Documet of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY Report w 12152 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KOREA SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT (LOAN 2514-KO) JUNE 30, 1993 MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12152 Type: PCR Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department I East Asia and Pacific Regional Office This document has a resticted distbudon and may be used b recipients only in the performance of their official dudes. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENT US$ 1 = W 790 (February 1993) US$ 0.001 = W I US$ 1 million = W 790 million US$ 1336.0 = W 1 million FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 WEIGHTS AND EX.SURES 1 meter (m) = 3 2808 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square kilometer (km2)= 0.386X. square miles (sq.mi) 1 hectare (ha) = 0.01 km2 = 2.4711 acres (ac) 1 metric ton (m ton) - 2.2046226 pounds (lbs) = 1.1023 short tons (sh tons or 2000 lbs) - 0.9842 long tons (lg tons or 2240 lbs) PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS JND ACRONYMS CBD - Central Business L..strict EIRR - Economic Internal Rate of Return GNP - Gross National Product ICB - International Competitive Bidding KHB - Korea Housing Bank KLDC - Korea Land Development Corporation KNHC - Korea National Housing Corporation KNR - Korean National Railroad LCB - Local Competitive Bidding NHF - National Housing Fund SMG - Seoul Metropolitan Government TPD - Traffic Police Department TSM - Transport System Management FOR OF.I tCtA USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK WatShIoN C.C. 20433 U.SA Office of Ditectot.General Operatin Evalution June 30, 1993 SUBJEOT: Project Completion Report on Rorea Attached is the "Project Completion Report on torea - Seoul Urban Transportatifn Project (Loan 2514-1O)," Jointly prepared by the Infrastructure 1)vision of the Asia Technical Department and the Infrastructure Operations Division of the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office and the Borrower. The project achieved its objectives concetning the construction of urban transport infrastructure and the introduction of Transport System Management (TSM) techniques. Although the project was successfully completed, it had to be re-shaped in order to acdommodate traffic decrease along specific corridors and protests from commuities that needed to be resettled. The project demonstrates that institution building in urban transport is a slow process-and requiras training and new management techniques. It also shows the need to integrate prevention against the negative social impacts of land acquisition in project design and preparation. These lessons are valuable in the context of Korea's growing needs for urban transport management. On balance, the project vutcome is rated assstisfactory, its institutional development impact as partial (due to its limited impact on broader sectoral objectives), and the sustainability of its policy approach as uncertain due to the persistent lags between urban transport improvements and continued inareases in traffic. The PCR is of good quality with the exception of the economic rate of return analysis which lacks substantiation. No audit is planned. Attachment rThis dbcument has a retricted distribution and my be used by recipients onty In the perforxaneeo their officiat duties. Its contents may not othermise be disctosed without Uortd Bank authorizati FOX OMFQ US ONLY VR0OMC COMPLETION REPOT KOREA sEOUL URBAN TR3WPORTATION PRon=C (Loan 2514-10) Table of cgntents Page Preface ,..,..........Ooooo..,oooooo0* oooeoooooao......,0 41a i Evaluation Summary 0000 **.... 0 00000 00i PART I BANKs'S REVIEW 10 Sumary ProJect Data *............ .............,00 1 2. Background and Sectoral Information .............0 .. 3. Previous Bank Involvement .............4 40 Follow-on Initiatives 0000000 0000000005 5. The Project ...................................... 5 6. Project Imi.lementation ........................... 8 7. Project 'Results and Lessons Learned ..............10 S. Sustainaoility/Remaining Issues 6600006090...06....15 9. Bank Performance 0 0000*o*o*ooooo01 100 Borrower Performance ......... **, .6 11. Project Relationships ..............6 12. Project Documentation and Data 000...0.01 PART II BORROWER' S EVALUATION A. conditions Leading to the Project ................17 S. m4ain Findingjs and Lessons Learned ........1 c. summary of Bank Role and Performance .......1 D. Ovaluation of Borrower's Own performance .......... is E. Remaining issues ***.0000000000000008 PART IIX STATISTICAL INFORMATION: TABZ 1. Related Bank Loans .............~.......*.........*.l0:9 2. Banik Resources ...... 3. Project Cost Suary ..................*...... * .21 4. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbrsoments 0000. 22 5. Status of Covenants k mo.. . . . . . .... . ..o*o..23 6. Detaile Projeo ;ct os - tActUal ..............eoeee*24 70 Project Implementation Schedule - Actal ....0....... 25 S. Incomeand Expenditures, 1981-91n ......*........ .26 This document has a resticted distibution and may be ed by meiplents only In the perfrne of thCe official dutes. Its contents may not otherwie be dlsclesed without World Bank authortion. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KOREA SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT (Loan 2514-KO) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Seoul Urban Transportation Project in Korea, for which Loan 2514-KO, in the amount of US$ 53.0 million equivalent was approved on May 17, 1985. The loan was extended from June 30, 1990 to June 30, 1992, and final disbursement was made on December 14, 1992, which refers to the recovery of the special account. Disbursements under the loan totaled US$ 24,601,084.68 million, with final disbursement made on July 30, 1991. USS 24.4 million were canceled effective January 23, 1987. US$ 4,155,915.32, cost savings and undisbursed balance, was canceled effective January 5, 1993 when the loan account was closed. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure Division of the Asia Technical Department (ASTIN), the Infrastructure Operations Division (EAlIN) of the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office and the Borrower, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Loan Agreement, supervision reports, the Borrowers own records, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda. PnOJUO COXMPI.MTON RUPORT KORUA INOIUL !D)NUTRNPORThTION VROOPOT (Loan 2514-10) UThLUJTITON 5uca The in projoct objectives include the consrution of urban transport infrastructure as well as the introduction of Transport System Management (TSM) techniques along selected transport corridors and in the Central Business District (CBD) of Seoul Special City. In addition, the project aims to preserve and strengthen public transport and promote institutional development, specifically of the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) and the Traffic Police Department (TPD). Due to a number of factors including traffic decrease along specific corridors, assistance from developers to finance roadworks and vociferous protests from individuals faced with resettlement, the project was amended and certain elements downsized in 1987 (major roadworks and interchange investments). However, the re-shaped project was successfully completed with the TSM component expanded, beyond the project scope, to other areas in Seoul and indeed other cities in Korea. With dramatic and continued increases in traffic in Seoul, the civil works components are expecte4 to yield benefits in excess of original estimates. However, although the TSM concept has been well received and is dupli.-ated in many other areas, the beneficial impact, although significant after implementation,, has in many cases been shorter lived than originally expected due to the continued and constant increases in traffic volumes. The main findings and lessons learned from the Seoul Vrban Transportation Project include the followlng: (a) The concept of TSX has been successfully introduged into Korea. Although it remains in its infancy due to limited professional expertise and the ;eiidency for public agencies to emphasize capital invesSment, there -iii- is a growing appreciation of the positive impact of TSM strategies. (b) Institution building in uroan transport is a slow and on-going exercise involving many elements which includes training, the purchase of new equipment, the introduction of new management techniques and organizational restructuring, in order to realize full potential benefits. With recognition of the importance of management and policy reforms, Korean cities are becoming poised for a new era of urban transport management. (c) Environmental issues, in particular community disruption resulting from land acquisition, was mucih underrated by the govarnment and did in fact directly impact the construction of a number of components. In the future more care will need to be taken in judging the impact of resettlement, and arrangements for land acquisitior. begun far in advance of project work so that construction schedules are not unduly disrupted. (d) There is a preference to use domestic resources for project components when domestic funds are available. The Bank's8 comparative advantage lies in the introduction of new and innovative ideas. This was apparent with government support of the TSM component, and withdrawal of a number of the civil works components. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KOREA SEOUL URBAN TRASPORTATION PROJECT (Loan 2514-O) PART I: 8ANK'S REVIEW 1. Summary Project Data Project Name : Seoul Urban Transportation Project Loan Number : 2514-KO RVP Unit : East Asia Loan Amount : US$ 53.OM Country : Korea Canneled Amount : US$ 28.4M Sector : Transport Disbursed Amount : US$ 24.6M Subsector : Urban Transport Approval Date : 5/17/85 Staff Appraisal: July 1984 Effective Date : 7/5/85 Number of Extensions: Two original Closing Date : 6/30/90 Amended Ciosing Date: 6/30/92 Total Project Cost: US$127.4M Appraisal ERR : 41% Re-assessed ERR : 35% 2. Background and Sectoral Information 2.1 In 1984, when the Seoul Urban Transportation Project was appraised, the population of Korea was 40 million. GNP growth had averaged at about 10% annually throughout the decade and 8.5% since 1964. Two decades of rapid economic growth had brought Korean per capita income to US$ 2000 by mid-1984. This, coupled with the changing structure of the economy resulted in a population shift from rural to urban, with over 60% of Koreans living in urban areas. While overall population growth in the 1980s declined to under 1.5% per annum, urban population continued to increase at more than 5% annually. A number of large cities emerged, with Seoul being by far the largest in the country at about 9 million inhabitants. 2.2 In 1991, Korea was still expanding and growing economically. The remainder of the 1980s saw a continuing GNP growth of about 10% annually. Overall population growth, estimated at 43 million in 1991, had declined to about 1.0% per year. Urban growth, although slowing, still registered an annual increase of 3%, and income levels had risen Iramatically to US$ 5400. With increased prosperity came a slow but rapidly rising growth in the number of privately owned automobiles. Between 1983-1988 there was a 24% annual growth nationally, and a 35% growth in Seoul and its immediately surrounding area (the Kyonggi Region). In 1991 alone there were about 540 new cars registered per day in Seoul, accounting for over one-fourth of the national average (2100 per day). Although car registration in Seoul decreased to 14% between 1991 and 1992, it has remained very high both nationally (25%) and regionally (35%). Associated -2- with this growth in automobiles had also come a significant rise in traffic accidents. In 1982 over 6000 persons were killed on the roads and another 130,000 injur3d, giving Korea the dubious distinction of having the third highest rate of deaths per 1000 vehicles among 36 developing countries. The estimated cost to the Korean economy amounted to over 1% of annual GNP. 2.3 During the 19709 and 1980s Korea's rapid economic growth, coupled with increased level s of disposable income, which spawned a higher number of trips, trained the transport system. Massive public sector investments in transport infrastructure were made to support this growth. with the government continuing to allocate a sizable proportion of its total capital expenditure to expand and modernize transport infrastructure (about 15% annually during the years 1982-1991). The basic objective of government intervention in transport in the 1980s was to increase and modernize the capaci%y of the transport system nationally, to accommodate projected traffic growth and avoid major bottlenecks. This was coupled with the objective to encourage development of new industrial areas and housing~ complexes outside of the Seoul city center. 2.4 In the years immediately preceding the Bank project (1966-1984), substantial changes had occurred in the modal distribution of traffic. Transport by road had become predominant, with road capturing 40% of the freight traffic (rail 31%; coastal shipping 29%-), and 73% of the passenger traffic (rail 25%). Appraisal Context: Seoul 2.5 As of December 1991, 24.5% of the total national population of 43 million people, lived in Seoul, which only occupies .61% of the entire territory of the country. Per capita income in the city had increased from US$2,600 in 1985 to almost US$ 6,500 by 1991. The increased income levels coupled with the city's dense population naturally led to housing shortages and traffic congestion. Problems were augmented by: a population and functional concentration of activity in the city center; roads historically radially structured towards the CBD; narrow streets; increased number of vehicles; and a significant increase in travel population. The results culminated in a 42% increase in traffic accidents between 1983 and 1988. In the period between 1983 and 1988 the number of person-trips had risen from 15 million to 18.5 million. By 1991 it had risen to 25.1 million. Although the share of car passenger traffic had doubled since the early 1980s, in 1991 it remained at a modest 14% of total passenger trips, with buses contin-iing to dominate transport in the city at 41% (declining from a high of 64% in 1983). Travel by subways and the railroad increased from 9% to 17% in the same time period (para.2.8). -3- Appraisal Context: Kyonggl Region 2.6 Seoul's growth has been at the center of the debate on spatial development strategy. Various actions have been taken to restrict and re-direct its growth including the est&a,1ishment of a greenbelt in the 1970s, strict land-use planning, and the division of the capital region into a spectrum of zones ranging from dispersal to promotional. These efforts have spread the city continuously southward. Today, the areas open for expansion lie in the far south of Kyonggi Province at distances between 30-50 km from the city. 2.7 The Kyonggi Region, located in the northwestern part of the country, includes three provincial-level administrative units including Seoul city, Inchon City (the country's seconid largest seaport with a population of 2 million in 1991), and Kyonggi-Do Province (which encircles Seoul and Inchon and includes the two busiest transport ccrridors, namely the Seoul- Inchon Corridor and the Seoul-Pyongtaek section of the Seoul- Pusan Corridor). Kyonggi Region is also highly industrialized, consistently generating about 40% of the national GNP with Seoul alone accounting for about 70%. The concentration of population and economic activity in the Region has resulted in an explosive demand for transport infrastructure and services. The Transport System 2.8 Transport in Seoul is composed of both road and rail. The emphasis of the road construction program in the 1980s was towards circumferential road projects and the improvement of cross-city links along the northern and southern banks of the Han River. The major short-term focus was to eliminate bottlenecks, build and improve major arterials of regional importance, and provide access to the eastern portion of the south bank for the 1988 Olympics and the many new apartment complexes which were being built. Although the 19805 saw a significant increase in private vehicles, Seoul residents remained major users of the public transport system (para.2.5). In 1983, of the estimated 15 million daily trips by mechanical modes, about 64% were by bus, 17% by taxis, 9% by car and others and 10% by rail/subway. In 1988 of the 18.5 million daily trips, 51% were taken by bus, 16% by taxis, 17% car and others and 17% by rail/subway. The subway system expanded significantly over the last decade from 22.1 kms in 1980 to 118 kms in 1991. In 1982 one of the major concerns of the government was to integrate the public transport facilities of bus and rail transit as fully as possible, and avoid severe congestion in the CBD. 2.9 Between 1982 and 1991, Seoul and its Region has grown dramatically, both in population and economic activity. The -4- result has been a continued strain on the transport network, with travel time in the CBD decreasing from 30.8 km/hr in 1980 to 18.6 km/hr in 1989, and 17.6 km/hr in 1991. However, in 1992, the trend appears to have been somewhat reversed with the average speed increasing to 19.3 km/hr. This is attributed to the limitations placed on car entry into the CBD (February 1992). Despite the construction of satellite cities (including Bundang, Ilsan, Kwacheon and Sang-gae with a total projected population of over 1 million), and improvement of access roads, these routes are heavily used and unable to keep up with demand. About 35% of the passenger traffic in the region either originates or is destined for Seoul. The situation is similar for freight traffic, where a high proportion moves not only across Seoul's boundaries but also circumferentially outride the city. To accommodate this traffic there are presently two ring- roads within Seoul, with a third under construction (completion expected by 2001). Transport Planning 2.10 Housing, water supply and sewerage, urban transport and general infrastructure were the primary focus of the Government's urban development strategy throughout the 1980s, with housing and transport among the top priorities. To deal with rapid growth in Seoul and the Kyonggi Region, two specific regional development plans were prepared in the early 1980's and have both been updated to bring the Region into the 21st century. The first, referred to as the Comprehensive Physical National Development Plan, has focused on relieving congestion in and around Seoul by introducing appropriate traffic management. The second plan, sometimes referred to as the Seoul Growth Management Plan, has focused on facilitating economic development with its prime emphasis on the construction of satellite cities (para.2.9), and improvements in expressways, rail lines and highways in and around Seoul, mainly to relieve population density and traffic congestion in the city. 3. Previous Bank Involvement 3.1 Since 1979, the Bank has made eight loans in support of urban development projects, two land development and low- income housing projects, three regional development projects and three water supply projects. All were designed to support significant policy and institutional changes. The Bank focus in the urban sector in Korea has been housing. Initially, the Bank concentrated on tl.e introduction of new approaches to the provision of low-income housing to its individual clients, the Korea Housing Bank (KHC) , the National Housing Fund (NHF), the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) and the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). Subsequently the Bank strategy has been elevated to encompass sector-wide concerns and policies -5- which link the performance of tha housing sector to the rest of the economy, with Bank support for urban development coinciding closely with the Government's emphasis on urbanization, industria3 Aesveloprent and energy conservation. 3.2 In other areas of infrastructure investment, the Bank has been significantly involved in the highway subsector, having approved loans for six highway projects totaling USS 690 million. One of these loans, the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project specifically focused on elimination of bottlenecks in and around Seoul by financing portions of Seoul's third ring road (the Pangyo-Kuri and Shingal-Ansan sections), encouraging coordinated transport planning in the region, and supporting a traffic management study in specific urban areas around Seoul. Similarly, a number of projects in the rail subsector also touched on teansport issues related to Seoul, specifically the Fourth and Fifth Railway Projects (Loans 863-X0 and 1101-K0), which included completion of the electrification program for lines connecting Sedul with the North-Eastern part of Korea, as well as those KNR lines in the Seoul suburban areas. 4. EgUgW_-on-InitiatJves 4.1 The Pusan Urban transport management Project is only project presently planned by the Bank in the urban transport stubsector. In 5eptember 1991 a Bank mission did appraise a Railroad Systems Modernization Project which had as its main component support of the expansion of the Seoul suburban passenger service. However, due to Bank's concern regaiding restructuring of the railroad, the project has been indefinitely postponed. 5. %be-299tAct Objectives 5.1 The main objectives of the project include not only the construction of urban transport infrastructure but also the promotion of more capable and better coordinated urban transport institutions. Specifically the objectives include: (a) improvement of the transportation system in Seoul through a comprehensive set of investments and programs such as: (i) improvements to major intersections; (ii) the construction and widening of strategic road links; and (iii) the introduction and application of Transport System Management (TSM) techniques along selected transport corridors and in the CBD; -6 - (b) preservation and sitroethening of the public transport system by: (i) introducing bus priority Aeasures; and (ii) promoting the integration of the bus and subway systems; and (c) promotion of institutional development by strengthening the capabilities of the Seoul Metropolitan Govesnment (SMG) and the Traffic Police Department (TPD) to plan,, implement and evaluate traffic and safety improvements. Descrlption 5.2 The project in%cluded the following four principal components: 1. Major Road Investments on three main routes: (a) construction of a missing link in the Western Arterial from Sihung to the Kyong-In Expressway to form an effective western distributor and bypass to the CBD (10.84 Kms); (b) widening and upgrading of the Eastern Arterial between Euijeongbu in the northeast and Seongnam in the southeast (8.7 kms) to provide improved access and CBD bypass; and (c) upgrade of the existing North Han River Road between the Hannam and Jamsil Bridges (8.4 kIs). 2. Major Intersection Improvements including; (a) the construction of a grade-separated interchange between the Eastern Arterial and the North Han Riverside Road at the Yeong Dong Interchange; (b) conversion of an existing rotary into a fully grade-separated interchange at Yeongdeungpo; and (c) rebuilding of the Gilum -nterchange to facilitate traffic movements westward onto the Ring Road. 3. TSM and Safety Programs: composed of a four-year program of TSM measures along about 17 major traffic corridors and in the CBD, including junction improvements, one-way streets, channelization, markings, signaling, bus bays and priority lanes, selective road widening, and the introduction of pedestrian facilities such as safety islands and controlled crossings. In addition there is also a city wide remedial program of accident prevention which includes the introduction of safety measures at about 200-300 hazardous locations through investments recommended by the accident investigation and analysis system to be introduced as part of the institutional development A. Traffic Police Department (TPD). 4. Institutional Development: to support technical assistance, training, studies and a limited amount of equipment to. improve both the content and process of urban transport administration in Seoul City. The focus included two main agencies, SNG and the Seoul TPD. -7- Deslgn and Organization 5.3 At the time of appraisal it was determined that Korean agencies had become well experienced in general civil works but remained weak in planning and coordinating a system of investments. Therefore the rationale for the project was to promote institutional development in order to strengthen planning capability and to introduce traffic management concepts and practices. The Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) became the executing agency for the project. The Project Management and Evaluation Bureau of SMG had the overall responsibility of overseeing the project,, vxith the Transportation and Construction Management Bureaus as well as the Office of Construction and Engineering, and the Traffic Police Department directly involved in Its implementation. The Construction Bureau together with the Office of Construction and Engineering were responsible for the major road investments and intersection improvements with the construction Bureau also involved in the design of the major works in the TSM Program. The Transportation Bureau retained virtual total responsibility for the TSM Program and shared responsibility for the implementation of the Safety Program, with the Traffic Police Department. Project. implementation began in 1985 and was completed in 1991. At the time of appraisal, it was intended that project implementation wopld take foir years, instead it took seven. Revisions a.32 Amendments 5.4 In 1987 adjustments were made to the Bank loan due to the cancellation of a ninber of project components including; the upgrading of the North Han Riverside Road; the Nowon-Gongdae Road; the Yeong Dong Interchange; and the Gilum Interchange. Work on the Gilkm Interchange was scaled down and a smaller version of the component shifted for inclusion in the TSX Program. A.new road, the Seongsan,Dong-Jungsan Dong route was included-in the project as a substitute. In addition six more corridors and 2 areas (including Gilum and Yeongdeungpo) were added to the TSM component. A total of US$ 24e23 million was canceled. 5.5 In 1990 an adjustment was made to the TSP Program. Due to exchange rate savings, a total of US$ 5.19 million was transferied from the TSM to the Seongsan. Dong-rungsan Dong Road component of the Bank project to f inance a shortfall in civil works. In January 1993, with the completion of the project, an additional US$ 4.2 million was canceled. -8- Physical Works 6.1 MAiqr Road l Invoe1e . As noted in para .5.4 above, there were some major changes made to the project in 1987, which resulted in the cancellation of two of the road components. The first, the North Han Riverside Road, whose objective was to upgrade a portion of the existing route and thus relieve some of the congestion on the road, was canceled due to a decrease in traffic. The reason !or this is that with the completion of the Olympic Expressway (1982-1988), much of the traffic which had been using the North Han Riverside Road dispersed. In response to this occurrence, the government lowered its priority for upgrading this route and postponed work to a future date. The second road canceled was the Nowon-Gongdae Road component. The reason for this cancellation was that sufficient domestic funds had been mobilized which enabled the government to carry out the project locally. The construction of a new housing development at Sang-gae (1986-90 for about 150,000 people), adjacent to the project route, allowed the Korea Housing corporation (KHC), which oversaw the development and collected the developer's contributicn to infrastructure upgrading in the area, to collect sufficient c.a.pital to upgrade the Nowon-Gongdae Road without the use of Bank funds. The construction of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong portion of the western arterial road was substituted for the above two cancellations. With its construction, much of the traffic which was forced to travel through the CBD to move from one end of the western arterial to the other, could now bypass the city center. 6.2 Mair IXIterseaion ImDroaements. Two of the major interchange improvements appraised under this project were also canceled. The first, cancellation of the construction of a grade separated interchange at Yeongdeungpo, was in part due to concerns that construction was not timely as it would occur during the Olympic Games of 1988, causing unnecessary congestion and disruption of traffic in areas affected by the games' activities. It was instead included in the TSM Program as a temporary solution. The other cancellation was the Gilus Interchange. The main reason for its cancellation concerns difficulties encountered with land acquisition and resettlement. ocal residents simply opposed the project to such an extent that it was dropped. 6.3 ransoZt M aag. t O adwSafetA.Pr=o=6 Implementation of both of these compohents was achieved without issue. All sub-components were successfully completed. As noted in paras.5.4 and 5.5 there were a number of additions made to the TSM component in 1987. Also because there were some exchange rate savings in this program US$ 5.19 million was transferred -9- from Tam to the civil works component in order to facilitate the completion of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road. 6.4 Two TSM monitoring studies have been completed during project implementation. These included a before and after analysis on both the TSM and safety components. The first study (Seoul City Public Transport System Improvement Study), which was prepared by the Korea Institute of Transport Studies, included 12 of the TSM corridors and was completed in July of 1989. Four of the remaining corridors were monitored and analyzed by the Traffic Management Institute of SMG (established in 1989). This study was completed in 1991. Procurement 6.4 Procurement experience under this project concerned: (a) Civil Works. Due to the down scoping of the entire project, noted in para.5.4 above, the number of contracts for major civil works declined from the appraisal estimate of about ten to five. The five resultant contracts totaling about 40 billion Won were tendered and awarded in conformance with the Bank's Guidelines on International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and were financed under the Bank Loan. The smaller civil works contracts dealing with the TSM and safety improvements were implemented over the entire project period on the basis of Local Competitive Bidding (LCB), in accordance with procedures which were acceptable to the Bank. The procedures and documentation on procurement were handled properly by SMG. Most works were satisfactorily completed with some delays encountered in the construction of the new road and western arterial, mainly caused by problems of land acquisition and revisions in the design of the new road alignment (construction of an underpass in place of a viaduct). (b) Consultina Services. Construction supervision of civil works was carried out by SMG with the assistance of local consultants fully financed by SMG. Three consultants provided advice and review functions for the major civil works. Similarly, for TSM and safety improvement works, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology and other local firms assisted the SMG staff. The performance of both SMG and the consultants in the supervision of the civil works was satisfactory. -10- Disbursement 6.5 The disbursement rate, in general, was slow throughout the project and stayed very low in the early stage of implementation (1985-87), before the down scoping of the project from the original loan amount of $53 to $28.8 million. Two major civil works representing almost 20% of project cost, the North Han Riverside Road and the Gilum Interchange, were postponed but later substituted by the construction of a new link for the western arterial road, the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong portion. Moreover, SMG became reluctant to draw upon loan funds when domestic funds were available with actual bid amounts lower than estimated costs. Following the cancellation of US$ 24.2 million in January 1987, disbursement improved but remained lower than expected because of delays and increase in land acquisition and construction costs of the two major remaining civil works components. The project was amended for the second time in December 1990 in response to the request for reallocation of funds between project components and extension of project closing date. The project closing date was extended twice and finally, was closed on June 30, 1992 with about $4.15 million loan amount left unutilized, which was canceled on January 3, 1993. 6.6 Overall, disbursement represented 19.4% ($24.6 million) of total revised costs ($127.4 million). The disbursement percentage for civil works as provided for in the Loan Agreement was 40% of total costs of the civil works financed by the Bank. The costs of consultancy services and land acquisition were entirely defrayed by the Borrower. 7. Project Results and Lessons Learned Project Results 7.1 The civil works component of the project was altered extensively. This was due to a number of reasons including decreased traffic levels (North Han Riverside Road), preference to use domestic funds (Nowon-Gongdae Road), fears of potential impact on traffic generated by the Olympic Games (Yeongdeungpo Rotary), and problems with land acquisition and compensation which resulted in component down scaling (Gilum Interchange). Included in their stead was the construction of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road. Completion of the remaining physical targets including the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road were, however, met successfully. In the interim, it has become apparent that those components withdrawn from the project have been or will shortly need to be included in the government's own investment program due to renewed urgency. For example, in the case of the North Han Riverside Road, following the end of the Olympic Games, traffic on the road increased to such an extent -11- that its upgrading became a government priority. As a result construction began in 1989 using domestic funds, with completion planned for the end of 1993. A similar situation has arisen with respect to both the Gilum and Yeor.gdeungpo Interchanges. In the case of the former, the component was down scaled and included in the TSM Program but with the magnitude of the traffic, success was limited. Anticipating the need for future works the city continued to purchase land for purposes of future construction of the interchange as originally planned. Land acquisition is now almost complete and the government expects to begin construction in either 1994 or 1995. In the case of the Yeongdeungpo Interchange, although it was also included in the TSM Program, success was likewise minimal due to the magnitude of the traffic increase. Although no detailed plans have yet been prepared, the government has acknowledged the need for a new facility and has begun to prepare plans for future implementation. 7.2 The developmental objectives of the TSM program were achieved beyond appraisal expectation. This was the Bank's first urban transport project in Korea which emphasized the intro- duction of TSMN The concept included a comprehensive approach to enhancing the effectiveness of the existing road and public transport network with a minimum of investment. Overall, this component has been an overwhelming success even though the impact of some TSM projects may have been short-lived due to extremely rapid traffic growth. All physical targets have been exceeded with even more implemented than originally planned. In addition all safety improvement schemes have also been implemented. Productivity improvements have been realized by both bus operators and bus users with the opening of bus lanes along major corridors. The two project implementing agencies, SNG and TPD, have embraced the approaches of TSM and road safety improvement as integral features of their transport sector strategies. The TSM concept has also gradually spread from Seoul to other large cities and over the years, expertise in design and implementation of TSI schemes, particularly among local consultants and central government institutions (e.g., Korea Transport Institute), has grown. The 1985 Urban Transportation Act, which requires cities with populations over 300,000 population to develop short and long range transporta- tion investment plans and traffic impact studies for major developments, offers evidence of the Korean Government's commitment to improved planning and coordination of urban transport through the implementation of TSM practices. The monitoring studies conducted indicate the extent of the impacts of both the TSM and safety components, with visible improvements seen in all seventeen of the corridors which include three business areas and about 600 intersections. Although in many cases full benefits have been short-lived due to rapid traffic growth, the passenger carrying capacity of all project corridors have increased. -12- 7.3 However, due to the lack of experience of SMG in TSM, and consequently their lack of confidence in making radical proposals, there have been some design shortcomings in TSM schemes implemented under the project. To some extent emphasis has been on physical improvements of roads and intersections (road signs and markings, channelization, installation of signals, pedestrian walkways, bus lane marking and signE, etc.) with limited integration of these improvements with operations planning (integrated traffic circulation plan, parking management, platoon type operations of bus in bus lanes, etc.), tactical planning (bus priority schemes, enforcement of traffic regulation, auto restraint policies, etc.) and strategic planning (land use and transport relationships), the three important components of any comprehensive TSM scheme. The importanca of interagency linkages, a necessity for enhancing efficient use of road space through TSM strategies, was also in some cases either not fully understood or avoided to minimize the hurdles of coordination and enforcement by various agencies (such as police, private bus operators and various bureaus of SMG). 7 .4 To support the implementation and continuity of these practices the TSM section of the Transportation Planning Division (under Transportation Bureau) and Traffic Division of Police Administration in SMG have been strengthened through training, technical assistance and purchase of equipment. The notion of treating transportation in an integrated fashion covering large continuous geographic area with a mix of strategies has gradually replaced past practices of isolated treatment of problems. In this respect the project has fully served its key objective. Over time TSM practices would mature in complexity and their importance further realized with experience. 7.5 Nonetheless, considering the magnitude and complexity of Seoul City's traffic problems, the existing TSM section needs to be further strengthened to effectively manage, design and monitor TSM and demand management programs. However, since the SMG tends to contract out TSM related works to consultants, the need for strengthening in-house capability is not fully realized. Moreover, there is generally an acute shortage of experienced transportation professionals particularly with TSM knd transportation planning skills because individuals with this kind of knowledge and expertise are difficult to retain. With the recent approval of the Local Autonomy Act (1988), urban district offices have gained significant independence in revenue generation, administration, planning, and implementation of projects. This has amplified the need for coordinated planning, design, and continuous monitoring in the central office. -13- Environment 7.6 The most pressing environmental issue confronting the project concerned the acquisition of land and resettlembent of affected residents. The project planners underestimated the degree of public opposition to land acquisition. Although it quickly became evident that land prices had risen, in most instances residents were prepared to sell, given the appropriate incentive. Delays occurred due to prolonged negotiations (from I to 3 years) as opposed to the one year which was planned at appraisal. In the case of the Gilum Interchange, the component was dropped from the project because of the government's inability to purchase all of the required land in a timely fashion. In other situations court decisions respecting the appropriate value of land lingered longer than anticipated. No data on the extent of resettlement was available to determine the magnitude of community disruption. Economlc Analysis 7 . 7 The project undoubtedly improved the transport and traffic conditions in Seoul City. The various investments included in the project were aimed at reducing traffic congestion, improving speeds and reducing travel times. This has to a large extent been achieved through street expansions and widening. and the construction of important links. The benefits quantified at appraisal remain justifiable. Although Vehicle operating Costs (VOC) savings have not altered appreciably since appraisal, income levels or the Korean population have increased substantially. The time savings attributable to the project have therefore also increased, with the resultant post-appraisal EIRRs somewhat different from that projected by the appraisal team. The re-calculated project EIRR is 35%. It was estimated at 41% during appraisal. The reason for the lower EIRR is due mainly to the cancellation the North Ran River Side Road which had a particularly high appraisal estimate (57%). The breakdown of the rates of return are as follows: Appraisal Post-Appraisal EIRR EIRR Nowon-Gondae 18% - North Ran River Side Rd 57% Suseo-Segok 30% 34% Kyong-In-Sih2ng 31% 35% Seongsan-Jungsan - 30% Yeong Dong Interchange 47% 41% Overall EIRR 41% 35t a a Ce a C__O :D b_ D< O 00000Doe -14- 708 Although a comparative economic analysis for the project, appraisal and post evaluation was prepared, it was difficult. The reason is that even though the SAR did include. some deLtails on the methodology used and basic assumptions made, neither the appraisal report nor the project files offered sufficient information for such an analysis. There were significant gaps in data on traffic (actual and projected), economic costs (annual and by major investment category), and treatment of quantified economic benefits during the life of the project, to conduct a thorough post evaluative analysis. In addition, no record was available on the economic evaluation of the Seoungsan--Jungsan Road component in project files. FIydins a Lnd uLess -WAIne4 7.9 The following outlines the main findings and lessons learned from the Bank's involvement in the Seoul Urban Transport Project: (a) The concept of TSM was successfully introduced in Seoul. AlthoUgh it remains,in its infancy because of limited professional expertise and the tendency of public agencies to emphasize capital investment, there is a growing appreciation of the positive impact of TSM strategies. In fact a total of eight additional areas in Seoul have already been selected for TSM improvements. (b) Institution building in thg urban transport sector is a slow and on-going process. The benefits of training, organizational restructuring, new equipment and introduction of new tnagement practices need time to catch hold. With the grifual growth in local training opportynities and recognition of management and policy reforms as important to emerging urban transport issues, Korean cities are becoming poised for a new era of urban transport management. (c) At the state of projebt preparstion environmental issues, in partic,;lar community disruption associated with land acquisition, must be identified along with a comprehensive mitigation plan. This is essential in order to minimize the risks of project delays and cost escalation. In fast growing urban areas such. as Seoul, the potential of delays linked with ;and acquisition is extkemely high due to rapid escalation in land prices and coimunity opposition. land acquisition needs to be initialed at the very early stage of project timplemenitation ahd an appropriate strategy for piblic participation developed. -15- (d) Commitment by the goverhment is key to project success, particularly in the case of innovative concepts or policy reform. This has been true with respeat to the introduction of TS! under this project. (e) There is a preference to use domestic resources for project components when domestic funds are available. Of the three civil works components which were canceled, all have been or-are in the process of being reinstated with financing from local sources. The Bank's comparative advantage in Korea lies mainly in the introduction of those components with limited expertise or knowledge internally, such as was the case with the TSM component in the project. 8. SustainabilitylReaining-Issues 801 With traffic ever increasing, it is expected that the major roadworks. and interchange investments will maintain or even exceed the forecast level of net benefits throughout their economic life. The final success of the construction component will depend on continued growth of the Korean economy, providing a spur to traffic growth. In the case of the TSM component the carrying capacity of all TSM project corridors has increased substantially. The only limitation is that the benefits may be visible for a shorter period of time than originally anticipated due to continued Zapid traffic growth. 8.2 Remaining issues include: (a) continued growth of traffic into the CBD. due to the development of satellite cities around Seoul- with limited local employment opportunities and few transport options. (b) although the success of TSM is undisputed, continued government priority on capital construction, including roads and rail/subway, will continue to make traffic management options less attractive. (c) traffic accidents continue to climb. Some progress has been made through improved signing, increased safety facilities, imposition of more severe penalties for violations, and improvements in driver testing. 9. BInkP.erformance 901 Bank performance was very good throughout the project cycle. The Bank provided a continuity of involvement with a minimum of staff changes. In addition supervision was regular and appropriately staffed. The Bank also proved flexible with -16- respect to the project, quickly incorporatintg chages as requested by the executing agency to allow for a successful completion of the project. 10. 1=Mffi6ZflAQxmBn22 10.1 The Borrower and its executing/implementing agencies, which iiicluded the Project Management and Evaluation Bureau, Construction Management and Transportation Bureaus, Office of Construction and Enginieering and the Traffic Police Department which were all part of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, performed well during the project. They eased the task of project preparation and performed well during project implementation. 11. a 11.1 The excellent relationship that has existed between the staffs of the Borrower and the Bank has contributed to the success of the project. It created good teamwork, in which each party displayed flexibility to allow for the successful a.hievement of the end goals. This was especially evident when significant changes in project scope needed to be initiated. These were accomplished with a minimum of problem and in a timely fashion. 2. Lrol ect 1pcumentation ard -.Data 12.1 The covenants contained in the Loan Agreement were reasonable and the Borrower complied with them. In addition, the staff appraisal report provided a useful reference framework during project implementation. However, with respect to post- appraisal economic analysis, incomplete documentation either in the files or in the SAR itself has made it very difficult to re- assess the benefits comparatively. In the future, SARs should as a matter of course include enough tabular information, including cost and benefit streams and travel projections to allow for a meaningful and comprehensive post evaluation analysis. 12.2 The Bankss documentation of the project after appraisal has also been inadequate. There are relatively few entries, little correspondence and minimal information in supervision reports. In fact there are very few supervision reports. 12.3 Finally, the project documentation and data available bY the Borrower has also been poor. Although some information has been kept, the government habit to destroy all "non- essential' information related to project work, after the rejulated five year period has left the files void of much of the substantive data required for a comprehensive post evaluation by the Bank. -17- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KOREA SEOUL RBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT (Loan 2514-10) PART XI: BORROWER'S EVALUATION A. Conditions Leading to the Project This project was first discussed with the government in 1980. Rapidly increasing automobile ownership, the need to integrate the subways with the road transport system, and the need to better connect the satellite cities to Seoul meant that transport was entc.ring a critical stage. The Bank's emphasis on the necessity to address not only traffic movement issues but also management of the system led to the inclusion of both the civil works and TSM components. It took five years for the government and the Bank to agree on the appropriate structure of the project. By that time traffic in Seoul had exploded, the needs were so great and the financing limited, that the introduction of TSM was fully embraced. B. Main Findinas and Lessons Learned The following includes findings and lessons which were identified by SMG: (a) This was the first and only Bank urban transport project in Seoul, but it's impact has been felt nationwide. The introduction of TSM has allowed not only SMG but also other urban areas to improve traffic movement and address bottlenecks with a minimum of financial expenditure. The results have been noteworthy. Inchon, Pusan., Taegu and Kwangju have all begun to implement the measures of TSM. Moreover, the city of Seoul has identified an additional 8 areas (Cheongryangri, Shinchon, Mokdong, the CBD, Sanggye, Mia, Chamsil, and Chunho) in which it will introduce the concept by 1995. (b) Traffic growth depends on many variables including the availability of convenient routes. As a result it is not always predictable, as was the case with the North Han Riverside Road. Traffic does however seek the shortest and quickest route, as has been discovered with the completion of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road, wnich has diverted some of the CBD traffic. C. Summary of Bank Role and PerfoAmnce C.1 The overall success of the project can be attributed, in part, to the good performance by Bank staff during the whole project cycle. Supervision missions were sent to Korea on a regular basis, and staff changes were kept to a minimum, thus enabling good relationships to be built up over the project period. In addition project flexibility allowed quick response to changes in components when it was required. D. Evaluation of Borrower's Own Performance D.1 The Borrower and its implementing agency performed well during the project. E. Remainina Issues 1.1 There are a number of issues which remain to be resolved in Seoul. The most pertinent concerns the attempt by government to change the travel patterns of those working in the CBD and requiring daily entry. With the continuing development of satellite cities, and the continuing influx of daily travelers from these cities to the CBD, the focus is on persuading travelers to change from using private vehicles to public transport. -19- PROJECT COXP?LMXON RBPORT SEOUL URBwN TRANORU!TATZON PROtnCT (Loan 2S14-10) PART XXIIs SThTXS?XCAL XNFONATZON Ia3le 1: RLATE SAMI LOANS LA rTide Purpose Approal Swus ConM. Loan 2704-KO To incease the supply of serviced land by May 1986 Completed PCR Isued on Utban Lad Dev. assisting Korea Land Dev. Corp. June 29. 1992 Project_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Loan 2801-KO To improve Pusan city's urban mangemnt April 1987 Completed PCR issued on Pusan Urban and finance by strengtenin project Dec. 18. 1991 Management selcdon and investnent planning, financial and managerial systems and by SUppOtUlg priority investmetts and the balanced developments of the city. Loan 2905-KO To increase he efficiency of mnspont in the Feb. 1988 Completed PCR issued on Kyunggi Regional Kyunggi Region by physically improving the Dec. 30. 1992 Transpot transpoi t inftastucmre in two specifi conidors and by supporttng the ongoing procesS of coonlinationof tansport invesnmnet planning in the region. Loan 2908-KO To increase the efficiency, capacity and Feb. 1988 Ongoing Utban Trnsport afety of the existn tuansporanon systen (Taegu) In Taegu city through the itoduction and application of TSM techniwques and the contuedon of a major urban expressway with assoiaed links. __________ Loan 3061-KO To es transport capacity by supponing May 1989 Ogoing Roase -.zovement de upgrding of the surfece and alignmnt of exitng moads. by improving road maintenance and opetaona by wideng roads and increasing traffic safety. . Loan 3329-KO To support the government's housing sec May 1989 ongoing Housing Sector staegy by poviding esoutces tho the National Housing Fund for Nadonal Housing fund for lower-income housing and by asisting te government in formuladng a framework for housing policy development and an agenda for policy tefotm in the sector. . -20- SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT Table 2: BANK RESOURCES A. Staff lautg aSat C=cle Num of ,ffweeks Throuth Agmual 112.6 sw A_m lth h fl AMMvI 58.9 w Sunervision 35.5 w ________a__ 5.3 I TomIa 2t2;3 sw B. MIsoos MosJyear { No. of Days in field Spemwinoa | Pefomae antgm Type of. poblem Preamdon June 1980 4 I10 ECOPTPIRAICONS n.a. Scot 1980 1 7 ECo n.a. Oct 1991 A21 ECOC/Wr/ n.a. Scot 1981 I 9 ECO n.a. Jan 19S2 t 5. ECQo_ n.a. June 1982 2 5 ECO/rE n.a. 2ec. 182a 4 13 ECcOE/UP n.a. Mat 92/HEUP n.a. Feb 1984 I S_ 2ECQ/UP n.a. _ __ Aggraisal July 198 . 20 | /Ue n.a. ct 1984 3 14 TE,'CONS n.a. -De 1984 L t 1 'O n.a. SuocrYvision . . Jan !986 4 1 FCOtJ HEC CNS t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Nor 1986 ;2-10 . ECOtUP t May 1987 4........... 3 UP Nov M ECOMP %feb1988 7URC Jan 1989 ..~...--.....4........ ECO _________ ________ 19 2 . . ECO/TE I . Sent 1991 2 4 13 . FA/E I__ May 1992 to 1 . ECO _ Jan 1993 2 r5EO. TP TmnpocPlaner ITHE Ttigbv/aY Fnui co EcOonomist Highway Engmneer FA F u nal jA EWach Asssm UP UbanT r LO Lan Officer -21X- SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT Table 3: PROJECT COST - SUMMARY AppuAisa Fsdmaz Revised SAhtwa Alm1 ____________ (USS mii) (USS mnii) (USS tnii) Loot Sx*8 Toca LOW POMP. TOMI LOW FoToip TolaL cms ucmI.q carn CachfAp ot abg corC cxebm C Majo roads 56.5 31.9 88.4 25.6 18.0 43.0 37.5 17.4 54.9 Major _msrca 12.0 7.1 19.1 2.8 II 4.6 2.6 _i 4.1 TSM & safey worts 9.8 8.9 18.6 19.6 8. 23.9 1.01 7.5 24.S Land aluisuzou 47.3 0 47.3 43.6 0 43.6 43.7 0 43.7 Tonicai asisanc 0.6 0.6 1.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 & uuiing _ ____ ___ ___ Sa cmon (aid 1991 126.1 48.5 174.6 91.6 26.6 120.3 100.81 26.6 127.41 cost} _ _ _ _ _ _ Physicl comu ci 7.5 5.5 13.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 price 8.6 8.4 17.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 condagrocia _ _ _ __ _ _ ______7 Tool omjmantCs 142.2 62.4 204.6 91.6 26.6 120.3 t00.81 26.6 127.4 -22'- SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT Tkbt 4: CUMULATE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DtSBURSEMENTS (USS miten) MRD Fucal Year Appaial Estmate Aca Acan as % of Apprisal. ________________ .,__ ... December3l, 1985 3.1 0.0 June 30. 1986 6.9 4.0 58.0 December31. 1986 133 4.0 32.5 June 30. 1987 l92 6.5 33,, December3l. 1987 27.7 9.1 32.9 June 30. 1988 37.6 9.8 26.1 Dmecember31. 1988 43.8 11.7 26.7 June 30. 1989 48.4 15.7 32.4 December31, 1989 51.5 19.1 37.1 June 30. 1990 53.0 19.1 36.0 December31. 1990 22.9 43.2/a June 30. 1991 22.9 43,2 la September 30, 1991 24.6 46.4 Li Note: USS24,243,00 was canceite in January 1987. and die undisbuned balae of USS4.155.95 was nceUed in Janua 993. /a Cumdlave disbbumem as percentge of toal loan amuunt. Daze of final disbWrsement July30. 1991 -23- SEOUL URBB MRPRT PROJECr TabJhJL SrATUS OF COVENAN1S Sec.ion Scams Oesampon Covena Coment 3.01(a) Complane The Domewer povide. as pmmpdiy as Scdule 2 need. the finds. Acilties. services a odUer resouce fquid for Schedule . 3.02 Compliae Goods. works and connunr serfees Schdule 4 shall be governed by the povisionsof Schedule 4. 4.01(a) Compliance Mainain records Vad accounts in _ _ _ _ ac ce wit sound accfinng p . 4.01(b) Compliance povide anual adit each Septmbe. SOE o) (a) (Iii) opuuon neded. Schedule I Compiane Fessibility Smdy on Par 8(i) a (lii) CompleWd 1986. pan 3 (b) before disu _ Schedule S Compliance Fumnish ank with Monitoring and Pam I Quaedy Repots. Schedule S Not Compan Completon of Wese Arterial. Part of component deleted. pa rm 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Schedule 5 Not Compian Com on Easm Arterial. Past of componae deleted. ,p an S __ __ __ __ __ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Schedule S CompUiance Staff up TSM Section. pats4 4_ Schedule ComPlInce TM advisors to be apponted. pam R(a) Schedule 5 Compliance Sabet advison tO be appobitd. pa m ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT Tabk 6 DETAILED ROJECT COST-ACTUAL As of December 31, 19"I Pujeect Cna _ pmss M381 won Mtt Us$ MNI= won cut of lAcd Fotelt Total Ouc LOt foseg Ttl Fog 8984 8985 8986 8987 1988 1989 99 1991 TOaWl CMikota Cog (5) Majo Roam 26169 83.320 39.439 40.2 362 17 4 5 .6 32.S 453 4.833 7341 8275 S.567 8.270 4.272 3989 Fantem Atuct 1 .637 834 2.471 2.5 2.8 I 0 386 38 5 240 2.231 _ _ _ _ 2.471 5 sae Dh1 - s* t 5 ino " 8.61t S14 2.471 25 2 S I 1.0 3. 31.5 240 2.231 . . . 2.47 11115/55 _ _ _ 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2122186 Westen Afteat Roa 24.S32 12.486 37.08 37 7 34 6 16.4 S80 32.2 . 283 2.602 7.341 12.753 0.562 1.270 4.272 37.013 KnaagnX.waySdn 14.Jt 7.934 22.249 22.7 200 0oo 30.0 33.3 283 2.602 7.348 tt.2l5 8ss _ 22.249 e1811851 _____ __ 49 _ _ _ __ Sftmngunng.ltun-fgus 80.237 4.552 t4.769 5s o 14 S 6.4 21 0 30.5 . ..5.8 7.709 8.270 4.272 14.769 82417 -t I__I _ _I.01_ Deungad Supsctvioao 94 5 . 94S 8 0 8 . 8) 0 8 162 196 20 81S 146 805 945 9 Majo tr Inttcbantt 2.810 1.240 3.50 3 4 22 2 .5 7 400 *| 9 2.523 38 . - - 3. Yewp dong 2.110 1,240 3.3s0 34 2 2 8 5 3.7 400 . 509 2.523 388 -=-- 3.350 3im27 I I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0312018 et)ngo to StoPetMvlo 323 321 0 3 0.4 0.4 0 = 89 300 4 = _ 3_ -21 TSWM and Sarety Wutks 83.994 5.401 17.395 877 55s 7.4 229 32.3 . 346 328 2.070 3.132 617 4.,15 6.787 87395 TsM 8Cou,sdo,&A C8t)) 10.279 4,389 14.595 14.9 83.8 5.9 89.0 31.8 W 4 328 8.828 3.832 687 4.8 85 4.239 14.598 80186185 Safety I.785 8,082 2.797 2.8 2.4 8.5 39 38.5 . . 249 . 2.548 2.797 03125186 Dessgn K S pestssioa 797 797 08 0.8 08 0 28 91 101 84 . 67 106 390 797 Taces ad Dutics Cvit Wosks s57 . 557 0.6 0 7 0. 7 0 . . . . . 557 557 Equi _ _ . 75 75 0.8 08 02 . 000 . - 27 9 29 9 I _ 7s Taxes and Dtes Eque . ...7.8.. 7.1 0.0t 008. 0 - 2 I 3 8 0.8 - 7.8 Lan Acquiooon 35.026 . 35.026 35.7 4.7 - 43.7 0 8.657 8, 197 5.307 7.472 3.086 I .S60 5l?. 35t?.026 Teeikitc Assi unee & . 283 283 0.2 . 02 02 800.0 . . 200 83 . . 213 Traning - - - - - Base cost 77.928 20.249 98.n77 800.0 800.8 26.6 27.48 20.9 8.686 9.777 18.317 17.262 19.248 2 t.267 6.134 12.006 98.77 Physt Contitngcies . ._ Puie Continsencies . . . _ . . . SOUL URBAN TRANPORT fROJKCr T PCT ROMC UWLEMENTATION SCUEVU - ACTAL - I p^2ct C_F tINS I"sl 1987 198 Igo1 19510 1991 !*~~~~ 12 3 4 6,,3 4 2 la 4 12 34 1 2 dl1 4 lU 2 3 4 2 4al Weu Aaeiuh 3t_1 Y?M DMiq Cmcd thm Taft Do r i: Go=6 SEOUL UU3AN ThANS3ORT PROIJIT Tabk S: NIOOMIE AND EXZNDMME, tf63-91 (ugM Won m"I 19m 2 983 1964 398Sh 3936 196? 3988 I896 3990 t991 .. .- AL A. 4aL -AoL. go.. AL 4 - . I ' ) *EVEHt4Il 492.3663.100 ZS7.27t 954.673 -940.04 13.94.30 8.S80 336.445 -81;7.81 -1.639.47 *-1. 073S.I 1.563.605 1561.756 1.716.761 L592.2s9 3.w *lol Ta 3S4.M9S 4.391 S92.412 635.34 7M2.749 964.346 1. 88.075 1.463.70S 1251.856 1.817.322 2.160.093 "asa & hai 101.812 154.547 224.643 279.648 313.206 3501.0 392.185 440.32 438.67S 736.915 963.54 Tiagt nm 24.342 27.922 20.t45. 19.643 20.625 21.656 22.739 23.876 23.336 35.017 37.673 1 3.7n5 20.240 19.371 20.032 23.720 29.652 35.472 3$.989 2.3W _ 3,eo5 8.99 EXPEND3IURE 485.128 5459 722.26 80379 85,.751 991.211 t84.815 1.219.120 3.324 8.500.427 944.971 1.847.024 t.S61.758 1.490.124 Q2.970 2.524,52 Carnal 473.2S7 572.00 706.797 78942 971.977 1.97.45 1.47S.239 1.817.SS6 1.469.465 I.930.822 2.49.8M6 bebe Sesce 11.871 1257 1.409 t7.437 = 19.2 = 21.64S 25.838 29.468 20.659 22.148 2S6 a mH ame .4.679 56.271 115.694 128.260 U4.296 125.369 39.65 117.673 6.657 103.272 28.50 WMt591 226,637 6M9.29 5317,98 -SAM Se,alSueath Yeatt 2993) ^ l 3.985 eb hsdd oet,diacisbcuekadundefa(AU Local 0 aaIsao.dle acomia oe hon heo. rwape f5