Executive Summary 1 Pacific Labor Mobility, Migration and Remittances in Times of COVID-19: Interim Report 30 November 2020 Dung Doan Matthew Dornan Kenia Parsons Kirstie Petrou Soonhwa Yi Executive Summary 3 LIST OF ACRONYMS 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 1. INTRODUCTION 12 2. THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19 14 3. THE PACIFIC DIASPORA 19 3.1 Pacific Islanders in Australia 21 3.2 Pacific Islanders in New Zealand 26 3.3 Pacific Islanders in the United States 30 3.4 COVID-19 Impacts on the Pacific Diaspora 32 4. SEASONAL WORKERS 35 4.1 Employment, Earnings and Savings 37 4.2 Remittances 41 4.3 Superannuation, Expectation and Satisfaction with Labor Mobility 46 5. DISCUSSION 48 5.1 Remittances to the Pacific in Times of COVID-19 49 5.2 Outlook for Labor Mobility and Remittances 53 5.3 Policy Recommendations 54 6. CONCLUSION 57 REFERENCES 59 Executive Summary 4 LIST OF ACRONYMS List of Acronyms 5 CNMI Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands EPS Employment Permit System FCI Finance, Innovation and Competitiveness FNPF Fiji National Provident Fund FSM Federated States of Micronesia GFC Global Financial Crisis ILO International Labor Organization IMF International Monetary Fund LFSP Labor Force Status LMIP Labour Market Information Portal MTI Macroeconomic, Trade, and Investment NHPI Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanders OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OTC Over-the-counter PICs Pacific Island Countries PLS Pacific Labour Scheme PNG Papua New Guinea RMI Republic of the Marshall Islands RSE Recognised Seasonal Employer SPJ Social Protection and Jobs SWP Seasonal Worker Programme Executive Summary 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements 7 This report is part of a broader analytical work The surveys were implemented by a team of program on labor mobility in the Pacific that the consultants led by Dung Doan that included World Bank has been undertaking with financial Crystal Ake, George Carter, Glenn Finau, Patricia support from the Australian Department of Foreign Fred, Robyn Kingston, Teaiaki Koae, Felix Maia, Affairs and Trade. The report brings together Vani Nailumu, Randall Prior, Aoniba Riaree, Seini analysis of both existing data and primary data Toufa, and Telusa Tu’I’onetoa. The interviews were collected through a series of phone-based conducted by Kirstie Petrou. quantitative surveys on Pacific seasonal workers, The authors would like to thank Carlo Corazza their households and employers, as well as (Senior Financial Sector Specialist, World Bank), qualitative interviews with representatives of Pacific Mauro Testaverde (Senior Economist, World Bank), diaspora groups in Australia and New Zealand. The Kristen Himelein (Senior Economist, World Bank), report also draws on ongoing analyses undertaken Ganesh Kumar Seshan (Senior Economist, World by the Social Projection and Jobs Global Practice Bank), Kim Edwards (Senior Economist, World (GP); the Finance, Innovation and Competitiveness Bank), and the Australian Department of Foreign GP; the Macroeconomic, Trade, and Investment GP; Affairs and Trade for constructive comments and and the Poverty and Equity GP. Section 2 draws on advice on earlier drafts of the report. analysis undertaken by the study team as part of another study, titled “Pacific Island Countries in Philip O’Keefe (Practice Manager until September the Era of COVID-19: Macroeconomic Impacts 2020) and Yasser El-Gammal (Practice Manager, and Job Prospects”. World Bank) provided overall vision and guidance to the team. The team is also thankful for The team would like to thank those who took part in administrative support from Jeremy Webster the surveys and interviews. The implementation of (Team Assistant, World Bank), technical support the surveys and interviews benefited from valuable from Shamita Afrin, Praveen Chakkaravarthy, Rigel support from the Fijian National Employment Colina, and Jane Hume of the Sydney IT Help Centre, i-Kiribati Ministry of Employment and team (World Bank), as well as helpful advice from Human Resource, Tongan Employment Division Hamish Wyatt (External Affairs Officer, World Bank). of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Timor-Leste The report was copy edited by Angela Takats and Embassy in Australia, ni-Vanuatu Department graphically designed by Heidi Romano. of Labour, Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Australian Department of The cover image is from the Pacific Labour Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Ministry of Mobility Program album in the photo gallery Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Ministry of of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs Business, Innovation and Employment, Approved and Trade, licensed under Creative Commons Employers of Australia, Horticulture New Zealand, (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ New Zealand Apples and Pears, and Uniting Church legalcode) and accessible at https://www.flickr. in Australia. Leisande Otto (Liaison Officer, World com/photos/dfataustralianaid/38738509150/in/ Bank) and Akka Rimon (Liaison Officer, World album-72157690967086312/. The image has been Bank) provided valuable assistance to facilitate cropped to fit the dimension of the cover page. the implementation of the surveys on ni-Vanuatu and i-Kiribati workers. The team is also thankful for helpful comments on the survey questionnaires and support to contact potential respondents from the Development Policy Centre at The Australian National University. Executive Summary 8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary 9 Pacific Island countries (PICs) are projected to The crisis has caused broad-based and significant experience a significant economic downturn in reductions in employment and earnings among 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis, mainly driven Pacific seasonal workers. Close to two-thirds of by sharp declines in tourist arrivals, disruptions workers under the SWP and RSE schemes have to donor-financed infrastructure activities, lower experienced fewer work hours and lower weekly commodity prices and lower remittance inflows. earnings as compared to the period of January and The impact of the pandemic on tourism, which February, according to a phone survey undertaken many PICs rely on, is expected to be five times as part of this study. Among those reporting a larger than that of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. decrease in income, the average reduction in their The GDP of PICs is expected to shrink significantly weekly earnings was 50 percent (or $A 400) among in 2020, accompanied by unprecedented job SWP workers and 48 percent (or $NZ 364) among losses. Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are RSE workers. Facing income losses, stranded expected to see double-digit contraction at seasonal workers have been largely unable to -24.7 percent, -12.5 percent, -15.1 percent and access formal social protection systems in host -13.1 percent, respectively; while the GDP of countries while being cut off from safety nets Solomon Islands is projected to fall by 7.7 percent. at home. Further downside risks to growth remain as fiscal Pacific Islanders working under longer-term visas gaps widen. also faced significant risks of employment and COVID-19 has also disrupted labor mobility from the income losses due to the impacts of COVID-19. Pacific and introduced critical challenges to Pacific In all three main host countries – Australia, New migrant workers and the economies that their Zealand and the US – Pacific workers are employed remittances support. Many Pacific workers find in occupations that are predominantly low- and employment in Australia under the Seasonal Worker semi-skilled, with high physical proximity and Programme (SWP) and Pacific Labour Scheme limited capacity to work from home. This makes (PLS), and in New Zealand under the Recognised them particularly susceptible to the effects of the Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme. In Samoa, pandemic and associated public health responses. Tonga and Vanuatu, seasonal workers under these Economic hardship among Pacific diaspora groups, schemes account for 6.0 percent, 14.7 percent documented through recent World Bank interviews and 8.1 percent of the workforce, respectively. of diaspora representatives in Australia and New They engage primarily in low-skilled jobs in the Zealand, has been compounded by limited access agriculture sector under short-term contracts of to social protection measures due to migration 6-11 months. International travel restrictions aiming status, language barriers that make accessing to curb the spread of the pandemic have left available assistance difficult, and larger households thousands of seasonal workers stranded in Australia among several Pacific Island groups. and New Zealand while halting the arrivals of new In addition to detrimental economic impacts, the workers under such schemes. At the same time, crisis has caused mental distress among Pacific the Pacific diaspora, concentrated in Australia, migrants, both seasonal workers and members New Zealand and the United States, has been of the diaspora. Concerns and anxiety related to affected by adverse labor market conditions in employment, visas, repatriation uncertainties and those countries. the welfare of family back home were reported as major issues faced by seasonal workers. The diaspora also reported a higher risk of family conflict and gender-based violence due to social distancing measures. Executive Summary 10 Although more resilient than expected, remittances Future remittance flows are difficult to project. to the Pacific are expected to decrease due to Despite the ongoing economic impacts of the the COVID-19 pandemic, as existing migrant crisis, aggregate remittance data has shown signs workers either lose their employment in host of recovery recently. Both cumulative and monthly countries, have their work hours reduced, or return remittance inflows to Fiji, Samoa and Tonga have home early at a time when new workers are not gradually returned to positive growth on a year- taking up employment overseas. The World Bank on-year basis since May. A shift from carrying estimates a 4.3 percent decrease of remittance cash back home to sending through remittance flows to the Pacific region for 2020, with country- service providers could have contributed to this specific projections ranging from 3 percent in the recovery in the recorded remittance flows, while Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) to 29 percent masking a decrease in total remittances. At the in Palau. Data collected by monetary authorities in same time, other factors are likely to have played receiving countries and by the World Bank phone a role in sustaining the level of remittances. survey on Pacific seasonal workers confirms a sharp These include social protection measures and decline in remittances during the early months of better-than-expected performance of the labor the crisis, followed by a recovery. market in host countries, which has benefitted the Pacific diaspora; the depreciation of Pacific Island More than half of surveyed seasonal workers currencies against the Australian dollar and other reported remitting less than they did during the hard currencies; and counter-cyclical remitting period of January-February 2020. Among those behavior by migrant workers. remitting less, the amount sent per transaction fell by 53 percent among SWP workers and 48 percent Looking forward, overseas employment among RSE workers. The extent of the decrease opportunities for Pacific Islanders are likely to in remittances sent by seasonal workers, however, be adversely affected for some time, even after has been less significant than the decrease in their borders are reopened. Labor market conditions earnings. This suggests that workers have adjusted in migrant destination countries are likely to their own consumption and saving behaviors to remain weak, especially in occupations at the cope with the impacts of the crisis and maintain lower end of the skills spectrum, in which a large the level of money sent home. part of the Pacific diaspora and migrant worker community are employed. In addition, weak labor The loss of remittance income is likely to worsen market conditions will reduce employer demand the welfare of remittance dependent households, for migrant workers under skilled visa categories. given the heavy reliance on remittances in the Travel restrictions and mandatory quarantine region. Seven of the top ten remittance recipients requirements that limit travel numbers (due to caps by share of GDP in the East Asia and Pacific on quarantine capacity) will also potentially restrict region are in the Pacific. In Tonga and Samoa, the numbers of incoming migrant workers in the remittances were equivalent to nearly 38 percent short- to medium-term. and 16 percent of GDP in 2019, respectively, with remittance income equivalent to approximately 30 percent and 8 percent of household consumption, respectively. Executive Summary 11 Notwithstanding this, demand for Pacific Island There are also other policy responses that PICs workers in certain industries in regional areas, and host countries could consider to support particularly in horticulture, is likely to remain migrant workers and their families. For host strong. Production in horticulture has continued countries, potential policy options include: despite COVID-19 lockdowns, and there is a high (i) expansion of employment retainment policies, demand for workers given the departure of other such as wage subsidies, reductions or deferrals migrant groups (especially backpackers) which in social insurance contributions, and paid sick form an important source of labor in the industry. leave for migrant workers affected by COVID-19; This is evidenced by the ongoing lobbying efforts (ii) employment promotion measures for low-skilled of employer groups requesting government- temporary and seasonal migrant workers to sponsored incentives for workers (both domestic improve their employment prospects, reduce the and migrant) in the sector. Given the need for labor risks of illegal work engagements, and facilitate in this sector and the poverty alleviation impacts of more efficient reallocation of labor from sluggish such employment, there is a strong case for sectors (such as tourism) to booming ones during re-commencing these schemes in a way that the crisis (such as agriculture); and (iii) expansion reduces costs to employers and workers whilst of social and health services to migrant workers, also safeguarding against potential infection. including access to COVID-19 testing and Recent pilot arrangements to bring Tongan and treatment. For PIC governments, potential policy ni-Vanuatu seasonal workers to Australia could interventions include: (i) repatriation and lay the foundation for a larger return of Pacific reintegration support for returning workers; seasonal workers. (ii) support for workers stranded overseas; and (iii) initiatives that support the sending of remittances. Executive Summary 12 1. INTRODUCTION Introduction 13 The COVID-19 crisis is likely to severely impact This briefing note presents interim findings on labor mobility and diaspora groups from the the impacts of COVID-19 on Pacific migrant Pacific, with consequent reductions in the value of workers and the Pacific diaspora, discussing likely remittances. Many Pacific workers find employment implications for resulting remittances to Pacific in Australia under the Seasonal Worker Programme Island countries. It forms part of an ongoing study (SWP) and Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS), and in of Pacific labor mobility, migration and remittances, New Zealand under the Recognised Seasonal which involves surveys of Pacific workers and their Employer (RSE) Scheme. They engage primarily employers under various labor mobility schemes in low-skilled jobs in the agriculture sector under in Australia and New Zealand, as well as diaspora short-term contracts of 6-11 months. As a result of groups in both countries. A final report will be COVID-19, new arrivals under such schemes have completed in December. largely ceased. Pacific Islanders who are working in Australia and New Zealand under longer-term visas, including those under the semi-skilled PLS, also face higher unemployment risk as host economies are affected by the pandemic. COVID-19 is therefore likely to result in income loss amongst migrant workers due to reduced work hours, loss of employment, and even potential infection. Border restrictions will also prevent travel by new workers and will increase costs incurred by workers to comply with COVID-19-related rules, such as mandatory quarantine. Executive Summary 14 2. THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19 The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 15 The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to deliver the The impact of COVID-19 on tourism is projected deepest global recession in eight decades (World to be five times larger than the impact of the 2008 Bank, 2020a). Unlike the Global Financial Crisis in Global Financial Crisis, and is estimated in 2020 2008, it has involved both a supply and a demand to result in 100.8 million job losses within the sector shock, owing to changes in individuals’ behaviors globally and a 2.9 percentage point increase in and the containment measures of governments, the global unemployment rate (WTTC, 2020). For which have included lockdowns and travel/mobility countries like Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu – where restrictions. It is forecast that the world is likely tourism accounts for over 50 percent of total to see negative global GDP growth in 2020 of exports – the disappearance of tourism is likely -4.9 percent (IMF, 2020). Job losses could amount to cause significant macroeconomic contractions. to 305 million globally according to the In April and May 2020, very few tourists arrived in International Labor Organization (ILO). Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu (Figure 1a). This resulted in Samoa recording zero tourism earnings in Pacific Island Countries (PICs) face strong both months (Figure 1b). Employer surveys in headwinds through their interconnectivity with Vanuatu suggest that the number of employees the global economy, despite to date having in the tourism industry has contracted by about experienced only small numbers of COVID-19 64 percent owing to COVID-19 (Vanuatu, April cases domestically. Key transmission channels 2020). In Fiji, the CEO of the Fiji Hotel and Tourism of COVID-19 impacts include a combination of Association recently claimed that over 100,000 disruptions to donor-financed infrastructure locals have lost their jobs due to COVID-19. activities (such as in Kiribati, where travel restrictions have prevented foreign skilled workers Remittances are also likely to be affected by the from entering the country), sharp contractions in crisis which is significant given that PICs are heavily tourist arrivals (particularly in tourism-dependent reliant on them. In 2019, seven of the top ten economies like that of Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, remittance recipients by share of GDP in the Tonga, and Cook Islands), lower commodity East Asia and Pacific region are in the Pacific.1 prices (important in the Solomon Islands and Fiji is among the region’s top ten recipients by Papua New Guinea (PNG)), and a reduction in value of remittance inflows, receiving nearly inward remittance flows (particularly significant US$ 290 million in 2019. In Tonga, remittances were in Tonga and Samoa). Lower oil prices will offset equivalent to nearly 38 percent of its GDP in 2019 some of these impacts, but the net effects will (Figure 2). In Tonga and Samoa, four out of every almost certainly be negative. On the fiscal side, five households receive remittances from abroad, falls in revenue are already creating challenges for with a similar share of households across the governments which are at the same time seeking consumption distribution benefitting (Figure 3). to increase counter-cyclical spending and bolster Nationally representative household data in healthcare readiness. Development assistance will Tonga indicates that remittances are equivalent become particularly important as a result, given the to approximately 30 percent of household inability of PICs (aside from Fiji and PNG) to raise consumption, while in Samoa they are equivalent capital on international credit markets. to 8 percent of household consumption. 1. The other three countries are the Philippines (9.9 percent), Vietnam (6.5 percent) and Cambodia (5.9 percent). The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 16 FIGURE 1A. Fall in tourist arrivals FIGURE 1B. Fall in visitor earnings (Jan-May 2020) (Jan-May 2020) 0% 30% 25% -20% 20% -40% 15% -60% 10% -80% 5% -100% 0% Jan Feb March April May Jan Feb March April May Fiji Vanuatu Samoa (Tala million, RHS) Samoa Sources: Reserve Bank of Fiji, Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, Central Bank of Samoa. FIGURE 2. Remittance inflows as a percentage FIGURE 3. Percentage of households receiving of GDP (2019) remittances in Tonga by welfare status (2015/16) 40% 100% 32% 80% 24% 60% 16% 40% 8% 20% 0% 0% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Fiji Tonga Samoa RMI Kiribati FSM Vanuatu Islands Palau Tuvalu Solomon Consumption quintile Source: Migration Data Portal Source: Household income and expenditure survey data The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 17 FIGURE 4A. Fiji: Sharp drop in population There is strong evidence of subdued domestic movements in Fiji in workplaces demand resulting from COVID-19 in Pacific Island countries. In Fiji, domestic cement production 20% contracted by 29 percent during January-May 2020, 10% according to the June Economic Review of the 0% Reserve Bank of Fiji. In April, the Solomon Islands -10% Central Bank monthly production index dropped -20% to a record low – a dip of 60 percent compared -30% to March, although the index bounced back in May, suggesting a potential sign of recovery. Data -40% from Google Maps showed that Fiji experienced a -50% sharp drop in people’s movements to restaurants, -60% shopping centers, bus stations, and places of work -70% in April (Figure 4). There has been a recovery since -80% lockdowns were relaxed but movements remain 2/24 3/24 4/24 5/24 6/24 7/24 8/24 considerably lower than January levels. 2020 Macroeconomic projections are inevitably prone Source: Google Community Mobility data to errors in the current context given high levels of uncertainty surrounding the continued spread of COVID-19, the development of a vaccine, and public health responses (including border closures). Growth projections have been revised FIGURE 4B. Fiji: Sharp drop in population multiple times in this fast-changing environment. movements in Fiji in transit stations Much depends on public policy responses – 20% both in the health and economic spheres - and assumptions on a recovery path. It follows that 0% downside risks will be influenced by the duration of COVID-19 containment measures, monetary -20% and fiscal measures put in place by respective authorities to moderate the effects, and the global -40% development of the pandemic. -60% Current projections are for very severe contractions in GDP among Pacific Island countries in 2020. -80% These will be particularly pronounced in countries which already have experienced setbacks, such -100% as Tropical Cyclone Harold (Fiji and Vanuatu in 2/24 3/24 4/24 5/24 6/24 7/24 8/24 particular, and Tonga and the Solomon Islands 2020 to some extent) and the measles outbreak in the fourth quarter of 2019 (Samoa). According to the Source: Google Community Mobility data World Bank’s forecast as of September 2020, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are projected to see double-digit contractions in GDP at -24.7 percent, -12.5 percent, -15.1 percent and -13.1 percent, 2. There exists considerable variation in the growth projection respectively. GDP of Solomon Islands is projected for Fiji. The World Bank’s growth projection for the country to contract by 7.7 percent. Further downside risks in 2020, as of June 2020, is much more moderate at -4.3 percent (World Bank, 2020a). The Asian Development to growth remain, as fiscal gaps are likely to widen. Bank also produces a similar estimate at -4.9 percent. Source: https://www.adb.org/countries/fiji/economy. The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 18 Job losses from this pandemic are unprecedented, Fiscal stimulus packages have been rolled out particularly in the tourism sector. Fiji saw some by PICs governments to moderate the effects of 115,000 jobs at risk3 – equivalent to a third of COVID-19. Most have scaled up support for health the total labor force4 or about two-thirds of systems to enhance their response capacity. paid employees in 2018. Jobs at risk encompass Support to both firms and workers have helped unemployment, reduced working hours, and ‘on- cushion the employment impact: providing liquidity leave’ status without pay. Unemployment benefit to firms to sustain their businesses (PNG and claims in the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF), Tonga); helping firms to retain cash flows (e.g., tax under COVID-19 withdrawal schemes, rose sharply or import duty relief in Samoa and Solomon Islands, in May and were sustained in June at 85,959, or deferred social security contributions in Fiji); compared to the annual total of some 30,000 in supporting worker retention (e.g., wage subsidies 2019. The majority of these new applications came in Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa, and paid sick leave from members in the tourism, taxi, and small/micro in Fiji); and employment support for vulnerable enterprise sectors who had been laid-off or were groups (e.g., youth and women in the Solomon experiencing reduced hours and lower income Islands). Social assistance measures have also due to COVID-19 (RBF, 2020). In PNG, a quarter of helped to support consumption among households workers who had been employed before the crisis and unemployed individuals, including one-off reported not working in June 2020 (Himelein et al., cash transfers to informal workers (Fiji and Tonga), 2020).5 Furthermore, new recruitment intentions and unemployment benefits for formal sector are falling, as businesses are still closed or workers that draw on superannuation savings (Fiji cancelling investment plans (they fell by 60 percent and PNG). Support to the informal sector has been in Tonga in March compared to March 2019 and by limited, despite implementation of some positive nearly 50 percent in Fiji during January-May 2020 responses. Governments in PICs, as in other parts compared to the same period in 2019). In PNG, of the world, have found it challenging to reach advertised jobs posted by the National Employment workers in the informal sector, with many citizens Service fell from 497 in February 2020 to 117 in not aware of measures that target informal workers May 2020. (as shown in surveys in Vanuatu April 2020).6 Job losses and loss of livelihoods will inevitably push some households into poverty. Preliminary modelling by the World Bank’s Poverty Global Practice projects that in a “moderate” scenario, household consumption could drop by 50 percent for one quarter (a 12.5 percent drop of annual consumption). In this scenario, the proportion of households involved in tourism, food or accommodation that live below the US$5.50 poverty line could increase by 9.3 percent in Fiji, 10.2 percent in Tonga, and 12.7 percent in Samoa. Continued links between those in urban and rural areas will provide some support for those that lose 3. https://www.ilo.org/suva/publications/WCMS_751883/ lang--en/index.htm employment, given the prevalence of subsistence 4. According to the 2015-16 Employment and Unemployment agriculture in many Pacific Island countries. Survey, 346,214 persons aged 15 and above were in the Labor However, impacts will still be significant due to Force and 167,300 (63.5 percent) were employed in the poverty rates being markedly higher among those formal sector. engaged in subsistence agriculture than among 5. According to the World Bank’s High Frequency survey data the rest of the population (World Bank, 2020b). collected during June 18 through July 3, 2020. 6. Department of Tourism & Vanuatu Tourism Office “Survey Results: National Tourism Business Impacts Survey, TC Harold and COVID-19 Pandemic,” April 24, 2020. Executive Summary 19 3. THE PACIFIC DIASPORA The Pacific Diaspora 20 The Pacific diaspora is an essential source of The vast majority of Pacific Islanders7 living in support for many households in the Pacific, with OECD countries reside in Australia (28%), New remittances performing an important informal Zealand (32%) or the United States (30%). Of those, social protection function. Many Pacific Island Micronesians make up the majority of Pacific countries have a large diaspora living overseas. Islanders living in the United States, and South Tonga, Samoa, as well as smaller countries like the Pacific Islanders make up the majority living in Cook Islands and Niue, have extremely high rates Australia or New Zealand. of emigration. TABLE 1. The size of the diaspora differs across PICs Stock of Resident Emigrants/ emigrants population population Marshall Islands 11,841 52,786 22.4% Micronesia (Fed. States of) 40,642 103,718 39.2% Palau 6,855 20,919 32.8% Fiji 189,571 880,487 21.5% Samoa 87,949 190,390 46.2% Tonga 53,247 105,139 50.6% PNG 17,464 7,308,864 0.2% Solomon Islands 1,768 560,685 0.3% Vanuatu 2,280 253,165 0.9% Kiribati 4,324 108,544 4.0% Tuvalu 1,816 9,876 18.4% Source: Population statistics are taken from the UN Population Division (2015). Migrant stocks in 34 OECD countries taken from the DIOC Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2010/13. Note: Due to data constraints, this table only includes emigrants to OECD countries. Emigrants to the US territories of Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are also included. Migrant stocks for Kiribati, PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have been adjusted to record only migrants in Australia who claim their ancestry is indigenous to their country of birth. The population used as a denominator in the third column is the resident population only. 7. Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia are three subregions of the Oceania region. Polynesia includes Austral Islands, Cook Islands, Easter Island, Hawaii, Kermadec Islands, Marquesas Islands, New Zealand, Samoa, Society Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuamotu Archipelago and Tuvalu. Melanesia is made up of Bismarck Archipelago, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Santa Cruz, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Micronesia includes Caroline Islands, Kiribati, Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands and Palau. The Pacific Diaspora 21 The diaspora faces a high risk of job and income 3.1 PACIFIC ISLANDERS loss as unemployment soars in host countries, IN AUSTRALIA given low education levels and a large reliance According to the 2016 Census, the largest on low-skilled and casual jobs, which have been Pacific diaspora groups in Australia are Samoans severely affected by the economic fallout of social (75,755 individuals), followed by Fijians (37,001) distancing measures. Jobless claims have reached and Tongans (32,697).8 Most of the Pacific diaspora historical highs in the US, while the unemployment groups live in New South Wales, Queensland and rate reached 6.8% in August 2020 in Australia, Victoria – two of these states have been heavily hit the highest in the last decade (Australian Bureau by the pandemic in terms of numbers of infection of Statistics, 2020) and is expected to remain cases. There is a higher number of people with between 7 and 9 percent in 2021/22 (Reserve Bank Fijian and Tongan ancestry in New South Wales of Australia, 2020). The impacts of COVID-19, and a higher number of people from PNG in however, are likely to differ across Pacific Queensland (Figure 5). Although Samoans are nationalities due to varying education levels, Victoria’s largest Pacific diaspora group, there which influence employment. are more Samoans in Queensland and New South Wales. 8. It is important to note that the Census allows for multiple ancestries as well as birth places. Among those that self- identified as having Samoan ancestry were respondents born in New Zealand (27,203) and Australia (26,057). On Census night, 19,632 people that were born in Samoa and self- identified as having Samoan ancestry were living in Australia. We have chosen to focus on ancestry here given its broader scope and the fact that evidence suggests that Samoans not born in Samoa regularly remit to family in Samoa. This also has the advantage of excluding (for example) Australians born overseas who live in Australia and have no ongoing relationship with their country of birth. The Pacific Diaspora 22 FIGURE 5. Selected Pacific diaspora groups by location in Australia (2016) Marimekko Chart www.clearlyandsimply.com S N AC NSW VIC QLD WA O Totals A T T 27,429 2,752 Samoan 75,755 43.9% 17,184 26,740 1,367 Fijian 19,368 8,188 37,001 21.4% 6,093 1,105 6,812 Tongan 32,697 19.0% 5,557 17,888 1 1,187 5 Papua New 1,275 12,768 18,798 10.9% Guinean 4,352 633 1 Timorese 2,237 2,132 0 8,962 5.2% 9 0 0 68,001 34,178 55,439 7,089 0 8 Grand total: Totals 40.3% 25.3% 39.3% 4.0% 0 172,526 Solomon Islander Ni-Vanuatu I-Kiribati New South Victoria South Queensland Western Tasmania Northern ACT Other Wales Australia Australia Territory Territories Samoan 27,429 17,184 416 26,740 2,752 161 284 790 8 Fijian 19,368 6,093 760 8,188 1,367 206 429 532 51 Tongan 17,888 5,557 286 6,812 1,105 114 237 686 5 Papua New 2,237 1,275 339 12,768 1,187 122 511 341 15 Guinean Timorese 2,132 4,352 175 538 633 18 1,057 54 - Solomon 382 213 51 1,059 81 12 37 44 - Islander Ni-Vanuatu 264 108 24 467 40 9 24 17 10 I-Kiribati 188 138 27 390 51 6 49 25 - Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Census of Population and Housing, 2016, TableBuilder. Place of Usual Residence. Ancestry, multi-response. Copyright Commonwealth of Australia, 2018. ABS data licensed under Creative Commons. Note: No reliance should be placed on small cell frequency count (e.g., cells with less than 20 counts). The Pacific Diaspora 23 Most of the Pacific diaspora in Australia has up As expected, education levels have a substantial to secondary education and a Certificate III & impact on the employment of Pacific diaspora IV. Between 68-87 percent of individuals above groups living in Australia. Higher education levels 15 years of age that have Pacific ancestry have yield better job prospects, particularly for those completed secondary school and/or hold a with more than secondary education. Pacific Certificate III & IV or diploma (Figure 6). This is the diaspora groups have similar proportions of situation for 8 in 10 Tongan and for 9 in 10 Samoan individuals in employment to that of the average diaspora members. Amongst all diaspora groups, Australian with comparable levels of education.9 i-Kiribati have the highest level of education However, there is some variability amongst completed, with 20 percent having a university Pacific groups. degree – this is comparable to Australian levels of educational attainment. FIGURE 6. Australian and Pacific diaspora groups by level of highest educational attainment (2016) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Ni-Vanuatu Papua New Solomon I Kiribati Fijian Samoan Tongan Timorese Australian Guinean Islander Secondary Education - Year 9 and below Certificate I & II Level Secondary Education - Year 10 and above Certificate III & IV Level Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level Bachelor Degree Level Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level Postgraduate Degree Level Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Census of Population and Housing, 2016, TableBuilder. Place of Usual Residence. Ancestry, multi-response. Copyright Commonwealth of Australia, 2018. ABS data licensed under Creative Commons. Note: Calculations excluded persons under 15 years of age, those with no educational attainment, not stated and inadequately described. No reliance should be placed on information for Solomon Islanders, Ni-Vanuatu and i-Kiribati Graduate Diploma, Postgraduate degree and Certificate level I and II due to small cell frequency count. 9. Census 2016 is the main source of information for analysis of small population groups. It allows for an analysis on labor market statistics at a more detailed level, as required by this study. The ABS Labor Force Survey does not provide detailed information for Pacific Diaspora groups. The statistics produced by these two collections are not comparable. For more information: https://www. abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2900.0main+features101432016 (Accessed 28 August 2020). The Pacific Diaspora 24 The Census data indicates that Papua New The Pacific diaspora work in occupations that are Guineans have a lower proportion of adults predominantly low- and medium-skilled. Laborers, employed per educational levels compared to machine operators and drivers constitute between Australians; whilst other groups (such as Fijians, 19-43 percent of the main occupations of Pacific ni-Vanuatu, Tongans, Timorese and Samoans) diaspora groups, most predominantly Tongans have a comparatively higher proportion of those and Samoans, as opposed to only 16 percent on in employment per educational levels. average for Australia. When sales workers and clerical and administrative workers are included, At the same time, Pacific diaspora groups have these percentages increase up to 60 percent. The comparatively higher rates of unemployment i-Kiribati diaspora, once again, are employed at than Australian cohorts, particularly for those occupation levels that are comparable to those of with Certificate III & IV level and below (Figure 7). the general Australian population (Figure 8). The proportion of 15 years and over of Pacific diaspora members by highest level of educational achievement that are looking for part-time or full-time work are particularly high for Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders, Tongans and Samoans. FIGURE 7. Higher rates of unemployment by education levels for Pacific diaspora groups living in Australia compared to general population (2016) 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Australian Papua New Fijian Solomon I Kiribati Samoan Tongan Timorese Ni-Vanuatu Guinean Islander Graduate Diploma, Graduate Cert, Post Grad Certificate III & IV Level Bachelor Degree Level Secondary education, Cert I & II Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Census of Population and Housing, 2016, TableBuilder. Place of Usual Residence. Ancestry, multi-response. Copyright Commonwealth of Australia, 2018. ABS data licensed under Creative Commons. Note: Unemployed includes those looking for full-time or part-time jobs; not in the labor force was excluded from this calculation. Data includes individuals 15 years and older. Low frequency cells were excluded from this calculation. The Pacific Diaspora 25 FIGURE 8. Australian and Pacific diaspora by main occupations (2016) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Ni-Vanuatu Papua Solomon I Kiribati Fijian Samoan Tongan Timorese Australia New Islander Guinean Managers Clerical and Administrative Workers Professionals Sales Workers Technicians and Trades Workers Machinery Operators and Drivers Community and Personal Service Workers Labourers Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Census of Population and Housing, 2016, TableBuilder. Place of Usual Residence. Ancestry, multi-response. Copyright Commonwealth of Australia, 2018. ABS data licensed under Creative Commons. Note: Occupations using ANZCO occupation list. Calculations excluded persons under 15 years of age, unemployed persons looking for either full-time or part-time work, persons not in the labor force, persons with Labor Force Status (LFSP), not stated and inadequately described. FIGURE 9. COVID-19 physical proximity score FIGURE 10. COVID-19 physical proximity score by selected major occupational by selected skill level group (2020) groups (2020) Source: Australian Government (2020) Labour Market Information Source: Australian Government (2020) Labour Market Information Portal (LMIP) Portal (LMIP) The Pacific Diaspora 26 The majority of Pacific diaspora groups work in 3.2 PACIFIC ISLANDERS occupations with a high physical proximity score IN NEW ZEALAND or in occupations with skill levels that are not easily The Pacific ethnic group10 is the fourth largest transitioned into digital or home-office settings. ethnic group in New Zealand and is projected to These low- to medium-skilled occupations require comprise 10 percent of New Zealand’s population some degree of physical proximity (Figures 9 by 2026. Most migrants from the Pacific to New and 10). Some of these occupations also have Zealand have originated from the Cook Islands, high exposure to disease and infection, such as Niue, Tokelau, Samoa, Fiji and Tonga. Pacific community and personal service workers. peoples live primarily in the North Island, mostly in These occupations are at greater risk of being Auckland, although there are also large populations affected by the COVID-19 crisis; for example, job in Canterbury, Wellington and the Waikato regions advertisements for sales workers and clerical and (Figure 11). administrative workers have declined by 35 and 43 percent, respectively (Australian Government, 2020b). It follows that the Pacific diaspora is more vulnerable than the general Australian population to loss of employment and livelihoods, with concomitant implications for remittances. 10. The New Zealand Census uses variable ethnicity to identify groups of persons with a sense of belonging. It is a measure of culture affiliation as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality or citizenship. It is self-perceived and a person can belong to multiple ethnic background. The Pacific Diaspora 27 FIGURE 11. Pacific diaspora groups by selected locations in New Zealand (Census 2018) Marimekko Chart www.clearlyandsimply.com Cant erb Auckland Wellington Totals ury Waikato Bay Ma Ot No Ha T 6,972 Samoan 118,503 179,667 44.3% 10,092 26,208 6,702 Cook Islands 46,668 78,468 19.3% Maori 3,132 8,712 3,606 Tongan 62,403 80,283 19.8% 3,192 3,330 1,995 1,590 Niuean 915 30,324 7.5% 23,088 444 Tokelauan 4,185 8,532 2.1% 1,701 1,560 Fijian 11,202 1,557 19,131 4.7% 576 3,099 0.8% 372 150 4,626 1,077 813 1.1% 0.3% 0.2% 269,433 19,602 46,902 21,753 11,3 10, 6, 7,8 9,5 2 Grand total: Totals 66.4% 4.8% 11.6% 5.4% 2.8 2.6 1. 1.9 2.4 0 406,020 Auckland Canterbury Wellington Waikato Bay of Manawatu- Otago Northland Hawke's Bay Taranaki Plenty Wanganui Samoan 118,503 10,092 26,208 6,972 3,354 4,458 2,286 2,487 4,215 1,092 Cook Islands 46,668 3,132 8,712 6,702 3,552 2,535 1,281 2,238 3,069 579 Maori Tongan 62,403 3,192 3,330 3,606 1,965 1,785 1,437 1,257 1,053 255 Niuean 23,088 915 1,995 1,590 687 492 240 834 252 231 Tokelauan 2,406 213 4,185 444 546 312 129 114 135 48 Fijian 11,202 1,701 1,557 1,560 729 735 420 663 297 267 I-Kiribati 1,410 90 309 576 273 123 57 48 171 42 Tuvaluan 3,231 57 447 120 147 87 222 144 132 39 Papua New 372 165 111 120 75 63 78 54 27 12 Guinean Ni-Vanuatu 150 45 48 63 30 21 201 15 231 9 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 2018 Census Dataset. Extracted from NZ.Stat 29 June 2020. Area: Regional Council/SA2. Note: No reliance should be placed on small cell frequency count (e.g., cells with less than 20 counts). The Pacific Diaspora 28 Between 71-85 percent of individuals above Despite educational improvements among the 15 years of age that self-identified as having Pacific younger population, Pacific diaspora groups work ethnicity have up to a secondary school level of in low- and medium-skilled occupations which education. Amongst all diaspora groups, Fijians require high levels of physical proximity. Laborers, have the highest level of post-secondary education machine operators/drivers and sales workers completed, with 29 percent having a Level 5 constitute between 33-45 percent of the main Diploma or above (Figure 12). The 2018 Census occupations of Pacific diaspora groups, most (Stats NZ 2020) reveals that younger Pacific ethnic predominantly among Tongans, Cook Islanders groups are acquiring more formal qualifications and Samoans, as opposed to only 26 percent of than before. Pacific students gaining post- the general population of New Zealand. Laborers secondary school qualifications (Level 5 Diploma represent one-fifth to one-quarter of Pacific or higher) increased from 13 percent (2013 Census) diaspora workers (Figure 13). to 18 percent in 2018. FIGURE 12. New Zealand and Pacific diaspora groups by highest level of educational achievement (2018) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Samoan Cook Tongan Niuean Tokelauan Fijian Other New Islands Paci ic Zealand Maori Peoples No qualification Bachelor degree and level 7 qualification Level 1-4 Certificate and overseas secondary Post-graduate qualification Level 5-6 diploma Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 2018 Census Dataset. Extracted from NZ.Stat 29 June 2020. Area: Regional Council/SA2. The National Certificate of Educational Achievement is the main secondary school qualification in New Zealand and it can be awarded at Certificate level 1,2, and 3. Resident population aged 15 years and above. The Pacific Diaspora 29 FIGURE 13. New Zealand and Pacific diaspora groups by main occupations (2018) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Samoan Cook Tongan Niuean Tokelauan Fijian Other New Islands Paci ic Zealand Maori Peoples Managers Clerical and Administrative Workers Professionals Sales Workers Technicians and Trades Workers Machinery Operators and Drivers Community and Personal Service Workers Labourers Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 2018 Census Dataset. Extracted from NZ.Stat 29 June 2020. Area: Regional Council/SA2. Resident population aged 15 years and above, full-time and part-time employed. FIGURE 14. Pacific peoples’ occupational representation (Dec 2019) 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Managers Professionals Technical Service Clerks Sale Plant Labourers and Trades Pacific Peoples Total All Ethnic Groups Source: MBIE (2019) 30 25 The Pacific Diaspora 30 Similar to the case of Pacific Islanders residing Samoans, Guamanians, Tongans, Fijians and in Australia, employment in low- and medium- Marshallese continue to represent the most skilled jobs makes Pacific Islanders in New Zealand populous diaspora groups in the US, according to more vulnerable to COVID-19 impacts than the the 2018 American Community Survey (Figure 15). general New Zealand population, affecting their Nearly three-fourths of the NHPI population live in employment prospects and their ability to send the West of the US in areas that are high risk for remittances. Income levels for these jobs are also COVID-19. lower than average, further increasing vulnerability. Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanders have The average income of Pacific Islanders employed been disproportionately affected by COVID-19, in New Zealand in 2018 was $NZ 40,300 per year, according to UCLA’s Centre for Health Policy lower than that of non-Pacific Islanders ($NZ Research COVID-19 Tracking Project (Figure 16). 53,500 per year). In addition, the Pacific Island Existing chronic health conditions, such as heart diaspora in New Zealand is largely employed disease and cancer, place this group at higher risk in occupations that were highly impacted by of death. One in five NHPI have been diagnosed COVID-19 lockdown policies as they are less able with heart disease and they are 46 percent more to work from home. likely than average to be diagnosed with cancer (PI-CoPCE, 2020). NHPI also have slightly higher poverty levels and lower health insurance coverage, 3.3 PACIFIC ISLANDERS according to the US Census. There were 20.1 IN THE UNITED STATES percent of NHPI living in poverty (compared to There is comparatively less information available 15.8 percent for the general population) and 17.9 about Pacific Islanders in the United States, percent of them living without health insurance owing to the fact that the US Census groups them in 2013 (compared to 13.4 percent) (U.S. Census together with Native Hawaiians. This group is Bureau, 2015; Bishaw & Fontenot, 2014; Smith & referred to as Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Medalia, 2014). Islanders (NHPI). FIGURE 15. Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander population (2018) Tongan 626, 457 Guamanian or Chamorro 213, 439 Samoan 182, 584 Native Hawaiian 61,685 Source: 2018 American Community Survey, 1-Year Estimates, Table B02019: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone or in Any Combination.z The Pacific Diaspora 31 NHPI COVID-19 Data Policy Lab Dashboard NHPI COVID-19 Data Policy Lab Dashboard U.S. NHPI COVID-19 State NHPI COVID-19 U.S. NHPI COVID-19 Data Sources & Top 9 States by NHPI U.S. NHPI COVID-19 State NHPI COVID-19 Top 9 States by NHPI Data Sources & Deaths Data Cases Case Rate Methodology Deaths Data Case Rate Methodology Select State: Illinois Arkansas Arkansas Illinois Illinois FIGURE 16. COVID-19 cases by race per 100,000 (2020) NHPI COVID-19 Cases NHPI COVID-19 Cases NHPI COVID-19 Deaths NHPI COVID-19 Deaths 2,438 45 Data Last Updated: 555 10 October 21, 2020 Arkansas Illinois HPI Case Rate States Ranked By NHPI Case Rate Racial and Ethnic Case Rates per 100,000 Racial and Ethnic Case Rates per 100,000 Iowa: 40,611.14 20K Iowa: 40,611.14 20K 20,597.32 NHPI COVID-19 Data Policy Lab Dashboard Louisiana: 20,597.32 157.75 Illinois: 19,157.75 19,003.82 10K Arkansas: 19,003.82 10K U.S. NHPI COVID-19 State NHPI COVID-19 Top 9 States by NHPI Data Sources & Utah: 6,637.74 Deaths Data Case Rate Methodology 73 Minnesota: 6,149.73 Idaho: 5,818.18 0K 0K Alaska: 5,562.83 5 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Tennessee: 5,015.85 Oct 1 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 01.45 Oregon AI/AN North Carolina: 5,001.45 Oregon Black NHPI Asian White Hispanic NHPI AI/AN Asian Black White Hispanic NHPI COVID-19 Cases Colorado: 4,875.87 NHPI COVID-19 Deaths HPI Death Rate 643 7 Georgia: 4,606.30 States Ranked by NHPI Death Rate Racial and Ethnic Death Rates per 100,000 Racial and Ethnic Death Rates per 100,000 Oregon: 4,533.92 Louisiana: 720.91 Louisiana: 720.91 4K Ohio: 4,379.98 wa: 591.42 300 Oregon Iowa: 591.42 HPI Case Rate 29 Racial and Ethnic Case Rates per 100,000 Washington: 3,131.29 3K 350.77 Arkansas: 350.77 California: 2,344.09 Iowa: 40,611.14 5.18 200 Illinois: 345.18 2K 4K Kentucky: 2,279.20 20,597.32 1.77 North Carolina: 101.77 100 Nebraska: 1,986.30 157.75 Georgia: 100.76 1K Maine: 1,801.80 19,003.82 Minnesota: 76.39 0 2K Wyoming: 1,601.94 0K Washington: 75.79 73 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Hawaii: 1,016.94 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 Colorado: 74.33 Alaska: 70.54 0K Tennessee: 57.65 5 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Ohio: 56.88 Sep 1 Oct 1 01.45 California: 55.69 NHPI AI/AN Asian Black White Hispanic Utah: 54.24 HPI Death Rate Racial and Ethnic Death Rates per 100,000 Oregon: 49.36 Hawaii: 14.09 Louisiana: 720.91 Source: Ponce et al. (2020) Nebraska: 0.00 wa: 591.42 40 29 350.77 5.18 1.77 20 Within 0 the NHPI group, poverty statistics are This lack of skills required for higher level particularly stark May 1 for migrants Jun 1 Jul 1 from the Aug 1 Micronesian Sep 1 Oct 1 employment is likely to be similar for migrants from island states. An American Community Survey in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Among 2015 estimated that just 4 percent of Marshallese FSM migrants in Hawaii, 5 percent held a bachelor’s aged 25 years and over were college graduates degree, while on the mainland, 6 percent had a and 75 percent were high school graduates. These full college degree. FSM migrants take largely figures are low compared to both the general entry-level jobs as house cleaners, aides in nursing population and other migrant groups. In terms homes, security guards, delivery drivers, and of occupation, Marshallese living in Arkansas cashiers at convenience stores and eateries. In work primarily in manufacturing (1 in every 3), addition, FSM migrants are disproportionately whereas Marshallese living in Hawaii work primarily employed in large plants, especially food in the recreation and accommodation sectors. processing plants, canneries, and lumber mills Before COVID-19, approximately 41 percent of all (Hezel & Levin, 2012). Marshallese in the United States in 2015 lived in Many low-skilled jobs have been affected by the poverty; about two in every five Marshallese lived COVID-19 pandemic, impacting migrants’ ability in Arkansas, but more than half of the Marshallese to find work and send remittances back home lived in Hawaii. These figures can be attributed during the pandemic. An analysis by McKinsey to the lack of skills required for higher level on the impact of COVID-19 in the US labor market employment (Levin, 2017). indicates that the pandemic has hit the leisure and hospitality sectors hardest. The Pacific Diaspora 32 Occupations that registered absolute decreases Interviews with diaspora representatives reveal that in job postings from March to April 2020 were many Pacific Island communities have been under a restaurant services (-30 percent), restaurant cooks lot of stress during the pandemic. Culturally, many (-30 percent), personal care aides (-25 percent), are reluctant to ask for help, and Pacific community light truck delivery drivers (-21 percent) and members and organisations have played an retail salespersons (-12 percent) (Lund, Ellingrud, important role in making sure food relief and other Hancock, & Manyika, 2020). Low-wage, part- non-monetary support reaches those in need. time, and minority workers are the most likely to Nonetheless, there is some concern that increased hold vulnerable jobs. Eighty-six percent of jobs financial (and emotional) stress resulting from the that the pandemic has made vulnerable paid less pandemic and being cooped up together in small than US$40,000 a year. Part-time workers were spaces might be associated with a rise in gender- disproportionately represented in vulnerable jobs. based violence within Pacific households. Workers without bachelor’s degrees were nearly Many Pacific Islanders are employed on casual twice as likely to hold vulnerable jobs during the contracts, and some are reported to have COVID-19 crisis. experienced reduced hours. Self-isolation and quarantine arrangements have also contributed to hardship. For example, Fijians employed on a casual 3.4 COVID-19 IMPACTS ON basis who have been required to self-isolate for THE PACIFIC DIASPORA fourteen days after returning from Fiji forfeited The education and employment profiles of the pay for that period. Pacific diaspora suggest that Pacific Islanders living overseas will be disproportionately affected by COVID-19 job and income losses. Across all three main host countries – Australia, New Zealand and the United States – Pacific Islanders on average have lower educational attainment than the rest of the population and engage in low- and semi-skilled jobs, which are less suited for home-based work. These characteristics expose them to relatively higher risks of contracting the virus but also having adverse labor market outcomes, potentially leading to negative flow-on effects on remittances. While evidence on COVID-19 impacts specific to Pacific Islanders in these countries remains limited at the point of writing, available data reveals an outlook that is both challenging and varied. Preliminary findings from qualitative work to capture the impacts of COVID-19 on Pacific diaspora groups in Australia and New Zealand suggest that impacts vary by location.11 In 11. Interviews with eight representatives of Pacific diaspora South Australia, for instance, there is a higher communities in Australia, after having contacted more than 50 groups in Australia and New Zealand. The sampling concentration of Pacific Islander employment in frame was designed to capture a variation of country professional roles than in other Australian states, of origin, location and organisation type (e.g., religious, potentially reducing the likely impacts of COVID-19 cultural association or business), illustrating the diversity of experiences these communities are facing during the on Pacific Islanders in the state. pandemic. Interviews range from 45 minutes to just over one hour and are still being conducted at the moment. The final report will reflect a more complete picture of the impacts of COVID-19 on the Pacific diaspora. The Pacific Diaspora 33 There is variability in access to and use of JobKeeper12 payments among the diaspora in “I think it really highlighted that…we Australia. There are also reports of difficulties in applying and accessing social services, particularly are not so much part of the Australian among Pacific Islanders who are not confident with community as we thought we were in their English. This has been especially problematic terms of being able to access some of the for those attempting to communicate with Centrelink13 over the phone, with some community social services that were available.” members consequently not accessing social MEMBER OF THE SAMOAN COMMUNITY services. In Australia, many Pacific Islanders have not had access to JobKeeper payments during the crisis. Many are ineligible because, having migrated to Australia via New Zealand, they are not Australian citizens. Others have been unable to access these payments as their employers have not applied for the scheme. While average household sizes vary geographically, Remittances to the Pacific during the pandemic most community leaders agree that Polynesian have varied across communities. Some diaspora households tend to be large, which magnifies community leaders were of the view that in some economic hardship when income reduction countries, like Papua New Guinea14, people back or income loss occurs. Samoan and Tongan home have been able to rely upon subsistence households can contain around 10-12 people. In agriculture in the face of COVID-19. Remittance Melbourne, the Fijian community also contains behaviors in their communities, therefore, have households of this size. In contrast, in South not changed substantially. In contrast, members Australia, due to the lower cost of living, most of the Fijian community spoke about an increased households contain nuclear families comprising need to send remittances due to the lack of tourism about five people. Job losses and reduced work will and associated job losses occurring in home thus impact households differently, but the income communities. Community representatives reported loss of one earner may directly impact more than that Fijians in Australia have made large sacrifices ten other people. in order to meet increased remittance needs. One community leader observed that people were subsisting on instant noodles in order to support their families at home. 12. The JobKeeper payment was introduced on 30th March 2020 by the Australian government to support employment during the COVID-19 crisis. Under JobKeeper, eligible businesses were granted A$1,500 per employee every fortnight until the 28th September 2020, when slightly lower payments were introduced based on whether employees were full-time or part-time. The payment is currently scheduled to end on 21st March 2021. 13. Centrelink is the Australian government agency that delivers social security payments and related services to Australian residents. 14. Interviews took place in July and August 2020, before the COVID-19 outbreak in PNG. Executive Summary 34 Cultural factors have also played an important Most Pacific diaspora community members remit role in how remittances have been sent during to the Pacific using online banking or Western the pandemic. For many members of the Samoan Union. There has been no noticeable increase in community, money and goods are remitted remittance fees, and some have reported that primarily when there are lifecycle events or Western Union reduced their fees for a period. celebrations. As funerals, weddings and other Most community leaders believe that social events have been cancelled in some communities distancing has not impacted how remittances are during the pandemic, the Samoan diaspora have sent or received; however, one member of the reduced their remittances accordingly. Community Fijian community noted that reduced opening members have described this as ‘a relief’ and ‘a hours at Western Union branches in Fiji and Samoa blessing’ as the cultural pressure to remit has have made it harder for some family members to virtually disappeared and they have been able to receive money. save money instead. While they hope that it will   stay this way, the Samoan community believes that once the restrictions ease, there will probably be an increase in the number of weddings and other celebrations, which might represent a large drain on their finances over a condensed period. Executive Summary 35 4. SEASONAL WORKERS Seasonal Workers 36 Approximately 25,000 seasonal workers from the The COVID-19 crisis has imposed serious Pacific are employed in Australia and New Zealand challenges on seasonal workers from Pacific Island each year. The majority come from Tonga, Vanuatu countries. Border closures by both destination and and Samoa, and participate in either Australia’s origin countries, aimed at slowing the pandemic, Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) or New have left thousands of seasonal workers stranded Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) in Australia and New Zealand. Although early scheme. Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa also have the concerns related to the legality of their stay largest number of workers as a proportion of their have been addressed by visa extensions and labor force. In Tonga’s case, almost 15 percent of re-deployment options, lack of work remains an the workforce participated in the SWP or RSE last issue in some areas given the seasonal nature of year (Figure 17). The numbers of Pacific seasonal employment. Data from the World Bank phone workers in Australia or New Zealand at any given survey on how COVID-19 has affected these time vary, influenced by the harvest seasons for workers suggests substantial and varying impacts different products. As of May 2020, there were on employment, earnings, and remittances. approximately 7,000 Pacific seasonal workers in Domestic border closures and the dependence Australia under the SWP and 9,300 in New Zealand of workers on their employers to apply for visa under the RSE scheme. extensions and redeployment (in Australia) and transportation to new workplaces (in both Australia and New Zealand) present additional challenges to the continuation of their employment and expose FIGURE 17. Seasonal workers/labor force them to risks of exploitation and distress. The ratio (2018/19) workers’ distinct living and working conditions (often in crowded spaces), together with their low 16% 14.7% levels of income, make them particularly vulnerable 14% to infection15 and consequent economic hardship. 12% 10% 8.1% 8% 6% 6% 4% 2.4% 2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.01% 0% Fiji Tonga Vanuatu Samoa Kiribati PNG Solomon Islands SWP PLS RSE Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data from the 15. While there has been no reported case of COVID-19 infection Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment, among Pacific migrant workers in Australia and New Zealand Pacific Labour Facility, Immigration New Zealand, and World in 2020, a cluster of infection has been recorded among Development Indicators database. meat workers in Melbourne. In the US, by early May about 5,000 meat workers, roughly 4 percent of the industry’s workforce, had tested positive. Outbreaks among migrant workers have also been recorded among meat workers across Europe and among migrant construction workers in Singapore, highlighting the health risk that seasonal workers face during this pandemic. Seasonal Workers 37 4.1. EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS Of those surveyed, 35.7 percent had experienced AND SAVINGS at least one week without any work since the lockdowns in March and 8.3 percent anticipate that Demand for seasonal workers during the pandemic, their total earnings from this work season will fall typically in the agriculture sector, has remained short of the pre-departure costs that they incurred strong. About half of SWP and RSE employers to participate in their labor mobility scheme. In interviewed in the World Bank phone survey contrast, a minor but non-trivial proportion of reported having experienced labor shortages this group worked more hours (13.2 percent) and for at least one month since March 2020, with earned a higher income (18.2 percent) than they the cancellation of incoming Pacific workers did pre-lockdown. and decreases in the number of backpackers, international students and local farm labor being The crisis appears to have highly similar impacts the main reasons. This confirms earlier news of on employment and earnings across SWP and farm labor shortages in both Australia and New RSE schemes. A notable difference is that the Zealand shortly after lockdowns16 as border proportion of RSE workers having more work is closures and health concerns curbed the flow of moderately higher than in the case of the SWP both Pacific seasonal workers, holiday markers and (16 percent as compared to 11 percent). RSE international students, who farmers traditionally workers also seem more positive about their rely on for fruit picking, precisely at the peak of earning prospects, with only 6 percent expecting the winter harvest season – May in Australia and their total earnings from this work season to be June-August in New Zealand. Vanuatu, the largest insufficient to cover their pre-departure costs sending country, had banned new participation (nearly 2 percent being unsure) compared to a in the SWP and RSE schemes since mid-March similar response among SWP workers of 11 percent (though several hundred have recently travelled to (and 5 percent for unsure). These differences could the Northern Territory, which is free of COVID-19, be attributable, at least partly, to a more severe as part of a pilot). There was also a net outflow labor shortage in New Zealand. The survey found of almost 40,000 backpackers in Australia under that 57 percent of Recognised Seasonal Employers the Working Holiday Maker visa in April and May, a were unable to find enough manpower to meet group that is estimated to comprise approximately their needs for at least one month after lockdowns 60 percent of the horticultural workforce (ABS were imposed, as compared to 44 percent of SWP 2020, Curtain et al. 2018). employers. Differences in re-deployment efficiency might also have played a role, although this is Despite an aggregate labor shortage, the pandemic uncertain. has led to broad-based decreases in employment and earnings of seasonal workers, though the impacts are far from uniform.17 Preliminary data from the World Bank phone survey reveals that two-thirds of Pacific seasonal workers under the SWP and RSE18 schemes have experienced fewer work hours and lower weekly earnings as compared to the period of January and February (Figure 18 and 19). 16. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/country/411844/coronavirus- further-strain-on-fruit-picking-labour-shortages 17. Data as of 20 August 2020 and based on surveys of 507 workers (273 from the SWP, and 234 from the RSE). 18. Data on PLS workers is being collected by the Pacific Labor Facility and not yet available. Seasonal Workers 38 FIGURE 18. Change in working hours FIGURE 19. Change in weekly earnings after lockdown after lockdown 100% 100% 80% 80% 66.3% 62.8% 64.7% 63.7% 67.5% 65.5% 60% 60% 40% 40% 20.9% 18.3% 14.1% 16.4% 21.1% 21.1% 20% 20% 16.2% 18% 18.4% 18.2% 10.6% 13.2% 0% 0% SWP RSE TOTAL SWP RSE TOTAL More hours Fewer hours Higher earnings Lower earnings Same hours Same earnings Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances. on Pacific labor mobility and remittances. Details may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. Details may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. FIGURE 20. Proportion of workers who extended Not only has COVID-19 had widespread impacts their visas and switched employers on Pacific seasonal workers, but the magnitude of these impacts is also significant. Workers who 80% experienced fewer work hours lost about 18 hours 68.1% 70% per week, on average, whereas those who had 59% 60% a heavier workload gained 12.8 hours per week. Among those reporting a decrease in income, the 50% average reduction in weekly earnings amounted to 39.1% 40% 50 percent (or $A 400) among SWP workers and 30% 48 percent (or $NZ 364) among RSE workers 22.8% 21.7% (Table 2). Among those who reported an income 20% 14.5% gain, the average increase was 69 percent ($A 209) 10% for SWP workers and 66 percent ($NZ 315) for 0% RSE workers. Higher Same Lower earnings earnings earnings Changed employers Extended visa Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances Seasonal Workers 39 TABLE 2. Changes in work hours and earnings after lockdowns Average change in weekly work hours SWP RSE Workers experienced more work hours 8.3 16.2 Workers experienced fewer work hours -17.8 -18.2 Average change in weekly earnings Workers experienced Absolute change $A 209 $NZ 315 higher earnings Relative change (%) 68.7 66.2 Workers experienced Absolute change - $A 400 - $NZ 364 lower earnings Relative change (%) -49.7 -47.7 Several factors are associated with whether The survey sample, however, is insufficient to workers benefited from the lockdown-induced ascertain whether the extent of labor shortages labor shortage. Across the schemes, workers varied across regions. reporting higher earnings originally worked Female workers have been more severely hit by the considerably fewer hours and made less money crisis. Although male workers are more likely to see pre-lockdown than those reporting lower or their earnings drop than their female counterparts, unchanged earnings. In addition, while there is when they do, the extent of reduction in their no considerable difference in the likelihood of income is less severe (although still substantial) at changing employers between these two groups of 47 percent as compared to 57 percent. Consistent stranded workers, those who witnessed increased with previous surveys undertaken by the World income were significantly less likely to have their Bank, female workers also earn significantly less visa extended (Figure 20). Since contracts of Pacific than male workers, despite working roughly the workers are typically aligned with the seasonal same number of hours. This appeared to be the demand for farm labor of their employers, it is case both pre- and post-lockdown, and as noted in possible that the lockdown-induced labor shortage previous studies, may be the result of the type of was largely local-based and only benefited those work that females undertake on farms (with women working below their full capacity pre-lockdown. more likely to be engaged on an hourly rate in Workers approaching the end of their contracts packing, while men more likely to be engaged on around lockdown were highly likely to be employed piece rates for picking fruit) (World Bank 2018). on farms which had passed their peak seasons and hence no longer had as much work to offer. Workers in certain regions were more likely to see their earnings increase – in particular, Queensland and South Australia in Australia, and Bay of Plenty and Marlborough in New Zealand. Seasonal Workers 40 FIGURE 21. Changes in weekly earnings The income effects of COVID-19 vary considerably by nationality and gender across nationalities. Samoan and i-Kiribati workers have been hit hardest, with approximately 100% 86 percent and 77 percent respectively seeing their earnings decrease. Tongan and Fijian workers 80% were least impacted, with 57 percent and 62 percent respectively reporting a reduction in their 60% earnings (Figure 21). The magnitude of the impacts also varies from country to country. I-Kiribati 40% workers remain among those worst affected, together with Timorese workers – while Fijian 20% workers, on average, experienced the smallest earnings decrease (Figure 22). 0% The reduction in earnings is strongly associated Fiji with substantial decreases in savings and Timor-Leste Tonga Vanuatu Kiribati Samoa Female Male consumption. I-Kiribati, Samoan and Timorese workers, who were more likely to witness their earnings decrease, are also more likely to save less Lower earnings Higher earnings and cut down on their own living expenses, such Same earnings as food, accommodation, phone, clothing and entertainment (Figures 23 and 24). Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances FIGURE 22. Percentage reduction in weekly earnings among workers reporting lower earnings 57.1% 56.7% 60% 51.7% 54.9% 47% 48.4% 46.6% 50% 40% 35.1% 30% 20% 10% 0% Fiji Kirabati Timor-Leste Samoa Vanuatu Tonga Female Male Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances Seasonal Workers 41 FIGURE 23. Changes in savings after lockdown 4.2. REMITTANCES Remittances from seasonal workers, unsurprisingly, 100% have significantly decreased. About half of the surveyed workers reported that their remittances 80% were lower than the pre-lockdown months of January and February, while only about 17 percent 60% reported remitting more each time as compared to the pre-lockdown period (Figure 25). Among those 40% reporting a reduction in remittances, the average amount sent each time dropped by 53 percent 20% for SWP workers and 48 percent for RSE workers (Table 3). Across workers of different nationalities, 0% the reduction is between 41 percent (Fiji) and 61 percent (Timor-Leste). In addition, among those Fiji Timor-Leste Tonga Vanuatu Kiribati Samoa who reported a higher remittance amount per transaction, part of the increase could be attributed to the fact that they remitted less. The high Significantly more More percentage increase in their remittance amount is About the same Less also partly mechanical – during the pre-lockdown Significantly less period, these workers used to send much less than Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on those who reported lower remittances, hence the Pacific labor mobility and remittances percentage change in their remittances is larger. In aggregate terms, the average amount remitted each time by SWP and RSE workers has dropped by $A 80 and $NZ 58, respectively. FIGURE 24. Changes in expenditure after lockdown The decrease in remittances, although substantial, is less drastic than that in earnings. Whilst about 100% two-thirds of interviewed workers saw their earnings fall, only half reported remitting less. 80% Workers who earned more tended to remit more and vice versa, but the correlation between 60% the changes in earnings and the changes in remittances was only moderate – approximately 61.1 percent of those earning less remitted less, and 40% only 30.4 percent of those earning more remitted more. When disaggregated by change in earnings, 20% the average changes in remittances were also markedly smaller than those in earnings in both 0% absolute and relative terms, regardless of whether Fiji Timor-Leste Tonga Vanuatu Kiribati Samoa earnings increased or decreased. This suggests that many workers adjusted their spending and saving behaviors to cope with the income impacts Significantly more More of the crisis and maintain the level of money sent About the same Less home. Significantly less Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances Seasonal Workers 42 FIGURE 25. Changes in remittances after FIGURE 26. Changes in remittances after lockdown by scheme lockdown by nationality and gender 100% 100% 80% 80% 48.7% 51.9% 55.6% 60% 60% 40% 40% 33.7% 30.8% 27.4% 20% 20% 17.6% 17.1% 17.4% 0% 0% Fiji Timor-Leste Tonga Vanuatu Kiribati Samoa Female Male SWP RSE Total Higher Same Lower Higher Same Lower Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances. on Pacific labor mobility and remittances. Details may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. Details may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. Seasonal Workers 43 TABLE 3. Average changes in remittances sent per transaction SWP RSE Workers remitted more Absolute change $A 556.9 $NZ 434.8 Relative change (%) 183.1 161.8 Workers remitted less Absolute change - $A 484.6 - $NZ 306.1 Relative change (%) -53.1 -47.6 Fiji Absolute change - $A 337.5 - $NZ 264.3 Relative change (%) -45.1 -35.0 Kiribati Absolute change - $A 196.7 - $NZ 196.0 Relative change (%) -54.8 -41.4 Samoa Absolute change - $A 83.3 * - $NZ 143.8 * Relative change (%) -26.2 -45.0 Timor-Leste Absolute change - $A 828.6 N/A Relative change (%) -60.5 N/A Tonga Absolute change - $A 593.5 - $NZ 302.2 Relative change (%) -48.0 -52.7 Vanuatu Absolute change - $A 590.2 - $NZ 427.4 Relative change (%) -57.1 -50.9 All workers Absolute change - $A 80.4 - $NZ 57.5 Relative change (%) 16.2^ 7.8^ Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances. * Based on fewer than 30 observations due to preliminary status of survey data. ^ The average relative change is positive mostly because of some outliers, whose remittances were very small pre-lockdown but increased substantially post-lockdown, resulting in drastic increases in percentage terms. Seasonal Workers 44 Remittances have also become less frequent. The transition, however, is quite modest and slightly Comparing remitting behaviors before and after more visible in New Zealand, where the usage lockdowns, the share of workers remitting on a of OTC services fell by 8.5 percentage points as weekly or bi-weekly basis has fallen, compensated compared to 7 percentage points in Australia. This by an increase in the share of workers remitting modest increase in online transfers is seemingly once a month or less frequently. There is no at odds with the sharp increase observed at the remarkable difference between RSE and SWP aggregate level by central banks. The Reserve workers in terms of changes in remitting frequency. Bank of Fiji, for instance, recorded in April 2020 a Notably, 11.4 percent of workers, who were month-to-month increase of 68 percent in inward interviewed between late June and early August, remittances credited to mobile wallets. Similarly, had not sent any money back since March. This during the same period the Central Bank of Samoa signals a critical and sustained fall in income for observed a month-to-month increase of 157 percent their remittance-receiving families. in mobile money wallets, despite a decrease of 23 percent in total remittance inflows. This could Amidst lockdowns and social distancing measures indicate that seasonal workers, unlike other Pacific to curb the spread of COVID-19, Pacific seasonal migrants, have limited access to and/or knowledge workers have shifted away from over-the-counter of digital remittance services. (OTC) remitting services and toward online transfers (Figures 28 and 29). FIGURE 27. Changes in remitting frequency 40% 36.1% 35% 29% 29.2% 30% 23.5% 23.5% 25% 20% 16.2% 14.2% 15% 11.4% 8.7% 10% 6.9% 5% 1.4% 0% 0% Weekly Bi-weekly Once a month Once every Once every Did not send/ 2 3 months 6 months Have not sent money home Pre-lockdown Post-lockdown Seasonal Workers 45 FIGURE 28. Changes in remitting channels FIGURE 29. Changes in remitting channels among SWP workers among RSE workers 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Online Online Over-the- Through Online Online Over-the- Through transfer transfer counter friends or transfer transfer counter friends or through through transfers convenience through through transfers convenience banks MTDs stores banks MTDs stores Pre-lockdown Post-lockdown Pre-lockdown Post-lockdown Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts Source: World Bank survey on COVID-19 impacts on Pacific labor mobility and remittances on Pacific labor mobility and remittances Remittances from seasonal workers can be expected to continue to decline in the medium- term if travel restrictions on incoming workers remain in place. Workers who have completed their employment assignments are gradually returning home, with special repatriation flights arranged for seasonal workers from both Australia and New Zealand in recent months. This has potential to impact output in the horticultural industry in the future unless labor force issues are addressed. There are promising developments in this area. Recent moves to bring ni-Vanuatu workers to work in the Northern Territory mango industry in Australia could lead to the re-commencement of labor mobility programs, particularly from Pacific Island countries that have not recorded COVID-19 cases. Longer-term prospects are therefore promising, notwithstanding current restrictions. Seasonal Workers 46 4.3. SUPERANNUATION, Compared with data collected by the World Bank EXPECTATION AND on SWP workers in 2015 (World Bank 2018), SWP SATISFACTION WITH workers appear less satisfied this time with the LABOR MOBILITY exception being ni-Vanuatu workers, although the large time gap and different survey samples make it Despite the overall negative impacts of the difficult to pinpoint what has driven such changes. COVID-19 crisis, Pacific seasonal workers remain fairly satisfied with their experience in Australia and Share workers wanting to return next year might New Zealand and the vast majority wish to return be partly driven by the detrimental impacts of next year. When asked to rate their satisfaction COVID-19 on their families and domestic labor with working in Australia/New Zealand on a scale markets, which could strengthen their incentive of 1 to 10 (1 being ‘Not at all satisfied at all’ and to continue working in the schemes. This also 10 being ‘Extremely satisfied’), the average rating highlights the demand for and the role of labor was 7.8 among SWP workers and 7.9 among their mobility in supporting employment and livelihood RSE counterparts (Table 4). The variation between among Pacific workers. the two schemes is minor; the only exception is For seasonal workers that remain in Australia or that Tongan workers in the SWP scheme gave a New Zealand, an ongoing risk relates to the fact markedly higher rating than Tongan RSE workers they are not covered by the formal social protection (9.2 compared to 7.1). Across nationalities, Timorese systems in their host countries. The pandemic- workers gave the lowest average rating at 6.8, specific support provided by host governments to which is likely related to the fact that they have seasonal workers has been modest. experienced the largest reduction in earnings, in percentage terms, during this crisis. TABLE 4. Satisfaction rating (out of 10) of working experience in Australia and New Zealand Nationality SWP RSE SWP 2015^ Fiji 8.2 8.3 N/A Kiribati 8.4 8.6 N/A Samoa 9.3* 7.9* 8.5 Timor-Leste 6.8 N/A 7.9 Tonga 9.2 7.1 9.9 Vanuatu 7.0 7.9 6.3 Overall 7.8 7.9 N/A * Based on fewer than 30 observations due to preliminary status of the survey data ^ World Bank (2018) Seasonal Workers 47 RSE workers are eligible for the COVID-19 sick The accommodation arrangements, work leave scheme, as well as some government environments and remote locations of seasonal funding under the COVID-19 Economic Response workers have also put them at risk in present Package, whereas SWP workers can withdraw up circumstances. Seasonal workers tend to live to $A 10,000 of their superannuation if they are in crowded, shared rental accommodation, and having difficulty meeting living costs. Data from employment typically involves working in close the World Bank phone survey of SWP workers, proximity with one another for long hours. Home- however, revealed that nearly 42 percent of based work is rarely an option and many workers workers are unaware of this entitlement. Seasonal are based in remote rural areas without good employment also provides no guaranteed paid transportation. Together with the hour or piece- leave for workers who are forced to self-isolate. rate nature of a lot of seasonal employment, this makes it unlikely that workers will seek testing for Cut off from their traditional social safety net at COVID-19 and medical treatment if they fall sick. home, workers in this situation are left exposed Indeed, earlier research on both SWP and RSE to both financial and health risks without workers has found that they tend to avoid visiting unemployment benefits or income support19. doctors and taking sick leave because they do not Community leaders interviewed by the World want to forfeit their daily earnings20. While both Bank report that in recent months community Australia and New Zealand have managed to avoid organisations have been providing food relief significant outbreaks to date and workers have for workers in some cases where work has been gradually been repatriated, the global pandemic is in low supply. unlikely to recede in the medium-term. Health and income protection for seasonal workers who stay in hosting countries should therefore remain a priority going forward, as labor mobility pathways are opened up with relaxation of travel restrictions.   19. PIC workers are not the only groups on temporary visa holders in Australia that are not covered by the formal social protection system. The other groups include: international students; temporary graduate visa holders; temporary skilled workers and their families; working holiday makers and New Zealanders who are long-term residents of Australia but don’t qualify for most government payments and services apart from Medicare.(https://insidestory.org.au/of-visas-and- viruses/) 20. https://ourarchive.otago.ac.nz/handle/10523/5063 Executive Summary 48 5. DISCUSSION Discussion 49 The impact of COVID-19 on employment (The decrease in Fiji, however, was partly a opportunities for Pacific migrant workers and continuation of a declining trend since 2006). the Pacific diaspora, and the resulting impacts As the COVID-19 pandemic has been causing on remittance income, are cause for concern. economic damages in both source and receiving Some Pacific Island countries are highly reliant countries, remittances to the Pacific region are on remittances, which form an important informal unlikely to follow a monotonous trajectory. safety net for a large proportion of the population. Data collected by monetary authorities in Pacific Similarly, labor mobility programs are a significant countries and by the World Bank phone survey source of employment opportunities for low- and of Pacific seasonal workers confirms a decline in semi-skilled workers, with 6 to 15 percent of the remittance inflows during the early months of the labor force in some countries engaged in such crisis, followed by signs of recovery. More than schemes. This section discusses the likely impacts half of surveyed SWP and RSE workers reported of the crisis on remittances, drawing on both lowering their remittances as compared to the available data and projections. The section that period of January-February 2020. At an aggregate follows discusses the outlook for labor mobility in level, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga all experienced sharp the medium- and long-term. drops in remittances during February-April (Figures 30 and 31), with the decrease most severe in Fiji. These declines in remittances were expected as 5.1. REMITTANCES TO THE PACIFIC existing migrant workers either lost employment IN TIMES OF COVID-19 in host countries, had their work hours reduced, or Remittances and remitting behaviors are influenced returned home early at a time when new workers by a range of factors, including economic were not taking up employment overseas. Yet the conditions in both source and receiving countries, three countries (Samoa and Tonga in particular) the employment and income profile of migrant have all seen signs of recovery in their remittance workers, living costs, cultural norms, the costs and inflows from May until September, with both year- accessibility of remittance sending services, and to-date and monthly remittances having returned exchange rates. The dynamic interactions among to positive YoY growth. these factors shape the flow and magnitude of These recoveries may be explained by several remittances over time. factors. One is a shift from carrying cash back Projecting remittances during COVID-19 is home, to sending through remittance service particularly challenging, partly due to the likely providers due to international travel restrictions. combination of cyclical and counter-cyclical Total remittances therefore might still decrease effects. When crises affect the Pacific but not despite observed recovery in the recorded remittance-source countries, remittances often remittance flows. The second factor is social behave in a counter-cyclical manner, with the protection measures in host countries, which might diaspora remitting more money in times of have mitigated income losses of migrant workers hardship back home (remittance responses to and hence sustained at least part of their capacity tropical cyclones, for instance). The opposite to remit. is true when crises affect remittance-sending countries. During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), for example, global remittances dropped as remittance-source countries entered recession. In the Pacific, remittances to Tonga and Fiji dropped 21. Data from the World Bank Remittance database shows that the decline in remittance inflows to Tonga that started in by 20.8 percent21 and 19.9 percent22, respectively, 2008 continued until 2010, whereas data from the country’s between 2007-2008, a decline considerably larger central bank shows the declining trend persisted until at least than that experienced globally. 2012 (Source: https://devpolicy.org/tonga-averting-a-bleak- economic-future-20121029/). 22. World Bank Remittance database. Executive Summary 50 Third, the economies of Australia and New Zealand, Moreover, the pandemic in the US is showing no the two major sources of remittances to the Pacific, sign of plateauing. The macro dynamics, with are gradually returning to normal and, therefore, respect to the disease’s containment, economic the negative impacts on employment of migrants downturn, potential recovery and international might be less severe than initially predicted.23 mobility as the pandemic evolves, make projections The US economy has also been performing better of future remittance flows difficult and mean than anticipated, with the unemployment rate, that remittance forecasts should be treated with by October, steadily declining for six consecutive caution. months and job gains occurring in leisure and COVID-19 has also encouraged migrants to shift hospitality, professional and business services, away from cash-based remittance services and retail trade, and construction. Depreciations of toward digital transfers. In some cases, remittance Pacific currencies against the Australian dollar and service providers have been unable to open due other hard currencies is another factor contributing to lockdowns and social distancing measures, to higher value received by Pacific Island countries. meaning that cash-based remittance services Counter-cyclical remitting behaviors by migrant have become limited, or unavailable, in both workers might have also played a role in sustaining sending and receiving countries. In Fiji and Samoa, the level of remittances. As discussed earlier, a for instance, some operators suspended their considerable portion of seasonal workers have businesses and announced that they would reopen maintained or even increased their remittances once lockdown rules were eased. Travel restrictions despite earning less money, often at the expense of have also meant that the physical transfer of cash their own consumption. across borders is not possible. This has increased In this dynamic context, the World Bank projects the relative importance of electronic transfers. In that remittances to Pacific countries will decrease all Pacific receiving countries, monetary authorities by 4.3 percent overall in 2020 (Table 5). This is have noticed a peak in digital crediting in bank a milder contraction than expected in low- and accounts and other digital wallets. In Fiji, the value middle-income countries in the East Asia and of inward remittances credited to mobile wallets Pacific region (11 percent in 2020) and the global increased by 23 percent in March and 68 percent in average (7 percent). Despite recent signs of April on a month-on-month basis, while by volume recovery, the main host countries – Australia, the increases were 30 percent and 59 percent, New Zealand and the US – are still forecasted to respectively. experience economic contraction in 2020.24 This translates into lower demand for migrant workers. In all three host countries, Pacific Islanders are predominantly employed in low- and semi- skilled jobs with high physical proximity and limited capacity to work remotely, making them particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of 23. Early estimates released at the peak of the crisis in April COVID-19 and associated public health responses, by the World Bank, central banks of several Pacific Islands countries and ANZ, for instance, were more pessimistic including lockdown and social distancing about the extent of the decrease in remittances (Table 5). measures. 24. The US Federal Reserve forecasts a 3.7 percent contraction Remittance projections, however, are subject in 2020, as of September 2020. The Reserve Bank of Australia as of November projects a contraction of 4 percent whereas to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and New Zealand expects a contraction of 2 percent. consequent changing macroeconomic conditions. Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ One source of uncertainty is the risk of a COVID-19 files/fomcprojtabl20200916.pdf; resurgence and renewed lockdowns, as observed https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2020/nov/ recently in Auckland (New Zealand) and Victoria forecasts.html; and South Australia (Australia). https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/gross-domestic- product-gdp Executive Summary 51 FIGURE 30. Monthly remittance inflows to FIGURE 31. Cumulative remittances to Fiji, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in 2020 Samoa and Tonga in 2020 (year-on-year change, percent, (year to date) (year-on-year change, in local currencies) percent, in local currencies) 50% 30% Tonga Tonga 40% 25% 30% Samoa Samoa 20% 20% Fiji Fiji 15% 10% 10% 0% 5% -10% 0% -20% -30% -5% -40% -10% Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Samoa Fiji Tonga Samoa Fiji Tonga Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji and Central Bank of Samoa. Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji and Central Bank of Samoa. 16% 14% Crediting remittances in money wallets from the Employer promotion of digital channels for sending UK, US, New Zealand and Australia increased by 39, of 12% remittances could be explored in the future for 32, 14 and 11 percent in April, respectively.25 Both such 10% workers, both as a means of reducing the risk Australian and New Zealand financial regulators of infection where COVID-19 cases are high, and 8% also confirmed that collection via digital channels in order to reduce costs for workers. This already increased in April (World Bank, 2020c). occurs in other countries such as Qatar where all 6% remittance transactions are now done online and The relative increase in digital transfers, which are 4% employers have been mandated to train migrant cheaper than cash-based transfers, has led to a 2% workers to use online-based transfer services slight reduction in the average cost of remittances. (Moroz et al., 2020). 0% The average cost of sending US$200 in remittances to the East Asia and Pacific region dropped to 7.13 percent in the first quarter of 2020, compared with 7.21 percent in the first quarter of 2019. Poorer migrants and their households, however, might lack knowledge of and access to online services as they require the origination and distribution of funds through bank accounts, payment cards or mobile money (World Bank, 2020c). This is supported by survey data on seasonal workers in Australia and New Zealand, whose switch to digital transfers during the crisis has been marginal. 25. It is important to highlight that the remittances via mobile wallets only accounted for 3 percent of the total volume of remittances received in Fiji. Discussion 52 TABLE 5. Remittance projections and experience during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) Reduction Expected reduction due to COVID-19 during GFC World Bank World Bank Central banks ANZ Pacific (October (April 2020) Insights 2020) East Asia and 11% 13% Pacific region Pacific region 4.3% 16.9% 10-20 % 22% Fiji 20% (between 4.6% 17.5% 10-15% 18% 2007-2008) Samoa 5% (between 3.7% 17.0% 15-20% FY2008-2009) Tonga 21% (between 2008-2009) 4.0% 16.7% 33% 30% (between 2008-2011) Kiribati 4.5% 16.0% Palau 29.3% 9.1% Marshall Islands 3.7% 1.4% Federal States of 3.3% 9.4% Micronesia Solomon Islands 5.2% 21.8% Tuvalu N/A 19.5% Vanuatu 4.6% 20.2% Papua New Guinea 4.3% 20.0% Note: World Bank estimates are based on remittance inflows for 2019 and projected remittance inflows for 2020. Discussion 53 5.2. OUTLOOK FOR LABOR Non-seasonal migrant workers and the broader MOBILITY AND REMITTANCES Pacific diaspora are particularly vulnerable to weak labor markets in hosting countries. Not only will Looking forward, the impacts of COVID-19 on job opportunities for foreign workers in generally migrant workers, the diaspora and remittances to be limited, the Pacific diaspora is likely to be the Pacific will depend on the future trajectory of disproportionally affected by pandemic-induced the pandemic and its ongoing economic impacts job cuts given their educational and employment in countries with large Pacific Island diasporas. The profiles. Migration programs that target Pacific length of the downturn will also be important. If Islanders, like the Samoa Quota and Pacific Access the global economic downturn is prolonged and Category, will also be affected as the migration recovery is years away, this will mean that tourism of successful lottery winners depends on finding receipts and remittances will remain below trend employment in New Zealand. for some time. It is worth noting that this was the experience after the GFC for countries like Tonga, Notwithstanding this, there is reason to be positive where remittances did not recover to their pre-GFC about the future of Pacific labor mobility. Pacific levels until well into 2011. Island countries have the advantage of having largely escaped COVID-19 and hence are likely to The reopening of borders will be crucial to the benefit from preferential assess to Australian and recovery of Pacific Island countries, yet it will New Zealand labor markets (provided they can likely be a slow and multi-phase process, with established testing regimes to the satisfaction openings occurring between countries when of overseas immigration and health authorities). there’s confidence that the disease is under control Recent arrangements to bring seasonal workers and adequate outbreak measures are in place. from Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu to Australia The resurgence of COVID-19 in Australia and New are encouraging initial steps for larger-scale Zealand in August 2020 shows how rapidly the resumption of Pacific labor mobility schemes, when situation can deteriorate. For the recently proposed fewer workers from other parts of the world are Pacific bubble, trans-Tasman bubble, Tamtam available for hire. This is especially important in bubble, and Bula bubble to be realized, it will be the case of Australia’s SWP, given that demand for important that Pacific Island countries put in place seasonal labor remains strong whilst backpackers, adequate testing, quarantine, and other public which account for about 60 percent of seasonal health initiatives, with appropriate support from farm labor, are unlikely to be able to return for development partners (World Bank 2020d). some time. The same advantage might be evident Opportunities for Pacific migrant workers are in other areas, such as semi-skilled work under the likely to be adversely affected even after borders Pacific Labour Scheme, although higher domestic reopen. High domestic unemployment, weak unemployment will likely dampen this prospect, consumer demand, and political pressure to especially in urban centers. substitute foreign workers with domestic labor Travel under the various Pacific labor mobility will reduce employment opportunities for all schemes also seems more feasible than other types migrant workers, and Pacific workers in particular. of travel, including tourism-related travel, when Fewer jobs overseas will be detrimental to borders reopen. Mandatory quarantine for travelers remittance-dependent households and Pacific is likely to remain in place in the absence of an Island economies where domestic jobs are limited, effective vaccine or treatment. and remittance income is an important source of consumption and investment financing as well as foreign exchange. Discussion 54 The recent pilot, that has seen ni-Vanuatu workers 5.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 26 travel to the Northern Territory to work in the At the time of writing, policy interventions by both mango industry, involved a 14-day quarantine, labor-sending and host countries to buffer Pacific funded by the state government and the industry. migrant workers and their households against the With the Vanuatu government exploring the damaging impacts of COVID-19 have been limited. possibility of sending more workers to the Northern Most PICs governments were yet to roll out any Territory, the success of this pilot could lay the support measures targeting migrant workers and foundation for larger-scale return of Pacific their households (Tonga is one exception, providing seasonal workers. financial support to families of SWP workers who There is a strong case for waiving quarantine or were stranded in Australia). Assistance to seasonal enabling work to be undertaken as part of the workers under the SWP and RSE schemes has been isolation period. The remote nature of seasonal confined to visa extensions, permission to change work reduces the risk of spreading infection. More employers – and in the case of workers in New importantly, the fact that most sending countries Zealand and Tasmania, cash support if required in the SWP and RSE are free of COVID-19 makes to isolate,27 or if they fall sick or are unable to mandatory quarantine seem unnecessary. Flexible work due to lockdowns. Members of the diaspora arrangements have been used in other contexts. In who do not have permanent residency status are Germany, for example, workers are able to work on ineligible for most government support. arrival provided they live and work separately from Looking globally, a range of policy interventions non-migrant groups for a period of 14 days (they have been adopted by countries in order to support also undergo pre-travel screening). migrant workers. Interventions range from short- Arrangement of flights also seems more feasible term emergency social assistance, employment for seasonal workers than for other groups of support and provision of social services, to travelers. Although there are concerns about the measures that aim to resume labor mobility and availability of standard commercial flights for encourage remittances in the medium-term. Some seasonal workers, charter flights could be used of those measures are extended to migrants as part as an alternative, particularly for the SWP and RSE of broader supports to the host population while schemes where workers tend to travel in groups. others cater specifically to them. Logistically, this would be relatively simple for countries that send large numbers of workers, such as Vanuatu and Tonga. Such flights have already been used, both for returning workers and for those participating in pilot schemes aimed at reopening seasonal work. 26. These policy recommendations are in line with those stipulated in Moroz et al. (2020) which discusses the World Bank’s potential responses to the COVID-19 crisis in support of migrant workers. 27. The Pandemic Isolation Assistance Grant provided by the Tasmanian government only cover self-isolation and requires applicants to demonstrate genuine financial hardship as a result of the pandemic. Discussion 55 Social safety nets: Destination governments Employment promotion: With severe threats should wherever possible extend emergency to job security resulting from COVID-19, some social assistance (such as cash transfers, vouchers, employment promotion measures need be or in-kind support) to migrant workers and introduced for low-skilled temporary and seasonal diaspora populations that have lost employment migrant workers, not only to improve their or livelihoods as a result of COVID-19. A number employment prospects and reduce the risks of of migrant destination countries have moved to illegal work engagements, but also to facilitate extend social assistance to migrant populations more efficient reallocation of labor from sluggish in response to the pandemic. For instance, a sectors (such as tourism) to booming ones during one-time cash transfer during the COVID-19 the crisis (such as agriculture). In Australia and New crisis was provided to all registered populations Zealand, permission to switch employers has been who have resided in Japan for three months or granted to workers under the SWP, PLS and RSE more. A similar payment was made by the state schemes. Additional support could include: of California to undocumented migrants who are i. Facilitation of job matching, given the fact that ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits low-skilled migrant workers tend to have limited and disaster relief measures (Moroz et al. 2020). job market information. (This has occurred in In Korea, a repatriation cost insurance scheme is the case of PLS workers and is also undertaken in place under the Employment Permit System in Korea). (EPS), allowing EPS workers to withdraw funds should they become unemployed and need to ii. Incentives to firms to arrange job-sharing return home. Sending countries can also support schemes for migrants. migrant populations stranded overseas. Tonga, iii. Provision of language training, upskilling or for instance, has provided a one-off payment to reskilling opportunities to jobless migrants students, seasonal workers, and seafarers who are (as done in Sweden and Korea). overseas. In the long-term, social safety nets should be incorporated into labor migration policies. Social and health services: (i) Equitable access to COVID-19 testing and treatment. COVID-19 is Employment retention: The economic literature a public health crisis and thus, free prevention shows that migrant workers, especially low-skilled and treatment should reach the entire population, workers, tend to complement domestic workers, regardless of migration status. While this creating new jobs for high-skilled native workers agenda has been implemented in New Zealand, and promoting task specialization (Dadush 2014, implementation in Australia has been partial, World Bank 2015). It is therefore important that covering migrant workers in four out of eight states migrant workers are covered by employment and territories (the Australian National Territory, retainment policies, such as wage subsidies, New South Wales, Western Australia and Victoria). reductions or deferrals in social insurance The US Families First Coronavirus Response Act contributions, and paid-sick leave for employees mandates that COVID-19 testing is free to anyone affected by COVID-19. Kuwait, for example, has in the US, including the uninsured, but patients can mandated that employers pay salaries, food and incur significant bills for treatment. shelter to all migrant workers while in quarantine (KNOMAD, 2020). New Zealand offers a similar version of this policy, where RSE employers are required to provide accommodation and pastoral care to RSE workers in self-isolation, and can apply for wage subsidies if workers are unable to work due to COVID-19. In Australia, the World Bank COVID-19 phone survey revealed demand amongst SWP employers for JobKeeper benefits to be extended to seasonal workers. Discussion 56 (ii) Accommodation and workplace compliance (v) Repatriation support measures. As migrant with social distancing requirements. Several workers worldwide have been stranded by border countries have offered housing services to facilitate closures, a number of destination countries have compliance among migrant workers. For instance: supported repatriation services (Qatar and UAE) Portugal set up numerous quarantine houses and flights (Norway, New Zealand, Bangladesh and for seasonal agriculture workers who needed to Vanuatu). Looking forward, high-level coordination isolate; Canada mandates that housing complies between labor sending and host countries with social distancing requirements (KNOMAD, is needed to establish repatriation protocols 2020); and local governments of Korea provide free and ensure adequate quarantine capacity for disinfection services to migrant housings estates returning workers if labor mobility is to resume at a upon request. Under the SWP and RSE schemes, meaningful scale. In some PICs, limited quarantine where employers are responsible for providing capacity has acted as a bottleneck for the return of accommodation to seasonal workers, adjustments workers. have reportedly been made by employers under Remittances: Initiatives could be taken in both guidance from authorities to enable workers to limit labor sending and host countries to facilitate contact outside of the workplace with the aim of the sending of remittances. Potential actions reducing COVID-19 risks. could include the development and scaling up (iii) Scale up outreach activities to keep migrant of digital remittance channels for migrants and communities informed. Low-skilled migrant their families (as has occurred in Qatar, where all workers may face information disadvantages outward remittances must now be sent online), owing to their remote working and living locations, actions that reduce remittance transaction costs limited social networks, or language constraints. such as the exemption of remittance inflows Outreach targeted to migrant populations helps from regulations and taxes (as implemented in to ensure effective delivery of social support and Sri Lanka), and relaxation of regulations to allow COVID-19 information to migrants. In Australia and unbanked populations to access digital remittances New Zealand, additional support for employers (KNOMAD, 2020, Moroz et al., 2020). of seasonal workers could help them keep Pacific Reintegration support: The return of migrant Island workers informed, so far these initiatives workers due to COVID-19 presents not only public seem to have been limited – only about two- health risks for sending countries, but also an thirds of SWP and RSE employers surveyed by the additional source of pressure on the domestic World Bank translated and provided information labor market. Income and employment support to their workers in response to social distancing can help returning workers cope. Examples of requirements. such support include one-time cash benefits (iv) Free tests and paid quarantine for newly (as in the Philippines and Bangladesh), loans arriving migrant workers. As countries look to re- (India and Nepal), and provision of employment open borders for labor mobility, it is important that in public construction projects (Kerala state of health and safety arrangements to limit the spread India). Improved understanding of what kinds of COVID-19 do not increase the costs incurred of migrant workers are returning home could by migrant workers, especially low-skilled workers help governments design adequate assistance. who tend to come from low-income backgrounds. In this vein, the Philippine Department of Labor The pilot to bring workers from Vanuatu to work in and Employment has launched a tracking system the mango industry in Australia’s Northern Territory to provide appropriate government assistance does well in this respect, with the cost of flights to returned Filipino workers who have lost and quarantine funded by the state government employment (support includes testing, pick-ups and industry. Questions remain as to how such and transfers to quarantine hotels). costs are best managed when the borders are open to larger numbers of workers. Executive Summary 57 6. CONCLUSION Conclusion 58 The COVID-19 crisis has adversely impacted the Seasonal workers have reportedly been under employment, earnings, and remittances of Pacific significant stress from social distancing, migrant workers and Pacific diaspora members. Job uncertainty regarding repatriation, and longer- loss, reduced working hours and financial stress are than-expected separation from loved ones. Stress reported among Pacific communities in Australia and mental health issues have also been observed and New Zealand while data on seasonal workers among Pacific diaspora groups due to a reduction also reveals a significant decrease in earnings in the number of community gatherings. Research and working hours. Remittance inflows to Pacific shows that conflicts and gender-based violence Island countries, as a result, have been negatively is more likely to occur when family members are affected, particularly remittances from seasonal confined to their homes. workers. Looking forward, the employment prospect for Employment impacts, however, are far from longer-term Pacific migrant workers depends uniform across locations, communities, and largely on the economic recovery in host countries. genders – with some groups less affected than Not only will job opportunities for foreign workers others. Pacific Islanders engaging in professional generally be limited, Pacific Islanders are also jobs are likely to have been less affected. In disadvantaged given their dominantly low- and addition, a non-trivial proportion of seasonal semi-skilled employment profiles. This will likely workers have benefited from the local shortage mean a lower level of remittances to the Pacific in of farm labor that arose from travel restrictions, the long-term. experiencing more work and hence higher Despite this, Pacific labor mobility programs incomes. Survey data suggests that the earnings of appear well-positioned for a post-pandemic world. female seasonal workers have been more severely Demand for seasonal workers as well as workers’ hit than those of their male counterparts. willingness to return next season remain strong in The effects on the frequency and value of both Australia and New Zealand. As the number remittances has also varied and depends not of other migrant workers has declined, there may only on the earnings of migrant workers but also be scope to expand participation in labor mobility demand for income support from their families schemes – particularly in the case of the SWP, and the availability of remittance services under creating valuable opportunities for Pacific workers social distancing measures. While demand for given the economic downturn in their home remittances reportedly increased, for instance, countries. For these opportunities to materialize, among Fijian communities affected by falls authorities in both labor-receiving and sending in tourism income, it was reported to have countries should prioritize re-commencement of decreased among Samoan communities given these schemes. fewer community commitments at home, such as Various policy interventions could be considered funerals and weddings. There is also evidence that by PICs and destination governments to reduce seasonal workers have remitted less frequently the negative impacts of COVID-19 on migrant and more likely through digital channels due to a workers and their households, and to support limited availability of over-the-counter services. the resumption of labor mobility schemes. Such This implies that a decrease in remittance flows policies should target the protection and promotion does not necessarily translate into an equal of employment of migrant workers, expand their reduction in household economic wellbeing; access to social assistance and social services further examination is required to ascertain how in host countries, support arriving and returning changes in remittances have affected household workers to cope with quarantine and testing consumption, investment and community building requirements, facilitate contactless money transfers in the Pacific. 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