1? i--- -~ --~j - X 'I -- 4- - I ('~1 1'' ~v - iLWfZ~!b' I o cT~ I ~ ø « _ o -' - w L.1 I Z >åJI -' f ~ i - ~ ~ I- 1- m jr i $0 -p I'- .uII -L ~ ii. ~ j~. -\,x ~. / - 9 é~. -~-~ ~' I'' ~zw A ~Cfl3 I Z I A- -I / I~$-& UJAC. Unit Abatement Cost as a measure of the overall economic attractiveness of a proposed project. Direct, indirect, and joint project costs The Unit Abatement Cost is defined by King as Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention stipulates follows: that the GEF will pay the "agreed full incremental costs" of measures taken by developing countries to Let UACP = Unit abatement cost meet the objectives of the Convention. The introduc- tion of the word "agreed" into this paragraph was TCP = Total discounted project cost intended to indicate that the developing country and the GEF would need to reach consensus on the pro- DBP = Total discounted domestic posed project and its estimated incremental costs. benefits In addition to the direct costs of a proposed project- AE = Physical quantity of emissions capital and running costs of the hardware, software, avoided or absorbed by the and personnel training-the Convention suggests a project number of other indirect and joint costs that can appropriately be included in the financing arrange- GV = Total value of one unit of ments. Indirectcosts include the measures oractivities GHG abatement or absorption that might be undertaken in conjunction with a pro- posed project in order to facilitate the later deployment Then UACP = (TCP - DBP)/AE. atlowercosts of similar technologyinrelated applica- tions. These indirect costs are associate d with mea- King suggests that the project is economically sures to eliminate market failures, including actions attractive if: taken to improve the flow of information, lower barriers to market penetration, and improve the effi- GV > UACP ciency of local markets or institutions. King proceeds to refine this metric further by defining Some of these measures may, however, generate the Unit,Incremental Abatement Cost (UIAC) for important short-term benefits to the local economy or projects in which incremental benefits exceed incre- relieve other local environmental problems. The Con- mental costs, as folloWS:5 vention was not intended to underwrite oese strictly local benefits. The part of the indirect costs which Let ICt = Incremental cost of project P generate these additional benefits may be treated, in accounting terms, as joint costs. IDBP = Incremental domestic benefits of project P One of the factors which complicates the calcula- tion of such joint costs is the presence of systemic IAEi = Incremental quantity of effects resulting from the introduction of the project. emissions avoided or absorbed Systemic effects are the impacts of specific projects by the project or measures on the existing institutional infrastruc- ture which change the value (and potentially the Then UIAC = (ICn - IDBa)dtAEi. cost) of a project over time. For example, a project In this context, the incremental project cost, IC., is not defined as net of incremental domestic benefits. 22 which introduces energy-efficient lighting into a as the expeditious development of new partnerships utility service territory may change both the scale between governments and enterprises which would and magnitude of the future load curve. It may also facilitate the transfer of advanced technologies. change the planning practices of the utility in ways Article 4 also empowers the GEF to finance the which open up previously "forbidden" or invisible implementation of resource surveys and the analyses options. The presence of these new options and the of existing resources, the formulation of innovative altered shape of the load curve may change both the policy initiatives to integrate considerations of the estimated value and the cost of the energy-efficient climate issue into national development strategies, lighting. Since the size of future benefits and the and the establishment of broad educational programs precise magnitude of joint costs will be difficult to to heighten public awareness of the implications determine in an objective fashion a priori, an arbi- of rapid climate change. Such programs can, and trary rule is proposed below for allocating the should, be designed to encourage the broadest possi- associated costs between the GEF and the country ble participation in these processes, including that of or enterprise implementing the project. non-govemmental organizations (United Nations 1992). Before taking up the allocation rule, however, it is important to establish the accepted range of indirect Since some of the activities listed above will haveboth costs that can appropriately be introduced into the national and global benefits, it is necessary to weigh economic calculus of GEF-supported projects. These carefully the share of gross incremental costs that include, inter alia, the following elements: should be agreed for financing under the Convention. Few of the shared benefits of these activities will have * Activities to promote and cooperate in the "devel- easily measurable direct economic effects on the local opment, application, and diffusion, including trans- economy. To avoid an extended analytic process that fer, of technologies, practices and processes that might lapse into an intellectual quagmire, one possible control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emis- rule for dividing such joint costs couldbeto split them sions of greenhouse gases" in half. If the implementing country wished to include * Activities and measures to promote "sustainable such activities as part of the agreed incremental costs, management, and promote and cooperate in the the estimated investment could be divided equally conservation, and enhancement...of sinks and res- between the GEF and the host government. Compared ervoirs of greenhouse gases...including biomass, to the financing of hardware and equipment, such an forests, and oceans as well as other terrestrial, arrangement might more easily be implemented for coastal, and marine ecosystems" underwriting these "soft"costs because theycan often * Activities that "take climate change considerations be paid in local currency rather than from scarce into account, to the extent feasible, in...social, foreign currency reserves. economic, and environmental" policy formulation * Measures that "promote and cooperate in scientif- Calculating the shadow price for GHG ic, technological, socio-economic and other re- abatement search, systematic observation, and development Anderson (1992) has suggested two alternatives for of data archives related to the climate system" calculating the value of GHG emissions which can be * Initiatives that "promote and cooperate in educa- avoided or reabsorbed. The first approach is best tion, training, and public awareness related to cli- applied when a clear threshold of danger or vulnera- mate," including those activities that promote the bility from GHG accumulation has been conclusively "full, open, and prompt" exchange of scientific, established through a consensus among the scientific technological, socioeconomic, and legal data or community or the through the political process of the expertise. negotiations of the Convention. Anderson estimates the value of one unit of GHG abatement as the cost of These aspects of Article 4, paragraph 1, suggest that deploying a backstop, low-emissions technology for GEF project loans should support the building of a period long enough to postpone crossing the agreed institutional capacity in developing countries, as well threshold of danger by one unit of time. He treats this 23 parameter as a proxy for the size of the carbon tax that including the future price and availability of fossil would be needed to bring forward the date of full fuels, the Research & Development policies of gov- deployment of renewable or zero-emissions technol- ernments, and the investment strategy of the GEF ogies to replace fossil fuels. Following the Hotelling itself. Based on a series of simulation studies of rule for valuing depletable resources, he estimates this different distributions of investments in solar, wind, proxy for the carbon tax, C, as follows: biomass, and other renewables, Anderson estimates a stream of values for avoided emissions starting at US Let n1t = Marginal cost of non-fossil, $35 per ton of avoided carbon emissions today, rising backstop technology in year T at a rate of approximately 10 percent per year to a limit of approximately US $600 per ton in then current fT = Marginal cost of fossil dollars. Alternatively, he suggests a constant figure of technology in year T US$35 per ton, so long as this figure is not discounted in cost comparisons based on net present value anal- T = Year in which the baseline or ysis. Although other analysts have suggested possibly business-as-usual scenario lower costs for solar and other backstop technologies, would cross the threshold of these estimates could serve as a useful upper limit on dangerous accumulations Unit Incremental Abatement Costs funded by the GEF. r = Real discount rate Uncertainties, non-linearities, and surprises Then C, = (nT - fT)(1 + r)r-t. As the Danish atomic physicist Nils Bohr once noted, the only thing which is certain about the future is the In this formulation, Ct represents the shadow price persistence of uncertainty. With respect to climate of measures to delay the crossing of the danger change, the main uncertainties pertain to regional threshold. It also represents the upper limit on the impacts. Scientists cannot yet predict these with any reasonable value that could be set for the UIAC. confidence and are unlikely to be able to do so for This innovative approach is elegant and intrinsical- many decades. The same can be said of any estimate ly attractive. But it is difficult to apply at present of the value of expected future damages. when there is no consensus on either the magnitude or the expected date of crossing the danger thresh- What is perhaps equally troubling is the inability of old in the baseline scenario. scientists to identify orquantify theprincipal feedback mechanisms that could trigger an accelerated The second approach offered by Anderson for esti- response to future emissions. The threshold of con- mating the shadow price of emissions reductions is centrations marking the danger point before rapid more easily applied in present circumstances, and climate change and the extent of future damages does not require a direct estimate of the damages due cannot be determined. Most scientists agree that there to global warming. This alternative does, however, may be feedbacks, both positive and negative, that are require two other pieces of relatively uncertain infor- still unknown, but which could significantly alter the mation, being critically dependent on: response of the climate system in the future. * The prospective costs of solar or other non-carbon Absent this information, but aware that local and backstop technologies regional climates are the physical manifestation of - The time profile of future investment in these interactions between a complex set of closely coupled technologies, non-linear systems, it is highly probable that there could be major surprises ahead in terms cf climate. Anderson notes that the future costs of the backstop It could be that all the unknown factors will be technologies will vary over time, depending on their negative feedbacks that damp out the effects of global application or market niche. The profile of future warming due to the continued accumulation of GHGs. investments will be determined by a variety of factors It is more likely that some of the feedbacks will be 24 positive and, at some future point, may trigger (at least will be more responsive to such environmental temporarily) a rapid deterioration of some regional requirements if: climate regimes. * They are subsidized by the GEF The uncertainty regarding the threshold of dangerous * The domestic share can be contributed in local accumulations and its rate of approach affects the currency estimates of the value of avoided emissions. Anderson * The domestic share can be used to cover the indi- estimates that a delay of one decade in crossing the rect costs that will make direct investments more threshold (for example, if it were fifty years hence effective. instead of forty years) would lower the value of avoided emissions to about US $12 per ton. By con- The GEF can facilitate their involvement by: trast, an acceleration in crossing the threshold would raise the value of avoided emissions to approximately * Including some of the indirect costs in the project US $75 per ton. package * Encouraging policy reform The optimal value and the most appropriate rate of * Providing training and support to local managers. discount to apply will remain a matter of judgement. Only the results of future climate research and inves- tigations into the manufacture and deployment of backstop technologies will allow a refinement of these estimates in the future. Special concerns of developing countries As developing countries consider measures to ad- dress the risks of global warming, they are confront- ed by several hard choices. The immediate pressures of survival caused by crises in health, education, nutrition, energy, and sanitation outweigh any com- peting claims on the limited funds available. Some of the largest consumers of capital in the developing world are electric utilities. These institu- tions are also a major source of GHG emissions. Like many institutions in developing countries, the electric utilities are in a triple bind (Jhirad and Mintzer 1992): * They are chronically short of capital, especially hard currency * They are suffering from declining technical and economic performance * They face calls for increasingly stringent environ- mental regulation. Like other institutions in this predicament, electric utilities will be reluctant to invest scarce hard cur- rency in new emissions-reducing technologies. They 25 Issues Shaping 6 the GEF Portfolio Several issues will shape the portfolio of the GEF as Anderson emphasizes the important differences in the it moves beyond the Pilot Phase to GEF II. A key implications and roles of the two types of projects: question relates to the balance to be achieved between so-called Type I and Type II projects. Type Iprojects. These are likely to have a predom- inant effect on local environmental problems and Type I and Type II projects are critical for meeting the needs of national eco- During the pilot period, a distinction was established nomic development. They are projects of the kind between Type I and Type II projects. In Type I typically financed by Official Development Assis- projects: tance. Type II projects. These principally address global * Domestic benefits are greater than national costs environmental problems. They are more specula- * Distinct global benefits also exist. tive in their economic returns and less likely to be funded by traditional forms of development Examples include waste-reduction and efficiency- assistance. improving projects, and cover measures such as the capture and commercial sale of flared gas. As Anderson notes, Type H projects are appropriately These projects usually have low UIAC and are, in a higher priority for the GEF Although they are principle, economically attractive for the imple- typically more complex and more expensive per unit menting country or enterprise even without GEF ofemissions reduction orsink expansion, theseprojects support. have the potential to reduce the long-term costs of the required transition to non-fossil fuels. Type 11 projects In Type II projects: may also open up new markets for joint commercial development by enterprises in developing and indus- * National costs exceed direct domestic economic trialized countries. Thus, if supported by the GEF in a benefits way which encourages participation by private enter- * The sum of global and domestic benefits exceed prises, such projects can be a fulcrum for sustainable national costs. development in many countries. Projects of this type include most photovoltaic Contributions by the GEF to Type o projects can lead applications, wind electric systems, biomass use, to future reductions in the cost of follow-on manufac- afforestation programs, fuel cells, and some turing. These future cost reductions, capturing econ- advanced efficiency-improving technologies oies of scale in manufacturing that are the result of (Anderson 1992). "learning by doing," represent an important global 26 benefit that will remain hard to quantify for many country to implement even without an international years (Anderson 1992). subsidy, or only those measuresin which the gover- ment vests sufficient importance to allocate some of its Calculating incremental costs: the problem chronically scarce investment funds. of the baseline To calculate the incremental costs of a proposed The importance of better information project, it is necessary to have something to compare Investment decisions made by the GEF will unavoid- it to. When two alternatives are mutually exclusive, ably be made inthe face ofcontinuing uncertainty. The the situation is relatively less complex; for example, uncertainties persist through every level of the analy- when a decision is required to replace a proposed coal sis. There are fundamental scientific uncertainties plant for electricity with a geothermal or natural gas about the workings of the climate system and the system. relationship of the greenhouse problem to other atmo- spheric problems, including stratospheric ozone de- When, however, the alternatives offer advantages in pletion and acid deposition. There are technological different but related areas, the pros and cons can uncertainties aboutthe characteristics, costs, andavail- acquire a daunting complexity. A possible situation ability of a variety of response options. There are could involve a choice between replacing an old oil economic uncertainties concerning the rates of growth plant with a new, advanced combustion turbine that of national economies and of national energy demand burns natural gas, or investing in a program of energy- as well as price levels, elasticities, and population efficient lighting. distributions among income groups. Finally, there are uncertainties about the policies that will be imple- In both cases, the comparison is very sensitive to a mented by governments-both with respectto climate series of input assumptions. The most important of change and to national priorities. these constitute the baseline against which the pro- posed investment will be compared. King and Munas- In the face of these uncertainties, perhaps the most inghe (1992) observe that the selection of the baseline valuable thing that the GEF can do is to invest in may alter the estimated value and costs of the pro- better information. In terms of the evaluation of all posed programs or measures. If the baseline is built on Type 11 projects, but especially in the case of solar, current trends, it may ignore simple, cost-effective wind, and biomass systems, better information about reforms which are not due to global warming. If, on the resource base is urgently needed. Very few devel- the other hand, the baseline assumes that "best prac- oping countries have up-to-date and accurate data on tice"technology is employed, only theoretically "true" solar availability, wind regimes, soil characteristics, incremental costs will be calculated and the resulting land-use patterns, or precipitation trends. Resource picture will be wholly divorced from reality. King and surveys conducted by local institutions are an inex- Munasinghe conclude that the baseline chosen will pensive solution which could dramatically improve reflect a number of operational considerations, and no the ability of domestic experts to evaluate future uniform homogeneous rule can apply. project alternatives. The calculation of the baseline scenario for any coun- Innovative and systematic programs for project momi- try is necessarily problematic because it involves a toring and evaluation are essential to the long-term counterfactual analysis. It is difficult to ascertain the success of the GEF. Such programs should include an policies and projects that would be implemented emphasis on costs and emissions but also highlightthe absent the GEF subsidy. Indeed, the availability of the lifetime and performance of projects. The ability of GEF subsidy may induce countries to politicize the projects or new systems to fit in smoothly with local characterization of their baseline scenarios in order to institutions will also be important to evaluate. By maximize the expected subsidy. Even without such developing well-documented data on the performance concerns, serious questions arise over whether the of different designs under alternative conditions, GEF baseline should include all negative-cost measures task managers will get a better idea of what works, that would be economically advantageous for the what doesn't, and how costs can be reduced in the 27 future. Training local institutions, including universi- ties, independent research institutes, and non-govern- mental organizations to perform these monitoring and evaluation tasks could increase local levels of compe- tence and build a broad base of local support for the GEF. Investment criteria and project selection The principal goal of GEF projects should be to work toward the overall stabilization objective of the Con- vention. Although emphasis must therefore be placed on investment in innovative technologies that can have a large impact on future emissions, substantial investments should also be made to increase the local capacity to develop, manage, and evaluate these inno- vations. In some cases it will make sense to invest in Type I projects that offer the potential for inexpensive early emissions reductions or sink enhancements. Such projects will be especially interesting if they offer new information about how to overcome market failures, increase the efficiency of existing institu- tions, or facilitate the adoption of innovations by indigenous communities. The GEF could also underwrite some experiments in the financial bundling or packaging of small projects in order to minimize transaction costs and spread the opportunities for participation in the overall process. One of the obvious keys to reducing future costs of Type II projects will be through technology demon- strations which graphically illustrate the potential of the chosen technology. In doing so, it is not necessary to employ the most advanced or radical design. It may even be more valuable to employ well-tested designs in systems that involve innovative institutional rela- tionships, advanced training programs, sophisticated monitoring systems, and challenging approaches to integrating such innovations into local communities. In this way, it may be possible to maximize learning by doing while minimizing the chances of outright failure. 28 Proposed Work 7 Program The principal elements of the GEF work agenda points for the regional development of key technolo- related to the issues discussed in the foregoing chap- gies, such as renewable and energy-efficient technol- ters will be carried out through the Program for ogies. Such institutes could also serve as repositories Measuring Incremental Costs for the Environment of data for monitoring and evaluation activities. By (PRINCE). The GEF Administrator, working closely principally employing citizens of the host region, with the Chairman and members of the Scientific and these institutes could make a major contribution to its Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) of the GEF, will human capital, and also increase public awareness undertake a series of special studies covering key about the climate problem. These institutes could also methodological, strategic, and institutional issues raised be used to encourage and facilitate the emergence of by the development of an operational definition of new partnerships between private enterprises in de- agreed incremental costs. Specifically, the PRINCE veloping and developed countries. program will include: By encouraging local enterprises to participate in * Conceptual and methodological studies regarding these partnerships, the GEF could increase their pragmatic options for defining full incremental learing experience, help them to capture econo- costs mies of scale in the production of advanced technol- * Studies outlining procedural and institutional op- ogies, and improve their economic competitiveness tions for reaching agreement on incremental costs, on a global scale. These new partnerships would and means by which conflicts could be resolved have the added benefit of building closer trade ties * Recommendations on specific approaches for in- between developing and developed economies. If volving the private sector such partnerships are successful, the shared eco- * Recommendations on new and innovative ap- nomic rentfrom these innovative technologies could proaches to financing agreed incremental costs help to offset the net capital outflow that now * GHG-abatement strategy studies developed on a proceeds from South to North. country basis * Seminars, workshops, andothermodes of training. Strengthening the Convention process By distributing investments among the Bank's re- In terms of building local capacity, the GEF could gions and among countries with different historical consider facilitating the formation of a network like experience, the GEF could illustrate the varied re- the Consultative Group for International Agricultural sponses to the global problem of climate change. By Research (CGIAR) to build on the expertise already offering participation in innovative investments to a available in certain regions. The competence of exist- broad cross-section of countries, the GEF could help ing institutes could be enhanced to serve as focal many countries to "buy in"ato the Conventionprocess. 29 If the GEF succeeds in developing a carefully bal- anced selection of project technologies, much new information will be gained about resources, emissions characteristics, and the costs of various response strategies. This information could point the way to- ward smooth transition strategies by minimizing avoidable mistakes, and spreading the economic re- wards of innovation over many sectors. This would help individual countries recognize new opportunities and keep their options open while contributing to global efforts to reduce the risks of rapid climate change. Through its support of the indirect costs of national response strategies, the GEF could help its members to identify, test, and evaluate innovative strategies for regulatory and institutional reform. Many of these response strategies could create benefits for the local economies which adopt them, benefits that go far beyond their effects on GHG emissions or reabsorp- tion by natural sinks. 30 Conclusions 8 and Recommendations The risks of rapid climate change are principally asso- differencebetweenthefullcostofthosemeasures, and ciated with the accumulation of carbon dioxide and the sum of the cost of the least expensive way to other GHGs in the atmosphere. The timing and extent deliver an equivalent economic service to the local of future regional impacts are presently unknown and economy, plus the direct, short-term economic bene- will remain uncertain for decades to come. Feedbacks fits to the local economy that would result from the and other complex interactions between the climate proposed measures. system, the ocean, and the biota may accelerate the pace of climate change, and trigger a non-linear re- The incremental costs of measures covered by the sponse to even small future increases in concentration. GEF should include both the direct costs of hardware, software, and training, as well as the All countries contribute to the emissions of GHGs. indirect costs associated with overcoming market Economically important activities in all major sectors failures, institutional obstacles, and other barriers to of the economy release such emissions. In the last two market penetration. These indirect costs are identi- centuries, emissions of these gases, especially due to fied in the Convention as including measures to activities in developed countries, have transformed the promote technology development and transfer; re- natural background greenhouse effect into the green- source assessment and data collection; training and house problem. As a result of this historical accumula- scientific exchange; and enhanced public aware- tion, national economies and natural ecosystems are ness of the climate problem. Where such indirect threatened by the risks of rapid climate change. costs clearly generate both local and global bene- fits, the GEF should pay up to one-half of the The GEF, designated as the interim financial mecha- incremental costs. nism of the Climate Change Convention, has an instru- mental role to play in mobilizing the international The GEF should encourage and underwrite response to global warming. The GEF is charged with projects which generate valuable new information financing the full cost of reporting requirements under on: the Convention and the agreed full incremental costs of measures taken by developing countries to achieve the - Advanced technologies and their deployment overall objective of the Convention. The relevant * Innovative adaptive responses measures are outlined in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the - Institutional reform FCCC. d Successful technology transfer. The incremental costs of measures taken to achieve the The GEF should also support the development of objectives of the Convention should be defined as the local capacity, and the creation of new partnerships 31 between governments and enterprises in developing and developed countries. An especially valuable ap- proach to achieving this goal would be for the GEF to support the formation of a CGIAR-type network of institutions of high repute to provide expertise on the deployment and application of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies. 32 References Anderson, D. 1992. "Cost-Effectiveness and the Investments of the Global Environment Facility." Background Paper for the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel of the Global Environment Facility. World Bank, Industry and Energy Department, Washington, D.C. Gleick, P.H. 1992. "Impacts of Climate Change on Internationally Shared Fresh-Water Resources." In I. Mintzer, ed. Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications, and Responses. Stockholm Environ- ment Institute and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. Houghton, J.T., G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums, eds. 1990. Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Report by Working Group 1. Cambridge, U.K.: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Howarth, R. and P. Monahan. 1992. "Economics, Ethics, and Climate Policy." Working Paper. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, Calif. Jhirad, D. and I. Mintzer. 1992. "Electricity: Technological Challenges and Management Challenges to Achieving a Low-Emissions Future." In I. Mintzer, ed. Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications, and Responses. Stockholm Environment Institute and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. King, K. 1992. "Sharing the Costs of Projects that Have Both Global and Domestic Environmental Benefits." Draft Report. World Bank, Environment Department, Washington, D.C. King, K. and M. Munasinghe. 1992a. "Cost-Effective Measures to Limit the Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in Developing Countries." Divisional Working Paper 1992-30. World Bank, Environment Depart- ment, Washington, D.C. King, K. and M. Munasinghe. 1992b. "Global Warming: Key Issues for the Bank." Divisional Working Paper 1992-36. World Bank, Environment Department, Washington, D.C. Mintzer, 1. 1990. "Living in a Warming World: Effects of Global Warming on Weather-Related Disasters."Draft Paper. World Bank, Environment Department, Washington, D.C. Norgaard, R. and R. Howarth. 1992. Sustainability and Discounting the Future. University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Pearce, D. 1992. "Cost-Effectiveness Criteria for the Protection of Biodiversity in the Context of the Global Environment Facility." Discussion paper for the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel of the Global Environment Facility. Second Draft. World Bank, Environment Department, Washington, D.C. United Nations. 1992. Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York. Warrick, R. and A.A. Rahman. 1992. "Environmental and Socio-political Aspects of Sea-Level Rise." In I. Mintzer, ed. Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications, andResponses. 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