

Corporate Growth, Financing, and Risks in the Decade before East Asia's Financial Crisis

Empirical analysis shows that some of the vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that helped trigger East Asia's financial crisis already existed in the early 1990s.

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Summary findings

East Asia's financial crisis has been attributed in part to the weak performance and risky financial structures of Asian corporations. In the period before Asia's financial crisis, however, analysts were not suggesting that the financial structures of many East Asian corporations would be unable to withstand the combined shocks of increased interest rates, depreciated currencies, and large drops in domestic demand.

To document the basic record of corporate performance and financing structures for East Asian corporations, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang analyze data for 5,550 firms in nine countries for the period 1988–96. They find large differences in performance and financial structure across countries.

Profitability — as measured by real return on assets (ROA) in local currency — was relatively low in Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore in the decade before the crisis. Corporations in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand averaged high returns — roughly double those in Germany and the United States for the same period.

In 1994–96, measured performance declined somewhat in several East Asian countries, especially

Japan and Korea. Those differences in performance were not fully reflected in sales growth, as investment rates were high and continued to drive output growth in all countries.

These stylized facts suggest that the East Asian miracle was indeed based on a vibrant corporate sector.

But the combination of high investment and relatively low profitability in some countries meant that much external financing was needed. Outside equity was used sparingly — in part because stock markets were depressed (Japan) or because insiders preferred to retain control — so borrowing was heavy in most East Asian countries, and leverage increased in the years before 1996 in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Risk increased as short-term (foreign exchange) borrowing became increasingly important in the 1990s, especially in Malaysia, Taiwan (China), and Thailand.

In other words, it is now apparent that some of the vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that were to become an important factor in East Asia's financial crisis already existed in the early 1990s, although they were not noted at the time.

This paper — a product of the Economic Policy Unit, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Network — is part of a larger effort in the network to study the performance and financing structures of East Asian corporations. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room MC10-628, telephone 202-473-3722, fax 202-522-2031, Internet address hvo1@worldbank.org. Simeon Djankov may be contacted at sdjankov@worldbank.org. November 1998. (23 pages)

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**East Asian Corporates: Growth, Financing and Risks
over the Last Decade**

by

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World Bank

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1. Introduction

The East Asian financial crisis has in part been attributed to the weak performance and risky financial structures of corporates. Ex-post, it has become clear that the operational performance of East Asian corporates was indeed not as stellar as many had thought and in fact involved investment with high risks. Also ex-post, it has become apparent that the financial structures of many East Asian corporates could not withstand the combined shocks of increased interest rates, depreciated currencies, and large drops in domestic demand. This poor performance and risky financing structures of East Asian corporates were, however, not notably featured among observers writing on East Asia prior to the financial crisis. Quite the opposite, East Asian corporates were considered an important contributing part of the East Asian miracle and were generally viewed upon as very competitive and adept at exploiting new market opportunities, and consequently attracted considerable amounts of (foreign) capital.

Reconciling the differences between these ex-post and ex-ante view will likely be a topic of much future research.¹ In this note, we are less ambitious and start with documenting the basic record in corporate performance and financing structures for East Asian corporates over the last decade. Analyzing whether this record led or contributed to a financial crisis will be pursued in future work. We use a database of balance sheet and income statement data for 5550 East Asian firms in nine countries over the period 1988-1996 for establishing the stylized facts on corporate performance and financing structures. The main data source are annual reports of the companies listed on the major stock exchanges in the region.

We find large differences in performance and financial structures across countries. Profitability, as measured by real return on assets (ROA) in local currency, was relatively low in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore throughout the period, while corporates in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand had high returns, on average twice higher than those recorded in Germany and the United States over the same period. In the years 1994-1996, measured performance declined somewhat in several East Asian countries, especially Japan and Korea. These differences in performance did not show up as much in sales growth as investment rates were high and continued to drive output growth rates in all countries. These stylized facts suggest that the East Asian miracle was indeed based on a vibrant corporate sector.

However, the combination of high investment and relatively low profitability in some countries meant that much external financing was needed. As outside equity was used sparingly, partly as stock markets were depressed (Japan) or because insiders preferred to retain control, leverage was high in most East Asian countries, and increasing in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. This created large risks as short-term (foreign exchange) borrowing became increasingly important in the last few years, especially in Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. Some of the vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that have now become a very apparent factor in

¹ Two companion papers use the same data to study specific aspects of the behavior of corporations in East Asia. Claessens et al. (1998a) investigates the patter of diversification into vertically related, complementary related, and unrelated businesses. Claessens et al. (1998b) examines the link between ownership structure and corporate performance.

triggering and aggravating East Asia's financial crisis, were thus already in existence in the early 1990s.

2. Data

The data come from annual reports of the companies listed on the major stock exchanges in the region and come from Worldscope and Extel databases. The datasets are unbalanced, i.e., the number of observations varies from year to year. We have excluded companies, which report data less than three times over the period 1988-96. We have also excluded financial and banking institutions (SIC6000-6999). Finally, in any given year, we exclude companies which do not include all of the following variables – net sales, net income after taxes, cost of goods sold, total assets, and the value of common equity. The data set consists of 588 companies in Hong Kong, 317 companies in Indonesia, 2526 companies in Japan, 392 companies in Korea, 772 companies in Malaysia, 170 companies in Philippines, 348 companies in Singapore, 265 companies in Taiwan, and 564 companies in Thailand.

Several caveats apply to the data. First, the statistics we report do not attempt to correct for cross-country differences in industrial structure. If a country data set has many utility firms, for example, average leverage might be higher and profitability lower. A forthcoming companion paper breaks down the sample into sectors (based on two-digit SIC codes) to provide a more accurate comparison of company performance across countries. The data also cover mainly large firms—the median size of the 5550 firms is 4273 employees, with the largest company employing more than 150,000 employees. This selection pattern arises since firms have to be listed on a stock exchange in order to enter the database, and listed companies tend to be large. The bias towards larger companies may be problematic if one were studying the effect of the Asian financial crises on the corporate sector. It does not pose a problem here, since we focus on the years preceding the crisis, when (as critics argue) large companies were at the root of the corporate and financial sector difficulties.

Whenever possible, we have compared the main variables of interest with those reported in other studies, in particular Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995), Glen et al. (1998), and Goldman Sachs (1998).² We also cross-checked the data for Japan with the *Comparative Economic and Financial Statistic for Japan and other Major Countries*, published by the Bank of Japan and the OECD Financial Statistics Part 3, *Financial Statements of Non-Financial Enterprises*. The similarity in calculations—large companies are also used there—provides some comfort in the robustness of our results.

² Pomerleano (1998) also analyzes East Asian corporations. He uses alternative measures of performance and leverage that are not easily comparable with the statistics in this study.

3. Performance Measures

As our first measure of performance we use the real rate of return on assets (ROA) in local currency. This is calculated at the firm level as the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in local currency over total assets minus the annual inflation rate in the country. The advantage of this measure is that it is not influenced by the liability structure of the corporate, as it excludes interest payments, financial income, and other income or expenses. Table 1 shows that across countries, East Asian corporates have had quite different ROAs. Relatively low profitability rates have been recorded by corporates from Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore with real ROAs on average of about 5%. High-profitability countries, at least for most of the period we study, have been Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Corporates in these countries averaged real ROAs of about 9%-10% for the whole period. ROAs for corporates in Malaysia and Taiwan fall in between these two groups, but their returns of about 7% are still closer to the high performers. These ROAs can be compared to ROAs in Germany and the United States³ of about 5 percent, providing support to the notion that the corporate sector contributed significantly to the East Asian Miracle during most of this period.

Table 1: Return on Assets for Nine Asian Countries, Germany and the US
(%, medians, in real local currency)


Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	5.1	5.3	4.9	4.8	4.5	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.6
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	9.4	9.1	8.6	7.9	7.4	6.2	6.5	7.1
Japan	5.7	5.4	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.6	4.1
Korea	4.4	3.9	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.1	3.7
Malaysia	5.4	5.6	5.4	6.2	6.0	6.5	6.3	6.1	5.6	6.3
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.1	6.4	8.1	8.5	6.8	8.4	7.9
Singapore	4.9	4.5	4.2	3.9	5.2	4.6	4.5	3.9	4.0	4.4
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.1	6.2	6.5	6.8	6.5	6.6	6.7
Thailand	10.8	11.0	11.7	11.2	10.2	9.8	9.3	7.8	7.4	9.8
US	4.7	4.8	5.1	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.3
Germany	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.7	5.6	5.2	5.1	4.9	5.0	4.7

Note: Table A1 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

As a further comparison of the performance of East Asian corporates, we plot the average 1988-96 ROA for corporates in all other countries that report to Worldscope (Figure 1). Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia have the highest ROAs in this sample of 46 countries, while Taiwan and Malaysia are close behind. At the other end, Korea and Japan have the lowest ROAs in the sample, together with Norway, Sweden, and Austria. Singapore and Hong Kong also have relatively low ROAs in real local currency.

³ For all companies listed on the DAX in Frankfurt, and for all NYSE companies in the US.

Figure 1: International Comparison on ROAs



Next we calculate the return on assets in US dollars, adjusted for the effects of currency movements (Table 2). This measure of performance presents the point of view of an international investor who can allocate resources across several countries. With the exception of Japan (6.6%) and Taiwan (8.4%), all East Asian countries have US dollars ROAs higher than the US median (8.7%). The Philippines (18.7%), Thailand (14.7%), and Indonesia (13.0%) have the highest average returns over the 1988-96 period.

Table 2: Return on Assets for Nine Asian Countries, Germany and the US
(%, medians, in nominal US dollars)

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	8.0	8.4	7.2	12.9	14.3	12.5	11.5	8.0	10.3	10.3
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	16.0	13.7	12.6	15.3	11.7	10.7	11.2	13.0
Japan	6.5	-6.0	13.3	14.8	7.0	16.2	15.6	1.0	-9.2	6.6
Korea	25.1	10.3	7.3	7.2	6.4	5.9	12.1	9.9	-1.0	9.2
Malaysia	-0.8	8.8	7.2	9.9	14.8	6.1	15.5	12.2	9.5	9.2
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	23.2	21.2	5.4	29.4	7.5	16.5	17.2
Singapore	8.9	9.4	15.6	13.6	6.9	9.3	16.4	9.0	6.8	10.7
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6.2	12.0	4.6	12.4	6.3	8.9	8.4
Thailand	13.9	14.6	19.3	16.9	13.4	13.1	16.6	13.2	11.5	14.7
US	8.7	9.6	10.5	9.1	8.3	8.4	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.7

The high returns in Table 2 are driven to some extent by the real exchange rate appreciation in the respective countries. Correcting for the real exchange rate appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar, we find significantly lower ROAs. For example, the return in US dollars once a correction is made for real currency appreciation is 8.4% in Korea in 1988. Mathematically, this is nothing else than the sum of the real ROA in Korean won (4.4%) and the inflation rate in the United States (4.0%)—all other terms cancel out in the calculation. This implies that the relative comparisons of the ROAs corrected for real exchange rate appreciations are the same as those in Table 1.

Our third measure of profitability is operational margin, calculated as the difference between sales and costs of good sold, as a share of sales (Table 3). The liability structure or other income and expenses of the corporate do not influence this measure either, but the capital intensity of the individual corporate does. The operational margin measure shows less cross-country differences and has been stable for most countries throughout the period. The cross-country differences may indicate that firms across East Asia were exposed to differing degree of (international) competition. Relatively lower-margin producers seem to be Singapore, followed by Hong Kong, Malaysia and Korea. Surprisingly, Japanese firms have higher-margins on goods sold ratios than these developing countries, which may reflect the high capital intensity of Japanese firms and the, often-argued, lower level of competition within Japan. Relatively high-margin producers are the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, which may reflect the degree of domestic competition, the lower wages and high share of natural resources in their exports (the later especially for Indonesia). No strong trend appears over time, albeit there is some decrease

in operational margins for Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore, possibly reflecting their higher wage growth while at the same time they were facing increased competition.

Table 3: Operational Margin for Nine Asian Countries, US and Germany
(%, medians)

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	23.5	19.5	22.2	19.6	17.4	16.6	17.3	14.6	14.2	18.7
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	35.7	33.3	34.4	32.8	31.2	30.6	32.9
Japan	22.2	22.7	22.9	22.4	21.9	21.8	21.8	23.1	23.3	22.1
Korea	13.7	16.8	17.3	16.9	19.2	18.7	19.6	21.4	22.1	19.6
Malaysia	16.4	16.3	17.1	17.3	17.6	17.4	18.4	19.5	25.5	18.1
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	36.1	26.4	26.4	27.5	30.8	33.3	27.7
Singapore	17.3	16.7	16.8	15.5	15.5	15.2	14.1	13.6	13.1	14.9
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	25.4	21.4	22.7	22.6	22.3	21.9	22.6
Thailand	21.9	24.3	25.7	27.3	25.9	25.1	24.9	24.7	22.7	25.2
US	14.1	13.9	14.1	14.3	15.5	14.0	14.7	14.8	14.6	14.4
Germany	13.2	13.4	13.7	13.5	13.8	14.1	15.6	16.7	17.1	14.6

Note: Table A2 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

The cross-country differences in returns on assets do not reflect themselves directly in differences in sales growth, which are also more variable over time (Table 4). Most East Asian corporates recorded on average high, real sales growth over the period. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand stand out, with 11.9%, 10.6% and 9.7% on average, followed by Taiwan with 9.3%. Other countries also had high sales growth rates, which are about double those of Germany (2.6%) and the US (3.7%). The country with the lowest corporate sales growth in East Asia is Japan, averaging 7.7%. These high sales growth rates mirror the high growth in export and domestic demand that has characterized this region over the last decade. We do observe some slowdown, however, in 1996 in sales growth for Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, possibly reflecting lower exports growth rates.

Table 4: Real Sales Growth (Year-on-Year) for Nine Asian Countries, Germany and the United States
(%, medians)

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	10.1	11.6	10.2	12.4	9.8	9.4	9.7	11.8	9.2
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10.7	12.1	12.4	9.4	8.3	10.6
Japan	7.4	8.2	8.4	8.3	8.8	8.5	7.2	4.3	7.7
Korea	8.4	8.7	8.2	8.3	7.6	7.3	7.2	8.6	8.2
Malaysia	9.7	12.3	11.8	12.7	13.1	12.6	11.7	11.9	11.9
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.4	6.7	7.6	10.6	12.2	8.2
Singapore	8.4	8.6	8.1	9.4	11.6	11.8	10.2	7.7	8.7
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.1	11.3	10.3	9.7	8.4	9.3
Thailand	11.6	10.3	10.8	9.6	8.3	10.1	10.7	5.7	9.7
US	4.3	3.4	-1.8	4.3	2.8	6.9	4.1	4.3	3.7
Germany	5.0	4.4	5.1	1.1	-4.2	2.3	1.3	4.7	2.6

Note: Table A3 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

That these sales growth rates were maintained at such a high level—and at rates very similar across countries—reflects in part the high investment rates in this region (Table 5). We measure investment growth as new dollar investments as a share of existing fixed assets. Over this period, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand stand out, with investment rates of up to 13%, and in some years even or more, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, with rates averaging about 10%. Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan had growth in investment in fixed assets of about 8. Japan has had low investment rates especially since 1990. This probably reflects in part its sustained financial and corporate crisis since the early 1990s.

Table 5: Capital Investment for Nine East Asian Countries, Germany, and the United States, 1988-1996
(%, medians)

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	14.3	16.6	8.3	7.6	7.2	19.8	7.6	5.8	9.3	8.3
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12.4	13.4	8.6	15.8	13.8	11.8	12.7
Japan	11.6	14.2	8.3	4.6	7.6	6.8	7.3	7.5	7.1	8.0
Korea	15.6	13.8	13.2	19.6	11.6	11.2	12.2	12.4	13.7	13.6
Malaysia	8.6	7.6	8.9	9.6	11.3	13.4	15.2	14.6	16.1	10.7
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9.1	8.9	7.8	13.5	14.1	14.5	10.8
Singapore	7.8	7.6	7.4	8.8	9.6	11.3	13.4	12.5	13.5	10.4
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	14.3	8.2	8.4	8.7	11.2	8.6	8.7
Thailand	10.4	12.9	12.3	15.0	14.9	15.0	14.7	14.5	5.8	13.8
US	3.8	4.1	3.0	-1.4	4.0	2.6	6.4	3.7	3.8	3.4
Germany	4.9	4.8	4.2	5.0	0.9	-3.8	2.1	1.3	4.6	2.5

Note: Table A4 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

4. Financial structures

The degree of riskiness inherent in the liability structures of East Asian corporates is evident in the data. The high investment rates, and relatively low ROAs for some countries, meant that external financing had to be large as internal sources of capital, i.e., retained earnings, were limited. This high external financing, mostly from the banking systems, has been always a characteristic of the East Asian Miracle. Leverage, defined as total debt over equity, remained then also high for many East Asian countries, much above that in other developing countries and many developed countries (Table 6). The highest leverage over this period was in case of Korea, about five times the lowest, Taiwan. Malaysia and Singapore were also low; leverage in the Philippines, while rising, was still much below that of Indonesia and Thailand.

**Table 6: Leverage for Nine Asian Countries,
Germany and the US**
(%, means)


Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	1.832	2.311	1.783	2.047	1.835	1.758	2.273	1.980	1.559	1.902
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.943	2.097	2.054	1.661	2.115	1.878	1.951
Japan	2.994	2.843	2.871	2.029	2.042	2.057	2.193	2.367	2.374	2.302
Korea	2.820	2.644	3.105	3.221	3.373	3.636	3.530	3.776	3.545	3.467
Malaysia	0.727	0.810	1.010	0.610	0.627	0.704	0.991	1.103	1.176	0.908
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.830	1.186	1.175	1.148	1.150	1.285	1.129
Singapore	0.765	0.922	0.939	0.887	0.856	1.102	0.862	1.037	1.049	0.936
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.679	0.883	0.866	0.894	0.796	0.802	0.820
Thailand	1.602	1.905	2.159	2.010	1.837	1.914	2.126	2.224	2.361	2.008
US	0.798	0.848	0.904	0.972	1.059	1.051	1.066	1.099	1.125	1.034
Germany	1.535	1.552	1.582	1.594	1.507	1.534	1.512	1.485	1.472	1.514

Note: Table A5 reports medians, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

Most East Asian countries saw some increase in leverage in the last few years: this was most notable for Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Japan had seen some de-leveraging earlier in the decade, possibly as there was some financial retrenchment, in the early 1990s, but lack of equity and corporate sector difficulties may have meant that no new equity was raised and loans were rolled over in the later part of the period. Leverage consequently rose. The rise in leverage in the Philippines is probably the result of its reforms in the mid-1980s, which led to revived corporate and financial sectors and better financing possibilities.

To study the riskiness of the financial structures of East Asian corporates, we next compare their average 1988-96 leverage ratios with the leverage ratios in the other Worldscope countries (Figure 2). Korean and Japanese firms have the highest leverage among all corporates in this group of countries, while companies in Thailand, Indonesia, and Hong Kong also have among the ten highest leverage ratios. At the opposite extreme, Taiwanese firms show relatively low leverage ratios. Firms in the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia also have below-average ratios. The pattern across other regions is also interesting. Western European countries typically display high leverage ratios, with Swiss firms having leverage almost as high as Japanese firms. In contrast, corporates in South American countries (Peru, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia) have low leverage, reflecting the less deep banking systems of these countries.

Figure 2: International Comparison of Leverage



Long-term debt (as a share of total debt) has been low across the whole period in all East Asian countries (Table 7). Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand stand out with less than 1/3. Japan and the Philippines have the highest share, ½, while the others are about 0.43. In contrast, about ¾ of debt of US corporates is long term, while in Germany the ratio is 0.55. In spite of the large attention to the role of short-term debt in the East Asian financial crisis, these data do not suggest a massive buildup in short-term debt for the East Asian countries, at least up to the end of 1996, but rather a consistently low share of long-term debt. In fact, only Japan saw some decrease in the share of long-term debt. As these data do not distinguish foreign exchange from domestic debt, it can of course be that the composition may have shifted away from short-term domestic debt toward short-term foreign exchange debt.

Table 7: Long Term Debt Share for Nine Asian Countries, Germany, and the US
(%, medians)


Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	59.7	59.5	53.8	56.5	44.7	44.7	40.7	37.3	36.4	44.9
Indonesia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	52.4	40.8	39.6	41.6	41.8	43.3	43.1
Japan	49.9	54.1	53.8	49.9	49.4	51.7	47.7	44.4	40.8	48.4
Korea	55.7	47.2	49.8	49.8	44.2	43.7	41.4	40.4	41.5	43.7
Malaysia	35.8	35.5	32.5	27.1	26.9	26.6	27.2	27.8	29.9	29.2
Philippines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	57.2	53.1	50.3	50.2	49.8	51.4	52.2
Singapore	57.2	55.4	54.1	33.8	33.8	33.9	40.2	38.6	41.1	43.3
Taiwan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53.9	44.4	32.8	34.6	34.3	38.9	35.9
Thailand	58.1	49.8	38.8	34.3	25.2	26.4	27.6	32.9	32.8	30.9
US	77.7	77.2	76.3	76.7	75.8	76.2	75.2	74.6	74.1	75.9
Germany	56.8	55.4	54.5	53.9	55.2	55.4	55.4	55.3	54.7	55.3

Note: Table A6 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.

The international comparison of the maturity of debt structure (Figure 3) reveals that most East Asian countries rank below European and Latin American countries in their share of long term debt.⁴ Among East Asian countries, only corporations from the Philippines have an average share of long-term debt greater than 50%. There is a general tendency for corporates in richer countries to have more long-term debt, as observed by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and others. Some other, low-income Asian countries (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China) have indeed low shares of long term debt. But many of the higher-income East Asian countries are outliers to this pattern, as they rely less on long-term debt than what would be expected on the basis of their per-capita income level. Japan, for example, ranks below many other OECD-countries. Among developing countries, Chile stands out as country with a very high share of long-term debt.


⁴ We present the share of long-term debt, rather than the share of short-term debt as the latter can underestimate the amount of liabilities with a short maturity as it excludes, for example, trade credits.

Figure 3: International Comparison of Long Term Debt Share



The structure of debt (domestic vs. foreign: short vs. long term) was different across countries, however. Figure 4 and table A7 report the distribution of debt across these four categories in 1996 for the six countries most affected by the crisis. Korea has the highest share of foreign short-term debt share, followed by Malaysia and Thailand. In contrast, the Philippines and Taiwan have the largest share of domestic long-term debt.


**Figure 4: Distribution of Debt in Six East Asian Countries:
Foreign Vs. Domestic and Short Vs. Long Term**



The data also suggest large differences across countries in interest payment coverage. This is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (but adding back depreciation)—that is, EBITDA or operational cash flow—to interest expenses (Figure 5). With the low interest rates in Japan, Japanese corporates needed to devote only a small fraction of EBITDA on interest payments, so the interest coverage ratio is about 8 in 1996, followed by Taiwan with 6.1. Thai and Korean corporates had the lowest interest coverage ratios, about 2.7 and 2.1 respectively.

Hong Kong, Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine corporates averaged between 3 and 4 while Singaporean firms averaged 4.5.

Figure 5: Interest Coverage in Nine Asian Countries, 1996



5. Summary

There were large differences in performance across countries as measured by return on assets. These differences did not show up as much in sales growth as investment rates were high and driven output rates in many countries. The high investment and relatively low profitability meant that external financing had to remain high in most countries, with high leverage as outside equity was used sparingly. While there were no strong trends in the early 1990s, leverage did increase in Korea and Thailand in the later years, signaling the vulnerability in corporate financial structures, that now has become a very apparent factor in triggering and aggravating the financial crisis. Across countries, the share of (foreign) short-term debt differed considerably in 1996, as did the ability of firms to cover interest payments from earnings. The underlying causes of decreased profitability and increased leverage are still elusive, and will be studied more extensively in future research.

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Annex: Comparisons of Main Results with Other Studies

To check the accuracy of our calculations (and the reliability of the data), we compare some of our main results with other studies that have looked at the same financial data for the same countries and similar time periods. First, we compare the results of real ROA with the calculations in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) and Glen, Singh, and Matthias (1998). For consistency, we convert the nominal ROAs of these studies also to real ROAs using the same source for inflation rates. The results are remarkably consistent across the three studies. Next, we look at the leverage ratios we generate and compare them with the Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic calculations. With the exception of Japan and Singapore, where our leverage figure is smaller than theirs, the other numbers are similar. Finally, we compare the interest coverage variable with those reported by Goldman Sachs (1998). Overall, there don't seem to be any major differences.

Comparisons with Other Studies (averages over the sample period)

Study	Real ROA			Leverage		Interest Coverage	
	Our study	DM, 1995	GSM, 1998	Our study	DM, 1995	Our study	GS, 1998
Time Period	1988-96	1983-93	1980-94	1988-96	1983-93	1996	1996
Hong Kong	4.4	4.6	n.a.	2.273	1.322	3.64	6.71
Indonesia	10.7	n.a.	n.a.	1.661	n.a.	4.02	n.a.
Japan	4.8	5.2	n.a.	2.302	3.688	7.57	n.a.
Korea	4.3	4.4	4.6	3.531	3.662	2.12	2.74
Malaysia	7.5	7.0	7.3	0.991	0.935	3.48	n.a.
Philippines	9.4	n.a.	n.a.	1.148	n.a.	3.11	3.09
Singapore	5.5	5.8	n.a.	0.862	1.232	4.32	4.06
Taiwan	6.8	n.a.	n.a.	0.894	n.a.	6.13	n.a.
Thailand	10.2	9.2	11.3	2.126	2.215	2.76	3.34

Source: DM – Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995); GSM – Glen, Singh, Matthias (1998); GS – Goldman Sachs (1998)

TABLE A1: Real ROA in Local Currency (EBIT over Total Assets, Adjusted for Inflation), 1988-96

Country		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	0.053	0.055	0.047	0.045	0.042	0.044	0.038	0.042	0.044	0.044
	Std. Dev.	0.044	0.052	0.041	0.038	0.044	0.051	0.035	0.051	0.052	0.048
	Median	0.051	0.053	0.049	0.048	0.045	0.038	0.039	0.039	0.041	0.046
	No. of Obs.	88	117	189	236	293	331	388	491	476	2465
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	0.128	0.126	0.122	0.112	0.108	0.098	0.095	0.107
	Std. Dev.	-	-	0.116	0.114	0.105	0.082	0.073	0.068	0.076	0.088
	Median	-	-	0.094	0.091	0.086	0.079	0.074	0.062	0.065	0.071
	No. of Obs.	-	-	8	107	235	248	260	279	268	1396
Japan	Mean	0.068	0.065	0.060	0.053	0.054	0.051	0.047	0.044	0.043	0.048
	Std. Dev.	0.052	0.053	0.049	0.041	0.042	0.040	0.038	0.039	0.039	0.045
	Median	0.057	0.054	0.046	0.047	0.048	0.045	0.041	0.038	0.036	0.041
	No. of Obs.	749	806	921	2004	2178	2230	2259	2250	2217	15893
Korea	Mean	0.047	0.050	0.048	0.046	0.045	0.042	0.048	0.043	0.039	0.043
	Std. Dev.	0.058	0.056	0.057	0.054	0.053	0.047	0.053	0.049	0.046	0.053
	Median	0.044	0.039	0.041	0.040	0.039	0.036	0.034	0.036	0.031	0.037
	No. of Obs.	66	79	82	151	208	314	329	325	258	1789
Malaysia	Mean	0.071	0.072	0.076	0.082	0.084	0.079	0.078	0.074	0.069	0.075
	Std. Dev.	0.096	0.091	0.091	0.093	0.112	0.088	0.082	0.096	0.092	0.092
	Median	0.054	0.056	0.054	0.062	0.060	0.065	0.063	0.061	0.056	0.063
	No. of Obs.	193	218	298	360	408	485	545	620	658	3567
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.117	0.092	0.089	0.101	0.084	0.091	0.094
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.175	0.141	0.124	0.137	0.124	0.126	0.125
	Median	-	-	-	0.071	0.064	0.081	0.085	0.068	0.084	0.079
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	40	89	106	123	152	145	675
Singapore	Mean	0.069	0.059	0.053	0.051	0.054	0.057	0.061	0.058	0.048	0.055
	Std. Dev.	0.072	0.062	0.064	0.076	0.067	0.061	0.087	0.092	0.094	0.076
	Median	0.049	0.045	0.042	0.039	0.052	0.046	0.045	0.039	0.040	0.044
	No. of Obs.	107	123	159	186	208	249	270	294	298	1789
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.070	0.071	0.072	0.067	0.066	0.068	0.068
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.066	0.074	0.074	0.059	0.074	0.080	0.073
	Median	-	-	-	0.051	0.062	0.065	0.068	0.065	0.066	0.067
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	24	70	119	205	247	214	894
Thailand	Mean	0.114	0.113	0.122	0.116	0.113	0.108	0.104	0.094	0.091	0.102
	Std. Dev.	0.132	0.129	0.143	0.137	0.126	0.117	0.116	0.124	0.115	0.119
	Median	0.108	0.110	0.117	0.112	0.102	0.098	0.093	0.078	0.074	0.098
	No. of Obs.	116	157	220	275	310	403	437	437	427	2880

TABLE A2: OPERATIONAL MARGIN, 1988-96

Country		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	0.261	0.254	0.266	0.247	0.237	0.234	0.220	0.192	0.191	0.236
	Std. Dev.	0.061	0.063	0.078	0.067	0.062	0.062	0.060	0.046	0.048	0.062
	Median	0.235	0.195	0.222	0.196	0.174	0.166	0.173	0.146	0.142	0.187
	No. of Obs.	75	94	145	182	230	252	304	406	403	2091
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	-	0.386	0.360	0.362	0.358	0.345	0.334	0.358
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.098	0.087	0.089	0.087	0.088	0.085	0.088
	Median	-	-	-	0.357	0.333	0.344	0.328	0.312	0.306	0.329
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	91	196	209	216	235	226	1173
Japan	Mean	0.242	0.246	0.247	0.247	0.245	0.242	0.244	0.255	0.256	0.247
	Std. Dev.	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.046	0.046	0.048	0.051	0.051	0.047
	Median	0.222	0.227	0.229	0.224	0.219	0.218	0.218	0.231	0.233	0.221
	No. of Obs.	739	793	906	1954	2124	2179	2209	2200	2168	15272
Korea	Mean	0.188	0.210	0.230	0.210	0.237	0.212	0.225	0.232	0.233	0.220
	Std. Dev.	0.039	0.049	0.065	0.035	0.051	0.034	0.037	0.038	0.035	0.040
	Median	0.137	0.168	0.173	0.169	0.192	0.187	0.196	0.214	0.221	0.196
	No. of Obs.	66	78	82	136	162	264	282	279	214	1563
Malaysia	Mean	0.181	0.189	0.196	0.201	0.209	0.202	0.210	0.205	0.221	0.202
	Std. Dev.	0.024	0.030	0.033	0.032	0.038	0.037	0.041	0.051	0.046	0.037
	Median	0.164	0.163	0.171	0.173	0.176	0.174	0.184	0.195	0.255	0.181
	No. of Obs.	150	175	218	275	308	340	351	384	373	2574
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.374	0.299	0.284	0.283	0.304	0.300	0.307
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.131	0.093	0.101	0.108	0.133	0.135	0.125
	Median	-	-	-	0.361	0.264	0.264	0.275	0.308	0.333	0.277
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	33	71	84	99	123	115	525
Singapore	Mean	0.207	0.203	0.211	0.193	0.195	0.200	0.191	0.187	0.172	0.194
	Std. Dev.	0.038	0.036	0.043	0.040	0.039	0.044	0.041	0.040	0.050	0.042
	Median	0.173	0.167	0.168	0.155	0.155	0.152	0.141	0.136	0.131	0.149
	No. of Obs.	85	98	122	145	163	180	197	208	195	1393
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.290	0.238	0.234	0.247	0.254	0.248	0.252
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.072	0.043	0.047	0.047	0.051	0.049	0.051
	Median	-	-	-	0.254	0.214	0.227	0.227	0.223	0.219	0.226
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	24	60	103	187	231	199	804
Thailand	Mean	0.255	0.291	0.289	0.293	0.288	0.285	0.280	0.284	0.261	0.281
	Std. Dev.	0.051	0.067	0.068	0.078	0.076	0.075	0.071	0.076	0.069	0.074
	Median	0.219	0.243	0.257	0.273	0.259	0.251	0.249	0.247	0.227	0.252
	No. of Obs.	115	155	216	257	287	349	380	380	376	2515

TABLE A3: REAL SALES GROWTH (Year-on-year)

Country		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	0.117	0.135	0.121	0.159	0.114	0.108	0.126	0.163	0.130
	Std. Dev.	0.178	0.214	0.198	0.234	0.192	0.176	0.257	0.312	0.248
	Median	0.101	0.116	0.102	0.124	0.098	0.094	0.097	0.118	0.092
	No. of Obs.	77	96	142	196	260	287	307	352	1717
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	-	0.128	0.141	0.169	0.115	0.104	0.131
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.189	0.227	0.243	0.196	0.216	0.206
	Median	-	-	-	0.107	0.121	0.124	0.094	0.083	0.106
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	106	224	236	241	250	1057
Japan	Mean	0.090	0.106	0.097	0.095	0.118	0.108	0.102	0.072	0.099
	Std. Dev.	0.182	0.196	0.207	0.213	0.224	0.206	0.186	0.177	0.207
	Median	0.074	0.082	0.084	0.083	0.088	0.085	0.072	0.043	0.077
	No. of Obs.	725	763	815	1534	1526	1533	1633	1717	10246
Korea	Mean	0.112	0.124	0.116	0.124	0.105	0.095	0.097	0.106	0.110
	Std. Dev.	0.182	0.186	0.191	0.217	0.187	0.230	0.213	0.223	0.226
	Median	0.084	0.087	0.082	0.083	0.076	0.073	0.072	0.086	0.082
	No. of Obs.	61	64	71	122	169	258	249	155	1149
Malaysia	Mean	0.127	0.168	0.159	0.153	0.178	0.192	0.146	0.149	0.157
	Std. Dev.	0.245	0.289	0.310	0.324	0.351	0.362	0.317	0.299	0.325
	Median	0.097	0.123	0.118	0.127	0.131	0.126	0.117	0.119	0.119
	No. of Obs.	147	168	245	316	376	504	562	585	2903
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.122	0.086	0.123	0.141	0.153	0.124
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.235	0.196	0.214	0.271	0.305	0.278
	Median	-	-	-	0.084	0.067	0.076	0.106	0.122	0.082
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	32	71	87	104	114	409
Singapore	Mean	0.109	0.112	0.098	0.152	0.142	0.159	0.121	0.097	0.117
	Std. Dev.	0.221	0.196	0.217	0.317	0.296	0.324	0.274	0.195	0.193
	Median	0.084	0.086	0.081	0.094	0.116	0.118	0.102	0.077	0.087
	No. of Obs.	75	104	135	158	182	234	245	252	1392
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.089	0.142	0.122	0.113	0.104	0.098
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.178	0.271	0.289	0.271	0.241	0.208
	Median	-	-	-	0.071	0.113	0.103	0.097	0.084	0.093
	No. of Obs.	-	-	-	21	62	104	176	180	543
Thailand	Mean	0.133	0.115	0.134	0.128	0.109	0.126	0.138	0.072	0.118
	Std. Dev.	0.293	0.284	0.301	0.277	0.201	0.294	0.311	0.176	0.223
	Median	0.116	0.103	0.108	0.096	0.083	0.101	0.107	0.057	0.097
	No. of Obs.	113	151	207	251	261	347	367	332	2029

TABLE A4: CAPITAL GROWTH (new investment as a share of existing fixed assets)

Country		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	0.165	0.190	0.122	0.116	0.121	0.265	0.123	0.077	0.151	0.145
	Std. Dev.	0.271	0.298	0.262	0.307	0.331	0.354	0.246	0.232	0.307	0.274
	Median	0.143	0.166	0.083	0.076	0.072	0.198	0.076	0.058	0.093	0.083
	No. of Obs	46	51	70	115	156	201	227	279	352	1497
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	-	0.150	0.206	0.163	0.271	0.166	0.164	0.184
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.254	0.327	0.362	0.382	0.245	0.284	0.286
	Median	-	-	-	0.124	0.134	0.086	0.158	0.138	0.118	0.127
	No. of Obs	-	-	-	85	107	232	247	253	267	1191
Japan	Mean	0.128	0.167	0.099	0.055	0.085	0.076	0.082	0.081	0.076	0.094
	Std. Dev.	0.119	0.140	0.109	0.106	0.104	0.111	0.109	0.109	0.096	0.096
	Median	0.116	0.142	0.083	0.046	0.076	0.068	0.073	0.075	0.071	0.080
	No. of Obs	732	749	808	911	1996	2156	2214	2230	2225	14021
Korea	Mean	0.204	0.195	0.178	0.245	0.157	0.128	0.142	0.136	0.154	0.171
	Std. Dev.	0.186	0.196	0.191	0.267	0.132	0.253	0.288	0.214	0.218	0.204
	Median	0.156	0.138	0.132	0.196	0.116	0.112	0.122	0.124	0.137	0.136
	No. of Obs	57	64	72	81	148	203	309	308	242	1484
Malaysia	Mean	0.146	0.132	0.172	0.179	0.162	0.212	0.237	0.175	0.189	0.178
	Std. Dev.	0.284	0.264	0.243	0.271	0.265	0.275	0.334	0.246	0.274	0.216
	Median	0.086	0.076	0.089	0.096	0.113	0.134	0.152	0.146	0.161	0.107
	No. of Obs	147	190	217	297	359	398	481	541	593	3223
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.121	0.115	0.137	0.166	0.190	0.213	0.157
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.257	0.263	0.275	0.300	0.333	0.289	0.278
	Median	-	-	-	0.091	0.089	0.078	0.135	0.141	0.145	0.108
	No. of Obs	-	-	-	31	43	95	110	128	148	555
Singapore	Mean	0.112	0.113	0.107	0.118	0.121	0.177	0.179	0.137	0.176	0.138
	Std. Dev.	0.252	0.254	0.341	0.153	0.179	0.358	0.285	0.277	0.292	0.284
	Median	0.078	0.076	0.074	0.088	0.096	0.113	0.134	0.125	0.135	0.104
	No. of Obs	82	105	120	158	185	206	247	267	281	1651
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.171	0.124	0.119	0.123	0.168	0.125	0.138
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.192	0.096	0.127	0.184	0.325	0.213	0.186
	Median	-	-	-	0.143	0.082	0.084	0.087	0.112	0.086	0.087
	No. of Obs	-	-	-	16	24	70	118	201	212	641
Thailand	Mean	0.152	0.176	0.233	0.234	0.237	0.195	0.217	0.180	0.074	0.189
	Std. Dev.	0.312	0.356	0.438	0.350	0.395	0.295	0.308	0.376	0.223	0.284
	Median	0.104	0.129	0.123	0.150	0.149	0.150	0.147	0.145	0.058	0.138
	No. of Obs	110	116	156	219	274	310	403	430	423	2441

TABLE A5: LEVERAGE (Total Debt Over Common Equity)

Country		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	1.832	2.311	1.783	2.047	1.835	1.758	2.273	1.980	1.559	1.902
	Std. Dev.	2.351	3.215	3.102	4.085	3.624	3.508	4.917	4.907	3.799	4.568
	Median	1.236	1.426	1.365	1.586	1.446	1.453	1.485	1.476	1.423	1.428
	No.of Obs	86	114	176	218	275	303	355	475	463	2465
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	-	1.943	2.097	2.054	1.661	2.115	1.878	1.951
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	2.893	2.992	3.158	2.626	2.958	2.137	2.857
	Median	-	-	-	1.785	1.826	1.817	1.764	1.847	1.827	1.814
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	166	216	230	244	269	264	1396
Japan	Mean	2.994	2.843	2.871	2.029	2.042	2.057	2.193	2.367	2.374	2.302
	Std. Dev.	3.102	2.901	3.014	3.817	4.228	4.541	4.218	5.107	4.857	4.676
	Median	2.186	2.055	1.946	1.784	1.798	1.713	2.045	2.108	2.109	2.061
	No.of Obs	847	898	1009	2206	2194	2227	2260	2252	2234	16117
Korea	Mean	2.820	2.644	3.105	3.221	3.373	3.636	3.530	3.776	3.545	3.467
	Std. Dev.	2.362	2.001	2.019	3.573	3.512	4.454	5.001	4.397	4.853	4.962
	Median	2.432	2.412	2.819	3.046	3.162	3.341	3.272	3.388	3.248	3.124
	No.of Obs	66	79	82	146	203	310	324	321	258	1789
Malaysia	Mean	0.727	0.810	1.010	0.610	0.627	0.704	0.991	1.103	1.176	0.908
	Std. Dev.	0.946	1.091	1.687	0.827	1.100	1.070	1.604	1.748	1.426	1.618
	Median	0.612	0.642	0.689	0.615	0.628	0.647	0.728	0.824	0.898	0.775
	No.of Obs	176	199	265	338	391	460	514	587	636	3567
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.830	1.186	1.175	1.148	1.150	1.285	1.129
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	1.566	1.811	1.930	1.652	1.751	1.954	1.842
	Median	-	-	-	0.745	0.869	0.882	0.875	0.877	0.925	0.873
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	44	94	110	123	154	146	675
Singapore	Mean	0.765	0.922	0.939	0.887	0.856	1.102	0.862	1.037	1.049	0.936
	Std. Dev.	1.082	1.610	1.551	2.571	2.041	2.254	2.111	2.118	2.685	2.241
	Median	0.722	0.789	0.812	0.768	0.754	0.826	0.749	0.768	0.814	0.762
	No.of Obs	106	121	149	181	198	229	247	275	283	1789
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.679	0.883	0.866	0.894	0.796	0.802	0.820
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.691	0.879	0.906	1.082	0.991	1.162	0.945
	Median	-	-	-	0.632	0.746	0.737	0.752	0.732	0.736	0.735
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	37	66	111	206	245	222	894
Thailand	Mean	1.602	1.905	2.159	2.010	1.837	1.914	2.126	2.224	2.361	2.008
	Std. Dev.	2.163	3.382	2.662	3.095	2.648	2.409	2.653	2.261	2.778	2.524
	Median	1.254	1.378	1.517	1.508	1.487	1.502	1.568	1.724	1.853	1.576
	No.of Obs	161	197	235	272	309	400	431	434	427	2880

TABLE A6: LONG TERM DEBT SHARE OF TOTAL DEBT

Country		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1988-96
Hong Kong	Mean	0.576	0.565	0.522	0.527	0.495	0.442	0.424	0.398	0.404	0.455
	Std. Dev.	0.349	0.330	0.307	0.326	0.295	0.251	0.231	0.209	0.205	0.256
	Median	0.597	0.595	0.538	0.565	0.447	0.447	0.407	0.373	0.364	0.449
	No.of Obs	111	114	167	192	231	256	315	442	440	2301
Indonesia	Mean	-	-	-	0.472	0.406	0.418	0.417	0.428	0.465	0.433
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.280	0.213	0.218	0.210	0.224	0.259	0.232
	Median	-	-	-	0.524	0.408	0.396	0.416	0.418	0.433	0.431
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	72	151	167	176	207	201	978
Japan	Mean	0.520	0.541	0.527	0.495	0.492	0.510	0.472	0.443	0.416	0.491
	Std. Dev.	0.288	0.306	0.285	0.270	0.265	0.289	0.247	0.222	0.197	0.266
	Median	0.499	0.541	0.538	0.499	0.494	0.517	0.477	0.444	0.408	0.484
	No.of Obs	701	788	894	1941	2108	2151	2181	2160	2124	15572
Korea	Mean	0.507	0.496	0.499	0.481	0.410	0.413	0.414	0.412	0.432	0.432
	Std. Dev.	0.243	0.208	0.170	0.173	0.163	0.161	0.157	0.158	0.172	0.168
	Median	0.557	0.472	0.498	0.498	0.442	0.437	0.414	0.404	0.415	0.437
	No.of Obs	65	78	82	146	195	305	317	313	256	1743
Malaysia	Mean	0.375	0.373	0.364	0.321	0.304	0.324	0.328	0.333	0.362	0.339
	Std. Dev.	0.187	0.182	0.171	0.135	0.122	0.135	0.139	0.146	0.170	0.150
	Median	0.358	0.355	0.325	0.271	0.269	0.266	0.272	0.278	0.299	0.292
	No.of Obs	147	171	222	269	326	389	447	518	572	3061
Philippines	Mean	-	-	-	0.541	0.495	0.459	0.471	0.487	0.517	0.493
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.356	0.308	0.299	0.325	0.329	0.394	0.316
	Median	-	-	-	0.572	0.531	0.503	0.502	0.498	0.514	0.522
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	44	87	85	91	121	127	558
Singapore	Mean	0.593	0.586	0.489	0.407	0.392	0.397	0.446	0.408	0.420	0.442
	Std. Dev.	0.457	0.427	0.322	0.233	0.213	0.219	0.261	0.224	0.232	0.261
	Median	0.572	0.554	0.541	0.338	0.338	0.339	0.402	0.386	0.411	0.433
	No.of Obs	101	108	121	159	178	203	221	250	267	1608
Taiwan	Mean	-	-	-	0.507	0.459	0.377	0.379	0.348	0.413	0.394
	Std. Dev.	-	-	-	0.232	0.207	0.178	0.185	0.163	0.233	0.196
	Median	-	-	-	0.539	0.444	0.328	0.346	0.343	0.389	0.359
	No.of Obs	-	-	-	67	68	104	189	235	206	868
Thailand	Mean	0.517	0.496	0.431	0.387	0.261	0.301	0.332	0.361	0.369	0.363
	Std. Dev.	0.336	0.303	0.223	0.179	0.094	0.128	0.146	0.166	0.174	0.162
	Median	0.581	0.498	0.388	0.343	0.252	0.264	0.276	0.329	0.328	0.309
	No.of Obs	101	134	159	193	260	347	370	378	378	2323

TABLE A7: DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT; FOREIGN Vs DOMESTIC, SHORT Vs LONG TERM
 (Shares, Median 1996)

	Foreign Short Term	Foreign Long Term	Domestic Short Term	Domestic Long Term
Indonesia	0.205	0.196	0.314	0.285
Korea	0.294	0.170	0.277	0.258
Malaysia	0.321	0.110	0.357	0.212
Philippines	0.197	0.213	0.255	0.335
Taiwan	0.223	0.192	0.239	0.346
Thailand	0.296	0.123	0.320	0.261

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