The Urban Environment and Population Relocation

Michael M. Cernea
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Michael M. Cernea

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Urban economic and social development in Third World countries often requires the involuntary displacement and relocation of various groups of residents, sometimes of entire established micro-neighborhoods. Social science research in developing countries, particularly urban sociology and urban anthropology, has dealt relatively little with this process. Forced displacements have remained to date a relatively silent companion of urban growth. Yet the frequency and magnitude of compulsory displacement are likely to increase in the developing world as the trend towards urbanization grows stronger.

The paper examines the social issues raised by involuntary displacements and relocations, their causal mechanisms, the typology of displacement processes, and the policy issues involved in guiding forced resettlement. The author analyses the dramatic disruptions caused by displacement - loss of home, often loss of jobs, destruction of income generating assets, or separation from site-related informal network services. Development projects that are oblivious to the perils of impoverishment through displacements are shown to be in conflict with the poverty reduction goals of urban growth strategies. Urban poverty is likely to increase when displacement occurs unless such displacement is guided by correct policies for population resettlement.

The paper discusses experiences with urban population relocation under ongoing World Bank-financed urban development projects and the Bank's policy guidelines for reestablishing those displaced. Three cases of major displacements of urban populations — in Indonesia, in China, and in a project at the border between Argentina and Paraguay - are discussed in some detail. Overall, the paper's conclusion is that population displacement and relocation must be regarded as part-and-parcel of policies for urban socioeconomic development, rather than a mere side-effect not requiring explicit policy and legal frameworks.

The author argues that, in order to avoid or minimize population dislocation, each country must enact domestic policies that will explicitly regulate involuntary displacement and relocation. To reduce the economic losses, social trauma and psychological pain inflicted on displaced people, urban investments and growth programs must address relocation with no less attention than is given to other components of urban growth.
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FOREWORD

Over the next twenty to thirty years, dramatic population increases are forecasted to take place in the world’s urban areas in general, and in the mega-cities of the Third World in particular. Economic growth will be accompanied by a declining share of agriculture in the total output and employment, and by an acceleration in the rate of urbanization. A considerable increase will occur in the number of metropolitan conglomerates with over 4 million people each. Mega-city formation will be more massive and rapid in the developing countries than in the developed ones, thus continuing to increase the population glut in many Third World cities. Although ongoing rural development policies and programs attempt to stem the flow of rural migrants to cities, this flow continues.

The social and environmental consequences of urban growth are extremely complex, and Michael Cernea’s present study is dedicated to one set of these consequences: the involuntary relocation of various population segments made necessary by development processes within the urban landscape.

Urban growth means reordering of city spaces, improved transportation networks, new industrial estates, new water and sewage systems, much better environmental services. The need for investments in basic urban infrastructure and equipments will increase dramatically, and they will require changes in land use. This, in turn, will entail intraurban compulsory relocation processes. Relocation of urban populations has happened until now as well, but it can be predicted that involuntary population displacement will become more significant than it has ever been on the Third World urban agenda — and requires more attention to policy, institutional, and research concerns.

Urban compulsory relocation raises critical issues: land availability, job losses and job creation, reconstruction of housing stocks and of viable new neighborhoods, adequate equipments for environmental management, as well as major financial and political issues. Some of these issues are explored in this study, in light of the lessons derived from Bank-assisted urban development, transportation and water supply projects and from applying the Bank’s policy guidelines for involuntary resettlement.

In publishing Michael Cernea’s study as a World Bank discussion paper, we intend to stimulate further the intellectual and operational search for identifying the best approaches and strategies to address such complex but unavoidable development and environment issues.

Mohamed T. El-Ashry
Director
Environment Department
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The author expresses his gratitude to the colleagues whose comments helped in preparing this study, and in particular to Leopoldo Bartolome, Ruth Cernea, Michael Cohen, John Courtney, Scott Guggenheim, Callisto Madavo, Luc Mougeot and Tova Solo.

My appreciation goes also to the local officials, project staff, and urban dwellers, who shared their knowledge and views during my field visits to the Jabotabek Urban projects in Jakarta, Indonesia, the Shanghai Urban Development project in China and the Argentina-Paraguay Yacyreta Hydropower Dam project. I also extend my personal thanks to Gracie Ochieng, who processed this paper under difficult circumstances. Parts of the present study draw on an earlier paper on this subject (Cernea 1989).
Prologue: TYPICAL PITFALLS IN URBAN DISPLACEMENT

While I was preparing the paper that follows, The Washington Post coincidentally published a news story about the same topic: specifically, a news report about the forced displacement of urban inhabitants in Khartoum, Sudan's capital city, and about the losses and sufferings inflicted by displacement on the affected urban population. With the vividness of an eyewitness' report, Jennifer Parmelee's article captured many of the typical pitfalls of such operations'. Such pitfalls, characteristic not only for Khartoum: they occur in other cities and countries as well, never involuntary population relocation is not guided by an adequate policy and legal framework.

I could hardly write myself a better introduction to the following sociological study. Therefore, I decided to reprint the Post's news story.

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**Sudan Razes Homes, Relocates Thousands**

*Diplomats Protest 'Humanitarian Crisis'*

By Jennifer Parmelee Special to The Washington Post

KHARTOUM, Sudan—Moses Adigeen stood in the middle of a vast sea of rubble that once was a bustling neighborhood of mud-brick homes of squatter families. One was his.

Mile after mile of houses have been summarily razed by government bulldozers under an urban renewal plan that has forced nearly a half-million people from their homes over the past year.

The new urban refugees are being relocated in ill-equipped camps outside the city, mostly without adequate water, food or shelter, creating what foreign aid officials describe as a new—and unnecessary—humanitarian crisis in a country already heavily taxed by hunger and hardship.

Khartoum state's minister of housing and public utilities, Sharaf Elnin Ibrahim Bannaga, who is in charge of the relocation program, defended it largely on environmental grounds, saying the areas inhabited by Khartoum's estimated 1.8 million squatters were infested with crime and disease and lacked adequate water, sanitation and other services. "They were environmental hazards," he said, "and we are bound by international treaties that call on us to enhance our environment."

The United Nations and Western embassies have formally protested to the Sudanese government to stop the evictions. They also accuse the government of blocking most of their efforts to help the displaced.

"It is a humanitarian crisis because of the immense scale and the suddenness with which it was done," said U.S. Ambassador James Cheek. "There was no preparation for the needs of the people, and assistance has been obstructed after

---

1 Jennifer Parmelee, "Sudan Razes Homes, Relocates Thousands," The Washington Post, March 7, 1992. In a follow up "letter to the editor" published later in The Washington Post, Sudanese officials disputed some of the assertions in Jennifer Parmelee's report and stated that the government of Sudan is providing adequate assistance to the people displaced.
they were unceremoniously dumped in the desert.

The new settlement to which Adugegn and his family are being moved—along with their belongings and the roof and wooden poles of their former house—is about 25 miles into the desert from the capital. Like other settlements for the newly displaced, Jebel Awila lacks basic services and opportunities—water, markets, health clinics, schools, jobs. The precarious situation there threatens to boil over as the blustering summer heat and sandstorms gain momentum.

“What will happen to us?” asked Adugegn, 25. The relocation will mean that Adugegn will no longer be able to get to his job as a private security guard at a Western embassy. “I don’t want to go. But I have no power to quarrel with the government.”

Adugegn migrated from the south nine years ago because of renewed fighting in Sudan’s long-running civil war. It took him five years to scrape together the funds and material to build a two-room house for his wife, parents and five children in Khartoum’s Karmuta area. At least 13 people were killed there in December in violent protests against the demolition scheme.

The relocation program has sparked another round of acrimony between the government and the West. The renewed antagonism has surfaced at a time when U.N. officials say Sudan has been increasingly cooperative in relief operations over the past year, with notable success in ferrying aid to conflict areas.

In the past, Western relief workers and diplomats have charged Khartoum with being intractable and unconcerned about human rights, willing to take draconian measures in the name of “development” no matter how high the humanitarian cost.

The Sudanese government, however, views criticism by the West in the context of perceived hostility to the fundamentalist Islam it champions.

“There is some barrier between you and us,” Bannaga, a British-educated environmental engineer, said in a recent interview. “You criticize us for the relocation... but I think it is really Islam you fear.”

Not so, said Ambassador Cheek: “This has nothing to do with what kind of government they are... This is not an Islamic-Christian question. It is a human question, period.”

“We’re not subjecting them to some foreign standard of behavior,” Cheek said of his and other diplomatic protests over the evictions. “This is a complete violation of the Sudanese tradition of humane treatment and regard for fellow human beings. According to aid workers, most of the squatter communities were well-integrated into city life. Some, as Bannaga said, occupy garbage dumps. But tens of thousands of other evicted families dwell in decent housing, by Third World standards. They had access to water, clinics, schools and jobs.

At the Karmuta area, for example, a brick house marked with white numbers for demolition showed lace curtains at its wooden-framed windows and a small garden outside. Not far away was one of 500 new water pumps installed in the area by UNICEF over the past year—with full government cooperation—at a cost of $1 million. They were put there by mistake, Bannaga said: UNICEF was dealing with the wrong government agency.

Bannaga said most of the people evicted were living illegally on land zoned for others, and he asked, “What would Londoners do if gypsy caravans settled in Hyde Park?”

Squatter families who arrived in Khartoum before the 1984-85 famine will now have “permanent rights” to 2,000-square-foot plots of desert land the government has allocated to them, Bannaga said. Those who arrived after the famine, however, will not be allowed to rebuild permanent structures, according to officials.

In the interview, Bannaga repeatedly cited a World Bank-funded study of Khartoum in defense of the relocations. However, the study recommends relocation only as a last resort. The World Bank has formally dissociated itself from the project and has accused Khartoum of misusing its name.

Most of the areas already leveled, such as Karmuta, were designated in the study for “restructuring and improvement”—not destruction. “Massive relocation is prohibitive because of the immense social and economic costs involved,” the study said. “It should be avoided.”

A European envoy who has monitored the problem said, “Most of these people already live very precariously—it doesn’t take much to push them over the edge. You should handle them delicately, with planning. Instead, the government comes in with a sledgehammer.”

At the Salaam camp about five miles from northwest Khartoum, authorities are drilling three 500-foot-deep bore holes for water meant to accommodate 150,000 people. There are no sanitation facilities and only one barely supplied clinic and supplementary feeding center for children, who already display the physical signs of malnourishment.

Make-shift homes of burlap sacking, cardboard and plastic do little to keep out the elements—certainly not compared with the mud-brick homes most of these people inhabited in the capital.

“What will happen when the heat reaches 120 degrees out here? There won’t be anywhere near enough water,” said one Western relief official visiting the site. “And then, what happens when they run out of fuel to run the water pumps? If they don’t put in a comprehensive system of services out here fast, before the summer comes a lot of people will die.”
A Silent Companion of Urban Growth

Demographic projections for the 1990s and beyond predict a very massive rural-to-urban population shift in the developing countries. The mega- and mid-sized cities will register the largest absolute population expansion. One of the major social and environmental problems triggered by this process is the frequent need to displace and relocate some urban inhabitants against their will.

Several main social issues raised by involuntary relocation as part of urban growth are analyzed in this paper, such as: the causal mechanisms; the typology of relocation processes; the magnitude of displacement; the risks of impoverishment through compulsory displacement; and the need for sound relocation strategies. Alternative approaches used to deal with dislocation and case experiences of resettlement in World Bank-financed urban projects are examined. Voluntary territorial mobility is generally a factor of development and a very visible and necessary companion of growth. But involuntary displacement and relocation is a different process, painful and costly. The author argues that, in order to avoid or minimize involuntary population dislocation each country must enact domestic policies that will explicitly regulate displacement and relocation. To reduce the economic losses, social trauma and psychological pain inflicted on displaced people, urban investments and growth programs must address relocation with no less attention than is given to other components of urban growth. Experience shows that innovative approaches apt to prevent unnecessary suffering are available and can be applied.
Much of the recent development literature tends to link the compulsory displacement of settled populations only with dam construction. This reduction is unwarranted. Reservoir submergence has been indeed the single biggest cause of development-induced displacement — but it is not the only one. Significant dislocations occur in many urban growth programs.

Paradoxical as this may be, urban involuntary displacement still remains a seldom discussed companion of urban growth and renewal in Third World countries. Some urban development specialists even deny or dismiss its relevance. For those affected, however, forced urban displacement means a dramatic disruption fraught with the perils of impoverishment. It means not only the loss of their homes, but often also the loss of their prior jobs or of their small businesses, as well as loss of access to site-related mutual help networks and to services such as schools, prayer houses, health facilities, etc.

Most often, national policies and environmental strategies for urban development are silent about the difficult and politically sensitive problem of forced displacement. Planners typically do not allocate adequate resources for reestablishing the livelihood and productive employment of dwellers who are forcibly displaced. Legal frameworks for protecting rights and entitlements, and democratic grievance procedures, are often absent, rudimentary, or unenforced. Sociologists and various other academic researchers tend mostly to focus on forecasting macro-urbanization trends, while insufficiently exploring their undesirable implications at the level of individual dwellers. Political leaders tend to highlight the benefits of urban growth, leapfrogging over their painful effects on the people compelled to yield the "right of way." In short, the neglect of development-caused displacement is a lacuna in both urban thinking and urban planning.
The composite consequence of this neglect is that displacement and relocation in urban environments are frequently underprepared, underfinanced, proceed haphazardly, and have a host of disastrous effects, many of which could otherwise either be avoided or mitigated through alternative approaches. This practice calls for correction.

Moreover, the prognosis for increased urban growth until the year 2000 and beyond suggests that forced resettlements will, in turn, become more frequent; thus, the obligation for improving resettlement practices is even more imperative.

Reordering of city spaces in developing countries is inevitable, and looms large. Indeed, by the end of the current decade, an additional 600 million people, representing two-thirds of the incremental population growth in developing countries will inhabit urban settlements. Table 1 reflects the anticipated redistribution of urban population and the multiplication of mega-cities by year 2025. While in 1980 only 15.8 percent of the world population lived in cities of 4 million and above, in 2025 this ratio will climb to 24.5 percent, with the speediest rhythm in developing countries (from 17.3 to 28.2 percent). Four-fifths of all the world’s mega-cities (over 10 million people each), namely 17 out of 21, will be in developing countries. Table 2 complements this picture by providing the absolute numbers and their rapid growth at intermediary points in time.
Table 1

WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION BY CITY-SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-Size Class</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2025</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>World</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Urban</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 million and above</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 million</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 1 million</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Developed Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Urban</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 million and above</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-4 million</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 1 million</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>67.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Less Developed Regions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Urban</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 million and above</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 1 million</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>53.6</td>
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This extraordinary expansion of the urban settlements in developing countries will have profound implications regarding population relocation as well (Cernea 1989). Increasing industrialization will demand space for new industrial estates, for services, commercial estates, communication and road networks, and for transportation corridors. However, urban growth will not only absorb additional physical territory, but will require reorganization and redevelopment of much
of the space already inhabited. The intraurban population movements entailed by such redployments will be partly voluntary, partly compulsory.

Table 2

PROJECTED GROWTH OF MEGA-CITIES BY SIZE CATEGORY AND POPULATION 1950-2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>4+</th>
<th>2-4</th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>4+</th>
<th>2-4</th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>200.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>136.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>299.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>109.2</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>432.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>281.4</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td>182.3</td>
<td>604.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>341.6</td>
<td>154.4</td>
<td>219.1</td>
<td>715.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>405.6</td>
<td>198.0</td>
<td>246.7</td>
<td>850.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>587.3</td>
<td>290.3</td>
<td>326.4</td>
<td>1204.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>820.7</td>
<td>380.0</td>
<td>399.0</td>
<td>1605.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>1255.0</td>
<td>493.2</td>
<td>457.1</td>
<td>2205.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be easily predicted that involuntary population displacement will be more frequent than it has ever been on the Third World urban agenda — raising major political, social and financial issues. It will demand more attention to policy and legal issues, to institutional and implementation capacity, and more social mitigatory work.

Sociological Research on Resettlement

Urban planning in developing countries has paid little attention to the plight of urban settlers forcibly displaced to make room for "development needs". This near-obliviousness has been reinforced by weak social science research on such processes, and by the undemocratic manner in which major urban investments are implemented, often without public consultation.²

The most relevant scholarly contributions to analyzing urban displacement and relocation were made in sociology about a quarter of a century ago, mainly during the 1960s. They dealt with forced relocation in industrialized countries, which had their own heavy share of abuses, politicization and disregard for the victims' interests. Herbert J. Gans (1959, 1967, 1968) carried out seminal research in the USA. His empirical findings and conceptualizations provided knowledge

² Many public programs are designed and implemented without consultation about their social/environmental impacts. It is of little wonder that in such programs people's displacement is mentioned in passing, as a simple precondition for land acquisition. Too often it is treated as no more than a mere "side effect". As an urbanist noted with involuntary irony, it is political pressure rather than the thoughtfulness of planners, that eventually brings displacement into the limelight: "In the course of land acquisition, users may be displaced... The secondary effects have, in the past, often received little attention -- at least until public concern has disturbed the course of project implementation" (Dunkerly, 1983).
unavailable previously, and to a certain degree he succeeded in influencing actual planning processes. Gans' pioneering work (see also his recent comments on it, in Gans, 1991), together with the valuable contributions of other sociologists and urbanists such as Anderson (1965), Dentler (1965), Greer (1965), Hartman (1962), Niebank (1968), and others dealt, with urban relocation caused primarily by slum clearance (see also US Bureau of the Census, 1965; US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965).

Further sociological contributions came in the 1970s through several ex-post impact assessment studies of prior relocation operations (for a synthesis, see Finsterbush 1978). It is noteworthy that the social research on involuntary urban relocation, and the cumulated political pressures exercised by those affected, gradually combined in influencing and improving the US legal regulations on property expropriation and compensatory payments (Federal Register, 1971, 1972, 1986).

What do we know, however, about involuntary urban relocation in developing countries? Much less, and certainly not enough to influence domestic policies, legal frameworks, actual projects or donors' assistance programs. Anthropologists and social geographers tend to study forced displacements primarily when they affect rural populations. Besides the well known account of favela relocation in Rio de Janeiro (Perlman, 1976), or a handful of papers on cases in Asian and African countries (Adekolu-John, 1988) little systematic field evidence is available about urban displacement. There is a much larger literature on relocation of inner city slum dwellers and relocation after natural disaster, which are displacements of a different type. Development-induced urban relocation has rarely been studied over the last two decades, despite its increasing occurrence.
Even in recent years, when dam construction in developing countries has ignited impassioned debates around the displacement of rural groups, urban relocation caused by economic growth programs has remained outside the research lens. It is therefore high time to highlight it for both policy and practical purposes.

The Causes of Urban Displacement

Urban relocation is a subset of a broader spectrum of displacement processes. One initial conceptual distinction needed is that between gradual population migration, on the one hand, and sudden and involuntary displacements, on the other.

Among processes of sudden displacement, we can distinguish three main types, corresponding to three types of events:

(a) *natural causes* (earthquakes, floods, landslides, and others);
(b) *political events* (wars, revolutions, or other forms of political/ethnic turmoil);
(c) *planned developments programs* (particularly infrastructural equipments).

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3 There are a few important exceptions. The recent evaluation study of urban displacements done by the Rotterdam Institute of Housing Studies (Davidson, Peltenburg and Zaaijer) and published by UNCHIS (1991) is a good contribution in this area.
These three sets of events trigger displacement processes that, at first sight, seem similar in their consequences. However, despite certain common features, the differences between them are substantial. Each type, therefore, requires individualized analysis and distinct responses (Cernea, 1991).

There is a basic difference between displacements in category (c) as compared to categories (a) and (b). Category (c) refers to planned, deliberate displacements, induced through programs that purposively pursue change. The key point is that, being known in advance, such displacements can and must be subject to mitigatory planning, including design and land use provisions likely to reduce the need to displace in the first place.

The urban displacements addressed in this paper are of the planned type. Within this category, displacements result from several distinct causes, which are analyzed further in the paper.

Why is it sometimes unavoidable to forcibly relocate some groups of urban residents?

Many Third World cities are the product of relatively rapid, spontaneous and massive rural-urban in-flows and natural population growth. This fast demographic expansion, combined with

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An additional, fourth type of event can be technological accidents. These may cause displacements of shorter duration than other events, but can be devastating and tend to happen primarily in urban or near-urban areas. One example is the technological accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor.
insufficient (or absent) master planning, low investments and weak regulatory frameworks, results in enormous social and environmental problems.⁵

Without significant rearrangements in settlement and services, the multisided growth and development of such new urban centers is at risk of being strangled. Cities cannot cash in on their potential. The stress inside the city core is compounded by the pressure of migratory in-flows descending upon the city's peripheries (and often upon its centers too). Infrastructure, transport and housing improvements become imperative. They often require a certain amount of planned population relocation, even against the will and expectations of the people involved.

We should note, however, that the term "planned" may somehow embellish and misportray these displacements, because although they are provoked by design, a real full-fledged "plan" is often missing. The term is supposed to convey the fact that a decision has been made in some city management quarters to administratively impose a displacement and relocation; whether or not what can be decently called a "plan" has been elaborated needs to be ascertained in every case.

The various causal factors that account for deliberate displacements can be conceptually captured in a taxonomy of the key causes of planned urban displacement. This taxonomy takes into account current and emerging trends in urbanization, social research carried out on city growth and city roles (Doggan and Kassarda 1988; Kassarda and Rondinelli 1990; Linn 1983),

⁵ Because of such circumstances, urban relocation in developing countries faces more difficult problems than, for instance, in the large and well regulated US cities, where in the 1950s and 1960s the initial social science research on displacement was carried out.
and the rationale behind some recent operational strategies for urban development (World Bank 1991; see also Farvacque and McAuslan 1991). We can identify the following four major causes of urban displacement:

1. **Urban economic growth.** Cities are becoming engines of national growth at a pace faster than anticipated earlier. Industrial manufacturing and service activities that benefit from the economics of agglomeration increase massively and diversify. Recent estimates indicate continuous economic expansion as the trend for the immediate future. Relocation is used to make room for new industrial estates, transportation corridors, economic ancillary activities, or for other infrastructural equipment entailed by economic growth and population agglomeration.

2. **Environmental improvements.** The anarchic spatial and demographic expansion of urban settlements has outgrown by far the capacities for supplying drinking water and energy, for waste disposal and sewerage, for sanitation, etc., leading to snowballing deterioration of the environment. Relocation, temporary or permanent, is caused by the need to make room for structural and infrastructural equipments for environmental services, health facilities, water supply systems, and others, and to insert them into already densely inhabited downtown or residential areas.

3. **Slum upgrading.** Social policies aimed at poverty alleviation and quality of life improvement arrive at a point when they must address slum conditions head on, and change them. Sometimes, slum/squatter areas can rarely be upgraded without some population movement.

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6 Real life situations, however, are often not always transparent, as will be discussed further in the text. Slum removal programs are often rationalized also on social policy grounds, even when they are just a veiled approach to free valuable real estate for other higher-paying users. The sociologists who studied the relocation of Boston's West End slum pointed out that the land freed ultimately became part of very expensive Boston real estate (Gans 1967; Dentler 1969). A case of politically motivated forced slum relocation that gained worldwide exposure was the 1991 decision of Thai authorities to relocate the inhabitants of several Bangkok slums which happened to be located next to the new buildings where the World Bank's annual meetings were scheduled for October of that same year. The displacements were carried out by the military government in spite of wide public protests, domestic and international, and despite the opposition of the World Bank. The Habitat International Coalition, an NGO concerned with housing policy issues, has demonstrated that a vast amount of forced urban displacement, particularly through slum removal, is "justified" through aesthetic reasons, or
Non-urban programs. Certain non-urban development projects infringe upon existing urban settlements, requiring their integral or partial relocation (e.g., new reservoirs that extend far beyond the dams and submerge or threaten to submerge existing towns). While this kind of dislocation is not caused *stricto sensu* by urban growth, the population affected and the issues involved are similar to those in categories (1), (2), (3).

Several brief comments on the above categorization are necessary.

First, actual relocation operations may result from a combination of two or more of the above causes. These causes are often intertwined, even if one or the other remains the main trigger of a specific displacement. The analytical and practical value of the taxonomy is that it helps conceptually to order and distinguish similar looking processes and to adjust operational programs better to needs.

Second, keeping these related causes analytically distinct allows for fine tuning in planning and for manipulating the variables which may reduce the size of displacement.

Third, to the people whose shelters receive the wrecking ball, dislocation is not less painful simply because it results from beneficial urban economic growth or environmental improvement.

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the need to accommodate major events (e.g., international games, fairs, conferences, etc.) yet in fact pursue the satisfaction of narrow vested interest.
Fourth, externalization of development costs and transfer of a part of these costs as a burden on the victims of displacement should not be allowed in either one of these kinds of processes. In practice the responsible factor initiating the processes described in groups two, three and four, is typically the government, while for resettlement triggered by economic growth the responsibility rests primarily with the private sector. Inasmuch as forced relocation is part of government programmed development, it is incumbent upon the government to provide the affected people with options and resources to fully reestablish themselves productively. The same should be true for the private sector’s economic ventures, when they account for expropriation and forced displacement. Market processes do not operate freely or equitably in situations of expropriation and displacement. Therefore, neither the government, nor private business should use political advantage for imposing part of the economic costs on those whose social existence is to be anyway disrupted through displacement.

The relationships between urban economic growth and slum upgrading programs as a trigger of relocation is often more direct than it appears at first sight. Slums and squatter areas are sometimes located in inner city sites that, at a certain juncture, may become necessary for commercial expansion and various business purposes. When urban economic growth intensifies the competition for scarce land in inner city areas, the private and public sectors become interested in forcing out the existing inhabitants — be they poor, middle class, or any less efficient users — and promoting alternative uses of those areas. Such alternative uses of the land turn out to serve commercial, banking or industrial interests; sometimes, high income residential dwellings are built in the former slum area. The history of forced urban relocation operations in the last half century, in both developed and developing countries, is overflowing with such cases.
Since slum removal by administrative decision has accounted for such a large proportion of involuntary urban displacement, it is useful to briefly dwell on their history and mechanisms.

Slum removal operations have been usually undertaken through the public sector's authority and line agencies. The overt justifications given for such removal had to be politically acceptable — they referred primarily to the improvement of the dwellers' conditions, or to public safety, etc. However, economic growth and the needs of the business sector were (more frequently than was admitted) the ultimate prompting factor for the public powers' decision to eradicate squatter settlements.

Over the last few decades, the stated rationale for, and approaches to, slum relocation have changed repeatedly. Davidson, Peltenburg and Zaaijer (UNCHS 1991) have traced and described these changes in urbanization philosophy by meticulously analyzing a vast number of relocation cases and approaches. Their study demonstrated that the first trend, which prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s, relied on a "negative" rationale: slum/squatter areas were described as illegal settlements and an eyesore to the larger community and this was used to justify and rationalize eviction. In fact, governments often did not hesitate to resort to brutal means to evict the inhabitants. In some countries it was expected that illegal squatters would have no alternative but

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7 "Settlements were cleared with bulldozers and their inhabitants forcibly ejected, often without any right for compensation. Mostly, governments did not even offer an alternative place for resettlements to the evictees... The underlying explanation for this attitude was that governments in this way hoped to eradicate the squatter problem... The early evictions were generally ad-hoc decisions; for the larger part they were not incorporated in a broader planning framework or related to other urban developments" (Davidson, Peltenburg and
to return to their places of origin (which did not occur), while in a few other countries relocation agencies offered the alternative of hastily built social housing projects consisting of high-rise, high density rental estates.8

The second trend, essentially developed during the 1960s, affirmed a broader approach towards urban planning and management, arguing less that the slum/squatter dwellers had no rights and more that they occupied potentially valuable land or that their settlement blocked desired changes in the planning of the city. It became more usual for public agencies to make provisions for relocation when they proposed to remove a squatter community. Governments emerged at times as "providers" of housing assistance,9 sometimes in ad-hoc built "satellite towns" sited nearby (e.g., Karachi in Pakistan, Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, etc.).

During the 1970s and 1980s, the gradual move away from indiscriminate slum displacements and towards reducing the number of displacees continued with the introduction of the so-called "urban renewal" programs. This meant that in some instances the policy of total relocation

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8 In Venezuela, for instance, when during the 1950-1954 the military governments forcibly evicted over 100,000 families from the slums of Caracas, about 115 high-rise "superblocks" of 14 stories each were constructed by the government in a formidable crash program to house the evictees.

9 A case study on relocation in Manila (Juppenplatz 1970) provides a clear example of the shift from the first to the second trend. In the 1950s, slum clearance was carried out massively in Manila in a pure eviction manner, without providing assistance or services. Ten years later, however, in 1962, the government set up a study team that recommended that government agencies should not only "transfer" squatters, but also formulate and carry out programs to assist in their socioeconomic reestablishment.
was abandoned in favor of slum improvement/squatter upgrading approaches, with only partial relocation in order to lower population density. Government agencies shifted gradually from a role of "providers" and producers of finished dwellings, to a role of "enablers": this consisted, on the one hand, in using site-and-services approaches to support those relocated to peripheral areas, and on the other hand in using urban renewal approaches (infrastructure and socio/environmental services) to support on-site improvements for the remaining dwellers (Davidson, Pentenberg and Zaaijer - UNCHS 1991).

Of course, these definitions of periods and trends are intended to sketch a broad image. Its generality inevitably simplifies what has been a dramatic process for those affected and an extremely complex problem for governments to address. Relocation history in one or another individual country may not exactly fit this periodization because of variations in the time when such problems were confronted and in the resources that different governments were prepared to allocate. The brutal eviction procedures of the early period have not been abandoned everywhere. They flare up recurrently with terrible consequences in slum relocation in one or another country (see, for example, in the "Prologue" to this paper, the 1992 report by Jennifer Permelle on recent slum relocation in Khartoum, Sudan).

The upgrading of old squatter areas will certainly continue in the developing countries during the 1990s and beyond, and will entail a significant share of total urban population relocation. Yet it is predictable that the main causal factors accounting for planned urban displacements will be the process of urban economic growth and the need for urban environmental improvements. In fact, recent evidence suggests also that urban economic growth may itself cause a new generation of slums
to appear as random and unregulated settlements on public or private lands, compounding the environmental and relocation problems already on the cities' agenda (see Box 1).

Box 1

Cairo's New "Random Communities"

The case of Egypt's capital city tells a relevant story about the unanticipated ways in which urban growth generates unplanned settlements.

In recent decades, Cairo has gone through accelerated economic and population expansion, accompanied by overflowing road traffic and resulting in grave transportation problems. To solve, or ease, the capital's transportation problems, the decision was made to construct a major traffic divesting highway ring around the city. The work on this ring started.

However, an unanticipated process described as a "settlement catastrophe" occurred during construction: about 80 "random communities" have sprung up on state owned lands adjacent to the highway ring, "most of which are built of tinplate cloth, cement and alluvium" (Manal Abdul Aziz 1992). The constructions occurred through encroachment. It is estimated that over 500,000 people live in these recent random communities within which economic growth also is occurring: these communities include some 550 small and medium industrial enterprises, exploiting access to the new road but depending on rudimentary services and causing very heavy pollution, slope erosion and overall environmental deterioration.

The case epitomizes the contradictory nature of urban growth. To the city's managers, now it seems that the new highway, however necessary, has entailed more seemingly intractable problems than the city was facing before its construction. In the spring of 1992, it was reported that Cairo's municipality was considering a plan of extreme measures for declaring Cairo "by decree" a city "closed" to further immigration, even though it was very unclear what this concept meant or how such an idea could be implemented.
I will further examine resettlement operations resulting from these two sets of processes — urban growth and environmental improvement. The fourth category in our taxonomy — town relocation caused by non-urban development projects — will be discussed only briefly.

**Urban Growth and Population Relocation**

The types of urban relocation listed earlier have appeared, in one form or another, in various urban development projects financed by the World Bank in different countries along the years. Bank strategies for urban development, and the experience of many Bank-financed urban projects provide therefore valuable empirical material for analyzing the issues involved in involuntary urban relocation.

At the policy level, the World Bank's lessons of experience are best crystallized in its 1991(b) policy statement on *Urban Policy and Economic Development. An Agenda for the 1990s* (World Bank 1991). This "agenda" continues the trend started earlier (see Ljung and Farvacque 1988) towards moving Bank urban lending "away from sporadic interventions, and towards encompassing broader issues of greater impact for the national economies and the productivity of cities".

The Bank's 1991 urban policy statement explicitly argues, first, that developing countries and the international donor community "should move towards a broader view of urban issues, a view that moves beyond housing and residential infrastructure, and that emphasizes the productivity of the urban economy and the need to alleviate the constraints on productivity" (World
Bank 1991b). Second, defining cities as potential "engines of accelerated growth," the policy redirects the efforts for alleviating urban poverty towards increasing the demand for the labor of the poor and enhancing their productivity. Third, it forcefully calls for devoting sizeable resources "to reversing the deteriorations of the urban environment" (World Bank 1991b). These policy orientations are directly relevant in situations when relocation becomes unavoidable because of urban economic growth or environmental requirements.

**Relocation Under World Bank-Financed Projects**

Involuntary resettlement that occurs under Bank-financed urban, transport and infrastructure project is subject to the Bank's overall policy for guiding involuntary resettlement operations, that was adopted in 1980, together with specific operational guidelines (World Bank 1980). This policy was revised, strengthened, and reissued in 1986, 1988, and 1990 (see World Bank 1986, 1991a; Cernea 1988, 1993). The Bank's resettlement policy is based on lessons learned from many relocation experiences, and from sociological/anthropological research on resettlement. Under these guidelines, both Bank staff and borrowers are first required to explore alternative solutions to avoid involuntary resettlement. When relocation is unavoidable, efforts should be made to minimize it and to ensure that those relocated are assisted to at last restore their former living standards and earning capacity, and if possible to improve them. Displaced persons should be (a) compensated for their losses at replacement costs, (b) given opportunities to share in project created benefits, and (c) assisted with the move and during the transition period at the relocation site. Similar policy principles regarding population displacement and relocation were adopted in December 1991 by the governments of all OECD countries for their international aid agencies (OECD 1991).
Both the Bank's policy and the OECD guidelines explicitly state that all resettlement programs must be development programs as well, and that measures must be taken to improve the conditions of those dislocated and prevent them from becoming permanently impoverished and destitute. To achieve this goal, the implications of resettlement must be pondered from the earliest stages of the project's preparation. At the same time, a range of development options for those displaced must be built into a full resettlement plan. The key characteristic of the Bank's policy is a shift from a welfare-like approach, limited mainly to cash compensation, to a development-oriented, integrated approach that can help settlers rebuild a self-sustaining production base and habitat.

At the operational level, World Bank financing of urban development and of environmental/quality-of-life improvements in urban areas (particularly for water supply and sanitation systems) has much expanded over the last two decades. From about US$65 million in fiscal year 1972, and US$305 million in fiscal year 1973, lending has increased to some US$2.1 billion in fiscal year 1986, US$2.2 billion in fiscal year 1988 and US$ 2.4 billion in fiscal year 1991. Table 3 reflects the evolution of lending to the urban sector in the context of the overall evolution of Bank lending to four other major sectors.

Table 3 also shows changes in lending precisely in those five sectors in which development-caused relocation is more likely to happen than under other lending. These are: agriculture, hydropower, transportation, urban development, and water supply and sanitation. The data indicate a decrease in lending volumes for agriculture and hydro-power, and an increase in lending volumes.
Table 3
TRENDS IN WORLD BANK/IDA LENDING BY SECTORS BETWEEN 1985-91
(in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric./Rural Dev.</td>
<td>3,749.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>2,930.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4,494.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower</td>
<td>2,250.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3,016.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2,006.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2,138.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1,745.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2,647.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Dev.</td>
<td>384.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1,324.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1,716.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply/ Sewerage</td>
<td>780.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1,114.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>535.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World Bank/IDA*</td>
<td>9,303.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>10,784.8</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>11,400.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total for these five lending sectors only. The difference up to 100 percent each year was lent to the other subsectors — projects for coal, oil and gas, industrial projects, projects for education, population, health and nutrition, and others.
for urban, transportation, and water supply and sewerage systems. These shifts in lending volumes
explain, among other reasons, the aggregate increase of urban displacement under Bank projects over
the last several years, while in other sectors (particularly agriculture) involuntary resettlement has
somewhat decreased.

**Relocation Size in a Comparative Perspective**

What is the scale of compulsory relocation brought about by the urban processes
described above?

To our knowledge, overall statistics of displacement are not maintained by any city
government. Much of such forced relocation remains publicly unknown because of that, as well as
because there are many deliberate attempts to hide or belittle the human costs of development
programs. This, of course, worsens the real consequences of displacement on the families directly
affected. However, some figures are available from urban projects that receive international financing
and are subject to more stringent planning and accounting. Far from telling the full story, these
figures give sobering indications of what the aggregate magnitude would be if all data were at hand.

A good number of Bank-financed urban and transport projects has included the
displacement of some people from their habitat and jobs (Table 4). These projects have improved
urban transportation, drinking water supply and health in major cities whose underdeveloped
infrastructure equipments and social services were slowing further economic growth and lowering
Table 4

BANK-FINANCED URBAN AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
ENTAILING INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Land Acquisition¹ (ha/cost US#)</th>
<th>People Affected by Displacement²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta-Cikampek Highway Project — Indonesia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4.4 million</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply Project — Korea</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Urban Development — Tunisia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yacyreta Dam I — Argentina and Paraguay</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>50,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development — Cameroon</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>200 hectares</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Cities Development — Philippines</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>384 hectares</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi Special Development — Pakistan</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>225 hectares</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation — Bangladesh</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Cities Urban Transp. Project — Indonesia</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>51 hectares</td>
<td>7,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Sewerage Project — China</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Urban Infrastructure — Cameroon</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>120 hectares</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir Water Supply — Turkey</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,000 hectares</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Rehabilitation — Mozambique</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>3,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Flood Reconstruction — Brazil</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12.6 million</td>
<td>41,400 (55,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development Project — Bangladesh</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3 hectares</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabotabek Urban Development I — Indonesia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>80 hectares</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu Urban Transp. — Korea</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>384 hectares</td>
<td>10,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan Provincial Highway Project — China</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>22,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project — China</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>6,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong Provincial Highway Project — China</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>26,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arun III Access Road Project — Nepal</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad Water Supply and Sanitation — India</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13,122 hectares</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The available information on land acquisition given in project reports is not uniform: sometimes it refers to areas to be expropriated, other times to the estimated cost of expropriation.

² The data about people affected available in project files refer sometimes to individuals, other times to families. A conservative average size of 5.5 persons per family was used in computing the number of individuals affected for some (not all) projects, with full awareness that family/household sizes vary widely across cultures and countries. Some figures are still preliminary estimates and may underestimate the size of relocation.
living standards. Some involuntary relocation in such situations appeared to be in the interest of overall development, and unavoidable.

The number of urban dwellers to be displaced in such projects has varied widely, ranging from 1,250 people in Pakistan's Punjab urban project to some 40,000–50,000 people in the 1988 Indonesia Jabotabek Urban Project I or 50,000 people in the Hyderabad Water Supply Project in India.

Taking an intersectoral comparative perspective, we note that displacement in hydropower projects is often larger. For instance, in India, the Narayanpur dam and the Almatti dam, both on the Krishna river, will displace 80,000 and 160,000 people respectively, within the same river basin. The Cirata dam in Indonesia displaced some 55,000 people, and the Danjiangkou and Shuikou dams in China displaced 383,000 and 70,000 people respectively. Altogether, agriculture and hydropower projects alone (i.e., without counting urban projects), approved by the World Bank from 1979 to 1985, resulted in the relocation of between 750,000-900,000 people in twenty-seven countries (Cernea 1988). Considering a longer period, 1980-1990, and including urban projects, we found a number of 101 Bank-assisted projects in which displacement was estimated to affect between 1.6 and 1.8 million people (Cernea 1991). The average size of dislocation per project in irrigation dam projects is larger than the average in urban projects; however, the frequency of involuntary displacement in projects addressing the urban sector is higher than the frequency of relocation among all projects for the agricultural sector. Land acquisition under urban projects appears to be "small" (certainly against land acquisition in hydropower and irrigation dam projects), yet the ratio of affected
people per unit of expropriated land is very high, sometimes going up to several hundred people per hectare.

Of course, the urban projects financed by the World Bank are but a very small fraction of the total investments in urban development made in developing countries, and thus account for only a correspondingly small fraction of urban displacements. Each year the developing countries invest more than US$100 billion, and perhaps as much as US$150 billion, in basic urban infrastructure and shelter, compared to some US$1.5 billion annual average Bank financing during fiscal years 1980-88. In addition, under projects assisted by international agencies such displacements tend to be handled better than in nondonor assisted projects, because they incorporate more preventive and mitigatory measures. Therefore, forced displacements in urban contexts and their consequences must be recognized as a problem that is more severe, and is occurring worldwide on a scale which is much larger than the urban interventions assisted by international donor agencies.

The performance of resettlement components under Bank-assisted urban projects is uneven, and it requires a separate in-depth analysis. Some significant implementation and performance aspects are discussed further in this paper, in connection with several major projects in Indonesia, China, Argentina and Paraguay and a special performance review, now being carried out as part of the 1993 overall analysis of the Bank’s resettlement project portfolio, will be published soon.
The Impoverishing Effects of Displacement

The loss of dwelling and assets caused by forced displacement, and the uprooting from an existing pattern of making a living, carry high impoverishment risks for those affected directly. While the overall economic effects of urban growth for the majority of urban inhabitants are positive, the serious negative effects that occur for a much smaller group along several basic dimensions of their lives (see Cernea 1990), are not less real. Moreover, they are hard to mitigate.

The displacement of households and economic units (workshops, commercial shops, small producers' units, food stalls, and others) deprives those affected either of dwellings, or of employment, or of access to their customers, or of a combination of these losses. The single most critical problem associated with urban displacement is not the loss of housing, but the loss of employment or of site-related income sources and the uncertainty of finding new employment in the relocation area. The distance of the relocation site from the original place and jobs often become an insurmountable obstacle to maintaining prior employment (see Box 2). Ascertaining whether or not economic development potential exists, or can be created, at the new location must therefore be a fundamental criterion in sound resettlement planning. Large distances result in large ratios of returnees. Furthermore, those who lacked legal title to their shelters and house plots are often regarded as ineligible for compensation. Tenants are also ineligible for compensation, even though they may be unable to find elsewhere equally affordable tenancy arrangements. For many, the standard of life deteriorates if policies and programs do not provide for adequate reestablishment.
Poorly conducted displacement operations that impoverish people are contrary to the stated policy goals of both national governments and donor agencies, yet they continue to occur frequently.

The social and cultural disruptions in neighborhood ties and kinship networks also have deep effects, which are additional to the tangible economic losses. Such non-quantifiable but real social and economic costs are the loss of access to mutual help, to child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other informal support systems. The heterogeneous composition of those compulsorily displaced multiplies risks and virtually guarantees individual tragedies. In self-relocation or voluntary migration, the people who move are a self-selected population, usually the young or middle-aged, generally healthy, determined to surmount relocation difficulties and apt to cope at the arrival place. In compulsory relocation, all who happen to be in the way must move, regardless of whether or not they are fit to do so and/or able to readjust: the children and the old, the healthy and the sick, the able-bodied and the crippled, the self-employed and the unemployed, full families or incomplete families, those dependent on others, and so forth. Therefore, compulsory relocation plans demand safety arrangements, and effective compensatory and reestablishment measures.

Short duration or "temporary" displacement turns out often to be more of a promise than a reality. Certain infrastructural projects (subways, pipelines, power lines) might need to displace some people only temporarily, during construction, until the new equipment is put in place. However, there is evidence that despite promises of city officials these people are usually not allowed to return after project completion, when the site that becomes again available is more valuable due
Distance Between the Departure and Relocation Sites

The distance between relocation site and previous residence is a critical variable in urban relocation. Short distances often allow people to hold on to prior jobs and maintain social contacts with the original neighborhood. On the contrary, when people are relocated to the periphery, unaffordable transportation costs or absence of transportation result in suddenly cutting off the relocatees from their prior income-sources and customer base.

Figure 1, based on data compiled by the Rotterdam Institute of Housing Studies, reflects the distance of the relocation site from the original place of the displaced people in 14 projects from 8 countries. It appears that a sizeable distance of about 10 km is very common and only in two cases there has been a 5 km distance. In several cases, however, the distance exceeds 20 and 30 kms! The hardships imposed on those displaced is thus compounded. Some sell their new house plots and return to the inner city. Those who stay have to work long years and decades to reconstruct a viable social community with adequate physical infrastructure.
to its environmental improvements. The gains are usually captured by the private sector, the new resources are rarely plowed back into assisting those displaced to get reestablished. Municipal executing agencies, as well as donors, tend to disregard the off-site adversities generated by the project and externalities in the use of surrounding land (Mougeot, 1992).

Cash compensation for expropriation is a procedure favored by many municipalities, and is rationalized by hard-core market economists as a fair way of handling displacement. In fact, however, anthropological and sociological field research has repeatedly found that leaving those displaced at the mercy of market forces is a recipe for rapidly melting away their cash compensation and making many of them homeless and landless. There is little difference in this respect between rural and urban displacees. It is often the case that the bulk of urban dwellers who are given only cash compensation and are denied municipal assistance in relocation face a higher risk than rural dwellers and end up worse off than they were before displacement, since they have less access to food production.

The politicization of displacement is increasing as well. The coercive nature of involuntary relocation, particularly when carried out with cultural insensitivity, and the prospects of job loss and further impoverishment, make urban displacement a politically tense and potentially explosive situation. Such politicization occurs especially where the affected people are not consulted at all by authorities, remain uninvolved in planning for alternatives, and have no chance to negotiate a trend towards stronger population resistance to relocation. This is visible in many developing countries such as India, Thailand, Brazil and others (Oliver-Smith 1991). Particularly in India, some instances of such opposition have gone far beyond the time-honored Indian tradition of passive
resistance, taking violent forms of active resistance, obstruction, demonstrations, etc. The political clashes around the Narmada Sardar Sarovar projects have been the most visible but not the only ones (Morse, Berger, Gamble and Brody 1992). If participatory approaches are not widely introduced, and if legal channels and democratic grievance procedures will remain practically closed to those affected, the political reverberations of involuntary relocation are likely to increase.¹⁰

Impoverishment, however, is not an inevitability. If properly planned, carried out with government's commitment to equity and adequate resource allocation, and with the informed involvement of those affected in bargaining and in considering options, relocation may ultimately generate certain benefits, not only losses or political turmoil. Such improvements may result, primarily, from gaining security of ownership title over the new houseplots, from better housing standards for the relocatees (this takes some time, but it stimulates resettlers to mobilize personal

¹⁰ Delayed political responses are also to be considered. Jean Gottmann, an internationally reputed urban scholar, interpreted the violent political explosion of the Paris Commune in 1870 as a delayed political response of the poor city masses to forced displacement -- among other factors. Indeed, during 1850s and 1960s, shortly before the Commune, the famous mayor of Paris, Baron Haussmann, ruthlessly demolished many slums and poverty areas in order to rebuild the center, and pushed the poorer inhabitants to the city periphery. Gottmann wrote:

"...the bloody revolt of the Commune, in which parts of Paris were buried,... (and) and the violence of the Commune, also had roots in the resentment of the mass of the people against Haussmann's policies pushing out the poor who came to the city hoping for a share in the better life, wealth, opportunity and amenities of the capital. They were pushed to the periphery, which created a sort of segregation by level of income and social status... The political consequences of Haussmann's planning lasted as well: the mass of the people resented the systems" (Gottmann 1990).
resources as well), and from better environmental and social services (sewage systems, water supply, electricity, simulation, etc.).

Resettlement as a development effort in itself can succeed only if adequate resources are mobilized to prevent impoverishment and if it has institutional backing. To move from policy to practice, the objectives of relocation must be embodied in technically- and socially-sound resettlement programs that are adequately financed. Such plans must contain provisions for fair and equitable compensation, physical transfer, and housing, but their backbone must consist of a development package providing a set of economic opportunities for the settlers through project-funded activities. Such an approach is neither easy nor cheap, but it is probably the only one that effectively reconciles the adversely affected needs of the individuals with the wider needs and development goals of the country.

The lessons of experience from various recent cases of urban relocation, some of which are presented in the next chapter, suggest both approaches which should be followed and approaches which should not.

Cases in Urban Relocation

Broad statistical pictures always come alive better through individual case-analysis. One such case is described in detail in the "Prologue" to this study — the case of Khartoum, as reported by J. Parmelee. I will briefly examine below additional three cases. The first two are cases
of metropolitan renewal — the so-called Jabotabek projects for the Jakarta conurbation, started in 1988, and the sewerage project in Shanghai started in 1987. These cases demonstrate the effects of growth and the needs for urban environmental improvements through major infrastructural renewal, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to displacement and relocation. The third case refers to town relocation caused by a hydropower dam and reservoir at the border between Argentina and Paraguay.

**Jakarta Urban Development**

Jabotabek is the mnemonic abbreviation for the largest metropolitan conurbation in Indonesia, consisting of the cities of Jakarta, Bogor to the south, Tangeran to the west, and Bekasi to the east. In 1986, the Jabotabek conurbation had a population approaching 8 million people, with an additional 1.3 million residing in the surrounding area, thus ranking among the twenty-five largest world metropolises. The population in the city proper more than doubled between 1961 and 1980 (from 2.9 to 6.5 million). The growth prognosis for the near future is high: Jakarta is expected to again nearly double its population between 1980 and 2000 and reach a total of some 12 million inhabitants. During the same period, the population of surrounding urban areas is expected to at least treble, resulting in a conurbation of 17 million persons by the onset of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, despite past investments, Jakarta's infrastructure and services have fallen behind the city's growth and have, in fact, deteriorated. Serious degradation affects the road network in Jakarta, which alone accounts for some 18 percent of all registered vehicles and almost 40 percent of all passenger cars in the nation.
The first Bank-assisted Jabotabek projects will upgrade primary and secondary arterial roads, construct development roads on the city's periphery, improve traffic management, support institutional and policy development, assist planning agencies, provide technical expertise, and so forth. At the outset, it was expected to cost the equivalent of US$224 million. This project was soon followed by the Bank-assisted Second and Third Jabotabek Urban Development, which focused on improving water supply and water pollution control.

Land acquisition under the first Jabotabek project is substantial, involving acquisition for road widening in well-developed areas with high population density, and for new roads in the city's developing urban fringes. According to estimates by government agencies, about 10,000 households and businesses are affected by the project. Although most acquisition for road widening involve only a narrow 2 to 4 m land strip along the affected property's frontage, this large program will affect the dwellings and jobs of some 40,000 to 50,000 persons and disrupt much economic activity. While not all of these people will have to relocate, even those who remain in place will have their house plots or business areas reduced. The hardest hit will be the poorest inhabitants — the renters and occupants who have no formal title. Some are regarded as "squatters", although they have long resided at those sites, and will be pushed out when plots are reduced in size or shops are demolished.

The weaknesses of the Jabotabek approach to relocation were epitomized at the start of the first project by the absence of a full resettlement plan for the people displaced. The borrowing agencies did not prepare one and, contrary to guidelines, the project was appraised without such a plan. Indonesia's urban development strategy does not explicitly provide for the full reestablishment of people displaced by urban growth. It only mandates cash compensation for land expropriated. A
field visit to the project in 1992 by the author of this paper found that in Jakarta, as in many other places, cash compensation alone is inadequate to prevent impoverishment; the sums allocated proved insufficient to buy alternative houseplots of similar quality. Project authorities are not aware whether or not the people who receive the cash compensation have been able to reestablish themselves productively, and do not even know where these thousands of people have gone. Tenants are particularly hard hit. Cash compensation for low grade housing is insufficient to build new dwellings and some displaced families remain homeless. Moreover, many also lose their employment. Under the Jabotabek program, only licensed business owners are compensated at a set rate for loss of economic activity. A large (uncounted) number of small-shop or food-stall owners belonging to the informal sector, who make a living in the high-density consumer downtown areas, are evicted to unknown places and without compensation.

Deficiencies in the preparation, preappraisal and appraisal processes for the first Jabotabek project allowed such weaknesses to remain uncorrected. Remedial measures were initiated in the post-appraisal/implementation stage and provisions to reduce the need for relocation were adopted for the design and approach of the Second and Third Jabotabek projects. Yet the absence of domestic policy and legal frameworks tailored to urban relocation needs remain a major constraint on any short term corrective actions.

**Shanghai Environmental Improvement**

The Shanghai project aims to modernize the obsolete sewerage system of this megacity. In a city with 6 million inhabitants, about half the population still has to rely on buckets for
excreta collection; these buckets are further discharged through a cumbersome and inefficient waste disposal process into the area rivers. Moreover, most Shanghai factories send 60 percent of their waste-water untreated or only partially treated into the city's Huangpu river, and 40 percent into the combined city sewers. The amount of pollution discharged into the Huangpu river far exceeds the assimilative (self-purifying) capacity of the river system, resulting in a serious deterioration of its water quality; the river turns anaerobic for 150 days a year, compared with 33 days in 1975. The project undertook the construction of a sewerage system, ten pumping stations, a treatment plant, and others works.

Dwellings and other structures had to be demolished to meet right-of-way and site requirements for the new infrastructure, displacing over 15,000 residents from several neighborhoods. Thanks to an adequate resettlement policy, however, this project included a well designed and funded plan for the socioeconomic reestablishment of the displaced population. Remarkably, the project financed and actually carried out the construction of at least $3 \text{ m}^2$ of new housing space for every square meter demolished. Displaced families were paid moving expenses. When the author of this study visited the new residential sites, early in the project's timetable, the buildings constructed by the project were ready to receive the relocatess during the first and second year of project implementation. There was no worsening of housing conditions: on the contrary, the new apartments were built at standards higher than the houses subject to demolition. Economic opportunities for the relocated people were either protected or substituted by alternative employment facilitated through the project management's care.
Yacyreta: A Social Program in Town Relocation

As previously stated, urban involuntary relocation results not only from urban growth per se, but sometimes from nonurban developments as well. For instance, major hydroelectric dams are usually erected in areas distant from big cities, but their reservoirs may stretch over tens of hundreds of kilometers along the river valley, and encroach on upriver urban settlements. Such cases are occurring, for instance, in several dams currently under construction: the Yacyreta dam (Argentina and Paraguay), the Almatti dam (India), the Shuikou dam (China), and others.

The need to start planning for relocation long before actual displacement is an important lesson from the Argentina/Paraguay Yacyreta dam project. The Yacyreta reservoir will eventually displace a total of 50,000 people, out of which some 40,000 live in the twin towns of Posadas (on Argentina's river bank) and Encarnacion (on Paraguay's bank). At the project's start, an entity was created to plan this operation — the urban resettlement and social action program (PRUAS) — staffed with architects, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and social workers (Bartolome 1988, 1991). The author's field review in 1991 of the progress achieved by the Yacyreta resettlement in Posadas town found several sound elements in the project's initial approach to relocation.

The social surveys carried out by PRUAS determined that more than 70 percent of the affected urban population were squatters living under very deprived conditions. It was realized that monetary compensation would not help these people to recreate their present housing
Consequently, the resettlement plan prepared by PRUAS included new housing to be constructed by the Yacyreta project, and social programs for improving the economic health and social conditions of the relocatees. The housing component provided for the initial building of 4,120 new individual houses in four different locations in Posadas. The new locations were chosen according to the following criteria: (a) proximity and/or accessibility to resettlers’ work places; (b) areas still not densely settled; (c) low real-estate values and thus low tax assessments; and (d) potential for introducing infrastructural equipment and necessary services.

An innovative approach was adopted to finance the various options offered. The people were given the choice of either being resettled by the project or receiving a cash compensation for the property lost. The problem to be solved was the difference between the value of the property to be demolished and the cost that would have to be paid to build or to acquire a

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11 The surveys established that about 83.6 percent of the houses subject to demolition were substandard. Cash compensation would have defeated the purpose of helping this population because given the low standards of housing, even a correct market value compensation would have given them only a small amount of money, insufficient to build new houses. On the other hand, the project could not build new housing for these people that would reproduce prior low standards. PRUAS concluded that a broader social program was needed. Initially, project management was reluctant to accept this recommendation, due to the additional costs involved, but the proposals were eventually endorsed and made part of the initial Yacyreta project.

12 As could be expected, the locations chosen were not the best by any single criterion, but were the result of an attempt to optimize all factors involved. The resettlement areas were going to be served endowed with water supply, electricity and sewerage systems, and would be equipped with educational, health, religious, and community facilities. The floor areas of the planned houses ranged from 45.3 m² (a single large room with kitchen and bathroom) to 76.8 m² (same, plus three additional bedrooms) for larger families. In cases where relocatees had been conducting some kind of commercial or artisanal activity at their previous residence, they were assigned a four-room house with a small commercial annex (total 87.2 m²). Provisions for such housing options were the result of timely consultation with the population affected by the PRUAS social staff.
new house. To impose the burden of this discrepancy on the families subjected to forced resettlement would have easily mortgaged their ability to meet their diverse needs. The project's managers decided that the project would cover the cost difference: if the involuntary resettler originally owned his house and opted for resettlement, he/she received a new house for resettlement. If the value of the new house exceeded that of the previous shelter, the project would absorb the difference.

Those who did not have title to the land on which they had built their houses could choose either between resettlement or cash compensation for their house's value. If they chose resettlement, they received a house proportionate to the size of their household. The value of the old (demolished) shelter was recognized as a down payment towards the purchase of the new houseplot and house, and resettlers would pay the balance in monthly installments over a thirty-year period. These installments could not exceed 20 percent of the monthly family income. The payments were expected to return only 50 percent of the house construction cost to the project over the thirty-year period.\(^\text{13}\)

To facilitate people's relocation, PRUAS also started a social action program with four main components: (a) preparation of the population for transfer, including legal assistance, help in the physical move, promotion of community organizations and group activities in the new neighborhood, and others; (b) a labor training and adult education subprogram, e.g., crafts and adult

\(^{13}\) Only about 5 percent of the families to be resettled in the first few years chose cash compensation over project assisted resettlement. Subsequent independent social research (Hamilton 1991) has found that a good segment of these families who choose cash compensation in retrospect considered that they made the wrong choice.
literacy; (c) a resettlement health assistance subprogram; and (d) a community development and social promotion subprogram.

Thus, the resettlement program went beyond simple replacement by providing better housing. It shifted from a welfare/relief approach in relocation to a development-oriented approach.

Argentina’s economic crisis in the 1980s, however, interrupted the dam and powerhouse construction, as well as the relocation program, after only 1700 families were resettled. The program deteriorated, houses were not delivered in time to those displaced, unjustified delays occurred in granting legal title to houseplots, and the staff of the resettlement units was depleted. The resumption of the project in 1992 (Yacyreta II) in order to complete the partially constructed hydropower dam, led to the reassessment and reprogramming of the relocation component as well.

**Current Issues in Urban Policy and Planning**

The projects examined above, as well as many other urban projects currently under review, reveal wide differences in the quality and effectiveness of the approaches to displacement and relocation used by government agencies in developing countries. Many fundamental life and welfare threatening problems facing the displaced groups continue to be disregarded or are resolved inequitably. The main issues which require analysis every time when a new project entailing displacement is being considered, are:
(1) Whether current urban growth strategies which cause compulsory
displacement also deliberately ensure the socioeconomic reestablishment of
those affected, and whether those specific urban projects which do not should
be financed;

(2) Whether the compensation package for those displaced is adequate and
includes, especially for the poorer people, compensation in kind rather than
only in cash (e.g., house plots, housing units, materials for house construction,
and so forth), so as to lead to improved physical housing standards for the
displaced;

(3) Whether the economic units displaced are relocated with a concern for
ensuring that they will gain access to a new customer base sufficient to at least
enable them to achieve previous income levels;

(4) Whether current technical standards and methodologies for urban master
planning and metropolitan growth can be improved to ensure a better
professional assessment of the displacement/opportunity costs of urban
renewal;

(5) Whether the affected population, and its representative organizations and
leaders, are systematically consulted and given an opportunity to participate
in planning, in the selection of alternative options, and in negotiating an acceptable relocation package;

(6) Whether, and how, to improve the legal framework for land expropriation and the actual procedures for assembling/purchasing land to adequately protect those affected, particularly the urban poor and the squatters; and last, but not least,

(7) Whether, and under which circumstances, national policies for metropolitan development can be reformulated to explicitly include the goal of avoiding or minimizing involuntary resettlement and equitable approaches for protecting the relocatees' interests, when displacement becomes inevitable.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the facts and arguments presented here is the need for a policy and planning framework addressing explicitly the complex issues of urban involuntary displacement. Relocation guidelines must be included in the overall national policies that govern urban planning and investment allocations in developing countries.
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