

ICR Review
Operations Evaluation Department

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| 1. Project Data: | Date Posted : 05/04/2004 | | |
| PROJ ID : P062668 | Appraisal | Actual | |
| Project Name : Oecs Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management | Project Costs 10.85 | 10.20 | |
| | US\$M) | | |
| | (US\$M) | | |
| Program | | | |
| Country : St. Kitts & Nevis | Loan/ | | |
| | Loan US\$M) 8.50 | | |
| | /Credit (US\$M) | 8.50 | |
| Sector (s): Board: PSD - Central government administration | Cofinancing 1.50 | 0.84 | |
| | US\$M) | | |
| | (US\$M) | | |
| (20%), Power (20%), Other social services (20%), General water sanitation and flood protection sec (20%), General transportation sector (20%) | | | |
| L/C Number : L4418 | | | |
| | Board Approval | 99 | |
| | FY) | | |
| | (FY) | | |
| Partners involved : ROC, CDB, EU, CIDA, OAS, PAHO | Closing Date 01/31/2002 | 10/31/2003 | |

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

In September 1998, Hurricane Georges struck the St . Kitts and Nevis, resulting in loss of life as well as serious economic and infrastructure damage . The project financed structural and nonstructural measures to protect people, infrastructure and property from future hurricane damage . APL1 was the first phase of a program (described in subsection 2c) designed to support immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation, disaster mitigation works, and institutional strengthening not only in St . Kitts and Nevis, but also in St. Lucia and Dominica. The program aimed to support the physical and institutional efforts of the five member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and to strengthen disaster recovery capacity and emergency preparedness management . There were three overarching development objectives of the project in St. Kitts & Nevis: 1) to reconstruct and rehabilitate key social and economic infrastructure to allow quick recovery (post-disaster works); 2) to strengthen key economic and social infrastructure with the aim of reducing potential future disruption (disaster prevention); and 3) to

strengthen the country's institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies in an efficient and effective manner.

b. Components

There were seven components (appraisal estimated costs in parentheses):

1. A Fast Disbursing Component (US\$ 2.4 million) provided import finance from a positive list of items required for recovery from Hurricane Georges . Essential imports could be financed retroactively up to a maximum of 20% of the total loan amount.
2. Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works (US\$ 5.35 million) entailed reconstruction/rehabilitation of hospitals, roads, power systems and storage facilities, roads and coastal protection, and relevant studies .
3. Strengthening the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC, US\$ 1.45 million) consisted of the construction EOC to earthquake - and hurricane-resistant standards (for NEMA).
4. Developing an Effective Early Warning System (US\$ 0.21 million) included the purchase of equipment destroyed during the hurricane and other logistical support for the National Meteorological Service (NMS).
5. The Community Based Disaster Management . (US\$ 0.11 million) subcomponent provided organization, training and support for new and existing District Disaster Committees (tasked with mobilizing and educating communities in disaster preparedness and recovery).
6. Institutional Strengthening (US\$ 0.28 million) focused primarily on hazard analysis and vulnerability mapping . Identify hazards and vulnerable sites for future mitigation activities and to set appropriate standards for development planning.

□ 7. Project Management (US\$ 0.52 million).

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

The Bank opted to set up a regional facility to address disaster risks rather than a series of emergency operations with individual countries, and individual loans were not set up for the five countries involved in the program . Because of the speed with which the project was appraised, however, much of the detailed preparation had to be undertaken after appraisal. The typical APL approach was modified to provide an horizontal dimension that would allow countries to join in different phases based on their stages of preparation (APL 1-3). At the same time, a contingent facility was set up with allowance for post- catastrophe mitigation work that could be called upon in the event of a natural disaster during project implementation (APL4). APL2 was to support activities in Grenada, St . Vincent, and the Grenadines. APL3 was to focus on additional physical investments identified through hazard mapping analysis and was to provide further long term institutional strengthening . Funding for this phase was eventually allocated to APL 2, and, as a result, APL3 did not materialize. APL4 funding remains available until the completion of APL 2, expected for January 2006.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project strengthened economic and social infrastructure which should help to minimize damage and

reduce the disruption of economic activity following the next major hurricane (objective 1). It also reconstructed and rehabilitated infrastructure to facilitate a speedy recovery from Hurricane Georges (objective 2). And it effectively strengthened the country's institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to emergencies (objective 3). Project achievements include:

Studies of road and coastal protection works have been prepared for implementation in the future (objective 1).

Hospital workers were given preparedness training (objective 1).

National Meteorological Service staff and communities were trained in disaster preparedness (USAID) (objective 1).

Emergency shelters have been built or reinforced (objective 2).

The airport tower in St. Kitts has been rehabilitated (with bilateral assistance) (objective 2).

An Emergency Operations Center has been constructed and provided with emergency equipment (objective 2).

An island-wide communications center has been established (objective 3)

Hazard mapping, building vulnerability reduction and building code improvements were provided (objective 3).

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

The project has helped to increase awareness of disaster risk management . This is not only due to physical works, but also to the institutional development and public consciousness raising . With the establishment of the National

Disaster Mitigation Council, disaster preparedness and management are now more in the public eye .

Other specific

noteworthy outcomes include:

The fast disbursing component was fully disbursed eight months after effectiveness .

Water and electricity supplies have been made more secure .

A new hospital wing has been built using hurricane resistant techniques .

Hurricane Lenny struck St. Kitts and Nevis in November 1999. Following the destruction caused by that event, the

studies of roads and coastal protection were focused more precisely on the demonstrated needs .

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

The study to improve water intakes in Nevis was postponed . The planned upgrading of meteorological systems did

not take place as planned .

| 6. Ratings : | ICR | OED Review | Reason for Disagreement /Comments |
|----------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|
| Outcome : | Satisfactory | Satisfactory | |
| Institutional Dev .: | Substantial | Substantial | |
| Sustainability : | Likely | Likely | |
| Bank Performance : | Satisfactory | Satisfactory | |
| Borrower Perf .: | Satisfactory | Satisfactory | |
| Quality of ICR : | | Satisfactory | |

NOTE:

NOTE ICR rating values flagged with ' * ' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

1. Reconstruction components often require careful assessment and a longer -term effort that generally extends the implementation period beyond the normal three years stipulated for Bank -assisted emergency operations (ERLs).

2. If major works are included in an emergency project, there should be an explicit provision at the design

stage for a review of project scope after designs have been prepared . In this particular case, it would have been more practical to separate the actual emergency operation, which would have included quick - disbursing components and technical assistance, and have the actual reconstruction works financed by a standard investment loan in a later phase .

3. Processing loans and/or credits for different (in this case, OECS) countries as separate projects, even if they are part of a broader program, may be preferable to integrating them into one horizontal APL . The Bank system does not

☐ allow for a segregation of reporting and accounting on individual sub -projects (because APL phases each correspond to one project with one P 0 number).

4. The implementation capacity of post -disaster Project Coordinating Units is slow to develop in most cases .

5. In projects lacking a critical mass of work it is difficult for governments to allocate enough of their scarce qualified manpower to Project Coordinating units .

6. TORs for consulting engineers need to specify government budget constraints to avoid over -designed infrastructure that will be unaffordable and therefore impossible to implement .

7. In emergency projects with short implementation periods (and where delays can compromise timely completion), the Bank needs to consider requiring performance guarantees of consultants and applying penalties for late submissions.

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

Why? The approach taken by the OECS countries (mitigation) is of great interest to the ongoing OED study of Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction .

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR strikes a good balance between accountability and lesson learning, always a challenge for a review of an

APL experience. The ICR is inconsistent with the PAD with respect to expected cofinancing, reporting it as zero --in

the PAD it is anticipated that US\$1.5 million will be provided by cofinanciers . The borrower's contribution to the

report is also inconsistent with the Bank -prepared sections in this respect, seeming to report cofinanciers' actual

contribution commingled with grants received (at the anticipated amount, versus the Annex 2 figure of US\$0.84

million.

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