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                 Strengthening Bangladesh’s Public Service Commission

1.      Context
1.1     Bangladesh’s Public Service Commission (PSC) is a constitutionally mandated custodian
of merit-based recruitment to the civil service. In practice, however, it is perceived to be a weak
organization that has not always well-managed the recruitment process. Since the 1990s the
media has reported politicized appointment of its members. Recently there have been allegations
of examination irregularities, including leakage of question papers of the civil service
examinations.
1.2     The management of the PSC and its role in civil service recruitment has departed from
comparative administrative practice. This note argues that the PSC’s independence from
micromanagement by the executive, and its improved management of the civil service
examination are critical for its credibility to uphold the merit principle. It lists short- and medium-
term actions that could help in restoring the PSC’s intended role and functions.

2.      Role of Public Service Commissions
2.1     PSCs are common in administrative traditions where the appointed executive is meant to
be permanent, politically neutral and unaligned to any particular political party or group of
elected officials. A PSC forms a critical piece of the public sector’s good governance framework
by providing a check and balance between the government’s interest and its employee’s interests.
In recruitment, which is an important element of civil service management, the PSC protects the
government’s interest by selecting the best among available candidates for a particular position. It
protects the employees’ interests by preventing patronage considerations from determining the
choice of candidate. Apart from this central role in recruitment, PSCs oversee whether or not the
executive is managing civil servants according to law, and in compliance with policies set by the
Government. As in the case of recruitment, PSC’s oversight prevents the executive from making
partisan and arbitrary decisions in civil servants’ promotion and punishment.
2.2      Because PSCs typically advise and oversee the executive, they tend to remain
independent of it and at arms length from it. Some PSCs do not report to either the Cabinet or to
any minister, but directly to Parliament. Others that are within the executive are set up outside the
line structure of ministries and departments.

3.      Independence of Bangladesh’s PSC
3.1       Bangladesh’s administrative tradition of a career-based civil service makes the PSC’s
impartiality all the more important. While elected governments come and go, the appointed civil
service remains the same. For citizens to believe that their Government is acting for their general
benefit and not to favor a few, their perceptions about civil servants’ merit, neutrality, and ability
to stand up against the elected executive’s improper directions—and thus the PSC’s ability to
enforce this—are very important. Unfortunately, Bangladesh’s Public Service Commission does
not enjoy much credibility. Although a constitutionally mandated body, it is treated as an attached
department of the Ministry of Establishment with which it needs to liaise for administrative
purposes. Since the 1980s, many administrative reform commissions, beginning with the third
Martial Law Committee, have strongly argued for the PSC’s independence and that the
Government invariably accepts its recruitment recommendations. Other administrative reform
commissions have suggested enhancing the status of chairman and members of Public Service
Commission in the warrant of precedence; and staffing the Commission’s secretariat with its own
staff, rather than with officers borrowed from the civil service.



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3.2     Regularizing employees who were previously employed in projects and paid from the
capital budget is currently among the PSC’s functions. The Commission cannot be expected to
play its impartial oversight role if one of its own tasks is to regularize the Government’s
somewhat irregular employment practices!
3.3       Transparency about how the PSC arrives at its recommendations and what resources are
available to it can provoke questions and discussion about its performance, and ultimately
enhance it. Towards this, the Commission is required to submit an annual report to the President
by 1 March of the following year, and it generally does so. But, this has turned out to be a
ritualistic process with no discussion in Parliament on the Public Service Commission’s
performance.

4.       PSC’s Management of Civil Service Recruitment Examinations
4.1     Since Bangladesh has a career-based civil service, the PSC’s effective management of the
recruitment function is vital. The same set of officers continues to move up the civil service to
occupy the government’s top positions, so it is important to get the best possible talent to start
with. This can happen only if the civil service examination is a useful tool to identify that talent.
For several years now, the examination has not only been considered badly managed, but is also
inadequate for identifying the talent required to perform government functions. The 27th civil
service examination conducted during 2005-06 was supposed to have rectified some of these
anomalies, but the changes introduced were only cosmetic—changing only the weight of subjects
and the interview within the total. The test overall remains similar to the Indian civil service
examination of 150 years ago. While India has moved ahead with updating its examination,
Bangladesh has not.
4.2      The syllabus and questions of PSC’s civil service examination do not test analytical or
managerial skills, or whether the candidate can draw lessons from experience or international
examples and apply them to current work. The mathematics paper tests algebra elements, such as
the Remainder Theorem, and geometry elements, such theorems on parallelograms and circles. It
is unlikely for Class I officers to solve such mathematical problems in the course of their work in
government. Additionally, the examination’s content and format are geared to identifying talent
for clerical and support functions rather than selecting leaders and change managers.


5.       Strengthening Bangladesh’s PSC: Short- and Medium-term Actions
The following short and medium-term actions could strengthen the PSC and demarcate its role. In
the short term:
        PSC’s independence, as laid down in the Constitution, could be made operational by
         separating it from the Ministry of Establishment and giving it autonomy to execute its
         own budget. In some countries this is achieved by allowing the PSC to directly charge all
         its expenditures to the Consolidated Fund.
        PSC’s credibility to identify talent in a just and fair manner could be reinforced.
         Appointing Commission members from the private sector and civil society, instead of
         only retired civil servants, can help dispel the perception that only those who can be
         manipulated are appointed as the Commission’s members. Five out 8 members of
         Singapore’s PSC are from the private sector. Whatever field they are selected from, PSC
         members need to be eminent persons in their own field who have displayed high integrity
         in their professional lives. In some countries, the President appoints PSC members on the
         basis of recommendations of a high-level committee that includes members of the
         Opposition party.


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      While the PSC continues to be staffed by senior officers deputed from the civil service,
       only the most competent officers with proven records of high personal integrity could be
       deputed to the PSC.
      Actions could be taken to introduce efficiency gains at each stage of the recruitment
       process to make it more manageable. For example, to reduce the number of candidates,
       the government could lay down that only those with first- and second-class bachelor’s
       degrees or master’s degrees will be allowed to sit for the examination. Interviews could
       then only be granted to, say, the top 10 percent in the examination, and the number of
       interviewees could be restricted to three times the number to be recruited. Other easy
       fixes include improving the way candidates’ documents are received and scrutinized,
       shortening the time between the preliminary and main written examinations, having a
       question bank, publishing exam results expeditiously, improving examination venues and
       logistics, and offering higher fees for those who grade the scripts.
In the medium term, there needs to be
      Capacity building of senior officers and staff to enable the Public Service Commission to
       fulfill its role. This could involve exchange visits and meetings with PSC members and
       staff in countries having similar administrative traditions. Intensive leadership training
       within the region or in East Asia could focus senior officers on the PSC’s role as
       custodian of the merit principle instead of minor administrative decisions.
      Only after restoring PSC’s credibility in the recruitment process, its oversight role, as the
       guardian of the merit principle in the public service in reviewing promotions and
       punishments, could be further developed.




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