Our Internet Site: http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/trans.htm 7 5
E..
TransitionEconomics Division * Policy Research Department * TheWorld Bank
China's Transition Experience,
Reexamined
by Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo
he most remarkable difference Chinese-style reforms to Russia or to *1. In 1978, at the start of the reform
between reforms in China and other countries of CEEFSU would not period, China's heavily subsidized state
T in countries of Central and East- be possible or desirable. Supporters of sector employed a relatively small share,
em Europe and the former Soviet Union introducing Chinese gradualism in Rus- 18 percent, of the labor force while the
(CEEFSU) is that China succeeded in sia might as well advise Russia to solve agricultural sector-not subsidized by
producing more than a decade of phe- its agricultural problems by shifting from the state-accounted for 71 percent of
nomenal growth, while countries of wheat to rice. We can summarize the the labor force. State-owned enterprises
CEEFSU, no matteT which reform strat- structural differences, and their impli- (SOEs) offered a generous package of
egy has been tried, have seen a sharp cations, as follows: wages and social protection, pensions,
initial downturn in production, usually heavily subsidized housing, medical cov-
with a significant rise in unemployment.
Theundoubted Chinese success ledmany What's inside.
economists to urge CEEFSU to adopt Latvian Banking Crisis: Stakes and respond to Michael Gray and Aleksandr
the Chinese dual-track approach (see Mistakes-ThefallofBaltijaBankisana Zhilin. (page 20)
box next page). By 1996, however, the omen-to avoidtremors intheirfinancial
call for thsul-raksectors, transition economies should BookoftheMonth-LeszekBalcerowicz:
call for this dual-track approach has tighten bank supervision, warn Alex Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation
basically disappeared in the fast-reform Fleming and Samuel Talley. (page 6) Reviewed by Martin Schrenk (page 22)
countries of CEEFSU, since their sharp
initial downturn has been followed by Using World Bank Credit Lines. Alex QuotationoftheMonth: "WeWill Regu-
rapid growth. Poland's per capita GDP -sFleming reports on an innovative method late Foreign-controlled Enterprises. " If
rapi grwth Pol-nds pr caitaGDP -used in the Baltics-to recapitalize Zyuganov wins..-a leading Communist
growth was around 6 percent in 1995, banks. (page 9) outlines a scenario for Russia. (page 24)
around the levels of the East Asian ti-
gers. A similar rate of growth is ex- HowtoTenderinBosnia.Ourcompilation Milestonesof Transition (page 25)
pected in 1996. includes an interview with Procurement
Coordinator Naushad Khan; a look at the World Bank/IMF Agenda (page 28)
Shifting from Wheat to Rice? specifics of reconstruction procurement;
and a basic primer on World Bank pro- Conference Diary (page 30)
The differences in initial conditions and curementprocedures. (pages 11-18)
New Books and WorkingPapers
economic structures are so profound PurchasingPower Parities (page 19) (page32)
that it has been necessary for countries
of CEEFSU to follow a fundamentally LettertotheEditor-RussianEconomic BibliographyofSelectedArticles
different kind of reform from Chinese Crime:TheFlipSide (page39)
gradualism. A simple transplantation of Leonid Grigoriev and Gregory Kisunko
The World BanklPRDTE
erage, childcare, food, and&recreational .2. Market reforms in the CEEFSU 3. In both regions partial liberalization
facilities. The peasants received none countries necessarily involved an initial unleashed macoreconomic pressures,
ofthese benefits and are still consuming decline in industrial production. In these especially by allowing state enterprises
roughly one-third of what urban resi- countries heavy industry was overde- to reduce actual and reported profits, so
dents consume. While most state enter- veloped under the old regimes' bureau- their tax payments decreased. These
prise workers have chosen to keep their cratic directives while the service sec- pressures were more manageable in
privileged positions (at least during the tor was correspondingly underdeve- China, partly because the state enter-
first fifteen years of reforms), the peas- loped. In China a decline ofagriculture's prise sector employed a smaller part of
ants have been only too glad to shift out contributionto the GNP itselfgenerated the labor force, partly because of rapid
oflow-income agricultural activities and growth, without a squeeze of the exist- growth in other sectors, and partly be-
into the new, higher-income jobs in the ing industry. Besides, industry was not cause of adequate monetary policy. The
nonstate sector, notably in the township as excessively built up, since it had en- pressures turned explosive in much of
and village enterprises (TVEs) and in duredamuch shorter period under stable the CEEFSU, particularly Bulgaria,
enterprises in special economic zones central planning than the industries in Poland, and the (former) Soviet Union,
of the coastal provinces (see box on the CEEFSU. The experience of China because of deeper structural problems
page 3). Thus, the nonstate sector grew and the CEEFSU countries suggests as well as gross macroeconomic mis-
despite the preservation of the state that the marketization of a planned management during the communist re-
sector. Itis importanttonotethat China's economy inevitably shifts resources to- form period (and well into the
rural reforms contributed directly to a ward the service sector: from the agri- postcommunist reform period in much
one-timejump inproductivityinagricul- cultural sectorin China, andfromindus- of the former Soviet Union).
ture between 1979 and 1985, but after try in the countries of the CEEFSU.
that, agricultural productivity returned Seen this way, much or all of the initial *4. One key macroeconormic burden is
to its historical trend. Therefore, rapid drop in industrial production in the social expenditure. In China social
growth in China has come mainly from CEEFSU countries after the start of spending from the central government
the non-state, nonagricultural sectors. reforms was a natural part ofthe needed covers a small fraction ofthe workforce,
reallocation of employment and re- much less than 20 percent. In CEEFSU.
Countries in the CEEFSU, by contrast, sources.
lacked a vast surplus-labor sector, and
the (also heavily subsidized) state sec- What Is the Dual-Track Approach?
tor workers were eager to keep their The basic Chinese strategy for moving This approach was introduced at the end
privileges rather than risk the transition from economic planning to a market sys- of 1978 withrapid and comprehensive lib-
to the nonstate sector. In Russia, around tem has been the gradual decentralization eralization ofthe agricultural sector while
three-fourths of the population are ur- of economic decisionmaking, including the the industrial sector remainedundertradi-
ban residents, and as of1991, morethan liberalization of the non-state-owned tional central planningmanagement. The
economy. The dual-track approach of es- agriculture communes were disbanded
90 percent of the population were em- tablishing a market track, parallel to an overatwo-yearperiod by distributing the
ployed in state-owned enterprises. Fur- existingplantrack, pervadesalmostevery land with multiyear (usually fifteen-year)
ther, Russian farners on state farms area of economic policymaking: sectoral leases to the peasants, and allowing the
(sokhozes) and collective farms (kolk reform, price deregulation, enterprise re- leasestoberelativelyfreelytradable. State
hozes) received approximately the same structuring, regional development, trade procurement prices for agricultural prod-
promotion, foreignexchangemanagement, ucts were raised, and free marketsfor some
income and benefits as SOE workers, central-localfiscal arrangements, anddo- agriculturalproductswereallowed. Farm-
thanks to very large subsidies from the mestic currencyissuance. Forexample, the ers now enjoy wide-ranging production
central government. Therefore, when typical process of dual-price transition is freedom: only 5 percent oftheirproduction
the new. nonstate sector was progres- as follows: in 1993 was set by the state plan.
sively legalized during 19 8 6-9 1, an SOE * Opening the free market while keeping
worker sitnitthstate supply unchanged at the (lower) plan In 1984 the dual-track arrangement was
price. extended to industrial goods, with state
could experience a drop in income and * Adjusting the plan price incrementally procurement quotas for consumer goods
security. The flow of workers to the overtimetoapproachthemarketprice. The much lowerthan for producer goods. The
nonstate sector was insufficient to rein- supply offered at the plan prices is nor- proportion of planned production of total
vigorate the economy. mally fixed by quota, if not reduced, over industrial output value has been reduced
time. Generally, no "shock" is observed from more than 90 percent in 1978 tO 5
when convergence of the two prices oc- percent in 1993.
curs.
2 March-April 1996
Transition
by contrast, social spending from the are still running losses, a d'ecaXd& after without endangering macroeconomic
central government covers nearly the the start of enterprise reforms. In 1992, stability, and to retain some control over
entire population, and public demands a boom year, output grew 13 percent, the enterprises, especially overtheirful-
for social guarantees outrun the fiscal and yet two-thirds of Chinese SOEs fillment of production quotas at plan
capacity of the state. were loss-makers. The heavy losses prices. With the state still being able to
have continued to the present. Some monitor the SOEs, there was less need
No Such Thing as Free Subsidies blamethetoughcompetitionbynonstate to consider immediate privatization be-
enterprises. But decline in profits oc- cause widespread spontaneous privati-
The usual argument for the superiority curred across the board, even in heavy zation did not occur. But the fact re-
of China's two-track approach com- industries with negligible new entry by mains that just as it did not succeed in
paredwithaPolish-style "bigbang" goes nonstate firms. Excessive wage in- producing the new socialist man during
something like this. Economic reform creases throughoutthe SOE sector may the Cultural Revolution, China, like Eas-
involves substantial upheaval, so it is have been a more relevant reason for em Europe and Russia, has not su.
desirable to moderate the size of the the profitability decline. Managers have ceeded in producing profitable SOEs
shocks that will hit the economy during little incentive to resist wage demands
the transition. Therefore, it is useful to because their future promotionto larger Another Look at China's Succes.
protect the old sectors of the economy SOEs is determined in part by increases Story
at the same time that new economic in worker welfare during their tenure.
opportunities are introduced by market In addition to the "advantages of bacl
liberalization. Since the old sectors are The financial weakness of SOEs under- wardness" in economic structure, thei
inefficient, they will lose out in compe- mines macroeconomic stability; it re- are several other factors that have con
tition with the new sectors, but this will duces fiscal revenue, widens the budget tributed to China's superior growth per-
happen graduallyas workers voluntarily deficit, and causes faster monetary formance:
flow from the old state enterprises to the growth; and it forces the central bank to
new and more efficient nonstate enter- cover the bulk of SOE losses through * China's reforms did not start at a
prises. A direct "assault" onthe existing bank loans. The relatively small size of time of high macroeconomic crisis
state enterprises-by cutting subsidies, the SOE sector (compared with coun- and severe external debt requiring
raising input prices, privatizing owner- tries of the CEEFSU) enabled the gov- implementation of an austerity pro-
ship-is both unnecessary and trau- erminent to help out the loss-makers gram.
matic. But in China the proportion ofthe
labor force employed by state-owned SOE, COE, TVE, FFE, SEZ
units was 18 percent in 1978 and was
still 18 percent in 1993. This means that In China, an SOE is a nationally owned predominantly established in the SEZs,
there were actually 35 million more enterprise; the central government is the Special Economic Zones.
Chinese working.m state-owned unis in . ultimate authority for the enterprises' op-
Chinese working in state-owned units in erations and the disposition its assets, even Opening of the economy to foreign trade
1993 than in 1978. The state-owned though the SOE in most cases has been and investment has caused Chinese ex-
sector is not "withering away." assigned to the provincial or county gov- ports toboom, especially exports from the
emmentfor supervisionand management. TVEs in recent years (see table).
Several studies have concluded that to- Thenonstateenterprisesarethose inwhich
tal factor productivity (TFP) growth of the central government lacks final author-
talfactorproductlvlty(TFP)growthof ity over the disposition of assets. The China'sExportBoom,1987-94
the Chinese SOE sector has been posi- nonstate sector consists of community- TVEshare Total
tiveinthereformnperiod.However,these owned (collective-owned) enterprises TVE Total in totalexport-GDP
calculations are based on questionable (COEs), cooperatives, individual-owned Year exportsexports exports ratio
price defiators of intermnediate and final enterprises, private corporations, and for-
eignjointventures. COEsare ownedby all 1987 16 147 10.9 13
outputs. Evencalculatingwiththesedata, the residents of the city, township, or vil- 1988 27 177 15.3 13
annual TFP growth of SOEs reached lage, andcoopeTativesby a small group of 1989 37 196 18.9 12
only about half of that achieved by the persons. The most prominent type of 1990 49- 299 16.4 17
collectively owned enterprises (which nonstate enterprise is the community 1991 167 383 17.5 19
include town and village enterprises) -ownedenterprisesintheruralareas,known 1992 119 468 25.4 19
astownshipandvillageenterprises (TVEs). 1993 235 529 44.4 17
Besides, overall profitability ofthe SOE Foreign Funded Enterprises (FFEs) were 1994 340 1042 32.6 23
sector has been declining. Many SOEs
Volume 7, Number 3-4 3
The World Bank/PRDTE
* China's saving rate is unusually the continuation of economic reforms. Ofall the factors identified as important
high even by East Asian standards. (When the conservatives sought to re- causes of China's achievements in the
Household saving is about 23 percent of impose a Stalinist central planning econ- 1978-92 period, onlythehigh saving rate
disposable income in China versus 21 omy in the immediate aftermath of the could be considered (in part) a policy
percent in Japan, 18 percent for Taiwan, Tiananmen shootings in 1989, the pro- lesson for economic reforms. The other
16 percent for Belgium, 13 percent for vincial representatives were strong factors are rather specific to China's
West Germany, and 8 percent for the enough to repel the recidivist tendency circumstances.
United States. The annual flow of house- toward centralplanning. Furthermore, it
hold saving intothe formal financial sys- was the mobilization of this new decen- Keeping the Bird Happy
tem (the state banks and rural credit tralizedpoliticalpowerbyDengXiaoping
cooperatives) rose steadily from 3.4 after the collapse of the Soviet Union Gradualism in China is as much the
percent of GDP in 1980 to 11.7 percent that forced the conservative faction to result of a political struggle between the
in 1991. accept the new vision of a socialist Stalinists and the refon-ners, and of a
market economy.) general lack of consensus in the society
The high household saving rate plays an at large, as it is the result of a particular
important role in stabilizing the Chinese *Central planning in China was al- theory of reform. The Stalinists sub-
economy. It has enabled the govern- ways much shallower than in the scribe to the "birdcage economy" doc-
ment to rely on seignorage (money- CEEFSU. The Soviet central plan con- trine. In the conception of its originator,
financing of the budget deficit and off- trolled 25 million commodities whereas Chen Yun, the central plan is the cage
budget SOE subsidies), sincethe house- the Chinese central plan controlled only andthebird is the economy. The premise
holds are willingholders ofthe increased 1,200 commodities, Furthermore, the is that without central planning, the
money supply. (Comparable subsidiza- breakdown of the national distribution economy will be in chaos and produc-
tion of industry in Russia has so far system during the decade of the Cul- tion will be inefficient-that is, without
produced very high inflation, because tural Revolution forced local authorities the cage the bird will fly away. The
theincreasedmoney supplyhas notbeen to promote small and medium-size in- amount of market activity that is to be
willingly held by households and firms). dustrial enterprises in order to meet lo- tolerated to keep the economy working
cal demand. is analogous to the amount that the cage
- The two disastrous leftist cam- needs to be swung to create the illusion
paigns, the Great Leap Forward * Existence of family ties between of greater space and keep the bird
(1958-62) and the Cultural Revolu- the mainland Chinese and the over- happy.Thereformers,ontheotherhand,
tion (1966-76), undermined belief seas Chinese has facilitated the con- believethatonlyamarketeconomywill
in Marxist dogmas, weakened the duct of business. The explosive growth promote long-term economic develop-
state's administrative capacity, and of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) ment.
discredited central planning. The in southern China is a result of whole-
Great Leap Forward program of crash sale movement oflabor-intensive indus- "Muddlingthrough" hasnotbeenastrat-
industrialization starved around 30 mil- triesfromHongKongandTaiwan,which egy, as claimed by some observers, so
lion to death in the 1958-61 period, and were losing their comparative advan- much as a result of the lack of political
the Cultural Revolution purged around tage intheseindustries. China was closer, consensus. The reformers were able to
60 percent of party officials. wages were lower, and language diffi- convince the Chinese leadership in Oc-
culties were nonexistent, compared with tober 1992 to formally abandon "the
The legacy of these two disasters en- the alternative sites in Southeast Asia. planned commodity economy" in favor
abled Deng Xiaopingto quicklytransfer Managers could commute daily from of "a socialist market economy with
a significant amount offormal and infor- Hong Kong to supervise their factories Chinese characteristics."
mal economic policymaking power and in Shenzhen. The family connections
resources to the provinces when he re- greatly reduced the transaction costs of In November 1993, forthe firsttime, the
tumed to power in 1978. The central the investment by providing reliable lo- party identified ambiguous property
ministerial and party apparatus were cal supervisors, inside information on rights as an important cause ofthe inef-
too politically exhausted and too dis- the enforcement of regulations, and ficiency of the state enterprise sector,
credited to resist his decentralization. contacts with the local authorities. and decided that large and medium-size
This ending ofBeijing's stranglehold over state-owned enterprises should experi-
political power has been fundamental to ment with the corporate system, and
4 March-April 1996
Transiton
that some small state-owned enterprises National Peoples' Congress-Waits and Sees
could be contracted out or leased; other China's economic targets imply a strategy tobecontrolled, especiallyhigh-grade real
SOEs shifted to the partnership system of continued austerity. However, pressure estate and urban construction projects.
in the form of stock sharing, or were from ailing state enterprises and inland
sold to collectives and individuals. provinces fora selective easing of credit is Inflation. Beijing enjoyed considerable
intense. AllofthekeyreportstotheMarch success in reducing inflation last year to
session of the National Peoples' Congress less than 15 percent from 21.7 percent in
Since there IS now more political con- stressed that the government would con- 1994, albeit with the aid of price freezes,
sensus at the elite level, popular support tinue its "appropriately" tight monetary administrative measures, and subsidies.
at the mass level, and better knowledge policy through 1996 and for the next five The government hopes that inflation will
generally of the steps required to estab- years in order to control inflation. Prime drop to 10 percent in 1996 and remainbe-
lish a market economy. it is not surpris- Minister Li Peng acknowledged, inhisre- low 8 percent through the next fiveyears.
ing that Chinahasccelrateport, the need for a "reasonable scale" of
ing that China has accelerated its eco- investment in fixed assets and in ongoing Budget. The draft budget provides for a
nomic reforms since 1994. The new construction projects. There is debate deficit of61.4billion renminbi in 1996, a
reform measures included unification of among Chinese leaders over whether to slight improvement over last year's 62.1
the exchange rate, making the currency relax credit. Some leading officials argue billionrenmtinbi. Totalrevenuewill amount
convertible for current account trans- that any loosening now would risk a new to an estimated687.2billionrenminbi, an
actions, a new tax system, the comimer- bout ofinflation. However, alarge number increase of 11. I percent over 1995, with
of SOEs and less-developed inland prov- expenditurestotaling748.6billionrenminbi,
cialization of the state-owned banks, inces are pushing for a loosening-up. up 9.9 percent. Tax reform, including im-
and the corporatization of SOEs. Nonetheless, economic targets are based provements in collection andthenew rev-
on the continuation of the tight credit enue-sharing agreements with the prov-
To sum up, the different results that we policy. inces, has helped to stabilize government
saw in China, Poland, and Russia imme- EconomicfGLipredictedGDPgrowth
diately after the implementation of dif- of 8 percent this year and average annual State-owned Enterprises. To assist ailing
ferent economic reform programs arose growth of 8 percent thereafter up to 2000. state-ownedenterprises (SOEs), whichare
more from differences in their economic This is down from average growth of 11.8 burdened by excess workers, outdated
structure than from the economic strat- percent in 1991-95. On the basis of these equipment, andpoormanagement, reform-
egies implemented. China's reformprob- and further projections, GDP is expectedto ers last year proposed a two-tier strategy
risefrom 5.8trillionrenniinbi ($700 billion) (see Transition, November-December
lem is basically the classic development to 8.5 trillionby 2000, and to doubleby 17 1995):
problem of promoting the movement of trillion by 2010. Actual GDP growth this
low-productivity, surplus agricultural la- year couldbearound 9 to 10percent. Tight * One thousandkeySOEs are to be singled
bor into industry and services, while credit and strong demand have led to up- outfor special assistance, including low-
wardpressure onthe exchangerate, which interest loans, debt forgiveness, and tech-
Central and Eastern Europe's and has eroded much of the gain in external nical aid, in order to transform them into
Russia's reform problem is the much competitivenessthatresultedfromthe 1994 modern corporate entities capable of oper-
moredifficultand conflictual adjustment devaluation. ating independently from the state and
problem of inducing labor to move from assumingresponsibilityforttheirownprof-
uncompetitive, heavily subsidized indus- However, althoughafall in net exports will its and losses.
tries to newly emerging, efficient indus- tend to slow the economy-trade was in
deficitinDecemberandJanuaryafternine- *A special fund is to be established to
tries. teen consecutive months of trade sur- encourage other SOEs to merge, offset
pluses-this may be offset by strong con- debts, and improve efficiency. It is also
This article is drawnfrom the articles sumption and capital investment. After understood that many ofthese companies
and ongoing research of the authors. growth in fixed assets investment came will declare bankruptcy. (Mergers, how-
down to 18.8 percent last year, Li envis- ever, may create monopolies and can
ages a 32 percent expansion in 1996 and couple more efficient firms with less effi-
Jeffrey Sachs is professor of Interna- average annual growth of 30 percent to cient ones.)
tional Trade at Harvard University 2000. Total fixedassetinvestmentin 1996
and advises governments in several is expected to reach 2.1 trillion renminbi, Theparliament's recentsession didnotyet
countries including Bolivia, Estonia, with 1.4trilliongoingto SOEsandinstitu- discuss these proposals.
Mongolia, Poland, and Russia. tions, and 660 billion to community-run
and private organizations. Priority will Basedon reports ofOxfordAnalytica, the
apparently be given to key projects under Oxford (U.K.)-based international con-
Wing Thye Woo is professor of Eco- construction ininfrastmrcture, agriculture sulting firm. (Email: ra@oxford-analy
nomics at the University of Califor- and industry, as well as to inland regions. tica. com).
nia, Davis. The startup of new projects will continue
Volume 7, Number 3-4 5
The World BanIkPRDTE
Latvian Banking Crisis: Stakes and Mistakes
By Alex Fleming and Samuel Talley
I n the spring of 1995 Latvia expe- Earlier. however, the Bank of Latvia did Rise and Fall of Bank Baltija
rienced the largest banking crisis not play any type of governance role in
of any country ofthe former Soviet the branches under its wing. Branch Bank Baltija expanded at unprecedented
Union (FSU) to date: the banking sys- managers followed a business-as-usual speed between 1993 and 1995. In 1994
tem lost about 40 percent of its assets policy, and as a result, a significant it became the largest Latvian commer-
and liabilities, and depositors are esti- amount of bad lending took place. Most cial bank in tenns ofassets, own capital,
mated to have lost almost $800 million in bad loans were concentrated in the and deposit funding. Nine main share-
savings. Earlier, bankers had hopes that branches of Unibank. An audit showed holders owned 91 percent of the total
their country would become the Swit- that as of March 1994, Unibank owned shares; roughly 59 percent were owned
zerland of the Baltics. Offering exceed- 40 percent of all nonperforming loans in bythe family of Alexander Lavent, chair-
ingly high rates ofinterest and operating the banking system, which totaled about man of the bank's supervisory board.
under a liberal regulatory and disclosure 25 million lat ($50 million). These loans Among Lavent's companies, several are
regime. Latvian banks attracted large were taken off Unibank's books and Russian-dominated and registered off-
capital inflows and short-term deposits replaced by government bonds. shore.
from Russia and the CIS. Butthen banks
began to fail with alarming frequency Government policy toward the evolving Baltija's assets grew from about $25
toward the end of 1994. The crisis commercial banking sector was driven million in January 1993, to almost $500
reached its peak when Bank Baltija, by primarily by parliament's insistencethat million by early 1995. Its own capital
far the largest bank in the country, was any person or entity should have the grew from about $1 million in early 1993
forced to suspend its activities. right to establish a bank. As a result, a to $44 million in January 1995. Baltija
plethora of banks emerged: by 1993 had thirty-seven branches and forty-
The Evolving Banking System morethan sixtybanks hadbeenlicensed. nineofficesthroughoutLatviawith 1,300
Some were pocket banks owned by employees in total. In April 1995, when
When Latvia gained independence in state enterprises; some were purely pri- the banking crisis began, the bank had
1991, it inherited branches of the same vate, dedicated to raising deposits to total deposits of$3 92 million and a loan
specialized Soviet banks as other FSU onlend to the owners; and some were portfolio of $283 million. The bank was
countries: the savings bank, the indus- set up with specific functions in mind ready to develop a large network of
trial/construction bank, a social bank, (Olympija Bank was set up to help fi- branches and become the number one
and an agricultural bank. While most nance the Latvian Olympic team). retail bank, in competition withthe sav-
FSU countries convertedthesebranches ings bank. It offered extremely high
into nationally owned banks that contin- The incentive for establishing a bank interest rates on lat deposits-90 per-
ued their former specialization, the was simply to gain access to a much cent for one-year deposits-at a time
Latvian government decided to com- cheaper source of funding than would when the savings bank was offeringjust
bine the forty-five branches of these be possible through existing banking in- 14 to 20 percent, and other banks a
former Soviet banks and place them stitutions. All of these private or quasi- maximum of 52 percent. By the end of
underthe auspices ofthe Bank ofLatvia. private banks were allowed to develop 1994 Baltija attracted some 200,000
This enabled the government to pursue with little supervision from the Bank of personal accounts.
a flexible bank restructuring strategy. In Latvia. From 1992 to 1994 the private
1993 nine branches were sold to private banks' share of total assets in the bank- In March 1995 the central bank invited
commercial banks (seven of them to ing sector grew from 47 percent to 85 all banks to prepare and present fman-
Bank Baltija); fifteen branches were percent. Credits granted by the new cial statements that had been audited on
consolidated into eightprivate banks and commercial banks accounted for 89 thebasis ofintenationalaccountingstan-
sold through offerings of shares; and the percent of the total by the end of 1994, dards. Bank Baltija failed to present
rump of twenty-one branches were a huge jump from 23 percent two years such accounts, or to give its auditors-
structured into one state bank-the earlier. Coopers and Lybrand-full access to
Universal Bank of Latvia, or Unibank. needed documentationforthe audit. That
6 March-April 1996
Transition
behaviorraisedconcernthatBaltijamight million to the Russian Inte#wk bank. was again declared bankrupt and this
have an insolvency problem, even if (Moscow-based Intertek is a pocket time was put in the hands of a liquidator.
moderate in size. bank, owned by major oil companies,
along with the Russian Ministry of En- Besides Bank Baltija, other middle-size
As enterprises started to withdraw their ergy, its largest shareholder. Some cross- banks were involved in the crisis, in-
deposits from the bank, followed by ownership between Baltija and Intertek cluded the Latvian deposit bank, the
households, which were slower to grasp was also suspected.) In return, Baltija Centrabank, and Olympija Bank. Those
the gravity of the problem, the Bank of was to receive Russian government were eventually declared insolvent. A
Latvia provided modest support for bonds equal to 29 percent of the par number of smaller banks also experi-
Baltija, as did a few large corporations value of the loans sold. The Russian enced difficulty. In all, about 40 percent
and commercial banks. It also initiated banknever deliveredthebondsto Baltija. ofthe assets andliabilitiesinthebanking
an across-the-board investigation ofthe system were compromised, totaling al-
bank's financial operations. The accoun- Finally, Baltija was declared insolvent in most$900million.
tants dug deeper and deeperinto Baltija's July 1995 and placed under the control
books and learned that the bank's nega- ofthe central bank. Ofthe roughly $500 What Caused the Crisis?
tive networth was about $320 million, or million inassets on Baltija's books, some
7 percent of Latvia's expected 1995 $260millionhaddisappearedbythetime Questionable banking practices during
GDP. The Bank of Latvia refused to the administrator took over. Attempts to transition, the effects of stabilization,
provide further liquidity support. The cancel the loan-sale agreement with and ill-fated responses to developments
crisis had come to a head. Intertek and have the loans returned to in the Russian commodities market all
Baltija failed. Intertek has refused even had ahandintheLatvianbanking crisis.
Officials of the Bank of Latvia and the to confirm that a loan agreement was
government began protracted negotia- ever signed and claims that all original *Transition uncertainties. Major play-
tions with Baltija's owners and manage- documents on the loans have been re- ers in the banking system-the enter-
ment. But the bank's managers and turned to Baltija. Funds were also prise borrowers, the bankers, and the
owners were just maneuvering to gain blocked at Baltija's correspondent ac- banking supervisors-are all prone to
time and opportunityto strip the bank of counts with banks in Russia, Belarus, mistakes as the economies make the
its assets. In late April 1995. for ex- and Ukraine. But Baltija has refused to transition from a command to a free
ample, Bank Baltija allegedly sold more die. It was declared bankrupt, but later, market system. As a consequence,
than half of its loan portfolio of $160 received a reprieve. On April 4, 1996, it nonperforming loans increase across the
banking sector; moreover, a lack of laws
governing loan collateral may inhibit col-
lections. (In Latvia commercial banks
had to make provisions of about $140
OA~~~ ~4 mifllion at the end of 1994, and another
A X27lSSS >11 k o S sA GPI bD ae l:l jP $86 million in the first half of 1995.)
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