



Disaster Recovery in Conflict Contexts



Thematic Case Study for the Disaster Recovery Framework Guide



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Cover photo: Satellite image of the devastation around Kalutara, Sri Lanka (center), on December 26, 2004, at 10:20 a.m. local time—about an hour after the first in the series of waves hit. Photo credit: © DigitalGlobe. Top left: Water supply and sanitation community discussion, Kaski, Nepal. Photo credit: Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank. Bottom right: Repairing and refilling breached sections of embankments as part of the North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project. Sri Lanka. Photo credit: Dominic Sansoni/World Bank

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Abbreviations

CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRF	Disaster Recovery Framework
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (separatist movement)
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (political party)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NRRC	Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OSE	United Nations Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
P-TOMS	Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structures
RADA	Reconstruction and Development Agency
SIHRN	Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs
TAFLOL	Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order
TAFOR	Task Force for Rescue and Relief



TAFREN	Task Force to Rebuild the Nation
UAS	Unified Assistance Scheme
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WRC2	Second World Reconstruction Conference



Refugee camp at Dadaab, located close to the Kenyan border with Somalia. The ongoing civil war in Somalia and the worst drought to affect the Horn of Africa in six decades has resulted in an estimated 12 million people whose lives are threatened.
Photo credit: Oli Scarff/Getty Images

Executive Summary

The already difficult task of undertaking a disaster recovery is made more problematic when a disaster occurs within a conflict affected context. The allocation of resources towards recovery can become highly politicized and exacerbate pre-existing social tensions between groups, leading to criticism of legitimacy and undermine the recovery effort. The conflict context creates a causal loop between the recovery effort and the conflict where one influences the other, or both simultaneously exert influence on each other. The design and implementation of a recovery effort are likely to be heavily influenced by the conflict. However, it is equally likely that the inverse will occur, with the recovery effort affecting the dynamics of the conflict itself. Negotiating these concerns calls for utilizing a recovery framework as outlined in the Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) Guide with special attention paid towards social inclusion principles to reduce potential risks.

In a conflict context, the guidelines for a recovery framework at its core remain centered on the holistic approach examining the four components advocated in the DRF Guide. These components are: (a) policy framework and vision for recovery; (b) institutional frameworks; (c) recovery financing; and (d) recovery implementation and monitoring. Where the conflict context differs is the emphasis on the utilization of the principles of impartiality, empowerment, gender, and ‘do no harm’ throughout the DRF to mitigate the risk of negative social impacts in the recovery effort. These principles are important in any natural disaster context as well, but become critical in implementing recovery for disasters within a conflict context where they must be followed to ensure equity across conflict and disaster victims.

This document does not go into the detail of the DRF guide but rather focuses on how recovery frameworks must be informed within a disaster-conflict nexus. At a structural level, a recovery framework for disasters in a conflict context resembles other disaster recovery frameworks. However, that should not overshadow the critical need for conflict sensitivity through a nuanced consideration of the local political context, the two-way relationship between intervention/action and conflict, and how both will inform the recovery effort. How well conflict sensitivity is incorporated in a recovery framework depends on how it achieves this two part criteria:

- 1. Avoid, to as great an extent as possible, having a negative impact.**
- 2. Maximize the positive impact on conflict dynamics through strengthening conflict prevention, structural stability, and peace-building.¹**

Disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention measures should occur together, and a “one-size-fits-all” model does not exist for recovery frameworks in general, especially in a conflict context. The process of constructing a disaster recovery framework needs to be highly context specific, and it may use the window of opportunity created by the disaster to contribute to peace-building.

In this annex a selection of risk reduction principles are defined, followed by case studies as they pertain to the four pillars of a DRF. Final recommendations and practical considerations for implementation of a disaster recovery framework in a conflict context are also included. The practical considerations section includes key questions that will assist readers in scoping the interface of disasters and conflict.



June 29, 2005, Galle, Sri Lanka—A german volunteer helps put up a transitional house for a tsunami affected family.
Photo credit: Paula Bronstein/Thinkstock.com


1. Introduction

Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) Guide has been jointly prepared by the the European Union (EU), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Word Bank (WB) to assist governments and partner agencies to deliver effective and efficient post-disaster recovery programs.² The DRF guide provides key planning and decision making processes for the development of recovery policies and programs in a general post disaster context. However, an increasing number of disasters are taking place in countries that already are experiencing fragility due to conflict or protracted violence.

Between 2005 and 2009, fifty percent of disasters took place in fragile countries. In such disaster recovery contexts characterized by high levels of political fragility, the viability of the disaster response is dependent on the management of fragility and conflict sensitivities. In order not to aggravate fragility, peace building and social cohesion need to be part and parcel of a country's recovery approach to help close pre-existing development gaps and avoid increasing fragility.³ Therefore, post-disaster recovery faces additional challenges in conflict settings. Accordingly, the process of developing a recovery framework needs to give specific attention to such situations to ensure that it is appropriate and operational. The objective of this thematic case study is to examine some challenges that post-disaster recovery can face in these settings, and to draw up a series of recommendations for the planning and programming of post-disaster recovery in these contexts.

Most importantly, this case study aims to learn from, and not evaluate in detail, the recovery initiatives in conflict-affected or fragile environments. It looks at specific features of post-disaster recovery in such contexts, highlighting some best practices and lessons learned from past experiences that can be used to inform the recovery process.

After providing a general overview of the disaster and conflict interface, the organization of the information in this thematic case study will follow the structure of the DRF Guide along the following four pillars:



This thematic case study is based primarily on desk research and secondary data analysis. It looks at different examples of disaster recovery in conflict contexts, with a detailed focus on the case of Sri Lanka.



January 2, 2005, Colombo, Sri Lanka—Volunteers unload relief supplies from Sri Lanka and overseas.
Photo credit: Scott Barbour/Thinkstock.com

2. Disaster and Conflict Interface: Basic Concepts and Principles

Underlying social, economic, and political conditions influence a disaster's impact. These conditions also influence the potential responses ranging from the immediate emergency/humanitarian assistance to longer-term recovery processes.

The interface of disasters and conflict must be seen as mutually inter-related. In one direction, conflict can push populations into disaster and escalate its impacts i.e. conflict displaces people to higher disaster risk areas, causes damage to infrastructure and basic services, or prevents disaster risk reduction strategies from being implemented. In the opposite direction, disaster can lead to or aggravate existing conflicts by exacerbating existing tensions or creating new ones. Grievances can arise as a result of resource shortages following a disaster. Governments may be weakened and rebel groups strengthened by the effects of a disaster.

In a disaster and conflict interface, post-disaster recovery outcomes are significantly affected if the response design is not conflict sensitive, potentially exacerbating a conflict situation. Possible adverse results from an insensitive response could be the distribution of aid being inequitable, discriminatory, or irreflexive of the affected population's diversity and specific needs. It also can lead to the development of a top-down process that has little buy in from the affected community.

At the same time the impacts and responses to disasters and/or conflicts also create opportunities for social change. A conflict sensitive post disaster response provides opportunity to redress social, economic, and political exclusions and inequalities; and promote a more participatory development process expanding the benefits of peacebuilding to all social strata. It may reduce conflict by creating opportunities for cooperation among the stake holders including the marginalized and vulnerable groups - provided there is prior willingness to engage in peace processes.

The review of a number of post disaster recovery processes suggest that the extent to which risk-reduction measures benefit marginalized and vulnerable groups relates to the ability of stakeholders in the recovery process to do two things (a) to remain legitimate and credible in the eyes of relevant constituent and societal groups, and (b) to look beyond the existing institutions and organizations around which people organize themselves. In order to accomplish these two mandates for providing equity a recovery process needs to embed a certain set of principles in its decision making process, that prioritizes avoiding marginalization of groups.

2.1 Risk Reduction Principles for Equity in the Recovery Process

As recovery process seeks to implement risk reduction measures there is the risk of deepening the divide or even creating social tension for disenfranchised groups. Being mindful of this risk to social cohesion in the planning process offers the opportunity to incorporate various principles to provide best practice safeguards. To this end framework designers and implementers should consider including the following principles. This is not an exclusive list, and other principles can also be considered for incorporation into a holistic recovery process design.

Impartiality

A key principle to be applied is that of impartiality. A simple definition would be: “Impartiality means not distinguishing one person from the next, and being aware that many people have an interest in the vulnerability of others.”⁴ In humanitarian and development aid, impartiality means that the response should be guided by human needs alone, rather than by political or other criteria. In peace-building, impartiality (or neutrality, as it is also called) defines the approach necessary for a mediator or peace-builder to build trust among all involved parties.⁵

Remaining credible necessitates that practitioners interact effectively with a diverse range of actors in relationships that can vary from harmonious and cooperative to antagonistic and confrontational. For example, in seeking rapid action and ease of interventions, the field staff of donors, NGOs and other partners sometimes have engaged with village elite groups, instead of identifying and working with the most vulnerable people. For the process to be inclusive, it is essential that practitioners engage with groups at all levels.

How do these views of impartiality/neutrality actually function? The basic thesis proposed here is that, to be conflict sensitive, a recovery framework must be acutely aware of the needs of the various societal and interest groups, and aware of the differences and power relationships between and across them. The framework must seek synergies to minimize and mitigate divergent actions. Otherwise, such actions would neither achieve the objective of a neutral or impartial recovery that provides for the needs of the most affected, nor would they become a conflict-reducing instrument.

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Empowerment

The mirror image of impartiality in intervention by governments and external actors is “empowerment,” that is, the full inclusion of all people affected by disasters and conflicts. Multiple and often complementary approaches have been adopted by donors and international organizations to achieve impartiality in assistance while generating local or national empowerment in regions or countries affected by disasters and/or conflicts.

One approach has been to bolster governance as a means of achieving greater local, regional, and national empowerment. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Nepal, donor governments and the UN worked to support and facilitate the establishment of stabilizing governance structures; either through elections, strengthening civil society, and/or institutionalizing local actors and community organizations.⁶ Similarly in the cases of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, the use of special funds by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to support community-related provincial recovery efforts generated both benefits to livelihoods and empowerment through project ownership.⁷ In the case of the DRC, development assistance providers were less successful at supporting measures meant to generate more accountability, inclusiveness, improved state-society relations, or a more stable political structure.⁸ Meanwhile, in the cases of conflicts in deeply divided societies such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, supporting empowerment while attempting to do no harm require a high degree of situational awareness of vertical and horizontal cleavages in any given conflict or disaster scenario – be it man-made or caused by a natural hazard.

Another approach has been to support local empowerment through the bolstering of national development strategies and the provision of targeted technical assistance. In 2005, the ADB and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) assisted the Government of Nauru to develop the National Sustainable Development Strategy – the country’s first national development plan. By supporting participatory leadership and processes across of the Nauru’s districts, ADB and AusAID contributed to the development of local capacity.⁹ Similarly in the aforementioned cases of the DRC, Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Nepal, donors opted to provide technical assistance to relevant ministries and government institutions.¹⁰

Box 2.1 Women at the Frontline for Peace in Bougainville

The Bougainville Conflict of 1988-1998 on the island of Bougainville, where the borders of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands meet, was the largest Oceania conflict since World War II. A peace agreement was signed in 2001 for the creation of an Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), and allowed for the disposal of weapons.

During the conflict and in the immediate period following the agreement women ignored personal risk by crossing conflict lines to successfully convince their sons and husbands to surrender their weapons. Today weapons disposal is complete in almost all areas of the island.

Grassroots women's advocacy NGO's such as Leitana Nehan Women's Development Organisation (LNWDA) obtained huge prominence during the conflict and peace making process by providing humanitarian relief, providing a forum for women and youth mobilization, and eventually large scale awareness and counseling programs. LNWDA's work has been a remarkable case study for gender inclusive peace making with its ability to promote and gain wide scale acceptance for its vision for the role of women in Bougainville society, its vision of peace, and its ideas about development.

Gender Equality

A third approach has been to support women's empowerment and gender equality. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 was the first UNSC effort to explicitly link the role of women in conflict to the international peace and security by acknowledging that gender equality was critical to achieving peace processes and post-conflict recovery.¹¹

In the cases of conflicts in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, women placed themselves at odds with conflicting parties and assumed risks by engaging principally male combatants on either side of each conflict to sue for an end to hostilities.^{12, 13}

Meanwhile, in Nepal, 11 large associations under the aegis of the Women's Peace Building Network worked to cement links between conflicting rival groups, with different interactive processes problem solving techniques, titled tracks (tracks 1, 1.5, and 2) to support the drafting of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end the decade-long conflict in 2006.¹⁴ Track 1 included political parties and the state bureaucracy, while women's NGOs and other groups participated in a parallel Track 2 effort. Meanwhile a Track 1.5 effort centered on the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP), which sought to create an opening for informal dialogue between some of the more prominent political parties and civil society groups to discuss key differences.^{15, 16}





Water supply and sanitation community discussion, Kaski, Nepal. Photo credit: Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank

Box 2.2 Nepal's National Action Plan Ensuring the Role of Women in Recovery

Ten years of armed conflict in Nepal left widespread impacts affecting ethnic groups in most of the districts, the country's socioeconomic performance, and disproportionately negatively impacted women's lives. During the conflict and post conflict periods women continued to raise their voice through various means and strategies. Their efforts led to the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325—an international legal framework that addresses the impact of war on women, but also the pivotal role women should play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace—being translated into the National Action Plan endorsed by the government.

Nepal's transitional situation provided opportunities, both at the national and at the community level, for women to participate in governance (where 33% of the constituent assembly are women), infrastructure development, informal mediation, and new found livelihoods reducing poverty. The commitment to women empowerment has led to a robust community of female driven advocacy.

Women's Alliance for Peace, Power, Democracy, and Constituent Assembly, a loose network of

women in peace initiated with the Government of Norway in 2007, turned into Sankalpa, a local nongovernment organization (NGO) that has incorporated 11 large networks related to women in peace and dealing with women's issues. The major theme of Sankalpa's engagement is strengthening women at all levels in politics and as change agents and active participants in the peace process. It also works in advancing support to implement the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 in coordination with the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.

Similarly, Women Acting Together for Transformative Change (WomenAct) is a coalition of 36 women's NGOs and networks to ensure women can raise their voices, work in teams, and support each other. It drafted a charter for inclusion in the political party manifesto and in the new Constitution. It encourages women to participate in the political process through advocacy, radio programs, and interactions. It also mobilizes a large number of women's organizations to educate women at the grassroots level on transitional and contemporary democratic issues across the country.

Box 2.3
Do No Harm
Project

The Do No Harm Project, which began in 1993, identified six key lessons on how interventions and conflict interact:

- 1. Interventions become part of the context.**
- 2. Contexts are characterized by dividers and connectors.**
- 3. Interventions interact with dividers and connectors.**
- 4. Actions and behaviors have consequences.**
- 5. The details of interventions matter.**
- 6. There are always options.**

Do No Harm

Another key concept that should be applied is the “Do No Harm” principle.¹⁷ This principle means that the well-being of the people must be the focus of the efforts to help them, and not only at the moment that the assistance is offered but also beyond a specific intervention.¹⁸

“Do No Harm” project was an outgrowth of Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) in 1993. It explored the relationship between humanitarian and development aid, and discover how to best support the positive efforts while avoiding the negative impacts of development aid in a conflict context. Prior to this humanitarian and development practitioners saw aid ideally being used to support local populations in their efforts to escape conflict and build their own peace, but at the same time saw aid being co-opted, misappropriated, and misused. The learning project sought to answer two questions. How does aid exacerbate conflict? And how does aid mitigate conflict?

LCPP was renamed the Do No Harm Project in 2001 formalizing what had become the lexicon term for the LCPP. That same year a training manual for Do No Harm that was released based on the lessons from the implementation phase and Options.¹⁹

“Do No Harm” principle means that the well-being of the people must be the focus of the efforts to help them, and not only at the moment that the assistance is offered but also beyond a specific intervention.

2.2 Integrating Equity Principles into Existing Frameworks

The challenge in applying these principles is to not create new frameworks, but to supplement the continuous use of the existing ones that work well. Rather than waste energy on reinventing variations of the wheel it is more efficient to find solutions that make valuable use of existing, well-functioning frameworks supplemented with the Risk Reduction principles. Doing so requires good leadership and well-trained flexible staff who can adapt to situations and learn rapidly to find the balancing point between general practice and the situation specific context.

There are already many frameworks that have been constructed to analyze aspects such as context and conflict, gender, livelihoods, governance analysis, etc. In vogue now is for *systems analysis*—in an attempt to “pull it all together”—arriving at the belief that “best practices” can be codified so that anyone can just “follow the book” to accomplish the goal. The reality in practice, however, shows that far from these beliefs there is not a one size fits all template that can be designed.

A review of the cases presented herein shows that no framework can be applied universally.²⁰ Moreover, the case reviews show that danger exists in attempting to create standard procedures for every eventuality rather than tailoring procedures to specific situations.

Specific local characteristics condition the four pillars that the DRF Guide frames:

1. In each country, unique policy frameworks are created in response to a specific political context. Understanding the numerous levels of nuance is even more critical when that context is one of underlying, unresolved, or ongoing conflict.
2. Institutional frameworks are cross-sectorally and thematically specific, reflecting power structures as much as technical distribution of activities.
3. Financing and financial management, as well as monitoring and evaluation, are often prescribed by donors rather than by internal legislation. This procedure leads to difficulties in achieving transparency and/or in being able to measure results.
4. The underlying causes of the difficulties in implementation arrangements in conflicts and disasters share certain commonalities. These include poor governance, poverty and inequality, environmental mismanagement, displacement, and inappropriate crisis response. Despite all these commonalities the framework must be tailored to specific needs of a situation.

In attempting to understand the Disaster and Conflict interface two lessons become very clear. First, disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention measures should occur together. Second, disaster response needs to be conflict sensitive to prevent hard-won peace dividends from being undermined and to ensure that aid programming is effective.

The Sri Lanka case study referenced in the following sections highlights the components of the recovery plan as they pertain to four pillars in the DRF Guide. The detailed examination will provide valuable lessons on the importance of adhering to the principles set out above.



A Sri Lankan construction worker builds a new school, to replace one destroyed by the Tsunami, December 27, 2005 in Galle, Sri Lanka. Photo credit: Paula Bronstein

Box 3.4
Sri Lanka
Post-2004
Indian Ocean
Earthquake
and Tsunami
Recover and
Reconstruction

On December 26th 2004 an undersea earthquake resulted in a massive tsunami that struck the several countries in the region including the eastern and southern coasts of Sri Lanka. The tsunami was responsible for the deaths of 35,322 individuals, displaced over 1,000,000 more, and affected two thirds of the outlying 13 coastal districts. The government projected it would take 3-5 years and US\$ 2.2 billion to complete the recovery effort to fully restore services and livelihoods. Just two years prior the Sri Lankan government had signed a ceasefire with the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) calming decades of insurgency yet no peace accord had been reached. Many actors within Sri Lankan society saw the handling of the recovery as an opportunity to improve trust in the public institution with transparency and accountability. The recovery effort constructed 60,000 transitional shelters; provided a combination of cash grants, food assistance, cash for work, and microfinance programs to restore livelihoods; restored services to health, sanitation, and education; and established social services expressly for the protection of vulnerable groups.

3. Disaster Recovery in Conflict Contexts

3.1 Policy Framework and Vision for Disaster Recovery

In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, several guiding principles were established to underpin the recovery strategy in Sri Lanka.²¹ These principles specified that the strategy should be conflict sensitive and that all recovery interventions should be analyzed for their potential impacts on the country's civil conflict.²² The strategy, at the very least, aimed to do no harm to the ongoing peace process; rather it attempted to foster the peace process.

The pre-disaster situation in the North East region of the country arising from the civil war was that more than 40,000 families were still living in relief camps, and more than 350,000 houses still needed to be reconstructed. The PDNA report noted: "...the recovery needs of the North East region need to be particularly focused on."²³ The PDNA report also acknowledged that "...any plan for post-tsunami equitable recovery will need to work within the current political situation and develop mechanisms that facilitate the redevelopment of all parts of Sri Lanka...". Thus, the recovery would need to cover both the Government-controlled areas and the areas controlled by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers.²⁴

The challenge was to translate these guiding principles into operational reality. In the case of Sri Lanka, the means to do so was detailed in the PDNA, which proposed five steps:²⁵

Figure 3.1 Five Conflict-sensitive Steps (from the Sri Lanka Case)

Public consultation	The public consultations include different line agencies within the Government, the legislature, the LTE, political parties, local authorities, civil society, the private sector, international NGOs and the general public to reach consensus on implementation modalities. The process would identify possible areas of contention and attempt to secure a compromise where possible, as well as ensure acceptance of the guiding principles.
Communication consultation	A two-way communication program relying on the Internet, print and electronic media, and a dedicated reconstruction newsletter would reinforce accountability and monitoring. Monthly beneficiary surveys could be built into the program to facilitate community monitoring of ongoing reconstruction efforts at the village level. Targeting different audiences, from national to local levels, would ensure appropriate feedback from the regions and help build a national consensus through the recovery program.
Arbitration and mediation service	Mediation and arbitration structures would be used to address reconstruction-related disputes and flag possible bottlenecks that need to be addressed at a higher policy level.
District based reconstruction plans	District reconstruction plans should be used to guide a balance allocation of resources between different parts of the country. This could well be the mechanism to match resources with needs. Such plans would be compiled in close cooperation with district authorities, municipal and provincial structures, and other stakeholders, moving beyond a narrow technical assessment to include social development, livelihood, gender, environment, governance and conflict dimensions.
Appropriate funding mechanisms	The international development community would work in close conjunction with the Government and other stakeholders to design appropriate funding mechanisms to ensure the coordinated allocation of international development assistance for the reconstruction process. Possible trust fund mechanisms should be anchored within a national framework for recovery, where the use of private NGO resources would be synchronized.

One year after the tsunami, the joint report on the first year of implementation of the recovery published by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and development partners noted that recovery in areas affected by the conflict had only just begun. The report concluded: “...it is clear that the impact on the conflict-affected areas of this massive tsunami effort needs to be carefully considered and monitored, and equity of treatment, at least with respect to standards, needs to be ensured.”²⁶

Based on this conclusion, the report recommended that

“...mechanisms to ensure that the potential beneficial impact of the tsunami recovery on the environment for the peace process can be maximized, need to be pursued, including efforts to involve representatives of all parties to the conflict and affected communities in the monitoring and oversight of the recovery program.”

These conclusions and recommendations are in line with the established guiding principle of conflict sensitivity set out in the recovery strategy. The joint report also highlighted the difficult challenge of ensuring that policy is put into operation.

Rapid assessments had already indicated that the North East region had been heavily affected by the tsunami. The PDNA report also addressed the tsunami’s effects in connection with the conflict. The report pointed out that the region was especially hard hit by the tsunami because its population was still suffering from the effects of 20 years of civil war.

Although a cease-fire agreement had been in effect for two-and-a half-years, infrastructure damaged during the conflict was still being rebuilt. Furthermore, many of the assets that had survived the conflict were destroyed or damaged by the disaster.

3.2 Institutional Framework for Disaster Recovery

Integrating conflict and fragility in a disaster recovery framework can present challenges for the prevailing institutional set-ups of many national governments, donors and NGOs. Disaster and conflict are commonly handled by separate departments, budgets, processes, and staff.

This challenge can be tackled in the medium and long term through institutional reform to promote effective integration of disaster recovery and the conflict sensitivity agenda, e.g. through introducing cross-sectoral bodies. Strengthened cooperation and coordination may provide a solution that is achievable in the short term.

For more information on the NRRC²⁷

Box 3.1 Nepal Overcoming Institutional Silos in the Short Term

Sustainable changes to integrate multiple actors into a recovery framework in the medium and long term require institutional reform. In the short term there are still some immediate options to work around institutional silos. A positive example of strengthened cooperation and coordination

between cross sectoral bodies to circumvent silo-ing challenge is the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC). It brings together different humanitarian and development actors to foster the development of a shared agenda, multiple funding sources and joint analysis.

Box 3.2 Bolivia Streamlining Response and the Tension between National and Local Governance

During the 2007 floods in Bolivia during a time of social confrontation, the government created a Transitory Command Unit which empowered the government to ignore established law and control all decision-making. This centralization of power led to a polarized disaster response and marginalization of departmental authorities and their recovery plans, which they had developed in consultation with municipalities and affected communities.

The polarization became even more evident and obstructive of the recovery process when international disaster aid was given to local governments instead of the national government, which insisted on coordinating the flow of resources into the country.¹ This case illustrates the kind of tension that tends to arise between local and national governments when power is centralized, and how international interventions may, with the best of intentions, exacerbate these tensions.

An additional challenge is the tendency that can be observed in many post-disaster situations to centralize the power and control by national government institutions. In many cases, such tendencies may be justified by a clear rationale. Centralizing power and control in the national government, creates a lone voice that does not provide, perhaps limits, the space for dialogue, which may hinder the recovery process and the bringing together of opposing groups. Especially at local level a lack of opportunities to provide input into the decision making process in the dialogue for disaster response can leave groups opposed to the central governments vision feeling neglected, and instill hostilities towards future implementation.

In Sri Lanka, due to the unprecedented scale of the post-tsunami operation and the necessity to coordinate numerous government actors, the international donors and organizations created a Center for National Operations under the direct purview of the President. The Center's purposes were to oversee and monitor emergency programs, and to liaise with relevant line ministries, the private sector, NGOs, and other organizations contributing to the relief and recovery phases.²⁸ Three new task forces were also formed under the President's Secretariat. At the district level, Disaster Management Authorities were appointed to coordinate relief efforts.²⁹ The three task forces, which included representatives of the public and private sectors, were:

1. Task Force for Rescue and Relief (TAFOR).
2. Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN).
3. Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order (TAFLOL).

To maintain a transparent approach, communication of actions was ensured by the GoSL through the Ministry of Information.³⁰

Conflict situations have a negative impact on the vital participation of women in the disaster recovery process.

Later, following the change of Presidency in November 2005, and with the aim to create a single government agency to coordinate the recovery process, all tsunami-related organizations (such as TAFOR and TAFREN) were merged into the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA), which operated under the Presidential Secretariat.³¹

One of the challenges of such a centralized power structure is the potential exclusion of local authorities from recovery planning. In addition, ensuring coordination between newly created structures is challenging. Several ministries established recovery schemes, while agencies often acted in isolation, creating confusion and inhibiting the development of unified frameworks.³²

In addition, the capacity of the existing district-level authorities was not up to the required levels, especially in the North and East of the country. A special program was introduced to overcome the lack of capacity for recovery programs in relation to governance, transparency, information management for recovery and development through human resources, equipment, furniture, transportation and other measures aimed at strengthening local institutions.³³

To overcome the barriers created by the prevailing institutional set-ups and conflict divides, the conflict parties in Sri Lanka sought to create a joint mechanism—the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structures (P-TOMS)—to facilitate cooperation and coordination in the recovery process. According

Box 3.3 Example of P-TOMS in Sri Lanka

Although the Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure (P-TOMS) was short lived, it does provide an interesting lesson learned from the post-tsunami recovery process in Sri Lanka. The reason is that the opportunity—opened by the tsunami tragedy—was jointly seized on as a means to revive the peace process by trying to build trust and confidence between the conflicting parties.

The conflicting parties began negotiations on a joint mechanism. Only a few days after the tsunami, direct negotiations began between the GoSL and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers, or LTTE) Peace Secretariats, without the involvement of the Norwegian facilitators of the peace process. Although the initial negotiations faced a series of obstacles and direct talks were suspended, with the Norwegians once more having to act as mediators, an agreement to create P-TOMS was signed six months after the tsunami.

The agreement provided a structure of three committees at the national, regional, and district levels to oversee distribution of assistance, and the creation of a Regional Fund to finance recovery and recovery projects. The Fund would

be accessed by the committees, which would comprise representatives of the GoSL, LTTE and the Muslim community. This 2005 agreement made P-TOMS the first joint working system among the parties to the conflict since the collapse of the Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) in 2003.

The newly established joint mechanism was suspended by the Sri Lanka Supreme Court following a constitutional case brought against the P-TOMS agreement by the nationalistic Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party which had withdrawn from the coalition government.

The ruling that P-TOMS was unconstitutional caused a major delay in recovery and recovery in the North and East because many donor funds had been earmarked via this institutional structure. However, the failure to establish a joint mechanism did not evoke a strong response from donors as many had already oriented their funding frameworks around the possibility of a P-TOMS collapse. United Nations agencies, for instance, reported no change in their intentions to distribute aid (Kuhn 2009).

to the P-TOMS agreement, review committees comprised of government officials and representatives of the LTTE and the Muslim community could recommend and monitor projects in areas hit by the tsunami.

This arrangement was widely seen as an ideal scenario for the conflicting parties to use the disaster and recovery as a window of opportunity to revive the peace process. However, some members of the Sri Lankan parliament opposed the concession, claiming that P-TOMS threatened the country's sovereignty by legitimizing the LTTE.³⁴ Although the agreement to establish P-TOMS had been reached six months after the tsunami, the Sri Lanka Supreme Court ruled key provisions of P-TOMS to be unconstitutional so the agreement was suspended.³⁵

In a joint report by the GoSL and development partners in December 2006, the establishment of P-TOMS was judged as being “the end of the expectation that post-tsunami recovery work could create an environment conducive to the revival of the peace process.”³⁶ Nevertheless, it is highlighted that RADA worked closely with the District Secretariats of all affected areas, despite the fact that “...the deterioration in the security situation from end 2005 has greatly affected the ability to promote equity within the tsunami-affected areas and the ability to address the difference of standards between the conflict-affected and the tsunami-affected populations.”³⁷

Box 3.4 Promoting Dialogue and Participation in Conflict-Affected, Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka

The People's Consultations project engaged tsunami-affected Sri Lankan communities in the recovery through organizing public consultations on plans for the recovery of affected regions.

Consultations were carried out in over 1,100 villages in 13 tsunami-affected districts. A total of 847 focus group discussions were convened. Each had 15–20 representatives from each village participating. Consultations were also carried out with host communities to ascertain their needs and interests regarding the resettlement of tsunami-affected people within their communities. Local authorities, NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) in the affected districts were also consulted to ascertain their needs and challenges in the recovery.

The People's Consultation Report on Post-Tsunami Recovery thus identified the main concerns and grievances of the tsunami-affected populations and highlighted their recovery priorities. The findings from the consultations were channeled into the District Recovery Plans for livelihoods, housing, and other recovery projects.

An overwhelming number of complaints were voiced during the People's Consultations. As a result, the consultations provided support to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka to establish help desks in each district through the Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit. The help desks were intended to raise awareness among communities about their rights and entitlements, and to follow up on their grievances.

Such a project cannot be viewed as a substitute for systematic incorporation of local participation in recovery planning and implementation. Nevertheless, it proved that, in contexts in which a range of pressures seriously compromises a bottom-up approach, such exercises help to flag overarching messages and highlight the importance of improving consultation.

Source: UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), “An Integrated Approach to Disaster Recovery: A Toolkit on Cross-Cutting Issues. Lessons from the Tsunami Recovery Unit,” 2007, 77.

Note: ^a World Bank (2006). “Report on People's Consultations on Post-Tsunami Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka.” World Bank, Washington, DC.



Volunteers pack bags of food as it arrives from around Sri Lanka and overseas on January 2, 2005. (Photo credit: Scott Barbour/Getty images)

Due to the prevailing centralized institutional structure in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, interventions implemented by the GoSL, LTTE, and, in most cases, by NGOs were top-down. Participation of the affected populations in the planning, design, and implementation of appropriate and sustainable recovery and recovery processes was rather low. Reports indicate that both the government and LTTE made centralized decisions without consulting the people affected. Lack of consultation with the local affected and non-affected populations resulted in creation of a legitimacy gap at the ground level in the overall response strategy.³⁸

Nevertheless, there were promising attempts to implement dialogue mechanisms with affected communities to enhance coordination to improve the participation of the beneficiaries, hence, to improve the quality and promptness of assistance.

Gender aspects are integral to institutional set-ups for recovery. However, reports indicate that conflict situations have had a particularly negative impact on the vital participation of women in the disaster recovery process.

In general, women in Sri Lanka had lower participation than men in post-tsunami decision-making, although there was significant variation among districts and regions. For example, women's participation in key government offices and post-tsunami committees was just over 30 percent in the Southern Province, 16 percent in the North, but only 8 percent in the East. Explanations for the regional differences include the higher degree of insecurity and conflict in the North and East. These frightening conditions impeded such things as travelling to meetings, especially for women.³⁹

3.3 Disaster Recovery Financing

In the interface between disasters and conflict, assessments show that it often proves extremely difficult to disaggregate the costs of, for example, road damage caused by both a disaster and the conflict. In some cases, this might, by default, expand the attention paid to areas affected by both conflict and disaster.⁴⁰ In Sri Lanka, it was clear that an insufficiently addressed issue was that some regions affected by the conflict prior to the disaster were in need of increased attention to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), due to damage to water supply systems caused by the civil conflict.⁴¹ This creates the opportunity for a more comprehensive approach covering the effects of both overlapping, cumulative damages. Inversely it poses the risk that trying to differentiate them leads to discriminating areas either because they were not conflict related or because they were not disaster affected.

Additionally, political uncertainty hampers disaster recovery interventions, leading to insufficient financing for recovery. In Sri Lanka, the conflict reinforced this uncertainty. In 2006 when the conflict escalated, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies claimed that the renewed fighting was preventing the agencies from reaching people in need. The UN's Deputy Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery visited the conflict zone and found that "in parts of the North and East, the tsunami recovery process has ground to a halt and significant investments in recovery are now imperiled."⁴²

The renewed conflict in the North and East, and the slow pace of recovery in the South, meant that the disbursement rate was remarkably low. By mid-2006, one-and-a-half years after the tsunami, only 13 percent of the external finance for recovery had been disbursed.⁴³

When disasters strike in conflict-affected regions, addressing problems that go beyond the disaster may be hampered by bottlenecks affecting the recovery process. In Sri Lanka, as a result of organizational mandates, agencies were limited mainly to addressing the problems of tsunami-affected people.⁴⁴ This structural limitation led to tensions between the "new tsunami affected" and the "long-term conflict-affected" families, because many of the latter were excluded from the post-disaster recovery programs.

Responding to a tsunami that strikes a coastal belt can lead to the neglect of other equally disadvantaged groups. For example, families displaced by the civil conflict, who often have had to live in camps for many years, were ineligible for the housing and welfare benefits directed at tsunami survivors.⁴⁵ Such grievances carry the potential to exacerbate existing conflict dynamics. These grievances bring a spot light to the need for recovery frameworks and funding arrangements that take into account these conflict realities.

Very positive examples were observed in Sri Lanka when corrective action was taken in 2006. For example, the majority of the development partners adapted their approaches to target entire districts, not just the tsunami-affected coastal areas.⁴⁶

The challenges of equitable distribution of resources were particularly evident in the housing sector. In Sri Lanka, two types of housing programs were implemented:

1. *Owner-driven*. recovery/repair of houses by homeowners with cash grants and technical assistance provided by the government and development partners
2. *Relocation housing program*. Donors and others built, or assisted with building, housing on relocation sites for families who had lived within the Buffer Zone created in the conflict-affected North-East.

Tracking how the recovery resources are used once they are disbursed is important to identify the geographical gaps between needs and allocations and ensure appropriate geographical and social coverage.

An analysis shows that expenditure per damaged home was approximately twice as high in the Southern Province as in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces (appendix 1). In addition, assistance per home was more than three times higher than the average in the Southern District of Hambantota, the President's home district; and expenditures per house were four times the average in the LTTE base of Kilinochchi.⁴⁷

The deficit in housing recovery financing in the Northern and Eastern Provinces requires a more detailed look at the finance granted by the three main donor types—bilateral, multilateral and INGO—which together accounted for 97 percent of all housing assistance.

The figures (appendix 1) show that the biases toward the South, and to Hambantota in particular, were consistent across nongovernmental, multilateral, and bilateral donors. The last group tended to exert a strong bias against LTTE-controlled areas.⁴⁸

Uneven regional distribution of the recovery financing of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) was seen as a key issue by a Joint Report of the GoSL and development partners. Restoring livelihoods also varied geographically: progress in the South was more advanced than in the North and East.⁴⁹ One reported obstacle was the reluctance of donors and the private sector to make long-term investments in conflict-affected areas in the North and East.⁵⁰

Experience has shown the need for contingency plans in peace efforts/processes.⁵¹ Conducting rapid, highly localized assessments to feed into the Post-Disaster Assessment, and subsequently the recovery framework, may help to reduce misallocations of recovery resources. Tracking how these resources are used once they are disbursed is important to identify geographical gaps between needs and allocation of these resources and ensure appropriate geographical and social coverage.

3.4 Disaster Recovery Implementation and Monitoring

Conflict and regional sensitivities play an important role in disaster recovery management. Post-disaster assistance needs to avoid fueling conflicts. Moreover, recovery activities involving any form of resettlement, if not locally rooted, could affect the social fabric and make-up of an area—exacerbating tense situations. In Sri Lanka, the tsunami affected neighboring communities (and houses) differently. Because recovery assistance was targeted only to affected families, tensions between those receiving special assistance and those not became a potential source of tension. Such developments highlight the importance of understanding local situations and the promotion of the principle of equity so that interventions do not add to existing tensions. These two necessities suggest the need for alternative programs to reach the conflict-affected families concomitantly.⁵²



The principle of equity requires prioritization of needs regardless of the reasons that the needs arose. While various underlying factors may shape how that needs are met, the goal should be that the potentially different measures meet common minimum standards. Equity is of particular importance in conflict environments, in which perceived differences in treatment easily can fuel conflict dynamics.

Two dimensions of the principle of equity may be seen as intrinsically relevant to disaster recovery in conflict contexts: the causal dimension and the regional dimension.

1. *Causal dimension*: Equity among the groups affected by the disaster and by the conflict. In Aceh (Indonesia), assessments highlighted the need to merge post-tsunami and post-conflict programs. If merging were done, the reintegration efforts for the victims of the conflict—as well as the recovery of houses and infrastructure destroyed by the 2004 tsunami—would be included in longer term programs.⁵³ This change would benefit all affected citizens in Aceh and would avoid the risk of creating tensions and jealousies among people who benefit from different support programs.⁵⁴ However, according to the World Bank, tsunami survivors received twice the amount of aid for home rebuilding than did people recovering from the conflict.⁵⁵

Another example is the response to internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by the tsunami and by the conflict in Sri Lanka. Table 3.1 illustrates the common types of losses and needs of both IDP groups. It should be emphasized that the vast majority of conflict-affected IDPs came mainly from Tamil and Muslim communities in the Northern and Eastern districts, whereas the tsunami affected the majority of these same districts, as well as Sinhalese communities in the South.

A Sri Lankan boy looks out at the temporary shelter where his family has been living in Galle, Sri Lanka. (Photo credit: Paula Bronstein)

Table 3.1 Sri Lanka: Summary of Disaster and Conflict Impacts⁵⁶

Indicator	Conflict	Tsunami
Reported deaths	Approx. 60,000 over the course of the conflict (approx. 2 decades)	35,322 , including over 4,000 missing , all on 26 December, 2004
Reported missing	21,000+ over the course of the conflict	See above
Reported injured	Approx. 50,000 over the course of the conflict	21,441 , all on 26 December
Reported internally displaced	Approx. 800,000 at peak; total figure over the course of the conflict varies	516,150 , all on 26 December
Persons requiring resettlement	342,717 people in total: 68,605 in welfare centers 274,112 with host families, as at July 2005	457,576 people in total: 64,467 in camps, and 393,109 with host families, as at February 2005
Homes damaged or destroyed	Over 326,000	Approx. 98,000
Livelihoods affected	Approx. 200,000	Approx. 150,000
Recovery needs assessment	\$3 billion as assessed in May 2003	Approx. \$2.2 billion as reported in December 2005

Source: Grewal 2006, 9.

When comparing tsunami and conflict-affected IDP groups in Sri Lanka, disparities and lessons learned in relation to the principle of equity can be studied along three variables: value, coverage, and timeliness.

- *Value.* The value of support provided to people affected by the tsunami and those affected by the conflict differed, to the disadvantage of the latter. This discrepancy was true with food and transitional shelter, and in recovery of permanent housing. To resettle selected conflict IDPs in permanent housing, the “owner-driven” Unified Assistance Scheme (UAS) provided grants to enable families to build their own homes. A similar program established in 2005 provided housing grants for the majority of tsunami IDPs. A second main scheme was “donor-driven”: to build new homes for tsunami IDPs. However, disparities in the value of support remained because most tsunami IDP families receiving grants also were able to benefit from supplementary assistance. A case study pointed out that tsunami IDPs benefiting from either of the two housing schemes received assistance estimated at \$3,000 and \$11,000, respectively, whereas conflict IDPs with housing grants largely were unable to access additional support.⁵⁷
- *Coverage.* All former householders in the tsunami IDP group were eligible for housing assistance. However, only families in the conflict IDP group with access to land and with family incomes of less than \$250 per month were eligible for the UAS allowances. In other words, only a little over *one-third* of the conflict families were eligible.⁵⁸

- *Timeliness.* Within 15 months of the disaster, over two-thirds of the eligible 98,000 tsunami IDP householders either had a completed donor-built house or had been granted at least the first instalment to repair or rebuild their homes through the owner-driven scheme. In contrast, between 2003 and 2006,⁵⁹ only 14 percent of the 105,000 eligible conflict IDPs received assistance to reconstruct their houses—again illustrating the issue of equity and inequality.
2. *Regional dimension: Equity within groups affected by the tsunami.* The example of housing recovery in post-tsunami Sri Lanka provides valuable insights into the challenges and lessons to be learned from the regional dimension of equity.

Two main housing reconstruction schemes were implemented in Sri Lanka, one “owner-driven” and one “donor-driven.” The regional breakdown of housing needs under the owner-driven scheme, and the related national disbursement rate show that the disbursement rate decreased continuously over the four installments in all regions (appendix 1). However, the conflict-affected North and, to a lesser extent, the East experienced much slower rates of progress than the South and West. With 85 percent of owner-driven housing needs being located in the North and East, these rates underline the challenges of ensuring equity within the tsunami-affected population in the implementation of recovery programs.

Transparency and communication are essential components to limit politicization and contribute to social cohesion. For example, responding to the Gayo Lues floods in the Aceh region of Indonesia, the International Organization for Migration sought to actively engage former members of the GAM separatist movement and the local government to build trust among all the parties.⁶⁰ In Sri Lanka, the Sarvodaya NGO addressed the lack of communication across geographic and ethnic divides by implementing a program of exchange visits, called “Village-to Village, Heart-to Heart.”⁶¹

Access to affected populations is crucial for any post-disaster intervention. Getting access may pose a specific challenge in areas that are not under government control or for which access is more difficult due to ongoing fighting or tensions. In Sri Lanka, contractors reportedly were reluctant to work in LTTE-controlled areas due to safety concerns, spiraling costs, such as transit taxes on construction materials, and having to unload and reload trucks for security searches at GoSL and LTTE checkpoints.⁶² In conflict-affected areas, negotiations with key stakeholders in the security sphere, as well as in recovery programs, are vital to overcome problems that hamper recovery. Similar situations have been seen in other countries, as was the case of Colombia, where the municipalities worst affected by the 2012 floods were the very ones that had suffered most from the internal armed conflict, IDPs and landmine victims.⁶³

Monitoring the recovery process forms a core part of any disaster recovery management. In Sri Lanka, the ability of RADA (GoSL’s Reconstruction and Development Agency) which coordinated all recovery efforts—to effectively monitor the process in the conflict-affected districts was greatly affected by the deterioration in the security situation.⁶⁴

Additional investment is considered necessary to develop integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks for assessing results, value for money, and outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected states. It is essential that the M&E frameworks include conflict benchmarks for disaster recovery in such contexts.⁶⁵ Additionally, to strengthen the evidence base for M&E, it is proposed that multidimensional risk indexes are developed to integrate existing data on conflict and fragility, natural hazards, vulnerability, poverty, and climate change.⁶⁶ Finally, M&E can identify geographic gaps between what is needed (as identified in a PDNA) and what is actually being allocated to allow for midcourse corrections and avoid inequities in the recovery process.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations for Disaster Recovery in Conflict Contexts

These conclusions and recommendations, though mostly derived from the Sri Lanka experience, are also informed by other cases in other regions. The experience analyzed emphasizes the importance of recovery frameworks being conflict sensitive for contexts in which disasters occur in conflict-affected environments. Central to the notion of conflict sensitivity is the idea that there is a two-way relationship between intervention/action and conflict. Not only can recovery action in conflict contexts be affected by conflicts, but recovery activities in a conflict-affected setting can have an impact on the conflict itself.

The process of constructing a disaster recovery framework needs to be highly context specific, especially in the case of conflict settings. A “one-size-fits-all” model does not exist. Recovery frameworks may potentially use the window of opportunity created by the disaster to contribute to peace-building. Some specific recommendations for developing disaster recovery frameworks in a conflict setting are as follows:

Policy Framework and Vision

Understand the potential co-benefits and negative consequences that a recovery effort may bring to a specific conflict context. Disaster recovery in conflict contexts should look at potential synergies with the conflict resolution objectives. Conversely, disaster recovery objectives must be sensitive to potential conflict emanating from the priorities adopted, particularly any possible effects on population groups, specific communities, and/or sectors.

All recovery interventions stemming from the vision and recovery policy should be conflict sensitive and be analyzed for their potential impacts on the country’s civil conflict. In this regard, conflict sensitivity means ensuring that recovery activities (1) avoid, to as great an extent as possible, having a negative impact, and (2) maximize the positive impact on conflict dynamics, thereby strengthening conflict prevention, structural stability, and peace-building.⁶⁷ Such a vision should be established, and then should guide any disaster recovery framework initiative in conflict contexts. Essential to creating an appropriate recovery vision that is sustainable is the incorporation of the aforementioned risk reduction principles: Impartiality, Empowerment, Gender, and Do No Harm.

Institutional Framework

Acknowledge that the mere presence of intervention alters the conflict and post-conflict scenarios. It is desirable to establish a mutually agreed upon process between conflicting parties and potential external cooperation organizations and donors that is respectful of human rights, minority and diversity, and humanitarian principles. There may also be a need to foster civil-military relations. Recovery efforts are likely to involve military and civilian authorities. Thus, it may be necessary to develop principles of engagement for the military and principles of effective collaboration among military, civilian, and international actors.⁶⁸

Coordinate appropriately to utilize the presence of external security actors. The presence of external security personnel, such as a peacekeeping mission, could pose important challenges to coordination. However, these actors can also participate in the recovery effort through logistical support and entry into volatile/insecure areas by recovery agents at any given time. The central focus of governments and development partners could be to exploit all available options to promote equity among all groups in fulfillment of their rights.

Build and support robust consultation and consensus building mechanisms. Regardless of whether the final institutional framework takes a bottom up approach or centralized approach there needs to be clearly defined mechanism that requires consultation with the local affected and non-affected populations. Missing this component can lead to legitimacy gaps in the recovery strategy for those most affected by the disaster. Disaster recovery in conflict affected situations, consensus-building should be strengthened through dialogue, consultation, and coordination, leading to agreements. Inclusiveness and participation should be inherent throughout the entire disaster recovery process: from damage and effects assessment, needs identification, and prioritization through implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Gender aspects are integral to institutional set-ups for recovery. Women are often subject to being marginalized by the conflict. Experience has shown gender participation to be crucial in all facets of disaster recovery. More so in conflict settings where they may play a crucial role in promoting peace that may be at risk due to factors induced by the disaster.

Ensure principle of equity across conflict and disaster victims. Historical precedent has shown that the value of support provided to disasters recovery efforts compared to conflict recovery often differs greatly. Usually this is to the disadvantage of the groups affected only by conflict, even though the damage and needs incurred from the conflict might eclipse those created by the disaster. The principle of equity requires prioritization of needs regardless of the reasons that those needs arose. While various underlying factors may shape how that needs are met, the goal should be that the potentially different measures meet common minimum standards.

Use localized assessment to reduce misallocations. Conducting rapid, highly localized assessments to feed into the Post-Disaster Assessment, and subsequently the recovery framework, may help to reduce misallocations of recovery resources. Tracking how these resources are used once they are disbursed is important to identify geographical gaps between needs and allocation of these resources and ensure appropriate geographical and social coverage.

Recovery activities involving any form of resettlement, if not locally rooted, can affect the social fabric and make-up of an area—exacerbating tense situations. Understanding the local demand and obtaining the buy-in of the affected populations at this level should be seen as critical. As this has been a recurring principle in the policy and institutional pillars it is the logical that it would again be emphasized at implementation.

Promote transparency and communication beginning at the initial stage of recovery. These should be seen as essential components of limiting politicization and of contributing to social cohesion throughout the entire disaster recovery process. Disseminating a clear vision and providing a venue for the viewpoints of civil society, humanitarian actors, and other sub-national actors, whether or not they get incorporated in the final framework, are a relatively low cost best practice towards obtaining legitimization of a recovery effort.

Establish conflict informed M&E framework. In fragile and conflict-affected states a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework requires additional investment, over a disaster only scenario, to develop an integrated framework for assessing results, value for money, and outcomes. It is essential that the M&E frameworks include conflict benchmarks for disaster recovery in such contexts.

Recovery Financing

Implementation Management and Monitoring

5. Practical Considerations to Determine the Interface of Disasters and Conflict in a Specific Context

When disaster recovery overlaps or coincides with a conflict-resolution environment, there is a need to link both processes and generate synergies between peace-building and disaster-recovery process. The recovery framework should look, first, at how it will interact with the conflict-resolution process. Second, the framework should consider what (if any) interaction, cross-cutting synergies or contradictions could affect a conflict assessment, either simultaneously or sequentially when the DRF process takes place. Thus, the framework is to be seen not only as an aspiration for coordination but also as mutual reinforcement of conflict resolution and disaster recovery. In other words, the framework should identify synergies between the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and the PDNA—such as joint public consultations, joint movements across the country, and linear messages to authorities in transition phases—as applicable, appropriate or feasible.

In some instances, and when appropriate, it would be desirable to explore the option of avoiding separate processes when the context points to a single Post-Crisis Needs Assessment.⁶⁹ This option is not to be perceived as advocating or forcing the post-crisis framing over others when the conflict drivers in a disaster setting are minor (or vice versa).

However, on the ground, the international community increasingly opts for hybrid solutions in most post-conflict, post-disaster, that is, post-crisis settings in general.⁷⁰ A case in point is that this “post-crisis” designation was used effectively in Pakistan to circumvent the complications that the terms “post-disaster” or “post-conflict” could bring into the dialogue with the authorities. The hybrid term was expedient and effective. The designation could also be a way to formalize the two-way linkages between disaster recovery and post-conflict response. Actual application should be context-specific, provided the concrete situation warrants a level of joint planning.

Table 6.1 is proposed as an example that could act as a guide to explore the interface of disasters and conflict response. Table 5.1 focuses on the content that the framework will contain.

Table 5.1 Disaster and Conflict Recovery Framework

	Post-Disaster situation	Post-Conflict situation
1. Institutional framework		
2. Policy and planning		
3. Recovery finance		
4. Management and monitoring		

General Questions

To fill the above matrix, an indicative, non-exhaustive list of questions could include the following.

- Were the conflict dynamics affected by the disaster?
- Is the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) hampered in accessing the disaster-affected area due to ongoing conflict? If yes, what measures will be adopted to overcome the obstacles?
- Should the PDNA report have a specific chapter/section that deals with the ongoing conflict?
- Was a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) conducted in the country prior to the PDNA? Does the PDNA cover the same geographic locations?
- Were conflict evaluation or fragility assessments used in the conflict transition? In the case of a disaster, how will those assessments be considered within the multi-hazard focus adopted to tackle the root causes of the crisis?
- What consideration is proposed for the PDNA to link to the PCNA interventions in terms of linkages, synergies, or coordination in implementing the post-disaster recovery?
- Does the PCNA or a conflict assessment/transition process have a specific chapter/section that addresses disaster recovery or disaster mitigation?
- Are there potential conflicts that the PDNA may exacerbate or generate? An example is differential or preferential treatment to the disaster-affected population in social services, housing, or taxation compared with the treatment given to the general population.
- Are the criteria used in the post-conflict intervention to be the same in the post-disaster recovery, for example, compensation to the population displaced by the disaster compared to the population displaced by conflict?

Institutional Framework

- Will the government create specific institutions to lead the post-disaster recovery? If so, how will these institutions integrate, interact, or coordinate with the conflict processes?
- At what level of government will recovery coordination be, and will that level be different from the level for conflict transition?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the organizational models used in transition? Is there any previous in-country experience of synergies or contradictions apparent between the recovery and transition processes?
- Do the international/development partners have different procedures/criteria for transition and recovery? Will similar rules be applied in the government's dealing with the in-country agencies for transition and for recovery?
- What do the primary duties and responsibilities for transition mean in terms of the [national] post-disaster recovery framework? How do they relate to the post-disaster procedures expected to be taken by other levels of government (sectoral or subnational regional or local)?
- What governance models does the government envisage for the disaster recovery, compared to the post-conflict transition? Table 5.2 may help describe the process followed in each case.

Table 5.2 Processes in Post-Disaster Transition and Post-Conflict Recovery

	Post-Disaster transition	Post-Conflict recovery
1.	Create a new institution for management?	
2.	Strengthen and coordinate existing line ministries to be the recovery leaders, sector by sector?	
3.	Use a hybrid option that combines features of both approaches, including creating a temporary taskforce or organizational unit. Did these features include existing ministries and/or local authorities?	
4.	Does the process leverage existing institutions and technical and managerial expertise both inside and outside government?	
5.	Other mechanisms? Please specify.	
6.	How were affected/conflicting parties are incorporated?	

- What existing capacity do external partners already have on the ground in country? How will they modify/adapt their capacity to support the transition and/or recovery? Capacity includes existing portfolios, partners' comparative advantage, institutional partnerships, humanitarian emergency operations, peacekeeping, and security operations.
- In the post-conflict response, what types of partners—such as of INGOs and CSOs—were engaged in recovery? Will the same partners take part in the disaster recovery processes?

Policy and Planning: Guiding Principles to Shape Transition and Recovery, Set Priorities, and Conduct the Processes

- How does the timeframe for the transition tie in and overlap with the post-disaster recovery?
- Was there a consultative process with all necessary stakeholders to prioritize and sequence needs in the post-conflict transition framework? Will the mechanisms used in that process be used to determine the post-disaster framework?
- In the post-conflict period, how was prioritization conducted within and among sectors? How were needs sequenced by time (short-, medium- and long-term needs)?

- How was the financing platform set up for the transition? Will there be a different national strategic and financing platform across multiple sectors for disaster recovery?
- In the post-conflict process, was there a pledging conference? What needs were expressed and which were met? Supplement statements with quantitative analysis.
- In the post-conflict transition, what were the protocols established for the process? Use table 5.3 as guide.

Table 5.3 Protocols for Transition and Disaster Recovery Processes

Transition process	Disaster recovery process
Law/legislation	
Policies	
Institutional mandate	

- How can the post-disaster recovery framework facilitate the reintegration of persons displaced by conflict who are returned or resettled internally?
- Were longer term aspects—such as building resilience, social accountability, and disaster reduction and recovery (DRR)—included in budget plans and undertaken in the post-conflict scenario?
- In the post-conflict period, which agencies or ministries had the greatest responsibility for developing financing strategies? Differentiate, if appropriate, between disaster and conflict.
- Was most of the financing for transition on or off budget? Will similar patterns be expected in the post-disaster period?
- How was the transition budget funded? Use table 5.4 as a guide (actual amounts or percentages may be used).

Table 5.4 Transition and Recovery Budget

	Transition process	Recovery plan
1. International official donor pledges		
2. International loans and non-reimbursable funds		
3. Multi-donor trust fund		
4. Partially funded by government (central, local)		
5. NGOs		
6. Community funds or other civil society contributions		
7. Benevolent institutions and private sector		
8. Other		
9. Percentage of unfunded needs in framework		

- In the post-conflict period, which institutions (government, social, international) tracked and monitored the use of funds? Which national institution was responsible for accounting for funds used across all agencies involved in the transition? Will the same procedures be used in the post-disaster recovery/recovery?
- What were the different sources/criteria of financing? Table 5.5 may be used as a guide.

Table 5.5 Sources of Transition and Recovery Financing

	Transition financing	Recovery financing
Donors–non-humanitarian actors		
Long-standing arrangements (such as risk financing, reprogramming, and reorientation of existing funds)?		
Based on humanitarian impacts?		
Based on security/conflict-avoidance priorities?		
Public-private partnerships?		
Private sector?		
Remittances from diaspora?		
Other		

Managing Programs, Ensuring Performance, and Delivering Results

- To what extent, and how, did government engender the participation of relevant stakeholders in, and local ownership of, planning post-conflict transition processes?
- In the post-conflict period, how did local communities participate in conducting assessments, setting objectives, and monitoring projects?
- During the transition period, was the central government seen as actively responding to the needs of all members of the affected communities? How will disaster response be synergized with conflict transition?
- In the post-conflict period, what results-management mechanisms did governments put in place? How are these mechanisms expected to differ in conflict transition and disaster recovery?
- In the post-conflict period, what were the baseline or target data used to compare and assess achievements? Table 5.6 may be used as a guide.

Table 5.6 Assessing Post-Conflict Achievements

Security and stabilization (conflict avoidance)	Humanitarian	Development (socioeconomic, environmental)
Goals established in peace or conflict resolution agreement		
Pre-disaster conditions incorporating DRR (Build Back Better principles)		
Pre-conflict physical infrastructure		
Adaptive and mitigation measures		
Social cohesion and social inclusion targets in specific sectors		
Health		
Education		
Social services		
Formalization and legitimacy		
Property and land tenure rights		
Human rights		
Nondiscriminatory measures (such as targets, positive discrimination for gender, race, religion)		
Other		

6. Appendix

Table A1. Sri Lanka: Post-Tsunami Recovery Allocations and Expenditures to Social Services and Infrastructure Compared with Housing Projects Tracked in the Development Assistance Database, by Province and District

District	Cost			Expenditure		
	Housing damage	Total (\$ millions)	Per home (\$)	Total (\$ millions)	Per home (\$)	Cost (%)
Ampara	12,640	141	11,122	55	4,386	39%
Batticaloa	11,657	140	12,003	46	3,916	33%
Trincomalee	5,322	164	30,787	39	7,287	24%
Eastern Province	29,619	444	15,002	140	4,722	31%
Jaffna	4,143	80	19,279	26	6,172	32%
Kilinochchi	288	38	132,464	7	23,141	17%
Mullaitivu	5,276	53	10,137	23	4,352	43%
Northern Province	9,707	172	17,669	55	5,686	32%
Galle	7,071	107	15,122	38	5,355	35%
Hambantota	1,559	103	66,035	35	22,320	34%
Matara	3,492	91	26,176	40	11,560	44%
Southern Province	12,121	301	24,852	113	9,324	38%
Colombo	3,739	29	7,692	15	4,124	54%
Gampaha	447	17	38,219	9	19,388	51%
Kalutara	3,422	51	14,863	19	5,562	37%
Western Province	7,607	97	12,709	43	5,667	45%
Total	59,054	1014	17,171	351	5,944	35%

Source: Kuhn 2009, Development Assistance Database 2008, and Divisional Secretariats 2006


Notes: Development Assistance Database records all projects coded under the Social Services and Infrastructure sector, including national and international donors. Population data came from the secondary data collection in Divisional Secretariats.

Table A2. Sri Lanka: Post-Tsunami Expenditures to Social Services and Infrastructure Sector per Household and Relative to National per-Household Average for All Donors and by Donor Type

	All Donors		Bilateral		Multilateral		INGO	
	Per house	Relative						
Ampara	4,386	0.74	1,266	0.79	2,004	0.57	1,069	0.84
Batticaloa	3,916	0.66	857	0.54	1,840	0.65	1,208	0.77
Trincomalee	7,287	1.23	3,663	2.30	2,086	0.79	1,469	0.87
Eastern Province	4,722	0.79	1,536	0.96	1,954	0.64	1,196	0.82
Jaffna	6,172	1.04	1,051	0.66	2,131	1.59	2,961	0.89
Kilinochchi	23,141	3.89	2,507	1.57	13,054	4.00	7,460	5.46
Mullaitivu	4,352	0.73	669	0.42	1,486	1.18	2,197	0.62
Northern Province	5,686	0.96	887	0.56	2,104	1.44	2,679	0.88
Galle	5,355	0.90	1,287	0.81	1,959	1.09	2,030	0.82
Hambantota	22,320	3.75	4,746	2.97	9,640	3.71	6,910	4.03
Matara	11,560	1.94	4,316	2.70	4,742	1.17	2,186	1.98
Southern Province	9,324	1.57	2,604	1.63	3,749	1.45	2,702	1.57
Colombo	4,124	0.69	618	0.39	2,378	0.46	857	0.99
Gampaha	19,388	3.26	10,367	6.50	1,887	3.82	7,129	0.79
Kalutara	5,562	0.94	482	0.30	2,289	1.50	2,791	0.96
Western Province	5,667	0.95	1,129	0.71	2,309	1.12	2,095	0.97
Total	5,947	1.00	1,596	1.00	2,393	1.00	1,865	1.00
% of Total	100%		27%		40%		31%	


Source: Kuhn 2009, Development Assistance Database 2008, and Divisional Secretariats 2006.

Notes: Development Assistance Database records all projects coded under the Social Services and Infrastructure sector, including national and international donors. Population data came from the secondary data collection in Divisional Secretariats.

Figure A1. Owner-Driven Program: Totally Destroyed Housing Requirements by Region (%)

Source: Grewal 2006, 20.

Figure A2. Owner-Driven Program: National Rate of Disbursement for Totally Destroyed Houses (as of March 2006) (%)



Source: Grewal 2006, 20.

Table A3. Owner-Driven Programme: Installments Received by Households Benefiting from the Four Installment Grants to Rebuild (as of March 2006) (%)

Installments received as a proportion of the needs required by region (with % in parenthesis)	First installment	Second installment	Third installment	Fourth installment
North	4722 (100%)	1046 (22%)	291 (6%)	33 (1%)
East	18,415 (100%)	11,425 (62%)	3190 (17%)	1153 (6%)
South	3447 (100%)	2868 (83%)	1815 (53%)	879 (26%)
West	754 (100%)	617 (82%)	501 (66%)	177 (23%)

Source: Grewal 2006, 20.

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- ⁶⁹ This goes to the heart of the GFDRR-FCV (Fragility, Conflict, and Violence) cooperation and the spirit of ongoing discussions.
- ⁷⁰ Opting for hybrid solutions is very evident in the current recovery needs assessments in conflict and disaster contexts such as the Ukraine and Gaza (conflict recovery driven) or the Ebola recovery (health emergency crisis driven).





The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is a global partnership that helps developing countries better understand and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards and adapt to climate change. Working with over 400 local, national, regional, and international partners, GFDRR provides grant financing, technical assistance, training and knowledge sharing activities to mainstream disaster and climate risk management in policies and strategies. Managed by the World Bank, GFDRR is supported by 34 countries and 9 international organizations.

<https://www.gfdr.org/recoveryframework>