Report Number: ICRR14737

IEG **ICR Review**
Independent Evaluation Group

1. Project Data:		**Date Posted:**	04/20/2015	
Country:	Uganda			
Project ID:	P110803		**Appraisal**	**Actual**
Project Name:	Post Primary Education And Training Program	**Project Costs (US$M):**	598.6	NA
L/C Number:		**Loan/Credit (US$M):**	150	140.94
Sector Board:	Education	**Cofinancing (US$M):**	573.22	NA
Cofinanciers:	Government of Uganda and various other donors	**Board Approval Date:**		03/21/2009
		Closing Date:	07/31/2012	07/31/2014
Sector(s):	Secondary education (74%); Public administration- Education (19%); Tertiary education (7%)			
Theme(s):	Education for all (66%); Education for the knowledge economy (34%)			

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2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

The credit agreement outlines three project objectives: (i) increase access to lower secondary education, (ii) improve the quality of lower secondary education, and (iii) enhance the enabling environment for post primary education and training.

The PAD confirms these objectives, but adds under the first objective that the project aims to increase access to lower secondary education *particularly among disadvantaged groups.*

The project was originally designed as the first three year phase of an Adaptable Program Loan that was to be comprised of three phases and aimed to support Uganda's Post Primary Education and Training Program.. The overarching objectives for the envisaged ten year program and spelled out in the PAD (but not the credit agreement) were broader: (i) to increase and improve equitable access to post primary education, with emphasis on the poorest rural and peri-urban areas; (ii) improve quality and relevance of post primary education and training; (ii) improve effectiveness and efficiency in delivery of post primary education and training. The project specific objectives which were focused on lower secondary education were a logical subset of these broader program objectives. In the end, the APL was discontinued after the first operation. Thus, for purposes of this ICR review only the project specific objectives as stated in the credit agreement will be assessed.

Some of the outcome targets were revised in August 2013, thus IEG will be applying a split rating.

b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Components:

The project supported three components. The original costs of each component, itemized below, are taken from the PAD, which presented only the initial allocation of IDA financing and not the total costs, including all financing sources (Government contribution and co-financing). No data is provided on actual costs by component because neither the ICR nor the Bank's operations portal contain this data. .

Component 1. Increase Access to Lower Secondary Education (original amount: US$92 million). Expansion of school infrastructure - construction of classrooms, libraries, teacher housing, multi-purpose science rooms and related water and sanitation facilities.

Component 2: Improve the Quality of Lower Secondary Education (original amount US$48 million). (i) Curriculum, examination and assessment reform for lower secondary education; (ii) in-service and pre-service teacher training; (iii) school level training in school management, accountability and pedagogical leadership; (iv) development and provision of learning materials (text books, science equipment, other instructional materials.

Component 3: **Enhance the Enabling Environment for Post Primary Education and Training** (original amount: US$10 million) (i) Advocacy and communication strategy for post primary education and training reforms; (ii) strengthen the Ministry of Education and Sports' (MoES) capacity in management; operations; financial management and audit; national assessment and examination; (iii) studies on skills development; support to private schools, double shifting, and effectiveness of school based procurement; (iv) developing strategy for reorientation and expansion of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), and upper secondary education; and (v) external review of the Program in order to guide Phase II of the then envisioned APL.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:

Costs: The project was designed to support a larger Government program to reform lower secondary education over three years. Total program costs were estimated to be $598.6 million. The ICR does not contain any information on actual program costs.

Financing: The approved IDA credit was SDR 99 million (US$ 150 equivalent) and SDR 93.09 (94%) disbursed.

Borrower contribution: Government was to fund $372.62 million. The ICR doesn't provide information on the actual Borrower contribution.

Other financing: Other donors were to finance $200.6 million, leaving a financing gap of $25.34 at the time of project approval. The ICR does not contain any information on actual financing by other donors.

In August 2013, a reallocation of USD 6.85 million equivalent was made from goods and equipment, consultants and training and unallocated disbursement categories towards works, increasing the latter to XDR 64.52 million.

In July 2012, the closing date was extended by two years from July 31, 2012 to July 31, 2014. In August 2013, some of the monitoring indicators and targets were changed.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

Substantial (before and after restructuring**):** The PDOs were well aligned with the country development challenges, the Government program and the Bank's Country Assistance strategies at the time of approval as well as the time of project closing.

At the time of project appraisal, Uganda had achieved substantial gains in access to primary education, resulting in a net enrollment rate of 91%. However, access to secondary education remained low (enrollment rate of 25%), was largely concentrated in urban areas and skewed towards upper income groups. Secondary education was plagued by capacity constraints, low quality and inefficiencies. In 2007 the Government launched its Universal Post Primary Education and Training Program with two sub-programs: one for lower secondary education and one for TVET. The program aimed to increase access, quality and efficiency of secondary education and technical education. Today access, quality and efficiency of the secondary education system (including lower secondary) remain key challenges.

The CAS in effect at project approval included a human development pillar which aimed to support the implementation of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan, with the latter including improving access and quality of post primary education among its goals. The current FY2011-15 CAS includes Strengthen Human Capital Development as one of its four strategic objectives and lists improved access to and quality of primary and post-primary education as a key outcome under this objective.

In light of the above, relevance of objectives is rated **substantial**. A high rating is not warranted because the project did not include improving efficiency of lower secondary education among its objectives, although several of the policy actions supported by the project as well as intermediate outcome indicators focused on efficiency improvements. Furthermore, the third objective, enhancing the enabling environment for post-primary education was not well defined (as reflected by lack of indicators in the results framework)

b. Relevance of Design:

Modest (before and after restructuring). Project components and most activities were well aligned with PDOs, but incomplete.

Project design was not sufficiently aligned with existing capacity at the MoES and at school level. This was the first Bank education project that was to be fully integrated into the MoES and implemented by the latter's existing departments. In addition, schools were expected to assume substantial implementation responsibility, including for procurement and management of civil works for school expansion. Project design failed to recognize that such drastic shifts required substantial capacity building. Excluding these capacity building activities from project design made for an incomplete results chain, as other activities, in particular those related to expanding access and to a lessor extent those related to improving quality, could not be implemented as planned or at the pace they were planned to achieve the objectives. Futhermore, the third objective was not well defined, as reflected by the lack of measurable indicators to monitor its achievement. Furthermore, the three year timeframe for implementation was unrealistic.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):

Some indicators and targets were revised in August 2013, about a year before the project closed.

Improve Access to Lower Secondary Education : Rated **Modest** (with respect to both original and revised targets)

Outputs: Implementation delays, largely due to inadequate project preparation and lack of capacity, including at school level, resulted in the project not meeting output targets with respect to construction and according to the borrower's ICR, only 30% of planned school furniture was actually delivered to schools by the end of the project. Out of 659 schools benefitting from project support for school expansion work, work in 573 was completed and schools were handed over to local school boards of governors who certified completion of work.

The Bank's ICR doesn't compare actual outputs against expected outputs and actual numbers provided aren't entirely consistent with those presented in the borrower's ICR. This review uses the figures from the borrower's ICR, as they seem more complete.

	Original Target	Revised Target	Actual Complete	% complete original target	% complete revised target	Unfinished
Number of beneficiary schools	763	659	573	75%	87%	86
Unfinished classrooms	1864	1335	497	27%	37%	113
New classrooms	6161	3838	3206	52%	84%	353
Administrative blocks	41	49	36	88%	73%	5
Science labs	405	384	290	72%	76%	54
Teacher housing	71	76	57	80%	75%	11
Libraries	144	138	122	85%	88%	6
Latrines	2296	1579	1268	55%	80%	161
Rain water tanks	N/A	N/A	633	N/A	N/A	135
School furniture	26716		8015	30%		

Outcomes

Achievement of this objectives was to be monitored by gross enrollment rates in lower secondary at national level as well as in the 10 districts with the lowest gross enrollment rate, but the ICR states that the latter indicator was dropped in 2013 because the Bank's project supported a national program, not just school construction in the ten districts with the lowest gross enrollment rates. At national level, original and revised targets were missed by four and three percentage points respectively overall and by similar amounts when results are disaggregated by gender. As the ICR points out, to what extent the observed increase can be attributed to Bank support is unclear, as these are national figures and it is not known what share of increased enrollment happened in schools which had benefitted from IDA supported renovations/expansions. It must also be noted that the original targets had been set to be achieved by 2012, yet enrollment in 2014 still fell short of these targets. The ICR states that issues of data quality may have led to unrealistic enrollment projections and target setting at the time of appraisal.

In absolute numbers, lower secondary school enrollment more than tripled, from 316,652 in 2008 to 1,007,369 in 2014.

	baseline 2008	original target for 2012	revised target	actual 2014
Lower secondary gross enrollment rate overall	32.9	42	41	38
lower secondary gross enrollment rate boys	35.9	40	42	35
lower secondary gross enrollment rate girls	32.9	41	40	37

Improve quality of lower secondary education : Modest (with respect to original and revised targets)

Outputs:

A revised lower secondary education curriculum framework for eight learning areas, with grade specific syllabi and a complementary assessment framework was produced.

- 3.89 million text books were supplied to 1559 schools compared to a target of 2 million textbooks.
- 5221 science kits (compared to target 6260), plus 5113 complementary chemical reagents were distributed to schools.
- A needs assessment, detailed design and tender documents for rehabilitation of two teacher training colleges were completed.
- 922 head teachers were trained (target 1300) in management and pedagogical leadership

The borrower's ICR states however that student access to learning materials provided by the project is often not guaranteed, due to lack of libraries (resulting in books being locked away in offices inaccessible to students) and lack of science rooms (resulting in science kits being locked away unused)

Outcomes: The original results framework set out to measure the share of senior 2 level students achieving minimum competency levels in biology, math and English, but specified that three years (original project design duration) was too short a time frame to expect any improvements in this respect. The ICR doesn't provide any information on these indicators.The data sheet indicates that these indicators were dropped during the 2013 restructuring because they were meant to monitor program level outcomes.

The ICR presents information on the transition from lower to upper secondary education as an indicator of the effects of quality improvements on student performance (the original results framework had identified this indicators as an outcome indicator for the third PDO, but IEG agrees with the ICR that it is better suited to measure progress under the second PDO). The ICR states that the share of students transiting from lower secondary to upper secondary school dropped from 44% in 2008 to 30% at project closure, missing the target by 28 percentage points. However, according to the ICR, baseline data are not fully comparable with end of project data due to changes in the education MIS system.

Intermediate indicators monitored include student to textbook ratio which went from 11:1 at baseline to 2:1 at project completion, substantially overachieving the revised target of 4:1 target and the original target of 3:1

In sum, there is no clear cut evidence to show that quality of lower secondary education has improved and the PDO has been achieved.

Enhance the Enabling Environment for Post Primary Education and Training : Modest (with respect to original and revised targets)

The original results framework used transition rates from lower to upper secondary school education as results indicator, but the ICR correctly uses those indicators as proxy-indicators for intermediate outcomes on learning quality. As a result, there ICR does not present any outcome indicators related to this PDO as no other indicators were identified in the results framework, at least partly a reflection of the vague definition of the objective.

Outputs:
The project supported the development, approval and launch of a national vocational education strategy; development and approval of a Secondary Teacher Development and Management System which is being operationalized with bilateral donor support, a flow of funds study, evaluations on Public Private Partnerhsips and double shifting, capacity development of the Uganda National Examination Board, operationalization of a geo-referencing system module of the Education MIS.

Outcomes:
There are no appropriate results indicators associated with this PDO in the results framework and the ICR only reports on outputs.

The project also supported various efficiency improving measures to help the government make more efficient use of limited public resources for secondary education. Specifically, to improve efficiency in secondary education the program sought to increase the student to teacher ration which went from 27 at baseline to 30:1 compared to an original target of 22:1 and a revised target of 33:1. Targets to increase the number of students per classroom (through introduction of shifts) were missed. The ratio went from a baseline of 64 students/classroom to 54 students/classroom compared to an original target of 74 students/classroom and a revised target of 72:1. While the project results framework assigned these indicators as measures of intermediate outcomes on education quality, they in fact are indicators to monitor efficiency improvements in the Uganda context, as the project aimed to increase rather than decrease them in efforts to make better use of scarce resources. More efficient use of resources in the sector can enhance the enabling environment of post primary education and hence IEG considers these indicators under this PDO. However, they do not reflect on results of other activities supported under the project to enhance the enabling environment.

Given that achievement under all three PDO was modest, overall efficacy is rated modest (both with respect to original and revised targets).

5. Efficiency:

Modest: No ERR or CBA was undertaken at appraisal. The ICR calculates an ERR of 44% and a cost benefits ratio of 5. However, based on information provided pertaining to the calculations of the CBA and ERR in addition to the ICR, IEG finds that this is likely a considerable overestimate. First, the cost stream only takes into account $125 million from the IDA credit (although the IDA credit disbursed over $140 million equivalent); no other costs are taken into account, such as government contribution to the program and contribution of other donors, nor are additional recurrent costs of running new schools/classrooms/teaching the additional students or student's opportunity cost while in school taken into account. Second, the calculations assume increased enrollment of 789,678 students, while figures provided in the ICR suggest that country wide enrollment increased by 690,717 students between 2008 and 2014 and it is unlikely that this entire increase can be attributed to the project. Third, the calculations assume that all enrolled students will finish lower secondary schooling, none will repeat any classes and all of them will find employment at the assumed higher earnings rate for people completing lower secondary schooling. The PAD suggested that in the early 2000s the rate of return for lower secondary education was around 14%, though this can not be considered the ERR of the project.

The ICR states that unit costs for classroom construction at $142/m2 compare favorably to those at appraisal (14% below) and compare favorably to those in other Sub-Saharan African Countries ($172). Textbooks delivered also fall in the lower range of textbook costs in SSA (average in Uganda $1.33 compared to $1-15 in other countries) but it is not clear how comparable these figures are, as much depends on specifications of textbooks. These figures would point to efficient use of resources for construction and textbook procurement, which together may have accounted for up to seventy percent of IDA funds.(Expenditure on works accounted for somewhat over 60% of IDA funding; it can not be determined from ICR how much textbooks accounted for) .

However, there are also signs of inefficiency. First are the substantial delays in implementation due to capacity constraints (the ICR states that some of these delays were avoidable and hence not just the result of poor project preparation). Second, construction for school expansion of 86 schools remains unfinished and it is not clear when it will be completed, given government resource constraints, resulting in potentially significant sunk costs given that contractors had been paid for part of the work but then abandoned the work. Third, according to the last audit report funds advanced to schools amounting to US$ 3.6 mllion equivalent remained unaccounted for one month prior to project closing (with current status unknown). Finally, the Borrowers' ICR points out that in many schools textbooks and science kits provided by the project go unused (see efficacy section) which clearly points to inefficient use of resources.

The project supported efficiency improving measures, such as increased workloads for teachers and higher student/teacher and student/classroom measures and a streamlining of the curriculum. However, such measures per se, while increasing system wide efficiency, are not a reflection of the efficient use of project resources.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point Value	Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal	No		
ICR estimate	Yes	44%	70%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome:

Relevance of objectives is rated Substantial, relevance of design is rated modest. Efficacy is rated modest before and after the level 2 restructuring and efficiency is rated modest. Together these ratings result in a moderately satisfactory outcome rating (before and after the level 2 restructuring). Since ratings don't differ before and after the level 2 restructuring, a weighting of the overall rating by disbursements is not necessary.

The project supported an ambitious government program to enhance access, quality and efficiency of lower secondary education and some progress was made particularly on the efficiency side. While many outputs were delivered, final delivery fell short of output targets at least under the first component, as well as in terms of numbers of teachers trained. Outcome targets were not met.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The ICR points out that capacity both at school level and at the level of the MoES remains fragile and further efforts will need to be made to strengthen capacity to sustain results. Furthermore, construction work for about 10% of schools was not completed during the project construction and at the time of ICR preparation, funds had only been secured to complete some. The ICR states that maintenance of completed construction will remain a significant challenge, given resource and capacity constraints. Increased use of project provided instructional material will require investments in libraries and science lab for which funding did not seem guaranteed at project closure. The ICR also states that additional teachers are needed in some schools to make full use of the new facilities. Funding for implementation of the new curriculum assessment system and for rolling out the curriculum developed under the project also remained uncertain, though some of these activities might be supported under a future IDA project which is currently under preparation.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Significant

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

On the positive, the project was well integrated with the government's education program geared towards expanding secondary education and it made an effort to streamline project implementation and management into the MoES' existing structures, while pioneering the decentralization of construction procurement and oversight to school level. However, the project suffered from considerable design shortfalls. The Bank failed to adequately assess institutional capacity constraints at the central and school levels and consequently not enough efforts were made to build needed capacity development into project design. This would have been particularly important given that the project introduced new institutional arrangements, including delegating responsibility for procurement and management of work contracts to the school level. Project design failed to take into account limited capacity to manage and account for funds at school level and introduce appropriate systems and safeguards.

The three year implementation time frame was unrealistic and, as the ICR points out, the project was not ready for implementation when it was approved. As a result, the first year and a half were spent completing project design.

The results framework had shortcomings - a number of outcome indicators were not properly aligned with the corresponding PDO. No efforts appear to have been made to ensure that the data underlying the results framework was correct.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

The Bank undertook 11 supervision missions. Efforts were made to address the design shortfalls, but opportunities were missed early on to restructure the project, including revisiting MoES staffing for project implementation and revamping the results framework. Safeguards specialists were not included in the supervision team until relatively late in implementation at which point the specialists found shortcomings in safeguards adherence, suggesting that stronger focus by the Bank earlier on would have been in order. The Bank should also have been more proactive in ensuring that adequate accounting and control systems were in place at school level and that school leaders received adequate training to handle civil works procurement at local level. Similarly, it should have worked more closely with MoES on ensuring that procurement timelines and contracts were realistic. While some adjustments were made to project design during the MTR, the latter was scheduled only a few months prior to the original project closing date.

Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

On the positive side, the Government showed commitment to the program supported by the project throughout its implementation and key reforms initiated with project support continue to be implemented to date. The Government embraced the novel implementation arrangements (mainstreaming into existing

MoES departments and decentralization to schools), but the ICR points out that the Government should have made more efforts to coordinate and effectively oversee the various units involved in project implementation, including on the policy front. Cross-departmental and cross-agency coordination was often difficult, affecting project implementation speed.

Government Performance Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The Civil Works Management Unit didn't work effectively enough with other MoES departments to resolve implementation issues. The ICR states that overall project implementation oversight was weak. MoES training of managers for school-based procurement was insufficient. The Technical Supervision Firms hired by MoES fell short of adequately supervising civil works and their contracts had been inadequately structured. Financial management was weak, with insufficient follow-up and controls at school level resulting in substantial amounts of funds remaining unaccounted for at school level that needed to be returned to MoEs at the time of project closure and there were problems with expenditure eligibility. There were shortcoming in the follow-up on environmental and social management aspects at school level and there were procurement problems with the first lot of textbook procurements which were only resolved after the Bank informed the Government that it would need to declare misprocurement if the issues were not resolved. During the last 18 months the Ministry replaced non-performing staff with a team that helped speed up implementation, but the time was not sufficient to complete all the work and make up for lost time. While these are considerable shortcomings, some of them are clearly linked to inadequate project preparation and failure to include sufficient capacity building into project design, aspects for which the Bank carries substantial responsibility.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

The PAD included a results framework with baseline and targets for most indicators. However, not all indicators were properly aligned with the relevant PDOs. In particular, outcome indicators selected to monitor the third PDO were not appropriate to gauge results under that PDO (they were better proxies for the second PDO) and the results framework didn't identify any results indicators for the second PDO. Furthermore, many of the indicators identified as intermediate outcome indicators were in fact output indicators (e.g. curriculum framework completed; staffing formula implemented; strategies agreed). M&E was to largely rely on the Ministry's Education MIS, but it was discovered during implementation that there were issues pertaining to the reliability of underlying data which had not been looked at during preparation.

b. M&E Implementation:

According to the ICR, to the extent that data was made available through the EMIS, monitoring indicators were regularly reported on in mission aide-memoires. However, the EMIS data were revised during implementation when it was determined that enrollment projections were based on overambitious efficiency improvement assumptions. The Bank was however unaware of these revisions until the last project year and hence indicators and targets were not revised again shortly before closure. According to the ICR, the project also financed several studies to assess the experience and impact of introducing double shifts into schools and of PPPs.

c. M&E Utilization:

There is little evidence that the M+E system was used for decision making during implementation

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards:

The environmental assessment and the involuntary resettlement safeguards were triggered.

E+S training was provided at school level and schools undergoing construction were expected to adhere to E+S standards outlined in the E+S handbook. Bank supervision missions did not include any safeguards specialists until well into the third year of implementation at which point they found that regional officials needed to provide schools with support on E+S management. The ICR states that E+S management improved during the last two years of implementation, but does not provide any concrete evidence to this effect. It also points out that the MoES fell short of adequately monitoring implementation of the resettlement action plan, although land acquisition (through donations) only occurred in three cases.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

Decentralized management of construction procurement posed significant challenges. Funds were advanced to schools, but weak fiduciary and reporting systems resulted in substantial delays in liquidating outstanding advances to schools. The ICR states that $19 million had not being accounted for at school level two months prior to project closure. The audit report, dated December 2014, states the as of end June 30, 2014 (one month before project closure) over UGX 10 million (US$ 3.6 million at exchange rate of 7/31/2014) remained unaccounted for. In addition, according to the audit report, contracts for 35 schools in the amount of UGX 9.1 million had been terminated, of which UGX 3.89 mio (US$ 1.4 mio) had been paid for certified works, but many had bid securities that had expired and could thus not be cashed. Also, IDA determined that US$ 1.12 million spent at school level were ineligible expenditures which the Government then refunded to IDA. There were also delays in submitting unaudited interim financial reports (IFRs).

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

MoES has embraced the school based procurement element of the UPPET design and institutionalized it as the government's way of delivering post primary education in the districts across Uganda.

d. Other:

12. Ratings:	ICR	IEG Review	Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Risk to Development Outcome:	Significant	Significant	
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	IEG rates quality of entry U and quality of supervision MU, per IEG guidelines this results in an overall U rating
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Quality of ICR:		Satisfactory	

NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

The ICR highlights the following lessons with which IEG agrees:

Proper institutional and capacity assessments during preparation and inclusion of a strong capacity development component are essential for projects that mainstream implementation in a decentralized system. This was the first IDA education project to mainstream implementation responsibility into the line agency (MoES) in Uganda and to decentralize certain responsibilities to schools. However, project design failed to include adequate capacity development activities to help ensure relevant MoES departments and school level officials have the capacity to implement the project.

Technical assistance strategically integrated with an agency responsible for program implementation can significantly help enhance capacity . Under this project, the lower secondary curriculum review process led by the National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) was supported by an international expert team that was fully integrated into the management structure and day to day operations of the NCDC, resulting in strong national ownership of the reform process
and enabling effective capacity development. Similarly, the project recruited 4 engineers who were integrated in the Construction Management Unit (CMU) and worked along with the 3 Government engineers to oversee school based civil works; under the overall supervision of the head of the CMU. Their involvement, albeit late during the project implementation cycle significantly helped improve implementation of civil works during the latter part of the project.

Ensuring a project is ready for implementation and defining an appropriate implementation time frame are important to ensure effective implementation and achievement of results . Half of the originally approved project duration time was spent completing project preparation resulting in important delays and unnecessary implementation stumbling blocks which got the project off to a bad start.

A focus on resolving implementation bottlenecks is important , but should not distract from focus on achievement of outcomes and objectives . Given design shortfalls, the Bank and counterparts had to focus on addressing implementation bottlenecks. However, the focus on these led to a focus on outputs, without timely attention to progress on achievement of outcomes.

14. Assessment Recommended? ○ Yes ● No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR provides a candid assessment of the performance of the project, the Bank and the Borrower, but it has some shortcomings. Where outputs are discussed, these are neither consistently compared against appraisal targets nor against revised targets and numbers aren’t always consistent with those provided in the borrower’s ICR. It would also be helpful to have baseline data presented in the discussion on results. The ratings in table 1 use a rather unorthodox mix of scales, modest for relevance and efficiency, but unsatisfactory for efficacy. The annex on efficiency fails to make it clear how the benefits stream is determined and what is included in the cost stream. The ICR does not present actual costs of individual components.

a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory