



CLR Review

Independent Evaluation Group

1. CPS Data	
Country: El Salvador	
CPS Year: FY10	CAS/CPS Period: FY10- FY14
CLR Period: FY10 – FY14	Date of this review: June 10, 2015

2. Ratings		
	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Development Outcome:	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>
WBG Performance:	<i>Good</i>	<i>Good</i>

3. Executive Summary
<p>i. El Salvador's growth has lagged its peers in Central America for the past decade. The economic context for this CPS was one of low growth with low and stable inflation. The political background was difficult, with the first center-left government in El Salvador since the end of the civil war in 1991 running the country, facing a fragmented opposition, and having to deal with tensions within the ruling party. The main longer term challenges were to increase the growth rate, as slow growth has constrained poverty reduction, increase domestic savings and investment, and reduce violence which has imposed a high social and economic cost. At the start of the CPS the country was suffering the consequences of the global economic crisis, to which the government responded with an anti-crisis plan. The WBG program set objectives, and outcomes, consistent with the scope of the government's crisis response program, and each strategic area of intervention (macro/institutional, delivery of social services, increase economic opportunities) was backed by WBG interventions. The program was originally designed for the FY10-FY12 period, and extended to 2014 in the progress report, to coincide with the administration's term.</p> <p>ii. Despite an implementation environment complicated by the political atmosphere, the WBG program was successful in increasing opportunities for the poor, primarily through the income support and employability project (focus area III). It also strengthened the delivery of social services under focus area II, but results in this area were uneven perhaps reflecting poor government implementation capacity and objectives that were unrealistically ambitious in light of inadequate capacity. The program also engaged in some longer term issues by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities under focus area I. Interventions related to macro, judicial services, and access to information were more successful than work on electricity subsidies, fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements. The WBG team attributes this difference to a lack of inter- and intra-institutional collaboration during project implementation, particularly in the less successful interventions. It also reflected strong political opposition to revenue and expenditure policies envisaged under an IMF program, which was suspended in 2012 and expired in March 2013. Moreover, a macroeconomic environment that never quite recovered, reduced the room for maneuver of government officials interested in strengthening fiscal policy</p>

CLR Reviewed by:	Peer Reviewed by:	CLR Review Coordinator
Juan Jose Fernandez Ansola, Consultant, IEGCC Surajit Goswami Consultant, IEGCC	Paul Levy Consultant, IEGCC Igor Artemiev Consultant, IEGCC	Monica Huppi Acting Manager, IEGCC



through significant tax and expenditure reform. IFC's investments in financial institutions appear to have increased the availability of credit to micro and small enterprises (focus area III).

iii. The program was focused and selective, with interventions balanced across the three strategic areas, and consistent with a well distributed set of objectives across the areas. Therefore the resources were concentrated for maximum impact on strengthening fundamentals by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, strengthening delivery of social services, and increasing economic opportunities. It was aligned with the twin WBG goals on poverty and shared prosperity. Social inclusion of vulnerable groups was supported by DPLs and investment lending, and about two thirds of program resources were devoted to social protection, education, and health. Thus the program was focused enough for resources to have maximum impact on the twin goals. Poverty and shared prosperity issues were reflected in the results framework and measured with indicators, although some of them failed to reflect the objectives appropriately. The CPS was also aligned with government objectives, and focused on areas with initial commitment at various government levels, which was essential during negotiations with congress about WBG interventions. However, a steady commitment was not maintained by the government during program implementation.¹ The program thus suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation during project implementation that resulted in significant delays in achieving the targeted outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which the WBG would contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. At the same time, as the CLR recognizes, the framework had significant weaknesses. In a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were already accomplished in the past. The quantified targets for the future were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC and MIGA activities were kept outside the framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate. The program was initially just for the FY10-FY12 period and extended to FY14 in the progress report.² However, the latter part of the program, after the progress report, was quite disappointing.³ Cooperation between IFC and IBRD during the CPS period focused mainly on IFC advisory projects.

iv. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR on consensus building and continued dialogue with various stakeholders in a politically polarized environment, better planning in an institutional environment lacking in collaboration, promoting synergies among IBRD, IFC, and MIGA for better results, and difficulties emanating from a poorly designed results framework. IEG would like to add that although the progress report was expected to be a significant exercise, it appears to have been a missed opportunity to attempt to modify the program and strengthen key interventions. As a result implementation progressed at an extremely low pace during the second half of the program. Progress reports (PLRs) in future should not miss the opportunity for a substantive reflection on what needs to be modified in the remainder of the program, and WBG teams should use the opportunity to revise approaches to implementation on the ground. The CLR draws no lessons from IFC's lack of involvement beyond the financial sector, despite ambitious plans for interventions in infrastructure, electricity, and others. IFC needs to go beyond identifying issues and explore the investments/interventions in considerable detail, specifying conditions for success and identifying barriers to choice. Finally, the adverse macroeconomic environment seems to have played a role in the poor results of focus area I, and the WBG could attempt to pay more attention in future to macro aspects in the absence of a Fund program as sustainable growth is key.

¹ This happened with the IMF program as well, and one of the consequences of its suspension and expiration was that the envisaged Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II was dropped from the WBG program.

² Both the CPS and the progress report have no time-frames on their covers, stretching the idea of flexibility.

³ Only some non-lending activities were delivered, primarily because lending activities required the commitment of the incoming government in 2014 and some activities had to be dropped because of inadequate government commitment to the WBG program in those areas (see footnote 1).



4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** The economic context for this CPS was one of low growth with low and stable inflation. El Salvador's growth has lagged its peers in Central America for the past decade. Private consumption, partly financed by remittances, has been the main driver, while investment has been the lowest in the region. Inflation has hovered in the 1-2 percent range in 2012-15, down from a range of 5-7 percent before that. The political background has been difficult, with the first center-left government in El Salvador since the end of the civil war in 1991 facing a fragmented opposition, and having to deal with tensions within the ruling party. The main longer term challenges were to increase the growth rate—slow growth has constrained poverty reduction—increase domestic savings and investment, and reduce violence which has imposed a high social and economic cost.⁴ At the start of the CPS the country was suffering the consequences of the global economic crisis, to which the government responded with an anti-crisis plan (Plan Anti Crisis). The main elements of this plan were: (i) generating income and employment to protect vulnerable populations; (ii) extending the *Red Solidaria* program to urban areas, and expanding the provision of education, health, and nutrition programs; and (iii) creating fiscal space for priority spending. The WBG program (initially for FY10-12) focused on strengthening fundamentals for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, enhancing social service delivery, and increasing economic opportunities, especially for the poor. The CPS was congruent with the country program, as it supported the government's immediate response to economic and social aspects of the crisis while beginning to respond to longer term development challenges. The strategy left open financing for the outer years of the program, to be agreed later based on the evolution of the country environment and emerging country needs.

2. **Relevance of Design.** The results matrix included a set of outcomes consistent with the scope of the government's crisis response program. Each strategic area of intervention (macro/institutional, delivery of social services, increase economic opportunities) was backed by WBG interventions. The interventions in the three areas contained an adequate combination of technical assistance, policy loans (DPLs), specific projects to improve the delivery of social services and increase economic opportunities for example, and targeted trust funded activities that complemented well the other interventions. IFC planned to be involved in the third area (economic opportunities) with interventions to improve logistics and power supply, and financial sector support to develop products for underserved populations and support the expansion of corporations able to integrate SMEs into their operations or have an impact on low-income groups. The expected outcomes of IFC interventions were not incorporated in the results framework. The main assumptions for WBG interventions to work were strong government ownership during project implementation and appropriate local capacity to implement the projects. The government took the lead in promoting the division of labor between development partners according to their skills and experience. The main partners were the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Commission, UN agencies, and the IMF. Bilateral agencies such as USAID, JICA (Japan) and AECI (Spain) were also involved. The Bank coordinated with the other partners, especially with the IADB, agreeing on areas where each would take the lead based on experience and skills, and the IMF, on debt sustainability analysis and tax reform issues.

3. **Selectivity.** The program was focused and selective, with interventions balanced across the three strategic areas, and consistent with a well distributed set of objectives across the areas. Therefore the resources were concentrated for maximum impact on strengthening fundamentals by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, strengthening delivery of social services, and increasing economic opportunities. The program was based on adequate country diagnostics and economic

⁴ These challenges are discussed in detail in El Salvador's SCD: *Building on Strengths for a New Generation*, April 29, 2015, Central America Country Unit, WBG, Washington DC.



sector work, but a number of these pieces were relatively outdated, going back to 2006 and 2007. The selected areas were congruent with the country's development goals, but the set of interventions and objectives underestimated the time it would take to achieve the proposed outcomes. The WBG's work program was in areas where it had shown capacity to deliver in the past, and the division of labor with other development partners was based on skill and experience. The program was in support of a government anti-crisis plan and that provided the rationale for areas of intervention. Still, the WBG appropriately started work on some longer-term issues related to institutional capacities. In the initial stage of the CPS (FY10-FY12), the program concentrated on shorter term issues, in line with government needs. Institutional change and capacity development were central pieces of the first strategic area, but the issue of sustainability without aid after the program was not addressed directly in the initial stage of the CPS. Nevertheless the CPS left the outer years open to modify the program as needed depending on developments and future country needs.

4. **Alignment.** The program was aligned with the twin WBG goals on poverty and shared prosperity. Social inclusion of vulnerable groups was supported by DPLs and investment lending, and about two thirds of program resources were devoted to social protection, education, and health. Thus the program was focused enough for resources to have maximum impact on the twin goals. IFC's planned interventions in logistics included upgrading the highway network, port system, and energy supply--constraints that limited growth and thus poverty reduction. Poverty and shared prosperity issues were reflected in the results framework and measured with indicators, although some of the indicators failed to reflect the objectives appropriately.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

Focus Area I: Strengthen Fundamentals for Economic Recovery by Addressing Macro and Institutional Vulnerabilities

5. **Approve tax reform legislation aimed at increasing tax revenues and closing tax loopholes, and strengthen tax administration.** The government reformed the tax system to create new specific taxes and increase some tax rates, expand the tax base, and strengthen tax and customs administration.⁵ The indicator on tax collection as a share of GDP, relevant for the objective, was met. Tax collection increased from 12.9 percent of GDP in 2009 to 15.9 percent of GDP in 2014. The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY09) supported the strengthening, modernization, and increased coordination between the Internal Revenue Agency, the Customs Agency, and the Ministry of Finance's Treasury Office. According to the WBG team, the Customs Agency and the Tax Administration Office confirmed increased coordination that enhanced their capacity to combat tax evasion through the implementation of systems enabling them to better select and manage cases to be audited. (Achieved)

6. On investment policy and tax incentives, IFC's AS project's main objective—for the authorities to develop a joint action plan with WBG—was Not Achieved.

7. **Eliminate electricity subsidy for large firms and reduce substantially overall cost of subsidies.** The planned reduction from \$211 million (2008) across the board subsidy to \$100 million to the poorest households did not take place. The authorities made good progress with targeting in 2010, which was largely reversed in April 2011 following a temporary surge in oil prices. Subsidies on the

⁵ Tax reform was also an important component of El Salvador's program with the IMF, which provided technical advice. The authorities raised the marginal income tax and some excise tax rates, and eliminated exemptions in two steps in 2010 and 2012 with a combined yield of 1.2 percentage points of GDP. However other tax reforms recommended by the IMF—removal of income tax exemptions (including on high-income pensioners) and broadening the scope of the new property tax—were not pursued.



consumption of electricity and liquid propane continue to benefit disproportionately the wealthy. (Not Achieved)

8. **Reduce transport subsidies.** The indicator to reduce subsidies by 50 percent—reformulated at progress report stage—to US\$42 million in 2014 was met. Subsidies in 2014 are estimated at US\$35.8 million—their reduction was important to open fiscal space for other priority spending. (Achieved)

9. **Improve PEFA ratings.** Although the government has defined a medium-term budget framework and piloted results-based budgeting in two ministries, the PEFA ratings on the indicator for multiyear perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and on the indicator on classification of the budget remain the same as in the baseline. (Not Achieved)

10. **Increase user satisfaction with judicial services.** The indicator on judicial services was met. According to the impact evaluation of the Soyapango Center, 85 percent of users are satisfied with its service provision. The court model was extended to two other locations in San Salvador. Survey results show that perceptions of judicial services introduced under the new court model—based on the Judicial Modernization Project (FY03)—has improved for more than 50 percent of current users. (Achieved)

11. **Enhance public access to fiscal information through new legal and regulatory framework.** The indicator on the new legal and regulatory framework, with two targets, was met. Under the first target, an Access to Information Law came into force in 2013. Under the second target, in mid-2010 the Ministry of Finance launched the Fiscal Transparency Portal providing easy access to a array of fiscal data based on international best practices. True, the second target for this indicator was introduced at progress report stage (June 2011) and the target had been achieved already by mid-2010. The indicator on percentage of public sector procurement transactions recorded in COMPRASAL also was achieved. Ninety two percent of public sector procurement is recorded in COMPRASAL (against a target of 80 percent for 2014. The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY09) contributed to this objective, and TA was provided through the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Development TAL (FY10) and grants for Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency (FY06, FY10). This support enabled the development of the fiscal portal website, training and workshops for system operators, and implementation of the Access to Public Information Law. (Achieved)

12. **Show tangible progress in making government financial statements consistent with International Public Sector Financial Statements (IPSAS) and Government Finance Statistics (GFS) standards.** The new Integrated Financial Management System (SAFI) is still under development and is expected to be up and running for budget 2017. Steps have been taken to harmonize accounting reports with legal standards. There is a proposal for a National Accounting Plan under the new SAFI II that takes into account IPSAS standards. The WBG supported this objective through the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance TAL (FY10) and the grants for Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency (FY06, FY10). (Not Achieved)

13. **Review, finalize and implement emergency plans for the most vulnerable populations and local jurisdictions.** Indicators on revising relevant laws and developing emergency plans—both reformulated at CPS progress report stage—were met. All sections of the Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan were updated in 2012, and strengthened in 2013 by integrating guidelines for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and including additional risks to ensure a comprehensive vision of disaster risk management. Sector emergency plans were presented to the Civil Protection National Commission in 2010. The latter indicator was introduced in the 2011 progress report when the proposed target had been achieved already (in 2010). The WBG supported this objective through the Disaster Risk Management DPL with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (FY11), the Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Initiative Project (FY11), and the Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience to Natural Hazards in Central America (FY14). (Achieved)



14. Establish a contingent line of credit as part of the country's disaster risk strategy. This objective was introduced at progress report stage (June 2011) and had been achieved already before its introduction (February 2011). The Disaster Risk Management DPL with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (FY11) for this purpose was approved on February 1, 2011. (Achieved)

15. Improve local capacities to assess risk. Under the WBG's Central America Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA) and follow-up training helped build institutional capacity for probabilistic seismic risk assessment for the education and health portfolio of the San Salvador metropolitan area. This was then extended to estimate probable losses and damages to 1,550 buildings of the health and education sectors. The Bank supported the incorporation of findings in guidelines for a risk reduction program. (Achieved)

16. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area I as Moderately Satisfactory. Overall this focus area was aligned with country development goals, although during the FY10-FY12 period, given the external context, the government was more concentrated on aspects related to the anti-crisis program. A tax reform including strengthened tax administration, reduction of transport subsidies, increased public satisfaction with judicial services and access to fiscal information, and strengthened capacity to deal with environmental emergencies point to successful WBG interventions in these areas. Work on eliminating electricity subsidies to large firms and reducing the cost of subsidies, fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements did not show similar satisfactory results. Strong political opposition to revenue and expenditure policies envisaged under an IMF program, which was suspended in 2012 and expired in March 2013, contributed to the poor results. Poor macro performance also limited the room for maneuver of government officials interested in these reform objectives. This focus area was supported by an appropriate mix of WBG projects and DPLs, trust funded activities, and AAA. El Salvador was also part of WBG regional initiatives on climate change adaptation activities. The key interventions were Sustaining Social Gains and Economic Recovery DPL (FY10), Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY11), Judicial Modernization project (FY03), and a DPL with CAT DDO (FY11). These were supported by trust funded activities and AAA: Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency Institutional Development Fund grant (FY06) supporting a technical assistance loan, Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency grant (FY09), and a Public Expenditure Review (FY12) that included a Public Expenditure and Institutional Review of the Security and Justice Sector (FY12). El Salvador also participated in two regional WBG interventions: Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Initiative project and Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience to natural Hazards in Central America.

Focus Area II: Strengthen Delivery of Social Services

17. Expand prevention and promotion of health care services through the Integrated Health Care Services model. The first indicator, reformulated at the progress report stage, was to increase the percentage of individuals receiving health care services from the 92 eligible municipalities from 70 percent in 2008 to 85 percent in 2014. It was not met. Sixty one percent of eligible municipalities received healthcare services at least once in 2014. The second indicator, which was met, targeted a nominal amount for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in health in the proposed 2010-14 budgets to be on average at least at the same 2008 level. There is a tenuous connection between the latter indicator and the objective, although higher levels of capital expenditure contributed to the expansion of the Integrated Health Care Services model. The Bank supported this objective through the Strengthening Health Care System project (FY12). (Partially Achieved)

18. Increase the number of hospital discharges in the public sector. The first indicator targeted an increase of hospital discharges from 365 thousand in 2009 to 480 thousand in 2014. Hospital discharges increased to about 400 thousand in 2014, and thus the target was not met. The second indicator was met, as 520 family community teams (ECOS) equipped and functioning according to norms established by the Ministry of Health were functioning in 2014. This indicator is not clearly linked to the objective. (Partially Achieved)



19. **Expand coverage, equity and quality of priority health services for targeted population.** The first indicator—on percentage of pregnant women receiving at least four pre-natal check-ups in 82 selected municipalities—was met. The second indicator—on percentage of poor people with access to public health services in eligible municipalities—was not met, but showed substantial results (61 percent against the 65 percent targeted). (Mostly Achieved)

20. **Implement drug supply management system in eligible public hospitals.** The indicator was for 20 public hospitals to have implemented a drug supply management system by 2014. As of that date, all hospitals are using the National Supply System as drug supply management and planning system. (Achieved)

21. **Increase enrollment rate in secondary education.** The indicators on the increase of enrollment and number of operating classrooms in secondary education were met. The indicator on non-personnel recurrent expenditure was also met. This last indicator did not measure achievement of the proposed objective and was introduced at the progress report stage (June 2011) when the target had already been met. (Achieved)

22. **Elaborate new curriculum for teaching science and technology in upper secondary schools (keeping in mind labor market needs for skills).** The indicator referred to the introduction of a new curriculum for teaching science and technology (in line with labor market need for skills) in upper secondary schools. The indicator was partially achieved, as the Ministry of Education developed a science and technology curriculum for upper secondary technical education in agriculture and electrical engineering that was implemented in 2011 with participation of the productive sector. (Partially Achieved)

23. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area II as Moderately Satisfactory. Results in this area were more uneven than those in Focus Area I. Only two out of six objectives were fully achieved, reflecting over-optimism in the results framework about the time it would take to get projects implemented. The enrollment rate in secondary education was increased and public hospitals are now part of a national drug supply management system. Coverage and quality of health services have improved but at a lower rate than anticipated under the program and partial results obtained in developing a science and technology curriculum in upper secondary schools. The main WBG interventions comprised an Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction and Health Services Extension project (FY02), a Strengthening Public health Care project (FY12), the Sustaining Social Gains DPL (FY10), and a Science, Technology, and Innovation System Capacity Support Non-Lending TA (FY12).

Focus Area III: Increase Economic Opportunities for the Poor

24. **Protect the income of the urban poor.** The indicator referred to the number of families in targeted urban settlements receiving income support. It was met, as 40 thousand individuals from extreme poor and poor urban settlements in 25 municipalities were benefiting from the Temporary Income Support Program by 2014. (Achieved)

25. **Design and standardize unified registration system of social protection system participants.** As of October 2014 the Registro Unico de Participantes was being used by the *Comunidades Solidarias* program to target beneficiaries in urban precarious settlements of 71 municipalities. Progress was observed in incorporating beneficiaries from other social programs and subsidies, but there is still significant work to do to have a unified registration system of all social protection system participants. (Partially Achieved)

26. **Expand. *Comunidades Solidarias* program to cover 125 poorest municipalities.** By 2014 the *Comunidades Solidarias* program was working in the 125 poorest municipalities of the country. (Achieved)



27. **Extend coverage of training programs.** On the first indicator, participants in the Temporary Income Support Program (PATI), which includes job skill training for its beneficiaries, has been expanded to the 25 poorest municipalities responding to the revised urban poverty map. On the second indicator, 58 Bolsas de Empleo connected to the National Employment Network were operating by October 2014, slightly less than the 66 targeted but still significant. (Achieved)

28. **Establish a system to finance municipal projects and increase transfer to municipalities by 2 percent during crisis period.** The indicator—reformulated at progress report stage—referred to establishing a system to finance municipal projects and increasing transfers to municipalities during the crisis period. The government transferred extra funds to municipalities but no system was put in place to finance municipal projects. (Not Achieved)

29. **Increase number of municipalities that produce 5-year development plans with ample civil society engagement.** As of 2014, 135 municipalities (52 percent of the total) had completed their five-year development plans with civil society engagement. (Achieved)

30. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area III as Satisfactory, as a majority of objectives in this area were achieved. This was the focus area most central to the anti-crisis program, and one where the government showed a fairly consistent ownership across objectives. Coordination with other development partners also contributed to more homogeneous results across objectives. Results thus were achieved, at least partially, in most objectives to increase economic opportunities for the poor, based on focused interventions and realistic objectives. The main WBG interventions were the Income Support and Employability project (FY10) and the Local Government Strengthening project (FY10). IFC contributed in this area through the support of financial sector projects for microfinance and through financing a cooperative.

Overall Assessment and Rating

31. IEG rates the overall development outcome of this CPS as Moderately Satisfactory. Despite an implementation environment that was complicated by the political atmosphere, the program was successful in increasing opportunities for the poor, primarily through the income support and employability project (Focus Area III). It also strengthened the delivery of social services under focus area II, but results in this area were uneven perhaps reflecting poor government implementation capacity and objectives that were unrealistically ambitious in light of inadequate capacity. The program also engaged in some longer term issues by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities under focus area I. Interventions related to macro, judicial services, and access to information were more successful than work on fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements. The WBG team attributes this difference to a lack of inter- and intra-institutional collaboration during project implementation particularly in the less successful interventions. A poor macroeconomic environment, and strong political opposition to tax and expenditure reforms under an IMF program were also contributing factors.

Objectives	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Focus Area I: Strengthen Fundamentals for Economic Recovery by Addressing Macro and Institutional Vulnerabilities	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Focus Area II: Strengthen Delivery of Social Services	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Focus Area III: Increase Economic Opportunities for the Poor	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory



6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

32. At the start of the CPS period, IBRD had 7 ongoing operations totaling \$762 million. The ongoing portfolio included investment operations in social protection, education, the environment (including earthquake emergencies), land administration, and judicial modernization. Three trust funded activities for \$6 million provided complementary financing.

33. During the CPS period, IBRD made commitments totaling \$540 million for eight operations, including a CAT—DDO DPL, a public finance and social progress DPL, and a sustaining social gains for economic recovery DPL. Seven trust funded activities for \$10 million provided complementary financing. IBRD committed resources were slightly below the planned amount (\$650 million), primarily because a planned project on innovation, science and technology and a planned DPL on public finance and social progress were not carried out. In addition to the DPLs, there were projects in fiscal management, local government strengthening, social sector support, health, and education.

34. On average, for the period FY12-15, IBRD committed resources were disbursed at a rate similar to that of the LCR region and at a higher rate than Bank wide. The average disbursement ratio for El Salvador's investment operations during the CPS period was 24 percent, as compared to 27 percent and 22 percent for the LCR region and Bank-wide respectively.

35. The El Salvador portfolio was less risky than the LCR Region and Bank wide portfolios. During FY12-15, the El Salvador portfolio had 9 percent of the projects at risk, as compared to 20 percent for the LCR Region and Bank-wide. On a commitment basis, the El Salvador portfolio also performed better with 3 percent of the commitments at risk as compared to 16 percent for the LCR region and 18 percent Bank-wide. IEG reviewed the ICRs of six projects that closed during the FY10-FY14 period and rated four as moderately satisfactory or better and two as moderately unsatisfactory. With respect to active projects, management assessments report that the majority of projects were making satisfactory progress towards achieving their development objectives except for the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Development project (FY10) and the Strengthening Health Care System project (FY12)—both rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in latest supervision reports.

36. Three IFC investments for \$55 million in net commitments were in operation at CPS inception. During the CPS IFC committed additional \$160 million through seven investments in the financial sector, addressing trade, housing, micro and SME finance as well as general commercial banking.

37. The CLR made no comments on the quality of the IFC investment portfolio, but internal IFC documents indicate that the IFC investment projects were being implemented as planned. IEG reviewed one IFC investment project that was in the portfolio during the review period and rated it as Mostly Successful.

38. MIGA provided \$173 million in investment guarantees during the CPS.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

39. A program of analytic work and advisory activities and services including 5 Economic and Sector Works (ESWs) and 14 Technical Assistance (TA) tasks was delivered during the FY10-FY14 period. The Bank provided advice to the government on using the reactivation of the rural sector, improving the efficiency of the judicial system, and developing the financial and insurance sector. All in all, the program of AAA supported well the Bank's lending program. The impact of the overall program of AAA is hard to assess, and the CLR does not attempt to make an assessment.



40. IFC had no ongoing advisory service (AS) project at CPS inception. During the CPS IFC approved 5 AS projects amounting to over \$2.9 million of total funds (public lighting, port, tax and incentives, Apoyo Integral, AMC El Salvador). Two of these were terminated owing to lack of progress and one closed during the review period was rated by IEG as Mostly Unsuccessful. Based on IFC internal documents the remaining AS projects are likely to be rated Mostly Unsatisfactory at completion

Results Framework

41. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expects to contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. Although the causal chain was not explicitly discussed in the text, and in some cases some objectives were not supported by linked WBG activities, the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. At the same time—as the CLR recognizes—the framework had significant weaknesses. In a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous link with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were in the past (already accomplished). Some indicators lacked target values. The quantified targets were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC and MIGA activities were kept outside the framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate. These weaknesses affected adversely the credibility of the results framework, particularly the one set up at progress report stage. Unintended positive or negative effects of the interventions were not explicitly identified in the program documents, and the scale up to country level outcomes could be inferred from the original results framework but were not explicitly discussed in the program documents.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

42. Donor coordination appears to have been good under this CPS, especially among the IMF, IADB, and WBG. According to the WBG team this had benefits for policy advice, for the coordinated funding of programs, and for collaboration with the government. The most successful example was the multi-funded Temporary Income Support Program (PATI), where donor coordination was led by the government. Regular meetings and constant dialogue among development partners was crucial for the alignment and interventions and programs for social protection. Another example of good practice was in the health sector, where the IADB and the WBG worked closely to develop a complex health reform. There are also counter-examples where development partner cooperation did not work well. In the fiscal sector, in particular, donor coordination has been poor. The WBG Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan was prepared in close coordination with multilateral organizations and donors but at the time of implementation it has suffered from poor coordination. According to the WBG team, ongoing efforts to improve coordination need to be supplemented by stronger ownership and leadership from the Ministry of Finance to be more effective

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

43. No major safeguards or fiduciary issues occurred during the CPS. The WBG team reports that a few minor issues were resolved in a timely manner by the WBG and government teams.

Ownership and Flexibility

44. The CPS was closely aligned with government objectives, and focused on areas where there was initial commitment at various government levels, which was essential during negotiations with congress about WBG interventions. However, a steady commitment was not maintained by the government during program implementation. The program thus suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation during project implementation that resulted in significant delays in planned outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. Good examples of government ownership are the Income Support and Employability project (FY10) and the Local Government



Strengthening project (FY10) that required a high commitment from implementing agencies and 262 municipalities. An example of poor ownership is the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance (FY10) that has floundered amidst poor intra-government coordination.

45. The program initially covered FY10-FY12 only, and was extended to FY14, to coincide with the administration's term, in the progress report of 2011.

WBG Internal Cooperation

46. Cooperation between IFC and IBRD during the CPS period centered on IFC advisory projects, where, according to the WBG team, IFC worked with IBRD in reforms to the PPP law and preparation of the bidding process for a project in La Union, a department in El Salvador. Despite the cooperation, the results framework for the program failed to integrate IFC activities. Moreover the collaboration has remained ad-hoc without strategic alignment and efforts to jointly explore and identify opportunities for development and greater impact. Issues related to potential conflicts of interest between IBRD and IFC were not discussed in the CLR.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

47. The CPS identified the main risks, such as a prolonged global deceleration following the global financial crisis—which did not happen. The mitigation in this case was to create fiscal space under the program to address emerging social and other needs. Another risk was that a highly polarized political climate could affect program implementation, which did materialize. In anticipation, the initial design of the program contained operations that could generate ample public support. Additionally, the WBG responded by intensifying stakeholder consultations to build understanding and support for operations that were critical, non-partisan efforts to promote social and economic development. Moreover, the WBG and the government recognized the need for consensus building processes and effective dialogue for the restructuring of an operation, including with the opposition.

48. Two other identified risks involved natural disasters and limited institutional capacity. Both materialized—a DPL CAT DDO was a partial response to the first, but the second was much more difficult to deal with in the context of a new administration with no previous executive experience. Despite WBG engagements to develop absorptive capacity through technical assistance, such capacity remained inadequate, showing in some instances that timeframes for objectives were unrealistic.

49. IEG recognizes that in a country in a political state-of-flux like El Salvador during this CPS, it is truly difficult to have all the bases covered regarding risks to the program. In this context, it was appropriate for WBG to commit initially to FY10-FY12. This provided the chance to “start again” in FY13 in case something unforeseen and of significant scale were to happen. The later part (after progress report) of this program was quite disappointing in terms of program implementation.

Overall Assessment and Rating

50. IEG rates WBG performance as **Good**. The program was well designed with a set of outcomes consistent with the scope of the government's crisis response program. Each strategic area was backed by WBG interventions, which contained an adequate combination of technical assistance, policy loans (DPLs), specific projects to improve the delivery of social services and increase economic opportunities for example, and targeted trust funded activities that complemented well the other interventions. IFC was involved in the third area (economic opportunities) with interventions to improve logistics and power supply, and financial sector support. The program committed initially to the FY10-FY12 period, and was extended to FY14 in the progress report of June 2011. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expected to contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. Although causal chains were not explicitly discussed in the text—and in some cases some objectives were not supported by linked



WBG activities—the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. But in a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were in the past (already accomplished). Targets were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC activities were kept outside the framework. These weaknesses affected adversely the credibility of the results framework, particularly the one set up at progress report stage. Program implementation suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation that resulted in significant delays compared to targeted outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. As a consequence the pace of implementation slowed down considerably, and two key interventions for the second half of the program (Innovation, Science and Technology project (FY12) and Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II (FY13)) never took off the ground. Donor coordination appears to have been good under this CPS, especially among the IMF, IADB, and WBG.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

51. The CLR framework of analysis is consistent with the progress report objectives, although the text and the summary of the CPS program self-evaluation have different presentations of the program for some clusters. The CLR discusses the evidence on program indicators, but it could have been more substantive in explaining the WBG's contribution to country outcomes. The CLR is candid but could have discussed the slow pace of program implementation after the progress report in more detail. Two key planned interventions never took off the ground. The CLR also could have been more critical with the way some indicator targets were set up ex-post at progress report stage, with targets already accomplished at the time of their setting. The CPS and progress report identify citizen security as a priority. Action was taken both in FY10 (organization of summit) and FY14 (Action Learning Approach Towards a Strategy for Citizen Security) and the CLR could have addressed this key priority in its assessment.

8. Findings and Lessons

52. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR about consensus building and continued dialogue with various stakeholders in a politically polarized environment, better planning in an institutional environment lacking in collaboration, promoting synergies of IBRD, IFC, and MIGA for better results, and difficulties emanating from a poorly designed results framework. IEG would like to add that although the progress report was expected to be a significant exercise, it appears to have been a missed opportunity to attempt to modify and strengthen key interventions. As a result implementation progressed at an extremely low pace during the second half of the program. Progress reports (PLRs) in future should not miss the opportunity for a substantive reflection on what needs to be modified in the remainder of the program—and WBG teams use the opportunity for revising approaches to implementation on the ground. The CLR draws no lessons from IFC's not being involved beyond the financial sector despite its initially ambitious plans for infrastructure, electricity, and others. IFC needs to go beyond identifying issues and explore investments/interventions in considerable detail, specifying conditions for success and identifying barriers to choice. Finally, the adverse macroeconomic environment seems to have played a role in poor results of focus area I, and the WBG could attempt to pay more attention in future to macro aspects in the absence of a Fund program, as sustainable growth is key.

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- Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for El Salvador, FY10-14**
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Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CPS Objectives

	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	Country Development Objective: Broaden the tax base		
	1. CPS Objective: Tax reform legislation aimed at increasing tax revenues and closing tax loopholes is approved, and tax administration systems strengthened		
	Indicator: Tax collection as a percentage of GDP Baseline: 12.4% (2009) Target: 15.8% (2014)	AS of December 2014, tax collection projection was 15.9%. The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (P122699) supported the strengthening of tax administration systems. This operation supported the strengthening, modernization, and coordination between three tax agencies: Internal Revenue Agency (DGII), the Customs Agency (DGA), and the Ministry of Finance's Treasury Office (DGT). The Customs Agency (DGA) and the Tax Administration Office (DGII) have confirmed that the Directorates have strengthened their respective capacity to fight tax evasion through the implementation of systems that will enable them to select and manage the cases to be audited by the Borrower's tax authorities.	Source: CLR and El Salvador Team.
	Country Development Objective: Improve targeting of subsidies		
	2. CPS Objective: Electricity subsidy for large firms eliminated and overall costs substantially reduced		
Indicator: Electricity subsidy for large firms eliminated and overall costs reduced Baseline: US\$210.9 million (2008) Target: US\$100 million only for targeted poor households (2014)	Efforts were made to improve the targeting. In March 2009, the government eliminated the generalized component of the electricity subsidy for households and firms, leaving only a subsidy targeted on the poorest households. Between April and October 2010, given the substantial increase in international petroleum prices, a temporary subsidy was reinstated for all residential consumers (but not for firms). After October the subsidy reverted only to the targeted poorest households. Despite these efforts, the electricity subsidy in 2012 totalized US\$200.6 million, around US\$100 million more than the estimated target	Source: CLR and El Salvador Team The outcome indicator was reformulated at the CPSPR stage.	
3. CPS Objective: Transport subsidies reduced			
Indicator: Amount of transport subsidies reduced by 50%	The transport subsidy estimated for 2014 is US\$35.8 M.	Source: CLR	



CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
<p>Baseline: US\$84 million (2008)</p> <p>Target: US\$42 million (2014)</p>		<p>The outcome indicator was reformulated at the CPSPR stage.</p>
<p>Country Development Goal: Implement results-based budgeting</p>		
<p>4. CPS Objective: Improve PEFA ratings</p>		
<p>Indicator: Improvements in PEFA ratings indicator #12 (Multiyear perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting) and indicator #5 (Classification of the budget)</p> <p>Baseline: PEFA #12=C+; PEFA #5=C (2009)</p> <p>Target: PEFA #12=B; PEFA #5=B (2014)</p>	<p>Although, PEFA indicators remain the same as the baseline, the Government has defined a medium-term budget framework (that was incorporated in the 2011 budget), and a result-based budgeting methodology that was piloted in the 2011 budgets of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health. The Government expects to implement a result-based budgeting methodology in all ministries in the coming years.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The target was provided at the CPSPR stage.</p>
<p>Country Development Goal: Enhance quality of judicial services</p>		
<p>5. CPS Objective: Increase user satisfaction with judicial services</p>		
<p>Indicator: Satisfaction of users with the new Judicial Services Center has increased by 50% and the Government has extended the model to other two judicial centers</p> <p>Baseline: A new Integrated Judicial Services Center was designed for the Soyapango district.</p> <p>Target: 50% increase in user satisfaction (2014)</p>	<p>According to the Impact Evaluation of the Soyapango Center, 85% of users are satisfied with its service provision. Almost 50% of users, and 27.6%, said that the Center is very efficient, or moderately efficient, respectively. Furthermore, the model was extended to two other locations in San Salvador.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The outcome indicator was reformulated at the CPSPR stage. The baseline provided at the CPSPR stage was not aligned with how the indicator was formulated.</p>
<p>Country Development Goal: Enhance access to information</p>		
<p>6. CPS Objective: Legal and regulatory framework in place to enhance public access to fiscal information</p>		
<p>Indicator: Legal and regulatory framework in place to enhance public access to fiscal information</p> <p>Baseline: No regulations exist on enhanced public access to fiscal information (2009).</p> <p>Target: (i) Legal and regulatory framework in place to enhance public access to fiscal information (2014); (ii) the Fiscal Transparency Portal has been redesigned and launched (2014).</p>	<p>Target one: An Access to Information Law came into force in 2013.</p> <p>Target two: In mid-2010, the Ministry of Finance launched the Fiscal Transparency Portal that provides easy access to a service array of fiscal data, based on international best practices.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The second target for the indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage (June 2011). The target had been already achieved by mid-2010.</p>



CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
<p>Indicator: Percentage of public sector procurement transactions recorder in COMPRASAL</p> <p>Baseline: 44%</p> <p>Target: 80% (2014)</p>	<p>92 percent of public sector procurement is recorded in COMPRASAL.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p>
<p>Country Development Goal: Improve fiscal transparency</p>		
<p>7. CPS Objective: Government financial statements show tangible progress towards being consistent with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and Government Financial Statistics (GFS) standards</p>		
<p>Indicator: Government financial statements show tangible progress towards being consistent with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and Government Financial Statistics (GFS) standards</p> <p>Baseline: Government financial statements are not consistent with IPSAS and Government Financial Statistics standards (2009)</p> <p>Target: Government Financial Statements are consistent with IPSAS and Government Financial Statistics Standards are automatically produced by an upgraded SAFI (2014)</p>	<p>The new SAFI is still under development and is expected to be up and running for budget 2017. Steps have been taken to harmonize accounting reports with legal standards. There is a proposal for a National Accounting Plan under the new SAFI II that takes into account IPSAS standards.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p>
<p>Country Development Goal: Improve disaster management</p>		
<p>8. CPS Objective: Review, finalize and implement emergency plans for the most vulnerable populations and local jurisdictions</p>		
<p>Indicator: The Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation National Plan is under revision as prescribed by law.</p> <p>Baseline: No (2009)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>All sections of the Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation National Plan were updated in 2012. In 2013, it was further strengthened by integrating guidelines for rehabilitation and reconstruction and including additional risks to ensure a comprehensive vision of disaster risk management. The revised Plan is currently under consultation.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>This CPS objective was reformulated at the CPSPR stage. The indicator to measure the achievement of the objective was introduced at the CPSPR stage.</p>
<p>Indicator: The sectoral emergency plans are presented to Civil Protection National Commission.</p>	<p>The sectoral emergency response plans were presented to the Commission in 2010. Since then, the 7 Sectoral Emergency Response Commissions have been meeting regularly and the plans are</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>This CPS objective was reformulated at the CPSPR stage. The</p>



	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Baseline: No Target: Yes (2014)	systematically implemented during relevant emergencies and are monitored for continuous improvement. In 2014, contingency plans for floods, seismic activity and epidemics (dengue) were activated. In addition, the National Seismic Contingency Plan for earthquakes and tsunamis was tested through simulations in June 2013 and in May 2014 with the support of the Humanitarian Allied Forces and the participation of the Sectoral Emergency Response Commissions.	indicator to measure the achievement of the objective was introduced at the CPSPR stage (2011). However, the proposed target had already been achieved in 2010.
9. CPS Objective: Establish a contingent line of credit as part of the country's disaster risk strategy			
	Indicator: Contingent line of credit established Baseline: No Target: Yes (2014)	A DPL with a CAT-DDO in the amount of US\$50 million was approved on February 1, 2011, made effective on May 24, 2011, and closed on August 31, 2014. It was fully disbursed through two requests on October 17 and 27, 2011, to provide resources to respond to the impact of the tropical depression 12E.	Source: CLR This CPS objective was introduced at the CPSPR stage (June 2011). The proposed target had already been achieved before its introduction (February 2011).
10. CPS Objective: Improve local capacities to assess risk			
	Indicator: Support for conducting the Central America Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA) delivered and findings from the CAPRA exercise incorporated into the Government's risk reduction program. Baseline: No Target: Yes (2014)	To support El Salvador's participation in CAPRA, the Bank and other partners provided hands-on practical training and complementary advisory services on probabilistic risk assessment. This support allowed local counterparts to assess seismic hazard, compile and update existing exposure data, codify this information, assess the vulnerability of the portfolio, and to finally calculate seismic risk using CAPRA. The Bank also supported El Salvador to incorporate the findings of the CAPRA exercise into guidelines for a risk reduction program.	Source: CLR and El Salvador Team. The CPS objective was introduced at the CPSPR stage (June 2011). A baseline and a target were proposed although no clear indicator was formulated.



	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Strengthen delivery of social services	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	Country Development Goal: Improve access to basic health services		
	11. CPS Objective: Prevention and promotion of health care services through the Integrated Health Care Services model expanded		
	Indicator: Percentage of individuals from the 92 eligible municipalities receiving health care services Baseline: 70% (2008) Target: 85% (2014)	61.3% of individuals of the eligible municipalities received health care services in 90 municipalities, at least once in 2014 (Source: Ministry of Health). Originally designed to reach 92 municipalities, the Strengthening Public Health Care System Project was restructured and reduced the number of eligible municipalities from 92 to 90.	Source: CLR and Ministry of Health The indicator was reformulated at the CPSPR stage.
	Indicator: Nominal amount for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in health in the proposed 2010-2014 Budgets are on average at least the same level as in 2008.	Nominal amount for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in health in the 2010-2014 Budgets were on average US\$331.1 million, surpassing the levels of 2008.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.
	12. CPS Objective: Increase the number of hospital discharges in the public sector		
	Indicator: Number of hospital discharges in public sector has increased by 10% over 2008 Baseline: 364,915 (2009) Target: ≥ 480,000 (2014)	Hospital discharges in 2014: 394,766; 2013: 403,181	Source: CLR and Ministry of Health The baseline for this outcome indicator was provided at the CPSPR stage.
	Indicator: Family community teams (ECOS) equipped and functioning according to norms established by MOH Baseline: 0 ECOS Target: 500 ECOS (2014)	520 ECOS working in 164 municipalities. From this total, 482 are family ECOS and 36 specialized ECOS	Source: CLR and Ministry of Health The indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.
	13. CPS Objective: Coverage, equity and quality of priority health services is been expanded for targeted population		
Indicator: Percentage of pregnant women receiving at least four pre-natal check-ups in selected 82 Municipalities Baseline: Not provided.	83% of pregnant women registered in the public health system of the 90 eligible municipalities received at least four pre-natal check-ups in 2014.	Source: CLR and Ministry of Health. The outcome indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage. No baseline was reported.	



	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Strengthen delivery of social services	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Target: 85% of pregnant women receiving at least four pre-natal check-ups		
	Indicator: Percentage of poor people with access to public health services in eligible municipalities Baseline: 50% Target: 65%	In 2014, 61.3% of individuals of the 90 eligible municipalities received health care services, at least once in 2014. Additionally, out of the 90 eligible municipalities, 32 have total or partial health coverage by ECOS.	Source: CLR and Ministry of Health. The outcome indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.
CPS Objective: Eligible Public hospitals have implemented a drug supply management system			
	Indicator: Eligible public hospitals have implemented a drug supply management system Baseline: No Target: 20 public hospitals have implemented a drug supply management system (2014)	All hospitals are using the National Supply System as a drug supply management and planning system.	Source: CLR The outcome indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.
Country Development Goal: Improve coverage and quality of secondary education			
14. CPS Objective: Increase enrollment rate in secondary education			
	Indicator: Secondary education enrollment to be increased by about 38,000 students Baseline: 55,000 (2008) Target: 93,000 (2014)	Total enrollment in secondary education increased more than 38,000 students (633,369 students in total by 2010).	Source: CLR The baseline for this outcome indicator was provided at the CPSPR stage.
	Indicator: Number of operating classrooms in secondary education Baseline: Not provided Target: Increased by 200	The number of operating classrooms in secondary education increased more than 200	Source: CLR This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.
	Indicator: Nominal amount for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in education and health in the proposed 2010 Budget are at least the same level as in 2008 Baseline: No Target: Yes	In 2010, non-personnel recurrent expenditures in education (US\$ 184,100,000) and in health (US\$265,200,000) were higher than the levels as in 2008 (US\$141,740,000 and US\$ 220,500,000 respectively).	Source: CLR This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.



	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Strengthen delivery of social services	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	15. CPS Objective: New curriculum for teaching science and technology in upper secondary schools elaborated, taking into account labor market needs for skills		
	Indicator: New curriculum for teaching science and technology in upper secondary schools elaborated, taking into account labor market needs for skills Baseline: No Target: Yes	In 2010, Ministry of Education developed a science and technology curriculum for upper secondary technical education in agriculture and electrical engineering. The new curriculum was implemented in 2011 with the participation of the productive sector.	Source: CLR
	CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area III Increase economic opportunities for the poor		
	Country Development Goal: Protect the income of the urban poor, through the implementation of targeted programs		
	16. CPS Objective: Protect the income of the urban poor		
	Indicator: Number of families in targeted urban settlements receiving income support Baseline: 0 Target: 40,000 (2014)	40,000 individuals from extreme poor and poor urban settlements in 25 municipalities have benefited from the Temporary Income Support Program (PATI).	Source: CLR and PATI
	Country Development Goal: Support design of components of a universal social protection system (SPSU)		
	17. CPS Objective: Unified registration system of participants designed and standardized		
Major Outcome Measures	Indicator: Unified registration system of participants designed and standardized Baseline: No Target: Yes (2014)	As of October 2014, the RUP was already being used by Comunidades Solidarias program to target beneficiaries in Urban Precarious Settlements of 71 municipalities; and progress has been made to incorporate other social programs (ECOS) and subsidies beneficiaries.	Source: CLR and PATI
	18. CPS Objective: Comunidades Solidarias expanded to cover 125 poorest municipalities		
	Indicator: Number of poor municipalities covered by the Comunidades Solidarias Rurales Program Baseline: 77 (2008) Target: 125 (2014)	The Comunidades Solidarias program is working in the 125 poorest municipalities of the country.	Source: CLR The baseline and target were provided at the CPSPR stage.
	Country Development Goal: Coverage of training programs extended		



CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area III Increase economic opportunities for the poor	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
19. CPS Objective: Participants in Temporary Income Support Program in 25 municipalities receive job skill training		
<p>Indicator: Participants in Temporary Income Support Program in 25 municipalities receive job skill training</p> <p>Baseline: No</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>PATI, which includes job skill training for its beneficiaries, has been expanded to the 25 poorest municipalities, responding to the revised urban poverty map.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p>
<p>Indicator: Number of “Bolsas de Empleo” fully operational and connected to the National Employment Network (RNE)</p> <p>Baseline: 28</p> <p>Target: 46</p>	<p>58 Bolsas de Empleo were operating by October 2014.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The baseline was provided at the CPSPR stage.</p>
Country Development Goal: Increase investment and employment in rural areas		
20. CPS Objective: Government has established a system to finance municipal projects and had increased transfer to municipalities by 2% during the crisis period		
<p>Indicator: Government has established a system to finance municipal projects and had increased transfer to municipalities by 2% during the crisis period</p> <p>Baseline: No additions to regular Government transfers via FODES (Municipal Economic and Social Development Fund)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The Government transferred extra money to the municipalities through the WBG project, but no program was put in place to transfer additional funds to FODES.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The outcome indicator was reformulated at the CPSPR stage.</p>
21. CPS Objective: Percentage of municipal Government that have produced their 5-year Municipal Development Plan with ample civil society engagement		
<p>Indicator: Percentage of municipal Government that have produced their 5-year Municipal Development Plan with ample civil society engagement</p> <p>Baseline: 25%</p> <p>Target: 45% (2014)</p>	<p>As of 2014, 135 municipalities had completed their five-Year Development Plans (52 percent of the total municipalities).</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The outcome indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.</p>



Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for El Salvador, FY10-14

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
Project Planned Under CPS / CPSPR 2010-13							
P118036	Sustaining Social Gains for Econ. Recovery DPL \$100	FY10	2010	2011	100.0	100.0	IEG: S
P095314	Fiscal Mgmt. & Public Sector Development \$20	FY10	2010	2017	20.0	20.0	LIR: MU
P117440	Income Support & Employability \$50	FY10	2010	2016	50.0	50.0	LIR: MS
P118026	Local Government Strengthening Project \$80	FY10	2010	2016	80.0	80.0	LIR: MS
P122699	Public Finance and Social Progress DPL I \$100	FY11	2011	2013	100.0	100.0	IEG: MS
P122640	DPL with a CAT-DDO \$50	FY11	2011	2015	50.0	50.0	LIR: S
P117157	Health Sector Project \$80	FY12	2012	2016	80.0	80.0	LIR: MS
P126364	Education Project \$50	FY12	2012	2018	50.0	60.0	LIR: MU
P126593	Innovation, Science and Technology Project	FY12	Dropped		20.0		
P127333	Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II	FY13	Dropped		100.0		
Total Planned					650.00	540.00	
Unplanned Projects during the CPS and CPSPR Period							
Total Unplanned							
On-going Projects during the CPS and CPSPR Period			Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount		
P067986	SV-Earthquake Emergency Rec. & Health		2002	2011	142.6		IEG: MU
P064919	SV JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION PROJECT		2003	2011	18.2		IEG: MS
P086953	SV Land Administration II		2005	2012	40.2		IEG: NR
P064910	SV Environmental Services Project		2005	2013	5.0		LIR: HU
P088642	SV Social Protection & Local Dev (FISDL)		2006	2011	21.0		IEG: NR
P078993	SV- Excellence and Innov. in Sec. Edu.		2006	2012	85.0		IEG: NR
P114910	SV Public Finance and Social Sector DPL		2009	2011	450.0		IEG: S
Total On-going					762.0		

Source: Dominican Republic CPS, CPSPR and WB AO Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 3-23-15

*LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Annex Table 3: El Salvador Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-14 (in US\$ million)

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount (Millions USD)
P095314	Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan	TF 56579	2006	2010	0.84
P092202	Protected Areas Consolidation and Administration	TF 55925	2006	2012	5.00
P109677	El Salvador: Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency	TF 92367	2009	2013	0.40
P095314	Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan	TF 95841	2010	2011	0.08
P116646	Addressing Youth Violence through Cultural and Music Learning	TF 94811	2010	2015	0.97
P125760	Safeguarding Human Capital of Urban Poor Children in the context of recurring food crisis	TF 11078	2012	2015	2.75
P126364	Education Quality Improvement Project	TF 10361	2012	2014	0.13
P124935	El Salvador FCPF REDD Readiness	TF 99529	2012	2017	3.80
P132415	EL SALVADOR: Agricultural and Energy Risk Management: An Integral Strategy to Cope with Drought and Food Insecurity	TF 13124	2013	2016	1.83
P126364	Education Quality Improvement Project	TF 14166	2014	2015	0.10
P125899	Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Initiative Project *	TF 521003	2011	N/A	0.69



Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount (Millions USD)
P144982	Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience to Natural Hazards in Central America *	N/A	2016	N/A	N/A
Total					16.58

Source: Client Connection as of 09/30/14

* Regional projects

Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work for El Salvador, FY10 - FY14

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P120936	FSAP Update El Salvador	FY10	Report
P110204	SV PER	FY11	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P124032	GCMCG: El Salvador Country Assessment	FY11	Corporate Governance Assessment (ROSC)
P123313	SV Land Tenure	FY12	Report
P127661	SV Public Expenditure Institutional Rev	FY12	Report
Proj ID	Technical Assistance	Fiscal year	Output Type
P115121	SV Policy Dialogue & Consensus Building	FY10	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P110432	SV Human Dev for Poverty Reduct	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P114001	FIRST #7099: IFRS Implementation TA	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P125050	El Salvador #10078 Fin. Crisis Prep Prog	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P121532	SV NLTA Improv.Science Educ in Primary	FY12	TA/EPD
P121763	SV-Improving Governance & Accountability	FY12	TA/EPD
P126387	El Salvador #10172 Org. Str. of Integ FS	FY12	TA/EPD
P129160	El Salvador #10200 Strength Safety Nets	FY13	TA/IAR
P129496	SV Innovation System Capacity Support	FY13	TA/IAR
P132366	Action Learning Approach: Towards a Strategy for Citizen Security	FY14	TA/EPD
P133465	SV Regulatory Framework	FY14	TA/IAR
P144426	RAAP for Municipality of El Salvador	FY14	TA/EPD
P150278	El Salvador PF Sector / Project Briefs	FY14	TA/IAR

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table ESW/TA 8.1.4 as of 9/30/14

Annex Table 5 IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-Present

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2011	P064919	SV JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION PROJECT	16.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2011	P067986	SV-Earthquake Emergency Rec. & Health	142.0	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	NEGLECTIBLE TO LOW
2011	P114910	SV Public Finance and Social Sector DPL	450.0	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2011	P118036	SV Sustaining Social Gains	100.0	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2012	P092202	Protected Areas Consolidation and Admin	0.0	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P122699	SV Public Finance and Social Progress	100.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
Total			809.0		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 3-23-15



Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-14

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
El Salvador	809.0	6	82.4	66.7	85.5	50.0
LCR	27,503.2	213	93.5	75.1	80.4	65.2
World	102,346.7	1,180	83.1	69.9	63.1	50.3

Source: AO as of 3-23-15

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for El Salvador and Comparators, FY10-14

Fiscal year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average FY10-14
Dominican Republic						
# Proj	8	6	6	8	8	7.2
# Proj At Risk	1	1	1	-	-	0.6
% Proj At Risk	12.5	16.7	16.7	-	-	9.2
Net Comm Amt	871.8	311.0	291.0	295.5	344.6	422.8
Comm At Risk	5.0	20.0	20.0	-	-	9.0
% Commit at Risk	0.6	6.4	6.9	-	-	2.8
LCR						
# Proj	349	353	346	332	315	339.0
# Proj At Risk	68	61	68	72	70	67.8
% Proj At Risk	19.5	17.3	19.7	21.7	22.2	20.1
Net Comm Amt	32,161.5	32,557.8	33,341.8	30,843.3	29,271.0	31,635.1
Comm At Risk	5,316.1	3,195.2	4,503.5	6,097.4	6,355.6	5,093.6
% Commit at Risk	16.5	9.8	13.5	19.8	21.7	16.3
World						
# Proj	1,990	2,059	2,029	1,965	2,049	2,018.4
# Proj At Risk	410	382	387	414	412	401.0
% Proj At Risk	20.6	18.6	19.1	21.1	20.1	19.9
Net Comm Amt	162,975.3	171,755.3	173,706.1	176,206.6	192,614.1	175,451.5
Comm At Risk	28,963.1	23,850.0	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	31,803.4
% Commit at Risk	17.8	13.9	14.1	23.2	21.3	18.0

Source: WB Business Warehouse as of 10/01/14

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for El Salvador, FY10-14

Fiscal Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average
El Salvador						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	41.48	36.23	18.26	9.71	14.24	23.98
Inv Disb in FY	14.49	61.62	19.57	21.96	29.05	29.34
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	34.93	170.07	107.19	226.03	204.07	148.46
LCR						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	39.18	30.88	21.96	23.95	18.76	26.95
Inv Disb in FY	4,998.44	4,513.46	3,338.43	3,523.98	2,491.08	3,773.08
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	12,756.70	14,614.23	15,201.65	14,712.30	13,280.99	14,113.17
World						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	26.91	22.38	20.79	20.60	20.79	22.29
Inv Disb in FY	20,928.83	20,933.51	21,048.75	20,509.01	20,756.34	20,835.29
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	77,760.85	93,516.54	101,239.14	99,582.39	99,848.44	94,389.47

* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment.

BW disbursement ratio table as of 10/1/14



Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for El Salvador, FY10-14

Period	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010	14,014,404	61,630,545	(47,616,142)	13,589,648	128,494	(61,334,284)
Jul 2010 - Jun 2011	410,337,822	65,443,684	344,894,137	15,058,554	953,762	328,881,821
Jul 2011 - Jun 2012	168,047,204	57,035,941	111,011,263	30,174,264	453,309	80,383,690
Jul 2012 - Jun 2013	21,602,359	54,617,188	(33,014,829)	34,118,205	247,551	(67,380,585)
Jul 2013 - Jun 2014	29,049,657	49,107,791	(20,058,134)	34,038,659	43,423	(54,140,217)
Report Total	643,051,445	287,835,150	355,216,295	126,979,331	1,826,540	226,410,424

Source: World Bank Client Connection 10/1/14

Annex Table 10: List of IFC's investments in El Salvador that were active during FY10-15 (US\$'000)

Project ID	Cmt. FY	Closure FY	Project Status	IFC Sector Primary	IFC Sector Explntry	Project Size	Net Loans ¹	Net Equity	Total Net Commitment
Investments approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15									
21505	2004	2015	Closed	MAS	Constr. & Real Estate	79,200	25,000		25,000
27833	2009		Active	Finance And Insurance	Trade Finance	25,000	25,000		25,000
27768	2009/10		Active	Finance And Insurance	Microfin.	10,000	5,000		5,000
Subtotal						114,200	55,000		55,000
Investments approved in FY10-15									
27261	2011	2014	Closed	Finance And Insurance	Microfin.	8,000	8,000		8,000
28635	2011		Active	Finance And Insurance	NBFI -Coop Fin.	30,000	30,000		30,000
33948	2013		Active	Finance And Insurance	Trade Finance	17,500	17,500		17,500
31776*	2013		Active	Finance And Insurance	Housing Finance	10,000	10,000		10,000
33879	2014		Active	Finance And Insurance	NBFI - Microfin.	20,000	20,000		20,000
32964	2014		Active	Finance And Insurance	Comm. Banking	50,000	50,000		50,000
(27833)	2015		Active	Finance And Insurance	Trade Finance	25,000	25,000		25,000
Subtotal						160,500	160,500		160,500



Project ID	Cmt. FY	Closure FY	Project Status	IFC Sector Primary	IFC Sector Explntry	Project Size	Net Loans ¹	Net Equity	Total Net Commitment
Investments approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15									
Grand Total						274,700	215,500		215,500

Source: IFC, April 2015- The list does not cover the regional projects. MAS: Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Services; na: not applicable. *IFC has equity positions and additional loans to the holding company. (xxxxx) indicates an increase in the maximum permissible trade finance guarantee under a previously approved project.

1: Includes Trade Finance Guarantees

Annex Table 11: List of IFC's Advisory Services in El Salvador, FY10-15

Project ID	Project Name	Start FY	End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
Advisory Services operations approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15						
Subtotal:						None
Advisory Services operations approved in FY10-15						
575408	El Salvador Public Lighting	2010	2011	Terminated	PPP	39,545
28425	El Salvador Port	2010	(2015)	Active	PPP	2,286,534
565327	Apoyo Integral AS	2011	2012	Terminated	A2F	74,882
579307	AMC El Salvador AS	2011	2013	Closed	A2F	275,114
599795	El Salvador Tax and Incentive Reform	2014	(2015)	Active	IC	298,963
Subtotal:						2,975,038
Grand Total						2,975,038

A2F: Access to Finance; IC: Investment Climate; PPP: Public-Private Partnerships

Source: IFC, April 2015 Regional Projects are not included.

For Closed/Terminated projects, Total Fund is actual expenditure during implementation. For Active projects, it is Project Size in the Plan/Amount secured (after 3 years).

Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for El Salvador

Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia	..	0.09	0.95	0.85
Austria	0.44	0.54	0.7	0.92
Belgium	0.81	1.25	1.08	1.3
Canada	2.01	3.64	2.71	1.87
Czech Republic	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03
Denmark	0.41	..
Finland	0.14	0.67	0.11	0.13
France	3.31	3.21	3.68	3.25
Germany	17.06	14.85	15.31	22.33
Greece	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.02
Ireland	0.84	1.5	0.16	..
Italy	1.41	4.15	1.29	1.49
Japan	8.75	-8.65	-4.6	4.34
Korea	4.31	4.93	4.6	3.89
Luxembourg	7.07	7.76	9.8	9.8
Netherlands	0.14	0.15	0.01	..
New Zealand	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03
Norway	1.13	2.1	0.62	2.26



Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013
Poland
Portugal	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.03
Spain	85.51	44.56	18.53	33.85
Sweden	1.51	1.41	1.01	1.09
Switzerland	1.51	1.96	1.79	2.14
United Kingdom	-48.82	0.01	-0.13	0.45
United States	151.26	170.92	160.88	53.4
DAC Countries, Total	238.61	255.23	219.03	143.47
EU Institutions	52.52	42.46	23.41	33.54
GEF	1	1	1.98	1.15
Global Fund	9.48	6.31	7.14	14.67
IAEA	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.43
IBRD
IDA	-0.84	-0.84	-0.7	-0.55
IDB Sp.Fund	-20.85	-19.54	-21.15	-21.56
IFAD	-0.66	-2.13	-2.94	-2.8
IFC
OFID	0.15	0.07
OSCE
UNAIDS	0.2	0.24	0.19	0.18
UNDP	0.8	0.51	0.85	0.64
UNECE
UNFPA	1.42	1.11	1.02	1.1
UNICEF	0.77	0.88	0.67	0.85
WFP	0.62	0.08	0.1	0.02
Multilateral, Total	44.7	30.42	11.11	27.74
Israel	0.11	0.19	0.23	0.17
Thailand	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01
Turkey	0.02	0.05
United Arab Emirates	0.01
Development Partners Total	283.31	285.65	230.14	171.21

Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 3-23-15

Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for El Salvador, 2010 - 2013

Series Name					ES	LAC	World
	2010	2011	2012	2013	Average 2010-2013		
Growth and Inflation							
GDP growth (annual %)	1.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.8	3.8	2.8
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	0.8	1.6	1.2	1.0	1.1	2.6	1.7
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	6,910.0	7,150.0	7,300.0	7,490.0	7,212.5	13,844.6	13,559.1
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) (Millions)	20,839.8	21,803.3	22,649.1	23,556.0	22,212.1	5,473,335.0	70,411,025.0
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	0.9	5.1	1.7	0.8	2.1	3.9	3.7
Compositon of GDP (%)							
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	12.6	12.5	11.9	10.8	12.0	5.1	3.1
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	26.7	26.9	26.9	27.0	26.9	33.5	26.9
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	60.7	60.6	61.1	62.2	61.2	61.4	70.0
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	13.3	14.4	14.1	15.1	14.2	20.2	21.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	-3.6	-4.3	-4.4	-4.3	-4.2	20.3	22.4
External Accounts							
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.9	28.0	25.6	26.4	26.5	25.0	29.5
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	42.8	46.7	44.1	45.8	44.9	25.5	29.5
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-2.5	-4.8	-5.4	-6.5	-4.8
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	53.0	53.3	57.5	57.1	55.2
Total debt service (% of GNI)	5.2	5.7	5.0	4.7	5.2	3.3	..
Total reserves in months of imports	3.8	2.8	3.4	..	3.3	8.8	13.5
Fiscal Accounts ¹							
General government revenue (% of GDP)	17.1	17.4	17.9	18.5	17.7
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	21.6	21.5	21.8	22.1	21.8
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	-4.4	-4.1	-3.9	-3.7	-4.0
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	49.7	50.0	55.2	55.5	52.6
Social Indicators							
Health							
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	71.6	71.9	72.1	..	71.9	74.4	70.6
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	89.0	89.0	92.0	92.0	90.5	92.2	83.4
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	70.2	70.3	70.5	..	70.3	81.2	63.3



Series Name					ES	LAC	World
	2010	2011	2012	2013	Average 2010-2013		
Improved water source (% of population with access)	81.0	81.0	81.0	..	81.0	81.7	80.9
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	15.2	14.6	14.0	13.5	14.3	16.3	35.2
Education							
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	63.5	63.0	62.2	..	62.9	72.4	..
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	113.2	113.5	112.6	..	113.1	109.7	108.4
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	64.7	67.2	69.2	..	67.0	88.4	72.1
Population							
Population, total (Millions)	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	605.2	7,003.9
Population growth (annual %)	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.1	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	64.3	64.8	65.3	65.8	65.0	78.8	52.3

Source: DDP as of 3/12/15

*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014