Input to The Yemen Policy Note no. 4 on Inclusive Services Delivery Yemen: Immediate Priorities for Post-Conflict Recovery of the Education Sector WOLD BANK GROUP 1 B Table of Contents Acknowledgements iii Acronyms iv Background 1 Introduction: sector situation before conflict 1 Conflict-related impacts and challenges 2 Key principles of re-engagement and reconstruction 5 Way forward: short to medium term 8 i ii Acknowledgements T he Education Sector note was prepared by Tomomi Miyajima (education specialist) with close collaboration with Amira Kazem (senior operation specialist). Inputs, comments and guidance were received from Khalid Moheyddeen (social protection specialist), Sepehr Fotovat (senior procurement specialist), Walid Al-Najar (financial management specialist), Lianqin Wang (lead education specialist) and Safaa El-Kogali (practice manager). iii Acronyms AES Annual Education Surveyt CSO Civil Society Organizations DDNA Dynamic Damage Needs Assessment DEO District Education Offices ECS Education Cluster Strategy ECW Education Cannot Waitvv EEC Education in Emergencies Cluster EiE Education in Emergency EMIS Education Management Information System FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence FMC Fathers and Mothers Council FTI Fast Track Initiative GEO Governorate Education Offices GER Gross Enrollment Rate GIZ Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency) GPE Global Partnership for Education JAR Joint Annual Review IDP Internally Displaced Person KFW German Development Bank LEG Local Education Group MDG Millennium Development Goals MoE Ministry of Education M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NEVY National Integrated Education Vision for Yemen NGOs Non-government organizations OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OOSC Out-of-School Children PMU Program Management Unit SBM School Based Management SFD Social Fund for Development TEP Transitional Education Plan TIMSS Trends for International Mathematics and Science Study UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development iv A- Background prove scope and quality and ways to en- hance inclusiveness, equity, transparency 1. This note is a part of a series of pol- and accountability of the education sector. icy notes prepared by the World Bank in anticipation of a post-conflict tran- sition in Yemen. These notes aimed to B- Introduction: sector situation identify immediate priorities for stabiliza- before conflict tion, recovery and restoration of services and infrastructure in the aftermath of Ye- 3. Prior to the current conflict, Yemen’s men’s current conflict. A subset within education sector achieved significant these notes focused on ways to restore progress toward meeting Education for service delivery in an inclusive manner All, increasing the primary education gross immediately after conflict. As such, these enrollment ratio (GER) from 73 percent in notes examined short-to-medium-term in- 1999 to 101 percent in 2013. Girls’ enroll- stitutional challenges facing the restora- ments also surged, with primary education tion and improvement of service across GERs rising from 52 to 92 percent over the sectors. They focused on the immediate same time period. However, despite this post-conflict priorities and challenges fac- commitment and significant progress, Ye- ing Energy, Water, Telecommunication, men fell short of achieving the Millennium Education, Health, and Transport sectors Development Goals (MDG) for primary in restoring services while also contribut- completion and gender parity at all educa- ing to higher-level objectives of address- tion levels by 2015. School dropout rates ing systemic inequities and reinforcing climbed, with persistent gender inequality trust in the state. The notes make practical present across all education levels. Fur- suggestions to the Government of Yemen ther, preschool education showed severe and international development partners to underdevelopment (with a GER of less provide immediate post-conflict support to than 1 percent) and a low quality of educa- ensure empowerment, accountability, and tion, as evidenced by the results in the in- better governance in service delivery. ternational learning assessment, Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2. The current paper focuses specifi- 2007 and 2011.1 cally on steps required to restore edu- cation services in an immediate post- 4. Before the conflict escalated in conflict situation. Specifically, the note March 2015, the education sector was looks at (i) key policy choices and inter- highly centralized. The Ministry of Edu- ventions to facilitate short-term stabiliza- cation (MOE) in Sana’a was the single en- tion; (ii) institutional set-up for the medi- tity that supervised preprimary, basic, and um-term recovery plan; and (iii) long-term general secondary education policy devel- vision with conducive measures to im- 1- Yemen’s education system consists of kindergarten, basic education, and general or vocational secondary education or vocational training, followed by undergraduate and postgraduate universities, teacher training institutes, community colleges, or technical education. Preschool and kindergarten—which are not compulsory and mostly private—cater to 3–6 year olds, with generally one year in preschool and two years in kinder- garten. Basic education—which is compulsory and free—starts at age 6 and covers grades 1–9. It includes a six-year primary cycle (grades 1–6) and a three-year preparatory cycle (grades 7–9). Governorate-level examinations are held at the end of grade 9, \awarding successful students with a basic education certificate. General secondary education—which is not compulsory covers grades 10–12. Students choose a science or humanities track at grade 11, and receive a secondary education certificate after passing examinations at the end of grade 12. Vocational second- ary education and training takes place in vocational training centers (two-year courses) or vocational institutes (three-year courses). 1 opment and service delivery, coordinating National Integrated Education Vision closely with local and international devel- for Yemen (NEVY) was underway and opment partners (DPs). It also managed progressing well. Since 2002, the gov- adult literacy initiatives and programs for ernment endorsed numerous strategies special needs students. The MOE han- related to education—from early childhood dled decisions related to policies, such as to higher education—and they intended for regulations, curriculum, the annual calen- the NEVY to harmonize earlier fragmented dar, teacher training, and choosing and strategies and address pertinent missing providing textbooks. The MOE delegated issues, such as teacher preparation and administrating and managing education student flow regulations and practices. at the local level to Governorate Educa- The Ministry of Planning and International tion Offices (GEO) and District Education Cooperation coordinated strategy devel- Offices (DEO), utilizing feedback and re- opment and involved various stakehold- porting mechanisms to the central MOE ers, including all line ministries related to through the Annual Education Survey education. However, this work stopped in (AES). Governorates appointed new prin- 2015 because of the inability to secure re- cipals and teachers, assessed needs for sources as the conflict escalated. new positions, and determined budgets, although staffing educational institutions fell under the Ministry of Civil Service’s C- Conflict-related impacts direct control and regulation, in coordina- and challenges tion with the Ministry of Local Affairs. The Ministry of Finance directly controlled and 6. The education sector has been sig- regulated educational institutions’ fund- nificantly impacted by the ongoing con- ing. Governorates supervised education flict. The Education Cluster and Ministry of institutions and monitored performance. In Education estimate that 2 million children addition, governorates built and expanded are currently out of school in Yemen. schools (in conjunction with districts and This figure includes approximately 350,000 with support from the MOE). School build- children who have been out of school ing also took place through Public Works since the conflict escalated in March 2015 Projects implemented by the MOE when as well as 513,000 IDP children. Altogeth- funds were available from international er, 2.3 million people – including students, partners. Governorates held authority over parents and teachers – require support the deployment and transfer of teachers to ensure that crisis-affected children are and their wages. Districts, in conjunction able to attend school. Displaced children with governorates, were responsible for are at higher risk of missing education. conducting teacher evaluations, distribut- Boys face higher risks of recruitment by ing staff and wages (distributed from the armed groups, while girls face higher risk governorates), and managing private edu- of being held back from school. cation (with final approval coming from the governorate level). Chart x: Schools affected by governor- 5. Until mid-2015, development of a 2 ate (UNOCHA Humanitarian Overview 2017) Chart xx: People in need of education by governorate (Education Cluster Survey 2016) 3 7. The World Bank’s phase 1 of the Dy- damaged in each of the four cities. Table namic Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) 4.2 provides the estimated cost (low and exercise provided in depth indications of high estimates) for rehabilitation and recon- the reconstruction needs in the four cities of struction of the schools across Yemen, and Sana’a, Aden, Taiz and Zinjibar. The Sep- compares education with other key sectors tember 2016 Damage Needs Assessment of the economy. Overall, it estimated that (DNA) exercise evaluated reconstruction about 95 million USD would be needed to needs in those cities. Table 4.1 provides provide reconstruction of damaged schools information on the percentage of schools in those four cities. Table1: Physical Damage Levels by City and Sector (%) Sana’a Aden Taiz Zinjibar Health 27 24 34 25 Education 35 38 34 16 Energy 55 27 67 50 )Transport (only inner-city roads 0.16 0.18 2.72 0.45 WASHa 8 57 69 — Residential housing 11 25 21 0 Source; Damage and Needs Assessment, Phase I, unpublished, World Bank, 2016. Note: a Due to a lack of reliable data and ground access, the first-phase DNA could not assess Zinjibar’s WASH sector. Table 2: Total Damage Cost Range by Sector Low Estimate (US$, High Estimate (US$, Sector )million )million Health 435 532 Education 86 105 Energy 125 153 Wash 78 96 Transport 126 154 Residential Housing 3,245 3,966 Total 4,095 5,006 Source; Damage and Needs Assessment, Phase I, unpublished, World Bank, 2016. Note: Throughout the report, the low and high damage cost estimates were calculated with a 10 percent margin of the average damage cost. 8. In response, the MOE has setup an Education Cluster DPs—such as Save the emergency response taskforce. This Children, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Inter- taskforce regularly assesses the damage nationale Zusammenarbei (GIZ), the United and needs of education beneficiaries, while Nations International Children’s Emergency also providing in-conflict support to the af- Fund (UNICEF), Office for the Coordination fected schools. Building on such an effort of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and and using additional survey data from the High 4 Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)— foundation to safeguard its terms. There- the MoE emergency education taskforce fore, any recovery and reconstruction plan identified key issues and immediate needs post-conflict would also have to mandato- at the school and community levels. Still, rily focus on reinforcing state institutions— regular updates of school-level data are while addressing urgent humanitarian necessary, to assess the rapidly changing needs—to prevent the slide back into con- situation accurately and to allocate finan- flict. Experiences from around are replete cial and human resources strategically. with instances where the singular focus on The taskforce must continuously consult post-conflict humanitarian relief—without and harmonize efforts with other DPs, to regard for institutional transformations— identify evidence-based policy options and have ended up being costly missed oppor- ensure related interventions’ complemen- tunities for breaking the cycle of violence. tarity and effectiveness. 11. There is thus a clear need for new thinking on Yemen to support more sus- 9. The MoE and Yemen Education Clus- tainable and inclusive ways of service ter developed and endorsed an Edu- delivery during conflict and immediate cation Cluster Strategy (ECS) for the post-conflict periods. In this context, period 2016-2017. ECS Covers the fol- the key challenge for Yemen’s develop- lowing objectives: Objective1: all crisis af- ment partners is to devise new and inno- fected girls and boys (3-18) have equita- vative ways to support the country, to not ble access to safe, inclusive and equipped only recognize the fundamental causes learning spaces, objective 2: Crisis affect- and effects of conflict and fragility but ed girls and boys (3-18) have the ability also, importantly, enhance the resilience to attend flexible, alternative learning op- and coping capabilities of communities portunities, objective 3: risks to all crisis af- and households. Therefore, these notes fected girls and boys (3-18) are reduced on inclusive service delivery—including through the improved ability to cope with the current note on Education—propose negative psychosocial effects and to limit a new approach that focuses on attend- the physical danger presented by conflict. ing to urgent service delivery needs in the most affected parts of Yemen while also D- Key principles of re-engage- incrementally enhancing inclusiveness, resilience and thus, the effectiveness of ment and reconstruction service delivery institutions. 10. Yemen is trapped in a vicious ‘cy- cle of conflict’ with chronically weak 12. Establishing Education as a key pri- state institutions directly contributing ority of Yemen’s recovery and recon- to the current round of violence. This struction goals is one of the overall violence, in turn, has further undermined policy challenge facing the sector. In state institutions thereby portending even addition, several challenges have been more violence for the future. The contin- identified including; (a) the lack of a unified ued weakening of national institutions has vision and leadership caused by the split of also diminished chances of sustainable the MOE between Sana’a and Aden, to (b) peace as any peace-agreement would be the politicization and division of education. undermined without a strong institutional The latter is illustrated by the recent case 5 of Sana’a abandoning newly revised first- e. Lack of Fiduciary Mecha- grade Arabic textbooks (whereas Aden still nisms. At the district or school level, plans to use the books), along with other the sector lacks a functional fiduciary issues of inequitable teacher and supervi- mechanism to provide goods and ser- sor deployment. Further, because of the vices directly, which includes adequate lasting conflict, (c) education service deliv- risk-mitigation measures. ery is affected and distorted severely, with f. Inadequate Monitoring and only fragmented and partial interventions Evaluation. The sector needs ade- available to students and teachers. quate monitoring and evaluation mech- anisms to track progress, flag issues, More specifically, the sector faces the follow- and evaluate the impact of policy- and ing challenges: system-level interventions. a. Lack of Common Vision. The 13. Addressing these challenges re- education sector needs a common vi- quires (a) taking stock of currently avail- sion toward restoring service delivery. able support provided to the education b. Insufficient Resources. The sector, coupled with continuous situation sector lacks sufficient human and fi- analysis and needs assessment; (b) lo- nancial resources to develop policies cal and international experiences of suc- and provide education services. cessful models to ensure service delivery, with a focus on how education can support c. Lack of Clarity of Roles and the community and social reconstruction; Responsibilities. Roles and respon- (c) collective efforts to restore political will sibilities need clearer definition at the and ownership for the education services various levels of sector administra- recovery; (d) system-level changes to pro- tion: at the central governorate, and mote resilient and responsive service de- district education offices, and at the livery, especially in areas where the dam- school level in the face of the central age has been more evident; (e) new and MOE’s deteriorating role. Given the enhanced roles and responsibilities at the diminished role of MOE in the educa- central, governorate, district, and school tion sector, there is an urgent need to levels, in addition to the Civil Society Or- enhance autonomy and accountability ganizations (CSOs) and private sector at the local level. partners; and (f) strengthened coordina- d. Limited Capacity. The MOE as tion and partnerships among different ser- a main education service provider suf- vice providers. fer from poor capacity at all levels. Pri- or investment on building capacity for 14. Existing coping mechanisms in Ye- the school leadership and Fathers and men that can be a driver for recovery. Mothers Council (FMC) has been lost In order to support the education sector due to the conflict. MOE and school during crisis, currently the following DPs leadership, as well as FMC need reg- support key activities—mainly through ular and consistent capacity building UNICEF on the ground, except for the support in order to ensure quality edu- Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera- cation and to strengthen school-level tion and Development (BMZ), which is autonomy and accountability. 6 plemented through GiZ. During the Decem- project, along with support for implementing ber 2016 meeting in Beirut, LEGs agreed the education emergency plan. The ECW that the MOE will seek support from DPs in provides support for four governorates identifying a partner that would lead devel- (Taiz, Sa’ada, Shabwa and Dhala’). Other opment of the Transitional Education Sector governorates and beneficiaries are covered Plan (TESP) with GPE’s support. Addition- by other partners. Table xx summarizes ex- ally, the GPE awarded to the MOE a grant isting interventions and active partners on to launch the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) the ground. Table 3: Mapping of existing support for education sector By whom: Agency What: Areas of Support Global Partnership for •• school rehabilitation, replacement of classroom furniture and basic educa- Education (GPE) man- tion materials and supplies aged by UNICEF •• psychosocial support for students •• quality improvement interventions (including school-based development and community participation), curriculum development •• improvement of teacher performance and management of schools •• improvement of institutional capacities, including the education manage- ment information system (EMIS) at the decentralized levels •• school accreditation at the decentralized levels •• development of preschool education •• compensatory opportunities for out-of-school children (OOSC) •• literacy and adult education programs Kreditanstalt für Wieder- •• school rehabilitation and basic learning materials, classroom furniture aufbau (KfW) •• psychosocial support, •• a self-learning program, •• WASH rehabilitation and promotion, •• volunteer teachers in internally displaced populations’ locations, and sup- port for displaced people United States Agency •• classroom furniture and school supplies, for International Devel- •• capitation grants and expansion of the Safer School Project opment (USAID) •• a self-learning program Government of Japan •• temporary learning spaces and psychosocial support. Educate a Child (EAC), •• temporary learning spaces, school rehabilitation Qatar •• WASH •• basic student supply materials Bundesministerium für •• Quality Education Improvement Program, which includes capacity building, wirtschaftliche Zusam- school staff training, community participation, and school-based develop- ment menarbeit und Entwick- •• Youth Employability Improvement Project, which introduces students to vo- lung (BMZ) cational studies, strengthens students’ vocational and labor market orienta- tion, and provides informal secondary school training programs Source: World Bank, 2017. 7 E- Way forward: short to medi- already investing on this front. um term c. Psycho-emotional support. Provid- ing this support helps students and 15. Based on the latest situation analy- teachers rebound from the conflict. sis, this section explores possibilities and mechanisms to improve the scope 17. Concrete actions in this regard are and quality of education service deliv- as follows. The best results will come ery by sustaining existing coping mecha- from delivering these activities in close co- nisms and adopting lessons learned from ordination with the MOE, donor partners, other FCV countries. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the communities. The MOEs and oth- 16. Immediate response period (0–12 er partners should define specific roles af- months): For this immediate phase, the ter mapping out existing interventions with education team considered interven- time and cost projections. tions that the MOE can implement quickly with limited financial resources, while still a. Provide a better learning envi- having a notable effect on learning. This ronment, furniture, and teaching and package would combine the physical in- learning materials. frastructure (hardware) and quality of ser- vices (soft side), which address the most • Rehabilitate light damages vulnerable population’s needs. The pro- (for example, replace broken posed interventions would facilitate the windows, repaint walls, and in- MOE’s efforts to engage the community in stall furniture and equipment) by restoring service delivery to schools. Spe- working closely with the com- cifically, the team recommends the follow- munity and CSOs. ing interventions: • Provide school kits, school uniforms, and stationeries. a. A school-based and community- • Support means for the MOE driven development approach. This to print and distribute textbooks would require effective engagement and teachers’ guides. from CSOs and private sector partners. Given that schools have operated un- • Identify large-scale damage der daunting crisis conditions, investing and prepare civil works con- in school-based-management (SBM) tracts for the schools that need approaches in collaboration with the full reconstruction and signifi- community and MFC helps affirm and cant rehabilitation. restore the education sector’s capacity and resilience. • Provide alternative learning spaces (such as tents and oth- b. Institutional development. DPs er equipment) so that teachers should provide the MOE, schools, and can educate in the absence of communities with capacity-building and school buildings. awareness-raising support to strength- en accountability and governance, in • Provide transportation to fa- close coordination with other partners cilitate students’ and teachers’ 8 access to schools or temporary procedures (to formalize and locations and facilities. systematically offer) for IDPs and OOSC. • Outline large-scale recon- struction for severely damaged • Offer institutional capacity- schools, clearly identifying such building activities to support the projects and preparing associ- MOE’s TESP. ated civil works drawings and bills of quantities. This propels c. Resume important demand-side the procurement and awards interventions and support the MOE’s process, clearing the way for re- policy-development activities. construction in the next phase. • Scale up the existing Rural • Provide meals to students. Female Teacher Contracting Considering the country condi- (RFTC) scheme to ensure girls’ tions and lack of access to basic schooling in rural areas, in close needs, field data suggests that coordination with UNICEF’s on- providing meals to students dur- going GPE program. ing the school day would greatly influence attendance rates and • Plan for the improvements for improve the opportunity for the existing EMIS, to support the learning. MOE in collecting and manag- ing education data that redevel- ops and reorganizes education b. Provide more options to ensure policy frameworks. Improving services for conflict-affected children. the EMIS would help the MOE • Obtain psycho-emotional sup- allocate resources more effec- port for students and teachers. tively, because the EMIS would collect school- and district-level • Provide alternative learning data and information about the options for OOSC by closely infrastructure and equipment’s collaborating with DPs and conditions, the availability of CSOs (details of alternative learning materials, and the sta- learning options are provided in tus of school personnel man- the “Other Policy Options and agement. Recommended Interventions” section). d. Coordination with WASH and • Identify flexible examina- transport sector: According to the tion options for internally dis- needs assessment conducted by the placed person (IDPs)—the UNOCHA and Education Cluster, is- MOE opened exam centers out- sues such as lack of toilets and WASH side the country for those who facilities in many schools is consid- fled the conflict. Such flexible ered one of the main reasons for girls management of examinations dropping out of school. Additionally, a should be continued and sup- recent survey carried out in six of the ported by DPs. most severely affected areas in Amran Governorate indicate that a main rea- • Identify flexible enrollment 9 sons for not enrolling in schools by girls building support for the MOE, to and boys is due long travel distances improve the education service deliv- to these facilities. Therefore, address- ery’s scope and quality, and to sup- ing those issues (e.g. WASH) and port SBM. transportation allowance would be one • Scale up demand-side interven- of the focus of the intervention at early tions—such as conditional cash stage. transfer (CCT) and RFTC—to in- centivize parents in disadvantaged Medium-Term Reconstruction Phase 18. areas to send children to school, es- (12-24 months) pecially for girls in rural areas. This phase should combine infrastructure/ • If the MOE decides to resume hardware and soft interventions (support NEVY, renew consultations and dis- for the MOE, students, teachers, and par- cussions with various stakeholders, ents), but with a large-scale reconstruction to define the new vision and inte- included as a major activity following a civil grated strategy for the education works contracts process (toward the end sector. of the initial 18 months’ phase). Further, the MOE would use and strengthen the Long-term strategic reforms, and 19. existing public education system and func- reforms of expected high impact (3–5 tions during this phase as much as pos- years). sible to deliver services (as opposed to the first phase, which would rely on direct in- Along with the immediate and medium- tervention to communities and schools by term reconstruction support activities, the relief agencies). The following are actions government should begin planning long recommended during this phase. term, focusing on how to ensure scope and quality of basic service delivery. This • Begin school building reconstruc- phase should focus strongly on bring- tion and large-scale rehabilitations. ing OOSC back to regular schools and strengthening the MOE’s regular func- • Continue support for students and tions, based on the foundational work ac- teachers (psycho-emotional sup- complished in previous phases. Toward port). this goal, the MOE must architect a long- • Continue support for school princi- term vision in close consultation with vari- pals and the MFC, to promote SBM ous education stakeholders. Using NEVY, and engage the community in school the MOE should redefine education’s role rehabilitation and management. in long-term national development, with actionable items clearly identified that sup- • Train and support teachers and port NEVY’s implementation, pinpointing a school leadership, as well as the concrete reform roadmap for the next 3–5 MFC, for further preparation and years. At this phase, the following actions collaboration with the community to are recommended, based on NEVY (if the address school-level issues (in view MoE decides to continue with NEVY), and of enhancing school-level autonomy the related reform roadmap. and accountability). • Use education as a vehicle to ad- • Continue institutional capacity- 10 dress and promote social cohesion, governorate, district, and community peace building, and civism goals. levels. • Define the role of school leader- OTHER POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOM- ship, and how to build its capacity. MENDED INTERVENTIONS BASED ON This includes putting a mechanism GLOBAL FCV EXPERIENCES for teacher management and pro- fessional development in place to This section provides concrete 20. improve student learning outcomes. guidance for inclusive service delivery, • Continue guidelines to implement based on a comprehensive review of SBM, which would define the roles experiences from other FCV countries. and responsibilities of the central How these countries restored education MOE, governorate, and district edu- service delivery during and after conflict cation offices, trainers, supervisors, has significant implication on policy rec- school principals, and MFC. This ef- ommendations for Yemen. fort would also provide guidance to schools regarding how to engage 21. The Resilience in Education System the community. (RES) 360° conceptual framework. Many • Undertake the MOE’s overall countries have studied education’s role framework development and direc- during and after conflicts, and the findings tion for work within the central MOE, from countries that adopted the RES 360° in close coordination with NEVY assessment tool could act as a blueprint and building on the TESP. Priorities for Yemen’s post-conflict recovery opera- include setting learning standards, tions. Learning from the RES 360° assess- developing curriculum and text- ment could help the government of Yemen books, developing a teacher train- redefine the MOE’s roles and responsibili- ing and professional development ties at all levels, making schools resilient framework, and many other areas of for emergencies and ensuring readiness education provision. The MOE also for further development. The following would monitor and supervise decen- chart describes the RES framework. tralized activities at the local level, while some of the actual service de- Chart 1: Education Resilience Approaches livery functions could be shared at Framework 11 NEVY and other operations. Source: World Bank, 2016. 22. Balancing immediate relief and long- 24. Strengthening emergency and disas- term reform. RES 360° findings from FCV ter preparedness at school. Yemen’s countries show that education could play fragility and vulnerability could last for a a pivotal role in promoting social cohesion while, even after the conflict ceases. Thus, and peace building. It is important for Ye- it is important for the MOE to incorporate men’s education sector to effectively bal- elements of emergency preparedness and ance immediate humanitarian assistance resilience into policy framework and imple- with longer-term development. This pre- mentation mechanisms, so that schools dicament is common, but with strategic can prepare better for future crises and planning, emergency interventions can sustain education service delivery even provide important foundations for longer- during conflicts. term reform and transformation. This vision is inherent within the RES 360° approach, 25. The way forward. The MOE currently as supported by the data. To address the has limited, partial functioning because twin goals of immediate humanitarian as- of sustained, far-reaching crises. Several sistance and long-term reform needs, the country cases could offer practical insights education team recommends (a) ensuring regarding how to enable service delivery that all education stakeholders’ voices are under fragile situations. The next sec- heard through consultations and needs tion presents a response model, detailing assessment; (b) identifying assets and ex- other countries’ specific examples that ad- isting mechanisms that can be mobilized dressed both immediate crisis response and improved; and (c) emphasizing impor- and long-term reform needs, and how they tant institutional links and connections to ensured education service delivery against longer-term, more sustainable interven- various constraints. This concrete model tions. has proven effective in several other FCV contexts. 23. Making the most of the current TESP. DPs increasingly recognize that SBM AS A MODEL TO PROMOTE INCLU- the imposed division of structures for im- SIVE SERVICE DELIVERY IN YEMEN mediate humanitarian relief and longer- 26. School–community assets as the term development support does not match driver for recovery. Research on commu- reality. Crises do not necessarily occur in nity involvement in education shows posi- a linear fashion that permit simple transi- tive findings of how communities can be tions from one to the other. By including instrumental not only in providing access school-level risk reduction and resilience- to education, but also in using the strength promotion activities in education sector of traditional and local community struc- strategic plans, ministries can keep their tures to help reopen schools and provide options open to both funding sources. Af- safer learning environments, even in the ter mapping out all the existing interven- context of ongoing violence. The follow- tions, the government of Yemen should in- ing paragraphs describe example imple- corporate elements into the current MOE mentations of school-based-management Emergency Education Strategy and TESP, (SBM), with suggested roles and respon- and identify how to implement immediate sibilities for the MOE and other partners. and long-term reform activities through 12 This model which focuses strongly on en- improving learning outcomes. More local hanced autonomy and accountability at control helps create better conditions for school level is based on recommendations improving student learning in a sustainable from the education decentralization study way, since it gives teachers and parents for Yemen conducted by the World Bank in more opportunities to develop common 2015. The report recommends to enhance goals, increase their mutual commitment school autonomy and accountability in to student learning, and promote more ef- coping with education in emergency situ- ficient use of scarce school resources. ations. 27. School autonomy and accountabil- 28. SBM in Afghanistan, Mali, and El ity are key components of an education Salvador—the school management system that ensure education quality committee’s (SMC’s) role. In Afghani- (box 1). By transferring core managerial stan, community-based education has responsibilities to schools, school auton- long been a response to conflict and low omy: (1) fosters local ownership and ac- education access rates. The participa- countability; (2) helps reflect local priori- tion of communities in Afghan schools is ties, values, and needs through increased holistic, rather than just administrative. participation of parents and the communi- Parents and community members co- ty; and (3) gives teachers the opportunity operate to ensure the safety of students to establish a personal commitment to stu- (especially girls), maintain school prem- dents and their parents. Increased school ises, and support teachers in the class- autonomy and improved accountability are room. This participation is supported by necessary conditions for improved learn- the MOE through the formation of SMCs, ing because they align teacher and parent grants for school construction and main- incentives. Studies have shown a clear tenance, and training and supervision of causal link between school autonomy SMCs and schools. The SMC members and efficiency in resource use. Viewed are both men and women who reflect the in this context, school autonomy and ac- community’s composition, and who take countability should be considered essen- the lead in engaging the community and tial components of an overall strategy for encouraging involvement in education ac- tivities. After further developing the initial Box 1. Defining School Autonomy and Accountability model, and scaling up coordination and external support, Afghanistan integrated School autonomy is a form of school management in which schools the community models into national policy are given decision-making authority over their operations, including the hiring and firing of personnel, and the assessment of teachers and education systems. After the crisis in and pedagogical practices. School management under autonomy 2012, community-based schools in Mali may give an important role to the school council, representing successfully integrated IDPs and contin- the interests of parents, in budget planning and approval, as well ued education service delivery through as a voice or vote in personnel decisions. By including the school community–school management commit- council in school management, school autonomy fosters account- abilityt. In its basic form accountability is defined as the acceptance tees, called comités de gestion scolaires of responsibility and being answerable for one’s actions. In sch ool (CGS), which existed before the crisis. management, accountability may take other additional meanings: The CGS was an asset for the MOE to tap (1) the act of compliance with the rules and regulations of school into during the system’s overhaul and new governance; (2) reporting to those with oversight authority over the policy framework’s development after the school; and (3) linking rewards and sanctions to expected results. conflict. During El Salvador’s war years, Source: Di Gropello 2004, 2006; Barrera et al. 2009; Heim 1996; because of the absence of any formal ed- Recehbei 2010. ucation services, communities organized 13 themselves to teach children how to read Box 2. Different Paths to School-Based Management and write. Community members offered their homes or physical space elsewhere In many countries, the implementation of SBM has increased stu- dent enrollment, student and teacher attendance, and parent in- in the community as makeshift class- volvement. However, the empirical evidence from Latin America rooms, and communal committees were shows very few cases in which SBM has made a significant differ- ence in learning outcomes, while in Europe there is substantial evi- established to gather resources and iden- dence showing a positive impact of school autonomy on learning. tify educators. As with the CGS in Mali, af- Two approaches to SBM—the grassroots approach taken in Latin America, in contexts where the institutional structure was weak ter the conflict in El Salvador, the elected or service delivery was hampered due to internal conflict, and the government formalized this practice, which operational efficiency approach taken in Europe, where institutions were stronger—coincide in applying managerial principles to pro- created schools with formal structures for mote better education quality, but they are driven by two different modes of accountability to parents and the community. In the Latin parental and community participation. American model, schools are held accountable through participa- tory school-based management; while in the European model, ac- countability is based on trust in schools and their teachers. In either 29. Implications for Yemen. Yemen’s case, school autonomy has begun to transform traditional educa- tion from a system based on processes and inputs into one driven MFCs are similar to the SMCs and CGS. by results. Prior to the conflict, MFCs played an im- Source: Patrinos 2010; Eurydice 2007; Di Gropello 2004; Arcia et al. 2011; Hood 2001. portant role through the previous Bank and DP’s projects in developing SBM 31. Flexible and alternative learning op- plans (school improvement plans), imple- tions outside the MOE schools. In ad- menting school community grants, and dition to SBM—in close collaboration with monitoring CCT implementation. Many DP MFCs, NGOs, and other education part- operations supported the MFCs’ capacity ners—the government of Yemen could building, and Yemen could use this asset consider supporting informal, alternative on the ground to sustain education service learning options in adverse contexts when delivery. MOE schools are not functioning because 30. The MOE’s role in the SBM model. of severe conflict and destruction. Various Although many case studies suggest that types of informal and alternative school- strengthening SBM and MFCs would be ef- ing could accommodate IDPs and OOSC fective in restoring immediate service de- in the absence of regular schooling during livery, it is important to define the MOE’s severe conflicts, or when schools are dam- roles and responsibilities while material- aged. It is essential that the MOE estab- izing inclusive service delivery in Yemen. lish a legal framework that could formally Many education activities mentioned in recognize and certify such alternative earlier sections could be implemented learning, so that those children who went with help from the community and do- through non-MOE schools could be rein- nor partners. Yet the MOE should handle tegrated into the formal education system some tasks, such as setting up the legal smoothly, without repeating their learning. framework; setting quality standards, ser- vice delivery mechanisms, and quality as- Supporting alternate means of edu- 32. surance mechanisms; and monitoring and cation. Even in nonemergency contexts, evaluating the scope and quality of service factors such as distance from home to delivery. Setting curriculum and printing school, security, and child labor can pre- and distributing textbooks also fall under vent children’s regular school attendance. the MOE’s responsibility, with support from In a crisis, while the regular schools are donors. not functioning because of destruction or insecurity, relief organizations could sup- 14 port several types of alternative basic of displaced children by teachers, during education. These may include (a) school and after school. Important lessons from outreach centers that maintain classrooms the recent flexible education responses in remote communities that lack access to to the Mali crisis can elucidate reforms in local schools, allowing children to follow access, teaching, and learning for greater government curriculum; (b) accelerated resilience and sustainable development. education that provides opportunities for Flexible and participatory education can older children who have missed school bring communities together and support and for whom learning in a classroom with the most vulnerable members. Yemen’s younger children is inappropriate or unde- formal education structures can adopt sirable, enabling them to eventually enter flexible strategies, such as flexible school mainstream government schools; and (c) schedules, after-school classes, learning flexible-hour schooling, which provides opportunities outside the classroom (such older children and working children with as community projects, internships, and condensed, catch-up curriculum outside of mentorships), and prospects for commu- normal school hours. Recruiting informal nity members and families to help teach. educators within communities can provide a foundation to meet immediate needs. 35. Using information and communica- These could include young people who tions technology to provide continuous may have practical experience as class- education. Somalia used interactive radio room assistants or who were engaged instruction to prevent gaps in education in school and community activities. This delivery. Interactive radio instruction might strategy also could help address short- be feasible in low-budget environments term staff shortfalls in remote areas and with limited security. The Education Devel- certain subjects. opment Center’s (EDC) Somali Interactive Radio Instruction Program provided con- 33. Implications for Yemen. The MOE sistent broadcasts of education programs could consider adopting greater flexibili- on literacy, numeracy, life skills, health, ties in times of crisis that would increase and conflict prevention between 2005 and the chance of education service delivery 2011. They transmitted broadcasts three to broader beneficiaries and OOSC who hours a day for up to five days a week on are deeply affected by the conflict. The fol- the FM band to common household radi- lowing are successful cases of the MOE os, potentially reaching more than 300,000 adopting flexibility in teacher management children. With the interactive radio instruc- and other policy areas. tion broadcasts, local teachers led classes. Simultaneously, the EDC trained teachers Flexible teacher policies. Mali’s MOE 34. to use interactive learning methods such issued flexible teacher policies which en- as activities, stories, and songs that could sured equitable teacher distribution after be broadcast via radio. Following the pro- the crisis. The policies allowed displaced gram’s closure in 2011, EDC signed li- teachers from the north to find tempo- censing agreements with the MOEs for rary positions in schools in the south, Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central and provided a system-wide structure (Federal), along with NGOs, allowing them that fostered school–community inter- to continue using the program and mate- actions during the crisis. Such flexibility rials. According to the EDC, these MOEs promoted voluntarism and caring support still use the program. 15 FINANCING FOR EDUCATION SERVICE appeals funded. Therefore, it is imperative DELIVERY that the MOE—together with the LEG and donor partners—must continue advocacy 36. Continuing advocacy and fundrais- to support education sector development ing during the non-conflict period. Fi- in anticipation of conflict situations. nally, it is crucial to address financing and seek solutions. Any and all interventions require resources, but research shows 37. MOE will need to play a central advo- that education in emergencies is severely cacy role. Building on existing platforms underfunded. One of the greatest limiting such as LEGs, Yemen’s MOE will need to factors in endeavoring to protect commu- play a central advocacy role to the donor nities and investments is the disconnect community, to increase awareness and between needs and funding. Internation- solicit financing for education sector re- ally, education is consistently and grossly covery and reconstruction, as well as de- underfunded, with only 1.4 percent of all velopment programs. The MOE will need humanitarian funding in 2012 being allo- continued guidance and support from DPs cated to education. No other sector con- to fulfill this critical role and boost capacity sistently ranks as the least-funded sector at all levels. or has a smaller share of humanitarian 16