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**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**TANZANIA**

**HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PILOT PROJECT  
(CREDIT N0. 2991-TA)**

**PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  
(CREDIT N0. 3570-TA)**

**SECONDARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  
(CREDIT N0. 3215-TA and Grant H093-TA )**

**June 28, 2010**

*Sector Evaluations (IEGSE)  
Independent Evaluation Group*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

1997	US\$1.00	Tsh 612
1998	US\$1.00	Tsh 665
1999	US\$1.00	Tsh 745
2000	US\$1.00	Tsh 800
2001	US\$1.00	Tsh 876
2002	US\$1.00	Tsh 967
2003	US\$1.00	Tsh 1038
2004	US\$1.00	Tsh 1129

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Analytic Advisory Services	GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
APLs	Adaptable Program Loan	GNI	Gross National Income
BEDC	Basic Education Development Committee	GOT	Government of Tanzania
BEST	Basic Education Statistics for Tanzania	GSES	Girls Secondary Education Support
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	HRDP	Human Resource Development Project
CEF	Community Education Fund	ICR	Implementation Completion Report
CSEE	Certificate of Secondary Education Examination	IDA	International Development Association
CSO	Civil Society Organization	IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)	IMF	International Monetary Fund
DPL	Development Policy Loan	JAER	Joint Annual Education Review
DPs	Development Partners	JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
EFA	Education for All	JCAS	Joint Country Assistance Strategy
EMIS	Education Management Information System	JESWG	Joint Education Sector Working Group
EPRP	Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project	LDP	Letter of Development Policy
ESDP	Education Sector Development Plan	LGA	Local Government Authority
ESPR	Education Sector Performance Report	LGRP	Local Government Reform Program
ESR	Education Sector Reviews	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
ESW	Economic and Sector Work	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
GBS	General Budget Support	MOE	Ministry of Education
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	MOEC	Ministry of Education and Culture (became MOEVT in 2006)

MOEVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEC before 2006)	PSLE	Primary School Leaving Examination
MOFEA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs	PTRs	Pupil Teacher Ratios
NECTA	National Examinations Council of Tanzania	QAG	Quality at entry Group
NER	Net Enrollment Rate	SACMEQ	Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Quality in Education
NGO	Non-government Organization	SACMEQ2	Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Quality in Education 2
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty	SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
PAD	Program Appraisal Document	SDRs	Special Drawing Rights
PDOs	Program Development Objectives	SEDP	Secondary Education Development Program
PEDP	Primary Education Development Program	SEIA	Secondary Education in Africa
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey	SICs	Sector Investment Credit
PIP	Project Implementation Plan	TA	Technical Assistance
PMO	Prime Minister's Office	TANU	Tanganyika (Tanzania) African National Union
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister Office-Regional and Local Government	TTL	Task Team Leader
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit	UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization
PSG	Project Support Group	UPE	Universal Primary Education

## **Fiscal Year**

Government: July 1 to June 30

Director-General, Independent Evaluation	: Mr. Vinod Thomas
Director, Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)	: Ms. Cheryl Gray
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**IEGWB Mission: Improving development results through excellence in evaluation.**
**About this Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEGWB peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. IEGWB incorporates the comments as relevant. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



# Contents

<b>Principal Ratings</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>Key Staff Responsible</b> .....	<b>viii</b>
<b>Preface</b> .....	<b>ix</b>
<b>Summary</b> .....	<b>xi</b>
<b>1. Background and Context</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>2. Human Resource Development Project, 1997-2005</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Objectives and Design.....	5
Implementation.....	7
Enrollment and Learning.....	8
Education Opportunities for Poor Girls.....	9
Building Capacity at Community Levels .....	10
Improvement in Policy, Planning, and Research .....	10
<b>3. Primary Education Development Program, 2001-2005</b> .....	<b>11</b>
Objectives and Design.....	11
Implementation.....	12
Achievement of Objectives .....	14
Expand Access .....	14
Improve Quality of Education .....	15
Increase Retention at the Primary Level .....	17
<b>4. Secondary Education Development Program, 2004-2007</b> .....	<b>17</b>
Objectives and Design.....	17
Implementation.....	19
Achievement of Objectives .....	20
Increase the Secondary Completion Rate, Especially Among the Underserved .....	20
Improve Learning Outcomes.....	23
Strengthen Management of Secondary Education .....	26
<b>5. Ratings</b> .....	<b>27</b>
Human Resource Development Project .....	27
Outcome .....	27
Risk to Development Outcome .....	28
Bank Performance .....	28

Borrower Performance .....	28
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	29
Primary Education Development Program.....	29
Outcome .....	29
Risk to Development Outcome .....	30
Bank Performance .....	30
Borrower Performance .....	30
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	31
Secondary Education Development Program.....	32
Outcome .....	32
Risk to Development Outcome .....	33
Bank Performance .....	33
Borrower Performance .....	34
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	34
<b>6. Lessons and Perspectives.....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Annex A. Basic Data Sheet.....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Annex B. People Consulted .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Annex C. Timeline of Events Affecting Education in Tanzania.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Annex D. Evidence on Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts .....</b>	<b>56</b>

## Tables

Table 2-1: Planned versus Actual Disbursement.....	7
Table 3-1: Tranche Release Conditions and Project Objectives for Primary Schools .....	12
Table 3-2: Pass Rates for the Primary School Leaving Exam (percent).....	15
Table 3-3: Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Quality of Education II, 2003 (top five performers) .....	16
Table 4-1: Tranche Release Conditions and Project Objectives for Secondary Schools .....	18
Table 4-2: Secondary Schools—Government owned and Community .....	20
Table 4-3: Enrollment in Government and Non-Government Secondary Schools .....	21
Table 4-4: Number of Students Completing Form 4 (CSEE or Division 1-4 pass) .....	23
Table 4-5: Recent Strong Pass Rates on Form 4 Exams (percent passing, Division 1-3 level) .....	24

## Figures

Figure 3-1: Increase in primary enrollments, 1990-2009 .....	14
Figure 4-1: Increase in Secondary Enrollments (Form 1-6), 1990-2009 .....	22

This report was prepared by Maurice Boissiere, who assessed the projects in January 2010. Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.



## Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<b>HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT I (CREDIT NO. 2991-TA)</b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact**	Substantial	Substantial	———
Risk to Development Outcome	———	———	Negligible to Low
Sustainability***	Likely	Likely	———
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<b>PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT (CREDIT NO. 3570-TA)</b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact**	Substantial	Substantial	———
Risk to Development Outcome	———	———	Moderate
Sustainability***	Highly Likely	Likely	———
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<b>SECONDARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3215-TA and Grant H093-TA )</b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Moderate	Significant
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

\*\*As of July 1, 2006, Institutional Development Impact is assessed as part of the Outcome rating.

\*\*\*As of July 1, 2006, Sustainability has been replaced by Risk to Development Outcome. As the scales are different, the ratings are not directly comparable.

## Key Staff Responsible

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### HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT I (CREDIT NO. 2991-TA)

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<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Charles C. Griffin	Ruth Kagia	James W. Adams
Completion	Rest Barnabas Lasway	Dzingai B. Mutumbuka	Judy O'Connor

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### PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT (CREDIT NO. 3570-TA)

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<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Donald B. Hamilton	Dzingai B. Mutumbuka	James W. Adams
Completion	Rest Barnabas Lasway	Dzingai B. Mutumbuka	Judy O'Connor

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### SECONDARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3215-TA and Grant H093-TA)

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<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Donald B. Hamilton	Dzingai B. Mutumbuka	Judy O'Connor
Completion	Rest Barnabas Lasway	Christopher Thomas	John McIntire

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## Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covering three education projects in Tanzania. The first operation, the Human Resources Development Pilot Project (US\$24 million equivalent), was financed through IDA Credit No. 2991-TA in the amount of US\$21 million equivalent with planned government contribution of US\$3 million equivalent. The credit was approved on October 7, 1997, became effective on February 18, 1998 and was closed on schedule December 31, 2005. An undisbursed amount of US\$ 467,500 equivalent was cancelled after project closing.

The second operation, the Primary Education Development Program (US\$200 million equivalent), was financed through IDA Credit No.3570-TA in the amount of US\$150 million equivalent. The credit was approved on October 9, 2001, became effective January 2, 2002 and closed on schedule with full disbursement on October 31, 2004. The Government of Netherlands also provided a Grant of US\$50 million which was administered by IDA.

The third operation, the Secondary Education Development Program (US\$250 million equivalent), was financed through IDA Credit No. 3215-TA in the amount of US\$124 million equivalent and an IDA grant of US\$26 million equivalent. The credit was approved on June 8, 2004, became effective September 30, 2004 and was closed with full disbursement on December 31, 2007, six months later than planned.

This PPAR was prepared by Maurice Boissiere, IEG consultant, and will serve as an input to the planned IEG evaluation of post-primary education. The findings are largely based on a three-week mission to Tanzania from January 18 to February 6, 2010. The mission met with education authorities in Tanzania as well as civil society organizations and private business people. The mission visited project sites in Kibaha district of the Coast region and in Mtwara Rural district of Mtwara region in southern Tanzania, a relatively poor area. A list of persons met is given in Annex C. The mission also examined: (a) World Bank project files; (b) project related reporting and evaluation; and (c) education studies by government, other Development Partners, and Civil Society Organizations, as well as the relevant research literature.

The IEG team gratefully acknowledges the logistical assistance and support of many resident mission staff, especially Ms. Rest Lasway (Senior Education Specialist) and Anne Muuna (Team Assistant) for expediting the work of the mission. A special acknowledgement is due to those government officials, especially the district officials and school personnel, who organized arrangements for productive visits to project sites. Civil society organizations and private sector business people were generous with their time and provided valuable insights for this assessment.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. No response was received.



## Summary

The purpose of this report is to assess the development effectiveness of and lessons of three Bank-supported education projects in mainland Tanzania implemented over a decade (1997-2007) – the Human Resources Development Pilot Project (1997-2005), the Primary Education Development Program (2001-2004), and the Secondary Education Development Program (2004-2007). These three projects were selected because they represent a coherent policy response to the economic and education needs of Tanzania and could provide valuable lessons in that context. Further, two of the projects involved support for secondary education; this assessment will therefore provide important evidence and lessons for the planned IEG evaluation of post-primary education.

Although still very poor (US\$ 440 gross national income per capita, 2008), Tanzania has been a stable and cohesive nation since its independence in 1961 under President Julius Nyerere. Attempts to implement African socialism did not succeed and left the economy in dire need of reforms by the time President Nyerere stepped down voluntarily in 1985. Successive governments undertook economic reform programs supported by the Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which led to a resumption of growth in the range of 6 to 8 percent annually since the mid-1990s.

The Bank has been supporting projects at all levels of education in Tanzania since 1963. Up to 1980 there were seven Bank supported education projects, followed by a pause in lending during the 1980s while economic reforms were being negotiated. Bank lending resumed in 1990 with the Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project. This was followed by the three education projects that are the subject of this assessment. Government education policy and Bank support for education entered a new phase with the introduction of the government's Education Sector Development Program (formulated in 1997, revised 2001 to run from 2001-2008) and the preparation of the Primary Education Development Program (2001). This new phase involved close collaboration among all stakeholders—government (central and local), the major donor partners, and civil society organizations.

The \$24.0 million **Human Resources Development Pilot Project (HRDP)** was approved on October 7, 1997 and became effective on February 18, 1998. The project closed on schedule December 31, 2005, and was financed by a \$20.9 million IDA credit with a government counterpart contribution of \$3.16 million. The objective of the project was to enhance Tanzania's education sector through: (a) raising enrollments in primary education and improving its quality/learning outcomes; (b) expanding educational opportunities and improving quality at the secondary level, particularly for girls from economically disadvantaged households; (c) building capacity at the district and community levels; and (d) improving policy development, planning, and research in the education sector. Notably, the HRDP was financed as a pilot for two interventions – Community Education Funds, which provided school grants based upon school based management and Girls' Secondary Education Support, which provided scholarships to poor girls who could not attend secondary school for financial reasons. The project also provided support to policy and planning in the Ministry of Education (MOE) which produced background studies for the Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP) and provided the basis for the primary education project below.

The US\$200 million **Primary Education Development Program (PEDP)** was approved on October 9, 2001 and became effective on January 2, 2002. It was financed by a \$150 million 3-tranche IDA sector adjustment credit and a \$50 million grant from the Government of Netherlands, administered by the Bank and also released in three tranches. The objective of the project was to support the Government of Tanzania to reform the delivery of primary education. Specifically, the objectives of the PEDP were to: (1) expand school access, (2) improve education quality, and (3) increase school retention at the primary level. These objectives would be achieved through improved resource allocation and utilization, improved educational inputs, and strengthened institutional arrangements for effective primary education delivery. The PEDP introduced, among other reforms, Capitation and Development Grants for direct disbursement to primary schools.

The follow-on \$150 million **Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP)**, was approved on June 8, 2004 and became effective on September 30, 2004. It was financed by a \$123.6 million IDA credit and a \$26.4 million IDA grant. The credit was in the form of a sector adjustment credit, released in three tranches, and the IDA grant was released as part of the tranche disbursement. The need for SEDP was recognized as a result of increasing numbers of primary school leavers, largely a result of the success of PEDP. As part of the SEDP, the long term aim of the SEDP was to build a productive and adaptable labor force and supply better quality students for the post-secondary education and training system. The specific objectives were to: (i) increase the proportion of the relevant age group completing lower and upper secondary education, especially underserved groups who are now getting better opportunities to complete primary education through the PEDP; (ii) improve learning outcomes of students, especially girls, and at the lower secondary level; and (iii) enable the public administration to manage secondary education more effectively, through the devolution of authority to lower levels, and strengthening of management capacities.

### **Human Resources Development Pilot Project**

The outcome of this project is rated **satisfactory**. All of the objectives were substantially relevant to the current Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the one at the time of approval and the project design was substantially relevant. The efficacy of the project in terms of achieving objectives is also substantial. The pilots for school-based grants (managed by the schools) involving 16 districts and over 1,600 schools and secondary education scholarships for over 4,700 poor girls were implemented successfully and provided the basis for similar activities in the follow on PEDP. Capacity building through training and technical assistance at both the local level and the Ministry of Education and Culture was also successful. Given the effectiveness of the project at a relatively modest cost, efficiency is also rated as substantial. The risk to development outcome, given the demonstration that schools could take on the grants and the local community can carry out selection of scholarship recipients, is **negligible to low**.

The performance of both the Bank and Borrower was satisfactory. Although the Borrower's implementation team got off to a slow start, careful supervision from the Bank team helped to accelerate implementation. At the local level, the training and commitment of communities resulted in school management committees being able to open and operate bank accounts, carry out small-scale procurement and undertake school-based planning. The

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements were not implemented as planned. The M&E design was thought to be too sophisticated by the new task team after effectiveness for MOEC capacity and could not be implemented in the Tanzanian context. However, impact studies done by local researchers were commissioned and valuable M&E information was collected.

### **Primary Education Development Program**

The outcome of this project is rated **satisfactory**. The objectives are substantially relevant to latest joint CAS (2007) and the design is substantially relevant to those objectives. The efficacy of the project in terms of achieving enrollment expansion (from about 4.9 million in 2001 to about 7.0 million in 2004) and improved learning (from primary exam pass rate of 22 percent in 2000 to 49 percent in 2004) is substantial.

Bank performance is rated satisfactory and Borrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory. The Bank supervision teams provided assistance to the Borrower in activities needed to complete tranche conditions. The Borrower showed both ownership and leadership in implementing the sector wide approach initiated with this project, coordinating with all of the major donors on annual sector reviews. However, in some areas the quality of local construction was inadequate. The Bank credit closed on time in October 2004, but the PEDP continues with financial support from domestic budget and DPs pooled funding. The risk to development outcome is **moderate**.

### **Secondary Education Development Program**

The outcome of this project is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**. The objectives are substantially relevant to the 2007 joint CAS, although relevance of design is modest: the choice of instrument was conducive to large expansion of education in the short run but not the longer-run objectives of improved quality and learning, or of capacity building. Efficacy of the project in terms of achieving objectives is modest. Although secondary enrollment increased from about 432,600 in 2004 to over 1,400,000 in 2009 (even more than the target), the shortfall in providing teachers and learning resources resulted in declines in learning achievement, with the passing rate needed for completing secondary education on Form 4 exams declining from 92 percent in 2004 to 72 percent in 2009. However, due to the large increase in the numbers of Form 4 students taking the exams, the actual number of students completing secondary rose dramatically from about 55,000 (2004) to about 246,000 (2009). Risk to development outcome is **significant** due to rapid expansion putting pressure on the education budget and shortages of qualified teachers.

Bank and Borrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory. The Bank assisted the Borrower in many technical ways and also played a prominent role in the donor group that provided pooled funding that fed into general budget support for education. The Borrower took an active leadership role in coordinating the Annual Education Sector Review, including nongovernmental and civil society organizations. However, due to the rapid increase in enrollment beyond the medium growth scenario specified in the Program Document, the Borrower faced fiscal pressures and could not maintain the capitation grant at the level agreed in the Letter of Development Policy. Although the Bank team advised the Borrower

against too rapid expansion, upon request by the Borrower, Bank management and the IDA Board granted a waiver on that particular condition, based upon good overall progress, and the third and final tranche of US\$50 million was released almost a year late. The credit was closed 6 months later than planned, in December 2007.

### **Lessons and Perspectives**

Looking back over education policy in the Education Sector Development Plan and its implementation, a coherent policy framework was provided for these three projects. The aim of achieving universal primary education while maintaining standards was largely successful. While universal secondary education was recognized as out of reach at this time, a significant expansion of the relatively small sub-sector was achieved, but learning achievement suffered from too rapid expansion of enrollment. Looking forward, the new ESDP 2008-2017 takes stock of achievements and challenges, while putting forth an ambitious and comprehensive program at all levels of education. It was formulated before the current global financial crisis and its fiscal sustainability needs more analysis.

This experience has produced a number of lessons, among them:

- **Fiscal sustainability of rapid expansion of secondary education needs to be re-assessed carefully within the realistic context of limited fiscal resources and competing needs of other education subsectors.** The unprecedented rate of expansion of community secondary schools is putting extreme pressure on the education budget. In recent years the government responded by reducing per unit resources which in turn compromises the quality of secondary education. Finding the financial resources to complete the job of building quality into the expanded system is an enormous challenge to be resolved by the government and development partners.
- **Rapid expansion of secondary education is more complex and difficult than rapidly expanding primary education.** Secondary education systems have subject specialties requiring efficient matching of student class streams and teachers; teacher shortages and lack of capacity limit the ability to increase the number of teachers of appropriate qualifications rapidly; curriculum, textbooks, and examinations need to be reformed simultaneously; and the management challenge inherent in rapid expansion and reform simultaneously would tax even the most capable systems of education.
- **Decentralization with school/community based management under the overall government decentralization pursued in Tanzania appears to have had a beneficial impact on community enthusiasm and participation, but further evaluation is needed about impact efficacy and efficiency.** A set of clear and relevant hypotheses needs to be formulated for testing so as to try to link improvement in learning with important attributes of decentralization.
- **The labor market situation warrants closer and careful monitoring as the supply of secondary school leavers is increasing.** There is a risk of creating an increasing pool of unemployed secondary graduates as a consequence of the overly rapid expansion of relatively low quality community secondary schools.

- **Expansion of secondary education needs to be accompanied by attention to quality of education.** Research studies show that quality secondary education is critical to obtain the economic benefits of growth and poverty reduction. Even with significant increases in domestic budget and development partner support in Tanzania, there will not be enough finance for all of the worthwhile goals in the new ESDP. The challenge will be maintaining the political and fiscal discipline to focus on quality while addressing community demand for expansion with limited fiscal resources.

Vinod Thomas  
Director-General  
Evaluation



# 1. Background and Context

1.1 The objective of this report is to assess the development effectiveness and lessons arising from World Bank support for three primary and secondary education projects spanning a decade in mainland Tanzania. These projects were not simply a sequence of individual education projects but supported a coherent and ambitious reform agenda for education in Tanzania. This reform agenda was led by the Government in collaboration with donors, leading up to harmonization of donor support as called for in recent years (such as the Paris Declaration on harmonizing aid) and innovative use of development policy instruments for the education sector. Lessons learned from the implementation experience of these projects can be of use for future Bank education support in Tanzania and elsewhere. Support for secondary education in Africa has been increasing in recent years, but IEG has not done assessment of this area, providing another rationale for IEG to learn lessons from the secondary education parts of these projects.<sup>1</sup> A timeline of Tanzania's education policies and the World Bank's engagement is in Annex C.

## General Country Background

1.2 In 1961 Tanzania (Tanganyika at that time) peacefully achieved its independence under the leadership of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who became the first President. Mwalimu, which means teacher in Kiswahili and is a title of respect, was the founder of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), the political movement and party that achieved independence from the United Kingdom. As a result of the political union with Zanzibar after a revolution there in 1964, Tanganyika became Tanzania. The former Tanganyika is now referred to as mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, though part of the union, has considerable autonomy in many areas. Since then, Tanzania has enjoyed political stability, becoming a cohesive nation in contrast to the experience of some other African countries.

1.3 In 1967 the Arusha declaration was promulgated with the stated goal of Ujamaa—the transformation of Tanzania into an African socialist economy and society.<sup>2</sup> This was motivated by the aim of overcoming the emerging inequalities during the early years of independence. The socialist policy did not succeed in its stated goals and by 1980 the economy was in dire need of revitalization. President Nyerere stepped down voluntarily in 1985, thereby setting a precedent of peaceful political transitions. The new leadership undertook a series of economic restructuring initiatives in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that led to improvements in the economic situation. Since then, Tanzania has experienced economic growth, which has been especially robust since the start of this decade with annual growth averaging 6-7 percent.<sup>3</sup> The Government of Tanzania (GOT) published “The Tanzania Development Vision 2025” in 1999 as a set of basic principles that would guide its economic and social policies, including a prominent role for education. Nonetheless, Tanzania is still a poor country with per capita gross national

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<sup>1</sup> Perkins (2004) reviewed secondary education projects completed from 1990 to 2000. Education projects in Africa did not perform as well as in the other regions.

<sup>2</sup> Ujamaa means “family hood” in Kiswahili.

<sup>3</sup> There is obviously much more to this story. For details, see Bigsten and others 2001.

income of US\$440 in 2008,<sup>4</sup> which has a direct bearing on its ability to mobilize the resources needed to finance an ambitious education expansion and reform.

### **Government Education Policy**

1.4 Tanzanian Government commitment to education as an integral part of its social and economic development goes back to those early years of independence. During colonial times education access was very restricted despite the desire of Tanzanian society for more educational opportunity. The Arusha Declaration was soon followed in 1967 by the policy document “Education for Self-Reliance,” in which education was assigned a seminal role in the transformation of Tanzania to an African socialist society.

1.5 The overall structure of the education system has remained relatively unchanged over the years, despite legal changes in curricula, exams and administration. The primary cycle now consists of Standards 1 to 7 (previously up to standard 8), the official ages being 7 years old to 14 years old. This is followed by lower secondary with Forms 1 to 4 and upper secondary with Forms 5 and 6. University consists of 3 years for most specializations, but some may take longer. Teacher training colleges offer courses after Form 4 (for primary school teachers) or Form 6 (for secondary school teachers), while a degree in education can be taken at university (the preferred qualification for secondary school teachers). This can be summarized as being a 7-4-2-3 structure, amounting to 13 years of primary and secondary schooling prior to university. Kiswahili is the language of instruction in primary schools, with English being taught as a subject. English becomes the language of instruction in secondary schools. National examinations play a large role at the end of each cycle for the purpose of selection to the next one. However, significant adult and non-formal education and vocational training features have been added over the years.

1.6 Some current features of education have their roots in the aspirations of these policies during the early years of African socialism. Universal Primary Education (UPE) was emphasized in the Musoma Declaration (1974) as a way of transforming rural society and agriculture, from which it was acknowledged the vast majority of the population would derive their livelihood.<sup>5</sup> Expansion of secondary and tertiary education access was restricted to the projected manpower needs of the modern sector, reflecting the manpower planning methods that were popular among international aid agencies in the 1960s and early 1970s. This manpower planning approach also fit in with the planning methods of a socialist economy. As a result, Tanzania throughout the 1980s and 1990s had one of the lowest enrollment rates in secondary education in Africa as well as globally.

1.7 By the early 1980s external shocks (oil crises, coffee prices, drought, and war with Uganda) and endogenous deficiencies of economic policy resulted in an economic crisis that needed to be resolved by a program of economic restructuring and recovery. Tanzania’s dialogue with the Bank and IMF went through a phase of tension in the early 1980s due to

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<sup>4</sup> This is the equivalent of \$1,230 per capita, taking into account purchasing power parity.

<sup>5</sup> The Musoma Declaration was promulgated by the political party and together with the “Education for Self Reliance” set the stage for UPE, mass literacy and adult/nonformal education campaigns in which illiteracy was almost eliminated. For more background see Mushi 2009.

differing perspectives on the root causes of the economic crisis and how to handle it. The Tanzania Country Assistance Evaluation (IEG 2001) relates how Tanzanian policy makers attributed the crisis to exogenous shocks, while the Bank and IMF stressed deficiencies of economic policies and institutions as the root cause. For the education sector this period of economic crisis and subsequent structural adjustment programs meant a huge reduction in resources that led to a reversal of progress made towards universal primary education (UPE) during the 1970s and declining quantity and quality at all levels of education. Due to scarcity of public budgetary resources to meet the rising demand for secondary school, the government allowed a small private secondary school sector to develop.

1.8 Despite the progress resulting from the economic reform efforts of the late 1980s and 1990s, social indicators were stagnating, including progress towards UPE and other levels of education. At the same time, the Government had committed to the Jomtien Education for All goals. In 1995 the Government and Ministry of Education prepared an Education and Training Master Plan. This was updated and further elaborated in a new phase of Government policy embodied in the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP 1997, revised 2001), a program formulated to run from 1998 to 2007 and to have large scale impact that would accelerate progress on stagnating education indicators. Within the larger ESDP, the Government, together with civil society stakeholders and donors, formulated a Primary Education Development Program to run from 2001 to 2009. This was followed by the Secondary Education Development Program in 2004. The Government's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2005) included a focus on education as part of its second cluster that deals with social well being and quality of life. The other two clusters relate to economic growth with poverty reduction and to governance and accountability.

### **Bank Support for the Education Sector**

1.9 The first education loan of the International Development Association (IDA) was to Tanganyika in 1963, the standard kind of "bricks and mortar" typical of early IDA education projects. During the early days of independence and the socialist period up to 1980 there were seven Bank supported education projects in Tanzania, most of them dealing with primary and secondary education and teacher and vocational training. While none of these were especially large in US dollar amounts, they were all Specific Investment Credits (SICs) with a record of slow disbursements. During the 1980s there was a hiatus in education lending due to the tensions in the dialogue referred to above, although some donors, especially the socialist ones of Scandinavia, continued external support for education. Bank support for education resumed in 1990 with the Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project (EPRP), the name of which suggests that the sector had suffered serious deterioration during the 1980s. The EPRP developed planning and research capacity that also helped in the preparation of the Human Resources Development Pilot Project (HRDP, 1998), which was conceived with the purpose of piloting solutions to the problem of expanding education rapidly, especially primary education in the light of the Jomtien EFA goals. The project piloted a scheme of matching grants to poor communities (Community Education Fund) and scholarships for poor girls to attend secondary school, as well building capacity in policy and planning within the MOE.

1.10 A new phase of Bank support began with the Sector Adjustment Credit of US\$150 million in 2001 for the Primary Education Development Program, to which the Dutch Government also contributed an additional US\$50 million. This was followed by another Sector Adjustment Credit of US\$124 million and an IDA grant of US\$24 million to support the Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP, 2004). These two credits are large in comparison to previous projects and also the first to use a quick disbursing policy approach in the education sector in Tanzania. The Bank support for PEDP closed in 2004 and that for SEDP in 2007, but these GOT programs continue with mainly public budget support supplemented by other donors as well as substantial contributions from local communities. It should also be noted that the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC) 4 through 7, which have been providing substantial general budget support (GBS), have significant education policy content and thus provide some support to the education sector. More than 2,500 additional classrooms have also been built under the recent Tanzania Social Action Fund. The Bank is also supporting the Science and Technology Higher Education Program with an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) in two phases, the first started in 2008 and the second is anticipated in 2011. The project supports the development of high level professionals in science and technology for the knowledge economy as well as improved training for teachers of science and technology subjects in secondary education.

1.11 The contribution of Bank Economic and Sector Work (ESW) has added to the understanding of education sector issues and their relation to broader economic and social development. The Country Economic Memorandum (World Bank 2007) is comprehensive and relevant to the needs of the education sector. Special chapters are devoted to the role of education in manufacturing, tourism, and technology development, as well as internal problems of the education sector. Also of relevance to secondary education in Tanzania is the Bank's Africa-wide study of secondary education launched in 2003 that resulted in a series of workshops/papers and a final comprehensive report in 2008.<sup>6</sup> Now the Bank is using shorter and more focused analytic work to deliver quicker topical reports, such as the recent one analyzing the implications of expansion of secondary education.<sup>7</sup>

### **Other Donor Support**

1.12 The education sector budget, as is true for the government budget overall, is highly dependent upon donor support for its investment component. According to the PRSC4 (2006) donor assistance in FY05 was about 12 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and amounted to almost half 4 of the Government budget. This pattern was projected to continue over the next few years and this aid dependence was cited as a risk if donor sentiment should shift. In recent years, harmonization of donor support has improved with regular meetings to share information and plan collaboration. There is now a Pooled Fund Partners group comprising 14 major donors for education and other sectors of the economy. A total of US\$627 million was committed as GBS by the partners for FY07 (see PRSC4), including the US\$200 million credit of the Bank. After the Bank, the United Kingdom is by far the largest donor with an amount of US\$158 million equivalent during that same year. In 2005 the Joint

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<sup>6</sup> Verspoor and others 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Jones, Gershberg, and Kweka 2008.

Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) report was produced that formulated the harmonization process under the leadership of the GOT. It is not possible to allocate how much of the GBS went to education sector.

1.13 The high point of donor harmonization for the education sector came with the PEDP in 2001. The pooling of funding from the Netherlands and others showed what is possible in this area. Under this approach donor aid is disbursed in tranches, after satisfaction of conditions, to a single account that is used by the government following its own procedures. The practice of annual Education Sector Reviews was introduced under PEDP and continues up to now. Coordinated by the GOT, all stakeholders, including civil society and non-government organizations, participate in this organized review of progress and issues to be addressed. The CSO's have developed significant capacity to do education policy analysis over the past decade and submit their contributions to the sector reviews as a network (see Tanzania Education Network Report 2009). Completion of satisfactory Education Sector Reviews are now among the conditions of the PRSCs for providing budget support.

## 2. Human Resource Development Project, 1997-2005

### Objectives and Design

2.1 **Objectives.** The \$24.0 million Human Resources Development Project (HRDP) was approved on October 7, 1997 and became effective on February 18, 1998. The project was scheduled to close December 31, 2005, and was financed by a \$20.9 million equivalent IDA credit with a government counterpart contribution of \$3.16 million. The objective of the project according to the SAR was to strengthen Tanzania's education sector through: (a) raising enrollments in primary education and improving its quality and learning outcomes through increased parental participation and financing, school-based planning and management of resources, school-based quality enhancement initiatives, and improved support for schools at the district level; (b) expanding educational opportunities and improving quality at the secondary level, particularly for girls from economically disadvantaged households; (c) building capacity at the district and community levels; and (d) improving policy development, planning, and research in the education sector.<sup>8</sup>

2.2 **Components.** Corresponding to the four objectives there were four components:

- (1) **Community Education Pilot** (US\$5.0 million), which included a pilot program of matching grants from the Community Education Fund (CEF) for school improvement in the pilot districts that agreed to match the government contribution and promote parental participation in school-based management. This required parental participation in school planning and implementation of the grant.

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<sup>8</sup> The Development Credit Agreement formulates the objectives slightly differently, resulting in 5 objectives rather than 4 (improving school-based management is treated as a separate objective, while in the SAR it is treated as the means to the end of increased enrollments, quality, and learning outcomes). Otherwise the objectives of the two sources have essentially the same elements.

- (2) **Girls' Secondary Education Support Pilot** (GSES, US\$6.9 million), which included a pilot program of financial support for selected girls (academically qualified from poor households) to enroll and complete four years of lower secondary with top 20 percent continuing to upper secondary.
- (3) **Capacity Building for Schools/Community** (US\$2.2 million), which provided the training and TA needed for schools/communities to implement their respective parts of the CEF and GSES as well as some training for Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) staff who were involved in the implementation of the CEF and GSES.
- (4) **Policy Development, Planning and Research** (US\$4.5 million), which provided support to the MOEC to improve the collection and computer processing of education statistics and to the National Examination Council of Tanzania to improve the quality and computer processing of the exams. Advanced training was also provided to selected staff to support the capacity to carry out high priority policy studies in support of the Education Sector Development Program. Support for Monitoring and Evaluation of CEF and GSES was included along with quick pilot community/household surveys to gauge community welfare.

2.3 It should be noted for background that the previous Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project (US\$38.3 million, approved in 1990, closed 1998), although not the subject of this assessment, provided some of the resources and activities leading up to the CEF and GSES pilots. The government requested a modification of the EPR project design to do some preliminary testing of the concepts. A few respondents who recall that period of time mentioned that the concept of providing school grants was new in Tanzania, and thus the project included activities, starting with pre-testing of pilots in 1996 and refinements in 1997, to develop the capacity at the school and district levels to implement the grants program. Thus HRDP was designed before the ESDP was finalized. The pilots for the CEF ran from 1998 to 2001. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the HRDP did not present any explicit theories of how or why school grants or girls' scholarships might result in achieving project objectives, but at this time school grants and school based management were becoming more popular with donors. There was also ample research evidence cited in the SAR concerning the high rate of return to girls' schooling. In a general sense, this was the underlying rationale for the two pilot components.

2.4 The SAR mentions that the aid agencies of the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, and European Union were expected to provide support for complementary activities under the last component with coordination by the MOEC. This donor support would relate to education statistics, pilot monitoring and evaluation, and pilot surveys. However, the amount of support and details were not specified.

2.5 **Monitoring and evaluation design.** The first two components were pilot programs to be implemented in five districts while the last two components were central programs for the MOEC and NECTA to build up their capacity in the specific areas listed above. Monitoring indicators were established for the last two central programs. The pilot districts were selected by the MOEC project team according to poverty and welfare index based upon

survey data available at the time. The SAR stressed the importance of Monitoring and Evaluation (M/E), especially for the evaluation of the impact of the pilot programs. A detailed M/E design was included in the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) that called for sample surveys (baseline and end of pilot) of both schools and households in such a way as to establish control groups for pilot and non-pilot participants.

**2.6 Implementation arrangements.** A Project Support Group (PSG) acted as the implementation and coordination group in the MOEC. It was formed by appointing the relevant officials from various departments to oversee implementation. The PSG was a standard project implementation unit, and other donors at that time had similar implementation units for their separate projects. The PSG staff were in effect consultants paid at a higher rate than the usual salary scale, a practice widespread in other Bank and DP projects at that time. The idea behind project implementation units was to augment limited MOEC implementation capacity, though it meant in the end that ownership for the project in the MOEC was mainly in the PSG.

## Implementation

**2.7 Planned vs. actual disbursements.** The actual disbursement tracked the planned disbursement at appraisal, except for some difference in the CEF component (Table 2-1). It is unusual for the actual to track so closely to the planned disbursement in such a project. Moreover, actual contingencies are usually absorbed into the components by close of a project. Despite these relative minor discrepancies, the data appear to approximate the project costs fairly accurately.

**Table 2-1: Planned versus Actual Disbursement**

Component	Appraisal Estimate	Actual
1 Community Education Fund	8.17	9.61
2 Girls Secondary Education Support	6.93	6.93
3 Capacity	2.22	2.22
4 Policy and Research	4.49	4.49
Price contingency	0.54	0.54
Contribution contingency	0.24	0.24
Enrollment contingency	0.24	0.24
Project Preparation Facility Refund	1.20	1.20
Total	24.06	21.08

*Source:* World Bank 2006, based on credit disbursement data as of 4/13/2006.

**2.8 Implementation experience.** The project got off to slow start because the PSG was not completely formed and settled in the ministry at the time of effectiveness. The project staff also needed time to familiarize themselves with the design. The initial response of the local community was hesitant, as this was new and they unsure of how the grants might work and how the community might benefit. However, after the initial supervision missions, the pace of implementation picked up and the CEF and GSES pilots became fully active by 1999. The PSG did not manage to mainstream the CEF and GSES into the overall Ministry

and local government structures; the project activities were not well known outside of the project implementation unit. .

2.9 In 1999, the MOEC decided to expand the CEF from five to 16 districts (out of 114 districts nationwide at that time). According the Mid-Term Report prepared by the MOEC in 2000, the reason was to test the impact of the CEF on medium-level welfare index districts. Still, many of the schools in the new districts were relatively poor in the economic context of Tanzania. This gave rise to an equity issue in that the CEF provided matching grants, and poor districts, which could not raise much money as the rich ones, wound up getting much less funding than the rich districts. Therefore, the matching formula was changed so that the poorer districts received matches in the ratio of 1:2 or 1:3. When the MOEC started to implement the new PEDP in July 2001, the matching criteria were dropped and all schools received capitation and development grants.

2.10 The selection process for the GSES that was worked out during the initial testing phase proved feasible during implementation. The first step was to identify girls from poor households who are academically capable, based upon primary exam scores and head teacher recommendations. Usually, one girl per school was chosen. The school/community committee and village council were also involved to make the selection more transparent locally. The Final Evaluation Report of the HRDP Project (Omari et al 2003) confirmed that poor households were well known to the teachers and village council. Based upon their examination results, twenty percent of the poor girls who completed Form 4 were selected for an additional 2 years of scholarship for upper secondary. Allowing time for this process to be completed meant a project of seven years (1997-2005), even though most of the non-GSES activities were completed well before 2005.

2.11 **Implementation of monitoring and evaluation (M&E).** The initial M/E design done early during implementation was considered to be too sophisticated by MOEC and new task manager and not practical for lack of appropriate data. . Discussions with Bank team staff and supervision reports point out that this problem was discussed during the mid-term review in 2000 and it was decided a new more practical evaluation of the pilots was needed. As a result, a the Final Evaluation Report (see Omari et al 2003 above) was commissioned by the MOEC and some useful data, although not as rigorous at the original design, was collected comparing CEF districts with national averages. This report is called final because the CEF and GSES pilots were completed by 2003, but time was needed until 2005 for the girls in the GSES to complete their secondary schooling.

## **Achievement of the Objectives**

### **ENROLLMENT AND LEARNING**

2.12 The first objective was to raise enrollments and improve quality/learning outcomes in primary education. Given the pilot nature of this project, this objective must be interpreted to apply only to the pilot districts. By the end of the project over 1,600 schools, representing all of the schools in the 16 districts, were participating in the pilot. They had active school committees that developed school plans and made decisions on how to allocate the school grants. School committees were created in 1978 legislation that states the membership (head

teacher, parents and, village council representatives (elected by parents). They have no power over personnel hiring/firing, but with the advent of school grants have decision making authority over how to spend for recurrent and construction items as part of the school plan process. The Final Evaluation (2003) presents survey evidence that CEF district school committees are more active, meeting 3-4 times per year versus the mandated minimum of twice yearly.

2.13 The enrollments at CEF schools increased by 32 percent from 518,861 (1998) to 658,119 (2001, the last year available for the 2003 Final Evaluation). Over the same period the NER increased in CEF districts from 54 to 78 percent, an increase larger than that of the national average NER of 56 to 66 percent over the same period. How much of this to attribute to the CEF component is difficult to decide since other DPs were supporting similar initiatives in some of the CEF districts, such as the District Based Support Project.

2.14 CEF districts also performed better on the PSLE compared to the national pass rate. CEF district pass rates increased from 21 percent to 35 percent (1998-2001) which was better than the increase at the national level of 21 percent to 29 percent over the same period. [ Final Evaluation Report 2003] Discussions with observers attributed this in part to the improvements due to CEF, but rigorous attribution is hard to determine given the lack of more rigorous M&E.

2.15 Despite some deficiencies in the evaluation design and possible contamination of the comparison districts (which would result in understating the impact), the available evidence suggests that this objective was **substantially** achieved, particularly taking into account the fact that the initially selected districts were among the poorest. The improvements registered in a number of indicators comparing CEF to nation-wide averages are striking and likely not just the result of random variation. NERs, primary exam scores, average spending per student and participation of the school committee were all higher for the CEF districts. Qualitative interviews with participants also lend support to the positive impact of the CEF pilot.

#### **EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR POOR GIRLS**

2.16 The GSES pilot provided scholarships (covering almost all expenses) to over 4,700 girls between 1996 (the year of pre-testing) and 2001 (last year of data for 2003 Final Evaluation), which was about 4 percent of all girls in secondary schools in 2001. This pilot program was instrumental in increasing general awareness of the importance of girls' education as there was not that much gender awareness in Tanzania at that time according to one administrator. The Final Evaluation Report (2003) found that the NER for girls in lower secondary in the GSES districts increased from 5 percent (1996) to 15 percent (2003). The mission found a primary school in one district where an older teacher recalled proudly that the 15 girls from his village all completed the program. The concept of scholarships for students from poor households was new and provided the ground work for the scholarship for boys and girls from poor households under SEDP.

2.17 Based upon the Final Evaluation Report (2003), the academic performance of the girls in this pilot was on par with the general population of girl students with a passing rate of

62 percent on the Form 4 exam. However, the majority of GSES girls scored a Division 4, the lowest passing score, which is comparable to the national average for girls. While this is not a high score, this was an achievement in light of the fact they were from underprivileged households. Still, a small percentage qualified to continue on to upper secondary. From 2000 to 2004, 409 girls scored high enough to enter Form 5, 266 to enter teacher training and 50 for further vocational training. Moreover, their dropout rate in lower secondary actually declined from 4.1 percent (1998) to 1.2 percent (2004). This objective was substantially achieved, given that the target for scholarships was basically reached and the survival rate of poor girls in the program was **substantial**.

### **BUILDING CAPACITY AT COMMUNITY LEVELS**

2.18 As a result of the numerous training activities and written manuals, schools and communities felt more empowered to make decisions relevant to their special circumstances. While the Final Evaluation Report (2003) for HRDP did not provide for a rigorous assessment of community empowerment, the qualitative evaluations, despite their limitations, confirmed to a strong degree that school committees in rural areas were capable of such responsibilities as school planning, procurement, and managing school bank accounts. The Final Evaluation Report estimated that over three million people were reached via sensitizing meetings and over 68,000 actually received training. This experience was reportedly a valuable precursor to setting up the capitation and development grants under PEDP. This objective was **substantially** achieved as it was demonstrated the schools and local communities could be trained to manage grants for non-salary inputs and civil works.

### **IMPROVEMENT IN POLICY, PLANNING, AND RESEARCH**

2.19 Interviews indicated that much was achieved in building up capacity in the above areas. The department was lacking in up to date computers and software in the late 1990s and the project filled that gap. More important was the training and attitude changes introduced. Thus, the staff was much more capable of participating in and supporting the studies, such as the Country Education Status Report (1999), that fed into the formulation of the Education Sector Development Plans of the government that led up to the preparation of PEDP. The project also provided support to the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA), which was established in 1973 to replace the Cambridge Examinations Syndicate that was responsible for national exams during the colonial period. Together with support also received under the previous Education Planning and Rehabilitation (1990-1998) in the form of computers and technical assistance, the capacity of NECTA was significantly upgraded by adding more up to date equipment such as optical scanners for reading exam forms and faster computers and networking to process results faster. However, one issue not addressed was the connectivity between MOEC and NECTA computer systems to allow faster sharing and analysis of exam results. Thus the overall result of this component is **substantial**.

### 3. Primary Education Development Program, 2001-2005

#### Objectives and Design

3.1 **Objectives.** The \$200 million Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) was approved on October 9, 2001 and became effective on January 2, 2002. It was financed by a \$150 million 3-tranche IDA sector adjustment credit and a \$50 million grant from the Government of Netherlands, administered by the Bank and also released in three tranches. According to the President's Report, the objective of the project was to support the Government of Tanzania to reform the delivery of primary education. PEDP is part of the government's overall Education Sector Development Plan and is supported by the larger Donor Partner group. Specifically, the objectives of the PEDP were to: (1) expand school access, (2) improve education quality, and (3) increase school retention at the primary level. These objectives would be achieved through improved resource allocation and utilization, improved educational inputs, and strengthened institutional arrangements for effective primary education delivery. The PEDP introduced, among other reforms, Capitation and Development Grants for direct disbursement to primary schools. The Capitation Grant (estimated to be about US\$10 per pupil) was for non-salary items such as books, learning materials, etc while the Development Grant (amount to be based upon school development plan) was for construction and rehabilitation.

3.2 **Design.** Given that the instrument was a sector adjustment credit, there were no components but rather a set of conditions for release of each of the three tranches. The policy matrix of the program document groups these according to: general education, expanding enrollment, improving teaching and learning, building capacity within the education system, strengthening institutional arrangements that support planning and delivery of education, and financing the PEDP. The activities required to meet tranche release conditions constituted a major reform effort on the part of GOT and MOEC. The tranche conditions, mapped into their objectives, are listed in Table 3-1.

3.3 **Monitoring and evaluation.** The EMIS was specified to be the main source of information for monitoring program outputs and outcomes on an annual basis. Indicators to monitored included enrollment rates, attendance rates, dropout rates, and PSLE scores. No special sample surveys were to be used as was done in the case of the HRDP Project. A joint GOT-donors comprehensive mid-term evaluation was also planned, the main purpose being to determine whether satisfactory progress was being made towards the original project objectives.

3.4 **Implementation arrangements.** Given the problems with the stand-alone project implementation units in previous projects, the Government let the Bank and other donors know that it wished a more coordinated approach. The overall coordination responsibility for this complex and wide ranging program for primary education was given to the Prime Minister's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government.

**Table 3-1: Tranche Release Conditions and Project Objectives for Primary Schools**

<b>Reform Objective</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b>Second Tranche</b>	<b>Third Tranche</b>
Expand School Access	-Abolish school fees.  -Issue guidelines for admission of all 7 to 10 year olds.	-Achieve Progress on performance indicators in Letter of Development Policy  -School development plans for 60% of schools and capitation grants to eligible schools  -Double shifting in 50% of classrooms	-Achieve further progress on performance indicators of Letter of Development Policy  -Introduce double shifting in 80% of schools with pupil-classroom ratio greater than 60:1.
Improving Quality of Teaching and Learning	-Prepare TOR for designs of teacher training, curriculum, and exams to enhance learning and classroom interaction.	-Prepare incentive package for deployment of teachers, especially for rural areas.  -Revise designs teacher training, curriculum and exams.	-Allocate at least 20% of primary education budget to non-salary expenditures.  -Start paying incentives for teachers' deployment.  -Implement revised designs for teacher training, curriculum and exams.
Capacity Building within education	-Issue instructions for school committees to establish and operate bank accounts for capitation and development grants.  -Establish mechanisms for delivery of primary education through regional secretariats, local governments, wards and schools.	-Issue strategy for implementation of National Policy for non-formal and adult education.	-Complete school development plans; open and operate school bank accounts.  -Train staff with direct responsibility for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, policy analysis and formulation.
Institutional arrangements to support planning and delivery of education	-Develop national information-communication strategy, including guidelines to all staff at all levels  -Designate official in PMO for overall PEDP coordination and coordinators in MOEC and PO-RALG.	-Issue specific guidelines for decentralized school/community level procurement of goods and services.	-Establish improved EMIS according to an agreed plan.  -Implement decentralized textbook procurement system for schools.
Finance of PEDP	-Funds allocated and released from MOF to primary school accounts through education accounts of local authorities.	-Allocate adequate budget to cover: (i) capitation and development grants, (ii) administrative costs related to grants to local authorities, (iii) provision of teachers on basis of 1:45 teacher/pupil ratio.  -Issue detailed criteria for development grant allocation between respective councils and all schools in each council.  -Distribute financial management manual for accounting, reporting and auditing of PEDP funds to all schools and councils.	-Continue to allocate adequate budget as before for grants, administrative costs and provision of teachers.

## Implementation

3.5 Implementation of PEDP went more or less as planned. There were challenges to deal with so many schools, but they were addressed. Over 12,000 bank accounts were opened by primary schools across the country as part of the effort to get them ready to receive grant funds. About 12,000 schools received training over the years of the program so that they could carry out procurement and make payments to suppliers from their bank account. Procurement policy regulations were issued by the MOEC to all schools. They procured basic materials, but there was the usual negative list of goods that are not allowed under adjustment programs.

3.6 The Dutch grant (\$50 million), which was executed by the Bank under a separate grant agreement, was also divided into 3 tranches. The first tranche was disbursed January 1, 2002 (effectiveness), and the other two in June 2003 and November 2004. However, the development partners continued support for primary education through the Pooled Funding Partnership and a series of IDA-financed Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs 4 through 8) provided general budget support for the government, which in turn is a source of funding for primary education, though how much of this went to primary education is not available as it is mingled with Government budget. The conditions of the PRSCs for education stated that a satisfactory annual education review should be carried out by the GOT and DPs. To give an idea of the size of the DP funding pool, US\$ 427 million was committed by donors overall to all sectors in FY07 (see PRCS 4, 2006). Compared to this, the US\$200 million for primary education from PEDP was substantial.

3.7 The activities related to meeting conditions and implementing other aspects of the program were conceptually grouped around four main themes.

3.8 *Expansion of Primary Enrollment.* This component aimed to enroll 7 to 10 year olds, introduce Development Grants to expand facilities, introduce the practice of regular school maintenance, recruit and train the teachers needed, and introduce double shifting to accommodate the surge in enrollment as a result of eliminating school fees. The purpose was to build in a culture of maintaining quality.

3.9 *Improvement of Primary Education Quality.* Capitation Grants were introduced here to compensate for loss of tuition fees and to provide for non-salary inputs. The grants were set at US\$10 equivalent, \$4 of which was set for textbooks and the remainder for other non-salary resources. Training was to be provided to upgrade teacher professional skills as well as decentralization and choice in procurement of textbooks.

3.10 *Capacity Building for Effective Delivery of Primary Education.* This component provided training of various players to ensure effective implementation of Development and Capitation Grants, disseminated information about PEDP to communities, schools and stakeholder.


3.11 *Institutional Reform to Support Planning and Delivery of Primary Education.* Institutional arrangements were to be strengthened by reforming the overall structure of planning and delivery of primary education. The MOEC's role was reoriented to that of making policy, setting standards and assuring quality. The Prime Minister's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government was given responsibility for delivery and direct oversight of schools through Regional Secretariats and Local Government Authorities. School/community committees were given more responsibility and participated more directly in the management of their individual schools.

## Achievement of Objectives

### EXPAND ACCESS

3.12 Enrollment expanded rapidly both in terms of absolute numbers and enrollment rates. The number of seven year olds (the official entry age) in government schools increased from 181,783 (2000) to 926,305 (2004 according to Education Sector Performance Report 2008/2009), implying that these numbers doubled twice over the course of 4 years. The enrollment rate of seven year olds went from 18 to 84 percent over the same time period. For primary education as whole the net enrollment rate increased from 59 to 91 percent between 2001 and 2004. The rapid increase in demand as a result of abolition of school fees in 2001 was accommodated through classroom construction (29,922 new classrooms were built in 2002-2004) and also through a plan of double shifting to help accommodate the surge. Teacher training programs were also shortened, from 2 years of academics to one year of academics plus one year of practice teaching and professional development. All in all, this was an impressive quantitative achievement. Since the completion of Bank support with the last tranche in December 2004, expansion of enrollment has continued with domestic resources and the support of other development partners. The latest years available from BEST (2008) and ESPR 2009 show primary enrollment level of 8,410,094 in 2009 and a net primary enrollment rate of 97 percent. Figure 1 shows the recent increases in the context of a long-term enrollment trend.

**Figure 3-1: Increase in primary enrollments, 1990-2009**



3.13 However, there is an issue around the true value of the NER. Recently analyzed household survey data (Demographic and Health Survey 2004/05) suggest a substantially lower rate (73 percent) than does the school-based EMIS data base (93 percent). The capitation grant is based upon the number of children officially enrolled, giving some

incentive to overstate the enrollment. However, there is no evidence that the overstatement of enrollment is so large. It is not clear why there is such a big divergence, but it appears that the household survey is closer to the true value, implying there is still some way to go in achieving UPE for poor households and hard to reach populations (Hoogeveen 2008). Nevertheless, there clearly was a dramatic increase in access to primary education over the life of the project which continues to the present that can be linked to the policies supported under the PEDP, indicating **substantial** achievement of this objective.

### IMPROVE QUALITY OF EDUCATION

3.14 The Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), administered by the National Examinations Council, is given at the end of the primary cycle (standard 7) and is used for selection of students to continue on to secondary school. Thus, the PSLE is a high-stakes exam and is not ideal for the purpose of gauging learning achievement as compared to a true national assessment of learning achievement that is calibrated to measure the same standards from year to year. However, NECTA has many years of experience and received Bank support from prior projects, developing along the way a professional reputation for its competence in maintaining the academic standards of the tests. With those caveats in mind, prior to PEDP, the PSLE pass rate was 21 percent in 1998 and 19 percent in 1999, according to the Education Country Status Report (2001). The pass rate increased from 27 percent (2002) to 62 percent in 2005 at the end of the PEDP IDA credit. It continued to rise up to 70 percent (2006) and then declined precipitously to 54 percent (2007) and to 49 percent (2009) (Table 3-2).

**Table 3-2: Pass Rates for the Primary School Leaving Exam (percent)**

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
22	25	27	40	49	62	70	54	53	49

*Source:* Basic Education Statistics for Tanzania (BEST), Press release by NECTA for 2009.

3.15 Initially, the improving results were cited as evidence that PEDP was having the desired impact on quality of education. There appeared to be a clear connection of inputs (funding) to outputs (enrollment, textbooks) to outcomes (exam result as proxy). Although some skepticism was voiced about increasing the weights given to Kiswahili (and less to English and mathematics) in computing the total exam score in 2003. English and mathematics have been the weakest subject areas for many years, so this should give an on-off increase to the PSLE scores. However, the exams results did seem to validate the positive impact of more resources on the system. Thus, the sharp decline in 2007 came as a shock and was widely reported and debated in the Tanzanian media. There is still no compelling explanation, although the Education Sector Performance Review (ESPR 2008/2009) did a preliminary investigation. The reasons identified were: 1) shortage of qualified teachers; 2) shortage of materials; 3) lack of regular in-service training and school supervision. Another factor could be the large enrollment increases, especially among children from poorer households, since 2007 would be the first year that the large cohort that entered after school fee abolition would have reached standard 7 and taken the PSLE. More analysis is needed here, though it should be remarked that the pass rate of 49 percent (2009) is still much higher than the than the 22 percent (2000) used as the benchmark by ESPR (2008/09), even with the much larger population enrolled that included more poor households.

3.16 Improvement in quality of inputs may be a factor behind the achievement of test scores remaining above baseline even after massive expansion. The pupil to textbook ratio went from 20:1 (2000) to 3:1 (2009). The pupil to teacher ratio worsened a bit, from 46:1 (2000) to 54:1 (2008), which is not ideal, but still manageable. The capitation and development grants improved spending on non-teacher inputs. It appears that Tanzanian primary education managed to at least maintain, if not improve, learning achievement and quality of inputs despite the massive expansion of the system. Other countries in Africa have found it difficult to achieve this.<sup>9</sup>

3.17 A more skeptical view on quality improvement is voiced in the Dutch cofinancier's comments in the ICR for PEDP (June 2005, see Annex 11). They point to the absence of learning assessment systems (other than PSLE) and the many other factors and processes affecting quality. Some light could be shed on this when the most recent round of the UNESCO sponsored Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Quality in Education program (SACMEQ) results are reported. SACMEQ is designed to be an assessment of learning achievement discussed earlier. Tanzania participated in the second round of SACMEQ in 2003, but not in round 1 that took place around 1998. Thus the SACMEQ 3 results for Tanzania are needed to get some comparison of results over time (from 2003 to 2007). By way of comparison with other countries, the SACMEQ2 results reported Tanzanian primary school pupils scoring on par with its East African peers on reading and further behind Kenya in mathematics, ranking fifth out of the fourteen countries (Table 3-3).

**Table 3-3: Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Quality of Education II, 2003 (top five performers)**

Country	Reading Score	Country	Math Score
Seychelles	582	Mauritius	584.6
Kenya	546.5	Kenya	583.3
Tanzania	545.9	Seychelles	554.3
Mauritius	536.4	Mozambique	530
Swaziland	529.6	Tanzania	522.4

*Source:* This table was extracted from the Country Economic Memorandum (2007).

*Note:* 14 countries from the region participated. Standard 6 was the grade tested and the language of the test was the language of instruction, Kiswahili in the case of Tanzania, but English for Kenya.

3.18 Since the SACMEQ program also collects data on regional and household income variations, researchers are eagerly awaiting this rich data set for Tanzania and the other countries which is due to be released late in 2010 (September 2009 was the original release date). Thus, the distributional aspects of quality could also be addressed. There are independent assessments of learning planned for this year by some CSOs in East Africa, which should contribute to a more complete picture of learning achievement over time.

3.19 This objective of improving quality of primary education was substantially achieved, given that the PSLE scores were more two times higher than at the beginning, and this is after the system taking in many more rural poor students.

<sup>9</sup> IEG's primary education evaluation stresses the importance of this issue of maintaining learning achievement as the drive for EFA proceeds (IEG 2006).

## **INCREASE RETENTION AT THE PRIMARY LEVEL**

3.20 In much of the documentation, this objective is treated in less detail, partly because it is viewed as following from the first two objectives. According to the latest ESPR (2009), drop-out rates were fluctuating a bit in the range of 3.2 percent in 2003 to 3.7 percent in 2008, and repetition rates declined a bit from 5.3 percent to 4.9 percent. However, the drop-out rate from standard 4 to 5 showed significant decline, from 13 percent (2001) to 5 percent (2004), compared to the target of 10 percent. This used to be a selection point, with a standard 4 exam determining those who would continue. The standard 4 exam is still given, but only for the purpose of assessment. However, students who perform poorly may have to repeat the year. With the greater availability of classrooms, almost all pupils can continue. The percent of the cohort completing Standard 7 was 70 percent in 2000 and has gone down to about 65 percent in 2008. Perhaps the transition to a mass primary system with increased numbers from low-income households is a factor here, with those not performing well in school dropping out to join the wage labor force or work on the family farm. Another factor to consider is pregnancy of girls in the upper grades of primary, who usually then drop out. More analysis is needed to understand this overall downward trend.

3.21 As in the case of exam scores, even after taking in many more poor rural students, retention rates improved, substantially achieving the objective.

## **4. Secondary Education Development Program, 2004-2007**

### **Objectives and Design**

4.1 **Objectives.** The follow-on \$150 million Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP), was approved on June 8, 2004 and became effective on September 30, 2004. It was financed by a \$123.6 million IDA credit and a \$26.4 million IDA grant; the credit was in the form of a sector adjustment credit, released in three tranches, and the IDA grant was released as part of the tranche disbursement. The long-term aim of the SEDP was to build a productive and adaptable labor force and supply better quality students for the post-secondary education and training system. According to the Program Document, the specific objectives were to: (i) increase the proportion of the relevant age group completing lower and upper secondary education, especially underserved groups who are now getting better opportunities to complete primary education through the PEDP; (ii) improve learning outcomes of students, especially girls, and at the lower secondary level; and (iii) enable the public administration to manage secondary education more effectively, through the devolution of authority to lower levels, and strengthening of management capacities.

4.2 **Design.** Since this project was financed by a development policy loan, there were no cost tables organized around components describing activities within the components. The three tranches were planned to be released each year for three years and the program credit would close June 30, 2007. Each tranche was subject to a number of conditions that involved actions critical to the success of the overall SEDP. Table 4-1 lists those conditions during each tranche showing how they map into the program objectives. The PRSCs also specified

the generic condition that satisfactory annual education sector reviews be carried out by the GOT and DPs.

**Table 4-1: Tranche Release Conditions and Project Objectives for Secondary Schools**

Project Objective	Effectiveness	Second Tranche	Third Tranche
Increase proportion of relevant age group completing secondary	-Issue circulars governing management of capitation, development and scholarship grants in schools.	-Reduce tuition fees for Government day schools from Tsh 40,000 to Tsh 20,000.	
Improve learning outcomes, especially girls	-Allow private sector publishers to compete for textbook provision and end of government monopoly.	-Allocate appropriate budgetary resources for FY2004-2005 to ensure adequate staffing and grants as in LDP.  -Adopt package of incentives to attract teachers to underserved areas.  -Amend the mechanisms for approval of educational books.  -Adopt and implement a program of continuous development of professional skills for teachers and administrators.	-Allocate appropriate budgetary resources for FY2005-2006 to ensure adequate staffing and grants as in LDP.  -Amend regulations for national curriculum and examinations.
Enable public administration to manage secondary education more effectively	-Issue circulars determining criteria for posting teachers to schools		-Issue regulations determining functions and responsibilities of central, regional, local and school authorities.

**4.3 Monitoring and evaluation.** The main text of the Program Document did not specify indicators to be used, but the LogFrame, which specified a number of target indicators, in the annexes specified that gross secondary enrollment rates (GSERs) would be used for objective 1 and Form 4 examination scores would be used for objective 2. Since objective 1 pertains to completion of secondary schooling, completion rates might be a better indicator. However, that information is more difficult to obtain, so the GSER was used, and subsequently net secondary enrollment rate (NSER) was also sometimes used (see para. 4.17 for a partial analysis of completion rates). With respect to objective 2, as was mentioned in the case of primary leaving exams, a true national assessment of learning achievement would be better, but Tanzania does not have one yet (perhaps in the follow on project to this one). Thus, the Form 4 examination results are used as a proxy (see below for more discussion). With respect to objective 3, consultants Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) prepared a baseline assessment of administrative capacity against which annual review processes could judge progress. The annual education sector reviews mentioned above are also an important part of the M/E processes. The long-term labor force goal is listed in the LogFrame, along with youth unemployment indicator, but it was stated that no impact was anticipated in the short-term (to 2006).

**4.4 Implementation arrangements.** Similar to PEDP, a decentralized approach was to be followed during implementation. A high growth and medium growth of enrollment was analyzed, and the medium scenario was selected for implementation, which was deemed to be compatible with the growth rate of the economy and public resources at that time. As in PEDP school grants would be administered by the secondary school/community committees.

There were three kinds of grants under SEDP: capitation, development and scholarship for poor students (girls and boys). However, the RALGs played a larger role in SEDP since secondary schools cover a larger catchment area than primary schools. The MOEC was to continue in its central role of standards, curricula reform and issued guidelines for schools to follow in the implementation of the grants. Teachers continued to be hired and provided by the Government and school committees were not involved in personnel hiring and firing. As in PEDP, school committees formulated school plans and made decisions about non-salary teaching resources and construction/rehabilitation of facilities.

## **Implementation**

4.5 During supervision of this DPL, there was no grouping of activities as was done in the case of PEDP. Here the emphasis was on the three objectives listed above and the conditions of tranche release, which were designed to achieve them. The first tranche of \$US 50 million was released in November 2004 after meeting the first set of conditions of effectiveness listed in Table 4-1. This first tranche was just in time for the new school year starting in January 2005, the first full year of SEDP implementation.

4.6 Starting in 2005 the government reduced tuition fees for government secondary school from Tshs 40,000 to Tshs 20,000, with the capitation grant making up for the loss of revenue to the schools. This action was one of the second tranche release conditions. Moreover, there was a vigorous campaign mounted by the ruling political party to encourage parents and students. In July 2006, partly to fulfill the ruling party manifesto issued in the 2005 election campaign, the Prime Minister proclaimed that there would be a community secondary school in every ward, which is a political/administrative subdivision below that of districts. Thus, community secondary schools are sometimes referred to as ward secondary schools. Even the SEDP Program Document (2004) mentions this target in relation to the government's poverty reduction strategy, but does not commit to it as an explicit objective of the SEDP operation. There was also a genuine bottom-up community-driven demand for secondary education, given the success of PEDP in increasing primary enrollments and also reflecting the historically low enrollment rates of Tanzanian secondary education. However, Bank supervision missions cautioned the Government about the fiscal dangers of too rapid expansion beyond the medium growth scenario of the SEDP Program Document and its impact on quality. As result of rapid expansion of enrollment, the grants were not released to schools at the full levels.

4.7 The second tranche release was in April 2006, 6 months later than anticipated due to delay in the submission of the government report detailing the fulfillment of tranche release conditions. Although this came with some delay, the tranche release was in time for utilization during the 2006 school year, which begins in late January each calendar year.

4.8 The third tranche release was delayed more seriously and this caused a delay in resource flows to the schools. The third tranche conditions were met except for the first, since the proposed capitation grant was Tshs16,960 versus the Tshs 25,000 per student as agreed in the LDP. The expansion of the system was so rapid by that point that the government budget had difficulties in maintaining the resources per student of the prior years. However, a waiver was granted by the IDA Board and the third tranche was released

in August 2007 versus the anticipated September 2006. This made it difficult for schools to utilize these funds during the 2007 school year. The credit closed on December 31, 2007, 6 months later than planned, and SEDP continued under GOT budget and GBS provided through the PRSCs and other DPs.

4.9 The implementation of the M&E arrangements followed Annex H of the Program Document. The focus was more on monitoring indicators such as enrollment rates and exam performance as opposed to impact evaluation. Annual reviews by the GOT and DPs based upon the collected monitoring indicators played a significant part of the M/E approach. The Program Document indicated that in a short term DPL of only 3 years, it was not realistic to see any impact on exams results or completion rates.

## Achievement of Objectives

### INCREASE THE SECONDARY COMPLETION RATE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE UNDERSERVED

4.10 There has been an unprecedented expansion of secondary schools constructed since the start of SEDP in 2004. Part of this came from increased demand due to tuition reduction in 2005 and part of it from the increased government financing under SEDP. The number of government-supported secondary schools increased from 828 in 2004 to 3,039 in 2008, most of which was due to the community school movement (Table 4-2). Although the distribution of schools by wards is not published, given that there are about 2,500 wards, it is likely that most wards would now have at least one secondary school. There are two distinct types of secondary schools supported by the government. Community schools are government supported, but are built by local communities with both cash and in-kind contributions; the government is expected to provide teachers and help with capitation and development grants under SEDP. These are in contrast to fully government-owned schools like those built in the early days of independence, with almost total government budget support. In order to be clear about the distinction, this report will refer to “government-owned schools” and “government-supported community schools.” It is clear in Table 4-2 that the majority of new schools are the latter type, encouraged under SEDP.

**Table 4-2: Secondary Schools—Government owned and Community**

Type	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Government owned	101			91	
Government-supported	674			2,715	
Total	828	1,202	1,690	2,806	3,039
( Increase)		(374)	(488)	(1,116)	(233)

*Source:* BEST and Education Sector Performance Report for 2008 (no breakdown for some years).

*Note:* The SEDP Program Document reported the 101 full government-owned schools in 2004. The BEST reported the 91 in 2007. There was no explanation for the discrepancy.

4.11 In addition to government schools of both types reported above there are two types of non-government schools allowed by official policy: seminaries (sponsored by various religious denominations) and private schools. These seminaries are not just for training students for religious vocations, but are registered academic secondary schools sponsored by religious groups. The private secondary schools are their secular counterparts, and both

charge fees that could be considered high by local standards. These non-government schools numbered 759 in 2008 making for a total of 3,798 secondary schools during that year. There has been an increase in non-government secondary schools over the years, but it has been more gradual as shown in Table 4-3 below.

4.12 Between 2004 and 2008, enrollment in all secondary schools has more than doubled from 432,599 to 1,222,403 (Table 4-3). Thus, enrollment growth has exceeded the high growth scenario which was discussed as an option only if sufficient resources would be available. Instead, the SEDP Program Document recommended the medium growth option as more prudent, and supervision missions cautioned the government about the rapid pace of expansion. However, community driven demands and the pressure of previous political manifestos led to a much faster pace of classroom construction. The construction and equipment for science and computer labs and libraries lagged behind. Completing this critical infrastructure is on the agenda for future developments (a follow up secondary project is under preparation). Shortage of qualified teaching staff is the most pressing problem.

4.13 This rapid growth of enrollment has led to an increase in lower secondary GER from about 10 percent in 2003 to 30.5 percent in 2007 (World Bank 2008). The Bank's Program Document in its LogFrame set a medium-term growth scenario with a lower secondary GER of 30 percent by 2010, which has been met early, based upon the above data. However, the government's LDP preferred a more ambitious NER target of 50 percent in lower secondary by 2010, but stated it would follow the medium growth scenario in view of the current growth of the economy. In the end, enrollment grew much faster than the medium growth scenario.

**Table 4-3: Enrollment in Government and Non-Government Secondary Schools**


Type of school	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Government Schools	264,888	355,188	490,492	829,094	---
Non-Government	167,711	169,137	185,180	191,416	---
Total	432,599	524,325	675,672	1,020,510	1,222,403

Source: BEST 2008

Note: Government schools include Government owned and Government-Supported Community schools. Non-government schools are seminaries and private schools.

4.14 SEDP continued after the three Bank tranches (2004-2007) with support from the DPs (also including Bank support under the PRSCs) and domestic budget resources. The initial Bank support was important in giving the start up of SEDP a strong lift. The impact of SEDP over a longer time period can be seen in the graph below showing the sharp acceleration in secondary enrollment.

**Figure 4-1: Increase in Secondary Enrollments (Form 1-6), 1990-2009**



Source: BEST 2008 and ESPR 2009

4.15 With respect to upper secondary (Forms 5 and 6), there has been less dramatic enrollment increase. For all government schools the number of students entering Form 5 increased from 25,240 (2007) to 31,301 (2008), an increase of 16 percent (from ESPR 2009). Including all upper secondary schools, the increase was from 37,816 to 43,052 for the same years, or an increase of almost 14 percent. The NER for upper secondary increased from the low level of 0.4 percent (2002) to 1.4 percent (2008), still low for upper secondary. The target set by the LDP was 25 percent for the NER in upper secondary by 2010. The ESPR 2009 considers this target at risk.

4.16 Enrollment data show progress on equal access to secondary education for girls by 2015. The gender ratio (girls to boys) rose from 84 percent in 2003 to 88 percent in 2007, just short of the target of 90 percent. Access to secondary school in rural areas has increased as a result of reduced tuition and of the school construction program. Almost every ward (the next smaller subdivision of a district) has a secondary school as promised in the Ruling Party Manifesto during the 2005 election. Coupled with the scholarship grant program, the third type of grant given to schools and targeted at poor families who still cannot afford the reduced tuition and other costs (uniforms, etc), access for the poor and rural areas is being addressed, even if in a relatively small way. The initial target was to grant such scholarships to 12,000 standard 7 leavers each year or 48,000 pupils for all four years. The MOEC issues a circular to schools and village committees on transparent procedures to be followed, based in part upon what was learned in the girls' scholarship component of the HRDP Project. The value of the scholarship covered almost the total cost of secondary, including tuition. According to the ESPR (2008/2009) the problem has arisen that declining budgets have reduced the number of scholarships to 11,895 in 2009 from 42,211 (2008) and 34,012 (2007).

4.17 Just as important as progress in enrollment is the completion of secondary school, especially at the lower secondary level. The objective statement of the Program Document does not give a definition of completion, but it seems reasonable to define it as obtaining the Certificate of Secondary Education (CSEE), which requires passing the Form 4 examination with a Division 4 or higher passing score. The exam scores are ranked into Divisions 1 to 4, below which is a failing score (see below for more detail about strong passing scores versus weak passing scores). If the pass rate is multiplied by the number of candidate, then the number of students completing Form 4 is obtained (Table 4-4).

**Table 4-4: Number of Students Completing Form 4 (CSEE or Division 1-4 pass)**

Year	Pass Rate	Number of Candidates	Number of Completers
2003	88	62,359	54,875
2004	91.5	63,487	58,090
2005	89.3	85,292	76,165
2006t	89.1	85,865	76,505
2007	90.3	125,288	113,135
2008	83.5	231,813	190,087)
2009	72.5	339,925	246,446

*Source:* BEST 2008; NECTA 2009

4.18 The number completing secondary by this definition increased from 54,875 (2003) to 246,446 (2009), a factor of 4.5 or 28.4 percent annualized. Even though the pass rate declined from 88 percent to 72.5 percent, the number of candidates increased rapidly. The Form4 completion rate, defined as the number of completers over the number in the relevant population age group (usually 17-18 year olds), must have increased dramatically as well since the numerator increased dramatically but the denominator only gradually. Without having the exact value of the relevant population age group, which is difficult to define in Tanzania with so many overage students, the relevant population age group likely did not grow much more than 2 to 4 percent annualized (the range of overall population growth during this time period). Thus, there was a dramatic rise in the secondary school completion rate, albeit from a low initial rate. More analysis like this can be done for Form 6 completers, but the results are not as dramatic. In terms of efficacy, whether from enrollment or completion perspective, this objective was **substantially** achieved.

#### **IMPROVE LEARNING OUTCOMES**

4.19 While unprecedented progress has been made on increasing enrollment, the objective of improving learning outcomes has faced serious challenges. Given that there is no national assessment of achievement at the secondary level, the Program Document cited National Form 4 exams as a proxy indicator. These exams are also administered by the NECTA. However, they are high-stakes exams used for selection to the Form 5 or upper secondary and other post-Form 4 programs such as teacher training and health and agriculture training. Although not ideal from the viewpoint of national assessment, they have been in place for many years and maintain standards against which progress can be judged. The SEDP Program Document indicated that positive results in National Form 4 pass rates could not be expected realistically within the three year lifetime of the credit, although results would continue to be monitored. During that time not only were schools expected to be constructed, but also teachers, textbooks and other materials were expected to be supplied.

However, teacher/pupil ratios worsened from 22:1 (2004) to 50:1 (2007) and the capitation grant as mentioned before declined from Tsh25,000 to Tsh16,400, implying less non-salary resources for instruction. No figures were available for textbooks, but reports of shortages were widespread.

4.20 NECTA recently released the results of the latest Form 4 exams, for which students sat in November 2009. The exams are scored according to Division 1 (the highest) to Division 4 (lowest pass level below which is failure). As mentioned above, this pass rate fell from 88 percent (2003) to 72.5 percent (2009). To qualify for further study a student must score Division 3 or higher, with Division 4 being so weak a pass, most observers regard it as a de facto failure. By this definition, the pass rate on Form 4 was about 18 percent in 2009, 11 percent lower than in 2008 and 20 percentage points lower than in 2003 (Table 4-5). More students (about 50 percent or more) are scoring in the Division 4 category over the past few years. Not only was the low level of passing a matter of concern, but also the declining trend. Part of this second objective was to improve learning outcomes for girls. The exam scores of girls lag seriously behind those for boys. While the lower secondary GER for boys and girls is roughly the same, girls scored much lower than boys in 2009 with a pass rate of 12 percent versus that of 22 percent for boys. This gap, which was typical of exam results for the past few years, indicates much more progress is needed on learning outcomes for girls in lower secondary.

**Table 4-5: Recent Strong Pass Rates on Form 4 Exams (percent passing, Division 1-3 level)**

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
38	38	34	36	27	29	18

Sources: Education Sector Performance Report (2009); BEST (2007); Year 2009 from NECTA as reported in a press release (the Citizen, Feb. 10, 2010).

4.21 What was also of concern was the poor performance in mathematics, science, and English, subject areas that are being emphasized for future technology development and economic growth. Community schools, which are the main secondary schools in rural areas, showed a much worse performance on these exams (31 percent pass rate) than Government schools (51 percent). Almost all of the major newspapers carried articles and letters from concerned citizens about the Form 4 exam scores, showing that education quality is an issue that is the concern of wider society. The general feeling was that shortages of teachers, low competence of new teachers from shortened training programs, lack of books and learning materials, etc. were all factors behind the decline, in part due to the reduced capitation grants mentioned earlier. In contrast to PEDP, where quality of education relative to the baseline appeared to be maintained while undergoing massive expansion, large scale expansion of secondary education resulted in declining exam scores of the new cohorts.

4.22 Some observers question whether the Form 4 exams actually measure quality of learning. The objection is that they are based upon old methods of rote learning and not upon critical and creative thinking, as promoted by international best practice in modern curriculum and assessment. For that reason, school-based continuous assessment of student performance is also supposed to count for half of the points needed to qualify for transition to the next level of study. Many observers believe that the exam score in practice still dominates that decision.

4.23 The new competency –based curriculum introduced under SEDP was intended to address that critique of the exams. The new curriculum was sent to schools in 2005 and the first exams based upon the new curriculum scheduled to be October 2008. The IEG mission examined the mathematics textbooks during school visits, and these seemed quite comparable to international standards (when available at schools). It is likely that the actual curriculum delivered by most schools is not yet the new one, given that in most school systems it would take time to train teachers and assure all schools have the new materials. Moreover, the new curriculum would require teachers with an even deeper understanding of their subject specialties and mastery of pedagogy, since they are required to entertain more questions from students and also pose critical questions and problems to engage their students. This is not likely to happen under the crash training programs that were necessary over the past few years. These programs have not been properly evaluated except for tabulating numbers of teachers trained. Thus, more detailed evaluation of the exam scores and implementation of the new curriculum, including teacher training, is warranted.<sup>10</sup>

4.24 While the Form 4 Exam pass rates are an imperfect proxy for learning, the downward trend is not suggestive of improvement; achievement of the objective of improved learning is particularly weak among girls. On the other hand, many more students from much poorer backgrounds in rural areas were taking the Form 4 Exam for the first time. The Program Document did not expect any change in exam scores over the short three year time frame of the Bank credit. Some decline could be expected as weaker students enter the pool of exam takers, even if there were the same level of quality inputs, such as teacher class load and learning materials. It should also be noted that the 2009 exam scores reflect the cohort who started Form1 in January/February 2006 after two years of sharp increases in enrollment. However, in this case there was also a clear deterioration in education quality inputs, in terms of qualified teachers and other materials. All of these factors taken together suggest that efficacy of this objective is **negligible**.

4.25 Given the typical situation of community secondary schools observed by the IEG mission, the relatively poor performance of these schools on the Form 4 examination results (whether old or revised) should not be surprising. Most of the stakeholders interviewed felt that these poor learning outcomes were the result of expanding community secondary schools too fast without supplying the resources per student needed for improving or maintaining learning outcomes. On the other hand, some officials interviewed expressed the view that it is better to lay down a basic infrastructure foundation now to provide some opportunity to young people who otherwise might be somewhat aimless. Then resources to improve that infrastructure and other dimensions of quality could be provided over time. This issue will be taken up again in the lessons section.

4.26 The twin objectives of quantitative expansion and improvement of quality are intended to contribute to the long term aim of developing an adaptable labor force. The Log Frame mentions that long term monitoring of the labor market to monitor any unemployment problems of secondary leavers that might develop. There is not much evidence that the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) has done much in the way of this

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<sup>10</sup> Kitta 2004.

monitoring. However, a few studies of the informal sector have been done by the Bank.<sup>11</sup> The fact that many secondary leavers must resort to the informal sector for employment shows that the formal labor market is no longer growing fast enough to absorb the new supply or that the quality of the new supply may not fit the needs of the formal labor market. This will also be taken up in the lessons section.

## **STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION**

4.27 Devolution of management and delivery of secondary education to lower levels of authority is a key part of government strategy. The MOEVT is supposed to play the role of policy and quality assurance at the national level, while also providing and paying teachers. The Regional Secretariat, which has a Regional Education Officer, has important oversight functions, within which school management boards have flexibility in allocating school grants to resolve local problems.

4.28 The mission in its visits to secondary schools was struck by the variation in the nature of local problems and how flexibility of school heads and management boards was essential. For some schools shortage of water was the problem, for others it long distance from towns or shortage of teachers in mathematics. One head teacher reported that he used Form 6 graduates from the village to tutor Form 4 students for their mathematics exam because he had no mathematics teachers. To help secondary schools resolve such problems a District Secondary Education Coordinator was appointed in 2006. Whereas before only one coordinator covered both primary and secondary schools, there is now a district coordinator for each one.

4.29 A great deal of training of key players at all levels was necessary for this devolution strategy to work. The ESPR (2008/2009) and the annual reviews give a list of training statistics. Over 700 administrators were trained by the Agency for Development of Educational Management. More than 1,300 school heads and senior academic staff were trained. But, apart from a Price Waterhouse Coopers' sampling of some regional needs, there did not appear to be any systematic analysis of training needs and no monitoring or evaluation of training efficacy or impact. While the training did take place, in the absence of evidence of its efficacy, achievement of the objective of strengthening management of secondary education is rated **modest**.

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<sup>11</sup> Johanson and Wanga 2008; Ruggeri 2009.

## 5. Ratings

### Human Resource Development Project

#### OUTCOME

5.1 Overall, the outcome for this project is **satisfactory**. This is based on substantial relevance of the project's objectives and design, substantial efficacy in achieving the project objectives and substantial efficiency.

5.2 All four objectives of this project were relevant to the current as well as prior CAS documents. The first two objectives, raising enrollment and quality of primary education and expanding access to secondary school for poor girls, relate directly to reducing poverty and improving social well being as emphasized in the recent JCAS (2007) and National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2005). The last two objectives concerning capacity building at the local school/community level and the MOEC central level are also necessary to achieving the first two objectives as well as contributing directly to growth and poverty reduction through improved delivery of public services. These objectives remained relevant over the course of the project and relevance of objectives is rated as **substantial**.

5.3 The two pilots were relevant to the objectives of testing out ways of increasing enrollment/learning and expanding opportunity for poor girls. The M&E design in the PIP was also relevant to the design, even though it might have been too sophisticated. The school/community capacity building activities were essential to implementing the pilots effectively, given that these kinds of grant administration activities were new to the schools and communities. The central capacity building for MOEC and NECTA were relevant to data collection and analysis. The relevance of design is rated **substantial**.

5.4 The efficacy of the project in terms of achieving all four objectives was **substantial** as well. Concerning the first objective of improving enrollment and quality in primary schools, comparison of pilot and non-pilot districts showed that the pilot districts performed better. Although the attribution of this to the project in those districts cannot be made with certainty, the judgment of most observers is that this is highly likely. Based upon the results listed in the achievement section for this project, a similar conclusion can be made with respect to the efficacy of the GSES in achieving the objective of assisting poor girls to attend and complete secondary school. The two capacity building sections provided a great deal of training and equipment that translated, based upon much anecdotal evidence, into capacity to deliver the relevant services. Efficacy is thus rated as substantial.

5.5 Given that this was a relatively small scale pilot project with the necessary capacity building added to it, the benefits of achieving objectives at a modest cost gives the project an efficiency rating of **substantial**. The size and costs of the pilot projects were adequate for the purpose of establishing the benefits of the approaches being piloted. Local firms and professors were used in testing instruments and evaluation, which helped to contain costs.

## **RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME**

5.6 The risk to development outcome for this project is rated **negligible to low**. The two pilot schemes have already been scaled up successfully in both PEDP and SEDP. The capacity building objectives at the school/community level and also at the policy level of MOEVT were successfully implemented and this capacity is still being utilized. No doubt more capacity in certain areas is still needed, but what this project, as a pilot scheme, aimed achieving was done so satisfactorily and can be sustained fiscally in coming years, if the economic growth and budget situation is maintained.

## **BANK PERFORMANCE**

5.7 Bank quality at entry was **satisfactory**. The preparation team was thorough and participatory. The Bank responded flexibly to the government request to modify the Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project so as to finance pretesting, design, and consultation with beneficiaries as part of preparation of the two pilots for this project. The quality at entry was rated highly satisfactory by the Bank's internal Quality Assurance Group (QAG). Among the eight dimensions rated by QAG, three were satisfactory and the others highly satisfactory. However according to the ICR, monitoring and evaluation, was not rated by QAG. Nonetheless, the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) did have an M/E plan with sample surveys that was regarded as too sophisticated for the MOEC capacity and was replaced with a simpler design.

5.8 Bank supervision was **satisfactory** throughout implementation. There were changes of Bank task team leaders (seven according to the Borrower's report contained in the ICR for the project), which would have been preferable to avoid in the interest of efficiency according to some respondents. However, there is no evidence of this having a negative impact with the Borrower expressing appreciation for the problem solving nature of supervision missions.

## **BORROWER PERFORMANCE**

5.9 The government performance was **satisfactory**. During implementation of the previous project the Government recognized the need to find ways to promote local community/school involvement and requested funds be reallocated to allow for pre-testing of the pilot design. The Government provision of counterpart funds and staffing was forthcoming when needed.

5.10 Performance of the MOEC as implementing agency was **satisfactory**. After a slow start, due to the Project Support Group not being in place, the pace of implementation picked up. The credit was almost fully disbursed with only a small amount of US\$467,500 remaining at closing, which was cancelled. The pilot CEF and GSES were implemented satisfactorily and sustainably. The key implementation team was stable throughout the seven years, something unusual in many Bank supported projects that experience losses of key implementation personnel. At the local level, district and school personnel who were local coordinators for CEF/GSES showed interest and commitment that was critical to satisfactory performance. However, senior local officials were often not conversant with the pilot

schemes of the project. Thus, the HRDP did not become well integrated into the Government structure. In the one district (a poor one) where the IEG mission was able to find teachers who were present that far back, the teachers showed evident pride in their achievements and in being pioneers in the pilot, especially the GSES. This was at a time when talk of gender equity was relatively new.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

5.11 Overall M&E is rated **modest**. The design of M&E is **modest**. The project aimed to pilot and evaluate two distinct interventions, but there was no evaluation design in the SAR other than the LogFrame, which was lacking in precision with respect to indicators. An evaluation design was developed during the early stages of implementation in the PIP. That design had some efforts to set up control groups for the pilots, including baseline data collection and sample surveys of households and schools. However, it was regarded as too sophisticated for the MOEC by the new task team that took over after effectiveness.

5.12 Implementation of M&E is also **modest**. After encountering the above problems with the M&E, another Impact Evaluation was commissioned by the MOEC. This was done by local university researchers and was able to obtain some useful results, even if not as rigorous as the original design. Household and school based sample surveys were done with a few non-CEF districts included, and data comparisons were made with national level statistics and CEF districts. Qualitative interviews of participants were also included.

5.13 Utilization of the data generated by the monitoring and evaluation that was implemented was **substantial**. The results of the two pilots were incorporated into the design of the PEDP grants and SEDP grants and scholarships. There was time to do so before PEDP started because the pre-testing of the CEF school grants started in 1995. The official pilot for school grants under CEF ran from 1998 to 2001.

## Primary Education Development Program

### OUTCOME

5.14 The overall outcome of PEDP is rated **satisfactory**. Relevance of objectives and design and achievement of all three objectives are rated substantial; efficiency is not rated for development policy operations.

5.15 All 3 program objectives—expanding school access, improving quality and increasing retention-- are relevant to the most recent JAST (2007) and poverty reduction strategy (2005), as well as strategies at the time of PEDP preparation in 2001. Virtually all similar policy and vision statements over the past decade or more have emphasized expanding primary enrollment to the point of achieving UPE with quality. Thus, the relevance of the objectives is rated **substantial**.

5.16 The design was intended to be the first phase of the overall Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP 2001). PEDP was designed to be decentralized in keeping with the overall government policy of decentralization. The school capitation and development

grants, piloted under the CEF component of the HRDP project, provided background experience in the development of guidelines to school committees on how to implement grants. The choice of a DPL allowed flexibility and a rapid infusion of resources. The relevance of design is rated **substantial**.

5.17 Despite some uncertainty about NER data based upon the results of household with school based data, the quantitative objective of significantly expanding enrollments was substantially achieved. Achievement of the quality objective was also substantial; although pass rates on primary exams declined after the initial large increases, the primary pass rate is still above that of 2001 at the start of PEDP (49 percent versus 22 percent). This is all the more remarkable given the huge expansion of enrollment drawing in pupils from poorer households. Retention rates of pupils in schools have not declined with the larger pool of poor rural students. Thus efficacy of PEDP is **substantial**.

#### **RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME**

5.18 The risk to development outcomes of PEDP is **moderate**. The quantitative indicators of enrollment increases have shown good progress. Despite the evidence that NER may be overstated by the school based data sources, prospects for continued progress in enrolling children in primary school look promising. The declining PSLE pass rates are cause for concern, but it seems plausible that a package of inputs to enhance quality can be managed from both a fiscal and technical perspective. The MOEVT and RALG education officers have been brainstorming on an emergency basis about this problem over the past few weeks as the President himself has directed that attention be paid to this situation.

#### **BANK PERFORMANCE**

5.19 The Bank's performance is rated **satisfactory**. The Bank's quality at entry is rated **satisfactory**. The Bank responded positively to the Government's request for support to reform the delivery of primary education. The design was ambitious, but it was based upon on-going reforms, such as local government decentralization, and extensive analytical work undertaken in the Country Education Status report. This was financed by the proceeds of the HRDP credit and conducted in collaboration with the Government, Development Partners and other stakeholders.

5.20 Bank performance during supervision was **satisfactory**. Supervision missions were carried out on a timely basis to provide technical support and to assure that activities to fulfill conditions were on track. The borrower also needed some analytical and policy support as this was the first development policy operation for the education sector.

#### **BORROWER PERFORMANCE**

5.21 Based upon the actions of government, especially Prime Minister's office, and the MOEC and local governments as described below, the overall borrower performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

5.22 The government's performance was **satisfactory**. The Prime Minister's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) was in charge of overall

coordination of PEDP, which was a complex and far reaching reform program. In contrast to the PSG in the HRDP, which was not integrated into Government structures, the PMO-RALG performed well in this role, also coordinating with DPs and civil society stakeholders. Annual sector reviews with DPs and stakeholders were conducted so that problems could be discussed and resolved along the way. This helped foster wide ownership of PEDP.

5.23 The performance of MOEC and PMO-RALG as implementing agencies was **moderately satisfactory**. Some problems arose in selected areas, but overall performance showed a high level of commitment. For the most part, roles were clear under the decentralized delivery arrangements and training in these roles was adequate. The borrower's impact assessment team found a few anomalies in use of grants, but they were still within the education purposes. There were areas where quality of local construction was not adequate. A public expenditure tracking survey on behalf of government and DPs was undertaken and results will be released soon. Despite some instances of delays in disbursement at the beginning of implementation, schools received their grants through the budget system and received guidelines and training on proper use of grants.

#### **MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

5.24 Overall quality of M&E is **modest**. The design of M&E is **modest**, as there was no design methodology specified apart from the standard LogFrame of the Program Document. The LogFrame specified the indicators to be used for each of the project objectives and how the data were to be collected.

5.25 Implementation of M&E as envisioned in the LogFrame was **modest**. This was mainly monitoring indicators and collecting statistics, as opposed to analysis and evaluation. However, a review of PEDP was commissioned by the Government at the end of the project in 2004 and even later in 2008, The Evaluation of the Impact of the Primary Education Development Plan 2002-2006 was commissioned, covering the period of the whole program in addition to the three years of the Bank credit. The consultant team in 2008 made extensive field visits and had useful recommendations, especially for the sustainability of PEDP and the preparation of PEDP2, currently under implementation. In the course of their field visits, the consultant team also found that the full capitation grant of US\$10 sent via local councils did not reach many schools in their sample (87 percent of the full amount reached schools), a lesson that could be rectified in PEDP2.

5.26 Utilization of M&E data was **substantial**. Through the process of joint annual reviews, the M&E results that collected were shared and discussed. This led to recommendations for the following year with respect to program implementation. The evaluation of PEDP referred to above was used as an input into the second phase of the Education Sector Development Plan, from 2008 to 2017.

## Secondary Education Development Program

### OUTCOME

5.27 The outcome of this project overall is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**. There were significant shortcomings in the operation's achievement of its objectives, particularly in terms of learning outcomes; achievement of the capacity building objective was modest, as was the relevance of design. Efficiency is not rated for development policy operations.

5.28 All of the objectives are relevant to the current JAST and the current growth and poverty reduction strategy. The long-term aim of an adaptable labor force and improved supply of students entering the post-secondary education system is especially relevant to the aim of technology development to promote economic growth. The first of the specific objectives—increasing the proportion of the age group in secondary, especially for underserved groups—while not aiming at universal secondary, does aim to expand opportunity in a way that reduces poverty and improves income distribution. The second specific objective of better learning outcomes is aimed directly at the productivity aspects of the growth and poverty reduction strategy. The specific objective of improved management is critical to improve service delivery as stated in the JAST and many related policy statements. The relevance of objectives is thus rated **substantial**.

5.29 The tranche conditions were relevant to the achievement of the objectives. The use of a DPL instrument provided some flexibility and was relevant to the situation in which a quick and large infusion of resources was needed to expand secondary enrollment, following the rapid increase in primary enrollment. However, it is much more difficult to rapidly expand secondary education, given its complexity, and while maintaining quality. Hence, the instrument was not conducive to improving and sustaining learning outcomes or to building capacity. And it did not ensure financial sustainability. The relevance of design is rated **modest**.

5.30 With respect to efficacy, substantial progress was made, on average, in increased completion rates, defined as CSEE certificates awarded at the end of Form 4. There is no specific information on completion rates among underserved groups; it is presumed that, given the very large increase in enrollment, these groups' completion rates also likely increased, though it is not clear whether their completion rates would have improved relative to the rates of the less underserved and non-poor. On balance, the first objective was **substantially** achieved. With respect to the second objective of improving learning achievement, the rapid expansion severely challenged the quality of education; there remain shortcomings in infrastructure and the number of qualified teachers. This has shown up in *declining* exam scores of Division 3 or higher, especially in English, science, and mathematics, which have been identified as subjects of priority. The exam scores of girls and poor rural areas lag seriously behind those for boys and urban areas. Thus, the achievement of the second objective is **negligible**. The third objective of improving administration of secondary education through devolution to regional and local authorities has made progress, but the extent of this progress is **modest**. More training is needed and the training to date has not been sufficiently evaluated.

## RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

5.31 The risk to development outcomes of SEDP is rated **significant**. Although indicators of quantitative objectives show great progress, expansion took place so rapidly that perhaps it was done too fast. Much incomplete infrastructure in terms of classrooms only was put up, but the fiscal sustainability in terms of completing infrastructure is now being called into question. The most serious risk to development outcome has to do with improving learning achievement. The shortages of qualified teachers and those inputs associated with improved learning, as evidenced by the declining scores in national secondary exams, means that an enormous fiscal and managerial effort is needed to reverse these trends. These risks were identified in the SEDP Program and, indeed, have materialized. However, there is still strong commitment and ownership by the government and wider society, in addition to expressions of future support from DPs. These problems are widely recognized but it will take time to turn them around. Thus, the recently approved (May 2010) Adaptable Program Loan in support of SEDP2 will attempt to address many of the risk factors that could undermine the quality of secondary education, especially in underserved areas where expansion of enrollment has been most rapid.

## BANK PERFORMANCE

5.32 Overall Bank performance was **moderately satisfactory**. The response to the Borrower's request to follow up on PEDP with a secondary education project was quick and flexible on the part of the Bank. The project was prepared rapidly, but still the Bank attempted to harmonize this program with all donors and CSO priorities. The conditions agreed upon for tranche release were relevant to the program objectives. The M&E specification of results (unemployment and exam scores) in the LogFrame that could not be achieved during time period of the three tranches raises questions about the appropriateness of a DPL, which is oriented to the short term. Otherwise, the quality at entry was thus **satisfactory**.

5.33 Bank performance during supervision was **moderately satisfactory**. The Bank assisted the government team during implementation to meet the conditions of tranche release. The Bank was flexible in the final tranche release in August 2007, which was delayed by the release of the Government report and fiscal difficulty in maintaining the level of capitation grant. Some in the Bank argued that the condition on the adequate size of the capitation grant should not have been waived, because it was the result of allowing enrollments to expand beyond the agreed medium term scenario, which the Bank supervision team warned against. However, the Bank decided in the end to support the request for waiver and argued in the Memorandum to the Board that the Government had made progress on all other conditions except for the capitation grant, which turned out to be about 68 percent of the agreed amount. The IDA Board agreed by granting the waiver of that condition. This raises the question of maintaining elements of policy after tranches are released since enrollment continued to rise faster than the medium term scenario in 2007 and 2008. However, all other conditions were met and supervision was also well coordinated with other DPs and stakeholders and the Bank participated in the annual education sector reviews.

## BORROWER PERFORMANCE

5.34 Overall borrower performance is rated **moderately** satisfactory. Government performance was **moderately satisfactory**. Realizing the need to provide more secondary education access after the success of PEDP, there was a strong commitment to proceed quickly on the part of the Government. However, near the end of SEDP the Government found it difficult to fully fund the secondary school capitation grants due to the rapid expansion of enrollment. There was also a delay in preparing the third tranche release report. On the whole, the Government met almost all of the conditions of tranche release, a partial waiver being granted by the IDA board for the third tranche.

5.35 The performance of the MOEC and RALG as implementing agencies was **moderately satisfactory**. Due to this strong commitment and vigorous promotion by national and regional ruling party officials, the medium scenario quantitative targets agreed in the LDP were exceeded as the promotion campaign and community driven demand led to rapid construction of classrooms and expansion of enrollment. The MOEC prepared guidelines for school to carry manage grants and carry out their new responsibilities. However, the commitment of the MOEC to provide teachers and textbooks was not able to keep up with the pace of infrastructure expansion.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

5.36 M&E quality is rated **modest**. The design of M&E is **modest** as there was no specific activity other than monitoring the indicators of the LogFrame. The Program Document indicated that the Form 4 exam score indicators dealing with quality were longer term and no impact was expected within the three years of the IDA credits. More attention could have been paid as to how national exam scores could be used in conjunction with measurement of quality of outputs and inputs.

5.37 Implementation of M&E was **modest**. Indicators with respect to enrollment and learning were tracked every year. The LogFrame mentions that the MOEC would monitor the unemployment situation of secondary school leavers, acknowledging this as a long term indicator. The mission did not find evidence that unemployment or the labor market in general was monitored in a systematic way. The Letter of Development Policy also committed the Government to monitoring long-term indicators in the labor market.

5.38 Utilization of M&E results was **substantial**. Enrollment and learning data were shared and widely discussed at the annual reviews of performance with all stakeholders. These discussions contributed to ownership of SEDP by all stakeholders. The Government and MOEVT have been slow to respond to issues of declining quality as a result of rapid expansion, although now they are putting attention on that problem.

## 6. Lessons and Perspectives

6.1 Looking back over education policy, in content and implementation, it can be seen how the Education Sector Development Program (2001) has provided a coherent policy framework for these three education projects in Tanzania. The Human Resources Development Project successfully piloted school grants and scholarships for girls, but also demonstrated that traditional project implementation units remain isolated in their overall impact on government structures. A broader programmatic approach involving Government and DP cooperation was needed to make rapid progress in primary education. With respect to primary education, the ESDP aimed at rapidly expanding primary education to the point of achieving universal primary education while maintaining standards of learning achievement. This policy objective was largely successful, but maintaining it will still take both fiscal and managerial effort. With respect to secondary education, the policy aim was to expand the relatively small sub-sector substantially (from 10 percent GSER in 2003 to 30 percent in 2007), although it was acknowledged that universal secondary education was not feasible. As in the case of primary education, the aim was to improve quality of learning via investments, such as the capitation and development grants to be managed by the schools. These policies, as well as the development policy lending instruments used by the Bank, were appropriate and supported the overall country assistance strategy, especially the third pillar regarding quality of life and delivery of social services. The secondary policy aims exceeded their quantitative targets of enrollment, resulting in fiscal pressure that reduced investment in quality. Reforms of curricula, examinations, governance and management were key features of both primary and secondary education policy, in particular, promoting decentralization and more school/community participation in school management.

6.2 Looking forward, a new Education Sector Development Program 2008-2017 was prepared in August 2008 to provide future policy guidance. The new ESDP continues the former policy priorities, which were along the right lines and received donor support. The new ESDP examines the remaining major challenges, particularly upgrading infrastructure to facilitate expansion of enrollment without lowering academic standards. More emphasis is given to performance-oriented outcomes. The new ESDP is also ambitious and comprehensive in that it covers from pre-school to university as well as non-formal adult and folk education.

6.3 Financing this comprehensive policy is recognized in the new ESDP as a major challenge and is based upon five fiscal assumptions: (1) low inflation (3.5 to 4.5 percent); (2) continued real economic growth of 6 to 8 percent; (3) government budget allocation to education of about 22 percent; (4) government revenue collection averaging about 16 percent of GDP; and (5) increased donor support of about 20 percent above 2006/07 levels in real terms. These assumptions were drawn up prior to the current global financial crisis and their realism needs to be analyzed again. Fiscal sustainability is thus a major issue for education policy and is an appropriate place to begin lessons from these projects.

6.4 **Fiscal sustainability of rapid expansion of secondary education needs to be re-assessed carefully within the realistic economic context of limited fiscal resources and competing needs of other education sub-sectors.** The unprecedented rate of expansion of

community secondary schools is putting extreme pressure on the education and overall budget, especially if per student resources are to be maintained at the level of the original SEDP design. In recent years the government responded by reducing the per student resources, which in turn compromises the quality objectives of SEDP (although a better job was done in PEDP with respect to fiscal sustainability and maintaining basic quality). This was recognized as a risk in the SEDP Program Document, even under the less ambitious medium growth scenario for enrollment expansion. Thus, although the unit cost of secondary education is relatively low in Tanzania, the rapid expansion of enrollment has caused a corresponding rapid increase in public spending on education, from 4 percent of GDP in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2007. Given the rapid rise in the numbers of teachers and need for learning materials, the education share of recurrent expenditure has increased from 18 to 27 percent from 2006-2008.

6.5 Taking primary and secondary expansion together presents an even more daunting fiscal challenge. The usual education projection models based upon demographic projections, pupil-teacher ratios, derived teacher demands, average teacher salaries, and pupil-textbook ratios were used in the preparation of PDEP and SEDP and can be used with some updating and further refinement. Pupil-teacher ratios are still relatively high (roughly 50:1 for primary and approaching 40:1 for secondary) and quality enhancement calls for their reduction, increasing unit cost further. Adding the results for each subsector, in 2010 the education sector is projected to absorb an estimated 7.2 percent of GDP or 40 percent of the total recurrent budget. This scenario is clearly untenable and thus more trade-offs must be considered.<sup>12</sup> Finding the financial resources to complete the job of building quality into this expanded system is an enormous challenge to be resolved by the government and development partners.

6.6 **A mix of lending instruments can be used in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way to support sector objectives.** PEDP was the Bank's first policy adjustment credit used in the education sector in Tanzania; the previous projects being standard investment credits with a record of slow disbursement. After getting used to the new quick disbursement of DPLs in tranches, most people interviewed, especially in the government, expressed a marked preference for this approach. However, the issue of sustainability with quick disbursing policy instruments comes to the fore in long-run education programs that take time to mature and evaluate. For example, in SEDP the rapid expansion of enrollment continued after the last tranche and the Bank had less influence in terms of conditionality. On the other hand, some officials felt that support spanning a longer term than what is typical of short term of policy credits is needed, which would argue for something like an APL spanning ten years or so. That would give time to see if exam scores or other assessments of quality show results and provide TA if needed. It is essential also that this longer term commitment of support be associated with a long-term vision for the sector agreed upon by

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<sup>12</sup> See Jones, Gershberg, and Kweka 2008. Verspoor and others (2008) also takes up these issues in an Africa wide context. Interestingly, SEDP was cited by the latter as an interesting example of a DPL approach in support of secondary education (see Verspoor and others 2008, Box10.1). However, given the evidence thus far, SEDP went off track when it failed to control the rate of expansion. A follow-up secondary education project is likely to focus on consolidating the quantitative gains with measures to improve quality, particularly teachers, textbooks, and affordable science labs.

the government and DPs, which was the case during the past decade but needs to be updated. Finding the proper balance among DPLs, APLs, and SICs is a critical issue for the Bank, other DPs and the government, requiring an open and frank dialogue on the pros and cons of various lending instruments vis-a-vis the long term vision for the education sector. No matter what instrument is chosen, the lesson of isolated project implementation units that have limited institutional impact and experienced slow disbursement should be taken into account in the design of implementation arrangements.

**6.7 Rapid expansion of secondary education is more complex and difficult than rapidly expanding primary education.** A rapid expansion of secondary education is much more complex than a similar reform for primary education. One reason is that secondary education systems are more complex with subject specialties requiring efficient matching of student class streams and teachers. Simple pupil-teacher ratios cannot be used in planning secondary expansion in the way they are for primary. As one head teacher remarked to the mission, “They keep sending me arts teachers when it is science and mathematics that I need.” Secondly, this expansion is undertaken in an environment of teacher shortages and lack of capacity to develop teachers of appropriate qualifications rapidly. Hence, the system is forced to resort to crash programs such as licensing Form 6 leavers and relying heavily on in-service teacher development, which is not always adequate. The third complexity is that curriculum, textbooks, and examinations are being reformed simultaneously. Even teachers of appropriate university qualification would be hard pressed to adapt to the new curriculum requiring competency-based pedagogy after years of working in an environment of old-style rote methods. Fourthly, the management challenge inherent in such a rapid expansion and reform simultaneously would tax even the most capable systems of education.

**6.8** Perhaps it is time to slow down the rate of expansion and consolidate what has been achieved quantitatively in the way of infrastructure. Teachers are the key resource at the front line of education delivery. Resources and management of the system need to focus on their professional development and provision of complementary teaching/learning resources to go with that. In the end, it is the development of the students that form the purpose of the education enterprise, but professional teachers and administrators are distinguished by their deep understanding of that truth.

**6.9 Decentralization with school/community based management under the overall government decentralization pursued in Tanzania appears to have had a beneficial impact on community enthusiasm and participation, but further evaluation is needed about impact on efficacy and efficiency.** There is much room for improvement and further research and evaluation to study what dimensions would most benefit from improvements. A design study comparing districts, or some other form of control groups among districts, could shed light upon improvements, especially if the evaluation results are factored into further training and capacity building. A set of clear and relevant hypotheses needs to be formulated for testing so as to try to link improvement in learning with important attributes of decentralization. For example, is it the school/community participation itself that could improve learning or is it the additional resources via the grants managed by the school/community?

**6.10 The labor market situation warrants closer and careful monitoring as the supply of secondary school leavers is increasing.** One of the over-arching objectives of SEDP is the development of an adaptable labor force needed for economic growth and technological progress. Given Tanzania's very low rate of enrollment of secondary school-age population the expansion of primary enrollment at the time of preparation of SEDP, expansion of secondary education seemed warranted. Unemployment of secondary school leavers was not considered to be a major risk. However, many observers, especially those in the private sector, now view this as a potentially serious problem, in light of the rapid expansion of relatively low quality community secondary schools. A number of recent studies indicate that secondary school leavers increasingly must find employment in the informal sector (see Kondylis and Manacorda 2006 and Ruggeri 2009).

6.11 In the past, secondary school leavers did not remain in agriculture or the non-agriculture rural economy. They usually migrated to the towns and pursued modern wage sector jobs. Now many of them are forced to also pursue informal urban self-employment, or many remain at home until they can find a job. Some may be forced to remain in the rural economy, which may offer the potential for *increased productivity there* if the quality of cognitive skills from secondary education is improved and other complementary economic and labor market policies are pursued. A few people interviewed believed that expansion of secondary education also would help transform traditional agriculture. While research has shown that primary school level cognitive skills increase agricultural productivity, there is not a great deal of research on what added value comes from secondary education in agriculture in developing countries<sup>13</sup>. Thus, careful monitoring of the labor market for secondary school leavers is needed to detect shifts in conditions that may require rapid and effective policy response.

**6.12 Careful consideration needs to be given to English language issues and improving its teaching at both primary and secondary levels in its relation to jobs and the economy.** Related to academic achievement and the labor market is the sensitive question of English in the secondary school curriculum. Most private sector employers see English as a practical communications skill needed in business. Some even report that Tanzanians lose out on job opportunities due to lack of fluency in English communication, even though the secondary school curriculum is officially taught in English. While recognizing that Kiswahili is the national language and has priority in the cultural heritage of the nation, private employers assert that English can still be taught well if given sufficient resources and qualified teachers. In theory, students start studying English in the early grades of primary and even get an intensive foundation course in the first semester of Form 1, so that they should be ready to study in English. In practice, this does not happen often enough. On the other side of this issue are those who call for teaching and learning in Kiswahili in secondary schools. These advocates believe that students would master the curriculum better if it is taught in the language they know best. However, since English is the language of instruction at the university level, this approach would also have to decide about the transition there. Other countries have faced this issue of balancing national language versus international ones, and the key to resolving it is providing sufficient

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<sup>13</sup> Behrman and others 2008.

resources under a well-managed language program to train teachers so that both languages are mastered at the required level.

**6.13 Given Tanzania's resource situation as a low income country, difficult tradeoffs need to be examined. Expansion of secondary education needs to be accompanied with attention to quality of education.** As noted in paragraph 4.12, much of the rapid expansion in secondary education is due to strong community demand. Nonetheless, the theme of setting priorities to focus on quality runs through much of the above. IEG's Primary Education Evaluation (2006) pointed out the importance of education quality as the basis for improving learning achievement in primary education. While there has been no comparable evaluation of secondary education, a number of research studies in recent years present evidence from various countries that quality of secondary education is critical to obtain the economic benefits of growth and poverty reduction.<sup>14</sup> Based on interviews and review of recent documents such as the Education Sector Performance reports, Tanzanian policymakers recognize this. In fact, the new Education Sector Development Program (2008-2017) actually projects reducing the rate of growth of Form 1 intake from 32 percent in 2009 to 2 percent by 2014 (see new Education Sector Development Program 2008-2017, Annex F, p.66). This would allow the lower secondary system to allocate more resources to quality while expanding the size of the system at a moderate rate. The recently approved Adaptable Program Loan (May 2010) in support of SEDP2 also recognizes these issues and aims to provide a minimum package of quality inputs. Even with significant increases in domestic budget and DP support, there will not be enough finance for all of the worthwhile goals in the new ESDP. The challenge will be maintaining the political and fiscal discipline to focus on quality while also satisfying strong community demand for expansion with limited fiscal resources.

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<sup>14</sup> See IEG 2006 and Hanushek and Woessmann 2008.



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## Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

### HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT I (CREDIT NO. 2991-TA)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs*	24.06	25.45	106
Loan amount**	20.9	21.08	100.8
Cofinancing	none		
Cancellation		0.53***	

\*Difference between estimate and actual is due to exchange rate. \*\*Disbursement data as of April 13, 2006.

\*\*\* Cancellation date 03/20/2006.

#### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00</i>	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	2.52	7.05	11.94	16.27	17.71	18.84	19.73	20.39	20.86
Actual (US\$M)	2.36	5.49	8.59	14.00	17.23	18.03	19.02	19.47	19.55*
Actual as % of appraisal	94	78	72	86	97	96	96	95	94
Date of final disbursement: 01/15/2006									

\*Source: Comptroller. It is unclear why the actual cumulative disbursements do not match the actual amount disbursed.

#### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Note Review	07/15/1989	07/15/1989
Negotiations	07/15/1997	07/15/1997
Board approval	10/07/1997	10/07/1997
Signing	10/29/1997	10/29/1997
Effectiveness	NA	02/18/1998
Closing date	12/31/2005	12/31/2005

NA = Not available

**Staff Inputs (staff weeks)**

	<i>FY97</i>	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00</i>	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>Total</i>
Preappraisal	NA										
Appraisal	NA										
Negotiations	NA										
Supervision		NA	NA	45.83	22.18	24.68	28.69	13.5	13.34	11.86	160.08
Completion										8.67	8.67
<b>Total</b>				<b>45.83</b>	<b>22.18</b>	<b>24.68</b>	<b>28.69</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>13.34</b>	<b>20.53</b>	<b>168.75</b>

NA = Not available

**Mission Data**

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>
Identification/ Preparation	03/1995	11	Mission Leader (1); Disbursement (1); Legal (1); Education Specialists (5); Team Assistant (1)		
Appraisal/ Negotiation	07/17/1997	6			
Supervision	05/14/1998	6	Mission Leader (1); Cluster Leader (1); Education Specialist (2); Operation Analyst (1)	S	S
	02/12/1999	6	Sr. Education Planner (1); Education Specialist (1); Sr. Operations Officer (1); Fin. Mgmt Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1);	S	S
	04/29/1999	3	Task Team Leader (1); Education Specialist (1); Sr. Operations Officer (1)	S	S
	10/04/2000	9	Operations Officer, TTL (1); Sr. HD Specialist (1); Consultant (2); Ed. Specialist (1); Fin. Specialist (1); Procurement Officer (1); Info. Analyst (1); Disbursement Assistant (1)	S	S
	12/18/2001	3	Team Leader-Op. Officer (1); Education Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1);	HS	S
	10/11/2002	6	TTL/Sr. Edu. Specialist (1); Education Specialist (1); Sr. Education Planner (1); Disbursements Assistant (1);	HS	S

<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>	
06/27/2003	6	Procurement Assistant (1); Evaluation Spec. Consultant (1) Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Fin. Mgmt Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1); Evaluation (1); Early Childhood Development (1)	HS	S	
11/05/2004	4	Procurement Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1); FM Consultant (1); Education Specialist (1)	HS	S	
05/04/2005	4	Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1); Consultant;	HS	S	
11/11/2005	4	Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Disbursement Assistant (1); Consultant ( 1)	S	S	
Completion	02/02/2006	1	Operations Officer	S	S

### PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT (CREDIT NO. 3570-TA)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs*	694.05	NA	NA
Loan amount	150	165.3	110.2
Cofinancing**	50	49.9	99.8
Cancellation			

\*Information withdrawn from Client Connection (Borrower was to contribute US\$544.05) \*\* the Netherlands  
NA = not available

#### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	50	100	150	(150)
Actual (US\$M)	50	105.95	105.95	165.34
Actual as % of appraisal	100	105.95	70.63	110.23
Date of final disbursement: 11/04/2004				

**Project Dates**

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Note	02/28/2001	02/28/2001
Negotiations	08/13/2001	08/16/2001
Board approval	NA	10/09/2001
Signing	NA	10/18/2001
Effectiveness	01/02/2002	01/02/2002
Closing date	10/31/2004	10/31/2004

NA=Not available

**Staff Inputs (staff weeks)**

	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-appraisal	78.25					78.25
Appraisal/Negotiations		18.04				18.04
Preparation		12.04				12.04
Supervision		25.11	35.66	32.68	13.23	106.68
Completion					27.7	27.7
Total	78.25	55.19	35.66	32.68	40.93	242.71

**Mission Data**

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>
Identification/ Preparation	10/31/2000	4	Team Leader (1); Education Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Mgmt (1)		
Appraisal/ Negotiation	03/30/2001	7	Team Leader (1); Operations Adviser (1); Education Specialist (1); Economist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Mgmt Specialist (1); Consultant (1)		
	07/17/2001	7	Team Leader (1); Operations Adviser (1); Education Specialist (1); Economist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Mgmt Specialist (1); Consultant		
Supervision	10/29/2001	4	Team Leader (1); Education Specialist (1); Economist (1); Consultant (1);	S	S
	05/15/2003	2	Team Leader (1); Education	S	S

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>
	11/11/2003	2	Specialist (1); Team Leader (1); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
	05/10/2004	2	Team Leader (1); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
Completion	03/02/2005	1	Education Specialist (1)	S	S

**SECONDARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3215-TA and Grant H093-TA)**

**Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)**

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	250	NA	
Loan amount	150	157*	104.6
Cofinancing**	50	NA	
Cancellation	none		

\*Due to fluctuation of US\$ exchange rate against the SDR. Amount at the time of project closing. \*\* 30.0 M from EU and 20.0 M from the Netherlands.

**Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements**

	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>FY08</i>	<i>Total</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	50.00	100.00	150.00	150.00	150.00
Actual (US\$M)	50.19	99.14	99.14	150.24	150.24
Actual as % of appraisal	100	99	66	100	100
Date of final disbursement: 09/06/2007					

**Project Dates**

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Review	08/25/2003	08/25/2003
Negotiations	03/23/2004	03/30/2004
Board approval	06/08/2004	06/08/2004
Signing	06/29/2004	07/05/2004
Effectiveness	09/08/2004	09/30/2004
Closing date	06/30/2007	12/31/2007

**Staff Inputs (staff weeks)**

	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>FY08</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-appraisal	21.14					21.14
Appraisal/Negotiations	31.22					31.22
Preparations	20.41					20.41
Supervision		61.42	33.91	43.05	16.20	154.58
Completion					19.85	19.85
<b>Total</b>	<b>72.77</b>	<b>61.42</b>	<b>33.91</b>	<b>43.04</b>	<b>36.05</b>	<b>247.2</b>

**Mission Data**

<b>Names</b>	<b>Titles</b>	<b>Unit</b>
<b>Lending</b>		
Donald B. Hamilton		AFTH1
<b>Supervision</b>		
Rest Barnabas Lasway	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH1
Arun R. Joshi	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH1
Patrick D. Murphy	Consultant	AFTH1
Anne Muuna	Team Assistant	AFCE1
Mercy Mataro Sabai	Sr. Financial Mgmt Specialist	AFTFM
Zainab Z. Semgalawe	Operations Officer	AFTAR
Ivar Strand	Operations Officer	AFTH1
Pascal Tegwa	Sr. Procurement Specialist	AFTPC

## **Annex B. People Consulted**

### **GOVERNMENT**

- B.N. Bureta, Director, Secondary Education (Retired), Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
- Abdallah Chikota, District Education Officer, Primary, Mtwara Rural District
- Angelina M. Conrad, District Education Officer, Primary, Kibaha District
- Festo L. Kang'ombe, District Executive Director, Kibaha District Council
- Theofrid Kikombele, Assistant Administrative Secretary, Regional Secretariat, Kibaha
- Hipson T. Kopenya, Regional Education Officer, Mtwara District
- Peniel Lyimo, Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office (National Coordinator of PEDP)
- Erasto Mbwilo, District Commissioner, Mtwara District
- A.S.M. Mwaimu, Director of Planning, Policy and Research (former), Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
- Mohamedi Ngwalima, District Executive Director, Mtwara District Council
- Suleiman Nyamvi, District Education Officer, Secondary, Mtwara Rural
- Bernard M.N. Nzungu, Regional Administrative Secretary, Kibaha, Pwani
- Igna J. Sanga, District Education Officer, Secondary, Kibaha District

### **DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS/CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS**

- Darius Mans, President, Africare (former Lead Economist, Tanzania Country Office)
- Elizabeth Missokia, Executive Director, Haki Elimu
- Elvis Musiba, Chairman, Chamber of Commerce (former), President Pangea Securities (current)
- Professor H.J. Moshia, Principal, Cha'ngombe Teachers College
- Professor Issa Omari, University of Dar es Salaam
- Rakesh Rajani, Head, Twaweza, Citizen Agency and Public Accountability in East Africa
- Kabeho Solo, Human Resources Manager, National Microfinance Bank
- Dana Worling, Training Manager, Kempinski Kilimanjaro Hotel

### **WORLD BANK**

- Madhur Gautam, Lead Economist, Agriculture (AFTAR)
- Charles Griffin, Director, Human Development Department (ECA), retired
- Donald Hamilton, Senior Education Specialist (AFTED), retired
- Arun Joshi, Senior Education Specialist, Country Office (AFTED)
- Rest Laway, Senior Education Specialist, Country Office, retired
- Rehema Mashayo, Water and Sanitation Sector, Team Assistant, Country Office (AFCE1)
- Emmanuel Malangalila, Senior Operations Officer, Country Office, retired
- John McIntire, Country Director, Country Office (AFCE1)
- Sherri Archondo, Private Sector Operations, Senior Operations Officer (AFTFE)
- Paolo Zacchia, Lead Economist, Tanzania Country Office (AFTP2)

### Annex C. Timeline of Events Affecting Education in Tanzania

Year	Tanzania national events	Tanzania education events	World Bank	Other donors and international events
1961	Tanganyika achieves independence with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere as first President.			
1962			Tanganyika joins the World Bank.	
1963			First IDA credit to Tanganyika, an education project. Followed by six more education investment projects up to 1980, when education lending paused.	
1964	Revolution in Zanzibar and union with Tanganyika giving rise to United Republic of Tanzania.			
1967	Arusha Declaration promulgated by the ruling party TANU and sets Tanzania on path to Ujamaa (African Socialism).			
1968		Education for Self-Reliance Policy document sets out critical role of education in the social transformation of Tanzania.		
1973		National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA) is established to replace the Cambridge Examinations Syndicate that was responsible for national exams during the colonial period.		
1974		Musoma Resolution promulgates the goal of universal primary education (UPE) by 1977.		

Year	Tanzania national events	Tanzania education events	World Bank	Other donors and international events
1979	Uganda invades Tanzania giving rise to war and leading to Tanzanian army defeat of Idi Amin and his exile			
1980			Last Bank education project for a decade as tensions in country dialogue over economic policy are worked out.	
1985	President Nyerere steps down voluntarily, paving the way for a new president and accommodation with IMF and the World Bank. Succeeded by President Hasan Ali Mwinyi.			
1990			Bank resumes lending for education with the Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project (1990-years, \$38.3 million).	Jomtien, Thailand Conference were Education for All goals are set. Tanzania signs on to the goals.
1995	President Benjamin Mkapa elected in first multi-party contest and ushering in period of accelerated economic reforms and decade of economic growth.			
1997			Human Resources Development Pilot Project (HRDP, \$25 million) approved (October).	
1999	Tanzania Vision 2025 document widely discussed and adopted with a broad vision of the country's economic and social future. Education sector is given prominent role.		HRDP begins pilot test of school grants and girls' scholarship.	

Year	Tanzania national events	Tanzania education events	World Bank	Other donors and international events
2000				Dakar, Senegal conference where the six EFA goals are re-affirmed with promises of donor aid. Tanzania again signs on to goals.
2001		Education Sector Development Program (2001-2008) and Primary Education Development Program (2001-2008) Prima PrimP Primary School Fees are eliminated.	Bank supports Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) with an adjustment credit of US\$150 million (October).	
2002				UN Conference in Monterrey, Mexico that formulates seven Millennium Development goals. Tanzania commits to the goals.
2004		Secondary Education Development Program (2004-2009) adopted.	Bank supports SEDP with 3 tranche adjustment credit to be disbursed each year. PEDP closes (October)	
2005	President Mkapa steps down after 2 terms and President Jakaya Kikwete elected in multi-party election.		HRDP closes (December).	

Year	Tanzania national events	Tanzania education events	World Bank	Other donors and international events
2006		<p>Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) becomes Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) and also takes on higher education from the Ministry of Higher Education and Science (MOHEST).            Tuition fees for government secondary schools reduced from Tsh.40,000 to Tsh20,000 (April).            The Prime Minister proclaims that there will be a community secondary school in every ward (July).</p>		
2007			<p>Bank approves the Science and Technology Higher Education Project, a two-phase adaptable program loan (\$100 million for each phase), bringing Bank support to all levels.</p>	
2008		<p>Revised ESDP (2008-2017) adopted.</p>		
2010	<p>Multi-party elections for President due near end of year.</p>			

## Annex D. Evidence on Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts

### Human Resource Development Pilot Project (1997-2005)

**Table D1: Outcome/Output Indicators**

Objective	Outcome Indicator	Baseline (1996)	Target	Actual (2005)
1a Enrollment	NPER, project districts (%)	54	None set.	78 (2001)
1b Learning	PSLE pass rate (%)	20	None set	35 (2001)
2a Girls' enrollment	SNER for girls (%)	5	None set	15
2b Girls' achievement	Score on Form 4 exam	Not available	None set	62% Div 1-4 pass rate (2003)
	Output Indicators			
3 Local capacity	People trained		None set	68,000+
4 MOE capacity	Staff qualification		10 staff high level training	14 masters degree, 1 Ph.D, 9 diplomas
	Studies done		11 studies	Done

Sources: World Bank 2006.

**Table D2: Planned vs. Actual Costs, by Component (US\$ million equivalent)**

Component	Appraisal Estimate	Actual Estimate
1 CEF	8.17	9.61
2 GSES	6.93	6.93
3 Capacity	2.22	2.22
4 Policy, Research	4.49	4.49
Price contingency	0.54	0.54
Contrib. contin	0.24	0.24
Enrollment contin	0.24	0.24
PPF Refund	1.20	1.20
Total	24.06	21.08

Note: Except for CEF component, appraisals and actual are identical. The note in the ICR attributes this to exchange rate movements within the basket of currencies comprising SDRs. This does not seem plausible since only CEF is affected. The ICR also reported a cancellation of a small undisbursed amount after closure. Despite these small anomalies, the above table is likely a reasonable estimate of the financial inputs for the project.

## Primary Education Development Program (2001-2004)

**Table D3: Outcome Indicators**

Objective	Indicator	Baseline (2001)	Target	Actual (2004)
School access	NPER, national (%)	78 <sup>a</sup>	100	91
	GPER, national (%)	59 <sup>a</sup>	>100	106
Education quality	National PSLE pass rate (%)	22 <sup>a</sup>	None set	49
Retention	Drop-out Std. 4 to 5 (%)	13	10	5

*Source:* PEDP Program Document (2001) and ESDP Performance Report (2009).

a. 2000 data.

**Table D4: Output Indicators**

Objective	Indicator	Baseline (2001)	Target	Actual (2004)
1 School Access	Percent 7 year old	18 <sup>a</sup>	100	84
	Number Enrolled, Standards 1-7	4,875,764	None set	8,410,094(2008)
2 Education quality	Pupil: Teacher ratio	46:1 <sup>a</sup>	45:1 (2010)?	54:1 (2008)
	Pupil: Text Ratio	20:1	1:1 (2010)?	3:1
	Recurrent government spending per pupil	28,800 <sup>b</sup>	36,600 (2007 proj.)	35,042 (2007)

*Source:* Enroll Std1-7 Baseline and target from PEDP 2(Nov2006). Actual 2008 from ESDP Performance Report (2009); Book ratio from ESDP Performance Report (2009); Recurrent Spending (Tsh) per Pupil Gov. schools: Baseline and projected data from PEDP Program Document. Year 2007 actual from Bank Policy Note, Jones and Gershberg (2008) with GDP deflator applied to get 1999 equivalent.

a. 2000 data.

b. 1999 data.

## Secondary Education Development Program (2004-2007)

**Table D5: Outcome Indicators**

Objective	Indicator	Baseline (2003)	Target (2007)	Actual (2007)
1a Increase proportion age group completing secondary)	GSER, national (%)	10.2	15	30.5
	No. of students completing Form 4	54,875	None set	246,446 (2009) (28% ann. growth)
1b Especially underserved	Gender ratio (%)	84	90	88
2a Learning outcomes	Division 1-3 Pass rate, Form 4 exam (%) <sup>a</sup>	38	None set	27
2b Especially girls	Division 1-3 Pass rate, Form 4 exam (%) <sup>a</sup>	Not available	None set	12 (girls); 22 (boys) <sup>b</sup>

a. Concerning Form 4 exams, the Program Document stated only minimal impact could be expected during the credit period of 3 years, but that progress would be monitored. After the declines to 2007, there was another sharp decline in Form 4 pass rates to 18% in 2009.

b. 2009 data

**Table D6: Output Indicators**

Objective	Indicator	Baseline (2004)	Target	Actual (2007)
1 Increase NSER	Number of schools	828	None set	3,039
	Enrollments, Forms 1-4	432,599	None set	1,164,250 <sup>c</sup>
2 Learning outcomes	Pupil teacher ratio	22:1	30:1 by 2009	50:1 <sup>d</sup>
	Book: student ratio	Not available	None set	Insufficient according to informal information
	Recurrent government spending per pupil (TShs) <sup>a</sup>	148,815 <sup>b</sup>	None set	134,888
3 Management capacity	Survey of capacity district offices schools.	PWC survey. Limited capacity all levels.	Circulars issued. Training conducted. EMIS developed	Circulars done. Training completed. EMIS done

Source: 2007 data from ICR. 2008 data from ESDP Performance Report (2009)

Recurrent Spending (Tsh) per Pupil from Jones and Gershberg (2008) for 2007 and SEDP Program Document (2004) for 2003 figure.

a. Calculated using GDP deflators to convert 2003 figure (114,815 TShs) to 2007 prices (148,815 TShs). Jones and Gershberg (2008) also noted a drop from Tsh151,888 (2006) to 134,888 (2007) due to the enrollment surge in government-supported secondary.

b. 2003 data

c. 2008 data

d. 2009 data