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Solving commitment problems in disaster risk finance (English)

Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to third-parties...
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Clarke,Daniel Jonathan; Wren-Lewis,Liam.

Solving commitment problems in disaster risk finance (English). Policy Research working paper|no. WPS 7720 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/396511468197075071

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