Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises

Overcoming Organizational Challenges

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Social Development Department
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Network

Document of the World Bank
Executive Summary

In the past few years, several development organizations, including the World Bank, have recognized that the success of development strategies and programs in countries affected by conflict depends on understanding the social and economic factors that affect conflict in these countries. They have therefore prioritized the development of conflict analysis tools so as to help conflict-sensitive programming. A conflict analysis consists of two main aspects: (i) the process by which the analysis is planned, organized, conducted, and applied, and (ii) the content of the analysis including its thematic focus and scope. This study examines the first of these two aspects, i.e. the process of a conflict analysis exercise. It examines experiences of development organizations with about twenty conflict analysis exercises to provide guidance to the organization of such exercises and application of their findings. The study thus looks to past experiences with conflict analysis exercises to provide recommendations for future practices.

A key finding of the study is that most conflict analyses arose from a need of operational teams to better understand the conflict dynamics in a country so as to improve the effectiveness of country strategy and program formation. To acquire knowledge on the conflict escalators and de-escalators, the country conflict analysis exercises used different techniques such as desk research, inputs from experts, workshops, specific studies, and fieldwork. The study finds that single-agency analyses were usually conducted when there was a need to provide a quick and confidential analysis to internal users. Multi-agency analyses were however increasingly the norm, and led to shared analysis and improved understanding between participating agencies.

Local partners have increasingly been involved in conflict analysis exercises. While local partnerships were usually forged with civil society organizations, government involvement varied greatly. The study found that despite reports and workshops, dissemination appears limited primarily because of lack of strategy and resources. While the analysis findings in most of the cases were used to inform country programs and operations, their use in some cases were weak due to limited country-team buy-in and lack of follow-up of conflict analysis teams post the analysis. Finally, the typical organization and implementation challenges included time and funding constraints, limited capacity, unstable and volatile security climate, and tackling of political sensitivities in preparing the analysis.

The study used the findings for recommendations on how effective conflict analysis exercises best should be organized and how conflict findings should be disseminated and applied. Key recommendations are:

- In most cases, limited exercises involving desk studies and review-expert workshops are sufficient. They are cheaper, quicker and more timely, and provide a meaningful picture of the chief conflict factors. For cases where the ongoing security situation has not permitted an examination of the conflict, comprehensive exercises may be preferable. Finally in multi-content analysis where conflict is not central to the study, attention to conflict factors offer opportunities for mainstreaming conflict understanding.
- Multi-agency collaborations have shown to be more effective and should be encouraged as they result in shared analysis, alignment of strategies, building of partnerships, and joint dialogue. It is important for the collaboration between partners to clarify the rules of engagement upfront.
- To guide the organization, content and dissemination strategy of the exercise, an advisory group should be established, comprising academics, peer reviewers, representatives of aid agencies, and potential users.
Challenges that may affect the process should be recognized and addressed so as to prevent problems during implementation of the exercise. It is important to:
  - create buy-in for the analysis from a wide range of actors;
  - select a conflict analysis team that includes skills in conflict analysis, local expertise, and specific technical fields (economists, governance specialists);
  - forge a constructive partnership between local and international partners;
  - consider host government sensitivities to conflict findings - focus on factors rather than actors if feasible;
  - in most cases, involve or at least inform host government of the exercise;
  - prepare contingency plans to deal with volatile and fluid environments.

In multi-agency exercises, in addition to the joint report, off-shoot products that meet specific agency needs should be developed, and these products should be publicly available.

Dissemination events should be seen as part of a longer-term process of promoting conflict analysis findings and encouraging their inclusion in programs and strategies.

The report was written by Shonali Sardesai and Per Wam. Leyla-Claude Werleigh-Pearson conducted and summarized interviews with partners involved in conflict analysis exercises. The report also benefited from inputs of the World Bank peer reviewers: Dirk Reinermann, Colin Scott, and Paul Francis. The work has been guided by Ian Bannon (SDV).
Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges

Introduction

More than 35 of the World Bank’s client countries – many of them among the poorest in the world – have been affected by violent conflicts during the past decade. While the number of violent conflicts has decreased in this decade, after the historic surge in the early 1990s, violent conflict still represents a staggering challenge to poor countries and to international development organizations. In any country, the effectiveness of development strategies and programs depend on a thorough understanding of the social and economic context in which they are implemented. In a country affected by conflict, where stakes are high and the situation often fluid, such an understanding is critical for aid to be effective. At worst, development aid can exacerbate conflict. Over the last few years, the World Bank, mandated by its Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict, and many other development organizations have made systematic efforts to better understand the social and economic factors that affect conflict in countries they work through conflict analysis.

It is now recognized among development practitioners that a well-designed conflict analysis can provide important pointers for development strategies and programs by contributing to an increased understanding of conflict causes and dynamics in a country. This builds a foundation to integrate a conflict-sensitive perspective in policy and programming in conflict-affected countries. Conflict analyses can thus create an environment for systematically appreciating and addressing conflict issues in the design and implementation of development strategies and programs. A conflict analysis comprises two key aspects:

- The process by which the analysis is planned, organized, conducted, and applied, and
- The content of the analysis, including its thematic focus and scope, guided by the specific conceptual framework and tools applied.

This study analyses the first of these two aspects.

The study reviews experiences of development organizations with conflict analysis exercises with the aim of providing specific guidance on the conflict analysis process. By systematically mapping the processes, challenges, experiences, and uses in operations, the study makes specific recommendations on ways to strengthen the organization and application of conflict analysis. The study does not examine the methodological frameworks used to conduct conflict analyses.

By identifying conflict factors and how they inter-relate, conflict analysis can help initiate a thought process by which teams prioritize and design context-sensitive programming. As used by most development agencies, conflict analysis is not an instrument for resolving conflict but to contribute to effective development processes. This incorporates efforts to avoid “doing harm” by inadvertently exacerbating conflicts. To some organizations it also includes efforts to design programs in a way that can help address conflict drivers and thus contribute to preventing future escalation of conflict.

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1 Development organizations use different terms such as conflict analysis, conflict assessment, conflict-related development analysis, in conducting conflict analyses. For purposes of consistency, this study uses the term, conflict analysis.
Organization of the Report

This report is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the objective of the study and outlines the approach used. Chapter 2 presents the main findings of the twenty conflict analysis exercises analyzed as part of the study. Chapter 3 draws from the findings to provide specific recommendations on how to carry out an effective conflict analysis exercise.
Chapter 1: The Approach

Background

Violent internal conflicts pose serious constraints to effective poverty reduction and development efforts in poor countries. Some development organizations have realized that in situations of emerging or ongoing violent internal conflicts, assistance as normal is not effective — it is important that programs take into account conflict-related risks and opportunities. Some organizations, including the World Bank under its Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict, have therefore prioritized the integration of sensitivity to conflict in development assistance through systematic conflict analyses. This need for conflict analysis is underpinned by the recognition that there is a strong link between effective development and the social and economic factors affecting the trajectory of conflicts. By appreciating that program effectiveness will be strengthened by better understanding the factors that escalate and de-escalate conflict, many development organizations, bilateral agencies and think-tanks, have developed different types of tools for analysis of conflict. These tools are mostly focused on guiding macro-level conflict analyses, usually at the country-level.

The agencies have developed these tools to help their country teams conduct conflict analyses so as to plan development assistance that is sensitive to the many factors that drive conflict. Such conflict analysis tools include the World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework, DFID’s Strategic Conflict Assessment, and UNDP’s Conflict-Related Development Analysis. A comprehensive presentation of the different conflict analysis tools developed by donor agencies, multilaterals and key think-tanks was prepared in 2004. Appendix 1 provides highlights of a few of these tools and explains how they work.

Objective of the Study

There has, however, been little systematic effort to review different experiences which could help development organizations agree on common elements of an effective conflict analysis, and consequently determine how to strengthen the use of conflict analysis in development planning in conflict-affected countries. The key objective of this study is to review the experiences of development organizations with the process of undertaking macro-level conflict analyses in order to guide the organization of exercises and the application of the findings.

Since 2000, application of conflict analysis tools in country contexts with the aim to better understand the specific social, political and economic drivers at play have gained significance. At this juncture, it seems appropriate to assess experiences with conflict analyses, their processes and uses. In order to keep the study focused and manageable, all the conflict analysis exercises conducted by the World Bank along with select analyses undertaken by organizations that are in the forefront of this field, such as DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), and UNDP, are examined. Other agencies (donors and think tanks) are included in the study when they have collaborated on conflict analysis exercises with the organizations that are the focus of this report.

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**Scope of the Study**

DFID was a frontrunner in the conflict analysis field – in 2000 it commissioned strategic conflict assessments for Sri Lanka, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. In 2002, the first multi-agency conflict analysis exercise was conducted in Nigeria. This was the beginning of a new phase marked by an increasing emphasis on multi-agency efforts in conflict analysis exercises, although development organizations also continue to undertake individual conflict analyses. The decision to collaborate reflects a growing trend in the development community of harmonizing efforts, coordinating activities, pooling resources, and taking advantage of comparative strengths to engage in conflict analyses.

Since the first DFID strategic conflict assessments, several conflict analyses have been conducted. This study examines the experiences with all conflict analyses undertaken by the World Bank either as stand-alone analyses or as part of wider analytical work, along with a sample of conflict analyses implemented by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Analysis</th>
<th>Lead Organization</th>
<th>Supporting Organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>World Bank, UK (DFID)</td>
<td>UNDP, Nigeria (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>UK (DFID), UNDP, Sweden (SIDA)</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka (2006)</td>
<td>UK (DFID), World Bank, Asia Foundation, Netherlands (Clingaendael), Sweden (SIDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>IFAD</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone, Chad</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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3 All conflict analyses conducted by the World Bank are assessed as part of this study. In the case of other development organizations, based on discussions with counterparts on availability of information, specific conflict analyses were selected for examination for this study. Some conflict analyses examined in this study are not identified by name as they are either classified as confidential by the development organizations or were unsuccessful. In addition, the study briefly examines World Bank analytical work that did not use formal instruments of conflict analysis in conflict-affected environments, for instance, the Country Social Analyses undertaken in West Bank and Gaza. It also assesses how conflict-affected countries that chose not to use conflict analysis tools managed conflict-related challenges in World Bank assistance.

4 Year of conflict assessment mentioned when it was implemented more than once.

5 As part of a 3-year program that aims to contribute to effective poverty reduction strategies in conflict-affected countries, in year 1, country conflict analyses were conducted on selected countries. While these analyses were not published independently, the findings guided the examination of PRSPs from a conflict

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Analysis</th>
<th>Lead Organization</th>
<th>Supporting Organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>World Bank (part of Social Analysis)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal, Chad, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Germany (GTZ)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)</td>
<td>Sweden (SIDA)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Canada (CIDA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Provinces of Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi)</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UK (DFID), National Planning Board (Bappenas), Conflict Studies Centre of the University of Gadja Mada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Australia (AUSAID), Solomon Islands (select ministries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Australia (AUSAID), New Zealand, Fiji (select ministries)</td>
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**Study Approach**

There is no single formula for either conducting a sound conflict analysis or ensuring significant impacts in operations or institutionalization of conflict-sensitive thinking. Depending on the objective, conflict analysis exercises can be undertaken in various ways. This study examines experiences with approximately twenty conflict analysis exercises conducted in diverse contexts such as Guatemala, Somalia, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. The conflict analysis exercises in this study represent:

- geographical diversity, including countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe;
- different methodological scope, including limited exercises (desk study) as well as detailed and comprehensive exercises (desk cum field work); and
- single-agency and multi-agency efforts.

To investigate experiences with these conflict analyses, the study used a four-stage process of review:

1. Assessment of experiences with procedural issues of the analysis to determine the internal decision-making process of the organization, i.e. the objectives and allocation of resources, role of host government and local actors, and challenges encountered;
2. Examination of dissemination activities, dialogue and follow-up;
3. Examination of uses of conflict findings in operations and development assistance to discuss implications for programming; and,
4. Use of findings as a basis for developing guidance to ensure more effective conflict analysis processes.

Semi-structured questionnaires to understand process issues, discuss dissemination activities, and determine operational uses (steps 1 to 3) were prepared to guide interviews with conflict analysis teams and users.\(^7\)

**Audience and Dissemination**

The audience of this study includes international donors and developmental organizations active in conflict-affected countries. The study expects to help the organization of the conflict analysis exercise: (i) be more effective so that it can have real impacts; and (ii) contribute to thought processes of teams that plan interventions in a country.

The findings generated under this study will be disseminated in several ways. This includes this report which synthesizes experiences with conflict analysis exercises and provides guidance for future analyses. The second product is a tip-sheet that highlights issues to be considered in organizing a conflict analysis exercise, and challenges and best practices. The study results will also be presented and discussed at workshops with interested partners.

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\(^7\) For details on the questionnaires, refer to Appendix 2.
Chapter 2: Presenting Findings

To understand the processes and challenges involved in implementing conflict analysis exercises and to ascertain their uses, about twenty experiences with conflict exercises were examined. They included exercises undertaken by the World Bank, DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), CIDA (Canada), SIDA (Sweden) and UNDP. Most conflict analyses reflected conflict dynamics at the macro-level (national) although they drew from sub-national levels of analyses (region, state, province), and often included sub-national assessments. This section highlights the key findings from the macro-level conflict analysis exercises and draws attention to positive experiences and challenges encountered.

Rationale for Conflict Analyses

Drawing from the case-findings, it appears that most conflict analyses were demand-driven and arose from an expressed need of the operational teams in an organization to better understand the conflict dynamics in a country. The main objectives of a conflict analysis was (i) to create or increase knowledge of the conflict factors to either contribute to country programming or to inform a specific instrument such as a country strategy or a poverty reduction strategy; or (iii) to integrate a conflict perspective into a wider assessment framework such as a country social analysis or a poverty and social assessment.

Analytical Scope and Techniques

- Country conflict analyses used different techniques such as discussions with experts, desk research, specific studies, and fieldwork, to acquire understanding of conflict escalators and de-escalators.

Findings demonstrate that conflict analysis exercises were either limited or comprehensive in scope and correspondingly applied specific techniques. Limited conflict analysis exercises were conducted to feed into the Rwanda Country Assistance Evaluation, the Central African Republic Policy Notes and assessments of the conflict sensitivity of the poverty reduction strategies in countries such as Chad, Sierra Leone and Bosnia (for an example, see Box 1). These exercises included desk research and discussions with experts, followed in some cases by limited fieldwork. Depending on the case, the conflict analyses were carried out by either international or local staff/consultants, or a combination of both.

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8 Exceptions include the UNDP-led conflict analyses in Indonesia (macro-analysis of 3 provinces) and Papua New Guinea (macro-analysis of 1 province) which were subaltern analyses.
9 For a brief summary of main features of key conflict analysis exercises, see Appendix 3.
Box 1: Rwanda: World Bank Conflict Analysis

**Purpose.** The Rwanda conflict analysis was designed to inform a specific institutional process. The aim of the analysis was to obtain a knowledge base of conflict and poverty issues in Rwanda and recognize their linkages, in order to support a Country Assistance Evaluation being carried out by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank. The idea was that the knowledge of the conflict dynamics in the country would help determine to what extent Bank-financed programs had helped address factors affecting conflict and poverty in Rwanda.

**Process.** OED requested the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Bank to take the lead on the Rwanda conflict analysis. Using the Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) methodology, the analysis involved a one-day focus group discussion with experts on specific sectors of Rwanda. These included Bank and IMF staff, donors, academics, researchers, and, representatives of NGOs and think tanks who worked and/or managed operations in Rwanda. At the workshop, experts presented findings on their area of expertise. Based on discussions, the key conflict-related priorities and their linkages were agreed upon. The CPR unit prepared a short report highlighting these issues which was then used by OED to inform its evaluation.

Comprehensive conflict analysis exercises were undertaken in cases such as Burundi, Fiji, Nepal, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Sri Lanka. These exercises involved a combination of desk research, background and focus studies, and different types of field work. It was implemented either by consultants, independently or with local support, or by a team of international and local consultants/staff with expertise on the country and conflict. In a few cases the team included host government representatives. While some of these exercises were single-agency endeavors, the majority were multi-agency exercises (for example, see Box 2).

Box 2: Somalia: Multi-Donor Conflict Analysis

**Purpose.** The decision to re-engage in Somalia after a decade’s absence required an understanding of the conflict issues and challenges in order to engage effectively in the country. Hence, the World Bank’s Country Director and the Somalia country team approached the Conflict Prevention Unit for support to undertake a conflict analysis exercise for Somalia. The rationale was that an increased understanding of conflict would inform the design of programs and interventions of the Bank and its partners, thus enabling effective implementation as well as potential conflict prevention impacts.

Since the Bank was re-engaging in Somalia after a long absence, it was considered important to involve other donors and organizations active in the country in the exercise. The Bank team therefore approached the different donors and partners with presence and expertise on Somalia. This allowed the Bank to capitalize on already existing networks and expertise, as well as to build relationships.

**Process.** The analysis focused on conflict sources and dynamics in the three main regions of Somalia in order to guide policy and program development in the country. The study was conducted in co-operation with Somali and international partners, with the Somali partners responsible for the regional studies and the Bank preparing a macro assessment.

The study involved adapting the Bank’s conflict analysis framework to the local context; training local partners in conflict analysis; conducting desk studies; conducting extensive fieldwork (by Somali partners and limited fieldwork by Bank team due to security issues); and preparation of reports. An advisory group guided the process. External academic experts were engaged to
review the reports and provide inputs. The final report is called *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.*

The Bank’s task team was responsible for analytical work as well as communicating with partners. The Bank team prepared the Terms of References for the study and made arrangements with local partners, but as it had no presence in Somalia, UNDP took the lead in the management of all logistics. In addition to the Bank and UNDP, DFID and the Swedish government also provided funding but did not actively participate in the conflict analysis exercise.

In a small sample of cases, there was an effort to integrate a conflict perspective into a wider strategy. In these cases, the common approach was to include a conflict analyst as a member of the team to ensure that specific conflict variables were reflected in the analysis. The conflict analyst engaged in desk-research as well as field missions to ensure systematic discussion of conflict issues. The cases included Angola and Guinea Bissau where conflict analysis was part of the World Bank Poverty Assessment and Country Social Analysis. While conflict was not covered in a separate chapter, it was mainstreamed in the analysis by including additional questions in the methodology.

**Single- and Multi- Agency Assessments**

- *Single-agency conflict analysis exercises were mostly the product of a conscious decision to conduct independent analyses for internal purposes.*
- *In some cases, limited international support for a comprehensive conflict analysis on a country compelled a single agency to conduct an individual analysis.*
- *Multi-agency exercises were the norm particularly in countries with high relevance to donor and development organization interests.*

Some agencies made conscious decisions to implement conflict analyses as individual exercises. This was particularly evident among the early cases of conflict analyses when agencies were experimenting with them. Single-agency exercises were also common when there was a need to provide a confidential or quick analysis to meet internal user demands. The findings demonstrate that this was frequently the case in many bilateral agency assessments. In some cases, agencies attempted to secure partnerships for the analysis but found little support from other donors. Hence, the agency was compelled to conduct the exercise independently. Some countries however had higher relevance to international interests and consequently generated greater involvement and commitment for conflict analysis exercises. These country cases usually had multi-agency exercises. Examples include Nigeria, Somalia, and more recently Sri Lanka.

Multi-agency exercises are increasingly becoming the norm. The multi-agency exercises were comprehensive one-time exercises. Similar to most single-agency exercises, they had limited funds allocated for updates despite frequent changes taking place in the conflict environment. In cases where the roles and responsibilities, particularly the relationships between core partners, were not defined explicitly, there was duplication of efforts and contrary messages, sometimes creating tensions between partners. In a few cases, funding of management issues was also challenging. The different financial practices of agencies combined with difficulties with disbursement processes due to varied financial operations rendered administrative coordination tense, even affecting the rhythm of the exercise.

Despite problems with multi-agency collaborations, on balance the benefits far exceeded the negatives. Even though there were challenges in coordinating different donor operational
systems, collaborative efforts decreased the financial costs for individual agencies. Donors pooled their respective funds and multiplied the financial resources available to meet the costs of conflict analyses. However, financial cost-sharing was only one among many benefits. Collaboration, for instance in Somalia, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Sri Lanka, allowed the partners to contribute their different areas of expertise, making it a more convenient and beneficial way to share the costs of the analysis. Core partners had different roles and responsibilities: some agencies covered logistics, some managed relationships, some provided staff/consultants, and some were responsible for quality control of the analysis. These exercises usually also included local partners, both host government and civil society organizations (CSOs). Findings confirm that participation in conflict analysis exercises helped to build capacity of local partners. In fact, UNDP has deliberately involved local partners in their exercises as this has showed to increase local ownership.

Despite the organizational challenges, multi-agency conflict analysis exercises have also improved relations between donors. The exercises brought donors together in regular meetings, increased interactions, and contributed to trust-building. In a few exercises, interested donors formed advisory groups to be informed of progress and to guide the process (see Box 3). This helped to ensure that different perspectives and requirements were taken into account. Continual involvement of donors in the exercise has improved the chances of the process being sustained. Joint analysis has also led to shared understanding and strengthened relations between donors, increasing the likelihood that recommendations from the analysis findings will be used in programs and that aid will be guided by a coherent and coordinated strategy.

**Box 3: Advisory Group Supporting the Process**

For the Somalia conflict analysis exercise, at the World Bank’s initiative, an advisory-group was formed. It consisted of donors funding the conflict analysis process (World Bank, DFID, SIDA, UNDP); donors interested in Somalia such as USAID and the EU; and NGO and think-tank representatives with expertise on Somalia. Meeting periodically, the advisory committee contributed to quality control of the analysis and provided guidance to the process. Bringing a group of interested parties together increased the stake of actors in the outcome of the conflict analysis and increased their willingness to use the findings and recommendations.

The Sri Lanka conflict analysis advisory committee was designed slightly differently. In this case, the initiating agency sought out “like-minded” partners and chose partners strategically to support the exercise. It was decided to limit the advisory committee to the funding partners, i.e. representatives of the World Bank, UK (DFID), Netherlands and Sweden (SIDA), although the objective of the analysis was to inform and influence the wider aid community. In the advisory group, the DFID representative was responsible for both coordinating the donor meetings and informing donors not directly involved in the process. The advisory group organized feedback sessions with the team, and advisory group members provided input as the conflict analysis exercise progressed.

**Role of Host Government**

- *In one set of cases, particularly those where conflict analyses were prepared for internal purposes of development organizations, the host government was neither informed nor involved in the exercise.*
- *In a second set of cases, the host government was informed and consulted but not involved in conducting the conflict analysis exercise.*
In a third set of cases, the host government was both informed and involved in the conflict analysis exercise, which both increased its stake and influence in the analysis.

The host government interfaced with conflict analysis exercises at three levels. In one set of cases, the host government was neither informed nor involved in the process. Some analyses were for internal purposes of development organizations and it was felt that host government involvement would weaken the candidness of the analysis. This led to decisions to neither inform nor involve the host governments. This is evident in at least a couple of cases in the review.

In a second set of cases, the host government was informed but not involved in the exercise. The host government was informed of the process and consulted as a key stakeholder but it was not directly involved in conducting the analysis. As a result, in these cases, host governments appear not to have endorsed the findings of the analysis nor used them to inform policy. In a couple of cases, it was consciously decided not to include government as a partner as the main purpose of the analysis was to inform donor strategy formation.

In a third set of cases, the host government was both informed and involved in the exercise. In most UNDP-led multi-agency conflict analysis exercises, UNDP made a concerted decision to include host government ministries in the team to give them a stake in the analysis. In the Solomon Islands and Fiji for example, UNDP and aid donors (especially the Australian Agency for International Development) partnered with host government ministries working on peace-building. By involving host government, the analyses not only increased buy-in from host government but also developed the capacity of host government to address peace and conflict challenges. The Nigeria conflict analysis exercise stands out in the review as it was led by a federal government agency with support from donors. In this case, the host government not only informed the process, it played a crucial role in shaping and driving the analysis (see Box 4).

### Box 4: Nigeria: A Case for Local Ownership

Donors (DFID, World Bank, USAID, UNDP) and Nigerian President Obasanjo agreed to support a conflict analysis for Nigeria in 2001 so as to arrive at a deeper understanding for the increased level of violent conflict since the country’s return to civilian rule in 1999. However, the central guiding principle of this analysis was that it be led by the government. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) operating under the Presidency was given the mandate to lead the process. The donors felt that local ownership of the conflict analysis process would increase its credibility and sustainability beyond the exercise. Assessment of the analysis demonstrates that support by the President and involvement of a domestic government agency led to country ownership of the process, allowed the conflict analysis to benefit from local knowledge and built local capacity. It also gave IPCR an opportunity to engage with donors and receive support for conflict-related activities. The ownership model (local agency as lead) had costs in terms of quality of the analysis, but donors found this trade-off acceptable as dividends in terms of access to information, openness to self-criticism of government agencies, and chances for follow-up and sustainability, outweighed costs.

### Outputs and Dissemination

- *Products of conflict analysis exercises included synthesis and regional reports, specific study reports, dissemination notes, and lessons learned notes.*
- *While confidential reports obviously had limited circulation, even publicly available reports appear not to have been disseminated effectively or widely.*
Different workshop formats were designed to present report findings. However, in a large number of cases, resource constraints prevented dissemination beyond a launch workshop.

The products of the conflict analysis usually included reports that examined the findings and in most cases provided suggestions for conflict-sensitive assistance. In some conflict analysis exercises, the analysis team recognized that a potential audience would not have the time or interest in reviewing the different levels of analyses in one product. Thus, the outputs were presented in separate volumes – a synthesis report as the core analysis report supported by regional reports or specific focus-issue reports as relevant. In Somalia, the synthesis report prepared by the World Bank team was complemented by regional reports prepared by local partners. In a few cases such as Nigeria and Sri Lanka, the report was converted into brief dissemination notes to highlight the main findings, recommend ways forward, and generate interest in the conflict analysis. Some agencies like UNDP, SIDA, and DFID prepared lessons-learned reports to retrospectively examine the analysis as well as to guide future exercises.

The purpose of the analysis also determined whether the report was confined to a single-agency or was promoted to a broader audience. Obviously, where the report was meant to serve as a confidential analysis of the conflict situation, it tended to have circulation restricted to the agency. However, in a couple of sensitive and confidential analyses, access was further filtered such that reports were only made available to limited staff.

Review of the cases demonstrates that planning of a systematic dissemination strategy as part of the conflict analysis exercise itself was rarely done. Reports were shared among partners of the analysis, but in many cases, host governments, the wider CSO community, and development organizations not involved in exercises did not receive reports. However, the reasons for not sharing information and not circulating reports widely were not clear from the interviews.

In several cases, workshops were organized to disseminate findings and discuss implications for the country. Depending on the case, different workshop formats were used. In cases such as the Nigeria conflict analysis, workshops were structured in different ways. These included a dissemination workshop with the larger aid community in the country, a workshop with different CSOs to promote the analysis, internal presentations to the host government, and a presentation in Washington DC by the Nigerian government agency that led the exercise. However, in some cases, a worsening political situation and reluctance of the government prevented a formal launch of the findings. As a result, the opportunity to educate and sensitize stakeholders (host government, CSOs, NGOs) was lost.

In a large number of cases, agencies implementing the conflict analysis were keen to both present the report at key donor capitals to widen impact, and to hold in-country workshops to help make the findings more operationally relevant. However, resource constraints often prevented dissemination beyond a launch workshop. This demonstrates that willingness to engage further with the conflict analysis was not matched by resources (staff time, funds) to disseminate widely, tailor analyses to different user needs, and to integrate the analysis into specific operations. It can be concluded that in most cases the launch workshop was considered as the main dissemination component of the conflict analysis when it should have been seen as the beginning of a wider strategy for dissemination (see Box 5).
Box 5: Dissemination Strategy for the Sri Lanka Conflict Analysis

It is too early to determine if the carefully designed dissemination strategy for the Sri Lanka conflict assessment will unfold as planned. After delays due to changes in the political context, a launch workshop was held in-country earlier this year. While the workshop was well-attended by the aid community, i.e. the primary target audience, and other stakeholders, the host government was conspicuous by its absence although it was invited to the launch and had received the report. However, this did not deter the partners who maintain efforts to encourage incorporation of report findings in aid strategy planning. Early indications show that most aid partners and international think-tanks expect to align their country strategy with the conflict report findings. As a follow-up to the launch workshop, the report is being translated into Sinhala and Tamil to enhance its relevance to the local conditions; a multi-donor international workshop with donors, government and opposition representatives was held in Washington DC in May 2006 to discuss findings with the larger donor community assisting Sri Lanka; and partners are being encouraged to produce spin-off reports to meet agency needs and arrange dissemination events for agency staff.

Applications of Conflict Analyses

- In several cases, findings from the conflict analysis have informed strategies and programs of agencies.
- Conflict analysis findings have been best used in cases where the country operational team was engaged with it from the onset of the exercise, when there was demand for a conflict analysis exercise from the operational team, and where the analysis aimed to inform larger processes of development organizations.
- Local actor involvement in conflict analysis exercises has increased their capacity beyond the exercise.
- In some cases, findings from a conflict analysis could not be translated into actions, thus reducing their utility to the country team.

Respondents agreed that a conflict analysis is meaningful if the findings are presented and disseminated in ways that lead to conflict perspectives influencing the organizations’ country strategy and design of programming. The review learned that use of analysis findings, and subsequent potential impacts, have been weak partly due to limited country operational team buy-in and disconnect between the conflict analysis team and operational users. There are however positive examples which are showcased below.

There are many cases wherein conflict analysis findings were systematically used to inform and influence country strategy and operations. In cases where country management supported the conflict analysis initiatives and where findings were translated into programmable actions, teams were encouraged to appreciate the value of the conflict analysis and to embark on discussions on how to incorporate a conflict perspective in their work.

In DFID conflict analyses, findings have not led to changes in DFID program priorities but they have resulted in “doing things differently rather than doing different things.” In GTZ, conflict analysis findings are providing the roadmap for the integration of conflict understanding into

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10 The impacts of conflict analyses are not discussed. To measure impacts would require studying both the extent to which development outcomes are effective because conflict factors have been taken into account and their counterfactual. This is not feasible under this study and requires more serious and systematic work on impact.

11 DFID Internal Review of Strategic Conflict Assessments, ongoing.
German development policies and programs. In fact, GTZ is satisfied with its experience with conflict analyses and is considering making them mandatory tools of development programming in crisis and conflict countries.¹²

CIDA has implemented conflict analyses in diverse contexts and is using analysis findings across these contexts to assess the impact of programming on peace and conflict dynamics. According to the Country Manager in Sierra Leone, the World Bank conflict analysis there has helped the country team consider the conflict risks that might affect the success of their projects. The multi-agency Nigeria conflict analysis informed the design of the Bank-assisted Fadama II project, helped address an understanding of the ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta, and recently fed into the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy. For all these country conflict analyses, there was agency and country-team buy-in from the onset of the process, and the country team was updated on progress on a regular basis.

Success in the use of conflict findings were also evident in cases where the analysis had been undertaken specifically with a view to informing larger processes such as country plans, UN programming cycles, poverty reduction strategies, and country economic reports. Analyses that were timed to feed into these processes had significant effects with findings translated into operational terms to contribute to policy and program development. For instance, in the multi-agency conflict analyses led by UNDP, findings fed into a program review for Bouganville (Papua New Guinea) and contributed to the design of new conflict prevention programs in three provinces in Indonesia where the analysis had been implemented.

Appropriate timing also enabled the analysis to pivot country discussions on strategy formation, both internally and with government. The Bank-led Somalia multi-agency conflict analysis is being used as a knowledge base for several in-country activities. It has provided input into the framework of the LICUS and PCF review of trust fund finances, was used in preparing the Country Economic Memorandum, and to inform the Joint Needs Assessment. It also seems that multi-agency analyses had greater influence on institutional policy-making and programming since they presented a uniform voice across agencies, thus increasing credibility. The recent Sri Lanka multi-agency conflict analysis exercise is illustrative of this and has led many donors to consider aligning their country strategy to the findings of the conflict analysis.

A common finding across all multi-agency exercises that involved local actors was that they built local capacity for conflict-sensitive engagement beyond the analysis exercise, and opened up space for dialogue on conflict issues and trends that previously did not exist. For instance, the local partners of the Somalia conflict analysis exercise are responsible for leading the discussions on peace-building in the Somalia Joint Needs Assessment, a cross-cutting theme throughout the needs assessment. They are expected to ensure that the dynamics and drivers of conflict are considered by the needs assessment sector teams.

On the negative side, the cases illustrate that many potential users were not even aware of the analysis, and when aware felt that the analyses neither contained operationally relevant findings nor provided specific guidance on how to translate findings into actions. In a few cases, findings were considered useful but were not translated into operational terms. As a result, users had to struggle with operationalizing the recommendations and subsequently lost interest. In many cases, the conflict analysis exercise was implemented in parallel with regular country work programs and limited efforts were undertaken to establish linkages or create buy-in among local actors.

¹² Interview with Uwe Kievelitz, Head of Unit, International Cooperation in the Context of Conflicts and Disasters, GTZ, March 2006.
potential users. Since the exercises were often undertaken by specialists, mainstream operational staff was not engaged in the analysis and their needs not reflected in the design, thus increasing incompatibility between the recommendations from the analysis and programmatic work.

Evidence confirms that when a conflict analysis had not been requested by an operational country team, and no efforts were made to engage with them during the exercise, it was difficult to generate buy-in at the end of the analysis. The cases show that such analyses were subsequently not discussed by the country team and did not influence policy and programming. In one extreme case, country team management gave explicit directions to their team not to consider report findings in country work as they had not been informed of the exercise. In some cases, users were skeptical about the quality of information which in their view did not capture nuances and changing trends, and consequently did not further their understanding of the country conflict dynamics.

The conflict analysis teams on the other side argue that there were no mechanisms by which they could encourage integration of findings and guide the development of conflict-sensitive operations. The main problem was that the analyses were undertaken in parallel with regular country program efforts, and the responsibilities of the conflict analysis team was considered complete at the end of the analysis, emphasizing a sharp demarcation between the conflict analysis team and the users. Budgets were not allocated and strategies were not designed to enable the conflict analysis team to advise on the implications of findings for country program design. As a result, efforts to encourage a conflict perspective in operations were met with non-cooperation by users and sometimes refusal to integrate conflict analysis in programming.

Some cases had champions who pushed for analysis findings to be linked to country program strategy and operations. When these champions were in positions of authority, they were able to successfully encourage the preparation of conflict-sensitive programs and projects. The challenge in these cases however was that structures to systematically incorporate a conflict understanding and ensure their continuity were not properly institutionalized. Consequently, the conflict analysis findings and recommendations lost traction when champions moved on.

**Challenges Encountered**

- In many cases, constraints of time, funding and capacity adversely affected the exercise, and problems in coordinating arrangements caused delays.
- Since all countries were not of equal interest to all donors, it was difficult to generate support for conflict analysis exercises in some countries.
- Deteriorating security environment and limited access led to delays and complications in data-collection.
- In many cases, host governments were opposed to findings from the conflict analysis such that the conflict analysis reports had to be adjusted or kept confidential.

The review showed that several problems faced in the organization and implementation of the conflict analysis made implementation in an already difficult environment even more challenging. The main challenges can be grouped under three headings.


Process Challenges

Limited funding, often coupled with time pressure, affected the comprehensiveness of the exercise. In a few cases, the analysis was carried out in stages that were not necessarily linked and had time-gaps, consequently impinging on the quality of the analysis. In one case, the team wanted to organize a workshop with local and international experts so as to identify the conflict escalators and de-escalators in a country, but lack of funding and time constraints made it depend on a brief workshop with only international experts. As a result, the analysis missed the local perspective.

Sometimes, the initiating agency tried to mobilize support from other donors for the analysis but could not generate the required funds as the country was not considered important enough. While the findings show that these analyses are fairly sound, they have drawbacks caused by the lack of wider support, including the inability to dig deeper into specific issues, make findings available to a larger audience, and present a common voice on key priorities.

In multi-donor exercises in particular, even when funds were secured, difficulties were experienced in administering the disbursement processes and coordinating the budgetary allocations, making timely delivery of funding lengthy and problematic. This in turn affected the time-line of the conflict analysis exercise and often led to disruptions in implementation schedules and complaints by the team of lack of support to complete the exercise. It is clear that even though management of financial issues was taken into account during planning, delays were longer than anticipated. Given the differences in financial administration systems of donors, this problem is unlikely to disappear and needs to be taken into account when planning a conflict analysis exercise.

In a related vein, estimating the time-line of the conflict analysis exercise was often problematic. It appears that joint exercises always took longer than expected due to delays in finalizing partnership arrangements, selecting a conflict analysis team and ensuring their availability, unforeseen events and deteriorating security, competing work pressures of the conflict analysis team, and delays and difficulties in coordinating feedback mechanisms. Findings show that funding partners were reluctant to be flexible beyond a point given pressing demands to complete the already lengthy process.

The cases show that a key constraint of working in countries battered by conflict is the inability to find qualified international and local expertise necessary to conduct a conflict analysis. In some cases, since sufficient funds were available, there were efforts to create the expertise through intensive training. Even when international support to local partners increased, however, low capacity affected the quality of the product and the time-line of delivery. Such low capacity is symptomatic of low-income and conflict-affected countries where the required level of personnel cannot be secured, often because they have left the country.

Security Challenges

The review confirms that issues of safety complicated data-collection and field missions. In several cases, data-collection and fieldwork were either limited to specific regions, had to be abruptly halted, or be undertaken by local consultants who had the networks to negotiate the insecure environment, although they too had to tread carefully. In Somalia for instance, local partners were responsible for engaging with civil society, regional administrations, militia groups, religious leaders and other stakeholders during the exercise. They had to plan a strategy that would keep them safe in an unstable environment. The local partners decided to be transparent
about the analysis and keep the regional administrations informed of the progress of their study. Because of the organizations’ past engagement, there was a foundation of trust and the interviewees were assured that their identities would be kept confidential. However, even such well-respected local partners did not engage in areas with serious security problems, and the donors did not pressure them to do so.

Unforeseen events like a civil war in a neighboring country or a natural disaster could also affect the conflict analysis exercise. In Sri Lanka, the tsunami occurred just when the conflict analysis exercise was about to start and naturally led to a shift in priorities. While the exercise was delayed, the team developed contingency plans on how best to move forward in addressing conflict dynamics in a tsunami-affected environment.

**Challenges of Political Sensitivities**

As a socio-political examination of the factors that exacerbate or weaken conflict, the analyses may highlight issues that do not necessarily reflect positively on government or other actors involved. This has caused consternation and even rejection of the analysis in some cases. In some conflict analyses reviewed, host governments did not encourage agencies to work on conflict. They considered conflict analyses as tantamount to interfering in the internal politics of the country. This caused serious challenges ranging from retraction of the analysis in one extreme case to negatively impacting on the relationship between the host government and the agencies in other cases.

In one case, the government believed that a planned conflict analysis by an international agency violated state sovereignty. Hence, the agency decided to undertake the conflict analysis exercise without informing the government. Still, with an improvement in relations with government, the agency decided to share the completed conflict analysis with government for review and endorsement. However, government authorities did not recognize the work undertaken, and although it was an important piece of work, the analysis has been kept confidential for fear of antagonizing the government further.

In another case, the report itself had to be adjusted in order to be more acceptable to senior actors within the country’s reconciliation process and future government, who were criticized in the report. External actors meddling in the country were also explicitly discussed. To avoid affecting the peace process as well as hurting the organizations behind the analysis, parts of the report were reformulated to be more politically acceptable.

In a third case, a conflict analysis had to be retracted because it was considered as overly-sensitive by the host government. The conflict analysis was designed to be integrated into a broader study aimed at improving the understanding of political, economic, social and cultural factors that affect this country. When the host government became aware of the study, it took offence at the findings and the commissioning agency had to retract it. As a result, this study does not “exist” for policy purposes and cannot be publicly mentioned.
Chapter 3: Developing an Effective Conflict Analysis Exercise

The previous chapter demonstrates that experiences with conflict analysis exercises have been uneven. While several best practices are highlighted, there are many issues to consider in implementing successful conflict analysis exercises. Drawing from these findings, this chapter proposes how the next generation of conflict analysis exercises can be made more effective in their organization, dissemination and application.

The Scope

There is no single formula for producing a sound country conflict analysis. Depending on the needs, it could involve (i) a desk review; (ii) a combination of desk and fieldwork; (iii) conflict workshops with local and international experts, or (iv) a blend of the three.

*Limited but cheaper, quicker, just-in-time analyses may be sufficient in most cases*

The objective of conflict analysis is to better understand conflict dimensions and their impacts on recent developments in the country. In most cases, the fairly rich existing knowledge base could be used to distill and analyze information from a conflict angle, and to increase understanding of current developments. Insights on conflict trends could contribute to policy and program development or could serve as a platform for coherence in aid strategies. For these cases, a limited stand-alone conflict analysis design, involving a limited desk study and review-expert workshop, is recommended. Examples include Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela.

In this type of analysis, findings would be presented and discussed at a workshop, in which participants agree on the priority conflict challenges and opportunities. The workshop would bring together country specialists covering different sectors and perspectives, and conflict analysis specialists. Quantitative data, if available, could serve as a supplementary form of information. The outputs from the workshop would form the basis of the conflict analysis report.

**Suggested Components of Limited Conflict Analysis Exercise**

- Desk study
- Workshops with local and international experts
- Synthesis of findings and policy recommendations (based on workshop outputs)
The advantage of a limited stand-alone conflict analysis is that it can present an excellent picture of the situation, provide a fairly systematic analysis of the conflict obstacles and opportunities, and offer general, and in some cases even specific, recommendations on how best to proceed. These analyses can be completed in a relatively short span of time with limited pressure on purse strings. Moreover, they can be updated on a regular basis due to time and cost-effectiveness. On the downside, these analyses could suffer from stronger biases as they depend on the views of a few experts, and may lack richness in nuances that accompany more exhaustive studies that include fieldwork. However, in most cases these faster, cheaper and just-in-time exercises would provide sufficient level of information and guidance for strategic planning.

In a smaller number of cases, the ongoing security situation may have prevented systematic study of conflict factors and their transformations in the country for a long period of time, or there may be a desire to take stock of the current manifestations of conflict and to deepen understanding of them. The rationale being that in-depth knowledge of the mosaic of complex conflict relations would be needed to inform the design of more detailed strategies and programs. In these cases, a comprehensive conflict analysis design, involving desk and fieldwork, would be the most suitable approach. Examples include Sri Lanka, Nepal, Nigeria, Solomon Islands and Somalia.

In this type of analysis, desk reviews and fieldwork would be carried out by international and local partners together. Findings would be discussed and finalized in workshops. The outputs from the desk reviews, fieldwork and workshops would contribute to the preparation of the final conflict analysis report.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Suggested Components of Comprehensive Conflict Analysis Exercise</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Launch workshop</td>
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<td>• Training workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Desk studies including reviews of existing literature, background studies, specific topic studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Field studies including consultations with stakeholders (in and outside the country)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Peer reviewer inputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Synthesis of findings and policy recommendations</td>
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<td>• Concluding workshop</td>
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The advantage of this type of analysis is that it would provide a thorough understanding of conflict challenges and opportunities, would be able to offer specific recommendations based on an informed judgment, and could serve as a seminal piece of work for the medium-term. To arrive at a rich knowledge base, however, the analysis can be resource demanding, i.e. it is relatively expensive, time-consuming, and labor-intensive, requiring continual staff involvement for up to a year.

**Conflict lens in multi-content analysis offers additional opportunities**

Even in cases where conflict is not at the center of the study, there is an increasing recognition of the importance for incorporating a conflict perspective. The extent to which conflict is addressed will naturally depend on the focus of the wider analysis. Generally in these cases, a brief conflict analysis based on existing information should be prepared and conflict factors to be featured in the broader strategy should be identified. However, the explicitness with which a conflict discussion is included depends on political sensitivities.
To inject rigor into the examination of conflict issues and ensure that conflict insights are properly integrated, conflict analysis methodologies should be systematically used by staff familiar with conflict analysis. Strictly speaking, this does not qualify as a conflict analysis; however, it would be pertinent to underline the importance of including a systematic conflict lens in this type of analysis, and the opportunities thus offered for mainstreamed attention to conflict.

The advantage of this type of analysis is that it ensures that conflict is covered, in varying degrees, within a multi-content analysis. A focus on conflict as one part of a larger analysis can however turn into a disadvantage. If conflict is not given systematic consideration, the conflict understanding may be drowned out by other issues, or worse, be based on insufficient data or rigor, thus rendering the conflict perspective meaningless.

**The Process**

*Multi-agency collaborations are more effective and should be encouraged.*

Multi-agency exercises should be the preferred model in implementing conflict analyses. They lead to pooling of resources (funds, staff with diverse experiences, backgrounds and perspectives), combining and collaborating efforts, and taking advantage of comparative strengths. The knowledge base generated by the exercise is likely to lead to shared analysis and coherent strategy formation.

On the donor side, it is likely to facilitate the building of partnerships and strengthening of joint donor policy dialogue. The analysis could provide the basis for donor harmonization and stronger influence. Shared responsibility for the analysis also reduces political risks for a single agency. The main problem with multi-agency efforts is that they are likely to have high transaction costs as it can be challenging to coordinate different agency operational systems. However, the experience demonstrates that the dividends from multi-agency conflict analyses far outweigh the costs.

In contrast, some agencies may decide to prepare an independent conflict analysis to better respond to internal program needs. The purpose may be to provide a candid analysis of country dynamics to inform the agency’s planning. However, single-agency conflict analyses tend to remain internal to the organization which is not helpful in either deepening understanding of conflict challenges beyond a single agency, or creating shared donor understanding and strategy alignment.

*Establish clear rules of engagement in joint assessments.*

Time invested in planning the organization, partnership and study approach will help anticipate and iron out challenges and disagreements that are likely to emerge in a lengthy and intense process. The conflict analysis team would benefit by establishing the rules of engagement as early as possible in the process. A smooth working relationship that clarifies issues of partnership is critical to a process that is likely to be unwieldy and difficult to maneuver at times.

Developing clear rules of engagement involves outlining the objective of the analysis, agreeing on the time period envisaged for the work and how it fits into planning cycles, resources that each agency can bring to the table including, but not limited to, financial contributions, responsibility for fund management and logistical arrangements, readiness to liaise with the larger aid community and government, and willingness to be responsible for the quality of the analysis.
Spelling out these issues in advance will enable partners to be clear about their roles and responsibilities, thus reducing duplication of work or accusations of poor performance.

During the exercise, the conflict analysis team would benefit from establishing an advisory group comprising academics, peer reviewers, and representatives of aid agencies, who meet on a regular basis. It is valuable to include a few potential users in the advisory group to help the analysis team focus more clearly on the implications of conflict findings for programmatic work. The analysis team should provide updates to the aid community and incorporate their feedback. Keeping the aid community informed of progress will maintain awareness of the conflict analysis and encourage them to recognize the value of conflict findings for their work.

**Prepare for potential challenges as early as possible.**

Early on in the process, it is helpful for the conflict analysis team to recognize challenges that may affect the exercise. These challenges are related to buy-in for the analysis, team composition, capacity constraints, government and political sensitivities, level of analysis, a changing context and insecurity, and unforeseen events.

**Creating buy-in from the aid community, donor country teams, and if possible, host government:** While few agencies are involved in the actual conflict analysis exercise, the outputs should have effect throughout the wider aid community. Attention should be paid to generate interest and create commitment among agencies beyond those participating in the exercise itself. Generating support is not an easy task since many do not recognize the value of independent conflict analysis. Some may view it as dealing with sensitive research outside of agency mandates. This makes it pressing for the analysis team to transparently clarify both the procedural and conceptual issues from the early stages of the exercise. Appreciation for the analysis may lead agencies (both participating and non-participating) to consider integrating findings in their strategy and program planning.

**Building a team with an appropriate skill mix:** Finding the right skill mix of conflict analysis expertise, local knowledge, as well as development experience is crucial to the success of the exercise. This will enable conflict analysis frameworks to be adapted to the local context while retaining their analytical rigor. This suggests that the team should be represented by three sets of skills: (i) specialists with experience in conflict analysis, an understanding of political sensitivities and preferably basic familiarity with the country; (ii) economists, natural resource specialists, and governance specialists; and (iii) local expertise on the country/region with language fluency and willingness to collaborate with international partners. A team represented by these three sets of profiles would be able to contribute to a context-specific conflict analysis.

**Capacity constraints:** Conflict-affected countries often experienced significant brain-drain resulting in poor local capacity for high-quality analysis. The fear among many aid agencies is that the weak capacity of local partners (including government) could impinge on the quality of the analysis. In contrast, international partners are seen as outsiders by local partners, even if they are specialists on the country. This can be used as a point of departure to forge a constructive partnership between the local and international. It builds capacity of local partners, enables them to learn from international experience, and to engage in an international team. International partners would in turn benefit from an insiders perspective into conflict dimensions, management of relations with government and diverse local groups, and expertise on how to operate in an insecure environment. While the problem of weak local capacity cannot be resolved by a single exercise, the recognition that local capacity constraints can affect the quality of the analysis should temper expectations of the agencies commissioning the exercise. The
conflict analysis exercise should be seen as the first step in encouraging investments in local human development which are likely to have positive impacts far beyond the analysis itself.

**Host government sensitivities:** In cases where the host government is involved in the exercise or is seen as a serious client of the analysis, it may require modifying the tone of the analysis and striking a balance between being truthful and sensitive. This should be seen as acceptable since it means the host government is engaged with the conflict analysis as an active participant, an informed observer, or user of the results. It is a misperception that taking host government sensitivities into account will weaken the rigor of the analysis. Rather than viewing this as a trade-off, the analysis can be presented so as to highlight the findings and impart the messages in non-judgmental ways. In this regard, it may be especially useful for the analysis to focus on conflict factors, rather than actors. Unless it is an internal confidential report, it is helpful for a public report to fine-tune the presentation to prevent creating or reinforcing tensions. In many cases, host governments may have a sincere concern that explicit discussion of sensitive issues could instigate violence or revive vestiges of violence.

There may be cases where the host government, without valid justification, refuses to entertain any reference to conflict. In these situations, the analysis team can proceed in three ways. First, agencies can impress upon the host government the benefits of addressing these issues while providing assurances that the analysis is not undertaken to undermine its functioning. Second, the team may resolve to proceed with the analysis, knowing that it will hurt relations with the host government. It may, however, decide to treat the exercise as an internal analysis to avoid offending the government. Finally, the funding partners may decide that it is prudent for an independent think-tank to conduct the analysis. A think-tank may have greater ability to manage the analysis as it is not constrained by having to maintain a relationship with authorities the same way as bilateral and multilateral agencies. In cases where the government is actively implicated in the conflict as the perpetrator, it would clearly be counterproductive to involve it in the analysis.

**Macro-level (national/regional) comprehensive coverage:** The conflict analysis usually aims to provide recommendations of macro relevance. This means that the analysis reflects conflict dynamics at the country or region (often the size of a small country) levels. The macro-level conflict tools are equipped to deal with both country-level or regional-level analyses, and in several cases have successfully completed both simultaneously. However, in macro-level analysis, it is not possible to capture the details of sub-regional conflicts and sub-sub-regional conflicts. The aid community should therefore not expect that the macro-conflict analyses will address the intricacies of specific micro-level conflicts; rather they will provide the basis and context for preparing follow-on analyses on micro-level conflicts.

**Insecurity and changing contexts:** A conflict analysis exercise is often conducted in areas of ongoing violence. It is therefore necessary that planning of the exercise takes this environment into consideration. One option is for the analysis to mainly draw from desk-studies, secondary literature and expert workshops. If the security situation allows, local experts can be involved in the exercise, be responsible for parts of the analysis, and potentially conduct fieldwork.

Given that conflict situations are volatile and fluid, security challenges can affect the analysis, both on its time-line and level of access. Security concerns need to be carefully managed. Contingency plans have to be in place in situations where deteriorating security may affect data-collection and field research. Lack of access due to security reasons might delay or require adjustments to the exercise. These possible risks need to be anticipated and monitored so that they can be tackled if they emerge.
In addition to insecurity causing setbacks, unexpected natural disasters or political upheavals may affect the process. While these may be difficult to anticipate prior to the exercise, it has to be flexible to allow for modifications. If the process is ongoing when unforeseen events occur, it can be managed if flexible yet firm alternatives are in place. A conflict analysis exercise is likely to be affected by sudden changes and its organizational design needs to take this into account.

**Strategy for Disseminating and Applying Conflict Analysis**

The conflict analysis exercise should be viewed as a crucial component of a larger process that contributes to conflict sensitive programming. The outputs of a conflict analysis exercise usually include reports, and it would be particularly useful if they have off-shoot products that meet specific agency needs. While it is beneficial to systematically disseminate the findings when the conflict analysis is completed, this should not be seen as the end of a conflict analysis. Rather it should be seen as a segue in a systematic strategy that ensures that conflict findings are incorporated into macro-strategies and integrated in programming.

**Reports**

It is customary for conflict analysis exercises to prepare principal reports at the end of the exercise. In multi-agency analyses, the audience does not share homogenous concerns and a single report is unlikely to meet specific agency needs. Thus, to be relevant, the principal reports should have spin-off capacities.

The main report from a multi-agency analysis should highlight select macro findings and provide guidance to the aid community on how best to respond to the conflict challenges in ways that reduce risks of conflict escalation and strengthen opportunities for conflict de-escalation. This report should serve as the basis for the aid community to discuss and develop coordinated strategies. Where applicable, the main report should be complemented by in-depth reports on specific topics and regions.

As a rule, multi-agency reports should be publicly available. Given the involvement of several agencies, it is impossible to keep multi-agency reports internal and confidential. Insensitive comments that inadvertently become public could damage relations with host government and even worse set in motion a negative spiral in-country. Single agency analyses may be disseminated as reports solely for internal consumption with the purpose of providing a candid analysis of country dynamics. However, this decision is justified if the aim is to inform agency programming and not influence the host country or other agency operations. Some make a case for a conflict analysis exercise to produce two distinct reports – public and internal. Experience shows that this is not a wise move. Besides difficulties associated with getting the balance right between the public and restricted versions, the revelation that there are two reports is likely and will obviously fuel interest in the internal version. It is more sensible for each agency to tailor the publicly available report to the demands of its agency.

**Dissemination Notes**

The challenge is to develop off-shoot products of relevance for the respective agencies’ specific needs. Some options to create and maintain buy-in within an agency include:

- Short notes that emphasize the nuances of the conflict findings, potential conflict-related risks and opportunities, and main features of regional reports or specific studies where
pertinent. These notes would be extremely valuable since most staff may not have time to review long reports. Briefer notes would make information more easily digestible and whet the appetite for spending time on the main reports.

- Summary of the findings with a focus on highlighting recommendations with operational relevance for a specific agency. The recommendations should be concrete and linked to specific programs to demonstrate significance of engaging with programs “differently” and in conflict-sensitive ways.
- Brief notes that reflect on what the findings mean for country strategy and how they can be translated into practical actions. This should include how current programs could be designed and implemented such that they consider conflict concerns and take advantage of opportunities. Related to this, it would be useful to have potential users prepare opinion pieces on how their program/project could benefit from considering conflict findings.
- Joint notes prepared by agencies – and if possible with the host government – on how the recommendations will influence strategic priorities, country programming, and donor harmonization. They should question what the findings mean for different donor programs and how the donors plan to work differently, both independently and collaboratively, based on these findings.

**Dissemination Events**

Dissemination events should be seen as the first step in a long-term process of encouraging the integration of findings in operations and policy programming. A launch workshop is appropriate to publicize the report. It is an opportunity to present findings and advocate their mainstreaming in programmatic work so that they have applications beyond a one-off exercise. It should be viewed as an entry point for discussions on conflict issues with diverse stakeholders such as host governments, opposition groups, aid community including donors, and civil society organizations. There should be special emphasis on convincing host governments as well as aid staff working in conflict-affected regions (but not specifically on conflict issues) to participate in the launch.

The launch can be planned on a relatively moderate scale or can be conceived as a dissemination tour to select donor capitals to promote the conflict analysis and widen its impact. While the latter in most cases is unfeasible for financial reasons, it is likely to lead to greater attention, but is equally likely to raise expectations of impact. It may be more sensible, and certainly more cost-effective, to arrange a modest launch with focused follow-up sessions with users (donors, governments). In these sessions, the off-shoot products, outlined earlier, which make information more digestible should be showcased. They should be used to discuss how findings can be made more operational and how linkages with strategies can be developed.

**Applying Conflict Findings: Integration into Planning**

To make the conflict analysis meaningful, it is imperative for agencies to facilitate an institutional environment where the conflict findings are used to both engage differently in the current programs and to stimulate new, innovative programs. The institutional environment should include a clear incentive structure for staff to apply conflict analysis findings in programming.

At the minimum, conflict analysis should be used as a diagnostic to provide better understanding of conflict dynamics in order to influence agency priorities for a country and to guide the dialogue with the government. However, for conflict analysis to be a vehicle that injects tangible changes in programming, findings need to be explicitly integrated into regular development
planning and be embedded in operations. The following provide preliminary suggestions on establishing linkages between conflict analysis and ongoing strategic work.

- **Monitor conflict findings and changes in their manifestations to influence country program design.** Country teams should meet at regular intervals to discuss implications of conflict trends for their strategy. It may be helpful for the country team to invite country and conflict experts to provide guidance on how to modify design and implementation of ongoing strategic programming according to country changes. Frequent monitoring would ensure that the programs capture the changing situations and remain up-to-date.

- **Integrate conflict findings in agency economic reports and country assistance strategies to contribute to conflict sensitive approaches.** Deeper understanding of a country’s conflict sources and dynamics would help guide policy and program development in the country. The increased understanding of conflict would directly inform the design of programs, and thus enable effective implementation as well as potential conflict prevention impacts. Program teams should be encouraged to use conflict findings to take stock of the conflict sensitivity of their work, and discuss how best to address conflict concerns and opportunities in analysis and strategy planning. While this suggests that a conflict analysis needs to inform the economic analysis or country strategy, it does not necessarily call for a separate country dialogue on conflict, especially if this could lead to tensions with host government. Rather, it indicates that conflict analysis be the first step in setting the stage for analytical and strategic development, with indicators that help monitoring of changes in the conflict environment.

- **Quality of a needs assessment is enhanced by conflict analysis.** When preparing for a needs assessment, aid partners should prioritize an understanding of conflict dynamics for countries affected by conflict. Awareness of conflict challenges, risks and opportunities prior to a needs assessment will strengthen the ability to identify priorities as well as introduce conflict sensitivity into sector work. Experiences reveal that mainstreaming conflict into needs assessments is not the best approach as conflict understanding often gets diluted or drowned out by sector topics. A discrete conflict analysis should therefore be mandatory to inform the needs assessment. Many sector specialists do not realize the utility of conflict analysis and treat it as a non-essential add-on, relegating sector analysis to being a purely technical undertaking. Hence, a concerted effort must be made to simultaneously push for conflict analysis as an entry point to a needs assessment, while emphasizing the risks of not carefully considering conflict factors in sector work.
In cases of needs assessments, usually prepared to support the immediate post-conflict recovery process, appreciation of the conflict issues should underlie the assessment. This suggests the needs assessment should be sensitive to understanding conflict both in terms of procedural issues as well as in the identification of recovery needs and their relation to the factors of conflict. Hence, it is important to conduct conflict analysis as it would provide the basis for both identifying priority sectors that could either promote or threaten peace, and for ensuring that the sector-specific needs assessments are conflict sensitive and take into account critical conflict challenges and opportunities for peace.


- **Poverty Reduction Strategies would benefit from a conflict lens.** The three preceding points primarily address the aid community. However, governments engaged in PRSs would benefit by drawing on findings of their own or agency conflict analyses. They should use the findings to discuss the interrelationship between poverty and conflict factors; determine how the identified conflict factors and challenges can be taken into account and potentially addressed in PRS design and implementation; and decide how conflict escalators and de-escalators can be updated, assessed and monitored.

**Applying Conflict Findings: Assessments and Monitoring of Potential Impacts**

Given the dynamic nature of conflict situations, it is likely that the manifestations of conflict-related challenges and opportunities continually undergo transformation, with changes in their direction (escalation versus de-escalation) and intensity. To increase the usefulness and durability of the findings of the conflict analysis, indicators that systematically monitor changes should be developed. Conflict monitoring would have two main aspects: (i) indicators would serve as early warning signals of worsening tensions, and (ii) indicators would be used to inform the design and monitoring of specific projects/programs.

(i) To enable the development of suitable indicators, the analysis team should identify “a set of sensitive and measurable indicators of change” that would be “monitored periodically to provide basis for comparisons and determination of trends, and agencies should agree on responsibilities for information collection and analysis.”

(ii) Further work needs to be done on how to adapt key conflict indicators to indicators relevant to specific projects and programs. Ideally, these should be used at the design stage so that conflict-related risks and opportunities to a specific project can be identified and managed, and then monitored and evaluated. By building the conflict-related indicators into the design of the project, it will be possible to track changes, identify problematic issues and opportunities that may emerge, and monitor program effects on the conflict environment.

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14 For details on project level impact assessments, refer to *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*, Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict
**Organizational Implications**

The above discussion presupposes a supply of agency staff that can support conflict-sensitive implementation. It is therefore far-sighted to invest in staff to serve as social scientists and conflict specialists in mainstream programmatic work. Their responsibility will be to provide a conflict lens to the design and monitoring of programs, and assist in the operationalization of conflict findings. Without the perspective of a specialist, the assessment and its application may have little impact beyond the champions and analysis teams who are likely to move on and get involved in other priorities. Limited conflict understanding in turn could be detrimental to the effectiveness of country strategic programming, policies and projects.

In order to continue pushing ahead with a conflict angle in programs, it may be helpful to reinforce current work and experiment with new efforts so that the impact of conflict is simultaneously broadened and intensified. These include:

- Independent conflict analysis exercises should continue to be the entry point in conflict-affected countries with greater emphasis on making the analysis operationally relevant.
- Conflict impact assessments for development interventions should be tested and mainstreamed.
- Efforts should be made to integrate a rigorous conflict lens to further strengthen country social analyses and analyze conflict within larger analyses. Similar efforts should be made to integrate a systematic conflict perspective into studies such as poverty assessments, participatory assessments and livelihood analyses.

Annex 1

In 2004, a review of the fifteen conflict analysis tools developed by donors, development organizations, and think tanks was completed. While a detailed discussion can be found in the resource pack on conflict-sensitive approaches,15 at this point, it may be useful to summarize how a couple of the tools are structured, the issues they look at and how they are implemented. The following two boxes present summary features of the conflict analysis tools developed by DFID and World Bank.16

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**DFID: Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)**

The SCA can be used to conduct local, national or regional level conflict analysis so as to help DFID staff and partner bilateral and multilateral agency staff be better prepared to plan country and regional strategies. The SCA will enable staff at DFID and other agencies to assess the impacts of conflict on programs, the risks of programs exacerbating conflict, and the opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions.

The conceptual basis of the SCA lies in a combination of the political economy approach, the greed and grievance model, combined analysis of the structures and actors, identification of different levels of dimensions of conflict, and recognition of the dynamic character of conflicts. While the SCA is a generic tool, it can be tailored to specific contexts and applied to different levels of analysis.

There are three main steps in a SCA.

(i) **Conflict analysis**: analysis of the long-term factors in the security, political, economic and social categories; analysis of the conflict actors including their interests, relations, capacities, agendas and incentives; and analysis of the long-term trends and triggers, capacities for managing conflict, likely future scenarios.

(ii) **Analysis of international responses**: mapping of interests and policies of international actors in the military, security, diplomatic, trade, immigration and development spheres, assessment of level of their coherence and analysis of their impacts on conflict dynamics; analysis of development actors’ approaches to conflict, assessment of their capacities to work effectively “in” and “on” conflict, and assessment of their potential to influence peace and conflict dynamics; and assessment of the interactions between development interventions and conflict.

(iii) **Developing strategies and options**: use of these findings to develop common donor approaches to better respond to conflict, to develop conflict-sensitive donor approaches, and to adjust current activities and develop new initiatives to work “in” and “on” conflict.

To complete these three steps, SCA involves a mixture of desk study and fieldwork. It is suggested that the SCA team consists of international and local consultants, as well as conflict and social development specialists. The SCA has been implemented in a range of cases including Nepal, Moldova, Sri Lanka and Kyrgyzstan.

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16 Ibid.
The CAF can be used to conduct country level or regional (within a country) level analyses so as to inform the development of strategic programming, country assistance strategies, poverty assessments, and country social analysis. While the main audience of the CAF are World Bank country teams, it can also be used by other teams, including host governments, who want to better understand the factors related to conflict, determine their linkages with poverty, and ascertain how these factors can be addressed through development assistance.

The CAF draws from research conducted at the Bank on conflict as well as operational experience. CAF is a generic tool, and teams are encouraged to adapt it to a specific context.

CAF has two main stages: screening indicators to test whether it is appropriate to undertake a full conflict analysis, and (ii) a full conflict analysis based on CAF. The full CAF includes the following steps.

(i) Conflict analysis: Existing information on the conflict situation in a country is interpreted on six main categories of factors that cover social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights and security, economic structure and performance, environment and natural resources, and external factors. Factors relevant to a country are analyzed on the seven dimensions including history (change over a period of time), dynamics (likely trend), public perceptions (public attitudes and biases), politicization (use by political groups and organizations), organization (establishment of interest organizations, influenced political parties), link to conflict and intensity, and link to poverty. Factors identified as relevant are further explored so as to identify the key conflict escalators and de-escalators in a country.

(ii) Monitoring: The key conflict escalators and de-escalators are monitored on a regular basis to capture changes and remain up-to-date.

Depending on the objective of the conflict analysis, CAF can be a comprehensive process or a simpler and quicker process. This suggests it can involve desk work, workshops, follow-up studies, stakeholder analysis, country consultations with stakeholders and fieldwork. It is suggested that the CAF team consist of Bank staff (conflict specialists, social scientists, economists, natural resource specialists etc) and local partners. The CAF has been implemented in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and CAR.
Annex 2

The questionnaire for the funding partners and conflict analysis team focused on the objectives, level of analyses, internal decision-making processes, allocation of resources (time, staff, funds), challenges, and lessons. The questionnaire to understand the dissemination strategy and effects of conflict findings on development assistance guided discussions with the conflict analysis team and potential users of the analysis. The conflict analysis team was asked to discuss outputs and dissemination strategy, while the users were asked to explain how they considered conflict in their programs/projects.

It should be noted that the two questionnaires were used as a framework for interviews. They are not clear-cut categories and were not always specifically divided during interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire for conflict analysis team on experience with conflict analysis exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Internal decision-making process of an organization:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Why was it decided to carry out a conflict analysis (CA)? Who took this decision? (e.g. thematic group, country team, policy division?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. How was the issue of an analysis communicated to your organization and what were the reactions to this decision?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Was it mandatory, demand-driven, or part of a work program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Who was identified to carry out the CA? Why were they chosen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. How were those involved in deciding that the CA was to be carried out involved in its implementation? (e.g. implementers/supervisory)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Objectives and key issues covered by analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. What was the aim of the CA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Was it part of a larger program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Were there specific areas of focus? What were they and why were they chosen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Levels of analyses:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Was the CA applied at a macro or micro level? Did it look at country, regional, sub-regional, program or/and project levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Process issues of analysis:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Was the CA developed in co-ordination with other agencies (multi-donor) or at multiple levels within the organization (single-agency driven)? In the case of a multi-donor analysis, please specify how the initiating agency proceeded to approach potential partners (donors, NGOs, think-tanks) and whether there was a rationale to guide the choice of partner (s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Who did it involve and what were the different roles and responsibilities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. What means were used to obtain information? (desk research and/or field work; communication strategy / languages used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. How were donors, NGOs, not directly involved in the conflict analysis informed of the process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Were governments informed of the process? If yes, what was their response and level of involvement? If not, why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Timing and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. How much time was allocated to carry out the analysis and how long did it take to conduct? If there were a significant discrepancy, what would have been a more realistic time to conduct this analysis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Was funding adequately allocated to carry out all aspects of the CA? (personnel, level of expertise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Was funding especially budgeted for the CA? If not, what were sources of funds and did it have an effect on other aspects of your organization’s program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Was sufficient staff allocated to the CA, and did they have adequate and varied expertise for the assessment?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. What are some key issues that you have learnt from this process?
7. Is there anything you would do differently? Which aspects would you definitely repeat?
8. Are there methods that you developed or would recommend to ensure effective CA implementation?

**Challenges:**
9. What kind of obstacles or constraints caused the most challenges for the CA process?
   - Political (e.g. donor-driven vs. country ownership vs. agency-driven)
   - Sensitivity (e.g. how were conflict sensitive issues tackled, especially if the analysis did not reflect positively on the government for example?)
   - Practical/Planning (e.g. adequate time and resources allocation, expertise, capacity)
   - Contextual (e.g. data collection in a challenging environment, neutrality vs. local knowledge, access to undisclosed information)
   - Institutional (e.g. level of awareness of country teams, integration and relevance with other analytical works)
10. How much did these affect the analysis?
11. What would you recommend to address challenges encountered throughout the CA?

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**Questionnaire for conflict analysis team & users for effects of conflict analysis**

**Dissemination Strategy**

1. Outputs
   a. What was the decision-making process to finalize the conflict analysis?
   b. What were the actual outputs? (e.g. internal memo, report, presentation, training for the country team, seminar with the Government)
   c. Did any results (products / change in policy or strategy) arise out of this process?
   d. Did the CA change or reinforce behavior (personnel/staff) or procedures (institutions/programming) related to the analysis?

2. Dissemination
   a. Once the CA was conducted, how were the results processed and disseminated?
   b. Did the parties involved in the CA receive the analysis? Was it distributed to staff in country / region / sub-region in which implemented?
   c. Were there restrictions on who could access the report? If so why? What impact did this have on the use and impact of the CA?
   d. Were there recommendations within the report on its use? Was a strategy developed in order to ensure specific or best use of CA?
   e. Was the CA shared with host governments? If so, what was their response? If not, why?

**Conflict analysis impact**

a. Did the CA have any institutional, programming or project impact from when it was decided to carry out the CA?

b. Were there systematic strategies developed to ensure that the results of the CA fed back into policy or project management? What were they?

c. Were any policy actions taken or developed to ensure effective use of the CA?

d. Was it possible to measure the level of impact of the analysis? Did this subsequently make any difference to the analysis’s overall goals in the short, medium and long terms?

e. How far has the conflict analysis influenced the design/redesign of activities in your organization or within the geographic scope of the analysis?

f. In your experience, what works best to ensure maximum impact of CA?

**Impact (users)**

a. Are you aware of this analysis? If yes, how?

b. How user-friendly are the findings for your operations?
c. How did you use them to inform your work?
d. What do you see as the added-value?
e. What do you see as the main problems and challenges?
f. On a more general level, how will you mainstream conflict findings into your work?
g. What do you see as the challenges to institutionalizing conflict sensitivity into programming?
### Features of Key Conflict Analysis Exercises At A Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Analysis</th>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>Single or Multi-agency</th>
<th>Host govt.</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Desk and limited fieldwork</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IFAD’s evaluation document, retrospective study of PRSP, working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Desk and fieldwork</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared with key ministers, expected to contribute to PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Desk and limited field</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Seminar, contributed to country strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Desk and limited fieldwork</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ltd.</td>
<td>Multi-content analysis, informed and advised Bank country-team strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Desk and fieldwork</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contributed to program design and review, preparation of comprehensive guidance package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Desk and fieldwork</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>Involved as partner</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Informed projects, increased understanding of Delta, contributed to Bank country assistance strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Informed World Bank evaluation of Rwanda program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone,</td>
<td>Desk and limited fieldwork</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contributed to PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Desk and fieldwork</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contributed to Joint Needs Assessment, Country Economic Memorandum, framework of the LICUS and PCF review of trust fund finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka 1</td>
<td>Desk and limited fieldwork</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contributed to DFID country strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka 2</td>
<td>Desk, fieldwork, specific studies</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contributing to country strategy of many agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


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