



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 08/21/2002	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P002427		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name:</b> Public Sector Management	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	11	10.1
<b>Country:</b> Sierra Leone	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	10	9.9
<b>Sector(s):</b> Board: PS - Central government administration (100%)	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>	1.0	0.2
<b>L/C Number:</b> C2435			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		93
<b>Partners involved :</b> Government of Sierra Leone	<b>Closing Date</b>	06/30/1998	12/31/2001
<b>Prepared by :</b> Elliott Hurwitz			
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		<b>Group:</b> OEDCR	
<b>2. Project Objectives and Components</b>			
<b>a. Objectives</b>			
Objectives were to improve Government ability to implement adjustment program and longer term growth strategy by strengthening capacity of institutions responsible for fiscal management . In addition, project aimed to: (1) increase public service productivity by initiating civil service reforms; (2) improve efficiency of public enterprises and their contribution to the budget through restructuring and reduction of Government role as owner and operator; (3) improve management of donor assistance by supporting aid coordination and helping set up of institutional structure for management of donor funds.			
<b>b. Components</b>			
The project provided TA in the following areas/GOSL agencies: <b>Fiscal and Financial Management</b> : Budget and expenditure control; Accountant General's office; Auditor General Department; Economic policy research and operations; procurement; aid coordination; Bank of Sierra Leone (BOSL); <b>Structural Reforms</b> : Civil service reform; public enterprise reform; petroleum unit; social and policy action program; <b>Institutional Support and other studies</b> : Preparatory work, including studies aimed at meeting longer -term objectives of the Government's adjustment program.			
<b>c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates</b>			
Original credit was for US\$10 million with effectiveness in January, 1993, and a planned tenure of 5.5 years. However in May, 1997, with 88% of project funds disbursed, there was a coup d'etat, leading to suspension of disbursements for about a year. In January, 1999, however, rebels again invaded the capital, forcing a further six-month suspension. By project close, the Bank had disbursed US\$9.9 million (99% of the planned amount), and the GOSL provided US\$0.22 million out of a planned US\$1.0 million (22%). Due to the political and security situations, the project was extended by 3.5 years.			
<b>3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some consultant studies completed before the May, 1997, coup remain relevant and provide a roadmap for public sector reform</li> <li>• Auditing standards were developed for the use of the Auditor General 's Department, and compliance manuals developed under the project are still in use</li> <li>• Assistance provided to the Petroleum Unit has facilitated access to petroleum products at prices reflecting the world market price</li> <li>• A new grading system for the civil service was introduced which is still in use</li> </ul>			
<b>4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A new budgeting system was developed and adopted which provided a framework for planning, recording, monitoring, and control of expenditures</li> <li>• A computerized system for aid coordination was introduced by the Bank of Sierra Leone</li> </ul>			
<b>5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most studies and other plans completed under the project could not be implemented; a military coup in May, 1997, disrupted project implementation and the subsequent insecurity caused many foreign consultants and</li> </ul>			

others to flee

- The security situation deteriorated further with the 1999 invasion of Freetown by rebels, which resulted in the looting of some equipment from beneficiary agencies and the destruction of networks and other systems at the BOSL and Ministry of Finance
- The project design was overly complex considering the country's capacity. In addition, it was designed to address general problems within the public sector, and was not based on any analytical work or on the priorities of the GOSL
- Public enterprise reform was highly unsatisfactory because of the poor security situation (which hindered access to the firms), depressed market conditions, and poor capacity and weaknesses in project implementation arrangements
- The project focused mainly on short-term fiscal and financial management, and did not address broader governance and accountability issues

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
<b>Outcome:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	Modest	Modest	
<b>Sustainability:</b>	Unlikely	Unlikely	
<b>Bank Performance:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory	Both Quality at Entry and Supervision are rated Highly Unsatisfactory. Quality at Entry is rated Highly Unsatisfactory based on rating of "negligible" on the following key factors: Consistency with Bank strategy; approach and design appropriateness; institutional analysis (capacity); risk assessment. Supervision is rated Highly Unsatisfactory based on a rating of "negligible" on the following key elements (pre coup d'etat): Timely identification of development impact problems; effectiveness of Bank actions; lack of documentation or evidence of impact on project of the mid-term review.
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
<b>Quality of ICR:</b>			

**NOTE:** ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

#### 7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- **A simpler design could have been more effective** –There were too many components for the country's limited capacity. The project could have been more effective if it had focused only on the highest priority areas
- **Project studies should be limited to those that can reasonably be implemented during the course of the project**
- **It would have been more effective to build the capacity of local training institutions** --The project relied extensively on foreign consultants and provision of training outside the country, which was probably a less effective approach than development of local capacity

**8. Assessment Recommended?**  Yes  No

#### 9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is satisfactory. Considering that events within the country severely constrained the availability of information, it presents a candid and well-documented assessment of project accomplishments and shortcomings. The ICR also presents its findings in a clear and concise manner.