

**Input to The Yemen Policy Note no. 4  
on Inclusive Services Delivery**

**Yemen: Immediate Priorities  
for Post-Conflict Recovery of  
the Education Sector**



**WORLD BANK GROUP**



# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Acronyms	iv
Background	1
Introduction: sector situation before conflict	1
Conflict-related impacts and challenges	2
Key principles of re-engagement and reconstruction	5
Way forward: short to medium term	8



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## Acronyms

AES	Annual Education Surveyt
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DDNA	Dynamic Damage Needs Assessment
DEO	District Education Offices
ECS	Education Cluster Strategy
ECW	Education Cannot Waitv
EEC	Education in Emergencies Cluster
EIE	Education in Emergency
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FCV	Fragility, Conflict and Violence
FMC	Fathers and Mothers Council
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GEO	Governorate Education Offices
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
GIZ	Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency)
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
JAR	Joint Annual Review
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KFW	German Development Bank
LEG	Local Education Group
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Education
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NEVY	National Integrated Education Vision for Yemen
NGOs	Non-government organizations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OOSC	Out-of-School Children
PMU	Program Management Unit
SBM	School Based Management
SFD	Social Fund for Development
TEP	Transitional Education Plan
TIMSS	Trends for International Mathematics and Science Study
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## A- Background

**1. This note is a part of a series of policy notes prepared by the World Bank in anticipation of a post-conflict transition in Yemen.** These notes aimed to identify immediate priorities for stabilization, recovery and restoration of services and infrastructure in the aftermath of Yemen's current conflict. A subset within these notes focused on ways to restore service delivery in an inclusive manner immediately after conflict. As such, these notes examined short-to-medium-term institutional challenges facing the restoration and improvement of service across sectors. They focused on the immediate post-conflict priorities and challenges facing Energy, Water, Telecommunication, Education, Health, and Transport sectors in restoring services while also contributing to higher-level objectives of addressing systemic inequities and reinforcing trust in the state. The notes make practical suggestions to the Government of Yemen and international development partners to provide immediate post-conflict support to ensure empowerment, accountability, and better governance in service delivery.

**2. The current paper focuses specifically on steps required to restore education services in an immediate post-conflict situation.** Specifically, the note looks at (i) key policy choices and interventions to facilitate short-term stabilization; (ii) institutional set-up for the medium-term recovery plan; and (iii) long-term vision with conducive measures to im-

prove scope and quality and ways to enhance inclusiveness, equity, transparency and accountability of the education sector.

## B- Introduction: sector situation before conflict

**3. Prior to the current conflict, Yemen's education sector achieved significant progress toward meeting Education for All,** increasing the primary education gross enrollment ratio (GER) from 73 percent in 1999 to 101 percent in 2013. Girls' enrollments also surged, with primary education GERs rising from 52 to 92 percent over the same time period. However, despite this commitment and significant progress, Yemen fell short of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for primary completion and gender parity at all education levels by 2015. School dropout rates climbed, with persistent gender inequality present across all education levels. Further, preschool education showed severe underdevelopment (with a GER of less than 1 percent) and a low quality of education, as evidenced by the results in the international learning assessment, Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007 and 2011.<sup>1</sup>

**4. Before the conflict escalated in March 2015, the education sector was highly centralized.** The Ministry of Education (MOE) in Sana'a was the single entity that supervised preprimary, basic, and general secondary education policy devel-

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1- Yemen's education system consists of kindergarten, basic education, and general or vocational secondary education or vocational training, followed by undergraduate and postgraduate universities, teacher training institutes, community colleges, or technical education. Preschool and kindergarten—which are not compulsory and mostly private—cater to 3–6 year olds, with generally one year in preschool and two years in kindergarten. Basic education—which is compulsory and free—starts at age 6 and covers grades 1–9. It includes a six-year primary cycle (grades 1–6) and a three-year preparatory cycle (grades 7–9). Governorate-level examinations are held at the end of grade 9, awarding successful students with a basic education certificate. General secondary education—which is not compulsory covers grades 10–12. Students choose a science or humanities track at grade 11, and receive a secondary education certificate after passing examinations at the end of grade 12. Vocational secondary education and training takes place in vocational training centers (two-year courses) or vocational institutes (three-year courses).

opment and service delivery, coordinating closely with local and international development partners (DPs). It also managed adult literacy initiatives and programs for special needs students. The MOE handled decisions related to policies, such as regulations, curriculum, the annual calendar, teacher training, and choosing and providing textbooks. The MOE delegated administering and managing education at the local level to Governorate Education Offices (GEO) and District Education Offices (DEO), utilizing feedback and reporting mechanisms to the central MOE through the Annual Education Survey (AES). Governorates appointed new principals and teachers, assessed needs for new positions, and determined budgets, although staffing educational institutions fell under the Ministry of Civil Service's direct control and regulation, in coordination with the Ministry of Local Affairs. The Ministry of Finance directly controlled and regulated educational institutions' funding. Governorates supervised education institutions and monitored performance. In addition, governorates built and expanded schools (in conjunction with districts and with support from the MOE). School building also took place through Public Works Projects implemented by the MOE when funds were available from international partners. Governorates held authority over the deployment and transfer of teachers and their wages. Districts, in conjunction with governorates, were responsible for conducting teacher evaluations, distributing staff and wages (distributed from the governorates), and managing private education (with final approval coming from the governorate level).

**5. Until mid-2015, development of a**

**National Integrated Education Vision for Yemen (NEVY) was underway and progressing well.** Since 2002, the government endorsed numerous strategies related to education—from early childhood to higher education—and they intended for the NEVY to harmonize earlier fragmented strategies and address pertinent missing issues, such as teacher preparation and student flow regulations and practices. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation coordinated strategy development and involved various stakeholders, including all line ministries related to education. However, this work stopped in 2015 because of the inability to secure resources as the conflict escalated.

## C- Conflict-related impacts and challenges

**6. The education sector has been significantly impacted by the ongoing conflict.** The Education Cluster and Ministry of Education estimate that 2 million children are currently out of school in Yemen.

This figure includes approximately 350,000 children who have been out of school since the conflict escalated in March 2015 as well as 513,000 IDP children. Altogether, 2.3 million people – including students, parents and teachers – require support to ensure that crisis-affected children are able to attend school. Displaced children are at higher risk of missing education. Boys face higher risks of recruitment by armed groups, while girls face higher risk of being held back from school.

**Chart x: Schools affected by governor-**

ate (UNOCHA Humanitarian Overview 2017)





Chart xx: People in need of education by governorate (Education Cluster Survey 2016)



**7. The World Bank’s phase 1 of the Dynamic Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) exercise** provided in depth indications of the reconstruction needs in the four cities of Sana’a, Aden, Taiz and Zinjibar. The September 2016 Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) exercise evaluated reconstruction needs in those cities. Table 4.1 provides information on the percentage of schools

damaged in each of the four cities. Table 4.2 provides the estimated cost (low and high estimates) for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the schools across Yemen, and compares education with other key sectors of the economy. Overall, it estimated that about 95 million USD would be needed to provide reconstruction of damaged schools in those four cities.

**Table1: Physical Damage Levels by City and Sector (%)**

	Sana’a	Aden	Taiz	Zinjibar
Health	27	24	34	25
Education	35	38	34	16
Energy	55	27	67	50
(Transport (only inner-city roads	0.16	0.18	2.72	0.45
WASH <sup>a</sup>	8	57	69	—
Residential housing	11	25	21	0

Source; *Damage and Needs Assessment, Phase I, unpublished, World Bank, 2016.*

Note: <sup>a</sup> Due to a lack of reliable data and ground access, the first-phase DNA could not assess Zinjibar’s WASH sector.

**Table 2: Total Damage Cost Range by Sector**

Sector	Low Estimate (US\$, million)	High Estimate (US\$, million)
Health	435	532
Education	86	105
Energy	125	153
Wash	78	96
Transport	126	154
Residential Housing	3,245	3,966
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,095</b>	<b>5,006</b>

Source; *Damage and Needs Assessment, Phase I, unpublished, World Bank, 2016.*

Note: Throughout the report, the low and high damage cost estimates were calculated with a 10 percent margin of the average damage cost.

**8. In response, the MOE has setup an emergency response taskforce.** This taskforce regularly assesses the damage and needs of education beneficiaries, while also providing in-conflict support to the affected schools. Building on such an effort and using additional survey data from the

Education Cluster DPs—such as Save the Children, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—the MoE emergency education taskforce identified key issues and immediate needs at the school and community levels. Still, regular updates of school-level data are necessary, to assess the rapidly changing situation accurately and to allocate financial and human resources strategically. The taskforce must continuously consult and harmonize efforts with other DPs, to identify evidence-based policy options and ensure related interventions' complementarity and effectiveness.

**9. The MoE and Yemen Education Cluster developed and endorsed an Education Cluster Strategy (ECS) for the period 2016-2017.** ECS Covers the following objectives: Objective 1: all crisis affected girls and boys (3-18) have equitable access to safe, inclusive and equipped learning spaces, objective 2: Crisis affected girls and boys (3-18) have the ability to attend flexible, alternative learning opportunities, objective 3: risks to all crisis affected girls and boys (3-18) are reduced through the improved ability to cope with negative psychosocial effects and to limit the physical danger presented by conflict.

## **D- Key principles of re-engagement and reconstruction**

**10. Yemen is trapped in a vicious 'cycle of conflict' with chronically weak state institutions directly contributing to the current round of violence.** This violence, in turn, has further undermined state institutions thereby portending even more violence for the future. The continued weakening of national institutions has also diminished chances of sustainable peace as any peace-agreement would be undermined without a strong institutional

foundation to safeguard its terms. Therefore, any recovery and reconstruction plan post-conflict would also have to mandatorily focus on reinforcing state institutions—while addressing urgent humanitarian needs—to prevent the slide back into conflict. Experiences from around are replete with instances where the singular focus on post-conflict humanitarian relief—without regard for institutional transformations—have ended up being costly missed opportunities for breaking the cycle of violence.

**11. There is thus a clear need for new thinking on Yemen to support more sustainable and inclusive ways of service delivery during conflict and immediate post-conflict periods.** In this context, the key challenge for Yemen's development partners is to devise new and innovative ways to support the country, to not only recognize the fundamental causes and effects of conflict and fragility but also, importantly, enhance the resilience and coping capabilities of communities and households. Therefore, these notes on inclusive service delivery—including the current note on Education—propose a new approach that focuses on attending to urgent service delivery needs in the most affected parts of Yemen while also incrementally enhancing inclusiveness, resilience and thus, the effectiveness of service delivery institutions.

**12. Establishing Education as a key priority of Yemen's recovery and reconstruction goals is one of the overall policy challenge facing the sector.** In addition, several challenges have been identified including; (a) the lack of a unified vision and leadership caused by the split of the MOE between Sana'a and Aden, to (b) the politicization and division of education. The latter is illustrated by the recent case

of Sana'a abandoning newly revised first-grade Arabic textbooks (whereas Aden still plans to use the books), along with other issues of inequitable teacher and supervisor deployment. Further, because of the lasting conflict, (c) education service delivery is affected and distorted severely, with only fragmented and partial interventions available to students and teachers.

More specifically, the sector faces the following challenges:

a. **Lack of Common Vision.** The education sector needs a common vision toward restoring service delivery.

b. **Insufficient Resources.** The sector lacks sufficient human and financial resources to develop policies and provide education services.

c. **Lack of Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities.** Roles and responsibilities need clearer definition at the various levels of sector administration: at the central governorate, and district education offices, and at the school level in the face of the central MOE's deteriorating role. Given the diminished role of MOE in the education sector, there is an urgent need to enhance autonomy and accountability at the local level.

d. **Limited Capacity.** The MOE as a main education service provider suffer from poor capacity at all levels. Prior investment on building capacity for the school leadership and Fathers and Mothers Council (FMC) has been lost due to the conflict. MOE and school leadership, as well as FMC need regular and consistent capacity building support in order to ensure quality education and to strengthen school-level autonomy and accountability.

e. **Lack of Fiduciary Mechanisms.** At the district or school level, the sector lacks a functional fiduciary mechanism to provide goods and services directly, which includes adequate risk-mitigation measures.

f. **Inadequate Monitoring and Evaluation.** The sector needs adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track progress, flag issues, and evaluate the impact of policy- and system-level interventions.

**13. Addressing these challenges requires** (a) taking stock of currently available support provided to the education sector, coupled with continuous situation analysis and needs assessment; (b) local and international experiences of successful models to ensure service delivery, with a focus on how education can support the community and social reconstruction; (c) collective efforts to restore political will and ownership for the education services recovery; (d) system-level changes to promote resilient and responsive service delivery, especially in areas where the damage has been more evident; (e) new and enhanced roles and responsibilities at the central, governorate, district, and school levels, in addition to the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and private sector partners; and (f) strengthened coordination and partnerships among different service providers.

**14. Existing coping mechanisms in Yemen that can be a driver for recovery.** In order to support the education sector during crisis, currently the following DPs support key activities—mainly through UNICEF on the ground, except for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), which is

plemented through GiZ. During the December 2016 meeting in Beirut, LEGs agreed that the MOE will seek support from DPs in identifying a partner that would lead development of the Transitional Education Sector Plan (TESP) with GPE's support. Additionally, the GPE awarded to the MOE a grant to launch the Education Cannot Wait (ECW)

project, along with support for implementing the education emergency plan. The ECW provides support for four governorates (Taiz, Sa'ada, Shabwa and Dhala'). Other governorates and beneficiaries are covered by other partners. Table xx summarizes existing interventions and active partners on the ground.

**Table 3: Mapping of existing support for education sector**

By whom: Agency	What: Areas of Support
<i>Global Partnership for Education (GPE) managed by UNICEF</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• school rehabilitation, replacement of classroom furniture and basic education materials and supplies</li> <li>• psychosocial support for students</li> <li>• quality improvement interventions (including school-based development and community participation), curriculum development</li> <li>• improvement of teacher performance and management of schools</li> <li>• improvement of institutional capacities, including the education management information system (EMIS) at the decentralized levels</li> <li>• school accreditation at the decentralized levels</li> <li>• development of preschool education</li> <li>• compensatory opportunities for out-of-school children (OOSC)</li> <li>• literacy and adult education programs</li> </ul>
<i>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• school rehabilitation and basic learning materials, classroom furniture</li> <li>• psychosocial support,</li> <li>• a self-learning program,</li> <li>• WASH rehabilitation and promotion,</li> <li>• volunteer teachers in internally displaced populations' locations, and support for displaced people</li> </ul>
<i>United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• classroom furniture and school supplies,</li> <li>• capitation grants and expansion of the Safer School Project</li> <li>• a self-learning program</li> </ul>
<i>Government of Japan</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• temporary learning spaces and psychosocial support.</li> </ul>
<i>Educate a Child (EAC), Qatar</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• temporary learning spaces, school rehabilitation</li> <li>• WASH</li> <li>• basic student supply materials</li> </ul>
<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality Education Improvement Program, which includes capacity building, school staff training, community participation, and school-based development</li> <li>• Youth Employability Improvement Project, which introduces students to vocational studies, strengthens students' vocational and labor market orientation, and provides informal secondary school training programs</li> </ul>

Source: World Bank, 2017.

## E- Way forward: short to medium term

**15. Based on the latest situation analysis, this section explores possibilities and mechanisms to improve the scope and quality of education service delivery** by sustaining existing coping mechanisms and adopting lessons learned from other FCV countries.

**16. Immediate response period (0–12 months):** For this immediate phase, the education team considered interventions that the MOE can implement quickly with limited financial resources, while still having a notable effect on learning. This package would combine the physical infrastructure (hardware) and quality of services (soft side), which address the most vulnerable population's needs. The proposed interventions would facilitate the MOE's efforts to engage the community in restoring service delivery to schools. Specifically, the team recommends the following interventions:

a. *A school-based and community-driven development approach.* This would require effective engagement from CSOs and private sector partners. Given that schools have operated under daunting crisis conditions, investing in school-based-management (SBM) approaches in collaboration with the community and MFC helps affirm and restore the education sector's capacity and resilience.

b. *Institutional development.* DPs should provide the MOE, schools, and communities with capacity-building and awareness-raising support to strengthen accountability and governance, in close coordination with other partners

already investing on this front.

c. *Psycho-emotional support.* Providing this support helps students and teachers rebound from the conflict.

**17. Concrete actions in this regard are as follows.** The best results will come from delivering these activities in close coordination with the MOE, donor partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the communities. The MOEs and other partners should define specific roles after mapping out existing interventions with time and cost projections.

a. *Provide a better learning environment, furniture, and teaching and learning materials.*

- Rehabilitate light damages (for example, replace broken windows, repaint walls, and install furniture and equipment) by working closely with the community and CSOs.
- Provide school kits, school uniforms, and stationeries.
- Support means for the MOE to print and distribute textbooks and teachers' guides.
- Identify large-scale damage and prepare civil works contracts for the schools that need full reconstruction and significant rehabilitation.
- Provide alternative learning spaces (such as tents and other equipment) so that teachers can educate in the absence of school buildings.
- Provide transportation to facilitate students' and teachers'

access to schools or temporary locations and facilities.

- Outline large-scale reconstruction for severely damaged schools, clearly identifying such projects and preparing associated civil works drawings and bills of quantities. This propels the procurement and awards process, clearing the way for reconstruction in the next phase.

- Provide meals to students. Considering the country conditions and lack of access to basic needs, field data suggests that providing meals to students during the school day would greatly influence attendance rates and improve the opportunity for learning.

b. *Provide more options to ensure services for conflict-affected children.*

- Obtain psycho-emotional support for students and teachers.

- Provide alternative learning options for OOSC by closely collaborating with DPs and CSOs (details of alternative learning options are provided in the “Other Policy Options and Recommended Interventions” section).

- Identify flexible examination options for internally displaced person (IDPs)—the MOE opened exam centers outside the country for those who fled the conflict. Such flexible management of examinations should be continued and supported by DPs.

- Identify flexible enrollment

procedures (to formalize and systematically offer) for IDPs and OOSC.

- Offer institutional capacity-building activities to support the MOE’s TESP.

c. *Resume important demand-side interventions and support the MOE’s policy-development activities.*

- Scale up the existing Rural Female Teacher Contracting (RFTC) scheme to ensure girls’ schooling in rural areas, in close coordination with UNICEF’s ongoing GPE program.

- Plan for the improvements for the existing EMIS, to support the MOE in collecting and managing education data that redevelops and reorganizes education policy frameworks. Improving the EMIS would help the MOE allocate resources more effectively, because the EMIS would collect school- and district-level data and information about the infrastructure and equipment’s conditions, the availability of learning materials, and the status of school personnel management.

d. *Coordination with WASH and transport sector:* According to the needs assessment conducted by the UNOCHA and Education Cluster, issues such as lack of toilets and WASH facilities in many schools is considered one of the main reasons for girls dropping out of school. Additionally, a recent survey carried out in six of the most severely affected areas in Amran Governorate indicate that a main rea-

sons for not enrolling in schools by girls and boys is due long travel distances to these facilities. Therefore, addressing those issues (e.g. WASH) and transportation allowance would be one of the focus of the intervention at early stage.

### **18. Medium-Term Reconstruction Phase (12-24 months)**

This phase should combine infrastructure/hardware and soft interventions (support for the MOE, students, teachers, and parents), but with a large-scale reconstruction included as a major activity following a civil works contracts process (toward the end of the initial 18 months' phase). Further, the MOE would use and strengthen the existing public education system and functions during this phase as much as possible to deliver services (as opposed to the first phase, which would rely on direct intervention to communities and schools by relief agencies). The following are actions recommended during this phase.

- Begin school building reconstruction and large-scale rehabilitations.
- Continue support for students and teachers (psycho-emotional support).
- Continue support for school principals and the MFC, to promote SBM and engage the community in school rehabilitation and management.
- Train and support teachers and school leadership, as well as the MFC, for further preparation and collaboration with the community to address school-level issues (in view of enhancing school-level autonomy and accountability).
- Continue institutional capacity-

building support for the MOE, to improve the education service delivery's scope and quality, and to support SBM.

- Scale up demand-side interventions—such as conditional cash transfer (CCT) and RFTC—to incentivize parents in disadvantaged areas to send children to school, especially for girls in rural areas.
- If the MOE decides to resume NEVY, renew consultations and discussions with various stakeholders, to define the new vision and integrated strategy for the education sector.

### **19. Long-term strategic reforms, and reforms of expected high impact (3–5 years).**

Along with the immediate and medium-term reconstruction support activities, the government should begin planning long term, focusing on how to ensure scope and quality of basic service delivery. This phase should focus strongly on bringing OOSC back to regular schools and strengthening the MOE's regular functions, based on the foundational work accomplished in previous phases. Toward this goal, the MOE must architect a long-term vision in close consultation with various education stakeholders. Using NEVY, the MOE should redefine education's role in long-term national development, with actionable items clearly identified that support NEVY's implementation, pinpointing a concrete reform roadmap for the next 3–5 years. At this phase, the following actions are recommended, based on NEVY (if the MoE decides to continue with NEVY), and the related reform roadmap.

- Use education as a vehicle to ad-

dress and promote social cohesion, peace building, and civism goals.

- Define the role of school leadership, and how to build its capacity. This includes putting a mechanism for teacher management and professional development in place to improve student learning outcomes.
- Continue guidelines to implement SBM, which would define the roles and responsibilities of the central MOE, governorate, and district education offices, trainers, supervisors, school principals, and MFC. This effort would also provide guidance to schools regarding how to engage the community.
- Undertake the MOE’s overall framework development and direction for work within the central MOE, in close coordination with NEVY and building on the TESP. Priorities include setting learning standards, developing curriculum and textbooks, developing a teacher training and professional development framework, and many other areas of education provision. The MOE also would monitor and supervise decentralized activities at the local level, while some of the actual service delivery functions could be shared at

governorate, district, and community levels.


## OTHER POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDED INTERVENTIONS BASED ON GLOBAL FCV EXPERIENCES

**20. This section provides concrete guidance for inclusive service delivery, based on a comprehensive review of experiences from other FCV countries.** How these countries restored education service delivery during and after conflict has significant implication on policy recommendations for Yemen.

**21. The Resilience in Education System (RES) 360° conceptual framework.** Many countries have studied education’s role during and after conflicts, and the findings from countries that adopted the RES 360° assessment tool could act as a blueprint for Yemen’s post-conflict recovery operations. Learning from the RES 360° assessment could help the government of Yemen redefine the MOE’s roles and responsibilities at all levels, making schools resilient for emergencies and ensuring readiness for further development. The following chart describes the RES framework.

**Chart 1: Education Resilience Approaches Framework**

The Education Resilience Approaches framework



The RES-360° focuses on components 1 and 4.

Source: World Bank, 2016.

**22. Balancing immediate relief and long-term reform.** RES 360° findings from FCV countries show that education could play a pivotal role in promoting social cohesion and peace building. It is important for Yemen's education sector to effectively balance immediate humanitarian assistance with longer-term development. This predicament is common, but with strategic planning, emergency interventions can provide important foundations for longer-term reform and transformation. This vision is inherent within the RES 360° approach, as supported by the data. To address the twin goals of immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term reform needs, the education team recommends (a) ensuring that all education stakeholders' voices are heard through consultations and needs assessment; (b) identifying assets and existing mechanisms that can be mobilized and improved; and (c) emphasizing important institutional links and connections to longer-term, more sustainable interventions.

**23. Making the most of the current TESP.** DPs increasingly recognize that the imposed division of structures for immediate humanitarian relief and longer-term development support does not match reality. Crises do not necessarily occur in a linear fashion that permit simple transitions from one to the other. By including school-level risk reduction and resilience-promotion activities in education sector strategic plans, ministries can keep their options open to both funding sources. After mapping out all the existing interventions, the government of Yemen should incorporate elements into the current MOE Emergency Education Strategy and TESP, and identify how to implement immediate and long-term reform activities through

NEVY and other operations.

**24. Strengthening emergency and disaster preparedness at school.** Yemen's fragility and vulnerability could last for a while, even after the conflict ceases. Thus, it is important for the MOE to incorporate elements of emergency preparedness and resilience into policy framework and implementation mechanisms, so that schools can prepare better for future crises and sustain education service delivery even during conflicts.

**25. The way forward.** The MOE currently has limited, partial functioning because of sustained, far-reaching crises. Several country cases could offer practical insights regarding how to enable service delivery under fragile situations. The next section presents a response model, detailing other countries' specific examples that addressed both immediate crisis response and long-term reform needs, and how they ensured education service delivery against various constraints. This concrete model has proven effective in several other FCV contexts.

## **SBM AS A MODEL TO PROMOTE INCLUSIVE SERVICE DELIVERY IN YEMEN**

**26. School–community assets as the driver for recovery.** Research on community involvement in education shows positive findings of how communities can be instrumental not only in providing access to education, but also in using the strength of traditional and local community structures to help reopen schools and provide safer learning environments, even in the context of ongoing violence. The following paragraphs describe example implementations of school-based-management (SBM), with suggested roles and responsibilities for the MOE and other partners.

This model which focuses strongly on enhanced autonomy and accountability at school level is based on recommendations from the education decentralization study for Yemen conducted by the World Bank in 2015. The report recommends to enhance school autonomy and accountability in coping with education in emergency situations.

**27. School autonomy and accountability are key components of an education system that ensure education quality** (box 1). By transferring core managerial responsibilities to schools, school autonomy: (1) fosters local ownership and accountability; (2) helps reflect local priorities, values, and needs through increased participation of parents and the community; and (3) gives teachers the opportunity to establish a personal commitment to students and their parents. Increased school autonomy and improved accountability are necessary conditions for improved learning because they align teacher and parent incentives. Studies have shown a clear causal link between school autonomy and efficiency in resource use. Viewed in this context, school autonomy and accountability should be considered essential components of an overall strategy for

#### Box 1. Defining School Autonomy and Accountability

**School autonomy** is a form of school management in which schools are given decision-making authority over their operations, including the hiring and firing of personnel, and the assessment of teachers and pedagogical practices. School management under autonomy may give an important role to the school council, representing the interests of parents, in budget planning and approval, as well as a voice or vote in personnel decisions. By including the school council in school management, school autonomy fosters accountability. In its basic form **accountability** is defined as the acceptance of responsibility and being answerable for one's actions. In school management, accountability may take other additional meanings: (1) the act of compliance with the rules and regulations of school governance; (2) reporting to those with oversight authority over the school; and (3) linking rewards and sanctions to expected results.

Source: Di Gropello 2004, 2006; Barrera et al. 2009; Heim 1996; Recehbei 2010.

improving learning outcomes. More local control helps create better conditions for improving student learning in a sustainable way, since it gives teachers and parents more opportunities to develop common goals, increase their mutual commitment to student learning, and promote more efficient use of scarce school resources.

**28. SBM in Afghanistan, Mali, and El Salvador—the school management committee's (SMC's) role.** In Afghanistan, community-based education has long been a response to conflict and low education access rates. The participation of communities in Afghan schools is holistic, rather than just administrative. Parents and community members cooperate to ensure the safety of students (especially girls), maintain school premises, and support teachers in the classroom. This participation is supported by the MOE through the formation of SMCs, grants for school construction and maintenance, and training and supervision of SMCs and schools. The SMC members are both men and women who reflect the community's composition, and who take the lead in engaging the community and encouraging involvement in education activities. After further developing the initial model, and scaling up coordination and external support, Afghanistan integrated the community models into national policy and education systems. After the crisis in 2012, community-based schools in Mali successfully integrated IDPs and continued education service delivery through community–school management committees, called *comités de gestion scolaires* (CGS), which existed before the crisis. The CGS was an asset for the MOE to tap into during the system's overhaul and new policy framework's development after the conflict. During El Salvador's war years, because of the absence of any formal education services, communities organized

themselves to teach children how to read and write. Community members offered their homes or physical space elsewhere in the community as makeshift classrooms, and communal committees were established to gather resources and identify educators. As with the CGS in Mali, after the conflict in El Salvador, the elected government formalized this practice, which created schools with formal structures for parental and community participation.

**29. Implications for Yemen.** Yemen's MFCs are similar to the SMCs and CGS. Prior to the conflict, MFCs played an important role through the previous Bank and DP's projects in developing SBM plans (school improvement plans), implementing school community grants, and monitoring CCT implementation. Many DP operations supported the MFCs' capacity building, and Yemen could use this asset on the ground to sustain education service delivery.

**30. The MOE's role in the SBM model.** Although many case studies suggest that strengthening SBM and MFCs would be effective in restoring immediate service delivery, it is important to define the MOE's roles and responsibilities while materializing inclusive service delivery in Yemen. Many education activities mentioned in earlier sections could be implemented with help from the community and donor partners. Yet the MOE should handle some tasks, such as setting up the legal framework; setting quality standards, service delivery mechanisms, and quality assurance mechanisms; and monitoring and evaluating the scope and quality of service delivery. Setting curriculum and printing and distributing textbooks also fall under the MOE's responsibility, with support from donors.

## Box 2. Different Paths to School-Based Management

In many countries, the implementation of SBM has increased student enrollment, student and teacher attendance, and parent involvement. However, the empirical evidence from Latin America shows very few cases in which SBM has made a significant difference in learning outcomes, while in Europe there is substantial evidence showing a positive impact of school autonomy on learning. Two approaches to SBM—the grassroots approach taken in Latin America, in contexts where the institutional structure was weak or service delivery was hampered due to internal conflict, and the operational efficiency approach taken in Europe, where institutions were stronger—coincide in applying managerial principles to promote better education quality, but they are driven by two different modes of accountability to parents and the community. In the Latin American model, schools are held accountable through participatory school-based management; while in the European model, accountability is based on trust in schools and their teachers. In either case, school autonomy has begun to transform traditional education from a system based on processes and inputs into one driven by results.

Source: Patrinos 2010; Eurydice 2007; Di Gropello 2004; Arcia et al. 2011; Hood 2001.

**31. Flexible and alternative learning options outside the MOE schools.** In addition to SBM—in close collaboration with MFCs, NGOs, and other education partners—the government of Yemen could consider supporting informal, alternative learning options in adverse contexts when MOE schools are not functioning because of severe conflict and destruction. Various types of informal and alternative schooling could accommodate IDPs and OOSC in the absence of regular schooling during severe conflicts, or when schools are damaged. It is essential that the MOE establish a legal framework that could formally recognize and certify such alternative learning, so that those children who went through non-MOE schools could be reintegrated into the formal education system smoothly, without repeating their learning.

**32. Supporting alternate means of education.** Even in nonemergency contexts, factors such as distance from home to school, security, and child labor can prevent children's regular school attendance. In a crisis, while the regular schools are not functioning because of destruction or insecurity, relief organizations could sup-

port several types of alternative basic education. These may include (a) *school outreach centers* that maintain classrooms in remote communities that lack access to local schools, allowing children to follow government curriculum; (b) *accelerated education* that provides opportunities for older children who have missed school and for whom learning in a classroom with younger children is inappropriate or undesirable, enabling them to eventually enter mainstream government schools; and (c) *flexible-hour schooling*, which provides older children and working children with condensed, *catch-up curriculum* outside of normal school hours. Recruiting informal educators within communities can provide a foundation to meet immediate needs. These could include young people who may have practical experience as classroom assistants or who were engaged in school and community activities. This strategy also could help address short-term staff shortfalls in remote areas and certain subjects.

**33.Implications for Yemen.** The MOE could consider adopting greater flexibilities in times of crisis that would increase the chance of education service delivery to broader beneficiaries and OOSC who are deeply affected by the conflict. The following are successful cases of the MOE adopting flexibility in teacher management and other policy areas.

**34.Flexible teacher policies.** Mali's MOE issued flexible teacher policies which ensured equitable teacher distribution after the crisis. The policies allowed displaced teachers from the north to find temporary positions in schools in the south, and provided a system-wide structure that fostered school–community interactions during the crisis. Such flexibility promoted voluntarism and caring support

of displaced children by teachers, during and after school. Important lessons from the recent flexible education responses to the Mali crisis can elucidate reforms in access, teaching, and learning for greater resilience and sustainable development. Flexible and participatory education can bring communities together and support the most vulnerable members. Yemen's formal education structures can adopt flexible strategies, such as flexible school schedules, after-school classes, learning opportunities outside the classroom (such as community projects, internships, and mentorships), and prospects for community members and families to help teach.

**35.Using information and communications technology to provide continuous education.** Somalia used interactive radio instruction to prevent gaps in education delivery. Interactive radio instruction might be feasible in low-budget environments with limited security. The Education Development Center's (EDC) Somali Interactive Radio Instruction Program provided consistent broadcasts of education programs on literacy, numeracy, life skills, health, and conflict prevention between 2005 and 2011. They transmitted broadcasts three hours a day for up to five days a week on the FM band to common household radios, potentially reaching more than 300,000 children. With the interactive radio instruction broadcasts, local teachers led classes. Simultaneously, the EDC trained teachers to use interactive learning methods such as activities, stories, and songs that could be broadcast via radio. Following the program's closure in 2011, EDC signed licensing agreements with the MOEs for Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central (Federal), along with NGOs, allowing them to continue using the program and materials. According to the EDC, these MOEs still use the program.

## FINANCING FOR EDUCATION SERVICE DELIVERY

**36. Continuing advocacy and fundraising during the non-conflict period.** Finally, it is crucial to address financing and seek solutions. Any and all interventions require resources, but research shows that education in emergencies is severely underfunded. One of the greatest limiting factors in endeavoring to protect communities and investments is the disconnect between needs and funding. Internationally, education is consistently and grossly underfunded, with only 1.4 percent of all humanitarian funding in 2012 being allocated to education. No other sector consistently ranks as the least-funded sector or has a smaller share of humanitarian

appeals funded. Therefore, it is imperative that the MOE—together with the LEG and donor partners—must continue advocacy to support education sector development in anticipation of conflict situations.

**37. MOE will need to play a central advocacy role.** Building on existing platforms such as LEGs, Yemen's MOE will need to play a central advocacy role to the donor community, to increase awareness and solicit financing for education sector recovery and reconstruction, as well as development programs. The MOE will need continued guidance and support from DPs to fulfill this critical role and boost capacity at all levels.