42139 Changing the Way Our Services Are Governed? Changing the Way Our Services Are Governed? Bottom-up Governance and Service Delivery in Moldova Opportunities and Challenges for Effective Mechanisms of Participation Sustainable Development Department Europe and Central Asia Region © 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Contents Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1Context and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Country Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Strategic Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Study Objectives and Scope, and Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Key Analytical and Policy Frameworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2How Participatory Can Moldovan Local Governments Be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Overview of Context and Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Opportunities for Building Participatory Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Potentials and Limitations of Existing Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Broader Constraints and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3Strengthening Participatory Capacity through the Social Investment Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Contextual Clarifications: From MSIF1 to MSIF2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Citizen Empowerment Strategies under MSIF1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Strengthened Participatory Capacities of Communities and Local Governments under MSIF1 . . 32 Challenges for Inclusiveness and Effectiveness under MSIF2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4Improving Governance of Basic Education Services through Parents'Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Existing Parents' Associations: Opportunities and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 External Challenges to More Effective Parent Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5StrengtheningTransparency and Client Power in Rural and UrbanWater Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Challenges for Bottom-Up Approaches to Accountability in Rural Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Enhancing Accountability for Water Service Delivery in Urban Settings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6What Can Moldovan Decisionmakers Do? Policy and Operational Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Overall Conclusions and Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Toward Participatory Local Governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Toward a Supportive Environment for Empowering Parents in Education Services . . . . . . . . . . 73 Policy Implications for Drinkable Water Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 v vi C O N T E N T S A P P E N D I X E S A Policy Recommendations for Improving Governance and Service Delivery in Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 B School Inspections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 T A B L E S 2-1 Government Mandates for Service Delivery in Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2-2 Assignment of Revenues and Responsibilities to Subnational Governments in Transition Countries. . . 16 3-1 Implementing partners for MSIF1 and MSIF2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4-1 Locus of Decisionmaking and Responsibility for Basic Education Services in Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 6-1 MSIF 2: A Transitional Mechanism toward Accountable and Mature Local Self-governments . . . . . . 73 A1 Policy Recommendations for Improving the Accountability of Local Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 A2 Policy Recommendations for Improving the Accountability of Education Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 A3 Policy Recommendations for Improving the Accountability of Water Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 B O X E S 1-1 Moldova's Drinking Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1-2 Moldova's Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2-1 Financing of Local Governments for Service Delivery in Moldova. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2-2 The USAID Local Government Reform Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2-3 Using the Media to Share Information with Citizens: Cahul, South Moldova. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3-1 An Overview of the First Moldova Social Investment Fund (1999­2004) Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3-2 What happens once the MSIF Project is over? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4-1 Key Study Findings on Different Modalities for Parental Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4-2 Authoritarian Attitudes: Observations of a Parent Meeting in an Urban School in Moldova . . . . . . . . 44 5-1 GoodPracticefromtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperationWaterandSanitationProgram . . . 53 5-2 Legacy of Soviet Union's Water Infrastructure on Piped Water Sanitation Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6-1 What are Citizen Report Cards?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6-2 Innovative Approaches to Accountability of Local Governments: Bolivia Vigilance Committee. . . . . . . . . 69 6-3 Participatory Budgeting in Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6-4 Parents Participation, Students Test Scores and Nicaragua's Autonomous School Program . . . . . . . . . 74 6-5 Parental Participation in School Governance: Good Practices from EU Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6-6 Informing Citizens about Water Tarif Issues: An Example from Cahul, Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 6-7 Piloting a Community Score Card Process: Maharashtra Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project . . . . 79 F I G U R E S 1-1 World Bank Indicators on Quality of Governance in Moldova, 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5-1 To Whom Would You Go for Help in Solving a Water Problem? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 6-1 Strategic Framework: Building Municipal Capacity for Community Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Acknowledgments T his study was designed and written by a core World Bank team from ECSSD led by Carine Clert and comprising Sarah Michael and Elizabeth Gomart. Research assistance was provided by Natalia Catrinescu, Arsala Deane, Evelin Lehis and Sheetal Rana. The team worked under the supervision of Alexandre Marc and Maninder Gill (Sector Managers, ECSSD) and benefited from the stimulating guidance of Brian Levy (Lead Public Sector Specialist, ECSPE). Financial support from the Moldova Country Unit (ECCU2), ECSSD, and the Trust Fund for Envi- ronmentally & Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD) is gratefully acknowledged. Beaulah Noble, Daphne Sawyer-Dunn, Natalia Cherevatova, Hiwote Tadesse and Irene Bomani provided important administrative support throughout the study in Headquarters while Tamara Ursu, Diana Calugher, Carolina Ceban and Irina Baraliuc in Moldova were instrumental to the team's field missions. Many World Bank colleagues contributed to the research and analysis contained within this report. We are particularly grateful to Edward Brown, Philip Moeller, Seema Manghee, Anush Bezhanyan, Yas- ser El-Gammal; Maya Sandu, Ala Pinzari, Alexei Ionascu, Sandu Ghidirim. Valuable peer review com- ments were provided on this report and the project concept note by William Reuben, Susanne Mueller, and Alec Gershberg. Useful recommendations on the first draft were provided by Poul Engberg-Ped- ersen, Lawrence Bouton, and Svetlana Proskurovska. The team also benefited from the initial advice of external experts on social accountability including Anne-Marie Goetz (IDS Sussex). The main government counterpart for this study is the Ministry of Economy of Moldova, which is the coordinating ministry for the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP). Other Moldovan government institutions have been associated with this study, especially the Moldova Social Investment Fund and the Ministry of Education. The team is very grateful for the support and feedback received from numerous representatives of government, civil society, and donor organizations during the launch of the study in September 2004 and a series of in-country consultations on the study held in May 2005. Special thanks go to Olga Covaliova and Aurelia Samson (PIU Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation Project); Ludmila Stepan (PIU General Education Project); Boris Popadiuc, Ludmila Malcoci and Ion Stanciu (Moldova Social Investment Fund and attached PIU); Patrick Adatte (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation); Kate Whyte, Jan Barret, and Silvia Apostol (DFID); Duane Beard (USAID Local Government Reform Project); Mihai Godea, Vadim Pistrinciuc, and Mircea Esanu (Centrul Contact). Special thanks go to Giovanna Barberis, Head, UNICEF Moldova, for supplying valuable reference to the UNICEF report on youth participation in Moldovan schools. Field work was diligently carried out by a local team led by Galina Buga, Anastasia Oceretnii, Liuba Petko, long with Cristina Baciu, Eugenia Bostan, Ion Buga, Ctlina Darie, Ion Cibotaric, Ana Ciurac, vii viii A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S Lilian Danilov, Maria Leu, Violeta Moraru, Igor Panas, and Natalia Rabei. Without their exceptional commitment to the project, this study could not have been completed. Most importantly, the team would like to thank the hundreds of citizens, service providers, local gov- ernment officials, civil society and donor representatives, and other stakeholders throughout Moldova who so generously shared their opinions, experiences and time through interviews with our research team. Their contribution to this report is the most significant of all. Acronyms and Abbreviations ARVIN Association, Resources, Voice, Information, and Negotiation CAS Country Assistance Strategy GDP Gross Domestic Product EGPRSP Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper DFID Department for International Development (UK) EU European Union MSIF Moldova Social Investment Fund NGO Nongovernmental Organization PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development WDR World Development Report ix Executive Summary B Thisreportpresentsthekeyfindings ottom-up approaches for increasing transparency and accountability are of aWorld Bank policy study con- explored within the context of local governance in general, and sectoral ducted in Moldova between July 2004 service delivery more specifically, with a focus on drinking water and and February 2005. It assesses the basic education services. The report explores opportunities and challenges for scope for Moldovan decisionmakers; current and potential bottom-up mechanisms to promote civic participation1 and civil society; and donor to be more effective in strengthening transparency, accountability, and respon- partners, including theWorld Bank, to siveness in local-level service delivery. The policy recommendations from the improve the governance of service study will inform the World Bank's policy dialogue within the context of the delivery through increased support Economic Growth Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP) and guide task of bottom-up approaches, which teams supporting government projects, especially in education, water and local can complement current top-down development. It is hoped that these recommendations will contribute to the proj- efforts. ects and programs of development partners, including donors and civil society organizations within Moldova. A matrix consisting of three tables in Appendix A outlines the recommendations for improving the accountability of local gov- ernment (Table A-1), accountability of educations services (Table A-2), and the accountability of water services (Table A-3). WHY SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF MOLDOVA BE INTERESTED IN THE BOTTOMUP GOVERNANCE OF SERVICE DELIVERY? Bottom-up governance in service provision matters for performance. In Mol- dova, as in many other countries, services often fall short of citizens' needs, in terms of both quantity and quality, with the poor and marginalized in rural areas and small towns particularly affected. Reasons for service delivery failure are complex and wide-ranging, including major fiscal constraints. However, this report draws on worldwide research and evidence that services work best when they put citizens at the center of service provision. As argued in the World Development Report 2004, generating space for meaningful and effec- tive civic inputs into decisionmaking around service delivery can contribute to improved performance by service providers. Citizens can be empowered to monitor services, exercising bottom-up pressures on service providers as well 1. As clari ed in Chapter 1, in this paper, civic participation refers to: (a) indirect modes of citizens' participation, through which service users exercise their in uence through making their voice heard by elected o cials who are mandated with service delivery responsibilities; and (b) direct modes of participation, whereby service users engage more directly with frontline service professionals and service providers' organizations and exert their client power. xi xii E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y as relevant decisionmakers (policy-makers and elected officials with mandates for service delivery) to address the quality and effectiveness of services, or simply to ensure fair treatment of all users. Similarly, improving citizens' access to information on the financial resources available for different services can increase transparency, promote better financial management, and reduce the potential for corruption. Participatory governance can help to achieve Moldova's broader development goals including: (a) pov- erty reduction priorities, such as strengthening human capital, providing adequate social and economic infrastructure, improving governance, and improving interactions between public administration and civil society, as highlighted in the Moldova Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP) 2004-2006 (GOM, 2004); and (b) integration in the European Union, for which strengthen- ing transparent, democratic processes and promoting greater local self-government are key require- ments. Overall Policy-Relevant Conclusions of the Study Opportunities exist... for the Government of Moldova to reinforce and/or introduce mechanisms for civic participation in local government decisionmaking and sectoral service delivery, as part of an overall strategy to improve public services. From a sectoral standpoint, entry points exist to strengthen relationships of accountability between citizens, service providers, and local government officials, particularly in the areas of basic social and economic infrastructure, primary and secondary education, and drinking water services. From a cross-sectoral perspective, there are strong opportu- nities for building more transparent and participatory elected local governments, to which numerous service responsibilities have been delegated under decentralization. With poverty concentrated in rural areas and small towns, Moldovan decisionmakers should not miss the opportunity to bring to scale successful community-driven experiences (such as the Moldova Social Investment Fund) with the full involvement of local and regional governments. Some of the key entry points/opportunities are as follows: Clients are interested and want to participate in issues related to service delivery. These two major ingredients for strengthening accountability in service delivery were observed throughout this study. While this study focused on civic engagement in the education and water sectors, it also found strong citizen interest in other services, especially roads, gas/heating, youth and culture ser- vices, and garbage/waste management. Given the acute unmet needs that exist in many of these sectors, most Moldovan citizens have strong incentives to take part in activities which they see as openings to making improvements in services. Many citizens seem willing to provide their feed- back to government officials on needs and service performance if they are given a forum (such as a government-sponsored report card program) to do so. Incentives and potentials exist for a range of community-based organizations, nongovernmental orga- nizations(NGOs),andothercivilsocietyorganizationstopromoteaccountabilityaroundservicedeliv- ery. This study observed that a strong foundation for greater involvement by civil society in promoting citizen involvement in service delivery already exists. Numerous community-based organizations and NGOs work in Moldovan villages and towns providing citizens with opportunities to voice their needs and opinions and assisting local governments to strengthen their participatory capacities. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y xiii Staff members and managers within certain service delivery organizations, such as some of the water utility managers observed during the study, have already developed and refined their own creative systems for informing clients about service issues and obtaining their feedback. These strategies can be shared among service providers and scaled-up or adapted to other service delivery contexts. Local government officials are directly elected, which potentially makes them strongly account- able to citizens. Furthermore, the Law on Local Public Administration delegates to them important areas of responsibility in education and utilities (water, electricity, solid waste). These local officials are perceived as very accessible by citizens and when provided with resource incentives, many have started open consultations with citizens around priority areas. ... But reform and policy challenges need to be addressed. To capitalize on these opportunities to promote civic participation and to ensure that the mechanisms adopted are inclusive, pro-poor, feasible, and effective, Moldovan decisionmakers and their donor and civil society partners must commit to establish a more supportive external environment for service delivery. Enhanced voice for citizens around service delivery issues must be balanced by greater receptivity to this voice by service providers and policymakers. Such receptivity hardly can be achieved without addressing the unfinished agenda of public administration and civil service reform in Moldova. Some of the recommendations for the Government of Moldova and its partners to consider as part of their strategic agenda include the following: Clarifying mandates and responsibilities for service delivery between service providers and relevant levels of government. Reassessing regulatory arrangements for the governance of service delivery is a key priority, particularly in the domain of urban water services. Providing elected local governments with the necessary skills and financial resources to fulfill their mandates. Priority should be given to address any gaps in the Law on Local Public Finances and other regulations relating to intergovernmental finance. Opportunities to strengthen the day-to-day relationships between local governments and central and district levels of the state administration also need to be addressed (see Table A-1, Appendix A). Addressing financing constraints faced by service providers, a key need identified by school and water utility officials throughout this study. Ensuring that good civil service principles are observed at all governance levels, with progress toward meritocratic, transparent, and unbiased public administration. Voice and participation are important to create pressure for accountability and performance, but they need to go hand in hand with a proper top-down effort to build an accountable and professional administration. Enhancing the flexibility of service providers in management and planning, while maintaining an overall commitment to results. The low-level autonomy of many service providers in decisionmaking limits their ability to adapt to new situations and to adopt innovative approaches to service provi- sion. Strengthening systems for monitoring and evaluating the quality of service delivery, with a focus on results rather than inputs, and for assessing the performance of frontline service providers. The education case study, in particular, strongly reinforced this need. It is important to acknowledge that the implementation of the above policy recommendations will require overcoming various challenges, including increasing fiscal resources and current technical capacity levels. Most important, Government's demonstrated commitment to public administration xiv E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y reform and political will to promote transparency and accountability in public service delivery and local governance will be strongly needed. The Government's agenda on improving the quality of services in Moldova should also prioritize the development of effective and broad-based strategies for information dissemination. Such efforts would strengthen the enabling environment for the engagement of community-based organizations and other civil society groups, including the media, to play a constructive role in promoting greater citizen involvement in service delivery. The media can play an important role in widely publishing and stimu- lating discussion on the results of participatory feedback mechanisms, such as service report cards. Only if people know what is going on, good and bad, can they hold their government accountable. Finally, if the vehicles for citizen participation in local governance and service delivery are to be credible and legitimate, they must be more inclusive of the poor, less educated, and other vulner- able groups. Parents' associations, for example, rarely were found to include the poorest commu- nity members. Constraints for broad-based citizen participation should be better understood and addressed through capacity building and targeted training, as well as the use of trained mediators and facilitators. While elite biases against the poor were often unintended, they nonetheless created a real risk of the benefits of civic participation being enjoyed disproportionately by local elites. In addi- tion, assistance should be provided to users' associations, especially those with the responsibility for managing or collecting funds, to improve their transparency, organizational skills, and governance structures. Such assistance is especially needed in towns in which trust may be negatively affected by heterogeneous communities. Specific Policy and Operational Recommendations In terms of process, the inter-linkages among the study's general policy recommendations highlighted above suggest that a valuable option for policy dialogue and agenda setting would be to discuss these recommendations within a broader strategic platform on participatory local development and poverty reduction. In the meantime, this study identifies several specific operational and policy options for improving accountability around local governance and service delivery in Moldova and suggests areas in which support could be targeted by Moldova's development partners, including the World Bank. Towards more participatory local governance. Two main avenues should be pursued simultaneously. First, the Government should provide a more supportive decentralization framework to ensure that citizens' voice on basic services can be heard and that elected local governments are able to be receptive to this voice. Some specific areas of action suggested by the study include the following: Address gaps in intergovernmental finance laws and revising rules for intergovernmental transfer formulas so that they provide transparent and predictable flows. The study clearly showed that the current system for intergovernmental transfers opens space for discretionary and arbitrary decisions from district levels of government. Support local governments to institute and improve the transparency of administrative procedures for citizen feedback. Documented policies and standards for handling citizen feedback (includ- ing public complaint logs and guidelines for responding to complaints) can encourage citizens to provide their feedback, reduce the discretionary handling of issues by government officials, and provide incentives to officials to support participatory processes. There are various ways of institutionalizing participatory mechanisms: creating new agencies tasked with ensuring citizen E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y xv participation, inscribing them into law, and/or incorporating them in local governments' strategic plans. Establish new mechanisms for citizen inputs and feedback, such as participatory monitoring of service delivery performance through citizen report cards and mechanisms for participatory bud- geting, which build on projects like the USAID Local Government Reform Project and the SDC Water and Sanitation Program. These mechanisms must be multidirectional, ensuring that when clients provide feedback to service providers, opportunities are created for providers and local officials to provide reciprocal feedback to citizens on how that information is being used to change services. Second, the Government should promote and coordinate an ambitious capacity-building program to strengthen the participatory culture and capacities of local authorities and communities. Key elements include the following: Include district officials in capacity-building programs or initiatives on participatory governance and bottom-up service delivery. Numerous study participants highlighted that district officials were regu- larly overlooked by donor projects for capacity-building support. Throughout the study, not a single example of joint local-district government learning was provided. The inclusion of district officials would facilitate joint learning and planning and could create positive incentives for, and attitudinal shifts in, district officials' support for more meaningful participatory processes in local government decisionmaking. Broaden the content of capacity building for local governments for better understandings of the external operating context (mandates, financing rules, power dynamics) and improve both man- agement and participatory skills. Study findings showed the need for local governments and their donor and civil society partners to be aware of the opportunities for and constraints on broad-based participation, and to be able to tailor adequate vehicles for broad-based citizen participation. The study also highlights recommendations for increasing the impact of donor efforts to create a posi- tive ongoing dialogue between local governments and citizens, including improving the transfer of skills for increasing transparency and participation to, and among, local government officials and encouraging greater donor coordination around local governance and service delivery activities and methodologies. It is fair to acknowledge that poor donor coordination may be a consequence of inadequate gover- nance arrangements. The government could demonstrate its commitment and interest in promoting local governance and regional development by establishing a clear institutional focal point at the central level to advocate for policy and legal improvements in these areas. Another way that this institutional focal point could facilitate donor coordination would be to help gather and disseminate information about existing donor-supported development interventions at the local level. Empowering parents in education services. Parental participation in education in Moldova through asso- ciations, committees, and fee payments illustrates the level of interest and commitment that parents already have for schools. This asset can be built on for accountability-enhancing reforms including the following: Improve monitoring, evaluation and incentive systems for educators. Rather than tracking mainly inputs, for example, school inspections should obtain technical information on the improvement of student performance, which would show the real valued added of teachers and schools. xvi E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y Increase transparency by ensuring that key public decisionmakers around education (minis- try, regional and local authorities, school officials) make the type of results-oriented information described above, as well as technical and financial information, widely available to the public. Explore ways to provide more flexibility and autonomy to schools in terms of school policy and resource allocation, building on worldwide experiences in which educational outcomes have been improved through increased school autonomy. Currently, the low level of school autonomy limits not only schools' possibilities to make rational decisions but also their incentives to address poten- tial demands from parents. Increase the role of school-parent committees in school governance, including some power over how general fees raised from parents are spent. Training for parents, teachers, and other stakeholders on these committees in technical and financial skills will be crucial. Preserve the rights of all parents to participate in these committees. The study findings suggest that it is essential that the Government be willing to take a firm and public stand on the fees being vol- untary, the illegality of excluding any parent from the committees, and the illegality of excluding or discriminating in any way against students whose parents cannot or do not pay. Building more transparent and client-oriented urban networked water services. For urban networked services, this study identifies three types of complementary strategic options: Increase consumer education on water services, including district-wide information campaigns on how water service delivery is organized and to whom citizens can turn for help with the vari- ous water-related issues they may face. Included in these information campaigns should be greater information on the role of local governments and service providers in setting tariffs, already a goal of the EGPRSP. The involvement of the media, citizens' groups, and water-focused NGOs in larger multi-stakeholder dialogues, such as those around the poverty reduction strategy process, can be crucial to citizens' understanding of, and influence over, decisionmaking around water service delivery. Strengthen the client orientation of Apa Canal utilities. Strategic levers include promoting response standards and hiring consumer service officers to better institutionalize procedures for reacting to customer feedback. This should be balanced by providing better motivations to staff to be responsive to client needs, both in terms of financial and non-financial incentives, such as training and learning opportunities, flexible work hours, and employee recognition programs. Build a more supportive external operating environment for Apa Canal utilities by rationalizing tariff structures and clarifying responsibilities within the water sector. Achieving this (for instance, by aligning Moldovan legislation and regulations on water services with European standards) will contribute toward increased understanding and ownership of their respective roles by local govern- ment officials and water service providers. Improving Citizen Voice on Rural Water Needs. Government plans to modernize water supply systems in many localities throughout Moldova will help many citizens to become first-time clients of water services. Specific additional recommendations based on this study include the following: Stimulate water users' associations, consumer advocacy groups, and NGOs involved in water service provision through capacity building and seed funding to create formal mechanisms for citizens to impact service delivery. Training and funding these groups also can institutionalize ongoing pro- E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y xvii cesses for citizens to exercise voice around broader water-related issues, such as pollution control and garbage disposal. Bring in good practices from water users' associations and effective mechanisms of civic participa- tion, such as the use of community score cards, designed both to give voice to the public and generate pressure in solving issues of poor service delivery, and to provide service providers with ongoing and immediate feedback for enabling corrective measures to be adopted. Initiate a project-funded newsletter linking water users' associations, such as the MSIF newsletter that is distributed to mayoralties and implementing agencies in participating villages, could help to promote a stimulating ongoing exchange of ideas and opportunities among water users' associations at low cost. The study highlights the role that donor resources targeted at the water sector can play in creating a powerful incentive for local governments to act on citizen demands for improved water services. In the absence of adequate incentives, local governments will continue to struggle to prioritize water services within their meager budgets as has long been the case in Moldovan villages. Community development funds and small grant programs help to free up local government resources and, given the high priority afforded to water concerns among rural citizens, water is likely to be an area in which participatory deci- sionmaking allocates new resources. Targeted block grants to the water sector (for example, for regular water testing and dissemination of test results) can provide a powerful incentive for local governments to address issues that are commonly overlooked. 1 Context and Objectives "Being unable effectively to demand accountability is both a symptom of poverty and one of the reasons why poor people remain poor." --Goetz and Jenkins, 2005 T his report presents key findings of a policy-oriented and action-oriented study conducted in Moldova between July 2004 and February 2005. It assesses the scope for Moldovan decisionmakers, civil society, and donor partners--including the World Bank--to improve the governance of ser- vice delivery, through an increased support of bottom-up approaches to comple- ment current top-down efforts. Bottom-up approaches to increase transparency and accountability are explored in the context of local governance and sectoral service delivery, with a focus on water and education sectors. The report explores opportunities and challenges for current and future mechanisms of civic partici- pation to be more effective in strengthening transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in service delivery at local level. This report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the main themes of the study. It is organized to (a) provide the country background and strategic rationale; (b) clarify the objectives, scope, and audience of the study; (c) sum- marize key analytical issues and frameworks that informed the study design; and (d) outline the methodological approach. Chapter 2 explores local power structures and the roles and responsibilities of local government in Moldova, highlighting existing mechanisms of voice, transparency, and participation that strengthen accountability at the local government level. The subsequent three chapters move to a more specific examination of issues of bottom-up governance of service delivery within specific programs and sectors. Chapter 3 focuses on the Moldova Social Investment Fund, and on the openings that its resource mobili- zation program has created for increased citizen engagement and participation in community decision-making around local infrastructure and services. The report considers issues of transparency and participation within the education sector in Chapter 4, focusing particularly on modalities for parent involvement in school governance. Chapter 5 explores existing mechanisms of accountability among consumers, service providers, and local government offi- cials within both the rural and urban water sectors. It considers the effectiveness 1 2 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? FIGURE 11 World Bank Indicators on Quality of Governance in Moldova, 2004 Voice and Accountability Political Stability 2004 2002 Government Effectiveness 2000 1998 Regulatory Quality 1996 Rule of Law Control of Corruption 0 25 50 75 Country's Percentile Rank (0­100) Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996­2004 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html). of these mechanisms in promoting voice, compact, and client power; and identifies opportunities and obstacles to their improvement. Finally, based on the analysis of accountability relationships presented in Chapters 2­5, Chapter 6 identifies openings and strategic levers for improving service delivery through strengthened local processes for transparency and civic engagement. Chapter 6 also provides practical recommendations on promoting bottom-up approaches to the Government of Moldova, the external donor community (including the World Bank), Moldovan civil society, and other key stake- holders. A matrix consisting of three tables in Appendix A outlines the recommendations for improv- ing the accountability of local government (Table A-1), accountability of educations services (Table A-2), and the accountability of water services (Table A-3). COUNTRY BACKGROUND The study is set against an overall challenging and complex economic, social, and political context. Moldova's transition to the market economy has been difficult. The economy has been characterized by high vulnerability to external shocks. After a deep and prolonged recession, economic growth has finally returned, averaging 6.7 percent over the last 3 years. Yet this is still below the regional aver- age for Commonwealth of Independent States. Moldova is also the poorest country in Europe with a national poverty rate of 48 percent, high inequality of income (0.42 GINI Coefficient in 2002), and a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of only US$542. Depending on the measure of absolute poverty used, between 40 percent and 50 percent of Moldovans are poor; the majority are considered extremely poor. The poor are particularly concentrated in rural areas and small towns. The response to poverty, particularly among youth, was massive out-migration (600,000­800,000 people) during the 1990s. C O N T E X T A N D O B J E C T I V E S 3 BOX 11 Moldova's DrinkingWater Over half of Moldova's population uses drinking water that does not comply and sewage) has been officially devolved to the municipal level, but without with accepted quality standards. Within Moldova's 1,689 municipalities, an corresponding funding and support. estimated 57 towns and 77 villages had a centralized water supply system as of 2004. In rural areas, a mere 17 percent of the population has access to A range of other national and international actors are also supporting water- centralized water supplies; and two-thirds of these pipelines do not meet related initiatives.The Moldova Environmental/Ecological Movement among hygienicstandards.Therestoftheruralpopulationreliesonwellsandsprings, other NGOs plays a watch-dog function, regularly monitoring water quality most unfit as sources of drinking water. In urban areas, the infrastructure of and raising awareness of water quality issues. Donor agencies in Denmark, the Apa Canals (that is, the water and sanitation utilities) has deteriorated. Japan, Kuwait, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom; and the European The majority of these utilities are in financial crisis due to low collection, low Bank for Reconstruction and Development have supported projects ranging tariffs, and high water losses. Approximately 40 percent of water systems fail from large-scale rehabilitation of water pipes and pumping stations to the to meet sanitary, chemical, or biological standards. creation of small-scale village drinking water supplies, and from strength- ening the technical and management capacity of Apa Canal to increasing In its recent Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper transparency and participation of citizens around water services. Despite the (EGPRSP),theGovernmentofMoldovahighlightstheobjectivesofincreasing numberofactivedonors,however,fundingforthewatersectorremainssmall accesstosafedrinkingwater,improvingthequalityofwatersupplyandsew- andtargetedatinfrastructureandoftenlackstechnicalassistanceforcapacity age services, ensuring the transparency of tariff setting, and improving the building. regulatoryframeworkofconsumer­supplierrelations.Withdecentralization, responsibility for providing water services in Moldova (both drinking water Sources: GOM, 2004: 64­5; SDC, 2004; andWorld Bank, 2003c. Moldova became independent in 1991 having no previous experience of democracy. The democrati- zation process still needs to be consolidated. The 1990s witnessed openings for some form of pluralism and regular elections (Way, 2002). However, the re-elected Communist government acknowledges the need to strengthen the enabling environment for democracy at the national and local levels, especially as it has strongly declared its intention to prepare for integration into the European Union. Furthermore, civil society is emerging but still young. There are an estimated 2,000 nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs) in Moldova; yet, only a fraction are operational and active, and these tend to be concentrated in the major urban centers (Catrinescu and Deane, 2004). Wider coalition building among civil society organizations--NGOs, research and policy institutes, media organiza- tions, user groups--also remains limited.2 Recent evidence from surveys and studies points to the need to improve overall performance on governance, which so far has been poor (Freedom House, 2004; and Transparency International, 2004). World Bank indicators on the quality of governance,3 for example, are above the average for several other former Soviet Union countries but confirm that corruption remains the most significant governance problem facing Moldova (Kaufmann and others, 2005; World Bank, 2005a) (Figure 1-1). The specific context for infrastructure and social services is alarming. The degradation of infra- structure is seen as one of the main risks for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in Moldova, including roads, water, sewerage, energy, and housing supply. The problem with potable water and adequate sanitation is particularly acute in small towns and villages and will benefit from greater analysis in this report (Box 1-1). 2. While not intended as an examination of Moldovan civil society, this report will highlight opportunities and strategies for civil society organizations to promote improved service delivery, particularly in chapters 2 and 6. 3. For more information on how these indicators are calculated, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/ sc_chart.asp. 4 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? There are also serious problems with access and quality of basic social services, particularly in edu- cation and health. Recent analysis of the education sector points to a downward trend in the number of school-aged children. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of 3­6 year olds is estimated to have fallen by 52 percent and of 7­15 year olds by 20 percent. This downward trend is expected to continue, particularly in rural areas and small towns. For the past decade, Moldova also has experienced declin- ing access to education especially in post-compulsory education (after eighth grade, when children are 13­14 years old) and pre-school (in which only 56 percent of children are enrolled). Achievement has declined with a widening of the gap between rural and urban areas (World Bank, 2005b). While the coverage for primary education is broad, the existing system is weak and of poor quality and in urgent need of reform. In the health sector, the rich use health services more frequently, while the poor tend to simply forego health care unless it is an emergency. Informal payments are increasingly important to secure access--fees that the poor cannot afford. STRATEGIC RATIONALE Why Participatory Governance in Service Provision Matters for Performance In Moldova, as in many other countries, the quantity and quality of services fail citizens, especially the poor in rural areas and small towns. Reasons for service delivery failure are complex and wide- ranging, including major fiscal constraints. The focus of this report does not implicitly suggest that accountability relationships--and accountability failures--are necessarily responsible for all failed improvements made in services.4 However, the rationale for this report does draw on worldwide research and evidence that services work best when they put citizens, and especially the poor and/or marginalized, at the center of service provision. This research is compiled in the World Development Report 2004 (WDR2004).5 As argued there, generating space for meaningful and effective civic inputs potentially can make a strong contri- bution to improved performance of service providers, for example: Citizens, exercising bottom-up pressures on service providers, can be empowered to monitor the performance of service providers and also relevant decisionmakers (policymakers, elected officials with mandates for service delivery) to address quality and effectiveness of services or simply to ensure fair treatment of all users. Improving citizens' access to information on available financial resources and their respective intended uses can increase transparency, reduce corruption, and promote better financial man- agement. Parents can track public expenditure on education to make sure that it was indeed used to buy schoolbooks. Fiscal discipline can and should be instilled from internal controls but needs to be complemented by external accountability processes. Good budgeting requires sound sys- tems. However, an open, transparent budget process that includes citizen engagement by an active and informed citizenry reduces the risk of over-planning expenditures and allows for government actors and citizens to better determine whether funds are actually being spent according to com- 4. As Goetz and Jenkins (2005) argue, "one needs to distinguish between obstacles stemming from scal constraints and obstacles that are a combination of elite capture and bias against the poor in service delivery and design... accountability may not be as big problem as is the emaciated budget." 5. Academic studies based on world-wide experience have also referred to the value of increasing citizens' voice in public service delivery. See, for example, Goetz and Gaventa, 2001. C O N T E X T A N D O B J E C T I V E S 5 mitments made in the budget. "Even when little financial information is available, [tools such as the public expenditure] tracking surveys can show what money is supposed to reach a community and how much actually does" (World Bank, 2004: 184). Improved local governance through participatory processes is also critical for greater respon- siveness to poor people's priority problems around services. This potential exists in Moldova where, although imperfect, the decentralization process delegated various areas of responsibilities to elected local self-governments (Chapter 2). Decentralization and local government reforms too often focus on "the supply side of formal systems and not on strengthening the demand side through actions that enable citizens to effectively utilize the space created--or to be created--by new rules and regula- tions (World Bank, 2002b: xxii)." Empowered local governments need to empower local communities through mechanisms that increase citizens' access to information, enable broad-based participation, and increase accountability of elected local governments to citizens and strengthen relationships between elected local officials and service providers. Of course, challenges are involved along the way. Intensified demand-side pressures for perfor- mance can raise expectations and backfire if not supported by an enabling environment on the supply side. Bottom-up approaches to accountability also need to be accompanied by corresponding efforts to strengthen the internal capacities of the public sector and improve organizational systems. Another series of challenges relates to the need to ensure broad-based civic participation around the governance of service delivery. This report hopes to demonstrate that it is worth taking up these challenges. Links with Moldova's Strategic Development Goals: EGPRSP and EU Integration Given its proposed linkages between service delivery and governance, this policy-oriented study feeds into the broader GOM goals and priorities for poverty reduction that are highlighted in the EGPRSP: (a) strengthen human capital and provide adequate social and economic infrastructure, which implies improving performance in service delivery in key sectors such as health, education, or water; and (b) improve governance. The EGPRSP is the first officially approved strategic government program docu- ment that makes explicit a comprehensive public sector reform agenda. Strategic objectives focus on increasing the efficiency of the central administration apparatus, improving the government decision- making process, developing institutional capacities, and strengthening human resource management. The EGPRSP also stresses the need to improve interaction between public administration and civil society. The Government of Moldova officially recognizes the need to improve local governance. While decentralization has yet to be fully prioritized, the EGPRSP recognizes the importance of public administration reforms to improve the capacity of local governments to manage the delivery of public services (GOM, 2004: 39­41). The EGPRSP also clearly states: "Continuing the decentralization pro- cess will involve the establishment of efficient self-government institutions and mechanisms, which will be responsive, transparent and accessible for the public" (GOM, 2004: 37). Notably, the Moldovan Constitution of 1994 highlights the principles of local autonomy and decentralization of public ser- vices. In addition, in 1997 Moldova ratified the European Charter on Autonomy of Local Authorities. In doing so, it committed to implementing a public administration system based on the financial autonomy of local authorities and the non-interference of the central government.6 6. e recent naming of 2005 as the "Year of Local Communities" by presidential decree also o ers a window through which greater attention and investment can be focused on issues of local governance. 6 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? The Government confirmed its commitment to prepare Moldova for integration in the European Union. The inaugural address of President Vladimir Voronin in March 2005 confirms the official strategic orientation that was marked by the GOM's New Neighborhood Action Plan between Moldova and the EU (December 2004). Key priority actions of the Plan for this policy-oriented study include: (a) strengthening "democracy and the rule of the law"--and implementing the Anti-Corruption National Strategy--which implies the opening of meaningful spaces for transparency and civic engagement; and (b) strengthening "local self-governments in line with European standards," which implies the need to prepare local self-governments for their future roles. Strategic Links for World Bank Engagement The World Bank's Moldova Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2004­08 articulates the need for this policy-oriented study on bottom-up governance and service delivery. The study fits within two inter-related pillars of the CAS: (a) improving access to social services, capital, and community infra- structure; and (b) improving public sector governance and combating corruption. The CAS states that the implications of the political economy context have been challenging for the Bank's engagement.7 As a result, the CAS takes a "cautious approach" that emphasizes bottom-up rather than a sole reli- ance on top-down interventions. It may be argued that, in the past, Bank investments largely focused on the systemic and programmatic aspects of reform, overlooking the need to raise government and citizens' capacity to interface, to improve transparency and participation, and to translate these into operational terms. Of course, this interface was and is strongly present in the implementation of the Moldova Social Investment Fund, Projects 1 and 2 (MSIF1 and MSIF2). Yet, the space for client power and participation has largely failed to reach sectoral investments, especially in education and health. Thus, there is a need to better understand the complex social, institutional, and power dynamics that hinder or promote transparency and accountability for improved performance in service delivery. The CAS sets out to "mainly support interventions at the local/community levels in rural areas and small cities­employing a community-driven development approach that relies on the strong involve- ment of communities, community groups, and local government authorities." This approach includes promoting "a culture of local community involvement in public issues by strengthening community capacities to make decisions, and to organize and manage funds to improve the quality of basic eco- nomic and social services" and supporting "a greater involvement of civil society in exercising account- ability over public action and the delivery of public services" (World Bank, 2004a). The study encompasses local governance, Moldova Social Investment Fund, drinkable water, and education. Its scope is consistent with specific World Bank commitments under the CAS pillar of "improving access to social services, capital and community infrastructure; and minimizing envi- ronmental risks": Support improved access to quality and water sanitation. A World Bank pilot project to improve the quality, efficiency, and sustainability of the water supply and wastewater services was initiated in 2003 (Box 1-2). The project includes four interrelated functional components: (a) urban water efficiency, (b) village water supply, (c) institutional strengthening, and (d) engineering services and 7. e CAS particularly points to a regrettable "gap between declared intentions and actions on the ground" in terms of policy reform, as observed between 2001 and 2004. C O N T E X T A N D O B J E C T I V E S 7 BOX 12 Moldova's PilotWater Supply and Sanitation Project Social surveys indicate that citizens'concerns over water and sanitation are ing the cost of operations and maintenance, will be ensured by the highthroughoutMoldova.ThedevelopmentobjectiveofthePilotWaterSup- establishment of water users' associations that will help collect fees ply and Sanitation Project is to demonstrate how to enhance the welfare of and monitor services. Local ownership will be essential to the success thepopulationlivinginmedium-sizedtownsandcitiesandsomeofthepoor- of the approach. An education campaign on water and sanitation is estruralareasbyimprovingthequality,efficiency,andsustainabilityofwater also associated with this component. supplyandsanitationservicesasoutlinedintheGovernment'sNationalWater Action Plan. Replication of the pilot model then would be proposed for the The Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation Project is already making a signifi- country as a whole. cant contribution to improving water services in Moldova. Apa Canal staff interviewed as part of this study particularly highlighted the positive Urbanmunicipalservices.ThefinancialviabilityoftheApaCanalorganiza- impact of the project in improving citizen's access to water services and in tions is threatened by inefficient energy-using pumps, major leaks and improving the capacity of the APA Canal organizations.Onetechnicaldirector losses of water, infiltration of contaminants, and arrears in payments not citedtheinstallmentof a distribution network facilitated through theWorld only from household users but especially from commercial and govern- Bank project as his best experience of community participation in the domain mentusers.Thus,investmentincludesnotonlyphysicalinfrastructurebut of water. Residents of the neighborhood in question came together and were also financial planning and the development of a user-oriented culture, activeinhelpingwith the installation, enabling it to be completed in a very including the establishment of customs service offices. shortamountoftime[StudysiteA8].AnApaCanaldeputydirectorfromanother researchsitespokeofhowhisstaffare now able to computerize all their data Rural community services. The water systems passed down to village and records thanks to new computers received via the World Bank project management by recent decentralization typically are inoperable or [Study site B21]. marginally functional. Donor grants are being sought to cover the costs of rehabilitation. The sustainability of these systems, includ- Source: Authors. advice (World Bank, 2003d). The urban component is in progress in four Moldovan towns and cit- ies, and planning is underway to initiate the project's rural component.8 Provide further analytical work on education and provide a new investment project in rural education (World Bank, 2004a: 22). Unlike the previous education project, the new project will fit into the CAS bottom-up approach. The new project therefore will strive to actively engage communities and parents in the process of improving performance and access to education services. In this context, this study should complement the education policy note (World Bank, 2005b). Support the strengthening of local government capacity to undertake the new responsibilities placed on local self-governments under the decentralization reform program and to position them to better involve local communities (World Bank, 2004a: 23). STUDY OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE, AND AUDIENCE The overall objective of the study is to assess the capacity for Moldovan decisionmakers, civil society, and donor partners, including the World Bank, to improve the governance of service delivery through increased support of bottom-up approaches to complement current top-down efforts. Given time and resource constraints, the scope of this study was narrowed to four case studies: 8. e MSIF also channeled World Bank funds to water services, with some 27 villages developing projects to improve community access to water during the MSIF1 project (Chapter 2). 8 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? The first case study (Chapter 2) explores the realities of local power structures, independent of individual service sectors and/or projects. It focuses on the accountability of local government to local citizens. The second case study (Chapter 3) considers the experience of the Moldova Social Investment Fund in promoting local decisionmaking and civic engagement around service delivery. The third and fourth case studies (Chapters 4 and 5) consider the existence and effectiveness of bottom-up approaches to increase transparency and accountability around education and water services, respectively. These sectors, chosen because they illustrated a broad variety of mechanisms for client participation and engagement, are sectors in which local government has a clear mandate and responsibility, and are sectors in which the World Bank has ongoing or upcoming activities in Moldova that could benefit from the study's findings. Specific analytical objectives of the study include: Identifying existing mechanisms for civic participation, with a focus on local governance and service delivery in basic education services and drinkable water services in urban and rural areas. In other words, addressing the following questions: What avenues are available for citizens to voice their concerns to local governments or about service delivery? Are these avenues used? If yes, how; and if not, why? Assessing the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Identify the achievements and limitations of these mechanisms in strengthening transparency and citizen voice, and receptivity to this voice on the part of elected local self-government officials (mayors, mayoralty staff) and service providers' organiza- tions (schools, Apa Canal utilities) and/or frontline professionals (teachers, Apa Canal engineers). Assessing their inclusiveness. Identify who participates and why, explore the extent to which the poor and/or vulnerable groups feel comfortable accessing and using these mechanisms. Exploring opportunities, entry points, as well as constraints and challenges to strengthen the effective- ness and inclusiveness of existing mechanisms and/or introducing new ones, such as participatory budgeting or citizen report cards. Challenges may be internal (raising questions about the dynamics of civil society organizations, for instance); or more external (for example, relating to the operating context of elected self-governments, resource constraints, or the level of school autonomy). Based on key stakeholders' experiences and perceptions, case studies analyze the social and institutional con- text at local levels that create positive or negative incentives for these key stakeholders to increase citizen voice and power, and receptivity to this demand. Understanding these dynamics includes looking at both formal and informal power relationships.9 From a policy standpoint, study objectives include: Highlight strategic implications for the overall Moldovan government's agenda on pro-poor service delivery and governance, stressing areas in which the government could ensure a more supportive environment for effective and inclusive mechanisms of civic participation (Chapter 6). Identify specific policy implications and options for strengthening participatory local governance and improving transparency and accountability in basic education as well as in drinkable water services (Chapter 6). 9. e study acknowledges that some of these external constraints relate directly to the ways in which the national macro political and economic contexts a ect what is happening locally. However, it is not in the scope of this study to provide an analysis of this macro-environment. See Way, 2002. C O N T E X T A N D O B J E C T I V E S 9 From the World Bank perspective, the main study objectives are to strengthen its policy dialogue with the Government and its key donor and civil society partners on pro-poor service delivery and local governance. This strengthening is proposed to take place mainly in the context of its policy advice on the EGPRSP and its implementation, and potential sectoral reforms, such as in the field of education. To facilitate this process, the recommendations of the study reflect the policy implications and linkages with the EGPRSP; these are summarized in Appendix A. Another objective is to identify practical options for mainstreaming effective and inclusive "mechanisms of civic participation" in cur- rent and planned investments and projects, especially for MSIF2, water, and rural education. By "mechanisms for civic participation" in the governance of service delivery, this report refers to mechanisms for (a) indirect modes of citizen' participation whereby service users exercise their influence through making their voice heard as citizens (that is, through strengthened relationships of accountability between themselves and elected officials mandated with service delivery responsi- bilities); and (b) more direct modes of participation whereby service users engage more directly with service providers' organizations (an APA Canal office, a school) and frontline professionals (what the WDR2004 refers to as client power). These mechanisms can be seen as mechanisms by which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate in exacting and/or seeking account- ability from service providers (agencies, frontline professionals) and local authorities. Examples of these mechanisms are wide-ranging, from information dissemination strategies, public hearings at the municipality, and participation of parents in school boards to more sophisticated instruments, such as citizen performance score cards whereby citizens keep service providers in check by reporting their assessment of performance/satisfaction to local and/or central government decisionmakers. Each case study chapter provides conceptual clarifications as to what mechanisms of civic participation exist or could be introduced for each thematic, participatory local governance (Chapter 2); project (Chapter 3, MSIF2); or sector (Chapters 4 and 5 on education and drinkable water, respectively). The primary audiences for this paper include influential decisionmakers in areas relevant to policy design in the Moldovan government and parliament; EGPRSP-related stakeholders, especially govern- ment members of the Interministerial Committee for the EGPRSP and representatives from the donor community and civil society (NGOs, research and policy institutes); governmental and nongovernmen- tal practitioners, staff advising and/or supporting programs in the selected study areas (local gover- nance, local development, public service delivery, especially in education and water services); and Bank staff advising Moldovan policymakers and influential decisionmakers in areas relevant to policy. A secondary audience includes academics; practitioners; and World Bank staff who have experi- ence in governance, social development, infrastructure, and human development and who are not actively involved in Moldova but have interest in learning from this study's methods, results, and policy options. KEY ANALYTICAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS Throughout this report, key analytical and policy frameworks will be clarified at the beginning of each case study chapter (Chapter 2, Chapters 4 and 5). Following is a summary of the four main analytical directions and their related sources on which the study has drawn. (1) The first direction focuses on routes for improving performance in pro-poor service delivery. The studybuildsontheWDR2004andonaninternalstrategypaperthatappliestheWDR2004tothespe- 10 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? cific context of the European and Central Asia Region.10 Three principal accountability routes--an "accountability triangle"--link service providers, citizens/clients, and politicians/policymakers: Long route. Citizens hold politicians and policymakers accountable through voice, and they in turn hold providers accountable through compact. Voice is the relationship between citizens/ clients and politicians/policymakers, and compact is the relationship between politicians/poli- cymakers and service providers. Intermediate route. Voice and compact relationships are evident at both the national and subna- tional levels. Thus, regional or local level officials are held accountable through an intermediate route (Levy, 2004). Short route. Citizens hold service providers directly accountable, through mechanisms of client power. By linking the various actors and dimensions of service delivery performance, these frameworks make it possible to assess the enabling environment and effectiveness of mechanisms of civic participation. The first direction helps to locate citizens' voice and the receptivity of others to that voice, within a broader operating context.11 (2) The second direction deepens the inquiry into the participatory elements of the intermediate route at the local level by identifying key elements that promote transparent, participatory, and accountable elected local governments. This is articulated in Chapter 2. (3) The third direction explores key factors that facilitate or constrain the engagement of civil soci- ety in increasing transparency and accountability.12It was outside the scope and objectives of this study to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the enabling environment for civic engagement in Moldova. This type of analysis was conducted by the World Bank through the Association, Resources, Voice, Information and Negotiation (ARVIN) framework in various countries.13 How- ever, the findings of the study give weight to the importance of an external supportive environ- ment for civil society, including adequate space for access and dissemination of information and voice, and government support for effective, institutionalized mechanisms of civic participation or decentralization legislation. For purposes of this paper, ARVIN's internal factors were also helpful in pointing to the need for civil society organizations to improve their own internal governance structures and their ability to represent all major constituents, including the poor and the vulner- able. Achieving these goals can improve their legitimacy in encouraging and/or organizing civic participation in the governance of service delivery.14 10. Levy, 2004. Selected countries include Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Tajikistan, and Turkey. 11. is set of analytical directions does not claim to be comprehensive. To extract valid conclusions about the role of social accountability in service delivery, it is necessary, for example, to make the distinction between holding accountable a policy that aims to guarantee access to the service (rural water policy) and a policy that aims to increase the quality of service delivery. 12. In this report, "civil society" refers to a wide range of actors who can enhance voice in the governance of service delivery, including nongovernmental organizations, community-based associations, users' associations (parents' or water users' associa- tions, for example), think-tanks, and an independent and constructive media. 13. See indwa and Monico, forthcoming. e Social Development Network developed the ARVIN framework to better understand external and internal environments for civic engagement and promote measures to improve them. Examples of countries include Albania, Ecuador, Mongolia, and Senegal. External determinants include the legal and regulatory framework, the political and governmental context, sociocultural characteristics, and economic conditions. Internal factors include corpo- rate governance, organizational endowment, and institutional legitimacy of civil society organizations. 14. ese points have been argued extensively. See, for example, Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Reuben, 2003; Pakulski et al, 2004. C O N T E X T A N D O B J E C T I V E S 11 (4) A fourth direction of analytical attention has been on the inclusiveness of mechanisms for civic participation that aim to strengthen transparency and relationships of accountability. Goetz and Jenkins (2005) point to elite biases--and not only to corruption (or elite capture)--as causes of accountability failure.15 As the authors argue, corruption is not the only reason why accountability institutions fail to protect service users, including the poor. Accountability failures that particu- larly afflict the poor can stem from elite biases. The authors define bias as referring "to practices that are not illegal or motivated by the desire for private benefit, but nevertheless involve allocative or regulatory decisions that benefit already advantaged groups." These biases may be intended or unintended. Biases may simply reflect assumptions made by policymaking elites about client needs and rights, and about which kinds of citizens possess the resources and skills necessary to engage in accountability processes. Therefore, these biases are paradoxically harder to expose "and to excise than sheer corruption or capture because they are often internalized and normalized." In the context of this research on service delivery, the study considered the extent to which biases against the poor or other marginalized groups apply to existing mechanisms for transparency and citi- zens' participation in Moldova. For instance, Chapter 4 on education examines how inclusive parents' committees and associations are, and whether any biases exist in the way that members are selected or meetings conducted that can discourage or omit specific social groups (such as the poor or less edu- cated). As illustrated by the study, issues of bias are often rooted in non-state social institutions that create and sustain inequalities. Overcoming unintended exclusion processes will require considerable training and awareness-raising efforts on the part of civic groups themselves. METHODOLOGY The methodology for the study adopted a case study and stakeholder-oriented approach. As detailed on pg 00, the research team elected to narrow the focus of primary data collection to four case stud- ies: (a) overall mechanisms of accountability of local government to local citizens, and accountability, transparency and participation around (b) the Moldova Social Investment Fund, (c) primary educa- tion, and (d) water supply services. The methodology consisted of three main phases: 1. Identification of key issues related to bottom-up governance and service delivery in Moldova. This phase focused on developing the knowledge base for the study, including gathering relevant background analytical, regional, and country information; and identifying gap areas in need of further exploration. This knowledge gathering took place through (a) a desk-based review of sec- ondary data on service delivery and local governance in Moldova; (b) desk-based interviews with a sample of task managers and other Bank staff working on operations and analytical work related to governance and service delivery; (c) field-based exploratory interviews with key participants in Moldova, including donors, think tank representatives, central and local government officials, and service providers; and (d) desk-based literature review of best practices for accountability and citi- zen participation in service delivery. The results of this phase were used to design the methodology for primary data collection. 15. Corruption refers to "the illegal use of public power for private gain­but also other forms of undue in uence that do not, technically speaking, constitute corruption in that they stem from the intimidation faced by o cials (from, for instance, politicians and the criminal underworld) rather than from an interest in direct pecuniary gain." (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). 12 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? 2. Primary data collection. Each case study is derived from field-based investigations in both rural and urban sites in three districts of Moldova, for a total of 6 study sites.16 The criteria for choosing these districts included (a) the presence of Bank instruments/projects related to education, water, and MSIF; (b) regional diversity (the three districts chosen were geographically distinct, and located in the north, center and south of the country); and (c) diversity of factors related to accountability and citizen participation, including ethnic and linguistic mix of residents, political affiliation of local government, local infrastructure and economic development, and availability services. Given the exploratory nature of the study and the sensitivity of many of the issues involved, qualitative research tools, including semi-structured interviews and focus groups, and nonpar- ticipant observations were deemed most appropriate for this study. A local field research team was hired and trained to conduct these events, based on a designed research guide. Questions were developed in collaboration with the field team and qualitative research experts, and were piloted in the field prior to use. Interviewees were identified through the assistance of key participants.17 All interviewees were assured of anonymity and confidentiality prior to their participation in the study. Their names and personal details do not appear in this study and were not shared beyond members of the study team. In each of the 6 sites, a minimum of 3 focus groups and 27 interviews were undertaken with service users; service providers (such as teachers, water service technicians, and members of SIF implementing agencies); local government officials; and civil society representatives. These num- bers were chosen because they were large enough to capture local issues at each site and allow for inter-site comparisons, while still being feasible, given the study constraints. Yet, while these minimums were chosen to ensure an adequate scale for the investigation, they were kept flexible to allow for follow-up interviews with respondents and for issues emerging during the field work to be included in the study. 3. Data analysis. On completion of the primary data collection, both literal interview reports and overall thematic reports were prepared by field workers. These reports were analyzed by hand-cod- ing to highlight formal and informal accountability mechanisms in place, the effectiveness of these mechanisms of accountability, the opportunities and constraints that affect citizens' participation in these mechanisms, and feasible lessons and recommendations for improving the accountability of services in Moldova. Preliminary results were discussed with field workers, World Bank col- leagues, and external experts. Policy implications were developed in a consultative manner through exchange with these groups. 16. To maintain the con dentiality assured to respondents, this study refers to these sites by letters and numbers in random order. Quotations gathered during the research are referenced in this report with a notation denoting the site from which the quote was collected and its internal identi cation number. 17. Including World Bank colleagues, local government o cials, civil society representatives, local shopkeepers, postmen etc. e majority of interviews were conducted in Moldovan, with a small number also conducted in Russian. Field workers kept detailed notes of all interviews and when given permission, taped interviews to aid in report preparation. 2 How Participatory Can Moldovan Local Governments Be? Sometimes it is possible to succeed in something without money, but with people's help. --Village mayor As long as rayons are not included in strategic planning exercises themselves and do not have their own strategic plans, we will always face problems --Village mayor W orldwide experience suggests that, all other variables staying equal, efforts to build participatory local governance offer strong potential for more effective and equitable delivery of services (Levy, 2004; IIED, 2004; World Bank, 2001b, 2003b). There is no one-size-fits-all policy to increase the transparency and accountability of elected local govern- ments. However, successes suggest that, to promote these two goals, elected local governments, service providers, and citizens must be supported by an enabling environment that maximizes positive incentives and limits constraints to them. Both formal and informal power and leadership dynamics should affect deci- sionmaking, trust building, and service provision to effectively promote the lon- ger-term goal of local participatory governance. As in other transition countries, local power dynamics are still evolving in Moldova, where the locus of local power is moving from collective farm structures to elected local officials (Dud- wick and others, 2004). Therefore, a better understanding of these dynamics should provide useful insights for strategic directions, especially at a time when the Government of Moldova prepares for EU integration, and consequently for adequately preparing local authorities for their future roles. This chapter explores the enabling environment for building more transpar- ent, participatory, and accountable local government in Moldova based on the experience and perceptions of key stakeholders. The chapter briefly provides contextual and conceptual clarifications, especially those associated with the intermediary route of accountability that was referred to in Chapter 1. It then summarizes study findings in response to the three following questions: 13 14 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 21 Financing of Local Governments for Service Delivery in Moldova The financial relationship among the local, district, and central author- 14 local taxes and fees, revenues from only 4 are employed at the ities is governed by the Law on Local Public Finances, and expenditure local level. assignments are determined according to the specific mandates of local and district governments. The transfer of funds from the central to the Local budgets are drafted by the mayor and local council but must be district governments is based on a formula that takes into account approved by the district council and reviewed by the finance department of the expenditures, revenues, and population of the district. In turn, the district. There is a lack of consultation in this process. Since the Minis- district authorities disburse a portion of these monies, calculated on try of Finance sets specific per capita formulas for education and culture, a per capita basis, to the local government authorities within their local authorities are limited in the expenditures that they can include in jurisdiction. These payments are usually made up of the tax revenues developing local budgets. Expenditures other than those allowed by per collected by local officials, including property tax and a percentage capita calculations are unlikely to be covered by transfers from the district of business income tax. Monies are remitted to the district, and a government. Local governments are required to submit a balanced bud- proportion is then returned to the local government in the form of get; no budget deficit or surplus will be approved. a transfer. IDIS Viitorul, a Moldovan research group, notes that, of Source: Catrinescu and Deane, 2004; IDSI, n.d. What opportunities exist for strengthening transparency, civic participation, and accountability relationships between citizens and local governments? Do mechanisms for promoting these outcomes already exist in Moldova, and how effective and inclusive are they? What constraints and/or challenges exist to increasing the effectiveness of transparency, civic par- ticipation, and accountability mechanisms? The findings of this chapter are principally based on interviews with over 25 local and district govern- ment officials from 6 localities, as well with as citizens, service providers, civil society organizations, and donor agency representatives. OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK An independent nation since 1991, Moldova has undergone several administrative reforms during the last past decade. In 2003, Moldova's system of 11 regional judets was converted into a two-tiered system of subnational government comprised of 33 districts (rayons), made up of 918 mayoralties.18 Districts typically contain 40 to 50 villages and towns but range from a minimum of 10 mayoralties to a maximum of 75.19 Local governments include a mayor, a local council, and mayoralty employees (such as agricultural or youth specialists) in proportion to the size of the community.20 Current local administration officials were elected or appointed to their posts in May 2003 for 4-year terms (Catri- nescu and Deane, 2004). Mayors are the only government authority in Moldova elected directly by the people. Local coun- cils, like district councils and parliamentarians, are elected by party lists. Local officials report directly 18 Technically, there are 32 rayons (or districts) and 1 autonomous territorial-administrative unit (Gagauzia). 19 According to Moldovan law, both district and village/town authorities are considered local government. In this note, a distinction will be drawn between these two subnational authorities. Village and town governments will be referred to as "local authorities," and rayon governments will be referred to as "district authorities." 20 While larger communities will have a vice-mayor, smaller communities do not. H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 15 TABLE 21 Government Mandates for Service Delivery in Moldova Sector Level of government Areas of responsibilities Education Central (Ministry of Education) Develops education policy, manages the preparation of and approves curricula, prepares and approves all assess- ment and examination materials, manages the production of textbooks District Operates lyceums (upper secondary schools), orphanages, and public boarding schools for vulnerable children (such as children with disabilities) and technical schools, provides the methodology of education Local Operates pre-schools, elementary and secondary schools (high schools), musical schools, and other educational institutions Health Central (Ministry of Health) Responsible for the overall health of the population; develops health policy; manages directly the tertiary health system; and is involved in inspecting the quality of healthcare, collecting performance indicators, training and retraining healthcare specialists, and maintaining lists of pharmaceuticals (World Bank, 2003a). District All health care provision Social District Both mandated to provide social assistance and protection, particularly to the unemployed. Additionally, district Services Local authorities are tasked with maintaining sanitary and social institutions. Utilities Central Is the regulatory authority, inspects the quality of water through the sanitary and epidemiological agencies Local Mandated to build and maintain electricity, water, sewage, and garbage collection systems Source: Catrinescu and Deane, 2004. to the district administration. Monthly reports are sent by both mayors and mayoralty accountants to the district, with more comprehensive reports delivered quarterly. In addition, district officials may make regular visits to villages. The formal decisionmaking power and financing of the different levels of government are enumerated in various laws (Box 2-1). It is outside the scope and purpose of this study to provide a detailed analysis of Moldova's decen- tralization process and delineation of responsibility for the delivery of key public services. However, it is important to locate the scope for transparency and civic engagement at the local level within broader local government dynamics. To review these dynamics, this study has drawn partly on the framework used to analyze the institutional setting for the "intermediate route for accountability" ­ between citi- zens and subnational levels of government­that is associated with decentralization processes (Levy, 2004). This intermediate route does exist in Moldova, where considerable responsibility for services has been decentralized to local governments (Table 2-1). According to the framework adopted by this study, three main sets of intermediary accountability relationships seem key for local service delivery and for decentralization to credibly strengthen citi- zens' voice and receptivity to this voice (World Bank, 2003b: chapter 5; Levy, 2004; and Blair, 2000). These relationships are summarized below: Sub-national electoral voice. Citizens first must be able to directly hold local government account- able through fair and transparent elections. Beyond elections, a range of other mechanisms of voice (within local-level arrangements for ser- vice delivery or local government decisionmaking) and voice-enhancing local actor groups (civil society, media) are needed to strengthen accountability relationships. Local government initiatives for transparency and interaction such as public meetings, opinion surveys, and formal grievance procedures; and voice-supporting agents including civil society organizations and the media all make it possible for citizens to express their needs and preferences to local governments and service providers. 16 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? TABLE 22 Assignment of Revenues and Responsibilities to Subnational Governments inTransition Countries Assignment Moldova Romania Turkey Kyrgyz Albania Education: Assignment Extensive Extensive None/ Some- Shared-ambiguous of responsibility marginal ambiguous ... of revenue Shared-ambiguous Some-ambiguous Limited None/ Some-ambiguous Shared-ambiguous Health: Some marginal None/ Assignment of None/ None/ marginal Shared-ambiguous responsibility marginal in transition Formally ... of revenue [no data] None/ extensive, None/ None/ marginal de facto Water: Extensive marginal marginal [no data] ambiguous Assignment of Extensive Extensive Extensive responsibility ... of revenue Limited [no data] Shared Shared (de facto) Sources: Levy, 2004; Authors, based on Catrinescu and Deane, 2004. The center­local compact, that is, the accountability relationship between central and local govern- ments, also should generate positive incentives for participatory local governance. This center­local compact encompasses but is broader than traditional fiscal and administrative decentralization. It can take a variety of forms (Levy, 2004). Devolution is an arrangement in which power for decision- making and resource allocation is fully transferred to the local level, which becomes the terminus of accountability. Delegation involves a less thorough transfer of responsibility in which local levels oversee service provision but remain accountable to the national level for performance. Deconcen- tration is direct service delivery arrangements between central government agencies and local-level service providers, bypassing local governments almost entirely. Because it maintains power at the central level, deconcentration is not a form of decentralization. Each of these three forms of cen- ter­local compact varies in terms of its assignment of roles, fiscal arrangements, and regulatory frameworks. Table 2-2 compares patterns of center­local compact in Moldova with those in four other transition countries. As shown in Table 2-2, the Moldovan context is consistent with patterns in other countries in the Region: Delegation is the predominant form of decentralization. Even in cases in which responsibility is nominally "devolved" to the local level, the absence of commensurate decentralization of resources prevents true devolution. In a pattern familiar in many parts of the world, locally elected municipalities have extensive responsibility for water systems (Chapter 5). As in Romania and Albania, a substantial role has been mandated for local authorities in education, with some responsibilities continuing to be shared with district and central governments. How- ever, in each of these countries, funding arrangements continue to result in an imbalance between assigned responsibility and available resources in the education sector (World Bank, 2005b). H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 17 In health, there is no shift of responsibility toward elected local governments in Moldova. It is par- ticularly for this reason that the health sector was not considered for this bottom-up study. As these examples of center­local compact patterns suggest, the enabling environment for local gov- ernance­including administrative, regulatory, and fiduciary frameworks ­ can positively or nega- tively affect the incentives for transparency, participation, and accountability in local governance. Elected local governments may try to be accountable to their citizens and responsive to their needs and concerns with regard to services, yet not be fully successful if they have little power and flexibility in decisionmaking. The formal authority of local governments can be undercut by a myriad of ex-ante controls imposed by central and/or regional governments, from approval of local budgets and plans to discretionary budget transfers. Some of these challenges are discussed in the context of study findings in the last section of this chapter. OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING PARTICIPATORY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Drawing on the framework outlined above, this policy study points to various opportunities that are available to strengthen transparency, civic participation, and accountability in local governance in Moldova. First, the existence of electoral voice as a relationship of accountability between citizens and local governments provides the necessary entry point for strengthening local governance. Local elections are held every four years, and citizens are able to directly elect their mayors.21 Local councilors are chosen in proportional voting based on party lists, but in some municipalities are assigned to repre- sent a specific street or sector of a village or town, thus giving citizens a specific individual to whom to address their concerns.22 To be fully effective as accountability mechanisms, direct local elections must be free and fair (Blair, 2000: 27). In this regard, concerns from the donor community and gov- ernance assessments of the 2003 local elections point to the potential for improvement for the next local elections.23 Second, potentials also exist for voice-enhancing actor groups (civil society, media) to play a major role in other mechanisms for transparency and civic participation outside of and between elections. Media organizations­print, radio and television­have an important role to play in strengthening the transparency and participatory nature of local governments.24 Private and government-owned media 21. e most recent local elections were held in May and June 2003. Due to changes in the system of local and regional administration, the number of elected mayors grew from 628 in 2000 to 892 in 2003. In the same period, the number of local councilors almost doubled (from 6,417 to 11,935). 22. By law, local councils are required to meet every 3 months; in practice many meet more o en as local business dictates. In larger towns, monthly council meetings are standard. ese meetings are open to the public, although some citizens o en are unaware. 23. Local and regional elections in 2003 "were described by international observers as meeting basic international stan- dards but causing concerns in numerous areas" (Freedom House Report on Governance in Moldova 2004, 13). e OSCE's Of- ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe monitored the two rounds of May 25 and June 8 2003. No elections took place in the breakaway region of Transnistria. e Communist Party emerged victorious, winning 367 of 892 mayoral positions (42% of the vote). 24. As the WDR2004 (World Bank, 2003b: 78) highlights, an active and independent media can strengthen mechanisms of voice. Blair (2000: 27) similarly argues that for accountability, there must "be ways to publicize citizens' views and uncover good- or wrong-doing in local government." He sees one of the main roles of the media as making political news public and notes that "only if people know what is going on, good and bad, can they hold their government accountable" (Blair, 2000: 29). 18 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? outlets play a valuable information-sharing function in many towns in the country. Many of these media outlets publish updates from mayors and local councils in newspapers or broadcast them on the radio. The study found that, in some communities, these media outlets go even further, providing and contributing to enabling environments for citizens and civic groups to express their views on the work of local governments. In addition, incentives and potentials exist for a wide range of other civil society organizations to make inputs into processes of local governance addressing service delivery issues.25 While civil society in Moldova is still young, both internal and external entry points already can be found:26 In terms of the external factors, the Law on Public Associations is imperfect, but the overall legal environment for registering new community-based organizations and/or NGOs at local level appears to be permissive. Additionally, various donors have dedicated specific interest and resources to strengthen and promote the development of civil society, including users associations and local NGOs. Key internal factors may be summarized as follows: Citizens have a major incentive to participate in areas of local government responsibility when they perceive an opening to improve these services. Promoting civic engagement in sectors in which citizen interest is strongest also can encourage citizen participation. While this study specifically explored transparency and participation in the education and water sectors, interview feedback suggested strong citizen interest in other services as well. The most commonly cited was roads, fol- lowed by community cultural and youth services,27 gas/heating, and garbage/waste management. Service users' associations already exist in multiple sectors and illustrate the potential for consum- ers to play a greater role in decisionmaking processes. Parents' associations are common in the education sector (Chapter 5), and are a small but positive trend in the rural water sector (Chapter 5). As discussed in the next chapter, community-driven projects such as the MSIF have shown that citi- zens can break the tremendous social isolation and overcome the feelings of collective mistrust that began during the Transition. Finally, innovations, such as the development of local youth councils, show that, even without substantial resources, agents of voice can be found in the smallest localities and among the least powerful actor groups (Gomart, 2002). While only a fraction of the estimated 2,000 NGOs in the country are active, some 24 to 36 with good capacity and links to district and international NGOs have emerged. Despite a difficult start, NGOs have taken an active part in the development of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP). Third, and despite imperfections in the central­local compact, local governments have inherited the responsibility for the delivery of several key services. Combined with the presence of sub-electoral voice, this responsibility gives strong incentives to mayors to respond to the most pressing needs of their constituents. In this context, local governments often are eager to learn and apply new approaches to local development--whether related to transparency, accountability, or civic engagement--if these approaches can be applied to local fundraising and community problem-solving. For example, the experiences of projects in Moldova, including MSIF1 or the USAID Local Government Reform Project 25 While highlighting the potential of civil society as an entry point to improved local governance, this study recognizes that many constraints and challenges exist to build an appropriate enabling environment for civic engagement in Moldova. Chapter 6 o ers strategic options for addressing this issue, speci cally as relates to the role that civil society organizations can play in promoting improved local governance and service delivery. 26 e approach of separating external and internal factors for the enabling environment for civic engagement derives from the ARVIN framework (See indwa and Monico, forthcoming). 27 Youth services (including creating employment to social opportunities) were highlighted as important to stem the rapid out-migration of young people from Moldovan villages. H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 19 BOX 22 The USAID Local Government Reform Project The Local Government Reform Project aims to "increase the autonomy, municipal property efficiency, responsiveness, accountability and transparency of local govern- Local government legislative reform. Identification and analysis of local ments in Moldova." Funded by USAID, the Project has worked in 60 villages governmentissuesthatwouldbenefitfromlegislativereformanddraft- across the country in partnership with communities, local governments, ing of reform proposals and groups including the UNDP Local Agenda 21 project, the Moldova Social Localgovernmentinformationnetwork.Improvinginformationexchange Investment Fund, and the Association of Mayors and Local Communities in among local governments through the establishment of internet con- Moldova. The Local Government Reform Project has engaged in a range of nections and web-page hosting. activities that target local capacity building: Many important lessons for increasing the accountability of local govern- Communitystrategicplanning.Supporttolocalgovernmentsandcitizens ments and local services to citizens can be gleaned from these activities of tocooperateonthedevelopmentofstrategicplansforcommunitysocio- the Local Government Reform Project. Some of these lessons include: economic development Fiscal decentralization technical assistance. Training and computerization The improvement of municipal services (including water, heating and on budgeting, cost accounting, tax collection waste management) is at the heart of the strategic goals of many local Municipalservicesimprovementsupport.Trainingandmicroprojectgrants communities. to pilot municipal services management models from other parts of the Citizen hearings are a promising tool for increasing citizen participation world inlocalgovernance.Withtrainingandsupport,localofficialscanbevery Civil Society Organizations trainingWorkshops and research to help build open and willing to encourage such hearings and often even spearhead capacity among civil society groups and to promote transparency and the process themselves. greater citizen engagement Localcouncilsareanoftenoverlookedactorgroupintermsofdonorsup- DevelopingthecapacityofLocalCouncils. Training and learning resources port,andcapacitybuildingfornewlyelectedcouncilorscanbeespecially for some 1,200 recently elected local officials important in broadening mindsets. Publichearings.Trainingsessionsforlocalofficialsandpublicemployees With training and technical assistance on asset management, the finan- and preparation of necessary materials for the convening of public hear- cial sustainability of local governments can be improved. ings Asset management. Pilot projects on inventory and accounting for Source: USAID, 2004. (Box 2-2), have illustrated that mayors can be both motivated and innovative in approaching com- munity problems and in fostering greater civic engagement with local governance. (See section on existing mechanisms of voice outside elections and citizen­local government interface and Chapter 3 on the MSIF experience.) Fourth, data gathered in this study confirmed that local governments were an important and acces- sible resource for citizens on service issues. This includes services for which the local administration is not actually responsible.28 Moreover, mayors and local administration employees (such as technicians and engineers) were regularly cited in interviews as among the first groups to whom individuals expe- riencing difficulties would contact, often outranking even friends and family members. As one local village official explained, "The people see the solution of their problems in the local public administra- tion. Even if the problems do not refer to the competence of the mayor's office, the people still apply them there anyway" [Case Study EG 18]. These perceptions from citizens confirm the promise of the intermediary route for accountability. 28 ese ndings are consistent with those of the regional study, " e Economic and Social E ects of Land Reform and Farm Restructuring," by Dudwick and others (2004). 20 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Fifth, the formal commitment of the Moldovan government to increased local government auton- omy is a promising opening for strengthening local governance and additional external resources already are available from donor agencies that are actively committed to this agenda. The current World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Moldova sets out to "mainly support interventions at the local/community levels in rural areas and small cities employing a community-driven development approach that relies on the strong involvement of communities, community groups, and local gov- ernment authorities (World Bank, 2004a: 24)." Other large donors, including DFID and USAID, are providing support and funding to locally based development and governance initiatives. Thus, numerous opportunities already exist for strengthening transparency, civic participation, and accountability in local governance in Moldova. Perhaps the final and most important opportunity is the foundation for accountability that has been laid by existing mechanisms and the wide range of stakeholders involved in them, as discussed in the next section. POTENTIALS AND LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING MECHANISMS Study findings confirm that a range of formal and informal mechanisms of increasing transparency and civic participation in the work of local governments exist in both rural and urban communities in Moldova. This section enumerates some of these many mechanisms and consider to what extent they succeed in promoting more transparency and participation in local government decisionmaking. To be considered successful, these mechanisms should be able, among other elements, to strengthen the voiceofalargenumberofcitizens,includingthepoorandmarginalizedand,correspondingly,promote the receptivity of local officials to respond to the needs and preferences voiced by their constituents. Outside of direct elections, open community meetings at which local officials and community mem- bers discuss local community business were found to be the most prominent formal mechanisms to enhance transparency and participation.29 Meetings took place in all six of the communities studied. By law, these community meetings should be held at least once per year; in all but one of the study sites, they were held more frequently. In villages, information about meetings is posted at the mayor- alty and generally transmitted by word of mouth and phone trees. In cities and towns, media outlets including newspapers, radio, and television also are used. Both citizens and government officials cited these meetings as events through which information on local services and the work of government was shared. In terms of their effectiveness, the study pointed to the following main shortcomings: Attendance at community meetings was more frequent in rural areas, where interviewees knew of meetings and were likely to have attended in the past. In urban sites, meetings were open to the public by law yet usually were attended on invitation only. People felt little connection with the issues discussed at these meetings. Greater attention to the timing of meetings is required, so that meetings are held on weekends and after work to permit maximal attendance by citizens. A second common mechanism is direct interaction with the mayor and mayoralty staff, both formal and informal. Citizens were found to voice their concerns by visiting the mayoralty or mayoral offi- cials to gain information or make a request. All mayoralties in the study sites had office hours during 29 In cities and larger towns, meetings are generally held at the mayoralty itself. In villages, they are held outdoors (weather permitting), or in the school or cultural center (likely the only buildings able to accommodate a sizable group of attendees). H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 21 BOX 23 Using the Media to Share Information with Citizens: Cahul, South Moldova The media is a powerful means through which local governments can share attend primary schools, and 5272 children attend secondary school. information with their constituents and increase the transparency of their budgetsandoveralldecisionmakingprocesses.Thefollowingisanaccountof The cost for providing children with school meals in 2003 was 950 the spending of the Cahul mayoralty during fiscal year 2003 excerpted from thousand leis... The cost for salaries in pre- through secondary school a local Cahul newspaper: institutions consisted of 11038 thousand lei. There is a very high cost in supporting these school facilities and for paying for their communal Theexpendituresideofthebudgetwasapprovedfor20648.1thousandlei services. In 2003, this cost was 4393.1 thousand leis. I want to point out andwas100%fulfilled.Themainpartofthisamountisforthefinancingof that during 2003, works were completed to install meters for all types of pre-school,elementaryandsecondaryschoolsandothereducationalinsti- services, which cut down costs of water, heat and natural gas. tutions, totaling 16277.8 thousand leis. All together, 1300 people work in educationalinstitutions,1404childrenattendkindergartens,830children Source: Cahul Express, 2004. which citizens could come to discuss issues or concerns with staff.30 Interactions between citizens and local officials were not limited to office hours, and all mayoralty staff claimed to receive citizens whenever they came to the office. Citizens also regularly meet informally with mayoralty staff. Par- ticularly in rural settings where a mayor and mayoralty staff are part of the community and known by all of its citizens, they are approached with complaints or requests at home or while riding on the bus or walking down the street. In terms of the effectiveness of this mechanism to promote transparency and civic participation, the study pointed to the main following points: Complaint procedures had been institutionalized and were working well in at least 2 of the 6 study sites but were completely lacking in others. Where formal procedures exist for dealing with direct complaints, officials are likely to respond. However, not surprisingly, they were able to resolve issues only when they possessed the requisite power and resources. Collective action pays off. Issues over which numerous complaints are received or by which a critical mass of citizens are affected are more likely to elicit responses from local officials. Third, information sharing offers good potential through local news and the media. In rural areas, common tools for information-sharing with citizens included billboards posted in public places, such as the mayor's office and schools. In urban areas predominantly, local government officials also dis- seminated news on the work of the mayoralty, recent council decisions, and upcoming mayoralty events through local newspapers, both government-funded and independent, as well as radio and tele- vision (Box 2-3). In one urban center, the study noted that televised roundtables in which local officials provided updates of their work and took live phone calls from citizens to exchange information and views took place several times per year. A major achievement of transparent and constructive use of the media was to provide an important outlet for the bi-directional flow of information between local government and citizens in urban areas. 30 Di erent mayoralties had di ering o ce hours and made di ering personnel available, including the mayor, vice-may- or, secretary of the mayoralty, and mayoralty specialists (water o cers, agriculturalists, youth o cers). In the city of Cahul, for example, the mayor and vice-mayor have o ce hours on alternate Mondays while specialists have weekly o ce hours, posted on a billboard in front of the mayor's o ce. 22 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Citizens were provided with not only information on local government activities but also nascent fora in which to make public their questions, requests, and opinions to government and service providers. One urban mayor highlighted the importance of feedback and commentary from citizens in newspa- pers and on local television for his mayoralty team to know when the city is running well and to gauge the citizens' concerns. However, the study also raised areas of concern. The use of the media is still limited largely to urban centers, and media tend to be still largely owned or controlled by government officials. Strategic planning processes are being introduced in Moldova. They include innovative mechanisms such as public hearings and participatory budgeting. They have been promoted in Moldova via donor programs such as the UNDP's Local Agenda 21 Project and the USAID Local Government Reform Project. They are also being considered under the MSIF2 project. Donors such as USAID report that local governments have been opened to strategic planning processes, and useful lessons can be drawn from the USAID project (Box 2-2). However, these processes, especially participatory budgeting mech- anisms, have only been enacted in a small number of communities, none of which were part of the selected study sites. Local Government Mechanisms to Promote Participation Remain Inadequate Overall, the study suggests that existing mechanisms of transparency and participation suffer from four main limitations in terms of increasing the ability of citizens to express their priorities to their local officials. First, transparency is growing around substance but remains poor on process. Citizens in rural com- munities attend community meetings and hear of local government decisions via word-of-mouth. Nev- ertheless, great uncertainty still exists on the extent to which local officials are responding to citizens in the decisions they make, as opposed to being motivated by resource and information constraints, technical considerations, or directives from the district. One may speak of emerging participatory local governments, but civic participation remains largely informal, ad hoc, and limited in scope. Second, this limitation is magnified by the vacuum of information about the role and responsibili- ties of local councils. While local council meetings are nominally open to the public, only 1 of the 77 citizens interviewed for the study mentioned their local council at all, and not a single interviewee had attended a council meeting. The results of this mechanism in promoting transparency in urban set- tings are even less pronounced, with few citizens attending town meetings, and many unaware of the identity of local council members or often the mayor himself. Third, information sharing is not systematic and tends to be adopted by local governments only when there is a concrete resource incentive to do so. Mechanisms that have been most effective in pro- moting transparency and information sharing have tended to be those facilitated by external actors, such as NGOs and donor agencies. None of the study sites had examples of participatory community planning or budgeting outside of the realm of the World Bank's SIF program. The incentives for infor- mation sharing and transparency also include furthering political agendas. Both citizens and local government officials interviewed in the study recognized that local government communication with citizens was augmented during election campaigns. H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 23 Fourth, more attention needs to be given to ensuring that participation includes all citizens. The study found good overall participation of rural communities in meetings organized by the mayoralty. However, no evidence was found of specific efforts to actively encourage or ensure the participation or input of excluded groups of citizens, such as the very poor, the disabled, and the socially marginal- ized. For instance, citizens selected to represent others on committees (such as the SIF implementing agency) often tended to be the wealthy or social elites, such as former collective farm leaders. While these findings do not mean that local government officials and civil society partners are not willing to foster broad-based participation, many of them are unaware of the constraints facing disadvantaged groups and of the importance of specifically targeting these groups in information and participation campaigns. Increasing efforts to ensure widespread participation of citizens and introducing tailored information strategies can reduce unintended elite biases in the short term and contribute to avoid "elite capture" of local resources and opportunities in the long run.31 Along the same lines, tailored mechanisms need to be developed for information sharing and trans- parency in rural and urban sites. In urban sites, where few respondents had ever attended a com- munity meeting, more investments need to be made in reaching out to citizens and inviting them to attend meetings, whether through direct mailings or media campaigns. A first step could be to undertake public education campaigns to familiarize citizens with their local representatives and their responsibilities. In rural sites, community participation in local meetings is generally already high. Nevertheless, since local media outlets rarely exist, greater attention needs to be paid to stimulating bi-directional information sharing between local governments and citizens. Some villages have begun to benefit from a recent project of the Moldovan NGO CONTACT, which funds the development of municipal newspapers in villages that can publish all the news of the locality. In Zberoia village, which has been supported by the MSIF program, the monthly village newspaper, which is delivered free to all homes by local children, includes community meeting summaries, local council decisions, and school news. Expanding such programs can provide a valuable service to rural communities and increase the potential for rural citizens to hold their local governments accountable for their actions. BROADER CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES As detailed above, the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to improve the transparency, participa- tion, and accountability of local governments to citizens has been mixed; and cutting edge mecha- nisms have not been introduced on a massive systematic scale. These limitations need to be located in the context of broader formal and informal dynamics in both state and non-state arenas, which were uncovered by the study and are summarized below. State-Related Issues and Dynamics A series of constraints identified by the study relates to the highly personalized and discretionary nature of local government decisionmaking. Especially in small communities, local government offi- cials were regularly found to be in situations of conflict of interest--unrecognized by them--in which 31 ese ndings give weight to the argument raised by Goetz and Jenkins (2005) on accountability failure due to elite biases. 24 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? they had a dual role as a local official and a service provider, or had overly close ties to service providers who reported to them. Numerous municipal posts are filled by appointment by the mayor.32 In terms of the culture of governance and who should be included, the study also pointed to elit- ist attitudes of most local government officials toward the poor, and perceptions of the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. Officials often rely on their preconceptions of what vulnerability means and which citizens merit their assistance (pensioners and widows do, for example) with no common, for- malized, and transparent framework for their decisions. However, most of the broader challenges raised by the study relate to the patterns of the center­local compact (see pg 19). First, the Law on Local Public Administration does not unequivocally specify and distinguish the mandates and resource allocations for district and local authorities.33 Overlap persists, particularly in the areas of socioeconomic development, provision of social assistance, and ensuring public order. Additionally, district authorities are tasked with coordinating initiatives such as youth activities, with local government, although the limits of such coordination are not specified. Second, the center­local compact seems to offer few incentives to elected local governments to enact mechanisms of transparency and participation or to orient their investments toward community priorities, even though, formally, local governments have both upward accountability to district and federal officials and downward responsibility to their constituents.34 A particular risk occurs in con- texts in which acute financial shortages exist. In this circumstance, the prime motivation of local offi- cials may be to engage in activities that allow for maximal capture of rents and financial or patronage opportunities. Third, most local governments are confronted with strong limitations on financial and human resources. The financial constraints faced by many local officials pose a serious threat to improving the delivery of services at local levels. Resource limitations (inadequate budgets and poor opportuni- ties for revenue generation) were the constraint most commonly cited by the local government officials in the study. Village investments often are ad hoc. Since mayoralties lack ongoing investment plans, when additional funds are located, they are spent immediately so as not to be lost to the district. Small communities often are particularly badly hit by financial constraints. Budget transfers are calculated on a per capita basis, which often barely covers fixed costs (from heating to salaries) leaving no funds for variable costs. Fourth, serious knowledge and experience limitations also constrain responses to citizens' priorities. These limitations relate to administrative, technical, financial management, planning, and leadership skills. In the words of one local councilor, "People are willing to participate. All we need is money and more information. One has to know more to be able to do something... There are no sources of information. The web is exciting and an excellent source to draw one's information from, but we have none [internet access]" [Case study F22]. Attracting qualified staff is also a challenge for many mayor- alties, which offer low and declining salaries, ongoing cut-backs, and the likelihood of interruptions in 32 While it would be di cult to assess the extent to which nominations are made based on patronage as opposed to merit, the existence of these discretionary appointments, when coupled with poor mechanisms of transparency, can pose a serious obstacle to local government accountability. 33 is law enumerates the mandates and decision-making power of the various levels of government. Amendments were made in the context of the 2003 Public Administration reform but areas for improvement persist. 34 e next section highlights one example of this trend, in which district o cials prevented local government o cials from publicly disseminating the mayoralty budget among local citizens. H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 25 pay. Both small villages and large cities included in this study had experienced long periods of salary arrears for workers including teachers, doctors, and police. Fifth, the nature of formal and informal relations between elected local governments and district administrations tends to generate an overall negative environment. The realignment of district authorities in 2003 from 11 judets to 33 districts magnified oversight of the activities of local governments by the district level while it reduced the tax base of each district. The result has been to make districts more financially reliant on the central government. This legislative reform has had a significant impact on local­district government dynamics. The overall trend evidenced by study findings is of district officials who often crossed borders between required oversight and excessive control or harassment.35 Dynamics associated with intergovernmental transfers are not exempt from undue political influence. Interviews with local government officials suggested that financial disbursements from the district authorities to individual municipalities may depend on the nature of an indi- vidual mayor's personal ties with district authorities and, often, on his/her political affiliation. To quote one local official of the district council, "If the person is from the same party as me, I might get some help" [Case study E13]. In another district, a village mayor explained his experi- ence of having his budget reduced because of his party affiliation, "Last year, the rayon council, when the budget was planned, allocated us only 25% from the collected land tax. I saw the list of mayors from the rayon. Where the mayors were communists, the allocations from the budget were 100%, while all the rest had only 25%" [Case study C18]. Overall,districtofficials'attitudeswerefoundtoprovidelittlesupportfortransparencyandpartic- ipation. Local government officials are in the position of relying on the district for financial trans- fers.Thus,whenfacedwithresistancefromthedistrict,theyrarelyareabletoadoptmechanismsto promote accountability. One illustration of this conflict concerned the desire of a town mayor and local council to publish the town budget to be more transparent with citizens. The budget showed a shortage of funds available as compared to funds required. Since it is not legal to adopt an unbal- anced budget, the local officials were told by their district that they were not allowed to publish the budget. Local officials who go against the wishes of the district risk losing portions of their budgets which often are handed out along party lines. Since no deadlines exist for financial transfers, local governments also can suffer long delays in receiving the funds due to them. Moreover, by calling local officials in to attend meetings, the district level can put significant time and resource pres- sures on local officials, impairing their ability to focus on local needs. Similarly, the lack of local governments' autonomy to set local budgets limits the feasibility of introducing effective mechanisms for civic inputs in local budgets. Indicative appropriations, normative spending guidelines, and per capita transfer formulas created by the Ministry of Finance, plus the requirement that local budgets be approved by the district authorities all limit local government discretion in spending and thus incentives to solicit civic inputs in local bud- gets (IDIS, n.d.). Only a few Moldovan localities have attempted to introduce participatory bud- geting pilots (section D). Promotion of this mechanism of accountability is considered under MSIF2. For promotion to succeed, full transparency and support from district and higher-level decisionmakers in the process will be a necessary precondition to encourage greater local gov- ernment autonomy and to avoid raising unrealistic expectations from citizens. 35 is trend may have been exacerbated by the pre-national election period. 26 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Challenges Associated with Actors and Dynamics Outside the State Arena The study raised challenges around three main types of actors: individual citizens; organized civil society, including the media; and donors. Citizens. Citizen initiative and demand for local government accountability often are constrained by historical factors, including the traditionally paternalistic relationship with local authorities. Citizens often are wary of engaging with local governments and organizing to demand accountability. Even when they are interested in such activity, citizens look to elites and traditional leaders to take a lead role. Historical traditions of leadership and social hierarchies, including those perpetuated by the Soviet communal farm system, are elaborated in Chapter 3 in the context of citizen participation in the MSIF program. This legacy resonates with the findings of the forthcoming regional study on the socioeconomic impact of farm restructuring in transition countries, including Moldova (Dudwick and others, 2004). In addition to negative experiences with civic engagement in local governance and the resulting mistrust, citizens often are so disenfranchised by broken promises and the lack of positive results from past efforts to participate that they are unwilling to continue to get involved in community initiatives. One local official said, "There used to be a master plan for fixing roads, pipes, etc., yet no single pipe was buried, and no single patch of asphalt was laid since 1990 to add to the pipes and asphalt already existing. Hence people are despaired, and are less active" [Study site B13]. Furthermore, weak social capital is an especially important constraint to mechanisms of participation in urban centers. With the large flow of migration from villages to urban centers and from urban centers outside the country, urban neighborhoods often experience very high turnover. Thus, neighbors have little history with or knowledge of one another. In such circumstances, organizing for the common good is difficult. At the same time that people have come to expect broken promises and few tangible results from their participation in local governance activities, the opportunity costs to them of participating have risen and are not always balanced by the benefits. In rural communities, in which labor-intensive agriculture is the dominant economic activity, it is not easy to prioritize attending day-time meetings over sowing and reaping. Even when time and economic concerns did not predominate, citizens inter- viewed highlighted social and personal costs of participation. These costs ranged from fear of being shamed for lack of education or eloquence, to being criticized for acting above their social status, to repercussions for criticizing local officials. Civil society. Despite entry points, there is scope for creating a more enabling internal and external environment to engage civil society. Despite a number of important achievements made in the last 10 years, civil society in Moldova remains weak and dependent on foreign and international donor financing. Many NGOs draft their projects to match donors' grant programs and criteria. It is unclear how many, if any, NGOs would survive without donor assistance. Moreover, both the local authori- ties and the general public still know little about civil society's activities and do not interact much with NGOs outside donor-assisted projects. Public authorities do not see NGOs with area expertise as resources that they can use to improve their performance. The recent trend of government-owned NGOs winning government projects and contracts is particularly worrying for improving state-civil society relationships (Catrinescu and Deane, 2004). These trends limit the role that civil society orga- nizations can play in promoting transparency and organizing citizens to demand improved measures of accountability from their local governments and service providers. H O W PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A N M O L D O V A N L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S B E ? 27 Media. Concerns exist about the extent to which the media in Moldova effectively deliver indepen- dent and relevant information to the public. While section C points to the importance of the media for information-sharing about local government and service delivery in urban centers, the media are almost entirely absent from rural locations. Several independent newspapers exist in the country, although they often are expensive for the general public and unavailable outside of towns and cities. Government-funded newspapers lack the investigative freedom to address shortcomings in service delivery or local government, and many are overtly partisan (Catrinescu and Deane, 2004). The only radio and television stations broadcasting to the whole country are controlled by the central govern- ment and their content reflects official government opinions. Donor Community. With limited political space in which to network beyond party-organized mayors' associations, local officials are in need of a forum in which to exchange experiences on innovations and mechanisms concerning transparency and participation. However, donor coordination and facilita- tion of sharing best practices around mechanisms to promote accountability in Moldova are limited. Mayors look to donor agencies to facilitate such opportunities and complained that donor network- ing and information exchange components tended to be limited to the projects of individual donors. An additional difficulty for mayors is that limited coordination among donors has led to differing methodologies being implemented by different actors without the creation of synergies and the avoid- ance of confusing overlap or contradictory methodologies. The MSIF newsletter sent to participating mayoralties and information centers created by the MSIF1 and the NGO CONTACT are positive steps in addressing this issue. This chapter highlighted existing mechanisms of accountability and pointed out both the obstacles and openings for building more transparent, participatory, and accountable local governments. Based on this chapter's analysis, specific policy and practical options will be highlighted in Chapter 6. Chap- ters 3­5 contain the case studies of the Moldova Social Investment Fund, the education sector, and the water supply sector, respectively. 3 Strengthening Participatory Capacity through the Social Investment Fund The most pleasant memory is related to the meetings concerning the gas [MSIF project]. People talked about anything they wished. It was nice. There were discussions, an environment of unity, of cooperation. I like the fact that people decided in a democratic way about how to install the gas pipes. --Villager F ollowing the collapse of the former system--and like many other tran- sition countries--Moldova introduced a social investment fund (SIF) mechanism to address quickly and effectively urgent country needs for basic economic and social infrastructure. Worldwide, the core of an SIF approach is communities working together with an agency that operates at arms-length from government to prioritize among a multisectoral array of local public invest- ments, and participate in their implementation and subsequent maintenance. This community empowerment approach makes social investment funds a mul- tisectoral variant of participatory client power (Levy, 2004: chapter 1). The first Moldova Social Investment Fund project (MSIF1) was implemented between 1999 and 2004. The MSIF2 began implementation in September 2004, which is the reason that study findings could not include selected MSIF2 sites.36 Some SIF critics express concern that the creation of a parallel agency respon- sible for local public investment seems at variance with efforts to strengthen the role, resources, and responsibilities of elected local governments. In prac- tice, however, available regional studies suggest that these apparent conflicts can be resolved in implementation. They point to the possibility that social 36 e study ndings presented in this chapter draw on interviews with 20 MSIF participants from three Moldovan villages in which SIF projects were introduced, as well as from key MSIF-as- sociated participants. However, a limitation with regard to primary data collection for MSIF1 must be addressed. e study included three rural village sites located in the north, center, and south of Moldova, all of which were exposed to MSIF1. e villages in the south and center successfully obtained a MSIF grant, whereas the village in the north initiated the process for a water project but was unable to gather su cient community contributions to meet MSIF grant requirements. e southern village initiated a water project in 1999, and the central village implemented a gas project in 2002. ese two villages were among the earlier participants in the MSIF1 program and, as such, their experience may not be representative of villages that joined at later stages of MSIF1a er the program had gained additional experience and its operations had evolved. 29 30 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 31 An Overview of the First Moldova Social Investment Fund (1999­2004) Summary ThefirstMoldovaSocialInvestmentFundwasestablishedin1999.TheMSIF1 term evaluation, adopted important changes into its communication, project's main goals were to help empower rural communities by strength- capacity-building, and sustainability strategies. More intensive participa- eningtheircapacitiestomakedecisions,organize,andmanage;andimprove tion and transparency mechanisms also were introduced later to improve thequalityofbasicsocialandeconomicservicesforruralpopulationsinMol- thequalityofprojects,thetimelinessoftheircompletion,andtheirsustain- dova, particularly the poor. ability. The project appraisal document lists three components: Achievements under MSIF1 are impressive. The project completed 479 Rehabilitating village and social infrastructure in rural communities microprojects in 4 years. Four main types of projects were implemented in through microprojects twinned with programs to improve services. 415 villages (of 1,600 villages in 600 municipalities) throughout Moldova: Financing small innovative microprojects to address the programs asso- 187 school rehabilitation (structure, heating); 27 water; 116 gas; and 77 ciated with the prevention of the institutionalization or de-institution- roads. It set up 18 information centers throughout the country in partner- alization of children at risk. ship with the NGO CONTACT and developed 3 community networks (400 Targeting community groups, local NGOs, local contractors, and local rural communities are part of these networks) for national exchange of government to build capacity in skills and relationships, and to foster experiences and dissemination of lessons learned. Social programs aimed newcommunity­governmentpartnershipsinthemanagementofsocial atimprovingcommunityresponsestovulnerablechildrenwerealsoimple- and economic infrastructure. mented by NGOs. The project evolved considerably over its lifetime and, after the 2001 mid- Source: Authors. investment funds can play a "key bridging role, as a transitional mechanism that not only supports poverty-reducing investment in the short term but also helps strengthen local participation and build local capacity more broadly, exiting from the stage as local governments mature."37 This Chapter is not intended to be an evaluation of MSIF1. After brief contextual clarifications of MSIF1 and MSIF2, it depicts MSIF1 tools for empowering village residents and inquires into the extent to which the project was able to build more transparent, participatory, and accountable elected local governments. At the end of chapter 3 identifies limitations and challenges for the follow-on project, MSIF2­especially since the latter is explicitly geared towards this goal. CONTEXTUAL CLARIFICATIONS: FROM MSIF1 TO MSIF2 The MSIF1 project did not explicitly aim at building more transparent and accountable local govern- ments (Box 3-1). It was created almost in an emergency context in which the institutional framework described in Chapter 2 did not exist. By contrast, a stated long-term objective of MSIF2 is the improved accountability and transparency of local government. In rural areas, MSIF2 focuses on improving the capacity of local government to organize the provision of improved social services in partnership with community-based organiza- tions and civil society. Participatory monitoring and evaluation will also be introduced in those rural sites. In small towns, which are eligible for MSIF investments for the first time, the project will assist elected local governments in involving citizens in decisionmaking. In particular, the project will seek to introduce accountability mechanisms such as participatory budgeting and citizen report cards. 37 See Levy, 2004, for instances of social investment funds from Albania, Romania, or Turkey. S T R E N G T H E N I N G PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A PA C I T Y 31 TABLE 31 Implementing Partners for MSIF1 and MSIF2 Towns (under Project Rural 20,000 inhabitants) Cities MSIF1 Implementation agency (local government, NGO, or microproject com- N.A. N.A. mittee) MSIF2 Implementation agency Beneficiary association Local government Community (local government, NGO, (NGOs) foundations or microproject committee) Source: Authors, based on communications with MSIF project implementation unit. Implementation partners also vary slightly between MSIF1 and MSIF2 (Table 3-1). What is impor- tant to notice is that, in small towns, the subproject proposals will have to be submitted by the local government, even if cooperation with local NGOs is required for implementation. This procedure will give important leverage to the project in encouraging mayors to insert participatory elements in their proposals. CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES UNDER MSIF1 Both operational procedures of MSIF1 and study findings of their application suggest that the MSIF is one of the most advanced projects in the Region in the way that it systematically attempted to mobilize citizens and strengthen their abilities to participate. The project built in community participation at every step, as illustrated and summarized below: Effective promotion and broad information collection and dissemination. MSIF1 organized promo- tion at two levels: district (rayon) and community. At the district level, the MSIF organized a work- shop in which the mayors of all the villages, principals of rural schools, local doctors, and local NGO representatives participated. Promotion took place in all 1,600 rural communities. At the vil- lage level, outreach activities included 3 to 5 focus groups in every village. In addition, mini-needs and -capacities assessments were organized in every district and village in the country. Expressions of interest. If a village expressed an interest, MSIF-trained facilitators were sent to the village to conduct a rapid assessment (consisting of focus groups and interviews). MSIF facilitators used their learning from the rapid assessment to facilitate a general community meeting (which 25 percent to 30 percent of the adult population were required by MSIF procedures to attend) on project selection. Community mobilization. Village leaders went house to house to spread information and pass out invitations to the meeting. They used the telephone to ask villagers to pass on the information to neighbors who did not have phones. Citizens also learned about the MSIF on television, and infor- mation was spread by word of mouth. Selection of the implementation agency. At the same general community meeting, the implementa- tion agency was elected. The membership of the implementation agency is entirely up to the com- munity, but the mayor or village councilors usually sit on the agency along with key stakeholders. From this point on, implementation agencies take over the preparation; community contribution collection; procurement; supervision; sustainability; and other functions, such as information dis- 32 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? semination. Implementation agencies are responsible for keeping the population informed about the microproject implementation progress, consulting about technical plans, and taking feedback, as well as monitoring the quality of construction. Since 2002, a participatory technical and social appraisal was introduced along with the MSIF-conducted technical and social appraisal. The for- mer enables willing community members to ensure that implementation agency developed plans meet the interests of the community and to submit suggestions for improvements.38 Once the proj- ect is complete, a users' association, the local government, or other entity takes over the operation of the infrastructure while the municipality retains ownership of the asset. In practice, the MSIF offers capacity building throughout the subproject cycle including after completion. STRENGTHENED PARTICIPATORY CAPACITIES OF COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER MSIF1 Evaluation reports, study findings, and key participant interviews strongly suggest that, even without an explicit objective to do so, the MSIF1 project may have positively affected the participatory culture and capacity of not only communities but also elected local governments (MSIF, 2004). Positive Community Dynamics Overall, evidence from MSIF1 sites and secondary data point to four main positive dynamics at com- munity level. First, MSIF dynamics can create positive social capital by bringing people together to resolve prob- lems collaboratively, democratically, and transparently.39 According to respondents, the main ben- efit of the project is having access to services. However, the collaborative and transparent process is also an important determining factor of satisfaction. Findings suggest that the MSIF projects created opportunities for residents in villages to work together and break the isolation that often characterizes post-Soviet communities.40 As a middle-aged respondent explained, "The most pleasant memory is related to the meetings concerning the gas [MSIF project]. The meetings took place in the yard of the school, people talked about anything they wished. It was nice: there were discussions, an environment of unity, of cooperation. I like the fact that people decided in a democratic way how to install the gas pipes." Second, communities seem more likely to engage the local government and trust in the power of collective action. The MSIF subprojects in the study sites made an impact on people's willingness to participate and take collective action. After a successful MSIF project, some people said that they were ready to believe in collaboration to achieve a common goal. They were more likely to trust one another and take part more readily in another project in which they could contribute money and labor. Con- 38 In time, more emphasis was placed the development of sustainability plans, and competitions were held to reward projects with the best plans. 39 e MSIF (2004) Impact Evaluation supports this nding. It found that satisfaction with projects was closely linked to access to services and to transparency; that is, villagers' assessments of how well they were informed about the project's progress and use of funds. 40 is statement con rms the results of the MSIF (2004) Impact Evaluation, which surveyed 30 MSIF villages. Of the respondents, 80.5% said the MSIF strengthened the community; 82.3% were more active in community a airs; 92.5% felt a stronger sense of control over their lives, and all who answered the question (89.5%) said they were more inclined to participate in community activities. S T R E N G T H E N I N G PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A PA C I T Y 33 versely, when an MSIF project fails, as in Site C, pessimism about the effectiveness of local government and the potential for collective action is pervasive. One village councilor explained that, along with social dislocation and the lack of trust and money, the failure of the MSIF water project was a major obstacle to citizens' coming together to resolve problems. Third, information sharing among villages of their accomplishments creates incentives for other sites to become more active. In this context, MSIF initiatives such as developing 3 community net- works (approximately 400 communities are members), creating 18 information centers, and a newslet- ter for sharing learning about project implementation and donor sources were invaluable. Respondents explained that the incentives to do something for one's own village or school often came from learning what others had done and a resulting sense of competition: "Why not here?" These points suggest major achievements in terms of citizens' empowerment per se, especially in view of the challenging rural social context of Moldova (Chapter 2). They also illustrate how a commu- nity-driven mechanism, such as the MSIF, can help citizens break out of social isolation and strengthen their incentives and capacities to mobilize to improve service delivery. These dynamics make clients powerful. The dynamics also prepare the ground for clients to become active citizens when local gov- ernments are ready and able to open a space for their inputs in governance. Positive Changes in Local Governments' Leadership Styles One could apparently conclude that the MSIF1 worked in parallel to the local government. In only 1 or 2 cases out of 476 subprojects did communities choose local government bodies as the project imple- menting agencies. Mainly for sustainability purposes at the time, the implementation team strove to involve local government in the identification, preparation, implementation, and sustainability of the microproject. As a key participant stated, "It is the local government that organized the general community meeting, participated in the microproject committee, signed the framework agreement and Memorandum of Understanding with MSIF, financially contributed to the microproject imple- mentation, monitored the quality and payment for the executed works, [and] elaborated and approved the sustainability plans." There also is anecdotal evidence that local governments contributed to the creation of Beneficiary Associations and encouraged them to be registered officially as NGOs. These facts confirm the point made in Chapter 2 that local governments quickly become more participatory when they have strong incentives, including financial resources, to do so. Furthermore, this study strongly suggests that MSIF has encouraged a more collaborative and par- ticipatory style of leadership among elected local officials. The MSIF procedures of citizen empow- erment described above have pushed mayors to mobilize the population and hold meetings within different neighborhoods to obtain feedback on the proposed project. While Chapter 2 mentions the persisting personalized and discretionary leadership styles of many elected local governments, these findings confirm that new incentives and dynamics can be fostered. One village mayor suggested that MSIF may not be able to change structural "problems about how local government works," but it does make mayors more likely to work with the community.41 Evidence from the study sites also suggests that local governments' more participatory and transparency practices continued even after the MSIF project implementation (Box 3-2). 41 ere is anecdotal evidence from interviews with MSIF eld sta that some MSIF procedures were adopted in some villages, especially with regard to transparency and information dissemination. 34 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 32 What Happens Once the MSIF Project Is Over? Even without an explicit objective to increase the accountability of local gov- After the MSIF and another donor project finished, the local administration ernment, the introduction of resources for service delivery, and transparency continuedtomeetwiththecommunityforrenovatingthelocalchurch.Atthis and participatory mechanisms impacted local government practices in Case moment, city­based businessmen who grew up in the village have offered study F. support for repairing a part of the community road.The local administration metwithvillagers,presentedaplanandaskedforpeople'slabortorepairthe road. But before the project started, the mayor said that one villager, after The MSIF project was a starting point for the community, says its mayor. Suc- seeing the repair plan, came with a suggestion for improving it. The busi- cessful implementation of the project encouraged local government to work nessmenandthelocaladministrationdiscussedhissuggestionandagreedto morewiththecommunity.Themayorbelievesthebenefitsofthemechanisms incorporate it into the plan. used by MSIF are that people from the community changed their"mentality" and are more encouraged and interested in participating in meetings and in improving the services in the community. Source: Authors. The MSIF-generated dynamics provide the necessary incentives for local officials to become more responsive to local needs. Local governments with scarce financial funds lack power and may claim not to be responsible for local problems. With potential additional funds, local government officials feel less afraid to raise expectations through consultative processes and more able to help. In the suc- cessful MSIF study sites, local officials were resourceful and central to bringing MSIF to their vil- lages. In both villages, the mayor or a village councilor claims to have brought information about the social investment fund to the village and initiated the process. In Study site F, the mayor was on the implementation agency. Even in Study site C, in which the project failed, the mayor (who was located in another village within the same primaria) worked with local businesspersons to contact businesses and district authorities for contributions to the project. Mayors were equally held accountable for poor performances of MSIF projects. Mayors who had created obstacles to bringing MSIF to their villages were voted out of power, while in other instances leaders of successful MSIF implementing agencies were elected mayor.42 Building participatory local governance also involves associating a wide range of stakeholders, including voice-enhancing local actors (NGOs) in the decisionmaking processes. In this context, this chapter supports findings from SIF studies worldwide: SIF dynamics and requirements encourage new incentives for broad-based collaboration and partnership. Because of the relatively large community contributions required for economic assets (water, gas, roads),43 it is not enough for community leaders to rely on household contributions of labor and cash. Leaders are encouraged to find other sources of contributions, such as local and national businesses and local and district government. CHALLENGES FOR INCLUSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS UNDER MSIF2 The new MSIF2 project can build on significant potentials and achievements to promote more par- ticipatory and transparent local communities and governments. However, the study also points to key 42 Personal communication with World Bank task team leader of MSIF until October 2004 (August 2004). 43 MSIF requires contributions from the local population. Of these, 20­50% must be in cash from the community; and another 50­80% (in kind or in cash) can be from any source, including the district or the local government, and/or local and other businesses. S T R E N G T H E N I N G PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A PA C I T Y 35 internal and external challenges to achieving this goal. Internal challenges tend to emphasize com- munity dynamics while external challenges relate to complex local­district relations. Internal Challenges and Implications: Trust, Inclusiveness, and Internal Governance First, MSIF2 should better identify and pay particular attention to the fact that lack of trust in local leaders can seriously impede citizen engagement. Experience from a village whose MSIF project failed yields useful insights. The village was faced with problems of mistrust, compounded by a lack of social cohesion and homogeneity. Emigration was common, and new residents often were seen by other citizens and service providers as less committed to the village. Differences in socioeconomic status that enabled the better-off to access services compounded the difficulties of organizing. The mayor and local businesspersons obtained a promise of a contribution from district officials but were unable to convince local constituents that their funds would be properly used. To increase levels of trust in this type of village, promotion and capacity-building efforts may focus on creating credible accountability mechanisms before the project is launched. Trusted leaders need to be identified to lead the process and act as mediators with official leaders. However, since MSIF2 includes small towns, the challenge of working with heterogeneous and divided communi- ties may only be heightened. Specific information and mediation strategies will be required for the urban sites. Second, the wide promotion mechanisms may be effective but not necessarily inclusive. This qualita- tive study suggests that the poorest residents are less likely to take part in participatory events, speak up in community meetings, or take on leadership roles. While the financial requirement obviously is not mandatory for participation in general meetings, in practice it generates shame among the poorest and disincentives to attend. In this context, the poor may still improve their access to services after subproject completion. However, because of their reaction to their inability to make initial financial contributions to the project, they will have foregone the opportunity to participate in the design of the service project. In addition, vulnerable groups who lack established status in community also tend to be less able to speak up. Data from focus groups in all MSIF sites suggests that years of rebuff by local leaders and lack of action by local governments in the face of perceived injustice or even violent threats by other community leaders impede the vulnerable from taking the initiative and trusting that participation will effect change. These findings provide yet another illustration of an unintended bias against the poor and the vulnerable, which echoes the findings of other chapters of this study (Chapter 4). If not addressed in the short term, unintended elite biases may create elite capture in the long run. As can be expected based on international experience, community-wide mechanisms for social mobilization are likely to replicate community structures that favor elites (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). Based on an understand- ing of a hierarchical society that tends to favor elites as leaders, appropriate mechanisms need to be devised to include those who lack the social status or safety to speak up. Examples of appropriate mechanisms include "champions" or "mediators" who have the required social status, are committed (because of appropriate incentives) to including the voices of those who are routinely excluded, and have been trained to bridge the gaps among local government officials, service providers, and mar- ginalized clients. 36 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? These findings also raise important implications for the monitoring and evaluation and report card processes, which need to be mindful to create inclusive fora for participation. Existing General Community Meetings, town hall meetings, and even anonymous individual surveys may not always be appropriate mechanisms to ensure full participation. Third, it is not enough to promote transparent local governments. There is scope to improve the internal governance of NGOs as the local providers on which MSIF relies.44 On the one hand, mecha- nisms to hold these nongovernmental service providers exist. The MSIF facilitates the community to create and to register beneficiary associations. The beneficiary associations are created at the general meeting of beneficiaries from the village. The executive committee of beneficiary association is elected also by the general meeting of beneficiaries and is accountable to all members of the association. On the other hand, this chapter raises the risk that these local service providers may not necessarily be more transparent or participatory than their government counterparts. Many of these NGOs are driven by local elites, with little or no representation from non-elite groups in the community. Oth- ers lack formal means of hearing citizen complaints or suggestions, or forms of redress or appeal for customers dissatisfied with their services. Internal accountability mechanisms are also weak in these groups, and the study indicates that these NGOs have little awareness of conflict of interest. In one instance, the wife of the chairman of the implementation agency is the implementation association's accountant. This is scarcely sufficient division of responsibilities for effective financial management. She was unable to answer simple questions about contributions, stating that her husband deals with these issues. At another site, the mayor appointed a close relative of a district official who made a large financial contribution to the MSIF project as the head of an NGO created out of the MSIF implemen- tation agency. Thus, there is a need for a closer examination of the internal structures that govern local service providers. For MSIF2 to better identify and enforce appropriate internal governance mechanisms, raising awareness in these NGOs on the impact of perceived conflict of interest on accountability and capacity building is a necessity. External Constraints and Challenges To be more effective in its attempt to build more participatory local governments, the MSIF2 should benefit from a more enabling external environment in which projects and policies would align district- and local-level incentives to support increased local level accountability. If local officials are to be effective and accountable, more transparent relationships with the district authorities will need to be fostered. In theory, with MSIF funds, communities and their directly elected officials could be freer to address their priority needs. However, in practice, to raise community matching funds, it is often necessary to seek contributions from businesses and the district govern- ment, which means that personal and partisan allegiances at the district level cannot be entirely cir- cumvented. Partisan alliances remained important for obtaining funds. In one study site, no resources were committed by the district, in which there was no shared political affiliation with the directly elected local officials. In another case, in which funds were contributed, political allegiances between the local council and the district council enabled the local authorities to access district resources. 44 In the case of MSIF1, `local providers' refers to formal rural NGOs, which continue to manage service provision a er the end of MSIF projects. S T R E N G T H E N I N G PA R T I C I PAT O R Y C A PA C I T Y 37 Thus, in small cities where MSIF2 will provide grants directly to local governments, relationships with the district may be important determinants of project success. Policies and projects need to provide incentives to district officials to adopt more transparent and policy-based relationships with local officials. The lack of a collaborative and supportive relationship between local and district governments impedes citizens' access to services. In MSIF1, the district was not always supportive of MSIF villages seeking technical approvals for their projects (for example, fire certifications). District councilors saw these projects as opportunities to raise money by charging villagers for these certifications. These bureaucratic obstacles delayed projects and became a de facto flat tax levied by district officials on local communities for access to services. This practice will be addressed in MSIF2, for which districts must sign memoranda of understanding stating their role as supporters of local development efforts. These memoranda of understanding address in part the need to realign district-level interests with local interests. Based on the various potentials and constraints discussed in this chapter, Chapter 6 highlights stra- tegic and operational recommendations for MSIF2 to promote more participatory, transparent, and accountable elected local governments. Chapter 4 on education will explore a more sectoral variation of client power through the role of parents in schools. 4 Improving Governance of Basic Education Services through Parents' Participation "We are aware that in the next four years we are obliged to do our best ... to ensure a modern education in Moldova." --Vladimir Voronin, President of Moldova, Inaugural Address, April 2005 A s the World Development Report (WDR) 2004 points out, successful provision of universal and quality education can come from different institutional arrangements, from very centralized to decentralized sys- tems with considerable local accountability (World Bank 2003b: 113). Examples of centralized systems are Japan or France, compared with more decentralized settings in The Netherlands. What matters is an enabling environment for key stakeholders to contribute to the broader development goal of higher quality and more equitably distributed learning. For this to happen, worldwide experience suggests that education systems should create and strengthen relationships of accountability in three main inter-related areas: Compact and management refers to relationships among elected central/local government officials;45 policymakers (for example, Ministry of Education); and service providers (schools, their administrators, and their teachers). These relationships typically impact, and should strive to ensure, key ele- ments for success such as adequate resources, a sound school financing sys- tem, clear division of responsibilities and objectives, motivated providers, and performance-oriented management (what WDR2004 calls issues of compact and management). Client power defines the means by which students and/or their parents and communities as indirect clients can increase transparency and accountability of schools through direct participation, for instance, through engagement in parents' committees.46 45 WDR 2004 refers to "politicians" who generally want to ensure that electoral promises are delivered. 46 WDR 2004 identi es "exit" from the public sector or use of private schools as another option to increase client power in the education sector. is option was not considered by the study because of its infrequency in Moldova. 39 40 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Other mechanisms by which citizens can participate more indirectly include having access to infor- mation on the government's education objectives at central and local levels and being enabled to monitor and hold the state accountable for its performance.47 It was outside the scope of the study to provide a detailed analysis of the Moldovan education sector on the first set of relations of accountability. Furthermore, the World Bank (2005b) Policy Note on Education in Moldova concentrates on related policy areas including access, equity, learning and labor market outcomes, efficiency, and school financing system. The main objective of this Chapter is to draw the attention of decisionmakers to the second set of relationships and to the under-reported role of parents' participation (client power).48 It is increasingly recognized worldwide that adequate mecha- nisms for parents' participation can be "valuable parts of an overall plan for school improvement" not only through monetary contribution but through inputs in decisionmaking.49 This chapter analyzes key findings based on experiences and perceptions of education stakeholders with a focus on primary and secondary services. First, it assesses the internal environment for direct mechanisms and forms of parents' participation (through parents' committees and associations), their influence on school governance, and their ability to represent the voices of parents, including the poorest. Second, it explores the extent to which there is an external enabling environment for parents' participation in the governance of schools in Moldova. Should parents' participation be promoted? To what extent would stakeholders have incentives and/or possibilities on the supply side to respond to this demand? Implications for policy and operational recommendations are presented concluding Chapter 6. EXISTING PARENTS' ASSOCIATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES Formal mechanisms for parents and students to hold education providers directly accountable are limited to two options: (1) choice by opting out of the system to private schools, which exist at all levels; adding private lessons to supplement government-funded education; or choosing better performing schools, often lyceums in urban areas and large villages; and (2) participation in parent meetings, gen- eral school meetings, parent committees, and/or parent associations. This section focuses on the study findings regarding the latter option, highlighting both the opportunities and limitations of existing mechanisms and dynamics. Opportunities for Clear Engagement from Parents In contrast to other countries, decisionmakers in Moldova have an extraordinary opportunity to enhance downward mechanisms of accountability within education services. The study findings con- firm that client engagement, the most difficult ingredient for successful exercise of "client power" in schools, clearly is present through good participation in meetings and contribution of fees. All but two parents interviewed said that at least one parent (or relative) attends the general school meetings and the parent class meetings. Initiated by the principal, general school meetings are held 47 WDR 2004 refers to these as voice mechanisms. 48 is chapter focuses on parents' participation in education services. While not expressly considered here, the participa- tion of students and young people in school decisionmaking also should be promoted as one means to improve the quality of education services. On this issue, see UNICEF's latest report on youth participation in Moldova (UNICEF, 2004). 49 In the WDR framework, client power also encompasses the exit strategy; that is, parents opting for private schools if unsatis ed with public schools performance. is option is not applicable to the current Moldovan context. I M P R O V I N G G O V E R N A N C E O F B A S I C E D U C AT I O N S E R V I C E S 41 BOX 41 Key Study Findings on Different Modalities for Parental Groups Parent class committee is composed of 3 to 5 of the most active parents depending on need. The parent association's management generally meets usually nominated by the teacher and elected by a show of hands by parents. with the school administration and then reports to parents at the general These representatives are relatively well educated, better off economically, schoolmeetings.Theparentassociationmanagestheschoolfund.Aparentis and well connected for getting things accomplished at the school. Their role appointed treasurer to track and report on finances.The management of the includes collecting money from other parents for small repairs, classroom parent association replaces the school parent committee and plays a similar improvements, gifts for teachers, and celebrations.These fees are illegal and role in school governance. therefore informal.There is no reporting mechanism for the use of funds and no separate account for the money collected.The school principal keeps track School parent committee or school senate is a selection of one member of accounts and sometimes reports to the general school meeting about col- of each parent class committee; the size varies depending on the number of lections and expenditures. classesintheschool.Theschoolparentcommitteehasaconsultativerolevis- à-vis the school administration. The committee organizes activities, collects Parent association is a registered NGO that is legally allowed to raise funds,andaddressesspecificdisciplinecasesorparent­teacherconflicts.The funds and open its own bank account. De facto, parent associations replace chairman of the school parent committee is elected at the general school the parent class committees. The leadership is sometimes nominated by meeting. the principal, but in most cases, procedures follow those of the parent class committees. Meetings of the parent association are held 2­3 times per year Source: Field work. twice a year, once a semester. Meetings typically bring up school activities and issues that require broad parental consultation, such as discussions of fees for repairs and reports of the parent association or the school parent committee.50 Parent class meetings are held 2­3 times per semester and chaired by the class coordinator (teacher) who follows children for a number of years. At these meetings, teach- ers typically inform parents about performance and discipline issues of their children, recommend additional books, and pass on didactic messages. In addition, elected parent representatives participate directly in school affairs through parent class committees and the school parent committee or school senate (Box 4-1). According to the majority of the study's respondents, parent class committees and parent associations often focus on collecting fees to supplement school budgets. The main distinction between the fee collection by parent associations and parent class committees is their legality (formal, i.e., legal, in the case of parent associations and informal in the case of parent class committees). The size of fees collected by the parent committees varies depending on the type of facility and its location (urban or rural). In the three urban study sites, for example, parent committees collected 150­400 Moldovan Leu (MDL) per year, which often accounted for a significant proportion of the school's budget.51 Fees are larger in urban areas and can be couched as regular monthly dues determined at the beginning of the year. Interviews and focus group discussions with teaching staff and administrators revealed strong positive perceptions of parents' engagement. As one school administrator put it, "There are some parents showing a great deal of interest for the school's work, as they come up with suggestions on how to improve the conditions in school, such as, for instance, buying new school desks, furniture." 50 ese meetings also are sometimes attended by the district-level school inspector and a representative of the mayor's o ce. 51 As an example, according to its director, one of the urban schools in the study received an annual budget of 50,000 MDL from the state and an additional 10,000 MDL from parents' contributions. e latter amount represents an overall direct pa- rental contribution of 16% to the school's nances. Parental contributions are similarly signi cant in rural schools. One village school director interviewed in the study estimated that parental contributions represented 30% of the budget for school repairs and 50% of the budget for school meals. 42 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Teachers repeatedly said that "they could not achieve what they are doing without parents," while the financial emphasis was strong. Parents and school administrators explained that parent associations were initiated by the principals or teachers to raise funds to cover salary arrears and school repairs. In 3 sites (2 rural and 1 urban),52 they were explicitly started to meet requirements for receiving funds from the MSIF1 project. The majority of parents interviewed concurred that they attend these meetings to learn about their children's performance, to be informed about class and school activities, and to better understand the school's problems and how parent-contributed funds are being used. Limitations and Challenges Despite these entry points and opportunities, the study findings point to serious limitations to parents' power and to challenges related to the internal functioning and governance of the parents groups. A first series of findings points to gaps in parents' engagement, with a particularly serious drop in engagementatsecondarylevelsofschooling. Attendance at parent class committee meetings was found to vary­from high attendance in elementary grades (1­5) to very sporadic in lower secondary school (grades6­9).Itincreasesagaininuppersecondaryandinlyceums.Since,parentalinvolvementisclosely linked to student performance, the drop in class parent meetings in lower secondary school may have a significant impact on student achievement during these years.53 This possible consequence suggests the need for specific awareness campaigns and a better understanding of this drop of attendance. Other participation gaps typically had to with the difficulty for education providers of coping with the consequences of international migration. As one urban teacher put it, "... considering the big number of parents working abroad, it is hard to mobilize them." This reality requires mobilizing other relatives such as grandparents who are considered to be less effective in supervising and disciplining the children. Previous studies of youth found that students with parents abroad are at great risk of dropping out, because of lack of parental supervision. A second series of findings shed light on the overall limited scope for parental influence and over- sight. Parents were found to be coerced to pay an array of fees over which they have little say in how the fees are either structured or managed. Supposedly, committees such as the parent senate and school parent committee have a degree of influence with the administration on management of financial and human resources as well as student discipline. However, parents tend to come to the school to ask what needs to be done, to prop up the system with additional funds rather than to contribute to chang- ing it. Unsurprisingly, many interviewees lamented the "symbolic role" of committees. Furthermore, evidence suggests the need for increasing the level of information and awareness raising of parents' potential role. The majority of parents interviewed who were not on the committees did not really understand the role of parental committees. Other elements point to the need to improve the internal transparency and governance of parents' associations and committees. First, the study uncovered the needs to revisit (and regulate) selection 52 e management of the urban school mistakenly believed that it could qualify for MSIF funds by setting up a parent association. e school, however, did not qualify under MSIF1 because it is located in an urban area, and will not qualify under MSIF2 because the town has a population of over 20,000. 53 e TMISS 2003 found a drop in achievement in the eighth grade compared to the fourth grade. e Education Policy Note (World Bank, 2005b: 13­14) lists two possible causes for the drop in achievement. One is the delayed impact of recent reforms on higher grades. Another is that achievement truly falls in those grades. I M P R O V I N G G O V E R N A N C E O F B A S I C E D U C AT I O N S E R V I C E S 43 criteria for members and to avoid conflicts of interest. The closeness among principal, teachers, and parents (who are nominated by the administration and teachers) on the committees was found to generate suspicions. Second, the study found scope for improving transparency in the management of funds collected from parents. Reported problems include: (1) absence of routine outside scrutiny of parent committee accounts or the parent association's management of the school fund; (2) inadequate separation of accounting responsibilities to effectively account for the monies collected from parents­ by parent committees and parent associations alike; and (3) absence of required reporting of collected funds and expenses for parents' committees.54 Not surprisingly, trust in good and honest manage- ment of these funds was found to be higher in small, homogeneous communities, as in villages, where "everyone knows the price of paint." However, perceptions differed in urban sites, in which in at least half of the cases, interviewed parents questioned expenditures on non-education-related activities. At least one-third of interviewed parents also felt it difficult to raise questions and issue complaints about these monies for fear of retaliation by teachers on their children. The following comments of an urban father illustrate these frustrations with internal management and governance of parents' groups: In my view, the director and the chairman of the parents association are managing the school... With the PA, they do whatever they want... The money collected for the school fund is not managed hon- estly, and not all these money are used for the school's needs... I was interested in participating, but my wife told me not to, because if I talked, my kid wouldn't get more than a 6 [a mediocre grade on scale of 10]. You can't look for truth on the bottom of the sea... this is how this school works. [This father questioned why the school was asking his children to bring a vase, flowers, and various other things from home. He did not get any support from the other parents and decided to not get involved any more.] The main ingredients for accountability, namely, parental interest and vehicles for parental participa- tion, already exist in Moldova. Yet, in the Moldovan context, fee payment and parental participation do not go hand in hand with increased downward accountability of schools. Furthermore, the com- mon perception that a parent's financial contribution determine his or her child's grades and standing limits the extent to which many parents believe their contributions entitle them to participate in school decisionmaking.55 Another finding is that parents' negative perceptions of fee-collecting committees/associations also relate to problems of planning and needs prioritization, which raise challenges to school manage- ment. Evidence suggested that parents' attitudes toward the parent committees and, in particular, the more formal parent associations, are often negative. Of 26 respondents who were not parent class com- mittee or parent association members, more then one-third (10) complained about fees, and another 13 (almost half) seem to begrudgingly accept them. This aversion to the formalization of fees is reflected in the opposition to parent associations by the one mayor who explained that only 20 percent of parents could afford to pay fees, and by two principals who opposed the creation of a parent associations in the school for fear of antagonizing parents. However, negative perceptions may be exacerbated by the fact that parents are overwhelmed by the number of fees and numerous requests coming from the school. As an example, the school might ask to collect fees for essentials, such as fuel; but teachers might also collect fees for a poster or plants for the classroom--hardly a priority, given the state of most schools. This proliferation of requests may reflect little serious needs prioritization in the medium term and strong training needs for school administrators. 54 Parent associations also formally report to their members, but their statements are rarely veri ed by outsiders. 55 Insights from the Technical Seminar on Education, In-Country consultations, Chisinau, May 2005. 44 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? A final series of findings raise concerns about the inclusiveness of current parents groups. The study inquired into the extent to which elite biases (against the poor and/or marginalized groups) existed in the design and implementation of mechanisms for parents' participation in education, with a special focus on parents' groups. The study found that insufficient attention is paid to risks of exclusion related to the collection of fees.56 Poorer families were found to be able to negotiate delayed payment, install- ment payments, or single payments for multiple school children. In villages especially, fees were more ad hoc and collected throughout the year, with more allowances for those who could not pay. For instance, some parents were allowed to contribute in kind or in labor instead of in cash, and some poorer families were even exempt upon review by the parent class committee. However, allowances for the poor are nei- ther widespread nor systematic. Furthermore, retaliation from teachers and humiliation at the parent meetings for nonpayment in cities were reported on a regular basis throughout the study. In this context, Moldovan decisionmakers should consider providing appropriate guidelines to schools regarding the role of parents associations in fee collection to preserve the rights of all parents to participate. It would be worrisome, for instance, if parent associations in their current form would replace parent committees as the main vehicle for parent participation and interface with the school administration. Parent associations are legal, voluntary organizations of fee-paying members. As such, they are not true equivalents of the class or school parent committees, which represent the entire par- ent body regardless of their ability to pay fees. The study also suggests the need for attitudinal changes to overcome biases in selecting members and conducting parent meetings. Selection of parent committees tends to be based on informal criteria that favor the better off. As one urban student put it, "... teachers tend to select parents with good social sta- tus, good profession, energy, leadership spirit." As a result, committee members often fail to represent the needs of all parents, poor parents in particular. Furthermore, both interviews and field observations suggested that parents' meetings rarely provided an enabling environment for empowering all parents to speakoutandbelistenedtoo,especiallypoorandruralparents(Box4-2).In"traditional"parentmeetings, teacherswerenotperceivedtocreateanatmosphereofmutualrespectandsupport.57Theytendedtoadopt an authoritarian attitude in which the teacher does the talking and parents listen. Rural parents whose children attend urban schools felt that they were "not taken seriously" in urban schools. In interviews, some even explained how this disrespect discouraged them from further attendance of meetings: "When we are many women, we cannot speak. The teacher is the person who speaks at the meeting, and we are listening. Either we are ashamed to speak, or we do not understand. Only after the meeting is finished, we go back home and we speak about different things."[Statement by rural mother] These are the parents from the town. We, those from the village, are not really paid attention to. [Rural mother discussing parent meetings in an urban school where parents from the town are more active] Most of the discussions take place after the meeting [among] parents "because during the meeting somebody says something and another opposes it, and you cannot say something in the meeting when everybody is present "because you are ashamed to speak in front of the teacher. But after the meeting, people discuss things more openly." [Rural father discussing parent meetings in an urban school] 56 As argued in Gershberg and Meade (2005), e ective compensatory means tested support is essential to address issues of equity but local control is another important element. It is impossible to determine the optimal fee level empirically. erefore, it is necessary to allow for school-level and parental decisionmaking power regarding fees within a framework to ensure equity, promote accountability, and prevent abuses of power. 57 One school principal showed an awareness of the problem of what he called "traditional parent meetings" stating that in his school parent meetings were more open and less teacher-led. I M P R O V I N G G O V E R N A N C E O F B A S I C E D U C AT I O N S E R V I C E S 45 BOX 42 Authoritarian Attitudes: Observations of a Parent Meeting in an Urban School in Moldova Thisfieldobservationofa"traditional"fourthgradeparentmeetingrevealsthe summarized.The teacher then describes what she has done for the class and "authoritarian" attitude of the teacher. Her arrogant style infantilizes the par- her professional dedication and concludes:"I have succeeded in doing these ents rather than engages them respectfully as full partners in problemsolving. things in a class of such bad and disobedient children..." She repeatedly humiliates parents as she discusses the performance of"such The teacher is called outside, and only then do parents speak up. They com- bad and disobedient children." plain to one another about needing to again buy new textbooks and that Themeetingiscalledbytheclasscoordinator,ateacher.Itisheldat11AMon the textbooks that they bought at the beginning of the year are no longer a Friday.Twelve parents are in attendance (of 17 invited parents), 10 women being used. and2men.Onewomanisthegrandmotherofastudent.Bothmenareseated Theteacherreturnsandasksarhetoricalquestion,"Thechildrendonotknow in the back of the room, silent and about two meters from the rest of the the multiplication tables. What shall we do?" The parents keep quiet and attendees. The teacher is "too authoritarian" and does not create an atmo- listen. She then goes through the individual performance of each student. sphereforparentalparticipation.Waitingforlatecomerstoarrive,theteacher "Can we do anything about this?"[Silence]"Yes?"The parents reply in unison, starts discussing additional textbooks and books to be purchased. She repri- "Yes." mands the parents for the children's failure to study, missing classes, getting low grades, being lazy, and getting complaints from other teachers. At the end of the meeting, parents are showing signs of impatience at the discussionabouttheNewYear'scelebration.Theteacheradmonishesthepar- The meeting is officially opened with a statement from the teacher,"Every- ent committee members,"Parents'committee, do not put everything on my thing done in the school requires help on the part of the parents. We had shoulders." gooddecorationsmadeforthetheaterproduction."Thesemester'sresultsare Source: Fieldworkers'report. These findings suggest the need for appropriate training of all forms of parents (or students) commit- tees and/or groups. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO MORE EFFECTIVE PARENT PARTICIPATION Should parents' participation be promoted? To what extent would stakeholders have incentives and/or possibilities on the supply side to respond to this demand? In the process of the study, stakeholders in district and local government, as well as the school administration, spontaneously raised some issues that shed light on the broader institutional context that affects the feasibility and potential effective- ness of both indirect and more direct modes of parent participation. External Challenges for Enabling Voice and Indirect Modes of Citizens' Participation Constraints to introducing effective citizens' voice (indirect participation) can be summarized by a weak focus on results in the current monitoring and evaluation system and by inadequate incentives for downward accountability. Some useful information is available. Students' performance is tracked primarily through year-end examinations, ranking in academic Olympiads and Baccalaureate, and national high school graduation education. However, the study pointed to at least four main areas that need improvement: Evidence did not show tracking of improvement of student performance or incentives for schools and frontline professionals to show value added. The system is therefore unable to identify and reward those dedicated teachers and schools (and students) who improved the 46 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? most. This focus on top performers creates risks of promoting pro-elite dynamics. Teachers with top performers may get recognition, but those whose students have improved the most may be ignored. This set of incentives is also at risk of even encouraging students who perform poorly to drop out. Most of the data collected by district departments of education seem to focus on tracking inputs. For instance, inspections of the schools by district-level inspectors report primarily on issues such as school finances; physical assets; and didactic matters, such as the teacher evaluation process or progress on curriculum (See Appendix B for additional detailed examples). There is no standardized assessment of educational achievement across schools in Moldova.58 Should parents be empowered to compare school results across the country or district, they would not be able to do so. Finally, the set of data available focuses on examination results; but if public policy does not address the current practice of selling examination questions and grades, these mechanisms of evaluating achievements may end up totally losing credibility. Some vice principals expressed concern about this issue. It is also discussed in the study results on the quality of governance by Transparency International (Carasciuc, 2001). In this context, the Government of Moldova needs to generate appropriate incentives and enforce regulations to curb the informal payments that threaten the authority of their staff and the legitimacy of the system. Even though most of the accountability system is geared upward, in a handful of examples in the study's six sites, education officials and school administrators initiate information dissemination and consultation with teachers, parents, and students. In one site, district officials reported to collect feedback from teachers and principals through questionnaires on retraining requirements. Through- out the sites, teachers provide feedback to the district about their satisfaction with the newly developed textbooks. Some teachers also reported gathering information through questionnaires about how par- ents could help the school and parental suggestions for school improvements. As one teacher from an urban upper secondary school put it: Parents and children fill out questionnaires and opinion polls. The class coordinator administers these questionnaires during class meetings, and these are absolutely confidential. There are issues that sometimes one could not realize unless administering a questionnaire, that the school faculty is not flawless as such. However, a more systematic approach should be adopted to ensure transparent, readily available information on the performance of front-line education facilities and to ensure the existence of incentives to act on results at all levels. Such information should be linked to the government's overall evaluation system for the education sector. Furthermore, the different levels of government may want to explore the positive role of civil society in helping to disseminate such information. Active youth groups, education-specialized NGOs, and community-based associations related to MSIF projects all represent possible resources that could be tapped. With regard to the public, a key challenge would be to ensure that information enables clients to judge the more technically complex dimensions of per- formance (Levy, 2004). As worldwide experience suggests, this availability of technical information is particularly important in education, in which not all performance factors may be attributed to teachers and/or schools (World Bank, 2003b: chapter 7). 58 e World Bank (2005b: 13­16) Education Policy Note discusses Moldova's performance on the TIMSS international mathematics and science assessments in 1999 and in 2003. I M P R O V I N G G O V E R N A N C E O F B A S I C E D U C AT I O N S E R V I C E S 47 Setting the stage for an informed debate among stakeholders seems particularly needed in the current Moldovan context. At the local level--and given a certain level of decentralization--the study found that parents do express complaints by going directly to mayoral and district offices. However, their demands are not necessarily forwarded upward in a systematic manner. At the national level, the Government has committed to engage in an ambitious reform program. Many observers admit that, in the past, Moldovan education debates have been highly politicized and dominated by the ethnic issues (Way, 2002). The debates often have pitted Russian speakers against Romanian speakers, to the detriment of airing concerns about educational outcomes and effectiveness. External Challenges for Effective Direct Modes of Citizens' Participation (client power) Moldova has decentralized aspects of school management to local governments, but the overall picture is complex (Chapter 2). Any attempt to build in and improve mechanisms of direct parental partici- pation should be preceded by a presentation of the broader institutional context for the delivery of education services. Responsibility for these services are distributed across key education institutions and government agencies. The Ministry of Education develops education policy, manages the preparation and approval of cur- ricula, prepares and approves all assessment and examination materials, and manages the produc- tion of textbooks. The district/rayon government is responsible for maintaining and operating lyceums, orphanages and public boarding schools for vulnerable children (such as children with disabilities), and techni- cal schools, as well as for providing the methodology of education. The mandate for financing and managing local educational facilities (kindergartens, elementary schools, gymnasiums, colleges, and Lyceums) falls on the shoulders of the district/rayon education department and the mayor.59 Local authorities are mandated to maintain and operate the physical structures of the preschools, elementary and secondary schools, music schools, and other educational institutions within their territory.60 Mandates overlap when elementary, secondary schools, and lyceums are in the same building. Moldovan schools have little autonomy because their accountability is linked to tight rules and proce- dures from the multiple levels of authority above, which allow for little discretion in terms of alloca- tion of financial and other resources (Table 4-1). These institutional elements and additional findings point to three main external challenges for more effective parental participation in the governance of schools: 59 Elementary schools include grades 1­4, usually within the Gymnasium. A Gymnasium o ers grades 5­9 of general education. College is the former technical/vocational school; it lasts for 4 years starting with the tenth grade. e rst 3 years mirror the lyceum program and also includes the classes (lessons) in the chosen specialization. e fourth year consists of specialization classes. At graduation, students receive a diploma of incomplete higher education. e lyceum covers grades 10­12 of general education. Schools that include lyceum-level grades need to meet higher quality standards (such as a larger proportion of highly quali ed sta ) and, as a result, are seen as leading to higher education. 60 Not all localities have educational facilities. e EGPRSP 2004­6 states that in 250 localities, educational facilities are entirely non-existent (corresponding to 16% of localities with a child population of approximately 10,000). In another 60 locali- ties there are only primary schools with 1700 pupils, while another 500 localities have only gymnasiums. (GOM, 2003: 82) 48 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? TABLE 41 Locus of Decisionmaking and Responsibility for Basic Education Services in Moldova Group Decisions Locus of decision and responsibility Funding Salary of teachers and principal National* Maintenance and operation of buildings, including heating Local or Regional depending on facility Organization Choose textbooks National (additional at school) Determine teaching methods School Set curriculum National Personnel Recruit/hire director (principal) Local Recruit/hire teachers School Set or augment teachers'pay National Determine training needs of staff Regional Funds for training costs (travel) Local or Regional Planning Set performance examinations National Implement school plan [The plan is elaborated according to the School (with district/rayon approval) curriculum from Ministry of Education] Resources Determine expenditures Regional Allocate personnel budget Regional Allocate nonpersonnel budget Regional Note: *The salaries of teachers and principal are funded by the government.The central government transfers the money to district, and district educational department transfers to local for being distributed to teachers. Regional = district/rayon, Source: Authors, based on key participant interviews. Low level of school autonomy should be revisited. In the current framework, school administrators have little discretion over budget allocations, human resources, or other aspects of school manage- ment (for example, teacher training). Schools do not have their own bank accounts; they receive itemized budgets from the district that dictate on what the funds need to be spent.61 Theoreti- cally, the school principal and the parents have a say in hiring or firing a candidate or a teacher. In practice, firings rarely occur because of the shortage of teachers, which affects rural areas and small towns most acutely. As discussed in Education Policy Note, this shortage limits schools' pos- sibilities to make rational decisions. In the context of this paper, a low level of school autonomy also condemns client power to remain weak, leaving few areas on which parents and communities can have an influence. This weak client power, in turn, generates few positive incentives and pos- sibilities for schools to address the potential demands and recommendations coming from parents' associations. The effectiveness of the communication system between central and local education decisionmakers must be improved or more room left for schools (and districts) to make decisions on pressing issues themselves. The majority of principals and district officials interviewed expressed frustration with the absence or the lack of timely responses to their requests and/or concerns from the ministry. Better communication and reporting between schools and elected local governments also should take place. The study suggested that formal mechanisms focus mainly on reporting between district levels and schools. However, mayors not only have direct accountability to citizens through their direct election, but they can also positively influence budget allocations to improve schools. 61 e negative e ects of the rigid per capita formula discussed in Chapter 2 also apply here and are analyzed in the Educa- tion Policy Note (World Bank, 2005b). I M P R O V I N G G O V E R N A N C E O F B A S I C E D U C AT I O N S E R V I C E S 49 It is in the context of inefficiently allocated and scarce resources that administrators have looked at the contribution of parents to their schools. Increasingly, schools have raised funds from parents (formal and informal fees, primarily on a nonvoluntary basis) to cover the budget gap and to acquire a measure of autonomy.62 According to the study, funds are used to supplement budgetary funds for the main- tenance of physical infrastructure and heating, expanding the curriculum with additional classes, acquiring pedagogical materials and equipment, improving access to staff training, and creating incentives for staff retention. Parent-teacher associations have always existed, but they really started booming in Moldova after the collapse of the Soviet system.63 Since the Government of Moldova is eager to improve the governance of education services, it is worth having a fresh look at parent-teacher associations' existing and potential contributions beyond the collection of fees. CONCLUSION Client power, voice, and compact triangle add up to weak downward accountability even though some essential ingredients for enhancing accountability exist, such as parental interest in schools, vehicles for parental participation, and school fees. In terms of compact, the lack of school financial autonomy limits a school's discretionary use of funds. The need for additional funding has led to the mostly informal and ad hoc collection of fees without adequate prioritization or planning for medium-term school improvement. Upward accountability mechanisms are weak in that they tend to be focused on gathering data for budgeting rather than resolving issues of access and quality of education. Teacher, student, and school evaluations tend to focus on identifying and rewarding good performers rather than providing incentives for front-line providers to create value added, that is, improvements in stu- dent achievement. Corruption in the education system and lack of transparency in teacher evaluation further weakens the legitimacy of these mechanisms. Parents in Moldova give money but have little control over how it is spent (or raised). At best, the parental groups are not representative of the parents in a school's catchment area, and at worst explic- itly exclude the poor. Parents are coerced to pay an array of fees over which they have little say in how they are either structured or managed. On the positive side, parental participation and payment of fees also illustrates the level of interest and commitment that parents already have for schools. This asset can to be built on for accountability-enhancing reforms. Policy implications and operational recom- mendations are discussed in the concluding Chapter 6. 62 Carasciuc (2001) found that extra payments--most of which were not voluntary--were "frequent" for supplementary lessons, reconstruction of school buildings, and inclusion of children in "special classes," and "sometimes" to express gratitude to or build good relations with teachers or directors, and for festivities held at the school. Almost 70 percent of respondents said that the refusal to make additional payments would "frequently," "in the majority of cases," or "always" have a negative e ect on a child's grade. 63 e study ndings suggested that not all schools are able to raise funds equally, revealing a gap between urban and rural sites; lyceums and other facilities; and schools that require fees as a precondition for enrollment and those that do not. As a result, urban lyceums, typically were found to acquire a higher level of de facto autonomy. 5 Strengthening Transparency and Client Power in Rural and Urban Water Services "The major problem today is to provide people with water." --Village mayor "If we are now connected to water, a thing that three years ago could not even have been imagined, we can say that the activity of our group changed the water services." --Town resident I n Moldova, access to safe drinking water is among the most prominent con- cerns of both government and citizens. This study confirmed that citizens consider water services as one of the most important services to them.64 Depending on communities, citizens perceived the improvement of water ser- vices as crucial for the local public health (addressing recurrent and debilitating dysentery and outbreaks of psoriasis and hepatitis), and for the development of small-scale economic activities, including backyard gardens. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Government of Moldova is committed to improving water ser- vices in the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP), and many donors, including the World Bank, and civil society partners are ready to assist it in this task. On the other hand, arrangements for water service delivery can be compli- cated and inconsistent. Drastically different situations exist in rural and urban areas, and these different contexts have different implications for improving relationships of accountability through mechanisms of transparency and civic participation. For networked urban water services, worldwide experience sug- gests that key elements for successful institutional arrangements include regu- lating providers, making them client responsive and ensuring that poor people 64 Water services were raised as an issue of concern by citizens­young and old, male and fe- male­in all of the sites included in the study, both rural and urban and those with and without running water. ese ndings were con rmed in the 2003 social assessment conducted by the Government of Moldova in the context of the World Bank project preparation in communities of 2,000­7,000 inhabitants. Sixty-seven percent of the 600 respondents surveyed cited lack of adequate water as a serious or very serious problem, and half of respondents identi ed water as the most seri- ous problem in their communities. 51 52 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? have access to affordable services. Policymakers also should make sure that citizens have a strong voice and an adequate level of technical information on their entitlements as users and payers. In rural non- networked services, community and self-provision may have to dominate. Nevertheless, they will still require national and local decisionmakers to effectively support clients in ensuring service quality and access while strengthening relationships of provider accountability (World Bank, 2003b: chapter 9). This Chapter inquires into entry points and challenges for strengthening mechanisms of account- ability within the water sector. The objective is to identify feasible strategic options to enhance the accountability of water services to citizens that could be used by the Moldovan Government and its key donor partners, including the World Bank water project teams. The research focused on issues related to household water use, drinking water in particular. The research did not address issues of irrigation or industrial water use. Given the significant differences between the rural and urban water contexts, this chapter will explore each individually. The findings of this chapter are based principally on detailed interviews on water services with over 35 citizens, as well as water service providers (water utility managers, technical specialists, and accountants); local government officials; water-focused NGOs; and donor agency representatives. CHALLENGES FOR BOTTOMUP APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTABILITY IN RURAL CONTEXTS This section explores the scope for bottom-up approaches to accountability in rural water services by clarifying specific context issues and analyzing study findings around entry points and constraints for mechanisms of voice and civic participation. Specific Institutional Context and Issues in Rural Areas For rural residents, who comprise approximately 54 percent of the total Moldovan population, water service delivery generally falls into 1 of 3 scenarios (World Bank, 2004d). The first and most common scenario is of villages that have no formal water service provision and set up informal self-help arrangements. Running water is not available, and the population relies upon wells and streams for their water supply. Local authorities (primaria) at the village level are responsible for the maintenance of the public village well and any centralized water supply in their community (World Bank, 2003d). However, financial and technical limitations make it difficult for local officials to address individual water consumption needs. Therefore, elected local governments typically focus on addressing the water needs of public buildings, such as schools, kindergartens, and churches. In these cases, individuals and the communities--with no external help--tend to organize communal wells or informal group connections to the centralized water infrastructure. Still limited in Moldova, the second scenario includes a community-driven approach to water ser- vices, which typically is set up with initial external technical and financial assistance. This approach has been piloted with the support of Denmark, Switzerland, the World Bank's MSIF project, and as planned by the village component of the World Bank Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Box 5-1). In these cases, water services are provided by a locally run water users' association, by the MSIF implementing agency, or over time by an NGO or municipal water company. These organiza- tions usually are formally independent entities, although tied closely to the local government and often S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 53 BOX 51 Legacy of Soviet Union'sWater Infrastructure on PipedWater Sanitation Provision Much of Moldova's current water infrastructure was built during Soviet was outdated long ago, and its current state of degradation magnifies the times. It was organized to provide water to citizens at nominal rates and inefficiencies of the system.Water conservation is not common among con- to support the large-scale agriculture and industry that once thrived in the sumers, who for decades paid minimal fees no matter how much water they country.With the collapse of most of these enterprises, Moldova's system is used. overly large for today's demand and requires huge amounts of costly energy to power its pumps and purification systems. Much of the water network Source: Authors housed within the mayoralty.65 All citizens who are customers of the water project can participate in these associations by attending decisionmaking meetings and by electing or ratifying the selection of a chairperson or an executive committee (usually including the mayor and local engineer). Ongoing, it is these committees that are the front-line providers of water services and handle payments, main- tenance of the water network, connections for new customers, and information meetings and notices for customers. In the third scenario, Moldovan rural citizens also may be clients of a municipal water utility. While municipal water utilities are based predominantly in cities and towns, they reach a small proportion of villages and rural communities in the country.66 The service delivery arrangements in such villages are the same as those in urban settings and will be covered within the analysis of urban water sector issues. In this context, and before turning to consider the range of mechanisms that promote account- ability, it is useful to understand the most common service-related issues identified by key village and government stakeholders in rural water services. Young and elderly villagers alike stressed the lack of access to water services. Nationally, less than one-fifth of rural inhabitants are connected to piped water services, a pattern that was borne out by all study respondents. Lack of access to piped water negatively affected people's health and well-being, economic opportunities, and household workloads. Lack of access to water was a particular hardship for the elderly and disabled who must transport water from wells and streams to their homes. Seasons can also affect the water supply in wells and streams, which can dry up in summer months when demand is greatest.67 Interviewees also frequently cited the poor quality of water in wells and streams. Rain, for instance, carries contaminants from garbage and waste products into wells. In the two rural study sites in which there was no piped water service, the quality of water in wells was also judged poor in terms of taste and color. The Ministry of Health's Sanitary and Epidemiological Agency is responsible for inspect- ing the overall quality of drinking water. However, the study got strong indications that virtually no inspections take place.68 65 ese arrangements represent positive and fruitful partnerships between civil society and the local governments around water service delivery­an arrangement that one observer called "co-production" and saw as an e ective arrangement in numer- ous sectors (Krishna 2004). 66 While data on the precise number of villages served by the 51 Apa Canals in Moldova is not available, these villages tend to be on the outskirts of urban centers and/or are along the water pipeline route between the urban center and its water source. 67 Droughts, common in Moldova, are estimated to occur as frequently as every third year (World Bank 2003c). 68 Moreover, since many surface wells are located on private property, when inspections do take place, many remedial ac- tions cannot be enforced. Based on interviews with key participants. 54 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Finally, water extraction was perceived to be labor intensive and difficult. Most relevant interview- ees recounted their difficulties in digging wells. As one resident put it, "People have dug well 20-meters down and not reached water." Representatives of local governments perceived specific challenges associated with their mandate to provide access to quality local water supplies for their citizens. The majority of local government officials interviewed felt that their limited budgets did not enable them to fulfill this mandate. In addition, they felt they lacked and could not afford the necessary technical expertise on how to oper- ate, plan, or construct a viable water supply system that would enable them to lead water-connection projects without external assistance. Accountability Relationships in Rural Water Service Delivery The study found entry points and challenges for three main routes of accountability: (a) Voice­the influence of citizens on politicians/elected officials; (b) Client power­the more direct influence of consumers on front-line service providers; and (c) Compact­the oversight of service provision by gov- ernment. As discussed in Chapter 1, the study focus is more on client participation rather than issues of "compact." However, as illustrated in the education case study, interviews with citizens, local govern- ment officials and service providers, and management raised important structural and institutional challenges, which show the difficulty of exploring mechanisms for transparency and civic participa- tion in isolation. Villagers' voice or indirect modes of participation: Entry points and limitations To a certain extent, the study found that entry points exist for citizens to advocate for their needs and potentially indirectly influence decisions on water, especially since village residents are already engaged and interact with elected officials. In rural settings, in which formal water service providers are often lacking, voice appears to be the main route of accountability available to Moldovan citizens. The most common means through which citizens have achieved voice to weigh in on water issues is through direct appeal to local government officials. In the same way that formal and informal inter- action with the mayor and mayoralty staff was used by citizens to promote the accountability of local government (Chapter 2), it is also used by citizens to promote accountability regarding water service delivery. Village residents rely on local government officials as points of contact for water issues. When asked who should be responsible for providing good local water service, "the mayor's office" was the most frequent answer given by rural interviewees. When asked about the individuals or groups to whom they would turn in trying to solve a problem related to water services, numerous respondents also cited local government officials, including the mayor or municipal engineer.69 Figure 5-1 illustrates the range of people to whom rural respondents would go if they had a problem with water services. A second common means through which rural citizens in Moldova develop voice regarding water issues is through group meetings. These meetings are most often open village meetings (such as meet- ings that took place as part of the MSIF project) as well as those most often initiated by local officials. 69 Interestingly, respondents who spoke about water-related problems o en had a similar list of individuals to whom they would go for help as the respondents who spoke about gas-related issues. S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 55 FIGURE 51 To whom would you go for help in solving a water problem? Sponsor e.g.,WB Neighbors 44-year old male, Study Site E12 Family Mayor Source: Qualitative, participatory research, January 2005. Note: In this exercise, respondents were asked to identify the groups or people to whom they would go if they had a problem with a specific service.They were asked to select circles based on their perception of the person's ability to help them to solve theproblem: larger circles for people who had more power or ability to help them solve their problem, smaller circles for people who had less power or ability. They then were asked to locate the circles relative to themselves, indicating the people to whom theywould go to earlier or who would be easiest to access, versus those to whom they would turn later. As illustrated in Figure 2, the 44-year old maleintervieweeexplainedthat,tosolveaproblemwithwater,hewouldfirstcontactthemayorwhohastheauthorityinthevillageandthereforethemostcapable ofsolvingtheproblem.Theintervieweealsowouldincludehisfamilyinthedecision. Hisneighborsmayhelphimbydiscussingtheproblemtogether.Onefinalplace he would turn is an external sponsor or agency. These meetings offer space for citizens to participate in a dialogue on water issues among themselves and with local government officials and provide a forum in which people can gain valuable informa- tion about water services, thus increasing the transparency of water service delivery. However, study findings also point to limitations in citizens' mechanisms for voice and influence to affect water services. Evidence suggests that their effectiveness has been mixed. First, interaction with government officials and group action regarding water services were found to be generally con- strained by many of the same factors that constrain participation and voice regarding other issues and services in Moldova (Chapter 2): lack of free time with which to organize, lack of trust in local leaders, migrating populations, and the absence of local leaders or NGOs to stimulate civic engagement. The study also identified a range of constraints specific to participation in the water sector. Among these is citizens' perception of water as a natural resource from which everyone benefited in the past and for which everyone should still be able to receive for free. Finally, most of these reported forms of citizens' participation appeared to be informal and ad hoc. Coming together around a particular task or issue, such as building a well, can be an effective way to exert voice as groups. However, it can also be a short-term phenomenon as groups dissolve or move on to other concerns once the issue at hand is dealt with. The study did not find strong evidence that existing NGOs can offer ongoing avenues for rural citizens to organize around water issues either, as most NGOs are based in urban centers and focused on environmental issues and river cleaning proj- 56 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 52 Good Practice from the Swiss Agency for Development and CooperationWater and Sanitation Program The SDC water and sanitation program, begun in 2001, was designed to sup- ages the system, including billing and maintenance. port improved drinking water systems in rural communities in 7 districts in Western Moldova. The chosen districts were located near the SDC regional Interviews with local government officials and members of the Water Con- office in Nisporeni, which allowed for regular visits and support.The program sumers'AssociationinZberoaiahighlightedtheongoingeffectsoftheproject. has improved access to potable water for some 16,000 people, and public The project demonstrates to the village that many local improvements can awareness campaigns on water quality have reached more than 25,000. be accomplished by the local government and population working closely Adopting mechanisms to promote information sharing and community par- together.The community has since continued the"spirit"of the water project ticipation in service delivery, the program has both improved the quality and in initiatives around dam repair and establishing a community center and efficiency of water service delivery and had a positive effect on the transpar- Internet center. The project illustrates to local government the importance ency of local decisionmaking. of sharing information with community members. The mayor's office now publishes a local newsletter, has installed a bulletin board at the mayoralty, In Zberoaia, for example, the project to build a water pumping station and and holds regular community meetings. And finally, the project promotes local pipe network involved 3 groups: the mayoralty, the general public, better maintenance and care of the water system infrastructure. The execu- and service providers. The mayoralty convened a municipal water com- tivecommitteepostsnotices,visitclients,writesarticlesforthenewsletterto mission that met weekly to provide support to the project. The general encourage consumers to take care of their pipes (including protecting them population participated in public hearings every 2­3 months and con- inwinter),andsendspersonalizedbillstoallconsumersencouragingontime tributed finances and labor. The service provider, the Water Consumers' payment. Association, is an independent NGO that includes all households that were connected to the water supply and has an elected committee that man- Source: SDC, 2003; 2004. ects.70 In this context, there is overall little consistent pressure applied on local government officials to advocate for village citizens' access to water. Examples of more direct forms of engagement: Client power The second scenario of a community-driven approach typically provides a strong entry point for vil- lages to have direct influence on service providers. Through initial external assistance, villages have created participatory water management schemes for a central village water supply through which citi- zens are able to exert their power. These schemes include water users' associations and enterprises. The program of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) provides a good illustration that bottom-up initiatives for more accountable service delivery are feasible and effective (Box 5-2). Similarly, study findings emphasize the following traits: While the total number of these associations is still small, they have promoted improved water qual- ity and helped providers to increase payment compliance by customers. The transparency of local charge systems, including the use of water meters, has helped to positively change citizens' attitudes about paying for improved water services. Given a choice, consumers have a strong preference for water meters, which enable them to monitor their individual household water use.71 70 Although in many MSIF1 villages with water projects, NGOs have developed out of MSIF implementing agencies and have continued to address issues of water service provision. 71 Catrinescu and Deane, 2004; and personal communication with World Bank Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation project team member. S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 57 Client power is also promoted through formal and informal mechanisms including meetings with association staff and participation in general meetings of the water association at which operating decisions are taken and ratified. These mechanisms have had a strong impact on the ongoing dialogue between consumers and service providers. Nevertheless, entry points and opportunities to strengthen direct and indirect modes of partici- pation to improve rural water services hardly can be seen in isolation from the broader institutional context of compact. The reality remains that, because of the absence of formalized water services, a compact between government and water service providers (such as a contract between a mayoralty and local technical expert for ongoing maintenance and repair of a community's water network) is lacking in most rural settings in Moldova. In a small number of rural communities, community development projects have resulted in the provision of water services. In these places, compact is present in an infor- mal sense--with mayoralty staff such as mayors, vice-mayors, accountants, or engineers present on the executive committee of water users' associations or municipal water enterprises. It is only in this way that interviewed local government officials felt that they could play a significant role in overseeing water service provision and in advocating for the needs of their constituencies around water. ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WATER SERVICE DELIVERY IN URBAN SETTINGS This section explores the scope for introducing more transparency and civic participation in urban water services by clarifying specific context issues and analyzing findings around the different routes of accountability. Given the types of challenges raised by the current system of Apa Canal utilities, more emphasis will be given to compact aspects in this section. Institutional Context and Key Issues for Service Delivery In urban centers, the local municipal water utility, known as Apa Canal, provides piped water services. Apa Canal utilities operate as independent organizations in each municipality, with their own staffing structures, financial frameworks, management agreements, levels of autonomy, and relations with the local government. The water pipeline infrastructure in Moldova is predominantly located in urban sites and, as such, only a small number of rural locations are served by an Apa Canal utility. While water services once were part of larger regional utilities, Moldova's 51 Apa Canal utilities all were transferred to the sole control of municipalities in 2000 (World Bank, 2003e). In addition to municipal oversight of their operations, Apa Canal utilities are also supposedly subject to the quality controls of the federal Sanitary and Epidemiological Agency of the Ministry of Health for drinking water and the Ministry of Environment for sewage services. Urban institutional water arrangements involve a wider range of stakeholders than in rural settings, namely, citizens, Apa Canal staff and management, and local government officials. As was done in the rural settings to place demand and supply of accountability in a broader context, the study explored urban stakeholders' perceptions of key issues for urban water. Experiences as perceived by urban con- sumers point to two common problems that occur in poor functioning systems. The first is the high cost of water. Interviewed consumers regularly found both the cost of connecting to the piped water supply and the ongoing cost of purchasing water to be prohibitive. Arrears in payment are widespread, and the majority felt that they would be unable to pay their water bills if water tariffs were to rise. The second problem is the limited availability of water. Commonly, water is available for several hours 58 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? during the morning and evening, with decreased hours of availability (as low as two hours daily) in locations in which it was more difficult or costly to pump water. From their perspective as service providers of networked water services, focus group participants and individual interviewees from Apa Canal stressed the following key challenges: Lack of adequate financing. Apa Canal utilities are dependent on revenue from tariffs to cover oper- ating budgets. When customers' payments are in arrears, the utilities cannot recoup their expenses. This problem was magnified by the rising costs of operating the water infrastructure, particularly the rising cost of electricity and gas. For instance, one Apa Canal manager explained that 65 percent of what consumers pay for a cubic meter of water goes to pay electricity costs [Study site B21]. Several of the Apa Canal utilities studied as part of this research were in debt. Lack of autonomy. While Apa Canal utilities are independent municipal enterprises reliant on their own products and services to generate their income, they are unable to set their own tariffs. Any changes that an Apa Canal utility desires to make to its tariffs must be ratified by the local munici- pal council. As local councils have tended to vote against any tariff increases in recent times, many existing tariffs do not cover Apa Canal expenditures, and the utility is unable to break even. Aging and inappropriate water infrastructure in need of rehabilitation and modernization: The exist- ing water network is inadequate on multiple fronts. It is overly large for demand in certain areas, requiring large amounts of power to work effectively while failing to reach other areas. Losses from leaking pipes average 30 percent but can reach up to 70 percent (GOM, 2004). Finally, representatives from elected local governments focused their concerns for lack of funding. While the operating budget for Apa Canal utilities comes from their revenues, funds for replacement and repair of water infrastructure located on public property, such as water pipes, should come from local governments via district budgets. However, after district expenditures on infrastructure, such as roads, little money for capital is transferred to the local level. Accountability Relationships in Urban Water Service Delivery The study found the three main routes of accountability--voice, client power, and compact--all to be present and used to varying degrees by stakeholders in the urban water sector in Moldova. Mechanisms that improve the voice of citizens to advocate for their needs The study found that entry points exist for citizens to get access to information on urban water services and to exercise their voice. As in the rural water sector, citizens in urban centers also exercise their voice through direct interaction with government officials through office hours and visits or calls to the mayoralty. Urban residents also use group meetings to influence government decisionmakers, inviting officials to street, block, apartment, or neighborhood meetings or attending local council meetings. A striking difference with the rural findings is a strong potential for information strategies as ways to promote greater transparency. In all three urban sites included in the study, newspapers carried information on water services, including financial details of proposed tariff changes, water supply schedules and supply stoppages, and technical information on works and system disinfection. Urban S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 59 respondents overwhelmingly pointed to the media, including both television and print, as the most common source of information on water issues. Citizens also used letters to the newspapers to draw attention to the problems that they face and to make known their needs and opinions on water issues. Respondents also cited the annual information bulletin and information displays at Apa Canal offices as key means to access information. The bulleting provides details of the water supply schedule, recent water quality readings, and networks to which different neighborhoods belong. From the results of the study, a final mechanism through which urban citizens have gained voice on water issues is through organized protest. While this phenomenon was limited to a single example from the study sites, it was a striking example of the power of citizen voice. In October 2003, new water tariffs were set by Apa Canal in Orhei and approved by the local council. In response, an ad hoc group of consumers, mainly pensioners, organized themselves in protest and threatened the Orhei city council that they would start blocking streets if the tariffs were not rolled back. In response to the consumer outcry, in February 2004 the city council compelled Apa Canal to lower water tariffs to their original levels. How effective have these mechanisms been in giving voice to citizens to influence water issues? The Orhei protest obviously succeeded in communicating the desires of citizens to their local officials. However, this occurrence was fairly unusual. Given the many other time pressures they face and the challenges of building trust in larger urban environments, in which the turnover of residents is high, urban consumers--just as do rural consumers--find it difficult to organize. Large-scale collective action around water service issues tends to be constrained by the wide dis- parities present in the water sector and the lack of common and equal incentives to organize. Since responsibility for water services has been devolved to the local level, different localities have different standards of service, which makes effective national advocacy around water services unlikely. For example, the price of water in the capital city, Chisinau, is approximately 3 lei per cubic meter, less than half the price in some nearby towns. Even within individual districts, access to water is not consistent. The city of Cahul is supplied by water from different pumping stations. As a result, part of the city receives water 13 hours a day, while 3 other areas receive only 8 hours of water service daily. Similarly, in Soroca, residents of the hillier quarters have a reduced schedule of water services compared to their neighbors on flat ground. These disparities suggest that external actors can play an important role in facilitating civic engagement and helping citizens to discover shared incentives for action. Even within smaller neighborhoods or apartment blocks, customers have differing incentives to organize.72 It is costlier for households farther from the main water pipes to get connected, so when a neighborhood is organizing a water connection, these households may be omitted or unable to afford to join. Similarly, within apartment buildings, residents on different floors face particular challenges that their neighbors will have no incentive to address. Higher floors have water less often because of the lack of sufficient pressure to push water upwards, while lower floors suffer no such problem. On the other hand, although broken or leaking water pipes flood lower floors, apartments on higher floors are unaffected. As one apartment resident observed, "Of course, the ones to suffer will participate, not the others. [...] Only the ones that are affected by the issue under discussion participate, if the difficul- 72 A World Bank (2003f) study, discusses many of the challenges of organizing homeowners' associations in apartment buildings, including problems of resident indi erence to problems which only a ect other residents and the di culty of col- lecting nominal membership fees. 60 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? ties refer to them" [Study site A12]. These findings suggest the need to develop local urban and rural consumer associations for water service delivery, which could target assistance to vulnerable groups. In addition, with support from NGOs and donors, these associations could be linked into a central national secretariat or hub to advocate for consumers around water issues. These two mechanisms would remedy the conspicuous vacuum that exists in Moldova in terms of formal representation of the interests of water consumers. Finally, evidence suggests that the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to promote voice around water services would be enhanced by the presence of regular mechanisms for citizens to exert pres- sure on elected local governments. Overall, interviewees perceived that water services receive much attention from politicians before elections. As one citizen put it, "Before the elections they make prom- ises. If anything happens, they are fast to come. Some pipes cracked in the neighborhood, and they came promptly to repair them. If it were not for the elections, they could have waited for a long time" [Study site A15]. Other interviewees lamented that little improvement in water services is realized after the elections take place. The lack of ongoing pressures on local governments outside of election periods, coupled with the lack of government authority, expertise, and financial resources with which to influence service providers, makes the intermediate route of accountability for water services one that is yet to be fully realized. Client power: Urban consumers' interactions with the Apa Canal service providers As in other sectoral services, client power in urban water services could include two options: (a) choice by opting out to private systems, or (b) direct engagement with service providers. As for the first option--which is not the focus of this chapter--findings did point out that urban citizens tend to exert their power by leaving or bypassing Apa Canal. There is a formal private sector however since Apa Canal holds a natural monopoly on the urban water infrastructure. Still, what the study reported were forms of self-help strategies whereby citizens entirely bypassed official piped water services. In many urban locations, for instance, citizens pay for bottled drinking water or for water to be trucked in to their homes. In some suburban areas, individuals or groups of neighbors construct wells or water tanks to provide for their water needs. Several interviewees in urban study sites recounted such expe- riences, which took place when groups deemed it too costly for groups to pay for the pipes needed to connect to the central water supply or Apa Canal was reluctant to extend its services to a particular neighborhood. The second option of direct engagement with service providers, however, provided a more effec- tive means for consumers to hold Apa Canal directly accountable. The study found that Apa Canal offices already started to develop mechanisms for clients' feedback, which could make the offices more responsive to the feedback. The most common mechanisms of client involve direct interaction on an individual basis with Apa Canal staff. This interaction can take several forms: (a) in writing, in the form of suggestions and complaints submitted to the local Apa Canal; (b) in person with Apa Canal staff who make local visits to check meters or to visit customers with payment arrears, with staff at head offices or sales offices, or during irregular open meetings; and (c) by telephone to the Apa Canal office, satellite sales/billing offices, or to the dedicated customer feedback line that exists at some Apa Canal utilities. In Orhei, for example, a 24-hour line is available for consumers to call to report prob- lems or request assistance. S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 61 Systems to respond to these forms of citizen feedback include registers in which all suggestions, proposals, or complaints are recorded by the receiving staff member--whether secretary, dispatcher, or controller--before being relayed to the relevant staff member. In addition to accepting client feed- back, information distributed from Apa Canal to customers and prospective customers also has the potential to promote client power. Through notice boards, mailings, and television appearances, infor- mation is made public. The information includes water quality, planned water works, tariffs, and water infrastructure in different neighborhoods, as well as contact details and office hours for technical and service staff, and to whom customers should address concerns about different water issues. Not only did the majority of interviewed clients tend to be aware of these mechanisms for client information and feedback but also some started to feel empowered to exercise their influence on Apa Canals. As one citizen explained, people no longer sit idly by, cursing the employees of Apa Canal. "If you do not apply personally with a demand or a complaint, you do not have a chance that someone would help you." Instead, customers have become more knowledgeable about what they want and are able to file claims and make demands. "At present, the people use these very forms, the demands and complaints," and "now problems are solved more easily than before" [Study site A13]. Individual mechanisms of exerting client power are widespread. The potential for consumers to exert collective directed pressure on Apa Canal seems to be present, but examples are still limited. These collective initiatives generally take place "pre-service" and consist of streets or apartment blocks working together to convince Apa Canal to branch the central water pipeline to their area. Since Apa Canal itself is unable to afford to make such connections for all residents, in order to get Apa Canal to agree, groups raise money to buy the necessary water fixtures and volunteer to do the labor themselves. Upon connection, Apa Canal may contract directly with these groups for water provision, with indi- vidual consumers paying their bills to their group leader rather than to Apa Canal. This arrangement also exists between Apa Canal and certain homeowners' associations, many of which exist in multiple apartment buildings in Moldova.73 Despite these entry points for client power, the study findings pointed to three main series of challenges: First, strategies for collecting and reacting to client feedback still show areas for improvement. Through newspapers and television, information on Apa Canal service schedules and planned works or cleanings does reach consumers.74 However, other types of information on water services and asso- ciated entitlements do not always reach all citizens, which constrains the ability of many of them to demand a level or type of service that is theirs by right. For example, while pensioners are eligible for discounts when connecting into the main central water system, many citizens were unaware of this provision. As described by a 67-year old, "We did not know about these discounts. When the water works for our connection were under implementation, we all paid for it" [Study site A19]. Similarly, the Orhei pensioners who protested the city's water tariff increases in 2003 (Section C.2.1) likely were unaware that when the tariffs were raised, special provisions had been put in place for vulnerable consumers (including pensioners and the poor) based on lists provided by the city's social assistance 73 "Strengthening Community Organization in the Housing Sector, Assessment of Private Homeowners Associations" (World Bank, 2003f) details the role these associations in organizing and contracting for heating, water, electricity, garbage, and maintenance services in Moldova. 74 Information on a recent citywide water disconnection for annual pipe cleaning in one town study site was distributed for a full week prior to the event; and on the day of the cut only two customers (of an estimated 12,500 households and 450 businesses) called in to the service center unaware of the planned disconnection [Study site B18]. 62 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? bureau. Open meetings called by Apa Canal to inform citizens about water service issues are not sys- tematic ways in which clients can influence water providers either. One Apa Canal director explained that these meetings "are not regular" and usually held "before elections." Second, many of these initiatives for collecting and responding to client feedback should be more systematically encouraged at the top levels of government. The study suggested variations among Apa Canal managers' attitudes to client responsiveness. Such variations can be explained by the auton- omy of each Apa Canal authority. However, to ensure consistent treatment of all utility consumers, transparency and customer service should be part of the training and incentives of every Apa Canal utility. The third and final series of challenges point to broader structural challenges linked to the response capacity of Apa Canal utilities. No amount of client power can achieve what a service provider is unable to provide. Lack of motivation, capacity, and funding were found to limit the response of Apa Canal to its own institutionalized mechanisms and processes for client feedback. Study focus group discussed these factors. Today's Apa Canal employees feel that they have few of the same incentives to perform that were present in "the old system," in which they enjoyed regular "trainings, study tours, systems of promo- tion, and competitive and steady salaries." Salary arrears were reported to be common, and managers interviewed spoke of having few training opportunities or financial incentives available to reward or encourage good performance among their employees. The low salaries result in rapid turnover among staff, and many specialists and employees with higher education are leaving to find other jobs. One Apa Canal manager lost 4 specialists (of his 37 employees with higher education in water and sanita- tion) during the month in which he was interviewed. The staff commonly found their work environment to be demoralizing: working with consumers who do not pay their bills, who attempt to steal water or intentionally sabotage water meters, and who do not report burst or leaking pipes. Staff expressed frustrations about seeing pensioners and poor people struggling to pay their water bills, while "wealthy consumers,75 commercial enterprises, and even government offices ignore their bills." In addition, every day, many front-line staff face angry customers who have unrealistic expectations of what staff people can do given their capacity and budget limitations. Finally, financial difficulties exacerbate capacity shortfalls. Many Apa Canal utilities struggle to stretch their revenues to cover their operating costs, and many others are in debt. In one urban site, for instance, 15 percent of consumers were found to have outstanding debts owed to Apa Canal. Thus, for citizens interested in being hooked up to the central water service, demanding a connection from Apa Canal is not a realistic option for achieving such a connection. An Apa Canal director explained, "New areas are asking for [us to] connect their households to water. We do not have the possibility to do it. We have no money" [Study site B21]. In such financial straits, no matter how strong the influence of clients, Apa Canal can do little to repair all of its service and quality shortcomings. To be connected, citizens must make and maintain the connection themselves. As one client explained, "In the past, everything was done by those from Apa Canal. It was not our business. Now they only install the com- mon meter and come only to take the metering data" [Study site A19]. 75 ese trends parallel those in the energy sector. A recent study in Moldova found that wealthy consumers were the most likely to steal electricity (Junge and others, 2004). S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S PA R E N C Y A N D C L I E N T P O W E R 63 Therefore, while numerous mechanisms by which clients can influence front-line water service providers do exist, the effectiveness of these client power mechanisms in promoting accountability remains limited by the nature of water service delivery and the difficulties faced by the monopoly water service provider, Apa Canal. Given these realities which constrain the effectiveness of client power, this chapter provides a further discussion of compact issues related to improving the account- ability of water services. Mechanisms that strengthen the compact between government officials and service providers The study points to several formal avenues by which local governments can oversee their local Apa Canal utility in Moldova. Apa Canal is responsible for sending monthly reports to the mayoralty on income and expenditures, the volume of water supplied, the volume of residual water captured, and any leakage problems; as well as data on the number of works executed, calls received, and hours worked. Regulatory arrangements also require Apa Canal tariffs to be ratified by the relevant local council. This arrangement enables local councils to directly influence the price that consumers pay for water services in their localities and requires Apa Canal to convince the local council of the need for price increases before they take place. In one study site, the mayor's office had decided on the local water supply schedule with which Apa Canal was to comply [Study site A8]. In other localities, the for- mal oversight of Apa Canal by local governments also includes the appointment of the director of Apa Canal by the local council and the presence of local councilors on the Apa Canal Board of Directors, alongside Apa Canal management. However, evidence suggests that a major constraint on the compact between local governments and water service providers is the ambiguity of regulatory arrangements governing relationships and the division of responsibilities between the two groups with different management agreements in dif- ferent municipalities. Apa Canal staff and officials interviewed saw local governments as being both over-involved and under-involved in water service delivery. Not only are officials able to take binding decisions that unfavorably affect the ability of Apa Canal utilities to operate, but interviewees also noted that officials do not always provide the support and assistance they are tasked with in their mandates. While Apa Canal tariffs must be approved by local officials, approval can trigger a chain of events that makes an Apa Canal utility less, rather than more, accountable to citizens in the long run. Con- sider the following scenario: the management of an Apa Canal utility asks its local government to ratify a tariff increase that is required to meet rising operating costs (due to rising electricity costs, client debts). Due to consumer pressures, local councils decide not to ratify the new tariffs in a bid to protect the interests of consumers and their own political stations. Yet, a perverse incentive can exist in such cases. The Apa Canal utility is unable to recover its costs via tariffs, which makes it more dif- ficult for it to improve or maintain access and quality of water services. In such situations, many of which were recounted during the study, the power of governments over Apa Canal and the compact between the two entities had what seemed like a positive impact on accountability as consumers were able to have their voices heard. However, this impact was a distortion of the long-term impact. Over time, inadequate funds hurt service provision, and Apa Canal became less responsive to the needs of clients, ultimately hurting their interests. The vast majority of Apa Canal staff and managers inter- viewed expressed frustration about the poor understanding of this cycle by local governments and 64 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? consumers. Many suggested the need for local officials to be trained to better understand their dual responsibilities to keep tariffs low for consumers and to ensure tariff levels that enable water service providers to sustain, and invest in, water services. Water service providers also are frustrated by the inability of local governments to fulfill their obligations concerning water service delivery. Included within the mandate of local governments are the replacement, reconstruction, and repair of water infrastructure on public property. Several Apa Canal directors complained that water issues were omitted from the official plans of their local govern- ments, whose budgets similarly failed to include any funds to maintain the water infrastructure. In the words of one, "We addressed [a request] to the mayor's office to discuss our issue about the renovation of the water and drainage system. But the issue was not positively solved. No money was included in the budget for this, and they could not help." These examples illustrate that while formalized compact frameworks do exist between local governments and water service providers in Moldova, these frame- works would benefit from modifications to better align the accountability of water service providers with the long-term needs of the people. These findings suggest several strategies and entry points that should be supported to promote greater accountability around water service delivery in Moldova to improve the performance of water services. These strategies are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, page 105. 6 What Can Moldovan Decisionmakers Do? Policy and Operational Options T This concluding and hese 3 objectives are mainstreamed in general strategic recommenda- forward-looking chapter tions and in specific policy and operational options in the context of 3 has 3 main objectives. World-Bank-supported projects: MSIF2; rural education, under prepa- Objective one highlights the ration; and a pilot water project. A matrix consisting of three tables in Appendix critical conclusions in the context of its A outlines the recommendations for improving the accountability of local gov- initial questions and points to overall ernment (Table A-1), accountability of educations services (Table A-2), and the strategic implications for the Moldovan accountability of water services (Table A-3).76 government's poverty reduction and governance agenda. Second, the chap- OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ter draws on the main findings of the case study chapters to identify specific Overall, study findings point to three policy-relevant conclusions: policy/operational options in the cross- 1. Strengthen and/or introduce mechanisms for civic participation in local gov- sectoral areas of local governance and ernment decisionmaking and sectoral service delivery, as part of an overall local strategies for improved service strategy to improve the governance of public services. delivery and in sectoral services for 2. Recognize internal and external challenges, including the need to provide a basic education and drinkable water in more supportive external enabling environment. rural and urban areas.76Third, it draws 3. Ensure an internal enabling environment for vehicles of citizen participa- out lessons for potential assistance tion around local governance and service delivery, with a particular focus on from the World Bank. inclusiveness and internal governance. (1)TheGovernmentofMoldovabenefitsfromstrongopportunitiestostrengthen and/or introduce mechanisms for civic participation in local government decisionmaking and sectoral service delivery, as part of an overall strategy to improve the governance of public services.77 There is strong promise for using 76 e matrix summarizing options and recommendations in relations to the EGPRSP frame- work and the recent EU integration plan is provided in Appendix A. 77 As clari ed in Chapter 1, civic participation refers to mechanisms for (a) indirect modes of citi- zens' participation, whereby service users exercise their in uence through making their voice heard as citizens, that is, through strengthened relationships of accountability between themselves and elected o cials who are mandated with service delivery responsibilities; and (b) more direct modes of partici- pation, whereby service users engage more directly with service providers' organizations (an APA Ca- nal o ce, a school) and frontline professionals, that is, what the WDR2004 refers to as client power. 65 66 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 61 What are Citizen Report Cards? Citizenreportcardsprovideevaluationandratingsofthequalityofpublicser- could help the Government meet its goals for improving public service vice delivery from citizens'perspectives.Their opinions on service awareness, delivery (as elaborated in its EGPRSP). From international experience, key access,satisfaction,andconstraintsarecompiledanddisseminatedtoservice factors that could contribute to the success of a citizen report card process providers, policymakers, and the general public to improve service quality. in Moldova are: The research in Canada, India, the Philippines, and United Kingdom--in ser- 1. Widespread publicity and information about the process through the vice sectors, including health, education, telecommunications, water, hous- media and local community meetings. ing--reveals that citizen report cards can spot where services are failing to 2. Opportunities for citizens to make concrete suggestions and recommen- meet citizens' needs and help government and service managers to target dations about services. greater resources to meet specific needs of the people, including the poor. 3. Creation of a multistakeholder steering committee that would identify There are several models for carrying out citizen report card processes, with issues to be covered, approve the methodology for carrying out the pro- civil society organizations, government departments or agencies, or even cess, and identify ways to address report card findings. parliaments taking the lead. 4. Public commitment by government to use the report card results to improve service delivery. By channeling valuable feedback on services in Moldova from citizens directly to government and service providers, a citizen report card process Sources: AsDB, 2001; IFES, 2005: Paul, 1998; Songco, 2001;World Bank, 2001a, 2004c. bottom-up approaches to strengthen relationships of accountability among citizens and the service providers and elected local government officials mandated with specific service delivery responsibili- ties. From a sectoral standpoint, the case studies suggest that entry points exist particularly in the areas of basic social and economic infrastructure, primary and secondary education, and drinking water services. From a cross-sectoral perspective, there are also strong opportunities for building more transparent and participatory elected local governments, which have been delegated various service responsibilities. Given the concentration of poverty in rural areas and small towns, Moldovan decisionmakers should not miss the opportunity to bring to scale successful community-driven expe- riences, such as the MSIF, by bringing in local and regional governments. Clients' interest and engagement are two major ingredients for strengthening accountability in service delivery. While this study focused on the education and water sectors, interview feedback sug- gested strong citizen interest in other services as well. The most commonly cited were roads, followed by community cultural and youth services, gas/heating, and garbage/waste management. Given acute unmet needs, most Moldovan citizens have strong incentives to participate when they perceive an opening to improve these services. They exercise their client power by engaging in associations for par- ents, rural water users, or MSIF beneficiaries. Given this interest, most citizens seem ready to provide their feedback to government officials on needs and service performance should they be given a forum in which to do so, for instance, through a Citizen Report Card mechanism (see Box 6-1). Incentives and potentials exist for a range of community-based organizations, NGOs, and other civil society organizations to mobilize and enhance the voice of citizens (Chapter 2, page 91) around both local governance and service delivery, and/or assist in strengthening participatory capacities of local governments. While attention must be paid to sustainability issues, these organizations can, for instance, help to introduce report card mechanisms. Some public agents in service provision organiza- tions, such as some Apa Canal managers, have developed on their own creative ways to inform clients and obtain their feedback. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 67 Local government officials are directly elected, which potentially makes them strongly accountable to citizens; and important areas of responsibility in education and utilities (water, electricity, solid waste) have been delegated to them by the Law on Local Public Administration. These local officials are perceived as accessible by citizens and, when provided with resource incentives, many start open consultations with citizens around priority areas (Chapters 2 and 3). (2) For these opportunities to be seized, and for these mechanisms to be inclusive--or pro-poor, feasible, and effective--Moldovan decisionmakers and their donor/civil society partners must face up to internal and external challenges, including the need to provide a more supportive external enabling environment. Bottom-up approaches to accountability are meaningful and effective if they enhance the voice of users, not only the demand-side of service delivery but also the receptivity to this voice. Client power and voice cannot be seen in isolation from relationships between service providers and policymakers, what the WDR2004 refers to as compact. No amount of client power can achieve what a service provider is unable to provide. As detailed in the next several sections, the study high- lights certain items that should be on the agenda of the Government: Advance the unfinished agenda of the public administration and civil service reform. As recom- mended by the World Bank (2005a) economic memorandum, the Government should find ways to accelerate the implementation of the key EGPRSP measures, the anticorruption plan, and other public sector governance reforms. Public voice and participation are important ingredients for successful service delivery by creating pressure for accountability and performance. How- ever, voice and participation can succeed only if top-down efforts to build an accountable and professional administration are in place. The recommended policy actions below offer a series of selected entry points to governance reforms that would yield early benefits in improving provi- sion of services. Provide elected local governments with the necessary skills and financial resources to fulfill their mandates. Priority should be given to address the gaps in the current intergovernmental finance law. The study identified various gaps in the local­center compact relationships among elected local governments, and central and deconcentrated levels of the state administration. Address financing constraints faced by service providers. Schools and Apa Canal utilities clearly identified this need. Allow service providers flexibility within a framework of accountability for results. The low level of school autonomy in management and planning limits the areas in which service providers can make decisions. Interviewees from Apa Canal utilities expressed similar frustrations with lack of autonomy. Strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems with a strong focus on results--as opposed to inputs--and the capability to assess how well frontline providers are performing. The education case study strongly reinforced this need (Chapter 4, page 55). Provide clear regulatory arrangements for the governance of the service activity. For example, in the area of urban water, address the ambiguity of regulatory arrangements (Chapter 5, page 79). The Government agenda should also provide for an overall supportive environment for effective and broad-based strategies for information dissemination. Such an environment would strengthen the enabling environment to engage organized civil society and for an independent and constructive role 68 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? of the media (Chapter 2, page 33). If citizen report cards are to be introduced, results should be widely published. As one expert puts it, "Only if people know what is going on, good and bad, can they hold their government accountable" (Blair, 2000: 29). (3) Policies and programs must ensure an internal enabling environment for vehicles of citizen participation around local governance and service delivery, with a particular focus on inclusive- ness and internal governance. The study particularly suggests that, for these vehicles to be credible and legitimate, they need to be more inclusive of the poor, less educated, or other vulnerable groups. Parents' associations, for example, rarely were found to include the poorest. Several donor agencies identified inclusiveness as an area in which they should focus more attention in their programming. Constraints for broad-based participation should be better understood and addressed through capac- ity building, use of mediators, and adequate rules of the game. The study found that elite biases against the poor often were unintended. Nevertheless, these biases create a real risk of generating elite capture in the long run. In addition, assistance should be provided to users' associations--especially those managing/collecting funds--to improve their transparency, management and organizational skills, and governance structures. Such assistance is especially needed in small towns, in which trust may be negatively affected by heterogeneous communities. TOWARD PARTICIPATORY LOCAL GOVERNANCE As discussed above and in detail in Chapters II and III, the Moldovan Government benefits from numerous entry points to achieve its EGPRSP goals of making "self-government institutions more responsive, transparent and accessible for the public" and "improving the accountability of local pub- lic administration for managing the delivery of public services (GOM, 2004: chapter 6.3.1)." Under EU standards, elected local governments tend to be responsible for at least 40 percent of investments. It is therefore crucial to prepare Moldovan local officials now for these future roles. However, this study sheds light on several constraints on the external and internal operating context for elected local governments that limit the possibilities to make these governments effectively and credibly more transparent, participatory, and accountable. Recommendations are summarized in the policy matrix in Appendix A. Some recommendations link directly with policy reform as part of the Government's plan to reform its public administration (this is reflected in both the EGPRSP and the EU integration plan). Others do not require reform and are to take place at operational levels, for instance, through the World Bank-supported MSIF2 project. Improving the External Operating Context The Government of Moldova must provide a more supportive decentralization framework, if citi- zens' voice on basic services is to be heard and if elected local governments are to be able to be recep- tive this voice. Key areas of action are summarized below: Implement EGPRSP-identified action of clarifying mandates and responsibilities among central, district, and self-government levels. Address gaps in the intergovernmental fiscal law, especially implement EGPRSP-identified W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 69 BOX 62 Innovative Approaches to Accountability of Local Governments: BoliviaVigilance Committee Bolivia's local "vigilance committees"monitor the activities of elected local a special committee of the Senate reviews the case and has the power to government bodies and participate in local planning and budget creation. suspend funds to the local council if it is found to have acted inappropri- They also promote transparency, participation, and accountability in local ately. governance through: Inclusive participation. Members of vigilance committees are selected from various traditional governance systems, including peasant asso- Prioritization of community needs. Feedback from the Cochabamba vigi- ciations and indigenous communal institutions; and the participation of lance committee resulted in municipal investments in building schools in non-elites is encouraged. poor areas and in improving hospitals. Formal complaints procedures.Vigilance committees that suspect wrong- doing by local councils can invoke a legal complaints procedure in which Source: Blair, 2000. action of increasing the fiscal autonomy of elected local governments,78 and revise rules for the intergovernmental transfer formula so that it provides transparent and predictable flows. The study clearly showed that the current system for intergovernmental transfers opens the space for discretionary and arbitrary decisions from district levels of government. Implement the principle, "Watch, don't control." Provide clear directions to district levels of government so that processes of intergovernmental monitoring proceed in ways that strengthen transparency without inhibiting the ability of elected local self-governments to adapt flexibly to their local circumstances (Levy, 2004). The EGPRSP does not explicitly address the ways in which informal power dynamics between district and local levels of government negatively affect decisionmaking, and incentives for all parties to open meaningful spaces for civic participation and transparency (Chapter 2). The re-elected Government should also take advantage of current momentum to officially and publicly communicate central government's support for elected local governments to institute and improve the transparency of administrative procedures for citizen feedback. Documented poli- cies and standards for handling citizen feedback (including public complaint logs and guidelines for responding to complaints) can encourage citizens to provide their feedback, reduce the discretion- ary handling of issues by government officials, and/or provide incentives from above to district-level officials to support participatory processes. There are various ways of institutionalizing participatory mechanisms: creating new agencies tasked with ensuring citizen participation, inscribing them into law, and/or incorporating them in local governments' strategic plans (Ackerman, 2004). The Vigilance Committees in Bolivia is one illustration (Box 6-2). This last option may be the most feasible in the current Moldovan context and is already envisaged by the MSIF and USAID local government reform projects. The Government should officially insert in its EGPRSP strategy and other relevant strategic docu- ments the establishment of new mechanisms for citizens, inputs, and feedback, such as participatory 78 e EGPRSP refers to "self-governments." e EGPRSP states: "In the area of state and local administration budget relations, activities will focus on reducing the nancial dependence of local governments and the stimulation of local nancial autonomy. is will be done through improving the legislation on nancial relations between state budget and administrative- territorial units' budgets, performing scal potential analysis from the territorial aspect, undertaking measures for enhancing their scal base and through improving the mechanism of budget equalization transfers mechanism" (GOM, 2004: 42). 70 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 63 Participatory Budgeting in Albania In Albania, where decentralization has been extensive, citizens have high The pilot helped to introduce a more participatory and grassroots expectations of local government yet often lack awareness of local govern- approach to formulating local budgets and investment planning. ment's roles and responsibilities. As result, local governments are often held This year, the three pilot locations will independently conduct the PBP responsible for the poor quality of many public services, some of which are processandwillreceivetargetedtrainingandcapacity-buildingasneces- within the mandate of the central government. Local government's lack of sary.Thisdemonstratesasignificantchangeinmindsetandawillingness experience in promoting civic engagement in governance, compounded by to open the budget process to citizens. A fourth pilot location, Elbassan, civic passiveness and fragile local institutions, has contributed to citizens' whichwillbeginparticipatorybudgetingthisyear,hasagreedtosetaside mistrustandcynicismaboutgovernment.Thismistrusthasinturnresultedin funds in its local budget to hire local assistance to facilitate the participa- poor payment of tax, creating a vicious cycle. tory budgeting cycle. To address these governance challenges, the World Bank facilitated a pilot Lessonslearnedduringthepilotarebeingdiscussedwithnationalpolicymak- participatory budgeting project with three local governments in Albania to ers in the Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization and Ministry test mechanisms to increase citizen participation in decision-making in the of Finance who are interested in scaling up the pilot to other locations. As a local budget process. Working with partners from the Ministry of Local Gov- result of the pilot, the Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization has ernment, Ministry of Finance, Association of Albanian Municipalities, Asso- askedthebankteamtohelpthemwithsocialaccountabilitytoolsthatcanbe ciation of Albanian Communes, Bank staff and selected Albanian NGOs, the scaled up to other local government units. A participatory budgeting toolkit pilot was tailored according to the budgeting cycle of local government units is being developed and will be disseminated to national ministries and local in Albania. Complementary tools were used to engage vulnerable groups government units. throughtheuseofaParticipatoryInstitutionalRapidAssessmentandpoverty maps.The results of the first year of the pilot were very positive: Source: Authors. monitoring of service delivery performance--citizen report cards--and mechanisms for participatory budgeting (Box 6-3). Much of the foundation will have been laid for these mechanisms by the MSIF2 and other donor-supported projects, such the USAID Local Government Reform.79 However, to ensure that people see the benefits of participation, these mechanisms must be multidirectional. In other words, they must ensure that when clients provide feedback to service providers, opportunities are created for providers and local officials to provide reciprocal feedback to citizens on how that information is being used to change services. Without multidirectional feedback, there is a serious risk that the already high level of skepticism among citizens about the impact of their participation could grow even higher. Strengthen Participatory Capacities of Local Authorities and Communities While working on fixing the rules of the game is essential, the Government should take responsibility to coordinate and promote an ambitious capacity-building program for participation of local authori- ties and citizens. Key recommendations are: Include district officials in future capacity-building programs or initiatives on participatory gover- nance and bottom-up service delivery. Numerous participants of the study highlighted that district officials often were not informed about NGO- and donor-sponsored rural development projects in their regions and regularly were overlooked by donor projects for capacity-building support. Throughout the study, not a single example of joint local-district government learning was pro- 79 Public hearings, citizens fora, and participatory budgeting and planning exercises have been used e ectively to promote transparency and participation in local governance in countries including Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Common factors contributing to the success of these initiatives included local government commitment and the inclusion of civil society organizations in support of the citizenry, both of which are feasible in Moldova with donor and central government support. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 71 vided. Going forward, the inclusion of district officials would facilitate joint learning and plan- ning. One mayor emphasized, "As long as rayons are not included in strategic planning exercises themselves and do not have their own strategic plans, we will always face problems... Rayon coun- cils have to be trained ... and other donors should be united for this purpose." Including them also could create positive attitudinal shifts and incentives for district officials to support for more meaningful participatory processes in local government decisionmaking. In addition to training in strategic planning and promoting participation and transparency, a particular area for capacity building at the district level, given its monitoring function, is skills in information gathering, and computing and analyzing statistics.80 The content of capacity building should be more comprehensive. Figure 6-1 provides an example of such a broad framework. Skills building aims toward a better understanding of the external oper- ating context (mandates, financing rules, power dynamics) and improved management skills as well as participatory skills. Study findings clearly showed the need for local governments and their donor and civil society partners to be aware of the opportunities for and constraints on broad-based participation, and to be able to tailor adequate vehicles for broad-based participation. Donor-sponsored projects in Moldova have helped local governments and citizens to create a positive dialogue in numerous communities. While these efforts are having a positive influence on improving the accountability of local governments, feedback from a wide variety of key participants, including donor representatives themselves, points to two major recommendations for increasing their impact: Encourage greater donor coordination around local governance and service delivery activities. Limited donor coordination has led to differing methodologies for community mobilization and community-driven development activities being implemented by different actors without the creation of synergies and the avoidance of overlap.81 Different local development projects include different planning processes, systems for procurement or management, and even guidelines for generating community contributions. A multi-donor impact evaluation of differing methodolo- gies could be used to consolidate programming and funding to focus on initiatives that have had the greatest impact and hold the greatest likelihood of catalyzing sustainable local governance into the future. Improve the transfer of skills for increasing transparency and participation to, and among, local government officials. Often it is donor or NGO staff who facilitates donor project mechanisms to promote accountability; and on completion of the projects, these skills depart with the external experts. Moreover, because local officials lack the budget discretion to implement initiatives without donor funding, the results of these mechanisms, such as strategic planning, often are overly tied to donor priorities. It is fair to acknowledge that poor donor coordination also may be a consequence of inadequate governance arrangements. The government could demonstrate its commitment and interest in pro- moting local governance and regional development by establishing a clear institutional focal point at the central level to advocate for policy and legal improvements in these areas. Another way that this institutional focal point could facilitate donor coordination would be to help gather and disseminate information about existing donor-supported development interventions at the local level. 80 Recommendations of the Technical Seminar on Participatory Local Governance, In-Country Consultations, May 2005. 81 is recommendation is also made in a recent study sponsored by DFID, CONTACT, and the Peace Building Frame- work project (Pistrinciuc and Marin, 2004). 72 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? FIGURE 61 Strategic Framework: Building Municipal Capacity for Community Participation Political Legislative/Policy Administrative Context Framework Context External Operating Context Elements of Management Vehicles for Participation Capacity Participation Clarify the objectives Strengthen the of participation municipal interface Skilled and Committed Understand the needs Management Appropriate of the poor Strengthen Sustainable Forms of Alleviate Community- Alleviate factors community capacity Participation management Municipality affecting and the community blockages Interface participation interface Promote options for participation Develop Respond to partnerships with Establish evolving redefined role of the nongovernmental forms of participation municipality actors Internal Municipal Capacity Develop staff capacity Establish effective structures Reform systems and procedures Establish financial stability Create attitudinal change A Supportive Government Framework Source: Plummer, 2000: 8. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 73 TABLE 61 MSIF 2: ATransitional Mechanism toward Accountable and Mature Local Self-governments Longer-term directions for elected local self- Local governance: Status Transitional strategies governments Basic institutional framework in place, but Strengthen capacity of self-governments Responsible for 40%­60% of public underfunded, and not consistently and to do business in a transparent, participa- investment (EU norm), funded through credibly downwardly accountable tory manner own-source revenues and transfers Strengthen civic associations, complaints High levels of civic participation in for- windows, performance report cards mulating local priorities and monitoring Implement forms of participatory budget- subsequent implementation ing Link access to incremental resource base (and added responsibilities) to achieve- ment of capacity, transparency, and participation benchmarks Source: Adapted from Levy, 2004. World Bank's Current and Potential Contribution. From an investment perspective through the MSIF2 project, the World Bank will make a valuable contribution to building more participatory local governments and communities (Chapter 3). The MSIF2 project represents a good vehicle to create a successful transition from the current imperfect decentralization to the future scenario of account- able elected self-governments that will be responsible for considerable sums of investment under EU standards (Table 6-1). The second generation of the MSIF has taken the right step of moving beyond community-driven development and planning to introduce innovative mechanisms to increase trans- parency and participation, such as citizen report cards and participatory budgeting. However, these challenges clearly suggest the need for a role for the Bank and other donors inter- ested in this area to move beyond a sole reliance on a bottom-up approach and to provide cutting-edge advice on the decentralization framework, especially regarding fiscal decentralization and implica- tions for sectoral service delivery. This level of engagement in the policy dialogue should require on the part of the Government a confirmation of political will and a strong commitment to the local governance agenda. TOWARD A SUPPORTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR EMPOWERING PARENTS IN EDUCATION SERVICES The study findings presented in Chapter 4 call for strengthening existing mechanisms of civic par- ticipation--of parents--as part of an overall strategy to improve the governance of basic primary and secondary education services. Unlike in other countries, the upcoming education reform in Moldova already benefits from essential ingredients for accountability. Parental participation through associa- tions, committees, and payment of fees illustrates the level of interest and commitment. This asset can be used to promote the engagement of other stakeholders, including students, and build on to achieve accountability-enhancing reforms. Evidence from the study confirms the need for the Ministry of Education, in collaboration with key stakeholders, to ensure a more supportive external environment to enable existing mechanisms of 74 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 64 Parents Participation, Students test scores and Nicaragua's Autonomous School Program "The Nicaraguan Autonomous Schools Program (ASP) has transferred more school-based management has had on the quality of schools in Nicaragua. power from the state to parents while demanding more from parents than "The clearest result of the reforms was a broad-based increase in local con- any other school reform in the Americas... It implements school-based trol of schools" (Gershberg and Meade, 2005: 25). Within a decade of its management (SBM) with local school councils that: (1) have a voting major- introduction, school-based management was happening in most schools, ity of parents; (2) allocate resources that derive in part from"voluntary"fees including those which were not a formal part of the autonomous school charged to parents; (3) have broad powers including hiring and firing school program. A quantitative study, for example, found that increased parental principals"(Gershberg, 2004). participation and control were associated with increases in student's test scores. Qualitative studies have similarly found that high levels of parental The most controversial aspect of this program has been the introduction of involvement and school autonomy hold promise for improved educational formalschoolfees.Whilethegovernmenthastakenstepstoensurethatsuch outcomes. charges are not mandatory and to limit the size of fees that are requested by autonomous schools, parents often feel pressured into paying them. Parents These studies also point to important factors required for the success of do have a strong say in the use of these funds however, and school coun- such programs.While parents were often influential in budget and finance cils have discretion in the allocation of 100 percent of the funds collected in issues through school councils, the leadership style of the school principal autonomousschools.Fundsareoftenusedtoprovidemonetaryperformance has a strong affect on the impact of parental involvement on school policy. incentives to teachers to top-up their salaries and have been seen as an Moreover, the program continues to raise questions about equity. Coercion important factor in achieving teachers'acceptance of the program. Funds are around`voluntary'fees can have a strong negative impact on the poor who also often used to pay for the running of the physical school building, includ- face particular difficulties in accessing schools. Any such program must ing maintenance and utility costs. therefore also include equity-enhancing measures, such as needs-based fee adjustments. Recent evaluations of the program have highlighted the impact that Source: Gershberg, 2004; Gershberg and Meade, 2005. parental voice and direct participation to be more effective. The policy matrix in Table A-2 of Appen- dix A highlights key areas for policy action, which are summarized below:82 A priority area is the need to strengthen the results orientation of the current monitoring and evalu- ation system (Chapter 4, page 89). If downward accountability mechanisms and demand-side pressures are to have any impact, positive incentives for enhancing the accountability of upper levels of education decisionmakers must be strengthened. Rather than tracking mainly inputs, for example, school inspections should obtain technical information on the improvement of student performance, which would show the real value added of teachers and schools. Current information tends to focus on top performers, which may go against the equity objectives of the education reform agenda. There is also scope to increase transparency through better information dissemination strategies. Key public decisionmakers around education (ministry, regional and local authorities, schools) should ensure that the type of results-oriented information described above, as well as technical information, be made widely available to the public. Moldovan decisionmakers should explore ways to provide more flexibility and autonomy to schools on how things ought to be done and resources allocated, as envisaged in the World Bank Education Policy Note. Currently, the low level of school autonomy limits not only schools' possibilities to make ratio- nal decisions but also their incentives to address potential demands from parents. The Government 82 It is meant to complement the proposed policy areas discussed in the World Bank (2005b) Education Policy Note. e Note addresses other necessary elements for reform and good governance of services, such as a sound nancing system and adequate motivation for teachers. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 75 ofMoldovawouldbenefitfromlookingatworldwidecasestudiesofcountriesthatsuccessfullyimple- mentedmoreschoolautonomywhilestrivingtoimproveeducationaloutcomes.TheNicaraguancase is an interesting example in this regard (Box 6-4). Despite strong challenges, Nicaragua successfully implemented reforms that have improved accountability and the use of parental funds. Attentiontoanenablingoperatingcontextisessential.In addition, there is scope to strengthen existing mechanismsofcivicparticipationbysupportingtheset-upofeffective,transparent,andinclusiveschool- parent committees, using appropriate guidelines and capacity-building compensatory mechanisms. Attention must be paid to internal governance. School-parent committees could benefit from a voting majority of parents, some inclusion of the local government, and the power to make some decisions over how all general fees raised from parents are spent. Member selection criteria should prevent conflict of interests. If the government is willing, the committees should be assigned more extensive governance deci- sions. Whether coerced or voluntarily, parents are currently paying. However, they should also be empowered to have more influence beyond resource mobilization. Good practices in EU countries are presented in Box 6-5. The rights of all parents to participate should be preserved. Study findings suggest that it is essen- tial that the government be willing to take a firm and public stand on (a) the fees being voluntary, (b) the illegality of excluding any parent from the committees, and (c) the illegality of excluding or discriminating in any way against students whose parents cannot or do not pay. In Nicaragua, ministry officials and municipal employees played a key role in "reminding" school staff that the fees were voluntary. However, policymakers also can do more, for example, by setting up guidelines. Legislation is one option. However, a balance must be struck so that the law does not eliminate the school's ability to raise funds, which are unlikely to be replaced with tax money. Ensuring an appropriate policy environment for promoting improved transparency of decisionmak- ing around education services and openings for parental participation includes creating new policies as well as ensuring that appropriate existing policies are followed. Legal regulations ensuring that parental contributions remain voluntary often are overlooked by officials from both schools and par- ents' committees. Where an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for civic engagement already exists, training and capacity building of school officials, teachers, and other decisionmakers can be used to shift mentalities and align entrenched practices with the law.83 The government also could develop compensatory mechanisms to assist and support poorer commu- nities and parents who pay to support the school. One possibility would be for the central government to match local contributions and raise the matching rate to correlate with the poverty of the school community. This matching would maintain all the accountability and other positive incentives inher- ent in the local contributions but also would help improve equity and have a compensatory component (Gershberg, 2004: 22). For example, the government could match school fees raised in the poorest communities by 10 to 1, and in poor communities by 5 to 1. Given the importance of attitudinal barriers to reform, training of school officials, teachers and par- ents committees is essential. Training parents, teachers, and other stakeholders would ensure that par- ticipants are able to positively promote the proposed changes and answer the concerns of those opposing 83 Technical Seminar on Education, In-country consultations. Chisinau, Molodva, May 2005. 76 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 65 Parental Participation in School Governance: Good Practices from EU Countries TheParentalParticipationinSchoolsprojectoftheEuropeanCommissionhigh- legal framework for education, education policy, building management, lighted the important role that parents can play in the education sector and and resource issues. identified opportunities to promote better partnerships between schools and InScotland,parentsholdamajorityofseatsonschoolboards,whichtake parents to improve the quality of education services. Based on research in Aus- part in the selection of senior staff and are responsible for approving the tria, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Scotland, many of the head teacher's plans to use the school budget. The inspector of schools lessons gathered from this project could be of particular benefit to Moldova, includes parents'views in school evaluations. Questionnaires are distrib- particularly as it moves toward aligning its policies and systems with those of uted to a random sample of parents and include questions on teachers, EUcountries. school facilities, and communication between the school and parents. In Belgium, a department for education within the Flemish community Whiletherewasnoonemodelinthe7studycountriesforeffectivelypromot- provides an annual subsidy for parents'organizations, including funding ingparentalparticipationinschools,theimportanceofinformationexchange for training parents on their rights and powers in school councils and among parents, teachers, and education authorities; and the promotion of funding for unions of parents'associations. parents'involvementinevaluatingandimprovingthequalityofschools'work In Italy, representatives from parents' organizations work with local were highlighted throughout. Successful strategies employed in these coun- authorities to improve inclusion policies and standards of service for stu- tries included: dents with special needs. Informationsharingontheschoolandtheeducationsystem: With a combined focus on improving communication between parents and education service providers and on promoting mechanisms for parents to In Scotland, all schools provide parents with a comprehensive school participate in the governance and management of education services, these handbook, including information on school organizational structures, strategies support the development of an enabling environment in which advice on promoting positive attitudes among students, and recent stu- higher-quality and more equitably distributed education services can be dent examination standings. achieved.InMoldova,thereisademonstratedneedforsuchstrategies.Wide- InAustria,theMinistryofEducationpreparesbrochuresonthelegalregu- spreaddisparitiesinqualityandaccesstoeducationpersist,particularlyalong lations affecting education for schools to share with parents. the rural-urban divide. And parental participation in the education system is In Portugal, each classroom teacher devotes one hour a week to meeting often disempowering and limited to making financial contributions. Perhaps with parents. most significantly, many of these strategies are particularly feasible for use In France, the right of parents to receive advice and information from in Moldova because they can be implemented at relatively low cost. How- schools is enshrined in the country's Education Act. ever,tobeassuccessfulinimprovingeducationqualityasintheEUcountries, these strategies will require both ongoing capacity building for parents and Activeparticipationinschoolmanagement: education service providers as well as the full commitment of the Ministry In the Netherlands, parents participate in discussions on school manage- of Education, district education departments, local government officials, and mentandgoalsandaredirectlyinvolvedinschoolevaluationsviapartici- school authorities. pation councils and school boards. Parents on participation councils and schoolboardsreceivespecializedtrainingontopics,includingthenational Source: Scottish Office, 1998. changes. Participants will need to be well versed in the objectives of the training and have the capacity to troubleshoot the initial stages of setting up an autonomous school. Training is needed for technical skillssinceschools,districts,andparentswillneedtomanagefinancesthatareabletowithstandexternal audits. Finally, training will also be needed to sensitize participants to socioeconomic and attitudinal barriers, such as the stigmatization of poorer or less educated parents (Chapter 4, page 62). Some of these policy options could benefit from the potential assistance from the donor community, especially the World Bank, in the context of its rural education project. However, if these changes are to be effectively enacted, broad stakeholder dialogue, effective dissemination, and leadership from above are required. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 77 BOX 66 Informing Citizens aboutWaterTariff Issues: An Example from Cahul, Moldova Precedents exist for information sharing between local governments and `Apa Canal,' which would have left the city without water. This same citizens on water tariffs and can be built on to improve consumer education situation occurred during July 2002 when the city was without water about the water sector. The following is an excerpt from an article entitled for three days. Thus, we had to choose the lesser evil. All these steps "Report by the Cahul Mayor: Activities of the Cahul City Council and Mayor- were taken in accordance with the decisions of the government of the alty," written by Mayor G. Zagorodnii in the Our Town section of the Cahul RepublicofMoldovaandwithnormativedocumentsdevelopedbyANRE Express newspaper in October 2004. (National Energy Regulatory Agency). I hope that when we receive the credit from theWorld Bank, we will be able to reduce costs and thereby reduce the tariffs. This, of course, has to be done in coordination with This year the mayor and the City Council had to increase the tariffs for the local and central governments as all the costs (including salaries, communal services, drinking water and sewage. Although this was not electricity and, cost of materials) were increased by the central govern- the best option, there was no other alternative.This situation emerged ment, but the final result­tariffs­is regulated/approved by the local when the company `Union Fenosa' threatened to cut off electricity to council government. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DRINKABLE WATER SERVICES Based on findings presented in Chapter 5, this section highlights strategic options for strengthen- ing mechanisms of civic participation in rural and urban water services. Proposed strategies are tar- geted at key stakeholder groups (citizens, water service providers, and local government officials) to strengthen the overall relationships and levels of accountability among them and offer a window to improved urban water service delivery. Finally, specific implications for the World Bank assistance in the water sector are outlined. Building More Transparent and Client-Oriented Urban Networked Services For urban networked services, this study identifies three types of complementary strategic options, outlined below. The first set of options aims at increasing transparency, that is, promoting voice and strengthening accountability relationships between citizens and elected local governments. Consumer education emerges as a priority. Local governments have a role to play in collaboration with water service provid- ers and in consumer education. The collaboration includes district-wide information campaigns on how water service delivery is organized, to whom citizens can turn for help with the various water- related issues, and what are the links between water, environmental management, and health issues. Box 6-6 provides an example of information sharing by the Mayor of Cahul. Included in any campaign should be greater information on the role of local governments and service providers in setting tar- iffs, already a goal of the EGPRSP (GOM, 2004). The involvement of the media, citizens' groups, and water-focused NGOs in larger multi-stakeholder dialogues can be crucial to citizens' understanding of, and influence over, decisionmaking around water service delivery and water issues in general. In parallel to these efforts to improve consumer education, central government has a role to play in institutionalizing consumer participation in water policymaking through new legal and regulatory provisions. These provisions should include the identification of a government officer tasked with 78 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? information dissemination on water services with whom relevant citizens' groups, NGOs, and water service providers could work closely. The second set of options aims at strengthening the client-orientation of Apa Canal Utilities, that is, increasing water consumer power. Key suggested actions include: Institutionalize Procedures for Reacting to Customer Feedback Enactment of response standards for Apa Canal utilities that have in place a formal process to record citizens' comments. Guaranteeing the period of time in which customers will receive responsestotheirqueriescanencouragevaluablefeedbackfromclients.Whilefinancialresources may limit the extent to which Apa Canal staff can solve all problems brought to their attention, this low-cost strategy can show clients that the staff are listening and promote a more positive relationship between the two groups. Apa Canal utilities should also ensure that their client feedback procedures are in compliance with national legal standards on consumer protection. Use of the consumer service officer, which is proposed in the World Bank Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation Project. The consumer service officer can play a key role in instituting such processes and addressing customer service issues. Promotion of learning across Apa Canal utilities. Utilities that do not yet have formal processes for receiving client feedback can learn from their sister organizations' positive experiences with feedback ledgers and 24-hour telephone feedback lines. The Association of Apa Canals, which exists to promote learning and support among Apa Canal utilities, can take a lead role, if given additional resources and training. Better target information strategies and assistance to vulnerable groups. Exploring information dissemination through sources accessible to vulnerable populations (such as through radio, for individuals who do not regularly leave their homes) and being transparent with these groups on the discounts and concessions that they are eligible to achieve will help to promote their power as clients.84 A more comprehensive assessment of vulnerability around water services should also be conducted because efforts to target the vulnerable are generally limited to pensioners and the unemployed. Donors could have an important role in providing resources for such initiatives. Provide incentives for Apa Canal staff to be responsive to community needs. Motivating staff to perform in difficult environments is a well-documented challenge in numerous sectors and coun- tries. While additional financial incentives for employees may be too costly and promote conflict between employees and consumers, numerous low-cost, nonfinancial incentives can be used by management at Apa Canal to encourage their staff members to perform up to standard, to promote innovative problem-solving, and to reward employees who are commended by customers.85 Some of these options include organizing regular training and learning days with internal company experts, instituting flexible work hours, improving team spirit through team-building and internal plan- ning processes, and developing employee recognitions (such as published "employee of the month" honors). 84 While many clients interviewed in the study received regular and clear information on services from Apa Canals­via notices, newspapers and television­vulnerable groups o en were less informed, including on provisions made to better meet their water needs. 85 Numerous studies, including recent work on the motivation of health workers in India and Sub-Saharan Africa ranked nancial incentives below non- nancial factors in terms of their e ect on worker motivation (Wagsta and Claeson, 2004; Mathauer and Imho , 2004). In fact, Apa Canals employees interviewed in the study cited a desire to help people, belief in what the organization could accomplish, and a sense of obligation to their employer far more o en than nancial motivations. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 79 The third set of options aims at building a more supportive external operating environment in terms of strengthening accountability relationships between elected local governments and Apa Canal utilities. Key identified areas of action include: Rationalizingandclarifyingresponsibilitieswithinthewatersector,ashighlightedintheEGPRSP (GOM, 2004). Achieving this­for instance, by aligning Moldovan legislation and regulations on water services with European standards­will contribute toward increased understanding and ownership of their respective roles by local government officials and water service providers. Reviewing the process and methods of tariff computation.86 Such a review by government should solicit the input of local and district governments to improve the effectiveness of local govern- ment oversight of Apa Canals in protecting consumers' long-term interests. Feedback from water service providers also highlighted the benefits of providing special training for local officials involved in setting water tariffs and ensuring that these officials have greater access to national experts specializing in tariff setting. Facilitating joint training and planning exercises on water services between Apa Canals and local government officials. Both of these groups are unclear about the constraints under which the other labors, whether in terms of finances, planning, or technical knowledge of water sup- ply and sanitation. Joint training and planning can help both groups to better understand their respective responsibilities, and their potential to better serve citizens.87 Rural Water Service Delivery Government plans to "improve the quality of services and to increase the number of consumers" by modernizing water supply systems in many localities throughout Moldova will help numerous citizens to become first-time clients of water services (GOM, 2004: 65). Specific additional recommendations based on this study to increase the voice and power of water consumers in rural areas are summarized below: Stimulating water users' associations, consumer advocacy groups, and NGOs involved in water ser- vice provision through capacity building and seed funding can help to create formal mechanisms for citizens to impact service delivery. Training and funding these groups can institutionalize ongo- ing processes for citizens to exercise voice around broader water-related issues such as pollution control and garbage disposal. Currently, citizen groups addressing water service issues are largely informal and ad hoc. While valuable, they have not given citizens a real voice in measuring or affecting the performance of services. Helping newly formed associations to link to formal institu- tions and processes such as large NGOs or government environmental committees can help these groups to play an ongoing role in the many issues related to local-level water services. Similarly, to avoid problems of scale and resource constraints, small villages can group with their neighbors to create a single water user's association for their locality at large.88 86 As the government recognizes, in the water sector, "existing tari s do not cover the nancial resources needed to main- tain and develop the sector's enterprises" (GOM, 2004: 65). 87 For example, prioritization exercises can be used to create a constructive plan for service delivery that takes into ac- count the particular issues facing speci c neighborhoods or parts of the population and to develop a budget that leverages the resources of both Apa Canal and local governments to ensure that community water service needs are more e ectively met. 88 Technical Seminar on Drinkable Water Services, In-country consultations, Chisinau, Moldova, May 2005. 80 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? BOX 67 Piloting a Community Score Card Process: Maharashtra RuralWater Supply and Sanitation Project ThestateofMaharashtrainIndiafacesmanyofthesamechallengesinensur- based on performance criteria identified by the community itself. Scores ing access to safe drinking water to its rural population as does Moldova. are shared within the community through focus groups, and discussions Among these are poorly managed and maintained water infrastructure; lack of possible suggestions to remedy problems are held. of capacity in local governments and communities to plan and operate new 2. Self-evaluation scorecard by service providers, whereby service suppliers investments;andtheabsenceofeffectivemonitoringandevaluationcapacity develop criteria to judge their performance, score their achievements, amongstate,district,andvillage-levelgovernments.Aspartofaninnovative and consider empowering options to make improvements. and comprehensive state-wide policy to reform the rural water supply and 3. Interface meeting between users and providers, in which both groups sanitation sector, the Jalswarajya project was established. This project aims can share their scores and feedback and together develop an agenda for to increase rural communities'access to water and sanitation services and to improvements. institutionalize the decentralization of these services to local governments and communities. As an ongoing process, these steps are followed by continued monitoring, adaptation, and follow-up. This model has a dual focus: providing an outlet As part of this project, a community score card process was developed that forcommunityfeedbackandsuggestionsonwaterservicesandamechanism gives voice to the public and generates pressure to solve issues of poor ser- for service providers to reflect on their work and empower them to influ- vicedelivery.Itsupplieswaterserviceproviderswithongoingandimmediate ence the way their organizations do business. Thus, this model could prove feedbacktoallowforcorrectivemeasurestobeadopted.Thecommunityscore valuable to the water sector in Moldova, in which the dual issues of disen- card is a hybrid of social auditing, citizen report cards, and participatory rural franchised community members and service providers exist. As a relatively appraisal. It consists of four components. These components move beyond low-cost mechanism, it would also be feasible for use in communities across collecting user feedback to include self-reflection by service providers and Moldova, with targeted capacity building for communities, service provid- an interface meeting between the community and providers in a multistep ers, and local governments; and support through the process. This external process: support role could be played by the World Bank water project task team as part of the rural component of itsWater Supply and Sanitation project, or by 1. Input tracking matrix provides an opportunity for the community to another donor or NGO. compare the stipulated project outputs, budget, or activities with what is actually received by the community. Community score card is a table Source: Operational Manual for Implementing the Community Scorecard Process, Maharashtra summarizingthecommunity'sassessmentoftheperformanceofservices RuralWater Supply and Sanitation Jalswarajya Project, draft, March 2004. Bringing in good practices from water users' associations and effective mechanisms of civic par- ticipation such as the use of community score cards in the Maharashtra Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in India (Box 6-7). The community score card process has been designed both to give voice to the public and generate pressure to solve issues of poor service delivery and to pro- vide service providers with ongoing and immediate feedback to enable corrective measures to be adopted. A project-funded newsletter linking water users' associations--such as the MSIF newsletter, which is distributed to mayoralties and implementing agencies in participating villages--can help to pro- mote a stimulating ongoing exchange of ideas and opportunities among associations at low cost. Specific Implications for World Bank Assistance in the Water Sector In the rural water sector in Moldova Access to potable drinking water remains a key challenge. Local governments and citizens are the principal groups that can be mobilized to address the problem, but to mobilize them will require the support of external groups, including the World Bank. W H AT C A N M O L D O V A N D E C I S I O N M A K E R S D O ? 81 Citizens would benefit from support that strengthens their ability to voice their needs and priorities and the World Bank can both directly and indirectly promote civic engagement around water issues. Support for direct citizen action is already a component of projects, such as the MSIF, through information sharing, capacity building, and participatory decisionmaking. Continuing to promote these objectives in the MSIF2 project, the rural component of the Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation project, and other future initiatives in Moldova can increase citizen voice and influence around water issues and promote more sustainable projects.89 Stronger citizen demands for improved water services can help to set the agenda of local governments, promoting increased government respon- siveness to the priority water needs of the community. The availability of additional resources targeted at the water sector can be a powerful incentive for local governments to act on citizen demands for improved water services. In the absence of adequate incentives, local governments will continue to struggle to prioritize water services within their mea- ger budgets. By freeing up local government resources, the MSIF experience offers one incentive model for local governments to address the poor quality of drinking water in their communities. MSIF funds, allocated through participatory community decisionmaking, are not guaranteed to be channeled toward water issues. However, given the high priority afforded to water concerns among rural citizens, water is likely to be an area in which many communities decide to allocate small grant resources. Targeted block grants to the water sector (for example, for regular water testing and dis- semination of test results) can provide a powerful incentive for local governments to address issues that are commonly overlooked. Ensuring that such grants include funds for information dissemina- tion and participatory activities can have the additional benefits of increasing the transparency of government activities and stimulating community engagement around community services. In the urban water sector in Moldova A key challenge to the urban water sector is sustainability of the water system.90 As the WDR2004 noted, "Sustainability in piped water systems is almost always equivalent to financial sustainability" (World Bank, 2003b: 67­8). The urban water system in Moldova follows this pattern. At the center of the system is a water tariff regime over which the water utility, Apa Canal, has no power and from which it is unable to recover its costs. This lack of autonomy for Apa Canal results in water tariffs being kept artificially low by local governments eager to please their constituencies and bolster their political capital, despite the potential benefits of increasing tariffs that would accrue to all three main stakeholders. Remedying this situation requires a realignment of relationships among citizens, local government officials, and Apa Canal. The realignment would create opportunities to increase each group's under- standing of the constraints and opportunities faced by the others. The increased participation of citi- zens in the water sector is a crucial element of this new model of interaction. Understandably, many government officials and service providers may be nervous about calls for increased citizen par- ticipation in decisionmaking in the sector. This study does not advocate participation for its own 89 e experience of the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia, for example, suggested that water projects that included community participation had lower failure rates than those which did not (World Bank, 2003b). 90 is lack of sustainability relates to nancial and regulatory concerns as well as to technical ones. e current study did not delve into the particular issues of the physical water infrastructure, and focuses here on regulatory, nancial, and organi- zational management issues. Nevertheless, it was clear that additional investments in infrastructure, such as those of the Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation project, will be crucial to ensure a better t between the water supply system and the water needs in Moldova. 82 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? sake but as a clear means to resolve the stalemate around tariffs and investments in water service provision. Responsibility for tariff-setting is vested with local governments, and many local gov- ernments are eager to keep their constituents happy by keeping water costs low. In these contexts, tariffs will never be rationalized unless consumers can understand how higher water tariffs would work to their benefit by allowing for more investments and improvements to the system. To achieve this level of understanding requires greater transparency from service providers, infor- mation campaigns by service providers and local governments, and a strong consumer advocacy movement. A large consumer advocacy association with smaller local branches could undertake consumer education on water services. It also could have an accepted seat at the table at which deci- sions about tariffs are made and act as the consumer counterpart of the association of Apa Canals in decisionmaking and planning forums. Inthese ways, improved participation ofcitizens inthe urban water sector would improve not only the accountability of services but also their quality. Yet, there is a clear vacuum of formal representation of the interests of water consumers in urban locations in Moldova. The World Bank, in partnership with other donor organizations working on service delivery, can help to remedy this situation by facilitating the development of small urban consumer associations and supporting wider linkages between them and their rural counterparts, including the eventual development of a central national secretariat or hub for consumer advocacy. References Ackerman, John. 2003. 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Wash- ington, D.C. A Policy Recommendations A P P E N D I X for Improving Governance and Service Delivery in Moldova 87 88 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? av av ankB tions av ankB orld orld authorities authorities W authorities W Moldo Moldo Moldo tions oft local oft ganiza local ory oft local media andt andt including andt associa' including Responsibility ernmenv societ orsy Go istricD ernmenv Go istricD Civil including onorsD ernmenv Go istricD Ma onorsD of Plan , altr el- tioncA on dev ert enc eedomfr the "y tion authorities the er 2004). 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(p rial schools orkw tion, ta and ommunitc 36). (p Sub institutions who based ' - t , for et ems stat inet imple pupilset om-c budget emenvo of of tions financial ec use syst and alua em impr" ace especially iny "t ticipa tiv and esourr tion elop syst tion links implemen par, evot ". ds dev, ess:c em tion tion norma erialt and skills educa efficienc "t estst syst and for EGPRSP ma informaet managemen elop standar and methodologyevo acevo educa aise "R and earC" ev of tion tion "D tion tional tional nat Impr improT onsolidac ding fundsy ". 82). 84). 83). (p human managemen (p educa (p educa ernatin wledge 84). 83). poor legisla men kno (p financing (p of egarr munit the vices ,t or- erS all els y ofe e , en fort ork ticipa- ervo andy lev mor ees olun-v tion tiona enc monit effec tions decision par oft primar of t- formanc local ting of educa this ducE tions civic par ofe emainr anspartr upperta ailableva anspartr,e tion per eporr edt amewfr tiv ommittct ot associa eas members of acy es em ar ot for as, ta orldwidew oft en es on es for school vic ernancv ease tiv facilities and elec par effec en orien syst eadilyr,t tic implemen of ease need polic ac eria ser go en tion (incr tion tion and pr asy xistinge up incr es tion ofy ):C. guidelines crit and mechanisms tion theevo ince vic esultsr alua ser ccountabilityA Proposed educa y) ev anspartre set school-pare educa ecS e and informa onom onomous fees'ts schools good tion ts ch feasibilit aut agenda aut thet 6, en y t-line inclusiv schools Clarify arP tar elecS engthen improt tion positivet and eparrP basic tabilit ea engthen the Str in egyta educa Cr Str ing omotrP echnicalt onfr ommunicacevo er eenw ithin ounc bet ernmenv Resear Assess school eformr W suppor and Chapt( ving Goal: tion str and ac Impr ing go Impro y of y er or- orf els and ot Bank influ- Deliv lev table orld monitt onyar xibilit fle ees tions Wyb vice ounc beot en primarily erS 4) higher ac eas ees er curr eenw ommittc ed for and es beot in em limitsy ar bet is and tiv onom limite identified tudyS Chaptot syst en esultsr ar tion ting aut ommittc'ts xistinge Recommenday in ernancev issue (Refer incet viderso on viderso en tributions pr alua eporr tions olicP. Go ev school pre onc or tion focus of of vic paryb olesr'ts and ed associa A2ELBAT om-up eak el en Inadequa educa W ing focus ser schools lev of enc arP and financial Problem Bott Main woL 90 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? Responsibility ytr y olicP ounC,e Noty Bank olicP andum orld Wot tion Memor ducaE Links es: Not onomiccE links EGPRSP - all ot ticipa- ervo y andy asso'ts enc par oft ts primar en en tions civic par ofe par part acy for as, anspartr es mechanismsy er en curr ees vic ernancv ease ort polic ser go poort (incr for mechanisms tion theevo es ommittc vic ser ompensac suppor and Proposed educa y) ainingtr engthen improt and tion elop basic tabilit Str in egyta educa evD assist videorP tions cia ounc Goal: tion str and ac y al - er y e rur Bank ar Deliv int enc asso'ts orld en Wyb vice erS 4) families er er equenfre anspartr part en and identified tudyS Chaptot poor mor the and ernaltinevo ees curr ofe ernancev for ommittc issue (Refer Go es or ad-hoc ancw improt ernancv and go om-up eas Allo mainly ar opecS tions and cia Problem Bott P O L I C Y R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S 91 av tions av av authori- Moldo analCA orld including W including authori- Moldo tions Moldo analCA including oft local APy ganiza NGOs ory oft NGOs oft local APy NGOs media andt utilit and ankB including associa' and ankB andt utilit and ankB Responsibility ernmenv societ orsy Go istricD erta ties W onorsD orld W Civil including onorsD kn ernmenv Ba Go Ma onorsD orld ernmenv W Go istricD erta ties W onorsD orld W - el- . , e includ- sew- 93,300 dev harmo es guar-t as"e tiv basesy tional ertaw and ofet tions and and, tion,a sharing tiona tha admin- effec ort bringing ertaw esc egular tion measur els ernatin local for on supply including tal among es esc and of egular and drinking ofy ertawe administr tic ehabilitar"ot sourer levot includes tions tion administr independenc ac ork skills esourr onmen ac informa pr ande opean vir elop oblem-solving tiv egular urE links and" qualit ertaw ertawt en ertin public . budgets ec publicot onictr amewfr financial pr erprisest ot EU dev bestet and elec local legisla the moderniz of and prot edvo tions within legal with of andy local ens' ds and the ort with EGPRSP essc and localities tion impr ec standar line ac ot egyta sec ganiza media, discussions tasksy the dissemina andt oft of elop 156 ertaw enues aintrot the in edvo in pr str on ory and mass evr and ymen of tion, dev"ot ems " edvo (6.3.1)ot priorit the sustainabilit emenvo age tional tion ed societ eviewr" eesy er tunities Impr syst ellsw Impr naa ough erm link thr hearings deploec impr tioning legisla sew plans emplo " age al legislae tly civil,of egicta Str include aiserot long-t oppor heT" func and ds (6.8.3) ing er rur (6.12) oping niz ec essc public as eet tiona esourr the xistinge Indir ac including and (6.3.1) eformr needed an ellw istr local (6.8.3) for the supply standar - ot ser- able y a ertawevo ound ser- ser- ar w ocac and oundary block ts eness and isy e engage ed vulnerot ho es adv enc get able tions and,y civicet vic ork ertaw ser tar, issues changesxe ernmenv go arwaevo er vic for ser ort delive sec vic ertaw on officialst improt tion vulner funding associa y anspartr authoritiest ams tion ser esponsibilitiesr and cises es abilit biaseset onsumerc ert seed ocac ea stimulaot ertaw ertaw ogr pr localot improt amewfry ess within ort ertaw ts vices erxe ernmenv erS tionscAy vic and gr edvo ts ernmenv informa and and ser dissemina moste w go ar vulner and adv go es erta local olicP ertaw and an ho tion oups their eliminaot onsumerc tions impr, gr and olesr, egular ernmenv for ts local go planning W ofy ers ens gr ed buildingy ertaw issuesy addrot buildingy financ est iny onsumerc qualit and (small ts of informa get for capacit includingy local and tabilit citizot and esponsibilitiesr enc which causest associa' oft campaigns tar demand among newslett mandat of Proposed ts ernmenv ounc ande ertaw es er analCA ac wha, er users capacit hub tion en funding go tic and clarify and budgets anspartr olesr AP es bett elopmen es citiz of ac ough local pr ert delive ainingtrt angemen vic be ough tional vic thr ernmenv assignmene and and their ande ea vic . eenw ccountabilityA ser ser engthen arry assistanc understand ertawet thr devt na informae for ainingtr go ed can ser joinet er get er in,t poolset ts) beste gre bet the stroT local es delive arT oups gr ettB ertaw es altr oups vic Stimula gr Suppor enc omotrP ertaw ea an men Cr gr Shar including videorP manage of xpenditure tionalizaR Ensur ertaw ganiz viderso or pr acilitaF vic ving Goal: vic Impro y y er ot t orf Bank ot ts e and Deliv among vic orld tions eliabler endst littleev capacitet ts efficien Wyb vice ha ser erS ernmenv 5) er andy ort budgets sec ens ting go impair and angemen qualit Citiz. inadequa, ort local their es vic identified tudyS Chaptot ertaw ertaw impac in sec hoc or for arry Recommenday ort ernancev ad demand xiste ser issues issue (Refer high-ot int ertaw . olicP. Go es in or and essc e en drinking tiv ac of measuring en ertawe egular orkw ertaw oups ofy A3ELBAT om-up of esc engagemen citize of formanc inc gr er Problem informal ine ort Bott Lack sour Civic be oicv per espitD and prioritiz opesc Ambiguous ac deliv 92 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? av authori- Moldo analCA analsCA AP analCA including analsCA AP oft local APy of APy NGOs of andt utilit tion utilit and ankB tion Responsibility ernmenv Go istricD erta erta ties W Associa W onorsD orld W Associa ser- tariff of tariffs age edt er tia anspar-tre " sew en and methodology differ ensur"ot campaignsy for supply and"y links ertaw uniformae ervo publicit ough for possibilities ecr epar thr EGPRSP tariffse pr"ot the ostc ealr tariffs eviewr ds plans tionalizaroT" and arwot esettingr tion ving tified including" mo es wheny iden (6.8.3) vic omputac and enc Not t ser- ot ertawevo distric staff . feed- and and, age omer tion our omers local improt of . encot custyb custot es tionscAy vic omputac input es oblem-solving tiv ser olicP ertaw tariff solicit onsumersc en pre of inc espondingr ofy for ens and,y tivav ommendedce ar es tabilit citizot policies innoe methods edur Proposed ts societ who ounc and tariff non-financial, omot oc ac eesy pre ess ostc angemen oc newt civil,ts prot engthen arry pr thae form, emplod stroT er ernmenv w-lot delive Review Ensur go Enac perot ar ewr Institutionaliz back Goal: vic y er Bank Deliv and andy lack on-cot orld Wyb vice ervo erS 5) er ecr viderso and mechanisms ostc es pre identified tudyS Chaptot vic vic espondroty ser ser ernancev impair issue (Refer ertaw ertaw capacit Go or tariff-settinge tariffs int of and tiv wlo needs om-up eesy tiona Problem Bott Ineffec erlyvo estmenvin Emplo motiv sumer B School Inspections A P P E N D I X T Field workers were unable to obtain hisdatashowsaheavybiasforinformationoninputsratherthanimpact. from district-level education officials a In addition, the lack of personnel, computerization and other resources sample of the inspection kits used for at the district level worsens this bias by focusing on information to meet monitoring. Instead, officials provided MOE requirements which is in itself very much focused on inputs. them with a list of data that is gathered There are different types of inspection conducted by district-level school during these visits by district officials inspectors: a) general control; b) parametric, c) special (upon request by a teacher, and the list of data forwarded up to the or parent to follow up on complaint); and d) one day control (which aims at evalu- Ministry. ating teaching quality and school environment including school temperature). Each type of control has its own objectives. The parametric control is meant to be completed once in a year for each school. It establishes the following: 1. Social economic situation of the location 2. Data about students: No of students, no of students from large families, num- ber of students from monoparental and biparental families, number of stu- dents from non poor families, No of children with disabilities, no of children who committed deliquesces etc. 3. Managerial team of the school: the constitution and for how long they work togethero 4. The structure of school personnel according to studies, age, professional grade 5. How the educational process is assured with needed reference materials 6. How the school gestionates its financial and material resources 7. The activity plan of the school The general control takes about a week. The objective is to gather data on: 1. School activity 2. Organization of the school 3. Efficiency of the spreading of the information vertically and horizontally in school 4. Internal Regulation 5. Activity planning 93 94 C H A N G I N G T H E W AY O U R S E R V I C E S A R E G O V E R N E D ? 6. School Plan for the next 5 years 7. The quality of educational process 8. The quality of students' education 9. School activity with children and vulnerable families; 10. Class attendance 11. The quality of teachers training department in the school 12. The use of school assets 13. Hygienic and esthetic state of the school 14. Methods that the school uses for evaluating its work 15. School heating (temperature, period of heating etc) 16. Reports on the general school meetings 17. Data about meetings with parents (how many times a year, percentage of parents' attendance etc.) The Inspectors analyze (i.e. check the number, whether they are in order and up to date) the follow- ing school papers: 1. Lists of the students from every grade 2. Lists with the students who enrolled and left the school 3. List of the students who do not attend school 4. Lists of the students with mental and physical disabilities who were excluded from general list 5. The requests of parents whose children are not any more studding in that school. These requests has to have the address of the school their children go to 6. Students personal records (files) 7. Teachers personal records (files) 8. Qualification grades (levels) of the teachers 9. No of children who graduate the school 10. School Activity plan, Monthly plan; and reports on the teachers and school administration meet- ings, etc. After the control is carried out, inspectors write a report and organize a meeting with the school administration and teachers and present the results of school activity and control findings. The report is then submitted to the Rayon (District) Department. The information given by Rayon (District) Educational department to the Ministry of Education: 1. Data about school attendance for every school and general for rayon 2. The nutrition of primary classes students (Number of children fed per week) 3. How much fuel school needs per week 4. The lists of young teachers (recent graduates) 5. The level qualification of teachers 6. Extracurricular work of the school 7. School training department activity (how teachers improve the quality of teaching) 8. The activity of the school library. S C H O O L I N S P E C T I O N S 95 9. List of the pensioned teachers who work and also the lists of the ones who do not work 10. Mayoralty (Local Primaria) Fund for school 11. Rate of child death 12. School activities organized for students rest 13. The shortage of teachers (what subjects do the school have shortage of teachers, period) 14. The provision of the school with technological means (material) 15. Cultural and art activities organized by school 16. Lists of the children who come from poor families 17. Lists of the children who left for abroad (Parents took with them) 18. The provision of the school with books 19. School endowment with computers 20. Data about teachers (years of work, studies, number of hours taught etc) 21. Students results at school (they structure the data by grades [1-10]) 22. Students results on exams per school and per rayon 23. Students results on local and rayon educational competitions on specific subjects 24. Lists of the students with disabilities 25. The fluctuation of students per rayon