Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00004048 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-79580) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF USD15 MILLION TO BELIZE FOR A MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT May 5, 2017 Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience Global Practice Latin America and the Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective November 30, 2016) Currency Unit = Belize Dollar BZD1.00 = USD0.5 USD1.00 = BZD 2 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BSIF Belize Social Investment Fund BMDP Belize Municipal Development Project CCC Community Consultation Committee CDB Caribbean Development Bank CPS Country Partnership Strategy DO Development Objective FM Financial Management IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion and Results IEG Independent Evaluation Group IP Implementation Progress IRR Internal Rate of Return ISR Implementation Status Report LPWG Local Planning Working Group MDP Municipal Development Project MED Ministry of Economic Development, Commerce, and Consumer Protection M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MGP Municipal Growth Plans MLLGRD Ministry of Labor, Local Government and Rural Development MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment MTR Mid-Term Review NPLG National Policy on Local Governance NPV Net Present Value PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PPF Project Preparation Facility PPIAF Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PSC Project Steering Committee TCC Town and City Councils TTL Task Team Leader Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Sector Manager: Ming Zhang Diana Marcela Rubiano Vargas, Project Team Leader: Frederico Ferreira Fonseca Pedroso ICR Team Leader: Yohannes Yemane Kesete BELIZE Municipal Development Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 15 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 16 6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 18 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 21 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 23 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 27 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 29 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results....................................................... 30 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 31 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 34 A. Basic Information Municipal Country: Belize Project Name: Development Project ID: P111928 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-79580 ICR Date: 03/22/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: BELIZE Original Total USD 15.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 14.89M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 15.00M Environmental Category: Implementing Agencies: Belize Social Investment Fund Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/13/2009 Effectiveness: 01/21/2011 01/21/2011 06/16/2014 Appraisal: 06/21/2010 Restructuring(s): 10/11/2014 06/02/2015 Approval: 09/16/2010 Mid-term Review: 06/03/2013 06/10/2013 Closing: 11/30/2015 11/30/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any No Quality at Entry (QEA): None time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time Quality of Supervision No None (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Closing/Inactive Satisfactory status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Sub-National Government 19 19 Transportation Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 31 31 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste 50 50 Management Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Finance Finance for Development 7 7 Housing Finance 7 7 Urban and Rural Development Urban Development 94 94 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 87 87 Urban Planning 7 7 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Tahseen Sayed Khan Yvonne M. Tsikata Practice Ming Zhang Guang Zhe Chen Manager/Manager: Project Team Leader: Diana Marcela Rubiano Vargas Ellen Hamilton ICR Team Leader: Yohannes Yemane Kesete ICR Primary Author: Sumati Rajput ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was to improve access to basic municipal infrastructure and to enhance municipal management in selected Town and City Councils (TCCs). Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Number of beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure (direct and indirect project beneficiaries (number), of which female Indicator 1 : (percentage) Value 0 60992 148943 157233 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Target exceeded by 5%. The methodology for calculating beneficiaries (incl. % was revised. achievement) Number of TCCs successfully completing investments in first and second phases. Indicator 2 : Value 0 7 7 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) At least 4 TCCs each have achieved minimum 4 out of 7 intermediate outcome Indicator 3 : indicators of Component 2. Value 0 4 7 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Target exceeded by 75%. (incl. % achievement) iii (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Km of drainage financed under the Project Indicator 1 : Value 0 3 25.35 33.7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Target exceeded by 33%. (incl. % achievement) Km of rehabilitated roads under the project Indicator 2 : Value 0 4 14.85 14.85 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Km of rehabilitated roads under the project (non rural) Indicator 3 : Value 0 4 14.85 14.85 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. This indicator was added in June 2015. (incl. % achievement) Number of improved intersections financed under the project Indicator 4 : Value 0 7 140 140 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of traffic signs financed under the project Indicator 5 : Value 0 12 214 214 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 iv Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCCs that comply with terms and conditions of subproject agreement Indicator 6 : Value 0 7 7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCCs that have adopted Municipal Growth Plan (MGP) Indicator 7 : Value 0 7 7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCCs increasing own revenue Indicator 8 : Value Local revenue collection 7 9 (quantitative in 2009 or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2015 Comments Achieved. Belize City and San Pedro did not receive infrastructure investments, (incl. % but since they received technical assistance, this value surpassed the target. achievement) Number of TCCs with qualified accountants on staff Indicator 9 : Value 0 7 9 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Belize City and San Pedro did not receive infrastructure investments, (incl. % but since they received technical assistance, this value surpassed the target. achievement) Number of TCCs submitting required monthly financial reports Indicator 10 : Value 0 7 9 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Belize City and San Pedro did not receive infrastructure investments, (incl. % but since they received technical assistance, this value surpassed the target. achievement) v Number of TCCs using a computerized financial reporting system Indicator 11 : Value 0 7 9 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. Belize City and San Pedro did not receive infrastructure investments, (incl. % but since they received technical assistance, this value surpassed the target. achievement) Number of TCCs with a physical asset maintenance plan and corresponding Indicator 12 : budgets Value 0 7 7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCCs with Roads and Safety procedures Indicator 13 : Value 0 5 7 7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCC staff that have received training from the Local Government and Indicator 14 : Urban Planning Officers Value 0 14 220 220 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of TCCs provided with spatial datasets showing land parcels Indicator 15 : Value 0 7 7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) Indicator 16 : Percentage of subprojects that meet BSIF's service standards in accordance with vi OM Value 0 95% 95% 95% (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 06/02/2015 11/30/2016 Achieved. There were two phases of sub-projects. In the first phase, this original Comments target value was 95%, while 100% was achieved. In the second phase, this was (incl. % 100%, revised to 95 %, and 95% was achieved. achievement) Procurement and FM duties are executed in accordance with national and World Indicator 17 : Bank guidelines Value 0 yes yes (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/17/2010 09/17/2010 11/30/2016 Comments Achieved. (incl. % achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 11/17/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 05/21/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.09 3 12/10/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.34 4 06/22/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.76 5 01/28/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.02 6 07/05/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.25 7 02/05/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.89 8 08/27/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.93 9 03/11/2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.50 10 08/18/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.39 11 03/24/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.53 12 09/13/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.36 vii H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions At the close of the Project Preparation Facility (PPF), the undisbursed balance of 06/16/2014 N S S 7.49 US$440,158 was reallocated to support activities under Component 1 and Component 2. A Level 2 restructuring reallocated project funds, in the amount of USD 250,000, from Category 2 (Goods and Works under Component 1 of the Project) to Category 1 (Non- 10/11/2014 N S MS 8.27 Consultant Services, and Consultants' Services under Component 1 of the Project) to cover the costs of the supervision contract for Phase II works. A Level 2 restructuring extended the loan closing date from November 30, 2015 to November 30, 2016 to: (i) ensure completion of Phase II drainage and road works and modify the implementation schedule accordingly; (ii) revise the disbursement estimates to 06/02/2015 N S MS 9.99 reflect actual experience and the proposed extension of the Project; and (iii) revise the results framework targets to take into account expected results of Phase II and adjust methodologies to be more in line with project implementation. viii I. Disbursement Profile ix 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country and sector context 1. Belize is a growing, upper middle income country, which is subject to natural disasters. In 2010, Belize was inhabited by 310,000 people1 and was experiencing rapid urbanization with greater urban population growth in inland towns/cities. At the time of appraisal, Belize had experienced transformation within its economic sectors, with a strong push toward the tourism and oil sectors. Furthermore, Belize is regularly affected by damage from natural disasters, with tropical storms affecting as much as 30 percent of GDP2. Prior to the start of the project, Belize was hit by Tropical Storm Arthur in May 2008. 2. Belize experienced numerous political changes before the start of the project. In February 2008, the People’s United Party was replaced by the United Democratic Party, which committed to enhancing fiduciary systems of the government. In 2009, Belize approved the National Policy on Local Governance (NPLG) focused on improving municipal management and increasing revenues. The NPLG also clarified responsibilities of towns and cities in regards to revenue collection. 3. Belize was in need for municipal infrastructure development and maintenance. With its increasing population, vulnerability to natural disasters, and political changes, Belize was experiencing a high demand for investments in municipal infrastructure, as well as for enhanced management of municipal finance by the Town and City Councils (TCCs). The frequency of hurricanes also highlighted the need to improve the road and drainage systems in critical areas. In order to maintain these developments and be able to finance operations and maintenance costs, Belize also needed to improve its revenue collection systems. 4. The country and sector context provided a strong rationale for Bank’s engagement. The World Bank had a long period of disengagement from Belize prior to this project. The new government was committed to enhancing municipal financial management and improving critical infrastructure needs. The World Bank’s rich international experience and practice in supporting municipal development and decentralized governance system made it an ideal development partner. 1 Belize Statistical Institute 2 Borensztein, E., E. Cavallo and P. Valenzuela (2008). “Debt Sustainability under Catastrophic Risk: The Case for Government Budget Insurance�, IMF Working Paper". 1 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 5. The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was to improve access to basic municipal infrastructure 3 and to enhance municipal management in selected Town and City Councils4. 6. The PDO was monitored with the following outcome indicators:  Number of beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure (direct and indirect project beneficiaries, of which female (percentage).  Number of TCCs successfully completing investments in first and second phases.  At least four TCCs each have achieved minimum four out of seven intermediate outcome indicators of Component 2. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 7. There were no changes made to the PDO. In June 2015, a level 2 restructuring made the following changes to the PDO indicators. Table 1. Change in targets of PDO indicators. PDO Indicator Change Number of beneficiaries with access to improved The target was adjusted from 60,992 to 148,943. quality of basic municipal infrastructure (direct The methodology for calculating direct and and indirect project beneficiaries (number) of indirect beneficiaries was modified in order to which are female) better capture the impacts of the project. This was done because investments were not decided during project preparation, but rather during implementation. Therefore, the methodology was revised to align with actual investments selected by the communities, which led to revising the targets and therefore, recalculation of beneficiaries. For direct beneficiaries, the target was adjusted from 20,330 to 69,177. For indirect beneficiaries, the target was adjusted from 40,662 to 79,766. For number of women, the target was adjusted from 10,368 to 35,280. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 8. The PAD identified the following as direct beneficiaries of the project: (i) city councils of Belmopan and Belize City; (ii) town councils of San Ignacio/Santa Elena, 3 Basic municipal infrastructure includes paved streets and basic drainage canals, as well as public spaces and other facilities, which are defined in the Operations Manual. 4 The town councils include San Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo del Carmen, Dangriga, Punta Gorda, Corozal, San Pedro, and Orange Walk. The city councils include Belmopan and Belize City. 2 Benque Viejo del Carmen, Dangriga, Punta Gorda, Corozal, Orange Walk, and San Pedro; (iii) The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE); and (iv) The Ministry of Labor, Local Government and Rural Development (MLLGRD). Component 1 benefitted six town councils and one city council, and Component 2 benefitted all nine TCCs. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 9. The project was designed with three components to support the achievement of the PDO. The first two components were directly linked to the PDO and complemented each other. The third component supported project management. 10. Component 1: Municipal Infrastructure Investments (Total US$ 11.75 million; IBRD US$ 11.44 million5). The objective of this component was to prepare and carry out municipal infrastructure in the participating TCCs. Eligible investments included paving streets, constructing drainage canals, as well as public spaces, parks, markets, and street signage. These investments targeted improvement of the environment and the quality of life in the participating TCCs. This component had two phases of sub- projects: 11. Phase 1 sub-projects. The TCCs were required to propose municipal investments totaling no more than US$400,000 per TCC to Belize Social Investment Fund (BSIF). Participating TCCs had to meet the following eligibility criteria: (i) Conduct open town meetings to address investment priorities and prepare minutes. (ii) Submit monthly financial reports to MLLGRD. (iii) Identify all employees and prepare organizational charts and job descriptions. (iv) Attend training on increasing revenues (e.g., from property taxes); (v) Collect information for a baseline of maintenance. (vi) Collect basic spatial information for future town development strategies. 12. Phase 2 sub-projects. TCCs were each allocated funds for municipal investments in the range of US$1 million to US$2 million. TCCs had to meet the following eligibility criteria: (i) Initiation of the process for adoption of the Municipal Growth Plan (MGP). (ii) Initiation of the preparation of a physical asset maintenance plan, corresponding budget, and incorporation of maintenance budget in the Annual Town or City Council budget. (iii) Monthly council meetings (of which at least one should open to the general public every two months) and public town meetings every six months. (iv) Submission and publication of monthly financial reports to MLLGRD. 5 Component costs exclude the Front End Fee (US$40,000) and Project Preparation Advance (US$800,000). 3 13. Component 2: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for TCCs, MLLGRD and MNRE (Total US$1.05 million; IBRD US$1.05 million 6). The two sub-components are outlined below. 14. Component 2a: TCCs Technical Assistance and Capacity Building. Strengthening of TCCs’ institutional and technical capacity to develop MGPs, design and implement municipal financial management systems, carry out revenue enhancement, develop asset management plans and enhance traffic management activities. These were directly aligned with the eligibility criteria for Phase 2 investments under Component 1. 15. Component 2b: MLLGRD and MNRE Technical Assistance and Capacity Building. Strengthening of the institutional and technical capacity of MLLGRD and MNRE through training of: (i) A Local Government Officer who will work under MLLGRD. (ii) An Urban Planning Officer at MNRE. 16. Component 3: Project Management (Total US$2.07 million; IBRD US$1.67 million7). Strengthening of the operational capacity of BSIF for implementation of the Project to ensure compliance with fiduciary, technical, safeguards, and monitoring and evaluation requirements. To this end, BSIF was required to put in place a Project Implementation Unit (PIU). 1.6 Revised Components 17. None of the components were revised. Changes were made to the eligibility criteria for Phase II investments under Component 1 as shown in the table 2. Table 2. Changes to eligibility criteria Operations Manual (2010) Revised Operations Manual Formal adoption of a MGP by the Initiation of the formal adoption of a MGP by the Town or City Town or City Council after Council after conducting a series of prior public meetings. conducting a series of prior public Initiation of the process for preparing an asset maintenance plan, meetings. its corresponding budget, and incorporation of maintenance budget in the Annual Town or City Council budget. Conduct monthly Council meetings Conduct monthly Council meetings of which at least one should of which at least one per month be open to the general public every two months starting from should be open to the public as October 2012. Conduct public Town meetings at least once every required by law starting from six months as required by law starting from October 2012. project approval. 6 Component costs excluded the Front End Fee (US$40,000) and Project Preparation Advance (US$800,000). 7 Component costs excluded the Front End Fee (US$40,000) and Project Preparation Advance (US$800,000). 4 1.7 Other significant changes 18. The project was restructured three times, as summarized in the Data Sheet. These changes did not affect either the PDO or the project components. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 19. Soundness of background analysis. The objectives of the project were well aligned with World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note 2009-2011 (Report # 47282-BZ), which includes two policy pillars of: (i) contributing to public sector strengthening; and (ii) addressing critical infrastructure needs to support economic development. The project objectives were relevant to country and sector context, and were developed with support from eleven technical documents8. The project built on the Bank’s previous engagement in Belize, financed under the Bank’s Roads and Municipal Drainage Project (US$ 13 million), which closed in 2005. 20. The project integrated four key lessons: (i) desirability of using wholesale approaches in municipal management, that creates healthy competition among municipalities, which was one of the key lessons learned from a review of portfolio of Municipal Development Projects (MDPs) conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 9; (ii) importance of linking municipal development plans with investment plans; (iii) need to emphasize operation and maintenance; and (iv) need to prioritize investments based on analysis. 21. The rationale for Bank’s reengagement through this project was also sound. The Bank’s prior experience on strengthening financial management and municipal infrastructure was relevant to the project’s objectives, which were consistent with the national priorities as well the decentralization policy approved in 2009. 22. Assessment of project design. The PDO as well as the project components were suitably designed to meet the needs of the country. Component 1 was designed to integrate community participation to ensure that all investments were developed in consultation with the communities. There was also a link between Component 1 and 8 These included: 1. Interim Strategy Note for Belize. World Bank. February 2009; 2. Shlomo Angel. Housing Policy in Belize: diagnosis and guidelines for action. January 2010; 3. Country Poverty Assessment. Government of Belize and Caribbean Development Bank. December 2009; 4. National Policy on Local Governance. Government of Belize, 2009; 5. Report National Symposium on Local Governance. “Transforming our communities through good local governance� Convened by the Ministry of Labor, Local government and Rural Development. November 2008; 6. Belize Towns Property Tax Act; 7. Victor Villarreal: Belize Municipal Development Project. 8. Municipal Finance and Revenue Enhancement Inception Report. May 2010. 9. Land acquisition and involuntary resettlement policy framework. February 2010. 10. Environmental Management Framework. Belize Social Investment Fund. June 2010. 11. Final reports on the Good Governance and Human Resources (2) Capacity Building Workshops. 9 IEG’s Special Study: Improving Municipal Management for Cities to Succeed, 2009 5 Component 2, where TCCs needed to successfully meet certain eligibility criteria in order to access investments under Component 1. To encourage greater ownership among the TCCs of the project, TCCs were required to provide a three percent cash counterpart contribution towards the total cost of each sub-project. 23. Since this was a reengagement project, the Bank quickly identified a strong counterpart in Belize. A well-structured institutional and implementation mechanism was developed to ensure that the project activities are of high quality and executed efficiently. The Ministry of Economic Development, Commerce, and Consumer Protection (MED), was identified as the main government counterpart. BSIF, a body under MED, was designated with responsibility to implement the project, and a separate PIU was set up by BSIF. To provide oversight to the project, a Project Steering Committee (PSC) was established with representation from central government agencies10 as well as the Mayors’ Association. 24. Despite the simple design and small size of the project, eight of the Bank’s ten safeguard policies were triggered and were fully addressed. No potential large scale negative indirect and or long-term environmental and social impacts were foreseen from project activities at appraisal. Details on Safeguards and Fiduciary are provided in section 2.4. 25. Adequacy of government commitment. There was strong commitment for the project at both the national and local levels of government. The administration’s efforts were focused on five key areas: (i) restoring fiscal sustainability and reducing the debt burden; (ii) improving government transparency and accountability; (iii) addressing critical infrastructure needs to support economic development; (iv) investing in and developing human capital; and (v) managing environmental resources to ensure contribution to improving people’s lives today and securing them for future generations. At the local level, the TCCs were keen to enhance their technical capacities to implement the NPLG. The PSC was established to oversee and guide project implementation and achievement of results. 26. Assessment of risks. The overall risk at the time of appraisal was correctly assessed as Moderate. Three ‘Substantial’ risks were identified: (i) poor collection of revenue; (ii) weak financial management capacity and lack of familiarity with Bank Financial Management (FM) processes given limited Bank engagements in recent years; and (iii) lack of familiarity with Bank Procurement Guidelines and procedures. 27. Four other risks were identified as ‘Moderate’: (i) multiple entities engaging across different functions of the local governments; (ii) TCCs’ inability to identify the highest priority investments and/or technically sound solutions; (iii) potential implementing agencies have not previously worked with the Bank; and (iv) compliance with environmental laws as well as impact on indigenous people. 10 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from the Ministries of (i) MLLGRD, (ii) MED, (iii) MNRE, (iv) Ministry of Works, (v) Ministry of Housing and Urban Development; and (vi) Ministry of Finance 6 28. Risks were correctly identified and assessed. Appropriate mitigation measures were identified and triggered as necessary to ensure that the PDO was successfully achieved. 2.2 Implementation Factors that positively affected project implementation 29. Simple project design. The project design had only three simple and clearly defined components, which were well-aligned with the development objective. The components on works and technical capacity building were interlinked, which helped ensure the achievement of project objectives. Coordination across the local government was possible because of the small size of the country. Project benefits reached a large part of the country because of community engagement as well as active collaboration among mayors and government officials. 30. Beneficiary engagement. The selection as well as maintenance of the works was driven by the communities. The communities voted on the location as well as the type of investments, and monitored progress through Community Consultation Committees (CCCs). The process for the development of MGPs, which was coordinated by MNRE in collaboration with a Local Planning Working Group (LPWG) from each TCC, was robust in its community engagement design. The working group consisted of technical experts, residents, as well as public sector representatives, making it inclusive yet technically sound. 31. Ownership of TCCs. The mayors were all very committed to achieving the objectives of the project. The requirement to provide a three percent cash contribution created greater ownership of the project, which facilitated implementation. When mayors began to see the positive results of these investments, they began to finance similar small works from TCC budgets. Factors that negatively affected project implementation 32. Technical design of the works. In a few municipalities, some of the drains were deep, and due to insufficient budget during project implementation as well as the challenge of cleaning covered drains, many sites left drains uncovered. To ensure safety and reduce the risk of accidents in areas where drains were deep, TCCs have already proactively covered a number of the drains, and have committed to continuing this as well as maintaining clean drains, partly using the additional revenue that is being generated through the revenue enhancement program. Additionally, the lack of an integrated drainage system initially created some flooding problems that have already been addressed by the municipalities. As part of the Dangriga Market rehabilitation, there were some challenges in the design of the soakaways and effluent management because of high water table in the area, which has already been addressed by the Mayor. 7 33. Overall delays. There were several delays due to procurement challenges. Since this was a reengagement project, the PIU had to invest a lot of time learning Bank procurement processes. Given the small country capacity, there were also some challenges finding appropriate contractors, as in Dangriga, where delays occurred due to the contractor. The contractor was however, eventually dismissed and replaced to avoid further delay. Additionally, there were delays in several sites because of difficulty of coordinating with utility companies. The PIU however, addressed the issue by actively following up with the utility companies during project implementation. Mid Term Review 34. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was timely and rated progress toward the PDO as well as overall implementation progress as ‘Satisfactory’. Key recommendations and lessons learned for the remaining project implementation included: (i) better documentation of social, economic, technical, and environmental justification of Phase II sub-projects; (ii) need to undertake a thorough design review of investments through site visits and use of external peer reviews to ensure quality of designs; (iii) increase in PIUs focus on enhancing contract/construction management through adequate documentation of issues; (iv) closer dialogue and better policy linkage with MLLGRD and MNRE; and (v) continued support for participatory processes and transparency in implementation. The PIU worked toward addressing the findings of the MTR. For example, the design changes were incorporated based on reviews by BSIF in some sites. The challenges of contract/construction management, especially for Dangriga, were also clearly documented after the MTR. The project retained its participatory and transparent nature throughout its life-cycle. 2.2 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 35. M&E design. At the time of appraisal, a results framework was developed with PDO indicators as well as Intermediate Outcome indicators which was appropriate to measuring the achievement of the PDO. Over the course of project implementation however, once the investments were selected through community engagement, it was possible to identify beneficiaries with more accuracy. This led to an improvement of the methodology for capturing beneficiaries, which resulted in a more appropriate target values. Similarly, the initial end-of-project target values were revised for several other indicators during the June 2015 restructuring, well before the project closed, and once all the sub-projects were chosen through community consultation during Phase 2. M&E design included appropriate arrangements for data collection, compilation, analysis, and reporting. 36. M&E implementation and utilization. Progress was monitored well through quarterly and annual progress reports prepared by the PIU. The quarterly reports outlined the status of the main project activities along with details of finances and expenses. The annual reports provided: (i) status of implementation; (ii) details of progress of the different components; (iii) financial management of the project; (iv) details of monitoring and evaluation; (v) challenges; and (vi) planned activities. The Bank team also collected information through supervision missions, including site visits, every five to six months. 8 The Bank updated the indicator values bi-annually and discussed the status of project implementation with all relevant agencies and addressed issues jointly. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 37. The project was correctly categorized as Category B, since the civil works were neither large nor complex and the environmental and social impacts were identifiable. The overall compliance was ‘Satisfactory’ at the end of the project. 38. Environment. Environmental safeguards triggered by the project were i) Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); (ii) Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04); (iii) Forests (OP/BP 4.36); and (iv) Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11). An Environmental Management Framework was developed, which took into account the Bank requirements for compliance with these policies. A separate Environmental Management Plan was developed to address the environmental challenges of the Dangriga sub-project. Compliance with Bank environmental safeguard polices is rated Satisfactory. 39. Social. The project triggered two Bank social safeguard policies (i) Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.11); and (ii) Involuntary Resettlement. The following documents were prepared to ensure compliance with these policies: (i) Social Assessment Study; (ii) Indigenous People’s Framework; and (iii) Resettlement Framework. While there were no major issues with regard to Indigenous People, the Mid-Term review highlighted the need for more culturally sensitive consultations, for which a Spanish translator was hired. Four sites11 required development of Resettlement Plans. All vendors were resettled and moved to more lucrative locations, or compensated. Compliance with Bank’s social safeguard polices is rated Satisfactory. 40. Legal. Two legal safeguard policies were triggered by the project: (i) Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50) because drainage projects in two sites 12 could have channeled water from the Mopan River to the Belize River and eventually to the Caribbean sea; and (ii) Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7.60), because of the long standing territorial dispute between Belize and Guatemala. Appropriate notifications were made to the Government of Guatemala in July 2010 and February 2009 respectively with regard to these policies, and no objections were received. Compliance with these two policies was rated ‘Satisfactory’ throughout the project and no issues were documented. Fiduciary Compliance 41. Financial Management. FM was rated ‘Satisfactory’ during most of project implementation and at the end of project. Financial transactions were recorded using QuickBooks accounting software, which facilitated the timely preparation of quarterly Interim Financial Reports. The project accounts, which formed a part of the entity-wide 11 The four sites were: Dangriga, Corozal, Orange Walk, and Belmopan. 12 The two sites were: Benque Viejo and Belmopan 9 financial statements prepared by BSIF, were audited by various private external auditors. The audited reports were acceptable to the Bank. 42. Procurement. Procurement was rated as Moderately Satisfactory at the end of the project. To address low procurement capacity, BSIF maintained a dedicated procurement staff. Contract management was a challenge as Belize Municipal Development Project (BMDP) was a re-engagement project and procurement staff had to quickly learn Bank processes. Throughout project implementation, the Bank guided the PIU to proactively manage procurement challenges through additional training of staff as well as through the recruitment of additional experienced procurement staff. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 43. Operations and maintenance. BSIF had set up the PIU and placed one staff to work with MLLGRD and one to work with MNRE to help coordinate the MGPs. At the close of the project, the PIU has been dissolved and as per the operations manual only the staff at MLLGRD has been retained. Several TCCs indicated that they would allocate funds in future budget cycles to ensure sustainability of the works and invest in similar additional works in other parts of their town/city. 44. Sustaining reforms and institutional capacity. The project has been instrumental in strengthening the capacity of the TCCs. Financial reporting has been computerized and TCCs plan to continue training new staff in order to ensure that financial transparency is sustained. Additionally, traffic Manuals have been developed in collaboration with the Caribbean Development Bank to ensure better traffic management; and asset management plans have been prepared and spatial data has been collected to inform future development strategies. TCCs plan to implement MGPs by ensuring that new developments are informed by these plans. 45. Next phase / follow-on Operation. Many TCCs have expressed interest to build on the achievements attained through this project by focusing on: (i) investments in comprehensive drainage infrastructure to ensure better flood management; (ii) investments aligned with the new MGP; and (iii) continued capacity building for financial reporting and planning. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance is rated Substantial 46. Relevance of the objectives is rated Substantial. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the PDO was well-aligned with the two policy pillars of the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note 2009-2011 (Report # 47282-BZ): (i) contributing to public sector strengthening; and (ii) addressing critical infrastructure needs to support economic development. The Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY12-FY15 also highlighted themes which were supported by the BMDP: (i) policies and strategies for mainstreaming natural resources 10 and climate resilience; (ii) institutional capacity strengthening for natural resource management and climate change; and (iii) investments to strengthen climate resilience. The CPS also points to Bank’s support for continued strengthening of public financial management in Belize, which was central to BMDP’s objective. 47. Relevance of the design and implementation is rated Substantial. The project had simple and clearly defined components that were designed to directly support the PDO. Component 1 helped develop municipal infrastructure in seven TCCs, which helped improve the quality of life in a number of districts. Component 2 strengthened institutional and technical capacity of the municipalities. The two components were strongly interlinked so that achievement of either component required or facilitated the achievement of the other. The participatory mechanism for the selection of investments was also key to successful project implementation. The coordinating role played by the PIU at BSIF was critical for the project’s success, particularly because this was a re- engagement project. In addition, the design required the TCCs to contribute to the cost of their sub-projects, which encouraged greater ownership and led to the success of the project. As discussed under M&E Design in Section 2.3, the Results Framework was appropriate to measure the achievement of the PDO. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Efficacy is rated Substantial 48. The PDO of the project is “to improve basic municipal infrastructure and to enhance municipal management in selected Town and City Councils�. Achievement of each of the two elements of the PDO is discussed separately below. 49. Improve access to municipal infrastructure investments is rated Substantial. The relevant PDO indicators are the number of beneficiaries and the number of TCCs successfully completing investments in both phases, while there are a number of relevant Intermediate Outcome indicators including drainages constructed; roads rehabilitated; intersections improved; and traffic signs erected. As shown in the Results Framework Analysis section of the Data Sheet and in Annex 2, the end-of-project targets of these indicators have all been either achieved or exceeded. 50. The TCCs indicated that municipal works have positively impacted the lives of the residents. Paved streets and better traffic management have been instrumental in providing access and easing traffic congestion. Paved streets in residential areas have encouraged more outdoor activities, such as biking and walking. The drainage systems developed have already shown positive results in the aftermath of Hurricane Earl in August 2016. The mayors of Belmopan and San Ignacio/Santa Elena indicated that the improved drainage systems ensured that the corresponding areas did not flood as in the past. The rehabilitation of parks, markets, sports complexes, and other community infrastructure has contributed to improving the lives of the community. As a result of these improvements, residents are investing more in their houses and surrounding areas. 11 Mayors from Orange Walk, San Ignacio/Santa Elena have already paved additional roads, and other mayors are committed to implementing similar works in the future. 51. Enhance municipal management is rated Substantial. The relevant outcome indicator was realized because all seven TCCs achieved the targets for all intermediate outcome indicators, even though the target was set for only four TCCs to show such positive results (see Results Framework Analysis section of the Data Sheet). Revenue enhancement emerged as a key intermediate outcome of enhanced municipal management. The consolidated own-source annual revenues of the nine TCCs on average increased by 48.1 percent; from approximately US$ 11.4 million (average for fiscal years 2009/2010, 2010/2011, and 2011/2012) to US$ 16.9 million (average for fiscal years 2012/2013, 2013/2014, and 2014/2015)13. TCCs have indicated a strong commitment to continue to strengthen revenue collection. TCCs have also achieved finance related project intermediate outcomes: qualified accountants on staff; submission of monthly financial reports; and use of computerized accounting systems. In addition, TCCs have strengthened their capacity on planning aspects: MGPs have been very well received by the TCCs, and several mayors have shown commitment to ensure the use and longevity of these plans; and adoption of road safety measures. In addition to the training on traffic management, two manuals were developed in collaboration with Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 3.3 Efficiency Efficiency is rated Substantial 52. Infrastructure development. The project was designed on a framework approach where specific investment programs were identified during project implementation based on selection and eligibility criteria established during appraisal. A traditional economic analysis was therefore not conducted at appraisal. The majority of the infrastructure investments are quite small and the combination of agreed selection criteria, including community involvement in sub-project selection, as well as the use of Bank Procurement Guidelines, ensures that these demand driven investments were implemented in a cost effective manner. 53. In the case of investments in roads and drainage, as an additional measure, unit costs of completion were compared with other similar recent Bank projects. The combined unit cost of rehabilitation of 17.25 km of roads and 33.7 km of drainage in BMDP ranged from US$264,000 to US$752,000 per kilometer in the seven towns/cities, with an average of US$445,000. Compared to average costs of road improvement projects in various countries, the BMDP is cost effective, as several projects have comparable or even higher unit costs. The average cost for rehabilitating roads under the Panama Road Rehabilitation Project was US$ 719,649 14 , while the average cost in 13 Revenue Enhancement Support Program, Belize Municipal Development Project, Annex A-1 and Annex A-2: Nine Municipalities Condensed Statement of Operations. 14 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2004), Panama Road Rehabiltiation Project 12 Malawi under the Malawi Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project was US$ 482,000 15 . Similarly, the average cost of rehabilitating urban roads under the Municipal Reform Project in Karnataka, India was approximately US$318,000 16 . A broader review of unit costs in World Bank road reconstruction projects in sub-Saharan African countries shows that the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction per km of a two-lane inter-urban road ranged from US$228,872 in Congo to US$955,755 in Kenya17. A similar study in Europe and Central Asia estimated that the average unit cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of two lane road is US$446,750 per km18. Since most of the road rehabilitation investments under the BMDP not only rehabilitated but also paved previously unpaved roads and provided new drainage on both sides of the road, the BMDP combined unit costs for roads and drainage are considered to be comparable with those of similar projects. 54. Capacity building. In the three years following the implementation of the capacity building component of the BMDP (fiscal years: 2012/2013, 2013/2014, and 2014/2015), the consolidated annual own-source revenues of the nine TCCs had on average increased from approximately US$ 11.4 million in the three years prior to the implementation (fiscal years: 2009/2010, 2010/2011, and 2011/2012) to US$ 16.9 million (i.e., by 48.1 percent)19. It would be reasonable to assume that the increased institutional capacity created under the project has contributed in some measure to this increase. If the increased capacity is considered partially responsible for generating additional revenues for the next five years, the Net Present Value (NPV), Benefit/Cost ratio, and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) from the capacity building component are US$4.79 million, 1.51 and 51.3 percent respectively. 55. Administrative efficiency. All activities were completed by the revised closing date of November 30, 2016. At the time of closing, US$14.89 million was disbursed; disbursements closely followed the disbursement forecast in the PAD. These are significant achievements, considering that BMDP was a re-engagement project and given Belize’s limited experience with the Bank’s operational policies and procedures at the time. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 56. The PDO as well as project design and implementation remained substantially relevant throughout the project implementation period. Both elements of the PDO were 15 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2007), Malawi Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project 16 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2015), Karnataka Municipal Reform Project 17 World Bank (2008), Monitoring road works contracts and unit costs for enhances governance in sub- Saharan Africa. Transport Papers, Transport Sector Board, World Bank 18 World Bank (2011), Monitoring Road Works Contracts and Unit Costs for Enhanced Governance in Europe and Central Asia. Transport Papers, Transport Sector Board, World Bank 19 Revenue Enhancement Support Project, Belize Municipal Development, Annex A-1 and Annex A-2: Nine Municipalities Condensed Statement of Operations. 13 substantially achieved. Project efficiency is rated substantial. Based on these assessments of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, the project’s overall outcome is rated Satisfactory20. Table 3. Summary of assessment of outcomes Ratings Relevance of PDO Substantial Objectives Substantial Design and implementation Substantial Efficacy / Achievement of PDO Substantial Improve access to basic municipal Infrastructure Substantial Enhance municipal management Substantial Efficiency Substantial Overall Outcome Rating Satisfactory 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 57. Starting in 2014, the project collected gender-disaggregated data on beneficiaries: half of the project beneficiaries were women, indicating gender parity. An important criterion for access to investments was public town halls to bring the communities together. Town hall meetings were initially conducted in English; a Spanish translator was later hired to ensure greater cultural sensitivity and inclusion of non-English speakers. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 58. The project targeted longer term institutional strengthening by building the capacity of local and central governments. TCC Mayors have indicated their commitment to maintain the management systems developed under the project. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) The project generated several positive unintended benefits, including the following: 59. Additional municipal works investments. These included for example, investments in San Ignacio / Santa Elena, where the Mayor paved additional streets to connect the elderly community with the project investments. In Orange Walk, the Mayor began providing free wifi in the rehabilitated central park as a result of increased public recreational activity. Project works have also encouraged TCCs to promote tourism initiatives. 20 Since the targets of the PDO indicators were changed, the overall ratings before and after the June 2015 restructuring were separately assessed and determined to be Satisfactory. This is because of how MDPs are usually designed; that is actual investments are determined during project implementation and that the full beneficiaries could only be determined during implementation. Therefore, weighing the ratings by disbursement before and after restructuring does not change the overall rating, which remains Satisfactory. 14 60. Synergies with other development partners. These include: development of traffic manuals in partnership with CDB; and use of Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) funds to improve municipal service delivery, revenue collection, and creditworthiness in selected towns and cities through the BMDP21. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops NA 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate The risk to development outcomes is rated Moderate, as discussed below. 61. Sustainability of works. On average 85 percent of the TCC budget comes from TCC’s own-source revenues, with about 15 percent coming from government transfers. With support from the project, over the last three years the own-source revenues have increased by 48.1 percent. This is quite significant, especially compared to government transfer increase of 3.2 percent during the same period. While these revenues could be useful in financing maintenance of the works, given competing priorities for finance, sustainability challenges will remain. In order to capture additional revenue to finance these costs, TCCs are trying to identify additional sources of funding. Belmopan for example, has proposed a municipal bond to the central government, a portion of which, estimated at BZ$450,000 will be used for maintenance. Another challenge that remains is ensuring cleanliness of drains, which would require behavioral change of residents. Some of the TCCs (e.g., Punta Gorda) are mobilizing residents to clean the drains in front of their houses. 62. Sustainability of capacity building. The project strengthened capacity for financial management, traffic management, etc., of the TCCs. The TCCs show political will to maintain this capacity by expressing their intention of publishing financial reports, as well as training additional and new staff on the systems that have been put in place through the project. Efforts are ongoing to move beyond the QuickBooks system to an integrated information management system. However, since the project required that TCCs implement the capacity building requirements to be able to access municipal investments, the incentive to follow through these commitments is no longer as strong after the closing of the project. 21 PPIAF supported the BMDP and the associated Revenue Enhancement Support Program: https://library.pppknowledgelab.org/documents/4121?ref_site=ppiaf 15 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory Quality at Entry is rated Satisfactory for the reasons discussed below: 63. Strategic reengagement. The Bank was able to successfully develop a strong relationship with the government. The PDO was well-aligned with the goals of the government, which created strong government ownership. Despite lack of prior engagement, the Bank ensured that the project was well-prepared and met strategic, technical, economic, institutional, financial, safeguard and other Bank requirements; the risk assessment was comprehensive, and appropriate risk management measures were included in the project design and in the implementation support plan. 64. Simple design. The project had only three components, which together contributed to achieving the PDO. In particular Components 1 and 2 reinforced each other. 65. Compliance with safeguards. The Bank ensured that the project complied with the eight safeguard policies triggered by providing guidance on social impact analysis and in the preparation of an acceptable environmental management plan, an indigenous people’s framework, and a resettlement framework. In particular, the Bank ensured that the requirements of the policies relating to International Waterways and Projects in Disputed Areas were complied with in a timely manner. 66. M&E. The design of the results framework at preparation, despite the lack of information on selected investments was sound, with well-defined outcome indicators as well as intermediate outcome indicators being outlined. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory Quality of Supervision is rated Satisfactory based on the reasons presented below: 67. Regular engagement with the PIU. The Bank team visited the PIU and project sites every five to six months to ensure that project implementation progressed satisfactorily in line with appraisal agreements. Implementation issues were identified at early stages and addressed quickly. The MTR was carried out as scheduled and the findings were used to strengthen project implementation. Despite being a re-engagement project, it was never in problem status. Project disbursement remained fairly close to the forecasts in the PAD. 68. Strong monitoring and reporting. Implementation status was documented candidly in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) biannually. The ISRs indicate that 16 project ratings were modified based on challenges encountered. The project had four Task Team Leaders (TTLs) (three changes, with two Co-TTLs at the time of the third change), yet leadership remained strong without adverse effects on project implementation. 69. Compliance with safeguard policies. The Bank team worked closely with the PIU to ensure that solutions were developed to minimize the impacts of challenges in ensuring compliance with the safeguard policies triggered. Due to this proactive approach, safeguard compliance was rated Satisfactory at project closing. 70. Transition arrangements. The Bank supported the PIU in ensuring that CCCs were set up to monitor project implementation. CCCs could be mobilized to support future maintenance and oversight of works. Financial management capacity was built through QuickBooks, which could be sustained through continued training. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 71. Overall Bank performance is rated Satisfactory based on the Satisfactory ratings for Ensuring Quality at Entry and Quality of Supervision. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory Government performance is rated Satisfactory based on the reasons presented below: 72. Government ownership. The BMDP was strongly championed by the government. Support from MED was instrumental in initiating and preparing the project, especially given the lack of prior Bank engagement in Belize. Throughout project implementation, the government remained involved and countersigned all Bank Aide Memoires to stay abreast of implementation progress, including community consultations as well as sub-project development. 73. Identification of key partners. The government played a key role in identifying BSIF as the key implementing agency, created the PIU, as well as delineated the roles of the different stakeholders, including MLLGRD and MNRE. The government was also instrumental in setting up the PSC and for providing a platform for stakeholders to oversee project implementation. 74. Strong beneficiary engagement. The government encouraged a community- driven design for the project. This was well received by the communities since they were empowered to influence the selection of sub-projects. Beneficiaries remained actively involved by supporting the PIU in monitoring sub-project sites in their neighborhoods. 17 (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory Implementing agency performance is rated Satisfactory for the reasons highlighted below. 75. Strong and committed PIU. BSIF was responsible for day-to-day management of the project. The PIU was established with clear roles outlined for staff. The PIU had high capacity staff with strong commitment to the project’s objectives. The PIU fulfilled reporting requirements of the project competently in a timely manner. 76. Timely resolution of issues. The PIU was initially unfamiliar with several Bank processes, but acted quickly to resolve procurement and safeguard issues in a timely manner and to reduce implementation bottlenecks as much as possible. 77. Relationship with other implementation partners. The PIU coordinated the engagement across different implementation partners and developed effective working relationships with them. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory 78. Overall Borrower Performance is rated Satisfactory based on the Satisfactory ratings of the performance of the Government and the Implementing Agency. 6. Lessons Learned Project-Specific 79. Simple and inclusive project design. A major factor for the successful implementation of the project was the simplicity of its design, with project components designed to focus on achieving the PDO. The project also engaged communities from the very beginning, which impacted project implementation positively. The consultation process was democratic and mobilized communities to organize themselves to vote on investments. The process in place for MGPs was ideal because it integrated technical experts with community representatives. However, expectations of beneficiaries for seeing project results could have been managed better through improved communication as a number of processes needed to be followed prior to project implementation. 80. Comprehensive planning for drainage systems. The project targeted street rehabilitation, and developed drainage to ensure that rehabilitated streets were able to eliminate flooding on the streets rehabilitated. While the drainage systems developed through this project have already shown positive results, a comprehensive plan would have mitigated minor shortcomings and provided greater benefits. 18 General Application 81. Successful re-engagement. In order for re-engagements to be successful, it is critical that the Government as well as the Bank share a strong partnership. Government commitment is central to positive outcomes as project priorities must align with government policy, and be driven by a government champion. In the case of BMDP, MED remained the key project champion. Furthermore, to ensure that there is adequate support for the Bank’s re-engagement in a country, the project should be highly relevant and strategic for the country and the sector. The BMDP was an ideal project for Bank re- engagement in this regard, with appropriate arrangements for successful implementation. 82. Small country capacity constraints. A few implementation challenges emerged because of lack of specialized expertise in a small country like Belize. The PIU had quality staff at all times, but they were often overwhelmed by the number of different sub-projects being implemented in multiple locations in seven towns/cities. It is therefore, important to consider capacity challenges while designing projects in small countries. 83. Sustainability and maintenance of project outcomes. It is essential for projects to focus on developing mechanisms to ensure sustainability and maintenance of works. In the case of the BMDP, enhanced municipal revenue would provide additional resources for the TCCs to maintain the works. Furthermore, the mayors also show strong commitment to continue the capacity building activities. Lastly, several road rehabilitation initiatives have emerged as a result of the BMDP, and these activities will continue to support the outcomes from this project. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 84. The Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) findings were presented to the MED, the PIU, as well as the Mayors. All stakeholders agreed with the ratings and expressed appreciation with the project’s outcomes and the collaborative effort of the different stakeholders that contributed to the success of the BMDP. The mayors expressed their intention to have maintenance programs for streets and facilities rehabilitated to ensure sustainability of the BMDP outcomes. The ICR was shared with the CCCs, who indicated the ICR accurately reflects the outcomes of the BMDP, which has positively impacted its beneficiaries. (b) Cofinanciers NA (c) Other partners and stakeholders NA 19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) 1. Municipal Infrastructure 11. 49 11.38 99 Investments 2. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for 1.44 1.44 100 TCCs, MLLGRD, and MNRE 3. Project Management 1.67 1.67 100 Total Baseline Cost 14.6 14.5 99 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 14.6 14.5 99 Front-end fee PPF 0.36 0.36 100 Front-end fee IBRD 0.037 0.037 100 Total Financing Required 15 14.89 99 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 0.42 0.42 100 International Bank for Reconstruction 15.00 15.00 100 and Development (IBRD) Local Govts. (Prov., District, City) of 0.31 0.31 100 Borrowing Country 20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Table A2-1. Component 1: municipal infrastructure investments TCC Activity Unit of measurement Planned Actual Belmopan Streets and Drains rehabilitated including 3,943 meters 4,388 meters the Bus Terminal area Traffic Safety Enhancement Benque Viejo Streets and Drains rehabilitated 2,928 meters 3,353 meters Drainage developed Side Walks constructed NA22 1098 feet San Streets and Drains rehabilitated 2,324 meters 2,824 meters Ignacio/Santa Drainage developed Elena Traffic Safety Enhancement Punta Gorda Streets and Drains rehabilitated 1,421 meters 1,846 meters Drainage developed Town Hall and Administration Building Rehabilitated 4,100 sq. ft. 4,100 sq. ft. Orange Walk Streets and Drains rehabilitated 1,802 Meters 2,177 meters Drainage developed Central Park Rehabilitated 2,400 sq. 2,400 sq. meters meters Corozal Streets and Drains rehabilitated 1017 meters 1492 meters Drainage developed Market Rehabilitated 1,500 sq. ft. and Sports Complex Constructed 12,000 sq. m. Dangriga Streets and Drains rehabilitated 865 meters 1165 meters Drainage developed Market Rehabilitated and Extension constructed 7,900 sq. ft. 7,900 sq. ft. 22 This planned output was decided during implementation. 21 Table A2-2. Component 2: technical assistance and capacity building Type of Activity Location Preparation of MGPs Corozal, Orange Walk, Belmopan, San Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo, Dangriga, and Punta Gorda Provision of Revenue Enhancement Support Corozal, Orange Walk, Belmopan, San Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo, Dangriga, Punta Gorda, San Pedro, and Belize City Provision of Finance Management Capacity Corozal, Orange Walk, Belmopan, San Building Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo, Dangriga, Punta Gorda, San Pedro, and Belize City Provision of Capacity Building in Traffic Corozal, Orange Walk, Belmopan, San Management Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo, Dangriga, and Punta Gorda Physical Assets Maintenance Plan and Corozal, Orange Walk, Belmopan, San Budget Ignacio/Santa Elena, Benque Viejo, Dangriga, and Punta Gorda 22 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The project had three components: 1. Municipal infrastructure investments, which included investments in roads, drainage, public buildings, markets, street lighting and public spaces/parks. This component also financed technical and engineering studies/designs to guide the above investments. 2. Technical and capacity building support to TCCs, MLLGRD, and MNRE to strengthen these institutions to increase TCCs’ own source revenues and fiscal sustainability. 3. Project management support for implementation, including monitoring and evaluation and compliance with all Bank requirements. The project was designed on a framework approach where specific investment programs were identified during project implementation based on selection and eligibility criteria established during appraisal. A traditional economic analysis was therefore not conducted at appraisal. Project costs Project costs by component are presented in Table A3-1. Table A3-1. Project costs by component Component Cost Percentage of total (US$ million) Infrastructure development 11.38 76 Capacity development 1.44 10 Project management 2.07 14 Total project costs 14.89 100.0 Project Benefits Table A3-2 below compares project outcomes and outputs with appraisal estimates. Table A3-2: Summary of project output and outcome indicators Target Results % achieved Project beneficiaries (Number) Direct beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure 69177 69177 100 Indirect beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure 79766 88056 110 Total beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure 148943 157233 106 Female beneficiaries with access to improved quality of basic municipal infrastructure 35280 35280 100 23 Project Outputs Roads rehabilitated (km) 14.85 17.25 116 Improvements in drainage (Km) 25.35 33.7 133 Number of traffic intersections improved 140 140 100 Number of traffic signs 214 214 100 Improvements in capacity of TCCs as a result of the project (Number) Towns and cities that have adopted MGP 7 7 100 Towns increasing own revenue collection 9 9 100 Towns with qualified accountants on staff 8 9 113 Towns submitting required monthly financial reports 9 9 100 Towns using a computerized financial reporting system 9 9 100 Towns with a physical asset maintenance plan and corresponding budgets 7 7 100 Towns with roads and safety procedures 7 7 100 TCC staff that received training from the Local Government and Urban Planning Officers 220 220 100 TCC’s provided with spatial data sets showing land parcels 7 7 100 Towns and cities that comply with terms and conditions of subproject agreement 7 7 100 Economic Analysis of Municipal Investments Project activities to improve municipal infrastructure included: reconstruction and rehabilitation of roads; improvements and construction of drainage; improvements in traffic signs and traffic management; and rehabilitation of public facilities like parks, sports facilities, and town buildings. The majority of these investments are quite small and the combination of agreed selection criteria, including community involvement in sub-project selection, as well as the use of Bank Procurement Guidelines ensures that these demand driven investments are implemented in a cost effective manner. Roads. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of roads and traffic management resulted in improved overall traffic flow. Based on consultations with Mayors and City Councils, the principal economic benefits from road development are: 1. Reduced travel time. 2. Reduced cost of transportation. 3. Increased access to markets and other services. 4. Reduced travel costs, including reduced vehicle operating costs. 5. Increased access to services, including access to schools and educational services for youth. 6. Increased access to services for the elderly. 7. Increased outdoor activities, such as biking and walking as a result of improved/paved streets. 8. Other multiplier impacts on the local economy, including job creation and revenue generation. 24 Drainage. Investments in drainage systems reduced flooding intensity and have already shown positive results in the aftermath of Hurricane Earl in August 2016 23. Drainage improvements have also reduced damage to roads and reduced maintenance costs. Other Infrastructure Improvement Works. These include, for example, development of markets, public buildings, sports complexes, and parks, which have further improved the communities’ access to public goods and have increased the quality of life. These investments have also encouraged residents to invest more in their houses and other private goods, which have resulted in higher property values, as well as and improved quality of life. Project investments have also created a demonstration effect, inducing municipal authorities to construct additional roads and drainage systems24. Unit Cost Comparison for Roads and Drainage Investments. In the case of investments in roads and drainage, as an additional measure, unit costs were compared with other similar recent World Bank projects. The combined unit cost of rehabilitation of 17.25 km roads and 33.7 km of drainage in BMDP ranged from US$264,000 to US$752,000 per kilometer in the seven towns/cities, with an average of US$445,000. Compared to average costs of road improvement projects in various countries, The BMDP is cost effective, as several projects have comparable or even higher unit costs. The average cost for rehabilitating roads under the Panama Road Rehabilitation Project was US$ 719,649 25 , while the average cost in Malawi under the Malawi Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project was US$ 482,000 26 . Similarly, in Ghana, the average cost of road rehabilitation and reconstruction under Ghana Road Sector Development Program was US$ 667,000 27 , while the average cost under the Camiri Highway Project, in Bolivia, ranged from 485,378 to 593,95928, and the average cost of rehabilitating urban roads under the Municipal Reform Project in Karnataka, India was approximately US$318,000 29 . A broader review of unit costs in World Bank road reconstruction projects in sub-Saharan African countries shows that the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction per km of a two-lane inter-urban road ranged from US$228,872 in Congo to US$955,755 in Kenya,30. A similar study in Europe and Central Asia estimated that the average unit cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of two lane road is US$446,750 per km31. Since most of the road rehabilitation investments under the 23 The mayors of Belmopan and San Ignacia/Santa Elena indicated that the drainage system ensure that the area did not flood like it used to during past hurricanes similar intensity. 24 Mayors from Orange Walk, San Ignacio/Santa Elena have already paved additional roads, and other mayors are also committed to implementing similar works in the future, to replicate the benefits achieved through this project 25 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2004), Panama Road Rehabiltiation Project 26 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2007), Malawi Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project 27 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2008), Ghana Road Sector Development Program 28 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2006), Bolivia Abapo- Camiri Highway Project 29 Implementation Completion and Results Report (2015), Karnataka Municipal Reform Project 30 World Bank (2008), Monitoring road works contracts and unit costs for enhances governance in sub- Saharan Africa. Transport Papers, Transport Sector Board, World Bank 31 World Bank (2011), Monitoring Road Works Contracts and Unit Costs for Enhanced Governance in Europe and Central Asia. Transport Papers, Transport Sector Board, World Bank 25 BMDP not only rehabilitated but also paved previously unpaved roads and provided new drainage on both sides of the road, BMDP unit costs are considered to be comparable with those of similar projects. Economic Analysis of Capacity Building Component 2 provided capacity building support to TCCs to strengthen the collection and accounting of own source revenues, including revenues from traffic management, trade licensing, property tax, and other revenues. Table 3 summarizes the costs of capacity building support to increase own source revenues. Table A3-3. Capacity building support to increase revenue Activity Cost (US $) Municipal Growth Planning 340,699 Revenue Enhancement Support / Locally based financial Consultant 110,366 Traffic Management Training Module 371,133 Financial Management Software and Training 135,207 Physical Asset Maintenance Plan 220,663 Technical Assistance (Local Government Officer and Urban Planning 223,959 Officer ) The revenues of the nine TCCs were compared for the three years before (fiscal years: 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012) and after (fiscal years: 2012/2013, 2013/2014, 2014/2015) the implementation of the capacity building component of the project: the consolidated annual own-source revenues of the nine TCCs had on average increased from US$ 11. 4 million to US$ 16.9 million (i.e., by 48.1 percent) 32 . It would be reasonable to assume that the increased institutional capacity created under the project has contributed significantly to this increase. The above data were used to compute the rates of return under two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, it is assumed that the increased capacity would generate additional revenues for the next five years. Under this scenario, the NPV, Benefit/Cost ratio and IRR from the capacity building component are US$4.79 million, 1.51 and 51.3 percent respectively. Under a second scenario, it is assumed that the increased capacity will result in increased net revenues for the next ten years. The NPV, Benefit/cost ratio and the IRR under this scenario are US$7.36 million, 1.59 and 52.4 percent respectively. 32 Revenue Enhancement Support Program,Belize Municipal Development Project, Annex A-1 and Annex A-2: Nine Municipalities Condensed Statement of Operations. 26 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Ellen Hamilton Lead Urban Specialist GGO22 TTL Yoohnee Kim Sr. Urban Economist GSU12 Co-TTL Bernice K. Van Bronkhorst Practice Manager GSU18 Stephen Jeremy Brushett Consultant GSU10 Peter J. Kolsky Maritza A. Rodriguez De Sr. Financial Management GGO22 Pichardo Specialist Christina Malmberg Calvo Country Manager AFMUG Carine Clert Lead Social Protection Specialist GSP05 Enos E. Esikuri Senior Environment Specialist GEN04 Social Water & Sanitation Lilian Pena Pereira Weiss GWA02 Specialist Yingwei Wu Yan Zhang Program Assistant EACCF Supervision/ICR Diana Marcela Rubiano Sr. Disaster Risk Management GSU10 TTL Vargas Specialist Frederico Ferreira Fonseca Disaster Risk Management GSU10 Co-TTL Pedroso Specialist Ellen Hamilton Lead Urban Specialist GGO22 Yoohnee Kim Sr. Urban Economist GSU12 Enos E. Esikuri Senior Environment Specialist GEN04 Maritza A. Rodriguez De Sr. Financial Management GGO22 Pichardo Specialist Noreen Beg Regional Safeguards Adviser OPSPF Stephen Jeremy Brushett Consultant GSU10 Disaster Risk Management Keren Carla Charles GSU10 Specialist Eric Dickson Sr. Urban Specialist GSU13 Peter J. Kolsky Anna R. Okola Transport Engineer GTI07 Maria Angelica Sotomayor Lead Economist GSU13 Araujo Disaster Risk Management Yohannes Yemane Kesete GSU10 ICR TTL Specialist Sumati Rajput Policy Analyst GFDRR Muthukumara S. Mani Lead Economist SARCE Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay Consultant SARCE Rajagopal S. Iyer Consultant GSURR 27 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY09 27.03 113683.39 FY10 39.57 143672.53 FY11 9.85 39553.67 Total: 76.45 296,909.59 Supervision/ICR FY11 11.65 52034.8 FY12 16.61 73521.75 FY13 10.74 41605.14 FY14 5.68 25394.67 FY15 25.94 92539.17 FY16 13.14 36917.62 FY17 23.4 74237.37 Total: 107.16 396,250.52 28 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results No beneficiary survey was carried out on this project. 29 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results No stakeholder workshop was conducted at project closing. 30 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Summary of Borrower’s ICR The BMDP, implemented by MED through the BSIF with the support of the World Bank, was successful in improving municipal governance, strengthening municipal fiscal sustainability, and improving selected municipal infrastructure. The BMDP, which became effective in January 31, 2011 and completed on November 30, 2016, successfully achieved its development objective, which was to improve and maintain municipal service delivery through infrastructure works and capacity building in select towns and cities in Belize. Key achievements include:  Improved fiscal conditions: The BMDP has made significant contributions to the fiscal conditions of Belize’s municipalities. Through the BMDP, the financial management capacity within the TCCs has improved resulting in increases in revenue collection, operational surplus and capital additions as well as decreases in deficits and overdrafts. Increased revenue has allowed TCCs to engage in much needed infrastructure rehabilitation projects and improve service delivery to the municipalities. Revenue collection is now being enforced in more areas and revenue personnel are on the staff of most of the TCCs. These outcomes have all improved the creditworthiness of the cities and municipalities.  More transparency: Through the BMDP, TCCs had to hold open town hall meetings, hire financial management staff and make financial information public in order to access the funds. In addition, the infrastructure works were selected through participatory meetings held by the TCCs. Through these activities, the governance and transparency of the TCCs have improved.  Enhanced planning for future economic development: All of the participating TCCs prepared MGPs, which outlined opportunities for growth and economic development in the cities and municipalities through participatory and analytical processes.  Improved asset maintenance: Physical asset maintenance plans and budgets were prepared for the TCCs. TCCs were provided with planning tools and training to assist them in making informed decisions about infrastructure investments and maintenance works. To develop these plans, the TCCs took an inventory of all their assets and included a line item in their budgets for asset maintenance.  Improved traffic management: Traffic management plans and manuals were developed in conjunction with CDB’s Road Safety Program. Training of TCC staff was carried out. As a result, there was significant improvement in traffic flow particularly in downtown areas of some municipalities.  Improved infrastructure resulted in:  Improved accessibility between sub-urban and the commercial/downtown areas in some municipalities, including Santa Elena and San Ignacio;  Contribution toward increased business in the commercial zones of some municipalities, including Belmopan; 31  Significant improvement in the aesthetics and availability of public services in downtown areas in municipalities, particularly in Orange Walk and Dangriga;  General improvement in the physical and sanitary environment of municipal markets, particularly those in Dangriga and Corozal;  Provision of additional and improved recreational facilities for all ages, which contributed toward the strengthening of family and community bonds in the municipalities, including in Orange Walk and Corozal; Key Challenges include:  Delays in works:  These included a waiting period for the commencement of the works, which was primarily due to procurement challenges.  Performance of consultants and contractors led to delays.  Finally, there were delays in construction because of the utility companies conducting infrastructure upgrades.  Sustainability of the capacity building engagements:  LPWGs in each of the seven (7) TCCs were responsible for developing the MGPs. However, going forward the TCCs will be responsible for implementation.  Continuity of financial and traffic management improvement will rest on the commitment of the mayors of the TCCs. Summary of Borrower’s comments on the draft ICR The BMDP has engendered a greater understanding of urban development as Government of Belize embarks on the implementation of decentralization of the management of municipalities. Access to improved infrastructure and effective management of municipalities were achieved as the result of the BMDP. In particular, issues of financial management, transparency and accountability were brought to the forefront of municipalities’ main goals. The government and the mayors have expressed satisfaction with the BMDP achievements. Infrastructure improvements have enhanced the center of towns and connectivity with growing suburban areas. The collection of taxes and efficient management of finances has significantly improved the management of their municipalities. The ICR ratings are acceptable and represent the commitment and collaborative efforts of the funding agencies and stakeholders. It is the intention of the TCCs to ensure sustainability of BMDP outcomes through planned maintenance programs for streets and facilities rehabilitated, continued training of TCC staff and the implementation and upgrading of MGPs. All involved stakeholders agree that achievements in the BMDP have positively impacted the beneficiaries and have expressed interest to build on the achievements attained through this project. 32 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders NA 33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 1. Aide Memoirs: March 2011, October 2011, April 2012, December 2012, June 2013, December 2013, June 2014, November 2014, March 2015, September 2015, February 2016. 2. Belize Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY11-FY15 3. Belize Long Term Strategy 2030 4. Belize Mid-Term Strategy 2010-2013 5. Belize Towns Property Tax Act 6. Borensztein, E., Cavallo, E., and Valenzuela, P. Debt Sustainability under Catastrophic Risk: The Case for Government Budget Insurance, February 2008. 7. Country Poverty Assessment. Government of Belize and Caribbean Development Bank. December 2009. 8. Environmental Management Framework. Belize Social Investment Fund. June 2010. 9. Final reports on the Good Governance and Human Resources (2) Capacity Building Workshops. 10. IEG’s Special Study: Improving Municipal Management for Cities to Succeed, 2009. 11. Implementation Status Reports: November 2010, May 2011, November 2011, June 2012, Jan 2013, June 2013, February 2014, August 2014, March 2015, August 2015, March 2016, September 2016. 12. Interim Strategy Note for Belize. World Bank. February 2009. 13. Land acquisition and involuntary resettlement policy framework. February 2010. 14. Municipal Finance and Revenue Enhancement Inception Report. May 2010. 15. National Policy on Local Governance. Government of Belize, 2009. 16. Project Restructuring Papers: June 2014, November 2014, June 2015. 17. Project Appraisal Document: Belize Municipal Development Project 18. Report National Symposium on Local Governance. Transforming our communities through good local governance. Convened by the Ministry of Labor, Local government and Rural Development. November 2008. 19. Shlomo Angel. Housing Policy in Belize: diagnosis and guidelines for action. January 2010. 20. Victor Villarreal. Belize Municipal Development Project. Municipal Finance and Revenue Enhancement Inception Report. May 2010 34 35