



1. Project Data

Project ID

P119328

Project Name

CI - Emerg. Basic Edu Supp Proj (BESP)

Country

Cote d'Ivoire

Practice Area(Lead)

Education

L/C/TF Number(s)

TF-12500

Closing Date (Original)

30-Sep-2015

Total Project Cost (USD)

41,349,656.24

Bank Approval Date

04-Apr-2012

Closing Date (Actual)

30-Aug-2017

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	41,400,000.00	41,400,000.00
Revised Commitment	41,400,000.00	41,349,656.24
Actual	41,349,656.24	41,349,656.24

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project development objective (PDO) as per the Grant Agreement (Schedule 1, pg. 5) and the Emergency Project Document (EPD, p. vi) was to assist in: (a) restoring and increasing access to basic education, (b) rehabilitating and improving the conditions for teaching and learning, and (c) restoring and strengthening institutional capacity to deliver quality basic education.



For the purposes of this exercise, IEG assesses the achievement of the PDO based on the following three objectives:

- to restore and increase access to basic education;
- to rehabilitate and improve the conditions for teaching and learning;
- to restore and strengthen institutional capacity to deliver quality basic education.

The PDO was not revised, but there were three level two restructurings (18 August 2015; 5 October 2016; and 10 May 2017) which included a number of revisions to the outcome targets. The first and third restructurings each involved a change in the Results Framework, change in components and cost, and reallocation between disbursement categories. The first and second restructurings also involved changes to the loan closing date.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

18-Aug-2015

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

Yes

d. Components

The project was comprised of three components described as follows in the EPD (p. vii) and also noting expenditure, which demonstrates limited deviation between planned and actual expenditure across components:

Component 1: Restoring and increasing access to basic education services (Planned: US\$20 million; Actual: US\$19.25 million) involved: (a) a primary school construction and rehabilitation program consisting of: (i) construction and equipment of new classrooms, using participatory, community-based approaches, or private contractors, as appropriate, (ii) rehabilitation and replacement of existing classrooms



and other related school infrastructure, as well as installation of latrines and water points, and (iii) provision and replacement of student desks in existing schools; (b) a program to promote access to lower secondary school; and (c) introduction of incentive schemes to promote girls' education. The project document noted that the government decided to use a combination of community-based and private sector enterprise approaches for the school construction and rehabilitation program. Where a community-based approach was deemed appropriate or most advantageous, the expectation was that the approach would help develop local ownership and promote social cohesion, and that the additional resources injected into local economies would also help expand economic opportunities. Private-sector enterprises were to be used for larger and more complex structures. The component was also designed to finance civil works, equipment, workshops/sensitization campaigns, and technical assistance.

Component 2: Rehabilitating and improving the quality of teaching and learning (Planned: US\$12 million; Actual: US\$13.17 million) set out to support a program: (a) to improve the quality of teaching and learning processes and outputs in primary education, consisting of: (i) pre-service teacher training through rehabilitating and equipping existing teacher training centers, the construction of two new teacher training centers (CAFOPs), and strengthening linkages between teacher training institutes and primary schools, (ii) a program of in-service teacher training designed to upgrade teaching skills of teachers already in the education system, and (iii) a program of training for the improvement of the assessment system for student learning; (b) to improve the availability of pedagogical inputs in primary and lower secondary education; and (c) to promote school health and nutrition.

The proposed school feeding program under component 2, part of the strategy to increase enrollment, was dropped at the third restructuring. Given the decentralized nature of the activity and the absence of an official school feeding policy, the Bank insisted on a systematic tracking system for monitoring purposes and that household contributions be eliminated (as per the Grant Agreement). As this policy did not materialize, the Bank redirected resources as follows: US\$3.745 million was reallocated from category 1 to categories 2 and 3 (Restructuring Paper 2), to support construction and other aspects of the *collèges de proximité*, in particular, the provision of potable water and sanitation. In line with the original aim of the component, limited health services, vaccinations, and a handwashing campaign at the school level were also supported.

Component 3: Restoring and strengthening institutional capacity to deliver quality basic education (Planned: US\$9.4 million; Actual: US\$8.98 million) set out to support a program of activities to restore and strengthen the administrative, technical, pedagogical, and monitoring capacity of the education system, through: (a) reinforcement of the capacity of key central-level departments involved in the planning and monitoring of the Education Sector Plan (ESP), and clarification of roles and responsibilities at national, central, and school levels; (b) re-establishment of capacity at the regional level to manage responsibilities devolved to the regions, through clarification of the respective mandates of central and regional levels; and (c) at the local level, clarification and strengthening of the roles and responsibilities of school-based management committees.



The planned establishment of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) was found not to be feasible within the project timeframe due to accumulated delays in implementation, the complexity and the time required of unifying several platforms in a post-crisis context, and a decision by the Islamic Development Bank to finance this activity moving forward. The ICR noted that, despite this adjustment to design, the project supported improvements in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of education system data.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Cost and Financing

Estimated cost at appraisal was US\$41.4 million. Actual cost was US\$41.35 million. The project was financed by a US\$41.4 million grant from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE, TF-12500). No contributions by the borrower were expected or made.

Dates

The project was approved 4 April 2012 and became effective 15 October 2012. A midterm review (MTR) was completed 15 July 2014. Planned closing was 30 September 2015, and actual closing (following restructurings outlined below) was 30 August 2017, some 23 months (64 percent overrun) later than originally planned.

Restructurings

There were three level two restructurings as summarized in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Summary of Restructurings		
Dates	Amount Disbursed (US\$ m)	Key Revisions
18 August 2015	22.36 (54.01%)	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost



		Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
		Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
5 October 2016	34.35 (82.97%)	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
		Change in Results Framework
10 May 2017	39.56 (95.55%)	Change in Components and Cost
		Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

The first restructuring resulted in:

- A 12 month project extension (from September 2015 to September 2016).
- A reallocation of US\$3 million in grant proceeds from components 2 and 3 to component 1: these reallocations in favor of construction costs for classrooms (component 1) were possible due to efficiency gains realized in the procurement of textbooks under component 2, and the availability of funds due to exchange rate gains and the cancellation of the EMIS activity.
- The PDO-level indicator target for the “number of classrooms rehabilitated at primary level” was revised downwards from 500 to 267 to reflect realities on the ground (some schools for “rehabilitation” were temporary structures that were not amenable to repair).

The second restructuring resulted in an 11-month project extension (from September 2016 to August 2017). Proposed revisions to two subcomponents (school feeding program and EMIS platform) were not enacted until the third restructuring. Changes to the Results Framework were mentioned but not proposed, as they were dependent on GPE approval that was ultimately given in late October 2016 and formed part of the third restructuring.

To account for changes in the number of classrooms constructed, the third restructuring involved downward revision of the targets for “total number of direct beneficiaries” and for “students enrolled in primary schools built by the project.” A number of changes to intermediate result indicators were also made as follows:

- Removal of “number of children receiving food supplies as a result of project intervention”; and “EMIS system in place and functioning”;
- Upward revision of the targets for the indicators: “number of heads of *Direction Régionale de l’Education Nationale* (DREN - Regional Education Directorate), school directors, inspectors”; and “number of teachers trained in-service”; and



- Downward revision of target for indicator “student teacher ratio” to account for actual enrollment growth.

The third restructuring also resulted in reallocation of resources between disbursement categories and changed the cost of components. A new financial management (FM) specialist was recruited to the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) following the second restructuring, and the project accounting system was updated. As a result, it was discovered that component 1 was overfunded, while components 2 and 3 required additional funds to pay for activities that were validated as part of the extension. Additional component 2 costs included the procurement of 1,550 pedagogic tablets, 36,000 wall boards, and in-service training activities. Component 3 required funding for training 1,500 teachers and 500 headmasters and project management for the 11 months of extension. The funds from component 1 were available because of the reduction in the number of rehabilitated classrooms (267 instead of 500) and because of gains associated with exchange rate movements.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The project objectives were highly relevant at inception and continue to be so going forward.

The project was aligned with the *2012-2014 Plan d'Actions à Moyen Terme* that emphasized three areas for the education sector: (i) strengthening access to education; (ii) improving education quality; and (iii) improving institutional capacity and governance. The EPD stated that the project would support the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in addressing the degradation of the education system in the aftermath of a ten-year political conflict and a subsequent five-month violent conflict following the November 2010 elections. The EPD noted that the project was consistent with the recommendations of the 2011 World Development Report that “emphasizes the key roles that re-establishing social services for communities and addressing social exclusion can play in restoring confidence in post-conflict situations.” The project also sought to help restore government capacity in education sector management, and to introduce measures to promote girls’ education and community participation. Development partners active in the education sector in Côte d'Ivoire (the European Commission, the French Development Agency, and the Islamic Development Bank) focused their attention on the formal vocational and training sector and, as such, the project complemented other support (noting that UNICEF coordinated all government, non-government organization, and donor activity in this space through the Education Sector Group).

The EPD noted that the education system suffered greatly as a result of the conflict, especially in the former conflict zones of the North and North-West. For example, 84 percent of school-age children in the South had access to primary education, compared to only 35 percent and 41 percent in the North and North-West



respectively; and, only 46 percent of children completed primary school (52 percent of boys, 39 percent of girls). The consequence of the overall deterioration was high drop-out rates and an increasing number of illiterate young children. The deficiencies in access to schools affected rural communities and girls in rural communities most. Girls were more likely than boys to work in the home, in farming, or in commerce. The distance of schools from homes also acted as a serious disincentive for girls for whom it was unsafe to travel long distances in an insecure environment. Education quality also suffered. For example, only 10 percent of children in grade 5 attained the minimum standards in French and Mathematics, and this was attributed to system weaknesses such as low quality of the teaching corps and inadequate understanding of the factors underlying low quality, inadequate supply of pedagogical materials, and low nutrition and health status of students.

A 2009 Country Education Status Report identified overall low performance of the education system with significant deficiencies in effective utilization of resources, including: (i) an overall statistically low relationship between resource allocation and student learning results; (ii) significant disparities in teacher allocation; and (iii) a lack of clear definition of roles and responsibilities of the different actors in the education system and inadequate mechanisms for monitoring, supervision, and support to ensure that these responsibilities were exercised to produce the expected results. The EPD stated that the government considered restoring the management of the system to minimum levels of operational efficiency as urgent, not least to avoid disenchantment and further strife.

The Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for Cote d'Ivoire (2015) found that high population growth put pressure on social infrastructure, including education, such that improvements in quality were being outpaced by the increase in demand. The SCD suggested that the greatest impact on the development of necessary human capital would be achieved by improving girls' access to education. Improving overall access to and quality of education was also said to require reallocations of expenditure including interventions on both the supply side (e.g., constructing schools at a reasonable distance and with gender-friendly basic amenities) and on the demand side (e.g., promoting affordable schooling for all children, particularly girls). The SCD suggested that higher allocations to quality education and effective decentralization were essential aspects of a rural development strategy capable of facilitating poverty reduction.

The FY16-19 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Cote d'Ivoire notes disparities in access to basic services, and gender disparities across wealth and urban-rural groups. It states (p. 9) that differences in primary school enrollment exist, but that the most pronounced disparities exist in secondary education, to which rural residents and the poor have limited access. Given the correlation between education and welfare, these disparities in access can limit future life prospects and employment outcomes for rural residents and the poor. Gender gaps in attainment persist at all levels in both urban and rural areas and at different wealth levels. In addition (p. 10), fiscal pressures due to rising indebtedness have led to cuts in social spending and have adversely affected the quality of spending, resulting in delays in necessary institutional reforms in education and other areas. Objective 5 under Focus Area 2 of the CPF (Building human capital for economic development and social cohesion) proposes to improve education service delivery and youth employability. Broadly speaking, the program seeks to support the Government in



improving the relevance, quality, and performance of the education and vocational training systems. It addresses inequality of access to quality basic social services, including education, both vertically (across the poverty scale) and horizontally (across regions, ethnic groups, social-economic groups). Interventions are to have a strong gender dimension to ensure equal access, including through differentiated design and implementation, as well as appropriate monitoring systems.

The ICR (p.32) notes the project is succeeded by the Education Services Delivery Enhancement project (P163218) that will, *inter alia*, address curriculum content in primary education, teacher training, and the community approach for construction.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

Restore and increase access to basic education

Rationale

The ICR (p. 9) stated that the project design involved a “trio of interventions ...designed to improve the environment for teaching and learning as well as to strengthen the institutional environment for delivery of basic education services” and elaborated the logic behind selection of these interventions. First, the project focused on supply by financing classroom construction and rehabilitation to accommodate expected increase in demand for primary education mainly in the central, central-western and south-eastern areas of the country. Project support was envisioned to lead to an increased supply of teachers as well as a number of key reforms for the education sector, such as: teacher training reform; the establishment of *collèges de proximité*; use of the community-based approach for construction; and the sub-cycle approach to grade promotion. Second, project reforms were envisioned to enhance quality by reducing the repetition rate (which was just above 15 percent (ICR, p.12)), and enhancing the curriculum, pedagogy, and learning assessment. Finally, to underpin sustainability, the project supported post-crisis institutional strengthening, seeking to restore and improve the capacity of the Ministry of National Education (*Ministère de l’Education Nationale*) to generate data and to design and implement policies based on reliable data.



With reference to outcome indicators, we note that the achievement of the increased access aspect of the objective could be measured, simply, by the indicator for increased number of beneficiaries. We also note that the restoration of access was also partly achieved through increase in the number of teachers and classrooms. However, the achievement of the second objective (to rehabilitate and improve the conditions for teaching and learning - see below) is also supported by the increase in the number of teachers and classrooms. In this review, those indicators are elaborated in support of the second objective (under Objective 2 below), rather than in this discussion of the first objective (in this section).

Outputs

Number of girls receiving incentives: Against a target of 450, 463 girls ultimately received incentives.

Number of textbooks purchased and distributed: Against the targeted 1 million textbooks purchased and distributed, 1.267 million were purchased and distributed.

Outcomes

Direct project beneficiaries: Planned 62,400 vs Actual 53,280: direct project beneficiaries are defined as students enrolled in primary and secondary schools built/rehabilitated by the project.

- **Students enrolled in primary schools built by EBESP:** Planned 60,000 vs Actual 50,880
- **Students enrolled in “collèges de proximité” built by project:** Planned 2,400 vs Actual 2,400
- **% female students:** Planned 45% vs Actual 47%

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 1 REVISION 1 **Revised Objective**

Restore and increase access to basic education



Revised Rationale

The statement of this objective remained unchanged, but the target values for two outcome indicators - “Total number of direct beneficiaries” and “Students enrolled in primary schools built by the project”- were both revised downward to account for changes in the number of classrooms rehabilitated.

Outputs: all of the outputs listed above under the original Objective 1 are also relevant here.

Outcomes

Direct project beneficiaries: Planned 53,080 vs Actual 53,280: direct project beneficiaries are defined as students enrolled in primary and secondary schools built/rehabilitated by the project.

- **Students enrolled in primary schools built by EBESP:** Planned 50,680 vs Actual 50,880
- **Students enrolled in “collèges de proximité” built by the project:** Planned 2,400 vs Actual 2,400
- **% female students:** Planned 45% vs Actual 47.0%

Revised Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

Rehabilitate and improve the conditions for teaching and learning

Rationale

The ICR noted that the project achievement in terms of building and rehabilitating allowed for the realization of targets relating to school enrollment in primary schools and in secondary schools. The increase in qualified primary teachers helped meet the objective of improved learning conditions for students. The number of additional primary classrooms total (built and rehabilitated) also served to improve learning conditions. The large increase in the number of students given the newly introduced policy of universal education led to a



revision of the targeted student-teacher ratio. Enhanced supply of textbooks, updated school curriculum, and adherence to that curriculum by better trained teachers also contributed to improved learning conditions.

Outputs

Teachers trained in service: The original target was 15,000 teachers trained. This was revised to 16,500 at the second restructuring. Ultimately 16,797 teachers received in-service training.

Student-teacher ratio: A targeted student/teacher ratio of 40:1 was revised to 43:1 at the second restructuring, and this target was very close to being met (43.6:1).

Number of heads of Regional Education Directorates (DREN), school directors, inspectors and pedagogical advisors trained: An original target of 3,000 was revised to 8,000 at the second restructuring. Ultimately 8,670 were trained.

Number of School-Based Management Committees (COGES) trained: Against a target of 3,000, 4,790 were trained.

Outcomes

Number of additional qualified primary teachers: Planned 7,500 vs Actual 24,000

Number of additional primary classrooms total: Planned 1,500 vs Actual 1,272

- ***Number of additional classrooms built:*** Planned 1,000 vs Actual 1,002
- ***Number of additional classrooms rehabilitated:*** Planned 500 vs Actual 270

Rating
Modest



OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

Rehabilitate and improve the conditions for teaching and learning (revised target, N of additional classrooms)

Revised Rationale

There was no change in the statement of this objective, but the target value for "Number of additional classrooms rehabilitated" was revised due to discovery that many of the classrooms originally targeted for rehabilitation were, in fact, temporary structures for which rehabilitation was deemed inappropriate. The knock-on effect of this change also required a change in the indicator for number of classrooms built in total (that indicator representing a combination of classrooms built and classrooms rehabilitated).

Outputs: all of the outputs listed above under the original Objective 2 are also relevant here.

Outcomes

Number of additional qualified primary teachers: Planned 7,500 vs Actual 24,000

No. additional primary classrooms total: Planned 1,267 vs Actual 1,272

- **No. additional classrooms built:** Planned 1,000 vs Actual 1,002
- **No. additional classrooms rehabilitated:** Planned 267 vs Actual 270

Revised Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 2

Revised Objective

Rehabilitate and improve the conditions for teaching and learning (revised target, N of teachers)

Revised Rationale



There was no change in the statement of the objective. The target value for number of additional qualified primary teachers increased from 7,200 to 15,200.

Outputs: all of the outputs listed above under the original Objective 2 are also relevant here.

Outcomes

Number of additional qualified primary teachers: Planned 15,200 vs Actual 24,000

Number of additional primary classrooms total: Planned 1,267 vs Actual 1,272

- **Number of additional classrooms built**: Planned 1,000 vs Actual 1,002
- **Number of additional classrooms rehabilitated**: Planned 267 vs Actual 270

Revised Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 3

Objective

Restore and strengthen institutional capacity to deliver quality basic education

Rationale

The project supported strengthened capacity to deliver quality basic education through the delivery of training throughout the system, i.e., at the school, regional, and central levels. At the local level, COGES were trained with a view to having a positive impact on community participation and enhancing accountability throughout schools and among contractors who built or rehabilitated classrooms. The project also financed the training of school heads on administrative and pedagogic management. At the regional level, the project supported the training of staff of inspectorates and regional directorates of education as well as the establishment of regional offices of the General Inspectorate of Education. At the central level, training was provided to key staff in government ministries.

Outputs



Number of heads of DREN staff, school directors, inspectors, and pedagogical advisors trained: 8,670 staff were trained, exceeding the initial target of 3,000 and the revised target of 8,500 (set at the second restructuring).

Number of COGES trained: By the first restructuring the target of 3,000 trained had been exceeded (4,790 trained), and it remained as such until project closure.

The ICR (p. 21) states that, at central level, staff from various entities - General Inspectorate of Education, Department of Finance, Department of Statistics and Planning, Department of Pedagogy and in-service training - received training on matters such as M&E, results based management, planning, and use of learning assessments. The ICR also states the project assisted in setting up a platform to archive, store and secure all national certifications from primary to upper secondary education, and that the government has produced an education sector strategy (2016-2025), which, if implemented, will likely allow for consolidation of project achievements. <https://www.globalpartnership.org/fr/content/plan-sectoriel-de-leducation-2016-2025-cote-divoire>.

Outcomes

System for learning assessment at the primary level: The ICR (p. 21) notes the project helped the government undertake a national learning assessment for Grades 1 to Grade 3 in reading and mathematics, providing evidence of stronger institutional capacity at the ministry to facilitate measurement of overall student progress. The reading assessment resulted in a shift in the reading method to a syllabic based approach (ICR, p. 8).

The ICR (p. 20) states that the project – through encouraging the government to address this issue via the Government budget and through the project supported the implementation of the national strategy for the production of key statistics - contributed to the improvement of the quality of national education data and its timely availability. Since 2012, school statistical surveys have been fully supported through the domestic budget, and the ICR elaborates that more reliable education statistics are regularly produced and help underpin education service delivery as well as analyses on teacher deployment and sector efficiency.

Rating
Substantial



Rationale

Overall efficacy was Modest under the original outcome targets and Substantial under both sets of revised outcome targets. With the majority of disbursements (54 percent) occurring under the original outcome targets, overall efficacy is rated Modest.”

Against the original outcome targets (which were in place during 54 percent of disbursement), objectives 1 and 2 performed modestly and objective 3 performed substantially, yielding Modest overall efficacy.

Against both the first and second sets of revised outcome targets, performance was substantial for each objective, yielding an overall Substantial efficacy rating under both sets of revised targets.

Given the achievements noted above, with the majority of disbursements (54 percent) occurring under the original outcome targets, overall efficacy is rated modest.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Modest

Primary reason

Low achievement

5. Efficiency

The project was eligible for processing under OP/BP 8.00 “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies” in recognition of extraordinary events (protracted conflict and ongoing political unrest) that Cote d’Ivoire had undergone, as well as the potential of the project to support the government’s efforts towards sustained peace by: employing peace-building activities (i.e. community-driven development approach with a peace-building component); providing economic opportunities; and increasing educational levels. The idea of the accelerated project processing was to provide rapid support to the government’s peace building efforts.

The introduction of the new model for lower secondary schools, “*collèges de proximité*” in rural areas, resulted in lower student unit costs and increased equity with the introduction of bivalent teachers (teachers trained to teach two subjects). The government continues to use this low-cost model for the expansion of the supply of secondary education in rural areas, meaning parents in rural areas will no longer have to bear any additional costs to enroll their children in distant secondary schools. The localized teacher training model (CAFOP) also proved efficient, removing boarding costs thereby saving budget resources and time of the student teachers.



The ICR (p. 24) states that support to community-based construction led to efficiency gains - the unit cost of classroom construction being US\$12,000 compared to approximately US\$26,000 under the more conventional approach (ICR, p.24). Quantitative evidence presented in the ICR (pp.23-24) and based on what appear to be sound assumptions suggests high returns to education. The analysis takes into account the incremental income that will be earned by children enrolled in project-built classrooms i.e., wages expected to be earned by the students during their working years, minus forgone earnings and assuming a lifetime of 5 years for classrooms at primary level and 10 years for those at lower secondary level. As the total wage income of the students in question depends on the unemployment rate, the net present value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project were estimated using the 2013 unemployment rates for workers in Cote d'Ivoire who had completed primary or lower secondary level education. Taking into consideration total project cost, depreciation, and recurrent cost of education in primary and lower secondary education, an NPV of US\$151.8 million was calculated together with an economic rate of return (ERR) of 27.5 percent (noting no baseline ERR was calculated at appraisal).

As noted above, it is acknowledged that the project derived some efficiencies that are likely to be important in terms of sustainability. Although it is understood that the initial three-year time frame was set based on the GPE mandate of funding for up to three years, the 23-month delay in achieving full implementation is notable, particularly for a project defined by its emergency status. The challenges of operating in a post-conflict environment, arguably, contributed to the delays and implementation issues. Understanding the reasons for the delays and implementation issues is helpful and important for deriving lessons to inform design of future projects, but this knowledge does not change the fact that the delays and issues occurred. In this project, taking all the elements into account, the delays and implementation issues noted above are consistent with an efficiency rating of modest.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	27.50	0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome



The relevance of the PDO is rated **high**, as the project directly engaged with critical aspects of public policy in a post-crisis context, and the objective remains highly aligned with ongoing analysis and strategy. Overall efficacy was **modest** under the initial set of outcome targets, and **substantial** under both the first and second sets of revised outcome targets, reflecting achievement of most of those targets. Efficiency is rated **modest**, reflecting positives such as efficiencies gained through a community-based approach, localized teacher training, and calculated returns to investment, but also crucially the less positive substantial time overrun--which is an important consideration given the emergency nature of the project and its 'high' relevance in the post-crisis context.

Under the original outcome targets: (\$22.36m of total \$41.35m disbursed = 54%): Relevance High, Efficacy Modest, Efficiency Modest = Moderately Unsatisfactory (3). $MU\ 3 \times .54 = 1.62$

Under the first set of revised outcome targets: (\$12.11m of total \$41.35m disbursed = 29%): Relevance High, Efficacy Substantial, Efficiency Modest = Moderately Satisfactory (4). $MS\ (4) \times .29 = 1.16$

Under the second set of revised outcome targets: (balance of \$41.350 disbursed = \$6.88m = 17%): Relevance high, Efficacy Substantial, Efficiency Modest = Moderately Satisfactory (4). $MS\ (4) \times .17 = 0.68$

Combined ratings: $1.62+1.16+0.68 = 3.46 = \text{Moderately Unsatisfactory}$, reflecting significant shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The context for the sustainability of outcomes looks positive. The ICR (p. 32) identified the community approach for building and rehabilitating classrooms as a boost to sustainability (buy-in and commitment), particularly given the mechanism for maintenance of the new infrastructure that was established with the *Comité Technique de Mise en Oeuvre* for each school based management committee. Local water management committees are likely to support ongoing commitment to preserve the new system of potable



water, which, in turn, is likely to benefit participating schools as well as surrounding villages. The reform of initial teacher training has led changes in the governance of the training centers.

The ICR (p. 32) informed that the general security situation has improved, resulting in dramatic reduction in the number of internally displaced persons (from a peak of 2.3 million in 2011 to 300,000 by end-2016) and an overall reduction in political turmoil. This project is succeeded by the Education Services Delivery Enhancement project that is intended to, *inter alia*, address curriculum content in primary education, teacher training, and the community approach for construction (with a view to the government adopting this approach on a wider basis for future school construction). The “*collèges de proximité*” are envisioned to help achieve an increase in access to lower secondary schools at lower cost, as will the introduction of more bivalent (paired) teachers, changes in teacher training, and the adaptation of curriculum content to five blocks of disciplines. The above will likely assist the government in increasing the supply of secondary education services in rural areas, and is expected to stimulate demand from parents in rural areas who will no longer have to pay additional costs to enroll their children in distant secondary schools after completion of primary school. This new model of lower secondary schools in remote rural areas has been adopted by other development agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the French Development Agency. The ICR also noted that CAFOPs contribute to sustainability because they offer a lower-cost option to train teachers without the cost of travel and remote boarding.

The project helped establish capacity within the education system that is likely to contribute to sustainability noting, for example, support provided towards the development of a national strategy for statistics production; support for the establishment of a directorate in charge of evaluations; the development of a system for monitoring teachers and recording inspectors’ findings; and, a system to archive examination results.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project document acknowledged that “application of emergency procedures does not compromise the Bank’s rigorous appraisal process or assurance of quality and soundness of the proposed operation.” A standard Concept Review meeting for the project was held in October 2010; however, preparations were put on hold due to ongoing conflict and taken up again in May 2011, at which stage the government requested the Bank to identify emergency response activities among the already-identified components and to accelerate the finalization of the project to meet the deadline for submitting the project to the GPEF Secretariat (September 23, 2011). The team and the government agreed on a set of interventions (project activities e.g., school building, teacher training, nutrition) that would address emergency needs and also help to lay the ground for further development of the sector. To advance as quickly as possible,



funds from an existing project (Projet d'Appui au Secteur Educatif et Formation – PASEF) were used to prepare emergency activities prior to GPE grant approval and receipt.

The ICR (p. 28) states that project design was informed by findings from the Education Country Status Report developed in 2009, which highlighted the main challenges for the education system in Cote d'Ivoire (e.g., limited and inequitable access to primary and secondary education resulting mostly from supply-side constraints, poor quality and low internal efficiency (high repetition and dropout rates), low institutional capacity for systems management, and inadequate funding and sub-optimal allocation and management of resources, particularly at the school level). Project design also benefited from lessons learned from past project implementation in country and further afield. Key lessons adopted included the decision to mainstream project implementation within the ministry, acknowledgement of (and support for) the importance of capacity building to enhance community participation in project implementation, the need for robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and the need to incentivize girls' enrollment and participation.

The project's results chain remained stable throughout the project lifecycle and was logically plausible insofar as the activities and objectives were logically linked to the overall objectives (ICR, p.28). However, given the post-crisis context, the objectives were overly ambitious. In comments on the draft of this document, the GP team noted the following: "The project began implementation only five months following the end of the political crisis and the armed conflict in the country. Challenges associated with implementation of similar education projects in FCV settings are well documented and are similar to those encountered in the implementation of this project." In addition, project design did not take full account of the time required to identify the sites for classroom construction and the classrooms to be rehabilitated; and to train local communities for school construction. Limited data resulted in underestimation of both the number of classrooms that could be rehabilitated and the cost of rehabilitating classrooms (the project team noted significant depletion in building capacity post-crisis).

Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The first implementation status report (ISR) rating for Implementation was Satisfactory before settling into a period (3 ISRs) of Moderately Satisfactory ratings. Then, between December 2014 and August 2016 (4 ISRs), Implementation was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory before recovering to Moderately Satisfactory for the final two ISRs (March and August 2017). The ICR (p. 30) stated that the Bank team conducted regular supervision missions and supported three restructurings. The late change in the project team at the ministry (following the second extension of the project end date) was key to the successful conclusion of the project, but that change was effected only when the contracts of the incumbents expired, despite poor progress. The ICR (p.28) states that weak project management and delays in establishing a fully functional



M&E system were evident early in the project lifecycle, with various concerns and delays noted in ISRs of June 2014 and December 2014. Some staffing issues were resolved only after two years (despite the emergency nature of the project), suggesting shortcomings in proactivity. The restructurings were all in order, i.e., restructuring papers and ISRs were complete and issues were clearly discussed.

The ICR noted that financial management and procurement were well supervised and unproblematic; however, there were issues with safeguards (rated moderately unsatisfactory in both the final ISRs and ICR) that the team could have been more attentive to (an assessment of community school sites was not undertaken). This represents a significant shortcoming in implementation performance.

The decision to cancel the school feeding program was taken as required by the Grant agreement in the absence of a monitoring mechanism suited to tracking that activity. The project team noted that the World Food Program continued to support school feeding and that the decision by the Bank not to support a school feeding program as part of this project was a conservative one associated with concern for reputational risk in the absence of adequate financial oversight. The project team also noted that the funding ear-marked for school feeding was diverted to support the Ebola effort and proved important in that regard.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The results framework captured project activities and linked them with objectives and components reasonably well. The six PDO-level indicators and the intermediate results indicators covered access to basic education (numbers of classrooms, beneficiaries, and teachers trained), quality of learning and teaching environment (teachers trained and student-teacher ratio) and improved sector capacity (reliable statistics, system for learning assessment, and trained regional staff and school management committees). The failure to measure school attendance, dropout, and repetition is a notable omission and a lost opportunity for robust measurement of relative efficiency. The ICR (p. 29) noted that the omission of an attendance indicator precluded a determination of whether attendance was affected by cancellation of the school feeding program. These omissions represent significant shortcomings in M&E design. In comments on the ICR Review draft, project team indicated that “although the project did remove the indicator on attendance, other key indicators, including access, repetition, retention, completion – which are critical in



capturing key outcomes – were measured.” The ICR did not present information on these other key indicators, however. Although the numbers of classrooms and beneficiaries were reported, these are not considered adequate information to measure access. Enrollment was reported in the ICR, but information on enrollment alone, without information on attendance, is also not considered adequate information to measure access. Specific information on results in terms of repetition, retention, and completion were not mentioned in the ICR, either in discussion of achievements of the project or in the section on M&E Quality.

The project sought to enhance national M&E capacity in the production of education statistics with a view to facilitating policy analysis for the sector. In that regard, the project supported the establishment of a directorate to carry out periodic learning assessments, a system for monitoring teacher performance and to record inspectors’ feedback, and a secure system for tracking/archiving examination results, all of which would support education quality. Finally, from 2013 onward, the project supported the production of annual statistical yearbooks. In summary, M&E design adequately allowed for measurement of efficacy (relying heavily on a simple counting exercise), but did not allow for measurement of relative efficiency or quality markers associated, for example, with dropout and repetition.

b. M&E Implementation

M&E implementation was weak in the earlier years of the project. According to the ICR (p. 29), the M&E officer at the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was not adequately qualified and so, despite regular reporting, there were shortcomings in M&E that meant it was not possible to fully track PDO and intermediate indicators. Because of this weakness, additional resources were deployed to produce a detailed mid term review (MTR - August 2014) that led, after a time lag, to restructuring. That mid term review set out progress and identified areas in need of improvement. The project team at the PIU was replaced in September 2016, and the new management and M&E officer ensured tracking of all project activities and reporting on progress towards targets associated with PDO and intermediate indicators.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR provides limited information on M&E utilization. The ICR (p. 30) states that the utility of the information produced by the M&E system for the project was limited given the weak capacity of the original M&E officer. The MTR helped bring about a needed and ultimately beneficial restructuring, and the appointment of new project management and M&E personnel who improved the overall quality of project M&E.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial



10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The Emergency Project Paper (EPP, p. 18) noted the project's classification as Environmental Assessment Category B given potential adverse environmental and social impacts associated with construction and rehabilitation of schools (including sanitary infrastructure such as latrines) and teacher training institutes. The EPP noted that there would be no land acquisition, as all interventions were planned for existing government land. The project triggered two safeguards policies: OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment and OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. An Environmental and Social Management Framework and a Resettlement Policy Framework had been prepared, reviewed, approved and disclosed in-country and at the InfoShop for the originally planned project (before it became an emergency project), and the EPP indicated that these instruments continued to be applicable to the emergency project. The EPP also committed to undertaking Environmental and Social Impact Assessments and Environmental and Social Management Plans and/or Resettlement Action Plans or Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans as necessary once sub-project sites and plans for civil works were finalized. Finally, the EPP noted that, in accordance with OP/BP 8.00 and to guide the environmental assessment and mitigation process, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework was developed to provide guidance on the approach to be taken during project implementation for the screening and design of sub-projects and planning of mitigation measures. Environmental and social safeguards were rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in both the final ISR (August 30th, 2017) and in the ICR.

The ICR noted that civil works commenced without completed environmental studies. As a result, an Environmental Audit and a Social Audit were conducted, and the main issue identified related to compensation for communities for the land/sites they provided for (government) schools. The environmental and social studies and plans recommended appropriate compensation from the government to the communities.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Despite capacity limitations in financial management early on in the project, there were no irregularities, and annual audit reports were presented on time. Interim unaudited financial reports met Bank requirements and were also submitted in a timely manner. Overall, no major issues arose, and any minor issues identified through supervision missions were addressed by the Bank and the government. Procurement performance was strong throughout the project cycle, with 725 of 726 bidding processes completed. Payment time for invoices improved from an average 35 days to 15 days following the second restructuring. No procurement-related issues arose, and project implementation delays were not associated with procurement processes.



c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory with respect to the original outcome targets, under which 54% of the Grant disbursed, consistent with partial achievement of objectives (and thus a rating of modest for overall efficacy).
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Overly ambitious design in a post-crisis context led to significant delays. Poor performance by the original M&E official was not proactively addressed. Significant safeguards issues arose and were not adequately resolved.
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Modest	Design was simple but did not include critical outcome-related measurement (e.g. attendance, repetition). M&E implementation was limited for a significant period.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR identified a set of insightful lessons that include reference to the value of an audit of pre-service teacher training for effective reform assuming the audit covers all stages of the process of teacher development from recruitment through training and certification; the efficiencies that can be



achieved through decentralized (regional) teacher training; and how, in the case of an emergency project, it is important that project design has activities that are "ready to go". The ICR suggested the project was partially successful in this regard, in that it identified and pursued the most urgent priorities, though it did not anticipate, for example, that the school feeding program would run into difficulty. The project was also overly ambitious in expecting the realization of a consolidated data system under an emergency project (although progress was made in upgrading data collection and reporting for the education sector). And finally, the ICR finds that the community approach used by the project was cost-effective in building local schools and may have a positive impact on social cohesion (lowered construction costs while also engaging the community, and improved capacity of school-based management committees that put the training provided by the project to practical use).

In addition, IEG identifies the following lessons:

Realism is always important, but particularly so in a post-conflict situation where expectations may be high and where stability may be dependent on demonstrating coherence and early results, serving, for example, to support the legitimacy of government. In this instance, the project was unrealistic in its ambition given the context and the short implementation period in question. Ultimately, certain core activities were dropped, and the project ran over its projected three-year cycle by 23 months.

A lack of urgency and proactivity in addressing issues arising in project management can have undesirable knock on effects. In this instance known issues with the project implementation unit were left unchanged until relevant personnel ran out of contract. This resulted in weak monitoring for much of the project. Once the picture became clearer with new personnel in situ, a late restructuring was effected to enable completion of project activities. That said, executing change so late in the process is less than ideal.

13. Assessment Recommended?

Yes

Please Explain

The project is a possible candidate for IEG's ongoing interest in and assessment of interventions in favor of education quality, including teacher training, learning assessment, and the role of school-based management.



It also may be of interest for possible lessons regarding service deliver in FCV-contexts, given that the project was implemented in a post-conflict setting.

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was well written and presented an easily comprehended project storyline, which included three restructurings. The ICR also candidly identified key shortcomings, such as lack of capacity among the original cadre of PIU staff, associated deficiencies in M&E, lack of proactivity among the Bank team in addressing PIU capacity issues, and the dropping of important activities such as the school feeding program. The ICR provides adequate evidence to back up achievement with reference to relatively simple, output type indicators (noting the emergency nature of the project and the core focus on increasing the numbers of teachers and other officials trained, functioning classrooms, and students enrolled). The ICR also provided adequate coverage of capacity building efforts and related developments (for example, in relation to the production of education statistics). A strong efficiency analysis is provided in the main text, and in Annex 4 (Efficiency Analysis). Overall, the ICR reflects provides an easy to follow narrative noting the complicated restructuring arrangements (which are easy to follow in the ICR); however, the ICR's assignment of overall rating of "substantial" for efficacy (ICR, page 25, table 6) is inconsistent with the assessment of partial achievement of the targets in effect before the first restructuring (at which point more than half of disbursements had taken place). In addition, the ICR could have provided more detail on the original and the revised Environment Assessment category, and on the successive revisions of outcome targets (particularly with reference to inaccuracies and inconsistencies in ISRs).

a. Quality of ICR Rating Substantial