

## GABON CAS COMPLETION REPORT REVIEW

*This review agrees with the CASCR that the country did not make acceptable progress towards a majority of the proposed CAS outcomes.*

*The World Bank's objective in Gabon was focused on poverty alleviation, with the Bank assuming mostly the role of a "Knowledge Bank." The role was ambitious given the limited resources available to the Country Unit and the lack of commitment within the Government to address poverty. Implementation of the CAS has been deficient. The Bank was absent from the social sectors for most of the period under review due to a shift of priority within the Country Director's office, high turnover in staff, and a two year vacancy in the country office (until FY03). The planned analytical work was not carried out or not followed-up on. The two suggested lending operations did not materialize due to lack of progress with the privatization of the Railway and disagreements between the Bank and the Government over the scope of the suggested Public Sector Reform Project. The thrust of the implementation was thus on supporting macroeconomic stability and on the four loans already under implementation in 1998. The Bank needs to clearly define its role in Gabon, reach agreement on priorities with the Government and allocate resources accordingly.*

### **The FY 99 CAS Program and Government Objectives**

1. The objective of the CAS was to help better orient Gabon's considerable resources towards reducing poverty, improving social outcomes, and encouraging good governance. The Bank deliberately saw its role in Gabon as an advisor and catalyst to promote attention to highly relevant poverty issues. The CAS objective was relevant and pro-active in its direct focus on poverty alleviation. However, as the CASCR notes, the Bank's CAS objective was not directly aligned with the focus of the Government and ownership in the country was low. Given the likely depletion of oil resources in the medium term, the Government's main objectives were to broaden the economic base and to improve public sector management in the wake of declining revenues.
2. The CAS aimed at four intermediate objectives:
  - support reforms in public finance management with a focus on better poverty and social outcomes of public expenditure;
  - help establish or reorient sector strategies in key poverty alleviation areas, such as health, education, rural, urban and transport sectors;
  - foster rational and transparent decision making at the technical level to reduce the scope for discretionary decisions; and
  - help implement complex sets of reforms and help leverage donor and private resources to foster private sector development.
3. To achieve the objectives, the World Bank foresaw in the Base Case Scenario two new lending operations, a Public Sector Reform TA Loan and a Railway Rehabilitation Loan, supplemented by a variety of analytical work (see Annex Table 2). Under the Low Case Scenario no new lending would take place, and AAA would be reduced to supporting



poverty related public spending and helping formulate a macro-economic program. The four projects already under implementation in FY99 also supported the intermediate objectives.

4. With ten pages of performance indicators, the CAS program was ambitious given the limited resources available.<sup>1</sup> The performance indicators were not directly linked to the stated objectives in the CAS, which makes a results-based evaluation difficult. The CAS covered the period up to FY02, but the CASC and this review cover the period through FY04. Gabon has remained in a net negative disbursement situation vis-a-vis the Bank during the entire CAS period (see Annex Table 6).

### **CAS Implementation by Objectives and Intermediate Outputs<sup>2</sup>**

5. Gabon slipped in and out of the Low Case Scenario during the CAS implementation. Macro-economic stability was off track twice during the CAS period, mostly due to substantial fiscal slippages in the wake of elections which resulted in large increases in the overall debt burden and a build-up of arrears to multilateral donors. Compliance with IMF programs was overall uneven, and two consecutive IMF programs went off track in 1998 and 2001. A Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for Health, Education and Rural Development was not formulated, and progress in privatizing the telecom and the railway authorities was slow. Despite these slippages, the Bank continued to operate under the Base Case scenario in the earlier years.

6. *Support reforms in public finance management with a focus on better poverty and social outcomes of public expenditure.* There was no progress in raising the efficiency of public expenditure management. The Bank initiated work on a Public Expenditure Review (PER) in 1997, but the work remained an internal exercise that was eventually dropped. The Public Sector Reform TA project, which was to be the main vehicle to reform public expenditure management, never materialized, despite a fully disbursed PHRD grant to prepare the loan. Disagreements between the Bank and the Government over the work of the consultants and the scope, direction, and financial conditionality<sup>3</sup> of the loan were the main causes. A PER of infrastructure projects was undertaken in 2001 within the Urban LIL. This led to the identification of additional small-scale construction projects—particularly in the education and health sectors—that are included in a successor operation planned for approval in FY05. However, none of the 28 recommendations regarding overall expenditure management have been implemented to date.

7. *Help establish or reorient sector strategies in key poverty alleviation areas such as health, education, rural, urban, and transport sectors.* Overall progress under this

---

<sup>1</sup> The CAS emphasized the role of the Bank as a provider of knowledge and suggested Board discussion on this issue, but did not elaborate on potential shortages in internal funding. Gabon had a record of poor compliance with donor programs, and implementation of World Bank programs took on average three years longer than programmed. Given the large amount of suggested analytic work on the one hand, and the need to initiate and supervise projects with extended closing dates on the other hand, the allocated administrative resources within the Bank were not sufficient to tackle the outlined agenda.

<sup>2</sup> The material in this section follows that of the CAS, which differs from that used in the CAS Review

<sup>3</sup> Gabon believes that its poor social indicators justify concessional lending terms, despite the country's income level.

component was limited. No new sector strategies were elaborated (see Annex Table 4), and implementation of existing ones was deficient. As noted in the CASCR, World Bank support for strategies in health, education and rural development never materialized as foreseen by the CAS and other donors stepped in to bridge the gap.<sup>4</sup> Implementation of transport and urban strategies that had been developed in 1998 under the Transport/Urban TA project has been limited.

8. Some work has been done to improve the deficient data base on poverty and the social sectors. A Demographic and Health Survey was carried out in 2000 with support of a PHRD Grant. The survey helped fill some gaps in the overall dismal availability of poverty related data in Gabon. Follow-up on the results was to be part of the Public Reform TA project, which did not materialize. Lately, the Bank has supported a Core Welfare Survey to update the most recent poverty data from 1993. The results will likely become the basis for a new poverty reduction strategy currently under preparation with World Bank support.

9. In contrast to the poor outcome with regard to broad sector strategies, good results have been achieved on the small scale. The Urban LIL successfully integrated communities into the planning process and enhanced local capacity to develop and implement neighborhood developments plans in poor urban areas. The broad participatory approach, as well as the resulting improvements in poorer urban areas, has created ownership not only at the local level, but also within the various ministries. There is now strong interest on the part of the Government to launch a larger follow-up operation.

10. *Foster rational and transparent decision making at the technical level to reduce the scope for discretionary decisions.* Progress towards transparency in decision making has been limited. There is no evidence that the scope of discretionary decisions has been reduced, and the 2001 PER concluded that around 75 percent of the infrastructure investments were still made outside of the budget. Several performance indicators, such as the creation of a Road Maintenance Fund that is managed transparently and efficiently, have been deficient or were not addressed at all (see CASCR, Annex 1). However, some achievements carry the potential to trigger wider reforms:

- An integrated budgetary expenditure information system was recently implemented with World Bank and IMF support, but it is still too early to see whether the system will improve transparency and lead to greater control over expenditure.
- The Urban LIL has established transparency in procurement procedures for small-scale infrastructure projects. According to the ICR, the new approach will now be expanded to a larger portion of the public investment budget.
- Very recently, progress was made towards implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

---

<sup>4</sup> A health sector strategy was eventually prepared with support from the WHO, and an education sector strategy is currently in preparation without World Bank involvement. An interim Poverty Reduction Strategy was elaborated with support from UNDP. The World Bank recently stepped in to help improve and finalize the strategy.

11. *Help implement complex sets of reforms and leverage donor and private resources to foster private sector development.* All of the projects implemented during the CAS period contained elements to help shift Gabon's economy to non-oil sector-led growth, but no change in the share of this sector in GDP has yet occurred. The Bank promoted the divestiture of the Government from major parastatals, but in many cases governance only changed from public to private monopolies with the necessary regulatory environment not yet functioning. Vested interests slowed down divestiture, led to lack of transparency in the process or withdrawals of concessions.<sup>5</sup> Service provision has improved somewhat, but prices have not yet come down.<sup>6</sup> There seems to be a widespread belief within the population that the privatization process has only led to foreign monopolies and higher unemployment.<sup>7</sup>

12. Implementation of the other areas of reforms was half-hearted during the CAS period. The Labor, Mining and Forestry Codes have shortcomings, while the Petroleum and Social Security Codes were not developed due to shifts in the Bank's overall focus. Weak local capacity has restrained other areas of reforms, such as promoting a better investment climate or improving the quality of the judiciary. The suggested Railway Rehabilitation Loan never materialized because the concessionaire was not interested. The concession was later withdrawn due to lack of maintenance by the concessionaire, which itself was partly a result of non-payment of freight-charges by the co-bidder who was not awarded the concession.

13. In the absence of a broader program, the Bank has correctly devoted its remaining administrative resources to promoting macro-economic stability in tandem with the IMF. This cooperation contributed to broadening the tax base, removing import surcharges and reducing tariffs and successfully implementing an oil windfall fund. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved since 2002, but public spending remains pro-cyclical and prone to excesses in election years. A FIAS study on the investment climate was done and widely discussed, and a Financial Sector Assessment was conducted. Additionally, some progress in the area of forestry and mining is being made in the wake of a new World Bank loan currently under preparation for FY06.

### **Overall OED Assessment of Outcomes**

14. Gabon has not made any measurable progress towards the higher level CAS objective of alleviating poverty. Its income per capita dropped from US\$4,270 in 1997 to US\$3,580 in 2003 (see Annex Table 1). The fall was due to negative average growth rates of the

---

<sup>5</sup> Since 1997 the Government has sold its majority stakes in eight major companies. While the Bank fostered the overall divestiture process, it was only directly involved in three cases: Telecom, AgroGabon, and Railway. So far, only one of the companies, Agrogabon, has been successfully sold in 2004. Progress in the privatization of the Telecom is still pending due to vested interests, and the concession of the railway has been called off.

<sup>6</sup> According to the region's estimates, electricity and water connections have increased by 30 and 33 percent, and the number of cellular phone subscribers has soared from 0 to 420,000 between 1999 and 2004. However, overall energy and water consumption per capita has slightly decreased during the period under review, and services have remained unreliable. The average costs of telephone calls are the third highest in Africa, with the state-owned telecom authority having a monopoly on international calls. The CASCR states that maritime and air transport rates have not fallen despite concessioning of the port and restructuring of the air carrier.

<sup>7</sup> The CASCR notes that an AfDB loan to buffer the social costs of enterprise restructuring and privatization was delayed due to Gabon's failure to service its debt.



economy<sup>8</sup> combined with a population growth rate of 2.3 percent per year. Oil remains the major source of income and, despite an overall reduction in output compensated by raising oil prices, still accounts for 66 percent of government revenue, 43 percent of GDP and 79 percent of exports (2002). Public expenditure in the social sectors remains inefficient. HIV is highly on the rise, affecting an estimated 8.1 percent of the 15–49 year olds in 2003, immunization rates have dropped from 54 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2003 and the pupil to teacher ratios are among the highest in Africa. Reliable data on poverty remains scarce. However, given the limited scope of the implemented program and the described achievements in individual sectors, OED agrees with the CASCR assessment, that CAS outcome can be rated “moderately unsatisfactory”.

15. The Bank did not meet its stated objective of providing advice and encouragement to help better orient Gabon’s considerable resources towards reducing poverty, improving social outcomes and good governance. On the one hand, the CAS objective with its sole focus on poverty reduction was not well aligned with the overall Government priorities and also failed to address Gabon’s high level of indebtedness. On the other hand, the CAS was not implemented as foreseen due to shortages in the Bank’s administrative resources, capacity constraints followed by a two-year vacancy in the Country office (until FY 03) and a shift in priorities within the Country Director’s office. Turnover amongst staff was high and follow-up on analytical work scarce. All these components made the dialogue between the Bank and the Government in Gabon more difficult. The Bank was basically absent from the social sectors for most of the period under review.

16. The Government’s compliance with loan conditionalities was uneven, and implementation of proposed reforms identified by analytical work sporadic. The Government appears not to be committed to “big-bang-reforms” in public expenditure management. The same holds for poverty reduction, where the Government has been reluctant to publicly acknowledge shortcomings. The Government is not willing to borrow on IBRD terms to address social reforms.

### **Assessment of CASCR**

17. The quality of the CAS Completion Report (CASCR) is satisfactory. It gives a balanced and thorough account of outputs by component and project, and discusses problems that prevented or delayed their implementation. However, the report is structured around the listed objectives in the CAS matrix, which are not identical with the stated objectives in the CAS itself. This makes the overall assessment of the CAS more difficult.

---

<sup>8</sup> Negative growth rates have mostly been due to the plummeting of economic growth by 8.5 percent in 1999 triggered by a fall in oil prices, a cut back in public expenditure and a lack of demand for the other major export product, timber. Since 2001, growth rates were on average 0.7 percent, which compares poorly with those in neighbouring countries or countries with similar GDP per capita (see Annex Table 1).

## Lessons and Recommendations

- The Bank still has to define its role and strategy in Gabon. It should reach agreement on priorities with the government and secure adequate resources up front to prevent a renewed slippage in implementation.
- Analytical work should focus on closing the information gap in Gabon, particularly with regard to social indicators and poverty related data. In the absence of such data, it is difficult to determine the full extent of poverty and also track progress made. By supporting the creation of an improved statistical system the Bank might also be able to raise awareness within the Government and civil society for pressing social and economic issues and possible approaches to their amelioration.
- The Government's commitment to reforming public expenditure has so far been questionable. To tackle the issue, the Bank might be better off promoting modest but feasible reforms that can serve as an entry point for more far-reaching changes in the future.<sup>9</sup> The Urban LIL has demonstrated the potential of this approach. Renewed Public Expenditure Reviews should identify the drivers of political and institutional change and areas with potential conflicts of interests, in order to find feasible points of entry.
- Extending the Urban LIL to cover small-scale construction projects in health and education should be embedded into broader sector strategies that themselves are based on thorough sector work. Earlier studies suggest that deficiencies in health care and education are mostly due to the lack of preventive care and the shortage of well trained professionals. Providing better infrastructure without addressing the bigger picture is bound to fail.

---

<sup>9</sup> See also the latest WBI Development Study "Building State Capacity in Africa."

**Annex Table 1: Macroeconomic and Social Indicators, CAS Implementation Period (1997-2004)**

Series Name	AVERAGE 1997-2004											
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Gabon	Cameroon	Cote d'Ivoire	Equatorial Guinea
GDP growth (annual %)	5.8	2.1	-6.2	2.0	2.5	0.0	2.8	2.0	1.4	4.7	0.9	22.4
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	4280	3870	3220	3120	3100	3000	3340	3960	3486	605	706	814
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	5530	5570	5170	5270	5400	5370	5500	..	5401	1761	1471	4336
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	3.0	-0.5	-8.4	-0.3	0.2	-2.2	0.6	-0.2	-1.0	2.5	-1.5	19.5
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	7.0	7.4	7.8	6.4	7.6	7.6	8.1	9.1	7.6	43.5	24.4	12.7
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	52.8	43.5	41.2	53.2	50.6	46.4	62.1	68.5	52.3	19.2	21.5	80.6
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	40.2	49.1	51.1	40.4	41.7	46.0	29.8	22.4	40.1	37.3	54.1	6.6
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	58.9	45.9	45.1	37.0	60.4	59.5	62.4	69.0	54.8	27.1	42.4	101.5
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	37.5	44.2	38.3	34.8	40.6	39.5	41.0	45.3	40.2	25.9	33.0	148.0
Current account balance (% of GDP)	9.8	-12.9	9.0	..	..	..	..	..	2.0	..	0.4	..
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	13.1	14.0	18.7	..	..	..	..	..	15.3	..	19.7	..
External debt (% of GNI)	90.0	108.8	104.5	92.5	91.2	85.1	72.8	..	92.1	104.3	116.7	63.4
Total reserves in months of imports	1.3	0.1	0.1	..	..	..	..	..	0.5	..	2.7	..
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 1/	..	..	..	33.4	34.0	31.5	29.8	30.9	31.9	10.8	17.2	..
Expenditure, total (% of GDP) 1/	..	..	..	21.7	30.8	28.1	22.4	22.8	25.2	10.2	19.4	..
Overall surplus/deficit, excluding capital grants (% of GDP)	2.5	-14.4	-1.4	0.6	2.2	3.6	4.2	4.6	0.2	0.4	-1.7	6.7
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	51.0	39.0	34.8	28.3	50.3	48.4	45.3	52.4	43.7	18.6	21.4	31.5
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	4.0	1.4	-1.9	0.5	..	..	..	..	1.0	2.5	3.1	..
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	56.0	56.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	..	55.3	49.4	63.1	59.9
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	..	..	..	..	..	36.0	..	..	36.0	48.0	40.0	53.0
Improved water source (% of population with access)	..	..	..	..	..	87.0	..	..	87.0	63.0	84.0	44.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	52.4	..	..	..	..	52.9	53.0	..	52.8	50.1	45.7	51.3
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	..	..	..	60.0	..	..	60.0	..	60.0	95.0	116.0	100.0
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	..	..	13.9	13.9	13.9	..	..	..	13.9	13.6	3.0	35.6
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	..	134.1	133.5	128.5	134.4	132.2	..	..	132.5	99.6	76.6	128.0
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	45.7	45.9	50.1	50.9	..	..	..	48.2	30.1	22.5	36.5
Population, total (in millions)	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	15.3	16.0	0.5
Population growth (annual %)	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.8
Urban population (% of total)	78.1	79.2	80.3	81.4	82.2	82.9	83.6	84.4	81.5	49.2	43.8	48.5

Source: SIMA as of May 2, 2005

1/ Figures from IMF Staff Report on Gabon

**Annex Table 2: Suggested work program under Low and Base Case scenarios (1999 CAS)**

<i>Case</i>	<i>Trigger</i>	<i>Lending</i>	<i>AAA</i>
Base Case	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintenance of Macro Stability</li> <li>• Formulation of MTEF in Health, Education and Rural Development</li> <li>• Privatization of Telecoms, Railway Concessioning</li> <li>• Satisfactory rating of projects under execution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Sector Reform TA Loan</li> <li>• Railway Rehabilitation</li> </ul> <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity Building (IDF Grant)</li> <li>• GEF (national and regional)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Expenditure Review (98)</li> <li>• Economic Work in support of IMF program</li> <li>• Debt for Nature Swap sector work</li> <li>• Policy Note on Maritime Transport</li> <li>• Macroeconomic Management and Budget work</li> <li>• Rural Development Strategy work</li> <li>• Health Strategy work</li> <li>• Education work</li> <li>• EDI Training for Parliamentarians</li> </ul>
Low Case	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-compliance with any of the above triggers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No new lending</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sector work to ensure protection of social spending</li> </ul>
On-going lending	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Privatization and Regulatory Capacity Building Technical Assistance Project (FY98-04)</li> <li>• Pilot Community Infrastructure Works and Capacity Building Project ("Urban LIL", FY98-04)</li> <li>• Forestry and Environmental Project (FY93-02)</li> <li>• Transport Sector TA Project (FY95-00)</li> </ul>		



**Annex Table 3: OED Project Ratings for Gabon, Exit FY 97-04**

<i>Project ID (OED)</i>	<i>Total Evaluated</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Inst Dev Impact</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>
Forestry/Environment	1	Moderately satisfactory	Modest	Unlikely
Transport Sector TA	1	Satisfactory	Substantial	Likely
Pilot Com. Infra. Up	1	Moderately satisfactory	Substantial	Likely
<b>Project ID (OED)</b>	<b>Total Evaluated (No)</b>	<b>Outcome % Sat (No)</b>	<b>Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No)</b>	<b>Sustainability % Likely (No)</b>
<b>Gabon</b>	3	100.0	66.7	66.7
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	582	62.8	36.9	47.9
<b>World Bank</b>	2169	74.2	45.5	65.4

Source: Business Warehouse as of May 2, 2005.

**Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work on Gabon, 1997- 2004**

<i>Document Title</i>		<i>Report No.</i>
<b>Country Assistance Strategy Document</b>		
Central Africa - Regional Integration Assistance Strategy	1/10/2003	25328
Gabon - Country assistance strategy Vol. 1- 2	9/22/1998	18415
<b>ESMAP Paper</b>		
Africa Gas Initiative Vol. 1- 6	2/28/2001	ESM240
<b>Public Expenditure Review</b>		
Gabon: Public Expenditure Review (PER)	1998	(Dropped)
<b>Sector Report</b>		
Gabon - Financial sector assessment	4/30/2003	25794
Gabon - Poverty in a rent-based economy	6/27/1997	16333

*Source: Imagebank as of May 2, 2005.*

**Annex Table 5: Portfolio Status Indicators by Year, 1997- 2003 (In USD million)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>
Gabon	# Proj	3	3	4	3	3	2	2
	# Proj At Risk	2	1	2	1	0	0	2
	% At Risk	66.7	33.3	50.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	100.0
	Net Comm Amt	37.7	37.7	42.7	37.5	37.5	15.0	15.0
	% Commit at Risk	73.5	26.5	35.1	26.7	0.0	0.0	100.0
	Comm At Risk	27.7	10.0	15.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	15.0
Cameroon	# Proj	7	8	6	9	8	8	9
	# Proj At Risk	7	5	4	1	2	5	3
	% At Risk	100.0	62.5	66.7	11.1	25.0	62.5	33.3
	Net Comm Amt	365.4	344.8	329.4	400.3	422.6	428.1	504.3
	% Commit at Risk	100.0	43.4	36.8	5.7	6.3	82.9	49.1
	Comm At Risk	365.4	149.7	121.2	22.9	26.7	354.8	247.4
Cote d'Ivoire	# Proj	14	15	15	16	12	12	10
	# Proj At Risk	2	2	5	2	6	5	7
	% At Risk	14.3	13.3	33.3	12.5	50.0	41.7	70.0
	Net Comm Amt	764.4	804.2	608.6	621.8	563.3	758.3	702.5
	% Commit at Risk	10.5	9.9	17.9	9.6	82.0	45.3	97.3
	Comm At Risk	80.0	80.0	109.2	60.0	461.8	343.8	683.5
Equatorial Guinea	# Proj	1	1	1	0	...	...	...
	# Proj At Risk	1	1	1	0	...	...	...
	% At Risk	100.0	100.0	100.0		...	...	...
	Net Comm Amt	5.5	5.5	5.5	0.0	...	...	...
	% Commit at Risk	100.0	100.0	100.0		...	...	...
	Comm At Risk	5.5	5.5	5.5	0.0	...	...	...
Mauritius	# Proj	7	7	2	3	3	3	2
	# Proj At Risk	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
	% At Risk	14.3	57.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Net Comm Amt	95.0	77.0	42.9	40.7	40.7	18.0	14.2
	% Commit at Risk	16.8	34.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Comm At Risk	16.0	26.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Business Warehouse as of November 15, 2004.

**Annex Table 6: IBRD/IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Gabon, FY 97- 05 (In US\$)**

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Gross Disb</i>	<i>Repay</i>	<i>Net Disb</i>	<i>Interest</i>	<i>Fees</i>	<i>Net Transfer</i>
1997	2,847,928	10,720,047	-7,872,120	6,145,116	51,553	-14,068,789
1998	4,951,387	9,909,666	-4,958,279	4,622,732	43,998	-9,625,008
1999	4,897,575	9,459,215	-4,561,641	3,692,150	57,503	-8,311,293
2000	6,137,754	11,183,005	-5,045,252	5,374,923	43,312	-10,463,487
2001	7,181,911	12,606,475	-5,424,564	5,262,056	46,802	-10,733,422
2002	2,420,774	7,212,218	-4,791,444	4,657,500	23,249	-9,472,192
2003	2,191,755	11,760,861	-9,569,106	5,312,759	16,244	-14,898,109
2004	2,466,983	10,817,018	-8,350,034	2,885,094	9,387	-11,244,515
2005	1,289,422	6,940,875	-5,651,453	1,389,784	2,339	-7,041,237
<b>TOTAL (1997- 2005)</b>	<b>34,721,219</b>	<b>92,428,410</b>	<b>-57,707,192</b>	<b>41,477,496</b>	<b>300,026</b>	<b>-99,184,688</b>

Source: Controller's website as of May 2, 2005.

**Annex Table 7: Gabon—Millennium Development Goals**

<i>Gabon</i>	1990	1995	2001	2002
<b>1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (2015 target = halve 1990 \$1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates)</b>				
Population below \$1 a day (%)	..	..	..	..
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (%)	..	..	..	..
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%	..	..	..	..
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	..	..	11.9	..
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	11	9	7	..
<b>2. Achieve universal primary education (2015 target = net enrollment to 100)</b>				
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group)	..	..	78.3	..
Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 (%)	..	59.3	102.1	..
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..
<b>3. Promote gender equality (2005 target = education ratio to 100)</b>				
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)	102.6	96.2	96	..
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%)	43.2	..	..	..
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	..	6	..	..
<b>4. Reduce child mortality (2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds)</b>				
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	96	91	87	85
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	69	67	64	63
Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months)	76	57	55	55
<b>5. Improve maternal health (2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three-fourths)</b>				
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	..	..	420	..
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	..	..	85.5	..
<b>6. 1 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc.)</b>				
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	..	..	4.7	..
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women ages 15-49)	..	..	32.7	..
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS	..	..	8,600.00	..
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	..	..	192	248.4
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	..	..	..	72.9
<b>7. Ensure environmental sustainability</b>				
Forest area (% of total land area)	85.1	..	84.7	..
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	..	2.8	2.8	2.8
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP \$ per kg oil equivalent)	3.7	4.2	4.7	..
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	7	3.4	2.8	..
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	..	..	86	..
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	..	..	53	..
Access to secure tenure (% of population)	..	..	..	..
<b>8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development</b>				
Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	21.7	33.5	234	239.7
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	..	5.6	15.8	19.2
<b>General indicators</b>				
Population	953 thous.	1.1 mil.	1.3 mil.	1.3 mil.
Gross national income (\$)	4.6 bil.	4.2 bil.	4.0 bil.	4.0 bil.
GNI per capita (\$)	4,800	3,820	3,100	3,060
Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and over)	..	..	..	..
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	5.1	4.6	4.2	4.1
Life expectancy at birth (years)	51.9	52.4	52.7	52.9
Aid (% of GNI)	2.5	3.4	0.2	1.7
External debt (% of GNI)	74.6	102.8	90.9	84.8
Investment (% of GDP)	21.7	23.7	30.5	28.4
Trade (% of GDP)	76.9	91.4	101.1	98.9

Source: *World Development Indicators database, November 2004.*

Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated.

Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.