ii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, j~~S I 'u~bhn~ servhe delivery a s c 6 r 0 c a r may 2002 u \*~'iWorid Bank Proshikai I Survey & Research System lanladesh: Urban Senrice Deliveiy A Score Card May 2002 13 World Bank Proshika Survey & Researc SyStem Contents Foreword: Abbreviations: Executive Summary: i Chapter 1: Objectives and Methodology I Chapter 2: Social Services 9 Education 9 Health Care 15 Chapter 3: Infrastructure Services 25 Electricity 25 Gas 31 Drinking Water 35 Sanitation Services 41 Transport 45 Chapter 4: Regulatory Services 55 Police and Judiciary 55 Land Administration 61 Chapter 5: Improving Service Delivery 67 Annexes: Annex I 73 Annex II 77 References: 113 i I i i I Foreword This report is the result of a collaborative effort between the World Bank, Proshika, Survey and Research Systems (SRS), and the Public Affairs Center (PAC), Bangalore. The quantitative survey was implemented by SRS, while the quantitative results were supplemented by numerous focus group discussions, conducted by Proshika. The World Bank was responsible for preparing the final report. PAC provided technical expertise and guidance throughout the process. The World Bank team was led by Kapil K-apoor and team members included Gregory K isunko, Aminur Rahman, Tanjina Rahman, Patricia Langan, and Joyce Mormita Das. The Proshika team included Md. Shahabuddin, Asgar Ali Sabri, Shahana Rahman, and Md. Abu Sayeed. The SRS team was led by Mohd. Yusuf and Siddiquer Rahman. The PAC team consisted of Gopakumar K rishnan and Sita Sekhar. The peer reviewers for this task were Nicholas Manning and Navin Girishankar, both from the World Bank. Financial support for this initiative from AUSAID, CIDA, Netherlands, and USAID is gratefully acknowledged. Abbreiation s PROSHIKA A non-government organization SRS Survey & Research Systems PMED Primary & Mass Education Division NGO Non Government Organization DWASA Dhaka Water Supply & Sewerage Authority CWASA Chittagong Water Supply & Sewerage Authority DPHE Department of Public Health Engineering DESA Dhaka Electric Supply Authority DESCO Dhaka Electric Supply Company BPDB Bangladesh Power Development Board BRTC Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation BRTA Bangladesh Road Transport Authority PAC Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore TI-B Transparency International - Bangladesh PPRC Power & Participation Research Centre BDA Bangalore Development Authority AUEO Assistant Upazila Education Officer MOE Ministry of Education C&AG Comptroller & Auditor General HPSP Health and Population Sector Program SSC Secondary School Certificate ESP Essential Service Package SMC School Management Committee PTA Parent Teachers Association SDS Service Delivery Survey MOHFW Ministry of Health & Family Welfare MMCFD Million Cubic Feet Per Day GTCL Gas Transmission Company Limited BUP Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad BRCT Bangladesh Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma Victims SPA Special Powers Act CWCS Centre for Women and Children Studies PIL Public Interest Litigation MOLJPA Ministry of LawJustice & Parliamentary Affairs GDP Gross Domestic Product NCB Nationalized Commercial Bank BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee ASA Association for Social Advancement IAS International Accounting Standards PSU Primary Sampling Units PPS Probability Proportionate to Size i i I Executive Summary Introduction Delivering essential services efficiently to meet the needs of households and businesses is a major challenge throughout the developing world, including Bangladesh. Access to a minimum package of essential services such as health, education, power, water supply, and sanitation, is critical for reducing poverty and improving welfare. Cross-country evidence suggests that investments in improving the delivery of services (whether infrastructure related, social or regulatory) can have high payoffs in terms of raising productivity and accelerating the pace of economic growth. These services are particularly beneficial to the poor who, for example, are often unable to access clean drinking water and are subjected to unsanitary surroundings, with adverse consequences for their health and employment opportunities. Adthough Bangladesh is predominantly rural, a defining trend for its economy and society is its rapidly growing urban population. During 1961-1991, while the country's population doubled from 55 million to 111 million, the urban population grew almost 9 times, from 2.6 million to 22 million. Currently, the urban population makes up approximately 20 percent of the country's population of 130 million. Urbanization is increasing by 5 to 6 percent annually, and it is expected that more than 50 percent of the population in Bangladesh will live in urban areas by the year 2025. The growing urban population has increased the burden on service delivery in cities, whose resource and management capacities are already over-extended. A key challenge for government, therefore, is how to cope with growing urbanization and develop service delivery systems that meet public policy goals and provide value for money to the citizens. This report's principal objective is to provide policy makers with information on the state of service delivery in urban Bangladesh from the point of view of the recipients, on the basis of a household survey, and establish a baseline against which future progress can be measured. The report is anchored on the premise that user feedback provides a valuable tool for improving transparency and public accountability. When users of services provide a quantitative and qualitative assessment of service delivery, based on first-hand interactions with the agencies providing these services, it is possible to rank the agencies by the quality of their performance. This 'score card' can then be used to evaluate progress for a variety of problems with the planning, management and accountability of service delivery. Bangldesh: Urban Service Deivey ii The constitution makes the Government of Bangladesh responsible for creating an environment for its citizens that allows them to improve their quality of life through, among other things, access to health, education and other essential services. To fulfill this goal, the government uses a variety of institutional mechanisms. A majority of services are provided by the central government either directly or through city corporations and centrally controlled autonomous agencies. There is also growing reliance on the private sector, both for profit and non-profit, for the delivery of urban services. Thus, for example, the delivery of legal, judicial and police services is the responsibility of the central government; education services are provided by a combination of the central government and the for-profit and non-profit private sector; and electricity and gas supplies are the responsibility of autonomous corporations. To assess user's satisfaction with the services provided, this survey collected primary data from a representative sample of 2,400 households: Dhaka (900), Chittagong (600), Khulna (500) and Rajshahi (400). Two special characteristics of the population that the survey focused on, and which appear extremely important for the quality of service delivery, are the respondent's income levels and place of residence. The survey covered 11 services (education, health, power, gas, water, sewerage and sanitation, garbage, transport, police, judiciary, and land administration). The list of services to be surveyed was developed through a consultative process between PROSHIKA, the Public Affairs Centre (Bangalore), Survey & Research Systems (SRS), the World Bank and through a workshop facilitated by PROSHIKA that included representatives from several NGOs based in the four cities. The results of the quantitative survey were supplemented by a series of qualitative focus group discussions, a process led by PROSHIKA. Satisfaction with Service Delivery The results of the survey confirm earlier assessments that satisfaction with the quality of services provided is low. Less than 20 percent of the households surveyed, in each of the four cities, are satisfied with eight of the eleven surveyed services (Table 1.1). The percentage of households satisfied with the other three services is only slightly higher. Police, land registration, transport, electricity, judiciary, health care, garbage disposal and sewerage and sanitation perform poorly. At one end of the spectrum, less than 2 percent of the households indicated that they were satisfied with the services provided by the police. Conversely, at the other end, 75 percent of the households in Dhaka expressed satisfaction with gas supply. Satisfaction among "poor" households' is not dissimilar to those of other households, but generally tends to be lower. A class of citizens that is particularly neglected are the bosti (slum) dwellers who are either deprived of key services or end up paying more for these services than do their more affluent, non-bosti counterparts. The survey results and focus group discussions reveal that government efforts to improve service delivery have not yet produced the desired results. Interaction between service providers and recipients is not always direct and the latter are often required to go through intermediaries to facilitate access. These intermediaries are usually very influential and are able to accelerate access to services by circumventing the system, in return for a fee. They facilitate "illegal" connections to essential services like electricity and water and, in the process, are able Defined in this survey as those households making less than Tk.2,000 per month. ________________________Executive Summary to enrich themselves by diverting resources away from the state. Once they have access, consumers encounter numerous problems such as regular power outages, low water pressure, and infrequent garbage collection. However, only a small proportion of households bother to lodge formal complaints. Grievance redressing mechanisms do not work well and consumers generally feel that there will be little or no follow-up to their complaint, unless an influential intermediary is used or a bribe is paid. In particular, survey results show that * less that 28 percent of the households are satisfied with the education system; in addition to the "official fee", respondents reported paying between 62 and 110 percent of this amount as "under the table" payments for admission, tuition, books, and other expenditures; * less than 18 percent of the households are satisfied with the quality of health care. Admission to a public health facility is not a routine affair, and patients have to use a variety of means to gain admission. These include paying a fee to the doctor at his private chamber, paying money directly to a hospital employee, or using a personal connection with hospital administration staff. Medical supplies and medicines are pilfered from the hospitals and sold on the open market - pharmacies are full of medicines that have "not for sale" labels on them; * less than 12 percent of the households are satisfied with the electricity service. Getting an electricity connection takes time and can cost two to three times the "official fee". Once a connection is received, the supply remains unpredictable, and resolving problems usually necessitates under-the-table payments. Poor households living in bostis illegally gain access by purchasing electricity from mastaans (muscle-men) to whom they pay, on average, Tk.50 per month per light bulb for a few hours use per day. Official charges, at existing rates, would not exceed Tk.13-15 per month. The mastaans stay in business by bribing electricity officials and the police, and government is deprived of much-needed revenues; * piped gas is provided only in Dhaka and Chittagong. Obtaining a gas connection can take, on average, one to six months and cost twice the "official" fee. Once a connection is received, however, the supply of gas is reported to be good, and satisfaction levels are higher than for other services; * less than 11 percent of households are satisfied with the quality of drinking water, although satisfaction levels are higher in Dhaka at 27 percent. More than 50 percent of the respondents indicated that there were long delays in getting a water connection, and bribes are frequently demanded. The average amount of bribe paid to get a connection is equal to the "official" fee in Dhaka and Chittagong, but is lower in Khulna and Rajshahi. The majority of "poor" households depend upon private sources for the supply of drinking water, and slum dwellers indicated during focus group discussions that they pay as much as Tk.2 per bucket of water. Affluent houses in Dhaka have access to piped-water at the official rate of Tk4.30 per 1,000 liters; * less than 17 percent of the households are satisfied with the quality of sanitation services, although a commendably high proportion of households report access to water-sealed toilets. Blockage of sewerage is a recurring problem, and there are delays in garbage collection, including garbage bins not being accessible and irregular pick-ups; Bangadesh: Urban Service Ddiver y * less than 20 percent of the households are satisfied with transport services, and complaints about traffic congestion and pollution are pervasive. Annual fitness certificates for vehicles can be bought by paying approximately 50 percent of the "official" fee. Vehicle owners report being harassed by the police even if they do have fitness certificates, as a result of which car owners have stopped getting their vehicles inspected and rely instead on bribing the police; * less than 2 percent of the households are satisfied with the services of the police. Respondents indicated that fear and distrust of the police were the top two reasons for not reporting a crime to the police. Households also indicated that even when a crime is reported, the police are largely ineffective in resolving their problems; * judicial services also get low scores from the respondents, with less than 8 percent of the households expressing satisfaction with the judiciary. Many households reported that they prefer shalish (arbitration) and other private means to resolve conflicts and get restitution; and * less than 10 percent of the households are satisfied with the present system of land registration. Among the households that that had recently been involved in a land transaction, more than 70 percent reported having to pay a bribe to get the transaction registered and for mutation. A large proportion of those paying bribes also made payments to the land administration official to reduce the transaction price recorded on the deed, since this price determines the legal registration fee. Paying the bribe resulted in the recorded price being reduced by up to 25 percent; While these "scores" might appear to be low, and the problems associated with improving service delivery might seem daunting, countries as diverse as Uganda and India, with similarly low scores, have initiated encouraging action programs aimed at improving the quality of services provided to households. For example, in Uganda, a public expenditure tracking survey revealed that only 20 percent of non-wage education expenditures were reaching the schools in 1995. As a result, the central government launched an information campaign and began posting public spending information at the schools and in the districts. A repeat survey in 1999-2000 shows that school's now receive 90 percent of non-wage education spending. Similarly in Bangalore, India, surveys conducted between 1994 and 1999 show noticeable improvements in user satisfaction with services like water and sewerage, hospitals, power, transport, and telecommunications as a result of the various programs under implementation. Improving Urban Service Delivery Urging the authorities to improve service delivery, the recently published report of the Public Administration Reforms Commission (PARC) notes that, "the poor quality of some public services, namely education, health, utilities, water, and power, reflect the absence of accountability, poor value for money and lack of effective redress of grievances for the people2." The PARC report notes that service failures adversely affect the productivity of economic activity and typically affect the poor disproportionately, as a result of which many poor households have to resort to alternatives that imply lower quality and higher costs. 2 Report of thePub/c Administration Reform Commission, Bangladesh, pg. 113, June, 2000. ____________________Executi.ve Surnm aq' Although developing economies are resource constrained, service failures are the result not merely of these resource constraints but also the institutional arrangements for delivering services. Service failures are also a reflection of the perverse incentives facing service providers and the political leadership. This report covers several sectors, each of which require a different policy response and differing levels of engagement by government and the other actors responsible for service delivery. The recommendations summarized here, therefore, only focus on a few cross-cutting issues that emerge from the survey and the focus group discussions. In particular, this report suggests that improving the efficiency and responsiveness of urban service delivery in Bangladesh will depend upon redefining the role of state and increasing partnerships with the private sector; changing the structure of incentives for service providers; bringing government closer to the people by decentralizing decision making and reevaluating the relationship between the center, local governments, profit and non-profit service providers and consumers; increasing the involvement of users and other stakeholders in planning, providing and monitoring service delivery by institutionalizing user surveys and instituting a system of accountability that makes service providers answerable to service consumers. Roie of the State. In many countries the prevailing view has been that government should be the dominant, if not the sole, provider of services. Government agencies have tried to do too much with too few resources and limited institutional capacity, as a result of which essential services are either not delivered or are delivered inadequately. This has started to change and the last two decades have witnessed a growing trend among governments in developing countries prioritizing their core activities and developing partnerships with the private sector and the NGOs. Rather than providing services directly, governments are contracting out the provision of services to the for-profit and non-profit private sectors and focusing more on their role as financier and regulator. Such private participation has generally resulted in improved access, and better services as has happened in the telecommunications sector in Peru and Senegal and in the water sector in the Philippines and Cote d'Ivoire. In Bangladesh, this shift is most pronounced in the social sectors where NGOs have emerged as important providers of health and education services. Grameen Phone is another good example of how private sector involvement has improved telecommunications access, even in under-served rural areas. However, the state remains a large player in areas that are better served by the private sector such as textiles, jute, cement and fertilizer, with the state enterprises involved making huge annual losses that are sustained through budgetary subsidies and loans from nationalized commercial banks3. Unless Bangladesh significantly downsizes its state-owned sector, and increases its partnership with the private sector (both profit and non- profit) the fiscal drain on public resources will continue, burdening policymakers and making it extremely difficult to improve the delivery of "public" services, such as law and order and justice. Changing Incentives. Experience from other countries shows that one of the most effective mechanisms to improve service delivery is to overhaul the system of incentives for good performance - the rewards and penalties confronting individuals and organizations charged with the responsibility of delivering service related outcomes. Service delivering entities in Bangladesh generally lack clear service-related goals and targets, their management is not held accountable for results, they face significant political interference in their day-to-day 3For details see Bangladesh: Parastatal Performance and Strategy: Kgy Issues and Po/iy Implications, Policy Note, World Bank, January 2002. Baniadesk Urban Service Deivery vi operations, and budgetary allocations are seldom performance-based. In addition, the wages and salaries of public servants have eroded significantly in real terms during the last two decades and promotion are not performance-based but depend instead upon seniority4. These are part of a system-wide problem and are not necessarily limited to problems within an individual organization or a particular sector. Although the political environment has generally deterred Government from overhauling the incentive system, Bangladesh is beginning to put in place some of the structures and processes for incentive-based improvements. In the education sector, for example, government provides for 80 percent of the teacher's salaries in registered non- governmental schools, at the primary and secondary level. It therefore has strong leverage over their performance, which it can use. The Primary and Mass Education Division (PMED) has set up a primary school grading system which includes a performance monitoring report for government and non-government schools. The grade a school receives makes it eligible for rewards or sanctions. If, for instance, a school receives a "D", PMED can exclude it from receiving wheat under the Food for Education program. In the energy sector, the Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority is endeavoring to link the issue of increasing collections and decreasing system losses with security of employment and is in discussions with its unions. The Power Development Board's recent initiative to cut off 168 lines belonging to large defaulters, mostly government entities, is to be applauded. The results of this survey show that consumers support such initiatives and would be willing to pay more for services, provided they can be assured of better service and service providers are held accountable for results. Decentralizing Systems. Experience from other countries suggests that decentralization can facilitate local involvement and participation, and build ownership. Local governments are often better positioned to interact with communities and allocate resources that are more responsive to needs at the local level. Local monitoring of projects and programs can also be more effective and less expensive, given the proximity of location. Decentralization is increasingly seen in Bangladesh as an important means to improve public service delivery and the government has taken steps to put in place a democratically elected local government system. To be effective, local government must be delegated genuine decision making powers and must be given adequate resources to fulfill their mandates. As Bangladesh considers various options for decentralization, it will be important to ensure that the links between the central government, local government, autonomous agencies, private sector and public are designed in a manner that ensures that the service providers are accountable to those who pay for and benefit from the services. The rapid expansion in literacy is creating a more aware population, making it increasingly possible for local communities to enforce accountability. Institutionalizing User Surveys. Users can play an important role in improving service delivery, but their efforts will only be effective if they are equipped with proper information. They need to know what services are being provided, what they cost, how they are financed, and who the intended beneficiaries are. Public availability of such information is key to improved accountability. The systematic collection, analysis and reporting of information of the type collected by this survey can be an important tool to monitor service delivery and improve performance. The surveys conducted by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and by PMED are good examples of the type of information that can be 4A detailed discussion of the structure of incentives that public servants face is contained in Tamilg eviathan: Reforming Governance in Ban,gladerh - An Inmtitutional Review, March 2002. provided to community representatives, which they can then use in their dialogue with service providers. Publicly posted prices can help customers hold officials accountable for quoting and charging the correct amount. This is beginning to happen, and tariff rates for the supply of electricity, gas, and water are generally published widely. However, while the tariff for supply is published, the price for connection is not. A potential user learns about the connection price when he/she talks with the clerical staff of the utility concerned. In the absence of published rates, the officials have considerable leeway to quote a price and demand a bnrbe. The discretionary authority enjoyed by officials, together with limited exit options for consumers, modest "official" fees, and the high value associated with accessing many essential services results in strong incentives to pay the higher underground price and not report the extra payment extorted by officials for connection and use. Connection prices therefore need to be published and easily understood. The publication of prices needs to be accompanied by the publication of client charters that reflect user's priorities and clearly spell out minimum standards for service that users can expect. Such client charters are being used effectively in the United K-ingdom, Belgium, Portugal and Malaysia. These should be prominently posted at every office responsible for delivering a service and enforced vigorously. Currently, none of the utilities guarantee a minimum quality or level of service. NGOs and community-based organizations can play an important role in raising awareness among users of what reasonable costs and standards of service they should expect, as well as the role they can play. Grievance redress mechanisms must be made more credible in order to encourage users to file complaints. Grievances should be registered, monitored and followed-up and users provided with prominently displayed "Complaints Boxes" to report inaction. Strengthening Accountability and Oversight. While users need transparent and reliable commitments by service delivering agencies to perform according to publicized standards, they also need a way to hold the agencies accountable to those standards, for instance through a credible grievance redressing mechanism. They have to perceive that it is "worth" taking time to file complaints. Another way is by including users on monitoring bodies where they play an active role, for instance, in analyzing operational performance evaluations, making policy recommendations, and overseeing implementation. A few hospitals in the country are presently experimenting with improving governance at the facility level through the use of autonomous boards that include community and government representatives. These boards have full authority to hire and fire, approve budgets and set fees. Although they are public hospitals, increases in their efficiency have already allowed them to reduce their reliance on government funding. The proposed energy sector and water sector regulatory commissions could be another good way to oversee the establishment of transparent rules and regulations governing the industry, developing performance indicators and putting in place monitoring systems. Among their many tasks, such regulatory agencies would be expected to protect consumers' interests by ensuring that system expansion and operation is at least cost, quality of supply is maintained and tariffs are reasonable. Government will need to ensure that standards are worked out in consultation with all stakeholders. In addition to regulatory agencies, other oversight institutions, such as the various Parliamentary Standing Committees, also have an important role to play and can hold public Bangadesh: Urban Service Deliverqy -iii hearings periodically in order to receive user feed-back. However, most Standing Committees presently lack the necessary information and the technical expertise needed to hold relevant government agencies accountable for efficient service delivery. Strengthening the Standing Committees is therefore another important priority. These committees should require timely external audits of the departments responsible for service delivery and hold the executive accountable for responding to audit objections. It would also be desirable to open up committee meetings to the media, and broadly enlist media support in publishing success stories as well as raising consumer awareness. Next Steps. In recent years the demand for better governance and improved service delivery has been growing within the country. This is being driven by the rapid expansion in primary education, the growing influence of non-governmental organizations and independent research institutes, the emergence of a new breed of outward looking entrepreneurs who are demanding a more supportive business environment, and an increasingly independent press. In addition to establishing a benchmark, the results of this survey, and the subsequent advocacy and dissemination that is intended, are expected to further strengthen the voice of the users of these services. Additional user feed-back will also become available as a result of the work that is being done by organizations like the Peoples Participatory Research Center, Democracy Watch and Transparency International (Bangladesh), and as client surveys become a routine part of how government agencies conduct business. This is already beginning to happen in the social sectors. This quantitative and qualitative information will provide the new government with useful information documenting how users value the services they receive. This information, together with the various sector specific reports that have recently been prepared, offer a valuable menu of reform options which the authorities can draw upon as they embark upon a program to revitalize the Bangladeshi economy. Object'ives and Methodology Introduction Adthough Bangladesh is predominantly rural, a defining trend for its economy and society is its rapidly growing urban population. During 1961-1991, while the country's population doubled from 55 million to 1 11 million, the urban population grew almnost 9 times from 2.6 mnillion to 22 mnillion. Currently the urban population makes up approximately 20 percent of the country's Figure 1.1: Monthly Income per Household,: population of 130 m-illion. Urbanization is increasing by 5 to 6 Dhaka percent annually, and it is expected that more than 50 percent of 45 the population in Bangladesh will live in urban areas by the year 40 40 20251. Four cities, Dhaka, Chittagong, K-hulna and Rajshahi 35 account for around 47 percent of the total urban population2. The . growing urban population has increased the burden on service x delivery in cities, whose resource and management capacities are already overrun. A key challenge for the government, therefore, is how to cope with growing urbanization and develop service 13 delivery systems that meet public policy goals and provide value for I money to the households. I The constitution makes the Govemnment of Bangladesh itr l 12001 to Abv responsible for creating an envirtonment that allowvs its people to ..... 20000 'T, 0000 improve their quality of life through, among other things, access to ir rL. .-0 I. .. a J -,'00, SRS health, education and other essential services. To fulfill this goal the government uses a variety of institutional mechanisms. A majority of public services are provided by the central government 1 Institutionalifation of CUP for advocagy for the urban poor, Coalition for the Urban Poor, Dhaka, 2001. 2 Towards an Urban Strategv for Bangladesh, World Bank, 1999. Bang> U. - Delivery2 Box 1.1 Agencies Responsible for Sernice Delikery * IjJjc:iu-,n: h.nuismrv ':4 Educau:on. PrMED. NGO) .and cc:,miiAniuri ;c- priv Li.c Ic'l:lu * 1-1 piilTh I[ini [r- .:.t -He.aldi prli.lea vct'or * s':.r; ur:i: L)\\ .Si\. (L\\ ASiA. cirv c.,rpur:tl 'l] * C\ .\rS -l cXr: . . .r;, [S. ,liis * l-;1''uiIlr':j \\ .uc{:r I)\\'A. C \\ ASA.N tcirt co.rp riciLtan .,ndui DrI-HE * I~l:t l:rii Sl`uppI, DES.N, DESCCO. :jid BEPrDB * JLI.I Tic i iiD hfl at E)hj. :mnd thILLme*rne :ril, * IBu Ir-,i. r:rr:iun BRTC .and prr:- rc conipiflic- * i .11 Ih: 11 *I!,o-- 1IsI)x * 1'*1.;I 1 I ;Inn in, 4- Hn:,me .Nttfair * lu,,iii.ir- Minim rn of L:t.%. 1ucuc and '.rhamcn ien .\ f.urs * I il RtL i [r-tu,.n. Nbn_ultrv ot L;_a%, lusuce and Parbanmcnuir, Aftf.ar: ''\'.1 ~~~ 'i'.' . i.A:./' ic'.:- rrb.r I ,,','; lou i/t^,i /.fiivYI /.ZiiS h/r!.. either directly or through city corporations and centrally controlled autonomous agencies. Although it is still a marginal player, there is growing reliance on the private sector, both for profit and non- profit, for the delivery of urban services. Thus, for example, the delivery of legal, judicial and police services is the responsibility of the central government; education services are provided by a combination of the central government and the for-profit and non- profit private sector; electricity and gas supply is the responsibility Figure 1.2: Monthly Income per Households: of autonomous corporations; and garbage collection is the Chiittagong responsibility of city corporations (Box 1.1) . 60 50 49 Objectives and Approach i~ 40 |The principal objective of this report is to assess the state = § 33 of service delivery in urban Bangladesh from the point of view of 30 the recipient, on the basis of a household survey, and provide a o 20 : benchmark against which future progress can be tracked. While S § W F ! 11 ~~~~~~~numerous reports on power, water, gas, transport and other utilities 10 5 have been published in recent years, including by multilateral and 2po '1 to numj i bilateral agencies, none of these reports systematicanly capture the bilaeaviews of the users of these services. This report is hence Up to '112001 to Tk.6001 to hk.12001 'L..% v- 'lk2000 6000 12000 to 20000 1 1:l l deliberatively descriptive, seeking to fill this gap by documenting how the users of these services value what they get, view the Source: Citizen Report Card Survey - 2000, -i conditions governing access to these services, and experience the interactions with the entities providing such services. The report is anchored on evidence that user feedback can provide a valuable tool for improving transparency and public accountability. When users of services provide a quantitative and qualitative assessment of service delivery, based on first-hand interactions with the agencies providing these services, it is possible to rank the agencies 3 Obje21. Aa; gy on the quality of performance. This 'score card' can then be used to evaluate progress related to planning, management and accountability of service delivery and can be used to augment existing oversight mechanisms. The score cards can be used to analyze efficiency (relating inputs to outputs) and effectiveness (relating outputs to policy goals and outcomes). They can be used for planning improvements and expansion of service delivery, Figure 1.3. Monthly Income per HouseholIs: including assisting managers in making staffing and production Klulna decisions. They can set baselines to measure progress in service 70 delivery improvements and inspire better performance among 60 6l agencies. They can be used to stimulate collective action by " 50 households, and provide organisational leaders with an opportunity Xi to design reforms and bring about strategic changes. 30 23 This concept of report cards, pioneered by the Public °3n 3 Affairs Centre (PAC) - a non-profit organisation based in 3 Bangalore, India - is now widely recognised as a powerful 'voice' mechanism to inform public officials of various issues in public (IF, t, '11;.20 01' k6001 1k.12001 bove service delivery and act as a pressure force for demanding 1k200G to 600Q to 12000 to 20000 'F .20000 improvements (Box 1.2). Since the first survey in Bangalore, report cards have been prepared for seven cities in India including SR Ahmedabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Delhi, Mumbai and Pune. A national exercise is also presently underway, covering 23,000 rural households and also 9,600 urban households. International experience with report cards has demonstrated the potential this tool can have for demanding more public accountability and providing a credible database to facilitate proactive civil society responses. The "Swabhimana Initiative" in Bangalore, launched by Figure 1. Montly Income per Househol s: the Commissioner of the Bangalore City Corporation is a unique Rajshaln i example of a state-citizen forum to improve the quality of civic life. 70 The People's Voice Program in Ukraine uses survey-based 70 63 60- information to put pressure from below on local leaders to r 60 00 improve service delivery. Client surveys are also being used in Q 40 Armenia, Latvia, Nicaragua and Uganda. 0 30 1i 25 20 Several similar initiatives are presently underway in 10 4 2 Bangladesh. Action Aid is developing in-house capacity to prepare 0 report cards at the city and division levels. Democracy Watch is o Q p i looking at service delivery issues in Chittagong City Corporation .v . o CO > and, together with Transparency International-Bangladesh (TI-B), a0 is preparing a manual in Bangla for division level score cards. < .s. > Peoples Participatory Research Center (PPRC) is also working on Source: Citizen Report Card Survey - preparing two reports on (i) best practices at the local government 2000, SRS level, based on a nation wide survey and (ii) a report card on Dhaka city. This report is meant to contribute to these endeavors by presenting findings that are based on rigorous survey methodology and design and a process that has involved a wide array of actors including public officials, donors, and NGOs. To assess households satisfaction levels with the services provided, this survey collected primary data from a representative sample of 2,400 households in four cities: Dhaka (900), Chittagong Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery 4 Box 1.2 Experiences wvith Report Cards Evaluating and Benchmnarking Public Senices in Baiigalore The F[trst Repo,rt C3rd Srud, ot pubic; Srr1.lct Ln B d.:ul.:,rt 1i l')93il --- cLvd .a r,nd..n;;:,n;plk Durve! :ot 1141.1 hou chold;. The extrci7t: .%.I; Oid,d bL, thrte que-u- -i.:.i r-H t u tr L .ri chc pu Lf.: ;Cr'Aices [hat mr mter nmo,- ic t he \.r umer \ la- ipcctl t.inr. ..t rhe zcr i.r : i,r - ti:..r . un The NGO Affairs Bureau only performs external audits if there is an allegation made against an NGO School. Madrasah-Dakhil) schools account for about 5 percent of students enrolled in secondary school. Funding and oversight relationships rable 2.1 between schools and national level bodies are summarized in Box Percentage of Children by Type of School (°o) 2.1. ..m _ |Although Bangladesh has come a long way in solving the Ke,,,,. -~ 0 | 0 | | problem of access to schools, student learning achievements remain low. Within schools, students get low effective learning ESf* 28 1 4 10 2 21 1 6 5 time, which is a function of the time spent by the students in EITh;iNI 35 61 13 48 25 38 6 30 learning activities and the effectiveness of teaching methods. P = Pr Fl. .~*.h.IJ. .0 z Uih II,. I Teacher absenteeism, poor motivation and lack of supervision and P = ' , 1. . . h. .1.J k. O Ohsr I 1 .EushhIds * N.o.iMlup an cr . . *t.IL.I support contribute to poor learning outcomes. Limited effort is .wcc A\nnr.% I A.Ic 2 1 made to assess student learning achievements. As a result, a large proportion of students leave primary school without achieving 11 Social Services basic literacy and numerical skills. Thus, the main challenge for Bangladesh now is to improve the quality of education2. Against this background, the survey asked the respondents to provide information about their experience with the education system. The results reveal the extent of overall satisfaction with the education system, the means households use to get their children adtmitted into school, their satisfaction levels with various aspects of the school experience, the problems they encounter and how these are resolved. It also reveals interesting information about the costs to households of education both in terms of official fees and "extra" payments that households are compelled to make. Figure 2.2: Overall Satisfaction with Education System (% of Households) Access and Satisfaction In general, respondents confirmed that access was not a serious problem and education services are generally available to Khuln3 them (results ranged from 86 percent of households in Rajshahi to 100 percent in Chittagong and Khulna) (Figure 2.1). The type of Diaka school that households send their children to generally depends " i- j upon income level (Table 2.1). The largest proportion of children in "poor" households who go to school in urban areas attend government schools3. Private schools are the next most popular, P. K -.i.hIhi and a greater proportion of "poor" children go to private schools than to NGO schools, reflecting the fact that not many NGO 5 Chirugong schools operate in urban areas. In Rajshahi, however, an equal proportion go to private and NGO schools (6 percent). A higher Ur ," X j proportion of "non-poor" households in Dhaka and Chittagong send their children to private schools than in IKhulna and Rajshahi (61 percent of households send their children to private schools in Dhaka and 48 percent in Chittagong). Very few poor households reported sending their children to government high schools, and a low percentage of other households do. School attendance, as reported by households, is high for all four cities, ranging between 94 and 97 percent. Low-income households, headed by less educated persons and females, however, tend to have lower Table 2.2 attendance rates and higher drop out rates. Many different and ti. Schools (° of Households) reasons were cited for both boys and girls never enrolling or attending school, including inability to pay fees, sickness, distance I I to school and the need for the child to work to help the family r[6flW,m'll 48 3 57 46 financially. 20 8 41 16 77 23 27 0 Although access is high, overall satisfaction with the Source: Annex Table 2.4 - 2.6 education system is low: for all respondents satisfaction levels do not exceed 28 percent. Satisfaction rates are as low as 5 percent in Chittagong (Figure 2.2), perhaps reflecting the fact that its residents 2 For further details see "Bangladesh Education SectorReiiea' World Bank, University Press L.imited, 2000. 3 As mentioned in Chapter 1, for the purposes of the survey, poor households are those with monthly incomes of less than Tk.2,000. Bangladesh: Urban Service Deivery 12 have higher expectations but also that the city has experienced a disproportionate decline in the quality of its educational Figure 2.3: Satisfaction with Govt. institutions. Respondents reported the highest satisfaction with Primary School (% of Households) NGO schools in Dhaka and Chittagong, while a greater percentage of households in Khulna and Rajshahi preferred Government ,, ;- schools (Table 2.2.) _ rhun.1n Satisfaction with Government primary schools varies J jj@.hjhj widely among cities although the pattern, in each city, mirrors that for the overall education system. Thus, overall satisfaction with Government primary schools is highest in Khulna at 57 percent of households and is lowest in Chittagong at 3 percent of households (Figure 2.3) ,, Jn,,.ng The wide differences in satisfaction rates among cities may reflect different experiences children are having, e.g. with school Vnr n.... i 1 1. n J facilities, teachers and school management. The differences may also be accounted for by different expectations among the cities. For instance, private schools may be setting a high standard in one city and that builds expectations that are then used to judge government schools. Many inputs at the school contribute to the Figure 2 L Probum- xichodhor overall education experience, such as the quality of the building, 26 uf H:iu,choId~.~recreational facilities, the classroom, laboratory materials and ____,_,;,- library, toilet facilities, drinking water and the behavior of the i I t - -___=,-- 25 teacher and quality of teaching, and quality of management of the . .rlS . =-= 51 school. These inputs can vary by city in government primary h* [; __9_ ischools and can account for the differences in satisfaction scores by city. For Dhaka and Khulna, for instance, more than 50 4 ' percent of households expressed satisfaction with the quality of - \ , In.T.II ,-, '.1.-.....-l-' tr- -inputs. In Chittagong, while most inputs received approval from ' - *|rJr- l . t ,- -ltl. more than 50 percent of the respondents, only 18 percent said they were satisfied with laboratory materials and the library and 32 percent were satisfied with recreational facilities. Problems and Problem Resolution Table 2.3 Problems Encouniered During Admission ('.e of Housebolds.) As llustrated in Figure 2.4, a significant proportion of households experience a number of problems, both getting their 'drnhilii -mi D t. R ;K children admitted to school and the experience their children have while in school. The residents of Chittagong experience the most 59 --_ 45 0 40 problems, with 51 percent reporting problems with their overall 16 17 32 19 experience with the school and 8 percent reporting admission- related problems. In terms of admissions, the problem cited most 10 8 8 0 often by respondents was the limited number of seats. Failure to pass admission tests and demands for donations by school 0 4 0 18 authorities were also cited (Table 2.3). Households reported using D D.-k, (-- ChJrtigr.g PL Rli,hahi. the services of a private tutor, a teacher at the school, or other i" KhLr,i means as strategies for getting their children admitted to schools. N-te M.ulupkV ir&Ar, po.6 xk .-.e A.nnix Tabc p2 b In Rajshahi, for example, participants in focus group discussions reported that they sent their children to tutors from the target school as an effective way to obtaining admission in that school. In I; _____________________Sci2 tZ I' 1o.Ac: Khulna, 37 percent of the respondents reported having to resort to "political influence" to get their children admissions. It is encouraging to note that respondents reported that bribes were not demanded by school officials in Dhaka and Rajshahi, although they did report receiving request for "donations." Figure2.5: Probles faced ithGovetrmcntPrimarySchools (%/ of Houtseholds) The problems do not end once children get admitted into 10 'U & school. Households in all cities reported various problems in 80 school, of which the most frequendy mentioned involve availability 80 38 -e i 5i of textbooks, teachers forcing parents to hire them as tutors and 40 38 ii teacher quality (Figure 2.5). For instance, for government primary 3) 11321 schools, more than half of all respondents who experienced DUk Chittagx,g Rashahi lhul problems in all cities, found it difficult to obtain free text books afficultto obtain fre textboks from the school (as many as 80 percent of Chittagong dwellers IStudmts t Wtgwdgcs wkssteachengaged stwor faced this problem). Discussants participating in focus group n*Ut-muitoy psitmncedu-toprqoalthyof tch.ng discussions reported that textbook charges per student ranged NotcNhltiple svrrxpo-sible from Tk. 10 in Chittagong to Tk. 40-50 in IKhulna every year. Soutt GtizsRepot C=dSuTy-2(K,SRS Furthermore, respondents indicated that students do not get good grades unless teachers are engaged as tutors. In KIhulna, bosti dwellers complained during focus group discussions that teachers' attitudes are a problem and teachers take advantage of Table 2.4 their position for personal gain. Students are compelled to hire; Complaints Filed versus Problems Resolved teachers as tutors outside of class hours, and are given low exam (% of Households) scores if they do not. Respondents also indicated that students _ perform poorly due to poor quality of teaching. In a focus group * held among bosti-dwellers in Chittagong, people said that teachers , 8 do not attend school regularly and that these "irregular" teachers 14 49 are not serious about their duty to teach the children. 10 48 There is a low incidence of resolution to many of these 21 27 problems - at the upper end, about 49 percent of households in Source: Citizens Report Card- 2000, SRS Chittagong indicated that they were able to get their problems resolved, although this did not necessarily improve their overall satisfaction with the education system. Households use a variety of means to resolve problems: they use influence, they pay bribes and, most frequendy, they file formal complaints with the authorities. Figure 2.6: Annual Educational However, filing a complaint does not guarantee a solution - less Expenditures by Income Group than half the respondents said they got resolution that way. Since 30000 filing a complaint is perceived as being a waste of time, only a 25000 249 11 minority of people with problems do so - at most 21 percent of I144 households in Rajshahi (Table 2.4). The "High" Cost of Education j 111,, l To better understand the price of education, households ., 5 were asked how much money they spent on their children over the , T 20000 last academic year in official payments, and extra payments, at the various types of schools. The survey included additional questions Incomc G.,)Up Tk20000 on education costs, including "costs" related to admissions and , getting good grades. Banglades Urban Service Delivery _4 The survey reveals that education is a high priority for families in Bangladesh and they pay substantial amounts for the Box 2.2 schooling of their offspring. Households spent, on average, Paying for Education between Tk.6,457 (Ra'shahi) and Tk.11,405 (Chittagong) for the The experience of Bosti DweUers in education of their children during the last academic year, with Klhulna expenses ranging from Tk.2,656 to Tk.24,911 by income level In Bangladesh, pninian, (Figure 2.6). In comparison, government expenditure per primary education i~uppoed t be free. but student in 1999/00 was Tk.1,378 per annum. Respondents srudents are being urcdr d t,. p3% Tk 100 J reported that this total expenditure included "official fees", and per head a. thE .id_nus;i-n tee In addiu.n, "under the table" payments for admission, tuition, books, uniforms primarn ;crdi.rlrId[ ihculd gcet theLr and other expenditures. The extra expenditure incurred by book'; 1rcc ..t c. Lil thc school ; households, over and above the "official fee," are high and auLhoriucz takc Tk 41-511 pcr 4Ludenr for amounted between 62 percent and 110 percent of the official fee, bookl-s. Ahhc-u+h th: GC.v.rnmntnt targets for all households. While poor households, on average, spend less Lhe poorcv.C 4111 perctr[ tf srudentn under than other households in absolute terms, their burden of extra t.. E-X.,d t. r E ducu't 1|I'r.cr.ii under I1 -ih, r- e Edu-ubii -. ' -rri u er payments, as a percentage of "official" fees, is proportionately -.%[uch Lhc' Are tIho-blc i.- rccel..e whea,iU *i pe..p1r able decide greater. (Figure 2.7). Households reported that extra payments fvho gif ate; [.-. riii firce f,.d ~ were generally requ'red for every type of school, whether wxho ger .omeumes, the students are compelled to bum severil suidebooks on books free of charge and students do not get good grades unless the same sublect. Students e ra m bosus are their teacher is engaged as a tutor. The focus group discussion neglected and find it dijificu]t to get among bosti dwellers in Khulna illustrates many of these hidden adris,sion into secondarx schools. costs (Box 2.2). In similar focus groups in Chittagong, bosti dwellers said that they have to pay a monthly fee of Tk. 20 to the school to help with the school's electric and telephone bills. However, they said they never questioned these fees because they feared retribution directed at the students by the teachers or school authorities. Figure 2.7: Extra Paymnent as % of Official Fee The survey results and focus group discussions illustrate a 300 258 general lack of accountability of schools and teachers to parents 3 250 220 and students. In Bangladesh, Parent-Teacher Associations, which have been useful in improving communication and accountabilities d 200 in other countries, exist in some places but are not active. School , Management Committees, which were meant to involve the a 1.l ~9 communities in the governance of schools, convene occasional 62 meetings that are inconclusive, do not have committed 3 201 | membership and are generally ineffective4. There are few other mechanisms for parents to learn about or influence the efficiency i.h. iu.h.hu Ns.i,.".. 'l aor effectiveness of their children's schools. The Chittagong focus n ;X;IF;|uLFl-I Ill'ti!lt,;llr~i,' ngroup pointed out that not only do parents have few mechanisms to monitor the performance of the schools to which they pay substantial fees, but they fear using them. Nor has government 4 Jalaluddin and Mushtaque, 1997. been able to set up effective monitoring mechanisms that can be used to evaluate efficiency and effectiveness at the school level. Each Assistant Upazila Education Officer (AUEO) is given Tk.200 per month to cover the expenses of supervising 20-30 schools and is required to visit at least ten. However, there are reports that this is not being done regularly. School-level audits are not conducted by either MOE, C&AG or other oversight bodies, although some NGOs have started doing this. Health Care Background The provision of basic necessities, including medical care, is an obligation of the government of Bangladesh under the constitution5. The most recent statement of the country's health sector policies and priorities is summarized in Health for all by the year 20006, which is being operationalized through the ongoing five year Health and Population Sector Program (HPSP). HPSP is a fully integrated sector-wide program that addresses issues of basic health care, drug administration, health information and monitoring, training, research and development, management, facilities and infrastructure, participation of community and local self-government bodies, and inter-sectoral collaboration. Figure 2.8: Access to Health Service In pursuit of the goal of health for all, Bangladesh has (/o of Households) made impressive progress in health service delivery and health sector outcomes during the 1990s. According to the mid term review of the Fifth Five Year Plan, health facilities have been Khulna SI expanded and modernized and the number of public hospital beds has increased by more than 1600 between 1997 and 1999. Over Rajshahi = 1,200 surgeons and 4,000 nurses have been appointed in BCS Health Service and Medical Colleges and hospitals. Health Chittagong F indicators have improved; life expectancy has increased from 58 to 61 years and the infant mortality rate per thousand live births has Dhaka __ declined from 78 in 1997 to 65 in 1999. Health services are provided by both the public and the 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 private sector (Box 2.3). There were nearly an equal number of Source: Annex'Table 1.1 public and private hospitals in Bangladesh by 1999 (528 public and 568 private), although public hospitals have a much higher concentration of beds (29,824) compared to private hospitals (11,371)7. The private sector hospitals generally serve clients who can afford to pay, while the vast majority of the poor depend upon the public sector for health care. Despite recent gains in health 5Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, as modified up to 30th of April 1996. 6 Mid Term Review of the Fifth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002, Ministry of Planning, December 2000, Dhaka. 7Ministry of Planning, 2000 Bangladesh Urban Service Delivery I6 Box 2.3: Managing the Hospitals GoermetMinistry of Health and GoenetExternal Audit C&AG's Hospitals Family Welfare Office NGO Non-Govemment External Audit NGO Affairs Hospitals Organizations (NGO) …Bureau Private HospitalsPrivate Organizations Oversight role of the Standing Committee Note: MOHEW provides funds to the institutions that it operates. NGOs and Private organizations do likewise for the institutions they run. --> The NGO Affairs Bureau only performs external audits if there is an allegation made against an NGO Hospital. Figure 2.9: Use of Health Facilities indicators, there are indications that users' expectations about 70 (% of Households) health service delivery are not being met. 60 In studies conducted by the Ministry of Health and Family 50 - Welfare8 and by Transparency International - Bangladesh9, poor 40 quality of care, including lack of proper treatment, poor doctor and 30 ' nurse behavior, lack of availability of doctors and nurses, and 20 . excessive costs including unofficial payments demanded by staff 10 * i 3 are some of the main problems cited with the public health care 0 . , I system. Users of medical services place primary importance on Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Raishahi tI Goer-ment Ilospital i I Nv.te Doctor Private flospital Note: Multiple answers possible Source: CGize-s Report Card Su, . . ' 8 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 1999. 9 Transparency International, 1997. 17 G: C= increasing the availability of medicines and qualified staff so that waiting times can be reduced.10 Against this background, the survey focused only on curative health care services at public hospitals, both in-patient and outpatient. Households were asked where they seek health care services, what kind of treatment and services they receive from the providers, their satisfaction with those services, what problems they encounter and how they resolve these problems. Figure 2.10: Hospital Admission: Two Most Recent Visits (% of Households) Access and Satisfaction 14 13 12 More than 80 percent of the households indicated that 10 they had adequate access to curative health facilities, with the exception of Dhaka where the proportion was lower at 54 percent 8 I (Figure 2.8). A person with a health problem is more likely to visit a 6 private doctor or a private hospital in Dhaka and IKhulna and a government facility in Ra'shahi. In Chittagong, an equal proportion reported visiting private doctors or government hospitals (Figure - 1 2.9). In all the cities surveyed, the choice of health facility is influenced by a variety of factors, but residents generally go to ! -hittagong Khuna Rajshahi government hospitals because they are less expensive. Private I l ovemment hospitals and doctors are considered to offer better treatment and ,e, po.-ble are more accessible. The exception is Dhaka, where good en treatment at public hospitals is cited by almost as large a proportion of households as low expenses, and is nearly as popular a reason for seeking treatment at government hospitals as it is for private hospitals and doctors (Anne'x Table 2.8). Notwithstanding the stated preference for private hospitals in Dhaka and Khulna, when asked about the two most recent episodes of hospital admission for a member of the household, a majority of respondents in all four cities indicated that they had Figure 2.11: Satisfaction with Overall Health admitted the patient to a government hospital (Figure 2.10). The Services(%ofHouseholds) type of institution used is linked with income levels. The vast 20 18 18 1 majority of poor households went to government hospitals 16 i 16 (ranging from 73 percent in Dhaka to 100 percent in Rajshahi) for 14 l4 their two most recent visits, whereas households with monthly 12 incomes from Tk.12,000-20,000 went to private hospitals or used 10 9 9 private doctors (from 45 percent in Dhaka to 60 percent in 8 I Khulna). Chittagong is a significant exception where the more 4 affluent households indicated using public hospitals. Education 2 levels are also associated with the type of institution used and the 0 lower the education level, the more likely the household is to use a Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Raish thi government hospital (ranging from 61 percent in Khulna to 100 IIAAliIFI i:PoorHH percent in Dhaka). Source: Annex Table 2.15 Getting admitted to a hospital is not a routine affair and users of medical facilities have to use a variety of ways, regular and 10 Baseline Service DeAivey Survey, 1999 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Bangadesh: Utbai Ser6vce Deliver S extra-regular, to gain admission. While the "normal" route requires no up-front payment, other routes include paying a fee to the Ta,ble 2.5 doctor at his private chamber, paying money directly to a hospital Proceduic fqir Admission in Govt. employee and/or using a personal connection with hospital Hospihal (... J l-uuseholds) administration staff. Between 18 percent of the households in Rajshahi and 49 percent in Khulna reported using extra regular D C R K methods to gain admission. For example, to get admitted into a government hospital in Dhaka, up to 18 percent of households pay N|-t -i 6(4 7 _ 82 51- a fee to the doctor, 8 percent pay money to hospital employees, while 4 percent use their connections with administrative staff. 1a 18.1 Iz 1 5 Similar behavior is observed in Chittagong and Khulna, although l 7 * Ra'shahi appears to be an exception in that no households reported i4 1 making payments to doctors or hospital employees (Table 2.5). These results are similar to those recorded for in-patient 3- IN admissions in the 1997 Transparency International survey. Focus D ['hAa. - hiLri .'r, '. Lm.hibJ.a. K KhiLni group discussants from bostis in Khulna reported that poor patients have to wait for several hours in a queue at Khulna Medical College Hospital even after buying tickets for treatment, even though there are many beds (250) available in the hospital. Table 2.6 Influential people, on the other hand, buy the ticket and go straight Satisfaction vaith In-parient Hospital to the doctor concerned for treatment without waiting in any Sernices Prouided During the Last Visit queue. The average duration of stay in a hospital ranges from 4 ( ol fHouseholds) days in Rajshahi to 9 days in Chittagong. I) C R k Overall satisfaction with the health service system is very low, with the highest satisfaction in Khulna (Figure 2.11). Across . -_ 15 32 26 the cities a larger percentage of poor households are satisfied with 4.1 11 22 23 health care than other households. Focus group discussions 18 ( 21 15 pointed out, however, that bosti dwellers feel that they are deprived = 31 IY14 of proper health facilities, and they do not get good care from 5 2r, 4 8n 14 doctors and nurses or the necessary medicines. As one discussant 2(. 21- 21 noted "even the ward boys harass the common people." -' 4 I x 12 Satisfaction levels with all types of in-patient and out-patient E' 2 4 4 Ix 8 services (including behavior of doctor, care provided by nurses, D DurA. C. n - Rhi K lnJiwlai iting period for diagnosis and quality of treatment) is low in S,r Annc-, walc'I public hospitals (Tables 2.6 & 2.7) and in no instance exceed 50 percent of the households surveyed. Equally low levels of satisfaction were recorded with the facilities including toilets, Table 2.7 drinking water, and the cleanliness of rooms. Satisfaction uith Out-patient Hospital Sertices Pro%ided Dunng the Last Vsisi Problems and Problem Resolution (I -, of Households) D C R '* The incidence of problems with public health facilities vary by city. Nine percent of households surveyed in Dhaka indicated LlGl tS@bffIIwar- X I | 21 39 that they had encountered a problem with the hospital, compared elTaiRrc11| 4 | i.8 21 4 to 43 percent in Chittagong. Poor households did not report a * * 2 13 9 ~~disproportionate number of problems (Figure 2.12). The main _*1 I I I I types of problems households complained about included the l * I' 3 i 5 |12 | behavior of medical staff, long waiting times, and inadequate D) Dhika.(I -hiruc.-m iVR.i hAh% k lkhiln diagnostic facilities (Table 2.8). Between 9 (Chittagong) and 69 _ __r=c Anrw\ i'AAC I MaIdEff ------ (Rajshahi) percent of the respondents complained about the inconsiderate behavior of doctors. Long waiting times affect 19 Sc'cJai between 25 (K(hulna) and 65 (Chittagong) percent of households, while up to 10 percent of the respondents (Dhaka) felt that their condition had been misdiagnosed. Focus group discussants noted the "lack of sincerity" on the part of doctors, which caused them to be negligent and often Thle I.S prescribe the wrong treatment. Concern was expressed with Problems Faced ar Government doctors prescribing medicines that were not available in the Hospirals ., Or Households) i hospital but could only be obtained from the doctor's office and with pathological tests that could only be performed by the doctor's preferred pathological laboratories. Participants believed that the doctors get a share of the profit from the laboratories to which they refer patients. The discussions highlighted the general sense that the quality of service received depends largely on 1 3 26 5 1 31l influence and money. For instance, bosti dwellers in K(hulna 44 I - 2 ) l explained that poor people generally do not get proper health care _ service in government hospitals since the number of doctors are 4 4 } 3 few compared with the large number of patients. The excessive 4u 65 _5 59 patient load often results in doctors writing prescriptions without _ C. examining the patient, relying instead only on the patient's description of the disease. Bosti dwellers in Dhaka complained about long delays saying that it could sometimes take a month for a patient to get to see a doctor at the hospital. They also complained about the unavailability of drugs in hospitals, noting that the 4 medicines that should be available to them free of charge are often l on sale outside the hospital and accused hospital staff of stealing Ii l stocks and selling them to pharmacies for re-sale. Bosti dwellers in Chittagong said that upwards of one-third of the drugs that 2 i I .I patients need are not available in hospital, but are sold outside. D DhA.l. K i[1h*r): i i hdhi. K KJi.lna Once again, these findings are consistent with the 1997 A= . 1 WA1 2 I. Transparency International survey, where 26 percent of households who had medical problems indicated that they had to purchase medicines from designated stores outside the hospital. Bosti dwellers indicated that the same medicine, paracetamol (pain killer), is generally prescribed for al ailments. They observed that ajas Figure 2 12. Households that Faced Problims (female care-takers), door-keepers, security guards and other low in SekLing Treatment in Govt. Hospitas level workers frequently remove saline, injections, and other " 43 medicines from the hospital and sell them to outside pharmacies 4, and medicine-shops. As a result, pharmacies are full of medicines I that have "not for sale" labels on them. - 20 Although many households experience problems with the 14l health care system, relatively few households - ranging from 6 I il percent in Dhaka to 31 percent in Rajshahi - bother filing a II complaint. Rajshahi residents are more vocal about the problems '-' n h Ch"tago ng Ra.1hi Ihun they encounter, with a majority indicating that they filed a IfBosti Non-Bose complaint three or more times. An important reason for ..,. '.nncx 'I'able 2.12 households not filing complaints is that there is no action taken when a complaint is filed. More than 75 percent of the households filing complaints in Rajshahi indicated that no action was taken to resolve their first or second complaint. BangIsadhv. Urban Serice Delivery 2t) The "High" Cost of Hospital Services Actual hospital costs are much higher than the official fees, since users are required to make extra payments to access services. As focus group participants in bostis noted, although most hospital services are supposed to be free, in reality, no service is available Box 2.4 without "speed" money. The w igh Cost of The magnitude of the bribes can be relatively large. In Low Cost Public Hospitals Chittagong, for instance, households spend, on average, 56 times . woman from a bostu in the amount of the official fee on bribes to resolve a problem (the C,hirurgong related the follouing average official fee is unrealistically low at Tk.9 and average z,tor abour the high ludden CO.S reported bribe is Tk.500). In KIhulna, the bribe is 5 times the of es;,tinual care official fee (average official fee is Tk.29 and the average bribe is A I '/lr :go ,P n . Irtuo jeairs Tk.145). Households are required to pay bribes at different stages dso. 11* I. o .n. , 5/ hr Ire atment, of the health care process. They first pay to get admitted, then to I' irS! .;.9i1 .fI .1 ttr see a doctor and then for medicines and other essential medical hoz.aaZ a.g ; I ...1&rin , .1unes . I lookS a.; , i,t . ene. i 1t,o supplies. Households also reported instances of sick patients, iku a j r,'.. ,; r,,.t. !;t,auie I lad no or;-.;g UJI .u~; r,~~. 1 rr ,nl:yI )b .lunable to use the stairs, making payments to use the lift. r,a:u.r:,. I .,dir . i,., iter. Improving Education and Health Services nefori uJ! - . o. t. .J. /. .'ijld U /i'..l I soild Results from the survey support previous studies that ior T:. q.#0 aiid JnJceni !re alole show that despite improving education and health indicators, .J'h'.' ',:4r :/b irra, r.e. : {vi ofit /YXer. satisfaction levels remain low. Households have to pay substantial Hoju, r,'r. I ..I e,e n.,b 0~ i."er. hidden costs to access health and education services. Whlle I! I .i. 'I/e olr .-al and offering a comprehensive strategy for improving social service 111 '.wa. ,w'*-n:,s I m.a1d lbe amouoni delivery is beyond the scope of this exercise, this section offers of n^L;s., I cI ~ a' !i.'Iernrnment suggestions in a few areas that appear to be important based on 1/:'o~m*.ia.~ :! A '; 10 te anMount fI survey results and where some initiatives are already underway"1. U/O.Ib: b- , b!".1jIi .: 4 . I em. Iij/ Uril.'i" ! ' ' 1 '' 1 n Improving Incentive Systems. Experience from other L 11.'i, , F ., . par countries shows that one of the most effective mechanisms to Iadle pre,i,nI,j ,'.', ieJ rj .,/ 'onigrI imnprove service delivery is to provide incentives for improved /o io.,rh/. I,,r an,i_ and1j sjlster de ,:oz e outcomes. Performance measures should take into consideration distIn o,ni.eIS health jenmces o/- tlhe the existing levels of resources in the community, and incentives hospial, should be provided to institutions that provide the best service. She added lacer that the current market value of the land In the education sector, for example, the government that ,he was compelled to sell is finances all expenses in government schools and at least 80 percent Tk.600,'o00 of teacher salaries in registered non-government schools, at the primary and secondary levels. It therefore has strong leverage over their performance, which it can use. Bangladesh is beginning to put in place some of the structures and processes for incentive- based improvements. PMED has set up a primary school grading system which includes a performance monitoring report for government and non-government schools. The grade a school receives makes it eligible for rewards or sanctions. If, for instance, a school receives a "D", PMED can exclude it from receiving 11 For more comprehensive discussion of the Education sector reform agenda see Bangladesh: Education Sector Review, World Bank, University Press Limited, 2000. 21 cOilS~1 wheat as part of the Food for Education program. However, the effectiveness of the system can be improved. While it is the responsibility of the AUEOs to collect information by grade level, this is not always done effectively. There are instances of AUEOs not visiting schools and having teachers fill out the inspection forms. Second, the school grades and performance monitoring reports are seldom used to reward, penalize or improve the school, and the school's grades are not publicized within the community. Bo 2.5 So despite its financial leverage, government does not generally link Bolh 2. Service Defi%ery Surve%ys for the He.lt payment to performance. and Population Sector Program Positive incentives could also be used to improve Throutgh the Flealih and management and limit corruption. Government should collect, on P uIpulauiin SectLor Program (HPSP,i, che a regular basis, disaggregated data on the imposition of all fees 1.hrLj;Ln of Health and Famndv \elt:ire m collected from households by the school authorities. Efforts collab.'r:mton with ocher siakuhiclders. iS. should also be made to track other hidden costs, such as requests dcveloping in annu l monjtoring for donations or the proportion of students required to attend rnechanirn, diroueh s'erce Ic Deh%erv additional fee-based tuition delivered by teachers from the school. { Sur.e.in (rder r, idtriuf! prerarn A good example of this in the health sector is the Baseline Service k progre ; and the actons th,t ''ill heIp Delivery Surveys conducted by the Health and Population Sector aCurreve]: it Mm , lcnienun1f the preci,- d Program (Box 2.5). Incentives could be withdrawn from , phas o,t .ervc': I.icrc sur't' to "mismanaged" schools and public health facilities where the ftcl.lo , up ,n tlm bahrlne v.ur,re' pubh;'hed tracked numbers are at odds with previously agreed targets. in June P1-) Thc bizAlric is . unlque Incentives should be available only to those schools and hospitals monitoring mnchni;rnm in that it Includes that show improvements in management as measured through a u;e, exQpcrinccc in- u;er pcrcepu.,ns ot variety of indicators including the number of hours teachers spend healch and f.-anid, plannin.r tcrvicet by the teaching, the student/teacher ratio, and the timely and free populAirni .t [areI.inL.dch ' i)). pronide; provision of textbooks and medicines to those eligible. key outcome id rr s ndic.mtors . agretd o.n bk r th.lderi [h.it Cjii be tr tralck-ed durcil rhe im,pie lnt rau,on ot Correcting Information Asymmetries and tracked tmi nonit pr impIcn cttaCi.vn ejf Strengthening Voice. The information collected by government S U) IS pr-. ides da r' f. r indicat'r should be in the public domain and published regularly. Both the s corre.p:,ndjni cc i-li'"l program education and health sectors are beginning to do this. The Ministry > compointrl i. in.lLjdiF reproducu%e of Health and Family Welfare has begun the process of 4 health, child hcl[h care. Lnuwed curailve incorporating citizen voice into its annual planning and monitoring c art. bcha.u-,-r CI-tFneC c-irimunicau'n. process through the Service Delivery Surveys (Box 2.5). This tool anid use alid L:%pcrncr. 'it he.lth ierice4 can be used at the local as well as national level, and baseline SIDS al>.> Iuehilght> tah cxtnt X cE I -hich indicators and progress monitoring reports can be disseminated to health and p.pulau,.n cri.cc.s are a wide audience. The nationally representative sample is useful for beictnrne niore ru pon n-e and setting city-wide benchmarks for comparing hospital performance accountable i[) ujer4 The procc;; a4it lfS setting city-wide ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' ~detign..d to encoura,ge stakchulder within and across cities. This information can be useful for both parricipmlurn in planning and mrnitonng, government and non-governmental organizations as well as the serviccs and tfo.ter dialo:gue bem.'cen ward commissioners who can use the results to monitor and ser%ice user; and providtrs. The sun.ev improve service delivery. instrument includeb a household quesuronnaure, tocus group guides, key Since households are paying for a substantial proportion of info:)rmant inier.vieus and insrutonal educational expenses, they need to understand the school's overall rev iex-i of Liruon Health and Faniilv budget and be given greater influence over spending decisions. \Welfare Centers and Thana Health This could be done either through the existing School Management Complexes. Committees or Parent Teacher Associations. Parents also need to be better informed about the factors that affect education quality so that they can press school administrators and national Banglades Urban Service Delivery _ ? 7 authorities to provide needed inputs. Increased parental involvement could also help to reduce the mismatch between the content and orientation of the education system and the demands of Bangladesh's evolving labor market. Findings from projects such as "Education Watch", targeted at parents with children of school going age can help. This project, spearheaded by the Campaign for Popular Education, a coalition of 400 NGOs, published a study of internal efficiencies of the primary education system, and is planning on publishing another volume on the variables affecting acquisition of basic competencies by students. Similarly, PMED has recently published and disseminated the results of a child Box 2.6 education and literacy survey while the Ministry of Education has Chhilam Boka, Hoilam Buddhirnan embarked upon a project to strengthen education management ii \\ t- ~.1fi-,ol, noa I am inceUiger) information systems. These are all positive developments in the I)urtn,o s..C_ exarninauons, right direction. Armed with pertinent information on the way ,a.; akd [.. i-: Elir ach.oIl authonues schools run and how those relate to student achievement, informed -,, ,te ,hu ..' h,L~her tha ocommunity members can play an important role in monitoring a fee th.it .%.; hnteher iFnarn thnfciatlCUvv tee I rdtu3ed ii- p.i*i thr extr;t iount social sector outcomes. and lodgied a c.1,piplairi .'.ah the \\ard Ccimm]"i.--:ner Akh,Iui. uh ihe \X ard The recent establishment of Hospital Advisory Comnmi-,i..ncr indicirid that he %Luld Committees, comprising representatives of NGOs and elected help, hLi per..niinl i %%Lafl! wad In officials, is also a welcome development. Their terms of reference league %vi' 1(11 ht Lch,ul auth.' and I are expected to expand gradually, from reviewing plans to also ,.a-; dt-Licd pcrmu~-i-n i- 4it Ijr t.he~ approving the use of all fees collected at the hospital. The Ministry exam. .nd hi.id t.- mic, one ear. of Health and Family Welfare has agreed to develop and publicize a Ev.nrualI., I psiid tle c\Lra aimOUnt to Evenruh...lV p.,id Eiuch'jri a bamount eo patient's charter of rights. The charter outlines the essential service Ehc sch _._..l iudi,rait;c bccause 1I. rcahzed th.b I %,uld be the ulinmate package (ESP) that patients can expect at every level of the health loscr If I could nut sit t ,r the exams. I service system. The charter should be posted at every point of .X.As a focl before, but now- I have health service delivery system, such as in hospital admission rooms, bcocme Lcethgent. and in in-patient hospital rooms. The charter should include a list of official fees for popular services and also a list of medicines that Bosti dcveller in Dhaka city are available at the clinic. Community groups should be involved in reviewing the charter before it is finalized through public hearings that can be held by the hospital advisory committees, and through their elected representatives (e.g. ward commissioners and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health). Strengthening Accountability and Oversight. In the education sector, parents currently have very little influence on service delivery, despite the fact that they are paying for it. Their only recourse to improve their children's education is to go for private tutoring. Various studies, including this survey, show that a significant portion of private expenditure on education goes towards out-of-school tuition to prepare for the final exams and households cite this as a major problem. This distortion could be corrected by redirecting the expenses to improving the quality of education, by improving instruction materials, training of teachers and reforming the exam system. In the health sector, while about two-thirds of all expenditures are financed from private sources, there is no regulation of private facilities. Patients have no control or influence over professional standards and behavior. In terms of forms of local oversight and problem resoluton, there are no legal requirements for open public hearings on school planning or hospital management. Neither is there a functioning formal mechanism for grievance redressal. In the education sector, beyond the monitoring activities of AUEOs, Box 2.7 school level audits should be conducted, and be made available to Box 2.7 SMC's, PTAs, the media and the public. Criteria to trigger an audit Accountabilir)' and its objecdve should include reports of low satisfacton, problems, low problem resolution and hidden costs. There are In che earh- 1991)'%s (he Unimtd indications that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Kingdom pioneered [he eNphcit ,.eunq Education is becoming more active. and publhcizing c, ti3ndard; tc.r qulILl . ser ice dchvier. to [he public ihr.:.uh A few hospitals are experimenting with improving C iuzen.. 'l.h.irer;. T-hc ch.irtcr- irc part governance at the facility level, through the use of autonomous ot che UKls iur.muc r. u- InIPr,.c theI boards that include community and government representatives. quahr% -,t *er Ice dch cr, l-he These boards have full authority to hire and fire, approve budget underliir1, phiJ ..-,ph. .,ft [thc hirtcr, 1; and set fees. Although they are public hospitals, incteases in their W [h4 til nicd, ', u'er .'f lic efficiency have allowed them to reduce their reliance on must b. ukr Into ice.ura :nd hi bt government funding: between 25 and 50 percent of their funding prc.m.ted TILI cFarr rh. -,ch tnd .thbh comes from government sources. In exercising their hiring and haw b.cn puaIi,.hed t .r ko er. ce firing authority, the autonomous boards should use the city level matche; ciciz nir ri,2hr- r.' their SDS information to set performance benchmarks for doctors, expectaun.:in The ai.,ri drtr bulild nurses, and hospital administrators. They should also ensure that ccunscn u; ind ruii: tic ., r.-rLne.; o accessible and responsive grievance redressal mechanisms are in us.er4, and Ire En dtirL in place for patients and should periodically review the performance d accoun.bilir. mIccl mh.lnil III thie of such mechanisms. SDS could be tailored to include questions ; tftrtac bermcn [1c. r id the on grievance redressal and benchmarks established for increasing s,cre IcC prn ... idr use of and problem resolution through grievance mechanisms. i - %%l n s._I,[ ir l h I rakr;d cit.:,l viU txll nf -Ir. .:e *.r'. iCc.. and tht The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health is C-iuztn% s lh1irtr \\hi,c piper pubh..hcd already collaborating actively with government and civil society in in lul 1yfl r;. .2nI,eC thi. It -et, uut a improving governance and service delivery. Committee members rang t uf. iriech ,ni;mi toi are working with MOHFW to adapt the above mentioned increa-e h..h ,.rm ird cc.'untabdirv experiment with autonomous boards to other hospitals. In and up'.Aard .icc. ul 1uit,ubr .\IAtrna.:tc addition, it is working with MOHEW and NGOs to improve serlice deh':crN mLch.aruni m uch a; integraton of health and family planning services. MOHEW itself pn ariz:u.mn and %vider conmpeuru.l, and should improve oversight through a vanrety of means. Given the conracung ut arc rtnin ended i.; issues around the ethical behavior of doctors and nurses revealed opuoJnl that incream cpi-cn edurt. eMc.re by the survey, MOHFW7 should better monitor accreditation and ett-ecibve redrcos mcrease citzen roice. renewal of accreditation of professionals, for example by analyzing Upwxard accountabdlry can be imprcovtd gnevances filed against frequently offending doctors. E ia tougher and more independenr in,pectorates and pertomiance-related paY. Infrastructure Services .Accessing infrastructure services such as electricity, Figure 3.1: Access to Electricity Servi :e gas, water and sanitation is crucial for households and of central (o/ of Households) importance in all kinds of econon-ic activities. Good infrastructure can lower production costs, increase productivity, Rajshahi ~ accelerate economic growth and help reduce poverty. Kun However, creating an institutional environment that encourages the suppliers of infrastructure services to be more responsive to Chittagong the needs of the users is clearly a challenge. Dhaka _______ Electricity " 80 90 100 >. .:re: Annex Tabele .l Background The Mlinistry of Energy and Mfineral Resources vision Statement (2000) indicates that it's objective is to provide FigUFe 3.2: H-ou'.ehold.. with Electricity "caccess to affordable and reliable electricity to the majority of Conine.i,mn r.ifi iliciuseholds) the people of Bangladesh by 2020." Making reliable and quality electricity available to all the people of the country, at affordable prices, can improve the standard of living and enhance 4____________ -1 econlomic development. Given the low base the country is starting from, this is an ambitious vision, and relying on the 78 public sector to meet this objective is unlikely to be successful. I,ij.r 7 76 Official estimates show that access to and consumption of electricity by rural and urban Bangladeshis is one of lowest in tz.,. '67 the world: less than 20 percent of the population has access (4.3 million consumning entities), of which 80 percent live in 3- 4, -il 60 70 80 urban areas (3.4 million). The industry faces severe challenges, I..[... both technical and managerial. Installed capacity today stands at only 3750 MW; generation capacity would have to increase ',c nb Bangadesh: Urban Service Ddivery 26 Figure 3.3: Respondents Knovledge of fivefold to 15,000 MW and system losses reduced substantially llegal Connection (". of Households) from the currently very high 35-40 percent levels if government's vision is to be realized. 21.!ll. l .. __t Electricity services to consumers are provided by distribution agencies: Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) Fsh.ll-a -. 1 and Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO) in Dhaka and Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) in the other LJh L -i. cities. DESA distributes electricity to the Dhaka metropolitan area, officially serving approximately 490,000 customers, R!, . - DESCO covers the Mirpur area of the Dhaka metropolis and has 93,000 customers, while BPDB serves customers in IE . 15 . Chittagong, K hulna, and Rajshahi. Improving distribution .,r:. .nl;. \ i jblt performance is high on the government's energy policy agenda as it has been acknowledged that distribution is the "weakest link in the industry"', due to high system loss, both technical and non-technical. Increasing revenue collection is another area Figure 3.4: Satisfaction %xith Electric"). of emphasis. Senice (.Xl Households) The survey asked respondents about their access to electricity and the quality of service provided to them. It K1sri,ul = -12 enquired about the types and frequency of problems encountered in getting electric connections and receiving [hWk, _ follow-up service, including the official and hidden costs encountered by them. In addition to overall satisfaction with the quality of service, it also queried them about corrupt practices, such as illegal connections, reducing the electricity bill l uhl. sr.L 2 illegally, paying bribes to get problems fixed, and other ways households get their problems solved. i 4 IY 1! 4 Access and Satisfaction Survey results show that electricity is accessible to the vast majority of the residents in the four cities surveyed (Figure Table 3.1 3.1). In excess of eight out of ten households in the four cities Satisfaction by Income Group reported that they had electricity supplied to their homes. ('/ of Households) Between 40 and 80 percent of "poor" respondents, i.e. those mc with income levels of less than Tk.2,000 per month, similarly k.) reported having an electricity connection at home (Figure 3.2). 11111 - 3 0. O 8 However, few respondents were willing to admit that their I I i1g,Ii 12 2 2 12 electricity connections were illegal. For example, only 5 percent _ of the respondents in Rajshahi, 6 percent in Dhaka and 9 9 1 0 12 percent in K(hulna said that they knew of people in their 1 2 8 16 neighborhood with illegal connections (Figure 3.3). A much 3 _ 8 16 higher proportion of households in Chittagong (21 percent) |ilfI 2 0 . indicated that they were aware of illegal electricity connections. D Daki. it: Ra't -hi ..K h.in...K gibflI Most respondents reported that illegal connections were Sourcc AR.r, I bk 37 obtained in collusion with the lineman. I Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Vision Statement. 7 Infrastructure Servi es Focus group discussions undertaken to supplement survey data revealed, however, that most bosti dwellers acknowledged that their electricity connections were illegal and Box 3.1 they had detailed knowledge of how illegal connections are Getting Connected in Chittagong made. Focus group discussions in bostis in Dhaka and Khulna revealed that bosti dwellers were generally aware that 'holding Accordung t0 .I focu4 group numbers' are required to get a legal electricity connection, di.scu-;4ion hdId %%ith the residents of which includes the installation of a meter. Since most bostis do Baris.il Co:l'n) in (ChIttagong, every not have holding numbers, bosti dwellers buy connections from household has obtained an illegal people with legal access to electricity in their houses and pay electricity connection from an charges for connection and use at "market" rates. In some cases adjacent mosque. This illegal the bosti dwellers are allowed use of electricity only for a limited connection has been intermediated period during th ,d,a . Both bosti dwe.lers in Khulna and a by local linesmen working in BPDB. peniod during the day. Both bosti dwellers in Khnuna and a The lineman collects Tk.100 per representative of DESA reported that "influential" people are household per month for electricity able to obtain illegal connections using threats or political consumption. 'The money collected influence. They also confirmed that it is common for people to from the bosti dwellers does not steal power for business and personal use by directly tapping accrue to BPDB; instead, the electric poles, sometimes without the knowledge of the amount is shared between the electricity office. Bosti dwellers in Chittagong, for example, lineman and other low level reported that they got connections illegally by tapping into the employees of BPDB. BPDB's existing legal connection of the neighborhood mosque. (Box administration has been advised that 3.1). payments made by bosti dwellers are used 3S comnribu6iun. to the mosque, tor ItS de%clopni-nt. Tl-u method of Despite good access to electricity in urban areas, getting illegal connecuon, ss not satisfaction levels are low. Satisfied respondents ranged from 12 lhmuted to tus bosu, but i. pervasive percent in Khulna to 2 percent in Chittagong and Rajshahi throughout Chirtagong (Figure 3.4). Poorer households reported similar low levels of satisfaction. (Table 3.1). Problems and Problem Resolution In the four urban areas covered by the survey, the vast , Figure 3.5: Problems Incidence in majority of users report that they have problems with both Electricity Connection getting an electricity connection and using electricity in their homes once they get the connection. Between 12 percent of the households in Dhaka and 39 percent in Rajshahi reported 4,i having problems getting an electricity connection (Figure 3.5). 411 R iuah These numbers, in all probability, understate the magnitude of , C1_1EI3C.Ong the problem since many respondents do not own the property o '''u27 they were occupying and were therefore not responsible for _ u getting the connection in the first place. In every city, a greater proportion of female headed households reported facing problems in getting connections than did their male 2 I. counterparts (Figure 3.6). Diiaka 5 nnex Table 3.2 * A :.-:..q) BangIesh: Urban Service Delivery 8 Of those who reported problems, an overwhelming Figure 3.6: Problems in Getting Electricity majority (ranging from 56 percent in Dhaka to 91 percent in Connection by Gender (% of Households) Chittagong) reported paying extra money to the officials * concerned to resolve their problem (Table 3.2). Bosti dwellers Khulna -6- - 7- in Khulna indicated, during focus group discussions, that while Rajshahi __________________ 5I ~'the cost of a legal electric connection was about Tk.1,200 (for C;ittaog~. the meter, cut-outs, etc.) the electricity office generally took an Cliittagong _4__ additional Tk.3,000 as a bribe for providing the connection. In Dhaka -_ 12 1l addition, the linemen who make the actual connection had to be 0 10 20 7ll sl x,l ,.1l given between Tk.300-400 as extra payment. Respondents also noted that there were long delays in getting a meter installed Source: Aneex I 1:1 ' Li IS ,i. and additional money had to be paid for meter and parts. Load shedding was reported as a serious problem by electricity users in all cities and by at least 60 percent of the households. Most indicated that this was a daily occurrence and frequently happened several times a day. Problems do not end Major Problems with Electricity Connection with load shedding. Voltage fluctuation, low voltage, power (% of Households) breakdown and over billing were common in all the cities Extra (Table 3.3). Moreover, problems do not happen just once - money Additional they happen often. Nearly half of households in all cities say Repeted Delav ViSZits to suppiy moncy)aid they experience problems at least once a month, if not several the tibe office Meter nmiter/parts times a day. official 1IMP<. 56 84 23 20 According to DESA, there is a formal grievance 91 72 40 18 mechanism available at the Executive Engineer's office that consumers can use to report problems they encounter. The user IIN!5IIii. 86 72 49 32 can either complain verbally or submit their complaint in 70 25 12 19 writing to the appropriate executive engineer, who then Source: Annex Table 3.2 responds by sending a person to examine the connection or meter in the home. Despite the existence of this mechanism, and low satsfaction levels and frequency of problems, relatively few households report their grievances to the authorities, except in Rajshahi. For example, while only 14 percent of the people experiencing problems report these in Dhaka, almost 49 percent Table 3.3 do in Rajshahi. Those who do report are often compelled to Problems other than Load-shedding (% of Households) report more than once - in 3 cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, and D C K R Rajshahi) more than 30 percent households reported having to 40 25 40 45 complain to the authorities more than three times for the _____rll _ ____ __ same problem. 30 18 14 8 - - As expected, bosti dwellers file complaints with the WA[|iM20 14 26 16 authorities much less frequently than do non-bosti dwellers. For 6 39 10 29 instance, although 84 percent of electricity users living in bostis D: Dhaka, C: Chitta ng; yK K hL lna; FL R:ajshahi Source: Annex Table 3.5 in Dhaka experience problems with We service, they do not file complaints with the authorities at all (Figure 3.7). Given that most bosti dwellers are aware that they have ilHegal connections, and do not have holding numbers, they feel that they do not have a basis to complain. They are also concerned that they may be vulnerable to eviction or harassment if they complain to authorities. Bosti dwellers in Rajshahi indicated that when they 29 Lrt'tf u 1tale Litzv .4-. do complain, they complain to meter readers. However, that doesn't necessarily solve their problem. Figure 3.7: Households Filing Complaints for Problems Other than Load-shedding As shown in Table 3.4, Khulna which faces fewer complaints (45 percent of households) and appears to have Kulna a more effective problem-resolution mechanism in place. I; Approximately, two-thirds of the respondents reported Rajshahi success in getting their problems solved - more than half _3_ by following normal complaint channels. The second most Chittagong frequent way to solve problems is to pay a bribe (as many Dhaka as 14 percent of households with problems in Khulna paid bribes). About 78 percent of Dhaka residents and 71 0 1U 20 30 40 50 6 percent of Chittagong residents, where problem levels tend '/o of Households to be higher, failed to get their problems resolved. Bosb Bosti What User's Pay for Electricity NI/s: Boti dwie/rs in Ihaka did noprs preblepri to uloihny Source: Annex Table 3.6 The survey asked respondents a series of questions about the costs, direct and indirect, official and "hidden", about getting an electricity connection, using the service, and solving problems. Their responses indicate that households, on Table 3 4 average, spend between Tk.2,666 (Khulna) and Tk.6,704 Prr,blem ResIunn i oF Hou,ehold-p (Chittagong) to get an electricity connection. In every city, = households paid more than just the "official fee" and, as mentioned above, more than 50 percent of the households Il tht:z' pi..li,irn. ' identified this as a problem. This extra payment was in most _5 cases quite large, amounting up to about 83 percent of the --- official fee in Dhaka and Chittagong respectively (Figure 3.8). _ r'r .,l.r. lJr..l,rr * .J While the popular perception is that there is public hlecr.-,r p, Li , , .- resistance to increasing electricity tariffs, results of the survey I -. and related focus group discussions show that people have a - _ = high willingness to pay for this "essential" service. Ironicaily, . l = ,- the poor bear a larger burden of costs for connection and usage Il 1.., did. and, as shown in Table 3.5, the proportion that the poor are.j;: .: i.ir. ihr.n .Ir-* . - paying for connections is high relative to their disposable . income. Assuming that ail poor households have monthly incomes at the top end of their income scale, i.e. Tk.2,000 per month, the cost of electricity connection is in excess of 150 percent of one month's income in all cities. Also, the ratio of Table 3.5 the cost of getting connected to monthly household income is Total Amounts Paid for Electricity Connection higher for the poor than for other income groups - for instance, (As' a% of Income) households in the next highest income bracket, Tk.2,001-6,000 - Up to Tk. Tk. Tk. per month, pay on average Tk.3,984 for connection in Dhaka. Ti.2000 6000 12000 20000 If all these households make Tk.6,000/month, then their . I I payment is 66 percent of one month's income, less than half the 1991 87 64_ 39 152 56 33 19 relative cost for poorer households. Focus group discussions in 16 44 21 13 Rajshahi revealed that bosti dwellers pay Tk.500-700 more than Note: The numbers are a percentage of the top cut off the official connection fee that BPDB charges. Moreover, point for each income bracket. approximately 20 percent of households with electricity Source Annex Table 38 connections said that in addition to the connection fee, they Bang eades Urban Serice Dlivery paid extra for the meter and the parts, whose costs are Figure 3.8: Extra Pas meni .4 a Of supposed to be included in the official connection fee. Official Fee In addition to the connection cost, focus group Rajshahi discussions also revealed that poor bosti dwellers paid higher amounts for electricity consumption. For example, bosti Khuna _37 dwelers in Dhaka revealed that they had access to illegally- Chittagong _- .4 procured electricity only from the evening to 5 a.m., and had to pay the going "market" price of Tk.50 per month for each Dhaka __ electric bulb. On the other hand, if they could get a legal 0 20 40 connection, the service would be available to them 24 hours a Source: Annex Table 3.,day and their cost would not exceed Tk.13-15 per month at existing rates. Bosti dwellers reported that they were compelled to pay sirmilarly high monthly rates for fans (Tk.50) and for TVs (Tk.50). Billing and Collection Table 3.6 Most respondents indicated that they pay their electric Regular Bil Payment and bill on time since non-payment results in disconnection. Disconnection Due to Non-payment Rajshahi residents reported highest regularity of bill payment; (%/o of Houaeholds) interestingly, Rajshahi also had the highest incidence of City P Biant Disconnection disconnection on account of delinquent payments (Table 3.6). 84 13 A considerable number of respondents (ranging from 20 86 21 percent in Dhaka to 41 percent in Chittagong) indicated that 93 37 they knew that it was possible to reduce the electricity bil 89 19thyke thtiwaposbetreueteeetiiyil Source: Annex Table 3.4 through an arrangement with the meter reader (Figure 3.9). Focus groups revealed that when a user feels that his electric bill is very high, he/she bribes the meter reader to tamper with the meter and reduce the charges on the bill. For example, if the electric bill amounts to Tk.10,000 the meter reader is given Figure 3.9: Know ledge of Reducing Bill in Tk.1,000 to reduce the bill to Tk.500. When the electric meters Collusion %,ith Nieier Reader are supplied to the consumers, they are duly sealed and are considered to be tamper-proof. However, meter readers break the original seal and install a similar seal which they can tamper lKh,uIr.n G with whenever necessary. Commercial users, such as mill and factory owners also collude with the meter reader to have their bills reduced. Focus groups also revealed that meter readers generally do not follow official procedure and do not themselves go from house to house reading the meters. Instead, they employ younger men for each billing area to do -bAlL, 't pr.orFUs--airlilithis work on their behalf, who are then paid Tk.1,000 for "- - completing one book of electric bills. In Rajshahi, people " I'' 2" "" @' reported that meter readers prepare "ghost bills", i.e. bills (f Hou4eholds without reading the meter. However, when asked, few ti t: | - | r l r El l--l A respondents reported taking personal advantage of the meter readers dishonesty - at the upper end, 8 percent of the ,-,,. . .*.. r., r~ n E wx .,r Irespondents in Chittagong admitted to such collusion. The results of the survey are consistent with several studies which show that nationally only about 55 percent of the electricity generated is paid for. Government has acknowledged 31 Irifrastructate Serri- 1 in its vision statement that, in addition to large investment requirements, there are serious governance issues that afflict the power sector that need to be addressed. The large system losses, estimated at between 35 and 40 percent, are in most part due to non technical reasons - mainly theft and pilferage - and are much higher than in other countries of the world. From the survey it appears that most consumers who are receiving electricity are paying for it, although not necessarily the full amount due and usually not to the government agency involved. Gas Background Natural gas is an important indigenous source of non- renewable energy in Bangladesh. Proven gas reserves were T estimated at about 11.3 trillion cubic feet in 1994 implying a Types of Cooking Fuel (% of Households) reserves-to-production ratio of about 35 years, which could increase as more reserves are discovered. Gas is used for power Cit PGied LPG others generation, fertilizer production and industry. Household 74 1 0.2 22 consumption accounts for less than 10 percent of natural gas 60 0.7 39 use. Total domestic gas consumption has risen sharply since 0 15 73 1985, with annual growth averaging about 9 percent and is S'-urce Amnex Tibl,1 ' n projected to grow by 6 percent annually for the next decade. __ _ Approximately 75 percent of total domestic demand is generated by two sectors - power and fertilizer. Gas exploration and drilling activities have expanded in recent years due to foreign direct investment by international oil companies, with production increasing by about 250 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) since 1998. According to Ministry of Planning Figure 3.10: Access to Gas Service estimates, gas transmission lines increased by 10 percent (% of Households) between 1996/7-1998/9, while distribution pipelines increased 100 by 31 percent over the same period. New Gas connections 7 have exceeded plans in 1997/8 and 1998/92. Gas production nf 3 and transmission capacity is sufficient to meet domestic demand till 2002/03, after which increased capacity will need to ., be created. Petrobangla, a statutory body of Government operating under the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, is the lead agency responsible for Bangladesh's gas sector. For the exploration and production of natural gas, it acts in partnership DI; i Chittagong with and is the sole purchaser of the output of foreign oil companies, with whom it has entered into production sharing A*,r*:c *\nrc% Tble 1.1 contracts. Four franchised operating companies (Titas Gas, Bakhrabad Gas, Wes Gas, and Jalalabad Gas) are responsible for transmitting and distributing gas in geographical zones defined by government. In addition, the Gas Transmission 2 Mid Term Review of the Fifth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002, Ministry of Planning, 2000. Ban3aesh: Urban Service Deivery 32 Company (GTCL), incorporated in 1993, which is expected to be eventually responsible for the national trunk system, presently operates about 20 percent of the trunk network. Table 3.8 There is general agreement that natural gas has been Satisfaction with Gas Service by Income Level priced considerably below its economic value for many years (% of Households) and subsidized gas sales have resulted in a significant transfer of _________________________________ resources. In fiscal year 2000, Petrobangla's average gas tariff 32 for all users (at $1.33/mcf) was 48 percent below the average E B 7 474 29 economic price ($2.56/mcf), based on the price negotiated 79 31 under power purchase agreements with independent power I III I 75 22 producers ($2.40/mcf). Even after the recent 15 percent gas J l:FiLii 83 39 No. of observations too small for income level tariff adjustment, average tariffs are 44 percent below the up to 11.2000 in Chittagong. economic price. Most of the benefits of domestic gas have Source: Annex Table 3.15 been passed on to the power sector where the gas tariff is 51 percent below its economic price and the fertilizer sector where the subsidy is 57 percent. Other beneficiaries are domestic households where the subsidy amounts to 47 percent. The total subsidy on gas distribution in fiscal year 2000 is estimated at Tk.18.7 billion ($370 million)3. Table 3.9 Households Facing Difficulty in The objective of the survey undertaken was to examine Getting Gas Connection (%) the operations of a small sub-set of gas sector operations, i.e. _______________________________ the supply of gas to households, their satisfaction with service delivery, problems that users encounter, and the official and L6_ = extra payments associated with the service. = _~~~~~3 61 61 Access and Satisfaction 1111 69 ~~~84 II 56 80 Source: Annex Table 3.12 A surprisingly high proportion of sampled respondents in Dhaka (74 percent) and Chittagong (60 percent) indicated that they were able to access piped gas services (Table 3.7). The Titas Gas Transmission and Distribution Company is responsible for piped gas connections and service in these two Figure 3.11: Satisfaction with Gas Service(% cities, while independent contractors provide the line to the of Households) households. Gas supply through pipeline is not available in KIhulna and Rajshahi where most households use other types of fuel (such as kerosene and fuel-wood). A small fraction of Chotgong households use LPG in cylinders (15 percent in K hulna and 10 percent in Rajshahi) for cooking and these are purchased on the market through authorized dealers (Table 3.7). Dhaka 75 Since the survey asked respondents about their 10 20 30 4n 50 60 70 satisfaction with gas connections and pipeline gas supply, no Source: Annex Table 3.15 data is reported for Khulna and Rajshahi on satisfaction, problems or costs. Satisfaction with the pipeline gas service, is higher than the other physical services included in the survey, such as electricity and water, but varies significantly between Dhaka and Chittagong - while 75 percent of the households are 3 Bang/adesh: Parastatal Performance and Strategy: Keg Issues and Po/iy Implications, World Bank, MAarch 2001 (draft) and MEinistry of Planning, 2000. -33 Il.rast ucx zvr satisfied with the service in Dhaka, only 29 percent are satisfied in Chittagong. (Figure 3.11) Problems and Problem Resolution Table 3.10 Problems with Gas Supply Connection Of the households with pipeline gas connections, a (% of Households) high proportion reported problems in getting connected - 48 percent in Dhaka and 67 percent in Chittagong (Table 3.9). Over 40 percent of Chittagong residents, who appear to have 21 48 more problems with gas connections than do Dhaka residents, 39 49 identified three main problems: the excessive time taken to get connected; having to make repeated visits to the gas office; and 1Q 41 the demands to pay extra money to gas office officials. In -i5i Dhaka, households have the same problems, but less frequently _ _ (Table 3.10). N. i lr1uir' v,. LI- L -J -- - ..- zi -- r .- -= Once the problem of getting connected is overcome, most households find that the supply of gas is good. Most households with gas connections indicated that gas is supplied consistently and only 14 percent of users in Dhaka and 13 Table 3.11 percent of users in Chittagong reported encountering Complaints with Gas Supply (% of breakdown (Figure 3.12). However, the supply of gas can sometimes be unreliable, as noted by 78 and 79 percent of respondents in Dhaka and Chittagong respectively (Figure 14 32 3.12). Non availability of cylinder and disconnection despite payment occur in a small minority of cases. 4 4 Thirteen percent of Dhaka residents and 15 percent of 7 4 Chittagong residents encounter gas-related problems at least d de once a month. However, when a household does have a problem, it is unlikely to report it to the authorities. Over 76 1 * 2 percent of Dhaka residents and 68 percent of Chittagong residents indicated that they do not contact the authorities when 59 38 they have problems since the problems do not get resolved. Of Source: Citizens Report Card Survey - 2000, those who lodged a complaint, an overwhelming majority of the SRS households both in Dhaka (59 percent) and Chittagong (38 _ percent) indicated that no solution to their problem was found (Table 3.11). Households filing complaints indicated that they have to complain repeatedly: 9 percent of the respondents in both cities reported complaining more than three times. Table 3.12 Time Taken to Get Gas Connection Billing and Costs (0% of Households) As with the other services, a majority of households a One 12 8 with gas connection indicated that they pay their gas bills onths 7 13 regularly - 91 percent in Dhaka and 82 percent in Chittagong. * Mi _ 4 7 Only 4 percent of households in Dhaka with gas connections an6 3 12 reported that they had been disconnected for non-payment of AnJ,f \ Table 3.11 the gas bill compared with 2 percent in Chittagong. Bangladesh Urban Service D ivery 3 Despite being a more efficient service provider, the gas Figure 3.12: Types of Problems sector is not without hidden costs, both in terms of time and with Ga* Supplv money. The time it takes to get connected varies between (% of Househol!d.. : Dhaka and Chittagong; although 74 percent of the households 10° -. of Houschold~) in Dhaka and 61 percent of the households in Chittagong X 80 7 9 79indicated that they did not know how long it took to get a gas X 60 1 : connection because they were either renters or did not remember, for those who did know, 12 percent in Dhaka said 2 40 ; that it took less than one month while 14 percent said it took 20 more than month. Eight percent of Chittagong residents o - | | 4 | ~l s ; indicated that it took them less than one month, while 32 percent said it took more than 1 month (Table 3.12). Dhaka pecn sarl :r 11 Break-down lnar-j Pc -r A greater percentage of Chlittagong residents have to Source: Annex Tabl, 1~ j ;~ make extra payments to get connected. Twenty eight percent of Chittagong residents reported making higher payments with total payments amounting to, on average, Tk.13,922 compared to the official fee of Tk.6,1934. In Dhaka, 10 percent of the respondents reported making extra payments, with the average payment amounting to Tk.8,024 compared to the official fee of Tk.4,935. Thus, in Chittagong, total payments amounted to 125 percent of the official fee while in Dhaka the extra payments amounted to 63 percent. 4 The official fee includes the application fee to Titas Gas plus the fee to the contractor for installing the supply line to the house. The official application fee charged by Titas Gas is Tk.2,950, while the contractors charge market rates. 35 Infrastructure Servic s Drinking Water Background Figuwe 3.13. A.t:ess to Drinldng Water -l Households) The supply of drinking water is an essential service "" ____ with important implications for public health, particularly due p _ _ to the high prevalence of water borne diseases in Bangladesh. , ---, .--__ _ - According to the 1977 Pourashava Ordinance, it is obligatory for city corporations to ensure availability of safe drinking water to households, since the provision and regulation 70 80 90 100 of water supply and prevention of infections and epidemics are . ['able 1.1 among the compulsory functions performed by the pourashava5. In Dhaka and Chittagong, autonomous, city-level bodies have been set up and entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the provision of safe drinking water on demand to every household within the jurisdiction of the city corporation. Table 3.13 In Dhaka, drinking water is provided by the Dhaka Water Bribe as a % of Official Fee by Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) and in Chittagong by Income Group - Water Supply the Chittagong Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (% of Households) (CWASA). In Khulna and Rajshahi, the Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE) is responsible for constructing I ) tzo 25__ 7 and installing water supply systems, while operations and 47 116 maintenance are the responsibility of the respective city mlil, 71 78 corporations (Box 3.2). l2001-2,hn00 197 119 MolreX thaln 20000 17 9 SourC. A.nne.e I ibr 3 22 These municipal level government bodies (city corporations and WASA's) are responsible for connecting the households to the water supply system; licensing tube wells and providing public taps; delivering safe drinking water through Figure 3.14: Househ,.ds with Piped Waier these connections, and maintenance. Water supply is provided Conrieiiuon either through pipeline directly to the households or through licensed tube-wells or public taps outside the households. Tube "" Dh - a well arrangements are either private and inside the premises of the household or shared and outside the premises in a common area. Traditionally, construction of new physical infrastructure ,, has been favored by municipal authorities over attention to X '.ri n, operations and maintenance. The result, as illustrated by this survey, is leakage, wastage, illegal connections and low level of . , _.r. F., service to users. The sector's main constraints include inadequate resources to finance investments in the sector, lack of commercial orientation in the sector leading to poor cost recovery, lack of autonomy of the local authorities in decision . = Khuln3 - making and limitations in the financial management and technical skills of sector staff. Billing and collection have also x. 5 Pourashava Ordinance, Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh 1977. Banadesh: Urban Service Delivey 36 Box 3.2: Who is Responsible for Providing Drinking Water? Drinking Water C&AG's Capital Development, D-WASA External Audit Office and production, and C-WASA Private Audit supply, operation Firms and maintenance Drinking Water production and Cty Corporation Supply, Operation nulna and Rajshahi) _ External Audit C& AG's and maintenance Office Capital Development DPHq of Drinking Water s t cth o Supply System (]Khulna and Raishahi) Oversight function by the Standiig Conunittee Pui SorStanding Committee for Local Government a< DivisionI been identified as a key constraint to increasing capacity and quality6. 'Yable3.14 The fast growing populations of the four cities have S'ourof Households)te stretched the capacity of the WASAs and the city corporations Private/- to the limit - most of dthe existing water supply services are Public Source Shre unable to meet demand and inadequate supply of safe drinking Slurce water have been cited as a major problem (Figure 3.13). For s HIW- 11 I I'.H HFI Hc,r example, in Dhaka, while water production averaged 768 U 4 4 h .. '-. million liters per day in 1999, gross requirements were r,.,_ 5Y :. 43 48 estimated at 2,482 liters7. Due to constrained access, not all _ _ _ households use drinking water from government sources of L.4 t5 supply, but use privately owned tube wells, hand pumps, wells, S \,. . nrc, rn. TaLlc 3 1) ponds and nvers. 6 Toward an Urban Strate,g for Bangladesh, World Bank, September 30 1999. 7 Ibid, World Bank 1999. i7 Infrastructue Servi>c- Fig.re 3.15: Households wih H..d Pum.s (% of The survey asked households about the availability of Households) water supply, their main source of drinking water and whether 100 93 they were satisfied with the water service provided, irrespective 80 of source. The survey also queried respondents about the 6 X problems encountered, how these problems were resolved and . 60 the overall cost to the households of ensuring safe drinking 4 water supply, including any hidden expenses. 40 Access and Satisfaction 0 1 l The degree to which households use government supplied water, including pipe connections to homes and public Source: Annex ''able 3.18 taps and tube-wells, varies tremendously among the four cities, ranging from 8 percent in Khulna to 84 percent in Dhaka (Table 3.14). Dhaka and Chittagong residents depend much more on public water sources than do the other cities. In Khulna and Rajshahi, hand pumps owned by the household or shared among several households are the most popular source of drinking water. While 78 percent of households in Dhaka 30 use a pipe connection, less than half the households in 27 Chittagong and Rajshahi do. The situation is very different in 25 Khulna, where only 3 percent of the households use water from 0 pipeline connection (Figure 3.14). The increase in salinity in the water in Khulna in recent years has caused households to avoid public sources and rely increasingly (92 percent) on hand pumps, either shared or personally owned (Figure 3.15). S 0 As Table 3.14 reveals, the majority of "poor" 5 households depend upon private sources for the supply of drinking wate.. The greatest reliance on private sources is in Khulna wherl: as much as 91 percent of poor households reported usin, private sources, compared to 65 percent in . . , I A.I, 2 Rajshahi, 52 percent in Dhaka and 48 percent in Chittagong. Focus group discussions among bosti dwellers revealed that in many instances there is no government water supply available to Box 3.3 bosti residents. Consequendy, various different private Not Copingwith Waier , . ~~~~~~~~~~Shortage an Chittagoog arrangcments are made for water, including creating their own water supply systems (Box 3.3). In some cases, bosti Rc,ident; ot ihe Belrtdj bu;u havc households pay for water on a monthly or daily basis to the few invented an innovative private source of households that own private tube-wells. Some NGOs are also water to compensate for the inaccessibility of known to get connections from DWASA and to provide water Chittagong WASA supply. Using the hilly topography of the surrounding area, they to people living on government land in bostis. Focus groups in have built a water reservoir at the bottom of Chittagong also said that the city corporation itself pays a fee to the hill which captures water flowing from procure water from CWASA for distribution to bosti dwellers the top. This primitive arrangement is quite free of charge by extending a pipeline from the mainline on the seasonal in nature, because only in the rainy season is there a continuous flow of water street. from the hills. During summer and winter, the residencE of the boiti t-ce an acute water Satisfaction levels with drinking water supply also vary cniis. When asked who [hey could approach significandy among cities. The highest satisfaction levels were to help them solve theLr perslslentE water recorded in Dhaka, where 27 percent of the households problems they indicated that tbey had no indicated that they were satisfied with the drinking water i Bangaesh: Ufban Servce Deivery 38 service. Only 8 percent of the respondents expressed satisfacton in Khulna and 11 percent in Rajshahi (Figure 3.16). Table 3.15 Problems with Water Supply Connection Problems and Problem Resolution (% of Households) D c R K Respondents in all cities reported experiencing 32 74 53 13 problems in getting a pipe connection, from 10 percent in ____ Dhaka to 59 percent in Khulna (Figure 3.17). These numbers 51 54 48 55 understate the magnitude of the problem, since many 48__ 40 8_35 respondents occupy houses for which they were not originally 48 4 0 35 responsible for gettng the water connection. In all cities lr DhA I, f ,.if K. Klhi,Jnk households complained of lengthy delays in getting a I 1-F.; r...'-r ird ar), - 2Dx:., srR.S connection: it was a problem cited by nearly half of all _________________________________ _ _ households (Table 3.15). Focus group participants from Dhaka said that it could take up to 6 months to get connected, even after paying the connection fee. Repeated visits to the water supply/municipal office (reported by as many as 80 percent of respondents in Rajshahi) and paying much higher than the official rate (reported by 74 percent of the households in Figurie 3.1': Probhlem, in Getung Chittagong) were other major problems cited. Focus group Ci,)erConnecutin '. oHouscholds participants from Chittagong and Dhaka bosts explained that the best way to get a connection was through a third person, R " I;hulni preferably a mastan who could manage the whole process. A D- Khu_na WASA official explained that the lengthy wait for connection in some cases motivated people to install hand pumps on the D- WASA pipeline without permission. The more well-to-do 4-l residents also install illegal suction pumps on the line in order to increase their water pressure, creating problems for other .,-, __ ALLag )sg households. and Of the households that have a pipeline connection, 1 | _ Dh aa nearly half encounter problems, ranging from 41 percent in Dhaka to 73 percent in Khulna (Figure 3.18). The main problem that households have with the pipeline service is S. C iwar R.,n1C a r.d inadequate supply; more than half of all households have this 2.:': SRS problem in Dhaka and Chittagong (Table 3.16). Focus group participants confirmed survey results; a typical example was cited by a man in the Goran area of Dhaka who, despite his pipeline connection, complained that water was available only at midnight. Table 3.16 Focus group participants in Dhaka, Chittagong and Problems v6iLh Water Supply Rajshahi also said that whatever water they received was full of (°oe of Households) dirt and unsuitable for drinking. Arsenic-contaminated water is also a cause of concem, although this issue was not covered by HII5Ix_ I >; the survey. The greatest concern with the quality of drinking 3- 4_ water supply was expressed by Dhaka residents (Table 3.16). _ 7 4;:. One major factor in the contamination of the public drinking -, _ _ L 4 ' ' water are the illegal hand-pumps that people install on the line D Dh.aka 1: Ch.rmpng RP Pap.hths K Kh.Ln3 without permission. Drinking water is also contaminated by ScLIrcC VAn Ia lble 3 24 underground reservoirs that are built by users for storing water. More affluent consumers have therefore resorted to buying 39 riflasftuc=e Senrik s bottled water for drinking purposes. An affluent respondent in Dhaka reported that he paid Tk.50 for a container that yielded 84 glasses of drinking water. He estimated that his monthly requirement was about 400 glasses, which cost him about Tk.250 every month. Water related problems occur frequently and a high proportion of respondents incurred problems more than 6 times during the last year in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna. In e Table 3.17 Rajshahi problems appear to be less frequent, with most saying Methods Used to Supplement Shortage of Water they occur less than 6 times a year. Focus group discussions Supply ( of Households) with bosti-dwellers in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi l - also confirmed that bostis often suffer from interruptions in .p _ supply and inadequate supply. Supply was the problem bosti dwellers mentioned most often. For instance, bosti dwellers in Li r,F,,, l' C_h,;wq .. , v.-F. F.Rl. hi .F.It,, Chittagong said that supply is available only twice a day and Ni -4,'l" - r 'F'- sometimes not available for 2 to 3 days at a time. To solve the l pipeline supply problem, the majority of the households are -. ga... - -. - compelled to make adjustments to their requirements and manage with whatever supply they have. Some try to compensate for the shortfall in supply by other means, such as getting water from a roadside public source, arranging water delivery from a tanker, or installing a motor on the pipeline to suck additional water (Table 3.17). Slum dwellers pointed out that they had to pay as much as Tk.2 per bucket of water, several times the price paid by those who had legal connections (for example, the official price charged to consumers in Dhaka city is Tk. 4.33 per 1,000 liters). In Khulna, since the vast majority of households do not depend on pipe connection or Figure 3.18: Households with Problems public tap, inadequate pipeline supply does not have much with Water Supply (% of Households) impact.81 80 N.'; Khulna, Despite numerous problems with the supply of water 60 Chin.ri through the pipeline, less than a third of the households in Dhaka and Chittagong contact the agency about their problems. 5ii h d Households in Khulna and Rajshahi are more likely to file [_ ii., complaints - 64 percent and 73 percent respectively (Table 3.18). Although a small proportion of people in Dhaka complain, they have to complain more often - more than half of those who file complaints had to contact the agency more than id 4 three times. In the other cities, people were more likely to i . ..-.., contact the authorities less than 3 times. >.. vl '.nr.. , Table 3.24 8 The use of a tanker to meet short supply is common when there is a breakdown or during heavy use periods, especially in the summer. Although this supplementary water source is supposed to be provided free of cost by the municipal office/WASA during water shortages, respondents reported that the water supply linemen charge approximately Tk.100 and at times up to Tk.300 per tanker during real crisis. This payment reduces the waiting time for delivery. Bangadesh: Urban Service Delivery it) Females are generally responsible for ensuring the water needs for the household. Focus group participants from a bosti in Rajshahi explained that households do not complain Table 3.18 to authorities because male members generally do not perceive Problem Resolution in Households with Problems the problems since it is the female members who are engaged in (%/o of Households) fetching water (reported by 70 percent of the respondents) to % of HH % H H Problekn 'V of HH reported with .iyI;p supplement shortages and deal with water-related problems. City faced problems to problem 11ormal Women participants observed that although the likelihood of 5MMS1r,l1 authozriqs not svr--.2 solvtd getting a solution to their problems is small, it is more likely that Iilwaka 41 21 66 22 complaining will work if the male members do it. Although R;isl4vw; 65 31 22 31 individual trips for fetching water are not very long9, the total Raj.4hahi 47 73 36 41 Khtlsna 73 64 45 29 time spent on fetching water per week can be high, requiring Source. Annex Table 3 23 and 3 24 multiple visits. Despite the high incidence of problems, many households are unable to get their problems resolved through normal complaints channel. Chittagong and Rajshahi residents are the most successful at this, with 41 percent of the Figure 3.19: Knomledge of Reducing Bill respondents filing complaints having their problems resolved. with Ni eter Reader (".of Householdc.) Households therefore have to use other means to resolve their 35 problems including paying a bribe, hiring outside help or using 3r:i political influence. Focus group participants from a slum in 30 Chirragong Khulna, for instance, said that there is water supply in only one 25 Kh.lni bosti, thanks to the personal and political influence of one commissioner of the City Corporation. A D-WASA official 20 said that there are three main ways to solve problems with D- 15 WASA: going to the office and repeatedly complaining to the 15 I)L 1t clerk; making an extra payment, and calling the official and 10 requesting a personal favor. 5 Rashahlu Hidden Costs 0 Source Annex Table 3.20 Respondents revealed that they had to pay bribes to get a pipeline connection; in Dhaka and Chittagong the bribe was almost equal to the official fee whereas in Rajshahi and KIhulna the extra payments equaled approximately 30 percent of the official fee (Table 3.19). Focus group discussions indicate that a primary reason for paying bribes is to speed up installation - in Cost o aDrinkingbl%ater3Connecion3- Dhaka participants said that even though they had paid in Official Fee and Extra Payment advance for the connection it took 6 months to get it. However if they paid a bribe, installation was completed quickly. Similar patterns of bribery are also prevalent in other water supply related transactions, such as for hand-pumps and tube-wells. When maintenance is required, users have to pay directly for repair. Focus group discussions with bosti dwellers in Rajshahi revealed that the repair of tube-wells cost between Tk.300-400 S.;urce Aflnflx I able 3 22 _ .______________________________________ '9 Walking and waiting times to collect water are not excessive for each trip. The average walking time is under 5 minutes, except in Dhaka and Rajshahi, where nearly one-third take between 6 and 15 minutes. Waiting times are usually under 5 minutes, except in Dhaka where it is usually more than 15 minutes. -1 Infrastructue Serv i es as "carpenter's (mistn) charge." They also indicated that they sometimes pay money to the personal assistant of the Ward Figure 3.20: Access to Sanitation Service Commissioner for repairs to their tube-wells as well. i(% of Households) Billing Khulna _ L Respondents indicated that they were diligent about Rajshahi -- paying their water bills on time (ranging from 84 percent in Chittagong to 100 percent in Khulna). A D-WASA official -tn. confirmed that if D-WASA delivers the correct bill on time, Chittagong then approximately 80 percent of the customers pay it on time without questions. However, respondents noted that it is Dhaka _ possible for influential people to avoid paying bills. In Rajshahi, focus groups admitted that they knew of people who used 40 50 60 70 80 9( loopholes, including collusion with meter readers in the city corporation's system to avoid paying their bill regularly. The D- Source: Annex Table 1.1 WASA official noted that the 20 percent who do not pay are those who are rich or powerful. Over billing is generally not reported as a problem by a igure 3.21: Households with Water Sealed large proportion of households, except in Rajshahi, where it is Toilets an issue. As in the case of electricity bills, focus group participants reported that officials did not read the meters and, 120 instead, prepared the bills "according to their own imagination." 500 95 However, people paid the bill anyway and said they had given 79 up complaining about over billing because it is not corrected. j - 67 80 The extent to which residents reported knowing how j to reduce the water bill in collusion with the meter reader varied -'3 . from a high of 30 percent in Chittagong to a low of 3 percent in Rajshahi (Figure 3.19). But only i small proportion of households admitted to reducing tht!.r bills in this manner - Eor Ckittogo R-siiis Nm Dhaka (3 percent), Chittagong (1 percen't) and none in Khulna and Rajshahi. .Llrctc AnnexTable3.28 ,PoorUN3n-o 0O Sanitation services Background Table 3 20 Good sanitation services are essential for the Houseliolds Hat-ing a Toilei Facilin (% of Households) prevention of communicable diseases and for keeping the environment clean. Effective sanitation systems are vital to prevent the large-scale spread of diseases, such as diarrhoea, I99o0 jaundice, typhoid and malaria, in urban areas. 7111.1 _ 89 55 Kli u,l a 99 98 Bangaesh: Urban Service Dliver 42 For the purposes of this review, sanitation services include sewerage and garbage disposal. Both sewerage and garbage disposal services are the responsibility of the city Figure 3.22: Latrine Connected to corporations in KIhulna and Rajshahi. In Dhaka and Sewerage System (% ofHouseholds) Chittagong, while storm-water drainage is the responsibility of 80 - the WASAs, garbage collection and disposal are the 70 Non- responsibility of the city corporations. The sanitation systems 60 Bl_n in the cities are made up of waterborne systems (Dhaka only), 50 N_o,-n. sanitary latrines, direct disposal in open fields and pit latrines 40 FBa.n and septic tanks. Garbage disposal methods include garbage 30 bins placed and serviced by municipal authorities, pick up 20 services by private companies and NGOs, direct disposal in 10 Basn open places and in drains, and other methods. Dhaka It is generally recognized that both sewerage and Dhaka (I.igarbage disposal services face major deficiencies on both the Source: Annex Table 3.2 supply and demand side. In terms of supply, the sewerage system faces problems with sewerage overflow, especially during the rainy season, and lack of connections. Overflows are the result of inadequate repair and maintenance, and lead to unsanitary conditions, aggravated by non functioning sullage Figure 3..3: Garhage Dh4posal In Area drainage systems10. 90~~~~~~~~~ 8 80 The survey asked households about their use of toilet 70 facilities, whether they had problems with the sewerage system, 60 '- 44' the frequency of such problems, and whether or not the 50 household reported the problem to the authorities. The survey 40 _ also inquired about the ways households dispose garbage, the 30 . quality of that service in terms of convenience and frequency, 20 _ _ _ ,_ Ic the cost of garbage disposal, and problems and problem o 10 S C . ! resolution mechanisms. Access and Satisfaction Toilets and Sewerage System"1. Between 54 and 85 percent of the respondents indicated that sanitation services were accessible to them (Figure 3.20). Toilets and latrines are available to a majority of urban households, ranging from 89 Table 3.21 percent in Rajshahi to 99 percent in Chittagong and Khulna Garbage CoUlecjuun Arrangemeni (Table 3.20). Water sealed toilets are predominantly used in all C. D Or Households) four cities, and the percentage of households using water sealed I p.1 d -,l - toilets is high, ranging from 64 percent in Rajshahi to 90 K lip 1s l, ' . PA, ,,,. percent in Khulna (Figure 3.21). Not surprisingly, the poor are 155 l ! . i1 7 rJ less likely to use water sealed toilets, compared to non-poor 1-1 ,_ .2 ! I ' i h j,7 households. For instance, 28 percent of bosti households have ,-.,,;.' l xX *^ water sealed toilets compared to 87 percent of non-bosti sa>ftce- . snn,. .rtI A~ ^households in Dhaka. Khulna is the only city where location of residence and income level does not seem to have significant IO Toward an Urban S1rategyfor Bangladesh, World Bank, 1999. 11 Only Dhaka has a sewerage systems. For those other cities, this implies connection to a septic tank. 43 infltasL, - e Servi es influence over whether or not households use water sealed toilets. Surprisingly, 95 percent of bosti households and 89 percent of "poor" households have access to water sealed FispaC 3.24: SatisfactionwithGarbage toilets. Although households in Khulna and Rajshahi use water Diposal (% of Households) sealed toilets, these are not connected to the sewerage system. is Seventy one percent of the households in Dhaka indicated that 14 12 12 their toilets were connected to the sewerage system compared 1'_ to 47 percent in Chittagong. Connection rates are lower for III 10 9 I( bosti dwellers at 47 percent in Dhaka and 15 percent in S 2 I Chittagong (Figure 3.22). ii Although the use of toilets, in general, and water sealed .. toilets, in particular, is high in all cities, households are not satisfied with toilet facilities, with satisfaction expressed by 11 li1ika Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi percent of the respondents in Khulna to 17 percent in Dhaka. Use of water sealed toilets does not seem to be associated with A.-rc nnex Table 3.35 11 All HH satisfaction. While a lower proportion of bostis in Dhaka have I Poor HH water sealed toilets, satisfaction is high relative to the other cities (45 percent). On the other hand, while Khulna shows similar satisfaction rates for bostis (40 percent), many more households have water sealed toilets. Figure 3.25: Household Faced Garbage Disposal. With respect to garbage disposal Seuer.age Problems (% of facilities, between 47 (Dhaka) and 63 (Khulna) percent of the Households) households reported that there were garbage disposal bins 41 available for their use (Figure 3.23). Garbage bins are relatively close, i.e. within 100 yards, for at least 34 percent of households H.,, 17 in Dhaka, 36 percent in Khulna, 42 percent in Rajshahi, and 76 percent of households in Chittagong. Collection from the ,-. h, _n 12 garbage bins is relatively frequent (once a day or more) in Dhaka, but is less frequent in other cities. Most households in I. J 1- Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi reported that garbage was picked up every other day or more than once a week. Other go 20 30 4( 50 garbage disposal methods include using a paid pick up service : Annex Table 3.31 (Dhaka and Chittagong), throwing garbage in an open place (all cities), throwing garbage in drains (all cities), or other methods (Table 3.21). The poor have fewer options than do other households, and mainly dispose of garbage by throwing it in drains or in open places, which is very unsanitary and is FLgure 3.26 Hu..u.ch;,Id. Rcpo.ricd Sewerage reflective of how under served their areas are by the municipal Problems. I., AuLh.iirN i .-.( Ho.useholds) authorities. Satisfaction rates with garbage disposal among households range between 10 percent in Chittagong and "' n Rajshahi to 15 percent in Dhaka. The lowest satisfaction among poor households is in Rajshahi, i.e. 5 percent of households (Figure 3.24). Problems and Problem Resolution N. L -~~~~~1-4 ., Sewerage Services. The residents of Khulna, who have the greatest proportion of water sealed toilets compared to other cities, have the greatest proportion of problems as well. , Whereas 12 percent of households in Chittagong and 17 Banmgadesh Urban Service D ivery 44 percent in Dhaka and Rajshahi have ever faced problems with sewerage, 41 percent of households in Khulna have faced FigLi,e 3 27 Hou.cboldJ. Faced Pioblem, problems (Figure 3.25). Blockage of sewerage is the problem "i.b Gaibage Dipoal t '. of Hou,ebhold most often experienced by households who have problems (46 percent of households in Dhaka and Chittagong, 79 percent in - KhuIni Khulna and 61 percent in Rajshahi). In addition to blockages, 13 _~h. 1- Dhaka (38 percent) and Khulna (3 percent) residents reported problems relating to leakage and overflow of the sewerage system. Six percent of Chittagong residents also had problems with the theft of manhole covers. P.i hik, Sewerage problems occur several times a week in hIrLng Dhaka (for 46 percent of households), Khulna (60 percent) and Rajshahi (45 percent). Problems were reported much less frequently in Chittagong, where only 6 percent of the respondents said problems occur once a month or more. The use of grievance redressal mechanisms varies significantly among cities: while 73 percent of households in Chittagong report problems with sewerage services to the authorities, only 17 percent do in Dhaka (Figure 3.26). Chittagong residents are FPr-be m '2. HA-.u,Fh.:.-d I Hcp Golbige also more frequent complainers; 44 percent report complaints Pr,blkm, 1.) ALdh.lIrn .:.1 H.zu>chold-l I., more than three times whereas in Dhaka, of those who do file 4 | complaints, only 23 percent complain more than three times. 2* _ I'FFIIJ,.F8:fl.n Complaining does not necessarily solve the problem, especially for bosti households. At least 40 percent of households do not get their problems solved, either for sewerage or garbage. Garbage Disposal. Households vary widely in their experience of problems. In Dhaka, 12 percent of households khZ E~ kF,ul.reported facing a problem with garbage disposal compared to 26 percent in Khulna (Figure 3.27). Garbage collection problems occur at least once every two weeks for most cities. In Khulna, however, problems are more frequent, and occur several times a week (53 percent). The types of major problems vary by city and involve garbage bins being too far away, bins not being available and irregular collection. Another problem Figure 3.29: Satisfaction wiLh mentioned in focus group discussions was unplanned land fills: Sewerage Shstem discussants noted that the municipal agency pays land owners to (- ., of Households) dump garbage on their land without necessary precautions. In kh,,ln - _ 1 l this way, "the general public is polluting the environment on a grand scale with the help of government." Participants in several focus group discussions also mentioned that despite the I -.--~' rule that garbage bins are to be emptied at night, when few people are on the streets, most municipal garbage collection is done during the day, which disrupts regular business on the _____h________j___ 17__ street and congests traffic. Poor households encounter similar -)hbj .. _-; . ... 17 problems which include garbage bins being far away and irregular collection. The use of grievance redressing 5 1'.. 1 5 ~mechanisms varies significantly among cities: 24 percent of ' ,; '.nV, I At1, I S4 households in Dhaka indicated that they report problems with garbage disposal to the authorities compared to only 4 percent in Khulna (Figure 3.28). Unexpectedly, a slightly greater 4' IfrfaScuse Servi- proportion of poor households indicated reporting problems compared to all households. In most cities, residents contact the relevant agency at least twice: between 92 percent in Dhaka and 74 percent in Chittagong. Transport Background Extreme traffic congestion characterizes most urban road space in Bangladesh. As a result of weak capacity in transport planning and traffic engineering, insufficient training and low quality equipment, traffic management is virtually non- existent12. Mass transit facilities are poorly organized and mass Figure 3.30: Access to Transport transit is dominated by slower forms of vehicles such as cycle- (% of Households) rickshaws and baby-taxis. Buses are in short supply and there is no metro or rail system to handle day-to-day commuter traffic. Kbulna a.; The survey examined several aspects of transportation Ra_shahi___ nn where public agencies are involved: bus service, road conditions and car licensing. These services are the Chittagong responsibility of a variety of national and municipal agencies. The Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation (BRTC), an Dhaka -_ _ -__ independent government agency, is charged with the responsibility of running publicly owned buses and it has, in 60 70 80 90 100 recent years, adopted a policy of leasing out public buses to Source: Annex'l'able 1.1 private operators. Public buses make up a minority of all buses accounting, for instance, in Dhaka for about 15 percent of all buses. Private buses are owned either by single operators or by private companies that operate large fleets. In terms of regulation, the Bangladesh Road Transport Association (BRTA) Table 3.22 ensures that all vehicles on the roads conform to established Availability of Transport in Household's Area technical standards. The safety and environmental quality of (0/. of Households) private vehicles is also regulated by BRTA through the issuance of a fitness certificate. This is meant to prevent unsafe vehicles _ 1 9 from operating on roads and to prevent accidents. Stickers are .. 93 99 69 71 issued to private vehicles upon registration and they are 71 98 40 92 required to go through an annual inspection. The traffic police, Bus 67 44 2 81 56 64 76 73 a unit of the national police under the Ministry of Home 80 93 4 78 Affairs, enforces traffic laws and manages traffic flow in the 4 11 16 50 cities. The municipal government is responsible for the D. Dhaku, t (:hCru:tng. K. Kh.1 1. IR. Rih, construction and maintenance of roads in urban areas, N.fc lTirprk ino-.r;p.j-blc S'j, r, u ,.~ latk 3 ' provision and maintenance of street lighting, and maintenance of publc streets. The survey asked respondents about the type of transport facilities available from both private and public 12 Toward an Urban Strategy for Bangladesh, World Bank, 1999. Bangladesk Urban Service Deir 46 sources. Since bus service is a main component of the mass transport system, the survey focuses on bus transportation, asking households about the quality of public and private bus services provided, satisfaction levels, problems encountered and grievance redress mechanisms. The survey also asked about Table 3.23 U satisfaction with road conditions, and with the overall transport Reasons for Using Public Buses system. Finally, it inquired about the process of getting a (. of Households) fitness certificate for a car and the costs involved. D C R K -- 32 46 62 Access and Satisfaction 3~~~~~~2 7 39 . 3 L ~~~~7 I 37 . 0 7 ..Rajshahi residents report the best access to transport itiili-i - 17 2 31 services (Figure 3.30). As summarized in Table 3.22, the cycle- 19 13 32 .. rickshaw is by far the most dominant mode of transportation, *= 15 3 32 .. with between 99 and 100 percent of the respondents in all cities D: Dhaka; C: Chittagong K: Khulna; R Rajshahi stating that they had access to rickshaw services. "Baby-taxis" Note: Multiple answers possible (auto-taxis), which are powered by two-stroke or three-stroke Souirce: Annex Tnhlel.37 engines, are the next most widely available mode of transport with access ranging from 69 percent in Khulna to 99 percent in Chittagong. Private buses are more available than public buses in every city. The availability of both public and private buses is lowest in IKhulna and only 2 percent of the households acknowledged ready access to public bus service.13 In addition, a significant proportion of respondents across the four cities indicated access to cars, jeeps, vans and tempos; availability of Table 3.24 rail service ranged from 4 percent in Dhaka to 50 percent in Reasons for Using Private Buses Rajshahi. (% of Households) Cost and accessibility are the principal considerations 42 27___ 54 among households in every city for using private and public i ible 68 77 62 57 buses. Respondents in Dhaka, Chittagong and Rajshahi noted 53 36 35 44 that the main reason for choosing public buses is their low cost 6 1 34 1 (cited by between 32 percent of the respondents in Dhaka and . nt 8 2 14 4 62 percent in Rajshahi - Table 3.23). The main reason for 3;: 2z-I 20 0 choosing private buses, on the other hand, is that they are easily 2 I . 19 I accessible and the bus service is more frequent. As many as 77 D Dhlk. C Chirup '.nOL; K. Khulra: I. Rijhalhi percent of travelers in Chittagong use private buses because N.-.ru PArlul jrls-k.cr, po-4;;ble N-J'JI( AM-NC -r31.Je' X.58 they are easily accessible. Higher frequency is the second most often cited reason for using private buses (Table 3.24). Poor households generally rank accessibility and frequency at or near the top of the reasons they take private buses as well. Convenience, fewer crowds, and comfort are some of the other reasons cited for using private bus transport. Overall there is a low level of satisfaction with the public transport system, with 19 percent of the respondents in Khulna indicating that they were satisfied with the bus services compared to only 3 percent in Chittagong (Figure 3.31). Poor households show similar patterns of satisfaction. The survey 13 For this reason, the number of cases is too low to be statistically reliable and thus answers on service quality of public buses are not included here. 4/7 Xftias rSu c t - i asked respondents to rate bus services across four dimensions, i.e. frequency, quality of fleet, fare, and behavior of driver/conductor. In general, private buses services score higher than do those in the public sector, particularly with , regard to the frequency of service and the conduct of drivers Households Table 3 2B 9 HousholdsFaced Problemi %%~ith Public BLJI. and conductors. However, Dhaka appears to be an exception, !Se-ice o.! O FHouscholds) where the overall satisfaction with public bus service is higher T- than with the private sector. One reason for this could be the a, t'3 fact that a large proportion of buses, although owned by BRTC, ; 4 24 1 have been leased out and are being operated by private sector 2 -.' operators. Poor households are generally less satisfied than the - - _4-I general public as across all four dimensions of service quality. ) D LIh A. i I :> W.I-. F. kt,dIl i'i ' A,. u The exception is Rajshahi, where they appear to be more .I s L' taI s IFt L' II satisfied with every dimension, and in Chittagong where they * r'.IF S- are more satisfied with the fares offered by public buses compared with private buses. Travelers were also asked their opinion about the conditions of the roads. Satisfaction levels with the quality of roads ranged from 5 percent in Chittagong to 34 percent in Khulna. Poorer households generally exhibited similar levels of satisfaction as the general public (Figure 3.32). Problems and Problem Resolution Between 14 percent (Dhaka) and 51 percent (Rajshahi) of the respondents indicated that they had encountered problems with public transportation (Table 3.25). The major problems cited were inadequate frequency of service and the Figure 3.31: Satisfaction with Bus Service high fares charged. In addition, focus group discussants expressed serious concerns about the lack of traffic 25 management, the frequent traffic jams and the resulting 21 environmental pollution. Participants were concerned that 20 19l traffic jams compromise the frequency and efficiency of public r transportation. They said that several factors contributed to x5 15 the congestion, including illegal shops built beside the road, illegal storage of bricks, sand and other construction material z 10 9 on the roadside, excessive number of trucks, and the frequent ° -. loading and unloading of goods on the main road. Another l6 5 reason cited for the congestion was the unplanned excavation 5 3 3 It of the roads by different agencies and the delays in fiing up 0 V i I the holes once the excavation-related task had been completed. ° Pollution from mechanized vehicles is also a major concern as [haka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi focus group discussants in every city complained about the 1I Al-I "black smoke" emitted by trucks, auto taxis and buses. Source: Annex 'l'able 3.42 P Poor I-H Discussants felt that officials of BRTA were not doing their job and were giving fitness certificates to unfit vehicles in return for a bribe. The frequency of transport related problems appears to be highest in Chittagong, where approximately 50 percent of the respondents indicated that they encountered problems Bangladeshb Urban Service Deivery 48 several times a week. The vast majority of travelers who face a problem with public transport do not contact the agency responsible and report the problem (from 68 percent in Rajshahi to 92 percent in Dhaka and Chittagong). Even when they do report problems, not more than a quarter of all reported problems were solved. Hidden Costs in the Transport Sector Figure 3.32 Safisfadion with Road Conditions The survey asked respondents to identify any hidden 40 37 costs - either in terms of bribes paid to resolve problems, to 35 34 obtain fitness certificates, and to avoid police harassment on t 30 grounds of vehicle fitness. No respondent indicated that they 0 had paid a bribe to have a transport-related problem resolved. 25 However, paying a bribe to BRTA officials to obtain an annual 20 IS 16 fitness certificate was widely reported, particularly in Dhaka. ,15 Respondents indicated that, in certain instances, the bribe O1 I 91 amounted to about 50 percent of the official fee. Focus group 51 s participants supplemented this information by indicating that ° . t even when the fitness certificate was valid, the police routinely Dhal0 stop vehicles and demand an extra payment. Since they can be SoDace:A ChxTabgo3.4 Nm AlsaH harassed by the police even if they have a valid car fitness PoorHH certificate issued by BRTA, and since BRTA officials take a PoorHH bribe to issue such certificates, many car owners have stopped getting their vehicles inspected and drive without the certificates. According to some estimates, only 50 percent of the vehicles on the road are now inspected annually and a large proportion of the vehicles plying the roads are unfit. Bribes to the police protect the owners of these vehicles from citations Table 3.26 for violating the law. Several old and unfit vehicles have Willingness to Pay for Better Electricity recendy been taken off the streets of Dhaka, in a drive to Service (% of Households) i.prove the traffic situation. me Traffic jams were mentioned in focus group discussions .2tlll 88 49 62 51 as a constant feature especially in Dhaka and as a sporadic but 5.^f,lilil 59 69 62 81 serious problem in Chittagong and Khulna. Participants cite a variety of causes, including insufficient road infrastructure 56 83 69 89 (narrow roads, lack of by-passes and under-passes), poor traffic 39 79 68 84 management (e.g. police block traffic on side roads to keep VIP _ _ roads clear, city corporation authorizing digging up roads during 59 83 64 65 busy daytime hours rather than at night, etc.), and poor driver D:Dhaka; C: Chittagong R. Raishahi; 1 Khulna or pedestrian behavior. The police even cause the traffic jams Source: Annex Table 3.9 by stopping vehicles to demand bribes, or have other intermediaries do this work for them. For instance, police take advantage of the lack of loading docks by allowing trucks, in contradiction of the law, to unload and load in the main arteries of cities in return for a fee, exacerbating the traffic jams. Participants also noted that the traffic police extract tolls from the drivers of all kinds of vehicles, including rickshaw drivers, without any reason. Government has recently issued instructions to prevent trucks from entering Dhaka city between 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. on weekdays. 9 lnfrastrucv=e ServI eC Improving Infrastructure Service Delivery As the survey results presented above illustrate, consumers experience with the delivery of infrastructure services is generally poor, no matter where they live in the four Table 3.27 metropolitan areas covered by the survey: both bosti and non- Wilingness to Pay for Beter Gas Service bosti dwellers face similar problems with accessing and using (% of Households) services and find that it is difficult to resolve the problems they encounter. Their options for exit - i.e. for alternatives to the current suppliers - are extremely limited due to the nature of the E D 86 40 59 53 service (large economies of scale, high legal barriers to entry,r and low differentiability of service). However, the commonality i 4 6G 44 88 of problems facing all users, across different income levels, 32 75 56 98 means that there is a large constituency for reform whose 21 3 collective voice can be harnessed to bring about sustainable 2 73 76 93 improvements in service delivery. 13 7 48 77 D: Dhaka; C: Chi~ttagong, R: Rajshali; K: It is not the intent of this section to provide detailed Khulna recommendations for reforming each of the infrastructure avaNlable: reponden Rajshari, if piped gas is sectors discussed above. However, by improving incentives and for better service. addressing several governance related issues, including Source: Annex Table 3.17 improving the flow of information, strengthening voice and strengthening oversight and accountability, good progress can be made in improving service delivery. Improving Incentives. The state of poor service delivery is symptomatic of the general lack of adequate, long- term planning that has not taken into consideration rapid urban population growth. There currently are few incentives for municipalities and other service providers to improve the supply of services and to manage demand for services. For Table 3.28 instance, participants at a focus group discussion from a Willingness to Pay for Better Water Service Rajshahi bosti observed that rather than providing incentives (% of Households) for households to switch to sanitary type latrines, the city corporation files cases against users of kacha (temporary) latrines. Assisting households to build sanitary latrines would 85 49 58 62 be a more efficient way to get the desired result. 63 46 86 Government's energy sector policy recognizes that 75 57 93 employees play an important part in the governance of the I 31 64 60 93 sector. According to the policy, "illegal and criminal activities of sections of employees remain the single most important 39 44 problem leading to large scale power theft in PDB and DESA D: Dhaka; C Chittagon& R.: Raishahi; K Khulna areas and thus endangering the financial and commercial Souree: Annex Table 3.26 viability of the entire industry'4." DESA has linked the issue of increasing collection and decreasing system losses with security of employment in its negotiations with the alliance of its five 14 Priate Sector Power Generation Polig of Bangladesh, Ministry of Energy and lvtineral Resources, 1996. Ba desh: Ur'at -W ' eV; rbl A. l Livery 50 unions. The agencies may also wish to create incentives for the employees to discourage demands for extra legal payments. For example, achievement of certain indicators of service quality (access, cost, satisfaction, problem incidence and redress) could Box 3.4 be set in consultation with the unions and users, and rewards Sector i shared with the employees when targets are achieved. The Sictor National Energy Policy also suggests introducing a The c'.crilnInt l,'.1S h an %. comprehensive program aimed at training employees, linked a posiu'.e ..iep in publicuing g with career planning and adequate funding for human resource elcctricir: iritt' , ,-er [he la,[ t VI development in the sector. years. Governmeri h,; aJod.pcd a 9 well specified poeitr Eiritt t..rmull u Distribution companies also need realistic operational and tariffs have s!nc, l-.cn ret.icd G performance evaluation systems that examine non-technical on that basis twice . .ir t.,'r hc . t system losses and take into account the users' experience and two years. By h.,i. i, ind address their real concerns. In this context, there is need to re- BPDB publish ch.ti,-- 11; tirff In the nesapr- , examine the rules regarding holding numbers. Access needs to the newvspapers v; ' rnmnrl-, power sector policy Staesi thaL che be expanded to those without holding numbers as this can "introduction of consumer voice and vastly increase revenues. The agencies' partners in this process organizational accountability in the could be the intermediaries, who have already effectively form of citizen/client charter" is one "privatized" the distribution market to bosti dwellers without measure that is being actively holding numbers. They have, thereby, expanded access, even to considered. DESA plans to the most disadvantaged groups. They could become effective introduce such a customer charter partners in Govemment's vision of providing access to quality that will spell out the users' rights to electricity service to the majority of Bangladeshis by 2020. request connection on certain days and receive a connection within a In the transport sector, survey results indicate that cerimin peri-d .-C uinc. ~'PcCtlhc commuters would willingly make greater use of bus services if prcmcedu.rms tr-r ciflnicl'fn arid the ¶j ptrbdiau_n ol i)Lc-.\n a .ind ;;te they could access these at affordable rates and if the frequency user. will be c\plaiIrd and the of service could be increased. In order to ease traffic chiarter will L, publici zed thr(,ugh et congestion it will be necessary to substantially increase the size radi, i relevvcx-nr anJd die nc . spap of the fleet, license a larger number of private bus operators to er , -operate routes and deregulate bus fares. Deregulated fares could create incentives for service providers to differentiate services taking into consideration tradeoffs between cost, accessibility and frequency. Providers could charge fares based on levels of accessibility and frequency. Incentives could be offered to re-invest increased profits in expanding fleet size, e.g. tax incentives for investing in vehicles that are environmentally friendly, such as those running on compressed natural gas. Given its recent success, BRTC might consider further sub- contracting its bus fleet to the private sector and introducing greater competition in the transport sector. Given the high prices that slum dwellers are presently paying for water and electricity, there is little wonder that willingness to pay for better service is high. The results of this survey show that the majority of respondents are willing to pay more for better service, especially for water and electricity. Willingness to pay is generally higher for poorer residents and declines with rising incomes, confirming that the affluent enjoy better access. This is also consistent with the high rates the poor are already paying (Table 3.26 - 3.28). However, it has become I~ 5 5r1 ;. ¢X: .;i eri es customary for public enterprises throughout the developing world to increase tariffs and to pass along the cost of their inefficiency to the consumer. Any price increase must be accompanied by commensurate improvements in service standards. Improving Information Flows and Strengthening Voice. Publicly posted prices can help customers hold officials accountable for quoting and charging the correct amount. This is increasingly beginning to happen, and tariff rates for the supply of electricity, gas and water are generally publicized widely (Box 3.4). As required by law, Strengthening Oversight over Dhaka WASA, Chittagong WASA and the city corporations i Water and Sanitation Services publish water usage tariffs in newspapers 30 days in advance of i any increase in tariffs. Therefore, literate Bangladeshis are . At the national level, informed of usage rates. However, while the tariff for supply is ., consideration is being given to the published, the price for connection is not. A potential user establishment of a regulatory learns about the connection price when he/she talks with the ¢ commission on sanitation. One of the clerical staff of the utility concerned. The lack of published rates commission's responsibilities would be on connection charges allows officials leeway to quote a price | to ensure that municipalities are fulftlling hi biain ne h and to demand a bribe. The discretionary authority that ig their obligations.under the officials enjoy, together with linmited exit options on the part of of sanitation and that the Ministry of consumers, modest "official" fees, and the high value : Local Government (MOLG) is households associate with accessing infrastructural services hke providing municipalities with adequate electricity and water results in strong incentives to pay higher 0 ;uppurt The commission would underground prices and not report the extra payments extorted umlkc ;urc that municipalities are by officials for connection and use. Connection prices ade1ui!1Lk monitoring both the public therefore also need to be publicized and easily understood. and prr-. re provision of sanitation i *~e-lcc; in their cities using survey- The publication of prices needs to be accompanied by 4 b.aid indicators as presented in this the publication of citizen/client charters that reflect users rcporr ".4onitoring indicators and priorities and clearly spell out minimum standards for service iirgcli wliould be designed in a that users can expect (see Box 2.7). These can be prominently parucip.u.:ry way. Users should be repre-;uruidL1 on the comm-ission's posted at every office responsible for delivering a service and board, and should be part of the enforced vigorously. Currently, none of the utilities guarantee a process of developing the monitoring minimum quality or level of service. For example, performance system. Monitoring reports should be indicators in use by WASA and city corporation management made publicly available, for instance and by external monitors and auditors of the system do not through public hearings by the currently include any measures of user satisfaction or of the Municipal council and WASA. The users actual experience with getting a connection or water performance of the grievance redressal delivery. NGOs and community based organizations can play system should also be monitored, and . bv increasinpr itz credibilitv more an important role in raising the awareness of users of what ptcple reasonable costs and standards of service they should expect, as m well as the role they can play. Grievance redressal mechanisms must be made more credible in order to encourage users to file complaints. Grievances need to be registered, monitored and followed-up and users provided with prominently displayed "Complaints Boxes" to report inaction. Users need to better understand, in quantitative terms, the high cost that collusion and bribery are imposing upon the system, with adverse consequences on access and quality of Bangaesh Urban Service Delivery 52 service. Periodic seminars open to the users and public service announcements can be effective tools in educating the public about their respective responsibilities. Publicly available data and development of analytical capacity can help better inform discussions that are already occurring on several of these issues. Box 3.6 Similarly, the community needs to understand the health and Improving Accountability in the environmental hazards of depositing waste on illegal sites Transport Sector throughout urban areas or on "official sites" which the The nild ttrm review of the municipality has not designed properly. It needs to understand Fifth Five Ytar 131an reports a greater the long term impltications if 40-50 percent of the waste in the emphasis on road safety, and mentions country remains uncollected, as it is today. Representatives of the newly created division level office citizen bodies, civil society organizations and NGOs need to which is exclusively involved in become better informed about the technical and governance implemnenting ro3d safdn- programs and issues constraining access to these essential services, thus other traffic enoinrcring measures like becoming "consumer advocates" for their constituency. An road marking and the in;salltnon of important step would be for municipal council standing traffic ,ignals Traiunig is ah.o being committees on health, sanitation, drainage and water to hold providtd to personnel involved in tr3tfic openhearings with consumergroups andNGOs. management to irnpress upon them ihe n.ed for strict observance ctf traffic regulations. Flo'.%ever, survey results Strengthening Accountability and Oversight. sh,.'w that the sys[em is eaAy While users need transparent and reliable commitments by cucrumnavigaied. w'.th the collusion ot service delivering agencies to perform according to publicized the police and otficil..l from BRTA. As standards, they also need a way to hold the agencies accountable long 3S no punurtve acuion is taken to those standards, for instance through a credible grievance against rhese officials. drn%ers uill have redressal mechanism. They have to perceive that it is "worth" no incenume to legally regster their taking time to file complaints. Another way is by including veehlces and lo have ethese inspected consumers on monitoring bodies where they play an active role, annuall%. Dn%ers that are caught with a for instance, in analyzing operational performance evaluations, fake ceruticate Should be required to pay making policy recommendations, and overseeing a fine that Is hluher than the bnbe thtmn pa to get the ceruficate from the BRTA implementation. or the fake c,ne trom ihe police. Enforcement of vehicle fitness and The proposed energy sector and water regulatory traffic remula-ons aS well as traftic commissions could be a good way to oversee the establishment management currently depends on the of transparent rules and regulations governing the industry, tr3thc police Currentdh thcrt are no developing performance indicators and putting in place ciuzens bodjts overseeing the monitoring systems. Performance indicators can be based on performance of the police and holdmg the minimum standards mentioned above to set baselines and Lhem accountable fir poor perfirmance targets (e.g. regarding user satisfaction, problem incidence and In aduton, the Parlhamentary Standing can be designed and monitored Comnurtte on Transport should resolution, etc.). The indicators strengthen its oversight over BRTC and as part of the regulatory commission's terms of reference. BRTA and Lhe police with respect to Among its many tasks, such regulatory agencies would be traffic management. expected to protect consumers' interests by ensuring that system expansion and operation are at least cost, quality of supply is maintained and tariffs are reasonable. Government will need to ensure that standards are worked out in consultation with all stakeholders. In addition to regulatory agencies, other oversight institutions, such as the various Parliamentary Standing Committees, also have an important role to play and can hold public hearings periodically in order to receive user feed-back. However, most Standing Committees lack the necessary .c.{ 2]Eo,'!ou16:Thfra> ii'2rvi'c ,,- information and the technical expertise needed to hold relevant government agencies accountable for efficient service delivery. Strengthening the Standing Committees is therefore another important priority. Municipal council standing committees on health, sanitation, drainage and water need to improve their understanding of the constraints to ensure all citizens have access to safe drinking water, which include not only technical infrastructure issues, but also management and governance issues. Standing committees must require timely external audits of the departments responsible for service delivery and hold the executive accountable for responding to audit objections. A,,g'Z~ - . Reg~ulatory Servi'ces Police and judiciary Background The police and judiciary are two of the most vital institutions of govemnance, as they are responsible for maintenance of law and order and the dispensation of justice. The services they provide are key to upholding the fundamental rights Figuire 4. l: Ac~cess to Police Service constitutionally guaranteed to all citizens of Bangladesh, such as -the ("/o of Households) right to security and safety, safeguards to arrest and detention, and protection in respect of trial and punishment'. The Mfinistry of Home Affairs is responsible for the national police service, whichr has offices at district and thana levels. The judiciary and the court 58 system comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Law, justice _____________71 and Parliamentary Affairs.I -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ T The credibility of both the police and the judiciary has 3 05 07 09 been the subject of several critical reports in Bangladesh. Several -neTbe. surveys, such as those conducted by TI-B and BUP, show that, 'neTalU rather than protecting, the police are considered ineffectual, and sometimes dangerous to people's safety and public order. Rural and urban households overwhelmingly say that the police are corrupt and partial2. For instance, a survey by Transparency I Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Part II, articles 31, 33 and 35. 2 Social Weather Survey, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, 1997. Bangadesh: Urban Service Delivery 56 International Bangladesh (TI-B) found that the overwhelming majority of respondents (96 percent) said that no help from the police could be obtained without money or influence.3 In the Figure 4.2: Access toJudicial Services survey by Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), police are ranked the most corrupt institution (83 percent of respondents said the Raishahi police are a "highly graft-ridden agency"). Urban residents feel usage that the prevailing law and order situation in the country is not Khulna good and existing laws are not being enforced, preventing criminals Chittagong 17 from receiving proper punishment (BUP 1997). A Survey .hitugong _ ~ 17conducted by the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma haka 4 Victims (BRC) revealed that 89 percent of the respondents reported being tortured by the police while in custody. The survey 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 also revealed that law enforcement agencies were responsible for Source Table 1.1 killing 71 people in 64 separate occurrences4. The US State Department's Human Rights report for 2000 found law enforcement agencies "routinely use torture, beating and other forms of abuse while interrogating suspects. Police frequendy beat demonstrators. The government rarely convicts and punishes those responsible for torture and unlawful deaths." The report goes on to say that the police service is often used by the Table 4.1 government for political purposes and the Special Powers Act Households Affected Directly by Crime (SPA) and Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allow (%o of Households) i arbitrary arrest and preventive detention. The Human Rights Loss of report also points out the lack of independence of and corruption MMIMIM t -_ within the judiciary noting that "much of the judiciary is subject to _ - _ _ ! executive influence and suffers from corruption5." :fl ._ _ _ I W_ |1T 1 _ _ _ 'This lack of protection from the ostensible "protectors" is ' disturbing, since households say that security is very important to N .lorl, i-| r-r . -bl I , them. In a participatory poverty assessment, households in poor \:1r.. LI1 41 communities said the risk of physical violence and lack of security 4.J : io'-n-- ....... - t . .-seJ, l-were key factors in their lack of well-being. This makes them even more vulnerable than they already are due to their lack of food, homes, and jobs. In some communities, poor people noted that well being to them meant freedom from police harassment and Figure 4.3: Dealing with Crime (% of hooliganism, as well as fair justice6. The police also wield Households) substantial power over the poor in urban areas. Respondents from 60 Dhaka and Chittagong mentioned that the police were very influential, but they exerted a negative influence on the lives of the 50 4K3 i; C poor. 40 _ [ ) _ I)Against this backdrop, the survey asked households about s 30 _ i 2. -their experiences with the police and judiciary in order to measure X3_0I; _ j., ° 20 3Transparency International - Bangladesh, 1997. In this survey, more than three- fourths of households also said they were not sure of the expected time for 10 _ settlement of pending legal cases, and 75 percent said that delays in reaching settlement were deliberate on the part of lawyers and defendants, revealing the 0 _ 1_ "court's high handedness." 4 State of Castodial Torture, Death and Prison Conditions, Akram Chowdhury, 1999. Reponedto Dealtthsugh No actbn U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000, D: obaka; C: shittahong R: Rajshahi; K: K.huina Bangladesh, February 27, 2001. D: Dhaka; C: Chittagong R: Rajshal-i; K: Khulna 6 Consultations with the Poor: Participatoy Poert Assessment in Bangladesh Rashed Un Source: Annex Table 4.2 Nabi.etmai,g1999. Nabi et al, 1999. levels of satisfaction, reveal problems during the process of resolving crimes and in court cases, both as plaintiffs or defendants. It sought to determine to what extent households who experience crime go to the police, and their satisfaction with the police and judiciary. Access and Satisfaction Respondents noted that the police had a significant . Table 4.2 presence in all cities, with upwards of 50 percent of the households R .isons for Not Reporting to Police in all four cities acknowledging that they were accessible (Figure (% of Households) 4.1). This is not necessarily the case with the judiciary, with as f Fcarof Fcarof little of 4 percent of the respondents in Dhaka saying that they had ild e Process firtlher n-:ml [rust Po~IWT access, compared to 58 percent in Rajshahi (Figure 4.2). Usage also hll5arassmCent complicated bv varies among cities, with as few as 1 percent of households _ ___ _ Y reporting using judiciary services in Dhaka, and compared with 22 _ percent in Rajshahi. 40 9 4 =E_ ~~~29 25 O 12_ Physical assault and loss of valuables/property were cited as 19 23 22 42 major problems in all four cities, with between 1 and 4 percent of Note: Multiple answers possible the respondents reporting personal involvement in such incidents 1 r Ane _ (Table 4.1). Given the low level of satisfaction with the police force (Figure 4.4), less than half of the respondents bother reporting these incidents to the police (Figure 4.3). Where the incidence of crime is lower, as in Rajshahi and KIhulna, households prefer to use rhalish (arbitration) and other private means to resolve the conflict or get restitution. In Rajshahi, for instance, about 26 percent of the respondents indicated using shalish, whereas in Dhaka the number was much lower at 7 percent. Participants in focus group discussions in Khulna observed that if anyone goes to Service (% of Households) the police for help, he/she is victimnized. They explained that although the criminals are known to the policeman, they are not arrested because the police are on their payroll. Discussants gave - 9 other examples of police victimization, including seizing vehicles without cause and not releasing them without payment of bribes. , - Consequently, satisfaction with the police ranges from 0.4 percent in Chittagong to 2 percent in Dhaka. Satisfaction with judiciary 4 ranges from 0.6 percent in Chittagong to about 8 percent in Dhaka. (Figure 4.5). Problems with the Police and Judiciary The survey revealed numerous problems with police and A I I!.:L. ' 1nn I 4 4 judicial services, through a variety of questions about the processes of reporting and resolving crimes, filing complaints and getting settlements through the courts7. Respondents indicated that fear and distrust of the police were the top two reasons for not reporting a crime to the police. Such fear and distrust is particularly 7The survey also asked questions regarding the speed of resolving cases through the courts and the costs of doing so, but it is difficult to come to a definitive conclusion due to the small sample size (Figure 4.6). Bandesh: Urjau Service Deivery 58 BOX 4.1 Police and Community - Learning Together SevLral srudjits ha%e shc)wn rhart thc police receive luruited trairLino and are 2-neriUth Ignorant ibuur Lhe nghrs of ciuztns. They lack thc necessarn skills to liten and conuniuact: e l etfccovel; cvitl th Lir chlnt;s I e pe.ipie whoI ha.c bLoi mibi,c[td t.-, crinms lFor cxsample. iccurdni [Lu, lc te cnecr t.hr \\r..mcn ,nl ChI!ddrcil St,idie ( \\ CSi i n o[ it':i r Ci: tihc p,:,lice ha%-e never r,i. d cnt].,n. ,. tiLe puml:. d a,ppic;bi-b [tw. wilmciicc to;in:t 'vAren. r.tiici,aril *r tanilti, i.. c.:rmeumes bcalu-e tlic p-hice ;[ti[ .11s trhcni%cl c; ire ni .[ e,1jiippC. -vill tliC I, i bouks In urdcr r.- help mr-yc The p-lice fromra tJre- r, 'er.ice. 'C\\ CS i1, bceii trairi,nin pm-ljcc nl. men A and child nr'hts ,t titc tii na Ic%el in Uhak.i. Bo:.:ra. lymen inc i idi (c3 ..r d Jt ;ricr ; cr. 1'1-h Tti Fj traiunig US'. ca anal.W. 'id strategies tr dealing ith ich crilne; a' otnj ripc. . ifc i tild,rcn Li II abus,c3 and tr-fficJing. lic p,lice u.:olrk .ith i \\ h S t\ I.-d.Llop c;:.-. Irnr. rc I Lit c _..,ninkpic; i- '% C S h4' -I U-iC'rp-cr.tcJ r.le ,r,r l .s and secuons oi Lcie c.,de :I-ng.; i. tlI tii\ -. tl; c ntitiAri. i!i their riiiliiic nmanu I N *t .mir, thuv p-lCe. Lbtar ii;i CO-mm1ilr'. ripre;Lni ti-c Ir. i thi i' irc- ini 1 . tcd In mii-ilstr '. .iki nd poct. :ind c-..nir-iunir rLpr% .eniau. e meet to dc-l,'p nit r-luuirc. l tie- .idsi.f-. t1cir pc re,pil nibilie 1in1 I I', a ntorccrernct and pcr;onal bcha. I. r and ,dJciiof. arca' rb.i !c er unpr vi- il-ic ,:*i aii-it themr-e. cs in .- riune I.:. particular action-s nd idenuk prev t.nor. e sratcfre . *r coamuniri: pol-cnil, ind neighborhood %.rch. r Thus ha ied 1l) new. commurnir watch commiTttees in several thdana. Inciluding Slibucaiil Thanr i nitric e Prevenuon Conin-ii[tee-i and Sadar Thana. In Sonatala police stauon, tht police have taken the initmiie to rai4e ; communrx- aoorcness it .c(men and child ights through information shanng and mntraction. (C.\ C'S halis hared I thetr trairnng mint..al with the ministry of Home Affairs and plans to expand such training tau other dh-ants high in Chittagong, where lack of trust was cited by 87 percent of households and fear of police harassment for a bribe was cited by 40 percent of households (Table 4.2). Households also indicated that when they did report a crime, the police were largely ineffective in resolving their problem. Between 65 and 80 percent of the respondents in Dhaka and Chittagong indicated that the Figure 4.5: Satisfaction with judicial police did not act at all in response to their complaints. Of the System (% of Households) households reporting crime, 42 percent of the residents of Khulna said that the police acted effectively, compared with 17 percent in Dhaka. Rajshahi 4-9 The "Price" of Justice Khulna _ 1.9 Although respondents felt that corruption was a problem Chiittagong 0.6 in the police and in certain parts of the judiciary, the interviewers reported that, not surprisingly, there was a general reluctance Dhaka 7. among the respondents to admit to bribing law-enforcement agencies. In Dhaka, 25 percent of the households who registered a 0 1 2 3 4 5 complaint about the police indicated that they paid a bribe to the Source: Annex T'able 4.-; police at some stage of the process. The reported incidence of bribing the police is much higher in Chittagong. The payment of bribes takes place both during the process of filing the complaint and during investigation. The average amount of bribe reportedly paid varied among cities from an average bribe of Tk.582 in Dhaka to Tk.2,494 in Chittagong. BOX 4.2 Increased Use of Public Interest Litigation Public interest litigation (PIL) is being used increasingly in Bangladesh as one way to enforce the states' accountability. During the 1990s, PIL has not only addressed classic civil liberties issues, such as ill treatment while in custody, but has also addressed the rights of communities and individuals to life, equality and equal protection under the law, and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. PIL has successfully been used by both individual petitioners and civil society groups, to establish the state's responsibility regarding violations of constitutional rights due to the state's action or inaction. In an explicit judgment of the Appellate Division, it was held that rights-based civil society groups/advocacy organizations wvith a demonstrated track record could initiate actions for the redress of the rights of those unable to access the courts for reasons of poverty or other disadvantage. The state's responsibility has been extended to the actions of non-state actors, as in the failure to fulfill the obligation of due diligence to prevent rights violations by private actors, such as in a case challenging the validity of a nation-wide strike by the Bangladesh Medical Association. PIL has been filed regarding righi; io hc.aIkh ser-ice and polce ser'ice,, ncludarig land nghcs At Icao 9 of 45 PIL ci eC. *micc ''94 have been directd relited r., v%,i.luc,n ot nghis by plcice the ureanment of pnm;ner>, safe' o. c.t nLn he police. arbiLran arrest, and % icuo.ln by the poliee of peuple trom homnei and places of busmIncs. Improving Police and Judiciary Services The results of the survey and focus group discussions in the four cities show that the current situation is one where a public good has been co-opted by influential elements to a great extent. Focus group discussion participants in Khulna confirmed that the police only help the rich and influential people, generally in return for some mutually agreed "contribution". An influential respondent from the "upper class" in Dhaka indicated that he had never been subjected to violence by musclemen (mastans), because they knew that the police would take action against them if he were to lodge a complaint. Exit, by those who cannot afford to pay, is pursued through non-engagement (they don't report crimes and avoid the courts). Voice is limited by fear of reprisal. Households feel that responsibility for improving the law and order situation lies not only with the police and the judiciary but also with government and with the people. To fight crime, households say that local government and the public have collective responsibility which requires, among others, that parents take more care bringing up their children, political parties avoid confrontation, and there should be more employment opportunities and recreational activities (BUP 1997). Based on this, interestng experiments in increasing voice are being used in direct community-police awareness raising, in an effort to build a compact between individuals and institutions at local levels (Box 4.1). Another development is the growing use of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in fundamental rights related cases involving the police and other agencies (Box 4.2). PIL is a tool civil society can Banladesh Urban Serice Deivery 6- use to press government to enforce individual rights. It complements other social change movements, but cannot replace them. PIL is generally not effective where existing political polarization inhibits a common understanding of public interest. It can also be an expensive and time-consuming way to ensure government accountability. It does not guarantee follow up by Figure 4.6: Households Involved in a Court Case (% of Households) government actors and nor does the court order ensure implementation; petitioners themselves must follow up cases. PIL Kihui.. can only be used ex-post and does not guarantee changes in institutional incentives that cause bad behavior to begin with. Ra1shah, Responding to the concerns expressed, the government of Bangladesh has embarked upon a program of legal and judicial Chtagong ____ reform, with support from the donor community. Increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system is a key priority Dhaka -Q of the program and this is to be accomplished by streamlining court procedures, installing a court management information 0.0 0.5 10 1.5 20 2.5 3.0 system, upgrading training facilities, promoting legal literacy and raising public awareness. It will also be important to review and Source: Citizens Report Card Survev - redress the structure of incentives of the judiciary. With monthly salaries and allowances ranging between US$100-500, judicial salaries are equivalent to salaries of clerical staff in the private sector and are a disincentive to good performance. In addition, there is need to publish standards of judicial performance, enforce these standards, and introduce penalties for non-compliance. Given the extremely low public confidence in the judiciary, it is also essential to undertake an integrity campaign and modernize the Figure 4.7: Reasons Cited for Delays in judicial code of conduct. judgemeni ('.'.)of Households) 50 Survey results confirm the concern that many people have with the deteriorating law and order situation and the widespread 40 Dliaki dissatisfaction with the police service. Insecurity of property rights, fear for personal safety and the practice of police extortion are 0 undermining confidence and deterring investment and economic c~ 30 growth. Poor career prospects and below subsistence salary levels 0 induce many police officials to become corrupt and this is 20 D* __ DhUaL_ aggravated by dishonesty at senior levels. As in the judiciary, there 0 is need to carefally examine the pay, allowances, and benefits of the 10 _ hulru police force and improve incentives for good performance. This must be accompanied by a policy of taking rapid and exemplary 0 _ _ _ _ action against officers found guilty of corruption and other crimes. Rrpted Pol.. I.|.. .... .|r 1-.1: 0a1..1. Stopping the often politically motivated transfer of senior officials, adlornmnt of I r . I s hesig '. . ,- .,r.s.. increasing allocations for training and the modernization of the Source: Citizens Rp..n C .ard >;e, - 21H U. police force and instituting some civilian oversight of the police service can all contribute to increasing public confidence and improving the law and order situation in the country. Land Administration Background Accurate and prompt recording of property rights and reducing the delays associated with the buying and selling of land Figure 4.8: Access to Land Services are essential to reduce transaction costs to facilitate optimal land (% of Households) use. The present land records system in Bangladesh, inherited from the British with only limited modifications, retains the colonial-era goal of enhancing land revenue, through a system of Rajshahi 7 1 I periodic land settlements in which land ownership and associated tax liability are determined. Khulna Ownership of land is estblished on the basis of a Dhaka multiplicity of documents, including the settlement record, the record of rights and a deed registration process. This has created a chaotic situation as these documents are often mutually 0 10 20 30 40 50 G0 inconsistent, making it difficult to establish land ownership Source: Annes Tablel.1 conclusively based on these records. The process of updating the settlement record, the record of rights or deed registration has stalled as land settlements are determined only at wide intervals. Since the present registration system only makes provision for the registration of deeds and does not address the authenticity of the title, as is the practice followed in several South Asian countries, Figure 4.9: Households Involved in Land government makes no effort to resolve competing claims when the Dealings Over the Last 3 years deed is registered. Indeed, rule 42(1) of Registration Rules 1973 (%of Households) states explicitly that "registering officers should bear in mind that 9.0 they are in no way concerned with the validity of documents 8.0 8.0 brought to them for registration ..."8. This has led to the 7.0 proliferation of several false deeds of transfer and results in high 0 60 transaction costs for owners who constantly have to monitor if ° competing claims are being made on their land. The system breeds 4 5.0 4 : corruption as false deeds of transfer can be registered easily. It also 4.0 results in unnecessary litigation and is an important reason for the 3.0 1 large back-log of cases pending in the judicial system9. These 2.0 . a disputes often take years to be resolved in court, during which time 1.0 i i the land remains under uncertain ownership, preventing its use as a 0 o i I valuable economic asset. For example, banks are reluctant to take 00 land as security when its legal ownership is in doubt. a° hgn ahi Khulna se N. te: Multiple answers possible The land registration process is the responsibility of the ..,.rce: Annex Table 4.6 Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MOLJPA), which it administers through its district, thana, and union level offices. The Directorate of Land Records and Surveys (Director of Land Records) is responsible for establishing and maintaining all 8 For greater details see Bangladesh: Study of Land Markets, World Bank, March 2000. 9 It is estimated that 70-80 percent of all civil and crirninal litigation owe their origins to land related disputes (World Bank, ibid). BangWadesh: Urban Service Delivery 62 property records. The system has different centers of responsibility for the production and maintenance of records for the same piece of land: the registers are maintained by the Sub- Registrar, who is an official of the MIOLJPA; the records of rights are maintained by the Assistant Commissioner for Land; and the publication of results of setdement are maintained by the Directorate of Land Records. Table 4.3 Average Value of Purchase, Sale and Land administration is an important service in fast growing Transfer of Land and Property metropolitan areas like Dhaka and Chittagong, where transfers of Ci Ph Value in Taka land and property take place at a quick pace and records are needed Purhas Sales Transfer J 4,595,162 1,178,797 0 to be updated in a timely manner. In the four cities covered by the 3,319,701 1,839,746 0 survey, there are basically two types of land, privately owned and 5,179,243 4,792,937 244,695 stated owned (khas land). Khas land includes new land (chars), _ 6< t?(1 Q155 444 4G? U0,0 71 S-woL;C *iuf 'nrr.j 'ur 4v2 . V -r1 'r Ir which is created through accretion and the soil erosion process, _- _ _ _ and land acquired through land ceilings. Parts of khas land are earmarked for redistribution, with priority to small holders and landless, according to law, although in reality, musclemen (mastans) and influential people gain control in many cases. The survey asked households whether they were involved in any property related transaction; the costs, including official fees and extra payments, incurred in these transactions; and their overall Figure 4.10: Households with Land satisfaction with the land registration system. Mutation (% of Households) Access and Satisfaction 16 14 lKhulna Between 3 (Dhaka) and 8 (Rajshahi) percent of households had either bought, sold or transferred property or land during the 12 last 3 years in the four cities covered by the survey (Figure 4.9). In 10 addition, the percentage of respondents reporting mutation of property bought during the past one year ranged from 2.5 percent = 8 _ R1 .hihi in Chittagong to 15 percent in Khulna (Figure 4.10). However, satisfaction with the land administration services is very low. The o 6 DIMk. highest percentage of households expressing satisfaction with the 4 . land registration system was recorded in Khulna (about 10 percent) while less than 1 percent of respondents in Chittagong were 2 satisfied (Figure 4.11). 0 Costs of Registering Land If households had bought, sold or transferred land during the previous three years, they were asked the value of the property and costs incurred in affecting the transaction, in addition to the official registration fees. The average value of transaction reported by the respondents, for each city, is summarized in Table 4.3. In excess of 70 percent of the households involved in property-related transactions reported that they had paid an extra amount, in addition to the official fee, to have the transaction registered. The average extra payment reported per land registration transaction was relatively high, ranging from Tk.4,545 in Chittagong to Tk.7,806 in Dhaka (Figure 4.12). A majority of households in every 63 R"gui-'l-"'l | i | | - E ,,2Ltlmry ,c2 v city also reported making extra payments for mutation, in addition to the official mutation fee; these ranged from 62 percent of the respondents in Chittagong to 88 percent in Rajshahi (Figure 4.13). The average extra payments per mutation were highest in Dhaka at Tk.3,926 and lowest in Rajshahi at Tk.1,200. "Poor" households in Dhaka reported having to pay Tk.5,000 to have their properties Figure 4.1t Satisfaction with Land mutated. Registration System (% of Households) 12 Of those who made extra payments, between 32 and 36 percent of the respondents in Dhaka, Khulna and Rajshahi 10 indicated that they made the payment to induce land administration officials to reduce the transaction price recorded in the deed, since this price determines the legal registration fee which is generally O G paid by the buyer. About 23 percent of Chittagong dwellers 4.0 acknowledged paying extra to reduce the recorded price. In terms 4 of the extent of the reduction, households in most cities indicated 2. 2 that the recorded price was reduced by up to 25 percent. However, 2 8 i I in Dhaka, 61 percent of households recorded an even higher l Ii I reduction, ranging between 26 and 50 percent (Table 4.4). A 'hittagong Dhaka Rajshahi Khulna majority of households, whether they had engaged in a land transaction over the last 3 years or not, felt that reducing the :..urce: Annex Table 4.11 official registration fees would induce buyers to record the actual value of the land - ranging from 38 percent in Raishahi to 73 percent in Dhaka (annex Table 4.10). Improving Land Administration An essential prerequisite for the efficient operation of land markets is a system of land records which clearly identifies owners, the extent of their ownership and whether there are others with Figure 4.12: Average Amount of Extra competing claims on the land. It is generally acknowledged that Payment for Land Registration (Taka) the current system of land records in Bangladesh does not facilitate this. The multiplicity of documents, requiring the attention of different agencies, creates the opportunity for delay10, fraud and Khu1na corruption. As the survey indicates, extra payments are made for all kinds of land-related transactions, usually to reduce the recorded Raishahi price, but also to speed up transactions. Various strategies for land administration reform in Bangladesh have been proposed and are 45'r5 . I- 1 being facilitated by project supported by Asian Development Bank. The initiatives include both administrative and legislative changes, U)-. ! and entail making public information that can assist in better monitoring the relevant government bodies, improving the public's 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 ability to articulate their demands for better service, setting and 3ource: Arnex Tables 4.7 and 4.9 publicizing standards for performance, creating accountability 10 Internal administrative delays among the various offices of the MOLJPA are pervasive. Delays in sending notices of sales from the thana level registration official to the thana level Assistant Commissioner of land can take 4-5 months. The AC rarely initiates the mutation process on the receipt of such notices - the initiative has to be taken by the buyer. Therefore, registration of the deed may not result in records of rights being corrected to reflect new ownership and boundaries. There is a huge backlog in completing mutation of land records. Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery (4 mechanisms that work, and improving incentives for government bodies to meet the standards. Reducing the number of documents, for instance into a single document representing proof of ownership, and the number of offices involved in registration and mutation is one option to decrease the number of steps involved and the number of points where extra payments can be extracted. However, this should be Table 4.4 accompanied by complementary strategies, described below. Households that Reduced Land Price and Extent of Reduction Improving Incentives. Reductions in the demand for - - - extra payments and reduced delays can only occur by changing the a,pljr<*n 32 23 36 34 behavior of officials, which will only happen if there is an incentive l)tefRediwetioJnin _ _ for them to change. A combination of rewards (both recognition 925ff/4 ... ,,39 65 73 66 and monetary) and punishment (prosecuting corrupt officials, firing -61 61 24 27 34 inefficient officials) have been found to be effective in several parts 12 0 0 of the world and such an approach can be piloted in one or more 0 r,0 - 0 0 locations. Incentives for users to refrain from offering bribes to reduce the recorded price on the deed should also be explored to break the existing cycle. One way of doing this could be for the authorities to publish registration fees by location that will be charged per unit of land, irrespective of the registered purchase price. Another option could be to reduce the price of registration, which can presently amount to as much as 5 percent of the asset value. Improving Information Flows and Strengthening Voice. Land records are not part of the public record and there is Figure 4.13: Households Pas ing Extra no requirement to exhibit them in a public place. Moreover, there for Mutation ('. of Households) is no public notice requirement for transfer of ownership. The system also does not allow for simultaneous mutation and registration, creating opportunities to produce false deeds of Khulna __ , _ 72 multiple transfers. Exhibiting land records in a public place has helped to correct mistakes and expedite the updating of records, Rajshahi ______-__ -._________ . for instance, in Madhya Pradesh, India, where Gram Panchayets, who have powers to decide undisputed mutation cases, openly exhibit Dhaka - ----basic land records so that people can correct mistakes in them. The relevant authority (e.g. MOLJPA) can regularly publish information on registration fees and the registration process and make sure that Chittagong , 62 this information is widely disseminated. User surveys could be instituted regularly to collect information on user satisfaction, 0 " problems encountered, and the costs (official and hidden) of the Sc,,r: .Ar,nc, IAt.1 4J' land registration process. Community groups and NGOs should be encouraged to use this information for advocacy purposes. Awareness campaigns by citizen groups and NGOs can emphasize the costs of corruption and can demonstrate how extra payments, if cycled back through the official system rather than into official's pockets, can result in improved service standards. Improving Accountability and Oversight. The Ministry of Law should establish and publish service standards and set monitorable targets to assess its performance. These standards 67 Fth?gulatory Serios can include measures of user satisfaction, such as the time taken to register a property, reduction in the number of complaints, a mechanism to track illegal payments, etc. Standards can be determined in tollaboration with the relevant Parliamentary Standing Committee and citizen groups, and can be published as a Users Charters for Land Registration and publicized in all relevant offices. External audits by the C&AG should incorporate questions related to these standards; this data can also inform legislation needed to simplify the land records system and the adjudication of disputes and to institute a tile based, rather than deed based, registration system. - - ------ Improvingr Servilce Del'ivery 11This report has summarized the results of a diagnostic survey that assesses user satisfaction with a range of services provided to urban households in Bangladesh. It complements the various reports on power, water, gas, transport and other utilities that have been prepared in recent years by, for the first time, systematically capturing the views of the users of these services. By presenting a series of quantitative scores, supplemented by the results of qualitative focus group discussions, the ratings provide a useful benchmark against which future progress in improving public service delivery can be tracked. Less than 20 percent of the households surveyed expressed satisfaction with eight of the eleven services examiined, and the percentage of satisfied households for the other three services are not much higher. In addition to comparing satisfaction with service providers across various sectors, the survey identifies specific areas mn which users experience the greatest number of problems, the efficiency and effectiveness of the grievance redress mechanism and estimates of "hiidden" costs incurred by households. Emphasizing the desirability of improving public servilce delivery, the recently published report of the Public Admninistration Reform Commission (PARC) notes that the agencies responsible for delivering services tend to be "rigid, unresponsive, inefficient and ineffective, pre-occupied with process rather than results, driven by outdated rules and regulations. They are regarded as insensitive to the changing demands of the people. Also, in general, public servants have not acted as 'servants' of the people, but rather as their 'masters'; they are sometimes politically influenced and almnost imnmune fr-om the requirement of accountability and transparency.' Bangladesh is not alone in it's desire to improve service delivery and, as experience from other parts of the world demonstrates, thils is a process that will take time and require suistained effort. It will also require action on several fronts. Redefi-ning the role of government and making greater use of the private sector and NGOs to deliver services in which they have a comparative advantage, changing the structure of incentives and subjecting service providers to move competition, decentralizing services and bringing the government closer to the people by involving users mnore in the decision making and oversight process, and institutionalizinig user- surveys of the type presented in this report must all be part of the strategy for improving service delivery. In addition, each of the services covered by the survey will require sector- ' Report of the Public Administration Reform Commission, Volume 1, pg. 7, June 2000. Bangdesh: Urban Service Deivery _ (S specific actions, with varying levels of public sector involvement and differentiated roles for different levels of government, autonomous agencies, private sector providers and consumers. Redefining the Role of Government. The provision of essential services in Bangladesh, as in many developing economies, has largely been a task that government has traditionally reserved for itself. This has stemmed from a belief among many senior policy makers that government should be the dominant, if not the sole provider of services. This belief, together with the shortage of resources and the scarcity of managerial, technical and financial skills has stretched government's limited capacity as a result of which essential services are either not delivered or delivered inadequately. More recently, however, there has been a gradual but discemable shift in government's position with increasing weight given to government's role as a coordinator and regulator of services. This is particularly evident in the social sectors, where NGOs have started playing an increasingly important role. In the health sector, for example, NGOs have been commissioned by government to provide essential primary health care services and NGOs have made notable progress in getting communities to adopt ORT for diarrhea, use of contraceptives and encouraging behavioral change to reduce the spread of HIV. They have also been active in the areas of nutrition, TB management, and leprosy management, mainly under contract with the government. A further shift is now taking place in the country from subsidizing NGO inputs to competitive contracting based on measurable outputs. An example of this is the competitive tendering process launched by the Bangladesh Public Health Consortium (BPHC) that has selected 28 NGOs to provide essential health services to 22 districts, covering 2 million people. These are encouraging developments which need to be pursued and replicated in other sectors. Skilful use of the private sector, NGOs and community based organizations in areas where they have a comparative advantage can sharply reduce the burden on the state and allow it to focus its activities on providing those services which the private sector cannot provide, for example improving the law and order situation. Contracting out services to the private sector can be especially effective for services that are contestable, that is in activities where the market can generate competitive pressures for better service delivery, such as in the power and telecommunications sectors (see Box 5.1 for an example of a water supply concession in Argentina). Experience from around the world * ~ -, ~. Box 5.1: Water Concession in Buenos Aires, Argentina § Although Buenos Aires sits on the bankls of a large nrver that has plenty of water, only 55 percent of its poorer residents were connected to the water system, and only 36 percent to the bewerage system in the early 1990s. The state owned utility, Obris Saniarnas de la Nacion (OSN), was unable to in1est enough to keep pace with groving demand, resultng in a deteriorating s% stem characterized by w.irer shortages. frequent breaks and interruptions. low pres.ure, poor water quality, and sewer flooding during rainstorms. Nmety-mne percent of consumption was not metered and the difference between water produced and the volume billed to consumers was 45 percent. OSN was generall) nu.niana.ged and its auditors cited poor internal organization and unreliable accounting systems as major drawbacks. The company was overstaffed with 8 workers per 1,000 connections compared with 2 in other comparable cities. Salaries were low, turnover of skilled personnel high, and there was a general lack of discipline among the staff In the ensuing clamor for reform, the Menem government decided that the benefits to reform far outweighed the costs of not reforming. The process they embarked upon resulted in a win-win situation for all concerned. A privatization committee was established, and the head of the labor union was made a member of the committee. A decision was taken that water services would be contracted out for a period of 30 years to a competitively chosen private company. Worker opposition to reform was reduced by providing them shares in the privatized company. Five major comparues quab6ed and the concession was offered to the companY that offered the lFrgest tanff reducuon - the winner was a company called Aguas Argentuias, which offered a 26.9 percent tanff reductLon. The rich and upper muddle income households benefited from lower tanffs and the suburban poor from improved access. a-r t; Cow | j AlcaizA,anuel A. Abdala, and Mlazy Shir]ey - World Bank Staff .-- 69 Improv Service DeLiviry shows that responsiveness and accountability increase by creating competitive pressures. When customers can choose a service provider and have exit options, the quality of service usually improves. Grameen Phone in Bangladesh is a good example of how private sector involvement in cellular telecommunications has improved connectivity, even in under-served rural areas. Recent experience in the education sector in Bangladesh has also demonstrated that switching from public provision to public financing of private or NGO providers can yield important benefits to all users. Private sector participation could be particularly beneficial in the distribution of power, where investment needs are substantial and system losses are high. Changing the Structure of Incentives. As discussed in detail in the PARC report cited above, there is need to change the structure of incentives facing the individuals and organizations who are responsible for delivering services. Many of these agencies lack resources, do not have clear performance-related goals, lack operational autonomy, are frequently subjected to political interference, and are seldom held accountable for results. Poorly paid staff feel no motivation to try and improve the quality of services they are offering. In addition to low wages, there is a general absence of merit-based recruitment and promotion2. Changing the structure of incentives facing public servants can be politically challenging, but it can be done and the rewards can be substantial. The scale on which it is done will depend upon the level of political commitment of the new government. The program can be economy-wide as in South Korea (see Box 5.2); at a state or district level, as was the case in Ceara, Brazil or Campo Elias, Venezuela; or at the enterprise level, as in the creation of the autonomous revenue authorities in Ghana and Uganda. An important element in each of these cases was the effort made to ensure that service delivering entities are responsive to the needs of the consumers in terms of accessibility, timeliness, quality and price. This is consistent with the results of this survey, which finds that there is a willingness to pay more for essential services, provided the qSality and timeliness of services can be improved and the service providers can be held accountable. This is especially true for essential services like water and electricity, which are valued highly by users, and is particularly true for poorer consumers, who presently enjoy insufficient access and appear to be paying more for certain services than more affluent consumers. Decentralizing Government. In recent years there has been a growing international trend towards decentralization, based upon the belief that the proximity of local governments to their constituents enables them to better reflect local priorities in their expenditure allocations and improve the coverage and quality of service provision. There are a number of Box 5.2: Overhauling incentives in Korea To improve the deliver! of sernices and Lncre:Se accountabiity to users. Korea adopted a sterm ot perfc)rmance agreements in 1983 wlhich rate Individual and corporate pertormnance on [hLe ba is of rcsult- achieved. Thie resulti. are comp:ared to an atireed set of benclhniark... which ire dcrived on the b.a:,t International expenence and In corsul[tauon with indepcndenit 'u[siders to nuniniiee potential c,nilfict ,t intere t. ectcor specitic quanuaLuve indcaturrs. covering prodLIctIVIFy. pr.)fit[.-tbilt physi-ic.ul ourput' coveraele. Ltorrnation st%rems. etc. are de%eloped and accrunt for 1I1 percent .,t the final *c.-,re. Tlw h perb)rmaince-ba.sed ranking of ser.-ice providers is pubbLised in the press and tlhc best 111.na1u.-rs .are iven monetary com)penlsauu,)n and also gain presrge. The annu3l bonus to staff m.-mbers and the carcer pro,pec[t of managers are Linked [t, [he ranking of tieir conipan.y. .Ns a result of adopting.q this s!Stenm, thcre hlas becn a signuficant improvement in management pertorma.nce including a sizeable Increase in [he rate of rerurn on assets. Source: World Development Report, \W'orld Bank, 1994 BanglWdesh: Urban Service Delivery _;70 ongoing experiments with decentralization worldwide, ranging from fiscal decentralization which involves surrendering control over budgets and financial decisions from higher to lower levels of government to administrative decontrol which involves transferring state functions, while retaining control over budgets and policies. While there is widespread support for decentralization within civil society, and particularly among the large NGOs, the decentralization initiatives that have so far been undertaken in Bangladesh have been tentative, marked with a certain degree of political unease3. The recommendations of the Local Government Reform Commission, established in 1996, have not been implemented and local governments continue to suffer from a variety of constraints including insufficient capacity, problems of accountability to constituents, and negligible funds over which they have discretion. Recognizing that improving local services requires effective local administration, several NGOs and donors have ongoing projects and programs to strengthen local government capacity, particularly through a variety of training programs. An important task confronting the new government will be to decide how best to proceed with decentralization that results in greater local accountability for service delivery. Among other issues, this will necessitate clarifying functional responsibilities between different levels of government; resolving issues of local revenue including local taxes, user charges, and intergovernmental transfers; exploring finance options for municipal governments; and striking a balance between oversight and regulation by the central government and accountability to local constituents. Institutionalizing User-Surveys. In recent years, increasing use is being made of client-surveys throughout the world to motivate better public service delivery. The surveys are being used as a diagnostic tool for service providers to design performance standards and benchmarks against which to measure future progress. Survey results are informing policy makers about the degree of household satisfaction with the services provided by various public service agencies, enabling them to assess the performance of major civic agencies. Data yielded by the surveys is being used to measure and compare outcomes across cities and across services and stimulate inter-agency competition in improving outcomes. Countries with very different institutional settings, such as Botswana, Chile, South Africa and Mexico are putting in place mechanisms that allow them to get systematic feedback on a range of policies and issues. In Singapore, the Division of Public Feedback regularly gathers citizen's comments on a variety of national policies and encourages periodic public hearings between interest groups and senior policy makers. The People's Voice Program in Ukraine conducts regular surveys of households, enterprises and public officials and this information is disseminated widely through the media, public discussions and conferences. Household level data is used to provide feed- back to service providers and technical assistance is being provided to municipal agencies to improve service delivery. User survey's in Uganda revealed that only 11 percent of rural households had even been visited by an agricultural extension worker and the Government is using this information to strengthen training programs for extension workers. As discussed in Chapter 1, user surveys and follow-up action has resulted in improved satisfaction with a number of services in Bangalore, India. As mentioned in the report, several NGOs in Bangladesh have already initiated user surveys with the objective of giving feedback to service providers and policy makers. In addition, service delivery surveys are now being regularly conducted by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Box 2.4) and have now become an integral part of the Health and Population Sector Program and are being used to monitor program effectiveness. The Ministry of Education has similarly embarked upon a program to strengthen education management information systems and PMED has recently published the results of a child education and 3 For a discussion of decentralization initiatives and issues see Taming Leviathan: Reforming Governance in Bangladesb, An Institutional Review, World Bank, March 2002. 71 -mptovfrg Service Delvery literacy survey. These efforts to solicit user feed-back, strengthen monitoring and evaluation, and create an institutional environment that learns from the results and feeds this back into the planning and implementation process deserves government support at the highest levels. The Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Department in the Ministry of Planning, whose responsibility it is to evaluate the effectiveness of government expenditures, could encourage other Government agencies and departments to follow the example of the Ministries of Health and Education and initiate regular client surveys. The information collected needs to be published regularly and be in the public domain. Using the newspapers and the electronic media to disseminate this information, including information about the amount of public funds allocated to districts and agencies, can help increase accountability and help reduce pilferage. Reducing asymmetries in information can do much to increase participation and give households, particularly the poor, the means to articulate their needs and expectations. It is also recommended that service delivering agencies, none of which presently guarantee a minimum quality or level of service, adopt client charters which tell the community what service standards to accept. These need to be prominently posted and e nforced vigorously, as is being done in different parts of the world. Similarly, publicly posted schedules of fees can help users hold officials accountable for quoting and charging the correct amount. Grievances must be registered, monitored and followed-up and users provicded with prominently displayed "Complaints Boxes" to report inaction. Strengthening Accountability. While users need transparent and reliable commitments by service delivering agencies to perform according to publicized standards, they also need a way to hold the agencies accountable to those standards. There are many ways to enforce such accountability. With the increase in public-private partnerships and the private provisioning of services, increasing consideration is being given in Bangladesh to the establishment of regulatory bodies to guide and oversee the activities of service delivering agencies. As is the case in many parts of the world, care needs to be taken to ensure that these bodies, who are charged with the responsibility of regulating prices and ensuring reliable service delivery, do not become politicized. Regulatory agencies must operate transparently, on the basis of simple, well-defined rules and regulations and hold periodic public hearings. In addition to regulatory agencies, legislative oversight of the executive can also play an important part in monitoring and improving performance. Survey results from several developing economies have demonstrated that performance improves when officials know that their activities are being monitored by elected representatives. Although Bangladesh's parliamentary system is young and evolving, it nonetheless has an established system of numerous bipartisan, sector-specific Parliamentary Standing Committees which are charged with the responsibility of overseeing the activities of the sector concerned. Although most Standing Committees suffer from capacity constraints and lack the technical expertise and resources needed to hold relevant government agencies accountable for efficient service delivery, they have an important role to play and can hold public hearings periodically in order to receive citizen feed-back. ~~p- Annex I: Survey Methodology and Process' Questionnaire Development The initial questionnaire was broadly based on a model provided by the Public Affairs Center (PAC), a questionnaire on "Report Card Survey on Primary Education" prepared by Transparency International (Bangladesh), and a concept note on governance scorecards prepared by the World Bank. The first draft of the questionnaire was written in English and prepared by the World Bank team. PROSHIKA organized a one day workshop in Dhaka where the coverage of the draft questionnaire was discussed. The workshop was attended by experts from major service sectors (i.e., lawyers, teachers, physicians, etc.) and by members of advocacy groups and community based organizations. A revised questionnaire, incorporating comments provided by the workshop participants was prepared and circulated to all members of the project team, including PROSHIKA, Survey and Research Systems (SRS), PAC, Economic Relations Division in the Ministry of Finance and the donors financing the survey. Once comments from the various entities were incorporated, the questionnaire was frozen and translated into Bangla for field tests. The translated questionnaire was pre-tested for wording and understanding by potential respondents, i.e. heads of households or their representatives in the field. The pre-test was carried out by SRS staff. The results of the pre- tests were reviewed and the questionnaire was finalized on the basis of this review. The final survey questionnaire contained 199 questions broadly classified under 15 subgroups or service categories. Sample Selection It was agreed that the household level survey would be conducted in the cities of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi, whose combined population accounts for about 47 percent of Bangladesh's national urban population. The four cities vary considerably in terms of size and population, with the largest being the city of Dhaka, with approximately 630,000 households (population 3,690,000) and the smallest being the city of Rajshahi with only 51,000 households (population 294,000), according to the 1991 census of population and housing. Chittagong and IKhulna have 259,000 households (population 1,431,000) and 130,000 households (population 663,000) respectively. These numbers are for the city and do not reflect the population of the greater metropolitan area. Determination of the sample size for I For greater details see background paper, Citi.en's Report Card Survgy-2000, Survey and Research Systems, Dhaka, April, 2001. Ba adesh Urban Service Delivery _l1 L11 74 the survey involved consideration of the Box 1. Characteristics of the Suneved Cities prevalence and variability of the items or attributes for -,l Population* Households Sample which estimates were needed - (thousands) ,. Size and the reliability and Dhak -= - . ' (l Ci , precision desired. The sample Chittagong 1.431 _._., I n size decided upon varied with iKhla '- . ,;, 11 x the size of the city, with 900 -Raishar: 1991 tp ti-',,,"T.'.',a: .I.' a' ll,..' .8 households for Dhaka, 600 for Chittagong, 500 for Populauon number, are t r the uties r.nl.i nd do n.c,[ rct1ccl Khulna and 400 for Rajshahi. the populauon of Lhe greauer mcruopohi.n arc.iS Sample selection was carried out in two stages - sample mohallas (neighborhoods) were selected first and then sample households were selected within sample mohallas. Households in the second stage were selected in clusters of 20 households. Each city was first stratified into two or more geographical areas according to certain pre-specified social, economic and urban patterns or characteristics. Thus, Dhaka was divided into four geographic strata, Chittagong into three geographic strata and IKShulna and Rajshahi into two strata each. Administrative units, or thanas, were used in creating geographic Box 2. Geographical areas by Cix strata. Each geographic area was further subdivided into two domains - one containing Geo-Areai I ,r.i.,Ih.,n R ar,ii..E)inr.ndi economically depressed areas, .Geo-Area 2: Cfr.,nnln:r[. 1.1 l,hm:i rp r. Lirpur. called bostis (slums) and the other -1 " 1. I1L .i, containing the rest of the areas of tGeo-Are-aI3: TeI,z:,ri, S.Ab,,1b.thi h ri l ., the strata. Mohallas within wards Ceo-Area 4: - Lb... I!htei li. itirlr and thanas were used to define , - - domains. Unlike geographical __Chittagoing areas domains could be Geo-Area 1: ; .,njli-1i. [).*tbl r I.l,-"jrInI overlapping. Thus each city was GeoiAk1 a2:, j C hanJL',. n. I,l.:r'.hl subdivided in two ways, by tGeo-.Area 3: iPh.lr ui Bind:.;r iHFh.altri i geographically similar areas and by d bostis and non-bosti areas within ZGe- r~1:, D.t,Li I r each geographic strata. In general, i'e-Areal: . Dtb.hr. .rill h a , &ae-Ave'a 2: khdi1; ,irs.r - .dl,2;lh.n..n.! bostis have relatively more households congested in a small jRajshahii area and lack general amem'ties Geo ,a I E -ll. such as water supply, electricity, rGeo-Area 2: . I l,uhlr. R:aipar.i bIhh MlAkdUr gas, and other public services. Residents of these areas are _ ; relatively poor, frequently undernourished and in most cases under-serviced. A bosti can have as low as fifteen-twenty households and as many as 3,000-4,000 households. Measures of size, in terms of number of households for each city and geographic area of the city were created from the latest estimates of total number of households by thana. Measures of bosti areas were estimated from the 1998 Bosti Census conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. Figures for mohallas, wards and thanas from the Bosti Census were accumulated to estimate the size of the bosti area domain within each geographical stratum. Size of the non-bosti area domain within the geographical stratum was then obtained 77 Annex L Survy Medhodology and Process by subtraction of the bosti area from the total geographical stratum. Geographical strata figures were arrived at from the latest estimates of household figures by mohalla, ward and thana. Sample allocation by over-all bosti and non-bosti area was made for each city. Bosti areas comprised approximately 17 percent of the total households in Dhaka and Chittagong, but were slightly lower in Khulna and Rajshahi. It was decided to over-sample bosti areas and 20 percent of sample households were allocated to the bosti areas. Mohallas were considered the primary sampling units (PSUs) and were listed by wards and thanas. A Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) selection procedure was used to select mohallas and the minimum size of a mohalla was fixed at 20 households. A mohalla with size less than 20 households within a stratum was combined (collapsed) with an adjacent mohalla or mohallas. Once a PSU or mohalla was selected, a listing of the households within the PSU was prepared, which was used to select sample households. A sample of 20 households was selected randomly, with a fixed interval, from the prepared list of households. Training the Field Investigators The survey was conducted by SRS. Bulk of the field investigators had been previously engaged by SRS and had prior experience in data collection from other surveys. Altogether, 30 interviewers and 7 supervisors were recruited for working on the survey. The field investigators, interviewers and supervisors were provided 4 days training (November 10-13, 2000) of which the first two days were spent in familiarizing the trainees with the sectors covered by the questionnaire, relevance of the questions to the sectors, and possible answers to the questions. Each query was discussed thoroughly with respect to relevance of the topic, objective and how the answers of the respondent should be recorded. The sequence of queries and 'skip' directions were explained during the training. Investigators were instructed to physically identify a selected mohalla or PSU and record its name and location by ward and thana. Use of ward and mohalla maps, preparing mohalla sketches by hand and physically identifying mohallas were explained in the training course. The training also included knowledge of listing of households covering sample mohallas and selection of sample households randomly from prepared list. After two days of office training, the investigators were taken to the field along with their supervisors for practical training, in which each investigator filled in one or more questionnaires interviewing one or more households. These filled-in questionnaires were inspected by the respective supervisors and were review.xed and discussed the next day during training sessions. Both the investigators and their supervisors were made aware of the type and nature of errors committed during the demonstration and were instructed on how to avoid recurrence of such errors during the actual enumeration of the survey. During a final review of training, the investigators and supervisors were provided with their assignment, schedules of field enumeration and their obligations and responsibilities. Field Enumeration and Data Collection On completion of training, the investigators and supervisors were provided with the necessary materials for data collection. Material distribution took place on November 12, 2000. Each investigator was given his assignment - the area and the number of clusters and sample households to be covered in the area, maps or sketches of maps for wards and mohallas for easy identification of sample areas, necessary forms (questionnaires) and an enumeration kit - pencils, erasers and cutters. Field supervisors supervised the distribution of materials. The enumerators and supervisors were dispatched to their respective enumeration areas on November 13, 2000. Each investigator was assigned 4 sample clusters in adjacent or surrounding areas or wards of a city and was required to complete the enumeration process over a period of approximately 25 days. Once a sample household was selected, the field Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery 70 enumerator interviewed the head of the household or his representative who was able to provide the information prescribed in the questionnaire. In case the head of household or his representative could not be contacted or refused to answer, the sample household was replaced. At least two attempts were to be made to get in touch with the prospective interviewee before the sample household was replaced. Specific replacement rules were provided to the field interviewers. One field supervisor had the responsibility of overseeing the work of four field investigators in adjacent localities within a city. He was required to observe a few of the initial interviews of each investigator, help solve problems, and maintain liaison with head quarters. The completed questionnaire was jointly inspected by the investigator and his supervisor to see that the questionnaire was properly completed and there was no ambiguity in the responses. Inspection of filled-in questionnaires was carried out continuously as a routine operation. After this inspection was completed the filled in questionnaires were submitted to SRS's head office for data capture. Arrangements were also made to check the field enumeration work by headquarter staff while the enumeration work was in progress. Officers from SRS head quarters visited the four cities during the enumeration period and observed the enumeration work being carried out by the investigators and supervisors. Two of the surveyed cities were also visited by other members of the project team (from the World Bank and PAC). Data Processing and Tabulation of the Results SRS computer operators carried out data entry during the month of January 2001 and manual checking of data entry was done on a sample basis. The manual checking revealed that the quality of data entry was commendable and the error rate for the data entered was extremely low. Computer checking for errors was also administered before the data was sent for processing. Computer checking was carried out to detect errors in coding and inconsistency in data, such as outliers and other type of errors. Responses were not edited and no imputation for non-response was made. Once the data were checked, requisite data files were generated and data tabulated on the basis of a tabulation plan. The objective of the tabulation plan was to present the information contained in each of the queries in a meaningful and easy to understand way. Approximately 168 tables for each city were prepared and shared with the team analyzing the survey results. I~~~~~~~V L Annex II Contents Objectives and Methodology: All Services Table 1.1: Households Reporting Access and Usage of Service (% of Households) Table 1.2: Satisfaction with Services by All Households (% of Households) Table 1.3: Satisfaction with Services by Poor Households (% of households) Social Services: Education Table 2.1: Percentage of children going to school by types of schools (0/) Table 2.2: Types of problems faced by households in admitting children to school (% of Households) Table 2.3: Payment of fees and bribes for children's education in the last academic year Table 2.4: Level of satisfaction with present quahty of children's education by school type (% of Households) Table 2.5: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with private schools (% of Households) Table 2.6: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with NGO schools (C/ of Households) Table 2.7: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with overall education system (% of Households) Social Services: Health Table 2.8 Reasons for using institution for service (% of Households) Table 2.9: Admission to the health facilities by type of hospitals/clinics (% of Households) Table 2.10: Methods of Admission to Government Hospitals (% of Households) Table 2.11: Level of satisfaction with in-patients and out-patients (% of Households) Table 2.12: HH faced problems while seeking treatment from government hospitals (% of Households) Table 2.13: Two main problems faced (% of Households) Table 2.14: Households who reported main problems to the hospital authorities (%/ of Households) Table 2.15: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with health service (% of Households) Infrastructure Services: Electricity Table 3.1: Households with electricity connection (% of Households) Table 3.2: % of Households faced problems with electricity connection and types of problems faced (%) Table 3.3: Households have knowledge of illegal connection in neighborhood (% of Households) Table 3.4: Regularity of Bill payment and disconnection due to non-payment Table 3.5: % of Households faced problems other than load-shedding and types of problems faced Table 3.6: Households reported problems (other than load-shedding) to authority (% of Households) Table 3.7: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with electricity supply (C/ of Households) Table 3.8: Payment of bribes for electricity connection Table 3.9: Willingness to pay more for better electricity service (% of Households) InfrastructureServices: Gas Table 3.10: Households with Gas Connection and types of connection (%/ of Households) Table 3.11: Time taken to get Gas Connection (% of Households) Table 3.12: Households faced difficulty with Gas connection and types of problems faced (% of Households) Table 3.13: Regularity of Bill payment and disconnection due to non-payment (% of Households) Table 3.14: Households faced problems with Gas supply and types of problems faced (% of Households) Table 3.15: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with Gas supply (% of Households) Table 3.16: Payment of bribes for Gas connection Table 3.17: Willingness to pay more for better Gas service (% of Households) Table 3.18: Households with piped water supply connection and source of water (0/ of Households) Infrastructure Services: Water Table 3.19: Source of drinking water (% of Households) Table 3.20: Households pay water bill regularly and knowledge of reducing bill through Table 3.21: Households facing shortage of water supply and methods to supplement shortfall Table 3.22: Payment of bribes for water connection Table 3.23: Households reported problems with water supply to authority Bangladesh: Urban Service Deivefy so Table 3.24: Households facing problems with water supply and types of problems faced (% of Households) Table 3.25: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with water supply (%o of Households) Table 3.26: Willingness to pay more for better water service (/o of Households) Infrastructure Services: Sanitation Table 3.27: Households with Toilet facility (% of Households) Table 3.28: Types of Latrine used and connection to sewerage (%/ of Households) Table 3.29: Households have garbage disposal bins in locality Table 3.30: Garbage collection arrangements used by Households (% of Households) Table 3.31: Households faced problems with sewerage system and types of problems faced (% of Households) Table 3.32: Households faced problems with garbage disposal and types of problems faced (%/ of Households) Table 3.33: Households reported sewerage and garbage disposal problems to authority (% of Households) Table 3.34: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with sewerage system (%l of Households) Table 3.35: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with garbage disposal (% of Households) Infrastructure Services: Transport Table 3.36: Transport service available in area (%l of Households) Table 3.37: Reasons for using public bus service (%l of Households) Table 3.38: Reasons for using private bus service (%l of Households) Table 3.39: Households faced problems with public bus service and types of problems faced (%/ of Households) Table 3.40: Households reported bus service problems to authority (% of Households) Table 3.41: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with road conditions (% of Households) Table 3.42: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with present bus service (%/ of Households) Table 3.43: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with frequency of bus service (%o of Households) Table 3.44: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with quality of fleet (0/ of Households) Table 3.45: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with bus fare (% of Households) Table 3.46: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with behavior of conductor/bus driver (%/ of Households) Regulatory Services: Legal Table 4.1 Household involved in/ subjected to physical acts and incidences of violation (% of households) Table 4.2: Procedural actions taken by households involved in/ subjected to acts of violation (% of Households) Table 4.3: Reason why Households did not report incidents to the police (% of Households) Table 4.4: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with police service (0/ of Households) Table 4.5: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with judicial system (% of Households) Regulatory Services: Land Table 4.6: Purchase, Sale and Exchange of Land over the last 3 years Table 4.7: % of Households paid Extra expenses for Land registration Table 4.8: % of Households showed lower price on land deed and extent of price reductioa reported on land deed Table 4.9: Mutation of Property and extra payment for mutation of land Table 4.10: Households feel that reducing registration fee will induce actual land value reporting Table 4.11: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with land registration system (% of Households) 81 AnaEMOhod oog*AllSemcem Table 1.1: Households Reporting Access and Usage of Service (% of Households) Dhaka Clhnagung ;Khulna RJIihi Service Acces, L|IU ge _AXcces; | l! e Ccc | c | *\CC Educanion S Y35I I I li.I , -Itkaic care scrvices '4 1 4 '4 54 Dnnking -. ier supp4 2S I_ Gla 3 - L.PPIN c;1,1, ,-13 Se%%trage SanLiuuon 5 t i,I 4 54 jt _ Trar.purt \' S Telephone Nlobde phone s 2' I*' PoLcc :-I 14 l -- 5i 4 Iudiciarv 4 1 I- I 1'' Binkig etnr%ices _ ,_ .'. 4 I Loan: debt scrvicc: 1 IS l' S $4 , land rtcirrition I'' II I '' 2'. , i4 Table 1.2: Satisfaction with Services by All H useholds (% of Households) Dh.kk3 Chintagong Khu.lna ,L- hai u Senice DS DS S DS Educ.jion 51 5 ; 33 28 10 12 17 Hlea]h Care II IY 4 419 18 32 9 34 Drinking Water 2 42 8 27 11 9 Electricin Scr-ice 34 (,I 12 44 2 41 Gas Service S 5 10 ' l_ na na na na *Seserage/Santaton I 11 c, 14 11 38 16 17 Garbage Disposal I5 24 lil 40 12 46 10 35 Transport - 2'. 4' 19 12 6 49 Police ' nS U 'S 1 84 2 55 Fudicar-Y 4(6 I ,i 2 47 5 37 Banking Services ' 5 34 52 3 16 4 Loan dcbr Services .1 1 4 4'.' 41 13 14 26 ,Lnd rep.;umuon 2 * I 48 10 25 4 14 * NCBs Only Table 1.3: Satisfaction with Services by Poor Households (% of Households) Dhaka ChiEripng Khulna Rj1sh.hi Senice S | DS <, DS SS |m>S mD DS Education It. 1 4 ( . 16 8 10 6 Healh Carc I 41 5') 16 24 14 21 Drinking X Xaer . 5. Electncir) Senrice 3 5- 8 42 0 21 Ga Sernicc 33 45 na na na na Seuerag.;'SanJEauon r2 15 48 Garbage Disposal 41 5'1 12 48 5 17 TransporE 3 4b ' 3; 21 7 5 33 I'oLce SC. 3 85 ludiciarY CI ." 0 47 Banking Sen-ices' Loan, debt Servces 44 23 113nd JrcLnirl' in 2. 3 ' 4 8 18 10 6 * NCBs Only S: Satisfaction DS: Dissatisfaction na: Not applicable; these cities do not have Cylinder Gas and Sewerage system. Note: For all satisfaction/dissatisfaction tables in the annex, we are reporting percentage of households strongly and moderately satisfied/dissatisfied. Marginal satisfaction/dissatisfaction are considered ambiviant and are not included in the Annex Tables. Bangladssb. .. m~i~0n Ce; -6ce. Delivery 82 Table 2.1: Percentage of children going to school by tvpes of schools I(o/) Govi. Schools Rjid,i4bFL 4'. -I 5 '' 2 54 24 :1 4- 4 42 3' NGO School, DhAJ.4 6 53 3 6 2 0 6 6 28 10 1 1 3 ChIiagrra,n 2 23 0 2 4 3 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 Khuilna 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 21 1 0 0 0 Rij.Iuhi 5 3 5 4 25 0 5 4 6 6 2 0 1 7 Private School, L2h4lk4 58 24 61 58 63 67 58 58 35 54 62 65 73 ( .I I I .,rr Lvn 47 28 48 47 50 45 46 50 13 33 57 66 50 Khl{ai 4 4. Ili ¾ ' 3 j 3' ' II 32 Table 2.2: Types of problems faced b, households in admitting children to school I(O/ of Households) Sex Ae Income Group (Tk) 1Ii ii, * Noni- MaeFmale Below 30 - 50 50 + Lip. t6001-6'0 12'.")1 CI '-r B3 o 0ttj 2:0:.' 1,0111 1 .' 101.1 2i)iI Limited seats DhAki 59 0 61 66 . . 37 . - . IIIlFi1.ig. 'Ic, 45 0 46 45 . . 45 50 .. 44 KlIulI I 40 .. 53 44 . .. 19 . . 35 RtalAiA 0 .. 0 0 . .. 0 . . . Failied in admi.,hioni lest DIILA. L Iu 0 1 6 18 . .. 29 . . . Clnurue-'a:, 17 0 17 17 . 23 10 ..23 lkhulini 19 .. 20 16 . . 1 8 . . 16 Rj1slohi 32 .. 33 32 . . 39 . . . Demand for donauun/bribes bNy school authorities [)hakj I'' ~~ ~~~ ~~0 1 1 6 . .. 19 . . . IInuuie. 12 L 0 1 3 12 . .. 0 20 .11 Khulria F 13 15 . .. 36 . . 21 Itaa hlui- . 9 8 ..10 .. . Table 2.3: Payment of fees and bribes for children's education in the last aademic year I Sex X ge I ncome Group (Tk) Toul 13l-oso Non- Miale FemaAle B cI owL3.) - 5 + Lip to 2('101 6 U0I)- 12(1-11 - he Bo5 3 vr1 20'1") 61001 I clru'j 20'30'' I (u')'.' Average ofFicial fee paid (Tk) l1)h~~~~ka 4Th;' "'3 5263 sir~~~~~~~~~ 1I' 0 5614 Y'S Au 25 4, i' IST Clurugong 4%, I 3K S%3 SSui 824u ~~~~ ~~~~~~35H I 450 'S '3 1V u'' '1' & KhuLr.a i-- 23 4 2 3(65'' ''') SIlI SS, 203 .233 Iii' ' . b'' Ralsluhi iK S4 3 Iii I''~ 3155 46,41 ISv 42>.. II 2V ... 4 . -32 ''' Bribe as a 'o. of ofrncial fee (K- of Households) MhA lO 2k '3 84 s-u -' 14'' --'' IB 151 i'' I.. Chirtugung I., 21 ''8. 10-3 5 5 1 :. s 11-1 12I'2 Rhunin -2 Ii U 5 li il (I1 ti. NI 4'1 Il'' V1- RajIuahi IV - IL~~~~~~~~11 116 33112 l''4 2 ~ - I I.~. 145 83 _______________ Ama Rol oAOJ. Table 2.4 Level of satisfaction with resent qualty of children's education by school tvpe ('¼ of Hotizebo1dq) Sex Inoe(-,iT T iral B.j~ri Non- N.c rmd I,w 30 - 5015. + Lp 2 ' .. 'I- 201- r .Go%.I. Pnmar-, Schools, SaLtisfacuion Dhjl~~j 4 s S 4 43 62 8 47 77 41 C- hir.iagong - 32 6 0 Khulnj ' ' 57 53 45 59 7 Ri114Iila 46 - 4 4 4 4 46 36 39 58 Dissatisfaction DhAka ' ' 0 8 0 U 0 'IiA uinrg'ri I - ' 2' 1.1 9 8 1 9 Khuilr.a 3 i 3 34 0 3 1 8 Raj~hahj 1 3 I! 4 3 4 1 3 23 0 1 8 5 Govt. High schools Satisfaction Dhak-11 2 2 14 2 Chitugong 1%5 13 15 0 0 K.ulna. 4 1 42 4 1 44 35 68 Rr1shahi, I' 31 It 20 6 20 1 0 DissaLisfaction D)hjkj 3 30 ChIltigong 3'6 3- 33 34 41 32 22 KliuIna III 1 4 8 6 Raj,h3aiu 24 2 211 7 44 1 4 25 Table 2.5: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with 3rivate schools (% of Households)___________ Lhi[tlgung I') I~Boo fil I II DSsatisfaction Dhaka 4 4 ' I C 11 I I tagong C) ~ ~ I) I' 14 ' j IKhLu1na .'' 24. Ri,hh un2 : u 23u Bangladesh: Urban Service Dlve 84 Table 2.6: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with NGO schools (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Tocal | Bosci | Non- Bhle Fcmale BIlow 30- 50 50 I- Llp co I 201 - 6001 - 1200l | r Boin 30 2000) 6(101) 1 2 20''1 |I'.- SaEisfaction Dhakalit3 -5 tTlurug-ng 14 31 '2 Khulra* 31 ' Rajshahi , 1 II , Dissauisfacuion tChmatagong 2 5 0 3 3 iKbutlnt 13 I; 13 Rapshahi I 1 3 I ' 1 Table 2.7: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with overall education system (% of Households) Sex I Age I Income Group (Tk) TotallBosn | Non- NMlle Female Below 30 - 50 50 + Up to| 2001 6001 - 1200)1 0,er ____________ Bosui 30 % rs. 2000 60O0 120001 214O0J j 01)0 Satisfacdion Dh.-u 21 41 17 21 19 23 22 17 16 27 22 10 12 Chiitagong 5 7 4 5 7 4 5 5 0 5 4 4 12 Khulna 28 24 28 29 6 17 31 24 16 31 35 24 35 Ralshahi 12 5 13 13 4 6 16 7 10 13 13 4 Dissatisfaction Dhaka 5 7 5 5 5 2 6 5 14 5 3 2 3 ChirLigong 33 17 35 33 30 24 34 34 46 37 27 33 21 Khulna 10 11 10 10 16 0 11 12 8 9 16 39 0 Raja;h thi 17 23 17 17 13 8 17 23 6 19 15 8 85 Amx _ o_ Sc Scrves: HSi Table 2.8 Reasons for using institution for service (% of Households) Frcc Les.; iLsiisv No (. knot fIn. expenpn :wcce4sib a]rera [ruarme dOrL tJr flu I. _ c n t .it. "piL] Dhaka D,.h-t aospital - ,. 32 1 '.1 U l'ariatc it4i I' 4 2 S i I Pnv1tC dO,cIEur '' - ,. ' S.' Ho,nr. .p.ilhic dc.-cct,r 1 . . .1 - ,, 1. NG( I run hio.palir ti '' '2. I II TrdidnaonA heidcr 1 i I I ,i Chiuragong LilAt. huspit_ I4 {.I 2d 1 I ' 4 Pnvx.it h,--r.ita '' !- Ii C. -2 4~ '4~ Inta[c doctor '' 3 il 4i i 2 H-lrmcopatluc d.,cior I' i .. 34 - 2 NCAII run hc;;pil TraLimonal hcaLr Eihulna Govt hospital ' , 42 2 1 4 14 Pnt'acc hospital , , I "I I 7.' 43 35 PInvate doctor I 2 2. I - Homcopatuc doctor I. 5i-1 Ssi52 NG_-O rusn lh,pital 4. h i(5 24 3.4 I. 4 Tridijona] hcalcr ' { ' ' '' I Raisbabi Govt. hospital .4 i "i, ' 32 33 41 2'. Private hospital I I ' r U 4' Privae doctor I III 41 2,I l -1 Homropithic doctor NGC) run hos;pial Tr.did'n.dl hcak]r Table 2.9: Admission to the health facilities by type of hospitals/clinics (O/o of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tkj Total Boso Non- NMAM: Female Belo-w 30 51) 50 + Uip to 201)] - 6(i-3U1 12i)01 |t-er Br"st 31) vrs. 21i |.i |61 1 1 I 200I' 2.1)ili) 2160)1 Gout. Hospitals D hal: 1.l {lil.1 (.1 .:.4 -.w ''' l '.4 7 54 4i 24 Chitoagong Si - ' -- . ,S SI I 1i4'' K>huina3 t. -: 'I' i- ;! 3 (.4 '3 ii -- 5 ' *' 4' Rashahl r 5 i , 4 - 2 U ' a ' 41 Private Hospitals Dhaka 3. ' 3'I * 4- ' 3I 411 13 12 22 Chittagong I. 13 Ix 1 2I 4 2! 1 il 2'2' Khulna '- S 22 2 24 1 i I '1' 2' Ralshah, 24 43 23 2 4 Sl P 21 I A4 NGO Hospitals Dhakl I I) I I '. '1' 2 il ii I II 4 Chirtagong ' I l I i I I I K;hulna 1 { | :1 s: : :, , , , ' I :I : I Ra shahi I ' II I- I i i i ,, B i3ggladeshk Urban Service Delivery 86 Table 2.10: Methods of Admission to Government Hospitals (% of Households) xSe I Age Income Group (Tk) To r I Bo,,u N.n* l lal. | cn-ial. h . l ' | 31 - 5;I I 5I + i | | ! | 1 - l | | R ;ll l 11 11 Vr| l 111l1 lsl 1 12lli 2lil Normal without paying any money DIrik '4 59 62 64 65 78 42 72 'Ihilr;r'e ~75 77 84 82 55 85 72 khhu]ru C.1 51 50 48 58 72 51 37 Iti1lbAhr §2 82 81 86 87 86 Paying fee at tbe private chamber of the horpital physician L)hul tI3 ''' 1 18 17 21 9 32 9 KIu.J,:ner I') II 9 0 3 37 0 16 t huln i 4 17 10 17 7 12 28 Rapiaul,.lu H '.' 0 .. .. 0 0 0 Directly by paying money to ho2pital employect DhA:i ' 8 9 7 9 13 0 1 hiirag- -n,! 1 4 1 15 16 15 8 15 13 Khulna ' ' 9 13 0 0 12 7 .- 4,hihr '.' '.' 0 .. .. 0 0 .. 0 Through personal connection with hospital administxation DhA3u 4 5 5 6 0 0 4 19 ihOrrirong '' '' 0 0 0 0 0 0 Khurna :1) 20 .. 21 18 8 20 21 i;: ____________________ 3.h 4 1 0 4 Table 2.11: Level of satisfaction with in-patients and out-patients (% of Households) D[hLkt C irrh 'o.r'0 Kh.ln | R ILrh.ih S As S Ds s [ DI I Beha'ior of doctor in-paricnr 5 I 1 li 1 . 2K. 3' (Uur*pjanl I5 1 3m 1. 21 i Care of nurses In-p.5ricln 4K 2 I ! :; ! I 22 t )ur-pinrnr 11 3 1 - 11 21 V W aiting period for diagnosis In*pnrlcnt I5 I - 4' 1 41 I 1: Out p3innt 3 l 2 K - I Quality of trearnent Toilet facilities ln-pin.nt 21 e !. 14 Dnnking -water in-pirient hI' 4 ' : : : ' Cleanliness of linen In-pa.cnt 2- I'' 4 -. 2 2 I * 2 Cleanliness of room In*pancnr .4 1 1 4 I ' a 3- 87 Am_ex__l____ ___ __ _`_ _ AnlrCxl l: " Table 2.12: Problems faced while seeki ng treatment from government hos 3itals (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk; DbAArJl | l N| n- ,\III I I I I I I I + i I i,' | I - | - Dllili.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~'' -l: 2i i. I i:ii* ., - .2 ., - ' ',. | 'hAIag' ng. 42 - 4 J. 4 1 4 4 J 42 4,: Khln.hi I J 4 . I lu ' 14 Table 2.13: Two main problems faced (% of Households) |pl] : | '1 [,rr 'OrL | iln.L | i;l l-,,hi | ir;r I S.co nd I l ur 1 .r,,l l ir-! | 'ndl i I or r I| .,o.j percentage of respondenis faced a problem wiLh go%emment hospiral, Bid bclI bu (r-) d,ct ors 14 t I Had bcha%ioir ut nur-f - I . 1i 2 Ii 21 -.Lrc .1in a.pni ill,r ,,f d,c ror .,. - ,. I. lI'. 'ar and :,vidjbLjcr ,.I nurft * I 1. 4 I I L 1 .r nA r,nlr u 3 t I 4 4 I1 \\Wrunbg diagn,s I .. 11 Ace;zlbiJr. 01 igfoat facl nfs I 4 1 . 4 ' .A% sljbib,h rnd nJcAnrines oftrdtr facilinEs * 4 1 2 Av.u tlbdir*, fj dmiking .. iir 1 7, I '' 11 ' Ir Cla rlhnc , ,t linc i I 4J 2 3 ' CiCtanIns; Lt' rourm ii 1. 1 ' Drn.rnd f,.,r curra PJInL ibnbI' 2 ' I I ' I ' Table 2.14: Households who reported main problems to the hospital authorities (% of Households) I Sex I Age Income GrOLIP (Tk) T. li |O'Dr. NOn. .NIt. ik F!Kalc[BL KkAw II- 50 S i,1 + Lip to 2|,iI. (IIT - - i 2I -r | | B .,3 - n I.I I 2I 2 DGha k .. 14 13 .. 0 8 31 .. 12 7 13 39 1hirtagong 11 .. 22 21 23 12 17 31 .. 7 22 37 68 KhLdn3 ' 22 38 38 .. .. 31 30 39 30 R Ilihih, t .. 55 57 . .. 63 68 . 64 49 Table 2.15: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with health service (% of Households) I Sex I Age Income Group (Tkj Tclr B onr N 1,n N Frnai BcIum 30 - 5(1 .1' + Lip tC) |2 JIl 6 1(1iI - | 120'l -i'vr Satisfaction Dhak I 1 411 5 11 12 - 12 V V I P I Chirttgong 4 I 4 J 4 ; 3 4 - 4 4 0 Khulna I I N Is IS I):1 12 r 2'. V H. I RaIdiahi 1 4 1 DissacisfacEion DIi.ka I <. 4t' IJ4 1I I 1 H I1 4 1 I. I - Cthrtugong 4' "I iI 5'' 4 4 1 .1 4 4J ;: ,. Khuiin 2 I| 34 32 ' 3 3' SQ 24 t 1 Rajilpihi 34 42 34 35 3 3.4 1, ' l .4 '7 Bangaesh Urban Servce Del 88 Table 3.1: Households with electricity connection (% of Households) _______ _ | Sex Age Incorne Group (Tk) Tmnal Bosn Non- | I. I-emale Belos 3u 3ij - 50( S0) + Up to 21'til - 6((1. 12'"! I - U 13061 n vrs. I zl ql (t4l 2 I1J I | 2 1i Il 2 ll:l Dhaki 93 60 99 93 92 94 92 95 67 92 100 99 100 (hinag.ong 96 91 96 96 89 90 96 97 76 92 100 100 100 Khujha 84 80 84 84 73 84 83 84 78 83 93 100 Ril-liahi 81 51 83 81 75 70 82 83 45 75 99 100 Table 3.2: % of Households faced problems with electricity connection and types of problems faced (%) Sex Age Income Grou (Tk) Total BonU Non hLalc | r Femi Bdle 30 30 Sl. Si 5J +. Lip to 2(001 - 611(11 - 121ijl - Bo-IMJ , Lr 200, 611i0l | : 20IuZii |1lI1 of Households faced problems %%ith elecrricirn conmection DhJka 12 1 1 12 l 5 9 20 5 6 13 21 25 lutthgonlg '; 12 . 34 5i 31 28 52 .. 22 41 61 69 Khailna I- 2' 2. 3, 25 23 33 22 27 26 61 Ra1shlhi a (u t 3s ,1 40 38 40 57 34 44 56 Extra money paid to official Dhaka 5O6 . r, 5; t' '' 41 1 64 79 48 27 Chiru1gong 91 2 4.2 12 Y.4 S' '5 S'. . 87 91 94 94 Khulru 71) '61l ' A ' n t.4 -4 77 55 26 Ra3;hihj Sb 5'I 'S *8 . '8.S' t19 89 85 86 50 Repeated Visits Eo the office [)hakij b4 '1' bro '!2 ':Il . ' I t.6 74 81 87 100 Chirtagong n 2 2s 3 -l Ii . 70 64 79 94 Khulna 5 41 24 23 S 35 22 42 21 21 25 RapIhahi 7' 56 4 - .I I 34 -2 .2 31 71 87 42 50 Delay in su )plying meter DChaka 1'3 1 24 23 28 '' 3 25 34 9 24 28 31 Chinrtung 40 I I 41 42 2 2' 3l i2 .. 18 49 63 31 Khul,u I' 4l I. !2 I; 2 !- '3 I 1 5 13 0 25 Raishahi 49 > SI J: ; 4 I . 0 46 63 42 50 Additional mone) paid for meter & parts Dhakh 20 0 20 21 17 0 21 21 0 9 15 33 29 Chitagong 18 0 19 19 11 11 15 23 .. 4 20 25 41 KhiaLu 19 20 19 19 28 24 17 21 10 14 39 49 RJl h h1 32 3 35 29 60 40 35 19 0 27 43 29 50 Table 3.3: Households have knowledge of illegal connection in neighborhood (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Tour| Bosn Non- ialc |Iemale hIo 30 30- 50 50 Lip to 2001 |60l1 | 120i1I - | 0r Bosn r. | 2i)i),) ci | 2 ': | 2i1(iiO 2ilIiiiiri Dhaka 6' 22 4 6 i i, u ; .5 4 S _ Clunagiong 2 I 21 21 10 32 1 22 21 - 1 K-hulna 2'' 3'i 2' I'' 12 3'' 2 II 2' 53 t; I R1iphahi i 2 I i i 3 4 I . 89 _ IfstrteSr it Table 3.4: Re ularity of Bill a ment and disconnection due to non-p avment _ g P ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~Sex Aee| Incomne Group Tk) |Total3| Bo.Stl |Non- N.1c e Bvlo.x 3nl 3n -t 5 51.l + Lip 1t( l1l lil- l;1|zh l l | ~~Bo-sra 2 . r | l)I 6i.1 11.1) zl l | I' ql l | t ll l Il u ° o of Householdb pay bill regularlvt D)h3kj .4 ' 3 i b4 J 4 I1 9 89 55 78 92 98 93 C:hjrr>i '6 5 5 4 91 82 85 93 100 KI>hu]ru ' I '' - ' ) 86 83 88 96 100 Raj,h.du "4 S> "' "4 S 4 88 79 94 92 92 Go of Households had line disconnection due to non-paJ ment Dhaka I ' .' H '3 ' ! I': 44 I - ' 4 Chiriagong 'I ' '4 22 I 22 :5 '2 4'' KICuln3 I'' iS 3' 1 2 i I 3 22 'ii - 4 lR.jahah, *. 3''l * 27. 42. '.' ',. 1. 22 '. 4'' ' Table 3.5: % of Households faced problems other than load-shedding and tvpes of problems faced Sex Age Income Grou (Tk) T,,ral B.-,;u N n I.,Je f-mlc c lod-B A 31j1 3' Su.' 5! + Up1-, 2' '111 61N1.I - 1'1W' I - |Ic °o of Households faced problems ocber than load-shedding Dlik | I; I >4 4- SI ;I' 47 49 59 67 40 46 71 75 (Churragong | 51 4 61 73 79 68 76 83 92 Khulnla J4 I 4- 44 - 45 44 47 43 46 38 54 Rahlhahj | j , iu 67 53 62 60 56 56 63 Power breakdown Dhaka 2'' - '' ' ! '' 21 17 24 31 15 11 12 Clurtagong 1 4 44 1 ' p; , 22 15 10 .. 20 13 3 0 Khuln.3 | u- 2 1 - - 35 15 39 26 9 14 Rajphah, | ., 41 i4 lu 1'. 15 23 36 18 7 25 Over-billing Dhaka | * i. Clurag-ung 4' 5 42 3 M m 4- 2 4u .. . Khulna I 2 iII II, I 1 i ; R41.hJhI |2'- 2.'.' 2K' 2\ 2' '.- 27 ,,271 2 Voltage flucruation Dhaka 4'' 4- '. 2.- 4- 4 41 - 24 12 'I 4- Chirtagong 5 2 . '4 ':. 10 22 '61 22 - 2j Ij Khuhaa 4'.1 '4 4' 4' 34 't, '. 4*:. 41 4' R.j'hsh] | 45 2 4', 44 49 54 4; IS ,.4 4. 4 'j Low voltage Dhi32ka | 31' 35 25 2 2'.' 25 ';, 2... 2. 4,, Churtagong |IS 12 I' '' 12 15 I*1 I !' I.1 14 '' Khulna 14 S 5 14 21 12, K I ! 14 Ralshah | I I 8 L. j S 11 ' ' i'i Disconnection Dha |4 . ' 4 2 r 5 ' I! 4 ' Churragong I 3 I I ' I 'I' I I Khulna j 3 ii I- u 5 14 I 1 ,. 4 14 Raj;hah I ,, 2 3 :. I l' ' 2 i Ban&g1&,br TrEi ?.erice1 D elivery 90 Table 3.6: Household,, report d problems (other than load-shedding) to aumhorir ('t. of Households) _ _I Sex Age Income Group iTk) Trit4I B:-1i N,u.n- Il.e | Female Below 3') 30 - 50 50 + LIp to 21''0 - I (i.l - I2001 |1 | -u l rs JQj O 1tl: l:liul): I 2'":u) | 2t:"'Ifr' 2'('0'jl Dbha'3 1 4 3 1 _ I ' 2 _ ChItagink 2 '' 2 3 ; 2 , - I . Kb ulna 422' I' I 43K 1 I ~ 2 1 It R1ajhahi 2 4 42 2 '1 'u 2 I 2 I Table 3.7: Level of satisfaction /dissatisfaction w sith electricity supply (Joof Households) Sex Age FIncome Group (Tk) .-rl|P.:,.nI N:-.n- BNI:.)%% | eml BO 3013 - 5u 50 t LIp nJ | 1 '8t'i 11 - |(m -|1 2001 -1|1;i Satisfaction Dhaka k '' 3 15 34 4 7 1 23 2 2 C:hjinag.,-,r 1 ,, . 1 4 ' , ' ' ' Khtuln 3 I3 , llIr 1 - ..: 'I'I, DissaEisfaction Dhaka t4 7 ' t. 4ii 15 \4 11i B5 I.. I- Kiluin3 44 .,I 4'. 44 44 3j 4; 41' 42 43 I Rai;hah' 4 1 4'. 41 41 "1 3 41'1 4 21 ½ ;1 Table 3.8: Payment of bribes for electricity connection ay Sex Age Income Group Toud |- Li N, Mdc Female Bclow 30| 30 - 50 50 t L'p to 2001 - 60(01 - 120WU - | Cr |-r s. 21 i')0 | 60') 12' 2'00) "["I' Average official fee paid (Tk) Dbalu 3W ' .'I 3313 31'' S 3(06 35K Ira) 2c1'2 3',>, 5TI'I I41 Chirtago.n t-V N'- .. .''u.3 3553 3-41 3tn3 33''. 35-3 2:81 434i 3.4 3 Khlu]ni I'4*... 1 -.4i 1 12 3(1 2141 2I I- A II i'3 1'35 1:' I Ph-.4 .I iS Rajihahi 23 *i2' 4', 2' _'.4 32'1 3,r' 23''- 42~ 2',; ' _' 'AC' Bribe as a '; of official fee Dhaka 3 Sb 4_2 '_ I .'*9 48 Chittaoiong .;4 4 ; 4 s)3 -v '14 1 2 i 3 . Khulna 12 4 41'1 4s 31 43 '' 3n '4 31 Rl!ahalu 2 ' 22 33 2(, 'n 31 2 3 ' '1 14 Table 3.9: Willingness to pay more for better electricity service (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) r1taJ 1i Non"- ale |FealTLe Below 30 30 - 50 50 + Lip to 2Li'1 T l - 120' ii - ( r Bo,t n yr2a. 2 010i) 6' It)1 1200) 2 20': 20 I)I Daiaka Yi ., i 3M ( 4 C 5. 1. b' '' ;" 31'' Chruag.ng -; i . - '' 3' bC -6 4') Is' ' " Khutna r C 4 -Y 3 5 4 5I si Y: '4 1.5 11aj-hahi .4 '.0 u1 4.4 (3 41. ('1 '2 c . 4 4 91 __________.'_L!_'-_';_. 7 nx'l.IfI', . Table 3.10: Households with tyes of Gas Connection (% of Households) Sex Age IInc onr Group Tkl Tm31a] B(ju NoJn- Mlae FrnJe Bdlou 30 - 50 5) + L p 2 2'"1, , | 11I - ' Piped Gas [)hiak 74 4 88 75 70 65 73 81 37 59 94 98 99 Chirugorig 60 18 65 60 60 34 63 63 9 47 72 84 86 Khulsii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 KL1Ouhj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ci inder Gas Dhak.I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1bJrugint g 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 12 Khuli,u 15 20 15 15 20 10 17 15 2 15 32 61 23 R_I hh j. h 10 4 11 10 11 2 10 18 10 6 13 48 48 Table 3.11: Time taken to get Piped Gas Connection (% of Households) [ I Sex | Age | Incomr GroILp (Tk) To-,tal Bu t Non- MNle [emale Belo, 30 - 5L 50 + Lip TO |1 '1 "I - ,. I I 21 , - :'r Less ihan one month Dhaka 12 I' 25 I 2' ii 'I n 1 5 4 12 16 27 :hirapcong I . 14 8 ,. II 3 1 1 4 19 I to 3 months Dhika - - l'. 3 4 14 0 1 8 15 16 CIhrupgong I . .1 13 3 I 3 i .. 12 13 15 5 3 to 6 months Dhahk 4 0 4 ' 8 ' 5 8 2 5 5 2 ChIn3gorlg - II - - 5 4 14 .. 0 8 17 19 Miore than 6 months Dhih | ' 3 ' 2 ' 5 0 4 5 1 2 1hi- rre J 12 hi 3 *14 'I 2' 5 8 28 48 Table 3.12: Households faced difficulty with Gas connection and types of problems facedi (% of Households) Sex I Age I Income GroutpI Tk, Tztal| LoroBNun- Non xalc Female Below 30- 50 5U t Lip o 2u'1'I |i'ill - t LpII -| .Bosti I 310 rs I| i |1 | ' Iiii ' '1111. | 'I IlI*l | ., of Households faced problems with Gas connection Dhaka 48 '.' JY 45 '- 2t 4 5i 6- 33 47 69 56 Chittigong |. .... V - 6I ;... (i 61 61 84 80 Took longer time than necessary Dhaki 21 21 I 3' 5 23 23 9 29 35 8 Chiluguig| 4> 4-' 4.S 4 38 63 26 44 78 65 Repeatedly visited gas office Dhaka 3K 3' 3 ; 26 34 46 26 38 45 56 Chirtagong |4 s' P. 4l 3 44 58 40 46 67 55 Contractor haird to track DhLk j 4 14 1I 22 l. 12 14 4 16 26 14 Chitrtgong 8 5 ' -, ,I 2 12 11 5 Extra payment made to gas office Dhaki 18 18 18 18 5 16 23 13 18 23 16 ChilLagon| 41 .. 42 41 41 .. 37 46 32 38 56 50 Bangladesh: Urban Service Dlivery 92 Table 3.13: Regularity of Bill p ment and disconnection due to non- ayment (% of Households) Sex Age Income Grou (Tk) Total Bo u Non- NIale Fcmale BeloW 31 - 50 50 + Lip t 2 |) 1I - 6001 12uOl - cr I | | Bo;n l 31) N-rs. 20(00| 6000 0 20000 |04.1|1) o of Households pa) bill regularly Dhaka '9 I ' 1 90 95 90 89 93 64 86 94 97 96 :hitr,gong b 93 SI SI 95 71 81 87 .. 78 81 86 100 o of Households had disconnection due to non-pa'ment Dhaka |4 4 4 4 t) 4 5 13 7 3 2 0 hiu- I : 0 ' 2 ' 0 2 3 0 2 6 5 Table 3.14: Households faced problems with Gas supply and types of problems faced (% of Households) I Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Toul| BotiMt Non- Na1 F-emale Beldo"W 30 - 50 |50 + Lip t) 2|1,11 - 6001 - 1201 - Oir I I Bomn I I ^r> . 2001 6|(113 12010 21ii(i| 200111): o of Households faced problems ,iLh gas supply DhakL 1 I' I' 10 16 21 SI 19 14 s 14 .lutu)osng I. Sb 14 IS ' 'S 14 l 19 2 20t) I 0 Breakdou-n (no supply/blockage ofvalve) Dhaa 14 0 1 4 13 23 0 I 1' II 16 16 II II Cbitrtgcung I 0 IS I ( SI 6 I 16 6 19 0 Inadequate supply (pipe) Dhak- Th 0 78 SO 6h lOO) 79 77 54 '( SI 75 tS C hirugong 10' 76 b3 'f 31 5' b2 7 94 71 ;0 Non-availabilitn of cylinder Dhak.i 2 Ii 2 2 u 0 O S Ot I) 3 I ' I Clhttag.n Ig ) I) 1:1 0 0 ( : 0I o 0 0) 0 Disconnection despite payment Dhakl I U I I 0 0 20 3 0 0 0 Chirtaprong I 'I O O 0 1) t! O O 0O 0 0 Note: Kheuna and Rajshahi use gY/ndergas and therefore are not reported here. Table 3.15: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with Gas supply (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group Total Bosu| Non. MIale Female BClOw 30 - S0 |0 + Up to 2001 6001 - T2001 O.r I I Bosu 30 yrs. 120Q 00 000) 2l:0C0O 2000O Dhaka 74 '75 68 85 7' 71) 3l 74 79 75 S 3 Chitugong 29 5~~ 30 30) 22 25 I1 29 3 1 22 9 Dissatisfaction Dhah I 10 10 I0 14 2 12 10 45 16 3 I Chauecrng | 17 42 16 17 0 14 14 23 11 17 31 IS Am * *fho ka G |l Table 3.16: Payment of bribes for Gas connection | |Sej | gS | Income Grou (Tk) To~L1 Bost, Non- M~ale FertnakI BLIo'.L 3')- 5'1 SOl+ Up E') 2i1(11i i - I I 21)0-1- . I I I 13(,~ri 1 | |31 ,r 21:11 (,il ( 1 112i': i 5 rI 2li(r11Il Average official fee paid (Tk) DhMAU 4-35 4935 4807 5685 5165 5186 4628 2244 4701 6120 4035 4176 Chiagong tl )3 0 6193 l (330 4648 5623 6512 5838 5060 6320 6813 6336 Bribe as a % of official fee Dhta | 3 63 61 72 33 38 97 78 42 51 113 67 I hntirong 15 135 121 185 95 136 112 207 103 120 106 Table 3.17: Willingness to pa more for better Gas service (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) ToL| Bosa Non ltile Femile BLIOW 30 - 50 50 t Uip t |l0ll - ( |00- 121'"11'| (-%er |o~ | B i>i 3 i):1xrs | l 2')':)i. | 001J (liOs | 211111: | 211t:lEl,:X | '61.1i ii, Dhak. 42 98 31 42 47 36 44 40 86 49 32 21 13 Chiriraong 69 61 70 71 48 55 68 76 40 66 75 73 71 K.hulrnu Si1 78 82 81 86 85 85 74 53 88 98 93 77 Pbj4hah, 49 63 48 49 46 30 48 65 59 44 56 76 48 Note:for Khelna and Rajshahbi ifpipedgas was made available, respondents were willing to pay morefor better sen*e Banglaesh. Urban Service Deliery 94 Table 3.18: Households with piped water supply connection and source of water (% of Households) __________ I I ~~~~ ~ ~~~~Sex X g e IIncome Group (Tk) Tcnal B,' ,u No n N-i le I-L i-n l Bc Hek*.,A ii3)- il~ 1 Lip I*. 2iii I L'1.1'1) I 1 2.I.1- "oof Households with piped water Dhaka 1 3 OII U - ~ 34i 1 'S Chnutiaone 4') 14 '54 4* ~ ' ' 2. 5 5 '. 3 ~ K1 55 Kbh.hn 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 i ' .' I Rtjjhahi I h 1 31' ;II "I, . I* Public Tap Dihaka (. 21 . 64 ' 2 t_hiniagorq 4 2 - ' - S 4 1L. 4 Khuln.3a' 4 4 I i 4 ' 4 I Ral.b;h, l--.uS - - U4 Own hand pum D ha ka , 4 I ' ~ 1 (Ihirtagong 1 ' 2 1 2 '' V '2 ' " 43 Khudina 35i . 3, 11A 4,, U 3' 2 41'1 lZjlh.ih '5 2 4 3" 3 ~ 45 24 3 42 2 4' 24 Shared hand pump D ha k. III 4 1 4 li I. i L 41- 13' Khulni 5' 56 5 4 4' '. '1 LL '52 4 ILj-.hhi ~~ 24 ' 25 2 3. :4 ' 4 3' 5 Table 3.19: Source of drnlking wtr (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) TOEld Bu~ra Nun- M e ml Belo%w 3') 3') - 5ill 50 + Up Eo 21)')l11 6001 - 1 2u01l C;r Bosd ~~~~~~~~~~~~210IC'I (',0 21:,0 2001,') 'IIt."3i'LI Govemment Source D ha ka -4 4'' ''3 4 4 > .4 4. i '14 ' I, Chirugi~~ng 5~~' 2'' 61 5 ' ' 5. 5 5;4 . . Khu1na 1'' 2' I ' Raj,hahi 31'' Y 3, 6 2' L- ' 5 t 5 Private Source Dhaka I LS F 'S Ii 1 5 OuraFrng 43 . ' 4 3 3 '5 4'' 4 4 4h 4. '' 24 4~ K hu1na ''2 'ii '3 '31I k ' 4 'I '3 '2-5 Raj.hahi '-.4 ',, - L. 4 '..'' 2 .4 .54 4.' 2 4 Table 3.20: Households pay water bill regularly and knowledge of reducing bill through meter reader C/o of Households) I Sex I Age IIncome Group (Tk) T'otal Bo4ri No- Ca tml Bekm 3U 30 - 50 5') ULp c,' 2u01 60'11l 12'"' -1 Households pa) bill regularly Dhaka 5' .' '2 .' "'K '2 's 4 ''4 `' '4 Chirtagong ':44 Raijshahi 92 97 96 100 95 WS 96 46 I100) Knowledge ata bill can be reduced dirough mneter reader Dhak-n 14 ' 1 4 13 lo Ii IS3 IS - 14 J., Chirragong 3')31 '' 2' 2 2 UI 5 ) '3 2 KhtAna j 6 30 2s RUjhahu 3 3 2 I) 2 S 3 2 li Table 3.21: Households facing shortage of water supply and methods to supplement shortfall I Sex Age IIncome Group (k) To'u)I Bosu I\LNfl- Mile Ferriale ~1JOw 01' 31) - 5') 50 + Lip IO 2,1)1)1- (1"'ul - I2L1'1 O- ' 'O. of Households facing shorEage DhkaU 57 3 59 57 54 61 57 55 30 53 62 60 66 C hi rial,!ng ""4'' 41 14 15 38 46 30 45 47 46 Khuina 34 3 6 32 1 6 60 HjLilauh'l ..~ 69 70 72 55 72 7 1 78 Adjust w,ith Ehe acvailable suppl% Dh.iki .l 80 71 96 80 73 88 85 74 72 75 Chjrugong S'. ~ . 86 83 79 87 84 84 84 100 8 6 Kh Ldn.1 '1 1 1 0 1 7 0 IU1~~hihi '.' - I ~~ 7 1 100 69 5 8 9 0 6 5 100 Get wager from source D)h.ikj '1) 3 2 3 0 2 3 0 2 5 0 5 Chirupr- n.' 7 8 6 21 5 9 9 7 0 0 khu]n. 1 1 2 1 1.. . 11.1i~~~Uij 4 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 Other:- (affa ge from tanker, use of motor, ecc) Dh.ik_i 7 13 6 7 10 0 7 9 8 2 5 20 14 IhJct.gu~ 5 0 5 4 11 0 5 7 0 3 9 0 14 Kh uJni 9 .. 0 1 0 . . . . K~iuihi 1 4 . 1 5 1 5 .. 0 7 32 .. 10 1 7 0 Table 3.22: Payment of bribes for water connection I Sex I Age IIncom-e Group (Tk) Total Bu,ri Noin- IN Ia], I tm-alL Bd,w 310 3,i -r50 5I' + Uip lo) 2'1'i.' I (1- ui 120-11 - ' r I I I~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~11) 6111 I21't 0 I,rrii AMerage official fee paid (Tk) D1.hak. 3.I ' 362!1 RtAI i22 ' 3860 3378 1991 3333 4167 3602 3111 Clhitugung, 4K!~2 452 45 I2 I' 4470 5254 7000 3002 5572 5603 6287 Khulni 21- 5 3"' 111) I,I I. '.I I O ''i.' lullI' 2188 2286 0 1877 2606 2250 0 Rjl4h.ihJ 24' 2 .1 '.i 65' " 2736 2514 200 2752 2920 3500 3000 Bribe as a ~i- of official fee Diuka 95 . 95 96 92 73 121 25 47 71 117 197 Clurugonig 94 .. 94 96 79 69 98 92 7 116 78 110 96 Khulna j29 13 34 28 67 103 1 6 19 23 38 22 R.i .,h 3hi 3 5 168 3 5 3 2 5 2 2 7 3 8 3 2 200 3 3 3 5 43 3 3 Table 3.23: Households reported problems with water supply to authority (% of Households) __________ I ~~~~ ~ ~~~Sex IAge IIncome G roup (Tk) ToiLa Bl3ozE Noni-- Male Female Belo'i 30' 31) -5 5O S + Li1p to 2'JO)1 - .01' -1r Bost ;i 2011110 61'I) 1 211(0 2111 21.1001II) Dh..ki 2! '1' 2 2! 23 ~ , I 5 II~ C hirtaging 3 I 31 3'' 4S I I 3 Kl i a] r (.4 FUp-liahi I -I I' 4''. . Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery 96 Table 3.24: Households facing problems with water supply and types of problems faced (O/ of Households) I Sex 1 Age IIncotne Group (Trkj Touil bo'n Non NMale Female Mdow 301 30 - 50 50 + U-p co 21)01- 6(.11 1,- 112001'-l Over Bosth 20: 6)0'i) 1 20()'j 2000i) 2)0'y)) ~-o or Households racing problems Dhaka 4 1 '. 4'.' 4'' !( 2 3 9 50 79 41 37 3 6 48 CIhirugong I51. 4 t 8 1 :15 66 59 74 57 58 62 Khu.lri4 -~~~ ~ ~~..' 1 I'."' 0(8 86 57 Ri1shTh, 4 4 4' Su ~~~ ~~~ ~~~59 46 46 38 54 44 Interrupted supply Dh-ika I I' 1' ' 13 8 10 18 7 3 4 c-hiruagong IS I'. 3'' 1 6 9 20 1 0 9 1 3 Khuln4 3 55 ('' I.. ?lU hi~hi M; . I III I I 10 10 .. 7 4 25 Over-billing Dlub ' 3 3. 3 5 2 4 4 4 1 3 3 Chirtagi)ng A . 0 8 9 .. 8 9 9 0 KhLJna '.1 ILU14hihj 42 43 43 3 50 49 1 8 .. 20 55 75 Inadequate spply, Dhauk 4182 5 5~ ( 5 8 59 24 54 69 79 59 C hittagong 1 " ." (2 69 76 .. 71 66 78 87 Khulna 4.45 4'.... 41. R.a,~hahi 2) 2 2 1 '.' 21 54 .. 28 20 0 ImpuriEcv or water Dhkak 2'. 3 ' P- I 25 29 59 23 21 1 5 34 Chinagong 4 4 4 6 .' 5 4 .. 1 1 0 0 0 lbi,hahi 2 3 24 24 ' 1 7 1 9 .. 39 21 0 Table 3.25: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with water sup1ply of Households) Sex Ae Income Group (Tk) Toul Bo~o Non- NlaJk Female Bdw301 30 - 50 L0 i p to 201-6001 I 1211001 (- %er Bosd i 2000 I 600' 1200 20I 20060 Satisfaction Dhiaka 4 6 2 ? 423 2 33 '. . 2 Chbnugong ' 1'I. I Khulna S kaj~hahi I'. I- I - i: i Dissatisfaction Chittagong 42 43 42 43 5 42 4I.) 3 3 5 3. 4 KhuLdn 1 2 Rj1;h.ihj )6 2 - Table 3.26: Willingness to pay more for better water service (% of Households) __________ I ~~~~ ~ ~~Sex I Age IIncome Group (rk) TalBosriF Nn- Male Female Be]ox 30 30 - 501 50 +I Lip to 2001 - 6001l - Non0 -I ONer I IBo,;ti 2CH00 6000 7120 200 20000 Dhaka3 4'- I,j 3 48~ " 41i1 40) 5I ,~5 51 41.1 31 3''I Chuiragong (L, 55 6- '2 4 '3 2 6' 49 44 '4 -- Khulna M- I 5S4 81 2 -6 -. 55 , N. I,. &u '3 '' R1a shAh, I ' '2 I ( 4'1 5' 52 31 3I' L,- 5 46. 97~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~taII atstcuc&i~ a1t~l Table 3.27: Households with Toilet facility (% of Households) ~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~Sex A2ge I n ilome Group DhA ik7Iav Chirtagone.I I Kliulni 1i1.hihu Table 3.28: Types of Latnine used and connection to sewerage (% of Households) __________ A2e I ~~~~~~~~~~exIncome Group Tora] Br,~nI Non.NIale Femal1 eN )(6.IMc 5i.i + Lip,o I 6'."1' - II2IO Ie % of Household,, w6ith wAter-scaled toilets Diraka y 78 54 74 88 86 90 Chirxgunp 4 *. .. ' 3 45 65 85 95 98 Kbulna '1 '5-. 4 I 30 89 90 95 91 Rajshdhu ..4 7 4 '1 . y, 70 69 60 66 100 Others Dhaka I ' 4 I '' I 11 41 20 2 2 0 ChirTag.ong : 4 2 41 23 1 6 55 34 1 3 4 2 Kbu1n., -F 8 8 8 4 9 Ra 1 ,h ah, 'A '' ' 3 4-1 33 28 28 37 33 0 I! of Households have latrine connected to sewerage sy-stem DbaLa - 1 47 7.i x' ' 6 62 56 77 91 89 Chirtugong 4 15 '" 481 41l 1v 49 27 40 50 59 55 Kh uln a i:,a, , n n~ r. i na na na na n a RapaIj r4 1in ', ii] n n n a na na na na na Table 3.29: Households have garbae disposal bins in locali nom ru Sex A ncm Go rilal Busn N on - 3ae eml Below 30 - 5' 50 + L'p Co 2001 -l 6001 - 112001 -I Oter ____________ ~~~~~~~Bow31 30 ')s2I0 00I1' 12-000 201k") 2'000 * of Households with garbage disposal bains in locality Dhaka 4 II s'. 4 4 5 4ui 4'- 4 5 " 5 i> Chirragong 5-4 5 4 54 41 .' 4' 51 2 Khulnaj .3 3 i U U H '1 . ' . Rtaj;hahi '. 4 4 5 ' 4 4Ž 1 Table 3.30: Garbage collection arangements used by Households (% of Households) I Sex J Age I Income Group TOEal Bosw Non- Miale Fernalel B elow 30R-- 50I 50 t uLp to 200) 1. I 6001 - 120{'1 -I Otisl lB o 301 rs 2t'0 LJIYJ 1 200 20') 21 000HI% LUse paid pick up sen-ice Dhakca 24 I 43 34 3. 2 34 41 4 22 u 5' S Chirtagong 12I 14 13 ' 13 INT S Khulna 4 4 J 4 4 ' Rl,itiahi I ' Throw in the open place Dhaka 32 45; 2. 2 32 2 4 3.3 C 1 2 4 Chionigong I1 2 I S 1 21 3I Is 13 I' . Khulna 5 45 y': 8 6T 3 1.4 Ra1s5hahx 342 .44 3 Throw in th~e drains Dhaklu 24 4 is 24 23 4 2 IS 3 Chittagong '.3 s'' ,uI. 2 : 'N.,u3' ~ . KChuLna 24 C- 21I 3 45 2 ,Rajphahi 2. 41 3 ~ ls 35 45 4 A ' ' Ž Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery 98 Table 3.31: Households faced problems with sewerage system and types of problems faced (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group Total B.-,s| Non- Male Fcmale Belou| 3(0 -S 5'+ Lip to 2001 61)01 - 12001 -| O) Bo ;n 30 r | 2'1'0 ' ;')0 | I,) | ')1' I 11: | 5ii, o of Household, faced sewerage problems Dh:ka I- S I- 18 1 IS ' ' 3 11 15 17 ( hm3agn. 1' I' 11 2; 1I3 lii '. 14 1I 9 8 Blockage of sewerage Dhak. 4,. 7.1 41 4v. 33 ;, j 67 64 45 13 19 Chittagong 4. JL. 4- 4 3.j '. 30 75 33 0 Leakage/overflow of seevetage syatem Dhaka N ,l 411 I II i2 24 23 50 54 54 L hlrL1s.-s 2'. - ' i{ . IS.I 25 ' 7 .. 10 25 67 0 Theft of manhole cover Dhak- 6 0 6 6 0 0 4 10 0 0 5 13 18 :ltitra.jn_I 0 0 0 0 °0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 3.32: Households faced problems with garbage disposal and types of problems faced (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group Totjal Bosn Nor.- \ale Feraalc Bclowv 30 - O SO + Uip to 2001 - 6001 - 12|I'.I -| C 'r Bo;n 130vr} 2000 (.OC'0 1 2001 | 20' 1|1)11 9-o of Households faced garbage disposal problems DhaL3 I' 2 14 12 10I 6 1I 1'. 27 12 7 10 hI-Lt Ut OIlg _ 1 I 6 _ i '1 5 S 7 13 Khuln * 44 2 - - 3 9 R31.;haha I' ' I I' :. I I.' '' 1 6 32 Nlunicipal arbage bins not close to house Dhakh' 11.'I I'I 1 13 II 'I 4 4 1' 13 28 Chirugung 1' 2 1' 2'1. 1' . 15 1 I 0l. IS b 0 0 Khulia (m.. I 6. .( (.5 8'' t() 1,1 411 0 Ra31hah ', ,, 44 ',,, K 68 3 24 '' 42 '.' 100 Irregular clearance of bins Dh3ka In, I ' 25 I8 ',, IY s 1' 24 12 57 Chituagong 44 1'"' 44 4t. 411 36 44 j,. I -'. -- 23 67 Khulnm ' il 2! .5 3I 1' 10P 23 ' 2' 2. 100 R}Iuhi 4' I32C 32 4'. i 32 45 44 I 41 - 0 hlunicipal garbage bins not available in area Dhaka 165 0 66 65 62 69 65 64 84 71 52 51 15 Chturgong 36 0 37 35 40 48 30 50 0 49 16 51 33 Khulku | 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 R3;jhahi 115 0 18 15 0 0 6 33 0 14 13 0 99 i In ices Zardill Table 3.33: Households reported sewerage and garbage disposal problems to authority (% of Households) Sex I Age Income Group 4Tk) Total |osri Non- Male FcrnLaic Belov | 30 - 50 50 + Ul t I 2'001 6011(1 - 12'1"01 - . .cr I | | BolBu o 3i) | 200'J 6111 1 2)10 2i11I1I 2(Hi, % ofl Households reported sevwerage problems to authoriiy Dhaki 17 1 16 16 20 23 16 7 19 Lhirugimng ' 3 68 63 50 K>;hulnlj V 16 21 h '24 17 R.mh4hJ1u '' '2I 14 .r16 38 34 4 of Households reported garbage problems to authority Dhkai 24 23 21 17 34 28 19 34 i hi ug.ng 23 22 24 20 18 22 15 Khuilvu 4 4 4 4 5 3 7 3 0 R1jj4hih 14 11 14 12 21 21 Table 3.34: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with sewerage system i % of Households) | Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Total Bom| Non- Male Female Below 30- 50 50 + Lirpto 2|' )i! 60(11, . 12_:1 I - U r cases Bosri 30 vrs |00111 6'1:11"1 1 l 21)1) 20111111) I .l Satisfaction Dhlika I 45 16 16 IS 26 17 13 5 27 19 6 8 Chicttgong 16 1' 16 2 16 I.S 14 16 25 8 Kbhuln II 9 9 21 10 9 13 1S 6 R3j4t13hj 16 5 7 16 20 7 ' 18 17 Dissatsfaction DhaLa I I ) II I 1 7 6 11 11 22 16 5 10 9 Chitrgong 14 14 14 S 17 6 35 1 0 0 Khutna 3-8 38 36 59 60 37 30 4b 34 Raj-h3hi | 22 '' D 1 9 29 14 19 11 39 Table 3.35: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with garbage disposal (% of Households) |_____ I Sex I Age Income Group (k) Total Bosa Non- iale Fcmna:le Below 30 -50 50 +-t UP to 2001' | 6t101 - |r1 - | lcr |___________ _ | Bosu 31) 'r, |O |0 6(1 ij) | 1211!1 | 20')')'1 2|'11''11") Satisfaction Dhaka | I ji IS I 14 23 16 9 9 19) I S ')| Chirtagong 10 0 II 10 6 10 1 9 b 10 I 4 Khulna 12 26 10 12 23 13 1 8 II IS 2 I 21 Rapshahi | U 4 11 10 I1 9 13 3 5 1 12 Dissatisfaction D)haka 24 3b 21 24 19 19 23 27 49 276 I | Chittagong 40 4S 39 39 49 43 40 39 j9 SI) 301 29 IC, Klulna 46 2i 0 48 21 38 4b3 4S 4-I 61 61 4h R,1.hah 3h 5 33 16 37 19 40 34 35 17 35 4i 5 Ban eshg e Urban Service Delvery 100 Table 3.36: Transport services available in area % of Households) P Sex Age | Income Group (Tk) TcP°d Bosui Non- Nra[e FtmiJt Below 30 - 50 50 + LIp Eo 2001 - 601)1 - | 12001 - Ovl I I | Bost, 30 yrs |2(0)| 6001) 120() 24)000 2i1") Public buses Chittagong 44 44 444 44 45 41' 44 4s ' ~ 41 41 O 3, 4 khtTh 2 2 2 t i 2 I I t 2 R>jIhahi SI -e' - .I .i. .,s 1' '2 -. i' '2 Private buses Dhika -I - '0 -2 '1:. .t -2 -- 2 ~ ~ u. ;!1 - Chitn1gong '.s S' ''' '*,- ''S 1 'I '*1 'r 'p. 1'''' 1'''' KhUhui 4i 1 I 44 41 23 ; ~ 1Y 43 1U 4( 5 ; Rjj*,hah, :'2 II: '-'I ''2 Ii'. s 'I ' 8 -i5 "2 .p .1. Pri% ate car/ieep/van Mhakiu ii; i55,ij 45 5s . - 5 Chirtagong i.4 U' L4 2. -3 5; :,t Th1 52 45 '! S KI-idna 6 - sI- 4'' I 4i RaIul~hah '4 1 54 ,1 4 I 3 | I Id. Ricksbaw DhaL 3 ' - 10 ) : II:I V , 1 | 1 : 'l ' ')!1 l: . | 1 " Chittagong 11iii ' I| 1III) 1 I1.: 1lii ''S I 1I,,' 1111.11 : lii; Auto/Taxi Rj1sluhi nt ''14 '.3 (3 -- 1l 34 -3 '4 SS "4 ';3 '-'4 " Chittagong ) l :1:-.i-| , ; f hlaxi/tempo Dh3ka b'I K"' 7' 1') .54 91-" SI 4 ' Y t . O Chirugong ')3 ''3 ')3 C4 S'l ''4 ''3 K'S 1:I' '33 '2 "3 ''6 Khuln. 4 4 4 4 O 3 3 ; 3 4 Rapshahi - , t -s 4 8 S 6 32 (4 Ttains DhaL1 4 8 3 4 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 ChitUgong I I I' IIn 13 4 III 1 O 5 IS '1 4 Khulna I L 1 Is I. 1.' 13 13 '. 4 1 25 3. Ral;hih ;' 4i. j I 3'1 .' ' 6 SJ 1' 1'- 4 4 - 101 _____________Ania 11 Infratrct Seices: Twnpo Table 3.37: Reasons for using public bus service (% of Households) Sex A e Income Grou Tk) Total Bo.rtI| Non Ma. I'cma1 BcDb | 30 - 50 51J + Up |2_-I I O 1 1 OcrI!:-.r BobLu 30 vr Less expensiBe Dhak.i '2 2 38 32 34 24 31 40 14 30 35 49 28 ChirtixOng 4L. 43 46 47 37 42 48 42 31 57 78 61 Khudna.. . Rah.duh '.2 4 61 62 66 73 59 63 36 59 70 91 Easily accessible Dh.ika 'I 4N H. 2'I' 'i 23 2Io 21 34 28 14 10 9 Chirugong - 1- N . ' - ' 5 8 8 0 7 Khuln.i Kltjjhihj . 3" Y 3 " 3 i 34 53 41 39 34 48 Mlore frequent Dhaka 1 r 10 9 7 6 8 4 -' hirugong I ' I I 11 00 1 0 0 Kh.1ni Raj;F.Au 3 1 4'1 3 4 41 ' 3i 48 34 40 32 31 No oLher source Dhaka I i 2 ' ' 10 4 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 (:hurugong 0I 2 l 1 E , z | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Khulna I161hahi - - - ( 15 2 6 13 19 7 2 18 Miost convenient DhLk I- l3 I .21'4 1 ' I. I 6 16 22 21 15 8 11 Chitt,gong 2 ' ' 2 I " 2 2 1 4 0 0 Khuln i R.hahi 'h1 11 '.3 '' 35 'I 31 36 46 34 23 9 Buses are less croAded Dhaka 3t It I') ' 2'' 11 18 23 20 12 10 Chirtagong 13 22 I 13 o 1h 14 8 23 6 0 0 Khulni RA1UIh, 3.2 s 15 31 41 24 33 36 50 35 23 18 Comfortable Dhaka 15 24 14 IS 21 i- 1. 14 11 18 i 14 ; Chirugong 3 'i 2 3 ) 2 S 1 4 ,, 1 4 , Khtdna L3Ihihahi 32 ( 3' 31 41 1} 33 35 5'. 3u 2''3 I Bagaeshr Urban Service Deliery 102 Table 3.38: Reasons for using private bus service (0A of Households) Sex I Age IIncome Group (Tkc) Toa Bs INon- Mak Female BeloA 30 - 501 50) + IUp:pto 2u01 I 600(1 - 121)01 - 7 ~~7 I ~Born30ur 2100 6 10% 1 201:10 2(1 2CO' Ltss C%-penli%e Dhtaka 42 I SI 4 ) 5' 42 " 2 46 51 3 1 23 t-iriup -ng 2 34 2 7 2. 33 2 2' 2 2 1 Khu]na ' '' '' '' '. I 31 IUhIuhl 34 3' 34 3Ž ~~ ~ ~~~~4 1 44 3 1 -I 4 4')1 Ea,iI% acce,sible Dhaka i u 6 u 78 69 61 70 74 73 57 40 Chiruag-,ng - 4 - S 63 70 79 78 55 78 79 75 73 Khulna 5 I '4 3 69 54 60 66 60 45 1? I &U1 hj '2 .4 (2 2 L..u 55 62 69 66 62 66 57 Mtore frequent DhAka '33 'A1 52 S3 3' '' I 47 53 60 55 42 29 Lhitugong 3I' l'7 3 2,' 3 41 1 8 39 33 35 47 Kh Wdn i 4 4-V 45 5 4'' 48 6 1 45 3 3 Ra1;hah, 3" 3') 3Ž 33 25 2'. 'U) 38 47 29 43 57 No oilier source Dhaka L ( . 6 5 4 5 7 9 0 Chirtugoing I I ) 3 I 1 0 2 1 2 0 Khulna I '1 I' 2 0 2 0 ta1hdhi 34 3'' 34 3 3 J I 3.4 46 61 33 26 57 Most convernent Dh taka 4 Ill6 1 0 7 9 1 0 3 8 Chirugong ii 5 S S 5 0 6 2 5 9 K.hid nA 4 4' - ' . 1 0 4 6 It,1;hah,II 1 4 3 12 I ' 4 14 22 32 12 13 40 Buses are less erouded Dhaka 3 '1. 4 3 4 2 4 2 2 4 3 0 5 Chirtagong 22 3 C' 2 3 1 0 2 4 2 0 Khulrna '' 1) Ii1 '11 0 0 0 0 R.ij-J hj 2')- 43 IS N 3 \ ' 27 27 1 6 25 40 Comfornable Dhaka 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 0 2 Chirtagong 1 0 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 Khulna 1 0 1 1 .. 0 1 0 0 0 3 R-i14uhi 19 42 17 19 18 11 1 9 26 27 15 22 40 103 Amex___________ bh%Ifs=utr Scr~ice Thnspft Table 3.39: Households faced problems with public bus service and types of problems faced (O/ of Households) Sex I Age Income Group (k) TouJ Bo~t I Non- iNtake Fniale Belodk 3u Su 50 L' + Lip to 21 it) I 60111 - 2I1'1 -1 aof Households raced problerms w6ith bus service DhaL- 4 1 5 I 16 16 9 9 15 21 8 4 C hirtagong 24 22 2 4 24 6 28 21 . 1 6 34 39 1 3 Khu1na R-il;h SI 'hSI 52 4 5 58 50 49 37 50 49 83 79 Less frequent transport Dhaka 4'. '.41 41 22 37 32 41 36 42 34 100 CLhirgunrg 42 3 43 44 25 'I 44 42 .. 34 52 35 0 KhL.111.1 Rjpuh,h 23I 14 24 24 5 26 27 31 24 1 8 21 Non-reliable senrice Dh-ika 6 ''I - '' 0 8 8 22 3 6 19 0 Chirugong I16 42 14 I., 2 0 22 3 .. 23 1 5 1 2 0 161,11 VIj i. I 26 1 0 29 1 8 20 1 0 1 0 High fare (ost) Dh4xka 33 33 3 32 Si.. 8 38 37 37 47 20 30 0 Chirt.iI,go-ng I ' I I, 23 67 9 32 . 1 1 13 32 50 R~I~hahi SI 3'I 12 421 26 35 31 36 28 41 48 Poor condition of %ehicles C.1hirLag-rng ' ' ' 1 ii Khidna Behavior of driver/ conductor Dhaka I 1 2 I 2 I' I V I . 2 ' Chirtaigong II 4 I I I! '' ' ' 14-2 KhuLna R-ijhhhi 212 ' 3' 3 4 I .1' . 2 Table 3.40: Households reported bus service problems to authority (% of Households) Sex Ae I ncome- Gr Tk' TEIBosn INon. NMale Feimale Belo~ 30 - 51) -506-T- ULIp)- 21ci1:I 6(01Eo I 2:0 Over I Bosti ~~~~~~~~~31 yr"'r2() 600011 1200)11 2110 2011 `6 of Households reported problems w6iLh bus service to authority Dh.aka 6. 6 SV 4 'Iii I Chittagong --231 ' Kut una Bmgladesh: Urban Service Delivery 104 Table 3.41: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with road conditions (% of Households) Sex | Age | Income Group (Tk) Toul Boin Non- Male Femae Bel(O-).| 3U - 50| 50 + Lip to 2'i| 1 - (,:U' - | I 2'iX1 - BoAti 30 - 21:11:1) III) 1O: 2:0.. . 1'0'I0 Satisfaction DhA-a 15 2s !3 tu il 2'. 1 8 '4 i Chirt-gong S ' 3 ; 4 - ' - - 3 ;' Khulna 3 3 4 42 42 35 31 3 33 2 RJlbMl ;! 4 - 1to I; 1, 1H IS 1':' 1. 2' 1 Dissatisfaction DhAh.i 34 46 32 35 29 20 35 40 50 28 34 35 42 Chirmagong 33 28 34 33 33 25 32 39 31 33 31 40 30 Khulna 14 0 17 14 7 11 14 15 11 14 14 31 Ral,1uhi 33 56 30 33 28 43 31 31 23 35 29 8 Table 3.42: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with present bus service (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Toutl Bosu Non- Male FemikA Belo| 30 - 50 51) -- L t 2001 - |601: - | I''l - |I r | | Boa;6 31! yrs 2 t.11-1) 6t:1licl 1 1 2ll | ':,l:i Satisfaction Dhaka I 4 I - - I' 8 4 3 i'' 7 1 7 C(hiugong 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 KhilnJ a ' 3') 15 VI 12 1I. 1 IL. 21 2'' 12 8 .. Ralshah i. Iu - - 5 5 6 0 . Dissatisfaction DhaluIu ' 426 ' . 'n 23 15 '( ' 42 . 22 16 19 Chirtagong 42 2" 44 42 4t. ' 43 43 3; 4; 40 54 21 Khulna 1' 2 14 1 13 11 1' - !1 18 45 . kj1;hih 4' l 1 4s 4' 3i u2 4 33 4. 6 23 . Table 3.43: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with frequency of bus service (% of Households) Sex I Age I Income Group (Tk) Toul| Bosn| Non- Male Female Belo- 30 50 I 5) + Lip to 2001 60uIj1 - 1 2_)% - U)crtr I I I Bosuti 30 vrs 20:0 60(0 12)1)0 21.101)1:1 2( 0)0 Satisfaction (Public Buses) Dhalk 25 3 23 2; 23 2'' 25 2u 26 i 22 3 2 Chirugong 2 n 2 3 n ii 2 3 ' 3 I' Khldnai Rilshalh 1 1 1 1 1 s. 1 22 24 1 1 6 I , Dissatisfac on (Public Buses) Dhaka 2 u ' 2 2 I 1 4 2 2 1 3 2 Chirtagong ! 11 2 1 I ' 0 1 ' O' 2 5 KhLilna Ra1shahi 15 8 16 15 13 14 I1 It. It 16 15 0 4 Sadsfaction (PrivaLe Buses) Dhalu 2u. t 1- 25 1.2 's 2- 23 34 '.'' 1- '4 1S Chiragong L. 2 2, 25 iI:I 3'' 2, I' 33 21 21 4 Khulna 44 1' 4s 45 3') 2 41 48 49 42 53 ;- RIUsthhi I ' V 1 It 2' IS 2i 1 , I1 21! lIb Dissadsfaction (Private Buses) Dhaka 4 1 5 4 ' 4 i 3 ' 4 ChirEugong 6 M C' 3 6 5 18 s 4 Khulna I I I I I ':1 1 3 I I RaAiah,h 15 I 14 15 12 I8 12 I5 I 1 - I I Table 3.44: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with quality of fleet (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Toal I Bosn Non- Ntale Fernale Belowx 30-50 50t U-L'p ro 2001 601tl - 12|1)0 - (uvr Botn 30 'rs 20O 1) 6(000 120001 20(1C0 2.111) Satisfaction (Public Buses) Dhaka 1s 1Q Is . 2. I- r 22 14 11 1 4j Chitrt.gong 3 , 3 3 '.' 3 4 ii 2 Khulna Raj.hahi 1 I- I. 22 1 3 25 2 I *. Dissatisfaction (Public Buses) Dhak.a 2 ' 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 Chitutgong 1:1 l :. . 1: I I I I H II Khulna Rajzhahi '.' 34 2') 31' 24 33 3'. 2.S 2; 3i 1 ' Satisfaction (Private Buses) Dhaka s II I 13 - - * I Chirtagong I1 Ii 1. 1 1 1 3 I 1 4 Khulna 22 .1 '4 22 31 3u 2'' 23 24 22 RaishaIi 5 ' I') 1 I5 15 16 21 31' I5 12 2'. Dissatisfaction (Private Buses) Dhaka 11:1 I. - '1' 5 1 1I s lt. 4 3 Chlrtagong 2' 'I 2! 2' 22 15 2 21 5 30 1' I1 5 Kihulna 4 U 4 4 '' - I - 5 3 1 R!Lahahi J;. 26. 2' 2( 35 2. 31 15 3j 4 ' n Table 3.45: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with bus fare (% of Households) Sex Age Inconie Group (Tk) Total Bo-u Non- lale Female Baoj, 3|3 - 50 5') + Lip to 201)1 -| 6001 - 121)1)1 . |Oxr ___________ |Bosri 31) r_ 20(1') 60o | 12101J) 2WO1)00 21:)0') Satisfaction (Public Buses) Dhaki 6 i 0 6 - (. 5 - 4 4 . Chittagong 1i: 31 - In 12 c 11 H 4 . 2 14 KIhLlna RajshAb 5 4 5 R 2 3 11 -' 1. 2 Dissatisfaction (Public Buses) Dhaka 11 iI 4 l IS 14 I I 30.' 1 2 54 Chuttagong 4 : 4 4 S1 ' 3 5 U 2 Khulna Ralshbalb '' 1 - .:) . -2 51 6' -3 (.4 43 Satisfaction (Private Buses) Dhaka 4 I 4 4 5 2 4 S 2 2 1 4 Chittagong - 6 - - 6 2 6 1 " I K.hulna 10 01 1 10 15 1 12 S 12 13 Rajsbahi 6 I.a '' ' - - ' I' '. I Dissatisfac ion (Private Buses) Dhaka I') e.5 111 18 311 26 '' 13 4'. 2- S Chitagong | 2) I 1 31 2' 33 1 21 35 Is 2S 2 4 .. Khulna | 12 0 12 12 0' 14 11 12 1 1 I IS RaIshai , 2 6 - .5 ' ,- .-, , 4 Banldesh: UJbin 2vire Deivery 106 Table 3.46: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with behavior of conductor/bus driver (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Tr¢ iM | Bo1 u Non- lMlale Female Below 30 - 50 50 + Up to| 20)1)1 - 61.1,1 -| 12'i-I &.cr BoWnD 30 rsI 2 j. I 2100 211)l 201' '0 Satisfaction (Public Bti-;es) Dhaka 14 Il 14 11 4 14 19 5 7 16 36 21 Chl-ugong 3 6 2 3 4 7 4 1 9 0 KiC ulna.. . .. . ......... Ralsh u I 4 5 5 2 4 11 9 6 2 9 Dissatisfaction (Publie Bu%se, Dhaka ' ;. 6 6 3 7 5 7 6 3 11 4 Chitugong 4 I 4 4 0 0 4 5 0 3 5 8 7 Khuln.i . . . . .. .. .. Rajnhalu ,. I '' 68 82 81 71 55 63 72 64 43 Satisfaction (Pri%jte 1lLS[Ses Dhaka I'. . I 10 9 3 9 13 4 3 13 25 18 Chiugorun III . 10 10 3 12 7 5 8 15 9 0 Khulna 2' ' 2 21 0 39 18 19 37 20 12 Ral,hhlu I. l l ~- 7 0 0 7 9 10 6 7 18 Dissatisfaction (PrFi ate Bu.es) Dhail ' 1 '. 2 20 30 25 22 17 43 28 10 8 13 Chirugong I II I 13 8 13 14 11 28 17 11 4 4 KhaIln3 4 '' ' 24 30 14 25 24 16 24 27 R.ai hihi - - . 74 88 88 77 63 55 78 77 43 107 _ A 1iLtos, Table 4.1: Household involved in/ subjected to physical acts and incidences of violationl (%o of Households) I Sex 7 Age I hiIome Group (Tk) Tr.ulJ Buoa| Non- Nile Female Below 301 30 - 50 | 50 t I± Uplr, 2'.''1 - I .i")l - 12001- Over I B i vs 2')')1. C. fi 1'' ')00 20000 2'.':'': XssAulted Dlika I '''' 2'' 2 24 I'' 2 Hl 1.3 3.1 2.5 0.0 Cthrtugong 3 3 4 3 4 3 j 1111 25 4'.' 1, 1 1 1.5 9.2 0.0 Khul.t 3 4 2 3 2 5 3 4 4'11 3 5 8 7.5 Ralshih 22 3 2 21 3 24 2 4V -I. 12 3s 8.1 Loss of valuables DIui t5 '''' 42 33 i2 2I 31 4b I1.' 2.6 26 7.2 8.9 Clututgolig 2 i 2! 2 ,11 I S || 1.9 1 1 5.3 4.2 Khulna . ' I' I' ''u 4 5 I 1.0 0).0 0.0 Raj:iuhi I I I ' IH '16 1) 3 . ' I'll * 1 2.2 7.5 Arrested for vItolating lavw Dhaka II 'fill I I III ili' III- if 4 fill C.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 Chittagong H-i 6-, 2 3 I It ,-5 I ,,,, ,,, H.1 (.6 (1) 0.0 0.0 K.hIlna II ' I I II ; 1 '' 34 H .1 I I tii 'ill 1.0 1.8 0.0 Raj-shjhi 111.1 111.1 l 'l ii ll ll Ill u C.0 (.0 0.0 Involved in a court case Dhaka 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.0 C.0 1.3 0.8 1.4 ChitLagong 1.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.3 0.0 C.4 1.7 1.8 0.0 Khuln;t 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.5 0.0 2.5 2.2 5.3 2.3 2.3 78 15.0 RjL,LIuha h 0.9 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.3 0.0 C.9 1.2 0.0 Table 4.2: Procedural actions taken by households involved in/ subjected to acts of violation (°/ of Households) Sex T Age Income Group (Tkl Total Bosti Non- Male Fetn3ae Below 30 30 - 50 50 + Llp o 2'."' . L.;l - 12'.".'1 - icr Bosu C s I!tl ,1 l |'1 I 1 It 2 1J ,| 1t Reponed to police Dhaka 42 42 44 3Y 43 32 41 Chirttigng 35 31 35 4'.' 22 - 4i. Khulna 4s 4 4 54u 45 Ra'shah b 31 3' Dealt throu h shalish Dhaaka - = 5 I' Chttugong II 12 I I 22 ' - I K.hulna 12 I 1') 1 4 11 Rajphah 2o6 23 2I Dealt ith I rivately Dhaka 2 2 2 " H Chittagong 3 3 3 4 0 H Khulna IS 21 lI 4 2 Ralsbaha 2; 23 2i No action taken Dhaka 43 43 44 58 25 44 i Chittagong 4 5 1 4Y 4S 45 4' :,4 4; Khulna 2i 2i 2u 2 2 RaIsh3ha 21 3 15 1I'_. Baadesh: Urban Service Delivery 108 Table 4.3: Reason why Households did not report incidents to the police (% of Households) S x Age Income Grou rk) ToLrI BosD Non- Male Female Below 301 30 - 50 50 t Up to 2001 - 6001 - 12001I Over Bo5u 2rs. | 2001) | 6000 I 1200 200 0 | )OOu Process complicated DhAa 'I 0 'I 2I 4 32 1.5 Chirtagong I3 ) i ,- Cs , bh .ul na ii I: Rha,;hi 22 2' 'i Fear of police harassment ror bribe Dhaka IS 'I IS 1' 14 4 u 1 Chitugong 41' 1: 41 4'1 1"I 511 3u. Khulna 25 2n ' RIIshahi 23 23 25 Fear or more uouble by police due to payment by opposidon Dhaka 4 1 U 4 4 1' Chittagong 1.1I ' lihu,ll i 111 0 Raj4hahi 1 12 - Could not trust the police Dhaka 54 11 54 55 uS 41 SS Ahirtugong . 'I Su 86s '. 56 Kh;lna ' '' '5 3 Kalst.ihi 1 I 22 21 Fear or further harassment by opponent ; -, . - . Dhaka 1 0 15 13 15 Is ISi ChirEagong 4 1 4 4 1. Khulnt1a 2 6 13 16 IRi;hihi 4 45 4 Table 4.4: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with police service (% of Households) I Sex I Age I Income Group (Tk) Total Bosn Non- Mlale Fernale Below 30 30 - 50 50 + Up to 2001 - 6001 - 12001 - Ov%e Bosti vrs 2000 6000 12000 20000 20000 Satisfaction Din2ka 2 ' -' 2 Chittagong t' 5 ) ) 2 ' . I ' 1 Khulna I H 1 3 3 Ra.jshahi 2 2 2 '1 3 4 t Dissatisfaction Dhaka | 3 i O 6(3 (65 (68 (.6' N( 86 (61 - 45 ~ ' Chiragong | :5 $1 'I '35 lul 84 9 '.' 93 9S n5 Khulna 864 82 84 S4 .0 85 8, 85 Rsjshshi | 55 53 56 4- 55 (1 52 61 109 Annx . Regator Sevfices: Le Table 4.5: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with judicial system (% of Households) Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Total Bosti Non- Mlale Female Below 30 30 - 50 50 + Llp to 2001 - 6(it01 - 121il - O| cr Boso vrs. |0('O 6000 1 2'I00 2000) 20010 Satisfaction Dhaka b b b ' '2 ') 3 1 I III 11 C0 Chirtagong I I0 1 0 4 0 I 1 I Khulna 2 3 2 O 3 2 Ralsbhu 5 5 4 6 2 14 4 Dissatisaction Dhaka .46 4u 45 52 3') 4': '3 u) 48 44 31 4 Chittagong s .3 A 4 I 4 4s4 83 S l I Khulnfa I 2. 54 . . 54 4 45 Rajshalu 34 35 4*1 14 Bangladesh: Urban Service Delivery 110 Table 4.6: Purchase, Sale and Exchange of Land over the last 3 vears (% of Households) _ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~~~~ Sx Age Income Group (TIkli JF11l os Non- lNlie FLminae Bel,, 3j5,1) 5!+ U , Ql 0l 6' - |0 t-\t Purchase Dhaka 3 4 ''ii 4 ' )1' I V I 2 1 l.i u l 4 1. I' 5 4 Chintag7ong 4 4 I. 4 4; 2 -- 4; ' -14 4 31 42 Khuln-i 51 .. 4 4 I 3) ! S U 2 74 , . 1t31>hlhl . 1:, 1 .> v . - -; II 1 ' I 2 ' '' ''i '' ''. q 5&> 11.1! Sale C h } l Rir g' ,iig 2 7, 3 2> 2 ' 2 ' '.-, : ' .P ; R4 C II] [tag, lig ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~ii - 4 Khulna 3 I I 3 7 2' 2 4 t 3 31 RilarhahIi li 1 -ii I i . S1l 3 '. '| 2 1|'Q 1 22 Exchange Chl,ag.. n fill (ii fill 1iii 1l1i 1.iii lilt l'll liii l liii 1il,l IlII (C h.jrrago, ng ii' H| H iiiHl- ii ii ii ii liii I ii lii li 'i ii ii ii -l KhJlLlna : 1i 1 i 1S 4 1lii 1 1 1 i '1' I 2 III11 II - lii li Rili hal '' 2 I i.f .. I I i ', 2. 'i' ''4 I S 4 Table 4.7: % of Households paid Extra expenses for Land registration Sex | Age Income Group (Tk) Tori] Bosu Non- NMae | Female3cIo| 30 - 5') 50 + Lip to 20| u - 6')') -I 12001 - (ivvc Bos n 3')r | 21:11 | ii)' | 1200'() | 2:1:11) 2'1"' Dhaka - _, -l _ -- (Chrragong 2 -1 I Khulnia I f _ ,' Rjhahi 51 j2 33 4,1 Table 4.8: % of Households showed lower price on land deed and extent of price reduction reported on land deed . Ses Age Income Group To r s Boi | Non- Milt Female Bclo% 3u - 5s 50 + ULp m |JuO | 6001 - 1201 - . t l | | Bo;u l 301 'rs | l 2',00l! | rO 600'.| 1 2'1l | 2'IiI1''1) |0010' °of Households sbowed low%er price on land deed Dhaki 32 32 3'J 35 ' C[teartgung 23 23 21 23, l,,, KIhulna , t 24' ,1 Ra1shihx 3 34 3i 12 3i Lip to 25. Dhaka V' 3,' 43 45 4liii Chirrragog , nu 3 u.' I I_ K-hiulna 3 ii 3 1i''' n,1'' Raj,hialu (W. (ii 2 4 ' 1I:)-: 26-50'. Dbhaka '.1 1 55 u 3 ChutEaong 24 2 i 4'' i 33 kIhtlna 2 3 34 Ra1-hahu 34 3.4 2s 4I i2 Dhaka I) i.i 'i ii ii ii Chlurugong 12 13 1 i J ui Kh uln a Ii ii I I Ra1;hali. I ii II Ii 111 _________________________ Annmex I: ?eguhtoty ? ervicc': land Table 4.9: Mutation of Property and extra payment for mutation of land p ty Sx Age Income Group (Tk) Total I|o;u Non- NIale Female Bel.-.u 3') - 5) 50I + Lip t. 201l1 |(Jill - I 1'1 I'.| r I l Bo-n 30 r . | 61)|( 1) 1 'I l 31)l | iJ ) '0 I JI 11|' )l c%O of Households had land mutation& Dhaka n. ii - n ' 2 7 6 2 3 9 10 9 Chirt;gong I 3 2 3 4 3 1 0 2 3 4 0 KhuIn P I 15 I lS ' 14 17 7 15 27 47 Ral;hahu I C1 12 8 5 0 7 12 16 %Ci of Houbeholds; paid extra for land mutations Dhaka 65 0 65 65 60 100 64 61 65 31 72 82 64 ChiJruiong 62 0 62 59 100 100 56 50 0 81 50 50 0 Khulna 72 88 69 73 63 32 77 74 48 78 64 82 RuP"halh 88 0 89 87 100 95 84 100 0 92 82 100 AMerage Arount of exura pa ment (Tk) Dhhka 3926 0 3926 3231 10278 2485 3829 4539 5000 3636 3681 3263 6121 C hirtagug 2782 0 2782 2894 2000 1150 3595 2000 0 2739 3100 2000 0 Khulni 1831 2013 1784 1836 1778 4078 1779 1674 1373 1466 2614 3143 R.ajshahi 1200 0 1200 1227 1000 1329 1144 1214 0 1191 911 2552 Table 4.10: Households feel that reducing registration fee will induce actual land value reporting i scA I I Inc i,nL Uriup TOtal I B13r. I Non- Nlale lemale l,a B 3'J - Sil S' + L-'p to | )0 6001 - |1 2'I0 - | I | | Bezsrz | | | ~~~~~31) rz | IEi !iAl | 5ll) 1 |1lil 1 51)() Dlaka ' .- - 3 ' iS 34 -. ,.,. -- ' ' Chinagolig 2 ;4 u34 (.3 44 I l 1.3 51 51 I Khuln.i ' 51 '3 3 -> 'A 55 (.2 n 4,. 4I4 lla.h~jI Ai' 44 ', IS 41 3 . , _ Table 4.11: Level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with land registration system (% of Households) _________ I Sex Age Income Group (Tk) Total Bosu Non- MNle Fema.le Belo'.v. 30 511 /51 + Lip to 21011 6(0) - 121)|11 | cr B.s,n 3i 3'rs 200 (i)ll) 12i)O0) 21)0 2Oilil0li Satisfaction Dhaka ' '.' 3 2 4 3 2 2 0 4 1 2 0 Chinagong I ii I I 0 : 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 Khulna In. 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