97399 For Official Use Only CLR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. CPS Data Country: El Salvador CPS Year: FY10 CAS/CPS Period: FY10- FY14 CLR Period: FY10 – FY14 Date of this review: June 10, 2015 2. Ratings CLR Rating IEG Rating Development Outcome: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory WBG Performance: Good Good 3. Executive Summary i. El Salvador’s growth has lagged its peers in Central America for the past decade. The economic context for this CPS was one of low growth with low and stable inflation. The political background was difficult, with the first center-left government in El Salvador since the end of the civil war in 1991 running the country, facing a fragmented opposition, and having to deal with tensions within the ruling party. The main longer term challenges were to increase the growth rate, as slow growth has constrained poverty reduction, increase domestic savings and investment, and reduce violence which has imposed a high social and economic cost. At the start of the CPS the country was suffering the consequences of the global economic crisis, to which the government responded with an anti-crisis plan. The WBG program set objectives, and outcomes, consistent with the scope of the government’s crisis response program, and each strategic area of intervention (macro/institutional, delivery of social services, increase economic opportunities) was backed by WBG interventions. The program was originally designed for the FY10-FY12 period, and extended to 2014 in the progress report, to coincide with the administration’s term. ii. Despite an implementation environment complicated by the political atmosphere, the WBG program was successful in increasing opportunities for the poor, primarily through the income support and employability project (focus area III). It also strengthened the delivery of social services under focus area II, but results in this area were uneven perhaps reflecting poor government implementation capacity and objectives that were unrealistically ambitious in light of inadequate capacity. The program also engaged in some longer term issues by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities under focus area I. Interventions related to macro, judicial services, and access to information were more successful than work on electricity subsidies, fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements. The WBG team attributes this difference to a lack of inter- and intra-institutional collaboration during project implementation, particularly in the less successful interventions. It also reflected strong political opposition to revenue and expenditure policies envisaged under an IMF program, which was suspended in 2012 and expired in March 2013. Moreover, a macroeconomic environment that never quite recovered, reduced the room for maneuver of government officials interested in strengthening fiscal policy CLR Reviewed by: Peer Reviewed by: CLR Review Coordinator Juan Jose Fernandez Ansola, Paul Levy Consultant, IEGCC Consultant, IEGCC Monica Huppi Surajit Goswami Igor Artemiev Acting Manager, IEGCC Consultant, IEGCC Consultant, IEGCC CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 2 through significant tax and expenditure reform. IFC’s investments in financial institutions appear to have increased the availability of credit to micro and small enterprises (focus area III). iii. The program was focused and selective, with interventions balanced across the three strategic areas, and consistent with a well distributed set of objectives across the areas. Therefore the resources were concentrated for maximum impact on strengthening fundamentals by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, strengthening delivery of social services, and increasing economic opportunities. It was aligned with the twin WBG goals on poverty and shared prosperity. Social inclusion of vulnerable groups was supported by DPLs and investment lending, and about two thirds of program resources were devoted to social protection, education, and health. Thus the program was focused enough for resources to have maximum impact on the twin goals. Poverty and shared prosperity issues were reflected in the results framework and measured with indicators, although some of them failed to reflect the objectives appropriately. The CPS was also aligned with government objectives, and focused on areas with initial commitment at various government levels, which was essential during negotiations with congress about WBG interventions. However, a steady commitment was not maintained by the government during program implementation.1 The program thus suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation during project implementation that resulted in significant delays in achieving the targeted outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which the WBG would contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. At the same time, as the CLR recognizes, the framework had significant weaknesses. In a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were already accomplished in the past. The quantified targets for the future were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC and MIGA activities were kept outside the framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate. The program was initially just for the FY10-FY12 period and extended to FY14 in the progress report.2 However, the latter part of the program, after the progress report, was quite disappointing.3 Cooperation between IFC and IBRD during the CPS period focused mainly on IFC advisory projects. iv. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR on consensus building and continued dialogue with various stakeholders in a politically polarized environment, better planning in an institutional environment lacking in collaboration, promoting synergies among IBRD, IFC, and MIGA for better results, and difficulties emanating from a poorly designed results framework. IEG would like to add that although the progress report was expected to be a significant exercise, it appears to have been a missed opportunity to attempt to modify the program and strengthen key interventions. As a result implementation progressed at an extremely low pace during the second half of the program. Progress reports (PLRs) in future should not miss the opportunity for a substantive reflection on what needs to be modified in the remainder of the program, and WBG teams should use the opportunity to revise approaches to implementation on the ground. The CLR draws no lessons from IFC’s lack of involvement beyond the financial sector, despite ambitious plans for interventions in infrastructure, electricity, and others. IFC needs to go beyond identifying issues and explore the investments/interventions in considerable detail, specifying conditions for success and identifying barriers to choice. Finally, the adverse macroeconomic environment seems to have played a role in the poor results of focus area I, and the WBG could attempt to pay more attention in future to macro aspects in the absence of a Fund program as sustainable growth is key. 1 This happened with the IMF program as well, and one of the consequences of its suspension and expiration was that the envisaged Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II was dropped from the WBG program. 2 Both the CPS and the progress report have no time-frames on their covers, stretching the idea of flexibility. 3 Only some non-lending activities were delivered, primarily because lending activities required the commitment of the incoming government in 2014 and some activities had to be dropped because of inadequate government commitment to the WBG program in those areas (see footnote 1). CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 3 4. Strategic Focus Relevance of the WBG Strategy: 1. Congruence with Country Context and Country Program . The economic context for this CPS was one of low growth with low and stable inflation. El Salvador’s growth has lagged its peers in Central America for the past decade. Private consumption, partly financed by remittances, has been the main driver, while investment has been the lowest in the region. Inflation has hovered in the 1-2 percent range in 2012-15, down from a range of 5-7 percent before that. The political background has been difficult, with the first center-left government in El Salvador since the end of the civil war in 1991 facing a fragmented opposition, and having to deal with tensions within the ruling party. The main longer term challenges were to increase the growth rate—slow growth has constrained poverty reduction—increase domestic savings and investment, and reduce violence which has imposed a high social and economic cost.4 At the start of the CPS the country was suffering the consequences of the global economic crisis, to which the government responded with an anti-crisis plan (Plan Anti Crisis). The main elements of this plan were: (i) generating income and employment to protect vulnerable populations; (ii) extending the Red Solidaria program to urban areas, and expanding the provision of education, health, and nutrition programs; and (iii) creating fiscal space for priority spending. The WBG program (initially for FY10-12) focused on strengthening fundamentals for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, enhancing social service delivery, and increasing economic opportunities, especially for the poor. The CPS was congruent with the country program, as it supported the government’s immediate response to economic and social aspects of the crisis while beginning to respond to longer term development challenges. The strategy left open financing for the outer years of the program, to be agreed later based on the evolution of the country environment and emerging country needs. 2. Relevance of Design. The results matrix included a set of outcomes consistent with the scope of the government’s crisis response program. Each strategic area of intervention (macro/institutional, delivery of social services, increase economic opportunities) was backed by WBG interventions. The interventions in the three areas contained an adequate combination of technical assistance, policy loans (DPLs), specific projects to improve the delivery of social services and increase economic opportunities for example, and targeted trust funded activities that complemented well the other interventions. IFC planned to be involved in the third area (economic opportunities) with interventions to improve logistics and power supply, and financial sector support to develop products for underserved populations and support the expansion of corporations able to integrate SMEs into their operations or have an impact on low-income groups. The expected outcomes of IFC interventions were not incorporated in the results framework. The main assumptions for WBG interventions to work were strong government ownership during project implementation and appropriate local capacity to implement the projects. The government took the lead in promoting the division of labor between development partners according to their skills and experience. The main partners were the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Commission, UN agencies, and the IMF. Bilateral agencies such as USAID, JICA (Japan) and AECI (Spain) were also involved. The Bank coordinated with the other partners, especially with the IADB, agreeing on areas where each would take the lead based on experience and skills, and the IMF, on debt sustainability analysis and tax reform issues. 3. Selectivity .The program was focused and selective, with interventions balanced across the three strategic areas, and consistent with a well distributed set of objectives across the areas. Therefore the resources were concentrated for maximum impact on strengthening fundamentals by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities, strengthening delivery of social services, and increasing economic opportunities. The program was based on adequate country diagnostics and economic 4 These challenges are discussed in detail in El Salvador’s SCD: Building on Strengths for a New Generation, April 29, 2015, Central America Country Unit, WBG, Washington DC. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 4 sector work, but a number of these pieces were relatively outdated, going back to 2006 and 2007. The selected areas were congruent with the country’s development goals, but the set of interventions and objectives underestimated the time it would take to achieve the proposed outcomes. The WBG’s wo rk program was in areas where it had shown capacity to deliver in the past, and the division of labor with other development partners was based on skill and experience. The program was in support of a government anti-crisis plan and that provided the rationale for areas of intervention. Still, the WBG appropriately started work on some longer-term issues related to institutional capacities. In the initial stage of the CPS (FY10-FY12), the program concentrated on shorter term issues, in line with government needs. Institutional change and capacity development were central pieces of the first strategic area, but the issue of sustainability without aid after the program was not addressed directly in the initial stage of the CPS. Nevertheless the CPS left the outer years open to modify the program as needed depending on developments and future country needs. 4. Alignment. The program was aligned with the twin WBG goals on poverty and shared prosperity. Social inclusion of vulnerable groups was supported by DPLs and investment lending, and about two thirds of program resources were devoted to social protection, education, and health. Thus the program was focused enough for resources to have maximum impact on the twin goals. IFC’s planned interventions in logistics included upgrading the highway network, port system, and energy supply-- constraints that limited growth and thus poverty reduction. Poverty and shared prosperity issues were reflected in the results framework and measured with indicators, although some of the indicators failed to reflect the objectives appropriately. 5. Development Outcome Overview of Achievement by Objective: Focus Area I: Strengthen Fundamentals for Economic Recovery by Addressing Macro and Institutional Vulnerabilities 5. Approve tax reform legislation aimed at increasing tax revenues and closing tax loopholes, and strengthen tax administration. The government reformed the tax system to create new specific taxes and increase some tax rates, expand the tax base, and strengthen tax and customs administration.5 The indicator on tax collection as a share of GDP, relevant for the objective, was met. Tax collection increased from 12.9 percent of GDP in 2009 to 15.9 percent of GDP in 2014. The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY09) supported the strengthening, modernization, and increased coordination between the Internal Revenue Agency, the Customs Agency, and the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Office. According to the WBG team, the Customs Agency and the Tax Administration Office confirmed increased coordination that enhanced their capacity to combat tax evasion through the implementation of systems enabling them to better select and manage cases to be audited. (Achieved) 6. On investment policy and tax incentives, IFC’s AS project’s main objective—for the authorities to develop a joint action plan with WBG—was Not Achieved. 7. Eliminate electricity subsidy for large firms and reduce substantially overall cost of subsidies. The planned reduction from $211 million (2008) across the board subsidy to $100 million to the poorest households did not take place. The authorities made good progress with targeting in 2010, which was largely reversed in April 2011 following a temporary surge in oil prices. Subsidies on the 5 Tax reform was also an important component of El Salvador’s program with the IMF, which provided technical advice. The authorities raised the marginal income tax and some excise tax rates, and eliminated exemptions in two steps in 2010 and 2012 with a combined yield of 1.2 percentage points of GDP. However other tax reforms recommended by the IMF—removal of income tax exemptions (including on high-income pensioners) and broadening the scope of the new property tax—were not pursued. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 5 consumption of electricity and liquid propane continue to benefit disproportionally the wealthy. (Not Achieved) 8. Reduce transport subsidies. The indicator to reduce subsidies by 50 percent—reformulated at progress report stage—to US$42 million in 2014 was met. Subsidies in 2014 are estimated at US$35.8 million—their reduction was important to open fiscal space for other priority spending. (Achieved) 9. Improve PEFA ratings. Although the government has defined a medium-term budget framework and piloted results-based budgeting in two ministries, the PEFA ratings on the indicator for multiyear perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and on the indicator on classification of the budget remain the same as in the baseline. (Not Achieved) 10. Increase user satisfaction with judicial services. The indicator on judicial services was met. According to the impact evaluation of the Soyapango Center, 85 percent of users are satisfied with its service provision. The court model was extended to two other locations in San Salvador. Survey results show that perceptions of judicial services introduced under the new court model —based on the Judicial Modernization Project (FY03)—has improved for more than 50 percent of current users. (Achieved) 11. Enhance public access to fiscal information through new legal and regulatory framework. The indicator on the new legal and regulatory framework, with two targets, was met. Under the first target, an Access to Information Law came into force in 2013. Under the second target, in mid-2010 the Ministry of Finance launched the Fiscal Transparency Portal providing easy access to a array of fiscal data based on international best practices. True, the second target for this indicator was introduced at progress report stage (June 2011) and the target had been achieved already by mid-2010. The indicator on percentage of public sector procurement transactions recorded in COMPRASAL also was achieved. Ninety two percent of public sector procurement is recorded in COMPRASAL (against a target of 80 percent for 2014. The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY09) contributed to this objective, and TA was provided through the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Development TAL (FY10) and grants for Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency (FY06, FY10). This support enabled the development of the fiscal portal website, training and workshops for system operators, and implementation of the Access to Public Information Law. (Achieved) 12. Show tangible progress in making government financial statements consistent with International Public Sector Financial Statements (IPSAS) and Government Finance Statistics (GFS) standards. The new Integrated Financial Management System (SAFI) is still under development and is expected to be up and running for budget 2017. Steps have been taken to harmonize accounting reports with legal standards. There is a proposal for a National Accounting Plan under the new SAFI II that takes into account IPSAS standards. The WBG supported this objective through the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance TAL (FY10) and the grants for Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency (FY06, FY10). (Not Achieved) 13. Review, finalize and implement emergency plans for the most vulnerable populations and local jurisdictions. Indicators on revising relevant laws and developing emergency plans —both reformulated at CPS progress report stage—were met. All sections of the Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan were updated in 2012, and strengthened in 2013 by integrating guidelines for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and including additional risks to ensure a comprehensive vision of disaster risk management. Sector emergency plans were presented to the Civil Protection National Commission in 2010. The latter indicator was introduce in the 2011 progress report when the proposed target had been achieved already (in 2010). The WBG supported this objective through the Disaster Risk Management DPL with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (FY11), the Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Initiative Project (FY11), and the Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience to Natural Hazards in Central America (FY14). (Achieved) CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 6 14. Establish a contingent line of credit as part of the country’s disaster risk strategy. This objective was introduced at progress report stage (June 2011) and had been achieved already before its introduction (February 2011). The Disaster Risk Management DPL with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (FY11) for this purpose was approved on February 1, 2011. (Achieved) 15. Improve local capacities to assess risk. Under the WBG’s Central America Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA) and follow-up training helped build institutional capacity for probabilistic seismic risk assessment for the education and health portfolio of the San Salvador metropolitan area. This was then extended to estimate probable losses and damages to 1,550 buildings of the health and education sectors. The Bank supported the incorporation of findings in guidelines for a risk reduction program. (Achieved) 16. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area I as Moderately Satisfactory. Overall this focus area was aligned with country development goals, although during the FY10-FY12 period, given the external context, the government was more concentrated on aspects related to the anti-crisis program. A tax reform including strengthened tax administration, reduction of transport subsidies, increased public satisfaction with judicial services and access to fiscal information, and strengthened capacity to deal with environmental emergencies point to successful WBG interventions in these areas. Work on eliminating electricity subsidies to large firms and reducing the cost of subsidies, fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements did not show similar satisfactory results. Strong political opposition to revenue and expenditure policies envisaged under an IMF program, which was suspended in 2012 and expired in March 2013, contributed to the poor results. Poor macro performance also limited the room for maneuver of government officials interested in these reform objectives. This focus area was supported by an appropriate mix of WBG projects and DPLs, trust funded activities, and AAA. El Salvador was also part of WBG regional initiatives on climate change adaptation activities. The key interventions were Sustaining Social Gains and Economic Recovery DPL (FY10), Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (FY11), Judicial Modernization project (FY03), and a DPL with CAT DDO (FY11). These were supported by trust funded activities and AAA: Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency Institutional Development Fund grant (FY06) supporting a technical assistance loan, Strengthening Fiscal Management and Public Sector Transparency grant (FY09), and a Public Expenditure Review (FY12) that included a Public Expenditure and Institutional Review of the Security and Justice Sector (FY12). El Salvador also participated in two regional WBG interventions: Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Initiative project and Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience to natural Hazards in Central America. Focus Area II: Strengthen Delivery of Social Services 17. Expand prevention and promotion of health care services through the Integrated Health Care Services model. The first indicator, reformulated at the progress report stage, was to increase the percentage of individuals receiving health care services from the 92 eligible municipalities from 70 percent in 2008 to 85 percent in 2014. It was not met. Sixty one percent of eligible municipalities received healthcare services at least once in 2014. The second indicator, which was met, targeted a nominal amount for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in health in the proposed 2010-14 budgets to be on average at least at the same 2008 level. There is a tenuous connection between the latter indicator and the objective, although higher levels of capital expenditure contributed to the expansion of the Integrated Health Care Services model. The Bank supported this objective through the Strengthening Health Care System project (FY12). (Partially Achieved) 18. Increase the number of hospital discharges in the public sector. The first indicator targeted an increase of hospital discharges from 365 thousand in 2009 to 480 thousand in 2014. Hospital discharges increased to about 400 thousand in 2014, and thus the target was not met. The second indicator was met, as 520 family community teams (ECOS) equipped and functioning according to norms established by the Ministry of Health were functioning in 2014. This indicator is not clearly linked to the objective. (Partially Achieved) CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 7 19. Expand coverage, equity and quality of priority health services for targeted population. The first indicator—on percentage of pregnant women receiving at least four pre-natal check-ups in 82 selected municipalities—was met. The second indicator—on percentage of poor people with access to public health services in eligible municipalities—was not met, but showed substantial results (61 percent against the 65 percent targeted). (Mostly Achieved) 20. Implement drug supply management system in eligible public hospitals. The indicator was for 20 public hospitals to have implemented a drug supply management system by 2014. As of that date, all hospitals are using the National Supply System as drug supply management and planning system. (Achieved) 21. Increase enrollment rate in secondary education. The indicators on the increase of enrollment and number of operating classrooms in secondary education were met. The indicator on non-personnel recurrent expenditure was also met. This last indicator did not measure achievement of the proposed objective and was introduced at the progress report stage (June 2011) when the target had already been met. (Achieved) 22. Elaborate new curriculum for teaching science and technology in upper secondary schools (keeping in mind labor market needs for skills). The indicator referred to the introduction of a new curriculum for teaching science and technology (in line with labor market need for skills) in upper secondary schools. The indicator was partially achieved, as the Ministry of Education developed a science and technology curriculum for upper secondary technical education in agriculture and electrical engineering that was implemented in 2011 with participation of the productive sector. (Partially Achieved) 23. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area II as Moderately Satisfactory. Results in this area were more uneven than those in Focus Area I. Only two out of six objectives were fully achieved, reflecting over-optimism in the results framework about the time it would take to get projects implemented. The enrollment rate in secondary education was increased and public hospitals are now part of a national drug supply management system. Coverage and quality of health services have improved but at a lower rate than anticipated under the program and partial results obtained in developing a science and technology curriculum in upper secondary schools. The main WBG interventions comprised an Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction and Health Services Extension project (FY02), a Strengthening Public health Care project (FY12), the Sustaining Social Gains DPL (FY10), and a Science, Technology, and Innovation System Capacity Support Non-Lending TA (FY12). Focus Area III: Increase Economic Opportunities for the Poor 24. Protect the income of the urban poor. The indicator referred to the number of families in targeted urban settlements receiving income support. It was met, as 40 thousand individuals from extreme poor and poor urban settlements in 25 municipalities were benefiting from the Temporary Income Support Program by 2014. (Achieved) 25. Design and standardize unified registration system of social protection system participants. As of October 2014 the Registro Unico de Participantes was being used by the Comunidades Solidarias program to target beneficiaries in urban precarious settlements of 71 municipalities. Progress was observed in incorporating beneficiaries from other social programs and subsidies, but there is still significant work to do to have a unified registration system of all social protection system participants. (Partially Achieved) 26. Expand. Comunidades Solidarias program to cover 125 poorest municipalities. By 2014 the Comunidades Solidarias program was working in the 125 poorest municipalities of the country. (Achieved) CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 8 27. Extend coverage of training programs. On the first indicator, participants in the Temporary Income Support Program (PATI), which includes job skill training for its beneficiaries, has been expanded to the 25 poorest municipalities responding to the revised urban poverty map. On the second indicator, 58 Bolsas de Empleo connected to the National Employment Network were operating by October 2014, slightly less than the 66 targeted but still significant. (Achieved) 28. Establish a system to finance municipal projects and increase transfer to municipalities by 2 percent during crisis period. The indicator—reformulated at progress report stage—referred to establishing a system to finance municipal projects and increasing transfers to municipalities during the crisis period. The government transferred extra funds to municipalities but no system was put in place to finance municipal projects. (Not Achieved) 29. Increase number of municipalities that produce 5-year development plans with ample civil society engagement. As of 2014, 135 municipalities (52 percent of the total) had completed their five- year development plans with civil society engagement. (Achieved) 30. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area III as Satisfactory, as a majority of objectives in this area were achieved. This was the focus area most central to the anti-crisis program, and one where the government showed a fairly consistent ownership across objectives. Coordination with other development partners also contributed to more homogeneous results across objectives. Results thus were achieved, at least partially, in most objectives to increase economic opportunities for the poor, based on focused interventions and realistic objectives. The main WBG interventions were the Income Support and Employability project (FY10) and the Local Government Strengthening project (FY10). IFC contributed in this area through the support of financial sector projects for microfinance and through financing a cooperative. Overall Assessment and Rating 31. IEG rates the overall development outcome of this CPS as Moderately Satisfactory. Despite an implementation environment that was complicated by the political atmosphere, the program was successful in increasing opportunities for the poor, primarily through the income support and employability project (Focus Area III). It also strengthened the delivery of social services under focus area II, but results in this area were uneven perhaps reflecting poor government implementation capacity and objectives that were unrealistically ambitious in light of inadequate capacity. The program also engaged in some longer term issues by addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities under focus area I. Interventions related to macro, judicial services, and access to information were more successful than work on fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting, and government financial statements. The WBG team attributes this difference to a lack of inter- and intra-institutional collaboration during project implementation particularly in the less successful interventions. A poor macroeconomic environment, and strong political opposition to tax and expenditure reforms under an IMF program were also contributing factors. Objectives CLR Rating IEG Rating Focus Area I: Strengthen Fundamentals Moderately for Economic Recovery by Addressing Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Macro and Institutional Vulnerabilities Focus Area II: Strengthen Delivery of Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Social Services Satisfactory Focus Area III: Increase Economic Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Opportunities for the Poor CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 9 6. WBG Performance Lending and Investments 32. At the start of the CPS period, IBRD had 7 ongoing operations totaling $762 million. The ongoing portfolio included investment operations in social protection, education, the environment (including earthquake emergencies), land administration, and judicial modernization. Three trust funded activities for $6 million provided complementary financing. 33. During the CPS period, IBRD made commitments totaling $540 million for eight operations, including a CAT—DDO DPL, a public finance and social progress DPL, and a sustaining social gains for economic recovery DPL. Seven trust funded activities for $10 million provided complementary financing. IBRD committed resources were slightly below the planned amount ($650 million), primarily because a planned project on innovation, science and technology and a planned DPL on public finance and social progress were not carried out. In addition to the DPLs, there were projects in fiscal management, local government strengthening, social sector support, health, and education. 34. On overage, for the period FY12-15, IBRD committed resources were disbursed at a rate similar to that of the LCR region and at a higher rate than Bank wide. The average disbursement ratio for El Salvador’s investment operations during the CPS period was 24 percent, as compared to 27 percent and 22 percent for the LCR region and Bank-wide respectively. 35. The El Salvador portfolio was less risky than the LCR Region and Bank wide portfolios. During FY12-15, the El Salvador portfolio had 9 percent of the projects at risk, as compared to 20 percent for the LCR Region and Bank-wide. On a commitment basis, the El Salvador portfolio also performed better with 3 percent of the commitments at risk as compared to 16 percent for the LCR region and 18 percent Bank-wide. IEG reviewed the ICRs of six projects that closed during the FY10-FY14 period and rated four as moderately satisfactory or better and two as moderately unsatisfactory. With respect to active projects, management assessments report that the majority of projects were making satisfactory progress towards achieving their development objectives except for the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Development project (FY10) and the Strengthening Health Care System project (FY12)—both rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in latest supervision reports. 36. Three IFC investments for $55 million in net commitments were in operation at CPS inception. During the CPS IFC committed additional $160 million through seven investments in the financial sector, addressing trade, housing, micro and SME finance as well as general commercial banking. 37. The CLR made no comments on the quality of the IFC investment portfolio, but internal IFC documents indicate that the IFC investment projects were being implemented as planned. IEG reviewed one IFC investment project that was in the portfolio during the review period and rated it as Mostly Successful. 38. MIGA provided $173 million in investment guarantees during the CPS. Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services 39. A program of analytic work and advisory activities and services including 5 Economic and Sector Works (ESWs) and 14 Technical Assistance (TA) tasks was delivered during the FY10-FY14 period. The Bank provided advice to the government on using the reactivation of the rural sector, improving the efficiency of the judicial system, and developing the financial and insurance sector. All in all, the program of AAA supported well the Bank’s lending program. The impact of the overall program of AAA is hard to assess, and the CLR does not attempt to make an assessment. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 10 40. IFC had no ongoing advisory service (AS) project at CPS inception. During the CPS IFC approved 5 AS projects amounting to over $2.9 million of total funds (public lighting, port, tax and incentives, Apoyo Integral, AMC El Salvador). Two of these were terminated owing to lack of progress and one closed during the review period was rated by IEG as Mostly Unsuccessful. Based on IFC internal documents the remaining AS projects are likely to be rated Mostly Unsatisfactory at completion Results Framework 41. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expects to contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. Although the causal chain was not explicitly discussed in the text, and in some cases some objectives were not supported by linked WBG activities, the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. At the same time —as the CLR recognizes—the framework had significant weaknesses. In a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous link with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were in the past (already accomplished). Some indicators lacked target values. The quantified targets were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC and MIGA activities were kept outside the framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate. These weaknesses affected adversely the credibility of the results framework, particularly the one set up at progress report stage. Unintended positive or negative effects of the interventions were not explicitly identified in the program documents, and the scale up to country level outcomes could be inferred from the original results framework but were not explicitly discussed in the program documents. Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination 42. Donor coordination appears to have been good under this CPS, especially among the IMF, IADB, and WBG. According to the WBG team this had benefits for policy advice, for the coordinated funding of programs, and for collaboration with the government. The most successful example was the multi- funded Temporary Income Support Program (PATI), where donor coordination was led by the government. Regular meetings and constant dialogue among development partners was crucial for the alignment and interventions and programs for social protection. Another example of good practice was in the health sector, where the IADB and the WBG worked closely to develop a complex health reform. There are also counter-examples where development partner cooperation did not work well. In the fiscal sector, in particular, donor coordination has been poor. The WBG Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan was prepared in close coordination with multilateral organizations and donors but at the time of implementation it has suffered from poor coordination. According to the WBG team, ongoing efforts to improve coordination need to be supplemented by stronger ownership and leadership from the Ministry of Finance to be more effective Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues 43. No major safeguards or fiduciary issues occurred during the CPS. The WBG team reports that a few minor issues were resolved in a timely manner by the WBG and government teams. Ownership and Flexibility 44. The CPS was closely aligned with government objectives, and focused on areas where there was initial commitment at various government levels, which was essential during negotiations with congress about WBG interventions. However, a steady commitment was not maintained by the government during program implementation. The program thus suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation during project implementation that resulted in significant delays in planned outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. Good examples of government ownership are the Income Support and Employability project (FY10) and the Local Government CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 11 Strengthening project (FY10) that required a high commitment from implementing agencies and 262 municipalities. An example of poor ownership is the Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance (FY10) that has floundered amidst poor intra-government coordination. 45. The program initially covered FY10-FY12 only, and was extended to FY14, to coincide with the administration’s term, in the progress report of 2011. WBG Internal Cooperation 46. Cooperation between IFC and IBRD during the CPS period centered on IFC advisory projects, where, according to the WBG team, IFC worked with IBRD in reforms to the PPP law and preparation of the bidding process for a project in La Union, a department in El Salvador. Despite the cooperation, the results framework for the program failed to integrate IFC activities. Moreover the collaboration has remained ad-hoc without strategic alignment and efforts to jointly explore and identify opportunities for development and greater impact. Issues related to potential conflicts of interest between IBRD and IFC were not discussed in the CLR. Risk Identification and Mitigation 47. The CPS identified the main risks, such as a prolonged global deceleration following the global financial crisis—which did not happen. The mitigation in this case was to create fiscal space under the program to address emerging social and other needs. Another risk was that a highly polarized political climate could affect program implementation, which did materialize. In anticipation, the initial design of the program contained operations that could generate ample public support. Additionally, the WBG responded by intensifying stakeholder consultations to build understanding and support for operations that were critical, non-partisan efforts to promote social and economic development. Moreover, the WBG and the government recognized the need for consensus building processes and effective dialogue for the restructuring of an operation, including with the opposition. 48. Two other identified risks involved natural disasters and limited institutional capacity. Both materialized—a DPL CAT DDO was a partial response to the first, but the second was much more difficult to deal with in the context of a new administration with no previous executive experience. Despite WBG engagements to develop absorptive capacity through technical assistance, such capacity remained inadequate, showing in some instances that timeframes for objectives were unrealistic. 49. IEG recognizes that in a country in a political state-of-flux like El Salvador during this CPS, it is truly difficult to have all the bases covered regarding risks to the program. In this context, it was appropriate for WBG to commit initially to FY10-FY12. This provided the chance to “start again” in FY13 in cas e something unforeseen and of significant scale were to happen. The later part (after progress report) of this program was quite disappointing in terms of program implementation. Overall Assessment and Rating 50. IEG rates WBG performance as Good. The program was well designed with a set of outcomes consistent with the scope of the government’s crisis response program. Each strategic area was backed by WBG interventions, which contained an adequate combination of technical assistance, policy loans (DPLs), specific projects to improve the delivery of social services and increase economic opportunities for example, and targeted trust funded activities that complemented well the other interventions. IFC was involved in the third area (economic opportunities) with interventions to improve logistics and power supply, and financial sector support. The program committed initially to the FY10- FY12 period, and was extended to FY14 in the progress report of June 2011. The results framework had an adequate initial design showing the country outcomes, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expected to contribute, intermediate indicators, and WBG activities. Although causal chains were not explicitly discussed in the text—and in some cases some objectives were not supported by linked CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 12 WBG activities—the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. But in a number of instances the indicators had at best a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and similarly, some indicators introduced at progress report stage had targets that were in the past (already accomplished). Targets were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC activities were kept outside the framework. These weaknesses affected adversely the credibility of the results framework, particularly the one set up at progress report stage. Program implementation suffered from a lack of inter and intra-institutional cooperation that resulted in significant delays compared to targeted outcomes. This was compounded by a transition between administrations in 2014, which had significant additional adverse effects in the implementation of some WBG projects. As a consequence the pace of implementation slowed down considerably, and two key interventions for the second half of the program (Innovation, Science and Technology project (FY12) and Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II (FY13)) never took off the ground. Donor coordination appears to have been good under this CPS, especially among the IMF, IADB, and WBG. 7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report 51. The CLR framework of analysis is consistent with the progress report objectives, although the text and the summary of the CPS program self-evaluation have different presentations of the program for some clusters. The CLR discusses the evidence on program indicators, but it could have been more substantive in explaining the WBG’s contribution to country outcomes. The CLR is candid but could have discussed the slow pace of program implementation after the progress report in more detail. Two key planned interventions never took off the ground. The CLR also could have been more critical with the way some indicator targets were set up ex-post at progress report stage, with targets already accomplished at the time of their setting. The CPS and progress report identify citizen security as a priority. Action was taken both in FY10 (organization of summit) and FY14 (Action Learning Approach Towards a Strategy for Citizen Security) and the CLR could have addressed this key priority in its assessment. 8. Findings and Lessons 52. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR about consensus building and continued dialogue with various stakeholders in a politically polarized environment, better planning in an institutional environment lacking in collaboration, promoting synergies of IBRD, IFC, and MIGA for better results, and difficulties emanating from a poorly designed results framework. IEG would like to add that although the progress report was expected to be a significant exercise, it appears to have been a missed opportunity to attempt to modify and strengthen key interventions. As a result implementation progressed at an extremely low pace during the second half of the program. Progress reports (PLRs) in future should not miss the opportunity for a substantive reflection on what needs to be modified in the remainder of the program —and WBG teams use the opportunity for revising approaches to implementation on the ground. The CLR draws no lessons from IFC’s not being involved beyond the financial sector despite its initially ambitious plans for infrastructure, electricity, and others. IFC needs to go beyond identifying issues and explore investments/interventions in considerable detail, specifying conditions for success and identifying barriers to choice. Finally, the adverse macroeconomic environment seems to have played a role in poor results of focus area I, and the WBG could attempt to pay more attention in future to macro aspects in the absence of a Fund program, as sustainable growth is key. Annexes CLR Review 13 Independent Evaluation Group Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CPS Objectives Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for El Salvador, FY10-14 Annex Table 3: El Salvador Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-14 (in US$ million) Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work for El Salvador, FY10 - FY14 Annex Table 5 IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-Present Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-14 Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for El Salvador and Comparators, FY10-14 Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for El Salvador, FY10-14 Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for El Salvador, FY10-14 Annex Table 10: List of IFC’s investments in El Salvador that we re active during FY10-15 (US$’000) Annex Table 11: List of IFC’s Advisory Services in El Salvador, FY10-15 Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for El Salvador Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for El Salvador, 2010 - 2013 Annexes CLR Review 15 Independent Evaluation Group Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CPS Objectives CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for Actual Results economic recovery by Comments (as of current month/year) addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities Country Development Objective: Broaden the tax base 1. CPS Objective: Tax reform legislation aimed at increasing tax revenues and closing tax loopholes is approved, and tax administration systems strengthened Indicator: Tax collection as a AS of December 2014, tax collection Source: CLR and El percentage of GDP projection was 15.9%. Salvador Team. Baseline: 12.4% (2009) The Public Finance and Social Progress DPL (P122699) supported the Target: 15.8% (2014) strengthening of tax administration systems. This operation supported the strengthening, modernization, and coordination between three tax agencies: Internal Revenue Agency (DGII), the Customs Agency (DGA), and the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Office (DGT). The Customs Agency (DGA) and the Tax Administration Office (DGII) have confirmed that the Directorates have strengthened their respective capacity to fight tax evasion through the implementation of systems that will enable Major them to select and manage the cases to Outcome be audited by the Borrower’s tax Measures authorities. Country Development Objective: Improve targeting of subsidies 2. CPS Objective: Electricity subsidy for large firms eliminated and overall costs substantially reduced Indicator: Electricity subsidy for Efforts were made to improve the Source: CLR and El large firms eliminated and overall targeting. In March 2009, the government Salvador Team costs reduced eliminated the generalized component of the electricity subsidy for households and The outcome indicator Baseline: US$210.9 million firms, leaving only a subsidy targeted on was reformulated at the (2008) the poorest households. Between April CPSPR stage. and October 2010, given the substantial Target: US$100 million only for increase in international petroleum prices, targeted poor households (2014) a temporary subsidy was reinstated for all residential consumers (but not for firms). After October the subsidy reverted only to the targeted poorest households. Despite these efforts, the electricity subsidy in 2012 totalized US$200.6 million, around US$100 million more than the estimated target 3. CPS Objective: Transport subsidies reduced Indicator: Amount of transport The transport subsidy estimated for 2014 Source: CLR subsidies reduced by 50% is US$35.8 M. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 16 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for Actual Results economic recovery by Comments (as of current month/year) addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities The outcome indicator Baseline: US$84 million (2008) was reformulated at the CPSPR stage. Target: US$42 million (2014) Country Development Goal: Implement results-based budgeting 4. CPS Objective: Improve PEFA ratings Indicator: Improvements in PEFA Although, PEFA indicators remain the Source: CLR ratings indicator #12 (Multiyear same as the baseline, the Government perspective in fiscal planning, has defined a medium-term budget The target was provided expenditure policy and budgeting) framework (that was incorporated in the at the CPSPR stage. and indicator #5 (Classification of 2011 budget), and a result-based the budget) budgeting methodology that was piloted in the 2011 budgets of the Ministry of Baseline: PEFA #12=C+; PEFA Agriculture and the Ministry of Health. The #5=C (2009) Government expects to implement a result-based budgeting methodology in all Target: PEFA #12=B; PEFA ministries in the coming years. #5=B (2014) Country Development Goal: Enhance quality of judicial services 5. CPS Objective: Increase user satisfaction with judicial services Indicator: Satisfaction of users According to the Impact Evaluation of the Source: CLR with the new Judicial Services Soyapango Center, 85% of users are Center has increased by 50% and satisfied with its service provision. Almost The outcome indicator the Government has extended the 50% of users, and 27.6%, said that the was reformulated at the model to other two judicial centers Center is very efficient, or moderately CPSPR stage. The efficient, respectively. Furthermore, the baseline provided at the Baseline: A new Integrated model was extended to two other locations CPSPR stage was not Judicial Services Center was in San Salvador. aligned with how the designed for the Soyapango indicator was formulated. district. Target: 50% increase in user satisfaction (2014) Country Development Goal: Enhance access to information 6. CPS Objective: Legal and regulatory framework in place to enhance public access to fiscal information Indicator: Legal and regulatory Target one: An Access to Information Law Source: CLR framework in place to enhance came into force in 2013. public access to fiscal information Target two: In mid-2010, the Ministry of The second target for the Baseline: No regulations exist on Finance launched the Fiscal Transparency indicator was introduced enhanced public access to fiscal Portal that provides easy access to at the CPSPR stage information (2009). aservicn array of fiscal data, based on (June 2011). The target international best practices. had been already Target: (i) Legal and regulatory achieved by mid-2010. framework in place to enhance public access to fiscal information (2014); (ii) the Fiscal Transparency Portal has been redesigned and launched (2014). CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 17 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for Actual Results economic recovery by Comments (as of current month/year) addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities Indicator: Percentage of public 92 percent of public sector procurement is Source: CLR sector procurement transactions recorded in COMPRASAL. recorder in COMPRASAL Baseline: 44% Target: 80% (2014) Country Development Goal: Improve fiscal transparency 7. CPS Objective: Government financial statements show tangible progress towards being consistent with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and Government Financial Statistics (GFS) standards Indicator: Government financial The new SAFI is still under development Source: CLR statements show tangible and is expected to be up and running for progress towards being budget 2017. Steps have been taken to consistent with International harmonize accounting reports with legal Public Sector Accounting standards. There is a proposal for a Standards (IPSAS) and National Accounting Plan under the new Government Financial Statistics SAFI II that takes into account IPSAS (GFS) standards standards. Baseline: Government financial statements are not consistent with IPSAS and Government Financial Statistics standards (2009) Target: Government Financial Statements are consistent with IPSAS and Government Financial Statistics Standards are automatically produced by an upgraded SAFI (2014) Country Development Goal: Improve disaster management 8. CPS Objective: Review, finalize and implement emergency plans for the most vulnerable populations and local jurisdictions Indicator: The Civil Protection All sections of the Civil Protection and Source: CLR and Disaster Prevention and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Mitigation National Plan is under National Plan were updated in 2012. In This CPS objective was revision as prescribed by law. 2013, it was further strengthened by reformulated at the integrating guidelines for rehabilitation and CPSPR stage. The Baseline: No (2009) reconstruction and including additional indicator to measure the risks to ensure a comprehensive vision of achievement of the Target: Yes (2014) disaster risk management. The revised objective was introduced Plan is currently under consultation. at the CPSPR stage. Indicator: The sectoral The sectoral emergency response plans Source: CLR emergency plans are presented were presented to the Commission in to Civil Protection National 2010. Since then, the 7 Sectoral This CPS objective was Commission. Emergency Response Commissions have reformulated at the been meeting regularly and the plans are CPSPR stage. The CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 18 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area I Strengthen fundamental for Actual Results economic recovery by Comments (as of current month/year) addressing macro and institutional vulnerabilities Baseline: No systematically implemented during indicator to measure the relevant emergencies and are monitored achievement of the Target: Yes (2014) for continuous improvement. In 2014, objective was introduced contingency plans for floods, seismic at the CPSPR stage activity and epidemics (dengue) were (2011). However, the activated. In addition, the National Seismic proposed target had Contingency Plan for earthquakes and already been achieved in tsunamis was tested through simulations 2010. in June 2013 and in May 2014 with the support of the Humanitarian Allied Forces and the participation of the Sectoral Emergency Response Commissions. 9. CPS Objective: Establish a contingent line of credit as part of the country’s disaster risk strategy Indicator: Contingent line of A DPL with a CAT-DDO in the amount of Source: CLR credit established US$50 million was approved on February This CPS objective was 1, 2011, made effective on May 24, 2011, introduced at the CPSPR Baseline: No and closed on August 31, 2014. It was stage (June 2011). The fully disbursed through two requests on proposed target had Target: Yes (2014) October 17 and 27, 2011, to provide already been achieved resources to respond to the impact of the before its introduction tropical depression 12E. (February 2011). 10. CPS Objective: Improve local capacities to assess risk Indicator: Support for conducting To support El Salvador’s participation in Source: CLR and El the Central America Probabilistic CAPRA, the Bank and other partners Salvador Team. Risk Assessment (CAPRA) provided hands-on practical training and delivered and findings from the complementary advisory services on The CPS objective was CAPRA exercise incorporated probabilistic risk assessment. This support introduced at the CPSPR into the Government’s risk allowed local counterparts to assess stage (June 2011). A reduction program. seismic hazard, compile and update baseline and a target existing exposure data, codify this were proposed although Baseline: No information, assess the vulnerability of the no clear indicator was portfolio, and to finally calculate seismic formulated. Target: Yes (2014) risk using CAPRA. The Bank also supported El Salvador to incorporate the findings of the CAPRA exercise into guidelines for a risk reduction program. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 19 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Actual Results Comments Strengthen delivery of (as of current month/year) social services Country Development Goal: Improve access to basic health services 11. CPS Objective: Prevention and promotion of health care services through the Integrated Health Care Services model expanded Indicator: Percentage of 61.3% of individuals of the eligible Source: CLR and Ministry individuals from the 92 municipalities received health care of Health eligible municipalities services in 90 municipalities, at least receiving health care once in 2014 (Source: Ministry of Health). The indicator was services Originally designed to reach 92 reformulated at the municipalities, the Strengthening Public CPSPR stage. Baseline: 70% (2008) Health Care System Project was restructured and reduced the number of Target: 85% (2014) eligible municipalities from 92 to 90. Indicator: Nominal amount Nominal amount for non-personnel Source: CLR for non-personnel recurrent recurrent expenditures in health in the expenditures in health in the 2010-2014 Budgets were on average The indicator was proposed 2010-2014 US$331.1 million, surpassing the levels of introduced at the CPSPR Budgets are on average at 2008. stage. least the same level as in 2008. 12. CPS Objective: Increase the number of hospital discharges in the public sector Indicator: Number of Hospital discharges in 2014: 394,766; Source: CLR and Ministry Major hospital discharges in public 2013: 403,181 of Health Outcome sector has increased by Measures 10% over 2008 The baseline for this outcome indicator was Baseline: 364,915 (2009) provided at the CPSPR stage. Target: ≥ 480,000 (2014) Indicator: Family 520 ECOS working in 164 municipalities. Source: CLR and Ministry community teams (ECOS) From this total, 482 are family ECOS and of Health equipped and functioning 36 specialized ECOS according to norms The indicator was established by MOH introduced at the CPSPR stage. Baseline: 0 ECOS Target: 500 ECOS (2014) 13. CPS Objective: Coverage, equity and quality of priority health services is been expanded for targeted population Indicator: Percentage of 83% of pregnant women registered in the Source: CLR and Ministry pregnant women receiving public health system of the 90 eligible of Health. at least four pre-natal municipalities received at least four pre- check-ups in selected 82 natal check-ups in 2014. The outcome indicator Municipalities was introduced at the CPSPR stage. No Baseline: Not provided. baseline was reported. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 20 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Actual Results Comments Strengthen delivery of (as of current month/year) social services Target: 85% of pregnant women receiving at least four pre-natal check-ups Indicator: Percentage of In 2014, 61.3% of individuals of the 90 Source: CLR and Ministry poor people with access to eligible municipalities received health of Health. public health services in care services, at least once in 2014. eligible municipalities Additionally, out of the 90 eligible The outcome indicator municipalities, 32 have total or partial was introduced at the Baseline: 50% health coverage by ECOS. CPSPR stage. Target: 65% CPS Objective: Eligible Public hospitals have implemented a drug supply management system Indicator: Eligible public All hospitals are using the National Source: CLR hospitals have implemented Supply System as a drug supply a drug supply management management and planning system. The outcome indicator system was introduced at the CPSPR stage. Baseline: No Target: 20 public hospitals have implemented a drug supply management system (2014) Country Development Goal: Improve coverage and quality of secondary education 14. CPS Objective: Increase enrollment rate in secondary education Indicator: Secondary Total enrollment in secondary education Source: CLR education enrollment to be increased more than 38,000 students increased by about 38,000 (633,369 students in total by 2010). The baseline for this students outcome indicator was provided at the CPSPR Baseline: 55,000 (2008) stage. Target: 93,000 (2014) Indicator: Number of The number of operating classrooms in Source: CLR operating classrooms in secondary education increased more secondary education than 200 This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR Baseline: Not provided stage. Target: Increased by 200 Indicator: Nominal amount In 2010, non-personnel recurrent Source: CLR for non-personnel recurrent expenditures in education (US$ expenditures in education 184,100,000) and in health This indicator was and health in the proposed (US$265,200,000) were higher than the introduced at the CPSPR 2010 Budget are at least the levels as in 2008 (US$141,740,000 and stage. same level as in 2008 US$ 220,500,000 respectively). Baseline: No Target: Yes CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 21 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area II Actual Results Comments Strengthen delivery of (as of current month/year) social services 15. CPS Objective: New curriculum for teaching science and technology in upper secondary schools elaborated, taking into account labor market needs for skills Indicator: New curriculum In 2010, Ministry of Education developed Source: CLR for teaching science and a science and technology curriculum for technology in upper upper secondary technical education in secondary schools agriculture and electrical engineering. elaborated, taking into The new curriculum was implemented in account labor market needs 2011 with the participation of the for skills productive sector. Baseline: No Target: Yes CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area III Actual Results Comments Increase economic (as of current month/year) opportunities for the poor Country Development Goal: Protect the income of the urban poor, through the implementation of targeted programs 16. CPS Objective: Protect the income of the urban poor Indicator: Number of 40,000 individuals from extreme poor and Source: CLR and PATI families in targeted urban poor urban settlements in 25 settlements receiving municipalities have benefited from the income support Temporary Income Support Program (PATI). Baseline: 0 Target: 40,000 (2014) Country Development Goal: Support design of components of a universal social protection system (SPSU) 17. CPS Objective: Unified registration system of participants designed and standardized Major Indicator: Unified As of October 2014, the RUP was already Source: CLR and PATI Outcome registration system of being used by Comunidades Solidarias Measures participants designed and program to target beneficiaries in Urban standardized Precarious Settlements of 71 municipalities; and progress has been Baseline: No made to incorporate other social programs (ECOS) and subsidies Target: Yes (2014) beneficiaries. 18. CPS Objective: Comunidades Solidarias expanded to cover 125 poorest municipalities Indicator: Number of poor The Comunidades Solidarias program is Source: CLR municipalities covered by working in the 125 poorest municipalities the Comunidades of the country. The baseline and target Solidarias Rurales Program were provided at the CPSPR stage. Baseline: 77 (2008) Target: 125 (2014) Country Development Goal: Coverage of training programs extended CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 22 CPS FY10-FY14: Focus Area III Actual Results Comments Increase economic (as of current month/year) opportunities for the poor 19. CPS Objective: Participants in Temporary Income Support Program in 25 municipalities receive job skill training Indicator: Participants in PATI, which includes job skill training for Source: CLR Temporary Income Support its beneficiaries, has been expanded to Program in 25 municipalities the 25 poorest municipalities, responding receive job skill training to the revised urban poverty map. Baseline: No Target: Yes (2014) Indicator: Number of 58 Bolsas de Empleo were operating by Source: CLR “Bolsas de Empleo” fully October 2014. operational and connected The baseline was provided to the National Employment at the CPSPR stage. Network (RNE) Baseline: 28 Target: 46 Country Development Goal: Increase investment and employment in rural areas 20. CPS Objective: Government has established a system to finance municipal projects and had increased transfer to municipalities by 2% during the crisis period Indicator: Government has The Government transferred extra money Source: CLR established a system to to the municipalities through the WBG finance municipal projects project, but no program was put in place The outcome indicator and had increased transfer to transfer additional funds to FODES. was reformulated at the to municipalities by 2% CPSPR stage. during the crisis period Baseline: No additions to regular Government transfers via FODES (Municipal Economic and Social Development Fund) Target: Yes (2014) 21. CPS Objective: Percentage of municipal Government that have produced their 5-year Municipal Development Plan with ample civil society engagement Indicator: Percentage of As of 2014, 135 municipalities had Source: CLR municipal Government that completed their five-Year Development have produced their 5-year Plans (52 percent of the total The outcome indicator Municipal Development municipalities). was introduced at the Plan with ample civil society CPSPR stage. engagement Baseline: 25% Target: 45% (2014) CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 23 Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for El Salvador, FY10-14 Project Proposed Approval Closing Proposed Approved Outcome Project name ID FY FY FY Amount Amount Rating Project Planned Under CPS / CPSPR 2010-13 Sustaining Social Gains for Econ. Recovery P118036 DPL $100 FY10 2010 2011 100.0 100.0 IEG: S Fiscal Mgmt. & Public Sector Development P095314 $20 FY10 2010 2017 20.0 20.0 LIR: MU P117440 Income Support & Employability $50 FY10 2010 2016 50.0 50.0 LIR: MS P118026 Local Government Strengthening Project $80 FY10 2010 2016 80.0 80.0 LIR: MS Public Finance and Social Progress DPL I P122699 $100 FY11 2011 2013 100.0 100.0 IEG: MS P122640 DPL with a CAT-DDO $50 FY11 2011 2015 50.0 50.0 LIR: S P117157 Health Sector Project $80 FY12 2012 2016 80.0 80.0 LIR: MS P126364 Education Project $50 FY12 2012 2018 50.0 60.0 LIR: MU P126593 Innovation, Science and Technology Project FY12 Dropped 20.0 P127333 Public Finance and Social Progress DPL II FY13 Dropped 100.0 Total Planned 650.00 540.00 Unplanned Projects during the CPS and CPSPR Period Total Unplanned Approval Closing Approved On-going Projects during the CPS and CPSPR Period FY FY Amount P067986 SV-Earthquake Emergency Rec. & Health 2002 2011 142.6 IEG: MU P064919 SV JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION PROJECT 2003 2011 18.2 IEG: MS P086953 SV Land Administration II 2005 2012 40.2 IEG: NR P064910 SV Environmental Services Project 2005 2013 5.0 LIR: HU P088642 SV Social Protection & Local Dev (FISDL) 2006 2011 21.0 IEG: NR P078993 SV- Excellence and Innov. in Sec. Edu. 2006 2012 85.0 IEG: NR P114910 SV Public Finance and Social Sector DPL 2009 2011 450.0 IEG: S Total On-going 762.0 Source: Dominican Republic CPS, CPSPR and WB AO Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 3-23-15 *LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory. Annex Table 3: El Salvador Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-14 (in US$ million) Project Approval Closing Approved Amount (Millions Project name TF ID ID FY FY USD) P095314 Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance TF 56579 2006 2010 0.84 Technical Assistance Loan P092202 Protected Areas Consolidation and Administration TF 55925 2006 2012 5.00 P109677 El Salvador: Strengthening Fiscal Management and TF 92367 2009 2013 0.40 Public Sector Transparency P095314 Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance TF 95841 2010 2011 0.08 Technical Assistance Loan P116646 Addressing Youth Violence through Cultural and TF 94811 2010 2015 0.97 Music Learning P125760 Safeguarding Human Capital of Urban Poor Children TF 11078 2012 2015 2.75 in the context of recurring food crisis P126364 Education Quality Improvement Project TF 10361 2012 2014 0.13 P124935 El Salvador FCPF REDD Readiness TF 99529 2012 2017 3.80 P132415 EL SALVADOR: Agricultural and Energy Risk TF 13124 2013 2016 Management: An Integral Strategy to Cope with 1.83 Drought and Food Insecurity P126364 Education Quality Improvement Project TF 14166 2014 2015 0.10 P125899 Central America Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate TF 521003 2011 N/A 0.69 Change Adaptation Initiative Project * CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 24 Project Approval Closing Approved Amount (Millions Project name TF ID ID FY FY USD) P144982 Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Resilience N/A 2016 N/A N/A to Natural Hazards in Central America * Total 16.58 Source: Client Connection as of 09/30/14 * Regional projects Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work for El Salvador, FY10 - FY14 Proj ID Economic and Sector Work Fiscal year Output Type P120936 FSAP Update El Salvador FY10 Report Public Expenditure Review SV PER P110204 FY11 (PER) Corporate Governance GCMCG: El Salvador Country Assessment P124032 FY11 Assessment (ROSC) P123313 SV Land Tenure FY12 Report P127661 SV Public Expenditure Institutional Rev FY12 Report Proj ID Technical Assistance Fiscal year Output Type P115121 SV Policy Dialogue & Consensus Building FY10 Knowledge-Sharing Forum P110432 SV Human Dev for Poverty Reduct FY11 "How-To" Guidance P114001 FIRST #7099: IFRS Implementation TA FY11 "How-To" Guidance P125050 El Salvador #10078 Fin. Crisis Prep Prog FY11 "How-To" Guidance P121532 SV NLTA Improv.Science Educ in Primary FY12 TA/EPD P121763 SV-Improving Governance & Accountability FY12 TA/EPD P126387 El Salvador #10172 Org. Str. of Integ FS FY12 TA/EPD P129160 El Salvador #10200 Strength Safety Nets FY13 TA/IAR P129496 SV Innovation System Capacity Support FY13 TA/IAR Action Learning Approach: Towards a Strategy for Citizen P132366 Security FY14 TA/EPD P133465 SV Regulatory Framework FY14 TA/IAR P144426 RAAP for Municipality of El Salvador FY14 TA/EPD P150278 El Salvador PF Sector / Project Briefs FY14 TA/IAR Source: WB Business Warehouse Table ESW/TA 8.1.4 as of 9/30/14 Annex Table 5 IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-Present Total Exit FY Proj ID Project name Evaluated IEG Outcome IEG Risk to DO ($M) SV JUDICIAL MODERATELY HIGH 2011 P064919 MODERNIZATION PROJECT 16.9 SATISFACTORY SV-Earthquake Emergency MODERATELY NEGLIGIBLE TO 2011 P067986 Rec. & Health 142.0 UNSATISFACTORY LOW SV Public Finance and Social SATISFACTORY MODERATE 2011 P114910 Sector DPL 450.0 2011 P118036 SV Sustaining Social Gains 100.0 SATISFACTORY MODERATE Protected Areas Consolidation MODERATELY SIGNIFICANT 2012 P092202 and Admin 0.0 UNSATISFACTORY SV Public Finance and Social MODERATELY SIGNIFICANT 2012 P122699 Progress 100.0 SATISFACTORY Total 809.0 Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 3-23-15 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 25 Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for El Salvador, FY10-14 RDO % Total Total RDO % Outcome Outcome Moderate or Region Evaluated Evaluated Moderate or Lower % Sat ($) % Sat (No) Lower ($M) (No) Sat (No) Sat ($) El Salvador 809.0 6 82.4 66.7 85.5 50.0 LCR 27,503.2 213 93.5 75.1 80.4 65.2 World 102,346.7 1,180 83.1 69.9 63.1 50.3 Source: AO as of 3-23-15 * With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately. Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for El Salvador and Comparators, FY10-14 Fiscal year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average FY10-14 Dominican Republic # Proj 8 6 6 8 8 7.2 # Proj At Risk 1 1 1 - - 0.6 % Proj At Risk 12.5 16.7 16.7 - - 9.2 Net Comm Amt 871.8 311.0 291.0 295.5 344.6 422.8 Comm At Risk 5.0 20.0 20.0 - - 9.0 % Commit at Risk 0.6 6.4 6.9 - - 2.8 LCR # Proj 349 353 346 332 315 339.0 # Proj At Risk 68 61 68 72 70 67.8 % Proj At Risk 19.5 17.3 19.7 21.7 22.2 20.1 Net Comm Amt 32,161.5 32,557.8 33,341.8 30,843.3 29,271.0 31,635.1 Comm At Risk 5,316.1 3,195.2 4,503.5 6,097.4 6,355.6 5,093.6 % Commit at Risk 16.5 9.8 13.5 19.8 21.7 16.3 World # Proj 1,990 2,059 2,029 1,965 2,049 2,018.4 # Proj At Risk 410 382 387 414 412 401.0 % Proj At Risk 20.6 18.6 19.1 21.1 20.1 19.9 Net Comm Amt 162,975.3 171,755.3 173,706.1 176,206.6 192,614.1 175,451.5 Comm At Risk 28,963.1 23,850.0 24,465.0 40,805.6 40,933.5 31,803.4 % Commit at Risk 17.8 13.9 14.1 23.2 21.3 18.0 Source: WB Business Warehouse as of 10/01/14 Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for El Salvador, FY10-14 Fiscal Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average El Salvador Disbursement Ratio (%) 41.48 36.23 18.26 9.71 14.24 23.98 Inv Disb in FY 14.49 61.62 19.57 21.96 29.05 29.34 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY 34.93 170.07 107.19 226.03 204.07 148.46 LCR Disbursement Ratio (%) 39.18 30.88 21.96 23.95 18.76 26.95 Inv Disb in FY 4,998.44 4,513.46 3,338.43 3,523.98 2,491.08 3,773.08 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY 12,756.70 14,614.23 15,201.65 14,712.30 13,280.99 14,113.17 World Disbursement Ratio (%) 26.91 22.38 20.79 20.60 20.79 22.29 Inv Disb in FY 20,928.83 20,933.51 21,048.75 20,509.01 20,756.34 20,835.29 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY 77,760.85 93,516.54 101,239.14 99,582.39 99,848.44 94,389.47 * Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment. BW disbursement ratio table as of 10/1/14 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 26 Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for El Salvador, FY10-14 Period Disb. Amt. Repay Amt. Net Amt. Charges Fees Net Transfer Jul 2009 - Jun 2010 14,014,404 61,630,545 (47,616,142) 13,589,648 128,494 (61,334,284) Jul 2010 - Jun 2011 410,337,822 65,443,684 344,894,137 15,058,554 953,762 328,881,821 Jul 2011 - Jun 2012 168,047,204 57,035,941 111,011,263 30,174,264 453,309 80,383,690 Jul 2012 - Jun 2013 21,602,359 54,617,188 (33,014,829) 34,118,205 247,551 (67,380,585) Jul 2013 - Jun 2014 29,049,657 49,107,791 (20,058,134) 34,038,659 43,423 (54,140,217) Report Total 643,051,445 287,835,150 355,216,295 126,979,331 1,826,540 226,410,424 Source: World Bank Client Connection 10/1/14 Annex Table 10: List of IFC’s investments in El Salvador that were active during FY10 -15 (US$’000) Project Cmt. Closure Project IFC Sector IFC Sector Project Net Net Total Net ID FY FY Status Primary Explntry Size Loans1 Equi Commitment ty Investments approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15 Constr. & 21505 2004 2015 Closed MAS 79,200 25,000 25,000 Real Estate Finance 27833 2009 Active And Trade Finance 25,000 25,000 25,000 Insurance Finance 2009/ 27768 Active And Microfin. 10,000 5,000 5,000 10 Insurance Subtotal 114,200 55,000 55,000 Project Cmt. Closure Project IFC Sector IFC Sector Project Net Net Total Net ID FY FY Status Primary Explntry Size Loans1 Equi Commitment ty Investments approved in FY10-15 Finance 27261 2011 2014 Closed And Microfin. 8,000 8,000 8,000 Insurance Finance NBFI -Coop 28635 2011 Active And 30,000 30,000 30,000 Fin. Insurance Finance 33948 2013 Active And Trade Finance 17,500 17,500 17,500 Insurance Finance Housing 31776* 2013 Active And 10,000 10,000 10,000 Finance Insurance Finance NBFI - 33879 2014 Active And 20,000 20,000 20,000 Microfin. Insurance Finance Comm. 32964 2014 Active And 50,000 50,000 50,000 Banking Insurance Finance (27833) 2015 Active And Trade Finance 25,000 25,000 25,000 Insurance Subtotal 160,500 160,500 160,500 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 27 Project Cmt. Closure Project IFC Sector IFC Sector Project Net Net Total Net ID FY FY Status Primary Explntry Size Loans1 Equi Commitment ty Investments approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15 Grand Total 274,700 215,500 215,500 Source: IFC, April 2015- The list does not cover the regional projects. MAS: Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Services; na: not applicable. *IFC has equity positions and additional loans to the holding company. (xxxxx) indicates an increase in the maximum permissible trade finance guarantee under a previously approved project. 1: Includes Trade Finance Guarantees Annex Table 11: List of IFC’s Advisory Services in El Salvador, FY10-15 Project ID Project Name Start FY End FY Project Status Primary Business Total Line Funds, US$ Advisory Services operations approved pre-FY10, but active during FY10-15 Subtotal: None Advisory Services operations approved in FY10-15 575408 El Salvador Public Lighting 2010 2011 Terminated PPP 39,545 28425 El Salvador Port 2010 (2015) Active PPP 2,286,534 565327 Apoyo Integral AS 2011 2012 Terminated A2F 74,882 579307 AMC El Salvador AS 2011 2013 Closed A2F 275,114 599795 El Salvador Tax and Incentive 2014 (2015) Active IC 298,963 Reform Subtotal: 2,975,038 Grand Total 2,975,038 A2F: Access to Finance; IC: Investment Climate; PPP: Public-Private Partnerships Source: IFC, April 2015 Regional Projects are not included. For Closed/Terminated projects, Total Fund is actual expenditure during implementation. For Active projects, it is Project Size in the Plan/Amount secured (after 3 years). Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for El Salvador Development Partners 2010 2011 2012 2013 Australia .. 0.09 0.95 0.85 Austria 0.44 0.54 0.7 0.92 Belgium 0.81 1.25 1.08 1.3 Canada 2.01 3.64 2.71 1.87 Czech Republic 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 Denmark .. .. 0.41 .. Finland 0.14 0.67 0.11 0.13 France 3.31 3.21 3.68 3.25 Germany 17.06 14.85 15.31 22.33 Greece 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 Ireland 0.84 1.5 0.16 .. Italy 1.41 4.15 1.29 1.49 Japan 8.75 -8.65 -4.6 4.34 Korea 4.31 4.93 4.6 3.89 Luxembourg 7.07 7.76 9.8 9.8 Netherlands 0.14 0.15 0.01 .. New Zealand 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 Norway 1.13 2.1 0.62 2.26 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 28 Development Partners 2010 2011 2012 2013 Poland .. .. .. .. Portugal 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.03 Spain 85.51 44.56 18.53 33.85 Sweden 1.51 1.41 1.01 1.09 Switzerland 1.51 1.96 1.79 2.14 United Kingdom -48.82 0.01 -0.13 0.45 United States 151.26 170.92 160.88 53.4 DAC Countries, Total 238.61 255.23 219.03 143.47 EU Institutions 52.52 42.46 23.41 33.54 GEF 1 1 1.98 1.15 Global Fund 9.48 6.31 7.14 14.67 IAEA 0.24 0.34 0.39 0.43 IBRD .. .. .. .. IDA -0.84 -0.84 -0.7 -0.55 IDB Sp.Fund -20.85 -19.54 -21.15 -21.56 IFAD -0.66 -2.13 -2.94 -2.8 IFC .. .. .. .. OFID .. .. 0.15 0.07 OSCE .. .. .. .. UNAIDS 0.2 0.24 0.19 0.18 UNDP 0.8 0.51 0.85 0.64 UNECE .. .. .. .. UNFPA 1.42 1.11 1.02 1.1 UNICEF 0.77 0.88 0.67 0.85 WFP 0.62 0.08 0.1 0.02 Multilateral, Total 44.7 30.42 11.11 27.74 Israel 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.17 Thailand 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 Turkey 0.02 0.05 .. .. United Arab Emirates .. .. .. 0.01 Development Partners Total 283.31 285.65 230.14 171.21 Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 3-23-15 Annexes CLR Review 29 Independent Evaluation Group Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for El Salvador, 2010 - 2013 ES LAC World Series Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 2010-2013 Growth and Inflation GDP growth (annual %) 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 3.8 2.8 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.6 1.7 GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 6,910.0 7,150.0 7,300.0 7,490.0 7,212.5 13,844.6 13,559.1 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) (Millions) 20,839.8 21,803.3 22,649.1 23,556.0 22,212.1 5,473,335.0 70,411,025.0 Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0.9 5.1 1.7 0.8 2.1 3.9 3.7 Compositon of GDP (%) Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 12.6 12.5 11.9 10.8 12.0 5.1 3.1 Industry, value added (% of GDP) 26.7 26.9 26.9 27.0 26.9 33.5 26.9 Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 60.7 60.6 61.1 62.2 61.2 61.4 70.0 Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 13.3 14.4 14.1 15.1 14.2 20.2 21.8 Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) -3.6 -4.3 -4.4 -4.3 -4.2 20.3 22.4 External Accounts Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 25.9 28.0 25.6 26.4 26.5 25.0 29.5 Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 42.8 46.7 44.1 45.8 44.9 25.5 29.5 Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.5 -4.8 -5.4 -6.5 -4.8 .. .. External debt stocks (% of GNI) 53.0 53.3 57.5 57.1 55.2 .. .. Total debt service (% of GNI) 5.2 5.7 5.0 4.7 5.2 3.3 Total reserves in months of imports 3.8 2.8 3.4 .. 3.3 8.8 13.5 Fiscal Accounts /1 General government revenue (% of GDP) 17.1 17.4 17.9 18.5 17.7 .. .. General government total expenditure (% of GDP) 21.6 21.5 21.8 22.1 21.8 .. .. General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP) -4.4 -4.1 -3.9 -3.7 -4.0 .. .. General government gross debt (% of GDP) 49.7 50.0 55.2 55.5 52.6 .. .. Social Indicators Health Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 71.6 71.9 72.1 .. 71.9 74.4 70.6 Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) 89.0 89.0 92.0 92.0 90.5 92.2 83.4 Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 70.2 70.3 70.5 .. 70.3 81.2 63.3 Annexes CLR Review 30 Independent Evaluation Group ES LAC World Series Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 2010-2013 Improved water source (% of population with access) 81.0 81.0 81.0 .. 81.0 81.7 80.9 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 15.2 14.6 14.0 13.5 14.3 16.3 35.2 Education School enrollment, preprimary (% gross) 63.5 63.0 62.2 .. 62.9 72.4 .. School enrollment, primary (% gross) 113.2 113.5 112.6 .. 113.1 109.7 108.4 School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 64.7 67.2 69.2 .. 67.0 88.4 72.1 Population Population, total (Millions) 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 605.2 7,003.9 Population growth (annual %) 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.2 Urban population (% of total) 64.3 64.8 65.3 65.8 65.0 78.8 52.3 Source: DDP as of 3/12/15 *International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014