



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 02/17/2004	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P037588		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name:</b> lvc:agric. Svcs. li	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	202.00	85.73
<b>Country:</b> Cote d'Ivoire	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	50.76	29.67
<b>Sector(s):</b> Board: RDV - Agricultural extension and research (85%), Central government administration (10%), Media (5%)	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>		
<b>L/C Number:</b> C3117; CQ086			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		99
<b>Partners involved :</b>	<b>Closing Date</b>	12/31/2001	06/30/2003
<b>Prepared by :</b>	<b>Reviewed by :</b>	<b>Group Manager :</b>	<b>Group:</b>
John English	Ronald S. Parker	Alain A. Barbu	OEDST

**2. Project Objectives and Components**

**a. Objectives**

The first agricultural support project (PNASA I) ran from 1994 to 1997. This aimed to (i) streamline and decentralize agricultural services; (ii) enhance the role of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Services (MINAGRA) in policy-making and monitoring of agricultural development; and (iii) increase farmers' role in the policy-making process. PNASAs I succeeded in streamlining the agricultural services and initiating a process of farmers' empowerment, but largely failed to strengthen MINAGRA.

PNASA II was planned as an adaptable program loan (APL) with three phases. PNASAs II, Phase I (this project) was to run from 1998 to 2001, with the succeeding phases running over a further 8 years to 2009.

The objective of Phase 1 was to *firmly establish responsive, cost-effective and autonomous agencies for agricultural research and extension services, largely owned and managed as private sector entities by their beneficiaries*. The second phase (2002 - 2005) was to consolidate the achievements of the first, and the third phase (2006-2009) aimed to complete the transfer of financial responsibility to the shareholders /clients of the research and extension institutions to ensure long-term sustainability.

**b. Components**

The agencies involved in implementation of the project were : the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRA); the National Rural Development Support Agency (ANADER); National Agricultural Research Center (CNRA) and Ministry of Information (MININFO).

The project had four components:

*Support to ANADER (US\$116.6 million or 58 percent of program costs)*, to strengthen adaptive research, extension and support Producer Organizations (POs) through (i) institutional reforms of ANADER; and (ii) investments in human and physical infrastructure.

*Support to CNRA (US\$61.3 million or 30 percent of program costs)*, to support a decentralized CNRA, to be privately owned and managed, like ANADER, by its main clients. The program was to finance investments in infrastructure, selected research programs, promote scientific networking (including the participation of CNRA in regional and international networks), and other capacity-building activities such as training and study tours.

*Support to key directorates in MINAGRA (US\$20.9 million or 10 percent of program costs)*, to support selected directorates to decentralize planning, carry out an agricultural census, and strengthen animal genetic improvement programs, and policy making and coordination for cooperatives.

*Rural Radio Stations (US\$3.2 million or 2 percent of program costs)*, to support the dissemination of information on market prices, and agricultural and environmental issues through MININFO.

**c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates**

Implementation of the program was heavily disrupted by civil and political turmoil in the country. There was a

coup in December 1999, and a second coup in September 2002 followed by a civil war, that continues. After the first coup counterpart funding was sharply reduced and Bank disbursements were suspended for almost two years. Closing was extended for 18 months. Total project expenditure was US\$86 mil, or 42% of the appraisal estimate. Expenditure percentages for the major components were about 60 for ANADER, 24 for CNRA and 10 for MINAGRA.

The Bank has decided to suspend the PNASA program operation and to follow the present program with more specifically targeted operations, through the National Capacity Support Program (PARC) to support relevant activities in MINAGRA and support for locally focused activities through the Rural Land and Infrastructure Development Project (PNGTER).

### 3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

ANADER and CNRA were established as autonomous agencies for agricultural extension and research, respectively, funded from dedicated sources from fees from beneficiaries and the government. Support to MINAGRA to strengthen its policy making and related activities was sharply curtailed because of the political and economic turmoil and little progress was achieved.

### 4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

**ANADER.** The institutional reforms of ANADER were carried through (with the majority of the staff opting to switch from civil service status), and a financial and administrative decentralization of its operations was carried out. The central office was restructured, creating four Directorates; extension /on-farm research, livestock, crops, and training/communication. Specialists were appointed in each of the 10 regions for each of the four directorates. Regional technical review committees (with producer input) were established, providing regular and efficient guidance for extension programs. Close liaison was maintained between ANADER staff and teams from the Rural Land and Infrastructure Development Project (PNGTER). These worked together to develop a village level participatory approach, preparing village diagnostics, an exercise also drawing on local farmer groups and the expertise of NGOs. Three hundred villages were covered in 1999, and 500 in 2000.

**CNRA.** Although rather slowly, CNRA also decentralized its operations, and completed a research planning process in close collaboration with beneficiaries and the research institutions. CNRA also put considerable emphasis on strengthening links with international and overseas research institutions to develop national and international partnerships for agricultural research. A significant amount of training and capacity building was achieved, with both local training courses and workshops and external training opportunities were utilized.

### 5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

Both **ANADER** and **CNRA** activities were adversely affected by the social turmoil and economic crisis that began in 1999. In addition to the hostilities, Bank disbursements were suspended for much of 2000 and 2001, and government counterpart funding was reduced almost to nil. The financial difficulties had the affect of forcing the agencies to shift responsibility to the regions and, thus, fostered the decentralization process. It is clear, though, that the overall pace of activity was adversely affected and, following the coup in September 2002 and the start of the civil war, rebels are occupying the northern half of the country and implementation activities over much of the country have come to a standstill.

**MINAGRA.** Some activities and reforms were undertaken by MINAGRA but little overall progress was made, with expenditure only amounting to 10 percent of that planned.

The **Rural Radio Stations** component was largely unimplemented. Little training was implemented, no equipment was purchased and little dissemination of information was achieved.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
<b>Outcome:</b>	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Although the ICR's 4-point scale does not allow for a "moderately sat." rating, the ICR in its text rates the outcome as "Marginally Satisfactory", so there is no disagreement
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	High	Substantial	ICR does not give sufficient evidence to judge that the project made a 'critical' rather than a 'substantial' contribution to the country's ability to effectively use its resources.
<b>Sustainability:</b>	Likely	Non-evaluable	Because of current country conditions, the degree of uncertainty as to future conditions is so high that no assessment of sustainability is possible.

<b>Bank Performance :</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
<b>Quality of ICR :</b>		Satisfactory	

**NOTE:** ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:**

The ICR states a series of lessons learned, but these are generally more assertions than lessons, e .g. publicly financed/publicly managed agricultural services do not work

Project experience does suggest one key lesson : Functional independence does insulate an organization from political paralysis and enable actions to be taken even under adverse economic and social conditions, even if operations have to be scaled back .

**8. Assessment Recommended?**  Yes  No

**Why?** To verify ratings and clarify findings, if feasible, as current conditions clearly limited the ability of the ICR to assess outcomes on the ground (see section 9).

**9. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

The ICR provides a great deal of data on institutional changes made under the project . However, it is clear that the adverse economic, social and political conditions have hampered the program's plans to support an expanded range of activities under the reformed structures . These conditions also clearly made it difficult for the ICR to assess how much the agencies were able to achieve under these conditions . The ICR also does not make clear why the decision has been made not to proceed to the second phase of the initially planned program, but to channel assistance through different operations .