Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance

The Lessons of Success

Francis Lethem
Lauren Cooper

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World Bank experience and that of other donor agencies suggests that "institutional" assistance (TA/i)—that is, assistance for nonengineering activities such as policy and institutional studies, managerial support, and training—is less successful than "engineering" assistance (architectural and engineering services relating to civil works and other hardware investments) because TA/i services deal with problems that are difficult to define and resolve. Moreover, the state of the art is unclear; these services require a thorough understanding of the society, culture, and institutions involved; and the outputs of TA/i lack the precision of engineering solutions, are difficult to assess, and usually require behavioral changes in the recipient.

The success of TA for nonengineering activities appears to depend on three factors in particular:

(a) **The commitment of all parties concerned.** That commitment is based on the supposition that there is an agreement on the need for TA/i, that the objectives of the assistance are clear and understood, and that the assignment is feasible in the time and with the resources allocated and in terms of the available state of the art. Commitment is more likely when TA is conceived as part of a strategy for institution-building and human resource development that allows the recipient of TA to learn by doing.

(b) **Careful design of the TA.** Special attention must be given to (i) choices among various modes of delivery, (ii) the role of both the recipient's staff and the TA staff, and (iii) administrative arrangements, including the recipient's ability to manage and supervise the assistance, and the criteria (both technical and behavioral) for selecting the specialists.
(c) The handling of TA as a process and not as a blueprint. The aid agency and the TA recipient must act as partners and jointly design the TA assignment, periodically review the progress of implementation, and possibly, with the help of the TA staff, redesign some elements of the TA over time. Furthermore, aid agency staff must act as catalysts to ensure that close cooperation is developed and maintained among them, the recipient's staff, and the TA staff and that all parties maintain their commitment to the objectives of the assistance.

This paper presents the conclusions from a review of several successful projects and offers a number of practical suggestions for TA designers and appraisers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Discussions with a number of aid agencies, CIDA (Canada), ODA (U.K.), UNDP, ORT, UNESCO, ILO, GTZ and KfW (Federal Republic of Germany), FAC (France), and Centre Lebret, with consulting firms and individual practitioners (particularly H. Debache, C.L. Germanacos and G. Honadle) and with technical assistance recipients in Africa, Asia and the Middle East all helped to broaden our perspective.

We owe a special debt to K. Murrell of the Department of Management, University of West Florida, for bringing to our attention some of the theoretical insights that helped us to interpret our field experience.
Papers in the Management and Development Series


Foreword

This study is one in a series of World Bank Staff Working Papers devoted to issues of development management. Prepared as background papers for the World Development Report 1983, they provide an in-depth treatment of the subjects dealt with in Part II of the Report. The thirteen papers cover topics ranging from comprehensive surveys of management issues in different types of public sector institutions (for example, state-owned enterprises, the public service, and local government agencies) to broad overviews of such subjects as planning, management training, technical assistance, corruption, and decentralization.

The central concern underlying these papers is the search for greater efficiency in setting and pursuing development goals. The papers focus on the role of the state in this process, stress the importance of appropriate incentives, and assess the effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements. They offer no general prescriptions, as the developing countries are too diverse—politically, culturally, and in economic resources—to allow the definition of a single strategy.

The papers draw extensively on the experiences of the World Bank and other international agencies. They were reviewed by a wide range of readership from developing and developed countries inside and outside the Bank. They were edited by Victoria Macintyre. Rhoda Blade-Charest, Banjonglak Duangrat, Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones prepared the manuscripts for publication.

I hope that these studies will be useful to practitioners and academicians of development management around the world.

Pierre Landell-Mills
Staff Director
World Development Report 1983
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Definition

Operational experience suggests that technical assistance (TA) consists of two main types of services: engineering-related TA (or assistance for hardware) and institution-related TA (or assistance for software). Engineering TA consists of professional architectural or engineering services for civil works and other hardware investments. These services are considered to be an integral part of the investments to which they are related, irrespective of the recipient country's stage of development; they can be applied in any part of the world without extensive additional research; and they require minimal or no behavioral change on the part of the recipient. Institutional TA, on the other hand, consists of (a) diagnostic and prescriptive assistance such as advice on institutional or policy matters and studies for national economic management and planning, public administration, or the management and operation of a particular sector or entity; and (b) managerial, technical, or other direct operational support as well as staff training. These services deal with problems or needs that are difficult to define and resolve given the state of the art, and they require a thorough understanding of the society, culture, and institutions involved. Their outputs lack the precision of engineering solutions and usually require behavioral changes within the recipient entity, and their outcomes are not always tangible or easy to assess. It often is a matter of opinion whether such services are needed at all in relation to a project.

Common Problems

Project-related technical assistance (PRTA), especially institutional assistance, frequently encounters the following types of problems:
(a) **Feasibility.** The knowledge or expertise to address a problem that has been identified may not yet exist, may not be readily available, or requires research before it can be applied to the local circumstances; the identified problem may not have been adequately studied and consequently the TA assignment may not be technically feasible or cannot be completed in the allotted time.

(b) **Design.** The delivery mode of TA services is often specified in a superficial manner, without adequate consideration of alternatives. Training is sometimes expected to occur automatically as a by-product of other activities, and scarce high-level national staff may be assigned as "counterparts" to merely observe expatriate experts in their work. Also, the expected output or benefits of the services (as noted earlier, these are not always tangible or easily measurable) may not be sufficiently specified.

(c) **Administration and implementation.** The recipient may lack certain capabilities to design and manage the assistance or to utilize its output, or may lack the resources needed to meet the expected local budgetary contribution. Administrative responsibilities, or arrangements for briefing and supervising the assistance, may not be clearly specified or may be unrealistic.

(d) **Behavioral factors.** Unlike major physical investments, TA does not seem to generate its own momentum toward implementation; therefore, its implementation strongly depends on whether both the TA recipient and the supplier can maintain a strong commitment to the TA objectives and mode of delivery. The success of TA is also dependent on the motivation of the national and
expatriate staff and on their ability to work together harmoniously.

Donor agency experience suggests that there are various approaches to avoid or mitigate these problems, as explained in this paper. In addition, two principles seem to be worth noting: (a) the more closely institutional TA is or is perceived to be related to the preparation or implementation of an investment or loan wanted by the recipient, the greater are its chances for success; and (b) the more competent the recipient institution and the more advanced the country, the more likely good use will be made of the TA.

Recipient Commitment

Agreeing on need and objectives. The most important phase in the TA process is that in which the need for the assistance is identified. When the need for TA is not immediately apparent to either the aid recipient or the donor agency, both should attempt to determine whether a problem exists and, if so, they should analyze it and then decide whether technical assistance is the best solution. In some cases, giving the recipient access to the technical experience of more advanced developing countries may help him to identify his own needs. The TA objectives ultimately agreed upon may or may not be the same as those the aid agency or the recipient would have come up with on their own, but they are likely to be the most acceptable to both parties and therefore stand a better chance of being successfully implemented.

Whether TA is needed can be established through the following steps:

(a) Determine whether local skills and TA are already available in the country so as to ensure that (1) the additional assistance will not undermine the work or credibility of national staff or duplicate the efforts of other multilateral or bilateral aid agencies, and
(ii) national staff will be available to benefit from training. If this information cannot be obtained, the aid agency may have to assist in assessing the available human resources and defining a strategy for their development.

(b) Determine the linkage of the TA with the development strategy of the recipient (country, sector, or entity). This information will indicate, for example, the degree to which the assistance should substitute for local capabilities or should attempt to develop them; and whether the assistance should be limited to a single project or program, or should extend to a sector or a profession as a whole, focus on developing diagnosis and supervision capabilities as against planning and execution capabilities, or help an entity to cope with broader mandates such as promoting the role of women in development, protecting the environment, or developing and conserving energy resources.

(c) Determine the appropriateness of the project technology and institutional arrangements, and degree of complexity or pace proposed for its implementation, since these choices will dictate the type and intensity of the TA required.

Feasibility of the TA. During the identification phase of TA, an effort should be made to establish whether the identified needs can be met in terms of the state of the art and expertise available, the organizational environment and international context in which the TA will be implemented, and the time frame and budget allowed. Another factor to consider is whether it will be possible, despite budgetary constraints, to create permanent positions to replace TA personnel by national staff where this is intended. As for the technology to be used, in some cases "off-the-shelf" technology may be applicable and readily obtainable from existing publications or established consulting firms. In other cases, general knowledge may have to be adapted to local circumstances (e.g., in
certain institutional design areas such as the delivery of services to large numbers of people) and the technical assistance provided in the form of "action research." Now and then, the divergent technical or philosophical viewpoints of competing aid agencies may have to be reconciled before assistance can be effective. A further consideration—in view of the fact that aid agencies such as the World Bank expect the recipient to be responsible for both the administrative and substantive aspects of project execution, including the TA component—is whether local skills and resources can be used in the design and management of the TA. When such skills and resources are not available, arrangements may have to be made for other preparatory assistance and additional training.

The likelihood of success is greater when TA tasks are planned as sequential parts of a development program; indeed, in some cases, the goals of the assistance may be better achieved through a series of projects rather than through one project. Another important step at this stage is to identify the criteria for success by specifying TA goals in measurable terms, including targets for training local staff and improving their competence. These criteria will clarify what is expected of the TA activities in a project and can be used to monitor implementation.

Other factors influencing recipient commitment to TA include:

(a) The estimated cost of the assistance in absolute and relative terms.

(b) The availability of alternative sources of financing for the TA and, when none is available, the recipient's willingness to borrow for TA (in the case of Bank-financed assistance).

(c) The existence of a consensus about the need for, and the objectives of, the TA at both the political and technical levels of the recipient.
(d) The possibility of promoting local capabilities through the use of local consultants or other TA delivery systems that actively associate local staff with the TA activities (Section III).

(e) The balance established between assistance for physical investments (which the recipient is more likely to want), and assistance for institutional and policy improvement (to which the aid agency may attach equal importance but which the recipient may perceive as threatening and void of assured, visible benefits).

In sum, technical assistance especially assistance for policy, institutional, and direct operational support must be wanted if it is to succeed. Therefore, in the process of identifying TA needs and verifying their feasibility, it would be advisable to apply the following principles: (a) technical assistance should be identified and designed with the same spirit of partnership that will be required during its implementation; (b) any differences of opinion between the recipient, the TA designers, and the aid agency should be quickly made known (in a culturally appropriate manner) and reconciled; (c) the relevant political and technical levels of the government should be brought into the decision process; and (d) all parties should feel equally responsible for the quality of the TA design and should not only be committed to its successful implementation, but also prepared to modify the TA assignment in the light of implementation experience. TA should thus be understood and approached as technical cooperation, and every step in the TA process should reinforce the commitment of all parties concerned.

Since the above principles cannot always be applied, differences of opinion may remain as to the need for the TA or its feasibility. Although the hiring of TA personnel might be made a condition of lending, there is no way of ensuring that the recipient will make use of the assistance. In such cases decisionmakers have the following options:
(a) They can minimize the need for the assistance by limiting the policy or institutional objectives to be achieved and redesign the project technology (if feasible), reduce the project's complexity, or slow down the pace of project implementation.

(b) They can stretch implementation of the TA over time.

(c) If these measures undermine the feasibility of the project or of the policy or institutional objectives to be achieved, they can postpone or drop the project.

**Design of the Services**

**Terms of reference (TOR).** TOR should specify as clearly as possible the TA tasks (including preparation of periodic reports) to be performed, their objectives, and the desired outcomes. Time frames and costs should be estimated as accurately as possible. Well-prepared TOR nonetheless remain negotiable and flexible within limits. As part of a phased assignment, consultants should be expected to prepare more detailed proposals once they are in the field, particularly for institutional and policy studies. In this way, consultants can demonstrate not only their technical competence, but also their sensitivity to local conditions and their suitability as trainers. Whenever technical assistance involves studies or policy work, the consultants may have to specify assistance needed by the recipient to implement the study's recommendations.

TOR should also indicate the organizational entity to which expatriate staff are to be assigned, individuals to whom they should report and have access, and the amount of authority to be delegated to them. The effectiveness of these arrangements usually depends on the competence of the project manager and his ability to make the best use of the TA team. When TOR are prepared for a study linked to a future project that may not be financed by the aid agency financing the study, the potential investors or financing sources should be consulted about the TOR at the earliest possible time.
TOR should be prepared for both expatriate and local personnel, and should indicate which (or which combination) of the following four basic models of TA would be appropriate in the given circumstances:

(a) The performer or substitute model, whereby an expert performs a specific task or function prescribed by the client/recipient.

(b) The prescriptive model, under which the expert diagnoses a problem and suggests alternative solutions.

(c) The counterpart-adviser model, which presumes that a national staff will work as an apprentice to the external specialist.

(d) The collaborative model, which expects both national and expatriate staff to perform substantive tasks, share responsibility for the results, work together as a team, and learn from each other.

Once a model is chosen, it is possible to specify a TA delivery mode that will reinforce the desired relationship. Included will be long-term or short-term specialists, or combinations of these—possibly in association with a training specialist—and teams of national and expatriate specialists. If it is essential to develop local capabilities, and local staff are already reasonably qualified, an alternative may be to propose that short-term specialists (or panels of specialists) visit the recipient's staff periodically and coach them on their work, rather than to provide only for long-term specialists, who may tend to do the work themselves. Another alternative might be a "twinning" arrangement promoting professional cooperation with a similar but more mature institution in another country (and possibly backed up by an experienced consulting firm): in this way advisory activities could be combined with on-the-job and formal training and could provide a framework for long-term collaboration.
Sources and choice of expertise. There are many potential sources of TA, including expatriate and local specialists and consulting firms, U.N. and multilateral agencies, nongovernment and volunteer organizations, bilateral aid agencies, private manufacturers, multinational corporations, similar operating entities in developed and more advanced developing countries, universities, and trade and professional organizations. TA designers can also choose between individual consultants and consulting firms. Individuals may be preferable for long-term advisory positions and for tasks that do not require teams of specialists. Firms may be preferable if a team approach and complementary skills are needed; moreover, they can make professional and administrative support available to their staff, and usually are more effective when an individual needs to be replaced quickly.

In the case of Bank-financed TA, since such assistance does not have to be procured from abroad, TA designers must decide whether to call upon expatriate specialists, encourage joint ventures between expatriate and local consultants, or rely upon local qualified staff and experts. In project-related TA, this decision will depend in part on the technology to be used in the parent project--both its type and level of sophistication and the amount of adaptation necessary for local circumstances. The choice of expertise may also depend on the country's stage of development, the urgency with which the recipient wishes the project or studies to be implemented, and the type of development strategy being followed. Other factors to consider are the level of local as against expatriate salaries, as well as the availability of local financial resources for hiring additional local staff.

Training design. If training is to be effective, it must be planned and implemented as an integral part of the project and of the training effort in the recipient country. TA and training components, as well as institutional measures to help retain the staff to be trained under the project, should be designed in concert, preferably with the help of a training expert. When training can begin ahead of the project, local staff will be able to make better use of TA personnel once they arrive in the field. In Bank-financed projects, such advance training is frequently funded from the Project Preparation Facility (PPF).
Because the training usually suffers when "doing" and "training" compete for a consultant's time, and because not all technical experts are good trainers, it may be advantageous to separate the responsibilities for training from the other technical assistance activities. If a TA contract is given to an individual or firm of proven effectiveness both as consultant and trainer, enough time and funds must be allocated to ensure success in both tasks.

Training can be made effective by (a) alternating periods of work in the country or overseas with formal training ("sandwiching"); (b) training staff on the job first, identifying the "star pupils," and training them further, thus building up a cadre; (c) sending the trainees to a job instead of to a training course (adults learn primarily by doing); (d) using experts periodically to coach the recipient's staff; (e) establishing a twinning arrangement with a similar operating entity abroad; and (f) arranging study tours abroad so as to focus on available solutions to the specific issues confronting the recipient.

To ensure that trainees will use their newly acquired skills, program designers should make certain that managers participate in the training in some way, perhaps by attending the beginning and closing training sessions or special seminars or workshops for them. TA staff can reinforce the training by following up on the activities of ex-trainees and by assembling training materials in procedures manuals.

Project designers should take into account the risks in sending personnel abroad for training. For example, the training might be difficult to adapt to local circumstances; trained personnel might not return from abroad, or if they do, they might be assigned responsibilities unrelated to the project; reintegration could be another problem.

Administrative Design and Implementation

A TA recipient may find the administration of TA extremely burdensome, particularly if inadequacies in this area created the demand for assistance in the first place. Once agreement is reached on which agency will select TA staff and manage the TA, it is necessary to determine
whether adequate logistical and administrative support can be expected.
Prior arrangements can be made to meet the professional needs of expatriate
consultants (and their families' personal needs) so that time will not be
lost from the project. If the recipient cannot provide adequate support,
the existing capability may have to be strengthened or a central capability
that can assist other agencies may have to be developed within the
government. Alternatively, a consulting firm may be contracted to provide
the necessary administrative and logistical support.

The administrative design should also specify the recipient's
contribution (financial or in kind) to the TA assignment and the
arrangements for briefing, supervising, and backstopping the TA team, as
well as for coordinating the latter's activities with those of other
government agencies or sources of assistance. The continuity of the staff
from the design stage to implementation, (or some provision to ensure that
the designers and implementers at least have access to each other) will aid
in clarifying the TA goals, methods, concepts, and constraints.

Periodic joint evaluation by the aid agency, the recipient, and
the consultants will allow TA assignments to be modified over time in
accordance with implementation experience which the TA team will
periodically report. Although a work program in engineering TA may not
have to be refined and adjusted as often as in TA for improving
institutions, the scheduling or even the scope of all TA assignments may
have to be adjusted as conditions change. Joint evaluation is one way to
maintain mutual trust and a spirit of cooperation among all the parties
concerned.

Staff and trainee selection. Selection procedures for both local
and expatriate staff should ensure the recruitment of a competent,
well-motivated, and mutually compatible TA team. Three main points need to
be considered in the selection of local staff:

(a) The availability of appropriate local staff to be
trained and/or to become members of the TA team should
be established as early as possible. A government that
lacks in-house capability (as it may if salaries in the
public sector induce trained staff to leave for
employment in private enterprises) may call upon local consultants to work with the expatriate specialists.

(b) In some cases—particularly when a training contract specifies performance objectives—it may be desirable for the expatriate consultants to help establish selection criteria as well as assist in the selection of local staff.

(c) Allowing staff to volunteer for an assignment, especially a difficult one, may be a useful selection technique. Sometimes, however, special incentives may be necessary.

In selecting expatriate staff, the recipient should follow generally accepted and sound selection and contracting procedures; if these are lacking, the recipient should be given assistance in establishing them. Decisionmakers should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of large as compared with small firms and of recruiting independent individuals as against using staff from consulting firms or U.N. agencies. They should be aware that the quality of TA staff and the security of their permanent employment are often related.

**Behavioral factors.** Specialists must be both technically competent and familiar with the policies and procedures of the aid agency and the recipient. The consensus now is that expatriate consultants or advisers including those from other developing countries should also have the "right personality;" that is, their personal attributes should include adaptability, flexibility, dedication to their assignment, patience, resourcefulness, tact, empathy, political sensitivity, and skills (including linguistic ability) in cross-cultural communication. Those hired to train local staff should also have pedagogical skills. The suitability of expatriate specialists can be determined from psychological testing of candidates by specialized firms or interviews by the recipient. Subsequently, they can be given advance training in cross-cultural communication, they can be coached by the recipient, or they can be assigned short-term probationary appointments.
Finally, TA is most likely to succeed when the manager is committed to the project, is willing and able to make effective use of the TA staff, and is able to establish a strong working relationship with the authorities involved in the project or development program.

Managing the TA Process and the Role of Aid Agency Staff

Because the state of the art in institutional TA is unclear and behavioral changes are often required in its implementation, this type of assistance should not be managed according to a "blueprint," but should be treated as an iterative process and probably broken down into discrete phases that take advantage of feedback, learning from experience, and appreciation of changes in the economic, political, or managerial context. Such a process depends on a strong partnership in which all parties have equal responsibility for the successful outcome of the assistance and are able to cope with considerable professional anxiety—particularly when the possible solutions to problems encountered in a development program are at the frontier of professional knowledge—while remaining patient and confident of ultimate success.

The staff of the aid agency may have to play a crucial role in this regard by ascertaining that all parties believe in the value of the assistance, by ensuring that all parties appreciate the time that may be required to achieve institutional objectives, and by taking steps to maintain the commitment of TA staff and the recipient. They can also verify that the TA objectives are substantively and administratively feasible; assist in drafting TOR and TA performance criteria; make certain that appropriate and timely organizational, administrative, and logistical arrangements are made; help consultants to understand the country environment in which they will work; participate in periodic joint evaluations of progress; and verify that the proposed staff selection criteria will allow the recipient to assemble a team of well-qualified and highly motivated expatriate and local personnel. Above all, the staff of the aid agency can act as a catalyst by facilitating communication among the various parties so as to promote mutual trust and ensure that the TOR are flexible enough to accommodate any necessary changes during implementation of the project.
and related TA activities. Making sure that the TA tasks are not overly ambitious and are phased so as to allow the recipient's personnel to learn by doing may be a fundamental step in promoting a developing country's self-confidence and increasing the capacity of its personnel to undertake increasingly difficult tasks.

For ease of reference, the salient points in this paper are presented in tabular form in Annex 1.
MANAGING PROJECT-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: THE LESSONS OF SUCCESS

INTRODUCTION

Part of the financing provided by the World Bank for development projects usually relates to services known as technical assistance (TA). In FY 82 these services averaged 9 percent of the loans and credits made by the World Bank/IDA and amounted to $1.2 billion.1/ How these services are designed and delivered can determine the success of a project.

Experience suggests that there are two types of project-related technical assistance (PRTA): engineering-related assistance (or assistance for hardware) and institution-related assistance (or assistance for software or nonengineering services). They differ in the state of the art and how much behavioral change is required of the beneficiary (Table 1).

Engineering TA, which receives more financial support and is the more successful of the two types, consists of professional architectural or engineering services related to the feasibility, design, supervision, or installation of civil works and other hardware investments. These services require minimal or no behavioral change in the recipient, and the state of the art is so widely known and accepted that the services can normally be estimated as a percentage of the construction or investment costs. These services are considered an integral part of the investments to which they are related, irrespective of the recipient country's stage of development. A number of policy issues concerning the design and procurement of this type of technical assistance are dealt with in the Bank's guidelines for the use of consultants (August 1981).

Institutional TA (TA/i) (see Table 1, Column B), on the other hand, consists of (a) diagnostic and prescriptive assistance such as advice

on institutional (financial, legal, organizational, managerial) or policy matters, studies concerned with improving the operation and maintenance of a particular sector or entity, and assistance in implementing the resulting recommendations; and (b) managerial, technical, or other direct operational support to public or private entities, and the provision of fellowships or other forms of training assistance. These services deal with problems or needs that are difficult to define and resolve since the state of the art is unclear. Moreover, institutional problems cannot be solved with the precision possible in engineering activities, and the results are often less tangible and harder to assess. Often it is a matter of opinion whether institutional TA is needed, and rarely can such assistance be effective or successfully implemented without a thorough understanding of the particular society, culture, and institutions involved, and without behavioral changes in the beneficiary.

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<th>Table 1: TYPES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</th>
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<td>A. <strong>Engineering assistance</strong></td>
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<td>(a) State of the art is known.</td>
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<td>(b) Requires minimal behavioral change in the beneficiary.</td>
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<td>(c) Comprises architectural or engineering services related to the feasibility, design, supervision, or installation of civil works and other hardware. Professional fees are an integral part of the investment cost.</td>
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These various problems can be divided into four basic types: those of a substantive nature, those arising in the design of the services, those connected with administrative arrangements for implementation, and behavioral problems. They are particularly acute in the social sectors and less acute in the infrastructure-dominated sectors. 2/ (Annex 1 summarizes the key issues in institutional PRTA).

Substantive problems. Problems of this type are more prevalent in institutional TA than in engineering TA. They fall into two categories:

(a) **State of the art.** The knowledge or expertise needed to address a problem that has been identified in the proposed project may not yet exist or may not be readily available. In some cases (such as the design of rural health services or the organization of rural road maintenance), applied research may be required, whereas in others (for example, the provision of extension services or the design of management information systems), the available technical or institutional know-how may have to be adapted to local circumstances.

(b) **Feasibility.** All too often, TA/i is "thrown at problems" that have not been adequately studied, and consequently the TA assignment may not be technically feasible or may be difficult to complete in the allotted time. For instance, an auditing firm will not be able to audit accounts that are in disarray. If they are in disarray, the TA assignment should start either by bringing the accounts up to date, or by evaluating assets and liabilities as of a given date in order to provide a sound basis for subsequent accounting.

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2/ Social sectors refer to agriculture, education, health, population, rural and urban development, labor-intensive infrastructure. Infrastructure-dominated sectors refer to energy, industry, irrigation, telecommunications, water supply.
Design of the services. TA/i is often designed in a cursory or superficial manner, without consideration of alternative methods of delivery (such as long- as against short-term specialists, consulting firms against institutional cooperation), or of training. Furthermore, training is sometimes expected to occur automatically as a by-product of other TA activities. Another problem is that scarce high-level national staff (i.e., "counterparts") may function merely as observers of expatriate experts in their work, instead of having substantive responsibilities and an opportunity to learn by doing. Finally, the expected output or benefits of the services (admittedly not always tangible or easily measurable) may not be defined explicitly enough to allow performance evaluation.

Administrative arrangements for implementation. Certain administrative and logistical obstacles often hamper the implementation of TA/i and undermine its effectiveness:

(a) The recipient's administrative capacity. The recipient or government agency involved may lack the capability to design or manage the TA or to utilize its output, or may lack the budgetary resources with which to provide the local contribution (personnel, housing, office space and transportation) to the TA.

(b) Administrative assignments. Specific responsibilities cannot always be assigned to any one party, especially when the assignment calls for collaboration between the TA specialists and the recipient's staff (as in the design or implementation of institutional improvements). In addition, the TA design may not specify how much professional, administrative, or logistical support the supplier of the services will provide to the experts in the field. Arrangements for briefing the experts and periodically reviewing their performance may not have been considered.
(c) **Time constraints.** Specialists who are technically competent, not to mention culturally sensitive, are usually difficult to find in the short time that is all too often allowed for their recruitment.

**Behavioral problems.** Two types of behavioral problems have been identified: lack of recipient commitment, and tensions between individual experts and the recipient's organization and staff. These problems seldom arise in engineering TA but are prevalent in institutional TA, largely because of the changes required of the beneficiary and the tendency of organizations to resist change. Furthermore, major physical investments seem to generate their own momentum toward implementation, whereas TA usually lacks such a driving force and therefore needs the continuous support of all parties concerned. These two problems arise from certain conditions:

(a) **Recipient commitment.** The recipient may not be interested in the proposed assistance because the government or entity involved may not be willing to borrow the funds required, or the recipient may believe that local capacities are adequate, may not recognize a need for such assistance (especially if the recipient was not involved in identifying the TA need), may have doubts about its chances for success in view of an earlier and possibly disappointing experience with TA, may consider the proposed assistance to be only indirectly related to the desired investment, may suspect that the TA is merely intended as a "watchdog" over the use of loan funds, or simply may object to its cost. An intended recipient may also have political reasons for objecting to any TA supplied from abroad, irrespective of origin. Or the assistance may be accepted by policymakers to obtain the desired financial assistance or

to meet conditions of lending for the project) but may be resisted by those at the technical level where it is to be applied. Or the agreement that existed during identification and design of the TA activity may be endangered during implementation by such seemingly insignificant matters as a disagreement over failure of the recipient to provide the expatriate specialist with an air-conditioned office, as promised, or refusal by the expert to provide a service not specifically mentioned in the terms of reference of the TA assignment. In some cases, particularly those involving policy and institutional matters, commitment may be lacking once the entity realizes the implications of follow-up actions.

(b) Individual psychology. The criteria for selecting expatriate staff may not take into account pedagogical and motivational factors or communication ability, and relations between expatriate and national staff may become strained because of income disparity or social and cultural differences. Furthermore, demoralization may occur when expatriate staff or their families are confronted with a new physical, professional, or social environment; when local staff are faced by poor career prospects and no continuity; and when local staff lack interest in the assignment, or the TA supplier lacks interest in training the recipient's staff.

The problems of TA/1 that have just been outlined can be resolved to a large extent by learning from successful experiences of the past. This paper attempts to identify components of success at each stage of the project cycle (identification, design, and implementation) through an in-depth review of 20 project histories selected from about 100 in which Bank staff identified particularly successful TA components.\footnote{For a definition of success, see Annex 2.}
findings were confirmed, wherever appropriate, by reference to other studies undertaken by the Bank staff, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, and by other aid agencies. The findings were then interpreted in the light of current theory on technical assistance, international relations, organization behavior, and adult learning.

The projects reviewed cover all six Regions to which the Bank lends support as well as the following sectors: agriculture and rural development, education, industry/industrial development and finance, population, health and nutrition, power, telecommunications, transport, urban development, and water supply. The technical assistance consisted of professional services for engineering design and construction; support for project management; several aspects of institutional development; the preparation of policy, planning, and feasibility studies; and local staff training and fellowships. The TA components were financed by the Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), other U.N. agencies, and bilateral donors. TA expertise was provided by expatriate and local specialists, consulting firms, consortia, U.N. experts, bilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and "twinned" agencies.5/

II. IDENTIFICATION OF NEED AND COMMITMENT

As a rule, the less PRTA is associated with investments in infrastructure, the more its success depends on the commitment of the recipients. Indeed, when PRTA involves the design and then supervision of the construction of major infrastructural works, TA specialists exercise considerable control over the outcome. But, when the PRTA involves the design and implementation of operational and maintenance improvements to existing infrastructure, the TA specialists have less control and the results of PRTA largely depend on the attitudes, behavior, and competence of others within the recipient agency. The same applies to TA for

5/ "Twinning" refers to the establishment of a professional relationship in which an entity in the recipient country receives assistance from a similar but more mature entity in another country.
institutional and policy studies, except that in addition local contributions will be needed to help the specialists gain insight into the local situation so that they will be able to prepare recommendations. In the last two types of activities, TA specialists may have, at best, some degree of influence over the outcome of the work. In addition, since the outputs of institutional TA are less tangible than those of engineering TA and since the need for TA/i (or its priority or feasibility) is often a matter of opinion, TA/i is clearly a riskier activity. That risk decreases, however, in proportion to the degree of recipient commitment. This section therefore focuses on the key ingredients of recipient commitment to PRTA/i: agreement that assistance is needed, and that it is feasible.

A. Agreement on Need and Objectives

The first step in the provision of PRTA/i is to identify the need for assistance. Aid agency staff have found that assistance is needed when the capability to perform project tasks is not available within the executing agency and has to be provided from outside. This assessment is based both on the observations of the executing agency and the project designers in first projects and on information from experience gained in earlier projects in the case of repeater projects. The executing agency doesn't always have information on available local and TA staff, however, and even donor agencies do not always know the numbers and specialties of TA personnel currently working in a country. Recipients and donors should therefore be encouraged to establish some mechanism for keeping track of TA personnel and their work. It may be advisable to supplement such information with special studies, such as country profiles on accounting and auditing, country reviews of the consulting industry, and country science and technology overview papers.

6/ This point was suggested by recent Bank staff reviews of TA in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
(a) The Political Environment

In both first and repeater projects, all parties concerned must agree at the outset that technical assistance is needed if the subsequent stages of design and implementation are to be completed successfully. At this early stage, all the parties should be able to clarify their views about the purpose of technical assistance and what they expect it to accomplish. They should recognize that PRTA choices are not isolated technical decisions, but are made within the global political context of relations between the developed and less developed countries. At times, that context may influence—or may be thought to influence—the perceptions and values of those involved in identifying the need for PRTA/i to a point where intended recipients regard technical assistance as less than welcome, irrespective of whether it is needed. In this type of situation, successful project designers will consider not only the immediate goals of PRTA/i but also how these goals relate to the recipient's longer term strategy for development or for building up human resources—even though the two sets of goals (immediate and long term) might conflict.

(b) Appropriateness of the Technology, or Institutional Arrangements

The need for PRTA often depends on the complexity of the design of the parent project in relation to locally available capabilities. Experience suggests that at times technologies have to be chosen before questions can be raised about how and by whom the project will be implemented—at which point TA is usually suggested as a means of achieving the project goals. Project designers must be able to recognize at the identification/feasibility stage how their design choices—for example, choice of kind and level of technology for the project's physical components, its institutional arrangements, or the proposed pace of implementation—will affect the type and amount of TA required to implement the project during both the investment and operational phases, as well as the direct operational support that will be needed to manage and operate

the beneficiary. As one engineer has noted: "An engineering design, for instance, often can be taken 'off the shelf' and installed anywhere—it is sterile and inanimate. But once you get to its running and maintenance, you get into human factors. Science can be applied worldwide; its management depends on the environment." This implies that project designers ought to assess the available human resources at a very early stage in the project cycle, and ensure that both the donor and the recipient understand and accept the project's requirements for trained manpower, maintenance and equipment, and recurrent budgetary expenditures. If the recipient cannot agree, for example, to the intensity of the PRTA required for the proposed project design, the design should be modified, if possible, to reduce the need for technical assistance. Alternatively, the recipient may become convinced—as in the case of agricultural development projects financed in Nigeria in the early 1970s—that intensive PRTA is a useful means of demonstrating the profitability of agriculture and thus attracting the better qualified graduates of its training institutions to seek permanent employment in the sector.

(c) Short-term and Long-term Development Objectives

The need for PRTA/i is also a function of the short- and long-term development objectives of the sector or entity supported by the project. TA merely intended to implement the project is said to be unacceptable, for instance, in rural development projects. Indeed, as suggested in the evaluation of several completed projects in western Africa, the objective of increasing farmer productivity requires not only that physical targets (such as the construction of a road or a dam) be achieved, but also that human resources be developed and institutional structures and linkages be created to and between the farmers so that the

8/ Some of the staff consulted have suggested that project designers tend to specify complex technologies and institutional arrangements (resulting both from the designers' and the recipient's preference for "top-of-the-line" technology), which then require a great deal of technical assistance and lead to continuing dependence on expatriate experts. In some sectors, though, (for example, telecommunications, industry, energy) certain minimum technological requirements must be met, irrespective of available local capabilities.
increased level of production can be sustained beyond the immediate life of the project. For the power sector, a question is whether the assistance is needed only to build a power plant in the short term, or whether TA should also be concerned with the long-term goal of transferring the necessary skills to the recipient, so that it will then be able to build other plants and develop its power system with its own expertise. The fundamental question is whether, in the light of a country's size, economy, and human and physical resources, the goal should be to develop local capabilities in all phases of, say, power engineering (feasibility, engineering, bid evaluation, installation, operation, maintenance); or whether the assistance should aim only at developing the recipient's "managerial autonomy" (that is, an in-house capacity to recognize that a need exists, plan how to satisfy it, know how and where to find the expertise to get the job done, whether local or expatriate, and be able to supervise the work). Should the assistance give the recipient a progressive mastery over a sequence of tasks and technologies of increasing complexity, and thus engender both technical capabilities and a psychology of success and self-confidence? Will local demand for the skills to be learned continue? Should the assistance also be concerned with broader mandates, such as promoting the role of women in development, protecting the environment, or developing and conserving energy resources?

(d) Need for Local Staff Training

Ideally, after local capabilities have been assessed within the sector and the enterprise, and those available to the project have been identified, the technical assistance needed to perform a particular task and the training needed by local personnel should be calculated as two parts of the same problem. It may be found, for example, that training activities (possibly financed in advance of project execution, as under the Bank's Project Preparation Facility) will have to be started early to ensure that staff skilled in the appropriate fields will be available to operate and maintain the investment once it is in place. Perhaps the best approach to assessing needs and achieving the agreement of all parties concerned is to link technical assistance to the development of local capabilities.
(e) **Assistance for Hardware as against Software**

Project officers have found that in general PRTA related to the physical aspects of a project is more acceptable to the recipient country than PRTA/i, which may be seen as outside interference. This attitude is not surprising since governments recognize that they may be held financially and politically responsible if, as a result of weak engineering or inadequate site supervision, a dam collapses, a road washes away, or a power supply fails. The consequences of not employing a consultant to improve a financial or management information system, on the other hand, may not be immediately apparent; such inaction may even be politically beneficial if it prevents a confrontation with potentially powerful vested interests. Engineering assistance is not always favored, however. In some countries, particularly the more advanced countries of Latin America and the Middle East, PRTA for engineering may be resisted because the intended recipient believes that local capabilities are adequate. Such countries may, instead, prefer to have technical assistance for software by which they can increase management efficiency or development planning capabilities.

The situation may be somewhat more complex when PRTA is not directly related to a project or to subsequent projects but seeks to promote institutional improvements or changes in sectoral policy. The potential for misunderstanding then increases considerably, especially in the "social sectors." As suggested by the case history set out in Annex 2, a consensus on objectives may be particularly difficult to obtain among parties with conflicting interests or viewpoints, or among TA staff from several donor agencies. In such cases the project or TA designers should probably find out who the stakeholders are, identify their purposes, and devise ways to overcome any serious differences among them.\footnote{W. Smith, F. Lethem, and B. Thoolen, *The Design of Organizations for Rural Development Projects - A Progress Report*, World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 375, Washington, D.C., March 1980, Chap. 4.}
(f) Disaggregating the Concept of Commitment

Assessing a recipient's commitment to PRTA is not simply a matter of verifying a minister's acceptance of the need for assistance. Commitment should be evident in all the personnel on whose collaboration or support the technical assistance depends at each policy and operational level. One bilateral agency has found that many agreements reached at the top levels of government and the donor country are highly tenuous, and that TA is often requested not because it is needed, but because it might pave the way for financial assistance. In such circumstances, the TA is likely to be resented by the national staff; the expatriate specialist, viewed as an enemy, will be shunned, and government staff will become demoralized. To avoid the risks of such high-level deals, this agency has made it a rule not to provide TA without prior detailed definition of its scope at the technical level.

When a recipient is advised to make organizational changes, or to train its staff, such recommendations may be considered threatening, no matter what the country's level of development might be. Project designers and aid agency staff should therefore pay particular attention to a recipient's reservations about the wisdom or feasibility of the proposed TA, and also to any faint signals of apprehension such as a request that the aid agency assume direct responsibility for implementing the TA component (thus the recipient would be more an observer than a participant). The aid agency may also wish to exercise caution in assuming a commitment whenever a recipient puts off selecting experts, or objects to providing U.N. agency staff with normal immunities and privileges. At the same time, while TA suggested by the recipient may reflect a genuinely felt need, aid agency should also be cautious about requests for TA that appear to stem from a notion that the agency is more reliable politically than the recipient, or that work done by expatriates is easier to administer or terminate than the work of equally competent nationals. Considerable time should therefore be spent on assessing the genuineness of a recipient's commitment.

(g) Other Considerations

Recipient commitment to PRTA will also be influenced by:
(i) The likely cost of the assistance. In some countries, especially in South Asia, resistance to TA would be understandable since the cost per month of a consultant may be ten to thirty times higher than local salaries. In such cases, and in the absence of grants to support TA, the cost of TA must be lowered, for example, through direct recruitment of specialists from the more advanced developing countries or through the use of shorter term consultants where appropriate.

(ii) The availability of alternative sources of financing for the assistance. Governments may not be prepared to borrow for TA unless they are satisfied that they have no other choice. The World Bank's policy, for example, is to be a lender of last resort for TA; thus it normally recommends TA as part of a loan or credit only after Bank staff have failed to identify additional sources of grant aid.

(iii) The possibility of promoting the country's capabilities through the use of national rather than expatriate consultants and firms, where appropriate. This is also Bank policy (see its Guidelines for the Use of Consultants).

(iv) Firsthand knowledge of the experience of the more advanced developing countries. Such information may be acquired by sending key nationals on professional visits to these countries during the stage of project preparation.

(v) Understanding that alternative TA delivery systems do exist, and that some of them may better fit the recipient's needs or level of development than the hiring of long-term experts. Such alternatives include the use of short-term "visiting" experts or panels of experts, and the "twinning" of agencies (see Section III).
B. Feasibility of the Assistance

Another important part of the identification process is to determine whether the identified needs can be met in terms of the state of the art and expertise available, the organizational environment in which TA is to take place, and the time and cost of the parent project. In the case of technical problems, "off-the-shelf" technology may be applicable here and there and may be readily obtainable from existing publications or from established consulting firms. This situation can be expected in the hardware-dominated sectors, as well as in areas (such as utilities accounting) where standard software technologies can be used.

Wherever the technology is to be adapted to the local environment, however, the work can only be effective if the recipient's knowledge of local conditions and TA specialists' technical knowledge are combined. This may cause the recipients to wonder, especially in the case of TA/i, whether the state of the art is sufficiently advanced to provide genuine expertise, or whether the problem to be solved can be adequately addressed by the means proposed. The problem is that in a number of areas of institutional development, little has been written that is directly applicable to the type of administrative, financial, and sociological environment present in most developing countries. The task for these countries is, for example, to

"Find effective ways of delivering essential foreign technical improvements to a large number of people. The problem is how to develop and administer delivery systems for new applied technologies such as educational TV, miracle seeds and fertilizers, and birth control devices. They must also find ways of organizing large-scale action programs which will increase economic efficiency or enhance social welfare through the application of new knowledge. Often these programs involve many organizations and groups in simultaneous and complementary activities under conditions of uncertainty. Their problem is no longer how to transfer or even adapt known technologies, but rather how to find the
combinations of incentives, methods and institutions that will work in specific situations. This problem must be solved largely through experimentation. How can a country improve and expand its secondary school system so that it will produce the kinds of graduates it will need? How can it organize and operate a progressive income tax system where prosperous citizens have never felt an obligation to pay income taxes? How can it design, organize and administer an incentive system that will induce and assist manufacturers to enter the export business? 

Thus technical assistance in these and similar areas should be understood as "action research" rather than as the transfer of accepted wisdom. This need can only be met through a long-term strategy for developing local research capabilities.

In all the cases of successful PRTA reviewed here, the assistance was aimed at particular needs for which the technical or institutional solutions were well established; where local adaptation was required, success was achieved through a joint effort of expatriate and local specialists. Whenever both parties failed to understand each other, however, the project appeared to suffer. In one of the projects, for example, a difference of opinion (though not immediately apparent) arose over the term of service of a project management unit for which technical assistance was to be provided. The designers saw this as a permanent unit, whereas the recipient's staff in the unit considered it to be only a temporary expedient and believed that they should be able to return to their ministry of origin to pursue their careers and become eligible for promotion. As a result, their commitment to the unit and to the development of a permanent capability for project management in the sector suffered. A solution to this problem might have been to break down the project into smaller components under the jurisdiction of the relevant

ministries and to provide assistance that would enable them to increase their individual capabilities and performance as well as coordinate their efforts.

Once technical feasibility has been established, the next step in the identification stage should be to relate the possible technical assistance to the three environments in which any project operates: (a) the internal or "controlled" environment, which consists of resources that are needed for project completion and that are under the control of the implementing agency; (b) the "influenceable" environment, which is made up of external entities that can both influence and be influenced by the implementing agency; and (c) the "appreciated" environment, which is composed of those entities that affect its performance but are neither controlled nor influenced by the project management. Traditionally, organization designers have focused their attention almost exclusively on the controlled environment and have either accepted passively as constraints or considered as irrelevant the factors and elements that are beyond management's control. Few have tried to take advantage of these elements, despite their potential contribution to achieving common goals if only the efforts of the external entities were coordinated, mutually reinforced, or even pooled. Similarly, in setting goals for individual consultants, TA designers have tended to concentrate on the project requirements and ideal conditions; environmental constraints seem to be taken into account only when TA performance is assessed.

Other important considerations at the onset of a project are administrative feasibility and the availability of local skills and resources that can be used to prepare TA proposals and to manage the TA, both in substance and administratively. Examination of these points may lead project designers to identify further needs for preparatory or managerial assistance and for staff training, as well as for institution-building (see Section IV). In addition, it may help them to

determine whether budgetary constraints will impede the creation of permanent positions for national staff in replacement of expatriate staff, where this is intended.

Many aid agencies believe that PRTA objectives should not be overly ambitious. Modest goals, they argue, are more easily achieved, and thus give the beneficiary a sense of accomplishment; in addition, they provide a firm basis on which to build further development of local capabilities. PRTA should be planned as sequential parts of a development program: that is, it must focus both on the short-term goals of projects and long-term goals for development (p. 24).

The underlying assumption here is that major improvements and changes occur incrementally over time and not rapidly or all at once. The Bank's lending pattern is well suited to take advantage of this, because in a given sector there usually are repeater projects implemented over a number of years. Thus, in first projects PRTA can be project specific, whereas it can pursue broader objectives for the sector—such as institutional development or a stronger capability for policy planning—in repeater projects. This approach facilitates planning for successful implementation. It also enables both recipient and donor to clarify goals and adopt strategies and action programs directed at long-term PRTA objectives.

Conclusions

Project-related institutional TA, that is, assistance likely to require behavioral changes of the recipient—especially assistance for policy, institutional, and direct operational support—must be wanted by the recipient if it is to succeed. For TA to be wanted, its objectives must be clear and acceptable and it must be feasible in terms of the time and resources allocated and the current state of the art; preferably, TA should be conceived as part of an institution-building strategy that will allow the recipient to learn by doing. All of this is more likely to occur when, as emphasized in this section, the following principles are observed: (a) the assistance should be identified and designed with the same spirit
of partnership as will be required during its implementation; (b) any differences of opinion that may arise between the recipient, the project designers, and the aid agency should be quickly brought to light (in a culturally appropriate manner) and reconciled; (c) the relevant political and technical levels of the government should be brought into the decisionmaking process; and (d) all parties should feel equally responsible for the quality of the TA design and should be not only committed to its successful implementation, but also prepared to modify the TA assignment in the light of implementation experience. These principles are derived from the experience of Bank staff associated with successful PRTA and are confirmed by organization theory.\textsuperscript{12} PRTA should thus be understood and approached as technical cooperation,\textsuperscript{13} and every step in the TA process should reinforce the commitment of all parties concerned. This mutuality of interest and cooperation are evident in all the cases reviewed for this study.

The above principles cannot always be applied, however, and the recipient, the project designers, and the aid agency may continue to differ over the need for TA, its objectives, or its feasibility. When that is the case, decisionmakers have the following options:

(a) They can minimize the need for the assistance by redesigning the project technology (if feasible), reducing the project complexity, making the TA objectives less ambitious, or slowing down the pace of project implementation.

(b) They can provide flexibility for implementing the TA over time if the project remains marginally feasible without all of the assistance.


\textsuperscript{13} An approach that has been recommended for more than twenty-five years. See "Technical Cooperation in Latin America--Recommendations for the Future," A Statement by the NPA Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation, June 1956. See also Yashpal Tandon, \textit{Technical Assistance Administration in Eastern Africa} (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell [for] Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1973).
(c) They can postpone or drop the project.

The hiring of TA personnel could be made a condition of lending, but there is no way of ensuring that the recipient will make use of the assistance. As one staff member has observed, "It is vital to make sure recipients appreciate the need for technical assistance because if they're browbeaten into it, it won't work."

III. DESIGN OF THE SERVICES

Many who are experienced in designing and providing technical assistance are of the opinion that the personalities of those involved, as well as some element of luck, are responsible for at least half of the success in PRTA. There is no doubt, however, that some design, let alone good design, sets the stage for success. PRTA design is a delicate process in which many factors have to be considered and for which there is no universal formula for success. This means that TA and project designers have to be aware of the choices open to them and of the implications of those choices before they can tailor their design to the situation and environment at hand. The critical choices pertain to four main components of PRTA:

(a) Terms of reference (TOR)
(b) Roles of experts and national staff
(c) Sources of assistance and contractual arrangements
(d) Training design

A. Terms of Reference14/

As suggested by Bank and other aid agency staff, TOR should clearly specify the objectives of the TA and define realistically the tasks

14/ This section is derived in part from and should be read in conjunction with "The Use of Consultants," A Multimedia Module prepared by Maurice Dickerson and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI), 1983.
to be performed (including the reporting requirements), the amount of time and cost involved, and the types of specialists required. Meanwhile, outputs and milestones by which to gauge progress towards interim and ultimate targets should also be clearly specified (if only to provide incentives to TA managers). However, the procedures for implementing the TOR need not be given in detail, particularly in the case of institutional and policy studies. In other words, consultants should not be told how to do their job, but what areas must be covered and to what extent. TOR should be flexible and negotiable (within reason), not rigid. The value of such flexibility can be seen in the experience of a colleague on a TA assignment. He arrived with broad terms of reference that had to be made more explicit; the task of doing so was shared by him and the government during lengthy negotiations, but ultimately both parties ended up with a work program with which they were genuinely satisfied. In another case, the original terms of reference for a transport coordination study that was successfully completed had to be almost entirely rewritten after a review of the consultants' first six months of work demonstrated that the TOR were inappropriate.

The prospective consultant or adviser should be encouraged to refine the initial diagnosis in the field before the terms of reference are finalized, particularly in institutional and policy studies. The TOR appearing in the project appraisal report are merely estimates, and it is not until all the "actors" are in the field that they can determine what is really needed and what will work. Not until then will the consultant be able to negotiate properly the TOR with the TA recipient and the aid agency\(^{15/}\) or will he or she have a clear idea of the task at hand, as will the recipient. This procedure can also help a recipient who is unsure of what to expect or how to use TA personnel and can be essential when the success of the TA depends on the joint efforts of external and local

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15/ Strictly speaking, when aid agencies such as the World Bank lend for TA, the consultant's contract is with the borrower only. In turn, the loan agreement between the borrower and the World Bank requires Bank agreement to the consultants and their TOR.
staff. Furthermore, the resulting terms of reference (with respect to both the time and cost of the project) are more likely to be reasonable, and the recipient more likely to make effective use of the consultant services.\textsuperscript{16/}
The Inception Report, usually prepared after the consultant has been on the job for about six weeks, provides another opportunity to bring to the recipient's attention inconsistencies in the TOR, problems of staffing, and the like. If the extent of the overall assignment cannot be determined at the time the TOR are drafted, the assignment can be split, say into two phases, and the "scope of work" defined only for Phase I, during which the consultant, either alone or with recipient staff, would produce draft TOR for Phase II for consideration by the client. Such phasing is a common practice in management and training assignments. When technical assistance involves studies or policy work, consultants may have to specify what assistance the recipient may need to implement the recommendations arising from this work.

TOR should indicate the organizational entity to which TA staff will be assigned, individuals to whom they should report and have access, and the amount of authority to be delegated to them. The effectiveness of these arrangements usually depends on the competence of the project manager and his ability to make the best use of the TA team (see Section IV).

When TOR are prepared for a study linked to a future project that may not be financed by the aid agency financing the study, or by that agency alone, draft TOR should be discussed with potential investors or financing sources as early as possible.

Although TOR are mandatory for expatriate experts, consultants, and advisers, they are seldom drawn up for national staff. Such an exercise could help both the recipient and the consultants to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities. It could also help to eliminate the unproductive role often given to local staff, who are asked

\textsuperscript{16/} This procedure also gives the recipient an opportunity to verify not only the prospective consultants' technical competence, but also their sensitivity to local conditions and their suitability as trainers (section IV).
to be mere counterparts of the consultants and are assigned no specific responsibilities.

B. Role of Experts and National Staff

The role of national staff as compared with that of outside consultants has only recently been given some attention, partly at the insistence of aid recipients who have become more capable, self-assertive, and sophisticated.TOR should be prepared for both expatriate and local personnel, and should indicate which (or which combination) of the following four basic models of TA would be appropriate in the given circumstances:

A. Performer model
B. Prescriptive model
C. Apprentice-teacher model
D. Collaborative model

The performer or substitute model, also called client-expert model, assumes that the TA recipient (or donor agency) correctly identifies the needs, communicates them correctly to the expert, and accurately assesses the capability of the expert to perform the required services. The significant element in this model is the end product of the services provided, and thus no attempt is made to develop local skills. This approach is particularly useful when the end product can be specified in detail (such as an audit) and when the emphasis is on time, cost, and adherence to the design specifications.17/ A variant of this model involves "administering" or "substituting"; that is, direct operational support is provided until local talent can be recruited and trained to fill a given position. This is essentially a caretaker function. If carefully

designed, this variant of the performer model may be helpful in other respects: for instance, it can enhance the development of local managerial capabilities by providing the recipient with a role model.\textsuperscript{18/} If not well designed, it may continue to give the dominant role to expatriate specialists whose own objectives run counter to those promoting the development of indigenous capabilities.

The prescriptive model, also called the patient-doctor model, assumes that the adviser who is brought in to diagnose a problem will find out what is wrong and which part of the organization needs attention. This model assumes that the "patient" will be willing to reveal the kind of information that the "doctor" needs to make the diagnosis. The chances for success are limited, especially when the adviser is hired at the insistence of a donor agency—for example, as a condition of lending.

A variant of this model, the host-guest relationship, has a greater chance of success. Several Bank staff who were interviewed mentioned that the consultant who is an effective outside catalyst can promote needed changes that insiders can seldom propose. First, by expressing surprise about current practices, the consultant can sensitize local staff to the issues and possible alternatives. Second, even when insiders are aware of problems and the need for change, they may hesitate to offer their suggestions or criticisms for fear of inviting the disapproval of higher authority or their peer group, being labeled as troublemakers, or losing their jobs. An expatriate consultant is not as constrained by local customs or group pressures and, as a foreigner, is "expendable" and may be allowed to do or say things that a national would not or could not do. This is not to say that expatriates should be insensitive to the local environment; rather, if they can be perceived as "guests" who are genuinely interested in the well-being of the "host,"

\textsuperscript{18/} See Annex 3, "A Systems Approach to the Delivery of Technical Assistance for Management Development."
rather than as high-cost temporary employees concerned mainly with personal gain, they can use their "foreign-ness" to promote change.\footnote{19}{As suggested by Father Vincent Cosmao, Director of "Centre Lebret," Paris, in a conversation with the authors.}

The counterpart-adviser (apprentice-teacher) relationship is based on the view that development consists mainly of the diffusion or transfer of skills and technologies. The outsider is placed in an advisory role, but he is expected to contribute technical advice and to transfer skills to the national counterparts. The difficulty with this widely espoused model of on-the-job-training is that the designer's training expectations are rarely realized, largely because "long-term advisers slip easily into the performer role when the counterpart is unassertive or unavailable; moreover, even when the long-term strategy has adopted the teacher mode, short-term assistance may be based exclusively on the performer model, which to many Westerners is more satisfying anyway."\footnote{20}{Honadle, Gow, and Silverman, "Technical Assistance Alternatives for Rural Development."}

When such a situation occurs, donor agency staff are particularly concerned that the whole undertaking may fall apart as soon as the adviser leaves.\footnote{21}{Hence, one of the European aid agencies has adopted the policy of changing the profile of its specialists from "doers" to catalysts or facilitators. Candidates are selected on the basis of both their technical competence and pedagogical or psychological suitability (see section IV).}

More specific TOR will only partly remedy this problem, since much will depend on how the consultant and the national staff actually work together. A variant of this model that is more likely to succeed divides the long-term assignment into a series of shorter term assignments, during which the same specialist visits the recipient's staff to advise and coach them on their work and to verify its quality. (In some instances, one TA staff member may have to remain in the field to maintain continuity and provide access to the consultants in case of unforeseen problems).
approach, often referred to as coaching or "bus-stopping," can be used when nationals who are almost fully competent are available to do the work and when the initial assignment is long enough for the outside specialist to become familiar with the local situation. In another variant, a full-time or part-time training specialist is made a member of the TA team. A third possibility is to secure the services of a panel of experts (as was done in a multipurpose project in Korea, in an education project in China and in a highway project in Argentina), which the recipient can call upon, as needed, to reinforce its own staff or provide a second opinion on the quality of their work.

The central problem in all these models seems to be one of finding a balance between a TA specialist with no authority and little responsibility and one who does all the work himself and gives local staff little chance to gain experience. The collaborative model attempts to find that balance by ensuring that the local staff perform key functions and share the responsibility for the success or failure of these activities.22/ The collaborative model can take several forms: the TA specialist may be a professional colleague; or he may act as a catalyst, a broker, or even a mobilizer, thereby enabling others to act, combining advisory with advocacy functions, and building local institutional capabilities. Although there is always a risk that the suggestions of specialists will not be implemented and that their advice will be ignored, in most of the cases we reviewed the specialists and their local colleagues had a strong working relationship and the national staff backed up the specialists, did not hesitate to call upon them, and incorporated their advice and services into the work program.

Like the above-mentioned "coaching" arrangements that overlap Models C and D, "twinning" arrangements are also an effective way of providing assistance. In this case, professional ties are established between an institution in a developing country and a similar but more

22/ An interesting example is provided by the successful implementation of a transport survey in Uruguay. In its letter of invitation, the sponsor encouraged the consultants submitting proposals to make use of available personnel from the sponsor's staff, and even provided relevant background information on the latter.
mature organization in another part of the world (preferably one that is backed up by a consulting firm with worldwide experience). Such ties facilitate the integration of TA and training (locally and abroad) and provide a framework for longer term collaboration, when needed, after the specialists have departed. Joint ventures are a special form of twinning. Annex 4 summarizes the available experience with this approach.

When TA designers wish to recommend a particular model of TA, they should also specify a delivery mode that reinforces the desired behavior, as shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of TA</th>
<th>Delivery Mode</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Performer (client-expert)</td>
<td>A. Long-term adviser for direct operational support, or to perform feasibility or other studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or substitute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Prescriptive (patient-doctor); host-guest</td>
<td>B. Short-term specialists to diagnose a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Apprentice-teacher; counterpart-expert; team member-coach</td>
<td>C. Combination long- and short-term advisers, together with a training specialist or coaching by visiting expert arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Collaborative; partnership; action research</td>
<td>D. Team of national and expatriate specialists, panel of experts, &quot;twinning&quot; arrangements, joint ventures, participation in international professional associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any one of these four models may be appropriate in a given situation, depending on the nature of the task, the availability and degree of competence of the recipient's staff, and the local manager's managerial style. The "coaching" and the "collaborative" models seem particularly promising, however, because they assign meaningful tasks to both expatriate and local personnel, and encourage them to work together as a team and to
learn from each other. Experience also suggests that the chances of TA success are increased when more than one form of TA is specified; thus, if any one should fail, the whole would not be doomed.23/

C. Sources of Assistance and Contractual Arrangements

There are many potential sources of TA, including expatriate and local specialists and consulting firms, U.N. and multilateral agencies including the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI), NGOs and volunteer organizations, bilateral aid agencies, private manufacturers, multinational corporations, universities, agencies similar to the TA recipient in developed and more advanced developing countries, and trade and professional associations. Many of these sources of assistance were involved with the TA aspects of the projects reviewed in this study.

Individual experts as against consulting firms. One of the choices PRTA designers have to make is whether to recommend the use of individual experts or consulting firms. The PRTA tasks, the local capabilities, and the project design will influence this decision. Wherever local capabilities are strong, it may be best to hire an individual expert to advise local staff. In a highways projects in Argentina, for example, individual consultants were hired to help national staff prepare a National Transport Study (after the disappointing initial employment of a consortium of consulting firms for whom the individuals worked). Having had primary responsibility for the study, the Argentines, as its final authors, developed a strong sense of "ownership" of the work, and therefore seemed more willing to make use of the study's findings and recommendations than they would have been if a consulting firm had done it.

for them. An individual expert might also be preferable if local capabilities are very limited and the expert is hired as an adviser on policy or planning matters who is expected to work closely with a high-level counterpart in a ministry (as was the case in a water supply project in Somalia). In other cases, too, outstanding individual specialists have been able to persuade an initially skeptical recipient of the usefulness of assistance.

Some aid agency staff recommended against the hiring of individuals who are not on the permanent staff of a consulting firm or U.N. agency, for fear they may be "adventurers" who may prove difficult to dismiss if they do not perform satisfactorily. If individuals are recruited through an overseas organization such as a recruiting agency, such an organization generally has no responsibility for the individual's performance—except possibly to replace individuals at the client's request. The likelihood that such difficulties will arise can be reduced by arranging an initial short-term assignment to refine their TOR before confirming the contracts.

When a number of experts are needed in the field—particularly when the work of one depends on the work of another—it is generally easier and less time consuming to hire them as a team rather than as individuals. In a rural development project in Tanzania, for example, the Land Use Team and the Roads Unit were staffed as teams and all key members arrived in the field at the same time. Projects staff believe that these factors contributed to the teams' success.

Every consulting firm, however, does not necessarily function as a team and turn out effective work. The ability of experts to work together depends on their personalities, perhaps on past experience in

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24/ When such studies are undertaken by expatriate specialists working alone, the studies tend to sit on a shelf (Model A above). For that reason, the new policy of one bilateral aid agency is that both local and expatriate specialists must be full partners in the studies the agency finances, especially those concerned with rural development (Model D above).
working together, and above all on the team leader. The advantages of using consulting firms (or other government or nongovernmental organizations with TA as their sole function) are that they have a reputation to maintain, provide professional and administrative support to their field staff, and can place and replace field staff in a timely fashion. The effectiveness of consultants in the field can be greatly enhanced by well-organized, expeditious, and continuous technical support from headquarters, reinforcement of the field staff by short-term specialists, and periodic field visits by headquarters staff. One successful training organization adds at least 25 percent to the cost of its specialists to allow for professional support. In doing so, it acknowledges that an individual specialist cannot be expert in everything, and provides a mechanism to fill any gaps in the expert's knowledge.

Use of local experts. Since TA financed by the World Bank does not have to be procured from abroad, these projects present designers with another choice: whether to call upon expatriate specialists, encourage joint ventures between expatriate and local consultants, or rely upon locally available qualified staff and experts. The decision will partly depend on the technology to be used in the parent project--both its type and level of complexity--and the extent to which the technology will have to be adapted to local circumstances. Needless to say, in using local expertise the recipient is also building up local capabilities. In some instances there may be a trade-off, however, in that expatriates may do the job more quickly and thereby ensure on-target production and a high rate of return, but, on the other hand, this may be at the expense of developing local skills and sustaining the project benefits over the longer term (an issue often raised in the case of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa). Thus, recipient and aid agency staff should agree on the project's short- and long-term goals before deciding whether local staff or expatriate assistance is more appropriate.

In decisions of this type, the recipient may also wish to consider political factors (some governments insist on nothing less than
"top-of-the-line" expertise if they are going to have technical assistance at all, psychological factors (the relative salary level of expatriate as against local staff), and budgetary factors (use of externally financed TA personnel as a substitute for national staff with local budgetary resources). 25/ Irrespective of these considerations, the World Bank's policy is to encourage the use of domestic consultants and firms whenever such firms are qualified to perform the work, either alone or in combination with foreign firms. 26/

Recipients may also wish to encourage joint ventures between expatriate and local firms, in which case the contracts should clearly define the responsibilities and services to be provided by each firm. Although various contractual arrangements are possible, it seems preferable for the recipient to contract first with the expatriate firm, which then subcontracts with the local firm. Thus the expatriate firm is responsible for the entire assignment, and the TA recipient does not have to take responsibility for coordination. Furthermore, this arrangement provides an opportunity for both firms to share their respective expertise as long as they are willing partners. 27/ Once the local firm has acquired sufficient experience, the contractual relationships can be reversed.

U.N. agencies and NGOs. When U.N. agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in some aspect of a project, their relationship with the TA recipient must also be clarified. Although these agencies usually deal with member countries as an equal partner, projects financed by another donor are likely to be implemented through a

25/ The UNDP's TOKTEN (Transfer of Know-how through Expatriate Nationals) system avoids several of the pitfalls associated with short-term assignments by expatriates. Under this system, national staff working abroad volunteer their time to serve briefly in their country of origin. See TOKTEN/Global Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 5, (Ankara: UNDP, January 1983).


27/ Ibid., paras. 1.12-1.14.
contractual relationship under which the U.N. agency (or NGO) is engaged by a client and the agency's staff is expected to report to the client.28/

One particularly promising source of assistance is that provided by volunteer retired executives through the International Executive Service Corps (U.S.A.) and similar organizations in Canada, the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Annex 5).

D. Training Design

Implicitly or explicitly, almost all PRTA aims at transferring skills from expatriate to local staff. This transfer is accomplished by various mechanisms from formal training courses for which local staff are sent overseas, to exposure to the work of consultants on the job. The training strategy adopted will depend, among other factors, on the project and PRTA goals, on local capabilities and goals, the financing and time available, and the individual expatriate's or consulting firm's training experience. If training is to be effective, however, it must be properly planned (preferably with the help of a training specialist) and implemented as an integral part of the project and the training efforts of the recipient country.

In most of the projects reviewed in this study, TA was provided for "doing" a task (Model A) as well as for training staff. In some cases, the consultant hired "to do" was also expected to train (Model C). Aid agency staff do not all agree that this strategy works. In several power projects in Honduras, for instance, the Hondurans gained planning capabilities as a result of being exposed to the work of the consultants. On-the-job training appears to be effective, particularly in construction and contract management, as suggested by the Honduran experience and by a

28/ It should be noted that when the World Bank provides "reimbursable" TA, it similarly becomes a contracting party employed by a member country.
recent interview with the manager of technology transfer in a major U.S. engineering and construction firm.\textsuperscript{29/}

For the most part, however, Bank and other aid agency staff do not consider training as a by-product of the performer model of TA to be very effective. They cite a number of reasons for this:

(a) Consultants know that their performance will be judged on the basis of the quality and timeliness of the product they produce and thus stress these items over training, as they did in several projects reviewed in this study. In some cases the consultant's contract failed to provide sufficient support (time and money) for the training.\textsuperscript{30/}

(b) Not all experts are effective trainers. Moreover, TOR may specify training as a part of the expert's


\textsuperscript{30/} One contract, for example, provided, that "to the extent that timely performance of the work is not hindered thereby, [the consultants] shall permit the Client's personnel to observe and participate in all phases of the performance of the Work to the maximum extent possible with the goal being to achieve maximum transfer of technology possible from such observation and participation. In particular, the Client shall have the right to assign reasonable numbers of its staff to work with [the consultant's] Personnel on the job, with the purpose of such assignment being through on the job training:

a) to assist the Client's staff in understanding the methods and techniques employed by (the consultants),

b) to train the Client's staff in project management and technical skills related to the Project, and

c) to improve the Client's ability to execute the Project.

The training responsibility of [the consultant] stated above shall be deemed included within the Work, and [the consultant] shall not be entitled to any separate compensation for providing such training. The expense of such trainees shall be borne by the Client."
functions but mention only technical competence as the necessary qualification for the assignment and may not provide a specific amount for the additional work involved in training local staff.31/

(c) Some consultants, it is said, deliberately deemphasize training, fearing that otherwise they might eventually become obsolete.

(d) It is sometimes difficult to recruit a counterpart who can work with the expert at the appropriate professional level: there may be no qualified local staff; if there are, they may have no interest in the training; they may think that little can be learned under the counterpart system (adults indeed learn more by carrying out substantive responsibilities than by observation).32/ Moreover, the counterparts may be only temporarily employed on the project, having been seconded from other important assignments so that the conditions set by the aid agency could be met.

(e) In countries with severe shortages of trained manpower, isolated efforts are unlikely to be effective. A broader sectoral approach to training is more appropriate here.

Most aid agency staff seem to favor separate training and consulting contracts (for instance, through subcontracts to a reputable firm) as they allow each firm to focus on its own speciality. In some

31/ See World Bank, Guidelines for the Use of Consultants, paras. 2.56-2.59 (training).

cases, consulting engineers may be subcontracted to the training consultants. Barring that, the TA program should provide for a training officer.

The TA or project designer has several other training strategies from which to choose: formal or nonformal training or a mix of both; training on the job, in-house, in-country, in the region, or overseas. All these strategies have advantages and disadvantages—the choice will depend on the training objectives and the financial and time constraints. It is useful, as mentioned earlier, to have specific training and competence targets in mind because training has to be designed to fit specific needs; overtraining amounts to training for export. The aim of most project-related training is intended to increase the practical skills of the trainees; hence, it should be directly related to the trainee's job. One way of doing this is to "sandwich" the training with work, that is, intersperse a training period with a period on the job so that the trainee has an opportunity to try out his newly acquired knowledge or skills. Another strategy is to train on the job first, identify the "star pupils", and then give them more intensive training elsewhere. Yet another strategy is to have people work overseas rather than attend a formal course, so that they will be able to learn through experience, for instance, under a "twinning" arrangement. Whenever special courses or overseas training threatens to isolate some trainees from their co-workers and actual job environment, however, national personnel can instead be given periodic coaching by a visiting expert or can consult with a panel (or bank) of experts (p. 39).

Staff who are in positions above the trainees should be directly involved in the identification, design, and implementation process. In this way they can ensure that the trainee's new skills will be used and that those around him will not feel threatened by the trainee's improved abilities. One method of involving staff is to set up special workshops for the managers of those to be trained, or to include them in the opening and closing sessions of the training programs. TA advisers in the field should attempt to train not only their colleagues but also the managers of their colleagues to ensure high-level support for their work and the work
of those who were trained. TA staff can reinforce the training by following up on the activities of ex-trainees and by assembling training materials that can be used in procedural or technical manuals by the organization.

A frequently experienced problem is the loss of trainees by the sponsoring organization once they have acquired new skills. In the civil service of many countries the link between job performance and reward is tenuous, and consequently the most competent staff become demoralized. These people have little incentive to seek training or to remain on the job after receiving it. To be most effective, then, training must be part of a strategy for institutional improvement that includes the development of a personnel management system that motivates people to perform to the best of their ability.

Effective training programs were conducted in power projects in Algeria and Tanzania, where trainees sent abroad on fellowships returned to the power company because career development, benefits, and salaries were good. Another successful experience has been reported for a steel expansion project in Turkey, where the introduction of continuous casting necessitated training in theory, operations, and maintenance. The training was structured in three phases: first, teams of national staff were sent to suppliers' shops and factories abroad so that they could become familiar with the new equipment; second, the suppliers' experts and consultants conducted training in the plant in Turkey; and, finally, specialized outsiders were retained on-site for continuing training and troubleshooting in operations and maintenance. A third effective program concerned a highway project in Argentina, under which a successful training course was implemented with the help of the Bank's Economic Development Institute. Twenty university graduates, all of whom were engineers or economists, were taught English and then given eighteen to twenty-four months of instruction. The design of the training was facilitated by the fact that the trainees had similar backgrounds and education. They were young, eager to learn, and not too concerned about their low salaries. Obliged to work for the government for one year after completing their training, they were all immediately absorbed into jobs with the transport agency. After
completing their year with the agency, they dispersed to other public and private agencies within the transport field. This was the intended result of their training program. The team spirit they developed as trainees was the basis for building a network of professionals across all transport modes in Argentina—a network of people who knew one another and had worked together. In this case, many of the key factors in successful training were present:

The sponsoring agency, particularly its director, was committed to the training.

All of the trainees selected desired the training.

Because they had similar educational backgrounds and experience, it was easier to design the training program; they were at the same level in their careers and that level was known by the program designers.

They had an incentive to use their new skills within the sponsoring agency.

One final observation on training: most of the training efforts reviewed in this study were directed at public sector bureaucracies. Thus it might be advisable to round out this review by looking more closely at the private sector, especially when the development goal is to train and develop entrepreneurs.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Many evaluation studies emphasize the importance of administrative design—once the nature of the assignment and of the TA services has been defined. Without it, there would be delays in the recruitment of national and expatriate staff, problems with unsuitable personnel, inadequate material or administrative support from the recipient
agencies, and inadequate guidance or weak supervision of TA personnel during their assignment—all of which would probably lead to cost overruns and poor performance. This section therefore focuses on administrative design, selection of national and expatriate staff, behavioral factors as a selection criterion, and the role of national managers.

A. Administrative Design

Administration of TA can be extremely burdensome for a recipient, especially where the recipient's inadequate administrative or managerial capacity created the demand for assistance in the first place or where the additional administrative load strains already limited staff resources. This burden may be even greater in Bank-financed TA, where the recipient agency is responsible for all aspects of implementation, as opposed to TA provided by many bilateral and multilateral agencies that carry out a large share of the administration of TA themselves. In some countries such as Bangladesh, Colombia, and Ecuador, TA has therefore been provided to help create a central capability within the government in order to assist other agencies in preparing TOR, identifying and selecting consultants, negotiating TA contracts, and monitoring progress.

Once agreement is reached on which agency should be responsible for selecting TA staff and managing the TA, it is necessary to ascertain the agency's ability to mobilize and maintain support services during implementation. In the projects reviewed here, at least part of the success of the TA was ascribed to the project manager's ability to mobilize the resources needed for effective implementation. Two levels of services are involved: logistical support, and management of the professional aspects of the TA.

Logistical and administrative support includes arrangements for office space and supplies, secretarial services, and transportation for field visits. The ability of longer term specialists to do their work also depends on how much time they must spend arranging for housing, furniture, customs clearances, personal transportation, access to health services, and their personal or family needs. To minimize the risk that TA staff might
waste time that could be spent on the project— as well as create ill-feelings by appearing to be more concerned by their material comfort than by the substance of their assignment, or become demoralized if the recipient entity cannot provide adequate support— it may be necessary to strengthen the entity's capacity to do so. Alternatively, the consulting firm may be contracted to provide the necessary administrative and logistical support. Most aid agency staff believe that even though experts provided by a consulting firm may cost up to twice as much per staff-month as individually recruited experts, the results are usually worth the higher cost.

The administrative design should also specify any other contribution (financial or in kind) the recipient will make to the TA assignment and the arrangements for briefing, supervising, and backstopping the TA team, as well as for coordinating the team's activities with those of other government agencies or sources of assistance. It should also include arrangements for creating permanent positions to replace expatriates (where this is intended) and for following up on policy or other recommendations. Continuity of staff from the design stage to implementation (or some provision to ensure that the designers and implementers at least have access to each other) will aid in clarifying the TA goals, methods, concepts and constraints.

Periodic joint evaluation by the aid agency, the recipient and the consultants will allow TA assignments to be modified over time in accordance with the implementation experience, which the TA team will periodically report. Although, in general, TOR in TA for project design

See World Bank Guidelines for the Use of Consultants, paras. 2.52-2.55.

Continuity of staffing between design and management of development projects is identified as a key factor of success in S. Paul's review of development projects (Samuel Paul, Managing Development Programmes, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). It is also normal practice to retain the same firm to carry out feasibility studies and the subsequent detailed engineering and construction supervision in the case of engineering TA.
do not have to be refined and adjusted as often as TA for improving institutions, the scheduling or even the scope of all TA assignments may have to be adjusted as conditions change. Joint evaluation is one way to maintain mutual trust and a spirit of cooperation among all the parties concerned (section V).

B. Selection of Staff and Trainees

Selection procedures for both local and expatriate staff should ensure the recruitment of a competent, well-motivated and mutually compatible TA team.

National staff. The availability of appropriate local staff to be trained and/or to become members of the TA team should be established as early as possible. This early action is vital for successful implementation of the project, for identifying training needs, and for organizing the advance training of local staff so that they can receive maximum benefit from contact with the expatriate experts. It should not simply be assumed that national staff (or counterparts) at the appropriate level are available, nor should their availability be made a mere condition of granting the assistance because it may be that no staff are available during project implementation.

In some countries it has become difficult to obtain national staff for development projects because many well-trained and motivated staff are attracted by the opportunities in the Middle Eastern countries, where they can earn more. Despite such cases, or those in which trained staff have been induced to leave private employment because of low salaries in the public sector, governments have been able to call upon local consultants to work with the expatriate specialists, as occurred in an irrigation project in Indonesia. When government staff are reluctant to work on a project outside the major cities, special financial or career incentives may be necessary.

Another common problem is that national staff may be assigned to a project for reasons unrelated to the project's requirements; they are then less likely to be interested in the project or even to be trainable.
Moreover, it may be impossible to force them out. In a recent paper, Denyse Harari discusses the receptivity of counterparts as an important factor in successful technical assistance:

Only one attitude, the willingness to cooperate, lends itself to genuine cooperation and to a concentration of the strength of the two partners in an effort of combined efficiency.... Two other attitudes which the expert may meet among his counterparts often depend on factors over which he has no control. The attitude of rejection displayed by some nationals in certain cases is not even directed at the expert himself but at the organization to which he belongs.... The passivity which experts may find resisting their efforts is often due to the actual structure of the government department to which the official or counterpart with whom they are supposed to be cooperating is answerable.35/

Allowing staff to volunteer for an assignment, especially a difficult one, may be a useful selection technique, as was demonstrated in an agricultural development project in Cameroon. Because the project site was in a remote area, only those who welcomed the challenge and wanted to participate became involved; staff self-selection was therefore the basis for a strong commitment to the project's success. One might infer from this experience that projects located in or near metropolitan areas may suffer because the staff may tend to be absorbed in city life. One technique that will help to ensure that the staff is motivated is to involve the consultant or trainer in the establishment of selection criteria and/or the prescreening of candidates; thus other considerations that the government may legitimately need to consider in the final selection apply only to already acceptable candidates.

Although it may seem obvious that trainee selection should involve an accurate assessment of each candidate's present skill level to ensure that the trainee is neither too skilled nor insufficiently skilled for the training proposed, surprisingly such a step is not always taken. Again, the training institution should probably participate in the selection process, conducted according to agreed criteria; otherwise, it cannot be expected to meet the agreed performance objectives. The case of Tanzania's electricity supply company in association with the Irish Electricity Supply Board, as described in the World Development Report 1983, provides a model for the design and implementation of staff training.

Expatriate staff. In selecting expatriate staff, particularly consultants, the recipient should follow generally accepted and sound selection and contracting procedures; if these are lacking, he should be given assistance in establishing them, for instance through a central entity (p. 52). Simple contracting procedures are useful since they enable the consultants to start work in the field immediately. When several groups of expatriates are hired from different organizations for the same project, their conditions of employment should be comparable.

Once an appropriate TA model and delivery mode have been chosen, the advantages and disadvantages of recruiting independent individuals as against personnel from firms or U.N. agencies must be weighed (Section III). Moreover, when a consulting firm is hired, the recipient has to decide whether to opt for a large or a small firm. The standard criteria

36/ The quality of TA staff is often related to their job security, that is, their assurance of returning to their former employer without loss of seniority after completion of the TA assignments. Hence, any measures taken by donor agencies and TA suppliers to enhance security in this regard for competent TA staff may result in a generally higher quality of assistance. (See World Development Report 1983 and Rodney Hills, "Technical Assistance: Towards Improving the Underlying Framework," Australian National University Development Studies Centre, Occasional Paper no. 14, 1979).
used in evaluating a firm include its general experience, the adequacy of its work plan, the personnel to be involved, and the proportion of its permanent staff. Price is also sometimes considered. Experience suggests that lower prices may be an empty lure since in the long run the services may cost more. Salary disputes usually involve very little money when compared with total project costs, and the consultants can make or break a project, depending on their competence and personal commitment to the project's success. (See the Bank's **Guidelines for the Use of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers and by the World Bank as Executing Agency** [August 1981], paras 2.21 to 2.38.)

Whether the choice is a consulting firm or an individual, technical competence and experience are generally the most highly valued attributes. Beyond the elements that can be presented in a curriculum vitae, certain qualities and attributes have been shown by experience to be extremely important; they fall under the category of personal traits.

C. **Behavioral Factors as a Criterion of Selection**

Whether consultants or advisers are hired as individuals or as members of a firm, the personal qualities most often sought are: commitment to their assignment, flexibility, adaptability, resourcefulness, patience, empathy, modesty, cross-cultural and political sensitivity, and communication skills (including linguistic ability and ability to relate to
officials at all levels of the hierarchy). 37/ In other words, external consultants, particularly those involved with PRTA/i, must have qualities that will enable them to work with local staff in a spirit of mutual respect. Although major income and social differences as well as cultural and psychological "distance" can make interpersonal relationships difficult, the personality factor can help the consultant to overcome or mitigate these differences. Those hired to train local staff should, obviously, also have pedagogical skills.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a report in 1980, "Training for Service in the Developing Countries," which identifies certain personality criteria desired in staff who are sent overseas:

In addition to good technical qualifications, qualities like social judgment, adaptability, initiative, a talent for administration and for teaching, and, in particular, patience and perseverance are emphasized. It is also judged important for recruits to be aware of the relative nature of their own scales of value and to

37/ For training and management assistance, some proficiency in the national language is indispensable. See Geert Hofstede, Cultural Pitfalls for Dutch Expatriates in Indonesia," Deventer, 1982. The importance of the language issue is stressed in the following comment by a Bank staff member: "Even the most straightforward of engineering reports sometimes sit on shelves unread simply because they cannot be read easily by technical host-agency staff. Even where translated, follow-up is often delayed or misdirected because the staff were unable to participate fully during report preparation, or simply because of translation difficulties. Language in the case of TA/i is of course a more serious issue. Projects designed with high-level clients—the kinds of people aid agency staff meet on missions—often have to be carried out by lower-level staff lacking English skills. Even the national language may be a difficult second language for them. And few projects continue long enough for direct English language training to make a significant impact, though even marginal improvements are worth the effort. If there is a language issue, it should be faced squarely during the design and recruitment stage. A good test is for aid agency staff to insist on meeting lower-level technical staff in the host agency at the time of TA component identification. Communications difficulties faced then would surely indicate problems ahead."
have an open attitude to the fact that values and attitudes in the receiving country may be different. (p. 13)

Combining their interviews with a Canadian survey, the Swedish investigators found that in determining the factors that contribute to "overseas effectiveness...a number of inner qualities (flexibility, respect, receptiveness, a calm demeanor, and a feeling for conditions in the host country) emerged clearly, and more strongly than the expressive traits (initiative, self-confidence and straightforwardness)." Similar conclusions have been reached by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

These findings imply that the personal qualities contributing to success in jobs in industrialized countries may not be the most useful ones for TA in developing countries. Hence, as suggested by Hofstede, TA staff need to recognize that they may have to play the role of "scapegoat" if something fails and may not be given the credit when it succeeds. They need to understand the "rules of the game" and accept them, although presumably they will also make sure that their own headquarters staff and the aid agency are fully aware of their actual performance and contribution to the project. Another consequence of Hofstede's findings may be that the likelihood of successful TA is greater when the experts ascribe to the same cultural values as the TA recipients.

Since headquarters staff in consulting firms and aid agencies usually want to hire people who are like themselves, they may tend to make

38/ D. Kealy and F. Hawes, Canadians in Development. Ottawa (CIDA, April 1979); and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, Training for Service in the Developing Countries, (November 1980).

39/ Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences. International Differences in Work-related Values (Sage, 1980).
the wrong selection. This risk, along with the difficulty of assessing personal qualities merely on the basis of a curriculum vitae, often makes it desirable for the recipient's staff and the prospective key field staff to interview one another before agreeing to work together. Both the recipient and the consultant staff should have strong interviewing and negotiating skills—an area in which some effort may be needed to bring both sides up to the current state of the art. Another way to promote good long-term relations between a TA recipient and consultants is to have the recipient hire the prospective consultants for a brief initial period in order to refine the proposed TA design (Section III). One East Asian country, it is reported, requires a trial period in the field for any education specialist whom they expect to hire. A third approach is to send national staff on a professional study tour abroad, during which they select the advisers with whom they wish to work on their return, as occurred in an education project in Thailand.

In view of the importance of behavioral factors for successful TA/i, consulting firms may need to expose their staff to at least some basic training in cross-cultural communications. This may be organized, for instance, under the aegis of SIETAR (Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research), or under the programs that are mandatory for the staff of a number of bilateral aid agencies prior to their assignment abroad. Individual recipient countries may, in addition, ask candidates for TA/i assignments to take appropriate psychological tests, as

40/ An intriguing possibility is that different skills and personal qualities are needed at different stages of project implementation. This was suggested by experience in a recent agricultural project in Nigeria under which a special team was hired for three months to launch implementation. Regarding rural roads programs, a leading consulting firm found that "In leading construction brigades in the field younger men with energy, enthusiasm and a touch of idealism (but not necessarily with a great deal of previous experience) have been the most successful." (Paper presented at the Fifth IRF African Highway Conference, Libreville, February 1983).

well as give expatriate specialists some coaching about local customs as part of their initial briefing.

A final criterion for selecting consultants, frequently mentioned by aid agency staff, is (not surprisingly) familiarity with the agency's and the recipient's policy objectives and administrative procedures. In the success stories reviewed here, the consultants in the field who operated with an understanding of these policy and procedural matters had fewer problems and were able to be more effective.

D. Role of National Managers

The project (or sector) manager can contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the expatriate staff's activities. Even though enthusiastic advisers can accomplish a great deal and carry people along with them, they will do more if the project manager supports their work. What is needed, then, is a project manager--whether local or expatriate--who is something of an entrepreneur, who is committed to the project, is willing and able to use his advisers (and/or the latter's headquarters) effectively, has a good working relationship with other national entities or local authorities whose support he needs, and has access to the decisionmakers. Another quality of effective managers is their ability to leave a legacy behind them, usually by grooming and training a replacement to carry their programs forward. In almost every successful project reviewed here, each manager possessed many of these characteristics.

The national director of a multipurpose project in Korea, for example, was effective because he was able to obtain support for the project from all agencies concerned; he had political acumen, was receptive to his consultants' advice, and knew how to make the most of their services. In a water supply project in Somalia, the national manager, although young and inexperienced, learned quickly how to use the experts' services. In Nigeria, the expatriate managers of several agricultural development projects had to establish good working relations with federal and state officials in order to make sure that the projects received the promised support.
V. MANAGING THE TA PROCESS
AND THE ROLE OF AID AGENCY STAFF

This paper has thus far emphasized the importance of both the substantive (for example, the TA objectives, feasibility, and design) and the process factors (for example, quality of the interaction between the recipient and the aid agency, and between the recipient and the provider of the TA services) throughout the stages of institutional TA. The cumulative uncertainties of the environment in which PRTA/i is applied and of the state of the art itself also have considerable bearing on the TA project cycle and on its successful management.

As a result of these uncertainties, the TA/i project cycle cannot be patterned after a "blueprint" of the type that is suitable for more predictable and controllable engineering or hardware activities. Rather, institution-related TA should, by and large, be treated as an iterative learning process, and emphasis should be placed on adaptation, flexibility, learning through experience, and redesign of initial arrangements. The similarity between the design of TA/i and the design of projects in the social sectors is striking. As one donor agency officer has put it: "The appraisal report all too often is looked upon as the only acceptable plan of action for achieving project objectives; all parties to a project need to recognize that the report is not 'cast in cement.' Flexibility and ongoing evaluation during project implementation are necessary, with the results fed back into project management. By year


3, a project in one of the social sectors should look different from that described in the appraisal report, and so also should the technical assistance."

In other words, not only should the consultants' proposals be based on a reassessment of the assistance specified in the appraisal report and loan documents, but the TA contracts should also be broken down into discrete phases, in which short-term and long-term expertise are mixed, and allow for reasonable flexibility in the TOR (pp. 34-35 and 53-54). As many of the cases reviewed have shown, TA contracts must provide the opportunity (such as the submission of progress reports) and must allocate sufficient time for periodic review of the TA goals, design, or pace of implementation, which may have to be modified as time elapses, and as the results of the initial TA activities become visible and the consequences of unforeseeable external events become manifest. Such periodic reviews are a key to the success of the assistance.

Management of the TA/i project cycle should also give considerable attention to behavioral factors. As noted at the outset of this discussion, PRTA/i cannot succeed without the commitment of all parties concerned—recipient, TA specialists (and their firm, if any) and the aid agency—and this commitment (which may be elusive) is required at all times.

Most important, however, is the recipient's commitment. It is the basic condition that must be met if any lasting changes are to emerge from institutional TA, and especially if the recipient is to become more effective in problem solving, decisionmaking, and implementation, and to have a decreasing need for the assistance. During the successive phases of the TA assignment, then, the recipient should be associated with the aid agency staff and TA specialists more as a partner than as a mere provider of information, and all parties should feel responsible for the successful outcome of the assistance.44/ Not surprisingly, it has often been

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observed that the most successful TA is that requested by the most sophisticated recipients because they are the ones best able to diagnose their needs, least threatened by recognition of their own weaknesses, and best able to make use of outside assistance.

For TA specialists as well as for aid agency staff and their managers, involvement with institutional TA usually demands different attitudes and a greater sensitivity to local peoples and cultures than are needed in providing engineering TA. TA and aid agency staff should be able to tolerate a high degree of ambiguity and should be able to cope with considerable professional anxiety, while remaining patient with the recipient and with each other, particularly when the TA addresses problems lying at the frontier of professional knowledge. Moreover, if they are to allow for and encourage periodic reviews of TA objectives and design, agency staff and their managers should not feel dismayed or threatened by the idea of a third party "re-appraising" the appraisal work.

The staff and their managers who were involved in the successful projects reviewed in this study all approached the project work with a deep commitment to the objectives of the TA recipient and an appreciation of the time it might take to achieve such objectives--possibly over the span of several successive physical investments. They seemed to have the patience, broad outlook and understanding, independence of mind, and self-confidence (without arrogance) that characterize individuals whose outstanding professional achievements have been widely recognized.

As long as the recipient does not perceive the advice of aid agency staff as interference, these staff should be able to contribute to

45/ Despite the best of intentions, one may not always succeed, as suggested by a recipient's recently expressed view that "Agency personnel behaved with an 'expert mentality,' i.e., they attempted to impose analyses, concepts and philosophy options that did not take sufficient account of the country's own choices." For a more successful case, see Annex 6.

46/ Argyris, Intervention Theory and Method.
the success of TA/i throughout the project cycle by verifying the commitment of all parties, helping to design the terms of reference, and ensuring that appropriate administrative and logistical arrangements are made and that the proposed selection procedures will allow the recipient country to assemble a team of well-qualified and motivated expatriate and local personnel (see Summary Checklist for Appraisal at Annex 7).

Since recipient commitment is fundamental to the success of institutional TA, if this commitment becomes an issue prior to approval of a loan or to the selection of specialists, aid agency staff should attempt to determine whether the problem stems from political factors, failure to perceive the need for TA, doubts about its feasibility, objections to its cost, or questions concerning the detailed design (source, mode of delivery, lack of training provisions, or excessive administrative load). They might then propose remedies or ways to address the particular problem, for example, by financing and arranging for visits by the recipient's staff to similar but more advanced organizations abroad, by identifying other sources of financing or expertise (including voluntary organizations), or by proposing various forms of training or alternatives to long-term specialists (for example, periodic coaching of local staff by visiting experts, or "twinning" of the local agency with a similar one abroad). Making such assistance a condition of lending for the project may ensure that specialists are hired but will not guarantee that they will be effectively used.

If problems relating to recipient commitment seem to arise after project approval, aid agency staff might encourage the TA specialists jointly with the client to analyze the situation as soon as they arrive in the field, to clarify for themselves and for the recipient the nature of their assignment and the method by which they intend to carry it out. This should be their first implementation task. As implementation progresses, periodic joint evaluations by the donor, the recipient, and the consultant staff can be valuable in modifying the assignment, as may be found necessary; in this way the recipient's and supplier's commitment to the objectives of the assistance can be maintained.
Aid agency staff can further facilitate implementation by ensuring that the recipient and the consultants understand the project and agency operational procedures. They themselves provide important TA throughout the project cycle. An agency such as the World Bank provides not only financing but also continuous advice; this is often described by the staff as a sharing of approaches and as a "collegial involvement" with the recipient that brings in the views of a sympathetic outsider.

The role that the aid agency plays in PRTA also depends on the style of individual agency staff and the time they are able to devote to supervising the TA aspects of the project. Some project officers deal almost exclusively with the consultants, some with both the consultants and the local staff. Ideally, an aid agency should be able to act as a catalyst or facilitator between the consultants and the local staff whenever the need arises, although a more activist role may be called for at times. In some cases, agency staff may help to identify important policy issues and bring them to the attention of the decisionmakers in recipient countries. In general, it is believed that PRTA/i would benefit from more supervision, since project supervision missions tend to focus on project hardware. When physical works are progressing satisfactorily, supervision missions are likely to be scheduled less frequently and this can have an adverse effect on PRTA/i.

Since successful PRTA/i is characterized by mutual trust between the aid agency, the recipient, and the consultants, continuity of staffing is necessary to develop and maintain this relationship. The implementation period offers the best opportunity to develop trust and continuity because it is the longest phase of the project cycle. When a strong working relationship exists between a consulting firm or a "twinned" agency and the recipient, there is much merit in the recipient retaining as consultants a firm with which its staff are already familiar and to which the aid agency has no objection.

The aid agency and the recipient must agree, finally during the design process, on the criteria for measuring and evaluating the success of PRTA. Although such agreement is easier to secure for engineering than for
institutional TA, it is possible to identify tasks, policy decisions, institutional improvements, and behavioral changes or the transfer of skills that the assistance is designed to promote.

The benefits of a project depend on the extent to which clear and measurable goals for PRTA can be achieved within the project time frame and cost. Goals that are modest but are achieved, and tasks that are at the right level of difficulty for the TA recipient to feel capable of carrying them out, not only fulfill the project objectives but also instill confidence and a desire to continue the development effort. Governments as well as individuals need to experience success if they are to sustain a commitment toward achieving a meaningful goal. Since the ultimate objective of development assistance is to increase the capabilities, self-esteem, and self-reliance of developing countries, these countries must have opportunities to develop confidence in their own abilities and to make their own decisions. Appropriately designed project-related technical assistance sets the stage for effective implementation and the success that encourages self-reliance.
I. Examine Commitment and Achieve Consensus on Goals:

A. Identify Need

- Diagnose need for institutional TA
  Recipient and aid agency (or project designers) should jointly engage in thorough diagnosis of need in order to achieve consensus that a problem exists and that TA is the best way to address it.

- Assess appropriateness of technology and institutional design under consideration
  How much can be done by local staff? Designers should be aware of the interrelationship between project design choices (including proposed pace of implementation) and TA required for their implementation and use. What are the implications of the project investment for the use of human, physical, and financial resources over the short and long term?

- Assess short- and long-term development objectives for the sector or entity
  What is the human resource development strategy for the sector?
  Is the goal to develop national capabilities in all areas of management or to develop "management autonomy"?
  Should training be provided for the entity only, or the sector as a whole?
  What are the linkages with larger mandates (e.g., women in development, environment, energy)?

- Is additional external TA needed?
  Can local skills be tapped from the public or private sector? Repatriated from abroad?
  Is PRTA duplicating efforts of other multi or bilateral groups?
  Is the TA staff already present in the country working in the same area? Have results of PRTA in previous projects in the sector or subsector been taken into account?

- Are there related training needs?
  Can TA and training needs be assessed concurrently? Should training be financed in advance of project execution?
B. Examine Feasibility of the Proposed Assistance

Assess state of the art and knowledge or expertise available to meet the TA need
- Can TA needs be met in terms of the state of the art and the expertise available, the organizational and political environment in which TA will be implemented, and the time frame and cost of the present project? If expertise is not available "off the shelf" (e.g., in institutional areas) should TA be provided in the form of "action research"?

Assess the availability of local skills and resources to prepare TA proposals and to manage the assistance, both substantively and administratively
- When such skills are not available, would recipient staff benefit from training in how to design and manage the assistance? Should aid agency staff themselves assist, or arrange for other preparatory assistance?

Assess the feasibility of achieving TA goals in a single project
- Would the success of TA be enhanced by planning the TA tasks as sequential parts of a development program, perhaps over a series of projects?

Assess internal and external factors likely to have an impact on TA activities
- Considering the organizational, legal, political, financial and other factors that may affect the success of PRTA should designers attempt to use these factors for the project's benefit, find ways to minimize their possible negative impact, or adjust TA goals to more realistically reflect the environment?

C. Achieve Consensus and Commitment About TA Need and Goals

Verify clarity of TA objectives and agreement of key stakeholders to such objectives
- State goals (criteria for success) in measurable terms (such as targets for training), to clarify what is expected of TA activities, as well as to help monitor their implementation.
- Seek balance between assistance for physical investment and for institutional or policy improvements.
- Verify that recipient's staff concerned with the TA at the political and technical levels perceive it as directly linked to project, sector, or country objectives; do not feel threatened by the TA; and are prepared to commit staff and other resources toward its implementation.
- Cross-cultural sensitivity may be required in order to understand how a recipient manifests commitment and what approaches or methods are most appropriate in seeking consensus.
Verify absence of other obstacles to TA
- Is there agreement on the cost of TA? Can it be lowered?
- Is the recipient willing to borrow for TA? Verify that no grant funds are available from other agencies.
- Is there agreement on the use of national, rather than expatriate consultants, where appropriate?

Reinforce commitment
- Provide recipient with access to experience of more advanced developing countries.
- Verify that needs for TA were kept to the minimum compatible with project objectives.
- Ensure that TA delivery systems other than the hiring of long-term experts will be considered during TA design.
- Ensure that the aid agency and recipient are prepared to modify the TA assignment in the light of implementation experience.
- In sum, ensure that TA is identified and designed in a spirit of partnership and that TA is part of an institution-building and human resource strategy, allowing the recipient to learn by doing.

II. Design of the Services
A. Terms of Reference (TOR)

Specify PRTA tasks in Terms of Reference (TOR)
- TOR should clearly specify their objectives, desired outcomes, the task to be performed, its time frame and cost, and the reporting requirements. However, TOR should not be overly detailed, especially in the case of institutional and policy studies, and may need to be phased, so as to allow consultants to prepare more detailed proposals once in the field. Verifiable interim outputs may be desirable.
- Well-prepared TOR are flexible and negotiable, within reason.
- Specify assistance needed to help recipient launch implementation of study or policy recommendations.
- TOR should indicate the organizational entity to which the expatriate staff should be assigned, to whom they should report and to whom they should have access, and how much authority should be conveyed to them. The effectiveness of these arrangements will ultimately depend on local management and the relationship established between local and consultant staff.
Define role/write TOR for both expatriate and national staff
Specify TA model and delivery mode

- This ensures that both foreign and local personnel will have meaningful assignments and a clear understanding of their responsibilities.
- TOR should indicate which model(s) of TA is appropriate for the tasks: (1) performer or substitute; (2) prescriptive; (3) counterpart-adviser; (4) collaborative. Also, what mode or combination of modes of delivery is preferable: long-term or short-term specialists or a combination of both, possibly in association with a training specialist, and teams of expatriate and national specialists; coaching by "visiting" experts or a panel of experts; or a "twinning" arrangement.

B. Sources and Choice of Expertise

Identify potential suppliers of TA

- TA suppliers include expatriate and local individuals and consulting firms, U.N. agencies, NGOs and volunteer organizations, bilaterals, private manufacturers, similar operating entities, universities, trade and professional organizations.

Specify individual versus firm

- Is individual consultant or consulting firm preferable? Individuals may be preferable for longer term advisory positions or when management TA is required. Firms are preferable when complementary skills are required, backed up by professional and administrative support from headquarters.

Local versus foreign specialists

- The choice of expatriate, local, or joint venture expertise depends, in part, on the technology to be used in the parent project and how much adaptation is required to local circumstances. Other considerations include the urgency with which the recipient wishes the project to be implemented, the development strategy, the availability of local talent, and the relative level of local versus expatriate salaries.

C. Training Design

Design PRTA and training in concert

- Transfer of skills and technology can be more effective if it is planned and implemented as an integral part of the project and other training efforts in the sector or country.
- If training can begin before the project starts, local staff are in a better position to make the most effective use of TA personnel once they arrive in the field.
- Call on a training or institutional specialist to design the training components as well as institutional measures to retain trained staff.
- Chances of successful skills transfer are better with an explicit, separately budgeted, training component, with two exceptions: (i) success has been achieved with engineering consultants training in contract and construction management; and (ii) skills are successfully transferred when nationals have primary or substantive responsibility for task achievement.
- If contract is expected to be given to a single firm that has proved effective both as consultant and trainer, be sure to allow enough time and financial resources to enable success at both tasks.

Choose a training strategy

- Training strategies include:
  (a) "Sandwich" training with on-the-job work.
  (b) Train on the job first, identify stars, send them for further training, build a cadre.
  (c) Send trainees to a job overseas, e.g., under a twinning arrangement.
  (d) Use short-term experts as coaches to train.
  (e) Arrange study tours abroad.
- Training can be tailor-made or a standard program, a one-time or periodic activity, formal or non-formal, on the job, in-house, in-region, or overseas.

Ensure ways for trainees to use new skills

- Ensure support of trainees' managers by involving them in beginning and ending training sessions or setting up special workshops or seminars for them. Follow up trainees after completion of training; incorporate training materials into operational manuals.

III. Administrative Design and Implementation

A. Make Logistical and Administrative Arrangements

Specify administrative responsibilities

- Select implementing agency and assess whether same agency should be responsible for designing, contracting, and implementing the TA.
To meet professional and personal needs of expatriates and their families (housing, offices, and equipment), ensure that beneficiary agency can provide adequate support, otherwise strengthen agency's capacity or shift responsibility to consulting firm or other TA supplier.

- Specify recipient's contribution (financial or in kind) to the TA assignment.

Ensure that professional aspects of TA process are managed

- Specify arrangements for briefing, supervising, and backstopping the TA team, and its coordination with other agencies.

- Promote continuity of staff from design to implementation, or at least access of designers and implementers to each other.

- Make arrangements for prompt review of TA staff reports, especially Inception Report, which may redefine TA needs and TOR and require early action.

B. Provide for Periodic Evaluation

- Schedule periodic joint evaluation among aid agency, TA recipient, and consultants to allow changes in assignment over time on the basis of implementation experience (flexibility to adjust TOR may be more significant for institutional than for engineering TA, although in the latter case scheduling may have to be adjusted or even the scope of work as conditions change).

C. Arrangements for Staff and Trainee Selection

Select local staff

- Assess availability of appropriate local staff at an early stage.

- Local consultants may be used where implementing agency staff are not available.

- In some cases, it may be desirable for foreign consultant to help establish selection criteria and to assist in local staff selection, especially for training.

- Staff self-selection can enhance the chances of having motivated staff. Special incentives may sometimes be necessary, however.

- Key characteristics of effective local manager (and staff) include commitment to the project, effective use of consultants, good working relations with authorities.

Select expatriate staff

- Verify that recipient has generally accepted and sound selection and contracting procedures; otherwise provide guidance.
Consider advantages of large versus small firm, U.N. organization versus individual contracts, the impact on TA staff morale of job security upon completion of assignment, etc.

- Ensure that if several groups of expatriates from different organizations are engaged, their conditions of employment are comparable.

- Individual qualities to consider in selection of expatriates include: technical competence; understanding of aid agency and recipient procedures and policies; and a range of personality characteristics (adaptability, dedication, flexibility, patience, tact, empathy, political sensitivity, and cross-cultural communication skills including linguistic ability). Training skills may also be a criterion.

- Psychological testing, interviews, or short-term initial appointments are ways to improve the matching of foreign and local staff.

Decide what selection criteria are most essential in achieving the particular PRTA task.

D. Make Arrangements for TA Follow-up

- Create local permanent positions to replace expatriates. Arrange for decisions to be taken about policy recommendations and assign responsibility for implementation. Retain consultants for additional advice, training as needed.
PROJECT-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Study Background

1. Definition

Project-related Technical Assistance (PRTA) refers to services provided by firms or individuals, working alone, or in association with beneficiary agency personnel, to help achieve the primary objectives of the project.

The purpose of the assistance provided may range from:

(a) execution of tasks for which skills are not available within the beneficiary agency; to

(b) transfer of knowledge and development of the beneficiary's technical and managerial capabilities.

In both cases the Technical Assistance may relate to project work (generation, appraisal, implementation, operation), to sector policy work financed under the project, and to institutional development (finance, organization, training, and so on).

2. Criteria of Success

Criteria for determining the success of PRTA include:

(a) completion of TA tasks (engineering and other studies, advice, training or operational activities) in time, within cost limits, and to the expected quality standards;

(b) achievement of expected outcomes such as:

(1) production, delivery of services, or productivity objectives are reached; organizations have been created;

(ii) studies financed have led to subsequent investments (or rejection of project ideas as unsound) or to adoption of policy recommendations;

(iii) recommended institutional changes or intended behavioral changes are adopted;

(iv) dependence on external assistance is reduced including for research and staff training as well as for the preparation, appraisal or management of subsequent projects; and

(v) the country's own consulting capabilities have been developed.
3. Project-related TA cases reviewed

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4. Sources of Financing for TA under the projects reviewed

Sources of financing for the TA components of the projects reviewed included, in addition to IBRD/IDA funds, UNDP, bilateral donors (France's FAC and Britain's ODA) and other banks and development organizations such as CCCE (French "Caisse Centrale" for Economic Cooperation), CABEI (Central American Bank for Economic Integration), CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation, UK) and Japan's OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund).
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE DELIVERY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

Technical assistance (TA) can take many forms. It can be formally planned as a vital part of the implementation of a project or program or it can be offered informally by a consulting team as an inherent part of project design. TA is also manifested in the personal contribution that aid agency staff may make to a project and to the TA recipient. An example of formal TA would be a provision in a project's TA component that the recipient develop an organization or administrative staff to manage the project. An example of informal TA is found in the discussions and joint problem solving carried on by host countries and aid agency staff in a social setting, such as a restaurant.

Thus, a key principle to be kept in mind when planning TA is that all possible forms of such assistance should be taken into consideration, and a strategic, goal-oriented, and systematic effort should be undertaken to ensure that the most appropriate TA is provided.

Discussed below are ten categories or forms of TA that are intended to assist project or TA designers in developing a system or "package" of assistance most appropriate to a particular project or program and specific situation.1/ This categorization of the forms of assistance is offered as a starting point from which to identify what TA is and can be. From there the challenge is to design assistance programs in such a way that the chances for project success are increased and the forms of assistance fit together into an appropriate "Gestalt" or total system. These forms of TA are examined as they relate to the development of managerial capabilities.2/

I. Planning

During the planning of a development project or program, the planning activity itself becomes an essential element of the TA offered a

1/ Training for management development should be added to this package but is not discussed here in view of Samuel Paul's forthcoming World Bank Staff Working Paper on this subject.

2/ Management capabilities (or management infrastructure) can be disaggregated into six major components:

(a) Decision making and action taking capabilities
(b) Project planning, organizing skills, and systems integration
(c) Systems evaluation and development of internal controls
(d) Leadership, motivational and reward systems developed
(e) Selection, placement, and development of people
(f) Information/communication systems and skills.

developing country. From the feasibility study to the planning of project implementation, this assistance, in the form of planning advice and support, may have an effect on the recipient country and may be a critical factor in helping it to develop its planning skills and capacity. As is so often the case in project work, this is an on-the-job form of assistance. While working with the donor agency staff or the consultants in planning their project, the host national staff are learning and developing some of their most important management skills.

II. Consultation

Another form of assistance can be labeled consultation, but it is not restricted to consulting services in the popular sense. This TA form of consultation occurs when anyone outside the national project design or management group is able to offer advice or assistance.

In development circles, consultation is normally taken to mean expert advice offered by a person or persons who are not from the donor agency staff or who are not attached to the project team staff. In this definition, the sense of consultation is restricted and is not always appropriate in the context of TA.

TA consultation can take two forms, depending on the needs of the recipient and the specifics of the project. The first form, which most readers would be familiar with, is advice offered or recommendations made by an outside expert. This model of consultation has many uses and is often of significant value. Unfortunately, it has two drawbacks: (a) the expert model often carries with it a significant cost factor, best termed the development of dependency; and (b) human nature and cross-cultural settings may lead the recipient to reject the expert's advice or perhaps listen to it politely, and then ignore it.

Thanks to the work of Edgar Schein at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and others, the literature contains considerable information on an alternative style of consulting called Process Consultation, which is particularly applicable to TA. It has been successfully adopted in the United States and Europe in order to help business organizations manage their personnel more effectively and successfully deal with the human and social problems inherent in any organization. The process consultation style is not easy to describe, but is based on a firm foundation of psychological and social-psychological theory as to how people in organizations behave and how it is possible to offer assistance and advice that they are not apt to reject.

This style of consulting, along with the expert style wherever appropriate, offers the recipient the assistance needed for developing not only the project but also internal management capacity for managing and implementing the project successfully.

III. Design Participation

When the host national staff participates in project design, they are given an opportunity to develop their management skills, again in the form of on-the-job training. As the national staff and donor agency staff work together to design the project and its organizational structure, the former have an opportunity to learn from the management experience and expertise of others.

More precisely, designing and developing an organization or institution that will be responsible for carrying out a project are basic management skills best learned through practice and successful experience. The donor agency or consultants offer this form of TA whenever the active participation of the beneficiary agency is systematically planned as a learning experience. The key here is to leave the host staff with the experience and knowledge that the donor agency and its advisers have accumulated during their years of activity in all parts of the world. Remember, too, that the donor agency's management style and culture are also influential in "grooming" managers in the developing countries (see Modeling below).

IV. Coaching

This form of TA, often found useful by recipients, is built upon the personal relationships formed between the involved parties. In particular, a "coaching" approach allows a senior expert to motivate and help the national staff responsible for a project to better develop their role. It also serves as a model for a managerial style which, when it is appropriate and the situation warrants, can be of benefit.4/

V. Modeling

A quite influential form of TA is that provided by donor agency staff or outside consultants when they serve as a role model for professional managers learning to handle a job. Although little research has been conducted on this form of TA, most readers who have had managerial experience will surely be able to recall how much influence they have had on the management style of those with whom they have worked. Role modeling affects not only the functional behavior to be emulated, but also the area of interrelationships, where a manager must be particularly skillful while operating in a complex cross-cultural setting.

Because of the significant influence that TA modeling can have, the importance of developing and improving the functional and interpersonal skills of consulting and donor agency staff cannot be underrated.

VI. Twinning

A highly successful form of TA that has been used lately calls for a matching of the recipient's organization to a similar organization in another part of the world. A forestry agency in a developing country might

4/ This approach, advocated by Gordon Lippitt, has been identified by the International Executive Service Corps (IESC) as one important ingredient of successful management advice overseas (see Annex 6).
be "twinned" with a similar agency in a more advanced country, for example, and the two agencies might have an opportunity to learn from each other.

This form of TA has considerable potential, but the key to its success is in the match of agencies, a design that allows person-to-person contact to take place and a relationship of trust to develop between the agencies beyond the necessarily narrow contractual terms.

VII. Administering

When a project or program is administered or run by an outside agency or consulting firm, that firm has an inherent responsibility to help develop the recipient's administrative and managerial capacity. When such control over the project exists, certain TA elements that will foster and speed up the development of the recipient's management infrastructure can be designed into the project. Although a development project may be operated along the lines of this model as a short-term necessity, the importance of TA for management makes it essential to allocate time and other resources to devise a practical step-by-step plan for management development. This should be done so that the recipient itself can administer projects as soon as possible. As in the case of modeling, a donor agency's operating style can have a significant effect on a developing country. When the agency's impact is positive in helping the country to develop its own managers, it should be encouraged further in this direction. For instance, the initial provision of TA for direct management of agricultural development in a West African country has led to the subsequent financing of an agricultural management training center in that country; the center will draw a number of its case studies from the experience gained under such projects and will set up on-the-job training opportunities under these projects.

VIII. Rewarding

A TA program that rewards and builds on the management successes of the recipient country has a much greater chance of achieving its goals. Rewards that take the form of special recognition (often an inexpensive process), or that are spelled out in the terms of reference for management development, are important incentives. Even better, as many successful projects can attest, is a financial incentive or the use of a profit motive. Even in the People's Republic of China, management incentives have been shown to produce the necessary results.5/

Many creative ways of using incentives and rewards can be designed into development projects or programs so that management skills are further developed. Similar types of incentives include: identifying and sharing the management practices of a particular organization or culture with others and publicizing these practices through international

IX. Others

The ability to influence a project through fear or threat of punitive action may sometimes be necessary. A price has to be paid, of course, when the situation calls for an implicit or explicit threat, but as a TA approach this should not be overlooked when the situation warrants such action to attain the desired goals.

A "forcing" approach is generally easier to use during the design stage of a foreign aid project. But when appropriate, a penalty clause (for example, in a loan agreement), or some type of pressure such as that generated by periodic country-donor agency meetings to review progress (or problems) in project implementation, may be necessary. This approach calls for very sensitive handling, and in cross-cultural settings the factors of "public face" and potential embarrassment can exert a powerful influence on project success.

When penalty is designed into a project, it must be a completely open part of the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient country or beneficiary agency, and possible penalties associated with poor performance in project implementation should come as no surprise.

X. Technology and Innovation

A powerful form of TA that the industrial countries can offer is the advanced technologies and organizational innovations that are currently growing at an exponential rate; they range from the simplest office machines to the most complex computer control systems. This form of assistance often has an overwhelming effect and therefore must be managed carefully. In other words, the opportunity to use advanced models and techniques of management should be analyzed from the point of view of cultural receptivity as well as socioeconomic impact. This form of TA can be incorrectly applied if careful attention is not given to the subtle, as well as drastic, impact that new work methods and machines can have on a developing country. As has often happened even in industrial countries, labor resentment or a fear of technological change has limited management's

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6/ The World Bank's Agriculture and Rural Development Department, for example, organized a number of regional workshops to disseminate the details of the experience of selected project managers in the monitoring and evaluation of agricultural projects. A number of short-term seminars organized by the World Bank's Economic Development Institute have adopted the same approach.
ability to develop more efficient forms of production and control. TA that has a technological component needs to be evaluated carefully to ensure its success and appropriateness in relation to the overall social and economic goals of a development project or program. The appeal or glamor of appearing to be "modern" can be a powerful incentive for introducing managerial improvements that might otherwise be resisted. (This phenomenon occurred in Western Europe about twenty years ago when the business computer first made its appearance there.)

In conclusion, designing into a total and appropriate system the many forms of TA available for management development represents a challenge for policymakers and project designers in recipient countries, for donor agencies, and for consulting firms. The formal component of TA is always accompanied by an informal side that can drastically affect project results. For example, the informal interaction of a donor agency's staff and/or external consultants with the recipient country can either make or break the most sophisticated or large-scale project. As suggested earlier in this Staff Working Paper, when TA comes in a "social package" of respect, friendship, and interpersonal sensitivity, its value is greatly enhanced. When the same technical quality of TA is offered in an aloof, uncaring and insensitive manner, a considerable adverse effect can be expected.

TA needs to be designed as a system that makes use of all the appropriate TA forms, and this system must take into account not only the formal needs of the project, but also the informal and interpersonal dynamics of the human environment in which it operates.
THE TWINNING OF AGENCIES: A NOVEL FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. The "twinning" of institutions in developing countries with similar but more mature organizations in other parts of the world has proved to be a very effective way to transfer know-how, train staff, and build up management capabilities. Professional relationships between operating entities offer advantages of complementarity and flexibility over time. The entity supplying technical assistance draws upon its own in-house resources in the functional areas that are relevant to the operation of such an entity and offers services, as needed, to the complementary functional areas in the twinned institution.

2. In some cases the twinning arrangement may need to be backed up by a third party, such as a consulting firm, to provide the worldwide experience or access to the latest technological developments that an operating entity may not always possess. Technical assistance can be provided in a variety of ways—for example: specialists from the supplier organization may work with the client agency as advisers or in line positions for short- or long-term assignments, or they may visit the client periodically according to an agreed schedule, say, two weeks every three to six months; the client's management and other staff may visit the supplier's plant; and the training offered can be formal, informal, or on the job and can be carried out at the client's or the supplier's facilities (or at both places), and is usually available at various skill and technical levels. Depending on the terms of the contractual agreement, a client agency has the flexibility to define and alter its work program over time, addressing a variety of issues while maintaining a professional relationship with the technical assistance supplier. For the client, a relationship with the twin allows "hands on" learning in a variety of ways, from a credible source—another entity actively and successfully engaged in the same work as the client.

3. Twinning arrangements vary considerably, depending on whether the entities are public or private institutions, utilities, or universities; the arrangements also depend on whether the entity is actively seeking TA contracts or is only responding to requests on an ad hoc basis. Some private entities have set up subsidiaries of the parent group, bid on contracts to provide specific services over a limited time period as would a consulting firm, and operate on a for-profit basis. Other entities sign letters of agreement that can lead to long-term cooperation, providing services at cost or close to it. Still other organizations provide a choice of administrative and cost arrangements, depending on the nature of the task at hand. Once the initial contractual assignment is completed, twinned institutions frequently maintain informal links with each other, establishing long-term relationships and possibilities for follow-up or additional contracts.

4. The entities that have established professional relationships of this kind include railways, power companies, water authorities, port authorities, irrigation agencies, universities, research centers, management institutes, forestry and agricultural institutes, dairy
development boards, municipalities, national development banks, and mortgage banks. National and international associations have promoted the twinning concept; these include the International Water Supply Association and the International Association of Ports and Harbors. On the industry side, twinning most often takes the form of joint ventures, with some type of equity participation involved.

5. Groups offering technical assistance under twinning arrangements are not exclusively from North America and Europe. Among the many examples from around the world are the Port of Singapore, the National Irrigation Administration of the Philippines, Indian Railways (RITE), and the Tunisian Water Authority (SONEDE). Twinning among developing country entities can increase the likelihood of transferring appropriate technologies, as well as enhance the opportunity for collaboration between the suppliers and the recipients of TA. For a developing country entity providing TA, a twinning arrangement can enhance its prestige, earn foreign exchange, and provide professional and personal rewards to its staff.
VOLUNTEER EXECUTIVE SERVICES—
A SPECIAL KIND OF NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Voluntary organizations of retired professionals have been formed in several countries to provide technical assistance to public agencies and private enterprises in developing countries. The British Executive Service Overseas (BESO) has more than 1,000 volunteers on its register and has completed at least 600 assignments in more than 60 countries since it was founded in 1972. Average cost per assignment in 1982, exclusive of local costs borne by the host country, was around $4,000. The Canadian Executive Service Overseas (CESO) has nine regional offices in Canada and 37 representatives overseas. It has a roster of 750 active volunteers and was involved in 330 projects in 63 countries in 1981-82 at an average cost of $6,000 per project, again excluding certain local costs. The U.S. International Executive Service Corps (IESC) has 24 offices around the world and 8,000 volunteers on its roster. It accepts 500-600 assignments a year at an all-inclusive cost of about $6,000 per man-month.

2. All three organizations depend heavily for success or failure on the personal relationships established between the volunteer and the client. In the case of the IESC, for example, the volunteer writes a report to the client at the end of the assignment, and the client writes a report on the volunteer's performance. If the volunteer's work is unsatisfactory, he is replaced at no additional cost to the client. It is the client who sets out detailed terms of reference for the job to be done. Volunteers are not paid salaries. Costs of travel are usually borne by the donor agency, and costs of subsistence by the host organization, which also accepts responsibility for office facilities, translation services and local transport. Assignments, which are limited to a maximum of six months (three months for the IESC), cover a broad range of expertise with particular emphasis on enterprise management, marketing, and the transfer of industrial technology.

3. The continued demand for their services suggests that the three organizations meet a real need and are a valuable complement to the more orthodox forms of technical cooperation between developed and developing countries. An evaluation of BESO's activities carried out in 1979 indicated that clients particularly appreciated the depth of experience and technical competence that mature executives were able to provide. The fact that they are not being paid regular salaries or occupying line positions makes it easier for them to establish a relationship of mutual trust with their counterparts in the host organization.

1/ These countries include Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Volunteer executive services are also being formed in Australia and Germany.

Source: Prepared by E. Peter Wright as background note for World Development Report 1983.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: REVIEW OF A SUCCESSFUL CASE HISTORY

1. A country in sub-Saharan Africa several years ago became disillusioned with technical assistance. More recently, it took a more relaxed attitude with respect to expatriate specialists. When a consultants' report on a study of the parastatals in the agricultural sector was recently issued, the head of the Planning Department in the Ministry of Agriculture referred to it as "our report." He liked the full involvement of national staff in the study, consequent enhancement of their morale, and he believed that this involvement had provided invaluable training and preparation for the wider responsibilities that they would be given as a result of the studies.

2. The consulting process. The head of the consulting firm described his approach to TA as follows:

(a) TA must be a cooperative effort. Therefore, a precondition to any assignment is the government's full agreement to cooperate in implementing the assignment. Without a field visit, such willingness on the part of the government cannot be assessed. Hence, his firm refused to prepare proposals from headquarters but requested and obtained the government's agreement to a field visit prior to submission of the proposals for the study.

(b) During their field visit the consultants identified key local personnel who they considered to be essential for the success of the assignment. One was a senior legal counsel in the Ministry of Finance, who specialized in land tenure questions; another was the former manager of a government agricultural parastatal agency, a man of competence and integrity. A third was a local sociologist, teaching at the university, and a frequent consultant to foreign aid agencies.

(c) After agreement was obtained with the government and the potential local consultants on the study's overall objectives, the consultants asked the local consultants to prepare their own TOR.

(d) To ensure the technical quality of the work and at the same time avoid hurting the local staff's feelings, the consultants organized a panel of independent technical experts to review the work of the local staff. The panel remained in the country of origin of the consulting firm.

(e) The diagnostic and interim recommendations were presented to the government by all the team members, both local and expatriate.
(f) The report proposed a variety of possible solutions to each of the identified problems or issues. It also tried to empathize with the government's political options, without sacrificing the validity of the report's technical proposals.
Annex 7

PRTA/i: SUMMARY CHECKLIST FOR APPRAISAL

1. Was the recipient involved in the assessment of TA needs? Was an effort made to minimize the amount of TA included? Is the recipient fully committed to implementing the proposed TA?

2. Is the assignment feasible?
   (a) Substantively?
   (b) In the time and within the costs allocated?
   (c) Manageable by the recipient?

3. How far has the design of the services progressed?
   (a) TORs available? Should the assignment be phased?
   (b) Delivery system and responsibilities of TA staff as well as national staff specified?
   (c) Preferred sources of assistance identified?
   (d) Training needs and strategy stated?

4. Is the TA administratively designed?
   (a) Agency responsible selected?
   (b) Logistical and administrative arrangements specified?
   (c) Coordination with other government agencies or sources of TA needed?
   (d) Government's contribution stated?
   (e) Arrangements for briefing/backstopping the specialists and for periodic evaluation foreseen? For follow-up?
   (f) Expert/trainee selection criteria stated?

5. Are specific outputs of the TA identified? Are the criteria for assessing TA success stated? Does the TA need to be linked to any particular covenant?

6. Is there evidence that no grant sources of TA are available?
World Bank Publications of Related Interest

Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action

In the fall of 1979, the African Governors of the World Bank addressed a memorandum to the Bank's president expressing their alarm at the dim economic prospects for the nations of sub-Saharan Africa and asking that the Bank prepare a "special paper on the economic development problems of these countries" and an appropriate program for helping them. This report, building on the Lagos Plan of Action, is the response to that request.

The report discusses the factors that explain slow economic growth in Africa in the recent past, analyzes policy changes and program orientations needed to promote faster growth, and concludes with a set of recommendations to donors. Including the recommendation that aid to Africa should double in real terms to bring about renewed African development and growth in the 1980s. The report's agenda for action is general; it indicates broad policy and program directions, overall priorities for action, and key areas for donor attention. Like the Lagos Plan, the report recognizes that Africa has enormous economic potential, which awaits fuller development.


The Design of Development Projects and Their Appraisal: Cases and Principles from the Experience of the World Bank

Jan Tinbergen

Formulates a coherent government policy to further development objectives and outlines methods to stimulate private investments.

LC 58-9458. ISBN 0-8018-0633-X, $5.00 (£3.00) paperback.

Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies

Bela Balassa

Provides an analysis of development strategies in semi-industrial economies that have established an industrial base. Endevors to quantify the systems of incentives that are applied in six semi-industrial developing economies—Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—and to indicate the effects of these systems on the allocation of resources, international trade, and economic growth.

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 416 pages (including appendices, index).

Economic Growth and Human Resources

Norman Hicks, assisted by Jahangir Boroumand

This work originated in a research project for the measurement and analysis of income distribution in the Latin American countries, undertaken jointly by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the World Bank. Presents estimates of the extent of absolute poverty for ten Latin American countries and for the region as a whole in the 1970s.

ISBN 0-8213-0012-1. $5.00.
First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries
Paul Streeten, with Shahid Javed Burki, Mahbub ul Haq, Norman Hicks, and Frances Stewart

The basic needs approach to economic development is one way of helping the poor emerge from their poverty. It enables them to earn or obtain the necessities for life—nutrition, housing, water and sanitation, education, and health—and thus to increase their productivity.

This book answers the critics of the basic needs approach, views this approach as a logical step in the evolution of economic analysis and development policy, and presents a clear-sighted interpretation of the issues. Based on the actual experience of various countries—their successes and failures—the book is a distillation of World Bank studies of the operational implications of meeting basic needs. It also discusses the presumed conflict between economic growth and basic needs, the relation between the New International Economic Order and basic needs, and the relation between human rights and basic needs.


The Hungarian Economic Reform, 1968–81
Bela Balassa

Reviews the Hungarian experience with the economic reform introduced in 1968 and provides a short description of the antecedents of the reform. Analyzes specific reform measures concerning agriculture, decision-making by industrial firms, price determination, the exchange rate, export subsidies, import protection, and investment decisions and indicates their effects on the economy. Also examines the economic effects of tendencies toward recentralization in the 1970s, as well as recent policy measures aimed at reversing these tendencies.


Stock No. WP-0506. $3.00.

Implementing Programs of Human Development
Edited by Peter T. Knight; prepared by Nat J. Colletta, Jacob Meerman, and others.


Stock No. WP-0403. $15.00.

International Technology Transfer: Issues and Policy Options
Frances Stewart


Stock No. WP-0344. $5.00.

Levels of Poverty: Policy and Change
Amartya Sen


Stock No. WP-0401. $3.00.
Patterns of Development, 1950-1970
Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin

A comprehensive interpretation of the structural changes that accompany the growth of developing countries, using cross-section and time-series analysis to study the stability of observed patterns and the nature of time trends.


Poverty and Basic Needs Series

A series of booklets prepared by the staff of the World Bank on the subject of basic needs. The series includes general studies that explore the concept of basic needs, country case studies, and sectoral studies.

Brazil
Peter T. Knight and Ricardo J. Moran

An edited and updated edition of the more detailed publication, Brazil: Human Resources Special Report (see description under Country Studies listing).

December 1981. 98 pages (including statistical appendix, map). English.
Stock No. BN-8103. $5.00.

Malnourished People: A Policy View
Alan Berg

Discusses the importance of adequate nutrition as an objective, as well as a means of economic development. Outlines the many facets of the nutrition problem and shows how efforts to improve nutrition can help alleviate much of the human and economic waste in the developing world.

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Meeting Basic Needs: An Overview
Mahbub ul Haq and Shahid Javed Burki

Presents a summary of the main findings of studies undertaken in the World Bank as part of a program for reducing absolute poverty and meeting basic needs.


Shelter
Anthony A. Churchill

Defines the elements that constitute shelter; discusses the difficulties encountered in developing shelter programs for the poor; estimates orders of magnitude of shelter needs for the next twenty years; and proposes a strategy for meeting those needs.

Stock Nos. BN-8002-E, BN-8002-F, BN-8002-S. $3.00 paperback.

Water Supply and Waste Disposal

Discusses the size of the problem of meeting basic needs in water supply and waste disposal and its significance to development in the context of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Examines the Bank's past role in improving water supply and waste disposal facilities in developing countries and draws conclusions for the future.


Poverty and the Development of Human Resources: Regional Perspective
Willem Bussink, David Davies, Roger Grawe, Basil Kavalsky, and Guy P. Pfeffermann

Stock No. WP-0406. $5.00.

NEW

Poverty and Human Development
Paul Isenman and others

Since economic growth alone has not reduced absolute poverty, it has been necessary to consider other strategies. The strategy examined in this study — human development — epitomizes the idea that poor people should be helped to help themselves.
Four chapters provide an overview of alternative strategies; a detailed look at health, education, nutrition, and fertility; lessons from existing programs; and an examination of broader issues in planning.

**Structural Change and Development Policy**

Holllis Chenery

A retrospective look at Chenery's thought and writing over the past two decades and an extension of his work in *Redistribution with Growth and Patterns of Development*. Develops a set of techniques for analyzing structural changes and applies them to some major problems of developing countries today.

**Tribal Peoples and Economic Development: Human Ecologic Considerations**

Robert Goodland

At the current time, approximately 200 million tribal people live in all regions of the world and number among the poorest of the poor. This paper describes the problems associated with the development process as it affects tribal peoples; it outlines the requisites for meeting the human ecologic needs of tribal peoples; and presents general principles that are designed to assist the Banks staff and project designers in incorporating appropriate procedures to ensure the survival of tribal peoples and to assist with their development.

**The Tropics and Economic Development: A Provocative Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations**

Andrew M. Kamarck

Examines major characteristics of the tropical climates that are significant to economic development.

**Social Infrastructure and Services in Zimbabwe**

Rashid Fanqee

The black majority government of Zimbabwe, coming to power after a long struggle for independence, has announced its strong commitment to social services to benefit the vast majority of the population. This paper looks at issues related to education, health, housing, and other important sectors and reviews specific plans and resource requirements to help improve the standard of living of the population.
remarkably successful in achieving growth, the distribution of its benefits among and within countries has been less satisfactory.


**World Development Report**

A large-format series of annual studies of about 200 pages, the *World Development Report*, since its inception, has been what The Guardian has called "a most remarkable publication. It is the nearest thing to having an annual report on the present state of the planet and the people who live on it." Each issue brings not only an overview of the state of development, but also a detailed analysis of such topics as structural change, the varying experiences of low- and middle-income countries, the relation of poverty and human resource development, global and national adjustment, and agriculture and food stability. Each contains a statistical annex, World Development Indicators, that provides profiles of more than 120 countries in twenty-five multipage tables. The data cover such subjects as demography, industry, trade, energy, finance, and development assistance and such measures of social conditions as education, health, and nutrition.

World Development Report 1982

(See Publications of Particular Interest for description and sales information.)

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World Development Report 1978

(Discusses the development experience, 1950–75, development priorities in the middle-income developing countries, and prospects for alleviating poverty.)

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