



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 06/26/2001	
PROJ ID: P053386		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Post Conflict Reconstruction	Project Costs (US\$M)	11.0	11.0
Country: Tajikistan	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	9.9	10.1
Sector(s): Board: TR - Roads and highways (52%), Crops (16%), General education sector (11%), Health (11%), Power (10%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	0.0	0.0
L/C Number: C3037			
	Board Approval (FY)		98
Partners involved :	Closing Date	09/30/2000	01/31/2001
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives
To support the Government's strategy for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement by facilitating the reintegration of the Karategin-Tavildra Valley area into the national economy through a targeted program of short-term reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure, and emergency support to agricultural development .

b. Components
Support to agriculture: through the purchase and distribution of inputs to farmers for the Spring 98 planting season (US\$0.6m.)

- Road infrastructure rehabilitation: repair/reconstruction of 19 bridges and two road sections (US\$5.1m.)
- Small community works: repair of schools, health-care facilities and other community facilities for villages in the Kartegin-Tavildara valley area (US\$2.3m.)
- Other infrastructure works: including, cleaning and repair of irrigation channels, repair and reconstruction of power lines, substations and transformer stations (US\$2.1m.)

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
Final costs were as estimated at appraisal . The project was approved on 01/29/1998 and closed on 01/31/2001 , four months later than scheduled .

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:
The project largely met the above objectives, through the following results :

- The Peace Agreement has held to date .
- Integration of the project area into the national economy has begun, as it has raised living standards of the war affected population (through job provisions to ex-combatants, assistance to farmers and the resumption of urban trade through restored access).
- The successful delivery of functioning infrastructure on a larger scale than planned .

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

- Physical targets were exceeded (nineteen bridges/two road sections versus the sixteen /one planned)
- Project led to Tajikistan's first ever environmental impact assessment and (involuntary) resettlement review.
- Creation of an effective partnership with locally based organizations, such as UNDP, the UN Office for Project Services and the Aga Khan Foundation .

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- Persistent insecurity led to deaths of contractor employees and local government officials .
- Security problems made it impossible for Bank supervision missions to visit project sites during most of the project's lifetime.
- Ambiguity surrounding the project objective, treated differently in different documents . Thus: (i) in the legal agreement, the objective was to address specific post -conflict reconstruction needs to restore assets and productivity; (ii) in the MOP and Bank ICR, it was to implement the Peace Agreement; and (iii) the borrower ICR, where the objective was to provide assistance and create favorable conditions for economic growth in the

project area.

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Institutional Dev .:	Negligible	Modest	According to the borrower ICR, the project created favorable opportunities for capacity development of local enterprises .
Sustainability :	Unlikely	Unlikely	
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- Emergency projects put together in a very short time cannot be prepared with the same degree of detail as a traditional operation.
- Built-in flexibility to respond to unforeseen needs has to be a feature of emergency recovery projects .
- The usefulness of a project can be overtaken by political logic where the government considers the visibility of its interventions more important than enhancing development .
- In post-conflict emergency circumstances, project risks can be reduced by limiting the number of sectors addressed.

8. Assessment Recommended? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Why? It would be a first OED audit in the country . Project experience can feed into OED's post-conflict work. ICR mission was unable to visit project sites for security reasons .

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

ICR provides a clear account of the project experience, provides adequate evidence for the results reported and covers all pertinent topics . A more explicit treatment of the challenges posed by the future operation of the project assets would have led to an unambiguous conclusion about the project's unlikely sustainability . Given the center place of the Peace Agreement in the project's objectives, a brief description of its terms and conditions --especially as far as development is concerned--would have usefully informed the evaluation . The borrower ICR provides a valuable input.