THE WORLD BANK Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reports directly to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. IEG assess- es what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans to run and maintain a project; and the lasting contri- bution of the Bank to a country's overall development. The goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank's work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves Bank work by identifying and disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from evaluation findings. W O R L D B A N K I N D E P E N D E N T E V A L U A T I O N G R O U P Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters 2006 The World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/ieg Washington, D.C. © 2006 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone 202-473-1000 Internet www.worldbank.org E-mail feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 5 10 09 08 07 06 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Photo credit: Banda Aceh, Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, January 2005. © Martin Adler, courtesy of Panos Pictures. ISBN-10 0-8213-6650-5 ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6650-9 e-ISBN 0-8213-6651-3 DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6650-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. Ainsworth, Martha, 1955­ Committing to results : improving the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS assistance: an OED evaluation of the World Bank's assistance for HIV/AIDS control / Martha Ainsworth, Denise A. Vaillancourt, Judith Hahn Gaubatz. p. cm. -- (Operations evaluation studies) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6388-1 ISBN-10: 0-8213-6388-3 1. Economic assistance--Developing countries--Evaluation. 2. AIDS (Disease)--Economic aspects--Developing countries. 3. HIV infections--Economic aspects--Developing countries. 4. AIDS (Diseasse)--Developing countries--Prevention. 5. HIV infections--Developing countries--Prevention. 6. World Bank. I. Vaillancourt, Denise. II. Hahn Gaubatz, Judith. III. Title. IV. World Bank operations evaluation study. World Bank InfoShop HC60.A4575 Independent Evaluation Group E-mail: pic@worldbank.org 2005 Knowledge Programs and Evaluation Capacity Telephone: 202-458-5454 Development (IEGKE) Facsimile: 202-522-1500 E-mail: eline@worldbank.org 362.196'9792'0091726--dc22 Telephone: 202-458-4497 2005052329 Facsimile: 202-522-3125 Printed on Recycled Paper Contents vii Acknowledgments ix Foreword xi Avant-propos xv Prefacio xix Executive Summary xxvii Résumé analytique xxxvii Resumen xlvii Acronyms and Abbreviations xlix Glossary 3 1 Nature, Disaster, and Recovery 5 Developing Countries and Natural Disasters 6 Response, Recovery, and Reconstruction 7 The World Bank and Natural Disasters 8 The Evaluation 9 Evaluative Instruments and Methods 11 2 The World Bank Responds 11 The Bank's Natural Disaster "Portfolio" 14 Analytic Work 14 Concentrations in Lending Patterns 15 Reallocations 17 Project Performance 18 Outputs and Outcomes of Projects 19 Hazard Management in the Bank 23 3 Disasters and Bank Strategy 23 Predictability of Disasters 24 Planning Implications for the World Bank 24 Disaster Planning in Poverty Reduction Strategies 25 Disaster Planning in Country Assistance Strategies HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT 29 4 Relevance of Bank Assistance 29 Defining Relevance of Disaster Assistance 31 Delivering Quick Support for the Immediate Response 32 Delivering New Projects for the Recovery 35 Reducing Vulnerability over the Longer Term 36 Does the Bank Respond Quickly? 38 Using a Long-Term View to Select Short- and Medium-Term Actions 43 5 Social Dimensions of Disaster 43 Participation in Natural Disaster Response 44 Shelter and Housing 46 Relocation 47 Vulnerable Groups 55 6 Bank Policy: Implementation and Implications 55 Natural Disasters in Relation to Other Emergencies 57 Emergency Recovery Lending Timeframe 58 Relief and Consumption Expenditures 59 Forms of Disaster Assistance 60 Rebuilding Physical Assets and Restoring Economic and Social Activities 60 Recurring Disaster Events 60 Disaster-Resistant Construction Standards 61 Emergency Preparedness Studies 62 Technical Assistance on Prevention and Mitigation Measures 62 Addressing Longer-Term Disaster Issues 64 Procurement 64 Donor Coordination 66 Institutional Development 67 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 68 What Works in Developed Countries May Not Work Elsewhere 68 When to Engage and How to Stay Engaged 68 The Challenges Ahead: A Review of the Evidence 70 Lessons 72 Recommendations 75 Appendixes 77 A: Bank Policy and Products 83 B: Study Methodology 93 C: Supplemental Data--Chapter 2 109 D: Survey Results 129 E: Supplemental Data--Chapter 3 133 F: Supplemental Data--Chapter 4 147 G: Cash Support 153 H: Housing and Shelter 159 I: External Advisory Panel Comments 161 J: Management Response 171 K: Chairman's Summary: Committee on Development Effectivess (CODE) iv CONTENTS 175 Endnotes 179 References Boxes 4 1.1 Why Do Natural Disasters Seem to Be Increasing in Number? 6 1.2 A Troubled Relief Effort Compromises the Ability to Recover 18 2.1 What Are Emergency Recovery Loans? 20 2.2 Other Organizations Have Institutional Structures for Disaster Risk Management 25 3.1 Disaster Damage Undermines Development Progress 26 3.2 To What Extent Do CASs Develop Disaster-Specific Strategies Appropriate to Prevailing Hazards? 31 4.1 Equipment Acquisition Can Be Particularly Problematic 32 4.2 A Sense of Urgency Can Lead to a Wasteful Response 35 4.3 Reducing Vulnerability May Also Reduce Poverty 36 4.4 Bank Helps Finance Insurance Scheme in Turkey 38 4.5 Damage Sustained Is a Function of a Community's Level of Vulnerability 38 4.6 Reducing Vulnerability Takes Time 40 4.7 Damage Assessments Are Useful But Have Some Shortcomings 48 5.1 The Poor Take the Heaviest Blow 50 5.2 Social Funds Can Be Part of a Rapid, Locally Based Response 59 6.1 Contingency Financing--A Learning Process 65 6.2 What Happens When the Bank Does Not Stay Engaged? Figures 5 1.1 The Cost of Disaster Damage Is Rising 12 2.1 The Number of Projects Related to Natural Disasters Has Been Rising, with Sharp Peaks in Lending about Every Five Years 13 2.2 The Bank Has Most Often Provided Lending for Disasters in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean 16 2.3 Reallocations Peaked Following Each Policy Revision 17 2.4 Natural Disaster Portfolio Ratings: Projects Approved and Completed, 1984­2005 34 4.1 Average Implementation and Extension Times for Projects Containing Disaster Activities: All Disaster Projects 37 4.2 How Long Do Projects Take? 51 5.1 Projects Are Increasingly Addressing Women's Vulnerabilities 56 6.1 The Use of ERLs Has Increased with Each Policy Revision 61 6.2 ERLs by Natural Disaster Type 63 6.3 Focus on Mitigation Has Increased with Each Successive Project in Turkey 65 6.4 The Bank Often Leads Coordination, But the Borrower Role Is Growing Tables 8 1.1 Key Provisions of Current Bank Policy Statement 12 2.1 Natural Disaster Portfolio Composition, 1984 to 2005 15 2.2 Concentration of Lending in the Disaster Portfolio Compared with Overall Bank Lending v HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT 16 2.3 Ten Largest Loans for Disasters 19 2.4 A Dozen Lessons Learned from Natural Disaster Projects 25 3.1 Many CASs That Should Discuss Natural Disasters Do Not 26 3.2 Natural Disaster Risk Can Be Mainstreamed in the Bank's Lending 30 4.1 The 10 Most Frequently Pursued Activities 48 5.1 Some Projects in the Portfolio Have Been Designed to Reach the Poor 49 5.2 Projects Often Exceeded Expected Impact on the Poor, But Data Are Incomplete 66 6.1 Project Performance Drops Sharply with More Than Three Partners vi Acknowledgments T his evaluation of the World Bank's experience with natural disasters was done by the Independent Evaluation Group­World Bank at the re- quest of the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. It comes at an ap- propriate time. Natural disasters are affecting development in many countries, setting back hard-won development gains. In consequence, lending for natural disasters is patient and detailed review of drafts of this report. a growing business for the Bank. The lessons We also gratefully acknowledge the financial produced by this evaluation are expected to support provided by our partner, the Swiss Agency inform good practice and ensure the achieve- for Development and Cooperation (SDC), which ment of results in Bank activities. The evaluation made possible a considerable amount of the is also intended for use in an ongoing revision of background research upon which this evaluation is the Bank's policy statement on emergency based. We also thank Margaret Arnold, Alcira assistance. Kreimer, and Zoe Trohanis of the Hazard Manage- The evaluation was conducted under the ment Unit, and Bank task manager Francis leadership of Ronald S. Parker, and this report Ghesquiere. The study conducted several field was written by Ronald Parker and William missions. The authors thank Y´yld´yz Aydin, Murat Hurlbut, with inputs from Anna Amato, Mark Sungur Bursa, Dawn French, Ali Ihsan, Cheryl Emmert, Silke Heuser, and Kristin Little. Helen Mathurin, Francisco Rivas, S.A.M. Rafiquzzaman, Phillip provided administrative support. Caroline KuljitS.Sidhu,andKrishnaS.Vatsafortheirsupport McEuen edited the manuscript for publication. and valuable insights during these missions. Peer reviewer Alexandra Ortiz provided valuable A database of project information created for comments on earlier drafts of the report. this evaluation brought together for the first The authors gratefully acknowledge the time all the available information on every Bank members of the Advisory Committee--Mary project that had disaster-related activities. This Anderson, Ian Davis, Prema Gopalan, and Franklin database will be turned over to the Hazard Risk McDonald--for their early guidance and their Management Team of the Urban Unit. Director-General, Evaluation: Vinod Thomas Director, Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank: Ajay Chhibber Manager, Sector, Thematic, and Global Evaluation: Alain Barbu Task Manager: Ronald S. Parker vii Foreword N atural disasters occur throughout the world, but their economic and social impacts have been increasing and are generally much greater in developing countries than in developed ones. Disasters can wipe out development gains and eclipse years of development investment. In Mozambique, Bank lending financed the The Bank and much of the development construction of 487 schools over a 20-year community must take into account in their period, but just one recent disaster, the floods of strategies how frequently disasters occur, and 2000, damaged or destroyed about 500 primary how often they strike the same countries. The schools as well as 7 secondary schools. The Bank's lending shows that disasters follow a Kashmir earthquake of October 2005 caused an clear pattern: Ten borrowers accounted for 208 estimated $5 billion in damage in Pakistan, of the 528 disaster-related projects (39 percent) roughly equivalent to the total official develop- in the portfolio over the 1984­2005 period. Bank ment assistance for the preceding 3 years, and lending commitments also are concentrated-- equivalent to the amount the World Bank had 7.5 percent of projects received 32 percent of lent to the country over the preceding 10 years. the financing. Until recently, disasters were treated as one- Disaster is still sometimes treated as an time, random events by governments and the interruption in development rather than as a agencies that helped them respond. But we risk to development in the approaches of both know from experience that disasters strike with the country and the Bank. Of current assistance regular periodicity--and repeatedly in some strategies for countries that have received Bank parts of the world. The potential for disaster is support in natural disasters, 44 percent did not foreseeable to the extent that it is possible to mention them. Even in the 40 countries that predict generally where an event is likely to have had 4 or more disaster projects, one-third occur at some time in the near future (but not of the strategies did not mention disaster. And, precisely when or its magnitude). Hence, low- for the subset of countries that had an extensive lying coastal areas on the Bay of Bengal will history with disasters (more than 8), about a experience more flooding, and small island third did not mention disasters at all. Project states in the Caribbean and countries along the loan documents rarely consider natural events Gulf of Mexico will be repeatedly hit by as a risk, even in highly vulnerable countries, hurricanes. although 176 projects were adversely affected ix HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT by disaster during implementation. We need to in creating global and regional funding find ways to integrate these risks more centrally solutions. But even if these are eventually into development assistance to improve established and the Bank decides to be a part of effectiveness. such solutions, the Bank's engagement with It should be recognized that the Bank has client countries will have to ensure continued demonstrated considerable flexibility in its focus on avoiding the next disaster, rather than approach to natural disasters and has learned to waiting for it to happen. Countries need to manage large and small responses well. Bank become more proactive rather than reactive, staff have often been innovative and have and Bank support to countries must do more to demonstrated the capacity to manage massive encourage this shift. reconstruction on many levels: more than 60 The funding mechanisms used by the Bank different kinds of activities have been need to be rethought: balance of payment undertaken in disaster-related projects, ranging lending has been relatively quick-disbursing, but from rubble clearance to construction of disbursement often does not take place in the transport infrastructure systems. post-disaster period. The Bank has increasingly The Bank has also demonstrated its ability to used the Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) in work with donors in a shared response and has responding to disaster, even when other instru- adapted policies and procedures to ensure that ments may be more appropriate to achieving assistance can be delivered expeditiously. Joint long-term reduction of vulnerability. Several damage assessments have become an important attempts to establish insurance and contingency mechanism for engaging with other donors and financing have helped focus government ensuring that borrower needs are met without attention on the development issues of overlaps. disasters, but too few have been completed and Almost 80 percent of Bank-financed natural evaluated to judge their value. Finally, loan disaster projects were rated satisfactory for reallocations are used much more frequently outcomes, compared with the Bankwide than other types of Bank disaster responses in average of 72 percent for the same period. highly vulnerable countries, putting develop- These ratings reflect particular effectiveness in ment goals at risk. rebuilding physical infrastructure and in This report recommends several adjustments provision of materials and equipment. In to the way the Bank currently handles natural general, though, disaster responses have tended disasters. First, it suggests revisions to policy to toward the reactive and tactical, when a better guide staff and enhance flexibility of Bank proactive and strategic approach would have responses to natural disasters. Second, it had longer-term benefits. Furthermore, encourages increased Bank capacity to respond attention to the poor has been especially to disasters and to ensure that it can be difficult to accomplish in disaster projects. mobilized quickly. Finally, it recommends that When disaster strikes, funds are needed the Bank prepare a strategy or action plan for immediately, and are often diverted from natural disaster assistance that includes an development because no contingency funding assessment of each country's level of disaster is available. The financial cost of responding to risk, and differentiation of approach on the basis the most recent events has stimulated interest of that assessment. Vinod Thomas Director-General Evaluation x Avant-propos L es catastrophes naturelles se produisent partout dans le monde, mais leurs effets économiques et sociaux se font de plus en plus sentir et sont en général beaucoup plus importants dans les pays en développement que dans les pays développés. Les catastrophes peuvent anéantir les progrès en matière de développement et éclipser des années d'investissement en faveur du développement. Au Mozambique, les prêts de la Banque ont fi- de prédire, en général, à quel endroit un évé- nancé la construction de 487 établissements sco- nement est susceptible de se produire à un cer- laires sur une période de 20 ans, mais une tain moment dans un avenir proche (mais pas le catastrophe récente, à savoir les inondations de moment ou l'ampleur précis d'un tel événe- 2000, a à elle seule endommagé ou détruit en- ment). On sait ainsi que les zones côtières à viron 500 écoles primaires ainsi que sept éta- basse altitude de la Baie du Bengale subiront blissements secondaires. Au Pakistan, le davantage d'inondations, et que les petits États tremblement de terre du Cachemire en octobre insulaires des Caraïbes et les pays du Golfe du 2005 a provoqué des dégâts estimés à 5 mil- Mexique seront frappés à maintes reprises par liards de dollars, soit à peu près l'équivalent du des ouragans. total de l'aide publique au développement des Dans leurs stratégies, la Banque et une grande trois années précédentes, et l'équivalent du partie de la communauté de développement montant des prêts accordés à ce pays par la doivent tenir compte de la fréquence des catas- Banque au cours des dix années précédentes. trophes et de la régularité avec laquelle elles Jusqu'à une période récente, les catastrophes frappent les mêmes pays. L'analyse des opéra- étaient traitées comme des événements isolés et tions de prêt de la Banque révèle une tendance aléatoires par les gouvernements et les orga- claire dans l'avènement des catastrophes : dix nismes qui les aidaient à y faire face. L'expé- emprunteurs ont bénéficié de 208 (39 %) des 528 rience nous apprend toutefois que les projets liés aux catastrophes du portefeuille pen- catastrophes frappent certaines régions du dant la période 1984­2005. Les engagements de monde avec une périodicité régulière, et de prêt de la Banque sont également concentrés -- façon répétitive. L'éventualité d'une catastrophe 7,5 % des projets ont bénéficié de 32 % du fi- est prévisible dans la mesure où il est possible nancement. xi HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT Dans leurs approches, le pays et la Banque registrée à l'échelle de la Banque pour la même continuent de traiter parfois les catastrophes période. Ces notes témoignent de l'efficacité de comme une interruption du développement, et la Banque dans le domaine de la reconstruction non comme un risque pour le développement. des infrastructures physiques et celui de la four- Parmi les stratégies d'aide actuelles en faveur des niture de matériel et d'équipements. En général, pays ayant bénéficié d'un appui de la Banque à toutefois, les interventions relatives aux catas- la suite de catastrophes naturelles, 44 % ne men- trophes ont eu tendance à être réactives et tac- tionnaient pas ces dernières. Même dans le cas tiques, alors qu'une approche proactive et des 40 pays qui ont bénéficié de quatre projets stratégique aurait été avantageuse à plus long ou plus liés aux catastrophes, celles-ci n'étaient terme. Qui plus est, dans les projets liés aux ca- pas mentionnées dans un tiers des stratégies. En tastrophes, il a été tout particulièrement difficile outre, dans les stratégies d'environ un tiers du de prêter attention aux pauvres. sous-ensemble des pays où se produisent de Lorsque la catastrophe frappe, les fonds sont nombreuses catastrophes (plus de huit), ces immédiatement nécessaires et ils sont souvent dernières n'étaient pas du tout mentionnées. réaffectés au détriment du développement, car Les documents de prêt des projets considèrent il n'existe pas de financement pour imprévus. Le rarement les événements naturels comme un coût financier des interventions réalisées au titre risque, même dans les pays très vulnérables, des plus récents événements a stimulé l'intérêt bien que les catastrophes aient eu un effet dé- envers la création de mécanismes de financement favorable sur 176 projets pendant leur exécution. mondiaux et régionaux. Mais même si l'on finit Nous devons trouver des moyens de placer ces par établir de tels mécanismes et qu'elle décide risques davantage au coeur de l'aide au déve- d'y participer, la Banque devra s'attacher en per- loppement afin d'en améliorer l'efficacité. manence, dans le cadre de son engagement au- Force est de reconnaître que la Banque a fait près des pays clients, à éviter la prochaine montre d'une flexibilité considérable dans son ap- catastrophe plutôt qu'à attendre que celle-ci se proche des catastrophes naturelles et qu'elle a ap- produise. Il convient que les pays deviennent pris à gérer efficacement les grandes et les petites proactifs au lieu de se contenter de réagir, et l'ap- interventions. Les services de la Banque ont sou- pui accordé par la Banque aux pays doit faire da- vent fait preuve d'innovation et mis en évidence vantage pour encourager ce changement. leur capacité de gérer des travaux massifs de re- Les mécanismes de financement dont se sert construction à nombre de niveaux : dans le cadre la Banque méritent d'être repensés : les prêts à des projets liés aux catastrophes, plus de 60 dif- l'appui de la balance des paiements se caracté- férents types d'activités ont été entreprises, allant risent certes par un décaissement relativement du dégagement des débris à la construction de rapide, mais souvent aucun décaissement ne réseaux d'infrastructures de transport. s'effectue durant la période qui suit la catas- La Banque a par ailleurs démontré son apti- trophe. Dans ses interventions en cas de catas- tude à travailler avec les bailleurs de fonds dans trophe, la Banque recourt de plus en plus aux le cadre d'une intervention collective, et elle a prêts d'urgence aux pays sinistrés, même lorsque adapté ses politiques et ses procédures pour as- d'autres instruments peuvent être mieux indi- surer une prompte fourniture de l'aide. Les éva- qués pour réduire la vulnérabilité à long terme. luations conjointes des dégâts sont devenues Plusieurs tentatives de mise en place de fonds un important mécanisme permettant de colla- d'assurance et de fonds pour imprévus ont borer avec les autres bailleurs de fonds et de contribué à attirer l'attention des gouverne- veiller à ce que les besoins des emprunteurs ments sur les problèmes de développement que soient satisfaits sans créer de chevauchement. posent les catastrophes, mais trop peu de ces Près de 80 % des projets relatifs aux catas- fonds ont été créés et évalués pour qu'on juge trophes naturelles financés par la Banque ont été de leur valeur. Enfin, dans les pays très vulné- jugés satisfaisants du point de vue de leurs ré- rables, la Banque recourt beaucoup plus fré- sultats, par rapport à une moyenne de 72 % en- quemment à la réaffectation des prêts qu'à ses xii AVANT-PROPOS autres types d'interventions liées aux catas- naturelles. Deuxièmement, il encourage le ren- trophes, ce qui compromet les objectifs de dé- forcement de la capacité de la Banque de réagir veloppement. face aux catastrophes et d'assurer une mobili- Le présent rapport recommande plusieurs sation rapide de ses ressources. Enfin, le rapport ajustements à la façon dont la Banque réagit ac- recommande à la Banque d'élaborer une stra- tuellement face aux catastrophes naturelles. Pre- tégie ou un plan d'action pour l'aide en cas de mièrement, le rapport propose des révisions à catastrophe naturelle qui prévoit une évalua- apporter à la politique afin de mieux guider le tion du niveau de risque de catastrophe de personnel et de rendre encore plus flexibles les chaque pays, et l'adoption de méthodes d'ap- interventions de la Banque liées aux catastrophes proche différentes sur la base de cette évaluation. Vinod Thomas Directeur général, Évaluation xiii Prefacio L os desastres naturales se producen en todo el mundo, pero su impacto económico y social ha ido en aumento y suele ser mucho mayor en los países en desarrollo que en los desarrollados. Estos fenómenos pueden arrasar con el progreso logrado en materia de desarrollo y significar años de retroceso en las inversiones en desarrollo. En Mozambique, el Banco financió la construcción zonas de litoral bajo de la bahía de Bengala ten- de 487 escuelas en un período de 20 años, pero drán más inundaciones, y los pequeños Estados tan sólo un desastre ocurrido recientemente -- insulares del Caribe, así como los países del golfo las inundaciones del año 2000-- dañó o destruyó de México, sufrirán repetidamente los embates de unas 500 escuelas primarias y siete escuelas se- los huracanes. cundarias. El terremoto de Cachemira de octubre El Banco y gran parte de la comunidad del de- de 2005 provocó daños por unos US$5.000 mi- sarrollo deben tener en cuenta en sus estrate- llones en Pakistán, que equivalen aproximada- gias la frecuencia con que se producen los mente al total de la asistencia oficial para el desastres y con que éstos azotan a los mismos pa- desarrollo de los tres años anteriores, y a los re- íses. El financiamiento concedido por el Banco cursos que el Banco Mundial había prestado a ese muestra que los desastres siguen un patrón defi- país en los 10 años precedentes. nido: de los 528 proyectos relacionados con de- Hasta hace poco, los gobiernos y los organis- sastres naturales (39%) que conformaban la cartera mos que los ayudaban a responder ante las emer- en el período de 1984-2005, 208 correspondían gencias producidas por los desastres consideraban a 10 prestatarios. Los compromisos de préstamo que éstos eran acontecimientos únicos y al azar. del Banco también muestran una determinada Sin embargo, sabemos por experiencia que los de- concentración: el 7,5% de los proyectos recibie- sastres naturales se producen con cierta periodi- ron el 32% del financiamiento. cidad, y que en algunas partes del mundo ocurren En algunos casos, en los planteamientos tanto repetidamente. La posibilidad de que ocurra un de los países como del Banco, los desastres se si- desastre puede preverse en la medida en que sea guen considerando como una interrupción del posible predecir en términos generales dónde proceso de desarrollo en lugar de un riesgo para es probable que se produzca un acontecimiento dicho proceso. En el 44% de las actuales estrate- en el futuro cercano (aunque no exactamente gias de asistencia a los países que han recibido cuándo o con qué magnitud). Por lo tanto, las apoyo del Banco en relación con desastres natu- xv HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT rales no se hace mención de tales fenómenos. In- tivo y estratégico habría producido beneficios a cluso en los 40 países en que se han realizado cua- más largo plazo. Además, en los proyectos rela- tro o más proyectos relacionados con desastres cionados con desastres naturales ha sido espe- naturales, un tercio de las estrategias omitió toda cialmente difícil atender las necesidades de la mención a ellos. Asimismo, aproximadamente población pobre. un tercio del subconjunto de países que tenían Cuando se produce un desastre, la necesidad una vasta trayectoria de desastres (más de ocho) de recursos financieros es inmediata y a menudo no hizo mención alguna a estos fenómenos. En estos fondos se desvían de otros programas de de- los documentos de préstamo rara vez se considera sarrollo porque no se dispone de financiamiento que los fenómenos naturales constituyen un para situaciones imprevistas. El costo financiero riesgo, ni siquiera en los países muy vulnerables, que ha significado la respuesta frente a los acon- pese a que 176 proyectos se vieron afectados ad- tecimientos más recientes ha despertado el inte- versamente por un desastre durante su ejecu- rés en encontrar soluciones para movilizar ción. Para aumentar la eficacia, debemos encontrar recursos a nivel mundial y regional. Pero incluso la manera de integrar mejor estos riesgos en la asis- si se llegaran a establecer estas medidas y el Banco tencia para el desarrollo. decidiera formar parte de esas soluciones, en su Hay que reconocer que el Banco ha demos- participación y compromiso con los países clien- trado mucha flexibilidad en lo que respecta a los tes éste debería asegurarse de que se preste aten- desastres naturales y ha aprendido a proporcio- ción permanente a las actividades de prevención nar respuestas adecuadas en pequeña y gran es- de un próximo desastre, en lugar de esperar hasta cala. El personal del Banco a menudo ha recurrido que ocurra. Los países deben ser más proactivos a métodos innovadores y demostrado la capaci- que reactivos y el apoyo del Banco debe alentar dad de hacer frente a reconstrucciones en gran en mayor medida este cambio de actitud. escala en muchos niveles: se han emprendido Es preciso replantear los mecanismos de fi- más de 60 tipos diferentes de actividades en pro- nanciamiento que emplea el Banco: los desem- yectos relacionados con desastres naturales, desde bolsos de préstamos para financiar la balanza de la remoción de escombros hasta la construcción pagos se han producido con relativa rapidez, pero de sistemas de infraestructura para el transporte. suele suceder que no haya desembolsos durante El Banco también ha demostrado su capacidad el período posterior a un desastre. En medida cre- para trabajar con los donantes en operaciones ciente, el Banco ha otorgado préstamos de emer- de respuesta conjuntas y ha adaptado sus políti- gencia para recuperación en respuesta a un cas y procedimientos para asegurar que la asis- desastre, incluso cuando otros instrumentos po- tencia llegue en forma expedita. Las evaluaciones drían haber sido más adecuados para reducir la vul- conjuntas de los daños se han convertido en un nerabilidad a largo plazo. Varios intentos de mecanismo importante para entablar una rela- establecer sistemas de seguro y fondos para im- ción con otros donantes y asegurar que no haya previstos han ayudado a centrar la atención de los duplicación de esfuerzos en la atención de las gobiernos en los problemas de desarrollo que oca- necesidades de los prestatarios. sionan los desastres, pero son muy pocos los que Casi el 80% de los proyectos sobre desastres han llegado a término y se han podido evaluar naturales financiados por el Banco fueron califi- como para determinar su utilidad. Por último, en cados de satisfactorios en cuanto a sus efectos di- los países muy vulnerables se recurre con mucha rectos, en comparación con un promedio de 72% mayor frecuencia a la reasignación de préstamos en igual período a nivel de todo el Banco. Estas que a otros tipos de respuesta del Banco ante si- calificaciones son indicativas de la particular efi- tuaciones de desastre, con el consiguiente riesgo cacia del Banco en la reconstrucción de infraes- de no alcanzar las metas de desarrollo. tructura física y el suministro de materiales y En el presente informe se recomiendan varios equipo. En general, sin embargo, la respuesta ajustes a la manera en que el Banco enfrenta ac- ante los desastres ha sido más bien reactiva y tác- tualmente los desastres naturales. En primer lugar, tica, en circunstancias en que un criterio proac- se sugiere examinar las políticas a fin de orientar xvi PREFACIO mejor al personal y aumentar la flexibilidad de las que el Banco elabore una estrategia o plan de ac- respuestas del Banco cuando ocurren desastres ción para prestar asistencia en caso de desastres naturales. En segundo lugar, se alienta al Banco naturales que incluya una determinación del nivel a aumentar su capacidad para responder ante de riesgo de cada país de sufrir desastres natura- tales situaciones y asegurar que pueda entrar en les, y la aplicación de distintos criterios sobre la acción sin demora. Por último, se recomienda base de dicha evaluación. Vinod Thomas Director General, Grupo de Evaluación Independiente xvii Executive Summary T he impact of natural disasters on economic well-being and human suf- fering has increased alarmingly. In the past year alone, the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean killed an estimated 220,000 people and left 1.5 million people homeless, catastrophic flooding and mudslides in Guatemala killed hundreds of people, and a massive earthquake in Kashmir killed tens of thousands more in Pakistan and India. The death tolls are staggering, and the costs to construction often is low and building codes, the human and economic development of the land registration processes, and other regula- affected countries are huge and rising. Natural tory mechanisms are lacking, as well as because disasters are becoming more costly: in constant numerous other development priorities dollars, disaster costs between 1990 and 1999 displace attention from the risks presented by were more than 15 times higher ($652 billion in natural events. material losses) than they were between 1950 Most natural disasters are foreseeable to the and 1959 ($38 billion at 1998 values). The extent that it is possible to predict generally human cost is also high: over the 1984­2003 where an event is likely to occur at some time in period, more than 4.1 billion people were the near future (but not precisely when or its affected by natural disasters. The number magnitude). Small island states in the Caribbean affected has grown, from 1.6 billion in the first and states along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico half of that period (1984­93) to almost 2.6 will undoubtedly be repeatedly hit by hurri- billion in the second half (1994-2003), and has canes; Pacific Rim states in the "ring of fire" are continued to increase. highly likely to be hit by earthquakes and Although disasters caused by natural events volcanic eruptions; low-lying coastal areas on occur throughout the world, losses to disaster in the Bay of Bengal are sure to experience more developing countries are generally much greater flooding; and Africa will very likely experience than in developed countries in terms of percent- more drought. Therefore, it makes sense to treat age of gross domestic product (GDP) or govern- the hazards of nature as risks to development, ment revenues. The disproportionate effect on especially where they occur repeatedly. developing countries has many explanations. Disasters dilute hard-won development Lack of development itself contributes to gains. In Mozambique, for example, Bank disaster impacts, both because the quality of lending financed the construction of 487 xix HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT schools. But the most recent disaster alone, the Its nonlending services can include conven- floods of 2000, damaged or destroyed about 500 ing of donor meetings, provision of assistance primary schools as well as 7 secondary schools. with post-disaster assessments, study prepara- The damage caused can outweigh years of tion, and technical assistance. Bank lending development assistance. The Kashmir earth- assistance can consist of funds reallocated from quake of October 2005 caused an estimated $5 existing projects, redesigns of planned projects, billion in damage in Pakistan, roughly equivalent or development of new projects using a variety to the total official development assistance for of lending instruments. In addition to its the preceding 3 years, and equivalent to the advisory and analytic services and technical amount the World Bank had lent to the country support, since 1984 the Bank has financed 528 over the preceding 10 years. projects that addressed natural disasters, There is no private insurance against hazard representing more than $26 billion in lending. risks in most developing countries. While about The Independent Evaluation Group examined half of these costs of natural disasters are covered the Bank's experience in disaster response over by insurance in the United States, less than 2 the past 20 years to extract lessons to inform percent of the costs are covered in the develop- good practice and ensure the achievement of ing world. In addition, the cost of hedging results in Bank-supported activities. The evalua- against natural hazard risks in developing tion is also intended to inform an ongoing countries often exceeds the cost of simply paying revision of the Bank's policy statement on for damages when they arise. Further, develop- emergency assistance. ing countries can generally count on aid from outside sources, a well-known moral hazard in The Bank Response the disaster field. For poor households, natural The Bank has demonstrated considerable hazards are just one of the many risks they face flexibility in its approach to natural and are unlikely to be a high priority. disaster assistance and has learned to When a disaster occurs, the key concerns for manage responses to events ranging from the affected country are what to do, how to do those of very large dimensions to smaller, it, and how to fund the necessary response. more limited events. Typically, funds are needed immediately, and are Bank staff have often been innovative in their often diverted from long-term development response to disaster events and have demon- because no contingency funding is available. strated the capacity to manage reconstruction on The financial cost of responding to the most a massive scale. The study identified more than recent events has stimulated particular interest 60 types of activities undertaken in disaster- in creating global and regional funding related projects, ranging from rubble clearance solutions. A proposal has been put forward for a and provision of emergency shelter, to construc- regional funding mechanism in Latin America, tion of flood shelters and transport infrastructure, and another proposal would expand an existing to institutional development. UN program to provide a global contingency Responses to disaster have included lending funding mechanism. and nonlending assistance, the latter including The World Bank has been increasingly disaster needs assessments, advisory assistance, engaged in helping countries to recover from and other forms of technical assistance. Among the disastrous impacts of natural events and to the responses that have demonstrated the Bank's reduce their future vulnerability. When the flexibility and innovation are the Honduras Social World Bank responds to a natural disaster it has Investment Fund (1999), the Maharashtra a wide array of lending and nonlending services Earthquake Project (1997), North China Earth- from which to choose. And its response spans quake Reconstruction (1993), Yemen Emergency multiple sectors and themes, including urban, Flood Reconstruction (1989), and the drought rural, environment, infrastructure, education, prevention in Niger (1988), all of which dynami- health, and social protection. cally adjusted to prevailing conditions. xx EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Bank also has demonstrated its ability Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) mention to work with donors in a shared response natural disaster risks, even in countries that have and has adapted policies and procedures experienced multiple events resulting in major to ensure that assistance can be delivered disasters. At the project level, objectives have expeditiously. mainly provided for short-term fixes and rarely Donor coordination was particularly strong addressed the root causes of the disastrous for Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua impacts of natural hazards. (1999); for the Marmara earthquake in Turkey (2000); for drought in Sudan (1989); and for The Bank has increasingly used the flooding in Bangladesh (1999), Mozambique Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), the focus (2000), and Gujarat (2002). Joint assessments of its emergency lending policy, in have become an important mechanism for responding to disaster, even when other engaging with other donors and ensuring that instruments may be more appropriate. borrower needs are met without overlaps. The ERL offers accelerated processing and a short implementation period of three years, and Natural disaster projects financed by the therefore has desirable qualities valued by both Bank have had higher ratings for outcome borrower and Bank staff who respond to and sustainability than the Bank's portfo- disasters. ERLs generally have worked well and lio as a whole. have high outcome ratings. But accelerated Almost 80 percent of the projects that had project processing is not always desirable. For natural disaster reconstruction or mitigation as a some projects, rushed appraisal has led to long substantial element were rated satisfactory for pauses between loan approval and first disburse- outcome, compared with the Bankwide average ment, poorly designed interventions, and of 72 percent for the same period. These ratings diminished poverty impacts. reflect particular effectiveness in rebuilding Furthermore, by relying on a three-year physical infrastructure and provision of materi- lending period, the Bank may end up emphasiz- als and equipment. ing activities that are expected to have short Sustainability ratings are similarly better than implementation times, while not attending to average, but institutional development ratings other activities that more fully address the needs are about the same as the average. The sustain- and vulnerabilities. It often happens that activi- ability rating (for what is mostly infrastructure) ties that might contribute greatly to the recovery reflects the likelihood that estimated net effort (and to the borrower's subsequent long- benefits will be maintained or exceeded over a term development) are not included in the ERL project's intended useful life. Experience with projects because they cannot be completed in the creation of disaster management capacity the three years allotted--and then the project has shown that it often takes more than one runs long in any event. project cycle to leave behind a functioning disaster institution where none existed. The crucial activities for long-term reduction of vulnerability take longer than But in general, disaster responses have three years to implement and have weak tended toward the reactive and tactical, borrower demand. when a proactive and strategic approach Only one of the 60 activities identified in Bank- would have had longer-term benefits. supported projects--balance of payment Countries affected by disaster, as well as the assistance--has taken less than three years to donors that try to help them, including the Bank, implement, on average. The types of activities have generally treated disasters as interruptions that can have the greatest impact on reducing in development rather than as a risk that is vulnerability, such as building code development integral to development. At the country level, or revision, development of hazard risk manage- few Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and ment institutions, and development of insurance xxi HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT and other mechanisms for laying off risk, are Recovery for the poor requires particular precisely those for which borrowers are least attention, but is especially difficult to likely to borrow. The Bank needs to find ways to accomplish in disaster projects, and poverty encourage such activities. impacts are generally not well documented. When Bank projects have targeted the poor, Actions taken during the first weeks and they have often exceeded their expected months after a disaster have a major impact: of 51 projects with documented impact on the recovery process to follow, impacts, 41 met or exceeded the expected and they need to be planned and impact. However, data are incomplete and implemented accordingly. documentation of the poverty impacts is thin. Choices made immediately following a Even in the difficult circumstances of a disaster--regarding shelter, resettlement, debris disaster response, beneficiary participation clearance, distribution of relief, and the like-- during the design and implementation stages is affect the later choices for longer-term solutions essential to success. The benefits of participa- and vulnerability reduction and can have severe tion were demonstrated in the 1993 Argentina consequences for the ability of the poor to Flood Rehabilitation Project, which involved recover. beneficiaries in all stages of the project. The Immediate post-disaster actions also need to interaction between beneficiaries and the local include the development of the capacities, authorities resulted in the timely availability of knowledge, and skills that will be required for construction materials and the accommodation the recovery process. If studies are going to of local customs in the architectural design of produce knowledge that is critical to fully new houses. Bank staff observed that this informed project actions, they need a strong created ownership among beneficiaries and advocate, such as the Bank. Capacity building increased maintenance. for procurement and preparation of bidding Experience in Turkey and Chile shows that documents should happen very early. Procure- cash transfers and the provision of livelihood ment is among the project activities most opportunities can be especially effective for the frequently cited in project-level evaluations as poor. Experience also shows that women and needing improvement. other vulnerable groups need special attention following disasters, especially in ensuring The Bank needs to be able to identify when equitable treatment. haste is counterproductive, lest funding mechanisms rather than development Reconstructed housing that is built using needs drive its response. disaster-resistant techniques and accord- The funding mechanisms themselves need to ing to the needs of occupants reduces be rethought: balance of payment lending has vulnerability. been a relatively quick-disbursing mechanism Building codes can improve the quality of the but, on average, it is nowhere near as fast as it was built environment, but in informal neighbor- supposed to be, and it has only helped in very hoods that typically do not comply with code limited circumstances. Several Bank-supported requirements, safer building practices need to be attempts to establish mechanisms to lay off risk disseminated in different ways. Simplicity of (insurance and contingency financing) have message is essential to the widespread adoption helped focus government attention on the long- of disaster-resistant technologies, as has been term development issues surrounding disasters, amply demonstrated in India. Because temporary but too few have been completed and evaluated housing is sometimes occupied for long periods to make an informed judgment about their value. of time, some projects have built temporary Finally, loan reallocations are used much more shelter to slightly higher standards so that it could frequently than other types of Bank disaster become another form of housing for the poorer responses in highly vulnerable countries. once the new housing is built. xxii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Moreover, if shelters are built using disaster- The Bank's long-term engagement with resistant construction techniques, not only are client countries needs to ensure continued they safer for the displaced living in them, but focus on permanent vulnerability reduction. such construction also serves as an example that The Bank has supported several research people will see, that will then potentially initiatives on risk hedging and private sector influence their future construction choices. involvement in reconstruction financing. Simple techniques can be used to ensure resist- Financial approaches to mitigating loss that are ance in owner- or craftsman-built small houses, receiving attention include: reinsurance with more sophisticated techniques may be used in catastrophe bonds, national homeowner engineer-designed buildings such as high-rises. insurance programs, disaster funds, and microfi- nance. Additionally, 10 Bank-funded projects are Bringing Risk Management into beginning to explore national insurance Development Strategy schemes (5 of which are ongoing and have not Natural hazard risks are highly concen- been evaluated). trated, so special attention needs to be given to planning ahead for disaster and to Coordination Inside and Outside the Bank reducing long-term vulnerability in The Bank has the human resources capacity countries at highest risk. to both respond to disasters and to address Ten countries account for 208 of the 528 long-term country needs related to hazard disaster projects (39 percent) in the Bank's risks, but mobilizing them is cumbersome. portfolio. Bank lending also is concentrated in The Bank has a cadre of committed and commitment terms--7.5 percent of projects experienced staff, but it lacks an effective way to received 32 percent of the financing. Natural reliably bring that staff and relevant knowledge hazard risks are foreseeable for many countries, to its borrowers, or even to its own task teams. yet those risks are infrequently considered in Since 1999 a three-person unit has assisted Bank country programs or in project financing, even task managers with natural and technological in highly vulnerable countries. disasters and helped provide a more strategic When formulating country lending programs and rapid response. This group is supplemented and project lending, the Bank needs to elevate by a thematic group comprising more than 100 the importance of natural hazards, especially for staff with disaster-related experience. However, highly vulnerable countries. To do this donors and client countries do not know who to efficiently, borrowing countries need to be contact when they have routine questions about categorized by vulnerability level. This report disaster and related coordination. The current presents one way to do this, dividing borrowers arrangement has also effectively reduced the into three groups according to level of vulnera- visibility of the natural disaster theme within the bility (high, medium, and low, based on the Bank. When a disaster strikes it can be difficult percentage of a country's GDP at risk from two to disengage knowledgeable and experienced or more natural hazards). staff from their ongoing tasks. The high concentration of risk also Donor coordination is especially critical to suggests that mechanisms are needed to disaster relief and recovery, in part because finance those risks or transfer them. of the dynamic nature of the situation, but Even if global or regional funds are eventually also because disasters typically attract the established, they will likely address only the involvement of numerous donors. short-term liquidity needs of disaster-affected Increasingly, borrowers themselves are countries. The Bank needs to be seen as a part providing the necessary donor coordination, of such regional and global solutions, but it also but they continue to need assistance with needs to continue to provide the longer-term coordination, especially in the early stages of activities directed at vulnerability reduction. relief and recovery. xxiii HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT Project experience shows that the develop- and to do so more effectively in a much shorter ment of a recovery strategy shared by all period. requires not only an immediate Bank presence · Ensure that contingency funds (be it on a coun- in the disaster-affected area, but also a try, regional, or global scale) result in all bor- prolonged presence that helps ensure that all rowing countries receiving a timely and reconstruction needs are covered, that the plan adequate financial response to major events. is appropriately designed for the available · Help bring natural hazard risk management capacity, that stakeholders' needs are met, that to the most vulnerable countries. there is a reasonable distribution of labor, and that the needs of the poor and vulnerable are The strategy or action plan needs to identify a considered. methodology to assess each country's level of In 1989, for example, Bank negotiators in disaster risk. It is suggested that countries be Sudan worked with other donors to ensure that divided into high-, medium-, and low-risk their interests were met and that there were no groups. The action plan then needs to identify unnecessary overlaps in coverage. By keeping how the Bank will assist borrowers in each the composition of the Bank's contribution category to lower their vulnerabilities and to flexible, the other donors were helped to make build on local capacities and leadership. adjustments in their programs. The Bank then In highly vulnerable countries, the action financed what was left. plan needs to make provisions to give more attention to natural hazards during the appraisal The development community should of investment projects generally, and specifically engage with disaster-stricken borrowers in the preparation of PRSPs, CASs, and other earlier and stay engaged longer. strategic documents. Where appropriate, these International experience on the impacts of documents need to go beyond a description of successful and unsuccessful relief management the risks, and identify monitorable mitigation and on the ability of key stakeholders to partici- and institutional development activities. pate effectively in the recovery process needs to For the most vulnerable countries, contin- be brought clearly to governments' attention. gency funding needs to be available, whether as The Bank specifically needs to be present during part of another loan, a set-aside in the CAS the emergency stage to ensure success of the lending program, or a free-standing catastrophe reconstruction projects it finances. Low-income fund (though these may become unnecessary if community groups need support until they regional or global funds are eventually develop the capacity to manage the infrastruc- established). Another alternative worth consid- ture that has been placed in their care. eration is a special fund under the Bank President's control that can be used to fund a Recommendations quick start when disaster occurs. Chapter 6 of the report makes a number of Countries deemed to be at medium to high specific suggestions about revisions to the risk need to include disaster-resilient design in Bank's policy for emergency lending--these are Bank-financed projects. For all countries, not repeated here in their entirety. disaster risks need to be considered in standard risk assessment documents. Prepare a Strategy or Action Plan for Natural The strategy or action plan should be submit- Disaster Assistance ted to the Board for discussion. The Bank's natural disaster assistance would benefit from the development of a strategy or Revise Policy to Better Guide Staff action plan and related guidance that would: and Enhance Flexibility of Bank Responses to Natural Disasters · Help staff to respond to emergencies with Emergencies are of many sorts and, although quick relief and well-planned reconstruction, there is some overlap, most differ from the xxiv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY disasters created by natural events in critical requires a longer period than has been available ways. Bank policy needs to reflect these differ- under ERLs. Such activities are more suited to ences by treating conflict and epidemic diseases standard investment lending but have often been separately, with provisions that apply only to the short-changed because of the ERL's three-year relevant topic. There are two ways in which this implementation time and the loss of borrower can be done: natural disasters can either be the interest in a second loan following the ERL. subject of a separate Operational Policy (as called for in the 1998 IEG evaluation of the Increase Bank Capacity to Respond Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruc- to Disasters and Ensure That It Can tion); or Operational Policy 8.50 could include Be Mobilized Quickly specific provisions for natural disasters, for post- Whether or not there is a designated unit to deal conflict situations, and for health and other with natural disasters and hazard risks, the Bank emergencies, so that each topic is dealt with needs the capacity to quickly gather and dissem- separately. In whatever form it takes, Bank policy inate international experience to borrowers in an needs to focus more on disaster prevention and emergency. In addition, task teams need support vulnerability reduction in all natural disaster while conducting post-disaster assessments and operations. Policy prohibitions on relief and the designing emergency interventions tailored to financing of recurring events need to be relaxed. the needs and capacities of each borrower. Accelerated processing and provisions for Responding to disasters requires multisec- quick disbursement for ERLs have partially toral expertise. Including disaster-knowledge- addressed the need for speed in launching able people on Bank missions following major short-term activities, though they could be crises can be crucial. Being selective in staffing fruitfully complemented by a new mechanism, identification for missions in post-disaster such as a special central fund managed by the settings avoids the problems of design and scale President's office (akin to the one in place in the of response that can occur when people are sent Inter-American Development Bank) to fund the who are not used to seeing destruction on a most urgent needs in the early days of a disaster massive scale or who lack country knowledge. response. The Bank has very few such people, and it But the use of ERLs is less appropriate for currently has no consistent mechanism for longer-term activities, such as mitigation, mobilizing them to respond to natural disasters. reconstruction, and institution building, which Pulling members of the Hazard Management require a longer preparation and appraisal time Thematic Group away from their ongoing and need not be exempted from due diligence responsibilities inevitably has a negative impact standards and safeguard compliance. on their normal activities. And there are so few Similarly, attention to social issues during knowledgeable staff that the same people tend preparation and implementation generally to be called upon repeatedly. xxv Résumé analytique L 'incidence des catastrophes naturelles sur le bien-être économique et sur la souffrance humaine s'est accrue de manière inquiétante. Rien qu'au cours de la dernière année, le tremblement de terre et le tsunami de l'océan In- dien ont fait environ 220 000 morts et laissé 1,5 million de personnes sans abri, des inondations et des coulées de boue catastrophiques ont tué des centaines de personnes au Guatemala, et un violent tremblement de terre au Cachemire a provoqué des dizaines de milliers d'autres morts au Pakistan et en Inde. Le bilan est saisissant, et le prix payé par les pays dans les pays en développement que dans les pays touchés, du point de vue du développement développés, en termes de pourcentage du pro- humain et économique, est énorme et en crois- duit intérieur brut (PIB) ou des recettes pu- sance. Les catastrophes naturelles deviennent bliques. Un grand nombre de facteurs expliquent plus coûteuses : en dollars constants, les coûts cette incidence disproportionnée sur les pays liés aux catastrophes entre 1990 et 1999 (652 mil- en développement. L'absence de développement liards de dollars de pertes matérielles) étaient de en elle-même contribue aux effets des catas- plus de 15 fois supérieurs à ceux de la période trophes, parce que les constructions sont souvent 1950-1959 (38 milliards de dollars en valeur de de piètre qualité, et en raison de l'inexistence de 1998). Le coût humain est également élevé : au codes de construction, de processus d'enregis- cours de la période 1984­2003, plus de 4,1 mil- trement des biens fonciers et d'autres méca- liards de personnes ont été touchées par des ca- nismes réglementaires, ainsi qu'à cause du fait que tastrophes naturelles. Le nombre des sinistrés de nombreuses autres priorités de développe- s'est accru, passant de 1,6 milliard de personnes ment détournent l'attention des risques pré- pendant la première moitié de cette période sentés par les évènements naturels. (1984­1993) à près de 2,6 milliards durant la La plupart des catastrophes naturelles sont deuxième moitié (1994­2003), et il continue prévisibles, dans la mesure où il est possible de d'augmenter. prédire, en général, l'endroit où un événement Même si les catastrophes causées par des évé- est susceptible de se produire à un certain mo- nements naturels se produisent partout dans le ment dans un avenir proche (mais pas le moment monde, les pertes occasionnées par les catas- ou l'ampleur précis d'un tel événement). Les trophes sont en général beaucoup plus grandes petits États insulaires des Caraïbes et les pays du xxvii HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT Golfe du Mexique seront sans nul doute frappés à sentent que l'un des nombreux risques qu'ils maintes reprises par des ouragans ; les pays rive- courent, et il est peu probable qu'ils y accordent rains du Pacifique situés dans le « cercle de feu » une grande priorité. sont très susceptibles d'être frappés par des Lorsqu'une catastrophe se produit, les pays tremblements de terre et des éruptions volca- touchés se préoccupent principalement de ce niques ; les zones côtières à basse altitude de la qu'il faut faire, de la manière de procéder, et Baie du Bengale subiront assurément davantage des moyens de financer les interventions né- d'inondations ; et l'Afrique connaîtra très pro- cessaires. En général, les fonds sont immédia- bablement plus d'épisodes de sécheresse. Il est tement nécessaires et ils sont souvent réaffectés par conséquent raisonnable de traiter les dangers au détriment du développement à long terme, de la nature comme des risques pour le déve- car il n'existe pas de financement pour imprévus. loppement, surtout dans les régions où ils sur- Le coût financier des interventions réalisées dans viennent de façon répétitive. le cadre des plus récents événements a stimulé Les catastrophes annihilent une bonne partie un intérêt tout particulier envers la création de des laborieux progrès accomplis dans le do- mécanismes de financement mondiaux et ré- maine du développement. A titre illustratif, au gionaux. Il a été tour à tour proposé d'établir un Mozambique les prêts de la Banque ont financé mécanisme de financement régional en Amé- la construction de 487 établissements scolaires ; rique latine, et d'étendre un programme existant mais une catastrophe récente, à savoir les inon- de l'ONU afin de créer un mécanisme mondial dations de 2000, a endommagé ou détruit à elle de financement pour imprévus. seule environ 500 écoles primaires ainsi que La Banque mondiale s'engage de plus en plus sept établissements secondaires. Les dégâts cau- à aider les pays à se remettre des effets désastreux sés peuvent anéantir plusieurs années d'aide au des évènements naturels et à réduire leur vul- développement. Au Pakistan, le tremblement de nérabilité future. Lorsque la Banque mondiale in- terre du Cachemire en octobre 2005 a provoqué tervient à la suite d'une catastrophe naturelle, elle des dégâts estimés à 5 milliards de dollars, soit a le choix entre un large éventail d'activités de à peu près l'équivalent du total de l'aide pu- prêt et de services hors prêt. Son intervention blique au développement des trois années pré- porte sur plusieurs domaines et thèmes, no- cédentes, et l'équivalent du montant des prêts tamment le secteur urbain, le secteur rural, l'en- accordés à ce pays par la Banque au cours des vironnement, l'infrastructure, l'éducation, la dix années précédentes. santé et la protection sociale. Dans la plupart des pays en développement, Ses services hors prêt peuvent comprendre il n'existe pas d'assurance privée contre les l'organisation des réunions des bailleurs de risques naturels. Si environ la moitié des coûts fonds, l'octroi d'aide pour évaluer les dégâts liés aux catastrophes naturelles sont couverts après la catastrophe, la préparation des études par l'assurance aux États-Unis, moins de 2 % le et l'assistance technique. Les activités de prêt de sont dans les pays en développement. En outre, la Banque peuvent consister à redéployer les le coût de la couverture des risques inhérents fonds de projets existants, à modifier la concep- aux catastrophes naturelles dans les pays en tion de projets prévus ou à élaborer de nou- développement est souvent supérieur aux frais veaux projets en utilisant une variété encourus pour réparer tout simplement les dé- d'instruments de prêt. Outre ses services d'ana- gâts subis lorsque ces catastrophes se produi- lyse et de conseil et son appui technique, la sent. Par ailleurs, les pays en développement Banque a, depuis 1984, financé 528 projets por- peuvent en général compter sur de l'aide pro- tant sur les catastrophes naturelles et représen- venant de sources extérieures, ce qui repré- tant plus de 26 milliards de dollars de prêt. sente un risque moral bien connu dans le Le Groupe indépendant d'évaluation a exa- domaine des interventions en matière de ca- miné l'expérience de la Banque dans le domaine tastrophe. En ce qui concerne les ménages des interventions liées aux catastrophes au cours pauvres, les catastrophes naturelles ne repré- des 20 dernières années, afin d'en tirer des en- xxviii RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE seignements pour guider les bonnes pratiques procédures pour assurer une prompte four- et assurer le succès des activités appuyées par la niture de l'aide. Banque. L'évaluation vise par ailleurs à guider la La coordination des bailleurs de fonds a été révision en cours de l'énoncé de politique de la tout particulièrement étroite dans le cadre des Banque sur l'aide d'urgence. interventions relatives à l'ouragan Mitch au Hon- duras et au Nicaragua (1999), au tremblement de L'intervention de la Banque terre de Marmara en Turquie (2000), à la séche- La Banque a fait montre d'une considé- resse au Soudan (1989), ainsi qu'aux inonda- rable flexibilité dans son approche de l'aide tions au Bangladesh (1999), au Mozambique en cas de catastrophe naturelle et elle a ap- (2000) et au Gujarat (2002). Les évaluations pris à gérer les interventions relatives aux conjointes des dégâts sont devenues un impor- événements, des plus grands aux plus pe- tant mécanisme permettant de collaborer avec tits qui sont plus limités. les autres bailleurs de fonds et de veiller à ce que Les services de la Banque ont souvent fait les besoins des emprunteurs soient satisfaits preuve d'innovation dans leur réponse face aux sans créer de chevauchement. événements liés aux catastrophes, et ils ont mis en évidence leur capacité de gérer des travaux Les projets liés aux catastrophes naturelles de reconstruction à très grande échelle. L'étude financés par la Banque ont obtenu des a identifié plus de 60 types d'activités entre- notes plus élevées, du point de vue des ré- prises dans le cadre de projets liés aux catas- sultats et de la viabilité, que celles du por- trophes, et qui vont du dégagement des débris tefeuille de la Banque dans l'ensemble. à la fourniture d'abris de secours, en passant Près de 80 % des projets dont un élément par la construction d'abris contre les inonda- important avait trait à la reconstruction après les tions et d'infrastructures de transport, et le dé- catastrophes naturelles ou à l'atténuation des veloppement institutionnel. risques de catastrophe naturelle ont été jugés sa- Les interventions relatives aux catastrophes tisfaisants en ce qui concerne les résultats, par ont consisté notamment en des activités de prêt rapport à une moyenne de 72 % enregistrée à et des services hors prêt, ces derniers compre- l'échelle de la Banque pour la même période. Ces nant l'évaluation des besoins liés aux catas- notes témoignent de l'efficacité particulière de trophes, l'aide sous forme de conseils, et d'autres la Banque dans le domaine de la reconstruction formes d'assistance technique. Parmi les inter- des infrastructures physiques, et celui de la four- ventions qui ont mis en évidence la flexibilité et niture de matériel et d'équipements. l'esprit novateur de la Banque, on peut citer Les notes de viabilité sont également supé- celles ayant trait à la création du Fonds d'inves- rieures à la moyenne, mais celles relatives au tissement social du Honduras (1999), à la ré- développement institutionnel sont approxima- ponse face au tremblement de terre de tivement similaires à la moyenne. La note de Maharastra (1997), à la reconstruction après le durabilité (des infrastructures, pour l'essentiel) tremblement de terre du Nord de la Chine indique la probabilité que les avantages estima- (1993), à la reconstruction d'urgence à la suite tifs nets seront maintenus ou dépassés pendant des inondations au Yémen (1989), et à la pré- la durée prévue de vie utile d'un projet. L'expé- vention de la sécheresse au Niger (1988), les- rience du renforcement des capacités en ma- quelles ont toutes été ajustées de façon tière de gestion des catastrophes a montré qu'il dynamique aux conditions de l'époque de leur faut souvent plus d'un cycle de projet pour im- mise en oeuvre. planter de façon durable, là où il n'en existait pas, une institution --créée après la catastrophe -- La Banque a par ailleurs démontré son ap- qui fonctionne. titude à travailler avec les bailleurs de fonds dans le cadre d'une intervention col- Mais en général, les interventions liées aux lective, et elle a adapté ses politiques et ses catastrophes ont eu tendance à être réac- xxix HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT tives et tactiques, alors qu'une approche buer considérablement à l'effort de reconstruc- proactive et stratégique aurait été avanta- tion (et au développement subséquent à long geuse à plus long terme. terme de l'emprunteur) ne soient pas couvertes Les pays touchés par la catastrophe ainsi que dans les projets financés au moyen des prêts les bailleurs de fonds qui essayent de leur venir d'urgence aux pays sinistrés, parce qu'elles ne en aide, y compris la Banque, ont en général peuvent pas être achevées dans le délai imparti traité les catastrophes comme une interruption de trois ans--et le projet finit de toute façon par du développement et non comme un risque in- aller au-delà de ce délai. hérent au développement. Au niveau national, rares sont les stratégies d'aide-pays et les stra- Les activités cruciales visant à réduire la vul- tégies de réduction de la pauvreté qui men- nérabilité à long terme nécessitent plus tionnent les risques liés aux catastrophes de trois ans pour leur mise en oeuvre, et naturelles, même dans les pays ayant connu plu- elles font l'objet d'une faible demande de sieurs événements qui ont entraîné de grandes la part des emprunteurs. catastrophes. Les projets quant à eux ont prin- Parmi les 60 activités identifiées dans les pro- cipalement visé à apporter des solutions à court jets financés par la Banque --au titre de l'appui terme, et ils se sont rarement attaqués aux causes à la balance des paiements -- une seule a été exé- profondes des impacts désastreux des catas- cutée pendant moins de trois ans, en moyenne. trophes naturelles. Les types d'activités qui peuvent avoir le plus grand impact sur la réduction de la vulnérabilité, Dans ses interventions liées aux catas- telles que l'élaboration ou la révision du code de trophes, la Banque recourt de plus en plus construction, la mise en place d'institutions de aux prêts d'urgence aux pays sinistrés, les- gestion des risques de catastrophe, l'établisse- quels sont au coeur de sa politique de prêt ment de l'assurance et d'autres mécanismes de d'urgence, même lorsque d'autres instru- déplacement de risque, sont précisément celles ments peuvent être mieux indiqués. pour lesquelles les emprunteurs sont le moins Le prêt d'urgence aux pays sinistrés offre un susceptibles de contracter des prêts. La Banque traitement accéléré et une courte période d'exé- doit trouver des moyens d'encourager de telles cution de trois ans, et il comporte par consé- activités. quent d'intéressantes qualités qui sont appréciées à la fois de l'emprunteur et des services de la Les mesures prises pendant les premières Banque chargés des interventions en cas de ca- semaines ou les premiers mois après une tastrophe. Les prêts d'urgence aux pays sinistrés catastrophe ont un impact majeur sur le ont en général été efficaces et ont obtenu des processus de reconstruction qui suivra, et notes élevées en ce qui concerne les résultats. il convient de les planifier et de les mettre Mais l'accélération du traitement du projet n'est en oeuvre en conséquence. pas toujours souhaitable. Dans le cas de certains Les choix opérés immédiatement après une projets, une évaluation hâtive a mené à de catastrophe -- et portant sur les abris, la réins- longues pauses entre l'approbation du prêt et le tallation, le dégagement des débris, la distribu- premier décaissement, à des interventions mal tion de l'aide, etc. -- influent sur les choix conçues et à des impacts réduits sur la pauvreté. subséquents en matière de solution à plus long En outre, en misant sur une période de prêt terme et de réduction de la vulnérabilité, et ils de trois ans, la Banque peut finir par mettre l'ac- peuvent avoir de graves conséquences pour l'ap- cent sur les activités qui sont censées compor- titude des pauvres à se remettre des effets de la ter une courte période d'exécution, en négligeant catastrophe. d'autres activités qui satisfont plus pleinement Les mesures prises immédiatement après la les besoins des sinistrés et permettent de ré- catastrophe doivent en outre prévoir le renfor- soudre les problèmes de vulnérabilité. Il arrive cement des capacités ainsi que l'acquisition des souvent que les activités susceptibles de contri- connaissances et des compétences qui seront né- xxx RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE cessaires pour le processus de reconstruction. prévu : des 51 projets dont les effets sont attes- Si des études doivent produire des connais- tés, 41 ont eu un impact comparable ou supé- sances qui sont critiques pour éclairer pleine- rieur aux attentes. Toutefois, les données sont ment la prise de mesures liées au projet, il incomplètes et les preuves montrant les impacts convient qu'elles soient préconisées par un pro- sur la pauvreté sont minces. moteur puissant, tel que la Banque. Le renfor- Même dans les circonstances difficiles qui en- cement des capacités de passation des marchés tourent une intervention liée aux catastrophes, et d'élaboration des dossiers d'appel d'offres la participation des bénéficiaires aux processus doit s'effectuer très tôt. Dans les évaluations de conception et d'exécution est indispensable réalisées au niveau du projet, la passation des pour en assurer le succès. Les avantages de la par- marchés est l'une des activités des projets les plus ticipation ont été mis en évidence dans le cadre fréquemment citées comme ayant besoin d'amé- du Projet de reconstruction à la suite des inon- lioration. dations survenues en Argentine en 1993. A cette occasion, les bénéficiaires avaient été associés à La Banque doit être capable d'identifier toutes les étapes du projet. L'interaction entre les situations où la hâte est plus néfaste que les bénéficiaires et les autorités locales a permis bénéfique, si elle tient à ce que son inter- d'assurer la disponibilité en temps voulu des vention soit déterminée par les besoins de matériaux de construction, et la prise en compte développement et non par les mécanismes des coutumes locales dans la conception archi- de financement. tecturale des nouvelles habitations. Les services Les mécanismes de financement ont eux- de la Banque ont relevé que cette situation a sus- mêmes besoin d'être repensés : le prêt à l'appui cité l'adhésion des bénéficiaires et amélioré l'en- de la balance des paiements a certes été un mé- tretien des ouvrages construits. canisme de décaissement relativement rapide, Il ressort de l'expérience de la Turquie et du mais en moyenne il est bien loin d'être aussi ra- Chili que les transferts d'espèces et la fourniture pide qu'on ne s'y attendait, et il n'a été utile que de moyens de subsistance peuvent se révéler tout dans un nombre très limité de situations. Plu- particulièrement efficaces pour les pauvres. L'ex- sieurs tentatives appuyées par la Banque pour périence montre par ailleurs qu'il convient d'ac- établir des mécanismes de déplacement de corder une attention spéciale aux femmes et risque (assurance et financement pour impré- aux autres groupes vulnérables, en veillant sur- vus) ont contribué à attirer l'attention des gou- tout à l'équité du traitement des sinistrés. vernements sur les problèmes de développement à long terme que posent les catastrophes, mais Les logements reconstruits de façon à ré- trop peu de ces mécanismes ont été créés et éva- sister aux inondations et à répondre aux be- lués pour qu'on se prononce de façon éclairée sur soins des occupants réduisent la leur valeur. Enfin, dans les pays très vulnérables, vulnérabilité. la Banque recourt beaucoup plus fréquemment Les codes de construction peuvent améliorer à la réaffectation des prêts qu'à ses autres types la qualité de l'environnement bâti, mais dans d'interventions liées aux catastrophes. les quartiers à habitat spontané où en général les exigences relatives aux immeubles ne sont pas Il convient d'accorder une attention spé- satisfaites, il importe de propager selon divers ciale aux activités de reconstruction ci- moyens des pratiques de construction plus sûres. blant les pauvres, mais ces activités sont La simplicité du message est indispensable pour tout particulièrement difficiles à réaliser l'adoption à grande échelle de technologies qui dans les projets relatifs aux catastrophes, permettent de construire des ouvrages résis- et les effets de la pauvreté sont en général tant aux catastrophes, comme il l'a été ample- mal établis. ment démontré en Inde. Étant donné que les Lorsque les projets de la Banque ont ciblé logements provisoires sont parfois occupés pen- les pauvres, ils ont souvent dépassé l'impact dant de longues périodes, certains projets ont xxxi HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT bâti des abris temporaires selon des normes lé- La forte concentration des risques donne gèrement plus élevées, afin qu'ils puissent au be- par ailleurs à penser qu'il est nécessaire de soin devenir une autre forme d'habitation pour trouver des mécanismes pour financer ces les pauvres, une fois les nouveaux logements risques ou pour les transférer. construits. Même si l'on finit par réunir des fonds mon- En outre, si les abris sont construits de façon diaux ou régionaux, ils ne serviront probable- à résister aux catastrophes, ils seront plus sûrs ment qu'à satisfaire les besoins en matière de pour les personnes déplacées qui y vivront, tout liquidité à court terme des pays touchés par les comme ils serviront d'exemple que les popula- catastrophes. Si la Banque doit montrer qu'elle tions pourront voir et qui pourrait influer sur contribue à de telles solutions régionales et leurs futurs choix en matière de construction. mondiales, il importe également qu'elle continue Des techniques simples peuvent être utilisées de réaliser des activités à plus long terme visant pour assurer la résistance de petits logements à réduire la vulnérabilité. bâtis par les propriétaires ou des ouvriers qua- lifiés, et on peut recourir à des techniques plus Dans le cadre de son engagement à long complexes dans le cas des immeubles conçus par terme auprès des pays clients, la Banque des ingénieurs, tels que les tours d'habitation. doit veiller à ce qu'une attention soute- nue soit accordée à la réduction perma- Intégrer la gestion des risques à la nente de la vulnérabilité. stratégie de développement La Banque a appuyé plusieurs initiatives de re- Les risques naturels sont très concentrés, cherche sur la couverture des risques et la par- aussi convient-il de s'attacher tout parti- ticipation du secteur privé au financement de la culièrement à prendre les dispositions né- reconstruction. Les approches financières de la cessaires avant que ne se produise la mitigation des pertes qui suscitent de l'intérêt catastrophe et à réduire la vulnérabilité à sont notamment : le déplacement de risque au long terme des pays à risque élevé. moyen des obligations catastrophes, les Dix pays bénéficient de 208 (39 %) des 528 programmes nationaux d'assurance des pro- projets du portefeuille de la Banque. Les opé- priétaires, les fonds de secours et le microfi- rations de prêt de la Banque sont également nancement. En outre, dix projets financés par la concentrées du point de vue des engagements Banque (dont cinq sont en cours et n'ont pas été --7,5 % des projets ont reçu 32 % du finance- évalués) commencent à étudier les régimes d'as- ment. Les risques naturels sont prévisibles dans surance nationaux. nombre de pays, et pourtant ces risques sont peu souvent pris en compte dans les programmes na- Coordination au sein et à l'extérieur tionaux ou dans le financement des projets, de la Banque même dans les pays très vulnérables. La Banque possède la capacité en ressources Lors de l'élaboration des programmes de prêt humaines nécessaires pour intervenir en cas aux pays et des opérations de prêt en faveur de catastrophe et pour satisfaire les be- des projets, la Banque doit amplifier l'impor- soins -- liés aux risques naturels -- à long tance accordée aux risques naturels, surtout terme des pays, mais la mobilisation de dans le cas des pays très vulnérables. Pour y par- ces ressources est difficile. venir de façon efficace, il convient de classer les La Banque a un corps de cadres dévoués et ex- pays emprunteurs par niveau de vulnérabilité. Le périmentés, mais elle manque de moyens effi- présent rapport propose un moyen de le faire, caces de mettre de manière fiable ce personnel qui consiste à diviser les emprunteurs en trois et le savoir pertinent au service de ses emprun- groupes selon le niveau de vulnérabilité de cha- teurs ou même de ses propres équipes de pro- cun (élevé, moyen et faible, en fonction du pour- jet. Depuis 1999, une unité composée de trois centage du PIB du pays qui est exposé à deux ou personnes aide les chefs de projet de la Banque plusieurs risques naturels). à gérer les catastrophes naturelles et technolo- xxxii RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE giques, et elle aide à réaliser des interventions plus a aidé les autres bailleurs de fonds à opérer des stratégiques et plus rapides. À cette unité s'ajoute ajustements au niveau de leurs programmes. La un groupe thématique comprenant plus de 100 Banque a ensuite financé la partie non couverte employés qui possèdent une expérience dans le des interventions. domaine des catastrophes. Cependant, les bailleurs de fonds et les pays clients ignorent à La communauté du développement doit qui adresser leurs questions courantes au sujet commencer à travailler plus tôt avec les em- des catastrophes et de la coordination y affé- prunteurs sinistrés, et maintenir cette col- rente. Le système actuel a en outre réduit effec- laboration pendant plus longtemps. tivement la visibilité du thème des catastrophes Il convient clairement d'attirer l'attention des naturelles au sein de la Banque. Lorsqu'une ca- gouvernements sur l'expérience internationale re- tastrophe se produit, il peut s'avérer difficile de lative aux incidences de la gestion efficace et in- faire en sorte que les employés compétents et ex- efficace du secours et à l'aptitude des principales périmentés abandonnent leurs tâches du mo- parties prenantes à participer efficacement au ment pour s'occuper de l'intervention. processus de reconstruction. Plus précisément, la Banque doit être présente pendant la phase La coordination des bailleurs de fonds est d'urgence pour assurer le succès des projets de tout particulièrement cruciale pour le se- reconstruction qu'elle finance. Les groupes de cours en cas de catastrophe et la recons- proximité à faible revenu ont besoin d'aide jus- truction, en raison en partie de la nature qu'à ce que soit renforcée leur capacité de gérer dynamique de cette situation, mais aussi l'infrastructure qui a été confiée à leurs soins. parce que les catastrophes donnent en gé- néral lieu à l'intervention d'un grand Recommandations nombre de bailleurs de fonds. Le chapitre 6 du rapport formule un nombre de De plus en plus, les emprunteurs eux-mêmes propositions précises par rapport aux révisions assurent la nécessaire coordination des bailleurs à apporter à la politique de prêt d'urgence de la de fonds, mais ils n'en continuent pas moins Banque. Ces recommandations ne sont pas d'avoir besoin d'aide en matière de coordination, reprises en intégralité ici. surtout au début des opérations de secours et de la reconstruction. Élaborer une stratégie ou un plan d'action pour L'expérience acquise dans les projets montre l'aide en cas de catastrophe naturelle. que l'élaboration d'une stratégie de recons- L'aide en cas de catastrophe naturelle de la truction à adopter par tous exige non seulement Banque bénéficierait de l'élaboration d'une que la Banque soit immédiatement présente stratégie ou d'un plan d'action, ainsi que de dans la zone sinistrée, mais aussi qu'elle y reste directives connexes, qui permettraient : pendant une longue période afin de s'assurer que tous les besoins en matière de reconstruction · au personnel d'intervenir en situation d'ur- sont couverts, que le plan est conçu de façon ap- gence en fournissant un secours rapide et en propriée pour la capacité disponible, que les mettant en oeuvre une opération de recons- besoins des parties prenantes sont satisfaits, que truction bien planifiée, et ce de façon plus ef- la répartition de la main-d'oeuvre est raisonnable ficace et en un temps beaucoup plus court ; et que les besoins des pauvres et des groupes vul- · de veiller à ce que la création de fonds pour nérables sont pris en considération. imprévus (à l'échelle nationale, régionale ou En 1989, par exemple, les négociateurs de la mondiale) ait pour effet que tous les pays Banque au Soudan ont travaillé avec les bailleurs emprunteurs confrontés à des événements de fonds pour veiller à ce que leurs besoins majeurs bénéficient d'une intervention fi- soient satisfaits et qu'il n'y ait pas d'inutiles che- nancière suffisante et à temps. vauchements dans la couverture. En maintenant · d'initier les pays les plus vulnérables à la ges- flexible le contenu de sa contribution, la Banque tion des risques naturels. xxxiii HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT La stratégie ou le plan d'action doit définir une la plupart d'entre elles diffèrent de façon fonda- méthodologie pour évaluer le niveau de risque mentale des catastrophes causées par des évé- de catastrophe de chaque pays. Il est proposé nements naturels. La politique de la Banque doit que les pays soient divisés en groupes à risque tenir compte de ces différences en traitant dif- élevé, moyen et faible. Le plan d'action doit en- féremment les conflits et les épidémies, au moyen suite indiquer la manière dont la Banque aidera de dispositions qui ne s'appliquent qu'à chaque les emprunteurs de chaque catégorie à réduire cas pertinent. Pour ce faire, il est possible de leur vulnérabilité et à faire fond sur les capaci- procéder de deux manières : les catastrophes tés et la volonté politique locales. naturelles peuvent faire l'objet d'une politique Dans les pays très vulnérables, le plan d'action opérationnelle distincte (tel que l'a recommandé doit prévoir des mesures permettant de prêter le Groupe indépendant d'évaluation en 1998 davantage attention aux risques naturels pen- dans son évaluation de l'expérience de la Banque dant l'évaluation des projets d'investissement en matière de reconstruction à la suite d'un en général, et lors de l'élaboration des Docu- conflit) ; ou alors, l'politique opérationnelle 8.50 ments de stratégie pour la réduction de la pau- pourrait prévoir des clauses précises pour les vreté, des Stratégies d'aide-pays (CAS) et d'autres catastrophes naturelles, pour les situations sui- documents stratégiques en particulier. Le cas vant un conflit, ainsi que pour la santé et d'autres échéant, ces documents doivent, au-delà de la cas d'urgence, afin que chaque sujet soit traité sé- description des risques, indiquer des activités parément. Quelle que soit la forme qu'elle prend, contrôlables de réduction de la vulnérabilité et la politique de la Banque doit se concentrer da- de développement institutionnel. vantage sur la prévention des catastrophes et la En ce qui concerne les pays les plus vulné- réduction de la vulnérabilité dans toutes les opé- rables, le financement pour imprévus doit être rations portant sur les catastrophes naturelles. Il disponible, qu'il fasse partie d'un prêt ou qu'il convient d'alléger les restrictions auxquelles la po- revête la forme d'un fonds mis de côté dans un litique assujettit l'aide et le financement en faveur programme de prêt de la CAS, voire d'un fonds des événements périodiques. autonome de catastrophe (même si ces fonds L'accélération du traitement des prêts d'ur- peuvent devenir inutiles si l'on établit en fin de gence aux pays sinistrés et de la prise de dispo- compte des fonds régionaux ou mondiaux). Une sitions pour leur décaissement rapide a satisfait autre solution digne d'intérêt est la création en partie le besoin de célérité dans le lance- d'un fonds spécial placé sous le contrôle du pré- ment des activités à court terme, même si ces me- sident et pouvant servir à financer un lancement sures pourraient être avantageusement rapide des opérations de secours lorsqu'une ca- complétées par un nouveau mécanisme, tel tastrophe se produit. qu'un fonds central spécial géré par le cabinet Les pays dont le niveau de risque est moyen ou du président (et similaire à celui qui est en place élevé doivent prévoir, dans les projets financés par à la Banque interaméricaine de développement) la Banque, la conception d'ouvrages résistant aux pour financer les besoins les plus urgents pen- catastrophes. Pour tous les pays, il convient de dant les premiers jours d'une intervention en cas tenir compte des risques de catastrophe dans les de catastrophe. documents classiques d'évaluation des risques. Le recours aux prêts d'urgence aux pays sinis- La stratégie ou le plan d'action doit être sou- trés est toutefois moins indiqué dans le cas des ac- mis au Conseil pour examen. tivités à plus long terme tels que la réduction de la vulnérabilité, la reconstruction, et le renforce- Revoir la politique pour mieux guider le ment des institutions, qui nécessitent un plus long personnel et rendre plus flexibles les délai de préparation et d'évaluation et n'ont pas interventions de la Banque liées aux besoin d'être soustraites aux normes de diligence catastrophes naturelles. raisonnable et aux mesures de sauvegarde. Il existe un grand nombre de types de situations De même, pour qu'une attention soit accor- d'urgence, et malgré quelques chevauchements, dée aux problèmes sociaux lors de la préparation xxxiv RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE et de l'exécution, il faut en général un délai plus L'intervention en cas de catastrophe exige long qu'on ne peut ménager dans le cadre des une expertise multisectorielle. Il peut s'avérer prêts d'urgence aux pays sinistrés. De telles ac- crucial de faire en sorte que des personnes ex- tivités conviennent mieux aux opérations clas- périmentées en matière de catastrophe partici- siques d'investissement, mais elles y ont souvent pent aux missions organisées par la Banque à la perdu au change en raison du délai d'exécution suite des crises majeures. En désignant sur une de trois ans des prêts d'urgence aux pays sinis- base sélective les cadres devant participer aux trés, et de la perte de l'intérêt de l'emprunteur missions dans les régions sinistrées, on évite les pour un deuxième prêt après l'obtention du problèmes liés à la conception et à l'ampleur de prêt d'urgence aux pays sinistrés. l'intervention qui peuvent survenir lorsque les membres de la mission n'ont pas l'habitude de Renforcer la capacité de la Banque voir des destructions à une vaste échelle ou d'intervenir en cas de catastrophe et d'assurer qu'ils ne possèdent pas de connaissances sur le une mobilisation rapide de ses ressources. pays. Peu de cadres ayant le profil idéal sont en Qu'il existe ou non une unité désignée pour service à la Banque, et à l'heure actuelle cette der- s'occuper des catastrophes et des risques natu- nière ne dispose d'aucun mécanisme cohérent rels, il est nécessaire qu'en situation d'urgence, pour les mobiliser en vue d'une intervention en la Banque ait la capacité de réunir rapidement cas de catastrophe naturelle. Le fait d'éloigner de les expériences internationales et de les diffuser leurs responsabilités courantes les membres du auprès des emprunteurs. En outre, les équipes Groupe thématique sur la gestion des risques a de projet doivent être appuyées lors de l'éva- inévitablement une incidence négative sur leurs luation des dégâts après la catastrophe et de la activités normales. En outre, le nombre d'em- conception d'interventions d'urgence adaptées ployés expérimentés est si petit qu'on tend à sol- aux besoins et aux capacités de chaque em- liciter les mêmes personnes à maintes reprises. prunteur. xxxv Resumen E l impacto de los desastres naturales en el bienestar económico y en el sufrimiento de las personas ha aumentado en forma alarmante. Tan sólo el año pasado, el terremoto y tsunami del océano Índico causó la muerte de unas 220.000 personas y dejó sin hogar a un millón y medio de ha- bitantes; las catastróficas inundaciones y aludes de lodo en Guatemala mata- ron a centenares de personas, y un devastador terremoto en Cachemira causó la muerte de decenas de miles de personas más en Pakistán e India. Las cifras de muertos son asombrosas y los cos- desproporción en los países en desarrollo tiene tos en términos de desarrollo humano y econó- muchas explicaciones. La falta de desarrollo por mico de los países afectados son enormes y siguen sí misma agrava el impacto de estos desastres, de- aumentando. Los desastres naturales resultan bido tanto a la mala calidad de las construcciones cada vez más onerosos: en dólares constantes, el como a la ausencia de códigos de construcción, costo de los desastres naturales entre 1990 y 1999 procedimientos para el registro de tierras y otros fue 15 veces más elevado (US$652.000 millones mecanismos de regulación, y a que existen mu- en pérdidas materiales) que entre 1950 y 1959 chas otras prioridades de desarrollo que desvían (US$38.000 millones en valores de 1998). El costo la atención de los riesgos que plantean los fenó- en términos humanos también es elevado: en el menos naturales. período comprendido entre 1984 y 2003, más de La mayoría de los desastres naturales son pre- 4.100 millones de personas se vieron afectadas por visibles en la medida en que sea posible prede- desastres naturales. Esta cifra ha aumentado de cir en términos generales dónde es probable que 1.600 millones en la primera mitad de dicho pe- se produzca un acontecimiento en el futuro cer- ríodo (1984-93) a casi 2.600 millones en la se- cano (aunque no exactamente cuándo o con qué gunda mitad (1994-2003), y continúa subiendo. magnitud). Indudablemente, los pequeños Esta- En todo el mundo se producen desastres pro- dos insulares del Caribe y los países a lo largo de vocados por fenómenos naturales, pero las pér- la costa del Golfo de México se verán azotados re- didas en términos del porcentaje del producto petidamente por los huracanes; los Estados de la interno bruto (PIB) o de ingresos públicos sue- cuenca del Pacífico situados en el denominado len ser mucho mayores en los países en desa- "círculo de fuego" tienen altas probabilidades de rrollo que en los desarrollados. Esta sufrir terremotos y erupciones volcánicas; con xxxvii HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT seguridad, las zonas de litoral bajo de la Bahía de nivel mundial y regional. Se ha presentado una pro- Bengala tendrán más inundaciones, y es muy pro- puesta para establecer un mecanismo de finan- bable que en África se produzcan más sequías. Por ciamiento a nivel regional en América Latina; lo tanto, es razonable considerar que los peligros también se ha propuesto ampliar un programa de de la naturaleza constituyen un riesgo para el de- las Naciones Unidas ya existente con el fin de sarrollo, especialmente en los lugares donde éstos crear un mecanismo de financiamiento para si- se repiten una y otra vez. tuaciones imprevistas de alcance mundial. Los desastres echan por tierra los progresos en En medida creciente, el Banco Mundial ayuda materia de desarrollo logrados con tanto esfuerzo. a los países a recuperarse de los efectos desas- En Mozambique, por ejemplo, el Banco financió trosos de los fenómenos naturales y a reducir su la construcción de 487 escuelas, pero el último de- nivel vulnerabilidad en el futuro. Cuando res- sastre --las inundaciones del año 2000-- bastó ponde a un desastre natural, el Banco Mundial re- para dañar o destruir unas 500 escuelas primarias curre a una amplia gama de servicios financieros y siete escuelas secundarias. Los daños provoca- y no financieros. Además, su respuesta abarca di- dos pueden contrarrestar con creces lo logrado en versos sectores y temas, entre ellos, urbanismo, años de asistencia para el desarrollo. El terremoto zonas rurales, medio ambiente, infraestructura, de Cachemira de octubre de 2005 causó daños por educación, salud y protección social. unos US$5.000 millones en Pakistán, que equiva- Los servicios no financieros pueden incluir la len aproximadamente al total de la asistencia ofi- convocatoria de reuniones de donantes, el sumi- cial para el desarrollo de los tres años anteriores, nistro de asistencia para las evaluaciones que se y a los recursos que el Banco Mundial había pres- llevan a cabo en cuanto se produce un desastre, tado a ese país en los 10 años precedentes. la preparación de estudios, y asistencia técnica. La En la mayoría de los países en desarrollo no exis- asistencia financiera del Banco puede consistir en ten seguros privados contra este tipo de riesgo. En la reasignación de fondos de proyectos en curso, los Estados Unidos, aproximadamente la mitad de la modificación del diseño de proyectos que se pla- los costos relacionados con los desastres natura- nea llevar a cabo, o la formulación de nuevos pro- les están cubiertos por el seguro, pero en el mundo yectos mediante el uso de diversos instrumentos en desarrollo esa proporción no alcanza al 2%. de financiamiento. Además de los servicios analí- Además, el costo de la cobertura contra dichos ticos y de asesoría, y del apoyo técnico, desde riesgos en los países en desarrollo a menudo es su- 1984 el Banco ha financiado 528 proyectos rela- perior al costo que significaría reparar los daños pro- cionados con desastres naturales, que represen- ducidos. Por otra parte, normalmente esos países tan préstamos por más de US$26.000 millones. pueden contar con que recibirán ayuda externa, un El Grupo de Evaluación Independiente exa- conocido riesgo moral en el ámbito de los desas- minó la experiencia del Banco relativa a sus res- tres. En el caso de las familias pobres, los riesgos puestas en casos de desastres en los últimos 20 años naturales son sólo uno de los numerosos tipos de con el objeto de extraer lecciones que permitan for- riesgos a los que se exponen y es poco probable mular prácticas recomendadas y asegurar que las que revistan alta prioridad. actividades apoyadas por el Banco consigan los Cuando se produce un desastre, la principal pre- resultados previstos. La evaluación también tiene ocupación del país afectado es qué hacer, cómo por objeto servir de base para la revisión que está hacerlo y cómo financiar las medidas de respuesta llevando a cabo el Banco de su declaración de po- apropiadas. La necesidad de recursos financieros lítica sobre asistencia en casos de emergencia. suele ser inmediata y a menudo estos fondos se desvían de programas de desarrollo a largo plazo La respuesta del Banco porque no se dispone de financiamiento para si- El Banco ha demostrado mucha flexibili- tuaciones imprevistas. El costo financiero que ha dad en su planteamiento con respecto a la significado la respuesta ante los acontecimientos asistencia en caso de desastres naturales y más recientes ha despertado especial interés en ha aprendido a proporcionar respuestas encontrar soluciones para movilizar recursos a adecuadas ante acontecimientos de enormes xxxviii RÉSUMÉN dimensiones y otros de menor gravedad o cionados con desastres naturales han recibido de alcance limitado. mejores calificaciones en lo que respecta a En muchos casos el personal del Banco ha re- los efectos directos y la sostenibilidad. currido a respuestas innovadoras ante situaciones Casi el 80% de los proyectos que tenían un de desastre y demostrado la capacidad de hacer componente importante de mitigación o re- frente a reconstrucciones en gran escala. En el es- construcción tras un desastre natural fueron ca- tudio se identificaron más de 60 tipos de activi- lificados de satisfactorios en cuanto a sus efectos dades en el marco de proyectos relacionados con directos, en comparación con un promedio de desastres naturales, tales como remoción de es- 72% en igual período a nivel de todo el Banco. combros, suministro de refugio de emergencia, Estas calificaciones son indicativas de la particu- construcción de refugios para protegerse de las lar eficacia del Banco en la reconstrucción de in- inundaciones, infraestructura de transporte y de- fraestructura física y el suministro de materiales sarrollo institucional. y equipo. Las medidas de respuesta han comprendido Las calificaciones con respecto a la sostenibi- asistencia financiera y no financiera; esta última lidad también son superiores al promedio, pero ha consistido en asistencia técnica en forma de las correspondientes al desarrollo institucional evaluaciones de las necesidades provocadas por son aproximadamente iguales a este último. La ca- los desastres, asesoría, etc. Como ejemplo de las lificación de la sostenibilidad (principalmente in- respuestas que han demostrado la flexibilidad y fraestructura) indica la probabilidad de que a lo capacidad de innovación del Banco cabe señalar largo de la vida útil prevista del proyecto se man- el Fondo de Inversión Social de Honduras (1999), tengan o superen los beneficios netos estima- la asistencia tras el terremoto de Maharashtra dos. La experiencia acerca de la creación de (1997), la reconstrucción tras el terremoto en el capacidad de gestión en casos de desastre ha norte de China (1993), la reconstrucción de emer- mostrado que a menudo se requiere más de un gencia tras las inundaciones en Yemen (1989), y ciclo completo de proyectos para establecer por las actividades para la prevención de sequías en primera vez una institución encargada de res- Níger (1988). En todos estos casos se hicieron en ponder en tales situaciones que funcione debi- forma dinámica los ajustes necesarios teniendo en damente. cuenta las condiciones imperantes. En general, sin embargo, la respuesta en El Banco también ha demostrado capaci- casos de desastre ha sido más bien reactiva dad para responder conjuntamente con los y táctica, en circunstancias en que un criterio donantes y ha adaptado sus políticas y pro- proactivo y estratégico podría haber pro- cedimientos para asegurar que la asistencia ducido beneficios a más largo plazo. llegue en forma expedita. Por lo general, los países afectados por desas- La coordinación de los donantes fue particu- tres, así como los donantes que tratan de brin- larmente estrecha tras el huracán Mitch que azotó darles ayuda, incluido el Banco, han considerado Honduras y Nicaragua (1999), el terremoto de los desastres como una interrupción del proceso Marmara, en Turquía (2000), la sequía en Sudán de desarrollo, y no como un riesgo que forma (1989) y las inundaciones en Bangladesh (1999), parte integral de dicho proceso. En el plano na- Mozambique (2000) y Gujarat (2002). Las eva- cional, son contadas las estrategias de asistencia luaciones conjuntas se han convertido en un me- a los países y las estrategias de lucha contra la po- canismo importante para trabajar con otros breza en las que se mencionan los riesgos que donantes y asegurar que no se produzca dupli- plantean los desastres naturales, incluso en paí- cación de esfuerzos para atender a las necesida- ses donde se han producido varios aconteci- des de los prestatarios. mientos que han dado por resultado grandes desastres. Al nivel de los proyectos, en los obje- En comparación con la totalidad de la cartera, tivos señalados se han dispuesto principalmente los proyectos financiados por el Banco rela- medidas de corto plazo y rara vez se han abordado xxxix HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT las causas básicas de los desastrosos efectos de los pagos-- ha requerido, en promedio, menos de riesgos naturales. tres años. Los tipos de actividades que pueden pro- ducir el mayor impacto en reducir la vulnerabilidad, En medida creciente, el Banco ha otorgado como la elaboración o revisión de los códigos de préstamos de emergencia para recupera- construcción, y el establecimiento de instituciones ción --el elemento central de su política responsables de la gestión de riesgos, así como de de financiamiento para situaciones de emer- mecanismos de seguro y de otro tipo para mitigar gencia-- para brindar asistencia en casos de los riesgos, son precisamente aquellos para los cua- desastre, incluso cuando otros instrumen- les los prestatarios tienen menos probabilidades de tos podrían haber sido más adecuados. solicitar financiamiento. El Banco debe encontrar Estos préstamos se tramitan en forma acelerada maneras de promover ese tipo de actividades. y el período de implementación es de apenas tres años; por lo tanto, sus características tienen Las medidas adoptadas durante las prime- muy buena acogida por parte de los prestatarios ras semanas y meses después de ocurrido y el personal del Banco que responde ante tales un desastre producen en un gran impacto situaciones. En términos generales, los présta- en el ulterior proceso de recuperación, y mos de emergencia para recuperación han dado deben planificarse y llevarse a cabo en de- buen resultado y gozan de altas calificaciones en bida forma. lo que respecta a sus efectos directos. Sin em- Las decisiones que se adoptan inmediatamente bargo, la tramitación acelerada de un proyecto no después de un desastre --refugio de personas, re- siempre es lo más conveniente. En algunos pro- asentamiento, remoción de escombros, distri- yectos, la apresurada evaluación inicial ha dado bución de ayuda, etc.-- influyen en las decisiones lugar a largas pausas entre la aprobación del prés- que se adoptan posteriormente para encontrar so- tamo y el primer desembolso, el diseño inade- luciones a más largo plazo y reducir el nivel de vul- cuado de las intervenciones y un menor impacto nerabilidad, y pueden tener graves consecuencias en la reducción de la pobreza. en la capacidad de recuperación de las personas Además, con un período de financiamiento pobres. de tres años, el Banco puede acabar poniendo én- En las medidas inmediatas luego de producido fasis en actividades que suelen tener breves pe- un desastre también se debe incluir el desarrollo ríodos de ejecución, dejando de lado otras que de las capacidades, los conocimientos y las des- aborden más plenamente las necesidades y vul- trezas que serán necesarias durante el proceso nerabilidades del prestatario. A menudo, en los de recuperación. Para que los estudios generen los proyectos financiados con préstamos de emer- conocimientos fundamentales que permitan adop- gencia para recuperación no se incluyen activi- tar medidas con pleno conocimiento de causa en dades que podrían contribuir considerablemente el marco de los proyectos, hace falta un buen pro- a los esfuerzos de recuperación (y, posterior- motor, como el Banco. El fortalecimiento de la ca- mente, al proceso de desarrollo a largo plazo del pacidad en materia de adquisiciones y preparación prestatario) porque éstas no se pueden terminar de los documentos de licitación debe ser una de en los tres años establecidos, con la consiguiente las primeras medidas. La mejora de los procesos prolongación del proyecto. de adquisiciones se cuenta entre las actividades que se mencionan con mayor frecuencia en las eva- Para llevar a cabo las actividades funda- luaciones a nivel de los proyectos. mentales que permiten reducir la vulnera- bilidad a largo plazo se requieren más de tres El Banco debe ser capaz de determinar en años y la demanda de tales actividades por qué casos puede ser contraproducente apre- los prestatarios es escasa. surarse en las decisiones, para que no sean Solamente una de las 60 actividades identifica- los mecanismos de financiamiento sino las das en proyectos financiados por el Banco --a necesidades de desarrollo las que impul- saber, la asistencia para financiar la balanza de sen su respuesta. xl RÉSUMÉN Es necesario replantearse los mecanismos de jorara el mantenimiento de las obras. financiamiento; los préstamos para financiar la La experiencia en los casos de Turquía y Chile balanza de pagos han sido un mecanismo de de- muestra que las transferencias de efectivo y las sembolso relativamente rápido, pero, en general, oportunidades para ganarse la vida pueden ser es- no son ni cercanamente tan rápidos como debe- pecialmente eficaces para los pobres. También rían serlo, y sólo han sido de ayuda en circuns- indica que las mujeres y los grupos vulnerables ne- tancias muy limitadas. Varios intentos apoyados cesitan atención especial después de un desastre; por el Banco encaminados a establecer mecanis- concretamente, se debe asegurar que reciban un mos para mitigar el riesgo (seguros y financia- trato equitativo. miento para imprevistos) han ayudado a centrar la atención de los gobiernos en los problemas de La reconstrucción de viviendas con técnicas desarrollo a largo plazo que plantean los desas- de construcción resistentes a los desastres tres, pero son muy pocos los que han llegado a y conforme a las necesidades de los mora- término y se han podido evaluar como para emi- dores reduce el grado de vulnerabilidad. tir un juicio informado sobre su utilidad. Por úl- Cuando existen códigos de construcción se timo, en los países muy vulnerables se recurre con puede mejorar la calidad de las edificaciones, mucha mayor frecuencia a la reasignación de pero en los barrios informales en los que no se préstamos que a otros tipos de respuesta del suelen cumplir dichas normas es necesario pro- Banco ante situaciones de desastre. mover por distintos conductos la utilización mé- todos de construcción más seguros. Es Las actividades de recuperación dirigidas a fundamental que la información se divulgue en un la población pobre requieren atención es- lenguaje sencillo para lograr la adopción genera- pecial, pero son particularmente difíciles de lizada de técnicas de construcción resistente a los llevar a cabo en el marco de proyectos sobre desastres, como se ha demostrado ampliamente desastres naturales, y el impacto en la pobreza en India. Dado que a veces las viviendas tempo- no suele documentarse en debida forma. rales se ocupan durante períodos prolongados, en Cuando los proyectos del Banco han estado di- el marco de algunos proyectos se han construido rigidos a los pobres, a menudo han sobrepasado refugios temporales conforme a normas ligera- el impacto previsto: 41 de los 51 proyectos cuyo mente más estrictas, de modo que pudieran con- impacto ha sido documentado alcanzaron o su- vertirse en otra forma de vivienda para personas peraron el impacto previsto. Sin embargo, no se más pobres una vez construidas las nuevas vi- dispone de datos completos y la documentación viendas. sobre el impacto en la pobreza es escasa. Además, si los albergues se construyen con Incluso en las difíciles circunstancias en que se técnicas resistentes a los desastres, no sólo son responde a un desastre, la participación de los be- más seguros para sus moradores desplazados, neficiarios durante las etapas de diseño y ejecu- sino que también sirven de modelos que la gente ción son fundamentales para obtener buenos puede apreciar, con la posibilidad de que lleguen resultados. Las ventajas de dicha participación a influir en sus decisiones de construcción en el quedaron demostradas en el proyecto de reha- futuro. Se pueden utilizar técnicas de construc- bilitación tras las inundaciones de Argentina, en ción sencillas para asegurar la resistencia de pe- 1993, ocasión en que los beneficiarios participa- queñas viviendas construidas por sus propietarios ron en todas las etapas del proyecto. La interac- o por artesanos; en edificaciones diseñadas por ción entre los beneficiarios y las autoridades profesionales, como edificios de altura, se pueden locales hizo posible disponer oportunamente de utilizar técnicas más complejas. materiales de construcción y tener en cuenta las costumbres locales en el diseño arquitectónico de Integración de la gestión de riesgos en las nuevas viviendas. El personal del Banco pudo las estrategias de desarrollo observar que todo esto permitió que los benefi- Los riesgos naturales están muy concen- ciarios se identificaran con el proyecto y que me- trados, por lo que es necesario prestar aten- xli HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT ción especial a la planificación antes de que ciamiento de actividades de reconstrucción. Entre se produzca un desastre, así como a la re- las soluciones financieras para mitigar pérdidas en ducción del grado de vulnerabilidad a largo que se está centrando la atención cabe mencio- plazo en los países que corren mayor riesgo. nar las siguientes: reaseguro con bonos de ca- De los 528 proyectos relacionados con desas- tástrofe, programas nacionales de seguro para tres naturales (39%) que conforman la cartera los propietarios de viviendas, fondos para situa- del Banco, 208 corresponden a 10 países. Los ciones de desastre y microfinanciamiento. Ade- compromisos de préstamo del Banco también más, en el marco de 10 proyectos financiados se encuentran concentrados: el 7,5% de los pro- por el Banco se están empezando a estudiar pla- yectos recibió el 32% del financiamiento. En el caso nes nacionales de seguro (cinco de esos planes de muchos países, los riesgos naturales son pre- están en marcha pero no han sido evaluados). visibles, pero pocas veces se tienen en cuenta en los programas para los países o en el financia- Coordinación dentro y fuera del Banco miento de los proyectos, incluso cuando se trata El Banco cuenta con los recursos humanos de países muy vulnerables. necesarios para responder ante situaciones Al formular los programas de financiamiento de desastre y atender las necesidades a largo para los países y el financiamiento para proyectos, plazo de los países relacionadas con los el Banco debe dar mayor importancia a los ries- riesgos naturales, pero la movilización de di- gos naturales, especialmente en el caso de los pa- chos recursos es complicada. íses muy vulnerables. Para proceder de manera El Banco tiene un cuerpo de funcionarios de- eficiente, los países prestatarios se deben clasifi- dicados y con vasta experiencia, pero carece de car por nivel de vulnerabilidad. En el presente in- una forma eficaz para hacer llegar de manera con- forme se señala una manera de hacerlo, dividiendo fiable ese personal y los conocimientos perti- los prestatarios en tres grupos según su grado de nentes a sus prestatarios, e incluso a sus propios vulnerabilidad (alto, mediano y bajo, según el equipos. Desde 1999, una unidad integrada por porcentaje del PIB del país en cuestión expuesto tres personas asiste a los jefes de proyectos del al riesgo en caso de que se produzcan dos o más Banco en materia de desastres naturales y tec- riesgos naturales). nológicos, y ayuda a entregar una respuesta más estratégica y expedita. Este grupo se comple- La alta concentración del riesgo también menta con un grupo temático integrado por más indica que se necesitan mecanismos para fi- de 100 funcionarios con experiencia en casos de nanciar o transferir dichos riesgos. desastre. No obstante, los donantes y los países Incluso si se llegan a establecer fondos mun- clientes no saben con quién ponerse en contacto diales o regionales, éstos probablemente sólo aten- cuando tienen preguntas de rutina sobre situa- derán las necesidades de liquidez a corto plazo de ciones de desastre y las actividades de coordina- los países afectados por un desastre. El Banco ción conexas. Con los mecanismos que existen debe considerarse parte de tales soluciones re- actualmente, de hecho también se ha reducido la gionales y mundiales, pero también debe seguir par- visibilidad del tema de los desastres naturales en ticipando en actividades a más largo plazo dirigidas el Banco. Cuando ocurre un desastre, puede ser a reducir el nivel de vulnerabilidad de los países. difícil sacar de sus tareas habituales al personal con conocimientos y experiencia en la materia. En su participación a largo plazo para aten- der las necesidades de los países clientes, el La coordinación de los donantes reviste es- Banco debe asegurar que se preste aten- pecial importancia para las actividades de ción continuada a la permanente reducción asistencia y recuperación tras un desastre, de la vulnerabilidad. debido en parte al carácter dinámico de la El Banco ha apoyado varias iniciativas de in- situación, pero también porque los desas- vestigación relativas a la protección contra riesgos tres normalmente atraen a numerosos do- y la participación del sector privado en el finan- nantes que desean participar. xlii RÉSUMÉN En medida creciente, los propios prestatarios para situaciones de emergencia; dichas sugeren- se ocupan de la necesaria coordinación de los do- cias no se repiten aquí en toda su extensión. nantes, pero siguen requiriendo asistencia para la coordinación, sobre todo en las primeras etapas Preparar una estrategia o plan de acción para de asistencia y recuperación. la asistencia en casos de desastres naturales La experiencia recogida de los proyectos mues- La asistencia del Banco en casos de desastres na- tra que para elaborar una estrategia de recupe- turales podría mejorar si se elaborara una estra- ración compartida por todos se requiere no sólo tegia o plan de acción --con las correspondientes la presencia inmediata del Banco en la zona afec- orientaciones-- que: tada por el desastre, sino también una presencia prolongada que permita asegurar que se atiendan · ayudaría al personal a responder ante situa- todas las necesidades de reconstrucción, que el ciones de emergencia con asistencia expedita diseño del plan sea adecuado a la capacidad dis- y actividades de reconstrucción bien planifi- ponible, que se satisfagan las necesidades de las cadas, y a actuar con eficacia en un período partes interesadas, que la distribución del trabajo mucho más breve; sea razonable, y que se tengan en cuenta las ne- · aseguraría que los fondos para situaciones im- cesidades de los grupos pobres y vulnerables. previstas (ya sea a escala nacional, regional o En 1989, por ejemplo, negociadores del Banco mundial) representaran para todos los países en Sudán trabajaron con otros donantes para ase- prestatarios una respuesta financiera oportuna gurar que se consideraran los intereses de estos y adecuada ante acontecimientos graves; últimos y que no hubiera una innecesaria dupli- · Ayudaría a gestionar los riesgos naturales en los cación de esfuerzos. Al mantener la flexibilidad en países más vulnerables. la composición de la contribución del Banco, se ayudó a los demás donantes a introducir ajustes En la estrategia o plan de acción se debe señalar a sus programas. Luego, el Banco financió el resto. una metodología para determinar el nivel de riesgo de que ocurran desastres naturales en los La comunidad del desarrollo debería tra- distintos países. Se recomienda que los países se bajar con los prestatarios afectados por un dividan en tres categorías: grupos de riesgo alto, desastre en una etapa más temprana y con- mediano y bajo. Luego, se debe establecer la ma- tinuar participando por más tiempo. nera en que el Banco brindará asistencia a los A los gobiernos se les debería hacer presente prestatarios de cada una de estas categorías con con toda claridad la experiencia internacional el propósito de reducir su vulnerabilidad y apro- sobre los impactos que produce una gestión acer- vechar las capacidades y el liderazgo de cada uno tada o desacertada de la asistencia y sobre la ca- de ellos. pacidad de las principales partes interesadas para En los países muy vulnerables, el plan de ac- participar de manera eficaz en el proceso de re- ción debe disponer que se preste más atención cuperación. Concretamente, el Banco debe estar a los riesgos naturales durante la etapa de eva- presente durante la etapa de emergencia para luación inicial de los proyectos de inversión en ge- asegurar el éxito de los proyectos de recons- neral, y específicamente durante la preparación trucción que financia. Los grupos de menores de los documentos de estrategia de lucha contra ingresos de la comunidad necesitan apoyo hasta la pobreza, las estrategias de asistencia a los paí- que desarrollen la capacidad para ocuparse de la ses y otros documentos de esa naturaleza. Cuando gestión de la infraestructura que se haya puesto corresponda, estos documentos no deberán li- su cuidado. mitarse a presentar una descripción de los ries- gos, sino señalar además actividades de mitigación Recomendaciones y desarrollo institucional susceptibles de segui- En el Capítulo 6 del informe se presentan varias miento. sugerencias concretas con respecto a la revisión En el caso de los países más vulnerables, se de la política del Banco relativa al financiamiento debe disponer de financiamiento para situaciones xliii HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT imprevistas, ya sea como parte de otro préstamo, con respecto a la asistencia y el financiamiento en fondos de destinación especial en el programa de el caso de acontecimientos recurrentes. financiamiento de la estrategia de asistencia a los La tramitación acelerada y las disposiciones países, o un fondo para catástrofes de carácter in- para el rápido desembolso de los préstamos de dependiente (aunque esto podría ser innecesario emergencia para recuperación han atendido par- si a la larga se establecieran fondos regionales o cialmente la necesidad de iniciar de inmediato las mundiales). Otra alternativa que valdría la pena actividades a corto plazo, pero podrían comple- considerar es la creación de un fondo especial ad- mentarse fructíferamente con un nuevo meca- ministrado por el Presidente y que podría utilizarse nismo, como un fondo central especial para financiar el inicio inmediato de las activida- administrado por la oficina del Presidente (simi- des en cuanto se produzca un desastre. lar al que existe en el Banco Interamericano de De- El diseño de los proyectos financiados por el sarrollo) para financiar las necesidades más Banco en países que se consideren de riesgo me- urgentes durante los primeros días de respuesta diano o alto deberá poder adaptarse en caso de después de un desastre. que ocurra un desastre. En los documentos ha- No obstante, los préstamos de emergencia bituales de evaluación de riesgos que se preparan para recuperación son menos adecuados para para todos los países se deberán considerar los ries- actividades a más largo plazo, como las de miti- gos de que se produzcan desastres naturales. gación, reconstrucción y fortalecimiento institu- La estrategia o el plan de acción se deberá en- cional, que requieren más tiempo para la viar al Directorio para su discusión. preparación y la evaluación inicial, y no necesitan quedar eximidos del cumplimiento de las normas Revisar la política del Banco para orientar de salvaguardia y diligencia debida. mejor al personal y aumentar la flexibilidad de Del mismo modo, la atención de los problemas las respuestas de la institución ante los sociales durante la preparación y ejecución de desastres naturales. las actividades suele requerir más tiempo del que Las emergencias son de diversa naturaleza y, pese se dispone en el marco de los préstamos de emer- a que existen ciertas semejanzas, la mayoría difiere gencia para recuperación. Tales actividades son en aspectos muy importantes de los desastres más apropiadas para las operaciones habituales provocados por fenómenos naturales. La política de financiamiento para proyectos de inversión, del Banco debe reflejar esas diferencias y consi- pero con frecuencia se han dejado de lado habida derar por separado los conflictos y las enferme- cuenta del período de implementación de tres dades epidémicas, con disposiciones que se años de los préstamos de emergencia para recu- apliquen únicamente al tema pertinente. Hay dos peración y debido a la pérdida de interés de los maneras de hacerlo: los desastres naturales pue- prestatarios en tomar un segundo préstamo. den ser materia de una política operacional in- dependiente (como se pide en la evaluación del Aumentar la capacidad de respuesta del Grupo de Evaluación Independiente de 1998 re- Banco en casos de desastre y asegurar que lativa a la experiencia del Banco en actividades de ésta se pueda movilizar sin demora. reconstrucción después de un conflicto), o bien Ya sea que exista o no una unidad designada que la OP 8.50 podría incluir disposiciones específicas se ocupe de los desastres naturales y los riesgos en relación con los desastres naturales, las situa- que éstos plantean, el Banco debe estar en con- ciones posteriores a los conflictos, la salud y otras diciones de reunir y diseminar rápidamente su ex- emergencias, de manera que cada tema se trate periencia internacional a los prestatarios en caso por separado. Cualquiera sea la forma que adopte, de una emergencia. Además, los equipos de tra- la política del Banco debe centrar más la atención bajo necesitan apoyo para llevar a cabo las eva- en la prevención de desastres y la reducción de luaciones que deben realizarse luego de un los niveles de vulnerabilidad en todas las opera- desastre, y para diseñar intervenciones de emer- ciones relativas a estos fenómenos. Se deben fle- gencia que se ajusten a las necesidades y capaci- xibilizar las prohibiciones establecidas en la política dades de cada prestatario. xliv RÉSUMÉN Para responder ante situaciones de desastre se no conocen el país. El Banco cuenta con muy requieren conocimientos y experiencia en diver- pocas personas con esas características, y actual- sos sectores. La inclusión de personas con cono- mente no tiene un mecanismo congruente para cimientos en materia de desastres en las misiones movilizar a estas personas responsables de res- del Banco tras una crisis grave puede resultar ponder ante un desastre natural. El hecho de fundamental. La selectividad a la hora de identi- sacar a los integrantes del Grupo temático sobre ficar a los funcionarios que integran las misiones gestión de riesgos de sus responsabilidades pro- en situaciones posteriores a un desastre permite duce inevitablemente un impacto negativo en evitar los problemas relacionados con el diseño sus actividades habituales. Además, dado que el y la escala de la respuesta que se pueden presentar número de funcionarios que cuentan con los co- cuando se envía a personas que no están acos- nocimientos necesarios es tan reducido, se suele tumbradas a ver destrucción en gran escala o que recurrir a las mismas personas una y otra vez. xlv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADB Asian Development Bank AFR Sub-Saharan Africa Region BP Bank Procedure CAS Country Assistance Strategy CGIAR Consultative Group for International Agriculture DEC Development Research Group (World Bank) DFID Department for International Development (U.K.) DRI Disaster Risk Index DRU Disaster Reduction Unit (UNDP) EAP East Asia and the Pacific Region ECA Europe and Central Asia Region EERL Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Loan (Turkey) ERL Emergency Recovery Loan GDP Gross domestic product HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative HMU Hazard Management Unit HRM Hazard Risk Management (Team) IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank IEG Independent Evaluation Group IEG-WB Independent Evaluation Group­World Bank LAC Latin America and the Caribbean Region MDGs Millennium Development Goals MFIs Multilateral financial institutions MNA Middle East and North Africa Region NGO Nongovernmental organization O&M Operation and maintenance OD Operational Directive OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OP Operational Policy OPN Operational Policy Note PIR Policy Implementation Review PIU Project Implementation Unit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PTI Poverty Targeted Intervention SRO Small Rural Operation UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization xlvii GLOSSARY Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses that exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Disaster risk The systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, management operational skills, and capacities to implement policies, strategies, and coping capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of hazards. Disaster risk The conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to reduction minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (disaster (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of reduction) hazards. Hazard A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, or human activity that may cause loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disrup- tion, or environmental degradation. Mitigation Structural and nonstructural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact of natural hazards, environmental degradation, and technological hazards. Preparedness Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the temporary evacuation of people and property from threat- ened locations. Prevention Activities to provide avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards and means to minimize related environmental disasters. Recovery Decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improv- ing the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encour- aging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. Relief/response The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to meet the needs of those affected. It is generally immediate and short term. Resilience/ The capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to hazards resilient to adapt, by resisting or changing to reach and maintain an acceptable level of structure and functioning. Risk The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property and livelihood loss, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. xlix HAZARDS OF NATURE, RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT Risk A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analyzing potential assessment/ hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose analysis a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods, and the environ- ment on which they depend. Structural/ Structural measures refer to any physical construction to reduce or avoid nonstructural possible impacts of hazards, which include engineering measures and measures construction of hazard-resistant and protective structures and infrastructure. Vulnerability The conditions determined by physical, social, attitudinal, economic, and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. Source: Adapted from UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. l Chapter 1: Evaluation Highlights · Natural disasters are becoming increasingly destructive. · The Bank is increasingly involved in responding to natural disasters. · Bank policy on emergency lending has been revised three times, but without the benefit of evaluation or knowledge about Bank experience with natural disasters. · The Bank's strategic planning for disaster has been limited. 1 Nature, Disaster, and Recovery Disasters reflect the ways societies structure themselves and allocate their resources.1 O n December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale hit off the coast of Sumatra. The fast-moving tsunamis it generated devastated the shores of countries from Indonesia to Somalia, killing an estimated 220,000 people and leaving 1.5 million people homeless. Three months later, an 8.7 magnitude earthquake possible explanations Natural disasters are with roughly the same epicenter generated (box 1.1). Without doubt, becoming increasingly widespread panic at the prospect of another though, the cost of destructive. tsunami and killed almost 2,000 people in disaster damages has Indonesia. Then, in the fall of 2005, a record been exploding: the number of hurricanes battered the Caribbean, economic costs of major disasters in constant Mexico, and the U.S. Gulf Coast. At the same time, dollars are now estimated to be 15 times higher Central America experienced a series of natural than they were in the 1950s--$652 billion in disasters including a hurricane, flooding, and an material losses in the 1990s (IMF 2003) (figure 1.1). earthquake. The human cost is also high: over the Most recently, world attention focused on the 1984­2003 period, more than 4.1 billion people powerful 7.6 magnitude earthquake that struck were affected by natural disasters (Guha-Sapir, the region bordering Pakistan and northern Hargitt, and Hoyois 2004, p. 85). The number of India on October 8, 2005. A humanitarian people affected has also been rising, from 1.6 disaster of enormous proportions, the billion in the first half of that period (1984­93) earthquake devastated towns and villages to almost 2.6 billion in the second half throughout the region, leaving tens of (1994­2003), and has continued to increase in thousands of dead and injured, and millions the current decade (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt, and homeless. In Pakistan, the official government Hoyois 2004, p. 85). estimate of the death toll was 86,000. India did This growth in damage to built environments not escape the devastating effects of the quake, and to the societies that use them is a product of with estimates of over 1,000 deaths. human actions. Social and economic vulnerabil- The reported number of disasters has been ity to natural events is rising as the world increasing, growing from fewer than 100 in 1975 to becomes more populated. The pursuit of more than 400 in 2005. This increase has many economic opportunity brings more people into 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 1.1: Why Do Natural Disasters Seem to Be Increasing in Number? Several factors contribute to the apparent increase in the number of reported disasters. 550 500 450 400 350 disasters 300 of 250 Number 200 150 100 50 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database-www.em-dat.net-Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels. · Increases in relief and reconstruction assistance have encouraged international reporting of more disasters. This is particu- larly the case for smaller events, which were previously treated as a local concern (IFRC 2005). · More specialized agencies are tracking natural events and their disastrous impacts. Many country governments have now de- veloped specialized agencies for tracking and reporting on natural disasters. The increased accuracy of observation and re- porting on the weather contributes to the increase in reported extreme weather events--a 50 percent increase each decade from the 1950s to the 1990s (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt, and Hoyois 2004). · Sea temperatures have risen. A rise in tropical sea temperatures of up to 2 degrees Fahrenheit over the past century has con- tributed to an increase in weather-related disasters, some of which may be cyclical in nature (Webster and others 2005). Human actions that urban settings and fragile and the loss of absorptive capacity of the soil-- coastal areas where the both legacies of poor agricultural practices contribute to the damage of earthquakes that destroy groundcover and other natural en- destructiveness need to be and extreme weather vironmental defenses. addressed. events is often greatest. · Human actions that contribute to the de- The more vulnerable structiveness need to be addressed. people are, the more disastrous a natural event · Destruction of forests and overgrazing to meet will be. Increasing environmental degradation the needs of growing population leads to also contributes to the intensification of the desertification. effects of natural events. · Earthquakes are most destructive in countries with poor building code enforcement and high · In drought, problems associated with a short- seismic vulnerability of construction, and when age of water are exacerbated by deforestation, landslide-prone, steeply sloped land loses grass soil erosion, and inappropriate land use. and forest cover and becomes occupied by in- · Floods are caused by the silting up of rivers formal housing. 4 N AT U R E , D I S A S T E R , A N D R E C O V E R Y Figure 1.1: The Cost of Disaster Damage Is Rising 700 600 500 values 400 2001 300 billions, 200 US$ 100 0 1950­59 1960­69 1970­79 1980­89 1990­99 Source: IMF 2003. Note: Data are for "great" disasters, in which the ability of the region to help itself is distinctly overtaxed, making interregional or international assistance necessary. Developing Countries and country over the preced- Impacts of natural Natural Disasters ing 10 years.3 disasters are very large in Although disasters caused by natural events The impacts of natural occur throughout the world, losses to disaster in disaster on societies also developing countries. developing countries are generally much higher differ, depending on their than in developed countries in percentage of level of development. In December 1999, gross domestic product (GDP) or government landslides in Venezuela and storms that hit France revenues. For example, Maldives' tsunami losses caused similar amounts of physical damage, amounted to 66 percent of GDP. Hurricane estimated at about $3 billion in both cases. But the Mitch caused losses equal to 41 percent of GDP human costs differed greatly: there were 50,000 in Honduras. deaths in Venezuela compared with 123 in France. Even when the national impact is relatively The disproportionate effect on developing small, the local impact may be catastrophic--the countries has many explanations. One is simply 2004 tsunami is estimated to have reduced that areas of the world that have harsh climatic Indonesia's GDP growth by just 0.1­0.4 percent, conditions, are subject to extreme weather, or but the province of Aceh suffered destruction of have unstable geology are difficult to develop, its capital stock equivalent to 97 percent of its and development gains can be fragile and easily GDP. Small island nations can lose multiples of overwhelmed by the effects of natural events. their GDP to natural disasters: Grenada lost 200 Lack of development itself contributes to disaster percent of its GDP to Hurricane Ivan. impacts, both because the quality of construction The damage caused by large disasters can also often is low and building codes, land registration outweigh development assistance. The Kashmir processes, and other regulatory mechanisms are earthquake of October 2005 caused an estimated lacking, as well as because numerous other $5 billion in damage in Pakistan,2 roughly equiva- development priorities Lack of development lent to the total official development assistance displace attention from contributes to for the preceding three years, and equivalent to the risks that natural the amount the World Bank had lent to the events present.4 destructiveness. 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Response, Recovery, and Reconstruction disaster, an unprecedented outpouring of interna- The first days following a disaster are typically tional support provided assistance to the affected very dynamic, in part because the global and populations. But donor promises during the first national media sharply and swiftly focus few weeks following a disaster are usually reduced attention on the immediate needs of victims and later, or even dropped altogether, when initial because of the risks to health and social order. estimates of need prove too high or when the Donors and governments are compelled to act. sudden inflow of assistance exceeds the country's However, their initial actions affect all future ability to manage the funds. actions. In any event, most of the costs of recovery A Harvard University study of 30 disaster and ultimately are borne by the country itself. The relief and reconstruction efforts concluded that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and initial actions are never neutral--they either Development (OECD) Development Aid support longer-term development or undermine Committee has reported that outside financing it (Anderson and Woodrow 1989). In the first and donations usually offset less than 10 percent months after a disaster the situation remains of a country's disaster losses (Linnerooth-Bayer The actions of the first highly dynamic--needs and Amendola 2000). Hence, disasters can can shift very quickly and represent a permanent loss of development few days affect all future missteps are common momentum. decisions. and can have serious Although the destructive impacts of disasters consequences. In Bolivia, are tightly connected with development, for example, initial relief efforts created additional disasters are typically treated as an interruption difficulties for the recovery (box 1.2). in development rather than as risks that should Without question, attention to natural disasters be a calculated part of development. Some is growing. In particular, the recent Asian countries are in a near-permanent state of earthquakes focused the world's attention on the recovery. The countries themselves also tend to magnified effects of disaster in developing lose sight of long-term priorities related to countries and generated commitments of support reducing their vulnerability to disasters as from donor nations. Shortly after the tsunami immediate needs are met and media attention Box 1.2: A Troubled Relief Effort Compromises the Ability to Recover Following an earthquake that devastated the urban areas of homes(doors,windows,floorandrooftiles,kitchenandbathroom Aiquile, Totora, and Mizque on May 22, 1998, the Government of fixtures), which represented about 70 percent of their cost. Bolivia requested an International Development Association · Bulldozers knocked down damaged buildings without pre- (IDA) reallocation of $5 million from the El Niño Emergency As- serving the boundary lines between properties, paralyzing sub- sistance Credit to help finance reconstruction. A Bank techni- sequent rebuilding efforts. cal mission found that a number of troubling decisions had been · Temporary settlement camps had been set up in a manner that made on how temporary shelter would be provided: led to social disintegration and abetted robbery and assault. · Victims of the disaster had been obliged to abandon their The Bank ultimately directed the requested reallocation to homes and possessions and move to refugee camps under rural housing. The way in which the early part of the process military control, where they were fed for free. This effectively was managed had severely compromised the recovery of the destroyed the local economy and, without commerce, few urban areas, because the Bank funds would have filled a major could afford to pay for services. gap in the assistance needed to rebuild the cities, had they been · Victimshadnotbeenallowedtorecovertherecyclablesfromtheir directed there. Source: Field interviews and observation in 1998 and World Bank data. 6 N AT U R E , D I S A S T E R , A N D R E C O V E R Y turns elsewhere. Mitigation, prevention, and from OPNs to ODs, and Disasters are often disaster risk management often drop off the then into OPs). treated as an development agenda and may be neglected as The Bank's three attention returns to other pressing development policy statements reflect interruption in priorities. an evolution in thinking development rather than Cleaning up the damage and rebuilding about its response to as a risk to development. structures without addressing the human emergencies such as actions that turn recurring natural phenomena natural disasters. The three statements differ in into disasters only ensures that the inevitable how they characterize emergencies, what next event will be as disastrous as the last. emergencies are covered, and in several other Annual flooding only regenerates agricultural areas, but all make timeliness a key concern. This soil when human settlements are not located in concern led to the creation a quick-disbursing floodplains. Where environmental degradation instrument in the 1984 OPN. The Emergency turns seasonal events into disaster, environmen- Recovery Loan (ERL), as it came to be called, has tal restoration needs to be part of the solution. become the instrument of choice in lending for In other places, increased attention to natural disaster emergencies. Although policy has infrastructure and settlement design is all that is evolved, the changes have been made without required to increase disaster resilience. Effective benefit of evaluation or knowledge of Bank activities that address root causes of vulnerabil- experience. ity and mitigate the potential for future damage Although it has a policy Most Bank borrowers are crucial to reducing the steady erosion of on emergency assistance have sought assistance development gains that natural disasters for disasters, the Bank has related to natural represent. never had a strategy for that assistance. Therefore, disasters. The World Bank and Natural Disasters strategic planning for The World Bank has financed reconstruction natural disasters has been confined to country- since its inception and increasingly has been level analyses in Country Assistance Strategies engaged in helping countries recover from (CASs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers disasters and reduce their future vulnerability to (PRSPs). natural hazards. Since 1984, most of the Bank's The Bank is one of a large number of institu- borrowers--110 countries in all--have sought tions that countries can call on and coordinate emergency financial assistance related to after a disaster. Indeed, the number of institutions disaster. that respond to disaster has been growing, making Since the 1970s, requests for Bank financing of donor coordination an increasing challenge. post-disaster reconstruction projects, humanitar- The roles of the various institutions are not ian crises, and post-conflict recovery have grown fixed and have blurred over time, though they steadily. A succession of Bank policy statements tend to follow traditional strengths. For has been developed to guide this work: instance, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society Operational Policy Note (OPN) 10.07, Guidelines and other international and national nongovern- for Bank Participation in Reconstruction mental organizations, along with the military, Projects after Disaster (1984); Operational typically participate in the immediate response. Directive (OD) 8.50, Emergency Recovery The United Nations Development Program Assistance (1989); and Operational Policy (OP) (UNDP) focuses more The number of 8.50, Emergency Recovery Assistance (1995). on the social aspects of Table 1.1 outlines the key provisions of the current recovery. The World institutions responding to policy (Annex A analyzes the evolution of policy Bank typically concen- disaster is growing and over its 20-year existence). The changes in policy trates on infrastructure coordination is becoming over time were made primarily for institutional and housing during the reasons (because all Bank policies were changed reconstruction, given its more complex. 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table 1.1: Key Provisions of Current Bank Policy Statement Relief and consumption The Bank does not finance relief and consumption (par. 2 and 4). Support for damage and The Bank provides immediate support in assessing the emergency's impact and develops a recovery strategy needs assessment (par. 3). Implementation time ERLs are fully implemented in two to three years (par. 6). Procurement rules Standard Bank Operational Policies, including those on procurement, consultants, and disbursement, apply to ERLs (par. 8). Suitability for Regular investment projects (not ERLs) may be preferable for recurrent disasters (floods) and slow-onset recurrent disasters disasters (droughts) (par. 5). Design standards, ERLs use disaster-resilient construction standards, emergency preparedness studies, and technical assistance prevention, and for prevention and mitigation. Prevention and mitigation projects carry out studies of vulnerability and risk mitigation assessment, reinforce vulnerable structures, adjust building and zoning codes, and acquire hazard-reduction technology (par. 6). Institutional and The Bank helps countries to establish an adequate institutional and regulatory framework for prevention and regulatory framework mitigation (par. 10). Donor coordination Collaboration with the UNDP and other international agencies, local nongovernmental organizations, and donors is helpful in designing the recovery assistance strategy under an ERL and in designing specific prevention and mitigation programs (par. 9). Source: Operational Policy 8.50 ­ Emergency Recovery Assistance, August 1995. Note: ERL = Emergency Recovery Loan. comparative advantage in that area. However, The Evaluation the Bank also has considerable experience with Heightened global awareness, increased public disaster recovery, as well as an important role in and private generosity, growing Bank investment assisting with coordination that ensures that in disaster recovery as well as disaster prevention country needs are met with as few overlaps and and risk management, and greater ability to conflicts of priorities as possible. anticipate some natural events make this an A key partnership of the Bank in natural appropriate time for the World Bank to review disasters is the ProVention Consortium, and update its policy and upgrade practices with launched in February 2000 to reduce disaster respect to natural disasters. This evaluation has risk in developing countries and to make been undertaken to inform that process. disaster prevention and mitigation an integral No assessment has previously been done of part of development efforts. The Consortium is the Bank's disaster-related assistance. The an international network focused on sharing evaluation assesses the relevance and effective- knowledge and leveraging resources to reduce ness of Bank activities related only to emergen- disaster risk. Though launched by and originally cies caused by natural events. Emergencies housed in the Bank, it is currently under the caused by armed conflict have been the subject management of the International Federation of of an earlier evaluation (IEG 1998), and thus are Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in not covered by this report. Geneva. This report does not evaluate the The study was conceived as a review of the partnership, but the Independent Evaluation implementation of Bank policy and examined the Group (IEG) will be evaluating it in 2006, and relevance and effectiveness of Bank operations, as therefore offers no judgments on its perform- well as their institutional development impact, to ance in this report. The current evaluation does develop lessons from experience. The evaluative draw on ProVention analyses. questions addressed are detailed in Appendix B. 8 N AT U R E , D I S A S T E R , A N D R E C O V E R Y Evaluative Instruments and Methods · Expert knowledge ­ No previous assessment The study examined the Bank's experience from through an extensive has been done of Bank several angles. The basic approach was to avoid review of the literature sampling, and instead identify all Bank-financed and the use of an Ad- assistance for natural projects with natural disaster activities. For visory Panel disasters. example, in the staff survey, all task managers that · Bank-financed proj- worked on at least one project with disaster activi- ects and activities ­ through a review of the ties were invited to respond. When the evaluation portfolio of projects and analysis of a textbase looked at an activity (such as housing) or a disaster of project information type (such as tropical storms), all the relevant · Staff knowledge ­ through surveys and in- projects were reviewed. Hence, different analyses terviews use different numbers of projects, but all use the · Detailed examination of critical issues full universe of projects relevant to that issue. The and countries ­ through issues papers and key study instruments were as follows (see case studies (field-based and desk studies). Appendix B for details and the methods used): 9 Chapter 2: Evaluation Highlights · Since 1984 the Bank has financed natural disaster activities in 528 projects for $26,281 million. · The Bank has approved 89 ERLs over the period and the in- strument is increasingly used in disaster responses. · The largest number of disaster projects were implemented in the rural sector. · Lending is highly concentrated--10 countries accounted for 208 projects. · Reallocations have been a large part of the Bank's response-- $3,047 million from 217 projects has been reallocated over 20 years. · Projects have been best at restoring physical assets: 115 completed projects successfully restored damaged infrastructure. 2 The World Bank Responds N atural disasters directly affect the traditional beneficiaries of World Bank­ financed development assistance--98 percent of the 211 million peo- ple affected by natural disasters each year from 1991 to 2000 were from developing nations (IFRC 2001). And although a few disasters have been devastat- involving natural disasters Natural disaster ing to the better-off (such as when cities with a contains projects entirely assistance accounts for large number of poorly built and badly designed devoted to disasters, high-rise apartments are hit by earthquakes), projects with formal 9.4 percent of unquestionably the most vulnerable to disaster disaster components as commitments since 1984. are the poor, who live in dangerous zones, on part of a larger project, marginal lands, and have precarious livelihoods. and projects with smaller disaster activities.1 It The Bank has a major stake in ensuring that consists of 528 projects hereafter referred to as country assistance following a disaster "disaster projects" when discussing the full contributes to long-term development, and that universe of activities (see Appendix B for more on the potential future impacts of disasters are how these projects and the amounts of lending reduced or prevented. As the human and were identified). A total of $26,281 million in economic losses from natural disasters continue activities have focused on natural disasters.2These to rise, they represent a large and growing 528 projects represent 9.4 percent of all Bank loan obstacle to sustainable development. Hence, commitments since 1984. the portfolio of projects supported by the Bank Some projects are entirely devoted to natural includes activities related to their immediate disasters. These include Emergency Recovery response, recovery, reconstruction (with mitiga- Loans (ERLs; including IDA credits and grants), tion), and prevention. as well as projects using other instruments. Such projects represent less than a third of the 528 The Bank's Natural Disaster "Portfolio" identified projects (table 2.1). The value of these The portfolio of projects approved by the loans and credits is $12,200 million. Executive Board of the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development The Growth of Bank Lending for Disaster [IBRD] and International Development Associa- Looking at the full portfolio (all 528 projects), tion [IDA]) since 1984 that have had some activity increasing Bank involvement over time is 1 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table 2.1: Natural Disaster Portfolio Composition, 1984 to 2005 Total Completed Ongoing All projects with some disaster activity 528 303 225 Emergency Reconstruction Loans 89 59 30 Disaster projects using other instruments 51 28 23 Projects with at least one full disaster component 130 85 45 Projects with an identified disaster activity below component level 258 131 127 Source: World Bank data. Note: Data based on project approval year. Lending for disasters has evident (figure 2.1). In lending for disaster has risen gradually over the been gradually addition, as a share of past 20 years. If projects that are still open (those overall Bank lending, approved since fiscal 1999) reallocate according increasing. assistance related to to the historical trend, the numbers in the most natural disasters has recent years will rise. Project reallocations are been growing (see Appendix C, figure C.1). discussed later in this chapter. Much of this assistance is quite recent: about 43 Among the 528 projects, the amount of percent of all disaster-related loans have yet to disaster-related support ranges from a few close. Lending for disasters is noticeably cyclical, thousand dollars for fire detection towers in a with peaks about every five years. Even so, Bank forestry project to a $500 million loan for post- Figure 2.1: The Number of Projects Related to Natural Disasters Has Been Rising, with Sharp Peaks in Lending about Every Five Years 50 3,500 45 3,000 40 35 2,500 30 US$ projects 2,000 of of 25 1,500 20 Millions Number 15 1,000 10 500 5 0 0 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Approval fiscal year Number of projects Loan commitments Source: World Bank data. Reallocations are recorded by approval fiscal year as well. 1 2 T H E W O R L D B A N K R E S P O N D S earthquake reconstruction. In recent years the and tropical storms, for Flooding most frequently scale of individual operations financed by the instance), either because gets a Bank response, but Bank has grown. The 1999 Turkey earthquake they struck together or alone led to Bank commitments of over $1.1 because another disaster many projects respond to billion and a Bank-coordinated reconstruction occurred during imple- multiple disasters. program of $1.7 billion. Other relatively recent mentation and the proj- events have unleashed large responses because ect had to be modified to take the later event(s) they have affected multiple countries (such as into account.4 Of the 140 completed and the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Mitch, and ongoing projects that were completely devoted the El Niño phenomenon). to disaster, 21 (in 17 countries) have focused wholly on prevention activities. Lending by Disaster Type The Bank has approved 89 ERLs for natural The kind of disaster for which countries most disasters since 1984.5 Reflecting the general frequently requested Bank financing was trend for the whole portfolio, floods dominated flooding. Of the 528 projects in the portfolio, this group of projects, earthquakes were the 243 had a flood-related activity. Drought was the second most common, and tropical storms were second most common disaster type, with 107, the third. and fire was third, with 95 projects. Since drought is the only type of disaster that is Lending by Region entirely slow onset, about 80 percent of the The Sub-Saharan Africa Region had the largest portfolio is primarily focused on rapid-onset number of disaster projects, 134 (figure 2.2). events.3 Notably, 127 of the 528 projects The Latin America and Caribbean Region was a responded to more than one disaster (floods close second with 128. The Middle East and Figure 2.2: The Bank Has Most Often Provided Lending for Disasters in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean 160 140 120 100 projects of 80 Number 60 40 20 0 Africa Latin America South Asia East Asia Europe and Middle East and the and the Central Asia and Caribbean Pacific North Africa Ongoing Completed Source: World Bank data. 1 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T North Africa Region had the smallest portion of East Asia Region has produced five reports on projects. This distribution generally follows the topics such as risk management in the Pacific broader trend in Bank lending. The Bank has region, with a pilot study of Vanuatu and a report helped the Africa Region to confront natural on the Philippines focusing on enhancing disasters for many years. It is the only Region poverty alleviation through disaster reduction. where drought is the most common hazard, and Among the Latin America and the Caribbean it also had the largest proportion of completed Region's four reports is one on the catastrophe projects. Recent attention has gone to the East insurance market in the Caribbean and another Asia and Europe and Central Asia Regions, which on "Risk and Vulnerability in Guatemala." This have a majority share of their portfolios in seems a particularly relevant report, as ongoing projects. The evaluation also compared Guatemala is in the "top ten" list of borrower Regional disaster lending with overall Regional countries that are at greatest economic risk for lending to identify Regions where disaster natural disasters, and it has not borrowed from impacts were disproportionate (see Appendix the Bank for natural disasters in 20 years. South C, figure C.2). Asia's four studies have included "Financing Rapid Onset Natural Disaster Losses in India" Lending by Sector and "Bangladesh: Climate Change and Sustain- The rural sector implemented 40 percent of the able Development." Europe and Central Asia natural disaster portfolio. This is not surprising, have done two research reports on the topic, since many disasters, such as floods, droughts, most notably one in Turkey entitled "Poverty and The rural sector and fire, and especially Coping with Crises." One of the two done in their mitigation and Africa was on "Systemic Shocks and Social implements the largest prevention activities, Protection." share of natural disaster take place in projects In total, notwithstanding authorship, 15 projects. involving forest manage- countries were the subject of specific analytical ment, irrigation, and work on natural disasters. All but one of the disaster-resistant crops. Other sectors that have countries are considered to be of elevated been highly involved are transport (13 percent), economic vulnerability and/or mortality risk. environment (10 percent), and urban (9 The Environment Department of the Bank percent). Among the 528 projects were 12 has devoted resources to at least six reports on multisectoral projects, accounting for 2 percent natural disasters--most on climate change. The of the total. Development Research Group (DEC) has produced five reports in the area in the past six Analytic Work years, including "Natural Disasters and Develop- The Bank has prepared 65 publications, working ment" and "Can Financial Markets be Tapped to papers, articles, and reports on natural disaster Help Poor People Cope with Weather Risks?" topics since 1999.6 The most frequently The Social Protection Department has done two researched topics have been risk management studies that have included major sections on and financing mechanisms. Although much natural disaster risk. The Consultative Group on research work on these topics is done collabora- International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has tively with country staff or staff in other depart- produced a study with the Bank on rebuilding ments with various expertise, 31 were done agriculture in countries affected by natural under the auspices of the Hazard Management disaster. Unit. As might be expected, most of these are global in scope or topically oriented. However, Concentrations in Lending Patterns about a third of them (10) focused on a particu- A majority of Bank member countries have lar country or Region. turned to the Bank for emergency financial Regional or country offices are responsible assistance (110 countries) following a natural for an additional 17 reports or publications. The disaster. However, lending has been highly 1 4 T H E W O R L D B A N K R E S P O N D S concentrated: 53 countries had only one or two tured, providing a total Ten countries account for loans with disaster activities, while the top 10 of $416 million for 39 percent of the lending countries had 208 projects (39 percent) among immediate reconstruc- them (table 2.2). tion. Funding of $10 to and 41 projects account In terms of commitments as well, Bank $130 million per project for about a third of the lending has been quite concentrated: 32 percent was taken from the lending. of the $42,552 million in commitments over the original implementing 20-year period from fiscal 1985 through fiscal agencies and given to another implementing 2005 went to 7.5 percent of the projects. The 10 agency handling reconstruction. Projects largest loans for reconstruction and/or preven- changed not only their scope, but also their tion totaled $3,882 million (table 2.3). components and the sectors they targeted. In part, reallocations appear to have been Reallocations sensitive to periodic increased awareness of After a natural disaster, when a country requests disaster in the Bank related to policy develop- assistance, Bank country staff first examine the ment. The number of reallocations each year existing country portfolio and identify loans varied from fewer than 10 in the 1980s to 17 in from which funds can be reallocated for the 1990s (figure 2.3). reconstruction. Over the past 20 years, funds The first jump in 1984 coincided with the from 217 projects have been reallocated (see introduction of OPN 10.07, which encouraged Appendix C, table C.1). reallocations, and a second jump appeared in The importance of reallocation as an 1990, perhaps in part because of the renewed emergency response is highlighted by compar- visibility of emergencies with the introduction of ing it with emergency recovery lending: since OD 8.50. While in the pre-policy period (1976­83) 1984, the Bank has made more than $3,047 reallocations averaged 2 each year, they averaged million available for natural disaster response 11 each year from 1984 through loan reallocations7 and has dedicated through 1999. A total of $3,047 million $9,021 million toward disasters through ERLs. After 1999 disaster- In a typical example, following the 2001 related reallocations has been reallocated from earthquake in Gujarat, 12 projects were restruc- decreased, presumably 217 projects since 1984. Table 2.2: Concentration of Lending in the Disaster Portfolio Compared with Overall Bank Lending Number of Lending to projects Rank: Rank: disaster with disaster activities all Bank projects, all Bank commitments, Rank Country projects (US$ millions) 1984­2005 1984­2005 1 India 43 8,257 2 1 2 China 32 4,902 1 2 3 Bangladesh 28 2,880 8 12 4 Brazil 27 2,349 4 4 5 Honduras 15 712 45 53 6 Turkey 13 3,390 11 7 7 Yemen 13 306 14 49 8 Madagascar 13 327 17 39 9 Mexico 12 2,145 5 3 10 Vietnam 12 1,232 29 17 TOTAL 208 Source: World Bank data. Each reallocation counted as a separate project. 1 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table 2.3: Ten Largest Loans for Disasters Approval Original loan amount Country Project name fiscal year (US$ millions) Turkey Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction 2000 505 India Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction 2005 465 India Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction 2002 443 Mexico Mexico Natural Disaster Management Project 2001 404 Turkey Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation 2005 400 Mexico Earthquake Rehabilitation & Reconstruction 1986 400 Turkey Emergency Flood Recovery 1999 369 India Drought Assistance 1988 350 Turkey Earthquake Rehabilitation & Reconstruction 1993 285 India Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehab. Project 1994 261 TOTAL 3,882 Source: World Bank data. The level of reallocations because, for the most the ERLs in the portfolio are ongoing; see recent years, the table 2.1). has responded to policy ongoing projects are While reallocations can give borrowers changes. still new and realloca- flexibility to react to unforeseen needs, the Bank tions tend to occur has been developing promising alternatives. toward the end of the project life, though it Additional lending to existing projects is already may also be because ERLs have been used in use, though it has not yet been applied in a instead of reallocations (more than a third of disaster response. In addition, a specialized Figure 2.3: Reallocations Peaked Following Each Policy Revision 18 16 OP 10.07 OD 8.50 OP 8.50 14 12 10 reallocations of 8 6 Number 4 2 0 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Source: World Bank data. Note: Based on project approval years. 1 6 T H E W O R L D B A N K R E S P O N D S form of development policy lending (the portfolio (figure 2.4). Reallocations give Contingent Hazard Recovery and Management Almost 80 percent of the borrowers flexibility but Loan) is in development. projects were rated These new alternatives may further help to satisfactory for outcome can prevent achievement avoid the diversion of funds from their original compared with the Bank of planned development purposes, as in reallocations. In 18 cases reallo- average of 72 percent for goals. cations have undermined achievement of the the 1984­2004 period. A original objectives of the project. For example, in sustainability rating of likely was attained by 63 January 1999, as a result of the earthquake in the percent of the disaster portfolio, seven points coffee growing region, the Government of better than the Bankwide average for the Colombia decided to use 55 percent of the 1984­2004 period. Secondary Education Project (a $90 million loan) together with funds from three other projects to Where Bank-Financed Projects Perform Best support reconstruction. Instead of supporting improvements in education, the proceeds went Disaster Type into the Reconstruction Fund for the coffee Project outcome ratings Disaster projects perform production zone. This decision was made for most disaster types better than average on despite the concern of the Ministry of National were well above the Bank Education that the municipalities left out had no average, with landslide outcome and other possibility of accessing supplementary and earthquake projects sustainability, and about resources for educational improvement. rated satisfactory on average on institutional outcome more frequently Project Performance than other disaster types. development. Bank-financed projects with at least one natural The story is similar for disaster reconstruction and mitigation com- sustainability. Earthquake projects were most ponent have had outcome and sustainability frequently rated likely for sustainability, at a rate 21 ratings that are higher than the Bankwide points above the Bank average of 56 percent. Figure 2.4: Natural Disaster Portfolio Ratings: Projects Approved and Completed, 1984­2005 100 93 90 80 82 78 80 70 72 70 63 64 60 56 53 50 45 satisfactory 38 37 39 40 31 30 Percent 20 10 0 Outcome satisfactory Sustainability likely Institutional development impact substantial Natural disaster portfolio ERLs Disaster only non-ERLs One disaster component Bankwide Source: IEG data. 1 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Institutional development impact performance smallest portfolio, and the worst (Africa), which was closer to the Bank average. Only drought and was the largest. Out of 13 completed projects in tsunami projects were rated above the average. the Middle East and North Africa Region, only One reason why drought projects received higher one was rated unsatisfactory on outcome. All but ratings than other disaster types was that such the Africa Region performed above the Bank slow-onset disasters provided a bit more time to average (see Appendix C, figure C.10). get the institutional framework right. These projects tended to take longer to implement as Outputs and Outcomes of Projects well, averaging almost seven years from approval The Bank's capabilities in assisting countries to completion (see also Chapter 4), so there was with their response to natural disasters are more time for institutional capacity development apparent in the results of its projects. Not (see Appendix C, figures C.6­C.8). surprisingly, Bank-financed projects were best at restoring physical assets. In 115 completed Emergency Recovery Loans projects, damaged infrastructure was success- ERLs (described in box 2.1) were rated substan- fully restored; in 28 projects, infrastructure tially higher than either the disaster portfolio or reconstruction was not fully completed or not the overall Bank portfolio (figure 2.4). Only 4 of entirely successful (Appendix C, table C.2). 59 completed ERLs were rated unsatisfactory on In addition, 86 projects had successful mitiga- outcome, accounting for a 93 percent satisfac- tion activities, while such activities were tory outcome rate. unsuccessful in 32 projects. Despite this ability to reconstruct infrastructure and provide some Comprehensive Multisector Projects additional security to the population, 73 projects and Other Subsets still recorded that a subsequent disaster lessened Although only 12 in number, multisector the project's impact (an additional 55 projects projects were the best performers, followed by were not disaster responses but were also another subset of 9 social sector projects affected by disaster during implementation). (including health projects). Of the larger Based on limited experience with prevention subsets, the urban sector performed best, activities, the Bank may not yet have learned although the rural and transportation sectors, enough about what activities are effective. Of which contain the bulk of the portfolio, still the 21 projects wholly devoted to prevention, 8 performed well above the Bank average (see have been completed and evaluated, with about Appendix C, figure C.9). 63 percent rated satisfactory. Of the eight, three were rated unsatisfactory on outcome and one Regions was rated highly unsatisfactory. This is a very There was a 22 percentage point difference small sample from which to make judgments, between the best-performing Region (Middle but it seems to indicate an area that may require East and North Africa), which was also the more Bank research. Some of the negative results indicate the difficulty of addressing social issues in disaster Box 2.1: What Are Emergency Recovery Loans? projects (discussed in Chapter 5). Thirty-five projects successfully restored economic assets, An Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) is a three-year lending instru- and nine successfully restored social assets. ment. It has several advantages over other Bank lending instruments: However, in six projects, stakeholders and it allows for expedited processing from project initiation through Board vulnerable groups were neglected, and target approval, quick disbursement through a positive list of imports, and delay groups were missed in two projects. in meeting some safeguard and fiduciary requirements. It requires an ad-hoc advisory committee headed by the country director. The ERL also Lessons Learned limits the use of conditionality. The lessons from project-level evaluations of 303 completed disaster projects exhibit some 1 8 T H E W O R L D B A N K R E S P O N D S persistent themes--the top 12 are listed in table useful to centralize the Projects performed best 2.4. Because certain lessons keep coming up, it hazard risk manage- when they restored suggests that they are not being learned (IEG ment function (see box physical assets. 2005c). 2.2 and Appendix C, table C.3). Hazard Management in the Bank This arrangement handles emergencies un- The growth in disaster-related lending in the late evenly, however. When a disaster strikes, the 1990s prompted the creation of a separate Bank country teams that are the Bank's interface with unit to guide staff. Between fiscal years 1999 and the borrowers are unlikely to have the expertise 2005 the Disaster Management Facility, later the needed and must call on others, either in the Hazard Management Unit (HMU), assisted Bank Hazard Risk Management Team or the Hazard task managers with natural and technological Management Thematic Group, for technical disasters and helped provide a more strategic assistance. The quality of the result is partly a and rapid response. The status of this unit function of who is around to answer the calls. changed in 2005, as detailed below. With the recent change, an important reserve Bank management has recently adopted a capacity has been lost. Soon after it was founded, distributed, decentralized approach to hazard what was then the Disaster Management Facility risk management in the institution rather than became the secretariat for The lessons from disaster retaining a specialized central unit. The theProVentionprogram-- current Hazard Risk Management Team of the making the team far more projects do not seem to Urban Unit serves as the anchor for the Hazard visible internationally. Buthave been learned--the Risk Management Thematic Group, which when that program left same ones are recorded consists of more than 100 Bank staff in the the Bank, the team lost various organizational units with a particular staff that could help in repeatedly. interest in hazard risk management.8 Other emergencies. Three people are too few to spread international organizations have found it across the natural disasters that occur every year, Table 2.4: A Dozen Lessons Learned from Natural Disaster Projects Category Times in database Disaster management, preparedness, and mitigation need to be addressed 49 Simple and flexible procurement is fundamental to expeditious implementation 40 Lessons regarding Project Coordination Units (PCU) and/or working with existing agencies (pros and cons) 31 Maintenance is critical for sustainability 25 Simple project design is more important when activities to be implemented are urgent 25 Community participation produces several identifiable benefits 25 Trade-off between careful project preparation and quick action 21 Emergency projects need experienced staff during project preparation 19 Assure borrower ownership by involving the highest levels of government 17 Donor coordination: cofinancing is preferable to parallel financing 16 Reconstruction often requires careful assessments and long-term efforts that extend beyond the three-year implementation period for emergency operations 12 Studies need to be prepared before project approval 12 Source: IEG project database. 1 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 2.2: Other Organizations Have Institutional Structures for Disaster Risk Management The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the U.K. Department for In- cated in Bangkok, Nairobi, New Delhi, and Panama), and 20­24 ternational Development (DFID), Inter-American Development National Disaster Reduction Advisors in highly disaster-prone Bank (IDB), and UNDP have specialized units and/or decen- countries. These senior officials act as permanent government tralized disaster specialists that deal with disaster prevention, counterparts, identify disaster risk management opportunities, mitigation, and management. and assist with relevant initiatives and oversee linkages with For instance, UNDP's Disaster Reduction Unit (DRU) helps UNDP programs. country offices set up and provide more effective responses for Similarly, the IDB has 36 disaster risk management focal natural disaster reduction. The DRU is made up of 8 Geneva- points--26 individuals in the country offices, and 10 in key de- based professionals, 4 Regional Disaster Reduction Advisors (lo- partments in headquarters. The Bank has adopted a andtheyaretoofewtobe seen as providing advice (7 respondents), provid- less-centralized approach both the face of the Bank ing project documentation or institutional to the donor community memory (4 respondents), and maintaining a to hazard risk and to serve the needs consultant database (2 respondents). management than other of countries affected The task managers that used the HMU cited international by disaster, while also additional services the HMU could provide, ensuring attention to including seed funds for supervision and organizations. long-term reduction of increased staff availability for missions. Task hazard risks in client countries and lending managers were also asked to provide sugges- programs. tions of how the services provided by the unit Overall, the perceptions of the HMU were could be improved. Their requests were for positive among staff surveyed about the unit's more assistance in designing prevention relevance and effectiveness. 9 Eight respondents policies, more training, the organization of a (22 percent) stated that they had used the HMU in more active thematic group, the promotion of their projects (see Appendix D for details of the adjustments to the Bank's ERL guidelines, the survey results). This number reflects the period inclusion of mitigation as a safeguard and the under study: only 6 of the 20 years reviewed mainstreaming of mitigation in regular lending overlapped with the period in which the unit was activities, and the promotion of the Bank's in existence. Among the respondents who had operational experience in conferences around used the HMU, the most helpful assistance was the world. 2 0 Chapter 3: Evaluation Highlights · Natural disasters are more predictable than commonly believed. · Reallocations are concentrated in highly vulnerable countries. · Disasters are rarely considered in PRSPs and CASs, even for highly vulnerable countries. · Categorizing borrowing countries according to their vulnera- bility would help in formulating country lending programs, especially in highly vulnerable countries. 3 Disasters and Bank Strategy Vulnerability to disasters is "largely dependent on development practices that do not take into account susceptibility to natural hazards."1 D ata available to the Bank on natural disasters have historically been vague and fragmented, constrained by a shortage of reliable sources in some countries, a relatively short history of data collection, and in- consistent methodologies. Reports typically presented a static view of In February 2004, the The exposure, risk, and disasters, focusing on the number of people United Nations Develop- killed and affected and on estimated disaster ment Program (UNDP) vulnerability of countries damage. Disaster was rarely considered an report Reducing Disaster to natural disasters are ongoing development challenge. The lack of Risk: A Challenge for known. information, together with the perception that Development described disasters are random and unpredictable, limited the global trends in exposure, risk, and vulnera- the Bank's strategic planning for them. Hence, bility to natural disasters. From an international the Bank had no overall strategy for disasters. development perspective, the report was signifi- But if disasters are predictable, then planning cant for two reasons. First, it featured a disaster for them should be a normal part of develop- risk index (DRI), which measured and compared ment work. physical exposure levels to four natural hazard types,2 vulnerability, and risk among some 200 Predictability of Disasters countries. Second, the report identified signs of The preceding chapter showed that some Bank vulnerability associated with development activi- borrowers frequently confront disasters brought ties under way that could lead to higher disaster on by natural events. Two recently completed risk.3 The statistical approach of the report studies on natural disaster risks confirm this allowed the UNDP to draw comparisons between pattern and dispel much of the uncertainty and a particular country's vulnerabilities and the unpredictability surrounding such events. An different natural hazards. understanding of the main messages of these Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk reports can broaden and deepen the Analysis (World Bank 2005) identified countries understanding of the Bank and borrowers, and prone to experiencing a high frequency of together with the results of this review, natural disasters accord- Disasters frequently recur culminate in a significant shift in strategic ing to single or multiple thinking regarding recurrent natural disasters. disaster variables. The in the same countries. 2 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T ProVention study on which it was based In terms of strategic thinking and policy presented a set of data on the risks of mortality formulation, the Bank can go beyond acknowl- and economic losses associated with six major edging the general existence of natural disasters natural disaster types4 and determined the and identify with relative precision the prevalence of natural disasters using a common geographic "hotspots"--the countries most geospatial unit of reference in all countries. In vulnerable to natural disasters--anticipate the addition, the report ranked countries in terms foreseeable human and economic risks, and of highest risk potential in order to influence then encourage borrowing targeted at reducing risk mitigation investments and to better inform risks, in line with these calculations, ahead of the Bank on how to manage its future the disaster event. emergency lending. The remainder of this Based on the list of hotspot countries in chapter incorporates the analysis detailed in the Natural Disaster Hotspots, 50 of the Bank's Natural Disaster Hotspots report. borrowers are at relatively high risk from two or Both studies identify areas likely to be more hazards; 47 of these actually borrowed affected by severe events and then determine during the period analyzed. Though these where disastrous impacts are likely to occur countries received 46 percent of all Bank because of the risks attached to the density of lending projects, they accounted for 56 percent human occupation. At some point in any analysis of the natural disaster projects and 62 percent of of vulnerability, the event needs to be the reallocated project loans. uncoupled from human actions, at least until The countries that experience extreme risks are understood as distinct from being events with the greatest frequency, therefore, inherent in the event itself. Such thinking should also experience the most interruptions to non- be the foundation for any strategic approach to disaster lending, which can increase the impact disaster assistance. of disaster and impede their overall develop- ment (box 3.1). Because many reallocations Planning Implications for the World Bank occur in these countries, it also suggests that A significant number of the Bank's disaster loans neither the Bank nor its borrowers are planning and credits can be characterized as ad hoc sufficiently for potential disasters in the places responses to what all involved parties consid- they are most likely to occur. This is borne out ered unforeseeable acts of nature. Yet it is only by analysis of disaster planning in the two main necessary to look at which countries have strategy documents used by the Bank and its borrowed the most for disasters in the past borrowers: Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) (table 2.2) to know with considerable certainty and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). which ones will borrow the most in the future. Most natural disasters are foreseeable to the Disaster Planning in Poverty Reduction extent that it is possible to predict generally Strategies where an event is likely to occur at some time in The PRSP is a product of borrowing country the near future (but not precisely when or its governments that is intended to improve the magnitude). It is also possible to know the poverty impact of external partner lending and fragility of the built environment and the likeli- the effectiveness of technical advice. Given the hood that the siting of a given human settlement effect major and recurrent disasters can have on will expose it to potentially destructive natural the life of the poor, disaster mitigation and events. Therefore, disasters should be anticipated prevention might be expected to be featured in as more predicable events, with human and these documents, especially in highly vulnerable financial risks calculated in advance, and Bank countries. Reallocations are highly policy and practices need Instead, of the 59 PRSPs6 prepared to date, to provide a supportive only 9 have incorporated aspects of hazard risk concentrated in the most framework for such an management.7 Of those 9, only 3--Honduras, vulnerable countries. approach.5 Nicaragua, and Vietnam--are highly vulnerable 2 4 D I S A S T E R S A N D B A N K S T R AT E G Y Box 3.1: Disaster Damage Undermines Development Progress Two examples illustrate the enormous brake that disasters place were approximately 10,000 kilometers of roads in the country. The on economic development and how easily hard-won gains can hurricane destroyed 6,000 kilometers of the better roads--almost be lost. five times what the Bank had helped to build. In addition, more than The World Bank has been helping Honduras to build its high- 163 bridges were damaged or destroyed. Estimates of the damage way system since 1955, when it was estimated that it had 2,500 kilo- to roads from the hurricane were on the order of $454 million. meters of roads. In the course of seven transportation projects Disasters have also taken a development toll in Mozambique. (totaling $120 million in commitments) between 1958 and the mid- Bank lending financed the construction of 487 schools. Just the 1990s, the Bank financed construction of 1,270 kilometers of high- most recent disaster, the floods of 2000, damaged or destroyed waysandfeederroads.BythetimeHurricaneMitchhitin1998,there about 500 primary schools as well as 7 secondary schools. countries (see Appendix E, table E.2a). This had an extensive history Few countries anticipate suggests that not only is hazard risk manage- with disasters (more disasters in their PRSPs. ment rarely addressed in PRSPs, but that the than 8), about a third did PRSPs that do address it tend not to be in not mention disasters at all. Moreover, CASs for countries with a relatively high economic risk countries that are prone to repeated disasters of from multiple hazards. the same type do not include those disasters in their planning (box 3.2) (IEG 2005d). Disaster Planning in Country Assistance All CAS documents contain a one-page matrix Strategies titled "CAS Summary of Development Priorities" Since the CAS is a planning document, evidence that lists country and Bank priorities. Priorities are that the country and Bank have given some rated as high, moderate, or low, and the main issues thought to disaster prevention might also be are identified. The CASs for three countries-- expected in that strategy. Often, however, Bangladesh, India, and Mozambique--flag natural natural disasters get no attention in the CASs. Of disasters in the Development Priorities Matrix. For current CASs for countries that have already these three countries, both the Bank and the received Bank support for work related to country rated it as a high priority. In addition, natural disasters, 44 percent did not mention the Turkey CAS includes natural disasters (table 3.1). Even in the 40 natural disasters among its Few CASs consider the countries that have had 4 or more disaster major issues, though it possibility of disruptions projects, one-third of the CASs did not mention does not flag it separately disaster. And, for the subset of countries that in the priorities matrix. from natural disasters. Table 3.1: Many CASs That Should Discuss Natural Disasters Do Not Number of their Number of disaster Number of countries CASs with no discussion projects in a country with this count of disasters Percent More than 8 disaster projects 16 5 31 4 to 7 disaster projects 24 8 33 2 to 3 disaster projects 33 15 45 1 disaster project 24 15 62 Total 97 43 44 Source: IEG data. 2 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T CASs is only 2.4. Not taking disaster into account Box 3.2: To What Extent Do CASs Develop in the CAS has an opportunity cost in that it may Disaster-Specific Strategies Appropriate to lead to significant under-investment in risk Prevailing Hazards? management and prevention. Of the 43 countries that have received Bank financing for flooding, only Categorizing Borrowers According to Disaster 4 CASs mentioned either the development of an early warning system Risk--An Illustrative Approach or land use planning. Only three mentioned development of a disaster- When formulating country lending programs, appropriate legal framework. the Bank needs to elevate the importance of Of the 13 countries with earthquake projects, only 3 CASs men- disasters, especially for highly vulnerable coun- tioned seismic strengthening of critical facilities such as hospitals, tries. To do this efficiently, borrowing countries schools, and the like. In El Salvador, for example, seismic-resistant de- would have to be divided into categories accord- sign and the reconstruction of 594 destroyed or severely damaged ing to their disaster risk levels.8 schools was envisaged in the CAS. Using the list of hotspot countries in the Of the 27 countries affected by drought, 8 of the CASs mentioned Natural Disaster Hotspots study as a starting food security or removing drought-related impediments to growth in agri- point, 35 countries have a high vulnerability, culture. Strengthening the safety net was discussed in seven. Targeting because 50 percent or more of their GDP is of interventions for orphans and vulnerable persons was addressed in four classed as being at risk from natural disasters in CASs, and one CAS mentioned creation of off-farm income opportunities. the report. Fifteen countries have a medium vulnerability to natural disasters because natural Source: IEG data. disasters could place between 30 and 50 percent of their GDP at risk. The remaining borrowing Borrowers can and Bank support for countries have been classed as having a low disaster work clearly vulnerability level, because natural disasters are should be classified by reflects the importance a relatively small risk. their disaster of including this topic in Based on a working hypothesis of a country's vulnerability. strategy documents. IEG level of vulnerability--and subsequent events can research also found that and will change understanding and improve the including disaster in the CAS affected its inclusion accuracy of any categorization scheme--the Bank in projects prepared under the CAS. The average needs to develop and adopt specific plans of number of Bank-supported projects for highly action. For example, countries of all vulnerability vulnerable countries that levels would consider disaster risks systematically Specific, differentiated mention disaster in their along with their consideration of macroeconomic plans of action can be CAS is 7.9. In contrast, and other threats in the risks identification developed within projects the average number for section of relevant Bank documents. for the more vulnerable the highly vulnerable For countries with medium and high vulnera- countries that do not bility levels, both disaster-related and regular groups and regions. mention disasters in their lending for infrastructure, technical assistance, Table 3.2: Natural Disaster Risk Can Be Mainstreamed in the Bank's Lending Disaster-contingent line Bank loans to incorporate Bank documents of credit in CAS disaster-resilient designs to consider Vulnerability level lending program and/or environmental restoration disaster risks High (>50% of GDP) X X X Medium (30­50% of GDP) X X Low (<30% of GDP) X 2 6 D I S A S T E R S A N D B A N K S T R AT E G Y and institutional development would include would emphasize disaster preparedness and disaster preparedness and mitigation. Projects mitigation in each country's CAS and set aside a financed by the Bank would incorporate certain portion of the CAS lending program for a disaster-resilient design considerations into disaster contingency. If the designated amount infrastructure and housing activities, in the was not used for emergency-related activities regions of each country most at risk, and nation- during a particular CAS period, it would be wide when appropriate. rolled over into the new CAS lending program, For highly vulnerable countries, the Bank rather than disappearing. 2 7 Chapter 4: Evaluation Highlights · The Bank has responded flexibly with a wide variety of activ- ities. · Without advance preparation, doing things in order of prior- ity can be difficult. · When activities are done and how long they take to complete are at least as important as what activities are done. · A quick reaction may not lead to the most relevant response. · Many important activities require long implementation times. · Most activities financed by the Bank take more than three years to complete. · Of 59 completed ERLs, only 10 have had follow-on projects. · Existing lending mechanisms do not significantly accelerate project processing and usually do not expedite the disburse- ment of funds. · More recent projects are, on average, slower than those of a few years ago. · Three-quarters of disaster assessments have led to an ERL. 4 Relevance of Bank Assistance W here does the World Bank fit in the scheme of things as borrowers respond to natural disasters and prepare for recovery and recon- struction? The external Web site states its role succinctly: "The World Bank is the largest funder of disaster recovery and reconstruction in the world."1 What this means for borrowers facing a severe Flexibility and innovation are essential to crisis is that if the Bank does not finance the success with a natural disaster response. Among solutions to the bigger reconstruction the Bank-financed responses that have problems, they will often be addressed only demonstrated such flexibility and innovation are piecemeal, if at all. Not returning to full function- the Maharashtra Earthquake Project (1997), ality has a multitude of small impacts, and it has which attempted to address the needs of the very been argued that much of the longer-term GDP poor and nomadic; North China Earthquake Re- cost of disaster is the result of incomplete construction (1993), which integrated cultural reconstruction (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler heritage in the response; Yemen Emergency 2005). Flood Reconstruction (1989), which had particu- When the Bank responds to a disaster, it often larly effective donor coordination; drought uses several of its funding mechanisms. For prevention in Niger (1988), which made highly example, in Honduras, following Hurricane efficient use of limited resources; and the Mitch, the Bank's primary response was balance Honduras Social Investment Fund (1999). of payment support through an Emergency Recovery Credit. This was supplemented by Defining Relevance of reallocations from seven existing projects and Disaster Assistance redirection of a social fund to assist in the The relevance of the actions taken following a recovery and reconstruction. A follow-on loan is natural disaster depends on the extent to being implemented to reduce vulnerability which they are timely, appropriate to country through strengthening municipal institutions needs, and reduce vulnerability. However, the for disaster management. The Bank has needs of the country and of those affected by responded to other disasters--the Turkey disaster change dramatically day by day and earthquake, flooding in Bangladesh--with a month by month following a disaster. This similar mix of financing. makes it difficult to remain relevant without 2 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T building a measure of flexibility into planned into account geographic, cultural, and social actions. factors, as well as hazard risks (see Appendix F, In the dynamic circumstances following a figure F.1). Table 4.1, which lists the 10 most natural disaster it can be difficult to do activities frequent activities, shows that many projects in order of priority. Several government officials have pursued activities related to reduction of interviewed during field visits made the point vulnerability (such as those related to disaster that readiness to implement too often management and to public awareness). outweighed the priority of the activity. This Timeliness is also extremely important-- meant that some immediately relevant critical when an activity is done and how long it takes to activities that required a plan (such as rehabilita- complete are at least as important as what activi- tion of public markets or housing for the poor) ties are undertaken. In the case of an were put off until one could be prepared, while earthquake, food is needed immediately post- other activities not requiring a plan (such as disaster and not later. If it arrives later, it can repaving urban streets) were started sooner actually detract from the sales of food harvested than necessary, diverting attention from the (and/or salvaged) in the interim (Jackson 1982). more critical activities. With a longer-term view As droughts become increasingly serious, there of disaster risks, countries might recognize that is a time when the poor consume seed stocks getting the priorities right would require a level and sell off domestic animals. Considering this, of advance planning by government ministries, interventions that lead to speedy recovery need as well as through institutions specifically to begin before the next year's crops are focused on disaster risk management. consumed and draught animals are gone. Over the past 20 years, Bank financing has The same principle applies to Bank activities. supported 60 distinct types of activities in For example, if balance of payment finance is to response to disasters, do any good, it must be disbursed quickly The Bank has responded exhibiting a high level of enough in the year following the event to cover flexibly with a wide innovation and flexibility. the cost of imports needed for reconstruction, variety of activities. Projects contained any- and not those unrelated to reconstruction. where from one activity India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Turkey type to 22, but generally projects have been used balance of payment lending for petroleum designed to provide solutions specific to the imports. In the following year, however, unique situation presented by each event, taking petroleum imports declined sharply, which suggests that the balance of payment loan may have led to an over-purchase of those products.2 Table 4.1: The 10 Most Frequently Pursued The activity most frequently pursued-- Activities provision of supplies and equipment--may be of dubious relevance. Specialized equipment Activity Number of projects purchased through a loan needs to be used Provision of supplies and equipment 88 effectively and efficiently. Accomplishing this Rehabilitation of road infrastructure 77 may require additional investment by the borrower (see box 4.1)--investment that may Rehabilitation of flood control infrastructure 53 not be forthcoming or may lose out to other Studies and research on disaster management 43 development priorities once the most pressing Institutional development for disaster management 43 needs have been met. Fire prevention activities 43 For emergency shelter to do any good at all, it Early warning and public awareness campaigns 39 should be erected only after victims have been (Re)Development of education facilities 38 assisted as far as possible to provide themselves Planning for disaster management 37 with shelter close to where their homes used to Rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage 37 stand (or, as often happens, have permanently Source: IEG data. resettled elsewhere). Of course, relevance also 3 0 R E L E VA N C E O F B A N K A S S I S TA N C E Box 4.1: Equipment Acquisition Can Be Particularly Problematic Equipment acquisition requires careful planning to ensure its pro- In some cases, large databases of geographic information ductive use. Technical assistance provided under emergency proj- have been established to provide information on different types of ectsmaypersuadepublicofficialstoinvestinmodernequipmentfor hazards, areas especially vulnerable to disasters, and available re- early warning, improved communication, and emergency supplies lief material, but they have not been regularly updated. In the Ma- and equipment for police, firefighters, and other first responders. harashtra Emergency Earthquake Project, data on disaster However, project experience has demonstrated a strong ten- vulnerability was collected, but the government then classified it dency for the devices to be bought but not installed. In other cases, top secret, and it was not shared with the officials in charge of dis- equipmentwasinstalledorsupplieswarehoused,butnobudgetwas aster management. made available for the people who were supposed to use it. requires that they only be constructed in areas Facility that permits the Timeliness matters as that experience severe winters, and early commitment of up to much or more than the enough to be useful--otherwise it represents a $20 million "in the first waste of scarce resources. hours after the disaster activities undertaken. The importance of timeliness is reflected in takes place." project performance. Of completed projects for The World Bank has nothing similar. Instead, which the time between approval and effective- it has relied on reallocations to fill this expressed ness was below the median (half the portfolio), need. Unfortunately, the documentation for 86 percent had satisfactory outcome ratings. For reallocations is so incomplete that it has not those above the median only 67 percent were been possible to determine the activities and rated satisfactory. Therefore, for projects experi- uses of reallocated encing difficulty in meeting effectiveness funds. Based on experi- Activities requiring requirements, the performance was lower ence, however, the Bank supplemental effort by the compared with those able to make a speedy first has sometimes been disbursement. pressed into ill-consid- country may remain at The funding mechanism used and the ered responses during risk. approach chosen depend on whether the intent the early part of a natural is to finance an immediate response to urgent disaster response (box 4.2). need, a medium-term response to assist Reallocations are highly relevant where the recovery and reconstruction, or a long-term relevance of the original project is reduced by response for reconstruction and mitigation. As disaster. Furthermore, those funds often keep their will be seen, however, this is not always the case. broad sector dedication. For example, funds There is a general pattern, but there are originally intended for school improvement have exceptions. Each circumstance is worth consid- been reallocated to school reconstruction after a ering separately. hurricane or volcanic eruption had destroyed schools(the1995HondurasBasicEducationProject, Delivering Quick Support for the the 1995 Nicaragua Basic Education Project, and the Immediate Response 1993 Papua New Guinea Education Development Countries affected by natural disasters often Project). In other cases, request quick assistance to replace lost capital projects have had slow- The quickest Bank and to prevent cascading negative economic disbursing components response is reallocation, effects from growing and multiplying. To help that, in an emergency, can but the use of reallocated with this, the Inter-American Development Bank be formally reallocated to has established an Emergency Reconstruction reconstruction purposes funds is not transparent. 3 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 4.2: A Sense of Urgency Can Lead to a Wasteful Response Zimbabwe experienced its worst drought of the century during The results were mixed. Relief goods such as foodstuffs were the 1991/92 growing season. The Bank responded with an ERL quickly imported, but the recovery was marred by delays in the supplemented by reallocations from three ongoing loans--a emergency water program and underachievement of targets for total of $37 million. agricultural recovery. Only limited institutional capacity was cre- The project was to be implemented by established units in ated to assist with future drought management, and proposed several ministries. However, their capacity was insufficient to policy and organizational improvements were not carried out. In handle the extra volume of work. Procurement planning, for ex- the end, more foreign exchange was made available than could ample, should have started at the earliest opportunity, but only be readily absorbed--$23.5 million of the IDA credit was can- began after credit effectiveness was declared. celed and hardly any reallocated funds were used. Source: IEG project database. Delivering New Projects for the Recovery Reallocations can be without regard to sector (such as Bolivia 1998, In the short to medium term, countries typically highly relevant, but Vietnam 1995, and Mexico request assistance such as budget support, reallocation is not 1993). technical assistance for reconstruction planning, always an option. For some countries, rapid reconstruction of transport infrastructure however, reallocation is essential to international trade, and the provision not an option. Small of equipment and supplies. The Bank now island states and small countries with fragile customarily provides such support through ERLs. economic and political systems3 often have few ongoing loans to reallocate, and even if they do, Balance of Payment Support they are small relative to the assistance required. Balance of payment support is intended to be a These borrowers are limited to requesting new quick-disbursing activity that meets the most lending from the Bank, which takes time to pressing financial needs of affected countries. process and adds to their overall debt. Designed to provide quick inputs to stabilize An alternative to reallocation in some cases macroeconomic conditions and facilitate has been the redirection of a social fund, which recovery following a calamity, this kind of by its nature is multisectoral and intended to support is not very common; only 15 loans have respond to community needs. In Honduras and been made for balance of payment support Nicaragua, following Hurricane Mitch, social following natural disasters. funds were an important part of the Bank's early Despite its emphasis on the rapid disburse- response, transforming themselves overnight ment of funds, balance of payment support took from centralized social investment funds into an average of about 7 months (214 days) to reach nimble rehabilitation and reconstruction effectiveness and 2.4 years (860 days) to reach agencies. Such redirections can provide critical closing. It thus did not meet institutional support to the poor in affected communities, intentions that it be an effective means of provid- but they ultimately do little to address the ing quick transfer of resources to affected problems faced by the government. More recent countries.4 As one task manager who imple- alternatives to realloca- mented this type of support noted, "I am very The ERL is typically used tion show some promise skeptical about disaster relief/emergency projects for meeting immediate going through the budget in most countries. In for short- to medium-term needs, but their value [reference to country deleted] we were supposed assistance. remains to be seen. to finance reconstruction through the budget, 3 2 R E L E VA N C E O F B A N K A S S I S TA N C E which never happened and, in the end, the frequency specifically for Balance of payment emergency project had neither a positive balance ERLs shows that of the support has not been an of payment nor reconstruction impact." most commonly imple- effective means of mented activities, the Support for Social and Economic Recovery top 10 are dominated by providing quick transfer Ideally, the Bank tries to separate activities that rehabilitation (of roads, of resources. benefit from a nearly immediate start-up and schools, water systems, those where there is a need to plan more slowly irrigation systems, health facilities, flood control for medium-term recovery and mitigation. OP infrastructure) and the purchase of equipment. 8.50 and Bank Procedure (BP) 8.50 call for Among the 10 least frequently pursued ERL consolidating project preparation activities, activities are land and water resource manage- expediting processing procedures, and disburs- ment, community-based disaster prevention, ing resources rapidly. Disaster projects are fire prevention, and forest management. The allowed accelerated processing and are expected degree to which rehabilitation has been allowed to have a short implementation period. OP 8.50 to overshadow prevention, the low relevance of and BP 8.50 establish a timing framework for some activities, and the absence of follow-on emergency recovery lending that limits the projects indicate that greater attention to elapsed completion time to three years. country needs and flexibility with regard to Although Bank policy for emergency lending implementation time, coupled with a more emphasizes a quick response and compressed varied assortment of implementation time, experience with the lending instruments, The time required to earthquake, drought, and tropical storm may be called for. complete particular types projects suggests that a quick response does not The disaster activities always lead to the most relevant response. The carried out during re- of activities affects completion time of disaster projects appears to covery and reconstruc- project completion time. be determined by the time needed to complete tion exhibited significant each activity, an interval that is predictable. variance in implementation time, ranging from Responding effectively to a specific disaster two to seven years. Figure 4.1 shows how long requires picking and choosing from the full projects containing each disaster activity took, menu of 60 activities, and not concentrating on on average. Only one of the activities was carried those that can be quickly accomplished. out in projects completed within three years, as Therefore, a quick response is necessary and stipulated for ERL projects by OP 8.50. possible only in cases where the required activi- Almost all of the most crucial disaster response ties can be carried out in a short time. activities required more than three years, in part Having a disaster policy that emphasizes time because they were conducted without pre- limits for the intermediate term may lead Bank staff disaster planning. For instance, projects involving torushcertainactivitiesunnecessarily.Forexample, land acquisition activities took an average of 7.5 in the St. Lucia Watershed and Environment years, and for those with infrastructure activities, Management Project, pressure to start reconstruc- 6.5­7 years was the average, depending on the tion led to inadequately analyzed designs and type of infrastructure. implementation that did not reduce vulnerability to In planning for projects related to natural the next storm. Specifically, silt was removed from disaster recovery, too little time was generally waterways, but the denuded hillsides in the budgeted for implementation. This is high- surroundingwatershedwerenotstabilized,andthe lighted by the revised implementation time for waterways quickly refilled with silt. most disaster activities Another risk inherent in a policy with time (shown in figure 4.1). For Only one activity type has limits is that projects may exclude some activi- example, on average, the been completed in less ties that take longer but achieve long-term completion of projects development goals. The analysis of activity with irrigation and drain- than three years. 3 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure 4.1: Average Implementation and Extension Times for Projects Containing Disaster Activities: All Disaster Projects Land management (AGR) 6.1 1.3 Land acquisition (AGR) 6.0 1.3 Fire prevention activities (PREV) 6.1 1.1 Livestock/fisheries mgmt (AGR) 5.9 1.2 New constr of flood control (INFR) 5.8 1.2 Operations/maintenance (O&M) 5.5 1.5 Forest mgmt (AGR) 5.8 1.1 Resp to slow-onset event (PREV) 5.8 1.1 New constr of rural water (INFR) 5.6 1.3 Demolition/rubble collection (INFR) 4.9 1.8 Flood control activities (PREV) 5.5 1.2 Training (DIS MGT) 5.6 1.1 New constr of irrig/drainage (AGR) 5.0 1.5 New constr of roads (INFR) 4.9 1.4 New constr of urban water (INFR) 5.3 1.0 Resettlement (RESTTLMT) 4.5 1.9 Cash transfer (FIN) 4.7 1.5 Rehab of flood control (INFR) 5.0 1.2 Rehabilitation of roads (INFR) 4.8 1.4 Studies (PJT MGT) 4.6 1.5 Planning (DIS MGT) 4.7 1.4 Tech assist: Non-eng (PJT MGT) 4.6 1.4 Tech assist: Engineering (DIS MGT) 5.0 1.0 Research (DIS MGT) 5.0 1.0 Commercial facilities (ECO STRGTH) 4.2 1.8 New constr of water/sanitation (INFR) 4.0 1.9 Supplies/equipment (AGR) 4.5 1.4 Water resource management (AGR) 5.0 0.9 activities Public facilities (ECO STRGTH) 4.3 1.5 Project training (PJT MGT) 4.7 1.0 New constr of housing (HSG) 4.4 1.3 Procurement (PJT MGT) 3.2 2.5 Disaster Loans to beneficiaries (FIN) 4.6 1.1 Rehab of rural water (INFR) 4.5 1.1 Education facilities (ECO STRGTH) 4.1 1.5 Rehab of housing (HSG) 4.3 1.3 Early warning (DIS MGT) 4.3 1.2 Transport facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.9 1.5 Retrofitting/strengthening (PREV) 4.0 1.4 New constr of elec/ener/comm (INFR) 3.7 1.7 Rehab of irrig/drainage (AGR) 4.4 0.9 Pest control activities (AGR) 4.8 0.5 New constr of shelters (INFR) 4.6 0.6 Design/supervision (PJT MGT) 4.3 1.0 Institutional development (DIS MGT) 4.1 1.1 Health facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.9 1.2 Rehab of electr/ener/comm (INFR) 3.7 1.4 Interfacing with govt/donor (DONOR) 3.1 2.0 Leveraging funding (DONOR) 3.1 2.0 Rehab of urban water (INFR) 4.0 1.0 Disaster insurance (FIN) 4.4 0.6 Policy reform (DIS MGT) 4.0 1.0 Community-driven prevention (PREV) 4.0 0.8 Consulting (PJT MGT) 3.4 1.4 Search/rescue & medicine (DIS MGT) 3.5 1.1 Rehab of water/sanitation (INFR) 3.7 0.7 Assistance subsidies (FIN) 4.0 0.4 Contingency financing (FIN) 4.4 0.0 PIU support (PJT MGT) 3.3 0.5 BoP/imports (FIN) 2.0 0.4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of years Average project time Average extension time Source: IEG data. Note: Each bar represents the average actual implementation time of all projects with a given activity. 3 4 R E L E VA N C E O F B A N K A S S I S TA N C E age infrastructure took 1.5 years longer than For most low-income Too little time is generally planned, and demolition took 1.8 years longer. countries that have not budgeted for Overall, of 303 completed projects, 28 percent faced a disaster recently, were completed when they were expected. The reducing vulnerability to implementation. rest ranged between 18 days and five-and-a-half disasters is just another of years late. Of ERLs, 42 percent were completed their many development priorities, and for those in the timeframe originally anticipated, though that have experienced disasters recently, vulnera- estimated times often exceeded the policy bility reduction quickly falls off the development requirement.5 agenda as governments turn their attention elsewhere. As seen in Chapter 3, disaster risks do Reducing Vulnerability over the not make it into the CAS or PRSP as often as Longer Term country exposure to such risks would seem to The Bank's standard lending instruments gen- warrant. When a CAS does discuss natural erally are well suited to efforts that reduce vul- disasters, it is likely to discuss activities related to nerability through new or rehabilitated vulnerability reduction (such as strengthening infrastructure (shelters, early warning systems, disaster management, long-term planning, early flood control works) or through developing the warning systems; see Appendix E, table E.1). capacity to manage disaster risks. As figure 4.1 When vulnerability is addressed, it can take a shows, such activities take longer than three years long time, but it can have a lasting impact on on average, and the time needed to implement poverty (box 4.3). It can also represent signifi- them usually is underestimated by a year or more. cant savings. Some ERLs have overreached by trying to cover Insurance that covers Investment lending such activities. Yet if such activities are left out of disaster damage is an the ERL with the expectation that additional important part of vulner- instruments can fill borrowing will follow, those activities may never ability reduction in most disaster needs, but ERLs be undertaken. ERLs have been followed up with developed countries, are rarely followed up normal disaster investment projects only 17 but it is rare in develop- percent of the time. Of 59 completed ERL ing countries. While with such lending. projects, only 10 have had follow-on projects about half of the costs of that took place within three years after they natural disasters are covered by insurance in the closed (with activities related to either United States, less than 2 percent of the costs reconstruction or prevention). are covered in the developing world. The study Box 4.3: Reducing Vulnerability May Also Reduce Poverty The Small Rural Operations (SROs) Project in Niger adopted a rural farmers benefited directly from these income-generating development approach to reducing drought vulnerability based activities. A strong impact on the incomes of the farm families arose on transfer of responsibility to beneficiaries. By intensifying off- from higher cropping intensities, cultivation of higher-value crops, season crop production through widespread use of existing and diversification toward non-crop activities. simple, low-cost technologies, the project generated rural income The project's impact on food security and poverty reduction has and helped mitigate food shortages. been positive in much of the project area, which has a chronic food The project took 11 years to implement (1988­98). It contributed deficit and where other donors are noticeably absent. The impact to the financing of 88 SROs in off-season production of horticul- on the welfare of women beneficiaries, who dominate the project's tural products and fruit trees, soil conservation, smallholder fish horticultural marketing and food processing activities, has been production, stock-raising, and animal husbandry. About 35,000 significant. Source: IEG project database. 3 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Limited experience with database shows that the insurance coverage may not be available. In many insurance shows Bank has supported developing countries, for example, the cost of activities focused on hedging against risks exceeds the cost of simply difficulties in laying off risk in 10 paying for damages when they arise. This is an implementation and projects (see Appendix issue the Bank will need to address in future sustainability. F, table F.3). These have attempts to put insurance schemes in place. included catastrophe bonds, index-based insurance, catastrophe Does the Bank Respond Quickly? models to facilitate coverage, work through Disaster projects are prepared and implemented microfinance institutions, contingency lines of under difficult working conditions. They may have credit, and the creation of a catastrophe to overcome shortages of critical materials, insurance pool. severed transportation links, and weak capacity or The limited experience has seen some capacity loss due to disaster damage. Under such success and encountered a number of difficul- circumstances a quick response is difficult, but ties. Perhaps the most successful of these experi- essential, to achieve. Based on analysis of the 528 ments was the catastrophe insurance pool projects examined, the Bank does not appear to developed for Turkey following the Marmara have increased its response time by using ERLs. earthquake, but the long-term success of that The average amount of time that elapsed experiment is not yet assured (box 4.4). Among between an emergency event and the presenta- the difficulties that need to be tion of a loan or credit to the Bank's Board of The Bank averages about faced is getting people to under- Executive Directors (figure 4.2) was 6.7 months seven months to get a stand how insurance works and (201 days). When disaggregated, the difference disaster project to the the benefits of paying into it. between ERLs and disaster projects that use Board. There also are good reasons that other instruments was small. The non-ERL Box 4.4: Bank Helps Finance Insurance Scheme in Turkey In order to extend liquidity to homeowners, reduce government The scheme faces some difficulties in not only sustaining but liability, and lessen dependence on foreign donors in the event increasing the numbers of insured in the country, however. Two of future disasters, Turkey launched a disaster insurance scheme newly enacted laws pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the Pub- in September 2000. The scheme, which will cover $1 billion in lic Financing and Supervision Law and the Procurement Law for damages in the event of a disaster, was launched in a timely fash- State-Owned Enterprises, may terminate the insurance program's ion, and soon had more than tripled the level of insurance pen- current exemption from all state regulations applying to govern- etration for earthquake coverage compared with that previously ment-owned enterprises. (It was created as a special, non- achieved by the private insurance market. government entity, as it does not have government employees, and Theschemealsodemonstrateditsabilitytopayclaimsquicklyin the government only intervenes in the event of a disaster calling anumberofsmall-andmedium-sizeearthquakesthathaveoccurred for over $1 billion in coverage.) since its initiation. A successful public awareness campaign, com- Whether these laws will apply to the catastrophe insurance pool binedwithanaffordableaverageannualpremiumof$20,broughtthe is currently being clarified. The current Disaster Law #7269 (which scheme significant initial penetration (the average is currently $46), provides easy compensation to earthquake victims), along with the andthelevelhasheldsteadyataround2millionpoliciesoverthepast lack of a strong insurance culture in Turkey, adds to the chal- three-and-a-halfyears.Increasedpenetrationisawaitingpassageof lenges faced by the scheme. the draft Earthquake Insurance Law. Meanwhile, the Bank is inves- tigating several measures to increase the number of policyholders. Source: Project Performance Assessment Report: Turkey (IEG 2005b). 3 6 R E L E VA N C E O F B A N K A S S I S TA N C E disaster projects were found to have an average cies has broadened and ERLs have not moved of 7 months (209 days) pass before they received more projects have at- significantly faster than Board approval. For ERLs, the preparation time tained emergency lend- other lending averaged 6.6 months (198 days)--just 11 days ing status, project less than projects that used other instruments. preparation and effec- instruments. The projects in the Bank's disaster portfolio6 tiveness times have required an average of seven months (208 days) to grown increasingly similar for ERLs and non- reach the effectiveness date, the first day on which ERLs (figure 4.2). In other words, the more a borrower is eligible to withdraw against an recent projects are, on average, slower than approved loan. Of these projects, however, only 27 those of a few years ago. Considering that even percent7 were able to reach effectiveness within emergency projects were prepared and reached four months of Board approval. If the time from effectiveness roughly one year after the disaster event to Board approval is added to the time from event, which was similar to non-ERL disaster approval to effectiveness, it is clear that having the projects, it appears that the Bank has usually current emergency lending mechanisms already in reacted slowly to emergencies, and this trend is place does not significantly accelerate project becoming more pronounced. processing and it does little to expedite the Disaster projects as a whole took longer to disbursement of disaster funds. close than regular investment lending. From The ongoing projects, on average, have also Board approval to the final project closing date, taken longer to prepare and to reach effective- the average implementation time of disaster ness than those that have closed, though in projects8 was 6.6 years (2,396 days), with a some of the largest responses, such as those for median of 7 years (2,541 days). In contrast, the the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Marmara and overall Bank portfolio took less time, with all Hebei earthquakes, and Hurricane Mitch, have projects9 having an average implementation been very quick. As the definition of emergen- time of 6.1 years (2,214 days) and a median of Figure 4.2: How Long Do Projects Take? 4.5 2.6 28.8 (2.4 years) BoP projects 6.6 3.9 46.8 (3.9 years) type ERL projects Project 7.0 7.6 81.0 (6.6 years) Non-ERL projects 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Number of months From disaster event to Board approval From Board approval to effectiveness Implementation Source: IEG project database. Note: The timeline includes an additional interval (project preparation) not used in the Bank's calculation of project completion time, and therefore it does not reflect the total project com- pletion time found in program documents. BoP = balance of payment. 3 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Disaster projects 6.1 years (2,230 days).10 Box 4.5: Damage Sustained Is a generally take longer to Even for ERL projects,11 Function of a Community's Level which are designed to of Vulnerability close than other projects, meet the most urgent and the time required to needs of a country "Strictly speaking, there are no such things as nat- complete them is following a disaster, the ural disasters, but there are natural hazards. A dis- average implementation aster is the result of a hazard's impact on the society. consistently time was 3.9 years (1,433 So the effects of a disaster are determined by the ex- underestimated. days). tent of a community's vulnerability to the hazard (or Projected and actual conversely, its ability, or capacity to cope with it). This implementation times indicate that the Bank vulnerability is not natural, but the result of an entire consistently underestimates the time required range of constantly changing physical, social, eco- to complete disaster-related projects. For the nomic, cultural, political, and even psychological 303 completed projects, the implementation factors that shape people's lives and create the en- time was extended by an average of 1.2 years vironments in which they live. `Natural' disasters are (433 days), or about 20 percent. In addition, nature's judgment on what humans have wrought." two-thirds of all ERL projects were not at all Source: Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) http://www.adrc quick--they were extended an average of 1.2 .or.jp/LWR/LWR_ abridged/definitions.pdf years (448 days), representing a 33 percent increase above the policy requirement of three times, which showed significant variation years. between activity types over a five-year range. Is implementation time a function of the activities undertaken rather than the type of Using a Long-Term View to Select lending instrument chosen? The time needed to Short- and Medium-Term Actions complete a disaster project has varied signifi- At the project level, there has been some degree cantly according to the mix of the disaster activi- of success in reducing vulnerabilities--by ties (Appendix F, box F.1 describes the range of building safe housing for victims, supporting objectives in the projects examined). The proper watershed maintenance, building retain- implementation time of those activities ranged ing walls, relocating people out of dangerous from almost 2.5 years to 7.5 years. Despite the zones, and funding monitoring and warning various permutations, each area of activity systems--but the general social and economic corresponded to average project completion situation of a country can exacerbate vulnerabil- Box 4.6: Reducing Vulnerability Takes Time The Loess Plateau Project is a best practice example of how vul- contour ditches and stone barriers, the farmers were able to re- nerability to flooding can be reduced by reversing severe envi- duce sediment inflows to the Yellow River. ronmental degradation. The agricultural project, focused on a In order to achieve this kind of success the project had to be highly eroded region of China, took eight years, but raised pro- designed in close consultation with those villages with the right duction and family income for poor farmers. to cultivate the land. Measures that would work had to be identi- Numerous small check dams were built to intercept runoff fied, and the means to best communicate them to stakeholders had and eliminate destructive flash floods. Severely sloping lands to be developed. Finally, the first efforts had to be successful to were planted with trees, shrubs, and grasses to stabilize the land demonstrate to potential adopters that the improved practices and produce fuel, timber, and fodder. Gullies were controlled and could have a significant impact on poverty. converted into first-class crop lands. By building terraces, using Source: IEG project database. 3 8 R E L E VA N C E O F B A N K A S S I S TA N C E ity levels across the board. This sort of vulnera- located in landslide and Vulnerability has been bility will not be reduced substantially within the flood-prone areas (box reduced somewhat, but scope of a single ERL. 4.6). In general, sustain- Bankwide experience has shown that while a able and significant local vulnerabilities may quick response to natural disaster is important, reduction of vulnerability be overlooked. it is equally important to identify local vulnera- cannot realistically be bilities and determine how to reduce them in attained in the three years allotted to an ERL. ways that lead to durable solutions. While Their short timeframe notwithstanding, as extreme events will always wreak some damage, noted in Chapter 2, the Bank's emergency sustainable development can limit the extent to projects perform well, surpassing the outcome which this occurs (box 4.5). ratings of the overall Bank portfolio. However, if With increasing frequency, the Bank has the three-year time constraint is allowed to drive helped borrowers to assess disaster damages implementation, projects financed with ERLs and to develop a recovery strategy. Based on the may leave too much undone. It is preferable that analysis in this chapter, it might be expected that activities financed by the Bank contribute the variability in the nature of the damage directly to the speedy resumption of the encountered and the type of activities required development process and the protection of the to address long-term vulnerability would lead most vulnerable segments of society. identification missions to identify root causes What the Bank can bring to the immediate that in many cases could only be properly response to disaster is its Three-quarters of disaster addressed by a careful appraisal and a standard knowledge of interna- investment loan. tional experience and a assessments have led to Addressing root causes makes economic commitment to partici- ERLs, though damage sense; over the course of 40 years, China has pate in the evolving assessments can be used invested $3.15 billion in flood control measures, donor dialogue regarding avoiding what is believed to be potential losses the nature of the overall to identify root causes of amounting to $12 billion (Benson 1997). Yet program to rebuild and disastrous impacts. almost three-quarters of all the disaster assess- the scale of the Bank's ments (23 out of 32) in which the Bank was likely contribution to that effort. As part of this involved led to the abbreviated preparation and process, the Bank can also more consistently and more rapid response of an ERL. Such loans enable effectively support comprehensive damage and the Bank to respond more quickly to a disaster, needs assessment activities, which set in motion but rarely address dangerous practices such as processes that increase local capacities and farming on steep hillsides without proper reduce vulnerabilities, and which in turn will help watershed maintenance and neighborhoods to set the recovery framework (see box 4.7). 3 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 4.7: Damage Assessments Are Useful But Have Some Shortcomings TheBankhasparticipatedindamageassessmentin32projectssince · Identify economic policy changes called for following a 1984anditsinvolvementhasincreased(halfoftheassessmentshave disaster. taken place since 1998). Assessments, at least for the most recent · Reduce vulnerability. disasters, are generally a cooperative effort of the government, the · Solicit donor funds. Bank, and other donors. Joint assessments facilitate donor coor- dination by helping to divide reconstruction tasks early on. Past assessments have had several shortcomings: In current best practice, successful damage assessments are quick, detailed, focused, and updated as the situation unfolds, · They generally have not been updated as more accurate in- and not abandoned after the initial effort. They are performed by formation comes in. a multisector team, and they involve affected people and institu- · Country and social context and the differential effects of dis- tions. They can be used to: aster on vulnerable groups have received little attention. · They have focused on needs without considering capacities. · More effectively design reconstruction projects by facilitat- ing efficient donor coordination and promoting a consensus Surveyed Bank staff report needing guidance with damage as- decision-making process. sessment. Almost half that had not used the Hazard Management · Measure the impact of disasters in monetary terms, and esti- Unit stated that the kind of support they would need from such a mate the disaster's effect on economic flows and on the ca- unit would be in damage and needs assessment. pacity for reconstruction and need for international cooperation. As the Bank has performed damage assessment in such a · Determine social and physical reconstruction needs, identify- small percentage of the projects in the study database (6 per- ing key sectors in need of assistance, thereby targeting the re- cent), and each disaster context calls for a tailored solution, giv- sponse and helping the country start reconstruction ing guidance for damage assessments in the Good Practice section expeditiously. of the policy may be preferable to mandating it in the OP. Source: IEG project database. 4 0 Chapter 5: Evaluation Highlights · An immediate response that ignores local power structures, social groups, and differences in vulnerability can make recovery more difficult. · Participation by local leaders and communities can help ensure an effective recovery. · In housing, the goal should be to help the disaster homeless, focus on the poorest, and encourage mitigation measures that will help reduce the impact of future disasters. · When relocation is required, care is needed to ensure that those relocated have jobs and an environment that offers the potential to rebuild social cohesion. · Disaster impacts and recovery vary, depending on social vulnerability and level of risk. · Cash support can be vital to the recovery of the poor. · Women's particular vulnerability can be addressed through improved data gathering, targeting, and equitable treatment. 5 Social Dimensions of Disaster "Natural" disasters are nature's judgment on what humans have wrought.1 N atural disasters destroy more than lives and infrastructure--they vio- lently and suddenly rip apart social interaction patterns and cohe- siveness. Recovering from a disaster, then, requires more than burying the dead, caring for the injured, and rebuilding structures. It must also ensure that social structures knit difficult by undercutting the very factors that together. This is a substantial challenge, and one helped create social cohesion in the first place. that is rarely addressed with great success by any And when the pressures of the response are of the many institutions that respond to allowed to carry over to the later stages of disasters, in large part because the character of rebuilding and mitigation, too little may be done the initial response may make doing so more to ensure that the social and livelihoods needs difficult. of the affected populations are considered. It Disaster responses resemble military may also leave the poor and other vulnerable operations in their heavy reliance on command- groups even more disadvantaged than they were and-control systems that historically have been before the disaster. effective in making a chaotic situation more IEG examined several issues with social manageable. With such an approach, however, development dimensions: poverty reduction, there is little room for participation. The sense gender-specific impacts, shelter, and housing. of urgency when lives are at stake works against Underlying all of these issues, however, is the such a process, which takes time to implement. larger concern about the inadequacy of partici- The perceived need for haste also makes it pation in the response to natural disasters. easier to take shortcuts to solving problems. Local power structures may be sidelined rather Participation in Natural Disaster than engaged. People and institutions that might Response help rebuild affected communities may be left Documents for 241 of the 528 projects in the out of the relief response, often because the IEG database mentioned some form of partici- responding institutions have limited knowledge pation. However, this covers a wide range of of the communities affected by the disaster. participatory activities. More notable, perhaps, An immediate response that ignores local is that only 50 mentioned beneficiary participa- power structures, social groups, and differences tion at the design stage, and 82 at the implemen- in vulnerability risks makes recovery more tation stage.2 A forthcoming report from 4 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T ProVention (Natural Disasters: Lessons from the because the location and space provided had Brink) considered Bank experience in five of the not been adequate. same countries3 examined by this study and In a number of projects, activities that were found "low levels of public participation in the central to the restoration the local economy did planning, design, and in many cases implemen- not take stakeholder views into account, with tation of recovery activities is a common and unfortunate results. In Gujarat, weavers that lost worrying theme across the case studies." their looms in the earthquake were provided Project evaluations fairly consistently raise with new ones, but they were not of the type community participation as an issue of traditionally used in the region. Field visits to importance. Twenty-five evaluations identified other countries noted inappropriate responses lessons having to do to the needs of businesses. Commercial centers Participation occurs with community partici- were built without clarifying rights and obliga- rarely but can enhance pation. Ten attributed tions regarding occupancy, maintenance, utility sustainability and enhanced sustainability fees, and the like. Similarly, the commercial of benefits to participa- spaces provided did not take into account the ownership. tion, eight declared that activity of the entrepreneurs--tire and auto participation is essential repair shops were given second-floor units, and for overall project success, and six found that newspaper and magazine stores were placed in participation enhances ownership of infrastruc- interior locations with little foot traffic. ture. While 2 evaluations made the point that The benefits of participation were demon- communities should be involved at the earliest strated in the 1993 Argentina Flood Rehabilita- stage possible during project planning, 12 tion Project. Beneficiaries were involved in all argued that community participation is essential stages of the project. The interaction between at all stages of the project cycle. They advocated beneficiaries and the local authorities resulted that communities should participate in in the timely availability of construction materi- planning, designing, implementing, managing, als and the accommodation of local customs in supervising, maintaining, and (sometimes) the architectural design of new houses. Staff financing a project. observed that this created ownership among Efforts to restore livelihoods may founder beneficiaries and increased maintenance. because of inadequate beneficiary participation. Beneficiary participation is especially Following the Gujarat earthquake, the bor- important when it comes to shelter and rower's priority was to provide housing for housing, because the nature of the place where earthquake victims, and the restoration of the people live has significant impact on their damaged public markets in the center of Bhuj feeling of security, and hence on their ability to was postponed until the completion of long- rebuild community. term urban planning. While urban roads were widened and dead-end streets connected, Shelter and Housing reconstruction was moving quickly outside the The publication "Doing More for Those Made city center. Shopkeepers and vendors could not Homeless by Natural Disasters" (Gilbert 2001) wait for the project to attend their needs: they stresses that emergency efforts to help the moved to the periphery where new markets homeless should avoid undermining good sprang up spontaneously. Three years after the housing sector policies, and seek to incorporate earthquake, the city best practice prescriptions of such policies When stakeholders' views commercial center still whenever possible. Emergency shelter and are not considered, the had not recovered. housing reconstruction efforts should always solution they are Following the Maharash- embody the Bank's priority concern with tra earthquake, public benefiting the poor by providing priority provided often fails to markets grew up sponta- assistance to those unable to afford it by other solve their problems. neously in several towns means. Reconstruction projects commonly 4 4 S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N S O F D I S A S T E R rebuild apartment buildings and commercial winters or weather con- Emergency shelter and areas without specifying clearly who will manage ditions are life-threaten- housing reconstruction and maintain them. Worse, they may leave ing. People are able to vulnerable groups even more disadvantaged provide themselves with should reflect the Bank's than they were before the disaster. adequate temporary shel- priority concern with the Several approaches to shelter have been ter using materials from poor. taken in the emergency context--building damaged buildings, and emergency shelters, relocating victims to safer families that did not lose areas, and facilitating self-help construction of their dwellings take in friends and relatives. temporary shelter while simultaneously prepar- When shelters are called for, efforts need to ing to house the homeless with housing be made to keep families and neighborhood reconstruction components (see Appendix H groupings intact. The layout of temporary for a more detailed analysis of housing and shelter structures can reduce crime if care is shelter issues). Where it has not been feasible or taken during the relocation process to ensure desirable to relocate people, the Bank has that as many doors as Social relationships supported dedicated shelters and strengthened possible face a common warning systems. For example, in Bangladesh, and well-lit area--thus sustain people during the Bank has funded the construction of cyclone avoiding the creation of disasters and should be shelters, which have provided Bangladeshis at passages and alleyways considered at all stages of risk with a place to go during severe storms. that are dark and not Some projects that provided shelter have well observed. the response. encountered difficulties brought about by the risk of breaking up social networks, dislocating Build to higher standards people from their extended families and jobs. Temporary housing is sometimes occupied for The sheer numbers of people in need of long periods of time (as after the 1984 Armenia housing have been daunting in some cases. Also earthquake). For this reason, temporary shelter an issue is the difficulty beneficiaries may have was built to slightly higher standards after the keeping up with maintenance of units handed Marmara earthquake so that the structures over (even if the unit was free). Reaching a could become another form of housing for the balance between affordable unit size and the poorer once the new housing was completed. need that large families have for space has been Moreover, if shelters are built using disaster- a difficult issue in projects financed by the Bank. resistant construction techniques, not only are From the Bank's perspective, the goal is to they safer for the displaced living in them, but help the disaster homeless get back on their feet such construction also serves as an example that as quickly as possible, while focusing on the people will see, that will then potentially inform poorest, and encouraging mitigation measures their future construction choices. to help reduce the impact of future disasters. Simplicity of message is essential to the The Bank has financed temporary housing for adoption of disaster-resistant construction disaster victims and learned through that technologies. The Maharashtra Emergency process that such shelters are sometimes Earthquake Project promoted simple earth- occupied for long periods of time, and often quake-resistant features for non-engineered become permanent. masonry construction based on three short rules that could be understood, adopted, and applied What Works? by the villagers. Their simplicity made wide Temporary housing is Preserve and secure existing social relationships dissemination possible rarely temporary and when providing emergency shelter and benefited a much should be built Financing expensive temporary shelter should be larger population than avoided unless the areas involved face severe originally targeted. accordingly. 4 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Consider the social context when providing sites resettled people moved back to their former and services location, either to go back to where their roots The approach of providing beneficiaries with a were, or to cash in their benefits by selling their "wet core" of plumbing in cooking and new home and moving back to the hazardous bathroom facilities and having them invest in area. In one case (Brazil 1988), new squatters building up around that start has had mixed settled into areas vacated by disaster victims. In success. This is, in part, because without a place some cases, project planners have designed to sleep, beneficiary families find it difficult to ways to discourage people from moving back by move to the site. In El Salvador, following the creating parks and recreation areas in the October 1986 earthquake, the sites and services vulnerable area (Honduras 2000), or having aspect of the project met with poor initial families sign contracts confirming that they acceptance and was never built. The sites and would live in their new homes, which they built services component of the Popayan, Colombia in self-help, for at least five years (Argentina project met with considerable success, however. 1993). The project's infrastructure components, which A well-known drawback to relocation is the carefully targeted poor households, had a lasting difficulty of preserving social networks in the positive impact on urban development. process. Of the 30 projects reviewed, only one successfully preserved social networks. This Provide incentives to complete rural housing confirms the pattern identified by Putting Social Funding for disaster-resilient rural housing has Development to Work for the Poor: An OED worked on an incremental "you finish one stage Review of World Bank Activities (IEG 2005g). In and you will get money for the next" basis. Such one project examined by the natural disaster an approach was successful in Turkey and India, study, focus groups reported that the major for example. reason beneficiaries had not moved to the assigned house was that they did not want to Relocation leave their original neighborhood. The Benefi- Over the past 20 years, people rendered ciary Analysis performed by the project reports: homeless by natural disasters or living on at-risk "Beneficiaries reported a strong preference for land were relocated in 30 projects, with varying rebuilding their own damaged houses, rather levels of success. In 20 cases, people were than moving to the assigned houses in new relocated to a safer area. In seven cases (all neighborhoods. Moving meant dissolving social earthquake-related), a lack of technical expertise networks that often had generations of history." coupled with victims' anxieties and opportunism led to a suboptimal result, and in four cases the What Works? area that disaster victims vacated received a higher-value use once they were gone. Use urban reconstruction to enhance cultural or In almost all cases, the vulnerability of the historic districts relocated families in these projects was reduced, After the Lijiang earthquake in China, high-rise if for no other reason apartment complexes were torn down and single Vulnerability can be than that they moved into family houses in a traditional style reconstructed. reduced with relocation, more disaster-resilient This helped Lijiang achieve UNESCO (United but this rarely takes place houses. However, in 24 Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural cases relocation sites Organization) designation as a World Heritage because too little care is were quite distant from Site, which increased the city's attractiveness for taken to prevent the original settlements, tourists, creating additional employment. reoccupation and to and commercial trans- port costs were therefore Consider employment patterns when relocating preserve social involved. After the El Salvador earthquake, squatters were relationships. In 7 of the 30 projects, relocated from the city center to a northern 4 6 S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N S O F D I S A S T E R suburb some 15 kilometers away from the center, disaster because of the Employment patterns can where most of them had been employed. A tightly interwoven nature be adversely affected by survey conducted by the project showed that of the two issues. The years after the disaster, economic conditions had 2000/2001 World Develop- relocation. worsened for 6 percent of the resettled families. ment Report underscores In India's Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake the importance and connection of poverty levels Reconstruction Project, some villages were and vulnerability to natural disasters and highlights relocated so far away that peasants gave up the importance of putting poverty reduction and farming because they could not reach their fields. vulnerability reduction high on the list of develop- ment priorities. Vulnerable Groups While experts note that the poorest countries Each type of disaster has impacts related to the and their weakest groups are the hardest hit in nature of the event (earthquakes knock down terms of direct and indirect losses from natural buildings) and another set of impacts on sectors disaster (see Chapter 2 and box 5.1),5 there is of society that are particularly vulnerable little quantitative analysis of how the poor are (earthquakes knock down a higher percentage treated during the The impacts of disaster of houses in informal neighborhoods where recovery (Freeman and construction does not follow the building code). others 2002), and little are uneven, and without The uneven impacts of disaster arise from differ- research on how the careful planning, the ences in income status, culture, gender, location impact of Bank-financed recovery can exacerbate of home, and land tenure. reconstruction work Essentially, disaster impacts on people vary, spreads across socio- existing social and depending on the levels of social vulnerability economic groups. economic inequalities. and risk.4 The unevenness of the impacts is often highly visible because of media attention, How the Bank Reaches the Poor but the recovery process is potentially more Project documents often mention that recon- uneven, and it tends to be less visible, at least to struction activities occurred in poor neighbor- those on the outside, because their attention hoods or poor rural regions, but far less has turned elsewhere. For example, in the frequently do they describe specifically what was absence of explicit determination to deal with done for the poor. Nevertheless, Bank-financed the situation of renters made homeless by natural disaster projects do help the poor to disaster, public money may end up being used recover, and when they do, this aspect may to provide multiple housing replacements for make a project more successful. the wealthy. Another common inequity occurs Among the measures Bank-financed projects when the immediate cash needs of the poor are use to help ensure that the poor are not left out ignored in the immediate post-disaster period are poverty targeting and selecting activities and they have to sell their productive assets, based on their likely affect on the poor. The including their land, to the better-off. portfolio analysis for this study found that, The Bank's various approaches to pre- and among the 528 disaster projects, 147 were post-disaster assistance have affected economic flagged as Program of Targeted Interventions and social recovery in different ways. The follow- (PTIs).6 Of these, 44 were completed projects ing sections discuss approaches used by the with one or more disaster-related components. Bank when dealing with the special situations of Textual analysis of the project documents found the poor and women in the complex context of that 98 completed and post-disaster recovery. ongoing projects in the In safe settlements, portfolio (regardless of poverty reduction Poverty and Disaster whether they were measures further reduce Poverty alleviation measures of all kinds, if flagged as PTI) had been successful, can lower levels of vulnerability to designed to reach the vulnerability to disasters. 4 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 5.1: The Poor Take the Heaviest Blow The 2003 World Development Report notes the pronounced mary victims of natural disasters, in part because they are difficulties the poor face when disaster strikes. "Developing priced out of the more disaster-proof areas and live in crowded, countries are particularly vulnerable, because they have lim- makeshift houses... poor families are hit particularly hard be- ited capacity to prevent and absorb...effects [of natural dis- cause injury, disability, and loss of life directly affect their main asters]. People in low-income countries are four times as likely asset, their labor. Disasters also destroy poor households' nat- as people in high-income countries to die in a natural disas- ural, physical, and social assets, and disrupt social assistance ter.... Poor people and poor communities are frequently the pri- programs." Source: 2003 World Development Report. See also "Fighting Poverty while Supporting Recovery from Major Disasters, Synthesis Report, Learning Lessons from Recov- ery Efforts" ( World Bank DMF and ProVention Consortium 2003, p. 1). poor.7 Table 5.1 summarizes the activities The project documents used various conducted by this larger group of projects that measures for impact. The most common were specifically targeted the recovery of the poor. economic rates of return, number of houses constructed or repaired in poor areas, acreage How Well Does It Reach Them? returned to agricultural production in poor A review of project documents found that 51 areas, and number of households with improved completed projects documented their impact water and sewage services. Not included in this on the poor. Of these, 41 had achieved or analysis were many projects that mentioned that exceeded expectations (table 5.2), and only 10 project benefits occurred in poor areas, but gave documented less-than- no further details. The sustainability of improve- Projects appear to reach expected improvements ments made for the poor was often questioned the poor, but the data are for the poor. As there are in the documents. incomplete. quite a few with no information on how well What Works? they reached the poor, the number with little or no impact on the poor Ensuring beneficiary views are heard is probably not complete. The performance data show that projects are more likely to succeed when beneficiary views Table 5.1: Some Projects in the Portfolio Have Been have been incorporated in the design of the Designed to Reach the Poor project. Beneficiaries have been involved in the project design and implementation phases Number of through involvement of local leaders, formal Poverty alleviation activity projects social assessments, and open meetings where all Overall project activities occurred in poor areas are welcome. The involvement of beneficiaries in (no specific activities cited) 23 the project design and implementation plays a Direct services to the poor (economic restoration, social part in greater project success. activities, health and nutrition, cash assistance, Cash support micro-enterprise programs, supplies) 21 During the recovery process, getting cash Improve food security and agricultural production 18 support to victims quickly has positively affected Housing 12 people's sense of safety and security. It has been Improved drainage in poor rural areas 11 a prominent first sign of the government's Improved transportation and access in poor areas 10 support in a time of acute need. Since 1984, the Pest control activities during large infestations 3 Bank has funded over $850 million in cash Source: IEG project database. assistance (cash transfer, cash for work, and 4 8 S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N S O F D I S A S T E R similar programs) in the context of 11 projects, 5 Table 5.2:. Projects Often Exceeded Expected Impact of which are ongoing (see Appendix G). Approx- on the Poor, But Data Are Incomplete imately 94 percent of these funds have been lent since the Turkey Emergency Earthquake Number of Reconstruction Loan (EERL) was appraised in Impact on the poor projects 1999. In projects that have closed and been Exceeded expected impact on the poor 9 rated, four out of six were found to be satisfac- Achieved expected impact on the poor 32 tory. Those rated unsatisfactory accounted for Less than expected impact on the poor 6 less than one percent of the funds allocated. Little or negative impact on the poor (when positive impact When promptly provided, cash support is expected) 4 enabled people to survive and get local No data available 14 economies moving again, and was reported as Source: IEG project database. highly preferable to in-kind support by benefici- aries. For example, the 1999 Turkey earthquake reconstruction project implemented a cash- eventually benefit the Cash support stabilizes transfer component that was widely considered poor indirectly, but pro- the situation of the poor successful, and even a model to be emulated, as grams that are effective in the early recovery four subsequent projects have already done. A in reaching the neediest beneficiary assessment for the Turkey project people within the re- stage. (the Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project) covery process are lo- reported that 85 percent of the people receiv- cated closer to the ground and are designed ing the allowance for rent support believed that with stakeholder input. Historically, the Bank it was necessary (Akkayan, Kirimli, and Polat has had difficulty working at this level, and when 2000). new structures to deal with the problem must be set up, the process slows down. In addition, Providing livelihood opportunities the learning curve for working at that new level Approaches to livelihoods generation have been is steep. tried in disaster projects, giving the affected Civil society organizations already on the people a chance to take part in the rebuilding ground are more adept at targeting and working and maintenance while providing much-needed with communities, the poor in particular. income sources. There are few examples of Disaster assistance becomes a matter of increas- success, however. Preparation for the North ing the scale of what they are already doing. The China Earthquake Reconstruction Project social funds supported by the Bank have such included income-generation schemes that were capabilities, and have been tapped for their introduced to help families repay loans received ability to quickly respond in emergency for reconstruction. This was of particular benefit situations (IEG 2002) (box 5.2). to affected poor farmers who did not have funds to repair or rebuild their homes. Local economic Mitigate to reduce the impact of disaster activity was not only restored to pre-earthquake The study survey asked task managers: what is levels but has been growing since project the best way to address the needs of the poor in completion. natural disaster projects? The most frequent response was: to develop prevention and mitiga- Working at the finer-textured, smaller-scale level tion programs so that Solutions that benefit the Following a disaster, solutions that will directly their homes did not fall benefit the poor are found at the micro level. As down in the first place. poor work at the micro one disaster expert interviewed by the study level, where the Bank team put it, governments have "thick fingers for Gender and Disasters finds it difficult to such fine-scale work." Building major infrastruc- The uneven impacts of ture, as the Bank tends to do after a disaster, will disaster are sometimes operate. 4 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box 5.2: Social Funds Can Be Part of a Rapid, Locally Based Response Following Hurricane Mitch, the Honduran Social Fund, FHIS, dra- 1998­October 2000), whereas 10,000 ($125 million) were executed matically expanded its operations to carry out over 2,000 small during the first eight years of the social fund's existence social assistance and infrastructure projects ($40 million worth). (1990­98). Operations during the two years following the disaster were sig- The Bank strongly supported FHIS's role in the reconstruction nificantly increased compared with the fund's first eight years efforts by stepping up disbursements of the next credit support- overall. Sixty-four hundred projects ($137 million) were ap- ingthefund($45million)andgranting$22.5millionasasupplemental proved during the two years following Mitch (November emergency credit in 1999. Cultural factors and starkest between the after)inthedesignofrecoveryefforts.Forty-one gender division of work genders, to the extreme of these projects have been completed, provid- that gender and survival ing insights into the ways women were treated patterns often make rates can be closely tied. during disaster reconstruction. The 30 ongoing women more vulnerable Only one woman for projects provide information about intended to disasters than men. every three men sur- activities and benefits. vived the December 2004 tsunami in one district in Aceh. In two What Works? other districts, females accounted for 77 and 80 percent of deaths (Oxfam 2005). Evidence that Improve data gathering women's deaths outnumber men's also can be After a disaster and during the recovery, lack of found after the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone data can impede equitable distribution of (Mushtaque and others 1993), as well as the compensation. The damage assessment can 1993 Maharashtra earthquake.8 help ensure equity by disaggregating mortality Women and men have different vulnerabili- and morbidity by gender and taking into ties, and they cope with disasters differently. A account losses suffered in the informal sector. number of factors9 contribute to the particular The Bank attempted this in the 1999 Turkey vulnerability of women before, during, and after Marmara Earthquake Assessment. However, natural disasters: a lack of information about even in that case, no gender disaggregated data evacuation warnings and shelter options, cultur- were provided. ally restricted mobility, and responsibilities within the family to care for the young and the Target female-headed households elderly. Gender projects stressed that single-headed The literature stresses the importance of households are especially vulnerable to natural assessing women's vulnerabilities separately disasters since caregivers are less mobile because of the potential for vulnerability differ- (Honduras 2000 and Nicaragua 2001). The ences and the relationship between these differ- Kenya Arid Lands II Project, a drought reha- ences and a number of cultural and social bilitation project, has linked female-headed factors. Increasingly, this has been happening in households with poverty. Drought-related Bank-financed projects, especially since the projects in Ethiopia (2002), Kenya (2003), and introduction of OP 4.20 on gender and develop- Zambia (2003) describe female-headed house- ment (figure 5.1). holds and other disadvantaged women as the IEG identified 71 most food insecure. Better data can help the projects10 that consider The increase in poverty in the aftermath of a women's needs and disaster and the increase in the numbers of Bank target assistance to vulnerabilities (called female-headed households after a disaster make women. "gender projects" here- women more vulnerable to a subsequent 5 0 S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N S O F D I S A S T E R Figure 5.1: Projects Are Increasingly Addressing Women's Vulnerabilities 10 9 OP 4.20 8 special 7 gave 6 women that to 5 4 projects of attention 3 2 Number 1 0 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Ongoing projects Completed projects Source: IEG project database. disaster. Despite women's acknowledged vulner- neglected is the agricul- Assistance to reduce ability to disasters, of 59 PRSPs, only those for ture sector. Women's women's work burden at Ghana (2003­5) and the Cambodia (2002) note agricultural labor often home can create support women's vulnerabilities to natural disasters. goes unrecognized, and they are not compen- networks. Provide support to lighten workload sated for their loss of Women shoulder much of the burden of care for tools and agricultural inputs after disasters. children and the elderly and disabled, as well as Women's full participation and coverage took such household tasks as provision of water and place in the 1987 Ethiopia Small-scale Irrigation fuel wood. Disasters can increase the intensity and Conservation Project. of this work, and informal networks among neighbors and the extended family, an Ensure access to training important coping mechanism for women in Training and capacity building for women follow- times of crisis, have often dissolved. ing a disaster has proved more difficult than Reconstruction programs need to try to employment creation. Training programs were preserve social networks and find ways to lower planned for 18 of the 71 gender projects. the workload of women. Paid childcare, Although women often provide labor in the delivered by older women, for example, was agricultural sector, they usually do not receive planned in the Zambia (2003) project to recreate advice on improved practices because of cultural a form of support network and to provide paid taboos in rural areas. employment for women. To overcome this problem, recent projects aimed to train female extension workers to reach Ensure equity of treatment in employment women in rural areas. In Women are often discriminated against in food- five such projects (Yemen Equitable treatment, in for-work programs, services, and employment 1989, Cameroon 1992, many dimensions, can opportunities during disaster recovery. Another Mali 2000, Tunisia 2001, area in which women's contributions are often and China 2002) female help women recover. 5 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T extension workers provided advice on animal Projects financed by the Bank have elevated husbandry and orchard management and the status of women in society by providing land developed materials and methods such as mass titles in the names of both men and women, as it media, drama, and farmer competitions. In the did in Maharashtra. Unprecedented in this 1992 Cameroon project, research indicated that region, even widows received houses in their around 40 percent of the women in these nutrition own names, and ex-gracia payments for lost groups improved their nutritional knowledge, and relatives were disbursed to them. The 2001 El that 20 percent of the women actually improved Salvador Earthquake Reconstruction Project their nutritional practices. also stipulated that titles be put in the name of both men and women. A beneficiary survey of Look for opportunities to create equity in land that project, conducted for this evaluation, ownership found some communities where 50 percent of Some projects have influenced gender relations respondents reported that a woman was one of by modifying land rights. In many developing the legal homeowners and that, overall, 37 countries, women are not allowed to own land percent of the homes were wholly owned by or houses. In Tonga, after a disaster in 2002, any women. In Argentina, following a major flood, a woman whose house was not damaged by the Bank-financed project reported positive social cyclone had to give up her home to a male impacts from putting house and land titles in the relative who had lost his house. wife's name. 5 2 Chapter 6: Evaluation Highlights · Coverage of the policy has expanded, but the same guidance is not appropriate for all emergencies. · Prohibitions on the financing of relief and consumption and on the use of ERLs for recurring events are unrealistic and un- necessary. · With minor modification, the available forms of emergency assistance serve borrower needs and give staff necessary flexibility. · The requirement to build to disaster-resilient standards needs reinforcement. · Assistance with prevention and mitigation is growing, but procedural issues need to be resolved. · Provisions for operation and maintenance in Bank-financed projects need improvement. · When the Bank is involved, highly effective donor coordina- tion requires a consistent Bank presence. 6 Bank Policy: Implementation and Implications T his chapter highlights the provisions of the Bank's Emergency Recov- ery Assistance Policy (OP 8.50) for which the evaluation has relevant findings. It examines the Bank's experience related to the cal disasters--everything from conflict to oil main provisions of the current OP (see table 1.1 spills, foot-and-mouth disease, and declines in and Appendix A) and answers three questions tourism following terrorist acts. Particularly on the effectiveness of the policy and suggests notable is that the use of ERLs has increased for provisions that would improve the next all emergencies, but especially for conflict iteration: situations. Figure 6.1 shows that before there was a · How does the portfolio reflect the policy's dic- policy (P0), and while the OPN and OD were in tates and prohibitions? effect (P1 and P2), about 70 to 80 percent of · Are there discrepancies between policy and ERLs addressed natural disasters. Since the practice? current policy has been in effect (P3), only 48 · Should the existing provisions be retained in percent are focused on natural disaster. About a revised policy? 38 percent of ERLs financed post-conflict projects, and 15 percent responded to "other" The following sections summarize the emergencies. available evidence relevant to each key policy While this spread of coverage of the OP provision. First, however, we consider whether appears sensible, it is unlikely that what might treating all emergencies equally in a single policy work for natural disasters would apply to conflict is advisable. situations, and vice versa. For example, while it is Bank policy on Natural Disasters in Relation to Other possible to set standards Emergencies for the disaster resilienceemergency assistance has Through the years, the Bank policy on of public and private broad coverage, but emergency recovery assistance has increasingly buildings, requiring simi- natural disasters are a become a guide that covers not only recovery lar resilience to bombard- category apart from the from natural disasters, but also recovery from a ment and muntions whole range of social, medical, and technologi- creates structures with rest. 5 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure 6.1: The Use of ERLs Has Increased with Each Policy Revision 50 40 30 projects of 20 Number 10 0 P0 P1 P2 P3 Policy period Natural disaster ERLs Civil war ERLs Other ERLs Source: IEG project database. only military purposes and is neither feasible nor · There is already a great deal of knowl- affordable. Epidemic outbreaks of communica- edge of best practice in the natural disas- ble disease require highly specialized expertise ter field. Knowledge required for an effective and an ability to take action with extreme response to a natural disaster is different from rapidity. Furthermore, they are entirely people- that required to address the other emergen- focused (requiring no reconstruction), and there cies currently covered by OP 8.50, and it is com- are clearly designated places through which to paratively well established. For example, we channel assistance (health ministries and global know already where disasters are likely to occur programs). (hotspots) and where human settlements are in A few years ago, an evaluation of the Bank's the danger zone, and can thus prepare for likely experience with post-conflict reconstruction project components (engineering designs and (IEG 1998) concluded that, unlike natural strategic approaches). In addition, disaster- disasters, civil conflicts require major efforts in resilient techniques for all types of infrastructure dealing with institutional frameworks and and the surrounding environment have been macroeconomic conditions. The recommenda- proven by decades of experience. tions of the report stated, "The provision of post- · This knowledge is very different from conflict assistance should not be handled under the knowledge needed to respond prop- OP 8.50, which should be recast to apply only to erly to the other types of disasters or natural disasters." Bank management agreed to emergencies. prepare a new OP, and in fiscal 2001, OP 2.30 on · The centrality of community input for Development Cooperation and Conflict was the design, implementation, and main- approved. Although it was expected that OP 8.50 tenance necessary in natural disaster would be modified around the same time, the emergencies is very distinct from the ap- revision is still pending. proach to conflict emergencies, where com- There are several reasons the Bank might munities are strongly divided. want to tailor policy provisions specifically for · The Bank's treatment of natural disasters also natural disasters. differs in that a good start at mainstream- 5 6 B A N K P O L I C Y: I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S ing disaster planning has already been Analysis of the full range Too much reliance is made--the study identified 246 projects with of activities conducted placed on the ERL a disaster-related activity below the compo- through these loans has nent level. shown that only one instrument. · The different situations carry distinct lev- activity, balance of pay- els of political liability for the Bank. Re- ment support, was regularly completed in this construction and disaster prevention, unlike timeframe. conflict-related work, do not require special at- However, even that activity has not been tention to the politics of sovereign affairs. completed rapidly enough (see figure 4.2). That is, on average, disbursements have taken place The policy framework for the Bank's natural much later than anticipated, and often too late disaster response is currently set within the to achieve the original purpose--providing context of "emergency lending," as covered in macroeconomic stability in the short term. Operational Policy 8.50. However, the policy Notwithstanding, many activities that would focuses almost entirely on the ERL instrument, normally benefit from more systematic and and does not fully cover the scope of the Bank's detailed preparation have been rushed during disaster-related work. the preparation of ERLs. Most of the Bank's activities regarding natural Given that ERLs have disasters fall elsewhere, and therefore receive averaged almost as long Natural disasters should too little attention. About 83 percent of the as other lending instru- be part of a country's risk disaster projects identified by this study use ments to begin disburse- instruments other than the ERL. Only 17 of the ments, the Bank has no profile, but country 106 drought projects are ERLs and only 2 of 95 true emergency lending strategy and project projects with some fire-related activity are ERLs. mechanism other than approaches should be In contrast, just below half of all earthquake reallocations, though al- projects (23 of 59) are ERLs. The largest ternatives are being de- nuanced by the country grouping, flood projects, includes 42 ERLs veloped. Moreover, even context. within a subportfolio of 243 projects. The policy at the appraisal stage, an spotlight on ERLs, and especially the emphasis analysis of the original closing dates showed that on the three-year timeframe, has led to the implementation of more than half of the problems and delays in project implementation ERLs was projected at over three years. because projects that benefit from attention to Faced with this, the Bank could either extend social and economic details have been prepared or eliminate the implementation time of ERLs to too quickly (see Chapter 4). allow for more realistic project planning, or What is needed is a highly flexible approach to reduce the implementation time, limit the scope, disaster response and prevention that is built on and simultaneously process a regular investment the activities required and the adjustments to the loan for reconstruction. Of course, a third alterna- financing mechanisms used. A first step for a tive would be to keep the three-year time limit and policy focused only on natural disasters would find ways to make it work as originally anticipated be to establish parameters such as those outlined by the policy. But if after in Chapter 3 for the conduct of operations, such having implemented 89 Given the time it has that all Bank-financed operations responding to ERLs over the course of taken to begin disasters, and even normal lending in the most 20 years the Bank has still disaster-prone borrowers, take disaster system- not comfortably made disbursement from an atically into account. the three-year goal, it is ERL, the Bank has had no doubtful that it will ever true emergency lending Emergency Recovery Lending Timeframe happen. mechanism other than OP 8.50 stipulates a three-year timeframe for The Bank needs an implementation of Emergency Recovery Loans. instrument that enables reallocation. 5 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T it to respond quickly when a fast response is Bank financed components in the Chile Public critical, whether it is an ERL executed in a Sector Housing Project (1985) that provided shorter timeframe or a fund such as the Inter- cash transfers to the earthquake-affected American Development Bank (IDB) uses. population. The funds made available to victims However, the Bank also needs to ensure that provided them with the means to meet activities can be properly sequenced and that "immediate consumption needs" and to pay for those requiring more time to implement can be their interim shelter, helping to revive the local completed within a single lending package. The economy. A cash transfer program was also latter is imperative because borrower demand successfully implemented following the 1999 for addressing vulnerability almost always Turkey earthquake. declines once the immediate needs following a Bank documents identify other cases where disaster have been met. Thus, the next policy relief and consumption activities have been revision needs to position ERLs within a broader financed directly or indirectly through the array of lending instruments that can fill all of provision of cash. These include: these needs. The flexibility that has character- ized the Bank's response to disasters needs to · Tsunami relief in Sri Lanka1 and Maldives.2 be further enhanced to allow the creation of · Potable water provision to victims in Hon- customized lending packages based on disaster duras3 and Zambia.4 type, country needs, and long-term vulnerability · Food provision in Bangladesh (indirectly concerns. through a microcredit program),5 Honduras,6 and St. Kitts and Nevis.7 Relief and Consumption Expenditures · Emergency search, rescue, and medicine were The current policy rules out the purchase of provided in 11 projects. consumables and actions that benefit individu- als, and lists those not to be financed by the The study Literature Review shows that Bank. While such prohibitions are sensible for thinking on the support for relief and consump- smaller-scale disasters where relief expenditures tion has evolved since the 1980s--so should can be covered by the government on its own or policy (IEG 2003). Events such as the recent with nongovernmental organization (NGO) Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Mitch assistance, it is too constraining on the Bank incapacitate urban infrastructure in vast regions when countries are nearly paralyzed by truly and capital cities. Extreme events such as cataclysmic events. Hurricane Katrina in the United States show In any event, current practice has not how policies that are sensible in most cases can followed these provisions very closely, and some lead to breakdowns in extreme cases. When projects have financed such prohibited activi- humanitarian considerations temporarily over- ties. For example, the 2002 Zambia Emergency whelm the capacities of all the involved Drought Recovery Project provided $20 million agencies, cash-strapped governments need for food distribution. Evacuation, restoration of assistance with critical aspects of relief in order access to transport, and temporary shelters are to proceed expeditiously with reconstruction other items proscribed by Bank policy, yet and economic recovery. In Bangladesh, follow- during the policy period ing the 1998 floods, the extent of the damage to Though the policy the Bank has financed agricultural production was such that the prohibits it, the Bank has temporary shelter pro- government could not restore production to financed both relief and grams in Colombia, El pre-disaster capacity without help. Salvador, Honduras, A Harvard University study found that when consumption. India, and Turkey. relief is handled in a developmental manner Project experience (that is, it builds on local capacities), it has a shows that the Bank also financed consumption. significant positive impact on the reconstruction Even during the OPN-governed period, the process that follows (Anderson and Woodrow 5 8 B A N K P O L I C Y: I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S 1989). When existing social networks are need to take account of Policy on critical inputs strengthened and new ones are established, this.8 While such funds for relief and shelter has they can continue even after relief efforts end, may help fill important not evolved in line with providing important social and institutional needs during disasters, links for the developmental processes that they also may detract specialist thinking on follow. from the need to focus these issues. attention on prevention Forms of Disaster Assistance and mitigation. The current policy describes five forms of Bank Recognizing that some disaster-prone emergency assistance: ERLs, reallocation, countries need immediate access to recovery and redesign of pipeline projects, free-standing reconstruction financing following a disaster mitigation projects, and assessments. The study event, the Bank supported the creation of contin- finds that the options provided by this policy gency mechanisms under three recent projects.9 provision grant considerable flexibility for This form of emergency lending was designed to countries affected by natural disasters. What it provide flexibility for the does not do especially well is to provide urgent immediate rehabilitation With some modification, lending for relief in a manner that does not of critical public services the forms of assistance involve opportunity costs, especially over the and the rapid restoration currently available are medium term. Regional or global solutions may of physical and social also be appropriate, and the Bank policy may public infrastructure, as adequate to the task. Box 6.1: Contingency Financing--A Learning Process While contingency financing seems to be a logical form of dis- in the funds. The Bank recognized in hindsight that few coun- aster risk management to support, Bank attempts have met with tries were prepared to implement such a lending facility, and that some difficulty. it needed to support the training of Bank staff and government First, initial attempts in the Caribbean and Mexico had narrow agencies. parameters that limited the accessibility of the funds. In the Taking these experiences into account, a slightly different ap- Caribbean, the floating phase 4 of an Adaptable Program Loan pro- proach has been taken in Vietnam and Colombia. In the case of vides for contingency financing to Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vietnam (Vietnam Natural Disasters Mitigation Project [P073361]), Lucia, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In the be- because a contingency funding facility would incur interest or ginning, to be able to use the funds, a country had to declare a na- commitment charges and only cover low-frequency hazards tional disaster. Not only did this not allow countries to address not likely to occur during the project timeframe, a rapid dis- smaller disasters, but there was reluctance to declare a national bursement facility was created instead. This facility was designed disaster, because doing so would clearly hurt one of the Caribbean's to have the capacity to also provide funding to smaller, more lo- main industries--tourism. calized disasters, using the existing country disaster response The parameters have since been relaxed, and, in the meantime, system. Likewise, the Colombia Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Grenada has made use of the facility to respond to a hurricane that Project involves the creation of a $150 million contingent fi- was declared a national disaster. In the case of Mexico, it was dif- nancing facility to act as a bridging facility until resources from ficult to justify paying the commitment fee for the contingency other multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) and international fund, because the country had not had a major disaster to put the agencies become available. This financing would be available funds to use, and already had a fund to deal with smaller disas- within one month of the declaration of a national disaster emer- ters. The loan was cancelled. gency. Though these more recent projects have made steps to Second, countries lacked the capacity to engage in this correct for the previous problem of limited accessibility, they have form of emergency borrowing, even if they expressed interest not yet been put to the test with a disaster. Source: Background report on small island nations (IEG 2005f). 5 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T The Bank needs a way to well as to incorporate Recurring Disaster Events prevention measures into The OP considers ERLs less appropriate for get funds to borrowers Bank-financed emergency recurring events and suggests that for annual more quickly than it has projects.Themechanisms floodingandslow-onsetdisasterssuchasdrought, in the past. provided were to assist a regular investment loan is likely to be more the rehabilitation and effective. In practice, ERLs have been used to reconstruction of public infrastructure and the respond to droughts and recurrent events. purchase of capital goods, but not the provision of Generally, ERLs tend to focus on more prominent relief supplies. and large-scale events. Figure 6.2 shows the The Bank might consider the development of relationship between disaster types and ERLs over an emergency facility like that of the IDB. Doing the three policy periods. During the current policy so could solve the urgent needs of those period (P3), the number of drought projects borrowers for whom reallocations are impossi- almost equaled the number of earthquake ble or undesirable and for whom new borrowing projects, and 44 percent of the ERLs responded to would be too large a burden. Of course, the recurrent flood phenomena such as those caused bigger borrowers do not need small amounts, by El Niño. So rather than exclude recurrent because they are usually capable of financing events from emergency projects, Bank policy immediate actions on their own. could recognize the likely recurrence of disaster and give more attention to identifying vulnerabil- Rebuilding Physical Assets ity and to mitigating the effects of future disasters and Restoring Economic in regular investment lending. and Social Activities The Bank has a long and positive experience Disaster-Resistant Construction with the execution of physical components of Standards projects, and their physical design (when it is Sixty percent of the completed projects in the sufficiently disaster resilient) has generally been disaster portfolio were either struck by a appropriate and of good quality. Addressing the subsequent disaster during implementation or social and economic recovery aspects of had their implementation process interrupted emergency projects has been more difficult. Yet by disaster, and 40 percent of those found that project experience examined by this evaluation project-constructed infrastructure or project shows that this aspect is critical for the sustain- activities had been compromised to some ability of the reconstruction investments. degree. In 121 of 197 completed projects with a The failure to create strong focus on mitigation, which were Creating user the social organizations supposed to use disaster-resilient reconstruc- organizations to manage necessary for upkeep tion standards, evaluations of 31 projects (26 facilities occupied by and decision making in percent) acknowledged flaws in the design, housing and commercial leading in 13 cases to severe damage by a multiple families or used areas caused problems subsequent event, and in 6 cases to partial by numerous businesses in many reconstruction damage. In most cases the damage was minor remains a challenge. projects.10 Creating the and restricted to one or two structures. More sustainable user organi- recent projects are showing considerable zations needed to manage infrastructure improvement in this area, and later projects are remains an unsolved challenge. Additional more frequently attempting to increase policy emphasis on this point would be resiliency and prevent destruction through desirable. Creating a capacity for maintenance is mitigation measures. Still, this is a disturbing often as critical to long-term vulnerability finding, and more needs to be done. reduction as the quality of the initial construc- Failure to plan for disasters at the project tion. This too could be reflected in policy. level also underlies losses in highly vulnerable 6 0 B A N K P O L I C Y: I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S Figure 6.2: ERLs by Natural Disaster Type 30 25 20 projects of 15 Number 10 5 0 P0 P1 P2 P3 Policy period Flood Tropical storm Earthquake Drought Source: IEG project database. countries. Of 65 projects in the transportation, Emergency More than half the urban, and water and sanitation sectors Preparedness projects were disrupted (approved between 2000 and 2004 in countries Studies identified as hotspots by the Natural Disaster Disaster projects often by subsequent disasters: Hotspots study [World Bank 2005]), the have a studies compo- in many, Bank-financed documents for only 3 include any detailed nent (flood-related stud- infrastructure was description of how a natural disaster might affect ies predominate) related damaged. the project and any cautionary actions to be to the achievement of an taken. Nine mention disaster risk in passing. important project objec- ERLs and other disaster reconstruction projects tive. IEG has found that when studies were were not included in the review. intended to be used in disaster prevention, about Staff seem to agree on the importance of half of the time they were completed but not emphasizing disaster-resilient construction. In taken into account. Of 197 projects that priori- the survey of experienced task managers, almost tized disaster mitigation or prevention and all of the respondents to the open-ended related technical assistance, 142 (72 percent) question, "What new directions should the included studies. In 54 projects (38 percent), Bank's efforts in natural disaster response take?" findings were taken into Disaster-resilient answered that the Bank should strengthen account, and in 23 prevention activities. However, where they are additional projects (16 construction needs attempted, results have not always been good: percent), study findings strong, consistent 58 percent of respondents said that prevention were partially taken into attention by borrowers and mitigation objectives often are not achieved account. In 37 projects in Bank-financed projects. (26 percent), however, and the Bank. 6 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Emergency preparedness studies were not During the first policy period (1984­89, OPN studies are typically undertaken or findings 10.07), an average of three prevention or mitiga- were not taken into tion measures per project were identified; completed too late and account. For the rest, during the second period (1989­96, OD 8.50), used too little. project documents did four, and during the third period (1996­2004, not provide information. OP 8.50), five. More rigor is still required, Ten project evaluations mentioned lessons however. Out of all 197 projects with clearly learned about preparedness studies. General identifiable technical assistance for mitigation or experience is that studies tend to be left until prevention activities, 80 (40 percent) did not late in a project, and it is therefore important to complete one or more mitigation or prevention carefully prepare the groundwork for studies components (see Appendix F, table F.2). much earlier--before project approval if The evaluation found that strong borrower possible, in order to avoid the long delays that ownership is essential for successful mitigation are known to be common. While a new policy or prevention, and that many borrowers still do could continue to emphasize these studies, not see the importance of such measures. High without conditionality tied to them, a full borrower ownership was observed in about half treatment in a good practice handbook would of the projects (51 percent) that had mitigation be sufficient. or prevention components, partial ownership in 30 percent, and lack of ownership in 16 Technical Assistance on Prevention percent.12 The lack of ownership often and Mitigation Measures expressed itself in high staff turnover or lack of Attention to mitigation Since the mid-1990s, staff (failure to appoint individuals for key prevention and mitiga- positions), and in a failure in the timely efforts is improving, but tion have been high provision of counterpart funds. High staff too often lacks borrower priorities, and in the turnover or understaffing was observed in 32 ownership. most recent projects percent of the 197 projects with mitigation or have become the pri- prevention activities, and problems associated mary project objective.11 The emphasis has also with counterpart funds in 39 percent. shifted from structural measures, which are still important, to nonstructural measures such as Addressing Longer-Term Disaster Issues institution building for hazard management, The current policy implies that long-term issues policy changes, the preparation of hazard are better treated in a follow-on project than in management plans, land use planning, enforce- an ERL. However, few ERLs have been followed ment of building codes, and insurance. up with normal disaster investment projects. An Turkey, for example, has invested more additional element of the rationale for the policy resources in such activities with each successive guidance on avoiding long-term problems was project (figure 6.3). In Central America, the Bank that whatever a country's implementation is implementing two innovative projects capacity is under normal circumstances, it is dedicated fully to developing disaster mitigation greatly reduced after a major disaster. Thus, and prevention capacity in Honduras and activities that were not possible before the Nicaragua; and preparation of a grant-funded disaster are probably even more difficult regional disaster mitigation and response afterward. Ensuring a flexible approach to project, along with four individual country financing a natural disaster response would help mitigation projects, is under way. ensure that longer-term issues get the careful Prevention and mitigation are areas where attention that has sometimes been missing. much remains to be done, and a new policy The failure to maintain infrastructure is an should retain a strong provision to this effect, entrenched problem that, while not easily though, as noted earlier, prevention approaches solved, requires attention. Among disaster may require more research and closer evaluation. experts, it has become increasingly apparent 6 2 B A N K P O L I C Y: I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S Figure 6.3: Focus on Mitigation Has Increased with Each Successive Project in Turkey 600 500 400 millions 300 US$ 200 100 0 Erzincan TEFER MEER ISMEP 1992 1998 1999 2005 Recovery and reconstruction Disaster mitigation and preparedness Source: Project Performance Assessment Report: Turkey (IEG 2005b). that much expensive disaster prevention of training in mainte- Maintenance is critical infrastructure fails for lack of maintenance. The nance management, and for many types of 2004 Caribbean Regional Disaster Conference a lack of beneficiary protective infrastructure, "Managing Hazards in a Changing Environment" ownership and account- concluded that governments' investments in ability. Over the past 20 yet is often overlooked. large-scale structures to reduce disaster vulnera- years, only about half (58 bility have been seriously compromised by out of the 121) of the projects in the database failure to conduct and fund maintenance. For with clearly identified mitigation activities example, many Bank-financed cyclone shelters provided for long-term maintenance of in Bangladesh are no longer usable for lack of reconstructed infrastructure, while 21 percent maintenance. In another case, Bank-financed provided only partially for long-term mainte- flood control infrastructure protecting a major nance. In 27 percent of the projects no mainte- South American city was severely compromised nance was provided at all.14 Without project- by the presence of junked automobiles and financed efforts to improve maintenance, hard- refuse blocking the watercourses. won progress is put at risk. Evaluations of Bank activities have often Twenty-five project evaluations mentioned noted that inadequate budgeting for operations the maintenance of infrastructure as a concern. and maintenance reduces the sustainability of Six of them recommended that provisions for project benefits, and it is no different in natural maintenance need to be made during prepara- disaster projects. This is a particular problem in tion. In Bank experience, governments in the maintenance of protective infrastructure developing countries tend to borrow in order to such as river training works,13 emergency rebuild what was lost and to construct to higher shelters, and emergency evacuation routes. design standards--but quite often they do not There is also a lack of human resources develop functional mechanisms to maintain the available for maintenance tasks generally, a lack structures. To address attitudes toward mainte- 6 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T nance of infrastructure, evaluations proposed Donor Coordination field-level training in maintenance. To provide a Disasters typically attract numerous donors. sustainable flow of budgetary resources after About 34 percent of completed and ongoing project closing, project evaluations identified disaster projects involve donors other than the only two alternatives for funding: the govern- Bank. The documents for 170 of the 528 disaster- mental budget and the collection of user fees related projects mention coordination with other from beneficiaries. donors.15 NGOs are involved in 38 percent of the disaster projects financed by the Bank. The Procurement documents mention working with donors on OP 8.50 stipulates that standard Bank many different levels--co-financing Bank- operational policies on procurement, consult- supported projects, the Bank co-financing others' ants, and disbursement apply to emergency projects, donors working on related projects of situations. OP 11.00 (2004) on procurement their own, or doing joint damage assessments. makes a special exception for emergencies--it The successive policy statements require that allows direct contracting following a disaster, the Bank should facilitate Although procurement without competitive collaboration between the government, the Bank, guidelines now have bidding (single source) multilateral and bilateral donors, and NGOs to provision for disasters, when this is the most develop a common recovery strategy. Project appropriate course of experience suggests that the development of such they remain difficult for action. In the project a strategy requires an immediate and prolonged smaller or infrequent evaluations reviewed for Bank presence in the disaster-affected area. borrowers. this study, the challenges Project documents show that the develop- inherent in the Bank's ment of a joint strategy has often been done procurement procedures were of great concern. well--in Bangladesh (1999), Gujarat (2002), Forty project evaluations mentioned problems Honduras (1999), Mozambique (2000), associated with the Bank's procurement Nicaragua (1999), Sudan (1989), and Turkey procedures when borrowers are stressed and (2000), and in Sudan serves as a best practice implementation capacity is insufficient to the example. However, sometimes such develop- scale of the task at hand. ment has been done poorly (box 6.2). When training in the Bank's procurement For the 1989 Sudan Emergency Flood rules has not been given to borrower staff with Reconstruction Program (EFRP), the Bank, administrative responsibilities for project together with the UNDP, fielded a 52-member accounts, deviations from accepted procedures multi-donor mission to conduct a damage and have caused significant delays in the reconstruc- needs assessment. The Bank members of the tion process. The biggest concern of staff that team were selected for their technical expertise in had been involved with projects was that future relevant sectors (agriculture, education, telecom- projects should ensure that procurement munications, health, rural water, power, transport, procedures are understood and that documen- telecommunication, and urban) and previous tation is ready before start-up. Ten natural experience in Sudan. Over a two-week period, the disaster project evaluations (of the 40 that deal mission produced a document that was then with procurement) stressed the importance of presented at a donor conference in Paris. giving attention to procurement even before At the Paris conference, the members of the loan or credit approval. The policy wording on mission helped broker the various donor this issue could benefit interests. The Bank followed up the agreements Development of a joint from the advice of a task made in these meetings with separate meetings strategy for donors has force convened among with each donor to make more specific arrange- procurement specialists ments. The Bank negotiators worked with the often worked well. in the Bank. donors to ensure that their interests were met 6 4 B A N K P O L I C Y: I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S Box 6.2: What Happens When the Bank Does Not Stay Engaged? As early as 10 days after the 1994 Maharashtra earthquake, a the government to meet. Since international NGOs provided large, World Bank delegation arrived to assess the damage and develop steel-reinforced concrete buildings, the government eventually had a plan for reconstruction and mitigation. After an initial assess- to do the same; when the NGOs provided flooring for the housing, ment, the team flew back to Washington in order to get the Ma- the government had to do the same. Had the World Bank team re- harashtra Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project mained on site it could have facilitated discussions between (MEERP) approved quickly. In the meantime, a few international donors, NGOs, the government, and beneficiaries to develop stan- NGOs started reconstruction. dards and a shared reconstruction strategy that was amenable to These NGOs set the standards for reconstruction quality and all parties. In the end, the Bank's strategy was finished five months created expectations among beneficiaries that were difficult for after the earthquake, too late to influence other donors. Source: IEG project evaluation. but that there were no unnecessary overlaps in overall strategy with others. However, an coverage. By keeping the composition of the important shift occurred under OP 8.50, which Bank's contribution flexible, the other donors calls for giving more responsibility to the borrower were helped to make adjustments in their and letting the borrower take the coordinating role programs. The Bank then financed what was left when that is appropriate. Figure 6.4 shows that, at to complete a comprehensive Emergency Flood least partly in response to Reconstruction Program. policy requirements, bor- Borrowers are now taking The OPN and the OD recommended that the rowers are indeed be- more responsibility for Bank coordinate donor efforts, and suggested that coming more involved in Bank staff share their damage assessments and coordinating donors. coordination. Figure 6.4: The Bank Often Leads Coordination, But the Borrower Role Is Growing 18 16 14 12 projects 10 of 8 Number 6 4 2 0 P1 P2 P3 Policy period World Bank Borrower Other donors Source: IEG project database. 6 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Project performance shows an interesting common strategy with other donors (5 respon- pattern regarding the participation of other dents). Other ideas offered were to create a donors in Bank-financed projects. It gets steadily permanent multidonor task force for disaster better when an increasing number of donors are response and to coordinate closely with other involved only up to a point (once four donors donors with contacts in agencies that are politi- are involved, performance falls off precipitously, cally and socially closer to the affected people. table 6.1). Donor coordination was a concern in 16 Institutional Development project evaluations. Ten evaluations mentioned Because hazard risk management takes place in a that donor coordination is especially important if broad sectoral context, institutional development interventions overlap and/or if the project activities need to address the work of line agencies success of one funding agency depends on the as well as to strengthen disaster-specific units. The other. While several evaluations suggested that evaluation found that the Bank strengthened other donors may be better at providing relief hazard management institutions on its own in 6 and strengthening institutions, five evaluations countries and in cooperation with other agencies Staff suggest establishing asserted that the Bank in 17 countries. It strengthened single-sector line was well placed to agencies in 14 countries (20 projects). In addition, donor cooperation in leverage external assis- it strengthened community-based disaster regular projects so it will tance after an emer- management in 6 countries (India, Indonesia, be in place when needed gency. Suggestions were Kenya, Nepal, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis). offered on how the Bank Forty-nine project evaluations discuss institutional for disasters. could coordinate donors. development; 28 of them stress the importance of This seems an issue strengthening a country's institutional capacity for better suited for a good practice handbook, and long-term disaster prevention and mitigation. the evaluation sees little reason for retaining it in Along with establishing or strengthening Bank policy. disaster management institutions, for which When task managers were asked to suggest budgetary allocations need to be made, changes ways the Bank can increase the effectiveness of in the national disaster policy are also important. donor coordination in disaster situations, 8 of In their response to the survey, a few experi- 26 respondents recommended mainstreaming enced task managers specifically warned against cooperation with other donors in regular designing projects with over-ambitious disaster projects so that these links and working relation- management objectives. Project experience with ships are already in place when a disaster strikes. institutional development could be summarized Other frequent responses were to strengthen in a good practice handbook, but there seems to the government to better coordinate natural be no compelling reason to retain this provision disasters (5 respondents) and to prepare a in a new policy. Hazard management institutions are most effective when they are cross-sectoral and address all potential natural and technolog- Table 6.1: Project Performance Drops Sharply ical hazards. with More Than Three Partners Over the past 20 years, the Bank has formulated institutional development components for 160 Projects Satisfactory completed projects. Institutional development Number of partners (number) (percent) encompasses a wide variety of activities, including One 41 63 project management (75 projects), disaster Two 29 66 management (40 projects), general research (43 Three 17 71 projects), early warning improvements (39 Four or more 9 56 projects), disaster-specific training programs (27 Total number with other donors 96 projects), engineering studies (23 projects), and Source: IEG project database. legal and policy reform (13 projects). 6 6 7 Conclusions and Recommendations N ature creates hazards, but the actions of people, societies, and gov- ernments create disasters. When disasters occur, international devel- opment institutions now routinely experience intense public pressure to act quickly to relieve the devastation and ease the government's macro- economic burdens. As the World Bank strives to be agile, and to time will lower the cost of the inevitable next meet the expectations of its shareholders, it event. needs to become more strategic, responding · Third, borrowers need regular reminders that with advice and resources, as well as lending and all actions that take place in development proj- nonlending activities that contribute not only to ects--financed by any donor or by the coun- recovery but also to long-term development and try itself--affect peoples' motivation and disaster prevention. In doing so, it would be well psychology, as well as the physical, social, eco- to remember that there is no period when nomic, cultural, and political factors that can disaster risks can be safely ignored or set aside, either increase societies' capacity to respond especially for the subgroup of countries that is to extreme events or reduce it. Rebuilding highly vulnerable to disasters. what existed before is never enough. Policies Several disaster-related challenges face the and actions intended to reduce the impact of Bank as it attempts to provide better services to the next disaster must be an integral part of a its borrowers: strategy of both the recovery from disaster and pre-disaster planning. · First is to ensure that the poor do not miss out · Fourth, maintenance helps ensure that what is on the recovery or, worse, lose the little they rebuilt will have an extended life span. The have left. durability of infrastructure rebuilt after disas- · Second, and even more challenging, is to ter is always in doubt when measures to in- work against complacency during those pe- crease the capacity to conduct routine riods when disasters are not on the nightly maintenance are absent. news and in the headlines. In its role as de- velopment advisor, the Bank needs to be a Of course, the longer the return period, the steadfast advocate for the small additional in- more difficult it can be for governments to vestments in disaster prevention that over justify investments in prevention. The problem 6 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T often comes down to making difficult develop- When to Engage and How to Stay Engaged ment choices from among the many competing The Bank's policy prohibitions on relief have not demands. Disaster prevention, because it is been respected for good reasons. Staff have wrongly perceived to be a periodic need rather seen that other agencies cannot always fill the than a constant one, tends to lose out to other immediate needs of the affected people and priorities--especially once the immediate relief regions following a large disaster. The Bank can needs of the most recent disaster have been mobilize the large-scale resources necessary for met. It is easy to forget that natural hazards cash transfer and the rapid restoration of become disasters only when we fail to take import/export-related infrastructure. account of the risks and plan for them. The Bank, like its borrowers and other donors, has found it difficult to stay engaged What Works in Developed Countries May with mitigation and prevention efforts. Rather Not Work Elsewhere than promoting long-term solutions that Many strategies that work for recovery efforts in address the interaction between environmental developed countries should never be attempted degradation and natural disaster, highly vulnera- in developing societies--especially when margin- ble countries--with the cooperation of the Bank alized groups are affected. For example, following and other donors--too often have been willing a disaster that destroys infrastructure in a to borrow repeatedly without addressing the developed country, time is money. Rubble root causes of disaster impacts. clearance takes place quickly, as does reconstruc- Particularly when it comes to prevention and tion; the cost of money and labor are the only response measures, project objectives and major constraints to completing these tasks. activities need to become more relevant. The In lower-income developing countries, taking very high outcome and sustainability ratings that the time to ensure that all usable building have been achieved over the past 20 years show materials are recovered and recycled is often the that Bank financing can deliver the outputs only way to ensure that the poor will be able to needed for a disaster response, but the high afford to rebuild. Once work opportunities ratings conceal shortcomings on the achieve- associated with rubble clearance and materials ment of durable outcomes and relevant impacts. recycling diminish, cash assistance targeted to For example, the equipment intended to help affected families as they wait for more reduce vulnerability needs to be used effectively permanent shelter is very important. Under to achieve its purpose; acquisition alone is not strictly specified circumstances, direct cash enough. Prevention and mitigation measures payments to individual victims can be one of the need to be bold enough to make a difference. best available options to keep the situation of Distribution of educational materials about the poor viable until the recovery takes off. disasters in classrooms has more meaning when Some strategies that do work in both the schools have been built to resist the prevail- developed and developing countries are the use ing hazards. Perhaps most important, those facili- of building codes to improve the quality of the ties that are essential for an effective response built environment and salvage of objects that need to be tied to networks that will not fail created the sense of place in the original them. Hospitals not only need to be sited and environment. The problem with emphasizing built so that they are disaster resilient, but they building codes in developing countries is that also need to be assured of an uninterrupted squatter settlements and other informal power supply, a network of secure access routes, neighborhoods will not comply with code and secure provision of safe water and sanitation. requirements, and safer building practices will therefore need to be disseminated in other The Challenges Ahead: ways. Simplicity of message is essential to the A Review of the Evidence widespread adoption of disaster-resilient What disaster-related challenges does the Bank technologies. face? While the number of natural disaster- 6 8 C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S related loans per year has gone up in each changed, the evaluation finds that the Bank has decade and the scale of those operations has been effectively deprived of a focal point that is grown, the economic losses due to natural visible to donors and borrowers and once was disasters have risen even faster--they currently internationally known. exceed in one year the Bank's contribution to The high number of damage assessments that reconstruction over 20 years. The cost of succes- result in ERLs suggests that Bank staff too often sive reconstruction in many countries constrains try to respond to disaster by asking what activi- subsequent development and puts at risk ties can be accommodated in a three-year ERL, agreed development goals. Far more attention rather than asking what needs to be done so that to prevention, mitigation, and risk management reconstruction and recovery can be handled is needed (Chapter 4), but client demand for most effectively and in a way that permanently such services is easily displaced by other reduces vulnerability. The Bank needs to be able development concerns. to identify when urgency is counterproductive, The Bank has organized itself in a manner lest funding mechanisms rather than develop- that handles emergencies unevenly. The three- ment needs drive its response. The funding person Hazard Risk Management (HRM) Team mechanisms themselves need to be rethought: has done a commendable job of training Bank balance of payment lending has been a relatively and borrower staff, organizing awareness- quick-disbursing mechanism, but it is nowhere building events, analyzing vulnerability, and near as fast as it was supposed to be, and it has establishing partnerships with the international only helped in very limited circumstances. and scientific communities and the private Contingency finance has not yet lived up to its sector to promote hazard reduction. early promise, and reallocations have been too When a disaster strikes, however, it is the concentrated in highly vulnerable countries country teams who are the Bank's interface with (Chapter 4). the borrowers. Yet country team staff are The Bank has done better at reconstructing unlikely to have confronted a disaster before infrastructure than at reducing vulnerabilities and must call on others in the Bank (recently and addressing their root causes. It has yet to including IEG). Because of its small size, the discover the best ways to respond when gender HRM Team calls on colleagues in the Hazard or the locations and "informality" of neighbor- Management Thematic Group for technical hoods within settlements make vulnerability assistance. irregular. The quality of the result is partly a function of Strategies and projects in disaster-prone who is around to answer the calls. But it is also countries do not routinely consider disaster the case that an important reserve capacity has risks. Even disaster response projects themselves been lost. Soon after it was founded, what was can be compromised by the rapid occurrence of then the Disaster Management Facility became the next unexpected event. Thus, reconstruction the secretariat for the ProVention program-- projects have sometimes built infrastructure that making the team far more visible internationally. is insufficiently resilient to disaster. But when that program left the Bank, the team Many project activities with long-term lost staff that could help in emergencies. development impact (such as creating a capacity Three people are too few to spread across the for infrastructure maintenance or creating natural disasters that occur every year, and they sustainable disaster management institutions) are too few to be both the face of the Bank to take more than three years to implement--in the donor community and serve the needs of many cases much longer. And many of the countries affected by disaster, while also fastest-implemented and best-performing proj- ensuring attention to long-term reduction of ects are not as impressive with hindsight-- hazard risks in client countries and lending especially when considering the important programs. While it could be argued that the core priorities and vulnerable groups that ultimately team remained the same, and only the name has went unattended (Chapter 4). 6 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T The way problems are defined determines received Bank support for disaster discuss the the nature of the proposed solution and affects countries' commitment to prevention and whether donor coordination can be effective. reduction. However, while Bank lending for Post-disaster assessment, done in collaboration disaster assistance has been influenced by the with others, has an important role but has not inclusion of this topic in the strategy documents, yet been adequately integrated into the Bank's much more needs to be done. disaster response activities (Chapter 4 and box 4.7). Even if the Bank ultimately does not lend, Lessons an early Bank presence with continuity and information on global best practice is highly Pre-Disaster Risk Reduction important and valued by its member countries. In the 20 years of Bank support for disaster Natural hazard risks are highly concentrated, so reconstruction, what achievements stand out? special attention needs to be given to planning The majority of borrowers have come to rely on ahead for disaster and to reducing long-term vulner- the Bank for advice and financial support each ability in countries at highest risk. time a major natural occurrence overwhelms Research has shown the concentration of their ability to cope. The Bank has lent an disaster risks and Bank lending patterns confirm estimated $26 billion in 528 disaster responses that concentration. Yet, though disasters are that generally have achieved their objectives and foreseeable for many countries, they are exhibit an improving trend. The Bank also infrequently considered in country lending frequently works harmoniously with the programs. Furthermore, a surprisingly large regional development banks, the UN system, number of projects in countries highly vulnera- and other donors, ensuring that all parties' ble to disaster have been adversely affected actions can be coordinated. during implementation by unanticipated natural For more than 20 years the Bank has captured events. Yet projects, too, typically have not its best thinking in a succession of policy included disaster in their risk assessments. statements to guide its actions in countries When formulating country lending programs overcome by catastrophe. Each restatement of and project lending, the Bank needs to elevate policy has had a clear impact on the nature of the importance of natural hazards, especially for Bank lending and contributed to reducing the highly vulnerable countries. To do this vulnerability of human settlements. The policy efficiently, borrowing countries need to be statements have provided many ways for Bank categorized by vulnerability levels. staff to put together assistance tailored to each borrower's needs and circumstances. The policy In general, disaster responses have tended toward statements have provided guidance, yet have the reactive and tactical rather than the proactive not been too prescriptive, permitting an and strategic. essential amount of flexibility. A relatively short history of data collection Bank staff have long been able to select from together with a static view of disaster damages an extensive menu of options when responding in highly vulnerable countries has led to project to disaster--this study has identified 60 differ- objectives that provided for short-term fixes. ent types of disaster-related activities supported Projects rarely address the root causes of by Bank-financed projects--and staff have not disaster. Natural disaster activities would benefit been pressured into a single approach for all from the development of a strategy or action disaster situations or all countries. Disaster as a plan and related guidance that would: help staff thematic area has gradually been mainstreamed to respond to emergencies with quick relief and in Bank activities. Almost 250 ongoing projects well-planned reconstruction, and to do so more conduct disaster-prevention activities, even effectively in a much shorter period; ensure that though they have no specific disaster objectives. contingent loan facilities (be it on a country, More than half the CASs in countries that have regional, or global scale) result in all borrowing 7 0 C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S countries receiving a timely and adequate Reallocating resources from existing projects, a financial response to major events; and help common Bank approach following natural disasters, bring natural hazard risk management to the affects the ability to attain long-term development most vulnerable countries. goals and may be less effective than specific reconstruction lending. Immediate Post-Disaster Actions Reallocation is most useful when the project being reallocated has been made irrelevant. The development community should engage with While restructuring old projects may be politi- disaster-stricken borrowers earlier and stay cally easier than new lending, and allows the engaged longer. Bank to support government entities that are International experience on the impacts of already accustomed to working with the Bank, successful and unsuccessful relief management for the most vulnerable countries, reallocation and on the ability of key stakeholders to partici- of resources is a partial solution, at best. pate effectively in the recovery process needs to Reallocations fill an important niche in the be brought clearly to governments' attention. Bank's ability to respond to natural disasters, The Bank specifically needs to be present during and they will undoubtedly remain an important the emergency stage to ensure the success of tool in the Bank's response package. However, the reconstruction projects it finances. Low- reallocation can be impractical (for countries income community groups need support until with few Bank loans) and can be overused (in they develop the capacity to manage the countries hit by frequent disasters). Because infrastructure that has been placed in their care. they currently offer a more rapid response than the processing of an ERL, they may be used The Bank has a wide array of tools it can use when it more often and more heavily than they should. responds to disaster, but it has increasingly relied on The impact of loan restructuring using the the Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) to meet additional funding mechanism is too recent to borrower needs following a disaster. be evaluated but offers a promising alternative. The ERL offers accelerated processing and a short implementation period of three years, and Planning for Long-Term Recovery therefore has desirable qualities valued by both borrower and Bank staff who respond to Actions taken during the first weeks and months disasters. ERLs generally have worked well and after a disaster have a major impact on the recovery have high outcome ratings. process that is to follow, and they need to be But accelerated project processing is not planned and implemented accordingly. always desirable. For some projects, rushed Choices made immediately following a appraisal has led to long pauses between loan disaster--regarding shelter, resettlement, approval and first disbursement, poorly debris clearance, distribution of relief, and the designed interventions, and diminished poverty like--affect the later choices for longer-term impacts. Furthermore, by relying on a three-year solutions and vulnerability reduction and can lending period the Bank may end up emphasiz- have severe consequences for the ability of the ing activities that are expected to have short poor to recover. Immediate post-disaster implementation times and not attending to actions also need to include the development other activities that address the needs and of the capacities, knowledge, and skills that will vulnerabilities more fully. It often happens that be required for the recovery process. If studies activities that might contribute greatly to the are going to produce knowledge that is critical recovery effort (and to the borrower's sub- to fully informed project actions, they need a sequent long-term development) are not in- strong advocate, such as the Bank. Capacity cluded in the ERL projects because they cannot building for procurement and preparation of be completed in the three years allotted--and bidding documents should happen very early. then the project runs long in any event. Procurement is among the project activities 7 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T most cited in project-level evaluations as previous OPN and the OD laid out options for needing improvement. more effective and less instrument-focused responses to natural disasters. A lack of maintenance has often been the main constraint on the sustainability of a natural disaster The Bank has consistently underestimated the time project. needed to carry out emergency-related lending. There has also been a lack of human The vast majority of (natural disaster) resources available for maintenance tasks emergency recovery activities have not (and generally, a lack of training in maintenance probably cannot) be achieved within the three- management, and a lack of beneficiary owner- year timeframe established by OP 8.50 for ERLs. ship and accountability for upkeep. And the Bank has consistently underestimated the time required for projects, which on average Bank Organization and Processes have taken approximately 20 percent longer than initially planned. Two-thirds of natural Though natural disaster has no natural sectoral home disaster projects have not met their original in the Bank, staff in numerous sectors need special- completion dates. While disaster projects are ized services to enable them to respond to disasters not unique in this regard, it often happens that and to mitigate vulnerability to natural hazards. activities that might contribute greatly to the While transport and urban development has recovery effort (and to the borrower's recently been the sectoral home of disaster subsequent long-term development) are not work, there is no compelling reason why this included in the ERL projects because they should be so: more work has been done in the cannot be completed in the time allotted--and rural sector, though that would not necessarily then the project runs long in any event. be a better place for a disaster team. Recommendations The general complexity of natural disaster response Chapter 6 of the report makes a number of has led the Bank to draw from a broad array of activi- specific suggestions about revisions to the ties, but this would happen more effectively in the Bank's policy for emergency lending--these are presence of guidance at the institutional, country, not repeated here in their entirety. and project levels. Experience shows that custom-fitting a Prepare a Strategy or Action Plan for Natural response to the disaster and to the country does Disaster Assistance work, and it often works best when artificial time The Bank's natural disaster assistance would limits are not imposed. Disasters hit all sectors, benefit from the development of a strategy or but not equally or even every time. Investments action plan and related guidance that would: need to create disaster-resilient systems. After help staff to respond to emergencies with quick large disasters where the Bank has opted relief and well-planned reconstruction, and to exclusively to provide budget support, do so more effectively in a much shorter period; infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation ensure that contingency funds (be it on a has often been partial, with serious conse- country, regional, or global scale) result in all quences for economic recovery. borrowing countries receiving a timely and adequate financial response to major events; The current OP's strong focus on the ERL instrument and help bring natural hazard risk management is too narrow for natural disasters, which are not just to the most vulnerable countries. emergencies but ongoing risk factors, especially in The strategy or action plan needs to identify a highly vulnerable countries. methodology to assess each country's level of Most of the Bank's natural disaster work is disaster risk. It is suggested that countries be done by regular investment lending. The divided into high-, medium-, and low-risk 7 2 C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S groups. The action plan then needs to identify In whatever form it takes, Bank policy needs how the Bank will assist borrowers in each to focus more on disaster prevention and category to lower their vulnerabilities and to vulnerability reduction in all natural disaster build on local capacities and leadership. operations. Policy prohibitions on relief and the In highly vulnerable countries, the action financing of recurring events need to be plan needs to make provisions to give more relaxed. attention to natural hazards during the appraisal Accelerated processing and provisions for of investment projects generally, and specifically quick disbursement for ERLs have partially in the preparation of PRSPs, CASs, and other addressed the need for speed in undertaking strategic documents. Where appropriate, these short-term activities, though they could be documents need to go beyond a description of fruitfully complemented by a new mechanism, the risks, and identify monitorable mitigation such as a special central fund managed by the and institutional development activities. president's office (akin to the one in place in the For the most vulnerable countries, contin- IDB) to fund the most urgent needs in the early gency funding needs to be available, whether as days of a disaster response. part of another loan, a set-aside in the CAS But the use of ERLs is less appropriate for lending program, or a free-standing catastrophe longer-term activities, such as mitigation, fund (though these may become unnecessary if reconstruction, and institution building, which regional or global funds are eventually require a longer preparation and appraisal time established). Another alternative worth consider- and need not be exempted from due diligence ation is a special "quick start" funding mechanism standards and safeguard compliance. when disaster occurs. Similarly, attention to social issues during Countries deemed to be at medium to high preparation and implementation generally risk need to include disaster-resilient design in requires a longer period than has been available Bank-financed projects. For all countries, disaster under ERLs. Such activities are more suited to risks need to be considered in standard risk standard investment lending but have often been assessment documents. short-changed because of the ERL's three-year The strategy or action plan should be submit- implementation time, and the loss of borrower ted to the Board for discussion. interest in a second loan following the ERL. Revise Policy to Better Guide Staff and Increase Bank Capacity to Respond to Enhance Flexibility of Bank Responses Disasters and Ensure That It Can Be Mobilized to Natural Disasters Quickly Emergencies are of many sorts and, although Whether or not there is a designated unit to deal there is some overlap, most differ from the with natural disasters and hazard risks, the Bank disasters created by natural events in critical needs the capacity to quickly gather and dissem- ways. Bank policy needs to reflect these differ- inate international experience to borrowers in an ences by treating conflict and epidemic diseases emergency. In addition, task teams need support separately, with provisions that apply only to the while conducting post-disaster assessments and relevant topic. There are two ways in which this designing emergency interventions tailored to can be done: natural disasters can either be the the needs and capacities of each borrower. subject of a separate Operational Policy (as Responding to disasters requires multisec- called for in the 1998 IEG evaluation of the toral expertise. Including disaster-knowledge- Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruc- able people on Bank missions following major tion); or OP 8.50 could include specific crises can be crucial. Being selective in staffing provisions for natural disasters, for post-conflict identification for missions in post-disaster situations, and for health and other emergen- settings avoids problems of design and scale cies, so that each topic is dealt with separately. of response that can occur when people are 7 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T sent who are not used to seeing destruction Hazard Management Thematic Group away on a massive scale or who lack country from their ongoing responsibilities inevitably knowledge. The Bank has very few such has a negative impact on their normal activi- people, and it currently has no consistent ties. And there are so few knowledgeable staff mechanism for mobilizing them to respond to that the same people tend to be called upon natural disasters. Pulling members of the repeatedly. 7 4 APPENDIXES APPENDIX A: BANK POLICY AND PRODUCTS The Bank's emergency-related work has been Owing to the lack of restriction, in recent governed by three successive policy statements years "emergencies" have included foot-and- that have reflected the evolution of Bank think- mouth disease (Uruguay 2002), the decline ing on responding to natural disasters. Opera- in tourism in Caribbean countries after the tional Policy Note (OPN) 10.07, Guidelines for September 11 attacks on the United States (St. Bank Participation in Reconstruction Projects Vincent and the Grenadines 2002; Dominica after Disaster, was adopted in July 1984. This 2002; Grenada 2002; St. Kitts and Nevis 2002; was superseded by Operational Directive (OD) and St. Lucia 2002), return-migration into Yemen 8.50, Emergency Recovery Assistance, in No- during the Gulf Crises (Yemen 1991), the AIDS vember 1989. And the OD was replaced in turn epidemic (Uganda 1988), and avian influenza by Operational Policy (OP) 8.50, Emergency Re- (Vietnam 2005), among others. covery Assistance, in August 1995. The three The key provisions of the current OP are shown policy statements differ in how they characterize in table 1.1 in the main text. Table A.1, attached to emergencies and in several other areas as de- this appendix, provides a detailed, comparative scribed below. analysis of the three policy statements. All three iterations of the emergency policy Evolution of Policy have instructed staff to see that projects are The emergency lending procedures formalized designed to restore assets and productivity in OPN 10.07 were based on an analysis of 40 re- levels after emergencies that seriously dislocate construction projects from the 1970s and early the economy. They focus on reconstruction, and 1980s. The OPN details how to respond to nat- agree that relief and consumption should never ural disasters, but barely mentions war, though be financed. The prohibition is based on the it refers to man-made disasters.1 OD and OP 8.50 argument that borrowing should be reserved for are more specific, describing an emergency as "an economically productive activities, and that extraordinary event of limited duration, such as relief is best provided by local groups, the a war, civil disturbance, or natural disaster." governments concerned, bilateral relief pro- Apart from the general definition, the policy grams, nongovernmental organizations, and statements have done little to restrict the kinds specialized relief organizations. of emergency situations that would be eligible The list of measures not to be financed by the for Bank financing. Hence, the range of events Bank has been more detailed with each revision that can be considered emergencies has grown. of policy. The OPN prohibits only temporary Each policy statement has had a slightly differ- shelter, whereas the OD lists search and rescue, ent list of natural disaster emergencies that are evacuation, health care, and food and water eligible for Bank response: the OPN names distribution. The OP adds temporary sanitation earthquakes, hurricanes, and droughts; the OD, and restoration of access to transport. The earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes; and the policy statements generally guide the Bank away current OP, cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, from financing any form of consumption or the floods, forest fires, and tidal waves. immediate needs of disaster victims. 7 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Forms of Bank Assistance after of a disaster, a borrower tends to be Emergencies overwhelmed by relief and reconstruction, so The Bank can respond to an emergency in sev- that it should not be burdened with complicated eral ways. A common response is to develop an conditionality. Limited conditionality may be Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), but the Bank used, however, if it is linked directly to the also can reallocate funds from an existing proj- emergency. ect or revise and hasten processing of a planned The OP calls for ERLs that do not reflect broad project. It can also develop a new investment loan sectoral, structural, or institutional goals. It for mitigation activities. states: "Projects that are too complex, attempt to implement entirely new approaches, rely on Emergency Recovery Loans an institutional support that in most cases is In 1970 and 1971, the Bank financed natural dis- weak, and require detailed planning studies are aster reconstruction projects after an earthquake not appropriate." in Peru and a cyclone in Bangladesh.2 In these projects, several shortcuts were taken to speed Short timeframe up the project appraisal process to meet the All three policy statements aim to implement borrowers' urgent needs. These then became the emergency projects within three years. The OPN model for a new instrument, which came to be and the OP recommend an even shorter imple- called the Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL). mentation period of two to three years. The three policy statements have not differed much in how they describe ERL features. As Recurrent events stated in the OPN, ERLs receive early clearance, All three policy statements agree that ERLs are convene an advisory group, prepare one not the right instrument for recurrent or long- document that is a combined appraisal report term events such as annual flooding and drought, and memorandum of the president, and use because these events have characteristics that are simplified procedures.3 The emphasis on using handled better by a normal investment project. this lending instrument has increased over time, Unlike the OPN and the OP, the OD lets the task accompanying the broadening scope of what manager decide whether slow-onset emergen- constitutes an emergency. The main features of cies, such as drought, war, or civil disturbance, this instrument are described in the remainder require the quick response of an ERL or the of this section. more thorough preparation of one or more nor- mal investment projects. Limits on what reconstruction should do All three policy statements draw limits around Disaster-resistant design/studies/technical assistance what reconstruction projects should do. The All three policy statements suggest that ERLs OPN suggests that projects limit themselves to the should use measures to reduce vulnerability, "rapid restoration of physical structures and pro- such as disaster-resistant construction standards. ductive activities." It discourages the creation of In addition, they note that ERLs should rein- permanent new institutions for project imple- force vulnerable structures, adjust building and mentation and advocates limited changes--for ex- zoning codes, and acquire hazard-reduction tech- ample, through disaster prevention and nology (for example, early warning systems). mitigation measures. According to the policy The OD and OP add the establishment of an ad- note, the aftermath of a disaster is the ideal time equate institutional and regulatory framework for to reduce vulnerability. prevention and mitigation to this list. The OD suggests limiting the number of The policy statements differ, however, in the sectors and objectives in an emergency project. way these measures should be implemented. ERLs are not intended to address long-term The OPN, for example, recommends not economic problems that require major policy undertaking projects that require detailed adjustments. On the contrary, in the aftermath planning studies. Yet later policy statements find 7 8 A P P E N D I X A : B A N K P O L I C Y A N D P R O D U C T S that without detailed planning studies, vulnera- stroyed the schools. In other cases, projects have bility is not reduced. Therefore, the OD had slow-disbursing components that, after an recommends studies for vulnerability reduction emergency, have been reallocated to reconstruc- as well as detailed preparation and record tion purposes without regard to sector. keeping of consultant services for these studies. The OP follows in a similar vein by calling for Redesign of projects not yet approved emergency-preparedness studies. Funds can also be made available after an emer- A shift in policy recommendations can also gency by redesigning projects not yet approved. be found regarding technical assistance. While All three policy statements propose redesign- the OPN recommends that such assistance be ing projects to include components for disaster provided by supervision missions, the OD and reconstruction. OP suggest having the assistance provided by consultants. Free-standing investment projects for mitigation Another way to respond is through investments Procurement/disbursement/retroactive financing to prevent foreseeable disasters from occurring The OPN allows for retroactive financing and ad- and/or limiting their destructive impact. Here, the vance contracting; the OD and OP stipulate that three policy statements differ. The OPN dis- projects should "use no more than 20 percent of cusses reducing vulnerability through invest- loan proceeds for retroactive financing." Other ment and reconstruction projects, but it does not ways of making funds available quickly are Pro- go as far as recommending free-standing miti- ject Preparation Facility and Balance of Payment gation projects. The OD also advocates includ- (BoP) Loans, the latter to finance a positive list ing mitigation components in normal investment of imports immediately after a disaster. projects and ERLs, but goes one step further in Once a project is approved, however, all three proposing free-standing mitigation projects that policy statements agree that standard Bank are not to be processed as ERLs. The OP ad- operational policies on procurement, consult- heres to a similar approach. ants, and disbursement apply. OD 11.00 (1989) and OP 11.00 (2004) on procurement also make Donor Coordination provisions for emergencies that allow for more All three policy statements discuss donor coor- flexibility in procurement procedures (as dination. The OPN suggests that the Bank assist recommended in IEG 1998). They permit direct the borrower in coordinating donor efforts, es- contracting without competitive bidding (single pecially in gathering information on damage as- source) when this is the most appropriate sessment. It explains: "Coordination among course of action. government and international agencies is vital to avoid duplication of efforts, adoption of contra- Other Response Options dictory policies to guide reconstruction, neglect of areas that may be important to consider in the Loan reallocations reconstruction strategy, and waste of resources." Not all emergency situations call for free-standing The OD emphasizes the Bank's role in attract- ERLs. Therefore, the Bank often uses loan real- ing and coordinating support from other donors. locations to provide smaller amounts quickly after The UNDP and other international agencies as an emergency. All three policy statements rec- well as bilateral donors and local nongovern- ommend reallocations of existing loans. The ad- mental organizations are mentioned as potential vantage of this approach is that the projects are partners. It notes that they should be involved in already approved, so funds can be quickly reded- designing prevention and mitigation programs. icated. Often those funds keep their broad sector The OP recommends coordinating with the dedication. For example, funds originally intended International Monetary Fund on quick-disburs- for school improvement have been reallocated to ing components. It also proposes collaboration school reconstruction after an earthquake had de- with the organizations noted under the OD to 7 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T design a recovery assistance strategy and required for a country to receive concessional specific prevention and mitigation programs. assistance from the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Monetary Disaster-Relevant Products Fund. The PRSP is also the basis for the provision The Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is of debt relief under the enhanced Heavily supposed to synthesize the country situation, Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. Since the government priorities, Bank Group strategy, and PRSP process is based on poverty diagnostics, it Bank partner activities into a coherent program might be expected that PRSPs for countries where for future work together. For this study, CASs the risk of natural disaster is high, and where were reviewed to determine, for countries with disaster regularly makes the life of the poor more significant disaster-related issues, whether these difficult, would consider disaster impacts and issues are reflected in their CASs. strategies for vulnerability reduction. The degree A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is to which this happens is noted in Chapter 3. Table A.1: Comparative Analysis of World Bank Policy Statements July 1984 Operational November 1989 August 1995 Policy Note, No. 10.07 ­ Operational Directive, Operational Policy, Guidelines for Bank Participation OD 8.50 ­ OP 8.50 ­ in Reconstruction Projects Emergency Recovery Emergency Recovery Category after Disaster Assistance Assistance Policy applicability Finance reconstruction activities Emergencies that seriously Emergencies that seriously dislo- after disasters. Destruction must dislocate the economy and cate the economy and call for a affect national priorities or may call for a quick response from quick response from the govern- seriously disrupt the development the government and the Bank. ment and the Bank. process. Definition of Natural and man-made disasters. An extraordinary event of limited An extraordinary event of limited "emergency" duration such as natural disaster, duration such as natural disaster, civil disturbance, or war. civil disturbance, or war. Relief and consumption The Bank is not equipped to provide The Bank does not finance relief The Bank does not finance relief assistance in the immediate post- and consumption. and consumption. disaster period. Relief is better done by others. Immediate support for Assist in defining appropriate Provide immediate support for Provide immediate support in as- damage and needs reconstruction strategies; identify (a) assessing damage and needs, sessing the emergency's impact assessment long-term implications of (b) decision-making consistent and develop a recovery strategy. immediate response; quickly with the recovery program, and assess damage and needs. (c) developing a recovery strategy. Financing instruments Reallocate existing loans, substitute Modify existing projects, modify Restructure the Bank's existing port- future lending, and /or prepare a projects under preparation, and/ folio, redesign projects not yet project-specific reconstruction loan. or prepare a free-standing ERL. approved, and/or prepare an ERL. Financing instruments Introduce limited change in disaster Inclusion of mitigation compo- In addition to emergency assis- for mitigation reduction/mitigation: Assist countries nents in normal investment opera- tance, support free-standing invest- to reduce vulnerability in regular tions and ERLs and preparation of ment projects for prevention and projects as well as in reconstruction free-standing preparedness and mitigation in countries prone to projects. mitigation projects. specific types of emergencies. 8 0 A P P E N D I X A : B A N K P O L I C Y A N D P R O D U C T S Table A.1: Comparative Analysis of World Bank Policy Statements (continued) July 1984 Operational November 1989 August 1995 Policy Note, No. 10.07 ­ Operational Directive, Operational Policy, Guidelines for Bank Participation OD 8.50 ­ OP 8.50 ­ in Reconstruction Projects Emergency Recovery Emergency Recovery Category after Disaster Assistance Assistance Limited conditionality Reconstruction projects, although ERLs are not intended to address ERLs do not attempt to address long- closely related to the attainment long-term economic problems term economic, sectoral, or institu- of medium- and long-term develop- requiring macroeconomic policy tional problems, and do not include ment goals, should confine them- adjustment. Conditionalities conditionality linked to macro- selves to specific rebuilding activities should be directly linked to economic policies. and the rapid restoration of physical the emergency. structures and productive activities. Short timeframe Complete projects within two to ERLs to be completed within Normally an ERL is fully imple- three years. three years. mented in two to three years. Procurement/ There is no need to depart from ERLs follow standard Bank Standard Bank Operational Policies, disbursement ordinary Bank lending mechanisms. Operational Policies including including those on procurement, those on procurement, consultants, and disbursement, consultants, and disbursement. apply to ERLs. Recurrent events Do not finance recurrent or long- ERLs respond to infrequent ERLs are inadequate instruments for term events such as annual floods events, not recurrent events such recurrent disasters such as floods or droughts. as floods. Judgment is needed to and slow-onset disasters such as decide whether slow-onset droughts. disasters, such as drought, war, or civil disturbance, require the quick response of an ERL, or the more thorough preparation of one or more normal investment projects. Disaster-resistant Reconstruction projects use ERLs use disaster-resilient recon- ERLs use disaster-resistant construc- design earthquake-resistant standards, flood struction design standards and tion standards, reinforce vulnerable control, and hurricane warning and include measures for preventing structures, adjust building and zon- response systems. They retrofit old and mitigating the impact of ing codes, and acquire hazard- structures and introduce an early future disasters. They reinforce reduction technology. warning system. Changes should be vulnerable structures, adjust consistent with the local economy building and zoning codes, and and traditions. Reconstruction proj- acquire hazard reduction ects also improve land use zoning technology. Attention should be and building codes. given to early warning systems and other technologies for emergency preparedness. Institutional and Establish an adequate institutional Establish an adequate institutional regulatory framework and regulatory framework for and regulatory framework for pre- prevention and mitigation. vention and mitigation. (Table continues on the following page.) 8 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table A.1: Comparative Analysis of World Bank Policy Statements (continued) July 1984 Operational November 1989 August 1995 Policy Note, No. 10.07 ­ Operational Directive, Operational Policy, Guidelines for Bank Participation OD 8.50 ­ OP 8.50 ­ in Reconstruction Projects Emergency Recovery Emergency Recovery Category after Disaster Assistance Assistance Donor coordination Bank experience may reinforce the The Bank can assist in attracting Collaboration with the UNDP and government's capacity to coordinate and coordinating reconstruction other international agencies, local efforts at all levels--local, national support from other donors. NGOs, and donors is often helpful and international. Information Collaboration with UNDP and in designing the recovery assistance gathering should be coordinated relevant international agencies, strategy under an ERL and in with the government and other local NGOs, and donors is often designing specific prevention and donors. The Bank should avoid helpful in designing specific mitigation programs duplication of efforts, adoption of prevention and mitigation contradictory policies to guide programs. The Bank can reconstruction, neglect of areas that prepare a report to mobilize may be important to consider in the donor support. reconstruction strategy, and waste of resources. 8 2 APPENDIX B: STUDY METHODOLOGY This evaluation uses the IEG-World Bank (WB) ship and engagement of beneficiaries and civil objectives-based evaluation methodology in society? Have they developed in-country ca- which performance is evaluated by measuring the pacity for disaster prevention and mitigation? Bank's progress toward its objectives. In a broad · Generation of lessons. Has the Bank devel- sense this involves the Bank's Mission State- oped best practice for mitigation, vulnerability ment as well as OP, BP, and GP 8.50. In a more reduction, donor coordination, poverty alle- restricted sense, it concerns how well disaster re- viation, and creating strong borrower owner- sponse projects attain project-level objectives. ship? What impact do events that take place The study draws heavily on completed and on- during the emergency phase, before the Bank going independent and self-evaluation, espe- is usually involved, have on projects? How has cially Project Performance Assessment Reports the analysis of natural disaster risks influenced (PPARs). the design of operations? How can the situa- tion of the poor be most effectively taken into Evaluative Questions account by post-disaster operations? The study addresses questions in five areas: Evaluative Instruments and Methods · Relevance. Do the Bank's policy goals ad- The study examined the Bank's experience from dress the major disaster-related needs of client several angles. The basic approach taken was to countries? Are they aligned with the Bank's avoid sampling by identifying a full universe. In the overall strategic objectives and competencies? staff survey, all task managers that worked on at Have operations been aligned to policy and to least one disaster project were invited to respond. country priorities? To what extent have oper- If the evaluation was looking at an activity (such ations complied with the policy by incorpo- as housing) or a disaster type (such as tropical rating effective prevention and mitigation storms), all the relevant projects were reviewed. measures? Does the current policy provide ad- The study used the following instruments. equate guidance to Bank staff? What has been the impact on operations of the policy changes Portfolio Review that occurred? The study identifies the post-1984 portfolio of dis- · Effectiveness. How well have operations per- aster operations financed by the Bank. Ratings formed against the objectives of Bank policy? data are reviewed, and patterns and trends in the To what extent have operations routinely Bank's lending in this area are identified (emer- achieved their stated disaster-related objec- gency lending projects initiated as a result of a tives? How sustainable have the projects and disaster, projects with components aimed at dis- initiatives been? How effectively has the Bank aster prevention and mitigation, and reallocations coordinated its activities with those of other in response to disaster). donors? How have Bank skills and organization Desk studies (described below) were hampered/fostered its effectiveness? conducted of a representative sample of · Institutional development impact. How projects that reflects the degree to which each effectively have operations promoted owner- approach is represented in the portfolio. The 8 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Box B.1: The Natural Disaster Portfolio: What Was understanding disaster risk, such as man's con- Counted and What Was Not nection to disaster, vulnerability, the macroeco- nomic effects of disaster, factors that amplify The natural disaster portfolio review took into account all projects disaster effects, the effects of recurring disas- with any activity related to disasters, although it excluded many activities ters, cities and vulnerability, and the connection that have a non-disaster-related purpose, but that may also help to re- between underdevelopment, poverty, and risk. duce the impact of disaster. For example, projects that build urban Chapter 3 explores the business of reducing storm sewers or irrigation projects that improve drainage both have a risk, including topics such as mitigation, re- positive impact in the event of disaster-related flooding. The study did sources and financing, an integrated approach to not include such activities under the category of "flood mitigation" un- risk reduction, and integrating poverty reduction less they were a direct response to a specific disaster event, or the and development programs with disaster risk wording in project documents specifically mentioned their contribution reduction programs. Chapter 4 deals with the to disaster prevention. business of transferring risk, including cost- spreading financial mechanisms--insurance, reinsurance, and microfinance. It also touches on post-1984 portfolio of disaster operations was the approaches to disaster of various develop- analyzed for patterns and trends in the Bank's ment organizations, including the ADB, DFID, lending in this area. Work financed through trust the IDB, and UN organizations, as well as the funds was studied. World Bank. Natural Disaster and Emergency Project Timing Lending Database The study analyzed the elapsed time of three dis- The study team created a database containing all tinct periods of the project cycle, including the the available information on Bank-financed dis- initial preparation time (from disaster date, when aster responses. This was analyzed to identify available,1 to Board approval), first disburse- which activities have been undertaken most often, ment time (from Board approval to effective- along with project performance ratings, to de- ness date2), and implementation time (from termine where the Bank has been most success- effectiveness date to revised closing date). ful, as well as where it needs to improve practice. The study examined the entire disaster Inter alia, the information generated from a portfolio as well as all Bank investments with the review of the full universe of projects indicates: aim of identifying projects that contain at least What percentage of projects include balance of two dates. The study then categorized the payment support? How many reconstruct public relevant projects into four groups: balance of buildings, urban infrastructure, private enter- payment (BoP) projects,3 Emergency Recovery prises, and/or family homes? An equally im- Loan (ERL) projects, all natural disaster projects, portant focus of the database is on an analysis of and all projects Bankwide. Balance of payment the activities and the lessons, and the results projects were selected from only completed that they achieved. projects,4 while ERL projects, the disaster-related projects, and the entire portfolio of projects Literature Review included both ongoing and completed projects. The study conducted a review of the literature In other words, 15 projects comprised the full to inform the research and analysis processes universe of the BoP group; 89 projects, the full with the findings of relevant academic and de- universe of the ERL group; 459 projects, the full velopment agency research. Areas of consensus universe of the disaster projects group; and 4,503 and controversy are identified, and issues and projects, the full universe of the entire Bank trends relevant to the Bank are explored. More portfolio approved between 1984 and 2005. specifically, the review report begins by outlin- When analyzing the project preparation time ing a short history of disaster response in Chap- period, disaster event and Board approval dates ter 1. Chapter 2 discusses issues important to were found in 11 BoP projects, 52 ERL projects, 8 4 A P P E N D I X B : S T U D Y M E T H O D O L O G Y and 66 disaster-related projects; project concept of the selected natural disasters and the effects dates (PCDs) and Board approval dates were of these operations on the national economy. Em- identified in 4,322 projects. With respect to first pirical data were gathered; the effects of the disbursement times, Board approval and BoP lending on the recipient country's econ- effectiveness times were available in 16 BoP omy were examined in the immediate, mid, and projects, 79 ERL projects, 455 disaster-related long term; and its effectiveness was evaluated. projects, and 4,369 other projects. As for This entailed the following research activities: implementation times, effectiveness and revised closing dates were found in 17 BoP projects, 79 · Identifying post-emergency lending projects ERL projects, 435 disaster-related projects, and that were specifically designed to improve and 4,503 other projects. support the BoP as a means to stabilize macro- The study also examined the projected and economic conditions and to minimize the gov- actual completion times of the 303 completed ernment deficit projects found in the natural disaster portfolio. · Gathering information on countries that were The study analyzed project timing using two afflicted by a natural disaster and were provided approaches. First, it focused on the projected and with the BoP lending over the past two actual completion times of projects with disaster- decades, and to summarize the features of the related objectives. The project objectives were BoP lending together with the methodology of categorized into at least one of 11 areas: (1) its implementation disaster management; (2) rehabilitation and con- · Collecting data on monthly BoP and macro- struction of public infrastructure; (3) agriculture economic indicators available at the IMF/World improvements, environmental conservation, and Bank Statistical Database for each relevant natural resource management; (4) economic country over a pre- and post-emergency time- restoration and strengthening; (5) pre-event period. disaster prevention; (6) rehabilitation and · Developing econometric models with avail- construction of housing; (7) financial assistance; able empirical data in order to test the effec- (8) project management; (9) operation and tiveness of the BoP lending on economic maintenance; (10) donor coordination; and (11) stabilization in the post-disaster context resettlement of affected populations. Second, the · Comparing the BoP performance of a target study looked at disaster activities derived from country over a several-disaster period, looking descriptions of the project components. Based at instances when it received BoP lending and on the descriptions, the study recognized 60 when it did not. Results were compared across natural disaster activities, corresponding to 60 countries and/or regions as appropriate. natural disaster component categories. Relevant projects contained at least one disaster activity. Surveys and Interviews Task managers still working for the Bank who had Analysis of Balance of Payment/Budget implemented one or more emergency loans were Support surveyed to gather the insights they have ob- In the Bank's involvement in post-emergency tained through these experiences. In addition, in- situations, there has been an emerging trend of dividual interviews of other relevant stakeholders providing balance of payment (BoP) assistance were conducted, including a survey of benefici- or budget support to the affected countries as aries that received Bank-financed assistance at a means of stabilizing macroeconomic condi- least five years ago to ascertain their perceptions tions. After the study database identified the of the process, their satisfaction with any infra- post-emergency lending projects that were structure constructed, and the nature of longer- specifically designed to improve and support term impacts. The survey instrument used is the BoP, the country assistance evaluation (CAE) reproduced in Attachment 1 to this appendix. findings and other macroeconomic indicators To gain a better understanding of project were analyzed to measure the economic impact effects on the ground, the study conducted a 8 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T survey of project beneficiaries in El Salvador. folio review. And they were weighted toward Under IEG supervision, a team of surveyors projects implemented under the current policy. conducted a survey of housing units (single- family homes and condominiums) built by the Targeted Inquiries into Disaster-Specific El Salvador Earthquake Reconstruction Project Issues and Themes (L 2873) for low-income families affected by the A number of themes were explored. For instance, earthquake. The draft survey instrument (see topics requiring a broader overview including the below) was developed in conjunction with the experience of other donors were examined: Ministry of Foreign Relations' Department of donor coordination, partnerships, the use of External Cooperation. The housing units disaster insurance, and other donors' experi- surveyed covered the work of the four partici- ence, including approaches to loss reduction pating financial institutions: CREDISA, CASA, (in those countries most prone to disaster). Atlacatl, and AHORROMET. The surveyors Other topics included inter alia a review of dis- participated in the data analysis process. At the aster-related local institutional development, end of the analysis process, the team presented contingency finance, damage assessment, storm written and oral observations. shelters, gender issues, and an analysis of CASs. The survey included questions about householder characteristics, the housing unit Field Case Studies and the surrounding neighborhood, and Based on the Portfolio Review and the findings homeownership issues. The survey instrument of the Desk Case Studies, five field case studies is reproduced in Attachment 2 to this appendix. that were outliers for a variety of reasons were On September 22, 2004, the IEG study team selected for extensive fieldwork. This work was held a stakeholders' workshop with 19 NGO done to see if the patterns identified for the full representatives participating in public-private universe of projects held for: projects that were partnership activities financed in part by the very large Bank-financed natural disaster assis- Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction tance programs (earthquakes in Turkey); un- Project (GEERP). The conclusions the partici- usual topography where disaster damages pants drew from their experience in response to sometimes reach a multiple of GDP (small island the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat were summarized states in the Caribbean); the 100-year event (Hur- from detailed notes taken during the session. The ricane Mitch in Central America); very large bor- document was used as a study Working Paper. rowers confronting the same events more than The summary was shared with the participants, once (India, earthquakes and floods); frequently who were given the opportunity to comment repeated Bank-financed projects for the same dis- and/or correct errors of fact or interpretation. aster type under successive policies (floods in Bangladesh); and a sixth case, which was done Desk Case Studies only as a desk study, examined loosely governed The study team performed desk studies on a se- states and disaster interaction (tropical storms lection of the projects identified by the portfo- and floods in Mozambique). lio review, with the intent of gaining an overview of the key events that take place during imple- External Advisory Panel mentation of Bank-financed emergency proj- A panel of experts in the field of developmental ects. The study sample was selected to reflect responses to natural disaster was convened to ad- the distribution of natural events to which the vise the study team and to review key evaluative Bank most often responds as shown by the port- documents and the final study report. 8 6 A P P E N D I X B : S T U D Y M E T H O D O L O G Y Attachment 1 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction: An IEG Review of Bank Assistance Project Manager Survey 1. If there was something you did during the course of a natural disaster-related project that you consider best practice, please describe it here. 2. What types of project designs or activities, if any, should Bank-financed disaster lending or non- lending services avoid? 3. What types of disaster-related project designs or activities is the Bank particularly good at? 4. a. Is the Bank's disaster-related lending focused enough on the poor? Yes No b. How could the Bank's disaster-related lending better address the needs of the poor? 5. How can the Bank increase the effectiveness of coordination with other agencies involved in dis- aster prevention or response? 6. What lessons have you learned about assessing damages after a major disaster event that the Bank or its Borrowers need to take into account? 7. Which beneficiary participation activities significantly enhance the implementation of disaster- related lending? 8. Under what circumstances (if any) have you seen beneficiary participation be counterproduc- tive in the post-disaster context? 9. What can be done to increase borrower ownership of disaster prevention/mitigation components in natural disaster-related projects? 10. a. Have you utilized the Hazard Management Unit (TUDHM) (formerly known as the Disaster Management Facility)? Yes No b. What types of support do Task Managers confronting disaster need from the Hazard Management Unit? 11. a. After board approval, what avoidable delays have you encountered in disaster-related projects? b. What, if anything, could the Bank do about these delays? 12. What new directions should the Bank's efforts in Natural Disaster prevention and mitigation take? 13. What additional disaster-related lending or non-lending services might the Bank offer? 14. What aspects of the Bank policy governing natural disasters (OP 8.50 Emergency Recovery Lend- ing) do you feel need be changed during the ongoing policy revision exercise? 8 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T 15. Do you believe that the majority of Bank-financed disaster projects achieve their disaster pre- vention/mitigation objectives? Yes No 16. Emergency Recovery Loans are currently allotted 36 months for implementation. In a revision of OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery Assistance) how many months would you allocate for imple- mentation? 17. During the current revision of OP 8.50, what types of emergencies would be appropriate for the new policy to cover? (Please check all that apply): Epidemics/pandemics Post-conflict Conflict reduction Failed states Natural disasters Technological disasters Economic crises Acts of terrorism Other If other, please specify 18. What training should be provided to task managers new to disaster? A short disaster training course for all TMs A mandatory training course for all task teams starting a disaster-related project. A training course for only those task teams that request one. No training is needed Other 19. If there is something else that you would like to say about the effectiveness of Bank activities in the post-disaster context, please note it here. 8 8 A P P E N D I X B : S T U D Y M E T H O D O L O G Y Attachment 2 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction: An IEG Review of Bank Assistance Household Survey: El Salvador Homeownership questions Number and percent: Did someone occupy this unit before you? Yes % No % What is your legal situation regarding this house? Owner % Under contract % Renting % Occupying an abandoned house/ squatter % If you own this unit, in whose name is the title? Man % Woman % Both % Don't know % Before moving to this home, where did you live? Rural area % Capital city % Another city % In your last home, what was your legal situation Owner % regarding that unit? Under contract % Renting % Living with others without paying % Living in an abandoned house % Public dormitory % Homeless % Other % The Housing Unit and Surrounding Neighborhood How did the 1986 Earthquake affect you? Destroyed my home Nothing/don't remember Damaged my home Psychological impact Lost personal effects Lost a family member Family member injured What do you like about this house? Everything Location That I own it Nothing Privacy House size Land area Comfortable Accessibility 8 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T What worries you about this house? Roof (houses) Nothing Quality of construction/ materials/water infiltration Walls Interior space is too small High monthly payment Location Insecure/Vulnerable to criminals Plumbing Flooring Environmental pollution What improvements have been made on this house? None Replaced doors or windows Extra rooms Replaced roof Enlarged at least 1 room Dividing walls Added a second floor Replaced the flooring Security grill work Name 3 things you like about this neighborhood Mass transportation Low crime Central location Everything Quiet Basic services Green zone School nearby Nothing Neighbors Climate Name 3 things that worry you about Nothing this neighborhood Potable water in short supply Risk of road or pedestrian accessibility to the community being lost Danger/risk Crime Contaminated river nearby Inadequate garbage collection Flooding Retaining walls Lack of play areas Lack of schools Everything Lack of street lights Poor quality materials in stairs/walkways 9 0 A P P E N D I X B : S T U D Y M E T H O D O L O G Y Attachment 3 Original Survey Instrument in Spanish Colonia: Pasaje: 1. ¿Alguien ocupó la casa antes de usted? SI NO 2. ¿Cuál es su situación referente a esta casa? Propietario Con promesa de venta Alquilando Ocupando casa abandonada Otra 3. ¿Si es dueño, a nombre de quién está la escritura? Hombre Mujer Ambos No sé 4. ¿Cómo le afectó el terremoto de 1986? 5. ¿Antes de pasar a esta casa, dónde vivió? En el campo En la ciudad capital Otra ciudad 6. ¿En su anterior vivienda, cuál era su situación? Propietario Con promesa de venta Alquilando Vivía con otros, sin pagar Ocupando casa abandonada Dormitorio público Sin casa Otra 7. ¿Qué es lo que le gusta de esta casa? 8. ¿Qué es lo que le preocupa de esta casa? 9. ¿Qué mejoras le han hecho a la casa? 10. Mencione tres cosas que le gusta de este barrio: 1. 2. 3. 11. Mencione tres cosas que le preocupa de este barrio: 1. 2. 3. 9 1 APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA--CHAPTER 2 Figure C.1: Disaster Lending Has Increased as a Share of Bank Lending Share of World Bank Portfolio in natural disaster lending (in 5-year increments) 16 14 12 lending 10 Bank 8 of 6 4 Percent 2 0 1984 to 1988 1989 to 1993 1994 to 1998 1999 to 2003 Source: World Bank data. Figure C.2: Some Regions Have Natural Disaster Portfolios That Are Large Relative to Their Total Portfolios 35 30 25 portfolio 20 of 15 Percent 10 5 0 Africa Latin America South Asia East Asia Europe and Middle East and the and the Central Asia and Caribbean Pacific North Africa Natural Disaster Portfolio All World Bank Projects Source: World Bank data. 9 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure C.3: The Bank Responds to Flooding More Often Than to Other Disaster Types 300 250 200 projects of 150 100 Number 50 0 Flood Drought Fire Tropical Earthquake Pest Landslide Tsunami Volcano Other storm Ongoing Completed Source: World Bank data. Figure C.4: The Rural Sector Implements the Largest Share of Projects Water supply and sanitation, 6% Environment Urban Social protection/Social fund, 4% 10% 9% Multisector, 4% Transportation 13% Energy & mining, 3% Other Education, 3% 28% Health, nutrition, and population, 3% Public sector governance, 2% Rural 40% Economic policy, 1% Private sector development, 1% Other, 1% Source: World Bank data. 9 4 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 Figure C.5: ERLs Are Typically Used for Floods, Earthquakes, and Tropical Storms 45 40 40 35 30 25 23 projects 21 of 20 17 15 9 Number 10 8 5 2 1 1 0 Flood Earthquake Tropical Drought Tsunami Landslide Fire Pest Volcano storm Source: World Bank data. Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) 2005 Grenada P092692 Hurricane Ivan Emergency Recovery - Phase IV ­ Project (ERL) n.a. 10 Hurricane Ivan P077682 Emergency Recovery Project 0.4 P069922 Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Program Project 3 9.7 P076715 HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Project 1.3 P077759 OECS Education Development Project 5 2004 Bangladesh P050752 Post-Flood Recovery Assistance Program n.a. Flood P050752 Post-Literacy and Continuing Education for Human Development Project 14 P044876 Second Female Secondary School Assistance Project 15 200 P044789 Private Sector Infrastructure Development Project 154 P041887 Municipal Services Project 15 P009468 and Aquatic Resources Management (Fourth Fisheries) Project 2 2002 El Salvador P067986 Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction and Health Services Earthquake Extension Project (ERL) n.a. 143 P041680 Secondary Education 31.9 P050612 Education Reform 35.2 P007167 Agriculture Sector Reform and Investment Project 3.3 (Table continues on the following page.) 9 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) (continued) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) 2001 Gujarat P074018 Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 443 Earthquake in India P009964 Haryana Water Resources Consolidation Project 37 P010455 Cataract Blindness Control Project 100.4 P010489 Andhra Pradesh First Referral Health System Project 7.5 P035827 Woman and Child Development Project 46.4 P010566 Gujarat State Highway Project 97 416 P010561 National Agricultural Technology Project 23.2 P010531 Reproductive and Child Health 23.2 P043728 Environmental Management Capacity Building Technical Assistance Project 15.5 P035821 Second District Primary Education Project 23.2 P010522 Assam Rural Infrastructure and Agricultural Services Project 7.7 P010457 Family Welfare (Assam, Rajasthan, and Karnataka) Project 7.8 P009977 Second Integrated Child Development Services Project 27.1 2001 Kenya P071196 Emergency Energy Credit (ERL) n.a. 72 Drought P001331 Arid Lands Resource Management Project 1.03 1.03 2000 Mozambique P070432 Flood Emergency Recovery Project (ERL) n.a. 30 Floods and P001804 Roads and Coastal Shipping Project 20 Cyclones P042039 Railways & Ports Restructuring Project 2 P001792 Health Sector Recovery unknown P001786 Education Sector Strategic Program unknown P001797 Capacity Building: Human Resources Development Project 3.6 57.1 P001781 Agricultural Services Rehabilitation and Development Project 21 P039015 National Water Development Project 5.5 P083263 Second National Water Development Project - Supplemental Credit 5 P001806 Municipal Development Project unknown 2000 Colombia P065263 Earthquake Recovery Project (ERL) n.a. 225 Earthquake P006854 Municipal Health Services Project 22.7 P006866 Secondary Education Project 50 93.7 P006880 Agricultural Technology Development Project 15 P039291 Urban Environmental Management Project 6 1999 Turkey P068368 Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 505 Marmara P038091 Road Improvement and Traffic Safety Project 24 Earthquake P009071 Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) Restructuring Loan Project unknown P009064 Employment & Training 10.8 P009089 Basic Education Project 46 257.3 P009095 Primary Health Care Services Project 14.5 P009076 Second Health Project 100 9 6 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) (continued) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) P058877 Emergency Flood Recovery 62 P048852 National Transmission Grid Project unknown 1999 Dominican P063201 Hurricane George (ERL) n.a. 111 Republic P035722 National Highway Project 7.5 Hurricane George P007020 Irrigated Land and Watershed Management Project 2 22.5 P035494 Basic Education Development (02) Project 10 P007015 Provincial Health Services Project 3 1999 Kyrgyz P062682 Flood Emergency Project (ERL) n.a. 35 Republic Flood P046042 Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 4 4 1999 Kenya P056595 El Niño Emergency Project (ERL) n.a. 40 El Niño Flood P001319 Urban Transport Infrastructure Project 37.5 37.5 1998 Ecuador P054656 El Niño Emergency Recovery Project (ERL) n.a. 60 El Niño P007107 First Social Development Project-Education and Training 5 29.2 Phenomenon P068739 Second Social Development Project-Health and Nutrition 13 P007115 Rural Development Project 11.2 1998 Argentina P055935 El Niño Emergency Flood (SIL) n.a. 42 El Niño P006051 Flood Rehabilitation 2 Phenomenon P006052 Flood Protection 101 117 P006005 Provincial Development 14 1998 Honduras P064083 Hurricane Mitigation (Honduras) BOP (ERL) n.a. 200 Hurricane Mitch P007388 Transport Sector Rehabilitation Project 1 P064634 Transport Sector Rehabilitation Project 20 P007392 Nutrition and Health Project 10.4 P007396 Environmental Development Project 6 P007398 JSDF-Developing Central American Small Farmers Links to Specialty Coffee Market 5 127.9 P007399 Basic Education Project 2.5 P048651 Fourth Social Investment Fund Project 45 P007387 Public Sector Modernization Structural Adjustment Credit 38 1998 Poland P053796 Emergency Flood Recovery Project (ERL) n.a. 200 Flood P008593 Second Roads Project 65 P008590 Housing Project 16 81 1997 Yemen P048522 Flood Emergency (ERL) n.a. 31 Flood P062714 Irrigation Improvement Project 0.2 Unknown Unknown unknown 14.5 (Table continues on the following page.) 9 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) (continued) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) 1995 Algeria P038695 Mascara Emergency Reconstruction Project (ERL) n.a. 51 Earthquake Unknown Rehabilitation Loan (proposed) 150 P004963 Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan Project 350 500 P004976 Housing Completion and Sector Development Project 1994 Papua P054238 Second Gazelle Restoration Project (APL) n.a. 25 New Guinea P004386 Land Mobilization Project 5.7 Volcanic Eruption P004387 Public Sector Training Project 12.5 27.2 P004392 Education Development Project 5 P004381 Telecommunications Project 4 1994 Madagascar P035914 Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation (ERL) n.a. 13 Cyclone and Flood P001507 Ports Rehabilitation Project 1.2 P001510 Highway Project 0.3 P001544 Economic Management and Social Action Program Project 0.9 10.1 P001515 Education Sector Reinforcement Project 3 P001512 Antananarivo Plain Development 0.3 P001520 Health Sector Improvement Project 2 P001583 Antananarivo Urban Works Project 0.4 P001522 Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 2 1994 Zimbabwe P003330 Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project (ERL) n.a. 150 Drought P003309 Third Power Project 90 90 1993 Kenya P001369 Emergency Drought Recovery (ERL) n.a. 20 Drought P001330 Animal Health Services Rehabilitation Project 2.5 P001317 Rural Services Design Project 2.75 8.95 P001300 National Agricultural Extension Project 3.7 1992 Zimbabwe P003330 Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation (ERL) 150 Drought P003294 Urban Project 25 P003305 Agricultural Credit and Export Promotion Project 7 37 P003286 Railways Project 5 1992 Sudan P002645 Emergency Drought Recovery (ERL) n.a. 16 Drought P002608 South Kordofan Agricultural Project 2 P002597 Agricultural Research, Extension and Training Project 1.5 7.2 P002640 Emergency Flood Reconstruction Project 3 P002613 Western Savannah Project 0.7 1991 Bangladesh P009549 Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation (SIL) n.a. 70 Cyclone and Flood P009435 BWDB Small Schemes Project 9 8 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) (continued) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) P009481 Fourth Flood Control and Drainage Project 30.50 30.50 P009512 Second Small-Scale Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Project 1991 India P010362 Andhra Pradesh Cyclone Emergency (ERL) n.a. 210 Cyclone P009843 Andhra Pradesh, Irrigation II 41 41 1990 Yemen P005896 Emergency Flood Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 10 Flood P005874 Highway Project (04) 5 P005883 Highway Project (05) 2 9 P005871 Education Project (04) ­ YDR 2 1989 Jamaica P007477 Emergency Reconstruction Import Loan (ERL) n.a. 30 Hurricane P007444 Fourth Power Project 4 4 P007439 Water Supply and Sewerage Technical Assistance and Rehabilitation Project unknown unknown 1989 Bangladesh P009541 Emergency Floods Rehabilitation III (ERL) n.a. 134 Cyclone and Flood P009447 Second Primary Education Project 21 P009458 Population Project unknown P009425 Rural Electrification Project unknown P009424 Ashuganj Thermal Power Project unknown P009512 Small-Scale Drainage and Flood Control Project (02) 42 146.38 P009491 Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project 18.5 P009487 Flood Rehabilitation Project (02) 25 P009419 Drainage and Flood Control Project (02) 4 P009451 Power Transmission and Distribution Project 11 P009458 Population Project (03) 8.1 P009491 Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project 16.78 1989 Nepal P010326 Municipal Development and Housing Reconstruction (SIL) n.a. 42 Earthquake P010199 Primary Education Project 2.4 2.4 1989 Sudan P002640 Emergency Flood Reconstruction Project (ERL) n.a. 75 Flood P002581 Blue Nile Pump Schemes Rehabilitation Project 22.1 24.1 P002587 Gezira Rehabilitation Project 2 1988 Bangladesh P009487 Second Flood (Emergency) Rehabilitation (SIL) n.a. 25 Flood P009447 Primary Education Project 16.7 P009458 Population Project 32.5 P009443 Port, Electrification and Supplemental Assistance Projects unknown 61.34 P009424 Ashuganj Thermal Power Project unknown P009419 Drainage and Flood Control Project 12.14 (Table continues on the following page.) 9 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.1: Combined Loan Reallocations and Emergency Recovery Loans in Response to Major Natural Disasters (1984­2005) (continued) Total Reallocation to allocations the disaster to the disaster Disaster Project ID Project name (US$ million) (US$ million) 1988 El Salvador P007163 Earthquake Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 65 Earthquake P007156 Fourth Education Project 4.1 4.1 1988 Bhutan P009573 Forestry Development II (SIL) n.a. 1 Pest P009569 Forestry Development Project 1.03 1.03 1988 India P009992 Drought Assistance (ERL) n.a. 350 Drought P009828 National Bank For Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) Credit Project 100 100 1987 Yugoslavia P009217 Energy Conservation and Substitution Project 30 90 Floods P009231 Third Highway Sector Project 8 8 1986 Brazil P006417 Northeast Urban Flood Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 100 Flood P006324 NW Region Development Program (First Phase) Highway Project 60 60 1985 Madagascar P001524 Cyclone Rehabilitation Project (ERL) n.a. 15 Cyclone and Flood P001524 Cyclone Damage Rehabilitation Project (01) 15 P001481 Education Project (02) 0.7 P001489 Water Supply and Sanitation Project (01) 2 18.2 P001498 Highway Project (06) 0.5 P001484 Fifth Highway Project unknown 1985 Bangladesh P009488 Flood Rehabilitation (ERL) n.a. 30 Cyclone and Flood P009392 Drainage and Flood Control Project 6.8 18.9 P009419 Second Drainage and Flood Control Project 12.1 1984 Mexico P007580 Lazaro Cardenas Idustrial Port III (SIL) n.a. 76 Earthquake and P007723 Highway Rehabilitation and Safety Project unknown Flood 1984 Colombia P006786 Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction (ERL) n.a. 40 Earthquake P006754 First Urban Development Project 6.4 7.7 P006761 Medium and Small Size Cities Water Supply and Sewerage Project 1.3 1 0 0 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 Figure C.6: Outcome by Disaster Type Landslide 89 Earthquake 87.7 Tsunami 86 Drought 84 Flood 83 Tropical storm 81.5 Pest 60 Fire 60 Other 50 Volcano 20 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Bank average Percent satisfactory Source: IEG data. Figure C.7: Sustainability by Disaster Type Earthquake 77 Drought 74 Tropical storm 64 Tsunami 61.5 Flood 59 Landslide 55.5 Other* 50 Pest* 50 Fire 44 Volcano* 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Bank average Percent likely Source: IEG data. Note: * = fewer than 5 projects. 1 0 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure C.8: Institutional Development Impact by Disaster Type Other* 100 Drought 61 Tsunami 58 Earthquake 42 Tropical storm 40 Pest* 40 Fire 40 Flood 34.5 Landslide 22 Volcano* 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Bank average Percent substantial Source: IEG data. Note: * = fewer than 5 projects. Figure C.9: Outcome by Sector Multi-sector 92 Social sectors 89 Urban 88 Rural 80 Transportation 80 Financial sectors 71 WSS 71 Environment 67 Education 57 Other 50 0 20 40 60 80 100 Bank average Percent satisfactory Source: IEG data. Figure C.10: Outcome by Region Middle East/N.Africa 92 Latin America/Carib. 85 Europe/Cent. Asia 80 East Asia/Pacific 80 South Asia 75 Africa 70 0 20 40 60 80 100 Bank average Percent satisfactory Source: IEG data. 1 0 2 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 Table C.2: Project Outputs and Outcomes Positive results Negative results Successful restoration of physical assets 115 Subsequent disaster lessened the project's impact 73 Successful mitigation activities 86 Unsuccessful mitigation activities 32 Successful institutional development/institutional objectives Infrastructure reconstruction was not completed / not successful 28 were met 48 Problems with procurement had a negative impact 27 Successful poverty alleviation 41 Lack of maintenance lessened the project's impact 22 Research program was implemented 18 Shortfall in counterpart funding 22 Beneficiary contribution had positive impact 16 Conceptual failure during design 19 Involvement of local community in mitigation activity 12 Objectives not attained due to reallocation 18 Successful distribution of project-financed inputs 12 Research component not undertaken / not implemented 17 Successful restoration of social assets 9 Problems with distribution of resources, goods, or services 13 Training had positive results 9 Uncooperative posture of government ministry 13 Reallocation of funds described as having led to a good result 8 M&E incapable of identifying extent of reconstruction Successful poverty alleviation 7 achievements 12 Dynamic staff influenced implementation positively 6 Unsuccessful institutional development 12 Successful resettlement 5 Cost recovery failed 9 M&E improved 4 Political interference 9 Positive impact on private sector 4 Unsuitable technical staff 9 Procurement was well managed 4 Failure to implement TA 7 Modifying eligibility criteria/scope during implementation Implementation agency not ready to implement 7 was important 3 Overambitious objectives 7 Project simplification was positive 3 Neglect of stakeholders / vulnerable groups 6 Successful distribution of cash subsidies 3 Staff turnover had negative impact 6 Better maintenance introduced 2 Assessment data incomplete or inaccurate 5 Integration of disaster mitigation into projects in Beneficiaries acted in unexpected ways 4 the respective country 2 Difficulties with land acquisition 4 Rapid Bank response had positive impact 2 Project scaled down due to slow implementation 4 Root causes of environmental degradation addressed 2 Root causes of environmental degradation not addressed 4 Skills acquired by project implementers helpful for other Poor economic recovery 3 projects financed by the Bank 1 Resettlement failed 3 Staff continuity had positive results 1 Reconstruction problems associated with pursuit of speed 2 Successful damage assessment 1 Target group missed 2 The Bank helped borrower leverage funds from other donors 1 Unsustainable local support/capacity 2 Collected data were not analyzed 1 Default by public agency partners 1 Duplication of efforts with other donors 1 Micro enterprise component not realized 1 Other donors backed out with negative consequences for project achievements 1 1 0 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.3: How Other Donors Handle Natural Disasters Issue ADB IDB Do they have a disaster unit? Planned Yes What is their organizational A Disaster Unit is planned, and ADB is currently Decentralized network of DRM Focal Points. IDB has 36 structure for disaster issues?b recruiting. disaster risk management focal points: 26 in the coun- try offices and 10 in headquarters (2 in central depart- ment -SDS-; 1 in each of the three environment divisions of the operational departments; 1 in each of the Finance/Infrastructure divisions of the 3 operational departments; 2 in the country divisions). The center focal point provides training, facilitates regional dia- logue, and provides support. The Sector Facility for Disaster Prevention (March 2001). Mainstreams instruments such as the project preparation checklists and indicators. They also con- duct other training on risk management for staff, and provide special briefings for executive directors on in- struments for disaster risk mitigation. Do they have a policy that cov- Yes Yesc ers natural disasters? March 1999: "Rehabilitation after Disasters" "Natural and Unexpected Disasters" (OM Section 25) (IDB Operational Policy 704)d "Emergency Rehabilitation Assistance Loan for A "Plan of Action" was created in March 2000 to put Small Developing Member Countries (DMCs)" the "Natural and Unexpected Disasters" policy into mo- (OM Section 24, June 1998) tion. A new financing mechanism, the "Sector Facility "Disaster and Emergency Assistance" (OM Sec- for Natural Disaster Prevention" (see below) was cre- tion D7/BP, June 2004) ated a year later. Gn-2339, the "Bank Action Plan for Improving Disaster Risk Management 2005-08." New IDB-wide action plan published in March 2005. This action plan includes dedicated DRM activities for 2005-2008 with trust fund support. Do they implement natural Yes Yes disaster projects? Do they have specialized Yes Yes instruments or Analytical instruments: Emergency Reconstruction Facility (ERF)f lending/grant tools? --Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Created in November 1998, this stand-alone immediate 1 0 4 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 UNDPa World Bank EBRD AfDB Yes No No No The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Re- The World Bank has a Hazard EBRD works primarily in loans AfDB has funded a number of covery (BCPR) Disaster Reduction Unit Management Thematic Group to the private sector. Where 6-month-long relief opera- (DRU) within the Bank. projects face disaster risk, in- tions, however. Helps UNDP country offices set up and surance is a condition. There was a Hazard Management provide more effective response for natu- Unit with one disaster specialist ral disaster reduction. and one information specialist The DRU is made up of seven Geneva- until 2005. based professionals and 20­24 National Disaster Reduction Advisors, and four Re- gional Disaster Reduction Advisors (Bangkok, Nairobi, New Delhi, Panama). The DRU hosts the Secretariat of the United Nations Disaster Management Training Program. Yes Yes No Yes At the 52nd session of the UN General As- OP/BP 8.50 "Emergency Recovery The Bank Group Emergency sembly, UNDP was given a mandate to act Assistance" Assistance Policy Guidelines as the focal point for disaster risk reduc- Currently undergoing revisions. The Special Relief Fund Gen- tion. Guidance is given in the form of strat- eral Regulations ("SRF") egy notes and tools. Yes Yes Noe Yes Yes Yes No Yes Emergency Recovery Loans (ERLs) Emergency Assistance Grants UNDP provides: Loan Reallocations from the Special Relief Fund (Table continues on the following page.) 1 0 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.3: How Other Donors Handle Natural Disasters (continued) Issue ADB IDB --Watching Brief response facility (PR 806) is a financing window di- --Damage and Needs Assessment rected at improving the IDB's response time to natural disasters. The unit operates under a set of streamlined Assistance instruments: eligibility and approval procedures and can enable re- --Portfolio Restructuring and Use of Loan sources to reach the country in need within the first Savings few weeks after the disaster.g --Emergency Assistance Loans (EALs) --Normal lending Emergency loans with flexible requirements for coun- --Technical assistance for disaster and terpart funding from the borrower (unlike their regular emergency loans). National, provincial, state and municipal gov- ernments and autonomous public institutions are eligi- ble to borrow from the IDB for disasters. Do they fund relief projects? No No Do they fund reconstruction? Yes Yes Do they reallocate existing Yes Yes funding to respond to natural Portfolio restructuring and use of loan savings Not executed by operational staff. Rather, it is decided disasters? is included as part of the initial damage and at the institutional level, and if the objectives are al- needs assessment tered, the project has to go again for approval. The original objectives are preserved as much as possible. "...In special cases with particularly urgent re- habilitation needs, ADB may reallocate out- Need to consider opportunity costs. How the reorient- standing loan proceeds for rehabilitation ing is done is critical. For example, in El Salvador, all of purposes ...However, this option will not be the sectors were affected by the twin earthquakes, and detrimental to normal lending operations in the reorienting the country's portfolio made sense, given country and will be consistent with the govern- that the entire portfolio was affected. ment's priorities given the emergency." Do they invest in prevention, Yes Yes preparedness, and/or mitiga- Established a natural disaster network. First phase of a tion? study on national systems and institutional mechanisms for the comprehensive management of disaster risk completed. Second phase will concentrate on Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. 1 0 6 A P P E N D I X C : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 2 UNDPa World Bank EBRD AfDB --access to TRAC 1.1.3 sudden response Regular lending funds to the UN Resident Coordinator in Technical assistance the event of major natural disasters. Damage assessment --Technical assistance to carry out impact Risk assessment assessments and to design sustainable re- covery and vulnerability reduction frame- works and programs. Yesh No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No The World Bank's Operational Manual considers a "major" re- allocation one that reallocates over 5 percent of the loan or re- quires major changes in project description. Among 152 projects for which reallocated amounts could be identified, all but five were major reallocations that ex- ceeded the 5 percent threshold. For more information, see Chap- ter 2 of this report. Yes Yes No No Early recovery initiatives, building mitiga- Number of mitigation activities in tion and preparedness measures into the projects has grown, with a shift rebuilding process. from structural measures, which are still important, to non-struc- Mainstreaming crisis prevention into its tural measures such as institution work using policy dialogue, staff training, building for hazard management and knowledge networking. policy changes, the preparation Mainstreaming disaster reduction into de- of hazard management plans, velopment policy, strategies, plans and land use plans, enforcement of programs. building codes, and insurance. (Table continues on the following page.) 1 0 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table C.3: How Other Donors Handle Natural Disasters (continued) Note: ADB = Asian Development Bank; IDB = Inter-American Devemopment Bank; UNDP = United Nations Development Program; EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- opment; AfDB = African Development Bank. a. http://www.undp.org/bcpr/disred/index.htm b. Bilaterals, such as DFID and USAID, also had disaster units. DFID has a team of seven experts, with a Humanitarian Response and Risk Reduction Team leader. In addition, six insti- tutional partnership staff spend part of their time focusing on natural disasters. There is also the Operations Team comprised of 24 Crown Agent staff that are contracted to provide humanitarian expertise such as needs assessment and appropriate responses. They have an operational capacity as well, and thus can be deployed in the aftermath of a disaster to provide on-the-ground assessment and also to support United Nations agencies (included are finance, logistics, and support staff). USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) employs approximately 25 disaster professionals in their regional teams, 11 in the technical assistance group, and 7 in the evaluation and planning team. c. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/om24.asp?p=aadb d. This policy is in force, but IDB is currently developing a new disaster risk management policy, which emphasizes risk management capacity building, and calls for the mainstreaming of risk analysis and management in IDB's lending operations. The policy encompasses activities that take place before, during, and after an emergency occurs. e. Some of EBRD's projects have been affected by natural disasters, but none is a disaster project, per se. f. Also referred to as the "Immediate Response Facility for Emergencies Caused by Natural and Unexpected Disasters." g. With the approval of the Executive Board, the president can approve a loan of up to $100 million if it meets the eligibility criteria. Otherwise, the maximum amount for an individual loan through the ERF is $20 million. The ERF provides for an investment loan with a fixed positive list of 10 items for recovery that do not require complex or long-term decisions (e.g., rubble clearance). Must disburse in 9 months, or all remaining will be cancelled in 12 months. This avoids wrapping immediate needs with other goals that require careful planning and more time. h. The UNDP "picks up where humanitarian relief leaves off" and supports early recovery initiatives by building in mitigation and preparedness measures in the rebuilding process. 1 0 8 APPENDIX D: SURVEY RESULTS Task Manager Survey comments. Where a significant aspect of the A survey of World Bank task managers was con- message was likely to be subsumed by combin- ducted in September and October 2004 to gather ing categories, a decision was made not to insights gleaned from the staff 's experience combine the categories. The categories are working on natural disaster recovery and re- sorted according to their frequency. construction projects. This section presents a summary of the answers obtained from the 19 Survey Size and Response Rate questions originally posed in the survey. The survey did not select a sample, but instead To organize and summarize data, responses opted to use the complete universe of respon- to the open-ended questions were grouped into dents based on their involvement in at least one categories, when this method seemed appropri- project in the natural disaster portfolio. Two- ate. A two-step process was used to identify and hundred and nineteen permanent staff and long- organize the categories. First, the respondents' term consultants were identified, and a survey comments were grouped according to specific was sent to each of them. Among the employees key words taken from their direct statements. identified, 34, or 16 percent, responded to the When this approach yielded too many unrelated survey. While this represented a relatively low re- groupings, a category best summarizing the sponse rate, it was not deemed unusual for Bank overall statement was imposed on the staff preoccupied with implementation. Survey Questions and Responses 1. If there was something you did during the course of a natural disaster-related project that you consider best practice, please describe it here. Twenty-four task managers answered the question. Of these managers, 12 described specific disaster-related projects on which they had worked. Eight referred to a single project, while the remaining four referred to two, three, four, and five projects. The projects were located in the following countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, the Caribbean, China, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, India (4), Madagascar (2), Nicaragua, Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen. The best practice activities they described are summarized below. · Areas where cooperation with other donors is especially important (5) · Different kinds of post-disaster assessments (5) · Ideas on mitigation and disaster preparedness (5) · How to overcome bottlenecks in procurement (4) · Different approaches to housing reconstruction (3) · Loan reallocations as a way to provide funds quickly (3) · Early supervision (3) · How to improve project design (3) 1 0 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T · Importance of rapid project preparation (2) · How to establish an implementation unit (2) · Bank-financed relief and consumption (2) · Handle safeguards parallel to implementation (1) · Financial service products for rural areas (1). 2a. What types of project designs or activities, if any, should Bank-financed disaster lending or nonlending services avoid? Twenty-seven task managers responded to this question. Some focused on what activities the Bank should support instead of stating what activities the Bank should avoid. The activities to be avoided include: · Financing relief (5) · Policy-related conditionality (4) · Multisector programs (3) · Designing overly ambitious disaster management institutions (3) · Duplication of efforts with other donors (2) · Creating new implementation units (1) · Loan reallocations (1) · Cash transfer to individuals (1) · Activities that perpetuate a "hand-out" mentality (1) · Social sector work (1) · Budget support (1) · Too many components in one project (1) · Undermining sector strategy (1) · Using ERLs and instead focusing on loan reallocations (1). It is important to note that while three respondents thought that the Bank should avoid financ- ing relief, one respondent supported the notion that the Bank should finance relief if necessary. He stated: "[The Bank] can't finance immediate disaster relief, which is mandate of other agencies. However, some flexibility is needed here; for instance, if medicines and blankets are needed, [the Bank should] finance them." Another task manager cited financing relief (blankets, nutrition kits, water purification tablets, and the like) as a best practice example (see above, question 1). 2b. What types of disaster-related project designs or activities is the Bank particularly good at? Twenty-six task managers responded to this question. Their responses were categorized in the following way: · Infrastructure reconstruction (12) · Designing and implementing complex projects (5) · Mitigation activities (4) · Post-disaster assessments (3) · Early capacity building in fiduciary support (2) · Reacting with flexibility to a crisis using demand-driven projects (2) · Balance of payment loans, supplemental loans, and reallocations (2) · Donor coordination (1) · Rehabilitation of social services (1). 1 1 0 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S When asked in what areas the Bank should increase its focus, the staff's answers were as follows: · Outsourcing projects to NGOs (2) · Developing insurance schemes (1) · Making broader use of ERLs (1) · Simplifying procurement procedures (1) · Establishing strong project management (1) · Introducing independent monitoring and evaluation (1) · Establishing effective Bank teams (1) · Improving mitigation measures (1). 3. Is the Bank's disaster-related lending focused enough on the poor? Yes/No Yes: 18 No: 11 No response: 5 4b. How could the Bank's disaster-related lending better address the needs of the poor? Twenty-six task managers responded to this question and offered the following suggestions: · Developing comprehensive prevention and mitigation programs (7) · Placing more emphasis on supporting rural areas (4) · Supporting livelihood and using local labor (4) · Focusing more on community-based approaches (4) · Undertaking poverty analysis (4) · Involving NGOs (2) · Promoting trade and industry to increase growth (1) · Including social capital restoration (1) · Reconstructing basic infrastructure (1) · Focusing grant funds from bilateral and other donors on poverty alleviation (1). 5. How can the Bank increase the effectiveness of coordination with other agencies involved in disaster prevention or response? Twenty-six task managers responded to this question, some providing more than one answer. Addressing the coordination with other agencies for disaster prevention, the responses included the following: · Mainstream cooperation in everyday work (8) · Strengthen the Bank's Hazard Mitigation Unit (3) · Use agencies that are politically and socially closer to the affected people (1). With respect to the coordination with other agencies for disaster response, task managers had the following to say: · Strengthen the government to better respond to natural disasters (5) · Prepare a common strategy (5) · Broad communication is important (4) · The Bank should take the lead in project preparation (3) · Mutual training and knowledge transfer (2) 1 1 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T · Organize joint assessment missions (2) · Create a permanent multi-donor task force for disaster response (1) · Let other agencies be responsible for implementation (1). 6. What lessons have you learned about assessing damages after a major disaster event that the Bank or its borrowers need to take into account? Twenty-five task managers responded to this question. While most answers addressed damage assessment, some focused on the related needs assessment. · Help build in-country capacity for data collection prior to the disaster (7) · Speed is more important than accuracy (6) · Involve the government and NGOs for damage assessment (5) · Take into account that damage is usually overestimated in the beginning (2) · Professional multisectoral teams are needed (2) · The Bank should use accelerated internal procedures to facilitate swift damage assess- ment (1) · Pay less attention to social and more to legal, institutional, and technical issues (1) · Distinguish between neglected maintenance and damage (1) · Identify measures to prevent future damage (1) · The Bank should rely more on expert agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (1) · Assess what withstood the disaster (1) · Use digital cameras to document the damage to private property (1). For those respondents who discussed needs assessments, their answers were as follows: · Deal with unrealistic expectations early on (3) · High-quality needs assessment is important (3). 7. Which beneficiary participation activities significantly enhance the implementa- tion of disaster-related lending? Twenty-two task managers provided relevant information on this question. They identified the following activities: · Activities at the local level (8) · Activities with benefits for individual beneficiaries (4) · Providing beneficiaries with information (4) · Consultation with beneficiaries (4) · Participation in housing reconstruction (3) · Developing a suitable early warning system (1) · Formulation of a safety net (1) · Activities on the policy level (1) · Quality monitoring (1) · Disaster management courses for mayors and government officials (1) · NGO-led activities (1). According to the respondents, beneficiary involvement was deemed useful during the follow- ing phase: · During the relief phase (1) 1 1 2 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S · During project identification (1) · During the project planning phase (1) · During the reconstruction phase (1). 8. Under what circumstances, if any, have you seen beneficiary participation be counterproductive in the post-disaster context? Sixteen task managers responded to this question. Five of them did not see beneficiary partici- pation as counterproductive. The eleven task managers who indicated some form of counter- productivity provided the following examples: · When projects involve beneficiaries in damage and needs assessment, which might cause small-scale corruption (4) · When projects involve beneficiaries in managing and distributing emergency assistance (1) · When authorities are corrupt (1) · When there is a lack of a good communication strategy with the public (1) · When the main beneficiaries are not the people participating (1) · When beneficiary participation is difficult for major infrastructure reconstruction (1). In some cases, task managers identified specific circumstances under which counterproductiv- ity may arise. They included: · Mass mobilization (1) · Disease prevention (2) · Combined natural disaster and civil unrest (2). 9. What can be done to increase borrower ownership of disaster prevention/mitiga- tion components in natural disaster-related projects? Twenty-four task managers responded to this question. Three of them stated that they had not encountered a lack of borrower ownership after a natural disaster. Twenty-one task managers provided comments that can be grouped into the following categories: · Develop good communication strategies (10) · Empower implementing ministries in each sector (4) · Ensure a strong implementation task force (3) · Involve beneficiaries in project design (2) · Create incentives for better government planning (2) · Provide more supervision (1) · Recognize the role that the media play in emergencies (1) · Promote the government's regulatory role (1) · Provide assistance rapidly (1) · Borrower ownership must be a prerequisite for Bank involvement (1). Some staff provided specific activities, including analytical and advisory assistance (AAA), workshops, capacity building, and establishing data preservation systems. 10. Have you utilized the Hazard Management Unit (HMU), formerly known as the Disaster Management Facility? Yes/No? Yes: 8 No: 23 No response: 3 1 1 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T If task managers had used the HMU, they were asked the following questions: 10a1. What aspects of its assistance were helpful? All eight respondents that used the HMU commented on its helpful assistance in the following areas: · Providing advice (7) · Providing project documentation / institutional memory (4) · Maintaining consultant database (2) · Offering other support (1). 10a2. What additional services would you like to see provided? Six of the eight task managers that used the HMU provided comments on additional services the HMU could provide. These services included the following: · Topics for disaster-risk management courses (2) · Seed funding for supervision (1) · Knowledge sharing services (1) · Technical assistance (1) · Additional staff for the HMU (1). 10a3. What services that it provides should be improved? Four of the eight task managers that used the HMU provided ideas on how to improve its services, including: · Providing more assistance in designing prevention policies (1) · Offering more training (1) · Organizing a more active thematic group (1) · Promoting adjustments of the Bank's ERL guidelines (1) · Using mitigation as a safeguard and mainstream it in regular lending activities (1) · Promoting the Bank's operational experience in conferences around the world (1). If task managers had not used the HMU they were asked the following question: 10b1. What types of support do task managers confronting disaster need from the Hazard Management Unit? Ten task managers that had not used the HMU suggested the following types of support: · Provide advice and technical and procedural assistance (5) · Provide support in damage and needs assessment (4) · Combine the different emergency facilities into one (1) · Increase HMU's visibility within the Bank (1). 11a. After Board approval, what avoidable delays have you encountered in disaster- related projects? Twenty-two task managers responded to this question. They raised the following issues that contribute to delays: · Procurement and disbursement issues (15) 1 1 4 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S · Delays related to institutional arrangements within the implementation agencies (5) · Political reasons (3) · Safeguard issues (2) · Lack of effectiveness conditions (1) · Lack of Bank management support (1) · Lack of disaster relief institution in the country (1) · Lack of seed money (1) · Project start up (1). 11b. What, if anything, could the Bank do about these delays? Nineteen task managers provided ideas on how to avoid delays between Board approval and effectiveness: · Simplify procurement guidelines (4) · Develop simple project designs (4) · Provide seed money (3) · Generate ideas on how to overcome political hurdles in the country (3) · Set up an implementation unit under the umbrella of the highest level of management (2) · Set up strong implementation teams (2) · Change legal requirements (2) · Overcome lack of in country capacity (1) · Establish disaster prevention and relief organization (1) · Relax effectiveness conditions (1). 12. What new directions should the Bank's efforts in natural disaster prevention and mitigation take? Twenty-three task managers answered this question. Their responses offered a broad range of advice: · Strengthen prevention activities (17) · Change Bank procedures (5) · Innovation in providing relief (4) · Lend directly to local authorities (3) · Focus on capacity building (2) · More research and best practice examples for disaster management (2) · Combine the Bank's different emergency facilities for hazards, civil war, and LICUS into one (1) · Use direct budget support instrument (1). 13. What additional disaster-related lending or nonlending services might the Bank offer? Nineteen task managers answered this question. Their thoughts covered a number of areas, including: · Research and advisory activities (7) · Use different financing mechanisms (6) · Provide more grant-based funding / seed funds to speed up project preparation and reduce vulnerability (5) · Increase knowledge sharing and awareness (4) · Increase safety in privately owned houses and apartment buildings (2) 1 1 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T · Offer relief coordination and management services (2) · Increase safety (2). 14. What aspects of the Bank policy governing natural disasters (OP 8.50 Emergency Recovery Lending) do you feel need to be changed during the ongoing policy revision exercise? Fourteen task managers responded to this question. Their comments were as follows: · Change ways of disaster financing (6) · Create incentives, planning, and economic instruments for prevention (3) · Simplify the current policy (2) · Develop a future policy that is more explicit on safeguards (2) · Consider financing relief (2) · Develop emergency procedures for project implementation, not only for preparation (1) · Create separate policies for natural disasters, post-conflict situations, and so on (1). 15. Do you believe that the majority of Bank-financed disaster projects achieve their disaster prevention/mitigation objectives? Yes/No Yes: 14 No: 10 No response: 10 16. Emergency Recovery Loans are currently allotted 36 months for implementation. In a revision of OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery Assistance), how many months would you allocate for implementation? Average: 43.5 Did not respond 9 60 months 5 48 months 5 36 months 8 Less than 36 months 2 No ERLs 1 Figure D.1: Suggested Implementation Time for ERLs 9 8 7 6 respondents 5 of 4 3 Number 2 1 0 60 months 48 months 36 months Less than 36 months 1 1 6 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S 17. During the current revision of OP 8.50, what types of emergencies would be appropriate for the new policy to cover? (Please check all that apply): Twenty-seven task managers answered this question, and provided the following feedback: Epidemics/pandemics: 17 Post-conflict: 20 Conflict reduction: 10 Failed states: 6 Natural disasters: 24 Technological disasters: 14 Economic crises: 8 Acts of terrorism: 6 Other: 5 No response: 7 Figure D.2: Importance Task Managers Attribute to Emergency Types to Be Covered by a Future Policy on Emergency Lending 30 25 20 15 respondents of 10 Number 5 0 Other Failed Acts of Economic Conflict Technological Epidemics/ Post- Natural states terrorism crises reduction disasters pandemics conflict disasters 18. What training should be provided to task managers new to disaster? Thirty-one task managers answered this question. Their comments were as follows: · A short disaster training course for all task managers (6) · A mandatory training course for all task teams starting a disaster-related project (14) · A training course for only those task teams that request one (4) · No training is needed (1) · Other (5). 19. If there is something else that you would like to say about the effectiveness of Bank activities in the post-disaster context, please note it here. Only one task manager responded to this question, adding the following comment: · Increase flexibility. especially in procurement (1). 1 1 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T El Salvador Beneficiary Survey survey instrument was developed in conjunc- IEG fielded a mission to El Salvador in Septem- tion with the Ministry of Foreign Relations' ber 2003 to review the results of the El Salvador Department of External Cooperation. The Earthquake Reconstruction Project (L2873-ES) housing units surveyed covered the work of and to conduct a survey with the beneficiaries of the four participating financial institutions: the emergency housing component. The survey CREDISA, CASA, Atlacatl, and AHORROMET. It examined project impacts seven years after the was not possible to use random sampling. In loan closed. A total of 918 housing units were many areas housing was not numbered and visited in greater El Salvador (including Apopa streets had no visible name. It also was not and Santa Tecla). In six neighborhoods of single- possible to find maps of the communities. family homes, surveyors visited 753 units, and in Surveyors were unwilling to enter a number four neighborhoods of multistory condominium of communities for safety reasons, and govern- buildings, surveyors visited 165 families. Table ment informants concurred that the risk was as D.1 shows the response rate. great as the surveyors described. The surveyors A team of four surveyors conducted the stayed in visual contact with each other at all survey under IEG supervision. The following times, going to all the units on every street or floor. A vehicle was placed at the disposition of the survey team, and the driver assisted with the Table D.1: General Survey Information monitoring of gang activity. Work in each community ended when the survey team or the driver felt endangered, or at the end of the Number Percent working day. The surveyors participated in the Housing units visited 918 data analysis process. At the end of each day, Consent to be interviewed 465 51 there was a debriefing with the task manager. At Abandoned/uninhabited units 89 10 the end of the analysis process, the team Declined to be interviewed 364 39 presented written and oral observations. 1 1 8 Table D.2: El Salvador Survey: Responses from Individual Neighborhoods Bosque de Los Los Monte Res. Resid Condo Condo Condo Condo San Prusia Almendros Naranjos Carmelo Europa San Lucas America el Bosque Marconi Miguelito General Condo/casa casa casa casa casa casa casa condo condo condo condo interview Number of houses visited info 103 149 121 146 129 105 60 33 48 22 Percentage interviewed 43.7 64.4 66.9 47.9 51.2 51.4 30.0 42.4 22.9 45.5 Percentage of nonrespondents (sum of next two) 56.3 35.6 33.1 52.1 48.8 48.6 70.0 57.6 77.1 54.5 Percentage of abandoned/uninhabited units 7.8 4.7 14.9 11.0 18.1 6.7 21.2 16.7 9.1 Percentage of inhabited but nonrespondent units 48.5 30.9 18.2 41.1 49.0 30.5 63.3 36.4 60.4 54.5 Percent 1. Alguien ocupo la casa antes de usted? si 35.6 38.5 37.0 30.0 19.7 31.5 44.4 35.7 33.3 20.0 no 64.4 61.5 63.0 70.0 80.3 68.5 55.6 64.3 66.7 80.0 100.0 2. Cual es su situacion referente a esta casa? proprietario 79.5 86.6 75.3 77.1 46.2 81.8 37.5 84.6 72.7 90.0 con promesa de venta 0.0 5.2 3.7 0.0 7.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 alquilando 20.5 7.2 16.0 10.0 46.2 10.9 50.0 15.4 27.3 10.0 ocupando casa abandonada 0.0 1.0 4.9 12.9 5.5 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3. Si es dueno, a nombre de quien esta la escritura? hombre 47.2 51.8 50.0 75.9 27.3 45.5 33.3 66.7 50.0 66.7 mujer 50.0 42.2 46.7 22.2 37.9 47.7 16.7 33.3 50.0 33.3 ambos 2.8 2.4 0.0 1.9 1.5 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 APPENDIX no se 0.0 3.6 3.3 0.0 33.3 6.8 38.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4. Antes de pasar a esta casa, donde vivio? campo 4.4 10.4 7.4 10.0 10.6 9.3 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 ciudad capital 68.9 64.6 75.3 62.9 66.7 75.9 61.1 92.9 81.8 70.0 otra ciudad 26.7 25.0 17.3 27.1 22.7 14.8 33.3 7.1 18.2 30.0 D: 5. En su anterior vivienda, cual era su situacion? SUR propio 35.6 17.7 27.2 28.6 25.8 33.3 11.1 7.1 9.1 10.0 con promesa de venta 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 VEY alquilan 46.7 71.9 54.3 64.3 60.6 53.7 61.1 85.7 72.7 90.0 vivio con otros sin pagar 15.6 10.4 18.5 4.3 10.6 9.3 11.1 0.0 18.2 0.0 RESUL ocupando casa abandonada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 dormitorio publico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 119 sin casa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 TS otra 0.0 0.0 2.9 3.0 1.9 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table D.3: El Salvador Survey: Ranked Response Questions Bosque Prusia Los Almendros Los Naranjos 6. Como le afecto el terremoto de 1986? G. en nada/no se acuerda 24 B. perdida de vivienda 51 B. perdida de vivienda 40 A. danos a la vivienda 13 G. en nada/no se acuerda 22 G. en nada/no se acuerda 28 B. perdida de vivienda 5 A. danos a la vivienda 20 A. danos a la vivienda 11 C. perdida de efectos personales 3 F. dano psicologico 7 C. perdida de efectos personales 1 F. dano psicologico 2 C. perdida de efectos personales 5 D. perdida de un familiar 1 D. perdida de un familiar 0 E. heridas 3 F. dano psicologico 1 7. Que es lo que le gusta de esta casa? A. ubicacion 16 E. todo 33 E. todo 24 D. es propio 15 I. Privacidad 16 D. es propio 14 E. todo 13 B. tamano de casa 13 A. ubicacion 13 G. comodo/acogedor 7 C. tamano de terreno 9 F. nada 8 F. nada 6 F. nada 8 I. Privacidad 5 I. Privacidad 5 H. accesibilidad 7 B. tamano de casa 4 C. tamano de terreno 2 D. es propio 5 C. tamano de terreno 3 B. tamano de casa 1 A. ubicacion 1 G. comodo/acogedor 0 H. accesibilidad 0 G. comodo/acogedor 1 H. accesibilidad 0 8. Que es lo que le preocupa de esta casa? I. Nada 24 A. techo (casas) 29 A. techo (casas) 22 A. techo (casas) 22 I. Nada 21 I. Nada 18 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 12 B. paredes 20 C. calidad de construccion/ 4 materiales/filtracion de agua B. paredes 7 E. cuota alta 15 E. cuota alta 3 J. ubicacion 3 C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 13 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 3 filtracion de agua C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 2 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 5 B. paredes 1 filtracion de agua D. piso 0 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 3 H. plomeria 1 E. cuota alta 0 J. ubicacion 2 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 1 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 0 D. piso 0 D. piso 0 H. plomeria 0 H. plomeria 0 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 J. ubicacion 0 9. Que mejoras le han hecho a la casa? E. ampliacion de cuartos 22 H. nada/no 35 H. nada/no 32 H. nada/no 21 G. cambio de puerta/ventana/ balcon, 32 A. Cuartos extras 19 instalacion de defensas F. cambio de techo 10 F. cambio de techo 22 G. cambio de puerta/ventana/ 13 balcon, instalacion de defensas A. Cuartos extras 9 A. Cuartos extras 13 B. muros divisores 8 1 2 0 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S Monte Carmelo Res. Europa San Lucas B. perdida de vivienda 33 B. perdida de vivienda 31 G. en nada/no se acuerda 22 G. en nada/no se acuerda 23 G. en nada/no se acuerda 18 B. perdida de vivienda 19 A. danos a la vivienda 11 A. danos a la vivienda 8 A. danos a la vivienda 12 F. dano psicologico 1 C. perdida de efectos personales 2 F. dano psicologico 2 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 D. perdida de un familiar 0 D. perdida de un familiar 1 D. perdida de un familiar 0 E. heridas 0 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 A. ubicacion 16 E. todo 15 H. accesibilidad 3 E. todo 16 A. ubicacion 10 B. tamano de casa 2 D. es propio 14 D. es propio 9 E. todo 2 I. Privacidad 10 F. nada 8 D. es propio 1 C. tamano de terreno 8 G. comodo/acogedor 5 F. nada 1 F. nada 8 I. Privacidad 3 I. Privacidad 1 B. tamano de casa 6 B. tamano de casa 2 A. ubicacion 0 G. comodo/acogedor 4 C. tamano de terreno 1 C. tamano de terreno 0 H. accesibilidad 0 H. accesibilidad 1 G. comodo/acogedor 0 A. techo (casas) 42 A. techo (casas) 25 C. calidad de construccion/ 8 materiales/filtracion de agua I. Nada 18 I. Nada 15 F. inseguridad/ entrada de ajenos 1 B. paredes 9 C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 9 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 1 filtracion de agua J. ubicacion 8 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 8 J. ubicacion 1 C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 7 B. paredes 7 A. techo (casas) 0 filtracion de agua E. cuota alta 5 E. cuota alta 4 B. paredes 0 H. plomeria 4 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 4 D. piso 0 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 1 J. ubicacion 4 E. cuota alta 0 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 1 D. piso 3 H. plomeria 0 D. piso 0 H. plomeria 3 I. Nada 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 3 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 H. nada/no 40 A. Cuartos extras 18 H. nada/no 6 G. cambio de puerta/ventana/ balcon, H. nada/no 17 G. cambio de puerta/ventana/ instalacion de defensas 22 balcon, instalacion de defensas 4 A. Cuartos extras 21 G. cambio de puerta/ventana /balcon, 12 A. Cuartos extras 0 instalacion de defensas F. cambio de techo 8 F. cambio de techo 9 B. muros divisores 0 (Table continues on the following page.) 1 2 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table D.3: El Salvador Survey: Ranked Response Questions (continued) Bosque Prusia Los Almendros Los Naranjos G. cambio de puerta/ventana/balcon, 6 E. ampliacion de cuartos 10 F. cambio de techo 4 instalacion de defensas B. muros divisores 5 I. Cambio de piso 4 C. verjas 2 C. verjas 4 B. muros divisores 1 E. ampliacion de cuartos 2 D. segunda planta 4 C. verjas 0 D. segunda planta 0 I. Cambio de piso 1 D. segunda planta 0 I. Cambio de piso 0 10. Mencione 3 cosas qu le gusta de este barrio C. transporte colectivo 23 I. Poca delincuencia 44 A. todo 20 K. el clima 18 C. transporte colectivo 37 C. transporte colectivo 18 H. apartado de ruidos 16 G. centrico 22 D. servicios basicos 16 G. centrico 15 F. los vecinos 21 E. escuela cerca 12 A. todo 14 J. zona verde 21 F. los vecinos 6 I. Poca delincuencia 14 B. nada 14 H. apartado de ruidos 6 D. servicios basicos 11 D. servicios basicos 6 I. Poca delincuencia 6 E. escuela cerca 8 H. apartado de ruidos 5 J. zona verde 6 F. los vecinos 5 A. todo 2 B. nada 4 J. zona verde 3 E. escuela cerca 0 G. centrico 4 B. nada 2 K. el clima 0 K. el clima 1 11. Mencione 3 cosas que le preocupa de este barrio H. nada 14 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 55 H. nada 26 E. las maras/delincuencia 13 C. mal sericio de agua potable 45 B. rios contaminados 22 B. rios contaminados 7 M.Crime 24 C. mal sericio de agua potable 14 C. mal sericio de agua potable 6 L. Lack of Schools 16 E. las maras/delincuencia 12 D. basura (servicios) 6 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 10 D. basura (servicios) 11 F. alumbrado publico 4 E. las maras/delincuencia 5 M.Crime 9 M. Crime 4 H. nada 5 F. alumbrado publico 7 I. Todo 3 I. Todo 3 J. muros de contencion 4 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 1 D. basura (servicios) 1 N.Lack of play areas 4 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 0 F. alumbrado publico 1 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 1 J. muros de contencion 0 B. rios contaminados 0 I. Todo 1 K. Poor Quality Materials 0 J. muros de contencion 0 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 0 Condo. America Condo. El Bosque Condo. Marconi 4. Como le afecto el terremoto de 1986? B. perdida de vivienda 10 B. perdida de vivienda 10 B. perdida de vivienda 6 G. en nada/no se acuerda 9 F. dano psicologico 2 G. en nada/no se acuerda 3 A. danos a la vivienda 0 G. en nada/no se acuerda 2 A. danos a la vivienda 1 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 A. danos a la vivienda 1 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 D. perdida de un familiar 0 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 D. perdida de un familiar 0 E. heridas 0 D. perdida de un familiar 0 E. heridas 0 1 2 2 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S Monte Carmelo Res. Europa San Lucas B. muros divisores 4 E. ampliacion de cuartos 7 C. verjas 0 E. ampliacion de cuartos 2 B. muros divisores 5 D. segunda planta 0 I. Cambio de piso 1 C. verjas 1 E. ampliacion de cuartos 0 C. verjas 0 D. segunda planta 1 F. cambio de techo 0 D. segunda planta 0 I. Cambio de piso 1 I. Cambio de piso 0 C. transporte colectivo 40 H. apartado de ruidos 22 G. centrico 6 I. Poca delincuencia 34 C. transporte colectivo 16 H. apartado de ruidos 4 G. centrico 19 E. escuela cerca 13 A. todo 1 J. zona verde 13 I. Poca delincuencia 12 B. nada 1 H. apartado de ruidos 12 D. servicios basicos 10 D. servicios basicos 1 A. todo 10 G. centrico 10 E. escuela cerca 1 B. nada 9 B. nada 8 K. el clima 1 E. escuela cerca 7 A. todo 7 C. transporte colectivo 0 D. servicios basicos 4 K. el clima 6 F. los vecinos 0 F. los vecinos 4 F. los vecinos 2 I. Poca delincuencia 0 K. el clima 1 J. zona verde 2 J. zona verde 0 H. nada 23 H. nada 27 D. basura (servicios) 14 J. muros de contencion 11 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 22 H. nada 14 E. las maras/delincuencia 6 J. muros de contencion 15 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 12 B. rios contaminados 6 M.Crime 7 B. rios contaminados 10 C. mal sericio de agua potable 5 D. basura (servicios) 6 N.Lack of play areas 9 D. basura (servicios) 4 B. rios contaminados 2 E. las maras/delincuencia 5 N.Lack of play areas 2 K.Poor Quality Materials in stairs/walkways2 C. mal sericio de agua potable 4 M.Crime 2 N.Lack of play areas 2 M.Crime 3 I. Todo 2 C. mal sericio de agua potable 1 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 1 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 2 E. las maras/delincuencia 1 I. Todo 1 L.Lack of Schools 1 F. alumbrado publico 1 J. muros de contencion 1 K.Poor Quality Materials in stairs/walkways0 I. Todo 1 F. alumbrado publico 0 Condo. San Miguelito B. perdida de vivienda 5 G. en nada/no se acuerda 5 A. danos a la vivienda 0 C. perdida de efectos personales 0 D. perdida de un familiar 0 E. heridas 0 (Table continues on the following page.) 1 2 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table D.3: El Salvador Survey: Ranked Response Questions (continued) Condo. America Condo. El Bosque Condo. Marconi 7. Que es lo que le gusta de esta casa? F. nada 7 E. todo 5 A. ubicacion 4 E. todo 4 H. accesibilidad 3 E. todo 3 A. ubicacion 2 F. nada 2 I. Privacidad 2 D. es propio 1 A. ubicacion 0 D. es propio 1 G. comodo/acogedor 1 B. tamano de casa 0 F. nada 1 I. Privacidad 1 C. tamano de terreno 0 G. comodo/acogedor 1 B. tamano de casa 0 D. es propio 0 B. tamano de casa 0 C. tamano de terreno 0 G. comodo/acogedor 0 C. tamano de terreno 0 H. accesibilidad 0 I. Privacidad 0 H. accesibilidad 0 8. Que es lo que le preocupa de esta casa? C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 8 A. techo (casas) 3 I. Nada 4 filtracion de agua B. paredes 3 C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 3 C. calidad de construccion/ 3 filtracion de agua materiales/filtracion de agua I. Nada 2 E. cuota alta 2 A. techo (casas) 2 E. cuota alta 1 I. Nada 2 H. plomeria 2 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 1 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 1 D. piso 1 J. ubicacion 1 B. paredes 0 B. paredes 0 A. techo (casas) 0 D. piso 0 E. cuota alta 0 D. piso 0 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 0 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 0 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 0 H. plomeria 0 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 0 H. plomeria 0 J. ubicacion 0 J. ubicacion 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 9. Que mejoras le han hecho a la casa? H. nada/no 14 H. nada/no 8 H. nada/no 8 E. ampliacion de cuartos 2 E. ampliacion de cuartos 2 G. cambio de puerta/ventana /balcon, 5 instalacion de defensas G. cambio de puerta/ventana/balcon, 2 G. cambio de puerta/ventana/ balcon, I. Cambio de piso 2 instalacion de defensas instalacion de defensas 1 A. Cuartos extras 0 A. Cuartos extras 0 A. Cuartos extras 1 B. muros divisores 0 B. muros divisores 0 B. muros divisores 1 C. verjas 0 C. verjas 0 C. verjas 0 D. segunda planta 0 D. segunda planta 0 D. segunda planta 0 F. cambio de techo 0 F. cambio de techo 0 E. ampliacion de cuartos 0 I. Cambio de piso 0 I. Cambio de piso 0 F. cambio de techo 0 1 2 4 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S Condo. San Miguelito E. todo 16 B. tamano de casa 7 F. nada 6 D. es propio 4 I. Privacidad 4 A. ubicacion 3 H. accesibilidad 3 G. comodo/acogedor 1 C. tamano de terreno 0 I. Nada 26 A. techo (casas) 5 G. espacio interior muy pequeno 4 F. inseguridad/entrada de ajenos 2 H. plomeria 2 C. calidad de construccion/materiales/ 1 filtracion de agua B. paredes 0 D. piso 0 E. cuota alta 0 J. ubicacion 0 K. contaminacion del medio ambiente 0 H. nada/no 16 A. Cuartos extras 14 D. segunda planta 10 E. ampliacion de cuartos 8 F. cambio de techo 3 C. verjas 2 G. cambio de puerta/ ventana/ balcon, 2 instalacion de defensas I. Cambio de piso 1 B. muros divisores 0 (Table continues on the following page.) 1 2 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table D.3: El Salvador Survey: Ranked Response Questions (continued) Condo. America Condo. El Bosque Condo. Marconi 10. Mencione 3 cosas qu le gusta de este barrio A. todo 6 G. centrico 6 G. centrico 9 B. nada 5 B. nada 3 A. todo 3 G. centrico 2 A. todo 2 E. escuela cerca 3 H. apartado de ruidos 2 D. servicios basicos 2 I. Poca delincuencia 3 I. poca delincuencia 2 I. poca delincuencia 1 D. servicios basicos 2 E. escuela cerca 1 J. zona verde 1 H. apartado de ruidos 2 C. transporte colectivo 0 C. transporte colectivo 0 C. transporte colectivo 1 D. servicios basicos 0 E. escuela cerca 0 F. los vecinos 1 F. los vecinos 0 F. los vecinos 0 B. nada 0 J. zona verde 0 H. apartado de ruidos 0 J. zona verde 0 K. el clima 0 K. el clima 0 K. el clima 0 11. Mencione 3 cosas que le preocupa de este barrio H. nada 5 H. nada 8 E. las maras/delincuencia 4 C. mal sericio de agua potable 2 C. mal sericio de agua potable 1 J. muros de contencion 4 I. todo 2 J. muros de contencion 1 H. nada 3 K. poor quality materials in stairs/walkways 1 K. poor quality materials in 1 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 2 stairs/walkways M.crime 1 M. crime 1 N.lack of play areas 2 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 0 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 0 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 1 B. rios contaminados 0 B. rios contaminados 0 I. Todo 1 D. basura (servicios) 0 D. basura (servicios) 0 B. rios contaminados 0 E. las maras/delincuencia 0 E. las maras/delincuencia 0 C. mal servicio de agua potable 0 F. alumbrado publico 0 F. alumbrado publico 0 D. basura (servicios) 0 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 0 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 0 F. alumbrado publico 0 J. muros de contencion 0 I. todo 0 K. poor quality materials in stairs/ 0 walkways 1 2 6 A P P E N D I X D : S U RV E Y R E S U LT S Condo. San Miguelito I. poca delincuencia 16 D. servicios basicos 13 J. zona verde 12 C. transporte colectivo 11 E. escuela cerca 10 A. todo 8 G. centrico 7 B. nada 4 F. los vecinos 1 K. el clima 1 H. apartado de ruidos 0 E. las maras/delincuencia 3 H. nada 3 M.crime 2 C. mal sericio de agua potable 1 D. basura (servicios) 1 I. todo 1 A. riesgo de incomunicacion 0 B. rios contaminados 0 F. alumbrado publico 0 G. aguas lluvias en pasajes 0 J. muros de contencion 0 K. poor quality materials in stairs/ 0 walkways 1 2 7 APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA--CHAPTER 3 Table E.1: Natural Disaster Issues Discussed in CASs CASs CASs Issue (number) (percent) Work with other donors 20 37 Strengthen the capacity for management of natural disasters 18 33 Long-term planning 17 31 Rehabilitation and reconstruction 15 28 Promote community participation 12 22 Recognize why the country is prone to natural disaster 9 17 Remove impediments to growth in agriculture 9 17 Food security 9 17 Catastrophe insurance 7 13 Strengthen safety net 7 13 Emergency relief planning 6 11 Public education 6 11 Land use planning 6 11 New construction 5 9 Orphans and vulnerable persons 5 9 Early warning system 4 7 Appropriate legal framework 4 7 Undertake analytical and advisory activities for assessment of mitigation strategies 4 7 Seismic strengthening of critical facilities 3 6 Country performance 3 6 Disaster as a major issue 3 6 Disaster as a country priority 3 6 Disaster as a Bank priority 3 6 Ensuring sustainability of disaster mitigation efforts 1 2 Creation of off-farm income opportunities 1 2 1 2 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table E.2a: Countries with High Vulnerability Based on Economic Risk to GDP from Two or More Hazards Percent of total Percent of population Percent of GDP Ranking Country area at risk in areas at risk in areas at risk 1 El Salvador 88.7 95.4 96.4 2 Jamaica 94.9 96.3 96.3 3 Dominican Rep. 87.2 94.7 95.6 4 Guatemala 52.7 92.1 92.2 5 Vietnam 33.2 75.7 89.4 6 Albania 86.4 88.6 88.5 7 Costa Rica 51.9 84.8 86.6 8 Colombia 21.2 84.7 86.6 9 Bangladesh 71.4 83.6 86.5 10 Philippines 50.3 81.3 85.2 11 Turkey 73.0 80.9 83.3 12 Trinidad and Tobago 66.7 82.4 83.1 13 Thailand 47.8 70.1 81.2 14 Barbados 79.9 79.9 79.9 15 Ecuador 24.4 73.6 72.2 16 Mexico 15.9 68.2 71.1 17 Dominica 68.3 67.0 68.3 18 Nicaragua 21.6 68.7 67.9 19 Chile 5.2 64.9 67.7 20 Iran, Islamic Republic of 31.7 69.8 66.5 21 Venezuela 4.9 61.2 65.9 22 Uzbekistan 9.3 65.6 65.5 23 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0 52.8 64.9 24 Jordan 13.7 64.9 64.7 25 Argentina 1.8 57.4 63.2 26 South Africa 8.6 56.3 62.4 27 Tunisia 30.4 64.1 62.4 28 Indonesia 11.5 67.4 62.3 29 China 13.1 49.8 56.6 30 Honduras 19.0 56.0 56.5 31 Haiti 44.4 47.9 56.0 32 Uruguay 3.0 55.0 55.0 33 Peru 4.0 41.5 53.7 34 Kyrgyz Rep. 8.3 51.3 53.4 35 Romania 37.4 45.8 50.3 Source: World Bank 2005c. Note: Nonborrowing countries have been omitted from this list. 1 3 0 A P P E N D I X E : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 3 Table E.2b: Countries with Medium Vulnerability Based on Economic Risk to GDP from Two or More Hazards Percent of total Percent of population Percent of GDP Ranking Country area at risk in areas at risk in areas at risk 36 India 22.1 47.7 49.6 37 Algeria 3.1 49.3 48.3 38 Paraguay 2.0 45.6 42.9 39 Azerbaijan 15.6 42.3 42.4 40 Pakistan 9.0 40.1 41.6 41 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 41.6 41.6 41.6 42 Georgia 4.4 40.5 41.0 43 Macedonia, FYR 38.8 29.6 38.7 44 Tajikistan 4.1 38.2 38.3 45 Bolivia 1.0 36.6 37.7 46 Mozambique 0.0 1.9 37.3 47 Djibouti 1.9 31.7 35.3 48 Cambodia 9.1 31.3 34.5 49 Morocco 3.4 30.4 33.4 50 Bulgaria 29.3 31.6 30.0 Source: World Bank 2005c. Note: Non-borrowing countries have been omitted from this list. 1 3 1 APPENDIX F: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA--CHAPTER 4 Box F.1: Objectives of Bank Lending The study analyzed the objectives of all the loans that had dis- (4) economic restoration and strengthening; (5) pre-event disas- aster-related objectives to identify the most common project aims ter prevention; (6) rehabilitation and construction of housing; (7) and to see whether the amount of time projects took to disburse emergency financial assistance to affected groups; (8) project and to implement had a close relationship with objectives or ac- management; (9) operation and maintenance; (10) donor coordi- tivities. (There is a very close relationship between the nature of nation; and (11) resettlement of affected populations. objectives, the activities undertaken, and implementation time. A Publicinfrastructureanddisastermanagementwerethetwomost Background Paper on this topic is available upon request.) frequently pursued disaster objectives, occurring in almost 50 per- Project objectives addressing natural disasters fell into 11 cat- centoftheprojects.Whenthesearecombinedwiththenexttwomost egories: (1) disaster management; (2) rehabilitation and con- frequently occurring objectives (agricultural and environmental struction of public infrastructure; (3) agriculture improvements, works, and economic restoration/strengthening), approximately 80 environmental conservation, and natural resource management; percent of all completed disaster projects were represented. 1 3 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure F.1: Frequency of Disaster Activity Categories: 1984­2005 Supplies/equipment (AGR) Rehabilitation of roads (INFR) Rehab of flood control (INFR) Research (DIS MGT) Institutional development (DIS MGT) Fire prevention activities (PREV) Early warning (DIS MGT) Education facilities (ECO STRGTH) Planning (DIS MGT) Rehab of irrig/drainage (AGR) Rehab of rural water (INFR) Rehab of urban water (INFR) New constr of flood control (INFR) Flood control activities (PREV) Health facilities (ECO STRGTH) Training (DIS MGT) Rehab of housing (HSG) Resp to slow-onset event (PREV) Design/supervision (PJT MGT) Land management (AGR) Resettlement (RESTTLMT) Rehab of electr/ener/comm (INFR) Tech assist: engineering (DIS MGT) Tech assist: non-eng (PJT MGT) PIU support (PJT MGT) Transport facilities (ECO STRGTH) Public facilities (ECO STRGTH) New constr of housing (HSG) Rehab of water/sanitation (INFR) Operations/maintenance (O&M) Retrofitting/strengthening (PREV) activity Forest mgmt (AGR) BoP/imports (FIN) Livestock/fisheries mgmt (AGR) Disaster New constr of roads (INFR) Consulting (PJT MGT) New constr of irrig/drainage (AGR) Commercial facilities (ECO STRGTH) New constr of rural water (INFR) Policy reform (DIS MGT) Loans to beneficiaries (FIN) Studies (PJT MGT) New constr of water/sanitation (INFR) New constr of urban water (INFR) Cash transfer (FIN) Search/rescue & medicine (DIS MGT) Assistance subsidies (FIN) Pest control activities (AGR) New constr of shelters (INFR) Project training (PJT MGT) Demolition/rubble collection (INFR) Land acquisition (AGR) Water resource management (AGR) New constr of elec/ener/comm (INFR) Community-driven prevention (PREV) Disaster insurance (FIN) Procurement (PJT MGT) Interfacing with govt/donor (DONOR) Leveraging funding (DONOR) Contingency financing (FIN) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Number of projects 1 3 4 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Figure F.2: Frequency of Disaster Objective Categories: 1984­2005 90 88 83 80 70 63 60 50 projects 50 of 40 Number 30 25 20 14 13 9 10 5 4 3 0 O&M Housing Prevention Financial infrastructuremanagement strengthening management coordination Resettlement Public Donor Disaster Project Agriculture/environment Economic Disaster objective Figure F.3: Distribution of Disaster Objective Categories among All Completed Projects: 1984­2005 Project management 3% O&M Housing Financial 1% Donor coordination 4% 4% 1% Resettlement 1% Prevention 7% Public infrastructure 24% Economic strengthening 14% Disaster management Agriculture/environment 23% 18% 1 3 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure F.4: Average Implementation and Extension Time by Disaster Objective Category-- All Projects, 1984­2005 O & M 6.5 1.6 Project 5.3 1.7 management Agriculture/ 5.5 1.1 environment Resettlement 4.4 2.2 Prevention 5.2 1.2 Disaster 4.8 1.2 management objective Donor 4.5 . 1.4 Disaster Public infrastructure 4.6 1.2 Housing 3.8 1.0 Economic 3.5 1.1 strengthening Financial 2.9 0.4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of years Average project time Average extension time 1 3 6 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Figure F.5: Average Implementation and Extension Time by Disaster Objective Category-- ERL Projects, 1984­2005a OP 8.50 ERL Timing Guidelines Resettlement 5.4 2.1 Project 3 2.3 management Donor 3.3 1.5 Housing 3.4 1.1 Disaster 3 1.3 management objective Prevention 3.3 0.9 Public infrastructure 3.1 1.1 Disaster Economic 3 1 strengthening Agriculture/ 2.5 0.8 environment Financial 1.5 0.1 O & M 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of years Average project time Average extension time a. Last year figures were available. 1 3 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table F.1: List of Disaster Activities (2) Pre-disaster prevention (7) Resettlement 201 Retrofitting/strengthening of existing/undamaged 701 Resettlement (private/public) infrastructure (8) Disaster management 202 Responding to indications of coming slow-onset event 801 Early warning/public awareness 203 Flood control activities and structures (pre-event) 802 Institutional development/strengthening (disaster-specific) 204 Fire prevention activities and structures (pre-event) 803 Emergency search, rescue, and medical assistance 205 Community-driven disaster prevention activities (pre-event) 804 Training (disaster-specific) (3) Public infrastructure 805 Legal and policy reform 301 Rehabilitation of road infrastructure 806 Studies and research 302 Rehabilitation of (rural) water systems infrastructure 807 TA: Engineering 303 Rehabilitation of (urban) water systems infrastructure 808 Planning 304 Rehabilitation of (urban) water/sanitation infrastructure (9) Project management 305 Rehabilitation of electricity/energy/telecommunications systems 901 Support for PIU 306 Rehabilitation of flood control structures 902 Procurement 307 Demolition and rubble collection 903 Training 308 Rehabilitation of shelters 904 Design and supervision 309 New construction of road infrastructure 905 Consulting 310 New construction of (rural) water systems infrastructure 906 Studies and research 311 New construction of (urban) water systems infrastructure 907 TA: Non-engineering 312 New construction of (urban) water/sanitation infrastructure (10) Financial assistance 313 New construction of electricity/energy/telecommunications systems 1001 Insurance 314 New construction of flood control structures 1002 Contingency finance 315 New construction of shelters 1003 Balance of payment/import finance (4) Housing 1004 Cash transfer 401 Rehabilitation of housing 1005 Assistance subsidies to beneficiaries 402 New construction of housing 1006 Loans to beneficiaries (5) Economic restoration (11) Operations & maintenance 501 Commercial facilities 1101 Operations and maintenance 502 Public facilities (12) Donor coordination 503 Health facilities 1201 Leveraging additional funds 504 Transport facilities 1202 Interfacing between government and donors 505 Education facilities (6) Agriculture/environment 601 Livestock/fisheries management 602 Water resource management 603 Land acquisition 604 Land management 605 Forest management 606 Equipment and supplies acquisition 607 Rehabilitation of irrigation/drainage infrastructure 608 New construction of irrigation/drainage infrastructure 609 Pest control 1 3 8 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Figure F.6: Average Implementation and Extension Times for Projects Containing Disaster Activities: Emergency Recovery Loans Demolition/rubble collection (INFR) 3.8 2.3 Land management (AGR) 2.7 3.1 Pest control activities (AGR) 3.5 2.0 New constr of elec/ener/comm (INFR) 3.7 1.7 New constr of roads (INFR) 3.8 1.5 Operations/maintenance (O&M) 3.0 2.3 Studies (PJT MGT) 3.6 1.7 Planning (DIS MGT) 3.5 1.8 New constr of housing (HSG) 3.6 1.6 Project training (PJT MGT) 3.9 1.3 Retrofitting/strengthening (PREV) 3.7 1.5 New constr of water/sanitation (INFR) 3.2 1.9 Training (DIS MGT) 3.7 1.4 Tech assist: non-eng (PJT MGT) 3.6 1.5 Forest mgmt (AGR) 4.1 1.0 Interfacing with govt/donor (DONOR) 3.1 2.0 Leveraging funding (DONOR) 3.1 2.0 Resettlement (RESTTLMT) 3.5 1.6 Public facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.5 1.5 Loans to beneficiaries (FIN) 3.6 1.2 Education facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.4 1.5 Flood control activities (PREV) 3.1 1.6 Commercial facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.3 1.3 Rehabilitation of roads (INFR) 3.3 1.3 Rehab of flood control (INFR) 3.2 1.3 Research (DIS MGT) 3.3 1.3 Tech assist: engineering (DIS MGT) 3.2 1.3 Rehab of housing (HSG) 3.3 1.1 Supplies/equipment (AGR) 3.1 1.3 activities New constr of flood control (INFR) 3.1 1.3 Health facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.2 1.1 Design/supervision (PJT MGT) 3.2 1.1 Early warning (DIS MGT) 3.3 1.1 disaster Water resource management (AGR) 2.9 1.4 ERL Transport facilities (ECO STRGTH) 3.1 1.2 Rehab of urban water (INFR) 3.2 1.0 Institutional development (DIS MGT) 3.0 1.2 New constr of shelters (INFR) 3.5 0.6 Resp to slow-onset event (PREV) 3.2 0.9 New constr of urban water (INFR) 3.2 0.9 Rehab of irrig/drainage (AGR) 3.3 0.8 Consulting (PJT MGT) 3.0 1.0 Land acquisition (AGR) 3.1 0.8 Rehab of rural water (INFR) 3.0 0.9 Rehab of water/sanitation (INFR) 3.2 0.7 Rehab of electr/ener/comm (INFR) 2.7 1.1 New constr of rural water (INFR) 3.0 0.7 Community-driven prevention (PREV) 3.2 0.5 Assistance subsidies (FIN) 3.1 0.5 PIU support (PJT MGT) 3.0 0.6 Livestock/fisheries mgmt (AGR) 3.0 0.6 Policy reform (DIS MGT) 2.8 0.6 Procurement (PJT MGT) 2.0 1.0 Cash transfer (FIN) 2.8 0.1 Search/rescue & medicine (DIS MGT) 2.0 0.7 New constr of irrig/drainage (AGR) 2.6 0.1 Fire prevention activities (PREV) 2.2 0.0 BoP/imports (FIN) 1.5 0.1 Contingency financing (FIN) Disaster insurance (FIN) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Number of years Average project time Average extension time Note: Each bar represents the average actual implementation time of all projects that included a given activity. 1 3 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure F.7: Average Implementation Time and Number of Completed Projects by Disaster Component: 1984­2005 (Part 1 of 2) 100 8 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.1 90 7.1 7.0 6.9 88 6.9 6.9 7 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 80 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 77 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 6 5.7 70 5 60 53 projects years of 50 4 of Number 43 43 Number 40 37 3 33 33 30 27 27 25 24 23 2 22 20 20 18 17 16 16 15 15 15 12 12 12 1 10 10 7 7 5 5 0 mgmt mgmt H20 H2O controlO&M mgmt event ral roads mgmt ru controlof controltransferofroads studiesplanning asstcresearch asstcfacilities facilitiestraining Land acquisition prevention collectiontraining urban tech tech water/san flood Forest toslow of of Resettlement Cash flood mgmt of Land Fire of mgmtof irrig/drainage Flood constr of mgmt mgmt resourcePublic Project Livestock/fish Resp constr constr Commercial constr Supplies/equipment constr New Rehab Project Water New Disasterconstr Rehabilitation Engineering New Disaster Disaster New New Demolition/rubble New Non-engineering Disaster activities Number of projects Revised project time 1 4 0 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Figure F.8: Average Implementation Time and Number of Completed Projects by Disaster Component: 1984­2005 (Part 2 of 2) 100 8 90 7 80 6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 70 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 5 60 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 projects years of 50 3.8 4 of Number 43 Number 40 39 38 37 37 3 35 2.4 30 30 27 26 24 2 22 21 20 20 20 18 15 14 13 12 1 10 10 9 9 9 5 5 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 water devt H2O g an ort housing facilitieshousingwarningfacilitiesgthening shelterscontrol reform ner/commfacilities funding of of t of govt/donor urban insurance prevention Consultinwater/s Procurement rural beneficiaries Pest & medicine subsidiesfinancingsupprt financing PIU of Early irrig/drainage of Policy of constr to Institutional Health with electr/e Disaster Rehab EducationRehab of Transpor elec/ener/commconstr of Design/supervision of Leveraging Rehab Rehab Assistance New Loans BoP/impo Rehab New Contingency Retrofitting/stren constr Rehab Interfacing Search/rescue Community-driven New Disaster activities Number of projects Revised project time 1 4 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table F.2: Implementation of Hazard Reduction/Mitigation Components in 197 World Bank­Assisted Disaster Projects Component Times implemented Maintenance 124 Construction to higher design standards and/or to protect from future hazards 123 Research, studies, policy changes including building codes 109 Training 89 Institution building for disaster and hazard management 73 Community participation in mitigation activities and disaster preparedness 67 Water supply / watershed management 61 Relocation and resettlement 44 Quality assurance and monitoring in construction 44 Early warning, forecasting, and seismic monitoring systems 41 Hazard mitigation and preparedness plan 38 Tree plantation and Vetiver plantation for slope stabilization 35 Forest management/fire protection 34 Agricultural inputs/drought-resistant crops 26 Risk and vulnerability assessment and monitoring 24 Communication equipment 24 Soil improvement/arresting land degradation 22 Employment/income creation 19 Drought management 19 Public information / awareness campaign 18 Pest management 16 Fire breaks 14 Shelter repair and construction 9 Fire tower 8 Insurance 5 Demonstration houses 2 Noncompletion of one or more mitigation components = 80 1 4 2 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Table F.3: Projects Involving Financing Mechanisms Approval Disaster-related Country Project name fiscal year component Status 1. Dominica Emergency Recovery and 1999 Insurance for public buildings Subcomponent cancelled Disaster Management Project (P069633) 2. Morocco National Rural Finance 1994 The use of the National Guarantee "The establishment of a Climatic Risk (P005486) Fund as a drought insurance Insurance Fund, ...never materialized." mechanism. (ICR) 3. Tunisia National Rural Finance 1995 Drought insurance mechanisma Unclear if ever happened from project (P005720) documents. 4. OECS OECS Emergency Recovery 1998 Financing lending operations in The floating 4th phase of this APL provides and Disaster Management each of the five mentioned countries for contingency financing to Grenada, Project covering St. Kitts & with the objects of fortifying or St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Dominica, Nevis, St. Lucia, Dominica, reconstructing and rehabilitating key and St. Vincent and the Grenadines in the Grenada, and St. Vincent & economic and social infrastructure event of a disaster. This project was ulti- the Grenadines (P062668) and facilities and strengthening the mately unbundled into separate country countries' institutional capacities to projects. The floating phase 4 has been prepare for and respond to disaster used by Grenada in response to Hurricane emergencies. Ivan (see below). Grenada (4APL) Hurricane 2004 Contingency financing (floating (Connected to above OECS project) ongoing Ivan Emerg. Rec. (P092692) phase 4 of the APL)b 5. St. Lucia Emergency Recovery and 1999 Increase government access to "Little was done to increase the govern- Disaster Management Project insurance ment's access to insurance under the proj (P070430) ect, other than the preparation of an inven- tory of public buildings" (PPAR). 6. Turkey Emergency Earthquake 2000 Catastrophic insurance pool TCIP, ongoing Recovery (P068394) 7. India Gujarat Emergency 2002 The component funded TA to assist Ongoing micro insurance scheme provided. Earthquake Reconstruction in the building of the Gujarat Compulsory for housing recipients. For a Project (P074018) Disaster Insurance Program. house of 2,500, insurance for 10 years was Premiums were taken from the $10. The government has taken up insur- money received by beneficiaries ance for schools and roads. The govern- for rebuilding. ment also wants to include other buildings (not damaged) in insurance scheme. 8. OECS (P070658) Only PID 2002 Insurance for the Caribbean region.c Dropped (insurance regulatory strengthening, catastrophe funding and risk pooling mechanisms, and risk management and mitigation to manage low income communities' exposures.) (Table continues on the following page.) 1 4 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table F.3: Projects Involving Financing Mechanisms (continued) Approval Disaster-related Country Project name fiscal year component Status 9. Colombia Disaster Vulnerability 2005 TA ($124,000) Ongoing Reduction (P082429) Risk Assessment using a model for EQ and flood--average annual loss and probable maximum loss. $150 million contingent financingd facility to act as a bridging facility until resources from other MFIs and international agencies become available. PAD: "The contingent facility can play a useful role in closing the gap between high frequency, but low severity, events covered with annual government appropriation and budget reallocations and low frequency, but high severity events, for which all other resources would be exhausted. As explained below, the contingent facility is also well suited to cover large, but not major, losses caused by multiple sources of risks which cannot be captured by a single parameter, as required by parametric (earthquake) insurance." "the contingent facility is also well suited to cover large, but not major, losses caused by multiple sources of risks which cannot be captured by a single parameter, as required by parametric (earthquake) insurance." 10. Vietnam Natural Disasters Mitigation 2005 "Contingency budget for disaster" Ongoing Project (P073361) "rapid disbursement facility" "contingency funding mechanism," PAD: "The option of a `Contingency Funding Facility' providing readily available budgetary support was explored. However, this option was rejected by the Government because it would incur costs (interest or commitment charges) and only cover low-frequency hazards, which 1 4 4 A P P E N D I X F : S U P P L E M E N TA L D ATA -- C H A P T E R 4 Table F.3: Projects Involving Financing Mechanisms (continued) Approval Disaster-related Country Project name fiscal year component Status might not happen during the project's lifespan. Instead, agreement was reached on the idea to develop a rapid disbursement facility which might also apply to lower-level localized disasters, utilizing to the extent possible the existing country system for post-disaster reconstruc- tion and, at the same time, paving the way for future direct support to the Government's budgetary system through an integrated institutional strengthening program." Other: Port Development and 1995 Project-built cranes were insured.e Mention of insurance was made in the Mauritius Environmental Protection SAR, in that it was one of the operational (P001926) parameters used for economic evaluation of the project. Because of the damage caused by two cyclones, particularly the Cyclone Daniella, the contractor had to get the compensation from the insurer which did not cover all the costs. (ICR) Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. a. "Although the use of the Fonds National de Garantie (National Guarantee Fund) as a drought insurance mechanism did partially address a systemic risk in agricultural financing in Tunisia, in the medium term, BNA was not able to implement its Action Plan successfully without a firm commitment from the GoT to give BNA autonomy in its loan portfolio manage- ment decisions. This issue had a significant impact on BNA's ability to implement the project and should have been resolved during project preparation." (ICR) b. "The financing consists of 50 percent IBRD funding, and 50 percent IDA credit. Given Grenada's current fiscal constraints, it is proposed that the Bank finance 100 percent of the pro- ject's expenditures. Up to 20% of total project funds may be allocated toward retroactive financing for activities procured after September 7, 2004." (MOP) c. "The project aims to put in place comprehensive country and sub-regional risk management ex ante funding strategies to reduce fiscal, economic, and financial instability in the wake of natural disasters, which occur due to resource dislocations and budgetary outlays traditionally required for reconstruction of uninsured and uninsurable public and private assets. The project also aims to strengthen the domestic insurance industries and their arrangements with the international reinsurance and credit markets, to augment the capacity of domestic in- surance markets to manage and transfer large risk exposures, while building up the requisite reserves to pre-fund and insure against future natural disasters." (PID) d. Front-end fee, plus annual commitment fee. "The contingent facility is also well suited to cover large, but not major, losses caused by multiple sources of risks which cannot be cap- tured by a single parameter, as required by parametric (EQ) insurance." PAD 104. 2-3 year return period: reserve funds (recurrent risks) ($15 million). 10-20 year return period: WB financed contingent facility ($150 million); 30-200 year return period: parametric insurance coverage (EQ risk). e. Not clear if the insurance was funded by the project. 1 4 5 APPENDIX G: CASH SUPPORT Since 1984, the Bank has funded over $850 mil- the Turkey EERL was appraised in 1999. In proj- lion in cash assistance (cash transfer, cash for ects that have closed and been rated, four out of work, and similar programs) in the context of 11 six were satisfactory. Projects that were rated projects, 5 of which are ongoing. Approximately unsatisfactory accounted for less than one per- 94 percent of these funds have been lent since cent of the funds allocated. Table G.1: Projects with Cash Transfer Elements Project Cash transfer Amount for cash Country (plus appraisal date) element transfer component Rating 1. Chile Public Housing Sector Housing subsidies and tangible $5.0 million Closed, no rating Project (1984) (P006608) goods following an earthquake. found The Bank reallocated US$5.0 million of the Loan to finance 4,000 grant certificates under the ASP program for homeless owners. Within six months of the earthquake, MINVU had replaced 3,200 houses, granted subsidies for 3,600, and assisted 37,000 other households with temporary shelter, repairs and materials 2. China North China Earthquake Credit provided to village bene- $30 million Highly satisfactory Reconstruction Project ficiaries in-kind (as construction (1991) (P003621) supplies), and in-cash (as reimburse- ment for construction goods).a After the first EQ, the reinforcement of EQ-resistant measures for the new housing produced a significant result: none of these housing units fell or had any cracks on the walls when an EQ with a magnitude of 5.8 occurred in Yangyuan on March 26, 1991b (Table continues on the following page.) 1 4 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table G.1: Projects with Cash Transfer Elements (continued) Project Cash transfer Amount for cash Country (plus appraisal date) element transfer component Rating 3. Burkina Faso Food Security and Cash for work program $4.9 million Component was Nutrition Project Did not lead to permanent income unsatisfactory (P000303) (1991) increases at the household level, nor was adequate training for infrastructure maintenance provided. Implementation problems because arrangements were left until after project start-up.c 4. Poland Housing (P008590) Cash assistance to small and $13 million for SMEse Satisfactory (1992) medium-size enterprises affected by flooding that occurred during lifetime of project.d First 40% a grant, rest a loan. 5. Turkey Emergency Earthquake Cash transfer to earthquake victims $252.53 million Satisfactory Recovery Project in the form of rent support, death compen- (P068394) (1999 10/27) sation, and business compensation. 6. Colombia Earthquake Recovery Housing subsidies $233 million (ICR) Highly satisfactory Project (P065263) (2000) (Funds went toward housing or rent US$100 million compensation)f (at appraisal) Bank Project funds would be used only to partially finance the direct subsidy pro- gram for owners. Other resources were iden- tified to finance the subsidized loan com- ponent and the renter subsidy programs. 7. Papua Emergency El Niño Cash for workg Original: $2.50 million; Unsatisfactory New Guinea Drought (2003) (P055462) (For road maintenance, and vehicular bridge actual: $.04 million repairs.) The contracting of these works demonstrated that communities can be mobi- lized to receive payment for works to be undertaken by local government bodies in rural areas, thereby providing the opportunity to introduce cash into economies in disaster situations and reducing dependence on government and donor handouts. Monitoring procedures not adopted and the intended en- hanced role of NGOs and church groups in community organization and monitoring was not developed. TOTAL CLOSED $538.47 million 1 4 8 A P P E N D I X G : C A S H S U P P O RT Table G.1: Projects with Cash Transfer Elements (continued) Project Cash transfer Amount for cash Country (plus appraisal date) element transfer component Rating 8. Maldives Post-Tsunami Recovery Cash support for those with $5.6 million from Ongoing and Reconstruction damaged houses and for those the IDA Grant for (P094193) (2005) especially vulnerable for 10 months cash support post disasterh $3 million for the Also sub-grants to small businesses sub-grants (not an IDA grant) 9. Sri Lanka Tsunami Recovery (2005) Cash transfer $36.5 million Ongoing 10 Indonesia Indonesia Community Block grants to tsunami-affected $49.9 million Ongoing Recovery Through the kecamatans Kecamatan Development Project (P097535) (2005) 11 Pakistan Earthquake Recovery (2005) Cash transfer $220 million Awaiting approval Total ongoing $312 million TOTAL $850.47 million a. CHINA: "Considering the emergency nature of the project, special procurement and disbursement arrangements were made to support swift project implementation. Under the spe- cial procurement arrangements, the credit was provided to village beneficiaries in two forms: (a) in kind-as basic materials (timber, steel, cement and glass) procured in bulk; and (b) in cash-as reimbursement for expenditures on other materials and labor obtained locally. ...because of the large number of individual and public beneficiaries in each village, a consoli- dated village contract (between the village and the county) based on the agreed village plans was devised to facilitate documentation for disbursement. Disbursements against the vil- lage contract were further simplified by a schedule of payments." (PCR) "Each village plan for the affected villages was prepared by the village and by the direct beneficiaries of the credit. Participation promoted an energized commitment at the local level. Although the local PMOs were disbanded, the lessons learned from this experience remained with the recon- struction management staff after they moved to other organizations. 2 2. Comments received from the borrower (see Annex D) underline the importance of the local management sys- tem. "Strict supervision and efficient operation are the keys to project success. During the implementation of the project, we established a good institutional system. The Project Units were set at the levels of county, town and village, contracts were signed, duties and deadlines were specified. The county government established the Project Office with special units dealing with finance, purchasing, project management, and quality control. Following the standards of the World Bank and local conditions, these groups effectively managed the proj- ect and obtained superior outcomes. After the first earthquake, the reinforcement of earthquake-resistant measures for the new housing produced a significant result: none of these housing units fell or had any cracks on the walls when an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.8 Richter scale occurred in Yangyuan on March 26, 1991" (ICR). b. The highly participatory modality used to implement the project, based on local management and decentralized decision making, proved to be very successful. Each village plan for the affected villages was prepared by the village and by the direct beneficiaries of the credit. Participation promoted an energized commitment at the local level. c. BURKINA FASO: "This component corresponded only partially with the project's objective of strengthening food security at the household level through income diversification. It did not lead to permanent income increases at the household level, nor was adequate training for infrastructure maintenance provided. Implementation arrangements were properly assessed during project preparation, but the formulation of adequate operational procedures for its implementation were left until after project start-up (in particular, procedures to ensure that contractors would have an incentive to use local unskilled labor rather than skilled labor from urban centers), which posed problems during implementation" (ICR). d. POLAND: "Although the number of SME beneficiaries turned out to be substantially less than initially projected, the project achieved its principal goal of providing a significant level of assistance to SMEs, and did help to restore production and economic growth in the flood affected area. However, the impact of the program was not as great as initially anticipated, in part because of the delay in start-up. By the time funds from the program started to flow, almost one year after the flood, some enterprises had already ceased operations. The first grant under the program was approved at the beginning of July 1998. As of end June 1999, when the final applications for assistance were submitted, a total of 586 enterprises had re- ceived government grants totaling PLN 46.9 million (about US$13.0 million)--bringing total commitments to about 80 percent of the US$16 million allocated from the housing loan for the SME assistance operation. Overall, substantial assistance was provided under the program and the outcome of the project was positive. The program mobilized PLN 126 million (about US$32.6 million) in commercial bank resources and disbursed PLN 46.6 million (about US$12.3 million) in grant form (slightly less than the total committed as some of the approved grants were not fully disbursed by the loan closing date). About PLN 22 million ($5.5 million) was provided from the beneficiaries own funds. Of the total assistance, 85 percent was provided to enterprises employing 50 people or less, for amounts of less than $100,000 equivalent. Only 10 grants were made for more than this amount. In terns of numbers, about 350 of the total number of grants were for less than PLN 35,000 each (about $10,000)" (ICR). e. "Commercial banks participating in the program were allowed to charge interest on the SME loans up to the level of the prevailing Lombard Rate (the rate at which commercial banks can obtain financing from the National Bank of Poland (NBP)), if they are short of funds. At the time the program started, this rate was around 27­28 percent, compared to the normal market rate for lending to businesses of around 22 percent. As flood recovery assistance at such a high rate would not have been very helpful or accepted, the initial proposal was for an interest rate subsidy, but following discussions with the Bank, and to avoid any risk of distorting the banking and financial markets, it was agreed to finance up to 40 percent of the SME loan as a grant, with the grant funded from the budget, including financing from the Housing Loan. For grants up to PLN 35,000, the beneficiary was expected to receive the full 40 (Continued on the following page.) 1 4 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table G.1: Projects with Cash Transfer Elements (continued) percent of the commercial bank loan as a grant. Commercial banks would have approval authority for grants of up to this amount. For grants larger than PLN 35,000, the percentage was determined by PARR, based on need, and submitted to the Minister for Flood..." (ICR). f. COLOMBIA: "The majority of residents of the affected zone fall in the lowest three income strata. Two subsidies offered to owners: a one-time subsidy to qualified beneficiaries for use exclusively for the repair, reconstruction or acquisition of a new unit which must, among other things, comply with the updated building code; or subsidized $60,000 credit for rebuilding (very low uptake on this option). Direct subsidy assistance for owners was in the form of a grant to cover actual losses suffered up to a maximum of COP 8 million (approximately US$4,000) per family. If the beneficiary lives or lived in a vulnerable zone, apart from the COP 8 million, there is an additional payment of COP 4 million (US$2,000) to acquire the lot which has to be vacated, thus assisting the owner to purchase a lot in a less vulnerable site. Families who lost the units they rented are entitled to subsidy assistance amounting to COP 5.9 million (US$2,950) toward the acquisition of their own home" (PAD). g. The rural works subprojects in Simbu covered road maintenance and vehicular bridge repairs. Most were completed or well advanced when loan funding ceased. The contracting of these works did demonstrate that communities can be mobilized to receive payment for works to be undertaken by local government bodies in rural areas, thereby providing the oppor- tunity to introduce cash into economies in disaster situations and reducing dependence on government and donor hand-outs. Unfortunately, the lack of adoption of the recommended pro- cedural forms did not allow monitoring of aspects concerning the organization systems for work, the participation of women, youth, and so on in the schemes, preferred method of payments, and legitimacy of distribution of payments. More comprehensive information would have been useful for future programs. Records at project completion were even inadequate to indi- cate the number of person-days employed in each subproject. The Bank found that the initial proposals for the self-help social infrastructure (schools and health posts) did not meet the project guidelines for local participation (labor contributed without remuneration) and advised that these should be revised to be in accordance with the project concept. None of these subprojects eventuated. This meant that this innovative part of the project was not developed, although the concept of self-help was adopted in the water supply schemes in Simbu. The intended enhanced role of NGOs and church groups in community organization and monitoring was not developed" (ICR). h. MALDIVES: "Component 1: Restoration of livelihoods consists of (a) safety net cash transfers to the affected population for their subsistence needs, and (b) a program to restore lost or damaged assets of affected enterprises. Sub-Component a: Safety net cash grants to households affected by the tsunami (US$5.6 million from the IDA grant). The government has begun providing one-time cash grants to families seriously affected by the tsunami under this program. This program is ongoing and an amount of Rf. 30 million has been disbursed to the affected population with an estimate of additional Rf. 20 million to be disbursed shortly. Government has started distributing Rf. 1,500 (US$117) per capita to families whose houses were completely destroyed; Rf.1,000 per capita to families whose houses were partially damaged; and Rf.500 per capita to families whose houses are intact but the household items swept away. This amount is intended to help affected families cover immediate expenses on food and household essentials. The government is also preparing a follow-up safety net program targeting the poorest and most vulnerable among the affected population; this new program would provide a small monthly cash payment for a limited period of 10 months to poor and heavily affected families. The purpose of limiting the period and narrowly defining the target groups is to avoid developing a dependency syndrome" (PAD). 1 5 0 A P P E N D I X G : C A S H S U P P O RT Table G.2: Cash Compensation in Resettlement, Not Directly Emergency-Related 1. Colombia Irrigation Rehabilitation Not an emergency. Completed, but not Closed II (P006793) (1986) direct cash transfer 2. Brazil Northeast Irrigation I Not an emergency. Completed, but not Closed (P006453) (1990) direct cash transfer 2. Madagascar Antananarivo Plain Compensation for Completed, but not Moderately Development Project resettlement.a direct cash transfer unsatisfactory (1990) (P001512) Not an emergency. 3. Brazil Minas Gerais Water 2/3 of the 2,855 families moved by $22 millionc Satisfactory Quality and Pollution the project from a flood basin opted Control Project (P006540) for cash compensation in lieu of (1992) relocation.b 4. Bangladesh Jamuna Bridge Project Cash compensation for land lost Completed, but not Closed (P009509) (1994) due to bridge construction. direct cash transfer Not an emergency.d 5. Vietnam Coastal wetlands Cash compensation for resettlement Ongoing protection and manage- and for annual crops/fish/produce lost, ment development and for affected businessese compen- (P042568) (1999 10/26) sation in cash for affected assets (10 per- cent implemented to date), (Typhoon Linda hit after the resettlement plan had been issued, delaying the whole process.) 6. Moldova SAC (P061496) (1999)f Drought followed by ice storm. Structural Completed, but not Closed Adjustment Credit. No cash support to direct cash transfer beneficiaries. a. MADAGASCAR: "Involuntary Resettlement. While the project has improved the living conditions of many poor households in the Antananarivo Plain, many households subject to re- settlement are in worse conditions than before. The original plan to give each family a resettlement plot in addition to compensation was changed to one of reduced compensation, tem- porary shelter and an option to buy a plot in three designated areas far from most employment opportunities. In 1998, only 3 of the 2,341 households displaced were living in the 3 designated resettlement sites. Most households used their compensation to settle nearer their original homes and many suffered a deterioration in tenure status and housing quality. More than 60 percent of former owners and tenants in a survey on resettled households were not satisfied with resettlement. The resettlement process did not provide assistance with the move, sup- port at the resettlement site or assistance with improving living standards as would now be required (appraisal was one year before OD 4.30 on involuntary resettlement was issued)." (ICR) b. BRAZIL: "An assessment of the group that received cash compensation demonstrated a high percentage of satisfaction with the new living conditions. The results related to plot area and type of use indicated a substantial improvement. Cash compensation enabled a family to select a bigger plot (180­230m2) situated in a planned urban area served by basic infra- structure. The assessment also indicated that a significant group moved to more distant neighborhoods" (ICR). c. The compensation was provided by the state government as part of the overall project. d. BANGLADESH: "In Bangladesh, the level of poverty is high; the population density is high; and the availability of replacement land is low. During the project preparations it was there- fore agreed that providing replacement land to all displaced persons would not be a viable option. Instead, the project would ensure that people were given sufficient cash compensa- tion to enable them to replace their lost land through private purchases, or make other investments. The project was to facilitate this process. Additionally, support was to be given to those suffering a reduction in incomes, to ensure that they were adequately rehabilitated and assisted in finding new or alternative livelihood opportunities. It was recognized that this constituted a risk, in that poor people are frequently unable to make productive use of a large cash grant, and that the money might be spent on consumption rather than on replacement land, homestead, or investment in income opportunities. The project therefore has the responsibility to assist people in making the best use of the compensation money provided" (ICR). e. VIETNAM: "All legal PAP are entitled to the following allowances: (i) Transport. Boat and/or truck transport will be put at the disposal of all relocating PAP so as to transport house- hold effects, salvaged and new building materials to the new resettlement site. Transport will provided in kind and is budgeted at US$77 per household; (ii) Subsistence. Each PAP will receive food support equal to US$30 per month for 6 months; (iii) Training. One member for each PAP will be entitled to a vocational training course to enhance household production or facilitate employment search. The allocation for this purpose is US$100 per PAP to be paid directly to the training institution; (iv) Business allowance. Affected businesses will receive cash compensation for lost revenues equal to six month of average income to be defined by PAP and VPC Chairman or a fixed allowance for lost business of US$100; and (v) Relocation (Continued on the following page.) 1 5 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Table G.2: Cash Compensation in Resettlement, Not Directly Emergency-Related (continued) Incentive. All PAP relocating in accordance with the schedule as proposed by the Project Management Board will receive a bonus of US$77. (h) Illegal PAPs will receive a US$30 trans- port allowance to move salvaged materials and to transport their goods to their relocation site" (PAD). f. One more project was considered for cash assistance, but no mention could be found in the text of either the ICR or the PPAR: Tanzania, Cashew and Coconut Treecrops Project (P002779) (1989); Credit program (vi) strengthening credit facilities in the southern cashewnut production areas in the form of a pilot credit scheme managed by the Cooperative and Rural Devel- opment Bank (CRDB); in kind credit for inputs has been given in the past, but this has carried with it the problem of creating a monopoly over seasonal inputs and investment items, hin- dering the development of local industries. In this example, critical inputs and equipment for cashew production that were not available in the local market, such as sulphur dust and blowers, were funded instead. $2.2 million; Credit program component was unsatisfactory. In Turkey the Bank supported a $252.53 Turkey cash transfer project (the Emergency million cash transfer ERL, which helped the Earthquake Recovery Project [L4581-TR]) government respond expeditiously to the reports that 85 percent of the people receiving Marmara earthquake emergency by providing the allowance for rent support believe that it is up-front cash assistance to earthquake victims necessary. Beneficiaries say that this support for accommodation assistance (75 percent of "saves them from total devastation and it helps total benefits); repair assistance (13.4 percent); to relieve a situation which would otherwise be death and disability benefits (10 percent); and more painful" (Akkayan, Kirimli, and Polat 2000). death benefit, survivor, and disability pensions One beneficiary said of humanitarian aid, "It (1.5 percent). Affected business owners received should be cash support instead of goods. a lump sum payment. Everybody would try to deal with his problems Providing immediate cash assistance for in a proper way. And there would be no queues victims meant that they could purchase their or quarrels"(Akkayan, Kirimli, and Polat 2000). own supplies, shelter, and the like, rather than In Gujarat, India, earthquake victims' need receive items in kind that might not have been for cash assistance became apparent to the Bank appropriate. Such assistance also represented a in an indirect way following the 2001 tangible sign of the government's efforts to help earthquake. Families were using the first install- the victims. Implementation was possible largely ment of house construction funding to purchase because the distribution infrastructure already food and other necessities to survive, rather existed and was functioning relatively well. The than using it toward the construction. As a primary distribution agency was already set up result, when it was time to issue the second to make such payments and they had a network installment, many of the families did not have of over 900 offices to enable distribution.1 the first phase of the house to show in order to A beneficiary assessment performed for the receive the second installment. 1 5 2 APPENDIX H: HOUSING AND SHELTER All sudden-onset disasters can create a need for The study identified 46 reconstruction temporary or medium-term shelter. Several ap- projects involving housing. Of these, 44 were proaches to shelter have been taken in the emer- rated by IEG as satisfactory (95.6 percent). gency context--building emergency shelters, Through the years, natural disaster­related relocating victims to safer areas, and facilitating housing projects have been growing in both self-help construction of temporary shelter while number and size (see figure H.1). The average simultaneously preparing to house the homeless loan size of the 8 projects implemented in the with housing reconstruction components. Where 1980s was $58.6 million. Twenty were it has not been feasible or desirable to relocate implemented in the 1990s, and the average people, the Bank has supported activities that cost was $128.2 million. In the first four years set up shelter on site and strengthened warning of this decade, 14 projects have been systems. For example, in Bangladesh, the Bank has completed, with an average loan size of $147.1 funded the construction of cyclone shelters, which million. Eleven more are ongoing. The total have provided Bangladeshis at risk with a place amount of funding and the share of the overall to go during severe storms. Sea-level monitoring housing funding they represent are also and warning systems were also implemented. growing (see figure H.2). Figure H.1: Average Emergency Reconstruction Housing Project Size Is Growing 160 147.1 140 128.2 120 100 million 80 US$ 58.6 60 40 20 0 1981­90 1991­2000 2001­4 Decade Average emergency reconstruction housing project Source: World Bank data. 1 5 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Figure H.2: Funding for Emergency Housing Is Claiming a Growing Portion of Overall Funds for Housing 100 90 80 70 60 50 Percent 40 30 52.8 20 30.7 10 17.3 0 1981­90 1991­2000 2001­4 Decade Other housing Percent of World Bank housing portfolio dedicated to emergency reconstruction Source: World Bank data. Emergency Shelters Dedicated versus Multi-Purpose Shelters Along low-lying coastal plains, which are partic- To improve shelter maintenance prospects, the ularly subject to tidal surges when tropical storms Bank moved from building dedicated cyclone coincide with high tides, storm shelters have shelters to building multi-use cyclone shelters that the potential to save thousands of lives. It is not were used primarily as schools. When it became necessary to construct shelters for everyone, apparent that school could not be interrupted for and there is probably no country where there is weeks or months on end because those made a sufficient number of these shelters because homeless by a disaster were using it for a shelter, other alternatives--such as escape roads leading the Bank focused more on creating shelters that inland and/or to higher ground--allow the more were also used as community centers or local gov- mobile to move themselves to safety. Seven ernment buildings, so as not to interrupt studies Bank-financed projects built cyclone shelters for prolonged periods of time. Not being able to between 1984 and 2003 (see Background Paper send children to school also caused unantici- available upon request). The total number of pated child care burdens for the family. Another cyclone shelters planned at appraisal was 624, strategy, which has been discussed but not yet put and 524 have been built by projects that are now in practice with Bank financing, is to enable closed (see table H.1). In two ongoing projects lower-middle- to middle-income families to build a cyclone shelter program was also planned, but multi-story cyclone-resistant homes. In the event no figures on achievements to date have been of a disaster, these structures could save the lives provided. of poorer neighbors with nowhere to go. 1 5 4 A P P E N D I X H : H O U S I N G A N D S H E LT E R Table H.1: Cyclone Shelters Financed by the World Bank, 1984­2003 Country Approval fiscal year Cyclone shelters planned Cyclone shelters constructed Bangladesh 1972 260 238 India 1991 187 182 India 1997 140 82 St. Lucia 1999 23 12 Dominica 1999 6 5 St. Kitts and Nevis 1999 8 5 Grenada 2001 No figures No figures St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2002 No figures No figures Relocation Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project, In the distress following major disasters, politi- some villages were relocated so far away that cians are often eager to promise relocation to vic- peasants gave up farming because they could no tims. World Bank support is welcomed to help longer reach their fields. realize these promises. Over the last 20 years, In 7 of the 30 projects, resettled people people rendered homeless by natural disasters moved back to their former location, either to or living on at-risk land were relocated in 30 of go back to where their roots were, or to cash in the projects in the study database, with varying their benefits by selling their new home and levels of success. moving back to the hazardous area. In one case A review of those projects shows that in 20, (Brazil 1988), new squatters settled into areas people were relocated to a safer area. A lack of vacated by disaster victims. In some cases, technical expertise coupled with victims' anxieties project planners have designed ways to discour- and opportunism led to a suboptimal result in age people from moving back by creating parks seven projects (all earthquake-related). In four and recreation areas in the vulnerable area projects, the area that disaster victims vacated (Honduras 2000) or having families sign received a higher value once they were gone. contracts confirming that they would live in An increase in land value, however, was not always at the expense of the economically most vulnerable. After the Lijiang earthquake in Box H.1: Highly Successful Relocation in Brazil China, high-rise apartment complexes were torn down and single family houses in a traditional style constructed. This helped The Rio Flood Reconstruction Project in Brazil was strongly poverty- Lijiang to be accepted by UNESCO as a World oriented and benefited several hundred-thousand low-income families. Heritage Site, which increased the city's attrac- Measures were taken after the 1988 flooding to relocate the estimated tiveness for tourists. It could therefore be 3,428 families away from flood-prone or drainage work areas. The re- argued that even families that had to leave the settlement component itself was successfully implemented despite a area and resettle at the city's periphery may number of delays. One study done immediately after resettlement in- profit from this project in the future. dicated that the living standards of 95 percent of the relocated families By relocating families through these projects, had improved substantially. A follow-up study done four years later in- their vulnerability was reduced in almost all of dicated the same results, with 80 percent of respondents reporting the cases. However, in 24 cases, relocation sites that they were better off after resettlement. were quite distant from the original settlements, and commercial transport costs were therefore Source: IEG project database. involved. For instance, in India's Maharashtra 1 5 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T their new homes, which they built through self- neighborhoods. Moving meant dissolving social help, for at least five years (Argentina 1993). networks that often had generations of history." A well-known drawback to relocation is the In most cases people tended to be pleased difficulty in preserving social networks in the with their resituated homes. In 17 projects for process. Of the 30 cases reviewed, only one which information was available, a majority of successfully preserved social networks, confirm- beneficiaries reported being satisfied with their ing the pattern identified by the (2005) IEG new home, or team leaders judged relocation a study, Putting Social Development to Work for success, while in 9 projects this was not the case. the Poor: An IEG Review of World Bank Activi- When a majority is satisfied with a project, one ties. In one case, focus groups reported that the can forget to pay special attention to a minority major reason that beneficiaries had not moved of often very poor families that might not have to the assigned house was that they did not want fared as well. to leave their original neighborhood. The Benefi- Whatever the positives of each case, relocat- ciary Analysis performed by the project reports: ing people usually has downsides: the disrup- "Beneficiaries reported a strong preference for tion of social networks to some degree is rebuilding their own damaged houses, rather unavoidable (because changes in the built than moving to the assigned houses in new environment inevitably change interaction patterns); it is bound to interfere with some families' livelihoods; and it results in the Box H.2: Relocation, If Not Carefully Planned, abandonment of existing infrastructure. When Can Lead to a Second Blow--The Loss of Social relocation is unavoidable, the Bank may choose Support Networks to work with NGOs and other partners to ensure In El Salvador, families that had lived together in apartment buildings that communities' social cohesion and liveli- before the earthquake had developed patterns of interaction based on hood are preserved. an established level of trust. They had spent years working out ways of managing things such as childcare, laundry, and holidays; there was Housing a formal and an informal leadership structure. From the Bank's perspective, the goal is to help When they were relocated, no effort was made to keep social group- the disaster homeless get back on their feet as ings together. Even under the best of circumstances, taking people from quickly as possible, while focusing on the poor- an apartment complex (where there had been a landlord involved with est and encouraging mitigation measures to help building maintenance) and making them owners of condominium units was reduce the impact of future disasters. Help to the going to be a challenge. Putting together families that did not know each disaster homeless means addressing a range of other made the adjustment infinitely more challenging. needs to help them piece their lives back to- gether. Source: IEG project database. The publication "Doing More for Those Made Homeless by Natural Disasters" (World Bank DMF 2001) stresses that emergency efforts to help the homeless should avoid undermining Box H.3: The Extremely Poor Remained in Tent Cities good housing sector policies, and always seek to incorporate best practice prescriptions of In the Turkey Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project, most of the such policies whenever possible. And over 115,000 families that received accommodation allowances were emergency housing reconstruction efforts satisfied with their new homes. Some 3,000 extremely poor families, how- should always embody the Bank's priority ever, remained in tent cities because they were unable to successfully concern with benefiting the poor, by providing complete the process that would qualify them for temporary shelter or priority assistance to those unable to afford permanent housing. No solution had been found for these homeless vic- housing by other means. Looking at the disaster tims by the end of the project. project database, 98 projects made a direct Source: IEG project database. impact on the poor. The most frequently cited activity in this group of projects was the 1 5 6 A P P E N D I X H : H O U S I N G A N D S H E LT E R provision of housing or infrastructure services sites and services component of the Popayan, (33 of 98). Colombia project met with considerable success, however. The project's infrastructure Temporary Housing components, which carefully targeted poor The Bank has also supported temporary housing households, had a lasting positive impact on for disaster victims and has learned through that urban development. The social situation after process that such shelters are sometimes occu- the earthquake was explosive: landlords could pied for long periods of time, and often become not repair low-income apartments cheaply a part of the permanent housing stock. With this enough to charge rents that the poor could in mind, projects have begun to build temporary afford. For the first time, Popayan experienced shelter to slightly higher standards so that they land invasions--a result of 24,000 people could then become another form of housing for becoming newly homeless. The project helped the poorer once the new housing is built. to defuse the incipient squatter problem by providing funding for the acquisition of land and Sites and Services a strong sites and services component. One approach the Bank has taken in sites and Seventeen new neighborhoods were created in services projects is providing beneficiaries with which marginalized people received legal title to a "wet core" of plumbing in cooking and bath- plots of land. Nearly a decade later, results are room facilities and having them invest in build- excellent. ing up around that start. The approach has met with mixed success, in part because without a Multi-Story Housing Complexes place to sleep, beneficiary families find it difficult Another approach has been building housing to move to the site. units outright. This relatively expensive approach In El Salvador, following the earthquake, the has been taken for middle-income families and sites and services aspect of the project met with for low-income families. Difficulties have been poor initial acceptance and was not built. The faced in some projects because relocating peo- Box H.4: El Salvador Several factors made cost recovery difficult in the housing com- amount and term. Not only did the financial institutions suffer, NGO ponent of the fiscal 1988 El Salvador earthquake project: staff estimated that half of the original families had been obliged to move out, many having forfeited years of mortgage payments. · Beneficiary selection specifically targeted low-income fam- When the IEG mission visited in October 2003, the families who ilies affected by the earthquake. had been able to keep up their original payment plans had paid off · The difficult post-disaster context meant that repayment was their loans. Those who fell behind were offered the opportunity to especially challenging. Many housing recipients had just suf- refinance, but when the accumulated interest was incorporated fered a disaster, with loss of personal possessions, medical into the principal, a higher rate was applied, and the term signifi- or funeral expenses, and temporary loss of employment. cantly extended. Thus, many original families are still paying back · The cost of screening applicants and administering the loans their loans. But they are complaining bitterly and they have cre- was considerable, and it was passed on to the beneficiaries. ated associations to lobby the government for loan forgiveness. · The actual price of the homes rose during construction. Numerous association members have stopped paying, although some credit agencies (including successors to those that went It turned out that the monthly payments on the project-provided bankrupt because of the repayment levels) forcibly evicted delin- homes were too expensive for the intended beneficiaries to repay. quent mortgage holders and resold the units, according to fami- This is reflected in the low levels of repayment at the original loan lies interviewed. Source: IEG project database. 1 5 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T ple from different places into one complex dis- While cost recovery may be a goal in regular locates people from their jobs and their extended lending, having such expectations in the difficult families, breaking up social support networks. The post-disaster context may be too optimistic, or sheer numbers of people needing to be housed perhaps even counterproductive. have been daunting in some cases. Certain situations have seen success, but Also an issue is the difficulty beneficiaries most projects aiming for cost recovery have might have keeping up with maintenance of experienced mixed results. Expecting benefici- units handed over (even if unit was free). aries to pay for project benefits after having just Reaching a balance between size and need has suffered a disaster--likely including the loss of been difficult, especially because units tend to personal possessions, medical or funeral be standardized for cost control reasons, and expenses, and temporary loss of employment-- then turn out to be poorly suited to large is perhaps not realistic. Expecting cost recovery families. Whatever beneficiaries see as "excess from those most likely to have difficulty paying housing," they will then rent out or sell off. Some for services or repaying loans exacerbates their argue for giving cash for repairs of the old house, situation, and may not be a viable political or for issues that are a higher priority to the decision either. Or, when cost recovery is a poor, and skipping the house building step. priority, the poorest can be bypassed because of Since the North China Earthquake their inability to pay. Add in administrative costs, Reconstruction Project was implemented, the limited experience of the poor with receiv- production and living conditions in the ing credit from formal sources, the seasonal earthquake-stricken areas have not only income situation of the poor, and obligations to recovered but improved. Before the project, pay penalties for missed monthly payments, and most of the people lived in small, dark adobe cost recovery can quickly move from difficult to dwellings with poor earthquake resilience. After impossible for all involved. the project was implemented, families in the Bank-financed housing projects have taken project villages moved into new permanent different tacks with respect to cost recovery. In houses that are large and bright. general, efforts have not been successful. In the case of the El Salvador Earthquake Reconstruc- Cost Recovery tion Project, housing beneficiaries were chosen Cost recovery is a contentious issue in the con- according to their income status, creating a text of the Bank's post-disaster housing work. homogeneous beneficiary pool of low-income families. The screening was successful, the Box H.5: Very Large, High-Quality Post-Disaster houses were built, and the beneficiaries were Housing--Mexico City housed. The cost of the houses was more than planned, and more of a subsidy had to be given Most of the homes wrecked by the earthquake were typical of the to each one as a result. Then, there were miscom- "vecindades" that housed Mexico City's poorest families--inner-city ten- munications as to the payback of the loans, after ements where 20 years of rent control had left housing overcrowded the beneficiaries had already agreed to a given and in ill repair. The project had a substantial effect on Mexico's dis- scenario. Suddenly they were expected to repay aster awareness, and the city, particularly its poorest residents, will not more than anticipated. All of this set up a situation be as vulnerable to the next natural disaster. The substantial housing in which the people carefully screened to be component rehoused some 78,000 families at a reasonable cost in beneficiaries were unable to pay, and the banks housing of a quality rarely found in the public sector, or in private hous- funding the houses all went under because no ing for low-income families, anywhere. one repaid their loans. Later, households Source: IEG project database. delinquent on their loan payments were evicted and a new payment plan was adopted. 1 5 8 APPENDIX I: EXTERNAL ADVISORY PANEL COMMENTS The members of the External Advisory Panel 1. The Bank needs a strong, high-level, well- welcome the IEG Evaluation of World Bank As- resourced central unit to effectively take sistance for Natural Disasters covering 20 years' its disaster-related strategy and policies experience of policy, practice, and investment in forward. Such a unit is needed to guide pol- natural disaster mitigation, reconstruction, and icy, monitor progress, and provide a vital in- recovery actions. Lending in relation to disasters formation function for the entirety of Bank ranks very high in the overall scale of Bank sec- operations. Even more important, such a unit tors of support; over 500 projects have been should be prepared to address resilience and undertaken totaling over $42 billion. risk reduction (which too often languishes in Further, there is evidence (cited in this report sleepy backwaters) and to integrate risk re- and widely known to disaster experts elsewhere) duction into the mainstream of the Bank's de- that there is an increasing global threat from a velopment program, policies, and projects. variety of disasters. Within the past decade there 2. The report refers to the importance of as- have been at least 16 severe to catastrophic sessing existing local capacities in areas events. The list is well known, and it ranges from vulnerable to disasters as the basis for de- the Kobe Earthquake, Mozambique floods, a signing strategies for prevention and volcanic eruption in Goma, the 2004 Asian readiness. The External Advisory Panel tsunami, devastating hurricanes such as Mitch strongly underlines this finding. As the report and Katrina, and the recent earthquake in notes, there is no single disaster response Pakistan. strategy that would prove most effective every- The trends indicate that, alas, in the coming where. Rather, an appropriate strategic re- decades it will be prudent for the Bank to expect sponse that answers immediate disaster-related a much longer list of cataclysmic events than in needs, reduces future disaster vulnerability, the past decade! Therefore, in our view, it is and supports long-term development rests on important for the Bank to anticipate and prepare accurate knowledge of, and programmatic sup- for these credible scenarios. The findings of the port to, capacities in the disaster-affected re- IEG evaluation point to the need for the Bank to gion. Therefore, we note with some concern raise the subject of disaster risk reduction and that when the Bank conducts an initial as- recovery support (including capacity building) sessment of a disaster situation, its staff or on its policy agenda as a matter of extreme consultants consider a double negative: "dam- urgency and priority. age" and "needs," without simultaneously look- The IEG evaluation presents a number of ing for the positive strength of "capacities." recommendations to strengthen the Bank's 3. The report mentions the importance of an- readiness in this area. We endorse all of these. alyzing gender in disaster prevention, In addition, however, having reviewed the preparedness, and response. The Advisory remarkable data assembled through the IEG Panel would place more emphasis than is in the team's evaluation, the members of the External report on this critical analysis. In our experience Advisory Panel would add or place greater in multiple disaster settings worldwide, clarity emphasis on several distinct areas. about the differences in gender roles, partic- 1 5 9 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T ularly, but not limited to, those that arise in fe- that mainstreams risk reduction, disaster male-headed households, has proven impor- preparedness, and prevention. tant to ensure fairness and effectiveness in Disasters pose a significant impediment to a disaster programming. sustainable global future. The World Bank, committed as it is to providing leadership in We offer these thoughts in appreciation of the sustainable development, cannot honorably excellent work done by the IEG evaluation team. ignore the challenges contained in this evaluation. After the most careful reflection on their We appreciate the opportunity to have been findings, we are convinced that the Bank has a associated with this study and feel sure that it unique opportunity to make a real and lasting provides a strong basis for the Bank's future contribution to a more resilient global system disaster-related work. Mary B. Anderson President, Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., Cambridge, MA, USA Ian Davis Visiting Professor, Resilience Centre, Cranfield University, UK Prema Gopalan Director, Swayam Shikshan Prayog, Mumbai, India Franklin McDonald Institute for Sustainable Development, Regional Centre for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, University of the West Indies, Jamaica 1 6 0 APPENDIX J: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management welcomes IEG's evaluation of Bank · The crucial activities for long-term reduction of assistance for natural disasters from 1984 to vulnerabilities take longer than three years to 2005. This comprehensive study highlights sev- implement and have weak borrower demand. eral areas of Bank involvement in a range of dis- · Given the high concentration of risk in certain aster management­related activities. The review's countries and regions, special attention needs main findings are appropriate and sound, and its to be given to planning ahead for disaster and recommendations are duly noted and appreci- to reducing long-term vulnerability, including ated. This response summarizes the main find- mechanisms to finance and/or transfer risks. ings and conclusions of the IEG review. It then The Bank's long-term engagement with client presents management's comments on the analy- countries needs to ensure continued focus on sis, conclusions, and recommendations. The permanent vulnerability reduction. draft Management Action Record is attached. · The Bank has the human resource capacity to both respond to disasters and address long- Summary of IEG's Findings and term country needs related to hazard risks, Recommendations but mobilizing it is cumbersome. The key findings of the study include: Recommendations · The Bank has demonstrated considerable flex- The following are recommendations for man- ibility in its approach to natural disaster assis- agement: tance and learned to manage responses from those of very large dimensions to smaller, more · Prepare and submit to the Board for discussion limited events. a strategy or action plan for assistance related · The Bank also has demonstrated its ability to to natural disasters that takes into account the work with donors in a shared response and has differing vulnerabilities of borrowing coun- adapted policies and procedures to ensure tries. Such a strategy or action plan should that assistance can be delivered expeditiously. identify a methodology to assess each country's · Natural disaster projects financed by the Bank level of disaster risk. It is suggested that the have had higher ratings for outcome and sus- countries be divided into high-, medium-, and tainability than the Bank's portfolio as a whole. low-risk groups. The action plan then must · Disaster responses have tended toward the re- spell out how the Bank will assist borrowers in active and tactical rather than the proactive each category to lower their vulnerabilities and strategic. In addition, to meet borrowers' and to build on local capacities and leader- emergency recovery needs, the Bank has in- ship. In highly vulnerable countries, the ac- creasingly relied on the Emergency Recovery tion plan needs to make provisions to give Loan (ERL) instrument following a disaster, more attention to natural hazards during the which has proven to be less appropriate for appraisal of investment projects generally, and longer-term activities such as mitigation, insti- specifically in the preparation of Poverty Re- tution building, and full coverage of social issues. duction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Country As- 1 6 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T sistance Strategies (CASs), and other strategic vention. Now, more Bank disaster recovery proj- documents. ects either include disaster mitigation elements · Modify OP 8.50 (or prepare a new OP) so that or are followed by specific investment lending it focuses on natural disasters and fosters the for disaster mitigation in client countries. use of instruments best adapted to addressing the long-term development needs of borrow- Improving the Bank's Response to Disasters. The IEG ers. Bank policy needs to reflect differences be- review shows that the Bank has demonstrated tween different emergency impacts, such as considerable flexibility in its approach to natural natural disasters versus, for instance, post-con- disaster assistance and learned to manage re- flict situations or health crises. The policy sponses better over time. Management agrees should focus more on disaster prevention and that speed, flexibility, and innovation matter in dis- reduction in all operations. Policy prohibitions aster response. The review also shows that ac- on relief and the financing of recurring events celerated processing and provisions for quick need to be relaxed. It also recommends con- disbursement from Emergency Recovery Loans sidering the establishment of a special central (ERLs) have partially addressed the need for speed fund managed by the President's office to fund in undertaking short-term activities in the after- the most urgent needs in the early days of a dis- math of a disaster. Ongoing revision of the Op- aster response. erational Policy statement on Emergency Recovery · Ensure that the Bank has sufficient special- Assistance (OP 8.50) will explore further simpli- ized expertise available to respond quickly to fication of procedures, update the expenditure el- disasters in a way that is suited to the specific igibility provisions of the policy, and clarify that circumstances of the event and the country financing options for immediate emergency needs context. The Bank needs capacity to quickly include rapidly disbursing contingent financing gather and disseminate international experi- and supplemental development policy lending. ence to its borrowers in an emergency. In ad- Immediate relief activities (in which UN agencies dition, task teams need support while normally take the lead) and the follow-on transi- conducting post-disaster damage and needs as- tional and recovery activities (in which the Bank sessments and designing emergency inter- often plays an important role) should be coordi- ventions tailored to the requests and capacities nated. Management agrees with IEG's conclu- of each client. sion that in the transition to recovery, cash transfer payments to disaster-affected families and com- Management Comments munities can be among the most effective means of support. An effective response to a disaster Impact depends on pre-emergency preparedness plan- The IEG report indicates that the costs of natu- ning and strong institutional mechanism in the ral disasters are increasing worldwide: in con- Bank's client countries to mobilize and coordinate stant dollars the costs are now 15 times higher the post-disaster response of all stakeholders. than they were in the 1950s, with material losses With this in view, the Bank is increasingly engag- reaching $652 billion in the 1990s. The human cost ing with its client countries in regions prone to is also staggering; from 1984 to 2003, more than disaster risks to provide technical and financial as- 4.1 billion people were affected by natural disas- sistance for building holistic capabilities for emer- ters. The World Bank increasingly has been en- gency preparedness and disaster prevention, gaged in helping developing countries recover though it has experienced weak borrower de- from the disastrous impacts of natural events mand for such projects. through analytic, technical, and advisory support and lending activities. Since 1984, the Bank has Building Bankwide Capacity for Emergency Response financed approximately 528 projects that ad- and Sustainable Disaster Recovery. Management dressed natural disasters, providing more than $26 would like to note that the Hazard Risk Man- billion in lending for disaster response and pre- agement (HRM) Team in the Infrastructure Net- 1 6 2 A P P E N D I X J : M A N A G E M E N T R E S P O N S E work anchor (INF) has undertaken systematic study, a first of its kind, provides a scientific foun- documentation and dissemination of lessons dation for benchmarking risks and ranking coun- and good practices from past disaster recovery tries on the basis of their mortality and economic projects to enable the Bank staff and clients to loss risks. The Bank is working with countries at improve the quality and effectiveness of Bank's varying degrees of risk, as brought out in this disaster recovery projects. In order to enhance study, to assist them to reduce their vulnerabili- Bank staff capacity to respond effectively to ties by giving more attention to risk reduction in clients' requests, the HRM Team regularly or- preparation of their strategy documents, such ganizes training of Bank staff in post-disaster as PRSPs. The Global Facility for Disaster Reduc- damage and needs assessment and design of re- tion and Recovery being established with De- covery projects. The Bank's internal procedures velopment Grant Facility (DGF) and donor are being streamlined by putting in place an funding will support client countries in putting emergency response checklist to delineate the in place appropriate policy, institutional and fi- roles and responsibilities of various Bank head- nancial frameworks for ex ante risk management. quarters units and country offices in a post-dis- aster situation, including identifying contact Catalyzing Greater Investment in Disaster Prevention points in central units. Further disaster mitiga- and Mitigation. The IEG review notes weak bor- tion and recovery specialists are being identified rower demand for investment in risk mitigation from the staff in regions and networks with rel- and emergency preparedness. Management evant skills and expertise. These specialists will would like to note that more analytical work-- be grouped to constitute the Quick Reaction such as risk, vulnerability, and capacity assess- Team (QRT) of the Bank to assist country teams ment studies; modeling catastrophes in to engage with the clients and other stakehold- macroeconomic projection; developing mitiga- ers from early on after a disaster. The QRT, with tion strategies; and identifying priority invest- the assistance of the anchor HRM Team, will ment opportunities with highest returns--is provide the much-needed capacity in the Bank required at the country level to demonstrate to gather and disseminate international experi- that hazard risk is a manifestation of flawed de- ence to borrowers in emergencies. velopment plans and that managing hazard risks is a good practice in sustainable development. Bringing Risk Management into Development. The With this in view, the Bank, in collaboration with review recognizes the need for special attention donors in the context of the International Strat- to be given to planning ahead for the disaster and egy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR),1 is also ex- to reducing long-term vulnerability in those coun- ploring to establish a Global Facility for Disaster tries prone to disaster risks. Many studies at the Reduction and Recovery to support national ca- Bank and its other partners have shown that pacity building to deal with the risks of natural poverty and disaster vulnerabilities are intrinsi- disasters and to catalyze global and regional cally linked, and that sustainable poverty reduc- partnerships for enhanced advocacy, informa- tion approaches must therefore incorporate risk tion, and knowledge exchange for risk reduction reduction as one of the integral elements. Man- in line with the strategic goals under the Hyogo agement concurs with IEG's findings that be- Framework for Action (HFA).2 The Bank commits cause natural hazard risks are foreseeable in substantial resources each year for reconstruc- many countries, country lending programs and tion after disasters and this proposed program all sectoral project lending should give adequate would help move the focus from reconstruc- consideration to managing and reducing disaster tion to mitigation and pre-disaster prepared- risks. With this in view, the HRM Team, in col- ness activities as a critical dimension of the laboration with Columbia University, conducted Bank's poverty reduction agenda. a global-scale risk analysis to identify natural dis- aster hotspots on the basis of mortality and eco- Coordination Inside and Outside the Bank. The review nomic loss risks due to multiple hazards. This notes that the Bank has the capacity to respond 1 6 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T to disasters and address long-term country needs (ii) an ability to speed up the preparation and related to hazard risks, but mobilizing it is cum- processing of the response and stagger response bersome. The Bank has a core HRM Team, which activities over the life of operation in a sequence provides strategic and rapid advice to country that best fits borrowers needs due, in part, to the and Regional teams, disseminates lessons learned ability to postpone key safeguard and fiduciary from past experiences, and facilitates access to processing conditions; and (iii) leadership of global practices, which have been developed the process by the country director and the Ad- through an ambitious research and knowledge visory Committee. Management agrees with management agenda. Beyond the core team, IEG's recommendations for greater emphasis the Bank's hazard risk management approach is on risk reduction and mitigation measures. A truly multisectoral, and the Bank's capacity is dis- disaster-recovery phase often witnesses greater tributed across sectoral experts in country teams, political will and momentum to introduce poli- Regions and Networks that are grouped in the cies and plans for long-term risk reduction, and Hazard Risk Management Thematic Group, an ERL with a flexible time limit can provide a which now consists of more than 100 Bank staff. window to initiate important long-term pro- Hazard risk management is a cross-cutting issue grams, which would enable the borrowers to that requires the engagement of a large number manage and reduce future hazard risk. of stakeholders. In order to develop and execute a Bankwide approach to hazard risk manage- Building Resilience through Risk Mitigation. Thanks ment in different sectors, a Steering Committee to recent advances in catastrophic risk modeling of Directors of relevant sectors has been con- and analysis, it is now possible for country stituted to coordinate Bank efforts in hazard poverty and economic diagnostic work to take risk management. into account, in every disaster-prone country, the risks that the country faces, identify the over- Improving Donor Coordination. The review notes all exposure of the country's productive assets that donor coordination is especially crucial to and population to such hazards, determine the disaster relief and recovery and that increasingly vulnerability of the housing stock and produc- governments are providing donor coordination. tive assets and population to such hazards, and Where requested by the government, the Bank draw numeric conclusions with regard to the has facilitated collaboration between the gov- expected annual and probable maximum eco- ernment, multilateral and bilateral donors, and nomic and fiscal losses from catastrophic events the NGOs to develop a common recovery strat- with different return periods. The Bank will in- egy. The Bank's presence in countries has helped creasingly work with client countries to institu- in staying engaged with the authorities from tionalize comprehensive disaster risk analysis, early on, as has been experienced in a number and use its results to guide its analytic and ad- of recent disasters. While strengthening gov- visory activities (AAA) and lending support for in- ernment capacity to better coordinate responses vestments in disaster risk mitigation and to disasters remains a priority, the Bank is also emergency preparedness. working with donors, multilateral development banks, and UN agencies to develop common Pricing the Residual Risk. In recent years, the Bank tools and methodologies for post-disaster as- has made a considerable effort to develop ca- sessments and to improve coordination. tastrophe risk transfer mechanisms in develop- ing countries and established partnerships with Scope leading reinsurers. Insurance and reinsurance Emergency Recovery Loans (ERLs). An ERL as an in- prices are highly sensitive to risk and thus act as strument of emergency response has three main the most reliable indicator of an appropriate advantages, which are (i) quick disbursement risk management strategy. The Bank has funded against a positive list of disaster-related imports, a number of insurance initiatives under disaster- 1 6 4 A P P E N D I X J : M A N A G E M E N T R E S P O N S E related projects and is working on several inno- management into poverty reduction agendas in vative instruments of risk financing to meet the countries at high risk of natural disasters. specific needs of client countries. The Bank's ex- perience with contingent facilities is limited to Knowledge Management and Learning Activities. The a few initiatives, including the Turkish Catastro- role of the HRM Team (INF) is to facilitate ex- phe Insurance Pool (TCIP) under the fiscal year change of knowledge and good practice, facilitate 2000 Marmara Earthquake Emergency Recon- Bank staff training in hazard risk management struction Project, and a contingent loan com- approaches, strengthen Bank's partnerships with ponent of the fiscal 2005 Natural Disaster donors, UN agencies, private sectors and other Vulnerability Reduction Project--First Phase stakeholders, and also act as a clearing house on Adaptable Program Loan (APL) for Colombia. matters pertaining to hazard risk management. The Bank is also spearheading several new in- The Bank has undertaken a series of actions to de- struments in the area of risk financing. For ex- velop policy-based tools for risk analysis, risk mit- ample, a catastrophe insurance facility is currently igation and risk financing. Regional working papers being developed for the Caribbean Region (the in risk management, the hotspots study on global Caribbean Catastrophe Insurance Initiative).3 In risk analysis, lessons from past disaster recovery addition, the Bank is exploring other ways to pro- projects, training and knowledge management vide timely and effective assistance for disaster in hazard risk management are all examples of the recovery through a contingent financing instru- ways in which the Bank's work has influenced ment, which would leverage adoption of disas- global, regional and national strategies for risk ter risk management strategies. Besides initiatives management and had a positive impact on the on risk hedging, the Bank is also working on de- plans and policies of client governments. Man- velopment of a parametric catastrophe reinsur- agement appreciates that the review acknowl- ance facility (Global Index Insurance Facility), in edges the high level of quality and impact of the collaboration with many development partners. Bank's research and AAA, which have enhanced the awareness in client governments about the Coordination and Partnerships. Management sup- need to strengthen public management capacities ports IEG's finding that the Bank should be fully and public-private partnerships for speedy exe- engaged from the outset of the recovery process cution of disaster risk management projects. in order to share its expertise in design of an in- tegrated recovery strategy. As the largest exter- Recommendations nal financier of disaster reconstruction, the Bank Recommendation 1. Prepare and submit to the Board has a tremendous amount of experience and for discussion a strategy or action plan for assistance lessons to share on disaster recovery, and gov- related to natural disasters that takes into account the ernments and other stakeholders will benefit differing vulnerabilities of borrowing countries. from the Bank's participation from early on after Management agrees that a comprehensive action a disaster. The Bank is in discussion with UN plan for better managing disaster risk is needed Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at all levels. The Bank's natural disaster assistance (OCHA) to better coordinate the onset of re- would benefit from a country-led and country- sponse and relief and transition to recovery owned national hazard risk management ap- phase. Donors and other stakeholders of the proach focusing on concrete client governments' new ISDR system have also sought the Bank's needs. These needs, as reflected in the national continued and active engagement at global, re- strategies, should be the foundation for a pro- gional and national levels due to its leveraging gram of Bank Group assistance to reduce disas- and convening capacity. The Bank has been nom- ter risks. Mainstreaming risk management in all inated to the strategic oversight board of the Bank operations and similarly helping countries ISDR, and many donors have shown keen interest to integrate risk management in all sectoral de- to work with the Bank in mainstreaming risk velopment strategies is a good practice consis- 1 6 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T tent with the Bank's overall mission to reduce asters, may not apply to other types of disasters, poverty. The hotspots study identifies the risk the vast majority of recovery and reconstruction level of countries on the basis of their relative risk aspects to be addressed in all emergencies (in- of mortality and economic losses to six major nat- cluding social assistance to address the needs of ural hazards. The Bank will work with the gov- displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, ernment counterparts in the countries at high economic integration and reinstatement of basic risks where new PRSs and CASs are being de- services, communication with affected popula- veloped, to integrate risk reduction in develop- tions and communities, restoration of livelihoods, ment strategies and facilitate development and and rebuilding of infrastructure) are in fact the implementation of country-led national hazard same. The ongoing revision of OP 8.50 will result risk management strategies. in a flexible, principles-based umbrella policy for emergencies. This approach will allow the Bank Recommendation 2. Revise policy to better guide staff to tailor its response to different types of emer- and enhance flexibility of Bank responses to natural gencies, whatever the underlying causes may be, disasters. and thus ensure increased effectiveness and rel- Management agrees that speed, flexibility and in- evance of Bank assistance. novation are important to an effective disaster response. To respond to these needs, the revised Recommendation 3. Increase Bank capacity to re- OP 8.50 should (i) address simplification of pro- spond to disasters and ensure that it can be mobilized cedures to make the ERL a more effective emer- quickly. gency lending instrument; (ii) clarify the Management concurs that the development of expenditure eligibility provisions to include cash a cadre of staff with sufficient specialized ex- transfers and consumables; and (iii) provide time- pertise for disaster response and mitigation is limit flexibility in the use of ERLs to allow initia- crucial. Beyond the core team of specialists in the tion of important long term programs, which will anchor HRM Team (INF) and the Regions, the enable the borrowers to manage and reduce fu- Bank will implement a time-bound program for ture hazard risks. The revision of OP 8.50 will capacity enhancement of Bank staff, put in place also emphasize the value of other tools, which the a standard emergency response plan, and con- Bank deploys in response to emergencies, such stitute a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) of disaster as portfolio restructuring, additional financing, specialists from Regions and Networks for rapid supplemental development policy lending, and en- deployment in disaster-affected areas. gagement with partners. While management agrees that certain aspects, such as emergency pre- Management Action Record. The draft Management dictability and preparedness and technological Action Record provides more specific responses know-how developed in response to natural dis- to IEG's recommendations. It is attached below. 1 6 6 A P P E N D I X J : M A N A G E M E N T R E S P O N S E Draft Management Action Record Recommendation Management Response Prepare a strategy or action plan for natural disaster Management agrees that a systematic approach for better man- assistance. aging disaster risk is needed at all levels. The Bank's natural dis- The Bank's natural disaster assistance would benefit from the de- aster assistance would benefit from a country-led and velopment of a strategy or action plan and related guidance that country-owned national hazard risk management approach fo- would: help staff to respond to emergencies with quick relief and cusing on concrete client governments' needs. These needs, as well-planned reconstruction, and to do so more effectively in a reflected in clients' national strategies, should be the foundation much shorter period; ensure that contingency funds (be it on a for a program of Bank Group assistance to reduce disaster risks. country, regional, or global scale) result in all borrowing coun- Mainstreaming risk management in all relevant Bank operations tries receiving a timely and adequate financial response to major and similarly helping countries to integrate risk management in events; and help bring natural hazard risk management to the most all relevant sectoral development strategies is a good practice vulnerable countries. consistent with the Bank's overall mission to reduce poverty. The strategy or action plan needs to identify a methodology to The methodology provided by the hotspots initiative, conducted by assess each country's level of disaster risk. It is suggested that theBankandotherpartners,identifiestherelativerisklevelsofcoun- countries be divided into high, medium, and low-risk groups. tries on the basis of mortality and economic losses associated The action plan then needs to identify how the Bank will assist with six major natural hazards. Countries at high risks, where new borrowers in each category to lower their vulnerabilities and to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Country Assistance build on local capacities and leadership. In highly vulnerable Strategies (CASs) are being developed, are being identified for countries, the action plan needs to make provisions to give more initiating a dialogue with the government counterparts so that risk attention to natural hazards during the appraisal of investment management approaches can be mainstreamed early on. projects generally, and specifically in the preparation of PRSPs, CASs, and other strategic documents. Where appropriate, these In fiscal 2006­8, management plans to focus on the following documents need to go beyond a description of the risks, and iden- action items: tify monitorable mitigation and institutional development activ- · Facilitate the preparation and implementation of country- ities. For the most vulnerable countries, contingency funding led national hazard risk management strategies, as part of needs to be available, whether as part of another loan, a set-aside national development strategies. in the CAS lending program, or a free-standing catastrophe fund · Mainstream diagnosis of natural disaster risks in CAS and (though these may become unnecessary if regional or global provide financial and advisory support to the implementation funds are eventually established). Another alternative worth of hazard risk management strategies when requested by the consideration is a special fund under the President's control that respective governments. can be used to fund a quick start when disaster occurs. Coun- · Working in partnership with governments, UN and other tries deemed to be at medium to high risk need to include dis- multilateral development banks (MDBs), establish a Bank-led aster-resilient design in Bank-financed projects. For all countries global facility for disaster reduction and recovery, to provide disaster risks need to be considered in standard risk assessment technical and financial assistance to client countries for de- documents. veloping national risk management strategies and action plans for risk prevention, and better disaster preparedness. The strategy or action plan should be submitted to the Board for · Develop incentives for client investment in mitigation meas- discussion. ures, especially in high-risk countries. · Develop a Bankwide emergency response plan along with nec- essary Standard Operating Procedures and Checklists to guide the Bank staff to respond to emergencies and under- take a well-planned recovery. 1 6 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Recommendation Management Response Revise policy to better guide staff and enhance flexibil- Management agrees that speed, flexibility and innovation are im- ity of Bank responses to natural disasters. portant to an effective disaster response. To respond to these Emergencies are of many sorts and, although there is some needs, the revised OP 8.50 should (i) address simplification of pro- overlap, most differ from the disasters created by natural events cedures to make the ERL a more effective emergency lending in- in critical ways. Bank policy needs to reflect these differences strument; (ii) clarify the expenditure eligibility provisions to by treating conflict and epidemic diseases separately, with pro- include cash transfers and consumables; and (iii) provide time- visions that apply only to the relevant topic. There are two ways limit flexibility in the use of ERLs to allow initiation of important in which this can be done: natural disasters can either be the sub- long term programs, which will enable the borrowers to manage ject of a separate operational policy (as called for in the 1998 and reduce future hazard risks. The revision of OP 8.50 will also IEG evaluation of the Bank's experience with post-conflict re- emphasize the value of other tools, which the Bank deploys in construction); or OP 8.50 could include specific provisions for nat- response to emergencies, such as portfolio restructuring, addi- ural disasters, for post-conflict situations, and for health and other tional investment financing, supplemental development policy emergencies, so that each topic is dealt with separately. In lending, and engagement with partners. whatever form it takes, Bank policy needs to focus more on dis- aster prevention and vulnerability reduction in all natural disaster While management agrees that certain aspects, such as emergency operations. Policy prohibitions on relief and the financing of re- predictability and preparedness and technological know-how de- curring events need to be relaxed. velopedinresponsetonaturaldisasters,maynotapplytoothertypes of disasters, the vast majority of recovery and reconstruction as- Accelerated processing and provisions for quick disbursement for pects to be addressed in all emergencies (including social assis- ERLs have partially addressed the need for speed in undertaking tancetoaddresstheneedsofdisplacedpersonsandothervulnerable short-term activities, though they could be fruitfully comple- groups, economic integration and reinstatement of basic services, mented by a new mechanism, such as a special central fund man- communication with affected populations and communities, restora- aged by the President's office (akin to the one in place in IDB) to tion of livelihoods, and rebuilding of infrastructure) are in fact the fund the most urgent needs in the early days of a disaster response. same. The ongoing revision of OP 8.50 will result in a flexible, prin- But the use of ERLs is less appropriate for longer-term activities, ciples-based umbrella policy for emergencies. This approach will such as mitigation, reconstruction, and institution building, which allow the Bank to tailor its response to different types of emer- require a longer preparation and appraisal time and need not be gencies, whatever the underlying causes may be, and thus ensure exempted from due diligence standards and safeguard compli- increased effectiveness and relevance of Bank assistance. ance. Similarly, attention to social issues during preparation and implementation generally requires a longer period than has been Management agrees that more emphasis must be placed on available under ERLs. Such activities are more suited to standard disaster prevention and risk reduction in all natural disaster op- investment lending but have often been short-changed because erations, and actions to that end are set out in response to the of the ERL's three-year implementation time, and the loss of bor- first recommendation above. rower interest in a second loan following the ERL. Increase Bank capacity to respond to disasters and en- Management agrees that the development of a cadre of staff with sure that it can be mobilized quickly. sufficient specialized expertise for disaster response and miti- Whether or not there is a designated unit to deal with natural gation is crucial. Beyond the core team of specialists in the HRM disasters and hazard risks, the Bank needs the capacity to Team in the Infrastructure Network anchor (INF) and its impor- quickly gather and disseminate international experience to bor- tant functions in training and knowledge management and tech- rowers in an emergency. In addition, task teams need support nical assistance to the country teams and Regions, the following while conducting post-disaster assessments and designing actions will be taken before end-fiscal 2007 to increase the emergency interventions tailored to the needs and capacities Bank's capacity and to put in place an effective mobilization of each borrower. Responding to disasters requires multisectoral plan for emergency management specialists: 1 6 8 A P P E N D I X J : M A N A G E M E N T R E S P O N S E Recommendation Management Response expertise. Including disaster-knowledgeable people on Bank · Support increased capacity within (i) the existing HRM Team missions following major crises can be crucial. Being selective (INF), (ii) Regional teams, and (iii) teams working to assist coun- in staffing identification for missions in post-disaster settings tries highly vulnerable to disaster impacts. avoids problems of design and scale of response that can occur · Develop learning and certification programs for staff in disaster when people are sent who are not used to seeing destruction response and conducting damage and needs assessments. on a massive scale or who lack country knowledge. The Bank · Mobilize and train multisectoral teams from each region to has very few such people, and it currently has no consistent be prepared for emergency response in highly vulnerable mechanism for mobilizing them to respond to natural disas- countries prior to a disaster. ters. Pulling members of the Hazard Management Thematic · Strengthen partnerships with other development agencies to Group away from their ongoing responsibilities inevitably has leverage experience and resources and facilitate improved a negative impact on their normal activities. And there are so coordination following a disaster. few knowledgeable staff that the same people tend to be called upon repeatedly. 1 6 9 APPENDIX K: CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY: COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (CODE) Background. The IEG Report prepared at the re- Conclusions and Next Steps. The Committee unani- quest of the Board covers a range of analytic mously commended the IEG Report for its ana- services, technical assistance, and more than lytical rigor and insight, and welcomed 500 projects amounting to over US$26 billion in management's response. Members were pleased lending since 1984 related to natural disasters. with the high performance rating of the Bank's dis- aster response operations, exceeding that of the Main Findings and Recommendations. The Report Bank's regular portfolio. This being said, it was rec- discusses the rationale for the Bank's involve- ognized that the Bank needs to become even bet- ment in disaster assistance, its response to nat- ter prepared to assist its clients to reduce disaster ural disasters, mainstreaming risk management risks both ex ante and ex post. Agreeing with the into development strategy, and cross-sectoral Report that mainstreaming hazard risk manage- and cross-regional coordination within the Bank ment in the Bank's operations is the most effec- and with other development partners. Three tive way to achieve sustainable poverty reduction, major recommendations are to prepare and sub- speakers encouraged greater emphasis on disas- mit to the Board for discussion a strategy or ac- ter risk reduction in Country Assistance Strate- tion plan for natural disaster assistance, revise gies (CASs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers policy (OP 8.50), and increase Bank's capacity to (PRSPs), in particular in countries prone to natu- respond to disasters and ensure that it can be mo- ral disasters. The need to address the link be- bilized quickly. tween climate change and the frequency and severity of natural disasters was also discussed in Draft Management Response. Overall, management this context. A variety of views was expressed on welcomed IEG's evaluation, found the report's proposed financial mechanisms to support na- main findings to be sound, and appreciated its tional capacity building and catalyze global and re- recommendations. They clarified the activities al- gional partnerships. A review of Bank's Operational ready undertaken or planned for the near future: Policy 8.50 was broadly supported despite some first, the Bank is working with the governments diversity of opinion on the direction of this effort. of high-risk countries to integrate risk reduc- The end of the calendar year 2006 was welcomed tion in PRSPs and CASs, and a new global facil- as a deadline for the completion of the revision, ity for disaster reduction and recovery is being with an understanding that the revised OP 8.50 established to provide speedy and effective tech- would be accompanied by a complementary cov- nical assistance to clients; second, Operational ering note on disaster management, which could Policy 8.50 is being revised; and third, the Bank clarify the broader issues raised at the meeting and is in the process of strengthening its in-house ca- by IEG. The creation of a QRT was broadly wel- pacity on disaster mitigation and emergency re- comed as a measure to sharpen the Bank`s own sponse by providing training to staff and by staffing deployment capacity. The main issues constituting a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) of raised during the meeting were the following: Bank staff with relevant expertise and experi- ence in disaster-related operations for rapid de- Strategy. There was strong support for a strength- ployment to disaster-affected areas. ened Bank involvement in disaster management. 1 7 1 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T One speaker stated that this involvement was at caution on establishing a separate contingent the heart of the Bank's founding mandate for re- fund and suggested more discussion on the construction and development. Most members topic. One member suggested that this debate supported the suggestion that the Bank needs a needed to be situated in the context of poten- clear but flexible strategy for assistance to disas- tial future revisions of the IDA allocation frame- ter management. Management proposed that work. This could be done by revising the existing rather than developing a full-fledged stand-alone IDA allocation framework, by earmarking sepa- strategy paper, it would be more practical and ap- rate resources within the IDA funding envelope, propriate to capture broad strategic issues raised or by creating a special fund outside of IDA, Fur- by the Committee and IEG in the cover note at- thermore, funding initiatives by other donors tached to the revised Operational Policy (OP 8.5). would need to be examined in order to avoid overlaps. This comment drew support from Mainstreaming Disaster Management. Many speak- other discussants. Management indicated that ers agreed that natural disasters should be treated these issues will be discussed with other donors as integral elements of development processes, over next few months. and emphasized the importance of the Bank Some speakers urged the Bank to examine shifting its focus on disaster management even more deeply the apparent lack of private sector further toward prevention and preparedness financing for disaster risk management (includ- and to mainstream disaster management in its ing private insurance). Management agreed with strategies and operations. In this vein, several this observation and clarified that private speakers urged the Bank to include disaster insurance may be more suitable in middle- management as major theme in CASs for all vul- income countries (e.g., Turkey) with more nerable countries, especially fragile and small developed financial sectors, while it may present island states. Likewise, governments were en- problems for small countries. Staff further couraged to do the same for PRSPs. Agreeing with clarified that in cases where market failures the comments, management gave the example prevented the provision of private disaster of the recent CAS for the Organization of East- insurance, insurance mechanisms that would be ern Caribbean States (OECS) countries, where partly financed by premiums, and partly through disaster preparedness and prevention were used development aid, could be considered. The as one of the strategy pillars. Speakers stressed Bank will engage in discussions on this over next that Bank's engagement should be flexible several months. enough to respond ex ante and ex post to all types of disasters. Members pondered how to Instruments. A member found deficiencies in the convince governments to adopt ex ante poli- traditional emergency recovery loans (ERL), and cies and measures to reduce disaster risks. For agreed with the Report's findings that ERL's du- this purpose, many speakers called for proactivity ration of three years limited the scope to Bank's by the Bank and timely sharing with the gov- achieve lasting results. Loan reallocations and ernments of vulnerable countries of accurate, sci- "front-loading" of CASs in the wake of disasters entific-based risk assessment as well as data on caused concern to some speakers, as such ap- impacts of natural disasters. In this context, it was proaches tend to divert resources from other suggested that country risk analysis should also projects. Management clarified that it was con- be an essential element of CASs and PRSPs and sidering the introduction of new innovative in- that the Bank's recent "hotspots" publication struments, including contingent financing be distributed among the constituencies. instruments. Additionally, the Bank is also plan- ning to present for Board approval a Global Fa- Financing Disaster Management. The evaluation cility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery findings revealed a need for more flexible ways (through Development Grant Facility funding), of mobilizing Bank financing for disaster re- to be established in collaboration with mem- sponses. On this point, some speakers urged bers of the International Strategy for Disaster Re- 1 7 2 A P P E N D I X K : C H A I R M A N ' S S U M M A RY: C O M M I T T E E O N D E V E L O P M E N T E F F E C T I V E N E S S ( C O D E ) duction (ISDR) System, particularly national gov- sion of labor between the Bank and other actors ernments, the UN system, and the private sec- in disaster management. While other organiza- tor. This Global Facility would focus on tions (such as UN's Office for the Coordination country-level technical assistance and holistic of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, and international capacity building for both ex ante and ex post dis- NGOs) should be responsible for immediate as- aster risk management in client countries. sistance (including cash transfers), the Bank ought to focus on disaster prevention, building Climate Change. Several speakers regretted the ab- capacity, and strengthening institutions. A num- sence of the issue of climate change from the ber of other speakers were of the view that the documents under discussion, noting that abrupt Bank should retain the flexibility to provide and powerful effects of climate change on the short-term assistance to affected people, in- weather massively increased the vulnerability of cluding cash transfer if the circumstances dictated people. This threat was particularly imminent in this. IEG commented that its review of the ex- poor countries. A speaker pointed out that climate perience revealed an emerging consensus on change was still a contentious topic, which needed the importance and effectiveness of cash trans- to be treated with caution. IEG agreed that climate fers following severe events, citing examples of change is an important link to disaster manage- cash being used for shelter and other needs nec- ment, but stressed that a deeper analysis was essary for immediate survival. Management ex- needed before definite causal linkages could be plained that it is important to distinguish understood. Management pointed out that a vi- between immediate relief activities and the fol- able and integrated risk management strategy low-on transitional recovery stage, during which would support adaptation measures in respect to the Bank plays an important role and for which climate change and variability in risk manage- cash payments are often the most effective means ment approaches, and informed the forum that of support. A speaker suggested that a cover the recent Clean Energy paper contained a chap- note accompanying the revised OP 8.50 could ter on adaptation. This paper discussed climate clarify some broader issues that cannot be cap- change impact in Africa and low-lying states, but tured in the operational guidelines. Manage- also indicates that more knowledge is needed. In ment explained that the CODE discussion and this context, a speaker stressed that the Bank the IEG study were important inputs into the on- needed to enhance its assistance to countries ex- going revision of OP 8.50, which will explore posed to drought, especially in Africa. further simplification of procedures, update the expenditure eligibility provisions of the policy, Revision of OP 8.50. The Committee generally wel- and clarify financing options for immediate emer- comed the revision of OP 8.50. A majority of gency needs. Staff indicated that the revised OP members felt that the policy should take on the 8.50 was planned to be presented to the Board form of an umbrella policy, encompassing all di- before the end of calendar year 2006. mension of disasters (made by man and nature), as proposed by management. This was seen as Partnerships and "Division of Labor." Members in line with the current drive toward creating agreed that building partnerships through de- more generic policies, as envisaged under the velopment programs and before disasters hap- modernization and simplification agenda. Some pen is essential for effective collaboration after members disagreed and felt that disaster man- destructive events. Some speakers also empha- agement was better addressed through a sepa- sized a need for a clear division of labor in dis- rate policy. A speaker suggested that the revised aster risk management among UN agencies, the policy should state that the Bank should not Bank, other IFIs and, where appropriate, non- normally fund direct cash transfers to disaster- governmental organizations. Management em- affected people, as this was better handled by phasized that partnerships with key donors and other agencies. He argued that the revised pol- governments, other IFIs, and UN agencies under icy should strengthen and formalize the divi- the umbrella of the International Strategy for 1 7 3 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Disaster Reduction (ISDR) System have been staffed hazard risk unit. Management responded established for leveraging resources and devel- that there were no plans for a new, specialized oping common tools and methodologies for ex unit, but that a proposal for a more flexible de- ante risk management and post-disaster assess- ployment of institutional capability from across ments and other recovery instruments. It was also the Bank was being developed. noted that the Bank has been invited to be a member of the strategic oversight board for the Other Issues. Some speakers noted the dearth of entire ISDR System. information on gender and urged the Bank to de- vote more attention to gender assessments in Enhancing Bank Capacity and Staffing. Most speak- connection with its disaster assistance. Staff re- ers welcomed the Bank's good record in global sponded that gender issues are integral to Bank's disaster response and recovery, but also agreed approach to risk management in operations, es- with the findings of the Report on the need to pecially for post-disaster projects, where strengthen Bank staffing capacity further, to as- women's participation has become integral to re- sist its clients to respond to disasters timely and covery and reconstruction project design. A efficiently. Management agreed with these com- member also raised the issue of procurement. ments and stressed the importance of system- Staff acknowledged that the Bank has faced some atically strengthening and building staff capacity procurement problems in disaster situations, for emergency response and disaster mitigation. especially when dealing with infrequent bor- In recognition that more organization and flex- rowers. However, staff also stressed the need ibility was needed in moving expert staff from for maintaining a sufficient degree of flexibility one region to another and equipping them with in procurement in disaster situations. A speaker necessary "tools," management indicated that in introduced the issue of resettlement after dis- addition to a small specialized core team in the asters, to which management responded that Infrastructure Network ("Hazard Risk Manage- the IEG report and findings from self-evaluation ment Team"), a Bank-wide Quick Reaction Team of operational work (e.g., CAS Completion Re- was being established. Most members broadly ports and Implementation Completion Reports) supported the QRT proposal, while one mem- provide valuable information for operationaliz- ber favored establishing a specialized and well- ing resettlement. Pietro Veglio Chairman 1 7 4 ENDNOTES Chapter 1 the total amount of reallocations is actually higher. The 1. John MacKinlay and Randolph Kent, "A New $3.0 billion does not include information on 29 per- Approach to Complex Emergencies," International cent of the 217 reallocation projects. Peacekeeping 4: 31-49. 8. A Hazard Risk Management steering committee, 2. ABC news report, October 16, 2005, quoting jointly chaired by the directors of the Financial Sec- Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. tor Operations and Policy Department (OPD) and 3. Official development assistance equaled $5.154 the Transport and Urban Development Department billion (OECD data). Bank lending, based on approvals (TUD), was constituted in fiscal 2006 to advise the the- for 38 projects over 1996­2006, equaled $5.277 billion. matic group and to facilitate better coordination 4. Bank research (World Bank 1998) has shown ev- among various units across the World Bank Group that idence that increases in development may initially work on disaster-related issues. The steering com- lead to increases in vulnerability before declining as mittee will meet quarterly and communicate elec- an economy becomes more developed. tronically as necessary. It is expected that the steering committee will improve synergy through information Chapter 2 sharing and provide strategic guidance to the the- 1. The treatment of reallocations in the several matic group. Bank databases is inconsistent. A small amount of 9. Surveys were sent to 219 task managers, 34 of double counting may have occurred where reallo- whom responded (a 16 percent response rate). cated loan proceeds are reported twice, in the origi- nal ICR and as part of new emergency loans. Chapter 3 2. This amount includes grants. Also taken into ac- 1. United Nations Division for the Advancement count are 11 Bank-administered projects using re- of Women (DAW), Inter-Agency Secretariat of the In- sources from the Global Environment Fund and trust ternational Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR), funds. In the absence of a completion report, ap- "Environmental Management and the Mitigation of praisal estimates of activity costs were used. If no Natural Disasters: A Gender Perspective," Report of the amount could be found for the disaster activity, but Expert Group Meeting, Ankara, Turkey, 6-9 November it was included in a larger activity at the subcompo- 2001. http://www.crid.or.cr/digitalizacion/doc/eng/ nent level, the only available amount was used. doc13987.doc. 3. Thirty-four drought projects had activities re- 2. The four disaster types were tropical cyclones, lated to other types of disasters as well. floods, earthquakes, and drought. 4. For this reason, when classifying disaster types, 3. The predominant concerns were environmen- loans are sometimes double counted, and the num- tal degradation, particularly of watersheds in rural ber of projects is greater than 528. areas, and the effects of rapid and uncontrolled ur- 5. The OPN referred to them as "reconstruction banization. projects." 4. The six natural hazards were drought, floods, 6. This does not include damage assessments or wind storms, earthquakes, landslides, and volcanoes. Board Reports. 5. A first step in such a strategic approach may be 7. Since Bank documents and databases do not al- wider adoption of the "five pillars" currently used in ways include information on the amount reallocated, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 1 7 5 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T Caribbean, and South Asia: risk assessment, risk mit- have admitted that they did not even realize that ERLs igation, institution building, emergency prepared- had a three-year limit. ness, and risk financing. 6. The analysis included 459 ongoing and com- 6. Eleven of them are interim PRSPs (IPRSPs). For pleted disaster projects for which data were available. a full list, see: http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 7. Twenty-seven percent equates to 125 ongoing EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,menuPK: and completed projects, out of a total of 459 projects. 384207~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~the- 8. The analysis examined 303 completed projects. SitePK:384201,00.html. 9. The analysis examined 4,503 projects approved 7. According to the Hazard Risk Management after fiscal year 1984 and completed by 2004. Team, those PRSPs are Cambodia (2003), Ghana 10. The lower average may be explained by the (2003), Honduras (2001), Malawi (2002), Mongolia structural adjustment projects, which typically take less (2003), Mozambique (2001), Nicaragua (2001), Tajik- time than most projects. Without structural adjustment istan (2002), and Vietnam (2002). projects, the average implementation time goes up to 8. IEG-World Bank, in consultation with the Haz- 6.76 years (2,467 days). These findings would still ard Risk Management Team of the Urban Unit, started suggest that natural disaster projects do not take less with the list of hotspot countries that are borrowers time to implement than other projects, on average. from the Bank and divided them into three groups ac- 11. Fifty-nine completed ERLs were analyzed. cording to levels of vulnerability (high, medium, and low), based on to the percentage of a country's GDP Chapter 5 at risk from two or more natural hazards. The coun- 1. Asian Disaster Reduction Center http:// tries in the high- and medium-risk groups are listed in www.adrc.or.jp/LWR/LWR_abridged/definitions.pdf Appendix E, tables E.2a and E.2b. This was deemed suit- 2. Another 30 projects mentioned participation in able because an approach based on economic risk is connection with labor, 21 mentioned consultation, 11 in line with the Bank's work as a financial institution. mentioned self-help construction, and 47 mentioned It needs to be stressed that the proposed categoriza- participation in other contexts. tion is offered for the purpose of stimulating discus- 3. The countries were Bangladesh, Honduras, sion. It is not IEG's role to be the arbiter of borrower India (Gujarat), Mozambique, and Turkey. risk. Bank management may choose to categorize 4. Social vulnerability is reflected by the degree to countries with a more complex system (including mor- which a socioeconomic system or physical assets are tality risk, for example) that takes more account of is- either susceptible or resilient to the impact of natu- sues such as Africa's high susceptibility to drought ral hazards and environmental changes. This vulner- but lower economic vulnerabilities. Only three African ability is determined by a combination of several countries currently figure in the proposed high- and issues, according to DAW and the UN/ISDR Secre- medium-risk groups. tariat:: 1) hazard awareness; 2) the condition of human settlements and infrastructure; 3) public policy and ad- Chapter 4 ministration; 4) the wealth/poverty of a given society; 1. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 5) organized abilities in all fields of disaster and risk EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK: management; 6) inequalities--gender relations, eco- 20485265~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~the- nomic patterns, and ethnic or racial divisions; and 7) SitePK:29506,00.html development practices that do not take into account 2. See the balance of payment background paper susceptibility to natural hazards (United Nations Di- (IEG 2004b; informal, available on request). vision for the Advancement of Women [DAW], Inter- 3. Such countries would include many of the least- Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for developed countries. Disaster Reduction [UN/ISDR] 2001. http://www.crid 4. See the balance of payment background paper .or.cr/digitalizacion/doc/eng/doc13987.doc) (IEG 2004b; informal, available on request). 5. Albala-Bertrand, as cited in Freeman and others 5. That so many ERLs are planned to take longer 2002. than three years indicates that practice often departs 6. The Bank began flagging projects with specific from policy. Some task managers of disaster projects poverty objectives in 1992, and recently discontin- 1 7 6 E N D N O T E S ued the practice. The average of the project ratings surance mechanism. 2001 Organization of Eastern of these 44 completed disaster PTI interventions was Caribbean States Emergency Recovery and Disaster 91 percent satisfactory--much higher than the Bank Management Program (L4418)--This project set up a average of 72 percent. contingent facility with allowance for post-catastrophe 7. Of these, 65 were completed and rated, with 80 mitigation work that could be called upon in the event percent having satisfactory outcomes. of a natural disaster during project implementation. 8. According to the Center of Studies in Social 10. This issue is discussed in some detail in recent Science (CSSS) 1999 study, the male-female ratio of project evaluations: El Salvador Earthquake Recon- the surveyed population in Maharashtra was signifi- struction Project (Loan 2873-ES), Report No. 28389; Ma- cantly higher than the ratio of the earthquake-devas- harashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Project tated districts. It was 942 and 937 for Latur and (Credit 2594-IN), Report No. 32515; Erzincan Earth- Osmanabad and 926 for the surveyed population af- quake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (Loan fected by the earthquake. According to the survey, the 3511-TR); Turkey Emergency Flood and Earthquake Re- larger number of women who died in the earthquake covery Project (Loan 4388-TR); and Emergency Earth- may be one of the reasons for this phenomenon. quake Recovery Project (Loan 4518-TR), Report No. 9. See study background paper on this topic for 32676-TR. more detail and relevant references to literature (IEGB 11. Several ongoing projects put mitigation measures 2005e; informal, available on request). as their first priority: the OECS Emergency Recovery and 10. For the purpose of this discussion, only proj- Disaster Management Project covering St. Kitts & Nevis, ects with at least one full disaster component were con- St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent & the sidered. Grenadines (P062668, approval year 1998--financed lending operations in each of the five mentioned coun- Chapter 6 tries with the objects of fortifying, or reconstructing and 1. 2005 Tsunami Economic Recovery Project rehabilitating key economic and social infrastructure and (P094205). facilities and strengthening the countries' institutional ca- 2. 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction pacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emer- Project (P094193). gencies); the Honduras Natural Disaster Mitigation 3. 2003 Fourth Social Investment Fund Project Project (P064913, approval year 2000--supports capac- (P048651). ity building to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters at 4. 2003 Emergency Drought Recovery Project the municipal level); the Nicaragua Natural Disaster Vul- (P080612). nerability Reduction Project (P064916, approval year 5. 1999 Emergency Flood Reconstruction Project 2001--aims to improve Nicaragua's disaster manage- (P063089). ment capacity); OECS Catastrophe Risk Management and 6. 1995 Basic Education (P007399). Insurance Reform Project (P070658, approval year 2002); 7. 1999 OECS: Emergency Disaster and Recon- the Colombia Natural Disaster Vulnerability Reduction struction (P062668). Project Adaptable Program Loan phases 1 and 2 8. At the regional trade talks in Argentina in No- (P082429, approval year 2005--aims at reducing the fis- vember 2005, a proposal was made to establish an cal vulnerability of the state to adverse natural events by emergency relief fund for Latin America and the strengthening national capacity to manage disaster risk Caribbean. A $500 million revolving fund also has and by reducing vulnerability in key municipalities that been proposed for the UN. combine high exposure to disaster risk and high contri- 9. 1994 Morocco National Rural Finance (L3662)-- butions to national income and productivity); the Ro- This project used the National Guarantee Fund as a mania Hazard Risk Mitigation and Emergency drought insurance mechanism. 2001 Mexico Natural Preparedness Project (P075163, approval year 2004--aims Disaster Management Project (L7038)--This project to assist the government in reducing the environmental, prepared a contingent earthquake-triggered facility (a social, and economic vulnerability to natural disasters, and facility that would allow deployment of pre-arranged catastrophic mining accidental spills of pollutants); and funding to cover risks in the event of natural catastro- the Vietnam Natural Disaster Risk Management Project phes) and a catastrophe bond as a market-based in- (P073361, approval year 2005--adopts an innovative ap- 1 7 7 H A Z A R D S O F N AT U R E , R I S K S T O D E V E L O P M E N T proach, providing support primarily for disaster pre- Appendix B vention and mitigation measures, including at the com- 1. Project concept date (PCD) was used for the munity level where vulnerability is often greatest, to analysis of the timing of the all Bank projects, and that reduce the impact of natural hazards on Vietnam's de- figure is compared with all disaster projects in the back- velopment process). ground paper. The analysis of timing from event date 12. For the remaining 3 percent, no information only looks at projects for which that date is available. was available. 2. The effectiveness time is defined as the time be- 13. Storms wash soil and debris into rivers, re- tween Board approval and the time when the project ducing channel capacity and increasing the risk of can start disbursing funds. flooding. River training, the only solution other than 3. Balance of payment/budget support was ex- addressing the root causes of the problem, consists amined separately because it is considered one of of a series of works that modify or constrain the be- the quickest forms of Bank lending. havior of rivers, typically including the creation of 4. Balance of payment projects had already been new embankments and the upgrading of existing identified in a previous analysis of the component ones, the planting of certain varieties of trees and activities of completed projects. grasses to hold soil in place, and stabilizing the outer edge of river bends using stones or other inorganic Appendix G material to lessen erosion and to keep the river to its 1. TURKEY: For more information, see the Turkey course. Once rivers leave their channels due to flood- Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project PPAR (Pro- ing, they can abandon them for good. River training ject Performance Assessment Report, Turkey, Erzin- returns waterways to alignments from which they can Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction have departed. River training also protects bridges, Project [L3511-TR]; Turkey Emergency Flood and drainage infrastructures, and roads by the creation of Earthquake Recovery Project [L4388-TR]; and Emer- guide bunds (sometimes referred to as hard points). gency Earthquake Recovery Project [L4518-TR]). 14. No information was available for 4 percent of projects. Appendix J 15. The largest proportion occurs in African proj- 1. The ISDR aims at building disaster resilient ects. However, among the 138 projects that consist communities by promoting increased awareness of the wholly of disaster-related activities, 49 mention work- importance of disaster reduction as an integral com- ing with other donors, and the South Asia Region has ponent of sustainable development, with the goal of the largest proportion. Curiously, project documents reducing human, social, economic, and environmental have mentioned other donors less and less as the years losses due to natural hazards and related technolog- have gone by. This may simply be a reporting phe- ical and environmental disasters. See http:// www nomenon. .unisdr.org 2. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Appendix A which was held in Kobe (Hyogo, Japan) on January 18- 1. Two-thirds of the 40 projects referenced dealt 22, 2005, adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action with reconstruction after natural disasters, and one- 2005­15: Building the Resilience of Nations and Com- third dealt with reconstruction after civil wars. munities to Disasters. 2. These are the earliest natural disaster projects 3. See the joint IBRD/IDA/IFC Country Assistance adequately documented in currently accessible files. Strategy for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 3. Though ERL procedures already were laid down States (Report No. 22205-LAC), which was discussed in the OPN, the use of that term occurred only later in by the Executive Directors on September 6, 2005. A the OD, which stipulated that every ERL should have the note describing the proposal, which was presented to term "emergency," "recovery," or "reconstruction" in the the 2005 Small States Forum held in Washington, DC title, to be more easily recognizable. Conversely, how- on September 24, 2005, is available at www.world ever, not every loan with these words in its title is an ERL. bank.org/smallstates. 1 7 8 REFERENCES The study literature review includes an exten- Gilbert, Roy. 2001. "Doing More for Those Made sive bibliography of documents reviewed for Homeless by Natural Disasters." World Bank this study.The background papers for this eval- Risk Management Working Paper Series No. uation are available on request from IEG­World 1. Washington, DC. Bank. 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Washington, DC. 1 8 1 IEG PUBLICATIONS Study Series 2004 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness: The Bank's Contributions to Poverty Reduction Addressing the Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs Agricultural Extension: The Kenya Experience Assisting Russia's Transition: An Unprecedented Challenge Bangladesh: Progress Through Partnership Brazil: Forging a Strategic Partnership for Results--An OED Evaluation of World Bank Assistance Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support The CIGAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Country Assistance Evaluation Retrospective: OED Self-Evaluation Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC Initiative Developing Towns and Cities: Lessons from Brazil and the Philippines The Drive to Partnership: Aid Coordination and the World Bank Economies in Transition: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Assistance The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and ­Driven Development: An OED Evaluation Evaluating a Decade of World Bank Gender Policy: 1990­99 Evaluation of World Bank Assistance to Pacific Member Countries, 1992­2002 Financial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance Financing the Global Benefits of Forests: The Bank's GEF Portfolio and the 1991 Forest Strategy and Its Implementation Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending IDA's Partnership for Poverty Reduction Improving the Lives of the Poor Through Investment in Cities India: The Dairy Revolution Information Infrastructure: The World Bank Group's Experience Investing in Health: Development Effectiveness in the Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector Jordan: Supporting Stable Development in a Challenging Region Lesotho: Development in a Challenging Environment Mainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending: An Update Maintaining Momentum to 2015? An Impact Evaluation of Interventions to Improve Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Outcomes in Bangladesh The Next Ascent: An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program, Pakistan Nongovernmental Organizations in World Bank­Supported Projects: A Review Poland Country Assistance Review: Partnership in a Transition Economy Poverty Reduction in the 1990s: An Evaluation of Strategy and Performance The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Support Through 2003 Power for Development: A Review of the World Bank Group's Experience with Private Participation in the Electricity Sector Promoting Environmental Sustainability in Development Putting Social Development to Work for the Poor: An OED Review of World Bank Activities Reforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to Market Sharing Knowledge: Innovations and Remaining Challenges Social Funds: Assessing Effectiveness Tunisia: Understanding Successful Socioeconomic Development Uganda: Policy, Participation, People The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction The World Bank's Forest Strategy: Striking the Right Balance Zambia Country Assistance Review: Turning an Economy Around Evaluation Country Case Series Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Brazil: Forests in the Balance: Challenges of Conservation with Development Cameroon: Forest Sector Development in a Difficult Political Economy China: From Afforestation to Poverty Alleviation and Natural Forest Management Costa Rica: Forest Strategy and the Evolution of Land Use El Salvador: Post-Conflict Reconstruction India: Alleviating Poverty through Forest Development Indonesia: The Challenges of World Bank Involvement in Forests The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: Findings from 10 Country Case Studies of World Bank and IMF Support Uganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Proceedings Global Public Policies and Programs: Implications for Financing and Evaluation Lessons of Fiscal Adjustment Lesson from Urban Transport Evaluating the Gender Impact of World Bank Assistance Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension (Transaction Publishers) Evaluation and Poverty Reduction Monitoring & Evaluation Capacity Development in Africa Public Sector Performance--The Critical Role of Evaluation All IEG evaluations are available, in whole or in part, in languages other than English. For our multilingual selection, please visit http://www.worldbank.org/ieg THE WORLD BANK ISBN 0-8213-6650-5