South Sudan

Approaches to Targeting in South Sudan

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Summary
This paper outlines a framework for strengthening the targeting of assistance to poor and vulnerable populations in South Sudan through World Bank programs. It was prepared by staff from 3 of the World Bank’s Global Practices: Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience; Poverty and Equity; and Social Protection and Labor. This paper is the first part of a two-year program aimed at improving the effectiveness and impact of targeting for investment operations in the current challenging context. The framework is intended for World Bank staff to enable a more evidence-based and methodical way in which to identify project sites and beneficiary populations, as well as to minimize the negative unintended consequences of aid in a context of prevailing armed violence.

Background
In January 2018, the World Bank Board endorsed a country engagement note (CEN) for South Sudan for the fiscal years 2018-2019. The CEN outlines a strategy that focuses on supporting emergency basic needs and livelihoods to help prevent further deterioration in the crisis. With a US$ 410 million envelope including the undisbursed active portfolio and tentative IDA18 pipeline, the CEN comprises two objectives: (a) support basic services for vulnerable populations; and (b) support to livelihoods, food security, and basic economic recovery.

The World Bank program is deployed in a context that is now beset by armed conflict. The world’s newest state became independent in July 2011 but since late 2013 has been in civil war. This has resulted in a significant deterioration in humanitarian conditions leaving very little opportunity for development activity. Over 2 million people have fled the country and some 1.9 million are internally displaced. A recent study indicated that some 380,000 persons have died as result of the war. Acute food insecurity has increased substantially – by September 2018 it was estimated that 6.1 million people were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse. The aggravation of food insecurity is primarily driven by protracted conflict, displacement, insufficient crop production (only 61 percent of the 2018 cereal needs met by the harvest) and macroeconomic deterioration.

South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. The poverty headcount rate at the international poverty line rose from 51 percent in 2009 to 82 percent in 2016, and the total poverty gap is estimated at 120 billion SSP (US$ 900 million). Poverty has generally been predominantly rural, characterized by an overall lack of access to services, infrastructure, and opportunities beyond basic agricultural production. Access to amenities and infrastructure, modern and improved sources of energy, water and sanitation is extremely low and is almost exclusive to urban households. Adult educational attainment and literacy rates are among the worst in Africa, largely due to low availability, access, and quality of education. The political and macroeconomic crises have more recently resulted in the growth of a more situational type of poverty due to near hyperinflationary price increases. These have particularly affected urban areas and have reduced the gap in the incidence of poverty between rural and urban areas.
As a result of these conditions, the South Sudanese are vulnerable to further deprivation. Among the non-poor, a large portion of people live only just above the poverty line and are therefore extremely vulnerable to falling into poverty. Based on estimates of the impact of the conflict between 2009 and 2016, further escalation of violence is likely to leave 9 in 10 people in poverty. Although almost all of the non-poor population is vulnerable to falling into poverty, there are differences in the nature of vulnerability throughout the country. For example, the recent poverty assessment showed that increasing food prices can reduce the school attendance of girls significantly, and that the poorest urban households are vulnerable to food insecurity. A continuation of the conflict would worsen not just the poverty rate, but also the severity of the deprivation in non-monetary dimensions.

Beneficiary Selection or Targeting
This analytical product aims to provide guidance to World Bank staff operating in South Sudan, the Country Management Unit, as well as any development practitioners interested in improving beneficiary targeting in fragile, conflict and violent (FCV) settings. The objectives of the framework are threefold:

i) Examine how to most effectively address poverty and reduce vulnerability in a context in which such a large proportion of the population is poor and the conditions for development are not present.

ii) Understand how to minimize any negative unintended consequences of aid, to “do no harm,” in a context of prevailing armed violence.

iii) Provide World Bank teams and the Country Management Unit with a practical tool for an evidence-based geographic selection of project sites.

Figure 1 outlines the key elements of this guidance note. At the design stage potential project locations can be selected with the help of the project targeting index (PTI) that is outlined in this document. Project teams can also use this note to think through the pros and cons of using different methodologies for selecting project beneficiaries. At the implementation stage a combination of a rapid and ongoing survey of beneficiaries as well as qualitative feedback from the project team can be used to address potential concerns and to calibrate operations so that they become more effective. Each of these components is addressed in this guidance note.

The framework proposed in this paper can strengthen the way in which World Bank operations select beneficiaries for its programs, by setting out a process to monitor the targeting and impact of assistance thereby ensuring that the right beneficiaries have been selected and that funds are being used for their intended purposes. The paper proceeds as follows: i) defining targeting and the implications of beneficiary selection in an armed conflict; ii) provision of a three-tiered targeting framework with monitoring & evaluation; iii) the first tier of geographic or location selection through the introduction of the project targeting index (PTI); iv) the second tier examining the different targeting methodologies; v) the third tier relating to implementation factors; vi) monitoring and evaluation; vi) conclusion and Annexes.

Figure 1. Outline of this guidance note
What is Targeting?
Targeting describes “the range of mechanisms for identifying households or individuals who are defined as eligible for resource transfers and simultaneously screening out those who are defined as ineligible.” Given the need for precision in using social transfers to the individuals or households to achieve poverty reduction goals, most of the literature on targeting has focused on social safety nets and social protection. The key impetus has been to maximize the use of scarce resources in reaching the poorest households. As cash transfers and social safety net systems have been adopted increasingly in both developed and developing countries, so has interest in targeting methods increased to ensure that the right beneficiaries are being reached. While these questions have predominated the social fund and safety-net literature, they have also expanded into other areas such as agriculture, community-based development, and public health.

Although there is a wealth of literature on targeting methods in development-specific contexts, the literature on the targeting of development assistance with humanitarian relief under armed conflict remains scarce. For beneficiary selection in the context of humanitarian relief or armed conflict, when defining a targeting approach it is important to examine the following three questions, which cover rationale, design and implementation. As shown in Table 1, operating in humanitarian relief or armed conflict settings makes the targeting criteria more complex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Normal scenario</th>
<th>Humanitarian emergency lens</th>
<th>Conflict &amp; Violence lens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design of project</td>
<td>Select places PTI</td>
<td>Select people Guide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why are you targeting?</strong></td>
<td>To reduce poverty</td>
<td>Help to mitigate the adverse impacts of shocks</td>
<td>Restore social cohesion, to integrate excluded groups, or as part of a political agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who are you targeting?</strong></td>
<td>The poorest and most vulnerable households or individuals</td>
<td>The most vulnerable, or those who have been the most severely affected (sometimes refugees or IDPs)</td>
<td>Also include specific pre-defined communities such as ex-combatants, returning refugees, or widows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How are you targeting?</strong></td>
<td>Several methodologies including proxy means testing, self-selection, categorical and community-based targeting.</td>
<td>Area-based analysis (such as vulnerability analysis mapping in the case of the World Food Program), as well as using eligibility criteria for selecting households or individuals</td>
<td>Methodologies will need to account for the challenges of working in conflict, including which areas are safe to access, and which are not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Challenges for Targeting in FCV**

Even under the best possible conditions, targeting for the poor can be challenging. Typically, sectoral spending patterns among essential public services for the poor, such as education, health care and water supply, disproportionately benefit better-off households. Within targeted programs, actual performance may not match program goals. A study on poverty-targeted social programs found that, while the median program transferred 25 percent more to poor individuals than an alternative model of universal targeting with the same budget, one-quarter of the targeted programs were in fact regressive with benefits disproportionately accruing to the non-poor. Adding to these difficulties, task teams confront specific challenges when targeting beneficiaries in armed conflict environments. These are outlined in Figure 2 below.

Another issue that is central to aid interventions in conflict areas is the principle of doing no harm. This has been a debate in the academic and policy literature for the last 30 years. This debate boils down to the possibility that the pursuit of certain objectives, such as reducing poverty, may in fact be causing harm by inadvertently sustaining armed conflict. Avoiding harm means ensuring that aid neither directly drives nor contributes to armed aggression, mass displacement, aid dependency, gross market distortions or elite capture. Operational strategies and design documents abound in the language of conflict sensitivity and “do no harm,” but all actors agree that in locations such as South Sudan “aid without effects” is impossible and attempts to achieve it are naïve.
At the macro level, task teams have to ask themselves whether their interventions support one party or another in their warring objectives. This is particularly sensitive as one of those parties may be the government. A series of questions follows, such as what are the implications of only working in areas controlled by the government and are there poor populations excluded in this way? At the micro level, there is a need to assess whether the selection of a particular beneficiary or group of beneficiaries exposes those persons to greater risk (e.g. the threat of violence) than had they not received the aid in the first place. With these kinds of challenges in mind, we now turn to South Sudan.

Ultimately, a sound targeting strategy based on objective data and evidence that is publicly communicated is a means to navigate competing interests and perceptions that could potentially undermine aid programming.

Universal Approach versus Targeting

The link between armed violence and impoverishment is well-established. The argument may be made that if the large majority of people are in need and are vulnerable in conflict settings, then why adopt a targeted approach, as this will simply exacerbate inclusion-exclusion differences? With the South Sudanese facing such extraordinarily high levels of food insecurity and poverty rates above 80 percent (as of 2017), targeting may not appear appropriate. In the context of such wholesale deprivation, a universal approach would advance social cohesion and avoid inter-group division, as well as circumvent the costs associated with targeting.
However, aid and budgetary restrictions render universal coverage almost impossible. Furthermore, experience suggests it is possible to use standardized methods to identify the most vulnerable and those in greatest need. In the absence of the necessary conditions for a universal approach, we note the following:

i) **Universal coverage of the territory:** There has been a concerted effort to ensure coordination with partners and/or coverage of the entire territory, such as food distribution through WFP and the delivery of health services through the Health Pooled Fund, which provides financing in all states along with the World Bank.

ii) **Common approach to identification and measurement of poverty and vulnerability:** Efforts are being made to strengthen the ways in which different institutions such as the World Bank work with humanitarian agencies such as WFP and UNICEF to adopt common approaches for the identification of beneficiaries.

iii) **Universal targeting at the sub-project level:** Once project teams have identified sub-project locations at the boma and payam levels, all efforts are made for universal targeting within the sub-project.
Targeting framework for Projects in South Sudan

The targeting framework builds on the experience outlined above and lays the emphasis on two phases:

i) First, providing guidance for targeting appropriate to the context, both geographically and at beneficiary level (ex ante).

ii) Second, offering a program for monitoring and collecting beneficiary feedback that allows for learning and adjustment (ex post). Ultimately, the context is so dynamic and challenges are so great that programs cannot fully “design themselves out” of the potential risks in armed conflict. Hence the importance of a second phase – programs need to monitor, learn and adapt accordingly.

For South Sudan, the current portfolio is relatively small. The CEN objectives are to be achieved by a mix of operations namely (i) those providing basic public goods such as health and water infrastructure, and (ii) those providing support at the household level such as via cash-for-work and support to agricultural livelihoods. These operations have their own targeting methodologies that are outlined at approval stage and have been further refined and strengthened. The current operations under the CEN are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2. Current World Bank operations under the CEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>PROJECT OBJECTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Government and Service Delivery Project</td>
<td>Improve local governance and service delivery in participating counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Rapid Results Project</td>
<td>Improve the delivery of High Impact Primary Health Care Services in Upper Nile and Jonglei states; and to strengthen the coordination, monitoring and evaluation capacities of the Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>Provide access to income opportunities and temporary employment to the poor and vulnerable, and put in place building blocks for a social protection system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Development Project</td>
<td>Contribute to increased crop production and productivity in selected areas, lay the foundation for the recovery of the agriculture sector, and improve the recipient’s capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible crisis or emergency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these projects have designed their own project-appropriate targeting methodologies. What this framework provides is coherence in the approaches adopted at the project level and specifically to:

i) examine the operational footprint and its implications at the country/ strategic level;

ii) provide a communication tool for development partners and government counterparts; and

iii) establish a program for monitoring learning and adaptation.

Key Points on a Guidance Framework

A framework is simply a device to set out criteria for decision-making. In a context such as South Sudan, a device cannot be prescriptive and can only guide project teams and country management in its decision-making, as well as being a communication tool in interactions with the government and development partners. Key points to note about providing a Targeting Framework for such a portfolio are:
i) **Targeting at the portfolio and country-wide level:** While these operations all have different targeting impacts, it is important in a conflict context to assess them at the aggregate portfolio-wide level. Limited resources mean that none of the above projects can reach national coverage, which leads to important decisions on which populations are most in need and what obstacles and advantages can impact project feasibility across the country.

ii) **Types of program assistance drive targeting methodologies:** No one method can be prescribed for all projects, as methodology is contingent on the type of assistance, commonly disaggregated into public or private goods. Such a framework can therefore only provide guidance on the key steps required to decide among different methodologies and how to outline the pros and cons of each approach.

iii) **Implementation:** Whatever methodologies are chosen for beneficiary selection, issues around implementation are critical in this kind of setting. Ensuring clear communications, transparent decision-making, regular interaction with key stakeholders and regular monitoring and key elements.

### Three-Tiered Framework with Monitoring and Evaluation

The Targeting Framework is split into three tiers accounting for the points raised above.

- **The first tier** is one that will affect all project teams in deciding upon the locations of project activities. The factors influencing these choices are not simply based on need (as measured, for example, by poverty), but also by feasibility and where program results can realistically be achieved, as well as agency presence and added-value.
- **The second tier** is about beneficiary selection in those locations, and this will be contingent on the type of assistance being offered.
- **The third tier** is about the factors relating to implementation of targeting in a conflict zone.
- **A Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanism** is included to evaluate (ex post) targeting performance, monitor project outcomes, and collect feedback from beneficiaries. The results of M&E allow for rapid learning and adjustment in the design of projects.

**Table 3. The three tiers of the targeting framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIER ONE</th>
<th>Geographic Strategic Coverage</th>
<th>These are the factors that all project teams will need to assess in choosing the locations where the project will be focused.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIER TWO</td>
<td>Beneficiary Selection</td>
<td>These are the methodologies that global experience suggests are useful in these kind of contexts, their advantages and disadvantages and several examples of how they have been used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIER THREE</td>
<td>Implementation factors</td>
<td>Factors relating to the conflict and recovery process that are dynamic and require real-time responses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Monitoring and Evaluation**
When considering a country-wide portfolio, it is essential to have an objective approach to decide which areas to target. Having such a geographic targeting framework to rank areas of World Bank intervention enables the government, development partners, and the Country Management Unit to evaluate whether the selection of project sites is consistent with their priorities. Not only does this mechanism provide task teams with guidance for selecting sites in line with the objectives of the project, it also enhances the transparency of the selection process. The goal of Tier One targeting is to create a geographic operational targeting framework that provides task teams and stakeholders with a ranking of locations based on criteria that are consistent with the CEN and the objectives of their projects.

The first challenge is to identify the appropriate unit of location. In South Sudan there are four administrative levels: state, county, payam and boma.\textsuperscript{xvii} Originally there were 10 states, but these were increased controversially by the current Government to 28 in October 2015 and subsequently to 32.\textsuperscript{xviii} The number of states remains a core question to be settled in the current peace process.

The county level was chosen for the purpose of the PTI as it is the unit with the most comprehensive data – state level data are too aggregated and payam/boma level data are not available for all indicators. In addition, the PTI refers to the old ten-state system as it uses state and county boundaries that are geo-located.

Although the advantage of having an explicit ranking of counties is clear, creating it is a challenging task. First, we need to identify criteria that are consistent with the CEN and that can be represented by reliable and updated data at the county level. Even if a criterion makes sense, if there are no data corresponding to it, it cannot be used for the geographic targeting framework.

Second, it is often the case that the CEN or the objective of a project cannot be represented by only a single criterion. When multiple criteria are identified, it may be difficult to consolidate them into a single measure that can be used to rank counties because the ranking usually differs by criteria. If so, consolidating them into one ranking is not trivial and the choice of method is important as it will affect the final ranking.

Third, each project has a project-specific mandate and objectives, and therefore this exercise creates a tailored ranking of counties for each project. For example, an education program is likely to consider the presence of schools in a given area, but for a health program it is important to know the existence of a health facility. This means the ranking of areas can differ by project and the targeting framework needs to be flexible enough to accommodate these differences.

The Tier One geographic targeting framework is developed in the following way outlined in Figure 3.

\textbf{Figure 3. Criteria for Tier One geographic targeting framework}
Identification of Selection Criteria

The selection criteria need to be consistent with the CEN and represented by reliable and updated data available at the county level in South Sudan. The framework has identified the following two categories – **Need and Feasibility** – and under them, a total of six criteria (see Figure 3) with corresponding data listed in Table 4 below:

i) **Need:** Where are the neediest and most vulnerable people in the country located, as defined by poverty levels, vulnerability and other factors such as forced displacement and conflict? Here we identify four criteria: poverty head count rates, poor population, food insecurity, and number of IDPs.

ii) **Feasibility:** Which locations are safe and accessible, and what are the constraints to access in different parts of the country? Here we identify two criteria: security level, and accessibility and project feasibility.

Table 4: Criteria by category and corresponding data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate</td>
<td>Need</td>
<td>2016 estimates from the South Sudan High Frequency Survey (HFS) and the 2018 South Sudan Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor population</td>
<td>Need</td>
<td>2016 estimates from the South Sudan High Frequency Survey (HFS) and the 2018 South Sudan Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food insecurity</td>
<td>Need</td>
<td>Projected January 2019 FAO food insecurity data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of IDPs</td>
<td>Need</td>
<td>June 2017 data from UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security level</td>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Combination of the ACLED conflict incidence and fatality data from July 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>September 2018 UNOCHA data on accessibility and project feasibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Construction of a Project Targeting Index (PTI) by Aggregating Multiple Components

The following box summarizes how these components are aggregated into one composite indicator — the PTI. The first step of the aggregation is to standardize each component. Since each component uses a different unit of measure, it cannot be compared across criteria or aggregated directly. For example, poor populations can have multiple thousands or more in counties, while the poverty headcount ranges between 0 and 1. If we aggregate them without standardization, the resulting indicator will only reflect the size of poor population. We therefore standardize all components so that they have the same means and standard deviations. The second step assigns a weight to each standardized component. The relative weight reflects the relative importance of the corresponding component in the geographic targeting. The third step adds up the weighted components to create the Project Targeting Index (PTI). This is then used to rank counties by the overall PTI score. The final step is to create four levels of priorities by ranking the counties by PTI score and dividing them into four strata, each with an equal number of counties. It is then possible to plot the counties on a map by level of priority.

Box 1. Constructing a Project Targeting Index (PTI) from county-level data

**Step 1:** Standardize each of the 6 components (county indicator minus overall indicator average, all divided by overall indicator standard deviation):

\[ s(Pov. \ rate), s(Poor \ pop.), s(IPC \ phase), s(IDPs), s(Security), s(Accessibility) \]

**Step 2:** Assign weights (default is equal weights all equal to 1):

\[ w(Pov. \ rate); w(Poor \ pop.); w(IPC \ phase); w(IDPs); w(Security); w(Accessibility) \]

**Step 3:** Sum over the weighted components to get project targeting indicators for \( x \) indicators and \( I \) counties:

\[ PTI_i = \sum s(x_i) \times w(x_i) \]

**Step 4:** Divide the Project Targeting Indicator into 4 priority categorizations.

An example of what the PTI looks like at the county level is shown below (Figure 4). In this figure, darker colors represent higher priorities. The large map in the middle represents the overall index for South Sudan, using the default formulation with all weights equal to 1. The six small maps on the left and right are the criteria-specific maps at the county level. According to this weighting structure the darkest blue counties on the large map are the counties that represent the category of highest need combined with highest feasibility.
Figure 4. Project Targeting Index with six criteria: Equal weights

Flexibility and Data Limitations

Given each project’s mandate and objectives, applying the same set of criteria for all projects might not be appropriate. To allow task teams to adjust the PTI, there are two options. First, task teams can change weights to reflect the project specific objectives. For the default setup, the PTI assigns a higher priority to areas with higher accessibility. But, if the objective of a project is to improve the accessibility of areas, then the task team may want to target areas with low accessibility. To reflect this specific priority, the PTI for them should assign a smaller or even negative weight to the accessibility component so that the PTI score will be lower for areas with high accessibility. Similarly, if a project is to provide support specifically to conflict-affected areas, then the targeting index could assign a smaller or even negative weight to the security component so that the PTI assigns a higher priority to conflict areas. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the ranking of counties with default weights (panel i), and a situation in which a larger weight is assigned to the security and lack of constraints components (panel ii). Since in panel ii the feasibility components (security and lack of constraints to operations) are weighted relatively more than in the panel i, the corresponding PTI assigns a higher priority to southeastern counties where the feasibility criteria are high, and slightly lower for central counties where the need criteria are high, on average.
As long as the objective of a project is included in the criteria of the targeting index, it can be reflected in the index by changing weights. However, if that is not the case, adjustments in weights do not do the job. If the objective of an education project is to improve children’s access to school, then a potentially important selection criterion would be the distance to school, which is not included in the above targeting index. Many sector-specific criteria are not included in the Project Targeting Index because corresponding data are not currently available.

UNICEF is currently creating many sector specific indicators at the county and sub-county levels. Once the indicators become available, there will be two ways to improve the project targeting index or framework. The first approach would be to directly include the sector specific criteria into the project targeting index, adjust it by changing weights based on the project objectives, and rank counties using the revised index. This would be a simple extension of the basic PTI methodology. The second approach would be to maintain the current index but add a sector specific index and explain any deviations from the targeting index using the sector specific index. This approach is indirect, and the selection of sites becomes less objective, but can still be made transparent by adding explanations. We will come back to the issue of transparency.

**Evaluation of Project Locations**

The PTI is also useful for evaluating project locations. Since the development outcomes of projects can differ significantly depending on where the projects are implemented, site selection is an important strategic decision for a project team and stakeholders (i.e., government, development partners and the Country Management Unit) who are keen to evaluate whether the choices made are consistent with their country strategies. The PTI can be used as part of this evaluation. For example, Figure 6 overlays the priority ranking of counties based on the PTI (using equal weights) with the number of health project locations (HRRP) in the left panel, and local government and service delivery project locations (LGSDP) in the right panel. While both projects were implemented before this PTI was developed, they look reasonably consistent with the priorities based on the PTI, although the health project appears more consistent with the PTI by covering many counties with high priorities (priority 1) in the central-east region.
The evaluation can be further deepened with criteria-specific maps. Figure 7 overlays the site selection of the local government project with the priority rankings of the selection criteria so that the consistency between the site selection and each criterion can be seen clearly. These maps show that the site selection of the local government project is less consistent with some criteria (poverty headcount rates and the number of IDPs) and more consistent with other criteria. Such a disaggregation exercise will be useful for stakeholders (government, development partners, and the CMU) to evaluate whether the site selection of a project is consistent with its objective and with their country strategies.

Implementation of the Tier One Targeting Framework
The team has created a Stata program that creates a priority map of counties based on weights selected by users. This can be a project team, the government, a development partner, or the CMU. The team has also developed a web-based tool which will create a priority map by selecting weights, accessible to users of all technical levels. While the current program can handle the six criteria selected in this report, the team plans to expand the underlying database and improve the user-friendliness of the program so that the PTI can be easily modified based on needs of users. In addition, the online tool will allow project teams to assess the presence and “footprint” of other development partners currently working in South Sudan. Annex II provides more detailed information on the presence of other development partners, also presented at the county level, along with an example map.

Figure 7. Project locations and priority areas of six criteria in the PTI
Transparency

The ultimate objective of the Tier One Targeting exercise is to introduce transparency into site selection, which is one of the most important decisions in project design. As outlined above, the PTI is not perfect given that each project has objectives that may deviate from the default PTI selection criteria. Therefore, the Tier One Targeting does not force a project team to follow the default PTI when selecting project sites. However, if the team deviates from the selections offered by the default PTI, it will be incumbent upon them to explain their site selection process. More specifically, the project team will be requested to show (i) what are additional criteria for the project, (ii) how consistent they are with the project objectives, and (iii) how important the additional criteria are compared with the original six criteria. If data corresponding to the additional criteria are available and can be incorporated into the PTI, the team can update the ranking map using the updated PTI. This exercise will not only help stakeholders like the government, development partners and the CMU assess whether the selection process makes sense, but will also help the project team select projects sites that are consistent with their objectives.
TIER TWO – Beneficiary selection and targeting methodologies

Once a location has been chosen, the main goal behind World Bank operations is to reach the people who need the program most, usually poor households and vulnerable groups, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and increased shared prosperity. There are several steps that are necessary to make that happen. The design and implementation of targeting methods within programmatic parameters are challenging despite a variety of tested techniques.

This section draws on global experience to provide an outline of the four main targeting methods: proxy means testing, community-based targeting, demographic, and self-selection. Random and universal targeting are also discussed but are not featured as core methods in this framework. Ultimately, the purpose is to offer task teams additional knowledge and guidance to enable them to choose the best targeting practice based on similar experiences in other FCV contexts.¹

Across the board, the literature tells us that the target beneficiary group and key goals should be clearly defined, and criteria should be articulated, monitored, and adjusted as needed to minimize inclusion or exclusion errors, which are the biggest obstacles to successful targeting outcomes.

In practice, there is often a mix of methods that are used for targeting. A combination that is commonly used is geographic targeting first (Tier 1), followed by Community-Based Targeting (CBT) and/or a Proxy-Means Test (PMT) depending on goals and circumstances of the project. Overall, targeted programs present a path for a smooth transition from a haphazard collection of relief projects to a more regularized system that aims to protect the population against poverty and vulnerability in a more holistic way.⁶⁴

As examined in the introduction, there are competing goals in FCV contexts that must be considered, ranging from addressing need to supporting social cohesion. The difficult choice is deciding which programmatic objectives should be prioritized and how to best achieve them. This is where thoughtful targeting can provide a good compass for action. However, it is important to choose one main goal to minimize competing objectives and potential trade-offs when trying to ascertain the most effective way to allocate limited resources through targeting.⁶⁵

Targeting Methods

The targeting methods covered in this section apply to development programs in all contexts, but there are several elements that can be useful for designing and implementing targeting mechanisms in difficult FCV circumstances.

¹ The methodology for this section was based on a literature review of policy articles and toolkits on targeting, World Bank projects in FCV contexts, as well as literature from other relevant institutions such as ODI, UNICEF and ICRC.
Table 5. Features of targeting mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting mechanism</th>
<th>TIER 1 TARGETING</th>
<th>TIER 2 TARGETING</th>
<th>OTHER TOOLS</th>
<th>TARGETING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides objectivity of beneficiary selection</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduces potential for elite capture</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can be easily administered (for project team)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can be easily verified/monitored</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards social cohesion</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is responsive to fast-changing situations</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures transparency (for beneficiaries)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures transparency (for project team)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimizes inclusion errors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimizes exclusion errors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is cost-effective to implement</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✔ = fulfils criteria  ✔ = partly fulfils criteria
The Proxy Means Test (PMT) is a method where a score for each household is calculated based on a small number of easily observable characteristics that are each assigned a weight (ideally obtained from factor or regression analysis of household data). Eligibility is based on a determined cutoff score. This method has been widely used to determine the level of poverty for assistance eligibility in the absence of concrete proof of income, which is common in the largely informal emerging economies and can be particularly challenging in FCV contexts. The design of a PMT is usually sophisticated and depends on collecting and utilizing reliable data that can predict poverty levels. PMT emerged nearly 40 years ago (first used in Chile’s Ficha CAS program in 1980), and since then it has been a widely used targeting tool globally. This sophisticated methodology is both an advantage and a disadvantage: it is specific in identifying poor households but is not sensitive to changing circumstances.

## POSITIVES

- It is likely to produce horizontal equity among similar households regardless of who administers the PMT, and thus reduce corruption or political risks.  
- It is often seen as fair and impartial – the public can accept it as scientifically rational and thus less susceptible to corruption and prejudice, especially when the rationale is publicly disclosed – further boosting transparency and legitimacy.  
- PMT can safeguard against embedded discrimination, and capture near poverty/vulnerability more fairly and accurately than a simple poverty headcount.  
- PMT is more accurate than other methods in identifying poor households correctly and objectively.  
- The objective criteria, which are limited and can usually be easily verified, are less susceptible to manipulation, and thus increase the program’s credibility, fairness, and robustness.  
- PMT does not have to be cost prohibitive or exclusionary. Members of the community can be trained to administer PMT tools like poverty scorecards to reduce costs and increase community trust, likely inducing greater candor and honesty of interviewee responses.

## NEGATIVES

- PMT is too general and static to account for quickly changing circumstances that a particular household may be experiencing during conflict, like internal displacement or a temporary food shortage, as PMT is designed to address chronic rather than transient poverty.  
- Making adjustments is usually too time consuming and costly to be viable.  
- Inclusion is especially important in FCV situations, and since PMT is designed to be right on average rather than correctly categorize every household, it might create additional tensions within the country.  
- PMT method may not be understood by the community and may seem too calculated, cold-hearted, or even corrupt.  
- Data quality is a concern as PMT success depends on choosing the right variables, assigning the right weights, and running the right regressions so that observed household characteristics can be easily measured but not manipulated.  
- In FCV contexts, nationally representative data is often unavailable and even simple household surveys are difficult to administer.  
- This method is harder to implement due to higher start-up costs and lack of capacity (human resources, data, etc...), which reduces the available funds for the actual program, compromising coverage/delivery to the people.
**CONCLUSIONS:** PMT is consistently one of the most accurate ways to target poor and vulnerable people. When compared to other methods, such as CBT, this approach identifies poor/low-consumption households with the greatest precision. A poverty-quintile method is especially precise, although basic-income scheme and simple demographic scorecards are also proven tools for finding poor households and effectively reducing poverty, as the latest evidence from nine African countries shows.

PMT can be used on a sample basis to verify the accuracy of poverty maps or poverty levels in selected areas. As a Tier II method, it would be easier to administer PMT in select limited locations rather than nationally, at least initially. Furthermore, running the program in mostly poor regions would reduce the risks of leakage and administrative costs associated with PMT. Additionally, PMT can be combined with other targeting methods like CBT for the selection of beneficiaries. Despite some significant drawbacks, PMT offers many benefits. Based on this analysis and existing evidence highlighted above, PMT could be a viable targeting option in South Sudan – although contingent upon reliable data and sound implementation. What is physically possible against what is appropriate in hostile regions largely determines the tradeoffs.

According to a recent World Bank poverty note by Pape and Pontara (2015), using PMT to target cash transfers in South Sudan could reduce poverty to 51 percent at a cost of 4.57 percent of GDP (est. at 20 SSP per person). At this rate, it would cover 57 percent of the population and 77 percent of the poor – resulting in a leakage of 31 percent. The large amounts of humanitarian aid could be used to build a social safety net, such as a PMT-targeted cash transfer, which would create more resilience among the people.

**Community-based targeting (CBT)**

Community-Based Targeting (CBT) is a method in which a community leader or a group of community members decide who in the community should receive benefits. Eligibility can be based on community and/or program poverty indicators.

There are six basic categories: (1) participatory ranking of all community members; (2) identification and screening of the beneficiary pool; (3) implementation of a PMT via questionnaire administration; (4) beneficiary selection on the basis of externally developed criteria; (5) selection of beneficiaries on the basis of autonomously developed criteria; and (6) validation of beneficiaries selected using external criteria. In other words, CBT can employ elements of both design and implementation (i.e. beneficiary ranking, selection, and/or validation) based on community or data-based definitions of poverty. It can also make use of active beneficiary participation in program implementation beyond targeting via wider Community-Driven Development (CDD) components, such as distributing benefits, choosing projects, or even administering PMT scorecards. There are many examples of CBT and broader CDD approaches – the literature on this topic is substantial, but the results are mixed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVES</th>
<th>NEGATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The accuracy of the results of CBT can be close to those of PMT – though CBT gives a bonus of greater community trust and satisfaction.</td>
<td>• Some evidence points to regressive benefits among vulnerable groups due to access and awareness issues they encounter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions: CBT and related community-based mechanisms can bring progressive and positive results for vulnerable and poor people. They can be effective tools for boosting program legitimacy and social cohesion but they must be implemented carefully in order not to exacerbate any underlying conflicts or inequalities. In the design phase of a CBT targeting method, community needs should be assessed and prioritized, and social control mechanisms should be put in place with defined rules for key participants. During the implementation phase, there should be space for adjustment according to participatory M&E to reassess prioritized investments and ensure smooth facilitation, as well as a transparent venue of communication about results. Despite its limitations, CBT is a leading targeting option. Strategically limiting the CBT coverage through geographic targeting can actually make the program more feasible, as it is easier to implement at a reduced scale. The caveat, particularly critical in South Sudan, is to ensure an equitable representation of different ethnic groups to avoid aggravating any existing tensions.

Categorical/demographic targeting
Demographic targeting is a common method of categorical determination of poverty, whereby eligibility is determined by age, gender, or some other specific demographic characteristic. Like geographic targeting, the rules of inclusion are simpler than methods that require more extensive assessment, such as PMT or CBT. It is usually based on a characteristic that is likely associated with higher levels of poverty and vulnerability, such as age or gender. Many cash transfer programs have targeted young children, the elderly, or widows. The chosen characteristic should be easy to observe and verify if needed to determine eligibility. This method goes beyond simply identifying poor individuals or households but can also promote greater social inclusion of chronically vulnerable groups, like women with young children or widows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVES</th>
<th>NEGATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic targeting</strong> is simple to administer as it does not require a tremendous amount of capacity for execution.</td>
<td>Demographic targeting does not work well if the chosen characteristic, such as age, is not a good predictor of poverty and is thus susceptible to significant leakage or elite capture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is cost-efficient, transparent, and can be easily scaled-up and combined with other methods.</td>
<td>It can be an overly simple method without secondary verification of actual conditions based on assumptions related to household scale economies and adult equivalences — and it can also be inaccurate if the selected characteristics are not good predictors of poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directing funds to children and the elderly yields high political and social approval, creates legitimacy, and is easier to understand for the participants, unlike more complex methods.</td>
<td><strong>Demographic targeting</strong> boosts resilience against current and future shocks by focusing on the most vulnerable members of society, such as disabled children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic targeting</strong> boosts resilience against current and future shocks by focusing on the most vulnerable members of society, such as disabled children.</td>
<td>In the case of FCV, categories can be even more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic targeting</strong> boosts resilience against current and future shocks by focusing on the most vulnerable members of society, such as disabled children.</td>
<td>The basic verification of beneficiaries under this</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
specific, such as young ex-combatants or female victims of violence.\textsuperscript{xlv}

- Evidence shows that demographic targeting for households with elderly or disabled people, widows, and children can be as effective as basic PMT methods.\textsuperscript{xlvi}
- It expands the targeted group beyond income-based poverty and widens the potential to help other vulnerable groups.
- Investing resources in women and children additionally boosts human development potential through increased spending ability on nutritious food and education, thus creating positive impacts post-intervention.\textsuperscript{xlvii}

\textbf{Conclusions:} Ongoing conflict and prevalent fragility make any targeting scheme difficult to run, but the simplicity and low administrative costs make demographic targeting a feasible solution in FCV contexts. It may be difficult in areas where registration of vital statistics, such as age, is insufficiently covered – but this can be supplemented with community knowledge (CBT) or household survey verification (PMT).\textsuperscript{li} The design of specific demographic categories can be tailored to the program and country context to improve targeting accuracy and ease of implementation. Targeting vulnerable groups, especially children and the elderly, is generally widely supported so there is little risk of fracturing a delicate social fabric or upending fragile politics. Like other interventions of this type, if it is designed with ethnic and local sensitivities in mind, it can help build social cohesion and trust in governmental institutions. This type of targeting can be perhaps used as a secondary method or an element of a more viable PMT or CBT approach in the Tier II phase.

\textbf{Self-selection targeting}

There are several types of self-selection targeting techniques including programs, goods, or services that are open to all, but designed in such a way to elicit interest and participation from the poor. In other words, beneficiaries volunteer to take part, with the assumption that the program is only attractive to those below a certain socioeconomic threshold. The most frequently implemented activity is Public Works (PWs), which has been found to be more effective than other self-targeting methods.\textsuperscript{lii} Thus, PWs are the focus in this section. Effective self-targeting can be accomplished by setting the PW wage slightly below the average market rate to naturally screen out the non-poor, thus targeting the poor without direct outreach (and also avoiding administrative costs). Setting the correct wage is a central feature of a PW program, and its success or failure largely depends on it – along with the overall share of the labor cost and the quality and coverage of the selected PW.\textsuperscript{liii} Many interventions in FCV contexts have been established as Community-Driven Development (CDD) projects that include labor-intensive public works programs operated by autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions (e.g. social funds and NGOs) in order to provide immediate support to poor populations in a fragile environment.\textsuperscript{liv} Nonetheless, PWs in countries affected by FCV have additional risks and benefits, discussed below.
### POSITIVES

- Self-selection offers secondary benefits beyond reaching the poor: repairing destroyed infrastructure and providing youth often associated with armed groups or gangs with jobs that can set them on a path to social integration.\[^{lv}\]
- It is often used in combination with geographic and or community-based targeting.\[^{lvi}\]
- This method disincentivizes violence by providing jobs and by offering an immediate response to shocks and poverty, thereby smoothing the road to greater economic stability and social cohesion.\[^{lvii}\]
- Rigorous impact studies suggest that PWs in FCV situations, particularly ones run with community assistance via social funds and CDDs, can generate significant improvements in the economic welfare of beneficiaries.\[^{lviii}\]
- Engaging young men in such programs can be especially beneficial, as it can catalyze a reduction of their political and economic marginalization and thus reduce the incentives behind their participation in violence.\[^{lix}\]

### NEGATIVES

- Misaligned incentives between the implementing agency and the local community can cause widespread corruption and graft, which compromises effectiveness, wastes resources, and stifles community empowerment.\[^{ix}\]
- PWs require materials and equipment inputs, which can be costly – and can also bring opportunity and transaction costs on the participants.\[^{lx}\]
- The targeting design can be problematic, with participation mostly limited to physically capable men. Women, children, and disabled and elderly people are de facto excluded from labor-intensive PWs and cannot directly benefit from the program.
- In cases of ongoing conflict, the infrastructure created via a PW can create highly-visible targets that can be sabotaged by rebel groups.\[^{lxii}\]
- A high rate of inclusion errors, payment delays, and other implementation issues can occur.\[^{lxiii}\]
- Self-selection requires reliable data on local needs and wages in order to design a program that reaches the right people in sufficient number.

## Conclusions:

Self-targeting methods, particularly PWs, are commonly used in FCV contexts. Like other methods, much of its success depends on design and implementation. The most common PW design includes two main features: setting the wage rate slightly below the market rate to facilitate self-targeting, and carefully considering the overall share of labor cost.\[^{lxiv}\] Generally, there should be no restrictions on eligibility, but if the program must be rationed it should be set up in poor areas via geographic targeting. The labor gains and created assets should be of maximum value to the people living in those areas, while the transaction costs should be kept low by making PW projects local and by protecting workers’ rights, which can be accomplished through community and NGO mediation.\[^{lxv}\] Recent research confirms that PWs can stimulate self-employment and raise long-term earning potential for participants, but has only a limited effect on FCV risks, since certain types of violence do not respond to job-based interventions.\[^{lxvi}\] Finally, stigma can play both a positive and negative role in that it can discourage the non-poor from participating but can also lead to lower participation from needy households for the same reason.\[^{lxvii}\] Thus, the way the program is communicated to the public matters.

Schemes based on self-selection, such as PWs, can be a viable choice following geographic targeting. Locating poorer regions first helps determine where the poorest people live and where such programs could be implemented with the most success. However, like demographically-based targeting, limiting the program benefits only to certain areas can be politically and socially contested, unless the self-selection programs are run in areas that are nationally representative and ensure fair access for people from different ethnic groups. This may be difficult to accomplish administratively, so PWs can be implemented as a part of a community-based program in a Tier II phase, which can likely mitigate equity concerns.
Other Targeting Methods
There are other targeting options, including universal coverage and random/lottery selection. The literature does not offer as much guidance on using these methods as it does for those highlighted in this framework. However, further research can be conducted if these options are needed either due to lack of capacity or lack of data – or are deemed as the only options to mitigate both administrative challenges and social tensions specific to FCV situations. The main drawbacks of universal targeting are that it is expensive and impractical for meaningful poverty reduction. The major minuses of random selection or a lottery system are unfairness and the exclusion of many poor households. However, if they are used as a secondary method – within a certain geographic area or as a complimentary part of a simply designed CBT or PMT – they can work. A few cases are discussed below.

Random/lottery selection can be a practical way to distribute limited funds with a degree of fairness. Random selection is often used for pilot interventions; nevertheless, the pilot design should still follow certain good practice, such as limiting the random selection to a poor area and being nationally representative for potential scale-up. This method is practical and fair in cases where the demand for a program significantly exceeds the supply. In this case, beneficiaries may have to be chosen randomly and/or on a rotational basis. If designed with statistically sound instruments and reliable baseline data, it can establish the right trajectory for a randomized control trial (RCT) impact evaluation. However, according to the literature reviewed here, there is little evidence on interventions that are purely lottery-based – though many programs employ randomization to conduct impact evaluations.
TIER THREE – Implementation Factors

Working in a conflict-zone, task teams will be regularly confronted by a number of factors that challenge the implementation of their programs, ranging from lack of access to attacks on project assets and personnel. Even the most carefully laid out plans for targeting will often need to be rewired according to local cultural norms and power-interests. It is therefore incumbent on task teams to have a good understanding of the local context and the systems and procedures in place (usually detailed in their Operations Manual) for responding to such situations. Outlined below are some of the factors associated with the civil conflict in South Sudan that impinge on aid programming.

Armed Conflict, Security and Access

Despite the signing of a new peace agreement in September 2018 between the main protagonists, armed violence will continue to present critical challenges to programming. This section will outline those features, the way that conflict can interact with aid, and the ways in which aid agencies mitigate the risks associated with working in an armed conflict setting (see more details outlined in Annex III).

Table 6. Key features of the conflict in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography of violence</th>
<th>Since 2016, the conflict has spread throughout the entire territory, particularly the formerly peaceful Equatorian states, although some locations are more stable than others.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-actor</td>
<td>There has been a proliferation of armed groups and a weakening of command and control, meaning power-sharing, security commitments, rule of law and access is uncertain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of territory</td>
<td>There are many different parts of the territory under influence of different groups; however, armed groups are not able to rigidly control territory or battle-lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict at multiple levels</td>
<td>There are a number of different armed conflicts in the country – some relate to the fragmentation of the elites but many are local-level (e.g. over water or pasture resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predation</td>
<td>Armed groups predate on resources from either the local population, such as livestock, or from aid agencies such as food stocks, vehicles or equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonality</td>
<td>The pattern is for the main warring parties to slow down offensives in the rainy season, although at the local level skirmishes and banditry can increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>There are some 64 different ethnic groups in South Sudan; ethnic identity is instrumentalized by elites and has become part of inter-group armed conflict, making it a critical factor for determining equity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
<td>Gender-based violence at the hands of both armed groups and partners/family members has reached epidemic levels, affecting as many as 65 percent of women and girls with great impunity.</td>
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</table>

The interaction of aid, conflict and beneficiaries

The interaction between aid intervention and conflict is complex and multi-faceted, forcing implementing agencies to consider many different constraints. For targeting, we need to focus in particular on the relationship between aid intervention, beneficiary selection and the warring parties. Given the hazards of assisting civilians in conflict, the starting point is to ensure that safeguards are maintained and specifically that aid agencies “do no harm.” What are examples of this in armed conflicts?

Table 7. Examples of potential harms caused by aid intervention

| World Bank programs and beneficiaries | Targeting of assistance can exacerbate inter-group tensions between perceptions of winner and losers, particularly if conflict is based around identity and ethnicity. The |
provision of assistance can expose beneficiaries to heightened risks of sexual exploitation and sexual violence.

| World Bank, warring parties and beneficiaries | Aid can possibly be used as a magnet in efforts to encourage forced displacement. Aid can be diverted at point of delivery. Beneficiaries can be exposed to violence due to their receipt of assistance. |

**Mitigating strategies**

As outlined in the CEN, a number of strategies can be undertaken to mitigate risk although such risks can never be completely addressed given the vagaries of armed conflict. Such strategies include:

i. **Adoption of principles based on humanitarian action and law:** Humanitarian principles act as guidelines to help orient aid interventions in armed conflict, including humanity neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

ii. **Equitable distribution of assistance:** An effort must be made to ensure that all vulnerable populations are reached across different identities and across different areas of control. This can be done in a number of ways:

   - Portfolio management across the country: to guarantee that World Bank assistance of some description is deployed in all the key regions (and by definition the areas of origin of the main identity groups in South Sudan)
   - Working in government and opposition areas: some operations are designed to target populations in areas outside government control (such as the health project)
   - Equitable targeting at the local level: to include all ethnic identities in program assistance at the location of the sub-project.

iii. **Conflict sensitivity:** It is important to ensure ongoing analysis of the local context to avoiding “doing harm,” which means ensuring that aid neither directly drives nor contributes to armed aggression, mass displacement, aid dependency, gross market distortions or elite capture.

iv. **Feedback and monitoring:** It is essential to allow for beneficiary feedback and grievance redress.

**Specific Policies for Peace and Recovery**

Countries emerging from conflict can also present opportunities for aid programs to support peace and recovery. Such “windows” are by definition subjective and not simply based on need. For example:

i. **Peacebuilding programs:** These can be aimed at working with communities where there is the most likelihood of underpinning a peace settlement or conversely the most violent areas in the anticipation that peacebuilding and stabilization programs may have an impact.

ii. **Recovery programs:** By default, these target areas with the greatest potential for productivity and economic recovery, which does not necessarily include those most in need.

A case for targeting particular areas and populations is being advanced by the Partnership approach for Resilience and Recovery Approach being formulated by a number of partners (principally the USA and UNDP). This approach acknowledges that agencies have little influence on the national level political context, but that there are other sources of violence in which programming can have an impact on peacebuilding and conflict mitigation at the local level.
Monitoring and evaluation and feedback mechanisms

Measuring the impact that projects have on the welfare of beneficiaries is a crucial part of project design and implementation. Information on beneficiaries typically comes from the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems that are built into projects. These are designed to track progress and to highlight any problems that may be occurring so that iterative changes may be made during project implementation and future projects can take these factors into account. Beyond monitoring implementation through the results indicators of a project, it is very important to collect local perceptions about the progress and the fairness or accuracy of targeting methods used in countries or areas characterized by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). Understanding local perceptions is critical for engaging local leaders and communities, which itself is essential for improving project effectiveness and generating longer-term insights into the effectiveness of projects in FCV settings.

Nevertheless, M&E has rarely been implemented in South Sudan because data collection in an FCV setting is expensive and logistically challenging. Rapidly changing security situations and lack of maintenance and investment in the road network have made access to many areas in South Sudan extremely difficult and time-consuming. However, the recent expansion of mobile phone network coverage, the availability of inexpensive handsets, and rapidly improving Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) software together offer a new opportunity for collecting data in a simple, quick and cost-effective way. An example of how M&E can be strengthened in FCV contexts comes from DRC with an evaluation of targeting in the public works STEP program (see box below).

**Box 2. Evaluating the impact of targeting strategies:** In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Eastern Recovery Project (STEP) supports a large labor-intensive public works program (LIPW) with the dual objective of offering temporary employment opportunities and earnings to “targeted” households or individuals. However, incomplete or missing information on income and wealth status in developing country contexts complicates the selection of beneficiaries. While increased emphasis is being put on targeting strategies especially for Social Protection programs, the available evidence remains thin, especially in FCV contexts. The Impact Evaluation implemented by DIME as part of the STEP LIPW program aims at filling such knowledge gaps by testing the efficacy of alternative targeting mechanisms to ensuring that the poor and vulnerable households are included.

The impact evaluation aims to answer three key research questions: 1) How effective are different targeting mechanisms in ensuring participation of the poor households in LIPW rural schemes? 2) What are the direct social and economic impacts of different targeting mechanisms on beneficiary households and communities? 3) What are the overall social and economic impacts of LIPW rural schemes on recipient individuals?

The effects of targeting mechanisms are evaluated using a randomized control trial study design, with villages as the unit of randomization. 150 villages located on the rehabilitated roads axes are included in the study. Randomization is done by strata according to village size, assigning 1/3 of villages to beneficiary selection by public lottery, 1/3 by chief selection, 1/3 by community choice.

While data from the impact evaluation is still being gathered, anecdotal findings indicate that in conflict prone areas people are more in favor of lotteries as a targeting strategy (versus chief or community selection). It seems communities believe there is less chance of elite capture and manipulation using this method. In STEP, lotteries are used as a targeting strategy in combination with geographic targeting and wage setting.
Proposed project effectiveness monitoring through beneficiary surveys

Upon the establishment of a Targeting Framework, the task team aims to enhance project effectiveness and increase beneficiary engagement by piloting a light, low cost, independent and iterative feedback loop. This system will collect information directly from beneficiaries about several aspects of the Safety Net and Skills Development project. The first aspect is to collect feedback on some key questions about the performance of the project, including successes and challenges. The second aspect is to better understand the perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the methods that were used to select project beneficiaries (for example community-based targeting, lottery, demographic targeting and self-selection). The third aspect is to collect the consumption data of beneficiaries in order to determine the best methods for measuring welfare when doing beneficiary monitoring in South Sudan. The feedback system directly addresses “social accountability and citizen engagement” which is one of the four major issues that were identified in the recent CEN that are central to projects across the World Bank’s portfolio in South Sudan.\(^2\)

The first step of the proposed activity will be to randomly select a sub-sample of beneficiaries from a project who will form part of the feedback loop. This will be followed by a baseline survey during which core respondent data are collected, and mobile phones and solar chargers (where necessary) are distributed. Once the baseline has been completed, respondents will be surveyed approximately once a month from a call center that will be established in Juba. In case there are connection and coverage issues, phone-based surveys will be combined with other methods of gathering the required information. For example, through using local field-based enumerators who would collect and transmit information to a centralized unit. This model of data collection has been implemented successfully in Mali, where project teams were able to assess the distribution and uptake of e-Vouchers for fertilizer, school feeding and cash transfer projects. There is also a precedent of using mobile phone surveys to collect welfare data on displaced populations in areas that are inaccessible to World Bank teams.\(^{xiii}\) In addition, the proposed team has substantial mobile phone survey experience, most notably through the Listening to Africa project. Upon completion of this pilot, the effectiveness of the approach will be assessed and potentially scaled-up or continued with a view to expanding to other FCV countries.

This system of monitoring and evaluation will be piloted on the South Sudan Safety Net and Skills Development project (SNSD: P143915) in order to gather information ahead of the full roll-out of a beneficiary monitoring system for the upcoming South Sudan Safety Net Project (SSSNP: P169274). The SNSD project was implemented in 10 counties in South Sudan, and it is planned that the SSSNP project will cover 7 out of those 10, plus an additional 3 counties. The fact that there is an overlap of 7 counties between the projects means that the lessons learned through this pilot activity will be directly applicable to the upcoming project, and to future World Bank operations in the country.

Proposed feedback mechanism for site selection

Task teams select project sites based on the Tier One targeting framework. To monitor the site selection, project teams will be asked to record the GPS coordinates of all project sites so that stakeholders can easily evaluate whether the site selection is consistent with the country strategy or the project objectives. However, it is likely that once the project is launched, task teams will face many unexpected challenges and unknown issues in many sites. Such site-specific information is often contextual and is not systematically collected by surveys or compiled from administrative data, but it will be highly valuable information for future project teams.

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\(^2\) The others are displacement, youth, and gender.
Therefore, we propose that project teams record any challenges or issues they face in a project site so that future project teams can easily draw lessons from past experiences. Also, although contextual information has been difficult to process in the past, software packages like Python now allows us to conduct statistical and econometric analyses using such data.

Conclusions of the Framework
Creating a well-targeted program is particularly challenging in conflict contexts such as South Sudan. However, there is extensive practical evidence and a rich body of theoretical research that can help guide the design and implementation of the chosen targeting method. This framework has consolidated theory and evidence from the main methods with the aim to provide a comprehensive overview allowing operational teams to make informed decisions when operating in South Sudan. Applying this framework in practice will involve consideration of its four main elements – as follows:

- **Project Targeting Index**: Applying the PTI allows for a methodological approach to location selection, thus reducing ad-hoc decision-making and strengthening the position of both task leaders and CMU in communicating the rationale for these interventions. Beyond justifying location selection, the role of the PTI is all but trivial – although many data sources are available for key indicators that are factored into the selection process, they have never before been aggregated to show the combined criteria in a visual and quantitative fashion.

- **Beneficiary targeting at the local level**: The choice of a targeting method is complicated, and no method is perfect. None of them can reach all poor people or completely lift them out of poverty, and each has important tradeoffs. Nonetheless, some methods outweigh the others. Above all, the chosen method should be appropriate, achievable, and acceptable for the context of each project. These parameters will dictate the tradeoffs and outcomes of the chosen targeting approach. What we see from the framework is that there are pros and cons to all of the approaches.

- **Factors in implementation**: Conflict creates a dynamic context in which tasks teams will be forced to respond to changing situations in real-time. This will involve for example closing off certain project areas and opening up new ones. Above all, there is a necessity for beneficiary feedback and learning to minimize the negative consequences of aid delivery.

- **Monitoring and feedback mechanisms**: These are designed to track progress and to highlight any problems that may be occurring so that iterative changes may be made during project implementation and future projects can take these factors into account. But it is also very important to collect local perceptions about the progress and the fairness or accuracy of targeting methods used in countries or areas characterized by FCV. The lessons learned from M&E and these feedback mechanisms will help future task teams minimize the risk of project failures and improve the effectiveness of the project.
South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world, afflicted by severe conflict and deprivation from both the human development and monetary poverty perspectives. Between 2009 and 2015 the poverty headcount at the international poverty line increased by 2.5 percentage points per year, rising from 51 percent in 2009 to 66 percent in 2015. This was followed by a dramatic spike in the poverty rate between 2015 and 2016 due to the simultaneous onset of hyperinflation and intensification of the conflict. Over this one year period the poverty headcount rose by 16 percentage points to reach 82 percent in 2016.

Poverty in South Sudan has generally been a structural type of rural poverty, characterized by an overall lack of access to services, infrastructure, and opportunities beyond basic agricultural production. Most of the poor are isolated and live in areas where the governments’ reach is minimal. Rural poverty has always been much higher than urban poverty, while the urban populations have much greater access to amenities and services, generating more opportunities and better livelihoods. The political and macroeconomic crises have however resulted in the growth of a more situational type of poverty due to near hyperinflationary price increases, particularly affecting the urban areas. As a result, the gap in incidence of poverty between rural and urban areas is closing.

Far from only suffering from monetary poverty, South Sudan ranks 181 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index. Basic health indicators in the country are extremely poor, highlighting the state of destitution much of the population lives in. Life expectancy at birth in 2015 was estimated to be 56 years (among the 10 lowest in the world). Given the prevalence of poverty in South Sudan, targeting households on the basis of monetary indicators alone may not be the most effective strategy to select program beneficiaries, and would result in a high rate of exclusion errors. On the other hand, in this context assessing vulnerability to poverty and to other basic deprivation is a useful way to target populations most in need.

Geographical Distribution of Poverty

In 2009, higher levels of poverty were concentrated in the more northern former states of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, and Warrap (76, 68, and 64 percent respectively). All of these states border the Republic of Sudan (or a disputed territory) and the concentration of poverty in these areas is most likely related to the historical conflict with the North. The remaining states experienced a more uniform level of poverty in 2009, though still high, at around 50 percent. Poverty in the less affected but covered states, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria, remained much more stable between 2009 and 2015, though movements within this period are not unlikely given the episodic bouts of fighting especially in Central Equatoria. Between 2009 and 2015 large increases in poverty could be observed in the regions covered by the High Frequency Survey (HFS)where the fighting was more prevalent, namely Eastern Equatoria, Greater Bahr el Ghazal, and Lakes. In contrast, poverty in the less affected states covered by the HFS – Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria – remained much more stable between 2009 and 2015. Poverty rates in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in 2015 also remained stable relative to 2009 levels.

By 2016, the southward spread of the conflict and inflation caused poverty to rise, leading to more than 4 in 5 people living under the international poverty line of US$ 1.90 PPP (2011) per capita per day across almost states covered by the HFS. In Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, about 9 in 10 people live under the international poverty line (95, 90, and 90 percent, respectively, Figure A1.1). In Lakes and Central Equatoria, the poverty headcount is slightly lower at about 8 in 10 people (84 and 80 percent, respectively). The predicted poverty map below shows the geographical spread of poverty in South Sudan.
Wellbeing and Deprivation

Given initially high levels of deprivation, the deterioration of economic conditions has driven many poor households further down to hardship conditions. From 2009 to 2016 households at all levels of consumption expenditure experienced a decline in consumption, implying that the average poor person is now even further below the poverty line than before. The average poor household has gone from consuming about three quarters of the poverty line in 2009 down to only about one half in 2016 (US$ 1.46 to US$ 1 PPP 2011). The poverty severity index increased by more than the poverty gap between 2009 and 2016, pointing to an increase in inequality amongst the poor due to an especially marked increase in people living far below the international poverty line. Overall inequality measured through the Gini index dropped considerably from 2009 to 2016, although this was...
driven by wealthier households experiencing greater consumption losses and the prevalence of poverty across the country.

High levels of deprivation as observed in South Sudan translate into widespread hunger and food insecurity. Food security has continuously deteriorated since late 2012, sometimes even reaching famine conditions in certain vulnerable counties. During the most recent harvest season in 2017, a time when food usually is abundant, as many as 4.8 million people were severely food insecure. By mid-2018, the number of severely food insecure people is expected to rise to 6 million, reaching almost half of the total population. Malnutrition amongst children is particularly worrisome, with some 1.1 million children under five expected to be acutely malnourished and almost 300,000 severely malnourished. As food deprivation has pushed many households to rely on their own food production, the poorest urban households are left most vulnerable to food insecurity.

Access to amenities and infrastructure is extremely low and almost exclusive to urban households, but it is much less strongly related to poverty status. The South Sudanese own very few valuable assets and their ownership is almost exclusive to the wealthiest households and urban households. Housing is generally of poor quality, with households often living in crowded conditions. Access to modern and improved sources of energy is even more limited and largely delineated along the urban-rural divide. Nevertheless, even amongst the wealthiest urban households only a minority have access to electricity. The availability of adequate WASH infrastructure is also a problem in South Sudan, exacerbated in rural areas.

Poor households have lower levels of education than wealthier households given urban-rural disparities in provision of education. South Sudan has very low rates of adult educational attainment, with one of the lowest adult literacy rates in Africa. This is largely explained by the low availability, access, and quality of education. Although the youth’s educational outcomes show an improvement over that of previous generations, net attendance rates remain lower than in most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the conflict is jeopardizing the progress achieved between 2009 and 2015, with school attendance rates falling back down to 2009-levels since the intensification of the conflict and onset of rapid inflation in 2016.

South Sudan ranks amongst the lowest countries in the world in terms of comparable metrics of life satisfaction. Mental wellbeing is an important aspect often overlooked in poverty analyses, particularly due to the difficulty of measuring such subjective concepts. In the context of the conflict and macroeconomic crisis, almost the entire South Sudanese population is unsatisfied with their lives, and the intensity of dissatisfaction is correlated with monetary deprivation.

**Vulnerability**

The South Sudanese population is vulnerable to further deprivation. Among the non-poor, a large portion of people live within 10 and 20 percent of the poverty line and are therefore extremely vulnerable to falling into poverty. Based on estimates of the impact of the conflict between 2009 and 2016, further escalation of violence is likely to leave 9 in 10 people in poverty. A country-wide escalation of the conflict would push estimated poverty rates upwards to near universal levels. Both urban and rural poverty would increase to levels higher than 9 in 10 people – the rural poverty headcount would reach 97 percent and the urban headcount 93 percent. While the predictions are restricted to poverty rates, the overall impact of prolonged conflict will clearly be larger.
With a total poverty gap of 120 billion SSP (US$ 900 million\(^3\)), ending poverty in South Sudan is expensive, but not completely unrealistic for an oil producing nation. A targeted Social Safety Net (SSN) has the potential to reduce poverty back to approximate 2009 levels at around 50 percent for roughly US$ 866 million or 116 billion SSP.\(^4\) However, this would require a significant shift in expenditures towards prioritizing development objectives, given that the government currently spends only about 12 percent of its budget on education, health, and infrastructure, compared to 28 percent on defense and security. Presently, much of the assistance available to the people has been donor funded largely in the form of short-term humanitarian aid. A social safety net in South Sudan can serve to bridge the gap between short-term humanitarian interventions and long-term development objectives.

With the policy focus centered on security and macro-economic stability, short-term interventions can help the poor to mitigate negative impacts to some extent. Food security is necessary to avoid further deaths and reduce malnutrition with its often-lifelong impacts for children. Thus, programs to spur agricultural production, at least at the subsistence level, will be important. The potential loss of a generation due to weak or non-existent schooling should also be avoided by ensuring that schools are rebuilt, opened and staffed with the minimum security needed to allow children to attend. Opportunities for the youth must be created to avoid idle youth and relapses into conflict. Public works programs can be combined with social safety nets to create opportunities and foster resilience against future shocks. Entrepreneurial activities should also be offered, specifically for young women to tap into their entrepreneurial potential. Finally, displacement should be ended by searching for durable solutions, with a focus on guaranteeing the security of the displaced population.

**Additional socioeconomic factors impacting poverty**

South Sudan is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis with more than a third of the population being forcibly displaced, amid growing concerns over ethnic violence. By the end of 2017, almost 4.5 million people had been forced from their homes – more than a third of the population. Approximately 1.9 million were internally displaced, while about 2.4 million fled South Sudan.

The South Sudanese economy is experiencing a severe output contraction, driven by falling oil revenues and conflict-related disruptions to economic production. The protracted impact of insecurity and large-scale displacement has contributed to taking a huge toll on livelihoods, with private consumption consistently falling since the end of 2013. Smallholder farming is highly prevalent in South Sudan, where more than 8 out of 10 households rely on own account agricultural production as a primary source of livelihood (83 percent).

Simultaneously, falling global oil prices contributed to the rapid depreciation of the local currency, which triggered an inflationary process given a rise in import prices at a time of domestic shortages. Overall, in the two-year period between December 2015 and December 2017, the official CPI rose by more than 1,100 percent, from 357 points up to 4,502 points (June 2011=100).

Labor markets are primarily agricultural, and they are strained by demographic pressures and conflict-related disruptions. South Sudan’s population is very young (57 percent below 18 years old), meaning the majority are not of working age and the working age population cares for a large number of dependents. High dependency ratios are strongly correlated with poverty. Furthermore, idle youth can create a risk factor for conflict. Thus,

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\(^3\) At the July 2017 commercial exchange rate of 134 SSP/USD.
\(^4\) At the July 2017 commercial exchange rate of 134 SSP/USD.
creating opportunities for the youth is essential for breaking cycles of violence. People living in rural areas and the urban poor rely heavily on agricultural production for their livelihoods. In urban areas, better off households are more likely to rely on wages and salaries. Labor force participation and unemployment rates are low, which is possibly due to conflict and economic disruptions.
Another layer of the online geographical targeting tool that will be made available to project teams is a map of the development presence of partners in South Sudan who are working in nine sectors. These are: camp coordination and camp management, education, emergency shelter and non-food programs, food security and livelihoods, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, and WASH. These data are produced regularly by UNOCHA and are available at the county level, meaning that they can add a naturally useful additional layer of information for project teams. While a full set of maps of the footprints of development partners is not included in this guidance note, project teams will be able to request a county-level map showing where operational presence is already concentrated in South Sudan. An example is provided below showing the number of education projects and activities that are being carried out in South Sudan according to the latest available data (November 2018 at the time of writing, Figure A2.1). There are 5 counties without any development partner presence in education, while Juba is the county with the most concentrated presence at 12.

Figure A2.1 Presence and number of development partner education programs in South Sudan
Annex III: Conflict Security and Access

Armed conflicts present a number of critical challenges. The most common form of intervention in such settings is undertaken by humanitarian agencies, which are designed and staffed to work in such contexts with the kinds of assistance that provide short-term relief. However, over time there has been increasing relevance and therefore expectation that development institutions, such as the World Bank, operate in countries beset by violent conflict.5

What this section will provide in terms of targeting will be to cover a number of the features of the conflict and their implications for programming as follows: i) description of the main features of the conflict;6 ii) an examination of the interaction between aid and conflict; and iii) the means by which aid agencies mitigate the risks associated with working in an armed conflict.

Key Features of the Conflict

Geography of violence: The initial onset of the fighting was between two groups, the government and its military forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the SPLA) and its opponents, the SPLA-Internal Opposition (SPLA-IO). Yet, over time there has been increasing fragmentation and proliferation of opposing groups. Concomitantly, the conflict has changed from a civil war largely between the two sets of forces, mainly concentrated in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states, to one covering the entire country (Figure A3.1 below and Annex VI). Yet, while it has spread it is clear that there are temporal/seasonal and geographical variations with the data indicating greater intensity in some areas and relative stability in others. PROGRAM IMPLICATION: there are no longer areas of certain stability as in the 2013-2015 conflict period, thus greater risk assessment and monitoring are needed.

Figure A3.1: Conflict Intensity in South Sudan since July 2016 (source: ACLED)

Multi-actor: The outbreak of conflict in late 2013 was initially the fracturing of the leadership in government, represented by the splitting of the SPLA into the SPLA-In Government and the SPLA-in Opposition.7 The split was initially a binary one; that changed in July 2016 with the flight of Riek Machar from Juba and the country. For

5 Reference – World Humanitarian Summit
6 Note on Methodology - This analysis was guided by a review of current and recent literature on conflict dynamics and political economy at national and state levels. It drew on data and quantitative research conducted by OCHA, ACLED and Aid Security, among others. Structured interviews with donors, diplomats, national ministry staff and aid agencies working in Juba helped corroborate initial findings and finalize this analysis.
7 SAS, John Young and Alex de Waal
example, in the last 18 months, the historically stable Equatorian states (the agricultural heartland of the country) have witnessed intense conflict, as groups excluded from previous peace negotiations have taken up arms. There are now over 40 armed factions and groups involved in the conflict (see Annex VII). IMPLICATION: teams need to be aware of the armed groups present in their areas of operation and the level of threat posed to interventions.

**Areas of control:** Over time state-level authority and local leadership has fragmented, concentrating around ethnic-geographies or homelands, and eroding the Juba-centric hierarchy in favor of competing heterarchies. All evidence suggests that the Government of South Sudan and SPLA are militarily dominant. However, they are not sufficiently powerful to militarily defeat all other armed opposition, nor is its command and control sufficient to politically dominate the areas under its control. IMPLICATION: teams need to be aware of the moral hazards of only working in government areas and consider expanding their operations to reach populations under opposition control.

**Multi-level:** Current conflict analysis suggests the dynamic is best understood at three different levels; hence, some commentators argue that even a national political settlement amongst key protagonists will not result in inclusive peace across the territory. As with the mosaic of different actors in the conflict there are a myriad of drivers for the armed conflict situated at many levels of the country.

- **National:** The SPLM-IO split from the SPLM in late 2013, due to a contest between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar. The SPLM-IO split into two factions in mid-2016 following renewed fighting in Juba, forcing Machar to flee into Democratic Republic of Congo, leading to his subsequent replacement by First Deputy President Taban Deng Gai. In May 2018 Taban Deng announced that his IO faction was rejoining the SPLM, while Machar-led elements continue to fight the government and the SPLA. Despite a ceasefire agreement signed in December 2017, conflict in parts of the country continues.

- **Sub-national:** Contests over land and resources have compounded the national level conflict whereby armed actors have taken on conflicts over state, county and ethnic boundaries. All 10 states have seen the formation of armed groups proclaiming a political mandate and mission to protect local interests, albeit these typically inhere to residing ethnic groups (See Annex VII). IMPLICATION: increased group fragmentation beyond the initial binary split of SPLA and IO is sowing fear among some populations and driving displacement toward more secure areas with steady relief supplies. In other areas, sub-national groups are seeking to placate aid agencies, enticing them with protection assurances in order to keep local communities from fragmenting further. Splintering of groups makes them weaker, giving aid groups some negotiating power.

- **Local:** Community defense forces or ethnic militias are not new in South Sudan. They are a consequence of an ethnically divided society with a long history of inter and intra communal violence, including asset stripping.

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9 Reference.
10 Need reference.
11 UN Panel of expert’s reference.
12 Reference.
18 http://www.bti-project.org/de/berichte/laenderberichte/detail/itc/SSD/
and cycles of revenge cattle raiding.\(^{20}\) Many militias are cattle-rustling and self-defense groups such as the Murle militia and White Army. The escalation of intercommunal and regional contestations that have little to do with the competition over central power.\(^{21}\) **IMPLICATION:** contrary to conflict at the national level, operational interventions aimed at addressing the prevention of conflict at the local level may have a chance for success.

**Wet and dry season variations:** At the national and sub-national levels, military offensives favor dry ground in the quest for scarce resources, and formerly quiet areas are affected by violence.\(^{22}\) At the local level, however, analysts find that local militias are more active in the wet season. Cattle-raiding is the dominant form of organized violence involving these groups, who track green pasture where private herds congregate, becoming hardier during the rains given abundant grazing.\(^{23}\) Inter-ethnic communal violence independent of cattle raiding (revenge attacks) is however unrelated to rainfall, studies have shown.\(^{24}\) **IMPLICATION:** Location access is seasonal but climate is also related to conflict although such risks can be mitigated through appropriate programming.

**Drivers of Conflict, Financing and Predation:** Many reasons have been posited for the resumption of armed conflict and why it is ongoing. Above all, South Sudan’s conflict has been associated with the fracturing of its political economy.\(^{25}\) The 2005 peace agreement between southern Sudan and Khartoum ushered in an extraordinary windfall in the form of oil revenues that supported an elaborate patronage network, primarily among the military class.\(^{26}\) There was a massive increase in government revenues, from a meagre US$ 100,000 in 2005 to US$ 3.4 billion in 2011–2012. Insurgent militias were offered amnesty and integrated into the SPLA as a policy of stabilization and thereby created an enormous security sector. Just before the 2005 agreement, the SPLA numbered around 40,000. By 2011, the SPLA had grown to 240,000 and there were an additional 90,000 personnel in other “organized forces,” including police and wildlife services. The sector absorbed some 60 percent of the official budget. From the 2013 period onward there has been a deterioration in financing both for the government, due to declining oil production and prices, as well as external support for the armed opposition. **IMPLICATION:** there has been an increased pattern of armed groups predating on aid agencies looting food and other assets.

**Ethnic diversity:** one of the drivers associated with the conflict is ethnic identity and inter-group conflict. There is no doubt that this has been instrumentalized as part of the national political conflict.\(^{27}\) In a country of over 64 different ethnic groups, aid agencies have attempted to ensure equity by being inclusive in programming for all ethnicities rather than those groups for example associated with the government. **IMPLICATION:** equitable distribution of assistance should recognize such diversity (see Annex III).

**Intersection of Aid and Conflict**

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\(^{21}\) The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), April 2017.


\(^{23}\) “Dense bush as a result of rainfall provides ample space for hiding following raids, and the availability of surface water during this time makes it easier to trek with the raided animals. Hence, the results of raiding are more successful during wet seasons.” From “Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa,” *Peace Review, A Journal of Social Justice*, Clionadh Raleigh, Dominic Kniveton, January, 2012: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343311427754

\(^{24}\) “Come Rain or Shine,’ op. cit.

\(^{25}\) De Waal, Alex. 2015. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa; Money, War and the Business of Power*.

\(^{26}\) Pinaud, Clemence. “South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of a Military Aristocracy.” *African Affairs*.

\(^{27}\) See e.g. UN SG Report (November 2016), statements of the SG Representative for the Prevention of Genocide (November 2016) and the UN Human Rights Council (December 2014).
Attacks on aid workers, assets and operations in South Sudan continue to be among the highest in the world. From January to May 2018, 51 national and international staff were kidnapped, wounded or killed. In 2016 and 2017, South Sudan was the world’s most dangerous environment for aid workers, reflecting the fracturing conflict and impunity for armed actors. A recent report has reiterated many of the emerging concerns of humanitarian intervention in an armed conflict and the risks associated with aid fueling conflict. These issues have confronted aid actors working in war-zones as international engagement in conflict has increased, particularly since the post-cold war period; many of these debates have concentrated on aid in the Sudans. “Do no harm” and the fear of unintended consequences inform donor desires to avoid direct support to the Government as well as consolidated certain ethnic interests. What helps strengthen this analysis is a typology relating to aid in conflict as outlined below in Figure A3.2.

Figure A3.2 Typology of aid and conflict interactions

What we see are essentially four types of inter-actions as follows:

i) **Between the World Bank and its beneficiaries:** Particular concerns in an armed conflict setting may range from expired medical drugs, to labor influx and the need to safeguard against sexual exploitation and sexual violence, as well as avoiding exacerbating tensions over “winners and losers.”

ii) **Between warring parties and beneficiaries:** Civilian communities face a range of threats from the raiding of stores and assets, to sexual violence, injury and death, as well as forced displacement from their areas of residence. Many South Sudanese are subject to a familiar pattern of violence and resource expropriation, resulting in safety-seeking behavior that involves either aid-dependent camp life or the

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28 [www.aidworkersecurity.org](http://www.aidworkersecurity.org) 2017 the total was 58 victims; in 2016 98 victims
30 ODI/USIP – unintended consequences of humanitarian aid, 2018
31 Reference
33 OCHA uses a database for its regular “access update” including: violence against assets; bureaucratic impediments; active hostilities; restriction of movement; violence against persons; and operational interference.
security of ethnic enclaves. Abrupt flight from one’s livelihood means abandoning life-sustaining assets; increasingly high IPC levels across rural and urban centers since 2015 track a country beset by near-ubiquitous famine conditions. Although inter-communal conflicts have existed for years in South Sudan, they are more intensive in times of war and famine when families who have lost their cattle seek ways to regain their wealth by raiding neighboring communities.

iii) **Between the World Bank and warring parties:** The belligerents are responsible for a range of infringements and rent-seeking activities including informal taxation, theft of assets, and bureaucratic delays. Areas outside Government control are now enacting a parallel regime of enforced work permits, transport fees and superfluous taxation of staff salaries and relief assets, just as aid agencies are subject to in Juba. In SPLA areas and the capital, cash-strapped authorities pursue a substitute tax regime targeting the aid community, driven by a pillaged and depleted national budget, thousands of unpaid civil servants and paralyzed public services.

iv) **Epicenter of World Bank, beneficiaries and warring parties:** Here we see the relationship between aid being possibly used as a magnet in efforts to encourage forced displacement, diversions of aid at point of delivery, and exposure of beneficiaries to violence due to their receipt of assistance. The bulk of relief agencies stick to safe access areas such as Protection of Civilians (POC) sites, IDP or refugee camps, while ICRC, MSF, WFP and a handful of others negotiate access to areas directly affected by conflict.

In approaches to targeting, program design and implementation should focus on interactions i and iv in order to best define a strategy for mitigating risks.

**Methods Adopted to Mitigate Risks Associated with Conflict**

**Humanitarian Principles:** Aid agencies navigate working in armed conflict settings through a variety of principles that are based on international humanitarian law and provide guidance to those delivering relief. There are four basic principles that govern humanitarian aid: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Humanity refers to the provision of aid to all persons in need, wherever the need exists, with the purpose to protect and respect all human beings. Neutrality is the responsibility of aid organizations not to choose sides in conflict or to favor a particular political, religious, or ideological doctrine. Impartiality demands that aid be given based on need alone and not be allocated based on any other distinctions including gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, class, political party, or religious belief. Finally, independence refers to the requirement that aid organizations are autonomous from any political or military objectives or actors, or with those goals in mind. These principles have been formally established by the UN General Assembly and reiterated by the International Committee for the Red Cross.

**Access:** Aid agencies have established an elaborate series of mechanisms to ensure the regular collection of data and analysis to intervene on access restrictions and delays. This includes a monthly and annual update produced by OCHA on impediments to access and UNDSS data on safe and unsafe roads (see Annex III). NGOs rely on the

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34 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, ipcinfo.org
37 [https://africacenter.org/spotlight/three-trajectories-facing-south-sudan/](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/three-trajectories-facing-south-sudan/)
38 These include The Hague and Geneva Conventions comprising international humanitarian law.
NGO Forum to undertake demarches particularly for bureaucratic impediments imposed by the government. According to recent analysis the key reason why access has deteriorated so drastically in addition to the fragmentation in the war has been a weak connection between the political diplomatic levels and aid providers.\textsuperscript{40}

**Conflict sensitivity:** Conflict sensitive programming aims to mitigate elite capture and anticipate threats to beneficiary safety and programming success. When integrated with effective public communication and feedback mechanisms, it can help dissolve grievances against the aid community. The nature of these threats is highly context dependent however, and varies widely between states and regions of the country. Avoiding “doing harm” means ensuring that aid neither directly drives nor contributes to armed aggression, mass flight, aid dependency, gross market distortions or elite capture.\textsuperscript{41} Operational strategies and design documents abound in the language of conflict sensitivity and “do no harm,” but all actors agree that in the current context “aid without effects” is impossible and attempts to achieve it are naïve. Certain mechanisms\textsuperscript{42} have been established to ensure the necessary analytics to assess conflict sensitivity, but as yet these have not been incorporated into World Bank programming.

**Monitoring and feedback:** Agencies monitor beneficiary satisfaction and perception of services, including local governance and oversight of said services, through a variety of mechanisms. At the World Bank Group, these include Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring (IBM) and Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) or beneficiary feedback. Other aid actors track incidents of conflict and population movements (Displacement Tracking Matrix, or DTM),\textsuperscript{43} trends in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC),\textsuperscript{44} hyperinflation and market price fluctuations per commodity (WFP, FAO), road access to markets/towns (OCHA tracks security/roadblocks and physical condition), and other proxy indicators.

\textsuperscript{40} USIP/OEI ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} “The Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Action In South Sudan,” ODI/USIP, May 2018. Not for public distribution.
\textsuperscript{42} CSRF
\textsuperscript{43} http://www.globaldtm.info/
\textsuperscript{44} http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/south-sudan/en
Annex IV: Recovery and Potential

Aid programs are seeking areas where there is likely to be a chance for recovery to take place, for economic productivity to increase and ultimately for stabilization (as in absence of violence) to consolidate. As outlined in the CEN, the World Bank’s added value is that it is able to span the humanitarian-development nexus. Most notably this has concretely involved partnerships with WFP and UNICEF in supporting their work on food distribution and addressing malnutrition. However, the real added-value of the World Bank in the current humanitarian crisis is to work with partners on exploring the opportunities in certain communities and locations where there are signals that it is possible to foster recovery and strengthen the population’s resilience to further shocks.

Opportunism does not lend itself to a set of well-defined, internationally tested data or factors to look for. However, the basis of existing World Bank operations, particularly the Local Government and Service Delivery Project and the Agricultural Development Project (in pipeline), is designed to support the recovery of communities and support the capacities of local institutions. Furthermore, a number of development partners are working on an agenda to promote resilience and recovery in areas that have the necessary conditions to do so. This is an agenda that the World Bank is following closely in terms of implications for its programming and targeting approaches.

The basic criteria under this section are as follows:

i) **Levels of risk and security:** Each agency in South Sudan undertakes its own security and access analysis before program intervention. There are some open source analytics which are useful in the analysis of conflict (e.g. Small Arms Survey/Human Security Baseline Assessment, ACLED, International Crisis Group, UNOCHA). What is important here is to recognize the different “levels” of conflict and the way in which projects interact with those differing levels and sources of conflict. This is well articulated in the Resilience and Recovery Approach that acknowledges that agencies have little influence on the national level political context but that there are other sources of violence in which programming can have an impact at local level peacebuilding and conflict mitigation.

ii) **Presence of other World Bank and development partner interventions:** Projects can build of the historical presence and counterpart institutions of other projects. For example, the Local Government and Service Delivery Project has supported over 730 community institutions (600 boma and 133 payam development committees) by working through international and national facilitating partners. These counterpart institutions can be used as a platform for other activities other than small-scale infrastructure such as agricultural recovery and public works programs. By the same token, and as anticipated by the Resilience and Recovery Approach, a crowding in of investments and programs can potentially have a leveraging effect in terms of gains for recovery albeit carrying with it the risks associated with predation in armed conflict (Annex VII – World Bank sub-projects).

iii) **Agricultural productivity:** This in many ways is a proxy also for security and stability; the greater the agricultural production (crops and livestock), the more likely it is associated with stability. Agricultural potential is particularly important in terms of the inputs aimed at increasing

45 Options Paper of Partnership for Resilience and Recovery Approach in South Sudan, December 2017, USAID/ UNDP
46 Ibid.
productivity through investments in seed multiplication as well as training. Based on historical and ecological data, the Agriculture Development team has identified areas which have the most potential for recovery over time.

iv) **Basic administrative capacity:** An important factor for engagement is the credibility, legitimacy and capacity of local counterparts. By local counterparts we include both formal, such as state and county civil servants, as well as informal authorities such as local chiefs. Such capacity will vary hugely across the country particularly as many of these positions are now unpaid given the fiscal crisis of the state. The Local Government and Service Delivery project sets out four indicators under this criterion that could be potentially adapted. These are: i) presence of critical staff including an Executive Director, Financial Controller and Planning Officer; ii) that a budget has been prepared and approved (although this is probably unrealistic in current circumstances); and iii) the presence of a functioning Legislative Council.

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47 Traditional Authorities and Local Government in South Sudan, Marcus Hoehne, 2008
48 Local Justice in South Sudan, Rift Valley Institute, 2010
Annex V: Targeting Background and Case Stories

Universal Approach versus Targeting

In South Sudan, all indicators suggest that with a poverty rate of over 80 percent and extraordinarily high levels of food insecurity, targeting in itself may not be appropriate. There is a strong argument to be made that assistance should be provided to everyone. It has been estimated that at least US$ 866 million would be required by way of social safety nets simply to bring poverty headcount levels from 2016 rates back to the 2009 rate of just above 50 percent. This clearly would require stability, free and unfettered access to all populations, and the fiscal commitment from the government to devote such resources to arresting food insecurity, malnutrition and chronic morbidity.

In the context of such wholesale deprivation, a universal approach would advance social cohesion and avoid inter-group division as well as circumvent the costs associated with targeting. It would increase the efficiency of redistributive spending (from domestic as well as international resources). However, the necessary conditions (including insufficient resources or security) do not allow for a universal approach although this is something that the government and its partners should consider if a credible political settlement is achieved. In the interim, there are two important ways in which a more “universal” approach can be adopted:

i) Universal coverage of the territory: With certain types of assistance there has been a concerted effort to ensure coordination with partners and/or coverage of the entire territory. WFP attempts to reach all populations within Phase 3 to 5 of the IPC food security categories, despite many access restrictions and delays. Furthermore, the Health Pooled Fund with the World Bank project ensures that all the original states are covered with basic medical services.

ii) Universal approach to identification and measurement: A number of different agencies deploy resources to obtain data on measuring need (manifested in vulnerability and poverty surveys) and monitoring impact. As part of the humanitarian development nexus, further efforts are being taken to strengthen the ways in which different institutions such as the World Bank work with humanitarian agencies such as WFP and UNICEF.

Administrative Units of Location

The question of location in South Sudan is a contested one and a central feature to the sets of differences between the opposing belligerents. Since October 2015, a government decentralization process increased the number of states from 10 to 32, which in turn increased the next level of administration, the county, from 86 to 183. This process is contested by the opposing parties. For technical reasons, the World Bank plans and programs according to the original 10 states, as there are no geo-linked shape files for the new configuration. Hence, poverty mapping is still undertaken for the original 86 counties. Data are not available for the next administrative levels, the payam and boma. Targeting at these lower levels of administration, in the Local Government and Service Delivery Project, is undertaken by stakeholder and community consultation.

Case Studies from Targeting Experiences

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan

49 World Bank, Poverty Assessment, 2018
The randomization rules from an impact evaluation (IE) of Afghanistan’s flagship National Solidarity Program (NSP), which facilitates village-level projects via CDD, offer some lessons for FCV-sensitive randomization design. Randomization was used not only to conduct the IE, but also due to data and budget constraints during the second NSP phase, only about half of eligible villages could receive the block grants at the time, but there was no village-level data to identify the most vulnerable villages. Thus, a virtual lottery was used to ration and distribute the limited funds in a fair and practical way. The team used a partitioned matched-pair cluster randomization design to assign 500 villages to treatment and control groups. The sample was selected out of 10 districts that were secure, ethnically diverse, and were nationally representative of rural characteristics (based on existing and collected household data). The 250 that were not selected were not aware of the program and were a considerable distance away from the 250 receiving NSP (but they received NSP once it was expanded in phase III and the IE ended). To address sensitivity to political and humanitarian concerns, certain villages in each district (15) were prioritized to receive NSP without IE participation (as selected by the implementation Facilitating Partners – local and national NGOs). This method was also employed to ease possible tensions or non-compliance related to randomization assignments.

However, this is not a case of a true lottery, as the main purpose of the calculated randomization is evaluation. The overall NSP program actually has universal rural targeting as a goal. After Phase III, the program has covered about half of the eligible villages in Afghanistan, which has an overall poverty rate of nearly 40 percent. Based on its inclusive coverage goal, universal targeting is the method preferred by the government – offering a “peace dividend” – and supported by demand from villages and elected CDC leaders. This is all possible thanks to a massive collaborative effort, which combines a multitude of financial and technical implementation partners, with a funding commitment about US$ 1 billion for NSP III, including a multi-donor Trust Fund. This is an exemplary effort, but one that is difficult to duplicate due to the amount of resources and coordination needed to make it work. (SOURCE: Beath, Christia, Enikolopov 2013).

**Targeting in FCV Contexts: Evidence from the Philippines, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Mali**

**Philippines:** The *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program*, commonly known as the 4Ps, was established in 2007 with the financial support from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The 4Ps is a conditional cash transfer program tied to education and health (as its predecessors including *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil). The target group are households with a per capita income that is below the regional poverty line and with children between 0-14 years of age. Household incomes were estimated through PMT (indicators included general household consumption and conditions, as well as regional variables). In addition, the lists of PMT-selected households were then validated through spot-checks and community assemblies. Initially, the program was targeted to municipalities with a poverty rate of 50 percent, making
about half of households eligible in the experimental sample villages. Mainly due to the significant transfer amount, 87 percent of beneficiary households complied with the conditionality parameters. Although the Philippines has struggled with civil conflict, the design and delivery of the 4Ps has been largely successful, going beyond just poverty reduction: empirical evidence and analysis from an RCT shows a positive causal effect of the 4Ps program on conflict reduction.

**Afghanistan:** Despite some progress, Afghanistan is still affected by FCV issues. Beyond the NSP (see above), there are several other interventions supported by the World Bank, including the Safety Nets and Pensions Support Project. The safety nets component sets ground for an emerging Afghanistan Social Protection Program (ASPP) by first piloting a modest SSN program in select provinces based on geographic targeting (with a poverty rate of 50 percent or more via poverty maps). The second phase of targeting relied on community and demographic identification of beneficiaries, but issues arose. The SSN was thus revised under AF to increase targeting accuracy and effectiveness. It reduced the demographic categories (originally widows, disabled, elderly, and poor rural families with children 14+ in the bottom 10 percent), to primarily target mothers with children under 5 that are in the poorest 20 percent of village households. Incorporating the 2013 AF revisions, households were targeted through PMT methods with community support (utilizing national vulnerability data, NRVA). The project just concluded with positive targeting results, although the overall outcome was rated as moderately satisfactory. According to the June 2018 ICR, the combined targeting approach (PMT with community mobilization) facilitated much better results than CBT alone: the inclusion errors were only 18 percent and exclusion 28 percent with PMT – much better than 85 percent inclusion and 80 percent exclusion errors under the initial CBT. This targeting method reached 45 percent of the bottom 20 percent of poor households and 66 percent of the bottom 40 percent (in line with most CTs). Overall, the citizens’ perceptions of this targeting process were very positive: 90 percent agreed that the targeting method was fair and transparent. However, there were some implementation problems including delayed payments and the failure to launch planned communication and redressal mechanisms. The project (P113421) began in FY2009, and the safety net component cost US$ 9.12 million.

**Indonesia:** Seminal experimental evidence on targeting from the post-conflict, ethnically diverse Indonesia lends some important lessons. The Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) and Mitra Samya, an Indonesian NGO, implemented a one-time unconditional cash transfer in a nationally representative sample of 640 villages. After the initial geographic selection, three targeting methods were tested: CBT, PMT, and a hybrid. The overall results show that the PMT method was more accurate on average, but CBT yielded greater community satisfaction. The PMT design included 49 proxy indicators based on national poverty data, with estimated district-specific formulas to account for variance. The CBT design rested on a poverty ranking determined though community meetings run by a local facilitator, ultimately limiting chosen households to ones ranked below a quota set via geographic targeting. The CBT/PMT method used the CBT approach first and then PMT to randomly verify the selection; this method was the least successful both on measures of accuracy and satisfaction – possibly due to its order and implications of distrust. Overall, the researchers recommend using a CBT method for significant reasons, including: (1) similar impact on poverty to PMT but greater legitimacy; (2) greater knowledge of intricate poverty and vulnerability beyond consumption; (3) no evidence of elite capture or social exclusion.

**Mali:** UNICEF implemented a very small CCT pilot program called *Bourse Maman* between 2002 and 2007. It was targeted towards women with school-age children in two regions – Mopti and Kayes – where the MDG for primary school enrollment was not met. The annual transfers were conditional on children’s attendance, with a bonus for girls. Targeting rested primarily on geographic and demographic methods, with some PMT and CBT elements. UNICEF collaborated with local NGOs to identify beneficiary
households: the poorest with most primary school children. The selection effort was also supported by community-based methods, using the help of local councils, women’s groups, school directors, school management committees, and local education authorities. Although there were some issues (confusion around targeting, lack of NGO coordination, and opposition from some local Muslim leaders), the program boosted school enrollment and attendance according to an external evaluation. The direct impact on poverty is unclear, but a UNICEF simulation points to utilizing PMT methods in scaled-up schemes as a feasible way of reducing the child poverty headcount by 17.3 percent, albeit with some inevitable errors (22.5 percent inclusion and 10.6 percent exclusion). Although this program was run before the violent conflict erupted in 2012, it still provides some insight on the implementation of a targeted scheme in a poor and fragile African country.
Annex VI – Changes in the Patterns of Violence
### Annex VII: South Sudanese Armed Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LOCATIONS</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>MILITARY/ POLITICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>South Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ South Sudan’s Armed Forces</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>General Gabriel Jok Riak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA-IO</td>
<td>South Sudan People’s Liberation Army- In Opposition</td>
<td>Upper Nile/ Jonglei</td>
<td>Riek Machar</td>
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### South Sudanese Opposition Alliance

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LOCATIONS</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>MILITARY/ POLITICAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Party- South Sudan Armed Forces</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>Gabriel Changson Chang and Peter Gadet Yak Gabriel Gatwech Chan</td>
</tr>
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<td>SSFDP</td>
<td>South Sudan Federal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria/ Torit</td>
<td>Anthony Ongwaja</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>Lawrence Amitayo Legge, Thomas Cirillo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDM</td>
<td>National Democratic Movement</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>Lam Akol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Movement</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>Dr Hakim Dario Moi, from the small Didinga tribe of Eastern Equatoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSLM</td>
<td>South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>James Gai Yoach and Bapiny Montuil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNMC</td>
<td>South Sudan National Movement for Change</td>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td>Former Western Equatoria Governor Henry</td>
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50 Sources SAS, NUPI, Reliefweb, newspaper sources
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Alliances</th>
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<td>Babaeng</td>
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<td>Jonglei</td>
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<td>Equatorias</td>
<td>Zande</td>
<td>Pro-SPLA-IO</td>
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<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>Mundari</td>
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<td>Upper Nile</td>
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<td>Olony</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Army</td>
<td>Upper Nile and Unity</td>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>Pro-SPLA-IO</td>
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<td>Tiger Faction/ Yaones Okij</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>Pro-SPLA-IO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Western Bahr Al Ghazal</td>
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**Ethnic militia, galweng and self-defence forces**

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**Former Detainees**

- Including Pagan Amum, Majak D' Agoot Kosti Manibe

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51 Armed groups in Yei, Torit, Morobo, Kajojeji counties and elsewhere--deserters have armed themselves in a number of areas in the Equatorias and have prepared for clashes with SPLA. https://tamazuj.atavist.com/factbox-armed-opposition-groups-in-south-sudan

52 See http://www.xinhuanet.com/engli/sh/2017-05/27/c_136321041.htm
Annex VIII – World Bank subprojects – LGSDP and HRRP
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vi (Kansiime et al, April 2018)
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ix (Gwatkin, 2000)
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xii (Coady et al, 2004)
xiv See for an introduction Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War, 1999
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xvi Harrigan, 2004
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xviii The 28 States System in South Sudan, Stimson Centre, 2016
xix Christopolos 2004
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xxxvii (Hargreaves et at. 2007; McCord 2013)
xxxviii (Van Domelen 2007
xlii Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler 2011
xl McCord 2013
xli Coady et al. 2004
xlii (Coady et al. 2004; McCord 2013; ICRC 2007).
xliii Van Domelen, 2007
xliv Ellis 2008; Coady et al. 2004
xlv McLeod and Tovo 2001
xlvi Coady et al. 2004, Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle 2016