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Report No: ICR00001187

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-56379 TF-56389 TF-90613 TF-90614)

ON

MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND GRANTS

IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF US DOLLAR 34.4 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

FOR A FIFTH POPULATION CENSUS PROJECT

December 15, 2009

Human Development Group AFTSP Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 4, 2009)

Currency Unit = Sudanese Pound (SDG) SDG 1.00 = US\$ 0.40 US\$ 1.00 = SDG 2.50

> FISCAL YEAR January 1- December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CPA	Comprehensive Peace agreement
EA	Enumeration Area
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
MA	Monitoring Agent
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOC	Monitoring and Observation Commission
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PCC	Population Census Council
SSCCSE	Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Kenichi Ohashi
Sector Manager:	Lynne Sherburne-Benz
Project Team Leader:	Yasser El- Gammal
ICR Team Leader:	Isabel Soares, Willem Struben

REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

Fifth Population Census Project

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A. Basic Information				
Country:	Sudan	Project Name:	Fifth Population Census of Sudan	
Project ID:	P099327	L/C/TF Number(s):	TF-56379,TF- 56389,TF-90613,TF- 90614	
ICR Date:	12/30/2009	ICR Type:	Core ICR	
Lending Instrument:	ERL	Grantee:	GOV. NATIONAL UNITY, GOV. SOUTH SUDAN	
Original Total Commitment:	USD 34.4M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 34.1M	
Revised Amount:	USD 34.1M			
Environmental Categ	gory: C			
Implementing Agenc UNFPA	ies:			
Cofinanciers and Oth	ner External Partne	ers:		

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	01/31/2006	Effectiveness:		
Appraisal:	02/05/2006	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	05/08/2006	Mid-term Review:		
		Closing:	12/31/2008	06/30/2009

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory
Grantee Performance:	Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)					
Bank	Ratings Borrower Ratings				
Quality at Entry:	Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory		
Quality of Supervision:	Highly Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Satisfactory		
Overall Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Satisfactory		

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes			
	Original	Actual	
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)			
Central government administration	65	65	
Sub-national government administration	35	35	
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)			
Other human development	33	33	
Population and reproductive health	34	34	
Social analysis and monitoring	33	33	

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director:	Kenichi Ohashi	Ishac Diwan
Sector Manager:	Lynne D. Sherburne-Benz	Laura Frigenti
Project Team Leader:	Yasser Aabdel-Aleem Awny El- Gammal	Bassam Ramadan
ICR Team Leader:	Yasser Aabdel-Aleem Awny El- Gammal	
ICR Primary Author:	Isabel Cristina Soares	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The immediate objective of the fifth population census is to produce reliable and accurate demographic, economic, and social data. The long-term objective is to develop capacities within Sudan for collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating and utilizing data from environmental related data that can be used as benchmark for development planning.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	No development indicator	s were developed at	appraisal	
Value				
quantitative or				
Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments			<u>.</u>	
(incl. %				
achievement)				

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	No Intermediate indicators	were developed		
Value				
(quantitative				
or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments				
(incl. %				
achievement)				


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/28/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	34.40
2	12/23/2008	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	34.40
3	08/31/2009	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	34.40

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Sudan is the largest country in Africa by land area and has rich natural resources, 1. but its development has been affected severely by conflicts for most of the period since independence about a half-century ago. Despite the scarcity of recent and reliable data on poverty across Sudan, it is generally accepted that poverty is widespread and deep. Preliminary data from the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey show the disparities among regions and the enormity of the challenge of reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, net primary school attendance is 53 percent overall, with variations between states from 90 percent to 4 percent. In the South, attendance is less than 10 percent in half the states. Health indicators reveal a similar picture with respect to high variation by state and much poorer conditions in the South. The outcomes on key measures of human development in Sudan's disadvantaged regions rank among the lowest in the world, though Khartoum and some Northern states along the Nile show performance well above the Sub-Saharan Africa average. A root cause of continuing poverty and inequality is the war and skewed distribution patterns of public resources, which are considered as among the primary reasons for the war. Recognition of the need to address inequality to promote peace and stability has risen since the holding of peace talks, and comprehensive provisions to address inequality run through the various peace agreements. If their implementation accelerates, there can be a reasonable expectation of alleviation of poverty, reduction in inequality, and reduced conflict.

2. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005 by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, created a historic window of opportunity for a peaceful and prosperous country. The CPA not only provided for a cessation of hostilities, but also contains a framework of wealth and power sharing to address the inequality between center and periphery that has been a root cause of conflict in Sudan. The signing was rapidly followed by the formation of the Government of National Unity (GONU) and the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The elections were initially scheduled for July 2009, but have been postponed to April 2010.

3. The CPA specified that two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) -one for GONU (MDTF-National) and one for GOSS (MDTF-South) - be established to facilitate the coordination of external donor financing of Sudan's reconstruction and development needs. The MDTF National (MDTF-N) focuses on consolidating peace and supporting recovery and development in war-affected and marginalized areas in the 15 Northern states, while the MDTF-South (MDTF-S) supports the nascent Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), and focuses on reconstruction, recovery, and early development in the 10 Southern states. Donors and the government authorities requested the World Bank/IDA to administer the MDTFs.

4. IDA's financial reengagement in Sudan is awaiting the clearance of Sudan's outstanding arrears, and IDA's strategy as laid out in an Interim Strategy Note (ISN) was thus to provide training and other technical support until provision of financial support is possible.

5. The conduct of the Fifth Sudan Population Census is one of the key benchmarks of the CPA, and is specifically provided for in the Interim National Constitution as a crucial element in preparing for the elections. The conduct of the Population Census is not only a constitutional obligation, but also a critical exercise to facilitate democratic governance in Sudan. The Census is also expected to provide a good data base for sector planning that contributes to the country's social and economic development.

6. UNFPA was explicitly mentioned in the CPA as the UN agency responsible for providing both Governments with technical support to conduct the Census. Due to the Census' highly technical nature and the limited capacity of the two Governments' statistical institutions, UNFPA was also requested to manage the MDTF projects on behalf of the Government institutions.

7. The MDTF projects were to be implemented in two phases: for GONU US\$7.1 million and US\$12 million in Phase I and Phase II, respectively (TFs 056379 and 090613), and for GOSS US\$4 (subsequently raised to 5.3) million and US\$10 million for Phase I and Phase II, respectively (TFs 056389 and 090614).

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

8. The immediate objective of the Fifth Population Census is to produce reliable and accurate demographic, economic, and social data. The project was to enable the primary target groups to have accurate and reliable data to formulate and monitor their plans. The long-term objective is to develop capacities within Sudan for collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating, and utilizing data from censuses and surveys. The project would result in sustainability of data collection and analysis in the future through increased capabilities, better frames for future surveys, quality maps, and expanded data processing facilities, which should help with the implementation of much-needed household surveys, such as household budget survey, agricultural census, labor force survey, and annual light monitoring survey of key indicators related to poverty eradication strategy and MDGs.

9. This being an emergency technical assistance project, the only agreed key indicator was the production of timely and technically satisfactory census data.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

There were no changes in the objective and agreed product.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries,

10. The main beneficiaries are the GONU and the GOSS agencies, international development agencies, and international and local community organizations involved in planning, providing, and monitoring economic and social development assistance. CBS and SSCCSE have benefited most directly through the provision of new facilities, equipment, and staff training.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

11. The project, over two phases, was to provide equipment and materials needed to conduct in a timely and satisfactory manner the Fifth Population Census in all of Sudan's 25 states. The Census was organized in four phases: (a) pre-enumeration, (b) enumeration, (c) data processing, and (d) dissemination. The enumeration would take place during the period from November 15-30, 2007. For more details see Annex 2, but the main activities per phase included:

(a) pre-enumeration phase: planning (establishing a census organization structure; preparing a comprehensive census work plan and budget; having in place a legal basis for the census; preparing, testing, and finalizing the census tolls; identifying and recruiting the census staff; putting in place a census advocacy and publicity strategy; having in place a reliable transport network; and preparing a training program for all the census staff); as well as geographical preparations (mapping the country and identifying all population settlements; delineating census enumeration areas (EAs); listing dwellings and households in all EAs; preparing EA summaries);

(b) enumeration phase (training of all field staff in the process of census enumeration; transporting all census materials to the field; allocating and deploying all field staff; actual census enumeration; and collecting, transporting, and storing all completed census questionnaires to the place of data entry);

(c) data processing phase (data entry; processing; tabulation; and analysis); and

(d) dissemination phase (launching of results, tabulations, and analytical volumes).

12. As detailed by component in Annex 2, the initially approved cost was estimated at US\$73.7 million in February 2006, and, based on subsequent field experience, officially adjusted in June 2007. At that time, taking into account substantial increases in the costs of planning, census cartography, enumeration, advocacy, vehicles and boats, data processing equipment, and cartographic equipment, the projected cost was revised to US\$102.9 million, of which about 25 percent was to be paid out of the MDTFs. GONU was to pay the remainder in cash and kind.

1.6 Revised Components

There were no changes in the agreed components of the census operation.

1.7 Other significant changes

13. Phase I of the MDTF-N and MDTF-S projects was submitted to the respective oversight committees of the MDTFs in February 2006. These proposals were based on a total Census cost estimate of US\$73.7 million, of which about 2/3 would be for the

North and 1/3 for the South¹. A total contribution of US\$ 11.1 million was initially approved for both MDTFs: US\$7.1 million for MDTF-N and US\$4 million for MDTF-S. An additional US\$1.3 million was later added to MDTF-S, thus bringing the total MDTF contribution to Phase-I to US\$12.4 million. Following about a year of experience in the field with the project's pilot census and the Health Survey (for details, see also Annex 2), a follow-up appraisal for Phase II showed the need for adjustment of the cost estimates to a total of US\$102.9 million, with MDTF providing an additional US\$22.0 million, bringing its total to US\$34.4 million. At the same time, GONU's contribution was to increase from US\$40.7 million to US\$68.5 million. The details are provided in the table below:

Table: Costs and	Table: Costs and Funding in US\$ million			
Funding Sources	Appraisal (as per 2006)	Reappraisal (as per 2007)		
GONU	40.7	68.5		
MDTF (North)	20.0	20.0		
MDTF (South)	13.0	14.4		
Total	73.7	102.9		

Table: Costs and Funding in US\$ million

Note: Excluding the contributions from bi-lateral sources (see Annex 1).

14. Another important change was the more substantial involvement of UNFPA in Phase II (see Section 2.2). Whereas during Phase I the government statistics agencies, CBS and SSCCSE, subcontracted UNOPS for procurement of equipment and vehicles, as well as the construction of prefabs, following a discussion and agreement between the GONU and GOSS involved parties, the World Bank and UNFPA, UNFPA directly managed both the MDTF-N and MDTF-S projects (direct execution modality, DEX). This decision was based on the outcome of the institutional and fiduciary assessment conducted by the Bank on the CBS and SSCCSE, which concluded that none of them had the capacity to administer the project. It was also considered that the CPA mentioned explicitly UNFPA's technical role in support of the Fifth Population Census. The Bank kept its monitoring and supervision role as the MDTF's Administrator.

15. Because of a variety of factors- mainly a lack of timely and full GONU payments (which delayed the pilot census) and delays related to political disagreements (including a dispute over ethnicity and origin issues in the questionnaire)- the Census activities eventually slipped from November 15-30, 2007 to April 22- May 6, 2008.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

16. The project proposal for Phase I was fully developed by the World Bank, in close coordination with the GONU and GOSS statistical centers and the GONU Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The Phase II project proposals were prepared mainly

by UNFPA, which has substantial experience with the planning, operation, and monitoring of census operations, in close coordination with both statistical centers, the Ministry, and the World Bank. The Bank conducted the project's appraisal, including an assessment of the fiduciary aspects. The DEX modality agreed upon for Phase II respected both Governments' full responsibility for Census-related decisions, while giving UNFPA the responsibility for managing the MDTF funds, including procurement of goods and services, and for providing the statistical centers with technical support.

17. Considering the involvement of other donors in the Census in both the North and the South, bilaterally but mostly through UNFPA, major consultation with all of them took place at the time of project preparation. Most of these donors are part of the MDTF, while others (USA in the South and France in both North and South) were also included in this coordination process.

18. To ensure the highest level of decision making and coordination, a Census organizational structure was established by a Presidential Decree. The following Census committees were created: the Population Census Council (PCC), the National Technical Committee (called Technical Working Group or TWG), the Financial Committee, the Advocacy and Publicity Committee, and the Monitoring and Observation Committee (MOC). The Decree also established branches of the PCC in the South and at state level.

19. The TWG played a major role in the whole process and throughout the Census phases. Established to provide technical support to CBS and SSCCSE, and to advise the PCC for decision-making purposes, it was chaired by the Census Controller and Director of CBS and co-chaired by the Chairman of the SSCCSE, and it included technical staff from both statistical centers, as well as UNFPA and donor specialists, and World Bank and bilateral donor representatives. The TWG met every 3-4 months, each time in a different location, both in the North and the South, this forum was crucial to build consensus between the North and South, thus decisively contributing to standardization of technical rules and procedures, as well as to overcome political disagreements.

20. The MOC also played a crucial role by involving not only government representatives from all 25 states of Sudan, but also representatives of different political parties, academic institutions, line ministries, and donors. Its major accomplishment was the recruitment of national and international independent monitors with technical knowledge in the Census domain, who successfully monitored the enumeration and data processing phases, thus bringing credibility to the process. Comprehensive and detailed reports on monitoring activities were produced and disseminated.

21. Finally, a coordination forum was established at the donor level; the Census Donor Group. This forum was chaired by the EU, and included all donors providing some kind of support to the Census. UNFPA was often invited to attend this forum's meetings. Representatives of the CPA Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC) and its members were invited to participate, as well as UN organizations and branches more directly involved in Census operations.

22. The political risks were well identified, and most of them were successfully handled. From the start, there were disputes between GONU and GOSS, with some of them still going on today (e.g., the use of the Census priority results for the purpose of the elections).

23. In hindsight, the only issue which probably should have received some more attention was whether donor funding should have been provided from the start to deal with proper staff capacity building. Also in view of limited MDTF funding, the decision was made that this was a government responsibility. As a result, only some early staff training was provided by UNOPs, some by other donors, and only towards the end some more substantial staff training paid with MDTF-funding by UNFPA. The lack of sufficient up-front staff training turned out to be a constraint.

2.2 Implementation

The Phase I grant agreements between the World Bank as the MDTF 24. administrator and GONU and GOSS were signed on May 8 and April 20, 2006, respectively. The memoranda of agreement between GONU and GOSS and UNOPS both were signed on July 22, 2006. Implementation had a slow start, and was affected by consistently late and incomplete GONU counterpart funding, as well as serious customs delays for the great variety of equipment, parts, and materials to be imported and shipped all over the country. About a year later, appraisal of the Phase II activities was conducted by the World Bank in close coordination with UNFPA, as the agency responsible for the projects' direct execution, and both governments' statistical centers. UNFPA substantially strengthened its managerial, technical, procurement, operational, and fiduciary capacity on the ground in both North and South Sudan to provide not only technical assistance and training, but also support to all related logistical and operational activities. The two grant agreements for the second phase for the North and South operations were signed by the World Bank as the MDTF administrator and UNFPA as the implementing organization, both on August 13, 2007. The closing date of Phase I grants was to be December 31, 2007, but was extended for a year to close on December 31, 2008. For Phase II, because of the slippage of census activities- namely the pilot census and the enumeration- by about half a year, the closing date was extended to June 30, 2009.

25. The World Bank continued to play an active role in monitoring implementation of the Census projects, and providing technical and fiduciary advice where needed. MDTF's Monitoring Agent reviewed the project's fiduciary aspects on a regular basis. Regular supervision missions were conducted by the Bank (quite often during the early stages of each phase's implementation, as well as during appraisals), which was complemented by continuous and close follow-up by Bank staff based in Khartoum. This allowed not only to preview and timely address bottlenecks, but also ensured full participation of the Bank in the several Census-related forums. Bank fiduciary staff at the Khartoum office, namely the financial management specialist, provided regular support on related issues. With regard to procurement, following the general standard agreement signed between the Bank and the UN (specific to the Sudan MDTFs), the UN implementing agencies (UNOPS in Phase I and UNFPA in Phase II) followed their own

procurement procedures. Finally, MDTF-National MA provided support in monitoring the physical progress of some of the projects' components, as well as in the review and clearance of the withdrawal applications, for further documentation purposes by the Bank's regional disbursement unit.

2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

26. The project activities were described in great detail in the annexes to the grant agreements, and the implementation schedule had been worked out in similar detail. This was monitored closely by all parties concerned: the implementing agencies such as UNOPS, UNFPA, CBS, and SSCCSE, and the World Bank on behalf of MDTF (with support of the MDTF-contracted MA). Reports on physical progress, as well as on fiduciary issues, were submitted by UNOPS and UNFPA on a quarterly basis. However, at the beginning, the withdrawal applications were not submitted with the same regularity, because the two UN agencies were not yet familiar with the procedures. Over time, those submissions became more regular, thus allowing speeding up the documentation of expenditures in the Bank system. The regular monitoring and coordination between the parties allowed timely and flexible adjustments to the activities and funding reallocations.

As also mentioned in Section 3.3, there was no economic evaluation of this exercise.

2.4.Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

27. Implementation by UN agencies was foreseen as one of the key channels to deliver MDTF results. However, the Bank experienced difficulties in reaching consensus with UN agencies on legal agreements, particularly relating to fraud and corruption, until a unique Sudan-wide agreement on legal templates was reached on November 10, 2006. In the case of UNOPS- sub-contracting modality, and before the general framework agreement for the Sudan MDTFs was agreed upon and signed between the Bank and the UN-, an external auditor was required. UNOPS has provided its first report, showing an unqualified opinion for the period through March 31, 2008. The Bank's financial management specialist at the Khartoum office reviewed the report, and considered it satisfactory. After a lengthy exchange between UNOPS and the World Bank, and taking into account the insignificant amounts disbursed between April 1 and December 31, 2008, it was agreed that an additional audit for the remaining nine months of 2008 would not be needed. As far as UNFPA is concerned, the World Bank accepted that the UN's own auditing system was sufficient. This was clearly stated in the respective grant agreements.

28. Disbursement procedures for the funds underwent a substantial change between Phase I and II. Whereas UNOPS had to obtain periodic payments from the Bank based on withdrawal applications, which did lead to occasional delays, also contributed to by the Bank's strict payment regulations, UNFPA was given full funding up-front. It still provided withdrawal applications, but lack of timely funding was never an issue. This was a major improvement. It should be noted again that all withdrawal applications were reviewed by the MA.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

29. The project strengthened both CBS and SSCCSE with new and improved infrastructure, ample and the latest equipment, and extensive explicit and implicit staff training, which should allow those agencies to play a more substantial role in collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating, and utilizing data from censuses and surveys. The project was to result in sustainability of data collection and analysis in the future through increased capabilities, better frames for future surveys, quality maps, and expanded data processing facilities, which should help with the implementation of much-needed household surveys, such as a household budget survey, an agricultural census, a labor force survey, and an annual light monitoring survey of key indicators related to the poverty eradication strategy and MDGs (see Section 1.2).

30. However, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, the project did so far not fully complete its post-enumeration activities, such as the dissemination of the priority results in the 15 Northern states and the analysis and dissemination of the 44 questions from the long questionnaire. This may mean that future activities, such as the recently started Poverty Survey assisted by the African Development Bank and Norway, may not have access to critically useful data already collected and ready for analysis. Unless early corrective action is taken by GONU, GOSS, and donors, there may be a loss of data and serious duplication of effort.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

31. **Highly Relevant**. The simple objective of producing a comprehensive Census was and still is highly relevant. The Census results will be of critical importance in providing the governments, donors, and international and local community organizations with the necessary tools to plan, manage, and monitor their social and economic development activities, as well as in preparing for the elections scheduled for next year. Not least important is the fact that the Census was a major element of the agreed program of nation-wide CPA activities, and should help the various stakeholders decide upon the division of the proceeds of natural resources, and thus contribute to a lasting peace. As such, it is also of major importance to the MDTF and IDA assistance strategy, the latter of which was last spelled out in the ISN of March 2008.

32. The design of a complex exercise to be carried out in about two years benefited particularly from substantial input from UNFPA experts, who drew upon their most recent experience in comparable countries. Implementation too benefited from major involvement of experienced international organizations, including UNOPS, UNFPA, and the Bank. In addition, a host of bilateral donor agencies provided substantial planning

and implementation support, all of which proved highly relevant to speedy implementation in a fast and complex work environment.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

33. **Substantial**. As mentioned in Section 1.2, the project objective of the Fifth Population Census was to produce reliable and accurate demographic, economic, and social data. The project was to enable the primary target groups to have accurate and reliable data to formulate and monitor their plans. This was substantially achieved. All project cycle activities- planning, geographic preparation, enumeration, and data processing- were well carried out, with the slippage in enumeration activities from late-November 2007 to April-May 2008 probably providing the implementing agencies with some badly needed breathing time to provide a better product.

34. It may have taken six months longer than planned, but, given the timeframe and implementation and political challenges, this was still a major achievement. Throughout the project cycle, its positive outcome was doubted by many stakeholders, but, by all standards, on technical grounds, Sudan has carried out its most comprehensive (in terms of coverage) and accurate Census. On the political front, because of the results' determining role in wealth sharing, the endorsement of the Census results continues to be subject to negotiations. Still, in this respect, it is a positive sign that also GOSS has now accepted the results as a valuable tool for planning purposes.

35. The long-term objective was to develop capacities within Sudan for collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating, and utilizing data from censuses and surveys. The project would result in sustainability of data collection and analysis in the future through increased capabilities, better frames for future surveys, quality maps, and expanded data processing facilities, which should help with the implementation of future surveys. This too was achieved. A substantial strengthening of facilities, equipment, and staffing has provided both GONU and GOSS with proper organizations to plan, manage, and monitor its future surveys and censuses.

36. Still, as mentioned above, GONU, GOSS, and donors should ensure the full analysis and dissemination of the remaining 44 questions of the long questionnaire which should be of particular use for the country's social and economic development planning.

3.3 Efficiency

37. **Moderately Efficient**. In view of the emergency technical assistance nature of the project, no economic and financial analysis was carried out at appraisal, and none was carried out in the context of writing this ICR. The only possible analysis would have been to compare the costs of the Sudan exercise with the cost of similar efforts in more or less comparable countries. However, the number of imponderables with regard to, e.g., country logistics, population composition, and census execution would make such exercise extremely difficult if not impossible. (There are few countries today that face the communication and infrastructure challenges that South Sudan faces.)

38. Still, despite the satisfactory outcome of the project, it has to be stated that the cost of the exercise was quite high. Lots of international organizations and specialists added to such cost. But, with the need for urgent action as one of the basic CPA activities, and the lack of local capacity in planning, managing, and monitoring such a massive and complex operation, the major involvement of UNOPS and UNFPA was unavoidable.

39. Both of these two organizations faced and overcame major logistical and political problems. But various complaints about UNOPS did surface. These included leaking prefab buildings in Khartoum, as well as sophisticated scanners in Rumbek, which were delivered, but not installed and serviced (until, much later, UNFPA obtained the services of an international expert, recruited especially for this purpose).

40. Naturally, it also should be noted that the costs were much affected by the fact that so many of the necessary implementation organization and activities had to be duplicated with offices, equipment, and other facilities in both the North and the South.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

41. **Rating: Satisfactory.** Given the critical importance of the CPA-prescribed Census to ensuring a basis for the allocation of resources, as well as to the upcoming elections, and the major political and logistical challenges facing implementation in a relatively short time, project completion with only six months slippage is a major achievement. Following some initial hold-ups, it was effectively executed. Without comparative data, it is difficult to say anything meaningful on its efficiency, but there is no doubt that the mandatory speedy implementation without the substantial involvement of expensive international organizations would not have been feasible. Still, the issue of the incomplete dissemination, as well as the lack of processing of the long questionnaire results, is a serious remaining issue requiring immediate GONU, GOSS, and donor corrective action. The Governments will also have to ensure maintaining the increased capacity building of their statistical offices.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

42. The project has provided an as-accurate-as-possible data base to go ahead with the elections, to help with the allocation of the proceeds of the country's natural resources, as well as to help plan, manage, and monitor its future social and economic development activities. It has provided the (so far raw data) basis for a much more reliable picture of the various aspects of poverty and gender, and will thus continue to be a major instrument at the disposal of GONU, GOSS, donors, and community development organizations.

(b)Institutional Change/Strengthening

43. The project has provided for considerable capacity building, mainly in strengthening CBS and in helping establish SSCCSE, and its various state-based offices.

It has provided a multitude of quality facilities, vehicles and equipment, as well as training in all technical aspects of the project cycle in general and census planning, management, and monitoring in particular. It has also, through its emphasis on proper fiduciary procedures, provided additional knowledge on internationally acceptable financial management and procurement policies and practices. It is now up to CBS and SSCCSE to maintain the newly acquired knowledge, as well as facilities, equipment, and staff.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

44. The project was an essential action under the CPA, and a necessary precursor to the elections, and this critical importance contributed substantially to promoting cooperation between relevant officials of GONU and GOSS, especially those dealing with budgets and Census execution.

45. The project also contributed, although temporarily, to employment generation and thus incomes throughout the country.

46. The most important and unfortunate outcome may well be the recent rejection of the results by South Sudan's legislature. The Census results, although developed on solid technical grounds, because of their possible implications for resource sharing, elections, and the country's political future, are now subjected to a complex political negotiation process. Still, the even more recent decision by GOSS to accept the Census results "for planning purposes" is a promising step in the right direction.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

N.A.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

47. **Rating: High**. The Project Proposal Document for Phase I did not provide a specific rating, but mentioned (a) possible delays in decision making regarding the date of the census and implementation timetable, (b) delays in the release of funds for preparatory activities, (c) mapping, listing and enumeration of special groups, (d) demining and security concerns, (e) logistical constraints such as poor roads and lack of transport, (f) scanning for data processing, and (g) decentralization of data processing. In addition, in separate assessments by the Bank's fiduciary specialists, financial and procurement risks were rated as high. In hindsight, all of these were addressed properly.

48. As far as the sustainability of the development outcome, the census data is now available to all actors in Sudan, is being used and will form the main source of information to policy makers and donors. The capacity development impact of the project on both statistical offices ensure the possibility of continuing to build on this outcome.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory. The Bank, as the MDTF administrator, joined GONU and 49. UNFPA in preparing the project, focusing much on the fiduciary aspects. Other donors were consulted as needed. Because of the Bank's lack of technical expertise in the project subject, as well as serious doubts about the ability of the government agencies to handle the technical and fiduciary implementation aspects, the Bank insisted that experienced international agencies be brought in to help execute the project. However, GOS objected to the high cost involved and UNFPA, the most experienced agency, objected that it did not have the necessary field presence. Eventually, it was decided to have the government agencies be officially responsible, with UNOPS handling all contracting of facilities, procurement of vehicles, equipment, and materials, as well as some training. In fact, in the South, because of GOSS' complete lack of absorptive capacity, UNOPS would basically play a turn-key role. The project would continue to benefit from UNFPA technical advice, as well as support provided by a host of other donors (see Annex 2). In addition, the MDTF MA would monitor the project's fiduciary aspects, although mainly financial management. A Project Implementation Manual was available, and the Bank would provide regular oversight. Keeping in mind the time pressure of the CPA-mandated project, it was agreed that various project details would still be worked out during implementation. The above arrangement presented a reasonable institutional set-up and implementation arrangement that proved to work well during implementation, particularly during Phase II when UNFPA was handling virtually the full range of project implementation aspects.

50. In hindsight, as mentioned above, the Bank should have more carefully considered whether the governments could and/or would fund the necessary staff capacity building right from the start; this did become a constraint.

(b) Quality of Supervision

51. **Rating: Highly Satisfactory**. The Bank did an excellent job in helping the various parties overcome technical and implementation issues. A senior officer based in Khartoum followed up on a day-to-day basis. When needed, the Bank sent supervision teams on a monthly basis, and it consistently allocated experienced staff. The country manager was much involved, and provided all necessary budget resources. Sector management too allocated all necessary staff resources.

52. The most positive contribution was possibly the country manager's decision to insist on a re-appraisal before endorsing the start of Phase II of the operation. Based on that assessment, the Bank insisted again that UNFPA become the executing agency, which this time was accepted by GONU, GOSS, and UNFPA. UNFPA quickly established a strong field presence in both Northern and Southern Sudan, and became fully responsible for all technical aspects of the remaining project cycle. The Bank also

helped much in ensuring close donor coordination throughout implementation, and in helping to reduce political pressure on the international and local technicians.

53. The establishment of the Census Donor Group was an excellent decision, and this group worked effectively throughout the process. It ensured enough coordination in place for the multiplicity of support (both through the MDTF and on a bilateral basis). The committee also played a crucial role in agreeing amongst donors on common positions related to a number of situations that came up during implementation.

54. The decision to disburse the full amounts of the two grants for phase II to UNFPA up-front helped to avoid any processing delays, and gave UNFPA full flexibility in conducting its international bidding. Accounting for the funds was not compromised, since UNFPA provided regular technical and financial reports, and withdrawal applications were processed to account for the amounts paid.

55. Bank missions produced regular and detailed aide-memoires and back-to-office reports, but Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports were only produced as of mid-2008, when MDTF-funded projects were "mainstreamed".

56. It also should be noted that the Bank team avoided intervention regarding political issues. This was the right approach, given the Bank's non-political nature and the fact that the Census is only one of many issues in the complex set-up of CPA implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

57. **Rating: Satisfactory**. This project benefited from both the Bank's management capacity and its recognition of its relative lack of expertise in census execution. The Bank's strengths were its ability to put together the strongest possible local and international implementation agencies, and to help overcome political and technical frictions through substantial and experienced management and staff input.

5.2 Borrower Performance

a) Government Performance

58. **Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.** In assessing government performance, one has to distinguish between GONU and GOSS. In the case of GONU, it remained commitment to executing the CPA-mandated Census project by (i) agreeing to provide substantial funding (US\$62.1 million) for the nation-wide operation, (ii) making available its most senior officials to join the PCC and its committees, (iii) helping in establishing MOC, and convincing all state officials to participate, and, (vi) last but not least, accepting the UNFPA as the executing agency during Phase II of the operation. However, obtaining GONU counterpart funding continued to be a slow and time-consuming process, thus holding up project processing. In fact, GONU stopped making further contributions following the enumeration activities. Similarly, GONU could have

done more to help overcome customs clearance problems, which did cause major delays, particularly after the enumeration phase. In the case of GOSS, it was a good decision to acknowledge from the start that it did not have the necessary capacity to implement these complex activities, and it thus needed comprehensive support from UNOPS and later UNFPA. It also contributed from its own budget resources US\$3.9 million when GONU did not provide full funding on time. Both governments should be complimented on their technical cooperation throughout the project cycle.

b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

59. **Rating: Satisfactory**. A multitude of agencies were involved. On the GONU side these were PCC and its committees, as well as CBS. All of these contributed as well as possible within their many constraints, and, with the technical assistance and training provided under the project, their performance improved over time. Eventually, MOC provided a substantial number of international and national observers, and helped endorse the census results. On the GOSS side, there was only SSCCSE, which was non-existent at the start of the project. It too built up some capacity over time. All of these agencies should be complimented on their contribution to the execution of a major and complex operation, covering all of Sudan during a time of major political frictions.

60. Although they are not part of the Government, both UNOPS and UNFPA should be mentioned, since they played major roles in the implementation. During the first phase, UNOPS processed major contracts for facilities and equipment, for which it was given very little time. During this phase, UNFPA too played a role as technical advisor, but this role was very much expanded during the second phase when it took on the main project technical management role. The performance of both agencies should be rated as moderately satisfactory during the first phase, and UNFPA's performance should be rated as highly satisfactory during the second phase.

c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

61. **Rating: Satisfactory**. Weighing the complexity of the operation, and the little time available for its execution in a vast nation which had just gone through a major and long internal conflict, causing wide-spread political friction, the recipient's overall performance should be rated as Satisfactory. GONU could have done more to help overcome budget and customs clearance problems, but this too should be kept in perspective. Unfortunately, the country's processing capacity is limited.

6. Lessons Learned

(both project-specific and of wide general application)

(a) Even though the Census, as part of the CPA, had a lot of political dimensions which were not in the Bank's terms of reference and domain of expertise, supporting such an important activity can work as long as the focus remains on the technical and implementation areas.

- (b) Census operations are highly specialized and need major technical support, particularly in countries with little relevant expertise and with major logistical and political problems.
- (c) UNFPA is the most-qualified international organization to provide technical and managerial census support, but its involvement is unavoidably expensive and needs major field presence.
- (d) The Bank's decision to allow full payment of the grant up-front provided UNFPA with maximum flexibility to carry out speedy procurement.
- (e) The Bank has to dedicate considerable resources to its MDTF administration, including the frequent and intensive allocation of experienced technical and fiduciary staff, as well as regular country and sector management involvement.
- (f) Although MDTF included a great number of donor members, quite a few additional ones were also providing relevant assistance, and had to be consulted and informed on a regular basis to ensure that everyone was following the "same play book".
- (g) Although MDTF funding was limited and decided to be a government responsibility, lack of government funding for proper staff capacity building became an issue.
- (h) In countries with two *de facto* governments, it becomes extra expensive to provide both with the necessary offices, equipment, and other facilities.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors (a) Grantee/Implementing agencies

N.A.

(b) Co-financiers/Donors

N.A.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

N.A.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) rioject cost by component (m cost nimen equivalent) r) =) c) i)			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
CBS	44.2	52.9	120
SSCCSE	29.5	40.4	137
Total Baseline Cost	73.7	93.3	127
Physical Contingencies	na	na	na
Price Contingencies	na	na	na
Total Project Costs	73.7	93.3	127
Project Preparation Costs	na	na	.na
	73.7	93.3	127
Total Financing Required	73.7	93.3	127

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) 1) 2) 3) 4)

1) See Annex 2 for more cost detail.

2) Figures do not include the cost of training and technical assistance activities provided for by UNFPA, GOSS, and various bilateral agencies in the amount of about \$33.0 million (see under (b) below) ,bringing the total cost to about US\$126.3 million.

3) Appraisal estimate data reflect the data set out in the Project Proposal Document of February 16, 2006. The latest cost estimate reflects the estimated repayments of UNOPS and UNFPA to MDTF of US\$0.26 million and about US\$ 3 million, respectively.

4) Apart from the provision of temporary and later permanent office accommodation, as well as the training of 42 staff, UNOPS helped procure 171 trucks and busses, 75 motorcycles, 800 bicycles, an emergency supply fuel tank, 161 computers, 200 GPS units, 306 radios, as well as cartographic and GIS laboratory equipment, generators, tents, and office, data processing, IT and other communication equipment. UNFPA also provided for substantial procurement, amounting to about US\$14.8 million. This included manuals, questionnaires, scanners, software and technical support, stationary and supplies, vehicles and boats, printing of census forms and training materials, GIS equipment and supplies, IT equipment and supplies, advocacy equipment, storage containers, furniture, shelving, fire resistant cabinets, digital cameras, air conditioners, ID card system, generators, printing of census ID cards, freight, and other services.

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) *	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
GONU Funding 2)		40.70	62.10	153
MDTF for North Sudan 2)	Grant	20.00	18.00	90
MDTF for South Sudan 2)	Grant	13.00	13.20	102

(b)	Financing	1)3)

1) Appraisal estimate data reflect the data set out in the Project Proposal Document of February 16, 2006. The latest funding estimates reflect the data set out in the Phase II Project Proposal Document of June 26, 2007, minus the originally projected US\$6.4 million which GONU did not provide, as well as the amounts which UNOPS and UNFPA are projected to pay back to MDTF.

2) It should be noted that the GONU contribution could never be fully certified. Much was in kind or for the payment of wages, and its documentation was not fully verifiable.3) Excluding the contributions from GoNU:

GOSS	US\$3.9 million
DANIDA	US\$6.4 million
EU	US\$4.8 million
UNFPA (own funding)	US\$1.8 million
USAID	US\$8.0 million
French Cooperation	US\$2.5 million
CEDEJ (EU)	US\$0.2 million
Netherlands	US\$0.2 million
DFID	US\$5.3 million
Total Additional	US\$22.0 million

Total Additional

US\$33.0 million

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1 The project was to provide for the production of a timely and satisfactory Population Census, the production of which would involve four phases: (a) preenumeration, (b) enumeration, (c) data processing, and (d) dissemination. These included:

(a.1) **planning** (establishing a census organization structure, including offices, which would oversee the whole operation; preparing a comprehensive census work plan; preparing a comprehensive budget for the whole census operation; having in place a legal basis for the census; preparing, testing, and finalizing the census tools, including the questionnaires and all the relevant instruction materials and guidelines; identifying and recruiting the census staff at various levels; putting in place a census advocacy and publicity strategy to ensure that both political and other leaders, as well as the general public, are well-informed about the census in order for them to provide full support and cooperation in the census operation; having in place a reliable transport network to facilitate the demarcation exercise and the census count, as well as other field operations; and preparing a training program for all the census field staff);

(a.2) **geographical preparations** (mapping the country and identifying all population settlements; delineating census enumeration areas (EAs) to ensure complete coverage and to avoid over-coverage during the census count; listing dwellings and households in all EAs; and preparing EA summaries to be used for manpower needs and logistics for enumeration);

(b) **enumeration** (training of all field staff in the process of census enumeration, including principal trainers, trainers, supervisors, interviewers, and editors and coders; transporting of all census materials to the field, including the questionnaires; allocating and deploying all field staff to their respective areas of enumeration; actual census enumeration; and collecting, transporting, and storing all completed census questionnaires to the place of data entry);

(c) **data processing** (data entry; processing; tabulation; and analysis); and

(d) **dissemination** (launching of results, tabulations, and analytical volumes).

2. All of these activities were carried out, although, at this stage, the latter only partially. In addition, the critically important processing of the extra 44 questions of the long questionnaire is not completed yet

The proposed schedule of activities was:

1. Preparatory

Legal, organizational,	September 2005	October 2007
fundraising		
Geographic preparation-	January 2006	September 2007
listing, mapping		
Demarcation of EAs and	January 2006	September 2007
house numbering		
Preparation of census tools	September 2005	March 2007

Institutional arrangements	September 2005	August 2007
and logistical preparations		
Advocacy	September 2005	December 2008
Pilot census incl. pre-test	November 15, 2006	November 30, 2006
Finalization of census	December 2006	June 2007
enumeration plans		
Procurement of census	January 2006	September 2007
equipment and materials		
Procurement of	January 2007	September 2007
enumeration supplies		
Establishment of 9 data	September 2006	September 2007
processing centers		
Distribution of supplies	September 2007	November 2007

2. Census Enumeration

Recruitment of field staff	July 2007	September 2007
Training of field staff	September 2007	November 2007
Assignment of tasks and	November 2007	November 2007
deployment of field staff		
Census field enumeration	November 15, 2007	November 30, 2007
Retrieval and storage of	December 2007	December 2007
questionnaires from field		

3. Data Processing

Recruitment of data processing staff	September 2007	October 2007
Training of data processing staff	November 2007	December 2007
Processing of short questionnaire and production of tables	December 2007	February 2008
Processing of long questionnaire and production of tables	March 2008	July 2008
Production of fact sheets and flyers	August 2008	December 2008
Preparation of analytical volumes	August 2008	December 2008

4. Dissemination

National launching of results from	January 2008	January 2008
short questionnaire		
State launching of results from short	February 2008	February 2008
questionnaire		
Launching of state tabulations	March 2008	August 2008
Launching of analytical volumes	December 2008	December 2008
Launching of fact sheets	August 2008	December 2008
and flyers		

5. The implementation schedule slipped because of various factors, mainly related to lack of absorptive capacity on the part of the CBS and SSCCSE, late budget contributions by GONU, and the need for time-consuming decisions of a political nature, explained in more detail in the main text. Still, the enumeration activities took place from April 22-May 6, 2008, and the results came out in early-2009, a remarkable performance.

6. The costs (in US\$ million) were initially estimated at US\$73.7 million, but were adjusted to US\$102.9 million in mid-2007 during the appraisal of the Phase II proposal:

Activity	Feb. 2006	June 2007
 planning census cartography 	2.4 14.3	6.3 17.1
3. enumeration	28.6	43.5
4. data processing	4.2	4.2
5. final results	1.2	1.2
 dissemination advocacy 	1.5 1.0	1.5 5.4
8. vehicles and transportation	11.3	16.3
9. data processing equipment	4.0	2.7
10. cartographic equipment	2.5	1.9
11. other equipment	0.2	0.2
12. capacity building (UNFPA-funded)	-	-
13. project management	2.4	2.4
Total	73.7	102.9

These were initially projected to be spent (in US\$ million) in the North (CBS) and South (SSCCSE) as follows:

	2006	2007	2008	Total
CBS	15.3	25.2	3.8	44.2
SSCCSE	10.1	16.7	2.7	29.5
Total	25.4	41.9	6.5	73.7

The adjustment in June 2007, in the context of the appraisal of the Phase II Proposal, resulted in a different allocation (in US\$ million):

	2006	2007	2008	Total
CBS	15.9	23.0	19.3	58.2
SSCCSE	10.8	21.0	12.9	44.7
Total	26.7	44.0	32.2	102.9

7. The initial appraisal cost estimates came from UNFPA, which used its experience with similar efforts in comparable countries, as well as in Northern Sudan. However, subsequent experience in the field, especially for the SSCCSE as it tried to recruit personnel for field mapping, as well as experience with the implementation of the Sudan Family Health Survey, showed the need for substantial cost adjustments. The most important increases can be attributed to more expensive statistical offices, the operation of the PPC and its committees, the acquisition of satellite imagery and base maps, aircraft rentals, vehicle and boat purchase and fuel and maintenance, media and advocacy, the rate of payment for training and enumeration and the provision of accommodation during training, and the printing of census documents and the production of enumeration materials.

8. As of the time of this report, the actual costs amounted to US\$93.3 million, of which US\$52.9 million can be attributed to CBS and US\$40.4 million to SSCCSE. Some additional cost can be expected to be made in CY09 for the dissemination of the Fifth Population Census Priority Results, as well as for the processing of the 44 remaining questions of the long questionnaire, but further MDTF funding was cut off on June 30, 2009.

9. It is noteworthy that these costs exclude the substantial cost of training and technical support funded by UNFPA itself, by GOSS, as well as by a great number of bilateral donors. A detailed description of those donors is given in Annex 1, but it amounted to an extra US\$33.0 million, bringing the total cost of the Fifth Population Census Project to US\$126.3 million. It also should be noted that the GONU contribution could never be fully certified. Much was in kind or the payment of wages, and its documentation was not fully reliable. Still, it should be noted that GONU funded much more than half of the total project cost.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

(including assumptions in the analysis)

1. In view of the emergency technical assistance nature of the project, no economic and financial analysis was carried out at appraisal, and none was carried out in the context of writing this ICR. The only possible analysis would have been to compare the costs of the Sudan exercise with the cost of similar efforts in more or less comparable countries. However, the number of imponderables with regard to, e.g., country logistics, population composition, and census execution would make this exercise extremely difficult if not impossible.

Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending/Grant Preparat	ion		
Bassam Ramadan	Lead Operations Officer	AFTH3	TTL
Nestor Koffi	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Selma Siddig			
Supervision/ICR			
Isabel Cristina Soares	Consultant	AFTSP	
Mohamed Yehia	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Yasser El-Gammal	Senior Operations Officer	AFTSP	

(a) Task Team members

(b) Staff Time and Cost

	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)		
Stage of Project Cycle	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)	
Lending			
FY06	8.30	50.00	
Total:	8.30	50.00	
Supervision/ICR			
FY07	12.3	115.00	
FY08	8.70	55.00	
FY09	3.07	15.00	
Total:	24.07	185.00	

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results *(if any)*

N.A.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results *(if any)*

N.A.

Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. In the absence of official feed-back from either CBS or SSCCSE, this ICR will quote some of the comments mentioned in the report submitted by the Chairman of the MOC in April 2009. This report assessed the adequacy of plans, operations, and management of the Census.

2. The Census was scheduled to be conducted at the most two years after signing of the CPA. This would have been September of 2007, which was postponed to November of 2007. Eventually, the Census took place in April 2008. November was not achievable because financing of the Census was not finalized, and the necessary logistical and administrative structures were not in place. Since the decision on the timing of the Census came late, this meant that the printing and delivery of materials had to be done under an unhealthy time pressure. Part of the reason why Sudan was able to deliver the materials under such circumstances was because the country has a UN infrastructure that is geared up for emergency and relief, and another part is the shear will to succeed that drives national mobilization of this nature.

3. The 2008 Census incorporated several innovative technical approaches, and was a major departure from previous censuses in that the South participated fully in the undertaking.

4. Although the timing slipped, the extended period allowed the technical staff to sharpen their implementation tools. Cartographic work benefited tremendously as a lot of field work was yet to be done. Other preparation activities too benefited. The extension was a blessing in disguise, and was quietly welcomed as it allowed all the final touches to be made in readiness for the enumeration phase.

5. Local language proficiency can make or break an operation such as a Census. In Sudan, it is estimated that 92.4 percent of the enumerators spoke the language of their assigned areas.

6. For Sudan to have executed the Census, and finalized the processing of data by December 2008, is nothing short of a miracle. There seemed to be insurmountable problems at each stage. By the beginning of 2007, the state offices were not contracted, funds were not fully secured, and the ambitious external independent monitoring group was being contracted, but arrangements were not fully finalized. Cartographic work was continuing, especially in the South. The date of the Census was yet to be announced when there were only 3-4 months remaining to April 2009. Given the explicit political purpose to which the Census results were to be put, technical navigation of the Census process was intractable, and at all stages required politically savvy interventions to succeed.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

- a. UNOPS submitted an ICR on its support to CBS and SSCCSE on the procurement of assets, construction of infrastructure, and capacity building, in accordance with Memoranda of Agreement signed on July 22, 2006. Its support was completed by the end of 2008, the closing date of MDTF's Phase I grants to GONU and GOSS. Of those grants, US\$7.1 million was spent in the North and US\$5.3 million in the South. Support in the North consisted of assisting existing GONU agencies in carrying out their responsibilities, but support in the South was more comprehensive because of its more serious capacity constraints. Apart from support for procurement, construction, and training, UNOPS later also provided support for the mapping exercises in the North and South. Implementation was affected by slow customs clearance (in some cases taking months to clear cargo), poor roads, insecurity, a disabling wet season, poor communications, and high cost of delivery, as well as the lack of capacity of SSCCSE to properly receive and manage assets. Implementation was also affected by insufficient and late counterpart funding of the costs of operational support, logistics, delivery, security, money transfer, warehousing, and capacity building. Still, apart from leaving substantial amounts of hardware, UNOPS contributed to training of staff in logistics, finance, radio operation, and boat operation, which can now be applied elsewhere. The ICR concludes by mentioning three lessons learnt: (a) following years of conflict and thus strong feelings of independence on the part of the recipients, donors have to compromise between "regular" and "less regular" approaches to operational implementation; (b) there should have been an early identification of possible choke points in the supply chain (customs clearance in this case), and corrective government action should have been taken; and (c) counterpart participation requires time for staff capacity building, and thus sufficient local staff time and budget.
- b. **UNFPA** completed an initial draft ICR on July 6, 2009. GONU and GOSS recognized the leading role of UNFPA technical support and resource mobilization for censuses, and stipulated UNFPA in the CPA as the only agency to provide technical support to both CBS and SSCCSE. During PHASE I, UNFPA mobilized resources from the European Union, DANIDA, DFID, The Netherlands, and French Cooperation, as well as its own resources, for technical, logistics, and monitoring support. Technical support consisted of:
 - (a) Support to CBS and SSCCSE with international and national staff providing advocacy, demographic, cartographic, data processing, analysis, and dissemination support;

- (b) Serving as secretariat for the meetings of the Technical Working Group, which included CBS and SSCCSE staff and technical advisors from the US Census Bureau, US Department of Agriculture, Bearing Point, Statistics Norway, DFID, and French Cooperation; and
- (c) Training of CBS and SSCCSE staff in census procedures and management.
- 1. During Phase II, technical support consisted of:
 - (a) procurement of cartographic, enumeration, data processing, analysis, and dissemination materials funded by MDTF;
 - (b) support to MOC funded by the European Union and DFID to recruit international and national monitors; and
 - (c) coordination of logistics support provided by the UN organizations in Sudan for storage, repacking, distribution, and retrieval of enumeration materials.

2. Due to this major effort, there was a remarkable enumeration coverage for the whole country (94.7 percent), including 89.9 percent for South Sudan. Data processing started in earnest at the CBS in Khartoum in August 2008 and at the SSCCSE in the South in September 2008. The data sets from North and South Sudan were finally merged over a three-week period at the data processing center in Khartoum, and the tabulations for the "priority results" produced and presented to the Technical Working Group meeting on February 16, 2009. However, this then resulted in major discussions on the data for Darfur, nomads, and Southerners on Northern Sudan. After further review, the results were submitted to the PCC, and endorsed by the PCC on April 26, 2009. The CBS then officially released the results on May 6 and the SSCCSE on June 6, 2009.

3. By the closing date of the project, all procurement had been completed as initially agreed, except for the production, distribution, and dissemination of the "priority results", which were only partially implemented because of delays in government approval of the census results. In addition, data processing personnel were supported at the data processing centers in Khartoum and Rumbek over the period September 2008-June 2009 through the payment of salaries and transport, facilities rental, electricity costs, and fuel for a generator.

4. Delays in the delivery of goods were caused by (i) wrangling over census questions like ethnicity, religion, state/county of usual residence, and the quantities

to be distributed to North and South Sudan, which caused a slippage in questionnaire production by at least two months; (ii) hold-ups in custom and tax clearance; and (iii) the initial lack of warehouse facilities by the CBS in Khartoum.

5. The ICR concludes by mentioning four lessons learnt: (a) recognition and acceptance of operational boundaries in the implementation of a project with two partners who fiercely guard their independence, (b) importance of diplomacy to avoid the impression of favoritism, (c) importance of providing the entire amount for a time-bound project like the census up-front to avoid funding delays, and (d) despite need for training and thus delays, use of national counterparts is essential to ensure project sustainability.

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

- Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Sudan, November 6, 2007 (draft), IDA
- Project Proposal Document for a proposed grant in the amount of US\$33.0 million to the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan for the Fifth Population Census of Sudan, CBS, SSCCSE, February 16, 2006
- Project Proposal Document for a proposed grant for Phase II in the amount of US\$22 million to the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan for the Fifth Population Census of Sudan, CBS, SSCCSE, June 26, 2007
- Fifth Population Census Project, MDTF-NS Grant No. 56379, May 8, 2006
- Fifth Population Census Project, MDTF-SS Grant No. 56389, April 20, 2006
- Memorandum of Agreement between GONU and UNOPS, July 22, 2006
- Memorandum of Agreement between GOSS and UNOPS, July 22, 2006
- MDTF-NS Grant for the Fifth Population Census Project, No. 90613, August 13, 2007
- MDTF-SS Grant for the Fifth Population Census Project, No. 90614, August 13, 2007
- Letter Agreement between IDA and UNFPA, August 13, 2007
- Interim Oversight Committee Meeting, Minutes of February 26, 2006
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Map of the Republic of the Sudan

