June 2018 Briefing Note Promoting equity and managing conflict in development Learning about Leadership, Regulation and Security from Papua New Guinea’s Urban Settlements David Craig and Doug Porter  1 Justice for the Poor is a World Bank research and development program aimed at informing, designing and supporting pro-poor approaches to justice reform. It is an approach to justice reform which sees justice from the perspective of the poor and marginalized, is grounded in social and cultural contexts, recognizes the importance of demand in building equitable justice systems, and understands justice as a cross-sectoral issue. Justice for the Poor research reports are aimed at development practitioners, partner governments, researchers, and others interested in justice reform. 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Craig/Worldbank 2 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S June 2018 Briefing Note Learning about Leadership, Regulation and Security from Papua New Guinea’s Urban Settlements David Craig and Doug Porter Papua New Guinea Urban Safety and Security ASA Activity Justice for the Poor (J4P) Trust Fund Acknowledgements This report was prepared by David Craig, Senior Government Specialist, and Doug Porter, consultant to Urban Safety and Security for the World Bank’s Advisory Services and Analytics activity. Virginia Horscroft was the task team leader. Caroline Sage and Doug Porter were the previous task team leaders, with support from Debbie Isser and Rob Taliercio. Research in Lae was assisted by Levi Johnston and Don Savi and facilitated by many members of Lae’s urban settlement leadership. This report draws on earlier work in Port Moresby to which Fiona Hukula, Rabura and Keke Aiga contributed. The work was funded by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) through the Justice for the Poor Trust Fund. None of this work would have been possible without the constant, warm and positive engagement of urban settlement, mediation and law and justice leaders, in both Port Moresby and Lae. These leaders, VC magistrates, women leaders and komitis of both genders welcomed the team, included us in events, talked and discussed openly at all times about what they were doing, kept us safe, and provided no obstacle when we needed to triangulate regarding komiti activities with other sources. Special thanks to Micah Yosman, Philemon Boddeh, Tony Miria, Andrew Kuno, Chris Waima, Doreen Yak, Peter Simbago, Esther Toss, Grace Laman, Helen Illitavalo, Hiob Awagasi, Anthony Guken, Francis Kanasi, James Kinjin, James Mukale, Judith Gidisa, Laura Dawa, Leo Raka, Mark Gigmai, Nalau Agi, Oscar Aiya, Michael Nakut, Sam Temiel, Zuabe Tinning, Mote Zaza, Anna Zerica. II L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S Contents Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................................II 1. Background..................................................................................................................................... 1 Urban settlement regulation: what is there, what functions, does it perform, 2.  and how does it work?....................................................................................................................4 2.1 WHAT LOCAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATE SETTLEMENTS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?.................................................................4 2.2 LOCAL REGULATORY FUNCTIONS ....................................................................................................................................................5 How does power and influence impact on settlement regulation?.................................................9 3.  Summary and implications for local governance and development practice...............................11 4.  4.1 UNDERSTANDING KOMITIS’ ADVANTAGES—AND LIMITATIONS..................................................................................................11 4.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN POLICY AND ENGAGEMENTS: “DO NO HARM”..........................................................12 4.3 OBSERVATIONS AND ADVICE FOR URBAN DEVELOPERS: CARRYING “DO NO HARM” INTO PROJECT PRACTICE ................13 4.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO STRENGTHEN KOMITI AND LIDA CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE ..............14 Annex 1: Research Methods.........................................................................................................18 Conte nts III Learning about Leadership, Regulation, and Security from Papua New Guinea’s Urban Settlements IV L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S 1. Background 1.1  This Briefing Note summarizes findings from the World Bank’s research and policy engagements between November 2014 and December 2016 in Port Moresby and Lae, the two largest cities in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The overall theme of this engagement was urban safety and security, with a dual focus on dispute- resolution and conflict-mediation mechanisms at the community level and on the experiences of women and others vulnerable to family and sexual violence (FSV).1 Although many of the findings and lessons learned are applicable to any context where the state’s reach is limited, this Briefing Note focuses on how PNG’s urban settlements2 are regulated, the apparent strengths and vulnerabilities of these mechanisms, the forms of lead- ership they involve, and the implications for urban governance. Research methods are described in Annex 1. The research, policy dialogues, and reports from this engagement have underlined four main points. 1.2 First, urban areas are crucial to PNG’s long- tal from education, the arts, and cultural exchange; term stability, economic growth, and diversifica- the legal or political capital that is necessary to ensure tion. Currently, only 14 percent of PNG’s people that rights are recognized and reflected in political live in cities, but these rapidly growing areas are of representation; and the social and symbolic capi- national significance for ensuring long-term stabil- tal needed to successfully and equitably order and ity, promoting economic diversification and growth, dignify public life. and delivering services fairly and effectively.3 Urban- ization will have its challenges, but it also offers the 1.3  Second, as is evident worldwide, PNG’s strongest possibility for diversifying an economy that successful urban transition will depend on its is currently dominated by natural resource extrac- ability to provide entry-level housing, economic tive industries and rural subsistence agriculture. The opportunity, access to transport, and legal-political institutional and political challenges posed by PNG’s representation.4 This, in turn, will depend on diversity and resource dependence are substantial, institutions that are capable of bridging the divides and cities offer extraordinary opportunities to transi- between PNG’s myriad ethnic groups so that divers- tion from this dependence because they can provide ity becomes the “unity in diversity” that people in uniquely beneficial ways of nurturing and deriving PNG celebrate. Indeed, PNG’s urban areas could be value from different forms of capital. These include: where the dysfunctional and conflictual polarizations physical or economic capital from investments in that characterize the country’s political economy, infrastructure and commercial activities; human capi- institutions, and social life might be overcome.5 This dual focus was intended to support the efforts of the Justice Services and Stability for Development Program (2016–2019), supported 1  by the Australian government. This Briefing Note draws on the following reports: D. Craig, D. Porter, and F. Hukula, “‘Come and See the System in Place.’ Mediation Capabilities in PNG’s Urban Settlements,” Research Report, Justice for the Poor (Washington, DC: World Bank: 2016); D. Craig and D. Porter, “‘There is Security from this Place’: Promoting the Safety and Economic Vitality of Port Moresby’s Local Markets,” Policy Note, Justice for the Poor (Washington, DC: World Bank: 2017); and D. Craig and D. Porter,“Safety and Security in Papua New Guinea’s Urban Settlements: Capable Institutions and Local Regulation beyond the State?” Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank: Forthcoming). Additional reporting on gender-based violence is forthcoming. Urban settlements are defined as residential settlements on land where custom is the basis of tenure and where there is informal or “low- 2  covenant” (registered self-help, site, and services) tenure on state land. World Bank, “Papua New Guinea Systematic Country Diagnostic” (Washington, DC and Port Moresby: World Bank, 2017); and World Bank, 3  “Papua New Guinea Risk and Resilience Assessment” (Washington, DC and Port Moresby: World Bank, 2017). See D. Saunders, Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping our World (London: William Heinemann, 2011). 4  These include the common oppositional divides between national and local, rural and urban, (Central) Highlands and Papuan or (MoMaSe) 5  Coastal cultural practices and identities, state and non-state, and formal and informal, and also between wantok or kin preference and reciprocal altruism. Backgro u nd 1 Kumkumung Leader Chris Waimo with a group of local youths. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank The residents of urban settlements are creating ins- activity and PNG’s business community is already titutions capable of bridging between rural village-, clear.7 More than this, where the regulation of land ethnic-, and group- [Tok Pisin: wantok] based justice and housing, market and other economic activity, practices on the one hand and modern urban and service delivery, and political representation fail, it national conceptions of human rights and universal tends to fuel ethnic divisions and drive inequalities laws on the other. Over time, urban settlements are along gender, age, and class lines. Failed regulation likely to be where divides and differences might be reinforces stigma, destroys livelihoods, deters invest- superseded by arrangements that do function, that ment, and corrodes public order. have regulatory and dispute-resolution capability, and where hybrid customary-modern (or what in 1.5  Fourth, improved regulatory performance this note is called kastom 6) practices serve as the hinges on a better understanding by investors, foundation for capable urban governance. government, and donors of “how things work” at the interface of urban state and kastom systems, 1.4 Third, the potential benefits of urbanization including the kinds of institutions and leadership are highly sensitive to regulatory failure, in involved and what they can be relied upon to do. particular, the breakdown of local law and order. It has long been acknowledged that the major The impost of crime and violence on commercial burden of managing disputes and conflicts in urban Kastom is to be differentiated from customary: Customary refers to traditional practices as defined in local ethnic contexts, imagined as 6  unaltered by colonial change. Kastom arrangements are a translation of such elements into modern and urban contexts, a translation that transfigures them into hybridized practices and doctrines that can relate to modern and colonial institutions. See D. Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013). S. Lakhani and A. Willman, “Trends in Crime and Violence in Papua New Guinea,” Research and Dialogue Series, Socio-economic Costs 7  of Crime and Violence in PNG 1 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014); and S. Lakhani and A. Willman, “Gates, Hired Guns and Mistrust: Business Unusual,” Research and Dialogue Series, Socio-economic Costs of Crime and Violence in PNG 4 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014). 2 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S settlements is carried by a range of local mechanisms, 1.6  Four basic questions have guided the range of including Village Courts, mediators, local leaders, consultations, interviews, seminars, and publica- and especially groups of individuals widely known tions since November 2014. as committees [komitis], all of which involve complex relationships with government administrations, the • First, who is involved in regulating urban settle- police, and other justice agencies. But how these ments and how do they work? arrangements work, and what they can and cannot • Second, how do they handle the four key be relied upon to do, is poorly understood. This is in areas of regulation that are crucial for capital part because PNG’s cities are widely stigmatized— accumulation: land and housing, public order, by commercial investors, government entities, and markets, and linkages between settlements and donor partners—as “no-go zones” of regulatory external agencies responsible for social services, dysfunction and failure and therefore places mired government administration, and political in chronic crime, violence, and insecurity. The representation? findings of the World Bank’s engagement show that this stigma is getting in the way of appreciating • Third, whose interests are served by the ways the notable and substantial contribution that these local mechanisms work and why? local institutions and leaders are making to urban • And fourth, what are the implications of the regulation. Documenting komiti and local leadership answers to these questions for three sets of actors: [lida, lidaman (male), lidameri (female)] institutional officials in PNG who are responsible for making capability, and frankly assessing their strengths and decisions about urban development, commercial shortcomings, is a necessary first step to correcting investors who have sponsored unprecedented the distortions of stigma that entrap settlements in investments in urban areas in the past decade, the public imagination as solely sites of violence and and donors who, together with the government, risk. It might also lessen the tendency for investments have turned attention to the significance of urban in urban development to intensify disputes and justice, law, and governance around settlements divisions and reduce the risk that interventions to for PNG’s prosperity and stability. improve urban regulation inadvertently undermine decades-long efforts by urban residents to create workable living arrangements. Backgro u nd 3 Urban settlement regulation: what is there, what 2.  functions, does it perform, and how does it work? 2.1  WHAT LOCAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATE blok komitis collect rent for indigenous landowners SETTLEMENTS AND HOW DO THEY WORK? and manage access and order in variously tenured settlements, and market komitis do the same in 2.1.1  Urban settlements on both state and custom local state, informal, or traditional landowner- land are for the most part regulated through locally established markets and sometimes play leading recognized arrangements commonly referred to as roles in market renovation projects. Komitis in some “the komiti system.” The job of the komiti is to solve places and sectors can claim sanction under local- or straighten out problems [daunim (or stretim) hevi] level government and ward bylaws; in other places, and create a good way of life for people [gutpela they operate in parallel or supplementary to, or sindaun]. Komitis represent their ethnic group or in the practical absence of, local state forms and settlement area [blok], but they can also pact and recognition. work together to resolve disputes and regulate activities to create and maintain order, security, and 2.1.3  A lida in urban settlements is someone who safety. Komitis take many different forms because has emerged and gained recognition as a leader they are highly adapted to local circumstances and by demonstrating superlative abilities in and to the different functions they fulfill. around komiti work. These abilities include being accessible and responsive when approached by 2.1.2 A komiti may be a term for an individual settlement residents; displaying skills in speaking and leader, for a cluster of individuals from a blok or consensus-building across diverse groups; delivering neighborhood, or for a much larger aggregation quality mediation and law and justice outcomes; and of power and authority assembled to stop ethnic representing local interests through strong networks disputes from escalating. Law and justice komitis and personal links with higher authorities. Unlike a hold regular courts [cots] and mediate disputes bigman or bossman/meri, they need not be wealthy throughout the week, activities they see as sanctioned in physical terms, but they must have considerable under either kastom and/or ward development trust, expertise, and respect. committee purview. Land management or settlement Law and Justice leaders, 3 Mile, Lae. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank 4 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S 2.1.4  Komitis and lidas draw together and 2.1.6 Thus, komitis stack together a diverse but coordinate various forms of local authority and collectively significant base of the forms of capital capital. Komitis are kastom or hybrid custom/modern outlined above: physical capital in terms of fees;8 institutions, in that they flexibly but durably combine human capital involving experience and mediation traditional/ethnic and modern state or quasi-state skills or knowledge of the legal system; cultural forms of authority, personified in individual komiti capital that includes ethnic expertise and knowledge and lidaman practice [blo ol lidaman]. Indeed, the of traditional legal usage and cultural values [pasin] defining, crucially enabling feature of komitis is that or village language; legal/political capital through they combine the authority of leaders and ethnic representing fellow settlement dwellers in public, groups inside the blok and also draw in individuals political and legal matters, and occupying positions with connections to the state, police, or others of authority within the blok, ward, Village Court, or whose power and respect is derived from a range local-level government; and symbolic capital as a of sources physically external to the settlement. result of recognition from, or a credible connection Komitis and lidas strongly desire official recognition with, powerful outsiders or, again, local forms of and remuneration and, especially in their law and government. Komitis’ ability to uses these forms of justice activities, regularly declare themselves to be capital effectively and fairly vary greatly. the unacknowledged frontline of the state, “putting our lives at risk every day” to solve problems in the 2.1.7  By employing this capital, komitis translate absence of a higher authority. custom and traditional authority into a basis for resolving disputes and creating livable urban 2.1.5  Irrespective of their makeup or official settlements within modern, ethnically mixed sanction, many komitis actively try to recreate kastom contexts. Local regulatory arrangements, a state-like authority, for instance, by linking with including komitis, are literally two-faced: They must or substituting for Village Courts, and most borrow be able to face or relate to the state and at the same some state trappings, such as adopting bylaws or the time, speak to local people with their customary or stamps, symbols, administrative voice, and turns of kastom expectations. To do this, they deliberately phrase of officialdom. There is also a competitive and mix, bridge, and blur elements of formal state aspirational element to becoming a respected komiti authority with diverse forms of custom and local as reflected in popular expectations about leadership authority. This mixing creates an ability to bring and performance. Komitis have a limited formal people with very different identities and loyalties legal mandate to hear cases but can claim sanction together to solve disputes. It also provides people on customary law grounds, where limitations that with local, personalized access to forums where pertain, for example, to Village Courts, do not apply. different and competing groups can mete out justice, using the physical, human, cultural, and legal capital that they have in hand. 2.2  LOCAL REGULATORY FUNCTIONS 2.2.1 These local arrangements handle the bulk of disputes and are thus responsible for creating the conditions for public order in settlements and markets within these areas, as well as regulating land and securing tenure, regulating markets and other business activities, and advocating for the rights and interests of settlement dwellers in relation to external government and commercial Lae ‘cot’ hears a case. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank agencies. Although each dispute may be a complex 8  Levels of fees vary widely: a major (local) case may yield substantial fines or compensation payments, of which a percentage is shared among the committee. But most everyday fees (e.g., a 50 kina “table fee” split between six komitis) barely reward time commitments U r b a n s e t t lem ent r egulatio n: what is there, wh at funct ions, does it perform, and h ow does it w o rk ? 5 A mixed Village Court/komiti group hear a case, 5 Mile, Lae. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank mix of more than one of these issues, it is useful settlement but currently includes issues related to to distinguish between the following four local family (marriage, adultery, and relationship disputes), regulatory functions. whether or not these have a wider impact on local order; public order (fights and ethnic conflict, swear- 2.2.1  Mediating disputes and public order ing and slander, drunkenness, damage to property, personal injury by accident); business activity (enter- 2.2.1.1  A predominant komiti function is to solve prise loans/repayments, assets and money, disputes disputes, enabling community life to go on in at the local market); and land and property (infringe- an orderly way. Mediation is often disparaged by ment on another’s property, damage, boundary issues, middle-class Papua New Guineans as a set of local rental/tenancy/occupancy disputes, unlawful sale, and informal arrangements, tolerable in settlements or as so on). transitional measures but ultimately not an effective or legitimate basis for governing a modern econ- 2.2.2  Regulating settlement and securing tenure omy and society. But the reality is that mediation is of growing significance to an increasing number 2.2.2.1  Regardless of the underlying land tenure, of urban residents who regard it as an effective and komitis play a role in territorial regulation. On legitimate way of handling challenges to their pros- custom land, with the mandate of the traditional perity and security. As they are often the first place landowner, komitis are likely to manage land and of resort for everyday disputes in the event of tribal housing in addition to local justice and public order. fighting, for example, komitis are usually the first line This may include deciding who is allowed to live next of engagement. They run a variety of cots, mod- to whom, licensing and monitoring “rent houses,” eled on but not legally recognized as Village Courts, and implementing bylaws involving curfews and which mediate and adjudicate public order issues. restrictions on certain activities. On government land, In both Port Moresby and Lae, the range of mat- in zones that include formal title, informally occupied ters regularly dealt with appears to be expanding. state land, and low-covenant settlements, komitis are The profile of disputes varies by neighborhood and elected or appointed by local government authorities 6 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S to deal with inter-ethnic disputes and other issues; 2.2.3.3  Regulation includes the allocation of in some cases, their informal powers can extend to zones within the market for the sale of different eviction and/or the imposition of fines for disorderly items (and by implication, their use by different ethnic behavior. groups), as well as the inclusion and exclusion of various other usages and activities, especially those 2.2.3  Regulating markets and business activity that routinely generate violence, such as the sale of betelnut and homemade alcohol and gambling. 2.2.3.1  The quality of regulation in neighborhood People who perpetrate violence, including rogue markets is crucial to the economic vitality, safety, traders prepared to “bighead against the market,” and social life of urban settlements. They need to are dealt with at several levels and commonly evicted be safe and secure areas to buy and sell, especially and banned. Achieving security in settlement markets as women have a dominant presence in these requires that komitis work with and across ethnic spaces, both as vendors and buyers. They also need differences and power asymmetries (where one to function efficiently as markets, providing sellers ethnic group is more powerful than others) to create and their families with a daily income and buyers a functioning, complex, multi-use environment. This with fresh, cheap, and abundant produce, and they usually entails astute negotiating daily, across ethnic need to generate revenue to meet operating and differences. Ethnic dominance can be the basis of maintenance costs. stability, but when it is exclusive, it is as likely to cause grievances to quickly escalate. 2.2.3.4 Where they have been recognized and supported, komitis have played a crucial role in the renovation of several Port Moresby markets since 2013 and thus have contributed to dramatic improvements in safety and security for both vendors and buyers. In Sabama, for example, a small town on the outskirts of Port Moresby, a complex enrollment of political patronage, funds, and legitimacy brought together the National Capital District’s governor, the local MP, the commander of the local police station, and the local komiti, which was able to draw in the authority of local businesswomen, ethnic and church leaders, and Village Court magistrates. Dispute resolution, Tokarara Market, Port Moresby. 2.2.4 Representing and promoting settlement Photo: David Craig/Worldbank interests 2.2.4.1 Komitis are routinely involved in nego- 2.2.3.2  Produce markets in Port Moresby and Lae tiating relations between settlement areas and are regulated through a variety of arrangements, the local government, the police, schools, and including provincial and citywide administrations, increasingly, higher-level city, provincial, and special purpose market boards, and in some cases, national officials. Komiti activities in relation to land the direct intervention of members of parliament and settlement or the mediation of disputes around (MPs). But in all cases, the major burden of everyday markets will routinely entail defending or negotiat- regulation is carried by the market vendors themselves ing residents’ rights before the police and/or the within their ethnic group affinities, working with proponents of infrastructure or commercial devel- komitis. These (individual and group) komitis, are opments. When a commercial, government, or aid- often recognized, appointed by, and sometimes in funded development project team seeks consulta- the employ of landlords [papa grauns], the wider tion or finds itself dealing with a dispute, grievance, blok chairman or komiti, or the MP, through his or her or compensation claim, it is likely that some kind of constituency office. komiti will be involved. The komiti may be asserting individual rights or the rights of the entire blok in U r b a n s e t t lem ent r egulatio n: what is there, wh at funct ions, does it perform, and h ow does it w o rk ? 7 the face of opposition from powerful external play- ers who are promoting kin preferences or language group [wantok] arrangements. 2.2.4.2 Komitis can act as a point for social mobilization and grievance, such as when municipal authorities fail to respond to client complaints (for example, in relation to electricity, water utilities, the performance of schools or health centers, or the conditions attached to public contracts). They also provide peer-based cross-support for other settlements, where ethnic or other expertise is not present. When another blok chairman is accused of malpractice, for instance, senior komitis in this wider Lae Law and Justice leaders hear a dispute under umbrellas. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank structure may intervene. 8 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S How does power and influence impact 3.  on settlement regulation? 3.1  Despite the positive outcomes outlined above, a dispute.9 Those living in Coastal traditions often local regulation is inherently conflictual and thus resent this dominance and try to negotiate and heavily shaped by unequal power relations. These modify these costly arrangements. include complex and difficult power inequalities between ethnic (Highlanders and Coastals, for 3.4  Local regulation is also shaped by age inequal- example) and age groups (including youth), as ity and the exclusion of youth. Although the rela- well as gender and class inequalities. Local contest tionship between komitis and youths is more than and competition can be handled locally only when just oppositional, many among the youth are mis- people feel their identity and background [Pasin trustful of komitis and see them as biased and often blo ples] and communal standing are recognized corrupt. Very few youths are actively involved in law and incorporated into widely accepted consensual and justice matters, though many would like to be. frames of reference and inclusive procedures, such as mediation. In this process, however, certain interests 3.5  Finally, local regulation is patriarchal, and (such as those of men) and traditions (such as those women have little voice in komiti operations. Men’s of Highlanders) will still come to dominate, though community networks may well afford them much this domination in itself can be seen as a part of the better access to komitis and as a result, women also institution’s regulatory capability. typically distrust komiti processes, especially in family disputes, which make up a considerable part of komiti 3.2 As a result, the effectiveness, consequences, dispute-resolution activities. Very few women have and legitimacy of komiti regulation outcomes are roles in komiti or Village Court structures (though very different in different places. Some komitis fail this may be very slowly changing), and those who to achieve commitment and cooperation, and their do face considerable challenges. Nor are there many dysfunction will be evident in internal divisions and women involved in market komiti work, despite the clashes. A lack of long-established and recognized predominance of women as traders and customers.10 leaders within ethnic groups can make problem solving harder or subject to errors of judgment and 3.6  Around FSV issues, women komitis and timing. Moreover, a komiti’s activities are also shaped magistrates are drawn immediately into disputes by ethnicity, age, gender, and the nature of its over local court jurisdiction and referral of cases. relations with formal public authorities. This leads to conflict with the male komitis, and sometimes women komitis or magistrates can be 3.3  Local regulation is influenced by ethnic excluded from mediations. Some women have inequality. In Port Moresby and Lae, PNG’s central reported much greater satisfaction in going directly Highlanders will commonly emphasize their own to the local or central police; others describe the distinctive leadership role in and influence on desirability of having komitis or Village Court komiti actions and operations. Their dominance is magistrates from outside the community sit in on evident in the way disputes are framed within an mediations; and still others actively seek to engage extended, carefully managed, and staged timeline, with women leaders and networks that operate at the in the ways komitis cooperate and take turns within edges of, or in competition with, komiti and Village a culture of public speaking, and in the importance Court arrangements. of compensation to the agreement reached to end The ways all of these operate and relate to various ethnic traditions are discussed in Craig and Porter, “Safety and Security in Papua New 9  Guinea’s Urban Settlements.” 10  See Craig and Porter, “‘There is Security from this Place.’” Ho w does power and influence impact on set t lement regulati o n? 9 3.7 Local regulation can therefore do harm in quick local resolution and compensation. Sometimes cases of serious FSV. It is common for komitis to komitis actively seek such cases, because fees and hear cases involving FSV that legally should be compensation can be considerable. When these heard in the formal court system. There are several cases are referred back to a komiti, the rights of the reasons for this. Such cases are often referred back victims, who are overwhelmingly women, are usually to komitis by the local police, or families opt for not upheld, leaving them vulnerable to further abuse. Lae Law and Justice/ Community Lidameris. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank 10 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S Summary and implications for local 4.  governance and development practice 4.1  UNDERSTANDING KOMITIS’ ADVANTAGES— very different forms of public authority: formal state AND LIMITATIONS authority on the one hand, and diverse customary and localized forms of authority on the other. When 4.1.1  The quality of urban regulation is crucial to local authority works, as it must in some ways, it can realizing the potential for PNG’s cities to produce bring together disputing parties to administer some the physical, economic, and social capital needed kind of justice by means of all the various forms of for diversified economic growth, effective and capital available. equitable service delivery, balanced justice, and social stability. In Port Moresby and Lae, many dif- 4.1.4  It is critical to recognize that the ways komi- ferent kinds of komitis and leaders have become tis and lidas create and exercise authority is fun- established as indispensable local mechanisms for damentally different from the functioning of state regulating competition and disputes around social agencies or development projects. Local sources of order, economic activity, and the representation of authority incorporate and work across different social rights and interests. Most of these komitis, however, and legal traditions; they are flexible, individualized, believe that they under-recognized and inadequately and subject to who is present at the moment in ques- remunerated for this work. tion. Formal business or state actors, on the other hand, value stability and continuity over flexibility 4.1.2 Nonetheless, an appreciation of the indis- and frequent change. pensable role of komitis does not automatically translate into policy or programming recommen- 4.1.5  Komitis create rules that are not universally dations. It would be easy —but nevertheless inap- accepted but are “kastomized” to the individuals, propriate—to simply recommend that the role of times, places, and cases directly concerned. This komitis and lidas be elevated and expanded, formal- “kastomization” creates established roles, responsi- ized, or adjusted. Any such change would require bilities, and agreements that bind people, but they prior consideration of how the so-called “formal are temporary rather than fixed over time. Their sector” regulatory agencies, including local govern- operational costs and the fines they impose locally ments, the police, courts, and prosecution and refer- are usually one-off and self-resourced. Unlike the ral agencies, actually function or might do so if the state forms of public authority, local arrangements fiscal, human resource, political, and administrative do not depend on stable and ongoing funding, but challenges they currently face were remediated. But neither do they create the accountability and durabil- even after such a comparative review, any recom- ity of agreements found in more formal public sector mendations would still need to contend with just how procedures. The local arrangements will often be wit- distinctive komitis, komiti leadership, and settlement nessed by a policeman, a local councilor, or a ward authority are and how closely they are adapted to committee chairperson, but this does not necessarily local situations. result in fixed or durable linkages with state authority. 4.1.3 Clearly, it is important to fully understand 4.1.6  Komitis that are involved in hearing disputes what these local forms of regulation and and other quasi-legal cases operate in highly leadership are—and what they are not—and what uncertain legal territory. In the absence of formal this means for relations with state authorities and or even Village Courts, or working alongside them potential development projects. Komitis have to in providing kastom mediation functions, komitis and be respected as urban kastom constructions that can lidas often venture into areas over which state court blur boundaries and work across conflicting interests. authority claims sole legitimacy. They typically do As already noted, komitis bridge on a daily basis two this in response to local demand, practical necessity, Sum m ary and implicat ions for local governance and development pr a c tice 11 and expediency, but when challenged by state legal primary audiences. Before such recommendations and other authority, their functioning can be sharply can be made, there are three caveats that should (though often only temporarily) curtailed. be considered on the scope and limitations of this research, the inherent nature of komiti and lida as 4.1.7 Thus, despite their apparently compelling forms of regulation, and their relations with formal local authority and efficiency, komitis and other state agencies. similar local mechanisms are not necessarily able to provide state, commercial, and development First, recommendations require a comparative projects what they often need, that is, a kind knowledge of the alternatives to the kinds of urban of authority that is universally applicable beyond regulation provided by the komiti and lida. Most the individuals involved, durable over time, and immediately, they need to be understood and enforceable according to the formal rules of compared to the actual local work and reach of accountability. statutory local governments, the police, courts, prosecution and referral agencies, and their higher echelons. These data could enable a comparative 4.2  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN review of the opportunity costs—the likely returns to POLICY AND ENGAGEMENTS: “DO NO HARM” and risks of public sector and/or donor investment in the available range of options, including in the 4.2.1  It can be difficult to draw practical implica- institutions involved. tions and policy actions from these conclusions, but there are two audiences for whom the findings Second, even if there are merits to giving further are crucial. This report’s findings have implications recognition, stature, credentials, funding, or capacity for what may be termed “urban developers,” which building to the komiti and lida, the burden of here includes public officials responsible for urban conveying such support would most likely be handled infrastructure and public facilities—for instance, the by the host of agencies with which there is at best creation or redevelopment of markets, water and an uncertain relationship and limited flexibility—and sanitation, lighting, roads, and buildings. Urban at worst, competitive hostility: the police, the formal developers are also private sector actors who under- justice sector, and land and other urban authorities. take these works or the commercial development of As described here, regulation in Lae and Port areas or specific sites for commercial retail, housing, Moresby in fact occurs through shifting, contradictory, factories, and warehousing operations. A second fragmented, and overlapping systems in which the audience includes officials (donors, government) who state, kastom, and private sector governance act in engage in urban settlements with the aim of improv- parallel and independently, and variously compete, ing justice and governance outcomes in ways relating collide, and collude. Komitis need to be able to to the functions of the komiti and lida, that is, dispute flexibly adapt to such contexts. mediation as it pertains to social order, shelter and security of tenure, market and business activity, and Third, efforts to alter the credentials, ways of political representation. operating, or outcomes of regulation by komitis and lidas will inevitably involve some formalization, 4.2.2 As noted above, it would be ill-advised which will risk destroying their current capabilities. to simply recommend that the role of komitis Business or state actors usually prefer stability and and lidas be expanded and formalized. Clearly, permanence over flexibility and variation. But komitis it makes no sense to stigmatize or disparage local must deliberately blend formal state authority with a mechanisms as merely “transitional arrangements” variety customary and indigenous forms, to a degree to be tolerated while formal state agencies catch much greater than public sector institutions, local up to reduce the distance between their statutory regulatory mechanisms. They seldom create the obligations and their actual performance. Komitis kinds of durable, accountable relationships sought and lidas are not simply transitional; they play crucial after and valued in public sector ways of doing roles in urban regulation that, if anything is predicted, business. Their local arrangements must always be are likely to increase in scale and scope. But much plural, flexible, personalized, and dependent on who less straightforward is the development of practical is there now. implications or recommendations for either of the two 12 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S 4.2.3  “Do No Harm” should be the guiding princi- and resulting in unacceptable costs?”—regardless ple of engagement. The komiti and associated forms of whether these are borne by the urban developer of leadership are not the only regulatory authorities or the “communities of interest” represented by at work in settlements, since komitis do nothing komitis, lidas, and kindred other local mechanisms.11 that is not also the formally mandated responsibility of local governments and so-called law and justice sector agencies. In practice, however, no one else 4.3  OBSERVATIONS AND ADVICE FOR URBAN can or will do what they do in providing local regula- DEVELOPERS: CARRYING “DO NO HARM” INTO tion, as they are crucial to, and currently perhaps the PROJECT PRACTICE backbone of, urban safety and security. Contained in the principle of “Do No Harm” are three points. While emphasizing the overarching concern that “Do No Harm” should be at the heart of any engagement First, experience shows that local mechanisms are that impinges on komitis and local lidas, there is a easily undermined and disrupted by engagements range of caveats and issues related to safeguarding with external agencies, with the effect that these urban development activities, especially around the forms of local regulation can lose their intelligibility instrumentalization of komitis in project contexts and and legitimacy. They can themselves become the around grievance. focus of grievance, causing existing conflicts to re-ignite or new cleavages to emerge within kastom 4.3.1 Anticipate that your activities will trigger or komiti leadership while at the same time reinforcing disputes and that engaging with local komitis and the marginality of already excluded women, ethnic leadership will not be optional. State, donor, or groups, and youth. commercial engagements to upgrade water, lighting, or roads, renovate markets, or establish commercial Second, urban developers—governments or private centers will always trigger disputes and grievances sector investors—create the greatest potential for about who benefits from, or bears the adverse harm when they are driven by narrow interests and impacts of, these activities and who has the authority short time frames and lack clarity and consistency. to make such decisions. Grievances will almost Grievances will be disruptive if some legitimate always be articulated by groups and individuals close factions within kastom arrangements perceive that in character and capability to the komitis and lidas they have been excluded. Undoubtedly, some urban discussed here. Engaging with settlement komitis developers will see an advantage in “gaming the and lidas will be unavoidable, but it is unlikely to system” and knowingly act in ways that are divisive occur on terms defined by the urban developer. and disruptive. Others will know that their interests are not well served if they engage with local mechanisms 4.3.2 Do not assume that it will be possible to only sporadically and opportunistically, that is, with instrumentalize or draw on the authority of the the “fly in-fly out” fickleness typical of project-based local komiti or to scale up or re-engineer its activi- commitments. ties for project purposes. As noted above, despite their local influence and effectiveness, komitis and Third, the potential for positive engagements is lidas will not provide the kind of fixed authority that increased where realism prevails, namely, where it is can be applied universally, formally, and equally recognized that anything to do with money, land and across the entire population. Urban developers are pecuniary opportunity, or honorific entitlements will unlikely to find that komitis’ authority in resolving dis- become subject to contest and rival claims by kastom putes can be applied, for instance, to managing tem- leaders. By coupling a positive outlook with realism, porary labor contracts or community in-kind contribu- urban developers would shift from a conventional tions for infrastructure projects. Neither is it likely that outlook of “How do I avoid disputes and grievances?” a komiti will successfully handle a contract to manage to another that asks “How can I preempt disputes security around a major asset or provide a stable and and grievances from escalating, turning to conflict, gender- or age-equitable platform to impartially rep- In terms of the safeguards and grievance management arrangements typical of donor agencies, including the World Bank, current 11  Grievance Redress Mechanisms could be reframed as Grievance Pre-emption and Management Mechanisms. Sum m ary and implicat ions for local governance and development pra c tice 13 resent community interests during an assessment of of costs and benefits, to be adjusted and again damages and a determination of compensation to witnessed through public rituals. people impacted by the urban developer’s activity. Nor is the kind of authority enacted by a komiti at a 6. Anticipate that as disputes and contests particular time or place readily able to be scaled up are activated, all local agencies and actors, or taken from one part of the city to another, such as whether variously described as formal, official, when a developer needs a “community interface” or kastom, or otherwise, will seek to capitalize on “focal point.” the opportunities presented through such con- tests. 4.3.3  Practical, rewarding, and safer engagements with local lida and komiti members are more likely 7. Assume that the formal administrative or where urban developers adopt the following coercive authority will not be able to predict- principles: ably discipline its involvement, and that it will be difficult to reliably instrumentalize its actions 1. Pro-actively consider ways in which komitis through agreements or the exchange of favors, and lidas can be engaged in the proposed sinecures, or material benefits. activities and ensure that they are consistently informed about them. This principle should apply especially to activities involving land and 4.4  IMPLICATIONS FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO shelter security, employment and contracts, STRENGTHEN KOMITI AND LIDA CAPABILITIES and the assignment of responsibilities for AND PERFORMANCE management and oversight to officials from local-level governments, districts, and provincial 4.4.1  Given the considerable vulnerability of administrations. komiti and lida structures to change and interven- tion, “Do No Harm” applies equally to in-terven- 2. Consider who is likely to benefit and be tions designed to recognize and strengthen local excluded. Consider how contracts and regulatory regulation, starting from initial contact. “Do No requirements created around the project may, or Harm” remains the bottom line in any engagement may be perceived to, exacerbate existing local with komitis and lidas, including those seeking to cleavages or even create new ones, or could be develop their own regulatory capability. This prin- more gender, age, and ethnic inclusive. cipal needs to be applied at each point, especially where there is the likelihood that engagement will 3. Actively “triangulate,” that is, verify through bring komitis increased recognition and contact with multiple sources who local leaders are and their other regulatory agencies, from the police to city competing interests and sources of respect and authorities. legitimacy, and how their fields of capability, such as disputes relating to land, housing, youth, 4.4.2  Recognize and support komitis and leaders and so on, are locally perceived. carefully. Locals are certainly keen to receive re- cognition and resourcing by state agencies. If harm 4. Ensure representation in agreements. Ensure is to be avoided, recognition needs to be provided that project agreements make it possible to clearly and consistently by stable and legitimate engage a range of different forms of authority. forms of local government (including, in PNG, Village These agreements must not simply rest on Courts, and local and urban authorities) or by those the putative power of the bearers of formal holding formal land title, including papa grauns government office; they should also ensure [traditional landowners]. Training, for instance, is one that agreements with local komitis and lidas are way to give headline recognition to komitis and lidas, constructed and endorsed in a public way in while at the same time enhancing komiti mediation relation to the project. skills and knowledge of formal procedures where disputes involve state agencies and also reminding 5. Frequently revisit agreements. Anticipate that them of their jurisdictional limits over such serious agreements will be renegotiated and require matters as sexual assault. roles and responsibilities, and the distribution 14 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S 4.4.4  If harm is to be avoided, the following general principles should guide any such engagement: 1. Do not attempt the heavy regulation of komitis, leaders, and mediation. Ensure that the flexible and adaptable qualities of komitis are protected, but work to address the egregious gender biases in both procedures and outcomes. This is most likely to be supported indirectly by improving gender representation in settlement and komiti governance and in wider community law and justice. At the settlement level, work with women’s, church, youth, and business groups to identify emerging women leaders and potential Law and Justice leader, Lae. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank komitis and mediators. Create local expertise among these groups and leaders around gender- based violence issues and provide settlement- level training in mediation, basic human rights, 4.4.3 If enrolling PNG’s police, justice, and local and the legal procedures associated with gender- government agencies in delivering support to based violence to women, men, youths, komitis, komitis and lidas, be aware of the competition, magistrates, and ward officials. Work down stigma, and antagonism in these relationships. The from the city authority to raise expectations and experiences examined during this research show that advocate for urban bylaws with provisions on the local regulatory mechanisms are often undermined representation of women in ward or zone law when they interact with ward or district governments and justice komitis. or with the police; indeed, the authors encountered instances in which state officials reached into komiti 2. Create a policy dialogue with emerging dis- activities in abusive ways to extract rents, exploit trict and city authorities about how they can authority, or grab resources. This is because these realistically commit to and cooperate around agencies are competitors in the local regulatory (for urban settlement regulation. Dialogue should example, mediation) market. But it is also because include the ways that local law and justice issues when the formal machinery of the state recognizes are included in the mandate of the district, local- other institutions, along with this will come efforts to level government, and/or city authority, and “freeze” local komitis and networks into singular— how these functions are resourced either as part and subordinate—roles and relationships. This is of—or supplementary to—the District Services partly why the normal arsenal of capacity building, Improvement Program (under which 10 percent such as providing training, formalizing pathways of of k10 million per year have been earmarked for response with the police, courts, or special purpose district-wide law and justice activities) on a pre- crisis response agencies, or introducing codes of dictable function and formula basis. This kind conduct and other measures of credentializing of closer assignment of function and funding is local mechanisms and leaders, can easily disrupt being currently piloted by the Department of the flexibility and mixing of norms, rules, and forms Provincial and Local Government Affairs in some of authority and legitimacy that keep these local of PNG’s provinces and districts, though not spe- arrangements working. Even where intentions are cifically in urban or law and justice settings. positive, the kinds of financial and human resources that the PNG government is able to provide to 3. Formalize the district (or city authority) law back these relationships are typically uncertain, and justice committee, enable it to function unpredictable, and so closely tied to personalized to solve larger disputes across the territory, patronage arrangements that they will usually disrupt and bring in wider women’s network-based local mechanisms and forms of leadership. lidameri into family cases. Provided city and/ or district authorities receive a clear legal man- Sum m ary and implicat ions for local governance and development pra c tice 15 Lae women’s network. Photo: David Craig/Worldbank date with respect to law and justice issues, city the access of emerging local law and justice authority or district leadership could then be leaders to Village Court positions. Village Courts supported to identify areas and places within the are arguably the agency most compatible with city that could bolster komiti development. This komiti regulation and least likely to damage it. may include formalizing district or city authority law and justice leadership, elected, as is current 5. Find ways to address the worst abuses of FSV practice in Lae, by the wider body of komitis and case handling related to mediation, komitis, Village Court magistrates practicing in various and policing. Work with the Constitution and bloks, zones, and sections. District law and jus- Law Reform Commission and the Family and tice komitis could become the sites from which Sexual Violence Action Committee to identify to test the efficacy of networks of komitis (male ways to stop the police and families from refer- and female) who could hear family cases across ring cases back to komitis, and ways to penal- the city, rather than having them heard within ize komitis, mediators, and rogue police offi- close communities and by local leaders. As in cers involved in circumscribing FSV survivors’ Port Moresby, a citywide mediation capability access to formal justice. Review legislation based or team could be established and, with due care on close ethnographic research to clarify the and attention to the unintended consequences, wider roles of komiti, kastom, and formal law in be supported with a budget, a dedicated vehi- relation to FSV. Find enforceable regulatory cle, and logistical support. Overall, this seems solutions where patterns of regular dysfunction likely to boost, and not undermine, local komiti related to customary uses or patterns of case capabilities. referral are clear. 4. Expand and extend urban Village Courts into 6. Support the re-emergence of community kastom land tenure settlements. Priorities are of policing at suburban stations by re-establish- course contingent on the fiscal means but could ing community policing posts and develop- include establishing at least one Village Court per ing career paths and a community of practice ward or on a consistent locality and population within the Royal Papua New Guinea Constab- basis; enacting and funding provisions in Village ulary (RPNGC). District law and justice leader- Court legislation requiring the appointment of ship could complement this RPNGC initiative women magistrates; and subjecting the courts by establishing a program of regular interaction to regular performance reviews as stipulated in with citywide community policing, including the Village Court Act to avoid capture, promote attendance at mediation, training, elections, and female magistracy, and ensure turnover and other events. 16 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S Sum m ary and implicat ions for local governance and development pra c tice 17 Annex 1: Research Methods This exploratory and formative piece of research used primary ethnographic and qualitative methods to examine neighborhood mediation practices: observation, participation, case studies, and group and individual interviews. Over the course of a six- month period in Lae and building on prior work in Port Moresby, this research developed and validated initial findings through triangulation and qualitative sampling strategies, including snowball sampling and sampling for difference and redundancy. At the same time, it applied theoretical and analytic approaches (drawn largely from international/comparative political science, urban political economy, and historical institutional analysis) to predict and explore patterns of institutional development and capability. These investigations enabled a wealth of empirical materials to be assembled. • Given the almost complete absence of studies in this area within Papua New Guinea (PNG), mainly due to access and safety issues but also stigma, as well as the access and safety issues for this study itself, it was crucial that formative work, framing analyses, and empirical exploration be conducted flexibly. • Research began with an extended series of conversations with local people in public spaces (markets, churches, shops, bus stops) and private homes, and moved from these contexts into a series of more structured individual and group interviews and the development of case studies in public sites, homes, workplaces, and businesses. It continued with discussions with komitis and lidas and those around them, and with observations at komiti-run mediation, election planning, meetings with officials, and community events. • Access to settlements was facilitated through discussions with various local leaders (men and women) and, in a few situations, with the police. Referrals and introductions from networks of mediators, lidas, women, and youth offered a further extension of the research into different settlements. • Snowball sampling was complemented by other sampling techniques, including i) applying triangulation (a technique that validates data by deliberately seeking different perspectives from multiple sources to cross verify, with the differences based on accepted social science parameters), ii) using multiple points of entry and research team mixes12 (not becoming dependent on or captured by one person, group, or site), iii) sampling for difference (ensuring that the qualitative sample includes the full range of points of view), and iv) sampling to redundancy (pursuing these techniques until little or no new material and perspectives come to light). In urban PNG’s mixed settlements, differences that matter include, at a minimum, ethnicity, gender, class, age, and duration of residence, and this research actively sampled for these differences at every point. • Common issues in this kind of research include the predominance of perspectives from certain (older, male, educated, dominant ethnic) leaders and the difficulties in accessing those most vulnerable or peripheral to power. Initial triangulation and sampling for ethnic, gender, age, and class difference as described above occurred, with interviews and focus groups at and around each site deliberately involving only women, youth, or ethnic minorities. At various points in the process, the core research team included two expatriate social scientists, a PhD-trained woman anthropologist 12  who is highly experienced in Port Moresby settlements, three senior community members, two short-term consultants resident in the settlements, and a youth researcher drawn from a local nongovernmental organization (NGO). 18 L E A R N I N G A B O UT LEADER S HI P, R EGULATI O N A ND SECURIT Y FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S URBAN SET T LEMENT S • Single interviews with strangers in these kinds of contexts produce results with very low reliability. Within both neighborhoods and the research team, this research was informed by ongoing iterative practices of reflecting together on emerging findings (in groups, individually, in reviews of writing and conversations). • Findings were discussed and validated during a series of presentations to different groups, including mediators, komitis, and law and justice sector and urban safety program staff, both indigenous and expatriate. • Altogether, more than 150 separate individual conversations, as well as semi-structured individual and group interviews of this kind were performed in Lae, building on a previous series of 200 similar interviews in the earlier Port Moresby work. Conversations occurred in the familiar mix of Tok Pisin and English within which much of this “local public” business in pursued. Although the research leader developed a certain facility in at least hearing Tok Pisin, translation was locally and immediately available on both sides. Annex 1: Research Me th o ds 19 Annex 1: Research Me th o ds 21