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The World Bank**

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SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING DOCUMENT

FOR A

PROPOSED GAZA EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING
(FROM THE TRUST FUND FOR GAZA AND WEST BANK)

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$41 MILLION

TO THE

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
(FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY)

FOR

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
DEVELOPMENT POLICY GRANT VI

October 17, 2014

Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice
West Bank and Gaza Country Department
Middle East and North Africa Region

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GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange rate effective September 12, 2014)

Currency Unit New Israeli Shekel
US\$ 1.00 = NIS 3.62

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------|--|
| CMWU | Coastal Municipalities Water Utility |
| CTP | Cash Transfer Project |
| DNA | Damage and Needs Assessment |
| DPG | Development Policy Grant |
| EU | European Union |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GPC | General Personnel Council |
| ICR | Implementation Completion and Results Report |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MDLF | Municipal Development and Lending Fund |
| MDP | Municipal Development Project |
| MDTF | Multi Donor Trust Fund |
| MoF | Ministry of Finance |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NERRPG | National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza |
| PA | Palestinian Authority |
| PENRA | Palestinian Energy Regulatory Authority |
| PID MDTF | Public Infrastructure Development Multi Donor Trust Fund |
| PMA | Palestinian Monetary Authority |
| PPL | Public Procurement Law |
| PRDP | Palestinian Reconstruction and Development Plan |
| SAACB | Supreme Audit and Administrative Control Bureau |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |

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WEST BANK AND GAZA

SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING FOR THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY GRANT VI

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GRANT AND PROGRAM SUMMARY

WEST BANK AND GAZA

SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING FOR THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY GRANT VI

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Borrower: | The Palestine Liberation Organization (for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority) |
| Implementing Agency: | Ministry of Finance |
| Financing Data: | Terms: Grant from the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank (TFGWB) Amount: US\$ 41 million |
| Disbursements: | Single-tranche operation to be disbursed upon effectiveness |
| Project ID: | P152527 |

**SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING DOCUMENT
FOR PROPOSED GAZA EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING
TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
(FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY) FOR PALESTINIAN
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY GRANT VI**

I. BACKGROUND

1. **For the past six years, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been implementing reforms, which have been successfully supported through the development policy grants. Despite numerous political and economic constraints, the PA managed to achieve an impressive degree of fiscal consolidation, reducing its recurrent fiscal deficit from 24 percent of GDP in 2009 to 11 percent in 2013.**

2. **However, due to shocks beyond the PA’s control, economic performance indicators in the Palestinian territories have been weakening significantly since 2012.** Following a period of strong economic growth that lasted for five years between 2007 and 2011 and peaked in 2011 at 12 percent, growth in the Palestinian territories started deteriorating, dropping to 6 percent in 2012 and then further to 2 percent in 2013. At this low rate of growth in 2013, real income per capita shrank. The situation deteriorated further during the first quarter of 2014. Negative growth was recorded in Gaza due to the closure of informal trade tunnels with Egypt, as those tunnels were the main trade route for Gazans. The West Bank experienced a relative stagnation, growing by a mere 0.5 percent. Although there are no new estimates to confirm it, poverty is expected to have increased since 2013, in particular given that unemployment has been on the rise reaching 45 percent in Gaza. In broad terms, political uncertainty, the reduction in donor aid, combined with a blockade of Gaza and very little progress in easing the movement and access restrictions that also hinder investment in the West Bank explain the downward growth trend that started in 2012.

3. **The Palestinian-Israeli peace talks facilitated by the United States re-started in mid-2013.** By the end of March 2014, the peace talks began to stall. After Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas forged a unity pact with *Hamas* (which formed the *de facto* authority in Gaza), Israel suspended its participation in the peace talks. Political developments in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have added to the complexity of the topics being negotiated.

4. **A “consensus” Palestinian Government was established in May 2014,** with a cabinet of technocrats, who are not affiliated to any political party, endorsed by both *Fatah* (the party led by President Abbas) and *Hamas*. The violence that erupted in Gaza in early July 2014 and continued until the end of August has put a strain on the consensus government. Service delivery in Gaza is complicated by the existence of two distinct public services—one paid and managed by the PA in Ramallah, and the other by the *de facto* authority in Gaza—and the current arrangement is unsustainable.

II. THE SITUATION IN GAZA

5. **The recent conflict in Gaza has created a humanitarian crisis and dramatically augmented the development challenges.** More than 2,100 Palestinians died during the hostilities, and a third of the population was internally displaced. The conflict resulted in massive destruction of infrastructure. According to the PA's estimates, as presented in its report to the Cairo conference on Gaza reconstruction, the total damage is close to US\$4 billion. These estimates as well as proposals for reconstruction are being refined in a full damage needs assessment led by the PA with support from the EU, UN and the World Bank. Gaza reconstruction will require the PA to agree with the Government of Israel (GoI) on an effective entry and access system to allow flow of critical construction materials into Gaza, and to allow reconstruction activities to be led by private contractors. The system would need to ensure entry of materials under the PA's leadership, assuring the GoI and donors that building materials are used only for the purposes intended. The efficacy and efficiency of this system will significantly affect the time and cost of the reconstruction process and will also determine the economic impact of the conflict.

6. **The economic impact of the Gaza conflict is doubtless severe.** The loss in West Bank and Gaza GDP compared to the pre-conflict forecast is estimated at US\$660 million.¹ Economic activity has virtually stopped in Gaza for almost two months. Furthermore, the damages to business infrastructure and inventory are thought to be severe. While fieldwork is ongoing to assess the damages to private companies in more detail, it is preliminarily estimated that facilities along with the equipment and inventory of more than 400 companies in the manufacturing sector and more than 900 in the service sector (primarily trade) have been damaged or destroyed. Inventory losses are estimated to be unusually high, as many companies kept large stocks of production inputs and finished products as a way of coping with the severe restrictions on external trade. A number of businesses will suffer as a result of human capital losses, due to death or severe injuries of their key staff. At the broad level, the World Bank and the IMF are forecasting that the Palestinian economy will shrink by almost four percent in 2014 in real terms with 15 percent GDP reduction in Gaza and 0.5 percent in the West Bank.

7. **The social and poverty impact is also severe.** Even before the conflict started, unemployment in Gaza had already jumped to 45 percent (June 2014), with youth unemployment at 63 percent. While there are no recent poverty estimates, it is known that unemployment is an important determinant of poverty in West Bank and Gaza and it is believed that close to half of Gaza's population lives in poverty. In fact, some 70 percent of Gaza's population had already been aid dependent. Now, with massive internal displacement, home destruction, deep recession, destruction of productive capacity within Gaza's economy, and the impact of the conflict on the mental and physical health of the Gaza population, the size of the social and poverty impact is hard to fathom.

8. **There is a huge need for immediate assistance, as well as the reconstruction and early recovery assistance that would help restore basic public services and livelihoods,**

¹ The Bank and the IMF were forecasting 2 percent real GDP growth prior to the onset of the Gaza conflict and the forecast now is -3.7 percent. This would translate in an approximate loss of US\$660 million in nominal GDP in 2014 only.

prevent the outbreak of disease and resumption of violence. The Palestinian Authority, whose budget has been chronically overstretched, despite its best intentions and efforts will not be able to face these challenges without generous financial and technical assistance from its multilateral and bilateral donor partners. Among other interventions needed, the PA has requested donors to augment their budget support to provide quick disbursing assistance for its programs in Gaza, but also to help it cope with the broader impact of the Gaza conflict on the Palestinian economy and public finances.

III. THE PA'S RESPONSE

9. **The PA has provided immediate assistance to alleviate the impact of the conflict in Gaza.** A large number of injured during the recent conflict in Gaza were treated in East Jerusalem and Israeli hospitals. While the exact cost of these treatments is not clear yet, they will be covered by the budget of the Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, the PA also provided fuel for generators to meet urgent needs for electricity during and immediately after the conflict. The PA also committed to temporarily extend financial assistance to an additional 20,000 poor people in Gaza, who were affected by the recent conflict. The PA estimates these additional expenditures have already amounted to around US\$30 million, but a detailed breakdown of expenditures is not available yet.

10. **In addition, the PA has been preparing a comprehensive strategy and plan to deal with the aftermath of the Gaza conflict.** As the first phase in the planning process, the PA prepared damage assessments for specific sectors. A plan called "The National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza" (NERRPG) has been prepared in consultation with the Bank and other donors for the October donor conference in Cairo. Given that full-fledged damage and needs assessments for all relevant sectors are yet to be completed, the PA is cognizant that the plan will be a living document for the next few months. However, it is impressive that the PA managed with donor support to prepare in record time a preliminary strategy that: a) provides a vision for Gaza's reconstruction and socioeconomic recovery; b) provides early damage estimates; and c) outlines the principles for the implementation of the plan and prerequisites for its success.

11. **Although this figure may be revised as a result of the full damage and needs assessments, the PA currently estimates that the cost of relief, reconstruction, and recovery in Gaza will amount to US\$4 billion.** In the housing sector alone, the cost of repairs and reconstruction is estimated at US\$1.4 billion, while the cost of reconstruction for damaged or destroyed companies is estimated at US\$1 billion. The provision of social assistance for an additional 20,000 poor beneficiaries until 2017 is estimated at US\$500 million. While these numbers have to be taken with caution until more accurate assessments are produced, the financial need is undoubtedly very high.

12. **The more detailed damage and needs assessment (DNA) will utilize existing data and sectoral assessments currently conducted by the PA.** The key objective of the DNA is to compile all existing assessments into one internationally accepted standard for determining damages, losses and needs. This standard will be used to finalize the NERRPG and prioritize the PA's and donor-financed interventions for recovery and reconstruction. The DNA would be led

and owned by the PA with assistance from a multi-disciplinary, multiagency team comprising the relevant UN agencies, the EU and the World Bank.

13. **It is also noteworthy that an overarching objective of the PA is to fully integrate Gaza under its governance structure.** The formation of the National Consensus Government was the first step in this direction. While this agreement has yet to be fully implemented in practice, it can be safely argued that effective governance by the PA in Gaza will be a crucial enabler of a successful Gaza reconstruction and recovery. In NERRPG, the PA has outlined a plan of interventions for effective governance in Gaza.

IV. THE WORLD BANK GROUP'S RESPONSE AND STRATEGY

14. **The Bank has been active from early stages of the joint effort to design a recovery and reconstruction plan for Gaza.** The PA has asked the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the European Union (EU) to assist with the post-humanitarian phase needs assessments, which will be critical inputs to enable the PA to revise and finalize the NERRPG.

15. The Bank has been supporting the relevant PA's institutions in the baseline construction; analysis, validation and quantification of damages; analysis of the service delivery and socio-economic impacts; and a preliminary quantification of reconstruction needs. Based on the World Bank's expertise and ongoing sector engagement in the Palestinian territories, the Bank will be supporting the PA and its partners in subsequent impact and needs assessment with a focus on physical infrastructure and service provision, i.e. water and sanitation, energy, and municipal development; productive infrastructure and impact on the private sector; and the Palestinian economy in general.

16. **The Bank's current portfolio was reviewed in light of the Gaza emergency reconstruction efforts.** To provide support to the emergency needs in Gaza in the most efficient and tested way, the Bank proposes using existing trust fund mechanisms and operations to channel funds reallocated from the current portfolio and additional donor contributions that would be expected. The proposed supplemental financing is one of the key elements of the emergency response to address the urgent needs in Gaza and those in the West Bank related to the Gaza conflict. Furthermore, the existing Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) that are currently active in the Palestinian portfolio are available to provide a channel for existing and new donors in funding the Gaza reconstruction needs. Funding can be provided to the PA's Central Treasury Account through the Palestinian Reconstruction Development Plan (PRDP) multi-donor trust fund; or directly to the PA's sector institutions.

17. **Scaling-up the ongoing well performing operations will assist in swiftly making additional funds available.** Additional financing is proposed for the following investment projects based on the fact that they are implemented by the PA's institutions that have local staff on the ground, work directly with utilities and municipalities in Gaza, have a good implementation track record, and can quickly channel the funds for immediate reconstruction needs: Second Municipal Development Project, Water Supply and Sewage Systems Project, Gaza Electricity Network Rehabilitation Project.

V. REFORM PROGRAM SUPPORTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY GRANT VI: AN UPDATE

18. **The DPG VI continues the efforts of the previous five development policy operations in strengthening the PA’s fiscal position and public finance management, but it also tackles private sector development as a new policy area.** The first two policy areas are aligned with the priorities indicated in the governance and institution section of the PA’s NDP 2014-2016. Engagement in these areas is warranted by the fiscal conundrum the PA faces in light of the decline in donor aid, its uncertain prospects, and the lack of progress in easing restrictions on private sector-led growth, all of which have contributed to a significant slowdown in economic growth. Furthermore, provided that the reduction of poverty, improvement in prosperity for the bottom 40 percent of the Palestinian people, and sustainable public finances necessitate private sector-led growth, the DPG VI has been designed to also extend support to the PA’s recently intensified efforts to improve the business environment. This new area of engagement under the DPG VI is aligned with MENA Region’s Framework for Engagement, specifically the objective of “creating Jobs, including for youth and women, by providing an enabling environment for opportunity, competition, innovation and entrepreneurship,” and the cross-cutting objective of supporting a “competitive private sector.”

19. **With a total of six standalone DPGs, that were de facto prepared as a programmatic series, the Bank has been relatively successful in supporting the PA’s reform program under three successive development strategies.** The outcome, Bank and borrower performance ratings in the implementation completion and results reports (ICR) for both DPG IV and DPG V are rated as “moderately satisfactory”, which have been confirmed in the Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) reviews. Thus, despite a high degree of fragility, volatility, and uncertainty in the operating environment in the West Bank and Gaza, the Bank has had moderate success in its effort to support structural reforms through several DPGs. Moreover, the Bank’s role in signaling to other donors who provide budget support through the Bank-administered multi-donor trust fund or on their own has arguably been even more important than the DPG itself. Without this assistance—roughly one third of the PA’s recurrent budget expenditures—the unemployment and poverty rates in the Palestinian territories would certainly be much higher than they are. The PA will remain dependent on substantial amounts of budget support until a political solution is found and restrictions on economic activity imposed by the Government of Israel have been substantially eased or removed to enable sustainable private sector-led growth.

A. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SINCE THE APPROVAL OF THE DPG VI

20. **The Palestinian economy was slowing down, even before the recent Gaza conflict.** Growth dropped from 6 percent in 2012 to about 2 percent in 2013 as a result of political uncertainty, a reduction in aid, the ongoing restrictions and the collapse of tunnel activity which had a severe impact on the economy of Gaza. The deterioration continued in 2014 and preliminary estimates by the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) indicate that the economy fell into recession in the first quarter of the year with growth amounting to -1 percent:

0.5 percent in the West Bank and -4 percent in Gaza.² Given that annual population growth in the Palestinian territories is about 3 percent, recent growth trends imply that a decline in real per capita GDP already started in 2013. In addition, unemployment has surged reaching 45 percent in Gaza (Q2 2014), which is almost three times higher than that in the West Bank at 16 percent.

21. The breakdown of tunnel activity in mid-2013 against the backdrop of recurring conflicts and the ongoing blockade led to a strong deterioration in economic conditions in Gaza. Gaza has suffered from a series of conflicts that have had a severe impact on economic activity and infrastructure. Gaza has also been placed under a blockade since 2006-7 that severely restricts the movement of goods and people to and from Gaza. Even though the blockade was slightly eased in 2010, private sector activity has continued to be severely constrained. In addition, the breakdown of the tunnel activity in mid-2013 led to a strong decline in the construction sector which has been the major contributor to Gaza's growth and employment in recent years.

22. Inflation in the Palestinian territories remains stable. Average inflation for the first seven months of 2014 in the West Bank was very close to that in Gaza at about 2 percent. Notably, inflation levels in Gaza in previous years used to be lower than in the West Bank. However, with the crackdown of the tunnel activity in mid-2013, prices in Gaza started to rise as access to cheaper Egyptian fuel, construction materials and other commercial goods became substantially more limited.

23. Despite the recession, the PA managed to keep the recurrent deficit below its prorated budget target in the first half of 2014. According to the MoF data, the PA's recurrent deficit between January-June 2014 was 24 percent lower than its mid-year budget target. The performance of the PA's revenues was impressive in the first half of 2014 as they grew by 23 percent compared to the same period last year, and exceeded the prorated budget target by 9 percent. This is attributed to a significant growth in clearance revenues due to increased official imports of Israeli fuel into Gaza as access to the cheaper Egyptian fuel was interrupted following the destruction of the tunnels. Domestic revenues also performed well due to front-loaded tax payments by several large companies driven by financial incentives to pre-pay taxes as well as a significant increase in the number of tax payers thanks to stepped up enforcement efforts.³ Expenditures were 2 percent lower than their mid-year budget target. The PA has continued to place tight controls on the wage bill, which represents more than half of recurrent spending. The zero net hiring policy that was put in place in late 2012 has been largely maintained and the wage bill is therefore expected to remain within its budget target for 2014. Spending on the use of goods and services was also kept below its budget target⁴. On the other hand, net lending, which

² At the time the DPG VI was prepared, the Bank and the IMF were projecting 2 percent growth in 2014.

³ The DPG VI supports two significant measures taken by the PA to improve revenue performance.

⁴ In the MoF's monthly budget execution tables, spending on goods and services exceeded its budget target but this is due to an accounting misclassification. About NIS516 million worth of arrears accumulated in previous years on operational spending were cleared in the first half of 2014. These repayments were recorded in the monthly tables above the line as cash expenditures under the use of goods and services, even though they should have been recorded as part of financing below the line. Amending this classification error reduces the spending on goods and services by NIS516 million, which makes this item below its budget target for the first half of 2014.

is primarily the result of unpaid electricity bills to the Israeli Electricity Corporation and results in the deductions from clearance revenues by the Government of Israel, continued to exceed forecasts. This complex problem is the result of increasing technical losses due to the lack of infrastructure investment, decreasing collection from customers, particularly in the West Bank, and the diversion of electricity revenues by municipalities to finance budgetary expenditures. The PA has already taken steps to deal with this problem, but the results will take some time to materialize.

24. **Finally, while the PA has recently reduced its bank debt and is expected to reduce the stock of arrears owed to the private sector, it has not yet managed to implement the planned pension system reforms, which is resulting in significant contingent liabilities for the PA's budget in the medium to long term.** Due to an ever tightening budget constraint in recent years, the PA has not been making regular contributions for the funded component of the pension fund. If the current trend continues, the pension fund's reserve would be exhausted by 2022 (World Bank projections).

B. ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT IN GAZA

25. **The Gaza conflict has severely impacted the Palestinian economy.**⁵ The Bank and the IMF were forecasting 2 percent real GDP growth for 2014 prior to the onset of the Gaza conflict and the forecast now is -3.7 percent. This would translate in an approximate loss of US\$660 million in nominal GDP in 2014 alone. The economic activity almost completely stopped in Gaza for the duration of the seven-week conflict, and this has significantly affected all economic sectors. For instance, based on preliminary estimates, the construction sector, which has been the main contributor to Gaza's growth in recent years has shrunk by 75 percent during the first three quarters of 2014 compared to the same period last year. Furthermore, agriculture sector output dropped by 30 percent while wholesale and retail trade shrunk by 15 percent. Growth in the Palestinian territories is expected to rebound to more than 4 percent in 2015 (11 percent in Gaza and 2.3 percent in the West Bank) assuming that large amounts of aid will be channeled for reconstruction. However, in Gaza, where the capacity of most economic sectors has been severely damaged by the conflict, a lot of time will be needed to build back the capacity and restore output back to pre-conflict levels. In addition, without a fundamental change, Israeli restrictions on the movement and access will continue to be the binding constraint to sustainable economic growth.

26. **Despite significant losses in Gaza, the banking sector remains healthy thanks to the efforts of the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA).** The sector is well regulated by the PMA which has steadily been building the capabilities of a central bank. Banks in general are risk averse and profitable due to several reasons, including cheap sources of deposits and healthy margins. The year-on-year growth of the sector's net assets was 15 percent in June 2014, and its net income grew by 4 percent when compared to the same period last year. The banking sector has a high credit exposure to the Palestinian Authority and its employees, and the PMA is carefully monitoring related risks. The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans continued to

⁵ GDP estimates in this section were prepared by the IMF in collaboration with the Bank staff.

be low at 3 percent; however, this is expected to increase due to the recent conflict as the capacity of some individuals and businesses, particularly in Gaza, to service their loan installments has significantly deteriorated. The PMA has already taken measures to deal with the effects of the latest conflict on the banking sector. It has recently reached an agreement with banks to reprogram loans (principal and interest payments) for six months and waive some fees for the people of Gaza. It has also reduced risk reserves from 2 percent of risk weighted assets to 0.5 percent.

Table 1: West Bank and Gaza: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2010-2017

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Estimate 2013 | Pre Conflict Proj. 2014 | 2014 | Post Conflict Proj. 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|------------------|----------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|
| Output and prices | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP (2004 market prices) | | | | | (Annual percentage change) | | | | |
| West Bank | 9.3 | 12.4 | 6.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | -3.7 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| Gaza | 8.4 | 10.7 | 6.1 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| CPI inflation (end of period) | 11.9 | 17.7 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 3.0 | -15.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 |
| CPI inflation (period average) | 2.8 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Investment and saving | | | | | | | | | |
| Gross capital formation, of which: | 18.5 | 17.3 | 13.7 | 12.4 | 11.9 | 13.8 | 15.9 | 15.8 | 15.8 |
| Public | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.5 |
| Private | 14.9 | 13.5 | 9.9 | 8.8 | 8.4 | 9.9 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.4 |
| Gross national savings, of which: | 7.9 | -6.4 | -15.2 | -5.6 | -8.8 | -12.3 | -15.5 | -13.3 | -12.6 |
| Public | -0.5 | -4.7 | -6.6 | -1.1 | -1.7 | -2.1 | -3.1 | -2.4 | -1.7 |
| Private | 8.4 | -1.6 | -8.6 | -4.5 | -7.1 | -10.2 | -12.4 | -11.0 | -10.9 |
| Saving-investment balance | -10.6 | -23.6 | -28.9 | -18.0 | -20.8 | -26.1 | -31.4 | -29.2 | -28.4 |
| Monetary sector | | | | | | | | | |
| Credit to the private sector | 31.1 | 24.2 | 14.3 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 13.0 | 10.0 | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| Private sector deposits | 9.9 | 4.0 | 6.8 | 10.7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 6.7 |
| External sector | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | (In percent of GDP) | | | | |
| Exports of goods and nonfactor services | 13.8 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 19.0 | 19.3 | 19.2 | 19.2 |
| Imports of goods and nonfactor services | 55.5 | 59.1 | 63.1 | 58.8 | 60.4 | 69.2 | 71.0 | 67.7 | 66.1 |
| Net factor income | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.3 |
| Net current transfers | 23.9 | 12.7 | 10.9 | 15.0 | 13.9 | 16.4 | 12.8 | 11.9 | 11.2 |
| Private transfers | 10.2 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| Official transfers | 13.7 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 11.1 | 9.9 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 |
| Current account balance (excluding official transfers) | -24.3 | -32.0 | -36.4 | -29.1 | -30.7 | -37.5 | -39.7 | -36.9 | -35.7 |
| Current account balance (including official transfers) | -10.6 | -23.6 | -28.9 | -18.0 | -20.8 | -26.1 | -31.4 | -29.2 | -28.4 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP (in millions of US\$) | 8344 | 9775 | 10255 | 11302 | 12004 | 11090 | 12018 | 12920 | 13794 |
| Per Capita nominal GDP (US\$) | 2061 | 2345 | 2389 | 2557 | 2638 | 2437 | 2567 | 2682 | 2784 |
| Unemployment rate | 24 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 27 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 31 |

Source: IMF, WB and PCBS

27. Despite having to incur additional expenditures to provide immediate assistance to the conflict-stricken people in Gaza, the PA has committed to continue reducing the deficit in the medium term. Based on the current projections and thanks to an unexpectedly strong revenue performance, the PA is expected not only to reduce the 2014 budget deficit, but also to reduce the large stock of arrears it owes to the private sector by roughly US\$100 million in 2014, which will inject some liquidity into the Palestinian struggling private sector. The recurrent deficit is projected to keep falling over the medium term from 11 percent in 2013 and 2014 to 6 percent in 2017. Overall deficit is also expected to drop from 12 percent to 10 percent over the same period. This declining deficit trend is in line with the IMF's assessment.

28. This will be driven mainly by a reduction in the share of expenditures in the economy as the PA continues its reform efforts to rationalize spending. For instance, the PA plans to continue implementing measures to control the growth of the wage bill and move forward with the civil service reform. In fact, the wage bill grew by less than two percent in nominal NIS terms in 2013 due to the PA's zero net hiring policy that had been in place since

late 2012. The PA plans to maintain this policy for the coming years.⁶ In addition, the General Personnel Council (GPC) has been working on a general review of all posts in each line ministry or agency to update the currently used job descriptions and to produce job classifications. The ultimate objective is to rely on these job classifications as criteria to determine budget allocations for staff costs to various ministries. The GPC has also started working on producing functional reviews, looking at the overall organizational structures within the PA including major ministries and public institutions. With support from the USAID, a number of measures are also being implemented by the MoH to improve efficiency of health expenditures⁷. Reducing net lending continues to be a key priority for the PA. The Bank has recently finalized the first study that identifies specifically the main drivers of this complex issue. Based on the recommendations of the study, the PA has already taken some steps to reduce net lending. For example, a legal decision to impose penalties on electricity distributors not paying their bills for purchased electricity owed to the Israeli Electric Corporation (IEC) was adopted by the Palestinian Energy Regulatory Authority (PENRA). To improve efficiency and transparency in the electricity system, the Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC), and the Palestinian Electricity Transmission Company (PETL) were established. PENRA also plans to launch smart meter pilot projects throughout the West Bank in order to increase electricity bill payment. These efforts combined are expected to lead to a 4 percentage points decline in PA spending in the medium term which is projected at 30 percent of GDP in 2017.

29. The PA's revenues are also expected to continue growing in the medium term due to the implementation of the revenue strategy that was launched in early 2014. The main objective under the strategy is to widen the tax base through policy and administrative measures. On the tax policy front, the PA has introduced amendments to various laws including the Investment Promotion Law and the Income Tax Law (see section C below). On the administration front, the PA has been reforming the system of penalties applied to tax evaders and delinquent taxpayers as the previous one was found to be inefficient. The MoF reports that since implementation started, an additional 2,500 taxpayers were added to the system. In addition, work is underway to restructure the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) and to increase the number of taxpayers within its jurisdiction. As a result of the abovementioned measures, tax revenues are expected to jump by 3.5 percentage points of GDP compared to the 2013 level.⁸

⁶ The PA has also reformed its policy on transportation allowance in 2014 to ensure that staff who are temporarily not coming to work do not receive transportation allowance and that the allowance is based on staffs' current residences, regardless of where they resided when they joined civil service. Leadership allowance to security staff in Gaza was also cancelled as of May 1.

⁷ The PA has already decentralized the referral process by creating three committees in the West Bank in addition to another committee in Gaza, as the previously used centralized model was not functioning well. In addition, the MoH has already produced a draft procedural manual that identifies the criteria to be followed for medical referrals outside the MoH facilities. With support from the USAID, the MoH has also been working on setting up a health information management system that will act as a centralized database for the overall referral process. MoH has also already negotiated draft contracts with the Israeli hospitals that the majority of cases are referred to with the aim of reducing the costs. Another area of focus is reducing net lending. Therefore, the PA has already created an inter-ministerial Special Committee that is in charge of monitoring and addressing all issues related to net lending.

⁸ The 3.5 percentage points increase is expected already in 2014 and it will largely be the result of a base expansion related to growth in fuel imports from Israel to Gaza. While this effect would wane in later years, it is expected that it will be fully compensated as a result of PA's tax reforms. Annual tax growth of 7 percent is expected between 2014 and 2017.

30. **If the PA's ongoing efforts to strengthen governance in Gaza succeed, tax revenues could increase significantly.** While the PA continued funding expenditure programs in Gaza following the Hamas-Fatah split in 2006 (currently above 40 percent of its expenditures are in Gaza), the revenues the PA collected in Gaza in 2013 were a mere three percent of the total.⁹ Even though this figure increased to above 10 percent in the recent months due to higher Israeli fuel imports to Gaza¹⁰, it remains well below its pre-2007 level. Estimating the potential revenues from Gaza is challenging. However, the initial estimates indicate that tax revenue that could potentially be collected on imports into Gaza is equivalent to US\$290 million¹¹. Estimating the amount of domestic tax revenues that could be internally collected in Gaza is even more difficult because the PA's tax administration is not operating there. However, assuming that as in the West Bank, internally collected revenues amount to approximately half of what is collected on imports, one can estimate that around US\$145 million in additional tax revenues could be generated in Gaza¹². The potential tax revenues for Gaza are close to 19 percent of the PA's total revenues in 2013. Finally, no revenues currently collected for Gaza's electricity bill are remitted to the PA, while the PA pays the entire electricity bill of Gaza (directly deducted by Israel from the PA's revenues through the clearance process). If this were to change, the PA's revenues could increase by at least US\$200 million based on recent collections in Gaza. In total, the yearly amount of revenues that could be generated in Gaza is estimated at US\$635 million. While the potential reintegration of Gaza under the PA's leadership and with the support of the donor community would also entail additional costs (currently estimated at around US\$400 million per year), the net fiscal impact would ultimately be positive.

31. **In sum, the macroeconomic policy framework remains adequate.** Despite a sharp drop in economic growth and recent political setbacks due to the failure of the peace talks, the PA has managed to augment revenues and control expenditures. The degree of fiscal consolidation achieved over the past five years is impressive by any standard. Although the economy is in recession, the PA is expected to reduce its budget deficit in 2014 and is expected to reduce the stock of arrears to suppliers with the aim of injecting some liquidity into the private sector. With the reforms currently under implementation and others envisaged under the NDP and some improvement in the political and security environment, the PA's deficit will continue falling and its finances will be on a sustainable track. Debt sustainability analysis, conducted in mid-2014 by the IMF shows that under the baseline scenario, the PA's debt will be on a sustainable track.¹³ Finally, despite the projected fiscal adjustments, until the ongoing restrictions on movement and access have been removed so that private investment can pick up and drive economic growth, the PA will continue to depend on substantial donor aid to finance its deficit.

⁹ The PA's total revenues dropped by four percentage points of GDP following the Fatah-Hamas split, which brought the end to its revenue collection operations in Gaza. Detailed figures are not available to fully ascertain if the entire drop is related to Gaza.

¹⁰ Taxes on these fuel imports are levied by the GoI and transferred to the PA.

¹¹ This figure is based on Gaza's GDP and imports in 2013 and assuming the same efficiency of collecting border taxes as for the West Bank.

¹² It is reasonable to expect that this share will initially be significantly smaller in Gaza until tax enforcement capacity is developed and the taxable base is augmented through economic growth.

¹³ For details, please see Annex 1 (Fund Relations Annex).

Table 2: West Bank and Gaza Central Government Fiscal Operations (commitment basis), 2010-2017

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Estimate | Projections | | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------|-------|----------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| | (In millions of US\$) | | | | | | | |
| Total net revenues | 1836 | 2045 | 2075 | 2312 | 2657 | 2874 | 3076 | 3282 |
| Gross domestic revenues | 653 | 738 | 729 | 853 | 811 | 879 | 929 | 978 |
| Tax revenues | 382 | 482 | 481 | 598 | 556 | 589 | 623 | 658 |
| Nontax revenues | 271 | 256 | 248 | 255 | 255 | 290 | 305 | 320 |
| Clearance revenues | 1259 | 1423 | 1459 | 1691 | 2042 | 2165 | 2290 | 2418 |
| Less tax refunds | 76 | 116 | 113 | 231 | 197 | 170 | 142 | 114 |
| VAT | .. | .. | .. | .. | 22 | .. | .. | .. |
| Petroleum rebate | .. | .. | .. | .. | 174 | .. | .. | .. |
| Recurrent expenditures and net lending | 2900 | 3139 | 3357 | 3517 | 3823 | 3911 | 4032 | 4150 |
| Wage expenditure | 1614 | 1782 | 1769 | 1919 | 2043 | 2132 | 2197 | 2260 |
| Non-wage expenditure | 1051 | 1217 | 1309 | 1388 | 1488 | 1567 | 1636 | 1705 |
| Net lending | 236 | 140 | 278 | 210 | 292 | 213 | 199 | 185 |
| Recurrent balance | -1065 | -1094 | -1281 | -1205 | -1167 | -1037 | -956 | -868 |
| Development expenditures | 299 | 370 | 243 | 187 | 328 | 488 | 510 | 531 |
| Overall balance (before external support) | -1364 | -1464 | -1524 | -1392 | -1495 | -1525 | -1466 | -1399 |
| Overall balance (after external support) | -86 | -452 | -483 | -27 | -11 | -120 | -121 | -121 |
| Financing | 1364 | 1464 | 1524 | 1392 | 1495 | 1525 | 1466 | 1399 |
| External budgetary support | 1147 | 843 | 885 | 1259 | 1284 | 1212 | 1137 | 1056 |
| Development financing | 131 | 169 | 156 | 106 | 200 | 193 | 208 | 222 |
| Net domestic bank financing | 84 | 93 | 127 | -248 | 120 | 120 | 121 | 121 |
| Domestic arrears | -60 | 358 | 404 | 285 | -109 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Residual | 62 | 1 | -48 | -10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Public finances (commitment basis) | (In percent of GDP) | | | | | | | |
| Total net revenues | 22.0 | 20.9 | 20.2 | 20.5 | 24.0 | 23.9 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Recurrent expenditures and net lending | 34.8 | 32.1 | 32.7 | 31.1 | 34.5 | 32.5 | 31.2 | 30.1 |
| Wage expenditure | 19.3 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.0 | 16.4 |
| Non-wage expenditure | 12.6 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 13.4 | 13.0 | 12.7 | 12.4 |
| Net lending | 2.8 | 1.4 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
| Recurrent balance (before grants) | -12.8 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -10.7 | -10.5 | -8.6 | -7.4 | -6.3 |
| Overall balance (before grants) | -16.3 | -15.0 | -14.9 | -12.3 | -13.5 | -12.7 | -11.3 | -10.1 |
| Overall balance (after grants) | -1.0 | -4.6 | -4.7 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -1.0 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
| Memorandum items (in millions of US\$): | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP | 8344 | 9775 | 10255 | 11302 | 11090 | 12018 | 12920 | 13794 |

Source: IMF, WB and PA MoF.

Note: The PA has been repaying operational arrears and recording these payments as expenditures. This accounting misclassification was fixed in the table from 2014 onwards, but the lack of data on the exact amount of these payments in previous years prevented correction to data prior to 2014.

C. REFORM PROGRESS SINCE APPROVAL OF THE DPG VI

32. **Despite implementation challenges and severe shocks caused by the conflict in Gaza to the Palestinian economy and public finances, the program supported under DPG VI remains on track.** There has been no reversal of prior actions and moderate progress has been made towards the achievement of the results defined in the context of the operation.

33. **Enhancing domestic tax revenues continues to be a priority for the PA.** Domestic tax revenues at 5 percent of GDP are low in comparison to other countries in the region and other lower middle income countries. Thus, the PA has been focusing efforts to increase collections primarily by eliminating different loopholes in the tax system and strengthening enforcement. Several laws and procedures are being revised and specific plans are being put in place to increase tax registration, as well as to detect and penalize non-payers especially since only 30 percent of the potential tax base is currently covered. The PA has recently reduced the size and scope of tax incentives provided in the Investment Promotion Law, as advised by the IMF. Assessments showed that these incentives have proven ineffective in their aim to attract

substantial new investments and have benefited few already profitable companies at a significant cost in terms of lost tax revenues. Recent amendments to the Investment Promotion Law (a prior action under the DPG VI) have narrowed the scope and duration of those tax incentives. The PA also adopted amendments to the Income Tax Law to introduce a 10 percent tax on distributed dividends, which reduces opportunities for tax arbitrage and broadens the tax base.¹⁴ Thanks to these internal reforms and better cooperation with the Government of Israel, domestic revenue collection has met its budget target and clearance revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA have substantially exceeded the budget target.¹⁵

34. The measures supported under the DPG VI have enabled the PA to successfully control the wage bill. At 17 percent of GDP, the public sector wage bill in the West Bank and Gaza remains high by international standards. Addressing this issue requires both short-term measures to contain the growth of wages and the number of staff on the PA's payroll, but also wide ranging structural reforms. The precarious fiscal and political situation is most probably the reason why the PA has so far been addressing this issue through short-term measures. Specifically, the PA has reformed its policy on transportation allowance in 2014 to ensure that staff who are temporarily not coming to work do not receive transportation allowance and that the allowance is based on staff current residences, regardless of where they resided when they joined civil service. Leadership allowance to security staff in Gaza was also cancelled as of May 1. The PA had put in place a zero net hiring policy in late 2012 and has maintained it since. Even though employment figures for June indicate that there has been a net increase in the number of PA employees by 830 staff, the PA reports that this increase is only temporary and it is caused by the fact that new recruitments usually take place in the beginning of the year while most retirements and other departures occur towards the end. A net reduction of 292 in the number of staff on the PA's payroll between June and August 2014 supports this argument.

35. Public procurement reform, also supported under the DPG VI, is another area where the PA has been making good progress. Following the enactment of amendments to the public procurement law (PPL) to fill some gaps and remove certain inconsistencies on the basis of inputs from various stakeholders and the adoption of the Regulation for the implementation of the amended Law in April 2014, drafted with the Bank's support, the Public Procurement Council is working on finalizing essential actions to launch the implementation of the PPL including: 1) finalizing the Cabinet's approval of the Council's organizational structure and subsequent hiring of key staff, 2) preparing the National Standard Bidding Documents, 3) training the procurement workforce, and 4) establishing a single portal procurement website where all procurement plans and contract award notices would be published.

36. Progress, although not fully satisfactory, has also been made in implementing the Public Finance Management (PFM) policies supported under the DPG VI. In the area of cash management, the PA has made significant improvement in regards to its cash planning system. This was done through establishing a cash committee that is in charge of the cash

¹⁴ First time revenues generated from this new tax will be collected by the PA in early 2015 once publically listed companies distribute dividends on profits earned in 2014.

¹⁵ Clearance revenues have also gotten a substantial boost as a result of increased fuel imports into Gaza from Israel. Due tax revenues on those imports are transferred by Israel to the PA.

forecasting and management process. The Committee is headed by the Minister of Finance, and includes the Accountant General and the Budget Director. The Secretariat is held by the Cash and Debt Management Department. Based on a template developed with the World Bank assistance, the MoF has produced an annual cash plan for 2014 that is adjusted on monthly basis. This has reduced uncertainty related to cash availability and has also helped identify monthly priorities for discretionary expenditures. Furthermore, the MoF has issued a decision (supported by the DPG VI), which formally committed it to implement new functions of the Integrated Financial Management Information System to strengthen arrears management. While the technical preparations to introduce an improved system have been made, these reforms have not been implemented yet. The Bank continues the dialogue and provides technical support to the PA (along with other donor partners such as, the EU and DFID) to ensure that these new functionalities would provide more detailed information on accumulated arrears and would facilitate better fiscal management.

37. **Finally, with support under the DPG VI the PA has recently implemented some important reforms to improve the business environment, particularly access to finance.** In January 2014, the President promulgated the Leasing Law which is expected to encourage new forms of business financing through leasing companies in addition to banks and microfinance institutions. Furthermore, an asset registry has been developed with the IFC support where leased assets can be formally registered and used for public notice. The asset registry will become particularly important once the Secured Transactions Law, which has been adopted by the Cabinet, is promulgated by the President. The Secured Transactions Law will formalize the use of different asset classes as collateral, including contractual future income streams and create a way to formally register pledges of assets used as collateral.

D. POVERTY AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS

38. **The proposed supplemental financing is expected to have a positive poverty and social impact.** As stated in the Program Document for the DPG VI, the actions supported by the operation are not expected to have any negative poverty and social impact in the short term and are expected to have a positive impact over the medium term. In fact, this supplemental financing is expected to have a positive poverty and social impact even in the short term as it will enable the PA to implement welfare enhancing programs, in particular its plan to temporarily expand financial assistance to additional 20,000 poor people in Gaza, as well as to provide additional assistance and services to restore livelihoods for the people in Gaza.

E. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

39. **Like the original DPG VI, the proposed supplemental grant will not have significant effects on the environment, forests and other natural resources.** None of the DPG VI prior actions have significant environmental impacts or risks.

VI. RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING

40. **The rationale for the proposed supplemental financing for DPG VI satisfies the Bank's operational policy.** The conflict in Gaza, as shown above, has created a humanitarian crisis and dramatically worsened the development challenges. The damages to Gaza's infrastructure and economy are enormous. The social and poverty impact associated with the loss of human lives, injuries, destruction of houses, displacement, and the loss of employment is severe. The conflict in Gaza has thus created an unexpected and urgent financing need for the PA's 2014 budget. Without additional donor support, not only would this urgent need to address immediate humanitarian and service delivery needs in Gaza remain unmet, but it could also jeopardize the PA's reform program, which is driving the socioeconomic recovery in Gaza and development programs in the West Bank and Gaza. Given the urgency, the proposed supplemental financing allows the Bank to provide support in a timely manner so that the Government can deal rapidly and decisively with the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, while also ensuring that reforms supported under the DPG VI continue to be implemented. Finally, it is noteworthy that each of the criteria for supplemental financing set out in the Bank's operational policy (OP 8.60, Development Policy Financing) has been met: (a) the program is being implemented in compliance with the provisions of the legal agreement with the Bank; (b) the PA is unable to obtain sufficient funds from other lenders or guarantors on reasonable terms or in a reasonable time without the supplemental grant; (c) the time available is too short to process a further free-standing Bank DPG; and (d) the PA remains committed to the program and the implementing agencies have demonstrated competence in carrying it out.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. TERMS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING

41. The proposed supplemental grant in amount of US\$41 million will be financed from the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank (TFGWB).

B. FUNDS FLOW AND AUDITING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCING

Fiduciary Aspects

42. **The fiduciary risk related to the DPG VI and the proposed supplemental financing is considered to be High.** In 2013, the monthly PA's fiscal reports started showing a growing unexplained "residual" amount, which was then reviewed and reversed. The PA has sought international expertise to clarify the situation, and has been working closely with the Bank and the IMF on this matter. A recent Bank review has provided additional comfort about the reconciliation between accounting and banking data. In 2014, the "residual" remains but at only five percent of the original level before accounting errors were identified and resolved. However, there still is a significant delay in the production of audited annual accounts. The last audit report made available by the supreme audit institution (SAACB) on the 2010 Government financial

statements included a number of qualifications.¹⁶ Other remaining PFM issues which are still being addressed are explained in the DPG VI Program Document. The Bank will continue to monitor and work with the MoF on key measures to strengthen public financial management and fiscal reporting. Finally, it is noteworthy that the PA has been publishing its budget on the MoF's website.

43. **A dedicated bank account will be used to segregate supplemental financing proceeds from the PA's other bank accounts, so as to enable an audit of the dedicated account.** The PA will hire an independent external auditor acceptable to the Bank to perform this audit.

Flow of Funds and Auditing Requirements

44. **The Grant proceeds will be disbursed in a single tranche to a US Dollar Dedicated Account that forms part of the PA's official foreign exchange reserves.** In the absence of a Palestinian central bank, the dedicated account will be held at the Bank of Palestine (Ramallah), a commercial bank where prior DPG proceeds have been deposited by the Bank.

45. **The PA will confirm to the Bank, within 15 days of disbursement, the receipt of the Grant funds and that the Grant proceeds have been credited to the Central Treasury Account to finance national budget expenditures; including the date and number of the Treasury Account in which the funds have been deposited as well as the exchange rate applied.** A satisfactory confirmation letter for the disbursement under the original DPG was submitted to the Bank by the MoF.

46. **All payments from the Central Treasury Account should be made through the PA's computerized Financial Management Information System and aggregated in monthly budget execution reports and annual accounts.** The local banking transactions should be made through financial institutions supervised by the Palestinian Monetary Authority and the National Committee Financial Follow up Unit, in accordance with the respective Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations.

47. **If any portion of the grant is used to finance ineligible expenditures as defined in the Grant Agreement, the Bank shall require the PA to refund the ineligible amount.**

¹⁶ The SAACB issued a qualified audit opinion on (i) the 2010 Palestinian Authority's financial statements and (ii) Ministry of Finance's and Palestinian Authority's compliance with some laws and regulations. The qualified opinion mostly reflects inadequate compliance with some mandatory requirements of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) – Cash basis, such as some incomplete bank reconciliations, unexplained discrepancies in the 2009 closing balances and 2010 opening balances, or insufficient accounting of payment arrears. These issues raised by the SAACB in its qualified opinion were considered as material by the SAACB, but not substantial enough to justify a rejection (disclaimer) of the statements.

Flow of funds diagram



External Auditing of the Grant Dedicated Account

48. **The PA will hire an independent external auditor acceptable to the Bank to perform an audit of the Dedicated Account.** The audit will be conducted in accordance with International Standards on Auditing, and with terms of reference acceptable to the Bank. The audit report will be approved and signed by the MoF before it is submitted to the Bank. The audit report will be submitted to the Bank within six months of the release of the single tranche payment.

49. **For the original DPG VI, the MoF submitted acceptable terms of reference for selecting an external auditor in a timely manner.** The MoF confirmed that the audit report for the original DPG VI will be submitted to the Bank before the due date of January 21, 2015.

50. **In general, the auditor will be required to:**

- Validate the transfer and deposit transactions into the Dedicated Account relating to the supplemental financing;
- Verify the extent to which the Bank's requirements under the Grant Agreement are met, and whether the PA's procedures are adequate to achieve this result;
- Verify that no funds are kept in or paid into the Dedicated Account other than those disbursed by the Bank for this particular operation;
- Ensure that the MoF follows adequate disbursement procedures as per PA and governmental standards including accuracy of the exchange rate prevailing at the date of conversion from US Dollar to New Israeli Shekel, and deposit to the Central Treasury Account within one week of the receipt of funds in the Dedicated Account.

VIII. BENEFITS AND RISKS

A. BENEFITS

51. **The potential benefits of this operation are significant.** The quick disbursement of the supplemental grant will assist the PA in meeting the immediate, urgent and enormous needs for relief and reconstruction of the conflict-stricken Gaza. While the financing need is substantially larger than the proposed grant amount, the Bank's decision to provide urgent assistance is also likely to encourage other donors who contribute to the PRDP TF to provide additional budget support through this mechanism. The proposed grant along with other extraordinary financing will help the PA prevent a humanitarian disaster in Gaza without reducing its ability to maintain

basic functions, to pay salaries, social benefits, and suppliers at the time of economic recession. As various studies of conflict and fragility have shown, if governments are not able to fulfill the core functions expected of them in terms of basic public services, social unrest may ensue: the Bank and other donors are providing grants to reduce that risk.

B. RISKS

52. **The risk assessment made for the DPG VI still remains valid and the overall risk is rated “high”.** The political and security situation in the West Bank and Gaza is very fragile, as demonstrated by the outbreak of conflict in Gaza in July 2014 and recent security incidents in the West Bank. The recent social unrest and civil servants' strikes also attest to the fragility of the political situation. The highly volatile political situation could deteriorate quickly and without much warning, stalling the reform process. If the security situation relapses, private sector confidence and investment will decline, public revenues will fall and the PA reforms may stall. In this case, the PA would not be able to meet its medium-term fiscal goals. Due to recent political uncertainties, the relaxation of movement and access restrictions imposed by the GoI in the West Bank and of restrictions on economic activity in Area C has slowed down. The severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza, even before the conflict, have stifled growth there and summer 2014 conflict pushed Gaza deeper into recession. If this trend were to continue, the PA may not be able to continue the reform process and fiscal challenges may become insurmountable. In light of the grueling humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza combined with the still unresolved internal political divisions, the resumption of violence in either West Bank or Gaza in the near future cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the risk of a shortfall in donor support—in particular against the backdrop of augmented assistance needs due to the recent conflict in Gaza—still remains. Finally, as detailed in the previous section, the fiduciary risk also remains high despite some recent improvements in the PA's PFM systems.

53. **These risks undoubtedly cannot be fully mitigated.** However, truce in Gaza, the recent agreement announced by the GoI to allow the flow of reconstruction materials into Gaza, and expressed commitment by the PA to the Consensus Government portend some improvements in the political, security, and economic conditions. Also noteworthy is the fact that the PA has continued to implement structural reforms despite the challenging political and economic environment as well as substantial fiscal pressures and it remains committed to continued reforms. The recent conflict represents the materialization of the political and security risk that was identified in the DPG VI Program Document. Therefore, this supplemental financing can be viewed as a mitigating measure aimed at alleviating the impact of a high risk that has materialized.

ANNEX 1: FUND RELATIONS ANNEX



WEST BANK AND GAZA

REPORT TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE¹

September 12, 2014

KEY ISSUES

Context: With the hostilities in Gaza, the political and security environment has deteriorated markedly over the past months. There have been several attempts to forge a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, brokered by Egypt, most recently on August 26, when an open-ended ceasefire went into effect. Nevertheless, prospects for a broader settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain highly uncertain.

Outlook and risks: The economic outlook has deteriorated substantially, especially for Gaza, which has suffered a devastating loss of life and property. While the conflict is focused on Gaza, disruption to economic activity has also occurred in the West Bank. The outlook depends critically on whether the ceasefire agreement holds, what its eventual terms are, and the speed and size of the international community's response to Gaza's reconstruction and humanitarian needs.

Key policy recommendations: The economic impact of the Gaza conflict is difficult to estimate at this stage, but the extent of the destruction and limited resources of the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) make international mobilization of aid crucial. The experience after the 2008/09 conflict indicates that without a lifting or at least easing of the blockade of Gaza, especially allowing the entry of construction materials, rebuilding efforts are likely to be unsuccessful. At the same time, it is vital that the Palestinian Authority, together with international partners, devise a robust fiscal mechanism to effectively deploy financial aid. This would help strengthen donor confidence that new resources will be effectively and transparently managed. Finally, the WBG's underlying fiscal strains have multiplied after the conflict, and with spending pressures bound to rise in the context of uncertain donor support, it is important that the Palestinian Authority maintains fiscal discipline.

¹ The IMF provides technical services to the West Bank and Gaza, including policy advice in the macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial areas, as well as technical assistance, with a focus on tax administration, public expenditure management, banking supervision and regulation, and macroeconomic statistics. See www.imf.org/wbg for recent staff reports.

Approved By
**Juha Kähkönen and
 Ranil Salgado**

Discussions were held in East Jerusalem and Ramallah during June 24–July 3, 2014, and the report was updated with subsequent developments. The staff team comprised Christoph Duenwald (head), Anja Baum, Rafik Selim, and Anna Unigovskaya (all MCD), and was assisted by Hania Qassis (Resident Representative Office) and Samim Cilem (Resident Advisor). The mission met Prime Minister Hamdallah, Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa, Finance Minister Bishara, Palestine Monetary Authority Governor Al Wazir, other senior officials, private sector representatives, and donors. The mission prepared a concluding statement and issued a statement to the media. Jonah Rosenthal, Cecilia Pineda, and Vanessa Panaligan (all MCD) contributed to producing this report.

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
CONTEXT

- 1. Mounting tensions earlier this year culminated in a lengthy armed conflict between Israel and Hamas in July and August.** Against the background of deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian relations following President Abbas' announcement of a reconciliation agreement between the two Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas, the cycle of violence following the killing of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank ignited a serious military confrontation between Israel and Hamas. The resulting loss of life and property has been devastating, but the recent open-ended ceasefire agreement brings optimism that a lasting truce can be negotiated. During the ceasefire negotiations, Israel has demanded the disarmament of Hamas while Hamas has demanded a lifting of the blockade.²
- 2. Even if a lasting truce is achieved, political uncertainties abound.** Much will depend on the eventual terms of ceasefire agreement, and whether this eventually sets in motion a broader peace process which would bring substantial economic benefits to the WBG economy. Prospects for a lasting reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas are also uncertain. A looming issue is the implementation of the Fatah-Hamas unity agreement reached in late April, including governance arrangements for Gaza and the timeline for national elections. At this point, the consensus government sworn in on June 2, 2014 remains in place, although it continues to govern predominantly in the West Bank.
- 3. While the IMF mission on which this report is based occurred before the conflict in Gaza erupted, the conclusions and policy recommendations remain broadly valid.** During the June/July discussions, staff emphasized the need for measures to contain the financing gap and for a contingency plan in case some of the fiscal risks materialize. After the mission had concluded its work, the tensions that were already palpable erupted into a military conflict, which has raised the WBG's public spending requirements for years to come owing to the need to rebuild Gaza. While staff's earlier policy advice remains generally appropriate, the dramatic shift in the economic landscape requires a modified emphasis in staff's policy recommendations. This report also offers revised macroeconomic projections for the WBG economy incorporating the impact of the conflict, but these are based on very limited information and may therefore have to be revised at a later stage.

² In this report, "blockade" refers to the restrictions placed on the movement of goods and people between Gaza on the one hand and Egypt and Israel on the other, whether by land or by sea. The nature of these restrictions has varied over time.

THE ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT

4. **Even before the Israel-Hamas conflict, the economy was slowing, particularly in Gaza** (Figure 1). Growth decelerated from 6.3 percent in 2012 to 1.9 percent in 2013 (from 6.0 to 0.5 percent in the West Bank and from 7.0 to 6.0 percent in Gaza), reflecting political uncertainty, continued fiscal problems of the PA, and the effects of the tunnel closure between Egypt and Gaza that had a strong impact on construction activity and employment. Growth continued to decline in the first quarter of 2014, turning negative in Gaza, and stabilizing in the West Bank, supported by exports, which continued to grow at a 5 percent annual rate.³ The situation in Gaza was particularly dire, with a humanitarian crisis slowly unfolding even before the Israel-Hamas conflict (Box 1). GDP data for the second quarter of 2014 are not yet available, but the Palestine Monetary Authority's (PMA) business sentiment indicator pointed to a continued decline in business confidence.⁴ In addition, Israeli search operations for the missing teenagers (later found killed) in the West Bank, which focused on the main industrial center of Hebron, are likely to have disrupted economic activity in the second quarter.



5. **Unemployment had surged to new heights, while inflation was stable.** In Gaza, the unemployment rate jumped to 45 percent in the second quarter of 2014 driven by a large loss of jobs in the construction sector, while declining to 16 percent in the West Bank reflecting seasonal factors. Youth unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza reached 39 percent, 63 percent in Gaza alone, adding to the risks of social instability.⁵ Inflation remained subdued, helped by a further strengthening of the NIS exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Inflation in Gaza remained below inflation in the West Bank prior to the conflict.

³ The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) has revised its national accounts estimates for 2000–14 based on IMF TA recommendations. The preliminary GDP series used in this report was shared with staff at end-August. The complete revised data-set is expected to be available soon.

⁴ This indicator, which is based on monthly surveys of managers of industrial firms in the WBG covering their current and expected levels of production, sales, and employment, has been compiled by the PMA since November 2012.

⁵ Labor force participation was 46.4 percent in the West Bank and 44.7 percent in Gaza in Q2 2014, with a large gender gap. The participation rate of males reached 71.7 percent compared with 19.4 percent for females.

Box 1. Gaza Before the 2014 Conflict—Heading Toward a Humanitarian Crisis

Political conflicts and the blockade of Gaza have been major obstacles to economic activity, reconstruction and development throughout the last decade. Political conflicts, the tightening of the Israeli blockade in 2007 and the Gaza war at the end of 2008 left Gaza in a dire economic and humanitarian condition, with real GDP falling by 30 percent between 2006 and 2008. The blockade severely restricted the import of necessary construction materials, as well as economic activity of other sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Consequently, economic recovery was weak: absolute real GDP reached 2005 levels only by 2012, real GDP per capita remained below the 2005 levels even by 2014, and unemployment never fell below 25 percent. The blockade also led to heavy economic dependence on unofficial imports via tunnels to Egypt.

The tunnel closure in 2013 led to a collapse in growth and a financial crisis of the Hamas government, resulting in unsustainable unemployment levels and rising poverty. Estimates suggest that prior to their closure, imports of construction materials that entered Gaza via the tunnels were more than three times higher than the imports via official crossings with Israel.¹ Moreover, tunnel trade was an important source of revenue for the Hamas government and Gaza municipalities. Following the tunnel closure, construction collapsed, fuel became scarce, and unemployment skyrocketed to 45 percent before the onset of the current conflict, with youth unemployment at 63 percent. Hamas was confronted with a payment crisis, leaving 40,000 Hamas employees with a reduced or no salary since the beginning of 2014. In addition, already in 2012 a total of 1.1 out of 1.7 million people living in Gaza received food assistance,² and more than 70 percent of Gaza's population relied on services of a financially burdened UNRWA; this situation undoubtedly became worse with rapidly growing unemployment rates.

The economic and poverty situation was exacerbated by an insufficient and deteriorating water and electricity infrastructure, leading toward a humanitarian crisis. While the water and electricity supply never regained 2005 levels, the majority of the existing infrastructure relied mostly on fuel from the tunnel trade. Consequently, after the tunnel closures, power outages increased and Gaza's sole power plant reported production stoppages of up to 16 hours per day. Access to water of acceptable quality was becoming a critical problem. Over-abstraction from the aquifer has led to increasing seawater intrusion, and daily power cuts limited the ability for wastewater treatment plants, which further reduced water quality. A further decline in the quality and quantity of the water aquifer will result in its collapse within the next few years. This pre-war situation was unsustainable, and a further deterioration as a result of the current war will lead to a humanitarian crisis, absent a quick and generous international response.

Gaza's Socio-Economic Development: 2005–13

| | 2005 | 2013 |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Social development | | |
| Population | 1,304,388 | 1,701,437 |
| Growth rate | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| Registered refugees 1/ | 961,645 | 1,240,082 |
| In percent of population | 73.7 | 72.9 |
| Poverty rate 2/ | 33.7 | 38.8 |
| Deep poverty rate | 19.9 | 21.1 |
| Education 3/ | | |
| Literacy rate | 93.3 | 96.4 |
| Female (in percent) | 89.7 | 94.5 |
| Economic development | | |
| GDP growth | -20.1 | 6.0 |
| GDP per capita (2005=100) | 100 | 86.4 |
| Inflation (eop) | 2.7 | -1.2 |
| Unemployment rate 4/ | 28.2 | 38.5 |
| Youth unemployment | 37.9 | 65.6 |
| Trade 5/ | | |
| Exports (in thousands of USD) | 39,938 | 4,683 |
| Imports (in thousands of USD) | 643,142 | 391,766 |

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

1/ Source: UNRWA, as of January 2014 and March 2005.

2/ Available for 2009 instead of 2005 and for 2011 instead of 2013.

3/ Available for 2012 instead of 2013.

4/ Based on fourth quarter.

5/ Available for 2004 instead of 2005 and for 2012 instead of 2013.

¹ See OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, Monthly Report, June 2013.



² See World Food Program Gaza Watch, WFP Palestine, 18 July 2013.

6. **The fiscal position was already under pressure before the armed conflict.** Despite strong revenues, arrears of the PA continued to increase through June, reflecting higher-than-budgeted spending and back-loaded donor support.

- Total revenues grew 23 percent year-on-year, owing mainly to strong clearance revenues and advanced domestic VAT filings by a number of large companies.⁶ Clearance revenues were bolstered by increased official imports of fuel into Gaza after the closure of the tunnels to Egypt and stepped-up tax administration efforts to combat under-invoicing.

- Recurrent expenditure increased during this period by about 6 percent year-on-year, exceeding the 4-percent growth rate assumed under the budget.⁷ Net lending (expenditure that represents the PA's payments for electricity, water, and sewage to Israel, which is incurred by means of deductions from clearance revenue) reached almost 85 percent of annual budget allocation by end-June and was responsible for excessive growth in expenditure, whereas wage and nonwage spending remained contained. The postponement of the cost-of-living adjustment and certain allowances, in addition to a reform of the transportation allowance and cancelation of the supervision allowance in Gaza, allowed containment of the wage bill, despite some increase in employment.

- At the same time, donor support in the first half of 2014 was low. As a result arrears, including to private suppliers, increased since the beginning of 2014 by more than NIS1 billion, or 2.5 percent of GDP, pushing public debt over the threshold of 40 percent of GDP prescribed by the Law on Public Debt (Figure 2). Additionally, the PA's direct



⁶ The Ministry of Finance introduced an 8 percent tax discount on pre-paid VAT in 2014.

⁷ Staff made an adjustment to the authorities' estimate of nonwage spending, taking into account that at least \$100 million of arrears were cleared, and were erroneously booked under committed expenses on goods and services.

and contingent liabilities to the Israel Electricity Company (IEC), some of which are in dispute, have gone up, reaching NIS1.5 billion at end-May.⁸

7. **Notwithstanding the economic slowdown and political uncertainty, as of end-June the banking sector remained healthy, although exposure to the PA and to consumer and real estate sectors was high** (Figure 3). The banking system remained liquid and profitable, with NPL ratios low at 2.6 percent and Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets at 18 percent in the second quarter of 2014. Credit growth to the private sector has been picking up through June this year, reaching 19.7 percent year-on-year. Banks continued to expand into the retail market, increasing their exposure to consumer, real estate and construction loans, which combined reached almost 50 percent of the banks' total private sector loan portfolio at end-June. Moreover, with a large share of consumer loans allocated to the PA employees, combined with banks' loans to the PA, total exposure of banks to the PA remained high, constituting 43 percent of the banks' loan portfolios. Reflecting high credit risk, lending-deposit interest rate spreads remained high at more than 10 percent for the NIS and 6 percent for the USD.⁹

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND RISKS

In this section, staff presents a set of revised macroeconomic projections taking into account the economic impact of the conflict. It should be stressed that, given the uncertainties, the estimates in this section should be considered highly tentative.

8. **Staff has revised GDP projections downward to reflect the economic impact of the conflict.**¹⁰ From the production side of GDP, it is likely that most sectors in Gaza will have experienced significant losses, including agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and services (Box 2). On the expenditure side, consumption and investment likely have been hit hard. Staff's preliminary estimates project a decline of Gaza's GDP by about 20 percent in the first three quarters of 2014, compared to the same period last year. For the West Bank, economic disruptions have been less, but the decline in household and business confidence might have led to lower consumption and investment. Indeed, the PMA's business sentiment indicator shows a dramatic decline in August, in both Gaza and the West Bank. In addition, exports will be affected by softening




⁸ Debt to IEC increased further to NIS1.7 billion at end-August.

⁹ NIS lending rates are about 12 percent, and deposit rates 1.4 percent. USD lending rates are above 7 percent, and the USD deposit rates 0.75 percent on average. The spread on the Jordanian dinar is 7 percent.

¹⁰ The previous report was published on June 30, 2014, and can be found on www.imf.org/wbg. In the June report, staff projected growth in the WBG to reach 2 percent in 2014, 1.6 percent in the West Bank and 3 percent in Gaza.

growth in Israel, the main export destination for the West Bank. Expecting a mild recovery in the fourth quarter of 2014 in both Gaza and the West Bank, staff projects that real GDP for the WBG will decline by between 3.5 and 4 percent for the year as a whole, with an output loss of 15 percent in Gaza and continuing stagnation in the West Bank. For 2015, staff projects a rebound in Gaza—on the assumption of increased aid to finance the reconstruction of Gaza—and a modest pickup in the West Bank for a combined growth rate of about 4.5 percent. With the projected decline in output, real per capita GDP in Gaza would fall to only 70 percent of its 2005 level and by 18 percent from 2013. Real GDP per capita in the West Bank would decline by 2 percent. Inflation in the WBG in 2014 is projected at 2.8 percent, up from 2.2 percent in the June 2014 report driven mainly by higher prices in Gaza and a depreciation of the shekel since mid-July. The WBG unemployment rate is expected to jump to 30 percent by end-2014. A sharp rise in Gaza's unemployment in the third quarter is likely, potentially followed by a modest decline in the fourth quarter as reconstruction begins.



9. **The full extent of the conflict's fiscal impact is unknown at present.** Despite the weaker growth outlook, revenue is likely to be somewhat higher than previously projected on account of stronger-than-expected clearance revenue, which increased by 31 percent year-on-year in the first seven months of 2014. On the spending side, the authorities will have trouble containing net lending, which is running at well above budget targets, and spending on goods and services, which partly reflects arrears repayment (the exact amounts are unknown because of poor accounting for arrears), will likely exceed budgeted amounts.¹¹ Our expenditure projections do not yet account for the spending needed for Gaza reconstruction since the costs are unknown at this stage.^{12,13} Taken together, this would result in an overall deficit of 16½ percent of GDP, up from 13¼ percent in the June 2014 report, reflecting in large part the downward revision in nominal GDP. Assuming that overall donor financing will reach \$1.5 billion (of which \$100 million is earmarked to arrears clearance, and \$200 million for development), in line with updated donor pledges, and some increase in domestic borrowing, the resulting financing gap will amount to about \$350 million.

¹¹ An inter-government committee has been set up to address the electricity non-payments, and a decision has been made to impose penalties on distributors who do not pay the bills to the IEC. These are encouraging measures, but their effectiveness is yet to be seen.

¹² Aside from minor war related aid transfers in July and August, no new spending on Gaza was made following the formation of the unity government in early June.

¹³ The PA is preparing the Report on the Initial Damage Assessment ahead of a donors' conference on rebuilding Gaza tentatively scheduled for October 12, 2014 in Egypt.

Box 2. Gauging the Economic Impact of the Conflict in Gaza

The July-August military conflict reduced economic activity in all economic sectors in the third quarter of 2014, but the impact varies substantially depending on pre-war conditions, economic restrictions, and infrastructure losses during the conflict. We estimate the total third quarter loss at 45 percent compared to the previous quarter, reducing GDP by about 20 percent during the first three quarters of 2014 compared to the first three quarters of 2013. The following provides an evaluation of the main economic sectors.

- **Agriculture:** During the conflict an enlarged security buffer zone around the border made most of Gaza's arable land inaccessible, and fishing was banned completely, causing an estimated yearly loss of more than 9 percent in August alone. In addition, most of the 17,000 acres of Gaza's farmland has been ruined by tanks, shelling and air strikes, and much of its agricultural infrastructure, including greenhouses, irrigation systems, animal farms, fodder stocks and fishing boats was lost (Source: UNFAO). Staff expects a reduction of agricultural output of 80 percent during the conflict, and of 30 percent in the first three quarters of 2014.
- **Manufacturing, electricity and water:** Around 420 factories were destroyed or severely damaged during the conflict (source: Palestinian Federation of Industries), further increasing the number of unemployed people. The destruction of Gaza's sole power plant and much of the water and sewage infrastructure will further and lastingly reduce the sector's output. Staff expects a reduction of manufacturing output of 20 percent in the first three quarters of 2014, which includes a 50 percent loss in electricity supply and a 30 percent reduction in water and sewage activity since the onset of the conflict.
- **Construction:** Construction activity collapsed after the closure of the tunnels in 2013 by Egypt, and its share of GDP shrank from 18.5 percent in 2013Q2 to only 6 percent in 2014Q1. During the conflict construction activity came to a complete halt. Therefore, staff expects a reduction in construction activity of 75 percent in the first three quarters of 2014.
- **Wholesale and retail trade and services:** Next to the destruction of service infrastructure, shops and equipment, retail and service activity is expected to be severely limited in 2014Q3 because of inactivity, difficulties to withdraw money from banks, and reduced imports from Israel. Staff expects a reduction in activity of 50 percent during the conflict, lowering the sector's output by 15 percent in the first three quarters of 2014.
- **VAT on imports:** VAT collection increased steadily since the closure of the tunnels due to larger official imports, up to 6 percent of total Gaza GDP in 2014 Q1. During the conflict, however, import activity was severely limited, reducing the third quarter VAT by 50 percent. Given large increases in the first half of the year, total year to date VAT is expected to have more than doubled in comparison to the same period in 2013.

10. **The risks to the near-term outlook are substantial.** If the current ceasefire failed to hold and the conflict resumed, the damage to the economy would increase. A truce without an easing of the Gaza blockade or a tepid response of donors to the financing need for infrastructure rebuilding and humanitarian assistance will postpone rebuilding and hence a recovery of economic activity. Other risks relate to potential inward spillovers from developments in the global economy and neighboring countries (Annex I).

11. **While a temporary boost to output might be expected next year from the rebuilding of Gaza, medium-term prospects remain bleak without a fundamental change of the political status quo.** The baseline scenario assumes that post-conflict reconstruction, supported by donors and private transfers, provides an economic boost to Gaza in 2015, after a sharp fall in output in 2014. The West Bank's economy is also likely to see a small rebound in 2015 after tepid growth in 2014. Beyond 2015, however, the baseline projection for the WBG is for a return to subpar growth of around 3 percent per year, implying rising unemployment and stagnant per capita incomes. This medium-term outlook is heavily dependent on how the political situation evolves, and the extent to which the Israeli restrictions in the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza persist.¹⁴ The baseline scenario assumes that the political status quo remains in place and that peace negotiations are suspended with no immediate prospects of resumption, and hence no significant easing of Israeli restrictions. This scenario is unlikely to be sustainable over the medium term due to the potentially destabilizing effect of the unresolved conflict with Israel and economic stagnation with rising unemployment. On the other hand, as discussed in detail in the previous IMF report, a breakthrough in the conflict would yield a substantial peace dividend, benefitting both the Israeli and Palestinian economies.

POLICY ISSUES

A. Fiscal Policy

12. **Even before the conflict, staff cautioned that the PA faced a difficult fiscal situation in 2014.** On the revenue side, staff welcomed the authorities' efforts to implement revenue administration measures to increase the tax base and improve compliance in the context of the revenue strategy. Indeed, to some extent these efforts were reflected in the strong revenue performance in the first half of 2014. On the expenditure side, the authorities had contained wage spending in the first six months of the year, albeit in part because the payment of the cost-of-living adjustment was postponed to the end of the year. On the other hand, staff noted that recurrent expenditure had been gaining strength mostly on account of a strong increase in net lending. And with back-loaded donor support, arrears had continued to accumulate as little progress was made on strengthening commitment controls. All in all, staff noted that a significant financing gap in 2014 was likely, raising the specter of further arrears accumulation and posing risks to debt sustainability. An updated DSA shows that public debt in the baseline scenario remains sustainable in the medium term, but at a higher level than in the September 2013 DSA, and highly sensitive to a range of shocks (Annex II).

13. **Staff therefore stressed the need for fiscal discipline.** Staff emphasized the need for measures to reduce the financing gap, including: containing the overall increase in the wage bill to 3 percent rather than 5 percent in the budget; accelerating the reduction of poorly targeted fuel subsidies, while expanding the targeted cash transfer mechanism to support the poor; containing net

¹⁴ The Government of Israel emphasizes security concerns that restrict its ability to ease or lift restrictions in the WBG.

lending by addressing the entrenched culture of non-payment in the electricity sector, relying on the World Bank's advice; and continuing efforts to increase revenue by raising tax compliance and reforming tax administration. Staff acknowledged that, with the year half over, it was not feasible to close the financing gap with fiscal measures alone and that additional external or domestic financing would be required to fill the gap. Recourse to further arrears accumulation to the private sector should be avoided as this undermines economic activity and tax collection efforts. In addition, staff cautioned that fiscal risks were on the rise and, if they materialized, would raise the financing gap further. The risks relate to increased Israeli deductions from clearance revenues, especially those related to the rising electricity debt with Israel, new spending pressures related to Gaza and the possible integration of the West Bank and Gaza administrations, and a shortfall in donor aid, much of which is yet to be disbursed. To counter these risks, staff recommended that a contingency plan be prepared. Such a plan would consist of additional expenditure cuts to avoid further arrears accumulation, and could include a wage freeze as a temporary measure and a complete freeze on nonessential spending.

14. **The authorities welcomed staff's recommendations, but there was little evidence of any traction.** While committed to prudent fiscal policies and wanting to avoid a further increase in arrears to the private sector, they were not willing to commit to specific measures to rein in spending. Instead, the authorities expressed frustration about the lack of control over a large part of their revenue base, citing unpredictable deductions by Israel from clearance revenue transfers as complicating fiscal management and planning. They also expressed concern about a perceived reduction in donor support.

15. **The conflict has made an already strained fiscal situation even more difficult for the PA to manage, and stepped up donor assistance will be critical.** The sharp decline in economic activity in Gaza will reduce revenue, but the bigger impact will be on the expenditure side. While the extent of the additional spending needs to alleviate human suffering and to repair physical damage in Gaza is not yet known, it is clear that the PA will not be able to absorb spending increases given its limited resources. Therefore, substantial additional donor assistance will be needed in 2014–15 and beyond to fund the reconstruction of Gaza. Given ongoing spending needs in the West Bank, it is important that the donor support is additional to, rather than a replacement of, the regular financial assistance the international community has been extending to the WBG for several years.

16. **For its part, the PA needs to maintain fiscal discipline and press ahead with fiscal reforms.** While some new donor cash assistance is expected in the aftermath of the conflict, it is unlikely to increase the spending envelope for the approved 2014 budget because much of the assistance may occur outside the PA's budget or, if through the budget, could be earmarked for Gaza. As a result, it is even more important now for the PA to take measures to reduce the financing gap. Moreover, given the dire fiscal position, it is now time to begin implementing the contingency measures discussed above. At the same time, public financial management (PFM) urgently needs to be enhanced for the government to strengthen its case for more aid and for additional aid to be used effectively. While progress has been achieved in cash management, arrears management needs to be improved, and reporting and recording of arrears must be made more reliable. This will be critical to sustain donors' confidence that their aid is used well. Given significant infrastructure needs, which are

exacerbated in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, the PA's capacity to manage public investment must be increased for efficient identification, selection and appraisal of projects, and for reliable projections of their capital and recurrent costs.

17. **Beyond the next few years, the fiscal reform agenda remains largely unchanged, although the Gaza conflict has raised its urgency.** At a broad level, the current financing model that relies on donor aid to finance current spending is not viable. A transition to a model that would involve reduced recurrent deficits over time—helped by implementation of the revenue strategy—and a gradual shift in the composition of spending away from consumption toward growth-enhancing development spending is needed. Such a shift would have to be supported for some time by sustained and more predictable donor financing in combination with easing of Israeli restrictions. At a more specific level, the key areas for reform in the fiscal area over the medium term are not new:

- *Enhancing revenue.* The revenue strategy launched in early 2014 needs to be moved forward with a stronger focus on the Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU), which remains significantly understaffed, on functional reorganization, and on rolling back of tax incentives.¹⁵ In this regard, the new amendments to the Investment Promotion Law are positive measures, as is the new 10 percent dividend tax slated to be implemented in 2015. The tax base should be expanded to Gaza if the unification between the Gaza and West Bank administrations proceeds.¹⁶ Tax policies and tax legislation must be harmonized between Gaza and the West Bank to recover domestic tax revenue in Gaza that has not been collected by the PA since 2007 when the Hamas-led government took over the administration of Gaza.
- *Rationalizing expenditure.* On the expenditure side, comprehensive pension and civil service reforms are needed. A pension reform, along the lines agreed with the World Bank in 2010, would help contain growing pension costs and would require raising the retirement age and eliminating lump-sum payments at retirement. A civil service reform would help reduce the wage bill and raise public sector efficiency. To this end, the General Personnel Council (GPC) has started developing job classifications and descriptions for line ministries. The importance of progress in this area is also underscored by the prospect of unification of the Gaza-West Bank administrations and the need to ensure the creation of an efficient unified public sector from the start. In addition, spending on healthcare must be rationalized. The practice of granting free referrals for treatment abroad could be subject to abuse, and monitoring is needed to control the costs.
- *Reforming the electricity sector.* The government must address the longstanding problem of accumulation of contingent liabilities to Israel for electricity. Electricity debt payments are deducted by Israel on a monthly basis in an ad hoc manner from clearance revenues, and the PA records these in the budget as spending on net lending. The energy issue is complex and involves theft, technical losses, and poor payment discipline at all levels, including end-consumers, energy

¹⁵ The latest initiative to put a term-limit on tax incentives is still not enacted.

¹⁶ Given the size of Gaza's economy, it should contribute about a quarter of fiscal revenues.

distributors and municipalities. However, it needs to be addressed, because non-payment undermines fiscal discipline and contributes to unstable energy supply, thereby hurting the WBG's growth performance.

B. Rebuilding Gaza

18. **Economic growth in Gaza is expected to rebound quickly, but achieving a sustainable recovery will be a major challenge.** If the current ceasefire holds, a small but immediate economic recovery is likely, based on a quick revival of retail trade, the service sector, and small scale industry surrounding reconstruction activities. It is expected that international cash assistance to households that lost their homes and income sources will be substantial, further supporting this trend. However, one of the lessons of the post-2008/9 conflict experience is that a cash-based recovery is likely to be unsustainable (Box 3). Reconstruction activity will need to target small- and medium-sized enterprises, manufacturing, and agriculture, in order to reduce unemployment and build a sustainable economic foundation. In addition, crucial for any lasting recovery is the reconstruction of Gaza's electricity, building, and water and sewage infrastructure, which requires large scale external investment to regain even its pre-war state. Based on past experience, larger scale investment is likely to reach Gaza with a delay, and consequently unemployment is likely to remain high well into 2015.

19. **A sustainable recovery will depend on robust international support and coordination, as well as an easing of the blockade.** Similar to the aftermath of the 2008/09 conflict, international mobilization for Gaza's reconstruction is expected to begin shortly after the end of the conflict, based on a damage and needs assessment and a recovery and reconstruction plan for Gaza. The potentially large pledges will require strong coordination between the PA, international donors and support organizations in Gaza. Otherwise, there is a high risk that only a fraction of the pledges will materialize. Moreover, public and private sector capacity constraints risk dampening the near-term economic impact of large aid pledges. Crucially, reconstruction activity and the effective use of international aid are contingent on easing the blockade of Gaza, which heavily restricts the import of necessary construction material. Without a change in the border regime, a lasting recovery cannot be achieved.

C. Financial Sector Issues

20. **The PMA has been adroitly implementing its crisis preparedness plans in the face of deteriorating security conditions.** The recent episodes of bank closures in Gaza in response to armed threats from Hamas employees, who demanded to be paid salaries by the PA, have highlighted the risks that pertain to the banking system in the WBG. To address these risks, the PMA has been advancing its crisis preparedness, including in the areas of business continuity, scenario planning, risk mitigation, and disaster recovery. Recently, banks' risk reserves have been raised, and in the anticipation of potential banking disruptions, ATMs have been filled and their network expanded. Additionally, the PMA has been expanding mobile banking and the use of universal credit cards. These actions helped banks to service clients in Gaza even during the conflict.

Box 3. A Look Back at the Gaza War 2008/09 and Its Aftermath (Operation Cast Lead)

The first of the three recent Israeli-Palestinian military conflicts, Operation Cast Lead caused severe loss of life and property in Gaza.¹ The 23-day conflict that began at end-December 2008 left more than 1400 Palestinians killed and caused significant damages to buildings, farmland, and public infrastructure, including water and electricity. Unemployment surged from 32 percent in 2007 to 41.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009, and the overall cost of rebuilding Gaza was estimated at close to \$5 billion.²

International resource mobilization began immediately after the hostilities ended, but actual donor disbursements fell short of pledges, as the blockade hampered project implementation. Based on the damage and needs assessment prepared jointly by the UN, NGOs, and the PA, the early recovery estimate for Gaza was \$1.3 billion. Donors pledged a multiple of this amount at the March 2009 donors' conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, with pledges from Arab donors exceeding those of traditional donors. However, one year later, only a fraction of the pledges (\$330 million) had materialized, as the realization of donor aid was severely limited by the restrictions on the import of construction materials by Israel. Consequently, most of the aid came in form of cash assistance to the poor, short-term employment schemes and emergency input-driven support to backyard farming (UN provided food assistance). In mid-2009, the PA adopted a supplementary recurrent budget of \$0.3 billion for emergency expenditure, which was two-thirds financed by external budget support, and the remainder by further bank borrowing.

Although the reconstruction effort was hampered by the blockade, the economy rebounded due to the proliferation of tunnel trade activity. Restrictions on import of construction materials under the Israeli blockade severely impeded major reconstruction efforts. As a result, more than one year after the conflict, three quarters of the damage to buildings and infrastructure remained unrepaired. Unemployment surged, as manufacturing was deprived of inputs, and export markets declined. However, growing tunnel trade between Egypt and Gaza, financed by unofficial and private sources, helped the recovery. During 2009–11, Gaza's economy grew on average by 12 percent. By 2010, more than 70 percent of damaged homes had been repaired and more than 50 percent of the damaged and destroyed industrial establishments had been reconstructed and resumed operations, albeit in many cases at reduced capacity.³

However, the recovery was not sustainable. The recovery was consumption-driven, aided by cash assistance. The blockade hindered exports and investment, including in critical infrastructure such as electricity and water, limiting industrial development and job creation. In addition, the dependence on the informal tunnel trade exposed the economy to a risk which materialized in the fall of 2013, when the tunnels were shut down.

¹ The 2012 seven-day long conflict caused 163 casualties and substantially less economic damage than the 2014 or 2008/09 conflicts, and is therefore not used as a comparison here.

² Based on UNDP Report: *One Year After, Gaza—Early Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment*, Jerusalem, May 2010.

³ Unorthodox construction techniques, such as recycling of crushed rubble and compressed earth block technology, were used to circumvent import restrictions imposed under the blockade.

21. **In the aftermath of the conflict, a high level of supervisory vigilance is needed.**

Experience elsewhere has shown that a sharp deterioration in economic conditions usually increases nonperforming loans. With the drop in economic activity in Gaza, and to some extent in the West Bank, the quality of loan portfolios is likely to weaken, which will be reflected in the financial soundness indicators only with a lag.¹⁷ During the mission, staff also discussed two recurring issues:


- *The exposure of the banking system to the PA.* The PMA argued that direct bank exposure to the PA is manageable and that the WBG banking system indicators have been sound during extended periods of high exposure to the PA. Staff cautioned about relying too much on banking indicators to assess banking stability, noting that (i) the low NPLs could mask the practice of ever-greening of loans, and (ii) that the high CARs could be partly the result of a zero-risk-weighting of the loans to the PA and send a misleading signal given the precarious fiscal position of the PA.
- *Banks' high exposure to the housing market.* Most of the housing loans are at interest rates that are linked to the LIBOR, increasing the risk of a sharp increase in NPLs in case of higher global interest rates, for instance, under USA monetary tapering. Enhanced monitoring of the housing market is also called for in light of the existing plans to introduce mortgage-backed securities by the Palestinian Mortgage Housing Corporation. Although the exposure to the housing market is high, data on house prices and rents are not available, and the PMA's current stress testing framework does not account for real estate market developments. To address the issue of inadequate monitoring, the PMA and the PCBS have recently agreed to work on developing a house price index, and the PMA plans to introduce from end-2014 new stress tests to account for the risks in the housing market.

22. **The PMA expressed concerns about the limits set by the Bank of Israel on the amount of NIS cash transfers it accepts from Palestinian banks.** Israel's restrictions have been a longstanding issue arising out of money-laundering and financing of terrorism concerns. Current agreed limits on monthly cash shipments are set at NIS300 million, which are insufficient as the WBG is a largely cash-based economy, leading to persistent excessive cash accumulation in the Palestinian banks. Limits on cash shipments have been relaxed for the months of July and August, with shipments of NIS600 million each. However, the outstanding stock of cash in banks now exceeds NIS800 million, incurring losses to the banks, hurting financial intermediation, and contributing to high lending rates. The Bank of Israel believes that over time the greater use of non-cash payments in both Israel and the WBG will help to alleviate the excess cash problem.

¹⁷ After the 2008/09 conflict, however, the banking sector proved to be resilient. A one-month spike in banks' excess reserves at the PMA and a slight reduction in credit growth were observed, but NPLs remained low and deposits stayed stable.

D. Structural Issues

23. **Structural policies to improve the investment climate and strengthen competitiveness remain an important component of the authorities' reform agenda regardless of political developments.** As was highlighted in the past IMF and World Bank reports, political uncertainty and Israeli restrictions seriously impact the investment climate in the WBG.¹⁸ In addition, price based indicators of competitiveness, such as the real effective exchange rate, imply that the WBG has lost competitiveness over time (text chart). Staff has argued that there is scope for independent policy action to improve the business climate. Although some progress has been made in this area, particularly in access to finance with the adoption of the Leasing Law, much remains to be done.¹⁹ This includes enacting the New Companies Law, the New Industry Law, the Debt Resolution Law and the Law on Secured Transactions, and activating the Movable Collateral Registry. Additionally, progress is urgently needed on land registration, which is among key factors hindering private investments in the WBG according to the World Bank.²⁰ Harmonization of the business regulations in the WBG is another challenge that will need to be tackled in the context of unification. The authorities agree with the staff on the structural reform agenda, but point out that the absence of a functioning legislature hinders policy action.



Sources: Haver, INS, and IMF staff calculations.

STAFF APPRAISAL

24. **The West Bank and Gaza's economic situation was difficult even before the Israel-Hamas military conflict in July-August.** Against the background of continued Israeli restrictions and rising political uncertainty, the WBG economy has been on a slowing trend since 2012, causing real per capita incomes to decline and unemployment to rise. Going forward, increased political uncertainty translates into greater macro-fiscal risks, and prudent policies by the PA as well as continued donor support are therefore needed more than ever. Despite the understandable focus on short-term economic management, it is important for the PA not to lose sight of the structural reform agenda aimed at boosting the economy's performance over the medium term.

¹⁸ For example, it takes on average 23 days for businesses in the West Bank to export and 38 days to import, compared to just 10 days for businesses in Israel. See *West Bank and Gaza Investment Climate Assessment: Fragmentation and Uncertainty*, World Bank, 2014.

¹⁹ See June 2014 IMF Report on Macroeconomic Developments and Outlook.

²⁰ See *West Bank and Gaza Investment Climate Assessment*, *op cit*.

25. **The conflict represents a major economic shock for the Palestinian economy.** The economic outlook has deteriorated sharply compared to the IMF's previous report, especially for Gaza, which has suffered a devastating loss of life and property, the impact of which is only beginning to be assessed. Given a sharp output loss in the third quarter, Gaza's real GDP is estimated to have declined by about 20 percent in the first three quarters of 2014, compared to the same period in 2013. For the year as a whole, we project that real GDP in Gaza will decline by 15 percent, and by 3¾ percent in the WBG, although these projections may need to be revised once more information becomes available. Going forward, the speed of economic recovery will depend on whether the current ceasefire agreement translates into a longer-lasting truce with an easing of the blockade of Gaza, and on the extent to which the international community is able to mobilize aid for Gaza. Of course, as discussed in past reports, the economic dividend from a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement would be substantial.

26. **The cost of rebuilding Gaza goes well beyond the PA's resources and generous donor support will be critical.** The full fiscal impact of the conflict is not yet known, but there is little doubt that the PA faces large expenditure needs related to the reconstruction of Gaza. The PA and international agencies will need to make a realistic assessment of these needs in the coming weeks and months. It will be important for the PA, with the support of its international partners, to prepare a recovery and reconstruction plan along the lines of what was presented at the 2009 Gaza Conference in Egypt. It is clear that there is no room in the PA's budget to accommodate the new spending needs, and that stepped up donor financial assistance will be critical. The WBG remains structurally reliant on donor assistance, even in the absence of the costs related to Gaza rebuilding, and it is important for donors to treat the Gaza-related assistance as an addition to the aid envelope and not a substitution.

27. **Against this background, the PA needs to maintain fiscal discipline and, together with its international partners, urgently develop a robust fiscal mechanism to harness effectively donor aid in Gaza.** Fiscal risks, which were already substantial before the conflict, have risen substantially. There are certainly grounds for higher spending related to Gaza reconstruction, but this needs to be tied to the availability of financing. In the meantime, the PA should contain current spending, especially in light of other fiscal risks, including the additional potential spending commitments—for instance, on salaries for public sector workers in Gaza—associated with integrating the West Bank and Gaza administrations. At the same time, the PA's welcome efforts to increase revenues should continue, to increase the resources available for meeting the rising spending needs. The PA also needs to urgently improve public financial management, including budgeting and accounting, to strengthen donors' confidence that aid is used effectively and transparently. To that end, the authorities may wish to seek scaled-up technical assistance from development partners and the IMF. Raising the capacity to manage public investments will need to be high on the PA's agenda in light of the coming repairs to Gaza's infrastructure.

28. **It is important that other economic policy areas are not forgotten as the focus on short-term crisis management sharpens in the aftermath of the conflict.** The impact of the conflict on the real sector may well weaken the quality of banks' loan portfolios, so enhanced PMA monitoring of the banking system is important. Beyond that, longstanding issues such as improving the business

climate, pension and civil service reforms, and strengthening the electricity sector, which is draining the budget, should not be forgotten. Indeed, the conflict makes some of these reforms even more pressing.

29. **A strong and sustainable recovery in Gaza will depend on an easing of the blockade and large-scale donor support.** The post-2008/09 conflict experience suggests that the following factors are central in producing a robust recovery: first, a lifting or at least an easing of the blockade of Gaza is needed so that construction materials can be imported into Gaza; second, in order to harness effectively the potentially large donor pledges, strong coordination between the PA, international donors, and support organizations in Gaza will be required; and third, generous financial support from the international community is needed in light of the large scale physical destruction in Gaza. It will be important that robust verification and monitoring procedures be put in place to ensure that financial assistance is used for intended purposes. From a broader perspective, it is important to reiterate the need to shift to a viable financing model, to replace the current unsustainable one, focused on a pro-growth re-composition of spending toward development, supported by more predictable donor financing and an easing of Israeli restrictions in the West Bank.

Figure 1. West Bank and Gaza: Recent Economic Developments, 2007–14




Figure 2. West Bank and Gaza: Fiscal Sector Indicators, 1994–2014




Figure 3. West Bank and Gaza: Financial Sector Indicators, 2000–14




Table 1. West Bank and Gaza: Selected Economic Indicators, 2011–19

(Population: 4.4 million, 2012 est.)
 (Per capita GDP: \$2,557, 2013)
 (Poverty rate: 18 percent in the West Bank and 39 percent in Gaza Strip, 2011 est.)

| | 2011 | 2012 | Est. | | Projections | | | | 2019 | |
|--|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | | |
| Output and prices | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (Annual percentage change) | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP (2004 market prices) | 12.4 | 6.3 | 1.9 | -3.7 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| West Bank | 10.7 | 6.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Gaza | 17.7 | 7.0 | 6.0 | -15.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| CPI inflation rate (end-of-period) | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| CPI inflation rate (period average) | 2.9 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Investment and saving | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (In percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | |
| Gross capital formation, of which: | 17.3 | 13.7 | 12.4 | 13.8 | 15.9 | 15.8 | 15.8 | 14.4 | 14.7 | 14.7 |
| Public | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Private | 13.5 | 9.9 | 8.8 | 9.9 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.9 | 10.9 |
| Gross national savings, of which: | -6.4 | -15.2 | -5.8 | -12.3 | -15.5 | -13.3 | -12.6 | -11.3 | -11.3 | -11.3 |
| Public | -4.7 | -6.6 | -1.1 | -2.1 | -3.1 | -2.4 | -1.7 | -1.1 | -0.5 | -0.5 |
| Private | -1.6 | -8.6 | -4.5 | -10.2 | -12.4 | -11.0 | -10.9 | -10.2 | -10.8 | -10.8 |
| Saving-investment balance | -23.6 | -28.9 | -18.0 | -26.1 | -31.4 | -29.2 | -28.4 | -25.7 | -26.0 | -26.0 |
| Public finances 1/ | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (In percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenues | 20.9 | 20.2 | 20.5 | 24.0 | 23.9 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 23.9 | 23.9 |
| Recurrent expenditures and net lending | 34.0 | 34.4 | 32.7 | 37.5 | 35.4 | 33.9 | 32.8 | 31.7 | 30.8 | 30.8 |
| Wage expenditures | 18.2 | 17.2 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.0 | 16.4 | 15.8 | 15.3 | 15.3 |
| Nonwage expenditures | 14.3 | 14.4 | 13.8 | 16.4 | 15.9 | 15.4 | 15.0 | 14.7 | 14.4 | 14.4 |
| Net lending | 1.4 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Recurrent balance (commitment, before external support) | -13.1 | -14.2 | -12.2 | -13.5 | -11.4 | -10.1 | -9.0 | -7.9 | -6.9 | -6.9 |
| Recurrent balance (cash, before external support) | -8.0 | -7.8 | -8.3 | -14.4 | -12.3 | -10.9 | -9.7 | -8.6 | -7.6 | -7.6 |
| Development expenditures | 3.8 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| (In millions of U.S. dollars) | 370 | 243 | 187 | 328 | 488 | 510 | 531 | 352 | 373 | 373 |
| Overall balance (commitment, before external support) | -16.9 | -16.5 | -13.9 | -15.5 | -15.5 | -14.1 | -12.8 | -10.3 | -9.3 | -9.3 |
| Total external support, including for development expenditures | 10.1 | 9.1 | 12.0 | 13.2 | 9.9 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 7.9 |
| (In millions of U.S. dollars) | 984 | 930 | 1,362 | 1,467 | 1,193 | 1,208 | 1,222 | 1,236 | 1,227 | 1,227 |
| External support for recurrent expenditure (in millions of U.S. dollars) | 815 | 774 | 1,255 | 1,287 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| In percent of GDP | 8.3 | 7.6 | 11.1 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| Financing gap (in millions of U.S. dollars) 2/ | --- | --- | --- | 349 | 661 | 608 | 585 | 298 | 244 | 244 |
| In percent of GDP | --- | --- | --- | 3.1 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Monetary sector 3/ | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (Annual percentage change) | | | | | | | | | |
| Credit to the private sector | 24.2 | 14.3 | 11.0 | 13.0 | 10.0 | 9.5 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| Private sector deposits | 4.0 | 6.8 | 10.7 | 9.9 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 5.8 |
| External sector | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (In percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account balance (excluding official transfers) | -32.0 | -36.4 | -29.1 | -37.5 | -39.7 | -36.9 | -35.7 | -32.6 | -32.4 | -32.4 |
| Current account balance (including official transfers) | -23.6 | -28.9 | -18.0 | -26.1 | -31.4 | -29.2 | -28.4 | -25.7 | -26.0 | -26.0 |
| Exports of goods and nonfactor services | 15.4 | 16.3 | 18.6 | 19.0 | 19.3 | 19.2 | 19.2 | 18.9 | 19.0 | 19.0 |
| Import of goods and nonfactor services | 59.1 | 63.1 | 58.6 | 69.2 | 71.0 | 67.7 | 66.1 | 62.3 | 62.0 | 62.0 |
| Net factor income | 7.3 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 7.1 |
| Net current transfers | 12.7 | 10.9 | 15.0 | 16.4 | 12.8 | 11.9 | 11.2 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 9.9 |
| Private transfers | 4.4 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Official transfers | 8.3 | 7.6 | 11.1 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) | 9,775 | 10,255 | 11,302 | 11,080 | 12,018 | 12,920 | 13,794 | 14,671 | 15,540 | 15,540 |
| Per capita nominal GDP (U.S. dollars) | 2,345 | 2,389 | 2,557 | 2,437 | 2,567 | 2,682 | 2,784 | 2,880 | 2,966 | 2,966 |
| Unemployment rate | 21 | 23 | 25 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Al Quds stock market index (annual percentage change) | -2.6 | 0.1 | 13.4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

Sources: Palestinian authorities, and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Commitment basis.

2/ Financing gaps in the medium term are expected to be filled by grants that are yet to be identified.

3/ End-of-period, in U.S. dollar terms.

Table 2. West Bank and Gaza: Central Government Fiscal Operations, 2011–17

| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | | Budget 2014 | SR 2014 | Projections | | | |
|---|--------|--------|--------------|------------------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | Sep Recon | Staff Outcome | | | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| (In millions of shekels, unless otherwise stated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net revenues | 7,321 | 7,969 | 8,080 | 8,348 | 9,311 | 9,216 | 9,446 | 10,139 | 10,809 | 11,509 |
| Gross domestic revenues | 2,642 | 2,806 | 3,047 | 3,078 | 3,126 | 3,233 | 2,884 | 3,102 | 3,262 | 3,430 |
| Tax revenues | 1,727 | 1,852 | 2,129 | 2,157 | 2,329 | 2,340 | 1,977 | 2,079 | 2,191 | 2,308 |
| Nontax revenues (accrued) | 915 | 954 | 918 | 921 | 997 | 992 | 907 | 1,023 | 1,072 | 1,122 |
| Of which: arrears | 130 | 59 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Clearance revenues (accrued) | 5,095 | 5,617 | 5,870 | 6,103 | 6,545 | 6,545 | 7,252 | 7,637 | 8,047 | 8,479 |
| Of which: arrears | -235 | -479 | -147 | 34 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Less tax refunds 1/ | 416 | 434 | 832 | 834 | 560 | 560 | 700 | 600 | 500 | 400 |
| Of which: arrears | 368 | 239 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net lending (commitment) | 11,897 | 11,591 | 11,421 | 11,336 | 13,915 | 14,175 | 14,768 | 14,991 | 15,410 | 15,845 |
| Of which: arrears | 1,300 | 1,863 | -272 | 1,601 | — | -356 | -356 | -353 | -351 | -351 |
| Wage expenditures (commitment) | 6,381 | 6,812 | 6,956 | 6,928 | 7,265 | 7,265 | 7,265 | 7,520 | 7,770 | 7,925 |
| Of which: arrears | 374 | 816 | -272 | 380 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Nonwage expenditures (commitment) | 5,015 | 5,709 | 5,325 | 5,648 | 6,050 | 6,050 | 6,463 | 6,722 | 6,900 | 7,201 |
| Of which: arrears | 926 | 1,046 | — | 1,271 | — | -156 | -356 | -353 | -351 | -351 |
| Net lending | 501 | 1,072 | 550 | 760 | 900 | 860 | 1,040 | 750 | 700 | 650 |
| Development expenditures (commitment) | 1,325 | 937 | 1,010 | 674 | 1,260 | 794 | 1,165 | 1,773 | 1,792 | 1,862 |
| Of which: on Gaza reconstruction | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 706 | 703 | 701 |
| Of which: arrears | 270 | 124 | — | 66 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Recurrent balance (commitment, excl. development expenditure) | 4,576 | -5,604 | -5,346 | -4,988 | -4,694 | -4,959 | -5,322 | -4,853 | -4,601 | -4,335 |
| Overall balance (commitment) | -5,901 | -6,541 | -6,156 | -5,862 | -5,864 | -5,663 | -6,487 | -6,576 | -6,393 | -6,198 |
| Total financing | 5,901 | 6,541 | 6,356 | 5,662 | 5,864 | 5,663 | 6,487 | 6,576 | 6,393 | 6,198 |
| Net domestic bank financing | 334 | 490 | 272 | -895 | — | 425 | 425 | 425 | 425 | 425 |
| External debt repayment | — | — | — | — | — | -37 | 37 | 39 | 61 | -144 |
| External financing for recurrent expenditures | 2,915 | 2,986 | 4,319 | 4,532 | 4,784 | 4,226 | 4,504 | 3,528 | 3,514 | 3,507 |
| External financing for development expenditures | 605 | 601 | 676 | 383 | 1,080 | 429 | 711 | 682 | 730 | 778 |
| Arrears | 2,043 | 2,646 | 125 | 1,680 | — | -356 | -356 | -353 | -351 | -351 |
| Residual/financing gap 2/ | 4 | -182 | 1,254 | -98 | — | 976 | 1,240 | 2,333 | 2,157 | 1,983 |
| (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise stated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net revenues | 2,046 | 2,072 | 2,153 | 2,312 | 2,586 | 2,502 | 2,657 | 2,874 | 3,076 | 3,282 |
| Gross domestic revenues | 738 | 728 | 811 | 853 | 924 | 909 | 811 | 879 | 928 | 978 |
| Tax revenues | 483 | 480 | 567 | 598 | 647 | 630 | 556 | 589 | 623 | 658 |
| Nontax revenues (accrued) | 256 | 248 | 244 | 235 | 277 | 279 | 255 | 290 | 305 | 320 |
| Of which: arrears | 36 | 15 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Clearance revenues (accrued) | 1,528 | 1,657 | 1,565 | 1,691 | 1,818 | 1,841 | 2,043 | 2,165 | 2,260 | 2,418 |
| Of which: arrears | -66 | -124 | -39 | 4 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Less tax refunds | 116 | 113 | 221 | 231 | 156 | 158 | 197 | 170 | 142 | 114 |
| Of which: arrears | 103 | 62 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net lending (commitment) | 3,325 | 3,525 | 3,576 | 3,694 | 3,865 | 3,987 | 4,154 | 4,250 | 4,386 | 4,518 |
| Of which: arrears | 363 | 483 | -72 | 443 | — | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 |
| Wage expenditures (commitment) | 1,783 | 1,767 | 1,852 | 1,919 | 2,018 | 2,044 | 2,044 | 2,132 | 2,197 | 2,260 |
| Of which: arrears | 105 | 232 | -72 | 105 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Nonwage expenditures (commitment) | 1,402 | 1,481 | 1,578 | 1,565 | 1,681 | 1,792 | 1,818 | 1,905 | 1,989 | 2,073 |
| Of which: arrears | 259 | 271 | — | 338 | — | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 |
| Net lending (commitment) | 140 | 278 | 146 | 210 | 167 | 242 | 295 | 213 | 199 | 185 |
| Development expenditures (commitment) | 370 | 243 | 289 | 187 | 350 | 198 | 328 | 488 | 510 | 531 |
| Of which: on Gaza reconstruction | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| Of which: arrears | 76 | 32 | — | 18 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Recurrent balance (commitment, excl. development expenditure) | 1,279 | -1,453 | -1,424 | -1,382 | -1,279 | -1,395 | -1,497 | -1,376 | -1,309 | -1,236 |
| Overall balance (commitment) | -1,649 | -1,696 | -1,692 | -1,568 | -1,629 | -1,593 | -1,825 | -1,864 | -1,820 | -1,767 |
| Total financing | 1,649 | 1,696 | 1,692 | 1,568 | 1,629 | 1,593 | 1,825 | 1,864 | 1,820 | 1,767 |
| Net domestic bank financing | 93 | 127 | 72 | -248 | — | 120 | 120 | 120 | 121 | 121 |
| External debt repayment | — | — | — | — | — | -10 | 10 | 11 | 17 | -41 |
| External financing for recurrent expenditures | 815 | 774 | 1,150 | 1,255 | 1,329 | 1,188 | 1,267 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| External financing for development expenditures | 169 | 156 | 180 | 106 | 300 | 121 | 300 | 190 | 208 | 222 |
| Arrears | 571 | 686 | -33 | 465 | — | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 | -100 |
| Residual/financing gap 2/ | 1 | -47 | 323 | -11 | — | 274 | 349 | 661 | 608 | 565 |
| (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise stated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenues | 20.9 | 20.2 | 19.8 | 20.5 | 23.6 | 21.6 | 24.0 | 23.9 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Recurrent expenditures and net lending | 34.0 | 34.4 | 32.9 | 32.7 | 35.3 | 33.2 | 37.5 | 35.4 | 33.9 | 32.8 |
| Wage expenditures | 18.2 | 17.2 | 17.1 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.0 | 16.4 |
| Nonwage expenditures | 14.3 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 13.8 | 15.2 | 14.2 | 16.4 | 15.9 | 15.4 | 15.0 |
| Net lending | -2.5 | -2.1 | -2.3 | -1.9 | -1.5 | -2.0 | -2.6 | -1.8 | -1.5 | -1.3 |
| Recurrent balance (commitment) before external support | -13.1 | -14.2 | -11.1 | -12.2 | -13.7 | -12.6 | -13.5 | -11.4 | -10.1 | -9.0 |
| External financing for recurrent expenditures | 8.3 | 7.6 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 12.1 | 9.9 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 |
| Development expenditures (cash) | 3.0 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| Overall balance (commitment) | -16.9 | -16.5 | -15.6 | -13.9 | -14.9 | -13.1 | -16.5 | -15.5 | -14.1 | -12.8 |
| Overall balance (cash) | -11.0 | -9.8 | -15.9 | -9.8 | -14.9 | -14.1 | -17.4 | -16.3 | -14.9 | -13.5 |
| Residual/financing gap | 0.0 | -0.5 | 3.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 4.1 |
| Nominal exchange rate (NIS per U.S. dollar) | 3.58 | 3.86 | — | 3.61 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Nominal GDP (in millions of shekels) | 34,977 | 39,541 | 40,800 | 40,800 | 39,426 | 42,674 | 39,426 | 42,392 | 45,399 | 48,174 |

Sources: Ministry of Finance, and IMF staff projections.

1/ Includes fuel subsidies.

2/ Financing gaps in the medium term are expected to be filled by grants that are yet to be identified.

Table 3. West Bank and Gaza: Central Government Fiscal Operations, 2011–17
(GFSM 2001)

| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Projections | | | |
|--|--------|--------|--------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| (GFSM 2001; in millions of shekels) | | | | | | | |
| Revenue | 10,841 | 11,576 | 13,263 | 14,661 | 14,348 | 15,053 | 15,794 |
| Taxes | 6,406 | 7,035 | 7,426 | 8,539 | 9,116 | 9,738 | 10,387 |
| Domestic taxes | 1,727 | 1,852 | 2,157 | 1,977 | 2,079 | 2,191 | 2,308 |
| Clearance taxes | 5,095 | 5,617 | 6,103 | 7,262 | 7,657 | 8,047 | 8,479 |
| Tax refund | -416 | -434 | -834 | -700 | -600 | -500 | -400 |
| Grants | 3,520 | 3,587 | 4,915 | 5,215 | 4,209 | 4,244 | 4,285 |
| External budget support | 2,915 | 2,986 | 4,532 | 4,504 | 3,528 | 3,514 | 3,507 |
| External development support | 605 | 601 | 383 | 711 | 682 | 730 | 778 |
| Other revenue | 915 | 954 | 921 | 907 | 1,023 | 1,072 | 1,122 |
| Of which: dividends | 160 | 120 | 116 | 114 | 129 | 135 | 141 |
| Expenditures | 13,222 | 14,530 | 14,009 | 15,933 | 16,714 | 17,203 | 17,707 |
| Expense | 11,897 | 13,593 | 13,336 | 14,768 | 14,991 | 15,410 | 15,845 |
| Compensation of employees 1/ | 6,381 | 6,812 | 6,928 | 7,265 | 7,520 | 7,720 | 7,925 |
| Use of goods and services | 1,792 | 2,112 | 2,148 | 2,252 | 2,331 | 2,393 | 2,457 |
| Grants 2/ | 501 | 1,072 | 760 | 1,040 | 750 | 700 | 650 |
| Other expense 3/ | 3,223 | 3,597 | 3,500 | 4,211 | 4,390 | 4,597 | 4,813 |
| Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets | 1,325 | 937 | 674 | 1,165 | 1,723 | 1,792 | 1,862 |
| Gross operating balance | -1,056 | -2,017 | -73 | -107 | -643 | -357 | -50 |
| Net lending / borrowing (overall balance) | -2,381 | -2,954 | -746 | -1,272 | -2,366 | -2,150 | -1,913 |
| Net financial transactions | 2,381 | -2,954 | -746 | -1,272 | -2,366 | -2,150 | -1,913 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Domestic | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Currency and deposits | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | 2,377 | 3,136 | 785 | 32 | 34 | 13 | -70 |
| Domestic | 2,377 | 3,136 | 785 | 70 | 72 | 74 | 74 |
| Loans | 334 | 490 | -895 | 425 | 425 | 425 | 425 |
| Net domestic bank financing | 334 | 490 | -895 | 425 | 425 | 425 | 425 |
| Other accounts payable | 2,043 | 2,646 | 1,680 | -356 | -353 | -351 | -351 |
| Arrears (recurrent) | 1,538 | 2,043 | 1,628 | -356 | -353 | -351 | -351 |
| Arrears (capital) | 270 | 124 | 66 | — | — | — | — |
| Arrears (clearance) | -235 | -479 | 14 | — | — | — | — |
| Foreign | — | — | — | -37 | -39 | -61 | -144 |
| Loans | — | — | — | -37 | -39 | -61 | -144 |
| Statistical discrepancy/financing gap | 4 | -182 | -38 | 1,240 | 2,333 | 2,137 | 1,983 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | |
| Gross operating balance excl. grants (commitment) | -4,576 | -5,604 | -4,988 | -5,322 | -4,853 | -4,601 | -4,335 |
| Gross operating balance excl. grants (cash) | -2,803 | -3,082 | -3,374 | -5,677 | -5,205 | -4,952 | -4,686 |
| Overall balance (NLB) excl. grants (commitment) | -5,901 | -6,541 | -5,662 | -6,487 | -6,576 | -6,393 | -6,198 |
| Overall balance (NLB) excl. grants (cash) | -3,858 | -3,894 | -3,982 | -6,842 | -6,928 | -6,745 | -6,548 |
| Revenue (percent of GDP) | 31.0 | 29.3 | 37.5 | 37.2 | 33.8 | 33.2 | 32.7 |
| Expenditure (percent of GDP) | 37.8 | 36.7 | 34.3 | 40.4 | 39.4 | 37.9 | 36.6 |
| Expense (percent of GDP) | 34.0 | 34.4 | 32.7 | 37.5 | 35.4 | 33.9 | 32.8 |
| Wage expenditure (percent of GDP) | 18.2 | 17.2 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.0 | 16.4 |
| Nonwage expenditures (percent of GDP) | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.1 |
| GOB (commitment) excluding grants (percent of GDP) | -13.1 | -14.2 | -12.2 | -13.5 | -11.4 | -10.1 | -9.0 |
| GOB (cash) excluding grants (percent of GDP) | -8.0 | -7.8 | -8.3 | -14.4 | -12.3 | -10.9 | -9.7 |
| External support (recurrent) | 8.3 | 7.6 | 11.1 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 |
| in millions of NIS | 2,915 | 2,986 | 4,532 | 4,504 | 3,528 | 3,514 | 3,507 |
| NLB (commitment) excluding grants (percent of GDP) | -16.9 | -16.5 | -13.9 | -16.5 | -15.5 | -14.1 | -12.8 |
| NLB (cash) excluding grants (percent of GDP) | -11.0 | -9.8 | -9.8 | -17.4 | -16.3 | -14.9 | -13.5 |
| Total external support (in millions of shekels) | 3,520 | 3,587 | 4,915 | 5,215 | 4,209 | 4,244 | 4,285 |
| Nominal GDP (in millions of shekels) | 34,977 | 39,541 | 40,800 | 39,426 | 42,392 | 45,399 | 48,374 |
| Exchange rate | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.6 | — | — | — | — |

Sources: Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff projections.

1/ Wage expenditures.

2/ Grants to local governments related to purchase of water and electricity.

3/ Includes transfers (social benefits) and minor capital.

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Table 4. West Bank and Gaza: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2010-14
(In percent)

| | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Capital adequacy (for all banks) | | | | | | | | | |
| Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets | 23.3 | 22.9 | 22.2 | 21.5 | 21.2 | 21.0 | 21.5 | 21.1 | 20.1 |
| Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | 21.4 | 21.1 | 20.3 | 19.8 | 19.5 | 19.3 | 20.0 | 19.6 | 18.9 |
| Capital adequacy (for local banks) | | | | | | | | | |
| Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets | 26.5 | 24.5 | 22.7 | 21.2 | 20.9 | 20.5 | 20.7 | 20.4 | 18.3 |
| Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | 21.6 | 20.3 | 18.8 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.3 | 17.8 | 17.5 | 16.2 |
| Asset quality 1/ | | | | | | | | | |
| Nonperforming loans (percent of total loans) | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.6 |
| Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | 2.9 | 3.8 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.4 |
| Coverage ratio (provisions as percent of nonperforming loans) | 70.4 | 60.9 | 60.1 | 61.6 | 59.3 | 60.5 | 59.1 | 58.9 | 61.2 |
| Earnings and profitability | | | | | | | | | |
| Return on assets (ROA) | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Return on equity (ROE) 2/ | 21.1 | 17.0 | 16.2 | 19.1 | 18.5 | 18.8 | 18.7 | 18.6 | 17.8 |
| Interest income to gross income | 59.4 | 71.7 | 72.4 | 74.0 | 75.0 | 74.6 | 74.0 | 74.5 | 74.1 |
| Non-interest expenses to gross income | 55.0 | 57.2 | 55.4 | 52.8 | 53.5 | 54.1 | 54.8 | 55.0 | 58.2 |
| Personal cost to non-interest expenses | 55.3 | 55.5 | 53.8 | 57.4 | 56.9 | 55.1 | 53.9 | 56.3 | 53.7 |
| Liquidity | | | | | | | | | |
| Liquid assets to total assets | 40.3 | 38.2 | 37.5 | 36.3 | 36.8 | 37.5 | 39.5 | 38.0 | 37.0 |
| Liquid assets to demand and savings deposits | 78.4 | 74.4 | 71.6 | 69.1 | 69.4 | 71.1 | 74.7 | 72.0 | 71.1 |
| Liquid assets to total deposits | 49.1 | 46.9 | 45.8 | 44.6 | 45.0 | 45.8 | 48.1 | 46.5 | 45.7 |

Source: Palestine Monetary Authority.

1/ Nonperforming loans includes loans more than 90 day overdue.

2/ Return on equity (ROE) is a ratio of income before extraordinary items and taxes to average Tier 1 capital.

Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix¹ Potential Deviations from Baseline

| Nature/Sources of Main Threats | Likelihood of Realization in the Next Three Years | Expected Impact on Economy if Risk is Realized | Policy Recommendations to Mitigate Risks |
|---|---|---|--|
| Heightened geopolitical risks in the Middle East, leading to a sharp rise in oil prices, with negative spillovers to the global economy | <i>High/Short term</i> | High The WBG is highly dependent on energy imports. Social pressures for costly mitigating measures would increase, particularly if second-round effects become prominent, and worsen an already difficult fiscal outlook. | (1) Implement full pass-through to consumers including for electricity tariffs; (2) Follow up efforts to improve collection at the local level; and (3) Use the existing targeted cash transfer scheme to support the poor. |
| Protracted period of slower growth in advanced and emerging economies | <i>High/Short to medium term</i> | Low A further slowdown in growth, higher unemployment, and worsening in the fiscal position. The WBG is sensitive to a slowdown in Israel. Austerity in donor countries could affect availability of aid for the PA. | (1) Instill confidence through strong domestic policies, anchored in medium-term fiscal adjustment; (2) Improve competitiveness of the economy via scaled-up investment in infrastructure, and education to support human capital development. |
| Pressures on the banking system mostly from a deteriorating domestic and regional environment, and potentially from the USA's monetary tapering | <i>Medium/Short to medium term</i> | Medium The WBG banks are heavily exposed to the PA and its employees. There are no direct linkages to global financial markets, but the considerable presence of Jordanian banks could pose major challenges in case of a crisis in the home country, because of insufficient coordination in bank resolution across borders. In addition, most mortgage lending rates are linked to the LIBOR, and their rise as USA monetary tapering progresses could lead to higher NPLs. The restriction on cash transfers by WBG banks to Israel is another source of risk. | (1) Instill confidence through strong domestic policies, anchored in medium-term fiscal adjustment; (2) Further strengthen the banking supervisory framework, including cross-border supervision and cooperation with the Central Bank of Jordan; (3) Broaden data coverage of the real estate market; and (4) Develop an early warning model and a contingency plan. |
| Resumption of hostilities between Hamas and Israel; a surge in unrest in Gaza and the West Bank | <i>Medium to High/Short to medium term</i> | Medium to High If the conflict resumes, the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza would deteriorate further. Even if the truce holds, domestic unrest in the West Bank (e.g., due to a flare-up of violence in Gaza because of further deterioration of the humanitarian situation) could lead to a tightening of Israeli restrictions, and possible suspension of clearance revenue transfers. Some donors may withdraw support. | In the short run, economic policies can do little to mitigate these particular risks. At best, maintaining strong domestic policies could instill some element of confidence. |

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| | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|---|
| Donor "fatigue" | Medium/Medium term | High The suspension of peace talks, if sustained, could lead some donors to reconsider their long-term commitment to supporting the PA, which could threaten fiscal sustainability. | (1) Instill confidence through strong domestic policies, anchored in medium-term fiscal adjustment; (2) Support fiscal sustainability via pro-growth policies; and (3) Continue reforms to improve government institutions. |
| Spillovers from social unrest in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria | Medium to High/Short term | High Social and political unrest in the nearby region could spill over to the WBG and potentially divert donor money away from the WBG. | Economic policies can do little to mitigate these particular risks. At best, maintaining strong domestic policies could instill some element of confidence. |
| <p>¹ The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff). The relative likelihood of risks listed is the staff's subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline ("low" is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, "medium" a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and "high" a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.</p> | | | |

Annex II. West Bank and Gaza: Debt Sustainability Analysis—An Update

Public debt continued to increase in 2013 and the first half of 2014, reflecting growing arrears.¹ Since the end of 2012 public debt increased by \$838 million, reaching \$4.9 billion or 44 percent of projected 2014 GDP, and exceeding a 40 percent government-mandated threshold for public debt. During this period, arrears grew by \$929 million, including by \$237 million during the first six months of 2014, reaching \$2.3 billion.² Arrears to the Pension Fund and private suppliers remained the primary financing source of the financing gap. They also were used to substitute for expensive domestic financing, which declined since end-2012 by \$113 million, as authorities reduced bank overdrafts and loans.³ Most of the accumulated arrears were to the Pension Fund—\$590 million, but a significant amount \$339 million was to the private suppliers.

Arrears comprise 46 percent of total debt. Arrears of the Pension Fund comprise 34 percent of debt at end-June 2014, constituting unfunded future fiscal liabilities, while arrears to the private sector, mostly for goods and services and tax refunds, comprise 12 percent of debt. *Domestic debt*, the second largest component of public debt comprising 28 percent of total debt, remains mostly short-term debt (75 percent) although the authorities recently managed to raise the maturity of domestic bank debt. Of total bank debt, arrears to banks are estimated at more than \$90 million. Bank debt is normally extended at interest rates ranging from 4 percent on loans to 7–8 percent on overdrafts.⁴ Overdrafts declined in 2013 but began creeping up again

| Public Debt (In millions of U.S. dollars) | | | | |
|--|-------|-------|-----------|------------|
| | 2012 | 2013 | Jun. 2014 | |
| | | | | In Percent |
| Public debt, including arrears | 4,041 | 4,638 | 4,879 | 100 |
| Domestic debt | 1,467 | 1,349 | 1,356 | 28 |
| Of which: long term | 337 | 298 | 346 | 7 |
| Bank loans | 719 | 651 | 606 | 12 |
| Of which: long term | 337 | 298 | 346 | 7 |
| Overdraft | 480 | 355 | 407 | 8 |
| Petroleum Authority loans | 178 | 225 | 272 | 5 |
| Other public institutions loans | 8 | 15 | 15 | 0 |
| Palestinian Investment Fund | 79 | 79 | 102 | 2 |
| PMA | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| External debt | 1,247 | 1,269 | 1,267 | 26 |
| Arab Financial Institutions | 629 | 650 | 628 | 13 |
| Al Azqa Fund | 522 | 524 | 517 | 11 |
| Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development | 57 | 58 | 58 | 1 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 50 | 48 | 52 | 1 |
| International and Regional Institutions | 359 | 345 | 345 | 7 |
| World Bank | 290 | 284 | 280 | 6 |
| European Investment Bank | 26 | 36 | 40 | 1 |
| IFAD | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| OPEC | 19 | 20 | 20 | 0 |
| Bilateral loans and advances | 280 | 296 | 296 | 6 |
| Spain | 92 | 96 | 95 | 2 |
| Italy | 33 | 35 | 34 | 1 |
| China | 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Israel 1/ | 150 | 160 | 161 | 3 |
| Arrears 2/ | 1,327 | 2,019 | 2,256 | 46 |
| Pension fund | 1,058 | 1,465 | 1,648 | 34 |
| Private suppliers 3/ | 269 | 555 | 608 | 12 |
| Memo: Debt Palestinian entities to Israeli Electricity Company | | 375 | 429 | |

Sources: Palestinian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

1/ Includes clearance advances.

2/ Excluding arrears on debt service, and for electricity to Israel Electric Corporation.

3/ Estimated arrears, includes payables.

Table A1. West Bank and Gaza: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, 2009–19
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | Actual | | | | | Projections | | | | | Debt-stabilizing primary balance % | |
|--|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | | 2019 |
| 1 Baseline public sector debt 1/ o/w foreign-currency denominated | 28.9 | 26.3 | 33.2 | 38.7 | 40.2 | 45.2 | 47.9 | 49.8 | 51.1 | 50.3 | 49.3 | 49.3 |
| 2 Change in public sector debt | 15.5 | 11.9 | 12.2 | 10.4 | 9.4 | 3.8 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.1 |
| 3 Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12) | 2.5 | -2.6 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 1.3 | -0.8 | -1.0 | -1.0 |
| 4 Primary deficit | 1.4 | -2.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 0.9 | -1.1 | -1.4 | -1.4 |
| 5 Revenue and grants | 3.7 | 2.0 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| 6 Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 49.9 | 37.8 | 31.0 | 29.3 | 32.5 | 37.2 | 33.8 | 32.2 | 32.7 | 32.2 | 31.6 | 31.6 |
| 7 Automatic debt dynamics 2/ | 53.6 | 38.9 | 37.4 | 36.3 | 33.6 | 39.8 | 38.5 | 37.0 | 36.7 | 35.2 | 32.5 | 32.5 |
| 8 Contribution from interest rate differential 3/ | -2.3 | -4.5 | -3.0 | -2.6 | -1.2 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| 9 Contribution from real interest rate | 3.7 | 3.8 | -2.5 | -3.4 | -0.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| 10 Contribution from real GDP growth | -2.1 | -1.6 | 0.4 | -1.6 | 0.2 | 0.5 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.5 |
| 11 Contribution from exchange rate depreciation 4/ | -1.7 | -2.3 | -2.9 | -1.9 | 0.7 | 1.5 | -1.8 | -1.8 | -1.6 | -1.5 | -1.4 | -1.4 |
| 12 Other identified debt-creating flows | 1.4 | -0.7 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 13 Privatization receipts (negative) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 14 Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 15 Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 16 Residual, including asset changes (2-3)/ | 1.1 | -0.1 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio 1/ | 57.9 | 69.5 | 107.1 | 132.2 | 133.7 | 121.5 | 141.5 | 150.2 | 156.5 | 156.1 | 155.1 | 155.1 |
| Gross financing need 6/ in billions of U.S. dollars | 10.0 | 12.3 | 18.0 | 24.0 | 25.1 | 31.2 | 34.6 | 37.2 | 39.0 | 38.8 | 38.2 | 38.2 |
| 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.7 | |
| Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balances) in 2014-2019 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45.2 | 46.7 | 48.1 | 49.6 | 50.8 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 | 51.9 |
| 45.2 | 45.8 | 46.6 | 47.6 | 48.6 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 49.7 |
| Key Macroeconomic and Fiscal Assumptions Underlying Baseline | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 7.4 | 9.3 | 12.4 | 6.3 | 1.9 | -1.7 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in percent) 8/ | 1.3 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in GDP deflator, in percent) | -8.5 | -3.7 | 1.8 | -4.9 | 0.6 | 1.2 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -1.0 | -1.3 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
| Nominal appreciation (increase in U.S. dollar value of local currency, in percent) | 8.8 | 5.2 | 4.5 | -7.2 | 6.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) | 9.8 | 7.9 | -0.1 | 6.3 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) | 18.1 | -18.7 | 5.5 | 3.2 | -5.6 | 13.8 | 1.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | -4.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Primary deficit | 3.7 | 2.0 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 1.1 | 7.6 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |

1/ Values coverage of public sector, e.g. general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.
 2/ Defined as $(\dot{D}_t - r_t D_{t-1}) / Y_t$, where \dot{D}_t is the period total debt, r_t is the real interest rate, and Y_t is the real GDP. \dot{D}_t is defined as $(D_t - D_{t-1}) / Y_t$.
 3/ The real interest rate contribution is defined from the decomposition: $\dot{D}_t = r_t D_{t-1} + \Delta D_t$, where ΔD_t is the real interest rate contribution to \dot{D}_t .
 4/ The exchange rate contribution is defined from the decomposition: $\Delta D_t = \Delta D_t^{FX} + \Delta D_t^{int}$, where ΔD_t^{FX} is the exchange rate contribution to ΔD_t .
 5/ For projections, this includes exchange rate changes.
 6/ Defined as public sector deficit plus amortization of medium and long-term public sector debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.
 7/ Values are in percent of GDP. Values in parentheses are in percent of GDP.
 8/ Values are nominal interest rate on public debt.
 9/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.

in 2014 as the authorities were facing increased financing pressures. The authorities have also resorted to borrowing from the Palestinian Investment Fund (\$23 million during in 2014), and General Petroleum Corporation (about \$40 million during 2013–14). *External debt*, comprising 26 percent of public debt and consisting of multilateral and bilateral concessional loans, increased marginally since 2012, mainly on account of disbursements by the European Investment Bank for construction of electricity stations. Arrears on external debt (principal and interest) reached about \$71 million at end-June.

The assumptions for the current Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) have changed since the last DSA in September to reflect updated medium-term projections and a negative effect on the 2014 GDP (base year) of the war in Gaza.⁵ They take into account:


- Slowing growth to 3 percent by 2019, averaging 3.7 percent over 2015–19 against 3.3 percent in the September 2013 DSA—a higher rate, but from a lower base to reflect a negative shock to real GDP in 2014 from the war in Gaza;
- Stable exchange rate and inflation, as determined by Israeli monetary policy (same assumption as in the September 2013 DSA); and
- A financing gap, averaging 2.9 percent of GDP in 2014–19—an upward revision from 2.7 percent in the previous DSA—to reflect declining aid, a slow pace of fiscal consolidation, and new spending needs associated with Gaza reconstruction. It is assumed that financing gaps are filled by a combination of arrears and domestic borrowing.

The results of the updated public DSA highlight increasing risks (Table A1 and Figure A1).

The DSA shows that public debt in the baseline scenario remains sustainable in the medium term, but at a higher level than in the September DSA, and sensitive to shocks. Debt is projected to rise to 51.1 percent of GDP in 2017 before declining to 49 percent of GDP in 2019, staying above the threshold of 40 percent, prescribed by the Law on Public Debt, throughout the projected period. This result is sensitive to a range of shocks. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that a shock equivalent to a one standard deviation to the interest rate will raise the debt to 55 percent of GDP by 2019. The shocks to growth, primary balance, or a combined shock will raise the debt level even more to 68, 61, and 61 percent of GDP by 2019, respectively. A one-time contingent liabilities shock equivalent to 10 percent of GDP (e.g., in the case of non-payments to utilities) will elevate the level of debt immediately by about ten percentage points. A similar effect will occur with a fall in donor aid.

⁵ See Staff Report for September 2013 meeting of the AHLG.

Figure A1. West Bank and Gaza: Public Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests 1/ 2/
(Public debt in percent of GDP)



Sources: Palestinian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Shaded areas represent actual data. Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.

2/ For historical scenarios, the historical averages are calculated over the ten-year period, and the information is used to project debt dynamics five years ahead.

3/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and primary balance.



4/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent and 10 percent of GDP shock to contingent liabilities occur in 2010, with real depreciation defined as nominal depreciation (measured by percentage fall in dollar value of local currency) minus domestic inflation (based on GDP deflator).

ANNEX 2: COUNTRY AT A GLANCE


West Bank and Gaza at a glance

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| Key Development Indicators | West Bank & Gaza | M. East & North Africa | Lower middle income |
|--|------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| (2013) | | | |
| Population, mid-year (millions) | 4.0 | 340 | 2,507 |
| Surface area (thousand sq. km) | 6.0 | 8,775 | 20,742 |
| Population growth (%) | 3.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
| Urban population (% of total population) | 75 | 60 | 39 |
| GNI (Atlas method, US\$ billions) | 10.0 | 1,113 | 4,745 |
| GNI per capita (Atlas method, US\$) | 2,550 | 3,450 | 1,893 |
| GNI per capita (PPP, international \$) | 2,920 | 7,062 | 3,877 |
| GDP growth (%) | -4.4 | 1.9 | 4.7 |
| GDP per capita growth (%) | 10.9 | 0.2 | 3.2 |
| (most recent estimate, 2005–2012) | | | |
| Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP, %) | <2 | 2 | 27.1 |
| Poverty headcount ratio at \$2.00 a day (PPP, %) | <2 | 12 | 56.3 |
| Life expectancy at birth (years) | 73 | 71 | 66 |
| Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) | 19 | 21 | 46 |
| Child malnutrition (% of children under 5) | 2 | 6 | 24 |
| Adult literacy, male (% of ages 15 and older) | 98 | 85 | 80 |
| Adult literacy, female (% of ages 15 and older) | 93 | 70 | 62 |
| Gross primary enrollment, male (% of age group) | 92 | 109 | 107 |
| Gross primary enrollment, female (% of age group) | 92 | 101 | 104 |
| Access to an improved water source (% of population) | 82 | 90 | 88 |
| Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) | 94 | 87 | 47 |



| Net Aid Flows | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2013 ^a |
|--|------|------|-------|-------------------|
| <i>(US\$ millions)</i> | | | | |
| Net ODA and official aid | .. | 179 | 685 | 2,001 |
| <i>Top 3 donors (in 2012):</i> | | | | |
| European Union Institutions | .. | 57 | 63 | 316 |
| United States | .. | 19 | 60 | 288 |
| Germany | .. | .. | 17 | 137 |
| Aid (% of GNI) | .. | .. | 14.2 | 21.9 |
| Aid per capita (US\$) | .. | 79 | 234 | 495 |
| Long-Term Economic Trends | | | | |
| Consumer prices (annual % change) | .. | .. | 2.8 | 1.7 |
| GDP implicit deflator (annual % change) | .. | .. | 10.4 | 9.4 |
| Exchange rate (annual average, local per US\$) | .. | .. | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| Terms of trade index (2000 = 100) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Population, mid-year (millions) | .. | 2.0 | 2.9 | 4.0 |
| GDP (US\$ millions) | .. | .. | 4,316 | 10,465 |
| <i>(% of GDP)</i> | | | | |
| Agriculture | .. | .. | 11.2 | 5.3 |
| Industry | .. | .. | 25.0 | 25.1 |
| Manufacturing | .. | .. | 12.1 | 16.2 |
| Services | .. | .. | 63.8 | 69.6 |
| Household final consumption expenditure | .. | .. | 86.1 | 86.6 |
| General gov't final consumption expenditure | .. | .. | 25.5 | 26.2 |
| Gross capital formation | .. | .. | 31.5 | 22.1 |
| Exports of goods and services | .. | .. | 20.5 | 16.5 |
| Imports of goods and services | .. | .. | 67.1 | 55.1 |
| Gross savings | .. | .. | 11.6 | 4.8 |



1980–90 1990–2000 2000–13
(average annual growth %)

.. 3.9 2.7
.. 14.3 3.8

.. 7.1 -0.1
.. 8.8 5.6
.. 2.8 4.7
.. 13.8 3.3

.. 12.8 2.9
.. 19.6 4.9
.. 14.7 0.8


.. 19.9 5.3
.. 14.3 2.1

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. .. indicates data are not available.
a. Aid data are for 2012.

Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG).


| Balance of Payments and Trade | 2000 | 2013 |
|---|--------|--------|
| <i>(US\$ millions)</i> | | |
| Total merchandise exports (fob) | 401 | 782 |
| Total merchandise imports (cif) | 2,383 | 4,697 |
| Net trade in goods and services | -2,257 | -5,267 |
| Current account balance | -990 | -2,815 |
| as a % of GDP | -22.9 | -21.0 |
| Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (receipts) | 1,010 | 1,666 |
| Reserves, including gold | .. | .. |
| Central Government Finance | | |
| <i>(% of GDP)</i> | | |
| Current revenue (including grants) | .. | 30.2 |
| Tax revenue | .. | 18.2 |
| Current expenditure | .. | 31.2 |
| Overall surplus/deficit | .. | -1.6 |
| Highest marginal tax rate (%) | | |
| Individual | .. | .. |
| Corporate | .. | 16 |
| External Debt and Resource Flows | | |
| <i>(US\$ millions)</i> | | |
| Total debt outstanding and disbursed | .. | .. |
| Total debt service | .. | .. |
| Debt relief (HIPC, MDRI) | - | - |
| Total debt (% of GDP) | .. | .. |
| Total debt service (% of exports) | .. | .. |
| Foreign direct investment (net inflows) | .. | .. |
| Portfolio equity (net inflows) | .. | .. |

Composition of total external debt, 2012
(data are not available)



| Private Sector Development | 2000 | 2012 |
|--|------|------|
| Time required to start a business (days) | - | 48 |
| Cost to start a business (% of GNI per capita) | - | 91.0 |
| Time required to register property (days) | - | 56 |
| Ranked as a major constraint to business (% of managers surveyed who agreed) | 2000 | 2012 |
| n.a. | .. | .. |
| n.a. | .. | .. |
| Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) | 17.7 | 24.2 |
| Bank capital to asset ratio (%) | .. | .. |

Governance indicators, 2000 and 2012



| Technology and Infrastructure | 2000 | 2012 |
|---|-------|-------|
| Paved roads (% of total) | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people) | 9 | 85 |
| High technology exports (% of manufactured exports) | .. | .. |
| Environment | | |
| Agricultural land (% of land area) | 62 | 43 |
| Forest area (% of land area) | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Terrestrial protected areas (% of land area) | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Freshwater resources per capita (cu. meters) | 264 | 207 |
| Freshwater withdrawal (% of internal resources) | 34.4 | 51.5 |
| CO2 emissions per capita (mt) | 0.27 | 0.62 |
| GDP per unit of energy use (2005 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent) | .. | .. |
| Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) | .. | .. |

| World Bank Group portfolio | 2000 | 2012 |
|--|------|------|
| <i>(US\$ millions)</i> | | |
| IBRD | | |
| Total debt outstanding and disbursed | - | - |
| Disbursements | - | - |
| Principal repayments | - | - |
| Interest payments | - | - |
| IDA | | |
| Total debt outstanding and disbursed | - | - |
| Disbursements | - | - |
| Total debt service | - | - |
| IFC (fiscal year) | | |
| Total disbursed and outstanding portfolio of which IFC own account | 30 | 45 |
| Disbursements for IFC own account | 30 | 45 |
| Disbursements for IFC own account | 18 | 0 |
| Portfolio sales, prepayments and repayments for IFC own account | 0 | 6 |
| MIGA | | |
| Gross exposure | - | - |
| New guarantees | - | - |

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified.
.. indicates data are not available. - indicates observation is not applicable.




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Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG).

With selected targets to achieve between 1990 and 2015

(estimate closest to date shown, +/- 2 years)

| | West Bank and Gaza | | | |
|--|--------------------|------|------|------|
| | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2012 |
| Goal 1: halve the rates for extreme poverty and malnutrition | | | | |
| Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP, % of population) | .. | .. | .. | <2 |
| Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) | .. | .. | .. | 21.9 |
| Share of income or consumption to the poorest quintile (%) | .. | .. | .. | 7.4 |
| Prevalence of malnutrition (% of children under 5) | .. | 3.6 | .. | 2.2 |
| Goal 2: ensure that children are able to complete primary schooling | | | | |
| Primary school enrollment (net, %) | .. | .. | 90 | 87 |
| Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group) | .. | 89 | 98 | 90 |
| Secondary school enrollment (gross, %) | .. | 68 | 81 | 83 |
| Youth literacy rate (% of people ages 15-24) | .. | 97 | .. | 99 |
| Goal 3: eliminate gender disparity in education and empower women | | | | |
| Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) | .. | 97 | 102 | 106 |
| Women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of nonagricultural employment) | .. | 15 | 14 | 17 |
| Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 4: reduce under-5 mortality by two-thirds | | | | |
| Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000) | 43 | 35 | 30 | 23 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) | 35 | 29 | 25 | 19 |
| Measles immunization (proportion of one-year olds immunized, %) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 5: reduce maternal mortality by three-fourths | | | | |
| Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) | .. | 95 | 97 | 99 |
| Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) | .. | 45 | 51 | 50 |
| Goal 6: halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and other major diseases | | | | |
| Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15-49) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) | 7 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Tuberculosis case detection rate (% , all forms) | 51 | 35 | 25 | 10 |
| Goal 7: halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to basic needs | | | | |
| Access to an improved water source (% of population) | 97 | 97 | 92 | 82 |
| Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) | 87 | 87 | 90 | 94 |
| Forest area (% of land area) | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Terrestrial protected areas (% of land area) | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2005 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 8: develop a global partnership for development | | | | |
| Telephone mainlines (per 100 people) | 3.2 | 3.1 | 8.5 | 9.3 |
| Mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 75.6 |
| Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.0 | .. | 1.1 | 41.1 |
| Households with a computer (%) | .. | .. | .. | 53.9 |



Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. .. indicates data are not available.

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Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG).