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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT



COLOMBIA

Programmatic Productive  
and Sustainable Cities  
Development Policy Loans

**Report No. 144224**

FEBRUARY 11, 2020

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**Report No.: 144224**

**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**COLOMBIA**

**PROGRAMMATIC PRODUCTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES DEVELOPMENT  
POLICY LOANS (IBRD-82250, IBRD-84550)**

February 11, 2020

**Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development**

Independent Evaluation Group

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Colombian Peso (Col\$)*

2012	\$1.00	Col\$1,783.71
2013	\$1.00	Col\$1,929.88
2014	\$1.00	Col\$2,318.29
2015	\$1.00	Col\$2,742.98
2018	\$1.00	Col\$2,896.93

## Abbreviations

4G	Colombia's Fourth Generation of Roads Concession
ANI	National Infrastructure Agency
CONPES	National Council of Economic Social Policy
CP	Contratos Plan
DNP	National Planning Department
DPL	development policy loan
DPO	development policy operation
GDP	gross domestic product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MVCT	Ministry of Housing, Cities, and Territories
NDP	National Development Plan
PDO	project development objective
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PPP	public-private partnership
PVG	Free Housing Program
SoC	system of cities
VIPA	Priority Interest Housing for Savers Program

*All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.*

## Fiscal Year

Government: January 1–December 31

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This report was prepared by Victoria Alexeeva, Hiroyuki Yokoi, and Natalia Salazar, who assessed the operation in May 2019. The report was peer reviewed by Simon Davies and panel reviewed by Fernando Manibog. Richard Kraus and Romyne Pereira provided administrative support.



## Principal Ratings

Indicator	ICR	ICR Review	PPAR
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Risk to development outcome	Modest	Modest	Modest
Bank performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

*Note:* The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Global Practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate Independent Evaluation Group product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR. PPAR = Project Performance Assessment Report.

## Key Staff Responsible

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**IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.**

### **About This Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20–25 percent of the World Bank's lending operations through fieldwork. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which executive directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government and other in-country stakeholders, interview World Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible World Bank Country Management Unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrower's comments are attached to the document sent to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report is sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

### **About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations**

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: <http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org>).

**Outcome:** The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, sector strategy papers, and operational policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared with alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. *Possible ratings for outcome:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

**Risk to development outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for risk to development outcome:* high, significant, moderate, negligible to low, and not evaluable.

**Bank performance:** The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan or credit closing toward the achievement of development outcomes). The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank performance:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

**Borrower performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation and complied with covenants and agreements toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for borrower performance:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

## Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loans (DPLs; P130972) intended to support the strengthening of the government of Colombia's policy framework on productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities.

DPL I was approved on December 13, 2012, supported by an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan of \$150 million (IBRD-82250), and closed on June 30, 2013. DPL II was approved on December 12, 2014, supported by two IBRD loans for \$700 million (IBRD-84550), and closed on December 31, 2015.

This PPAR serves the accountability and learning purposes of the Independent Evaluation Group, which evaluates the extent to which the two DPLs achieved the intended outcomes and offers an opportunity to draw lessons that could inform the way that the World Bank engages in urban sector reforms.

This report is based on interviews, documents, and data collected during a visit to Colombia in May 2019. The team held interviews with the National Planning Department, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Housing, and other sector institutions and agencies in Bogotá; urban planning and transport secretaries in Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Medellín; and World Bank officials (see appendix F for a full list of persons interviewed). The cooperation and assistance of all stakeholders and government officials are gratefully acknowledged, as is the support of the World Bank country office in Colombia.

Copies of the draft PPAR were sent to government officials and implementing agencies for their review. The Ministry of Transportation provided the comments, which are attached in appendix G.

## Summary

Colombia's urbanization process has helped drive growth and improve service delivery to its population. Colombia is a highly urbanized country, with 80 percent of its population living in cities in 2017. Five large cities—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga—account for 40 percent of the urban population. About 85 percent of the country's gross domestic product is generated in urban areas. A focus on services has resulted in 100 percent of the urban population receiving access to electricity and 80 percent using safely managed drinking water services. The poverty rate is lower in urban than in rural areas in Colombia.

Yet, while improved urban systems have boosted economic development, Colombia faces several challenges in its efforts to enhance the productivity and efficiency of its city systems. Colombia's cities require support for interjurisdictional planning—for land use, infrastructure development, and other investments to boost regional productivity. Poor planning has resulted in higher-than-average transport costs and longer travel times compared with other countries in the region. However, it is inefficient competition rather than the lack of more effective coordination among cities that undermined sustainable regional growth.

In this context, the World Bank provided a series of development policy loans (DPLs) to Colombia in 2012 and 2014 to promote the efficient management of Colombia's cities and support the strengthening of the government's policy framework to improve their productivity, sustainability, and inclusiveness. Extensive analytical work and dialogue with the government of Colombia supported this operation. The first DPL, financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, provided \$150 million to Colombia between 2012 and 2013; the second International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-financed DPL provided \$700 million between 2014 and 2015.

The DPL's objective was and remains highly relevant to the national policy and sector context, and most of the project's prior actions were substantially designed to fulfill the aims of the DPL reform areas. However, the alignments of some prior actions show weaknesses, especially in the area of achieving more sustainable cities, and with the definition of outcomes and their measurement.

The DPL series substantially contributed to the aim of strengthening the productivity of Colombia's cities by putting in place essential frameworks and institutional support for more effective intercity planning and infrastructure development. The DPLs successfully helped create a "system of cities" framework within the National Development Plan that is helping Colombia more holistically harness the combined potential of its cities as regional centers of growth; put in place a policy framework for urban planning for

regional connectivity and infrastructure development and formed a Subdirectorate for Territorial Development within the National Planning Department; and created a transformative National Infrastructure Agency that, with support from the DPLs on regulations, enables public-private partnership structuring.

However, progress is slow on achieving effective interjurisdictional coordination and consolidation through the creation of new metropolitan areas. Planned investments designed to provide local incentives to promote intercity planning and development have been used for various other purposes, including in support of Colombia's peace process aims in rural areas. Nevertheless, the government of Colombia remains strongly committed to promoting regional and local development, and no policies have been reversed since the series ended.

The objective of supporting more inclusive cities is rated high; the DPLs put in place legal frameworks and subsidies to improve access to basic water and sanitation services and housing for low-income residents. More than 150,000 low-income urban residents in 32 municipalities benefited from increased access to services. Adjustments to the low-income housing policy helped reduce the housing deficit from 20 percent in 2012 to 14.5 percent in 2018.

The DPLs only modestly achieved the objective of strengthening the government of Colombia's policy framework on sustainable cities. Challenges associated with achieving increased "environmental efficiency" pertain to expanding public space, establishing congestion and pollution pricing systems, and identifying high-risk areas that pose threats to urban residents. There was only a modest increase in public space and in the identification of high-risk areas that required skills and resources not readily available to municipalities through the DPL series. A national road safety plan was also put in place but will require dedicated support at the intercity and city level to become operational.

Several lessons emerged from this assessment of the Colombian DPL series.

**Tacit assumptions that additional fiscal outlays will be forthcoming to support prior actions in development policy operations (DPOs) can create risks to the sustainability of policy reforms.** Risks to sustainability were detected in components that required additional fiscal resources, such as the extension of subsidies (for example, the Free Housing Program), matching grants (for example, the Contratos Plan), or the creation of new entities (for example, the creation of a transport regulation commission and a planning unit). Their implementation was dynamic at times of adequate fiscal resources (2012–14) but lost momentum when the fiscal space tightened (2014–18). During periods of fiscal stress, the government can reduce budget allocations to flexible budget items, such as those involved in the DPLs.

**When designing prior actions that require local-level implementation, it is important to consider municipal capacity and the time required to enact local-level reforms.** In the case of the Colombia urbanization DPLs series, delays occurred because of low technical and institutional capacity at the local level; in some cases, only the largest cities were able to make progress. The Colombian decentralization model that provides full local autonomy presents difficulties in the implementation of policy reforms at the local level. Although the government has enabled local interventions in national laws and decrees, municipalities can autonomously decide when to implement certain enacted policies depending on the balance with other priorities and resource availability.

**In designing multisectoral DPOs with many prior actions across sectors, which include local implementation requirements, municipal capacity building may be required.**

Central government agencies, the World Bank, or other international financial institutions can deliver the support. As an instrument, a DPL is designed to support the central government budget, without earmarking financing to sector ministries that are part of the operation. Parties responsible for overseeing implementation indicated that their willingness to work on this operation depended on securing complementary support. The National Planning Department and line ministries must do most of the design work and are responsible for implementing policies and complying with targets. In fact, for complying with their commitments, in some cases, they needed to source other finance from development partners to make sure the policy measures were achieved.

**In the context of multisector DPOs, it is critical that prior actions be directly linked to results indicators so a clear line of sight and envisioned impact is identified ex ante, thus supporting a strong design at entry.** In these DPLs, the results were expected to trigger policy and institutional change in support of more productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities in Colombia. Some results were defined more in terms of outputs broadly attributable to specific reforms, and in some cases, these were processes and actions rather than results. For example, structuring the National Development Plan 2014–18 with a territorial or regional approach that takes into account the system of cities framework is an action, and the number of conceptual design or feasibility studies supporting travel demand management policies is a process. In these instances, it is difficult to discuss the causal links between actions and results that should be indicative of having triggered changes that signal the achievement of the development objectives.

José Cándido Carbajo Martínez  
Director, Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development  
Independent Evaluation Group



# 1. Background and Context

1.1 In 2012 and 2014, the World Bank provided a series of development policy loans (DPLs) to Colombia to promote the efficient management of Colombia's cities and improve their productivity, sustainability, and inclusiveness. Three issues are important in understanding the broader development context relevant to the assessment of this operation: (i) the solid macroeconomic track record in Colombia, (ii) the nature and characteristics of the country's decentralization process, and (iii) urbanization challenges at the time of appraisal of the operation.

## Macroeconomic Context

1.2 Colombia has made significant progress on the economic and social fronts. Between 2002 and 2017, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased by 62 percent from \$4,764 to \$7,612 (in constant dollars of 2010), the poverty rate fell from 50 percent to 24 percent, and the extreme poverty rate decreased from 18 percent to 8 percent. Economic growth has been resilient despite a sharp decline in international oil prices. The exchange rate has absorbed a considerable proportion of the oil price shock, depreciating 70 percent between September 2014 and the end of 2018. The current account deficit, which increased from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2013 to 6.4 percent of GDP in 2016, has been registering a correction trend since 2017.

1.3 Growth slowed from 4.7 percent in 2014 to 1.8 percent in 2017 but recovered to 2.8 percent in 2018. Notwithstanding the slight increase in unemployment since mid-2018, poverty indicators have not been affected. The implementation of the peace process is expected to provide a boost to confidence in Colombia's prospects and support growth through increased investments. However, it puts pressure on public finances, which have the added fiscal burden of the migration of about 1.2 million Venezuelans to the country.

## Colombia's Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization

1.4 Colombia, a traditionally unitary country, started decentralizing progressively in the late 1980s. Political decentralization started in 1986 with the election of mayors and expanded to the administrative and fiscal spheres with the enactment of a new Constitution in 1991. The objectives of intensifying decentralization were to improve the population's access to social services, reduce regional economic and social inequalities, and diminish poverty across the country. The outcomes of decentralization were expected to be reached through efficiency gains achieved by devolving responsibilities to lower levels of government that would have the capacity to provide more and better services to their people according to their local needs and preferences.

1.5 The country is divided into 32 departments and 1,102 municipalities. The 1991 Constitution delegated competencies and responsibilities to subnational departments and municipalities to be responsible for providing education, health, and water and sanitation services, and developing infrastructure within their jurisdictions.<sup>1</sup> It also provided subnational governments with financial resources through two mechanisms: intergovernmental transfers through the General Participations System and natural resource royalties through the General System of Royalties.

1.6 Decentralization in Colombia has proceeded at a slow pace and has not shown evidence of satisfactory results in reducing regional disparities. The heterogeneity in institutional capacity is a substantial limitation of the decentralization process. Other possible restrictions to the process include highly earmarked resources transferred from the central government, the reversal of some competencies to the central government, and the institutional difficulties in raising revenues (OECD 2014; Villar and Salazar 2016; World Bank 2009a).

## **Challenges of Colombia's Urbanization**

1.7 Colombia is a highly urbanized country. The urban population grew from 57 percent of the total population in 1970 to 74 percent in 2000 to 80 percent in 2017. Forty percent of the urban population is concentrated in five large cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga. Cities are the engine of growth, as urban areas generated 85 percent of the GDP. Urbanization is also critical to reducing social inequality. Access to essential services increased significantly in urban areas in the last decades. Since 2016, 100 percent of the urban population has had access to electricity, and 80 percent use safely managed drinking water services. The poverty rate is lower in urban than in rural areas in Colombia.

1.8 Although improved urban systems boost economic development and reduce poverty and inequality, the World Bank, through its urbanization review, identified three main priorities to address urban challenges: (i) deepen economic connectivity, (ii) enhance interjurisdictional coordination on a regional and metropolitan scale; and (iii) foster efficiency and innovativeness. It was specifically recognized that an appropriate system of cities (SoC) was crucial to improving access to basic services, facilitating the reduction of poverty rates, and improving the quality of citizens' lives (Samad, Lozano-Gracia, and Panman 2012). The system's efficiency and productivity was a key determinant of the country's capacity to transition from an upper-middle-income to a high-income economy.

1.9 Colombia's decentralization delegated city management responsibilities to the municipalities without a mechanism to encourage coordination for spatial planning

across cities and administrative boundaries. Land use planning was executed in a fragmented manner, which resulted in housing deficits. Poorly planned intracity road infrastructure resulted in higher transport costs and longer travel time compared with other countries in the region. Colombian cities competed within their jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, improving interjurisdictional coordination and regional connectivity was key to ensuring equitable growth (Colombia, DNP 2014; Samad, Lozano-Gracia, and Panman 2012; World Bank 2012, 2014, and 2016a).

1.10 In December 2012, the World Bank provided the first sectoral urban DPL (DPL I) for Colombia, followed by the second one in 2014 (DPL II), to promote the efficient management of cities and improve their productivity, sustainability, and inclusiveness. Extensive World Bank analysis on urbanization and dialogue on urban issues with the government of Colombia supported this operation (Samad, Lozano-Gracia, and Panman 2012).

## **2. Relevance of the Objectives and Design**

### **Objectives**

2.1 The project development objective (PDO) of the programmatic DPLs was “to support the strengthening of the government of Colombia’s policy framework on productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities” (World Bank 2014, i). The PDO comprises three subobjectives: productivity, sustainability, and inclusiveness. The relevant reform aspects are organized under each subobjective (table 2.1). Although the term *inclusive* was added under DPL II, inclusiveness had been a key policy intervention in DPL I (for the theory of change, see appendix B).

**Table 2.1. Objectives and Key Reform Aspects**

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Key Reform Aspects</b>
Productivity	(i) Establishing a multisector policy framework to develop and manage Colombia’s system of cities (ii) Strengthening the interjurisdictional coordination, among municipalities and across levels of government, of planning and investment (iii) Establishing an institutional and policy framework for urban connectivity and regional infrastructure
Sustainability	(i) Enhancing environmental efficiency (ii) Identifying high-risk settlements (iii) Establishing an institutional and policy framework to improve access to safe transport services
Inclusiveness	(i) Establishing a legal framework to improve access to basic water and sanitation services for low-income households (ii) Establishing a legal and policy framework to improve access to affordable housing for low-income households

Source: World Bank 2016b.

## Relevance of Objectives

2.2 Relevance of the objectives is **high**.

2.3 **Country context.** The PDO was highly relevant to the country context and well aligned with the government’s national and regional development strategies. The DPLs have remained aligned with the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Framework FY16–21, which centers the Bank Group’s engagement on three pillars: fostering balanced territorial development, enhancing social inclusion and mobility, and supporting fiscal sustainability and productivity. The DPL’s aims of promoting productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities are aligned with all three pillars (World Bank 2016a).

2.4 Despite efforts to develop a medium-term territorial development policy—within the country’s decentralized framework—national programs in Colombia were structured as sectoral strategies and lacked a coherent, integrated approach at the local level. The World Bank’s Colombia urbanization review introduced a concept of the SoC that enabled cities to operate as functional and efficient agglomerations, foster regional integration, and reduce regional inequalities (Samad, Lozano-Gracia, and Panman 2012). After the review, the government launched the Mission of Cities, a high-level initiative to define a national policy to carry them to 2035. The need for a territorial approach to development was reinforced in 2013, when Colombia started the process of joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which also emphasized the need to close regional gaps to reduce inequality (OECD 2014).

2.5 **Government and World Bank strategies.** Colombia's National Development Plan (NDP) 2010–14 recognized the importance of urban development as an engine of economic growth; however, it lacked provisions to enable territorial planning. The pursuant plan (NDP 2014–18) introduced a new framework on territorial planning using the SoC as part of the Mission of Cities that included demography, productivity, cost of living and quality of life, infrastructure, institutions and planning, rural-urban links, and finance. This new framework enabled the government to formulate territorial development strategies in important sectors such as transport, housing, and water and sanitation and to facilitate a collaborative planning process beyond cities' jurisdictional boundaries. After the DPLs' completion, the most recent NDP (2018–22) maintained this approach.

## Relevance of Design

2.6 Relevance of design is **substantial**. The PDO was explicit, and the four policy areas—(i) creating sustainable and inclusive cities, (ii) increasing access to affordable housing, (iii) strengthening institutions and regional coordination, and (iv) improving urban connectivity and regional infrastructure finance—supported it. Most policy and institutional reforms and measures were well informed by extensive analytical work (World Bank 2014, annex 7). The macroeconomic framework was fiscally sound at the time of approval.

2.7 The assessment of relevance of design is based on the analysis of prior actions and their relevance and criticality for the outcomes. A good understanding of the significance of prior actions is an important consideration factor in the analysis of logical links. It is expected that prior actions should be significant in terms of scope and ambition, credible and deep enough to trigger policy or institutional change, and largely irreversible under reasonable assumptions (World Bank 2015).

2.8 The criticality of some prior actions was evident. The approval of a multisector policy framework based on the SoC approach allowed urban planning to facilitate integrated and coordinated urban development in Colombia. Similarly, the policy for Colombia's Fourth Generation of Roads Concession (4G) Program increased confidence in better structuring of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for improved infrastructure to foster regional integration. The prior actions provided value added in terms of the continuous World Bank support and policy dialogue. However, as the World Bank team pointed out during the interview process, prior action on public space was an exception because the World Bank had not been engaged in this reform area.

2.9 Most prior actions contributed directly to the expected results of the programmatic series. In a few cases, prior actions had no links to the results: the

adoption of a road safety plan and the creation of transport institutions had no related outcomes. Some prior actions were processes or actions that required a follow-up to ensure implementation. For example, structuring NDP 2014–18 with a territorial or regional approach (prior action 1) under the SoC framework is an action, and the number of conceptual design or feasibility studies supporting travel demand management policies is a process. In these cases, it is difficult to discuss the causal links between actions and results that should be indicative for triggering change toward achieving the PDO.

## **3. Implementation**

### **Implementation Experience**

3.1 DPL I and DPL II were implemented according to the expected timeline of 2012–15. The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved DPL I in December 2012, and it closed in June 2013. DPL II was approved in December 2014 and closed in December 2015. No significant changes affected the design, scope, execution arrangements, schedule, or funding allocations of DPLs, which were implemented efficiently though with some minor shortcomings (World Bank 2014, 2016b).

3.2 As a lending instrument, a DPL is designed to support the central government budget. Financing was not earmarked to the sectoral ministries or the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación; DNP); at the same time, these institutions had to do most of the design work and were responsible for the implementation of policies and compliance with targets. During the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) mission, respondents responsible for program implementation remarked that their willingness to work on this operation depended on securing complementary support from other development partners to achieve results.

### **Environmental and Social Compliance**

3.3 The policies this operation supported were not expected to have any adverse social or environmental effects. On the contrary, several supported policies explicitly targeted poor and vulnerable urban households and had net positive environmental effects, as described and elaborated in the program documents (World Bank 2012, 2014). The DPL series included measures to address the negative externalities produced by increased motorization and congestion (both climate change considerations and local pollutants), natural disasters, and land degradation and to strengthen the overall environmental management and protection framework under the 4G Program (World Bank 2014). Social impacts were also expected to be positive because most prior actions included in the DPLs focused directly on improving outcomes for the lowest-income

residents of cities. For example, the improved affordable housing policy was expected to result in potential benefits for vulnerable populations through increased access to safe shelter and services.

### **Fiduciary Compliance**

3.4 The DPLs' proceeds were provided as general budget support to the government and not earmarked for any agency or purpose. Hence, no procurement actions were taken (World Bank 2017).

## **4. Achievement of the Objectives**

4.1 The achievement of objectives is discussed with respect to the three main objectives of the DPLs: (i) urban productivity, (ii) urban sustainability, and (iii) urban inclusiveness. Each objective encompassed policy areas associated with prior actions. Appendix B (theory of change) provides the detailed configuration of the policy areas and prior actions.

### **Objective 1. Strengthening of the Government of Colombia's Policy Framework on Productive Cities**

4.2 The achievement of this objective is **substantial**. This objective included three reform aspects: (i) establishing a multisector policy framework for Colombian cities; (ii) strengthening the interjurisdictional coordination, among municipalities and across levels of government, of planning and investment; and (iii) establishing an institutional and policy framework for urban connectivity and regional infrastructure.

#### **Reform Aspect 1. A Multisector Policy Framework**

4.3 The first reform aspect of objective 1—establishing a multisector policy framework for Colombian cities—was achieved.

#### **DPL I, Prior Action 1. Creation of a Subdirectorate of Territorial Development in the DNP**

4.4 In 2012, through Decree No. 1832, the government created the Subdirectorate of Territorial Development within the DNP. Among its 26 functions, the subdirectorate oversees supporting the formulation of the NDP's investment program and promotes the formulation and execution of policies for territorial planning and regional development. The NDP benefited from a highly participatory approach, with a substantial regional dialogue, identification of gaps, diagnosis of regional differences, and definition of the national and regional investment priorities.

4.5 **Outcome.** The outcome target was met for this prior action; the government successfully prepared the NDP for 2014–18, building on the policies and achievements of the NDP 2010–14. For the first time, the NDP 2014–18 included regional chapters and territorial and multisector indicators. The regional approach of development is also present in the NDP 2018–22.

## DPL II, Prior Action 1. Development of the System of Cities

4.6 In October 2014, the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social; CONPES) approved a multisector policy framework based on the SoC approach to strengthen their efficiency and sustainability, as evidenced by the CONPES document on the national policy to strengthen the SoC in Colombia (CONPES 2014b).

4.7 **Outcome.** The SoC contributed a new vision of planning practice in Colombia, allowing for the transition from a sectoral vision of development to a territorial and urban approach. The SoC was the central pivot point around which the NDP 2014–18, *Todos por un Nuevo País*, was conceived (Colombia, DNP 2015a).

4.8 A key finding of the evaluation mission was that the SoC also informed other sectoral policy and plans and promoted the territorial planning concept. For example, the Master Plan for Intermodal Transport was prepared in 2016 with the view to territorial planning informed by the SoC. The most relevant infrastructure projects to connect cities, regions, borders, and ports were identified and prioritized according to their impact on the competitiveness and the economic development of the country. The plan's design focused on identifying the multimodal transport network required to bring the most important agglomerations of the SoC closer to foreign trade, and it also outlined the required next steps to expand the transport network to isolated and disadvantaged regions (Colombia, ANI 2016). As discussed throughout this report, other national government policies on urban issues have been based on the SoC.

4.9 Similarly, the formulation of the SoC supported the design of a new categorization of municipalities to understand regional and municipal heterogeneities better and design appropriately differentiated economic policy interventions. Without changing the existing categorization but enhancing it as a tool for planning and design of public policies, the DNP uses a new methodology based on indicators of six different dimensions: (i) urban-regional functionality, (ii) economic dynamics, (iii) quality of life, (iv) environmental conditions, (v) safety level, and (vi) institutional capacity. The first criterion uses the SoC concept. Municipalities are classified into seven categories across three levels of development: robust, intermediate, and incipient (Colombia, DNP 2015b).

4.10 The evaluation mission found that although the SoC is widely used in the planning, design, and implementation of differentiated policies at the national government level, the conceptual framework has not been internalized or operationalized at the municipal level. In the cities visited (Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Medellín), the interviewees acknowledged awareness of the SoC but did not base their planning practice on it. The sustainability of the SoC requires efforts to extend its use as a policy framework beyond the DNP and the NDP to all national and territorial institutions involved in the planning, formulation, and implementation of urban policy.

## **Reform Aspect 2. Interjurisdictional Coordination of Planning and Investment**

4.11 The second reform aspect of objective 1—strengthening the interjurisdictional coordination, among municipalities and across levels of government, of planning and investment—was partially achieved.

### **DPL I, Prior Action 7. Regulation and Implementation of the Contratos Plan**

4.12 The Contratos Plan (CP) is formal signed agreements between the national government and subnational governments (SNG) to channel regional public investment based on territorial needs. The legal framework of the CP was implemented in the NDP 2010–14, the NDP 2014–18, the Organic Law of Territorial Organization of 2011 (Law No. 1454), and CONPES document 3822 of 2014, and is still evolving in the NDP 2018–2022. The legal framework of CP has emerged in the context of a decentralization arrangement, which generates weak incentives for subnational governments to dedicate own resources to complement intergovernmental transfers from the General Participations System and the lack of regional coordination to participate in investment projects with significant economic impact (see appendix C for more detail).

4.13 **Outcome.** At the DPLs' completion (December 2015), 7 CPs had been signed with nine departments, falling short of the targeted 10 CPs. The CPs were subsequently renamed Contratos Paz, and 6 additional contracts were signed between 2016 and 2018. In 2016, as the government was implementing the Peace Agreement, it used the CP as a legal mechanism to provide investments in regions prone to guerilla violence. In two phases, 2,320 projects were approved, of which 643 have been completed, 467 are in the execution phase, and 1,179 are in the initiation and planning phase (see Table 4.1). Transport infrastructure, housing, and agriculture have been the major recipients of the CP investment funds (see appendix C for more detail).

4.14 The CP mechanism was less dynamic than expected.<sup>2</sup> In 2014, based on the lessons of the pilot phase, the CP was strengthened as a planning instrument through CONPES 3822, and its elements were included in the NDP 2014–18 (Articles 198 and 199;

DNP 2015a; CONPES 2014a). The main changes were (i) a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities among different actors, (ii) the creation of a regional fund for the CP for better coordination and monitoring of funds, and (iii) the development of an internal monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to monitor projects within the CPs. In 2016–17, the second evaluation of CP was carried out (Colombia, DNP, USAID, and CNC 2017).

**Table 4.1. Projects and Commitments under the Contratos Plan and Contratos Paz**

<b>Project or Commitment</b>	<b>Contratos Plan</b>	<b>Contratos Paz</b>	<b>Total</b>
Contratos Plans ( <i>no.</i> )	7	6	13
Total number of approved projects ( <i>no.</i> )	902	1,418	2,320
Projects by Contratos Plan ( <i>average no.</i> )	129	233	362
Projects completed ( <i>no.</i> )	479	164	643
Projects in execution ( <i>no.</i> )	249	218	467
Projects in negotiation phase ( <i>no.</i> )	159	1,020	1,179
Discarded projects ( <i>no.</i> )	15	16	31
Total investments of projects completed and in execution ( <i>Col\$, millions</i> )	10,708,408	2,309,552	13,017,961
Average amount of investments per project ( <i>Col\$, millions</i> )	184,241	33,483	217,724
Total investments ( <i>Col\$, millions</i> )	15,518,145	9,037,096	24,555,241
<b>Commitments</b>			
Government ( <i>percent</i> )	78	56	70
Subnational governments ( <i>percent</i> )	22	36	27
Other sources ( <i>percent</i> )	0	8	3

Source: DNP 2019.

4.15 Weak prioritization of projects has resulted in each CP having many projects scattered in different sectors with a low impact at the regional level. In the transition toward Contratos Paz, the objective of financing major investments with the metropolitan and urban impact was further diluted because postconflict zones are generally small, far from city centers, and have low population densities and development priorities circumscribed to small areas of influence and multiple sectors. Compared with the first generation of the CP, the number of projects per Contratos Paz increased from 169 to 233, and the average investment decreased from Col\$184 million to Col\$33 million. Another relevant finding is that the impact of CPs varies according to the institutional capacity of the subnational governments involved. Atrato-Darién, a CP in which Antioquia Department was the leading subnational government, was highly successful in prioritizing, coordinating actions, and executing projects. It is the only CP that has been fully executed.

4.16 From the urban viewpoint, CPs have not been used as a mechanism for municipal coordination. All CPs have been signed with departments, although cities or groups of cities can take part. Rural projects represent 83 percent (see appendix C). IEG's discussions with authorities produced hypotheses for these results. First, as a constituent unit of departments, municipalities have benefited from projects financed by CPs, though the urban component incorporated in these projects is relatively low. It is in the central government's interest to promote investment at the departmental level because the financial capacity of departments is severely limited by weak revenue sources like excise taxes (on liquors, beers, cigarettes, tobacco, and hazard games). By contrast, municipal revenues depend on more dynamic and broad sources like property tax and industry and commerce tax (a levy on firms' net income). Second, because resources for investment are scarce at the departmental level, it is also in the interest of governors to execute CP investment projects outside of cities.

4.17 The third phase of the CP, started with the NDP 2018–22, seeks to return to the original idea of the CP as a multiparty financing mechanism for large regional investment projects. In the new NDP, the CP is again renamed as Pactos Territoriales. The plan is to confine projects to the nine regions identified by the gap methodology of the SoC, to be complemented with the analysis of interdependencies mentioned earlier (Colombia, DNP and RIMISP 2018). Several large projects were identified in a joint effort between the central government and subnational governments. A new CONPES document is being prepared that defines the details of the new generation of the CP.

#### **DPL II, Prior Action 6. Implementation of the New Metropolitan Areas Regime**

4.18 In 2013, Law N. 1625 established the requirements and standards providing metropolitan areas with a political, administrative, and fiscal regime. The associative plan of the metropolitan areas had been in the Colombian regulation since the 1970s,<sup>3</sup> but the new regulations establish that a metropolitan area consists of municipalities that belong to the same department or other departments located around a municipality, defined as "core" for the provision of public services and for the planning and coordination of sustainable development, human development, and territorial land use management. The creation of a metropolitan area requires the approval of (i) all mayors of the interested municipalities, (ii) one-third of the council members of each municipality, (iii) 5 percent of their citizens, and (iv) the governor or governors of the departments to which the municipalities belong.

4.19 The law also defines the leading role of a core municipality—the mayor of a core municipality is the chair of the metropolitan area board, and other mayors have a seat on the board. The law requires that municipalities assign resources for a metropolitan area operation. The responsibilities of a metropolitan area have remained largely

unchanged to program and coordinate the development of the integrated municipalities, rationalize and (eventually) extend public service delivery across the area, and execute road infrastructure works and projects of social interest. Nonetheless, the law added three additional functions: (i) a metropolitan area is responsible for the issuance of specific guidelines to ensure harmonization of territorial land use plans, (ii) a metropolitan area is the environmental and public transport authority of the area, and (iii) a metropolitan area is responsible for coordinating the social housing policy (Roldán 2017).

4.20 **Outcome.** DPL II did not establish a numerical indicator for this prior action. At completion (December 2015), there were seven metropolitan areas in the country (Valle de Aburrá,<sup>4</sup> Centro-Occidente, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Cúcuta, Valledupar, and Tunja). However, Tunja (created in 2016) is the only metropolitan area created after the regulation was issued in 2013 in the DPLs' framework. This suggests that the policy action was implemented but without much success; the creation of new metropolitan areas has not shown dynamism.

4.21 During the field interviews, the IEG team found that the political complexity of the participating municipalities to form a metropolitan area could be the main hindrance to the policy implementation. For example, the officials of Barranquilla explained that the municipality explored and voted for the creation of the metropolitan area, but the vote did not meet the required number. According to the officials, this was largely because of potentially concentrating political power to the dominant municipality; small municipalities perceive that creating the metropolitan area would concentrate more power in the core city of Barranquilla. The lack of financial resources also prevented successful operationalization of the metropolitan area. Municipalities must contribute resources to the metropolitan area operation that could otherwise be used autonomously on other projects. Unless the benefits of operating as a metropolitan area are evident, there are not many incentives to cede resources.

4.22 Another possible explanation for the low dynamism of the metropolitan area is that there are many other types of regional associative mechanisms (municipal and departmental associations, administrative regions and provinces for planning, and regions for planning and administration), all of which compete with metropolitan areas. An impact evaluation of metropolitan areas and other associative mechanisms found that a significant number of municipalities have little knowledge of the existing associative metropolitan area framework (Colombia, DNP, Economía Urbana, and SEI 2017; Roldán 2017; Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2016).

### **Reform Aspect 3. Urban Connectivity and Regional Infrastructure**

4.23 The third reform aspect of objective 1—establishing an institutional and policy framework for urban connectivity and regional infrastructure—was partially achieved.

#### **DPL I, Prior Action 8. Creation of a National Agency for Infrastructure to Structure Regional Infrastructure Concessions**

4.24 The government of Colombia created the National Infrastructure Agency (Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura; ANI) through Decree No. 4165 in 2011. The government changed the legal nature of the former National Institute of Concessions to establish the ANI as an eminent technical entity, operating with administrative and financial autonomy and high standards of governance and transparency. The creation of the ANI was necessary to restore confidence in the agency and increase standards of governance and transparency for the former National Institute of Concessions' allegedly corrupt practices and lack of results in the past.

4.25 There was no specific numerical indicator for this prior action. The newly created agency has been operating successfully to plan, coordinate, structure, contract, execute, administer, and evaluate concession projects and other forms of PPP for the design, construction, maintenance, operation, administration, and use of the public transport infrastructure in all its modes. The ANI employs 246 staff, about 74 percent of whom have a master's or specialized degree and competitive pay compared with the public sector's average (Colombia, ANI 2018a).

#### **DPL I, Prior Action 9. Approval of a New Regulation to Provide a Framework of Guidelines for PPP Structuring Financing and Management**

4.26 A new PPP regulatory framework was adopted through the Law on Public-Private Partnerships (Law N. 1508 of 2012). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) helped the government prepare the PPP umbrella legislation, incorporating international best practices. In 2014, experts from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IFC, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency provided further policy and technical advice for reforms allowing new sources of local domestic financing in infrastructure (World Bank 2018).

4.27 This law introduced improvements to the PPP model. It established efficient distribution of risks between the government and the concessionaires, introduced standardized contracts, and eliminated payment advances. The new model makes payments after fulfillment of service or the termination of functional units. Concessionaires must provide equity from the beginning of the project. Finally, the law established a limit on the renegotiation of contracts.

## DPL II, Prior Action 8. Approval of a Policy for Colombia's Fourth Generation of Road Concessions

4.28 Colombia's 4G program is a large-scale plan to create a nationwide toll road network with private sector participation. It was adopted through CONPES document 3760 (CONPES 2013c), which dictated the program guidelines, evidencing its economic impact and strategic need. Based on this, the ANI established a portfolio of projects that constituted the 4G Program. At the government's request, the Bank Group provided integrated advisory and financing support to lay the foundation for the program. The World Bank worked closely with the government, using an integrated approach, including (i) assistance in developing an enabling environment, (ii) support for the preparation of PPP transactions, (iii) capacity building for both officials and local investors, and (iv) direct investment in National Development Finance Corporation (Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional; World Bank 2018).

4.29 **Outcome.** By the DPLs' completion date (December 2015), the target of PPPs structured with signed contracts and financing frameworks under the 4G Program had been surpassed, with 11 PPPs approved versus a target of 8. According to the information provided by the ANI (appendix E), in March 2019, 14 projects were physically executed, and 8 were in the preinvestment phase and close to financial closure (expected by 2020). According to the more detailed data for March 2019, 11 projects show physical execution above 20 percent and 5 projects above 10 percent. Nearly 820 kilometers of roads have been built using PPP arrangements.

4.30 The 4G Program consists of 29 projects with investment estimated at \$14.6 billion. The program used the input of the SoC, and its implementation aimed at allowing the interconnectivity of regions, urban centers, and ports. The impact estimates suggest that its implementation would produce a reduction in travel times of about 30 percent and a decrease in vehicle operating costs by 20 percent, in addition to generating nearly 120,000 jobs at its construction peak period (Colombia, ANI 2018a).

4.31 The IEG mission confirmed that there is evident consensus on progress despite the restrictions related to the deterioration of the fiscal situation, the effect of the Odebrecht bribery scandal, and specific limitations in contractual management (environmental licenses and land acquisition, mainly; ANI 2018b). The World Bank, in the second edition of its report on regulation and implementation of PPP in infrastructure, highlighted the Colombian performance in ability to structure and prepare projects, in which the country obtains the best score in the region and the fourth in the world after countries such as Australia or the United Kingdom. Colombia ranks 25th overall in PPP regulation and implementation, matching countries with more experience in this field, such as Australia (World Bank 2018).

4.32 **Institutional factors.** Apart from the prior actions established in the DPLs, other institutional changes were introduced to consolidate the new concessions model in Colombia. In particular, in 2011, the government of Colombia created the National Development Finance Corporation, which started operations in 2013 (Decree No. 4174 in 2011). The corporation is a second-tier bank that allows leveraging the possible sources of financing for awarded PPP projects. Its shareholders are the national government, IFC, the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and CAF-Development Bank of Latin America. In addition, a new infrastructure law (Law No. 1682 from 2013) introduced regulation to alleviate cumbersome procedures encountered in infrastructure projects' execution. It also included elements to improve the planning and structuring of infrastructure projects (World Bank 2017).

#### **DPL II, Prior Action 7. Creation of a Transport Planning Unit and a Transportation Regulatory Commission**

4.33 The government issued regulations to create the Transport Infrastructure Regulation Commission (Law No. 1682 from 2013 and Decree No. 947 from 2014) and the Transport Infrastructure Planning Unit (Law No. 1682 and Decree No. 946 from 2014). The need to create these two institutions arose from recognizing that the transport infrastructure's slow development was associated with weak organizational structure in the sector. The Transport Master Plan identified duplication of functions, low levels of specialization, and lack of clarity in the definition of roles and responsibilities of different institutions; weak governance conflicts of interest; and limited information flows (Colombia, ANI 2016).

4.34 According to the regulations, the Transport Regulation Commission would be responsible for the design and definition of the regulatory framework for transport services and transport infrastructure (except for the maritime services) and, when market failures arise, for the promotion of efficiency and competition, and control of monopolies. The Transport Planning Unit would plan the development of transport infrastructure in a comprehensive, indicative, permanent, and coordinated manner; promote competitiveness, connectivity, mobility, and development; and consolidate and disseminate the information required for the formulation of transport infrastructure policy.

4.35 **Outcome.** Both institutions have been legally created but not operationalized. During the evaluation mission, different interviewees concurred that operationalizing these institutions has been postponed mainly for budgetary reasons originating from the deterioration of the central government's financial situation since 2015. The NDP 2018–22 highlights the reorganization of the transport sector as one of its objectives and the need for the operationalization of these institutions. The NDP suggests that the

government prioritize starting the operation of the Transportation Infrastructure Regulation Commission (NDP 2019).

## **Objective 2. Strengthening of the Government of Colombia’s Policy Framework on Sustainable Cities**

4.36 The achievement of the objective is modest. The objective included reform aspects to enhance environmental efficiency, identify high-risk settlements, and establish an institutional and policy framework to improve access to safe transport services.

### **Reform Aspect 1. Enhancing Environmental Efficiency**

4.37 The first reform aspect of objective 2—enhancing environmental efficiency—was partially achieved.

#### **DPL I, Prior Action 4. Approve National Public Space Policy Guidelines to Promote the Creation of Public Spaces in Urban Areas**

4.38 The NDP 2010–14 created the national public space policy to support subnational governments in strengthening their institutional capacity for planning and managing public space. Specific policy guidelines were delivered through CONPES document 3718 (CONPES 2012). The document established the concept of public space for planning, management, measurement, and monitoring. The definition includes green areas, parks, and squares that constitute public space. Finally, CONPES also provided guidelines to improve the quantitative and qualitative indicators of public space for municipalities to include in their development and territorial plans.

4.39 Notably, the World Bank has not been engaged in this reform area, as pointed out by the World Bank team during the interview process.

4.40 **Outcome.** The outcome indicator was to attain a level of 3.9 square meters per inhabitant at the completion of DPL II (December 2015), starting from the baseline of 3.3 square meters per inhabitant in 2012. According to DPL II, the availability of public spaces in cities increased from the baseline, reaching 3.6 square meters per capita. According to the DNP, the average indicator level for 30 Colombian cities increased slightly from 3.0 square meters per inhabitant in 2013 to 3.4 square meters per inhabitant in 2017, which is close to the baseline in 2012. Overall, evaluating compliance with the target is difficult because measurement of the indicator has been modified over time, yielding lower levels than those considered the baseline in DPL II.

## DPL I, Prior Action 5. Create a National Urban Redevelopment Company to Support the Structuring of Urban Redevelopment Projects

4.41 The National Company of Renovation and Urban Development was created in 2011 (Decree-Law No. 4184 from 2011) and started operations in 2012. Both DPLs indicated the company's broad objective would be supporting the structuring of urban redevelopment projects. The company was initially created but with a limited purpose (transformation of public land and renovation of public offices in Bogotá). However, the company's management facilitated the expansion of its scope for action.

4.42 **Outcome.** This prior action did not have an associated outcome target. In 2015, the government took additional regulatory measures to consolidate the company. These measures strengthened asset management by opening the possibility of land use modifications in the projects' areas and introducing new financial programs (through PPPs) to attract private resources. Spatial and architectural specifications of public buildings were also standardized. Law N. 1753 from 2015 modified the company's legal nature and transformed it into a public real estate agency (Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria Virgilio Barco). Today, the company has 18 full-time officers and 64 contractors, and it has engaged in 40 projects in Bogotá and other cities with investments of nearly \$180 million (see appendix D). Medellín, Cúcuta, Cartagena, and Bucaramanga, among other municipalities, have requested the company's services to renovate their public buildings. An Urban Renovation Fund is planned as a strategy for project financing.

## DPL II, Prior Action 2. Introduction of a Regulation for Cities to Adopt Congestion or Environmental Charging Schemes and Earmark the Revenues Collected to Improve Public Transit

4.43 Law No. 1450 from 2011 permitted municipalities or districts with more than 300,000 inhabitants to impose charges for the use of areas of high congestion or high pollution. Subsequently, Decree No. 2883 from 2013 established criteria to determine congestion charging zones and charging schemes. Law N. 1450 from 2011 also stipulated using the proceeds from congestion or pollution charges to finance road infrastructure and public transportation projects and programs, along with mitigation programs for vehicular environmental pollution.

4.44 **Outcome.** The process-oriented target of presenting at least two conceptual frameworks for the introduction of urban congestion charges was met. Bogotá and Cali prepared travel demand management studies. After the completion of the two DPLs, Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali submitted proposals for congestion charges to their city councils; however, these efforts met with political opposition.

4.45 Cali was the only city that approved a bill to introduce congestion and pollution pricing (Agreement 0401 of 2016). This measure establishes that the owners of private vehicles would be able to circulate during the *pico y placa* schedule, which restricts cars with specific plate numbers from driving on certain days, by paying about \$500 per year. The interviewees pointed out that the city was not able to collect a significant amount of revenues that could be earmarked to invest in improving public transit systems and nonmotorized modes (walking and cycling). This measure was also considered contradictory because it might have the opposite effect and worsen congestion by allowing the circulation of private vehicles that *pico y placa* would otherwise restrict.

4.46 The case of Bogotá is instructive. According to the INRIX 2018 Global Traffic Scorecard, Bogotá is one of the most congested cities in the world. In 2018, drivers lost 272 hours in road congestion.<sup>5</sup> Under the existing regulatory framework, the local government submitted congestion-charge proposals to the city council on three occasions (2011, 2014, and 2015). However, the council rejected them, arguing that the city still has a poorly performing public transport system that is unable to meet additional demand resulting from implementation of the proposed policy that would lead to a shift from private cars to public transport.

4.47 Efforts to introduce charges for congestion or pollution continue. For the financing of mobility plans, the new NDP authorizes cities to collect fees for the use of infrastructure or the use of certain areas (Article 97 of Law N. 1955 from 2019). The existing regulation defines fees or rates, and the NDP proposes the plan of public prices.

### DPL II, Prior Action 3. Introduction of a National Technical Standard for Electronic Vehicular Identification Systems

4.48 The Ministry of Transportation issued Decree No. 2846 on December 6, 2013, to set up a national technical standard for electronic vehicular identification systems. The introduction of the Electronic Vehicular Identification System was supported without a solid understanding of the applicability in Colombia and later proved technically and economically unfeasible. It was informed by the knowledge exchange between Singapore and Colombia through the World Bank's South-South Partnership. The idea was to introduce unified electronic devices for all vehicles that would enable identifying and charging of vehicles for tolls, congestion pricing, pollution charges, and parking, among others. This necessitated the adoption of a nationwide technology standard or protocol, which was defined through Decree No. 2846 as a vehicular radio frequency identification system based on standard ISO11EC 18000-63 or equivalent.

4.49 **Outcome.** The system has not been implemented. A feasibility analysis showed that the proposed system was expensive and complex. In 2015, the government of Colombia passed a decree on Intelligent Transportation Systems and completed the

definition of the regulatory framework for electronic payments through vehicular identification on Intelligent Transportation Systems (Decree No. 2060 and Resolution 4303 of 2015). The Ministry of Transportation, as the lead institution implementing this regulation, created an internal unit in 2015 to work on standardizing the technology for single-card electronic vehicular identification and toll collection. The ministry intends to incorporate this unit of 19 professionals as an integral part of its structure.

4.50 It is noteworthy that cities are using electronic technology to apply road use charges, and ongoing work focuses on introducing differentiation by strata and social variables. Seven cities are implementing the Integrated Mass Transportation Systems and have adopted centralized payment systems based on electronic payment using smart cards without contact, and a fleet management and control system as a verification and monitoring tool, which allows the location of vehicles and eases fleet management. The Strategic Systems of Public Transportation, which are currently being structured, incorporate the technical, technological, and financial elements mentioned previously. A control team in the Pasto municipality pioneered the system in 2015.

## **Reform Aspect 2. High-Risk Settlements**

4.51 The second reform aspect of objective 2—identifying high-risk settlements—was not achieved.

### **DPL II, Prior Action 4. Adopt a Standardized Methodology to Be Used by Colombian Municipalities and Districts to Select, Collect, and Consolidate, in a National Inventory, Information Relating to Human Settlements Located in Areas Prone to Landslides and Floods**

4.52 In 2012, the Ministry of Housing, Cities, and Territories (Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio; MVCT), requested World Bank support to quantify the number of urban settlements located in areas at high risk from floods and landslides. An initial joint study carried out in several Colombian municipalities found that the methods used for the identifying and quantifying families located in high-risk settlements were neither consistent nor systematic. In 2014, the MVCT issued Resolution N. 448, which legally requires municipalities to comply with the methodology for development of the national inventory. The methodology, compiled in a guide, was prepared in a highly participatory process, and the MVCT developed software and trained 148 municipalities in its use in 2015 and 2016. The ministry has also conducted dissemination activities to inform municipalities and encourage them to use the guide and upload the information in the software.

4.53 **Outcome.** Upon completion of the DPL series, only 4 municipalities had prepared their inventory versus a target of 42 established in the development policy

operation (DPO), and no progress was made in 2016–18. One of the reasons expressed in the interviews is the low capacity of the subnational governments to build their inventories. The MVCT has been providing technical assistance to municipalities, and 230 municipalities were trained in 2014–18 (MVCT 2018).

### **Reform Aspect 3. Access to Safe Transport Services**

4.54 The third reform aspect of objective 2—establishing an institutional and policy framework to improve access to safe transport services—was partially achieved.

#### **DPL I, Prior Action 3. Adoption of a Road Safety Plan**

4.55 In 2012, the government adopted the National Road Safety Plan 2011–16 (Resolution N. 1282 from March 30, 2012). This program was revised in 2013 through a participatory process led by the Ministry of Transportation, and the revised plan for 2014–21 was approved in 2014 (Resolution 2273). It includes an action plan with about 60 activities to be conducted at the national level and across sectors and guidelines on road safety at the local level.

4.56 The National Road Safety Agency (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Vial) was created by Law No. 1702 from 2013 and started operations in May 2016. The agency is responsible for preparing, planning, coordinating, and monitoring the National Security Road Plan. The plan guides and promotes coordinated measures throughout the national territory, encouraging the formulation and application of policies and actions at the departmental and municipal level to reduce the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents at the country level. The National Road Safety Observatory within the agency manages and analyzes the information and contributes to the design, implementation, and monitoring of policies related to road safety. To support the agency's operation, the law also created the National Road Safety Fund, which receives revenue of 3 percent of the total insurance premiums paid on the issuance of mandatory motor vehicle liability insurance policies.

4.57 **Outcome.** No outcome indicator was linked to this prior action in the DPLs. The observatory's main activities include workshops and training for public officials at the local level and education campaigns at the national level. It requires additional support to oversee effective enforcement at the local level, including for relevant data collection and analysis. The sector requires additional support because road safety indicators are not improving: road accidents are the second most common cause of death in the country, with a high fatality rate for motorcyclists (Colombia, Ministerio de Transport 2018).

### Objective 3. Strengthening of the Government of Colombia’s Policy Framework on Inclusive Cities

4.58 The achievement of this objective is **high**. The objective included three reform aspects to establish a legal framework to improve access to basic water and sanitation services for low-income households and affordable housing.

#### Reform Aspect 1. Access to Basic Water and Sanitation Services

4.59 The first reform aspect of objective 3—establishing a legal framework to improve access to basic water and sanitation services for low-income household—was achieved.

#### DPL I, Prior Action 2. Facilitate Improved Access to Basic Services for Low-Income Households across Colombian Cities

4.60 The Intrahome Connections to Water and Sanitation Program (Programa de Conexiones Intradomiciliarias a Servicios de Agua y Saneamiento Básico) was created by the NDP 2010–14 and confirmed in the NDP 2014–18. The detailed regulation was issued through Resolutions 494 from 2012 and 169 from 2013 and Decree 1077 from 2015. To contribute to greater inclusiveness and improvements in the quality of life for the poor in Colombian cities, the regulation allowed provision of subsidies for very poor families to connect households to neighborhood water and sanitation services. The subsidies included installation of internal networks and hydrosanitary devices, such as dishwashers, showers, toilets, sinks, and laundry, for access to these services.

4.61 **Outcome.** The indicator target for improved access to basic water and sanitation networks for low-income households was exceeded upon the DPLs’ completion (December 2015). A total of 32,161 low-income households (strata 1 and 2 in a socioeconomic scale) in 25 cities, with an average population of 100,000 residents, were connected to the neighborhood water and sanitation networks through a connection subsidy, against a target of 25,000. As of May 2018, the program continued to operate but at a slower pace. From the creation of the program in 2012 until May 31, 2018, 34,349 subsidies were extended, benefiting more than 150,000 Colombians in strata 1 and 2 in 32 municipalities of the country.

4.62 In 2016, the DNP conducted an impact evaluation of the program, which showed that the program was responsible for reducing diarrhea cases in children under age 5 years and youth under age 18 years. The reduction is estimated at 33.9 percent for children under age 5 years and at 1.57 percent for youth. The impact evaluation calculated the direct benefits to families from lower morbidity costs (no transportation costs or costs of medical visits). Several of the impacts could not be quantified, such as

improved psychosocial health and well-being for the families and greater security for women within their household.

## **Reform Aspect 2. Affordable Housing for Low-Income Households**

4.63 The second reform aspect of objective 3—establishing a legal and policy framework to improve access to affordable housing for low-income households—was achieved.

### **DPL I, Prior Action 6 and DPL II, Prior Action 5. Legal Framework for the Provision of Public Housing and for the Priority Interest Program for Savers**

4.64 The MVCT enacted a new comprehensive housing policy and established the legal basis for new financial mechanisms aimed at providing affordable housing to low-income families (Law No. 1537 from 2012).<sup>6</sup> This law also assigned responsibilities across levels of government for the provision of housing to low-income households and incentivized private sector involvement. CONPES documents 3740 and 3746 from 2013 spell out the financial and legal details of the programs included as prior actions in the DPLs (CONPES 2013a, 2013b): the Free Housing Program (Programa de Vivienda Gratuita; PVG), the public housing program for low-income households with mortgage-paying capacity, and the Priority Interest Housing for Savers Program (Vivienda de Interés Prioritario para Ahorradores; VIPA).<sup>7</sup>

4.65 The PVG was designed as an in-kind subsidy for the most vulnerable households (that is, households in displacement conditions because of armed conflict, affected by natural disasters, or living under conditions of extreme poverty). The VIPA program was a mixed subsidy program that included a subsidy for the down payment and an interest rate subsidy. It was intended to benefit families with an income below two legal minimum wages. In 2015, the Mi Casa Ya program was established for better targeting and promoting efficiency in the awarding process of subsidies, introducing some changes to the VIPA program. Mi Casa Ya was aimed at households with incomes between two and four legal minimum wages. The program introduced additional requirements for eligible families: (i) not owning a home in Colombia, (ii) not having been granted a housing subsidy or interest rate subsidy, and (iii) the housing unit value not exceeding 135 legal minimum wages. To improve the efficiency of the subsidy granting process, a technological platform developed by the banking sector was used to verify the family's eligibility online.

4.66 **Outcome.** As of September 2018, 102,852 in-kind subsidies were granted through the PVG, surpassing the initial goal (and the DPLs' target) of 100,000. The MVCT expanded this program to a second phase of 30,000 new free houses, concentrating in the poorest municipalities. A total of 4,641 subsidies of the second phase had been delivered

by September 2018.<sup>8</sup> Between 2013 and 2018, public investment in the PVG was estimated at about \$1.9 billion. For the VIPA program, 135 housing projects were built in 21 departments. Since 2013, 35,953 subsidies were assigned at the DPLs' closure compared with the target of 10,000 housing subsidies. Between 2016 and December 2018, an additional 53,737 VIPA subsidies had been assigned, and the government expects to grant 32,311 subsidies in 2019.

4.67 The DPLs supported the adjustments to the low-income housing policy and were effective in reducing a quantitative housing deficit, which decreased from 20 percent in 2012 to 14.5 percent in 2018 (figure 4.1). The new government, despite additional modifications to the policy, maintains this segmentation.

**Figure 4.1. Quantitative Housing Deficit in Colombia, 2010–18**



Source: MVCT 2018.

4.68 The PVG, however, faced difficulties. First, the high fiscal cost of the program could be financed when the national government's financial situation was solid, but the deterioration of the fiscal situation since 2015 affected the pace of program execution. Second, the program found cohabitation problems among the owners in several projects caused by various factors.<sup>9</sup> Interviews with national and local authorities showed that the social activities required for harmonious cohabitation in condominiums were unforeseen as part of the program and after a short time, conflicts, disputes, and unwanted situations started occurring. Third, many of the projects did not foresee the need for constructing facilities such as schools, health centers, and parks, which made it harder for families to adapt to their new lives. However, national and local authorities have been deploying social support actions to address these problems.<sup>10</sup>

## 5. Ratings

### Outcome

5.1 The outcome of the DPL series is **satisfactory**. Specifically, the objectives of the DPL series were highly relevant in terms of both the government's strategic priorities and the World Bank's strategy. Relevance of design is **substantial** given that most prior actions of the programmatic series contributed directly to its expected results of the programmatic series. However, the significance of selected prior actions and definition of outcome had weaknesses. There was high achievement of the inclusion objective, substantial achievement of the productivity objective, and modest achievement for the sustainability (whose definition was limited per the agreed actions).

### Risk to Development Outcome

5.2 The risk to development outcome is **modest**. The government has maintained its strong commitment to promoting regional and local development. This continuity has persisted in recent years despite political changes (2018 presidential election) and less favorable economic conditions. Relevant reforms to the transport sector's institutions remain in force despite changes in economic conditions and factors associated with the afore-mentioned Odebrecht scandal. Several measures have not been adopted for budgetary reasons (that is, transport planning and regulatory entities). Public expenditure inflexibility is particularly high in Colombia, making budget items like the extension of subsidies or the creation of entities (generally more flexible) prone to being diminished or eliminated. Also, political factors may hinder the implementation of some measures and sustainability of public initiatives. This is the case in the introduction of congestion charges. However, the government of Colombia's perseverance to seek more politically feasible options is notable. Although the government adopted the right measures to enable interventions at the local level, their implementation has been slower than expected due to the autonomy of subnational governments. In other cases, the delay was mainly caused by low institutional capacity in many subnational governments.

### Bank Performance

#### Quality at Entry

5.3 Bank performance was **satisfactory**. The macroeconomic framework was adequate for the purposes of development policy lending. The DPLs were part of a programmatic and multisectoral Bank Group engagement supported through a portfolio of financial, knowledge, and convening services (World Bank 2014). Considerable

analytical work informed the DPL series, and the World Bank strategically prioritized the policy areas through its flagship urbanization review report. For the respective sectoral areas, the World Bank worked closely with the government to induce policy reform.

5.4 According to the client, the urbanization review was critical to enabling the government of Colombia to perform territorial planning. The concept of clustering cities by urbanization ratio was well accepted and internalized by the government. Most of the interviewees said that the World Bank and IFC support to ANI and PPP significantly transformed the enabling environment for transport PPP.

5.5 The M&E design was adequate on balance, with some moderate shortcomings (see the Monitoring and Evaluation section).

### Quality of Supervision

5.6 The World Bank team engaged with the government and established clear mechanisms of program supervision, primarily through the DNP. The World Bank also worked closely with the DNP's Subdirectorate of Public Credit, which coordinated donor support for the government. The World Bank conducted regular discussions and two supervision missions. Close coordination between urban and transport specialists enhanced the quality of supervision of the multisector urban program.

5.7 The World Bank team made revisions to improve the M&E design, but some shortcomings remained.

### Borrower Performance

#### Government Performance

5.8 Government performance is **satisfactory**. The government commitment was high and largely informed by the World Bank's previous analytical work like the urbanization review. It initiated background papers and held consultation meetings with diverse stakeholders among governments and civil society. This initiative created a solid foundation to rationalize the SoC in Colombia, which ended up being one of the strategic policy areas in the NDP.

5.9 At the central level, the DNP conducted numerous technical analyses to enable some prior actions. The Ministry of Transportation was well informed by the policy to foster a strategic transportation system, such as the multimodal transport network. On balance, the policy reforms achieved satisfactory results in many areas, although some lacked progress for budgetary reasons, political complexity, or low capacity at the local level.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

5.10 M&E quality is rated **substantial**, recognizing that the project would have benefited from the development and inclusion of more outcome indicators in line with the reform aims. This was especially true for the aim of achieving sustainability of Colombia's cities.

### Design

5.11 The results framework of the programmatic DPL reflected a complex multisector intervention that interconnected four broad policy areas in support of achieving the development objectives. The program's policy matrix presented prior actions of the first operation and triggers for the next operation.

5.12 Indicators had concrete baselines and targets and, with a few exceptions, were measurable. Some indicator measurements had issues, as in the case of urban public space availability. In other cases, a numerical indicator was not set, and targets were instead set in terms of the adoption of a reform, the implementation of a process, or the creation of an entity. Some results were defined more in terms of outputs broadly attributable to specific reforms. In some instances, these were processes and actions rather than results; for example, for prior actions 2 and 3 of DPL II, the number of conceptual design or feasibility studies supporting travel demand management policies is a process.

### Implementation

5.13 The original policy and results matrix defined medium-term objectives under each policy area that were consequently dropped under DPL II (World Bank 2012, 19–21). DPL II formally added the term “inclusive” to the PDO statement “to support the strengthening of the Government of Colombia's policy framework on productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities” (World Bank 2014, i). The term had already been used throughout DPL I, in line with many prior actions, especially in its first policy area. DPL II included four new prior actions and a revision of the wording of the other five indicative triggers. Overall, although there were certain improvements in the M&E design, certain results indicators and links between prior actions and outcomes could have been strengthened.

### Use

5.14 The government used the M&E data to track progress of the programmatic DPL reforms.

## 6. Lessons

6.1 Several lessons emerged from this assessment of the Colombian DPL series.

6.2 **Tacit assumptions that additional fiscal outlays will be forthcoming to support prior actions in DPOs can create risks to the sustainability of policy reforms.** Risks to sustainability were detected in components that required additional fiscal resources, such as the extension of subsidies (for example, the PVG), matching grants (for example, the CP), or the creation of new entities (for example, the creation of a transport regulation commission and a planning unit). Their implementation was dynamic at times of adequate fiscal resources (2012–14) but lost momentum when the fiscal space tightened (2014–18). During periods of fiscal stress, the government can reduce budget allocations to flexible budget items, such as those involved in the DPLs.

6.3 **When designing prior actions that require local-level implementation, it is important to consider municipal capacity and the time required to enact local-level reforms.** In the case of the Colombia urbanization DPLs series, delays occurred because of low technical and institutional capacity at the local level; in some cases, only the largest cities were able to make progress. The Colombian decentralization model that provides full local autonomy presents difficulties in the implementation of policy reforms at the local level. Although the government has enabled local interventions in national laws and decrees, municipalities can autonomously decide when to implement certain enacted policies depending on the balance with other priorities and resource availability.

6.4 **In designing multisectoral DPOs with many prior actions across sectors, which include local implementation requirements, municipal capacity building may be required.** Central government agencies, the World Bank, or other international financial institutions can deliver the support. As an instrument, a DPL is designed to support the central government budget without earmarking financing to sector ministries that are part of the operation. Parties responsible for overseeing implementation indicated that their willingness to work on this operation depended on securing complementary support. The DNP and line ministries must do most of the design work and are responsible for implementing policies and complying with targets. In fact, for complying with their commitments, in some cases, they needed to source other finance from development partners to make sure the policy measures were achieved.

6.5 **In the context of multisector DPOs, it is critical that prior actions be directly linked to results indicators so a clear line of sight and envisioned impact is identified ex ante, thus supporting a strong design at entry.** In these DPLs, the results were expected to trigger policy and institutional change in support of more productive,

sustainable, and inclusive cities in Colombia. Some results were defined more in terms of outputs broadly attributable to specific reforms, and in some cases, these were processes and actions rather than results. For example, structuring the NDP 2014–18 with a territorial or regional approach that takes into account the SoC framework is an action, and the number of conceptual design or feasibility studies supporting travel demand management policies is a process. In these instances, it is difficult to discuss the causal links between actions and results that should be indicative of having triggered changes that signal the achievement of the development objectives.

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<sup>1</sup> Since the late 1960s, subnational governments have been enabled to constitute associations, for example, through the creation of metropolitan areas in the case of municipalities. However, these association mechanisms are voluntary. The institutional arrangement does not mandate functions or provide governmental resources to associations as the Constitution does for departments and municipalities to deliver the delegated services.

<sup>2</sup> An analysis on the impact of the Contratos Plan (CP) highlighted the need to introduce the following adjustments: (i) build the capacity to monitor the content and commitments agreed to in the CP; (ii) strengthen the organization of the teams involved in the implementation of the CP through a detailed definition of roles and responsibilities; (iii) address the issue of the responsibilities and commitments attributed to the sectors in the CP (it was not possible to demand compliance to the sectors at any territorial level); (iv) define other and additional sources of funds for the CPs; and (v) enable a horizontal articulation among regions.

<sup>3</sup> The 1968 Constitutional Amendment granted legal status to metropolitan areas. In 1979, Decree No. 3104 introduced specific requirements and operational regulations for metropolitan areas, and in 1994, Law N. 128 added specific provisions related to their administrative responsibilities and financing sources. Under that regulatory setup, the decision to create a metropolitan area was at the departmental assembly level, and municipalities had little influence in this decision. The governance plan did not require all municipalities to participate; only the presence of the core municipality and two additional ones are required in a metropolitan area's governing board.

<sup>4</sup> Valle de Aburrá (Medellín and its surrounding municipalities), created in 1980, is the metropolitan area with the most development prospects. According to interviews held during the evaluation mission, authorities mentioned that its success has been mainly the result of the shared view of the necessity of municipal cooperation for regional development, the long-term planning approach, and the availability of resources to operate and execute their plans. Medellín has contributed significant resources to the metropolitan area. Additionally, the metropolitan area could possibly raise its own resources from the environmental surcharge, pollution fee, and the service provision fee. The main elements of the metropolitan area of Valle de Aburrá's metropolitan planning are included in the Metropolitan Development Plan prepared for 2008–20. Authorities commented that they are working on a new one with a 10-year horizon. In addition, their actions are guided by the Metropolitan Land Use Guidelines, the Basin Management Plan, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan, the Metropolitan Mobility Master Plan, the Plan

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for the Territory Occupation, the Land Management Standards, and the Metropolitan Strategic Housing and Habitat.

<sup>5</sup> See the INRIX 2018 Global Traffic Scorecard at <http://inrix.com/scorecard/>.

<sup>6</sup> Colombian housing policy gained new momentum at the beginning of the current decade—in 2011, the National Development Plan 2010–14 (*Prosperidad para Todos*) chose the home building sector as one of the five engines of growth, and in 2012, the Santos administration created the Ministry of Housing, Cities, and Territories (Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio; MVCT). The ministry emerges from splitting the Ministry of Housing and Environment into two entities: the MVCT and the Ministry of Environment. The new policy design introduced a segmentation among the poor households and set up a financial instrument to assist each segment according to its saving capacity. The policy's primary purpose was to reach the poorest families. Because of low or no saving capacity, the poorest and most vulnerable families, in practice, had been excluded from previously implemented financing arrangements, accumulating a high quantitative deficit of affordable housing in this segment of the population.

<sup>7</sup> Under the previous system, although the policy differentiated between public housing for low-income families and public housing for the poorest households, based on housing unit costs, there were no distinctions within the second heterogeneous segment, where some households may have some mortgage-paying capacity. Originally, the designed subsidy program was similar for both public housing for low-income families and the poorest households. The subsidy was extended to families to facilitate access to credit from financial institutions, that is, to achieve the financial closure for extremely low-income households. However, the financial closure was not achieved in many cases because of the low saving capacity of poorest households and the prudent attitude of the Colombian banking sector, meaning that a substantial percentage of budgeted resources for housing subsidies was not executed. Also, the participation of the private sector in the construction phase was not conducted under clear rules. Corrupt practices have been identified, the quality of construction was often inadequate, and many projects never came to fruition (Herrera 2019). Law N. 1537 of 2012 included other important principles intended to make the participation of the private sector more efficient. For example, the law establishes that payments to private developers are made at the end of the project against delivery of finished housing and requires minimum technical construction standards. To avoid geographical concentration, the new policy enabled subnational governments with land availability to participate in the program (Herrera 2019).

<sup>8</sup> The new government is planning to suspend the program because of its high fiscal cost.

<sup>9</sup> Families began to live in condominiums with multiple neighbors and social interactions, while in fact, numerous benefited families had previously lived in houses in the countryside or on the outskirts of the city, relatively isolated from each other. As a result, families were not familiar with rules governing the vertical property, such as administration fees and garbage management. In other cases, numerous families used to obtain their subsistence from activities or businesses developed inside their home, which is impossible under condominium rules. Large families started to live in housing with better conditions but of smaller size, which caused overcrowding.

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<sup>10</sup> Territorial entities and the government of Colombia were forced to develop social support programs. The MVCT has worked in four action lines (community organization, rights and duties, security and communal harmony, and productive development) through alliances with nongovernmental organizations and based on workshops and cooperative activities under the National System of Social Accompaniment and Social Infrastructure to the Free Housing Program. Actions taken at the local level have reinforced these efforts. In the case of Medellín, for example, the Housing and Habitat Social Housing Institute of Medellín (Instituto Social de Vivienda y Hábitat de Medellín), which is in charge of managing the municipality of Medellín's housing programs, deployed measures of social support successfully. The mission found that these programs' success at the local level varies according to the city's institutional capacity.

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## Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

### First Programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loan (Loan No. IBRD-82250)

Table A.1. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate (\$, millions)	Actual or Current Estimate (\$, millions)	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	150	150	100
Loan amount	150	150	100

Table A.2. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY12
Appraisal estimate (\$, millions)	150
Actual (\$, millions)	150
Actual as percent of appraisal	100
Date of final disbursement	12/21/2012

Table A.3. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Concept review	07/11/2012	07/11/2012
Negotiations	09/25/2012	09/25/2012
Board approval	12/13/2012	12/13/2012
Signing	12/14/2012	12/14/2012
Effectiveness	12/19/2012	12/19/2012
Closing date	06/30/2013	06/30/2013

Table A.4. Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Original Staff time (no. weeks)	Actual Cost <sup>a</sup> (\$, thousands)
Lending		
Total	38.17	232,833.18
Supervision or ICR		
Total	4.33	34,611.20
<b>Total</b>	<b>42.50</b>	<b>290,727.56</b>

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.

a. Including travel and consultant costs.

## Second Programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loan (Loan No. IBRD-84550)

Table A.5. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate (\$, millions)	Actual or Current Estimate (\$, millions)	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	700	700	100
Loan amount	700	700	100

Table A.6. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY14
Appraisal estimate (\$, millions)	700
Actual (\$, millions)	700
Actual as percent of appraisal	100
Date of final disbursement	12/16/2014

Table A.7. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Concept review	03/11/2014	03/11/2014
Negotiations	10/06/2014	10/06/2014
Board approval	12/12/2014	12/12/2014
Signing	12/15/2014	12/15/2014
Effectiveness	12/18/2014	12/16/2014
Closing date	12/31/2015	12/31/2015

Table A.8. Staff Time and Cost


Stage of Project Cycle	Original Staff time (no. weeks)	Actual Cost <sup>a</sup> (\$, thousands)
Lending		
Total	76.80	305,027.37
Supervision or ICR		
Total	18.34	85,122.06
<b>Total</b>	<b>95.14</b>	<b>390,149.43</b>

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report

a. Including travel and consultant costs.

# Appendix B. Theory of Change

Figure B.1. Theory of Change for Productive and Sustainable Cities



Note: DNP = National Planning Department (Colombia); PPP = public-private partnership; WSS = water and sanitation services.

## Objective 1. Productivity

The first objective of the development policy operation (DPO) is to support the government of Colombia at strengthening the policy framework on productive cities. This objective includes three policy areas and eight prior actions.

- Establish a multisector policy framework to develop and manage Colombia's system of cities through two prior actions: (i) the creation of a Subdirectorate General of Territorial Development in the National Planning Department (prior action 1.1.1) and (ii) the development of the system of cities conceptual framework (prior action 2.1.1).
- Create an interjurisdictional coordination mechanism to strengthen regional planning and public investment through two prior actions: (i) design and implementation of Contratos Plan, with horizontal (between two or more jurisdictions of the same level) and vertical (between various levels of government) coordination mechanisms within a region (prior action 1.3.1) and (ii) the introduction of a legal metropolitan framework for coordinating planning and development between large cities and their areas of influence through changes in the existing metropolitan areas framework (prior action 2.3.1).
- Establish an institutional and policy framework for urban connectivity and regional infrastructure through four prior actions: (i) the creation of the National Infrastructure Agency (prior action 1.4.1), (ii) the creation of a new model of infrastructure concessions (prior action 1.4.2), (iii) the creation of a Transport Planning Unit and the corresponding Transport Regulatory Commission (prior action 2.4.1), and (iv) the implementation of fourth generation concessions under the new model of investment management established in ii (prior action 2.4.2).

## Objective 2. Sustainability

The second objective of the DPO is to support the government of Colombia at strengthening the policy framework on sustainable cities. This objective includes six prior actions.

- Enhance environmental efficiency by creating public spaces through two prior actions: (i) the introduction of national public space policy guidelines to promote the creation of public spaces in urban areas (prior action 2.4.2) and (ii) the creation of a national urban redevelopment company to support the structuring of urban redevelopment projects (prior action 2.4.2).
- Identify high-risk settlements through one prior action: the adoption of a standardized methodology to be used by municipalities and districts to select, collect, and consolidate, in a national inventory, information relating to human settlements located in areas prone to landslides and floods (prior action 2.1.4).
- Introduce a regulation allowing municipalities or districts with population above 300,000 people to establish charges to motorists in connection with the use of

urban areas with, among other things, high traffic congestion and pollution to improve public transit (prior action 2.1.2), and adopt a national technical standard for electronic vehicular identification systems aimed at collecting data to identify ground transportation vehicles through radiofrequency systems (prior action 2.1.3).

- Improve access to safe transport services through adoption of a National Road Safety Plan for 2011–16 to increase urban and interurban road safety in its territory (prior action 1.1.3).

### **Objective 3. Inclusiveness**

The third objective of the DPO is to support the government of Colombia in strengthening the policy framework on inclusive cities. This objective includes prior actions in two policy areas.

- Improve access of low-income urban population to water and sanitation services through one prior action: introduction of a regulation for the provision of subsidies for water and sanitation connections for lower-income families (strata 1 and 2; prior action 1.1.2).
- Increase access to affordable housing for low-income households through two prior actions: (i) adoption of the legal framework for the provision of public housing to the poorest and most vulnerable households, which do not have any saving capacity (prior action 1.2.1), and (ii) establishment of the principles of regulation for carrying out the Priority Interest Housing Program for Savers, which is aimed at providing different types of subsidies to selected families to facilitate purchase of a house (prior action 2.2.1).

## Appendix C. Details of Contratos Plan

After the French experience, the Contratos Plan (CP) was introduced with two main objectives: The first was to articulate investment initiatives between the central government and subnational governments (vertical dimension) and to stimulate departments and municipalities to agree on the prioritization of investments in projects with a significant impact at the regional level (horizontal articulation). The second objective was the concurrence of central and subnational governments financing for investment. A CP can be signed between the central government and departments, municipalities, a group (association) of departments, or a group (association) of municipalities. A dedicated regional fund was created in the National Development Plan 2014–18. This fund was constituted with concurrent financing resources and aimed at the fulfillment of objectives, goals, and results agreed on each CP. The details of Contratos Plan and Contratos Paz are presented in Table C.1 and C.2.

**Table C.1. Details of Contratos Plan**

Name of CP	Number of Approved Projects	Number of Projects Completed	Number of Projects in Execution	Number of Projects in Mangement	Number of Discarded Projects	Total Investments of Projects Completed and in Execution \$COL million	Average Amount of Investments per Project \$COL million	Total Investments \$COL million
Contratos Plan								
1. Arauca	0	113	13	7	2	\$ 678,025	\$ 5,381	\$ 1,741,000
2. Atrato Gran Darié	166	111	39	16	0	\$ 1,128,591	\$ 7,524	\$ 1,128,591
3. Boyacá	113	9	54	40	10	\$ 1,234,044	\$ 19,588	\$ 2,037,038
4. Cauca	147	63	49	35	0	\$ 734,378	\$ 6,557	\$ 944,548
5. Nariño	159	98	27	34	0	\$ 1,494,510	\$ 11,956	\$ 1,521,474
6. Santander	43	10	28	3	2	\$ 4,874,986	\$ 128,289	\$ 7,245,494
7. Tolima	139	75	39	24	1	\$ 563,874	\$ 4,946	\$ 900,000
Contratos Paz								
1. Bolívar y Sucre	537	43	80	403	11	\$ 960,239	\$ 7,807	\$ 3,939,792
2. Caquetá	198	35	18	144	1	\$ 488,675	\$ 9,220	\$ 1,417,720
3. Guainía	81	8	15	58	0	\$ 86,219	\$ 3,749	\$ 265,118
4. Guaviare	166	5	18	143	0	\$ 114,666	\$ 4,985	\$ 484,410
5. Meta	181	16	23	141	1	\$ 130,587	\$ 3,348	\$ 1,457,715
6. Valle del Cauca	255	57	64	131	3	\$ 529,167	\$ 4,373	\$ 1,472,341

Source: DNP.

Note: CP = Contratos Plan.

**Table C.2. Contratos Plan and Contratos Paz: Number of Projects by Sector**

		Contratos Plan		Contratos Paz	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Urban/Rural	Urban	189	20.95	154	10.86
	Rural	445	49.33	1,172	82.65
	Urban/rural	268	29.71	92	6.49
Sector	Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural	121	13.41	172	12.13
	Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenibl	16	1.77	116	8.18
	Ciencia y Tecnología	35	3.88		0.00
	Comercio, Industria y Turismo	32	3.55	28	1.97
	Cultura	14	1.55	14	0.99
	Defensa	9	1.00	1	0.07
	Deporte y Recreación	11	1.22	44	3.10
	Educación	137	15.19	130	9.17
	Inclusión Social y Reconciliación	41	4.55	146	10.30
	Información Estadística	1	0.11	0	0.00
	Interior	1	0.11	4	0.28
	Justicia y del Derecho	0	0.00	4	0.28
	Minas y Energía	50	5.54	103	7.26
	Planeación	7	0.78	120	8.46
	Proyectos por definir	0	0.00	0	0.00
	Salud y Protección Social	99	10.98	50	3.53
	Tecnologías de la Información y l	3	0.33	4	0.28
	Trabajo	1	0.11	7	0.49
	Transporte	164	18.18	190	13.40
	Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio	160	17.74	285	20.10
<b>Total number of projects</b>		<b>902</b>		<b>1,418</b>	

# Appendix D. Projects of Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria Virgilio Barco

UBICACIÓN	ENTIDAD	OBJETO	VALOR ESTIMADO DEL PROYECTO	Año
Bogotá	ALCALDIA LOCAL DE CIUDAD BOLIVAR	Desarrollar la construcción, edificación y ejecución del proyecto de gestión inmobiliaria integral de infraestructura física, que permita contar con instalaciones para los salones comunitarios.	\$ 2,800,000,000	2018
Bogotá	ALCALDIA LOCAL DE KENNEDY	Desarrollar la construcción, edificación y ejecución del proyecto de gestión inmobiliaria integral de infraestructura física para la nueva sede Administrativa de la ALCALDIA LOCAL DE KENNEDY en la ciudad de Bogotá D.C.	\$ 27,700,000,000	2018
Bogotá	ALCALDIA LOCAL DE PUENTE ARANDA	Desarrollar la construcción, edificación y ejecución del proyecto de gestión inmobiliaria integral de infraestructura física para las nuevas instalaciones de la ALCALDIA LOCAL DE PUENTE ARANDA en la ciudad de Bogotá D.C.	\$ 29,400,000,000	2017
Fezca - Cundinamarca	ARCHIVO GENERAL DE LA NACION	Estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física y de gestión inmobiliaria integral que requiere el AGN.	\$ 1,700,000,000	2018
Bogotá	CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTORICA	Asesor, estudiar, diseñar, edificar, instalar y financiar para apoyar la construcción y ejecución del proyecto de infraestructura cultural y de gestión inmobiliaria integral para la planta en el funcionamiento del Museo Nacional de la memoria.	\$ 71,290,000,000	2017
Bogotá	CONCEJO DE BOGOTÁ	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar proyectos de infraestructura física y sus complementarios para el CONCEJO DE BOGOTÁ D.C.	\$ 1,200,000,000	2018
Sociedad Alébrica Suelo - Secc Cartagena - Bolívar Bucaramanga - Santander Ipiales - Nariño Jesús - Antioquia	CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE LA JUDICATURA	Gestión inmobiliaria de adquisición de predios e inmuebles que atiendan necesidades de la rama judicial en materia de infraestructura física propia para el funcionamiento de sus sedes administrativas y judiciales a nivel Nacional.	\$ 60,000,000,000	2018
Medellín	CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE LA JUDICATURA	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de gestión inmobiliaria integral de infraestructura física requerido por el Consejo Superior de la Judicatura.	\$ 24,500,000,000	2017 - 2018
Riacha - Ciénega Bogotá	CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA	Establecer el marco general para formular, estudiar y ejecutar los proyectos de gestión inmobiliaria o infraestructura física que requiere la entidad.	\$ 5,600,000,000	2016-2019
Riacha - Ciénega Bogotá	CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar los proyectos de infraestructura inmobiliaria integral y de infraestructura física para las gerencias departamentales.	\$ 15,860,000,000	2016-2019
Catagosa / Medellín	DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO	Gestión inmobiliaria requerida para solucionar problemas de infraestructura de la defensoría en materia de espacio físico para el funcionamiento de sus sedes.	\$ 1,680,000,000	2017 - 2018
Departamento de Bolívar	FISCALIA GENERAL DE LA NACION - BOLIVAR	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar los proyectos de infraestructura física requeridos para la planta en el funcionamiento de las sedes de la Fiscalía en el departamento de Bolívar.	\$ 9,960,000,000	2016
Cúcuta	FISCALIA GENERAL DE LA NACION - CUCUTA	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física de la sede de la ciudad de Cúcuta.	\$ 59,669,000,000	2016
Bogotá	FISCALIA GENERAL DE LA NACION - PALOQUEMAD	Adquirir predios en el desarrollo del proyecto de infraestructura física sede administrativa en la ciudad de Bogotá.	\$ 4,940,000,000	2016
Magdalena - Sucre	FONDO DE ADAPTACIÓN SERVICIO NACIONAL DE APRENDIZAJE	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física y de gestión inmobiliaria integral para la planta en el funcionamiento de la sede de formación agropecuaria.	\$ 11,000,000,000	2017
Bogotá	FONDO ROTATORIO DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física para optimizar y poner en funcionamiento el inmueble de propiedad del fondo rotatorio del ministerio de relaciones exteriores.	\$ 1,290,000,000	2017
Bogotá	INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE METROLOGIA	Formular y estudiar un proyecto inmobiliario que evalúe las condiciones de funcionamiento de la sede actual del Instituto Nacional de Metrología.	\$ 660,000,000	2017
Bogotá	LA NACIÓN - MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto para la adecuación del sótano del Ministerio del Interior.	\$ 1,070,000,000	2018
Bogotá	LA EMPRESA DE RENOVACIÓN Y DESARROLLO URBANO DE BOGOTÁ D.C.	Realizar la edificación física, legal y financiación del proyecto inmobiliario denominado "Nuevo Centro Administrativo Distrital (CAD)" en la ciudad de Bogotá D.C. bajo la modalidad de Asociación Público Privada APP.	\$ 3,439,000,000	2017
Medio - Putumayo	LA NACIÓN - MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR - FONDO NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD Y CONVIVENCIA CIUDADANA-FONSECOM	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto para la planta en el funcionamiento del Centro Administrativo Municipal.	\$ 7,200,000,000	2018
Amaponá	LA POLICIA NACIONAL	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto para la planta en la nueva subestación de Policía.	\$ 2,230,000,000	2017
Pardo - Nariño Chiricahá - Cauca	LA POLICIA NACIONAL	Estudiar los proyectos asociados a las nuevas sedes del comando de departamento Policía Cauca y áreas de apoyo para la Policía Metropolitana de Medellín, así como del comando de la Policía Metropolitana de Pardo.	\$ 2,090,000,000	2018
Sabana Valdeguzá - Tambo	LA POLICIA NACIONAL - MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar los proyectos de infraestructura física, Gestión Inmobiliaria y reglamento integral requerido por el Ministerio - Financiera para la convivencia y la seguridad ciudadana.	\$ 29,250,000,000	2018
Bogotá	MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL	Gestionar y ejecutar proyectos de desarrollo y/o renovación urbana que se deriven de planes de mejoramiento.	\$ 116,470,000,000	2018
Bogotá	MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL	Gestionar y ejecutar proyectos de desarrollo y/o renovación urbana que se deriven de planes de mejoramiento.	\$ 31,430,000,000	2018
Bogotá	MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL	Gestionar y ejecutar proyectos de desarrollo y/o renovación urbana que se deriven de planes de mejoramiento.	\$ 1,100,000,000	2018
Bogotá	MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DEL DERECHO	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar proyectos de infraestructura y de gestión inmobiliaria, incluyendo aquellas necesarias que se requieran para el funcionamiento del sistema carcelario.	\$ 2,910,000,000	2017
Bogotá - Bucaramanga	MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO	Estudiar y ejecutar los proyectos de infraestructura física y de gestión inmobiliaria integral que requiere el Ministerio para el desarrollo de las direcciones territoriales.	\$ 1,090,000,000	2018
Bogotá	SECRETARÍA DISTRITAL DE SEGURIDAD, CONVIVENCIA Y JUSTICIA DE LA ALCALDIA MAYOR DE BOGOTÁ D.C.	Desarrollar un proyecto inmobiliario en el Castillo Noite para apoyar las labores de reclutamiento de la brigada XIII del Ejército Nacional.	\$ 4,000,000,000	2018
Bogotá	SUPERINTENDENCIA DE VIGILANCIA Y SEGURIDAD PRIVADA	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física para optimizar las instalaciones de la sede de la superintendencia de vigilancia y seguridad privada.	\$ 993,000,000	2017
Bogotá	SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL SUBSIDIO FAMILIAR	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar el proyecto de infraestructura física para el funcionamiento actual y planta en el funcionamiento de la Sede Administrativa.	\$ 6,290,000,000	2017
Bogotá	UNIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA ESPECIAL JUNTA CENTRAL DE CONTADORES UNAJCC	Formular, estudiar y ejecutar un proyecto inmobiliario para resolver las necesidades de infraestructura de la UNAJCC.	\$ 14,921,000,000	2017
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Cooperación Internacional de Ideas para la edificación del esquema del Plan Maestro del Proyecto Ciudad CAM.	\$ 1,300,000,000	2013
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Plan Parcela - Ciudad CAM.	\$ 4,946,000,000	2012 - 2017
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Diseño del plan de edificación del CAM.	\$ 9,100,000,000	2015
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Edificación del plan de edificación del CAM por APP.	\$ 2,135,000,000	2016
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Diseño del proyecto Medellín.	\$ 10,700,000,000	2016 - 2018
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	Edificación del proyecto Medellín por APP.	\$ 1,125,000,000	2018
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	La construcción del Plan Especial de Maestría y Postgrado (PEMP) para el proyecto Maestrías.	\$ 224,000,000	2017
Bogotá	Agencia Nacional Inmobiliaria	edificio para el traslado de la Base Naval del Caribe.	\$ 362,000,000	2014 - 2017
			\$ 583,732,000,000	

## Appendix E. National Infrastructure Agency Public-Private Partnership Projects

Table E.1. National Infrastructure Agency Public-Private Partnership Projects

Project	CAPEX (\$, millions)	Kilometers	
		Planned	Executed
Autopista al Río Magdalena	533.3	169.42	—
Autopista Conexión Pacífico 1	800.0	50.10	1.76
Autopista Conexión Pacífico 2	466.7	94.91	71.91
Autopista Conexión Pacífico 3	633.3	153.00	63.45
Autopistas al Mar 1	566.7	167.00	26.30
Autopistas al Mar 2	533.3	92.36	—
Autopistas Conexión Norte	466.7	146.00	78.40
Bucaramanga–Barrancabermeja–Yondó	663.3	115.73	10.37
Bucaramanga–Pamplona	329.0	134.10	—
Cartagena–Barranquilla–“Circunvalar de la Prosperidad”	516.7	158.96	60.13
Honda–Puerto Salgar–Girardot	433.3	233.35	180.40
IP–Accesos Norte a Bogotá	180.0	25.45	—
IP–Ampliación a tercer carril doble calzada Bogotá–Girardot	672	278.30	—
IP–Antioquia–Bolívar	466.7	337.27	98.41
IP–Cambao Manizales	214.0	256.00	—
IP–Chirajara–Fundadores	515.0	33.38	—
IP–GICA	933.3	42.57	—
IP–Malla vial del Meta	453.3	727.77	—
IP–Neiva–Girardot	283.3	205.75	21.80
IP–Vías del Nus	390.0	98.60	15.72
Mulaló–Loboguerrero	601.3	32.34	—
Pamplona–Cúcuta	563.3	113.27	—
Perimetral de Oriente de Cundinamarca	466.7	152.24	94.13
Puerta de Hierro–Palmar de Varela y Carreto–Cruz del Viso	233.3	202.56	—
Rumichaca–Pasto	733.3	125.57	—
Santana–Mocoa–Neiva	516.7	486.03	—
Santander de Quilichao–Popayán	483.3	139.68	—
Transversal del Sisga	203.3	131.72	43.95
Villavicencio–Yopal	799.7	304.47	1.15
Total general	14,651.0	5,315.00	820.00

Note: CAPEX = capital expenditures; — = not available.

## Appendix F. List of Persons Met

Name	Activity	Email
National Planning Department		
Ana María Aristizabal	Head of Territorial Planning (Gerente de Contratos Plan)	
Mónica Peñuela	Deputy Director of Credit Department (subdirectora de crédito)	
Jonathan David Bernal González	Deputy Director of Mobility and Urban Transport; Director of Infrastructure and Sustainable Energy (subdirector transporte; director de infraestructura y energía sostenible)	jonbernal@dn.gov.co
Oscar Julián Gómez	Deputy Director of Mobility and Urban Transport (subdirector de movilidad y transporte urbano)	
Sergio Alejandro Peña	Consultant Transport (Consultor transporte)	sepena@dn.gov.co
Héctor Giovanni Páez	Public-Private Partnership and Infrastructure Consultant (Consultor transporte)	hpaez@dn.gov.co
Lauren Catherine Patiño	Consultant Transport (Consultor transporte)	lpatino@dn.gov.co
Redy Adolfo López	Director of Urban Development (director de Desarrollo urbano)	rlopez@dn.gov.co
Adriana Moreno	Housing and Urban Development Adviser (Asesora subdirección de vivienda y desarrollo urbano)	lmoreno@dn.gov.co
Doris Suaza Español	Environment and Sustainable Development Adviser (Contratista de la dirección de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible)	ddosuaza@dn.gov.co
Beatriz Eugenia Giraldo	Deputy Director of Water and Sanitation (Subdirectora de Agua y Saneamiento)	bgiraldo@dn.gov.co
José Antonio Pinzón	Deputy Director of Housing and Urban Development (subdirector de vivienda y desarrollo urbano)	jpinzon@dn.gov.co
Manuel Fernando Castro	Former Deputy Director-Territorial (Ex Director-Territorial)	
Lizeth Gabriela Bonilla	Economist-Housing (Economista Vivienda)	lbonilla@dn.gov.co
Jairo E Castillo	Consultant/Adviser Public Sector (Consultor/Consejero en Sector Público)	jecastillo@dn.gov.co
World Bank		
Camila Rodríguez	Sr. Infrastructure Specialist (Especialista senior en infraestructura)	
Taimur Samad	Program Leader Sustainable Development	
Angélica Núñez	Senior Operations Officer	
Alexandra Ortiz	Lead Urban Development Specialist	
Henry Forero	Senior Public Sector Specialist	

Name	Activity	Email
Ministry of Transportation		
Edgar John Jairo Carvajal	Adviser (Asesor Ministerio de Transporte)	ecarvajal@mintransporte.gov.co
Edna Piedad Cubillos Salcedo	Consultant (Contratista de unidad de Movilidad Urbana Sostenible)	ecubillos@mintransporte.gov.co
Jorge Zorro	Consultant (Contratista de unidad de Movilidad Urbana Sostenible)	jzorro@mintransporte.gov.co
Luis Felipe Lota	Director of National Road Safety Agency (director de la Agencia Nacional de Seguridad vial)	luis.lota@ansv.gov.co
Diego Jiménez Vargas	Adviser (Asesor Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Vial)	
National Infrastructure Agency		
Louis Kleyn	President (presidente de la Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura)	lkleyn@ani.gov.co
Silvia Urbina Restrepo	Project Manager (Gerente de proyectos)	surbina@ani.gov.co
Oscar Laureano Rosero Jiménez	Financial Manager (Gerente financiero de la vicepresidencia de gestión contractual)	orosero@ani.gov.co
Ministry of Housing		
Víctor Saavedra	Vice inister (Viceministro de Vivienda)	vsaavedra@minvivienda.gov.co
Carlos Felipe Reyes	Technical Director of the Housing System (Director técnico del sistema habitacional)	cfreyes@minvivienda.gov.co
Nicolás Galarza Ase	Adviser (Asesor en temas urbanos)	
Territorial Renewal Agency		
José Alejandro Bayona	Director of Project Structuring (director de estructuración de proyectos)	jose.bayona@renovacionterritorio.gov.co
Habitat Bogotá		
Guillermo Herrera Castaño	District Secretary (Secretario Distrital del Hábitat)	guillermo.herrera@habitatbogota.gov.co
Jorge Alberto Torres Vallejo	Subdirector of Sectoral Information (jefe en subdirección de información sectorial)	jorge.torres@habitatbogota.gov.co
Karen Lorena Hernández Bedoya	Director's Adviser (Asesora del director)	
Cadaster		
Olga Lucía Lopez Morales	Director (directora de catastro distrital)	olopez@catastrobogota.gov.co
Fedesarrollo		
Juan Mauricio Benavides	Research Associate (Investigador Asociado)	jbenavides@fedesarrollo.org.co
National Real Estate Agency Virgilio Barco		
Aníbal Ramírez Cuellar	Financial Adviser (Asesor financiero)	aramirez@avb.gov.co

## Appendix G. Borrower Comments

**From:** La unidad de Movilidad Urbana Sostenible) of the Ministry of Transportation

**Sent:** Thursday, January 2, 2020 8:48 AM

**Subject:** FW: Banco Mundial: Borrador de Reporte (IEG) Evaluación de Resultados.- Políticas de Desarrollo sobre Ciudades Productivas y Sostenibles de Colombia DPL I y II

La Unidad de Movilidad Urbana Sostenible (UMUS) del Ministerio de Transporte, a partir de las lecciones aprendidas en la implementación del Programa Nacional de Transporte Urbano (Préstamo No. 8083-CO), propone los siguientes comentarios para el Anexo H: Comentarios del “Prestatario” —del Reporte de Desempeño respecto a los Préstamos para el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de Políticas para ciudades sostenibles, productivas e incluyentes:

- Dar continuidad al Programa Nacional de Transporte Urbano (Préstamo No. 8083-CO), considerado clave en el fortalecimiento del marco de políticas públicas en Áreas Metropolitanas y de las ciudades más habitadas del sistema de ciudades del país. Gracias a este programa se encuentran en operación 7 Sistemas Integrados de Transporte Masivo tipo BRT e implementan 8 Sistemas Estratégicos de Transporte Público.
- Consideramos clave continuar el esfuerzo en la construcción de capacidades técnicas e institucionales a nivel local y nacional, en la alineación y articulación de políticas públicas y acciones que orienten el desarrollo urbano a través de los Sistemas de Transporte Público sostenibles y la movilidad activa, en la búsqueda por mejorar la calidad y seguridad en los servicios de transporte, la conectividad urbana y regional, la oferta y calidad del espacio público y la eficiencia ambiental a través de la definición de resultados a corto y largo plazo con sistemas de monitoreo, construcción de líneas de base con indicadores de impacto intersectorial y seguimiento constante de la calidad de los resultados obtenidos.
- Teniendo en cuenta el reto que representa la transformación de la Movilidad Urbana y Regional, creemos importante plantear y explorar nuevos mecanismos de gobernanza y gestión institucional coordinada entre la institucionalidad local y nacional (nacional-local, local-local, nacional-nacional). Por ejemplo: entre unidades de planeación y regulación del transporte y de planeación urbana.
- Las recomendaciones del Banco Mundial frente a la implementación de la política pública son importantes para continuar con la elaboración de política pública acorde con los lineamientos de los ODS. La dificultad manifestada en el

informe de implementar las políticas públicas en las ciudades, radica en gran medida en que la toma de decisiones se tiene que hacer de manera conjunta y articulada entre la Nación y las autoridades locales, lo cual genera demoras o repeticiones y contratiempos en ocasiones.

- Las políticas públicas urbanas deben ser socializadas nuevamente con las nuevas administraciones locales (2020–14) para que éstas tengan en cuenta los avances logrados y poder trabajar sobre lo construido con anterioridad.
- Se resalta que gracias a la ayuda de la Banca Multilateral en concreto, Colombia logró la concreción de lineamientos de política pública para la creación y actualización de entidades como la ANI o la Virgilio Barco. En este sentido, sabemos que de la mano con el Banca Multilateral se logrará dinamizar y continuar con la actualización de entidades del sector público, que reflejen las nuevas necesidades del sector transporte.