Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00003344 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H4970, TF-96439, TF-94654) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.1 MILLION (US$ 15 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI FOR AN EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND TRANSITIONAL REINTEGRATION PROJECT Global Practice Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience (GSURR) Country Department AFCE1 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective on October 31, 2014) Currency Unit = Burundi Francs (BIF) US$1.00 = BIF 1,562 FISCAL YEAR 2014 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing AFRVP Africa’s Office of the Vice President APPMs Armed Political Parties and Movements BETF Bank Executed Trust Fund CAAF/G Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups CAS Country Assistance Strategy CD Country Director CFDC Centre Familial de Dévelopment Communautaire CFDR Compte Fiduciaire de Décaissement Rapide CNDD-FDD Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie CNDRR National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration D&R Demobilization and Reintegration DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration EDRRP Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project EDTRP Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project FA Financing Agreement FNL Forces Nationales de la Libération FNL-D Forces Nationales de la Libération-Dissidents FPs Focal Points GDP Gross Domestic Product GoB Government of Burundi HI Handicap International IA Implementing Agency IGAs Income Generating Activities IPs Implementing Partners IRC International Rescue Committee ISR Implementation Status and Results M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MIS Management Information System MTR Mid-Term Review PDO Project Development Objectives PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence TAs Technical Assistants TCT Technical Coordination Team TSA Transitional Subsistence Allowance UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Philippe Dongier Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Markus Kostner (acting) Task Team Leader: Leanne Bayer ICR Task Team Leader: Natacha Lemasle BURUNDI Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ........................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................... 4 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...................................................................................................... 10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................... 15 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance.................................................................. 15 6. Lessons Learned.................................................................................................................... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ....................... 17 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...................................................................................... 18 Annex 2. Outputs by Component .............................................................................................. 20 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ............................................................................. 31 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ......................... 34 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ....................................................................................... 36 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ............................................................... 41 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................................. 42 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ................................... 50 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents................................................................................... 51 Annex 10. List of interviews conducted for ICR preparation…………………………………53 Annex 11. Synergies……………………………………..……………………………………56 MAP Datasheet A. Basic Information Emergency Demobilization and Country: Burundi Project Name: Transitional Reintegration Project IDA-H4970,TF-96439, Project ID: P113506 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-94654 ICR Date: 12/08/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: BURUNDI Original Total USD 15.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 10.55M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 9.98M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/18/2008 Effectiveness: 09/25/2009 04/10/2010 09/09/2011 09/22/2011 10/16/2012 Appraisal: 02/02/2009 Restructuring(s): 12/03/2012 12/21/2012 12/23/2013 05/26/2014 Approval: 06/16/2009 Mid-term Review: 10/18/2010 11/08/2010 IDA Grant: 12/30/2013 / Closing: 12/31/2011 MDTF: 06/30/2014 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 100 100 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 100 100 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Philippe Dongier John McIntire Practice Markus Kostner Ian Bannon Manager/Manager: Project Team Leader: Leanne Michelle Bayer Marcelo Jorge Fabre ICR Team Leader: Natacha Caroline Lemasle ICR Primary Author: Natacha Caroline Lemasle F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces-Dissidents; and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex- Combatants demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) n/a (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Number of demobilized/released out of the total number eligible (Disaggregate: Indicator 1 : FNL adults demobilized, Dissidents adults demobilized, minors released) 100% (4,950 FNL, Value 1,554 FNL-D, (quantitative or 0 100% including 380 qualitative) minors) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/30/2010 Comments (incl. % 100% of demand for demobilization was met. achievement) Percentage of beneficiaries (and/or families in the case of children) reporting using the majority of reinsertion support to provide for basic needs for Indicator 2 : themselves and/or dependents (Disaggregate adults and children: Gender, FNL/FNL-D/EDRRP, disabled) 92.9% - (including: 92.8% of men adults, 95.9% of women adults, 92.1% of FNL, Value 91.8% of FNL-D, (quantitative or 0 70% 94.8% of EDRRP, qualitative) 95.3% of Disabled, 87.2 of children - children not disaggregated by Gender or affiliation). Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 Comments Data presented here slightly differs from last ISR that included preliminary (incl. % results of the final survey. achievement) Percentage of beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to Indicator 3 : that of their peers in their community (Disaggregated: Gender, Adult/Child, EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, ill/disabled adults). Value 60.8% in 2010, (quantitative or 0 70% 60.2% in 2011, qualitative) 46.9% in 2012. Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012 Comments Indicator on economic reintegration was revised and rephrased in 2013, as it was (incl. % too difficult to measure and subject to bias (see indicator 4 below). achievement) Percentage of beneficiaries who contribute more than 50% of the household Indicator 4 : income (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP, ill/disabled) 63.98% (including: 68.1% of men adults, 31.6% of Value women adults, 64.9 (quantitative or 70% n/a of EDRRP, 62.4% qualitative) of FNL, 67.3% of FNL-D, 55.7% of disabled, and 49.8% of minors) Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/19/2014 06/19/2014 No target stipulated. Other data show ex-combatants' successful economic Comments reintegration (Annex 2): ex-combatants have better access to employment than (incl. % their peers in communities and access to shelter for ex-combatants improved achievement) continuously during implementation. Percentage of beneficiaries who report greater social acceptance by their Indicator 5 : communities than during the first three months after demobilization/release (Disaggregate: Gender, child/adult, EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, ill/disabled adults) 86.1% (including 56.4% better accepted, and 29.7% feeling the same level as acceptance - with same or better Value Year 1: 60%, Year acceptance for (quantitative or 0 2: 90%, Year 3: 86.5% of adult qualitative) 90% men, 85.3% of adult women, 86.7% of EDRRP, 86.1% of FNL, 86.4% of FNL-D. 86.5%, 86.5 of Disabled, 86.1% of minors). Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 Comments Target was almost reached. The slight shortcoming could be a transitional (incl. % setback explained by pre-2015 election tensions or commodity prices increase. achievement) Number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve medical progress as Indicator 6 : intended by their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D/EDRRP, medical handicap severity level) 518 in May 2011 (28% of estimated 1,800 caseload), 1,270 in December 2011 (48% of 2,643 Value identified (quantitative or 0 80% caseload), 1,870 in qualitative) July 2012, (62% of 3,002 identified caseload), 2,071 in December 2012 (61% of 3,395 identified caseload) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012 Comments Indicator was revised in 2013, due to complexity of measuring "medical (incl. % progress"(See revised indicator 7 below). achievement) Percentage of identified disabled ex-combatants who received all foreseen Indicator 7 : treatment as identified in their medical treatment plan (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL-FNL-D/ medical handicap severity) 93.5% (3,307 out of Value the 3,538 identified (quantitative or 0 90% caseload - no qualitative) disaggregated data available) Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014 Comments Target of 90% exceeded with 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants who received all (incl. % foreseen treatment as identified in their medical treatment plan. achievement) Number of eligible severely disabled ex-combatants who received a house under Indicator 8 : the conditions stipulated by the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL, FNL-D, EDRRP) 150 (100% of Value 100% of eligible eligible) (quantitative or 0 beneficiaries (Disaggregated data qualitative) not available) Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014 Comments (incl. % 100% of eligible beneficiaries received a house. achievement) Indicator 9 : Direct project beneficiaries Value 0 10,112 (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/19/2014 Comments (incl. % n/a achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Number of ex-combatants who are registered, receive non-transferable ID cards, Indicator 1 : and have their data captured in the MIS (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D) 100% - 6,504 adults (including 245 Value women adults and (quantitative 0 Year 1: 100% 6,259 men adults; or qualitative) 4,950 FNL, and 1,554 FNL-D) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2010 Comments 100% of eligible beneficiaries received an ID card and had their personal data (incl. % registered in year 1. achievement) Number of identified minors reunified with family or placed in alternative care Indicator 2 : arrangements (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D) Value (quantitative 0 Year 1: 100% 626 (100%) or qualitative) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2010 Comments 100% of eligible children were reunited with families or placed in alternative (incl. % care arrangements in year 1. achievement) Number of conflict affected people to whom benefits have been delivered during Indicator 3 : the first year of the project. Value (quantitative 8,616 or qualitative) Date achieved 06/19/2014 Comments Indicator added in 2013, as part of the revision of the RF under AF (as per new (incl. % guidelines on conflict core indicators). achievement) Number of adults that receive timely reinsertion support as stipulated in the Indicator 4 : project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D) Value 98.75% (8,033 (quantitative 0 95% including: 1,536 or qualitative) EDRRP, 4943 FNL, 1553 FNL-D, data disaggregated by gender not available). Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 98.75% received reinsertion support as per the project manual (within 3, 6, and 9 Comments months of demobilization). Data presented here differs slightly from the ISR (incl. % (data presented in the ISR includes all reinsertion benefits provided regardless of achievement) timing). Number of children that receive appropriate (ie in kind, to families) and timely Indicator 5 : reinsertion support as stipulated in the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, EDRRP, FNL, FNL-D) 95.2% - 596 out of 626 caseload) (including 316 Value FNL, 40 FNL-D, (quantitative 0 95% 240 EDRRP, data or qualitative) disaggregated by Gender not available). Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 Comments 95 % target met with 95.2%. Note that data presented here differs slightly from (incl. % data in the ISR that reported on beneficiaries of at least one of the three tranches achievement) of payment. Data reported here reflects beneficiaries of all three tranches. Number of adults that receive appropriate and timely reintegration support as Indicator 6 : stipulated in the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, EDRRP, FNL, FNL-D, kind of reintegration support, able/disabled) 99.7 % - 7,417 out of 7,441 eligible (including 254 women / 7,163 Value men, 932 EDRRP, (quantitative 0 90% 4,936 FNL, 1,549 or qualitative) FNL-D, 762 disabled ex- combatants, and 620 minors) Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 Comments (incl. % 99.7% received reintegration support. achievement) Number of children that receive appropriate reintegration support as stipulated in Indicator 7 : the project manual (Disaggregate: EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, kind of reintegration support) Value 99% - 620 received (quantitative 0 100% reintegration or qualitative) support. Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014 Comments 99% of children received reintegration support (timeliness not stipulated in (incl. % project manual). 85.4% of children received reintegration support within 18 achievement) months after demobilization (on average sooner than the rest of the caseload). Number of associations supported by the project that receive transitional Indicator 8 : economic reintegration support Value (quantitative 0 634 721 or qualitative) Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014 Comments (incl. % Number of associations supported exceeded target. achievement) Number of handicapped ex-combatants who receive timely medical intervention Indicator 9 : (rehabilitation and/or treatment) (Disaggregate: Gender, EDRRP, FNL,FNL-D, medical handicap severity level, support in progress/complete) Value Year 1: 20%, year (quantitative 0 2: 60%, year 3: n/a or qualitative) 100% Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012 Comments This indicator was dropped in 2013 (redundant with revised indicator PDO 7 (incl. % above). achievement) Number of beneficiaries trained in conflict mitigation (Disaggregate: ex- Indicator 10 : combatants (FNL, FNL-D, CNDD-FDD), local authorities). 100% - 1,644 (including 947 community Value members - (quantitative 0 90% Disaggregated data or qualitative) for ex-combatant military affiliation not available) Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 Comments 100% of 1,644 identified beneficiaries received training. Data slightly differs (incl. % from data reported in ISR because the ISR does not include the 118 who received achievement) training under the original project. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/23/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.00 2 05/24/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.76 3 09/19/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.27 4 09/19/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.27 5 04/30/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.76 6 10/10/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.85 7 04/24/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.92 8 10/28/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.00 9 05/26/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.57 10 07/04/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.55 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings Amount Board at Disbursed at Restructur Approved Restructuring Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Key ing Date(s) PDO in USD Changes Made Change DO IP millions (IDA funds only) Cancellation of US$ 5 million equivalent IDA. During project preparation it was foreseen that the project would be funded through a US$10 million IDA grant and a US$12.5 million MDTF. The IDA allocation was increased to US$15 million prior to the Board meeting to cover a potential short-term shortfall of 04/10/2010 N S S 6.21 donor contributions to the MDTF. An MDTF Grant of US$ 12.5 million became effective on April 21, 2010, covering the full project cost. Pursuant to Section 6.03, paragraph 6 of the General Conditions of the Financing Agreement, the Country Director (CD) approved the cancellation of the equivalent of US$5 million from the IDA Grant. IDA Grant no cost extension from December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2012. In response to the slow progress 09/09/2011 N MS MS 9.27 in provision of medical support (limited local capacity) as well as to the need to improve the variety of economic reintegration support. Extension of MDTF (TF96439) to match the extension of the IDA grant, 09/22/2011 S S 9.27 from December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2012. Reallocation of MDTF funds including the allocation of unallocated funds and 10/16/2012 S S 9.85 an increase in Category 3 (from 2.7 to 10.1%) (Operational costs), due to project extension. IDA Grant no cost extension from 12/03/2012 N S S 9.85 December 31, 2012 to December 30, ISR Ratings Amount Board at Disbursed at Restructur Approved Restructuring Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Key ing Date(s) PDO in USD Changes Made Change DO IP millions (IDA funds only) 2013. The extension was due to slow progress in implementation of the medical component. All targets were achieved by the end of the project. Extension of MDTF (TF96439) to match the extension of the IDA grant, 12/21/2012 S S 9.85 from December 31, 2012 to December 30, 2013. Reallocation of IDA funds including the allocation of unallocated funds as well as a decrease in Category 2 (from 22.1 to 5.73%) (Goods, works, non- 12/23/2013 S S 10.00 consulting services, consultants’ and Training) and an increase in Category 3 (from 13.2 to 19.7 %) (Operational costs), in response to project extension. Reallocation of MDTF to cover increased expenses in Category 2 (from 16.5 to 36.2%), (works related to 05/26/2014 S S 10.00 construction of houses) due to an increase in commodity prices between February 2013 and January 2014. I. Disbursement Profile 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country Context: Since the early 1990s, the Great Lakes Region had been embroiled in a series of closely interlinked conflicts. In Burundi, the most recent period of violence started in 1993 following the assassination of the democratically-elected President Melchior Ndadaye during a coup attempt. In August 2000, Burundi began emerging from seven years of brutal civil war upon the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The country made a successful transition to a multi- party system of government between 2000 and 2005. Social indicators sharply deteriorated as a result of the civil war. At appraisal, Burundi ranked 167 out of 177 countries in the 2007/2008 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. Burundi was from the onset and remains today, a fragile country, with all the challenges it entails for project implementation (including limited in-country capacity and instability). Sector Context: A first diplomatic breakthrough occurred on August 28, 2000 when 19 Burundian parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces Nationales de la Libération-Palipehutu (FNL-P) were absent from the Arusha process and continued their armed struggle against the government. A comprehensive cease-fire agreement between the Government of Burundi (GoB) and a portion of CNDD-FDD was finally signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on November 16, 2003. In response to a GoB request to the World Bank, the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (EDRRP) - the first of the two Demobilization and Reintegration (D&R) projects - was prepared and approved by the World Bank Board of Directors on March 18, 2004. This first D&R operation was supported through an IDA grant of US$36 million and a complementary grant from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of US$41.8 million. The EDRRP closed on December 31, 2008. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Alignment with High Level Objectives: In light of EDRRP’s closure and the recognition of pending activities required for the consolidation of the peace process, the continued support to D&R in Burundi was an urgent strategic priority. In addition, following the successful conclusion of peace negotiations and the transformation of the FNL into a political party, there was a demand for D&R from the FNL. The proposed activity was to directly contribute to the achievement of the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS FY09-12) for Burundi, particularly CAS Outcome 2.1: “Improved reintegration of ex - combatants and vulnerable groups”. The new operation would allow for continued support to a key element of the Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP I)—improve governance and security—through the coordinated use of IDA resources and a single-purpose Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) supported by key development partners. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The objective of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (EDTRP) is to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces-Dissidents; and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex-Combatants demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex- Combatants. 1 Key original PDO level Indicators: 1. Number of demobilized/released from FNL and Dissidents out of total number eligible (disaggregated by adults and minors, gender, and ill/disabled) 2. Percentage of beneficiaries (and/or families, in the case of children) reporting using the majority of reinsertion support to provide for basic needs for themselves and/or dependents (disaggregated by adult/child, gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled) 3. (a) Percentage of beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to that of their peers in their community (disaggregated by adult/child, gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled) 3. (b) Percentage of beneficiaries who report greater social acceptance by their communities than during the first three months after demobilization/release (disaggregated by adult/child, gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled) 3. (c) Number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve medical progress as intended by their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen (disaggregated by gender, EDRP/FNL/Dissident/PNDDR, medical handicap severity level) 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification Given the satisfactory performance of the project, strong commitment from the GoB to provide housing for severely disabled ex-combatants as well as the availability of resources (MDTF balance), the GoB requested Additional Financing (AF) from the Bank to provide housing for severely disabled ex-combatants among other activities aimed at strengthening support to vulnerable groups. An AF of US$ 7.9 million (US$4.25 million funded by MDTF and US$3.63 million by the GoB) was approved by the Executive Directors on August 26, 2013 and became effective on November 26, 2013. PDO level indicators were modified as follows (note that there were also changes in intermediate indicators): Revisions to PDO indicators Rationale for Change Parent project Restructuring 3a. % of beneficiaries who report Revised Previous indicator was being in a similar economic 3a. % of beneficiaries who contribute subjective and prone to bias. situation to that of their peers in more than 50% to the household income their community Disaggregate: gender; FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled (adults) 3c. # of handicapped ex-combatants Revised “Medical progress” was not who achieve medical progress as 3c. # of identified disabled ex-combatants defined, and too complex a intended by their individual who received all foreseen treatment as concept to be adequately rehabilitation or treatment regimen.” identified in their medical treatment plan. measured for such a large Disaggregate: gender; Target was revised from 80% to 90%, in caseload of beneficiaries. EDRP/FNL/Dissident/PNDDR; light of the progress of provision of medical handicap severity level medical support. N/A New Additional PDO indicator to 3d. # of eligible severely disabled ex- measure provision of combatants who receive a house under additional benefits. the conditions stipulated by the project manual Disaggregate: FNL/Dissidents/PNDDR N/A New Addition of Core indicator to 3e. Direct Project Beneficiaries (number), measure the overall number of of which female (%) beneficiaries of the project. 2 1.4 Main Beneficiaries, As per the Project Paper, the project’s main beneficiaries included: (i) a limited caseload of approximately 1,500 beneficiaries remaining from the previous project (EDRRP) (reinsertion, reintegration, and medical services), (ii) up to 5,000 FNL combatants and 1,564 FNL-D (demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration), and (iii) up to 600 children associated with the armed groups FNL and FNL-D (specialized services for reintegration). Further, the GoB would receive implementation support assistance to preserve its operational and technical capacity to demobilize and reintegrate combatants from the FNL and FNL-D. By the end of the project: (i) 1,630 beneficiaries from the EDRRP received reinsertion and reintegration support, (ii) 4,950 FNL combatants and 1,554 FNL-D along with 626 children associated with FNL and FNL-D received D&R support, and (iii) 3,538 disabled ex-combatants received medical support. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) Component 1: Demobilization of FNL and FNL-D forces including encampment, sensitization, validation of combatant status, registration, socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants, surveying expectations for reintegration, pre-discharge orientation programs, medical triage, voluntary counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS, and transport support to communities of return. Component 2: Reinsertion support of new demobilized ex-FNL and ex-FNL-D, including reinsertion kits and a monetized unconditional cash transfer allowance (known as transitional subsistence allowance) as well as extensive counseling and orientation during the pre-discharge orientation (PDO) process. A small caseload from the previous program received the outstanding payments of their reinsertion support. Component 3: Transitional socio-economic reintegration support for all demobilized adult ex-combatants, as well as a small pending caseload from the EDRRP, to include beneficiaries’ selection of their personal reintegration path. Transitional economic reintegration included a range of interventions such as the provision of scholarships, employment opportunities, vocational and skills training, and microenterprise generation and promotion (including training on basic business development, accounting skills, and promotion of associations). Further, transitional social reintegration included the provision of information and sensitization events with ex-combatants and communities, fostering reconciliation, psycho-social trauma counseling, and HIV/AIDS counseling and referral. Component 4: Support to vulnerable groups included specialized support and/or additional protection to vulnerable groups including children associated with armed forces, female ex- combatants, and disabled ex-combatants. 1.6 Revised Components Component 3 and component 4 were revised under the AF to include additional activities as follows: Component 3: Transitional socio-economic reintegration support to include: (a) provision of conflict mitigation training to ex-combatants and their host communities; (b) provision of technical assistance to relevant local associations of ex-combatants; and (c) provision of psycho- social counselling and gender sensitization. 3 Component 4: Support to vulnerable groups with a focus on disabled ex-combatants through: (a) construction of disability-appropriate houses; (b) provision of specialized medical support; (c) implementation of training activities to support the autonomy and general health of the disabled ex-combatants; and (d) communications strategy to ensure timely and transparent communication on the provision of houses. 1.7 Other significant changes Cancellation of US$5 million IDA grant. During project preparation it was foreseen that the project would be funded through a US$10 million IDA grant and a US$12.5 million MDTF. The IDA allocation was increased to US$15 million prior to the Board meeting to cover a potential short-term shortfall of donor contributions to the MDTF. An MDTF Grant of US$ 12.5 million became effective on April 21, 2010, covering the full project cost. Pursuant to Section 6.03, paragraph 6 of the General Conditions of the Financing Agreement, the Country Director (CD) approved the cancellation of the equivalent of US$5 million from the IDA Grant on April 20, 2010. Extensions. Two consecutive one year, no-cost extensions of the IDA grant and the MDTF (from December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2012 and from December 31, 2012 to December 30, 2013)—responding to the slow progress in provision of medical support (related to limited local capacity) as well as to the need to improve the variety of economic reintegration support —were approved by the CD. In addition, project activities were extended until June 30, 2014 through additional financing to the MDTF. The MDTF’s extension at the trustee level (extended from June 30, 2012 to December 31, 2014) resulting in an extension of the MDTF for more than two years, was approved by the Africa Region’s Office of the Vice President (AFRVP). Reallocations. Three reallocations of funds were approved by the CD: (i) reallocation of MDTF funds including the allocation of unallocated funds and an increase in Category 3 (from 2.7 to 10.1%) (Operational costs) on October 16, 2012, (ii) reallocation of the original IDA Grant on December 23, 2013 including the allocation of unallocated funds as well as a decrease in Category 2 (from 22.1 to 5.73%) (Goods, works, non-consulting services, consultants’ and Training) and an increase in Category 3 (from 13.2 to 19.7 %) (Operational costs), in response to project extension, and (iii) reallocation of MDTF funds under the AF on May 26, 2014 to cover increased expenses in Category 2 (from 16.5 to 36.2%), (works related to construction of houses) due to an increase in commodity prices between February 2013 and January 2014 (note that this reallocation does not appear in the data sheet, because the project code for the AF to the MDTF was not linked to the parent project at the time of the finalization of this ICR). 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry The Burundi National Commission for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), established on August 28, 2003, was the implementing agency for the Burundi EDRRP (2004-2008). The EDRRP demobilized over 26,000 adult ex-combatants, supported the release of over 3,000 children associated with the fighting forces, and provided reinsertion support to approximately 29,000 former Gardiens de la Paix and combattants militants. Several activities initiated under the EDRRP were not completed (reintegration, support to children associated with armed forces and disabled ex-combatants). This caseload was transferred to the second project, the EDTRP. The previous project was rated moderately unsatisfactory, due to financial management issues, and shortcomings in the provision of reintegration benefits, among other issues. 4 Soundness of background analysis and project design. The EDTRP was designed based on lessons learnt from the previous project, with a simplified implementation framework, and activities organized around clear components articulated around the project’s PDOs. Lessons learnt from the EDRRP successfully incorporated in project design included: (i) Project implementation by a small technical coordination team with project activities mostly outsourced to implementing agencies. The project Technical Coordination Team (TCT) was significantly reduced in scope in comparison with the EDRRP and staffed with competitively recruited technical personnel. This successfully contributed to de-politicize the project and ensure high technical capacity of project staff. (ii) Highly qualified financial and procurement staff were included in the TCT to verify financial and procurement tasks with support from an independent international consultant. (iii) An active role for the NCDRR. The appointment of a D&R advisor to the President proved crucial to solving issues as they arose and ensuring strong Government ownership. (iv) A single-purpose, single country MDTF with an associated trust fund committee. While the previous project was co-financed by the MDRP, IDA funds and a single country, single purpose MDTF including a Bank Executed Trust Fund (BETF) were combined in the new project. This was key in providing flexible and responsive assistance to the borrower’s needs as well as ensuring the presence of a Bank field-based staff to ensure close monitoring and support to the project. (v) Improved communications. During the EDRRP’s implementation, many negative reactions among beneficiaries could have been minimized through adequate communication. The new project included a communications specialist, specifically recruited for this task, who closely monitored the impact of the communications strategy and regularly updated it. Risk assessment. Risks were overall candidly and accurately identified in both the parent project and the AF: (i) risk of insecurity and political instability in Burundi, and (ii) related potential reputational risk for the Bank supporting an operation closely tied to both political and security issues. Mitigation measures included: (i) ensuring the program remained a key priority for the GoB; (ii) close harmonization with other members of the international community, and (iii) clear analysis of options and exit strategies if conditions deteriorate. There was also an acute awareness of the challenges that emerged in the previous project and of the fragility of the implementation environment. The main risks and mitigation measures identified at the project level were: (i) Weak institutional capacity and weak financial and procurement management: This was addressed through: (a) project implementation by a small technical and competitively recruited team, including financial management and procurement experts, (b) hiring of a DDR expert based in Bujumbura through the Bank Executed portion of the MDTF, and (c) hiring of a World Bank international financial management consultant to provide technical support to the TCT; (ii) Potential perceptions of CNDD-FDD versus FNL demobilization and reintegration program: The project was designed based on the principle of parity with benefits provided to ex- combatants during the EDRRP; (iii) Real or perceived gap in support for demobilization and reintegration: Provision of US$4 million retroactive financing to avoid gaps in the provision of benefits; and (iv) A short-fall in future financing due to lack of support for the MDTF: US$5 million additional IDA allocation was agreed to mitigate the risk of underfunding from donors. 5 While a number of mitigation measures aimed at addressing limited in-country capacity were employed through highly competitive recruitment and provision of technical assistance, limited availability of medical and psychosocial services was not clearly identified as a specific challenge, despite being signaled in a 2005 disability report commissioned under the previous project (Jadin and Minani, 2005). Along with other issues that could not have been predicted, including higher than anticipated caseload of disabled ex-combatants from the previous project, this resulted in the slow identification and provision of support to disabled ex-combatants and two successive project extensions, was eventually addressed and successfully implemented. In the AF, additional project level risks were also accurately identified and adequately mitigated: (i) Potential negative reactions from ex-combatants not selected to receive housing: This was mitigated efficiently through: (a) clear selection criteria, and (b) a communication strategy to ensure transparency and prevent conflicts; (ii) Availability of land for the construction of houses for disabled ex-combatants: Close collaboration with the GoB for the pre-selection of land during project preparation, and provision of Government-owned land plots for construction; and (iii) Complexity of procurement and management of multiple contracts with construction firms in multiple locations and within a short timeframe. This was addressed through: (a) recruitment of a full time engineer by the TCT to augment quality control and supervision, (b) provision of additional training for the TCT procurement specialist, and (c) recruitment of an international engineer to support the Bank team during critical stages. 2.2 Implementation Project implementation was characterized by efficient demobilization and reintegration processes, with the project addressing project and context-related issues in an efficient and timely manner. Overall economic context. In 2009 when the project started, inflation was high at 11% but decreased in the following years. The inflation rate, however, increased again in 2012 and reached 18.0%. This unpredictable increase impacted the construction of specialized housing for disabled ex-combatants as the budget had been prepared on the basis of a lower inflation rate (this was addressed through reallocation). During project implementation, GDP growth steadily increased while unemployment remained stable around 7.8% for the general population and 12.9% for youth (in parallel, unemployment for ex-combatants consistently decreased) (see PDO outcome section). Political context and conflict mitigation. In the aftermath of the May 2010 communal elections, Burundi experienced escalating violence. The opposition political parties including the FNL garnered fewer votes nationally than expected and pulled out of subsequent elections (legislative and presidential elections in July and August 2010) citing election fraud by the ruling party. The ruling party went on to win at all levels (communal, legislative, and presidential). Opposition political parties organized themselves politically into a coalition called Ikibiri ADC. The FNL was the only political party in the coalition that comprised of ex-combatants. Following the political breakdown between the ruling party and opposition parties, some FNL militants in Bujumbura Rural mobilized into armed gangs. Clashes between these gangs and local police rapidly escalated. The ruling party mobilized an offensive in Bujumbura Rural comprised of local police, intelligence agents, and members of the ruling party’s (CNDD-FDD) Youth wing (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Eventually, violence spread throughout the country (International Crisis Group, 2011 and 2012). Ahead of the 2010 elections, the project had formalized a network of ex- combatant representatives including technical assistants and focal points (annex 2). This played a strong function for ex-combatants to report back concerns and issues to the TCT. The Mid Term Review (MTR) noted that ex-combatants reported feeling intimidated in their local communities, 6 while some were put in jail or interrogated by intelligence services. In response to increased tensions, the project provided conflict mitigation training to IPs and representatives of ex- combatants. The training evaluation indicated that participants felt equipped to successfully address conflicts, especially those between local governments and ex-combatants. Based on the positive results of the training evaluation, this activity was scaled up under the AF and extended to members of the municipal administration, ex-combatants, and community leaders. In 2011 and 2012 in particular, the TCT and IPs also played a strong role in advocating for ex-combatants from the FNL in cases where they were harassed or arrested, which again further emphasizes successful project de-politicization. Development context and synergies. The project was designed to establish synergies with development partners to complement project implementation. While the MTR noted that it was a challenge to establish long term synergies, the project managed to collaborate with key partners to support the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (see annex 11 for a full list of all partnerships established): (i) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Bureau des Nations United au Burundi (BNUB), and the GoB provided support to 10,186 adults associated with FNL combatants (including 1,051 women)(UNDP, 2010). (ii) The International Rescue Committee (IRC) provided support through Villages de Paix to children whose family members could not be traced. (iii) UNICEF and the African Union contributed to the reinsertion and demobilization of children through the provision of reinsertion benefits and vocational training to 150 children. (iv) The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) supported Handicap International (HI) from 2010 to 2013 through a full time international prosthetics expert at the Centre National d'Appareillage et de Réadaptation (CNAR). This partnership helped build local capacity and accelerate the provision of prosthetics to disabled ex-combatants while ensuring that prosthetics continued to be provided to the rest of the population in parallel. In addition, HI provided economic reintegration support to 2,020 disabled ex-combatants (Handicap International, 2013). In-country capacity context. Coordination and capacity building of implementing partners. The TCT had a centralized structure and was intentionally organized around a small technical team coordinating the work of 11 Implementing Partners (IPs). The project recruited an umbrella organization to avoid bottlenecks in coordination and payment of IPs, as well as to ensure close field monitoring and consistency of approaches. IPs interviewed identified this decision as key to overcoming bottlenecks, avoiding delays, and building their management and planning skills. Psycho-social support. The EDTRP is one of the pioneer D&R projects to include psycho-social trauma counselling. Psycho-social support, however, proved challenging due to limited in- country mental health structures and capacity, limited field presence of the mental health IP, and ex-combatant reticence in admitting the need for mental health support. To address the limited field presence, the project added three psychosocial assistants between 2012 and 2013 (from 20 to 23). Eventually, all identified cases benefitted from some type of mental health support. When the original grant closed, the caseload of psychiatric and epileptic cases was transferred to the medical team who provided them with treatment until the project closed. Issues were not entirely overcome, however, as an evaluation conducted found the frequency of the various types of support received by beneficiaries to be low (annex 2). Medical support. The MTR noted a number of external constraints negatively affecting the implementation of the medical component: (i) underestimation of the remaining caseload from 7 the EDRRP (2,982, versus the 1,500 estimated for the old caseload), (ii) limited in-country capacity for the provision of prosthetics and medical services (Handicap International 2012 and 2013), and (iii) limited capacity of the TCT to manage the medical component. Numerous efforts were made to address these challenges including: (i) two project extensions; (ii) hiring of a medical expert to manage disability support within the TCT; (iii) hiring of an international disability expert through the BETF to provide technical support and develop an improved database for disabled ex-combatants, and eventually hiring of a second expert for planning of activities; (iv) hiring of a medical IP to identify the caseload and plan provision of medical support; (v) provision of additional equipment, transport, and staff to the medical IP; (vi) rehabilitation of buildings for increased accessibility at the prosthetics center; (vii) identification of additional service providers for the production of prosthetics; and (viii) increased frequency of coordination meetings with the medical IP. These efforts led to improvements but progress was too slow to guarantee the completion of the medical component before project closure. Eventually, in light of the IP’s low performance, it was decided not to renew the IP’s contract and to integrate the best elements of the medical team into the TCT. Support to disabled ex- combatants improved after the major change to absorb the medical team (graph in annex 2). In the end, 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants received all treatments included in their medical plan. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization M&E Design. The project’s M&E was designed to be supported by a Management Information System (MIS) that recorded all data related to ex-combatants’ status and benefits received. The MIS system was transitioned from the EDRRP with very minor changes. Most indicators were disaggregated by caseload (EDRRP and EDTRP), gender, adult/minor status, and ill/disabled status. Progress was measured with a heavy focus on output indicators (11), versus outcome indicators (3) (revised Results Framework). Some indicators were subject to bias (“percentage of beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to that of their peers in their community”), or not clearly defined (“number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve medical progress as intended by their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen”; “number of handicapped ex-combatants who receive timely medical intervention”, as “medical progress” or “timeliness” were not defined). The Task Team, however, seized the opportunity to improve these indicators with the restructuring of the project for the AF: “percentage of beneficiaries who contribute more than 50% to the household income” was added, assessing economic reintegration in terms of ex-combatants’ financial dependence to their family; and “number of identified disabled ex-combatants who receive all foreseen treatment as identified in their medical treatment plan”, significantly clarifying the two previous indicators on medical support. M&E Implementation. Implementation of M&E by the project was considered best practice, as reflected by the 2012 invitation by the World Bank Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the project M&E specialist to share the experience of the project with other D&R teams. The M&E department consisted of six staff: an M&E Specialist, an MIS Specialist, and four data entry clerks. The staff received technical assistance from the World Bank and the TDRP. An international consultant helped develop a new database to include data related to disabled ex-combatants. The project delivered all quarterly reports, beneficiary surveys, and annual independent evaluations and put in place a rigorous process for data collection and verification. Only one report (the second annual beneficiary survey) was rejected by the TCT due to low quality. In addition, the project undertook an independent evaluation on the provision of psychosocial support and an impact assessment of communication activities. M&E Utilization. MIS data was consistently used to inform management, technical, and budgetary decisions. For example, data on ex-combatants’ area of resettlement was used to divide the 11 reintegration partners in eight operational zones to ensure stronger presence in high density 8 areas. Data on the disabled caseload revealed the slow progress in provision of medical support and precipitated decisions to first strengthen the medical IP, and eventually to integrate the medical staff directly into the TCT. The external evaluation on communication activities led to changes in broadcasting time of radio programs, cancellation of some stations with limited impact, increased coverage of stations with a larger impact, and the cancellation of journal distribution because of lack of impact. The TCT prepared a hand-over strategy upon project closure for the MIS database as part of the project’s hand-over strategy. The MIS database was handed over to the President’s cabinet that became responsible for safekeeping of the sensitive data. A liaison was appointed by the President’s cabinet as a member of the Inventory Commission specifically handling the transfer of the MIS, and the Government MIS expert was trained to manage the database. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Financial Management. The TCT maintained a sound financial management system throughout implementation. The project staff received several trainings on World Bank fiduciary procedures as well as project software. Unaudited Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) were submitted on time and satisfactory. External auditors issued clean audit reports. Management letters from the external auditors did not raise any major issues; there were no overdue audit reports and interim financial reports from the project. The project had a financial management manual, updated as relevant, which detailed key internal control procedures. One designated bank account was opened in a commercial bank for the purposes of project implementation. There were no ineligible expenditures. The project maintained proper books of accounts and prepared the necessary records and books of accounts which adequately identified the goods and services financed out of the Grant proceeds. The overall financial management system was rated as satisfactory during the last supervision missions. Procurement. Initial issues related to non-compliance with the procurement plan in the process of contracting IPs, as well as delays in the renewal of IP contracts causing gaps in implementation of activities, were eventually addressed. Under the AF, multiple contracts with multiple firms for constructions sites countrywide were successfully managed by the procurement department, supported by an engineer hired to review all contracts with constructing firms. The overall procurement performance of the project was rated as satisfactory during the last supervision missions. Safeguards. At appraisal, the project was classified as category B and safeguards policy Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) was triggered. As per the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), each ex-combatant’s micro project (average value of US$390 equivalent) was screened to identify and mitigate potential negative social and environmental impacts. Under the AF, the project remained classified as category B, the ESMF was revised, OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement was triggered, and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared. The TCT hired a Safeguards Specialist to ensure the fulfillment of safeguards requirements under the AF. The project was advised to construct three new houses for Batwa families living in the area of construction sites, similar to the houses for the project beneficiaries and to include additional environmental works at four sites (retaining walls and water canalization). Budget constraints to fulfill safeguards requirements were overcome through: (i) support from a World Bank urban project (PTPGU) that completed the environmental works, and (ii) a US$40,000 transfer from the GoB to the PIU to ensure the construction of the Batwa houses. GoB and the Bank’s collaboration in meeting all safeguards requirements were exceptional and provided for strict compliance with environmental and social safeguards policies and procedures. Per the final mission in October 2014, all environmental works in all the sites 9 were confirmed to be completed. The project was granted a satisfactory rating for overall safeguards during the last supervision missions. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The D&R process is completed and there is no planned follow up operation. The project was to provide transitional economic and social reintegration of eligible ex-combatants. However, notably, several measures were taken to facilitate the sustainability of project gains, including: (i) development of an exit strategy with the GoB to ensure continuity of support to disabled ex- combatants needing permanent care and continued monitoring of ex-combatant issues through the “Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense, (ii) provision of conflict mitigation training to help community leaders, authorities, and ex-combatants prevent conflict escalation, and (iii) design of houses for disabled ex-combatants with local and sustainable materials, and low maintenance features. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The overall relevance of the project is rated substantial. First, the relevance of project objectives is rated high because activities under the project are highly consistent with the Burundi CAS for FY13-16, in particular with Pillar 2 on “increasing resilience by consolidating peace and social stability” and especially with results area 4 on “increasing safety nets to reduce livelihood volatility for the ex-combatants and their family”. Second, project design is rated substantial, as lessons learnt from the previous project were successfully implemented, including through simplifying and de-politicizing the project implementation framework. There were however some shortcomings in the design of the Results Framework. Third, the relevance of project implementation is rated high, because of regular implementation support missions, the recruitment of a field based staff for daily project support, and key highly relevant decisions (including preparation of AF to construct houses for disabled ex-combatants – a high risk given the short timeframe for the completion of the activity in a fragile environment, but an activity extremely well prepared, that responded to an urgent need, and was implemented successfully). 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives PDO 1: Demobilize members of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces – Dissidents The achievement of this PDO is rated high. First, 100% of the 4,950 FNL (5,000 estimated) and 1,554 (1,500 to 1,564 estimated) FNL-D eligible were demobilized (PDO indicator 1.a and b). The project was able to overcome delays in the start due to the late transmission of the list of eligible FNL candidates and completed demobilization activities ahead of schedule. Second, 100% (6,504) of the demobilized received an ID card (Intermediate indicator 1.a). PDO 2: Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex-Combatants demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project with a particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants. Reinsertion: Provision of reinsertion support is rated high. First, the target of 95% of eligible adult ex-combatants receiving reinsertion benefits as per the conditions defined in the project 10 manual (Intermediate indicator 2.a), was exceeded with 98.75% 1 achieved (annex 2). Second, Reinsertion benefits were used for their intended purpose as 92.9% of beneficiaries (70% target as per PDO indicator 2) indicated that they used the majority of their reinsertion benefits to provide for basic needs for themselves and/or their dependents. Transitional Social Reintegration: Provision of social reintegration support is rated substantial. First, social reintegration support was diverse and comprehensive: sensitization and reconciliation, conflict mitigation, and psycho-social trauma counselling (annex 2). Second, under the AF, the target of 90% of identified beneficiaries receiving conflict mitigation training (Intermediate indicator 3.g) was exceeded with 100% of the identified caseload receiving training (total of 1,644). Third, as per the 2014 beneficiary survey, only 86.1% of beneficiaries felt better accepted (56.4%) or felt the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their communities as during the first three months after demobilization (PDO indicator 3.b). The 90% target for greater acceptance was thus almost reached. The slight shortcoming could be only a transitional setback explained by tensions arising in the pre-2015 election period, or increase in commodity prices and related competition for scarce resources (as per the 2013 beneficiary 90.1% of ex-combatants felt better or similarly accepted). This is confirmed by other indicators such as feeling of closeness to neighbors, or participation in community activities (annex 5), confirming a high level of social integration of ex-combatants in communities. Fourth, while quality and frequency of mental health support was found to have limitations (annex 2), the provision of such support is a remarkable effort at addressing a key aspect that few D&R projects undertake, and all identified cases received some type of mental health support. As per the 2014 beneficiary survey, over 85.2% of those who received psychosocial assistance claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic reintegration. Transitional Economic Reintegration: Provision of transitional economic reintegration is rated substantial. First, the target of 95% of beneficiaries receiving reintegration support (Intermediate indicator 3.a) was exceeded with 99.7% receiving reintegration support (total of 7,417, including 4,936 FNL, 1,549 FNL-D, and 932 EDRRP).2 Indicator 3.a however refers to timely provision of benefits as per the PIM. While the PIM does not define timeliness, one assumption is that beneficiaries ideally would receive reintegration support within 18 months after demobilization (when their reinsertion benefits run out). The dataset of the 2011 beneficiary survey indicates that 71.8% of beneficiaries received reintegration support within 18 months after demobilization, and 88% within two years. Second, ex-combatants were encouraged to form or join associations (Revised RF - Intermediate indicator 3c), and the project exceeded the target number of associations to receive support (721 economic associations supported, target of 634) consisting of both ex-combatants (9,407) and community members (23,179), and the 56 best performing ones received additional in-kind support. Third, the initial economic reintegration outcome indicator on ex-combatants’ perception of their situation in comparison to that of their peers (PDO Indicator 3.a) went from 60.8 % in 2010, to 60.2% in 2011, to 46.9% in 2012 (target: 70%). This could have reflected general increasing pressure on households due to high inflation rather than an actual increased difference between ex-combatants and community members. The revised indicator, reflecting financial independence, was almost met with 64% of beneficiaries 1 Data provided here slightly differs from the ISR that present all reinsertion benefits provided. Data provided here only includes reinsertion benefits provided as per the timeline specified in the PIM. See CNDDR and Universalia, Première Evaluation Indépendante du PDRT, 2010, p.15 2 Note that this differs slightly from data in the final ISR, where the overall number for reintegration is accurate, but contains typos in the disaggregated numbers entered in the comments. Data provided here comes from Aide Memoires and the GoB final report. 11 reporting earning more than 50% of the household income (baseline: 70%). Most importantly, numerous indicators in beneficiary surveys indicate successful economic reintegration of beneficiaries with a continuous decrease of unemployment rates (from 9.3% in 2010 to 5.3% in 2014) which contrasts with the relative stability of the unemployment rate of the rest of the population (consistently around 7.8%). In addition, there was an improvement of housing quality with fewer beneficiaries living in huts (from 9.2% in 2011 to 6.8% in 2014) and more in houses (from 84.6% in 2011 to 92.0% in 2014) (annex 5). Support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants. “Particular focus” on support for female, children, and disabled ex-combatants was meant to ensure that (i) vulnerable groups have equal access to project benefits as the rest of the caseload, and (ii) the project paper for the original project states that the project provides “specialized support and/or additional protection to vulnerable groups” (p.11).This was achieved through the design of a specific component dedicated to vulnerable groups, representing 34% of the project total cost (US$10.2 million). Support to female ex-combatants: Support to female ex-combatants is rated substantial. First, female ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision of benefits which they received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload with 100% of eligible female ex- combatants demobilized (245 total for new caseload), 99.6% receiving reinsertion benefits (254 total), and 99.6% (254 total) receiving transitional individual economic reintegration support, including 87.6% within 18 months after demobilization (sooner after demobilization than the rest of the caseload). Second, gender-sensitive support was comprehensive: (i) prioritization of provision of demobilization support to women before the rest of the caseload; (ii) separate areas at the demobilization camps; (iii) gender-sensitive demobilization kits; and (iv) training on household budget management and sexual gender-based violence. Third, by the end of the project, unemployment rate of female ex-combatants (10.0%) was close to that of women in Burundi (8.2%) (annex 5). Support to children ex-combatants: Support to children ex-combatants is rated substantial. First, 100% of the 626 caseload (246 EDRRP and 380 EDTRP) was reunited with families or provided with alternative care (Intermediate indicator 1.b). Second, children received support in similar proportion as the rest of the caseload with 100% demobilized (380 out of the estimated 350 to 400) (PDO indicator 1.c), 95.5% (596 out of 626)3 receiving all three reinsertion payments as defined in the project manual meeting the 95% target (Intermediate indicator 3.b), and 99.0% (620) receiving economic reintegration support (Intermediate indicator 3.b), almost meeting the 100% target, including 85.4% within 18 months after demobilization (sooner than the rest of the caseload) .4 Third, tailored support was provided by two expert IPs and follow up was conducted in collaboration with UNICEF. Fourth, the project adapted support to the changing needs of children, who were on average 17 at the time of demobilization, and who became adults over the course of the project (annex 5). They were encouraged to join associations and were integrated in the adult caseload for follow up by IPs. Fifth, former children ex-combatants (now young adults, mostly male) have equal or better access to employment as their peers in the communities, with only 9.9 % of former children ex-combatants unemployed, versus 12.3% of male youth in Burundi (annex 5). 3 The ISRs report that 99% of children received reinsertion support, but this corresponds to the percentage of children who received at least one of the three tranches of reinsertion payments. The indicator refers to the Project manual, which stipulates that children should receive all three tranches. The total of 596 was established based on lists provided in: CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014, pp. 42-44 4 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 12 Support to disabled ex-combatants: Support to disabled ex-combatants is rated substantial, because: First, disabled ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision of benefits which they received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload, with 100% of eligible disabled ex-combatants demobilized, 99% receiving reinsertion benefits5, and 99.6% receiving transitional individual economic reintegration support. Provision of reintegration support to disabled ex-combatants was slower than for the rest of the caseload (due to identification challenges, and prioritization of medical support), with 57.1% receiving their reintegration benefits within 18 months, and 81.5% within two years after demobilization (dataset analysis of 2011 beneficiary survey). Second, 93.5% (3,307 out of 3,538) of disabled ex-combatants (exceeding the original 80% and the 90% revised targets) received all treatments included in their medical plan (PDO indicator 3.c). While there was no external assessment of the quality or timeliness of medical support, no complaints were received through the elaborate communication system with ex-combatants. According to the 2014 beneficiary survey, 67.3% of disabled ex- combatants stated that they physically felt better after treatment and treatment helped them achieve economic reintegration (annex 5). Third, 100% of eligible severely disabled ex- combatants (150) received specialized houses (PDO indicator 3.d). Fourth, an intermediate indicator on timeliness of medical support in the RF of the parent project (former Intermediate indicator 3.c) was eventually dropped (timeliness was too complex to define and measure at an individual level for such a large caseload). However, provision of medical support to disabled ex- combatants initially progressed slowly due to limited in-country capacity, which led to project extension. This activity would be rated high, but is downgraded to substantial to account for these delays. Aggregation of PDO ratings. Sub-ratings for PDO2 are aggregated based on ratings of its four main components: Reinsertion is rated high, Social Reintegration is rated substantial, Economic Reintegration is rated substantial, and Support to Vulnerable Groups is rated substantial. All ratings are assigned a number on a rating scale from 1 to 4 (from 1 to Negligible to 4 for High), with an average of 3.25, corresponding to a Substantial rating. Based on a high rating for PDO1 and a substantial rating for PDO2, the overall PDO rating is substantial. 3.3 Efficiency Efficiency is rated substantial. First, the project was designed to minimize and control costs through robust financial and procurement controls by the PIU through: (i) recruitment of highly qualified procurement and financial management experts, (ii) verification of financial management by an independent international financial advisor, (iii) recruitment of a medical expert within the TCT and an international disability expert to verify and monitor costs of medical services and equipment, and (iv) recruitment of a local and of an international engineer to help manage contracts with construction firms, and monitor costs of houses. Second, a comparative analysis of unit costs per beneficiary with other D&R projects implemented recently in Central Africa indicates that with a cost of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of US$2,132 per beneficiary, the EDRRP is within the range of efficiency of D&R projects, albeit on the higher end of the spectrum (US$ 2,495 for Burundi EDDRP, US$1,817 for DRC EDRRP, and US$1,786 for Rwanda EDRRP). Average cost per beneficiary for additional specialized support to vulnerable ex-combatants (including medical and housing costs) is substantially higher for Burundi EDTRP with US$2,331 per beneficiary, than in the Rwanda EDRRP with US$778. Higher costs on vulnerable support in Burundi mainly relate to provision of medical support, 5 Disaggregated data on provision of reinsertion benefits to disabled was not available. However, per the 2011 beneficiary survey (p.162-165), 99% disabled ex-combatants interviewed stated they received all reinsertion payments. 13 which required more resources due to significantly more limited in-country capacity. Average cost of houses for disabled ex-combatants (US$358 per square meter) compares favorably to similar houses built for disabled ex-combatants in Rwanda, under the Rwanda Project (US$370 per square meter) (Annex 3). 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory based on high project relevance, an average of substantial PDOs, and substantial efficiency. The rating is consistent with the significant results achieved by the project, in a challenging fragile context. The rating is also consistent with the unique achievements of the project, providing tailored support to vulnerable groups (including female ex-combatants), pioneering provision of mental health support in the field of D&R, and providing medical and housing services for disabled ex-combatants, all rarely included in D&R projects. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Gender aspects. Beyond providing a gender-sensitive approach, the project aimed at promoting gender equality between ex-combatants and their spouses and within communities. The MTR stressed the need to increase project performance on gender aspects. With technical assistance from the World Bank, a Gender Action Plan was established to mainstream gender activities, (training on sexual and gender based violence, cultural activities, radio programming on gender topics, listening clubs, training on women leadership and management of household budget). The project collaborated with the Centre pour le Development Familial with a focus on including gender sensitization as an integral part of each social reintegration activity. Only one activity identified in the action plan, mainly psychosocial support to female ex-combatants, was not completed due to the phasing out of mental health support. Spouse participation in micro-projects significantly increased over time, with 76.7% of beneficiaries indicating that their spouse participated in carrying out their micro-project in 2011 and 93.3% in 2014. Spouse attendance in male ex-combatants’ training however remained low (12.8%), due to lack of child care opportunities, and reluctance from male ex-combatants to include their wives.6 Poverty impacts. The purpose of the project was to provide transitional economic and social support to facilitate ex-combatant reintegration in society at the level of their peers in their communities of resettlement. Most indicators (annex 5) show that this was accomplished. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Institutional strengthening was not a component of the project as D&R activities are transitional by nature. The institution in charge of implementing the project was not intended to outlast the project. It is worth noting, however, that while the TCT will not be sustained after project closure, a national agency was empowered to further coordinate the D&R process. The TCT staff benefitted from continued technical assistance, and the institutional experience and capacity gathered during this process allowed for significant institutional strengthening and capacity building within GoB through the support of the BETF, as emphasized in the counterpart’s ICR.7 6 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, December 2011, p. 218 7 CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014 14 (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) There are no unintended outcomes or impacts that can be measured. An argument could be made that the project was a pioneer in including mental health support to ex-combatants, demonstrating the importance of addressing trauma. Since then, mental health support has been included in the Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project and in the Great Lakes Sexual and Gender Based Violence and Women’s Health Project, to address the needs of SGBV survivors. The project also shed light into the needs of disabled ex-combatants in Burundi, and paved the way for the current collaboration between the Dutch embassy and the GoB to strengthen the capacity of the Kamenge military hospital. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops See annex 5. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial. The risk to development outcome is rated substantial because: (i) the overall political context in Burundi remains uncertain and the upcoming 2015 elections could lead to civil unrest and political instability, and (ii) consolidation of transitional economic and social gains will depend on economic and political stability. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory. Both the parent project and the AF were well designed, allowing for successful implementation, despite initial shortcomings on the design of the results framework and related to mitigation of in-country capacity. First, Project preparation and design were highly relevant to the country context and the Bank’s assistance strategy. The project was able to respond to a critically urgent need from the Government in a timely and efficient manner, including fast project preparation. Second, project design was highly relevant to the PDO, and lessons learnt from the previous project were successfully integrated in project design. Third, main risks were appropriately identified and adequately mitigated (especially fiduciary aspects), despite initial shortcomings in mitigation of limited in-country capacity for medical support. Fourth, the financing arrangements, in particular the US$1.1 million BETF, allowed for responsive assistance to the borrower’s needs through intense supervision and technical assistance which could not have been possible under regular Bank budget. Fifth, while there were issues with the Results Framework, these were rectified during the design of the AF. Sixth, the high quality of the design of the AF (including establishment of clear criteria for land identification, recruitment of international engineer and disability expert for design of house plans, strengthening of TCT team with safeguards and engineering experts, reinforcement of procurement capacity) allowed for the successful construction of houses for disabled ex- combatants in a short timeframe (6 months), in a low capacity and fragile environment. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Satisfactory. First, the Bank closely monitored the achievement of the PDOs through: (i) regular implementation support missions (total of 12 missions, average two per year), (ii) a field- based Bank staff funded through the BETF who played a key role throughout implementation, particularly in the successful implementation of the AF, and (iii) close monitoring of fiduciary compliance, including independent financial reviews, and follow up on safeguards after project closure. Second, the Bank consistently took corrective actions to address project and context- 15 specific challenges, and ensure achievement of PDOs (revision of implementation arrangements to strengthen medical component, strengthening of mental health support, inclusion of conflict mitigation training). Third, the Bank used opportunities to improve project design and implementation (revision of results framework, inclusion of specialized housing for severely disabled ex-combatants). (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory. While it took some adjustments to mitigate all aspects of limited in-country capacity and there were initial shortcomings with the results framework, the Bank designed a highly relevant original project and AF that efficiently responded to urgent needs and achieved results that in many instances are far beyond what most D&R projects are able to achieve, in a country that remains fragile. In addition, risks taken with the AF, given the short timeframe for the construction of houses, were rewarded with success, thanks to effective performance in design and supervision. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory. First the Government collaborated closely with the Bank during project preparation and agreed on the need to depoliticize the structure of the implementing agency (lessons learnt). Second, the Government demonstrated strong ownership through: (i) counterpart funding of US$3.6 million for the AF, (ii) appointment of a D&R advisor to the President who played a key role in ensuring that D&R related issues were addressed promptly and efficiently, (iii) identification and provision of land plots, and land titling for construction of specialized housing for the severely disabled in a record amount of time, and (iv) implementation of an exit strategy with collaboration between Ministries of Defense, Health, and Solidarity to ensure continuity of support to disabled ex-combatants needing permanent care and continued monitoring of ex-combatant issues through the newly created “Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense. Third, the Government ensured adequate compliance with safeguards requirements, including funding of houses for Batwa families under the AF. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory. Despite initial challenges in coordinating IPs and adequately monitoring the medical component, management by the project’s Implementing Agency (IA) was consistently rated satisfactory (appointment of key technical staff, fiduciary compliance, satisfactory implementation, and utilization of M&E arrangements). Project management was rated highly satisfactory in the final Implementation Status and Results (ISR), in light of the strong performance, efficient planning and management, and professionalism of the TCT in implementing complex activities in a very short time under the AF. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory. Despite initial coordination and management challenges experienced by the IA, both the Government and the IA demonstrated strong project ownership of the project and commitment to the achievement of the PDOs 6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application) (i) DDR projects providing medical and mental health support should be designed based on a clear assessment of related in-country capacity. Mitigation measures were adopted during implementation, but a clearer identification of the risks associated with limited in-country capacity for provision of medical and mental health support would have allowed: (i) designing 16 adequate mitigation measures from the onset, including a capacity building plan, to use the project as an opportunity to strengthen national medical and mental health services; and (ii) ensuring that some limited in-country services (prosthetics) were not temporarily overwhelmed by demand from project beneficiaries, at the detriment of the general population. (ii) DDR projects should invest on mental health. While provision of mental health support was a challenge, beneficiary surveys show that mental health support played a strong role in ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. Moving forward, it would be important to: (i) analyze more in depth the links between mental health support and ex-combatant economic and social reintegration, (ii) invest in early provision of mental health support, starting at demobilization camps and throughout reinsertion, to ensure that ex-combatants receiving reintegration support, are ready to make the most efficient use of it, and (iii) from an operational perspective, as support is intended to eventually come to an end, it would be important to clearly define the type of mental health support to be provided and what the completion of mental health support would entail. (iii) Direct channels of communication with high political levels can facilitate implementation of D&R projects. Besides its technical challenges, the Burundi D&R process had strong political impacts, and was highly sensitive. The nomination of a D&R advisor in close link with the project, at the Presidency, played a key role in (i) facilitating direct government ownership of the process, and (ii) ensuring that urgent and sensitive issues could be resolved promptly and efficiently. While this model might not be relevant or possible in all contexts, it should be considered in other complex and sensitive settings. (iv) A small implementation structure with activities outsourced to local organizations can help mitigate limited institutional capacity and risks of political interference. The implementation framework used in Burundi, while not transferrable to all settings, could be used where there are high risks of political interference in the D&R process, to ensure that technical activities are implemented by technical agencies, competitively recruited, and somewhat sheltered from direct political interference. (v) Post completion follow up missions can be a strong incentive to ensure and monitor full completion of activities and compliance with safeguards. The Bank team conducted two post completion missions to ensure compliance with all safeguards requirements, and follow up on the project exit strategy and follow up action taken by the GoB. While this was not mandatory, these missions signaled the Bank’s concern for completion of the project, and helped ensure adequate handling of the most vulnerable groups of beneficiaries. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The recipient and the implementing partner both indicated that they agreed with the document and had no further comment. (b) Cofinanciers The draft ICR was shared with representatives of donors to the MDTF (the European Commission, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands). No comments were received from donors, except from representatives of Norway who emphasized the importance of describing project’s sustainability. 17 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Component Appraisal Appraisal Total Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Original Estimate Estimate (Original Estimate Appraisal Project (IDA Additional Project+AF) Grant H497- Financing BI+TF096439) (TF014654+GOB) 1 Demobilization 1.2 - 1.2 0.3 25 2 Reinsertion 5.1 - 5.1 3.7 73 3 Reintegration 8.4 1.5 9.9 11.1 112 4 Support to 2.6 5.1 7.7 10.2 132 vulnerable groups 5 Project 4.5 0.8 5.3 4.9 92 Management Unallocated 0.7 0.5 1.2 - - Undisbursed n/a n/a n/a 0.17 n/a Total 22.5 7.9 30.4 30.2 99.3 NB: Appraisal estimate for the original project is based on component allocation after cancellation of US$5 million (b) Financing (US$ equivalent) Project cost by source of financing (US$ million equivalent) Appraisal (before Appraisal (after Actual/Latest Percentage of cancellation) cancellation) Estimate appraisal Parent Project IDA H497 15 10 10.2 102 MDTF096439 7.5 12.5 12.5 100 Additional TF014654 n/a 4.3 4 93 Financing GoB n/a 3.6 3.5 97 Total n/a 30.4 30.2 99.3 Project cost by Disbursement Category (US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Appraisal Total Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Appraisal Original project Additional (IDA Grant Financing H497- (TF014654+GO BI+TF096439) B) 1 Beneficiary services and 17.3 2.8 20.1 20.3 101 Grants 2 Consultancies, goods, works, 2.9 3.9 6.8 6.1 90 and services 3 Operating costs 1.7 0.8 2.5 3.8 152 Unallocated 0.6 0.4 1.0 n/a n/a Undisbursed n/a n/a n/a 0.17 n/a Total 22.5 7.9 30.4 30.2 99.3 18 NB: Appraisal estimate for the original project is based on component allocation after cancellation of US$5 million Main discrepancies between appraisal estimates and actual costs:  Demobilization costs were only 25% of appraisal estimates. This is due to: (i) the use of existing facilities, availed by the GoB, and (ii) the acceleration of the demobilization process, with a shorter than anticipated encampment time for beneficiaries.  Costs of support to vulnerable groups reached 132% of appraisal estimates. This is due to: (i) a larger than anticipated caseload of disabled ex-combatants from the previous project, (ii) higher than anticipated medical costs, and (iii) higher than anticipated costs for construction of specialized housing, due to inflation and increased commodity prices.  Operating costs reached 152% of appraisal estimates, due to two one year project extensions, and an additional six months through additional financing. 19 Annex 2. Outputs by Component This annex presents a detailed overview of project outputs per component and subcomponent. This complements section 3 of the ICR. Table 1: Summary of outputs Demobilization Reinsertion Reintegration8 Demand Actual Eligible Actual (all Eligible Actual three payments received) EDRRP Adults 0 0 1,630 1,557 952 932 (old) Children 0 0 246 239 246 241 EDTRP FNL 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,947 4,939 4,936 (new) FNL-D 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,553 1,550 1,549 Total 6,504 6,504 6,504 6,500 6,489 6,485 adults EDTRP Children 380 380 380 359 380 379 Total 6,504 6,504 8,134 8,057 7,441 7,417 adults Total 380 380 626 596 626 620 children Component 1. Demobilization (US$0.3 million equivalent). 100% of the 4,950 FNL and 1,554 FNL-D adult eligible were demobilized (total of 6,504 – target 100%). The project was able to overcome delays in the start due to the late transmission of the list of eligible FNL candidates and completed demobilization activities by August 10, 2009 ahead of schedule and 100% of the demobilized received an ID card and had their data entered into the MIS (target 100%). The project prioritized the demobilization of female ex-combatants to ensure their security. Component 2. Reinsertion (US$3.7 million equivalent). The target of 95% of eligible adult ex- combatants receiving reinsertion benefits as per the project manual (within 3, 6, and 9 months of demobilization)9 (Intermediate indicator 2.a), was met with 98.75% receiving their reinsertion support as scheduled.10 The first independent evaluation indicated that provision of reinsertion benefits to adults was done as per the timeframe indicated in the project manual and was consistent in quality and quantity with the project manual. Only 101 ex-combatants did not get their reinsertion payments as per the foreseen schedule, either because they could not be located or because they had not opened a Bank account or there were processing errors related to their account number. The project continued searching for the remaining beneficiaries, and in the end, 99.1% of the caseload (total of 8,057), including 95.5% of the EDRRP pending caseload (1,557 out of 1,630 eligible), 99.9% of the FNL caseload (4,947 out of 4,950) and 99.9% of the FNL-D 8 Note that disaggregated data differs slightly from data in the final ISR, where the overall number for reintegration is accurate, but contains few typos in the disaggregated numbers entered in the comments. See CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014, p.22 9 CNDDR, Manuel des Procédures de Mise en Œuvre du Projet, October 2009, p. 49 10 CNDDR and CURDES, Première Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2010, p. 15 20 caseload (1,553 out of 1,554) received their reinsertion benefits. In the 2011 beneficiary survey, 92.9% of beneficiaries (70% target) indicated that they used the majority of their reinsertion benefits to provide for basic needs for themselves and/or their dependents.11 Table 2: Distribution of Reinsertion Benefits Category Identified Achieved Total Percentage Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 Old Caseload 1,630 One Installment 1,557 95.5% (EDRRP) FNL 4,950 4,947 4,947 4,947 4,947 99.9% FNL-D 1,554 1,553 1,553 1,553 1,553 99.9% Total 8,134 6,500 6,500 6,500 8,057 99.1% Male 99.9% 7,879 7,803 (adults) Male and female data not disaggregated by Female tranche 99.6% 255 254 (adults) Total 8,134 6,500 6,500 6,500 8,057 99.1% Beneficiary surveys indicate that reinsertion benefits were increasingly used for long term investment, with the first two tranches used for buying clothes and food, with a progressive shift towards income generating activities by the second and third tranches. Component 3. Transitional Socio-Economic Reintegration Support (US$11 million equivalent). Socio-economic reintegration activities were outsourced to 11 IPs according to the geographical distribution of the ex-combatants’ reintegration location. Each of the IPs consisted of a communications expert, a psychosocial expert, and an economic reintegration expert. The 11 IPs were eventually coordinated by an umbrella NGO to harmonize efforts. Both social and economic reintegration supports were intended as transitional with beneficiaries eventually integrated in mainstream systems, and accessing the same economic and social support as all other Burundi citizens. 11 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p.476, table 224, on the first use of the initial payment of reinsertion benefits. This data slightly differs from data in the last ISR, that indicates 90.2%, based on preliminary results of the survey before finalization. 21 Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of the 11 Implementation Zones Transitional Social Reintegration. Per the 2014 beneficiary survey, only 86.1% of beneficiaries felt better accepted (56.4%) or felt the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their communities as during the first three months after demobilization (PDO indicator 3.b). The 90% greater acceptance target was thus almost met. The slight shortcoming in reaching 90% could be explained by tensions arising in the pre-2015 election period. Levels of reported acceptance were for instance higher in the 2011 beneficiary survey with 90% reporting being treated by their peers like any other community member. Transitional social reintegration support was diverse and comprehensive and included sensitization and reconciliation activities, conflict mitigation training, psycho-social trauma counseling support, as described below: o Sensitization and reconciliation activities. IPs carried out information, sensitization, and reconciliation activities for ex-combatants and host communities including on conflict resolution, management of rumors, and women's leadership in peace building to promote social cohesion. Technical Assistants (TAs) and IPs reported anecdotal evidence indicating the positive impact of these sessions including the fact that they: (i) helped dispel stigma, (ii) served as a warning system and reveal underlying tensions before escalation; and (iii) functioned as a conflict management tool. 12 These activities were highly attended by both ex-combatants and community members. Sensitization and communication with ex-combatants was facilitated through the formalization of the structure of ex-combatant representatives ahead of the 2010 elections. All IPs recruited 12 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2012 22 one TA for 100 ex-combatants (one third were women), and each TA was allocated two Focal Points (FPs). Each FP was responsible for 50 ex-combatants. It was confirmed that the TAs met daily with the FPs and that each ex-combatant was visited by a FP once every two weeks (more if there was a pressing issue).13 o Conflict Mitigation. The project provided conflict management training initiated as a direct response to an escalation of violence at the community level with reports of intimidation against the beneficiaries and the risk of negative impacts on social reintegration efforts. Initially, 118 participants were identified among IPs (including experts and TAs) to undergo a six-month training of trainers. Participants reported they felt equipped to successfully address conflicts, especially those between local government and ex-combatants.14 Under the AF, the training was expanded to include members of the municipal administration, ex-combatants, and community leaders. The project carried out six training sessions in each zone (a total of 48) with 1,526 total participants (579 ex-combatants and 947 community members). Training was provided to 100% of identified trainees (1,644 including from the original project and under the AF) and exceeded the 90% target. IPs and representatives of the TCT interviewed for this ICR considered this activity as one of the most successful of the project.15 Anecdotal evidence reported by the IPs also indicate that the project played a strong role in advocating for project beneficiaries when they were harassed or imprisoned, emphasizing the successful de-politicization of the TCT. o Psycho-social trauma counseling. The project provided psycho-social support through a specialist IP until December 2013. The support included individual, family, and group counseling, home visits, discussion groups, community sensitization as well as treatment, monitoring, and referral of psychiatric cases. This activity was carried out by 23 psychosocial assistants in eight areas of project intervention. Expert psychosocial supervisors (one per region) had oversight over the activities of psychosocial assistants and nurse psychiatrists. Serious psychosocial cases requiring attention were treated and followed by psychosocial assistants in the form of regular meetings and group treatment. Psychiatric cases were referred to regional hospitals. Per the 2014 beneficiary survey, over 85.2% of those disabled ex-combatants who received psychosocial assistance claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic reintegration. The quality and frequency of such support, however, was found to be limited. 16 Nevertheless, the provision of psychosocial support is a noticeable effort at addressing an aspect of reintegration that few D&R projects undertake (only one other example in Rwanda) and 100% of identified cases received some type of mental health support. Table 3: Caseload of Psychosocial Cases Total who Percentage Ongoing by received some who received Category Identified Discharged Stabilized end of activity support some mental health support 13 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, May 2011 14 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2012 15 Interviews conducted with representatives of Implementing Partners between May 12-16, 2014 16 CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation du Processus de Réalisation des Activités d’Encadrement et d’Assistance Psychosociale du PDRT, November 2013 23 Psychosocial 3,050 781 255 2,269 3,050 100% Cases Psychiatric 250 6 142 244 250 100% Cases Findings from an independent evaluation of the project’s psychosocial intervention 17 suggested that the quality of diagnostic was likely limited given the fast pace of the diagnostic process, and emphasized the mixed responses from beneficiaries regarding impact and quality of support received. This was due, among other factors, to the limited number of qualified staff and limited presence of the IP in the field. Figure 2: Frequency of mental health support sessions received (2013) 45.0% 40.3% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 27.6% 25.0% 20.0% 16.3% 15.0% 10.0% 8.7% 5.0% 2.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% At Least Once Once Per At Least Do Not Twice a Everyday Once Every Once a Every Year Once a Know Year Every Three Month Two Week Two Months Months Weeks Source: CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation Du Processus De Réalisation Des Activités D’Encadrement Et D’Assistance Psychosocial Du PDRT, November 2013. The closing of the psycho-social component was prepared more than a year in advance, with the task team urging the project to inform beneficiaries of the conclusion of psychosocial support and orienting beneficiaries in need of continued support to the Centre Familial de Dévelopment Communautaire (CFDC) in their respective areas. When the original grant closed, the caseload of psychiatric and epileptic cases was transferred to the medical team who provided them with treatment until the project closed, while support was stopped for the remaining 2,269 ongoing caseload. As for economic reintegration, social reintegration support including psycho-social support was intended as a transitional support and was, therefore, not meant to be permanent. As for 17 CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation du Processus de Réalisation des Activités d’Encadrement et d’Assistance Psychosociale du PDRT, November 2013 24 the rest of the Burundi population, EDTRP beneficiaries were meant to access services available to all citizens in Burundi at project closure. Transitional Economic Reintegration. The first economic reintegration outcome indicator comparing ex-combatants perception of their situation to that of their peers (PDO Indicator 3.a) was consistently under the 70% target (60.8% in 2010, 60.2% in 2011, and 46.9% in 2012). The indicator, based on self-perception, could have reflected general increasing pressure on households due to high inflation and increase of commodity prices rather than actual differences between ex-combatants and community members. The revised indicator, reflecting financial independence, indicates that 64% of beneficiaries reporting earning more than 50% of the household income (baseline: 70%). Beneficiary surveys also indicate successful economic reintegration with a continuous decrease of unemployment rates (from 9.3% in 2009 to 5.3% in 2014) and improvement of housing quality with fewer beneficiaries living in huts (from 9.2% in 2011 to 6.8% in 2014) and more in houses (from 84.6% in 2011 to 92% in 2014 as per beneficiary surveys) (Annex 5). The positive evolution of ex-combatants’ situation contrasts with the relative stability of the unemployment rate of the rest of the population, consistently around 7.8% during the course of the project. Transitional economic reintegration support included both individual support and support through associations, as follows: o Individual economic reintegration support. The project provided reintegration support to 99.7% of eligible ex-combatants (including 4,936 FNL, 1,549 FNL-D, and 932 EDRRP) receiving the planned individual transitional reintegration support, exceeding the 95% target. The Project manual18 does not stipulate a timeframe other than the closing date of the project for provision of reintegration support. The 2014 beneficiary survey indicates that reintegration benefits were provided in a relatively short amount of time in comparison with the previous project, with 88% of beneficiaries receiving reintegration within two years after demobilization including 51% within a year. 19 The 2011 beneficiary survey showed that some ex-combatants accumulated sufficient capital to increase the scope of their economic activities with 66.7% of respondents who used their income for basic needs while 23.4% reinvested in their businesses. 20 Transitional economic reintegration options included scholarships, employment generation, vocational and skills training, and microenterprise generation and promotion. The MTR noted that in practice 99% of beneficiaries chose income generation support which had a clear monetary direct impact. 21 The task team urged the TCT to ensure that IPs provide adequate information on options available. The 2013 beneficiary survey found that over 90% of the demobilized who were surveyed reported receiving sufficient information on their reintegration options.22 While individual economic reintegration support, therefore, was not as diverse and comprehensive as originally envisioned, the goal of offering various options and ensuring that ex-combatants were able to make an informed and free decision was reached. o Support to economic associations. In order to improve the success rate of economic reintegration, ex-combatants were encouraged to form or join associations. A total of 721 18 CNDDR, Manuel des Opérations de la Réintégration des Ex-Combattants, Avril 2010 19 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 518 20 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p.234 21 The 2011 and 2013 annual beneficiary surveys showed that ex-combatants chose their reintegration options based, among other factors, on the possibility of making money in the short term. 22 CNDDR and Card Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013, p. 190 25 associations received training and technical assistance (exceeding the 634 target) reaching both ex-combatants (9,407) and community members (23,179). Under the AF, the 56 best performing associations received additional in-kind support. Component 4. Support to Vulnerable Groups (US$ 10.2 million equivalent). Female Ex- combatants. All 245 female ex-combatants, 100% of those eligible, were demobilized by the project. As in most D&R projects,23 women represent a very small proportion of the caseload as few are willing to self-identify as ex-combatants due to fear of stigmatization. The project circumvented this issue by providing support to spouses of ex-combatants (see section 3.5 on gender aspects). The TCT provided gender-sensitive demobilization support to female ex- combatants including: (i) providing demobilization to women ex-combatants earlier than the rest of the caseload; (ii) ensuring separate and secure areas at the demobilization camps for female ex- combatants and their children; and (iii) providing gender-sensitive demobilization kits as well as including additional sugar and flour and baby clothes for lactating mothers.24 As per the 2013 beneficiary survey, 94.2 % of female ex-combatants indicated that they felt that they had been treated equally or better than men during the demobilization process. In addition, 99.6% of women (254) received their reinsertion benefits, and 99.6% (254) received their reintegration support, including 87.6% within 18 months after demobilization.25 Table 4. Distribution of Reinsertion and Reintegration Benefits for female ex-combatants Identified EDRRP FNL FNL-D Total Percentage (old Supported caseload) Demobilization 245 N/A 206 39 245 100.0 Reinsertion 255 9 206 39 254 99.6 Reintegration 255 9 206 39 254 99.6 As part of gender mainstreaming, IPs provided specific training geared towards female ex- combatants including on sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), organized cultural activities, conducted radio programming on gender topics, formed listening club and provided a series of training on women leadership and on management of household budget. Further, the project collaborated with the Centre pour le Development Familial with a focus on including gender sensitization as an integral part of each social reintegration activity. Only one activity identified in the action plan, mainly psychosocial to all female ex-combatants, was not completed due to the phasing out of mental health support. In the 2014 beneficiary survey, 79.3 % of female ex- combatants indicated that IPs had not provided child care, which made their attendance to training challenging (however, 87.1% of female respondents indicated they had attended training nonetheless).26 While social stigma is usually a key challenge for female ex-combatants,27 their situation improved during the project as 75% considered they were discriminated against when looking for employment in the 2011 beneficiary survey, while this dropped to 67.1% in the 2014 23 Hanson, Stephanie, 2007. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa”, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 24 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, October-November 2009 25 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 26 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, p. 351 27 Hanson, Stephanie, 2007. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa”, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 26 beneficiary survey. Women are also members of associations in larger proportion than men (34% versus 21%).28 Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups. The project aimed for all children associated with FNL and FNL-D (including a caseload from EDRRP) to be separated from those groups, reunited with their families or placed in alternative care, and receive full reinsertion and reintegration support as appropriate to their status as minors. All of the identified 626 children ex- combatants identified (100% of eligible) including 246 from the EDRRP and 380 from the EDTRP received support from the project and were reunited with families. In contrast to what was initially foreseen, reinsertion support to children was provided in tranches (6, 12, and 18 months after demobilization). 97.9% of eligible children (613 children) received at least one payment, and 95.5% (596) received all three payments, meeting the 95% target. The two IPs providing support to children operated in coordination and maintained regular contact, allowing for a coherent approach between the two organizations in their respective northern and southern zones. The IPs provided sensitization activities to mitigate conflicts in school and within families. Both agencies utilized a large network of field-based FPs to ensure adequate coverage and local follow-up of children ex-combatants. 29 The large number of children who chose income generating activities over schooling can be explained by the average age of the caseload, 17 years of age, and their reluctance to delay income generation further. A total of 92 children initially opted for formal education, but 3530 dropped out due to lack of motivation and stigmatization, and received IGA support instead. 31 In the end, 99% (620 out of 626) children received their reintegration benefits, almost meeting the 100% target, including 85.4% within 18 months after demobilization.32 The project adapted support to the changing needs of children, who were on average 17 at the time of demobilization and who became adults over the course of the project. They were encouraged to join associations, and were integrated in the adult caseload, for follow up by IPs, along with other adult ex-combatants. Disabled Ex-combatants. Disabled ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision of benefits which they received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload, with 100% of eligible disabled ex-combatants demobilized, 99% receiving reinsertion benefits 33 , and 99.6% receiving transitional individual economic reintegration support, including 57.1 % within 18 months and 81.5% within two years after demobilization.34 Despite initial delays in the provision of medical support, 93.5% (3,307 out of 3,538) of disabled ex-combatants (exceeding the 90% target) received all treatments included in their medical plan, and all 100% of eligible severely disabled ex-combatants (150) received specialized housing. According to the 2014 beneficiary survey, 67.3% of disabled ex-combatants stated that they physically felt better after treatment.35 No complaints or issues were reported by beneficiaries on the quality of support received. 28 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p.34 29 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, March-April 2010 30 This number varies from 27 to 35 depending on sources 31 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, May 2011 32 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 33 Disaggregated data on provision of reinsertion benefits to disabled was not available. However, per the 2011 beneficiary survey (p.162-165), 99% disabled ex-combatants interviewed stated they received all reinsertion payments 34 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 35 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième enquête des bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 207 27 o The medical component was the most challenging project component due to: (i) an underestimation of the remaining caseload from the EDRRP (actual remaining caseload of eventually 2,982 versus the 1,500 estimated), (ii) limited in-country capacity for the provision of prosthetics and medical services,36 and (iii) limited capacity of the TCT on medical support to manage the medical IP. Numerous efforts were undertaken to address these challenges including hiring of additional TCT staff, provision of technical assistance from international disability experts as well as additional staff, resources and equipment to the IP. Eventually, in light of the low performance of the IP, it was decided not to renew their contract and to integrate the best elements of the medical team in the TCT. In the end, 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants received all treatments included in their medical plan.37 Ex-combatants in the 2013 survey cited the following reasons for not completing their treatment plan: lack of information (46.5%), being accustomed to his/her disability (9.3%), lack of transportation (18.6%), private treatment (7.0%), and still waiting for treatment (11.6%).38 Table 5: Treatment/Services Provided and Status Received Relevant Type of Treatment39 Needs Identified Percentage Achieved Treatment General Medicine 1,295 1,249 96.45 Ophthalmology 404 364 90.10 Stomatology 141 131 92.91 Neurology 380 354 93.16 ENT 119 112 94.12 Dermatology 9 8 88.89 Gastro-enterology 33 28 84.85 Urology 52 39 75.00 Pneumology 39 35 89.74 Cardiology 7 7 100.00 Nephrology 7 7 100.00 Physiotherapy 911 895 98.24 Orthotic 474 455 95.99 Surgery 2,075 2,043 98.46 Prostheses MI 244 240 98.36 Prostheses MS 38 38 100.00 TOTAL 6,465 6,242 96.55 36 Handicap International, Etude sur la situation des personnes handicapées au Burundi, 2012 ; Handicap International, Leçons apprises du Projet Turi Kumwe Réinsertion socio-économique des anciens combattants handicapés au Burundi 2010-2013, August 2013 37 CNDDR, Rapport d’Achèvement du Projet d’Urgence de Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi 2009-2014, June 2014 38 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 155 39 A patient can be treated in two or more services. 28 Progress to support disabled ex-combatants improved significantly in 2013 after the best elements of the medical team were absorbed into the TCT. Figure 3. Evolution of provision of medical treatment (before and after change in implementing structure) 4,000 3,538 3,538 3,409 3,304 3,309 3,332 3,500 3,280 3,245 3,002 3,504 3,504 3,000 3,265 3,296 3,307 3,307 3,129 2,857 2,966 2,500 2,617 2,664 2,000 2,302 1,500 1,870 1,931 Identified 1,539 Consulted a Doctor Once 1,000 Received Treatment 500 0 A key challenge for the disability support in the long term was the caseload of 555 ex- combatants requiring permanent medical care including: 7 tetraplegics, 23 hemiplegics, 44 paraplegics, 118 epileptics, 90 with osteitis and chronic wounds, 66 with chronic pain and neurological disorders, and 237 patients with psychiatric disorders. 40 To ensure continuity of support to disabled ex-combatants needing permanent care and continued monitoring of ex-combatant issues, the GoB established the “Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense. o Houses for disabled ex-combatants. Under additional financing, 150 severely disabled ex- combatants were provided with specialized housing. Construction of the houses in 12 locations started in January 2014. By the closing date of the project, 115 of the 150 houses were completed. The two sites that were delayed included Karurama in Rugombo Commune and Bugarama in Mpanda Commune. Additional earthworks were identified by the engineer during a March 2014 mission that caused the delay in those sites. A mission by the project engineer in July 2014 confirmed that all 150 houses and relevant site work, including retaining walls, were completed. 40 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2013 29 o Training to Support Health and Autonomy. Per the AF project paper, autonomy support was to include: (i) general health promotion and training of beneficiaries and caretakers on prevention of complications, (ii) provision of medical kits, (iii) sensitization of medical staff in nearby health facilities, (iv) autonomy training for paraplegic beneficiaries, double amputees and the blind carried out in two phases, before and after moving in the new house, and (v) training of local artisans (bike shops) in the repair of wheelchairs and other mobility devices. Most activities planned were undertaken: the TCT prepared and implemented an autonomy plan, provided training to beneficiaries and caretakers, trained nurses in 13 local health clinics, and distributed medical kits and food supplies to beneficiaries. However, due to time constraints and delays in the construction of houses, foreseen in-house training of beneficiaries and training of local artisans in wheel chair repairs could not be implemented by the end of the project, 30 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) Most recently completed D&R projects in Africa that would be comparable to the Burundi D&R project include: the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P078658) (2002-2011), the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (P075129) (2002-2008), and the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project (P081964) (2004-2008). D&R projects present significant particularities that affect the cost per beneficiary. Potential limitations to the comparison of cost per unit include: (i) operating costs vary significantly from one operating environment to the other. For instance, quality of roads, distances, and accessibility are very different in DRC and Rwanda; (ii) in all above mentioned projects, not all beneficiaries receive all types of benefits. For instance, in several cases pending caseloads from previous projects receive only pending benefits, which could artificially lower the cost per unit; and (iii) the range of benefits provided varies from one project to the other. For instance the EDTRP provides advanced medical and housing support to disabled ex-combatants, which was not the case in the EDRRP or in the DRC projects. To facilitate comparisons, costs per units are thus calculated: (i) without including operating costs, (ii) by first establishing the cost per beneficiary per type of benefit (demobilization, reinsertion, etc), and presenting the average cost per unit for one beneficiary receiving all types of benefits, and (iii) presenting cost per unit for comparable benefits only. The DRC EDRP and the Burundi EDRRP both include a component on vulnerable groups. However, this component only includes basic support to vulnerable groups, corresponding to support mostly covered under D, R and R components in the Burundi EDTRP and the Rwanda EDRRP projects. Under these last two projects, the vulnerable groups’ component covers additional advanced support, including medical support, and specialized housing for disabled ex-combatants. For that reason, for comparison purposes, it is assumed that support provided under D, R, and R components under the Burundi EDTRP and the Rwanda EDRRP project covers similar activities as under all four components (including vulnerable groups), under the DRC, and Burundi EDRRP. As only Rwanda and the Burundi EDTRP provided advanced medical and housing support to disabled, efficiency for these particular services are assessed separately (see below). One significant limitation cannot, however, be addressed: only quantity of services provided is assessed, and quality, while discussed below based on anecdotal evidence, cannot be measured or compared. Table 6. Summary of unit cost per beneficiary for D, R, & R benefits, in US$ (excluding operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Burundi DRC42 Rwanda43 EDRRP41 Unit cost 2,132 2,495 1,817 1,786 41 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009, p. 25-26 42 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2012, p. 28 43 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.32-45 31 Based on the cost per unit, the EDRRP appears in the general range of unit cost for D&R projects, with an improvement since the previous project. Lower cost per beneficiary in DRC in comparison to Rwanda and the two Burundi projects, can partially be explained by the large caseload and related economies of scale. Table 7. Detailed Burundi EDRRP and DRC EDRP unit cost per beneficiary, in US$ (excluding operating costs) Burundi EDRRP44 DRC EDRP (as per ICR)45 Total cost (US$) Number of Cost per Cost per beneficiary beneficiaries beneficiary per per component component (US$) (US$) Demobilization 2,300,000 26,283 88 627 Reinsertion 16,800,000 23,022 730 430 Reintegration 16,000,000 21,996 727 534 Vulnerable 5,400,000 5,684 950 226 Groups Total 2,495 1,817 Table 8. Detailed Burundi EDTRP and Rwanda EDRP unit cost per beneficiary for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, in US$ (excluding operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Rwanda EDRRP46 Total cost Number of Cost per Total cost Number of Cost per (US$) beneficiaries beneficiary (US$) beneficiaries beneficiary per per component component (US$) (US$) Demobilizati 259,700 727 357 5,300,000 45,353 117 on Reinsertion 3,712,193 8,057 461 17,200,000 29,092 591 Reintegratio 9,744,605 7,417 1,314 24,434,725 22,675 1,078 n Total - - 2,132 - - 1,786 Table 9. Detailed unit cost per beneficiary for additional support to vulnerable groups (mainly through specialized medical support and housing to disabled ex-combatants) (excluding operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Rwanda Total cost (US$ million) 10.2 8.5 Total caseload 4,375 10,968 Cost per disabled (US$) 2,331 778 44 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009, p. 25-26 45 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2012, p. 28 46 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.32-45 32 Unit cost for additional support to vulnerable groups (main costs related to specialized medical support and housing) is significantly higher in the EDTRP than in the Rwanda project. This indicates a lower efficiency in Burundi. Higher costs on vulnerable support in Burundi mainly relate to provision of medical support, which required more resources due to significantly more limited in-country capacity. In addition, a higher proportion of the most expensive benefits (surgery and provision of houses) was provided in Burundi: Table 10. Comparison of percentage of beneficiaries receiving houses and surgeries in Burundi and Rwanda Burundi Rwanda Number Percentage Number Percentage Total disabled caseload 3,538 8,400 House 150 4.3 176 2.1 Surgery 2,043 57.7 704 8.4 Data on cost of specialized houses shows that EDTRP’s efficiency of housing benefits is comparable to the Rwanda project. While quality of houses cannot be measured, houses in Burundi were designed by the same international engineer as the one who designed houses in Rwanda, following the same principles and criteria. Houses in both countries are thus of reasonably comparable quality. Table 11. Comparison of cost per m2 for comparable specialized disabled housing in Burundi and Rwanda (US$ equivalent) Burundi Rwanda Average Unit cost (US$ equivalent) 25,513 25,887 Surface (m2) 71.2 70 Cost per m2 358 370 Based on the above information, the EDRRP is assessed to be within the range of efficiency of D&R projects, while admittedly being overall on the higher end of the spectrum. 33 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Name Title Unit Bank Staff Andrew Osei Asibey Sr. Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist GPSOS Aurore Simbananiye Program Assistant AFMBI Bella Lelouma Diallo Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGODR Benjamin Burckhart Social Development Specialist GSURR Chantal Rigaud Communications Associate DFGPE Charlotte McClain- Senior Operations Officer GSPDR Nhlapo Cheick Sagna Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Daksha Shakya E T Consultant GSURR Emmanuel E T Consultant GSURR Sinzohagera Emilie Reese-Smith ET Consultant GSURR Fanny Robert E T Consultant GSURR Helene Bertaud Sr. Counsel LEGAM Leanne Michelle Bayer Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Marcelo Jorge Fabre Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Marco Nicoli Sr. Knowledge Management Officer LEGKL Melance Ndikumasabo Procurement Specialist GGODR Natacha Lemasle Social Development Specialist GSURR Pacifique Ndoricimpa Team Assistant AFMBI Pamela Ording Operations Analyst GSURR Beecroft Philip Beauregard Sr. Counsel LEGAM Pia Peeters Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Stavros George Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Stavrou Sylvain Auguste Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Rambeloson Non-Bank Staff Abdel Bensavvy Consultant - safeguards n/a Davide Naggi Consultant – disability expert n/a Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Consultant - environmental safeguards n/a Fernando Martins Consultant - financial management n/a Goncalves Olivier Jadin Consultant – disability expert n/a Richard Coppinger Consultant - engineer n/a 34 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD (including travel and No. of staff weeks consultant costs) Lending 2009 (Original project) 14.36 78, 078.28 2013 (additional financing) 0 26 Lending sub-total: 14.36 78,084.28 Supervision/ICR 2010 32.25 138,694.10 2011 19.21 129,081.80 2012 16.71 114,713.95 2013 29.96 191,127.06 2014 17.88 78,815.56 2015 19.87 66,534.38 Supervision sub-total: 135.88 718,966,85 Total 150.24 797,051.13 35 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Introduction From 2009 to 2014 the EDTRP was implemented to facilitate the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in communities, with the goal of ensuring that their social and economic integration matched that of their peers in communities. To monitor reintegration of beneficiaries, the project undertook yearly beneficiary surveys. The first beneficiary survey (2010) focused on demobilization (the only activity implemented under the project at the time) and the second beneficiary survey was rejected due to low quality. The findings presented here cover mostly the last three beneficiary surveys with a focus on the evolution of the social and economic situation of beneficiaries: the third (2011), the fourth (2013), and the fifth (2014). The surveys were designed to include a wide variety of social and economic indicators, and used similar questionnaires and sampling methods over the years, allowing for comparison of findings over time. However, one important element for the evaluation was not included in the surveys: while the project aims at ensuring that beneficiaries reach similar levels of economic and social prosperity as their peers in communities, the questionnaire was not systematically administered to community members. Community members were included in the survey, but administered a different and much shorter questionnaire related to their perception of ex-combatants. Administering the same questionnaire to both community members and beneficiaries, as was done for instance in the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, would have allowed for a more informative monitoring and assessment of beneficiaries social and economic integration in comparison to the rest of the population. In addition, the beneficiary surveys lacked a systematic review of the relevant literature to contextualize statistical results, as well as a qualitative approach, for instance through focus groups, to establish causality between statistical findings and project activities. Reintegration Beneficiaries’ social participation. As is often the case in D&R programs, ex-combatants resettling in communities first tend to isolate themselves before they progressively become more engaged with the community. It is not possible to establish direct causality between project activities and increased social participation of ex-combatants. Beneficiary surveys, however, indicate that ex-combatants became increasingly more involved in the community over the course of the project. For instance, in 2011, 42.5% of beneficiaries reported that they belonged to a management committee for a local group or organization, which increased to 51.3% in 2013, and 54.9% in 2014. Anecdotal evidence suggests that project activities targeting both ex-combatants and community members, such as sensitization and reconciliation activities, conflict mitigation training, and psychosocial support, contributed to this positive evolution. Ex-combatants’ perception of social reintegration. Ex-combatant’s perception of progress in social acceptance by their peers in communities was high in 2014, with 86.1% of beneficiaries feeling better accepted (56.4%) or feeling the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their communities as during the first three months after demobilization. Compared to 2011, where 86.6% of beneficiaries reported feeling better accepted (64.2%) or feeling the same level of social acceptance (22.4%) by their communities as during the first three months after demobilization, a slightly higher proportion of beneficiaries (90.1%) reported feeling better accepted (68.0%) or feeling the same level of social acceptance (22.1%) by their communities as during the first three 36 months after demobilization in 2013. Therefore, while the situation progressed between 2011 (86.6%) and 2013 (90.1%), the 2014 (86.1%) data suggests a slight decrease in perception of social acceptance. This could suggest that progress in social acceptance reached a peak at the end of the project. However, a similar drop is observed on a similar but slightly different indicator on social integration: while in 2011 83.8% of ex-combatants indicated that they felt like they were treated as anyone else in their communities, this proportion reached 90% in 2013, to slightly drop to 86.6% in 2014. It is unclear what explains the slight reversal on this community acceptance indicator. One explanation is that this relates to tensions arising in 2014 in the context of the pre- 2015 election period. This could also be related to increased pressure on households due to inflation and increased commodity prices, increasing competition for resources. At the immediate neighborhood level, however, beneficiaries have reported a consistently increased feeling of closeness to their neighbors in their communities, with 83.9% reporting they felt very close to their neighbors in 2011, 84.9% in 2013, and 89.3% in 2014. Community perceptions of ex-combatants’ social reintegration. The steady improvement of social reintegration of ex-combatants is confirmed by community members. In 2011, 90.8% of community members surveyed indicated that they thought that in their town, over the previous two years, the trust level towards ex-combatants had improved or remained the same. 47 This proportion increased to 93.3%48 in 2013, and 94%49 in 2014. Regrettably, community members were asked about their assessment of the general perception of ex-combatants rather than their personal opinion of ex-combatants. However, while the question might have facilitated a biased response, it is expected that the level of bias would be similar each year, and the consistent increase is likely to reflect an improvement of the situation over time. Economic Reintegration Individual economic reintegration support. As described in annex 2, economic reintegration support included both individual support and support through associations. As part of individual support, ex-combatants overwhelmingly chose to receive a grant to implement an income generating activity through a micro-project. This reintegration support was meant to be transitional and help beneficiaries cope while they find or create more sustainable sources of income. However, it is noticeable that by the end of the project, 40.8% of beneficiaries indicated that they were still implementing their micro-project. As expected, this proportion decreased over the course of the project with 58.1% in 2011, and 42.8% in 2013, as beneficiaries transitioned to other activities. Interestingly, a large proportion of beneficiaries who sold their initial micro- project, used benefits to create a new micro-project, although this proportion decreased over time with 45.8% in 2011, 50.1% in 2013, and 24.7% in 2014. It is unclear whether this decreasing tendency to reinvest in new micro-projects is an indication of failure or a sign that beneficiaries found other, potentially more durable, sources of income. The project also strongly encouraged beneficiaries to include their spouse in the implementation of their income generating activity, to encourage gender equality in the household, and ensure more efficient management of resources. As a result, spouse participation in micro-projects significantly increased over time, with 76.7% 47 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 295 48 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013, p. 402 49 CNDDR and SOGES, CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 669 37 of beneficiaries indicating that their spouse participated in carrying out their micro-project in 2011 and 93.3% in 2014. Support to associations. In addition to individual economic reintegration support, the project encouraged ex-combatants to join associations and to work in collaboration with community members. As a result, an increasing number of ex-combatants joined associations: from 19.6% in 2011, to 31.4% in 2013. However, a noticeable drop occurred in 2014, with only 21.7% reporting being part of an association. This could be explained by the slowdown of support to associations at the end of the project (except for the 56 most performing ones). This could also reflect a general trend in the country; however, lack of comparable data among community members does not allow drawing firm conclusions. The surveys show a steady tendency for ex-combatants to join or open their associations to community members, with 78% of beneficiaries indicating their associations included community members in 2011, versus 92.3% in 2013, and 93.6% in 2014. This tendency confirms the successful implementation of project activities and campaign to encourage mixed associations, but also emphasizes the general successful social reintegration and peaceful cohabitation of ex-combatants with community members. Overall economic situation of ex-combatants. (i) Food and shelter. While it is not possible to establish with certainty direct causality between project activities and ex-combatants’ economic situation, it is noticeable that the economic situation of ex-combatants improved steadily over the course of the project, in particular regarding access to shelter, food and employment. For instance, the proportion of ex-combatants living in huts decreased over time (from 9.2%50 in 2011 to 6.8%51 in 2014), while an increasing proportion moved to houses (from 84.6%52 in 2011, to 92%53 in 2014). Similarly, ex-combatants became increasingly owners of their dwelling (from 51.8%54 in 2011 to 65.3%55 in 2014). Access to food, however, remains a challenge for ex-combatants, as for the rest of the population, and has worsened over the course of the project, 42.3% of beneficiaries reported having enough food to keep a healthy diet “almost always” or “generally” in 2011, versus 38.7% in 2013, and 21.7% in 2014. This reflects a general issue for the Burundi population. According to the latest UN estimates, over 7.1 million Burundian people live in food conditions defined as “crisis and emergency” 56 , representing approximately 70% of the total population, 57 in a context where growth of agricultural productivity is stagnating.58 Access to shelter for female and former children ex-combatants is also often more challenging than for male ex-combatants. Per the 2014 survey, 88.3% of female ex-combatants, and 89.7% of former children ex-combatants, live in houses versus 91.5% of male ex-combatants. Female ex- combatants, however, perform well in terms of access to food in comparison to other groups, with 22.8% of female ex-combatants and 11.1% of former children ex-combatants reporting as having 50 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 44 51 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 276 52 CNDDR and CARD Engineering. Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 44 53 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 276 54 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 45 55 CNDDR and SOGES. Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 277 56 United Nations World Food Program, Overview of Food Security in Burundi 57 World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank: Burundi total population in 2013, 10.2 million 58 Burundi – Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant Project, World Bank, 05/15/2012 38 enough food to keep a healthy diet “almost always”, or “generally” in 2014, versus 21.9% of male ex-combatants.59 (ii) Employment. Indicators related to employment of ex-combatants showed that ex-combatants made substantial advances over the course of the project, with 9.3% of ex-combatants reporting being unemployed in 2009, versus 5.3% in 2014. In comparison, the unemployment rate in Burundi has been consistent at 7.8% on average between 2009 and 2012.60 In addition, surveys suggest that ex-combatants are more likely to focus on one paid employment rather than on multiple employments with variable and unpredictable income, with 20.1% ex-combatants having more than one paid activity in 2011, versus 7% in 2014. In the 2014 beneficiary survey, 10.0% of female ex-combatants (in comparison with 8.2% for women in Burundi) and 9.9 % of former children ex-combatants (mostly male) (in comparison with 12.3% for young males in Burundi as per 2012 data) reported being unemployed versus 4.9% male ex-combatants.61 Female and former children ex-combatants suffer from unemployment in higher proportions than male ex- combatants. However, the project overall successfully supported the economic reintegration of children and female ex-combatants to the level of their peers in communities. Consistent with recent draw backs observed in 2014 for the overall population of Burundi, while 64.3% were confident their economic situation would improve in the future in 2011, and 70% in 2013, by the end of the project in 2014, only 58.4% believed so. Female Ex-Combatants. Beneficiary surveys indicate that the provision of benefits to female ex- combatants was done in a gender-sensitive way, and that there was no discrimination against women in the provision of project benefits. As per the 2014 survey, 92.3% reported that they were treated in a similar manner or better than men in the demobilization process and 86.6% reported being treated in a similar manner or better than men in the reintegration process. While the surveys show that there was a lack of child care provision by IPs (only 20.7% of women were provided with child care), 87.1% of female ex-combatants still managed to attend trainings. While the situation of women in their communities has improved over time, with approximately 70% of female ex-combatants reporting in 2014 that they had been treated better or equally than other women by other women in their communities and approximately 73% of the female ex- combatants reporting they were treated better or equally by men in their communities. However, some stigma against female ex-combatants remains as in the 2014 survey, 67.1% of the female ex-combatants feel discriminated when seeking employment. Children ex-combatants. Beneficiary surveys indicate that the general situation for children ex- combatants has improved since demobilization, with the majority reporting in 2014 as being treated as anyone else by other adults (73.8%), family members (88.0%), and authorities (69.6%). 90.4% in 2014 also rated their relations with their neighbors and schoolmates or workmates as average or good. Children ex-combatants, however, in general noted their dissatisfaction with the project with 61.4% reporting in 2013 that the reintegration process was poor or very poor in the 2011 survey. Initially, 59 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 289 60 World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank (2012 is the latest available data on Burundi, however, based on the fact that unemployment data has been consistent over the past few years, it is assumed that data for 2014 would be in the same range) 61 World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank 39 children surveyed in the beneficiary surveys consistently reported their displeasure with IPs as well. For example, per the 2011 survey, 52.5% reported that they did not trust the IPs. However, this improved over the course of the project, as per the 2013 survey only 35.2% reported not trusting the IPs. Initial dissatisfaction with the support received is attributed to children’s disappointment with benefits received (no cash), in comparison to adult ex-combatants (who received cash). At the time of demobilization, the average age of children was 17 years old, while the cut-off age to access adult benefits was set at 18. This was seen as unfair to children ex-combatants who would have preferred to be treated as adults and provided with the same reintegration options and comparable monetary benefits. The improving trust in the IPs relates to the project’s commitment to integrate former children ex-combatants, once they became young adults, and provide economic support to associations. Disabled ex-combatants. A total of 3,538 ex-combatants were identified as needing medical care. In the 2014 survey, 67.3% disabled ex-combatants stated that they physically felt better after treatment. As per the 2014 survey, over 85.2% of those who received psychosocial assistance claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic reintegration. Encouragingly, employment prospects of disabled ex-combatants have improved over time as well. Based on the data collected in the 2013 survey, 60.8% of the disabled ex-combatants surveyed were employed or involved in income generating activities. Lack of access to employment for disabled ex-combatants, however, relates more to their disability than to their ex- combatant status. 69.2% of interviewed disabled ex-combatants reported in the 2013 survey that when looking for work they felt discriminated as a disabled ex-combatant and 61.7% felt discriminated due to their disability. However, for employed, workplace discrimination has been decreasing over time with 41.8% in 2011 versus 36.7% in 2013 survey reporting workplace discrimination. 40 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results n/a 41 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Component 1: Demobilization Key lessons learned in the implementation of the demobilization process are:  A good business plan is important;  The coordination of different services such as Operations, Finance, Procurement (for logistical support), Monitoring and Evaluation (Data Collection on demobilized Monitoring activities) is necessary;  The expert in Monitoring and Evaluation needs to work closely with the Head of Operations; and  Increased awareness and psychosocial assistance in the demobilization center to reduce false expectations by the demobilized. Component 2: Reinsertion Key lessons learned to ensure successful reinsertion are:  Collect and record accurate data on recipients' bank accounts for the success of bank transfers;  Increase awareness among beneficiaries to report their bank accounts to avoid cases of reinsertion support non-payment;  Follow the payment schedule for reinsertion support to avoid revolts of the beneficiaries in the event of late payments;  Record regular payments made by the partner Bank in the MIS; and  Ensure adequate recruitment of registration agents to ensure regular updating of the database. Impact of Reinsertion on Beneficiaries: Interviews with beneficiaries conducted confirmed that the distribution of the transitional reinsertion support went well. In general, the demobilized said they were faced with problems of indebtedness accumulated during their stay in the bush or garnered upon leaving it. In general, beneficiaries expressed that the support was not enough to respond to the debt. However, beneficiaries considered reinsertion benefit as a factor in their reintegration in that the money allowed their participation in social events in the community and helped them respond to the needs of their families. Per the fourth beneficiary survey, the percentage of beneficiaries who claim to have used most of their Transitional Subsistence Allowance to ensure the satisfaction of their basic needs and those of their families was 63.8%, 62.3%, and 59.4% respectively for the first, second, and third installments. In conclusion, various studies have confirmed that the reinsertion support facilitated beneficiaries’ reinsertion. Component 3: Socio-Economic Reintegration Reintegration of adults began in June 2010 with the signing of contracts for 11 IPs. An umbrella NGO was hired to coordinate the activities of the 11 IPs. When the project was extended, eight IPs were retained. The main activities carried out by the IPs were:  Identification of 7,441 demobilized eligible for reintegration support;  Sensitization information on economic opportunities;  Identification and development of micro income generating activities, entrepreneurship, employment promotion, formal education, and vocational training;  Specific training on the operation and management of micro projects; 42  Assistance to 30 ex-combatants who chose formal education;  Provision of support in full to 7,417 beneficiaries, a rate of 99.66% of all ex-combatants identified including 7,390 who opted for IGAs and 27 who received all tranches for formal education; and  The provision of in-kind support to 56 pre-cooperative groupings. In all areas of project intervention, capacity building for ex-combatants and members of the host community who participate in pre-cooperative groups were completed. The training topics included structuring near-cooperative groups, the concepts of simplified accounting, design and development of a project, agro-pastoral management, and community solidarity. 56 selected associations benefitted from in-kind support. Throughout the duration of the project, more than 100 activities were organized in regards to Social Reintegration including:  Awareness of ex-combatants, receiving communities, and administrative authorities;  Promotion of peaceful coexistence, peaceful conflict resolution, community and socio- cultural reconciliation activities;  Psychosocial support for traumatic events via TPO;  Counseling and referrals for HIV/AIDS; and  Training in mediation, communication, negotiation and peaceful conflict resolution. Key lessons learned from the socio-economic reintegration include:  A good business plan is very important;  Recruit very competent IPs;  Regularly monitor the implementation of activities, especially during the start-up of IPs’ contracts;  Involve beneficiaries in steps to support their economic reintegration;  Organize workshops for IPs to harmonize their interventions;  Promote associations including ex-combatants and the host community;  Provide in-kind support for micro-economic reintegration after the receipt of reinsertion support;  Follow the schedule of the various stages of reintegration support to ensure adequate management of beneficiaries’ expectations. Impact of socio-economic reintegration: The third annual independent evaluation has identified the following observation: "The economic performance of individual socio-economic reintegration are mixed…their absolute failure rate is very low and more than one quarter of the target has seen a significant improvement in its income. This improvement is more pronounced in urban areas while EAFGA (children associated with armed groups) have consistently experienced the lowest performance (85% of target getting a FBU income 50,000 or less)." The third annual independent evaluation concluded that there is a positive impact of individual economic reintegration on social integration. The report noted, "The element of individual economic reintegration promoted the social integration of PDRT [EDTRP] demobilized, stabilizing their economic and social situation, and creating the conditions for networking and social fabric necessary for strengthening and continuation of project achievements.” The impact of the economic reintegration component on social reintegration is difficult to fully grasp but this impact is certain. The main achievements which testify to the positive impact are: 43  Stabilized helpless social groups evenly throughout the country;  It has made possible some integration by creating the basic conditions for its development: basic dignity, respect for self and others, initiatives in productive and income-generating activities as well as for professions or training; and  It built, in less than a year, a network and a social fabric first between the IPs and the demobilized and then between the demobilized which will develop the ex-combatants’ confidence to other constituent activities such as the development of associations. Component 4: Assistance to Vulnerable Groups Female Ex-combatants i. Assistance to Females A Gender Action Plan was developed by the project to guide the implementation of mitigation measures already identified and additional activities to strengthen the gender sensitive activities within the transitional reintegration activities. In all activities organized by the project and partners, they took into account the gender dimension. In this area the project has achieved the following:  Production of 32 radio programs specifically dealing with issues related to gender  Creation of 8 listening clubs composed of female ex-combatants and women ex- combatants whose role was to listen to the radio programs together, to critically suggest new topics to be covered relating to the experiences of women in general and female ex- combatants in particular  35 participatory theater presentations on topics related to gender were conducted in different parts of the country  A documentary showing the role of women in the various joint associations (host communities and ex-combatants) was been produced, distributed to partners, and shown in different communities  A series of training was conducted for the benefit of ex-combatants and members of host communities on the management of the household budget  Leadership training in general and in particular on the role of women in leadership in Burundi o on violence against women o on support for victims of violence against women  A traditional dance competition involving mainly ex-combatants and developing themes related to socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants  A women's football competition ii. Assistance to Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups (CAAF/G) The main challenges concerned the school reintegration, vocational training, and reinsertion:  Change of name or surname: The situation of some children was complicated by the fact that they changed their name or first name. This act is not acceptable by law because their records cannot be changed. Faced with this difficulty, the two IPs in consultation with the project opted for education of these children under their original names and surnames before they were enrolled in the rebellion;  Lack of vocational training centers in the area: Some children associated with armed groups wanted vocational training while there were no such training centers; 44  Impatience for and reservations on in-kind support: The vast majority of children associated with armed groups and even parents continued to call for cash money to be paid immediately. The IPs had to explain that support will be given in kind, in a multi-step procedure in order for reinsertion and reintegration to succeed;  The high mobility of children associated with armed groups: In regards to both the granting of support for reintegration or reinsertion, the two IPs experienced mobility problems of the children who did not want to stay with their families because of their discrimination by surrounding communities;  The abandonment of formal education by some CAAF/G: The project provided grant support for the reintegration of children having resumed formal education for three years. Of the 102 children who chose formal education, 74 completed the study and 28 dropped out of school; Children who dropped out of formal education received further income generation activities support;  Dissatisfaction with the amount of support: Children separated in 2008 wanted to believe they were entitled to 405,000 FBU for reinsertion as other ex-combatants; and  Concerns related to the election period: Associated children and their host families thought that the elections were going to stop their support and they called day and night to know when they would receive their support. IPs took time to reassure them as how the project would not stop support due to the elections. iii. Medical rehabilitation of Disabled Ex-combatants Challenges and key lessons learned in medical rehabilitation are:  Medical rehabilitation requires different skills and a significant logistics organization as the identification is not just simple counting but a diagnosis on a case-by-case basis to determine the sequence of treatments that are necessary;  Medical planning and organizing needs to take into account the availability of partner stakeholders (hospitals, pharmacies physio-therapy, workshops for making prostheses or orthoses);  Coordination with IPs and medical partners is crucial in the organization of treatment, transport, and follow-up for rehabilitation;  The implementation of care planning with ex-combatants is challenging (transportation issues, irregularity in taking medication);  The institutions that can make upper prosthetics are rare and hard to find in the country;  The consultations and surgeries were too numerous to be completed on time; and  The construction of 150 houses was pledged over a short period of five months and required huge efforts that needed to be closely monitored by the project. Communications This section covers all communications and outreach activities. These activities began with the establishment of a preventive communication strategy with adequate and constant messages to different target groups. The project recruited Cabinet BESD to conduct an impact survey of its communication activities between 1 April 2009 and 31 July 2011. From this impact survey of communication activities, the key findings, lessons, and recommendations that emerged were:  Participants in the focus group stated that the most accessible channels are the community focal point, radio, and mobile phone use;  All provinces visited by the evaluation mission were sufficiently covered by the radio stations broadcasting from the city of Bujumbura; 45  Information about the project passing through its partner radio stations were not sufficient because some were placed in low-audience time slots and were not advertised to the target group;  Participatory theater was supported by a limited number of demobilized. However, those who participated appreciated it a lot because it provided valuable advice and help to reduce the stigma on demobilized by the rest of the community;  The messages communicated by the project were relevant including information on the process of demobilization and reintegration, the economic opportunities, and ways of prevention and fight against HIV/AIDS. Radio channels played an important role but information conveyed at the Demobilization Center was regarded as more critical;  The messages conveyed, especially in the Demobilization Centre, have helped to change the behavior of demobilized, in particular to understand that they are no longer military personnel but need to become like other civilians. This behavior has positively influenced the coexistence of demobilized and the rest of the community members although there are still prejudices and stereotypes about the target group.  Although less than half of the demobilized "heard" the radio shows, 67% of those who listened were satisfied to very satisfied with 20% of women being very satisfied versus 10% of men. Activities related to communication such as listening clubs and participatory theater directed to a mixed audience (male/female ex-combatants/host community) positively affected social cohesion. Monitoring and Evaluation As part of the Monitoring and Evaluation, the project conducted the following studies: five beneficiary surveys; four independent annual evaluations; impact survey of communication activities between April 1, 2009 to July 31, 2011; and a Process evaluation of implementation of supervisory activities and psychosocial support between November 2010 and the end of June 2012. The third annual independent evaluation confirmed that within four years, the project identified many of the challenges. The identification of the disabled and the mentally ill, both of which belong to the component of vulnerable groups, however, took longer. The impact of the demobilization (2009) and reinsertion (2009-2010) components, covering substantially most target indicators on the results framework, included targets achieved. Despite the difficulties of survival faced by ex-combatants, they returned home and, in general, invested in different livelihoods. The results of individual economic reintegration are more difficult to assess. The project strategy and its support reflected the participation of demobilized in community life from the second half of 2011. The creation of associations including both ex-combatants and community members promoted immediate reinsertion of the demobilized within host communities. Support for vulnerable groups is an essential component of the project that remains unfinished. The analysis of the project’s gender aspect shows that female ex-combatants feel less stigmatized than at the beginning of their rehabilitation. Their experience today tends to be assimilated to that of Burundian women in general. Reintegration seems to have had less impact on CAAF/G who generally show less success economically and dissatisfaction with their reintegration during beneficiary surveys. The project, therefore, recommends CAAF/G receive targeted learning or training activities, also in the framework of participation in community life, in the future. 46 Care of the disabled, leaves an important task unfinished. The increase in managed care will depend on the availability of specialized services for their care. The future of chronic disabilities is worrying as well. It raises a question of public health in Burundi and will require the involvement of different partners: Government of Burundi, donors, specialized care units. Project Supervision Given the urgent nature of the project and past performance of World Bank operations, at least four supervision missions during the first year of project implementation followed by at least three supervision missions during the rest of the project duration until June 30, 2014 were carried out by the World Bank team. A representative of this team, Senior Social Development Specialist was recruited and based in Bujumbura who later became the Task Team Leader during activities from November 2013 to June 2014. At least two missions of the World Bank team were carried out regularly as assistance to project implementation each year. Recommendations provided in the different aide memoires have been applied by the project team and the World Bank. In addition, a mission of the World Bank visited Burundi between 9 and 19 November 2010 to jointly conduct with the Government of Burundi the project mid-term review. Finally, supervision missions carried out by the World Bank have helped to strengthen the operational capacity of the national structure, especially in planning operations / activities, financial management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and management in general. Innovations and improvements have been made periodically in the implementation of project activities to achieve the planned objectives. Recommendations based on Lessons Learned during Implementation i. The Government of Burundi  In general, create and/or strengthen the structures responsible for the socio-administrative supervision of the population in each county. Indeed, it would help in controlling the experienced psychosocial and socioeconomic households and, therefore, in setting up structures for monitoring and supervision of the population on these issues;  Hire an exit strategy manager;  Always encourage work in synergy with the leadership of the State in the supervision and management of its population process: learn from others, build the best expertise, use and retain primary responsibility that guides and directs;  The state should do everything possible to enable access to mental health care in all hospitals and other existing care in the country. Indeed, the long distances with all support systems, heavy price to pay for transportation and health care, bureaucratic paperwork requirements and other obstacles make it a difficult and painful life for a mental health patient and his family;  Hold meetings of thematic coordination between stakeholders at national and regional levels in order to avoid a fragmented effort and involve administering agents where they exist as a strategy for intervention sustainability;  Consider how the name "ex-combatant" could gradually be out of use to complete an ex- combatant’s transition to a community member as some ex-combatants interviewed are embarrassed to keep the name;  Initiate programs to strengthen the capacity of households to enable them to take charge of their own problems (diseases, accidents, etc.); 47  Avoid stigmatizing ex-combatants in general and those with psychosocial problems and/or mental health in particular to make them feel like full citizens because stigma can worsen psychosocial and/or health;  Facilitate the accreditation process after which associations of ex-combatants and community members can work within the law, as some lenders may require, among other conditions;  Analyze court records of ex-combatants held as soon as possible so they may change their status to sentenced instead of alleged perpetrators. ii. Implementing Partners  Assign adequate staff to make interventions possible. Indeed, the investigation and the results of the SWOT analysis reveal that the staff on site was a small number compared to territory that was to be covered and the number of beneficiaries that were to be followed;  Identify existing structures that can supplement possible referrals. This could reduce agents’ responsible for monitoring the beneficiaries stress because it is difficult to answer all questions of the ex-combatants;  Share relevant information to carry out a coordinated response. It was indeed found between the different partners involved in the project that information was not shared properly;  Involve beneficiaries actively in activities that affect them. IPs reported they were organizing community events or reconciliation but sometimes they did not necessarily consult the participation of ex-combatants provided that such activities often include limited resources;  Increase awareness campaigns to raise awareness among beneficiaries and their communities on the need to work towards their progressive empowerment; and  Psychosocial officers should ensure patients under treatment take their medication as prescribed. Conclusion The project objectives are divided into four components. The first three can be considered completed, namely demobilization, reinsertion, and socio-economic reintegration. The fourth component consists of an appropriate response to basic needs in material terms as well as relief of physical, psychological and moral consequences for vulnerable groups. In less than four years, the project addressed most of the challenges posed to its initial objectives. Through a system of adequate management and monitoring, the project achieved its target of over 99% for the first three components’ results indicators. The identification of the disabled and the mentally ill required more attention and, therefore, took longer. Given the remaining challenges, the project, originally scheduled for three years (2009-end 2011), was extended until the end of 2013. The extension helped provide effective rehabilitation and treatment of demobilized with disabilities, psychological or psychiatric illnesses as well as further economic and social reintegration by strengthening the capacity of ex-combatants linked to the organization and management of associations. A new component of construction and allocation of new housing for seriously disabled ex-combatants was completed in a very short period of five months during the additional financing period. The extension of the project until 30 June 2014, however, has achieved all the goals, even with regard to the rehabilitation of disabled ex-combatants. Immediately after the completion of the houses, the beneficiaries must be installed in these homes. The Government of Burundi and its development partners should take the necessary steps 48 to monitor this situation and project closing. Thus, the following activities will need to be supported:  Continued medical management of ex-combatants with chronic disabilities who require permanent care: supply of drugs (eg anticonvulsants) and other pharmaceutical supplies for paraplegics with urinary incontinence or colostomy, repair or replacement of orthopedic equipment like prosthetics for mobility;  Continued care for psychiatric cases;  Preparation of all chronic disabilities to self-care and/or through synergies, identifying other potential stakeholders who can take care of the permanently disabled caseload; and  Provision of solutions for sustainable medical insurance (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Solidarity, etc.). In addition, the following recommendations would need to be implemented to ensure the full installation of severely disabled ex-combatants into their new homes:  Provision of basic medical kits depending on the type of disability for the first moments of the houses’ occupation;  Provision of food necessities for the first three months of tenure;  Provision and delivery of furniture and kitchen equipment for households;  Supervision of beneficiaries for starting income generating activities such as agriculture and small businesses as they live in rural or urban areas; and  Support to autonomy and health of severely disabled beneficiaries to ensure the prevention of medical complications related to disability. Overall Recommendations i. The Government of Burundi  Continue tracking demobilized ex-combatants in their socio-economic reintegration by developing a sustainable project that targets them along with some members of the host community through the Country Assistance Strategy 17 (CAS 17) of the World Bank and the PRSP II of Burundi;  Continue to support CAAF/G who came of age at least in the context of associations including other vulnerable children;  Further rehabilitate chronically ill ex-combatants who should be entrusted to another state structure at the end of the project because they need to be monitored continuously;  Continue psychosocial assistance of the mentally ill who are not yet recovered;  Invite disabled ex-combatants to participate in joint associations or associations of services to disabled ex-combatants; and  Support the integration effort of disabled ex-combatants in terms of (media radio) communication and income generating activities in general, and particularly the 150 which have been installed in homes. ii. The World Bank and Other Development Partners  Advocate for new projects to be developed for sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants under the Country Assistance Strategy 17 (CAS 17) of the World Bank and the PRSP II of Burundi;  Support initiatives undertaken for demobilized to ensure peace and security in Burundi and in the sub-region. 49 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The recipient and the implementing partner both indicated that they agreed with the document and had no further comment. (b) Cofinanciers The draft ICR was shared with representatives of donors to the MDTF (the European Commission, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands). No comments were received from donors, except from representatives of Norway who emphasized the importance of describing project’s sustainability. While the project was intended as transitional, it contributed to strengthen in-country capacity through technical assistance and training. In addition, various follow up initiatives suggest the recipient’s willingness to ensure the sustainability of project results, in particular through: (i) th e strengthening of in-country capacity to provide support to Disabled ex-combatants (Kamenge military hospital), (ii) the creation of an “Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” to ensure follow up and continued support to ex-combatants. 50 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents CNDDR o All Quarterly Progress Reports (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) o Annual Reports (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) o CNDDR and CURDES, Première Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2010 o CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011 o CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013 o CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014 o CNDDR, Gender Action Plan, March 2011 o CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014 o CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation Du Processus De Réalisation Des Activités D’Encadrement Et D’Assistance Psychosocial Du PDRT, November 2013 o CNDDR and BESD, Enquête D’Impact des Activités de Communication du Projet de Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire, December 2011 o CNDDR, Autonomie Plan, May 2014 o TPO Burundi, Rapport D’achèvement des Activités sur le Traitement des Cas et la Reference, December 2013 o CM Partners, Projet De L’harmonisation De la Formation des Formateurs Devant Assurer la Formations Des Ex-combattants et membres de la Communauté Influents en Techniques de Communications, Facilitation/Médiation et la Résolution des Conflits, Final Report, March 2014 o CNDDR, Soins des Démobilisés Handicapés, Situations au mois d’avril 2014 o CNDDR, Manuel des Procédures de Mise en Œuvre du Projet, Octobre 2009 o CNDDR, Manuel des Opérations de la Réintégration des Ex-Combattants, Avril 2010 World Bank o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February 2009 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, October-November 2009 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, March-April 2010 o World Bank, EDTRP, Mid-Term Review, November 2010 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, May 2011 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, November-December 2011 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, June 2012 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, December 2012 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February- April 2013 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, December 2013. o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February 2014 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, March 2014 o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, June 2014 o AFTCS, Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Emergency Recover Grant in the Amount of SDR 10.1 Million (US$l5.0 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Burundi for an Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, June 2009 o Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR), December 2009, May 2010, February 2011, September 2011, April 2012, September 2012, April 2013, October 2013, May 2014, June 2014 51 o AFTCS, Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Restructuring and Additional Emergency Recover Grant in the Amount of US$4.25 Million to the Republic of Burundi for an Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, August 2013 o IDA Financing Agreement, Grant Number H497-BI, June 2009 o Trust Fund Grant Agreement, MDTF Grant Number TF 096439 o Administration Agreement, TF 071297, December 2009 o Additional Financing Agreement, MDTF Grant Number TF 014654, September 2013 o World Bank Group, Country Partnership Strategy for Rwanda, FY 2014-2018, June 2014 o International Development Association and International Finance Corporation, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Burundi for the Period FY09-FY 12, July 2008 o International Development Association and International Finance Corporation, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Burundi for the Period FY13-FY 16, September 2012 o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, April 13, 2010 o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, September 10, 2012 o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, December 23, 2013 o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, May 26, 2014 o World Bank, TDRP Quarterly Report, January-March 2011 o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009 o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2009 Other o Amnesty International, Burundi: Locked Down- A Shrinking of Political Space, 2014 o Handicap International, Annuaire des services sociaux et économiques existants dans les provinces de Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, Bururi, Gitega et Muramvya, Edition 2012 o Handicap International, Etude sur la situation des personnes handicapées au Burundi, 2012 o Handicap International, Leçons apprises du Projet Turi Kumwe Réinsertion socio- économique des anciens combattants handicapés au Burundi 2010-2013, August 2013 o Hanson, Stephanie, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2007 o Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You” Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi, 2010 o Human Rights Watch, “You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living” The Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi, 2012 o IMF, Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, February 2007 52 o IMF, Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II, August 2012 o International Crisis Group, Burundi : du Boycott Electoral a l’Impasse Politique, Rapport Afrique N°169 – 7 février 2011 o International Crisis Group, Burundi : Bye Bye Arusha ?, Rapport Afrique N°192 – 25 octobre 2012 o International Crisis Group, Burundi: réussir l’intégration des FNL, Briefing Afrique N°63, 30 juillet 2009 o Jaremey McMullin, Expanded After Action Review: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Burundi: 2000-2011, UNDPKO OROLSI DDR SECTION (April 2011) o Jadin, Minani, Appui à la Réadaptation Médicale et à la Réintégration Socio- Economique des Démobilisés Handicapés, Rapport commissionné par le PNDDR, 2005 o United Nations World Food Program, Overview of Food Security in Burundi o World Bank, Burundi – Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant Project, May 2012 53 Annex 10. List of Interviews Conducted for ICR Preparation GoB Denise Sinankwa Présidence de la Senior Economics Advisor République, Burundi Implementing Agency: Technical Coordination Team (TCT) of the National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) Jeroboam Nzikobanyanka TCT Program Coordinator Albert Sezirahiga TCT Operations Officer Alexis Sinzakaraye TCT Chief Medical Officer Sylvie Nsavyimana TCT Financial Management Specialist Adolphe Hasabindero TCT Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist Gordien TCT Management Information Systems Specialist Desire Ndagijimana TCT Gender and Communications Specialist Pascal Mafyiritano TCT Procurement Specialist Implementing Partners of the TCT Portien Bikebako Umbrella NGO Director Twitezimbere Ladislas Kabwa Umbrella NGO Technical Director Twitezimbere Herman Ndayisaba TPO Director Francois Xavier Nsababana TPO Coordinator / Psychosocial Expert Annick Comexcell Director Alphonse Ndabiseruye ODDBU Executive Secretary Jean Bosco Ngomirakiza ODDBU Coordinator Income Generating Activities Athanase Barunsaze ODDBU Expert in Synergies and Communications/ Head of Training and Communications Department Gilbert Batungwanayo ADL Director Representatives of Donors to the MDTF Yves Nindorera Belgium Embassy, Program Manager Bujumbura Elizabeth Droyer Norway Embassy, Counsellor (NB – assignment ends in June Bujumbura 2014 – replacement Achilles Kiwanuka based in Uganda: Achilles.kiwanuka@mfa.no) Niels Veenis Embassy of the First Secretary Netherlands, Bujumbura Political and Military Affairs Charlotte Tilli Blomhammard European Union Counsellor Delegation, Bujumbura 54 Natacha Meden Center for Security Senior SSR Advisor Development and the Rule of Law, Geneva, Switzerland Olivier Jadin Belgian Cooperation International Disability Expert Caroline Duconseille Handicap International, Program Director Bujumbura, Burundi World Bank Leanne Bayer World Bank Task Team Leader of the EDTRP (December 2013-June 2014) Pia Peeters World Bank Task Team Leader of the EDTRP (April 2010-November 2013) Marcelo Fabre World Bank Task Team Leader of the EDRRP (July 2008-March 2010) 55 Annex 11. Synergies Partner organizations Contribution to project United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Support to children whose families could not be Nations Development Program (UNDP), identified through Villages de Paix International Rescue Committee (IRC) UNDP, United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi Support to 10,186 adults associated with FNL (BINUB), and GoB combatants (including 1,051 women) UNICEF, African Union Contribution to the reinsertion and demobilization of children through the provision of reinsertion benefits and the provision of vocational training to 150 children Swedish International Development Agency Funding of full time international prosthetics expert (SIDA), Handicap International (HI) at the Centre National d'Appareillage et de Réadaptation (CNAR). Provision of economic reintegration support to 2,020 disabled ex- combatants World Food Organization (WFP) Implementation of Work for Food project supporting 124 ex-combatants, as well as community members in Bubanza, Cibitoke, and Bujumbura Rural Provinces BINUB, UNICEF, IRC, Stamm Foundation, Design and implementation of a collaboration American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative framework for reintegration support to children (ABA-ROLI), Burundian Association for Human associated with armed groups Rights and the Rights of Detainees (APRODH), Ministry of Human Rights and Gender, Ministry of National Solidarity, Repatriation of Refugees and Social Reintegration, Burundian Non-Governmental Organizations (ODDBU, BDDB) UNICEF, Burundian NGOs (ODDBU, BDDB) Design and implementation of project to support children associated with armed groups and other minors in communities Local associations (Dufashanye in Karusi, ADDP in Collaboration between associations of ex- Kamenge, and AEM in Cibitoke) combatants and project to ensure the inclusion of former FNL ex-combatants in associations WFP Design and implementation of project for the benefit of about 100 ex-combatants in Kabezi, Muhuta and Bugarama (Bujumbura Province), Bubanza (Bubanza Province) and Buganda (Cibitoke Province) Belgian Technical Cooperation (CTB) Hiring of ex-combatants for road construction in Kinama and Kamenge HI, Ministry of National Solidarity, Repatriation of Design of a collaboration framework for support to Refugees and Social Reintegration disabled ex-combatants Cord (International NGO) In-kind support to associations of ex-combatants Local NGOs Provision of vocational training, leadership training to ex-combatants in some communes in Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Mairie Provinces World Vision, Local NGOs Provision of in-kind support and loans to ex- combatant associations 56 57