



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 04/24/2002	
PROJ ID: P002407		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Roads Rehab & Maint	Project Costs (US\$M)	92.74	43.15
Country: Sierra Leone	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	45	42.6
Sector(s): Board: TR - Roads and highways (74%), Central government administration (25%), Other industry (1%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	36.89	0
L/C Number: C2451			
	Board Approval (FY)		93
Partners involved : UNDP, JICA, EC, AfDB	Closing Date	06/30/1998	06/30/2001
Prepared by:	Reviewed by:	Group Manager:	Group:
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The main objectives of the project were to:

- Remove physical bottlenecks in the country's transport network, in order to promote a supply response from the economic recovery program through a sustainable road rehabilitation program;
- Build institutional capacity to better plan and manage the repair and maintenance of roads and to promote a sustainable system for funding road maintenance;
- Strengthen the transport sector institutions to improve sector management and planning and to foster market-oriented policies;
- Encourage new methods of infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance, using appropriate labor-intensive technology and local resources, in order to increase employment generation and to provide sustainable maintenance systems;
- Increase the share of private sector participation in road maintenance and develop capacity of small-sized contractors to maintain the road network; and
- Promote the use of non-motorized transport (NMT) to reduce head-loading by women and to increase rural mobility, improving transport services available for the rural poor.

b. Components

Original Components

- Trunk Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance:** (i) rehabilitation and strengthening of about 357 km of paved and 136 km of gravel roads in the trunk road network; (ii) improvement of the Central Business District (CBD) of Freetown, through rehabilitation of main roads (20 km); and (iii) maintenance of trunk roads by contract including support for developing small-sized local contractors, and for the use of labor-intensive technology.
- Strengthening of Road Management Institutions:** (i) technical assistance to help organize, manage and train the staff of Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) and training of domestic contractors; (ii) procurement of maintenance equipment, spares and vehicles; and (iii) provision of office facilities and other logistical support for SLRA.
- Support to Department of Works (DOW):** office equipment and facilities.
- Support to Transport Sector Institutions:** technical assistance, training and office equipment for the Department of Transport, Communications and Tourism (DTC) to improve sector planning and policies, and for key studies.
- Pilot Program for Promotion of Non-Motorized Transport (NMT):** Support for the development of NMT in the rural areas including assistance to NGOs.
- Technical Assistance for Project Design and Supervision:** consultant services for engineering design and project supervision.

Revised Components

Due to security reasons the rehabilitation of the Taiama-Bo-Kenema was not finished and the focus of the NMT component was shifted to the Western and Lungi areas and to Freetown.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

At appraisal, total project cost was estimated at US\$92.74 million. The credit amount was US\$45.00 million, the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) was to contribute US\$10.85 million and the remaining US\$36.89 million was to be financed by other donors. Due to civil unrest, the other donors pulled out of the project. At project closing, the credit was not fully disbursed and about US\$2.4 million was cancelled. The disbursements were suspended in 1998 and 1999 and the project closed three years after the original closing date.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project was implemented during a period of civil war and some of the components were not implemented. The project achieved most of its major objectives with some shortcomings.

(a) The objective of removing physical bottlenecks in the country's transport network through a sustainable road rehabilitation program was partially met. Share of road network in "good" condition increased marginally from 10% to 32% and is far below the appraisal target of 50%. The project was not successful in promoting sustainable funding for road maintenance. Road Fund allocations at the end of the project were only 47 per cent of the appraisal target.

(b) The objective of building institutional capacity to better plan and manage the repair and maintenance of roads was partially achieved. Technical Assistance (TA) and training for engineering design and contract supervision was provided to SLRA and a computerized Road Maintenance Management System (RMMS) was setup to enhance SLRA's capacity to prioritize road maintenance. Domestic and overseas training was provided to the staff of SLRA. It is too early, however, to judge whether the TA and training provided under the project and the RMMS system would enhance the institutional capacity of SLRA given the difficult political environment.

(c) The objective of increasing the share of private sector in road maintenance was partially met. At the end of the project the share of periodic maintenance by contract was 30%, far below the appraisal target of 70%. The targets for contracting out pothole patching (90%) and mechanized routine maintenance (100%) were met.

(d) The project assisted in capacity building of small-sized contractors to maintain the road network by training 57 labor/light equipment based contractors. The objective of using appropriate labor-intensive technology was achieved, 100% of routine (labor based) maintenance is being contracted out.

(e) The objective of promoting the use of non-motorized transport (NMT) was not met.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

Significant progress was made in the development of the capacity of small-sized contractors to undertake maintenance.

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- The actual cost of construction was much higher than the contract award price due to delays, suspensions and destruction caused by the civil war. .
- The government did not increase the road user fees as agreed during project negotiations.
- The oversight arrangement for the Road Fund was inadequate. The Road Fund was placed under SLRA Board which can cause conflict of interest.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome:	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	The outcome of the project is rated moderately satisfactory for the following reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The objective of removing physical bottlenecks in the country's transport network through a sustainable road rehabilitation program was partially met.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was not successful in promoting sustainable funding for road maintenance. • The objective of increasing the share of private sector in road maintenance was partially met.
Institutional Dev .:	High	Substantial	It is too early, however, to judge whether the TA and training provided under the project and the RMMS system would enhance the institutional capacity of SLRA given the difficult political environment.
Sustainability :	Likely	Unlikely	Sustainability of project benefits is unlikely because of: (i) the uncertain political environment, (ii) contributions from road fund for maintenance are inadequate, and (iii) the government has been unable to increase the road user fees to increase road fund revenues.
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

1. Projects that are re-started at the end of the war/conflict need to be re-appraised or restructured to respond to new circumstances and conditions.
2. The costs of civil works are very high for projects that are implemented in countries that are undergoing violent civil crises. About 33% of the credit was disbursed to civil works contractors for damages and loss of time.
3. Project funding suffers significantly when most donors withdraw in case of war/conflict and the government is also unable to fulfill its financial obligation. The Bank remained even when all donors withdrew from the project.

8. Assessment Recommended? ☐ Yes ☒ No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR could have discussed in more detail the reasons for: (i) the continued Bank involvement when all donors withdrew from the project, and (ii) why the Bank assumed the risk of the war and compensated contractors for damage and loss of time caused by the war.