53715 IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers Since1998,Indonesiahasbeenundergoingamomentouspoliticalandeconomictransition.The fall of the New Order, the economic crisis, and radical decentralization have changed the political, economic and social context. Within this new context, power relations are in flux, identities are being renegotiated, and institutions are changing. Changes in incentives, and in the role of formal and informal institutions at various levels, have altered the ways in which individualsandgroupsrelatetoeachotherandthestate.Understandingthisnewcontext,and the ways in which various actors (national and international) can promote progressive social changeisimportant. The Indonesian Social Development Papers series aims to further discussion on a range of issues relating to the current social and political context in Indonesia, and to help in the generation of ideas on how democratic and peaceful transition can be supported. The series willcoverarangeofissuesincludingconflict,development,corruption,governance,theroleof thesecuritysector,andsoon.Eachpaperpresentsresearchonaparticulardimensionofsocial developmentandofferspragmaticpolicysuggestions.Papersalsoattempttoassesstheimpact ofvariousinterventions--fromlocalandnationalactors,aswellasinternationaldevelopment institutions--onpreexistingcontextsandprocessesofchange. The papers in the series are works in progress. The emphasis is on generating discussion amongst different stakeholders--including government, civil society, and international institutions--rather than offering absolute conclusions. It is hoped that they will stimulate further discussions of the questions they seek to answer, the hypotheses they test, and the recommendationstheyprescribe. PatrickBarron(serieseditor) pbarron@worldbank.org Bagian dalam cover depan DeliveringAssistanceto ConflictAffectedCommunities TheBRAKDPPrograminAceh AdrianMorel MakikoWatanabe RobertWrobel December2009 IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.13 PapersintheIndonesianSocialDevelopmentseriesarenotformalpublicationsoftheWorldBank.They arepublishedinformallyandcirculatedtoencouragediscussionandcommentbetweenthoseinterested inIndonesiandevelopmentissues.Thefindings,interpretations,judgments,andconclusionsexpressed in the paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to: the World Bank and affiliated organizations; members of the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent;oranyofthefundingagencies. ThefullrangeofpublicationsassociatedwiththebroaderstudyoflocalconflictinIndonesia(ofwhich thisreportisaproduct)isavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org. Emailaddressesforcorrespondence: amorel1@worldbank.org mwatanabe@adb.org rwrobel@worldbank.org Copiesofthispaperareavailablefrom: PNPMSupportFacility JalanDiponegoroNo.72 Jakarta10310Indonesia Tel:+62(0)213148175 Fax:+62(0)2131903090 Preface The end of the conflict in Aceh led to the arrival of a range of different programs aimed at `reintegrating' former combatants and providing assistance to conflictaffected groups. The BRAKDP program was an innovative attempt by local and national governments to employ lessonslearnedfromsuccessfulcommunitydevelopmentprogramstopostconflictAceh.The program, designed and implemented with support from the World Bank, delivered around US$ 21.7 million to over 1,700 conflictaffected villages, aiming to support the welfare of conflictvictimswhilebuildingsocialcohesionandtrustinthestate. DidBRAKDPwork?Whatdidtheprogramachieve?Whatchallengeswerefacedandwerethey addressedsuccessfully?WhatlessonscanbelearntfromtheBRAKDPexperiencethatmightbe usefultosimilarprogramsinthefuture?Thispaperaddressesthesequestionsbypresentingan assessment of program achievements drawing from data and evidence from the project's Monitoring Information Supervision (MIS) system, supervision missions and qualitative fieldwork. It should be read in conjunction with a complementary impact evaluation, CommunityBasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactsofBRAKDP(IndonesianSocial DevelopmentPapernumber12),whichidentifiesprojectimpactsonwelfare,socialcohesion, andtrustingovernment. PatrickBarron Conflict&Developmentteam WorldBank,Indonesia i ExecutiveSummary The Communitybased Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims (or BRAKDP) channeled overUS$20millionto1,724conflictaffectedvillagesacross67subdistrictsin17districtsfrom August 2006 to August 2007. The program was designed and implemented after earlier attemptsbytheAcehPeaceReintegrationAgency(BRA)toapplyanindividualproposalbased system to identify and assist conflict victims proved unsuccessful, and an alternative mechanism was needed. BRA, with technical assistance from the World Bank, adapted the communitybasedblockgrantmechanismutilizedbytheGovernmentofIndonesia'sKecamatan DevelopmentProgram(KDP)toempowercommunitiestodecidewhoisavictimandwhatkind ofassistancevictimswouldreceive.Allvillageswithinthetargetedsubdistrictsreceivedblock grantsrangingfromRp.60million(US$6,000)toRp.170million(US$17,000)dependingonthe intensity of past conflict in the subdistrict and the village population size. The primary objectiveofBRAKDPwastoimprovethelivingconditionsofconflictaffectedcommunitiesand conflictvictimsbydeliveringdevelopmentassistancetailoredtolocalneeds. Mainfindings The program aimed to identify and deliver assistance to conflictaffected villagers. The responsibilityforidentifyingwhowaseligibletobenefit,byhowmuch,andinwhatwayswas devolved to communities who made these decisions through a series of village meetings. Overall,thisprocesswentwell.Whilefundswerespreadtoalargeproportionofhouseholdsin target areas, communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries based on levels of conflictaffectedness. The `mostaffected' conflict victims were prioritized and received larger amountsofassistance. Communityparticipationinprogrammeetings,evenamongstvulnerablegroupssuchasconflict victims and women, was strong: 40 to 56 percent of households were represented at key meetingsoftheprogramcycle.Conflictvictimsshowedsatisfactorylevelsofparticipationand awareness of program objectives and processes. A large proportion of women attended meetings,althoughthequalityoftheirinvolvementindecisionmakingprocessesoftenproved poor. Excombatants interacted with and influenced BRAKDP in positive and negative ways. Thenatureoftherelationshipwithformercombatantsvariedacrossareasandwasinfluenced by the local conflict history, relations between excombatants and villagers and the level of influenceformercombatantsretainedovercommunitiesafterthepeaceagreementand,above all, the ways in which program facilitators engaged with former combatants. Despite the fact thatprogramprocedurespreventedexcombatantsfrombenefitingdirectlyfromtheprogram, theywerebroadlysupportiveandsometimesplayedaveryconstructiveroleinsocializingand implementing the program. A number of attempts by former combatants at capturing funds through extortion or by exerting pressures on villagers were resolved peacefully after mediationbyprogramstakeholders. BRAKDP had positive welfare impacts in target areas. The program applied an open menu, which made both public and private goods eligible for funding. Communities overwhelmingly ii preferred economic activities over public goods. Eightynine percent of funds were spent on livelihoodsprojects.CommunitiesassociatedBRAKDPwithcompensationfortheconflictand opted for projects that would provide direct individual benefits. The large majority of beneficiaries invested funds in productive activities, such as the purchase of livestock and agricultureinputs.Technicalassistanceforsmallscalelivelihoodsprojectsprovidedthroughthe programwasinadequateandeffortstolinkbeneficiarieswithoutsidesourcesofknowhowand capitalfellshort. LevelsofsatisfactionwerehighandcommunitiesfeltthatBRAKDPwassuccessfulinproviding a wellneeded injection of capital as well as fulfilling the needs of conflict victims for compensation and recognition. The program instituted a complaints handling system that trackedcomplaintsovertimeandprovidedinformationandclarificationofprogramprocedures. ComplaintsoverBRA'sshiftfromaproposalbasedtoacommunitybasedsystemforassisting conflict victims, the amounts of subdistrict and village block grant allocations, and implementationdelaysdecreasedovertimeasaresultofintensivesocializationactivitiesand asfundshittheground. ImplicationsandRecommendations BRAKDPcouldhavebeenmoreeffectivehadseveralmodificationsbeenmade.Theseinclude the articulation of a clear policy stance by government linking BRAKDP assistance to the obligations defined in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, upgrading the skills of program facilitators to assist communities in the process of identifying conflict victims, and linking smallscale livelihoods subprojects to outside sources of technical assistance and capital. Policy makers in Aceh should continue to leverage KDP, now called the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri), to channel assistance to conflictaffected villages throughouttheprovince.In2009,thenewFinancialAssistanceforVillageProsperityprogram (BKPG)willchannelaroundUS$100millioninprovincialanddistrictgovernmentfundsthrough PNPM to all villages in Aceh. The government should explore possibilities of using BRAKDP's targeting mechanism within BKPG to deliver private goods to vulnerable groups. Future development programs in Aceh should avoid targeting mechanisms linked to conflictera identities.Instead,programsshouldapplytargetingmechanismsbasedonindicatorsofwelfare, suchasunemployment,education,andassetlevels. ExperiencefromBRAKDPisrelevanttoDDRandcommunitydrivendevelopmentpractitioners in conflictaffected countries and regions, as well as for policy makers in other parts of Indonesia. BRAKDP's positive welfare impacts suggest that funds intended as compensation can have developmental impacts provided that the proper delivery mechanisms are in place. ThisquestionsthewidelyheldassumptionthatDDRprogramsmustfollowasequenceinwhich compensation is delivered prior to implementing programs with a developmental focus. In terms of targeting, the program proved more successful when beneficiaries were identified strictly based on criteria related to conflict loss and victimhood. This suggests that iii communitybased DDR programs should allow all groups, including former combatants for whichothertargetedprogramsmayexist,accesstoprogrambenefitsprovidedthattargeting criteriaarebasedonwelfareindicatorsratherthanidentity. iv TABLEOFCONTENTS EXECUTIVESUMMARY ................................................................................................................... II TABLEOFCONTENTS .................................................................................................................... V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ VIII GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. IX 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 ThePeaceProcessinAceh.............................................................................................................. 1 1.2 CommunityBasedAssistancefortheReintegrationofConflictVictims ........................................ 2 1.3 Structure,Aims&Methods ............................................................................................................ 4 2 THEBRAKDPPROGRAM ....................................................................................................... 6 2.1 ObjectivesofBRAKDP.................................................................................................................... 6 2.2 TargetAreasandAllocations .......................................................................................................... 6 2.3 HowwastheProgramImplemented? ............................................................................................ 7 3 IDENTIFYINGCONFLICTVICTIMS .............................................................................................. 11 3.1 WhoisaConflictVictim?PerceptionsofVictimhoodandIdentificationCriteria ........................ 11 3.2 HowCommunitiesIdentifiedConflictVictims .............................................................................. 13 4 INCLUSION:INVOLVINGDISADVANTAGEDGROUPSINDECISIONMAKING .......................................... 21 4.1 LevelsofParticipation................................................................................................................... 21 4.2 ParticipationofDisadvantagedGroups:WomenandConflictVictims ........................................ 23 4.3 EngagingExCombatants .............................................................................................................. 27 5 HOWFUNDSWEREUSED:THEECONOMICIMPACTOFTHEPROGRAM .............................................. 34 5.1 WhatdidBeneficiariesUseFundsFor? ........................................................................................ 34 5.2 ReasonsfortheChoicesmadebyCommunities........................................................................... 37 5.3 TechnicalQualityofProjects ........................................................................................................ 39 6 VIEWSOFCOMMUNITIES:LEVELSOFSATISFACTION&COMPLAINTS ................................................ 41 6.1 LevelsofSatisfaction .................................................................................................................... 41 6.2 ComplaintsHandlingMechanisms................................................................................................ 42 6.3 Complaints .................................................................................................................................... 43 6.4 Socialization .................................................................................................................................. 49 6.5 OneYearafterCompletion:WhatIssuesareIdentifiedbyBeneficiaries? ................................... 52 v 7 IMPLICATIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 54 7.1 HowCouldBRAKDPhaveContributedmoreEffectivelytoReintegrationinAceh? ................... 54 7.2 What'sNextforCommunityBasedReintegrationandPostConflictRecoveryinAceh?............. 56 7.3 ImplicationsforDDRTheoryandPractice .................................................................................... 57 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................60 ANNEXA:LISTOF2006TARGETSUBDISTRICTSANDALLOCATIONS ..........................................62 ANNEXB:SUPERVISIONMISSIONSEF R NC I O D SEC CATIONS ......................................65 E E ES NS O ANNEXC:COMPLAINTSHANDLINGFLOWCHART .................................................................. 68 TableofTables Table1.1BRAReintegrationPrograms20052007 ........................................................................2 Table2.1SizeofVillageBlockGrants(Rp.) ....................................................................................7 Table2.2BRAKDPImplementationTimeLine ............................................................................10 Table3.1VariationintheProportionofBRAKDPDirectBeneficiariesinSubdistrictPopulation ......................................................................................................................................................14 Table3.2VariationintheProportionofWomenAmongBRAKDPBeneficiariesAcross Subdistricts ................................................................................................................................15 Table4.1LevelsofAttendanceofFemaleVillagersinBRAKDPandRegularKDP ......................24 Table4.2ReportedCasesofExtortionbyExcombatants ...........................................................31 Table6.1CategoriesofIssues ......................................................................................................43 TableofFigures Figure2.1BRAKDPProgramCycle ................................................................................................8 Figure3.1SampleofConflictVictimsMap...................................................................................13 Figure3.2DirectBeneficiariesasaPercentageoftheTotalPopulation......................................14 Figure3.3ProportionofWomenAmongBeneficiaries,ByDistrict .............................................15 Figure3.4AverageAmountsofAssistanceReceivedByVictimhoodCategory ...........................18 Figure 4.1 Comparison of Attendance Rate Between BRAKDP and KDP, as a Proportion of All Households...................................................................................................................................22 Figure4.2ParticipationandAwarenessbyGender .....................................................................26 Figure4.3ParticipationandAwarenessbyVictimhoodCategory ...............................................26 Figure5.1FundsSpentByTypeofActivity ..................................................................................35 vi Figure5.2EconomicSubprojectsvs.otherActivities,PerDistrict,asaProportionofFunds Allocated.......................................................................................................................................36 Figure5.3BreakdownofSubprojectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoEconomicActivities)...36 Figure5.4BreakdownofSubprojectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoInfrastructure) ...........37 Figure6.1BreakdownofInformationRequestsandComplaintsReceivedViaTextMessage ....47 Figure6.2EvolutionofInformationRequestsOverTime ............................................................48 Figure6.3PerceptionsofBRAKDP ..............................................................................................53 TableofBoxes Box1.1TheKecamatanDevelopmentProgramandPNPMinIndonesiaandAceh ......................3 Box2.1ObjectivesofBRAKDP.......................................................................................................6 Box3.1BRACriteriaforConflictVictims ......................................................................................12 Box3.2CriteriaUsedtoRankConflictVictimsandScaleAssistance ...........................................16 Box3.3RankingConflictVictimsinAcehTimurandAcehUtara .................................................20 Box4.1DefusingTensionsinBireuen ..........................................................................................30 Box4.2ExcombatantsDemandaPieceofthePietheCaseofNisam,AcehUtara...................32 Box4.3ExcombatantsasSpoilerstheCaseofSawang,AcehUtara .........................................33 Box5.1TheOpenMenu...............................................................................................................35 Box5.2TheBalancebetweenLivelihoodsandInfrastructureinBateeDabai,Makmur,Bireuen ......................................................................................................................................................39 Box5.3BagiRata­CasesofSuccessfulandUnsuccessfulSubprojectSelectionand Implementation............................................................................................................................40 Box5.4PoultryFarminTimanangGading ...................................................................................40 Box6.1ReallocationofVillageGrantstheCaseofManyakPayed,AcehTamiang ....................45 Box6.2ConstraintsandIssueswithInitialDisbursementtoSubdistricts...................................46 Box6.3SummaryofSocializationActivities .................................................................................50 vii Acknowledgements This paper was funded by generous contributions from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) and the World Bank's Post Conflict Fund. Many other individuals and institutions contributed to this report. The whole Aceh Conflict and Development team participated in supervision missions. Pak Rusli and his team at KDP's Regional Management Unit (RMU), as well as KDP facilitators in the field, also joined missions and played a key role in ensuring their success. Susanne Schafer provided inputsonthequalityofwomen'sparticipation.MilenaSeiboldprovidedinsightsregardingthe efficacy of the program's complaints handling system. The section of this paper devoted to socialization borrows largely from Teuku Zukhradi Setiawan's assessment of socialization impacts. Wawan Herwandi processed data from KDP's MIS system. Patrick Barron, Victor BottiniandSusanWongprovidedcriticalfeedbackthroughout.KeystafffromtheMinistryof HomeAffairs,BappenasandtheKDP'sNationalManagementCommitteewerealsosupportive. TheauthorswouldalsoliketothankBRA'sleadership,bothPakIslahuddin(theagency'sformer head)whowasinstrumentalinimplementingtheprogram,andcurrentdirectorPakNurDjuli. viii Glossary Acronyms AMM AcehMonitoringMission CDD CommunityDrivenDevelopment DDR Disarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration FGD FocusGroupDiscussion Forbes JointForumtoSupportPeaceinAceh(ForumBersama PerdamaianAceh) GAM FreeAcehMovement(GerakanAcehMerdeka);organization formerlyseekingAcehneseindependence GoI GovernmentofIndonesia IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson IOM InternationalOrganizationforMigration Kodam ProvincialCommandoftheIndonesianarmedforces KPA AcehTransitionCommittee(KomitePeralihanAceh);namefor demobilizedGAM LoGA LawontheGoverningofAceh MIS ManagementInformationSystem MoU MemorandumofUnderstanding(thepeaceagreementsigned betweenGAMandGoIinHelsinkionAugust15,2005) NGO NonGovernmentalOrganization PETA DefendersoftheHomeland(PembelaTanahAir):antiseparatist front RRI IndonesianStateRadio(RadioRepublikIndonesia) Tapol/Napol Amnestiedpoliticalprisoners(TahananPolitik/NarapidanaPolitik) TNI Indonesianarmedforces(TentaraNasionalIndonesia) UNDDR UnitedNationsDisarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration ResourceCenter WB WorldBank IndonesianJurisdictionalLevels Kotamadya UrbanDistricts(fiveinAceh) Kabupaten RuralDistrict(18inAceh) Kecamatan Subdistrict(276inAceh) ix Desa Village(6,411inAceh) Dusun Subvillage/hamlet GovernmentMinistries Bappenas NationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(BadanPerencanaan PembangunanNasional) Dinsos DepartmentofSocialAffairs,provinciallevel(DinasSosial) KPPN OfficeofStateTreasury(KantorPelayananPerbendaharaan Negara) PMD CommunityDevelopmentdivisionoftheMinistryofHomeAffairs, provinciallevel GovernmentPositions Bupati RuralDistrictHead Camat SubDistrictHead Geuchik VillageHead(Acehnese) KepalaDesa VillageHead Walikota MayorofUrbanDistrict BRAKDPTerms ARLS AcehReintegrationandLivelihoodsSurveys Bapel AgencyresponsibleforimplementingBRAprograms(Badan Pelaksana) BKPG FinancialAssistanceforVillageDevelopmentprogram(Bantuan KeuanganPemakmurGampong) BRA AcehPeaceReintegrationAgency(BadanReintegrasiDamaiAceh) BRAKDP CommunityBasedReintegrationAssistanceforConflictVictims program DOK Operationalfunds(DanaOperasionalKegiatan) FD VillageFacilitator(FasilitatorDesa) FK SubDistrictFacilitator(FasilitatorKecamatan) KDP KecamatanDevelopmentProgram KM DistrictManagementConsultant(KonsultanManagemen Kabupaten) MAD KecamatanDevelopmentForum(MusyawarahAntarDesa) MD VillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesa) x MDI FirstVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaI) MDII SecondVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaII) MDIII ThirdVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaIII) PIU ProjectImplementationUnit PjOK SubdistrictlevelDevelopmentCoordinator PL FieldAssistant(PendampingLokal) PNPM NationalCommunityDevelopmentProgram(ProgramNasional PengembanganMasyarakat) PTO OperationalGuidelines RMU RegionalManagementUnit TKPPK KDPCoordinationTeam(TimKoordinasiPPK) TPK ProjectImplementationTeamatthevillagelevel(TimPelaksanaan Kegiatan) UPK ImplementationManagementUnitatthesubdistrictlevel(Unit PengelolaanKegiatan) OtherTerms Bagirata Equaldivisionofblockgrantsacrossallindividualsorhouseholdsin agivenvillage Diyat Formofcompensation Meunasah Villagecommunityhall,alsotypicallyusedforreligiousteaching andprayers Musyawarah Meetingwheredecisionsaremadebasedondeliberationand consensus Mukim Traditionalfigure Panglima Commander Panglimawilayah Commanderatwilayahlevel Pilkada Localexecutiveelections Wilayah Region,roughlyequivalenttodistrict xi BRAKDPTargetSites xii 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 ThePeaceProcessinAceh On15August2005,theGovernmentofIndonesia(GoI)andtheFreeAcehMovement(GAM) signed the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) putting an end to a separatist conflictthatlastednearlythirtyyearsandresultedinalmost30,000deaths.Almostfouryears on,muchprogresshasbeenmadetowardsconsolidatingpeaceinAceh.TheAcehMonitoring Mission(AMM)successfullyoversawthedestructionof840GAMweaponsandthewithdrawal of 31,681 police and military by the end of December 2005. On 11 July 2006, the Indonesian nationalparliamentpassedtheLawonGoverningAceh(LoGA),asrequiredundertheMoU.In 2006, during Aceh's first direct local executive elections, GAMaffiliated independent candidatesIrwandiNazarwonalandslidevictoryinthegubernatorialrace,andGAMaffiliated candidates won half the regency contests. Despite sporadic violence, the 2009 legislative elections took place without major incident. Partai Aceh, the local political party formed by GAM,felljustshortofobtaininganabsolutemajorityintheprovincialparliamentandsecured over half the seats in seven district legislatures, a further step in the transformation of the formerseparatistmovementintoademocraticpoliticalorganization. Despitetheseearlysuccesses,thetransitionfromconflicttosustainablepeacewilltakemany years.Experiencefromotherpostconflictcontextsdemonstratesthataseriousriskofrenewed conflictexistsforanumberofyearsafteranypeaceagreement(Collieret.al.2003).TheAceh conflict had significant impacts, which continue to shape social and statesociety relations. Thousands of lives were lost, thousands more were traumatized, the economy was severely stunted,civilsocietywasweakened,andgovernmentcapacityreduced(MSR2009).Whilethe initial return of combatants and former political prisoners occurred without serious problem, addressing their needs as well as those of the wider community is crucial to healing the fracturesinsocietyandensuringsustainablepeace. The MoU mandated the establishment of a Reintegration Fund, financed out of the national budget and managed by provincial government, to address many of these challenges and to facilitatethereintegrationofformerconflictactorsintosocialandeconomiclife.1 TheBadan ReintegrasiDamaiAceh(AcehPeaceReintegrationAgencyorBRA)wasestablishedinFebruary 2006 to oversee the reintegration process, and developed a series of programs targeting key populationgroups.Tocarryouttheseprograms,theIndonesiangovernmentbudgetedRp.1.5 trillion (approximately US$ 150 million)2 for the Reintegration Fund for 20052007.3 The 1 "GoIandtheauthoritiesofAcehwilltakemeasurestoassistpersonswhohaveparticipatedinGAMactivitiesto facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants,pardonedpoliticalprisonersandaffectedcivilians.AReintegrationFundundertheadministrationof theauthoritiesofAcehwillbeestablished"(HelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstanding,Clause3.2.3). 2 TheexchangerateusedthroughoutthisreportisofUS$1=Rp.10,000. 3 The central government allocated BRA a budget of Rp. 200 billion (US$ 20 million) in 2005, Rp. 600 billion (US$ 60 million) in 2006 and Rp. 700 billion (US$ 70 million) in 2007, by which time it was anticipated that BRA 1 Reintegration Fund provided social and economic assistance (see Table 1.1). The former includedcompensationfortherelativesofthosedeadormissingduetotheconflict,housing assistance, assistance for physically disabled people, and medical assistance. The latter providedasetamountofcompensationtodifferenttargetgroupssuchasformercombatants, politicalprisonersandconflictvictims. Table1.1BRAReintegrationPrograms20052007 Plannedno.of Category Formofassistance Amount(US$) beneficiaries GAMcombatants 3,000 Cash 2,500/person GAM"noncombatants" 6,200 Cash 1,000/person Politicalprisoners 2,035 Cash 1,000/person ProIndonesiamilitiagroups 5,000 Cash 1,000/person GAMwhosurrenderedbeforethe 3,204 Cash 500/person MoU(andwhousuallyjoinedthe militiagroups) Medicalassistance 3packets Inkindassistance 500,000/year Villagebasedassistance(2006to 1,724villages Villagegrants 6,000­17,000/ mid2007) village Individualconflictvictimassistance 1,059persons Cash 1,000/person (midtolate2007) Compensationforlossoffamily 33,424persons Cash 300/personper member(diyat) year Housingassistance 31,187units Cashallocation 3,500/house Assistanceforthephysicallydisabled 14,932persons Cash 1,000/person Source:Forbes(2007a;2007v);BRA(2008);communicationwithBRAmembers 1.2 CommunityBasedAssistancefortheReintegrationofConflictVictims The Reintegration Fund included support for conflict victims. In April 2006, BRA invited all individualswhosufferedconflictrelatedlossestosendproposalsdirectlytoBRA.Thisprocess proveduntenableasover48,500requestsforfundsweresubmitted,andBRAhadnomeansto researchandverifytheseproposals(SharpeandSim2009).AttherequestofBRA,theWorld Bank supported the design of an alternative delivery system that utilized the existing GovernmentofIndonesia'sKecamatanDevelopmentProgram(Box1.1). wouldhavecompleteditsmandateanditsfunctionswouldbemainstreamedintoexistinggovernmentstructures. The combined contribution of central and provincial governments to the reintegration effort amounts to Rp 1.7 billionorUS$170millionandrepresentsjustunderhalfofthetotalamountofpostconflictassistancecommitted to Aceh (Rp 3.7 trillion or US$ 370 million). The other half has come from donors, the private sector and NGOs. (MSR2009). 2 Box1.1TheKecamatanDevelopmentProgramandPNPMinIndonesiaandAceh KDPwasajointWorldBank­Governmentcommunitydevelopmentprogramthatwasfirstlaunchedin1998atthe onsetoftheAsianfinancialcrisis.Overthreephasesdeliveredfrom1998to2007,theprogramchanneledUS$1.4 billionofWorldBankloansandgrantsandnationalgovernmentfundsto33,500ofthepoorestvillages,almost halfofIndonesia'scommunities. KDP consisted of a straightforward system of decisionmaking and administration. Block grants of between US$60,000170,000foreachsubdistrict(kecamatan)wereprovideddirectlytocollectiveaccountsatthatlevel. Thesegrantswereusedforalmostanythingvillagersidentifiedasadevelopmentpriorityfortheirvillage. In2008,theGovernmentofIndonesiadecidedtoscaleupKDPtoachievenationalcoverage,undertheumbrella oftheNationalProgramforCommunityEmpowerment(PNPM).In20092010,PNPMKDPwillchannelgrantsof uptoUS$300,000toeverysubdistrictnationwide,coveringeachofthearchipelago's70,000communities.The centralgovernmentwillscaleupitsfinancialcontributiontotheprogramtofullfinancingby2011,andplansto extendprogramimplementationuntilatleast2015. InAceh,KDPoperatedthroughouttheconflictyearsandwasusedasaplatformthroughwhichtorespondtothe tsunami.Afterthatdisaster,KDPwasscaleduptocovereveryruralvillageintheprovince.Itwasthefirstlarge international posttsunami project to start and finish. Over a twoyear period, the project covered every subdistrictinAcehandNias,reachingalmost6,000villages.Givencoverageandpastsuccesses,KDPprovideda mechanismforchannelingreintegrationfundstoconflictaffectedareas. Recently, the provincial government of Aceh elected to use PNPM as a key instrument in its development strategy.Launchedin2009,theFinancialAssistanceforVillageDevelopment(BKPG)programwillprovidegrants of Rp. 150 million (approximately US$ 15,000) to every village in Aceh through the PNPM mechanism. BKPG is financedjointlybyprovincialgovernment(Rp.100millionpervillage)anddistrictgovernments(Rp.50millionper village)andisthelargestsubnationalpovertyprograminIndonesia. KDP was identified as an appropriate platform through which to deliver assistance to conflict victimsandconflictaffectedcommunities.Theprogramhaddemonstrateditsabilitytooperate insensitiveconflictandpostconflictareas.ItwasabletosustainitsAcehactivitiessince1998, despitethecontinuingconflict,inlargepartbecauseofitspopularitywiththecommunityand its perceived political neutrality. KDP has also successfully operated in other conflict areas in Indonesia,includingPoso,Ambon,andCentralandWestKalimantan. AnumberofKDP'sdesignelementsmadeitasuitablemechanismfordistributingreintegration assistance.First,theprogramdesignemphasizesequity,transparencyandaccountability.These principles are important in all development projects, but are even more vital in postconflict contexts.Second,theprogramdevolvesdecisionmakingtothelocallevel.Alldecisionsonfund allocationinKDParemadeatthevillageandsubdistrictlevels,ensuringthatlocalknowledgeis utilized.Giventhescarcityofresources,anddifficultiesinensuringaccuratetargeting,involving communities in decisionmaking can make resource allocations more acceptable. Allowing communitiestodecidewhoshouldbenefitandwhatthemoneyshouldbespentonincreases theirownership.Thisinturncancurbelitecaptureandmakescommunitiesmorereceptiveto theoutcomesoftheprogram. 3 BRAKDPdeliveredaroundRp.204billion(US$20.4million)inblockgrants4 to1,724villagesin 67subdistrictsacross17districts.ItwasinitiallyplannedthatBRAKDPwouldbeimplemented over two years, with around Rp. 564 billion (approximately US$ 56 million) of central governmentfundingchanneledtoeveryruralvillageinAcehintwosuccessiverounds.However, as the first round was nearing completion in mid2007, BRA decided to revert to its initial scheme of individuallytargeted assistance and BRAKDP's second round was never implemented. BRAKDPallowedcommunitiestoproposealmostanykindofproject;beneficiariescouldbethe entirecommunity,agroupofvillagersorindividuals,dependingonthecommunity'sdecision. Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target group and had to benefit from the program. 1.3 Structure,Aims&Methods This paper presents an overview of BRAKDP's achievements, an analysis of issues faced, and provides recommendations for communitydriven development (CDD) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) practitioners designing or overseeing programs that use communitybased mechanisms to deliver reintegration assistance. It should be read in conjunctionwithanaccompanyingimpactevaluation(Barronet.Al.2009).Thispaperdrawson fourprimarysources:(i)asurveyofKDPdistrictfacilitators;(ii)jointsupervisionmissions;(iii) KDP's Management Information System (MIS) database; and (iv) findings from the Aceh ReintegrationandLivelihoodsSurveys. KDPDistrictFacilitatorSurvey.AtelephonesurveyofallKDPdistrictfacilitatorswasconducted in November 2006. The aim was to get a snapshot of progress before funds reached the ground and to identify key technical and sociopolitical issues that could affect program implementation. This also allowed for the identification of districts that needed special attention. A total of 25 responses (24 male and one female) from 15 out of 17 districts (responses from Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya were missing) were collected. A focus group discussion with representatives from six diverse districts was conducted for more indepth discussion. Supervision Missions. In order to capture a more detailed picture of progress and implementation dynamics, the World Bank, together with BRA and KDP's Regional ManagementUnit(RMU),conductedthreemajorsupervisionmissions.Thesemissionscovered acombinedtwothirdsofprojectlocations(44outof67subdistricts)­seeAnnexB.Thefirst mission was conducted in November 2006 before funds were disbursed to target villages. A morecomprehensivesupervisionmissionwasconductedinMarch2007whenimplementation was well underway. Five teams surveyed 20 subdistricts across eleven districts, almost 4 ThetotalbudgetoftheprogramwasofRp.217.7billion(US$21.7million),ofwhich94percentweredisbursed to beneficiary communities as block grants, while the remaining six percent were used to cover program operationalexpensesatsubdistrict(threepercent)andvillage(threepercent)levels. 4 onethirdoftargetsubdistricts.AthirdsupervisionmissionwasheldinJulyandlateSeptember 2007 to make an initial assessment of program outcomes. In all three missions, selection of target areas took into account geographic diversity, representation of diverse levels of conflictaffectedness,populationsize,andthesizeofblockgrants.InterviewsandFocusGroup Discussions(FGD)wereconductedwithawiderangeofinformantsincludingBRAdistrictlevel officials, KDP facilitators, exGAM combatants, Homeland Defenders Front (PETA) members, localgovernment,communityleaders,conflictvictims,andwomenheadsofhousehold. MISDatabase.Projectdatawasusedtoobtaininformationonprogramprogress,participation rates at intervillage and village meetings, samples of proposals prioritized by villagers, and conflictvictimmaps. Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS).Alargesurveywascarriedoutoneyear aftercompletionoftheprogram,fromJulytoSeptember2008toevaluateprogramimpactsin three distinct areas: welfare of the conflict victims and conflictaffected communities; reintegration and social cohesion; and trust in local government and statesociety relations. 2,150 randomly selected households, as well as all village heads, were interviewed in 215 villages spread across each of the 67 rural subdistricts that received BRAKDP, and 215 matched control villages that did not benefit from the program but were otherwise similar. Thesesurveysincludeddetailedmeasuresofhouseholdwelfare,socialcohesionandattitudes towards government, to assess how villages treated in BRAKDP differed postprogram from thosethatwerenottreated.ThepresentpaperusespreliminaryfindingsfromtheARLS,buta morecomprehensiveanddetailedanalysisofthesurvey'sresultsispresentedintheseparate impactevaluationpaper(Barronet.al.2009). Thepaperisdividedintosevensectionsplusannexes: · SectionIIgivesabriefdescriptionoftheprogramandtheprogramcycle; · Section III discusses how communities handled the challenging tasks of identifying conflictvictimsanddirectingassistancetothemostaffected; · Section IV looks at participation and inclusion issues, including ways that excombatantsinteractedwiththeprogram; · Section V discusses beneficiary communities' usage of funds and program welfare impacts; · Section VI assesses the level of satisfaction of communities with program outcomes andprovidesananalysisofmaincomplaintsandconcerns; · SectionVIIprovidesasummaryoffindingsandrecommendations. 5 2. THEBRAKDPPROGRAM ThedesignoftheBRAKDPprogramdifferedinanumberofwaysfromregularKDP.Thissection describes the BRAKDP program: its objectives, target areas, institutional arrangements, and the basic program cycle. It also outlines arrangements made to assure quality and promote institutionallearning. 2.1 ObjectivesofBRAKDP BRAKDP aimed to deliver quick assistance to conflictaffected villagers to improve their material wellbeing in the shortterm. In addition, it sought to promote social cohesion, to strengthen villagelevel decisionmaking institutions, and to cultivate greater faith in governmental institutions in the aftermath of the conflict (Box 2.1). A previous World Bank study on the efficacy of KDP suggested that by applying the principles of participation, transparency, local choice and accountability, communitydriven development programs help improve intergroup and statesociety relations, which in turn builds immunity to violent conflicts (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2006). BRAKDP applied the communitydriven developmentapproachtoreintegrationwiththehopethatitwouldimproverelationsbetween variousconflictaffectedgroups,includingexcombatants,IDPs,conflictvictims,andthestate. Box2.1ObjectivesofBRAKDP · Deliverquickassistancetoconflictaffectedvillagersinatransparentandacceptedmannertohelp stabilizethesecuritysituationandtoensurereintegrationfundsdonotleadtonewconflict · Enhanceproductiveeconomicactivitiesoractivitiesthatenhanceconflictaffectedindividuals'and communities'livingconditionsthrougheconomicorcommunityinfrastructureprojects · Enhancecommunityparticipationandinvolvementindecidingpriorityactivitiesthathelpaddress peacebuildingandpostconflictreconstruction · Promotecohesionandacultureofpeaceinvillagesanddevelopandstrengthenthedevelopment ofinstitutionsinvillagesforthispurposes 2.2 TargetAreasandAllocations BRAKDP targeted 1,724 villages across 67 subdistricts in 17 districts, or around onethird of villages in Aceh. Urban areas did not receive the program. Target subdistricts were selected based on conflict intensity5 and past performance in regular KDP. All villages within the selected subdistricts received block grants varying from Rp. 60 million (approximately US$6,000)andRp.170million(approximatelyUS$17,000),withtheamountdependentonthe intensityofpastconflictinthesubdistrictandthepopulationofthevillage(Table2.1).Villages 5 Conflictintensitywascalculatedatthesubdistrictlevelbasedonthefollowingnineindicators:conflictvictims (2002 Dinsos); conflict victims (2003 Dinsos); conflict victims (2004 Dinsos); military intensity (Kodam); GAM returnee estimates (AMM/WB); political prisoners (IOM), GAMGoI incidents (2005 Aceh Kita & Serambi); perceptionsofsafetypreMoU(WB);andperceptionsofconflictpreMoU(WB).Insufficientinformationexistedto targetbyconflictintensityatthevillagelevel. 6 weredividedintothreebandsbasedonpopulation--large(over700persons),medium(300­ 699persons),andsmall(below299persons).Thefollowingtableshowsthedifferentsizesof theblockgrantsforeachvillage.Alistoftargetedsubdistrictsandblockgrantsisprovidedin AnnexA. Table2.1SizeofVillageBlockGrants(Rp.) Population Large Medium Small High 170,000,000 150,000,000 120,000,000 Intensity Conflict Medium 120,000,000 100,000,000 80,000,000 Low 80,000,000 70,000,000 60,000,000 Where there were discrepancies in the number of villages or village population size, village allocations could be readjusted through discussions at the intervillage meeting, which took placeatthesubdistrictlevel.Theallocationforeachsubdistrictcouldnotbeaugmented,but theamountcouldberedistributedbetweenvillages. 2.3 HowwastheProgramImplemented? BRAKDPwasmanagedjointlybyBRAandKDPwithtechnicalassistanceandsupportfromthe World Bank. The provinciallevel Department of Social Affairs (Dinsos) had fiduciary responsibilityfortheprogram.BRAattheprovinciallevelwasresponsibleforoverallpolicyand implementation.DinsosandBRAcoordinatedcloselywiththeMinistryofHomeAffairs,which executesKDP,aswellastheGovernor'sOffice,theNationalPlanningAgency(Bappenas),the KDPRegionalManagementUnit(RMU),andtheWorldBankonanymajorissuesrelatedtothe program. BRA's Project Implementation Unit (PIU) along with the KDP Regional Management Unitwasinchargeofdaytodayimplementationandmonitoringoftheprogram. The program used the same open menu as regular KDP--meaning that communities could propose almost any kind of project. Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target group.6 Former combatants were not intended to benefit from BRAKDP assistance as the Reintegration Fund included other programs that specifically targeted them. During public village meetings community members decided who would receive assistance and how much wouldbeprovidedtoeachpersonorproposalgroup.Tobettertargetassistance,theprogram includedaconflictvictimsmappingprocess,whichassistedcommunitiesinidentifyingthemost vulnerable victims to help ensure that they would benefit. Individuals and groups who had submitted proposals to BRA under the previous system could present their proposals at the 6 Funds were disbursed based on proposals and could not simply be equally divided among individuals or households. 7 villagelevelmeetingforconsiderationbythecommunityatlarge.However,existingproposals receivednospecialconsiderationandwerenotnecessarilyprioritizedoverotherproposals.The projectfollowedtenmainstepsasshowninFigure2.1. Figure2.1BRAKDPProgramCycle 8 Step1­Socializationatthesubdistrictlevel:theintervillagemeeting(MAD).Here,district facilitatorsexplainedtheBRAKDPprogramanditsprocedurestoabroadaudience.Thetarget groupsforthismeetingincludedthesubdistrictheads(Camat),religiousandtraditionalfigures (Mukim),subdistrictlevelgovernmentdevelopmentcoordinators(PjOK),BRA,excombatants, communityrepresentatives,police,theIndonesianmilitary,villageheads,communityleaders, andKDPfacilitatorsatthedistrict,subdistrict andvillagelevels.Aplanonhowtospendthe subdistrictoperationalfee(threepercentofthesubdistrict'sblockgrant)wasdiscussed,and thescheduleforvillagemeetingswasdetermined. Step 2 ­ Socialization at village level: the first village meeting (MD I). The program and its proceduresweresocializedanddiscussedatthevillagelevelbylocalKDPfacilitatorsandfield assistants(PL).Discussioncoveredthebackgroundtotheprogram,explanationofprocedures, fundallocationandreleaseprocedures,reportingrequirements,andschedulingofthesecond villagemeeting(MDII).Aplanforhowtospendthevillageoperationalbudget(threepercent ofthevillage'sblockgrant)wasalsodiscussed.Theoperationalbudgetcoveredvillagemeeting expensesandexpensesofthevillageimplementationteams. Step3­Developmentofprojectideasandmappingconflictvictims.Tomakesurevulnerable groupswerenotexcluded,BRAKDPinstitutedtwomeasures:theconflictvictimsmappingand smallgroupmeetings,includingawomen'smeeting.Villagefacilitators(FD)andPLsorganized themappingandsmallgroupmeetings.Thevillagefacilitatorshelpedidentifythemostaffected conflictvictims,whichinturnenabledthefacilitatorstoworkwiththemtohelpensuretheir effective participation. The small group meetings provided avenues for marginalized groups such as women and the poor whose voices were otherwise likely to be dismissed at larger communitywidemeetings.KDPfacilitatorssatwiththesmallergroupsandhelpedthemdefine theirprioritiesandchooseprojectsthatcorrespondedtotheirneeds.7 Step4­Communityprioritizationanddecisionmaking:secondvillagemeeting(MDII).Ideas for subprojects were prioritized during the MD II, and conflict victims maps were reviewed. Prioritization followed the same process as KDP--open discussion followed by voting. The number of proposals and the amount allocated for each proposal selected depended on the availabilityoffundsandthecommunity'sdecision. Step 5 ­ Subdistrict verification and proposal writing. After priorities were determined, prioritizedgroupspreparedtheirproposals.Thesewerethensubmittedtoaverificationteam whoprovidedtechnicalinputsandadviceonhowtoimprovethem.Theverificationteamhad toverifyproposalswithinfivedaysofreceipt. Step6­Thirdvillagemeeting(MDIII).Thismeetingwasheldtoconfirmfundallocationforthe prioritizedproposalsandtoschedulethedateforthereleaseoffunds. 7 Seethesubsequentsectionsformoredetailsonconflictvictimsmappingandthewomen'sgroupmeeting. 9 Step7­SubdistrictHead'ssignoff.Wheneachvillagewasready,proposalsweresubmitted to the Camat for signoff. The Camat could issue an endorsement letter as proposals were submitted without waiting for other villages to submit their proposals. Information on the issuanceoftheendorsementletterhadtobepostedonprojectinformationboards. Step 8 ­ Fund disbursement. Upon receipt of the Camat's signoff, the KDP financial unit releasedfundstoprojectteams.Villagerswitnessedthisfunddistribution. Step 9 ­ Implementation. Villagers implemented subprojects under the supervision of the villageimplementingteamandtheKDPfacilitators. Step10­Accountabilitymeetings.Thevillageimplementationteamwasobligedtoupdatethe community on the progress of the subprojects and provide financial reports twice during implementation through accountability meetings. The first meeting took place before the implementationteamrequestedthethirdtrancheoffunding.Communities'approval,andthe KDP facilitator and local government's endorsement at the accountability meeting, triggered payment of the third tranche. Once the project was completed, a second accountability meetingwasheld.8 Table2.2showstheprogressofprogramimplementation,stepbystep. Table2.2BRAKDPImplementationTimeLine 2006 2007 S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D Receipt of 6% DOK Receipt of 94% BLM Inter-Village Meeting (MAD) 1st Village Meeting (MD I) Conflicts Victims Mapping Sub-village meetings 2nd Village Meeting (MD II) 3rd Village Meeting (MD III) Disbursements to communities Implementation of Activities Accountability Meeting 8 Eventually,thedecisionwasmadetoallowdisbursementofblockgrantsintwotranchesonly:sixpercentand94 percent.Themainreasonforthisdecisionwastheprevalenceoflivelihoodsprojectsamongactivitiesselectedby beneficiarycommunities.Whilesuccessivetranchesofdisbursementsallowbettermonitoringandcontroloverthe implementation of infrastructure projects, oneoff disbursement is more fitted to the purchase of livestock or agricultural inputs. Therefore, only one accountability meeting was eventually held in most villages, after the completionofactivities. 10 3. IDENTIFYINGCONFLICTVICTIMS The program aimed to deliver assistance to conflictaffected villagers. Failing to ensure a transparent, fair and widely accepted targeting process risked increasing tensions and social jealousies. BRAKDP devolved decisionmaking over who qualified as a conflict victim to communities.Thisapproachpresentedseveralsignificantchallenges.First,theoutcomeofthe targeting process very much relied on the beneficiary communities' subjective perceptions of victimhood.Asitturnedout,thedominantperceptioninmanytargetlocationswasthatmost villagers were victims to some extent. Indeed, given the intensity of the conflict in program areas,manyindividualscouldlegitimatelyclaimsomeformofconflictrelatedloss.Toaddress asmanyoftheseclaimsaspossible,communitiesoftendecidedtospreadfundsthinlyacrossa largeproportionofhouseholdsorindividuals,includingtothosewhohadbeenonlylightly,ifat all,affectedbytheconflict.Whilethispreventedtensionsfromemergingbetweenbeneficiaries andnonbeneficiaries,itmeantthatlesssupportwasavailableforthemostaffectedvillagers. Second, communitybased mechanisms are susceptible to influence by elites or powerful groups,suchasexcombatants,whosometimestriedtocapturethedecisionmakingprocessto secureashareoftheassistance. This section analyzes the ways in which communities identified conflict victims. It begins by discussingthedefinitionofconflictvictimusedbytheprogram.Itthenprovidesadescriptionof identificationproceduresandmechanisms.Thisisfollowedbyananalysisofhowcommunities actuallyidentifiedandprioritizedvictims. KeyFindings: · The targeting process went well overall. The most heavilyaffected victims were prioritized,andtheamountofassistancetheyreceivedwastypicallyhigherthanthatof nonvictimsbyalmost20percent. · Fundswerespreadbroadlyacrosshouseholds.Atotalof233,282individuals(22percent oftheoverallpopulationoftargetsubdistricts)benefiteddirectlyfromtheassistance. Thirtyninepercentofbeneficiarieswerewomen. · Communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries according to levels of conflictaffectednessandscaledassistanceaccordingly. · Theidentificationprocessprovedtobesensitive.Thisresultedindemands,widespread during early stages of the program cycle, for funds to be divided equally across all households or individuals in a given village. A range of factors affected the ability of programfacilitatorstoovercomethesedemands. 3.1 WhoisaConflictVictim?PerceptionsofVictimhoodandIdentificationCriteria TheHelsinkiMoUdoesnotincludeadefinitionofwhoisandisnotavictimandhencewhois entitledtoassistance.MeetingsbetweenBRAandGAMproducedanagreedlistofcriteriatobe usedfordeterminingvictimstatus.MostofAceh'spopulationfellunderthisbroaddefinition, giventhedecisiontoincludethenegativeimpactofconflictonlivelihoods(seeBox3.1). 11 Box3.1BRACriteriaforConflictVictims InFebruary2006,representativesofBRA,formercombatantgroupsandcivilsocietyagreedinajointmeeting onthefollowingcriteriatodefineconflictvictimsanddetermineeligibilitytocompensation: · Widows/widowersandchildrenofindividualsdeceasedbecauseoftheconflict; · Relativesofindividualswhodisappearedasaresultoftheconflict; · Individualswhosehousewasdamaged,destroyedorburnedbecauseoftheconflict; · Individualswhosepropertiesweredamaged,destroyedordisappearedasaresultoftheconflict; · Individualswhoweredisplacedasaresultoftheconflict; · Individualswhowerephysicallydisabledormutilatedasaresultoftheconflict; · Individualswhosufferedpsychologicaltraumabecauseoftheconflict; · Individualswhowerephysicallyinjured; · Individualswholosttheirsourceofincomebecauseoftheconflict. Specific BRA programs targeted some of the mostaffected and most objectively identifiable categories of conflict victims, such as those who lost a family member as a result of conflict violence(throughtheDiyatprogram),individualswhosehousehadbeendamagedordestroyed (through the BRA housing program), and those who suffered physical or mental injuries. However,theseprogramsdidnotbenefitthewidershareoftheAcehnesepopulationthathad alsosufferedfromtheconflictbuttoalesserdegree.Thisemergedasasignificantsourceof tension within communities as villagers who had not received assistance resented those who had.BRAKDPaimedtodefusethesetensionsbycomplementinghighlytargetedprogramsfor themostaffectedbyprovidingsomelevelofcompensationtothewiderpopulationthatwas lessaffected. BRAKDPConflictVictimIdentificationMechanisms AftertheMDI,hamletmeetingswereheldwherevillagersmadealistofconflictvictims.The programallowedcommunitiestoapplyitsowndefinitionforvictimhood.TheBRAcriteriawere used as a starting point for discussions but villagers could decide to expand or amend the criteriatoadapttargetingtolocaldynamicsandneeds.Theselistswerebroughttothesecond village meeting (MD II) where the whole community reviewed the list. Community members drewupamapofconflictaffectedpersonstoassistinproposalselection(seeFigure3.1foran example).DuringtheMDII,themapswerereviewedandcommunitiesagreedonafinallistof beneficiaries.WhereKDPfacilitatorsfelttheprocesshadnotbeeninclusive,orthatvictimshad notbenefited,theyoftencalledmorevillagemeetings. 12 Figure3.1SampleofConflictVictimsMap The image part with relationship ID rId16 was not found in the file. Note:highlyaffectedvictims'housesarecoloredinblack 3.2 HowCommunitiesIdentifiedConflictVictims Villagers perceived a large proportion of the population to be victims. Communities differentiated types of victims based on the level of affectedness, usually using three categories:highlyaffected,mediumaffected,andslightlyaffected.Thesecategorieswereoften usedtoprioritizeproposalsandscalethesizeofbenefits.Thosemostaffectedreceivedmore thanthosewhowerelessaffected. "Everybodyisaconflictvictim" According to MIS data, 233,282 individuals, or 22 percent of the overall population of target locations,benefiteddirectlyfromBRAKDPassistancethroughtheprovisionofcashorinkind assistance for economic activities. Most were identified by communities as conflict victims, although a share of the assistance was often directed towards `nonvictims' in order to maintaincohesionorinanattempttoaddresstheneedsofothervulnerablegroups,suchas the poor.9 Figure 3.2 below shows that there was important geographic variation across 9 AccordingtoARLSprojections,anestimated530,000individualsliveinhouseholdsthatbenefitedfromBRAKDP. Of these, over half (287,000) are conflict victims. Note that these figures reflect the number of persons living in 13 districts, with the percentage of direct beneficiaries ranging from seven to 58 percent of the totalpopulationoftargetlocations. Figure3.2DirectBeneficiariesasaPercentageoftheTotalPopulation 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% eh e s a r ya e rM h g Ac eriah Ac eh T s ya an a Ac Pidie t ra ra n ng r e ra l Ga ngki Ac Bara u Ac Lue Na eulu a an ay ue ga ta im Ac h Ja A c t Da Be eng lat nR mi Ac Bire eh h U B Si Se Sim yo Ta T eh eh Te ga e eh Ac eh ne Ba eh eh Ac Ac Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit In some subdistricts, the proportion of direct beneficiaries reached over twothirds of the population: 66 percent in Beutong, Nagan Raya; 71 percent in Samalanga, Bireuen; and even the entire population of Peusangan Siblah Krueng, Bireuen. However, Table 3.1 below shows thatin85percentofBRAKDPtargetsubdistrictstheproportionvariedmoremoderatelyfrom lessthantento30percentofthepopulation. Table3.1VariationintheProportionofBRAKDPDirectBeneficiariesinSubdistrictPopulation Proportionofthepopulation Numberof % whobenefiteddirectlyfromBRAKDP subdistricts subdistricts >50% 5 7.5 30%50% 5 7.5 20%30% 20 30 10%­20% 24 36 <10% 13 19 Total 67 100 Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Anestimated 209,026peoplebenefitedindirectly frominfrastructureand otherprojectsthat benefitedthecommunityasawhole. Thisgroupoverlapswiththatofdirectbeneficiaries,as many individuals benefited both directly from livelihoods support and indirectly from infrastructureandcommunalprojects. beneficiaryhouseholds,notthenumberofdirectbeneficiaries(Barronet.al.2009). 14 Representationofwomenamongbeneficiaries Amongdirectbeneficiaries,90,166(39percent)werewomen.Theproportionvariedfrom18to 51percentacrossdistricts(Figure3.3). Figure3.3ProportionofWomenAmongBeneficiariesbyDistrict 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% gara Pidie Jaya Utara Lues t r r a ya kil en ah riah tan iang ulue Bara Timu Besa t Day Sing n Ra Bireu Teng Sela r Me Tam Sime Teng Aceh Gayo Aceh Aceh Aceh Bara Aceh Naga Aceh Aceh Bene Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Atthesubdistrictlevel,boththehighestandlowestratiosofwomenwererecordedinAceh Timur, with 58 percent of women benefiting in Peureulak subdistrict and eleven percent in Madatsubdistrict.However,inmostlocations,thepercentageofwomenvariedbetween30 and50percentofbeneficiaries(Table3.2). Table3.2VariationintheProportionofWomenAmongBRAKDPBeneficiariesAcrossSubDistricts ProportionofwomenamongBRAKDP Numberof %total directbeneficiaries subdistricts subdistricts >50% 7 10% 30%50% 40 60% <30% 20 30% Total 67 100% Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Notallconflictvictimsarethesame "Everyone in the village is a conflict victim and will benefit from BRAKDP, but these twenty householdsneededmorethantherest." VillageHead,BateeDamai,Makmursubdistrict,Bireuen Communities often understood the need to differentiate victims according to degree of affectednessandtoscalebenefitssuchthatthosethatwereseriouslyaffectedreceivedmore than others. Strategies for creating categories and ranking beneficiaries typically originated 15 from the KDP facilitators and were socialized through villagelevel facilitation and implementationteams.CommunitiesgenerallyusedBRA'ssetofcriteriaasastartingpointbut also occasionally applied other criteria. The most common combination used to identify and classify conflict victims was the degree of conflictaffectedness and the level of economic vulnerability. In some cases, prior receipt of outside forms of assistance was used as an additionalcriterion.Forexample,inSingahMulovillage,BenerMeriah,severalconflictvictim widows were excluded as BRAKDP beneficiaries because they had received assistance from governmentprogramsin2005.Box3.2givesanumberofexamplesofhowcommunitiesused and combined different types of criteria to rank conflict victims and scale assistance accordingly. Box3.2CriteriaUsedtoRankConflictVictimsandScaleAssistance A.Degreeofconflictaffectedness AsongTongpeuding,TiteuKeumalasubdistrict,Pidie.Fourcategoriesofconflictvictimsweredecidedupon,with each category receiving a different amount of assistance. These are: High people whose house was burned receivedapproximatelyRp.3.5millionperhousehold;Mediumpeoplewhohadadeathinthefamilyreceived approximatelyRp.2millionperhousehold;LowpeoplewhoweretorturedreceivedapproximatelyRp.1million perhousehold;andcommoncommunitymemberswhoreceivedapproximatelyRp.500,000perhousehold. Blang Pantei, Paya Bakong subdistrict, Aceh Utara. All households in the community were divided into four proposal groups. The first group, consisting of five households, each of which suffered a death in the family, received30percentofthetotalblockgrantallocation.Thesecondgroup,consistingofsevenhouseholdswhose housewereburnt,received25percent.Thethirdgroup,consistingoffivehouseholdswhosememberssuffered heavy beatings, received 25 percent. The fourth group, consisting of the rest of the community, shared the remaining30percent.Thoseinthefourthgroupwereconsideredashavingsufferedfromminorbeatingsandloss oflivelihoods. B.Degreeofconflictaffectednessandeconomicneed Meriah Jaya, Timang Gajah subdistrict, Bener Meriah. Of 322 households, 167 were selected as beneficiaries. Beneficiariesweredividedintothreegroups:(i)householdswhosufferedadeathinthefamily,orhadhousesand fieldsdestroyed;(ii)householdswhosufferedtraumaorwhowereunabletotendfields;and(iii)poorhouseholds that did not possess land or did not have money to purchase food. Assistance was scaled with the first group receivingthelargestamountofsupport. Jaba,Peudadasubdistrict,Bireuen.Seventytwoof102householdswereidentifiedasconflictvictims.Giventhat theconflictwasveryintenseinthisvillage,thesehouseholdswereidentifiedbecausetheywererelativelypoorer than the other 30 households. Beneficiaries were divided into two proposal groups, livestock and farming. The amount of assistance was scaled within the proposal groups according to levels of conflictaffectedness. In the livestock group, twelve households who suffered a death in the family, an assault that resulted in a family memberbeingdisabled,orwhohadplantationsburnt,receivedsixgoatseach.Eighthouseholdswhosemembers suffered beatings or psychological trauma received three goats each. Seven households who suffered a loss of livelihoodreceivedtwogoatseach.Fortyfivehouseholdsthatwerenotaffectedbytheconflictreceivedinputs forricefarmingduetotheireconomicsituation. C.Degreeofconflictaffectednessandpriorreceiptofeconomicassistance Timanang Gading, Kabayakan subdistrict, Aceh Tengah. Twelve out of a total population of 49 IDPs were prioritizedasBRAKDPbeneficiariesbecausetheywereseverelyaffectedbytheconflictandhadnotreceivedany priorformsofassistance.EachbeneficiaryreceivedRp.2.5million.Theremainingblockgrantfundswereusedfor communityprojects. 16 The examples in Box 3.2 illustrate how communities took advantage of the flexibility of the BRAKDP identification mechanism by forming categories of beneficiaries based on a combination of criteria, some conflictrelated and others not, that best fitted local realities, dynamics and needs. They also reflect the prevailing pattern of communities applying a very broaddefinitionofconflictvictimswhileatthesametimeextendingbenefitstononvictims.In alltheexamplescitedabove,aminorityshareofthebenefitswasallocatedto"therestofthe community", either in the form of direct individual assistance to villagers that were not identified as conflict victims but who needed economic support, or indirectly through infrastructure or communal projects that benefited the whole village. Such decisions were typicallyaimedatavoidingsocialenvyandtensionsthatmightresultfromexcludingpartofthe community from the assistance. Similar concerns about maintaining social cohesion and avoiding inequities affected the balance between livelihood and infrastructure proposals in termsofactivitiesselectedbycommunities.Inmanyvillages,whilethebulkofthefundswere allocated to economic activities, some money was invested in the rehabilitation or reconstructionofcommunalinfrastructureasawaytoensurethatthewholecommunitywould benefitinsomeway(seeSection5). Findings from the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) confirm some of the observationsfromsupervisionmissions.Thesurveysfoundthatassistancewasindeedbroadly distributed.Largenumbersofdirectbeneficiarieswerereachedandincludedconflictvictimsas well as the wider population. The ARLS data justifies some reservations with regards to the efficacy of villagelevel targeting, as it shows that conflict victims were not significantly more likelytobenefitfromtheassistancethanothervillagers.Onaverage,44percentofvictimsand 41 percent of the mostaffected in target areas received support, while 40 percent of nonvictims also benefited. However, the survey does show that the average amount of assistance received by victims was higher than that received by nonvictims, and that the mostaffected received the greatest amount. Figure 3.4 shows that victims received approximately thirteen percent more than nonvictims, and the mostaffected nearly 20 percentmore(Barronet.al.2009). 17 Figure3.4AverageAmountsofAssistanceReceivedbyVictimhoodCategory Source:Barron,Humphreys,PalerandWeinstein(2009) Identifyingvictims:acontroversialprocess Evidence from the impact evaluation suggests that communities were satisfied with the outcomeofthetargetingprocess.10 However,designatingvictimsandscalingassistanceoften proved controversial and sensitive. An unwillingness to label individuals or subsets of households as conflict victims or nonvictims led in many cases to community requests that funds be dispersed equally across all individuals or households. Villagers claimed that they wouldrathergetnoassistanceiftheycouldnotdivideupthefundsequally.Suchdemandsfor `equal division' (bagi rata) were widespread during the early stages of the program.11 In variouslocationsboththeMADandMDImeetingsfailedandhadtoberepeated,asfacilitators didnotconsiderbagiratatobeanacceptableoutcome.TheMarch2007supervisionmission found that in some locations reaching consensus required up to five successive village meetings. Demandsforequaldivisionoffundsacrosshouseholdsorindividuals Bagi rata demands were typically regarded by KDP facilitators as contrary to program procedures, and therefore strongly discouraged. Communities often presented legitimate reasons in favor of equal division of the assistance. Some communities argued that in their villageeveryonehadsufferedmoreorlessinthesamewayfromtheconflictandthattryingto 10 Only ten percent of respondents thought that not enough people had benefited, and twelve percent that conflictvictimshadnotbeensufficientlyprioritized(Barronet.al.2009). 11 A phone survey of facilitators in 67 subdistricts in the initial stages of implementation found that there had beendemandsforequaldistributionofmoneyin158villages,orapproximatelyninepercentofalltargetvillages. Theexactproportionofvillagesthateventuallydividedtheassistanceequallyishardtoassess,asvillagerstended to hide it from facilitators and many cases remained unreported. However, supervision missions found that this trendwasparticularlystronginAcehTimur,insomewestcoastdistrictssuchasNaganRaya,andinGayoLuesand partsofAcehTengah.InMarch2007,everyvillageineachofthefourAcehTimursubdistrictsthatweresurveyed hadperformedbagirata.Bybagirata,werefertothedistributionofequalsharesoffundsorinkindassistanceto allindividualsorhouseholdsinthevillage,withoutexceptionoranylevelofdifferentiation. 18 distinguish further between categories of victims was an unnecessarily painful process that would threaten social cohesion and result in inequities. Concerns over the fairness and inclusivenessofcommunaldecisionswerealsoraised. Communitydrivenapproachescarryan inherentriskofexcludingthemarginalized.12 Marginalizedgroupsmaynotbeinvitedorfailto attenddecisionmakingormaylackthevoicetolobbyinfavoroftheirinclusionintheprogram. In villages surveyed in November 2007 in Aceh Selatan, two communities insisted on equal disbursementoffundsbecauseconflictvictimsfearedmissingoutonprogrambenefits. "Conflictvictimshavelesseducationandareaminorityinthisvillage.Wedon'thaveleverage inthecommunity.Ifwerelyonthecommunitytodeterminewhoqualifiesforassistance,we won'tgetthebenefitsthatwedeserve." Conflictvictim,KluetSelatansubdistrict,AcehSelatan "One man burned the MD I attendance sheet when he was told that the money couldn't be divided up equally. He was very upset because his son died during the conflict, but he still hasn'treceivedanyassistanceorcompensation." Villager,KluetSelatansubdistrict,AcehSelatan Demandsfordividingfundsequallycouldthereforeoriginatefromconcernsoverinclusiveness, equity and justice. In other cases, demands for equal division did not emanate from the community as a whole, but rather from pressures exerted by specific groups. Supervision missions found that many demands for bagi rata were the result of interventions from excombatants within the community. As excombatants received support from other assistance schemes specifically targeted at them, they were not intended to benefit directly fromBRAKDP.However,theysometimestriedtocircumventprogramrestrictionsbypushing forequaldivisionoftheassistance,whichwouldallowthemtosecureashareofthefunds.In Nagan Raya, all four villages surveyed in September 2007 did not rank conflict victims and opted for bagi rata. Although the rationale offered by villagers was the need to avoid generatingtensionsoverthedistributionofassistance,evidencesuggestedthatexcombatants hadstronglyadvocated,ifnotimposed,thisoptionasawaytoensuretheytoowouldbenefit fromtheprogram.Suchcasestypicallygeneratedbitternessanddisappointmentamongcivilian victimswhohadsufferedseverelyduringtheconflict. Box3.3belowcontrastshowdemandsforequaldivisionandtargetingissueswerehandledin Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur. Although these two neighboring districts shared a number of important similarities, targeting was done very differently. Comparing them helps to isolate factors that explain why some communities identified subsets of conflict victims and scaled assistancewhileothersfailedtodoso. 12 Although the risk of exclusion of marginalized groups is just as great in projects that use more topdown approaches,where,forexample,governmentofficialsorotherkeyinformantsidentifybeneficiaries. 19 Box3.3RankingConflictVictimsinAcehTimurandAcehUtara Aceh Timur and Aceh Utara are neighboring districts that share several important characteristics. Both were the seat of some of the most intense conflict violence and have large numbers of excombatants. These districts benefited from the largest share of BRAKDP allocations, with Aceh Utara receiving approximately US$ 5.5 million or 27 percent of BRAKDP block grant allocation and Aceh Timur receiving around US$ 5 million or 24 percent of block grant allocation. The size of the target population in both districtsisalsosimilar.Despitethesesimilarities,targetingoutcomeswerestrikinglydifferent.Mostvillages inAcehTimurdistributedequalallocationstoallhouseholdswhereasrelativelyfewdidsoinAcehUtara. There are several factors that explain why communities in Aceh Utara tended to carry out a detailed processofidentifyingandrankingconflictvictims: FacilitationskillsofKDPfacilitators:TheAcehUtaradistrictlevelKDPmanager(KM)heldaspecialsession for all FKs during which they were instructed not to allow equal distribution of assistance across all households.TheKMinsistedthatFKsfacilitatearankingprocess. The influence of excombatants: KDP facilitators in Aceh Utara engaged excombatants constructively in theprogram,thusturningthemintoalliesandnotspoilers.InBlangPantei,AcehUtara,amemberofthe Village Implementation Unit (TPK) that was also an excombatant advocated using BRAKDP funds for sustainablelivelihoodsactivitiesratherthanforoneoffconsumption.Bycontrast,inAcehTimur,exGAM combatantsstronglyadvocatedinfavourofbagiratasothattheywouldreceiveashareoftheassistance. Village authorities and nonelites tended not to intervene in the face of such overt manipulation by exGAM. Levels of elite capture: InvillagessuchasSeneubokBayu,AcehTimur,nonelitesindicatedthattheydid nottrustvillageauthoritiesandthereforewantednothingmorethantheirindividualcutoftheBRAKDP assistance. Levels of trust in the village: Villagers interviewed during supervision mission FGDs in Aceh Timur were oftenreluctanttopursueprojectsthatrequiredcollectivearrangementsforimplementation,maintenance orprofitsharing.Theconflictnegativelyimpactedonsocialrelationswithinandacrossvillages.Oneresult was a lack of trust and uncertainty, which meant that many favored immediate over longterm benefits. The same pattern was clear in other areas, as illustrated by the quote from an Aceh Barat Daya villager below: "Everyoneaskedforequaldisbursementbecausegroupactivityisdifficult.Ifagroupplantedrice and rats ate it, they'll blame each other. If a group bought a tractor to share, it is difficult to decidewho'sinchargeoffixingifitbroke.It'seasierforeveryonetogetsmallamountsofcash individually." Femalevillager,Babahrotsubdistrict,AcehBaratDaya Informationflows:InAcehTimur,communitiesreceivedinstructionsfromBRAallowingthemtodistribute assistanceequallyacrossallhouseholdsandheardrumorsthatneighboringvillageshadalreadydoneso. 20 4. INCLUSION:INVOLVINGDISADVANTAGEDGROUPSINDECISIONMAKING In a program that aimed to provide assistance to conflict victims, and particularly the most vulnerableamongthem,theinclusivenessofthedecisionmakingprocesswaskeytosuccess. Communitybasedmechanismspresentaninherentriskthatthevoiceoftheminorityandthe most disadvantaged social groups will be ignored by the majority. Guaranteeing wide participationandrepresentationofallincollectivediscussions,andpreventingspecificgroups fromexertingundueinfluenceoverthesediscussions,werethereforecritical. This section analyzes community participation in BRAKDP program meetings and processes, with a focus on the involvement of two groups that are typically vulnerable to exclusion, namely women and the most affected conflict victims. It begins with a breakdown of attendance levels at meetings, and a comparison with attendance at regular KDP meetings. AnalysisthenturnstothedegreetowhichvariousgroupswereabletoinfluencetheBRAKDP decisionmakingprocessesandthechallengesthatdifferentgroupsfacedintryingtodoso.The sectionconcludeswithadiscussionofhowexcombatantsinteractedwiththeprogram.Former combatants were formally excluded as program beneficiaries, yet often exerted a strong influence over communities and decisionmaking processes. Depending on how they were engaged by program stakeholders, former combatants could be spoilers or supporters in socializationeffortsandindefusingtensions. KeyFindings: · Levelsofparticipationwerehigh,varyingfrom40to56percentofhouseholdsattending key meetings. Attendance at BRAKDP village meetings compared favorably to that of regularKDP. · Women's participation was high with women making up 38 percent of meeting attendees.Relativelyhighattendancelevelsofwomendidnotresultininfluenceover decisionmaking. · Conflict victims showed similar levels of attendance, awareness, and efficacy as other villagers. · EngagingexcombatantsandKPA13 inpositivewaysledtobetteroutcomes. 4.1 LevelsofParticipation This section breaks down levels of attendance at the most important meetings. Attendance levelsatsimilarmeetingsinregularKDPofferausefulmeansofcomparisonasKDPfollowsthe same program cycle and has been received positively by communities in Aceh.14 Figure 4.1 compareslevelsofattendanceinBRAKDPandregularKDP. 13 The Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) is the civilian organization formed after the peace agreement to representformercombatantsfromGAM'smilitarywing. 14 SeveralroundsofKDPhavebeenimplementedinAcehsince1998.Theprogramiswellknownofvillagers.Data usedhereforcomparisonwastakenfromthe20072008roundofKDP,knownasPNPMKDP. 21 15 Figure4.1ComparisonofAttendanceRateBetweenBRAKDPandKDP,asaProportionofAllHouseholds 60% 50% 40% BRA-KDP 30% KDP 20% 10% 0% MD I Dusun-level MD II Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit AttendanceattheMAD TheMADisaforumtosocializetheprogramtoawideaudienceatthesubdistrictlevel.Each subdistrict enjoyed high participation with an average of 120 people attending the MAD per subdistrict.Onaverage,142peopleattendtheMADforregularKDP.However,inregularKDP, theMADisaparticularlyimportantforumwherevillagescompeteforblockgrantsandhence participationishigh.InBRAKDP,theMADsimplyprovidedinformationonblockgrantsizesand operationalprocedures;itwasimportantintermsofsocializingtheprogramtocommunities, but no key decisions were to be taken during this meeting. That participation levels for the BRAKDPMADweresohighdemonstratesthestronginterestofcommunityrepresentativesin theprogram. AttendanceatMD1 MDIisthevillagelevelsocializationmeetingwhereinformationontheprogramisprovidedto thecommunityatlarge.MostoftheMDIenjoyedhighlevelsofattendance.Insomevillages, more than 300 people attended with the average attendance 57 people per village. Across program areas, fortytwo percent of households were represented at MD I. Participation comparesfavorablytoregularKDPvillagemeetings,whoseaveragenumberofparticipantsis 49pervillage,or38percentofhouseholds. Attendance­dusunmeetings Between MD I and MD II, subvillage meetings were held in each hamlet (dusun). At these meetings villagers drafted lists and maps of conflict victims and discussed activities to be fundedthroughBRAKDP.Thehighestlevelsofattendancewerereachedduringthesemeetings. 15 AttendancetoMAD,discussedinthetext,isnotshowninthisfigure,becauseitisameetingatsubdistrictlevel wheretheattendanceofallvillagersisneitherrequirednorexpected.Eachvillagewilltypicallysendadelegation composedofalimitednumberofpeople.Therefore,theproportionofhouseholdsattendingisnotanappropriate indicatorofsuccess. 22 Anaverageof76peopleattendedineachvillage,representing56percentofhouseholds.Thisis significantly higherthanforregularKDP,wheretheaverageisof60peoplepervillage,or46 percentofhouseholds. Anumberoffactorsexplainwhyahigherproportionofvillagersattendeddusunmeetingsthan villagelevelmeetings.Forone,theyweresmallerscaleandmoreflexiblegatheringsthatcould be organized in a way that better accommodated the respective schedules of participants. Second, they were meetings that gathered people who were immediate neighbors, possibly makingdiscussionsanddecisionmakingsmoother.Finally,subvillagemeetingsweremeantto prepareidentificationofbeneficiariesbylistingandmappingconflictvictimsineachdusun,and discuss activities that would best address their needs. Provided they were happy with the outcome of these meetings, many villagers considered that their active participation was no longernecessary.Theyentrustedanumberofdelegatestoconveythesubvillagelistingsand proposalsduringtheMDII.Attheendofthedecisionmakingprocess,thisresultedquiteoften intheorganizationofprioritizedproposalgroupsalongdusunlines,withtheconflictvictimsof eachsubvillageassembledinthesamegroup. AttendanceattheMDII In the MD II, the listing and mapping of conflict victims was reviewed by communities and villagersselectedproposalsforfundingafteropendiscussion.TheMDIIwasthusakeymeeting wheredecisionsweremadeaboutwhoshouldgetassistanceandhowthefundswouldbeused. Anaverageof55peopleparticipatedineachMDIIrepresenting40percentofhouseholds.This againcomparesfavorablytoKDP,whoseaveragenumberofparticipantsinMDIIwas41per village,or32percentofhouseholds. WhywereattendancelevelshigherforBRAKDP? Atthevillageandsubvillagelevel,significantlyhigherlevelsofattendancewererecordedfor BRAKDP. A reason for this difference may be the types of activities financed by BRAKDP. In contrast with KDP, where infrastructure projects are dominant, BRAKDP communities gave preference to livelihoods proposals that would provide benefits to individuals or individual households.Theprospectofreceivingdirectbenefitsprovidedvillagersandvictimsalikewitha strongincentivetoattendmeetings. 4.2 ParticipationofDisadvantagedGroups:WomenandConflictVictims The participation of women and conflict victims in the program was high. However, women oftenplayedapassiveroleinthedecisionmakingprocess. Participationandinclusionofwomen TheparticipationofwomeninBRAKDPmeetingswasrelativelyhighwithwomenrepresenting 38 percent of the audience of meetings on average. This percentage varied little from one meetingtoanother(Table4.1).Therewasalsoverylittlegeographicvariationacrossdistricts, with the proportion of women among the audience of MAD, MD I, dusunlevel meetings and 23 MDIIbetween36and39percentinallareas. Table4.1LevelsofAttendanceofFemaleVillagersinBRAKDPandRegularKDP BRAKDP RegularKDP %ofmeeting %ofmeeting Averagenumberof Averagenumberof Meeting attendeeswhoare attendeeswhoare womenattending womenattending women women MAD 37 44 40 57 MDI 38 22 44 22 Dusun 39 30* 43 26 MDII 38 21 43 18 *Thisistheaveragetotalnumberofwomenwho,ineachvillage,attendedoneortheotherofthesubvillagemeetings,not theaveragenumberofwomenwhoattendedeachofthesemeetings. Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Women were also well represented among beneficiaries (39 percent). However, FGDs during the supervisions missions showed that women's understanding and influence over the decisionmakingprocesswasonthewholeveryweak.16 Mostwomenhadlittleknowledgeof theprogrambeyondtheamountofblockgrantallocations. Thereareanumberofreasonsforlowlevelsofunderstandingandinvolvementfromwomen. Programsthatencouragewomen'sparticipation arechallenging in Acehas such effortsoften collide with local traditions and perceptions. Husbands and sons tend to represent the householdinpublicdiscussionsandmakedecisions.Meetingswereoftenheldatnightorearly in the morning, at a time that was convenient for men but not for women, who attend to household matters at these times. Married women would typically only attend when their husbandshadotherobligations.Whentheydidaccompanytheirhusbandstomeetings,women would generally let the husband represent the household and did not take part in the talks. During FGDs, many women admitted being uncomfortable when offered to play a more assertive and influential role in program discussions. Lower levels of education and literacy amongwomenalsohinderedtheircapacitytounderstandprogramproceduresandparticipate moreactively. Incentives were not sufficient to strengthen women participation. BRAKDP procedures emphasizedflexibility asawayofallowing communitiestodesignsolutions bestfittedtothe needsoflocalconflictvictims,regardlessofgender.Theprogramcycleincludedwomen'sgroup meetings, to be held between MD I and MD II. These meetings were aimed at encouraging womenconflictvictimstodevelopandsubmitproposals.However,evidencefromsupervision missions shows thatwomen'sgroupmeetingswereoftennot held,or werepoorly organized andfacilitated.Thesemeetingsgenerallydidnotresultinthesubmissionofwomen'soriented proposals,letaloneselectionbycommunities.Therewere,however,notableexceptions. AsiscommoninCDDprograms,theextentandqualityofwomen'sparticipationhingedonthe 16 The March 2007 supervision mission ranked women's awareness as satisfactory in only three of the twenty subdistrictssurveyed. 24 qualityoffacilitation.Ineachvillage,thecommunityelectedtwoVillageFacilitators(FD),one man and one woman. Supervision teams evaluated the performance of FDs as generally very poor.AmajorityofFDsappearedinsufficientlytrainedandunderutilizedbysubdistrictlevel facilitators.Thisimpactedonwomen'sparticipation,asfemaleFDswereexpectedtoplayakey role in mobilizing women, organizing meetings, providing them with further information on programobjectivesandprocedures,andencouragingthemtoformproposalgroups.Insome areas,however,goodqualityoffacilitationatthesubdistrictlevelmanagedtoovercomethese challenges. Some KDP facilitators interrupted meetings when they felt too few women were present and conditioned the continuation of the program on higher levels of women's participation. Women's proposal groups were formed in 31 villages of Titeu Keumala subdistrict,Pidie,andeachsubmittedaproposalforarevolvingfund. "There was very high participation in the program here. People were really interested in the program. In one village, the PLs [field assistants] stopped the meeting because not enough womencame.Theytalkedwiththelocalleadersaboutthis.Thenlater,theprogramwasable tostartagainwithveryhighfemaleparticipation." KDPsubdistrictfacilitator,Seunuddonsubdistrict,AcehUtara Finally,findingsfromFGDssuggestthatwomenwhowereheadsofhouseholds,oftenconflict widows, tended to be more actively engaged than other women. As they could not be representedbymen,theyweremorelikelytoattendmeetingsandparticipateactively.InFGDs, mostshowedabetterunderstandingofprogramprocedures,althoughtheyoftencomplained thattheirclaimswereinsufficientlytakenintoconsideration. Findings of the ARLS survey (see Figure 4.2), by and large confirm program MIS data on women's participation. Female respondents were less likely than men to have heard about BRAKDP (men: 62%; women: 52%), heard about meetings (men: 40%; women: 34%) or attended meetings (men: 27%; women: 12%). However, female heads of households were more involved than other women and their levels of awareness and attendance at meetings nearly matched that of men (17 percent attended meetings compared to 20 percent of maleheadedhouseholds)(Barronet.al.2009). 25 Figure4.2ParticipationandAwarenessbyGender 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Heard of BRA-KDP Aware of meetings Attended meetings Men Women Male-headed Households Female-headed households Source:Barron,Humphreys,PalerandWeinstein(2009) n n Participationandinclusionofconflictvictims Onthewhole,thelevelofparticipationofconflictvictimswassatisfactoryandvictimswereas aware and involved in BRAKDP as the rest of the community. Figure 4.3 shows only slight differencesacrossgroups. Figure4.3ParticipationandAwarenessbyVictimhoodCategory 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Heard of BRA-KDP Aware of meetings Attended meetings Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-affected Source:Barron,Humphreys,PalerandWeinstein(2009) Mixedoutcomesacrossregions FindingsfromtheSeptember2007supervisionmissionshowedevidenceofsignificantvariation inparticipationandinclusivenessacrossregions.InAcehTimur,thecentralhighlandsandthe west coast of Aceh, nonelites and disadvantaged groups, including conflict victims, often did notattendMDsbecausetheywerenotinvitedtothemeetings.Inthesameareas,findingsalso suggested that village elites, and in some cases excombatants, monopolized key 26 decisionmakingprocesses. "Meetings are normally attended only by village authorities. Hamlet Heads, religious figures, communityleadersandvillagegovernmentofficialsattend." Femalevillager,LutTawarsubdistrict,AcehTengah "It is always a group of people who are close to the village authorities that monopolize the benefits." Villager,IndraMakmusubdistrict,AcehTimur On the other hand, some areas enjoyed high degrees of inclusiveness. In Bireuen, key informants from disadvantaged groups, including conflict victim widows, IDPs and youth, indicatedthattheyfrequentlyparticipatedinMDs.Theywereabletodescribethevenue,the agendaandtheapproximatenumberofattendees.SatisfactionwithBRAKDPdecisionmaking processeswashigh.ThekeyfactorexplaininghigherlevelsofnoneliteparticipationinBireuen is the way in which excombatants were formally engaged in the program as PLs or TPK members.Giventhehighpopulationofexcombatantsinthedistrict,theirbuyinwasessential forsuccessfulprogramimplementation. 4.3 EngagingExCombatants FormercombatantsinteractedwithandinfluencedBRAKDPbothpositivelyandnegatively.In someplacesthereweretensions,asformercombatantswereexcludedasdirectbeneficiaries. In other areas, former combatants played a supportive role. The nature of the relationship between BRAKDP and excombatants depended on factors such as the local conflict history, powerrelationswithcommunitiesand,aboveall,theextenttowhichfacilitatorsmanagedto engagetheminsocializationeffortsandotherprogramprocesses. Excombatants'relationshipswithcommunities There were very few serious problems related to the return of GAM combatants and former political prisoners to Acehnese villages. 17 However, supervision missions observed wide variationintherelationshipsbetweenGAMandothervillagersacrossregions.Threetypesof relationship were identified, and each helped shape the nature of the participation of excombatantsintheprogram.InareaswhereGAMenjoyedstrongsupportduringtheconflict, suchastheeastcoastofAceh,excombatantscontinuedtoplayastrongroleinvillagelife.This, however, sometimes led to attempts at extortion or fund diversion, impacting on program performance. "The peace process is not realized 100 percent but only 80 percent. The shadow of GAM's powerstillprevails.ThereisstillhighinfluenceofGAMineveryaspectoflife." Villager,Seunuddonsubdistrict,AcehUtara 17 The GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment found that 89 percent of former GAM combatants had not encounteredanyproblemsreturningtotheirvillages,primarilybecausetheyreturnedtoplacesoforigin(World Bank2006). 27 In other villages, exGAM enjoyed strong support but did not have exclusive dominance in decisionmaking.AllthevillagesthesupervisionteamvisitedinAcehBaratDaya,forexample, wereproGAM.Familiesinthesevillageshadtiestoformercombatants,eitherasrelativesor throughfriendships,andmanyhadassistedGAMinthepast.However,thepowerofGAMwas neversuchthatotherformsofauthorityweremarginalized.Inthesevillages,therelationship between excombatants and communities (and their leaders) was not a problem and GAM returneesreintegratedsmoothlyintotheircommunities.Excludingthemfromtheprogramdid notbecomeamajorissueperhapsbecausetheystillhadsupportfromtheirfamiliesandtheir familiesweremostlikelygettingassistancefromBRAKDP. Third,invillageswherecommunitiessufferedaggressionfromboththemilitaryandGAM,such as in the central highlands and Aceh Selatan, the relationship between ordinary villagers and former combatants remained tense. Although few acts of vengeance have taken place, some villagers,especiallyvictims,saidthattheytriedtostayawayfromGAMreturnees. "To be honest, we're really hurt by what GAM did to us. We would like to take revenge if possible.Sowedon'tinteractwiththematall." Villager,Samaduasubdistrict,AcehSelatan In such villages, GAM returnees' participation in community meetings or collective activities waslower.Becausetheydidnotparticipate,theirunderstandingoftheprogramwasminimal. Knowingtheywerenotincludedinthetargetbeneficiaries,someactivelytriedtosteersome community members to demand equal disbursement with the hope to get a portion of the assistance. Excombatants'senseofentitlementtoassistance Manyexcombatantsfeltthattheirsacrificeduringtheconflictmeantthattheyshouldcontrol localleadershippositions.Somealsofeltthattheyfoughtforindependence"onbehalfofthe community" and hence should be prioritized in receiving assistance. Such views possibly justifieddemandsinsomeareasforashareofthefunds,andinsomeoccurrences,extortion attemptswhenthesedemandswerenotmet. "EveryoneshouldunderstandthatreturningGAMareheroes.Weshouldreceivemoney.There are1,000combatantshere[inNisam]andthere'spotentialforthemtoconductcriminalactsif BRAKDP doesn't target them. GAM are conflictaffected people as well and therefore we shouldalsogetmoney.Wehavepriorityoverothersinthecommunity.Peopleshouldrespect usandourvalues.Don'tgiveussmallmoneyaswewilllosedignity." ExGAMcommander,Nisamsubdistrict,AcehUtara Thismentalitywasexacerbatedbythelackoftransparent,equitableandconsistentdistribution of other forms of reintegration assistance to GAM. To provide economic support to former GAM combatants, BRA initially developed a program targeting 3,000 combatants with individual payments worth Rp. 25 million. Funds were channeled through KPA. Wilayah 28 (roughlyequivalenttoadistrict)levelKPAleaderswereresponsiblefordeterminingthenames of the former combatants eligible for assistance. The money was then to be divided among otherexcombatantsandGAMaffiliatedpeoplewhowerenotincludedinthelist.Eventually, the assistance, planned for 3,000 individuals, ended up being divided across a much larger number of beneficiaries (Barron and Burke 2008). Moreover, KPA's management of funds lackedtransparencyandwasnotconsistentacrossregions.Thisresultedinnumerousformer combatants receiving much smaller sums than they expected, or not receiving anything at all (MSR2009). Some excombatants also felt they should play a formal role in the program because they thought they knew better than others who the `real conflict victims' were. Some GAM interviewed during the second supervision mission felt the program was less than effective becauseitprovidedassistanceto`victims'whodidnotactivelysupportGAMduringtheconflict. In the words of one local commander, "communities may have one definition of conflict, but we know who the real victims are. It is those who sacrificed for Aceh by actively becoming involvedinthestruggle." ImpactofSocialization Lackofsocializationoftheprogramtoexcombatantsledtoinappropriateinterventionsfrom some of them later during implementation. Insufficient information about BRAKDP and, in cases, misinformation spread by word of mouth resulted in attempts to capture assistance throughillegitimatemeans.Someexcombatantsfeltneglectedandthisinturndeepenedtheir frustrationtowardsBRAandjealousyfortheprogrambeneficiaries.WhereexGAMdidattend socializationmeetingstheyusuallyplayedaconstructiverole. Excombatantsaspartnersinprogramimplementation Findings from supervision missions indicated that a vast majority of excombatants were supportiveoftheprogram.Inelevenoutofthe15subdistrictssurveyedinMarch2007,KPA andexcombatantsgavepositiveopinionsofBRAKDP.Theyoftenplayedaconstructiverolein the program, acting as intermediaries between the communities and facilitators, providing furthersocializationtovillagers,andhelpingdefusetensions.Inareaswithahighpopulationof GAM returnees, they often held positions as Field Assistants (PLs), Heads of Village ImplementationTeams(TPK)orVillageFacilitators(FD).InBireuenandAcehUtarainparticular, the role of GAMaffiliated program staff was key in overcoming tensions and problems that arose during the early stages of program implementation, such as demands by other excombatants to benefit from BRAKDP, pressures to divide funds equally and extortion attempts.Box4.1providesexamples. 29 Box4.1DefusingTensionsinBireuen DuringearlysocializationofBRAKDPinCotKatepangvillage,Jeumpasubdistrict,over40excombatantsinthe village mistakenly thought that BRAKDP assistance was to be directed specifically to them. Attempts by KDP stafftoclarifythismisunderstandingledtoaviolentbacklash,andasubdistrictofficialwasphysicallyassaulted. However, thanks to the efforts of Baharuddin, an excombatant employed as a KDP field assistant (PL) in Jeumpa, resistance to BRAKDP among excombatants was overcome over time. Baharuddin carried out repeated, facetoface socialization efforts with excombatants in local coffee shops. By approaching excombatants in an informal manner, Baharuddin was successful in clarifying BRAKDP objectives and methodologies.Asaresult,excombatantsremainedengagedintheprogram,andsubsequentMDstookplace withoutfurtherincident. KDPstaffinGandapurasubdistrictfacedsimilarchallengeswithexcombatants.Inoneincident,excombatants stopped an FK while she was driving to a village and demanded BRAKDP funds from her. Munzir, an excombatantemployedasPL,intervenedontheFK'sbehalftodefusetensionswiththeexcombatants. "IexplainedtomyfriendsthatBRAKDPassistanceisforconflictvictims,notforthosethatmakethe conflict." Munzir,PL,Gandapurasubdistrict,Bireuen On the whole, BRAKDP facilitators interviewed during supervision missions underlined the importanceofsecuringthebuyinofexcombatantstoensuresatisfactoryprogramoutcomes. Facilitatorssuggestedadditionalsocializationeffortsspecificallydirectedatformercombatants, and often advocated the formalization of their involvement in the program through the recruitment of a specific number of excombatants as facilitators and program staff in each subdistrict. Excombatant'sdemandsforassistanceandextortionattempts Most excombatants understood the rationale for not allowing them to benefit from the assistance. However, in a few cases former combatants did not accept it and interfered negativelywiththeprogram.IntwovillagesinAcehSelatanvisitedinNovember2006,exGAM insistedthatthevillageblockgrantbeequallydisbursedsothattheycouldreceiveashareof thefunds.SimilarcaseswereobservedinNaganRayaandinAcehTimur. "ThereisarumorherethatGAMhaverequested20percentofthe[BRAKDP]projectfunds.I thinkthemoneyshouldgotothemfirst,notthecommunity.Becauseoncetheyhavereceived somethingtheprocesswillgomoresmoothly." Villager,Seunuddonsubdistrict,AcehUtara In Seunuddon and Nisam subdistricts in Aceh Utara, excombatants strongly demanded that theyreceiveaportionoftheblockgrants,leadingKDPfacilitatorsandcommunitiestofearthat theprogramwouldnotgoonunlesssomemoneywaspaidtothem.Suchattemptsatextortion wererecordedineightofthe67targetsubdistricts(Table4.2). 30 Table4.2ReportedCaseofExtortionbyExCombatants Location(subdistrict,district) Natureoftheincident Stepstakenandoutcome Seunuddon,AcehUtara DemandsbyKPAfora20percent Demandsdroppedafterfurther cutofvillageblockgrants. socialization. Terangon,GayoLues DemandsbyKPAfora15percent Demandswithdrawnafterprotests cutfromvillageblockgrants. fromcommunities. Kabayakan,AcehTengah KPAissuedalettertotheCamat, AftermediationfromtheBRA demandingaRp.3million districtoffice,demandswere (US$300)cutpervillage. withdrawn. KluetTimurandSamadua,Aceh ReportedattemptsbyKPAto Intimidationandthreatsstopped Selatan obtaina21percentcutofblock afterfurthersocialization. grantsinbothsubdistricts. Nisam,AcehUtara DemandsofaRp.13million Demandsdroppedafterspecial (US$1,300)cutpervillage. followupmeetings. GeulumpangBaroe,Pidie Asblockgrantsweredisbursedto Themoneywaslaterretrievedby BlangBaroevillage,Rp.58million localpolice. (US$5,800)washandedovertoa KPAmember. Gandapura,Bireuen ReportsofdemandsbyKPAfora LocalKDPfacilitatorslaterdenied Rp.2.5million(US$250)cutfrom thatanyattemptwassuccessful. villageblockgrants. Source:MISComplaintsHandlingDataandsupervisionmissions Mostcasesweresortedoutaftersocializationandmediation,sometimeswiththehelpofBRA district offices. On the whole, KPA showed good will and withdrew demands without much resistance. Only in Nisam subdistrict in Aceh Utara were there significant implementation delaysthatnecessitatedtheinterventionofprovincialBRAandKDPmanagement(seeBox4.2). These experiences illustrate how inadequacies in BRA's reintegration assistance to GAM excombatantssometimesnegativelyimpactedonBRAKDP. 31 Box4.2ExcombatantsDemandaPieceofthePie--theCaseofNisam,AcehUtara Nisam subdistrict was one of the most severely affected areas during the conflict. Large numbers of people werekilled,numeroushousesdamagedandlivelihoodsweredestroyed.Boththecauseandeffectofthiswas thehighconcentrationofexcombatantsinthesubdistrict.AccordingtosomeGAMsources,thereare1,000 exGAM members in Nisam of whom at least a half are former combatants. Many did not receive any BRA assistanceastheagreementbetweenGAMandthecentralgovernmentcoveredonly3,000combatantswhose names were submitted to BRA. Those who missed out felt they were entitled to reintegration benefits from elsewhere.ThisresultedinpersistentdemandsfromlocalKPAforapieceofBRAKDP. Inlate2006,twoKPAcommandersfromWilayahPasee(YusopHSandJafarDaud),issuedaletterinstructing thateveryvillageallocatefundstobenefitthefollowinggroups:atleastfiveformercombatants;atleastten GAMcivilians;15GAMsupporters;andfourregularcommunitymembers.Inaddition,theymadeanumberof conditions such as "if female combatants had their houses burnt down, they should receive a special allocation","villagesthatwerelessconflictaffectedshouldgive50percentoftheirfundstoothervillagesthat sufferedfromhigherconflictimpact".SuchinstructionswereclearlyagainsttheprinciplesofBRAKDP,which statethatfunduseshouldbedetermineddemocraticallybycommunitymembers. TheseinitialclaimswereabandonedfollowingnegotiationsinvolvingtheprovincialmanagementofBRA,KDP andtheWorldBank.However,inMarch2007,facilitatorsreportedthatKPAwasmakingnewdemandsdirectly to communities, whereby each village should save a Rp. 13 million (US$ 1,300) share, allegedly to build a cemetery and memorial for excombatants. It appeared that some communities actually supported the initiative. The issue was further complicated when local police informed that KDP facilitators could be prosecuted for "complicity of public funds embezzlement" if they allowed villagers to accommodate KPA demands. KDP staff consequently decided to freeze funds disbursements until the issue was sorted out. Eventually,afteranewroundofnegotiationsledbyajointBRA,KDPandWorldBankdelegation,KPAagreedto withdrawanydemandscancausenofurtherdifficulties.RelationsbetweenKPAandKDPfieldstaffremained cordialafterthis. Such problems were not specific to BRAKDP alone. The two supervision missions found attempts by excombatants to appropriate funds from a range of development programs. In fact, attempts by former combatants to obtain a "tax" of ten percent from development projects have become common practice in Aceh (Aspinall 2009). Another case in Sawang subdistrict, Aceh Utara, deserves mention. Although not directly related to extortion, it illustrates how the intervention of excombatants could worsen existing tensions between communitiesandKDPfacilitators,playingaleadingroleinescalatingprotestsandfrustrations tophysicalintimidation(seeBox4.3). 32 Box4.3ExCombatantsasSpoilers--theCaseofSawang,AcehUtara SawangisaneighboringsubdistrictofNisamthatsharesanumberofsimilarcharacteristics,includingahigh levelofconflictintensityandalargenumberofformercombatants.InSawang,inequitiesinthedistributionof reintegrationassistancetoexcombatantsledtoafeudbetweenrivalgroupswhichresultedinseriousviolence, includingkidnappingsandassassinations.Sawangalsohasahistoryofwidespreadextortionandintimidationby KPAonpublicprojectsanddevelopmentprograms. On7February2007,amobledbyfourKPAmembersraidedthelocalKDPImplementationManagementUnit office. Office equipment, documents and archives were destroyed. Computers were damaged or stolen. TroublesseemedtooriginatefrommisinformationdisseminatedbyamemberoftheBRAdistrictoffice,which created the perception that facilitators were responsible for delays in implementation. The perpetrators allegedly acted "on behalf" of frustrated local communities. The incident resulted in a twomonth halt in program implementation. It was eventually sorted out through a special MAD with the participation of BRA, KDPandWorldBankprovincialstaff. Itisunclearwhetherextortionwasalsoatriggeringfactorintheincident.However,whatisinterestinginthis caseishowKPA'sinterventionallowedforexistingbutmanageabletensionstoescalateandledtheprogramto atemporaryhalt. ImpactsofBRAKDPontherelationshipbetweenexcombatantsandothervillagers The ARLS surveys provide some evidence that the program impacted negatively on communities', and particularly conflict victims', levels of acceptance of returning former combatants(Barronet.al.2009).Thisispossiblyduetoattemptsbyexcombatantstoclaima shareoftheassistance,asillustratedintheexamplesabove.Thesurveysshowthatthemost frequent complaint of beneficiaries regarding BRAKDP outcomes was that excombatants benefited too much. On the other hand, levels of acceptance are higher in locations where communitiesdecidedtoexertsomeflexibilityandallowexcombatantstobenefit.Theremight be two reasons for these seemingly contradictory findings. First, villagers weremore likely to accommodate the claims of excombatants in communities where former combatants were betterintegratedfromthestart.Second,allowingformercombatantstobenefitwasprobablya good way to prevent them from making troubles. Conversely, enforcing program procedures toorigidlybyexcludingexcombatantsmighthaveledtotensions,thusaffectingnegativelythe relationshipbetweenexGAMandothervillagers. Thesefindingspointtotheexclusionofexcombatantsfromtheassistanceasapossibleflawof the program that undermined the program's objective of strengthening social cohesion. This suggests that specific groups should not be excluded from programs delivering reintegration assistance through communitybased mechanisms, and that more emphasis should be placed onengagingexcombatantspositivelyinprogramprocesses. 33 5. HOWFUNDSWEREUSED:THEECONOMICIMPACTOFTHEPROGRAM BRAKDPencouragedbeneficiariestoinvestfundsinproductiveactivitiesthatwouldresultin sustainable improvements in economic welfare. The program offered a truly open menu that allowedcommunitiestochoosetospendmoneyoninfrastructureaswellasonprivategoods. Delivery of funds was conditional on the submission of sound project proposals and program facilitators provided technical assistance to beneficiaries to develop and carry out productive economicactivities.Bothmeasureshelpedsafeguardagainstassistancebeingwastedinoneoff consumption. Communities largely gave preference to livelihoods projects, and twothirds of beneficiaries invested project funds in productive activities (Barron et al 2009). Although relativelymodestamountsofassistancewereprovidedtoindividualsandhouseholds,thereis evidence that this injection of capital had significant impacts on the welfare of beneficiary communities. Thissectionbeginswithabreakdownofthetypesofsubprojectsselectedbycommunities.Itis followed by a discussion of the reasons for the prevalence of private over public goods, and concludeswithanassessmentoftheprogram'seconomicimpacts. KeyFindings: · Most beneficiary communities preferred to use program assistance for economic activities rather than common goods and infrastructure. Eightynine percent of block grantswerespentonlivelihoodprojectswithcattlebreedingandagricultureinputsthe dominantactivities.Tenpercentoffundswereinvestedininfrastructure. · The most important reason for the prevalence of livelihoods projects over common goodsisthatcommunitiesassociatedBRAKDPwithcompensationfortheconflict.They consequentlyoptedforprojectsthatwouldtranslateintodirectindividualbenefits. · Higher levels of satisfaction were found in communities where a minority share of assistancewasusedforcommongoodsandinfrastructure,asastrategytoensurethat thewholecommunitywouldbenefit. · BRAKDP was successful in providing beneficiary communities with a muchneeded injectionofcapital.Twothirdsofbeneficiariesinvestedfundsinproductiveactivities. · The program was associated with significant impacts on the welfare of target communities,includingareductioninthenumberofhouseholdsreportedaspoor,gains inhouseholdassetholdingsandanincreaseinlanduse. 5.1 WhatdidBeneficiariesUseFundsFor? The program procedures allowed for great flexibility in terms of the activities eligible for funding(seeBox5.1).Communitiescouldproposealmostanykindofproject. 34 Box5.1TheOpenMenu The program used the same open menu as regular KDP. Funds could be spent on economic activities, infrastructure, health and educationrelated activities or anything the community proposed except the following: development/rehabilitation of office buildings; financing of civil servants' salaries; purchase of chainsaws, weapons, explosives, asbestos, and other materials damaging to the environment; financing of activities related to the employment of underworking age children; financing of activities related to politics/politicalparties;andfinancingofanythingrelatedtothemilitaryorarmedforces.UnlikeregularKDP, buildingorrehabilitationofmosquesandpurchaseoffertilizerswasallowed. IncontrasttoregularKDP,wherecommunitiestypicallyuse80to90percentofthefundsfor infrastructure projects such as access roads and irrigation canals, BRAKDP beneficiaries overwhelmingly preferred economic activities. Eightynine percent of BRAKDP funds were spent on economic activities (Rp. 181.8 billion, or approximately US$ 18 million); ten percent wereinvestedininfrastructure(Rp.21.4billion,orUS$2million);lessthanonepercentwere usedforotherkindsofactivities(seeFigure5.1). Figure5.1FundsSpentbyTypeofActivity Billion Rp. 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Economic Public Goods Education Health Others Activities Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Trends in project selection varied by region (Figure 5.2). In Aceh Tamiang and Simeulue, the assistancewasexclusivelyspentoneconomicactivities.Similarly,inPidie,Bireuen,AcehUtara andAcehTimur,thefourdistrictswhichbenefitedfromover80percentofallBRAKDPfunds due to high levels of conflictaffectedness and large populations, at least 90 percent of the moneywasusedforeconomicactivities.Bycontrast,AcehTengahandAcehBaratgavepriority to infrastructure over economic subprojects, allocating 60 percent and over 80 percent of fundsrespectivelyfortheseactivities. 35 Figure5.2EconomicSubprojectsvs.otherActivities,PerDistrict,asaProportionofFundsAllocated Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Among the economic activities, animal husbandry and agricultural activities were the most preferred(Figure5.3).AroundRp.138billion(approximatelyUS$14million)or67percentofall BRAKDPblockgrantswereallocatedforthesetwoactivities.Thedominationoflivestockand agricultureprojectsreflectsthesocialcompositionofthetargetpopulationoftheprogram,but alsoreflectsthepreferencegiventoactivitiesthatwouldaddresspressingeconomicneeds. Figure5.3BreakdownofSubprojectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoEconomicActivities) Cooperatives & Revolving Funds Small Trade 1% 10% Small industry 13% Fisheries & Livestocks Aquaculture 48% 3% Agriculture & Plantations 25% Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit Where communities selected infrastructure, they largely favored social and religious facilities 36 suchascommunityhalls(meunasah)andmosquesoverroads,irrigationandotherpublicgoods (see Figure 5.4). There are a number of reasons for this. First, the amount of BRAKDP allocations wouldgenerallybeinsufficient toallowforheavyinfrastructurework.Incontrast, facilitiessuchasmeunasah,mosqueandprayerroomswerelesscostly.Second,asdiscussedin greater detail below, communities often used infrastructure projects to address perceived inequities resulting from projects that provided funds to sets of individuals or households. In this scenario, the majority of funds financed livelihoods projects, while the remainder was investedinpublicgoodsfromwhichallbenefited.Thisstrategymitigatedjealousiesandhelped maintain social cohesion. With these objectives in mind, the choice of social and religious facilitieswasthereforeasensibleone. Figure5.4BreakdownofSubprojectbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoInfrastructure) Other public Wells & Irrigation facilities 4% 5% Roads & Bridges 17% Meunasah 50% Mosques & other religious facilities 24% Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit 5.2 ReasonsfortheChoicesmadebyCommunities Whyweremostfundsusedforeconomicactivities? There are a number of reasons why livelihoods activities were generally preferred. Villagers expected compensation for the hardships suffered during the conflict. Individual economic benefitsprovidedbeneficiarieswithabettersenseofrecognitionthaninfrastructureprojects. "Thisassistanceisforconflictvictims.Ifthefundsshouldbeusedforcommunitygoods,then peopleshoulduseanothersourceofmoney." Villager,KluetSelatansubdistrict,AcehSelatan A lack of capital was and remains a major impediment to economic recovery and growth in rural Aceh (World Bank 2005). Many villagers noted that provision of capital, compared to other forms of livelihoods support, would best enable them to rebuild and recover from the losses they had suffered. This is common in postconflict settings where severely 37 conflictaffected communities often have a need for immediate livelihoods support such as capital, inputs for fishing and farming, and incomegenerating activities. Programs such as regular KDP were in place to provide infrastructure whereas in most villages programs providing capital were scarce. BRAKDP, through its open menu which allowed for economic activities,servedasabadlyneededsourceofcapital.VillagersinAcehBaratDaya,forexample, clearly noted that if they needed rural infrastructure, they would use other sources of assistance. Mixedmessagesandmiscommunicationfromdifferentprogramstakeholdersplayedarolein influencing communities' project preferences. BRA viewed the need to fulfill compensation claims of the mostaffected conflict victims as an important part of its mandate, and encouraged the use of BRAKDP funds for economic activities over infrastructure. BRA's preferenceforlivelihoodsactivitiesranagainstprogramrulesthatallowedforpublicgoodsto be funded. On more than one occasion, this tension was exacerbated by insufficient coordination between BRA provincial leadership and district branches, which resulted in contradictorymessagesbeingcirculatedtoKDPfacilitatorsandcommunities.Duringtheearly stagesoftheprogramcycle,BRAdistrictofficesinAcehTimurandAcehSelatanissuedofficial instructions to KDP facilitators that infrastructure subprojects were not allowed in BRAKDP. These instructions were quickly revoked by the BRA provincial level management and clarificationletterswerecirculatedtoKDPfieldoffices.Thecirculationofinconsistentmessages led to considerable confusion as communities were forced to unnecessarily withdraw and/or revise proposals. In Aceh Tengah, villages such as Kelupak Mata abandoned community hall constructionprojectsaftertheinterventionofBRAdistrictpersonnel. Theroleofinfrastructureinmaintainingsocialcohesion Although on the whole infrastructure projects were rarely selected for funding, records of village meetings show that communities often indicated a strong need for drinking water, irrigation systems and roads. Project proposals for such activities frequently figured among thoseinitiallysubmittedforselection.However,inlocationswherethemajorityoffundswere used for infrastructure subprojects (up to 100 percent of funds in some villages), decisions were usually based on the desire to avoid conflicts and tensions generated by the process of identifyingconflictvictims.Singlingoutthemostaffected,differentiatingcategoriesaccording tolevelsofsuffering,andprioritizingsometothedetrimentofotherswasoftenaverysensitive process(seeearlierchapter).Invillageswhereallhadsufferedmoreorlessthesamelevelof impact from the conflict, categorization and prioritization was even more challenging. In communities where some had objectively suffered more, their claims could still conflict with theneedofthewidercommunityforsomemeasureofcompensationandrecognitionoftheir ownsuffering.Infrastructuresubprojectsservedasamechanismthroughwhichcommunities could avoid tensions related to identifying victims by providing public goods for the whole village. Complementaryaspectsoflivelihoodsandinfrastructuresubprojects HigherlevelsofsatisfactionwereobservedincommunitiesthatmadethemostofBRAKDP's 38 flexible procedures and open menu by selecting both economic and infrastructure projects. InfrastructureprojectsweresometimesfundedthroughacombinationofBRAKDPandfunds from other programs or private contributions (see Box 5.2). Infrastructure projects helped maintain social cohesion by offsetting jealousies that stemmed from the prioritization and delivery of assistance to the mostaffected by providing public goods benefiting the entire community. Box5.2TheBalancebetweenLivelihoodsandInfrastructureinBateeDabai,Makmur,Bireuen FromablockgrantallocationofRp.150million(approximatelyUS$15,000),BateeDabaiusedRp.109million to purchase livestock for the benefit of twenty highlyaffected households, including eight widowheaded families.Theremaining41millionwasusedtobuildameunasah(communityhall).AlthoughtheRp.41million wasnotsufficienttocompletetheconstructionofthemeunasah,villageauthoritiesraisedanadditionalRp.30 millioninvoluntarycontributions. 5.3 TechnicalQualityofProjects "BRAKDP gave us a kickstart this year. It reduced our loan burden and allowed us to plant more." Villager,Peudadasubdistrict,Bireuen The ARLS data shows evidence of significant program impacts on the welfare of target communities. BRAKDP was associated with an eleven percent drop in levels of poverty as reportedbyvillageheads.Theprogramalsoresultedingainsinhouseholdassetholdings,such as stoves and motorcycles, especially amongst conflict victims. Most strikingly, the survey showsstrongevidenceassociatingBRAKDPwithalargeincreaseintheamountoflandbeing farmed(Barronet.Al.2009). Durableimprovementswerepresumablymorelikelyinlocationswherestrongprioritizationof the mostaffected allowed them to benefit from higher amounts of capital. One would thereforeexpectmarginalimpactswherebenefitswerespreadthinlyacrossalargenumberof individualsorhouseholds,asoccurredwherebagiratatookplace.Whilesufficientdataisnot availabletotestthesehypotheses,supervisionmissionsfoundexamplesofbagiratathatledto meaningfulwelfareimpactsandothersthatfailedtodoso(seeBox5.3). 39 Box5.3BagiRata­CasesofSuccessfulandUnsuccessfulSubprojectSelectionandImplementation Successfulcase:KandehVillage,Seunagansubdistrict,NaganRaya Kandeh village was almost totally deserted during the last six years of the conflict. After the MoU, nearly all households returned. Many were former GAM combatants. The community decided to use the totality of BRAKDPfundstostartarubberplantation,witheachhouseholdreceivinghalfahectare.Fiveconflictwidows conveyed their frustration with project selection. They felt they should have been prioritized over other villagers. They also complained that excombatants manipulated the decisionmaking process to their advantage,astheybenefitedfromplantationlotsontopoftheRp.25milliontheyhadalreadyreceivedfrom BRA.Nonetheless,villagersonthewhole,includingthewidows,acknowledgedthattherubberplantationwasa soundprojectthatshould,overtime,haveasignificantimpactonthecommunity'swelfare.Thevillagersknew they would not collect any direct benefit from the plantation before five years. However, in this community where rubber is the traditional trade, most considered the project "as an investment for their children and grandchildren". Unsuccessfulcase:BlangBeurandehvillage,Beutongsubdistrict,NaganRaya Similar factors influencing subproject selection led to a total failure in Blang Beurandeh. In 1999, this village wasthetheaterofoneofthemostinfamousincidentsoftheconflictyears:themassacrebytheIndonesian military of Teungku Bantaqiah, a controversial Islamic scholar accused of supporting the rebellion, and about sixtystudentsfromhisIslamicboardingschool.AsinKandeh,theBRAKDPdecisionmakingprocesswasheavily influenced by excombatants who pushed for bagi rata in order to get a share of the benefits. However, insteadofinvestingassistancefundsinasoundandsustainableeconomicproject,cashwashandedout,with everyindividualinthevillagereceivingRp.160.000(US$16).Withfundsspreadsothinly,moneywasquickly spent on consumer goods. The widows of the sixty victims of the 1999 massacre strongly deplored this outcome.Ironically,evenexcombatantscomplainedthefundswereinsufficient. Strongfacilitationduringprojectdesign,andpriorexperienceandtechnicalknowledgeofthe activity amongst beneficiaries, also contributed greatly to the success of projects. Box 5.4 showsanexampleofalivelihoodprojectthatresultedinsustainableeconomicgainsasitwas tailoredtotheprofessionalskillsandexperienceoftheproposalgroup. Box5.4PoultryFarminTimanangGading TwelveconflictvictimsinTimanangGadingvillage,Kebayakansubdistrict,AcehTengah,eachreceivedRp.2.5 million(US$250)inassistancefromBRAKDPtopursueeconomicactivities.Apoultryfarmhadanimmediate positive impact on the livelihood of one of the beneficiaries. Prior to receiving BRAKDP assistance, a conflict victimownedclosetoahundredchickens.However,hedidnothaveaproperplacetohousethepoultry,nor did he have the capital to fatten, breed and market them. Upon receipt of the assistance, the beneficiary investedaportionoftheamounttoconstructalargecooptohousethechickens.Hepurchasedanadditional 100chickensatatotalcostofRp.260,000(US$26)andinvestedtheremainingamountinfeed.Atthetimeof the September 2007 supervision mission, the conflict victim was selling chickens to food vendors and restaurantsataprofitofRp.4000­5000perchicken.Hewasusingtheprofitstoconstructanothercoopand purchasemorepoultry. 40 6. VIEWSOFCOMMUNITIES:LEVELSOFSATISFACTION&COMPLAINTS This section draws from supervision mission findings and the Aceh Reintegration and LivelihoodsSurveys(ARLS)toassessoveralllevelsofsatisfactioninbeneficiarycommunities.It also presents the prevalent types of complaints conveyed by beneficiaries and the ways in whichthesewereaddressedbytheprogram. MainFindings: · Levels of satisfaction were high and communities felt that BRAKDP was successful in fulfillingtheneedsofconflictvictimsforcompensationandrecognition. · Complaints,widespreadintheearlystagesoftheprogramcycle,werefocusedonthe following issues: change in the delivery mechanism from earlier BRA proposalbased system to BRAKDP's communitybased system; subdistrict and village block grant allocations;anddelaysinimplementation. · Projectrelatedcomplaintsdecreasedovertimeasaresultofeffectivesocializationby KDP facilitators and as funds hit the ground. There were very few cases where complaintsorprotestsledtointimidationorresultedinsignificantdelaysordisruptions inprogramimplementation. · Theprogramundertookanextensivesocializationcampaignthatutilizedmultipletypes of media. Facetoface socialization activities were most effective, while radio had the leastimpact. 6.1 LevelsofSatisfaction Ninetyfour percent of all respondents from target locations, and 97 percent of the mostaffected conflict victims, deemed the program "typically helpful" to them and the community.18 Overalllevelsofsatisfactionobservedduringsupervisionmissionswerealsohigh. In March 2007, thirteen of fifteen surveyed subdistricts showed strong support for the program.DissatisfactionorhostilereactionswererecordedintwosubdistrictsofAcehTimur. These were driven by the frustration of local excombatants at not being formally allowed to benefitorstemmedfromimplementationissues,suchasdelaysorprotestsovertheamountof allocations,thatwerelateraddressed. Regarding satisfaction with program decisionmaking processes, findings of the September 2007supervisionweremorenuancedwithsubstantialvariationacrossregions.InAcehUtara, Aceh Timur, the central highlands and the west coast, some felt that decisions were unduly influencedbyelites.Intheseareas,womentendedtobelesssatisfiedwiththeprogramthan men.Incontrast,boththeMarchandSeptember2007supervisionsrecordedthehighestlevels of support and satisfaction in Bireuen and Pidie. In these two districts, the decisionmaking process was widely regarded as fair, despite initial resistance from excombatants. High satisfaction levels across groups including women, mostaffected conflict victims and other 18 Barron et. al. (2009). Respondents could choose between three options: typically helpful; neither helpful nor harmful;ratherharmful. 41 disadvantaged groups was in large part attributable to higher levels of participation from nonelitesandtheprogram'sconstructiveengagementofexcombatants. While most people were satisfied with overall outcomes and agreed that BRAKDP was successful in providing a needed and immediate injection of capital to conflictaffected communities, respondents interviewed during supervision missions conveyed doubts that BRAKDP assistance would result in sustainable impacts. The amount of BRAKDP funds was deemed insufficient in the absence of linkages to and followup from programs that improve infrastructureandprovideaccesstocapital,skillstraining,andmarketingsupport. "Thecommunityishappyenoughtogetassistance,evenifamountswerenotsufficient.The moneyatleastgivesushopeandrenewedspirittoundertakenewactivities" HeadofTPK,TimangGajahsubdistrict,BenerMeriah Of particular importance with regards to BRAKDP's main objective, most communities acknowledgedthatBRAKDPsuccessfullyfulfilledtheneedsofconflictvictimsforcompensation and recognition of enduring past hardships. Even in locations where assistance funds were spread thinly, many beneficiaries interviewed during supervision missions felt satisfied with havingreceivedcompensationandwerereadytofocusmoreonlongertermdevelopment. "Itwasimportantforustoreceivecompensation.Nowthatwehavereceivedit,wenolonger needfurthercompensation.Wewillchooseeconomicdevelopmentinthefuture" VillageHeadofacommunitywhooptedforequaldivisionoffundsacrossallhouseholds, SyamtaliraBayusubdistrict,AcehUtara 6.2 ComplaintsHandlingMechanisms Communities had high expectations for the reintegration benefits provided by local government and, for many of them, a history of disappointment in local government service delivery.Itwasthereforevitaltocreateamechanismthroughwhichcommunitiescouldsubmit inquiriesandcomplaintsandprovideevidencetocommunitiesthatcomplaintsandquestions wasbeingheardandactedupon.InBRAKDP,inquiriesandcomplaintsweresubmittedthrough avarietyofchannels,includingtextmessagestoapublicizedphonenumber,walkinstoKDPor BRAoffices,adesignatedpostofficebox,KDPfacilitators,otherstakeholders,andthemedia.A Complaints Handling Specialist was hired at the KDP Regional Management Unit (RMU) to compile and categorize all incoming complaints. Once categorized, all complaints were registered in the BRAKDP database before being relayed, when deemed relevant, to the appropriate KDP or BRA staff for followup. Complaints submitted directly to KDP and BRA personnel,newspapersandtextmessageswerethechannelsutilizedmostfrequently,withtext messagingthemostpopularamongstcommunitymembers.19 Giventhepoliticalsensitivityoftheprogram,therewerecomplaintsofanaturethatKDPstaff 19 TheflowchartofBRAKDP'sComplaintsHandlingmechanismisshowninAnnexC. 42 alonecouldnotaddress.ThesewereforwardedtotheBRAProjectImplementationUnit(PIU) (Table6.1).TogetherwithBRAPIU,theComplaintsHandlingSpecialistdeterminedthebestway toaddresstheissuesandwasinchargeofprovidingresponsestothecomplaints.Verification andproblemsolvingwerefollowedupbytheComplaintsHandlingSpecialisttogetherwithKDP facilitators. Table6.1CategoriesofIssues IssuestobehandledbyKDP 1 Problemsrelatedtoprogramprocess/procedures · Problemsregardingsizeofblockgrants · Problemsregardingcategoriesofconflictvictims · Problemsregardingtargetsiteselection 2 Misallocationofprogramfunds 3 InappropriateinterventionfromgovernmentofficialsorKDPconsultants 4 Unforeseeableeventssuchasnaturaldisasters(forcemajeure) IssuestobehandledbyBRA 5 · Problemsrelatedtotheconceptofprogram(e.g.shifttocommunitybasedmechanism) · Problemsregardingalreadysubmittedproposals · Inappropriateinterventionfromexcombatants/KPA,PETA,politicalprisoners,securityforcesetc. · Complaintsregardingreintegrationprogramingeneral 6.3 Complaints Thenumberofcomplaintswasrelativelylow.Widespreadduringearlystages,thefrequencyof inquiries by communities progressively decreased as implementation progressed and further socialization was carried out, providing communities with a better understanding of program mechanisms. Complaintsandconcernsmostcommonlyreportedwererelatedtothefollowingissues: (i) Questionsoverthefateofpreviouslysubmittedproposals; (ii) Conflictintensitycategorizationandvillageblockgrantallocations; (iii) Delaysinimplementation; (iv) Demandsforfundstobedistributedequally; (v) Excombatants/KPArequestingapartoftheassistance. Issues (iv) and (v) were discussed at lengths in previous sections. The others are discussed below. Questionsregardingpreviouslysubmittedproposals Over 48,500 proposals from conflict victims were submitted to BRA in April 2006. On supervisionmissions,itwasnotuncommontofindvillagesinwhichoverahundredpeoplehad sent proposals to BRA. People had high expectations and a genuine need for BRA assistance. Mosthadinvestedsignificantamountsoftimeandmoneyinpreparingtheproposalsandhad noinformationthattheproposalbasedsystemhadbeenabandoneduntilthiswasdiscussedin 43 BRAKDP'sfirstvillagemeeting.Individualswereunderstandablyupsetatthischangeinpolicy, disappointed that their proposals would not be acted upon, and dismayed at the prospect of havingtoexpendadditionaltimeandeffortinparticipatinginBRAKDP.BRA'schangeinpolicy wasamajorsourceofcomplaintsearlyonintheBRAKDPcycle.Asfundsreachedcommunities in early 2007, tensions over past proposals largely disappeared and community satisfaction grew.TheMarch2007supervisionmissionfoundnoseriouscasesofcomplaintsabouttheshift toBRAKDP'scommunitybasedsystem. "A lot of community members sent proposals to BRA so people initially thought that the [BRAKDP]moneywasfortheproposals.Therewasnoexplanationabouttheshiftinsystem, andmanyarestillwaitingforthemtobefunded.Infact,onlyaweekago,therewasaflyer fromtheBRAdistrictofficeencouragingpeopletosendmoreproposalsforBRAKDP." VillageHead,KluetSelatansubdistrict,AcehSelatan Conflictintensityandvillageblockgrantallocation Some communities noted that conflict intensity varied significantly within subdistricts and hence village allocations should be scaled according to both population size and villagelevel rather than subdistrict level conflict intensity. Finding consensus on this contentious issue often required more than one village meeting; some communities held a series of KDPfacilitatedmeetingstoreachconsensus.AnextremecasewasthatofKecamatanManyak Payed in Aceh Tamiang, where a second MAD was held to reallocate village block grants accordingtovillagelevelconflictintensity(Box6.1). 44 Box6.1ReallocationofVillageGrantstheCaseofManyakPayed,AcehTamiang TheMADinManyakPayedsubdistrictconductedonNovember2006wasattendedbymanycommunity representatives, village heads, KDP facilitators, excombatants, BRA and other prominent figures. It ended in dispute because community representatives disagreed with the village allocations. Villagers thoughtallocatingvillageblockgrantsbasedonsubdistrictlevelconflictintensityandvillagepopulation size was unjust. Failing to consider villagelevel variation in conflict intensity meant that villages with high conflict intensity but small populations got lower allocations than villages with lower conflict intensity but larger populations. Excombatants and villagers argued that some villages experienced difficultsituationsduringtheconflictandthereforedeservedmoreassistance.Theythusdemandedthat villageallocationsberevisedbyconductinganotherspecialMAD. KPA Aceh Tamiang took the initiative to organize a special MAD. With 300 participants, including community representatives from 36 villages, the Camat, military, district police, KPA, and KDP facilitators, the meeting's attendance was well above the provincial average. At the meeting, it was decided that village allocations should be revised based on villagelevel conflict intensity. Allocations werethendeterminedandagreedbyallparticipants.Thetablebelowshowstheagreedreallocation: Population Large Medium Small High Rp.150,000,000 Rp.130,000,000 Intensity(village) (6villages) (10villages) Conflict Medium Rp.110,000,000 Rp.95,000,000 (4villages) (5villages) Low Rp.75,000,000 Rp.65,000,000 (5villages) (6villages) This reallocation did not entail changes to the previously determined subdistrict allocation of Rp. 3,880,000,000.Allthevillagesfelttheyhadasayindeterminingtheblockgrantandthemeetingadjourned witheveryonefeelingsatisfied. Other communities pointed out that the population of certain villages was larger than that identified by BRAKDP and that allocations should be revisited accordingly. An extreme case wasGampongMesjidvillage,Nurussalamsubdistrict,AcehTimur,whichhad1,818inhabitants and suffered from high levels of conflict intensity. The village benefited from the highest possible block grant allocation (Rp. 170 million, US$ 17,000), but it was still regarded by the communityasinsufficienttocoverlocalneeds.Itwasalsoconsideredunfairincomparisonto villagesthatreceivedthesameamountbuthadbeenlessaffectedandhadfewerinhabitants. Thiscausedtrouble,leadingvillagerstorefusetogothroughwiththeprogram.InNovember 2006, a delegation of villagers came to Banda Aceh to convey their complaints to BRA's provincial management. Although BRA was sympathetic to the communities' claims, no agreementwasreached:budgetlimitationsmeantthatitwasnotpossibletoaddtoGampong Mesjid'sblockgrantwithoutreducingtheallocationsofothervillagesinthesamesubdistrict. Program implementation was still frozen when the March 2007 supervision mission surveyed thevillage.Eventually,BRAfoundabudgetarysolutionthatallowedGampongMesjidtobenefit from a Rp. 50 million (US$ 5,000) block grant complement and program implementation was resumed. This was the only case where disagreements over allocation amounts led to protractedprotestsandatotalhalttoprogramactivities. 45 Issues (i) and (ii) mostly appeared during early stages, between MD I and MD II. They lost importanceasfurthersocializationwascarriedoutandimplementationprogressed.Afterthe MDII,theywerereplacedbyprotestsoverthepaceofimplementation. Delaysindisbursements The program was socialized in August 2006 but due to administrative delays program funds weredeliveredtosubdistrictFinancialManagementUnitsonlyinDecemberofthesameyear (Box6.2). Box6.2ConstraintsandIssueswithInitialDisbursementtoSubdistricts Operational funds and block grants were first transferred to collective accounts created by KDP's Financial ManagementUnits(UPK)ineachofthe67participatingsubdistrictsinDecember2006.Theprimaryreasons for slow initial disbursement to the subdistrict accounts were BRA's and the Department of Social Affairs` (Dinsos) lack of familiarity with the communitydriven approach and a lack of capacity to manage the necessarypaperwork.ThesituationimprovedafterBRAestablishedaProjectImplementationUnitinOctober 2006. Nonetheless, to prevent the 2006 budget from being taken away by the Ministry of Finance after December2006,theendoftheIndonesiangovernment'sfiscalyear,theWorldBankhadtomobilizefinancial experts from the KDP team who worked fulltime with BRA, Dinsos, and the Treasury (KPPN) to ensure the disbursementhappenedintime. In the end, operational costs (six percent of the total allocation) were disbursed on 1 December and the remaining94percentfor65outof67subdistrictswasdisbursedbetween1820December.Twosubdistricts (SimpangKramatandKutaMakmur,bothinAcehUtara)werelateinsubmittingtherequestfordisbursement andhencewerepaidoutoftheunspentportionofBRA's2005budgetinlateApril2007. Thedelayinthedisbursementoftheoperationalbudgetledtocomplaints.Insomeareas,the delayraisedcommunitysuspicionsthateitherBRAorKDPfacilitatorswerestealingthemoney, orthatnoassistancewasgoingtocomethroughafterall.Thisnegativelyimpacteduponthe credibility of BRA and KDP personnel. Negative perceptions persisted until funds were transferredfromcollectiveaccountsatthesubdistrictleveltothevillagelevel.Thissteptook anadditionalseveralmonthsasvillagershadtosubmitsoundproposalsbeforefundscouldbe released. Hence, there were widespread suspicions by communities in some areas that KDP facilitators were deliberately slowing down the implementation process in order to collect interestonprogramfundsdepositedinbankaccounts. "There'sdistrustofpeopleheretowardsKDPfacilitators.Thisisbecausetherewasfalsenews inthenewspaper.ThepapersaidthatthefundshadalreadybeendisbursedtotheFinancial ManagementUnit,butthatthedisbursementtothevillageswasdelayedbecausetheUPKwas tryingtoearninterestoffthefunds." KDPFacilitator,ManyakPayedsubdistrict,AcehTamiang "The delay in disbursement is the biggest problem. The community's trust towards the KDP facilitatorsisdecreasingbecausethedisbursementisslow." KDPFacilitator,Samaduasubdistrict,AcehSelatan 46 Concerns over disbursement delays had largely dissipated by the time of the March 2007 supervisionmission,inpartduetoeffectivefurthersocializationandfacilitationbyKDPstaff,in partbecausefundshadstartedtoreachvillagesandbeneficiaries. Theevolutionofissuesovertime:Inquiriesandcomplaintsreceivedviatextmessages Asoneofthechannelsmostoftenusedbycommunitiestoaddressinformationandcomplaints, textmessagingprovidesausefulinstrumenttoidentifyissuesandanalyzetheirevolutionover time.Textmessageswereclassifiedintooneoffivesubcategories:(i)clarificationofpreviously submitted proposals; (ii) questions concerning the process and mechanisms of BRAKDP (beneficiaries,mechanisms,timingofdisbursement,etc.);(iii)questionsconcerningotherBRA reintegration programs; (iv) complaints and requests related to BRAKDP, such as GAM extortion attempts, demands for direct cash transfers, complaints regarding KDP facilitators and corruption allegations; and (v) others, usually inquiries that were not directly relevant to theprogram.Between23August2006,andtheendofApril2007,atotalof493messageswere received. As Figure 6.1 shows, 41 percent of all messages received sought information on eligiblebeneficiaries,disbursementschedulesortheprogramimplementationprocess.Another 22percentwerequestionsregardingBRA'sotherreintegrationassistance.Fifteenpercentwere complaints about BRAKDP, including demands to equally divide the funds, corruption allegations,andGAMextortionattempts.Afurthersixpercentsoughtclarificationonthestatus ofpreviouslysubmittedproposals. Figure6.1BreakdownofInformationRequestsandComplaintsReceivedViaTextMessage 6% 16% Status of former proposals Questions about BRA-KDP process and mechanisms 15% Questions about other BRA programs 41% Complaints related to BRA-KDP Others 22% Source:MISComplaintsHandlingSystem Thenumberofcomplaintsandinformationrequestsevolvedovertime(Figure6.2).Therewas a steady increase in the number of monthly incoming messages until the end of December, except for a temporary drop in November. The number of inquiries, however, dropped significantly starting in February. No messages were recorded after April and the Complaints Handling Specialist handling the line was demobilized in June. The significant decline in the numberofinquiriesappearstorelatetothreefactors:first,asmeetingsprogressedcommunity 47 understanding of the program increased; second, articles on BRAKDP appeared more frequently in the local press (throughout February, for example, newspapers featured stories about the program almost every day); third, complaints and concerns declined as funds disbursementsstartedinFebruary. Figure6.2EvolutionofInformationRequestsOverTime 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 A 06 S O N D J 07 F M A Status of former proposals Questions about BRA-KDP process and mechanisms Questions about other BRA programs Complaints related to BRA-KDP Others Source:MISComplaintsHandlingSystem Figure 6.2 also shows that the type of information requested changed as the program progressed.InAugust,mostsoughtclarificationonthestatusofpreviouslysubmittedproposals and eligibility criteria. Inquiries about proposals rapidly decreased, however, demonstrating increasing acceptance of the shift of mechanism. The number of text messages on eligibility alsodecreasedovertimewhilethedisbursementschedulebecamethecommunities'foremost concern.20 Statementssuchas"Weneedit[thefunds]urgently"or"Isit[BRAKDP]justalie?" expressed a sense of impatience among communities. This type of inquiry progressively disappearedasdisbursementsstartedinFebruary. A positive trend was the general demand for program oversight. In August and September people sought information about the program and fund allocation in order to preempt any misconduct.FromSeptemberonwards,messagesreporting(alleged)corruptionorelitecapture started. A case was reported from Manyak Payed in Aceh Tamiang that a Village Head had prioritized his family in the allocation of funds. In one subdistrict in Aceh Selatan, the subdistrict facilitator allegedly decided on who would receive funds. In Lawe Alas, Aceh Tenggara,theKDPFinancialManagementUnit(UPK)andcommunitiesreceivedpressurefrom the Camat's office to save funds from the grants allocated to the subdistrict to finance the 20 Both inquiries about eligibility and disbursement schedule fall under the same category ­ Questions about BRAKDPprocessandmechanism­inFigure6.2. 48 rehabilitationofaroad.InManyakPayed,AcehTamiang,reportswerereceivedofattemptsby theCamattotakeacutfromtheoperationalfundsallocatedtothesubdistrictfinancialunits (UPK). March saw a significant increase in complaints related to implementation issues as disbursementtovillageswasinfullswing.Themaintypesofcomplaintswere:(i)thoseoverthe way assistance was distributed, including by heavily affected conflict victims who felt they should have been prioritized more; (ii) corruption allegations; and (iii) reports of extortion attemptsbyKPA.Inallcases,therewasfollowupbyprogramstaffandmostcasesweresolved. MessagesaboutotherBRAreintegrationassistancewerealsofrequentlysentthroughout the ninemonths,andnotablyaccountedforthemajorityofmessagesinDecember.Theseincluded questions from exGAM combatants, amnestied political prisoners, members of former antiseparatist militia, IDPs and ordinary villagers asking about reintegration assistance in general,and,specifically,abouthousingassistanceandDiyat.Thenumberofmessagesoneach issuefluctuatedovertimebutqueriesoverhousingassistancewerethemostfrequent. 6.4 Socialization Thediscussionofthenatureandevolutionofcomplaintsaboveunderlinestheimportanceof socialization. Many concerns and issues stemmed from insufficient understanding by communitiesofprogrammechanisms,andtheywereeventuallysortedoutbysimplycarrying outfurthersocializationactivities.Socializationwasalsocriticalindefusingclaimsfromformer combatantstoashareoftheassistance. BRAKDP'ssocializationstrategy BRAKDPwassocializedthroughthreeprimaryformsofmedia:printmedia,radioandmeetings between program facilitators and beneficiary communities (see Box 6.3). Initial information disseminationtargetedthepublicatlargethroughnewspapers,communityradio,posters,and brochures. Q&A advertorials were published in three different newspapers. Five editions of Ceureumen,abiweeklytabloiddeliveredwiththeBandaAcehbaseddailySerambiIndonesia, provided a fullpage report on the progress of BRAKDP and provided answers to complaints sentbytextmessage.FourepisodesofradiodramaproducedbyalocalNGOwerebroadcast throughouttheprovincetoprovidedetailsoftheprograminahumorousmannerusingeasily understandablelanguage. More targeted socialization activities came in the form of workshops held at the district and subdistrict levels by BRA, KDP provincial and district staff and the World Bank. Districtlevel workshopswereheldbetweenSeptemberandOctober2006intenlocationsclusteringall17 targetdistricts.Intervillagemeetingswereheldinall67subdistricts.Thesegatheringsaimed atsocializingtheprogramtosubdistrictheads(Camat),governmentcoordinationbodies,BRA districtoffices,KPA,religiousfigures,communityleaders,villageheads,military,andpolice. 49 Box6.3SummaryofSocializationActivities 1.PrintedMaterials · 5,000postersonprogramintroduction · 5,000postersontheprogramcycle · 100,000Q&Aleaflets · 2,000flipchartsforvillagelevelsocialization · 3,800copiesofoperationalguidelines 2.Q&ANewspaperAds · SerambiIndonesia(August18andOctober18) · Waspada(August18andOctober18) · Ceureumen(midAugust) 3.RadioDrama · Four episodes broadcast on RRI from October 16 to November 20, three times a week for one episode 4.BiweeklyProgramUpdateinCeureumen 5.UpdatedQ&A · SecondsetofQ&Awasproducedimmediatelytoanswermajorquestionsandtoclarifyconfusing information.CopiesweresenttoallBRAdistrictofficesandKDPfacilitators. 6.Workshops&SocializationMeetings · Districtlevel workshops held between late September and early October in ten locations (representativesfromall17districtsattended) · Subdistrictlevelsocializationmeetings(MADs)wereheldbetweenOctoberandNovemberinall 67subdistricts · Every village held the first village meeting between October and November to socialize the programtocommunitymembers AfollowupsocializationcampaignwaspreparedthatincludedadditionaltrainingtoBRAand KDPfacilitators,distributionofamonthlyprogramnewsletter,additionalQ&Adocuments,and thedevelopmentofatextmessagingsystemforrapiddisseminationofinformation.BRAKDP jointmonthlycoordinationmeetingsstartedinMarch2007toimproveinformationsharingand coordination between BRA and KDP facilitators. These additional socialization efforts helped reduce the amount of inaccurate information disseminated by BRA district offices. In intractable situations where the two parties could not agree on an issue in the field, representatives of BRA, RMU and the World Bank conducted followup missions to help to clarifyissues. Villagemeetingsappeartobethemosteffectivemeansofsocializationatthecommunitylevel (SharpeandSim2009).KDPfacilitatorsnotedthatcommunities'loweducationlevelsandlack of awareness sometimes limited the impact of print media; personal contact was a more effectiveapproachbecausethecommunitycouldhavequestionsansweredimmediately.Field missions also found that communities regarded KDP facilitators as the best source of information. However, depending on verbal socialization alone posed risks. Both quality and 50 quantityofinformationdiminishesasitcascadesdowntheKDPfacilitatorchain.Furthermore, vulnerable and often marginalized groups, including women,wereless likely to attend village meetings. As such, special socialization efforts were required to seek out and engage these groups. Printmediawaseffectiveatthedistrictandsubdistrictlevel,buthadamorelimitedimpactat thecommunitylevel.Thereareseveralreasonsforthis.First,particularlyinruralareas,villages showed a reluctance to read print materials, such as the Q&A advertisements published in newspapers. Acquiring the newspapers required time and money and some community members had difficulties understanding the technical language presented exclusively in Indonesian.Visualaids,suchasflipchartsandposters,weremoreeffectiveatthecommunity level. Radio was the least effective medium. The primary reason for this is that the radio drama episodes were broadcast exclusively by the local station of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI). AlthoughRRIhasabroadcoveragearea,amultitudeoflocalradiostationsreachroughlythe same number of communities throughout Aceh. Research shows that communities exhibit a strong preference for local radio stations rather than public radio (Sharpe and Wall 2007). Airing the radio drama on local as well as public radio stations would most likely have had a greaterimpact. Mobile phones are one communication medium increasingly used by NGOs and the private sectorinIndonesia.RegionalmobilephoneuseisexplodingandphoneownershipinruralAceh is significant. While no concrete data on phone ownership is available, anecdotal evidence suggeststhatvulnerablegroups,includingyouthandformerGAMcombatants,frequentlyown mobile phones. Mobile phones can be used as a twoway communications tool that disseminates information and allows the users of such information to provide feedback. BRAKDP's complaintshandling system allowed communities to channel complaints via text messages with great success. This suggests that mobile communications could be used as an effectivesocializationmedia. Challengestosocializingtheprogram Engaging vulnerable groups such as women and the mostaffected conflict victims required extraordinaryeffortsfromprogramfacilitators.Marginalizedgroupswerelesslikelythanothers toattendprojectsocializationmeetings.Publicspacessuchascoffeeshopsareexclusivelymale environments in Aceh and therefore women are effectively excluded from this information source (Sharpe and Wall 2007). Further, women in rural villages have few opportunities to access television and print media. To compensate for this lack of access to information, program facilitators experimented with organizing informal meetings or women's groups as meansthroughwhichtomoreeffectivelyreachouttowomen. Logistical obstacles in rural areas severely hampered efforts to socialize BRAKDP. Village facilitatorsworkinginremoteareastendedtohavearelativelyweakunderstandingofprogram 51 processes because they often did not attend training sessions held at the subdistrict level because of high transportation costs. This lack of information in turn limited the information thatcouldbepassedontocommunities.Similarly,villagerslivinginremoteareashadlimited access to print media and other sources of information on the program. Because of high transportationcosts,villagersinremoteareaswouldrarelytraveltosubdistrictcenterswhere theycouldaccessnewspaperorvisittheKDPsubdistrictorsubdistrictadministrator'sofficeto request information. In addition, it took longer for print materials, such as posters and flip charts,toreachremoteareas.Insomecasesthesewereonlymadeavailableafterkeymeetings tookplace. Deliveryofprintmaterialswasdelayedandthereforedidnotreachsubdistrictandcommunity levelspriortoMADandMDI.Assuch,subdistrictandvillagefacilitatorswereunabletouse valuablevisualaidsduringthiscrucialstageofthesocializationprocess. Lack of coordination between BRA and KDP personnel at the district level had negative consequencesforthesocializationeffort.Inseveralcases,informationprovidedbyBRAstaffat both the provincial and district levels caused confusion among communities. For example in AcehSelatan,theBRAdistrictofficedistributedflyersrequestingthatcommunitiescontinueto sendindividualproposalsforconflictvictimsassistancetotheoffice.TheBRAdistrictofficealso told communities thatthefundscouldbedisbursedequallytoindividuals without aneedfor proposals.ThisledafewvillagestorejectKDPfacilitators'explanationthatthefundscouldnot bedisbursedequally,bringingtheprojectprocesstoastandstill. "We went to the BRA district office and heard about the program. BRA told me that the [BRAKDP]fundswereforpreviouslysubmittedproposals." ExGAMcombatant,Samaduasubdistrict,AcehSelatan Finally,facilitatorshadalimitedtimespaninwhichtosocializetheprogram.Theywereunder pressuretocompleteprogramsocialization,conflictvictimmapping,andproposalidentification activities so that all disbursements could be made to UPKs by December 2006. As a result, facilitators had to rush socialization activities and could not wait for print materials to arrive. Socialization to all stakeholders requires a significant amount of time and resources but can lead to benefits in terms of greater ease of program implementation and decreased local tensions.Keymessagesmustbereinforcedonnumerousoccasionsandthroughvariousmeans inordertohaveanimpact. 6.5 OneYearafterCompletion:WhatIssuesareIdentifiedbyBeneficiaries? The ARLS, implemented in mid2008, provides a useful indication of what beneficiary communities think about the program a year after its completion. A striking 94 percent of villagers and 97 percent of the mostaffected victims thought the program was generally or veryhelpful(Barronet.al.2009).Thesurveyalsoshowsthatthelevelofcomplaintswasvery low(Figure6.3).Thegreatestcomplaints,madebytwelvepercentofrespondents,wererelated toperceptionsofdiversionsofmoneyandprojectselection.Amongthemostaffectedconflict 52 victims, the main complaint was that the program benefited other groups, such as excombatants,toomuch.Onlytwelvepercentofconflictvictimsfeltthattheydidnotbenefit enoughfromtheprogram.Thisfiguresdropstotenpercentamongthemostaffected. Figure6.3PerceptionsofBRAKDP 100% 100% 90% 90% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% l on fu ir ey s nt ed h im fa le lp rta rti uc on dl op un ict he to m an po m pe tv Ex s lly o lh m ge of lic to h ca ti el ug la ns nf A os tw pi vil no co ET io ty tm no rs ss it e /P it s ve ef no wa ro ts AM ef en Di ac en en s m G tb itie m tb ns ra d no ee tiv no og tio fite gr Ac d ca Pr d ne Di sa Di lo Be Di Al All Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-Affected Victims All Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-Affected Victims Source:Barron,Humphreys,PalerandWeinstein(2009) 53 7. IMPLICATIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS BRAKDP complemented highly targeted reintegration programs designated for former combatants,politicalprisonersandothercategoriesofconflictaffectedgroups.Theprogram's communitydrivenprocessaimedtostrengthensocialcohesionwhilesupportingtheeconomic andsocialreintegrationofcivilianconflictvictims.ThispapershowsthatBRAKDPwaslargely successful in delivering assistance to conflict victims in a swift, transparent and locally appropriate way, and led to welfare improvements in target areas. However, as discussed in detail in the accompanying BRAKDP impact evaluation, the program was less successful in buildingsocialcohesiondespiteitsattempttoengageformercombatantsandvictimsalikein decisionmaking processes related to postconflict reconstruction and recovery. This final sectiondrawsfromthemainfindingsofthepapertoconsiderhowBRAKDPcouldhavebeen moreeffective,providerecommendationsforfuturepostconflictprogramsinAceh,andassess thebroaderimplicationsforDDRtheoryandpractice. 7.1 HowCouldBRAKDPhaveContributedmoreEffectivelytoReintegrationinAceh? While BRAKDP funds intended as compensation produced positive welfare impacts, the programfellshortonseveralothercounts,suchasidentifyingconflictvictimswithinvillages.A lackofcommitmentfromgovernmenttodevolvedecisionsoncompensationtocommunities, and inadequate training for project facilitators and technical assistance to beneficiaries are some of the obstacles that prevented the program from fully achieving its objectives. The recommendationsbelowhighlightwaysinwhichobstaclescouldhavebeenovercomeandmay thereforeberelevanttoCDDandDDRpractitionersoperatinginotherpartsofIndonesiaorin otherconflictaffectedcountriesandregions. Recommendation 1: Encourage government stakeholders to define clear policies and programsfordeliveringcompensation. TheGovernmentofAcehprioritizedthequickdeliveryofcompensationtoformercombatants and conflict victims in order to meet its commitments stipulated in the Helsinki MoU. At the sametime,someofthegovernment'sinternationalpartnersstressedtheneedtomaximizethe developmental impacts of the compensation and encouraged the use of mechanisms such as BRAKDP to achieve both objectives. While the government used BRAKDP to channel assistancetoconflictvictims,therewasneveraclearpolicystatementthatassistancedelivered throughtheprogramwouldfulfillthegovernment'sobligationtocompensateconflictvictims. The failure to clearly articulate the program's policy objective visàvis the Helsinki MoU resulted in tensions and the dissemination of conflicting messages during project implementation. Conflict victims with high expectations of being compensated did not understandwhytheywererequiredtosubmitaproposalinordertoobtainassistancethrough BRAKDP. Conflicting instructions were issued by KDP facilitators and BRA counterparts over howprogramfundscouldbeused.Thelackofaclearpolicystancedamagedthecredibilityof BRAandhinderedtheimplementationofBRAKDP. 54 Recommendation2:Provideprogramfacilitatorswiththeskillsandtoolsneededtofacilitate aprocessofidentifyingconflictvictimswithinvillages. BRAKDPleveragedanetworkofexperiencedKDPdistrictandsubdistrictfacilitatorswhowere embeddedincommunitiesandfamiliarwithlocalconflictdynamics.KDPfacilitatorswerehighly adeptatfacilitatingaprocessofmanagedcompetitionthroughwhichKDPprogramfundsare allocatedacrossvillagelevelinfrastructureprojects.TheseskillsbenefitedBRAKDP,asonlya handful of programrelated conflicts resulted in violence or the destruction of property. However, the KDP facilitators were ill equipped to guide communities through a process of identifyingconflictvictims.Facilitatorshadneverundertakensuchaprocessbefore,andwere unfamiliarwithconceptsofvictimhood,compensation,andreconciliationandhowthesecould beappliedwithinthecontextofKDP.TheprogramusedBRA'sbroadcriteriatodefineconflict victims and claims for compensation were widespread. Further complicating matters, the subjectofvictimhoodwasasensitiveandpainfulonewithincommunities,andconflictvictims were reluctant to publicly identify themselves, or even to discuss the matter, without prompting. Identifying conflict victims may have been more successful had it been linked with a broader processofcommunitylevelhealingandreconciliation.Adiverserangeofpeacebuildingskills, ranging from conflict resolution to social psychology, would be needed to facilitate such a process.Whileitisunrealistictoexpectallorevenamajorityoffacilitatorswithinaprogramof thescaleofBRAKDPtopossesssuchskills,ataminimumtheyshouldhaveabasicknowledge ofconflictresolutiontechniques,includingmediationandnegotiation,andbeprovidedwitha clearsetofcriteriaforidentifyingconflictvictims. Recommendation3:Provideamechanismandsafeguardsthroughwhichformercombatants areabletobenefitfromBRAKDPassistance. Chapter 4 points out the importance of allowing all groups, including former combatants, to accesstheprogramregardlessofotherobjectives.ForBRAKDP,definingamechanismthrough which to provide benefits to former combatants was difficult given that former combatants were entitled to large amounts of support through separate targeted programs. Priority was rightly given to noncombatants who lacked other sources of assistance. However, given the poordeliveryofgovernmentprogramstargetingformercombatants,manyoftherankandfile received little to nothing, and therefore had legitimate claims for assistance at the time BRAKDPwasimplemented. One strategy to provide former combatants access to program benefits would be to define targetingcriteriasolelyonvictimhoodratherthanstructureprogrammingbyotherconflictera identities.Insuchascenario,formercombatantswouldbeeligibleforassistanceprovidedthat they could demonstrate an extraordinary need that had not been met by other government reintegration programs. Safeguards to prevent program capture by former combatants might includereachingouttoformercombatantleadershiptosocializetheprogram'sprioritizationof noncombatantsandcrosscheckingBRAbeneficiaryliststoavoidoverlap. 55 Recommendation 4: Provide high quality technical assistance to victims in support of the privategoodsdeliveredthroughBRAKDP,includingbuildinglinkagestotrainingandsources ofcapital. BRAKDPledtoclearwelfareimprovementsintargetsubdistrictsandvillages.Thisfindingisin some ways surprising given that the KDP program structure is better suited to support infrastructure subprojects, while BRAKDP funding was overwhelmingly used for smallscale livelihoods activities. As KDP facilitators did not have the experience or resources needed to provide training and followup support for these livelihoods activities, some stakeholders feared that BRAKDP funding would be used only for shortterm consumption. In reality, the largest proportion of BRAKDP funding was used for productive investments in agriculture, livestock,andothersmallscaleeconomicactivities.ThissuggeststhatBRAKDPwelfareimpacts couldhavebeenevengreateriftheprogramhadbeenabletolinkbeneficiarieswithaccessto trainingandothersourcesofcapital. 7.2 What'sNextforCommunityBasedReintegrationandPostConflictRecoveryinAceh? A recent study of postconflict recovery in Aceh shows that the needs of former combatants andconflictvictimshaveevolvedsignificantlysinceBRAKDPwasconceivedandimplemented in 2006 (MSR 2009). Aceh has benefited from solid levels of economic growth driven by tsunami reconstruction over the last four years. Former combatants have by and large reintegrated successfully into political and social life and most now benefit from fulltime employment.However,certaingroups,suchasformercombatantsaged3645,womenheaded households and displaced persons, have not benefited proportional to others and are vulnerable to economic shocks. Moving forward, inclusive economic growth rather than targetedreintegrationprogramsisneededtogeneratesustainablelivelihoodsandsustainthe socialandeconomicimprovementsofthepastfouryears(MSR2009). The Government of Aceh should use the substantial resources at its disposal to promote inclusive growth by providing public goods through investments in agriculture and rural infrastructure,encouragingregulatoryandsecurityenvironmentsthatarefavorabletoprivate investment, and offering programs and services to vulnerable groups. The following recommendationsoutlinewaysinwhichprogramslikeBRAKDPcansupportinclusivegrowth. Recommendation 5: The Government of Aceh should continue to leverage PNPM's communitydrivenmechanismtochannelassistancetoruralvillages. In 2009, the Government of Aceh will deliver the first round of the Bantuan Keuangan Pemakmur Gampong (Financial Assistance for Village Development --BKPG) program. This program, which is financed from provincial and district budgets, will deliver approximately US$15,000toeveryvillageinAceheachyearforthenextthreeyears.BKPGoffersanexcellent opportunityforvillagesthatmightotherwisemissoutonothersourcesofassistance,including regular PNPM, to meet pressing infrastructure needs. Similar to BRAKDP, BKPG grants are delivered at the village level, thereby eliminating competition for funding across villages. The 56 communitydriven approach that delivers public goods will ensure that benefits are spread widelyratherthantargetedtospecificgroups. Recommendation6:Exploreopportunitiestotargetanddeliverprivategoodstovulnerable groupsthroughBKPG. In 2009, PNPM and BKPG will channel around US$ 130 million to villages in Aceh. Around US$100millionofthiswillbedeliveredatthevillagelevelthroughBKPG.Whileinfrastructure needsarehighinmanypartsoftheprovince,particularlyinruralareas,theconcentrationof largeamountsoffundingatthevillagelevelwillencouragevillagestoprioritizeneedsthatgo beyondinfrastructureandotherpublicgoods.Villagesshouldbeencouragedtoprioritizethe needsofvulnerablegroupsanddeliverbenefitsintheformofprivategoodsthroughBKPG.The Government of Aceh should consider piloting an approach similar to BRAKDP that expands BKPG's project menu to include private goods for vulnerable groups. Key elements of this approach would include an open menu that includes private goods, criteria for identifying vulnerable groups, and specialized technical assistance to smallscale economic activities initiatedbyprogrambeneficiaries.Thegovernmentcouldchanneladditionalfundingtoareas whereitwishestopilotsuchanapproach,orsimplyusefundsthathavealreadybeenallocated forBKPG. Recommendation 7: Policymakers should use welfare indicators rather than conflictera identitiestotargetfutureprograms. Therehavebeenliterallyhundredsofgovernmentanddonorsupportedpostconflictprograms implemented in Aceh, many of which have targeted the needs of former combatants. While overallformercombatantsarereportinghighlevelsofemployment,thereislittleevidenceto suggestthathighlytargetedprogramshaveledtosignificantwelfareimprovementsacrossall groups of former combatants (MSR 2009). Nearly four years on from the signature of the Helsinki MoU, programs that deliver assistance based on conflictera identities will further harden these identities and ultimately undermine social cohesion. There is little if any justificationtocontinueprogramsthattargetspecificgroupsbasedonconflicteraidentities. Thisisnottosuggestthatsomeformercombatantsandconflictvictimsdonotrequirefurther assistance. Lower levels of welfare tend to correlate with characteristics such as age, gender, unemployment,andassetlevels(MSR2009).Policymakersshouldthereforeusesuchcriteriato targetprogramsinordertoassistvulnerablepeoplefromarangeofgroupsincluding former combatants,conflictvictims,anddisplacedpersons. 7.3 ImplicationsforDDRTheoryandPractice BRAKDP emerged from a growing consensus amongst DDR practitioners that the needs of victims must be addressed in addition to the needs of former combatants in order for communities to reconcile and heal. DDR programs that focus solely on providing cash and inkind assistance as incentives for combatants to lay down their arms ignore the needs of 57 civilians who suffer greatly as a result of the conflict, and face major challenges in rebuilding their lives. This can create jealousies within the noncombatant population, damage social cohesion,andunderminetheprocessofreintegratingformercombatants.Giventhattargeted programs were provided to former combatants and other groups, BRAKDP's policy was to assistcivilianconflictvictimsonly. Recommendation8:Communitybased/drivenreintegrationprogramsthataimtostrengthen social cohesion should avoid program rules that exclude specific groups, including former combatants,asprogrambeneficiaries. Findings from the accompanying impact evaluation show that BRAKDP had marginal impacts onsocialcohesion(Barronet.al.2009).Surprisingly,communitiesinprogramareaswereless likely to accept former combatants than they would have been if they had not received the program.Thefindingspresentedinthispapershowthatthisnegativefindingisverylikelydue to the decision to exclude former combatants as direct beneficiaries. Findings from the evaluation and the supervision missions showed that acceptance of former combatants was higher in communities in which former combatants actually benefited directly from BRAKDP assistance. This suggests that relaxing program rules to allow former combatants to benefit directlyfromtheprogramcontributedpositivelytosocialcohesion. DDR practitioners, particularly those that are designing or overseeing programs that apply communitybasedandcommunitydrivenmechanisms,shouldconsiderthepotentiallynegative impacts on social cohesion when deciding whether or not to restrict access to benefits for groupssuchasformercombatants. Recommendation 9: Under the right conditions, communitybased/driven reintegration programs can deliver `emergency' compensation in ways that maximize developmental impacts. DDRprogramsgenerallyfollowasequenceinwhichcompensation/reparationsaredeliveredto combatantsandvictimsimmediatelyfollowingapeaceagreement.This`emergency'phaseof DDRprioritizesthepoliticalimportanceofthedeliveryofthesecashorinkindpaymentsover the impacts that these resources may have on the wellbeing of the individuals that receive them. Programs with broader development objectives, such as the reconstruction of infrastructure and provision of sustainable livelihoods, generally come after the `emergency' phaseiscompleted(UNDDR2006). DDR in Aceh followed a similar sequence (Barron 2009). The Helsinki MoU mandated the compensation of combatants and victims, after which broader `economic empowerment' programs would be delivered. Compensation to former combatants was delivered through a topdownmechanisminwhichpaymentsweremadedirectlyfromthegovernmenttoformer combatants through the KPA. Minimal efforts were made by the government to track how muchcompensationwasreceivedandbywhom,muchlesswhetherthefundswereusedfor productive purposes (Zurstrassen 2006). BRAKDP by contrast attempted to compensate 58 conflictvictimsinawaythataimedtomaximizedevelopmentalimpacts.Theprogramdidsoby devolving decisionmaking authority over who is entitled to compensation to communities, linkingthedeliveryofcompensationtothesubmissionofsubprojectproposals,andproviding TAtohelpcommunitiesusefundsforviablesmallscaleeconomicactivities.While,asdiscussed in Section 7.1, each of these mechanisms had its shortcomings, findings from the impact evaluation show that the program had positive impacts on welfare. The majority of project fundswereusedforproductivepurposesasopposedtooneoffconsumption.Ultimately,itwas thecommunitydrivenmechanismforidentifyingvictimsthatprovedpoliticallyunacceptableto theBRA.BRApreferredatopdownapproachinwhichcompensationwastransferreddirectly tovictimsthatwereidentifiedbydistrictlevelverificationteams. BRAKDP shows that it is not necessary in all cases to separate programs that deliver `emergency'compensationfromprogramswithbroaderdevelopmentaims.Communitybased and communitydriven reintegration programs can deliver compensation in ways that have positivewelfareimpactsonthosebeingcompensated.Thekeytothesuccessofthisapproach lies with the political will of national and local governments to allow communities to decide whodeservescompensationandwhatformthecompensationshouldtake. 59 References Aspinall,Edward(2009)."CombatantstoContractors:ThePoliticalEconomyofPeaceinAceh." Indonesia75:134. Barron, Patrick (2009). "The Limits of DDR: Reintegration Lessons from Aceh" in Small Arms Survey,SmallArmsSurveyYearbook2009.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Barron,PatrickandAdamBurke(2008)."SupportingPeaceinAceh:DevelopmentAgenciesand InternationalInvolvement."PolicyStudiesNo.47.Washington,D.C:EastWestCenter. Barron,Patrick,SamuelClarkandMuslahuddinDaud(2005)."ConflictandRecoveryinAceh:An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process." Jakarta: DecentralizationSupportFacility. Barron,Patrick,RachaelDiproseandMichaelWoolcock(2006)."LocalConflictandCommunity Development in Indonesia: Assessing the Impact of the Kecamatan Development Program." IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.10.Jakarta:WorldBank. Barron, Patrick, Macartan Humphreys, Laura Paler and Jeremy Weinstein (2009). "CommunityBasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactofBRAKDP."IndonesianSocial DevelopmentPaperNo.12.Jakarta:WorldBank. BRA (Aceh Reintegration Agency) (2008). Economic Section Update. Unpublished document. November. Collier, Paul et al. (2003). "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy". Washington,D.C.:WorldBankandOxfordUniversityPress. ForbesDamaiAceh(2007a).Update.5June.Unpublisheddocument. ForbesDamaiAceh(2007b).Update.October.Unpublisheddocument. MSR(2009). "MultiStakeholder Reviewof PostConflict Programmingin Aceh:Identifying the FoundationsforSustainablePeaceandDevelopmentinAceh".BandaAceh/Jakarta:MSR. GovernmentofIndonesiaandFreeAcehMovement(2005)."MemorandumofUnderstanding betweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofIndonesiaandtheFreeAcehMovement".Helsinki. 60 Sharpe, Joanne and Sim Kok Eng Amy (2009). "Promoting Peace: Communications, Public Outreach and Socialization of the Aceh Peace Process." Indonesian Social Development Paper No.17.Jakarta:WorldBank. Sharpe, Joanne and Imogen Wall (2007). "Media Mapping: Understanding Communications EnvironmentsinAceh."IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.9.Jakarta:WorldBank/DSF. UNDDR (United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center) (2006). "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards". New York: UNDDR. World Bank (2006). GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through CommunityLevelDevelopmentProgramming.BandaAceh/Jakarta:WorldBank. Zurstrassen, Matthew (2006). "An Evaluation of BRA Support to Former Combatants". UnpublishedWorldBankevaluationreportforBRA.10September. 61 ANNEXA:LISTOF2006TARGETSUBDISTRICTSANDALLOCATIONS No. Kabupaten Subdistrict #Villages Population Intensity Allocation 1 AcehBarat SAMATIGA 34 17,118 LOW 2,410,000,000 2 AcehBaratDaya BABAHROT 7 16,243 MEDIUM 840,000,000 3 AcehBaratDaya TANGANTANGAN 21 17,272 LOW 1,580,000,000 4 AcehBesar MESJIDRAYA 13 12,451 LOW 970,000,000 5 AcehBesar KRUENGBARONAJAYA 12 12,865 LOW 910,000,000 6 AcehBesar DARUSSALAM 29 19,508 LOW 2,020,000,000 7 AcehBesar SUKAMAKMUR 35 12,537 LOW 2,350,000,000 8 AcehJaya KRUENGSABEE 17 15,477 MEDIUM 1,840,000,000 9 AcehSelatan KLUETTIMUR 7 8,925 MEDIUM 800,000,000 10 AcehSelatan TAPAKTUAN 15 19,308 MEDIUM 1,700,000,000 11 AcehSelatan SAMADUA 27 15,282 MEDIUM 2,800,000,000 12 AcehSelatan KLUETSELATAN 17 12,538 LOW 1,210,000,000 13 AcehSingkil LONGKIP 10 4,531 LOW 690,000,000 14 AcehSingkil SULTANDAULAT 17 12,065 LOW 1,240,000,000 15 AcehTamiang MANYAKPAYED 36 26,774 MEDIUM 3,880,000,000 16 AcehTengah KEBAYAKAN 19 12,891 LOW 1,380,000,000 17 AcehTengah LAUTTAWAR 15 17,605 LOW 1,130,000,000 18 AcehTenggara LAWEALAS 23 14,390 LOW 1,690,000,000 19 AcehTimur BANDAALAM 16 8,521 HIGH 2,240,000,000 20 AcehTimur JULOK 35 21,559 HIGH 5,140,000,000 21 AcehTimur RANTAUSELAMAT 14 16,248 HIGH 2,280,000,000 22 AcehTimur PEUREULAKBARAT 11 9,672 HIGH 1,740,000,000 23 AcehTimur PEUREULAK 33 30,658 HIGH 5,200,000,000 24 AcehTimur PANTEBIDARI 23 21,403 HIGH 3,610,000,000 25 AcehTimur INDRAMAKMU 5 3,289 HIGH 760,000,000 26 AcehTimur SIMPANGULIM 23 5,051 HIGH 2,890,000,000 62 27 AcehTimur PEUDAWA 17 9,836 HIGH 2,510,000,000 28 AcehTimur IDITUNONG 25 8,651 HIGH 3,290,000,000 29 AcehTimur MADAT 26 22,265 HIGH 4,110,000,000 30 AcehTimur RANTAUPEUREULAK 22 29,887 HIGH 3,410,000,000 31 AcehTimur NURUSSALAM 42 17,352 HIGH 5,860,000,000 32 AcehTimur DARULAMAN 45 15,054 HIGH 5,970,000,000 33 AcehUtara LANGKAHAN 23 13,159 HIGH 3,430,000,000 34 AcehUtara SAWANG 39 26,212 HIGH 5,930,000,000 35 AcehUtara NISAM 44 34,264 HIGH 6,900,000,000 36 AcehUtara SIMPANGKEURAMAT 16 9,098 HIGH 2,390,000,000 37 AcehUtara SEUNUDON 33 22,881 HIGH 5,150,000,000 38 AcehUtara SYAMTALIRABAYU 49 19,627 HIGH 6,630,000,000 39 AcehUtara KUTAMAKMUR 39 18,660 HIGH 5,540,000,000 40 AcehUtara MATANGKULI 72 25,120 HIGH 9,730,000,000 41 AcehUtara PAYABAKONG 39 12,097 HIGH 5,160,000,000 42 AcehUtara BAKTIYABARAT 27 16,942 HIGH 4,020,000,000 43 BenerMeriah PINTORAMEGAYO 5 4,087 MEDIUM 540,000,000 44 BenerMeriah TIMANGGAJAH 15 26,641 MEDIUM 1,720,000,000 45 BenerMeriah SYIAHUTAMA 16 8,696 LOW 1,060,000,000 46 Bireuen PEUDADA 44 24,910 HIGH 6,570,000,000 47 Bireuen PEUSANGANSIBLAH 19 10,525 HIGH 2,940,000,000 KRUENG 48 Bireuen PEUSANGANSELATAN 19 11,181 HIGH 2,820,000,000 49 Bireuen GANDAPURA 38 15,109 HIGH 5,340,000,000 50 Bireuen SAMALANGA 46 23,017 HIGH 6,650,000,000 51 Bireuen MAKMUR 26 13,021 HIGH 3,800,000,000 52 Bireuen JEUMPA 40 30,760 HIGH 6,390,000,000 53 Bireuen JEUNIEB 39 20,655 HIGH 5,780,000,000 54 Bireuen JULI 21 24,443 HIGH 3,420,000,000 63 55 Bireuen JANGKA 45 25,639 MEDIUM 4,620,000,000 56 GayoLues TERANGON 16 9,916 HIGH 2,350,000,000 57 GayoLues PINDING 9 4,664 MEDIUM 880,000,000 58 NaganRaya SEUNAGANTIMUR 35 11,025 HIGH 4,710,000,000 59 NaganRaya BEUTONG 28 10,618 MEDIUM 2,600,000,000 60 Pidie MILA 20 11,937 HIGH 3,100,000,000 61 Pidie GEULUMPANGBARO 21 9,346 MEDIUM 2,080,000,000 62 Pidie MANE 4 9,064 HIGH 680,000,000 63 Pidie BANDARDUA 45 18,631 HIGH 6,310,000,000 64 Pidie SAKTI 49 20,501 MEDIUM 4,680,000,000 65 Pidie GEUMPANG 5 6,740 HIGH 830,000,000 66 Pidie TITEU/KEUMALA 31 14,411 MEDIUM 3,080,000,000 67 Simeulue TEUPAHSELATAN 16 6,780 LOW 1,100,000,000 1,724 217,380,000,000 64 ANNEXB:SUPERVISIONMISSIONSTIMINGANDTARGETLOCATIONS Supervision No. Kabupaten SubDistrict Intensity Allocation Nov06 Mar07 Sep07 1 AcehBarat SAMATIGA LOW 2,410,000,000 2 AcehBaratDaya BABAHROT MEDIUM 840,000,000 3 AcehBaratDaya TANGANTANGAN LOW 1,580,000,000 4 AcehBesar MESJIDRAYA LOW 970,000,000 5 AcehBesar KRUENGBARONAJAYA LOW 910,000,000 6 AcehBesar DARUSSALAM LOW 2,020,000,000 7 AcehBesar SUKAMAKMUR LOW 2,350,000,000 8 AcehJaya KRUENGSABEE MEDIUM 1,840,000,000 9 AcehSelatan KLUETTIMUR MEDIUM 800,000,000 10 AcehSelatan TAPAKTUAN MEDIUM 1,700,000,000 11 AcehSelatan SAMADUA MEDIUM 2,800,000,000 12 AcehSelatan KLUETSELATAN LOW 1,210,000,000 13 AcehSingkil LONGKIP LOW 690,000,000 14 AcehSingkil SULTANDAULAT LOW 1,240,000,000 15 AcehTamiang MANYAKPAYED MEDIUM 3,880,000,000 16 AcehTengah KEBAYAKAN LOW 1,380,000,000 17 AcehTengah LAUTTAWAR LOW 1,130,000,000 18 AcehTenggara LAWEALAS LOW 1,690,000,000 19 AcehTimur BANDAALAM HIGH 2,240,000,000 20 AcehTimur JULOK HIGH 5,140,000,000 21 AcehTimur RANTAUSELAMAT HIGH 2,280,000,000 22 AcehTimur PEUREULAKBARAT HIGH 1,740,000,000 23 AcehTimur PEUREULAK HIGH 5,200,000,000 24 AcehTimur PANTEBIDARI HIGH 3,610,000,000 25 AcehTimur INDRAMAKMU HIGH 760,000,000 65 26 AcehTimur SIMPANGULIM HIGH 2,890,000,000 27 AcehTimur PEUDAWA HIGH 2,510,000,000 28 AcehTimur IDITUNONG HIGH 3,290,000,000 29 AcehTimur MADAT HIGH 4,110,000,000 30 AcehTimur RANTAUPEUREULAK HIGH 3,410,000,000 31 AcehTimur NURUSSALAM HIGH 5,860,000,000 32 AcehTimur DARULAMAN HIGH 5,970,000,000 33 AcehUtara LANGKAHAN HIGH 3,430,000,000 34 AcehUtara SAWANG HIGH 5,930,000,000 35 AcehUtara NISAM HIGH 6,900,000,000 36 AcehUtara SIMPANGKEURAMAT HIGH 2,390,000,000 37 AcehUtara SEUNUDON HIGH 5,150,000,000 38 AcehUtara SYAMTALIRABAYU HIGH 6,630,000,000 39 AcehUtara KUTAMAKMUR HIGH 5,540,000,000 40 AcehUtara MATANGKULI HIGH 9,730,000,000 41 AcehUtara PAYABAKONG HIGH 5,160,000,000 42 AcehUtara BAKTIYABARAT HIGH 4,020,000,000 43 BenerMeriah PINTORAMEGAYO MEDIUM 540,000,000 44 BenerMeriah TIMANGGAJAH MEDIUM 1,720,000,000 45 BenerMeriah SYIAHUTAMA LOW 1,060,000,000 46 Bireuen PEUDADA HIGH 6,570,000,000 47 Bireuen P.SIBLAHKRUENG HIGH 2,940,000,000 48 Bireuen PEUSANGANSELATAN HIGH 2,820,000,000 49 Bireuen GANDAPURA HIGH 5,340,000,000 50 Bireuen SAMALANGA HIGH 6,650,000,000 51 Bireuen MAKMUR HIGH 3,800,000,000 52 Bireuen JEUMPA HIGH 6,390,000,000 53 Bireuen JEUNIEB HIGH 5,780,000,000 54 Bireuen JULI HIGH 3,420,000,000 66 55 Bireuen JANGKA MEDIUM 4,620,000,000 56 GayoLues TERANGON HIGH 2,350,000,000 57 GayoLues PINDING MEDIUM 880,000,000 58 NaganRaya SEUNAGANTIMUR HIGH 4,710,000,000 59 NaganRaya BEUTONG MEDIUM 2,600,000,000 60 Pidie MILA HIGH 3,100,000,000 61 Pidie GEULUMPANGBARO MEDIUM 2,080,000,000 62 Pidie MANE HIGH 680,000,000 63 Pidie BANDARDUA HIGH 6,310,000,000 64 Pidie SAKTI MEDIUM 4,680,000,000 65 Pidie GEUMPANG HIGH 830,000,000 66 Pidie TITEU/KEUMALA MEDIUM 3,080,000,000 67 Simeulue TEUPAHSELATAN LOW 1,100,000,000 67 ANNEXC:COMPLAINTSHANDLINGFLOWCHART Complaints/Problems Categorizeandregisterinto BRAKDPdatabase Crosscheck/ Clarification Correct Incorrect IfproblemsrelatedtoBRA, Classifyproblemstobehandledthrough consultwithBRAPIU. BRAKDPorBRA (Category5problems) KeyActorsforcomplaints Actiontaking/ handling Intervention Consideranothercourse ofaction Solved NotSolved ComplaintsHandlingSpecialistto disseminate/reporttheprogressand resultsofhandledcomplaints& recordfinaloutcomeindatabase 68 IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers No. Title Authors(s) Date 1 The Dynamics of District Governance: Forums, Budget Processes and LuthfiAshari May04 Transparency Dynamika Pemerintahan Kabupaten: Forum, Perencanaan Anggaran danTransparenci 2 ViolenceandConflictResolutioninNonConflictRegions:TheCaseof PatrickBarron Aug04 Lampung,Indonesia DavidMadden 3 Mobilizing for Violence: The Escalation and Limitation of Identity YuhkiTajima Aug04 Conflicts 4 More Than Just Ownership: Ten Land and Natural Resource Conflict SamuelClark(ed.) Dec04 CaseStudiesfromEastJavaandFlores Bukan Sekedar Persoalan Kepemilikan: Sepuluh Studi Kasus Konflik TanahdanSunberDayaAlamdariJawaTimurdanFlores 5 Crisis, Social Ties, and Household Welfare: Testing Social Capital AnnaWetterberg Apr05 TheorywithEvidenceFromIndonesia 6 Village Corruption in Indonesia: Fighting Corruption in Indonesia's AndreaWoodhouse Apr05 KecamatanDevelopmentProgram 7 CountingConflicts:UsingNewspaperReportstoUnderstandViolence PatrickBarron May05 inIndonesia JoanneSharpe 8 Aceh:ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment AdamBurke Oct05 Afnan 9 Media Mapping: Understanding Communications Environments in JoanneSharpe Apr07 Aceh ImogenWall 10 Conflict and Community Development in Indonesia: Assessing the PatrickBarron Jul06 ImpactoftheKecamatanDevelopmentProgram RachaelDiprose MichaelWoolcock 11 Peaceful Pilkada, Dubious Democracy: Understanding Aceh's SamuelClark Aug08 PostConflictElections BlairPalmer 12 CommunityBased Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the Impacts of PatrickBarron Dec09 BRAKDP MacartanHumphreys LauraPaler JeremyWeinstein 13 DeliveringAssistancetoConflictAffectedCommunities:TheBRAKDP AdrianMorel Dec09 PrograminAceh MakikoWatanabe RobWrobel Papersareavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org 69 Halaman terakhir isi Bagian dalam cover belakang