Legal and Judicial Reform Unit
ha   ~    Legal Departinent
The World Bank         20177
August 1999
Comparative International Study
of Court Performance Indicators
A Descriptive and Analytical Account
FILE COPY
Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakolias






Comparative International Study of
Court Performance Indicators
A Descriptive and Analytical Account
Edgardo Buscaglia
Maria Dakolias



© 1999 The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development / THE WORLD BANK
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First printing August 1999
This report has been prepared by the staff of the World Bank.
The judgments expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Board of Executive Directors or of the governments they represent.
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the World Bank at the address above or faxed to 202-522-2422.
Edgardo Buscaglia is a fellow at Stanford University and at the
University of Virginia Law School. Maria Dakolias is counsel in the Legal
and Judicial Reform Unit of the World Bank's Legal Department. These
comments are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the insti-
tutions that they represent.
The authors wish to thank John Lockhart for his comments, Peter
Borboris for his research assistance, and Susan Kellerman for her staff
assistance.



Contents
Introduction                                                     .1................................................ 
Systems in Developed and Developing Countries .................. 2
Methodology ................................................ 7
General Findings and their Significance .......................... 9
Results of the Survey  ...................................... 10
Factors that Affect Procedural Time ........................... 13
Capital Budgets and Technology ............................. 15
How Judges Spend their Time ............................... 17
Cost per Case, Budget Resources, and Cost Elasticity of Supply . . .18
Insignificant Factors (Number of Staff, Salaries,
Level of Training) ........................................ 19
Factors that Affect Clearance Rates ............................. 20
Significant Factors (Technology, Capital Budget, Cost Elasticity,
Administrative Time) ..................................... 20
Insignificant Factors (Salaries, General Budget, Resources,
Number of Staff) ......................................... 22
Conclusion  ................................................. 24
Annex .................................................... 26
Judge Questionnaire ......................................... 29
Notes ...................................................                                                    37
iii






Comparative International Study of
Court Performance Indicators
A Descriptive and Analytical Account
Introduction
There is a growing awareness that a judiciary able to resolve cases in a
fair and timely manner is an important prerequisite for economic devel-
opment. In many developing countries, the judiciary is not consistent in
its conflict resolution, and carries a large backlog of cases, stifling private-
sector growth and causing the erosion of individual and property rights.
Governments worldwide are embarking on programs of judicial reform
to resolve these problems.
This report discusses the findings of a quantitative survey of the fac-
tors affecting the efficiency of the judiciaries in 10 developing and devel-
oped countries on three continents. The report uses a jurimetric analysis1
to measure how procedural times and clearance rates2 are affected by a
variety of factors, ranging from budget-related variables to the manager-
ial style of the judge. These factors can be grouped into three main cate-
gories: procedural, administrative, and organizational.
The report explains why enhancing court performance must be a key
objective of judicial reform. This is particularly true in a decade in which
many countries have experienced a surge in demand for judicial services.
The report explains how each factor affecting court efficiency was identi-
fied, and how information relating to that factor was gathered and ana-
lyzed. It concludes by exploring the results of the analysis-how each fac-
tor affects procedural time and clearance rates-and the significance of
these results for judicial reform programs.
We hope that our analysis will help judiciaries identify the factors that
most affect their performance, and therefore help them orient and design
appropriate reforms. Many of our conclusions debunk common percep-
tions of which elements are important for improving judicial performance.
It is important to note that in identifying these factors we focused on
only one aspect of judicial effectiveness: that is, how well resources are
used in generating court output. Court output, or court efficiency, can be
measured in terms of the elasticity of supply of court services, procedur-
1



2                                  COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
al time, and clearance rates. Inefficiency causes delays, which raise liti-
gant-related costs; higher costs in turn impede user access to the courts,
and thereby damage faith in the legal system. Efficiency is therefore an
important aspect of a judiciary's effectiveness.
We chose to focus on efficiency as a measure of court performance
because it provided a quantifiable means of comparing courts world-
wide. However, justice has many other dimensions, and judicial reforms
often strive for less quantifiable changes, such as improving the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and enhancing procedural transparency. It is
important to keep this distinction in mind, because factors that affect effi-
ciency do not always improve the overall quality of justice, and in some
cases can even undermine it. By the same token, some factors that do not
affect efficiency do affect the quality of the delivery of justice.3
Systems in Developed and Developing Countries
An effective judiciary offers access for the population, and provides pre-
dictable results and adequate remedies. Many judiciaries, however, suf-
fer from a dysfunctional administration of justice, lack of transparency,
and a perception of corruption. The basic elements of an effective judicial
system may be missing, including relatively predictable outcomes within
the courts; accessibility to the courts by the population, regardless of
income and educational level; reasonable time to disposition; and ade-
quate court-provided remedies. In cases such as these, lack of confidence
in the administration of justice runs high, and is most pronounced among
small economic units and low-income families.
Democratization, growing urbanization, and the adoption of market
reforms have created additional demands for court services throughout
the regions examined in this study These three factors have increased the
complexity of social interactions, making the improvement of judicial
conflict-resolution capabilities even more necessary. The shift of most
economic transactions toward the market domain and away from the
public administrative sphere has created an unprecedented increase in
private-sector demand for clearer definition of rights and obligations,
and an increasing demand for civil justice. Germany is one of the leaders
in this area, experiencing a 37 percent increase in civil cases since 1984.4
The judiciary's inability to satisfy the growing demand for disposi-
tions, as recorded in this study, is one of the most challenging and impor-
tant aspects of judicial reform.5 Greater backlogs and time delays are
common-statistics show that delays in U.S. courts, for example,
increased during 1976-1987.6 It can be argued that the incentives faced by
judges and court personnel are at the heart of these problems in many
countries. Politicized appointments, lack of quality control standards for



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   3
work performed by judges and court personnel, lack of proper require-
ments for career entry and promotions, and lack of a practical model
against which to assess the character and psychological suitability of
applicants for the position of judge all add up and contribute to the poor
performance of courts. This is despite the huge sums of money spent on
higher salaries and better technologies in most of the countries sampled.
In addition, these delays may be attributed to procedural defects. Other
reasons are the lack of legal training, the absence of an active case-man-
agement style, and the excessive administrative burden that falls on some
judges. One study found that Argentine judges spend approximately 70
percent of their time on nonadjudicative tasks. In Peru, the figure is 69
percent.
Poorly trained judges in an overburdened legal system are also sus-
ceptible to corrupting influences, and therefore create an environment
where the rule of law cannot be guaranteed. The use of ex parte commu-
nication is one aspect of legal practice that especially contributes to this
perception, and there are accusations that cases are decided in ex parte
meetings. All of the problems mentioned above also add cost and risk to
business transactions and thus reduce the potential size of key markets.
At the same time, access to justice is blocked to those who cannot afford
the expense of waiting through court delays.
These inefficiencies become more problematic as market reforms trig-
ger private-sector demand for a clearer definition of rights and obliga-
tions. Lack of timely resolution of conflicts raises costs and creates uncer-
tainty, and can obstruct the development of the private business sector.
When parties do not trust that a contract will be enforced, they limit their
transactions to business partners who have a strong reputation or with
whom they have dealt in the past, thus precluding start-ups or other
unknown players. Consistent interpretation and application of the laws
are necessary to provide a stable institutional environment where the
long-term consequences of their economic decisions can be assessed by
both businesses and the public.
Clearly, there is a need for a change in legal culture, as well as a sys-
tematic change in the delivery of justice. Although the entire reform
process may take generations to run its course, the effects of judicial
reform will be felt by everyone-the private sector, the public, the legal
community, and members of the judiciary. Ultimately, the private sector
and the public should be able to rely on an efficient and equitable system
that is respected and valued.
Many of the countries included in this study have implemented their
own reforms, with differing results. Some have implemented a few iso-
lated reforms, while others have developed broad reform programs. The
discussion about which reforms are successful continues. This study does



4                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
not aim to describe the immense wealth of experiences that the judicial
systems of these countries offer, but a brief review of some of their main
reforms provides a glimpse into the performance of their courts. France,
Ukraine, Hungary, Singapore, Panama, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina,
and Colombia were analyzed. Many of these countries are undertaking
judicial reforms, others are contemplating reforms, and still others are
studying their courts. Although many of the countries are in Latin
America, a small sample from Europe, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and Asia have also been included in the study. These countries
may be at different stages in development and at different stages of
reform, but they offer a rich sample for comparison. France has been
included to enable comparison with the systems of a developed country.
Singapore was included because its recent judicial reforms have made a
remarkable difference in efficiency; it should also be noted that Singapore
is the only common-law legal system among the sample.
The countries that have experienced positive results, in terms of effi-
ciency, from their reforms during 1990-96 include France, Peru,
Singapore, Chile, and Panama. All these countries have clearance rates in
excess of 89 percent, which although not perfect is more efficient than
many countries. One should bear in mind, however, that some of these
legal systems are criticized for a lack of independence, transparency, or
trust in the judiciary. Although the Chilean judiciary has a good reputa-
tion relative to other Latin American systems, for example, there is talk of
needed reforms. There have been efforts to evaluate judges in their per-
formance, however, and this has created positive improvements in the
incentive system. The country's reform efforts have placed its judiciary
among the most efficient of the countries sampled in the region.
France is an example of a judiciary that uses a cooperative administra-
tive system. The Tribunal de Commerce is supported by the Office of the
Greffier-the clerks of the court-which is responsible for the filing and
administering of cases.7 The judges do not spend time on administration
like their colleagues in Latin America, and this has proved efficient. They
are also not burdened by such large caseloads-on average, each judge
receives fewer than 300 new cases per year.
In Panama, the reforms have benefited from merit-based competition
for judicial positions.8 Although the Supreme Court is charged with the
administration of the judicial branch, an Administrative Secretariat was
established under the Court in 1990 to manage the administrative, finan-
cial, and personnel issues of the judiciary. In 1993, a judicial school was
established under the Supreme Court with courses geared toward train-
ing newly appointed and current judges. Together with administrative
changes and increases in the capital budget, efficiency has increased to
respectable levels.



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                     5
Peru has seen a dramatic change in the courts since 1992, when the
Executive Board (Consejo Ejecutivo) and a judicial management office were
created for the overall administration of the courts.9 The 1993
Constitutional Reform established the National Council of the Magistracy
(Consejo Nacionial del la Magistratura) to select, appoint, ratify, and remove
judges and prosecutors of all levels.10 Investment in the judiciary began
with the purchase of new computers for the courts in Lima, and judicial
information booths have been installed to give the public better access to
information. Peru has also established model courts on the pattern of a
cooperative administrative system, and this has both decreased the time
judges spend on administration and increased clearance rates.
Singapore has undertaken substantial reforms in the 1990s to improve
court efficiency, making large capital investments in both 1991 and 1996.
A common administrative office has allowed the judges to shed all
administrative responsibilities. In addition, litigants are no longer enti-
tled to unlimited use of court time without an increase in cost, and can-
not agree to extend the time for setting a matter down for trial or for fil-
ing an appeal. Singapore has also introduced the Technology Court, a
videoconferencing system that allows lawyers to examine witnesses any-
where in the world.11 These changes have greatly increased court effi-
ciency. It should, however, be noted that Singapore's quality of justice is
questioned by many.
The other countries sampled have not shown great improvements in
their efficiency levels, despite the reforms they have implemented during
this period. These countries include Ecuador, Ukraine, Colombia,
Argentina, and Hungary. They have clearance rates of less than 79 per-
cent, which indicates that the number of pending cases continues to
mount, increasing the burden on the courts and the delays for the parties
concerned. These countries need to reexamine their judicial systems to
determine what reforms are missing and which perhaps did not work.
Reforms undertaken in Colombia include a 1991 constitutional reform
that created the Judicial Council (Conisejo Superior de la Judicatura). The
council is in charge of discipline and administrative matters such as
human resources, operations, and finance, and is also responsible for
defining career tracks for judicial employees. Reforms previous to the
1991 constitutional changes included the creation of the Common Clerks
Offices in 1987, which introduced technology to the courts, and the 1989
creation of the Oficinas y Unidades Judiciales, which lends technical, sys-
tems, and judicial support to the courts. But even with a significant
increase in the number of personnel in 1991, the reforms have not
improved clearance rates sufficiently to allow Colombia to address the
demands placed on judges. This may be because judges here are faced
with additional issues of security.



6                                  COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In December 1992, Ecuador similarly passed a series of constitutional
and statutory changes to the judicial system. These doubled the size of
the Supreme Court, created a Judicial Council (Consejo Nacional de la
Judicatura), redefined the jurisdictional role of the Supreme Court, creat-
ed a new mechanism for the selection of judges, and increased the judi-
cial budget and salaries. In late 1995, the Congress passed other constitu-
tional provisions mandating the decentralization of the judiciary and the
use of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms. These changes have
not had a dramatic effect on the efficiency of the courts, however, because
they have not been coupled with the increase in the capital budget that
would permit investment in technology. Capital increases were in fact
made only recently, and it is too early to determine the results. One other
positive change has been the removal from office this year of 10 judges
for behavioral transgressions. By removing these judges, the Judicial
Council has taken a very public step to improve accountability in the
courts.
Hungary has experienced several changes in the jurisdiction of the
courts, and these have caused an increase in cases filed. Specifically, a
1993 procedural reform that changed the jurisdiction of the County and
District Courts caused a sharp increase in the cases filed in the District
Court in Budapest. No reforms have been implemented yet to address
this increase- although the courts' budgets increased, the extra money
was not allocated for capital costs.
Ukraine has experienced a difficult adjustment to a market economy.
There has been an overall drop in the number of cases filed, but little
investment has been made in the courts and they have not improved their
performance. The judiciary lacks a suitable physical infrastructure and
modern technology-including typewriters and photocopiers.12 This has
created a situation in which the courts are unable to address their current
caseload and their problems of inefficiency.
Argentina, in contrast, has seen a steep rise in the number of cases
filed, and these have caused an overload that the judiciary is ill-prepared
to handle. The country created a Judicial Council under the 1994 consti-
tutional reform, but this has only recently begun operations. A law man-
dating mediation for all civil cases in federal courts in Buenos Aires has
been successful however, and the Supreme Court, a vital part of the judi-
cial reform process, has also made changes. The Court now has an admin-
istration branch that includes offices for Information Systems,
Infrastructure, Notifications, Finance, Human Resources, and
Management. These offices, headed by the General Administration
Secretary, have improved the Court's ability to plan for its future needs.
But although there has been an effort to make administrative changes, the
judges are still burdened with excessive administrative duties. In addi-



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                     7
tion, 95 percent of the budget is dedicated to operational costs, and very
little to capital investments. Overall, the courts have not seen an improve-
ment in the efficiency of case resolution. Additional reforms are planned.
Methodology
The aim of this study is to describe and explain, as far as statistically pos-
sible, the differences in the performance of court systems within a sample
of developed and developing countries. Significant differences in court
performance are identified and related to common international denom-
inators that can be addressed in future judicial reforms. These variables
have been collected in order to identify trends in court performance
worldwide.
This analysis is based on information from the federal first-instance
courts that have jurisdiction over commercial cases.13 Information relat-
ed to salaries, caseloads, budgets, and personnel was gathered for each of
the sampled courts. The general budget allocations of each of the specif-
ic sampled courts were then calculated. In addition, a survey was made
of each court, including a study of the time allocated to different tasks.
This was for the most part answered by the judges themselves14 (see sur-
vey, attached). The objective of the survey was to assess how the different
characteristics of the cases sampled-for example, the complexity of a
case-affect the productivity of the judge and court personnel, and to
evaluate how managerial style and case complexity affect processing
time.
Judicial perceptions of the court environment are an important com-
plement to empirical data in explaining court performance. Although
these perceptions are subject to bias, they provide additional data that
enriches the empirical results. These perceptions have not been compared
with an empirical study on case time, however, due to the excessive cost
of such a comparison.
The framework used for this study relates input variables-the differ-
ent types of human and nonhuman court resources-with output vari-
ables that measure the supply of court services. Our aim was to deter-
mine how the supply of court services in commercial cases tried by first-
instance courts is affected by different input variables. For the purpose of
this study, we used statistical techniques to identify the input variables
that have most impact on the performance of the court systems.15
The main output variables to be considered are the expected duration
of commercial cases, measured in days); the clearance rates; and the cost
elasticity of the supply of court services. The expected duration of com-
mercial cases measures time to disposition, and the clearance rate mea-
sures the proportion of cases filed per year per court that are disposed



8                                  COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
during that same year. Cost elasticity determines the percentage change
in the number of cases disposed per court that would be produced by a 1
percent change in the allocation of budget resources to that court. A large
elasticity of supply, such as 4, would indicate that a 1 percent increase in
the allocation of money to the court in question would produce a 4 per-
cent increase in the number of disposed cases. These output variables are
tested and related against the input variables.
The input variables considered here and their projected effects are as
follows:
1. Budget devoted to capital resources-i.e., fixed assets and tangible-
intangible capital spending. We expected that an increase in capital
spending would increase clearance rates, increase the elasticity of sup-
ply of court services,16 and decrease the expected duration of a case
disposed. The latter is measured in terms of the Cappelleti Index,
where the expected duration of a case in a specific court is found by
dividing the number of pending cases at the end of a year by the num-
ber of cases disposed that same year. We expected results to show that
more infrastructure coupled with more court equipment would tend
to increase the capacity of a court to dispose of cases in less time.
2. Budget resources allocated to each court. We expected to find the same
effect as in the variable capital spending-that an increase in this vari-
able would increase clearance rates and elasticity, and decrease the
expected duration of cases disposed.
3. Expenditure on labor and other material inputs needed to keep the
courts operational, as reflected in the variable cost per case disposed.
We expected that a decrease in the variable cost per case disposed
could be related to an increase in clearance rates and a decrease in the
expected duration of a case disposed. For example, a decrease in the
time allocated by each court employee to an average case filed would
decrease the labor costs per case and make more time available for
court personnel to deal with other cases pending.
4. The use of technology. Software can be used to manage information in
the courts, (a) to maintain a database of jurisprudence; (b) to run case-
tracking systems; and (c) for word processing. We expected to see a
decrease in procedural times and an increase in clearance rates with
the additional application of technology to case processing.
5. The amount of time dedicated by each judge to jurisdictional tasks. An
increase in this variable would tend to decrease the expected duration



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                      9
of cases, and increase clearance rates and the cost elasticity of supply
of court services.
6. The amount of time dedicated by each judge to administrative tasks.
An increase in this variable would tend to decrease clearance rates and
increase the expected duration of cases disposed.
7. The managerial style of the judge. The more active and rational the
managerial style of the judge, the higher we would expect court effi-
ciency to be. Managerial activism can be measured by the determina-
tion of specific criteria for (a) managing cases, (b) the delegation of
administrative tasks to court personnel, and (c) the use of technology to
accelerate administrative tasks. Effective management would tend to
decrease the expected times to disposition, increase clearance rates, and
increase the elasticity of supply of court services. This variable also
touches on the main aspects of the organizational factors affecting court
efficiency. A court organization that avoids duplication of administra-
tive tasks, specifies criteria for managing cases based on the complexi-
ty of the issue at hand, and applies technology to administrative mat-
ters would tend to increase clearance rates, reduce the expected dura-
tion of cases filed, and reduce the variable cost per case disposed.
The jurimetric study presented here aims at determining if our suppo-
sitions about the above relationships are valid, and if these variables are
significant in the courts sampled. The indicators we used can be classified
as procedural (procedural times and clearance rates), administrative (as a
product of budget size and of the salaries of administrative personnel and
judges), and organizational (number of employees, use of technology, and
managerial techniques), and were selected for their capacity to illustrate
the relative efficiency and efficacy of the court systems sampled here.
By identifying significant relationships between the input and output
variables, we hope to help those responsible for designing judicial poli-
cies focus on the most effective means of improving court services.
General Findings and their Significance
Below, we highlight the results of the survey, including how different
variables affect duration and clearance rates, and the significance of the
results. While many results tend to confirm our predictions, some
debunk common ideas about how to structure a judicial reform program.
It is important to remember that these results only look at court perfor-
mance measured through clearance rates, procedural times, and cost elas-
ticity of supply of court services."7 While some factors do not boost case



10                                COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
processing times, they may improve other aspects of the judiciary, such
as independence from political or financial influences.
We have reserved other areas of court performance for future study.
Results of the Survey
Survey questions were designed to analyze how judges allocate their
working time, and what they perceive to be the main factors that affect
efficiency in the judicial process. For example, questions were directed at
their perceptions of how factors such as management and infrastructure
affect the performance of the courts. A representative sample of judges
was surveyed in the countries included in this study,'8 and it is interest-
ing to compare their perceptions with the results of the empirical analy-
sis. The survey results are described below.
Information technology is often perceived to be an important factor in
efficient case processing. As a result, some of the questions relating to the
effect of management are also related to the use of information technology.
Information technology can play an important role in management and in
improving transparency. The judges surveyed had the following views:
Figure 1. Level of Importance of Information Technology in
the Efficient and Fair Processing of Cases
6
5                    4.8  4.83          4.8    63
4
o 4     ~~3.5               ,     3.5    
0
03
2
0~~~~~ 
0~~s 
Countries
5 most important -+1 least important



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                  11
The importance of information technology in the efficient and fair pro-
cessing of cases is assessed as high by the judges from Colombia,
Ecuador, Panama, and Ukraine. While still moderately high, the level is
slightly lower for the judges from Hungary and Peru. The judges gener-
ally perceive that information technology can facilitate efficient process-
ing and at the same time enable good records to be maintained of cases
disposed.19
Figure 2. Level of Importance of Management Skills of Judge
in the Efficient and Fair Processing of Cases
6
5~~~~~~~ 
4.5
5 4.5 . .- ~~~~~4.334.
4
Co 4 , : - . : . - - | ~~~~~3.19l
a3
< 2
0                                    0
0
O-     _  '   O       <'S   ;   C,  :       ,'
Countries
5 most important - 1 least important
Of all the factors involved in the efficient and fair processing of a case,
the management skills of the judge and court personnel ranked the high-
est overall. The Ukrainian judges did not agree with this analysis, but all
other countries clearly displayed this interpretation.20
In addition to management issues, there are other elements that figure
into the operation of the courts. These elements are not as easily modified
as management issues. They include the number of judges, infrastruc-
ture, and the judicial budget, all of which the judges surveyed consider to
be important.



12                                   COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Figure 3. Level of Importance of Infrastructure in the Efficient
and Fair Processing of Cases
6.00
5    4.83          5
5.00
o 4.00                                             3.63
C)
o)                X                  S>-  ai 3Eft*t..,,,§EtS,iti$
(a 3.00 $ SW .&4$i2qa,stytSg.i5 <tu.s
0)~~~~~~ 
2.00                   m  }    m                tg"t0 y0}}9300s
0.00
Countries
5 most important - 1 least important
Infrastructure is identified as one of the most important factors in the
fair and efficient processing of a case by the judges in Colombia, Ecuador,
and Panama. For the other countries, this factor was of moderate impor-
tance. In some of these countries, infrastructure is a serious problem; the
court houses are crowded, there are lines to use the elevators, and there
is little space in which to keep files safe.
The number of judges is seen by most surveyed to have a moderate to
high impact on procedural times. Although Chile and Hungary did not
rank this factor as high as the other countries surveyed, they did rate it as
a secondary factor.
Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama ranked budget allocation as the most
important factor in the fair processing of a case. The remaining countries
ranked it at a moderate level of importance.
Judges perceive that the judiciary needs an appropriate level of budget
resources to function efficiently. Since many judges do not have direct
responsibility or power over the budget, they are of the opinion that the
criteria to allocate the budget should be reconsidered.



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                  13
Figure 4. How significant is the Number of Judges as a Cause
of Time Being Too Long
6
5
5
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
U)
fq     ~~~2.6
2
0~~~~~~~~~~~18
0  -      .       .,: E  -       -        .    -  -
O  _  O   G,.....-.           ..'.,,    .  -
Countries
Scale of 1-5 where 5 is the most important
Factors that Affect Procedural Time
The tirne needed to dispose of a case is an indicator of efficiency, and
varies from country to country. Countries with high clearance rates and
small backlogs of pending cases have low average durations for case dis-
posal. The factors that show up as affecting procedural time21 confirm the
results predicted by previous studies.22 We used Spearman correlations
to associate the expected duration of cases disposed with the following
factors: (a) capital budgets and technology; (b) adjudicative time, admin-
istrative time, and managerial activism by judges; and (c) cost per case



14                                    COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Figure 5. Level of Importance of Budget in the Efficient and
Fair Processing of Cases
6.00
5.00 -                  NW Kx              4.6
4a00 costi 3lsiiyo.upl8f1utsrvcs    ofiietgetrta
4.00
100 
0~~~~~~ 
03.00
1.00~~~~~~~~~~~~1
Countries
Scale of 1-5 where 5 is the most important
and cost elasticitv of supply of court services. A coefficient greater than
zero shows a positive association between two factors, while a coefficient
less than zero shows a negative association. The Cappelletti-Clark indi-
cator was used to determine procedural time.
It is important to recognize that the Cappelletti-Clark index is just the
ratio of ending inventory (pending cases) to withdrawn and adjudicated
cases. It is not an annual input-output ratio, but rather a stock-flow ratio.
Other studies show a clear parallel between this index and the actual pro-
cedural times per case.23 When published data in a particular jurisdiction
do not include direct measures of duration of litigation, it is necessary to
use the Cappelletti-Clarke index as an indirect measure. This indicator
has proven to approximate both the median and the mean actual dura-
tion, and thus represents a good "measure of central tendency." However,
it should be stressed that this index is far from being a measure of the effi-
ciency of the court, and it is not useful in assigning cases and staffing
courts. The primary virtue of this indicator is its ease of computation.
Increasing times to disposition and illegal payoffs hamper citizens'
access to justice, as measured in terms of time, money, and procedural



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                    15
requirements.24 The longer a case is pending in the courts, the greater the
drain on judicial resources.25 Longer times to disposition within com-
mercial jurisdictions also add cost26 and risk to business transactions,
thereby reducing economic activity. Delays also increase attorney costs,27
which may prohibit the litigant from pursuing a valid claim after the
court of first instance. Given the many appeals available in Latin
American courts, this form of delay causes hardship to both parties and
puts excessive pressure on all levels of the courts.
The expected duration of a case affects not only the efficiency of the
courts, but also the public's perception of the judicial system. In many of
the countries sampled, the public has expressed concern over the ineffi-
ciency of the courts. One 1997 poll in Peru showed that more than 70 per-
cent of the population does not trust the judiciary, making it less trusted
than either the national police or the intelligence services.28 It is not just
the public that is concerned, however-it is also the judges responsible
for the process. In most of the countries sampled, judges overwhelming-
ly agree that the time to resolve a case is too long.
The findings from this study show that capital budgets, technology,
judicial activism, and cost per case can affect case processing time. The
number of court staff, salaries, and the level of training appear not to
have the same effect. Other studies support our findings that judicial
activism is one of the main factors in reducing the time to resolve a case,29
and that early and continuous control over caseflow can reduce delay.30
It should be noted that these factors are under the control of the courts
and do not depend on external elements.31 Courts with long case pro-
cessing times often lack active case management, so case management
can be a good place to start.32 Clearing the inactive cases from the files
can also help reduce delays.33 It has been shown that courts that have
implemented delay-reduction programs have experienced a substantial
reduction in case processing time.34 These factors are just some of the
issues that should be considered in evaluating the efficiency of the courts
as related to the expected duration of a case.35
Capital Budgets and Techniology
Throughout the entire sample of countries, an increase in capital budget
resources36 has the effect of increasing the proportion of disposals per
employee and judge, and thereby reducing the time to disposition.
Similarly, countries that have larger capital budgets experience high
clearance rates and lower expected case durations (Table 1). The caveat is
that while an increase in capital resources affects time to disposition,
adding general resources37 to the budget does not (Table 2).
The common perception, however, is often that the budget as a whole
should be increased. Although there is almost always the need to



16                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
improve infrastructure and invest in new technology, more often than not
the increases in the budget usually are related to operational costs. Many
countries in Latin America do not increase their capital budgets; instead,
it is not uncommon that 95 percent of the budget is used for salaries. For
example, in Argentina, where the expected duration for a commercial
case is almost three years,38 the majority of the court budget is used for
salaries. In Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Ukraine, and Peru, case durations
increased during the period sampled. Although some of these countries
experienced an increase in the general budget, this did not translate into
a lower expected case duration. In contrast, Singapore significantly
increased its capital budget in 1991 and subsequently experienced a 39
percent decrease in pending cases in 1993. In Panama, an increase in the
capital budget was similarly met with an increase in court performance:
the number of pending cases dropped by 70 percent in 1994 from the pre-
vious year, and the number of resolved cases increased by 39 percent in
the same year.
Perceptions of what causes delay are also misleading. Judges relate
delays to a need for more judges and more court personnel. Based on
individual interviews, they also perceive the problem of delay to be
caused by factors outside their control; for example, by litigants. In the
United States, the lack of sufficient resources and too few judges are com-
mon complaints of judges in slow courts, even though the number of
cases per judge is almost equal to that of courts that are considered to be
fast.39 The general perception that courts are understaffed is not shared
by those in the fast courts.
The results of the study in fact show that the most important factors
causing delay are those within the court's control. Analysis and discus-
sion within the courts of the contrast between objective and subjective
data are therefore important.
Judges also tend to perceive that infrastructure and other elements that
benefit from capital budget increases can reduce the time to resolve a
case-the judges sampled viewed good infrastructure as one of the factors
that decrease procedural times, for example. Adequate infrastructure can
also help to improve the morale of the judiciary and provide improved
respect for the service that it provides. However, judges also agree that
budget management is essential for efficiency in resolving a case. Very
often, budgets are managed by the higher court, and in some cases by the
chief judge instead of by a specialized professional. This is not true in every
case-in some of the countries sampled, specialized administrative court
personnel take charge within the court, and in other cases it is the Ministry
of Justice that has the main responsibility for budget management.
Judges do consider information technology to be one of the most
important elements capable of reducing the time needed to dispose of a



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                  17
case. Courts that make most use of computers have a lower cost per
case40 and lower expected duration of cases disposed. The country that
uses the least amount of information technology is Ecuador, where a case
for the payment of debt takes an average of 800 days to be decided.4" In
some countries, judges make no use at all of computers. Emphasis should
therefore be placed on providing the administrative office of the court
with access to information technology, both for word processing as well
as for caseflow management. Training is also necessary to ensure the suc-
cessful introduction of computer technology to the courts.
How Judges Spenid their Time
The more time that a judge dedicates to the administrative tasks of each
case, the greater the procedural times observed (Table 1); and the less
time spent on adjudicative duties, the lower the clearance rates and the
higher the expected duration of cases disposed. As a result, it is impor-
tant to review the administrative responsibilities of judges in different
countries to see how time spent on administrative duties can be reduced.
This has a direct effect on the time to resolve a case, which in turn can cre-
ate obstacles related to access to the courts.
On average, judges in the countries sampled work approximately 11
hours a day,42 including time spent in and out of the office. On average,
they spend approximately 55 percent of their time on adjudicative work,
preparing and writing judgements; approximately 30 percent of their
time on nonadjudicative duties; and 14 percent on administrative work.
The countries where the judges devote the most time to administrative
tasks are Argentina and Colombia, and the countries where they devote
the least amount of time to administrative tasks are Chile and France.
There are several countries where judges dedicate less than 60 percent of
their time to adjudicative responsibilities, including Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama. The countries where judges
devote the least amount of time to adjudicative duties are Argentina and
Ecuador.
It is therefore important that some of the reforms be devoted to reduc-
ing the administrative burdens on judges, so that they may spend at least
half of their time on the adjudicative duties for which they have trained.
This assertion is supported by the facts that 78 percent of judges in devel-
oping countries consider administrative tasks and lack of resources to be
their most important constraints, and that 57 percent of judges in devel-
oped countries argue that substantive legal constraints hamper their pro-
ductivity and therefore harm the quality of justice. Increasing delays,
backlogs, and the uncertainty associated with expected court outcomes
have diminished the quality of justice in some of those countries sampled
for this study.



18                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In this negative context, managerial activism by the judge is an effec-
tive method of reducing the expected case duration and of increasing
court performance. For example, judges often allow the litigants or their
lawyers to control the process of the case-and often allege that lawyers
create delays. Our jurimetric findings show that managerial activism
results in an increase in the supply of court services and therefore a
decrease in processing time. The country with the least activism is
Argentina, while the country with the greatest judicial activism is
Hungary. Other countries that seem to be quite active include Colombia,
Singapore, and Ukraine, where the courts systematically arrange for con-
ferences in order to encourage settlement among the parties to a dispute.
Active managerial style and more time dedicated to adjudicative
issues are associated with a lower expected duration of cases disposed
(showing Spearman correlation coefficients of -0.671 and -0.410, respec-
tively; Table 1). The time dedicated by judges to administrative tasks has
a lower and less significant association with the expected duration of a
case filed (0.224). In addition, the judges surveyed consider that the man-
agerial skills of their key personnel and information technology are
among the most important tools to improve the time to dispose of a case.
In Hungary and Peru, managerial skills, in fact, were cited as the most
important factor by judges. This finding is consistent with other studies
that have concluded that early court control, including setting firm trial
dates for the case,43 can help to reduce the time to resolve the case.44
Court commitment is required to establish and meet these time goals.45
For example, the United States has adopted time goals that specify that
cases be resolved within two years.46 Developing this form of active man-
agement style requires cultural change, training, and perhaps even a
change in the skills mix of court personnel.
Cost per Case, Budget Resources, and Cost Elasticity of Supply
The cost per case is an important element that should be considered not
only for efficiency purposes, but also for access-to-justice issues. It is clear
that when the cost per case is high, obstacles are created for those indi-
viduals who may not be able to afford to bring an action before the court.
In essence, rights may not be enforced because of cost considerations.
People who file legitimate claims have a right to proper access, and court
costs should not prevent them from enacting their rights. Reform projects
may consider waiving court fees for low-income groups. For example,
Peru and Ecuador have recently established court fees with exemptions
for certain cases.47
In addition to the official court fees, the view of individuals and busi-
nesses alike is that informal incentives are required to motivate court per-
sonnel and judges to process cases that would otherwise remain pending



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                    19
for years. This "transaction fee" does nothing to sustain a legitimate judi-
cial system, but simply goes to the personal benefit of a judge or court
official, contributing to corruption in the system and effectively obstruct-
ing justice.
Another pattern found among the courts sampled is that increases in
procedural times cause the cost per case disposed to increase significant-
ly This is logical, since the longer the case remains in the system, the
more resources it drains from the judiciary. In conjunction with the find-
ing that an increase in the resources invested in capital budgets reduces
the cost per case disposed, this suggests a negative association between
the variable cost per case disposed and the resources invested in capital
budgets. By investing in technology to increase productivity, the courts
should logically achieve a positive impact on costs.
The cost elasticity of supply of court services (CELSUP) has a positive
effect on procedural time. Although the cost elasticity measure takes into
account the general budget resources, its positive effect is due to capital
allocation. This is consistent with the results that capital budget can be
applied to improve procedural time. Although the cost elasticity and cap-
ital budgets are interrelated, they are separated here to shed light on the
net effects of further increases in spending. In addition, it is an indicator
that can be measured by the courts and monitored over time to determine
whether a certain amount of spending improves procedural time.
CELSUP measures the percentage increase in disposed cases resulting
from a 1 percent change in budget resources. A CELSUP value larger than
I indicates that an increase in the allocation of capital budget resources to
the court would have a positive effect on the number of cases disposed
by the judge, and one disproportionate to the investment made. This in
turn would have a positive effect on procedural time. This study shows
how the effectiveness of resources spent can be measured through court
performance (i.e., cases disposed), and that CELSUP is a valuable budget-
related variable that can be monitored annually in future studies of the
courts.
Insignificant Factors (Number of Staff, Salaries,
Level of Training)
As a result of the jurimetric analysis we find that the number of court per-
sonnel, salaries, and the level of training do not have a significant impact
on the duration of case disposal. These results debunk the common per-
ception and thrust of many reform programs. It is extremely common for
courts to identify the lack of staff or judges as the primary cause of delay,
and the judges sampled here in fact identified court size as second only
to the litigants as the most significant cause of delay in resolving cases. In
reality, the number of staff or judges does not always solve the problem



20                                  COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
of delay, and in some countries increasing staff size has had arguably neg-
ative effect. In Chile, time to dispose of a case actually grew between 1979
and 1992, despite two laws that quadrupled the number of civil courts in
Santiago.
Salary levels were also found to bear little relation to delay,48 although
it is important to note that adequate salaries are necessary not only to per-
mit independence of the judiciary but also to address issues of corrup-
tion. Salaries also affect the quality of lawyers that are attracted to the
judiciary. For example, in Chile, salaries of first-instance judges are 10
times the per capita income, a fact that may have some effect on the qual-
ity and reputation for honesty of the judges and staff.
Finally, despite the fact that the level of training was not found to have
a significant effect on procedural times, its importance cannot be ignored.
Training is essential to improve use of information technology, to elevate
managerial activism, and to address substantive legal issues. For exam-
ple, many of the judges indicated that the complexity of the cases they
handle causes delays in resolution. Judicial training in complex legal
issues would logically assist these judges to resolve cases more efficient-
ly, and ensure that they are resolved based on sound legal reasoning. If
for no other reason, training should be provided because it would bene-
fit the quality of the decisions made. Raising the quality of judicial deci-
sions is an important goal of the judicial service, and affects the public
perception of the judiciary.
It is interesting to note that similar studies have found that court size,
the number of judges, the caseload per judge, and the number of filings
and dispositions per judge do not affect case processing time.49 Although
the number of filings per judge may seem intuitively to be an important
factor of time, it has not been found to be significant. For example, in the
United States, the fastest and slowest courts have similar numbers of
cases per judge.50 This finding is supported by the fact that the fast courts
were actually found to improve their efficiency when filings increased.
One factor that contributes to this improved efficiency is said to be the
commitment of the court to provide an efficient service to the public.51
Chile and Singapore have different number of filings per judge, but both
judiciaries have high clearance rates.
Factors that Affect Clearance Rates
Significant Factors (Technology, Capital Budget,
Cost Elasticity, Administrative Time)
A regression analysis of the factors affecting clearance rates worldwide
shows that these have experienced an increase due to: (a) the use of tech-
nology applied to case-tracking, jurisprudence, and decision-making;



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   21
(b) an increase in the cost elasticity of supply of court services, as
explained above; and (c) the increase in the resources allocated to capital
budgeting (Table 2). These factors showed a positive impact, recorded at
a 5 percent significance level. At the same time, we found that the fol-
lowing factors negatively affect clearance rates: (a) increases in the pro-
portion of a judge's time devoted to administrative tasks; and (b) adding
administrative personnel. The above factors, positive and negative,
together account for 56 percent of the changes in the clearance rates.
Other studies have found that when there is a growth in caseloads, the
clearance rates decrease.52
Technology, as discussed above, improves efficiency as measured in
terms of clearance rates. The use of information technology by the courts
for case tracking, jurisprudence, and writing decisions has a positive
effect on the courts. Case tracking allows court personnel to follow the
different stages of the case and determine whether procedural require-
ments have been met or are still pending. It is important to ensure that
the case is progressing according to the timetable that the law has laid
out to allow the implementation of quality control techniques. In all the
developing countries in this sample, the majority of the judges surveyed
indicated that the time limits included in the procedural guidelines were
not enforced. Although it is not clear why the time limits are not
enforced, the use of information technology can help courts follow the
time limits and advise them when action is needed. In addition, since
many judges complain that they do not have timely access to new laws
and court decisions, technology that gives judges access to jurisprudence
can assist in the decision-making process. This brings greater assurance
that decisions will be consistent and predictable. Finally, decisions that
are written with the use of information technology demand less time
and fewer personnel.
Cost elasticity has a positive impact on clearance rates: the countries
that have higher cost elasticity of supply of court services are also expe-
riencing higher clearance rates. This is true for all countries in this sam-
ple (Graph 1).
Capital budget is an important element in determining clearance
rates. As discussed above, budget that is allocated to capital expenditures
has a positive effect in reducing the expected time to resolve a case. In
addition, capital budget earmarked for the provision of information tech-
nology and improved facilities in the courts appears to permit improved
working conditions, which in turn increases the clearance rates. One clear
example is Singapore, where substantial investment in the 1990s paid off
with clearance rates in the 90 percent range. Peru and Panama, which
also made increases in the capital budget, experienced an improvement
in the clearance rates.



22                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In Panama, the total budget increased over the period 1990-1996, with
the major increases taking place in 1992 and 1995 (27 percent and 25 per-
cent). The capital budget grew by 108 percent in 1992, only to drop
between 1992 and 1993, and rise again by 748 percent in 1995. The 1992
investment period coincides with an improvement in clearance rate in
1994. Panama is a country where the clearance rates are respectable,
given the demand on the courts, but where the large number of pending
cases may prevent the courts from improving efficiency. In a counter
example, Ecuador, which increased only the general budget, did not ben-
efit in the same way.
Administrative time. The time that judges spend on administrative
work also tends to significantly affect clearance rates. As discussed ear-
lier, the time spent on administrative tasks is time taken away from the
adjudicative duties judges are appointed to perform. A large amount of
time spent on administration is an issue mostly in developing countries
in Latin America, where there is less of a separation of responsibilities
between court personnel. Some judges actually feel that their adminis-
trative duties-such as signing checks-give them power, and they do
not therefore want to delegate them. In contrast, in Hungary and
Ukraine much of the administration is handled by the Ministry of
Justice, thus alleviating the burden of the court. There is an argument
that this diminishes the independence of the judiciary, but this factor
may be less important than other elements affecting judicial indepen-
dence.
Insignificant Factors (Salaries, General Budget Resources,
Number of Staff)
Increases in the salaries of judicial personnel, judges included, have an
insignificant effect on clearance rates (Table 2). The probability of a zero
coefficient relating salaries and clearance rates is 34 percent, which at a 5
percent significant level is a high probability. For example, salaries for
judges in Ukraine are low compared to the private sector; there are also
complaints that salaries are not paid on time. Ecuador has increased the
salaries of judges to the point where they are 15 times the per capita
income, but clearance rates have not improved. Conversely, judges in the
court sampled in France are not paid a salary, but their clearance rates are
among the best. In the longer term, an increase in salaries should lead to
better-qualified judges, and may also assist in reducing corruption. Many
citizens in developing countries complain that judicial personnel expect
additional payment for processing their cases efficiently. This obviously
damages perceptions of the judiciary: increased salaries, coupled with
other reforms, may have a positive impact on the judiciary. This was the
case experienced in Peru.



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   23
Similarly, increases in general budget resources did not have an
impact on the clearance rates in 144 cases sampled worldwide (Table 3).
Specifically, percentage changes in the allocation of budget resources to
the courts only explain 2 percent of the changes in the clearance rates.
This table also shows that there is a 41 percent chance of there being no
relationship at all between budget resources and clearance rates. This is
clearly a likely event at a 5 percent significance level. This jurimetric
analysis therefore questions the common assertion that adding resources
to the courts is a first step in reducing caseloads and improving court per-
formance. For example, in Ecuador the annual budget for the civil courts
in Quito increased by 287 percent from 1990 to 1996, but the clearance
rate actually decreased from 51 percent to 40 percent.53 This strongly sug-
gests that budget growth is not correlated with greater court efficiency.
Adding staff to the court, counter to many perceptions, also tends not
to reduce clearance rates. Many judges believe that adding personnel
would assist in the efficient processing of cases, but this is not necessari-
ly true in practice. For example, in Colombia there has been a substantial
increase in personnel since 1991, but the clearance rate has not increased
enough to justify the additions. It may be more successful, in fact, to use
the same number of personnel, but in a more efficient manner (Table 1).
For example, in Chile the clearance rate dropped from 115 percent in 1990
to 52 percent in 1994, recovering to 106 percent in 1996. The drop was
probably due to the steady rise in cases filed, and, specifically, to the sud-
den influx of cases filed in 1995. The courts showed that they were able
to raise their productivity to deal with the greater number of cases.
In some of the other developing countries sampled, there is no clear
division of responsibilities among the staff, who are in some cases there-
fore unable to adapt to changes in the court-especially those related to
information technology. Because of this, some reforms recommend
removing existing employees to make way for new personnel with the
necessary skills and experience. Among the countries sampled, the num-
ber of personnel in the courts ranges from two to 17 persons. The num-
ber that each court employs may depend on the procedural nature of the
legal system and its distinct requirements, however, making it difficult to
make worthwhile comparisons across countries.
This analysis supports the results of previous studies that have deter-
mined that an increase in the number of administrative personnel and an
increase in salaries have an insignificant correlation to changes in clear-
ance rates. While judges in Argentina have an average of 15 employees in
each court, judges of the High Court in Singapore share a registrar,
deputy registrar and assistant registrars.54 The Singapore court staff have
both judicial and administrative responsibilities55-judges play no direct
role in case management, which is very different from many systems in



24                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Latin America. Furthermore, judges in Singapore and Argentina both
earn generous salaries, but their clearance rates are quite different. Our
regression results tend to confirm that the changes in salaries paid to judi-
cial personnel have questionable short-term impact on the productivity
of the courts. There may, however, be a positive impact on corruption and
on the independence of the courts.
Conclusion
It is clear from the quantitative analysis discussed in this paper that the
countries that have concentrated on simply adding budget resources to
their judiciary have done so with no more success than those that have
concentrated on reforming the administrative structure of their courts-
for example, by reducing the administrative burden within the judges'
domain. Those countries that have made substantial capital investment
in infrastructure and information technology, however, have seen more
significant improvements in procedural times than those that have
attempted to increase the number of judges. Chile, for example, passed
two laws that quadrupled the number of civil courts over the period
1979-1992. Remarkably, case disposal time increased. Singapore, in con-
trast, invested heavily in its courts in 1991, and succeeded in improving
its clearance rate from 91 percent in 1992 to 96 percent by 1997.
It is clear from the jurimetric results of this analysis that effective bud-
get allocation can have a significant impact on court performance. The
allocation of budget resources to infrastructure and information technol-
ogy shows the greatest effect on clearance rates and the expected dura-
tion of cases. This is a critical finding in view of the fact that the countries
with the worst court performance are those devoting the largest propor-
tions of their budget to raising salaries and increasing staff sizes, rather
than to capital investment.
The surveys of judges show that by eliminating duplication of admin-
istrative tasks through the use of procedural and operational manuals
and by introducing an active case-management style, courts can enhance
their clearance rates and at the same time reduce their procedural times.
If salaries must be increased, the increases should be underpinned by the
introduction of judicial reform indicators to track and ensure that effi-
ciency also improves. The policy goal should be that higher remuneration
bring better court performance: this can be assessed by stating the mis-
sion strategy for and specifying the required performance of each court
employee, and by establishing quality control standards to monitor that
performance.
It must be stressed that the recommendations made in this paper do
not depend on the legal framework within which they are applied, and



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                  25
that they can be implemented even by countries that lack common-law or
civil-law systems. This study focuses only on those common factors that
have shown a positive impact on international court performance-fac-
tors such as effective leadership, judicial accountability for case process-
ing, and independence of the courts. Variables such as willingness to
reform and the political balance between the three different branches of
government can obviously propel or obstruct reforms; the jurimetric
analysis proposed here merely provides a framework within which to
assess the measures that can improve efficiency and that can be used to
develop public policy in this area.
By designing reforms that include the factors described in this study,
countries should be able to achieve positive short-term results. Longer-
term success requires that these elements be part of a broader program,
however-each of them may have little impact if implemented alone. For
example, salary increases based on court performance indicators will
return positive results only when accompanied by training programs
addressing case-management techniques and when supported by
changes in court administration.
Finally, the approach outlined in this paper describes a mechanism to
monitor court progress by which data is used as a powerful tool to fine-
tune reforms. This mechanism enables courts to assess whether their per-
formance has improved or declined, and even to determine why. If they
are to use this approach, however, those developing countries that do not
already have reliable information must first build the database of quanti-
tative and qualitative information that will enable this type of monitor-
ing. This may in some cases require that these countries modernize their
office of statistics.
Enhanced efficiency and access to the courts for those who need it and
cannot find substitutes to resolve their conflicts are the goals of any judi-
cial reform. Achieving greater efficiency in the supply of court services is
compatible with the goal of providing greater public use of or access to
the judiciary. In fact, when procedural times decrease, the cost of access
decreases and clearance rates improve. Further studies should advance
an explanation of why the court system should concentrate its resources
on a more limited range of case types, shifting other cases to alternative
dispute-resolution mechanisms provided by the private sector and
endorsed by the government. One of the objectives of making compar-
isons of court performance indicators is to assess what service is being
provided, at what cost, and how this service can be improved with the
resources available.



Annex
Table 1. Spearman Correlations Relating the Expected
Duration of Cases to Key Variables
Matrix of Spearman Correlation Coefficients
EXPDUR
CAPBUDGE
EXPDUR                      1.000
ADMTDAY                     0.224
JURTIME                    -0.410
MANAGQ5                    -0.671
TECHNOLOGY                 -0.949
Cost Per Case                0.79
Number of Observations:       75
The Spearman correlation coefficients shown in Table 1, associating
several factors to the expected duration of cases disposed, confirm the
results that previous studies had led us to expect (Buscaglia and
Dakolias, 1996):
* higher use of technology in the courts is associated with a lower
expected duration of cases disposed, as seen by a negative coefficient of
-0.949;
* a more activist managerial style and more time dedicated to adju-
dicative issues are associated with lower expected duration of cases dis-
posed (-0.671 and -0.410, respectively);
- the time dedicated by judges to administrative tasks has a low and
insignificant association with the expected duration of a case filed (0.224);
* the higher cost per case disposed is associated with a higher expect-
ed duration of cases disposed, with a positive and significant coefficient
of 0.79.
26



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   27
Table 2. Non-Linear Regression Results Explaining Clearance
Rates
Explained Variable: Clearance Rate
SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.56
VARIABLE        COEFFICIENT             T             P(2 Tail)
CONSTANT            97.18              0.00             ...
CAPBUDGE             9.01              2.30             0.00..
ADM. TIME per DAY  -0.46              -0.07             0.06..
TECHNOLOGY          13.90              1.12             0.00..
CELSUP               0.73              0.43             0.01
SALARY              -0.02              0.12             0.34
ADMIN. PERSO.       -0.45              0.21
A regression analysis of the factors affecting clearance rates worldwide
shows that the following variables have a significant positive impact (at
a 5 percent significance level) on the productivity of the courts:
* an increase in the resources devoted to capital spending;
* increased use of technology;
* greater cost elasticity of supply of court services.
In contrast, increasing the proportion of their time that judges devote
to administrative tasks and increasing the number of administrative per-
sonnel per court tend to have a negative effect on clearance rates. Finally,
our regression results tend to confirm that the salary levels of judicial per-
sonnel have no impact on court productivity.
Table 3. Regression Results: Clearance Rates Against Budget
Resources
144 Cases
Explained Variable: Clearance Rate
MULTIPLE R: 0.139 S
SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.019
VARIABLE      COEFFICIENT   STD ERROR    T         P(2 TAIL)
CONSTANT         0.682        0.057      11.975       0.000
BUDGET          -0.006         0.007     -0.829       0.413



28                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Table 3 shows the regression results of relating the annual percentage
increases in budget resources to the clearance rates across all countries
sampled. Increases in general budget resources, unlike capital budget
resources, have no significant impact on clearance rates. The coefficient
equal to -0.006 is not significant at a 5 percent level (in this case, the prob-
ability of a coefficient equal to zero for the population is 41.35 percent).
Graph 1. Clearance Rates Plotted Against the Cost Elasticity of
Supply of Court Services
150
100
50
CLEAR-RA
20
10                                            0
CAPBUDGE -10
-30               -      CELSUP
Graph I shows the effects of increasing budget resources (CAP-
BUDGE) on the supply of court services (CLEAR-RA). The graphical pat-
tern seen here indicates that those countries with higher cost elasticities
of supply of court services also have higher clearance rates. This is true
for all countries sampled in this study.



Judge Questionnaire
PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE
NUMBER.
1. Time Needed to Dispose of a Case?
Please estimate the total number of hours
a. What was the approximate overall average worktime required by
the judge to dispose of a case:   TOTAL HOURS (judicial
time spent on and off the bench that can be directly related to the
processing of the specific case discussed here)
b. (i) What was the approximate worktime in this case dedicated to
nonadjudicative duties          TOTAL HOURS
(ii) What was the approximate worktime in this case dedicated to
administrative work (other than case management activities):
1 TOTAL HOURS
c. What was the approximate overall worktime spent by supporting
personnel (main personnel in case processing)     TOTAL
HOURS
2. a. What Are the Six or Seven Main Steps in the Procedural Process?
(e.g., preliminary scheduling, discovery management, dispositive
motions, other motions, conferences, decision, and others. If these
steps are the most important, please use them because it will help
our comparison)
b. Please Link Each Activity with the Time Demanded by the Officer
in Charge.
This will serve to relate the type of court action with the time to
dispose of a case
Each Step       Judge (Hours)   Other Personnel (Hours)
a.
b. _
29



30                                   COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
C. _
d. _
e.
g.                          ___               _ _ _  _ _
(add any other type of activity considered to be of interest)
3. When you first become involved with a case, what are the main obsta-
cles that create additional work?
High   Medium          Low    No Opinion
a. Overall complexity
b. Difficulty of discovery
(material to support case)
c. Inconsistency of laws
d. Difficulty in relations 
between parties and/or attorneys
4. a. Which one of the following management procedures would you
rank as most important to you, on a scale of 1-5 (5 is the most
important)? [This question relates to the factors that improve the
time to dispose of case, regardless of whether the judge has them
or not]
i. efficient use of resources [this includes the use of computer
technology needed to monitor cases, infrastructure, necessary
qualification of staff, management skills of principal person-
nel, special assistance to individual courts in management,
budgetary problems, and planning]
1      2       3       4       5      (circle one)
ii. expeditious case disposition [this includes the judge's ability to
make certain requirements during the processing of the case;
for example, limiting the number of interrogatories, time



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   31
allowed for discovery, and assigning penalties for frivolous
motions]
1      2      3       4      5      (circle one)
iii. firm and certain procedural times for each step as established
by law
1      2      3       4      5      (circle one)
b. What is the level of importance that the following administrative
factors have for the efficient and fair processing of cases: (scale of
1-5, where 5 is the most important)
Information technology
1      2      3       4      5      (circle one)
Technical qualifications of personnel technology
1      2      3       4      5
Budget technology
1      2      3       4      5
Infrastructure technology
1      2      3       4      5
Management skills of judge and personnel technology
1      2      3       4      5
5. a. Some cases require intensive judicial management. Other cases
may be largely unmanaged, with the pace and course of litigation
left to the lawyers and the court involved only when requested.
How would you characterize the level of judicial management in
your typical case? [Does the judge determine the order in which
he/she reviews the casefile? e.g., first come, first served; social
urgency; or on the basis of complexity?]



32                                COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Intensive or high              1
Moderate                       2
Low or minimal                 3
None                           4
I'm not sure                   5
b. In hindsight, do you feel the level of judicial management in your
typical case should be more or less than it actually is (e.g., should
you or your office take more time to assist the parties to settle
before the case is disposed)?
Should have been more intensive I
Level was correct              2
Should have been less intensive   3
No opinion                     4
6. Do you assign cases to a specific case management category or "spe-
cial track"?
a. Yes         b. No
7. Has this specific "track" assignment influenced how you manage a
case?
a. Yes, made it more time intensive
b. Yes, made it less time intensive
c. Yes, different but not more or less time intensive
d. No impact on management
e. No opinion
8. Is any kind of court related alternative dispute resolution method used
in the cases? (Circle One)
a. Yes. If yes, indicate which mechanisms were used (e.g., arbitration,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, settlement conference with
judicial officer, or certification that lawyers discussed settlement)
b. No. If no, indicate what kind of ADR, in your opinion, should be
used, if any?



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                   33
9. Do you apply any other mechanisms that are intended to increase the
likelihood of settlement?
Yes (please explain)
No
10. How would you characterize the following activities in your court as
they relate to improving the time needed to dispose of a case?
a. Initial scheduling set by court
i. Not applicable
ii Yes, but it was not followed
iii. Yes, and it was generally followed
b. Additional settlement conferences held by the court
i. Yes
ii. No
c. Settlement discussion(s) held in the presence of:
i. Not applicable
ii. Yes, in the presence of the judge
iii. Yes, conferences held with a judicial officer in the court, but not
in the presence of the judge
d. Were litigants present at settlement conference?
1) No    2) Sometimes              3) Always
e. Were specific limits (time, scope, or quantity) placed on the period
of discovery?
1) No    2) Yes, but not adhered to  3) Yes, and were adhered to



34                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
f. Parties made an early disclosure of relevant information without
formal discovery requests.
1) No    2) Yes                   3) Don't know
g. Parties made a good-faith effort to resolve discovery disputes
before filing any motion
1) Yes   2) No                    3) Don't know
h. Time limits were enforced in procedural steps
1) Yes   2) No
11. In your opinion, is the amount of time it takes for a case from filing to
disposition too long, or too short for the interests of justice to be
served?
Much too long             I
Too long                  2
Reasonable                3
Too short                 4
Don't know                5
If your answer is "Much too long" or "Too long" please answer ques-
tion 12 below.
12. Which of the following are the most significant causes of the time
being too long? (scale of 1-5, where 5 is the most important)
a. the court size (number of judges) is not sufficient for the increase
in number of cases filed within your jurisdiction, causing unman-
ageable caseloads per judge.
1      2      3       4      5      (circle one)
b. case management/court administration
1      2      3       4      5



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                       35
c. nature or complexity of the case
1      2       3       4       5
d. litigants or their lawyers delay case intentionally (e.g., frivolous
motions)
1      2      3      4        5
e. lack of technical qualifications in the court personnel
1      2       3       4       5
f. excess of administrative responsibilities by the judge
1      2       3       4       5
g. other (please explain)
1      2       3       4       5
13. a. Do you have any information technology in your court?
Yes            No      (circle one)
b. If yes, are there any computer-based monitoring/case manage-
ment systems applied in your court?
Yes            No      (circle one)
c. If yes, briefly describe the type of computer system used and
whether it is useful to improve the management of the cases (e.g.,
user friendly; it is used by court personnel and/or the judge)
14. Would you classify the court administrative system prevailing in most
first-instance courts within your legal jurisdiction as: (e.g., where
Supreme Court is responsible for all administration, budget and sup-
plies)
a. Too centralized
b. Moderately centralized



36                                COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
c. Moderately decentralized
d. Too decentralized
15. a.  Have you written proposals or participated in conferences to
discuss the improvement of case/court management tech-
niques with other judges within your jurisdiction? (circle one)
i. Many times
ii. Seldom
iii. Never
b. If the answer is many times or seldom, were any of these pro-
posals implemented, and if so, what was the result?
16. Other than the things we have been talking about, have there been
efforts in your court to improve court or case management in order to
speed up the resolution of cases? (e.g., have you applied case classifi-
cation techniques or case scheduling and monitoring?)



Endnotes
1.  This kind of analysis includes statistics applied to the description
and analysis of a legal system.
2.  The clearance rate is the ratio of cases disposed to cases filed.
3.  One study has defined efficiency as a product of timeliness and
quality. "Efficiency, Timeliness, and Quality: A New Perspective from
Nine State Criminal Trial Courts." Brian Ostrom and Roger Hanson, with
John Goerdt and Donald Rebovich. National Center for State Courts,
1998.
4.  Germany leads in this area, ahead of Japan, the United States, and
New Zealand. The country's population has increased by 12.4 percent
during this period. "Examining Work of State Courts," 1996, pp.15 and 18.
5.  Transnational legal problems have also grown tremendously in
number and complexity. Social Role of the Legal Profession, p.119.
6.  Reexamining Pace, p.6
7.  The greffiers, civil servants who are appointed after undergoing
training and passing an examination, are responsible for recording judg-
ments, recording statements made by the parties, and preserving court
records. The Office of the Greffier has additional responsibilities, which
include maintaining the local registries of companies.
8.  "Legal System of Panama," Saint Louis University Law Journal,
Summer 1996, Vol. 40, p. 1393.
9.  A court administrator was appointed recently who has close ties
to the military, raising some questions about the reforms. FBIS, June 1,
1998, "Editorial Views New Meddling in Judicial Branch."
10.   Provisional judges and prosecutors were commonly used in the
past. FBIS, December 11, 1997, Judicial Branch Submissive to Executive.
37



38                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
11.  Each lawyer, the witness, and the judge and court officials have
a computer or television monitor. The courtroom is also outfitted with a
large projection television. Documents can be shown on the monitors,
along with video material. Lawyers can also use the computer facilities
for elaborate presentations if they wish. The fact that a witness is overseas
or not available cannot be used to delay a trial.
12. Judicial Overview of Central and Eastern Europe, p.8
13. In some cases, choices had to be made as to which courts handle
larger types of commercial disputes. This was the case in Germany and
Colombia.
14. Singapore was the only exception.
15. This approach has been used in previous studies of court services
(Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1995, and Buscaglia and Ulen, 1996). In these
previous studies, applied to Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, key vari-
ables were found to determine the output and productivity of individual
courts sampled for that purpose as primary data sources.
16. Elasticity of supply indicates how the productivity of the courts
increases when the budget resources are increased.
17. Cost elasticity of supply is the same as elasticity of supply.
18. Representing 5 to 10 percent of the relevant universe in each
country sampled.
19. Singapore and Chile did not answer this question.
20. Singapore did not answer this question. Chile was the pilot coun-
try for this survey, and as it was felt that the situation in that country was
artificially enhanced by this fact, answers to this question from Chile are
not included here.
21. Expected duration.
22. Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1996.
23. Carlos Gregorio, 1994.
24. Buscaglia and Dakolias, p.27.



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                                    39
25. "National Center for State Courts," N.2 1993.
26. Opportunity costs of the time devoted by the user to litigation
and the cost of not being able to use the personnel and capital because
spending time and resources dealing with litigation.
27. Direct costs for the user are lawyer fees. Court direct costs are
computed by the capital cost devoted to each case, and increase when the
indirect costs for the court also increase. This is because as the time per
case increases, the opportunity costs of not dealing with other pending
cases also increase.
28. "Peru: Poll Shows People Do Not Trust Most Government
Institutions," FBIS, Sept. 3, 1997, available in FBIS, Doc. No. FBIS-LAT-
97-246.
29. "Reexaming Pace," p. 35.
30. "Examining Court Delay," p. 4.
31. "Examining Court Delay," p. 39.
32. "Reexamining Pace," p. 40.
33. "Examining Court Delay," p. 14.
34. "Examining Court Delay," p. 44.
35. Other factors that could be included and which have been found
in other studies to be significantly related to case processing time are
pending caseloads per judge and the backlog index. "Reexamining Pace,"
p. 49.
36. This is defined as real spending devoted to capital court
resources, such as chairs, buildings, computers, etc.
37. General resources is all spending devoted to personnel and cap-
ital, and includes technology, such as new forms or ways to organize per-
sonnel and capital in order to resolve cases.
38. Buscaglia and Dakolias, p. 16, technical note 350.
39. "Examining Court Delay," p. 41.



40                                 COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
40. Courts that use more information technology are more produc-
tive in terms of resolving cases.
41.  "Procedural Time Study, Projusticia," Ecuador, 1997.
42.  This includes time spent in and out of the office.
43.  "Reexamining Pace," p. 48.
44.  "Examining Court Delay," pp. 40-41.
45.  "Examining Court Delay," pp. 4, 35, 39
46.  "Examining Court Delay," p. 39. While not all the courts are
meeting this goal, it does provide a standard for which to aim. Courts
have averaged a 22 percent success rate in meeting the two-year stan-
dard. "Reexamining Pace," p. 36.
47. In Ecuador, however, the fee structure has not yet been imple-
mented.
48. This was even in the case of a two-year backlog.
49.  "Reexamining Pace," p. 51.
50.  "Examining Court Delay," p. 28.
51.  "Examining Court Delay," p. 46.
52.  "Examining Court Delay," p. 23. In addition, studies have found
that a decrease in the number of pending cases also has a positive effect
on the clearance rates.
53. Although the increase in judicial-sector spending appears to
have been substantial, most of this increase simply reflects the rising
rate of inflation during the 1970s and 1980s. If the annual budget for the
judicial sector is computed in 1975 sucres, expenditures increased mod-
estly over the same period (1973-1989), from 121.4 million sucres to
197.5 million sucres. In addition, most of the increase in the judicial-sec-
tor budget occurred during the period from 1973 to 1979, when the
annual rate of increase was approximately 7.6 percent. In contrast, from
1979 to 1989, judicial-sector spending increased at an annual rate of less
than 0.5 percent.



COURT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS                              41
54. The 20 judges that make up the High Court (12 judges and eight
commissioners) share personnel for administrative purposes.
55. Supreme Court Singapore, at 17.









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