basic social services. Achieving the MDGs is enshrined in the Interim National Constitution, and serves as a backdrop for the ongoing development effort in other parts of Sudan. The purpose of this report is to further harness that commitment by identifying the needs and providing tangible solutions for addressing these. At the same time, the report recognizes the progress made in terms of establishing institutions, policies and systems to deliver services in other parts of the country, and the priorities identified in this report should be seen in the context of scaling up national programs to cover Darfur. 4.9 A major constraint to planning and prioritizing in Sudan has been the lack of consistent and recent data on access to basic services. However, the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS)70 now provides a much richer database to assess current levels of outcomes, regional disparities, and to a lesser extent (because of comparability problems) time trends. Preliminary findings confirm that the major challenge facing Sudan‘s progress towards the MDGs is the massive inequalities in outcomes and access to services. At the same time, the new data underline variation within the region, with West Darfur consistently behind South Darfur and North Darfur. 4.10 Given absorptive capacity constraints and the difficult operational context in Darfur, initial basic services expansion may have to be modest, but should take advantage of the capacity developed by humanitarian programs. Striking the right balance between humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction and development, while simultaneously satisfying high expectations, is one of the main challenges. 4.11 With a view to both accelerating progress towards the MDGs and promoting long- term sustainable development, it is important that policies and projects take into account gender disparities, the HIV/AIDS challenge, and the need to sustainably manage natural resources and protect the environment. Popular awareness and understanding of these issues must be developed, including through adapting educational curricula and professional training. 4.12 Moving from independent projects to a more holistic sectoral approach is critical for ensuring the coherence of interventions, obtaining efficiency gains in the use of resources, 70 The Sudan Household Health Survey is the first nationally representative survey in two decades, and was commissioned to follow-up on the CPA/JAM (see MDG chapter for details). 84 and facilitating the efforts of the authorities to coordinate and integrate activities. The health sector programs co-financed by the National and Southern Sudan Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) provide an example of sector-wide frameworks that should be used to avoid multiplication of individual donor-financed initiatives. This chapter highlights important issues that should be addressed to ensure sector-wide and integrated approaches that link to infrastructure development and efforts to build a decentralized government with sufficient capacity and finances to perform intended functions. Links will need to be forged from the outset to ensure that programming provides for the necessary integration, and, the findings presented in this chapter should be read in the context of the chapters covering infrastructure, governance, and rural development. B. DIAGNOSTIC: EDUCATION SERVICES Education System and Administration 4.13 In 2006, there were an estimated 1.1 million school-aged children in Darfur, of which about 50 percent were in South. Primary education is composed of eight grades with pupils aged six to 13 and is officially free and compulsory. 71 The grade system is designed by FMoE and cannot be altered by state or local authorities. Primary education ends with the Basic Education Certificate (BEC). Kindergarten for children aged four to six years is neither compulsory nor free. Secondary education (neither compulsory nor free) is provided over three years after the BEC (general or technical) in secondary schools, and vocational training for two years. Secondary education ends with the Sudan School Certificate, which is required for access to university. Many teachers are versatile, working in both lower and higher grades. 4.14 As part of Sudan‘s decentralization, the federal level focuses on policy and standards while state governments are responsible for primary and secondary education. In the early 1990s, responsibility for managing and financing primary and secondary education was transferred to the 26 state governments (16 in Northern Sudan). The Interim National Constitution (INC) confirms that state governments are responsible for primary and secondary schools and their administration. States are also responsible for local government. Responsibilities which are concurrent to the federal and state levels are tertiary education, education policy and scientific research. This suggests flexibility with regard to the divisions of responsibilities both between the state and local levels and between the state and federal levels. In practice, however, the education administration in Darfur follows a more rigid division of responsibility. 4.15 The Federal Ministry of Education (FMoE) has a powerful role in determining policies and standards.72 FMoE sets out policies, strategies and planning, decrees the standards for the recruitment and the training of teachers, determines the curricula, edits the textbooks, determine plans for teachers‘ in-service training, and deals with external relations. State government action in these areas – for example the addition of local content to the curricula – is subject to FMoE approval. A major standard-setting role for the State Ministries of Health (SMoEs) is to determine the requirements for and issue the Basic Education Certificate. Otherwise, SMoEs have more operational authorities, such as approving new schools (including private schools) and defining school calendars and examination dates. 71 FMoE is contemplating adding a ninth grade. Should this decision be taken, the only first six grades would be free and compulsory. 72 The Federal Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research is responsible for tertiary education. 85 4.16 The standard organizational structure of State MoEs involves one minister, a director general, and around 15 directors. These posts are currently staffed in all three SMoEs in Darfur. Working conditions in the three state ministries are similar, although in 2006 at least, the SMoE in El-Geneina suffered more frequent cuts in electricity and telephone communications. Ministry buildings are ancient but well-kept, and seem to be sufficient for daily activities, except for larger meetings. However, equipment is lacking. Computers are few and out-of-date, without connection to any network, furniture is old, and photocopiers and printers are extremely rare. For example, in El-Fasher, North Darfur, SMoE staff need to go to the market to make copies. 4.17 Capacities of the SMoEs in management, planning and monitoring are weak. Currently, these administrations are not in a position to cope with the task of rebuilding an education system that will involve a dramatic increase in management activity in a short time. SMoEs have low supervision and monitoring capacity, with poor links to the Localities. Vehicles are lacking or ancient, there are insufficient funds for fuel, no postal services, and security concerns, which have so far prevented strengthening of these links. With regard education management information systems (EMIS), data collection forms exist, but SMoEs have no means for printing and distributing the forms, and do not have standardized methods for compiling and analyzing information. Data are collected when the opportunity occurs and recorded by hand by under-trained staff. Information collection from Localities in outlying areas is sporadic but more regular in the main towns. As a result, the quality of available information is far from meeting the requirements of efficient management. Statistical yearbooks are often lacking; in 2006, none of the three SMoEs had a complete set. The most recent available yearbook dates from 2002. 4.18 Locality administrations are responsible for operational management of primary schools, school construction, and pedagogical supervision of teachers, while the state governments retain responsibility for teacher salaries. There are six localities in North Darfur, seven in West Darfur and nine in South Darfur. Directorates of education exist in each Locality, and at least in the main towns seem to be adequately staffed. However, due to a complete lack of equipment and funds for operations or investment, they are largely unable to fulfill their responsibilities. In practice, headmasters and Education Councils (Parent- Teacher Associations) tend to bypass the Locality level and deal directly with the SMoE. Localities are not even always informed about new construction of schools. Administrative Units are the level below the Locality and their main role in education is to handle the payment of teachers‘ salaries. 4.19 Education Councils (Parent-Teacher Associations) are, de facto, a major part of the financing and administration of the public education system. Every school has an Education Council, elected in one way or another, with an executive board and regular meetings. Education Councils collect funds for construction and rehabilitation of schools, water supply, teacher incentives, school meals, and sometimes textbooks and other material (chalk, teaching materials). They keep accounts which are in theory supposed to be checked by the Locality. Although there are no official primary school fees, the funding channeled through Education Councils represents a significant financial commitment from parents. 4.20 SMoEs often seek the input of Education Councils before making major decisions, frequently inviting them to meetings. In South Darfur, the SMoE has created a fund to support the involvement of the Education Councils in school construction: once walls have been erected by the Education Council, this fund can finance the roof. 4.21 Education Councils have been targeted for capacity-building and training by donor- funded humanitarian and development programs. Some NGOs have pre-conflict experience 86 in working closely with Education Councils at the community level, while current humanitarian programs implemented by UNICEF and NGOs include training and support for Education Councils, in order to encourage community participation and as part of a sustainable exit strategy. Teachers 4.22 There is a shortage of teachers and large disparities in Pupil-Teacher Ratios (PTR) (Table 4.1). Shortages of teachers are explained by the fact that candidates having the required university education are rare in Darfur, while living conditions and wages are not attractive enough to recruit graduates from other regions. The table shows that West Darfur in particular suffers from a shortage of teachers. The state averages also mask disparities within states. Field visits indicated that in the towns, classes in each of the first three grades often have over 100 students. 4.23 The required qualification for teachers was raised in 1990 to a university degree and has led to a shortage of qualified teachers throughout Sudan. Until 1990, teachers were trained by Teacher Training Institutes in a two-year program for those holding the Sudan School Certificate (having completed secondary school) or a four-year program for those holding the Basic Education Certificate (having completed primary school). In 1990, the ladder was modified (from 6+3+3 to 8+3), while required teacher qualifications were increased to a university degree, even for primary teachers. Universities created Faculties of Education in order to meet this new commitment and responsibility for teacher training passed from the FMoE to the Federal Ministry of Higher Education. Teachers recruited before 1990 have attended courses at these Faculties or taken distance learning courses from the Sudan Open Learning Organization in order to upgrade their qualifications. 4.24 The shortage of teachers in Darfur has been exacerbated by the current conflict. Many teachers have fled to Chad or sought more lucrative and regular employment in other fields with humanitarian organizations. Furthermore, government regulations do not permit inter-state movement of teachers, so teachers who are displaced to another state due to the conflict can only receive their salaries from their original state, which is not possible for most IDPs. Table 4.1: Numbers of Teachers and Pupil-Teacher Ratios (Public and Private Schools), Darfur, 2005-06 Teachers Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR) Males Females Total North Darfur 2,909 3,870 6779 1:30 South Darfur 3,728 5,075 8803 1:31 West Darfur 1,408 1,544 2952 1:80 Total Darfur 8,045 10,489 18534 1:38 73 Sources: State MoEs and authors‘ estimates. 4.25 Teacher training is not standardized and generally regarded as too academic. The content of training by Faculties of Education differs from university to university, although in general the main focus is on academic subjects while training in teachers‘ professional skills is neglected. In general, headmasters and SMoE Director Generals and Directors express dissatisfaction about current teacher training. They state that teachers‘ professional skills are lower than before, even if their academic background is supposed to be better. According to 73 The data include teachers in both public and private schools and there may be double-counting since many may teach in both public and private schools. The data do not include volunteer teachers. 87 parents, graduate teachers lack motivation in their jobs. It has been observed that some new teachers, due to their academic background, are reluctant to teach a variety of subjects, preferring to specialize in one or two areas. Therefore, the SMoEs have implemented additional in-service and skills-oriented training for new teachers in the former Training Institutes. FMoE provides very limited support to in-service training, while NGOs are frequently involved in these training courses. UNICEF in collaboration with NGOs has in fact established training programs for teachers that include an HIV/AIDS prevention module, psychosocial support, peace education and conflict resolution. 4.26 A new category of teachers has emerged in the IDP camps, most of them with secondary education from various professional backgrounds. They have received training from the NGO‘s managing schools in the IDP camps under humanitarian programs. State Ministries of Health have allowed secondary school graduates to be trained as teachers but made clear that they would not be able to pay them. Nor have most NGOs provided regular salaries due to the concern about leaving government with an unsustainable wage bill. They are therefore termed ―volunteers,‖ and communities are expected to support them. However, faced with the reality of insufficient community resources, particularly among IDPs, an in- service training program has been designed to offer de facto incentives in order to boost recruitment and encourage retention. The in-service teacher training scheme supported by UNICEF provides training and support to volunteer teachers in IDP camps and host communities with large IDP populations. Currently, 1,653 volunteer teachers are participating in the scheme that began with the 2005/2006 school year. The scheme, which links incentives (US$50 per teacher per month) to participation in training, has allowed recruitment of teachers for new classrooms, reduced class size and increased the knowledge and skills of the volunteer teachers in child-centered teaching methodologies, HIV/AIDS prevention and peace education. The total number of volunteers in Darfur is not known (764 have been reported in West Darfur alone). Government does not have a plan for keeping these volunteer teachers after humanitarian programs cease, which notably would need to address the issue of their educational qualifications not meeting the current standard. Schools and Classrooms 4.27 There are large differences in conditions across primary schools in Darfur. Most private schools have permanent buildings and some furniture (at least tables and benches for the children). Public schools are disparate. Long-established schools in the town centers are very similar to private schools. Sometimes several kinds of classrooms can be seen in the same school. Some schools have an evident lack of classrooms, with children sitting under trees. Temporary structures are being used as schools in IDP camps, but temporary classrooms exist in permanent schools as well. Some schools are separate for girls and boys, other schools are mixed. 4.28 There is a severe shortage in the total number of schools and classrooms. Table 4.2 provides data on the number of students and schools, while Table 4.3 provides data on the number of primary classrooms and Pupil-Classroom Ratios. Overall, in Darfur there is one classroom for 49 students, already a high ratio, but this includes temporary classrooms such as tents and even trees. Considering only permanent structures, there is one classroom for 162 primary students in Darfur, indicating severe over-crowding, which has consistently been observed by field visits. Moreover, these permanent structures are often dilapidated and damaged. 4.29 There are significant disparities between states: in North Darfur, there is one permanent classroom for 108 children, while in South Darfur the ratio is 1 to 153 and an exceptionally high 1 to 321 in West Darfur. 88 4.30 In response to the shortage of school infrastructure, communities have resorted to a range of temporary structures, which require high maintenance and often annual rebuilding, which has further increased the burden on parents. Current humanitarian programs provide some support: for example, a UNICEF program for temporary classrooms, using steel poles for frames and locally available materials for the sides and roof, built 288 classrooms in IDP camps in the three states. Table 4.2: Numbers of Enrolled Students and Schools, Darfur, 2005-06 Pupils Schools* Primary Education Total 763,025 3,119 North Darfur 229,850 533 South Darfur 296,718 1,272 West Darfur 236,457 1,314 Secondary Education Total 82,157 443 North Darfur 26,176 121 South Darfur 47,500 289 West Darfur 8,481 33 *Does not include schools in IDP camps. Source: State MoE. Table 4.3: Numbers of Classrooms and Pupil-Classroom Ratios (PCR), Primary Schools, Darfur, 2005-06 Permanent Temporary PCR PCR (all classrooms classrooms* (permanent) classrooms) North Darfur 1,814 3,487 1:108 1:37 South Darfur 1,754 2,982 1:153 1:57 West Darfur 722 3,359 1:321 1:57 Total Darfur 4,290 9,828 1:162 1:49 *including trees and tents Data are from various sources. 4.31 Secondary education faces similar challenges in terms of the poor quality of facilities and instruction. Buildings are deteriorated and sometimes destroyed. Seats, tables and textbooks are lacking or not provided in a sufficient quantity. Laboratories, when they exist, are dilapidated and under-staffed. As a result, the study of science is neglected in the three states of Darfur. The consequence is that the requirements of the Sudan School Certificate often cannot be met, and even when they are, secondary students from Darfur often rank low in national examinations, preventing access to universities, particularly science programs. Textbooks and other Materials 4.32 The FMoE develops, edits and prints primary school textbooks for all of the Northern states, although the supply does not meet demand. A parastatal firm prints textbooks for the education system, sometimes subcontracting to private printers. It has not been receiving adequate subsidies from the federal government, and has, therefore, been selling textbooks to those states that are willing to pay for them. 4.33 Discussion with parents, teachers, headmasters and SMoE Directors in Darfur suggests that in general the curricula are acceptable but there is a need for improvement to adapt to the challenges of the post-conflict period. The National Center for Curricula and Educational research (NCCER) in Khartoum is responsible for development of curricula, preparation of textbook and teacher guides, evaluation of textbooks and educational research. 89 National curricula seem to be generally accepted in Darfur, although the curricula could be improved in order to meet the challenges of the next years, including better meeting the needs of specific groups such as nomadic groups, IDPs and returning IDPs. The core curricula could be expanded to new subjects, such as life skills and HIV/AIDS education, could remove gender-biased content and introduce gender-sensitive topics, and could be modernized in the subjects of mathematics and English, where student performance in North Sudan overall has been weakest. 4.34 Stated policy is for textbooks to be provided free-of-charge; however, in practice this is not the case. Generally, SMoEs purchase textbooks from FMoE and pay delivery. The Localities do the same from the SMoEs, and the cost is eventually transferred to parents. Sometimes, but on an irregular basis, FMoE delivers free textbooks to some states. In 2006, North Darfur received appreciable quantities of textbooks (worth SD 250 million), but this has not been the case for West and South Darfur. Sometimes, textbooks are available on the private market. For example, a field visit found textbooks for sale in Nyala but a visit to El- Geneina found no textbooks available for sale. In some cases, internationally-funded programs provide support to communities and Education Councils (Parent-Teacher Associations) to allow them to purchase textbooks or distribute them directly. For example, in 2005, UNICEF distributed 91,795 textbooks and 4,707 school kits, benefiting an estimated 382,000 children. 4.35 The material quality of textbooks is criticized in discussions with stakeholders in Darfur. Textbooks are intended to last three years, but poor quality paper and binding does not allow this, further reducing their availability. 4.36 Although data on this are not recorded by the SMoEs, it is evident that textbooks are never available on time and in a sufficient quantity. In consequence, availability of textbooks is very low in the classrooms – and they are almost unavailable in remote areas. For example, a field visit to El-Geneina found only one textbook for the teacher and one for groups of ten pupils in a fourth grade class of 120 children. In that city, textbooks are not available on the private market and the West Darfur MoE has not made any purchase since the beginning of the conflict. 4.37 The SMoEs are responsible for providing school furniture, and can fund this from federal Chapter 2 transfers. However, Chapter 2 transfers are erratic and are not allocated by sector, so that allocation to the State MoE by the State MoF can be uncertain. As a result, these types of expenditures are far from the level necessary to adequately furnish schools in Darfur. In 2006, FMoE sent 25,000 chairs and tables to North-Darfur (in-kind), and 6,890 to West Darfur. 4.38 Field visits found that there is rudimentary furniture in public schools in town centers and in private schools, but it is most often completely lacking in schools in outlying and rural areas. Children sit on the sand or on canvas or mats, since classrooms (when they exist) usually do not have cement floors. Sometimes, even blackboards are lacking. Half of a blackboard perched on half of a chair is being used by a class of 120 children in El-Geneina. Nevertheless, in general, it was observed that the furniture that does exist is well-kept. 4.39 School uniforms are a deep-rooted tradition in Sudan, but contribute to the financial burden on families for unclear benefits. In Darfur, the cost is reported to be SD 700 per child. It seems that in some cases, children drop out of school because their parents cannot afford uniforms. However, in West-Darfur, it was observed that pragmatic approaches are being taken, and pupils wear various clothes to school. UNICEF and NGOs currently provide girls‘ uniforms in large quantities, but the sustainability of these expenditures is uncertain. 90 School Enrolment 4.40 Primary school gross enrolment ratios are significantly below North Sudan and Sub- Saharan Africa averages.74 The State MoEs report that 760,000 children are currently enrolled in primary schools in Darfur, attending various types of schools (regular public schools, nomadic schools, private schools, IDP schools). Given population estimates, this represents a gross enrolment ratio (GER) of 52 percent. At 42 percent, the estimated GER is lowest in South Darfur, which has the largest population. The estimated ratios in North and West Darfur are 61 percent and 59 percent respectively. These can compare to an estimated GER for Northern Sudan as a whole of 62 percent in 2003, and to an estimated average GER for Sub-Saharan Africa of 87 percent in 2004.75 Table 4.4: Primary School Enrolment, Darfur, 2005 Number of Students Estimated Population ages Gross Enrolment 6-13 Ratio (%) Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total North 104,966 124,884 229,850 184,654 191,156 375,810 57 65 61 Darfur South 123,549 173,169 296,718 350,204 356,344 706,548 35 49 42 Darfur West 94,927 141,530 236,457 195,639 203,195 398,834 49 70 59 Darfur Total 323,442 439,583 763,025 730,497 750,695 1,481,192 44 59 52 Darfur Sources: State MoEs and authors‘ estimates. 4.41 Survey-based estimates for the 1990s suggest that primary gross enrolment rates fell in North and West Darfur but may not have changed significantly in South Darfur. The 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) sampled 6,275 households in the Darfur states and was intended to provide representative estimates at the level of individual states, although there are questions about whether it reached nomadic populations. The resulting estimates on primary school attendance reported by households (which is used here as a proxy for enrolment) are presented in Table 4.5. In North Darfur, the survey-estimated primary GER in 2000 was 72 percent, which can compare to the administrative report of 61 percent in 2005. In South Darfur, the 2000 estimate was 41 percent, compared to the reported GER of 42 percent in 2005. In West Darfur, the 2000 estimate was 46 percent, compared to the reported figure of 59 percent in 2005. Overall estimated primary gross enrolment in 2000 was 50 percent, compared to the reported figure of 52 percent in 2005. By comparison, the survey estimate of the primary gross enrolment ratio for Northern Sudan as a whole in 2000 was 69 percent. 4.42 The 2000 survey data also allows estimates of primary net enrolment rates,76 which averaged 42 percent, ranging from 61 percent in North Darfur to 34 and 36 percent in South and West Darfur respectively. The survey estimate for Northern Sudan as a whole was 57 percent. The 2006 SHHS suggests improvements, with net primary attendance rates of 67, 56 74 Gross enrolment ratio: total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, relative to the official school-age population for that same level of education. Rates over 100 percent for primary school thus indicate the presence of over-age children. 75 Note that the GER provides no information about completion, achievement or survival (i.e. a ―good‖ GER may conceal a high drop-out rate, if many out-of-age pupils attend school) but is mainly an indicator of the actual supply and accessibility of basic education. 76 Net enrolment rate: The number of pupils in the official age group for the relevant level of education enrolled in that level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. 91 and 46 percent in North, South and West Darfur respectively; although further analysis is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. Table 4.5: Estimated Primary School Enrolment, Darfur, 2000 Primary Gross Enrolment ratio (%) Primary Net Enrolment Rate (%) Female Male Total Female Male Total North Darfur 69 75 72 59 63 61 South Darfur 37 45 41 31 37 34 West Darfur 44 48 46 34 39 36 Total Darfur 47 53 50 39 44 42 Estimated by authors with data from MICS. Denominator is children aged 6-13 years (n=6,309). 4.43 Primary school completion rates in Darfur may be as low as 30 percent, even though administrative data on drop-out rates and on the proportion of children who complete primary school are not available. The estimate from the 2000 MICS was 43 percent. Dropping out of school is motivated by a range of factors related to poverty, including the inability of families to continue paying school fees and the need for children to work in order to supplement household income. 4.44 Girls are significantly less likely to be in school than boys. In 2005, it was reported that 42 percent of primary school students were girls (46 percent in North Darfur, 42 percent in South Darfur and 40 percent in West Darfur), compared to the to the estimated Sub- Saharan Africa average of 46 percent in 2004. The reported primary gross enrolment rate for girls in 2005 in Darfur was 44 percent, compared to 59 percent for boys. The ratio of the GERs for girls to boys (gender parity index) was 0.75. The MICS data indicate that in 2000, the gender parity index was 0.89, suggesting an increase in gender disparity during the crisis. A regression model of 2000 survey data shows that, after accounting for socio-economic status, geographic differences and other factors, boys were 30 percent more likely to be in school than girls (Table 4.6). Although data are not available, key informants indicate that girls likely have lower completion rates than boys, and this can also be seen in the 2000 MICS data. 4.45 Gender disparities can also be seen in material conditions. Field visits have observed that in schools where classes are separate for boys and girls and where the number of classrooms is insufficient, girls‘ classes are under trees, while boys are in the classrooms. 4.46 Available data and information from key informants indicate that boys, older children, children from urban areas, from better-off families, and from North and South Darfur, are more likely to attend school. Although disaggregated enrollment data are not available, key informants indicate that along with disparities between states, there are large disparities in enrolment between localities and between urban and rural areas within states. The 2000 MICS collected data on whether children attended school in the previous year and Table 4.6 illustrates various disparities:  boys were 1.3 times more likely to have attended school than girls,  older children were more likely to attend school,  children in urban areas were 1.8 times more likely to attend school than those living in rural areas,  compared to the poorest 40 percent of households (as ranked by an asset index), children from the middle 40 percent of households were 1.6 times more likely to attend school, while those from the top 20 percent were twice as likely, and  compared to North Darfur, there was no statistically significant difference with South Darfur, but children in West Darfur were half as likely to attend school. 92 Table 4.6: Random-Effects Logistic Regression of Whether a Child Attended School Last Year, Darfur, 2000 Odds Ratio p-value Boy (compared to girl) 1.3 0.02 Age (1-year increments) 1.2 0.00 Urban (compared to rural) 1.8 0.00 Asset index (compared to lowest 40 percent) middle 40 percent 1.6 0.00 highest 20 percent 2.1 0.01 State (compared to North Darfur) South Darfur 0.7 0.14 West Darfur 0.5 0.00 percent of variation associated with cluster 19 percent Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at p<0.05. Children aged 7 - 14, n=3,483 Estimated by authors with data from 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). 4.47 Nomadic education evidently does not meet the needs of pastoral groups and faces a number of difficult challenges. State governments have attempted to improve education for these communities, but programs have been under-financed and affected by the crisis. Mobile education programs represent 6 percent of enrolled children (around 39,000 students in 2005), despite the fact that the nomadic population is said to account for 30 percent of the total population of Darfur. Mobile schools are intended to develop a close relationship with nomadic communities, moving with them, but there are evidently an insufficient number. In North Darfur, the state government established 265 mobile schools between 1994 and 1999, but only 15 are currently functioning. Many teachers are not willing or able to accept seasonal mobility and face inadequate incentives. There is also a lack of support and supervision, leading to teacher absenteeism and sometimes desertion. Only the first four grades are provided in nomadic schools, leaving nomadic children with few or no options for education beyond that point. Functioning schools are overcrowded with one teacher often responsible for a large number of children of diverse grade levels. The curriculum is sometimes not adapted to the needs of nomadic communities. 4.48 A 2003 study of a mobile school in North Darfur found that it had had four grades, each taught in a separate thorn bush shelter.77 One teacher, moving between the grades, was of the same ethnic group as the nomadic community and was responsible for 188 students, including just 36 girls. The traditional leader of the community lobbied the state government to establish the school and pay a salary for the teacher. The teacher hoped that his new wife, a teacher also from the community, would be able to help with the work, but the state government was committed paying the salary of only one teacher per mobile school. The teacher, with the small amount of teaching equipment, went with the community on its traditional north-south movements. 4.49 A third of school children in Darfur are enrolled in schools in IDP camps supported by humanitarian programs. Children enrolled in the camp schools presently represent 34 percent of enrolled children in Darfur (around 239,000). Since 2003, two categories of children have attended IDP camp schools: i) children who were enrolled in their village of origin before the conflict and who continue their schooling; and ii) children who did not have the opportunity to attend school before the conflict and who are receiving formal education often for the first time. A major challenge for the post-conflict period will be to ensure that access to education is not reduced with the phasing out of humanitarian support. 77 OXFAM (2003) 93 4.50 Access to secondary education is very low, with the secondary gross enrolment ratio estimated at 18 percent. Secondary education comprises 3 grades (grades 9 - 11). There are 335 secondary schools (211 public and 124 private) in Darfur and all provide separate education for boys and girls. Students are estimated to number around 82,000, which suggest a secondary gross enrolment ratio of just 18 percent. The MICS data indicate a secondary gross enrolment ratio of 23 percent in 2000. This ranged from 35 percent in North Darfur to 21 percent in South Darfur and 16 percent in West Darfur. Overall, the estimated secondary gross enrolment ratio in 2000 was 24 percent for boys and 22 percent for girls, for a gender parity ratio of 0.92. 4.51 Secondary school teachers are reported to number 3,600 for a relatively good pupil- teacher ratio of 22. Access to secondary education is officially open to children who have obtained the Basic Education Certificate; however, fees and the cost of uniforms prohibit access to the poorest. In North Darfur, enrolment is reported to be slightly decreasing, but slightly increasing in South Darfur. 4.52 The needs for vocational training programs are huge and urgent. Vocational training will be a necessity for demobilized youth – most will be too old to join regular schools and their training needs (i.e. peace education) will be much different. At the same time, economic recovery and public investment during the post-conflict period should increase the demand for skilled manpower. 4.53 Data are not available to allow an assessment of the quality of education in terms of student performance. This will be needed in the future to inform options to reform the education sector. Literacy 4.54 Literacy rates before the crisis were similar to North Sudan averages, albeit with significant regional and gender disparities. Table 4.7 presents estimates from the 2000 MICS data on literacy in Darfur among youth (age 15-24) and among adults (age 15 and over).78 Overall youth literacy was 74 percent while adult literacy was 59 percent, suggesting improvement between generations in access to education. Disparities are evident between North/South Darfur, where youth literacy was around 75-80 percent and adult literacy around 60 percent, and West Darfur, where youth literacy was 65 percent and adult literacy 54 percent. There are also large gender disparities. Overall, literacy among female youth was 66 percent, compared to 86 percent among boys. Comparison to the smaller gender disparity in primary school enrolment discussed above suggests that access to schooling for girls has been improving over time. Finally, the estimated overall literacy rates in Darfur in 2000 were similar to the Northern Sudan averages of 78 percent among youth and 61 percent among adults. Table 4.7: Literacy Rates, Darfur, 2000 (%) Age 15-24 (n=3,839) Age 15 and over (n=11,993) Female Male Total Female Male Total North Darfur 76 87 80 52 75 63 South Darfur 67 89 77 44 78 60 West Darfur 55 79 65 38 72 54 Total Darfur 66 86 74 44 76 59 Estimated by authors with data from 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). 78 Literacy here is defined as the self-reported ability to read a newspaper ―easily‖ or ―with difficulty.‖ 94 4.55 Regression analysis confirms that men, residents of urban areas and of North Darfur, and the better-off, are far more likely to be literate. Table 4.8 presents results of a regression model of youth literacy using the 2000 MICS data. All of the possible determinants are statistically significant (p <0.05). Male youth are 4.5 times more likely to be literate than females. Literacy is more likely at younger ages, supporting the proposition that access to education was improving over time. Urban residents were 4.8 times more likely to be literate than rural residents. In addition, compared to North Darfur, residents of South and West Darfur were significantly less likely to be literate. Finally, compared to the poorest 40 percent of the population, the middle 40 percent were 3.2 times more likely to be literate while the highest 20 percent were 11.1 times more likely. Table 4.8: Random-Effects Logistic Regression of the Youth Literacy (ages 15-24), Darfur, 2000 Odds Ratio p-value Male (compared to female) 4.5 0.00 Age (1-year increments) 0.9 0.00 Urban (compared to rural) 4.8 0.00 Asset index (compared to lowest 40 percent) middle 40 percent 3.2 0.00 highest 20 percent 11.1 0.00 State (compared to North Darfur) South Darfur 0.6 0.02 West Darfur 0.2 0.00 percent of variation associated with cluster 27 percent Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at p<0.05. Ages 15 – 24. n=3,839 Estimated by authors with data from 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Financing of Education 4.56 The state and local governments in Darfur are greatly dependent on transfers from the federal government.79 These transfers do not pass through line ministries at either the federal or state levels, but rather to the states, and then from the states to the localities. 4.57 Recruitment of teachers involves oversight at every level of government, particularly including approval from State Ministries of Finance. Administrative Units of the Localities estimate the needs for additional teachers for the next year. Localities submit their proposals to the State MoE, which consolidates them for inclusion in the state budget proposal. State budgets are generally approved by the state legislature and submitted to the federal authorities. In order to recruit teachers, the SMoE needs an authorization from State Ministry of Finance (SMoF), which in turn requires authorization from the Federal Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE). 4.58 State government spending on education has increased in recent years. Table 4.9 presents available data on state government expenditures (and budget in the case of 2006). It shows that like state government expenditures in general, spending by the State Ministries of Education has increased in recent years. In North Darfur, State MoE spending rose from US$1.0 million in 2003 to US$2.9 million in 2005; in South Darfur, MoE expenditures increased from just US$340,000 in 2001 to US$1.6 million in 2005; in West Darfur, MoE spending was US$390,000 in 2003 and US$1.0 million in 2005. It is unclear whether these figures include teachers‘ salaries which are paid through Localities. Data on state transfers to Localities is not disaggregated, although we may assume that a significant proportion is for 79 See budget chapter for more details 95 teachers‘ salaries. Transfers to localities have also increased dramatically, although again from a low base. For example, in North Darfur, these were US$5.9 million in 2001, increasing to US$24 million in 2005. Table 4.9: State Government Expenditure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* Expenditure (SD million) North Darfur Total 2,890 3,484 4,324 5,248 8,234 12,530 16,241 Ministry of Education 395 703 878 1,529 Localities 1,514 1,759 2,571 2,720 4,752 5,840 9,581 South Darfur Total 4,126 5,414 5,775 9,821 14,370 Ministry of Education 272 278 425 738 1,204 Localities 2,061 2,490 2,727 4,950 5,199 West Darfur Total 2,742 7,475 6,376 Ministry of Education 172 279 415 Localities 1,145 2,018 2,901 Expenditure (US$ million) North Darfur Total 11.2 13.5 16.4 20.1 31.9 51.4 72.9 Ministry of Education 1.5 2.7 3.6 6.9 Localities 5.9 6.8 9.8 10.4 18.4 24.0 43.0 South Darfur Total 15.9 20.6 22.1 38.0 59.0 Ministry of Education 1.0 1.1 1.6 2.9 4.9 Localities 8.0 9.5 10.5 19.2 21.3 West Darfur Total 10.5 28.9 26.2 Ministry of Education 0.7 1.1 1.7 Localities 4.4 7.8 11.9 Expenditure (US$ per capita) North Darfur Total 7.01 8.40 10.24 12.55 19.89 32.09 45.46 Ministry of Education 0.94 1.70 2.25 4.28 Localities 3.67 4.24 6.09 6.51 11.48 14.96 26.82 South Darfur Total 5.20 6.71 7.23 12.41 19.25 Ministry of Education 0.34 0.34 0.53 0.93 1.61 Localities 2.60 3.09 3.41 6.26 6.97 West Darfur Total 6.21 17.10 15.46 Ministry of Education 0.39 0.64 1.01 Localities 2.59 4.62 7.03 *Figures for 2006 are budgeted amounts. Sources: State Ministries of Finance. 4.59 Government spending on education is mostly for teachers‘ salaries. Although data are not available, government officials are unanimous in reporting that government education spending is almost entirely consumed by salaries. This would be consistent with state government expenditures as a whole, the bulk of which are allocated to salaries (see budget chapter). 4.60 Nevertheless, teacher salaries are reported to be low and not paid regularly. In Northern Sudan as a whole, the average teacher‘s salary is equivalent to 2 times GDP per capita, which is lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of about 4.4 times GDP per capita. According to teachers in Darfur, as well as other civil servants, three or four month delays in salary payments are not unusual. 96 Figure 4.1: Total State Government Expenditures on Wages and Salaries (US$ per capita) 20 18 North Darfur 16 14 US$ per capita 12 10 South Darfur 8 6 West Darfur 4 2 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Sources: State Ministries of Finance. 4.61 If teachers‘ salaries represent a significant proportion of the total state government wage bill, domestic public spending on primary and secondary education in Darfur may be consistent with levels observed in very poor countries. If we assume that 60 percent of total state government expenditures on salaries goes to teachers (or alternatively, that 85-90 percent of transfers to Localities are for teachers‘ salaries), domestic public spending on primary and secondary education in the three states would have been very low in 2000-03, but then would have risen to US$4-5 per capita by 2004-05 in South and West Darfur and over US$10 in North Darfur. Figure 4.2 indicates that this level of per capita education spending would be consistent with countries having a GDP per capita of US$200 to 300, whereas Sudan‘s overall per capita GDP in 2006 was close to $1,000. Education spending by the Governments of West and South Darfur would be comparable to countries such as Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda and Niger. Education spending by the government of North Darfur would be comparable to countries such as Uganda and Zambia. Figure 4.2: Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education vs. GDP per capita 35 per capita public expenditures on primary & secondary Kenya 2004 30 25 education ($US) 20 15 Uganda 2004 10 5 Eritrea 2004 0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 GDP per capita ($US) Note: Countries with GDP per capita less than US$1,000 for which data are available. Source: World Bank Edstats. 4.62 Given that around 600,000 students are enrolled in primary and secondary schools not supported by international programs, and assuming that 60 percent of state spending on 97 salaries is for teachers, public spending per student could be as high as US$30 to 60. If this were the case, public spending on basic education in Darfur would be exceptionally inefficient, although perhaps understandable given the constraints imposed by the conflict. 4.63 Gross Enrolment Rates in Darfur are similar to countries that are spending only US$3-4 per capita on primary and secondary education. Figure 4.3 suggests what this spending is buying in these countries. It shows that a correlation between reported public education spending and results in terms of gross enrolment ratios can be seen but is not as strong as could be expected. It seems that gross enrolment ratios of 100 percent or higher can be achieved by some countries with per capita spending on primary and secondary education of as low as US$5 (Rwanda and Madagascar). The reported primary gross enrolment ratios in 2005 were 61 percent in North Darfur, 42 percent in South Darfur and 59 percent in West Darfur (Table 4.4). The reported ratios in North and West Darfur are consistent with countries such as Niger and Eritrea, which are spending US$3-4 per capita on primary and secondary education, while the GER in South Darfur is somewhat lower. Figure 4.3: Primary Gross Enrolment Ratio vs. Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education 140 Uganda 2004 120 Kenya 2004 gross enrolment rate, primary (%) 100 80 60 Eritrea 2004 40 20 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 per capita public expenditures on primary & secondary education ($US) Note: Countries with GDP per capita less than US$1,000 for which data are available. Source: World Bank Edstats. 4.64 International donor funding of education programs is significant but low on a per capita basis. Reported spending on education in Darfur amounted to US$3.8 million in 2004 and US$3.2 million in 2006. The 3-year total for 2004-6 provides an annual estimated spending level of US$2.8 million. Assuming coverage is of the 3 million ―conflict-affected‖ population targeted by the humanitarian operation, annual per capita donor spending on primary education in Darfur can be estimated at around US$1, although with a reported 239,000 students in schools supported by international programs, spending per student can be estimated at US$12. 4.65 Private household expenditures on education are significant and represent a burden for the poorest households as well as a barrier to access. Aside from government salaries of teachers on the civil service payroll, other spending on education comes from parents, mostly channeled through Education Councils (Parent-Teacher Associations). This includes construction and maintenance of schools, as well as incentives for both government teachers and ―volunteer‖ teachers (not on the government payroll). Textbooks and school uniforms are 98 purchased by parents. Although there are no official tuition fees, other types of official or semi-official fees include final examination fees (levied by the SMoEs), admission fees (designed to pay for desks and benches and levied by the Education Councils) and operating cost fees (levied by the Education Councils). A 2005 study in North Darfur found that parents‘ expenditures per child for school are 7-8,000 Sudanese Dinars (SD) annually, of which SD 2,500 to 3,500 is for various fees, SD 1,500 to 5,800 for textbooks, and SD 1,650 for the school uniform.80 The total is equivalent to about US$30 per student. Multiplying by the total number of reported primary and secondary school students of 843,000 amounts to about US$25 million of household spending on basic education in Darfur. The reported GERs, as well as information from key informants, indicate that the cost to parents is a significant barrier to access to basic education. 4.66 The 2005 Interim Constitution states that the government ―shall ensure free education at the primary level and in illiteracy eradication.‖81 Achieving this would require additional (as well as more efficient and equitable) public spending in order to reduce the costs to parents as well as to cover the cost of increased enrolment. Demand for Education 4.67 Demand for school education is very high in Darfur. Evidence can be seen from: i) The existence of private schools (both primary and secondary) in every town. These private schools are full and busy, whatever the fees families have to pay. Most private schools provide evening lessons, in order to welcome over-age students. There are even private schools in some IDP camps. ii) A very high level of enrolment in public schools compared to capacity, leading to overcrowded classrooms (when classrooms exist). Despite a very poor quality environment (i.e. no desks, one textbook shared by 10 pupils, sometimes not even a classroom), pupils continue to attend schools in classes of 100-120. iii) Very strong involvement of the communities, through Education Councils (Parent-Teacher Associations). When poverty does not allow Education Councils to collect funds for buildings or teacher incentives, parents make in-kind contributions (work, materials, food). iv) High private expenditures on education. Although data on private expenditures are lacking, it is evident that the gross enrolment ratio (GER) in Darfur is far higher than could be supported by the current level of public funding, meaning that private spending is filling a large gap. v) The conflict itself has created demand for education in that many children (including girls and older children) who would not have gone to school under normal circumstances are attending school in IDP camps. Before displacement, many of these children would have been devoted to labor activities and their families would not have been able to afford the cost of schooling. 4.68 Given this high demand, improving supply (classrooms and teachers) towards reasonable levels and lightening the financial burden on parents will immediately lead to a dramatic increase in educational access, enrolment and completion in Darfur. 80 UNICEF (2005a) 81 Paragraph 13(1)(a). 99 C. EMERGING PRIORITIES IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR 4.69 More field work and discussion are needed to inform emerging priorities. However some preliminary directions can be indicated. In the education sector, the MDG targets are to: i) ensure that all children are able to fully complete primary school by 2015; and ii) eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, and in all levels of education by 2015. Making progress towards these targets requires significant improvement in both enrolment and completion rates, along with greater increases among girls, and will require improvements in the following areas: school infrastructure, boarding schools, teachers, education system management, secondary education, vocational training, and education financing. School Infrastructure 4.70 Effective monitoring of patterns of the return and settlement of displaced populations will be important for setting standards and planning school infrastructure development. The results of the aggregated decisions of IDP and refugee communities and families will probably not exactly match the plans of authorities. SMoEs should therefore approach the setting of standards (such as for school sizes and pupil-teacher ratios) with caution and flexibility. Good data on settlement patterns will also be essential, and not just for the education sector. A geographic information system (GIS) to map patterns of return and settlement will be useful for planning for basic social services, including education, and close coordination and communication between any GIS effort and the SMoEs will be critical. 4.71 Developing and adopting appropriate building methods and materials for new and reconstructed permanent classrooms should be a priority for further assessment. Current building technology for schools largely consists of using clay bricks, fired using wood and charcoal. Large scale construction risks extensive environmental damage due to deforestation and may not be feasible. Cement is not produced in Darfur so that cement or cement bricks need to be transported from Khartoum. Prices are high: US$950 per ton in El-Geneina. Alternative technologies for producing bricks should be assessed, such as gas or oil-fired kilns, at the same time that the education sector‘s inter-dependence with other sectors, such as transport and private sector development, should be emphasized. 4.72 Planning and funding of school construction and rehabilitation needs to be well- planned, coordinated and reliable. Currently, there is no standard process for funding classroom construction. In many cases, community initiatives provide some or all of necessary funds or materials, sometimes on the promise of public funding for a proportion. In some cases part of the construction goes ahead while the other part is never completed. For example, it has been observed that communities have built walls, but these deteriorate when the promised state-funded roof does not materialize. Lack of coherence in funding arrangements is linked, of course, to erratic availability of public funds. When sufficient funds become available under a reconstruction program, however, it is clear that a systematic and rational planning process – still taking in account community contributions – will be a prerequisite to avoid inappropriate investments and wasted effort. 100 Table 4.10: Pupil-Teacher Ratios and School Sizes Related to Required Village Sizes (Eight Grades) PTR Separate girls/boys Mixed Mixed + alternate intakes School size Required School Size Required School size Required village size village size village size 50 400 3,636 400 1,818 400 909 48 384 3,491 384 1,745 384 873 46 368 3,345 368 1,673 368 836 44 352 3,200 352 1,600 352 800 42 336 3,055 336 1,527 336 764 40 320 2,909 320 1,455 320 727 38 304 2,764 304 1,382 304 691 36 288 2,618 288 1,309 288 655 Note: Estimates assume that 22 percent of the population is school-aged (6 to 13 years). 4.73 Demand-driven investment could lead to a large number of scattered and unsustainable small schools. Because Education Councils are the main sources of funds and materials for building, parents and communities are deeply involved in determining infrastructure investment. However, this demand-driven capital investment may lead to an unsustainable pattern of widely scattered small schools, reflecting the settlement pattern of returning IDPs and refugees. The example of Mauritania is instructive. In response to low enrolment rates in rural areas, the Government decided to support any community that requested a basic school. Schools mushroomed, scattered across the country. However, due to their small size and difficulties in hiring enough teachers, few of these schools were able to supply the complete six years of basic education. As a result: i) enrolment increased quickly (up to a GER of 96 percent), but completion collapsed (to 45 percent); ii) quality was weakened; and iii) the number and diversity of schools made monitoring more difficult for the Ministry of Education, preventing any serious supervision and guidance. It is necessary to strike a balance between involvement of communities and PTAs and more top-down planning by SMoEs on the basis of basic principles (ratio of services to population, equity in resource allocation, implications for recurrent costs, availability and incentives for teachers, standards of quality, implications for supervision). 4.74 Critical questions for investment planning include the sizes, organization and catchment populations of schools, particularly in low-density rural areas. The current SMoE standard is for each school to have eight classrooms (one for each grade), corresponding to around 400 pupils (50 per class). In addition, both government officials and the population seem to prefer separate schools for boys and girls, although mixed schools do exist in many places. Table 4.10 shows for different pupil-teacher ratios (PTR), the implied size of schools and village populations for different types of school organizations (gender-separate, gender- mixed, and mixed with alternate student intakes). It shows the following: i) The current SMoE standard (eight complete grades in each school), applied to gender-separated schools, is sustainable only for villages with over 2,600 inhabitants. ii) The same standard, applied to mixed schools, is sustainable for villages of over 1,300 inhabitants. iii) If settlement patterns lead to many villages of under 1,300 inhabitants, the current standards are not sustainable. iv) Alternate intake mechanisms or decreasing PTRs would allow for schools in smaller villages. With a ratio of 36 pupils for each teacher in a gender-mixed school with alternate student intakes, a school could be sustainable in a village of 101 as few as 655 inhabitants. However, a decreased PTR (less students per teacher) increases costs per student as well as increases the need for teachers. Alternate intakes are costless, but delay access for half of the children and may increase drop-out before completion among older children. v) Multi-grade classes, which have been used in rural areas of West Africa, are difficult to implement in an eight-grade system. Implementing multi-grade classes for the first four grades only is not a solution, since it leads to classes of 20-25 pupils for grades 5 to 8, dramatically increasing average costs. vi) Choosing adequate solutions for school sizes and locations is a matter of optimization, since there is no pattern without some disadvantages. 4.75 Two or three options for standard school sizes and organizations could be developed for different situations (i.e. urban areas, larger villages, and low-density rural areas), requiring flexibility in school organization as well as acceptance of increased average costs and higher demand for teachers (due to lower PTRs) in rural areas. It is noted that implementing a proposed addition of a ninth grade to primary education will increase the difficulties in planning to maximize sustainability and minimize costs (Table 4.11). Table 4.11: Pupil-Teacher Ratios and School Sizes Related to Required Village Sizes (Nine Grades) PTR Separate girls/boys Mixed Mixed + alternate intakes School Size Village Size School Size Village Size School size Village Size 50 450 3,913 450 1,739 450 978 48 432 3,757 432 1,670 432 939 46 414 3,600 414 1,600 414 900 44 396 3,443 396 1,530 396 861 42 378 3,287 378 1,461 378 822 40 360 3,130 360 1,391 360 783 38 342 2,974 342 1,322 342 743 36 324 2,817 324 1,252 324 704 4.76 Community-level Education Councils (PTAs) could be directly funded to manage school rehabilitation and construction, with technical support and oversight provided by the SMoEs. Education Councils are currently the main source of funding and management of school construction and this experience and capacity should be exploited when greater public domestic and external financing are available. This will help ensure that schools meet community needs and priorities. At the same time, as noted above, school construction should be done according to well-developed SMoE investment plans which optimize the trade-offs between school size, catchment populations, equity and accessibility, and cost. 4.77 A transparent process and set of agreements between the SMoEs and Education Councils would set out respective responsibilities, followed by technical assistance to the Education Councils on construction design, contracting and funds management, as well as supervision and monitoring by the SMoEs. Preparatory work would include development of options for construction standards, methods, materials and costs, pre-qualification of suppliers and contractors, and development of standard contracting and accounting forms. Authorization and monitoring procedures would need to be developed to mitigate the risk of corruption. Construction quality would similarly need to be monitored by engineers engaged by the SMoE. 102 Boarding Schools 4.78 The effectiveness of boarding schools in improving access to education for nomadic groups should be assessed. At present, schools for nomadic groups provide education for the first four grades only. As there is no specific solution for the four upper grades, primary school completion is very low among children from nomadic populations. It seems that in many cases, nomadic tribes make regular migrations to and from a central point. Sometimes the old, women, and very young children stay at this central point while men and livestock move around during some weeks or months. Boarding schools could be located at such points insofar as it is possible to attract the necessary staff, have adequate accommodations, and ensure security. However, this way of life is not generalized among all nomadic groups, and many move in their entirety, without leaving people at any fixed point. 4.79 Boarding schools for the scattered sedentary rural population are advocated by government officials and stakeholders in Darfur, many of whom received their basic education in such schools. Boarding schools could be envisioned to address the needs of disbursed populations living in villages of less than 600 inhabitants for whom a regular school would clearly not be sustainable. There is no way to be sure that this would meet the real demand of communities, since they have preferred to settle on the basis of their livelihoods, rather than in villages already offering a minimum of basic social services. Prudence should lead policy-makers to do some studies and surveys, as well as pilot experiences, in order to assess the real demand for boarding schools. In addition, the additional costs of boarding schools related to the accommodation, subsistence and security of the students, needs to be carefully assessed, as well as anticipated sources of financing. International experience suggests that publicly-subsidized boarding schools often absorb a significant proportion of education budgets, often for the benefit of better-off households who are more likely to obtain admission of their children than are the poorest households. 4.80 In any case, it is clear that for villages of over 600 inhabitants, boarding schools are not an advisable strategy, since gender-mixed regular schools with alternate intakes and PTRs around 36 are feasible and far less costly. In these cases, the high costs and management burden of boarding schools will not be balanced by any advantage, either in access or in completion. Teachers 4.81 Policies governing teacher qualifications, training and remuneration require wholesale reform if there is to be any hope of meeting the increased demand for teachers. There is already a shortage of teachers in Darfur, while post-conflict improvements in the supply and quality of education will entail even greater demand. 4.82 Current high standards for teacher qualifications should be revised in order to both improve the supply of possible candidates as well as integrate the ―volunteer‖ teachers who are currently working in IDP camps and in other areas. Current standards limit the supply of teachers due both to the low number of university graduates from Darfur and the difficulties in attracting graduates from other regions of the country. More flexible standards are required: for example, secondary education with additional practical teacher training. At the same time, supervision and quality control, along with refresher training, would contribute to improving teacher quality. For example, many countries in West Africa (such as Guinea, Niger and Senegal) have lowered required teacher qualifications and made an effort to evaluate change in pupil performance. They found that performance was similar to what was achieved by pupils taught by university graduate teachers. Tunisia, which can be considered among the best-performing countries on the continent in terms of education access and completion rates, developed its basic education services over three decades on the basis of 103 teachers with post-secondary practical teaching training. Moreover, it should be said that in the case of Sudan, raising teacher qualifications in the early 1990s does not seem to have led to any obvious improvement in the quality of basic education. 4.83 Retaining ―volunteer‖ teachers, particularly those working in IDP camps, will be crucial to avoiding a drop in education capacity and will require flexibility with regard to teacher qualifications as well as a dedicated training and accreditation process. Government has not been involved in the spontaneous creation of a new category of teachers – ―volunteers‖ – mainly in the IDP camps, but also in communities where no teachers on the public payroll are present. Increased school enrolment associated in particular with the numbers of IDP children who did not previously have access to education has been only possible with these ―volunteer‖ teachers, many of whom have received training from NGOs. Retaining this asset should be a priority for government during the post-conflict period, and failure to do so will likely lead to drops in school enrolment during the period of return of the IDPs. As noted above, revision and flexibility in the required qualifications for teachers will be necessary. This could be accompanied by a training, testing and accreditation process aimed primarily at these ―volunteer‖ teachers. Government would also need to deal with the financial implications of adding these teachers to the public payroll. 4.84 Teacher salaries need to be raised. Average teacher salaries in Sudan are reported to be equivalent to twice the GDP per capita, which is far below the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Fast Track Initiative considers that achieving Education For All (EFA) requires that teacher salaries be at least 3 to 3.5 times GDP per capita. Teacher salaries should reflect other aspects of the job which are disincentives: in general, teaching is not a prestigious profession and the position often requires geographical mobility. Low teacher salaries also lead to behaviors which undermine performance and quality, including absenteeism and pursuing parallel employment. Finally, the burden of meeting the necessary level of remuneration to keep teachers on the job falls on households who pay a variety of unofficial incentives. 4.85 Remuneration could be adapted to different situations, in particular in order to attract teachers to remote rural areas. Education Councils often pay unofficial incentives to teachers, both in cash and in kind (such as food and housing) in order to retain them, particularly in rural areas. However, it is in the areas where such incentives are most necessary that the population is least able to afford them. Differential incentives for different situations are needed in order to improve equity in the allocation and quality of teachers. 4.86 Pre-service teacher training programs need to be more professionally and practically- oriented, while specific training for ―volunteer‖ teachers as well as refresher training for currently-qualified teachers should be developed. Many stakeholders and government officials in Darfur indicate that current teacher training programs in universities, although providing academic knowledge of specific subjects, do not develop professional and practical teaching skills. These include the ability to daily manage large groups of young children, regularly supervise their work and check their notebooks with constructive feedback, and practice effective pedagogical techniques. Improving teacher training is of course linked to revision of the standards for teacher qualifications. This could involve development of more focused one or two year post-secondary training programs, either provided by universities or by revived teacher training institutes. In addition, as discussed above, a dedicated program to improve the skills of current ―volunteer‖ teachers should be developed concurrently. At the same time, refresher in-service training for currently-qualified teachers should be developed. Development of such programs would start with an assessment of needs and requirements, including technical assistance in order to bring experience from other countries. 104 Secondary Education 4.87 Targeted investments in secondary school education are necessary to increase enrolment and, importantly in the short term, improve quality. Secondary school gross enrolment rates have been estimated at around 8 percent in West Darfur and 15 percent in North and South Darfur. These rates mean that Darfur is not in a position to educate the cadre of professionals that it requires to develop in the post conflict period, and efforts are thus needed to improve enrolment rates. While achieving this will require the establishment of new secondary schools (discussed in the section on financing below), it is clear that significant effort to improve the quality of secondary education is necessary. Vocational Training 4.88 Development of vocational training is important to facilitate the economic and social integration of older than school-aged children, including former combatants, as well as to help provide the needed skilled labor for reconstruction and economic development. Current programs in Darfur are described in the private sector development chapter. Strengthening such programs will require partnership between the public and private sectors in order to ensure that training meets the needs of the economy. Private stakeholders may be from the informal sector, and training may be organized on a part-time basis, for already-employed youth. For example, Benin is experimenting with such a program, financing vocational training for 5,000 youths per year, for around 300 hours per year per beneficiary, with close links with informal sector firms. Education System Governance and Management 4.89 Increasing the transparency and credibility of the budget is a pre-requisite to improving public sector governance, accountability and management of the education system. As discussed above, there has been in recent years some assurance about transfers from the federal to the state and to the locality levels in order to meet teachers‘ salaries, although significant control over salary levels and civil servant numbers still seems to reside at the federal level. Federal and state budget allocations for recurrent costs (Chapter 2), capital investment (Chapter 3) and development programs (Chapter 4), however, are far less reliable, so that they have little credibility (see budget chapter). The result is that parents, through Education Councils, bear the bulk of these types of costs. SMoEs have little control over the allocation at the state level of either federal transfers or own-state revenues. Without clarifying and legitimizing the budget process, including improving the effective influence on it of lower levels, increased availability of funds will not be sufficient to improve governance and accountability. 4.90 Education Councils currently play a large role in the financing and management of basic education services and this should be strengthened through a capacity-building program combined with direct funding. Education Councils should play a major implementation role in school construction and rehabilitation, receiving and managing funds directly, accompanied by an effort to build their capacity to manage these investments as well as to influence and coordinate effectively with the SMoE and locality education authorities on planning, budgeting, and policy issues. Technical assistance can help define the priority needs; this should be followed by training as well as material support including computers and office equipment. 4.91 The role of the education authorities at the Locality level in monitoring, supervising and supporting teachers and the quality of education services in general should be strengthened. Day-to-day monitoring and supervision of teachers, notably including providing feedback and advice, should be an important role for the education authorities at the 105 locality level. Fiduciary monitoring of financial resources transferred to Education Councils could also be an important task. Both would require strengthening the capacities of the Locality administrations, including training and material support. 4.92 Strengthening the policy, planning and monitoring capacities of the SMoEs should be a priority. A number of policy areas need to be addressed in order to lay the necessary groundwork for sustainable development of Darfur‘s education system. Currently, SMoEs largely apply without modification policies and standards that have been determined at the federal level. One of the major themes of this assessment is that many such policies need to be better adapted to the Darfur context, and it will be the SMoEs that will do this. They should be supported with technical assistance in the major areas of reform, followed by training in the planning and budgeting skills necessary for implementation of reform and development programs. For example, as discussed above, infrastructure investment will need to follow carefully-developed plans, adapted to different circumstances, and SMoEs will take a lead role in developing these plans. Monitoring and evaluation of the system is also an important role for the SMoEs which needs strengthening. An ongoing project financed by the European Union to strengthen Education Management and Information Systems (EMIS) in each state includes development of the information systems in Darfur. D. DIAGNOSTICS: BASIC HEALTH, NUTRITION AND HIV/AIDS SERVICES Child Health and Nutrition 4.93 Pre-crisis estimates of child mortality in Darfur were comparable to or better than other states. Estimates of infant and child mortality from the 1999 Safe Motherhood Survey, before the crisis, were high, but – interestingly given other socio-economic indicators – not among the worst in Sudan. Infant mortality82 was estimated at 61 and 64 per 1,000 live births in North and South Darfur, and at 71 in West Darfur. Under-five mortality was estimated at 101, 96 and 104 per 1,000 in North, South and West Darfur respectively. This can be compared to estimates for Khartoum State of infant mortality at 69 and under-five mortality at 103. 4.94 Since 2003, child mortality has increased dramatically. More than 30 retrospective mortality surveys have been carried out in Darfur since 2003, differing in coverage, recall period and methodology (Table 4.12). The estimates for crude mortality rates per day refer to the specific recall period, usually a period of months before the survey.83 The implied annual crude rate is the mortality level that would have occurred if the observed daily rate were to prevail over a one year period. 4.95 Although improved levels of child mortality are associated with the humanitarian response, renewed conflict will likely exacerbate the fragile situation. Surveys in 2005 of groups defined as affected by the conflict indicated that the humanitarian response brought child mortality down somewhat, but some measured rates were still high.84 A large retrospective mortality survey in 2005 found that IDPs experienced higher child mortality than non-IDPs, with exceptionally high rates in South Darfur85 (Table 4.13). A 2005 82 Infant mortality is the risk of death in the first year of life while under-five mortality is the risk during the first five years of life. 83 Crude mortality among under five children of 2.0 per 10,000 per day is generally considered a humanitarian emergency. 84 For example the 2005 observed daily mortality rates for the conflict-affected population in North and West Darfur (Table 13) if translated into an implied under-five cohort mortality rates, would correspond with cohort rates of 235 and 150 per 1,000 respectively. 85 WHO and Federal MOH, 2005b. 106 nutrition survey, intended to be representative of a ―conflict-affected‖ population of about 3.2 million, found crude under-5 mortality rates of 0.85 per 10,000 per day among IDPs and 0.62 among residents (n = 2,090 households). Higher levels of conflict and reduced access for humanitarian programs would raise mortality rates. Table 4.12: Crude Under-Five Mortality Rates, Specific Locations, Darfur Location Year Survey Crude under-5 Implied crude under-5 conducted by mortality rate mortality rate (per 1,000 per (per 10,000 per day) year) Darfur Region 2004 CDC, WFP 1.0 37 North Darfur Entire state 2004 WHO, Epiet 2.5 91 Serif Umra 2004 Epicentre, MSF 1.8 66 West Darfur Zalingei 2003- Epicentre, MSF 1.8 66 04 Murnei 2003- Epicentre, MSF 1.5 55 04 Murnei 2004 Epicentre, MSF 1.7 62 Niertiti 2004 Epicentre, MSF 2.1 77 El Geneina 2004 Epicentre, MSF 14.1 515 Entire state 2004 WHO, Epiet 3.1 113 Murnei 2004- Concern 1.2 44 05 South Darfur Kass 2004 Epicentre, MSF 5.9 215 Kalma 2004 Epicentre, MSF 2.9 106 Kalma 2004 WHO, Epiet 11.7 427 Compiled by Guha-Sapir and Degomme (2006). Implied mortality rates are estimated by the authors. Table 4.13: Crude Under-Five Mortality Rates, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 Crude under-5 mortality Implied crude under-5 mortality rate rate (per 10,000 per day) (per 1,000 / year) North Darfur overall 1.5 55 IDPs in camps 1.5 55 IDPs outside of camps 1.8 66 affected residents 1.1 40 West Darfur overall 0.9 33 IDPs in camps 1.0 37 IDPs outside of camps 0.8 29 affected residents 0.7 26 South Darfur IDPs in camps 2.6 95 Source: WHO and Sudan Federal Ministry of Health (2005b). Implied mortality rates are estimated by the authors. n = 4,099. 4.96 The major causes of child mortality and morbidity are – like in other very poor settings – diarrhea, acute respiratory infection (ARI), malaria and measles, often accompanied by malnutrition. Available data suggest that diarrhea, ARI and malaria are particularly important. The 2005 retrospective mortality survey found that diarrhea and malaria were the most important reported causes of child mortality (n = 105), with diarrhea associated with the 107 highest number of deaths.86 The surveillance system in IDP camps reports that ARI and diarrhea are the most significant reported specific causes of death.87 4.97 The 2005 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations among a large sample of under-fives (n = 2,820), found that 56.3 percent reported fever in the previous two weeks, 43.5 percent had diarrhea, and 45.3 percent had a cough with difficulty breathing.88 A similar survey in 2006 found that 51 percent of under-five children had fever in the previous two weeks, 41 percent had bloody or watery diarrhea, and 38 percent had cough with difficulty breathing (n = 2,064).89 Similarly, a 2005 survey in six IDP camps in South Darfur found that 18 percent of under-five children had diarrhea in the previous one week and 4 percent had symptoms of ARI.90 It seems that even with adequate access to water and sanitation in many of these camps, diarrhea remains a significant problem. 4.98 Survey data from before the conflict show that poor children and children in South Darfur were significantly more likely to suffer from cough and fever. Regression models using the 2000 MICS data show that poverty was strongly associated with the risk of cough and fever among children (see the Appendix to this chapter). Children in the highest socio- economic group were 70 percent less likely to have a cough in the previous two weeks, and 40 percent less likely to have a fever. After accounting for socio-economic status and other factors, children in South Darfur were much more likely to have experienced cough and fever than children in the other states, which may be due to environmental and disease transmission patterns. The models did not show any significant difference in child morbidity between urban and rural areas. 4.99 Child malnutrition has increased. The 2000 MICS estimated the prevalence of acute malnutrition91 among children aged 6-59 months at 23 percent in North Darfur, 12 percent in South Darfur and 9 percent in West Darfur (n = 3,349). Estimated prevalence was strikingly high in North Darfur, but the rates in South and West Darfur were either consistent with or better than in other states. By comparison, the overall estimated average in Northern Sudan at this time was 14 percent. There are indications that, like child mortality, acute malnutrition increased dramatically in 2003-04 and then returned to levels closer to the pre-crisis prevalence. An escalation of conflict will likely bring rates back up again. A 2004 nutrition survey of part of the conflict-affected population in the three states found an extremely high level of acute malnutrition (21.8 percent) among children aged 6-59 months (n = 844).92 Larger surveys in 2004 and 2005 found prevalence of 11.9 and 13.1 percent respectively (n = 1,943 and 1,431), with the same differences between states that were evident before the crisis; that is, very high acute malnutrition rates in North Darfur, quite high rates in South Darfur and lower rates in West Darfur (Table 4.14). Surveys among specific communities reveal frequent pockets of high malnutrition. In 2006, a survey in Geireda IDP camp in South 86 WHO and Federal MOH, 2005b. 87 WHO and Federal MOH, 2006 88 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 89 WFP et al., 2006 90 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 91 Three common anthropometric indicators for child malnutrition are height-for-age ratio (chronic malnutrition (stunting));, weight-for-height ratio (acute malnutrition (wasting)); and the weight-for-age ratio is considered a composite indicator for overall malnutrition (underweight). Children whose ratios are below 2 standard deviations under the median of a reference population are considered malnourished. The mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) is also used, usually in humanitarian emergency situations, to assess child and maternal malnutrition, using fixed cut-offs. 92 Prevalence of acute malnutrition among under-five children over 15 percent is generally considered a humanitarian emergency. WFP, 2004 108 Darfur found prevalence of acute malnutrition of 15.5 percent among under-fives, while a survey in Nyala town and surrounding camps found a rate of 18.8 percent.93 Table 4.14: Prevalence of Acute Malnutrition, Conflict-Affected Children, Darfur, 2005-06 2005 2006 North Darfur 15.6 16.0 South Darfur 12.3 12.6 West Darfur 6.2 10.5 Darfur 11.9 13.1 Sources: WFP and UNICEF (2005) and WFP et al. (2006). Children 6-59 months 4.100 Chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are prevalent. The longer-term effects are evident in a high rate of stunting, which was measured at 39.2 percent in the large nutrition survey in 2005.94 Micronutrient deficiencies are also of concern; the 2004 nutrition survey found 55.3 percent prevalence of anemia among under-five children.95 4.101 Although most infants are breastfed, feeding practices likely contribute to malnutrition and infection. The 1999 SMS found that over 97 percent of infants in the Darfur states were breastfed. Similarly, the 2005 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations found that 96.4 percent of children under-two years were ever breastfed, but only 65.7 percent were exclusively breastfed during their first six months. Early breastfeeding is not done for more than one newborn out of four. An abysmally low proportion (17 percent) of 6-24 months-old received the recommended four to five meals per day of complementary feeding.96 A survey of women in IDP camps in South Darfur in 2005 found that half reported difficulties breastfeeding, which has been observed among conflict-affected populations in other settings.97 Reproductive Health and Nutrition 4.102 Fertility is very high in Darfur. The 1999 SMS found that total fertility rates (TFR) were 7.2 in North and South Darfur and 6.5 in West Darfur, compared to the North Sudan average of 5.2.98 Average age of marriage for women was 19.1 years in North Darfur, 17.1 in South Darfur and 17.3 in West Darfur, which can be compared to the North Sudan average of 19.2. However, average household size in 1999 was below the Northern average of 6.4 –5.6 in North Darfur, 6.0 in South Darfur and 5.2 in West Darfur, although the 2006 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations in Darfur found an average household size of 6.2.99 4.103 Gender factors have a significant impact on reproductive decision-making. A 2005 survey of women heads of household (n = 1,293) in six IDP camps in South Darfur found that only 30 percent of women felt that decisions on the number and spacing of children were shared by husband and wife, and 43 percent felt than a man may beat his wife if she disobeys him. At the time of their marriage, 61 percent of women reported feeling pressured, while 20 93 UNICEF, 2006a 94 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 95 WFP, 2004 96 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 97 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 98 Total fertility rate: The number of children who would be born to an average woman who would experience (in her lifetime) each of the age-specific fertility rates of a population measured at the time of the survey. 99 WFP et al., 2006 109 percent said they had not consented to the marriage. Among women desiring but not using contraception, 63 percent reported their husbands would not allow it.100 4.104 Female circumcision is prevalent, increasing the risks of birth complications, maternal mortality and morbidity. The 1999 SMS found that prevalence of female genital mutilation, or circumcision, was 85.1 percent in North Darfur and 91.9 percent in South Darfur, in line with the Northern Sudan average of 90.1 percent. The practice is less common in West Darfur, where 51.7 percent of women were circumcised. Table 4.15: Reported Symptoms of Complications during Pregnancy, 1999 (% of births during the preceding five years) Oedema Urinary Malaria Jaundice Other At least of lower tract one limbs infection symptom North Darfur 17.3 22.2 32.2 12.6 8.4 40.7 South Darfur 23.9 33.5 49.0 20.8 12.1 56.6 West Darfur 11.3 16.9 30.0 6.9 7.4 37.9 Northern Sudan 14.8 19.3 35.0 9.0 7.1 43.2 Source: 1999 SMS. 4.105 A significant proportion of mothers are malnourished. The 2005 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations found that 6.4 percent of mothers with children aged 6-49 months were malnourished.101 4.106 Micronutrient deficiency is very common among mothers in Darfur. The 1999 SMS found that 9.9 percent of women in Darfur aged 15-49 years reported night-blindness during their last pregnancy, a sign of vitamin A deficiency (n = 1,418). This was lower than the Northern Sudan average of 13.3 percent. More recently, among conflict-affected populations, 14.1 percent of mothers of children aged 6-59 months reported night-blindness during their most recent pregnancy in the previous three years (n = 245).102 The 2004 survey of conflict- affected populations tested hemoglobin and found that 28 percent of non-pregnant and 18 percent of pregnant mothers of children aged 6-49 months were anemic (n = 463). The survey also found that 25.5 percent had detectable iodine-deficiency.103 4.107 Illness during pregnancy and complications during labor and postpartum are common, increasing risks to mothers and newborns. Table 4.15 presents data from the 1999 SMS on morbidity during pregnancy, showing that malaria is by far the most common reported complication during pregnancy, particularly in South Darfur where it is reported to affect almost half of pregnant women. Urinary tract infection and oedema are also common. Table 4.16 presents estimates on complications during labor and delivery, indicating that a quarter of mother suffered from prolonged labor and, in North and South Darfur, a quarter suffered from high fever. Heavy bleeding was quite common, experienced by 5-7 percent of mothers in Darfur, somewhat higher than the Northern Sudan average of 3.3 percent. Table 4.17 shows the proportion of women who suffered post-partum complications, indicating that 17-28 percent experienced high fever and 4-6 percent experienced heavy bleeding. 100 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 101 Mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) of under 21.5 cm. WHO and UNICEF, 2005 102 WHO and UNICEF, 2005 103 WFP, 2004 110 Table 4.16: Reported Symptoms of Complications during Labor and Delivery, (% of births during the preceding five years) Prolonged High fever Eclampsia Heavy Fetal labor bleeding malposition or distress, or prolapsed umbilical cord North Darfur 22.1 25.8 1.6 5.5 6.7 South Darfur 27.7 24.4 1.8 4.7 10.1 West Darfur 23.8 17.9 1.7 7.2 5.1 Northern Sudan 19.7 14.2 0.7 3.3 9.8 Source: 1999 SMS Table 4.17: Reported Symptoms of Postpartum Complications, 1999 (% of births during the preceding five years) High fever Heavy bleeding Eclampsia North Darfur 19.9 6.0 0.6 South Darfur 27.8 5.6 2.2 West Darfur 16.9 3.8 1.1 Northern Sudan 19.8 3.1 0.6 Source: 1999 SMS 4.108 Consistent with these risk factors, current levels of maternal mortality are thought to be extremely high. The 1999 SMS used an indirect technique to estimate the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in the Darfur region at 524 per 100,000 births, with a reference period of 12 years before the survey, while the Northern Sudan average was 509. However, the survey report authors suggest that maternal deaths may have been under-reported. A study in IDP camps in West Darfur in 2006 may provide some indication of the current magnitude. It found that 14.7 percent of surveyed women reported the death of a sister during her last pregnancy (n = 774), which is a staggeringly high number.104 The main reported causes of death were obstructed labor (27.2 percent), hemorrhage (40.4 percent), sepsis or fever (7.9 percent), and eclampsia (1.8 percent).105 4.109 Rape and other gender-based violence have reportedly increased dramatically with the crisis. A qualitative study of IDPs in Darfur found that sexual violence and abductions were mentioned in every focus group discussion as a serious problem for women and girls, affecting in particular IDPs when they venture outside camps to collect firewood and grass (52 focus group discussions involving 624 IDPs).106 Mental Health 4.110 Violence, gender-based violence, and displacement have had important psychological effects. The qualitative study of IDPs mentioned above found that both men and women frequently described psychological effects of sexual violence: 104 The 1999 SMS estimate was based on only 1.7 percent of women reporting that a sister had died during pregnancy or childbirth (n = 30,000). 105 Diaaeldin Ahmed, 2006 106 UNFPA and UNICEF, 2005 111 Girls and women reported that the psychosocial consequences of sexual violence for them included: shame, depression, stigma, illness, difficulty coping, and at the worst - suicide. All of the groups, but especially the men felt powerless, helpless and to a certain extent humiliated by the ongoing violence directed at women and girls. In one location, the men also stated that the only reason they had not committed suicide was because it is forbidden by their religion. […] Unmarried girls were the most affected and some did not seek health care in clinics due to stigma and shame.107 4.111 A quantitative survey of women in six IDP camps in South Darfur (n = 1,293) used a standard screening instrument, the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) to estimate that the prevalence of major depression was 31 percent. About 63 percent reported one or more symptoms, including feeling depressed or hopeless. In the previous year, 5 percent of women reported thinking about suicide and 2 percent reported personal suicide attempts. Two percent of households had a member who had committed suicide in the previous year. 108 As discussed below, available survey data indicate that a significant proportion of households in Darfur have experienced violence-related mortality, which implies significant psychological effects on survivors. HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis 4.112 Although there are no data on population prevalence of HIV in Darfur, the conflict has exacerbated known risk factors. The UNAIDS estimate of adult prevalence for Sudan as a whole is 1.6 percent. Prevalence rates of 4-6 percent have been found in small scale studies in Northern Sudan among sex workers, sexually-transmitted infection (STI) patients, tuberculosis patients, and soldiers. However, there are no data to allow for an estimate of prevalence in Darfur, although infection rates among small groups have been measured. The Federal MoH reports that in 2004, 1.3 percent of tuberculosis patients in South Darfur were infected with HIV and that prevalence among pregnant women attending antenatal care clinics in North Darfur was 0 percent. Test results from blood bank donors in the three tertiary hospitals in the three Darfur states have found prevalence of between 0.5 and 3.3 percent. It should be noted that reported adult prevalence estimates for the countries neighboring Darfur are 10.7 percent in Central African Republic and 3.5 percent in Chad. The conflict has exacerbated and introduced a number of risk factors for spread of the disease: economic and social disruption, increase in poverty, population movements and displacement, violence, and presence of soldiers and armed groups. As noted above, rape associated with the conflict has been widely reported, putting victims at risk of HIV infection. 4.113 Knowledge of HIV/AIDS is very low. Only 20 percent of women in West Darfur had even heard of the disease, while this proportion was only around 35 percent in the other two Darfur states, compared to 40 percent overall in Northern Sudan (Table 4.18). More recently, a survey in El Geneina (West Darfur) IDP camps found that 56.3 percent of respondents had heard of HIV/AIDS, 32.3 percent had heard of HIV/AIDS and knew of two preventive measures, and only 6 percent mentioned condoms as a method of prevention (n = 778).109 The 2006 SHHS indicates that comprehensive knowledge among women aged 15-24 is still extremely low, at 13.4, 7.4 and 5.3 percent in North, West and South Darfur respectively.110 107 UNFPA and UNICEF, 2005 108 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 109 UNICEF, 2006b 110 Percentage of women aged 15-24 who correctly identify two ways to avoid HIV infection and reject three common misconceptions about HIV transmission. 112 Table 4.18: Knowledge of HIV/AIDS, Darfur, 2000 (% women 15-49 years) Heard of HIV/AIDS Have one partner Use condoms Abstain North Darfur 32.5 12.2 7.4 3.9 South Darfur 34.8 23 13 9.6 West Darfur 20.5 8.2 9.5 5.7 Northern Sudan 40.4 22.5 10.8 8.4 Source: 2000 MICS. 4.114 No data are available on tuberculosis in Darfur, although it is likely that the conflict has contributed to risk factors. Available estimates are for Sudan as a whole. WHO reports that annual tuberculosis incidence in Sudan is estimated at 180/100,000. Population displacement, poor living conditions, and disruption of health services due to the conflict in Darfur have likely exacerbated risks associated with the disease. Overall Mortality 4.115 Overall mortality in Darfur has risen. As noted above, a large number of retrospective mortality surveys have been done in Darfur during the crisis since 2003. The various surveys have found crude mortality rates ranging from 0.7 to 5.6 per 10,000 per day.111 Among surveys which sampled larger populations, the 2004 nutrition survey of conflict-affected groups in the three states found an overall crude mortality rate of 0.7 per 10,000 per day (n = 880 households).112 A similar survey in 2005 found a rate of 0.46 (n = 2,090 households).113 4.116 Table 4.19 presents results from a retrospective mortality survey of conflict-affected populations in 2005 which estimated that crude mortality was 0.8 per 10,000 per day in North Darfur, 0.6 in West Darfur, and 0.8 among IDPs in West Darfur (n = 1,780 households).114 A nutrition survey in 2006 among conflict-affected populations found a crude rate of 0.36 per 10,000 per day.115 Although differing methodologies make comparison questionable, these studies nevertheless suggest that mortality increased in 2003-04 and then decreased in 2005. All of these rates can be considered very high.116 4.117 Many surveys have found that a significant proportion of deaths were due to violence, ranging from 4 to 85 percent in particular locations.117 For example, the 2005 retrospective mortality survey of conflict-affected populations found that in North Darfur, deaths attributed to injuries were 55 percent of the total among the resident population, 34 percent among the IDPs living outside camps, and 9 percent among IDPs living in camps (Table 4.19). 111 Crude mortality among all ages of 1.0 per 10,000 per day is generally considered a humanitarian emergency. Guha-Sapir and Degomme, 2006. 112 WFP, 2004 113 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 114 WHO and Sudan Federal MoH 2005b. 115 WFP et al., 2006 116 Based on 1993 census data, life expectancy in Darfur was estimated at around 55 years. Such estimates are done using models. For the purpose of comparison, applying such a model to the crude mortality rate of 0.8 per 10,000 per day observed among conflict-affected populations in North Darfur in 2005, results in a life expectancy estimate of just 34.0 years. Applying it to the crude rate observed in West Darfur of 0.6 per 10,000 per day results in a life expectancy estimate of 41.5 years. (This is the expected years of life of a birth cohort if it were to experience the mortality conditions observed by the survey. (These life expectancy figures were derived by the authors using the Coale-Demeny ―North‖ model life tables). 117 Guha-Sapir and Degomme, 2006 113 Table 4.19: Crude Mortality Rates and Proportion of Deaths Attributed to Injuries, all Ages, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 (n = 4,099 households) Crude mortality rate Percent deaths (per 10,000 per day) attributed to injuries North Darfur overall 0.8 IDPs in camps 0.8 9 IDPs outside of camps 0.9 34 affected residents 0.8 55 West Darfur overall 0.6 IDPs in camps 0.5 11 IDPs outside of camps 0.8 0 affected residents 0.4 6 South Darfur IDPs in camps 0.8 14 Source: WHO and Federal MoH (2005b). Health Service Utilization and Access 4.118 Overall, in 2000, access to basic health services in North Darfur was low but comparable to Northern Sudan averages, but was worse in South and West Darfur. Currently, the humanitarian operation has dramatically increased service utilization by IDPs in camps, but access has remained poor or deteriorated for other population groups. Child Health and Nutrition Services 4.119 Utilization of most basic child health services has historically been low in Darfur. Table 4.20 presents estimates from 2000 of utilization rates for basic preventive and curative child health services. Coverage of most basic services was very low, although in some cases comparable to equally low averages for Northern Sudan as a whole. Only 2.4 percent of under-five children were reported to be sleeping under insecticide-treated nets (ITNs). Immunization coverage was very low: only 40.7 percent for measles and 48.8 percent for BCG. North Darfur estimates were usually comparable to the averages for Northern Sudan, but coverage in South and West Darfur for most interventions was significantly lower. Reported treatment of cough and fever are indicators of utilization of basic curative services and the averages for Darfur are similarly low. Fewer than one in four cases of cough among under-five children received medical treatment and only 28.7 percent of fever cases received treatment, with the latter proportion significantly lower than the Northern Sudan average of 41.9 percent. Table 4.20: Utilization of Child Health Services, Darfur, 2000 Slept under Vitamin A Immunization Received treatment from ITN (6-59 (12-23 months) a health provider (under-5) months) (under-5) measles BCG cough fever North Darfur 0.5 50.9 61.6 69.3 40.4 43.8 South Darfur 1.5 20.9 33.9 41.3 24.2 23.8 West Darfur 5.9 29.9 27.4 34.6 10.5 26.3 Darfur 2.4 31.8 40.7 48.8 24.8 28.7 Northern Sudan 1.9 49.7 58.0 63.4 22.7 41.9 Source: Authors‘ estimates from 2000 MICS data. 4.120 Humanitarian operations have increased access to basic curative care for conflict- affected populations, while utilization of government hospitals and clinics remains low. Administrative information shows that consultation rates are relatively high for IDPs, at 1.6 to 114 1.9 visits per person per year.118 Consistent with this, the 2005 nutrition survey of conflict- affected populations (about half the population of the region) found that 63.8 percent of children with an illness in the previous two weeks were brought to a health provider for treatment.119 Table 4.21 presents estimates from the 2000 MICS data on the treatment of children who had a cough in the previous two weeks, and from the 2005 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations on the treatment of children who were reported to be ill in the previous two weeks. First, it suggests that access to treatment, at least for the population served by the humanitarian operation, has improved substantially: in 2000, 77.1 percent of children with cough did not receive treatment, while in 2005, 36.2 percent of children among the conflict-affected population did not receive treatment. Second, it indicates that this increase in access to care was almost entirely due to humanitarian programs implemented by NGOs. In 2005, about one-third of ill children among the conflict-affected population received care at an NGO clinic, while in 2000, this category of care was not relevant enough to be included in the survey. At the same time, the share of children who went to other providers hardly changed – both surveys found about 9-10 percent going to a hospital and about 6 percent going to a government health facility. Table 4.21: Sources of Treatment for Under-Five Children with Cough (2001) and Ill Children among Conflict-Affected Population (2005), Darfur Cough treated Illness treated 2000 MICS 2005 "conflict-affected" (n = 417) (n = 1,506) NGO clinic - 32.5 hospital 8.8 10.8 government PHC facility 6.7 6.4 private doctor 2.7 - mobile clinic 0.0 1.3 village health worker 2.0 3.8 pharmacy / shop 2.0 5.7 traditional healer or relative/friend 0.8 - not specified / other 0.0 3.2 no treatment 77.1 36.2 total 100.0 100.0 Source: Authors‘ calculations from data from 2001 MICS and WFP and UNICEF (2005). Table 4.22: Utilization of Preventive Child Health Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005-06 (% under-5) Slept under Measles immunization Vitamin A supplement ITN 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 (n = 1,978) (n = 1,973) (n = 1,976) (n = 2,013) North Darfur 62.3 66.8 39.3 44.5 South Darfur 81.3 68.3 32.6 32.7 West Darfur 67.3 65.1 46.6 34.0 Darfur 38.2 69.2 67.3 39.2 37.1 Sources: WFP and UNICEF (2005) and WFP et al. (2006). 4.121 Coverage of basic preventive and household-level interventions remains low. Table 4.22 presents data from nutrition surveys of the conflict-affected population in 2005 and 2006. On average, measles immunization coverage among under-five children in 2006 was about two-thirds. The comparable figure from the 2000 MICS for the same age group among the general population of Darfur was 41.8 percent, indicating that measles campaigns by the 118 WHO and Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2006 119 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 115 humanitarian operation have maintained and even increased coverage for some groups. Similar to measles immunization, utilization of bednets significantly expanded among conflict-affected populations due to distribution by the humanitarian operation, so that in 2006 38.2 percent of under-fives among the conflict-affected population were sleeping under an insecticide-treated net. Coverage of vitamin A supplementation, however, may have fallen, as 49.7 percent of under-fives in 2000 had received vitamin A in the previous 6 months, while the proportion (among the conflict-affected population) was 37.1 percent in 2006. A 2005 survey of IDP camps in South Darfur found that 35 percent of women heads of household knew how to mix homemade oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and 30 percent had access to ORT packets, proportions which may be higher than the pre-conflict level but are still low in absolute terms, particularly given the prevalence of diarrhea.120 4.122 Coverage of child nutrition interventions was historically limited and remains low. Although curative nutrition programs under humanitarian programs are accessible to a significant proportion of the conflict-affected population, their effective utilization is low. As noted above, only half of under-five children had recently received vitamin A supplementation in 2000, and just over a third (among the conflict-affected population) had benefited from this intervention in 2005 and 2006. On the other hand, in 2005, 73.1 percent of households (among the conflict-affected population) had iodized salt, compared to only 1.6 percent (among the general population) in 2000. This is due to humanitarian assistance, as 91.5 percent of these households had received salt through food aid. With regard to curative nutrition interventions, Table 4.23 presents data from nutrition surveys of the conflict-affected population in 2005, indicating that around 60 percent of the sampled population was served by supplementary feeding programs and around 40 percent by therapeutic feeding programs. However, it was found that among the children measured as malnourished by the survey, only 20 percent were enrolled in a supplementary feeding program and only 28 percent were patients of a therapeutic program. Table 4.23: Availability and Utilization of Child Nutrition Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 Available in sampled clusters Percent of surveyed malnourished (n = 87) children enrolled* supplementary therapeutic supplementary therapeutic feeding program feeding program feeding program feeding program (n = 130) (n = 15) North Darfur 39.4 30.3 11.0 0.0 South Darfur 53.8 34.6 36.4 42.9 West Darfur 89.3 67.8 20.8 33.3 Darfur 59.7 43.7 20.2 28.3 *percent of surveyed under-5 children with moderate or severe acute malnutrition who are enrolled in supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs respectively. Sources: WFP and UNICEF (2005). Reproductive Health and Nutrition Services 4.123 Utilization of antenatal care has been very low, although humanitarian programs have increased access for IDPs. In 1999, less than half of pregnant women in Darfur received antenatal care, ranging from over 40 percent in North and South Darfur to 33 percent in West Darfur. This compares to a much higher average of 71 percent in Northern Sudan overall. Similarly, tetanus toxoid vaccination, a standard antenatal care intervention, was provided in less than a third of pregnancies in Darfur, compared to over half in Northern Sudan as a whole. Humanitarian programs have increased access for IDP populations, but there are no 120 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 116 current data for the rest of the population. A survey of IDP camps in South Darfur found that all pregnant women reported currently having access to antenatal care. Reflecting the situation previous to the crisis, 58 percent reported receiving antenatal care for all their pregnancies. Of those who did not receive antenatal care, 89 percent said no services were available, 47 percent reported financial difficulties, and 27 percent said they did not have their husband‘s permission.121 A 2006 survey of IDPs in West Darfur found coverage of antenatal care of 65.6 percent in camp settings, but the 2006 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations inside and outside camps in the three states found that only 30.8 percent of pregnant women had received iron supplementation.122 This compares to around 30-45 percent in 1999 (Table 4.25). Nevertheless, the effects of bednet distribution by humanitarian programs are evident, as in 2006, 42.5 percent of pregnant women among the conflict- affected population reported using ITNs. 4.124 Contraceptive use is very low in Darfur. In 1999, less than 5 percent of married women in Darfur had ever used modern contraception and 1 percent or less were currently using it. This picture is confirmed by the 2006 SHHS, which found contraceptive prevalence rates of 1.9, 1 and 2.4 percent in North, West and South Darfur respectively. 123 Utilization is far lower than the already very low rates overall in Northern Sudan (Table 4.24). This is largely a matter of preference and knowledge; a 2005 survey of women in IDP camps in South Darfur found that 81 percent of women who were not using contraception did not want to do so. However, among the remaining proportion who desired contraception, 63 percent reported that their husband did not allow it, 15 percent said it was not available, and 11 percent said it was not affordable.124 Table 4.24: Utilization of Contraception and Antenatal Care, Darfur, 1999 Modern contraception (% pregnancies in previous 5 years) (% married women) ever used current use antenatal care tetanus toxoid vaccination North Darfur 4.6 1.2 43.5 31.9 South Darfur 4.6 1.0 48.8 26.4 West Darfur 4.2 0.5 32.8 32.0 Northern Sudan 21.4 7.2 71.2 52.1 Source: 1999 SMS. Table 4.25: Services Received From Antenatal Care, Darfur, 1999 (% of births in previous 5 years who received antenatal care) Blood Hemoglobin Urine test Iron Folic acid pressure test supplement supplement measured North Darfur 21.6 50.8 53.7 35.0 46.4 South Darfur 33.1 46.8 49.5 39.9 33.3 West Darfur 24.1 43.8 45.6 41.8 54.8 Northern Sudan 51.4 61.8 64.2 55.7 46.2 Source: 1999 SMS. 4.125 The quality of antenatal care has been poor. Table 4.25 presents data from the 1999 SMS on the types of services received from antenatal care. It shows that, for each type of 121 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 122 WFP et al., 2006 123 Contraceptive prevalence is the proportion of women currently married or in union aged 15 – 49 years who are using (or whose partner is using) a contraceptive method (either modern or traditional). 124 Lawry, Kim and Torbay, 2005 117 standard service, not more than 50 percent of pregnant women in Darfur received it, and that the proportion is consistently lower than the average for Northern Sudan as a whole. For example, in North Darfur, among the 43.5 percent of women who received antenatal care (Table 4.24), only 21.6 percent had their blood pressure monitored and 35 percent received an iron tablet. 4.126 Delivery in a health facility has been rare, as many deliveries are attended at home by untrained or low-trained providers. In 1999, less than 4 percent of births occurred at a health facility in Darfur, compared to the also low Northern Sudan average of 13.6 percent (Table 4.26). The 1999 SMS found that 68.6 percent of deliveries in North Darfur and 55.4 percent of deliveries in South Darfur were attended by a trained provider, which is comparable to the Northern Sudan average, although the figure was significantly lower for West Darfur at 33.3 percent. More recently, the 2006 SHHS found that the proportion had decreased slightly, to 67, 50 and 32 percent in North, South and West Darfur respectively. However, observers have noted that the majority of these are attended by trained village midwives, and there are doubts about whether these have the necessary skills and materials to be considered medical providers. At the same time, a large proportion of deliveries were not attended by any type of formally trained provider – the proportion in West Darfur was about two-thirds in 1999 and similarly high in 2006. Table 4.26: Delivery and Postnatal Care, Darfur, 1999 (% of births in previous 5 years) Delivery Postnatal In health By trained By TBA By relatives Vitamin A facility provider* or others supplement North Darfur 1.2 68.6 20.6 11.4 8.1 South Darfur 4.1 55.4 26.0 18.9 8.5 West Darfur 2.6 33.3 23.0 43.8 12.2 Northern Sudan 13.6 59.6 31.1 13.5 26.7 *Includes doctor, health visitor, village midwife, and other health professionals, but excludes trained TBAs. Source: 1999 SMS. 4.127 Access to postnatal care has been poor. The 1999 survey found that only 8-12 percent of women received a post-natal vitamin A supplement (Table 4.26). The 2006 nutrition survey of conflict-affected populations found that 19.4 percent of women received postnatal vitamin A supplementation, indicating that access to postnatal care remains poor. 4.128 Access to Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) is for the most part limited to the main hospitals, where care is adequate but requires quality improvements. Detailed information on EmOC in the three states of Darfur is not available. It is reported that Comprehensive EmOC, which includes blood transfusion and C-section –crucial to reducing maternal mortality – is only available in district/rural hospitals staffed by one or more physicians. A recent study of five of the eight civilian hospitals in North Darfur provides a revealing picture of the quality of this care in places where it is available.125 Obstetricians and nurse anesthetists are found only in the tertiary hospital in the state capital, while all rural hospitals are staffed with a single doctor who performs emergency C-sections with no anesthetist support. Four of the five hospitals had a vehicle which could serve as an ambulance, but none had any communication system with other health facilities. In practice, transport of emergency cases was reported to be done by private or NGO vehicles, as well as animal-driven carts. In line with national policy, emergency cases receive care free of cost within the first 24 hours. Beyond this timeframe, IDPs (subsidized at the time under a WHO program) and those covered by health insurance continued to receive free treatment, while 125 UNFPA, 2006 118 others needed to pay the full costs of care. Each of the studied hospitals had a functioning laboratory and performed blood transfusion, with HIV screening but in most cases without blood banking. There were functioning sterilization equipment and provision for clean water in the five hospitals, as well as electric generators. The assessment found that none of the hospitals had maintenance staff, so that equipment requiring minor repairs were often abandoned. Hospital pharmacies were found to be relatively well-stocked, which is attributed to the revolving fund system, but pharmacy attendants had no basic training. Some basic equipment and drugs, such as sphygmomanometers and weigh scales, were not readily available in the maternity wards. Partographs were not in use in any hospital and none were adequately equipped for neonatal resuscitation. Guidelines for case management were not available in all the hospitals and one did not have a maternity register. There was some awareness of the universal precautions for prevention of HIV infection of health workers, but these were largely not being applied. Mental Health Services 4.129 In a very difficult environment, there are limited or no mental health services or support for victims of the conflict. Although a qualitative study among conflict-affected populations in 2005 found that victims of sexual violence receive a certain amount of community support and acceptance, stigma is such that unwed women and girls in particular avoid seeking medical care due to feelings of shame. Nor does the legal system show much understanding of victims‘ circumstances.126 UNICEF and some NGOs implement some interventions designed to strengthen the psychosocial support provided by communities, including training, awareness-raising and kits for recreation activities. A survey of IDPs in South Darfur found that, of the women who had symptoms of major depression, 72 percent thought that one-on-one counseling would be beneficial, while lesser proportions believed that more group or community-oriented activities would help them (Table 4.27). Table 4.27: Type of Mental Health Support Deemed Beneficial, South Darfur, 2005 (% of IDP women heads of household who had symptoms of major depression) (n = 390) % International agencies 98 One-one-one sessions 72 Group sessions 47 Religious counseling 32 Access to education/trade programs 17 Financial programs 12 Traditional healer 12 Local groups 9 Women's support groups 8 Note: More than one answer allowed. Source: Lawry, Kim and Torbay (2005). HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis Services 4.130 Health services and activities related to HIV/AIDS in general are weak if not absent from Darfur, and are generally not perceived as a high priority. As discussed above, the level of awareness and information of the population, and as a corollary the level of risk prevention behaviors, are low. There is a Sudanese National HIV/AIDS Control Program (SNAP) in Khartoum. In the absence of state managers, the SNAP relies on an HIV/AIDS Darfur zonal coordinator, supported by UNICEF. Prevention activities are very sporadic and conducted by different NGOs, usually as a component of other programs. Discussions are ongoing about 126 UNICEF, 2006b 119 developing a coordination mechanism in Darfur involving State Ministries of Health (SMoHs), UN, NGOs, and interested donors. 4.131 WHO and the SNAP have established a Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) center in Nyala (South Darfur) and are planning one in Al-Fasher (North Darfur). The Nyala center was following 20 patients between February and July 2006, presumably all with full- blown AIDS. Access to this lone and little-known center is problematic and is probably affected by social acceptability and stigmatization problems. This situation provides a very limited basis on which to expand the programs necessary to contain the increased risk of transmission following the end of hostilities, demobilization and returns. 4.132 Data are limited on tuberculosis services. The National Tuberculosis program supports diagnostic and DOTS centers across the country, including Darfur. Overall, in Northern Sudan, about half of patients diagnosed with tuberculosis are under DOTS. This proportion is very likely lower in Darfur due to constraints on case detection and access to care. There is no experience with community DOTS approaches. Disparities and Barriers to Access to Care 4.133 Historically, even accounting for socio-economic status, children in North Darfur and in urban areas were more likely to receive basic health services, likely due the fact that availability of these services was highest in those areas. Table 4.20 indicates that before the crisis, coverage of basic child health services was consistently highest in North Darfur and lowest in West Darfur. For example, measles immunization coverage was 61.6 percent in North Darfur and only 33.9 percent in South Darfur and 27.4 percent in West Darfur. Regression analysis of data from the 2000 MICS shows that children in North Darfur were consistently more likely to receive basic preventive and curative health services compared to children in West Darfur, even after accounting for household socio-economic status (see the Appendix to this chapter). For example, a child in North Darfur was almost five times more likely to be immunized against measles. The models also show that children in urban areas were much more likely to receive services than those living in rural areas. A child with fever in urban areas was four times more likely to get treatment than a child in rural areas. Because these models account for indicators of socio-economic status, such as mother‘s education and household assets (which affect demand and financial and cultural access to services), these geographic and urban/rural disparities indicate that availability of services was higher in North Darfur and in urban areas. 4.134 Humanitarian programs may have reduced inequalities between states but have created new disparities between some groups. Table 4.24, which presents data on child health service utilization among the conflict-affected population in 2005, suggests that geographic inequalities between states have been reduced. For example, although in 2000, measles immunization was much higher in North Darfur than in the other states, coverage had equalized by 2005-06, at least among the populations assisted by the humanitarian program. However, Table 4.28, which presents data from a 2005 mortality survey of the conflict- affected population, indicates that although humanitarian assistance has led to very high access to basic health services by IDPs living in camps, IDPs and residents outside of camps have lower access, particularly in North Darfur (and presumably in South Darfur, where insecurity precluded the survey outside of camps). 120 Table 4.28: Reported Access to Formal Medical Services, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 (% of households) IDPs in camps IDPs outside camps Residents North Darfur 100 68 52 South Darfur 99 West Darfur 94 99 90 Source: WHO and Sudan Federal Ministry of Health (2005b). 4.135 The humanitarian operation has dramatically improved access to basic health services for IDPs in camps. Again, Table 4.28 shows that over 95 percent of people in IDP camps report having access to medical services. Utilization rates are similarly high; the surveillance system currently reports that in IDP camps, health facilities see an average of 1.5-1.7 curative consultations per person per year, a rate which is high compared to what is observed in other poor settings in Sub-Saharan Africa.127 4.136 The poor have clearly less access to basic child health services. The regression models described in the Appendix to this chapter, which account for geographic and urban/rural differences (and thus likely accounting for service availability to a certain extent), show that mothers‘ education and household wealth significantly affect access to basic services. For example, a child whose mother had any education was 2.3 times more likely to be vaccinated against measles than a child whose mother had no education. Similarly, a child in the highest socio-economic group was much more likely to be vaccinated against measles or to have received vitamin A supplementation, although, interestingly, this effect is not seen with regard to indicators of access to curative services. 4.137 Geographic barriers to access to basic health services are significant and will endure. Particularly in rural areas and among semi-nomadic populations, distance and lack of transport infrastructure represent significant barriers to access. This is particularly critical for Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC). Reports of maternal death due to an inability to even call for transportation are common. Some pastoralist populations follow seasonal migration patterns and do not have consistent access to a fixed health structure. Given the size and population density in Darfur, access problems will remain to some extent for a long time for rural populations. 4.138 Households and patients face large financial barriers to health care. Except for IDP populations served by humanitarian programs, patients pay official and unofficial user fees and drug costs. Under a Federal program, emergency services ―for the first 24 hours‖ are provided free of charge in referral hospitals. This time benchmark is however arbitrary and easily circumvented. In practice, populations often choose to avoid referral to a hospital, where they will incur costs they cannot cover. WHO has been reimbursing rural hospitals for treatment of IDPs, but this scheme has only been extended until September 2006 and its end will increase the financial accessibility problem. 4.139 Cultural and gender barriers to care are also present, often linked with economic and financial concerns. Gender issues, for example household decision making, control of resources and work requirements placed on women, are constraints in Darfur. Women generally prefer utilizing the services of a female care provider, who may not always be available. Many women give birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants (TBAs) or relatives (46 percent in 1999) (Table 4.26), and this is often attributed to cultural preference, although a qualitative study found that women chose TBAs over trained village midwives due to the cost of the latter (reported as SD 4,000 or US$18). Moreover, fees 127 WHO and Federal MoH 2006 121 differed according to the sex of the newborn, with the delivery of a boy more expensive than that of a girl. Both men and women go to traditional healers, who reportedly use hot substances on the skin and purging as treatments.128 4.140 Such barriers mean that many people do not receive medical care, although access is currently higher in the IDP camps served by humanitarian programs. For example, the 2000 MICS found that over 70 percent of children in Darfur with fever or cough did not receive care from a medical provider (Table 4.20). However, the 2005 nutrition survey of conflict- affected populations found that a still-high 36 percent of sick children were not brought to a health provider.129 Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation 4.141 Water and sanitation are very important to health given the burden of diarrhea disease. In 2000, the main water source of 47 percent of households was piped water into their dwelling, a public tap, or a deep well with a pump, compared to 64% in Northern Sudan as a whole. 52 percent of households had a traditional pit latrine and about 8 percent a flush toilet, while 35 percent had no access to sanitation facilities, proportions that were comparable to Northern Sudan averages. The average reported time to a water source was 38 minutes, with the average time in North Darfur (88 minutes) far higher than in South and West Darfur (20-21 minutes) (Table 4.29). Recent nutrition surveys of conflict-affected populations found that 63 percent in 2005 and 73.3 percent in 2006 had access to an adequate water source.130 The major reported constraints to obtaining clean water were insufficient water (59.9 percent), low quality of water (21.6 percent), and long distance or time to collect (20.0 percent). Around 60 percent in both time periods had access to a latrine, (Table 4.30) although it should be emphasized again that the most recent surveys only sampled the ―conflict-affected‖ population of around 3.6 million. Table 4.29: Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation, Darfur, 2000 Access to piped water, Average time to water Latrine or other toilet public tap, or deep well source (minutes) facilities (percent of with pump (percent of (n = 4,443) households) households) (n = 4,693) (n = 4,724) North Darfur 58.0 88 72.2 South Darfur 52.2 21 69.2 West Darfur 30.8 20 51.8 Darfur 47.3 38 64.7 Northern Sudan 63.9 47 63.7 Authors‘ Estimates from 2000 MICS data. Table 4.30: Access to Adequate Water and Sanitation, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005-06 (percent of households) Adequate Water Source Latrine 2005 2006 2005 2006 North Darfur 54.4 66.7 51.9 60.9 South Darfur 57.7 76.3 62.7 60.5 West Darfur 76.8 76.8 59.4 59.2 Darfur 62.5 73.3 57.6 60.1 Source: WFP and UNICEF (2005) and WFP et al. (2006). 128 UNFPA and UNICEF, 2005 129 WFP and UNICEF, 2005 130 Defined as piped water, public tap, deep well with pump, or treated water from a tanker or bladder. 122 4.142 Water supply by humanitarian programs may have reduced disparities between states but has contributed to differences in access between different groups within states. In North and South Darfur, IDPs in camps had far higher access to a protected water source (95 percent in North Darfur and 61 percent in South Darfur), compared to IDPs outside of camps and residents (30 to 50 percent) (Table 4.31). Table 4.31: Access to Protected Water Source, Conflict-Affected Population, Darfur, 2005 IDPs in camps IDPs outside camps residents North Darfur 95 46 32 South Darfur 61 49 45 West Darfur 72 Source: WHO and Sudan Federal Ministry of Health (2005b). 4.143 The burden of collecting water is borne mostly by women and girls. The 2006 survey found that women (63 percent) and girls (16 percent) are the main collectors of water for their households. Health System Organization and Supply Health System Organization 4.144 State governments have responsibility for secondary health services (rural and district hospitals), as well as, through the Localities, for primary health care services. Decentralization of responsibilities in the mid-1990s has not been accompanied by the necessary transfer of resources or of capacities, particularly in the poorer states, like the three states of Darfur.131 Despite their overall responsibility for the functioning of basic health services, effective control by the State MoHs is constrained by a number of factors, including the fact that salaries consume the bulk of the State health budget and that a significant proportion of the available non-salary funds are channeled through vertical programs centered at the Federal level. Similarly, although State MoHs are consulted, humanitarian budgets and operations are fully managed by UN agencies and NGOs. 4.145 There is no effective Health Management Information System (HMIS) in Darfur, although the emergency disease surveillance system provides a basis for further development. Each state MoH has a very basic statistical unit, but information from health facilities is irregular. Most health information for Darfur is provided by UN agencies or NGOs, who have often set up their own information systems for reporting to their headquarters and donors. The most operational and collaborative information system is a disease surveillance and early warning system (EWARS) operated by WHO and the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), mostly covering IDP populations.132 It represents a possible starting and learning base for the development of a more comprehensive HMIS. 4.146 The State Revolving Drug Funds have some drug and commodity logistics management capacity, but most drugs and commodities used in Darfur currently are provided by the humanitarian operation. When distribution of supplies and drugs takes place, it is more likely to be based on ―push‖ (distribution of a pre-defined quantity) rather than on ―pull‖ (based on needs and demand). 131 For discussion of the health system in Northern Sudan, see World Bank, 2003; Joint Assessment Mission, 2004; and Shariff and Ajab, 2004 132 Pinto et al., 2005 123 4.147 The health administration capacity of Localities is minimal, with very limited resources, notably a lack of means of transportation necessary to conduct supervision visits. Although salaries of some health workers may be paid at the Locality level, these serve simply as a transit point for funds transferred from the state level. No systematic assessment is available but a number of the Locality health administrations are reportedly staffed with low level professionals, not qualified or skilled enough for clinical and administrative supervision tasks. The state ministries themselves have very little resources for and conduct little supervision of Localities and health facilities unassisted by international partners. 4.148 Communities have not traditionally been involved in oversight or management of health care, and their experience in this area is weak in spite of recent efforts supported by NGOs and UN agencies. Overall community ―health competency‖ appears to be low. Community-organization structures are weak, and the social cohesion in conflict areas presumably damaged. NGOs as well as UNICEF with the Child Friendly Community Initiative (CFCI) have supported community health committees (CHCs) consisting of influential community leaders who play the role of facilitating all health issues within camps or villages. Health Service Supply 4.149 Organization of the public sector primary health care (PHC) system has gone through a number of policy changes and evolutions, not always fully translated operationally. 133 There is a wide range of descriptions of the PHC system by different stakeholders, of its constituent units and their staffing, and the standards that should be followed. The current FMoH policy, communicated to the State MoH level, is to have one Basic Health Unit (BHU) per 10,000 population. The BHU encompasses what used to be called Dressing Stations, Dispensaries and PHC Units. They are supposed to be staffed at least by a Medical Assistant (MA), a nurse and a nutrition educator. The Dressing Stations staffed by CHWs are theoretically no longer part of the PHC policy. In practice, effective staffing of BHUs by MAs varies within and between states. The next level consists of Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs), with a target of one per 50,000 population. Health Centers are supposed to be staffed by doctors, supported by MAs, nurses, lab technicians, etc, with capacity for minor surgery. In practice, these capacities are not always present in PHCCs. The standard for first- referral hospitals (district or rural hospitals) is coverage of one per 100,000 population, with staffing by Specialist and General Physicians and capacity for surgery, including C-sections. Table 4.32: Public Sector Health Facility Numbers and Population Ratios, North Sudan, 2003-04 Rural hospitals Urban & rural Dressing Stations Health Centers and PHC Units no. population no. population no. population per facility per facility per facility Khartoum 11 * 90 61,869 (1) - Northern, Nahr el Nil 49 32,599 236 6,768 142 11,249 Red Sea, Kassala, Al-Gadarif 18 224,538 79 51,160 321 12,591 Al-Gazira, Sinnar, White Nile, Blue 70 106,527 236 31,597 621 12,008 Nile North and South Kordofan 34 116,329 111 35,632 468 8,451 North, South & West Darfur 19 345,195 35 187,391 467 14,044 *No ratio calculated because urban hospitals not included Source: Sudan Federal Ministry of Health and WHO health facilities survey in 2003-04. 133 Primary health care (PHC) services are considered to include preventive and curative interventions at the household, community and facility levels (health units and centres) and in district and rural hospitals. 124 4.150 Darfur has historically suffered from low investments in its health infrastructure and has the lowest standards in Northern Sudan for availability of health facilities. A facility survey in 2003-04 found that the ratios of population per facility in Darfur were the highest of all the Northern Sudan regions (Table 4.32). There were 345,000 people per rural hospital in Darfur, compared to just 33,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 109,000 in Northern Sudan as a whole. Similarly, there were 187,000 people for each Health Center in Darfur, compared to just under 7,000 in Northern and Nahr el Nil states and 35,000 in Northern Sudan as a whole. The ratio of population to Dressing Stations and PHC Units (which under the policy are to be designated Basic Health Units) in Darfur was more comparable to other parts of Northern Sudan, although still the highest at 14,000. The Northern Sudan average was around 11,000. The higher number of low-level – and lower cost – facilities in relation to higher-level facilities in Darfur reflects the available human and financial resources, but may also provide a basis for a recovery strategy which emphasizes basic preventive and curative interventions that can be made available at the community and Basic Health Unit level. Table 4.33: Ratios of Public Sector Hospitals and Beds by Population, Northern Sudan, 2003-04 No. of hospitals per No. of hospital beds per 100,000 population 100,000 population Northern State (best ratio) 4.9 240.0 South Darfur (worst ratio) 0.3 22.7 Northern Sudan average 1.0 73.5 Source: Sudan Federal Ministry of Health and WHO health facilities survey in 2003-04. 4.151 Pre-conflict ratios of population per hospital bed (Table 4.33) also confirm the great disparity in service availability between Darfur and other parts of Northern Sudan. In South Darfur, there were around 23 hospital beds per 100,000 population, compared to 240 beds in Northern State. Figure 4.4: Population per Public Sector Health Facility by Locality, South Darfur, 2005 250,000 200,000 population/first-referral hospital population/Health Unit 150,000 100,000 standard for hospitals 50,000 N/A N/A standard for 0 Health Units 1) ) ) 1) 6) 4) 3) 3) 0) 79 46 9 00 9 49 2 25 0 ,2 ,7 ,4 ,5 ,1 ,0 1, 9, 1, 19 4 8 54 9 (4 (2 (7 3 2 (9 9 i( (1 (3 (2 (1 s lla n lu n d a am la ei ria s er Tu da rs as ya D lb he Fu or A K E d N S B E d Id ai eh R Source: WHO (2006). 4.152 There are also disparities in health infrastructure within Darfur. Figure 4.4 shows the ratios of population to rural hospitals and Basic Health Units (PHC Units and Dressing Stations) in each Locality in South Darfur in 2005. It shows that several large Localities 125 (Kass and Sheria) considerably exceed the standards for ratios of population per district hospital, while one large Locality (Sheria) clearly lacks Basic Health Units (all Localities lack Health Centers, as there is only one facility classified at this level in the state). In general, it is evident that health facilities are more concentrated in urban areas and better-off regions. 4.153 Many health facilities are built by the community when government investment is lacking. The 2003-04 facilities survey found, for example that 52 percent of facilities in South Darfur were built by the community, compared to a Northern Sudan average of 35 percent, likely reflecting lower government investment in health infrastructure in Darfur.134 4.154 Available data indicate that the public sector health infrastructure at all levels in the three states in Darfur is largely insufficient to meet the standards in terms of population coverage. Table 4.34 presents estimates of the health infrastructure situation and indicative requirements in the three states of Darfur.135 The theoretical requirements are based on the official standards for size of population per facility, using reported facility numbers from different sources which are sometimes contradictory and may be out-of-date or not reflect current functionality. Accurate mapping of actual infrastructure requirements will require field assessments of existing facilities and their functionality, as well as good data on population patterns following the return of IDPs and refugees. Nevertheless, the table provides an indication of the patterns of requirements in terms of health infrastructure. Applying the official standards, there is a need for significant numbers of all three levels of facilities. Of course, the official standards may not be realistic for all situations in Darfur and may represent an ideal situation, so that actual implementation will require interim or phased targets, an issue which requires further assessment. 134 Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2005 135 The table presents the facility classifications and standards which are in use in Darfur, which do yet reflect the federal policy decision to upgrade the Primary Health Care Unit and Dressing Station categories into Basic Health Units staffed by Medical Assistants. Estimated requirements are to be considered indicative and to serve as the basis for further assessement and consultation. 126 Table 4.34: Estimated Public Sector Health Facility Numbers and Indicative Requirements, Darfur, 2005 Theoretical Highest Theoretical North South West Services qualified catchment Darfur** Darfur*** Darfur‡ provider population size tertiary tertiary care MD Al Fasher Nyala Geneina hospital Specialist Hospital, Teaching Hospital Kuwait Hospital, Children‘s Nyala Hospital Specialized Hospital, Medical Military Hospital, Police Hospital district/rural surgery; MD 100,000 10 hospitals 10 hospitals 6 hospitals hospital* complicated Specialist and ratio and ratio and ratio deliveries (C- 1:175,000; 1:340,000; 1:300,000; Section); specialties theoretical theoretical theoretical gap of 8 gap of 24 gap of 12 hospitals hospitals hospitals Primary minor surgery; MD 50,000 15 PHCCs 16 functional 4 PHCCs Health Care uncomplicated Generalist and ratio PHCCs and and ratio Center deliveries; 1:115,000; ratio 1:450,000; (PHCC) outpatient 1;210,000; services; emergencies; RH theoretical theoretical theoretical services gap of 20 gap of 52 gap of 32 PHCCs PHCCs PHCCs Dispensary outpatient Medical 10,000 103 167 functional 111 (or Basic services; ORT; Assistant functional facilities and facilities Health Unit) immunization Midwife facilities and ratio 1:20,000 and ratio Primary immunization; Nurse ratio 1:16,000 Health Care health education; 1:17,000; theoretical Unit (PHCU) environmental gap of 173 health theoretical BHUs theoretical Dressing health education; Nurse or gap of 73 gap of 71 station environmental CHW BHUs BHUs health Note: that population figures used to calculate ratios are those of the pre-crisis estimates for Darfur. The population figures used by the 2005 WHO ―gap analyses‖ are considerably lower (3.38 million). (WHO, 2005a and 2006a) *Hospital numbers are from a 2005 WHO map (Figure 5). Tertiary hospitals (except military and police hospitals) are included in the ratio calculation. **PHCC numbers for North Darfur are from 2003 FMoH reported figures. (Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2003). BHU/PHCU/Dressing Station numbers are from the 2005 WHO ―gap analysis‖ of health workers. (WHO, 2005a) ***PHCC and BHU/PHCU/Dressing Station numbers for South Darfur are from the FMoH/WHO health facility survey in 2003-04 (functional facilities) and differ considerably from the 2005 WHO ―gap analysis‖ of health facilities in the state (1 PHCC, 67 PHCUs and 15 Dispensaries). (WHO, 2006a) ‡ PHCC numbers for West Darfur are from 2003 FMoH reported figures. (Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2003). PHCU numbers are from the 2005 WHO ―gap analysis‖ of health workers. (WHO, 2005a) 127 Figure 4.5: Map of Public Sector Hospitals in Darfur, 2005 Source: WHO. 128 Figure 4.6: Coverage of IDPs by Public Sector PHC services, Darfur, 2005 Source: WHO. 129 4.155 A number of health facilities are operated by the State Health Insurance Funds for their beneficiaries. It is reported that the State Health Insurance Funds operate 6 health facilities in North Darfur, 9 in South Darfur, and 4 in West Darfur, mostly located in the capital cities. 4.156 Nomadic populations are underserved, although mobile clinics and campaigns to reach nomadic populations have been supported by State MoHs and NGOs. Information on these programs is limited. 4.157 Along with supporting the functioning of many existing health facilities, humanitarian programs currently fill gaps in coverage of conflict-affected populations with mobile and temporary clinics as well as campaigns. UN agencies and NGOs currently provide significant financial, material and technical support to existing public sector health facilities in order to provide health care to conflict-affected populations. For example, in 2006, UNICEF supported 208 PHC facilities with estimated coverage of over 2 million. With regard to nutritional services, UNICEF supported 89 supplementary feeding centers (SFC) and 44 therapeutic feeding centers (TFC).136 In 2005, WHO provided drugs and staff incentives to 10 hospitals to enable reductions in fees for IDPs.137 In addition, mobile and temporary clinics are supported, as well as immunization and vitamin A supplementation campaigns. Figure 4.6 maps coverage of IDPs by PHC services in March 2005, showing that most camps had access to some services, although a significant number, including four camps of over 50,000, had no access. Health Human Resources 4.158 Darfur historically has the lowest density of health workers in Northern Sudan. Table 4.35 presents estimates based on reported numbers of health workers in Northern Sudan in 2003. For example, in the three Darfur states, there were 2.5 physicians for every 100,000 population, compared to the Northern Sudan average of 18.4 and the figure for Khartoum of 48.9. By comparison, the reported ratios in Mali and Tanzania, with per capita annual incomes of less than US$300, are 4.7 and 4.1 respectively. Table 4.35: Health Workers per 100,000 Population, Northern Sudan, 2003 Doctors Nurses Midwives Khartoum 48.9 82.7 36.8 Northern, Nahr el Nil 15.5 235.7 124.5 Red Sea, Kassala, Al-Gadarif 7.2 53.8 39.6 Al-Gazira, Sinnar, White Nile, Blue Nile 10.0 64.5 39.0 Northern, Southern & Western Kordofan 6.0 41.5 53.5 Northern, Southern & Western Darfur 2.5 27.6 28.2 Northern Sudan 18.4 51.0 33.8 Source: Authors‘ estimates from data reported by Sudan Federal Ministry of Health (2003). 4.159 Recent estimates of health worker numbers are similarly low, and more PHC workers will be required in order to improve coverage, particularly in rural areas. Table 4.36 presents the numbers of different categories of health workers in Darfur in 2005 reported by WHO (unfortunately, ―PHC workers‖ are not disaggregated into nurses and medical assistants).138 It indicates that there are around 245 doctors working in primary and first-referral services in Darfur, about 1,700 ―PHC workers,‖ and 1,400 trained midwives. 136 UN, 2006b 137 WHO, 2006b 138 WHO, 2005a 130 Table 4.36: Reported Numbers of Health Workers, Darfur, 2005 Doctors Doctors PHC workers PHC workers Trained (district/ rural (PHCC) (PHCC) (BHU) community hospital) midwives North Darfur 10 40 633 182 630 South Darfur 52 111 443 777 629 West Darfur 8 24 85 664 143 Darfur 70 175 1,161 1,623 1,402 Source: WHO (2005a). 4.160 The resulting ratios of health workers to 100,000 population are presented in Table 4.37 with estimates somewhat similar to the reported figures from 2003, before the crisis. Overall, there are 3.5 doctors, about 40 ―PHC workers,‖ and 20 trained midwives per 100,000 population. The WHO study estimated that there is a need for 1,300 ―PHC workers,‖ 300 trained midwives, and 2,800 ―Home Visitors‖ (outreach workers), and that no additional doctors are required. However, the total population used in the WHO analysis was only 3.3 million, less than half the total estimated population of the region. This raises doubt as to whether the WHO study included health workers serving the rest of the population of the region. In any case, the analysis highlights the need for substantially greater numbers of lower-level PHC workers – community health and outreach workers, nurses, and medical assistants. As discussed below, the needs are particularly acute in rural areas. 4.161 A certain number of health professionals are seconded from the State MoHs to health facilities operated by the State Health Insurance Funds. In South Darfur in 2005, for example, 125 doctors and nurses were employed in this way, receiving financial incentives in addition to their official salaries. 4.162 Large numbers of health workers are employed or supported by the humanitarian operation. A UN report indicates that there were almost 15,000 humanitarian workers in Darfur in April 2006, of which about 1,000 were expatriates.139 It has been reported that 5,000 of these worked in the health sector, with 45 NGOs and 3 UN agencies. Some numbers of health workers are employees of state governments in other states who have been attracted to humanitarian work in Darfur. Nevertheless, if it is the case that large numbers who work in the humanitarian operation are on the civil service rolls, then the departure of international organizations will not necessarily lead to a precipitous drop in the numbers of health workers. However, without remedial measures, the end of financial incentives and technical support will certainly drastically affect the quality of their work, their choice of location, and the relative time they devote to public and private practice. 4.163 There are considerable disparities in health human resources within Darfur, with health workers concentrated in the state capitals. Table 4.37 indicates that doctors are more concentrated in South Darfur while midwives are more present in North Darfur. West Darfur has the lowest density of doctors and midwives, but is comparable to the other states in terms of ―PHC workers.‖ Table 4.38 presents reported numbers of health workers by Locality, showing clearly the concentration of both higher and lower-skilled cadres in the state capitals (El Fasher, Nyala and Geneina). 139 UN, 2006b 131 Table 4.37: Health Workers per 100,000 Population, Darfur, 2005 Per 100,000 population Doctors PHC workers Midwives North Darfur 2.8 46.3 35.8 South Darfur 4.8 35.9 18.5 West Darfur 1.8 41.2 7.9 Darfur 3.5 39.9 20.1 Source: Authors‘ calculations from data reported by WHO (2005a). Table 4.38: Reported Numbers of Health Workers by Locality, Darfur, 2005 Doctors PHC Workers Home Visitors Midwives North Darfur 50 815 1,145 630 El Fasher 46 467 890 371 Kutum 1 95 255 62 Kebkabiya 1 109 0 60 Mellit 1 87 0 61 Waha 0 3 0 21 Umm Keddada 1 54 0 55 South Darfur 154 1,220 294 629 Nyala 126 453 46 197 Kass 5 130 20 57 Shareia 0 49 19 62 Ed Daein 10 205 45 103 Adilla 2 32 16 34 Edd Alfursan 2 107 59 51 Buram 5 153 60 79 Rahed Al Berdi 2 56 17 27 Tulus 2 35 12 19 West Darfur 32 749 313 143 Geneina 21 374 128 47 Kulbus 2 71 8 15 Habilla 4 59 68 17 Zallingei 4 124 60 33 Jebel Marrah 1 59 27 18 Mukjar 0 19 7 7 Wadi Salih 0 43 15 6 Total 236 2,784 1,752 1,402 Source: WHO (2005a). 4.164 There are no data on the gender distribution of health staff, although it is clear that female health workers, except for village midwives, are much less present in rural areas. Although it may be the case that the gender of health workers has an impact on utilization of services by women, this issue was not mentioned by IDP focus groups questioned about their problems and requirements with regard to health services.140 4.165 Although quantitative data are lacking, quality of service is reported to be generally poor. Reports from managers and field workers indicate very poor quality of service, with a near total absence of standards, irrational prescriptions from physicians both experienced and recently graduated, and a work environment generally non-conductive to best practices in spite of large scale training efforts. Both absenteeism and malpractice (i.e. reporting the delivery of a drug of vaccine withheld and sold on the market) are observed or suspected by field observers. This points to serious gaps in both motivation and professional standards – gaps which cannot be addressed solely by technical training. 140 UNFPA and UNICEF, 2005 132 4.166 Health facilities are often staffed below standard and training of health workers may be deficient. Many health structures are staffed by personnel below the minimum officially required; more qualified personnel (qualified nurses, medical assistants, physicians) are difficult to attract and retain in rural areas. Many nurses do not have the skills that would normally be expected. Midwives receive different level of training depending of the training institution. They are qualified as ―Skilled Birth Attendants‖ although many do not have the skills matching this. 4.167 In-service training and technical supervision is currently provided by NGOs and UN agencies to health staff working under humanitarian programs. 4.168 Human resource policy and standards are set at the federal level, but in some cases may not be adapted to local realities and are slow in implementation. An intention towards increasing the professionalization of the health workforce is evident in federal health human resource policy. This is evident in the Sudan-wide explosion in the number of medical schools and graduates since the 1990s, and the stagnation in the numbers of lower-level PHC cadres. However, due to the attractions of living and working conditions elsewhere, this surplus of doctors is not evident in Darfur. The central human resource of PHC services in Darfur consists of Medical Assistants, but under a recent policy, this category is being phased out in favor of doctors and of nurses upgraded to university level training. Implementation of this upgrading policy is reported to be slow in Darfur. Meanwhile, the workers in place may be unduly constrained under policies which assign most responsibility to higher-level cadres. Nurses normally do not carry out the functions of nurses in other countries, such as taking vital signs, seeing some outpatients, placing intravenous fluid lines, etc. Community health workers (CHWs) and even nurses in some areas are not allowed to give ORT, or - if they are - are also asked to refer all cases of diarrhea, rather than refer based on an assessment of danger signs. 4.169 Sudan has historically emphasized the training of village midwives. Upgrading of midwives continues to be a policy goal, with the intention of improving the quality of care for deliveries in the community. 4.170 Better information on the salaries and incentives of health workers is needed. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain much data on the government salary levels, NGO incentives, and other payments to health workers, although it is known that most midwives do not have official salaries. Some humanitarian NGOs have reported that their monthly wage for a medical assistant is SD 80,000 or US$360, while the wage for a doctor is SD 100,000 or US$450. This issue, including formal and informal user fees which remunerate health staff, is determinant for the prospects for improving the coverage and quality of basic health services. Health Care Financing 4.171 As noted above, total State government expenditures in Darfur have increased significantly since 2003, with the largest proportion allocated to salaries. At the same time state and local governments in Darfur are greatly dependent on transfers from the federal level. A significant proportion of federal transfers are earmarked, mostly for recurrent expenditures, including for health workers‘ salaries (see budget chapter). 4.172 Available data indicate that annual per capita spending by state governments on health has increased to on average US$2 per capita, or 10 percent of total state expenditures. Table 4.39 provides available data on spending by State Ministries of Health in Darfur. Data on development spending in the health sector are only available for South Darfur, so that the figures for total health spending in South and West Darfur are underestimates. In addition, it is not clear whether a proportion of the state government transfers to the Localities is for 133 health workers salaries. Available data on state health spending suggest increases in line with total state government health spending. Table 4.40 indicates that, overall, state government health spending tripled between 2003 and 2005, from at least US$4.5 million to at least US$13.7 million. This reflected the increase in total state government spending, as the proportion allocated to health remained at around 10 percent. In 2005, this translated into per capita spending on health of around US$2. Table 4.39: Reported State Ministry of Health Expenditures, Darfur, 2001-05 (SD million) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 North Darfur 433 627 952 wages and salaries 304 518 770 goods and services 129 109 182 development South Darfur 329 428 538 1,319 1,944 wages and salaries 228 289 350 703 749 goods and services 95 132 160 186 208 development 7 7 28 430 988 West Darfur 214 326 441 wages and salaries 165 285 351 goods and services 48 40 90 development Data are not available for empty cells. Source: State Ministries of Finance and Economy. Table 4.40: Reported State Ministry of Health Expenditures, Darfur, 2001-05 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 $US million 4.5 8.8 13.7 North Darfur 1.7 2.4 3.9 South Darfur 1.3 1.6 2.1 5.1 8.0 West Darfur 0.8 1.3 1.8 $US per capita 0.71 1.38 2.15 North Darfur 1.03 1.51 2.44 South Darfur 0.42 0.53 0.67 1.67 2.60 West Darfur 0.48 0.74 1.07 % of total State Gov Expenditure 9% 9% 10 % North Darfur 8% 8% 8% South Darfur 8% 10 % 9% 13 % 14 % West Darfur 8% 4% 7% Data are not available for empty cells. Source: Authors‘ calculations from data reported by State Ministries of Finance and Economy. 4.173 Most government health spending is on wages. Wages and salaries account for 70-80 percent of State Ministry of Health expenditures in North and West Darfur (where development expenditures are not included, since data are not available). In South Darfur, for which there is information on development expenditures, this proportion is somewhat lower and has fallen as development spending has risen: 65 percent in 2003, 53 percent in 2004, and 39 percent in 2005. 4.174 There are substantial differences between the three Darfur states in health spending per capita. Table 4.40 indicates that health spending by the West Darfur state government, at US$1 per capita in 2005, is less than half that in North and South Darfur. In absolute terms, South Darfur, with the largest population, spends the most on health, at US$8 million in 2005, compared to US$3.9 million in North Darfur, and US$1.8 million in South Darfur. South Darfur also seems to have the largest effort at 14 percent of the total state budget. These figures, however, need to be considered in light of the fact that development spending on 134 health, which is substantial in South Darfur, was not available for the other two states (Table 4.39). Table 4.41: Budgeted Federal Development Transfers, Darfur, 2006 SD US$ US$ per capita million million (domestic funding) North Darfur 242.1 1.1 0.62 Comprehensive & primary health program 20.0 Fistula eradication 5.6 Malaria, HIV protection projects 18.0 Rural hospital rehabilitation & maintenance 75.0 Health program (pro-poor national program) 81.6 Primary health care 41.9 South Darfur 337.7 1.5 0.45 Fistula eradication 5.7 Rural hospital rehabilitation & maintenance 65.0 Health program (pro-poor national program) 115.1 Primary health care 75.2 Malaria, HIV protection projects 76.7 West Darfur 380.4 1.7 0.94 Fistula eradication 5.7 Rural hospital rehabilitation & maintenance 75.0 Health program (pro-poor national program) 76.6 Primary health care 43.8 Malaria, HIV protection project 146 Community promotion & awareness 33.3 Total 960.2 4.3 0.62 Authors‘ calculations from data reported by Federal Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 4.175 While planned development expenditures in the health sector in Darfur are not negligible and are rising, the effort is modest and actual execution is weak. Table 4.41 describes budgeted federal development transfers to the state governments in Darfur for 2006. They represent a total of about US$4.3 million, or US$0.62 per capita, which is equivalent to about 30 percent of actual state health spending in 2005. Health sector projects account for 5.4 percent of the total development budgets for the Darfur states in 2006. However, the total development budgets for Darfur accounted for only 4.4 percent of the national development budget. Moreover, as documented in the budget chapter, execution of development budgets has historically been low, and 2006 seems to be no exception. 4.176 While data on trends in health sector development spending in South Darfur show a dramatic increase since 2001, the experience of North Darfur at least suggests that as more development budget has been allocated, the proportion actually transferred and spent has fallen. Table 4.42 provides information on health sector development transfers for the period 2001-02, which, at a total of US$0.8 million in 2004, are substantially lower than the 2006 budgeted amount of US$4.3 million (Table 4.41). 135 Table 4.42: Reported Federal Development Transfers for Health, Darfur, 2001-04 2001 2002 2003 2004 SD million 110.1 144.0 56.0 195.0 North Darfur 30.7 43.5 25.0 53.0 South Darfur 31.1 45.2 20.0 90.0 West Darfur 48.4 55.3 11.0 52.0 US$ million 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 US$ per capita 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.12 Source: Authors‘ calculations from data reported by Federal Ministry of Health. 4.177 The State Health Insurance Funds are a significant source of domestic public health financing, although mostly benefiting civil servants and their families. Established in 1998, the Health Insurance Funds cover most basic care and some hospital care (including obstetric surgery), while beneficiaries must co-pay 25 percent of the cost of drugs. The Funds operate health services with staff seconded by State MoHs. In areas where they do not have clinics, they contract with MoH facilities. Civil servants contribute 4 percent of their salaries and the government contributes 6 percent. There has been some effort to expand coverage to associations, such farmers‘ and pastoralist unions, particularly in South and West Darfur, and the monthly premium per person is SD 1,000 (US$4.50). However, these efforts have been constrained by the Funds‘ need for regular payment of premiums, which is difficult to ensure, particularly among poor enrollees. In North Darfur in 2005, there were 42,000 beneficiaries, representing just 2.4 percent of the population. In South Darfur, 250,000 people were covered, or 7.6 percent of the population. In West Darfur, beneficiaries are reported to number 100,000, or 5.3 percent of the population. Overall in Darfur, public sector insurance covers about 400,000 people, or less than 6 percent of the population. Table 4.43: Health Sector Humanitarian Assistance, Darfur, 2005 Total humanitarian assistance (US$ million) 786.3 Food aid (US$ million) 476.2 Humanitarian assistance excluding food aid (US$ million) 310.2 Health sector assistance (US$ million) 73.7 Health sector assistance as percent of total 9 Health sector assistance as percent of total excluding food aid 24 Beneficiaries (million) 2.5 Estimated total Darfur population (million) 7.0 Health sector assistance per beneficiary ($US) 29.49 Health sector assistance per capita ($US) 10.57 Source: UN (2005b) and (2005c). 4.178 Total expenditure of the South Darfur Insurance Fund in 2005 was reported to be SD 322 million, or US$1.3 million. This works out to US$5.30 per beneficiary, somewhat above the premium charged to individuals. There were about 112,000 consultations/transactions, which indicates an annual per beneficiary consultation rate of about 0.5, which is somewhat low utilization, although certainly higher than the rates of non-covered populations not served by the humanitarian operation. As noted above, per capita annual curative consultation rates in the IDP camps served by humanitarian organizations exceed 1.5. Assuming that expenditures per beneficiary in North and West Darfur are similar to South Darfur, total spending by the insurance funds in 2005 could be estimated at US$2.1 million, or about US$0.30 per capita. 136 4.179 Health sector spending by the humanitarian operation is very high, at U$30 per beneficiary in 2005. Table 4.43 presents reported spending on humanitarian programs in 2005 (both included and outside of the UN appeal), which totaled US$786 million, of which US$74 million, or 9 percent, was for health and nutrition programs. Spending on health and nutrition represented 24 percent of total non-food aid expenditures of US$310 million. The reported number of beneficiaries in 2005 was 2.5 million, indicating that health spending per beneficiary was almost US$30. On a per capita basis, this represented US$10, or four times the estimated public domestic expenditure on health. The 2006 UN appeal for the health sector was US$152 million, of which US$37 million (24 percent) had been pledged by donors by end November 2006. The total amount pledged (all sectors) was US$1,011 million, of which US$385 million was non-food aid.141 The health sector commitments were thus about 10 percent of non-food aid humanitarian funding. If a similar proportion is spent outside of the UN appeal as was the case in 2005, then it can be estimated that about US$60 million would be spent on health in 2006 by humanitarian programs. This is US$24 per beneficiary and US$8.60 per capita. Such levels of spending considerably exceed what has been observed in some other conflict-affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in DRC, humanitarian health programs generally spend US$6-10 per beneficiary. 4.180 Total domestic public spending on health in 2005 can be estimated to be in the order of US$2.50 per capita, while international funding was US$10 per capita. The figure for domestic public spending on health aggregates the estimates for State MoH spending of US$2 per capita, the State Health Insurance Funds of US$0.30 per capita, and development spending by the states, data for which are not available for North and West Darfur (Table 4.39). Adding humanitarian spending on health and nutrition services brings estimated total public spending on the sector to US$12.50 per capita. This is of course, presently allocated in different amounts to different groups. The humanitarian programs, with spending of almost US$30 per beneficiary in 2005, targeted a conflict-affected population, largely IDPs, of 2.5 million. The State Health Insurance Funds, spending about US$5 per beneficiary, provide services to about 0.4 million people. The remainder, spending by State MoHs, is intended to support services for the entire population of the region with around US$2 per capita. 4.181 There is a need for further empirical analysis of what level of spending would be necessary to deliver a package of essential health services in conditions of peace, although work in other countries suggests that US$4-5 per capita could have important results. Although the UN Millennium Project estimates that US$15-30 per capita is necessary to make significant progress towards the health MDGs, other models, such as the World Bank/UNICEF Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks (MBB) analysis in various countries, suggest that considerably less, on the order of US$4-5 per capita could provide significant results, particularly in the initial years of scale-up.142 4.182 Information on current and past health programs can also provide empirical data to illuminate the question of the necessary level of funding in Darfur. For example, reports from a PHC program for about 120,000 IDPs and residents in South Darfur in 2001-02 indicate that relatively good results were obtained with per capita spending of around US$4.50. Annual per capita curative consultation rates were around 1.0, measles immunization coverage was estimated at 90 percent, 21 percent of deliveries were in clinics, and 60 percent were attended by TBAs trained by the project. The main reported problem was a lack of accessible surgical facilities for obstetric emergencies, since a referral hospital was not available within a reasonable distance. The project budget supported primary-level services in eight facilities, including outreach and campaigns (Save the Children, United Kingdom). 141 UN, 2006a 142 African Union, 2006 137 4.183 State Ministries of Health raise substantial revenues through user fees, equivalent to a significant proportion of their expenditures (Table 4.44). In North Darfur in 2005, for example, this amounted to US$2.5 million, or 64 percent of reported health expenditures. The proportion is somewhat less in South Darfur, at 19 percent. It seems that health services are an important source of revenue for the State MoHs, as it is likely that the bulk of these revenues are from user fees, raising financial barriers to care and further contributing to the financial burden on households for health care. Table 4.44: Reported State Ministry of Health Revenues, Darfur, 2001-05 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 $US million North Darfur 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.4 2.5 South Darfur 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.5 percent of Ministry of Health expenditures North Darfur 45 percent 58 percent 64 percent South Darfur 23 percent 25 percent 47 percent 23 percent 19 percent Authors‘ calculations from data reported by State Ministries of Finance and Economy. 4.184 Household out-of-pocket payments are indeed an important source of domestic financing for health services, although quantitative data are not available. As discussed above, it is widely reported that user fees are routine, and are in fact official policy, outside of the free or highly-subsidized services provided by humanitarian programs. These raise substantial barriers to utilization and shift to households much of the burden for financing of health care. For example, a WHO program subsidizing hospitals was explicitly designed to reduce user fees for IDPs in order to improve their access to services.143 Based on reported information, the authors estimate that the subsidy is around US$10 per hospital patient (both IDPs and non-IDPs). 4.185 When international assistance is not present, drug costs are mostly borne by patients. Although data on this are not available for Darfur, the national policy is for cost-recovery for drugs through Revolving Drug Funds (RDF). The exception is emergency cases during the first 24 hours, which are subsidized from the federal level, although data on these expenditures in Darfur are not available. Health facilities receiving support from the humanitarian operation, often in the form of drug kits, prescribe drugs highly subsidized or free to conflict-affected populations. E. EMERGING PRIORITIES FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR 4.186 A program for sustainable development of the health sector will need to start immediately following peace. The development program will face the new challenges related to the crisis as well as longer-term structural constraints and problems in the health sector. Challenges brought to the fore by the crisis include the need to rebuild, re-equip and re-staff health facilities, the challenge of sustaining improvements in health services for conflict- affected populations achieved under the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs, and the increased need to address certain health problems exacerbated by the conflict, in particular mental health and HIV/AIDS. Examples of long-standing health system limitations that also need to be addressed by the development program include low domestic public financing, poor capacity of the state and local health administrations, sometimes in-adapted policies and over-ambitious standards, low quality health services, poorly-paid and motivated health 143 WHO, 2006b 138 personnel concentrated in the main cities, and geographic, cultural and financial barriers to access to services. Persistent structural constraints include, of course, the poverty of the population, the low local revenue base of the local and state governments, the particular needs of nomadic groups, dispersion of the rural population accompanied by increasing urbanization, poor infrastructure and high cost of transport, and weaknesses in other sectors that have a large impact on the health sector, in particular governance, education and water and sanitation. 4.187 At the same time, the development program could build on some favorable structural factors as well as on potential opportunities in the post-conflict period. First, unlike in some post-conflict situations, there is an existing health system and administration, with capacity that can form the basis for reconstruction and development. The existing service delivery system and health administration has interacted with and been strengthened by the humanitarian operation over the past years. This has included development of the knowledge base for the sector, including the various assessments, surveys and inventories cited in this paper. The experience of government officials in working together with UN agencies and NGOs should benefit the post-conflict period. Another favorable factor is represented by the many health workers in Darfur who have received training and exposure to international best practice under the humanitarian program. In addition, there are large numbers of health professionals – a surplus, in the case of doctors – in other parts of Northern Sudan who may be willing to work in Darfur given policy changes and incentives. Finally, the growing economy and government revenues in the rest of Northern Sudan raise the prospect of significant domestic public financial resources becoming available for the sector in post- conflict period. 4.188 Effective coordination and transition with the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs will be essential. The major challenge in this respect will likely relate to the financing and implementation of health service delivery. Like the humanitarian program, maintenance and expansion of health service coverage under the immediate post-conflict recovery program will substantially rely on external financing with implementation led by UN agencies and international NGOs. The medium-term development program could be faced with the challenge of maintaining the gains of the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs while shifting much of the financing to domestic government sources and much of the implementation to Sudanese capacity. With regard to financing, the immediate post- conflict period will already face the challenge that per beneficiary funding will be substantially reduced from the level of the humanitarian operation. Along with a possible further reduction of per beneficiary funding – related to reduced funding levels and/or increased requirements in terms of higher population coverage – the medium-term development program would also need to shift a greater proportion of the financing burden to domestic government sources. At the same time, the immediate post-conflict and medium- term development programs will need to work together to improve the predictability of funding flows, both external and domestic, and this will require considerable strengthening of the coordination, planning and budgeting roles of government. Capacity-building, particularly of local health administrations, needs to be well-integrated into NGO implementation of immediate improvements in service delivery. Capacity-development of local NGOs could also be a priority during the immediate post-conflict period. With regard to the medium-term development program, the basic policy challenge would be to take advantage of the implementation capacity of NGOs at the same time as increasing government ownership, control and financing. 4.189 Effective coordination with other sectors in order to achieve synergies and economies of scale is recommended but difficult to achieve. Other sectors are very important to health and nutrition. Governance and public sector management issues are crucial to government 139 oversight and administration of the health sector and, in particular, to effectively translating domestic government financial resources into improved access to quality health services. Unfortunately, inter-sectoral coordination is extremely difficult to achieve. First, both external partners and governments are divided into sectoral silos, each with their own priorities and constituencies, which often compete with each other for the limited resources available. Second, overcoming sectoral divisions requires high-level political commitment, at the cabinet level for example. Third, effective implementation of an inter-sectoral program can make large demands on planning and implementation capacity. For example, in post- conflict situations, implementing a complex and often over-ambitious post-conflict recovery and development program demands the full attention of each sector ministry, while more centralized and coordinated implementation may simply lead to paralysis if the coordinating body does not exist or has insufficient capacity. A real and effective coordination between sectors will only be possible if these factors are addressed from the outset. 4.190 The objectives of the medium-term reconstruction and development program should be to sustain and increase equitable access to basic health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS services for the population of the Darfur region, while laying the basis for sustainable financing and development of the health system. The rest of this section lays out a series of ―Strategic Directions‖, which could be considered for the post conflict period. Expand Access to High-Impact Interventions by Communities and Households 4.191 Much of the burden of disease in Darfur could be addressed through low-cost and high-impact interventions at the community and household levels. The situation analysis makes clear that much of the burden of morbidity and mortality is due to easily-preventable or treated diseases, particularly among children – notably malaria, acute respiratory infection and diarrhea. At the same time, there is high-prevalence of psychological distress. These diseases and conditions can be addressed with low-cost and high-impact interventions delivered at the community level and by households themselves. At the same time, the physical geography and dispersed population of Darfur, combined with poor availability of health facilities and providers, argues for bringing knowledge and commodities to the households rather than the other way around. Worldwide evidence shows that ―lower level‖ health staff can effectively and safely manage a range of health issues and relieve the burden placed on the more qualified staff, who can then be freed to deal with more complex problems. This would remain true even once all health facilities are staffed at the prescribed level. In the Darfur context, outreach workers or community health workers should play an important role in ensuring continuous access to care and commodities among mobile and nomadic communities. 4.192 A package of community and household-level interventions for scaling-up should be developed and could include:144  clean delivery  neonatal care and pneumonia management  support to immunization campaigns and outreach  handwashing promotion and safe-water interventions  oral rehydration therapy and zinc supplementation for diarrhea  de-worming  vitamin A supplementation  promotion of early, exclusive and prolonged breastfeeding  complementary infant feeding 144 This list is to be considered indicative and to serve as the basis for further assessement and consultation. 140  long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) for pregnant women and infants  malaria treatment with artemisin combination therapy (ACT)  antibiotic treatment of pneumonia and dysentery in children (Community-IMCI algorithm)  identification of sick child danger signs for referral, and education of caregivers  child spacing / family planning  community psychosocial programs addressing gender-based violence and psychological distress  birth and death registration 4.193 Such interventions can be administered primarily by facility-based outreach workers, community health workers (CHWs), or the households themselves. For example, malaria or pneumonia treatment could be provided by outreach workers or CHWs directly, or by households with support from the health worker. Social marketing of relevant commodities and drugs could take advantage of commercial networks and private for-profit health providers such as drug sellers in urban areas. The mix adopted will depend on the context as well as policy choices. Further technical definition of this package and its delivery should be elaborated as part of the program preparations, and should be integrated with and supported by work at the facility level.145 4.194 Mental health interventions should be included in both the community and facility- based packages due to the specific circumstances of Darfur. As noted in the situation analysis, gender-based violence and mental health need to be addressed in Darfur and relevant interventions should be designed and implemented at both the community and facility levels.146 4.195 The importance of diarrhea-related morbidity and mortality in Darfur points to the need to emphasize home-treatment and include hand washing and safe water interventions in any community and household-level package of services. Promotion of home-treatment of diarrhea, using pre-mixed or homemade ORT, should be a standard part of any outreach or community-level package. At the same time, there is considerable scope for prevention. There is evidence that ensuring a safe water supply is not enough to reduce the incidence of diarrhea due to poor hygienic practices and contaminated containers.147 There is also increasing experience with mass distribution and social marketing of inexpensive point-of-use water purification commodities, which should be considered in the Darfur context due to the importance of diarrhea mortality and the timeframe required for the infrastructure investment in safe water supply.148 4.196 Outreach and community-based strategies, as a classic public health care (PHC) strategy, were for many years part of the national strategy, but this aspect has been neglected for some time in favor of a more clinically-oriented system. For example, the FMoH strategy specifies that the lowest level of health facility, PHC Units, now often staffed by CHWs, should be upgraded to Basic Health Units staffed by a nurse or medical assistant. A re-shift in emphasis would need to be accompanied by modifications in such policies. Similarly, outreach workers, CHWs – and households – will need to be allowed to perform interventions, such as administering antibiotics, which are currently confined to higher-level cadres. 145 For description of a multi-sectoral community-based program see Bessenecker and Walker, 2004 146 For discussion of relevant issues, programs and interventions, see WHO (2003), van Ommeren, Saxena and Saraceno (2005), Baingana and Bannon (2004), and Médecins sans Frontières (2005). 147 Fewtrell and Colford (2004). Guidance on hand-washing promotion can be found in World Bank (2005b). 148 See Macy and Quick (2002) and references. 141 4.197 Community-based programs can succeed or fail based on the supervision and motivation of CHWs. Case studies and review of international experiences have shown that general principles can be applied to motivate and retain CHWs, but that their detailed workings are always contextual.149 The primary and main element is the modality for supporting and anchoring CHWs in their own community. Incentives are also required, but do not have to be directly monetized. Incentives that are negotiated and supported by community structures, including in-kind compensation and appropriate recognition of services rendered, seem to show the best prospects. They need to be adapted to the level of responsibility asked of CHWs. On the other end, if CHWs are in fact volunteers, they cannot be asked to operate as employees. When they are asked to carry out the functions of employees of the government, compensation has to follow through a clear governmental plan and budgetary commitment.150 4.198 Sustained support to community health workers in Darfur would likely require professionalizing and regular remuneration. Two main directions can be taken; the first leaning on a volunteer or semi-volunteer force, the second requiring more professionalization. Under the first option, CHWs can be trained and established in their villages, with incentives from their own communities and the government contributing in indirect ways to their compensation, and in direct ways to their supervision, training, and supplying. The other option – which conforms with the policy trend towards greater professionalization of lower- level health cadres – is to have trained CHWs as employees of the State MoH in communities. These personnel could be trained CHWs, or village midwives with expanded training and responsibilities. This latter scheme has obviously higher financial cost, but would probably be more robust if this staff is expected to be more than health educators and to actually deliver services. There might be value, even if opting for the second option, in a combined model involving not only government funding, but also community commitment and diversified stakeholder involvement. Public financing of remuneration could be channeled through community structures rather than through the civil service payroll (given the numbers involved, it is unlikely that Ministries of Finance would concur with the necessary expansion of the civil service). In any scenario, supervision – ongoing, regular and supportive – is key. This supervision has to be technically savvy with a clear and consistent reference to simple standards. It must be enabling by ensuring that essential drugs and tools (i.e. timers, drug box, registries) are made available in a timely fashion. 4.199 Current experiences in outreach and community-based strategies in Darfur could serve as a basis for scale-up. In the context of Darfur, there are now a number of relevant programs being implemented through UN agencies, international and some national NGOs. The resource environment in which these models exist will change after resolution of the crisis, but this diverse experience can provide lessons for developing a viable Darfur model for community health. These experiences have common elements: i) using CHWs or Community Health Promoters (CHPs) for awareness, outreach and preventive activities; ii) increasing utilization of services; iii) ensuring some basic package of services with or without reproductive health services, and with or without delivery services; and iv) some involvement of community structures in support of activities and/or rehabilitation of facilities. For example, Save the Children raised contraceptive prevalence from 0.5 percent to 13.2 percent in their region of intervention in West Darfur. To achieve this, ―community health committees‖ were established consisting of influential community leaders who played the role of facilitating all health issues within their respective camps. Health education was facilitated through community health promoters who worked at the household level. Training in key safe motherhood messages such as the importance of child spacing was provided to 149 Bhattacharyya, Winch, LeBan and Tien, 2001. 150 Tendler and Freedheim, 1994. 142 community health promoters to, in turn, become trainers to the families. The project also included a vital registration component. A serious study of such experiences should be conducted with a view of identifying potential for sustainability and scale, which would make them appropriate to the Darfur environment. Improve Coverage and Quality of Facility-based Health Services 4.200 Facility-based health services deliver a number of basic interventions as well as provide referral care. Facility-based health care, provided by physicians, medical assistants, and nurses, provides the skills and infrastructure for a number of high-impact interventions, as well as essential back-up in the form of referral care for severe and complicated cases that cannot be handled at the community/household level. 4.201 The package of services to be provided by Basic Health Units could involve much of what is included in the community and household-level package above, as well as the following: 151  routine child immunization and outreach  management of neonatal infections  vitamin A treatment for measles  antenatal care and tetanus toxoid immunization  skilled delivery care and referral of complications 4.202 The package of services to be provided by Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs) could similarly include much of what is provided at the BHU level as well as the following:  short-stay inpatient services  laboratory and X-ray services  therapeutic feeding services for severely malnourished children  basic surgery  basic (and perhaps comprehensive) emergency obstetric care  management and referral of acute mental health conditions 4.203 Expanding the coverage and quality of health facility services would require policy work, capacity-building and investment in the major system inputs. It is anticipated that policy and planning work, as well as the start of some investments, could be done in the initial part of the post-conflict period, preparing the way for substantial training and physical investment in subsequent years. Many of these health system development activities are being implemented by the National MDTF-financed Decentralized Health System Development Project, which will provide models and experience useful to a future Darfur program. 4.204 Existing policies and standards should be further detailed and adapted to the circumstances of Darfur. The ―Standards of PHC Services‖ produced by the FMoH PHC Directorate have been shared with the SMoHs and should provide a starting point.152 These standards simplify the numbers and nomenclature of service units in the system (in particular consolidating the range of lower level facilities into a standard Basic Health Unit) as described in the situation analysis. The standards, with their infrastructure development, equipment, and staffing implications, need to be 151 These lists are to be considered indicative and to serve as the basis for further assessement and consultation. 152 Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, undated 143 detailed, shared, and implemented from the beginning of the post-conflict period, shaping the reconstruction and development programs. An indicative example is provided in . 4.205 Table 4.45. Table 4.45: Indicative PHC Structure highest standard for qualified structure catchment services health population worker limited (health post) Community 20-100 mobilization / outreach / distribution (i.e. ITNs) or no structure Health households monitoring (defaulters, pregnancies) Worker nutrition education (CHW) or treatment of simple cases on Community-IMCI Outreach algorithm worker detection of danger signs and referral (facility- based) Basic Health Unit Medical 10,000 case management (national protocols) (BHU) Assistant people growth monitoring, micro nutrient supplementation and vaccination antenatal care health education referral early warning system supervision on community activities provision of the essential drugs supplementary feeding services Primary Health General 50,000 Basic Health Unit services plus: Care Centre Physician people short stay services (PHCC) essential lab services X-Ray services provision of the essential drug list supervision of BHU activities therapeutic feeding services comprehensive emergency obstetric care basic surgery Regional Specialist 100,000 secondary care Hospital Physicians people Note: This table is only indicative, and requires further assessement and consultation 4.206 This policy work will clarify the level of staffing and services required at each level (BHU, PHCC, rural/district hospital). This will involve defining the skill mix appropriate to the conditions of Darfur, taking in account financial, human resource and capacity constraints. Of course, the service package to be delivered at each level needs to be clearly defined and linked to the level of staffing necessary to deliver it. Service standards and protocols should be designed to allow lower level cadres to relieve some of the burden from the higher levels. Transitional plans for facilities not yet staffed at the desired level will need be established. 144 Simple policies need to be developed to give clear guidance to lower-level personnel about what they can do in the absence of the required higher-level staff. The referral system will need to be defined in a realistic way, taking in account financial, geographic, communication and transport constraints, and defining in particular the interactions between facility-based services and community-based providers. 4.207 Realistic phasing of the implementation of standards for PHC service delivery is also crucial, taking in account financial, human resource, infrastructure, and capacity constraints. For example, fielding physicians in all PHCCs and Medical Assistants (MAs) in all BHUs will take some time. One needs to consider that to ensure that an MA is always available in a BHU, at least two need to be effectively posted to be able to cover for planned or accidental unavailability of one or the other. It will be some time before this can be achieved, given the difficulty in fielding staff where they are needed. Health Infrastructure and Equipment 4.208 Although current information could provide an idea of health facility requirements to reach the official coverage standards, a detailed assessment would likely be the first step in the investment program. Table 4.34 in the situation analysis provides indicative estimates of health facility requirements given the current MoH standards for population per facility and the available information on current numbers facilities. For example, it is estimated that over 70 Basic Health Units (BHUs) in each of North and West Darfur, and over 170 in South Darfur, will be needed over the long term to meet the ideal standard of 10,000 people per BHU. Much better data will be required to start planning the capital investment program so that the immediate priority in the post-conflict period will be a detailed assessment of needs for facility rehabilitation, construction and equipment. At the same time, review of technical standards for facility types will be required, taking in account local conditions, construction materials and costs. 4.209 A transparent process of prioritization based on clear criteria would be needed in order to determine an investment program which fits the available timeframe, resources and capacity. It is clear that a transparent process of prioritization on the basis of clear criteria will be needed, as it will not be feasible to fully meet the coverage standards in the medium term. The available resource envelope, as well as implementation capacity and time constraints, will help determine the overall number and types of facilities that can be constructed and equipped under the program. A possible basic criterion for prioritization will be to target areas with a combination of low coverage and high population. At the same time, the capital investment program should be calibrated with work on other inputs, particularly human resources. That is, staffing should be assured for newly rehabilitated, constructed and equipped health facilities. The balance between lower and higher-level facilities is also an important choice to make, given the high cost of the latter, particularly hospitals. Human Resources for Health 4.210 Both clarity in terms of requirements and an assessment of available human resources should be priorities in order to plan the program in this area. Table 4.36 and Table 4.38 present currently-available data on the numbers and types of health workers in Darfur. Definition of human resource requirements will depend on the coverage and technical standards, targets and phasing for development of the PHC service delivery system. With regard to required numbers, a WHO study states that there is a gap of 1,300 ―PHC workers.‖ However, if the minimum requirement is for one specialist physician per district/rural hospital, one general physician per PHC Centre, and one ―PHC Worker‖ (Medical Assistant or Nurse) per Basic Health Unit, then Table 4.46 suggests that there may not be a shortage 145 overall in Darfur.153 Nevertheless, this calculation ignores the need for replacement staff and considers all ―PHC Workers‖ as capable of running a BHU, which is very likely not the case. Table 4.46: Minimum Theoretical Requirements and Reported Numbers of Health Workers Minimum theoretical requirement Reported numbers doctors doctors PHC doctors (district/ doctors PHC (district/ (PHCC) workers rural hospital) (PHCC) workers rural (BHU) (BHU) hospital) North Darfur 18 35 176 10 40 182 South Darfur 34 68 340 52 111 777 West Darfur 18 36 182 8 24 664 Darfur 70 139 697 70 175 1,623 4.211 The available data, however, do indicate that significant skills upgrading will be required in order to, in particular, meet the staffing standards of BHUs. It is likely that many of the ―PHC Workers‖ currently enumerated would not meet the qualifications of Medical Assistant or higher-qualified nurse that are required for BHUs. The program should include significant pre- and in-service training for these mid-level cadres, necessary to staff the BHUs and PHCCs. Technical work, building on the national PHC human resource strategy and the experience of the DHSDP, will be required at the start of the program in order to develop curricula and training programs appropriate to the Darfur context. Current or potential future supervisors (from SMoH and Localities) should be involved in training needs assessments as part of their own learning and capacity building. 4.212 An effective recruitment and incentive scheme would be necessary to staff hospitals and PHC Centers with physicians, particularly in North and West Darfur, as well as rural and isolated areas in all three states. The available information indicates that, overall, there are sufficient numbers of physicians working in Darfur as a whole, but they are concentrated in urban areas and there are gaps in North and West Darfur. For example, there are reportedly 32 doctors working in district/rural hospitals and PHC Centers in West Darfur, but the theoretical minimum requirement is 54. It is clear that rehabilitation and equipment of district/rural hospitals and PHC Centers will need to be accompanied by transfers of doctors and an incentive system which will keep them in place in rural and isolated areas. Insofar as transfers from South Darfur (where overall numbers of doctors exceed minimum requirements) is unlikely to be possible, this challenge will need to be met by recruitment of newly-graduated doctors to work in North and West Darfur.154 4.213 Adequate remuneration and incentives will, in general, be necessary to attract and retain PHC staff in rural and isolated areas. The experience so far shows that it will be extremely difficult to retain qualified physicians, medical assistants or qualified midwives without a notable effort. Organizations currently delivering services, from the SMoHs to the NGOs, add incentives to retain qualified physicians even in the state capitals. Policy work in this area will be needed in order to ensure that remuneration is both sufficient to keep people in place but also financially sustainable for the government. A small study on the incentives and perceptions of health workers would be a good start to inform policy. Incentive plans will have to be formalized based on: a) level of hardship (village vs. city; city vs. state capital; state capital vs. Khartoum); and b) actual performance and delivery of a valuable service by these professionals. Rigorous accountability mechanisms are sine qua non of any effort to 153 Estimated requirements are to be considered indicative and to serve as the basis for further assessement and consultation. 154 For discussion of this issue see Winch et al., 2003. 146 improve compensation. Both accountability and motivation are fostered by close, regular and constructive supervision by skilled supervisors, 4.214 In the medium term, the objective needs to be to take advantage of the post-conflict influx of resources and development effort in order to build a renewed professional culture. More than simply increasing coverage of care providers and defining policies, the health system needs to make policies living realities which guide actions and decisions from pre- service training, fielding positions, equipping staff, supporting them, to ongoing supervision and monitoring. Standards from Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) for example, will need to be translated into MoH tools for assessing facilities, assessing performance of staff at each level, and monitoring activities from communities to BHUs, to PHCCs, and referral structures. The same goes for reproductive health services. Transition with the Immediate Recovery Program and the Role of NGOs 4.215 A strategy for continuing the operation of health services supported by the ongoing humanitarian programs will need to be developed. This has two key dimensions. First, the risk of losing the substantial human capacity brought to the health sector by international support should be mitigated. It is estimated that 5,000 health personnel now work in Darfur under different governmental, NGO and UN programs. The issue of capacity is not only one of qualification, but one of experience, professional culture, and practice. The serious concern is not about these personnel losing their employment; it is about the Darfur health system losing the benefit of their experience. Finding the modalities for keeping this capacity in the system is one of the central challenges of the transition from the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs. A strategy will need to address incentive and remuneration issues, answer the question of whether or not to absorb these workers into the civil service, and be linked to the issue of a continued role for NGOs in providing and supporting services. 4.216 Second, the role of national and international NGOs in the continuing operation and development of health services should be addressed. An FMoH policy document on the role of the voluntary sector opens the possibility of a continued role for NGOs in health service delivery.155 Such arrangements in other contexts have involved government financing and management of contracts with NGOs, with a range of possibilities for specific modalities. An important consideration involves the extent to which NGOs directly employ and manage health staff. In some cases, NGOs directly provide services with their own staff, financed by the government under contact. In other cases, NGOs provide support to government health services, with some financing going through the NGO and other financing going through existing government systems, mostly for wages. Continuing partnership with international and particularly national NGOs could retain some of the current NGO capacity, avoid inflation of the civil service rolls, introduce through the contracts an emphasis on performance, and strengthen the government‘s monitoring and evaluation and oversight role. It could be either a transitional strategy for the post-conflict period, at the end of which the system reverts to fully government-run service provision, or it could be the basis for further development along the lines of separation of purchaser and provider.156 Address Maternal Mortality 4.217 Addressing maternal mortality requires work at the household and community levels as well as the facility level. A range of factors influence maternal mortality, including from outside the health sector, particularly poverty, transport infrastructure, and access to transport. 155 Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2004b 156 See Palmer et al. (2006) and Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) for discussion of contracting mechanisms. 147 In the health sector, action to address maternal mortality needs to be taken both at the household/community and facility levels. . 4.218 Maternal outcomes are, among the health MDGs, some of the most sensitive to the status of referral systems. Although antenatal care (ANC) and training of traditional birth attendants/village midwives contribute to maternal and newborn health, they do little to reduce maternal mortality. The evidence, which has been gathered primarily in the last two decades, is worth bringing back to memory.  All pregnancies are essentially ‗at risk‘ and can present with danger signs, which require access to Basic or Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC). It is recommended that for every 500,000 people there should be at least four facilities offering Basic EmOC and one facility offering Comprehensive EmOC (Table 4.47).  UNFPA recommends a three pronged strategy for reducing maternal deaths: 1) skilled birth attendance, with very specific standards; 2) EmOC; and 3) family planning services. Table 4.48 presents essential services which skilled birth attendants and adequate referral systems can perform to reduce maternal mortality, depending on the settings.  With few exceptions, all countries where skilled attendance is more than 80 percent have maternal mortality ratios MMRs below 200.‖157 ―Skilled attendance‖ is defined as ―the process by which a woman is provided with adequate care during labor, delivery and the early postpartum period‖ and requires both a skilled attendant and an enabling environment. An ―enabling environment‖ includes adequate supplies, equipment and infrastructure as well as efficient and effective systems of communication and referral.‖158 Table 4.47: Standards for Basic and Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care Basic EmOC Functions Comprehensive EmOC Functions (Performed in a health centre without the need for (Requires an operating theatre and is usually an operating theatre) performed in district hospitals)  IV/IM antibiotics All six Basic EmOC functions, plus:  IV/IM oxytoxics  Caesarean section  Manual removal of placenta  Blood transfusion  Assisted vaginal delivery  Removal of retained products Table 4.48: What Skilled Attendants can do to Prevent and Manage Direct Causes of Maternal Mortality Cause of What Skilled Attendants What Skilled Attendants % Mortality Maternal Can do to Prevent Can do to Manage Preventable by Mortality Skilled Attendance Post-Partum Active management of third oxytocics, uterine massage, 30% Hemorrhage stage manual removal of placenta, fluids and blood Eclampsia Early identification and magnesium sulphate, 20% management of pre-eclampsia antihypertensives, delivery Obstructed Use of partograph caesarean section, 70% Labor symphysiotomy Puerperal Use aseptic techniques antibiotic therapy, removal 50% Sepsis of infected material Source: UNFPA. 157 Graham, Bell and Bullough, 2001; Bergström and Goodburn, 2001 158 White Ribbon Alliance/India, 2002 148 4.219 The 3-delays model can be used to diagnose causes of maternal mortality (delay in seeking care, delay in reaching facility, and delay in receiving proper care in the facility) and is useful for assessing feasible strategies.  Reducing the first delay will require addressing cultural factors of health perception, health competency and intra-household decision-making patterns. This will not change rapidly. Given the cultural reluctance to delivering inside facilities, it will not change at all unless women‘s experiences delivering in facilities not only demonstrate increased safety (better management, earlier detection of danger signs, timely referral and life-saving EmOC services) but also increased quality from the perspective of the woman as a client.  The number of deliveries at home will remain high for years to come in any case, and proper emphasis on promoting Home Based Life Saving Skills at the household level will be required, integrated in the community-based package.159  Emergency obstetric care should be provided free to the patient in order to remove the financial barrier to the decision to seek care. The cost of services is another factor which constrains the prompt decision to seek care, when referral to a hospital is a possibility. A policy of free referral and obstetric care (including C-section) for complicated deliveries would provide a tangible benefit and help avert maternal deaths.  In areas with poor access to a referral hospital, Primary Health Care Centers should provide Comprehensive EmOC, in particular C-sections. The second delay – in reaching the facility – is in great part structural in Darfur, particularly for rural communities. Addressing it is an issue across sectors, notably road and communication infrastructures. And while physicians working in PHCCs can be led to conduct emergency C-Sections, the existing policy is to make Rural Hospitals the only referral site for comprehensive EmOC in a Locality. Given the distances involved, especially but not exclusively in North Darfur, the likelihood that this referral can happen in due time is in question.  The last delay – in receiving proper care at the facility – is squarely in the hands of the health system. It needs to be addressed from a clinical perspective (effectiveness of case management) and from an administrative perspective (effectiveness of admission procedures, financial accessibility of services). Regulations need to be set for example in PHCCs where a physician is available and able to perform emergency C-sections, about when to refer and when to intervene. Not all PHCCs will have this capacity. 4.220 Figure 4.7 illustrates the current policy on delivery and referral services, and options for improvements.160 The three schemas deal with the second delay, once a village midwife has determined the need for EmOC.  Schema #1: the current policy, the woman has no benefit from reaching a primary health facility; she must find her way to a regional hospital. The range of time needed to go from a rural community to the nearest hospital has to be studied. This model places high expectations on the skills of village midwives, with reaching fast transportation the only backup plan.  Schema #2: the challenge is to reach a PHCC, which presumably is closer to the woman‘s community. The PHCC could provide basic EmOC, and given some communication and transportation investments, can speed access to the regional 159 For further discussion and an example from the region, see USAID, 2007; Sibley et al., 2001; and Sibley, 2003. 160 These are to be considered indicative and to serve as the basis for further assessement and consultation. 149 hospital and communicate about the woman‘s arrival, in order to reduce the third delay.  Schema #3: the woman only has to reach a BHU, from where an ambulance pre- positioned at the PHCC can be called for. In that scenario, the standard for normal deliveries in BHUs could also be raised (using partographs, preventing post-partum hemorrhage, etc.). Figure 4.7: Long term Options for Darfur Delivery and Referral System 4.221 A study of maternal mortality, including case studies following pathways and causes, could be planned during the first year of the post-conflict timeframe in order to better inform policy choices. 4.222 Options should be explored to scale up already existing Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) services in all referral hospitals. State level planning has already taken place with the support of UNFPA and other agencies. The essential elements of these plans need to be supported. Rural/District Hospitals need to provide 24 hours-a-day Comprehensive EmOC, free-of-charge to the patient. This means that staffing needs to allow for physician rotations, blood banks have to be operational, operating theatres may need rehabilitation, and Comprehensive EmOC equipment should be made available. 4.223 If the consensus of the initial policy dialogue and expert consultation supports this case, another priority should be to ensure that Basic EmOC (including use of the partographs, active management of the third stage of labor, and prevention of post-partum hemorrhage with oxytocics) is provided in all Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs). When PHCCs are 150 effectively staffed by physicians, they should be equipped for attending physicians to perform emergency C-Sections when timely referral is impossible.  All PHCCs should have a clean delivery room fully equipped. As cultural barriers to obstetric services weigh heavily in women‘s decision making, appropriate attention should be paid in all rehabilitation or reconstruction efforts to create a setting where privacy can be respected as much as possible. This is not a luxury, but a condition for success. UN and NGO-supported health programs have in effect expanded the capacity of primary care facilities to be able to offer delivery services. Evaluation results are scarce and there are indications that preferences for home deliveries endure. But these models should not be dismissed without close examination of the pros and cons.  Midwives and physicians at PHCC levels need to be trained in EmOC procedures, and staffing provided to allow rotation of staff. A number of organizations have already conducted EmOC training, and training can focus on gaps, which agencies like UNFPA have already identified to a large extent.  Training and equipment are necessary but not sufficient to institutionalizing practices. Some effort needs to be placed on announcing and supporting the application of the EmOC standards. This will require communication directed at professionals.  Close supervision at the onset, and ongoing afterwards needs to be integrated in the plans prior to any training. 4.224 The objective is to provide effective management of complicated deliveries at least as soon as a woman reaches a health structure, starting with the PHCC. A feasibility study for improving referral (communication and transportation) from PHCC facilities to rural hospitals could be conducted, along with scrutiny of the capacity for a viable referral system between BHU and the higher levels. 4.225 At lower levels, improving detection of pregnancy and delivery danger signs will continue to be important, as will ensuring clean deliveries. But the main question is about the desirability of promoting facility-based deliveries at all in PHC facilities, particularly Basic Health Units. The current policy takes into account the (general) preference of the population for home deliveries. Staffing of BHUs does not include midwives, and BHUs are not equipped with delivery rooms. PHC Centers are not thought either to have to conduct deliveries, although a number actually do. 4.226 The FMoH has started implementing a plan to bring village midwives to practice as effective Skilled Birth Attendants (SBAs), starting with the training of their trainers, Sister Midwives. This should be followed up closely. The training of midwives does not save lives. But certain key practices in managing labor and delivery do save lives, starting with the identification of danger signs and prompt referral.  Whether operating at the community level or in BHUs, midwives should be able to conduct clean deliveries and be equipped to do so. But the standard for SBAs goes beyond this and should definitely apply in all facilities where deliveries take place. To be implemented this will require the involvement of midwifery schools and Locality supervisors.  Detection of danger signs and prompt referral need to be salient features of any new training. Home Based Life Saving Skills need to be integrated in the training and communication outreach to women and households through the CHWs, CHPs and midwives. TBAs can be involved in that effort. 151  Midwives currently performing at the level of a SBA need to be identified and recognized. The trend in utilization of services will not change unless results are shown and associated with a specific standard of care. Develop Financing and Management of the Decentralized Health System Health Financing 4.227 The sources, structure, and magnitude of financing for health services are of course crucial to both the supply and demand for services and thus to the entire development program. The financing envelope and mechanisms on the supply side are basic issues to determine for the implementation and sustainability of the development program, while on the demand side relieving financial barriers to care and the burden on households is dependent on sufficient public subsidies. 4.228 Increasing the public resources available to health services will improve the financial access of impoverished vulnerable communities by reducing the necessity for user fees to sustain services. The current high level of funding for humanitarian programs allows the provision of services which are free, or nearly free, to the user, raising utilization and reducing the financial burden on households. It is unlikely, however, that this level of funding will be available over the medium term so that it will be necessary to find a point of equilibrium where a sustainable level of financing is sufficient to both support effective services and reduce financial barriers (i.e. lower user fees and subsidize drugs). This should lead to relying on the lowest level care providers to deliver the services that can be safely and effectively be delivered at that level, particularly in rural areas. This will reduce the cost and increase the coverage of services. The guiding principle should be to provide services as low in the system as is safe and effective. 4.229 State government health spending needs to be dramatically increased, through increased federal transfers to the states and concomitant budget allocations to health by state governments. Initial policy work could focus on establishing clear and realistic requirements and goals for state funding for health care. How this is translated into reduced financial burden on households needs to be explicitly addressed, particularly how increased public funding will lead to reduced user fees and drug prices. With regard to drug prices, the current national strategy involves drug revolving funds, which has ensured good drug supply in many cases but has passed on the entire cost, and sometimes more, to the patients. Finding a subsidy mechanism which maintains supply while reducing prices for poor and vulnerable groups should be a major priority for policy development. Similarly, the issue of remuneration and incentives is intimately linked both with the available financing levels and with the question of whether or not health workers will continue to request payments from patients. With regard to household and community-level interventions, the level of subsidies for commodities and drugs such as LLINs and ACTs, as well as the remuneration of CHWs are key issues. Depending on the available envelope of public financing, free or highly- subsidized services, commodities and drugs could be made available for entire communities or just for specific groups, such as pregnant women and under-five children. 4.230 The possibility of contracting NGOs to deliver or support services is also a financing issue, in that it is essentially a mechanism for government to apply public funds to effective service provision by private non-governmental providers. 4.231 State health insurance could be a mechanism to both expand access to care, particularly in urban areas where supply is sufficient, and – like contracting – to separate the purchaser from the provider. Coverage of the existing public sector insurance programs could be expanded through scaling-up of the limited experiences with pooling of informal sector 152 groups (for example, tea sellers, blacksmiths, university students). Assessment of these experiences should be a priority for policy work during the initial stages of the program. A significant subsidy from the federal level would likely be required over the medium term. The value and feasibility of purchasing of services through such pooled micro-insurance schemes, either from government health services or from local NGO providers could also be explored. Decentralized Management Capacity 4.232 The development program could focus on capacity development of the state level initially, and then the local health administrations. As discussed in the situation analysis, responsibility for most health care in Darfur lays with the state governments, with the Localities playing a limited role in some areas, primarily transmission of wages. Capacities of the state and local administrations to manage the health system need to be developed. Initially, the focus should be on developing state-level capacity, moving to the locality level once core functions are in place in the states. The immediate recovery program, which involves service delivery and support at the local level in areas of resettlement, should be encouraged to focus on local administration capacity. 4.233 The Federal level should continue to play a policy leadership and support role to SMoHs. It should continue to build its capacity to update, produce, and communicate protocols and standards through didactic methods, from integration in pre-service training, to the production of job-aids, and corresponding management tools (supervision, monitoring, assessment) with involvement and buy-in from the SMoH levels. 4.234 The post-conflict context of Darfur will present a number of particularities which will have an important impact on how administrative capacity is developed.  The eventual role of a regional administration will require attention as planning for administrative capacity development proceeds.  If the recommendations of this paper are accepted and a larger role is forged for outreach and community-based efforts, the health system will have to transition from its strong emphasis on clinical care, which will have important implications for the administration of the system.  The role of non-governmental and civil society organizations in the health sector, related to the transition from the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs, will shape how state and local health administration capacity is developed. Significant roles for NGOs, possibly through publicly-financed performance-based contracts, would mean that state administrative capacity should be more focused towards areas such as monitoring and evaluation and contract management rather than concentrating on the traditional tasks of day-to-day personnel and commodities management. 4.235 A major priority for capacity-building, essential to improving health services at all levels, is in the area of clinical and managerial supervision. In the long run, a working supervision system at state and locality levels will be the linchpin of the PHC edifice. Experiences in supervision in Darfur over the last years should be reviewed and partners should be sought to form partnerships with training institutions, which can serve as resources to the health system in building supervision capacity. As recommended by FMoH policy standards, the SMoHs should use the services of a cadre of Master trainer-supervisors, who will be responsible for following up and coaching clinical supervisors in the Localities and facilities. It is not likely that hospital-based physicians can carry out this responsibility effectively, although they could serve as resource professionals. The Master trainer- supervisors should know and have practiced the treatment, care and management protocols 153 which are national policies. They should apply a range of skills including technical mastery, coaching, facilitative supervision, problem solving skills and progressively apply principles of quality assurance. The team would be brought together regularly as a corps of experienced practitioners interested in furthering their skills. Each step of training should be contingent on demonstrated implementation of the learned skills in the field. 4.236 Supervision has to reach facilities and community providers consistently in order to support quality and overcome challenges. Given the geography of Darfur, day-to-day supervision responsibility should over the longer-term be built at the level of Localities. In Localities, capacity building will start with a functional analysis of the role that Localities need to play and the human and physical resources needed to fill that role, particularly in the areas of supervision and information processing. Particular attention will be paid to the adequacy of skills and resources, and accountability about use of these resources through monitoring of actual supervision received in the most remote facilities. SMoHs should provide essential leadership, guidance and coordination at the onset, with a view of decentralizing planning and coordination responsibilities as capacity is built in Localities. 4.237 Capacity in personnel management, procurement, financial management, contract management, and commodity logistics needs to be developed at the state level. Supervision is related to personnel management, although the administrative functions of hiring, managing and paying health staff should be considered separately from technical oversight. This type of administrative capacity also includes procurement, financial management and contract management, and needs to be developed at the state level. The extent to which the civil service payroll is expanded to include health workers currently working for humanitarian programs or newly-recruited health workers will depend partly on the extent to which the transition from immediate recovery will involve significant contracting of NGOs who manage their own staff. In any case, capacity in personnel management, starting with an updated database and remuneration schedule (related of course to the issue of incentives discussed above) should be developed in the SMoHs. As in other areas, a longer-term goal could be to decentralize this further to the Localities. 4.238 Procurement and financial management capacity needs to be urgently developed in the state MoHs as post-conflict investment and contracting proceeds. These functions in the state ministries have been allowed to deteriorate, both because most public spending is on salaries and handled through the civil service salary payment system, and because whatever investment spending is done is often handled either by the state Ministry of Finance or the Federal level. Significant investment, along with better budgets for operational costs, during the post-conflict period will require urgent development of procurement and financial management capacity in the SMoHs. Contracting of NGOs will similarly require such capacity, as well as contract management and supervision functions. 4.239 Commodity security and logistics management are long-term capacity building priorities for the state level which need to be developed. For the moment, logistics management capacity in SMoHs is limited to emergency drugs for hospitals. Capacity and systems will need to be developed to ensure timely supplies of IMCI drugs, delivery kits and basic EmOC drugs and supplies at the facility level, as well as relevant commodities and drugs for outreach and community level programs. Development of the cold chain infrastructure will require particular attention and time, but would be necessary for improving routine immunization throughout the PHC system. 4.240 In addition to the human and management aspects of commodity management, necessary investment in infrastructure and transport will have to be studied, although it is recommended that transport and distribution be contracted to private transporters. Expert 154 consultations and assessments will be carried out to determine the most efficient ways to structure logistics systems. There is no benefit in adding Locality health teams as an unnecessary step in commodity management. Once capacity is built at the state level to store, manage and distribute commodities, Localities might not be needed to carry out the distribution, but simply to inform on needs. 4.241 Like in other areas, it will be important to take advantage of the logistics and commodity management capacity put in place under the humanitarian and immediate recovery programs, for example the current provision of essential drug kits by UNICEF and WHO. Transferring this capacity to a sustainable system will be a priority. 4.242 The states should consider centralizing commodity procurement at the regional level for economies of scale. Initial assessment should determine the need for one central regional essential drug pharmacy based in one of the states, with the other two keeping low stock levels and responsible mainly of distribution within the state; versus the need to develop storage capacity in all three states. 4.243 The health system needs a basic Health Management Information System (HMIS) to guide management decisions and response mechanisms. Health information about Darfur, as shown in the situation analysis, is fragmented. The medium-term goal should be to develop an HMIS limited in scale, focusing on a few essential signals for management response, with a format allowing expansion of its scope as capacity is built. The long-term goal should be a computerized system, linked across the three states, and feeding into a Federal HMIS system. The threshold for using information technology (IT) will be determined based on initial feasibility studies and lessons learned from the current emergency surveillance system (EWARS). The up-front cost of investing in an effective information and communications system may be compared to the prospect of an incomplete and ineffective paper-based system. It is likely that, given the challenges of building capacity in each of the localities, the system would be designed to feed data from PHCCs (which would compile data from the BHUs and community levels) and rural/district hospitals directly to the SMoH, with feedback rapidly provided to the Locality health administrations that are in place. 4.244 One SMoH could serve as a regional pole and take the leadership in this area. Standardization of practices and policies across the three states will be required as well as encouraged by the development of this system. It should be initially focused on the most important challenges to the health of the population (activities and achievements in control of diarrhoeal disease, case management for ARI, malaria, immunization coverage and defaulter tracing, etc.). The priority should be placed on tracking a small number of signals for which management responses are defined, rather than building a comprehensive and over-ambitious system. 4.245 In the short-term, during the time it takes to build even a basic administrative information system, it is recommended to rely on small surveys to provide the necessary data for prioritization, programming and resource allocation. Such surveys could be done at regular intervals, and once it is shown that the administrative reporting system works, could be used to verify the HMIS data. Regular implementation could be contracted out to a Darfur university, for example, in order to avoid straining SMoH capacity. Pre-developed modular survey tools can easily be adapted locally. Prevent the Spread of HIV/AIDS 4.246 The program on HIV/AIDS could build on planning and programs already in place in Darfur, with an effort to focus on activities which will have a known impact on the spread of the disease. The Sudan National HIV/AIDS Control Program (SNAP) has a national strategic 155 plan which focuses on raising awareness, communication, health sector interventions including blood screening, sexually-transmitted infection (STI) treatment, voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), and capacity-building.161 Some policy work and planning for implementation of this strategy has been done in Darfur, most notably strategic plans for each of the three states. For example, work in North Darfur in recent years has included a number of communications initiatives as well as training and support for health sector interventions, notably two VCT centers and one surveillance site. A development program would build on this work, while working to focus activities on those most likely to have an impact on the spread of the disease. Lack of such focus has been identified as a major flaw in World Bank HIV/AIDS projects in other countries.162 4.247 In Darfur, maintaining such focus could involve the following actions.  The scale of the response demanded of the health system by the HIV/AIDS epidemic cannot be fully described until more is known about the extent of the problem in Darfur. As recommended by UNAIDS and the SNAP, a sero- prevalence study stratified at the state level should be conducted to understand the extent of the epidemic, establish a baseline and develop a response strategy for Darfur.  Health sector interventions will receive continued support and will be gradually expanded. In particular, these are blood transfusion safety, promotion of universal precautions for health workers, STI treatment and VCT.  Given the continuing sensitivity of the issue in the country, efforts on advocacy and awareness-raising, both among political and community leaders and the general population should continue.  However, it should be recognized up front that such communication efforts will do little with regard to immediate prevention of the disease. In this case, it is recommended that focused efforts targeting known high-risk groups should be implemented by non-governmental organizations and peer groups, including improving the availability of condoms as means of protection among these groups. This can build on already-existing programs, such as training for peer-to- peer education among uniformed personnel in North Darfur. 161 Sudan Federal Ministry of Health, 2004a. 162 World Bank, 2005a. 156 Appendix 1: Determinants of Health Outcomes and Service Utilization in Darfur Table A. 1: Regression Models of the Determinants of Health Outcomes among under five Children, Darfur, 2000 acute malnutrition cough in previous fever in previous (wasting) 2 weeks 2 weeks (n = 3,835) (n = 4,175) (n = 4,203) odds p-value odds p-value odds p-value ratio ratio ratio child's age (months) 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.84 1.01 0.00 male 1.34 0.00 1.13 0.25 1.26 0.00 household size 1.01 0.58 1.01 0.73 1.00 0.95 mother has education 0.84 0.19 1.40 0.01 0.92 0.43 highest 20 percent asset index* 1.34 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.61 0.05 middle 40 percent asset index* 1.10 0.47 0.93 0.63 0.81 0.06 cluster proportion BCG vaccination** 1.12 0.27 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.93 adequate water supply 0.91 0.54 0.78 0.11 0.99 0.96 latrine or other toilet 0.67 0.01 0.96 0.81 0.83 0.13 urban 0.96 0.83 1.01 0.96 0.84 0.24 North Darfur** 5.00 0.00 1.15 0.53 0.88 0.41 South Darfur** 2.46 0.00 3.32 0.00 1.31 0.05 percent variation associated with 4% 8% 5% cluster *Compared to lowest 40 % of households as ranked by an asset index. **Proportion of children aged 12-23 months with BCG vaccination in the cluster, measured in 10 % increments. ***Compared to West Darfur. Random-effects logistic regression models, accounting for within-cluster variation. Authors‘ estimates from 2000 MICS data. Table A. 2: Regression models of the determinants of child health service utilization, Darfur, 2000 Measles Vitamin A Treatment for Treatment for vaccination supplementation cough fever (12-23 (6-59 months) (under-5) (under-5) months) (n = 3,366) (n = 333) (n = 900) (n = 621) odds p- odds p- odds p- odds p- ratio value ratio value ratio value ratio value Child's age (months) 1.07 0.20 1.01 0.00 0.99 0.43 1.00 0.51 Male 1.17 0.49 0.86 0.10 0.69 0.20 1.49 0.04 Household size 0.99 0.85 0.99 0.63 1.02 0.66 1.03 0.43 Mother has education 2.31 0.00 1.29 0.02 1.95 0.05 2.34 0.00 Highest 20 % asset index* 6.17 0.01 2.03 0.00 0.97 0.97 2.45 0.12 Middle 40 % asset index* 2.15 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.78 0.48 1.54 0.08 Urban 4.56 0.00 2.43 0.00 1.55 0.23 4.16 0.00 North Darfur** 4.67 0.00 1.96 0.01 7.05 0.00 2.85 0.00 South Darfur** 1.21 0.59 0.66 0.09 3.63 0.02 0.82 0.56 Percent variation associated 18 % 23 % 13 % 24 % with cluster *Compared to lowest 40 % of households as ranked by an asset index. **Compared to West Darfur. Random-effects logistic regression models, accounting for within-cluster variation. Authors‘ estimates from 2000 MICS data 157 CHAPTER 5. BUDGET TRENDS AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT Prepared by Bill Battaile, Mosllem Alamir, and Tarig Ismaeil A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 5.1 This chapter aims to provide a basic understanding of budget trends and fiscal management in Darfur, and points to future reform needs. The time period under review is 2000 to mid-2006. It should be noted that actual figures are used during 2000 – 2005 and plans for 2006. Figures of West Darfur only run through 2005. All annexes referred to are available upon request. B. DIAGNOSTICS Budget preparation, Execution and Credibility Budget Preparation Process 5.2 The budget preparation process in the Darfur states is similar to that of other northern states. The fiscal year starts on January 1 and ends on December 31. The process begins with estimates of revenues and expenditures for the coming year. There is no specific formula by which the Darfur states makes these estimates, which tend to be based on previous actual performance with some percentage changes, which vary among the states. The national government issues a general budget directive with macroeconomic assumptions for the budget planning. 5.3 The process follows a bottom-up approach in that it starts from the localities where a committee established by the locality commissioner (Mutamad) proposes revenues and expenditures. The state line ministries also establish committees to estimate their revenues and expenditures for the next year budget. All localities, line ministries and other institutions submit their proposals to the state ministry of finance. This committee revises the estimates received, and summarizes these into a consolidated state budget proposal. 5.4 The consolidated proposal is then submitted to the State Council of Ministers (SCOM) for review, revisions and approval. Upon approval, the budget proposal is submitted to the state Legislative Assembly where specialized committees review the proposed budget. The objective of this stage is to assess whether the proposed budget meets the state‘s socio- economic goals. The chairs of the specialized committees present their findings and recommendations to the assembly that comes up with an agreement on the final budget. Upon the legislative approval, the state consolidated budget becomes law. A copy of the state budget is delivered to the Chamber of General Auditing, and to the state MOF for execution. 5.5 On the budget process, one of the problems is related timing – the so-called fiscal calendar -- whereby the states are expected to have their annual budgets finalized before the federal transfers are known. This creates discrepancies between state expectations and what is likely to be funded – evidenced in practice by the large deviations between plans and actuals, as shown below. Revenue: Composition and Trends 5.6 Like other northern states, revenue sources in the Darfur states fall broadly into two major categories: own revenues and federal transfers (Box 5.1). In general, per capita 158 revenues show a steady growing trend during 2000 - 2006, largely driven by rapid increases in federal transfers. On the other hand, per capita own revenue growth was flat and even declined in some years, which state officials attributed to disruption of revenue collections due to the conflict (Figure 5.1).163 One exception is a huge increase in West Darfur per capita own revenues in 2004, for which no detailed explanation was available. This may have been driven by the need for a balanced budget in the context of the desired increased in spending. Box 5.1: State Revenue Sources Own Revenues Tax Revenues: include individual business profit, capital gains, real estates profit, and stamp duties, which are collected by state ministry. Reportedly, each state ministry should transfer what ever it collects on the spot to the chamber of taxation for the state ministry of finance. Non-tax Revenues: include user charge fees for public services delivery and licenses, which are collected by perceived state ministry of finance. State centralized revenue items: include different revenue items that are not classified under a particular state ministry or locality. Localities own revenues: include user charge fees for public services delivery and licenses provided by localities, and animal tax. Federal Transfers: include different types of federal transfers, which include earmarked transfers (current and development transfers), and block transfers (VAT, difference in petrol prices and the agriculture tax compensation). Exceptionally, North Darfur receives additional support that started in 2001 as well as irregular transfers (emergency program for water in 2001 and national program in 2002). 5.7 State revenue excludes Zakat as a source, which appears to be contrary to Article 9 (1) of the Interim Constitution of South Darfur. One of the objections raised in the state Assembly discussion of the 2006 budget in Southern Darfur related to this point. As learned from PER state case studies: “On the revenue side, Zakat collections are federal revenues given the fact that Zakat chamber is a federal institution whose actions emanate from Islamic teachings and religious mandate. In this respect, Zakat revenues cannot be treated as off-budget activities on the part of the state and should rather be seen as a federal institution‟s activities that have effect on living standards of the poor. On the spending side, Zakat revenues have clear bearing on poverty: since poor and destitute are two of the five recipient categories of Zakat�164 5.8 In terms of per capita revenue, very significant increases are found, albeit from a negligible base in the early 2000s. In addition, per capita amounts are broadly similar in each of the states through 2004 (Figure 5.2). In 2005, when results for only South and North Darfur are available, the former rose significantly, whereas revenues in North Darfur were stagnant. A sharp rise is shown for both states in 2006, though as stressed below, in practice this was far below budget plans. The huge rises for West Darfur during 2004 - 2006 are surprising and further discussions and analyses are needed. 163 The following abbreviations for the three Darfur states are used in this paper: NDS=North Darfur state; SDS = South Darfur state; WDS =West Darfur state. 164 See Sudan PER 159 Figure 5.1: North Darfur: Actual Per Capita Revenue, 2000-2006 8000 7000 6000 5000 SD 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Revenues State Own Revenues Federal Transfers Source: Annex Table 1. Figure 5.2: North, South and West Darfur: Actual Per capita Revenue, 2000-2006 (USD) 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 US$ 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 North Darfur South Darfur West darfur Source: Annex Table 1-3. 5.9 The increasing dependency on federal transfers is striking. Own revenue was the major revenue source for all the three states at the beginning of the review period, which was subsequently reversed (Figure 5.3). Figure 5.3: South Darfur: Broad Composition of Total Revenue, 2000-2006 100.0 80.0 % of Total 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 State Own Revenues Federal Transfers 5.10 Own revenue can be disaggregated by ministry and locality for North and South Darfur. All tax revenue and state centralized items are recorded under the state ministry of finance. The respective shares of revenue from ministries and localities were fairly stable over the review period. Figure 5.4 shows the general trend for North Darfur by way of illustration. Looking at the composition, several features are noteworthy. The state ministry 160 of finance and the state capital localities account for the bulk. Even though agriculture and livestock represent the bulk of the economic activity in Darfur, little revenue collection is recorded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. This might partially be due to the reliance on ―Native Administrations‖ for related collections (see below), which could be recorded as ―localities revenues‖. Figure 5.4: North Darfur: Ministry and Locality Revenue (% of Total), 2000-2005 100 90 80 70 60 Percent 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Ministries Localities 5.11 Darfur states‘ fiscal plans for 2006 indicate dramatic revenue increases, by 102 and 271 percent in North Darfur and South Darfur respectively, driven largely by transfers from the central government, which are projected to increase by 112 percent and 389 percent, while own revenue was projected to grow by 27 percent and 53 percent respectively. However given Darfur‘s revenue execution record, the 2006 budget risks facing serious financial challenges if past performance does not improve significantly. Expenditure: Trends and Composition 5.12 In the last two years, the increase in spending has been striking, albeit from a very low base. Over the period 2000-05 spending increased by 35, 39 and 57 percent in North, South and West Darfur, respectively (Figure 5.5). For 2006, the state budgets achieved even larger increases: by 122.6, 32.1 and 7.7 percent in West South and North Darfur, respectively. 5.13 In per capita US dollars, we can see a doubling between 2003 and 2005, and a massive planned increase in 2006 (Figure 5.5). However, the credibility of these plans is questionable if we look at previous deviations between planned and actual spending (see below). Figure 5.5: North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur States: Per Capita Expenditure Trends, 2001-2006 actual; (USD) 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 US$ 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 North Darfur South Darfur West darfur Source: Annex Tables 5.7- 5.9. 161 5.14 In terms of composition, the budgets of the Darfur states‘ follow an economic expenditure classification system similar to the national budget, and other states, in four chapters (Box 5.2). Box 5.2: Expenditure Classification Chapter one: public employees‘ wages and salaries. Chapter two: goods and services at ministries and localities levels Chapter three: investment and capital contribution Chapter four: new or ongoing developments project 5.15 The state allocations for development projects have proved to be very limited over the last six years at least. Spending on development was constant in North and West Darfur, though slightly rising in South Darfur. This can be largely attributed to the high and rising share of resources allocated for current expenditure in particular wages and salaries, which are crowding out other activities (like development and maintenance). 5.16 Annual increases in allocations for wages and salaries were the major source of the rapid increase in Darfur states‘ total expenditure, as is illustrated for North Darfur in Figure 5.6. In 2004, for instance, chapter 1 expenditures increased by 98, 85 and 82 percent in North, West and South Darfur, respectively, and further increased by 26, 46 and 63 percent in 2006. Box 5.2 reports the main reasons cited by state authorities for this increase. 5.17 Even in light of the significant pay increases that have been centrally mandated in over the past years, the size of the reported wage bill increases are surprising. Annex tables 18-20 show the annual increases in wage allocations in the localities, health and education. In 2004, this amounted to increases of 85 and 87 percent in North and South Darfur, respectively, and was projected to increase by a further 65 percent in North Darfur‘s 2006 budget. Box 5.3: Factors Behind Darfur States’ Wage Bill Boom What are the main reasons behind the observed wage bill boom in Darfur? These mirror similar increases in other states, and can be decomposed into price and quantity effects, including: Long-term structural increase in civil employees associated with decentralization. The switch to a federal system led to the creation of many additional ministries, commissions, localities and administrative units. South Darfur‘s increased the number of ministries from five during the 1990s to eight, and added four commissions over 2000-2006, while the number of localities and administrative units increased from four and twelve, respectively, during 1994-1999 to nine and forty-one over 2000- 2006. These observed structural changes in the governance system have led to many new positions of varying grade levels in the state. There has also been creation of advisors with each ministry. In 2006, the number of public sector employees is reported to be 19,000. Short-term measures designed to reduce unemployment. This hiring is not part of a written employment policy, but by acts of individual managers/ministers. This occurs at the ministry levels; at least for low-level employees. Details not available. Increases in civil employees‟ wages and benefits. Substantial annual increases in base compensation. For example, wages and salaries were increased by 50 percent in 2004 and by 20 percent in 2006. It was reported that the states are not represented on the National Committee for Wages and Salaries Increase, which is responsible for wage bill reforms and adjustments, and that the wages bill changes take place without consultation with the states. According to the INC, however, the state civil service is to be within the exclusive power of the state and each state is to establish its own civil service with its own terms and conditions of service, for which it is responsible for financing out of own resources. 162 5.18 The wage bill increases appear to have crowded out other spending. For instance, South Darfur applied the federally mandated 20 percent increase to its wages bill for May and June, 2006 at the expense of executing plans for development projects and maintenance. Of course, some wages and salaries are pro poor – but data is needed on who are being paid, as at either ends of the spectrum we have teachers and nurses on the one hand and, for example, security and police on the other. Figure 5.6: North Darfur: Actual Per Capita Expenditure, 2000-2006 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 SD 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Expenditure Wages & Salaries Goods and Services Capital Contribution Development Source: Annex Table 7. Budget Credibility 5.19 Deviations of actual revenue from budgeted amounts were high during the period under review. The deviation of total revenue from budget averaged 39% for North Darfur (Table 5.1) and 41 percent in South Darfur (Table 5.2). This is a huge shortfall and necessitates rationing of expenditures and deviations from budget plans. 5.20 On the revenue side, both own revenue and federal transfers are poorly budgeted. For example, localities‘ revenue had fallen on average short of budgeted by 46 and 51 percent in North Darfur and South Darfur respectively. Similarly, ministries‘ revenue was on average 6 and 64 percent less than budgeted in North Darfur and South Darfur respectively. Revenue budgeting in South Darfur seems to be relatively weaker than in North Darfur. 5.21 On the expenditure side, deviations widened over the period under review (Figure 5.7). Actual expenditure for all states has fallen consistently below plans during 2000–2005, and in North Darfur, the gap has widened over the period. The overall deviation of actual expenditure from budget in North Darfur amounted on average to 32 percent, and 43 percent in South Darfur. Significant variations thus exist between actual expenditures and budgeted amounts at the ministries and localities level. Similar data was not available for West Darfur. Figure 5.7: North Darfur: Trends in Actual and Budgeted Expenditure, 2000-2006 (USD) 120.0 100.0 80.0 Millions US$ 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Actual Budgeted 163 5.22 The Darfur state government budgets for 2006 showed a massive planned annual increase in spending between 2005 and 2006, of about 90 and 287 percent in North Darfur and South Darfur respectively. However, based on actual execution rate for 2006, this increase was significantly less, around 43 and 54 percent in North Darfur and South Darfur respectively, underlining the persistent deviations between budgets and actual spending. 5.23 The variations are most pronounced in development spending and wages and salaries. Development expenditure deviated substantially from budget over the whole period. On average, actual development spending in North Darfur fell below budgeted amounts by 71 percent, and by a massive 81 percent in South Darfur. Thus among expenditure categories, development expenditure has the worst record on execution. This appears to be largely due to shortfalls in revenue, in recent times especially federal transfers. Mismatches between budgeted and real spending requirements, bottlenecks in fund flows or even lack of capacity could also be factors. Table 5.1: North Darfur: Deviations of Actual Revenue and Expenditure relative to Plans, 2000-2006 (in %) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Revenues -38.5 -38.9 -43.0 -34.9 -33.7 -42.9 -43.9 State Own Revenues -48.1 -48.9 -44.4 -60.2 17.5 -4.6 11.9 of which: Ministries -25.8 -18.0 -23.8 -24.8 30.2 23.3 Na Localities -57.9 -60.0 -52.9 -75.4 2.1 -29.8 Na Federal Transfers 1.6 -28.1 -42.0 -16.1 -38.7 -45.8 -48.3 Total Public Expenditure -21.5 -35.2 -36.0 -37.8 -24.8 -39.5 -43.4 Wage and Salaries -37.2 -44.5 -36.0 -24.5 -9.2 -24.7 22.9 of which, Ministries -61.9 -83.3 -57.2 -21.7 -18.0 -15.4 Na Localities -29.2 -30.3 -24.5 -26.2 -3.8 -28.1 Na Goods and Services 24.0 -8.8 -23.2 -52.1 -51.8 20.3 -14.5 Of which Ministries -1.8 23.0 -29.0 -63.3 -66.7 30.1 Na Localities 317.5 -57.6 -10.2 -9.0 2.5 -16.3 Na Investment & Capital Contribution -91.2 -30.3 -68.9 -97.8 -95.9 -88.7 -94.1 Development Expenditure -89.8 -96.0 -81.8 -32.1 -43.0 -83.7 -91.0 Table 5.2: South Darfur: Deviations of Actual Revenue and Expenditure Relative to Plans, 2000-2006 (in %) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Revenues -46 -41.5 -48.9 -35.7 -33.6 -40.8 -55.2 State Own Revenues -50.6 -42.5 -38.3 -34.9 -45.5 -24.7 -33.5 of which: Ministries -83.7 -80.9 -65.3 -63.7 -78.3 -9.8 Na Localities -56.1 -51.1 -51.5 -55.3 -49.5 -45 Na Federal Transfers -28.3 -39.3 -57.3 -36.3 -19.2 -47 -59.0 Total Public Expenditure Na -34.2 -61.5 -46.2 30.6 42.7 - 54.0 Wage and Salaries Na -33.7 -27.4 -28.1 22 -25.9 - 13.0 of which, Ministries Na -33.7 -33.6 -27.4 12.4 -18.2 Na Localities Na -33.6 -24.1 -28.5 27 -29.4 Na Goods and Services Na -5.8 -16.9 -14.2 8.2 13.2 - 10.9 Of which Ministries Na -0.4 -27.9 0.9 -22.6 -17.5 Na Localities Na -13.6 -6.1 -19.5 42.9 24.9 Na Investment & Capital Contribution Na 24.7 -94.5 -87.5 -63.9 -81.9 - 73.3 Development Expenditure Na -95.7 -97.8 -87.6 -71.5 -52.9 - 82.0 164 5.24 The extent of deviation of actuals from plans is so massive and persistent that the credibility and value of the budget itself is called into question. It appears that significant reforms and changed practices are needed so that the budget is a credible tool of policy, planning and implementation. Revenue Own Revenues 5.25 Darfur states depend on traditional revenue sources, which include licenses and departmental fees, and federal receipts (Box 5.1). State own source revenue shrank from more than two-third to around one-third and less than one-fourth of total state revenue in South Darfur and North Darfur respectively between the period 2000-2005. This implies growing dependency on federal transfers to meet the state budgetary needs. 5.26 Meeting revenue collection targets in the current circumstances in Darfur is very difficult, due to both systemic factors and the impacts of the conflict. Among the former are unrealistic own revenue forecasts which may be driven by the required balanced budget, inefficient revenue collection and administration, and low capacity for own revenue mobilization. 5.27 The ongoing insecurity has adverse effects on revenue efforts. First, many people are removed from their usual situation and are not receiving services from their state public provider, if at all. It may thus be unclear to them why they should pay taxes. Second, the tax administration is disrupted by the relocation of both the taxpayers and the tax collectors. Third, the information base which taxes are collected, the tax payer data files (however kept), are often lost or destroyed. Fourth, while conflict continues, there are many 'unofficial' charges being levied. In all these circumstances, there is a much lower tendency to pay. Overestimation of Own Revenue 5.28 Forecasts of annual revenue has four steps, which can be summarized as follows:  all state line ministries and localities submit their revenue estimations to the state ministry of finance. We were told that this initial annual revenue estimation is based on what was collected in the three previous years for each revenue source along with expected changes in economic activities.  revision of these submissions by the state ministry of finance (through Technical Committees). Based on the Technical Committee‘s recommendations, the state ministry of finance prepares the state‘s consolidated preliminary revenue forecast for the next fiscal year.  the consolidated preliminary revenue estimates are then reviewed and discussed at the meeting of the SCOM.  approval of the state consolidated preliminary revenue estimates by the State Assembly based on the SCOM recommendations. 5.29 In practice, Darfur states‘ revenue for the fiscal years 2000-2006 reflect unrealistic forecasts (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). As Darfur states follow the so-called balanced budget, state line ministries and localities tend to inflate their own revenue estimations in order to balance against expected expenditures. In addition, Darfur states were apparently motivated to overestimate their own revenues for political reasons; especially in 2006 budgets. North Darfur‘s own revenue, for instance, is estimated to increase by 102 percent compared with 2005 actuals. This tendency critically undermines the credibility of Darfur states‘ revenue 165 budgeting. For instance, North Darfur own revenue revealed a persistently low execution rate around 50 percent throughout the period 2000-2003 (see Table 5.1). Own Revenue Capacity 5.30 Like many other states, Darfur states appear to have weak revenue collection capacity. The challenges are worse in Darfur due to the significance of the traditional livestock sector and informal trade activity, and weak infrastructure and institutional capacity. Darfur states‘ own revenue base remained static for many years and is not improved parallel with the increased state government‘s responsibilities and assignments. As noted above, the weak performance of own revenue has been attributed to several factors.165  Weak own revenue base. State own revenue is strongly influenced by the state‘s economic structure. Own revenue sources can be divided into three categories: (i) tax on (capital gains, rental, real estates, individual enterprise business, livestock, and state stamp duties); (ii) user charge fees for public services delivery; and (iii) license fees (markets, trade, health, private education, etc. (Box 5.1). Localities rely upon traditional sources (like livestock) that are also highly mobile and unstable.  Limited private sector development. Lack of basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, and electricity and power), and weak financial sector in Darfur discourages private sector activity and thus income generation.  Insecurity. The conflict has seriously affected the main productive and trade sectors, e.g. private investment, agriculture and livestock. Consequently, Darfur states, especially localities, have lost substantial potential revenue bases as insecurity and conflict damaged agriculture and depleted livestock and deteriorated basic infrastructure for private sector development.  Weak service delivery performance. This makes taxpayers unwilling to fulfill their tax obligations. For example, lack of veterinary services and other evidence of benefits of public services discourage fulfillment of tax obligations. 5.31 Moreover, Darfur has significant informal trade activity that is largely outside the net of formal tax collection. The inability of Darfur state governments to bring this sector into the tax net reportedly results in a considerable loss of revenue. In particular, the traditional livestock sector is informal in nature (no books of account) and the number of livestock fluctuates from season to season. High inter-jurisdictional mobility of livestock between states and within localities seeking for grazing areas has also contributed to the current low own revenue collections in Darfur. 5.32 Lack of implementation infrastructure and weak institutional capacity are also cited by state officials as a contributory factor. This includes outdated equipment, lack of enforcement capacity to punish tax defaulters, lack of organized database, and inadequate staff due to poor salaries and working conditions. 165 In its efforts to mobilize its own revenue, South Darfur state authorities organized a workshop under the theme of ―self-reliance‖ and came up with recommendations for short term (e.g. specific projects to promote establishment of free trade zones and promotion of exports through establishment of exports village), medium term (e.g. projects for promotion of local industries) and long-term focusing on promotion of and encouragement of investment in utilization of local resources such as fruits and livestock. 166 Box 5.4: The Role of the Native Administration in Tax Collection The Darfur states use the ―Native Administration‖ as tax collectors for livestock sector, with an agreed percentage paid by the state (locality).166 In a conference held in Kass town in 1993, it was agreed that the locality should pay 30 percent out of livestock tax total collection to the ―Native Administration‖, to be distributed between the three leaders of ―Native Administration‖, as 15 percent for ―El-Sheikh‖ and 10 percent for ―El-Omda‖ and 5 percent to ―El-Nazir‖; whether this is being done is unknown. According to state finance officials, ―Native Administrations‖ are a good tax collection agency because they can easily and more cheaply conduct a reliable tax assessment, and have strong enforcement and follow-up as well as some local accountability and transparency. The Governance report provides a more detailed review of the role of the Native Administration. 5.33 Given what we observe in practice in 2006 in each of the Darfur states, that is, large falls in own revenue, it is important to understand the underlying factors. It is clearly not solely an issue of capacity. At the locality level it appears, from discussions in the field, that very little or nothing is being collected. At the State Ministry level, it is possible that revenues are being collected to the extent they are needed to fund Ministry-based remunerations. Both the NA and Ministry remuneration funded from revenue collections likely involve off-budget activity that is not recorded anywhere. This suggests that among the changes that are needed is a change to the system to increase accountability for collection and spending of these public revenues, so that all revenue placed into the public account and all expenditure on remunerations shown as expense against the public account. Federal Transfers 5.34 Federal transfers to Darfur, like other states include: (i) current and development grants to the state to fulfill its assignments for wages and development projects; and (ii) block grants (non-conditional transfers). Recent federal budgets have witnessed significant absolute terms increases in transfers to all the northern states. However, two states, namely Khartoum and Gezira, predominate with more than one-third of federal transfers over 2000-2006 (Table 5.3).167 Darfur‘s share remained between 12 and 16 percent (Table 5.3). This implies that humanitarian and reconstruction needs created by the conflict have not yet been considered in transfer allocations. 166 The foundations of this system are based on the administrative model of indirect rule of the British administration (see governance chapter). 167 It should be noted that data in Table 3 is different versus Annex Tables 9-10 due to different data sources. Reportedly, part of these differences is explained by in-kind transfers to states via federal line ministries directly to state ones and not through the state ministry of finance. 167 Table 5.3. Federal Transfers to Northern States 2000-2006 State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in millions SD) N. Darfur 1122.8 3193.9 3208.7 4698.4 6812.4 10465.0 13481.0 S. Darfur 933.4 2290.2 2582.7 4065.9 6039.7 8483.0 12330.0 W. Darfur 827.2 2017.7 1769.8 2555.9 3729.5 5601.0 7331.0 Greater Darfur 2883.4 7501.8 7561.2 11320.2 16581.6 24549.0 33142.0 Khartoum 1125.0 9903.5 14634.2 21753.0 26470.2 36596.0 36841.0 Gezira 4041.9 8355.8 11348.9 14803.2 22301.4 32817.0 41347.0 Others (11) States 9628.0 25196.2 28699.9 41403.1 58055.3 88526.0 137562.0 Total transfers 17678.3 50957.3 62244.2 89279.5 123408.6 182488.0 248892.0 (in percent of total transfers) N. Darfur 6.4 6.3 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.4 S. Darfur 5.3 4.5 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.6 5.0 W. Darfur 4.7 4.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 Greater Darfur 16.3 14.7 12.1 12.7 13.4 13.5 13.3 Khartoum 6.4 19.4 23.5 24.4 21.4 20.1 14.8 Gezira 22.9 16.4 18.2 16.6 18.1 18.0 16.6 Others (11) States 54.5 49.4 46.1 46.4 47.0 48.5 55.3 Source: National State Support Fund (NSSF). 5.35 In terms of fairness and transparency, Darfur officials claimed that the current transfer system lacks a clear objective structure and formula mechanism, as different transfer types are not transparent and unpredictable. This is partially related to the question of how total amount of vertical transfers (grant pool) is determined (e.g. whether as a share of a national resources, or of service delivery costs, or on political basis). Darfur‘s officials claimed that they do not have any idea about how the system works and how the vertical allocation of different types of transfers is made. 5.36 Officials in South and North Darfur report that they do not know whether the transfers‘ horizontal share is based upon a formula basis or what revenues it can expect in each year. There is a general concern and dissatisfaction about the nine criteria168 used by the central government to allocate transfers to various states. The three states of Darfur met and came up with recommendations to adjust the weights attached to four criteria (security 20 points, population density 20 points and financial performance 10 points) and to include nine additional criteria.169 State officials felt the current transfers system fails to provide adequate incentives for state governments to make concrete efforts in terms of fiscal capacity to mobilize own resources, sustainable public investment planning and motivation to select medium-term investment projects. This has a serious implication on effective budgetary planning at the state level. 5.37 Predictability is weak for both earmarked and block federal transfers. Deviations of actual transfers from budgeted amounts are high and fluctuated over the period under review as federal receipts coming well below budget. For instance, the overall percentage deviation of total transfers from budget amounted on average to 34% for North Darfur (Table 5.1) and 168 These criteria are: financial performance 20 points, population density 10 points, natural resources 10 points, human resources 10 points, infrastructure 10 points, education 10 points, health 10 points, security 10 points and average income per capita 10 points. 169 The nine additional criteria and their weights are: unemployment 10 points, economic infrastructure 10 points, geographical location 10 points, addressing impacts of war 20 points, displacement 20 points, transport 10 points, communication 10 points, return 5 points and private sector effectiveness 10 points. 168 38% in South Darfur (Table 5.2). This significant shortfall necessitates rationing of expenditures and deviations from budget plans. 5.38 Nonetheless, federal transfers play a growing major role as a main source of public expenditure financing in Darfur. Figure 5.8 shows that most state revenue comes from the federal government, with the exception of Red Sea state. For instance, federal transfers account on average for roughly 70 percent of the sample states‘ revenue in 2005. Federal transfers provided to North Darfur, for example, constituted and financed more than 80 percent of total revenue and total assignment allocations in 2005 compared with around 30 percent in 2000. More generally, the data highlight that Darfur states are moving towards high dependency on federal transfers to finance their budgetary assignments, especially in the last two years. More specifically, both North Darfur and South Darfur are heavily reliant on current transfers that are assigned to fulfill state‘s wage and salary expenditures, although the basis for distribution of current transfer across Northern states is non-transparent and unpredictable. Figure 5.8: Share of Federal Transfers in State Revenues, (percent of total state’s revenue) Red Sea 2005 2000 S. Darfur Gezira N. Kordofan W. Darfur N. Darfur 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Source: National State Support Fund (NSSF). Note: Figures are based on actual execution 5.39 The structure of federal transfers reflects several highlights. Most of the increase in transfers to Darfur states was earmarked, while the share of non-conditional transfers was marginal. For example, earmarked transfers constituted, on average, about more than 70 percent in South Darfur State during the period. While the predominance of earmarked transfers has increased significantly, the bulk is for payment of civil servants salaries. Current transfers represent more than three-fourth of earmarked transfers against a very limited share committed for development. Development Spending and Management Capacity 5.40 As emphasized above, development spending receives the lowest priority in Darfur budgets. This is consistent with preliminary findings of PER fiscal case studies of other northern states in Sudan.170 Interviews with Darfur state ministry of finance representatives reveal similar reasons behind the low development spending to those found in Red Sea and North Kordofan for example. This includes the crowding out of development spending by the payroll, as well as the assignment for responsibility for development expenditures to the locality level, which is relatively resource poor. Preliminary PER findings show development budgets have been the worst performing of the four chapters in state budgets. 170 As part of the PER work program on fiscal decentralization, state case studies are underway for Red Sea state (RSS), North Kordofan state (NKS), and Gezira state (GS). 169 5.41 Development spending in Darfur has historically been marginal. In 2002, total state spending on development per capita was only about US$0.2, US$0.1 and US$0.1 in North, South and West Darfur respectively. In comparison, total per capita spending amounted to US$10.60, US$5.30, and US$5.40 in the three states respectively. 5.42 State authorities also reported conflict-specific impacts on development efforts. First, fighting has damaged existing development projects and infrastructure. Second, insecurity has interrupted the implementation of on-going projects. Representatives from all three states mentioned the national government froze development projects at various times during the conflict. Third, the emergency relief demand that grew out of the conflict has overridden any development planning priorities. Fourth, security problems have lowered the ability to collect revenues, especially in localities hardest hit by the conflict where formal revenue collection has effectively ceased. This has lowered the pool of available resources for public spending in general, but has affected development disproportionately given the structure of expenditure assignments. Localities are largely responsible for development spending, with historically little assistance from federal funding. 5.43 What has been the record on development spending? The earlier discussion showed the low share of development spending relative to other chapters. Inspection of the time series for each state also reveals significant variation. Development spending in all Darfur states was consistently low between 2000 and 2002 (below 5 percent of total expenditures) and has remained low in West Darfur. By contrast, South Darfur has shown a steady rise in the share of expenditures devoted to development, from 1 percent of expenditures in 2001 and 2002, to 12 percent in 2004 and jumping to 21 percent in 2005. North Darfur saw a spike in development spending to 16 percent of the total state spending, before falling back and stabilizing at 8 percent for 2004 and 2005. 5.44 How do recent levels of development spending in Darfur compare to other states in the North? Figure 5.9 and 5.10 compare Darfur averages over the 2002 - 2004 periods (for which we have comparable data) to the three PER case study states, in both share and per capita terms. The data shows significant variation across the different states, with Darfur states tending to the lower end of the range. This is especially true in per capita terms, where all Darfur states are well below Gezira and Red Sea states. North Kordofan, which is considered less wealthy than Gezira and Red Sea states, comes out worst. While other disadvantaged states need to be reviewed, this suggests Darfur‘s low share of development spending may not be lower than other poor states in the North. The high per capita results for the Red Sea state partly reflect its small population (less than one-half of North and West Darfur and roughly one-quarter of South Darfur). Figure 5.9: Development Spending Share of Total Expenditures (2002-04 average) Among Darfur States Relative to PER Comparator Northern States North Darfur Red Sea RSS South Darfur GS Gezira West Darfur Greater Darfur Greater Darfur Greater Darfur North Kordofan NKS 170 Figure 5.10: Per capita Development Spending (US$ 2002-04 average) Among Darfur States Relative to PER Comparator Northern States North Darfur Red Sea RSS South Darfur Gezira GS West Darfur Greater Darfur Greater Darfur Greater Darfur North Kordofan NKS - 2 4 6 8 - 2 4 6 8 Note: Greater Darfur =simple average for three states 5.45 Development budgets for 2006 show dramatic planned increases, but as noted earlier, the credibility of plans is low. The 2006 national budget promises a large increase in federal transfers for development in northern states, from 39.0 billion in 2005 budget to 141.6 billion dinar.171 At the state level, this led to very large increases in development budgets, including in Darfur. Receipts of federal development transfers in 2006 for the Darfur states were not available to the team. However, MOFNE data on aggregate development transfer execution for the first five months show execution well below last year‘s performance at this time, both in level and percentage terms (Table 5.4). 5.46 There has been a significant drop in budget execution rates between 2005 and 2006 (Table 5.4). Figures for January through May 2006 show that total budget execution fell by almost two-thirds, from 28 to 10 percent, with significant falls in the execution of both local (from 28 to 12 percent) and foreign (from 39 to 5 percent) development transfers. Table 5.4: Execution of Federal Development Transfers, January May 2006 Relative to 2005 (Millions) 2006 2005 Month Local Foreign Total USD* Local Foreign Total USD* January 892 0 892 4.05 1202 56 1,258 5.72 February 1,661 300 1,961 8.91 1659 262 1,921 8.73 March 2,670 535 3,205 14.57 4775 1,128 5,903 26.83 April 4,088 759 4,847 22.03 5037 477 5,514 25.06 May 1,963 880 2,843 12.92 5972 361 6,333 28.79 Jan-May sub-total 11,274 2,474 13,748 62.49 18345 2,284 20,629 93.77 Annual figure 92,100 49,500 141,600 643.64 66587 5,876 72,463 329.38 Jan-May execution rate 12% 5% 10% 28% 39% 28% Source: MOFNE and World Bank estimates. *SDD/USD = 220. 5.47 Lastly, on development spending, there is of course activity conducted outside the budget, including both NGO/donor projects and community funding. It is beyond the scope of this note to take stock of these activities. Many NGOs and donors are active in Darfur, though most are focused on humanitarian activities. More unexpected was the information from state and locality representatives of significant community-funded development. The examples cited were mostly small-scale activities identified by the local residents themselves as priorities (e.g., bridges, wells). It is unclear whether this is a recent reaction to the limited funds available to the localities or if this has been a longstanding practice. 171 These figures include forecast foreign financing. 171 Development Planning and Management Capacity 5.48 State budgets have received more resources from the federal government, and slowly North and South Darfur are putting proportionally more towards development efforts. Continued efforts are needed to channel more resources to development, especially for West Darfur. But the success of development efforts will eventually depend on the ability to manage these resources well. Indications from the mission are that development planning capacity at the state level is very poor and a major constraint to effective resource management in the future. 5.49 The poor track record on development spending has gone hand in hand with very limited capacity in the state to plan and maintain development projects. The preliminary PER case study evidence suggests that this is a general finding for states in North Sudan, but Darfur seems especially hard hit by the effects of conflict. Discussions with Darfur representatives centered on the following reasons for poor capacity: Decentralization of responsibilities without significant training; poor coordination on development efforts across various levels of government; lack of financing for past effort; and lack of ICT and equipment to do the job. 5.50 On the positive side, state officials were unanimously positive about the quality of identification of development priorities by localities. Specifically, proposals are made by locality technical committees are regarded as appropriate. On the other hand, the locality lack the expertise for proper project appraisal, and quality feasibility studies are prohibited by the high cost. 5.51 Capacity building needs for state-level development planning and management are extensive, including all stages of project management. The PER action plan, which has been developed for northern states, includes specific capacity building efforts in key areas including public expenditure management, project management and implementation, and the budget process. Darfur officials could possibly get priority when these activities are being implemented. C. EMERGING PRIORITIES 5.52 There are important reforms needed to improve pro-poor spending and budget management overall at the state and locality level. Below are specific areas that could be addressed, and interventions that could be initiated immediately. These are building on specific findings from the first phase of the ongoing Public Expenditure Review, which assessed several areas related to federal and state level spending and capacity. The proposed measures are primarily focused on supply-side accountability, while further analysis is needed to better understand the demand-side context, including the specific needs of the expected beneficiaries and resulting value-added. 1. To build capacity for effective resource allocation and use: At both the state and federal levels: o Expand and deepen federal training problems currently in place for state and locality government officials. 2. To improve budget processes: Federal level: o Accelerate GFS adoption in the states to enable a consolidated budget. o Make the transfer of fund from the Federal to sub-national levels formula- based, predictability and transparent to recipients. 172 o Provide data directly to the States on monthly expected transfers. o Establish annual budget procedures to give States firm estimates of intergovernmental transfers and expected monthly cash flows to establish more credible State and Locality budgets. Estimates should distinguish between block and earmarked transfers. These procedures may consider suggested changes in budget calendars. State level: o Prepare guidelines to clarify revenue and expenditure assignments between the state and locality levels and lower budget deviations. These guidelines should incorporate budgeted levels of transfers consistent with the abovementioned federal estimates. o Improve revenue estimation, including development of analytical basis and database of supporting information. The latter may consider longer term instruments such as use of the national census as an instrument for data collection. o Outline steps for states and localities to follow the federal reporting format. o Develop program to make budget plans, and outturns, publicly available. o Prepare an empirical review of civil service size and composition, to clarify the trends over time. 3. For more effective development planning/management: Federal level: o Provide data for each state on development transfers (budgeted and outturns), including source of financing. State level: o States to provide a functional/sectoral breakdown of 2000-2005 expenditures and the 2006 budget, to enable an estimate of pro-poor spending. Joint: o Prepare guidelines for a more streamlined and effective procedure for development planning, including roles of various parties in development planning and execution (MOFNE, federal line ministries, state MoF and line ministries, and localities). D. CONCLUSIONS 5.53 This chapter has documented a persistent fiscal situation at the state and locality level in Darfur which is marked by weak revenue collection capacity and insufficient federal support, along with weak planning and budgeting capacity and poor budget credibility. The result has been that development spending has lagged other northern states, with adverse effects on human development outcomes and access to basic services (see MDG and basic services chapters). While local strategies are needed to address specific constraints in the three states, many of the needed reforms can only succeed with sufficient support and buy-in from the federal government. As such, it will be important to utilize and build on ongoing reform initiatives in other northern States, as well as national programs and projects, to create synergies that can benefit the states‘ capacities to deliver poverty reducing activities. 173 CHAPTER 6. AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT172 Prepared by Jack Van Holst Pellekaan (WB), with Abdalla el Hag Mohamed, Ahmed Hassan Hood, Yousif El Fadl Mubarak, Babo Fadlalla, Hassan Abdel Noor, Hassan Mohamed Hassan, Ibrahim Ahmed Adam, Ibrahim Dukheiri, Lucy Podszun, Lisa Overby and Sandra Pagoda. A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 6.1 This background paper provides a diagnosis of the current technical and economic status of Darfur‘s natural resources and the agricultural sector – broadly defined to include pastoralism, crop production, agro-pastoralism, forestry, as well as fruit and vegetable production. The aim is to evaluate the current problems facing all sub-sectors and draw conclusions on possible future actions for reconstruction and development for various sub- sectors. The implicit and explicit policies of the government have been reviewed. The background paper addresses the need to achieve the efficient management policy for natural resources, effective macroeconomic and sectoral policies, and land policy. It also examines the options for the most effective institutions to implement the policies identified as necessary for reconstruction and development of the agricultural sector. 6.2 The program, which assumes broad-based peace and security, has three themes, namely achieving sustainable use of natural resources, improving growth in the agricultural sector; and establishing efficient institutions and investments to support reconstruction and sustainable development of the agricultural sector. While the following diagnosis does point to broad strategic directions for consideration, it stops short of making specific recommendations and investment programs. Sources of Wealth and Growth 6.3 Darfur is made up of a multitude of different ethnic groups which engage in different livelihoods such as nomadic pastoralism and small-scale crop farming, and combinations thereof. The region‘s economic wealth, and its attraction to outsiders, stemmed from rich natural resources such as soil, water, forest and rangelands. For example, livestock exports from Darfur in the past accounted for an estimated 25 percent of all livestock exports from Sudan, Darfur was self reliant for food, and had active trading relations with other regions of Sudan and neighboring countries such as Chad which supplied non-food consumer goods in exchange for livestock and forest products such as gum arabic. 6.4 Darfur was essentially an agrarian community made up of nomads, sedentary small and large-scale farmers and mainly sedentary agro-pastoralists with substantial physical and social capital who also worked in jobs in the irrigation projects along the Nile and in the semi- mechanized farming areas in Gedarif and Blue Nile states, and sometimes migrated permanently to these areas. It was also an area largely neglected by the central government and hence state governments had inadequate funds for even minimal social services and infrastructure development. 6.5 Sustaining livelihoods has usually been precarious because of uncertain rainfall, and poverty among subsistence agro-pastoralists was widespread. Addressing these issues through public programs was always a challenge; addressing them now is a greater challenge 172 All annexes referred to in this chapter are available upon request. 174 Rural Areas and Agriculture Decapitalized 6.6 Today, after three years of devastating conflict and several decades of neglect, most small-scale farmers and agro-pastoralists have had their livelihoods either completely destroyed or seriously disrupted. For those families still living on their land, the traditional annual departure of males during the ―off season‖ to earn additional cash income as laborers in the towns, irrigation and semi-mechanized farming areas has been limited because of the insecurity for those left behind. At the same time nomads, with herds of various sizes to manage, face difficulties because their mobile traditions have also been disrupted. These traditions included seasonal movement along agreed stock routes and the grazing of animals on agricultural land after the harvest of annual crops, and access to well known watering points and communal grazing land. Decades of mismanagement of natural resources has made it necessary for nomads to travel south earlier than according to traditional practice. This resulted in a conflict over the use agricultural land and communal grazing areas. Finally, Darfur‘s natural resources have been destroyed by conflict. For example about 10 to 50 percent of natural forests (including national parks) have been cut down for firewood, charcoal production and for building. 6.7 The root cause of this disabled and dysfunctional agricultural sector has been an intense battle over the use of Darfur‘s natural resources as population rose rapidly, and the traditional institutions (weakened by inroads on their authority by the central government) were unable to effectively manage the allocation of land rights and natural resources. The overall result has been an estimated 33 percent decline in the agricultural sector‘s gross domestic product in Darfur since 2003. Moreover, the farmers now in IDP camps have suffered a greater relative loss of income. Recent estimates suggest that only about half of land that was cultivated before the onset of the crisis is currently being cultivated.173 6.8 Due to the conflict, large parts of rural Darfur have been de-capitalized in every sense. Physical capital such as community buildings, housing, storage facilities, boreholes and irrigation equipment, livestock flocks and herds, and the quality of the rangelands have been either destroyed or reduced in value. There are many exceptions to this generalization - such as in areas where military and tribal-based attacks, destruction of capital and disruption of productive capacity and livestock did not take place. Nevertheless, even areas not touched by the recent crisis, inter tribal tensions and conflict over resources persist. 6.9 Apart from the impact of the crisis on livelihoods, human capital has also been destroyed, leading to the loss of almost a full generation of education and training at all levels in many parts of Darfur, particularly in rural areas (see background paper on basic social services). The departure of skilled technicians and managers has left a big gap in the capacity of local governments and communities to provide leadership for reconstruction and development, and for sustained support services. Social capital has also been devastated because of the mistrust created by unprecedented assaults on communities and families in villages across Darfur. Communities have therefore been torn apart and the communal leadership, cohesion and relationships which previously provided for the equitable management of resources and for mutual support to tribes and villages have been undermined. B. DIAGNOSTIC: SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 6.10 Darfur, an area of approximately 510,000 square kilometers, one-fifth the size of all Sudan and almost the size of France, is well endowed with natural resources such as rich soils, significant forests and open woodlands, vast reserves of underground water, and rains once a year, which are not always reliable. This chapter addresses the first theme of this 173 WFP Survey – September 2006 175 background paper, namely that an important part of the reconstruction and development program that should start immediately to address the serious environmental destruction that is taking place. Unless this is done there is very little prospect for sustainable pastoral and agricultural development.174 Population Growth 6.11 Some 33 years ago the three Darfur states had a population estimated at only 1.3 million but by 1983 this had jumped to an estimated 3.5 million175, implying an annual rate of growth of about 9.5 percent. It was then a prosperous region with a stable ecosystem based on communally managed natural resources and traditional leaders still had substantial influence over the allocation of land rights. The many newcomers were welcome and there was a well organized system to allow access to the relatively abundant land. But the 1984/85 drought dealt a heavy blow to Darfur‘s confidence and wealth; crops were turned into dust and human and livestock deaths were numerous. After the drought the population growth rate slowed considerably but was still reported to be above 3 percent per annum (see MDG chapter). By 2005, the population of Darfur reached an estimated 6.5 million or almost 19 percent of Sudan‘s estimated population of 34.5 million.176 Rapid population growth in Darfur also resulted in an average population density of about 18 persons per square kilometer which is higher than most other regions in Sudan except for parts of Khartoum state, around Port Sudan and in the vicinity of Wad Medani. 6.12 As noted in the MDG chapter, urbanization in Darfur has doubled with the conflict, from 20 to 40 percent of the population in urban areas between 2003 and 2006. Many families currently living in IDP camps may decide not to return to their traditional rural areas and instead establish homes in the state capitals, or other major towns such as Kutum, Kebkabiya, Kas, Morney, Zalingei and Buram. As a result the proportion of the population living in rural areas in future will almost certainly remain lower than the pre-conflict estimate of 80 percent by 2015 (see MDG chapter for scenarios). 6.13 Darfur‘s people are one of its important resources, but the interaction between the population and Darfur‘s fragile resources has caused tension around land use and environmental problems. An objective assessment of the status of all Darfur‘s natural resources has not been done for decades. There is, however, enough evidence to suggest the destruction of many of Darfur‘s natural resources, after at least three decades of intense exploitation, are the reason for declining productivity of the pastoral, agricultural and forestry sub-sectors. The evidence on trends in productivity will be discussed in the next section. Climate 6.14 Darfur is characterized by short mild dry windy winters (December to February) and long hot rainy summers with adequate sunshine and great variations between day and night temperatures. The average daily temperature increase from north to south. The yearly normal minimum temperature is 20 ْ and the annual maximum temperature is 36 ْ centigrade. Humidity increases from north to south with particularly high humidity in hilly areas in the Jebel Marra area. 174 Annex A provides a summary of the status of Darfur‘s natural resources but also underlines the fragility of many of those resources. 175 Abduljabbar (2004), Central Bureau of Statistics. 176 The estimated population of Northern Sudan has been estimated at about 29.1 million in 2004 having grown over the last five years at a rate of about 2.8 percent per annum. Hence Darfur‘s estimated population is about 22 percent of the population of Northern Sudan. 176 6.15 Rainfall occurs during the summer and varies between almost zero mm in the North to 800 mm in the high rainfall woodland savannah in the southern parts of Darfur. It generally begins in June and ends in October with peaks reached in July or August. The incidence of rainfall is more variable in Darfur than any other region in Sudan (need data). However, anecdotal information suggests that annual rainfall is generally decreasing over the years and the isohyets are moving southwards. This southern movement has made areas such as North Darfur particularly vulnerable to drought. Darfur, like most other regions in Sudan suffered a severe drought in 1984/85 during which rainfall was far below the long term declining average. Fortunately, there were good rains in 1985 and since then, but full recovery of the vegetation has still not taken place. Soils and their Mismanagement 6.16 There are two main soil types in Darfur namely, sandy soils and dark clay soils. The sandy soils are mainly stabilized sand dunes known locally as qoz lands. These are generally flat to undulating with various depths. The soils are very permeable, excessively drained and therefore have low water holding capacity, but the vegetation of predominantly annual grasses and hardy tree species such as numerous acacias, though slow growing, are well adapted to these soils. The clay soils, including the soils of the well known Jebel Mara area, are part of the central plains of the Sudan. These are soils with high clay content and hence have substantial water holding capacity. They are the basis for a large expanse of intensive, productive agriculture. Other similar soil types are known locally as gardud, a non cracking clay soils, found in many parts Southern Darfur, and the naga‟, a cracking clay soil, which also occurs in Southern Darfur. However, these soils lack phosphates, which without fertilizer restrict their use. Box 6.1 describes the five agro-pastoral production systems in Darfur identified by Swift and Gray in 1989.177 6.17 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) reports that land degradation is widespread.178 UNEP notes that the top soils in Northern Darfur generally, and parts of Southern and Western Darfur (but on a smaller scale), are thin and low in carbon content. Excess exploitation by repeated grazing and cultivation without fallow of periods, as has been the case in areas used for mechanized farming, has depleted the carbon and nutrient content of these fragile soils, resulting in a loss of fertility and hence a sharp reduction in the capacity of such areas to recover. Unless areas subjected to this sort of abuse are fallowed (not used for crops for long periods of time and allowed to regenerate with acacia trees that fix nitrogen and convey other benefits), soil erosion is inevitable and desertification follows. The root causes of desertification are the exploitation of land for cultivation of crops, grazing and extreme pressure on forest resources, the absence of institutions to exert any controls over the intensity of cultivation on fragile soils, high stocking rates, and ultimately deforestation. Annex A (available on request) provides stark evidence about areas in Northern and Southern Darfur that have been seriously damaged in the space of only 13 years. 177 Swift J. and J. Gray, ―Report on Darfur Region Food Security Policy and Planning: Darfur Regional Government‖, Republic of Sudan (under assignment from the Overseas Development Agency), Mimeo, 1989 178 UNEP (2006). ―The Environment of Darfur‖ 177 Box 6.1: Classification of Production Systems by Swift and Gray Goz/Wadi farming in North Darfur (31.6 percent of all farmers) Millet is the staple crop, grown on large areas of sandy goz soil as well as on alluvial wadi soil. Households meet part of their annual home consumption. Watermelon is widely grown and intercropped, basically with millet and provides good income. Goz soils predominate in the north-east, while in Kebkabiaya alluvial soils are common. Livestock has traditionally been part of this system, with camel, sheep cattle and goats all owned in small numbers by farming households. Goz/Wadi farming in South Darfur (34.5 percent) This is similar to the north but the rainfall is higher resulting in more stable yields and variety of crops. In the past, shifting cultivation was practiced; however, population pressure due to growth and immigration from north Darfur has led to continued cultivation of the same area. Millet is the dominant food crop, mostly on goz, followed by sorghum and groundnut is grown as cash crop. Gum Arabic production was in the past practiced by at least one third of the farmers. Livestock, namely cattle and goats are raised. Jebel Mara mixed farming (7.2 percent) Annual precipitation ranges from 450mm to 500mm. Such reasonably high rainfall often resulted in grain sufficiency and even surplus. The system is characterized by extensive mille and sorghum production in low lands as well as horticultural production using irrigation. A variety of horticultural crops are produced. Camel, sheep and goat pastoralists (5.7 percent) Camel, sheep and goat pastoralists are concentrated mainly in North Darfur. Main tribes are Zagawa and Meidob. The fragile system has consistently inflicted major livestock loses during drought and famine periods; much more in North Darfur than in South Darfur. Cattle pastoralists (8.6 percent) Cattle pastoralism is common in South Darfur and was previously mainly nomadic and practiced by Arabs. Sheep and goats are also kept. Cattle pastoralists used to migrate in a bidirectional manner (north-south wards). They migrate to the North during the rainy season and south during the dry season in search of pasture and water; and some currently move west because of insecurity. Pastoralist also cultivate along their route of migration, mainly millet, sorghum, groundnut and okra. 6.18 Immediate action to arrest further soil degradation is needed. It is therefore suggested that an inventory of Darfur‘s natural resources is undertaken, and that customary laws giving the appropriate authority (perhaps a democratically constituted Native Administration) legal power to regulate areas cultivated and stocking rates in gazetted environmentally fragile areas in Northern Darfur. Forests and Rangelands being Plundered 6.19 Rangelands are open forests with a low frequency of tree and scrub cover which allows grass to grow and which can then be used for the grazing of livestock. Prior to the conflict, land classification studies and surveys assessed South and West Darfur as the wealthiest amongst states of Northern Sudan in terms of forest resources, and on equal footing with forests in Southern Sudan. The current extent of forests in Darfur is unknown but, estimates in the National Forest Inventory, 1998 put the gross area of exploitable growing 178 forests at 24.25 million feddan, equivalent to half of all forest areas in Northern Sudan (see Table 6.1).179 6.20 Using satellite imagery the Africover mapping study in 2004 estimated that tree cover in Darfur had declined at an annual rate of 0.54 percent to 22.85 million feddan. The exercise clearly shows the preponderance of forests in South and West Darfur although none are dense forests. The forest cover is now probably depleted by increased resort to firewood and charcoal production. Table 6.1: Generalized Land Use in Darfur’s Three States and Northern Sudan - 1998a/ Area (‘000 feddan) Region Cultivated Grazing Forestry Populated b Unclassified Total Darfur (Three States) 9,639 4,570 24,252 643 4,498 43,602 Northern Sudan 49,909 30,226 48,504 4,189 16,398 149,226 Darfur/N. Sudan (%) 19.3 15.1 50.0 15.3 27.4 29.2 Source: National Forest Inventory, 1998 a/This inventory only covers areas north of latitude 10˚N, except insecure areas. b/ In urban and peri-urban areas. 6.21 Gazetted areas of forests (or areas are under process of being gazetted) are substantially less than areas classified as forests above.180 The Forest Policy for Sudan of 1932 recognized two types of forest reserves, namely central forest reserves and provincial forest reserves serving national and local needs respectively. The 1986 Statement of Forest Policy recognized additional categories in community and private forests. 6.22 In 1993, a Presidential decree meant that the area of registered forest climbed to 12 million feddan equivalent to 2 percent of the total area. This has since doubled again to 25 million feddans. Of this total about Darfur accounts for 28 percent of the area of all reserved forests, or forests under process of reservation in Sudan (see Table 6.2). Another 42 million feddans (equivalent to 7 percent of Sudan‘s land area) is declared as wildlife reserves. Table 6.2: Number and Areas of Reserved Forests and Areas in Stages of Reservation (2003) State Reserved Under Process of Total (gazetted) Reservation No. of Area No. of Area No. of Area Forests (‗000 Forests (‗000 Forests (‗000 feddan) feddan) feddan) North Darfur 9 17 49 192 58 209 South Darfur 38 3,506 26 1,012 64 4,517 West Darfur 36 499 36 1,811 72 2,310 Total Darfur 83 4,021 111 3,015 194 7,036 Sudan 1,105 11,414 1,222 13,610 2,327 25,025 Darfur/Sudan (%) 7.5 35.2 9.1 22.2 8.3 28.1 Source: Various Annual Reports by the National Forest Corporation, and 100 Hundred Years Anniversary Report (2002). 6.23 Thus, about 25 million feddans are classified as forest, but only 7 million feddan are either gazetted as forest reserves or under process for gazetting. Over time, Darfur‘s rich 179 This includes forests species which range in from Acacia Desert Scrub in North Darfur to Woodland Savanna in South East of South Darfur, and Special Areas of Woodland Savanna in South and West Drafur 180 Forest reservation is an administrative and legal process established in 1923. It is a lengthy process that involves 14 steps in eight government departments following which an area of land is declared a ―reserved forest‖ in the Government Gazette. 179 reserves of forests have substantially from the lack of protection by National Forest Corporation (NFC) guards and been subject to indiscriminate felling. It is not known what is currently left of the reserves in terms of tree stocks. There is, however, evidence that illegal cutting and saw milling continues in the reserves on a substantial scale, including pit saws in some of the IDP camps. Nevertheless, the largest problem is almost certainly the high consumption of firewood, as described below. Firewood and the Dangers of a Free Good 6.24 Darfur‘s relatively rich forest resources compared with the rest of Sudan, and its remote location from other sources of fuel such as liquid petroleum gas (and hence its high price) have resulted in a heavy use of wood for cooking in inefficient stoves and for other sources of energy. Available data show that the per capita consumption of firewood in the three Darfur States is higher than in the other parts of Sudan, while the opposite is true for the consumption of charcoal. The explanation is that under normal circumstances the majority of the population in Darfur lives in rural areas where firewood is abundant and collection is usually free. High consumption comes out clearly from the 2006 SHHS (see MDG chapter). We estimate that Darfur, with about 19 percent of the population of Sudan, consumes 31 percent of all firewood consumed in all Sudan (see further below). 6.25 The national annual consumption of firewood and charcoal by the household sector in all Sudan was estimated by the National Energy Assessment in 2001 to be 8.3 and 2.0 million tons respectively. Urban households use more charcoal which understandably consumes predominantly firewood. Using these aggregate consumption estimates, the implicit average per capita annual consumption of firewood and charcoal in Sudan is calculated to be 0.27 and 0.07 ton respectively, which is much (70 percent) higher than the Sudanese average. On the other hand the per capita consumption of charcoal in Darfur is 40 percent lower than the Sudanese average. Similarly, the use of agricultural by-products as source household energy, in Darfur, is very low. 6.26 The obvious question is: How long can Darfur continue to burn firewood at such high rates? The appropriate way to measure this is to compare annual consumption against the allowable cut. Table 6.3 shows clearly that in Darfur the estimated annual consumption of wood products in 2001 was 10 percent below the allowable cut (6,074 thousand cubic meters) which was exceptional in that all other regions in Sudan except Bar El Gazal were exceeding allowable cuts. But that was in 2001 and that cutting of forests has accelerated. For example, around one camp, the collection of firewood and grass accounted for 70 percent of livelihoods.181 A recent FAO survey found that 70 percent of Darfur‘s households collect firewood for their own use and for sale. Updated estimates of both annual wood consumption and the allowable cut are needed. Table 6.3: Annual Firewood and Charcoal Consumption and Allowable Cut in Darfur and Other Selected Regions in Sudan (‘000 cubic meters) Region Consumption Allowable Cut Firewood Charcoal Total Darfur Region 4,404.5 948.8 5,454.3 6,074.5 Khartoum 1,609.7 1,821.3 3,431.0 19.7 Northern Region 589.3 319.0 908.3 11.9 Kordofan Region 2,214.7 1,091.3 3,306.0 899.7 Bahr El Gaza 1,550.0 315.4 1,431.4 11,248.0 Source: Second National Energy Assessment, year. Note charcoal figures are wood equivalents. 181 See Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, Conflict, Camps and Coercion: The Continuing Livelihood Crisis in Darfur, World Food Programme Report, June 2006, page 105 180 6.27 The NFC imposes royalties and taxes on fuelwood production. Usually traders obtain permits from NFC against payment of a royalty before going to forest areas, where rural workers collect fuelwood. In addition there are taxes collected at several check points along the road (see Table 6.4). It has been reported that areas controlled by SLA/M the traders pay tax, SD 15,000 per lorry, for permit to access the forest. The initial charge is SD 2,000 per cubic meter of wood. Table 6.4: Royalties and Taxes on Fuelwood collected by Forest National Corporation Unit Tax (SD) Volume/weight Unit Tax (SD/Kg) Firewood Lorry load (Comer) 10,000 7 c.m (3 tons) 3.33 Firewood Lorry load (Themes) 14,000 14 – 20 c.m (7 tons) 2.00 Firewood Lorry load (Nissan) 28,000 20 c.m (12 tons) 2.33 Firewood Camel load 400 na na Firewood donkey load 200 25 to 30 Kg 6.67 Charcoal, sack 1000 30 to 35 Kg 28.57 Source: Alternative Fuel Study, 2005 prepared by Relief International. 6.28 Insecurity has reduced the supply of fuelwood to the cities and towns. As a consequence prices of firewood and charcoal have soared. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the prices of firewood and charcoal in various El Fasher markets. For example, charcoal prices per sack rose from SD 1,200 in 2002 to SD 3,000 in 2005. The negative impact on poor households has been devastating, especially given the higher unit price for the smaller packages. Charcoal prices can be expected to continue to rise as the availability of firewood declines, and taxes and royalties increase. Table 6.5: Prices of Firewood in El Fasher Markets (2005) Unit Weight (Kg) Price (SD) Price (SD per Kg) A) Umdafaso Market Rubta (large ―bunch‖) 8.14 400 to 500 49.2 – 61.4 Rubta (small ―bunch‖) 1.74 100 57.4 B) El Mawashi Market Hizma 8.63 450 to 550 52.1 – 63.7 Source: Alternative Fuel Study Survey, Relief International, 2005. Table 6.6: Prices of Charcoal in El Fasher Markets (2005) Unit Weight (Kg) Price (SD) Price (SD per Kg) A) Um Dafaso Jute sack, 33.65 3,000 to 3,200 89.2 – 95.1 Plastic bag 1.74 200 114.9 Plastic bag 0.8 100 125 B) El Mawashi Jute sack 34.0 2,800 to 3,000 85.3 – 88.2 Source: Alternative Fuel Study Survey, Relief International, 2005. 6.29 While rural population can generally obtain domestic firewood for no cost, urban consumers pay market prices. Despite the increases in market prices, demand has risen relentlessly. The price elasticity of demand for cooking fuel such as firewood must be high. One option to reduce the destruction of forests that has resulted in serious externality costs is to find substitutes for raw firewood. Strategies to cope with the inevitable rise in charcoal prices include more efficient stoves. A more sustainable strategy would be to develop alternative sources of energy such as Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) and solar energy. 181 Potential for Liquefied Petroleum Gas 6.30 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) has been used in the region since the 1970s. However, prices were high because cylinders could only be re-filled in Khartoum or Nyala. In 2000 the NFC launched its famous Sudagaz project, which provided LPG cylinders on credit to the formal sector. However, NFC lacked the necessary infrastructure and logistics to maintain the service, many cylinders leaked. Consumption of LPG in Darfur was negligible - less than 0.15 percent of the national consumption in 2002 (see Table 6.7) 6.31 LPG consumption by households in Darfur has increased since 2000, mainly due to government policy encouraging production. Two LPG companies, Nile Petroleum and Abersi Gas, operate in El Fasher and Nyala, and the former with depots, dominates the market. The present monthly LPG sale, in El Fasher, is estimated at 37.5 tons, equivalent to about 3,000 cylinders of 12.5 Kg capacity. Given estimated household consumption, the LPG penetration rate in El Fasher is probably still far less than 5 percent. Table 6.7: LPG Consumption in the Northern States (2002) State Quantity Share of Market (metric ton) (percent) Khartoum 22,2622 70.4 Gezira 3,0026 9.5 River Nile 1,4413 4.5 Kassala 1,2596 3.9 Red Sea 1,1148 3.4 White Nile 1,0242 3.2 Northern 8773 2.8 Blue Nile 2,843 0.9 North Kordofan 3,669 1.2 South Kordofan 137 0.07 North Darfur 58 0.04 South Darfur 264 0.09 Total 31,6791 100 Source: MEM, 2005 6.32 The cost of kerosene per gallon, and for refilling LPG cylinder (12.5 Kg) in Darfur is high compared to the cost in Khartoum (Table 6.8). For El Geneina there is no depot and empty cylinders still need to be transported to Nyala by road for refilling. Table 6.8: Costs of Kerosene and LPG in Darfur and Khartoum (SD per unit), 2006 Product Location (unit) Khartoum Kassala El Fasher Kabkabiya Nyala El Geneina Kerosene (per gallon) na na 800 1,250 Na na LPG (per 12.5 Kg 1,100 to 1,300 3,000 to na 1,700 4,000 to cylinder) 1,500 3,500 4,500 Source: Mission estimates. na = not available at the time of preparing this draft. 6.33 LPG demand is price elastic and offers an attractive substitute for the limited firewood supplies in Darfur. Supplying LPG at attractive prices would probably encourage many consumers to substitute LPG for firewood for cooking. Such changes in consumer preferences could be reinforced if mechanisms could be devised to improve the incentives for consumers in Darfur to use LPG. The most effective approaches could be to provide access 182 to credit for purchasing LPG household cooking equipment for households and, if it can be managed, subsidize the cost of gas containers eligible for use only in Darfur. 182 Options for Household Energy Conservation 6.34 Introduction of improved charcoal stoves started as early as the mid 1980s with an improved charcoal stove, Kenyan Ceramic Jiko (KCJ), or El Sorour as named in Sudan, available on the market (Energy Research Institute (ERI) and CARE-Sudan). The stove is made of two different materials: metal cladding and a ceramic liner. Its efficiency, about 26 percent, is relatively high compared to that of traditional metal charcoal stove, 10 to 15 percent. Another improved charcoal stove, Azza, inspired from the Thai-bucket design was also introduced by the FAO/NFC-Fuelwood development, but followed similar trend as the KCJ. Domestic production of stoves began particularly Khartoum and El Obeid, but it was not commercially viable. The price of improved charcoal stoves was high relative to traditional ones and combined with the price of charcoal, household demand was limited. 6.35 Another traditional charcoal stove (Mubkhar) made of unburned clay proved very efficient, even better than El Sorour stove, based on laboratory tests conducted by the Energy Research Institute. It originated in the Gezira area and gradually found use everywhere in the country. The stove is made of local materials (clay, dung/grass, metal mesh), simple to manufacture and cheap. However, its life span is often very short. Mubkhar stove is presently produced throughout in Darfur by potters (usually women) and sold in the market places side- by-side with other pottery products. The reason for high customer demand is its low price (SD 100) and high efficiency, even though its lifetime is very short (un-fired clay), about one week depending on level of use. Producing clay stoves is also an important source of income. 6.36 Numerous other stoves have been designed and tested. The FAO/NFC-Fuelwood Development Project undertook considerable dissemination on improved mud stoves, throughout the country but concentrated in Darfur. Two versions, one for normal cooking practices and the other for Kisra (local food similar to pancake) making, were introduced. The stove is made of locally available materials (clay, dung), and simple to manufacture. The strategy was based on self made stoves, market based methods of dissemination. 6.37 The dissemination of improved mud woodstoves and the Mubkhar charcoal stove in Darfur has been feasible not only in the IDP camps, but also in the towns. Additional support for dissemination is needed to ensure widespread use of improved stoves in Darfur and hence more efficient use of wood fuels. In future there will probably a wider choice of wood stoves since research on more efficient stoves continues. 6.38 The future choice by consumers will depend on costs of fuels which will in part be determined by policies in Darfur on access to natural resources such as firewood and charcoal. The efficiency of different stoves will affect consumer choice, but capital costs are likely more important. Table 6.9 summarizes various options available currently, ranked according to one measure of efficiency, namely the cost per unit of energy. It is clear that the technically most efficient options are the LPG gas burner and improved woodstoves. It is suggested that policies be designed to provide incentives for producing these improved wood stoves in urban and rural areas of Darfur rather than the traditional three stone open fireplaces.183 182 To the extent that this policy subsidizes industry in Darfur, this distortion should be weighed against the benefits for Darfuris in terms of employment and incomes. 183 Refer to work by the NGO Practical Action 183 Table 6.9: Useful Energy Cost of Different Fuels and Cooking Stoves in El Fasher, 2006 Fuel Heat value Type of Stove Overall Fuel Cost Estimated Thermal Cost of Useful (MJ/Kg)a/ Efficiency (SD/Kg) Energy (%) (SD/MJ) LPG 47.3 Gas burner 53.6 240 9.46 Firewood 19.0 Improved 22.8 56.9 13.13 mudstove Firewood 19.0 Three-stone 10 56.9 29.95 fireplace Charcoal 30.0 Kanoon El 26 104.26 13.37 Serour (KCJ) Charcoal 30.0 Traditional 14.1 104.26 24.65 metal stove Source: staff estimates. a/ mega joules per kilogram. National Forest Policy and Implications for Darfur 6.39 Forest policy is perhaps the most dynamic of rural policies in Sudan. The first policy statement issued in 1932, divided the responsibilities and forest administration between the provinces and the centre. In 1986, a new policy endorsed by the Central Minister of Agriculture recognized Central (Federal), Provincial (State), Institutional, Community and Private Forests. The National Forest Program (NFP) framework originates from a number of international initiatives particularly the Tropical Forest Action Programme (TFAP) launched and co-sponsored by FAO, the World Bank and UNDP in 1985 and revised in 1991. The concept has been broadened to encompass a variety of actions (―forest-specific‖ as well as ―forest-related‖), including capacity building for the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests.184 The last two forest policy revisions, of 1986 and 2005, used the NFP framework. Hence the 2005 National Forest Policy Statement can be reviewed to assess if it addresses the problems and meets the aspirations of the people of Darfur. If not, an amendment could be introduced in a participatory manner involving all stakeholders. 6.40 Forest policy in Darfur needs to address resource ownership and management, acknowledge the productive role of forests in producing wood for all purposes, focus attention on the importance of non-wood forest products, fodder and browse and protection of watershed, identify biological diversity, local heritage (haraz trees in agrosylvo-pastoral system and gum arabic as well as desertification control. This policy can be at national or state levels. Specific acts or laws can be passed by the federal or state authorities to protect particular trees or shrub species.185 Of course, enforcement of forest law, like other laws, depends on the prevalence of overall law and order. 6.41 National Forest Policy Statements (as in 1986) have called for particular aforestation and reforestation arrangements. The policy requires that owners of irrigated and rainfed agricultural holdings put 5 and 10 percent of their respective areas into shelterbelts or woodlots. The forest policy for Darfur could likewise specify the obligation of owners of all types of forest holdings to have management plans for them which prescribe harvest and 184 The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests in 1997 agreed that the term NFP is a generic term for a wide range of approaches to sustainable forest management to be applied at national and sub regional levels. 185 For example, trees such as Heglig ( Balanites aegyptiaca), Tebeldi (Adansonia digitata) etc are already protected by local and central orders. 184 tree/shrub replacement modalities. Such forest policy could specifically encourage the concept of home tree/shrub nurseries producing both forestry, horticultural and shade tree species. 6.42 Despite the pressure on clearing land for agriculture it is proposed that the existing forest reserves in Darfur should be maintained, although grazing could be permitted with strict stocking rate controls. Some range scientists claim that forests and woodlands provide more than 50 percent of fodder needs of the national herd and the entire needs of wildlife. In some areas in North Darfur where forests have tree-less plains, livestock grazing should be banned until the natural vegetation has regenerated. 6.43 Institutionally a number of issues need to be resolved, namely: (a) whether the Range and Pasture Administration (RPA) should be located in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests or in the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries; (b) strengthen the RPA in all aspects, administratively, technically and financially; (c) revise National Forest Policy to specifically acknowledge the role of forests (reserved or otherwise, natural or plantation) in providing fodder and browse material for livestock and wildlife. 6.44 South Darfur has the last remaining substantial forests in Northern Sudan and are hence of regional and national importance. These forests are key to preserving Darfur‘s biodiversity and environment as well as the sustainable generation of income from livestock and various forest products. One option is that the FNC, in consultation with communities, be given the financial resources to strengthen its management of all forest reserves in Darfur, enforce controls on tree cutting to ensure sustainable future forest production, speed up the rate at which reserves are gazetted, stimulate public and private tree planting programs, and also explore alternative sources of natural fuel for cooking for households. 6.45 Given the extraordinarily high rate of fuel wood consumption in Darfur urgent measures are needed to find alternative cooking fuels. LPG and solar energy are the most obvious options, in addition to solar (see infrastructure background paper). Given the urgency of reducing fuel wood consumption it may be useful, in addition to promoting the use of LPG, to consider subsidized kerosene for all Sudan as part of a national environmental policy which would further reduce the pressure on the demand for fuel wood and charcoal – much of it originating in Darfur. Water Supplies Plentiful but Variable and Costly 6.46 The availability and use of Darfur‘s water resources for human, industrial and agricultural consumption is outlined in the infrastructure summary. There are broadly two main substantial and available underground water resources in Darfur, namely underground water in aquifers in sandstones that can be found below about 60 percent of Darfur‘s area; and the remaining 40 percent of Darfur, referred to geologically as the central basement complex, that underlies the central plains where water is trapped underground in volcanic rock formations. In addition to this there are a variety of surface water resources which will be summarized in a qualitative sense because quantitative information on the extent of surface water resources is not available. Irrespective of the supplies of water, its management will be crucial but faces a number of constraints; they will be listed below. Underground Water 6.47 The two main aquifers in Darfur are the Baggara aquifer and the Nubian sandstone aquifer. (Table 6.10). The Baggara covers about 10 percent of the area of Darfur; water can usually be found at depths of 50 to 100 meters with estimated storage capacity of 3,000 million cubic meters. The Nubian sandstone covers 50 percent of Darfur and water is found 185 at similar depths to the Baggara. The estimated stored water in this aquifer is, however, very much larger at about 600,000 billion cubic meters. The yield from boreholes in these aquifers is as high a 100 cubic meters per hour and is used for livestock, irrigation and domestic consumption. 6.48 This abundance of water is extracted through thousands of hand dug wells, tubewells and costly large diameter boreholes. Water yards for providing water for human and animal consumption are numerous, and had been equipped with various types of pumps powered by hand, diesel, electrical and solar pumps. However, there is inadequate information at many sites where water is extracted. 6.49 The second major underground water sources are in the rock formations of the central basin complex which cover about 40 percent of Darfur‘s area, including the Jebel Mara agricultural area. A smaller part of this complex covers the south-west part of South Darfur. In this complex, water from rainfall, wadis or springs is trapped underground in volcanic rock formations, typically at depths of 30 to 50 meters. Yields from boreholes are usually less than 3 cubic meters per hour, but can drop quickly during the dry season and hence cannot be used for irrigation. Table 6.10: Estimated Underground Water Resources in Darfur Name of Aquifers Area Coverage Stored Max. Aquifer Typical Annual and Basins Water Depth Depth of Recharge Capacity Water Level (% of Darfur‘s (meters) (million cubic area and actual meters) area, sq. km) Baggara 10% 60,000 300,000 3,000 50-100 20 Nubian Sandstone 50% 260,000 600,000 1,000 50-100 - Sahara Basin 200,000 200,000 1,000 50 50 - Um Kedada B. 55,000 50,000 1,000 20-100 20 - Wadi El Ku B. 3,600 100,000 1,000 30-90 60 - Disa Outlier B. 300 na 1,000 40-50 Na Source: Background paper prepared by Eidam Abubakr Ismail in 2006/2007 6.50 Water in the basement complex is less abundant than in the aquifers. Hand dug wells are difficult to construct and boreholes need considerable preliminary geophysical investigation. Most existing boreholes are equipped with hand pumps and discharges and about 5,000 have been drilled in Darfur. Most of the emergency programs have relied on this borehole technology, but a number have dried up as a result of the high demand for water. Surface Water186 6.51 The main sources of surface water in Darfur are traditional sources such as (i) pools, lakes and springs and lakes; (ii) hafirs (man made earth tanks); and dams constructed across water courses. i) Traditional Sources. Temporary pools are various types of natural depressions in the ground which usually dry up after the rainy season. Water quality is usually not good. The lakes and springs are more permanent and vary in size. Examples are the Kundi and Buta Raya lakes (Buram Locality in South Darfur), Dariba Lake and various (Jebel Marra), and Lake Enzi (Wadi Salih locality in South 186 Background paper by Eidam Abubakr Ismail 186 Darfur). The water in these sources, used by nomads, are also generally are not of good quality. ii) Hafirs. These are earth tanks excavated in clay soils to reduce water losses through infiltration. Their size varies but they generally hold 5,000 to 6,000 cubic meters each. There are three types of hafirs depending on their structure namely the Khor hafirs which are fed by channels leading into the hafir, the Jebel Catchment hafirs which are fed by water that is caught in embankments. Both esee hafirs have the disadvantage in that they collect considerable amounts of silt as well as water. The third source is self catchment hafirs which can be as big as 10,000 cubic meters. They are commonly built in clay pans and collect less silt and hence last longer than the others mentioned already. There are an estimated 120 such hafirs concentrated in the north west of West Darfur. iii) Dams. These are of two types, namely earth dams and masonry dams and their capacities vary from 500,000 to 4.5 million cubic meters and are very popular. They have been built mainly in the northern and western states of the Darfur region. The oldest is the Mellitt dam built in 1947 with a capacity of 1 million cubic meters. Water Management187 6.52 The constraints facing the effective management of water resources in Darfur include the absence of institutions responsible for overall water management and agreed water use policies, as well as inadequate measurement and monitoring of water use and management of water sheds. The lack of controls on the use of water for irrigation – private or public – and the absence of education of impact of poor sanitation and mismanagement of the environment on the quality of water resources are also major concerns. 6.53 It has been estimated that the amount of water required annually by livestock in Darfur is about 300 million cubic meters.188 Underground water used for irrigation is obtained from the large aquifers. Without information on areas irrigated, estimates are hazardous, but could be placed, at most, 100 million cubic meters. With domestic and industrial use accounting for another 100 million cubic meters, it is tentatively estimated that the total annual consumption of water in Darfur is about 500 million cubic meters. This rate of consumption is clearly well within the available sustainable water supplies (Table 6.10). However, the distribution of supply is not even. For example, the future demand for stock may exceed supplies if these routes run across the basement complex because of the location specific nature of underground water in this complex. Similarly the location of irrigation schemes will need to be restricted to the Baggara and Nubian sandstones aquifers. A policy issue that will need close attention in future planning of water use will be cost recovery. Authority over the Management of Natural Resources and Land Rights 6.54 Sustainable management of natural resources and land is a crucial precondition for the sustainable growth of livestock, crop and forestry production. Traditionally the Native Administration had authority over natural resource management and the allocation of land use rights. Since the 1970 Unregistered Land Act the traditional powers of the Native Administrations over land allocation and the management of natural resources were abolished and substituted with local government. But in the absence of an active local government most local issues that involve a limited number of parties in locations where traditional leaders are 187 Eidam, op cit 188 Verification of assumptions about number of livestock and the calculation of animal units is needed. 187 acknowledged to have authority are still settled by the Native Administrators, usually the sheikhs. The Native Administration, along with many tribes that they lead, have maintained the authority to collect livestock taxes which are still distributed in part to the Native Administrators and the local government also receives the largest share. To the extent that local government remains dependent on the Native Administration for collecting its revenue there is a practical, if somewhat tense, inter-dependence (see governance chapter). Emerging Priorities 6.55 As the population of Darfur increased and competition for access to fixed natural resources became more intense, but the traditional authority of the Native Administration over natural resource use and the allocation of land rights were increasingly ignored. The vacuum of traditional authority allowed more frequent resort to violent resolution of conflict and consequently long standing relationships and trust were fractured and hostility became uncontrollable. This vacuum also led to the appointment of statutory authorities to exercise the management of land us and land rights which also cause friction. Unless the vacuum of authority is filled with a locally accountable leadership that has both moral and legal authority to manage natural resource use and the allocation of land rights, it is extremely unlikely that can be sustained, or that private sector driven reconstruction and development will occur. It would seem that an institutional arrangement that will fill the vacuum of moral and legal authority over natural resource management and the allocation of land rights are urgent policy priorities, as part of the work of the Darfur Land Commission and the governance reform agenda. 6.56 Aggregate water supplies in Darfur in relation to aggregate demand are sufficient, but the distribution of supplies and demand do not match well. There are many locations where water is present but the supply is variable during the dry season and likely to be less than the longer term demand. It is therefore suggested that increased intensive efforts are made to explore a range of strategies for water harvesting which have already shown to be successful in a number of locations (see infrastructure chapter). C. DIAGNOSTIC: AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND, STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH Structure and Relative Importance of Darfur Agriculture 6.57 Agriculture in Darfur is part of the traditional rain-fed farming sub-sector in Sudan. Table 5.11 shows that for Sudan as a whole during 2000 to 2005 the annual value of crop and livestock production accounted for about 40 percent of GDP. Crop production is dominated by traditional rain-fed farming – typically made up of small-scale farms which are typical of the farming systems in Darfur. Limited areas of Southern Darfur are used for semi- mechanized farming where farms are large and crops are produced using mechanization as well as manual labor. 6.58 Livestock is an important sub-sector in Darfur and the rest of Sudan, accounting for about 22 percent of total GDP and 53 percent of agricultural output. Indeed, the relative importance of the livestock sub-sector in agriculture has increased over time. For the decade 1981/82 to 1990/91 livestock accounted for an average of 37 percent of GDP from agriculture in Sudan; in the following ten years it averaged 47 percent and for the five years 2000 to 2005, 53 percent. This has been an important structural change in Sudan‘s agricultural sector. As mentioned above, Darfur accounts for most of the remaining forestry areas in Northern Sudan and the dominant open forests contribute substantially to the livestock industry, but in relative terms it is only a small part of GDP from the agricultural sector. 188 6.59 There are no official estimates of GDP by state in Sudan, but we have sought to construct estimates for Darfur (Table 6.12). The exercise suggests that traditional rain-fed sub-sector (including livestock, crops and forestry) accounts for the bulk of the region‘s GDP – probably about 65 percent -- with services making up most of the rest. Livestock probably generate about 60 percent of the agricultural sector‘s GDP. 6.60 The traditional rain-fed farming system includes the large rangelands which are also the location for most of Sudan‘s livestock. Table 6.11 implies that in 2005 the traditional rain-fed farming areas and livestock accounted for about two-thirds of agricultural GDP (although less in drought years; see also Annex Table C1). This share is nonetheless less than the 70 percent of the rural population living and working in traditional farming areas. In contrast the semi-mechanized areas produced 1.2 percent of agricultural GDP but only about 0.7 percent of the rural population lives there. Irrigated areas produce about 26 percent of GDP from agriculture, and are occupied by about 12 percent of the population. Of course, there are annual variations due to seasonal conditions, and there are absentee lease holders in both the semi-mechanized and irrigated areas, nevertheless the broad picture is a skewed distribution of per capita GDP across the three major farming systems. 6.61 This picture applies precisely to Darfur. In relative terms, those who live and work in large numbers in the traditional small-scale farming areas will always be poorer than those in other farming systems until there is a reconstruction of average farm sizes and substantial technological change to allow productivity increases. In Darfur it is possible that some nomads are relatively better endowed and have higher average incomes than sedentary small- scale farmers. On the other hand, nomads‘ wealth depends on their continued access to communal grazing lands in various areas in Darfur which in recent years has become extremely problematic. Table 6.11: Sudan’s GDP, by Sector and Sub-Sector - 2000-2005 Sectors/Sub-sectors Annual Average 2000 to 2005 (1981/82 prices) Average GDP Growth Rate Share of GDP (SD billion) (percent pa) (percent) Agriculture 654.9 3.6 40.8 Irrigated 172.3 7.0 10.7 Rain-fed Semi-Mechanized 8.3 13.6 0.5 Rain-fed Traditional 82.2 2.8 5.1 Livestock 349.7 3.4 21.8 Forests 42.4 3.7 2.6 Industry 429.6 22.6 26.8 Petroleum 224.0 115.1 14.0 Manufacturing 118.8 5.1 7.4 Electricity and Water 21.4 5.5 1.3 Building and Construction 65.4 10.9 4.1 Services 520.6 4.5 32.4 Government 163.1 10.5 10.2 Non-Government 357.5 2.3 22.3 Total 1605.1 7.1 100.0 Source: Ministry of Finance and National Economy, General Administration for Macroeconomic and Policy and Programs the Central Bank. 6.62 Table 6.12 below provides a preliminary estimate of GDP in Darfur, based on estimated agricultural outputs, for the period 2000-6. These estimates, along with local market prices were endorsed by knowledgeable experts and the available official statistics for Darfur. However a number of questions do arise, and are briefly noted here. The share of livestock is surprisingly low but this may reflect the large market margins involved in getting 189 livestock to the urban markets in Eastern Sudan. The average share of crops is larger than expected but this may reflect unusually high local crop prices – at the same time, the growth trend has been negative since the substantial 2004 harvest. Livestock production is estimated to have continued growing steadily at quite a rapid pace: The estimates suggest that between 200 and 2006 agricultural GDP (without firewood and charcoal but taking account of changes in the value of livestock) averaged about US$62 per head of the estimated population in Darfur. If the agricultural sector accounts for half of Darfur‘s income, which seems to be a reasonable assumption, average GDP per capita over the last seven years would have been about US$120. The estimate for 2006 only would be about $130 per capita. This is substantially lower than the national average, although close to what was estimated as the level for Southern Sudan in the CPA JAM. Interestingly, if the value of firewood and charcoal production is included, its value actually dwarfs other components of agricultural GDP, although note that a key theme of this chapter is that the current rates of exploitation and production of firewood and charcoal from forests are not sustainable. Clearly the estimates in this table are preliminary and incomplete, and need to be discussed and checked. No estimates have yet been made for the non-agricultural sectors but it is to be expected that the relative importance of the non-agricultural and the service sectors in Darfur will grow in the future, although agriculture is still expected to remain dominant. Table 6.12: Preliminary Estimates of GDP from Agriculture in Darfur, 2000 - 2006 Sectors/Sub-sectors Average 2000 to 2005 (nominal prices) Average Growth Share of GDP Share of GDP GDP Rate (excl firewood (incl firewood (SD million) (percent pa) and charcoal) and charcoal) (percent) (percent) Irrigated Crops - - - - Rainfed semi-mechanized na na - - crops Rainfed traditional crops 62,293 -1.5 63.4 23.7 Minor crops na na - - By-products na na - - Total Crops - - - - Livestock 35,204 22.3 35.8 13.4 Forests (gum arabic) 812 38.0 0.8 0.3 Fisheries - - - - Total 98,309 7.9 100.0 37.4 …Firewood 143,000 na - 54.4 …Charcoal 21,552 na - 8.2 Total (incl. Firewood and 262,861 na 100.0 100.0 Charcoal) Source: Cluster estimates. Preliminary - subject to review. Note that the value of changes in the value of livestock numbers is included in this table. There are no price index series available for Darfur and therefore the estimates in this table are in nominal terms. They are not comparable with the aggregate GDP data in Table 6.11 above which are in constant 1981/82 prices. Estimates of firewood and charcoal production was taken from the Second National Energy Assessment, 2001, and kept constant for all the years because of the lack of any other data points. Hence no growth rates for these have been calculated. Status of Current Livelihoods in Rural Areas 6.63 The baseline for agricultural pastoral livelihoods is the outcome of decades of settlement and development, reflecting also the exploitation of Darfur‘s natural resources, numerous droughts, feeble public expenditures on support services to farmers and herders, and most recently, a devastating conflict. 190 6.64 The farming system classification, summarized and simplified in Figure 6.1, is based on the dominant activity, but traditionally farms in Darfur have been a diversified mixed enterprises designed to spread risks. Isolation and high costs of buying inputs, the difficulties associated with selling outputs, and minimal access to support services for production such as credit and extension, raises several questions, including the success of the livelihood strategies they have pursued, and the options for the future. A related issue is the opportunity for alternative employment, even if seasonal, that is available to heads of households to supplement farm income as their main source of livelihood. The analysis here will focus on small-scale mixed farming because some data are available. It will first focus on the current status of livelihoods that has been affected by the destruction of assets and widespread insecurity. The discussion will then move to an assessment of the policy issues facing Darfur‘s agricultural sector and future prospects. We do not diagnose the situation facing large-scale nomadic herders, who manage or own large flocks of sheep or herds of cattle in Darfur, due to lack of information. 6.65 There are a number of studies of the welfare and source of livelihoods for rural households in Darfur, most notably a report by Save the Children UK in 2004, two reports by Tufts University, another by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspers, and most recently a survey of food security and nutrition implemented by FAO in September, 2006189. More such studies are being prepared, but those available provide a dramatic overview of the changing status of livelihoods for small-scale agriculture in Darfur. Figure 6.1: Traditional Farming and Land Use Systems Farming Systems Combinations of Land Use (in each system) Sedentary, Village based, Crop-dominated Agro-silviculture (crop and forest production) Agro-pastoral (Transhumant) Silvo-pastoral (animal raising with forestry activities) Pastoral, Agro-silvo-pastoral Nomadic (all three activities together) 6.66 Farm assets have been devastated by the war.190 This has very significantly diminished the capacity for people in rural areas of Darfur to generate livelihoods:  Productive assets destroyed. Houses, livestock, agricultural tools and infrastructure, water sources, seeds and grain stores have been looted and destroyed in numerous areas which made agricultural production impossible. 189 The FAO survey included 2,155 households of which slightly more than half were IDPs. The IDPs in camps represented 39 percent of the sample, 9 percent of IDPs lived in communities where they outnumber residents, 5 percent of IDPs in communities where they are a minority. 190 See Buchanan-Smith and Jaspers (2006), and Young et al (2005) 191  Natural resources destroyed. The fighting and desperate measures by people to survive by plundering natural resources have destroyed forests, soils and water resources.  Public infrastructure and services destroyed. Many public health centers, schools and water supplies have been made unusable, and staff has departed thus making living in rural areas even more precarious, and education non existent with serious implications for the young because it is possible for a whole generation to emerge from Darfur without basic education. 6.67 Farmers who lost their assets – amounting to an estimated 60 percent of farm households – have adopted a range of strategies to provide for their families. The dominant strategies have been as follows:  Escape to IDP camps. There are at least 2.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in some 50 camps throughout Darfur. Hence about one-third of Darfur‘s households experienced substantial changes in their livelihoods based on agriculture and livestock. They are desperately adapting to alternative ways of surviving.  Escape to towns. Another significant proportion of the population has been forced out of agriculture and now survives on vastly different patterns of income generation in towns.  Seasonal or permanent off farm employment. Many heads of households have sought employment in the agricultural sector in other states and towns. The opportunities to move to seasonal employment in semi-mechanized farming areas and towns have, however, been limited because of the dangers associated with traveling in Darfur and the reticence of males to leave families unprotected.  Exodus from Darfur. Some 200,000 deaths and a substantial (but unknown) number of people have moved to Central Sudan to escape the violence – perhaps a permanent loss of human capital from Darfur. 6.68 The result of this destruction of core assets and resources, and the associated disruption, has been well captured by a recent FAO-led survey of rural (still ―resident‖) households in Darfur including in IDP camps. Major findings from the survey are as follows:  More limited diversification of income. In a substantial change from the traditional situation, households in North and West Darfur were much more likely to rely on one source of income only, compared with South Darfur where diversification remains important. Households in West Darfur were less likely to rely on agricultural-based activities as their main income source, compared to North and South Darfur, but more likely to depend on low income-earning activities such as the sale of firewood and grass which, as underlined in section 2 of this chapter, have long term detrimental impacts on the environment..  Main source of income is wage labor. This accounted for 45 percent of income among all IDPs and 29 percent among residents still farming. For all IDPs (in camps and outside camps) other activities which generated income were firewood collection (19 percent), sales of food aid (17 percent) and petty trade (8 percent). For the residents, the other activities included sales of cereals (21 percent), sales of other crops (14 percent), petty trade (12 percent) and sales of firewood (11 percent).  Insecurity and limited job opportunities severely constrain income generation. Having lost most of their normal sources of livelihoods wage income has become important, but yet more than 50 percent of the households identified insecurity and limited employment opportunities as the major reasons for low incomes. 192 Nevertheless 16 percent of households mentioned a lack of manpower as constraining their income earning capacity. This presumably indicates that there is some demand for skilled manpower but that appropriate skills may not be available. Among the factors that constrained income earning capacity, illness accounted for 12 percent, and 9 percent was due to closure of markets. Less than 5 percent mentioned low market prices for the agricultural production or low productivity agricultural production which supports the view that, despite the destitution, the market demand for basic necessities is strong.  The real value of wages varied widely. Terms of trade of cereals against average wages for unskilled labor ranged from 5 to 17 kg of millet or sorghum for one day of work across Darfur which is within the range of adequacy for a family of five. But it leaves very little margin for the other necessities of life 6.69 An estimated 1.6 million people (equivalent to about 250,000 households) remain productively active in rural Darfur – albeit under extremely difficult circumstances. There are also about 2.5 million people in IDP camps (about 400,000 households). In the absence of a household survey of income or welfare, Young et al (2005) estimated typical household incomes in rural areas in North Darfur in 2005 for poor and middle income levels in various food economy zones in North Darfur and to assets.191 Assets for higher income households were not assessed, although Young et al made an estimate of household income for IDPs in the mixed cash crop food economy zone. We have already stressed the diversity of Darfur‘s natural resources and rainfall, and that North Darfur can be a tough environment for agricultural and pastoral production. Livelihoods and household incomes of course also vary according to the availability of assets such as land area, water resources, livestock numbers, and proximity to markets. 6.70 Table 6.13 summarizes a typology of livelihoods from the Young report, and classifies the population based on income and livelihood systems. IDPs are listed with an average annual income of SD55,388 (US$223) per household which is equivalent to about $44 per capita, which falls into the higher range of poor households in the rest of the region, although the difficulties facing IDPs are also stressed by the authors.192 Table 6.13: Typology of Household Income Levels and Livelihood Systems in Darfur Group Share of Household income Livelihoods population (%) (US$/year) Low High Poor 40 – 50 79 – 314 Agro-migrant Mixed cash crop Tombac Wadi Middle 25 – 35 240-665 Agro-migrant Mixed cash crop Tombac IDPs 20 – 30 223 Services, wage labor 6.71 Data from Young et al presented in Figure 6.2 suggests, not surprisingly, that household assets (e.g. farm area and livestock ownership) have an important impact on livelihoods. This has important implications for the design of future rural and agricultural development programs. 191 Food economy zones are defined by type of soils, landscape under the general heading of ―ecology‖ such as alluvial soils and the dominant agricultural production such as tobacco or pastoral. The food economy zones used in Young et al are defined according to the framework designed by Save the Children (UK) in 2004. These food economy zones are described in Annex H. 192 Presumably the value of food aid and associated assistance should be added to the cash income to reflect a total income equivalent. 193 Figure 6.2: Average Farm Size and Livestock Ownership on Small-Scale Mixed Farms, North Darfur (2005) 140 120 Average per Farm 100 80 60 40 20 0 Poor Middle Better-Off Average Farm Area Average Number of Livestock Source: Derived from Young et al (2005). Potential Future Growth and Prospects for Improved Livelihoods 6.72 A reconstruction and development program to support the sustained revival of livelihoods and growth in the agricultural sector in Darfur will need to be based on addressing the systematic constraints that affect the sector. Having discussed the constraints the paper will examine the three main sub-sectors as sources for growth in the agricultural sector, namely food crops, gum arabic and livestock. 6.73 There have been no major droughts in Darfur over the past decade, but each main sub-sector still faces many constraints that have hindered performance. The disruptions and devastation caused by conflict have placed those constraints into sharper focus. These factors define the baseline for future reconstruction and development and hence also shape the agenda for action to support future livelihoods and improve the prospects for Darfur‘s agricultural sector. The main constraints are: (a) Macro-economic, trade and agricultural sector policies have had a detrimental impact on production incentives. (b) Vulnerability of traditional land use systems. (c) Land policy is based on the authority of traditional leaders who have lost many of their customary powers over the allocation of land use rights which has in turn weakened the status of customary land rights and hence the incentives to invest. (d) Research to support the introduction of improved technology, the basis for real growth, has been severely reduced because of under funding. (e) Isolation, which increases marketing costs for agricultural inputs and outputs. Distances between markets within Darfur, and between Darfur and markets in Khartoum, Port Sudan, Libya and Egypt are considerable, yet infrastructure such as roads and railways are poor or non-existent and need rehabilitation or development. (f) Weak local government institutions provide minimal social and economic services to support the needs of individuals and communities. 194 These are major challenges for public policy and private investors. What have governments and the private sector done to address these issues is examined below. National Macroeconomic and Agricultural Policies 6.74 The Government‘s macroeconomic policies have gone through a number of phases since independence in 1956.193 These phases reflected development plans which for decades focused considerable financial resources on those parts of the agricultural sector which dominated the generation of wealth, employment, exports and income. The concentration of investment was in the federally-owned irrigation schemes and the semi-mechanized farming sub-sector. These activities received the bulk of the agricultural credit from the Government and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan during the government‘s efforts to support irrigated cotton for export and semi mechanized rainfed farming as ―the bread basket― for the Gulf countries in the 1970s. On the other hand in the traditional farming sub-sector, where the bulk of the population lived and which includes most of Darfur, public investment in services and infrastructure was minimal. 6.75 The policies affecting the agricultural sector over time could be characterized as follows:  In the 1970s, Government intervention in the economy through price controls on agricultural products, mismanagement of public investment in areas such as agriculture, inadequate support for agricultural research, weak support services to farmers including negligible credit to the traditional farming sub-sector, and inadequate infrastructure in rural areas kept regions such as Darfur isolated and poor.  In the 1980s public investment in agriculture continued to focus on irrigation and the controls on market prices of cotton, gum arabic and oilseeds resulted in major problems for producers, particularly those in the traditional farming areas where oilseeds and gum arabic are major sources of income. In addition substantial amounts of public resources were being used fighting the civil war in the South. This caused the budget deficit to rise and inflation reached staggering heights. Food prices rose and following considerable civil unrest the controls were abandoned.  In the early 1990s, after a change in government, and in the wake of continued substantial budget deficits, extremely high inflation, and the withdrawal of all multi-lateral donors and most bi-laterals from investment activities in Sudan the Government decided in 1992/93 to introduce a major stabilization program which slashed budget expenditures and eliminated most controls on markets and trade. This Comprehensive National Strategy of 1992-2002 was the first published official document in Sudan that stated that monetary policy should maintain price stability and low inflation. 6.76 The reform policies enabled macro stabilization although the impact on public services such as health and education was very severe. Nevertheless, most price and market controls were removed, the private sector was able to operate with more freedom, and the financial sector became somewhat stronger. Agriculture benefited in that farmers had more incentive to produce, although the severe budget cuts reduced the already small investment on 193 Ali, A.G. and Elbadawi, I.A. ―Explaining Sudan‘s Economic Growth Performance,‖ May 2002. 195 research and decimated the infrastructure development programs such as roads to isolated areas. 6.77 Eventually there was a revival of economic growth and increases in average per capita income, to the extent that Sudan is rapidly approaching average per capita income of US$1,000 and middle income country status. Drought-free seasons and exchange rate devaluation supported a surge of growth in agricultural exports in the second half of the 90s, at which stage the startup of petroleum production boosted aggregate growth. But growth did not extend to most traditional rain-fed farming areas such as Darfur, except for producers of sheep and sesame for export but their gains will have been reduced substantially by high marketing costs. Moreover, the sharp appreciation of the exchange rate over the last 12 months will have reduced the terms of trade for exporters of primary products substantially. 6.78 In sum, Darfur‘s rural producers have gained little from government policies because few addressed the systematic constraints faced by the traditional farming sub-sector. Indeed, the sole export concession to the Gum Arabic Corporation would be a problem for small scale farmers in Darfur if not for the rise in domestic demand for gum from domestic processors as well as the ample opportunities to sell raw gum directly across the open western borders. The national government has given prominence to traditional rainfed farming in its current Green Mobilization Program, but the program does not include the decontrol of the gum arabic market which would be one of the swiftest ways to support small-scale farmers anywhere in the traditional farming areas. The recent systematic appreciation of the exchange rate has destroyed the incentives to produce crops for export in Darfur. This is a major policy issue. 6.79 There are, however, sound prospects for agricultural development if adequate public resources can be applied within a sound policy environment to provide strong incentives for farmers to produce. It will also be necessary for the government to enable more effective management of natural resources including land, and to finance the development of technological change to improve productivity. The specific challenges are discussed in the next paragraphs. Vulnerability of Traditional Land Use Systems 6.80 Land use in Darfur was traditionally built on a situation in which land was plentiful and populations were modest. They generated substantial incomes and provided adequate livelihoods for decades before the land degradation in the Sahel zone, including Darfur arose due to recurrent droughts, increased population, and smaller crop producing farms. The drought episodes in the 1960s were repeated in the subsequent decades, with the most serious drought in 1984/85. The balanced ecosystems were thereby shattered and there was wide- spread resource degradation as farmers struggled to extract a living out of their land and using marginal lands ill suited to annual cropping. 6.81 The 1984/85 drought resulted in enormous losses of livestock by nomads for whom this was their only resource. Many agro-pastoralists and nomads lost all their livestock through death or sales. Having lost their source of income many former nomads moved to urban areas to find jobs. Others resorted to farming after obtaining land use rights from their customary leaders. A significant number retained their nomadic lifestyle albeit with a sharply reduced herd, relying on supplementary seasonal employment. This third group would later become the core of the Janjaweed. 6.82 The debilitating impact of the 1984/85 drought was exacerbated by the lack of or insufficient support from key government institutions (central, state and local) or from the communities. The main outside support was food aid and numerous children owe their lives 196 and names to the massive international food aid effort.194 But, despite the critical importance of food aid, the international assistance did not stimulate reconstruction and development aimed at sustainable production and livelihoods. Darfur was at that time not a priority region for the central government and as the seasons improved after the mid 1980s, Darfur remained characterized by substantial human deprivation. 6.83 Reflecting the central government‘s disinterest in Darfur, as shown in the background paper on the Government budget, state and local governments were poorly funded and weak (see budget chapter). Communities were left to their own devices to find ways to cope with the legacy of droughts, poor infrastructure and weak social services. As a result a wide range of privately rational but publicly hazardous coping strategies were followed. Examples of such strategies, already mentioned above, included tree felling for charcoal or firewood, horizontal expansion of agriculture in order to compensate for productivity losses induced by land degradation. This reduced the rangelands available for livestock. One example is the rangelands of Northern Darfur which were particularly important as winter grazing areas but susceptible to erosion if cultivated. Millet cultivation in these areas resulted in the collapse of pastoral livelihoods under the weight of increased stocking rates in the remaining communal grazing lands. Land Policy 6.84 Land policies do not provide farmers with long term security (either through long term leases or as freehold) in most areas in Sudan, but leaves the allocation of land rights to customary law - also without formal long term security. Customary law does, however, provide farmers with long term user rights if they continue to cultivate the land which, unfortunately, in most regions in North Darfur, and some parts of Southern Darfur, is a prescription for serious land degradation. Until there is a land policy that transfers the wealth inherent in land from the state to the people on the basis of efficient long term leasing – be it through statutory or customary law there will not be an effective agricultural investment program. Until there is long term investment in agriculture (including livestock, forestry and fisheries) its productivity and competitiveness will remain low and exports of agricultural commodities will inevitably decline 6.85 A Darfur Land Commission (DLC) has been established, but its work cannot start in earnest until the National Land Commission (NLC) has been established. It is anticipated that the NLC will lay down a number of national principles on land policy within which regional Land Commissions such as the DLC will operate. Research and Technology Development 6.86 Agricultural and animal research is crucial to the achievement of higher productivity for crops and livestock – particularly in the rainfed traditional farming areas. It is continually important to enable agricultural producers to better cope with challenges such as the poor genetic capacity of seeds for major crops, eroded soils in some areas, high prevalence of pests and diseases in crops and livestock, and inadequate infrastructure for the marketing of livestock and agricultural products which lead to high costs and spoilage. Rainfall in Darfur is more variable than in other states of Sudan which creates additional challenges regardless of existing technology. There is also some evidence of a secular decline in average rainfall. Low and variable rainfall leads to low and fluctuating yields for all crops and other vegetation, leading eventually to degradation of the natural resource base. This is in turn reflected in reduced surface and groundwater supplies for domestic consumption as well as for crop and livestock production. 194 One can meet men in Darfur who have names like Reagan. 197 Isolation and Infrastructure 6.87 Isolation and infrastructure development have been reviewed in the infrastructure background paper. The absence of even minimal transport networks in most areas of Darfur increases the cost of trading with markets inside and outside Darfur, increases market margins and consequently reduces net incomes for producers, and makes it extremely costly for Darfur‘s economy to be integrated with markets in the rest of Sudan and the world. Because of the absence of either a reliable road or a railway from Darfur to markets in Khartoum and elsewhere in central Sudan, cattle and sheep are walked along stock routes either all the way or part of the way but important stock routes are hazardous because of insecurity and uncertainties about water supplies.195 Darfur‘s isolation therefore makes the cost of goods and services purchased outside high, although one benefit is natural protection for local food producers against of food ―imports‖ into Darfur. Weak Governance 6.88 Local government has, as revealed by the draft Sudan: Public Expenditure Review, 196 been poorly funded in the past by either the central government or from the resources of the region. The performance of local government has been reviewed in the report by the Governance Cluster. The significance of the weakness of local government for the agricultural sector is the lack of security, poor infrastructure, inadequate support services and weak primary health and education programs – all of which affect the productivity of the agricultural and pastoral sub-sectors. 6.89 It is against the backdrop of these systematic constraints that this paper now turns to the prospects for specific groups of agricultural and pastoral enterprises in Darfur. D. EMERGING PRIORITIES: PROSPECTS FOR PRODUCTION AND, TRADE OF CROPS Field Crops (Millet, Sorghum, Sesame and Groundnuts) 6.90 The major field crops grown across Darfur are millet and sorghum as food crops; groundnuts, local watermelon, sesame, roselle or kardadeh and gum arabic as cash crops. Fruit and vegetables are also potentially important exports, but not covered here. And there are numerous minor crops grown in Darfur such as maize, cowpeas and a range of vegetables. It is also noted that rainfed cotton (grown on the large areas of clay soils could be much more important in the future. 6.91 Darfur makes a substantial contribution to national crop output. It has typically produced about 52 percent of all millet produced in Sudan, 6 percent of sorghum, 30 percent of groundnuts, 12 percent of sesame, 20 percent of gum arabic but this has recently declined to only 12 percent.197 Millet is by far the most important crop grown but, as shown in Figure 6.3, yields are erratic, and in some years very low. These reflect considerable variation in rainfall and soils noted above. A significant feature of crop production in Darfur is that millet dominates in North Darfur, but sorghum is almost as important as millet in South and West Darfur. Groundnuts are most important in South Darfur. Sesame is not very important in any of the states but has potential. 6.92 The annual variability of yields for crops such as millet, sorghum and sesame in Sudan (measured by the coefficient of variation) grown under rainfed conditions between 195 Descriptions of these stock routes can be found in Young et al, Chapter 4 196 World Bank: Sudan: Public Expenditure Review, Volumes I and II, June 2007 197 Agricultural Research Station, El Obeid 198 1973 and 2005 was between 30 and 40 percent.198 Except for millet in West Darfur and groundnuts in South and West Darfur the coefficient of variation is equal to or higher that for Sudan as a whole (Table 6.14). Long term average millet and sorghum yields for North Darfur are about twice as variable as for the whole of Sudan. For South and West Darfur variability is on average slightly higher than for all of Sudan. This is a concern not least because millet and sorghum are staple foods, and sesame is an important export. On the other hand for groundnuts, production is mostly in South and West Darfur where the variability is less although problems facing the international marketing of groundnuts need to be solved. 6.93 With average seasonal conditions Darfur can be self reliant for millet and is able to trade livestock and groundnuts for other foods and also for non food needs. But in years of low yield, the situation is usually the reverse and food imports such as sorghum are needed. Figure 6.3: Trends in Millet Yields for Three Darfur States (1981/82 to 2005/06) 350 300 250 Kg per hectare 200 150 100 50 0 19 2 19 4 19 6 19 8 19 0 19 2 19 4 19 6 99 8 20 2 20 4 6 20 0 /8 /8 /8 /8 /9 /9 /9 /9 /9 /0 /0 /0 00 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 01 03 05 /2 19 19 North Darfur South Darfur Darfur Rainfed West Darfur 6.94 An average agricultural farm household in Darfur grows crops on 6-13 ha of land. The average area of grain grown is larger in North Darfur, although productivity is less. Crop sequencing, and to a limited extent, crop rotation are practiced with the goal of improving soil fertility. Normally, no purchased inputs are used. Traditionally shifting agriculture was practiced through alternative production of gum arabic and field crops. In this system the land was cleared of all trees and used for field crops, usually for seven to ten years until productivity declined and the appearance of striga (weed which parasitizes sorghum roots and reduces yields). However, this practice has almost disappeared in most places as a result of population growth and increasing demand for land. Table 6.14: Coefficients of Variation for Yields of Major Rainfed Field Crops States and Period Sorghum Millet Sesame Groundnuts North Darfur (1973 - 2005) 0.58 0.64 1.37 0.52 South Darfur (1973 – 2005) 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.30 West Darfur (1994 – 2005) 0.35 0.21 0.47 0.25 Sudan (1973 - 2005) 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.39 198 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of a series. 199 6.95 Low and erratic rainfall across all three states, though more prominent in North Darfur, results in low productivity for most crops. The erratic nature of rainfall includes late starts or early cessation of rain, prolonged dry spells in the middle of the season, or a combination of these events. While traditional practices such as shifting agriculture have ceased, there is limited adoption of new technologies. For example, there is limited or no introduction of improved drought tolerant or early maturing crop varieties and very little improvement in cultural practices.199 6.96 The significance of the challenges posed by the environment is shown by trends in millet yields in similar agro-climatic zones – namely North/West Kordofan and neighboring North Kordofan compared with South Kordofan and neighboring South/West Kordofan over three decades. It is clear not only that the drier states perform less well and that there is also decline in average yields for millet in the drier states. Table 6.15: Millet Productivity by Production Region over Different Periods (1970/71-2003/2004) 1970/71- 1978/79- 1991/92- 2003/04 1990/91 2003/04 North/West Kordofan, North Darfur: Average Yield (kg/fed) 99 89 55 Coefficient of Variation (%) 75 65 41 Trend (kg/fed/year) -5.4 -12.1 2.1 South Kordofan, South/West Darfur: Average Yield (kg/fed) 152 139 143 Coefficient of Variation (%) 31 36 23 Trend (kg/fed/year) -1.8 -10.9 0.9 Source: Derived from data of the Planning and Agricultural Economic Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, Khartoum. Prepared by Hamid Faki. 6.97 Pests and diseases are other factors that cause low productivity. Plant protection measures have declined in the last decade which has been attributed to the limited logistical support available for the Plant Protection Department (PPD) in the federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. The situation was worsened by delegation of responsibility of controlling ―local pests‖ to the localities and rural councils who do not have the resources to take action and without opportunities to coordinate their actions with neighboring localities and councils. Some pests like grass hoppers have been defined as local, but their widespread impact after they have completed their reproductive cycle requires a coordinated control program and therefore should qualify as a national pest. 6.98 In Darfur, there has been a serious decline in the productivity of the main crops, compared with African averages and potential, as shown in Table 6.16. For example the table shows that yields of sorghum, millet, sesame and groundnuts are all substantially less that the yields in research stations in Western Sudan 6.99 Experience in other countries facing similar challenges shows that location specific research, and the development of location-specific technology packages, private and public extension services, water harvesting, appropriate and simple farm technology, and a macroeconomic and sectoral policy that provides adequate price incentives to adopt improved technology and produce a marketable surplus are all potential strategies for improving yields. The difference in performance between Darfur and the benchmarks is typical throughout 199 A new variety of millet that matures in 45 days is available and would be attractive for drought prone areas where rapid maturity can mean the difference between surviving and not surviving a dry season. 200 Sudan. Low and declining export sales confirm that such low productivity undermines Darfur‘s international competitiveness. Closing the productivity gap is necessary to improve competitiveness but in rainfed agriculture where exogenous factors such as droughts and pests of various kinds cannot be easily managed, represents a major challenge. It needs concerted action, including through adequate financing and the training of researchers, in order to achieve results within the next decade. Table 6.16: Productivity Comparisons of the Four Main Field Crops Grown in Darfur (kilogram per hectare) Source of Information Sorghum Millet Sesame Groundnut International 1,354 669 405 959 Africa 871 619 362 762 North Darfur 307 176 122 496 South Darfur 515 354 189 616 West Darfur 721 558 319 785 Research in Western Sudan 1,285 833 428 1,300 Drylands all over the world 800 600 500 1,300 Source: El-Dukheri (own calculations, 2006) and Osman (2001). Gum Arabic 6.100 Darfur has over the last five years produced about 36 percent of national gum Arabic output (Table 6.17). Gum arabic can be produced relatively cheaply using few domestic resources and the output from Darfur has no difficulty gaining access to markets. Acacia trees that produce hashab and talha gum are ideally suited to the climate and soils of Darfur and the gum produced is of high quality.200 Annual yields per tree vary considerably from - 50 to 500 grams depending on the standard of management. Table 6.17: Gum Arabic Purchases by Gum Arabic Company – Sudan and Darfur (1995/96-2005) Season Sudan Darfur Hashab Talha Total Hashab Talha Total Darfur as Percent of Sudan 1995/96 30,291 1,434 31,725 na na 5,545 17.5 1996/97 1,7746 13 17,759 na na 2,856 16.1 1997/98 12,479 4,634 17,118 na na 2,291 13.4 1998/99 21,165 6,679 27,844 na na 3,421 12.3 99/2000 3,677 4,393 7,970 499 4219 4,718 59.2 2000/01 12,009 3,696 15,705 2,746 3497 6,243 39.8 2001/02 12,855 3,074 15,929 2,561 186 2,747 17.2 2002/03 13,972 1,865 15,837 2,193 882 3,075 19.4 2003/04 7,953 7,912 15,865 1,339 5,845 7,184 45.3 2005 21,021 8,769 29,781 4,416 4,973 9,389 31.5 Source: Gum Arabic Company Sudan. About 85 percent of Darfur‘s gum is produced in South Darfur. 6.101 In most years, prices to producers/traders have been stable at around 10 and 30 percent of the fob price at Port Sudan (Figure 6.4), which is a very low share. All exports of 200 Hashab (Acacia senegal) is the highest quality gum arabic and accounts for about 46 percent of all gum arabic purchased by the GAC over the five years from 2000 to 2005 in Darfur. Talha (Acacia seyal) accounts for the remaining 54 percent of Darfur‘s production. 201 raw gum must be sold through the Gum Arabic Company (GAC) which holds the sole concession for gum exports.201 The power of the GACs concession to manipulate export prices keeps prices to producers at a very low share of the fob price at Port Sudan. But recently there was a surge in prices caused by low stocks, a rapid increase in local processing, and expectations that the concession to the GAC for raw gum exports would be terminated. The overall effect, however, has been that the export monopoly has reduced the income of about 1 million producers who are among the poorest farmers in Sudan, at least 20 percent of whom are in Darfur, mainly South Darfur.202 Figure 6.4: Floor Price (at Auction) as a Percent of Export Price (fob Port Sudan) 100 90 80 70 60 Percent 50 40 30 20 10 0 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 6.102 Costs of numerous charges and taxes paid to the central, state and local governments between El Obeid (the main auction point) and Port Sudan for raw gum arabic amount to about 50 percent of the total marketing costs to Port Sudan. Even if prices paid to farmers were moved closer to the fob price, the marketing costs (which include substantial taxes) should be reduced. 201 A Ministerial Order issued by the Minister of Foreign Trade on 9 August, 2006 declared henceforth all exports of gum arabic products would be through GAC, whereas previously the GAC only controlled exports of raw (unprocessed) gum arabic. 202 See‖ Policy Note: Export Marketing of Gum Arabic‖, Paper prepared for the Oversight Committee of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund – National, April 2007 202 Table 6.18: Marketing Value Chain for Gum Arabic from El Obeid to Port Sudan SD/ton Total Marketing Cost (Percent) Market price (El Obeid) SD 7,500/kantar 187,500 Taxes Zakat (10 % of gross) 18,750 22.0 Wounded soldiers (1% of gross) 1,875 2.2 National Forest Corp (5% of gross) 9,375 11.0 Central Government fee(5% of gross) 9,375 11.0 Sub-total 39,375 46.3 Transport Charges Facilitation and customs (informal) 222 0.3 Aggregate toll charges 1,000 1.2 Truck freight costs (El Obeid to Port Sudan) 60 0.1 Charges at Port Sudan` SSMO Inspection 270 0.3 Marketing Service 620 0.7 Handling and fob charges 1,000 1.2 Customs (1% of fob) 1,900 2.2 Sea port charges 950 1.1 Port charges 350 0.4 Total 85,122 100 Source: Salih Alajab, November, 2006. Livestock Production and Trade 6.103 Official estimates suggest that over one-fifth of the national herd is reared in Greater Darfur (Table 6.19).203 West and South Darfur are estimated to be the second and third livestock producing areas in Sudan after Blue Nile, and North Darfur is ranked sixth out of the 26 states which reflects the decline in the quality of natural resources. Also according to these data sheep and goats are reared on a large scale in all three Darfur states. North Darfur has 12.4 percent of the national camel production, whereas South Darfur is the leading cattle production area in Sudan. 6.104 It is well known that livestock production patterns have been disrupted in recent years because of the major conflicts over land and grazing rights. But changes in taxation policy in the context of current customary land laws have also had an effect. In 2000 the central Government decided that the states should no longer require the payment of sales taxes by farmers selling their produce in local markets. Recognizing that this change would have fiscal implications for the states the central Government agreed on a compensation arrangement for the lost revenue. But these changes have also had a considerable impact on the livestock sub-sector which affects the relative comparative advantage of the livestock exports and hence future trade. Darfur would have been severely affected. 6.105 Livestock producers pay head taxes and these revenues are used to pay for various levels of native administration and to defray the costs of locality governments. In addition there are numerous taxes (e.g. locality dues, Jihad tax, Pastoralist Union tax, martyrs‘ tax, and wounded tax) and other charges (e.g. grazing charges and veterinary certificate costs) paid by 203 However, the accuracy of these estimates is questionable because the last census was carried out in the 1970s. A recent study, ―Livestock Marketing in the Eastern and Central Sudan – Policy Note‖, March 2007, prepared for the Oversight Committee of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (National) provides additional data and analysis on livestock marketing in Sudan. 203 herders as livestock move through localities while going to markets, where middlemen and buyers again need to pay additional fees. Total taxes (excluding head taxes) and charges paid during marketing add up to about 33 percent of the fob price of livestock. In addition livestock producers in the traditional rainfed farming and pastoral areas pay Zakat taxes of 10 percent of revenue at the time of first sale. Marketing costs for export crop producers represent about 35 percent of fob prices. 6.106 Although livestock and crop producers pay similar taxes and charges for marketing, annual charges paid during production and specific additional levies imposed on pastoralists, mean that livestock producers are more heavily taxed than crop farmers. At the same time customary land policy allows increases in farming areas by the Native Administration but with minimal consultation with nomads who are typically not part of the community that manages the customary land rights. The continued usufruct rights to the cropping areas are dependent on farmers regularly cultivating these areas. This imperative deprives pastoralist of grazing lands. In summary pastoralists, particularly those whose herds have increased in numbers, have become more heavily taxed than crop farmers and are loosing grazing areas with the possibility that the additional cultivation and more intensive stocking on the residual grazing areas will cause irreversible destruction to the environment 6.107 Livestock exports accounted for 18 percent of the value of total non-oil exports from Sudan in 2005.Data on Darfur‘s livestock exports are not available in the Ministry of Animal Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Bureau of Statistics or the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Even statistical offices in Darfur cannot obtain export data because of the informal nature of livestock marketing. It is nonetheless clear that Darfur‘s overseas export markets are now dominated by sheep exports to Saudi Arabia. The trade of sheep and camels to Libya stopped following the closure of the border. Camels are still traded to Egypt via a long walk that starts in El Fasher. Table 6.19: Estimated Livestock Populations in Darfur and Sudan, 2006 State Cattle Sheep Goats Camels Total North Darfur 674,302 3,638,158 2,843,274 505,672 7,661,406 South Darfur 4,132,158 3,718,782 2,950,164 95,425 10,896,529 West Darfur 3,971,806 3,779,250 3,463,236 365,389 11,579,681 Darfur total 8,778,266 11,136,190 9,256,674 966,486 30,137,616 Darfur as % of Sudan 21.4 22.1 21.7 23.7 21.8 Sudan total 41,116,000 50,390,000 42,756,000 4,078,000 138,340,000 Source: Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, 2006 6.108 Information from livestock traders and experts in the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries confirm the substantial contribution of Greater Darfur to Sudan‘s overall livestock exports. Experienced observers note that specific types of sheep from Darfur (e.g. sawakni) command a premium in Saudi markets and that in normal years live sheep exports from Darfur account for at least 25 percent of total sheep exports from Sudan. Most sheep exported from Sudan are sold to Saudi Arabia. However the conflict in Darfur resulted in a substantial decline in livestock exports from Sudan in 2003 because of major disruptions to production and marketing channels (Table 6.20). Young et al (2005) estimate that the non- Arab population lost between 50 and 90 percent of its livestock to formal and informal armed robbery. The looted livestock were usually not killed, but integrated into other flocks and herds and not sold. 204 Table 6.20: Estimated Number of Livestock Exported from Sudan (2001-2006) Year Cattle Sheep Goats Camels a/ 2001 n.a. 15,417 13,883 185,500 2002 2,655 1,602,638 53,164 155,710 2003 184 1,315,399 57,639 88,423 2004 750 1,703,562b/ 101,899 132,602 2005 501 1,271,787 109,650 131,156 2006 (est/preliminary) na 987,406c/ na na Source: Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, 2006. a/ Exports depressed due to Saudi imports ban b/ Exports higher than usual due to Saudi ban on Australian imports c/ The Animal Resources Services Company estimated that following the surge of sheep shipments during December for Eid in early 2007, total shipments for 2006 were probably about 1.3 million head. 6.109 The supply of livestock offered to markets can be limited by several factors, including the cultural importance of large herds and flocks to livestock herders, insecurity, or low prices. A person‘s wealth in nomadic communities is measured by the size of his herd or flock, not the money he earns by selling livestock. Looted livestock may not be sold in local markets because of the need to provide evidence of ownership. Insecurity on stock routes is another substantial deterrent to selling in local markets. Livestock, belonging to displaced farmers and spared from looting, were typically sold under duress in large numbers at local and regional markets after their ownership was verified. Finally, prices in local markets may be low because of the insecurity facing buyers as they move livestock along stock routes to other markets. In recent years stock routes shifted to avoid insecure areas. 6.110 The final destination of local livestock, except camels, may not be decided until after they leave Darfur. Grading and assembly of sheep for export markets are skilled activities and done by specialist consolidators as animals move toward or while at intermediate markets. Consolidators assemble large numbers of animals from numerous individual producers (nomads and agro-pastoralists) and typically focus their final assembly activities in markets such as the one at Gabesh in North Kordofan, and El Khewi in South Kordofan. Assembling a uniform flock of sheep or mob of cattle and trekking them from Darfur to markets such as Dar es Salaam and El Moileh near Omdurman could easily take 3-4 months. Trucking from El Kwehi in South Darfur obviously takes a much shorter time. Veterinary authorities, who issue inspection certificates at quarantine points for livestock destined for exports, keep records of animals passing through quarantine facilities, but they do not collect information about the area of origin. 6.111 While the sale price of livestock of uncertain ownership will always be discounted, there is evidence of a sustained recovery from the market collapse in 2003. The social and tribal implications are not well understood, neither is it clear whether the nomadic management of flocks and herds has changed, but there are currently substantial sheep and cattle movements out of Darfur, even though marketing costs are high including the need to pay considerable protection money in areas of conflict. For example it has been reported that during 2005 one company operating primarily in Darfur exported 250,000 sheep to Saudi Arabia, which alone would have represented about 21 percent of all of Sudan‘s sheep exports in that year. Preliminary information suggest that large numbers were again being exported to Saudi Arabia late in 2006 while average prices for sheep exported are normally below domestic prices there is a premium for Sudanese sawakni sheep in Saudi markets. 6.112 Other markets could become more important in future for livestock produced in Darfur. Prior to the conflict, approximately 20,000 camels and 25,000 sheep were marketed 205 through Mellit to Libya each year.204 The closure of the Sudanese border to Libya since May 2003, has limited livestock exports to Libya except for a small volume of illegal cross-border trade. 6.113 Meat exports to Saudi Arabia are significant but could be much larger if sheep production was more efficient. The potential for sheep meat sales to Saudi Arabia are obvious when looking at historical trading patterns, and could be increased considerably if the transport facilities for moving meat from centers such as Nyala could be rehabilitated. There is one abattoir in Nyala that could sell meat internationally, but it is constrained by the current poor infrastructure and hence high transport costs to Port Sudan. Rail transport is one solution to the rapid transport of sheep and cattle as occurred when block trains moved livestock rapidly and efficiently from Darfur and Kordofan to Port Sudan (see Infrastructure background paper) if loading and unloading facilities can be improved and appropriately located.205 Rail is the obvious solution for meat transport to Port Sudan and in future is probably the best solution to the export of livestock products in contrast to the transport of live sheep and cattle to centers such as Omdurman and Port Sudan because of the high costs of maintaining animals during the transport process – except of course for the Haj trade when live sheep are preferred.. Table 6.21: Meat Exports from Sudan (2001 – 2006) Beef Sheep Meat Goat Meat Camel Meat 2001 1,714 4,855 36 12 2002 347 7,114 354 7 2003 178 7,837 221 16 2004 765 5,571 217 57 2005 656 4710 27 27 Source: Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, 2006. 6.114 Chad and the C.A.R. have strong economic links to Darfur in terms of livestock production. Border regions host the same tribes and droves from Darfur used to be trekked on pastures stretching across both sides of the border. Trade between Darfur and its western neighbors, however, was traditionally limited to small-scale transactions, mainly cross-border trade.206 Regional prices of sheep and cattle were traditionally unattractive for livestock exporters. Sheep from Darfur are traditionally exported to Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Qatar and Central Sudan, cattle are designated for Khartoum and Lebanon, camels are exported to Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt, and goats to the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia. Since the crisis broke out, however, security concerns disrupted the normal trading routes. In 2003 panic selling of livestock by displaced farmers did not only depress local prices in Darfur, but also flooded the markets of bordering regions in the C.A.R. and Chad. Nevertheless future prospects for all these markets could be good. But costs will need to be contained because Sudanese sheep, landed in Saudi Arabia are more costly than those from the main competitors. The main reason for a continuing market share is the preference for Sudanese sheep for festivities and ceremonies. This may not last forever. 204 Young et al. 2005: xi 205 A World Bank-assisted project called the ―Sudan Livestock Marketing Project‖ (Credit 782-SU), financed, inter alia, improvement in the infrastructure for livestock marketing including the financing of rolling stock for livestock transport. The project was a success in providing an efficient method for moving livestock and annually moved more than 1.2 million sheep and 200,000 cattle annually. It is not clear, however, to what extent this trade was subsidized by special credit arrangements.. 206 Data on this small-scale trade is not available as most of it takes place unofficially in order to avoid taxes. 206 6.115 In 2004 wholesale prices of livestock soared by 70 to 90 percent relative to pre-war levels as a result of the collapse of the traditional supply chains and increasing costs of livestock movements to markets. On top of the grazing fee payable to each local government where animals cross. In addition herders usually have no option but to enter insecure areas controlled by militias or rebel groups where high security fees for safe passage are extracted. Fee payments of approximately 1 percent of the wholesale price of the drove provide five to ten militias who ‗protect‘ a drove for about two weeks. In order to minimize the security fees drovers have to make detours and bypass grasslands. 6.116 Continuous fighting, looting of flocks and general insecurity have necessitated the abandonment of established trade routes. The new migration routes, however, extend trekking times and thus put greater stress on animals. Traditionally, herding and assembling large flocks in Darfur took three weeks to two months. Depending on the trade routes chosen207, the livestock has to endure up to 50 more days of trekking from the veterinary authorities to the final markets. Moreover, the feeding needs of the livestock are less accommodated by the new migration patterns. Thus, the effect of the new trekking routes is that the livestock have lower weights and are less robust when they arrive at their export destination. 6.117 By 2006 the average wholesale prices for sheep and cattle soared by 70 to 20 percent respectively relative to levels in 2003 as a result of the strong demand for Darfur livestock. At the same time the collapse of the traditional supply chains and increased costs of livestock movements to markets. On top of the grazing fee payable to each local government where animals cross, herders usually have no option but to enter insecure areas controlled by militias or rebel groups where high security fees for safe passage are extracted. Fee payments of approximately 1 percent of the wholesale price of the drove provide five to ten militias who ‗protect‘ a drove for about two weeks. In order to minimize the security fees drovers make detours and bypass grasslands. 6.118 The new migration routes, however, extend trekking times and thus put greater stress on animals. Traditionally, herding and assembling large flocks in Darfur took three weeks to two months. Depending on the trade routes chosen208, the livestock have to endure up to 50 more days of trekking from the veterinary checking stations to the final markets. Moreover, the feeding needs of the livestock typically not well accommodated by the new migration patterns. Thus, the effect of the new trekking routes is that the livestock loose weight and are less healthy when they arrive at terminal markets or their export destination. 6.119 The value chain for cattle (Table 6.22) for cattle from Southern Sudan which were purchased by a trader in Nyala and sold in Omdurman shows that the total marketing costs are 38 percent of the original purchase price and will probably be between 25 and 30 percent of the final sale price at Omdurman. Close to 24 percent of these costs are for various taxes. But the largest cost item is transport. These costs have the effect of substantially reducing the sale price to producers in Nyala. 207 Sheep are transported from North Kordofan to Port Sudan by truck within five to seven days. On top of that, cattle that are destined for Khartoum are trekked 50 days due to bad road conditions, and the costs of road taxes. 208 Sheep are transported from South or North Kordofan to Port Sudan by truck within five to seven days. Cattle destined for Khartoum are often trekked 50 days to Khartoum due to bad road conditions, but durng the wet season they can gain weight en route.. 207 Table 6.22: Marketing Value Chain for Cattle from Nyala to Omdurman (based on herd of 50 cattle) SD/head Percent of Total All Costs Sales, Locality Inspection, Taxes Sale at Nyala (5-7 year old) 60,000 Sales tax 1,200 5.3 5.3 Vaccinations and Veterinary inspection 250 1.1 Zakat (10 percent) 6,000 26.4 Locality tax 1,200 5.3 5.3 South Kordofan Locality tax 1,200 5.3 5.3 Veterinary certificate inspection 500 2.2 2.2 Rangeland use 250 1.1 North Kordofan Locality tax 1,200 5.3 5.3 Rangeland use 250 1.1 Droving costs (50 cattle) Two for at least 90 days (SD/day) 3,600 15.8 Watering Costs and Hay 45 waterings at SD 50/head/watering 2,250 9.9 45 feedings at SD100/head/feeding 4,500 19.8 Omdurman Sale yard fee 300 1.3 Student support fee 50 0.2 0.2 Wounded support 10 0.1 0.1 Total 22,760 100.1 23.7 Sale price (Omdurman) 80,000 Support Services 6.120 Technological change is central to improve productivity. There is an important role for the Government and the private sector in providing services like research, extension and also agricultural credit. While research has a national flavor the specific circumstances of Darfur have been recognized decades ago when the Government established research facilities in Nyala and El Fasher. 6.121 Research funding has declined over time, given dwindling foreign support and government cutbacks. At the national level, total agricultural R&D spending declined at an annual average rate of 2 percent over the past three decades: while agricultural researchers in Sudan were well resourced in the 1970s, total spending declined as total research staff numbers grew. By 2000, average spending per researcher was half the average level in the Eastern and Central African average. 209 Total public spending on research as a percentage of agricultural GDP in 2000 was only 0.17 percent, i.e., US$0.17 investment in R&D for every US$100 of agricultural output). The ratio has also declined over time considerably lowering Sudan‘s ranking among other countries in the region. 6.122 Advice on appropriate technology along with information about markets and other information such as on-farm storage and processing are important elements that need to complement research. There are numerous approaches that could be adopted and it is also possible for the private sector to become engaged. One model that is being implemented in 209 Beintema and Faki, 2003 208 the livestock sector in Sudan and Darfur is the use of private animal health workers. But staffing is a general problem in Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock and under funding by state governments has taken an enormous toll. Annex F provides information on the staff in the three state ministries of Agriculture, which show that the extension and advisory capacity is very weak. Substantial capacity building will be required in all three ministries and programs will need to be established to provide training as part of the reconstruction and development program. Box 6.2: Agricultural Credit Models In El Geneina the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) is piloting a small-scale credit program aimed at assisting IDPs to recover from their lost farm production capacity. It is using a model adopted in other part of Sudan by the ABS. The pilot is based on an agreement with a small group, such as a small village of about 50 people, to form a borrowing group for financing agricultural production. There are criteria for membership which includes men and women. The principle for forming a group is to promote collaboration and ―consolidate trust‖. The group‘s management committee opens an account with the ABS in the name of the group and makes certain commitments for repayment. Forms of financing are either murabaha for which the effective interest rate is 6 percent for 6 months, or salam, where the repayment is a share of the output paid in kind. If the crop fails due to poor weather or war the loan is rescheduled for payment after the next season. The ultimate guarantor for the loans is the management committee. Special groups just for women are also formed using the same system and managed by women. The ABS is also providing productive assets such as goats and sheep (purchased in the local markets) – again secured by a borrowing group - rather than providing cash loans. The repayment dues after 12 months can be either in kind or cash from the proceeds of the sheep through reproduction (twice a year) and milk sales. Based on material provided by Manager, Agricultural Bank of Sudan, El Geneina 6.123 To give some idea of the staffing difficulties for providing public support services, Annex F shows that the Ministry of Agriculture, Agriculture and Animal Resources in North Darfur has only 13 active agricultural extension officers available for an estimated 83,500 small-scale farmers in the state. In South Darfur the state ministry has only 49 for an estimated 482,000 small-scale farmers, and in West Darfur there are 30 active extension agents to cover about the same number of small-scale farms as in South Darfur. For the livestock sub-sector there are 314, 104 and 256 community animal health workers in North, South and West Darfur respectively. Annex I shows the difficulties faced by these ministries in funding a stronger system for support services. Tables in this annex show that for North, South and West Darfur the proportion of the state budgets allocated to wages, goods and services are only 1.6, 2.2 and 3.3 percent of the total state expenditures. 6.124 Financial services are critical, and have been addressed in the private sector background paper. Credit for small-scale farmers is a special challenge. Such farmers presently have no equity and hence special arrangements like group liability programs will need to be established. Box 6.2 provides an example of a small-scale credit program Summary Findings 6.125 For decades Darfur‘s rich natural resources attracted settlers and nomads which led to a rapid population increase and an intense use of natural resources. Agricultural production rose and as employment and incomes were generated the trickle of new-comers swelled to a river and for over a decade there has been conflict over the use of Darfur‘s natural resources. Before the escalation of conflict in 2003, Darfur‘s population grew more rapidly than most states in Sudan - about 3.1 percent per annum compared with a national average of 2.6 percent. Darfur‘s livestock industry was buoyant because there was a strong demand for its sheep in Saudi Arabia and Libya, for cattle in Central Sudan, and for camels in Egypt and Libya. Gum arabic (hashab and talha) was in high demand and was sold in significant quantities to Chad and Nigeria, and at auction in El Obeid. Millet and sorghum producers 209 found a strong local demand for their output from the rising population, but export demand for groundnuts (the main oilseed grown) fluctuated after the abolition of the oilseeds marketing monopoly in 1980. Reflecting the buoyant agricultural sector, there was substantial growth in the demand for land. 6.126 The allocation of land to newcomers to the region was made according to customary law under the leadership of traditional community leaders with significant community involvement. But the authority of the Native Administration has been systematically weakened by lack of fiscal resources and the appointment by the central government of numerous locality officials with legal powers over the allocation of land and the management of natural resources. This issue is covered in detail in the Governance background paper, where it is noted that the weakening of the moral authority of traditional leaders over the allocation of land rights and natural resource management, their replacement over time by government-appointed locality officials with no political support in the community, and the marginalization of the Darfur region through the gross under-funding of public services all became grievances. The absence of leaders with both the moral and legal authority to arrange and manage peaceful settlement of disputes contributed to the conflict that has laid waste to this once prosperous region. 6.127 Physical insecurity has forced at least 400,000 households into 50 camps and has prevented them from engaging in normal agricultural activity. The majority of these families are now dependent on humanitarian assistance for their livelihoods. Those forced to live in camps may have food security while in the camps, but they have few current opportunities to permanently resume farming or generate income from other activities. There are a few who manage to return to their land temporarily to plant, maintain and harvest crops; they are lucky but also run tremendous risks. Assuming peace and security, the way forward for those households in camps is either their return to farming or the pursuit of different livelihoods. Whether their future is in rural or urban areas they will become part of the private sector. Hence it will be the development of the private sector that should be the overarching framework for the rehabilitation of livelihoods in Darfur – acknowledging that considerable assistance of various kinds will be needed. 6.128 For most of those who remain in Darfur‘s rural areas (an estimated 250,000 households), high costs of production and marketing have had devastating negative effects on their net income. Some of them in favored circumstances may operate profitably in a conflict economy where prices of foods and for services have been inflated. But the majority has difficulty achieving and sustaining even low levels of livelihoods in the environment of continuing violence, high rates of informal taxation and few opportunities to increase productivity through improved technology, higher grade inputs or even higher levels of inputs through credit. To a large extent these households practice small-scale subsistence farming with the possibility of selling a surplus in good years, although isolation and marketing costs are obstacles. Livelihoods based on livestock are usually in the hands of medium to large- scale herders/nomads who belong to traditional livestock rearing tribes but have become increasingly sedentary over time. They rely on the natural productivity of the rangelands, but these are also under threat because of the destruction of trees and hence the sustainability of their livelihoods is at risk. Their rise to sustainable livelihoods will depend on them growing as an integral part of the private sector. 6.129 The destructive private use of natural resources because of a breakdown in communal management and stewardship of water, forests and forage, has exacerbated the chronic difficulties facing productive activities. One result is that forests, which are also the major rangelands used by livestock and wildlife, have been destroyed by the collection and intensive use of firewood for domestic and commercial purposes. We estimate that the annual value of 210 firewood and charcoal extraction from Darfur‘s forests and rangelands is about $760 million, which is much larger than the preliminary estimates of GDP from crops and livestock. But this level and value of production is extractive, not sustainable and has brought Darfur to an environmental and fuel crisis. The region is on the verge of consuming more wood than is being replaced through natural forest growth. Urgent measures are therefore needed to ensure against the destruction of the last remaining natural forests in Northern Sudan, to launch re- forestation programs, and find a substitute source of fuel for cooking. 6.130 Intensive cultivation of soils that are not suited to such land use - often in the wake of the destruction of rangelands – will start a cycle of wind and water erosion ending in massive desertification from which there will be no recovery. This process has already taken place in parts of North Darfur and is likely to continue unless over-grazing and destructive cultivation cease. Water resources, though vast in the many deep aquifers, are not adequate for the prospective draw down due to uncontrolled private irrigation and a substantial increase in urban demand. In some of the most productive agricultural areas of Darfur, the water resources are the poorest. This presents a substantial challenge for sustainable intensive small-scale agriculture. The core strategy to address all these natural resource issues is based around a land use mapping program, building on some work already done, and following it up with institutional arrangements that will ensure long term sustainable land management in Darfur. 6.131 Growth in Darfur in the foreseeable future will depend largely on the agricultural sector. Other potential sources of income growth are in the services sector (including services to support agriculture such as transport, marketing of inputs and outputs, storage, research, extension, and credit) and other off-farm private sector development such as construction and small-scale manufacturing and processing of agricultural products. There are no official estimates of GDP generated by agriculture in Darfur but preliminary estimates indicate that per capita growth has been stagnant – no doubt because of the destruction of productive capacity and the disruption of the livestock trade. The evidence from recent survey data is that harvested annual crop areas are at most only half of pre-war levels. Under current conditions, livestock could provide steady growth of between 5 and 6 percent, but any rapid growth is more likely to be mainly in crops such as millet, groundnuts and perhaps sesame. Livestock market data suggest that sheep and cattle have been regularly sold out of Darfur in substantial numbers. This underlines the fundamental importance of livestock production and the importance of sustainable use of the rangelands. Forests generate lumber, firewood and charcoal production of enormous value, but there are major questions about sustainability. Gum arabic is still produced and will probably become increasingly important as the rangelands are rehabilitated following their destruction because of relentless felling of trees and the effects of war and export marketing is decontrolled. See Box 6.3 for a more detailed discussion of growth in Darfur‘s agricultural sector. 6.132 The three states in the Darfur region have different resource endowments and hence differing prospects for agricultural and pastoral development. South Darfur with the best climate and soils for crop production averages 1.2 feddan of crops harvested per person which is easily the highest among the three states. On the other hand the number livestock per person is by far the highest in West Darfur at about 6.5. North Darfur has declined in terms of crops harvested and livestock numbers because of the assault on its natural resources. With their natural resources more in tact, South and West Darfur will be the main sources of future growth until the rangelands in North Darfur have been rehabilitated 6.133 While more work is needed to assess future sources of growth in Darfur, it is clear from various pieces of evidence that incentives to produce are reduced by the costs of marketing such as transport, protection in insecure areas, and numerous formal and informal 211 taxes result in high marketing margins and hence net benefits to primary producers in Darfur are heavily discounted. High marketing costs have typically resulted in prices paid to producers of export products such as groundnuts and livestock that are seldom more than 50 percent of fob prices at Port Sudan. For raw gum arabic the percentage is typically no more than 30 percent. In addition, the 20 percent appreciation of the exchange rate in the recent two years has, despite its theoretical justification, seriously weakened export competitiveness for all agricultural products, including those coming from Darfur. 6.134 Improvements in productivity must be the first line of defense for the agricultural sector against the impact of an exchange rate appreciation. They are feasible on the basis of available technology, but it will take 5 to 10 years at least to achieve improvements on farms and in grazing areas – assuming there is an adequate public budget allocation for research and extension. In the meantime the welfare of people in rural Darfur will decline further. On the other hand crops such as millet fetch good prices in the local market because the high cost of importing food to Darfur effectively protects local food production. 6.135 If peace and security can be restored and productive capacity rehabilitated, Darfur‘s agricultural sector has the potential to contribute substantially to national income and exports. But an important remaining constraint is the dysfunctional land policy that fails to provide farmers with long term leases in most areas in Sudan, but leaves the allocation of land use rights to customary law which has been weakened by the appointment of alternative traditional leaders also functions without long term leases. Customary law does, however, provide farmers with long term user rights if they continue to cultivate the land but, unfortunately, in Darfur this has been a prescription for serious land degradation as farmers continue to crop on marginal fragile land and thereby also reduce access to grazing areas. The well-known conflict between pastoralists and farmers is also a major unresolved land policy issue. Until there is a land policy in Darfur that is acceptable to the various claimants to land use rights, investment and rapid and sustained growth in agriculture and livestock production in Darfur is unlikely to occur. Box 6.3: Prospects for Growth in Darfur’s Agricultural Sector Growth prospects are informed by past performance and the future economic environment. From 1995 to 2001 until the drought, growth in millet production averaged 1.6 percent annually and groundnuts 15.5 percent (see figure below). But in 2002 both production in crops slumped severely because of the drought in 2001, briefly recovered in 2003 and then slumped severely as the conflict in Darfur disrupted farming. Since then millet production, predominantly locally consumed, appears to be making a comeback. On the other hand groundnut production continued to decline suffering from a loss of markets as traders (who had provided much of the credit to farmers during the expansion phase) retreated from activities in Darfur because of the insecurity (Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in Darfur, Sudan 2006. Final Report April 2007). The earlier years of steady growth in groundnut production were due to increased production in South and West Darfur. This could be achieved again with peace and security, the return of groundnut traders to provide credit, and a close attention to the quality of production. Production of sorghum has grown over the last decade, except for a spike in production in West and North Darfur in 2001 due to a large increase in area harvested, but then a sharp decline in 2002 following the 2001 drought, a recovery, and then a further decline as hostilities broke out. Gum arabic has a history of fluctuating production due to factors other than the weather. But from 2002 and during the conflict in Darfur, gum arabic production grew rapidly at a rate of 45 percent per annum because it remained a ready cash crop with significant sales in Chad. But, until the marketing of gum arabic is decontrolled it will be very difficult to assess the real trend in production because of the mixed market signals facing producers. 212 Darfur: Trends in Groundnut and Millet Production 800 700 600 "000 metric tons 500 400 300 200 100 0 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Groundnuts Millet Future livestock production is more difficult to assess. Official data on numbers are so smooth – growing steadily at 3 percent and 1 percent annually, despite the problems. These are unlikely to be reliable indications of either historical growth or future prospects. Herd models, conditional on a range of assumptions, show that within a wide band of parameters for flock and herd performance, sheep numbers could grow by about 5.5 percent and cattle numbers by about 5.6 percent annually. On the basis of a stable livestock industry and no exogenous shocks such as war, drought, disease and grasshoppers the growth in off take (production) could track the growth in numbers with small annual fluctuations. Using the weighted average for growth rates for crop and livestock production, we estimate potential growth of GDP for the agricultural sector in Darfur to be close to 5 percent per annum, but this could be boosted significantly by good policies, sound institutions and appropriate investments. But if groundnuts are in a permanent slump, growth in sorghum production remains stagnant, then average growth of the sector will depend mainly on millet at about 2.5 percent per annum with large annual fluctuations, and livestock growth at 5.5 percent per annum with a weighted sector average of about 3.5 percent per annum. 6.136 The conflict has destroyed livelihoods because it has destroyed the means for earning a livelihood – namely households, shelter and farms. Environmental degradation has also undermined the ability of households to earn a livelihood and drawn attention to the need to find ways to stabilize and improve incomes by reducing environmental degradation, reducing the risks faced by traditional agriculture, and at the same time diversifying the rural economy away from risky enterprises. National government policy has paid little attention to the plight of the agricultural sector in traditional farming areas generally in Sudan, including Darfur. Darfur‘s farmers face severely limited technological options, poor support services such as extension and credit, weak planning capacity for the sector and as a result many of the issues facing the sector are not addressed, and considerable isolation because of the absence of reliable road and rail transport. Natural resources have been degraded and Darfur faces one of the most variable climatic environments in Sudan. All these factors have a detrimental impact on the competitiveness of Darfur‘s agricultural sector. 6.137 Institutions such as the NA that have traditionally managed the use of natural resources and have also been responsible for the management of customary land rights have been weakened, as noted above. On the other hand the alternative of community/locality leadership appointed by the central government has also been unsuccessful and led to the fragmentation of traditional groupings such as tribes. In this context, the leadership imposed by the center is not seen by the population as having the moral authority to provide leadership. Neither the NA nor the system of appointments of community/locality leaders is locally accountable and hence vulnerable to abuse of power and lack of support. Ways need to be found to democratically strengthen the institutions that manage the use of public 213 resources and the allocation of land rights by the public sector. A positive development is a reported trend toward a more democratic model in decisions about NA leadership. 6.138 Apart from institutions to reduce the destruction of the environment, a sustainable model for land policy, and more effective public support services for agriculture such as research, extension and rural finance, poor infrastructure has been a major chronic problem for the agricultural sector. Stock routes are a major cause of conflict and road and rail networks are in need of major rehabilitation and expansion. A crucial review underway on the alignment and improvement of stock routes (including the provision of better and more appropriately-placed facilities) should be completed and reviewed to ensure that old and new stock routes provide for the efficient movement of animals between grazing areas and markets, along with the rehabilitation of feeder roads. The comparative benefits of rail and road transport rehabilitation will need to be carefully analyzed. Rail will effectively haul large exports such as livestock, grain and forest products and imports such as steel, cement, other building materials and bulk foods over long distances under most climatic conditions. On the other hand terminal rail facilities for loading and unloading livestock in rapidly expanding urban areas may create problems therefore livestock may be more efficiently and ―humanely‖ transported by road. The most effective combination rail and road systems for all of Darfur‘s economic development will need to be devised on the basis of economic analysis when all the potential payloads and investment costs have been assessed. E. CONCLUSIONS 6.139 To conclude, we highlight the six important conclusions that have been the core of this chapter, namely:  Peace and Security. A lasting solution to the violence and civil war over access to Darfur‘s natural resources is a necessary condition for agricultural development. The specific issue for agriculture is that there is a violent interface between crop producers and livestock herders over access to land and water which needs to be resolved. While this background paper has discussed the institutional issues this conflict cannot be finally resolved until there is a political solution.  Macroeconomic and Sector Policies. Since producers respond to incentives it will be necessary to achieve a sustained policy environment with effective social services that will stimulate investment in agricultural and pastoral production.  Natural Resource Management Policy. The production of crops, forest products and livestock cannot be sustained unless the unsustainable destruction of Darfur‘s natural resources is stopped. Over-cultivation and cultivation in marginal areas, over-grazing, indiscriminate felling of trees, and uncontrolled use of underground water will, if continued, eliminate any hope of Darfur living up to its potential as one of the most dynamic areas for agricultural growth in Sudan.  Land Policy. Soon after the cessation of hostilities mechanisms should be introduced in the context of the Darfur Land Commission to address the grievances over land and establish a new policy that will avoid future conflict over the authority to allocate land rights and manage land use. Ways need to be found to convert the value that currently resides in Darfur‘s land to its use as collateral for investment in productive purposes. The Darfur Land Commission has been established and conceptual work on future land policy has started. 214  Reconstitution of Livelihoods in the Private Sector. Those inside and outside camps will need to be given the support and space to become part of a growing private sector again. Ways need to be found to provide an enabling environment so that the private sector will decide that it is prepared to invest in Darfur‘s future. Part of the challenge is for public policy to remove market failures and the capture of markets by a few privileged people or groups. Darfur‘s natural comparative advantage in agricultural production, while challenged by its isolation, is undermined by marketing costs which are high in part because of the numerous formal and informal charges from which no services are provided.  Improved Technology and Efficient Support Services. There is a need for efficient public and private institutions that will be able to stimulate and support rural growth. A crucial element will be the resuscitation of institutions to develop improved technologies to increase productivity in the agricultural sector, and to disseminate technologies. Another crucial set of institutions will be for improving access to credit to support small-scale producers to finally introduce new technologies and open up opportunities for agro-processing to facilitate more efficient marketing of agricultural and pastoral products.  Infrastructure Development. Isolation is a major cause of high costs, low real incomes and hence poverty in Darfur. But the cost of roads, bridges, railways, airports and electricity are also high. It will therefore be necessary to design an efficient infrastructure development strategy and then prioritize specific infrastructure developments – using as many dual purpose facilities as possible. 6.140 It is clear that Darfur‘s natural resources provide an ideal environment for crop and livestock production, to underpin the re-establishment of decent livelihoods, and indeed future prosperity. The issue for Darfur‘s agricultural economy is not whether crops and forests will grow or livestock will reproduce and gain weight. Rather the issue is: can the pre-conditions for sustained growth be established? 215 CHAPTER 7. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT Prepared by Terje Wolden, with contributions from Haroon Osman Sam and Amin Sabri (Electricity), Subnash Seth (Transport), Ahmed Musa Siyam (urban infrastructure), Edmond Carpentier (Rail), and Herve Morice and Eidam Abubakr Ismail (Water), Asbjorn Wee and Yousif Elfadil.210 A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 7.1 With an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the ninth largest country in the world, but has been plagued by civil war and underdevelopment. Infrastructure needs are immense, as was documented in the CPA JAM211, and this deficit causes isolation that creates and sustains poverty. Addressing rural isolation by improving access is expected to be a key element to reduce poverty and sustain peace through larger and better integration of the country. Nowhere are these issuers more relevant than in Darfur, where the already very limited infrastructure network has been further eroded by the recent conflict, and where most people have little or no access to basic services and rely on costly alternatives (unsafe water, indoor pollution due to biomass fuel and time lost to fetch fuel and water). 7.2 Darfur‘s inequality compared to the rest of Northern Sudan has been a key source of conflict and social tension, and needs to be addressed in order to sustain peace and reduce poverty. Key development gaps with respect to access to health, education, and basic infrastructure (water supply and sanitation, electricity, roads, etc) need to be addressed quickly in order to advance economic development, and large scale investments in these areas will also contribute to growth by creating jobs. This is particularly important in Darfur where the potential sources of economic growth are limited, and where the agriculture sector accounts for the majority of rural employment and income.212 7.3 Among the causes of conflict and widespread and deep poverty in Darfur, at least two are related to lack of infrastructure:  Remoteness: Darfur is now on the economic periphery, lacking the benefits of proximity as well as good connectivity to markets, intermediaries, information and skills. The distance from Nyala to Khartoum is 1,305 km by rail; from Nyala to Port Sudan it is 1780 km; and by ―road‖ from Khartoum to El Fasher is 1,250 km, of which about 400 km is only an earth road not reliable during and after the rainy season.  Lack of public investment: While the implementation of a negotiated peace involving power and wealth-sharing should begin to correct these imbalances, the three states need affirmative action in social and physical infrastructure to catch up with the rest of North Sudan and achieve similar levels of human development. 7.4 It is difficult to overemphasize the low base from which infrastructure development will have to begin and the magnitude of the efforts needed to bring real improvements to Darfur. At the same time, infrastructure investments should serve three main purposes in development and poverty reduction: first, through the direct benefits of increasing access to markets, health centers, education opportunities and basic human services such as water 210 The water and sanitation sections below draw on work done by AfDB 211 ―Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication‖, 2005. 212 Agriculture and Rural Development chapter 216 supply, electricity or affordable transport; second, by contributing to job creation and growth through providing the basic infrastructure—water supply, roads, rail, power and municipal services—needed to support livelihoods, private sector development and trade; and finally, if investment programs are well-designed, through employing people directly in their implementation and operation. This creates important multiplier effects in local communities and in the region as a whole. Each of these three elements is desperately needed, and will be crucial for sustaining peace and reconciliation in Darfur. Focusing on only one or two would mean missing important opportunities to use infrastructure investments to stimulate economic growth and to reduce poverty. 7.5 A key constraint to infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion will be implementation capacity. Other major concerns include:  linking infrastructure developments in Darfur to national networks and priorities;  establishing adequate capacity to maintain and operate infrastructure and ensuring that services match internationally recognized safety and security standards;  varying levels of security and ongoing conflicts in part of the area; and  the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of different levels of government. 7.6 There will likely be a tendency to overstate the absorptive capacity for aid. Plans are inevitable ambitious, as was highlighted by the slow implementation of the CPA JAM. Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity depend partly on policies and institutions, and low capacity can often result in donors having to bypass local institutions and provide aid in-kind, or setting up special implementing units outside of regular government agencies. Such arrangements can inhibit development of capacity in government line ministries, and are difficult to terminate once entrenched in the system. 7.7 The persisting low levels of development investments in Darfur indicate that capacity in the three states might not be much better than in Southern Sudan in 2006, although more detailed assessments are needed. B. DIAGNOSTIC AND CHALLENGES 7.8 While many of the challenges to infrastructure development in Darfur echo those in other Northern states, the magnitude and depth of the problems are larger. The following section will briefly review the current situation and key issues and constraints within each of the infrastructure sectors (water and sanitation, electricity, urban and municipal services, and transport), as well as core cross-cutting issues that need to be tackled. In Section III ideas to inform overall and sub-sector strategies and programs are presented. 217 Figure 7.1: Road Accessibility in Darfur (2004) Water and Sanitation 7.9 Improving water supply and sanitation in Darfur would produce substantial health benefits and raise the quality of life and life expectancy, in particular for women. Putting appropriate institutions in place will be key to achieve sustainable improvements in quality of water and sanitation services in urban as well as rural areas with due regard to the 218 environment. International experience shows how public institutions have been chronically unable to develop and operate widespread access to these services. In this respect, and given the urgencies involved, the government and donors would have to seriously consider how urban facilities can be provided and operated by the private sector, with investments supported by the public sector and donors. For smaller communities in rural areas, the experience elsewhere points to a partnership between the communities themselves with assistance from NGOs as key to sustainable delivery, again with investments supported by the public sector and donors. Intervention of the private sector can also be considered in cases where the nature of the equipment (―semi-urban‖ large water yards with mini-networks) or specific local constraints (agreement for a ―neutral‖ actor to manage a water yard accessible for both pastoralists and settlers) would justify it. Planning needs to take into account rural as well as urban needs, and return scenarios (see MDG chapter). Uses of Water 7.10 Agricultural Use: Darfur holds an estimated 24 million heads of livestock. It can be estimated that this number of livestock may require about 300 Mm3 of water per year; most of which is extracted from natural surface sources, with severe constraints on water availability in the dry season. 7.11 Access to water for agriculture has been a major factor in the present conflict: rainfall has markedly decreased since 1970 in the whole region, with several droughts between 1980 and 2000. During that period, agricultural and pastoral activities suffered severely, with desertification of a growing part of traditional rangeland and a resulting increased pressure from nomad groups on land and water resources of more favored areas traditionally occupied by settlers. 7.12 Human Consumption: Overall, access to adequate water for human consumption in Darfur was about 85 percent in 2000, ranging from about 97 percent in North Darfur, to 83 percent in West Darfur and 80 percent in South Darfur.213 Levels were thus above the Northern states average of 81 percent. Preliminary findings from the 2006 SHHS indicate that access levels have decreased dramatically in all three states, to 48, 44 and 40 percent in North, South and West Darfur respectively (see MDG chapter, Figure 2.12).214 This deterioration is likely a result of the conflict and the physical destruction of water points, disruption of community-based maintenance systems, lack of availability of spare parts and collapse of water charges collection. Although large regional disparities exist, the proportion of existing water schemes (hand pumps, water yards), that are no longer functional now is estimated to exceed 60 percent in most places. Clearly a reversal of these trends is needed on a sustained basis to attain reasonable progress towards the water MDGs. However, the situation is markedly better in the many IDP camps, where access to safe water and sanitation might be as high as 98 percent, reflecting the post-conflict NGO efforts in operation and maintenance of water supply systems. 7.13 Urban and Industrial Consumption: The urban population in Darfur has almost doubled since 2000, as a result of the large influx of almost 2 million IDPs, and now accounts for nearly 40 percent of the total population. Combined with water requirements for industrial production of ice blocks, soap groundnut oil, tannery, plastics, textile and petroleum 213 Measured water access depends on the definition. Here we look at access to adequate water sources, which is significantly higher (about double) that of improved water sources. 214 The 2000 data are not as detailed as the 2006 SHHS data, especially in terms of whether wells are protected or unprotected, hence the 2000 series are upper-bound estimates, and may overstate the extent of deterioration. 219 storage tanks in the three state capitals, this has put large pressure on the already limited urban water supply systems. Availability of Water 7.14 It is estimated that there is a total annual runoff of 1.5 billion m3 over Darfur, thus confirming the availability of significant volumes on major wadis. This is however seasonal, with the exception of some low-lying parts of Bahr El Arab, permanent streams in the Jebel Marra and the upstream section of wadis in the vicinity of Jebel Marra. Surface water is typically accessible only 4 to 5 months a year, during and shortly after the rainy season. Furthermore, Darfur has experienced reduced rainfall over the last decades, which has resulted in increased peak discharges, reduced flow durations and reduced recharge of underground aquifers. 7.15 Mobilization of surface water occurs mainly through natural surface water sources, whether temporary (under various names depending on size and shape) or perennial. Springs are found mainly in Jebel Marra (Galol, Golo, Soni, Ages), while lakes are found in Jebel Marra (Lake Deriba), in Bahr el Arab (Lake Kundi) and Wadi Salih (Lake Enzi). Evaporation is a major factor in the depletion of these reservoirs. 7.16 Surface water is also mobilized through artificial storage schemes (hafirs or dams). It is estimated that more than 120 hafirs exist in Darfur, mostly in the north western basement area and in the south eastern clay plains. Hafirs are normally excavated in impervious clay soils, with typical storage capacities of 5,000 to 10,000 m3 each, but their capacities have been greatly reduced during the past years due to lack of rehabilitation. A few dams have also been constructed across wadis, especially in hilly areas (the Mellit dam was constructed in 1947 with a capacity of 1 Mm3, Golo Lake in West Darfur has a 4.5 Mm3 capacity), but are similarly constrained by lack of maintenance and siltation problems, which have severely reduced the available storage capacity of many dams. 7.17 Groundwater is the only significant permanent source of water in Darfur. Although not water bearing, the Jebel Marra tertiary volcanic formations store considerable volumes of rainwater every year, feeding the perennial streams radiating from the mountains. The alluvial aquifers underlie most of the seasonal wadi beds and their banks. Where the wadi bed is lower than the water tables, such as the Umm Bala area in West Darfur, permanent marshes, pools and lakes remain all year round. Alluvial aquifers are a potentially substantial source of water; stored resources are estimated at 3 billion m3 for the whole Darfur; while renewable resources have been estimated at 600 Mm3 annually in South Darfur alone. While the chemical water quality of alluvial aquifers is generally good, there is potentially strong bacteriological contamination due to human and cattle concentrations along the wadis (Wadi Nyala in Nyala town and surroundings is just one example). Further research is needed, as comprehensive data on water flows, and reconnaissance studies along most of major wadis, are not available. 7.18 Other potential sources of ground water include the Baggara aquifer complex, the Nubian sandstone aquifer, the Sahara basin, the Umm Kaddada basin, Wadi El Ku and the Disa outlier but these may not be economically viable. At present, alluvial aquifers such as the Baggara aquifer complex are mobilized either through hand-dug wells with simple water lifting devices or from large diameter boreholes or tube wells equipped with electric pumps (for high-intensity town water supply, water yard schemes, or for irrigation). Off-takes can be high, but water points have been created without reference to sustainable water management schemes at basin level, and evidence suggests that off-takes in some areas have already locally reached physically sustainable limits (eg. Wadi Nyala at Nyala town). 220 7.19 Water sources for human consumption. The DHS and MICS, and the 2006 SHHS facilitate the comparison of water sources across time and regions (see MDG chapter, Figure 2.13). This shows that Darfur has not only low but also decreasing access to improved water sources compared to other Northern states and a much higher dependency on wells. ―Other‖ water sources include springs, rainwater, water vendors (including tankers, or a cart with a small tank or drum), and bottled water. The disaggregated figures for 2000 show that most of the piped-in connections in the region are limited to North Darfur, as are most of the protected springs and protected wells. In West Darfur, half of the households have an unprotected well and a fifth of households in South Darfur obtain their water from vendors. In 2000 about 14 percent of households had a piped-in connection, however by 2006 the number decreased to 3 percent, and this data is mainly for those outside the IDP-population. Sanitation 7.20 In 2001, UNICEF estimated that access to improved sanitation in Darfur was about 60 percent overall, but that the situation in West Darfur was as low as 51 percent. However, the 2006 SHHS data suggest that the proportion of household members using improved sanitation facilities is much lower, at 32, 30 and 20 percent in North, West and South Darfur respectively. At the same time it is believed that the massive movement of population to IDP camps has contributed to improved access to sanitation facilities since 2003. 7.21 Sanitation practices rely on the use of individual pit latrines, most of which are traditional and consisting of an unlined hole covered with planks. Improved pit latrines consist of a lined pit covered with concrete slabs and are widely used in urban centers. Use of pour flush latrines and septic tanks remain limited to about 5 percent of the population, mainly in urban centers. In larger cities, and following the breakdown of public schemes operated at mahalia215 level, de-sludging services are now provided by private actors equipped with small truck-mounted tanks (in Nyala, seven such trucks are currently in operation). In the absence of monitoring and supervision, and compounded by access constraints to designated disposal sites, most of the waste is indiscriminately disposed, with adverse environmental consequences. Effluent from semi-industrial uses such as slaughtering houses is generally allowed to run to waste, and no attention seems to have been paid to risks of groundwater pollution due to seeping effluents. 7.22 No system for collection of charges for sanitation is in place. Since services that could generate revenues, such as de-sludging, have been given to the private sector, activities linked to environmental sanitation rely totally on private resources and cross subsidization mechanisms in the public sector. Key Issues and Constraints 7.23 The key issue is how to expand access to improved water and sanitation in urban and rural areas. The conflict has led to marked deterioration in water access in urban centers where neither production nor distribution capacities have been properly maintained or upgraded in line with the large population growth. Less than 60 percent of the nominal production capacity in urban centers is currently mobilized. Distribution networks and storage facilities are between 30 to 40 years old, and subject to frequent breakdowns. 7.24 High User Costs. Many people are now paying the high water prices that are generally attached to the ―alternative‖ water sources. Charges can typically range from about US$1 to 2/ m3 at the water point up to US$10/m3 for home delivery within a few kilometers 215 Mahalia means ‖locality‖ or district. There are 23 mahalias in Darfur, between 6 and 9 in each state. 221 away. The burden on poor households due to high tariffs frequently results in severe reductions in individual water consumption, which can be below 15 liters per person/day. 7.25 Tariffs are a burden on users with access to public systems, but water revenues do not cover expenditure. Official water tariffs for urban systems have remained unchanged, with a flat rate corresponding to US$1 to 2 /m3 for small users according to their actual consumption. However, collection of charges remains only partial (about one third of individual connections do not pay charges), and the percentage of current revenues towards current expenditures (salaries and operating and management costs) is only 50 percent in El Geneina and 85 percent in Nyala. Cost recovery is about 100 percent in El Fasher, but with minimal operating and management (O&M) expenses leading to rapid deterioration of the infrastructure stock. Current deficits are covered by state subsidies; in all cases, revenues do not cover investment and amortization charges. 7.26 Institutional deficiencies. Recent years have been characterized by a marked instability of institutional arrangements and administrative practices, with unclear definitions of lines of authority, roles and responsibilities between different agencies and levels of government. Ad hoc arrangements resulting from the conflict and deteriorated human capacities have further blurred the institutional panorama. 7.27 Inadequate budget and staff resources have been available for public institutions at decentralized level, though some agencies such as Sudan Water Council (SWC) count their nominal staff in the hundreds. Working conditions are not attractive, which makes finding experienced technical and managerial staff very difficult. Training opportunities for existing or new staff are rare. These constraints have weakened institutions and eroded sector capacities, including for collecting and using basic scientific information when prioritizing and making decisions. In general, little or no attention appears to be given at the appropriate level to such key issues as sustainability of water resources, integrated water resource management or watershed management, or to monitoring and evaluation activities. For similar reasons, sanitation and hygiene promotion, including with respect to household water storage, has received little public support other than under emergency programs by NGOs. 7.28 Water quality control is limited, including in accessible urban areas where part of the water supply is provided through water points operated by private actors. Such activities have been mostly carried out only when commissioning works, with limited controls during the operation stage. Electricity 7.29 The experience in developing countries has often been negative when it comes to public utility companies‘ abilities to provide cost-effective access to electricity and quality of service, particularly for the urban poor. Steps have been made in Sudan to allow the private sector to provide and operate power plants, and even participate in power distribution. However, much more needs to be done to allow greater and more transparent competition in the supply of electricity, and also in strengthening the role of the private sector in extending the electricity coverage to the 95 percent of Darfur‘s population presently without access. 7.30 In the short tem, efforts could be usefully made to repair existing facilities to improve delivery to social service providers and government offices. In the medium term, however, the government could consider the use of concessions to allow development of better electricity in urban areas with support by the public sector and donors for investments. 222 Current Status 7.31 The predominant source of energy in Sudan is biomass (firewood, charcoal, residues), which represents 80 percent of national energy consumption, compared to petroleum (17 percent) and electricity, only about 2 percent. Overall, about 5 million people or around 17 percent of Sudanese have access to electricity. This is low compared to such neighbors as Egypt (23 percent) and Eritrea (33 percent). 7.32 Most electricity consumption is in the Khartoum area, where 70 percent of the available electricity is consumed. There are also large disparities within Sudan, with electrification ratios of about 25, 17 and 16 percent in the Northern, Eastern and Central regions respectively. This compares to a ratio of about 5 percent in Darfur, indeed the three Darfur states have the lowest rate of electrification among the Northern states. Darfur is at a considerable energy disadvantage in that only four towns partially supplied by diesel/gasoil fired generators, and almost half of the available electricity is consumed by residential areas, while the rest is consumed by industry (30 percent), commercial and public services (20 percent), and agriculture (2 percent). 7.33 The national grid covers a small part of the country along the Blue Nile with 220 kV transmission line from the Roseires hydropower station (280 MW) to the Khartoum area where most of the thermal generation capacity of 654 MW is installed. The Merowe dam, under construction, will add 1250 MW hydropower to the system when completed in 2009. There are aledgedly plans to connect Darfur to the national grid as soon as Merowe becomes operational, although so far no funding has apparently been allocated, nor has the feasibility study been initiated. 7.34 The existing power grid system in Sudan thus does not include Darfur. Instead, four isolated power systems based on diesel plants are located in El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina and Ed-Dein. While a grid system could provide between 342-527 MW, the isolated power systems in use in Darfur have a total installed capacity of just 25 MW of which 19MW is available for use to serve the population. The available power plants are limited to the four main cities only, and rural areas are not served. The total number of NEC consumers in Darfur is only 9680 (about 1.1 percent of NEC consumers in 2005). 7.35 Following a 2001 Electricity Law, the Ministry of Electricity was created by separating the Directorate of Energy Affairs from the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The Ministry has added new directorates responsible for planning and regulations, in addition to a Rural Electrification Directorate (RED). RED is responsible for planning, implementation and follow-up of rural electrification projects in the towns and villages which have not yet been reached by the National Electricity Corporation (NEC) networks. RED is also responsible for the training of relevant personnel for operation and maintenance of generation units and distribution networks including renewable energy systems. 7.36 In the effort to accelerate electrification of the country and alleviate financial constraints, the Electricity Law allows private sector participation. The Investment Encouragement Act offers various incentives to investors including tax exemptions. In power generation, the private sector is already participating in agreement with NEC. The private sector has also started participating in the distribution of electricity. However apart from stand-alone diesel driven systems, NEC is the only operator at present. Its monopoly regarding electricity generation and supply did, however, cease with the introduction of the new Electricity Law. The Corporation has about 926,000 consumers (2005). 7.37 While access to electricity in Darfur is severely limited, those few with access consume very little due to the price/tariff and infrastructure deficiencies. Average per capita 223 electricity consumption in Sudan is 117 kWh, but only 4.1 kWh in Darfur. The present tariff is around 10 US cents/kWh. Although high relative to per capita income in Darfur, user charges are insufficient to cover NEC‘s operating costs and the organization is largely dependent on subsidies. Government subsidies have, however, fallen considerably in recent years and at present covers only about 14 percent of total operating costs. The tariff level is expected to increase to 12 US cents/kWh, which might further reduce consumption of electricity in Darfur, although it would likely improve private sector interests in extending electricity services and providing O&M services. 7.38 Since 1986 new consumers have to pay for the cost of extension of the network. In addition, the new consumer now also pays connection fees (70,000-110,000 SD) and meter fees (23,000-80,000 SD). This arrangement clearly benefits areas already connected but effectively prevents the majority of households living in Darfur from gaining access to electric power from the local grids, especially lower income households that ideally should be target. Most households in Darfur instead use kerosene lamps or candles for lighting, although the monthly cost of kerosene can be higher than the monthly electricity bills of similar households. As documented in the MDG and rural development chapters in this report, firewood and charcoal consumption is very high in Darfur. 7.39 Minimal electricity infrastructure is available. The four diesel/gas oil fired power systems in Darfur carry a total installed capacity of just 25 MW (67 percent of available capacity). However, the three power stations in El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina were initiated some forty years ago and as such suffer from frequent interruption of service and are no longer suitable for economic repairs and extension of service. One example of the effects of such infrastructure deficiency was a 10-month long black-out between 2002-2003 when electricity supply was limited to hospitals, water pumping stations, and other essential services, and forced load-shedding. Existing installed generating capacities are sufficient for only 15-20 percent of the total connected and unconnected consumers in Darfur. Nyala, for example, is divided in two parts (North and South) and load-shedding is applied in each part every 12 hours. In El Geneina, the power station operates for only 17 hours each day as a result of generator overheating and fuel supply problems. 7.40 Improvements in the electricity sector in Darfur will require significant investment in associated infrastructure to lower the cost of fuel transportation and storage facilities. Generators procured by the Ministry of Electricity for NDS under the Rural Electrification Program are still warehoused in El Fasher due to a lack of transportation and installation funds and facilities. Key Issues and Constraints 7.41 Institutional and regulatory improvements needed. It appears that a comprehensive policy and strategy to guide the sub-sector development is lacking. A regulatory framework is under preparation in national ministerial committees but progress is slow. Any investment in electricity and associated infrastructure needs to be complemented by an appropriate legal framework covering licensing, safety, standards, setting of tariffs and tariff differentiation, private sector relations, privatization of distribution and sales, all of which are urgently needed for investments to take place in Darfur. 7.42 The Ministry of Electricity has, in addition to the Directorate of Energy Affairs (transferred from Ministry of Energy and Minerals) dealing with energy policies, also established a Directorate of Rural Electrification, a Directorate of Planning, an Electricity Regulatory and Monitoring Directorate (ERMD) and a unit for Southern Sudan Co-ordination within the Ministry. Committees have been appointed to elaborate the new regulatory 224 framework required by the Electricity Law. Regulations for licensing, tariffs, safety etc., are expected to evolve from the work of these committees. 7.43 Since the establishment of the Ministry in 2002, however, a primary concern has been to assign qualified personnel to the various functions. Appointments to senior positions were only recently completed. The Ministry is thus operational but without sufficiently qualified staff to meet the challenges set out by the rural electrification policy and strategy, including in particular planning requirements and implementation of new regulations and guidelines. 7.44 Addressing the energy deficit in Darfur raises a number of challenges, including an appropriate regulatory system, which is not yet in place, and organizational entities with appropriate objectives and responsibilities to be effective in the drive to develop the renewable resources. There are also challenges related to capacity building aspects of state and regional government structures, and local governments and authorities, at the community structures, and the private sector. Finally, not least, serious consideration needs to be given to financial aspects, including the role of subsidies, tariff setting, and so on. 7.45 In order to maintain and extend the power supply to the main population centers, existing diesel generating equipment needs to be rehabilitated and partially replaced. New equipment is required to meet the immediate needs in unsupplied centers and provide new connections in the towns with partial supply. 7.46 Apart from the financial and O&M constraints diesel generators represent, implying substantial fuel subsidy needs, affordable transport capacity for fuel is also a critical element. Alternative and cheaper generation as well as a transmission network is necessary to establish a sustainable power supply and basis for extensive grid based electrification. Installation of heavy fuel oil (HFO) generating equipment, eventually a larger plant in a regional grid in Darfur connecting the 4 main towns, would reduce the generating costs considerably, but will not eliminate the current transport constraints. 7.47 Darfur is predominantly rural and lack of electricity is one major constraint to sustainable rural development and generation of rural jobs and income. In a post-conflict situation, it would be necessary to remove existing barriers to enable electricity to reach new population groups, creating the necessary premises for improvement of social services and income generating activities. Extension of the grid and grid-based generation capacity has physical and economic limitations due to high cost of transmission lines to remote areas. Thousands of villages and small towns in Darfur will be excluded from electricity supply for the foreseeable future, if alternatives involving utilization of renewable resources, first and foremost utilization of photovoltaics, but possibly also mini hydropower resources, are not considered. The potential for mini hydropower need to be identified. The process from investigations to completion of construction may take 2-5 years depending on the size and complexity of the schemes. Small scale biomass based electricity generation (for instance gasification) depends on the technology development to be fully commercialized. Required quantities and concentrations of biomass which may not be available at present, and this, together with the transport conditions and distances involved may limit the prospects. 7.48 Insulation values in Sudan are relatively high, between 5 and 6 kWh per m2 per day. The solar energy potential could be an interesting alternative in some rural areas where demand is low and dispersed, first and foremost as stand alone systems for water pumping, schools, clinics etc. (solar home systems). The investment costs are high, but will nevertheless be a least cost solution in many cases. At present larger solar systems would only in exceptional cases be relevant. A combined system with 600 kW solar and diesel back-up will have a cost of around US$ 6 m (US$10,000 per kW), the distribution network not included. 225 7.49 Some reviews show that the Jebel Marra area may contain economically viable geothermal energy resources, but further investigations are needed to inform decisions about viability. Pending the output of these investigations, exploitations of any geothermal resources could be considered an option for the medium term. As hydropower and geothermal resources possibly constitute the only exploitable major local energy potential of significance in the short- to medium term (5-10 years), necessary investigations should be considered a high priority and related feasibility studies should be implemented as a matter of urgency. The regional transmission lines to distribute production to the main urban centers should also be included in the planning process. Urban Infrastructure and Municipal Services 7.50 The focus here is limited to urban and municipal infrastructure and not the broader ―urban development agenda.‖ The broader agenda raises many cross-cutting topics such as decentralization, including fiscal decentralization and the sub-national budgeting process, municipal management, cost recovery, etc. which would all eventually have to be addressed in the context of future urban development. The aim here is to assess the magnitude of needs and identification of critical emerging priorities in infrastructure and urban services to improve the overall quality of urban life in the short to medium term with an emphasis on services to the most vulnerable in these urban areas. However, a more holistic approach to urban development and associated reforms would need to be developed early on in order to avoid a situation where extremely rapid urban development runs well ahead of the capacity of urban areas to provide sustainable employment and capacity of emerging authorities at regional and state level to manage the process. 7.51 The definition of an urban centre varies from country to country and even within countries. Among the parameters used in defining centers as ―urban‖, is population, administrative role, physical and socioeconomic profile. In this report, an urban centre in Darfur is defined as any human settlement with a population of at least 5,000. Accordingly, 35 urban centers have been identified across the three states, including the three state capitals. Twelve could qualify as medium-sized and require special consideration in any development program (Table 7.1). The selection of these medium urban centers was based on a number of factors including population size, commercial and political importance (e.g. Locality capital), and the extent to which it acts as a service center for a wider group of people in the vicinity. Table 7.1: Identified Medium and Small Urban Centers Identified Medium and Small Urban Centers State Medium Urban Centers (12) Small Urban Centers (20) No. North Darfur Kutum, Um keddada, Meleit, Dar El-Salam, El -Tina, El-Layeit, 13 Kakabiya El-Malha, Haskanita, Fataburno, Korma, Tawila, Karnoi South Darfur Ed-Dein, Buram, Edd El Geraida, Tulus, Adela, Shayeria, 10 Fursan, Kass, Rehaid El Berdi Katela, West Darfur Zalingi, Garcila, Furbaranga Golo, Mokgar, Kulbus, Baida, 9 Morni, Nartati 7.52 There is a severe shortage in municipal services provision in all urban centers in Darfur, with severe effects on the economic and social outcomes of the population. Apart from the three state capitals, the status of the infrastructure and services cannot be easily assessed, as the local governmental entities responsible have not yet been properly established. For these centers, the focus should be on identifying basic infrastructure services needed and to launch an urban development planning program. 226 7.53 It has been observed that over 60 percent of the urban communities identified in this report flourished along seasonal streams or wadis that run during autumn. However, the wadis represent a potential threat to these urban centers since they occasionally overflow and might cause destruction of infrastructure or isolation. 7.54 Another common feature of these medium and smaller urban centers in Darfur is that they derive their existence from their great dependence on available agricultural and livestock resources. This trend is most likely to continue in affecting and reshaping future prosperity and provision of infrastructure and services, such as water supply or erosion protection projects, has to take this into account. Snapshots of the State Capitals 7.55 Before 1994, El Fasher was the capital of the region, and the city has retained some of its capacity as an administrative, political and commercial city. The population was estimated to about 215,000 in 2006, about 8 percent of the state population, with about one third in squatter areas with no access to municipal services. Five IDP camps have been established around the town: Abu Showk, Zam-Zam, Kherban, Kulkul and El Salam. 7.56 At present, El Fasher suffers from a lack of proper basic infrastructural services. The little services that do exist are in a poor state due to lack of proper maintenance, rehabilitation or extension, as a result of shortage in fund allocation, administrative weaknesses and lack of technical manpower. 7.57 El Fasher has only about 18 km of single lane asphalted roads of which about half are in need of repairs and rehabilitation. The total length of engineered gravel roads amounts to 13 km serving very limited areas. The city has two bridges, both are in need of maintenance and rehabilitation works. 7.58 The Department of Roads and Bridges in the Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (MPP&PU) is the authority responsible for design and construction of all urban and rural roads and bridges in the whole of the state except for the limited national road network and rural access (tertiary) roads under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. However, due to its limited capabilities and lack of funding the department limits its activities to the state and municipal roads in the greater El Fasher area only. 7.59 The topography of the town dictates that urban drainage system is directed towards the town centre where the two seasonal streams also discharge their excess waters forming a large pond. The existing drainage system, which serves a limited portion of the town, is in very poor condition and requires extensive maintenance and upgrading. 7.60 For solid waste management the municipality is catered for by collection and disposal from public buildings, market areas and some old neighborhoods of the town. For a limited zone, the municipality incinerates the collected solid waste locally in a way that causes pollution and fire hazard. Except for this, there is random dumping of significant amounts of private waste, with large consequences for the environment. 7.61 The Planning Department of the MPP&PU manages the urban planning of the whole state with limited staff. Its main activities are design and construction of public buildings, and ad hoc planning of limited parts of towns, mainly squatter areas. The planning process is very slow due to human resource and financial constraints. 7.62 Nyala is the largest commercial centre in western Sudan and is linked to Khartoum via rail, although only limited transport services are offered at present due to poor condition 227 of the track. The city has an estimated population of 340,000. Because of the recent conflict, the town is surrounded by nine IDP camps, which have an additional population in excess of 300,000. The almost doubling of the population has put overwhelming pressure on the already meager services of the city. 7.63 Geographically, Nyala is located on the doorstep of the Jebel Marra mountain range, and is separated into two parts by the seasonal Wadi Nyala. It is highly dependent on water extracted from shallow wells located along the wadi bed. To facilitate crossings of Wadi Nyala and the many khors that penetrate the town, there are two main bridges and a few box culverts, although not nearly adequate during the rainy season. 7.64 The condition of the roads within the city is relatively good, but the network is still far from being adequate for a centre of this size. Table 7.2 below summarizes the status of these road linkages. The urban asphalted roads are limited in length but in good condition. The cost for constructing one kilometer of a gravel road in Nyala is estimated to be in order of US$175,000 while for asphalt road the figure reaches US$300,000. A limited number of road contractors are registered and available in the state. Table 7.2: Summary of the Status of Road Linkages in Nyala Road type Names Length Comments Asphalt Cinema, Jamhoria, Ed dein, Cango, 29km In a good condition. Maintenance roads Jebel Marra, Wohda, El Gair1, El costs 300,000 $ every three years Shabi market, Concorb and Airport Gravel El Gair 2, El Mowashi, Bonouk, 30km Require US$5.25 million to be roads asphalted at a rate of US$175,000/km Existing Air port (12m), Elmalia (8m), Jebel 671 m Constructed during 1983-2005. All bridges Rd. (26m), Abgelaib Nar (15m), are in good condition and Makkah (200m), Domaia (350m), culverts Eshlack (50m), Technical college (10m) 7.65 A limited storm water drainage system of about 9.8 km was established long ago by the municipality. However, most of the drains are concentrated in a limited area of the town, and most if not all require maintenance. For other area the excess runoff just penetrates the town and discharges into Wadi Nyala. Wadi Nyala itself is a source of hazard as recurrently the water level exceeds the bank and encroaches into neighboring buildings. 7.66 The picture of solid waste management is very different from that for El Fasher. About 80 collection points exist within the town and the waste is usually incinerated locally without being transported to the open landfill area outside town. The service of transferring the solid waste outside the city is limited to market areas, public buildings and a few neighborhoods within the vicinity of the centre. It is estimated that less than 20 percent of the population is served, and the monthly service charge is about US$2.5 (compared to say US$3 in Khartoum State). The municipality has a very limited number of vehicles and manpower, which helps prevent any expansion of coverage. 7.67 El Geneina was relatively recently named as capital of the newly formed West Darfur State and lies adjacent to the international border with Chad. The population of the town was estimated in 2006 to be of the order of 140,000, although the town has also attracted more than 200,000 IDPs in seven camps located just outside the town borders. 228 7.68 Geographically the most significant feature of El Geneina is Wadi Kaja, which separates the town into two parts as it flows intermittently during the wet season. In addition, several other small khors runs through the town on loose sandy soils and discharge into Wadi Kaja. Because of their steep slopes and high rain intensities, these khors usually form deep vertical cuts, and can be a hazard to the town during the wet season. 7.69 No paved road exists in El Geneina, but construction of a 10 km gravel road has just been completed connecting the custom headquarters and MPP&PU. As for water crossings, the town has an old one-lane steel bridge which is in very poor condition. In addition, a new concrete bridge has recently been constructed across the Wadi to facilitate easy access to the new airport under construction, which has been relocated to the other side of the Wadi. 7.70 The surface water drainage system is in a very poor condition. It is about 10 km long only and of medium size, with drains of two meters average width that were constructed during the colonial period. The sandy soil prevalent in and around El Geneina town aggravates the situation when torrential rains hit the town resulting in gully erosions that produces deep vertical cuts. Similarly, water supply networks, electricity networks and telecommunication services are all severely affected by gully erosions. 7.71 The mighty Wadi Kaja itself is not stable and has changed its course several times in the past. During the last decade and estimated 500 Feddans of productive fruit gardens were lost on the western side of the wadi due to this instability. A recent study concluded that urgent repair works must be initiated to safeguard the town from wadi encroachment and erosion caused by the khors. 7.72 The solid waste management system in El Geneina town is similar to that in El Fasher. A traditional system is used for collection, which covers a small portion of the town, market areas and governmental buildings. 7.73 The MPP&PU is technically responsible for housing provision through coordination between the established survey, planning, land and building construction departments. These departments suffer greatly from budget cuts and have limited revenues generated from land survey and other fees related to change of land ownership. The role of the ministry is just limited to distribution of plots of land for housing on the basis of site and services provision. Snapshot of Medium and Small Urban Centers 7.74 Medium and small urban centers in Darfur have no municipal service in the conventional sense of the term. Without exception, the municipal officials usually remotely manage the meager services, if any, in these towns from the state capitals. This is done through occasional visits. 7.75 Based on the topographical features, two types of towns can be identified in the region: (i) a number of urban centers flourish along many of the seasonal wadis such as the towns of Kutum and Zalingi; (ii) other urban centers are located in plain areas with no near by khors such as the towns of Ed-Dein and Buram. 7.76 The former group of urban centers, with Kutum town as a typical case, suffers from connectivity and flood problems with slight order of variation. Provision of adequate crossings in the form of bridges and/or culverts is vital. Furthermore, the construction of river bank protection measures, roads, and surface water drainage systems is also seen as crucial for livelihood of these towns. As regard to housing, typically 30 percent of the urban population lives in squatter areas. There is no municipal engineer in these towns and all services are managed from the capital. 229 7.77 Ed Dein, located in a sandy plain area in South Darfur State, is representative of the second group. It has no asphalt roads, but currently the municipality is constructing a three kilometer long gravel road. Because of the weak sandy soil the town is in bad need of improvements to its deteriorated road network to make them all-weather roads. The high infiltration rate during rains makes urban drainage less of a problem in some of these towns. A traditional system is used to collect the refuse from the town markets and the limited governmental premises. Burning of refuse within the town is widely practiced. A housing unit has been recently established for Ed Dein. The limited public buildings need maintenance and extension. Key Issues and Constraints 7.78 Less than a decade ago Darfur‘s population was overwhelmingly rural, with very small urban centers: apart from Nyala and El Fasher few, if any, had populations measured in the tens of thousands. Over the last ten years, and in particular since the start of the recent conflict, existing settlements have exploded in size. In 1993 the total population of the three capitals was about 460,000. Now it is conservatively estimated to almost 800,000, and with the IDP camps amount to almost 1.5 million. Although a portion of the IDPs are expected to return to their villages once the conflict ends, indications are that many will chose to stay (See MDG chapter for scenarios). 7.79 The economic basis for increased urbanization is not yet clear, although the private sector chapter in this report presents some options. Traditionally, the urban economy relied on livestock, and income came from livestock export and a few other primary produce such as groundnuts, tanneries and textiles. There has not been much increase in such export, largely due to high and increasing transportation costs and lack of access to markets. There is still some industry in the larger urban centers and skilled crafts-persons are in demand, especially in the construction industry, but overall, it is very difficult for Darfur to compete without significant investments from both the public and private sectors. 7.80 Urban dwellers and in particular urban poor are required to spend a larger part of their cash income on basic goods and services (food, fuel, water, shelter, sanitation) than rural dwellers. The traditional approaches in post conflict situations have been inclined to focus first of all on programs improving, housing, infrastructure and physical environmental conditions. There is a need for such programs to be coordinated with efforts to address the fundamental conditions affecting livelihood in slums and IDP camps, and urban poverty in general. This would require better urban development policies for aid to be more effective, but also for the Government to focus more explicitly on the underlying causes of underemployment and lack of income generating activities for urban poor. This should include the provision of policies that provides a more conducive environment for small enterprises, community organizations and NGOs to provide municipal infrastructure and services. 7.81 Poor management of urban development: MPP&PU is technically responsible of providing and supervising the municipal services. However, due to both shortages in staff, next to no budget, unclear sharing of responsibilities for planning of urban services (electricity, water and roads to name a few) and poor institutional capacity, the Ministry is unable to deliver on its huge responsibilities. As an example, the MPP&PU of South Darfur employs about 100 engineers and technicians. Over half are new recruits of young engineers with little practical experience, and almost all the staff lack basic training. With more than 30 percent of the population in the larger cities being rural-urban migrants living in squatter areas, a large part of the capacity for urban planning is directed at getting some order in the disorganized land occupation. Land registration procedures are poorly defined and managed 230 due to low institutional capacity. The decentralization that took place in 1994 when the regional administration in El Fasher was replaced by state administrations located in the three capitals, caused a fragmentation of an already weak institutional capacity, and tended to increase the reliance on the central administration in Khartoum. 7.82 Regulatory framework: To encourage private, semi-private and NGO modes of delivery and operation of urban utilities such as water supply, sanitation, electricity and roads (construct and/or maintain and operate), there is also a need to regulate in terms of price, operating standards, environment, safety, and so on. However, an unclear legislative and regulatory framework, poor and unreliable budgetary support from the central government in Khartoum and low willingness and poor ability to pay for public services, makes transparent outsourcing of public works and operations very difficult. 7.83 Municipal budgets and financial management: It is difficult to see how the urban centers can improve their performance without a considerable increase in revenue to operate and maintain new infrastructure and services, not to mention investment costs. This would require more reliable and larger transfers from the central government and coordinated help from donors. Greater willingness and ability of people to pay taxes and tariffs would require a local taxation and cost recovery system that allow taxes and user fees to be collected. Improvement to local governance and better financial management is also needed. 7.84 However, without economic development, there will not be much taxes to collect and no willingness/ability to pay taxes or fees for services, and consequently, for a long time Darfur‘s urban areas would have to rely on central and external transfers. It makes little sense to spread out assistance thinly with many scattered projects that have little synergies and no connectivity. An urban recovery and development strategy for Darfur would require a well integrated set of actions that in concert for a particular urban area would achieve growth and be sustainable. In this respect, good donor coordination becomes paramount. 7.85 Fiduciary concerns: Except for electricity and water, most municipal infrastructure and services are financed from state budgets. Constraints in public financial management at the state and local levels are significant (see budget chapter). For Darfur to be able to proceed with large investments in urban infrastructure and restoration of basic municipal services, key fiduciary issues are the modalities of the flow of donor and central government funds, accountability for implementation and how to ensure better effectiveness of aid. This is compounded by a weak information base that makes planning difficult and the fragmented approach to financing of urban infrastructure. A fiduciary assessment of the MPP&PU at the level of the states would be a good basis for an action plan to improve implementation capacity and effectiveness. 7.86 Civil society involvement: Traditional decision-making structures in Sudanese villages allowed the voices of the citizens to be heard, although not necessarily on an equal basis. The village elder and chiefs had a higher influence in decision making and the women‘s voices are rarely heard, incongruously reflected in their denial of basic education. In the fast growing urban centers, even traditional arrangements for letting peoples voices be heard, is not working, and women and more generally the underprivileged urban poor are weakly represented in fora and poorly listened to when it comes to all aspects of urban life. Broader information and consultation processes would need to be introduced in urban centers in order to get critical feed back from all citizens on all planned investments to improve urban living including water supply, solid waste management, sanitation, land management in general, and urban planning. A critical aspect of MPP&PU and municipal procedures to be developed are thus the consultation procedures that would allow all interested and affected parties to be heard in an equitable way also in the poorer neighborhoods. 231 Transport 7.87 The transport infrastructure has deteriorated due to lack of maintenance, prolonged war and insecurity, budgetary cuts and limited access to foreign financing. Many of the roads and bridges, airports, and the railway line are in need of substantive improvements and repair. Apart from aviation, currently the transport network is limited to the railway connection between Nyala and Khartoum and Port Sudan, and a few kilometers of partly paved national roads between El Fasher and Nyala and between Nyala and El Geneina. Apart from these, none of the main roads within the three states are engineered roads with pavements; all state roads are mainly dirt tracks of varying widths with undefined alignment and with poor conditions that become impassable during the rainy season and for months thereafter; the road connecting El Fasher with Khartoum, via El Obeid, still has large unfinished sections, including between En Nahoud to Um Keddada to El Fasher (about 400km). 7.88 The Government of National Unity (GNU) recently restructured the transport sector by amalgamating the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Roads and Bridges. The new Ministry of Transport and Roads & Bridges (MTRB) is responsible for sector policy and oversight of sub-sector modal organizations under its auspices. The Minister has a State Minister as deputy and all public corporations in the transport sector report to him including Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC) and the National Highway Authority (NHA). The Under- secretary is responsible for planning/coordination, financial affairs and administration of the Ministry. Highways and Rural Roads 7.89 The national road network in Darfur comes under the responsibility of the NHA, which was established in 2001 and now is under the new MTRB. Originally, NHA had a Board of Trustees, with some representation from user groups. However, this no longer functions, as there is no direct user-consultation on the administration and management of the network. NHA is solely responsible for the planning, construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of all ‗national roads‘. In practice, NHA acts as technical adviser (consultant) for all existing or planned roads outside of municipalities, including ‗state roads.‘ 7.90 There is still a lack of clarity about ownership and responsibility for local non- national roads, as there seems to have been no re-classification of roads after 1994 when the regional road network was handed over to the states for administration. There is little local capacity or financing available to carry out work on this part of the road network, and NHA is assisting the states within its limited resources. The ongoing efforts to establish a Transport Sector Master Plan, should provide the framework for needed legislation and a re- classification of roads, as well as recommendations for a more stable flow of funding for national highways, state roads and local access roads. 7.91 In Darfur, the road and infrastructure is poorly developed, and what is there is in poor condition and/or damaged. The lack of paved all weather road network connectivity, in combination with the poor rail network connection to Khartoum and Port Sudan are limiting transport operations and seriously hampering recovery in all sectors and economic growth. Existing international connections – to Libya, Egypt and Chad – are also barely operational due to lack of maintenance. The regulatory system, which is part of the national system, is also functioning inadequately. 7.92 The national (primary) road network in Darfur is managed by the National Highway Authority (NHA) and limited to the following roads: 232  Adre (Chad border) - El Geneina – Zalinji (175 km gravel)  Zalingi - Kass – Nyala (215 km paved with a bituminous seal);  Nyala - El Fasher (213 km partly paved with a bituminous seal)  El Fasher - Umm Keddada (186 km)  Umm Keddada – Dam Gamad (North Darfur border, 80 km earth track) 7.93 In addition, the road from Nyala to Ed Dein is part of the national network, including the continuation from Ed Dein to connect to En Nahoud (altogether 436 km of earth tracks of which 160 km are outside Darfur). This means that the current national road network in Darfur is about 1,145 km out of a total of 35,000 km for all of Sudan. 7.94 The NHA is a relatively small organization with only 30-35 engineers, and lacks the capacity and funds to manage the national road network in Darfur. The three Darfur States are combined into one NHA administrative entity with a regional office in Nyala and branches in El Geneina and El Fasher. At the NHA road camp in Nyala, there is just one engineer responsible for the entire region. Staff salaries are depressed and considerably lower than private sector comparators, particularly the oil sector, where engineering salaries are around ten times higher. As a result it is difficult to attract qualified engineers. 7.95 The extensive network of non-national rural roads and tracks in Darfur was recently handed over to the states to be administrated as State (secondary) roads by the State MPP&PU, which is also responsible for undertaking paved road projects within municipalities (Table 7.3). However, the staffing of the state roads directorates suffers more from brain drain than NHA due to low salaries and difficult working conditions. Limited funding is available through block grants allocated to the state ministries of finance as well as limited local revenues, but is far from sufficient to maintain the network. In 2005, local road revenue was reportedly about 1 billion Sudanese Pounds. Table 7.3: Key State Roads in Darfur North Darfur State o El Fasher – El Tina road (360 km) o El Fasher - Mahla road (198 km) o El Fasher – Saraf Omrah road (230 km) o El Fasher – Deribat road (132 km) South Darfur State o Nyala – Buram – El Radoum road (288km) o Nyala – Ed al Fursan – Rihaid Al Birdi (142 km) o Manawashi – Dirbat – Suni road (80 km) o Nyala – Tolos (114 km) o Nyala – Shairia road (92 km) o Kass – Kalukiting road (to Jebel Marra, 34 km) o Ed Dain – Buram road (150 km) o Buram – Tolos – Katela - Ed al Fursan (127 km) West Darfur State o El Geneina – Kulbus – El Tina road (distance to Kulbus 110 km) o El Geneina –Habila – Furbaranga road (160 km) o El Geneina –Misterei – Beida road (170? Km. o Zalingi – Garsela – Mokgar – Bendisi (Furbaranga) road (166 km including connection to Dilaj) o Nertiti – Joldo – Golo – Rokiro road (135 km) 7.96 All other rural roads are considered tertiary roads, which are the responsibility of the State Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Urban roads and streets, except national roads within municipal boundaries, are under the MPP&PU and covered under the Urban Development section as far as this needs assessment is concerned. Most state and tertiary roads are just earth tracks, with no defined alignment and with drifts for major water 233 crossings. Roads tend to be passable in dry weather, but become impassable during and after rain. This inhibits access to rural villages affecting the poorest population the most. Furthermore, traffic levels, which were historically low compared to other parts of Northern Sudan, have been further interrupted during the period of conflict. Railways 7.97 The vastness of the country combined with the extremely poor state of the roads network suggests that the railway could be a serious option to cater for transport needs in the near to medium future. In fact, the SRC Babanousa-Nyala rail line is the only land access route available all year round to provide transport for goods, people and livestock to and from Darfur‘s vast region under reasonably safe and secure conditions. However, the condition of the track has deteriorated considerably since 2004 when the Babanousa-Wau link was assessed as part of the CPA JAM. This deterioration is due mostly to security issues, age and type of track components as well as a total lack of maintenance equipment or repair crew transport. 7.98 SRC is a parastatal managing and operating one of the larger railway networks in Africa. Of its 4,578 route km network, a little over a third is not in operation presently. The main network was completed before 1930. The railway‘s main line extends from Port Sudan to Khartoum via Atbara with an alternate link between the port and Sennar via Kassala. There are various branch lines including one to the west to El Obeid and Banaousa. From Babanousa a link west to Nyala was commissioned in 1959, as was the line to the south to Wau in 1962. SRC track is mostly on earth ballast and its overall condition is not satisfactory for high speeds and axle loads exceeding 15 tons. 7.99 SRC owns close to 120 mainline locomotives, 44 shunting locomotives, about 3500 freight wagons, 800 tank wagons and 167 passenger coaches. Of these the operational fleet is less than a third. For example only 33 main line locomotives are reported to be operational, and with availability estimated at 50 per cent only 16 locomotives can be used to haul traffic daily. The main workshops for heavy repairs are at Atbara with wagon workshops at Port Sudan and Khartoum. 7.100 The GM is responsible for the administration of SRC in accordance with the policies of the Board. Presently the Board has ten Directors. The headquarters of the railway is at Khartoum and its principal operating and maintenance centre is Atbara, 313 km North of Khartoum. Five Deputy General Managers (DGMs) report to the General Manager. The railway is divided geographically into five Regions one of which is Western with a head- quarter in Babanousa. SRC had 11,773 staff at the end of 2004. Staff productivity is very low compared to levels elsewhere in Africa. An aspect of SRC‘s institutional arrangements is that, though it has substantial autonomy, it is bound by practice to follow GNU wage norms. 7.101 Due to security concerns, trains between Babanousa and Nyala are currently moved once a week in ―convoys‖ of three or four trains, consisting of 20 wagons per train. During these convoys stops are made along the rail line to off-load fuel, food, water and to make repairs to the track. These repairs are caused by sabotage or, in most cases, broken rails, sleepers, damaged rail joints or/and substructure stabilization problems. Delays are frequent due to security issues, derailments and repairs, and average transit speed does not exceed 15 to 20 km/hr on the 335 km line, resulting in a transit time of about 24 hours. 7.102 Data shows that the one-way traffic in the first 7 months of 2005 was 95 trains and lost time due to all unscheduled delays was estimated to be close to 3,000 hours (over 120 days). About 15,000 metric tons per month of freight was moved in that year; this has 234 dropped to 11 metric tons per month for the first 7 months of 2006. It is estimated that about 50,000 metric tons could be moved, month per month, if SRC capacity was improved. 7.103 While security and deteriorated state of the tracks between Nyala and Khartoum explain some of the current inefficiencies, the performance of Sudan‘s railway system and SDC is inadequate, adding to the constraints. Significant investments are needed to revive the railway by involving the private sector on a larger scale than hitherto, expanding the use of multi-modal operators, upgrading skills and making modest investments to rehabilitate and upgrade the rail network. Civil Aviation 7.104 Given the size of Sudan, and the poorly developed roads and rail systems, an effective aviation system will be crucial over the coming years to ensure effective and reliable movement of persons and goods across large distances. 7.105 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is the central organization for aviation in Sudan, and responsible for the development and operating of all air traffic. The organization was recently moved to the Office of the President and as a result is financially more autonomous than before and operating relatively independently in the performance of most of its duties. Its main role is that of a regulator and operator responsible for enforcing the aviation safety and security systems as well as construction, maintenance and operation of all airports. CAA also has the role of a Ministry to process plans and budgets, process legislation and bilateral air services agreements and other agreements with neighboring countries. It is responsible for the CNS/ATM216 system, carrier agreements, carries out accident investigations and provides the training of most professions required by the aviation sector. Meteorology is also now the responsibility of the CAA after the Ministry of Civil Aviation was abolished when the CAA moved under the Office of the Presidency. 7.106 CAA suffers from the same constraints as other authorities in Sudan, in that staff is employed on civil service conditions. In theory, revenues earned from over-flying and take- off and landing of aircrafts have to be transferred to government, although the CAA has been able to reach an understanding with the government that the revenues it collects from over- flight and similar charges should be used in order to develop the CNS/ATM and other critical infrastructure components of the system. The Director General of CAA, who is the responsible person for upholding aviation safety and security (the DCA) is appointed by the President. 7.107 The overall employment of the CAA is some 5000 persons. The CAA does not only run the aviation system; it also has a considerable in-house capacity to both design systems and works, and also to implement projects, including civil works. The CAA has even bid for works, e.g. to build airfields servicing the oil companies. It has several asphalt plants and crushers as well as asphalt pavers capable of paving runways and aprons as well as access roads from the highway network. 216 CNS = communications, navigation and surveillance; ATM = air traffic management 235 Table 7.4: Airports in Darfur Region State Major Airport Domestic Airport Airstrip (CAA responsible) (CAA responsible) (state responsible) North Darfur El Fasher Kutum Karnoy Kabkabia Muzbad Hashkanita Muhageria Tina Um kaddada South Darfur Nyala Ed Dain Rihad Al Birdi Buram Al Radom Al lait jar Al nabi West Darfur El Geneina Zalingi Golo Garsela Kulbus Jama 7.108 Three of the airports in Darfur are designated as international, and Nyala airport has one weekly direct flight to/from Libya. A new international airport is also under construction close to El Geneina (cost US$37 m). The airports are listed in Table 7.4 below with some basic information about them. 7.109 The aviation system needs to be upgraded, and the Civil Aviation Authority has therefore already embarked on a development plan for airports and the air navigation system in Darfur. Details of this program are available in a separate background note on civil aviation in Darfur prepared by the CAA. Key Issues and Constraints 7.110 Inadequate capacity to manage roads. This applies to both national roads under the NHA as well as State roads under the state MPP&PU. The lack of capacity would be a major constraint if multiple contracts for state road improvements are tendered and implemented at the same time. This would require not only extensive supervision and quality control but also contract management capabilities and regular follow-up of all road services by the respective state road agencies. 7.111 One institutional option that should be considered both for the short and longer term is to have the national and rural state road networks for all of Darfur managed by one regional road authority. This is the practice in many countries without taking away the ownership and ultimate responsibility for state roads from the states and the responsibility of national roads from the NHA and ultimately the ministry for transport in Khartoum. This would address the fragmentation of responsibility for roads in Darfur. It would be necessary to strengthen the NHA office in Nyala with staff from the three State Roads Directorates and would have to be supported by technical assistance for a transitional period. This would be similar to the arrangement established in Southern Sudan, where NHA has delegated the managerial responsibilities for national roads to the regional administration (GOSS). However, in the case of Darfur, it would be the states delegating managerial responsibility for state roads to the strengthened NHA regional office. 7.112 Another option could be to strengthen the four road agencies in Darfur, but this would require more resources, more technical assistance by international experts and make coordination more difficult. Anyway, the ultimate ownership and budgeting responsibility would remain the same in both options. However, the first option would allow the State MPP&PU to concentrate its effort on urban infrastructure and municipal services. 236 7.113 The magnitude of investments needed to improve accessibility. In all areas of Darfur, the size of the investment and maintenance costs associated with broad improvement of accessibility appear overwhelming. The NHA has provided one estimate for a core Darfur rural state road network of 3,000 km (Table 3) at a cost of almost US$1 billion, even if all these roads were to be paved with only relatively inexpensive bituminous surface treatment. In addition, huge investments are also needed in these state road corridors to reach rural villages, without which the benefits would be limited. 7.114 Under severe budget constraints, at least two issues would need to be addressed: i) What should be the balance of funding for rural village access roads as opposed to national and state roads to improve connectivity of urban as well as rural areas? Many small towns and villages would not be accessible from the core state road network, and with poor connectivity in the national highway network, agriculture based economic growth critical to rural and urban areas would suffer. The preferred approach would have to take poverty-reduction objectives as well as general economic development objectives into account. ii) If the road network could be improved in a stage-wise fashion, where initially all state roads and some national roads are constructed to reduced but acceptable standards, including the use of spot improvement techniques through construction of permanent drainage structures first (small bridges, box and pipe culverts, and simple water crossings) to facilitate access and mobility over a wider area. This approach has a poverty reduction focus in helping to provide affordable transport services to the rural poor first and provides network connectivity at a lower cost/albeit with lower standards and higher maintenance costs. 7.115 Sustainability through maintenance. The management of maintenance is very dependent on the institutional arrangements adopted and many other factors. Irrespective of the overall arrangements adopted, the sheer size of Darfur makes a conventional measurement-contract approach to undertaking maintenance impracticable. Use of some kind of area-based long-term performance-based management contracts with a private service provider, such as currently operating in Chad, is probably the only viable approach, despite the known difficulties of their initial implementation, and the need for large upfront improvements to make roads ‗maintainable.‘ Unless the staffing strength is increased significantly to allow for effective supervision, and sufficient and competent staffing can be provided in state government organizations, then the management of such maintenance contracts will also need to be considered contracted out. 7.116 One option could possibly be to combine the construction and maintenance contracts for the roads, in which investments are to be made into multi-year contracts. Thus, contractors would bid, not only for the initial works cost, but also for the maintenance of the road over a five to seven year period, or even longer. This longer-term involvement of contractors could also be used to implement a staged approach to the road improvements, with all-weather passability as the initial key performance criterion and deliverable. Any approach requiring a long-term input from contractors, have a need for a stable political and security environment. It also requires a long-term commitment of funds for the maintenance works through stable funding arrangements that are not dependent on fluctuating annual budgets. The institutional arrangements for maintenance could be contentious because of the centralization/decentralization issues and the multi-year budget commitments that are involved. The appropriate approach needs to be subject to broad discussion, and agreed at a political level. 237 7.117 The safety of airports and passengers. The key issue in civil aviation is the poor safety of aircrafts and passengers at many of the airports in Darfur. This is related not only to the lack of perimeter fence around airports that allow anybody even livestock and wild animals to enter the runway and other facilities, but also the lack of safety screening equipment and building space for this at the air terminals for screening of passengers and cargo. There is progress on this, but more can be done given the considerable air traffic to Darfur and related charges and income for CAA. 7.118 Lack of consultative decision making. Proposed investments financed by donors will support a number of feasibility and detailed design studies for future infrastructure investments, for which World Bank safeguard policies relating to consultation and disclosure will apply. In particular, for environmental Category A and B investments217, the implementing agencies are supposed to consult project-affected groups and local nongovernmental organizations about the project's environmental and social aspects, and take their views into account. There is a lack of tradition and decision-making procedure in transport that is consultative in nature, and this may limit what can be achieved in terms of planning and preparation in the short term. 7.119 Lack of multi-modal transport operators. A freight forwarding or multimodal transport provider industry is lacking that can take responsibility for cargo from origination to destination including handling of cargo between transport modes, undertake custom clearance and provide warehouse facilities under a single bill of lading. One consequence is that transaction costs are high 7.120 Passenger service markets. Public transport is limited except in and between major urban areas. Inter-city bus service between the major cities is regular (depending on security) and inexpensive. Intra-city bus service in the major urban areas is generally regular. However, most buses and bus stops are unmarked. Public transport service to larger communities in the interior is usually limited to irregularly scheduled mini-buses. Most rural communities have no public transport at all. To address this lack of affordable transport in rural areas and towns, a review of the regulatory regime for public transport is needed to address the policy, institutional and regulatory issues. Cross-Cutting Issues 7.121 The key cross-cutting issues facing the infrastructure sectors in Darfur relate largely to management and implementation; greater equity in access, related to gender, location and socio economic status; and integrating environmental concerns into planning and implementation. Building Local Management Capacity 7.122 Given the need to show the results of the peace process quickly, the need to be able to use aid effectively during the early stages when aid is more readily available, and the fact that the greatest constraint to effective infrastructure development is institutional, one early challenge is to create the necessary implementation capacity at the level of the states, localities and communities. In fact, there is likely to be unrealistically high pressure from all groups to achieve early results on the ground once there is a lasting peace. Many policy and decision makers, donors and civil society have little understanding for the institutional and physical difficulties in planning, procuring and implementing infrastructure projects under post conflict conditions in Darfur. State government agencies in Darfur will be under pressure from potential project beneficiaries to deliver infrastructure improvements quickly. 217 As defined in World Bank Operational Policy 4.01, Environmental Assessment. 238 Institutional constraints will make it difficult to coordinate and administer aid during the critical first few years a peace agreement is effective. There may also be risks of conflict re- emerging in some areas, which might affect selection of priorities, construction progress, and costs in delivery of infrastructure services. With the poor accessibility in most of Darfur and with a lack of a local capacity to prepare projects, there is also a risk of some competition among donors to both prepare and implement projects on behalf of the states (bypassing government capacities), and for investments to be channeled to easily accessible areas (urban), which are not always the areas with the greatest needs or high prevalence of poverty. 7.123 Given this, a key early challenge will be to create the necessary implementation capacity in Darfur without disrupting the development of indigenous institutions. The options for how this could be done should be discussed in a participatory workshop and, eventually, at a political level. 7.124 For the urban sectors, three urban aid management directorates staffed by local experts and supported by TA and embedded in each of the three state MPP&PU is an option to be considered in a transition phase to avoid a multitude of project implementing units in various municipalities and agencies for urban sector projects. This would at least create the institutional capacity needed in the short term for aid coordination and project implementation in urban areas. In addition to aid coordination and resource mobilization, such a Directorate could have two distinct roles in the early stages of urban development – to support MPP&PU as a technical unit to act as employer/purchaser for technical assistance, goods and civil works contracts; and to carry out all procurement, financial management, accounting and auditing in a transparent way. It could build on existing government structures in the state capitals and rely on pooled financing by donors and the government under a common (single) implementation and reporting mechanism. Gradually, the unit would reduce in size as activities, functions and responsibilities are taken over by newly strengthened agencies, directorates and city councils. In this respect, again revisit the channeling of all funds for urban development through one development partner, either an administrator of a multi-donor trust fund or through the new regional government for Darfur with the use of programmatic sector wide approaches and other aid effectiveness measures. The training required for state government departments and agencies could be provided by consultants supporting the temporary directorates or through institutional twinning or other TA delivery mechanisms. Gender 7.125 Implementation activities related to HIV/AIDS should be coordinated with involvement of the Ministries concerned and in cooperation with the World Health Organization. There are different modes by which the donors can contribute to these efforts. 7.126 Practical strategies are needed for increasing female participation in consultations and decision-making and promoting access to employment, in particular in urban areas. Pilot projects for female employment would have to be developed in each of the infrastructure sectors using approved infrastructure (re)construction projects funded by donors. Collaboration with other related agencies involved in employment projects, such as the ILO and Habitat, could be sought also in this respect. Environmental and Social Safeguards 7.127 Planning and implementation of infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion in Darfur should ensure environmental sustainability and be in line with an agreed environmental and social framework for infrastructure investments. This would have to take into account the Agenda 21 UN Conference on Environment and Development as well as good international practice (see for example World Bank guidelines). Fortunately, there is already an 239 environmental and social safeguards framework in place for Southern Sudan, and this should be applicable with minor modifications. This would be very helpful in the critical first stages when many infrastructure sub-projects may be environmental category A and/or may require resettlement, but are not sufficiently defined or even identified at project appraisal. C. EMERGING PRIORITIES 7.128 Across all infrastructure sectors, more detailed assessment of physical and institutional needs and constraints are required including broad consultative efforts before completing the prioritization of large scale investments, policy programs and institutional development. However, there are areas where actions could be considered to accelerate the process of implementing high impact projects. Such emerging early priority actions are identified below for each of the infrastructure sectors, according to the following criteria (not necessarily in the order of priority):  Support activities that foster safety, security and reconciliation such as regional linkages and integration, access to basic services and employment.  Avoid short term activities that exclude longer term options that have not yet been evaluated. This would give the government and other stake-holders time to agree on policies and institutional frameworks critical for the role of government, private sector, NGOs and communities in service provisions.  Give priority to technical assistance to prepare for future investments and the creation of institutional capacity and new regulatory frameworks.  Select activities that build on existing implementing and managerial capacities, in particular communities and NGOs.  Support restoration and improvements and/or better operation and maintenance of existing facilities.  For new investments, give priority to projects providing a stage-wise upgrading or the use of spot improvement approaches to maximize impact and visibility.  Removal of constraints and provision of capacity to allow concerned implementing entities to participate actively in project preparation and implementation.  Provision of training to manage infrastructure or the preparation of plans for capacity building in order to manage rehabilitated/new infrastructure. 7.129 Until much greater certainty prevails in Darfur, it may be unwise to invest heavily in projects with long term implications such as an integrated power grid, high standard highways or upgrading of railway networks. Over the medium term, considerable technical assistance would be needed for effective operation and maintenance. Tradeoffs across possible interventions will need to be borne in mind, given the objectives of supporting economic growth and poverty reduction. Water and Sanitation 7.130 The foregoing analysis underlines the importance of a comprehensive water and sanitation program for each of the three Darfur states in the future. While significant field work and analysis, as well as consultations remain to be done, this could include the following elements.  Institutions and governance: This must incorporate the clarification of the respective roles of federal and state levels, especially regarding the relations between the National and State Water Corporations, and clarification of roles of public entities at state level, including a streamlining of the responsibilities of the 240 mahalia levels and the clarification of the missions of the WES projects and units. Some level of integrated water management capacity will be required not only at local or watershed level but also at the regional level.  Capacity building: There should be a strengthening of government capacities for collection and utilization of data on water resources, realization and dissemination of applied research for water mobilization, planning, supervision, management and monitoring, as well as the provision of support to communities and the private sector.  Budget and finance: This should involve a review of tariff structure in the urban sector in accordance with financing needs, and the establishment of a sustainable financing scheme for sanitation including a progressive leverage of charges linked to public services. A revolving Sanitation Fund should also be considered created at mahalia level.  Technical guidelines: The general focus of such guidelines should be improved water resource mobilization. For surface water, for animal and human use, construction of hafirs and deepening of existing natural depressions is to be considered. When construction of dams is not possible a diversification of water- harvesting technical options should be developed. There should be increased and sustainable mobilization of alluvial aquifers while construction of subsurface dams should also be considered in order to increase the recharge of aquifers from the wadis during the rainy season. For ground water, there should be implementation of hand pump systems in the low yielding areas of the basement complex. In the other areas, there should be construction and operation of water yards with mini-networks allowing a ―semi- urban‖ approach and under provisions ensuring improved service, sustainability of the local resource, reduced unit investment and operating costs.  Quantitative objectives: Water supply programs should aim to provide measurable and improved access to potable water against agreed targets. While further consultations are needed to conclude on these specific targets, international standards provide some guidance, and suggest that programs should be designed on the basis of (a) 20 liters per capita per day for human use, from water points less than 1km from dwellings and full coverage of livestock watering needs in rural areas and (b) 50 liters per capita per day in the medium term, to be increased to 80 liters per capita per day in the longer term in urban areas. However these objectives might be over-optimistic in the medium term given the ongoing delay of the reconstruction process.  Quality issues: A parallel improvement of water supply and human health could be achieved through: a) Improvement of water quality at the production stage through systematic and periodic controls and training programs targeted at private sector operators and retail vendors; b) Protection of the water sources from bacteriological pollution through fencing and creation of specific water points for cattle, installation of dedicated watering points, improvement of effluent discharge for sanitation facilities and c) Promotion of household hygiene practices, including for water storage. School hygiene clubs are expected to be efficient dissemination tools in this respect.  Sanitation: The above outlined program will rely on the mobilization of civil society groups for advocacy and of local NGOs for community animation, health education and management of latrine construction programs. Related capacities will be strengthened. Preference will be given to low-cost schemes such as individual pit latrines, with adequate consideration for local potential pollutions of the underground water resource. In urban centers, initiatives of the private sector in sewage disposal will be encouraged through technical training and improved access to capital. 241  Guidelines for spatial priorities: In terms of zonal concentration, investments in the water sector will prioritize large human settlements, which will include urban centers where a numbers of former IDPs will have settled on a permanent basis. In the state capitals, especially Nyala and El Fasher, where nearly one third of the population now lives, technical schemes for the improvement of water supply have been identified, studied and partially funded. Programs for mahalia centers will concern the upgrading of both off-take works and distribution facilities. 7.131 Programs would be expected to include expansion of the water production and storage facilities together with the rehabilitation and expansion of the transmission and distribution networks. Electricity 7.132 It seems that in the short term diesel based power generation in the main urban centers is the only option to address the most important immediate needs. It is, however, essential to clarify the alternatives to diesel early on because of the needs for large subsidies to make electricity affordable and the transportation problems and related costs. Since there also seems to be local potential for utilizing geothermal and hydro based power sources, such options would have to be identified as a matter of priority. In terms of main strategic options, two elements can be identified, namely: a) Fast track electrification of towns all over Darfur. Secure additional generating capacity in the major cities based on diesel generators is a short term and costly option. Apart from the financial and O&M constraints diesel generators represent, the transport capacity of diesel fuel and the local costs of fuel are critical elements. An installation operating on daily basis to meet a peak load demand of 1 MW would have an estimated need of annual supply of diesel of close to 1,000 tons. Taking into consideration the fuel prices and a relatively high tariff, subsidized investment will not suffice. Also fuel subsidy will be necessary. Therefore, a strategy to install diesel plants to electrify larger non- electrified rural growth centers, including Locality capitals should therefore seriously consider the subsidy implications. Planning and construction of available hydropower and geothermal power resources with related distribution system is consequently imperative in any strategy to enable pursuing further electrification, meeting the expected growth in demand, and curbing diesel consumption for power generation. In this respect the necessary regional transmission system is critical and needs to be developed in parallel with development of alternative power resources. This would allow a more centralized and efficient power generation and distribution, while allowing the Darfur transmission network to be connected to the national grid, either to provide additional power from Darfur for distribution in Sudan and reduce dependency on import, or to substitute for lack of local power sources in Darfur, in which case a connection to the national grid would come earlier. b) Rural electrification. Installation of solar systems (photovoltaic) as soon as possible to serve smaller rural population centers all over Darfur, primarily to supply electricity to water pumps and services facilities like health institutions, schools, clubs and mosques/ churches in the rural areas. There are two alternatives that could be considered: (i) Contract a service provider (e.g. an NGO) to supply, install and maintain the equipment, and collect fees according to a commercial agreement in partnership with local communities; or (ii) contract a 242 supplier to install the equipment, and hand it over to the States or community for operation, maintenance and collection of fees. 7.133 These alternatives have to be assessed together with capacity building in a feasibility study followed by an implementation plan. Both alternatives have advantages and disadvantages, including how training is addressed, extension of services to solar home systems, etc. The following should be addressed in the feasibility study:  Basic training and instructions of identified personnel in the local communities are required for regular control and cleaning of batteries, etc, and to manage fee collection and accounting;  Arrangements to be made for a technical unit to be on call for periodic control and technical assistance when faults appear or spare parts are required. This could either be a supplier‘s local representative, the service provider if that alternative is chosen, or the state administration that possibly have technical personnel for various services (training - capacity building is required). The arrangement should cover a number of installations in a geographical area.  Identification of villages/communities and their service requirements, preparation of standard packages, the institutional sustainability, identification of constraints that may threaten sustainability, and mitigation measures, as well as preparation of information material and manuals. Other emerging priorities for the electricity sector fall into the following project groups:  Preparation of Electricity Sub-sector Polices and Regulations;  Policies and regulations with related sector organizational, training and capacity building implications should be forged into an efficient executive structure where all the concerned parties‘ interests are appropriately managed. A joint high level committee is suggested as one good option for this purpose which is to be supported by TA, to coordinate project identification, prioritization and implementation of power rehabilitation and development programs;  Feasibility Studies: (i) for utilization of geothermal resources in Darfur. These include Jebel Marra volcanic complex and adjacent areas. Geothermal energy may provide power to the incumbent areas and possibly provide export opportunities or supply the National Grid. Preliminary studies have indicated that the potential in Jebel Marra area is sufficient to sustain power capacity of up to 400 MW; (ii) for utilization of hydropower in the Jebel Marra mountains and elsewhere in Darfur; and  Extension of the national grid to the Darfur state capitals. This could be implemented in the medium term to substitute for missing geothermal or hydropower resources, although before a decision is made, it will be necessary to prepare: (a) a least cost option study compared to a larger central heavy oil plant located in Darfur, (b) a feasibility study including environment and social impact assessments (ESIA), and (c) a design and construction plan (line section work plan) for the planned investments in the Kordofan and Darfur States. This technical assistance is estimated to take about two years. A rudimentary cost estimate of the above grid extensions, using steel tower design and international contractor prices, amounts to around US$600 m (from background paper for CPA JAM). With a construction capacity of about US$100 m per year, the project can be completed within six years. 243 Urban Infrastructure and Municipal Services 7.134 New urban challenges raise the need for a strategy to improve governance, management, planning as well as short term improvements to urban infrastructure and services. Among the overarching issues that need to be addressed in any strategic option are:  Are the options to be presented state by state independently, or as a regional or national program for Darfur?  Who are the target groups: Squatters, IDPs, or other urban dwellers? The assumption is that all issues related to IDPs would have to be addressed together, including any additional actions related to urban development. This leaves first and foremost the existing regular urban population and urban squatters where the majority of urban poor lives, with some priority for the squatter areas as the target beneficiary?  Given the expected funding shortfall compared with the available resources and implementation capacity, there will be a need to concentrate available funds on fewer sectors and specific urban areas to maximize impact. There will be painful tradeoffs that need to be addressed to ensure appropriate distribution of available resources.  Who will finally decide on the urban development programs? There are a number of agencies, levels of government and decision makers involved, that makes regional planning and urban development difficult in the case of Darfur. 7.135 A strategy to guide the national, state and local governments, donors and urban developers, to coordinate their resources would likely be conditioned on national commitment to provide significant co-funding for urban infrastructure to make up for past imbalances. A coherent strategy for urban development for Darfur would likely include the following elements:  Participatory planning and consultation;  Support for land management and urban planning;  Revisions to policy and regulatory frameworks;  Safety/Health investments (Water supply, sanitation and solid waste management);  Investments in urban streets and market areas;  Low cost housing;  Addressing the balance between the level of investments in the capital and the other urban town; and  Be able to scale up support for successful sectors or well functioning agencies. 7.136 A spectrum of needs will have to be addressed concurrently for multiple sectors for the development program to be effective. Aid coordination becomes an important element as well in such concerted efforts. Specific individual agencies could take the lead in different sectors or work under a common theme such as water (UNICEF), housing (Habitat), power, etc. Attention must also be directed at the need for some capacity building at the national government in areas related to urban development. 7.137 Accordingly, emerging priorities for the urban sector would likely include an investment program to rehabilitate existing infrastructure, using professional operators and private sector agencies. However, to enable effective implementation, a mechanism should be designed to ensure appropriate participation in the planning and prioritization process, agreement on municipal finance and budgeting, and adherence to proper procedures for management and fiduciary controls. At the same time, efforts are needed to establish good 244 land use and management procedures and to clarify the role of the City Councils and the state MPP&PUs in urban planning, in particular in relation to upgrading of squatter areas. 7.138 Infrastructure institutions at the local level, including for water supply, electricity, sanitation and solid waste could be explored as a way to ensure more local participation, and would also help with employment generation. However, a gradual approach could be adopted, where support for an integrated limited program of investments in a few cities could be scaled up, based on the above criteria for joint donor and national government finance, while formulation of Urban Development Program options under budget constraints are ongoing for each state. Transport 7.139 The nature of demand for transport capacity in Darfur in the post-conflict period will be extraordinary in nature. Demand will not only be determined by ordinary production and consumption, but also by the needs of peace keeping operations, supporting relief and recovery operations, the return of IDPs, and urgent rehabilitation and spot improvement needs. 7.140 More generally, transport development to address Darfur‘s historical isolation will need to contribute to the cohesion of the country and recognize the relationship between the three Darfur states and the national government. These will likely be of overriding importance for Darfur in the coming years, and should inform the starting point for a discussion of strategic options and identification of critical development projects in the transport sector and effectively also for non-transport infrastructure in the short to medium term. 7.141 Another starting point for identifying strategic options and addressing key sector issues is by looking at the various components needed to ensure regular provision of services, including:  Policy and regulatory framework;  The operators (mostly the private sector); and  Infrastructure, including the capacity to develop and manage. 7.142 For most of Sudan, each of components is in place and functioning, although improvements are required. The needs in this regard in the rest of the country (barring South Sudan) are conventional, unlike in Darfur, where at state level the infrastructure and institutional capacity is embryonic at best, transport operators are few, transport services costly and service often poor or dysfunctional. 7.143 The road sector is by far the most important transport sector in addressing isolation and poverty. There are thus three key areas where efforts need to be focused, in the short to medium term, to facilitate recovery efforts in all sectors by developing the road network in Darfur:  Bringing a ‗core‘ regional and national road network up to a technical standard where objectives are met, in terms of access, connectivity and socio-economic recovery, through investments in network development, possibly in stages;  Ensuring sustainability of the network through maintenance and renewal, which require institutional structures, competent management, plus works-execution capability; and 245  Putting funding arrangements in place, including borrowing, donor grants and regular budget resources, possibly including earmarked road use charges based on a fuel surcharge to provide an independent (of budget) funding source for multi- year contracting of road services. 7.144 There are three main strategies that could be followed to bring a ‗core‘ road network up to an appropriate level:  Option 1: ‗top-down‘ approach, giving priority to roads of national strategic importance to provide connectivity of the region to the national capital and hence to the sea ports (the ‗Salvation Road‘), then focusing on providing connections and access within Darfur by investing in inter-urban state roads connecting major towns and these with state capitals; then investing in other secondary before attention is directed at tertiary roads.  Option 2: ‗bottom-up‘ approach, giving priority to connecting villages and larger rural settlements to local markets, and then connecting markets to the major towns, before investing in main roads linking towns in Darfur.  Option 3: ‗corridor‘ approach, starting with main roads from Nyala connecting to El Fasher and El Geneina, and then developing corridors connecting towns and working generally radially out from Nyala, but also El Fasher and El Geneina. 7.145 The first option is essentially an accelerated version of the strategic approach followed by the Government for decades but providing additional funding. The approach reflects NHA views that funding for other rural roads in Darfur will be ineffective until these main connections to Khartoum, via El Obeid, have been made available. Providing the main connection to the sea ports also presents an alternative improved corridor (to rail) along which construction materials can be transported, thereby reducing costs. Construction logistics, at least in the medium term, would be relatively straightforward. The approach would give time for local construction capacity to develop before logistics became more complicated as works started to disperse all over the region. 7.146 The second option aims to provide basic all-weather access from local settlements to local markets and basic social services, principally through the construction of culverts and simple water-crossings, and by spot-improvements to facilitate reliable all year access and mobility. This approach has a poverty-reduction focus in helping to provide affordable transport services to the poorest first. Investments would be prioritized on the basis of agreed criteria, including density of human settlement (cost of access provision per person served). Issues that have to be addressed with this approach are the detailed criteria for selecting investments from those scattered across the whole area of Darfur, and the associated logistics of managing a large number of dispersed projects early in the development process. Labor- based construction methods could be adopted for the priority roads, although the lack of construction materials may limit the use of such methods. The cost of construction materials (particularly cement, fuel and steel but also bitumen) is likely to be higher because of the lack of good connections to Khartoum and the main sea ports, unless the railway track to Nyala can be upgraded urgently to provide low cost transport during the recovery period. 7.147 The third option is, essentially, a compromise, with investments starting from a ‗hub‘ at Nyala, and then radiating outwards from there, with development taking place not just in the road but in the corridor by connecting settlements in the road corridor to the upgraded road, and hopefully other sector investments could be directed to the same corridor to maximize effects and create synergies. The main roads to El Fasher and El Geneina and key roads radiating outwards from the capitals would have priority, but other investments would be made to connect these corridors to areas where there are dense human settlements. The 246 detailed criteria for this have to be established, but the strategy would increase benefits by coordinating investments in main corridors initially and the areas of influence of this corridor. Main and secondary roads would be built to minimum acceptable engineered standards (to be defined) to spread the available finance over as large an area as possible thereby also maximizing impact at lower cost per household served. Investment in other roads to settlements would be provided by constructing simple water-crossings and to make spot- improvements to enable all-weather access to affected communities. 7.148 The second and third options are greatly facilitated if minimum investments can be made to the railway to Nyala, on an urgent basis, to increase the reliability and frequency of rail services. There are several options for how this could be carried out under various budget envelops (from US$ 20-45 m). It could then be anticipated that construction materials (and other inputs to recovery and development as well as humanitarian aid) would be transported by rail, direct from Port Sudan using private sector operators, which would reduce the cost of construction materials and relief efforts in all sectors. Transshipment by rail would also limit damage and wear and tear from heavy vehicles to the Salvation Road in Darfur until better arrangements are in place for regular maintenance. By providing reliable access by rail to Ed Dain and Nyala, and road access to the rest of the country through El Fasher, the construction of a national road from Ed Dain to Khartoum (at a very high cost due to distance) could possibly be postponed. 7.149 Irrespective of the option adopted, the road investments to be proposed and agreed upon will only be viable if sustainable maintenance arrangements can be provided. Introducing these poses significant policy, funding and institutional challenges, since there is little capacity in the country or Darfur at present. Work on developing institutional capacity and more reliable funding arrangements in this area will need to start at the same time as the investments are planned to ensure that some maintenance capability exists when the first projects are completed. 7.150 Among the three options proposed above for developing the road network in Darfur, there are good reasons to adopt the third approach. The needs for new regional roads are enormous, the population quite dispersed, and there will be painful budget constraints over the next decade. However, the bottom up approach does have the advantage of dealing with poverty directly by addressing the isolation that causes and sustains poverty. It also can provide employment and incomes if a regional access program is sufficiently broad. It would also promote rural development, reduce rural-urban migration and facilitate returns. 7.151 Strategic options for regional and state roads across the Darfur states need to be subjected to consultations involving stakeholders and policy makers. In doing so the effects of choices on the rate of progress towards the MDGs should be considered. 7.152 The current list of priority road investments for state roads (Table 3) was derived through consultations with, among others, representatives of the State MPP&PU. It appears that each state has prepared its priorities without coordinating investment needs with other states and using development of corridors rather than just through roads. Thus, issues of network connectivity, benefits, people served and poverty impacts have not been taken into account at this stage. 7.153 The consultations identified the following top priorities for regional roads across all states as:  El Fasher-Kutum-Umm Baru  Nyala-Geraida-Buram 247  Rural roads connecting Jebel Marra to the three state capitals, via national or high-priority regional/state roads; these are: Netiti-Golo-Rokero, Golo-Dirbit- Menawashi, and Rokiro-El Fasher 7.154 The assumption here is that the construction of Nyala – Ed Dain and El Fasher – Umm Keddada are given first priority in the national road budget by actual allocation of budget funds. 7.155 The recommended approach would have to be subject to further consultations at national and state levels. The next step should be to carry out these consultations through workshops, possibly in each of the three states, followed by a joint workshop in Khartoum to agree and refine the strategy, and to identify overall priorities across the states within medium-term state road budget envelopes. 248 CHAPTER 8. PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT Prepared by Magdi M. Amin, with Abdel Ghani Abdel Jalil (industry and statistics), Abbakr Nasser (Enabling Environment), Abda El Mahdi (Access to Finance) and Dr. Babiker Badri (Access to Skills). A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 8.1 Darfur‘s development challenges are immense as a result of prolonged conflict, environmental degradation, and the legacy of past policies which created narrow development and conditions for political fragmentation (see companion paper on development challenges). The magnitude of the challenges call for a multi-faceted approach involving the public and private sectors, donors and civil society. 8.2 Security, wealth and power sharing, and a framework for addressing longer-term are essential ingredients of future peace and development. Yet as Collier and others have noted, half of countries that have achieved peace re-enter conflict within a decade. Those with an extensive history of conflict, weak institutions, poverty and depend on natural resources are the most likely to slip back into conflict.218 As Elbadawi and others have documented, economic distress is a precursor to conflict. As such, breaking the cycle of conflict requires cementing through broad-based growth. This is an essential part of the peace dividend expected by citizens. 8.3 Economic opportunity will not be assured solely through central government transfers or donor flows. While these will be crucial, especially during the emergency, recovery and reconstruction phases, an economy dependent on aid and transfers is neither sustainable nor realistic, and may in fact be counterproductive. If emergency support absorbs so much effort that little progress is made during the initial post-conflict period on establishing the conditions for sustainable, market-led growth, when aid declines, as is typical after the first 3-5 years, this will coincide with reduced growth rates. This, in turn, increases the chances of a resumption of hostilities. 8.4 This chapter proposes ideas for catalyzing a response from the private sector when peace comes, that will be commercially sustainable over time. There need to be efforts to catalyze long-term investments by the private sector in public service delivery and environmental adaptation, and to make reconstruction accessible to the domestic private sector. The risks of doing business in Darfur need to be alleviated through investments in governance and a regulatory framework for private sector development. State and local governments of Darfur may need to forgo local revenue in order to reduce transaction costs and allow private sector growth to restart. Among the longer term benefits of a prosperous private sector would be reinforcement of the principles of interdependence and mutual gain from exchange, irrespective of ethnic and tribal barriers. 8.5 This chapter is framed around the notion that the private sector can contribute to sustaining peace, to redressing patterns of inequitable growth in the Sudan, and to improving livelihoods through both employment income and service delivery in Darfur. The operative question is how to broaden the distribution of investment and opportunity so that more employment is created and more workers and families are vested in peace. The urgency is underlined by the massively increased number of Darfuris, in particular the Large number of IDPs who have fled fighting in rural areas, who are otherwise likely to swell the ranks of the 218 See, for example, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (World Bank and Oxford Press) 2003. 249 urban unemployed. There is a clear need to expand employment, self-employment and industries that can absorb workers, including construction. For this, private investment is required. A Framework 8.6 Effective public policy for private sector development is about balancing of public and private interests. In market-oriented systems towards which Sudan has strived since the mid-1990s, private investment is encouraged in most spheres, and the role of the public is to address market failures and to remove constraints to investment. Market failures include lack of market information, externalities (both positive and negative), imperfect competition, and a failure to assure access to public goods. Constraints include administrative costs, for example. 8.7 As stated at the outset, there is a strong and overarching public interest increasing private sector investment as soon as possible to sustain peace – once obtained - in Darfur. There is an additional interest in specific forms of investment such as those in public service delivery and climate change adaptation. For those investments to occur, the goal of private sector development strategy is to influence the investment decisions of the private sector in ways consistent with the public interest. This can be addressed in part through removal of constraints, correcting specific market failures, and through catalytic programs. To prioritize this agenda, a simple framework is proposed. 8.8 Private firms, whether individual Profit Analytical Framework entrepreneurial entities or large corporate entities, exist to earn a profit commensurate with the risk of investment Viable investments undertaken. Investment decisions will be made when expected returns compensate the investor for expected risks. Unviable investments Accordingly, investment decisions can be influenced either through increasing expected profits or reducing uncertainty. Risk 8.9 The controllable factors that Profit Factor markets- skills, capital, material (costs) Risk Conflict influence profit and risk for this purpose Output markets (revenues) Commercial Taxes and Administrative costs Governance/Institutions are the competitiveness of factor markets Infrastructure Weather/Environment (land, labor, and capital) and output/product markets, infrastructure inputs, and costs imposed by public administration such as taxes and customs. Among the most obvious risks are conflict, policy and institutions (such as the risk of expropriation or contract enforcement), and weather related events. Since this framework is about public policy, it does not take into account commercial risks or the natural resource endowment of the region. 8.10 Below we examine how these factors operate in Darfur. By way of introduction, it is noted that:  Businesses in Darfur pay a wide variety of taxes to local, state and Federal authorities. Local taxes were historically the only real source of revenue for local and state authorities, because federal transfers were so negligible (see budget report). 250  Access to capital and skills is severely constrained. It has been perceived by the financial sector as a risky place to do business, which has reduced the availability of credit to business as banks have often either ignored the region or limited the credit exposure of Darfur-based branches.  Technical education suffered from neglect and has not been responsive to local demand. Since well before the conflict Darfur has lost many of its talented people to emigration, which undermines its ability to compete.  Historically, Darfur played a key role in the agricultural and transport industries both in Sudan and in neighboring countries. Now, however, the current climate for investment has sharply reduced the scope of these traditional markets. This suggests that a private sector development program for Darfur must consider both the re-establishment of traditional, and the establishment of new, markets. The latter includes involving the private sector in areas traditionally served by public and other providers. The geographic space of Darfur is not the limit. Moreover, as we show below, national policies and infrastructure investments influence the market scope for Darfur‘s private sector.  All of Sudan has limited infrastructure, including road densities which are among the lowest not only in Africa, but in the world. Darfur has particularly acute shortfalls, as documented in the infrastructure report. This was historically the case, and has been exacerbated by the war. For example, it is estimated that over two-thirds of citizens of the major cities of Nyala, Geneina and El Fasher are not served by water or electricity. Telecommunication services are routinely shut down by central authorities. 8.11 Even when a sustained cease-fire comes into effect, there will be a lingering impact of insecurity on the perceptions of entrepreneurs. Violence, theft and looting have destroyed capital. Insecurity will be manifested throughout the investment climate in the form of a risk premium demanded to attract investment. It also will result in cautious lending practices, excess demands for security in real property for loans, reduced tenors, and a reduction of transactions that are based on trust, which include remittance flows, informal credit (nizam el Sheil) and routine trade. One option for the private sector strategy might target investors who are well positioned to mitigate risk perceptions: domestic and Diaspora Darfurians. 8.12 International evidence increasingly suggests that economic growth in the post-conflict period is particularly sensitive to policy and institutional development. Many basic institutions related to the core legal framework supporting enterprise establishment and trade exist and have been functioning throughout the conflict in urban centers. However as laid out in the governance report, the nature and erosion of Darfur‘s institutions also contributed significantly to conflict, and need fundamental reforms in order to underpin a sustained peace and broad-based prosperity. 8.13 The Darfur conflict is perhaps the world‘s most potent symbol of the dangers inherent in environmental degradation. The science is now sufficiently clear to attribute a measurable rise in global average temperatures to the increase in greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide and water vapor). The private sector, as we show below, is heavily dependent on the prosperity of agriculture and livestock sectors, and has thus been adversely affected by the environmental degradation which has reduced productivity (see rural report). Thus, combating the factors that increase environmental risk (unsustainable use of water and deforestation) is strongly in the private sector‘s interest. 251 B. DIAGNOSTIC: DARFUR’S PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEXT Historical Role 8.14 Since its establishment as an independent Sultanate by Suleiman Solong in the 16 th Century, Darfur has maintained a tradition of independence and had only once before the 20th Century been ruled by central elites.219 Due to its geographic isolation which serves as a natural barrier to entry, and colonial policies which focused infrastructure on the Gezira economy, Darfur has developed as a somewhat autonomous economic region. At the same time, Darfur has served, since the period of Turko-Egyptian rule, as a backbone of the Sudanese economy, particularly as an exporter of livestock, Gum Arabic and oilseeds, and with an artisan manufacturing sector and trading infrastructure serving an area as far west as Niger, north into Egypt and East to the Red Sea. 8.15 In the 1970s and 1980s, Darfur was one of the most industrialized regions of Sudan if ranked by number of establishments, but these establishments are of a very small average size. The 2003 industrial survey identified in excess of 4,000 small manufacturing establishments in South Darfur, second only to Khartoum State, while North Darfur is the seventh most industrialized state. Taken together, the number of small manufacturers in Darfur far exceeds that of Khartoum State. The manufacturing base is largely of workshops and traditional industries focusing on post-harvest agro-industry (such as processing of edible oil from sesame), metalworking, gum arabic, tobacco, processing of ground nuts and livestock. These sectors were supported by a fairly extensive trucking industry. Its workers are known for their industriousness, and the region has produced many of the more successful entrepreneurs in Sudan. Figure 8.1: Darfur – Historically High Concentration of Small Manufacturing Manufacturing Establishments by State 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 te a Ba ppe f ur El rfur or ur W Ka fan Ko ern W ea ive n ua l Si if um N nar G le ile ria Bl fan El Nile R ile or la Eq aza r R of a ar W azi i . K rf t K sa N ar rN S N to to ad o Da h N Da n do h .D d rd s ut ort G ed r ue ar G hi S. . Kh So N U h hr es Industrial Survey (2003) 8.16 A large share of Sudan‘s SMEs is in Darfur, but few large manufacturers. According to the 2003 Industrial Survey there are an estimated 5,530 manufacturing units employing less than ten workers in Darfur. This is roughly a quarter of all of the small manufacturing establishments in Sudan. Official estimates are that there are 221 large manufacturing establishments with ten or more employees in Darfur, which represent 13 percent of all such 219 See Causes and Background to the Conflict in Darfur Region of Western Sudan, Eltigani Ateem (2005). 252 establishments in Sudan. Of this, 191 in South Darfur, 23 in North Darfur and only 7 in West Darfur. 8.17 There is minimal presence of state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing sector, but many co-operatives. All manufacturing establishments (except one textile factory and one tannery in Nyala) are privately owned. However, 34 percent of enterprises are cooperative enterprises. There are state-owned firms outside of manufacturing, including in trading, banking and insurance. Figure 8.2: Distribution of Manufacturers by State and Sector 4,500 4,000 3,500 Small Manufacturers 3,000 Large Manufacturers 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 - North Darfur West Darfur South Darfur Source: Industrial Survey (2003) Distribution of firms by Sector Chemical Tobacco Leather tanning Wood Non-metal mineral Febricated metal Food and beverage Source: Industrial Survey 2003 8.18 Manufacturing is sectorally concentrated. About 70 percent of manufacturing is in food-related industries and 12 percent is in fabricated metals. This underlines the high dependence on agriculture, since much of the metal fabrication is related to the manufacturing or servicing of agricultural equipment. Blacksmiths in Southern Darfur produce large quantities of hand tools, animal drawn plows, hoes rakes and knives. The distribution of firms varies by state, however. North Darfur includes tobacco processing, sector, whereas Nyala includes more agricultural tools. 8.19 In the 1990s, Darfur began to suffer a loss of human capital and investment as profit margins declined while the cost of doing business remained high. There is a long tradition of migration for work to Libya, Khartoum and the Gulf, which accelerated over the last two decades (see rural chapter). 253 8.20 Utilization of the installed capacities in the manufacturing sector was low for most activities. Investment in the replacement and renewal of productive units were neglected over time, and both machinery and infrastructure became obsolete. By 2003, of these 221 larger enterprises in Darfur, almost half - 99 -had been closed down -before the major flare up of hostilities. Table 8.1: Manufacturing Enterprises in Darfur, 2003 Operational Non-Operational Total South Darfur 92 99 191 North.Darfur 23 - 23 West Darfur 7 - 7 Total 122 99 221 8.21 The main problems affecting the private sector at that time were shortages of raw materials, lack of design capability and poor production skills. Darfur‘s private sector has not been exposed to significant FDI, thereby limiting the extent to which it has absorbed new skills. Yet, there are also reserves of resiliency and innovation (see Box 8.1 on Darfur‘s blacksmiths). Box 8.1: Darfur's Blacksmiths Darfur‘s artisan blacksmiths, or hadaheed, illustrate the resourcefulness, as well as challenges facing the private sector. Among the products made are simple, and an average blacksmith shop with several workers can make about 20 ploughs per week, using such materials as old car spring leafs. To obtain flat steel of the required width, the leafs are heated in a charcoal fire and cut by chisel into 3 strips of equal width. The leafs have to be reheated several times until the cutting is completed. Holes are punched into the red hot strips in the same process. No welding or drilling operations are done These blacksmiths have suffered a tremendous loss of market as agricultural production has declined since the onset of war. For the remaining market, there is competition with imports from China and elsewhere. To compete, blacksmiths need access to credit to purchase metal and fuel inputs, and modernized production methods through vocational training. As noted by Practical Action (2006) none of those working in the production of the agricultural tools had graduated from any of the technical institutions in the state or any other state of the region. Impact of Conflict on the Private Sector 8.22 At time of field research and writing, security was the key issue facing all Darfurians. The humanitarian crisis and human tragedy of the Darfur conflict is amply documented elsewhere. The specific impacts on the private sector are less well documented, and cannot be fully documented before the cessation of hostilities. Based on what we know, these impacts include a high level of business closures and loss of formal employment, changes in trade patterns, transportation, financing and confidence in institutions. 8.23 Field interviews suggest that only 10-20 percent of the 5,530 enterprises measured in the Industrial Survey were operational in late 2006, meaning that the manufacturing sector has declined to between 500 and 1,000, and mostly very small manufacturing shops like blacksmiths. This suggests maximum formal industrial employment of 10,000 out of Nyala‘s population of 1.5 million, or less than 1 percent of the population. The Nyala Chamber of Commerce estimates that those factories that have remained open operate at only around 30 percent of capacity. They also suggested that the rate of closure varied by subsector, with noodle factories closing completely, and a small share of soap factories still operational (see Figure 8.3). Plastics factories have continued to operate using pellets from Khartoum as well as imports. 254 Figure 8.3: Level of Business Closures in Nyala, 2006 100 90 80 70 60 Percnt 50 Not functioning % 40 Functioning % 30 20 10 0 Soap Sesame Noodles Plastic sweets Source: Staff estimates based on information provided by the Nyala Chamber of Commerce, September 2006. 8.24 Trade patterns have been disrupted. Violence along trade routes has raised transport costs, and is believed to have contributed to fuel shortages as well as increased isolation of rural markets. The cost of renting a truck to ship from El Geneina to Omdurman rose 150 percent between 2004 and 2005.220 The war (and previous proxy wars involving Libya) contributed to a government decision to divert Darfur-Libya border trade through a border post further north, presumably a more direct route to Port Sudan, and then ultimately to close the border with Libya. This had the effect of reducing exports of livestock to Libya, reducing remittances and the size of the market served by Darfur (see rural chapter). Insecurity on travel routes has also contributed to increased input costs. The cost of cement, for example, is 75 percent higher in Nyala than in Khartoum due both to distance and to numerous payments for security en route. The war has introduced new players into the marketplace. Armed groups have entered trade, both as a transporter for fee of produce and as a buyer and seller of produce. 8.25 Even prior to the war, access to the traditional lending mechanism (―Nizam Al Sheil‖) began to decline as merchants and traders began to leave the region or withdraw to the cities (see section 4 below). The sharp reductions in agricultural production, documented in the rural report, have limited both the inputs required to sustain Darfur‘s industrial base, and the demand for the industrial and service sector (ploughs, handtools, servicing of pumps, tractor engines, etc.). 8.26 At the same time, the rapidly growing urban centers have created some vibrancy in the private sector. Markets in the central cities of El Fasher and Nyala, fueled by a combination of increased international presence and urbanization, appeared to be thriving in 2006. The informal economy appears also to be thriving as informal solutions arise to problems of mass, unanticipated urbanization. Our field visits showed that traders import a wide range of consumer products, from horticultural produce of Jebel Marra to Chinese electronics from Dubai, solar panels from Khartoum and cosmetics from West Africa. The El Fasher Tumbac market and the larger Nyala livestock market remain operational, although at a much reduced level as a combination of taxes and insecurity have impacted produce and livestock flows. Construction appears to be active in some sub-sectors. 220 Markets, Livelihoods and Food Aid in Darfur: A Rapid Assessment, USAID, 2005 255 8.27 The longer-term impacts of the conflict on the private sector include the loss of confidence in institutions, both formal and informal. This includes a loss of confidence in government, as well as a loss of social capital and trust within and between different groups in Darfur. Informal institutions included sophisticated arrangements for marketing as well as land tenure. Key institutions, such as a rotating market which provided a ―market day‖ for different towns in a rotational pattern, have ceased. Some towns that depended on border trade with Libya, such as Mellit in North Darfur, have ceased to exist as market towns at all, with most businesses simply boarded up.221 8.28 Thus, the overall impact of the war has been to significantly expedite an ongoing de- industrialization in Darfur, massively destroy physical and social capital, and to shift private sector toward trade and labor export. This has accelerated a prior trend in Darfur‘s status from an industrial to a labor exporting and trading region. On the other hand, the war has also created new demands for service delivery in cities, which may ultimately serve as new sources of growth (see MDG report for alternative demographic scenarios). Investment Climate Constraints 8.29 In this section we review different aspects of the investment climate – related to administrative costs, access to capital, skills and capacity, infrastructure and market functioning – assessing current problems and policy implications. Administrative Costs 8.30 Since the mid 1990s, Sudan‘s national government has made remarkable legal and institutional changes to promote domestic and foreign investments and economic growth. The Investment Encouragement Act of 1999, amended in 2003, the ―one-stop-shop‖ of the Ministry of Investment, and the reduction in the corporate tax rate to 10 percent demonstrate a commitment to pro-investment policies. National data suggest that business start-up has been facilitated as a result of these measures. However, administrative barriers still make the business entry process cumbersome and costly for investors particularly at the state level. 8.31 Many of the gains from Sudan‘s policy of facilitating private investment have been undermined by the incomplete process of decentralization (initiated in 1992) through which public services such as education, health, infrastructure and agricultural management were delegated to state and local authorities, but without revenue or administrative capacity to execute the mandates (see governance report). According to the 2003 Local Government Act, revenue sources assigned to state and local authorities are the taxes on economic activities in the region. 8.32 The result is a proliferation of various taxes on productive enterprises. The full range of taxes is difficult to assess, as it varies by product and location. However, the hypothetical case of an investor who owns a piece of land in, for example, Nyala, which she pledges to a bank to build a small shop would face:  SD 1 million paid to the Government to allow the land to be used as collateral (in addition to an interest rate of 2.5 percent per month from the Bank)  50 percent of the value of the building as a building tax  Business registration and establishment fees paid to start the business  A minimum of SD 1,000 each for trade and health licenses, paid annually  Depending on the products sold import duties or excise taxes 221 Young, et al, Darfur: Livelihoods Under Siege. Tufts, 2005. 256  Zakat of 10 percent on gross revenue  Value Added Tax, profit tax, wounded tax and student tax at the national level. 8.33 These come in addition to high commercial costs. The investor would of course need to pay high prices for supplies, including SD 800 per gallon for fuel (which includes a SD 100 tax to the locality), prices for cement and steel reinforcement bars to establish the shop that are 75 percent higher than Khartoum due to transport costs, and then either purchase a generator or face electricity availability of 10 percent. Skilled construction labor costs of SD 2,500 and unskilled labor costs of SD 1,000 to build the shop would also be higher than Khartoum due to the higher cost of living. 8.34 An increasing tax burden is falling on fewer firms. As described above, the firms in the region before the war were numerous but small, often similar and competing for the same customers and supplies. As such, competition kept margins low. These firms have a limited ability to absorb higher costs. The private sector appears caught in a vicious circle in which limited transfers raises local levies, which in turn causes more firms to shut down or leave, and raising tax pressure on the surviving firms. The state, on the other hand, is faced by ever- increasing demands on physical infrastructure and services, and tries to increase collection, reaching further and further down to smaller firms. Even informal micro-enterprises - tea sellers, water vendors, and the like - are now paying taxes and levies. 8.35 In the case of livestock, for example, at least five taxes are imposed (Table 8.2). This is despite a presidential decree exempting the agricultural production from taxation, they are imposed. This is added to formal VAT and informal taxes by different authorities on the road from production areas to market centers. Per head tax on camels, at SD 2,700, represents about 6-10 percent of the price of a camel. This appears to have a number of unintended consequences, including forcing nomads to avoid it by moving to Chad or Central African Republic for long periods, which can among other effects, deprive their children of education. Table 8.2: Taxes on Livestock (SDD Per Head Animal Livestock Sale tax Zakat Stamp Slaughter Total Camel 800 1,200 500 100 100 2,700 Cow 400 800 300 100 100 1,700 Sheep 200 200 150 100 100 650 Goat 100 100 100 100 100 500 Table 8.3: Crop Taxes Market Service Fees Market Taxes 5% on 100 LB 15% on 100 LB Source: Ministry of Finance, North Darfur, El Fasher. 8.36 The view among public officials and private entrepreneurs alike is that the tax burden is high in relation to the size and scale of businesses in the region. Even if local tax revenue is low (see budget report), and taxes are not officially collected, at least in the cases of manufacturing and workshops, there are substantial attempts to collect, even to the point of jailing alleged defaulting entrepreneurs. 8.37 The tax system is also unduly complex, requiring multiple types of collection efforts. At the national level, there are an equally impressive number of exceptions through which to bypass many of these taxes. The 2007 Budget Circular issued by MOFNE takes several important measures for eliminating the proliferation of fees and taxes, including reviewing mandates for existing fees and requiring specific authorization to create a new one. But for 257 Darfur‘s private sector, the problem is urgent, and perhaps too complex to address through a gradualist approach. 8.38 There could be different ways for the private sector to obtain tax relief:  At the national level, obtaining investment privileges from the Ministry of Investment is one such option. The Federal Investment Encouragement Act defines a threshold for qualifying as a strategic investment, which enables an investor to qualify for maximum tax incentives, as US$10 million. However not a single investment has qualified as a strategic investment in Darfur.222 Therefore it seems that a new Investment Encouragement Act could be needed for three Darfur states, through which regional authorities would be granted the power to classify the projects and determine the minimum capital put in a new project- taking into consideration the economic situation prevailing in the region. It is worth noting, however, that due to distance and a lack of clear policy authority, local authorities are not certain (and the private sector less so) that national authorities such as Customs would honor incentives created at the state level.  A broad-based, time-bound tax holiday for all investment activity in the region could be introduced in order to stem the flow of capital and labor from the region and create new jobs quickly. The tax holiday would be designed to specifically address the downward spiral of declining own-source revenues leading to higher collection pressure and incentives to become informal. The tax holiday would be applied to formally registered firms and accompanied by efforts to simplify and streamline business registration efforts in order to shift business from the informal to the formal sector and, over time, broaden the tax base.  Tax holidays could be introduced in specific geographical zones. 8.39 In addition to taxes, and security and access to finance described below, land registration poses the largest impediment for investment in the region due the lack of clear property rights outside of city boundaries. The city of Nyala has established two industrial zones (one for heavy and one for lighter industries) but both are poorly served by utility connections and would not serve the small and informal sector. The growing informal sector, as described below, is increasingly focused on provision of urban services, and is therefore not well placed by being located in industrial centers on the outskirts of town. The existing small manufacturing sector tends to be located closer to roads that serve their client base. Access to Capital 8.40 Darfur‘s banking sector comprises two Central Bank (CBOS) branches and a total of 39 banks. The Nyala branch of the CBOS is considered the main branch for the region, undertaking the regulatory and supervisory roles in the region, and providing bank monitoring services to the El-Fasher CBOS branch. 8.41 The geographical distribution of the 39 banks servicing the Greater Darfur region is shown in Table 8.4. These banks are all branches of 14 main banks which have their headquarters in Khartoum State and which have their main regional branch in Nyala city in South Darfur. Reflecting its economic weight, South Darfur is the most serviced region, in terms of formal financial services and in particular banking services, with twenty five of the banks in the region being found there and with all the banks having one or more branches in that state. The Sudanese Agricultural Bank is by far the most widely accessible bank offering a total of 12 branches across the three states. The only specialized bank offering micro- 222 Director for Investment, South Darfur 258 financial services is the Savings and Social Development Bank which has only recently opened one branch in Nyala city. Table 8.4: Distribution of Banks in Darfur Ownership Branches South North West Sudanese Agricultural Bank Public 6 3 3 Animal Resources Bank Public 2 1 1 Farmers' Commercial Bank Public 1 0 0 Savings & Social Development Bank Public 1 0 0 Omdurman National Bank Public/Private 1 0 0 Islamic Cooperatives Development Bank Public/Private 2 0 0 El-Nilein Bank Private 2 2 0 Al-Baraka Sudanese Bank Private 1 0 0 Exports Development Bank Private 2 1 0 Tadammon Bank Private 2 0 0 Faisal Islamic Bank Private 1 1 0 Sudanese Islamic Bank Private 1 0 0 Sudanese French Bank Private 1 0 0 Bank of Khartoum Private 2 1 1 Total Number of Banks 25 9 5 Source: Central Bank of Sudan, Nyala. 8.42 However, in 2006, mostly due to security considerations, many bank branches were closed, including for example, the branches of the Exports Development Bank in Buram, Al- Geneina and Kuttum. 8.43 The size of financing being offered by banks in Darfur is very small compared to other regions in Sudan. This can be only partly attributed to the prevailing security situation, given the region‘s large contribution to the Sudanese economy. The major providers of financing in Darfur can be identified by studying the portfolios of the different banks in Nyala and El-Fasher. The largest financiers are Al-Nilein Bank and the National Omdurman Bank, each respectively contributing about 42 and 20 percent of total financing in Nyala. The National Omdurman Bank has no branches elsewhere in the region so all its services are concentrated in one branch, that of Nyala. While the Agricultural Bank which has the largest network of branches in the region, in recent years it has contributed only about 3 percent of total financing in Nyala city. 8.44 With the onset of conflict and its impact on agriculture in particular, financing has been diverted (in response to market forces) away from agriculture and into local trade. Although data do not allow rigorous comparisons over time, this trend emerged from interviews with both banks and their clients (business community, farmers, herders and others). This can be seen in Table 8.5, which depicts the distribution of financing by economic sector in Nyala where, on average, 70 percent of financing in the past four years went to local trade. This also reflects the evolution of economic activity in Southern Darfur from production to commercial trade where there is quick profit to be made with less risk. Local trade financing has not featured as strongly in El-Fasher but nevertheless accounted for more than a fifth of financing in the in the last 3-4 years. 259 Table 8.5: Bank Financing by Economic Sector, Nyala City, 2003-2007 All Amounts by Thousand Dinars Percentage shares Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 Agriculture 123,713 111,865 172,034 134,139 3 3 3 2 Manufacturing 308,301 409,798 2,719,337 2,752,555 8 12 41 35 Transportation 19,233 22,884 183,494 167,410 0 1 3 4 Producers 2,521 33,798 62,917 218,096 0 1 1 5 Professionals 56,688 181,925 62,536 52,423 1 5 1 1 Local Trade 3,270,518 2,356,047 3,350,350 4,146,115 85 69 50 73 Services 25,539 48,850 44,824 29,135 1 1 1 1 Other 40,859 252,193 95,545 347,661 1 7 1 4 Total 3,847,372 3,417,360 6,691,037 7,847,534 100 100 100 100 8.45 According to interviews conducted in Darfur for the purpose of this study, financing of the agricultural sector has declined tremendously due to lower production levels as a result of the war. However, this is not confirmed by the data for the period 2003 – 2006 which shows an increase in financing for agricultural purposes, albeit at a slow rate. In Nyala, agricultural financing has remained at a low of about 3 percent of total financing for the last 4 years but in El-Fasher it maintained its share of financing at about just over 40 percent in the past 3 years (Table 8.6). 8.46 Previously, financing was to a large extent directed toward agricultural products used in agro-industry, but this is no longer the case. The overall shares of financing being allocated to manufacturing averaged 9 – 10 percent for the period 2003-2006.223 In El-Fasher, financing for manufacturing dropped to a low of about 2 percent of total financing in the last two years. Table 8.6: Bank Financing by Economic Sector, El Fasher City, 2003 - 2006 Sector Million SD 2003 2004 2005 2006 Agriculture 1717 2322 3492 459 Manufacturing 179 324 150 19 Transportation 14 79 280 22 Producers 163 145 45 0 Professionals 151 88 82 9 Local Trade 1691 1514 1438 107 Services 160 79 139 217 Others 512 813 2933 192 Total Financing 4585 5365 8560 1026 8.47 The specialized public banks in Darfur, as in other regions of Sudan, have not been able to fully fulfill their stated mandates.  The Sudanese Agricultural Bank accounted for 64 percent of total agricultural financing in 2005 and has the most extensive network of branches, but has been greatly constrained by insecurity and the resulting lack of agricultural production. Moreover, while Darfur‘s agricultural production is mostly dependent on 223 This average is estimated without Nyala for the years 2005 and 2006, because the figure is otherwise distorted by one large loan by El Nilean bank to the manufacturing sector– representing 84 percent of total financing -- which was contracted in the bank‘s Khartoum headquarters but implemented by the Nyala branch. 260 traditional rainfed farming and small scale, the Agricultural Bank failed to provide significant financing to this group.  The Animal Resources Bank has moved away from its mandate, toward more profitable activities. The branch in Nyala shows that a maximum of 17.5 percent of its financing went to livestock production in 2006, and only 3 percent in 2005. The bank has directed more than 75 percent of its financing to local trade in the last three years.  The Savings and Social Bank, being the only specialized bank in the provision of microfinance services, only recently opened a branch (in Nyala). 8.48 Like in other parts of the country, transactions in the banking sector are concentrated on the Murabaha mode of financing, which is a trade-finance transaction in which the bank purchases a good on behalf of a borrower and sells it back to him/her in the future at an agreed higher price. Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 show that the share of such transactions in Nyala increased from 25 percent in 2003 to 75 percent in 2005 reflecting the move away from risk- sharing into profit-sharing. This can also be seen in the slight decline in the share of Musharaka transactions, falling 14 to 12 percent of total financing between 2003 and 2005. Other modes of financing, namely, Mudarabah and Salam which are often seen as more producer-friendly (Mudarabah transactions match 100 percent financing by one partner with entrepreneurial skills of the other partner, with profits to be shared on an agreed basis) have been on a steep decline with their total share in financing dropping from 61 percent in 2003 to 13 percent in 2005. While the data for El-Fasher suggest a different pattern, it is clear that Murabaha has become increasingly dominant. Table 8.7: Financing by Islamic Mode for Banks in Nyala City, 2003 – 2006, Thousand SD Activity 2003 2004 2005 2006 Murabaha 1,143,687 1,914,845 5,135,677 4,768,980 Musharaka 662,616 701,810 826,406 2,154,286 Other 2,790,128 611,304 930,292 1,045,563 Total Financing 4,596,431 3,227,959 6,892,375 7,968,829 Percentage shares Murabaha 25 59 75 60 Musharaka 14 22 12 27 Other 61 19 13 13 Table 8.8: Modes of Financing for Banks in El Fasher City, 2003 – 2006, Thousand SD Activity 2003 2004 2005 2006 Murabaha 2,448.4 3,031.4 3,469.6 473.2 Musharaka 1,616.7 1,888.4 3,292.4 467 Total Financing 4,594.0 5,616.7 7,242.7 1,025.9 Percentage shares Murabaha 53.3 54.0 47.9 46.1 Musharaka 35.2 33.6 45.5 45.5 8.49 Although default rates are high for agricultural financing, overall, rates have been kept very low and stable – Table 8.9 presents non-performing loans in Nyala and El-Fasher banks. The Sudanese Agricultural Bank in Nyala shows the highest share of non-performing loans but that has been steadily on the decline with default rates falling from 85 percent in 2003 to 36 percent in 2005. This improvement is attributed, by its management, to its enforcement of a stringent policy of not providing previous defaulters with new finance. 261 Table 8.9: Default Rate as a Percentage of Financing, Banks in Nyala City, 2003-2006 Bank Default Rate (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank of Khartoum 14 71 18 N/A El-Nilein Bank 0 0 0 0 Tadamon Islamic Bank 3 1 12 20 Sudanese Islamic Bank 14 7 10 6 Faisel Islamic Bank 2 71 10 4 Exports Development Bank - 4 3 2 Farmers' Commercial Bank 14 13 13 10 Sudanese Agriculture Bank 85 56 36 72 Al-Baraka Sudanese Bank 10 2 68 13 Islamic Cooperatives Development Bank 1 7 37 0 Sudanese French Bank 51 9 21 16 Animal Resources Bank 2 2 2 0 Omdurman National Bank 7 8 2 33 Average 6 8 6 1 8.50 Other banks, namely El-Nilein Bank and Omdurman National Bank which together contributed 75 percent of total bank financing in Nyala in 2005, showed default rates as low as 0.3 and 1.8 percent respectively. This is can be attributed to the move by these banks to finance the more lucrative activities of local trade and financing of small cars ‗Tiko‘ and ‗Atos‘ which are evidently popular in Nyala and Al-Fasher. The data shows that these two banks had negligible agricultural financing in 2003 and 2004, and no such financing in subsequent years. In 2005, Omdurman National Bank which contributed more than 20 percent of total financing in Nyala directed almost all its financing (89 percent) to local trade. 8.51 Table 8.10 shows the status of deposits for banks in Nyala and El-Fasher. It is clear that banks have not been able to attract savings and investment deposits as seen by the extremely low share of these deposits for all banks in both cities. A maximum of 26 percent was reached for non-current deposits in Nyala in 2005 and El-Fasher, the maximum was 22.5 percent for the same year. Table 8.10: Deposit by Type for Banks in Nyala and El Fasher Cities, 2003 – 2006 (Thousand SD) 2003 2004 2005 2006 Nyala Total Bank Deposits 2969456 3919837 4962534 5672893 Share (percent) Current 84 80 75 75 Saving 11 15 18 17 Investment 5 5 8 8 El Fasher Total Bank Deposits 13126.9 21904.7 31904.5 3594.9 Percentage shares Current 82 78.4 77.6 76.2 Saving 15.7 18.7 21 21.6 Investment 2 2.9 1.5 2.1 262 8.52 Central Bank credit policies and regulations are a prime constraint on banks from expanding credit, although the operation of the banks is also a significant factor. Specifically,  Collateral requirements are restrictive (see Box 8.2).  Compliance with Basle requirements for banking safety have reduced the presence of banking services in war-affect areas;  CBOS stipulation that loans should not exceed 50 percent of deposits;  Cost of finance - while CBOS does not stipulate a ceiling, indicators are given which banks are expected not to substantially exceed. 8.53 While these issues affect the banking system throughout Sudan, they have had particular adverse effects in Darfur, as described below. Box 8.2: Collateral Requirements and Darfur’s Private Sector CBOS policies stipulate that loans greater than one million dinars (US$5000) can only be provided upon presentation of adequate guarantees. The major types of collateral in Darfur are real estate, goods in storage, and insured animals. Real estate and/or registered land represent the majority of guarantees. Such property is mortgaged to the bank and is usually set at a value ranging between 150- 200 percent of the value of the loan. This rate is fixed by the bank‘s headquarters according to their calculations of the risk. CBOS policy in this regard only stipulates that the bank should ensure ―adequate collateral‖ when providing a loan, and it is up the banks to determine what this involves. In practice, there are several major problems. First, that local evaluations of property are greatly inflated, and this is considered by headquarters to be overpriced/ unsustainable. Second, in case of default by the borrower, it is very difficult to sell mortgaged property either because of social cohesion or because of fear of reprisals by the owners of the property or their family/tribe. Third, mortgage fees are extremely high being set at about 2 percent of value of the property. Goods in storage are used as collateral by farmers who mortgage their goods in a musharaka or murabaha agreement. However, this depends on storage facilities of the borrower, and raises the risk of fraud on their part, as well as possible losses due to poor condition of the stores which is out of the bank‘s control. In financing of livestock production, the producer is required to present insured animals as collateral. The insurance process is costly and time consuming, because it appears that local insurance companies are not trusted by local banks and the paperwork has to be sent to Khartoum for insurance approval. Moreover, insurance rates are very high in the Darfur region. 8.54 Bank branches throughout the country are required to be fully compliant with Central Bank regulations with little or no leeway given for war conditions. This has meant that banks have had to reduce their number of branches as well as the workforce within those branches still in operation. This has led a sizeable reduction in access to finance particularly in the areas outside of the main cities in the Darfur region. The activities of branches in Darfur are also limited by their mandates from headquarters in Khartoum:  Junior staff are located in Darfur, with limited qualifications and experience.  The limited mandate given to local branch management for loan approval. The ceiling is specified by headquarters; for example, it appeared to be 15 million SD (US$75,000) for all branches in Nyala.  Headquarter requirements that branches achieve certain profit targets as a condition for elevation to higher posts or increased staff. 8.55 Finally here it is noted that awareness of Bank policies and financial products being offered is extremely limited among small producers/traders. Clients‘ rights when accessing finance need to be better promoted, which is a function of the CBOS. 263 8.56 Looking ahead, small and micro-enterprises -- in all economic sectors be they agricultural, industrial or trade and service oriented -- are likely to be the most viable option for a large part of the population in the aftermath of conflict. They have many economic advantages and much to offer to the development of the region. Yet they are hampered, among others, by lack of institutional financial support. Finding appropriate funding was signaled out as one of the major problems faced by the majority of micro-entrepreneurs interviewed for the purposes of this study. Box 8.3: Access to Informal Credit in Darfur: Nizam El Sheil Access to informal finance in Sudan in general, and in Darfur in particular, usually refers to the traditional method of known as the Sheil system. This was widely used in the past, especially in rural areas among shop-keepers, traders and owners of large agricultural schemes. In Darfur, such informal methods were the major source of financing for small farmers who would cover their financial needs against the pledge of the following year's crop or against some form of property they owned. Informal financing was also sometimes linked to the formal banking system whereby big merchants would act as intermediaries, that is, as the client approaching the bank on behalf of the local producer and meeting the credit requirements that the small producer could not provide –collateral and/or other requirements, such as having a bank account, check book, etc. Relatively high interest rates were charged and the informal creditor provided loans only on condition that repayment was made in kind or at a price set by the money lender, which was invariably below the price that the crop would fetch at the end of the season. Small producers, without alternative credit options, suffered from the high cost associated with this type of informal financing, and often they became trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, low productivity and unending indebtedness, which could lead to the eventual loss by the small producer of all his belongings including his land. These practices, which formerly dominated, have declined and are now almost non-existent. This has been attributed mostly to the effects of the war when the financially able – merchants who typically were the providers of goods on credit- have left the region and migrated to other major cities in Sudan. 8.57 Micro-producers presently have no access to the formal financial system either because of lack of awareness or because of reluctance on the part of banks to offer such services to the economically active poor, and women in general. In an attempt to encourage banks to enter into the microfinance business, in 2003 CBOS issued a guideline to all banks to direct at least 10 percent of their financing to small producers, professionals and household enterprises. Yet studies224 have shown that this policy did not achieve its goal as most banks‘ financing to this category remained far below that level.225 For example, this figure did not exceed 2 percent for banks in Nyala – except for the Savings and Social Bank, which is specialized in microfinance. The only bank in El-Fasher to provide financing for small producers was the Bank of Khartoum, but this amounted to less than 1 percent of its financing. The reluctance of banks to offer financial services to small and micro- entrepreneurs is mostly related to the associated ‗transaction costs‘, that is, the relatively cost of administering and delivering credit and the cost arising from the risk of default. Micro loans are small in size yet the associated administrative costs remain the same regardless of size. Moreover, small entrepreneurs are perceived as being risky clients because they cannot offer the needed collateral and do not keep proper books. 8.58 Despite data constraints, it was clear that the status of the provision of microfinance by non-banks and specifically NGOs in the Darfur region is worse than elsewhere in the country, where microfinance services generally offered by NGOs fall far below the demand – both in quantity and quality (UNICONS, 2006). 224 Situational Analysis of the Microfinance Sector in Sudan Unicons Consultancy Ltd. Comm. by CBOS. 225 The Central Bank of Sudan is now launching a national microfinance development strategy. 264 8.59 As a result, small entrepreneurs rely mostly on advance payment by customers, savings and accumulated profits, as well as possibly loans from friends or family members. However such resources are limited in times of conflict and just after peace. Summary of Financing Constraints 8.60 The key problems related to access to capital can be summarized as follows:  Short–term financing is the only type available to producers/investors/traders. Depending on the purpose of the loan, repayments periods range from six months to one year, which is too short to allow for any type of production or investment to bear fruit.  Murabaha mode of financing is the predominant mode strains producers. Musharaka which is more producer friendly is used to a lesser extent. Salam and Mudaraba modes which are more suitable to financing for agricultural produce are almost non-existent.  The cost of finance is high. It can be as high as 2 percent per month (24 percent per annum) in the banking sector. Informal financing, when available, as it is now in short supply in the Darfur region, provides loans at much higher rates – reaching in some instances 200 percent. Skills and Private Sector Capacity 8.61 Skills are critical to the development of the private sector. Given that Darfur has among the lowest average literacy rates in Sudan, education is a tremendous challenge that is treated separately in the basic social services chapter. The focus of this section is on technical education. Skill delivery for the private sector involves a range of stakeholders, including the private sector itself, while training can be delivered by the state, civil society or private institutions. 8.62 The status of technical education in Darfur varies across each of the three states, and is thus described separately. At the same time, as highlighted below, a number of common patterns emerge. State-Level Assessments 8.63 Consistent with South Darfur‘s relatively more industrialized private sector, there appears to have been more attention given to technical training, at least in terms of the number of the delivery institutions and the diversity of the training offered. The state has three channels through which technical training is offered, namely: the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, the State Ministry of Education, and Institutions of Higher Education. 8.64 The Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports‘ mandate allows the use youth centers established during the Nemeri regime to facilitate and deliver technical knowledge to youth. The youth centers were designed to target the groups that were too old for the general educational stream, while the programs aimed to provide vocational training for school dropouts. They are divided into disciplines based on the gender of the target group or individuals. The boys‘ program provides basic skills in general electrical, car mechanics, blacksmith and carpentry, while the girls‘ program provides skills on food processing, sewing and knitting, handicrafts and use of local materials. 8.65 However, several problems presently face the vocational center. In the past, financial sources ranged from World Vision to Zakat, with technical support received from the Nyala University and Nyala technical college. Since the 1990s, the Nyala youth center did not 265 receive any financial support from the central government nor assistance from the international community. Moreover, due to the dispute between the administration of the center and the Ministry, support was withdrawn and the center was closed. All the assets were transferred to the Chamber of Small Industries, which was assigned by the government to supervise the vocational training. However the financial limitations in addition to the lack of necessary tools for the training have contributed to weak training outcomes for participants. 8.66 The Ministry of Education runs four technical and industrial schools, as summarized in Table 8.11. Table 8.11: Technical and Industrial Schools in South Darfur Nyala technical school Kas technical school Da’en industrial Buram industrial school school This school has four This school has four This school has four This school has four divisions: specializations: specializations: specializations: - Mechanical - Building - Building - Building - Construction construction construction construction - Commercial. - Carpentry - Carpentry - Carpentry - Vocational training for - Pluming - Welding and - Pluming the school dropouts - General electricity finishing - General electricity Each of these main In addition, the school - General In addition, the school divisions has more than has a commercial electricity has a commercial one specialization. branch. branch. Source: SME 2006. 8.67 Two institutes of higher education with technical curricula, Nyala University and Nyala Technical College, operate in Nyala. Among the observations from the field assessment are the following  Lack of connection to the needs of the local industry, that is, the food and fiber processing. All the technical training was geared towards the provision of the necessary skills for building construction and car mechanics and other steel and wood work for household demands. Very little, if any, is given into developing skills that cater for agro-industries, which accounts for the bulk of industrial activity.  The Nyala technical college in Nyala has programs that are directed towards the needy communities, including those in the IDPs as well as the poor in the Nyala. They also have some training programs specially designed to capacitate those working in the refrigeration and cooling workshops, running under the supervision of the environment conservation unit in the Ministry of Industry. 8.68 The general view among officials met is that the contribution of these institutions is limited, as evidenced by the limited opportunities of graduates of these institutions. Financing constraints are cited as a major obstacle. 8.69 In North Darfur, there are three technical schools (Fasher, Um Kaddada, and Kebkabiya), two vocational institutes (Fasher and Mallit), and one women‘s institute in Kebkabiya. To enter a technical schools the applicant must have passed the basic school certificate. The technical schools provide a secondary school certificate. Graduates either fulfill the requirements of admission for higher education for bachelor degree or high diploma, or enter the labor force. 8.70 The vocational institutes provide training for secondary school dropouts (with complete basic education). At the end of two years, graduates are offered an intermediate 266 diploma in the relevant specialization. Vocational centers are another form of technical training in North Darfur. However, these centers provide only short courses for skilled laborers. Table 8.12: Distribution of Technical Education/Enrollment, North Darfur Type of institute Number of pupils enrolled Technical school 311 Vocational institute N/A Commercial school 376 Vocational centers N/A Source: North Darfur, General directorate of technical education 2006 . 8.71 West Darfur has three technical schools, Geneina, Zalingei and Wadi Salih. While it was not possible during the field to visit all the schools, information was acquired from the reports of the state Ministry of Education and the national council for technical education. This information showed that only the technical school in Geneina was in-fact in operation. In addition to the academic program, the school offers specialization in principles of industry, engineering drawing, and commercial studies. As in South Darfur, responsibility for technical education is distributed between the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education. There are no institutions of higher education in Geneina. The workshop and tools of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports‘ youth vocational centre in West Darfur has been leased to the private sector. The state minister suggested that the centre could resume its functions as a training and capacity building centre for those who missed their chances in the general education institutions. 8.72 Discussions in West Darfur highlighted some lack of clarity about responsibility for technical education. The State Ministry of Education‘s director of the secondary education suggested that this was outside his jurisdiction, and rather under the national council for technical education. He also argued that the state‘s education budget allocation does not facilitate for the high expenditure that technical education requires. This uncertainty has impacted staff. In the Geneina Technical School, 19 out of the 31 teachers are classified as technical educators, but only six have actually attended post secondary education. The rest are graduates of the same school. It is clear that none of the teachers in the school met the national requirement that all basic education teachers should attain a university degree. Box 8.4: Non Governmental Skill Delivery Systems Donor Efforts. Historically, a large share of intermediate technical training was supported through foreign aid. For example, the Nyala technical school was built and sponsored by USAID. However western support for technical training tended to diminish after 1989. More recently, some livelihood improvement projects targeted to women in IDP camps, such as sewing skills, have been initiated. NGO Efforts. Sudanese NGOs have developed projects incorporating microfinance and training in such areas as flour milling. Some of the international NGOs are concerned with the technical training as a tool to improve the social capital and skills at the community level. One such NGO is Practical Action (PA), which, among other things, provides technical training to some Zaghawa communities of northern Darfur in the production of animal driven agricultural tools. However, interviews suggest that PA does not interact with any of the already existing technical institutes in the state. PA has conducted their training programs using their own technical consultants. American NGOs, such as CHF and Mercy Corps, provide capacity building and entrepreneurship training directly to IDPs in camps, including skill building such as mat weaving, fuel efficient stove production, sewing and handicrafts. 267 8.73 The findings in Geneina confirm the picture from the other Darfur states that technical secondary schools are not able to fulfill their objective of producing a technical cadre to meet the economic needs of the region. However, there is also something of a vicious circle at work. For example, graduates of the technical institutions in North Darfur represent 5-10 percent of the total work force working in the local industry. This finding supports the findings of Young et. al (2005) on the Darfurians in the Libyan Kofra. Interviews with the relevant industrial unions suggested that the weakness of the industrial sector in North Darfur has limited employment opportunities and hence, the ability of the technical institutions in attracting the young into building better capacities. Linkages to Industry 8.74 As noted above, there are now very few working firms looking for fresh graduates. The biggest employer in the state and the region is the public sector in the service provision departments, mainly water, electricity and roads. The growing construction sector may absorb more graduates, but at present many contracts are being won by firms based elsewhere in Sudan. Meeting with some of the state officials indicated that local firms lack the heavy machinery and skilled personnel that are needed. 8.75 There is no active heavy industry in Darfur. The local chamber of industry attributes this to the lack of skilled personnel who would be able to run and maintain the industry and the lack of the enabling environment, including infrastructure, which would allow for the development of heavy industry. In this sense, the collapse of private industry in Darfur appears to have contributed to the collapse in technical raining. 8.76 In thinking about the future, it is important to consider the changing skill needs of the private sector. Civil works and construction are emerging as important sub-sectors, for example. Private sector engineers should be allowed to benefit from capacity building and training activities designed to enrich the experience of those responsible for the road development, for example. Summary of Constraints The key constraints can thus be summarized as follows:  Administrative fragmentation of technical education, which is a feature of technical education systems in a range of developing countries, including Egypt, Thailand and Bangladesh, usually resulting from waves of reform to address evolving training needs.226 Technical education is one of the main disciplines of the general secondary education in Sudan. Until 1992, it was under the responsibility and management of the Ministry of Education, of the central government. After decentralization in the early 1990s, it became the responsibility of the state governments. There has been discussion about establishment of the National Council for Technical Education (NCTE), but the necessary legislation had not yet gone to Parliament. While this is indicative of intent to improve the status of technical education, we found that this proposed reform has created confusion in the lines of accountability, responsibility and financing of technical education in all three states of Darfur.  Inflexible curricula and lack of mechanisms to align curricula with private sector needs is a basic hurdle. Most of the technical training does not meet the market demand of the local industries. The input of the private sector on curriculum 226 Middleton, et. al. Skills for Productivity, World Bank 1993. 268 design is limited, as the curriculum is largely federally driven. The new NCTE may serve to address this, but practical mechanisms including internships, private sector curriculum councils, and monitoring systems to evaluate performance of graduates in the private sector are absent.  Marginalization of technical education relative to academic has been associated with the focus of the national government on higher education. This has resulted in stripping of assets, a shift in production of textbooks from technical to academic, removal of pupil's accommodation facilities as well as the budgets to run these facilities. This bias against technical education was supported by other administrative actions that deepened the disadvantages of technical education, such actions started from the recruitment of the unqualified to the cessation of the in-service training of teaching staff.  In both North Darfur and West Darfur, a large share of technical educators lacked post secondary degrees. Many of the staff members in these schools had never attended any pre-service, in-service or any kind of during service training. In some cases, the class instructors themselves are graduates of the same school with no further training to qualify them as trainers for the secondary school pupils. Most of the university graduates who attained technical degrees prefer to take technical posts in the public or the private sector. These jobs do not include teaching.  Previous decisions to decentralize technical secondary education put the burden on the state budgets. However, as state budgets are limited and technical education requires some upgrade and maintenance of capital equipment, the result is a lack of financing. A technical committee that assessed the needs of the technical education in North Darfur reported that the technical school workshops have not been maintained since 1985.  Lack of finance for accommodation facilities and pupil‘s lodgings. Since the mid-1990s, it has been the policy of the state to close all boarding facilities, to limit public expenditure. However, one effect has been to deny those coming from the poor rural areas access to technical training. The meals provided by the schools were one of the attracting factors that allowed for many of the rural poor to apply for these schools, as it reduces the burden of feeding and housing from the shoulders of the parents of these pupils. The towns and villages in the state are scattered and the geographic distance between them is large, that would not allow for the commuting of the pupils between the school and their homes 8.77 Darfur cannot reemerge as a production center without stronger technical skills, yet technical education is in crisis. Efforts of donors, the private sector and non governmental organizations to provide training to Darfur´s entrepreneur show are presently limited, but do show promise, particularly through innovative NGOs such as Practical Action and SUDO, some of which deliver entrepreneurship skills directly to IDPs in camps. These efforts would need to be substantially scaled up to have a tangible impact on the region. 8.78 The gap in skill delivery systems appropriate to the private sector has contributed directly and indirectly to the weak industrial sector in the region. It was highlighted in discussions with local chambers of industry that the lack of skilled labor in the region had contributed to the collapse of many industries, especially the bigger factories. Yet, at the same time, the weakness of the industrial sector in the region had also contributed to the drain of the region from its skilled labor and technical consultants. This argument was supported by Young et al. (2005) about the emigration of many skilled personnel to outside the region, either to central Sudan or Arab countries. The suggested policy implications are addressed below. 269 Output and Product Markets 8.79 In post conflict environments, output markets are naturally curtailed, through reductions in purchasing power, through disruption of transportation linkages and reductions in supply. Many post-conflict situations also feature distortions caused by the entry of free or low-cost food aid, and at times monopolies established over key products or transport routes as a form of war profiteering. Establishing and promoting competitive markets is therefore a critical part of any post-conflict private sector development strategy. Markets are also critically important for establishing peace, as they are a key way for people from all walks of life, all ethnicities to socially interact, and to exchange information and produce for mutual gain. 8.80 Historically, Darfur‘s market infrastructure was sophisticated and represents an important comparative advantage or capability on which to build. Traditionally, a three-tier structure operated, in which large urban markets were linked to regional markets through traveling traders (―Um Dawerwer‖) who rotated on a weekly or bi-weekly basis across these markets, which were in turn served by smaller village markets. Produce moved between these markets by the region‘s well-developed trucking industry, which would utilize backhauls to move grain or produce across village, regional or urban markets.227 Retailers in most cases were women, and wholesalers were men. 8.81 Rural markets have been severely disrupted at the village and regional market levels, as well as the rotating market institutions that provided opportunities for rural town dwellers to buy and sell with other towns. Livestock markets have similarly been disrupted by limited mobility (see rural report). Urban markets, particularly in the larger cities with AMIS presence and IDP camps, have grown. These markets are traditional in format and lack modern facilities such as cold storage, fumigation rooms, modern market information systems, and consist mainly of uncovered stalls. Field visits indicated that horticultural produce which are sensitive to post-harvest deterioration (tomatoes, oranges, onions, etc.) are sold by small individual traders in open markets. 8.82 Even for those markets that remain functional, insecurity and resulting scarcity has impacted trade. Transportation costs now include a risk premium which is factored into the cost of all goods. Cement prices in Nyala are SD 75,000 per ton, whereas in Khartoum it is SD 45,000 per ton (August 2006). Basic medicines such as Chloroquine in Khartoum cost SD 100, whereas in Nyala the cost is SD 200. These prices are linked to the decline in agricultural trade, since these materials are transported on the backhaul of a shipment of Darfur‘s many agricultural exports (sesame, Karhadeh, oilseeds, oranges, etc.). As war sharply reduced cultivation and the number of shipments to markets, the products shipped to Darfur in backhauls also became scarce. 8.83 This shift represents a challenge for Darfur‘s industrial base, as limited rural marketing and limited agricultural produce will mean limited demand for tools, on the one hand, or processing on the other. On a regional level, the central African market area served by Darfur‘s agro-industry (Southern Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, and northern Congo) has also been disrupted, due both to closures and insecurity. The clear conclusion is that traditional markets for the private sector that existed up to 2003 will take a long time to recover, while new market opportunities have also grown. 227 Rationale for a Possible Market Support Program in Darfur, Sudan, El-Dukheri, et. al. CARE, 2004 270 Infrastructure 8.84 A key precondition to private sector growth is physical infrastructure -- infrastructure links producers to buyers, allows efficient information sharing and the delivery of all inputs and outputs. While infrastructure is the subject of another report, the focus here is on the links to private sector development. 8.85 The Sudan has among the lowest densities in the world in several categories of infrastructure. Within the Sudan, Darfur has been particularly poorly served, which was one of the causes of conflict. The region has only 7 percent of Sudan‘s asphalted roads, roughly 215 km, and 12 percent of Sudan‘s gravel roads. The railway line terminates at in Nyala. Electricity supply is estimated in the main cities as 10 percent available. Water supply coverage is lower than any state in northern Sudan with the exception of Blue Nile (see Figure 4). In terms of telecommunications, the capital cities of Darfur are served by Sudatel (fixed and Mobile) and Mobitel, but these services are frequently cut off and of poor quality. 8.86 The state capitals have grown tremendously as a result of the crisis, and infrastructure networks (water, power, telephone, road) now cover only a small share of the population. Pent-up demand has resulted in a thriving informal business in private water and power has resulted, but is vastly undercapitalized and unregulated. Figure 8.4: Poor Coverage Indicators Water Supply Coverage as % of Demand 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 e r r if a um r le ira fu r fu fu ar ag Se Ni ar ez ar ed Da to er D d ue tD G ar G Av Re rth h Kh Bl El es ut n No So W da Su Source: National Water Courporation Figure 8.5: Informal Sector Filling the Service gap 271 8.87 It is clear that infrastructure service in any sector is not sufficient to support an economic recovery, and that a massive investment gap will need to be filled. A recent assessment suggests that it is unlikely for these massive service delivery gaps to be filled using the public sector in a reasonable time frame due to the need for substantial sector reform to address inefficient service provision and below-cost tariffs.228 For several infrastructure sectors, a two-track approach will be needed. Public sector provision will be needed to, for example, to extend the national grid to Darfur states to lower the cost of power and reduce reliance on wood burning and diesel generation. 8.88 At the same time, research has pointed to the important role that private infrastructure providers play post-conflict including unlicensed and unregulated providers that initiate activities even before final peace agreements are signed.229 However, larger, formal private infrastructure providers are far more sensitive to risk than investors in industry, causing critical sectors such as water and transport very longer timeframes to emerge on a large scale private basis. Countries that have succeeded in attracting private participation early in the post-conflict period have removed barriers to entry, addressed regulatory risks and/or use risk mitigation techniques, and avoid complex bidding arrangements meant to maximize contract revenues. Those that fail to do so ―confront a bitter paradox - they can neither absorb fully reconstruction aid nor can they attract much private investment to infrastructure sectors that could offset the state‘s low absorptive capacity.‖230 8.89 The key controllable risk in private participation in infrastructure service provision is the payment risk from the state. Mobile telephony tends to appear rapidly in post-conflict environments because payment risk can be removed by using pre-paid services through scratch cards. But the private sector can play an important role in any sector in which those payment risks can be removed. As such, part of the federal commitment to reconstruction of Darfur could be structured as a guarantee of timely payment by the public sector for privately- delivered infrastructure services. 8.90 Output-based contracts could be used for key services. For example, new housing will require connections to utilities – water, electricity, and telecommunications. Field visits, discussions with both public and private sector suggest that each connection is a fairly standardized operation for which the local private sector is already capable. As such, it would be possible to auction to the private sector the right to deliver these services. The auction would identify the private provider willing to deliver at the lowest cost. A catalytic fund will guarantee public payments for privately-delivered infrastructure services contracted by state. 8.91 Off-grid service providers may be a viable option. An approach to improving the private sector‘s contribution is to scale up and formalize the ―off grid‖ informal small scale sector, alongside longer-term efforts to build public grids. In Cambodia, nearly 15 percent of those service providers eight years after the end of Cambodia‘s conflict were those that had begun distributing electricity prior to the signing of the initial peace agreement. Because the public grid in Darfur will take substantial time to develop, and because the ultimate size of the city cannot be known until the question of the return of IDPs is answered, off-grid operators may be an effective, rapid response to urban service delivery needs. 228 Sudan: Review of Policy and Institutional Capacity to Facilitate Private Participation in Infrastructure. Castalia Strategic Advisors. November 2006. 229 ―The Private Sector‘s Role in the Provision of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Countries: Patterns and Policy Options‖ Jordan Z. Schwartz, Shelly Hanh and Ian Bannon, Social Development Policy Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction. World Bank. 2004. 230 Ibid 272 8.92 Off-grid, informal providers may provide services at a quality and price that is highly variable. Darfur‘s water vendors appear to act competitively, and price water according to the distance of the customer from the water source. There is little in the way of economies of scale, quality testing, or actual investment beyond the two barrels welded together, cart and horse. Such providers would be an easy target for the National Water Corporation or the National Electricity Corporation who would want to maintain their monopolies. But for the reasons cited above, outlawing such providers would be extremely counterproductive. 8.93 Rather, a more effective approach would be to formalize and upgrade these suppliers in order to improve quality and reduce cost, while also generating Darfur-based employment and investment. As such, it would be necessary to establish: (a) a licensing regime; (b) a simple regulatory framework to allow for random testing of quality; and (c) the ability to obtain bank financing. Cambodia‘s rural electrification program is instructive (see Box 8.5). Box 8.5: Cambodia's Rural Electricity Providers Cambodia has one of the lowest electrification rates in Asia with only about 12% of its population of 13 million connected to a power supply. Electricity costs are among the highest in the world. These two aspects are partly connected and both are partly the consequence of Cambodia‘s recent turbulent history - the country has only recently emerged from a lengthy period of conflict, civil war and invasion. Civil peace was restored only in 1998. Private independent power producers (IPPs) engaged in early1994 to revive supplies, contributed 63 percent of the supply in 2002; generation by the government-owned Electricite du Cambodge (EdC) accounted for 32 percent. There is no national grid and towns are supplied through isolated systems. EdC and IPPs are small capacity, low efficiency, high fuel cost diesel plants. In addition, earlier IPP contracts provided for high risk premiums. Rural supplies are expensive as they reflect costs posed by: (a) very small diesel generators, using diesel oil transported over long distances; (b) small loads with demands peaking at certain hours; (c) high losses of the networks; and (d) high risks borne by operators due to lack of regulation and clear franchising arrangements. Around 91 percent of the rural population either use automobile batteries (costing US$2-3.5/kWh) for occasional use, or use no electricity. EdC does not have the capacity or financial resources to extend its small grids into the countryside and vast remote areas which can be more economically served by decentralized grids. The existing roughly 600 REEs, provide a possible private sector-led framework for developing local systems. To make significant contributions to Cambodia‘s RE goals, however, the REEs must significantly expand their scale of operations and reduce costs and prices, all of which are interrelated. To make a better contribution, REEs need: (a) legitimacy, through licensing, to be able to solidify and formalize their businesses, coupled with a clear framework of technical standards and pricing guidelines within which all players have a common understanding of expectations; (b) improved access to financing, beyond the current limited resources of the entrepreneurs‘ private equity; and (c) greater access to technical and managerial support. The World Bank‘s 2005 Rural Electrification Project supported private rural electricity enterprises through:  Licensing. To establish franchise rights, provide business stability and allow access to finance. Licensing would also establish safety, quality and service standards, and pricing boundaries.  Financing. To facilitate flows of commercial financing, especially loan financing, to REEs who have little or no access to local financing. While legitimization through licensing would help, it would be necessary to foster borrowing relationships with the banking sector, which is currently underdeveloped.  Technical Support. To enhance technical and managerial capacity of REEs to enable them meet minimum standards, and delve into decentralized generation. Cross-Subsidization. A special urban-rural cross-subsidy mechanism to provide a measure of relief to the inherently poor rural consumers from the high costs of RE 273 The Role of good Governance 8.94 The legitimacy of institutions of governance has a profound impact on the quality and form of private sector development. Particularly for smaller firms who cannot enforce their rights through financial or political means, a level playing field is an essential prerequisite to committing significant capital. Weak institutions cannot reduce the perception of risk to the point that investments are considered viable. 8.95 As outlined in the governance chapter, transparent, rules-based, and meritocratic governance is an essential component of an inclusive, broad-based development strategy. Furthermore, particularly in a politically polarized atmosphere, a credible state is even more necessary to ensure that rules will be enforced equally. Due to the deep polarization and divisions which have emerged in Darfur, there is a great risk that the public sector will be perceived as favoring particular groups, tribes, ethnicities or individuals and therefore use the power of the state to create an unfair playing field. This will be a serious impediment to investors. 8.96 Property rights will play a pivotal role. Enforcement of commercial laws is equally important. To lower transaction costs and to enable trade with distant counterparts, well- enforced commercial laws that deter breach of contract are a must. The alternative will be a resort to social capital and trust – informal mechanisms - as the primary means of contract enforcement, which as discussed previously, have been deeply damaged. Informal mechanisms may allow trade across groups of common ethnic affiliation that trust each other, but cannot be the basis for scaling up growth across national and ethic boundaries. 8.97 The lack of state-owned companies is positive, but competition from the military now needs to be ended. Because military vehicles now patrol the main inter-city roads, they are able to transport goods and are doing so. These vehicles are now involved in moving goods back and forth to supplement their income. The legitimacy of the state post conflict will depend in large part on the extent to which the power of the state is used to enforce rights fairly and universally. This is undermined when military authorities are seen as participants in the economy with specific economic interests. 8.98 The voluntary institutions representing the private sector can play a critical role. Workshop discussions with Chambers of Commerce, Employers Federation, women's associations, pastoralists, blacksmiths and others. These groups held a diversity of views, and had in-depth knowledge of the policy problems faced by the private sector and the pros and cons of different actions. While it was widely understood that some groups were Government sponsored, their views were respected by others. From all sides, there was a good deal of willingness to participate and raise long-standing issues which often concern infrastructure, security, finance, competition, and employment. 8.99 An advisory group of Darfurians in the Diaspora can also play an important role. As mentioned previously, a large share of the most talented men and women from the region now reside in Khartoum, Libya, the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. Many are highly successful investors, and have been exposed to a range of policy environments. While the voices of those experiencing the crisis must be considered first and foremost, it is important to find institutional mechanisms to integrate the Diaspora both in policy guidance and as participants in the recovery. 8.100 A Private Sector Forum can be a useful means of providing voice to the private sector. Such a Forum, also called Investors‘ Councils, are a result-oriented, structured dialogue in which the private sector and the public sector can discuss the agenda of policy and institutional issues required to create recovery. The public sector benefits from policies that 274 are more widely owned and from the ideas and feedback of the private sector, while the private sector obtains an opportunity to raise policy concerns and focus the government‘s agenda. Forums do not substitute for institutional means for transparent policymaking such as public comment periods on laws and democratic institutions. C. EMERGING PRIORITIES 8.101 In essence, Darfur faces an extremely difficult combination of four factors: low skills, high costs, limited access to credit and smaller markets. If only one of these problems was present, stimulating the growth of the private sector would be a tactical issue. But the combination of all four factors - particularly high costs and shrinking markets - would cause businesses to fail in any circumstance. This makes a strategic shift in the orientation of Darfur‘s private sector necessary. 8.102 There are two options for operating in a high fixed cost environment, and neither is presently available to Darfur‘s private sector. One approach is to produce higher value products which may command prices sufficient to cover those costs. However, Darfur does not have the skill or capital base to achieve this in the short-term. The other option is to produce at sufficiently large volumes such that low margins would be able cover high fixed costs. However, as a result of insecurity, the market size served by Darfur‘s private sector has declined. These will need to be rebuilt, but this will take time. 8.103 In the short run, the only way to stem the decline of the private sector is a sharp reduction in fixed costs to lower the break-even point for Darfur-based businesses. This will reduce the rate of closure and allow those who remain open to begin to employ more and improve the regularity and quality of service delivery. While this will reduce public revenues in the short-run, it will substantially increase the tax base in the long-run. 8.104 In the medium term, the emphasis must shift from stability and survival of the private sector to renewed growth. New growth options and scenarios must be considered. One such scenario is that Darfur regains its role as the processing and distribution hub for the region‘s agricultural base. A second scenario, leveraging the region‘s sophisticated marketing expertise, is one which it shifts to a regional logistics hub for a wider array of agricultural and non-agricultural products traded across Sudan and into Central and West Africa, and one in which it shifts to urban services and construction as it supports a permanent shift from rural to urban. This entails an investment in trade support logistics, complementing investment in roads. 8.105 For growth to resume, new market opportunities will need to be created. The key opportunities identified in the assessment are: (a) urban services; (b) private infrastructure and construction; and (c) climate change mitigation (see Box 8.6). The investment climate will need to serve small and microenterprises, serving growing urban markets. Restarting manufacturing will require addressing the issue of markets in the medium-term. Efforts will be focused on reestablishing old markets with lower transaction costs, particularly Chad, Libya, Central African Republic and Red Sea exports. Equity investment will come from targeting Darfuri Diaspora, and by strengthening governance to restore confidence in institutions. 275 Box 8.6: Role in Climate Change Adaptation At the edge of the Sahara, Darfur is on the front line of the global battle to confront the implications of climate change. The recent Stern Report identified the Sahelian zone as among the regions of the world that will be impacted most. Desertification has been a major contributor to the conflict, and can be partly traced to unsustainable practices, including charcoal for cooking and heating; shifting cultivation and clearing of forests; and excess grazing (see rural report). On the positive side, a peaceful and prosperous Darfur is well placed to serve as a center of innovation on involving the private sector in climate change adaptation. Any sustainable private sector development strategy should contribute to reduction of harmful practices. Indeed the private sector can also help bring solutions in various forms, including: • marketing alternative fuels and fuel-efficient stoves, including gas cookers, and potentially ethanol; • innovative solar solutions, including individual solar-powered light bulbs now being delivered at low cost throughout Africa; • generating alternative livelihoods based on peri-urban employment to diversify pastoral livelihoods; • introducing new savings mechanisms, such as mobile microfinance, thereby reducing the incentive among pastoralists to maintain large herds, as well as access to risk mitigation instruments to again reduce the incentives to maintain large herds; and • restoration of the gum arabic belt. Reforestation may qualify for financing from the various carbon- related funds. Projects in Kenya and Uganda use carbon financing to obtain steady long-term incomes from tree planting. The organizational efficiency of the private sector may help expedite commercially sustainable reforestation. Stabilizing the Private Sector – Short run Measures after Peace 8.106 A series of measures could help to stabilize the private sector in the short term, and should aim to reduce the administrative costs faced by private investors, establish mechanisms to solve disputes and stalled negotiations, and establish access to finance. In addition, a key recommendation would be to improve the policy, legal and regulatory framework for market-based, competitive delivery of financial services, including institutions to improve information sharing in the financial sector as well as property rights; focus on microfinance (including deposit taking) and leasing to facilitate more immediate needs of SMEs; introduce weather and crop insurance, as well as limited guarantees for long-term investment; and focus on strengthening skills and capacity in the long-term. Expanding access to Finance 8.107 Measures needed to expand access to finance should begin in the short term, but need to extend over time. These measures fall under the several headings outlined above. Improving the Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework  Reform and strengthen the regional branch of the CBOS to serve with a mandate to ensure that implementation of national policies takes the special characteristics of the region into consideration including the market forces that are in play. The mandate of CBOS would extend to broad oversight of the development of non- bank financing instruments, establishment of institutions to support financial markets.  Securing the rights of borrowers and creditors. A strong legal environment is a pre-requisite for private sector development, in general, and access to finance and financial development, in particular. When creditors‘ rights are well defined and 276 are enforceable, financial institutions will be more amenable to providing the needed financing to firms. For example, one of the constraints to expanding credit was the social factor associated with the selling of collateralized property in time of default. In such cases, strong creditor rights arising from the enforcement of laws guaranteeing the creditor priority in the case of default reduces the risks to future lending. Securing borrowers rights is also much needed by enforcing laws that formalize rights to assets, including land. Lowering the costs associated with the securitization process is important.  Credit Bureaus. Given Darfur‘s risk environment, a credit bureau containing both positive and negative information on borrowers could facilitate the flow of information. The problem of lack of information about borrowers was seen in the recent fraud case in Nyala city but is a much more widespread phenomenon. Credit bureau information works both ways by allowing, on the one hand, the lender to better predict future loan performance and, on the other hand, improving the borrower‘s incentive to repay loans promptly because late payment to one lender could result in sanctions by many institutions.  Establishing a Registry for Movable Collateral. This could greatly improve access to finance. A system that would require registration of security interests could be introduced as in the case of Romania in 1999. The system would allow lenders to access information on whether other creditors or lenders had claims on the same goods. It would also ensure the enforcement of agreements and the repossession of collateralized goods in an efficient manner. Sustainable Delivery of Microfinance and Leasing 8.108 Given the scarcity of real assets to serve as loan security in Darfur, secured lending is not be an option for many potential borrowers. Microfinance, which relies on intensive supervision or social pressure to maximize repayment rates, as well as leasing, in which equipment itself serves as collateral, are appropriate instruments for Darfur post-conflict. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) could be supported through efforts to facilitate the licensing of new local MFIs, and through adapting microfinance instruments to local conditions. Efforts are also needed to strengthen the skills and capabilities in the medium to long term, to ensure the viability of the financial sector. 8.109 In addition, options could include accelerating the introduction of leasing, which can serve as an important instrument of the post-conflict recovery, particularly as it may help to finance construction equipment, manufacturing equipment and other capital goods. The leasing industry is already legal in Sudan and leasing firms enjoy tax privileges for their imported equipment. However, leasing is relatively limited in Darfur. 8.110 Introducing innovative risk mitigating instruments, aimed small farm, non-farm micro-entrepreneurs and especially women entrepreneurs is considered to be the single most constraint to accessing financing. Greater flexibility is needed in the definition of what type of collateral is acceptable in the case of microfinance with due consideration being given to non-conventional collaterals. At the same time, construction financing for smaller domestic firms could be an option to ensure that smaller firms in Darfur, which are technically capable of delivering construction projects, are able to qualify for participation in reconstruction and development projects. 8.111 Improving monitoring and evaluation of CBOS. CBOS maintains reliable data based on reports from commercial banks, both state and privately-owned. In light of the strategy for expanding access to finance, there will be an increased need for timely information that is geared toward monitoring access to credit as well as the loan performance. It is also 277 recommended that data be collected and published on the microfinance activities of licensed banks, NGOs, CBOs and the donor community - a process that will entail monitoring the development of the microfinance sector overtime. Such a database could be established and maintained by the recommended MF Unit within the Central Bank branches in Darfur. Improving Skills 8.112 Strengthen governance of technical education. Technical education in Sudan has been subjected to: (a) marginalization due to the academic bias that was practiced by the federal and state ministries of education, and (b) confused governance structures, which made it unclear whether Ministries of Technology, Industry, or Education were accountable for results. The new Council has not yet clarified this picture. For Darfur, governance structures should be considered that clarify accountability for results, budget appropriately for those results, and directly incorporate the concerns and demand of the local private sector. The governance arrangements may need to incorporate both the education and industrial authorities. This will strengthen the legitimacy of the institutions and the extent to which both students and the private sector view them as viable options for future employment. A new governance arrangement should include flexible funding, centrally managed, for specific projects to upgrade the performance of training institutions. 8.113 Accountability for results needs to be measured, with the flexible resources from the center allocated to better performing institutions who meet defined performance targets (including interim targets to upgrade curricula, create linkages with employers) as well as student-based targets such as attainment, graduation, testing results, and wage premia. 8.114 Improved links with employers. In Middleton‘s landmark work on vocational training, the key is public commitment: ―Close cooperation between employers and training institutions is critically important to developing the information needed for training of all kinds. Cooperation can take many forms, but all of them depend on strong commitment from the government to a real and substantial role for private employers. This commitment is embodied in the statues governing the training system, but it is implemented through allocation of resources to the process of cooperation. At a minimum, this means building the capacity of individual training institutions to undertake cooperative efforts.‖231 Specific mechanisms include involving employers in curriculum design, in placement, through part- time teachers, and through financing. Joint industrial capacity building through partnership between the private sector firms in the region and the bigger firms in the other states of the Sudan headed by Darfuri entrepreneurs is one such possibility. 8.115 Involve civil society. There is need for strengthening traditional micro and small enterprises in terms of skills, appropriate technologies and entrepreneurship. Networking with NGOs, social centers, women's associations for training, extension services, product/process appropriate technologies, marketing, etc. is necessary. Entrepreneurship needs to be developed for establishment of micro and small informal enterprises and micro credit schemes for creation of employment both in the rural areas and among the urban poor New Sources of Growth: Expanding Markets 8.116 It is necessary to consider alternative scenarios for Darfur‘s future in support of growth. A key issue is to expand the private sector in new markets – both geographically and sectorally. While Darfur is an integral part, its geographical region and the agricultural populations surrounding it, due to war its urban centers have become more like islands – maintaining trade with distant markets but less integrated with its immediate surroundings. 231 Middleton (1993) p. 207 278 8.117 Survival and future prosperity will depend on establishing efficient transportation and logistics linkages both with its immediate hinterland, but also to more distant markets. The key investments proposed to enable this are dry ports linking both Nyala and El Fasher to Libya, Chad and CAR, along with harmonization of border management functions. On the Vietnam-Cambodia border as well as the Thailand-Cambodia border, countries have agreed on a single joint border office, serving the customs and security needs of both countries. Such investments will need to take place alongside of investments in establishing more all-weather roads. 8.118 In the long run, one can consider Darfur as a logistics hub linking Asian and Dubai- based logistics hubs in to land-locked countries in the heart of Africa: Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, Northern Nigeria, and Southern Libya. However, further work is needed to explore potential visions and associated options, in the context of infrastructure investments, a revived rural economy, and improved governance. D. CONCLUSIONS 8.119 The private sector will be crucial to successful reconstruction and development of Darfur, and thus to a sustainable solution to the conflict. This chapter has outlined many of the key challenges facing private sector driven growth in Darfur. Foremost among these is the loss of security, social capital, and trust both between market participants and with government, a high cost investment climate and emigration had contributed to a large number of business failures prior to the war, but this sharply accelerated after the war. The region is characterized by weak factor markets, particularly to provide the skills and capital required to support a return to traditional manufacturing. Undercapitalization limits the ability of the private sector to finance growth. Infrastructure has been destroyed or neglected, creating a significant challenge for commerce but opportunity for private involvement; and traditional markets have shrunk in size and geographical scope. 8.120 An appropriate private sector development strategy, informed by the views of a broad range of stakeholders, will be needed to provide conditions that will allow recovery and growth of the sector. The potential benefits of private sector involvement in the reconstruction and development process are large, provided that the constraints presented by national policies and regulations are overcome A cross cutting issue to be addressed will be to ensure that sustainable growth can only take place within the context of environmentally sound policies that do not exacerbate unsustainable practices. 279 BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdalla Ahmed Abdalla. (2004). ―Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur: Experiences and Development Options.‖ UN University for Peace, 2004. African Union (AU). 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