Document of The World Bank Report No: 27663 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-43170) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$8.0 MILLION TO THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA FOR A PUBLIC SECTOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNIZATION PROJECT (FORMER PUBLIC SECTOR AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT) February 25, 2004 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Depatment Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective January 25, 2004) Currency Unit = Bolivares VEB 1.598,00 = US$ 1 US$ 1.00 = 0.625VEB FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS: Country Assistance Strategy CORDIPLAN: Planning and Development Office IDB: Inter-American Development Bank IPID: Integral Plan for Institutional Development MPD: Ministry of Planning and Development MTC: Ministry of Transport and Communications PCU: Project Coordination Unit QAG: Quality Assurance Group Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Director: Marcelo M. Giugale Sector Director: Ernesto May Task Team Leader/Task Manager: David F. Varela VENEZUELA PUBLIC SECTOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNIZATION PROJECT (FORMER PUBLIC SECTOR AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT) CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 6 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 6 6. Sustainability 6 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 6 8. Lessons Learned 8 9. Partner Comments 9 10. Additional Information 10 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 11 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 12 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 13 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 14 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 16 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 17 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 18 Project ID: P041807 Project Name: PUBLIC SECTOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNIZATION PROJECT (FORMER PUB SEC MOD & DECEN) Team Leader: David F. Varela TL Unit: LCCVE ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: March 9, 2004 1. Project Data Name: PUBLIC SECTOR LEGISLATIVE AND L/C/TF Number: SCL-43170 ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNIZATION PROJECT (FORMER PUB SEC MOD & DECEN) Country/Department: VENEZUELA Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: Sub-national government administration (69%); Central government administration (31%) Theme: Decentralization (P); State enterprise/bank restructuring and privatization (P); Debt management and fiscal substainability (S); Regulation and competition policy (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 02/05/1996 Effective: 06/28/1999 Appraisal: 06/25/1997 MTR: 11/01/2004 Approval: 04/23/1998 Closing: 03/31/2002 04/01/2006 Borrower/Implementing Agency: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela/Ministry of Planning and Development Other Partners: Inter-American Development Bank STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Javed Burki Country Director: Marcelo M. Giugale Andrés Solimano Sector Manager: Ronald E. Myers Kkrishna Challa Team Leader at ICR: David F. Varela Antonio Martín del Campo ICR Primary Author: David F. Varela 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: U Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: N Bank Performance: U Borrower Performance: U QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The Public Sector Legislative and Administrative Modernization Project (former Public Sector and Modernization Project), originally had the following objectives: (a) increase public sector capacity to manage State productive enterprises and infrastructure, and to improve the fiscal and financial status of participating state governments, through the promotion of private sector participation; and (b) strengthen the national regulatory framework in selected transport sub-sectors, and modernize institutional structures in the national government. The first objective was consistent with the decentralization process that began in Venezuela in 1989 with the direct election of Governors and Mayors, that initiated a transfer process of several functions (among them the operation and maintenance of roads, ports and airports) and diverse productive enterprises from the national to state governments. This objective was also related to the fiscal constraints of the country, and in general to the low management capacity of the state governments that forced them to explore other ways to manage effectively the assets and the public services recently transferred to them through private sector participation. The second objective was aimed at supporting an organizational and functional restructuring in the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), in order to strengthen its role in regulation and supervision in the transport sub-sector. This objective was in line with a national strategy that promoted the delegation of operative functions to the state governments. This objective was also related to the rationalization of the institutional structure at the national government level. The project was aligned with one of the objectives of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) approved in 1997, which was "to modernize the public sector." It was also in line with the other CAS objective to "support sustainable growth" through private sector participation in the productive activities that were transferred to the state governments. Likewise, the project was designed in conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which co-financed fifty percent of the Project. 3.2 Revised Objective: The government that took office in February 1999 decided to review the project design and in January 2000 requested the Bank to refocus it on activities responsive to the challenges posed by the constitutional and administrative reforms then in progress, as well as to adapt the implementation arrangements to the revised institutional framework of the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD). On the basis of this request the Bank reformulated the Project objectives and components and undertook a major restructuring. At that point, the IDB decided to withdraw its support of project and canceled the respective Loan. The Bank preferred to continue with the project even though it was aware of the high risks involved in that decision, because the restructured Project would reflect the new government priorities, and might become the appropriate vehicle for maintaining a dialogue with MPD in the area of public sector reforms, which both the Bank and the Government considered strategic. The general objective of the reformulated project would have been to improve the efficiency and efficacy of the Venezuelan public sector. The specific objectives would be to: (a) lay the foundations for a new inter-governmental regime that improve economic efficiency in the allocation of public resources; (b) - 2 - modernize the public sectors regulatory framework and business practices to increase the transparency, efficiency, efficacy, and social control governing public administration; (c) strengthen the Governments management capacity in key basic administrative areas; and (d) support the decentralization process and promote good decentralization practices within the sub-national governments. The reformulated Project would support the national Governments initiatives based on an Integral Plan for Institutional Development (IPID). The reformulated objectives were also consistent with the public sector modernization objective of the 1997 CAS. The restructured Project had a different focus. First, the objectives related to the activities that would have a national impact were more ambitious than in the original project. Second, the aspects related to the decentralization process were aimed more to strengthening the national governments capacity to direct it rather than to develop the capacity of the decentralized institutions. Third, the privatization of public enterprises, which was one of the fundamental objectives in the original Project, was eliminated. 3.3 Original Components: The Project had the following components: I. Privatization at State Level would support four pilot state governments (three of them already defined, and a fourth one to be defined), through the design and implementation of customized strategies for privatizing productive activities and granting of concessions for the construction, operation and maintenance of transport infrastructures. The component would finance specific privatization initiatives. A Private Sector Development Team would provide technical assistance to the participating states for strategy development and implementation. II. Reform and Decentralization at National Level, would support reforms in the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) to restructure its organization and personnel, strengthen supervisory functions, and develop regulatory and competition frameworks in the transport sub-sectors (e.g., airports and ports). This component would also finance restructuring studies to support the wider public sector programs of the government. III. Project Coordination would be the responsibility of CORDIPLAN (institution that in 1999 was converted into MPD); there would be an Executive Committee comprising the Ministers of CORDIPLAN and MTC, and the participating governors, which would supervise the implementation. Two technical groups, a Private Sector Development Team, and a Public Modernization Team would support the Project Coordination Unit. In each state and in the MTC specific coordination units would be responsible for implementation of the respective components. 3.4 Revised Components: The reformulated Project would have had four components: A. Development of the Public Sector's Basic Legal Framework. This component would provide the technical-assistance and goods required for the preparation, discussion, approval, and/or implementation of: l The Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund Law and Sub-National Finances Law together with the corresponding regulations which were envisaged as part of the National Assembly's legislative agenda during 2002. - 3 - l The administrative regulations necessary to develop and implement recently approved laws in the area of Public Sector Reform. This component would have supported the development of regulations for the following laws: Public Administration Organic Law, Civil Service Act (including a Public Sector Wage Policy), the Simplification of Administrative Procedures Law, and the Social Participation and Control Law. In the case of the Simplification of Administrative Procedures Law, the Project would have also financed the simplification of two administrative procedures on a pilot basis. B. Strengthening of the public sector's management capacity to support the implementation of the new legal framework. This component would have financed the technical assistance and the acquisitions of goods and services required to perform key management functions for the implementation of a new legal framework. In particular, this component would have financed the implementation of: (a) a modern and automatized Public Employee Registry; (b) an individual performance evaluation system; (c) an on-line public procurement system; and (d) an institutional performance evaluation system. C. Support to the Decentralization Process. This component would have supported the provision of technical assistance to enhance the central Government's ability to monitor and supervise the decentralization process and to promote good decentralization practices at the sub-national level. This could have included the financing of seminars and workshops to disseminate successful decentralization experiences, such as in case of the State of Carabobo, and to help facilitate inter-governmental learning and coordination. D. Project Coordination. This component would strengthen the operational capacity of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) by financing the technical assistance necessary to manage adequately the implementation of Project activities. Component Cost Rating Basic Public Sector Legal Framework $870,000.00 HU Strengthening of PS Management $3,730,000.00 HU Capacity to Implement new Legal Framework Support to Decentralization Process: $2,480,000.00 HU Project Coordination $920,000.00 U 3.5 Quality at Entry: The original projects objectives were consistent not only with the CAS but also with the Government's priorities at the design time. Similarly, project components were equally aligned to the strategy and to the priorities agreed between the Government and the Bank. In connection with the privatization process to be developed at the state level there was an extensive participation process not only with the Governors and their staff, but also with representatives of community organizations, through workshops held in each participant state. However, the risk that the signing of the Loan Agreement a few days before a new Government took office was not properly assessed, taking into account that the incoming President during his electoral campaign had strongly questioned the Governments of the past 40 years. In retrospect, it is clear that it would have - 4 - been more cautious to delay the signing ceremony, considering that eight months had elapsed since the Project had been approved by the Bank's Board and implementation had not started; to ensure ownership the Bank could have waited for the new Government's review of the objectives and components, and considered the possibility of an early restructuring to align the Project to the new Government's priorities. The duration of the Project's formulation, negotiation and approval processes clearly exceeded the Bank standards. From the identification mission (March 1995) until signing (December 1998) almost 4 years elapsed; in other words, Project preparation began when the Caldera Administration had only been in power one year and was signed when the same Administration had only a few months left. The same task manager was responsible of the whole preparation process and from the technical point of view the Project was well formulated and the quality at entry review rated it as satisfactory (S). The intermediate stage of the restructuring process was relatively short. In spite of the complexity of certain issues, the reformulation and renegotiation processes were finalized by the Bank and the MPD teams in approximately six months (August 2001 to March 2002); likewise, progress was made in ensuring that the restructured Project would be operational immediately after the Board approved the respective amendment, through the preparation of the PCUs Operative Manual and Financial Administrative System by local consultants working in conjunction with Bank staff; additionally, the Government prepared a Project Implementation Plan for the Bank's review and approval. However, there were serious delays for the Government and the Bank to initiate the formal restructuring process, and once the Project had been reformulated and negotiated, the MPD further delayed the final decisions. Both delays (more than three years and a half) concluded with the request for Loan cancellation in a letter sent by the Minister of MPD on November 19, 2002; as a consequence, the proposed amendment to the Loan Agreement was never submitted to the Bank's Board of Directors. This was always a risky project and was carefully treated as such. The CMU and SMU worked closely together, with high level discussions, several missions, and extensive communications on how to handle it. The decision to restructure and extend the Loan in early 2002 was appropriate on country relations grounds. A new Minister of MPD had specifically requested that approach, considering the Project as a vehicle for a reinvigorated reform effort and as a clear signal of Bank's support for such effort. The alternative of canceling the Project and preparing a new operation was rejected for various reasons: (a) the Government's overall objectives remain the same; (b) the restructured operation would directly support the implementation of the Government's Comprehensive Institutional Development Plan, which is the facilitating framework underlying the Government's State Modernization Program; (c) restructuring the Project would enable the Bank to respond expeditiously to the Government's request for assistance; (d) given the prevailing social and political climate, the "building-block" approach embedded in the restructured project seemed the most promising of all possible alternatives; and (e) the streamlined design of the restructured project would be completed with existing in-house information and expertise. The situation in Venezuela however continued to deteriorate. Key project counterparts were replaced, the Loan did not disburse, and project implementation was further delayed. The strategy did not pay off but, as a decision path, it was the only possibility under the circumstances. The Bank discussed the status of the Loan with the Government, and the Government agreed to request its cancellation. Immediately thereafter, the Bank's Quality Assurance Group (QAG) delivered the final report on the evaluation of the quality of the Project's supervision (QSA5) for the period 2001-2002 with marginal rating. - 5 - 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Not Applicable. This Project was not Implemented. 4.2 Outputs by components: Not Applicable. This Project was not Implemented. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: Not Applicable. This Project was not Implemented. 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not Applicable. This Project was not Implemented. 4.5 Institutional development impact: Not Applicable. This Project was not Implemented. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 5.4 Costs and financing: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: Not Applicable. This Project was not implemented. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance - 6 - Bank 7.1 Lending: Unsatisfactory. The technical quality of the project and the negotiation process could be rated as satisfactory. However, the excessive duration of the preparation process leads to an unsatisfactory rating (since the first identification mission at the beginning of a Government period until the Loan Agreement was signed at the end of the same Government period, the Task Team took almost four years). During that period the political context had substantially changed, and that was not rapidly reflected in Project design; this led to a difficult situation in which a Project that had been approved by the Banks Board of Directors and signed by the outgoing Administration could not be implemented because the incoming Government asked for some time to review it. The restructuring efforts ended with a quality technical proposal that could be rated as satisfactory but the delays on the Bank and the Government side diminished the feasibility of a reformulated Project. Although the new Government requested the Bank in January 2000 to change the project objectives and components, the reformulation did not begin until August 2001; during that period the Project was under the responsibility of four Task Managers. 7.2 Supervision: Unsatisfactory. As mentioned before, in December 2002 QAG delivered the final report on the quality of the Projects supervision which considered the comments jointly prepared by the Country Management and the Sector Management Units (CMU and SMU) to a preliminary draft. The report considers the supervisions global quality as marginal. As a rationale for this rating, the panel explained that "...neither the country nor the Bank interests were served by the use of supervision for interminable attempts at project restructuring during the whole period under review (FY01-02). The panel recognizes that the decision was taken on country relations grounds, based on information available at the time, and, most recently, at the specific request of a new Finance (sic) Minister in early 2002. Nevertheless, the panel does not consider the responses from the Bank effective overall during the period under review." 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Unsatisfactory. Considering the ratings on the lending and supervision sections above, the overall Bank performance is considered unsatisfactory (U). Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Unsatisfactory. The Bank's Board of Directors approved the original project on April 23, 1998; however, the Loan Agreement was signed on December 12, 1990 because the Government was not able to comply before with the formalities related to the prior approvals required for signing; according to the legislation in force at that time, the Loan Agreement had to be approved by the Finance Committees of the two Chamber of the National Congress. Even though the external financing was authorized by the Law that authorizes the national Government to contract public credit operations during 1997, this Loan was not approved by said committees until November 18, 1998. During the restructuring process, on the side of the Government there were also excessive delays and serious coordination problems at the highest level of MPD. First, although the new Government took office in February 1999, it was almost a year later (in January 2000) that requested a change of the original objectives. Once a new team in the Minister of Planning and Development took over in May 2002, it wished to revise the reformulated and renegotiated Project even - 7 - though the process had finished in March 2002. The new Minister requested the incorporation of a new component related to the development of a technological platform, whose inclusion had a major impact on the design of the already renegotiated Project. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Unsatisfactory. The Project was not implemented because the Government's delays made implementation unfeasible, and its performance is rated as Unsatisfactory (U). 7.6 Implementing Agency: Unsatisfactory. The Project was not implemented because the Implementing Agencies delays made implementation unfeasible, and its performance is rated as Unsatisfactory (U). 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Unsatisfactory. The Project was not implemented. Because the Borrower's delays made implementation unfeasible, its performance is rated as Unsatisfactory (U). 8. Lessons Learned 8.1 Political changes have considerable impact on Project design and implementation. The Bank should be more sensitive to the political changes taking place in a country (such as a new government, or a minister change in an implementing institution), in order to analyze the implications, moreover when the Project has not been approved, signed or implementation has not begun. 8.2 Time-bound action plans and legal remedies are basic tools during a restructuring process. When a project restructuring is needed, the Bank should agree with the Government on a time-bound action plan, with specific benchmarks and milestones, in order to avoid never-ending discussions. If key benchmarks or milestones are not reached, it may be more appropriate to exercise the unilateral rights to suspend and cancel the operation, as per the standard provisions of the Loan Agreements and the General Conditions. 8.3 Proactivity is required at all stages of Project design and implementation. Whenever changes occur at the level of a minister or vice minister of the executing agency, the Task Team should take the initiative to approach the new authorities, clarify any doubts that they could have about the Project, and make special efforts to involve and commit them to the process. 8.4 Timing of signing is critical: the benefits of prompt signature may be superseded by the costs in terms of loss of ownership. Project approval or signing around the time of a Presidential election or inauguration may be highly counterproductive even for the best technically designed operation. In case a change in the policy approach is likely, the Bank should assess the risk that the new Administration may become suspicious of Bank's agreements with the prior Administration; this risk is even higher when the incoming Government has publicly announced a radical departure from the economic and social policies of the previous one. Project approval or signing around that time may seriously impair its overall feasibility and sustainability. 8.5 Frequent changes in Task Manager may be counterproductive. While the continuity of task manager may assist in the generation of sound technical proposals at the design stage, the frequent changes - 8 - at the time of supervision may erode the quality of the constant dialogue and follow up required for Project implementation to proceed smoothly. 8.6 Participation and consultation devices are required at all stages of the Project cycle. Participation and consultation are not exhausted during the preparation. For future State reform projects, it is essential to built-in consultation and participation mechanisms with stakeholders external to the implementing agency, in order to stimulate the internal decision-making process. 8.7 Coordination with other partners should go beyond the financial and technical aspects of an operation. The Bank should coordinate closely its decision-making process with multilateral or bilateral partners, in order to take joint decisions at the project design or implementation stages. The withdrawal of one co-financier may be a serious alarm signal, that definitively could indicate major troubles for the projects future. Efforts to continue alone with the operations designed in conjunction with other donors may prove disappointing. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: On May 21, 2003, the Vice Minister of MPD provided the following comments on the Final Report/Public Sector Modernization and Decentralization Project: "As regards the Implementation Completion Report prepared by the Bank, let me say that we share the opinion expressed in the report, however, with a few observations which could be described as lessons learned. The project was signed on December 16, 1998, when a new government, with a different point of view on State modernization and the way to approach privatization had officially come into office. This fact should have made evident that the project's political and institutional feasibility merited consideration. Likewise, it should be pointed out that from August 2001 on, the period in which I took over the Office responsible for the project, efforts were made to speed up the process (however, the Bank's speed was not the same). In relation to the Bank's expenditure on the project in areas such as: missions, personal, for both the original and reformulated project, we are not in a position to judge these as supposedly these were expenses the Bank entered into independently, with the exception of those to which the MPD gave its no objection, as is the case of several authorized missions." - 9 - (b) Cofinanciers: N/A (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N/A 10. Additional Information N/A - 10 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Not Applicable. This project was not implemented. - 11 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Not applicable. This project was not implemented. - 12 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Not applicable. This project was not implemented. - 13 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 11/94 1 Task Manager 2/95 4 Task Manager, Specialist in Privatization, in Institutional Development and in Transport 3/96 2 Task Manager, Specialist in Privatization 7/96 4 Task Manager, Specialist in Privatization, Specialist in Decentralization, Specialist in Privatization 11/96 2 Specialist in Privatization, Specialist in Air Transportation Appraisal/Negotiation 7/97 3 Task Manager, Lawyer, Specialist in Privatization 8/97 1 Specialist in Privatization 9/97 2 Task Manager, Specialist in Privatization 11/97 2 Task Manager, Specialist in Privatization Supervision 11/20/1998 2 Task Manager; Consultant S S 12/03/1999 2 Task Team Leader; Privatization S S 06/29/2000 3 Task Manager; Operations S S Analyst; Privatization/Restruct 05/09/2001 2 Task Team Leader; Sector U U Leader 08/31/2001 1 Task Manager U U 11/01 5 Task Manager, Country - 14 - Economist, Lawyer, Specialist in Procurement, Financial Specialist 3/02 2 Task Manager, Lawyer 6/02 1 Procurement Specialist 9/02 1 Task Manager ICR 2 Task Manager, Consultant The project was not implemented (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 92.5 282.8 (189.4 in staff, 90.2 in travel, 3.2 in others Appraisal/Negotiation 28.5 80.2 (56.9 in staff, 21.5 in travel and 1.8 in others) Supervision 69.9 293.1 (210.2 in staff, 46.6 in travel and 36.3 in others) ICR 3.0 8.0 (8.0 in staff) Total 193.9 664.1 (464.5 in staff, 158.3 in travel and 41.3 in others) NOTE SUPERVISION: Although the project was not implemented, in the Bank financial information these amounts appear allocated to supervision during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Supervision was mostly associated with the restructuring efforts, assistance to the Project Coordination Unit, and reprogramming of project implementation activities. - 15 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Not applicable. This project was not implemented in either its original or reformulated form. - 16 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 17 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Project Appraisal Report, Public Sector Modernization and Decentralization Project, February 12, 1998. 2. Project Appraisal Document, Public Sector Legislative and Administrative Modernization Project (Former Public Sector Modernization and Decentralization). 3. Public Sector Legislative and Administrative Modernization Project, Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA5), December 2002. 4. BTOR of the Identification Mission for the Proposed Public Sector Modernization and Decentralization Project, March 21, 1995 ( Martin del Campo). 5. Minute of the PCD Review Meeting for the proposed Public Sector and Modernization Project, October 2, 1996. (Martín del Campo). 6. Several Back to Office Reports. 7. Twelve (12) Project Status Reports of different dates (in archive). 8. Several letters between Bank Task Managers and representatives of the Minister of Planning and Development. 9. Several letters between Bank Task Managers and their Bank superiors. 10. Letter from the Ministry of Planning and Development dated 1/11/2000 to the Bank requesting the changes to the objectives of the original project. 11. Letter from the Ministry of Planning and Development dated 11/19/2002 to the Bank requesting Project cancellation. - 18 - - 19 -