81543 Copyright © 2013 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, USA All rights reserved First printing: September 2013 Manufactured in the United States of America Cover illustration: Rachel Roth The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, or its affiliated organizations, or to members of its board of executive directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the part of the World Bank Group any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................................................................................................v Background . ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................1 Methodology ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................6 Main Findings ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................7 Implications for Project Teams and Practitioners ..................................................................................................................................................... 24 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 References ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 29 Annexes 1 .........................................................................................................................................A–3 Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies. 2 Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing ....................................................................................................................................................................................................A–117 Social Accountability Mechanisms. 3 Budget Transparency in World Bank Development Policy Lending Operations........................................................................................................ A–129 Boxes 1 Why Is Budget Transparency and Monitoring Important?.............................................................................................................................................................. 1 2 Budget Transparency and Monitoring in World Bank-Supported Development Policy Lending Operations....................................................... 9 3 Alternate Budgeting for Vulnerable Groups.........................................................................................................................................................................................12 4 BT&M in Fragile and Postconflict Situations......................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 5 ................................................................................................................18 The Role of CSO Umbrella Networks in Budget Transparency and Monitoring. Figures 1 Distribution of 95 BT&M Initiatives Across Regions.......................................................................................................................................................................... 4 2 Budget Cycle......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 3 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Budget Transparency Feedback Loop. 4 Stakeholders in the Budget Process.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 5 Breakdown of BT&M Activities Across Key Sectors......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 6 ...............................................................................................................................................................................14 Types of Mechanisms Used by BT&M Initiatives. 7 Duration of BT&M Initiatives........................................................................................................................................................................................................................19 Tables 1 Illustrative Budget Transparency and Monitoring Activities.........................................................................................................................................................15 2 Mapping BT&M Outcomes Across the Budget Cycle.....................................................................................................................................................................20 iii Acronyms and Abbreviations AFR Africa Region LAC Latin America and the Caribbean Region BT&M budget transparency and monitoring MNA Middle East and North Africa Region CSO civil society organization NGO nongovernmental organization DPL Development Policy Lending PFM Public Financial Management EAP East Asia and Pacific Region SAR South Asia Region ECA Europe and Central Asia Region SDV Social Development Department (World Bank) iv Acknowledgements This stock-taking report is a product of the Social Addison, Katherine Bain, John Ivor Beazley, Lisa Bhansali, Development Department (SDV) at the World Bank. The Robert Chase, Yoseph Abdissa Deressa, Cheikh Ahmed Diop, study was led by Sanjay Agarwal under the guidance of Anupama Dokeniya, Peter D. Ellis, Adrian Fozzard, Andrea Helene Grandvoinnet (SDV). The report was written by Gallina, Soraya Goga, Endashaw Tadesse Gossa, Errol G. Harika Masud (lead author), Sanjay Agarwal, Martin Luis Graham, Sheila Grandio, Asli Gurkan, Craig Hammer, Zahid Alton, Shruti Majumdar and Darshana Patel. The core team Hasnain, Leif Jensen, Kimberly D. Johns, Sarah Keener, Thomas benefited from valuable inputs, comments and guidance Kenyon, Gregory Kisunko, Jana Kunicova, Joseph Mansilla, from a group of experts including Albert Van Zyl from the Rosa Maria Martinez, Yasuhiko Matsuda, Zachary Mills, International Budget Partnership and David Nummy, Nicola Edgardo Mosqueira, Suleiman Namara, Luiza Nora, David Smithers, and Carolina Vaira from the World Bank. Michael Nummy, Mitchell O’Brien, Roberto O. Panzardi, This report would not have been possible without contri- Stefano Paternostro, Tiago Peixoto, Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge, butions from colleagues who provided inputs in identifying Andrianjaka Razafimandimby, Djalal Dini Sari, Fabian Seiderer, over 200 initiatives for the stock-taking exercise. Vivek Srivastava, John Titsworth, and Diane Zovighian. The authors would also like to thank Laura Johnson for her invalu- In particular, the authors would like to thank Noor Zada able editorial support. (Partners Jordan), Jeremy Coon (Inter-American Foundation), George Cheriyan (CUTS International), Phil Oliff (Center on Finally, the authors are grateful to the Governance Budget and Policy Priorities), Michelle Soeller (GIZ) and Naimur Partnership Facility (GPF) for supporting the activities under Rahman (Affiliated Network for Social Accountability-South this initiative. Asia), for providing their invaluable insights for the case stud- The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed ies documented in this exercise. in this report are entirely those of the authors and should The authors would like to express their gratitude to all not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to the World Bank task teams who provided input to ensure its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of the accuracy of the case studies, especially Douglas M. Executive Directors or the countries they represent. v Background Budgets are key documents that lay out a government’s eco- transparency and monitoring efforts also help remove insti- nomic priorities in terms of policies and programs. Budget tutional bottlenecks that result in delayed budget alloca- transparency refers to the extent and ease with which cit- tions, thereby jeopardizing the delivery of vital services to izens can access information about and provide feedback people. Even though they have a far-reaching impact on the on government revenues, allocations, and expenditures. lives of people, opening up budgets beyond the exclusive Budget monitoring entails using such information to analyze, domain of policy makers and administrators is a relatively critique, and track government finances in order to provide recent phenomenon that has gained momentum in the last this feedback. two decades. As evidence demonstrates, governments that Budget transparency is a prerequisite for public par- are transparent about their budgets reap several benefits, ticipation and accountability, which are instrumental for including the ability to attract cheaper international credit a democratic and legitimate budget process. Both budget (box 1). Box 1. Why Is Budget Transparency and Monitoring Important? Budget transparency can provide numerous benefits. Budget transparency and oversight about how resources are allocated and spent are powerful disincentives for officials to misuse or misappropriate funds because their actions are more likely to be scrutinized; this leads to a decrease in corruption. When budgets are open to the public and effective legislative scrutiny, there is less room for deviation from policy decisions and reversal of budget allocations. There is a decreased likelihood that the ruling elite will manipulate budgets. Additionally, transparency and monitoring of budgets provides citizens with entry points to provide feedback on the quality and adequacy of services and infrastructure. This feedback, combined with reduced corruption, often results in a more efficient use of resources. In many cases, the perception of high levels of corruption, poor services, inadequate infrastructure, and opaqueness of operations lie at the heart of citizen distrust of government. The opening up of government books-of-account therefore usually increases trust in government. Budget transparency is also instrumental in generating higher revenues for governments because citizens are more likely to pay taxes and contribute donations to local schools and health centers when there is confidence that funds will be well spent. Based on aggregate World Bank data for 169 countries, Islam (2003) finds a strong correlation between transparency (i.e., the existence of freedom-of-information laws and the regular publication of government economic data) and the quality of governance. Further, Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) suggest, based on the results of their study from 20 countries, that transparency is associated with lower levels of corruption, better socioeconomic and human development indicators, and greater economic competitiveness. Furthermore, countries with high levels of budget transparency tend to achieve positive development outcomes and more fully realize the economic and social rights of their citizens; they also tend to be more democratic (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2011). Even when regional and per capita income differences are held constant, a significant statistical association between budget transparency and infant and child survival, the percentage of the population using improved drinking water, and public health expenditure levels still remains. Budget transparency also helps to attract cheaper international credit. Research shows that countries with higher levels of fiscal transparency have higher credit ratings and lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates (Hameed 2011). Glennerster and Shin (2008) find that sovereign spreads decline after the adoption of transparency-related reforms, such as the publication of International Monetary Fund country surveillance reports and the release of various reports about compliance with standards. 1 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Global Trends in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (IBP 2008), and more Budget Transparency recently, in the Middle East and North Africa.1 The trend of greater budget transparency and monitoring Nevertheless, progress has been gradual for improving (BT&M) is part of a broader momentum toward “demand- budget transparency and, to the extent that it is measurable, side” transparency and accountability initiatives that are led even slower for using budget reforms to improve develop- by citizens seeking to hold the accountable by increasing ment outcomes. The Open Budget Index2 score increased transparency and access to information (McGee and Gaventa from 47 to 57 percent between 2006 and 2012—only a 10 2011). In addition to the “New Public Management” approach percent gain—in the 40 countries where comparable data of the 1990s which emphasized downward accountability was available for this period. Public institutional reform, that gave individual consumers more information about including improving budget transparency, is a complex and choices of public service providers, the democracy and difficult task, both technically and politically. Even when good governance agenda provided an impetus to demand- there is support from the highest levels of government to side accountability efforts by advocating for the direct institute such reforms, a considerable amount of time and participation of citizens in governance and by adopting a technical support are required to foster their ownership rights-based approach for access to public services (Joshi within public institutions (World Bank 2000). 2012). Political momentum around participatory budgeting Documented examples of BT&M work confirm that while in Porto Alegre during the mid-1980s, the “neoliberal” shift the efforts of development partners and civil society groups in economic policy in the 1990s, and the proliferation of a have led to increased budget allocations for specific sectors, substantial number of independent budget groups in devel- they have yet to meet their promise of achieving resounding oping and transitional countries over the past two decades impact on governance and development outcomes. Kolstad also helped to galvanize the trend toward more open bud- and Wiig (2009) have questioned whether access to informa- get processes (Robinson 2006). tion can by itself address endemic issues of limited citizen On the supply side, mounting concerns over the ineffec- capacity and inadequate incentives to process and utilize the tiveness of government spending in addition to stringent aid information. In a similar vein, Joshi (2012) and McGee (2011) budgets and public spending cuts in the wake of the global highlight the paucity of evidence attesting to the impact financial crisis continue to foster the international commu- of transparency and accountability initiatives. Among other nity’s interest in improving the accountability of budget factors, this is traced to a lack of consistent and comparable processes and spending. Because of these developments, focus on impact and cohesive theories of change. the budget transparency and accountability landscape has In order to continue to build on the potential and the changed significantly. In addition to assuming more respon- momentum of country-based budget transparency and sibility for providing complete, timely, and quality aid infor- accountability initiatives, a number of nascent global multi- mation flows to governments, development partners are stakeholder initiatives have emerged to promote open increasingly using country systems to manage aid flows in and accountable governance. For instance, more than 60 the most transparent manner possible (CABRI 2011). The World Bank’s position of lending to finance budgets only in countries that publish their budgets represents an import- 1. Despite the wide expanse of BT&M activities, it is difficult to determine ant milestone in this regard. In fact, in over 50 Development the costs involved through a desk research study because this information is not readily available and because it varies depending on scope, context, Policy Lending operations, the World Bank has introduced and duration. The authors had information about costs associated with budget transparency as a necessary prior action or a set the World Bank Budget Transparency Initiative in Nepal (annex 1.80) that of actions prior to loan approval. Meanwhile, the capacity was US$95,000 and Cameroon (annex 1.1) that was US$220,000, excluding of civil society to analyze and influence public budgeting staff and travel costs. 2. Produced by the International Budget Partnership, the Open Budget has expanded dramatically over the past 15 years. Today, Index score for each country reflects the public availability, timeliness, civil society is actively engaged in public budget processes and comprehensiveness of the eight key budget documents produced by in over 100 developing and transitional countries in Africa, governments, including the Executive’s Budget Proposal, Citizens Budget, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Review, Year-End Report and Audit Report. 2 Background governments have formalized over 300 specific “open this area of engagement. The objectives of this stock-taking government” commitments and have agreed to be inde- exercise are to: pendently assessed on the implementation of these commit- • Compile a menu of budget transparency activities that ments through the Open Government Partnership.3 While illustrate different social accountability approaches the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency4 is focusing on adopted by civil society, governments, and World Bank advancing and institutionalizing global norms and standards task teams to improve budget transparency and moni- for transparency, participation, and accountability in pub- toring and to facilitate North–South and South–South lic finance, the Global Movement for Budget Transparency, knowledge exchange on this subject;7 Accountability and Participation5 is working to move budget transparency a step closer toward better governance and • Identify drivers, key activities, and strategies used by development outcomes by strengthening the link between BT&M initiatives; and budget accountability and human rights. • Provide options to World Bank task teams and develop- ment practitioners of various budget transparency and Rationale and Objectives monitoring activities that could potentially be integrated into projects. Even though there is a sizeable amount of literature regarding budget transparency, no systematic attempt has been under- taken to analyze information on budget transparency and Audience monitoring initiatives. Therefore, the Social Accountability Audiences for this report include World Bank task teams and Demand for Good Governance Cluster in the Social interested in learning about the options and strategies avail- Development Department (SDV) of the World Bank sought able for mainstreaming budget transparency activities into to fill this gap by taking stock of budget transparency and Bank operations; policy makers; Public Financial Management monitoring initiatives that have adopted social accountabil- (PFM) professionals; fiscal transparency advocates; and civil ity6 approaches and that have been implemented in World society networks and organizations interested in improving Bank and non-Bank projects. However, it was apparent from transparency, civic engagement and accountability in bud- the onset that this exercise would draw heavily on the much getary processes. broader and deeper range of civil society experiences in Scope 3. Launched in September 2011, the Open Government Partnership is a This stock-taking exercise includes 174 budget transparency multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from initiatives. Of these, 95 initiatives from 53 countries have governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corrup- been documented as short case studies that cover context, tion, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance. To become a member of the Open Government Partnership, participating countries actions, results, and implications (annex 1). The remaining 79 must embrace a high-level open government declaration, deliver a coun- are comprised of 33 initiatives currently under implementa- try action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to inde- tion (annex 2) and 46 World Bank-supported Development pendent reporting on their progress going forward. Policy Lending operations that contain BT&M elements 4. The Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency is a multistakeholder action (annex 3). 63 of the 95 initiatives were led by civil society network working to advance and institutionalize global norms and signif- icant, continuous improvements on fiscal transparency, participation, and groups, and for the most part, funded by development part- accountability in countries around the world. ners; the remaining 32 were mainly government initiated, 5. The Global Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability and with 26 initiatives supported by the World Bank and one by Participation is an effort by a broad range of activists and organizations the Asian Development Bank (annex 1.39). from around the world working to advance issues of public finance and budget accountability in order to achieve human rights. 6. Social accountability refers to the broad range of actions and mecha- nisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state to account, as 7. Hopefully, because the experiences of several developing countries well as actions on the part of government, civil society, media, and other have been documented in this stock-take, this illustrative menu of BT&M societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. (World Bank Social options can help to promote South–South knowledge exchanges in the Accountability Sourcebook). area of BT&M. 3 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Figure 1. Distribution of 95 BT&M Initiatives Across Regions Africa East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Number of initiatives Number of Countries Middle East and North Africa Multi-Country Others South Asia 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 In terms of geographic breakdown, the greatest number category, including three global initiatives and one regional of initiatives (36 percent) are from the Africa Region; the low- initiative from the Middle East and North Africa Region. est number (2 percent) are from the Middle East and North Africa Region (figure 1). The “Others” category documents The stock-taking exercise is illustrative—not comprehen- BT&M initiatives in developed countries such as Canada, sive; it is an attempt to document a wide range of activities Germany, Israel, Italy, South Korea, and the United States. across the various stages of the budget cycle (figure 2). In Four initiatives have been assigned to the “Multicountry” every fiscal year, the budget cycle begins at the formulation Figure 2. Budget Cycle Key Budget Documents: Key Budget Documents: Audit reports; Legislative Audit 1. Budget Formulation: Executive’s budget proposal; Committee reports The executive formulates the draft budget. Supporting budget reports 4. Budget Oversight: 2. Budget Approval: The budget accounts are audited and audit findings The legislature reviews and amends the budget— are reviewed by the legislature, which requires action to and then enacts it into law. be taken by the executive to correct audit findings. Key Budget Documents: Budget law; Reports of 3. Budget Execution: legislative budget committees Key Budget Documents: The executive collects revenue and spends money In-year reports; Mid-year report; as per the allocations made in the budget law. Year-end reports; Supplementary budgets Source: Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizens’ Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditures. 4 Background stage, when the executive normally drafts the budget and (governments) in the budget process simplify and dissem- then sends it to the legislature for discussion, debate, and inate budget information to demand-side actors (citizens), approval. The budget is enacted into law during the approval citizens will use this information to provide solicited and phase, which is followed by the execution phase when the unsolicited feedback on the budget. Ultimately, the govern- government implements it. Finally, during the oversight ment will respond to and/or incorporate citizen feedback in phase, the legislature and supreme audit institution scruti- upcoming budget cycles, ensuring that the feedback loop is nize budget expenditures undertaken during the fiscal year. sustained over time. The Budget Transparency Feedback Loop (figure 3) charts Even though procurement is not the focus of this report, out assumptions underlying the means by which govern- we have included it in this stock-take because it is an inte- ments can engage citizens in the budget process to promote gral part of the budget implementation process, involves social accountability and the entry points through which cit- significant public resources, and has captured the interest of izens can participate in the budget cycle. This feedback loop several demand-side initiatives involved in monitoring fiscal is based on the presumption that when supply-side actors transparency. Figure 3. Budget Transparency Feedback Loop 5 Methodology This stock-taking exercise was based primarily on desk was analyzed to identify broad trends8 across the selected reviews and involved sampling, documentation, and analysis. sample. The synthesis of the main findings was based on a combination of quantitative analysis of the data points for regions, sectors, and the types of activities, as well as a qual- Sampling itative review of the factors that enhance or limit budget The team identified and screened close to 250 BT&M cases transparency and monitoring practices and the types of out- based on a literature review, extensive Internet searches, and comes achieved. input from 12 civil society organizations (CSOs) or networks and around 60 World Bank staff members. Purposive sam- Assessing Results pling was used to select 174 initiatives, of which 95 short case studies were documented, to provide a broad illustration of Because of limited available evidence linking increased the range of BT&M activities across regions, sectors, and lev- budget transparency to development results, only BT&M els of government that met the predefined criteria of qual- initiatives highlighting explicit results within a social account- ity of information and robustness of results (annex 1). The ability framework were documented. This social account- remaining 79 are comprised of 33 initiatives currently under ability framework categorizes results in terms of behavioral implementation (annex 2) and 46 World Bank-supported and institutional changes. Behavioral changes consist of Development Policy Lending operations that contain BT&M (1) information-seeking behavior—nonstate actors asking elements (annex 3). for information about public resources and service deliv- ery when they would not normally do so; (2) accountabil- ity-seeking behavior—individuals with a growing sense of Documentation entitlement beginning to question and challenge informa- A standard template was created to compile and document tion, service providers, and governments; and (3) develop- 95 selected cases. Data on these cases was triangulated to ment outcomes-seeking behavior—citizens individually the extent possible, given time and staff constraints, through and collectively seeking to fulfill specific development out- Internet research and the input of concerned project/CSO comes through access to public services and entitlements. teams. As these localized behavior changes are iterated over time they upwardly inform the practices of government; gradually they become internalized as norms and eventually estab- Data Analysis lished as institutional changes. Institutional changes include Selected cases were recorded into a database that captured process changes (e.g. shifts in the functioning of manage- the region, country, level of government, sectors and sub- ment systems, including how data are received and how sectors, duration, and type of engagement of the 174 ini- decision making occurs) and policy changes (e.g. changes to tiatives (see http://dfggdb for the entire database). Data legislation). 8. The universe of BT&M activities is fairly complex, lending itself to a wide array of tools, stakeholders, sectors, and levels of implementation; it is difficult to disentangle key trends from data currently available. 6 Main Findings The case studies examined in this report vary considerably within government to push for increased transparency. One across a range of factors, including scope, scale, and actors, example of this is the state executive’s engagement with but they have at least one aspect in common: they all deploy the Lagos State Civil Society Partnership in Nigeria (annex strategies along the budget transparency feedback loop and 1.19). The partnership was provided with the opportunity to engage citizens. contribute to the development of the education sector’s Medium Term Sector Strategy 2013–15, and its recommenda- tions were eventually adopted by the Ministry of Education. Who Is Involved? Oversight institutions. There are a growing number of This section maps out the state and nonstate actors involved cases in which the legislative branch and supreme audit insti- in the BT&M area. State actors include the executive, over- tutions are making efforts to strengthen their budget over- sight institutions (legislatures and supreme audit institu- sight roles by engaging with citizens in a more proactive and tions), and the judiciary. Nonstate actors include citizens, effective manner. For example, Honduras’s Supreme Tribunal CSOs, media, development partners, and the private sector. of Accounts (annex 1.67) has set up a process for citizens to While the executive continues to be at the foundation of participate in government audits by allowing them to pro- budget transparency and monitoring work, this study shows vide input on the selection of audits, participate in public that as this area continues to evolve, nonstate actors have hearings, and work on action plans for institutional improve- also become increasingly engaged (figure 4). ment arising out of selected audits. Similarly, Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance (annex 1.83) not only arranges in-person prebudget consultations with State Actors citizen groups, but also invites online prebudget submissions Executive. The budget system functions with a series of that are posted on its website. Committee members then horizontal and vertical accountability relationships: spending use this feedback to submit recommendations. agencies and the central budget authority, public officials Judiciary. Given the increasing shift toward a human and political officeholders, the cabinet and the executive rights-based approach to budget work, in some countries, head-of-state, junior and senior officials, and regions and the judiciary has emerged as a player in PFM. For example, the capital. The diversified nature of the executive makes to overcome the government’s reluctance to increase bud- it possible for external actors to work with champions get allocations for HIV/AIDS programs, the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa filed and won a case in the high Figure 4. court against the government, enjoining it to introduce Stakeholders in the Budget Process the full-scale Prevention of Mother-to Child Transmission Program (annex 1.26). State Nonstate Q Executive Q Civil society organizations Nonstate Actors Q Legislature (think tanks, academic or Supreme audit institutions research institutions, activist Citizens and civil society organizations. Civil society groups Q Q Judiciary organizations, and networks) Q Media engaging in BT&M activities range from government-sup- Q Donors Q Private sector ported consultative groups to academic institutions and think tanks to networks of citizen coalitions. 7 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring BT&M activities in developed economies are generally pact to prevent corruption and illegal transactions during more likely to be undertaken by think tanks or research insti- the procurement process of a major expansion of the Berlin tutes that tend to focus on upstream budget work, but there Brandenburg International Airport (annex 1.85). are exceptions to this. For example, Poland’s Gdansk Institute Development partners. Development partners provide conducts detailed economic policy analysis and provides funding and technical assistance for CSO-led BT&M activi- policy recommendations to the executive and legislative ties and help to build the capacity and commitment of gov- branches (annex 1.53). There is a more balanced mix of budget ernments in aid-recipient countries. In 2010, development groups in middle income or transition countries. While think partners for Afghanistan committed to channel up to 50 tanks such as Kenya’s Institute for Economic Affairs (annex 1.11) percent of their funds through the budget on the condition are instrumental in BT&M initiatives, organizations that work that the government make its budget more transparent and with peasants and workers like India’s Mazdoor Kisan Shakti increase its spending capacity. In turn, the government made Sangathan (annex 1.78) have also proved to be successful. a commitment to draw up a credible development plan that There are also cases in which citizen-led movements have would increase its budget capacity and improve transpar- evolved into strong coalitions with formal organizational ency (annex 1.74). The World Bank has undertaken a host structures. For example, founded in 1989 by 500 concerned of BT&M activities itself in the form of CSO capacity build- citizens, the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice in the ing. The World Bank Institute’s work through the Affiliated Republic of Korea has grown to 35,000 members and 35 local Network for Social Accountability- South Asia (ANSA-SAR) branches. It has been able to use South Korea’s public audit brokers relationships between CSOs and their government system to improve government accountability for the use of counterparts. Along these lines for example, the World public resources, particularly with respect to procurement Bank Institute’s Parliamentary Strengthening Program brings (annex 1.90). together like-minded members of parliament and parlia- mentary committees at the regional and global levels by Media. The media, if it has the capacity and political free- using parliamentary networks, assisting ministries of finance dom to perform its watchdog role, serves as a critical partner to publish their budgets and opening up discussions to in promoting citizen participation and social accountability. the public (e.g., Indonesia’s project on Improving Ministries Budget transparency campaigns, particularly ones led by and Agencies Websites, annex 1.37), and supporting analyt- CSOs, struggle to succeed without the media’s involvement. ical work (e.g., the Budget Transparency Initiative’s work in Media reports on corruption and the misuse of public funds Cameroon, annex 1.1). These activities have been conducted can serve as a rallying point for CSOs and citizen groups to through trust funds or by mainstreaming in the World Bank’s undertake BT&M activities. Conversely, civil society budget operations, such as through Development Policy Lending groups can work with the media to publicize instances of operations (box 2). corruption or other weaknesses in budget processes. This was the case for Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR) in 2003, which, after uncovering that government funds for Why Are BT&M Initiatives HIV/AIDS treatment had been misused, released its findings Taking Place? to a leading newspaper, a popular radio news program, and a BT&M activities are undertaken at both the domestic and television news program. This release was followed up with international levels in response to a combination of socio- a press conference to discuss the case and to distribute economic and political factors, ranging from increased crime related materials to additional journalists (annex 1.69). to fiscal deficits. Private sector. While the private sector’s involvement in BT&M activities has been limited, it has maintained an interest Domestic Factors in the open contracting aspect of PFM. For instance, in 2004, the Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld GmbH, (a limited private Civil society groups have engaged in BT&M work in response sector company in Germany) and Transparency International to a host of factors, the majority of them domestic. In Germany joined together to introduce a no-bribes integrity some cases, it is easier to isolate the factors involved. For 8 Main Findings B udget Transparency and Monitoring in World Bank-Supported Development Box 2.  Policy Lending Operations Many World Bank-supported Development Policy Lending (DPL) operationsa incorporate BT&M-related “prior actions” and/ or “benchmarks.” Prior actions are a set of policy and institutional actions deemed critical to achieving the objectives of a World Bank-supported program that are mutually agreed upon by the World Bank and the client and that a country agrees to take before the Board approves a loan. In short, they are legal conditions for disbursement. A review of the database of DPL operations indicates that a total of 51b projects in the past decade have included budget transparency related prior actions (annex 3). A review of these DPL operations displays a wide range of prior actions related to BT&M. The most common action was consultation with civil society before the adoption of a budget law or charting of a new accounting system. For instance, in Peru, the 2007 Budget Law was to be passed only after consultation with civil society, resulting in the inclusion of 11 priority areas of social sector expenditures (annex 3.38). Some DPL operations go beyond consultation and envision a participa- tory role for civil society. For instance, as a prior action, the Government of the Central African Republic was required to adopt a new chart of public accounts but only after extensive consultations and workshops in which civil society and other stakeholders, such as development partners and government officials, are brought together to participate (annex 3.04). In Azerbaijan, representatives from civil society were invited to participate with members of parliament on an Oil Fund Supervisory Board in order to review expenditures (annex 3.20). In addition to consultation and participation, prior actions can require setting up mechanisms for the monitoring of government resources by civil society in specific sectors e.g., in the electricity sector in Haiti (annex 3.34) or through school management committees in Pakistan (annex 3.46). There are prior actions that involve actively publishing and disseminating budgets in the form of paper publications e.g., the 2002 oil fund budget in Azerbaijan (annex 3.19) or the 2003 budget law in Chad (annex 3.05) and on existing or newly- created government websites e.g., in the Central African Republic, where the ministry in charge of mines published how mining revenues are used (annex 3.03), in the Democratic Republic of Congo where information on the management of oil resources was published (annex 3.06), and in Ecuador where disaggregated monthly central government expenditures and subnational accounts were posted (annex 3.26). The use of websites is encouraged at both the national and local levels. For instance, in the DPL operation in Orissa, India, updated month-end accounts of rural local bodies had to be posted on the government’s website. A few prior actions have also taken transparency a step further by not only encouraging the regular publishing of bud- gets, but also actively disseminating information on budgetary allocations. For instance, in the capital city of Conakry and the administrative region of Kindia in Guinea (annex 3.09), a public information campaign to disseminate data on budgetary allocations for schools and primary health care centers in its FY 2001 Budget Law constituted a prior action. Additionally a few countries were advised to prepare citizens guides to budgets as a benchmark (e.g.,Yugoslavia, annex 3.24) and even enact acceptable government budgeting and accountability laws as a prior action (e.g., Sierra Leone, annex 3.14). Some benchmarks, or implementation progress markers that help monitor the progress of DPL operations, have also involved nonstate actors. These are few in number and squarely focused on actions like the participatory monitoring of budgets—such as expenditure tracking surveys or citizen report cards (e.g., Philippines, annex 3.17 and Senegal, annex 3.13). a. DPL operations provide rapidly disbursing financing to help borrowers address actual or anticipated development financing requirements of domestic or external origin. A DPL, which can be extended as loans, credits, or grants, aims to help the borrower achieve sustainable poverty reduction through a program of policy and institutional actions, such as strengthening PFM, improving the investment climate, addressing bottlenecks to improve service delivery, and diversifying the economy. They support such reforms through nonearmarked general budget financing that is subject to the borrower’s own implementation processes and systems. b. Of the 51 projects, 5 DPLs (DRC, Kyrgyz, Peru, Morocco, and Sierra Leone) are discussed in annex 1. BT&M-related elements from the remaining 46 are summarized in annex 3. 9 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring instance, of the 95 documented cases, four BT&M initia- Widespread corruption and scandal. The Japan Citizen tives were undertaken in response to the actualization of Ombudsman Association grew out of several citizen initia- “special funds” that were provided to specific constituen- tives in various parts of the country during the 1980s and cies to address development needs, five in response to the 1990s in response to numerous cases of bribery and malfea- availability of royalties or funds from investments in min- sance by public officials (annex 1.88). ing, one in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and two as Poor service delivery. There are also instances of gov- a reaction to discrete events. In other examples, it is harder ernments choosing to engage in budget transparency work to distinguish the triggers from the symptoms because sub- to address service-delivery gaps in collaboration with civil par service delivery and instances of corruption tend to go society stakeholders. In addition to providing valuable feed- hand-in-hand. Examples of these factors are provided below. back, civil society partners can be useful allies in monitoring Changes in laws. In 2003, when Kazakhstan passed a law the effective implementation of state policies. An example that recognized the rights of disabled persons and estab- of this is Gambia’s Pro-Poor Advocacy Group that brings lished programs to provide rehabilitative services, Namys, the government, CSOs, and development partners to work a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that advocates for together to ensure that the national budget is responsive to the rights of disabled persons, proceeded to work with a the priorities and needs of the poor (annex 1.5). In response coalition toward the ratification of the Integrated Disability to the consistently poor quality of education and the misuse Rehabilitation Policy at the local and national levels of gov- of public funds intended for school construction, Malawi’s ernment to ensure adequate funding for this policy (annex Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education used pub- 1.50). lic expenditure tracking surveys to monitor the use of such funds (annex 1.14). Specific policy commitments. The Mexican government made an international commitment to reduce maternal Natural disasters. In 2007, in response to the slow pace mortality, declaring it as one of its main health objectives of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected commu- for 2000–06. But by 2003, as the maternal mortality rate nities in Northwest Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, remained stubbornly high, FUNDAR—an independent cen- a large coalition of CSOs and citizens embarked on a cam- ter for analysis and research working on budget issues in paign to realign rehabilitation assistance with the people’s Mexico—decided to evaluate the extent to which public priorities and to ensure that it was equitably distributed resources were being allocated toward achieving this stated (annex 1.81). goal (annex 1.70). Discrete events. As part of the Teenagers Rights Access to windfall funds. After the Asutifi district in Movement launched by the Institute for Socio Economic Ghana started receiving gold mining revenues from the Studies in Brazil, teenagers are working with the People’s Cup Newmont Mining Corporation in 2006, the Integrated Social Committee to monitor Brazil’s spending on the upcoming Development Centre and the Institute of Local Government 2014 World Cup and to engage in related issues, including the Studies created the Asutifi Subnational Project to address potential for forced evictions because of the government’s weaknesses in governance mechanisms to improve revenue building of infrastructure for World Cup events (annex 1.58). management in the district (annex 1.6). Improvement of Public Financial Management capacity. Access to “special” funds. In 2005, the Caucus of In 2003, after a 2002 Public Expenditure Review revealed mul- Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) in the tiple weaknesses in Morocco’s budget and human resources Philippines launched Pork Barrel Watch to encourage more management systems, the government decided to prepare transparent use of funds for the benefit of the public (annex a long-term public administration reform program with 1.44). This was in response to concerns that 20–50 percent technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and of discretionary funds for special projects (“pork barrel” European Union (annex 1.72). Rebuilding institutional capac- funds) assigned to congresspersons and senators had been ity in postconflict environments is also a key motivation to squandered. engage in budget transparency and monitoring projects, as evidenced by World Bank projects in Liberia (annex 1.13) and in Sierra Leone (annex 1.22). 10 Main Findings Emphasis on decentralization. After Indonesia’s “Big Where are BT&M Tools Being Used? Bang” decentralization reforms in 2000, many district bud- gets were opaque, with little transparency or public consul- This section provides insights regarding the various levels of tation during the development phase or when expenditures government as well as the main sectors and areas of engage- in approved budgets were disbursed. It was in this context ment where BT&M activities are taking place. that the Indonesian government worked with the World Bank to prepare and implement the Initiatives for Local Levels of Government Governance Reform Project (annex 1.38). Despite efforts to select examples across all three main levels of government—national, provincial, and local—the International Factors number of documented BT&M examples at the national gov- Global movements and coalitions that have mobilized civil ernment level (67 percent) far exceed the number of cases society budget groups such as Global Movement for Budget at subnational levels (18 percent for the provincial level and Transparency, Accountability and Participation have helped 39 percent for the local level). This trend is persistent even to create a more receptive enabling environment for pro- after accounting for BT&M initiatives that are being under- moting networking and knowledge exchange on budget taken across multiple levels of government, possibly because transparency work and encouraging CSOs to use their bud- most of the documented research on budget transparency get analysis and advocacy skills to tackle human rights issues focuses on the national level. The fact that there are not as (e.g., maternal mortality and education). Governments have many documented examples at subnational levels does not also used budget transparency to respond to specific stim- necessarily mean that BT&M activities have not been under- uli, including acknowledging international norms and trends, taken at these levels. maintaining fiscal sustainability, and addressing breakdowns With regard to the subnational BT&M examples included or gaps in service delivery. The majority of examples in this in the sample, there appears to be no bias toward working sample involve improving public financial capacity, particu- at these levels in some regions as compared to others. In larly when development partners are involved. A few illus- fact, the distribution was more or less even across regions. trative examples are provided below. Even in the case of the Middle East and North Africa Region, Efforts to elicit and respond to donor interest. Struggling where BT&M work is relatively new, participatory budgeting to secure a steady flow of foreign assistance, reduce the fiscal has been piloted at the district level (annex 1.92). However, deficit, and tackle development problems after the political the same does not hold true for cross-country comparisons. crisis and suspension of foreign aid in 2009, the Honduran In each region, there are countries where subnational bud- government decided to respond to the increasing attention get work has taken root earlier or faster because there is a of development partners to governance and accountability federal system requiring it in larger territories (e.g., Indonesia, reforms by undertaking a number of measures to improve its annex 1.36); earlier campaigns have established precedents financial management practices, including making the bud- (e.g., India, annex 1.78); or service-delivery issues have become get more transparent (annex 1.66). particularly dire at the local level (e.g., Tanzania, annex 1.29). International attention. In 2011, part of the commitment by the Philippines to the Open Government Partnership, a Sectors and Areas of Engagement new initiative called the “Open Budget Partnership” aims Not surprisingly, the majority of documented cases (83 per- to make the national budget more accessible and under- cent) focus on improving budget transparency as part of standable among citizens, while a full-disclosure policy was their overall PFM practices. Others, while still incorporating included in the 2011 General Appropriations Act, compelling PFM aspects, are more specific in terms of the sectors that all government agencies and offices to disclose budgetary they influence. BT&M initiatives were found in the health, and financial documents, including legislators who have been education, water, and sanitation sectors. To a lesser degree, assigned Priority Development Assistance Funds (annex 1.44). 11 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Box 3. Alternate Budgeting for Vulnerable Groups Understanding budget information from the perspective of the marginalized is essential in making a case for allocating more financial resources for the poor, underdeveloped, and marginalized sections of society. Toward this end, alternate budgets are generally developed by CSOs with high levels of technical skills to highlight the underlying priorities and biases of proposed fiscal policies by governments and their impact on specific groups or issues of public concern. Preparing an alternate budget involves analyzing a government’s proposed budget and based on a costing exercise, influencing budget allocations by producing viable alternatives or by monitoring budget execution, particularly as it affects disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. Children’s budgets. For almost a decade in South Africa, a civil society coalition strove to increase the amount, age cohort, and coverage of the child support grant to disadvantaged communities and to improve its administration (annex 1.25). Since 2002, Zimbabwe’s Child-Friendly National Budget Initiative has also worked to hold the government accountable for resource allocation and use of funds for the benefit of children (annex 1.34). Gender budgets. Since 1997, the Tanzania Gender Networking Program has promoted the examination of policy making and resource allocation with a gender perspective as well as the adoption of tools to mainstream gender considerations in government budgets (annex 1.30). In addition to other budget issues, SEKNAS FITRA (Indonesia Transparency Budget Forum), an Indonesian CSO, also works to make budget processing and implementation more gender-responsive at the provincial level through its Gender Budget Program (annex 1.35). Budgets for the disabled. The Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union has produced alternative budgets that underline serious deficiencies in Lebanon’s social services and incorporate the needs and perspectives of all Lebanese social groups, including the disabled (annex 2.25). In Kazakhstan, the CSO Namys has collaborated with the government to ratify the state’s policy on disability rehabilitation and to improve allocations for its rehabilitation program (annex 1.50). Budgets for disadvantaged groups. In India, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights led the campaign against the diversion of the Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan funds, a pro rata proportion of which is to be used specifically for Dalits, a segment of the population that has traditionally been outcast and has contended with deep-rooted educational, social, and economic discrimination (annex 1.75). In Pakistan, three years after the devastating earthquake, the Omar Asghar Khan Foundation led a campaign to realign rehabilitation assistance with people’s priorities and ensure that resources were being equitably distributed in Hazara (annex 1.81). they were also found in the agriculture, fishing, and forestry; BT&M activities not only span several levels of govern- mining; and environment sectors (see figure 5).9 ment and sectors, but also several types of countries with varying levels of state and CSO capacity. The stock-take Mapping the cases to the key sectors does not do justice reveals that, not only is a fair amount of BT&M work being to the wide range of BT&M work that is being carried out. To done in stable countries where capacity issues are not very address this, some key areas of engagement, such as vulnera- constraining, but that it is also being conducted in postcon- ble groups (box 3), procurement, constituency development flict and fragile settings (box 4). funds, budget analysis, monitoring, and capacity building, have also been identified (see table 1 for more illustrative activities). How Are BT&M Initiatives Being Implemented? 9. The mapping by sector is based on the World Bank’s classification of This stock-take provides examples of BT&M initiatives that sectors. It must be acknowledged that most BT&M initiatives attempt to are being implemented at each stage of the budget cycle, influence budget allocation decisions with the intention of improving ser- vice delivery. Transparency and participation are mostly a means to that from budget formulation through budget oversight. This end. section captures the range and number of mechanisms that 12 Main Findings Figure 5. are being used for BT&M across the 95 documented cases Breakdown of BT&M Activities (figure 6). Across Key Sectors During the budget formulation stage, the majority of Agriculture, Fishery, cases either attempt to solicit public input for the national Water and and Forestry—2% Sanitation—2% or district budgets (e.g., prebudget consultations in Canada Education—11% or participatory planning in the West Bank and Gaza, annexes Social Protection—7% 1.83 and 1.73, respectively) or produce alternate budgets for Environment—1% the benefit of certain issues or population groups (e.g., the Health—7% cost-benefit analyses and action plans that South Africa’s Mining—5% Treatment Action campaign produced to make the case for increasing the health budget’s provision for HIV/AIDS treat- ment and prevention, annex 1.26). The budget approval phase involves a broader range of activities, including detailed budget analysis (e.g., Namibia’s Public Institute for Public Policy Research, annex 1.16); simplifica- Administration, tion and dissemination of the budget (Luta Hamutuk’s work Law, and Justice—83% in Timor Leste, annex 1.46 and the World Bank’s work in Cameroon, annex 1.1); and advocacy that spans many forms, Note: The percentage of key sectors exceeds 100 percent because several initiatives involve such as engaging with government officials (Integrity Watch more than one key sector. Afghanistan, annex 1.74) or legislators (Israel’s Adva Center, BT&M in Fragile and Postconflict Situations Box 4.  The process of recovery and transition from violent conflict and fragile situations is complex, and standard solutions are usually ineffective. Poverty levels are typically high and welfare outcomes low. The stability and social cohesion necessary for development is often lacking. When it comes to budget transparency, the influence of fragility and weak institutions manifests itself in a variety of ways, including a lack of access to budget data, low technical capacity of CSOs and the state, and inaccurate information. In these contexts, therefore, building the capacity of the supply side is usually a priority. A classic approach is to focus on Public Financial Management reforms, and Sierra Leone is a case in point where the World Bank’s Integrated PFM Reform Project is working to strengthen civil service, fight corruption, and strengthen PFM. However, it is equally important to link these supply-side efforts with demand-side social accountability mechanisms in order to build legitimacy, trust, and the often-broken social contract between citizens and the state. For instance, the Bank project in Sierra Leone has interrelated components (annex 1.21). One component supports capacity development of nonstate actors (NGOs and civil society) for the monitoring and oversight of PFM functions and for exercising scrutiny over the use of public resources, while other components focus on strengthening macro fiscal coordination and central finance functions, and reinforcing the control system for improved service delivery. In other words, a major factor in the consolidation of a peace process with progress already made is the improved management of public resources combined with the empowerment of local communities to monitor funds. This is especially true in postconflict settings. Another World Bank-supported project with the same approach is the Municipal Development Project in West Bank and Gaza, where improving financial management was as crucial as improving planning capacities and encouraging community participation (annex 1.73). The project helped over 50 municipal governments to collaborate with communities to develop simple Strategic Development and Investment Plans which have facilitated greater disclosure of information regarding financial data and municipal budgets and projects and achievements. 13 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Figure 6. Types of Mechanisms Used by BT&M Initiatives Advocacy 51 Analysis 54 Anticorruption 5 Audit 9 Capacity Building 44 Disclosure 25 Dissemination 32 Litigation 5 Monitoring 45 Participatory Budgeting 14 Simplification 11 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Note: The percentage of activities exceeds 100 percent because several initiatives involve more than one activity. annex 1.86), organizing rallies (South Africa’s Treatment The following section provides a more detailed break- Action Campaign, annex 1.26), and actively working with the down of BT&M activities in support of citizen and CSO media (Mexico’s FUNDAR, annex 1.69). understanding of budget issues, developing expertise to ana- lyze and compare budgets, and collaborating across bound- The budget execution stage generally entails budget aries. A summary of these activities is presented in table 1. tracking for a project or sector or the monitoring of discre- tionary funds. For example, the Uganda Debt Network has worked with citizen monitors to track funds expended on Supporting Nonstate and State Actors to schools in the Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido, and Kumi dis- Understand Budgets and Budget Issues tricts of Teso region (annex 1.32). In Paraguay, Federación de Providing training, technical assistance, and budget-literacy Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay has worked with neigh- education. Budget training and sensitization has traditionally borhood associations to monitor the Special Projects Fund focused on citizens and civil society groups, but it is increas- that supports the building of community infrastructure and ingly being used to educate legislatures, members of the civil generates employment (annex 2.19). service, journalists, and, to a limited degree, the private sec- The budget oversight stage has involved both bot- tor. For example, SEKNAS FITRA, the Indonesia Transparency tom-up and top-down approaches. An example of the Budget Forum CSO, maintains Indonesian language budget former is efforts by the Kenyan group Muslims for Human resource centers that are accessible to the public. The World Rights (MUHURI) to organize community-level social audits. Bank Institute has launched programs that provide tools and These were followed by public hearings in which both com- training to CSOs and their government counterparts as well munity members and public officials participated (annex 1.10). as journalists and media owners to enhance citizen participa- In terms of the latter, the Supreme Tribunal of Accounts in tion throughout the budget process (annexes 2.32 and 2.33). Honduras has worked with CSOs to engage in eight govern- Producing Citizens Budgets. Citizens Budgets have ment audits in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, emerged as an increasingly popular tool to mobilize citizens the environment, and municipalities (annex 1.67). and promote budget awareness. They are produced both by NGOs (e.g., Namibia’s Institute for Public Policy Research) and 14 Main Findings Table 1. Illustrative Budget Transparency and Monitoring Activities Area of Engagement Activities Related to Budget Transparency and Monitoring Disclosure • Engaging with government officials to gain access to budget records (e.g., Kenya, A1.10). • Using freedom-of-information laws to request access to budget information (Argentina, A1.57). • Producing budget-tracking tools that provide constituency-level information on a project, including timeline, description, status, and multiyear disbursement schedule. (e.g., Kenya, A.1.12). • Designing and launching online portals to track procurement (e.g., Nigeria, A1.17) as well as budget execution and overseas development assistance (Timor Leste, A1.47). Simplification • Producing simplified budget guides (e.g., Ethiopia, A1.4). • Producing Citizens Budgets (e.g., Namibia, A1.16). • Producing simplified templates that consolidate and integrate information about service providers with informa- tion acquired from social audits (e.g., Nepal, A1.80). Dissemination • Organizing budget forums to disseminate information on current budget proposals (e.g., Zambia, A1.33). • Organizing one-day interactive dialogues on budget transparency for local authorities and community leaders (e.g., Sri Lanka, A1.82). • Organizing online participatory forums where local communities affected by projects can post comments, videos, links, and relevant documents (e.g., Brazil, A1.59). • Setting up budget information boards in public places or local offices in order to present key budget information and event announcements (e.g., Azerbaijan, A1.48). • Publishing databases or interactive maps of funded projects, including project descriptions and locations as well as information about beneficiaries (e.g., Mexico, A1.68). • Sharing alternate budgets or public finance bulletins with the media and public officials (e.g., Poland, A1.53). Participatory • Sending geotargeted SMS messages to citizens inviting them to budget assemblies and allowing Planning/ them to vote and provide feedback on preferred investment priorities (e.g., DRC, A1.3). Budgeting • Providing support to district municipalities in preparing a participatory district development plan (e.g., Peru, A.71). • Preparing a Citizens Charter of Demands to consolidate and present priorities of citizens (e.g., India, A1.79) Analysis • Developing a framework to analyze budget expenditures and allocations (e.g., Tanzania, A1.28). • Conducting in-depth review of government budget documents for specific sectors (e.g., South Africa, A1.25). • Examining annual growth of certain budget items and identifying trends (e.g., Nigeria, A1.19). • Reviewing budget documents to assess trends in over- or underspending (e.g., Argentina, A1.57). Monitoring • Developing internal performance indicators to assess progress of legislatures or local, provincial, and national governments (e.g., Ghana, A1.7). • Collecting primary and secondary data on allocation and disbursements at the regional and district levels (e.g., Ghana, A1.9). • Developing tools to measure corruption and inefficiency in public procurement (e.g., Philippines, A1.45). • Establishing and training community budget oversight committees (e.g., Sierra Leone, A1.22). • Organizing regular project site visits to follow up on project implementation (e.g., South Africa, A1.23). • Mobilizing civil society as observers during bidding and procurement processes carried out by governments (e.g., Philippines, A1.42). Audit • Organizing social audit hearings (e.g., Kenya, A1.10). • Collaborating with the supreme audit institution to report budget waste (e.g., South Korea, A1.89) or conduct audits (e.g., Honduras, A1.67). • Monitoring execution of investment works through citizen audit monitors (e.g., Colombia, A1.61). (continued) 15 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Table 1. COntinued Area of Engagement Activities Related to Budget Transparency and Monitoring Litigation • Using constitutions, freedom-of-information laws, and international policy commitments (e.g., Mexico, A1.70) to make the case for public interest litigation. • Utilizing the expertise of economists, medical professionals, and other experts for budget analysis (South Africa, A1.26). Capacity • Conducting capacity-building and sensitization workshops for civil society members and Building parliamentarians (e.g., Kenya, A1.11). • Establishing a training program for master trainers and social audit facilitators. (e.g., Nepal, A1.80). • Producing budget-literacy training modules (e.g., Ethiopia, A1.4). • Organizing workshops to train journalists (e.g., Cameroon, A1.1). • Mobilizing independent research to advise parliament on budget reform issues (e.g., Tajikistan, A1.56). • Training CSO partners within countries (e.g., Kyrgyz Republic, A1.52) or across countries (e.g., Luta Hamutuk, A1.46). Advocacy • Adopting a nonpartisan approach to lobbying with legislative members (e.g., Israel, A1.86). • Engaging with senior public officials (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo, A1.2). • Organizing pre- and postbudget hearings (e.g., Kenya, A1.12). • Facilitating networks and alliances among stakeholders around budget transparency by organizing regular work- shops on budget issues for CSOs involved in budget issues, (e.g., Tajikistan, A1.56). • Organizing marches and rallies (e.g., India, A1.75), • Filing petitions (e.g., South Africa, A1.26). • Ensuring the representation of civil society in consultative groups and task forces (e.g., the Gambia, A1.5). • Mobilizing existing civil society networks (e.g., Tanzania A1.29) and building CSO or citizen networks (e.g., South Korea, A1.90). • Engaging citizens through media such as radio spots, documentaries, theater, and art competitions, and through student budget clubs. (e.g., Cameroon, A1.1). governments (e.g., South Africa). The World Bank’s Financial led by the Omar Asghar Khan Foundation in Pakistan (annex Transparency and Accountability Initiative provided support 1.81). CSOs have also organized civil disobedience marches, to Ethiopia’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development distributed petitions, engaged in door-to-door advocacy to produce a simplified budget guide and budget templates (South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign, annex 1.26), as well as budget training modules (annex 1.4). involved nontraditional groups—including young people— in budget discussions and monitoring (Brazil’s Teenagers’ Raising awareness and mobilizing communities and cit- Rights movement, annex 1.58), and facilitated interactive izens. A wide variety of tools have been developed to dis- dialogues on budget transparency between government seminate budget information and to get buy-in from citizens officials and communities (Sri Lanka’s Centre for Policy regarding fiscal transparency issues. For instance, the World Alternatives, annex 1.82). Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) in Nepal devel- oped “frequently asked questions” (FAQ) flyers to inform Governments have organized consultative groups to stakeholders of the principles of good governance and social engage with CSOs and other stakeholders (Dominican audits for schools (annex 1.80). Republic, annex 1.64) and have worked with development partners to train and institutionalize citizen monitors and CSOs often work with the media to draw attention to watchdog groups (Colombia, annex 1.61). Both CSOs and gov- advocacy campaigns, such as the “Bounced Check” rally ernments have also organized pre- and postbudget hearings organized by the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (Kenya’s Institute for Economic Affairs, annex 1.11; Canada’s (annex 1.75) or the “sit-in” in front of the parliament building Ministry of Finance, annex 1.83). 16 Main Findings Developing and Using Specific Expertise to Analyze a Croatian CSO, produced the Croatian Open Local Budget and Compare Budget Data Index that measured the quantity and quality of publicly available local budget information and the extent to which Using technical analysis to address budget issues. Both local budget processes are open to the public in 33 cities CSOs and governments use technical analyses to broaden (annex 2.12). and stimulate budget debates and to promote ex ante and ex postaccountability for the use of public finances. Some CSOs scrutinize the government’s overall fiscal framework Collaborating Across Boundaries (e.g., Poland’s Gdansk Institute, annex 1.53), while others have Forming coalitions. Civil society has made efforts to estab- assumed an approach oriented toward a particular sector lish and foster coalitions for undertaking BT&M work. In (Luta Hamutuk’s work on the extractives sector in Timor addition to strengthening negotiating power in terms of Leste, annex 1.46) or a beneficiary group (NANGO’s work on numbers, coalitions have enabled CSOs to draw on vari- Children’s Budgets in Zimbabwe, annex 1.34). Governments ous sources of expertise and, particularly in contexts where (e.g., Kenya and Moldova) have used tools such as BOOST to such activities are decentralized, expand monitoring net- compile detailed data on public expenditures from national works (see box 5). For example, the three civil society groups treasury systems to assess how to reduce budget deficits involved in Mexico’s 2007 Subsidios al Campo campaign and restore medium-term structural balance (annex 1.95). brought together different and necessary competencies to Producing tools and templates. Civil society and devel- redress the unequal distribution of farm subsidies: FUNDAR, opment partners can be instrumental in producing tools that an urban-based CSO with budget skills; Asociación Nacional can help to improve budget transparency and monitoring. de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo In addition to the simplified “My School At-a-Glance” tem- (ANEC), a grassroots organization of small agricultural pro- plate outlining details on school-level demographics and ducers; and the Environmental Working Group, an organi- resources, the World Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative in zation with experience in building an open-access dataset Nepal produced the “School Governance Assessment Tool” on farm subsidies in the United States and raising awareness that combines information on the social audit process, man- about the concentration of benefits among wealthier recip- agement of school finances, and the conduct of the School ients (annex 1.68). In order to curb the misuseof the School Management Committee (annex 1.80). Procurement Watch Facilities Grant at the community level in Uganda’s Teso in the Philippines developed the “Differential Expenditure region, the Uganda Debt Network helped to establish the Efficiency Measurement Tool” to measure corruption and Teso Anti-Corruption Coalition that brought together repre- inefficiency in public procurement; it has been tested in sentatives of communities from multiple districts to identify collaboration with the government’s internal audit agency instances of corruption (annex 1.32). (annex 1.45). Cooperating with government. Civil society groups and Producing rankings and assessments. Government bod- public officials have collaborated to curb corruption and ies and civil society groups have used assessment mech- improve the utilization of public funds. For instance, the anisms to track commitments or produce rankings that Colombian Anticorruption Presidential Commission, with World Bank support, launched Citizens’ Visible Audits to compare progress and deficiencies in fiscal transparency. The promote transparency and citizen participation, specifically Dominican Republic’s Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative in the management of royalties for contracts overseen by uses a traffic light scorecard system to measure government state agencies. Between 2008 and 2010, 20 projects in the agency compliance with an agreed roadmap to improve education sector were audited through this effort, repre- governance and to remind the agencies about milestones. senting investments of US$36,000 (annex 1.61). Green indicates that the initiative’s recommendations have been completely adopted; yellow indicates that progress Collaborating with development partners. While the has been achieved but that some actions have yet to be majority of CSO-led BT&M initiatives in this stock-take implemented; and red indicates that implementation has are donor-funded exercises, growing international inter- been delayed (annex 1.64). The Institute for Public Finance, est in improving governance outcomes has led to more 17 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Box 5. The Role of CSO Umbrella Networks in Budget Transparency and Monitoring As compared to coalitions and multistakeholder consultative groups, the role of civil society umbrella networks in the BT&M area has been relatively limited; some exceptions to this include the People’s Budget Initiative in India (annex 1.79), the Citizen’s Ombudsman in Japan (annex 1.88), the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice in South Korea (annex 1.90), and the State Fiscal Policy Initiative in the United States (annex 1.91). CSO umbrella networks can offer a number of advantages, including resources and recognition for smaller organizations, “cross-pollination” and exchange of ideas, opportunities for a diverse range of constituencies to coalesce around specific budget issues, and strengthened negotiating power with the state as the reference point for budget issues. At the same time, these networks may contend with drawbacks that include incompatible missions and incentives, divi- siveness among members, difficulty in setting standards for self-regulation, delay and inflexibility in engaging and respond- ing to policy discourse, and reduced negotiating power caused by internal contentions. United States: The State Fiscal Policy Initiative. A network of 42 diverse public policy organizations in 41 states and the District of Columbia, the State Fiscal Policy Initiative was created in 1993 to provide reliable policy analysis and effective advocacy for equitable and sustainable budget and tax policies at the state level. It is supported by a collaboration of foun- dations and is coordinated by the Center on Budget and Priority Policies in Washington, DC. State Fiscal Policy Initiative members have become the “go-to” organizations in their states for credible analysis, reliable data, new policy ideas, and coalition leadership on behalf of more responsible and inclusive fiscal and budget decisions. Their activities include reli- able and accessible research and analysis, strategic communications with a wide range of audiences, and outreach to other constituencies. India: The People’s Budget Initiative. Established in 2006, the People’s Budget Initiative is a coalition that has facilitated the involvement of civil society in the budget process of the Union government every year by creating a platform where civil society activists articulate key demands and expectations from the forthcoming Union budget. The members of this coalition include people’s movements, grassroots organizations, national and international development organizations, aca- demia, and the media. The Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability in New Delhi serves as the Secretariat of the People’s Budget Initiative. Activities of the initiative include organizing an annual national convention on the approaching Union budget, preparing the People’s Charter of Demands, and monitoring the national government’s fiscal commitments. substantive collaboration between development partners goods and services about how to submit strong competitive and civil society groups that goes beyond funding. For exam- bids (annex 1.13). ple, in 2010 and 2011, the Millennium Challenge Corporation Supporting oversight institutions. In addition to work- (MCC) worked with the International Budget Partnership ing with legislatures to improve their budget literacy and and Fundación Democracia sin Fronteras to assess bud- internal administrative and financial management (e.g., the getary developments in Honduras to determine whether Canadian Parliamentary Center), CSOs like Israel’s Adva it qualified for funding through a second MCC Compact Center and Kenya’s Social Development Network engage (annex 1.66). intensively with members of parliament during the budget Cooperating with the private sector. Even though the debate process by providing briefings and sharing alternative primary focus of BT&M work is public sector accountability, approaches to the budget. There is also an increasing uptake it also involves interactions with the private sector, partic- of collaboration between civil society and supreme audit ularly in the context of procurement. One government-led institutions, such as opportunities proffered to citizens by example is that of the efforts of Liberia’s Public Procurement the Supreme Tribunal of Accounts of Honduras to partici- and Concessions Commission to advance procurement pate in government audits (annex 1.67). reform by organizing regular trainings for local suppliers of 18 Main Findings Litigating to advance public interests. Civil society allocations for specific sectors or disadvantaged groups (e.g., groups have generally resorted to using public interest liti- Tanzania Gender Networking Program, annex 1.30), there gation when other means of engaging with the government are instances of CSO-led activities at the budget execution to address budget issues have been unsuccessful. In 2001, stage that have succeeded in having short-term influences South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign won a case that (e.g., the tracking of constituency development funds by it filed against the government in the high court to enjoin MUHURI in Kenya, annex 1.10) or medium-term influences the introduction of a full-scale Prevention of Mother-to- (e.g., the tracking of constituency development funds by Child Transmission program for HIV/AIDS. The court ordered Pork Barrel Watch in the Philippines, annex 1.44). Initiatives the government to draw up an implementation plan for this led by governments and development partners tend to program within three months and ultimately, by 2010, the ini- require less time to meet their objectives. tiative covered over 80 percent of all expectant mothers in Initiatives that have continued for longer than a decade the country (annex 1.26). include economic analyses conducted by think tanks and academic institutions and budget tracking and monitor- How Long Does It Take for BT&M ing initiatives undertaken by organizations with robust and Initiatives to Produce Results? expansive grassroots support. Established in 2001, Namibia’s Institute for Fiscal Policy Research continues to conduct For ease of analysis, the timeframe for the 95 documented budget analyses and provide policy recommendations initiatives has been divided into four categories: (1) less than (annex 1.16). Similarly, India’s Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan one year; (2) 1–5 years; (3) 5–10 years and; (4) 10+ years. has been led by grassroots support from peasants and work- As depicted in figure 7, the majority of BT&M initiatives ers since its formation in 1990 (annex 1.78). documented as case studies lasted 1–5 years.10 Most of these Depending on the political context and demands involved, initiatives succeeded in bringing about behavioral and pro- other civil society BT&M campaigns have taken longer than cess or policy changes. However, these changes have not five years to achieve desired outcomes that brought about always been institutionalized or replicated. While the major- institutional changes. A case in point is the decade that ity of the examples consist of campaigns to increase budget passed before a civil society coalition could convince the South African government to increase the amount and age Figure 7. Duration of BT&M Initiatives cohort of the child support grant in the context of a macro- economic policy that prioritized reducing budget deficits Less than 1 year—5% and other measures of fiscal discipline (annex 1.25). 10+ years—21% 19 BT&M initiatives became functional during the past 5-10 years and continue to be engaged in ongoing activities. For instance, the Gambia’s Pro-Poor Advocacy Group was launched in 2003 to promote dialogue among stakeholders 1–5 years—53% with the goal of opening up the budget process to citizen participation and continues to work towards this objective (annex 1.5). Results of this stock-take are mixed for BT&M work con- ducted for less than one budget cycle. In the case of the 5–10 years—20% Marshall Islands (annex 1.39), for example, an attempt to insti- tutionalize gender budgeting over the course of 18 months failed. But activities such as producing budget transparency 10. Impacts can be uneven and often depend on numerous factors, such as assessments (annex 2.12) and organizing a right-to-budget positive or negative shifts in the political economy. In some cases, impacts information campaign (annex 1.93) to disseminate knowledge can be rolled back. Because the stock-take was based on a desk review of cases that invariably did not refer to the rolling back of impacts, this has about the state of budget transparency have been moder- not been explicitly discussed. ately successful. 19 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring What Results Have BT&M development outcomes, they have met more intermediate Initiatives Achieved? goals like exposing corruption. Results have been highlighted in table 2 by categorizing the outcomes in terms of behav- This section analyzes the results of BT&M initiatives within ioral, process, and policy changes. It is assumed that, over a social accountability framework of behavioral changes, time, a combination of increased information and account- including information-seeking, accountability-seeking, and ability will lead to institutional changes that might accelerate development outcome-seeking behavior as well as institu- the achievement of concrete development outcomes. tional changes comprised of process and policy changes. While the framework used to capture outcomes based This stock-take confirms the findings from existing litera- on behavior and process changes is useful, it is often diffi- ture that BT&M initiatives are generally successful in meeting cult to maintain a strict dichotomy between them for two their stated goals (McGee and Gaventa 2011 ) and that while reasons: there is no tangible evidence that the initiatives lead to better Table 2. Mapping BT&M Outcomes Across the Budget Cycle Stage of Budget Cycle Behavioral Changes Process Changes Policy Changes Formulation • The executive invites CSOs • Provincial governments • The House of Commons to contribute to documents start opening up the budget Standing Committee on Finance outlining medium-term formulation process conducts prebudget hearings government priorities (India, annex 1.79). in accordance with a standing (Nigeria, annex 1.19). • The government makes public order of Parliament (Canada, • Development partners the budget summary, a Citizens annex 1.83). agree to channel more aid to Budget, the enacted budget, budget initiatives (Afghanistan, and in-year reports (Democratic annex 1.74). Republic of Congo, annex 1.2). Approval • CSOs use awareness-raising • There are increased allocations • Legislatures draft or amend tactics (e.g., Ask Your for social development for legislation (Indonesia, annex 1.35). Government Campaign radio three consecutive fiscal years diaries (annex 1.93) and Mazdoor in response to the evidence Kisan Shakti Sangathan’s street provided by alternate budgets theater (annex 1.78). (e.g., the Social Watch Philippines’ Alternate Budget Campaign, annex 1.43) Execution • Citizens begin providing input • Governments and the private • The government begins using and feedback on the budget sector generate savings through public expenditure tracking process and report budget better procurement practices surveys to track execution of waste (South Korea, annex 1.89). (Philippines, annex 1.45). funds (Malawi, annex 1.14). • Citizens participate in social • The government enacts a audits (Kenya, annex 1.10). new law to promote budget transparency in procurement contracting (Law No. 10/010 of April 27, 2010, Democratic Republic of Congo, annex 1.2). Oversight • The supreme audit institution • Supreme audit institutions • The government introduces invites the public to engage improve oversight by getting external audit systems to local in state audits (South Korea, budget waste reports governments (Japan, annex 1.88). annex 1.89). (South Korea, annex 1.89) or by working with citizen monitors (Honduras, annex 1.67). 20 Main Findings • Because most BT&M initiatives are not based on theories NGO—built on the Amasango and Seven Schools public of change that are well mapped out, it can be difficult interest litigation cases (annex 1.24) by making a deliberate to distinguish between milestones of changing behav- effort to challenge the systemic issues plaguing the educa- iors and processes. For example, the goal of the Ask Your tion system. As a result, the court directed the government to Government campaign (annex 1.93) was to illustrate the set minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure. real-life experiences of citizens going through the pro- cess of requesting budget information from their govern- What Are the Common ments and to offer concrete evidence on the problems Challenges? civil society faces in accessing public budget information in a wide range of countries. This can easily be charac- This section outlines some difficulties that emerged terized as information-seeking behavior. However, in across the multiple BT&M initiatives included in this stock- instances such as Brazil’s Teenager’s Rights Movement take, including limited capacity, legal frameworks, limited (annex 1.58), it is harder to differentiate whether the time horizons, lack of institutionalization, and unwilling activities of the youth involved can be characterized stakeholders. as accountability-seeking behavior, development out- come-seeking behavior, or both. Limited Capacity • There are overlapping areas between the behavioral Even though the expansion of BT&M initiatives is a proxy changes of nonstate actors and institutional changes attestation of improved demand-side capacity for engaging by state actors as well as changes in perceptions and in this type of work, gaps in budget literacy, limited techni- understanding of both state and nonstate actors and the cal skills and staffing, and financing constraints remain chal- development of understanding (or lack thereof) between lenges by reducing incentives either to initiate budget work these two sets of stakeholders. For instance, the opportu- or continue it over the medium and long term. nity to provide input into the budget has encouraged an increasing number of Canadians to engage in the budget While litigation and other budget transparency mech- formulation process, and this high level of participation anisms can successfully expand the responsibilities and/or has in turn motivated the House of Commons Standing priorities of the state, it is often the case that there is no Committee on Finance to take ownership of public con- corresponding expansion in the state’s ability to administra- sultations (annex 1.83). tively or financially deliver on them. It took the Treatment Action Campaign a decade to convince the government to With regard to both institutionalized outcomes and rep- increase the grant amount and coverage for the child sup- lication of CSO-led BT&M practices by governments and port grant. The relatively slow pace of these reforms had other CSOs, the results of this stock-take are encouraging. much to do with the South African government’s unwilling- For example, a World Bank-led Citizen Visible Audit project ness to acknowledge the seriousness of the HIV/AIDS epi- in Colombia (annex 1.61) expanded to 158 audits in 29 commu- demic, but budget constraints constituted another key issue. nities in 2008–09, covering public works funded by US$348 Corresponding staff and time constraints such as those million from royalty funds. In response to irregularities encountered in implementing Colombia’s integrity pacts uncovered by the Japan Citizens’ Ombudsman Association, (annex 1.62) make it more difficult to engage with citizens the government amended the law to add an external audit on budgets even if there is support from higher levels of system for local governments that now includes a lawyer, an government. accountant, and a tax accountant who are required to draft audit reports (annex 1.88). Restricted Access to Budget Information While some of the outcomes listed can be character- ized as one-time benefits, even when BT&M initiatives do Even though public access to budget information has not lead to institutionalized outcomes in the short- or improved (the average Open Budget Index score for 40 medium-term, over time and over several iterations, several comparable countries increased from 47 to 57 percent have influenced more successful campaigns. In South Africa, between 2006 and 2012), citizens still have difficulty acquir- Equal Education—a community- and membership-based ing needed budget information, well illustrated by the Ask 21 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Your Government Campaign, during which only 1 out of 80 Arranque Parejo en la Vida program that sought to reduce countries (New Zealand) provided substantive answers to all maternal and child mortality. FUNDAR and its partners were six budget information requests (annex 1.93). able to successfully lobby the federal government for a ten- fold increase in the budgetary allocation for the program in However, relevant mechanisms and staff capacity for the 2003 budget. However, by 2004, the government had compiling, directing, and responding to budget informa- included these funds in a highly aggregated budget for a tion requests may not be available. Generally, there is not blanket health protection scheme, making it impossible to a single integrated unit in the Ministry of Finance—or any determine whether or not the resources for the program’s other ministry—that responds to demands for this informa- implementation had been impacted by that year’s budget tion. Even in a case like South Korea’s Budget Waste Hotline cuts (annex 1.70). that provides a mechanism to solicit public feedback, the government, as it contended with budget cuts, phased out the public relations campaign encouraging citizens to report Short Timelines and Limited Funding waste (annex 1.89). It is difficult to achieve structural changes in governance Furthermore, it is important to note that while govern- arrangements and build capacity in government institutions ments may make budget information available through a and CSOs within a one-year timeframe. In addition to the Ministry of Finance website, this may not be particularly breakdown of funding, this was a key drawback of the gen- beneficial if literacy rates are low or if a limited percentage der budget project that the Asian Development Bank and of the population has access to the Internet. In Honduras, the University of South Australia piloted in the Marshall only 11.8 percent of the population has Internet access, of Islands (annex 1.39). Additionally, some of the examples in this which only 44 percent have the ability to access the infor- stock-take attest that, short of institutionalization, replica- mation from home (annex 1.66). tion and scaling-up of BT&M involves medium- to long-term processes. An example of this is the Parliamentary Centre’s work with the Russian legislature, which started in 1994 with Lack of Enabling Legal Frameworks parliamentary development and staff training for the two While the absence of right-to-information legislation (e.g., chambers of the Russian federal assembly and the regional MUHURI’s struggle to gain access to constituency devel- legislatures; by 2004, it had evolved into the Accountability opment fund records) is a difficult issue to contend with, Strengthening Program, launched to realize the gains that another hindrance is the use of legal loopholes to escape had been made by strengthening the linkages between the the consequences of corruption. This is manifested by a case Russian supreme audit institution and the Russian federal in Mexico where Provida, a nongovernmental organization, assembly (annex 1.54). failed to pay a penalty imposed by the internal controller for the misuse of funds designated for HIV/AIDS treatment. Reluctant and/or Disinterested Stakeholders Similarly, inadequacies in Mexico’s judicial process have allowed the president of the budget committee who was There are examples of executive branches being unwilling instrumental in Provida acquiring the government grant to to engage in efforts to change the status quo because it is escape indictment (annex 1.69). usually their activities being scrutinized by CSO-led BT&M initiatives. In extreme cases, this includes banning CSO activ- ities, as was the case in 2005 when the Tanzanian govern- Lack of Institutionalization ment imposed a ban on HakiElimu for “misinforming the Even though most CSO-led BT&M campaigns included in this public about the state of education in the country” (annex stock-take have managed to meet their immediate objec- 1.29). Similarly, efforts to improve budget transparency have tives, often no institutionalized systems and practices are put been perceived as opposition tactics to discredit the current in place for effective governance and public accountability. government or as lip service for short-term political gains. An illustration of this is FUNDAR’s campaign to convince the Moreover, weak demand for transparency, particularly at the Mexican government to increase budget allocations for the local level, does not bode well for improving governance. 22 Main Findings It is also possible that there are genuine time constraints be taken for granted.11 For example, while coalition members that make it more difficult to meet demands for trans- leading the Subsidios al Campo campaign wanted to empha- parency. During the implementation of integrity pacts in size issues of inequality in the rural sector such as agricultural Colombia, the public administration was torn between the subsidy distribution, journalists were more interested in fer- legitimate goal of attaining results in the short term and the reting out any scandalous findings. need to devote sufficient time to design and structure good Some multi-stakeholder groups, such as the Gambia’s Pro projects as well as to the monitoring of these projects by Poor Advocacy group, have successfully involved multiple third parties. Another challenge was to get the civil servants stakeholders to engage in a continued dialogue and to open to devote sufficient time to listen to firms, civil society, up budget processes. Others have not been particularly use- and citizens in general, and to provide well-substantiated ful, either because of a heavy bias in their composition in responses to their questions. favor of the government that would put them in a stronger Contention among key actors on how to change the sta- position to stamp out dissent, or as was the case for the tus quo, particularly during short-term projects, can pose Stakeholder Working Group for the Bayelsa Expenditure and difficulties. The Asutifi subnational project in Ghana faced Income Transparency Initiative in Nigeria, because policy and challenges resolving differences about whether it should budget decisions were made without taking into account focus on helping the district forecast and manage volatile input from CSO representatives (annex 1.18). revenues or on encouraging participatory budget planning. This division deterred the success of the project because several initiatives were started but were not carried through to fruition (annex 1.6). Even though the media has been an instrumental source 11. BT&M interventions often include activities relating to motivating and of support for BT&M campaigns, its focus of interest cannot training journalists. 23 Implications for Project Teams and Practitioners The fact that almost all of the initiatives documented in this ultimately, pressured the government into returning the stock-taking exercise achieved their objectives demonstrates funds to special caste programs. the great potential of BT&M activities to unearth problems and increase accountability. To make lasting change, the Adjust to Context process must be institutionalized. Several lessons can be extracted from this exercise that may be relevant for project BT&M opportunities that emerge during transitions should teams and practitioners as they promote open and account- be seized. Political transitions, including upcoming or ongo- able budget systems and practices. ing elections, measures to curtail fiscal crises, new legislation, policy commitments at the international and domestic lev- els, and high-profile corruption scandals can provide win- Plan for Long-Term Engagement dows of opportunity to advance BT&M. The prospect of Engagement over a number of budget cycles is often nec- upcoming elections for example, enabled MUHURI in Kenya essary for institutionalization or replication. Even though to obtain previously unavailable constituency development government-led attempts to improve fiscal accountability fund records from one parliamentarian who had a political are easier to institutionalize than CSO led efforts, they often incentive to be transparent (annex 1.10). take several years to become established and demonstrate Fragile and postconflict situations call for an incremen- results. A short timeframe is valuable for raising awareness tal approach. In fragile and low-capacity contexts, an incre- and increasing understanding of nuanced budget issues, but mental approach that starts with the basics (e.g., capacity it usually takes several budget cycles for budget reforms to building, simplifying, disclosing, and disseminating local-level take root. It is also useful to have a profound understanding budgets) is more likely to succeed. In Liberia, capacity build- of the budgetary decision-making process and its politics, ing was accompanied by improved incentive schemes, and especially because of the wider governance implications intensive in-service training (annex 1.13). This focus on the that they often have. This was evident in the attempts of the career development of the training participants ensured Asian Development Bank and University of South Australia their commitment to the cause. to pilot gender budgeting in the Marshall Islands (annex 1.39). BT&M initiatives are more likely to be successful when Quick fixes are not always possible or effective. Medium- embedded in large programs or projects. In the case of to long-term CSO campaigns have greater impact because Ethiopia’s Protection of Basic Services project, fiscal trans- sustainable service delivery and policy reforms often parency received traction because it was integral to the proj- require comprehensive, sequential changes. For example, ect. It helped to scale up the project and secure required the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights in India first attention from its development partners and government used a right-to-information request to obtain data on funds ministries and garner political support. Further, new meth- earmarked for poor and vulnerable scheduled castes. Next, odologies and tools, such as those associated with the pro- they successfully campaigned to have “code 789” estab- tection of basic services, often require a long incubation lished, which enabled civil society to track funds earmarked and learning phase that can be accommodated in large proj- for Dalits (annex 1.75). By using this code, they were able to ects such as this one (annex 1.4). Similarly, the World Bank- identify funds diverted to the Commonwealth Games and, supported Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative in the 24 Implications for Project Teams and Practitioners Dominican Republic confirmed that successful implementa- has documented that large numbers of people can be moti- tion requires the continued commitment and engagement vated to engage on budget issues if the media is used stra- of national and local political leadership and international tegically, if CSOs coalesce around a single cause, and if issues development agencies as well as constant pressure from a are taken up that have a very concrete impact on many peo- dense network of coalitions (annex 1.64). ple’s lives, despite the dry nature of all things budget-related. Technical budget analysis that is aligned with govern- Use a Range of Analytical Tools and ment priorities is more useful and convincing. Examples Mobilization Approaches of this type of successful alignment can be found in the Treatment Action Campaign’s cost-benefit analyses and A wide range of tools can be used to promote budget well-researched action plans in South Africa (annex 1.26); they transparency. Tools include Citizens Budgets and simplified were helpful in attempts to increase allocations and expen- budget guides, such those produced by Ethiopia’s Financial ditures on HIV/AIDS because the government was already Transparency and Accountability Initiative (annex 1.4); infor- contending with efficiency and implementation issues in this mation dissemination platforms, such as those used by the sector. BNDES Platform in Brazil (annex 1.59); radio diaries, such as those used by local CSOs in Malawi and Uganda during the Collaboration between CSOs and government entities Ask Your Government campaign (annex 1.93); web consul- yields the best results. As with Pakistan’s Omar Asghar Khan tations and face-to face roundtables by Canada’s House Development Foundation following the 2005 earthquake, of Commons Standing Committee on Finance and the World Bank projects can include reputable advocacy organi- Department of Finance (annex 1.83); web portals that pro- zations as executing agencies to help increase the effective- vide information on budgets, procurement aid, and project ness of their monitoring efforts and use of resources. World results, such as those set up by the government of Timor Bank teams, through their convening power, can catalyze Leste (annex 1.47); simplified budget templates, such as those partnerships between CSOs and government ministries for used by the World Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative proj- BT&M. ects in Cameroon and Nepal (annexes 1.1 and 1.80); and South Korea’s budget waste hotline (annex 1.89). However, the use Strengthen Legislation and effectiveness of such tools, particularly information and communication technology tools, is wholly dependent on Laws matter. They can provide teeth to citizen demands for context. For example, lessons learned from Nigeria’s pro- particular services; patchy legal frameworks allow officials curement portal observatory demonstrate that citizens may committing fraud to escape sanctions. This stock-take fea- not automatically use available technology in the absence tures several cases in which a minimum level of service pro- of incentives (and the means) to do so. Information might vision to citizens was enshrined in law, allowing civil society need to be translated into local languages and presented in to sue the government for failing to meet its obligations. an organized fashion by sectors or localities so that citizens This type of public interest litigation has proven successful in can monitor areas of particular interest to them (annex 1.17). several cases, providing powerful legal trappings to demands for good governance. On the other hand, this stock-take Mass mobilization around budget issues is possible— also includes cases in which officials convicted of fraud and has happened before. A major challenge for BT&M ini- never served their sentences because of loopholes in legal tiatives that are focused on citizen and civil society action frameworks. Therefore, in environments with independent is reaching a critical mass of pressure on officials to heed judiciaries willing to rule against the government, advocat- demands that have been raised. It may be crucial for great ing for the adoption of particular laws can provide excellent numbers of people to rally around specific BT&M-related openings for advocacy campaigns and offers disincentives demands to gain political traction, especially in democ- toward corrupt behavior. racies, because elected leaders have to be responsive to popular pressure in order to be reelected. This stock-take 25 Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring Support State Institutions in terms of conducting timely and comprehensive audits of projects and collaborating with citizens to monitor satisfac- Ministries often need support in responding to bud- tory implementation of ongoing projects. Relevant improve- get transparency demands. Today, in over 100 developing ments in the quality of government audits are possible within and transitional countries, civil society is actively engaged a short time period if audit institutions, audited entities, and in the public budget process. And although there is a fair civil society collaborate. amount of demand for budget transparency, there is not yet a concomitant expansion of state capacity to respond to it—financially or administratively. Ministries often need Support Civil Society Organizations and Other support to respond to these demands, which could be pro- Nonstate Actors vided in the form of a dedicated unit or even autonomous Civil society and citizen networks offer advantages of entities such as parliamentary budget offices that are solely scale and rationale. A credible national network of citizen responsible for responding to BT&M demands. BT&M work groups that advocate for evidence-based change (United in Afghanistan revealed that it was difficult to access bud- States’ State Fiscal Policy Initiative, annex 1.91) can influence get information because there is no integrated unit in the policies and allocations. Networks that actively monitor the Ministry of Finance—or in any ministry for that matter— external auditing process (e.g., Japan’s Citizen Ombudsman, that was responsible for providing such information upon annex 1.88 and South Korea’s Citizens Coalition for Economic request (annex 1.74). These supply-side constraints act as Justice, annex 1.90) are strong deterrents for misusing pub- deterrents to BT&M efforts. lic resources. Such networks also encourage mentorship of BT&M activities must be extended to subnational gov- new groups and cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on ernments. Provincial and local-level governments are at the different fiscal issues. In addition to high quality technical frontlines of service delivery. They suffer from issues such as analysis and coalition building, garnering grassroots support lower capacity and weak budget execution. To achieve bet- to push for reforms in budget processes and policies is often ter development outcomes, more systematic consideration helpful. SAPDA’s strategy in Indonesia to convene and train must be given to BT&M at subnational levels, especially the stakeholders helped secure the financing of health security local level, through technical assistance and capacity-building for the disabled. Projects supporting such networks of bud- activities that focus on local-level officials as well as CSOs. get organizations should be considered (annex 1.36). A nonpartisan approach to working with legislatures Complementing advocacy skills of CSOs with technical may be effective. High-level technical analysis combined analytical capacity on BT&M helps build a constructive dia- with training for parliamentarians is useful to build their logue. In contexts with a vibrant civil society but relatively capacity to engage more effectively in the budget process inexperienced CSOs, interventions to improve advocacy (e.g., World Bank Institute’s work on creating autonomous skills that are complemented by initiatives to strengthen parliamentary budget offices to support parliamentarians technical capacity can help create a constructive dialogue in their BT&M work, annex 1.94). This also makes it easier to with government. South–South learning on public procure- work at the regional and local levels by mitigating the sus- ment and monitoring among CSOs is worthy of integration picion surrounding budget work. Adopting a nonpartisan in projects as well. approach, such as that of Israel’s Adva Center (annex 1.86) The media is often crucial for successful BT&M activi- and serving all legislators regardless of party affiliation helps ties. A common theme in the stock-take is that the media to expand the budget debate and establish the legitimacy can make or break BT&M efforts. The media is a powerful of the concerned entity with government officials and the amplifier of messages, and if it reports on BT&M activities, public. they will gain more traction immediately. Three things are Supreme audit institutions can be engaged as willing necessary for this to happen: a political environment that partners in BT&M. Increasingly featured in both govern- allows the press to freely report on BT&M issues, including ment and CSO-led efforts to promote budget transparency, corruption; a sufficient capacity of journalists to investigate national supreme audit institutions can be useful allies, both and analyze budget issues; and media interest in reporting 26 Implications for Project Teams and Practitioners about such issues. Development partners can significantly in transparent and fair contract awards but face collective contribute to each of these. action problems that are difficult to overcome. Donors can use their convening power to help solve such coordination The private sector can play a much larger role in BT&M. failures. Further, natural resource extraction companies can Examples of private sector engagement around BT&M are use their influence to set up mechanisms to ensure that min- scarce in this stock-take, but it is evident that there is much ing royalties going directly to local communities are spent potential for it to play a larger role. One major area of engage- transparently—instead of being pocketed by elites. ment is procurement. Many companies have an interest 27 Conclusion The stock taking exercise illustrates the range of mechanisms making it difficult to track and attribute results regardless of involved in BT&M in different contexts and demonstrates timeframes. Finally, there is a dearth of literature on initia- significant promise of influencing governance processes and tives that have not achieved their goals, which would allow outcomes. The vast array of techniques, tools, and strate- lessons to be drawn from these failures. There are incen- gies for advocacy, analysis, dissemination, and mobilization tives to document successes rather than failures, but there of different types of actors in producing medium-term is value in documenting failures because this allows for a results is truly remarkable. The stock-take also reveals gaps better understanding of the challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed in order to realize long-lasting that may be useful to consider when designing future BT&M benefits of BT&M and confirms that theories of change and interventions. expected outcomes of BT&M initiatives are not always clear, 28 References Bellver, Ana and Daniel Kaufmann. 2005. “Transparenting Transparency: Initial Kolstad, Ivar and Arne Wiig. 2009. “Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Empirics and Policy Implications.” Policy Research Working Paper. 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World Bank, DC. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/3077.pdf?exp Washington, DC. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ ires=1378421936&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=41D8A503C0704 0,,contentMDK:22880282~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSite 69665F7FE13165AB16B. PK:4607,00.html. Joshi, Anuradha. 2012. “Do they Work? Assessing the Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives in Service Delivery.” Development Policy Review 27. http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/188642/Default.aspx. 29 Annexes Sectors Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry Mining Education Public Administration, Law, and Justice Environment Social Protection Health Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Government-led and/or World Bank-supported initiatives CSO-led initiatives Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project AFRICA A1.1. Simplifying and Disseminating Budget Cameroon National, Education; Health; Budget Transparency Initiative Information to Increase Citizen Feedback and Provincial, Public Administration, Reduce Waste and Corruption and Local Law, and Justice (Decentralization, Public Finance) A1.2. Using the Open Budget Index to Promote Democratic Republic National Public Administration, Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Budget Transparency of Congo Law, and Justice Démocratie (Public Finance) A1.3. Using Information and Communication Democratic Republic Local Public Administration, ICT4Gov for Participatory Budgeting Technology-Mediated Participatory Budgeting of Congo Law, and Justice to Mobilize Resources for the Poor (Decentralization) A1.4. Simplifying and Disseminating Budgets to Ethiopia Local Public Administration, Protection of Basic Services I, II, III Expand Budget Literacy Law, and Justice (Public Finance) A1.5. Championing Pro-Poor Budget Policies The Gambia National Public Administration, Pro-Poor Advocacy Group through Budget Analysis and Training Law, and Justice (Public Finance) and Education A1.6. Unsustained Budget Monitoring Fails Ghana Local Mining Revenue Watch Institute, Integrated to Improve Weaknesses in Governance Social Devlopment Centre, and Mechanisms Institute of Local Government Studies A1.7. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Ghana National Public Administration, Parliamentary Centre Promote Better Budget Oversight Law, and Justice A1.8. Analyzing and Publicizing the Budget to Ghana National, Public Administration, Integrated Social Development Promote Pro-Poor Fiscal Policy Local Law, and Justice Centre (Public Finance) and Education A1.9. Tracking District Budget Allocations and Ghana Local Public Administration, African Development Program Disbursements to Promote the More Efficient Law, and Justice Use of Public Resources (Public Finance) and (Decentralization) A1.10. Using Social Audits to Monitor Kenya Local Public Administration, Muslims for Human Rights Constituency Development Funds Law, and Justice A1.11. Facilitating the Review of Public Kenya National Public Administration, Institute of Economic Affairs Policy and Public Affairs to Inform Budget Law, and Justice Decision-making (Public Finance) A1.12. Mobilizing Citizens to Influence Kenya Provincial Public Administration, Social Development Network Development Planning and Resource Allocation and Local Law, and Justice (Public Finance) A1.13. Holistic Procurement Reform toward Liberia National Public Administration, Fourth Reengagement and Reform Reconstruction of Post-War Liberia Law, and Justice Support Program A1.14. Public Expenditure Tracking of the Malawi National Public Administration, Civil Society Coalition for Quality Education Budget for Better Outcomes for Law, and Justice and Basic Education Students and Teachers Education A1.15. Monitoring Budgets to Improve Service Mali Local Public Administration, Governance and Budget Delivery After Decentralization Law, and Justice Decentralization Technical Assistance (Decentralization) (continued) A–3 Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project A1.16. Making National Budgets Accessible to Namibia National Public Administration, Institute for Public Policy Research Citizens through Budget Analysis Law, and Justice (Public Finance) A1.17. Citizens Training Toward Better Nigeria Provincial Mining, Public Nigeria Procurement Monitoring Procurement Monitoring Administration, Law, Project and Justice A1.18. Attempting to Work with Nigeria Provincial Mining Revenue Watch Institute Multistakeholder Groups to Institutionalize Budget Transparency A1.19. Collaborating with the Provincial Nigeria Provincial Education Lagos State Civil Society Partnership Government to Promote the Transparent Utilization of the Budget A1.20. Engaging Civil Society Partners to Ensure Nigeria National Public Administration, The Public and Private Development a Transparent Procurement Procedure and Law, and Justice Centre Provincial A.21. Enhancing Service Delivery by Including Sierra Leone National Public Administration, Integrated Public Financial Nonstate Actor Oversight in Public Financial Law, and Justice Management Reform Project Management Reform (Public Finance) A1.22. Enhancing Participation in the Monitoring Sierra Leone National Public Administration, Economic Rehabilitation and and Execution of the Budget in a Post-Conflict Law, and Justice Recovery Credit III Situation A1.23. Advocating to Increase Access to South Africa Local Water, Sanitation, Social Justice Coalition Sanitation in Informal Settlements and Flood Protection (Sanitation) A1.24. Using Budget Analysis and Litigation to South Africa Provincial Education Legal Resource Centre and the Public Eradicate Mud Schools and Local Service Accountability Monitor A1.25. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy South Africa National Public Administration, Black Sash, Institute for Democracy to Improve Child Support Grant Budget Law, and Justice in Africa, Alliance for Children’s Allocations Entitlement to Social Security and the Children’s Institute A1.26. Using Budget Advocacy and Litigation South Africa National Health (HIV/AIDS) Treatment Action Campaign to Advocate for Improved Allocations for HIV/ AIDS Treatment A1.27. Using Budgets to Facilitate Social Tanzania Local Water and Sanitation Policy Forum Monitoring A1.28. Curbing Unnecessary Expenditures to Tanzania National Public Administration, Sikika Meet Public Needs and Priorities Law, and Justice; Health A1.29. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Tanzania National Education HakiElimu Improve the Quality of Education A1.30. Using Budget Analysis and Pilots to Tanzania National Public Administration, Tanzania Gender Networking Program Mainstream Gender Considerations in Fiscal Law, and Justice Policies A1.31. Building the Capacity of Community Uganda Local Public Administration, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Procurement Committees in Fragile Areas Law, and Justice Project to Enhance Transparency in Community Subproject Investments A1.32. Building Anticorruption Coalitions to Uganda Provincial Education Uganda Debt Network Monitor Misuse of Education Grant Funds and Local A1.33. Monitoring the Extractives Industry to Zambia National Mining Caritas Zambia Encourage the Use of Resources for the Public Benefit A1.34. Using Budget Analysis to Improve Zimbabwe National Public Administration, Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly Budgeting Law, and Justice Centre and Network and National Association of Non Governmental Organizations (continued) A–4 Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project East Asia and Pacific A1.35. Working with the Legislature to Promote Indonesia Provincial, Public Administration, Sekratariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Budget Transparency Local Law, and Justice Untuk Transparansi Untuk Anggaran (Decentralization) A1.36. Using Budgets to Advocate for Indonesia Provincial Public Administration, Advocacy Center for Women, People Expanding Health Security for the Disabled and Local Law, and Justice and with Disabilities, and Children Social Protection A1.37. Improving Websites of Targeted Indonesia Local Public Administration, Improving Agency Websites for Ministries to Increase Public Knowledge of Law, and Justice Budget Transparency Government Spending (Decentralization) A1.38. Reforming Budget Implementation to Indonesia Provincial, Public Administration, Initiatives for Local Governance Open Up District Budgets Local Law, and Justice Reform Project (Decentralization) A1.39. Providing Technical Assistance for Marshall Islands National Public Administration, Ministry of Finance Integrating a Gender Perspective into Public Law, and Justice Expenditure Management A1.40. Institutionalizing Civil Society Mongolia National Public Administration, Supporting Civil Society Oversight on Engagement to Make the Procurement Process Law, and Justice Public Procurement Transparent (Public Finance) A1.41. Making Budgets Publicly Available to Mongolia National Public Administration, Governance Assistance Program Foster Accountability Law, and Justice A1.42. Engaging Civil Society Partners in Philippines Provincial Public Administration, Davao Procurement Transparency Monitoring the Procurement Process Law, and Justice Group A1.43. Improving Budget Accountability and Philippines National Public Administration, Social Watch Philippines Allocations for Social Development Law, and Justice A1.44. Using Citizen Monitors to Track Pork Philippines National, Public Administration, Caucus of Development NGO Barrel Funds Local Law, and Justice Networks A1.45. Monitoring Public Procurement to Philippines National Public Administration, Procurement Watch Inc. Reduce Inefficiencies and Corruption Law, and Justice A1.46. Using Community Monitoring to Address Timor Leste National Public Administration, Luta Hamutuk Mismanagement of Post-War Reconstruction and Local Law, and Justice Funds A1.47. Pursuing Transparency in Budgets, Aid, Timor Leste National Public Administration, Ministry of Finance and Procurement via Online Portals Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Europe and Central Asia A1.48. Promoting Public Participation in Azerbaijan Local Public Administration, Economic Research Center Municipal Budgets to Increase Transparency Law, and Justice A1.49. Publishing Citizens Budgets and Kazakhstan National, Public Administration, Center for Legal and Economic Influencing Budget Transparency Legislation Provincial, Law, and Justice Reforms Assistance Local (Public Finance) A1.50. Analyzing the National Budget to Kazakhstan National Public Administration, Namys Strengthen the Rights of the Disabled Law, and Justice and Social Protection A1.51. Strengthening Reforms to Make Budget Kyrgyz Republic National Public Administration, Governance Technical Assistance Execution Transparent Law, and Justice Credit Project A1.52. Strengthening Budget Literacy Kyrgyz Republic Local Public Administration, Information Matters—Transparency among the Media and Citizens to Enhance Law, and Justice and Accountability in the Kyrgyz Transparency (Decentralization) Republic A1.53. Influencing National Budgets to Push Poland National Public Administration, Gdansk Institute for Market Legislative Changes Law, and Justice Economics (Public Finance) (continued) A–5 Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project A1.54. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes Russia National Public Administration, Parliamentary Centre to Promote Better Oversight of the Budget Law, and Justice Process A1.55. Using Budget Analysis and Training to Russia Provincial, Public Administration, St. Petersburg Center for Humanities Promote Amendments to the Budget Law Local Law, and Justice and Political Studies (Public Finance) A1.56. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight Tajikistan National, Public Administration, Mainstreaming Governance in and Building Coalitions to Enhance Budget Local Law, and Justice Tajikistan Country Program Transparency Latin America and the Caribbean A1.57. Using Budget Analysis to Promote Access Argentina Local Education Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la to Education Justicia A1.58. Working with Public Schools to Brazil National, Public Administration, Institute for Socioeconomic Studies Promote Human Rights and Improve Budget Local Law, and Justice Transparency and Education A1.59. Civil Society Platform Works Together Brazil National Public Administration, Brazilian Institute of Social and to Encourage Brazil’s Development Bank to Law, and Justice Economic Analysis Disclose Spending A1.60. Using Budget Analysis to Construct a Brazil National Public Administration, The National Food and Nutrition Right-to-Food Budget Law, and Justice Security Council A1.61. Promoting Transparency around Royalty Colombia Local Mining Citizen Visible Audits to Improve Funds to Enhance Social Control over Public Public Investment Transparency and Investments Accountability A1.62. Using Integrity Pacts to Generate Savings Colombia National Public Administration, Transparency International Colombia and Address Corruption in Contracting Law, and Justice A1.63. Combining Supply-Side Reforms and Dominican Republic National Public Administration, Performance and Accountability in Demand-Side Capacity Building to Increase Law, and Justice the Social Sectors; Building Demand- Budget Transparency and Monitoring Side Capacities for increasing Budget Transparency and Performance Accountability A1.64. A Multistakeholder Participatory Dominican Republic National Public Administration, Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative to Curb Corruption Law, and Justice Initiative A1.65. Using a Human Rights Approach to Guatemala National Public Administration, International Center for Human Rights Promote Social Spending Law, and Justice Research (Public Finance) A1.66. Using the Open Budget Index to Honduras National Public Administration, International Budget Partnership and Encourage Progress on Budget Transparency Law, and Justice Fundación Democracia sin Fronteras (Public Finance) A1.67. Audit Institutions and Civil Society Join Honduras National Public Administration, Tribunal of Accounts Efforts to Improve Public Audits Law, and Justice (Public Finance) A1.68. Using the Freedom-of-Information Law Mexico National Agriculture, Fishing, Centro de Análisis to Expose Unjust Farm Subsidies and Forestry e Investigación A1.69. Tracking Misuse of HIV/AIDS Funds to Mexico National Public Administration, Centro de Análisis e Investigación Reverse Wrongful Allocations Law, and Justice and Health (HIV/AIDS) A1.70. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Mexico National Health (Primary) Centro de Análisis e Investigación Increase Budget Allocations for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality A1.71. Strengthening Community Participation Peru Local Public Administration, Peru Rural Roads Program to Make Road Construction and Maintenance Law, and Justice Transparent (Decentralization) (continued) A–6 Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project Middle East and North Africa A1.72. Enhancing Budget Transparency to Make Morocco (MNA) National Public Administration, Public Administration Reform Loan IV Public Spending More Efficient Law, and Justice A1.73. Enhancing Financial Management and West Banka and Gaza Local Public Administration, Municipal Development Project Planning Capacities of Municipalities to Deliver (MNA) Law, and Justice Better Services (Decentralization) South Asia A1.74. Using the Open Budget Index to Make Afghanistan National Public Administration, International Budget Partnership and Progress on Budget Transparency Law, and Justice Integrity Watch Afghanistan (Public Finance) A1.75. Tracking Misuse of Scheduled Caste Sub- India National, Public Administration, The National Campaign for Dalit Plan Funds to Improve Budget Implementation Local Law, and Justice Human Rights and Social Protection A1.76. Civil Society Monitoring of Drug India National, Health Support for Advocacy and Training to Procurement and Disbursement to Address Local Health Initiative Inefficiencies A1.77. Advocating for Changes in Government India Provincial Public Administration, Developing Initiatives for Human and Budget Priorities in Favor of Disadvantaged Law, and Justice and Social Interaction Groups Social Protection A1.78. Pioneering a Participatory Approach to India Provincial, Public Administration, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan Public Expenditure Management Local Law, and Justice and Social Protection A1.79. Using a People’s Charter of Demands to India National Public Administration, Centre for Budget and Governance Highlight Budget Priorities Law, and Justice Accountability A1.80. Improving Budget Literacy to Empower Nepal National, Public Administration, Budget Transparency Initiative Citizens Provincial Law, and Justice and Local (Decentralization) and Education A1.81. Tracking Earthquake Reconstruction Pakistan Provincial Public Administration, Omar Asghar Khan Development Funds to Ensure they Reach Intended and Local Law, and Justice Foundation Beneficiaries A1.82. Introducing Participatory Budgeting to Sri Lanka Local Public Administration, ANSA-SAR funded Center for Policy Enhance Accountability of Pradeshiya Sabhas Law, and Justice Alternatives (Decentralization) Others A1.83. Consulting with the Public to Develop Canada National Public Administration, Ministry of Finance and House of Budget Policies and Priorities Law, and Justice Commons Standing Committee on Finance A1.84. Proposing Alternative Federal Budgets to Canada National Public Administration, Canadian Centre for Policy Demystify Budget Formulation Law, and Justice Alternatives (Public Finance) A1.85. Using Integrity Pacts to Keep Corruption Germany National Public Administration, Transparency International Germany at Bay in Public Sector Contacting Law, and Justice A1.86. Using Budget Analysis and Training to Israel National Public Administration, Adva Center Restore Emphasis on the Social Sector in the Law, and Justice National Budget A1.87. Using Budget Analysis to Propose Italy National Public Administration, Sbilanciamoci! Alternative Budget Approaches Law, and Justice A1.88. Citizen Activists Work Together to Japan National Public Administration, Japan Citizen Ombudsman Monitor the External Auditing Process and Local Law, and Justice Association (continued) A–7 Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies Implementing Organization/ Implementing Agency/Name of Initiative Country Level Sector Project A1.89. Using Citizen Participation Mechanisms South Korea National Public Administration, Budget Office, Special Committee of to Verify Fiscal Priorities Law, and Justice Budget and the Board of Audit and (Public Finance) Inspection A1.90. Encouraging Citizen Participation in South Korea National Public Administration, Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Audits to Uncover Waste of Public Resources and Local Law, and Justice Justice A1.91. Promoting Progressive Budget and Tax United States National Public Administration, The State Fiscal Analysis Initiative Policies to Advance Equity and Prosperity and Law, and Justice Network Provincial Multi-Country A1.92. Building Participatory Budgeting Jordan, Bahrain, National, Public Administration, Partners Jordan Coalitions to Improve Municipal Budgets Lebanon, and Yemen Local Law, and Justice (Public Finance) A1.93. Engaging in a Cross-Country Exercise to 80 countries National Health, Environment, International Budget Partnership, Demand Budget Information Public Administration, AccessInfo Europe, and the Centre for Law, and Justice Law and Democracy A1.94. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight 60 countries National Public Administration, Parliamentary Strengthening Program and Government Accountability Over Budgets Law, and Justice A1.95. Giving a BOOST to Budget Analysis and Multi-Country National Public Administration, BOOST Budget Analysis and Country Capacity for Budget Transparency Law, and Justice Transparency A–8 Country: Cameroon Sectors: Education; Health; Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization, Public Finance) Levels: Local; National; Provincial Name of Project: Budget Transparency Initiative Areas of Engagement: Budget Simplification; Capacity Building; Dissemination A1.1. Simplifying and Disseminating Budget Information to Increase Citizen Feedback and Reduce Waste and Corruption Context • BTI developed and implemented a local budget transparency Despite relatively strong economic growth in recent years, ser- index and a website, the “Cameroon Budget Inquirer,” which vice delivery continues to be poor in Cameroon. When compared presents the national public investment budget using appeal- Africa to other countries in the region, Cameroon lags behind on many ing graphics. A Facebook page created under the initiative with human development indicators and is unlikely to meet any of the 2,138 “friends” from the Northwest Region allows interested citi- Millennium Development Goals by 2015. An important reason for this zens to exchange views on budget transparency and allowed the is Cameroon’s weak governance, as evidenced by its consistently low World Bank team to remotely supervise activities under the pilot. score on the Mo-Ibrahim governance index (45 out of 100 in 2012) • In order to build capacity, over 30 workshops were organized and a low ranking on the 2012 Corruption Perception Index (144). As to train heads of schools and health centers on how to fill out for budget transparency, Cameroon scored only 10 out of 100 on the simplified budget templates and to explain the roles of different Open Budget Index in 2012. This reflects the fact that while budgets stakeholders, including principals, health center managers, local are public documents accessible to all citizens in principle, in prac- officials and mayors, during budget dissemination meetings. A tice, budget information is difficult to come by because of politi- workshop to train journalists on how to investigate and report cal, administrative, capacity, and logistical constraints as well as cost on budget-related issues was also conducted. barriers at all tiers of government, including national, regional, and municipal levels, and at service-delivery points like schools and health Results centers. To address this problem, a Governance Partnership Facility Anecdotal evidence shows that activities under the BTI were suc- (GPF)-financed initiative has piloted a citizen-centered approach cessful in: for disseminating simplified budget information for 151 schools, 58 • Increasing tax revenues. In at least one local council (Ngaoundere health centers, 28 municipalities, regional administrations from 2 of III), tax revenues increased after a budget dissemination session Cameroon’s 10 regions, and the national public investment budget. because the council managed to raise XAF 763,400 (US$1,527) in cattle taxes for the first time. The mayor attributes the change to Actions (2011–13) activities under the BTI. • The Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) piloted a new approach • Empowering parent-teacher associations (PTAs). Parents reduced to simplify, analyze, and disclose budgets at multiple levels their PTA contributions by 50 percent (from US$4 to US$2) at one (i.e., national, district, health center, and school) and to build the school after its budget was disclosed because they felt that the awareness and capacity of government officials at various lev- school’s official funds were sufficient for most of its needs. els as well as citizens to promote a public dialogue about public • Increasing trust between citizens and officials. Disclosing budget expenditures, thereby increasing social accountability. information and directly engaging citizens increased their trust in • BTI introduced transparency into budget processes to reduce officials, improving relationships between them. For instance, dur- waste and corruption and to foster the demand for disclosure of ing a BTI radio program, the mayor of the council of Ngaoundere I financial information. This was accomplished in two pilot regions could clarify a caller’s question about a bridge he had promised of Cameroon by actively engaging citizens and soliciting their to build. feedback. • Influencing priorities. Secondary-school students used dissemi- • Activities primarily targeted health clinic users and staff, parents, nation meetings to express their priorities and concerns; in some teachers, students, local communities, mayors, local civil society cases, they were able to influence school priorities and decisions organizations (CSOs), and the media in over 230 institutions (151 on resource allocation. schools, 58 health centers, and 28 municipalities). They created awareness and engaged citizens through radio programs, the- ater and art competitions, and newly-established student bud- get clubs. (continued) • BTI organized and facilitated over 200 public meetings in local communities during which budgets were read out and citizen feedback gathered. A–9 (continued) • Reducing corruption. A school principal was forced to return At the subnational level, where budgets impact citizens most misappropriated funds (XAF 10 million, approximately US$20,000) directly, this can be achieved through public meetings, local and after students and parents revealed that he had raised fees for social media, and entertainment approaches like theater. At the items already covered by the lump sum registration fees. In national level, a website visualizing budget information in user- another case, a CSO galvanized by BTI exposed a corrupt health friendly ways is a promising approach. official. • An index to benchmark local government budget transparency can spur greater transparency and improved performance if Africa Implications for Project Teams implemented repeatedly. • For budgets to result in feedback from citizens, better policies, and more efficient resource allocations, budgets not only need to References be made public but also simplified and proactively disseminated. Cameroon Budget Inquirer: http://cameroon.openspending.org/en/ Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/budgettransparencyinitiative.cameroon?fref=ts A–10 Country: Democratic Republic of Congo Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Citizens Budgets; Legislatures A1.2. Using the Open Budget Index to Promote Budget Transparency Context • Once the memorandum was signed by the minister, REGED The 2008 Open Budget Survey (OBS) revealed that of eight key engaged in working sessions with the budget minister’s office budget documents,1 the government of the Democratic Republic to discuss the issues highlighted in the memorandum and helped of Congo only provided information on one, the enacted budget, the ministry develop a Citizens Budget. Africa and it only provided that after the budget had already been passed, • As a civil society representative in the Economic Governance denying citizens the opportunity to provide input on the budget for- Thematic Group, REGED participated in the committees that mulation or execution process. As a result, the overall Open Budget produced the March 2010 Strategic Plan for Public Finance Index (OBI) score was 0 out of 100. Réseau Gouvernance Economique Reform and played a key role in introducing the concept of et Démocratie (REGED), a civil society network originally launched “citizen oversight” in the strategic plan. to support the postconflict transition process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was well aware of the reasons for this low score. Results Government employees, for example, are generally subject to • Release of hitherto unpublished budget documents. By the end administrative secrecy and disclose information only after receiv- of September 2010, the government had made the budget sum- ing authorization from senior officials. A high level of administrative mary, a Citizens Budget, the enacted budget, and in-year reports secrecy has been observed, particularly as it relates to demands for public. As a result, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s overall financial information. Furthermore, the government struggles with score rose to 6 in the 2010 OBI. The government also published data management and reliability. The data exists but its collation is the executive’s budget proposal for 2010, but did so after the cut- complicated and requires improved capacity. A single directorate is off date used by the OBS to assess the public availability of docu- responsible for many tasks, including data collection, budget prepara- ments. If this document had been published in a timely manner, tion, and monitoring. the OBS score would have been much higher. • Enactment of laws promoting budget transparency. Soon after Actions (2008–11) the release of the strategic plan for public finance reform, new • After the release of the 2008 OBI in February 2009, REGED laws were enacted that further entrenched budget transparency. directly engaged with the ministry of budget and discussed Law No. 10/010 of April 27, 2010, which relates to procurement essential documents that should be published by the govern- contracts, has several provisions to promote fiscal transparency, ment to improve budget transparency. After these sessions, the including Article 6 that establishes prerequisites for public pro- government began publishing more budget reports in detail, curement, the integration of needs assessments within budget starting with quarterly reports dating back to January 2009. planning, and compliance with disclosure requirements and trans- • REGED organized a workshop for civil society to introduce the parency. The provisions of Article 17, which enshrine the principle Citizens Budget and held a workshop for journalists on the eight of bidding for public procurement, constitute important ele- key budget documents of the OBS. It also trained media on how ments of disclosure because the law mandates all offers be pub- to follow the parliamentary debate on the budget law and how lished in the press for several weeks. to discuss taxation and budget information on television. • REGED prepared a memorandum for the minister of budget. The Implications for Project Teams memorandum called for the release of documents, the develop- Leveraging the World Bank’s convening power to bring together civil ment and publication of a Citizens Budget, and the need to work society organizations that are willing to engage in evidence-based with officials for joint ownership of budget transparency require- advocacy with relevant government stakeholders has the potential ments. Concurrently, it trained provincial assemblies on budget to result in significant improvements in budget transparency. transparency in 7 of the 11 provinces, held formal and informal meetings with parliamentarians and advisers, and submitted References formal proposals and briefing notes to government officials to International Budget Partnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org. explain and garner support for the memorandum. Schouten, Claire, and Jean-Pierre Samolia Monamoto. 2013. “The Impact of the Open Budget Initiative Secretariat and its Partners on Budget Transparency in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Case Study and Background Paper Prepared for 1. These eight key budget documents include the pre-budget statement, the Open Budget Index, International Budget Partnership, February 2013. executive’s budget proposal, the enacted budget, the Citizens Budget, in-year reports, the mid-year review, the year-end report, and the audit report. A–11 Country: Democratic Republic of Congo Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: ICT4Gov for Participatory Budgeting Areas of Engagement: ICT; Participatory Budgeting A1.3. Using Information and Communication Technology-Mediated Participatory Budgeting to Mobilize Resources for the Poor Context Results The Democratic Republic of Congo has long suffered from condi- • Large volume of SMSs received. Over 250,000 SMSs have gone tions that have prevented the full development of its citizens and out, of which 100,000 are received messages from the population. Africa communities. Citizens have suffered the effects of conflict and in Evidence suggests that even farmers from far flung villages (who many provinces are unable to access the most basic of public ser- cannot travel to meetings) have successfully sent in votes articu- vices. South Kivu is a context where lack of trust between citizens lating their priorities. and the government has become a major barrier for better public • Better allocation of resources. As senior officials point out, this service delivery. In fact, a core reform area now is decentralization has substantially improved their understanding of what citizens because the transfer of funds from provincial to local governments want and has allowed them to readjust budgets accordingly. They is not currently mandated by law, nor is participation or feedback had assumed that health and education were priorities, but they from citizens. While many citizens in the province do not have access found out that what was in fact more important was infrastruc- to water or electricity in their homes, most have mobile phones. ture (e.g., building bridges between schools and farming areas). Mobile phones are performing a key role in enhancing transparency • Increase in transfer of funds from provincial to local level. As and accountability. Mobile penetration in the Democratic Republic the provincial government sees an increasing capacity of the local of Congo is increasing rapidly, from 16 percent to an estimated 47 government to better allocate resources, communities involved percent in 2013. In addition, 55 percent of the country’s population have already seen an increase in transfer (and regularity) of funds resides in areas currently covered by mobile networks, including from the provincial to the local level.  most rural areas from the eastern province of South Kivu. The World • Reduction in tax evasion. The preliminary results of an external Bank Institute’s ICT4Gov program is leveraging and improving upon evaluation suggest a reduction of tax evasion at the local level, this technology to enhance participatory budgeting processes. with citizens more willing to pay taxes as they link government spending to an improvement in the delivery of services. Actions (2010–present) • Greater trust and enthusiasm among citizens. In a survey con- ICT4Gov is using mobile phones for four purposes: ducted in 2012, 70 percent indicated that trust between citizens and the leaders of the local governments has been strengthened • Participatory budgeting meeting/assembly announcements are throughout the process and 92 percent of citizens said they made through mobile phones. Geotargeted SMS messages are would enthusiastically participate in the new cycle of participa- sent to citizens to invite them to the assemblies, providing them tory budgeting in 2012–13. with the date, time, and location. • Replication of the model in other countries. The mobile usage • Mobile phones are also being used for voting, allowing citizens experiences in South Kivu have been replicated in the Dominican to send a text to identify their investment priorities, hence point- Republic, Cameroon, and Brazil. ing out where they would like to see the money being spent in their community. Implications for Project Teams • Moreover, mobile phones are being used to announce the voted In fragile contexts, where levels of trust are low and citizens hard to decision, making the process more transparent and inclusive than reach—both because of a lack of trust and because of the limited ever before. reach of the state—information and communication technology • Finally, mobile phones are being used to ask citizens about the tools can prove to be powerful for enhancing citizen participation projects that had been chosen. Through text messages, citi- in budgets from a distance. As highlighted above, a large number of zens are able to offer feedback and monitor the projects. Over citizens were able to make their investment priorities heard, even 250,000 text messages have already been sent throughout the though they were not at the assembly meetings where investment different stages of this initiative. decisions were made. References Estefan, Felipe, and Boris Weber. 2012. “Mobile-Enhanced Participatory Budgeting in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” blogs.worldbank.org. February 13. http:// blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/mobile-enhanced-participatory-budgeting-in-the-drc. Powerpoint created by project team: http://prezi.com/s0rtts3nlpqz/ ict-mediated-participatory-budgeting-in-south-kivu-drc/. A–12 Country: Ethiopia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: Local Name of Project: Protection of Basic Services I, II, III Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; Dissemination; Simplification A1.4. Simplifying and Disseminating Budgets to Expand Budget Literacy Context Results In 2006, the government of Ethiopia, through the Ministry of Finance • High rate of budget disclosure. Over the last two years, public and Economic Development, began publishing its budget online. budget and service-delivery information has been disclosed at It also provided guidelines for districts to publically disclose their public venues in over 95 percent of districts using FTA tools. Africa budgets; soon budget disclosure was institutionalized in the govern- • Higher number of budget-literate citizens. Nearly 200,000 citi- ment’s financial management system down to the subdistrict level. zens drawn from different sections of society had received basic The Financial Transparency and Accountability Initiative (FTA), part of budget literacy training as of March 2013. the World Bank’s Promoting Basic Services (PBS) Phase I in Ethiopia, aimed at furthering the government’s efforts to deepen budget Implications for Project Teams transparency. FTA is a government-led initiative funded by multiple Financial transparency initiatives are likely to be more successful when development partners; it supports the dissemination of the budget, they are an integral part of large projects like PBS that can help with provides large-scale budget literacy training, and obtains feedback scaling up and securing the necessary attention from all partners. through experience-sharing forums. PBS is currently in its third phase. Furthermore, if such initiatives complement existing government policies, they are more likely to garner the political support necessary Actions (2006–present) to succeed. However, adapting tools to local contexts presents sev- • A Financial Transparency and Accountability Perception Survey eral design challenges and can cause implementation delays. Further, (FTAPS) was conducted, which revealed a low level of awareness new methodologies and tools such as those associated with the FTA about the public budget and uncertainty about where budget require long incubations/learning phases. decisions were made among citizens. It also showed that citizens have a very limited access to information but still retain a strong Reference interest in learning about their local public budgets. Ethiopia—Ethiopia Promoting Basic Services Program Phase III Project: P128891— Implementation Status Report: Sequence 01 (English), World Bank, Washington DC. • FTA developed several budget tools to address the needs of citizens, including a simplified budget guide, a layperson’s bud- get, expenditure templates, service facility-level templates, and budget-literacy training modules. These simplified tools were designed, pilot tested, validated, and owned by the government of Ethiopia. FTA customized the tools to local contexts and used them to disseminate information at the district and subdistrict levels. A–13 Country: The Gambia Sectors: Education; Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Pro-Poor Advocacy Group Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Capacity Building; Disclosure; Dissemination A1.5. Championing Pro-Poor Budget Policies through Budget Analysis and Training Context that were used for sensitizing communities on the importance, The Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG) was set up in 2003 by civil nature, and magnitude of resources made available by central society organizations, donor agencies, and government partners. government to the education sector. Materials were used to train ProPAG emerged at a time when the Gambia was graduating from regional budget groups of teachers, parent–teacher associations, Africa the strategies for poverty alleviation implemented since 1994 to the and representatives of the Tanji Bird Reserve Site Management first poverty reduction strategy paper. Within that framework, the Committee. government of the Gambia identified Pro-PAG as “a forum for on- • The 2000–04 budget expenditure publication was later updated going dialogue between stakeholders with a view to opening up the for the period 2001–05 and shared with the national assembly, budget process to citizen participation.” Its vision is to ensure that sparking action on the parliamentarians’ part to request advance the national budget is responsive to the priorities and needs of the copies of the 2006 budget from DOSFEA. The national assembly poor by raising awareness of community-based poverty issues. aired their concerns via the media and in discussions with the ministry of finance. Actions (2004-present) • During the annual budget consultations, Pro-PAG conducted a Results series of capacity-building and sensitization workshops for civil • Increased budget allocations for education. Increased alloca- society members and parliamentarians on basic budget literacy tion of 1.5m GMD (US$45,696) to the 2004–05 education budget and analysis. Upon receipt of the cabinet’s budget estimates, Pro- benefited voluntary school staff, such as untrained teachers and PAG carried out a preliminary analysis and released a “budget school caretakers. brief,” a copy of which was officially shared with the Department • Improved awareness of parliament. Members of the National of State for Finance and Economic Affairs (DOSFEA). Once the Assembly Select Committee have become more aware of the budget was submitted to the national assembly, and before it importance of their role in legislative oversight and have gained a was debated, Pro-PAG convened a budget sensitization ses- better understanding of issues related to the education budget. sion for parliamentarians to share key observations on the draft • Increased support from donors. Budget work with committee estimates. members attracted the support of other organizations, such • Pro-PAG builds the capacity of the national assembly to under- as the UNDP, the African Development Bank, and DFID. Due to stand the education budget and analyze allocations to educa- the success of the initial training program, it became possible to tion. Members of the national assembly were taken to local expand the capacity-building initiatives to include other groups schools to see for themselves that, although a large proportion such as the Gambian teachers’ union and local municipalities. of national resources have been committed to education, this did not automatically translate into gains in the international educa- Implications for Project Teams tion goals committed to by the government. As each national • In some contexts, working from the national level down to the assembly committee’s term ends and a new body of members community level with national government support might be is elected, these trainings are repeated. Pro-PAG expanded these more effective than starting with local budget work. capacity-building initiatives to include other groups, including the • Working closely with members of parliament to build their Gambian teachers’ union and the Child Protection Alliance. capacity to engage more effectively in the budget process helps • Pro-PAG produced a database on educational expenditures by mitigate the suspicion surrounding budget work, making it easier level and type that allowed for a review of budget estimates to work at regional and local levels. and actual expenditures from 2000 to 2004, a period when dec- larations were made in “Education for All,” the government’s References national action plan for education from 2004–15. The results Pro-Poor Advocacy Group Website: http://www.pro-pag.org/. were published in a synopsis of government spending on educa- Harrison, Amy, and Simon Blower. 2011. “Final Report for Annual General Meeting (AGM).” Prepared for Pro-Poor Advocacy Group Annual General Meeting October tion and were used to advocate for greater budget allocations 29, 2011. to the education sector. In a bid to take budget tracking down Perry, Victoria. 2008. “Civil Society Engagement in Education Budgets: A Report to subdistrict-level communities, Pro-PAG presented the data Documenting Commonwealth Education Fund Experience.” Prepared for in an understandable format and materials were disseminated Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF). A–14 Country: Ghana Sector: Mining Level: Local Implementing Organizations: Institute of Local Government Studies; Integrated Social Development Centre; Revenue Watch Institute Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Capacity Building A1.6. Unsustained Budget Monitoring Fails to Improve Weaknesses in Governance Mechanisms Context • After conducting a detailed survey of the capacities, attitudes, In 2006, Asutifi, a tiny district in central Ghana with a relatively and practices of local stakeholders, ILGS drafted modules to unknown farming community, caught the attention of one of the provide training for the district assembly and others in the Africa world’s largest gold producers, Newmont Mining Corporation (NMC). transparent, accountable management of mining resources. While the revenue Asutifi was to receive from Newmont was small compared to other districts, it made up a significant percentage of Results Asutifi’s income. Income from gold, however, is volatile and requires • Disrupted fund flows. Because of a lack of additional resources financial forecasting, realistic budgeting, and participatory manage- and expertise, ILGS was unable to finalize the modules. ment, all of which were major challenges for Asutifi. Three years • Pushback from hierarchical authorities. ISODEC designed tem- later, Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) partnered with two Ghanaian plates for the traditional chiefs to report the use of mining royal- organizations—the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) ties, but they went unused because of the chiefs’ refusal to be and the Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)—to create the more accountable to their communities. Asutifi subnational project and produce a baseline study. The study • Limited uptake of findings in the district plans. Even though found weaknesses in the governance mechanisms for revenue man- participatory processes led to prioritizing and incorporating com- agement in the district: mining revenue was being spent arbitrarily and munity needs into Asutifi’s MTDP for 2010–13, it is unclear if those there were no internal fiscal rules for spending it. In 2008, Newmont needs have been adequately incorporated. In short, even though Gold Ghana Ltd (NGGL) established Newmont Ahafo Development the project set out to improve the transparency of the spending Foundation (NADeF), a corporate social responsibility initiative, in an and management of mining royalties, the Asutifi government has attempt to spur development in 10 communities within the compa- not shown much progress. ny’s operating area; it agreed to contribute US$1 for every ounce of • Inability to support the creation of functional and multistake- gold sold. They raised US$7 million, but soon after, tensions arose holder consultative platforms. Overall, the project required between NGGL and the local authorities with the latter accusing the dialogue and the entering into coalition with Asutifi’s elected company of disregarding locally-determined development priorities. assembly and administration, NGGL and NADeF, traditional chiefs Therefore, RWI’s aim was to improve the overall governance of min- in the district, local businesses, and civil society, the absence of ing revenues. The project lasted for two years, 2009–11. which eventually led to the project’s derailment. • Small wins of more awareness and trust. Despite its failure in Actions (2009–11) achieving its objectives, the project did build awareness of the • To ensure that the community’s needs were reflected in Asutifi’s need for transparency in the mining sector among both assembly 2010–13 Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP), ISODEC and and community members. Moreover, the level of trust and collabo- ILGS led a workshop that targeted 15 district officials, who in ration in the district improved with the formation of the consulta- turn trained 80 people drawn from area councils, unit commit- tive forum. For instance, as a result of advocacy by CSOs, through tees, and other community leaders. This workshop focused on the Ahafo Extractive Engagement Group, in 2010, Newmont agreed helping participants identify and prioritize their needs so they to pay a fine of 7 million Ghanaian cedis (approximately US$3.7 mil- could offer input to the local government’s development plan. lion) for cyanide spillage in the previous year. • ISODEC coordinated the formation of a quarterly consultative Implications for Project Teams forum, comprised of traditional chiefs, district assembly mem- Building alliances for monitoring and working through civil society bers, NMC, and local civil society organizations (CSOs). In the partners that have gravitas in a given context is key to the success of forum, these stakeholders shared expectations and discussed Budget Transparency & Monitoring initiatives. Moreover, it is neces- mining-related issues, including environmental damage, transpar- sary to align interests and voices within civil society—in this case, ency in the use of royalties, and participation in the district plan- among the district assembly officers, the traditional chiefs, and com- ning process. munity members—in order to bring about constructive change. • To address the problem of NADeF and the assembly’s develop- ment plans not being aligned and that the former was disregarding References Website of Revenue Watch: www.revenuewatch.org. locally-determined development priorities, ISODEC prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that required Newmont Boampon, Owusu. 2012. “Ghana’s Golden Opportunity: A District Struggles with to consult the MTDP when selecting projects to support. Even Striking it Rich.” Case study prepared for Revenue Watch Institute (RWI). though Newmont refused to sign the MOU, at the very least, the http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/GhanaCaseStudy7.10.12.pdf MOU proposal catalyzed a more collaborative approach among Newmont, the district assembly, and the district office. A–15 Country: Ghana Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Parliamentary Centre Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Capacity Building; Legislatures A1.7. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Budget Oversight Context Results For most of the tumultuous political period since Ghana became For the Ghana Parliamentary Budget and Finance Unit project, the independent, parliament’s proscribed role in matters of governance Parliamentary Centre: has been partly responsible for its limited capacity and weak over- Africa sight. When Ghana turned to a multiparty electoral democracy in • Contributed directly to the drafting of a budget bill by intro- the early-to-mid-1990s, a number of bilateral and multilateral donors ducing a bipartisan draft version that included a provision for a identified the opportunity to provide support to Ghana’s parliament parliamentary budget office. so that it can play a stronger role in the country’s governance. One For the Financial Scrutiny Project, the Parliamentary Centre: of them is the Parliamentary Centre, a Canadian nonprofit, nonparti- san organization that supports parliaments around the globe, includ- • Increased the openness of PAC proceedings by opening them to ing Ghana’s, by providing training and technical assistance to build the public, a change that has now been institutionalized. This has capacity. boosted parliament’s efforts to increase accountability and trans- parency, combat corruption, and improve budget oversight and Actions resource allocation. This, in turn, has renewed public confidence Funded by the United States Agency for International Development in the ability of parliament to oversee the executive; it has also (USAID) and UK Aid, the Parliamentary Centre assisted Ghana’s parlia- increased the transparency and accountability of Public Financial ment with the Ghana Parliamentary Budget and Finance Unit project Management procedures and officials. as well as the Financial Scrutiny project. • Increased interest to establish audit report implementation committees. By November 2007, as result of the PAC’s probing October 2006–December 2008. For the Ghana Parliamentary Budget questions, the Daily Graphic reported that 10 ministries, depart- and Finance Unit project, the Parliamentary Centre: ments, and agencies approached the Internal Audit Agency to • Established a budget and finance unit equipped with the nec- help them establish audit report implementation committees to essary expertise, including economic modeling and forecasting strengthen Public Financial Management. knowledge. • Prosecuted malfeasance. The attorney general set up a special • Developed consultative mechanisms such as roundtables unit to prosecute cases recommended for prosecution prior to between key parliamentary committees, budget policy think the establishment of the Financial Administration Tribunal (court). tanks, and the Ministry of Finance to increase parliament’s capac- The project also saw the attorney general resume the prosecu- ity to engage effectively in Public Financial Management and tion of dormant cases about the loss of public resources. budget processes. • Developed internal performance indicators to enable Parliament Implications for Project Teams assess its own progress with respect to its role in the budget In addition to providing training and technical assistance to legisla- process. tures, it is critical to develop internal performance indicators to allow parliament to assess its own progress with respect to its engagement May 2007–November 2009. For the Financial Scrutiny Project, the in the budget process. These indicators could prove to be a valu- Parliamentary Centre: able tool if they are institutionalized and used to hold successive parliaments to account for their level of engagement in the budget • Provided training to the members of the public accounts com- process. mittee (PAC) to improve their knowledge of Public Financial Management and to scrutinize the evidence produced by the References auditor general. Parliamentary Centre Website: http://www.parlcent.org/en/. • Organized a public meeting of the PAC, October 16–29, 2007, Financial Scrutiny Project Website: to deliberate on the auditor general’s report on the ministries, http://www.parlcent.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/project_pdfs/ departments, and agencies for 2004 and 2005 to promote public Project_Description_-_Financial_Scrutiny_Project.pdf. support for the work of the committee and parliament. Anthony, Tsekpo, and Alan Hudson. 2009. “Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles: Ghana Case Study”, Prepared for Parliamentary Centre, January 2009. A–16 Country: Ghana Sectors: Education; Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Levels: National; Local Implementing Organization: Integrated Social Development Centre Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Monitoring A1.8. Analyzing and Publicizing the Budget to Promote Pro-Poor Fiscal Policy Context • The IFP also provides training to local government staff, legisla- In 2000, the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), a civil tors, and civil society groups on pro-poor planning and budget- society organization (CSO), created the Centre for Budget Advocacy ing, enabling it to engage directly with key decision makers. (CBA) with the mandate to specialize in social budgeting activities. Africa Now relaunched as the Institute for Fiscal Policy (IFP), the CBA helps Results ISODEC and other advocacy groups underpin their policy arguments • Adoption of IFP’s fiscal policy suggestions. Some recommenda- with informed budget analyses. Furthermore, it uses budget informa- tions included in the Open Letters to the President and in the tion to engage with policy makers for more pro-poor tax rules and IFP budget statements have been adopted by the government, spending, particularly with regard to education. including revenue and expenditure measures advocated for by the IFP, although other factors could have contributed to this, Actions (2000–present) too. • The IFP analyzes annual pre-budget and post-budget state- • Dissemination of budget and regular reports on education ments and comments on government budget policy. It also part- expenditures. The IFP has been successful in producing and ners with other groups to produce themed budget analyses. For widely disseminating regular reports on the budget. It also suc- instance, in 2009, it produced a study with UNICEF that showed cessfully facilitated the formation of the GNECC, and through that, despite overall expenditure exceeding the budget in 2008, the coalition, the production of regular reports on expenditures spending for sectors critical to children and women was below at the school level. In addition, it collaborates with the coalition budgeted amounts. to influence educational policies and allocations, resulting in • Once the national budget is passed, the IFP analyzes district-level increased investment in the education sector through the gov- budgets to determine the share of the budget going to social ernment’s capitation grant. sectors. It has also worked with the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC), a network of nongovernmental Implications for Project Teams organizations (NGOs) working on education issues to track dis- • Supporting organizations such as the IFP can lead to more budget trict-level education budgets. The IFP developed surveys for transparency and, eventually, to increased expenditure on social GNECC to interview students, teachers, and others to monitor development. how capitation grants1 are used and helped the coalition ana- • For results to materialize in budget processes or policies, techni- lyze the gathered data. The coalition used the resulting reports to cal or financial support to CSOs may need to be provided over engage the Ministry of Education and school-level officials. several years. • The IFP disseminates the findings of its pre- and postbudget analysis through ISODEC’s bulletin “Public Agenda” as well as References through radio and television. It organizes local, national, and inter- ISODEC Website: http://www.isodec.org.gh/aboutus.php. national workshops as well as press conferences, and also pub- De Renzio, Paolo. 2005. “CSOs and Budgets: Linking Evidence and Pro-Poor Policies.” Overseas Development Institute United Kingdom. lishes articles in newspapers. It sponsors annual forums across the 10 regions to collect public opinions on the annual budget and then includes them in its “Open Letters” to the President. 1. Capitation grants are school operating grants. Under the policy, the central government makes cash transfers to all public schools based on the number of students enrolled. In other words, it allocates funds to schools on a per capita basis to support efforts at improving school performance. A–17 Country: Ghana Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) and (Decentralization) Level: Local Implementing Organization: African Development Program Area of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Monitoring A1.9. Tracking District Budget Allocations and Disbursements to Promote the More Efficient Use of Public Resources Context Results Decentralization can lead to severe imbalances in the regional distri- • Evidence of a serious lack of accountability and transparency bution of wealth and development, as the resources of local authori- in district budget allocations and disbursements. Some of the Africa ties are often unequal. This was the case in Ghana, in the 1990s, when major findings were that (1) for the past four-year period, the district assemblies were facing problems in generating their own rev- ministry of finance had never released the full allocation to the enues to meet their financial commitments. The District Assemblies’ administrator of the DACF; (2) there were several delays through- Common Fund (DACF) was set up as a pool of resources created out the disbursement process, including the submission of the under section 252 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana. It is a minimum proposed formula to parliament, the acquisition of approval, of 5 percent of the national revenue that is set aside for sharing with the allocating of funds, and finally, the disbursement of funds to all district assemblies in Ghana by a parliament-approved formula, the various MMDAs and even the receipt of the money by the enabling the use of the nation’s wealth for the benefit of all citizens. assemblies; and (3) baring one district, the amounts received by Since the turn of the century, however, payments into the DACF have the district assemblies were lower than what was allocated and been delayed for more than a year, resulting in a failure to disburse what was to be disbursed to them. to the metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs). • Improved sensitization and awareness. Through the process of Moreover, there have been complaints from citizens and reports of participating in this research, monitoring, and evaluation of the misapplication and financial malpractices in connection with the dis- DACF, and through focus group discussions with community mem- bursements to and use of proceeds by the MMDAs. Therefore, to bers, both were sensitized to the DACF. Moreover, this was the first monitor the DACF, to find out if the guidelines of the DACF are trans- time that links were established between the government, devel- parent and well followed, if resources allocated indeed get to the opment partners, and the team undertaking the study. MMDAs, and if the funds received by MMDAs are used for assigned • Limited follow-up by district officials. Documentation on the purposes, the African Development Program, in collaboration with DACF and the undertaken projects is either not available or not other nongovernmental organizations, has engaged in intense bud- easily accessible. At the roundtable discussions in one of the dis- get analysis and tracking with the explicit aim of bringing about more tricts, the representatives of the assemblies promised to send transparency and more efficient use of public resources at the dis- more detailed information, but none of the four districts actually trict level. did so. • Lack of sustained funding. One problem is the lack of funding Actions (April–July 2003) support to mobilize and train communities as a follow-up activity • Primary and secondary data was collected on allocation and and for the institutionalization of involving civil society organiza- disbursements of the DACF at the regional and district level. A tions in the tracking of DACF and other public funds to become comprehensive body of information on budget allocations was part of the decentralization process. compiled on four district assemblies—from the West, East, North, and the Ashanti region by means of key informant interviews car- Implications for Project Teams ried out to gather primary information and to verify information Involving the government and communities in the research and provided by various agencies and documents, through observa- monitoring and evaluation process from the very beginning is key tion of physical evidence, and through focus-group discussions at to ensuring that their perspectives are taken into account, which the community level. also facilitates data collection for budget tracking and analysis. • The data was then analyzed in terms of the timeliness of alloca- Additionally, technical and financial support for such initiatives tions, disbursements, receipts of the funds, and the consistency needs to be sustained over lengthy periods of time if they are to be of the amounts allocated by each agency with the amount actu- effective. ally received by the four district assemblies. References King, Rudith, Vitus A Azeem, Charles Abbey, Samuel Kwaku Boatang, and Donkris Mevuta. 2010. “A Report on Tracking of the District Assemblies Common Fund: A Pilot Study of Four District Assemblies.” In Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa, edited by Mary McNeil and Carmen Malena, chapter 4. Washington, DC: World Bank. A–18 Country: Kenya Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Local Implementing Organization: Muslims for Human Rights Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Constituency Development Funds; Monitoring; Social Audits A1.10. Using Social Audits to Monitor Constituency Development Funds Context Results Established in 2003, Kenya’s Constituency Development Fund (CDF) • Signing of petition for greater transparency. Toward the end entitles each Member of Parliament (MP) in Kenya to allocate approx- of the hearing, the Chamgamwe MP signed a petition that imately 83,839,922 Kenyan shillings (approximately US$987,420) per demanded greater accountability and transparency measures be Africa year to support development projects in their district. While some incorporated into the CDF Act and called for a comprehensive reports praise the projects funded by the CDF and its potential to freedom-of-information law, which he had previously opposed. improve community infrastructure, others complain about corrup- • Reelection of the Chamgamwe MP. At the end of 2007, the tion and a lack of public accountability in the management of CDF MP was reelected, even while the majority of sitting MPs lost funds. Since 2005, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), a nongovern- their seats. CDC officials and the MP himself acknowledged to mental organization based in Mombassa, Kenya, has been monitoring MUHURI staff members that “at least 40 percent” of the votes expenditures made under the CDF. the MP received were due to the social audit. • Social audit precedent for the Bahari constituency. Given the Actions (2005-present) precedent set in Chamgamwe, the Bahari MP agreed to give MUHURI conducted two social audits—one in August 2007 in MUHURI access to Bahari’s CDF records. According to govern- Changamwe and the other in July 2008 in Bahari. ment audit reports, Bahari had the “best-managed” CDF in the country, but the social audit revealed several irregularities. A pub- • Because there is no access-to-information law in Kenya, MUHURI lic hearing with over 1,000 attendees was held, but the proceed- struggled unsuccessfully against resistant officials for two years ings were delayed and CDC members did not attend. to gain access to CDF documents. However, by describing the • Unsuccessful attempts to gain access to CDF funds in other con- audit as a “training” event instead of a public discussion, MUHURI stituencies. After these two social audits, attempts by MUHURI eventually convinced the MP of Changamwe that the social audit to acquire CDF documents from the Kisauni and Likoni constitu- would be a groundbreaking event because he would be the first encies were unsuccessful. Even though both constituencies had MP to ever open his accounts to civil society. In addition, they new MPs who would not be implicated in any mismanagement convinced the MP that the audit would help boost his public of the CDFs that the social audits might uncover, both refused to image—a particularly persuasive argument during an election provide the CDF records to MUHURI. year. MUHURI obtained a partial set of CDF records for 14 proj- ects as part of the social audit—projects the Changamwe CDF Implications for Project Teams Committee (CDC) considered the best. These included bills of CDF legislation should have disclosure provisions, and right-to-infor- quantities, minutes of CDC meetings; and completion certificates. mation legislation greatly facilitates the implementation of budget • Using these acquired documents, MUHURI and the social audit transparency interventions. Furthermore, reelection plans can be lev- team conducted site visits to all 14 projects, which included eraged to gain support for budget transparency activities. interviews with local residents. They discovered a number of problems in the implementation of the projects that would have References been impossible to identify without detailed project records. A MUHURI Website: http://www.muhuri.org. day-long public hearing was then held to announce the findings, International Budget Partnership. 2008. “Partnering to Make Budgets Work for the with an attendance of approximately 1,500, including residents, People: Case of Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Kenya.” International Budget local CDF officials, and the media. Partnership, Washington, DC. O’Riordan, Alexander. 2010. “Towards an Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in Kenya.” In Social Accountability in Africa: Practitioners’ Experiences and Lessons, edited by Mario Claasen and Carmen Alpin-Lardies, Chapter 12, Section 3, IDASA and ANSA-Africa. A–19 Country: Kenya Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Institute of Economic Affairs Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Dissemination; Legislatures; Participatory Budget Planning A1.11. Facilitating the Review of Public Policy and Public Affairs to Inform Budget Decision-making Context Results During the 1980s and 1990s Kenya’s fiscal policy was characterized • Positive influence over legislation. In March 2003, parliament by persistent budget deficits, a rising debt burden, and poor utili- passed a motion allowing a bill to be brought before the House Africa zation of public funds resulting from corruption, weak account- that would establish a parliamentary budget office. The IEA, ability, wasteful spending, and a lack of openness in the budget working with several reform-minded legislators, was centrally process. Because budget information has not been readily available involved in the drafting of this bill and the subsequent revision to civil society, Kenya’s Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA’s) Budget to the parliamentary standing orders that enhanced the role and Information Programme (BIP) promotes informed debates on public effectiveness of parliament in the monitoring of public finances. policy issues by targeting policymakers, including members of parlia- More recently, BIP made a number of proposals for Kenya’s PFM ment (MPs), civil society, private sector actors, and the public at large. Bill 2011, one of which reiterated the need for clear disclosures on all financial reports and was incorporated in the published draft Actions (1994-present) of the amended Public Financial Management bill. • Every year, BIP hosts pre-budget hearings that provide an oppor- • Improved communication of the concerns of multiple sectors. tunity for the corporate sector, the social sector, and other BIP’s activities have given voice to sectors that are not normally interested groups to make budget proposals for possible consid- consulted by government. Rather than considering only the main eration by the treasury. Submissions are synthesized by the IEA productive sectors like agriculture and manufacturing, the gov- in the form of a Citizen Alternative Budget and presented to the ernment is now exposed to the concerns of, for example, the treasury for consideration. service sector, the capital markets, the Bankers Institute, and the • After the presentation of the budget but before the parliamen- social sectors. tary debate on the budget, BIP summarizes key points from the • Utilization of BIP Training. Some organizations have used the budget documents and presents the information to members skills and knowledge from BIP’s trainings to undertake budget of parliament in a timely manner that is easy to comprehend. It monitoring and analysis from a gender perspective; organizations also provides key budget information to the media in order to such as ABANTU, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and the stimulate public interest. Health Rights Advocacy Forum (HERAF), among others, have used • BIP conducts additional in-depth research and analyses on pub- various tools, including community scorecards. lic policy and budgets, disseminating it in the form of bulletins and research papers to the media, civil society, parliament, and Implications for Project Teams ministries. Its manuals on budget literacy include the “MP’s Guide Building expertise to influence the budget process and gain legiti- to the Budget” and “Training for Trainers.” macy as a stakeholder takes a number of years as well as strategies • BIP organizes post-budget workshops. During the post-budget such as capacity building and information dissemination. workshop for the Members of Parliament in September 2011, BIP presented a written memorandum to the commission entitled References “Implementation of the Constitution and the Ministry of Local Institute of Economic Affairs Website: http://www.ieakenya.or.ke. Government.” It laid out BIP’s concerns about the need for space Institute of Economic Affairs. 2012. “Annual Report 2011.” IEA-Kenya. for public participation and its support for stronger transparency International Budget Project. 2000. “A Taste of Success: Examples of the Budget in the budget process. Work of NGOs.” International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. • BIP represents civil society in the task force established by the Mwenda, Albert K., and Mary N. Gachocho. 2003. “Budget Transparency: Kenyan Perspective.” Research Paper Series No. 4, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. permanent secretary in the ministry of finance to develop the second five-year Public Financial Management (PFM) reform strat- egy (2013–18). A–20 Country: Kenya Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Levels: Local; Provincial Implementing Organization: Social Development Network Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Disclosure; Coalition Building; Monitoring A1.12. Mobilizing Citizens to Influence Development Planning and Resource Allocation Context Results The Social Development Network (SODNET) is a voluntary forum • Creation of self-sufficient budget groups. The grassroots groups founded in April 1994 to promote effective strategic alliances among created by SODNET have become effective at transmitting popu- Africa nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interested in social devel- lar social demands from below and mobilizing popular participa- opment. One of SODNET’s programs is designed to facilitate public tion in policy making. They elect their own representatives and participation in the budget process. This was in response to the fact form committees for this work. The committees also submit that most citizens in Nairobi are unaware of the link between the quarterly reports to SODNET and monitor resource allocation national budget and grassroots-level spending given that the budget and use. Overall, SODNET’s activities have provided a way for citi- is a technocratic project involving little effort to engage the public zens to effectively engage with other actors, allowing citizens to by the government. SODNET provides opportunities for local com- shape social policy processes that influence development plan- munities to monitor the management of public resources across the ning, resource allocation, and use and to monitor public resource country through its social watch chapters. This is achieved by pro- management in a way that facilitates government fulfillment of cessing public demands for probity, transparency, and accountability the needs of people, especially those living in poverty. among public servants. • Improved understanding of budget processes. The initiatives first began in 1996 in only three districts, but today SODNET has Actions (1996–present) chapters in sixteen Kenyan districts. There has been an ever- • SODNET has facilitated the establishment of committed grass- increasing demand from SODNET’s grassroots constituencies for roots groups in the districts to monitor public expenditures and more intensified popularization of the budget process and for demand participation in the governance processes. SODNET also meeting ordinary Kenyans’ need to gain a deeper and more func- supports this cadre by holding workshops and training events, tional understanding of the intricate—and sometimes decep- presenting group concerns to national ministries, encouraging tive—linkages between macroeconomic framework conditions cooperation with government officials at the district level, and and the budgetary dispensations that accompany the annual par- holding regional and national meetings. liamentary business. • SODNET has set up what is now called the “Infonet programme,” which aims to weave technology, open data, and citizen empow- Implications for Project Teams erment into a potent product for social change. SODNET’s An effective way to enhance citizen awareness and collect citizen Infonet program supports four different projects. One of them, feedback on the budget is by creating and nurturing grassroots orga- named Ugatuzi, is a budget-tracking tool designed to enable nizations that work on budgetary issues. However, it is important to citizen engagement in Public Financial Management. It provides go beyond merely building strategic alliances on the demand side— constituency-level information on projects funded by devolved SODNET’s primary focus—because it is only when the demand side funds: project timelines, description, project status, and multiyear strategically links up with the supply side, and relevant entry points disbursement schedules. It allows organized groups in communi- of the supply side are identified, that the budget transparency loop ties to input comments and identify incidences of corruption and can be expected to be closed. The ability of a civil society organiza- malpractice. tion to advance its goals can be greatly enhanced if it develops the • SODNET works closely with multiple stakeholders on budget capacity to engage as partners in the local and national economic issues, including government officials, parliamentarians, other governance processes. nongovernmental organizations, and the media. It also establishes liaisons with NGOs working on similar issues. Reference SODNET Website, Kenya: http://www.sodnet.org. A–21 Country: Liberia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Fourth Reengagement and Reform Support Program Areas of Engagement: Capacity Building; Procurement A1.13. Holistic Procurement Reform toward Reconstruction of Post-War Liberia Context Results Fourteen years of civil war (1989–2003) destroyed Liberia’s profes- By addressing capacity issues for the regulatory body, public sec- sional workforce, infrastructure, and institutional capacity. The public tor personnel, and private service providers, the approach is already Africa procurement system disappeared and the country was left without transforming Liberia’s procurement process. skilled practitioners. Civil servants, without the necessary training and experience, carried out procurement. This held back Liberia’s • Enhanced procurement oversight. The reforms have strength- recovery—in large part due to procurement delays, only 46 percent ened the public procurement and concessions commission, of the capital budget was spent in the fiscal year 2009–10. Faced with enabling it to recruit and train new monitors so it can begin pro- an overwhelming lack of capacity, the Liberian government realized curement monitoring expected of a regulatory body. Government it needed to go beyond traditional procurement reform, which tends institutions must have approval from the commission for their to emphasize the creation of a strong regulatory system. Instead, first procurement plans before they can access their allocations from and foremost, it aimed to ensure that all stakeholders—from moni- the national budget. The commission now has a public website tors to suppliers—had the right knowledge and systems to fully play where it publishes information, including procurement plans and their roles. opportunities. It has also started reviewing procurement docu- ments from government institutions, in compliance with the law. Actions (2011–13) • Strengthened capacity for cadre of professionals. The short- To drive the massive reconstruction effort, a three-pronged approach term in-service training and monthly procurement clinics have to procurement reform assisted by the World Bank supported strengthened staff capacity, resulting in better quality docu- Reengagement and Reform Support Program (RRSP4) was taken: ments and reduced lead times for the procurement processes. • Increased budget utilization. The percentage of the budget • Liberia’s existing oversight body, the public procurement and spent rose nine points—to 58 percent—for the year 2010–11, concessions commission (PPCC), urgently needed strengthen- benefitting all sectors, from agriculture and infrastructure to ing so it could adequately perform its regulatory function. With health and education. Instead of obtaining quotations only from World Bank support, a consultant conducted an assessment of known suppliers or awarding contracts directly to a specific com- its human resource requirements and identified a severe short- pany, procurement staff now places notices of public procure- age. As a result, the government employed 12 additional procure- ment opportunities in the newspapers. Tighter procurement ment monitors, increasing the total number of staff to 40. The practices have helped Liberia improve its score on Transparency consultant developed a roadmap to further strengthen the International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since 2010, from a commission’s institutional capacity and funding was secured to ranking of 87 out of 178 countries in 2010 to 75 out of 176 in 2012. implement these recommendations. • To upgrade the skills of existing procurement employees and to Implications for Project Teams train newly-recruited personnel, the government began a short- While capacity building is routine in projects of this nature, ensuring term in-service training program through the Liberia Institute that it is holistic takes more effort. In a fragile state with a dearth for Public Administration. A World Bank procurement specialist of critical skills, capacity building can be accompanied by improved facilitated monthly procurement clinics at the ministry of public incentive schemes and intensive in-service training. Enriching the works to impart practical skills for carrying out procurement pro- career development of participants ensures their commitment to cesses to staff. The government also established a Procurement the course. Training School to deliver an intensive one-year procurement training course to 25 students per year to provide procurement Reference specialists for deployment in the public sector. Chinamale, Winter. 2012. “Reconstruction in PostWar Liberia: Holistic Procurement Reform.” Case Study prepared for Procurement Innovation Challenge, World Bank, • To help local suppliers of goods and services participate effec- Washington, DC. tively in the tender process, the PPPC began regular sessions to train private sector staff on how to submit competitive bids. A–22 Country: Malawi Sectors: Education; Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.14. Public Expenditure Tracking of the Education Budget for Better Outcomes for Students and Teachers Context • CSCQBE has set up 13 district networks to decentralize moni- From 1994 to 2001, increased funding for education in Malawi has toring of the education budget in order to give citizens more not translated into increased quality of education. The Malawi control of the budget monitoring process. These networks sup- Africa government’s funds for education are given to the National Local port school-based budget monitoring by school or community- Government Finance Committee, which allocates funds directly to based groups like school boards or parent–teacher associations. districts using parliament-approved formulas. District assemblies then distribute funds to the schools as they see fit. In 1999, for Results example, the Ministry of Education was conned out of MK 187 mil- • Increased allocations. Based on the evidence provided by lion (US$453,585) slated for school construction. To fight such abuse, CSCQBE, the Malawi government has been addressing the dis- since 2002, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education parities between rural and urban areas and plans to introduce (CSCQBE) in Malawi has performed annual budget monitoring surveys incentives for rural teachers, including providing hardship allow- of education expenditures. Using the Education for All (EFA) assess- ances and paying for the construction of housing for rural teach- ment and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as guidelines, ers. Similarly, government budget statements reflected that funds the coalition has conducted surveys to ensure that the government to purchase teaching and learning materials and to train teachers has allocated sufficient resources to basic education that are in line who specialize in teaching children with special needs increased with the EFA and MDG goals and that these resources are spent from MK 20 million (US$51,638.480) in 2002–03 to MK 34 million according to the government’s policy and budget. (approximately US$87,777) in 2004-05. • Institutionalization of budget work. Complementing CSCQBE’s Actions (2002–present) survey efforts, in 2004, the Malawi government conducted the • For its surveys, the CSCQBE samples roughly 10 percent of all first public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) for the education schools in Malawi. The schools are divided into geographical sector, and civil society counterparts were included in the Survey regions and then subdivided into rural and urban schools from Management Team. which a certain number are randomly chosen. Member organiza- tions of the CSCQBE administer the surveys to sampled schools. Implications for Project Teams • When in 2003 it was discovered that a number of teachers either PETS can be successfully conducted, even in low-capacity environ- received their salaries late or did not receive them at all, CSCQBE ments, if challenges such as inadequate budget data produced by the lobbied a parliamentary committee on education to investi- government and limited time and technical capacity of civil society gate the issue. The committee returned a report to the national to analyze data and produce quality reports are overcome. assembly. • A draft report of the results of each year’s survey is circulated References among CSCQBE organizations and discussed at a special budget CSCQBE Website: http://www.cscqbe.org. monitoring meeting. In order to coincide with the budget delib- Ramkumar, Vivek. 2008. “Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education Carries out Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Malawi.” In Our Money, eration in Parliament, the report is released in June at a public Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditure. meeting with ministry officials, parliamentarians, development Washington, DC: International Budget Partnership. partners, and the media. The CSCQBE sends out press releases and holds district meetings where district assembly officials, district education officials, civil society organizations, and school officials can discuss the results and, if necessary, formulate action plans to address any salient issues. A–23 Country: Mali Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: Governance and Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance Areas of Engagement: Budget Monitoring; Capacity Building; Citizens Budgets A1.15. Monitoring Budgets to Improve Service Delivery After Decentralization Context Results When it was enshrined in the 1992 constitution, decentralization—a • Preparation and dissemination of studies and templates for central element of the modernization agenda in Mali—was expected training and capacity building of CTs and communities. First and to improve allocation efficiency in the face of different local prefer- foremost, studies have been prepared to identify resources to be Africa ences for public goods. In the past two decades, Mali has made signif- transferred to CT and guidelines and templates on the partici- icant progress in the postdecentralization era, especially with respect patory monitoring and evaluation systems in education are now to budget credibility, comprehensiveness, transparency, policy-based available and have been disseminated. Moreover, training material budgeting, and predictability in budget execution at the central level. on citizen budgets to train community members have also been Moreover, several competencies have been successfully transferred cleared. And finally, templates for the treatment of financial data to the municipalities (Collectivités Territoriales or CT). However, the for citizen surveillance committees are now available. transfer of resources needed for their effective implementation has • Training of CTs and piloting of citizens budget. Several training lagged behind. Also, several challenges remain to improve the pub- sessions have already been organized on budget preparation and lic administration, law, and justice system, especially with regard to execution as well as on procurement procedures at the CT level. accounting and financial reporting, internal and external audit and Moreover, in certain CTs, citizens budgets are now being piloted oversight, and enhancing capacities at the decentralized level. At the as well. request of the government of Mali, the World Bank’s Governance • Delay of progress due to country context. To date, there have and Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance was financed to been a number of barriers to project implementation; given strengthen capacity for Public Financial Management at the CT level the weak capacity of implementers, some aspects related to for improved budgetary decision-making and enhanced transparency the implementation mechanism, specifically combining national and oversight. One of the three components of the technical assis- and World Bank procedures, have proven to be quite complex. tance (TA)—External Oversight and Community Participation with a Following a supervision mission in March 2013, a number of mea- budget of US$1.7 million—is supporting capacity building for fidu- sures were adopted to simplify procurement plans with a more ciary oversight and participation by communities. fluid validation mechanism; significant progress regarding imple- mentation is expected by the end of 2013. Actions (2011–14) • The specific subcomponent related to budget transparency Implications for Project Teams and monitoring provides support to establish a framework for Once citizens budgets are prepared and disseminated, it is important effective participation of key stakeholders, including women to take the next logical step to close the budget transparency loop and youth, in the monitoring and evaluation of the allocation and by ensuring its active utilization by all stakeholders and ownership by use of public resources. both the CTs and the committees of these budgets. Moreover, since • Guidelines for citizen budgets are being prepared and civil the purpose of the citizens budget is to enable people to participate servants, elected officials, and civil society members are being in discussions around the budget, it should be made available and trained to prepare citizens budgets as well produced as soon as the budget is approved . • Consultants are preparing studies and providing input for the drafting of procedure manuals on the collection and treatment References of financial data to inform community surveillance committees, Mali—ML–Governance and Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance Project: P112821—Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 03 (English), ISR 9806, they will also provide training on the use of such manuals. World Bank, Washington, DC. April 15, 2013, • Study visits are being organized so that officials and commu- Mali—ML–Governance and Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance Project: nity members across CTs in the country and in the West African P112821—Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 57477, April 4, 2011, World Bank, Economic and Monetary Union countries can learn from each Washington, DC. other about budget monitoring. A–24 Country: Namibia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Institute for Public Policy Research Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Citizens Budgets; Simplification A1.16. Making National Budgets Accessible to Citizens through Budget Analysis Context Results The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) is a nonprofit organi- • Introduction of a Citizens Budget. The ministry of finance has zation dedicated to enhancing budget transparency at the national embarked on producing a leaflet entitled “A Citizen’s Guide to level in Namibia. It was founded in 2001 in a context of limited bud- the National Budget” containing annual public spending and rev- Africa get analysis within and outside the government as well as limited enue in a nutshell and actively distributing it as a supplement to civil society participation in national budget formulation. The prob- newspapers and via the Internet. lem was not one of limited information. As IPPR notes, there were • Improved Open Budget Index (OBI) ranking. Namibia’s rank in a plethora of budget documents that could be readily downloaded the 2012 Open Budget Survey went from 53 to 55 and is now from their website. Instead, the problem was that the quality of the ranked second in Africa, suggesting that more user-friendly bud- documents did not keep up with the quantity. There were plenty of get information is now available to the general public. discrepancies in estimates, each document was more than 800 pages • Uptake of IPPR’s suggestions by the government. The ministry long and difficult for the casual reader to navigate, let alone under- of finance has taken up many of the recommendations contained stand the finer details. Therefore, IPPR aimed to make the national in the budget analysis, including a three-year rolling budget, fiscal budget accessible to the general public, to provide accessible infor- targets, disclosure of contingent liabilities, future projections, and mation and analysis to policy makers, and to assess whether the bud- improvement of budget documents and data. get met stated policy objectives. • Suggestions for improved budget transparency and citizen engagement. IPPR research is read and used by the government Actions (2009–Present) but is not institutionalized in any sense. Moreover, IPPR research • IPPR conducts the Open Budget Survey for Namibia, and helps suggests that, in order for Namibia to get a score between 61 and produce general budget commentary by applying general eco- 80 on the OBI (wherein citizens get a “substantial peek” into state nomic principles to assess the extent to which the budget is coffers), more must be done by the government (for example, being used to meet national development objectives. holding a pre-budget briefing before it is tabled in parliament, a • Because the existing Namibian budget documents are difficult to mid-term budget review in order to assess the execution of pro- navigate and often use somewhat technical language, the need grams and projects halfway through the financial year and inform for a Citizens Budget was expressed; this would allow not only a citizens about the progress made. larger share of Namibians to understand the budget and make their voices heard, but would also address key questions, such as the Implications for Project Teams government’s overall strategy with the budget, how the budget can In countries with low state capacity for quick uptake, high-quality help during the economic crisis, and what it is being spent on. budget analysis needs to be backed by capacity-building efforts. • IPPR also appealed to the ministry of finance to involve ordinary citizens in the budget formulation process. References IPPR Website: http://www.ippr.org.na/?q=news. allAfrica. 2013. “Namibia: National Budget Rated Very Highly.” http://allafrica.com/ stories/201304030716.html. A–25 Country: Nigeria Sectors: Mining; Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Provincial Name of Project: Nigeria Procurement Monitoring Project Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; ICT; Monitoring; Procurement A1.17. Citizens Training Toward Better Procurement Monitoring Context Access is open to the general public and includes standard web- After years of scandal, Nigeria has struggled to restore public trust in site tab displays and an open source library. The participatory, the government and rid the public sector of persistent corruption. analytical, and technical pages on the portal are focused on This is most apparent in the government procurement process, where generating procurement reports, offering online procurement Africa approximately 70 percent of government activity seems takes place training, and providing procurement-related legal advice; access behind closed doors. Complicating matters, public-service contract- is restricted to verified procurement monitors. ing is often highly technical, making it arcane and difficult for the • To ensure that procurement information can be reported with average citizen to take advantage of recent laws allowing civil society uniformity, a standard checklist was developed based on the to observe all stages of the procurement process. As a result, citizens benchmarks in the Public Procurement Act and in consultation are often unable to monitor and provide feedback to the govern- with representatives from the various identified stakeholders. ment about this process. In order to strengthen the feedback loop in energy sector investments, the World Bank is working with the Results government of Nigeria as well as local CSOs to train citizen monitors • Better dissemination and scrutiny of public works. Over 120 citi- that can ensure accountability and effectiveness of expenditures. zen monitors trained as part of the project are now actively track- Under the Nigeria Procurement Monitoring Project, the World Bank ing public works across the country. The website has gone live provided technical assistance on contract monitoring by drawing on and is fully functioning, and it serves as an important educational lessons learned from procurement systems around the world. Within tool for citizens interested in accessing reports and guidelines. the government, the project has worked primarily with the bureau • Created an active online portal. Citizen monitors have generated of public procurement, the regulatory agency for government pro- and submitted 135 reports through the online portal. curement. The project has also established a voluntary coalition of • Greater state-society coordination on issues of corruption. The Nigerian civil society organization (CSOs), led by the Nigerian Public project has successfully fostered a strong working relationship and Private Development Center. Other members of the coalition between CSOs and government enforcement agencies aimed include representatives from the extractive industries and the media. at eliminating corruption. Citizen monitors file reports while the bureau of public procurement ensures that appropriate follow- Actions (2009–present) up action is taken. • The design of the procurement portal observatory is innova- tive; careful thought and consideration was put into the needs Implication for Project Teams of the various stakeholders in the procurement process including Lessons learned from the Nigerian experience to date indicate that investigative journalists; CSOs; professional bodies (procurement the use of information and communication technology by citizens— observers); the bureau of public procurement (regulators); federal such as the website—has much room for improvement. It cannot ministries, departments, and agencies (procuring entities); con- be assumed that citizens will automatically use available technology; tractors, suppliers, and bidders; development communities, and incentives should be offered to encourage people to fully partici- Nigerian citizens. pate in monitoring projects that use technology. Moreover, there is a • During the development phase of the procurement portal growing understanding that information might need to be presented observatory, advocacy toward and capacity-building activities organized by sectors so that citizens can monitor areas of particular for various stakeholders—CSOs, professionals, regulators, pub- interest to them; people tend to find it easier to monitor procure- lic procurement officers, and legislators—were undertaken to ment in subject matters that they are already interested in. ensure that the system and design framework could meet the information needs of various stakeholders and that it could be Reference scaled up. Procurement Monitoring Portal Observatory Website: http://www.procurementmonitor.org. • The portal is broadly categorized into descriptive pages (open) and participatory, analytical, and technical pages (restricted). The descriptive pages are mainly for receiving and sharing information. A–26 Country: Nigeria Sector: Mining Level: Provincial Implementing Organization: Revenue Watch Institute Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Capacity Building A1.18. Attempting to Work with Multistakeholder Groups to Institutionalize Budget Transparency Context Results Like many resource-rich countries, Nigeria passes a great portion of • Limited impact on increasing transparency. While civil society’s its oil wealth directly to oil-producing regions such as Bayelsa State— understanding of Public Financial Management systems and its Africa an underdeveloped region that was the site of Nigeria’s first oil dis- ability to analyze and critique government planning and budget- covery in 1956). But without careful management and oversight, such ing processes has increased, this awareness has not yet translated increased revenues can undermine local economic stability, reduce into improved transparency and accountability of resource reve- accountability, and increase conflict. In fact, the state government nues or increased government capacity and performance. A web- is frequently accused of financial recklessness and mindless extrava- site—http://bayelsa.gov.ng/beiti—has been created but is rarely gance. Paradoxically, Bayelsa State is the only state in Nigeria that updated. is implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative at • Failure to pass BEITI bill. Because BEITI was housed in the bureau the state level. The Bayelsa Expenditure and Income Transparency of due process and e-government that lacks its own legal frame- Initiative (BEITI), is a multistakeholder initiative inaugurated by the work and only recently became a full-fledged agency of the gov- government and supported by the United States-based Revenue ernment, passage of the bill was delayed. This delay evoked CSO Watch Institute (RWI). Launched in 2008, BEITI’s main aim is to institu- advocacy and lobbying led by BANGOF, but despite best efforts, tionalize transparency and accountability and enhance citizen partic- the bill was not passed. ipation in the budget process. It was initiated by executive governor • Limited gains on challenging top-down structures. Despite the of Bayelsa to demonstrate his commitment to running an account- bold step of including civil society in the multistakeholder work- able government that seeks sustainable development for its citizens ing group, colonial legacies of top-down governance proved hard beyond oil, and that seeks to decrease vulnerability to conflict and to challenge in the short run. social violence. However, despite being the first state in the Niger • Small wins. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the attempt to Delta to publish its budget and revenue allocation, what began with develop and institutionalize the initiative has produced lessons a “big bang,” has cooled down over time. critical to replication efforts elsewhere in the country. Actions (2008–11) Implications for Project Teams • Soon after BEITI was established, the governor brought together Ideally, a subnational project should be embedded within the state a multistakeholder working group comprised of top govern- government’s development strategy and viewed as a key aspect of ment officials, including commissioners, directors, the director of Public Financial Management reform. In terms of institutional loca- due process and e-governance, oil company representatives, the tion, subnational initiatives are better placed within one of the core private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs) who worked finance agencies, ministries or departments before they try to acquire collectively to open up the books of the state to the highest level their own legal framework and measures of independence from the of scrutiny in an attempt to position Bayelsa as Nigeria’s most government. Only then can a more transparent and accountable transparent state government. approach to governance work its way through the government via an • RWI provided technical assistance to the ministry of justice to effective communications strategy. help draft the BEITI bill (intended to improve regional trans- parency and citizen participation in the budget process, and References BANGOF has helped gather local groups to issue joint calls for Revenue Watch Website: http://www.revenuewatch.org. quicker action (for example, to expedite the passage of the bill Weate, Jeremy. 2012. “An Uphill Struggle: Oil Wealth and the Push for Transparency into law). in the Niger Delta.” Case Study, Revenue Watch Institute, New York, NY. • RWI has also funded and provided training to several CSO plat- forms—such as the Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform on budget and project monitoring at the community level; it also funded and provided reports of its findings and its efforts to increase accountability mechanisms. A–27 Country: Nigeria Sector: Education Level: Provincial Implementing Organization: Lagos State Civil Society Partnership Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Legislatures; Monitoring A1.19. Collaborating with the Provincial Government to Promote the Transparent Utilization of the Budget Context • LACSOP’s analyses of the education budget helped launch their During 2012, in their latest drive to promote citizen engagement and budget series, which includes analyses of the health, infrastruc- accountability in the budget process, the Lagos state house of assem- ture, and poverty-alleviation sectors. In turn, this research has Africa bly and the executive branch have encouraged partnerships with civil deepened their engagemens with the executive and legislative society. Established in 2007, the Lagos State Civil Society Partnership branches of government. (LACSOP) is a coalition of 47 major civil society organizations that has been working to institutionalize participatory governance and sus- Results tainable pro-poor service delivery in Lagos state through collabora- • Input for the education sector strategy. The executive asked tive interventions with the executive, legislature, and media and by LACSOP to contribute to the development of the Education conducting independent assessments of government performance. Sector Medium Term Sector Strategy 2013–15. The strategy pro- cess had not been previously been open to public participation, Actions (2007–present) but the recommendations of LACSOP were eventually adopted • LACSOP’s research on the government’s budget priorities in the by the ministry. LACSOP expects to see these changes reflected education sector has focused on teacher quality, the construction in the 2013 budget. and rehabilitation of school facilities, and the provision of tuition- • Input for 2013 budget proposal. Following engagements with the free education at all levels. In their budget analyses, LACSOP con- legislature, LACSOP’s research on education budgets prompted sidered economic indicators, including nominal growth rates and promising reactions from the executive and legislative branches the percentage of total expenditures that are budgeted for edu- of the Lagos state government, including an invitation by the cation compared to current policy commitments. state legislature to provide technical support for reviewing the • In one example, LACSOP investigated the quality of school executive governor’s budget proposal prior to the passage of the instructional materials like textbooks, which are crucial both 2013 appropriation law. This request was considered a significant to building teacher capacity and supporting student learning. breakthrough given the one-party nature of the state’s political Analysis revealed that expenditures for examinations were over terrain and the legislature’s reputation for not wanting to “rock 50 times greater than the funds allocated to books under the cur- the boat.” riculum services department. While examinations are important for measuring student learning, LACSOP argued that books should Implications for Project Teams be prioritized over exams—without adequate budget support In addition to the executive branch and the national legislature, for books, the quality of education and government efforts to engagement with provincial legislatures and executives can provide meet education commitments risked being compromised. critical entry points for engaging CSOs in the promotion of budget • In other instances, LACSOP examined the annual growth of cer- transparency. They should be considered key stakeholders in BT&M tain budget items and identified a troubling trend: from 2009 to activities. 2010, the share of total education funding budgeted for “special duties” more than doubled, from 4 to 8.6 percent. However, the References meaning of “special duties” was not clearly defined, allowing for LACSOP Website: http://www.lacsop.org. the inefficient and potentially corrupt use of education resources. Kadiri, Dede. 2012. “Civil Society Speaks; Does Government Listen?” International Budget Partnership e-Newsletter 68 (September-October). LACSOP‘s budget report stated that unless special duties can be Omankhanlen, Odidison. 2012. “Budget: Lagos Legislature Partners Civil Society.” shown to play a major role in fulfilling policy commitments and Nigeria Tribune 24 (September). improving education, such a considerable increase in allocation could be better used for items that have the potential to impact change and promote sustainable results. A–28 Country: Nigeria Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: National; Provincial Implementing Organization: The Public and Private Development Centre Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Capacity Building; Monitoring; Procurement A1.20. Engaging Civil Society Partners to Ensure a Transparent Procurement Procedure Context Results The Nigerian Procurement Monitoring Portal is an example of how • Mobilization of CSOs. CSOs now mobilize and coordinate their civil society organization (CSO) monitoring coupled with a robust engagement with the public sector on accountability and trans- Africa web-based mechanism can be effective at encouraging, promoting, parency using the free and open software made available by and supporting citizen participation in the public procurement pro- PPDC. cess. Its objective is to promote transparent, accountable, and effi- • Detection of misuse of funds. Reports from the portal placed on cient public procurement that delivers value for money and increases the listserv, guide regulators to areas of concern and support their the quality of services delivered. The portal is operated by the Public ability to prevent, detect, and investigate wrongdoing. and Private Development Centre (PPDC), a CSO that brings together the interests of both citizens and the private sector to improve pro- Implications for Project Teams curement in Nigeria. The following are the key features of the portal: Lessons learned to date from the Nigerian experience indicate that to support citizen monitoring of the Nigerian federal procurement citizen use of information and communication technology, such process to hold it accountable to statutory objectives of transpar- as the website, leaves much room for improvement. It cannot be ency and accountability; to provide citizens, media, regulatory, and assumed that citizens will automatically use technology. There should oversight stakeholders with evidence-based reports that, when mon- be incentives to encourage people to fully participate in monitoring itored, can provide early warning signals of procurement that is likely projects that use technology. Moreover, there is a growing under- to fail; and to support compliance by government entities through standing that the information presented may need to be organized public disclosure and access to information. by sector so that citizens can monitor areas where they have a par- ticular interest; it was noted that people find it easier to monitor Actions (2001–present) procurement in subject matters that already interest them. • The portal is seen as a legitimate source for advice and informa- tion. This information and communication technology-based Reference observatory is being deployed to provide virtual access for sub- World Bank. 2012. “Developing the Nigerian Procurement Monitoring Portal mission of monitoring reports by CSO representatives and other Observatory.” Public and Private Development Centre for the Procurement interested stakeholders based on simplified standard checklists, Innovation Challenge Case Study. World Bank, Washington, DC. to support automated analysis and dissemination of such reports. The observatory also provides daily legal advice for investigative journalists, and other interested observers through blogs. • CSOs use submitted reports to carry out evidence-based advo- cacy to federal ministries on the challenge of accessing procure- ment information, which has led to the creation of guidelines for accessing procurement information that, for the first time, outlines how CSOs, professional bodies, and other interested members of the public can play more effective roles in the public procurement process. This is now on the portal along with other procurement-related resources for various stakeholders, including procurement training tools and manuals. • Reports from the portal placed on the listserv, guide regulators to areas of concern and support their ability to prevent, detect, and investigate wrongdoing. A–29 Country: Sierra Leone Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Name of Project: Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project Areas of Engagement: Budget Dissemination; Capacity Building; Procurement A.21. Enhancing Service Delivery by Including Nonstate Actor Oversight in Public Financial Management Reform Context • Nonstate actor oversight, such as assisting the development of Since the end of the civil war in 2002, Sierra Leone has made signifi- analytic and dissemination capacity of nonstate actors to scruti- cant progress in building peace, achieving macroeconomic stability, nize the use of public resources. Africa reestablishing democratic institutions, strengthening core systems, and bringing decisions and resources closer to citizens through a Results (preliminary) major decentralization initiative. The government’s new poverty • Online budget dissemination. The 2012 national budget has reduction strategy paper sets the direction and development pri- been published on the MoFED website. A Citizens Budget was orities for the new administration based on a foundation of good prepared and disseminated in 2012 and 2013. governance that includes strengthening the civil service, fighting cor- • Dissemination of income and expenditure data. The accountant ruption, and strengthening Public Financial Management (PFM). The general’s department publishes income and expenditures on a Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project supports the quarterly basis through the national gazette and on the MoFED government’s integrated PFM program with interrelated components website. The national public procurement authority also pub- including one that supports capacity development, monitoring, and lishes contracts issued on their website. oversight of PFM by nonstate actors (nongovernmental organizations • Dissemination of data on central allocations for education. and civil society). The various technical activities being undertaken Local councils display funds from central government quarterly contribute to three “platforms”—credible and transparent budgets; allocations that are included in the national annual budget and improved allocation of all available resources; and greater efficiency available for primary health care and schools. and probity in resource use that leads to improved service delivery. • Improved oversight by non-state actors. Fifteen nonstate actor organizations from the four regions of the country have been Actions (2009–13) awarded grants to the tune of US$472,919 for projects that pro- Activities can be divided into four relevant components that relate mote ongoing Public Financial Management reform efforts. to improved budget management and service delivery: Implications for Project Teams • Strengthening macrofiscal coordination and budget manage- In low-capacity contexts like Sierra Leone, an incremental approach ment by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development that begins with the basics, i.e. strengthening the credibility of the (MoFED). This includes improving budget credibility associated budget and financial accountability, is more likely to be successful in with a more developed and appropriately-managed aggregate the end. Sustainable public sector reforms also require strong gov- fiscal position by establishing a macrofiscal division in MoFED; ernment ownership as well as financial commitments from and day- implementing the International Monetary Fund-styled financial to-day involvement in the work by development partners. Finally, a programming and policies model system (SLIMM); developing a multidonor approach is preferable in these low-capacity contexts. medium-term expenditure framework; and strengthening budget In the particular context of Sierra Leone, the idea of support being process in ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). provided through separate bilateral agreements was considered but • Reinforcing the control system for improved service delivery. dropped. Low-capacity governments require additional external sup- This involves 19 local councils and working toward a robust public port at the local level to facilitate regular sets of disbursement, finan- procurement cadre, norms and practices, tightened payroll and cial management, procurement, and reporting requirements to avoid compensation controls, improved accounting reporting and pro- prolonging the modernization process and to ensure transparency. cedures, and further publication of the public expenditures track- ing survey; References • Strengthening central finance functions, which primarily Sierra Leone—Integrated Public Financial Management Reform: includes the rollout of the Freebalance system, a new govern- P108069—Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 07, Report No. ISR ment resource planning technology, in 12 MDAs and all aspects of 10116, May 24, 2013, World Bank, Washington, DC. training and human resource capacity development required to Sierra Leone—Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (English), Report No. 46166, Project Appraisal Document, May 8, 2009, World Bank, support the main PFM functions; and Washington, DC. A–30 Country: Sierra Leone Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit III Areas of Engagement: Monitoring; Participatory Budget Planning A1.22. Enhancing Participation in the Monitoring and Execution of the Budget in a Post-Conflict Situation Context established in all regions. They participate in annual budget dis- A couple of years after emerging from the end of a brutal civil war cussions when the ministries and departments defend their poli- that lasted more than ten years, Sierra Leone made gradual but sig- cies and budget proposals and discuss activities carried out in the Africa nificant progress in reestablishing peace and security and promot- previous year. The budget discussions are also attended by rep- ing social and economic security for its people. In particular, the resentatives of local and international nongovernmental organi- government has made significant progress in strengthening public zations as well as representatives of their development partners expenditure management under reforms aimed at strengthening in the country to inform them of the government’s development budget implementation, monitoring, and expenditure control. These activities so as to avoid overlapping or duplicating development reforms have been supported by the World Bank through ERRC I and efforts. Another task of the community budget oversight com- II, an important component of which was the involvement of local mittees is to monitor budget implementation in their respec- communities in the budget process. In fact, fiscal 2002 witnessed a tive regions or districts, complementing the PETS task team. substantive increase in participation by civil society in budget for- mulation, with consultative workshops and sector discussions help- Results ing identify expenditure priorities and allocation of resources. The • Reduction in leakages of school budget allocations as a result Republic of Sierra Leone expressed its intent to maintain this partici- of PETS. New PETS reports on education and essential drugs were pative process; one of the main aims of the ERRC III was to assist the completed. The former led to reduced leakages in resources trans- government with this process. ferred to the primary school system. Overall, PETS has strength- ened the accountability framework for the government—the Activities (2004–05) president’s national policy advisory committee, auditor general, To ensure the transparent and accountable management of public and anticorruption commission agreed that the PETS report was expenditures, the following actions were taken: an important source of information for their work. Apart from highlighting the leakages, it has also pinpointed the importance • Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) were used to exam- of strong planning norms for budgeting. ine the flow of funds from the center to frontline delivery units • Increased awareness of financial management problems and in order to explore and understand the lack of correspondence documentation of their sources. PETS reports are discussed in between increased allocation of government resources and the cabinet and are valued by the president’s national policy advi- improvements in the social sectors. In its second phase, PETS sory committee, the auditor general, and the anticorruption com- provided quantitative evidence of budget execution; leakages in mission. Senior public servants now have increased awareness of nonsalary recurrent expenditures at the central ministry, district, the high degree of noncompliance with budget execution guide- and facility level; and diagnostic information on critical poverty lines and of the low levels of capacity, especially in bookkeeping sectors. skills, in cost centers at all levels. • Community and civil society participation in budget prepara- • Active participation of civil society organizations. Civil society tion and execution was encouraged to enhance the participa- organization representatives actively participate in the annual tory nature of the budget process. The government established policy hearings and budget discussions when line ministries budget committees to review and endorse all of the objectives and departments defend their budget policies, proposals, and and policies stated in strategic plans and to participate in the activities. execution of the budgets of the ministries, departments, and agencies. Community budget oversight committees have been (continued) A–31 (continued) Implications for Project Teams References In Sierra Leone, the aftermath of the civil war weakened traditional Sierra Leone—Third Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit Project— English. Implementation Completion and Results Report, World Bank, accountability mechanisms, as is the case in any postconflict and Washington, DC. fragile situation. The auditor general’s office, the internal audit, and Sierra Leone—Third Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit Project— parliament had been significantly weakened, but PETS were able to English. Program Document, Report No. 25812, World Bank, Washington, DC., fill this accountability vacuum, even though this created a significant April 23, 2012. amount of pressure on and expectations from PETS that had to be Africa Wallace, Lindsay, Jim Edgerton, Richard Harris, and Erisa Ocheing. 2003. “Sierra managed by the team. Leone: Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) Review Final Report.” Case Study, DFID and World Bank, Washington, DC. Addison, Douglas, and Renato Villela. 2004. “Sierra Leone: HIPC Expenditure Tracking, Assessment and Action Plan.” Prepared by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in collaboration with the Authorities of Sierra Leone. A–32 Country: South Africa Sector: Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection (Sanitation) Level: Local Implementing Organization: Social Justice Coalition Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.23. Advocating to Increase Access to Sanitation in Informal Settlements Context Results The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a coalition of civil society organi- • Provision of funds for janitorial services. The City of Cape Town zations in the informal settlement of Khayelitsha in Cape Town. Soon introduced a janitorial service for regular maintenance of flush after it was formed in 2008, SJC received reports from many residents toilets and standpipes. This service also provided jobs for 500 Africa that the lack of adequate toilet facilities resulted in people being unemployed people. The city promised to fund this service every assaulted, raped, and murdered when relieving themselves. SJC esti- year. mated that at least 500,000 residents of informal settlements in Cape • Improved maintenance of sanitation facilities. The city now Town did not have access to adequate sanitation. Therefore, in 2010, takes its maintenance responsibilities more seriously. For example, SJC launched the Clean and Safe Sanitation Campaign, which aims in November 2011, it repaired 256 toilets in Khayelitsha. to ensure that the City Council properly maintains existing toilets • Successful access to janitorial service contracts. SJC found that and provides additional clean and safe sanitation facilities in informal the city spent 11 percent of its operational budget to contract settlements. private companies to perform functions like servicing chemi- cal toilets, but the companies did not clean the toilets as often Actions (2008–present) as agreed, and the city did not monitor them properly. After SJC used various strategies to launch and implement the Clean and repeated requests, SJC was given copies of the agreements with Safe Sanitation Campaign. the private service providers. According to the law, these agree- ments should be on municipal websites, but SJC only received • SJC did some budget work, but it was not able to find reliable them after there was media advocacy and a threat of legal action. information on how much the city spends on Khayelitsha or on SJC used the agreements to show that the providers were not informal settlements in general. It therefore started mobilizing complying with all requirements. public support for its goals by raising awareness. For instance, • Tagging of GPS coordinates for public toilets. The SJC convinced SJC lined up at public toilets in places frequented by the middle the city to tag each toilet with its GPS coordinates to enable class to represent the many South Africans still waiting for access repair teams to find them easily when problems are reported. to clean and safe sanitation facilities. Tagging is necessary because many streets in Khayelitsha do not • SJC also endeavored to create a better relationship with the have formal names and numbers. city. The city listens to SJC because of its large community-based • Establishment of complaint hotlines. The City of Cape Town membership and its partnerships with other sections of civil soci- agreed to install free phones, which residents can use to report ety. SJC’s partners range from religious leaders to professionals problems directly to the water and sanitation technical opera- and organizations that often have skills to help SJC put forward tions center. its arguments and demands. SJC has encouraged the city to make incremental changes to improve sanitation in Cape Town’s infor- Implications for Project Teams mal settlements. Integrating high-quality technical analysis with targeted advocacy of • Since the mayor of Cape Town conceded to SJC’s demands and key decision makers, public mobilization, and the use of the media committed to the provision of improved sanitation services can result in pro-poor changes in budget allocations as well as more by June 30, 2012, SJC has monitored these commitments. For transparency regarding how these funds are spent. instance, SJC visited ten sites over three months and found many problems. References Website: http://www.sjc.org.za. International Budget Partnership (unpublished). “South Africa: Access to Sanitation in Informal Settlements.” Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. Social Justice Coalition. 2012. “Monitoring of the City of Cape Town’s Janitorial Service for Communal Flush Toilets in Informal Settlements.” A–33 Country: South Africa Sector: Education Levels: Provincial; Local Implementing Organizations: Legal Resource Centre; Public Service Accountability Monitor Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Infrastructure; Legislation A1.24. Using Budget Analysis and Litigation to Eradicate Mud Schools Context seven schools that were willing to legally confront the educa- One of South Africa’s poorer provinces, the Eastern Cape, spends 45 tion department, despite a perceived threat from the provincial percent of its total provincial budget on education. Of the education head office. To mitigate the risk, each school established an department’s total budget of R26.2 billion (approximately US$2.6 bil- infrastructure crisis committee composed of parents, students, Africa lion) for 2012–13, 81 percent was allocated for personnel, leaving few and community members to act as plaintiffs in the case, shield- resources for desperately-needed investments such as safe school ing staff and school board members from repercussions. The LRC structures. Despite promises by politicians to ensure safe school also selected larger schools to preempt the possibility that the structures in the province, the Eastern Cape still had 572 mud schools education department would shut down the schools and transfer in 2004–05. In 2009, the education department stated that R23 billion the children, resorting to economies-of-scale arguments. would be required to eradicate all unsafe structures, including mud • The complaint filed against the Eastern Cape province and the structures, but the total education infrastructure budget for that national government made three points. First, it cited the con- year was only R981 million. stitutional right to education and numerous government policies and legislation at the national and provincial level that Actions aimed to eradicate mud schools. Second, the complaint detailed The Amasango Case (2008–11) the efforts made by each of the schools to communicate • Desperate for a new building for Amasango School, the school’s their needs, including petitions and correspondence. Finally, it governing body (SGB) lobbied the education department for stressed the lack of transparency by the Eastern Cape educa- years in repeated meetings, letters, and phone calls, but with tion department in designing its plans for improving educational no results. Therefore, the SGB set up a task team to address the infrastructure. issue, including police, labor union representatives, municipal offi- cials and politicians, members of the school management team, Results and parents. On the recommendation of this task team, in 2008, The Amasango Case SBG, in collaboration with the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and • Lack of compliance with court ruling. The court ruled that the the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM), pursued legal Eastern Cape education department’s failure to provide appro- action against the education department. The SBG based its case priate and adequate school facilities at Amasango was “uncon- on the argument that the failure to provide adequate facilities for stitutional, unlawful, and invalid.” It ordered the department to Amasango was a violation of the constitutional requirement for develop and implement a plan for improving the school’s facilities the government to provide appropriate and adequate education and to report back to the court every three months on its prog- for all children. ress. Unfortunately, the court has been unable to ensure com- • The education department backtracked on its initial offer for a pliance. To date, and in contravention of the court ruling, only settlement, arguing that Amasango was already on the list of pri- temporary structures for the Amasango school have been put in ority schools and that resources were insufficient to address all place, and a new school has not been built. needs simultaneously. PSAM’s budget analysis helped to reject The Seven Schools Case the education department’s argument by demonstrating that the • Legal commitment to replace inadequate school structures. education department had been under-spending its infrastruc- The government of South Africa committed R8.2 billion ($US1 ture budget and that as part of the provincial budget process, billion) to replace inadequate educational structures nation- under-spent budget lines are routinely adjusted downward. If ally over the following three years. Allocations for each of the sufficient funds were unavailable, this was partly the result of the seven schools were included in a memorandum of understand- department’s failure to spend its resources. ing (MOU) signed by the national government and other par- The Seven Schools Case (2009–11) ties involved in the case. Additionally, the provincial education • The LRC identified 25 mud schools in the Eastern Cape—all with department was instructed to put in place temporary measures poor buildings, a lack of access to water, and shortages of desks for the seven schools within two months. Temporary structures and chairs, among other deficiencies. LRC then supported each were in fact constructed, and some of the seven schools have school in building their cases. The process resulted in a list of since been rebuilt, although the construction of some has been delayed because of difficulties with tenders and contractors. (continued) A–34 (continued) • Establishment of the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Implications for Project Teams Delivery Initiative (ASIDI) by the national department of edu- • In addition to strategic public interest litigation, a comprehensive cation in 2011. ASIDI was funded by two conditional grants from campaign that includes grassroots mobilization and community the national department of basic education, which provided ownership, a plan for obtaining high-level political support, and a two major dedicated funding streams for the eradication of deliberate strategy to harness the media are often necessary to mud schools: the Education Infrastructure Grant and the School convert court victories into meaningful policy changes. Infrastructure Backlogs Grant. Both were introduced in the 2011–12 • It is the work in these other areas that often prepares civil soci- Africa budget, which was tabled by the national minister in the same ety organizations (CSOs) for successful litigation. The Amasango month that the MOA on the seven schools was signed. and seven-school cases developed as a result of committed CSOs • Establishment of Precedent. More recently, Equal Education, a being prepared to respond to legal opportunities when they community and membership-based education nongovernmen- arose, and that poise and preparation was a consequence of their tal organization, made a deliberate effort to challenge the sys- previous efforts in the field of educational justice—efforts that temic issues plaguing the education system by asking the court for PSAM had included budget monitoring and evaluation. to require the minister to set minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure that would apply countrywide. Shortly References before March 2013, the minister conceded to this demand. International Budget Patrnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org. Tshangan, Alison Hickey. 2013. “The Impact of Litigation by the Legal Resources Centre for Adequate Classroom Infrastructure in South Africa.” IBP Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, International Budget Partnership, Cape Town, South Africa. A–35 Country: South Africa Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organizations: Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security; Black Sash; Children’s Institute; Institute for Democracy in Africa Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis, Children’s Budgets; Coalition Building; Litigation A1.25. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve Child Support Grant Budget Allocations Context problem—i.e., children qualified for the grant at the start of each In 1996, as part of the South African government’s commitment to phase-in year of the grant but then “fell off” the system when realize the right of the poor to social security, the Lund Committee they were a year older. The CSO coalition recommended that Africa was tasked with assessing the existing system of support for children any child born after April 1994 be eligible for a grant during each and families known as the State Maintenance Grant (SMG), and with of the phased extensions, regardless of their age and the current developing approaches to target children more equitably but within stage of the grant rollout process. the SMG budget. The SMG did not reach the poorest women and • More recently, an increasingly discomfited civil society has resorted children—approximately 45 per 1,000 Indian and “colored” children to instigating litigation supported by evidence-based research. received the grant, while only 2 per 1,000 African children received the Results grant, despite the fact that there is more extensive poverty in black • Increase in the grant amount. The CSG was introduced in 1998 at communities. As per the recommendations of the Lund Committee, R100 per month, increased again to R110 in July 2001, and was then the South African cabinet agreed to phase out the SMG in favor of a increased every year at a rate equal to or slightly higher than infla- new Child Support Grant (CSG) that would cover more children at a tion. Because of these increases, budget allocation toward CSGs lower monthly grant payment of R75 (approximate US$8) per eligible have gone from R2.4 billion (approximately US$315 million) to R 14.4 child up to the age of seven. Civil society was largely excluded from billion (approximately US$1.89 billion) between 2001 and 2008. the deliberations and recommendations of the Lund Committee. • Increase in coverage. Changes in the age cohort have also taken However, once this information became public, national civil society place since 1998, increasing gradually from children under 7 years called on the government to increase the amount and the age cap of old to a phased-in extension to children and youths up to 18 that the grant and to improve its administration. began on January 2010. This extension was set to benefit a further Actions (2001–09) two million children at an estimated additional cost of R7.4 billion • A key aspect of the efforts of civil society organizations (CSOs) (US$970 million) over the three years of phased extension. was to undertake extensive evidence-based research. In 2000, • Resolution of “start-stop” issue. In response to the CSO submis- for example, research conducted by the Institute for Democracy sion to the DSD, an eligibility date was chosen that will prevent in Africa (IDASA) and the Children’s Institute demonstrated how children from “falling off” the CSG system. the value of the grant had fallen in real terms since its introduc- • Changes to means test to qualify for grant. CSO litigation has tion in 1998. This evidence was used in a number of submissions resulted in changes to the means test that has led to increased to relevant government departments and legislative committees grant applications and the implementation of regulations reduc- in 2000 and 2001. Such research was also used to demonstrate ing the document burden on applicants. that there were sufficient public resources to finance an exten- • Acknowledgment of CSO research support. Government offi- sion of the CSG to children and youth up to 18 years of age, and cials have recognized the value of CSO research that provides to assess and monitor service-delivery problems as well as the evidence of the poverty-fighting value of the CSG. It has been value of the CSG as an effective tool to address poverty. acknowledged that this evidence-based research was regularly • Since the early days of the CSG, CSOs have organized marches used by the DSD and that it has led to “general support” within and filed petitions aimed at the Department of Social the treasury for the CSG to be expanded as far as possible given Development (DSD), parliament and specific members of the the government finances. government, and participated in policy processes. For instance, when the government published draft regulations for a proposed extension of the CSG for children and youth up to the age of 18 years, civil society made a joint submission to the DSD to address key concerns with the regulations. One issue was the “start-stop” A–36 (continued) Implications for Project Teams and while litigation may successfully expand the responsibilities of • In addition to strong research-based evidence, high-quality CSO the state, there is often no corresponding expansion in the state’s engagement sustained for many years (in this case for more than ability to deliver in terms of administration and finances. a decade) can result in desired fiscal policy changes. • At the same time, while litigation can achieve desired outcomes, Reference ramping up incidences of litigation by civil society could encourage Overy, Neil (unpublished). “South Africa: Civil Society Uses Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve the Lives of Poor Children.” IBP Case Study Series: From the government to become more conservative in its policy making, Africa Analysis to Impact, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–37 Country: South Africa Sector: Health (HIV/AIDS) Level: National Implementing Organization: Treatment Action Campaign Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Dissemination; Litigation A1.26. Using Budget Advocacy and Litigation to Advocate for Improved Allocations for HIV/AIDS Treatment Context • To promote its civil disobedience campaign while contending In South Africa at the turn of the millennium, even though the HIV/ with government delays in implementing the agreed upon NTP, AIDS epidemic had reached epic proportions, the South African gov- TAC influenced the media and public opinion by leaking a copy Africa ernment allocated a mere R214 million (approximately US$28.5 mil- of the report from the Joint Treasury and Health Task Team. This lion) to implement HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment regimes. The report demonstrated that, contrary to the governments’ claims, government’s reluctance to increase budget allocations for HIV/AIDS an ARV treatment plan was affordable and that it would save programs stemmed from its skepticism regarding the link between thousands of lives. HIV and AIDS and, to a larger extent, the high cost of procuring drugs and rolling out treatment plans, particularly in the context of the lim- Results ited national health budget. Launched in 1998 to campaign for equi- • Increase of budgetary allocations for HIV/AIDS programs. In table access to healthcare, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and 2007, the South African cabinet endorsed the HIV & AIDS and STI its partner organizations used a number of tactics to address the lack (sexually transmitted infections) Strategic Plan for South Africa of government action to deal with this health epidemic. (2007–11), which committed the government to spending R45 billion (US$6 billion) on HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment Actions (1998–07) over a five-year period. In the early 2000s, TAC launched the Prevention of Mother-to Child • Expansion of HIV/AIDS programs. By 2010, the PMTCT initiative Transmission (PMTCT) Campaign and the Antiretroviral Medicine covered over 80 percent of all pregnant women and the ARV pro- Campaign (ARV) to convince the government to expand both pro- gram allowed 1.2 million South Africans to receive antiretroviral grams. Both campaigns involved four key strategies: treatment through the public health sector. • To counter the government’s argument that implementing HIV/ Implications for Project Teams AIDS programs was unaffordable, TAC conducted an in-depth • High-quality technical analysis is invaluable to effect changes in review of the government’s budget documents and drew atten- budgetary allocations and key to credibly engaging with govern- tion to the 2001 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, which reported ment representatives, influencing public opinion, or taking legal that provincial departments of health had actually under-spent actions. their budgets by R473 million (US$63.1 million). • Demands for revised budget allocations based on a cost-benefit • TAC utilized the expertise of health economists and medical analysis and accompanied with a well-researched action plan are professionals to produce a draft National Treatment Plan (NTP) more likely to have a favorable impact because governments are based on the analyses of necessary delivery systems and medi- already coping with issues of allocative efficiency. cines and their associated costs. This NTP was used to engage with government representatives as well as labor and business References leaders at the National Economic, Development and Labor Overy, Neil. 2011. “In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights Council because the minister of health was unwilling to engage Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and Litigation.” IBP Case Study with TAC. For both campaigns, TAC commissioned research that Series: From Analysis to Impact, No. 7 (August), International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. proved that public funds expended on these programs would Friedman, S., and S. Mottiar. 2006. “Seeking the High Ground: The Treatment Action actually lead to measurable cost savings within five years. Campaign and the Politics of Morality.” In Voices of Protest: Social Movements in • The results of TAC’s budget analysis were used during the pro- Post-Apartheid South Africa, Scottsville, edited by R. Ballard et al., pp. 23–24. ceedings of the case that it filed—and won—in the high court against the government, enjoining it to introduce a full-scale PMTCT program. A–38 Country: Tanzania Sector: Water and Sanitation Level: Local Implementing Organization: Policy Forum Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Disclosure; Monitoring A1.27. Using Budgets to Facilitate Social Monitoring Context • When the city council refused to negotiate and engage in spite In July 2008, Policy Forum entered into an agreement with the of these findings, the association resorted to civil disobedience, Mwanza Policy Initiative (MPI), a civil society network operating refusing to pay any tax until the council agreed to meet with in Tanzania’s Mwanza Region, to jointly develop a social monitor- them. Finally, in December 2008, the council agreed to meet with Africa ing program. A monitoring team was formed in Mwanza city com- the association. prised of staff members and volunteers from local civil society and community-based organizations that were members of MPI. The Results Mwaloni Fish Market Association, a member of MPI whose members • No increase in fish market levy. The fish market levy was not are fishermen and fish sellers, identified the first issue for monitor- increased, and the association was invited to participate in the ing. In September 2008, the Mwanza City Council announced that it planning and budget process by the Mwanza City Council. planned to increase its levy on the Mwaloni Fish Market Association • Budget allocation for fish market infrastructure. An allocation by 100 percent, effective that month. The association felt that this was included in the 2009–10 city budget to rehabilitate the infra- was unfair because they were already heavily taxed, while the plumb- structure at the fish market as per instructions from the national ing in the fish market had been broken for several years. The local ministry of livestock development and fisheries. government had yet to fix the plumbing despite the fact that poor • Issuance of government directive on unspent funds. Policy sanitation at the fish market contributed to the cholera and typhoid Forum has used the evidence from these local monitoring initia- outbreaks that were a regular occurrence in the city. tives to inform its national-level advocacy. For example, it noted that in all districts where social monitoring was conducted, there Actions (2008–10) were unspent funds that were neither reallocated nor returned • The monitoring team started by collecting the city council’s to the ministry of finance. Based on evidence that it prepared, budget and planning documents, a challenging task because in September 2009, the ministry of finance issued new council the information was either not produced or not accessible to financial instructions to all district councils, which emphasized civil society. However, after three months, the team was able to that they must either reallocate or return to the Treasury all obtain the strategic plan, medium-term expenditure framework, unspent funds at the end of the year, and that disciplinary action annual plan and budgets for two years, and the annual auditor’s would be taken if this was not done. report. • Policy Forum assisted MPI’s monitoring team to analyze the bud- Implications for Project Teams get documents, which produced three key findings that helped It is useful while undertaking BT&M projects to take into account them address the tax hike. First, they discovered that, despite the that when community members are involved in generating informa- fish market contributing three percent of total revenue to the tion that solves some of their concrete problems, they have a greater city’s budget, they were excluded from the city council’s partici- incentive to make the necessary effort to access such information patory planning and budgeting process, which was accessible to and to learn how to rigorously analyze it. Even then, however, change civic actors by invitation only. Second, in contrast to the 25 per- is often gradual and it takes time for results of social accountability cent allocated to the renovation of the council treasurer’s office, exercises to materialize. there was no allocation in the 2007–08 capital budget to rehabili- tate the fish market’s water and sanitation infrastructure. Lastly, References there was a discrepancy of approximately 10 million Tanzanian International Budget Patrnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org. shillings (US$8,000) between the amount they recorded as having Mugizi, Gertrude. 2010. “Mwaloni Fish Market Association—Case Study.” Presented at Public Health Watch Skills Building Conference in collaboration paid the tax collector and the amount the council reported it had with Mwanza Policy Initiative, Centre for Social Accountability, Budapest, Hungary, received. These conclusions were shared with relevant govern- March 23–25, 2010. ment officials and local councilors at a public hearing as well as with the wider MPI network. A–39 Country: Tanzania Sector: Health; Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Sikika Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Dissemination A1.28. Curbing Unnecessary Expenditures to Meet Public Needs and Priorities Context Results While civil servants have relatively low salaries in Tanzania, some ben- • Decline of budgetary allocations for unnecessary expenditures. efit from various additional allowances when they attend trainings or Between 2009 and 2011, the prime minister’s directive was taken study tours and are therefore keen to receive this additional income. seriously with regard to training and ignored for vehicle purchases, Africa Since 2006, Sikika has been analyzing the government’s health bud- hospitality, travel, and the like. In 2009/2010, overall “unneces- get in collaboration with like-minded civil society partners, and pre- sary expenditure” category allocations decreased by 22 percent sented the findings of this analysis to the annual health sector review through cuts in trainings and workshops. In 2010/2011, there was a attended by government, donors, and civil society organizations. nominal increase in total unnecessary expenditures. During both Based on its analysis of the health sector in the 2008/2009 budget fiscal years, spending on training and workshops declined, while proposal, Sikika found that health sector allocations for unnecessary expenditures in other categories, such as allowances, increased. expenditures such as allowances, workshops and training, overseas • Increased awareness of budgetary issues and processes. Trade and local travel, and vehicles added up to Tshs 34.2 billion (approxi- unions used Sikika’s analysis to argue for wage increases by cutting mately US$21,034,367). Sikika argued that this money should be excessive allowances. Other civil society organizations (CSOs), more efficiently allocated to other items that would improve health including Twaweza and Policy Forum, published an analysis of pub- care. The issue captured the attention of the prime minister, who lic sector allowances in September 2009. Donors became more announced that future government expenditures on workshops and conscious of the use of aid disbursements, which resulted in them seminars had to be approved by his office and that expenditures on taking a tougher stand to remove hidden wage costs. Through the new vehicles would be restricted. The prime minister’s directives led Social Services Parliamentary Committee and other select MPs, to revised budget guidelines in 2009, but these guidelines did not Sikika effectively assisted MPs in analyzing budgets and proposing include specific targets for reducing unnecessary expenditures. revisions to the ministry of health and social welfare. • Establishment of presidential commission on public service sal- Actions (2007–10) ary enhancement. The growing public debate on allowances and Sikika monitored adherence to the prime minister’s commitment public service pay issues led to the establishment of a presidential by launching a national “unnecessary expenditures” campaign commission on public service salary enhancement in 2006. This between 2009 and 2011. This campaign involved three key steps: commission reportedly recommended significant reductions in expenditures on allowances and seminars and workshops as well • Sikika developed a framework to analyze “unnecessary” expen- as the taxing of allowances. However, the commission’s report, ditures across all government operations. This included expendi- though submitted to the President in January 2007, has yet to be ture categories allowing for an appropriate level of analysis that released. would be easily understood and that would be comparable over time. Because actual expenditure data was unavailable, Sikika ana- Implications for Project Teams lyzed budget allocations rather than actual expenditure amounts. High-quality technical analysis is necessary but not sufficient to • It used its analysis of the national budgets for 2009/2010 and effect changes in budgetary allocations. An approach that integrates 2010/2011 to identify unnecessary allocations for new vehicles, analysis with targeted advocacy of key decision makers, public mobi- seminars, and conferences and to lobby key stakeholders to lization, and use of the media is more effective. garner their support for reducing these expenses. This analysis provided a valuable means of engaging with members of parlia- References ment (MPs) and members of the Social Services Committee in the Sikika Website: http://www.sikika.or.tz/en. context of oversight and budget planning. Bofin, Peter. 2012. “Freeing Funds to Meet Priorities and Needs: Sikika’s Campaign • Sikika made a conscious effort to first identify and engage with to Curb Unnecessary Expenditure in Tanzania.” IBP Case Study Series: From potential agents of change, including the administration, political Analysis to Impact, Study, No. 8 (September), International Budget Partnership, circles, the donor community, and trade unions. From April 2010 Washington DC. onward, it disseminated its findings through the media. With Twaweza, Uwazi, and Policy Forum. 2009. “Reforming Allowances: A Win-Win Approach to Improved Service Delivery, Higher Salaries for Civil Servants and headlines like “Government uses TZS 176 mil for allowances” and Saving Money.” Brief 9.09, Policy Forum, November 30, 2009, Dar es Salaam. “Government shooting itself in the foot on allowances,” Sikika clearly hit a nerve with its focus on wasteful expenditures. A–40 Country: Tanzania Sector: Education Level: National Implementing Organization: HakiElimu Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Dissemination A1.29. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve the Quality of Education Context • Even though the government initially reacted strongly against While the government of Tanzania had made significant strides in HakiElimu’s campaign by issuing an interdict against it in increasing primary school enrollment, particularly between 2004 and September 2005, HakiElimu continued to engage with different 2007, Tanzania continued to face complex challenges in providing parts of the government, either face-to-face or in stakeholder Africa high-quality education for its people, including an average teacher– consultative meetings with the prime minister, the Ministry of pupil ratio of 1:52 in primary and secondary schools. HakiElimu is a Education, and the ministry of finance, among others, to obtain civil society organization (CSO) in Tanzania that works to ensure that their input on how to end the delays of getting teachers their all the country’s children receive high-quality basic education. When salaries and how to improve their welfare. developing its program strategy for 2004–07, it noted improvements in enrollment levels but identified a lack of attention to educational Results quality. Based on these concerns, it crafted and implemented a cam- • Increase in the minimum wage. In January 2007, the government paign that led to significant improvements in Tanzania’s schools. increased the minimum wage for teachers from 80,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$60) to 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$75) per month. Actions (2005–07) • More timely distribution of wages. Since 2007, teachers have • HakiElimu partnered with the Tanzania teachers’ union to sur- received their salaries before the end of month and with fewer vey teachers on their living and working conditions. The result- hassles. ing report, “The Living and Working Conditions of Teachers in • Improvement in teacher–pupil ratio. The number of teach- Tanzania” (2004), identified key problem areas in the education ers employed in primary schools increased from 135,013 in 2005 system, including low morale due to low pay and poor quality of to 154,895 in 2008, while the number of government primary teachers and working environments. schools increased from 14,257 to 15,673, and secondary schools • HakiElimu mobilized the countrywide Friends of Education from 1,202 to 3,039. The teacher–pupil ratio in primary schools Network, a national network of citizens concerned about the improved from 1:56 in 2005 to 1:52 in 2006. state of education in Tanzania, to ask questions, write to the government, and advocate for quality education and responsible Implications for Project Teams management of educational funds. • It is useful to build grass roots awareness and support for bet- • It also used popular media to educate the public and foster ter utilization of public resources while advocating for policy debate on Tanzania’s school system. It produced dramatic radio reforms. spots on the delays in payment of salaries and other issues that • It is also helpful to take timing and political priorities into account. teachers had to endure to receive their salaries. It produced In this case, when the Mkapa government banned HakiElimu 44 popular publications and widely distributed them, ulti- activities in 2005, the country was approaching general elections mately sending out 1.8 million copies of these publications to and the ruling party was planning to use enrollment gains as a approximately 24,000 Friends of Education, CSOs, and individual campaign issue. Tanzanians. References HakiElimu Website: www.hakielimu.org. International Budget Partnership. Unpublished. “Quality of Education Reforms: The Case of HakiElimu’s Campaign of 2005–07.” IBP Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–41 Country: Tanzania Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Tanzania Gender Networking Program Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Dissemination; Gender Budgets A1.30. Using Budget Analysis and Pilots to Mainstream Gender Considerations in Fiscal Policies Context Results Initiated by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), the • Direction provided for the preparation of budget guidelines Gender Budget Initiative (GBI) has its roots in the lack of informed with a gender focus. The government recognized the importance Africa participation and feedback of citizen groups for the poverty reduc- of gender budgeting and included gender in the budget guide- tion strategies and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s that lines. In 2001, budget guidelines further mandated that all ministry, left women and children on the margins of economic development. department, and agency budget submissions had to be prepared Inspired by both the South African and Australian gender initiatives with a gender focus. and using funding provided by Swedish International Development • Institutionalization of gender mainstreaming in selected sectors. Cooperation Agency, TGNP pioneered the GBI in 1997 along with 20 – The ministry of water and irrigation has a policy that directs other like-minded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) united the establishment of water committees made up of 50 per- under the Feminism Activism Coalition. Its key objectives included cent women at all administrative levels. promoting the examination of policy, decision-making processes, – The government training of budget officers for the new and resource allocation and utilization with a gender perspective as requirements of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework also well as the design and adoption of tools for gender mainstreaming of included gender issues. Training on gender budgeting is now budget policies and budgets. required, and the TGNP coalition is the main provider of it. – The government and donors invited TGNP and its partners to Actions (1997–01) participate in a public expenditure review and in the Tanzania • TGNP collected and analyzed budget data with a gender lens in Country Assistance Strategy processes. As a result, TGNP selected ministries, including education, health, agriculture, and could provide input during the consultations and advocate industries and commerce. TGNP teamed up government officials for transparency and accountability of government actors and from most sectors with nongovernmental researchers and com- the inclusion of a variety of gender perspectives in govern- missioned a gender-activist university professor to supervise the ment decision making. research. This approach was part of their strategy of reaching key actors, creating openings, and building alliances. Implications for Project Teams • TGNP’s analysis concentrated on the main direction of policy Efforts to assist with mainstreaming gender budgets in the Public development, planning, and budgeting, the decision-making pro- Financial Management cycle should begin with a mapping of gender- cesses, sources of income, and the actual allocation of resources related budgets and pilot experiences with selected ministries, sec- both to sectors and specific programs. TGNP published the results tors, or projects. of this research in a booklet that was also translated into Kiswahili. The findings of this exercise were shared in public forums with a References broad range of stakeholders, including civil society, government, TNGP Website: www.tngp.org. donors, and members of parliament. Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance. 2011. “GBI Initiative in Tanzania is • Dissemination activities were complemented by efforts to build bearing fruit.” Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance. http://www.genderlinks. org.za/article/gbi-initiative-in-tanzania-is-bearing-fruit-2011-09-30. the capacity of coalition members, other NGOs, Community “GBI: The Case of Tanzania.” Case Study prepared for Course on Introduction to Based Organizations, and key government actors. These Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Analysis, Module II, World Bank, Washington, included: alternative gendered budget guidelines; checklists for DC. the ministry of finance to facilitate gender mainstreaming in bud- get processes; and guidelines for the routine collection of gen- der-disaggregated data for budgeting purposes. A–42 Country: Uganda Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Local Name of Project: Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; ICT; Monitoring; Procurement A1.31. Building the Capacity of Community Procurement Committees in Fragile Areas to Enhance Transparency in Community Subproject Investments Context Sanctions include suspension of disbursement to local govern- Northern Uganda’s economic stagnation arose out of more than two ments and communities found to be in violation of project rules decades of brutal conflict. The insurgency in the region took a toll and guidelines. The approach focuses on both preventive and Africa on both the population and the economy such that, by the end of enforcement measures. Preventive measures include routine 2005, an estimated 1.6 million people had been forced to leave their monitoring, inspections, education, and raising awareness among homes in Northern and Eastern Uganda out of fear of being attacked citizens; enforcement measures include the investigation of com- or abducted by rebels to live in camps for internally displaced per- plaints about NUSAF 2 projects and, when necessary, the pros- sons. The community safety-net systems and the traditional social ecution of criminal acts. and economic fabric of the people of Northern Uganda had been greatly disrupted and weakened by the armed conflict. In response Results to these factors, the government of Uganda, under the coordina- • Improved utilization of community funds. The direct involve- tion of the prime minister’s office, initiated the implementation of ment of communities in monitoring enhanced subproject com- the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project, with the pletion rates and promoted the utilization and sustainability of aim of empowering communities in 18 districts of Northern Uganda the investments. by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and • Reduced leakage in funds. The strengthened capacity of com- plan for their needs through subprojects; implementing sustainable munities to perform oversight functions helped to minimize development initiatives to improve socioeconomic services and some forms of malpractice at the community level, such as cor- opportunities; and by placing money in the hands of communities, ruption, elite capture, and waste of community resources. contributing to improved livelihoods. NUSAF 2 further strengthened • Increased responsiveness of local governments. Despite varia- bottom-up accountability with a support program provided as part tions in capacities across and within districts, local governments of a Transparency, Accountability, and Anti-Corruption Program. at the district and subcounty level have been responsive about appraising subprojects, providing technical support during imple- Actions (2009–present) mentation, and supporting the certification and commissioning • NUSAF 1 made an effort to build the capacity of community of funded community investments. project management committees and community procurement • Enhanced capacity for grievance redress. A total of 3,695 social committees in their core duties, including conducting execu- accountability committees have already been instituted and tive committee and general community meetings; selecting and trained in subproject implementation and grievance-handling; undertaking viable procurement options; monitoring the progress 31 percent of the committee members were women. The SMS of subproject implementation; and managing contractors. These Corruption Reporting System (Report2IG), which will enable citi- efforts were all geared toward ensuring high subproject comple- zens to send SMS text messages to report cases of corruption, tion rates and promoting the use and sustainability of community has been developed and tested. investments or their spin-off benefits. • In a bid to enhance the involvement of communities in monitor- Implications for Project Teams ing their subprojects, the project held trainings with subcounty When placing money in the hands of communities, transparency and technical staff. In turn, the trained staff mentored local commu- accountability in handling of subprojects and investments can be nity members in basic monitoring. a challenge, especially in hard-to-reach areas. However, combining • NUSAF 2 instituted social accountability committees with the efforts at increasing the participatory involvement of communities in primary responsibility of handling grievances at the grassroots level. subproject management, public sharing of expenditures at the local These committees are also trained to use community scorecards— level, and follow-up on the misuse of funds appears to have success- a qualitative tool used for local-level monitoring of how inputs and fully enhanced levels of transparency. expenditures match with entitlements and budget allocations. • Support has been provided to investigative arms of govern- References ment carrying out investigations of reported cases of corruption, Uganda—Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project, Implementation Completion and Results Report, ICR1211, December 30, 2009. poor accountability, and abuse of office during project imple- Uganda—Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project, Project Appraisal mentation, including violations of project rules and procedures. Document, 23855, April 13, 2002. A–43 Country: Uganda Sector: Education Levels: Local; Provincial Implementing Organization: Uganda Debt Network Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Monitoring A1.32. Building Anticorruption Coalitions to Monitor Misuse of Education Grant Funds Context Results The School Facilities Grant (SFG) is a Ugandan government program UDN’s actions prompted the prime minister’s office to conduct an that has assisted poor school communities since 1998 by funding investigation that confirmed UDN’s findings, identified serious flaws Africa the construction of new classrooms, furniture, toilets, and residen- in the tendering process, and subsequently led to the introduction of tial housing units for teachers. Funds released under the SFG are measures within SFG to prevent the abuse of funds, including: monitored by civil society organizations in some districts, particularly nongovernmental organizations such as the Uganda Debt Network • Appointment of a new engineer. The district tender board was (UDN). UDN was formed in 1996 as a coalition of advocacy and lob- dismissed and a new district engineer was appointed to oversee bying organizations campaigning for debt relief, but it eventually the SFG projects in the district. expanded its scope to ensure that any public spending increases • Rebuilding of classrooms. The contractors responsible for the owed to debt cancellation and increasing aid flows were channeled poor construction of school buildings were ordered to rebuild to priority sectors and effectively utilized all the way down the ser- the classrooms. vice-delivery chain. UDN’s work revolves around four thematic pro- • Revisiting quality assurance procedures. The government of grams: Community Participation and Empowerment Program, Policy Uganda also revised the SFG guidelines and introduced provisions Analysis and Socio-Economic Research Program, Budget Advocacy to ensure that construction of school buildings, classrooms, and Initiative Program, and Governance and Rights Program. Under its toilets maintained high quality standards. For instance, contrac- Budget Advocacy Initiative, one of UDN’s key contributions has been tors are now required to submit performance guarantees that to highlight a major misuse of funds from the SFG in Katakwi district that they will do quality work and ensure timely delivery. Further, in the Teso region of eastern Uganda. banks are required to provide guarantees on any advances that are released to the contractors who need to demonstrate some Actions (2000–03) prequalification before they are allowed to bid for local govern- • UDN organized workshops and conferences during which it ment contracts. identified and trained community members on anticorruption activities. Implications for Project Teams • UDN assisted in establishing the Teso Anti-Corruption Coalition Strategic linkages with senior government officials, parliamentarians, (TAC), which brought together representatives of communities in and the media are essential to build anti-corruption coalitions. In this the districts of Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido, and Kumi to iden- case much of UDN’s success was determined by its capacity to iden- tify instances of corruption. TAC highlighted a major abuse of tify key allies in different sections of society and cultivate these rela- funds from the SFG in the Teso region. tionships by demonstrating how its goals were also in their interest. • UDN published a report and produced a documentary on the misuse of funds that received wide media coverage and drew the Reference Renzio, Paolo de, Vitus Azeem, and Vivek Ramkumar. 2006. “Budget Monitoring attention of the prime minister’s office in Uganda. as an Advocacy Tool: Uganda Debt Network.” Lessons from Civil Society Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives research project case study, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–44 Country: Zambia Sector: Mining Level: National Implementing Organization: Caritas Zambia Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Disclosure; Monitoring A1.33. Monitoring the Extractives Industry to Encourage the Use of Resources for the Public Benefit Context Results Caritas Zambia (Caritas) is a faith-based civil society organization • Worked toward a progressive tax system. In response to pressure based in Lusaka, which was founded in 2001. It works to improve the toward a more progressive tax system, the government raised the Africa lives of all Zambians through its four key programs: the Institutional minimum tax threshold (the income level at which people must Development Programme, the Sustainable Livelihoods Programme, begin to pay taxes) in 2001 and introduced a more equitable tax the Economic and Environmental Justice Programme (EEJP), and the code in 2004. Governance and Human Rights Programme. Under the EEJP, Caritas • Pushed for legislative change in extractive industries. In 2008, in has been a strong voice on budget-related issues for many years and response to the Caritas campaign for a windfall profits surtax on is widely recognized as one of the leading organizations conducting Zambian extractive industries, the government finally started to budget analysis and advocacy in Zambia. In fact,the EEJP predates the apply the country’s progressive tax regime to the extractives sec- forming of Caritas and has been doing budget work for more than tor and passed the Mines and Minerals Development Act, which 15 years. increased the mineral royalty rate to 3 percent and allowed the ministry of mines and minerals development to enforce a “use it Actions (2001–present) or lose it” principle with regard to exploration licenses. The gov- • Staff members of EEJP have consistently advocated for the gov- ernment also set up a revenue resource account—a special fund ernment to increase public investment in social infrastructure. to be used for new social programs—especially in the education Continuing this work, Caritas recently submitted proposals to sector. parliamentary committees and the central budget office of the • Government incorporated Caritas’ suggestions in the budget. ministry of finance and national planning to increase funding for When Caritas demanded that the government implement certain key agricultural, educational, and health care programs. components of its “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” the gov- • Caritas has also made monitoring the extractive industries in ernment responded by adopting some of the suggested strate- Zambia a core part of its work. Increased demand for and extrac- gies in Zambia’s 2002 budget. tion of minerals, particularly copper, has led to a boom in industry profits. Caritas has lobbied policy makers to ensure that mining Implications for Project Teams for Zambia’s copper is conducted in a responsible and environ- Outreach to the community, in conjunction with a comprehensive mentally sustainable manner and that all Zambians stand to ben- public communication campaign and media strategy, has raised efit from the use of their country’s natural resources. awareness of the importance of using gains from natural resources • Caritas’ work on Public Financial Management has increased the for social development. interest in budgeting among civil society organizations and the general public. The organization occasionally holds budget References forums to disseminate information on current budget proposals International Budget Partnership. 2011. “Partnering to Make Budgets Work for the People.” Partnership Initiative Case Study on Caritas Zambia, International and solicit opinions from citizens on what priorities they would Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/ like to see reflected in future budgets. uploads/Profile-of-CARITAS-Zambia-2011.pdf. • Caritas also advocates for a more progressive tax system as well as a more comprehensive poverty reduction strategy for the nation. • Caritas first started campaigning for a “windfall profits” surtax on Zambian extractive industries in 2006. A–45 Country: Zimbabwe Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organizations: National Association of Non Governmental Organizations; Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy, Analysis; Capacity Building; Children’s Budgets; Gender Budgets A1.34. Using Budget Analysis to Improve Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly Budgeting Context • Both NANGO and ZWRCN make oral and written submissions Between 1999 and 2007, Zimbabwe’s political and economic chal- and hold meetings with government officials and policy mak- lenges imposed significant financial pressure on households and on ers to share specific recommendations on issues that will make Africa the nation as a whole, making budgeting difficult. In addition, back- the national budget more responsive to the challenges facing ground research conducted separately by the Zimbabwe Women’s women and children. They have mobilized various stakeholders Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN) and the National Association to form strong coalitions for child-responsive and gender-sensi- of Non Governmental Organizations (NANGO), revealed that the tive budgeting. needs and input of women and children were not represented when the national budget was formulated. Results • Increases in budgetary allocations. In addition to the introduc- Actions (2002–07) tion of new budget line items, such as the “Children in Difficult Since 2002, the Child-Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI) Circumstances” line item under the “Ministry of Public Service, launched by NANGO and the Gender Responsive Budgeting Project Labor and Social Welfare,” by 2007 there was a nearly 50 per- (GRBP) headed by ZWRCN have adopted the following strategies to cent increase in budget line items such as the Basic Education hold the government accountable for resource allocation and use for Assistance Model, Children in Difficult Circumstances, public the benefit of women and children. assistance, and other social protection programs as a percentage of the total national budget. • Desk research as well as multistakeholder consultative work- • Increased transparency and accountability. In response to a shops and focus group discussions with women and children, strong campaign by NANGO and ZWRCN for increased transpar- which bring together beneficiaries and policy makers to share ency in the distribution and use of resources set aside for HIV views and expectations regarding gender-sensitive and child- and AIDS, for instance, it is now common for a newspaper to run friendly budgeting and to inform the policies and budgets of key a full-page list of quarterly beneficiaries of these funds. government ministries. • Democratization of budget debates. Parliamentary portfolio • To influence fund allocations, independent budget analysis is con- committees, including the budget committee that reviews sub- ducted before the national budget is crafted and after presenta- missions of line ministries and stakeholders on policy issues and tion of the budget statements. Post-budget analysis workshops allocations, have been established. help to identify, plan, and implement additional action-oriented research and advocacy activities. Parliamentarians, policy makers, Implications for Bank Operations and budget makers are invited to participate so that they can Using targeted and informed advocacy to increase budget alloca- hear the undiluted views of women and children. tions for vulnerable and/or marginalized groups is helpful in leading • Capacity-development programs have been launched, which to positive outcomes. include budget literacy and analysis training workshops that use a “trainer of trainers” approach; they also use “nontraining” capac- References ity-building methodologies, including training manuals, informa- Website for ZWRCN: http://www.zwrcn.org.zw. tion and educational materials that government officials, civil McNeil, Mary, and Carmen Malena. Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from society, and other development actors can use independently. Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa. 2010. World Bank: Washington DC. Workshops are conducted for the public and for members of parliament, the women’s parliamentary caucus, and government policy makers. A–46 Country: Indonesia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Levels: Local; Provincial Implementing Organization: Sekratariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Untuk Anggaran Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Dissemination; Gender Budgets; Legislatures A1.35. Working with the Legislature to Promote Budget Transparency Context • FITRA publishes regular analyses of budget issues, press releases, East Asia and Pacific Stories of corruption and graft from some of Indonesia’s remote and more lengthy budget-related studies that are meant to provinces are common. Civil society organizations and the media strengthen social monitoring of the national budget through have always been skeptical of the ability of local governments to greater social consciousness and awareness-raising. responsibly manage their finances, and for the past decade, they • As part of its public education program, FITRA maintains a have been putting pressure on members of the local legislatures separate Bahasa Indonesian only website containing up-to- (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) to submit their budgets date budget information and documentation. It also maintains and expenses for audit. The Sekratariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Indonesian-language budget resource centers that are available Untuk Transparansi Untuk Anggaran (Indonesia Transparency Budget to the public. Forum, or FITRA) emerged in September 1999 as an autonomous non- profit organization to promote good governance and to support the Results right of the public to be involved in budget processes—from budget • Government Regulation 37 annulled. Under pressure from the arrangement to its evaluation. It seeks to become the foundation coalition against Government Regulation 37, the president of for discourse and activities on budget transparency in Indonesia by Indonesia assembled a panel and decided to annul the opera- conducting research and analysis and by orchestrating public policy tional provisions of the law; DPRD members were required to advocacy campaigns via the media, publications, and public educa- return funds already disbursed (US$155.4 million). DPRD budgets tion programs. Since 2000, FITRA has performed activities that con- now reflect regional fiscal capacity. cern state budget analysis and citizen participation in Jakarta as well • Increased allocations to health and education. Supported as Banten, Depok, Solo, Maluku, Papua, Kupang, and other regions in by the Partnership for Governance Reform, a multistakeholder Indonesia. organization working with government agencies and civil society organizations to advance reforms, they successfully called for Actions (2005–present) greater budget allocations to health and education, while USAID • In 2006, when the government passed Regulation Number 37, supports their transparent and accountable budget programs and which provided retroactive income and funding for all DPRD advocacy efforts. members, the controversy over budget outlays peaked in Indonesia. The regulation included a salary increase for legislators Implications for Project Teams and a communications and operational support allowance; FITRA A nongovernmental organization’s horizontal linkages (i.e., coalition- quickly pointed out that poorer provinces could not afford this. It building capacities) and vertical linkages (i.e., capacity to move the would mean that money would be funneled away from already- state or legislatures), combined with technical competency, are deprived sectors. It galvanized 45 nongovernmental organiza- essential for influencing legislative and executive changes. tions to form a coalition, devised a media strategy to extend its reach, and published widely. The movement culminated in large References public demonstrations outside the state palace and the supreme SEKNAS-FITRA Website: http://seknasfitra.org. court. International Budget Partnership. 2011. “Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA)—Indonesia.” IBP Case Study, International Budget • FITRA’s other projects include the nationwide development Partnership. Washington, DC program on budget transparency, the Gender Budget Program, which aimed to make budget processing and implementa- tion more gender-responsive in the areas of Polmas Sulawesi Barat regent, Palu and Timur Tengah Selatan, and the Pro Poor Budgeting in NTB, an advocacy campaign aimed at eradicating poverty. A–47 Country: Indonesia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice and Social Protection Levels: Local; Provincial Implementing Organization: Advocacy Center for Women, People with Disabilities, and Children Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Capacity Building; Coalition Building and Budgets for Disabled People A1.36. Using Budgets to Advocate for Expanding Health Security for the Disabled East Asia and Pacific Context government agencies, facilitated by the regional government sec- According to data issued by the ministry of social affairs in2008, there retariat; the meeting also benefitted from the informal support are at least 40,290 people with disabilities in the Yogyakarta Special of the vice governor of Java. After this meeting, a strategic net- Administrative Region (DIY). The data do not include all people with work of stakeholders was developed to approach the govern- disabilities, particularly those living in remote areas who are often ment on a continuous basis, especially the regional council and concealed by their own families, preventing them from being prop- the agencies responsible for health security in order to increase erly recorded. They also do not belong to an organization that specif- their understanding of the needs of the disabled. ically works to address the interests of people with disabilities. Their exclusion from the statistics and the government database often Results causes a problem in access to basic services such as health security • Increased health security for the disabled and spillover effects. for citizens. And despite evidence of insufficient medical services As of December 2010, SAPDA has succeeded in getting health for people with disabilities, the government does not as yet have a security financed for more than 1,573 disabled people through an regulation that provides a legal basis for the healthy security provi- allocation from the provincial government of DIY. This strength- sion for them. The health financing schemes of the national and local ened the bargaining position of people with disabilities who pre- governments still exclude them. The Advocacy Center for Women, viously had never received sufficient health security. And now People with Disabilities, and Children (SAPDA) has been addressing that health security has increased, this should create the basis for this gap, and, among other things, has been keenly focused on bud- people with disabilities to receive—or at least demand—other get advocacy for the disabled since 2005 through social mobilization services as well. and capacity-building efforts; it eventually succeeded in encourag- • Increased budgetary allocation for empowerment of disabled. ing people with disabilities to establish their own organization and In Sleman municipality, the budget allocation for empowerment helped them gain access to regional public funds. of people with disabilities rose from IDR 25 million (approximately US$ 2,500) in 2006 to IDR 500 million (approximately US$ 50,000) Actions (2005–11) in 2009. This money can be used to finance health, education, • SAPDA began with what they called an “issue mapping” of per- economic, and other special needs of people with disabilities, sons with disabilities. Given that the limited efforts of people such as mobility devices and hearing aids. with disabilities to improve their access to health services were • Authorized SAPDA to facilitate access to healthcare for dis- among others associated with their lack of understanding of their abled. SAPDA persuaded the health social security financing key issues, they began by facilitating a process of problem analy- division of the health department of the Province of Yogyakarta sis and identification of their key issues. This mapping revealed Special Territory to give it the authority to assist people with that the government at both national and local level had not pri- disabilities access healthcare in that province. SAPDA volunteers oritized services targeting the disabled in their budgets. now provide assistance to over 1,500 disabled members and their • They also organized budget training for disabled communities families to access health security and sustain the initial efforts of in Klaten, Sleman, and Yogyakarta city in 2005. The training and SAPDA. capacity building focused on developing skills in public policy advocacy as well as technical skills for negotiating with the gov- Implications for Project Teams ernment in advocating for the fulfillment of the basic rights of Budget advocacy efforts for the marginalized or disabled must begin the disabled community. with those affected first: building a basis for self-reliance and capac- • Upon completion of the training, SAPDA and the communities ity to feel equal with fellow citizens is crucial and becomes the foun- and organizations of people with disabilities at the city level dation for involving them in advocacy efforts. moved forward to advocate for the fulfillment of rights in the form of health security and budget allocations for people with Reference disabilities in the annual city budgets of the and the province of International Budget Partnership. 2011. “Show Me the Money: Budget Advocacy in Indonesia.” Budget Advocacy Stories, International Budget Partnership in DIY. It started with a meeting in Central Java in 2008 between partnership with IDEA, Inisiatif, Lakpesdam NU and Seknas-FITRA, Yogyakarta, disabled stakeholders from six areas and provincial- and city-level Indonesia. A–48 Country: Indonesia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: Improving Agency Websites for Budget Transparency Area of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Dissemination; ICT A1.37. Improving Websites of Targeted Ministries to Increase Public Knowledge of Government Spending East Asia and Pacific Context for Budget Transparency) as well as representatives from the Indonesia has made great strides in strengthening governance central information commission and academia. The evaluation since political reforms were initiated in 1998. However, critics have of the websites considers the following: financial, procurement, lamented the slowing pace of reforms. It is thought that increased and performance (planning and activities) information; design and public knowledge of government spending is able to boost demand architecture; and content management. for more accountability and to increase deterrence against irregulari- • After evaluating the websites, the team is then expected to ties. An Institutional Development Fund grant—Improving Ministries develop modules for website design and management. Practical and Agencies’ Websites for Budget Transparency—seeks to boost training and on-site assistance will also be provided to the web- the public knowledge by assessing the websites of government site officers of the targeted ministries. agencies and evaluating their indicators of accountability. Improving the public perception of the integrity of the agencies is another Results (anticipated) very important goal. No public documentation of the government • Demonstration of increased knowledge of budget transparency agencies’ efforts toward greater accountability and transparency by staff. It is hoped that by the end of 2014—the project’s antici- had previously existed. The websites had offered very limited public pated completion date—at least 75 percent of the technical staff information. The project’s objective, since its launch in October 2012, of the five targeted ministries will at least be able to demonstrate has been to assess the effectiveness of 47 government ministry and knowledge of improving public accessibility to information, and agency websites as well as their performance as it relates to budget also possibly expand accessibility. transparency. Paramadina University, which is implementing the proj- • Increase in the number of budget inquiries. Correspondingly, ect in collaboration with the primary government counterpart of the when the project closes, it is expected that there will be at least central information commission, provides counterpart funding for a 50 percent increase in the number of inquires about budget office facilities, staff time, and administrative support as mentioned information and reports. during the project preparation. Implications for Project Teams Activities (2012–present) Combining assistance in creating websites for agencies geared • Paramadina University, in collaboration with central information toward budget transparency and complementing online dissemina- commission is providing assessment benchmarks. Five ministries, tion with an oversight committee comprised of stakeholders from including the Ministry of Education and the ministry of religious antigraft civil society organizations and the media—is an interesting affairs, are receiving particular focus because of their size. two-pronged approach that is likely to strengthen the transparency • The website assessments, which began in December 2012, are process. carried out by a team of 18 website reviewers and a steering committee that evaluates the team’s work. The steering commit- Reference tee is comprised of members of prominent antigraft civil society Please contact Dini Sari Djalal at ddjalal@worldbank.org for more information. organizations and the media—such as Masyarakat Anti-Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Community), Viva News, and FITRA (Coalition A–49 Country: Indonesia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Levels: Local; Provincial Name of Project: Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Project Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; Participatory Planning; Procurement A1.38. Reforming Budget Implementation to Open Up District Budgets Context Actions (2003–12) East Asia and Pacific Indonesia’s “Big Bang” decentralization in 2001, part of the wide- One of ILGRP’s three main components, Local Governance Reform, ranging reforms of the post-Suharto era, led to a fundamental shift is budget-transparency related and supports the following activi- in governance and service delivery in the country This major shift ties—reforming the district planning and budgeting process with a in responsibilities and resources presented serious implementation focus on the enhancement of participation and strengthening links challenges at the district level across Indonesia. Although the basic with local pro-poor priorities; reforming district budget implemen- national-level legal and procedural frameworks for decentralization tation as well as financial management and reporting, with a focus on were in place, there were several problems—the structures were new improving local procurement and financial management practices; and untested and many district governments had limited capacity and strengthening accountability mechanisms, such as increasing to effectively implement the new arrangements and deliver on their information disclosure and cross-district networking. newly-expanded roles and responsibilities. Governance and corrup- tion-related issues presented a major concern. District budgets were Results opaque, with little transparency or public consultation in the devel- • Disseminated budgets in 14 districts. Prior to ILGRP, there was opment phase or about how expenditures were made in relation to little or no active information dissemination. As a result of the approved budgets. It was in this context that the Initiatives for Local project, summaries of district budgets, accountability reports, Governance Reform Project (ILGRP) was approved by the World and district procurement plans with estimated contract amounts Bank in June 2005, following an extensive period of project prepa- were made public. ration with the government of Indonesia that began in late 2001. • Strengthened financial management practices. At the outset, all ILGRP aims at supporting district governments in improving transpar- districts had relatively weak financial management arrangements, ency, accountability, and public participatory practices as well as in but after receiving the qualified audits, 14 district governments undertaking reforms in financial management and procurement. The now have sound financial management practices. project advances good governance at the district level through the establishment of a set of minimum reforms in the key cross-cutting Implications for Project Teams governance areas of public participation, transparency, financial man- Successful district-level governance reforms require strong district agement, and procurement as well as in preparing a participatory leadership, the presence of change agents within the district-level Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Plan. bureaucracy or cadre of civil servants, and dynamic and engaged civil society. References Indonesia—Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Project, Implementation Completion and Results Report, ICR2018, March 20, 2012. Indonesia—Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 27424, May 16, 2005. A–50 Country: Marshall Islands Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Agency: Ministry of Finance Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Gender Budgets A1.39. Providing Technical Assistance for Integrating a Gender Perspective into Public Expenditure Management East Asia and Pacific Context the workshop, two meetings were held between the ministries As of 2002, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) had a compara- of health and education and the chief secretary’s office. During tively low participation of women in paid employment, a high school- these meetings, each ministry had the opportunity to map out dropout rate among girls, and high teen pregnancy rates. Moreover, their funding allocations for programs and outputs having a RMI’s policy on women had expired in 2001, and the government direct or indirect impact on teenage pregnancy. The process had yet to become a signatory to the United Nations Convention of sharing information about the programs being conducted for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. In enabled the ministries to identify some duplications and gaps in response to a request by the RMI government, a project team from programs on teenage pregnancy. the Asian Development Bank and the University of South Australia (UniSA) provided technical assistance to the government to support Results analysis of the budget and public spending in terms of their impact • Breakdown of budgetary process. Overall progress in changing on gender issues. Carried out over the 2002–03 budget cycle, the and reallocating the budget was completely hindered by a break- framework for this project was developed by the UniSA team, which down in the budgetary process that year, resulting from a renego- established the possible overall parameters of the pilot project and tiation of the compact grant funds with the United States. provided the basis for the training workshops—the primary strat- • One-off efforts to incorporate gender considerations in the egy adopted—as well as the evaluation. In addition, a Marshallese budget. steering committee was established that was comprised of two joint – The ministry of internal affairs achieved a reallocation of ministry of finance project coordinators, the women’s desk officer funds, which it planned to spend on a teenage pregnancy pro- from the ministry of internal affairs, and a representative of the non- gram. Unfortunately, this program did not succeed because of governmental organization (NGO) umbrella group, Women United in staff changes in the project’s steering committee and a failure the Marshall Islands. to spend the funds on time, thereby losing the opportunity to direct this reallocation of money toward a program on teen Actions (2002–03) pregnancy. • The first workshop for government officials in the RMI included – The Ministry of Education decided to spend a United States a number of activities to develop an understanding of gender federal grant received for health education among adolescents issues in the Republic of the Marshall Islands; a statistical over- on the issue of teenage pregnancy, an example of changing view of the socioeconomic situation of men and women in the budget allocations by redirecting resources to alter the type RMI using national census and other relevant data; and aware- and quality of goods and services delivered by government. ness-raising of potential direct and indirect gender impacts of ministry programs and activities. Implications for Project Teams • Strategies that were adopted to promote government account- • Even though a one-year timeframe is valuable for raising aware- ability as it relates to gender impacts of its policies and budgets ness and creating an understanding of gender issues in policies, in included establishing administrative mechanisms within the order for gender budgets to fulfill their potential, they need to government necessary for implementing the pilot project; and be developed over several budget cycles. capacity building of NGOs to advocate for gender-related issues • Even though gender-sensitive budget analysis is essential to and to link budgeting to planning processes that reflect gender achieving a gender-sensitive budget, changing budget allocations concerns. requires a deep understanding of the budgetary decision-making • In order to push the pilot project’s focus from analysis and aware- process and its politics. ness-raising, the RMI steering committee decided to develop a program focusing on one gender issue—teenage pregnancy. Reference This would serve as a focal point for budget analysis and revision. Sharp, Rhonda, and Sanjugta Vas Dev. 2006. “Integrating Gender into Public Expenditure: Lessons from the Republic of the Marshall Islands.” Pacific Studies 29 Toward this end, a second workshop was organized for govern- (3/4–September/December). ment officials to understand that their ministry budgets had sig- nificant direct and indirect impacts in the area of gender. After A–51 Country: Mongolia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Name of Project: Supporting Civil Society Oversight on Public Procurement Areas of Engagement: Budget Monitoring; Capacity Building; Procurement A1.40. Institutionalizing Civil Society Engagement to Make the Procurement Process Transparent East Asia and Pacific Context Results Mongolia’s legal architecture for procurement has been undergo- Over the last year, PPP transitioned from developing basic structures, ing considerable changes over the past few years. Major revisions of processes, and norms to “enhancing” its network, that is, fine tuning the public procurement law in June 2011 included the creation of a strategies, solidifying memberships, and engaging in network activi- central procurement agency responsible for all major procurements ties such as joint advocacy and procurement monitoring. Some key from the national budget, a greater role for local governments in achievements to date include: procurements funded from local budgets, enhanced internal con- trols, a new provision for framework agreements, and a new formal • Increased membership and member engagement. PPP has been role for civil society organizations (CSOs) in bid evaluation and ex successful in increasing its membership from approximately 30 post contract monitoring. A Governance Partnership Facility grant to 60 CSOs. Engagement of its members through contributions that aims to improve transparency and the value-for-money of of staff time and in-kind resources has also increased, indicating Mongolia’s public procurement system focuses on the last provision, greater connectivity among and enthusiasm of its members. about the new role of CSOs in public procurement. The amended • Development of a five-year strategic plan. A strategic plan procurement law opened the door to the formation of the Public has been developed and publicly declared clear goals and Procurement Partnership (PPP), a procurement-monitoring network agreed-upon strategies aimed at improving effectiveness of the of CSOs. Established in 2012, this network of about 60 CSOs is work- partnership. ing to build awareness, participation, and accountability around pub- • Coordination of policy dialogue and constructive engagement lic procurement—a joint effort that has magnified their strength to with the ministry of finance. As a result of the dialogue, in Fall engage with government agencies through increased coordination of 2012, the ministry of finance changed the implementing rules and advocacy efforts. regulations to include several of PPP’s requests, including allow- ances for monitors and the use of specific reporting templates Actions (2013–present) for members of the CSO bid evaluation committee. • The grant will finance several nonlending technical assis- • Cooperation agreements with subnational governments. The tance activities, including supporting the Procurement Policy PPP and its subnetworks have signed or are in the process of Department of the ministry of finance to develop implementing signing cooperation agreements on procurement monitoring rules and guidelines to govern the participation of CSOs in vari- with several aimags (provinces) (e.g., Khuvsgul, Uverkhangai, and ous stages of the procurement process—from bid evaluation Omnogovi Aimags). In partnership with these government agen- to monitoring of contract implementation—at both central and cies, members of the PPP will monitor the implementation of local government levels. It seeks to ensure that CSO monitoring contracts, especially in the road and construction sectors. is well coordinated with other state oversight bodies, including the national audit office and the anticorruption agency. Implications for Project Teams • Furthermore, the grant will facilitate PPP in developing internal When working in a context such as Mongolia, with a vibrant civil soci- self-governance regulations for its members that will set the ety and a growing—but still limited—number of CSOs with special- rules for participation within the network and ensure that CSOs ized skills in procurement, interventions to improve advocacy skills are accountable and free of any conflicts of interest. It will also should be complemented by initiatives that strengthen the technical help the PPP to develop internal monitoring tools. capacity of CSOs. South–South learning about public procurement • The grant will develop the capacity of PPP through training, and monitoring among CSOs is also worthy of integration in projects. peer-to-peer learning, and networking with other organizations within and outside the East Asia region, including partnerships Reference Hasnain, Zahid. (unpublished). “Mongolia: Supporting Civil Society Oversight in with the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability; knowledge Public Procurement.” Background note prepared for CSO Forum and Donors’ exchange visits to countries that have been innovating in this Meeting, June 2012. area, such as the Philippines; and partnerships with CSOs active in the field of procurement including Procurement Watch and Roads Watch, among others. A–52 Country: Mongolia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Governance Assistance Program Areas of Engagement: Disclosure; ICT A1.41. Making Budgets Publicly Available to Foster Accountability Context • In order to improve the anticorruption framework in Mongolia, a East Asia and Pacific In the past decade, the government of Mongolia has made tangible main activity involved adopting an effective conflict-of-interest gains in improving public sector systems and processes. The disclo- framework for reducing corruption and increasing integrity in the sure of fiscal data—the budget, public debt, and procurement infor- Mongolian public administration that complies with the United mation—has also improved, but much more must be done to make Nations Convention Against Corruption. This was realized by this data easily understandable and usable for citizens. Transparency producing outputs that included a functional system of income- is particularly critical for Mongolia’s development because of the and-asset declaration and disclosure and a code of conduct huge increase in public expenditures financed by rapidly-rising min- framework for conflict-of-interest prevention and resolution. eral production and the high levels of patronage in the awarding • Finally, in order to develop a robust framework for monitoring of contracts and other expenditures that compromises the quality corruption, the project assisted the anticorruption agency in of spending. Public opinion surveys conducted since 1995 indicate developing the Mongolia Corruption Index, a perception sur- increasing public concerns over corruption. Improving governance vey-based index of corruption. It was launched in 2009 and is around the mining value chain is central to the World Bank’s engage- updated every two years. ment in Mongolia, as detailed in the Country Partnership Strategy; it is being operationalized through a number of technical assistance Results projects and through a Governance Partnership Facility grant. One • Improved public accountability and monitoring. Before the start such project is the Governance Assistance Program, which seeks to of the project, very little procurement data was public. Now, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governance processes through the ministry of finance’s website, citizens can access in the management of public finances, promote transparency and information on key parts of the procurement cycle, such as ten- accountability in the performance of public sector functions, and der announcements, bidders, and awarded contracts. foster Mongolia’s investment climate . • Lowered perceptions of corruption. The perception of corrup- tion has decreased as measured by the Mongolia Corruption Actions (2006–13) Index. • The project helped establish a dynamic website for the minis- • Improved Open Budget Index ranking. A reduced perception of try of finance by providing technical assistance for its design in corruption within the country led to Mongolia’s Open Budget a manner that fulfilled the need for disclosure and by develop- Index ranking improving from 18 in 2006 to 60 in 2010, before ing the skills and capacity of ministry of finance staff to create, declining to 51 in 2012. update, and upload content. • The project financed the development of a public procure- Implications for Project Teams ment monitoring system to help the ministry of finance track all A combination of technical assistance and capacity building yields budget-funded procurement and display the information on its the most effective results in budget transparency interventions. website. References Mongolia-Governance Assistance Project, Implementation Status and Results Report, Report No: ISR9646, May 11, 2010. Mongolia-Governance Assistance Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 35212-MN, April 12, 2006. A–53 Country: Philippines Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Provincial Implementing Organization: Davao Procurement Transparency Group Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Monitoring; Procurement A1.42. Engaging Civil Society Partners in Monitoring the Procurement Process Context Results East Asia and Pacific Studies have shown that 30 percent of the Philippine government’s • Decreased irregularities in procurement. More monitoring has procurement budget, which constitutes about 15 percent of the total resulted in better procurement with fewer irregularities noted annual budget, is lost due to corruption and other forms of misus- by observers and a resulting drop in corruption associated with ing public funds. Sources include audit reports, testimonies from procurement. Several CSOs also reported that, as a result of their witnesses such as government employees involved in procurement, vigilance in the monitoring of the construction of a government and entities who have been parties to procurement by government. building, the budget had been utilized as laid out in the original Several of these corrupt practices have also been exposed in the project plan, resulting in better quality of construction and, in mass media. To stop this type of corruption, the Davao Procurement some instances, better services for the population. Transparency Group (DPTCG), a coalition of 26 member organizations • Increased acceptance of CSOs as a legitimate oversight mecha- involved with programs on good governance and anticorruption, has nism. Another observed impact has been the growing number been operating in the Mindanao region of the Philippines since 2009. of government procuring agencies that are open to the presence and participation of CSOs as observers of the bids and awards Actions (2009–10) committees (BAC). In the initial phase of the project, only seven • DPTCG seeks to organize and enhance the capacity of civil soci- government agencies were receptive, most of them from Davao ety organizations (CSOs) by mobilizing them as observers during city. Currently, some 18 government agencies are inviting DPTCG the bidding and procurement processes carried out by the gov- to send BAC observers to monitor all phases of the bidding pro- ernment. The participation of CSOs as observers of all phases of cess, and several invitations have been received from provinces the bidding and procurement process as well as in contract moni- around the Davao region as well. toring is allowed by the Philippines Government Procurement • Enhanced legitimacy of DPTCG as a government partner in pro- Reform Act, but it is not required. curement. DPTCG is now a key partner in helping the govern- • Since DPTCG operates with CSOs involved with voluntary moni- ment prioritize and select what procurement procedures will be toring as observers of the procurement process, it first must build the focus of coalition oversight. trust with government entities in order to have access to bid- ding procedures and documents. Therefore, DPTCG also seeks Implications for Project Teams liaisons with and outreach toward government agencies to help One of the factors identified by DCPTG as critical to success is the bridge resistance and create partnerships for fighting corrup- participation of academia and the private sector in the early stages; tion. Several meetings, forums, and other interface activities with this proved to be an effective strategy for facilitating dynamic and server heads and key personnel of different government agencies progressive thinking and the development of action steps to combat were initiated by DPTCG. corruption in the procurement system. • Some of the additional functions performed by DPTCG include capacity building, third-party monitoring, community mobiliza- Reference tion, coalition building, and structured consultations. DPCTG Website: http://ptfund.org. A–54 Country: Philippines Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Social Watch Philippines Areas of Engagement: Alternate Budgets; Budget Analysis; Capacity Building; Monitoring; Legislatures A1.43. Improving Budget Accountability and Allocations for Social Development Context their interactions with government agencies. After both cham- East Asia and Pacific Founded in 1997, Social Watch Philippines (SWP), a part of the bers pass the budget, ABI defends its gains against the veto power International Social Watch Network, is a network of civil society of the president and calls for immediate approval and implemen- organizations and individuals with the broad goal of monitoring and tation of the budget jointly approved by the House and Senate. advocating for progress of the government commitments to the • The ABI clusters also conduct budget tracking on the budget social development goals defined in the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for agriculture, the environment, health, education, and condi- and the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). SWP’s primary tional cash transfers. They monitor the implementation of the activity is the Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI) in which civil soci- budget items that were included in the General Appropriations ety organizations engage in the national budget process during the Act because of ABI’s budget advocacy. budget preparation, legislation, implementation, and accountability stages. The group analyzes the budget’s impact on education, health, Results the environment, food and agriculture, and the overall economy. • Increased allocations for social development. Because of the ABI members, together with their partner legislators, formulate an Alternative Budget Initiative campaign, there was an increase alternative budget proposal that, in their view, would lead to better of P5.2 billion (approximately US$127,232,923) in allocations for progress toward the MDGs. social development in the 2007 national budget, P6.3 billion (US$154,147,580) in the 2008 budget, and an increase of P7.7 bil- Actions (2007–present) lion (US$188,402,598) in the 2009 budget for health, agriculture, • To complete this initiative within the time allotted for budget the environment, and education. Ahead of the 2009 budget, the hearings, members of the ABI consortium split into clusters on entire minority group of the Senate and House of Representatives, health, education, agriculture, the environment, and macroeco- as well as majority group members of both chambers, adopted all nomics. Each cluster then forms a technical working group to alternative budget proposals. identify priority issues and formulate alternative budget pro- • Increased accountability. Moreover, ABI’s rigorous campaign posals for each area. After the group’s consultations are com- for transparency and accountability, focusing on the release of pleted, each cluster meets with legislators to discuss and impounded funds, led to a special provision against impoundment. finalize the budget proposals. Additionally, the Bicameral Conference Committee made a reso- • SWP also conducts various workshops to involve more citizens lution to let the public attend and learn the results of bicameral in the budget process. For example, in 2007, SWP taught other meetings on the budget. The Senate and House of Representatives civil society actors how to formulate their own alternative bud- also agreed to form a joint legislative oversight committee on the gets. A year later, the group conducted a workshop that produced budget to conduct monthly hearings on budget implementation. a detailed plan for the 2009 budget engagement for each cluster, • Participation of nongovernmental organizations in the bud- with agreements on key priority issues, a work plan, strategies of get process. Because of the ABI, the Congress Committee on engagement with the executive and the legislative, and a media Appropriations invited nongovernmental and people’s orga- strategy. SWP also organizes training seminars to help members nizations to participate in budget deliberations in congress of the media better understand the issues behind the national and to present their alternative budget proposals. The House budget process so that they can then more effectively present Committee on People’s Participation is now working on a bill to the issues to the masses and to build partnerships with reporters institutionalize people’s participation in the national and local covering the national budget and civil society interventions. budget processes—a result of ABI advocacy for a participatory • For the ABI to influence actual budget allocations, SWP and budget process. its partners brief legislators in the Philippines House of Representatives and Senate on the alternative budget pro- Implications for Project Teams posals, gather their suggestions and input, and try to gain sup- High-quality technical analysis is necessary but not sufficient to port for the proposals. ABI responds to questions and concerns effect changes in budget allocations. An approach that integrates from legislators and provides additional information supporting analysis with targeted advocacy of key decision makers, public mobi- the alternative budgets. ABI clusters vigilantly monitor budget lization, and use of the media is more effective. deliberations and readily provide legislators data for their media releases, speeches, and responses to issues. During budget delib- Reference erations, ABI provides technical notes to support legislators in Website: http://www.socialwatchphilippines.org. A–55 Country: Philippines Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: Local; National Implementing Organization: Caucus of Development NGO Networks Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Constituency Development Funds; Monitoring A1.44. Using Citizen Monitors to Track Pork Barrel Funds Context Results East Asia and Pacific More commonly known as “pork barrel funds,” the Priority Develop- • Launch of a transparency and accountability initiative for lump ment Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Congressional Allocations (CA) in sum funds. In 2011, after the new administration took office, the budget of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) the DBM took a major step in making the information on PDAF are discretionary funds allocated to each congressperson and senator publicly available through the electronic “Transparency and to finance projects they identify. Because 20–50 percent of earlier Accountability Initiative for Lump Sum Funds” (e-TAILS) section discretionary funds were squandered, the Caucus of Development on its website. The DBM also adopted measures to promote the NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) launched the Pork Barrel Watch (PDAF proper and efficient use of the PDAF. These include requiring Watch) in late 2005. Capitalizing on its capacity as the largest network that legislators specify the scope of work and type of equipment of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused on development, needed, the number of units to be built for housing projects, the people’s organizations, and cooperatives in the Philippines, CODE- type of vehicle and the number of units to be purchased, the NGO aims to influence relevant national policies and the practices number of scholars and health beneficiaries, and, for education and policies of legislators in order to achieve a more responsible and and health projects, the names of schools and hospitals. transparent use discretionary funds. • Issuance of full disclosure policy. In 2010, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued a full Actions (2005–10) disclosure policy that requires local government units to make CODE-NGO has undertaken PDAF Watch in the years 2005–06 (Phase publicly available through their website or bulletin boards various 1), 2007 (Phase 2), and 2009–10 (Phase 3). budget, financial, and other documents, including the PDAF proj- ects that went to the local government units. • Every phase of PDAF Watch begins with the recruitment of vol- • Greater budget transparency. A new initiative—the “Open unteer monitors across different regions of the country. These Budget Partnership”—led by a senator aims to make the national volunteers are trained on how to gather information, interview budget more popular and understandable among citizens, key informants, and conduct field monitoring of PDAF proj- and a full-disclosure policy was included in the 2011 General ects. Simultaneously, information on the utilization of PDAF Appropriations Act that compels all government agencies and is requested from DPWH, the Department of Budget and offices to disclose budgetary and financial documents, including Management (DBM), and all congresspersons and senators. the PDAF of legislators. • Based on the list of PDAF/CA-funded projects, volunteer moni- tors randomly select three projects in their assigned district. Implications for Project Teams Once the projects are identified, volunteer monitors gather per- A new administration geared toward addressing corruption and pov- tinent documents regarding these projects from the office of the erty and that is willing to take measures to promote budget transpar- legislator, the district engineer’s office, and/or the local govern- ency could be the linchpin for making the budget more transparent, ment unit; undertake field monitoring visits to validate the status participatory, and accountable. of the project as reported; and inspect whether project specifica- tions were met. Reference • Key informant interviews among officials of the implementing Soliman, Sandino, Sixto Donato Macaset, and Patrick Lim. 2011. “A Step Back into agencies and members of the community are also undertaken to the Darkness: PDAF Watch Report.” Caucus of Development NGO Networks. further explore any concerns raised during the field monitoring. • Volunteer monitors then prepare a report and submit it to CODE-NGO, which then analyzes all the data and prepares and disseminates a consolidated report. A–56 Country: Philippines Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Procurement Watch Inc. Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Capacity Building; Disclosure; Legislatures; Monitoring; Procurement A1.45. Monitoring Public Procurement to Reduce Inefficiencies and Corruption Context • Set up a web-based reporting and feedback mechanism to aid East Asia and Pacific Before Procurement Watch Inc. (PWI) was established in 2001 to com- in the drive for greater transparency and sharing of reports by bat corruption in public procurement, there were no laws govern- trained CSO affiliates. The reports submitted by the affiliated ing the procurement of office goods and supplies. The government CSOs have not yet been posted on PWI’s website for wider read- could change procurement practices at will. When the government ership but shall be made accessible to the public. set up a task force to examine procurement reforms and draft a • Developed the differential expenditure efficiency measure- new law on procurement, members of PWI’s governing board were ment (DEEM), a tool to measure corruption and inefficiency in included. Thus, PWI became intimately involved with the task force public procurement. It has tested DEEM by collaborating with activities and established itself as a nongovernmental procurement the government’s internal audit agency, which agreed to provide expert. Over the next two years, PWI led a civil society campaign PWI with access to procurement documents maintained by the to support passage by the national legislature of the Government agencies it audits. Procurement Reform Bill (GPRB), a new procurement law, and after the law’s passage it devised means for its implementation. Results • Savings achieved due to better procurement practices. In the Actions (2001–present) first semester after the passage of the GPRB, savings materialized To have full access to government information, PWI adopted a non- from the posting of advertisements on the Philippines Electronic adversarial stance and presented itself as a partner to the govern- Government Procurement System for projects up for bid due ment offering its services. It undertook the following actions: to an increase in information dissemination and a subsequent increase in competition. For instance, the bureau of corrections • To promote passage of the procurement law, PWI provided tech- recorded savings of 58 percent on subsistence of prisoners, nical assistance and advocacy support. ammunitions, and office equipment. The housing and land-use • To increase the chances of getting sufficient votes for the pas- regulatory board saved 38 percent on information technology sage of the procurement law, PWI provided free technical assis- parts and accessories. tance to both the administration and opposition leaders. PWI • Training of 800 citizen monitors. PWI’s efforts have resulted in was a vital part of the Technical Working Group (TWG), tackling the training of 800 citizen monitors to ensure that contractors the procurement bill in both houses of congress; it was also des- comply with contracts. ignated as a member of the Secretariat of the TWG of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws. Implications for Project Teams • As a part of its advocacy support, PWI organized information • Creating or supporting entities that can provide quality technical campaigns for both private and public sectors on the GPRB, assistance as partners to members of the legislature is an effec- stressing that the bill was an anticorruption measure. PWI staff tive strategy to further the public good. met with professional government associations, business groups, • Helping civil society get a seat at the government’s table can lead civil society organizations (CSOs), and student organizations to to effective collaboration in implementing better Public Financial present the bill’s salient points, impart updates, and garner sup- Management practices. port. It also granted TV, radio, and broadcast interviews and dis- tributed posters, streamers, and primers on the GPRB. Reference International Budget Partnership. 2008. “Procurement Watch Inc. Specializes To promote the implementation of the law, PWI has: in Monitoring Public Procurement in the Philippines.” In Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditure edited by • Assisted in crafting the law’s implementing rules and regulations. Vivek Ramkumar. Washington, DC: International Budget Partnership. • Provided training to track procurement for different groups, including the ombudsman, government agencies involved in large procurements, CSOs, and private citizens. A–57 Country: Timor Leste Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: Local; National Implementing Organization: Luta Hamutuk Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Monitoring; Capacity Building A1.46. Using Community Monitoring to Address Mismanagement of Post-War Reconstruction Funds East Asia and Pacific Context Results After a long history of violent conflict, the reconstruction of Timor • Delivery of infrastructure. The community monitoring has contrib- Leste’s physical and social infrastructure is a priority. However, recon- uted to greater community engagement and the delivery of critical struction projects are prone to corruption and misappropriation of infrastructure to more than 101,660 Timorese people. In Bazartete, resources whether they are managed by government agencies or pri- for example, a municipality of 63,329 people, monitoring commit- vate contractors. It is therefore critical to increase transparency. In this tees discovered that schools lacked desks, chairs, and blackboards. vein, Luta Hamutuk was established in 2005 by a number of activists They shared these findings with the Ministry of Education, resulting to ensure a participatory and accountable development process. As in the delivery of the necessary school furniture and in rehabilita- of 2011, Luta Hamutuk was working with the government and commu- tion of schools. Community monitors also mobilized to ensure that nity monitors to ensure the effective oversight of 15 reconstruction low-quality pipes were substituted with better ones, as a result of programs and projects worth US$1.3 billion across various districts. which villagers now have access to clean water. • Pro-poor budget allocations. In addition to increasing efficiency Actions (2005-present) savings due to whistle blowing on project delays and lack of mainte- Luta Hamutuk works in the following areas: nance, Luta Hamutuk’s work has led to pro-poor budget allocations, ensuring national funds reach communities across the country. For • It reaches out to as many communities in Timor-Leste as pos- instance, Luta Hamutuk monitored the building of housing for war sible to facilitate discussions on the state budget, the petroleum veterans in the Dili, Viqueque, Manatuto, and Liquisa districts. They fund, and the development plan. Led by Luta Hamutuk staff, such found that the houses were often too small and/or insufficient for community briefings provide basic information on the source the number of veterans. Luta Hamutuk offered recommendations of the state’s revenues (oil and gas). They explain the mecha- to address these problems to the office of the prime minister, par- nisms by which these revenues enter the state budget, what the liament, SEAVAC, the ministry of infrastructure, and the high court; state budget is, how allocations are made, and what the present these recommendations were also shared with the media. As a development plans are. These briefings encourage community result of their monitoring and advocacy, Luta Hamutuk was able to feedback to foster informed citizen action in order to improve increase veteran housing budget allocations. the reconstruction process. Community briefings also serve as a • Replication in post-conflict contexts. Learning from the success- recruiting ground for volunteer “focal points” who become the ful experience in Timor Leste, similar citizen/state committees link between the local leaders and the community and between have been replicated in Afghanistan to enhance community- the community and the Dili-based policy community. driven accountability there. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Luta • Luta Hamutuk supports the focal points and their communities Hamutuk’s partner in the Network for Integrity in Reconstruction, as they monitor projects in eight districts. The total value of devel- visited Luta Hamutuk to learn about their approach to commu- opment projects monitored by Luta Hamutuk was US$7,404,672.83, nity engagement and monitoring and are now supporting similar as of November 2010. The monitoring exercise serves to verify monitoring boards at the provincial level in Afghanistan. whether promised projects are in fact implemented and whether the quality is appropriate. The projects monitored are mostly clin- Implications for Bank Operations ics and school buildings as well as electricity, irrigation, canaliza- • Undertaking budget transparency and monitoring can be instru- tion, water and sanitation, and road projects. mental in postconflict countries where gaining legitimacy and • Lutu Hamutuk facilitates the creation of monitoring commit- showing results are often pressing concerns, even more so than in tees that include local government authorities and community other developing countries. members and which monitor and report on several reconstruc- tion projects. The focal points regularly update the committee • Replicating sucesssful budget transparency and monitoring mod- members on the status of the projects that they monitor. Results els from other post-conflict countries could be supported in of the committee meetings are used for advacacy with the gov- World Bank projects. ernment and companies working on infrastructure projects. • It also encourages focal points and their communities to iden- References tify development projects that would respond to their needs Luta Hamutuk Website: http://www.lutahamutuk.org. and to advocate for them to the government. Revenue Watch Institute. “Monitoring the Oil and Gas Sectors and the Petroleum Fund of Timor Leste.” http://www.revenuewatch.org/grants/ A–58 monitoring-oil-and-gas-sectors-and-petroleum-fund-timor-leste. Country: Timor Leste Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Agency: Ministry of Finance Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Dissemination A1.47. Pursuing Transparency in Budgets, Aid, and Procurement via Online Portals Context • Besides the portal, the government has also undertaken a range East Asia and Pacific Throughout 2011 and into 2012, the government of Timor-Leste made of other transparency initiatives under the TLTM: Timor-Leste several significant advances in the pursuit of its transparency and is now part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative good governance agenda by launching a series of online portals ded- (EITI), a program that calls for transparency for countries with icated to improving public sector transparency. These online por- energy wealth. Through the EITI process, companies publish what tals were part of a broader initiative, referred to as the Timor-Leste they pay and governments disclose what they receive; this infor- Transparency Model (TLTM), which, according to the government, mation is verified and publicly disclosed. provided a system of “360 degree fiscal accountability chain from the point of resource extraction to the time of investment through Results reliable, public and shared systems and information.” On its website, Luta Hamutuk, a civil society organization dedicated to budget trans- the government of Timor-Leste declared the goal of the project as parency, evaluated the effectiveness of the Portals of Transparency follows: and the EITI processin several districts of Timor-Leste. Interviews were conducted with the district administrator, the subdistrict “The Transparency Website will allow people to participate, in administrator, students, village chiefs, youth representatives, compa- real time and interactively, in the process of the Timor-Leste nies, political parties, local nongovernmental organizations, teachers, national budget and to contribute to National Development. lecturers, and communities. Results suggest: Citizens can investigate projects further to view budget trans- actions to ensure the budget is being spent as intended. This • Limited guidance on utilization of the portal. As many as 95 ensures honesty and transparency to improve citizen and percent of the respondents questioned the use of the website investor confidence. The Timor-Leste Transparency Portal because they were unable to understand how to use it. In addi- provides 10 years of budget information: the budget that was tion, many of them experienced difficulties in understanding approved and the actual budget spent. Reports and filtered terms and acronyms used on the portal. results can be exported in PDF, Word, Excel, XML and HTML • Lack of clarity on the future of these portals. Challenges remain formats.” regarding the expansion of these portals to line ministries and the widening of their usage as core tools. Actions (April 2012–present) • Housed within the ministry of finance, the portals can be accessed Implications for Project Teams online—www.transparency.gov.tl. Their launch is considered an The provision of a web-based tool to increase transparency can important achievement for Timor-Leste as they provide a set of complement sound economic policy, encourage public oversight, user-friendly and generally-accessible tools for use by govern- and build confidence within the private sector, attracting investors ment, civil society, the private sector, and citizens to engage and by dispelling inaccurate information through reporting in an open hold each other to account for the use of public resources. and timely manner on government processes, particularly those • The portals are currently split across four fields: budget execu- related to public finance management and procurement. In postcon- tion, overseas development assistance, government procure- flict and fragile states like Timor-Leste, the reputational benefits that ment, and project results. Data on revenues, allocated budgets, such portals can offer should not be ignored—that is, regardless of and budget execution across ministries are updated every 24 its effectiveness, by signaling to the population its intention to “open hours, whereas data on aid disbursements from development up its books,” the initiative can have a trust-building effect that is key partners are collected on a quarterly basis—in Portuguese, in such contexts. Tetum, and English. The next step for the portals is to post photos of public works projects to provide the public with an References even better understanding of public decisions in real time. Portal de Transparência de Timor-Leste Website: http://www.transparency.gov.tl. Mitchell, Leigh, and Nicholas Travis. 2013. “Implementing the New Deal: Transparency in Timor Leste.” G7+ Peer Learning Note #2. Evaluation evidence from Lao Hamutuk, March 6, 2013. http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/portal/ LHPDHJPortaAprov6Mar2013en.pdf. A–59 Country: Azerbaijan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Local Implementing Organization: Economic Research Center Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Capacity Building; Dissemination; Participatory Budget Planning A1.48. Promoting Public Participation in Municipal Budgets to Increase Transparency Europe and Central Asia Context • Each of the six municipalities hosted public hearings in early and Since the inception of the local self-government system in Azerbaijan mid-December 2006 to encourage public participation in the in 1999, the establishment of a well-functioning governance system debate on the draft 2007 budgets for municipalities. Before the at the local level has been a priority. Even so, as of October 2006, hearings, chief municipality officers and persons responsible for municipalities struggled because of a lack of budgeting skills and lack financial matters were provided with necessary guidelines on of experience with civic engagement in budget drafting and budget the forms and contents of the reports to be developed. Public documentation procedures. In order to encourage public participa- advertisements detailing the place and date of the hearings were tion in municipal budgets and policy making and to improve the trans- posted throughout the municipalities before the event. The parency of the local budget process, the Economic Research Centre, municipal budgets were published in newspapers with explana- an independent nonprofit research institution based in Baku, with tory comments and disseminated to the local population before support from Counterpart International, initiated a project called the hearings to enable them to raise relevant questions during the Enhancing Transparency Initiatives and Ensuring Public Participation hearings. in Municipal Budgets. Results Actions (October 2006-March 2007) • Improvement in tax collection. The public involvement in the • Based on their assessment of the budget management systems of decision-making process increased citizens’ sense of ownership the six selected municipalities, project experts provided techni- and increased trust between them and the municipal manage- cal assistance to design economic and functional classifications ment body. This was reflected in the changes in postproject tax of expenditures in order to bring the budget projections for the collection. For instance, Piral municipality had an increase of up next fiscal year in line with legislative requirements. They also pro- to 95 percent in tax collections and Hasangala municipality stated vided assistance with software-based registration of local tax that the debts outstanding since 2000 have been repaid, in part and duty payers and developed model regulations for the local due to increased tax revenues since the public hearings. budget process. • Budget information boards were set up in various public places, Implications for Project Teams such as in front of school buildings or municipal offices, to present Supporting small pilot projects can lead to meaningful results and key budget information or event announcements in an attempt serve as valuable learning experiences, thus incubating larger efforts to garner broader public attention. Decisions at different stages at promoting participation in and transparency of budget processes. of the budget process were also shared on these boards and thus disseminated to members of the local community. Reference Baku. 2007. “Enhancing Transparency Initiatives and Ensuring Public Participation in Municipal Budgets (ETPMB) Project.” Final Report, Economic Research Center, USAID Civil Society Project subgrant: CSP/CE-06-01, April 10, 2007. A–60 Country: Kazakhstan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Levels: Local; National; Provincial Implementing Organization: Center for Legal and Economic Reforms Assistance Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Budget Simplification; Citizens Budgets A1.49. Publishing Citizens Budgets and Influencing Budget Transparency Legislation Europe and Central Asia Context • Legislative changes. The draft legislation, called the “Methodology The Center for Legal and Economic Reforms Assistance (CLERA) is of Development and Dissemination of the Citizens Budget,” was an Almaty-based civil society organization (CSO) that has been prepared after two months of actively-engaged cooperation working on budget transparency—particularly publishing Citizens between CSOs, the ministry of finance, and the Soros Foundation. Budgets—in Kazakhstan since 2010. Funded by the Soros Foundation– The finance minister’s bill was signed into law in June 2011 and cov- Kazakhstan’s Public Finance Transparency Program and the Local ers issues related to the development of Citizens Budgets at both Government Initiative, CLERA has been working to improve the pro- the central and local level. What is unique about the bill is that vision of information to the public by the Kazakh government, which Citizens Budgets will not only be published when the govern- scored only 38 points out of 100 on the 2010 Open Budget Index. ment publishes the executive’s budget proposal but also after the formulation, approval, implementation, and evaluation stages of Actions (2010–present) the budget process. • Soon after its formation, CLERA pioneered a model for a Citizens • Wide dissemination of budget and information on the bill. As of Budget in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region more broadly. October 2011, the finance minister’s bill is currently being imple- • In November 2010, they developed three different types of mented, and relevant chapters are available on official websites Citizens Budgets that could be used at the national, regional, of state agencies, including that of the ministry of finance and and local level. These models were widely disseminated at several local governments. Individual line ministries and state agencies regional conferences, including one about the 2010 Open Budget have made vast strides by publishing their own Citizens Budgets, Survey in Astana, Kazakhstan where key stakeholders such as the which they strive to make more user-friendly. finance minister and members of supreme audit institutions par- ticipated and noted that the Kazakh government could use the Implications for Project Teams CLERA Citizens Budget model to draft its own version for all lev- Working closely with a champion (in this case the finance minister) is els of the budget system. key to making the shift from advocacy and research toward making an impact on legislation and policy. Results • Integration of CLERA’s Citizens Budget methodology in finance References ministry’s work. In May 2011, the ministry of finance formally Khassan, Zhanibek. 2011. “Finance Minister of Kazakhstan Citizens Budget Bill.” e-Newsletter for International Budget Partnership 62 (September-October), Public established a working group to develop procedures and a meth- Finance Transparency Program of Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan. odology for the production and publication of the Citizens Budget. The working group included CSO representatives and members of National Budget Network of Kazakhstan (NBSK). A–61 Country: Kazakhstan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice; Social Protection Level: National Implementing Organization: Namys Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Budget Analysis; Disabled People’s Budgets; Monitoring A1.50. Analyzing the National Budget to Strengthen the Rights of the Disabled Europe and Central Asia Context Results Established in 2002, Namys (“Conscience”) advocates for the rights of • Ratification of government program on disability rehabilitation. disabled persons. Initially, Namys focused its attention on advocating In late 2005, the Almaty city administration ratified the integrated for a law that recognized the rights of disabled persons and estab- rehabilitation policy designed by the advocacy coalition led lished programs to provide rehabilitative services. In 2003, Namys by Namys. This advocacy campaign was an unqualified success launched a campaign to overturn a regressive law proposed by the resulting from sound policy research and constructive engage- government that would have represented a return to the old Soviet ment by nongovernmental organizations with government offi- policy that essentially left the disabled to their own devices. These cials. Ultimately, Kazakhstan signed the International Convention efforts paid off when the government accepted some of Namys’s on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional main provisions, including clearly placing the responsibility to protect Protocol in 2008. In addition, a national law, “On Social Protection the rights of disabled persons on public agencies. of Invalids in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” was passed along with the Complex Program on Rehabilitation of Invalids for 2006–08. Actions (2001–08) • Increase in budget allocations for a rehabilitation program. Having achieved the passage of the law protecting the rights of the The Almaty cty government disability rehabilitation program for disabled, Namys began focusing on the budgetary issues: 2002–05 had a budget of approximately US$2 million. As a result of the advocacy campaign, the newly-approved budget for the • Namys monitored allocations to public agencies meant to help Integrated Disability Rehabilitation Policy for 2006–08 in Almaty disabled persons in order to ensure that they were being properly was US$27 million—a 13-fold increase. utilized. During the course of its monitoring activities, it found that Almaty city’s program to provide new wheelchairs to 250 Implications for Project Teams disabled persons every year was procuring wheelchairs of a poor • Viable propositions made by civil society can be initially adopted quality. at the local level and then only later at the national level. • In 2004, Namys organized a coalition of partners to advocate for • In addition to civil society engagement, the government’s intent the ratification of the Integrated Disability Rehabilitation Policy at to become a signatory to an international convention can provide the local and national government levels and to ensure adequate an incentive to change laws and policies. funding for the policy. • The coalition conducted policy-based research on the References Governmental Program on Disability Rehabilitation from 2001–05, Ramkumar, Vivek. 2008. “Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide which found that the previous government program only met 40 to Monitoring Government Expenditure.” International Budget Partnership, percent of its target indicators for this program. The coalition also Washington, DC. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Our- determined that the program was underfunded and that it did Money-Our-Responsibility-A-Citizens-Guide-to-Monitoring-Government- Expenditures-English.pdf. not account for issues other than health rehabilitation that would USAID. 2006. “Final Program Report of Civic Advocacy Support Component of the improve equal access for the disabled. The coalition used this Civil Society Support Initiative Program: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.” Submitted to research to formulate a new rehabilitation policy. USAID by Counterpart International, September 1, 2004–July 31, 2006. • Namys lobbied for policy ratification at both the local and UNDP. 2013. “Kazakhstan: A Champion for People Living with national levels. At the national level, the coalition established Disabilities.” http://europeandcis.undp.org/ourwork/governance/ strong contacts with heads of ministries, parliament members, show/6C5B0559-F203-1EE9-B8848DBBE4A5ABA8. and representatives of the presidential administration, working directly with seven separate ministries, including the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Ministry of Economy and Budgeting, Ministry of Culture Information and Sports, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Industry and Trade. It conducted a number of high-level discussions with mem- bers of parliament on the promotion of the policy within the government. A–62 Country: Kyrgyz Republic Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project Areas of Engagement: Audits; Procurement A1.51. Strengthening Reforms to Make Budget Execution Transparent Europe and Central Asia Context Results A small, landlocked country with a population of 4.9 million, the • Budget preparation through due process. Before the implemen- Kyrgyz Republic began its transition to a market economy in 1990 tation of the Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project, the with relatively good social indicators. However, since independence, budget was poorly presented and allocations were managed on a income levels have declined by approximately 60 percent, and in 2001, monthly basis according to cash availability. Since the implemen- poverty levels were high, with income per capita at only US$300, tation of the credit project, a transparent budget is being pre- the second lowest in the Commonwealth of Independent States. pared with the ultimate goal of integrating it into a medium-term Improving governance was seen as critical if these challenges were to framework. be successfully overcome. In this context, the Governance Structural • Published budgets on the treasury website. In a context where Adjustment Credit (GSAC) program sought to improve public sector budget reports were fragmented and not made widely available, transparency and responsiveness; to develop the ability of external the budget execution reports (monthly, quarterly, and annual) stakeholders to hold the government accountable; and to increase are now being published on the website of the central treasury. the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the public sec- Summary budget reports are also made publicly available within tor. In turn, the Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project sup- six months of budget execution. ported the GSAC reforms, particularly with regard to the second objective. The objectives of the credit project were to strengthen Implications for Project Teams public expenditure management by establishing a more strategic and Enhancing the effectiveness of public procurement by regularly pub- transparent budget formulation process and strengthening account- lishing information is an integral part of the process of making bud- ability and transparency in budget execution; to improve the internal get implementation transparent. control environment; and to improve transparency, value for money, and accountability in public procurement. References Kyrgyz Republic—Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project: P071063–Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 18, World Bank, July 16, Actions (2003–12) 2012. • A plan was developed to restructure and strengthen the state Kyrgyz Republic—Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project: Project commission on public procurement and material reserves, and Appraisal Document, Report No. 25787, World Bank, April 21, 2003. the procurement function of ministries and agencies was clearly delineated. • Revised procurement rules and processes were implemented to increase transparency and impartiality and support to publish the procurement bulletin was provided. • Procurement audits of selected items that affect service qual- ity in the health and education sectors (e.g., pharmaceuticals and text books) were carried out to verify compliance with procure- ment rules and regulations, to assess value-for-money in ref- erence to national and international market prices, and to take consequential remedial actions. A–63 Country: Kyrgyz Republic Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: Information Matters—Transparency and Accountability in the Kyrgyz Republic Areas of Engagement: Capacity Building; Dissemination A1.52. Strengthening Budget Literacy among the Media and Citizens to Enhance Transparency Europe and Central Asia Context • A 132-page learning resource guide, “Coverage of Budget Issues With a Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) grant of US$793,000, the in the Media” was published; it was reviewed by the ministry of Information Matters: Transparency and Accountability in the Kyrgyz finance and parliament’s committee for finance and budget and Republic (IMTAK) program provided training to the executive and then approved for the training of journalists by the chairman of elected branches of local self-governments (LSGs) and representa- the committee. Several state bodies, government officials, chief tives of civil society on budget transparency and budget literacy. The editors from prominent media sources, and donors—including project builds on an overall government commitment to enhance other World Bank Public Financial Management projects—found transparency with a focus on budget processes at the village level of its content relevant to staff needs and overall organizational government (Ayil Okmotu) where citizens can feel the most impact. priorities. IMTAK supports the larger Public Financial Management program through the development of constructive demand for transparent Results budget process at the village level of self-government. • Better informed media coverage of budget transparency issues. Using newly-acquired analytical skills, journalists have started Actions (2009–12) writing well-informed articles on complex budget related issues. • Training of more than 1,000 representatives of LSG authorities, They understand that any budget—whether it is one of a partic- local councils, civil society organizations, and active citizens ular state or of a family—depends on the contribution of every on topics including budget planning, prioritization, and monitor- able-bodied member creating material or cultural value for the ing access to budget information in all oblasts (provinces) of the benefit of the community. The articles published have covered a Kyrgyz Republic as part of the implementation of IMTAK’s local wide range of topics, including the role of foreign borrowing, the budget literacy and access-to-information training component. management of municipal assets, the reduction of fiscal deficits, This component was implemented by the Eurasia Foundation of and the correlation between taxation and the business climate. Central Asia. • Enhanced literacy among all stakeholders with regard to budget • Under IMTAK, training materials have been developed on bud- matters. The project has raised the awareness of citizens and the get transparency and public participation in budgetary processes mass media about the right to information—particularly bud- as well as programmatic budgeting and monitoring of the bud- get information—and has enhanced the level of literacy about get. Approximately 1,200 sets of training materials were distrib- budget matters. These efforts have helped improve the respon- uted among the staff of LSG authorities in Russian and Kyrgyz siveness of public officials to requests from citizens for budget- languages. related information. • Another component of the IMTAK project, Budget Reporting • Promotion of constructive dialogue. By bringing together mul- for Journalists and Media Training, was designed to train jour- tiple stakeholders with differing points of view, the project has nalists to analyze, produce, and disseminate reliable information facilitated a constructive dialogue about the budget between on financial and budgetary issues at the local and national level. communities and local governments and has increased the Between 2011 and 2012, 170 journalists, including ten students from involvement of civil society representatives at all stages of the the journalism department of Osh State University, participated budget process. in the training. • Scaling up of IMTAK’s activities and efforts. The impact of IMTAK was scaled up by follow-up and spin-off activities funded by the World Bank and other donors. (continued) A–64 (continued) • Additional funding for extension of reforms. Implications for Project Teams – Based on the early successes of IMTAK, one local partner • Media can be both a powerful agent and a platform for the bud- has leveraged significant additional funding from the United get transparency agenda of any country. It is therefore critical to Europe and Central Asia States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office ensure that the media is well-informed and capable of reporting of Transition Initiatives to extend the program with facilita- on complex budget transparency issues. tion of open budget hearings and other supporting activities. • The effectiveness of budget transparency and literacy capacity- The funding enabled an increase in training coverage; intro- building and training exercises can be significantly increased by duced a wider set of activities; and organized budget hear- using more hands-on exercises and practical examples that par- ings in 185 villages and four cities and towns of the Naryn, ticipants can use in their daily work. Talas, and Osh oblasts—over 7,000 citizens participated in these hearings. Using materials developed at the first stage Reference of IMTAK, the USAID-funded project developed methodical World Bank. 2013. “Information Matters: Transparency and Accountability. manuals for LSG staff and easy-to-read “how-to” guides for Project Presents its Accomplishments in the Kyrgyz Republic.” Press release, February 19. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/02/19/ citizens about participation in local budgeting. Several state imtak-project-presents-its-accomplishments-kyrgyz-republic. bodies and nongovernmental organizations requested copies of the manual for distribution and use by their staffs. – In August 2012, a project funded by the World Bank-managed Europe and Central Asia Region Public Financial Management trust fund began with the aim of establishing a platform for the exchange of experience and ideas among LSG staff. Under this grant, a system for mutual peer-to-peer training to discuss issues of local budgets and to share experiences and proven solutions is being set up. The trust fund steering com- mittee is considering allocating more funds for scaling up this program as a recipient-executed activity. A–65 Country: Poland Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Gdansk Institute for Market Economics Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Dissemination A1.53. Influencing National Budgets to Push Legislative Changes Europe and Central Asia Context • GIME also organizes annual specialist conferences—sector- Ever since Poland shifted gears toward a free market economy in 1989, specific seminars presenting its quarterly research findings; these the country has witnessed unprecedented growth rates. However, are well attended by key stakeholders from the government, the the difficult process of modernizing the Polish economy occurred private sector, and the media as well as civil society. with a backdrop of a major shortcoming in the Polish legal system: • GIME was also concerned that the systems that fund Polish health a lack of precisely-defined rules and regulations specifying how the care and education are inefficient, and with investigation and council of ministers prepares and publishes documents containing research, it found that education funding is allocated inflexibly comments on the state budget and fiscal policy. These factors led and unfairly by a system that does not clearly delineate local and to an internal demand for transparency and a better understanding national funding responsibilities. With regard to health care, it of the national budget as well as a demand for civil society partici- found a hospital system groaning under the weight of unsustain- pation in the public debate over the challenges of fiscal policy in able debt. Poland. To fill this gap, the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (GIME) was established in 1989 as a nongovernmental independent Results scientific research institution (ISRI) that conducts research, provides • Considered legitimate government partners. In 2009, the independent assessments of the economy for the business sector Ministry of science and higher education commissioned a project and the public at large, and formulates useful recommendations for in partnership with Ernst and Young, inviting GIME to prepare a government policy. strategy for the ministry. • Pushed legislative changes. The strategy prepared by GIME for Actions (1989–present) the ministry of higher education is now the basis for a slew of leg- • GIME is reputed for strong fiscal transparency-related research islative changes for the period 2011–15—changes that address the and in 2001, it conducted a standalone study that compared financing and management of institutions of higher education. Poland’s performance to the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Transparency Code, revealing that the state of openness and Implications for Project Teams transparency of public finance in Poland was slightly worse than Wherever possible, projects should engage credible independent sci- found in the IMF’s own assessment. They not only pointed out entific and research institutions for quality budget analysis. the drawbacks and deficiencies of the system that was respon- sible for this, but also formulated practical recommendations for Reference legislative changes, which gained traction. Wojciech, Misiag, and Adam Niedzielski. 2001. “Openness and Transparency of Public Finance in Poland in the Light of International Monetary Fund Standards.” • Since 2002, GIME has been publishing the “Public Finance Report sponsored by the German Marshall Fund, No. 29/2011. Bulletin” every quarter. It contains current data on the state of public finances in Poland: state budget execution, public debt, local self-government finance, appropriated funds, descriptions of new legislation concerning public finance, and other articles. It also includes forecasts of public revenues and expenditures and describes the relationship between fiscal policy and macroeco- nomic performance of the economy. A–66 Country: Russia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Parliamentary Centre Areas of Engagement: Budget Capacity Building; Legislatures A1.54. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Oversight of the Budget Process Europe and Central Asia Context Results In response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Russia’s • Introduction of performance monitoring. The project helped to adoption of its 1993 constitution that established the frame- introduce performance auditing in four Russian regions. work for freely-elected multiparty legislatures, the Parliamentary • Measures to improve independence of the legislative branch Centre, a Canadian nonprofit organization, has worked since 1994 to from the executive branch. Russian partners became strongly enhance the capacity of the Russian legislature. After the Canada- interested in approaches used in Canada to guarantee the inde- Russia Parliamentary Program ended in 2004, the Accountability pendence of parliament from the executive branch. Inspired by Strengthening Program (ASP) was launched to realize the gains that the Canadian model, the Federation Council Commission on had been made to improve parliamentary oversight by strengthen- Internal Economy submitted a series of proposals for legislative ing the linkages between the Russian supreme audit institution (the amendments aimed at reducing the dependence of the federal accounting chamber of the Russian federation) and the Russian fed- assembly on the government. These were the first formal steps eral assembly. It aimed to increase transparency and accountability taken aimed at strengthening parliament’s independence in Russia. in the use of government funds by strengthening parliamentary oversight at the federal and regional level; strengthening budgetary Implications for Project Teams accountability in the Russian federation through the development of While technical support is useful, it is important to keep in mind a system of state financial control; and reforming the internal admin- while designing projects that it takes several years to achieve changes istrative and financial management of the Russian federal assembly such as strengthened legislatures and more open political spaces for (the duma and the federation council). legislatures to perform oversight functions. Actions (2004–08) References • The ASP provided assistance to develop the relevant methodol- Parliamentary Centre Website: www.parlcent.org ogy and conduct six pilot performance audits of government Parliamentary Centre. 1998. “Case Study for Governance Cooperative on programs with significant social impact in four regions, such as Canada-Russia Parliamentary Program.” http://www.parlcent.org/en/2011/03/22/ accountability-strengthening-program-2. support to the disabled, healthcare, children in northern areas, and road construction. The results of these performance audits were reviewed by the relevant legislative assemblies and were appealing to parliamentarians because they focused on the eco- nomic and efficient management of public funds and the effec- tiveness of government programs. • ASP assisted in the improvement of internal management prac- tices in the federal assembly by introducing a system of member office budgets that allows for the spending of funds available for the work of parliamentarians in their constituencies and in their Moscow offices in a more flexible, efficient, and accountable manner. • ASP assisted in the development of draft legislation on state financial control, proposing a clear delineation between the external and internal audit of public expenditures. A–67 Country: Russia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: Provincial, Local Implementing Organization: St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Dissemination A1.55. Using Budget Analysis and Training to Promote Amendments to the Budget Law Europe and Central Asia Context Results The St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies (CHPS) • Uptake of suggested amendments to the budget. During the is a civil society organization established in 1993 by a group of depu- drafting of St. Petersburg’s 1999 budget, NGO activists and bud- ties of the city council, activists of democratic parties, journalists, get experts set up working groups to identify key budget pri- and businessmen, with the purpose of fostering the development of orities, analyze the implications of choosing various alternatives, civil society in St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia. The main and draft comments and addenda to the proposed budget that activities of the center focus on Human Rights and Development were later made available to government officials. Amendments of the Regional Ombudsmen program, the Civil Society Against to the budget regarding the education and care for the disabled Corruption Initiative, the Transparent Budget Program, the develop- were, in fact, ultimately accepted. ment of public policy centers, and setting up the Expert Council on • Recognition as a legitimate partner in budget transparency. The Civil Education and Human Rights in the State Duma. In particular, the Russian department of finance asked the CHPS to prepare a draft Transparent Budget Program aims to promote participation of inde- law on budget transparency for the subsequent budget. pendent nonstate specialists in the budget process, assuming that it • Resistance from media and lower-level government officials. increases the efficiency of the budgeting process and helps achieve Two aspects were common hindrances in the work of the CHPS: improved social impacts. the media’s unwillingness to publish information about the bud- get for fear that the public might start delving too deeply into Actions (1998–present) it and provoke difficult debates, and a lack of willingness at the • CHPS began their preparatory efforts in 1998 when they focused lower echelons of the government to open their budgets, much squarely on assessing the situation, gaining information, imple- less to provide resources to make the process participatory. mentation of the IMF Code on Budget Transparency, and learn- ing from the experience of the United States, Brazil, Croatia, Implications for Project Teams India, Indonesia, Kenya, and South Africa. In an environment where the media is resistant to cooperate with • By the early 2000s, the CHPS began involving local government budget transparency initiatives, carrying out a systematic public officials, training nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in relations campaign, introducing new ideas to the general public, budget transparency through master classes and seminars, and and shaping the informational space need to feature particularly began demystifying the contents of the budget into a for- prominently. mat easily understood by the public. They handed out infor- mational brochures in the regions of Novossibirsk, Samara, St. Reference Petersburg, Pskov Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies Website: http://strategy- spb.ru (in Russian). and Petrozavodsk city. • In 2001–02, the CHPS began to disseminate the budget through public hearings focused mostly on the budget draft and on bud- get execution information. It also brought together independent experts from NGOs to work together in consultative groups at the budget draft preparation stage; the NGOs provided valuable feedback and made recommendations to modify the legislation to make public participation sustainable. A–68 Country: Tajikistan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: Local; National Name of Project: Mainstreaming Governance in Tajikistan Country Program Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Dissemination; Capacity Building; Coalition Building; Legislatures A1.56. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight and Building Coalitions to Enhance Budget Transparency Europe and Central Asia Context Activities to strengthen Parliament have been conducted: Tajikistan is the poorest country in the Eastern Europe and Central • A budget committee secretariat with permanent research staff Asia Region. It also has the most remittance-dependent economy for whom training and support is provided has been established. in the world. Still recovering from a civil war that ended in 1997, • Mobilization of independent research to advise parliament on Tajikistan faces a number of development challenges, including budget reform issues. energy security and high rates of poverty—54 percent in 2007. It • Support has been provided to the parliamentary communica- ranks below average in the ECA Region in terms of governance and tions office, including training and resources for media events and continues to struggle with corruption and a lack of transparency and publications to improve parliament’s external communications on accountability in the budget process. Accountability in the budget budget issues. process is hindered by opaque policy processes and decision mak- ing and by technical limitations. The objective of the project is to Results (anticipated) help ease the governance constraint on development in Tajikistan • Heightened awareness by and participation of Tajikistan citi- by mainstreaming governance interventions on the country, sector, zens. The project anticipates a 10 percent improvement in lev- and project level. It seeks to support greater citizen engagement els of participation and budget information demand and in their in the budget process through improved capacity of parliament, awareness of their right to budget information. improved media and citizen access to analyze budget information, • A more accountable state due to the exposure of graft. The increased government financial accountability to parliament and the project expects a 10 percent improvement in business confidence electorate, and increased public service-provider responsiveness to as demonstrated in the final annual survey. citizens. Two budget-related activities include the introduction of • Increase in the amount of budget information in the public budget-related transparency and accountability measures and the domain. An increase of 10 percent is expected by the end of the strengthening of the parliament’s capacity in approving budgets and life of the grant. reviewing expenditures. Implications for Project Teams Actions (2010–13) The capacity of CSO networks and relevant parliamentary commit- In order to increase transparency and accountability several measures tees to engage on budget issues and impact budget processes can be are being carried out: significantly strengthened when linked, allowing each to leverage the • Networks and alliances among stakeholders around budget trans- other’s expertise and influence in order to improve budget processes parency have been facilitated by organizing regular workshops and make them more transparent. on budget issues for civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in the budget issues, parliamentarians, national and local govern- References ment officials, members of mahalla (neighborhood) committees, Grant Funding Proposal for Mainstreaming Governance in Tajikistan Country Program, World Bank, Washington, DC. and journalists. These events serve as a forum for information World Bank. 2010. “Grant Funding Proposal for Mainstreaming Governance in exchange, knowledge-sharing and networking, and provide the Tajikistan Country Program.” Internal document prepared for grant funding request, opportunity for CSOs to define how best to participate at the World Bank (July). national level. • Information is used for a dialogue with authorities of different lev- els. Proactive information-sharing has been facilitated between the parliament and CSOs working on public-finance issues. A–69 Country: Argentina Sector: Education Level: Local Implementing Organization: Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Disclosure; Litigation A1.57. Using Budget Analysis to Promote Access to Education Latin America and the Caribbean Context Results In Argentina, the constitution of the city of Buenos Aires solidifies • A court ruling in ACIJ’s favor. The court ruled that the govern- the right to education by establishing that the government must ment should guarantee and finance universal access to initial- guarantee and finance a public, secular, and free education system level education for children between the ages of 45 days and that respects the principle of equal opportunity. Moreover, while the five years and that it must submit detailed information about all national government has a duty to provide access to education to ongoing and planned projects directed at satisfying the existing every child over five years old, the city’s duty applies to every child demand for space. Moreover, the court demanded that the gov- over 45 days old. Furthermore, the city’s constitution dictates that ernment produce specific plans aimed at guaranteeing access to budget items assigned to education cannot be reallocated. For many initial-level education for each qualifying child from 2008, taking years, there was a dearth in the number of early education facili- into account the children excluded in 2007. ties and kindergartens in Buenos Aires. Between 2002 and 2006, the • An out-of-court agreement to take action to meet space needs number of children excluded from early education increased by 37 at existing initial-level educational facilities. After the govern- percent; the number has continued to increase ever since. As a part ment of Buenos Aires appealed the court’s ruling, the high court of its education equality program, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad promoted an out-of-court agreement that included commit- y la Justicia (ACIJ), a Buenos Aires-based civil society organization, ments from the government to take action to meet all space decided to work on this issue. needs at existing initial-level educational facilities, to create new spaces by agreed deadlines, to guarantee that the budget Actions (2006–11) resources required to meet these commitments be available, • To highlight the discrepancy between the amounts allocated and to include specific budget items earmarked for fulfilling new for early education and actual spending, ACIJ used the Buenos needs in every budget henceforth. The high court retained juris- Aires Freedom of Information Act to request information about diction in order to intervene at a future date in case there is a lack the total number of existing schools offering early education, a of compliance with the agreement. detailed and disaggregated account of the number of students • Organization of a public hearing by the high court to discuss who had applied for early schooling between 2001 and 2006, and the agreement. In an unprecedented move, the high court set the number of children placed on waiting lists in each school in up a public hearing that included all relevant actors in the educa- those years. It also requested information about all the resources tion community to engage them in a fruitful and enriching pub- allocated to school infrastructure between 2001 and 2005 as well lic debate. Support for the draft agreement at the hearing was as complete and detailed spending data on construction, mainte- almost unanimous. nance, and school provisions for the same years. • When the government did not give ACIJ the requested informa- Implications for Project Teams tion, the organization litigated on the grounds that the Freedom The establishment of informal or, as in this case, formal monitor- of Information Act compelled the government to provide the ing mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreed reforms might be information. considered. • After collecting all the necessary information, ACIJ used a bud- get analysis to produce evidence that, for five years, the city Reference government had under-spent a significant portion of resources ACIJ Website: http://acij.org.ar. allocated to early education facilities. Based on this evidence, it filed a class action case arguing that the city of Buenos Aires had not complied with its constitutional obligation to guarantee and finance universal access to initial-level education. • Both before and after the lawsuit, ACIJ carried out a public cam- paign, disseminating information about the education crisis and encouraging members of the public to write letters of complaint to public officials. A–70 Country: Brazil Sectors: Education; Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Local; National Implementing Organization: Institute for Socioeconomic Studies Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Budgets for Youth; Capacity Building; Monitoring A1.58. Working with Public Schools to Promote Human Rights Latin America and the Caribbean and Improve Budget Transparency Context Results Many of Brasilia’s public schools are plagued by violence and drugs, • Amended 2009 budget for schools. A key success occurred in contributing to weak academic performances, continued pov- 2009, when the students participating in the project met with erty, and social exclusion of many students. In 2007, the Institute lawmakers and public managers about the federal district educa- for Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) launched the Teenagers’ Rights tion budget. After monitoring their school budgets and analyzing Movement—ONDA (Onda: Adolescentes em Movimento Pelos budgets, the students proposed a budget amendment of approx- Direitos) to teach youth how to participate in discussions about their imately US$1 million to the local parliament. The amendment was rights and citizenship, and how they are affected by public budgets. passed and funds were allocated to build sports facilities and INESC selected schools from differing communities on the outskirts renovate schools. of Brasilia—including some rural areas—based on their levels of • Greater oversight of 2014 World Cup spending. In 2012, 200 teen- social exclusion, teenage violence, drug abuse and drug dealing, and agers from the poor region of Cidade Estrutural participated in a lack of academic performance. forum with the People’s Cup Committee, an entity established to monitor Brazil’s spending on the World Cup. Comparing the Actions (2008–present) World Cup budget to the federal district government’s spend- • To date, INESC has organized workshops for 500 young people ing on the promotion of the rights of children and teenagers, from 10 public schools that focus on human rights; democratic students learned about the importance of monitoring govern- participation and state obligations; the public budget; and com- ment budgets for equity and fairness. They also discussed the munication and advocacy strategies. government’s shortcomings in addressing several risks around the • During the workshops, students were trained to become writers, megaevent, such as the sexual exploitation of children and teen- photographers, and illustrators for the magazine Descolad@s, agers, child labor, and the potential for forced evictions as the which aims to broaden the budget debate, delve deeper into government builds World Cup infrastructure. The teenagers will discussions generated at ONDA workshops, and, in its “Eye on continue to engage with these issues as the date of the World the Budget” section, highlight the budget execution of programs Cup approaches. aimed at children and teenagers. It also seeks to provide a forum for reaching consensus on an agenda for influencing public Implications for Project Teams policies and budgets geared toward education and the youth in Capacity building targeted at youth is necessary to expand traditional Brasilia. Other workshops have been focused on budget issues citizen engagement in budget transparency projects. in specific localities, such as child labor in Cidade Estrutural, the environment in the Rio São Bartolomeu basin community, and References citizen rights in the Mesquita Quilombo community. INESC Website: http://www.inesc.org.br. • In addition to the school programs, INESC encouraged the International Budget Partnership. 2011. “INESC Educates Brazil’s Youths on How to students to attend other events where public budgets were Influence Public Budgets.” Partnership Initiative Case Study, International Budget Partnership (IBP), Washington, DC. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/ debated, such as city council meetings and the federal legisla- uploads/Profile-of-INESC-Brazil-2011.pdf. ture. It also urged them to join advocacy networks for children Reuters. 2012. “Brazil’s World Cup Transparency Push Falls Short.” October 31. and young people, where the knowledge gained through the project could be used. A–71 Country: Brazil Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Coalition Building; Disclosure; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.59. Civil Society Platform Works Together to Encourage Latin America and the Caribbean Brazil’s Development Bank to Disclose Spending Context 2009, the BNDES Platform held the first of a series of projects The powerful Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e called the “South American Meeting of Populations Affected Social (BNDES), one of the world’s largest development banks, has by BNDES.” It attracted participants from 50 organizations and been repeatedly criticized for its lack of transparency. Criticisms of social movements from Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and a num- BNDES have focused on its unhampered growth, its unclear criteria ber of other countries where BNDES operates. At the end of the for subsidizing loans, and its murky accounts, as well as on the fact meeting, a delegation met with the president of BNDES, demand- that four-fifths of its lending goes to large and powerful companies. ing greater transparency and decision-making reform at the bank. Actions (2005–present) Results Between 2005 and 2011, the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic • Increased availability of information about BNDES projects. For Analysis (IBASE) used the following strategies to monitor BNDES’s the first time in the history of the bank, some information about spending: the projects that it funds has been made public. In February 2009, BNDES published a list of the projects that had begun within the • In 2007, IBASE helped create the BNDES Platform, a coalition of previous 12 months; it was updated quarterly. After additional 35 civil society organizations to monitor the activities of BNDES. lobbying by IBASE, the bank began providing information on all The platform leads a campaign to create popular pressure on of the projects it has funded since 2008. BNDES to change its policies and practices and to strengthen • More informed media reporting about BNDES. The BNDES the role of civil society in monitoring its budget and decision- Platform’s advocacy work has changed the content and frequency making processes. In April 2010, in order to highlight the relation- of media stories about BNDES. At the start of the Platform’s cam- ship between corporations and equity participation by the bank, paign, the media only echoed information submitted by the bank the BNDES Platform published an interactive map of BNDES- itself publicizing the bank’s activities, but now there is more criti- funded projects that includes project descriptions and locations cal scrutiny of BNDES by important opinion leaders in the media. and information on beneficiary corporations as well as the share structure for each project. The map also features an important Implications for Project Teams participatory forum, where local communities affected by proj- • Supporting information dissemination platforms coordinated by ects can post comments, videos, links, and relevant documents. credible organizations can yield substantial results in terms of • IBASE acts as a reference organization within the platform, pro- increased transparency and accountability. ducing and disseminating information on the activities and impact • Complementing support to such platforms by helping targeted of BNDES and acting as the coalition’s convener. IBASE conducts public institutions publish the requested information is likely to studies on BNDES operations, using the bank’s own information significantly increase the impact of civil society efforts. in addition to analyses and data from other research institutions. • IBASE publishes a newsletter with information on the platform’s References monitoring activities of BNDES and conducts awareness-raising IBASE Website: http://www.ibase.br/en. campaigns about the role BNDES plays in development and the “Brazil’s Development Bank: Nest Egg or Serpents Nest?” The Economist, Rio de related budgetary implications this has. For instance, in November Janeiro (August 5). A–72 Country: Brazil Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Agency: The National Food and Nutrition Security Council Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Food Security A1.60. Using Budget Analysis to Construct a Right-to-Food Budget Latin America and the Caribbean Context other government activities had to be considered. To minimize Brazil is the world’s fourth-largest food exporter with a productive the complexity of the process, CONSEA decided to only include capacity sufficient to meet internal demand and still be a major food activities carried out and financed by the federal government. It exporter. Nevertheless, in 2009, 30 percent of Brazilian households— identified 18 policy priority areas related to food and nutrition some 66 million people—faced some degree of daily food insecu- security, which together make up the food and nutrition security rity. Of these, more than 12 million people experienced severe food budget of around R$27.2 billion (US$16.3 billion). insecurity or hunger. Access to food, not production, is the primary • CONSEA has been monitoring the allocations and expenditures problem because millions of people simply have too little income to of a smaller number of priority programs since 2006. This work buy enough food. In 2003, the National Food and Nutrition Security has enabled it to make concrete proposals to the federal gov- Council (CONSEA) in Brazil was established to advise the president ernment related to the budget for food and nutrition security on food security and right-to-food issues; it submits recommenda- and to examine the food and nutrition security proposals within tions for action directly to the cabinet. It is comprised of 40 repre- the annual budget bill. sentatives from civil society, 17 from government, and 16 nonvoting observers. In 2005, CONSEA made plans to compile a right-to-food Results budget to be in a better position to assess whether or not the • Support for food security laws at the state level. In 2007, Brazilian government’s budget allocations to food and nutrition were CONSEA successfully influenced the national budget when it adequate. The right-to-food budget was envisioned as a basis from proposed strengthening the national food and nutritional secu- which CONSEA could get involved in the budget planning process rity system, and approximately R$2.7 billion (US$1.6 billion) were and make concrete suggestions for increases and decreases in spe- distributed among the 27 Brazilian states to support the drafting cific budget lines. of food security laws at the state level. Actions (2005–07) Implications for Bank Operations • After exploring whether an institutional or programmatic An assessment made from a food perspective that identifies the approach would be more useful for monitoring the government’s underlying causes of hunger in the country may point to the most rel- budget allocations to food and nutrition, CONSEA chose the lat- evant government actions that should be undertaken and monitored. ter. The institutional approach sums up the budgets of all gov- ernment institutions that have responsibilities for achieving food References security goals, while the programmatic approach sums up the CONSEA Website: www.gender-budgets.org. budgets of all programs that have specific food-security objec- Oxfam International. 2010. “Fighting Hunger in Brazil: Much Achieved, More to Do.” Oxfam Case Study, Oxfam International. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam. tives, irrespective of the institutions responsible for them. org/files/cs-fighting-hunger-brazil-090611-en.pdf • CONSEA then listed all government food security programs in Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2009. “Budget Brazil. In addition to the 31 programs included in the Fome Zero Work to Advance the Right to Food: ‘Many a Slip…’.” Right to Food study, FAO, Strategy (a government initiative to eradicate hunger), many Rome, Italy. A–73 Country: Colombia Sector: Mining Level: Local Name of Project: Citizen Visible Audits to Improve Public Investment Transparency and Accountability Areas of Engagement: Budget Audits; Capacity Building; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.61. Promoting Transparency around Royalty Funds to Latin America and the Caribbean Enhance Social Control over Public Investments Context Results Colombia’s legal framework sets a foundation for the participation of • Expansion of the CVA program. From its beginning, the pro- civil society. The constitution protects the right of citizen participa- gram expanded from 1 to 158 CVAs in 29 communities; by 2009, it tion and Law 80 of 1993 establishes that all contracts entered into by covered public works funded by mining royalties to the tune of state agencies are subject to surveillance and social control, and that US$348 million. Between 2008 and 2010, 20 projects in the educa- the national government and local authorities must establish mecha- tion sector were audited through CVAs, representing investments nisms to ensure that these contracts are controlled and supervised of US$36,000. In total, the project supported the organization of by the community. In line with this, the Colombian Anticorruption 72 community hearings at the start of the public work projects, Presidential Commission launched Citizen’s Visible Audits (CVAs) to during their execution, and at their completion; 4,000 people promote transparency and citizen participation, specifically in the representing more than 680,000 beneficiaries participated. management of royalties. Further, the 2007 National Development • Raised awareness. Because of the detailed explanations pro- Plan (Law 1151) assigned the responsibility of implementing CVAs vided in workshops at the beginning of CVAs, now citizens better to the national department of planning.1 In order to support it in understand how royalty resources are managed. the design, implementation, and institutionalization of CVAs, a • Greater demand for accountability. As a result of the initiative, US$700,000 Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) grant was com- and shown by an impact evaluation, communities have started missioned in 2008 with three explicit goals: to raise awareness among asking for greater public accountability by showing their concern citizens regarding royalty sources, to increase confidence in commu- about the allocation of royalty resources and insisting that these nity monitoring as a tool to hold governments accountable, and to funds be invested in priority areas that communities can identify improve collaboration between communities and local authorities for themselves. on transparency and accountability issues. • Better coordination and greater consensus. As a result of the CVAs, there is better coordination between communities and Actions (2008–present) local authorities around the prioritization of public projects. • The community adopted a methodology for monitoring the • Necessity of expanding citizen participation throughout the execution of investment works; whole public investment cycle. The impact evaluation demon- • Consultations with citizen groups as well as hands-on training strated that CVAs would maximize their impact if applied at the were conducted to generate confidence to engage and know- different stages of the public investment cycle. It was also sug- how about how to implement the CVA process and to increase gested that the use of information and communication technol- the citizen groups’ ability to judge the quality of the execution of ogy would decrease the cost of CVAs and increase participation. work; As a result, the World Bank presented a follow-up program aimed • Lessons learned were promoted and disseminated among at expanding CVAs throughout the Public Financial Management citizens; cycle and inserting the use of information and communica- • Presentations and discussions were carried out during public tion technology tools in the process. This follow-up program is hearings, which were carried out before the launch of a project, financed through another GPF grant and will be implemented midway through its implementation, and after its completion to throughout fiscal 2013–15. evaluate final results. (continued) 1. Moreover, in the recent 2012 royalty law (Ley de Regalías de 2012), CVAs are mentioned as one of the available methodologies to monitor the use of roy- alty funds. A–74 (continued) Implications for Project Teams References Latin America and the Caribbean Legislation creating spaces for citizen participation is the bedrock Feldman, D., and E. Mosqueira. 2011. “Citizen Visible Audits (CVAs).” Case study, World Bank Institute, Washington, DC. for promoting social control over public investments. Furthermore, it became clear during this project that participation, if it is to be Di Vinadio, Tommaso Balbo, Priyanka Sinha, and Paramjit Sachdeva. 2012. “Strengthening Inclusive Ownership Through Capacity Development: Operational meaningful and scalable, must be inclusive and cost effective. Lessons from Case Studies.” World Bank Institute, Washington DC. Flowchart of CVA Methodology and Results Constraints Irregular use of funds and even corruption practices in public works financed with royalties CD Activities Public hearings at launch, implementatio, and completion of public projects Agents of Local councils Beneficiaries committees Communities Change Raised awareness regarding use of royalty funds and community’s role; increased know-how in monitoring public projects; improved collaboration between communities and local authorities ICOs and Change Process Change in disposition Change in motivation Change in the ability and ability to interact and ability to to monitor with citizens and be control the use of investments works more responsive royalties • Increased transparency • Participation in public of information on hearings increased public projects • Community’s demand Strengthened • Greater commitment for accountability on Inclusive to transparency, the use of royalties Ownership collaboration, and and the quality of accountability in use public expenditure is of public funds increased Source: diVinadio and others (2012). A–75 Country: Colombia Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Transparency International Colombia Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; Budget Disclosure; Dissemination; Procurement A1.62. Using Integrity Pacts to Generate Savings and Address Latin America and the Caribbean Corruption in Contracting Context • In this context, TPC’s role involved: monitoring the prompt and Given the political turbulence and allegations of corruption linked wide dissemination of procurement information on the gov- with the previous administration, Colombian president Andrés ernment agency’s website; monitoring the publicity of the call Pastrana, after winning the 1998 elections, made the fight against cor- for proposals for the project to guarantee equal access and free ruption a key component of his political agenda, and he made the competition among firms; promoting the signing of an IP among vice president directly responsible for it. In this context, Transparencia bidders and between bidders and the administration; supervising por Colombia (TPC), was invited by the vice president to partici- compliance with the agreed rules for submitting bids; monitor- pate in the debate about the proposals and main lines of action of ing the evaluation of the bids and the award of the contract; the Presidential Program to Fight Corruption. The Integrity Pact (IP) and preparing progress reports about the process for the public. emerged as one of TPC’s key recommendations. A tool for prevent- ing corruption in public contracting, an IP is an agreement between Results a government agency offering a contract and the companies bidding • Adoption of IPs by multiple corporations. Sixty-two IPs were for it that obliges that latter to abstain from bribery, collusion, and implemented for contracting in sectors including communica- other corrupt practices for the duration of the contract. tions, public works, transportation, informatics, and finance and energy as well as in areas related to goods and services, food, Actions (1998–2005) beverages, and supervision of major contracts. These pacts were • To design the IP, TPC formed a high-level advisory group com- agreed and subscribed to by 301 national and 52 international prised of professionals with direct experience in public contract- corporations. ing from private companies, industry associations, the public • Savings due to less corrupt procurement processes. On average, sector, and consulting firms. The design process identified oppor- the pacts generated a savings of 18 percent of the budget for the tunities and difficulties for the successful launch and implemen- corresponding contracts. tation of Integrity Pacts in Colombia. At the same time, the group • Use of IPs by the Bogota Ombudsman’s office. The IP tool adapted the IPs to suit local conditions and to allow for their was transferred to the Veeduría Distrital de Bogota (Bogota effective implementation in Colombia. Ombudsman’s office), which adapted it to its needs and used it • After developing an IP proposal, TPC, with the support of the in 49 of the main contracting processes in 16 city entities during Presidential Program to Fight Corruption, called upon public the administration of Mayor Mockus, involving a total of US$1,560 oversight institutions, multilateral institutions, the private sector, million. and civil society to present its methodology and seek allies to test the tool within the country. The government actively pro- Implications for Project Teams moted IPs so that participants in national or international bid- IPs are beneficial to curb corruption in procurement, but the time ding processes entered into anticorruption agreements and faced investment required by third parties to monitor these projects and by pecuniary liabilities if they breeched them. public officials to respond to contract-related queries and to ensure • TPC led and conducted the IP initiative at all times. In each bid- transparency of the procurement process are also considerations. ding process, it was involved as a third party with no economic interest in the contracting process. Consequently, it could focus References on the request and analysis of all useful information on pos- Transparency International Colombia Website: www.integrity.transparency.bg. sible corruption risks while being cautious not to replace Robledo, Rosa Ines Ospina. 2009. “The Experience of the Systematic Implementation of Integrity Pacts for Public Contracting in Colombia.” those responsible for the contracting process under the Public In Transparency and Public Probity: Case Studies from Latin America, Faculty Procurement Law. of Law, University of Chile, January 2008, 145–160. A–76 Country: Dominican Republic Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Projects: Building Demand-Side Capacities for increasing Budget Transparency and Performance Accountability; Performance and Accountability in the Social Sectors Areas of Engagement: Alternate Budgets; Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; Citizens Budgets; ICT; Monitoring A1.63. Combining Supply-Side Reforms and Demand-Side Capacity Building Latin America and the Caribbean to Increase Budget Transparency and Monitoring Context included analyses of specific sectoral budgets, including one on The Dominican Republic has long-standing governance problems education resources and performance that helped in the move- and numerous surveys confirm that corruption is perceived as a ment to increase the percentage of gross national product (GDP) major problem by a majority of Dominicans and that institutional allocated to education to 4 percent in accordance with the law trust is low. In 2012, in its Corruption Perception Index, Transparency and another one on specific municipal budgets, comparing actual International gave the Dominican Republic a score of 2.2 out of 10 practices to norms. (1 representing the greatest perception of corruption). Service pro- • In addition, the observatory has engaged in policy debates on vision is often clientelistic, captured for private gain, and governed the budget by providing alternative budget proposals. However, by discretional and opaque processes. The population generally this policy-level engagement is still relatively new and requires lacks accountability mechanisms to change the situation in its favor. continued capacity support. To address these problems, the World Bank, in its 2010–13 Country Partnership Strategy, embarked on an ambitious program to improve Results governance, including measures to increase budget transparency and • Improved access to reliable budget data. Through the portal, cit- monitoring by civil society organizations (CSOs). izens can now obtain reliable and timely data about where, when, and what the government spends money on as well as about Actions (2010–12) types of spending, funding sources, and budget execution rates. • To foster budget transparency at the national level, the World Data can be downloaded in Excel, PowerPoint and PDF formats. Bank included as a trigger for the Performance and Accountability • Improved Open Budget Index score. During the most recent in the Social Sectors Development Policy—the creation of a International Budget Partnership assessment, the Dominican citizen-friendly online budget portal. Feeding directly from the Republic score went from 14 out of 100 in 2010 to 29 in 2012, the Dominican Republic’s financial management information system, second highest increase in the region after Honduras. the Portal del Ciudadano Dominicano was launched in 2011, estab- • Enhanced political engagement and dialogue. The level of politi- lishing citizen access to national budgetary information through a cal engagement in protests also increased from 5 to 8 percent in user-friendly online portal. 2012, probably due to the engagement of the coalition in support • In addition, citizens can access a Citizens Budget (Presupuesto of spending 4 percent of GDP on education. For the first time, Ciudadano), in which the government’s intended activities and the government is making good on its 4 percent spending com- associated expenditures are laid out along with the sources of mitment and the dialogue has shifted toward how to ensure qual- revenues to finance them. The Presupuesto Ciudadano also pro- ity of education, through both supply-side measures to monitor vides information on key milestones in the budget process. performance at the school level and through greater engagement • Complementing this reform with demand-side measures, the of citizens. Public Budget Monitoring Project provided capacity support to the public budget observatory—a body comprised of several Implications for Project Teams CSOs with the support of the Centro Juan Montalvo—to pro- Efforts to increase budget transparency and to make governments mote advocacy and analysis on national budget issues and to more accountable for its spending will likely best succeed if the gov- translate it into accessible formats at the community level. ernments’ financial information is made accessible to citizens in user- • The observatory has published periodic analyses of the budget friendly formats and if the technical capacity of CSOs to analyze this to show whether allocations match government commitments information is simultaneously built. and has informed various other civil society efforts, including the movement that demands that 4 percent of GDP be allocated to Reference education. Using comic strips, it demystifies the budget, raises Citizen’s Portal: http://www.portaldelciudadano.gov.do. awareness, and generally increases budget literacy. This has A–77 Country: Dominican Republic Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; Budget Dissemination; Capacity Building; Monitoring A1.64. A Multistakeholder Participatory Initiative to Curb Corruption Latin America and the Caribbean Context • An independent civil society observatory made up of a coali- Even though the Dominican Republic has undertaken initiatives tion of 14 civil society organizations, oversaw implementation against corruption in the last decade, the results have not been and presented their results during the accountability workshops. enough to increase people’s confidence in public institutions. Instead, corruption has led to poor quality in public services, which Results in turn reduces the public’s confidence in the administration, gen- IPAC as a new country approach to tackling corruption has led to tan- erating tax evasion and eroding social support for political reforms. gible improvements in the quality of public expenditures by making Concerned by the citizens’ loss of confidence in the government, budget execution more transparent and accessible, the procurement the president appealed to international development agencies for process more integrated with the financial management system and support in preparing a plan to fight corruption. The World Bank and by contributing to significant progress in the creation of a single trea- 12 other institutions helped set up the multistakeholder Participatory sury account. Anti-Corruption Initiative (IPAC)—a broad participatory mechanism • Greater online budget dissemination. The publication of a under which representatives from the government, Dominican civil web-based user-friendly tool that provides the public access to society, and the private sector sat at the same table to coordinate budget information from the financial management information efforts to fight corruption in the country. system. • Creation of a new performance-assessment framework. To Actions (2010–12) move toward greater professionalization of the public adminis- • The IPAC was launched at a workshop with the participation of tration, a new and innovative performance assessment frame- 260 people from different sectors of Dominican society, includ- work was created for civil servants. ing the media, which gave it broad coverage. At the workshop, • Greater transparency in budget management. Significant prog- 10 multistakeholder working groups were established: procure- ress was made in the establishment of the single treasury account ment and acquisition, civil service, planning and financial man- to centralize all public resources and ensure greater transparency agement, access to information, infrastructure, public health, in the management of public funds. education, energy, water, and fiscal supervisory agencies. • Increase of civil society capacity to analyze and monitor state • A public road map was then developed in six weeks, with pri- budgets. Civil society organizations published a regular budget- orities, implementation arrangements, donor responsibilities monitoring bulletin, used them for advocacy campaigns (such and financial support, responsible government officials, a calen- as the 4 percent of GDP for education), and introduced budget dar, and concrete milestones. The road map was published on literacy programs for grassroots organizations. the initiative’s webpage without prior government consent and opened for a one-month public online consultation. Implications for Project Teams • The 30 recommendations and 99 actions to achieve them To make irreversible advances against corruption as in the Dominican were officially presented to the president in a second work- Republic, early actions must be strongly institutionalized in the pub- shop, which also had very high attendance and extensive media lic administration to gain more legitimacy with political stakehold- coverage. ers. Continued engagement of international development agencies • To measure government agency compliance with the agreed-on is important, as is the commitment of the national and local politi- measures, the workshops introduced a traffic light scorecard cal leadership. Battling corruption requires constant pressure from a system, with green indicating recommendations that had been dense network of coalitions. adopted completely, yellow indicating that some advances had been made but that action had yet to be finalized, and red indi- Reference cating that the recommendation was delayed. The instrument not Ordonez, Ximena Fernandez, Nidhi Khattri, Pedro Arizti, John Mario Gonzalez, and only measured implementation status but also served to remind Patricia Rogers. 2011. “Improving the Quality of Public Expenditure in the Dominican different government departments about the need to meet a Republic.” World Bank, Washington DC. specific deadline. Four accountability workshops were held every three months, with an average attendance of 250 people. A–78 Country: Guatemala Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: International Center for Human Rights Research Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.65. Using a Human Rights Approach to Promote Social Spending Latin America and the Caribbean Context • In 2012, CIIDH presented a “Diagnosis with Human Rights The International Center for Human Rights Research (CIIDH) in Approach” report for the Mi Familia Progresa (My Family Makes Guatemala was formed in 1993 to support and seek justice for vic- Progress, or MIFAPRO) conditional cash transfer program; the tims of the Guatemalan civil war. CIIDH focused on investigating past report lessons learned from other conditional cash programs human rights abuses and winning reparations for victims as well as in Latin America as well as suggestions for policy directions for protecting political rights in the postwar era. This Guatemala City- MIFAPRO to take. CIIDH used this diagnosis to provide input for based organization began budget work and policy advocacy in 1997 a bill regarding conditional cash transfer programs with a human following the negotiation of the Peace Accords. In addition to pro- rights approach, and presented and discussed this with various moting political reconciliation under the accords, CIIDH monitored civil society organizations, congressional committees, and the military spending in Guatemala and has since expanded the scope of ministry of social development, which is in charge of running the its work to include research and advocacy on fiscal policy, analysis of program. social spending, and promotion of budget transparency and account- ability all over Guatemala. Results • Prevention of tax evasion. In 2006, CIIDH’s suggested amend- Actions (1997–present) ments led to the creation of an interagency commission to pre- • To make the more vulnerable sectors of the population a collec- vent tax evasion. By establishing a framework to crack down on tive priority, CIIDH has campaigned to increase budget alloca- lenient regulations, CIIDH’s social expenditure observatory helped tions for health, education, and rural development. the government uphold the rule of law and increase revenue for • CIIDH uses the integrated accounting system of the Guatemalan spending in the social sector. government to monitor information on the execution of the • Implementation of school feeding program. During the 2007 federal budget; it complements this information with in-depth budget negotiations, CIIDH successfully pressured the finance interviews of public officials working in different areas of gov- and currency committee, as well as the minister of education, ernment. It releases a quarterly report entitled “Social Spending to implement a school feeding program, which resulted in 1,500 Watchdog” (Observatorio del Gasto Social) with information on schools receiving rations of milk powder and additional discre- the quality, quantity, and transparency of the federal budget con- tionary funding to support a supplemental nutrition program for centrating on fiscal revenues and social spending with a particu- poor children. lar focus on the ministries of education, public health, and social assistance. Every quarter, within eight days of its finalization, the Implications for Project Teams report is presented to the public at a press conference. It is then Drawing on the human rights background of civil society organiza- distributed to public officials, members of congress, civil society tions combined with detailed budget analysis and effective monitor- organizations, the private sector, and international institutions. ing skills can help influence increases in budget allocations. • CIIDH is active in providing input to strengthen a 2006 anti-tax- evasion law. In its original form, the bill was drafted by business Reference interests and had no provisions to enforce tax compliance. International Center for Human Rights Research. 2006. “Social Spending Watchdog in Guatemala: A Quarterly Report.” • Its Monitoring the Right to Food and Nutrition Security project ensures that all Guatemalans have access to safe and affordable food by monitoring the implementation of the National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security. A–79 Country: Honduras Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organizations: International Budget Partnership and Fundación Democracia sin Fronteras Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis A1.66. Using the Open Budget Index to Encourage Progress Latin America and the Caribbean on Budget Transparency Context Results Despite the enactment of the Transparency and Access to Public • Establishment of measures to improve fiscal transparency and Information Law and the establishment of the Institute for Access management. The Honduran government drew on the findings to Public Information in 2009, Honduras’s score on the International of the “Public Finance Management Performance Report” and Budget Partnership’s (IBP’s) Open Budget Index (OBI) declined dra- OBI reports to formulate the 2012 plan to improve fiscal trans- matically from 38 points out of a 100 in 2006 to 11 points in 2008 parency and management. Coordinated by the minister of the and 2010. While the decline in these scores can be attributed the presidency, the plan was developed by an interagency commis- political crisis in 2009–10, it also reflects the inconsistent attitude sion comprised of the minister of finance, the revenue service, and approach of the different governments in Honduras toward the minister of planning, the public accounting authority, and the budget transparency. IBP and its local partner, Fundación Democracia Institute for Access to Public Information. sin Fronteras (FDsF), used the results of the OBI to encourage the • Drafting of anticorruption plan based on fiscal transparency government to meet domestic and international demands for fiscal measures. To further its commitment to better governance and transparency and citizen participation. fiscal transparency, the Honduran government joined the Open Government Partnership. To qualify, the government drafted Actions (January 2011–December 2011) an anticorruption plan that included elements from the plan to • The results and recommendations for Honduras in the 2010 Open improve fiscal transparency and management. Budget Survey—a product of the collaboration between the IBP • Rejection of the second compact for Honduras. Unfortunately, and its civil society partner in Honduras—were disseminated despite these efforts, the MCC rejected the second compact for through press conferences, television presentations, and events Honduras in December 2011. The decision was based on a num- with government and civil society representatives. IBP and one ber of considerations, including the availability of funds, the first of its Honduran partners, El Centro de Investigación y Promoción compact’s implementation record, the opportunities to gener- de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), also organized subse- ate growth and reduce poverty, and Honduras’ poor scores on a quent meetings with government officials from the ministry of series of governance indicators. finance. Other national and regional authorities in addition to international agencies also took note of the results, including the Implications for Project Teams National Anticorruption Council of Honduras, which integrated For World Bank operations, it is useful for task team leaders to keep the OBI into its training program as an indicator of governance. in mind that pressure to steady the flow of foreign aid can encourage • In 2011, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the governments to make fiscal transparency reforms a priority. Basing Honduran government agreed on a new policy improvement the push for such reforms on independent and legitimate assess- plan to improve the country’s governance and fiscal transpar- ments can also increase their likelihood of being adopted by the ency. Because the MCC had to measure how well this plan was government. implemented in order to determine further funding, it requested that IBP and FDsF independently assess the budgetary develop- Reference ments made in 2010 and 2011. In addition to the off-cycle OBI Pino, Hugo Noe. 2012. “The Impact of the International Budget Partnership’s Open assessment, the MCC facilitated the “Public Finance Management Budget Survey and its Partner Institutions’ Advocacy on Budget Transparency in Honduras.” Open Budget Survey Case Study, International Budget Partnership, Performance Report,” produced by the National Opinion Research Washington, DC. Center at the University of Chicago, to monitor the implemen- tation of transparency and financial management reforms in Honduras. A–80 Country: Honduras Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Agency: Tribunal of Accounts Areas of Engagement: Audit and Participatory Budgeting; Budget Advocacy; Analysis A1.67. Audit Institutions and Civil Society Join Efforts to Improve Public Audits Latin America and the Caribbean Context • At stage four, the TSC presented its findings and recommenda- Despite significant efforts to encourage civil participation in the tions for improving the audited entity’s management at public social auditing processes in Honduras, the results have been mixed hearings, including the roles and responsibilities of both gov- because of a lack of coordination and communication between the ernment and civil society. Attended by 1,200 individuals, these civil society organizations (CSOs) who would provide the social over- hearings also provided an opportunity for the representatives of sight and the supreme audit institutions that exercise institutional eight of the audited entities to sign public commitments to make control. From September 2007 to March 2008, Honduras’s supreme improvements based on the audit. tribunal of accounts (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas or TSC), with assis- • Stage five involved citizen tracking of improvement recommen- tance from the World Bank, developed a methodology that allowed dations. This promoted citizen participation and control over the citizens and CSOs to participate in the TSC’s government audits. action plans for institutional improvement that arise from audits. The methodology was designed to democratize and increase the transparency of government audits and is the result of an important Results planning process that included developing the conceptual design • Improved TSC credibility. The credibility of the TSC’s perfor- and technical structure of the auditing process; implementing eight mance has increased as has trust in both the auditing institution government audits with citizen participation in the areas of educa- and the audited entities. This strengthens the auditor’s ability to tion, health, infrastructure, the environment, and municipalities; and perform its oversight duties by enhancing its capacity to address training auditors and public employees of audited entities as well as social and community concerns. citizens from 87 CSOs across the country. • Improved citizen input in government audits. The audit con- trol process changed due to this mechanism to incorporate the Actions (September 2007–March 2008) perspectives of citizens on the quality of services provided by The process for citizen participation in eight government audits con- public agencies. Following these public hearings, 123 of 187 inter- sisted of five stages: nal control deficiencies were detected because of information provided by the public. Based on input from the public, 12 of 23 • Stage one involved integrating information generated by citi- cases related to noncompliance with existing laws were detected; zens and the media into the general plan of audits as a decisive and 26 of 40 audit findings were determined by the public. In fact, element for choosing which institutions to audit. 92.8 percent of the total financial amount of civil liabilities was • At stage two, the roles and activities of the TSC as well as those detected through information provided by the public. of civil society and audited institutions, were discussed and agreed upon. This phase was important because it established Implications for Project Teams the institutional and social alliances needed to improve the man- • Relevant improvements in the quality of government audits are agement of the audited entities and public service provisions. possible within a short time period if audit institutions, audited These alliances helped strengthen communication channels and entities, and civil society join efforts. encourage citizens to voice opinions on the quality of services. • Social control, exercised through social auditing, does not replace • At stage three, the TSC organized public hearings to explain to institutional control but can complement and strengthen it and citizens how their input would be integrated into the auditing can help improve the audit institution’s performance. process, the aspects and areas in which their contributions would not be included, and the reasons why some suggestions would Reference not be included. Leal, Luis Fernando Velasquez. 2008. “Democratization, Visibility, and Transparency in Governmental Audits in Honduras.” International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–81 Country: Mexico Sector: Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry Level: National Implementing Organization: Centro de Análisis e Investigación Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Farm Subsidies; Monitoring A1.68. Using the Freedom-of-Information Law to Expose Unjust Farm Subsidies Latin America and the Caribbean Context 1,300 pesos (US$99) for small producers—those with less than Since the 1990s, the Mexican government’s Procampo program sub- five hectares)—and a ceiling of 100,000 pesos (US$7,630) for large sidizes large and small farmers to shield them, and poor farmers in producers. The new rules also called for a single registry system particular, from the effects of trade liberalization. Despite govern- to enhance transparency and accountability. In 2009, amidst con- ment expenditures on these programs amounting to 176 billion pesos tinued controversy over the program, the campaign claimed its (approximately US$14,309,777,704), by 2007, it was clear that rural first political casualty: the minister of agriculture resigned and poverty had continued to rise Because Mexico City-based media returned to the senate. was not interested in the technical details of agricultural policy, the • Lack of compliance to changes in the program. Several institu- public debate focused on the total budget allocated to the rural sec- tional failures prevented the campaign from more profoundly tor rather than on the distribution of the resources within it. In 2007, influencing the distribution of farm subsidies. While the Ministry Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR) and the Asociación of Agriculture mandated important changes to the operation of Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo the farm subsidies program, the government agency responsible (ANEC) launched the Subsidios al Campo campaign to inform public for implementing the program has not complied; moreover, the debate on the issue. ministry has no mechanism for ensuring compliance. As a result, as late as 2011, the mandated floor and ceiling for agricultural sub- Actions (2007–09) sidies were not in place, and the new unified registry had not • The coalition used Mexico’s freedom of information law to been established. obtain lists of agricultural subsidy recipients. Obtaining correct • Auditor general’s review of the program. A review of the program information in the necessary format required 30 requests, 16 by the auditor general (AG) found 557 officials from the ministry appeals, and one year of patient work to clean the datasets and of public administration on the recipient list; they were asked to convert them into user-friendly formats on the web. The web- return over five million pesos (approximately US$380,000) that site shows that the distribution of subsidies is not only skewed they had received in 2009. The AG also found 18,023 producers toward wealthy farmers, but also toward wealthier states. with more than one identification number and 323,026 benefi- • Since journalists tended to focus more on scandalous findings ciaries older than 75 years of age—a dubious figure for that age than on subsidy distribution, the coalition promoted a deeper bracket. analysis of the Procampo program and a more nuanced agenda • Greater transparency of the program. One minor legal out- in the press. With support from the Woodrow Wilson Center come was an order in the 2011 budget for greater transparency for International Scholars and the William and Flora Hewlett in the agricultural subsidies program. This outcome led the min- Foundation, a group of academics and policy experts were invited istry of agriculture to routinely publish figures on farm subsidies, to conduct research on topics related to the campaign using data although the government does not divulge the names of indi- from the Subsidios al Campo website. vidual recipients as the Subsidios al Campo website does, citing • These studies captured the attention of policy makers and privacy concerns. experts in the field and also led to increased newspaper cover- age as more irregularities in the program were exposed. Implications for Project Teams Diversity of coalition partners to bring about changes in fiscal policy Results can be an asset. In this case, the combined efforts of activists, a peas- • Revision of subsidy recipient list and rules of the program. In ant farmer organization, information and communication experts, response to the coverage and debate generated by the project, and academics proved to be essential to inform public debate on the ministry of agriculture announced that it would revise the the Procampo program. recipient list, removing individuals who received illegal benefits. In response, peasant groups insisted that the updated list also References include small producers who should not have been excluded in Website for FUNDAR: http://www.subsidiosalcampo.org.mx. the first place. In April 2009, the ministry announced new oper- Cejudo, Guillermo M. Cejudo. 2012. “Evidence For Change: The Case fof Subsidios al Campo in Mexico.” IBP Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, No. 6 (July), ating rules for Procampo, which included a minimum subsidy of International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–82 Country: Mexico Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice and Health (HIV/AIDS) Level: National Implementing Organization: Centro de Análisis e Investigación Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Coalition Building; Dissemination, Monitoring A1.69. Tracking Misuse of HIV/AIDS Funds to Reverse Wrongful Allocations Latin America and the Caribbean Context leading TV news program. Proof of misuse of funds was shared In 2002, Mexico’s chamber of deputies (the lower house of with the media in advance of the story’s release to enable them congress) approved an increase of 600 million pesos (approxi- to conduct additional research and to prepare the story. The mately US$48,985,046) for national HIV treatment and preven- release was followed by a press conference to discuss the case tion. Subsequently, however, the president of the chamber’s and distribute the evidence to additional reporters. budget committee arbitrarily shifted 30 million pesos (approximately • After the media’s coverage of the case, FUNDAR and its partners US$2,449,224) allocated for the purchase of antiretroviral drugs for were invited to meet with the ministry of health, members of an HIV/AIDS program to ten “Centers to Assist Women.” This was the legislature, the internal controller, and Mexico’s supreme audit unlawful since nongovernmental organizations may not receive more institution (SAI) to discuss the follow up to the case. than 250,000 (US$20,410) pesos from the ministry of health per year and are required to submit proposals in an open process in order to Results be eligible to receive any funding at all. Funds cannot be allocated at • Audit of Provida funds. The internal controller’s investigation the discretion of government officials. corroborated the coalition’s findings and identified other admin- istrative irregularities. In its report, the controller recommended Angry legislators, involved in the initial approval of the 600 million that Provida be fined 13 million pesos and be required to return pesos for HIV treatment and prevention, called civil society organi- the funds provided to it. The SAI also conducted an audit of zations (CSOs) to denounce the allocation to these centers. Centro the Provida case and reconfirmed the controller’s findings. The de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR), along with groups focusing on SAI demanded that Provida return the funds, pay the imposed reproductive rights, women’s health, gender budgeting, and HIV/AIDS penalty, and be barred from receiving public funds for 15 years. advocacy, formed a coalition to investigate this reallocation of funds. In addition, the Ministry of Health cancelled all further disburse- ments to Provida that had been planned for subsequent years. Actions (2003–05) • Lack of follow-up to audit findings. Unfortunately, legal loopholes In order to reverse the wrongful allocation of funds and to address have helped Provida avoid paying its penalty, and the case was legal loopholes, the FUNDAR coalition adopted a four-pronged still being adjudicated in court as of February 2008. Furthermore, strategy: inadequacies in Mexico’s judicial process have allowed the presi- • It used Mexico’s freedom-of-information law to obtain informa- dent of the budget committee, who was instrumental in getting tion from the ministry of health that confirmed the illegal dis- Provida the government grant, to escape indictment. bursement of funds to the Centers to Assist Women. In this way, the coalition was also able to reveal that the Centers to Assist Implications for Project Teams Women were a front for Provida, a pro-life organization that cam- Providing support to CSOs to conduct quality budget analysis, to paigned against the government’s HIV/AIDS policies. Based on the make effective use of Freedom-of-information laws, and publicizing financial records that Provida had submitted to the Ministry of the misuse of funds via the media can result in the unearthing of Health, FUNDAR and its partners were also able to audit Provida’s corruption and the return of misallocated or misappropriated funds. expenditures and determine that 90 percent of the funds allo- Legislators might also look to CSOs with such expertise and form cated to Provida had been blatantly misused. coalitions to fight corrupt practices. Therefore, in some contexts, • FUNDAR shared the results of the audit with other CSOs and coalition-building between legislators and CSOs can strengthen the requested their support to demand greater transparency and demand for good governance. accountability in this case. Consequently, more than 2,000 CSOs supported the coalition. References FUNDAR Website: www. fundar.org.mx. • In order to reach public opinion and to make the case inescapable International Budget Partnership. 2008.“The Provida Case Study: Developing for the government, the coalition decided to target the story and Advocacy Strategy: Step by Step.” International Budget Partnership, to a leading newspaper, a leading radio news program, and a Washington, DC. A–83 Country: Mexico Sector: Health (Primary) Level: National Implementing Organization: Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR) Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Coalition Building; Dissemination; Monitoring A1.70. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Increase Latin America and the Caribbean Budget Allocations for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality Context Results During 2002, Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR), a center • Increased budget allocation. FUNDAR and its partners success- for analysis and research that works on budget issues in Mexico, fully lobbied the federal government for an increase in the bud- engaged in a project evaluating the extent of public resource alloca- get allocation for APV, arguing that previous funding levels were tions for the reduction of maternal mortality. The Mexican govern- inadequate to reduce maternal mortality to levels promised. This ment had made an international commitment to reduce maternal resulted in a tenfold increase from 62 to 602 million pesos in the mortality, and this was also one of the government’s main health 2003 budget. objectives for 2000–06. Despite of the 2001 launch of the Arranque • Raised awareness of maternal mortality issues. Health officials Parejo en la Vida (APV) program, which sought to reduce maternal started to show interest in the project, examine its findings, and and child mortality, the maternal mortality rate remained stubbornly ask for advice about defending their budget and making a case high in 2003 at 6.2 deaths per 10,000 births. for why it should be a priority in the budget. Furthermore, the arguments of the members of congress working on issue related Actions (2002–03) to gender, equity, and health were bolstered; and the agenda of • Since FUNDAR did not have the specialized knowledge to address longstanding committed groups was reinforced with new infor- maternal mortality issues, it partnered with civil society orga- mation and articulated in terms that the government could not nizations, networks, and longstanding experts with substantial deny. experience working on reproductive health issues. FUNDAR and • Setbacks in 2004. Between 2003 and 2004, the budget for the its partners organized a working meeting to produce a research APV program was integrated into that of a blanket health pro- plan that specified the type of information that would be use- tection scheme that covered all diseases and illnesses and did ful to investigate for the production of politically relevant not meet the criteria of a maternal mortality program. Since the information. budget for this blanket scheme was highly aggregated, there was • Before the 2003 national budget was tabled, FUNDAR and no way to identify whether the cuts in the 2004 budget affected its partners built momentum for a broader discussion about the resources for the implementation of APV. The fact that the strengthening the APV program. They broadcast radio inter- program did not release implementation progress reports makes views and published several articles in national newspapers, ascertaining the amount of resources it had at its disposal even and they organized a series of meetings with both chambers of more difficult. congress. One of these meetings was a public forum exclusively dedicated to the issue of maternal mortality; it was broadcast on Implications for Project Teams the “congress channel” and included the officials responsible for If the government has made policy commitments at international the topic. Once the budget proposal was tabled, further meet- and domestic levels, budget analysis can be directly juxtaposed to ings were organized in order to inform government decisions and the government’s own promises. encourage it to increase the budget allocation to and scope of the APV program. References • During 2003, FUNDAR continued to monitor the APV program Website for FUNDAR: www. fundar.org.mx. at federal and state levels and demonstrated important impedi- Diaz, Daniela, and Helene Hofbauer. 2004. The Public Budget and Maternal ments to progress in reducing maternal mortality, including defi- Mortality in Mexico: An Overview of the Experience.” FUNDAR. ciencies in program design, delays in the execution of funds, and Robinson, Mark and Vinod Vyasulu. 2006. “Democratizing the Budget: FUNDAR’s Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives in Mexico.” Lessons from Civil Society budget allocation criteria that reinforced prevailing inequalities Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives research project case study. among the different states. A–84 Country: Peru Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: Peru Rural Roads Program Areas of Engagement: Budget Monitoring; Capacity Building; Participatory Budget Planning; Transport A1.71. Strengthening Community Participation to Make Road Construction Latin America and the Caribbean and Maintenance Transparent Context Results Since 1995, the Peruvian government has engaged in a large-scale • Implementation and approval of participatory provincial road decentralization process to improve both the coverage of rural infra- plans. There have been 150 road plans that reflect the commu- structure and the quality of public expenditures. Decentralization has nity’s investment priorities that have been approved, and in 15 been most successful in the rural road sectors under the Peru Rural provinces, rural infrastructure investments prioritized by the plans Roads Program (known by the acronym PCR), which was initiated have been implemented. under a central agency within the ministry of transport and com- • Development of better participatory budgeting skills. Technical munications (Provias Descentralizado), to support the decentraliza- skills in participatory budgeting have increased under the pro- tion of rural road management to local governments. But despite the gram as province-level staff assists local officials to develop proj- progress achieved by PCR, a number of barriers remain; a particular ects and technical proposals. challenge is the improvement of the quality of public expenditures • Greater disclosure of flow of funds. As a result of the project, for subnational governments, especially ones receiving significant local authorities are providing more information to citizens about transfers.Moreover, the rigidities of subnational governments in the account status and resource use. Some municipalities have invited use of their budget resources have to date been a binding constraint microenterprises comprising community members (microempre- to the full realization of decentralization. The project therefore sas de mantenimiento vial rutinario or MEMV) to be part of par- sought to improve the quality of decentralized public expenditures. ticipatory budget sessions. • Strong behavioral changes toward making budgets transparent. Actions (2001–06) In one of the districts, the mayor, in an attempt to make the bud- • Unlike centrally-delivered road programs, PCR gives communities geting process more accountable, plans to hold several meetings a key role at two important stages: the identification and pri- for residents to learn about the management of the municipality’s oritization of the roads to be rehabilitated and maintained. PCR resources. In a number of other districts, mayors have organized partnered with a Peruvian nongovernmental organization (Caritas sessions in Quechua and Spanish to inform the citizens of the Peru) to provide training in project management, work with program and discuss wider local development issues. local communities to develop proposals, organize participa- tory planning sessions, and provide technical assistance during Implications for Project Teams implementation. Participatory provincial budgets and road plans within the scope of • To foster integrated development planning and strengthen the this project are treated as living instruments that should be continu- management and planning capacity of local authorities, the Local ally updated to make certain that they remain powerful planning Development Window (Ventana de Desarrollo Local or VDL) tools. This approach ensures the sustainability of the project and is helped district municipalities prepare a participatory district essential for the full realization of decentralization. development plan (81 district plans were elaborated under the second phase of the program). The preparation of participatory Reference plans to identify key rural roads will ensure that the needs of local Peru—Second Rural Projects: Implementation Completion and Results Report, ICR366, June 5, 2007, Washington, DC. stakeholders are fully reflected in the prioritization of investment alternatives. A–85 Country: Morocco Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Public Administration Reform Loan IV Areas of Engagement: Capacity Building; Disclosure; Information and Communications Technology A1.72. Enhancing Budget Transparency to Make Public Spending More Efficient Middle East and North Africa Context Results In 2002, the Moroccan government, in cooperation with the World Public bids go online. Existing tools as regard public bids online have Bank, conducted a participatory public expenditure review that been extended to some public entities as well as some local admin- showed multiple weaknesses in its budget and human resources istration (download offers, terms of reference, results and the sub- management systems. The findings of the review prompted the mission of offers online). Over a third of the government-controlled government to prepare a long-term public administration reform public institutions and all local governments can access tender docu- program in 2003 with technical and financial assistance from the ments, terms of reference and outcomes online using the common World Bank and the European Union. Both institutions helped the online procurement portal, www.marchespublics.ma. Extending the government design the reform program, which led to the signing e-procurement portal (where 80 percent of bidding documents are of the Public Administration Reform Loan (PARL) and to a structural published) to all ministerial departments has further reinforced trans- adjustment grant from the European Union. Following up on PARL parency in the management of public finances. I and II, PARL III and IV were designed to continue the support to the public administration reform program agenda. The objectives of Implications for Project Teams PARL IV are to improve government efficiency in the management of E-government not only increases transparency, but it can also greatly budget resources by promoting greater transparency and account- enhance the efficiency of government procedures and processes— ability and by introducing performance measurements; to improve such as procurement. government efficiency in the management of human resources by preparing a new management system for staffing and remuneration Reference that includes performance measurements and by streamlining cur- Morocco—Public Administration Reform Loan IV, Governance Assistance Project, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Report No. ICR00001932, rent human resources management; to consolidate and control pub- June 30, 2011. lic payrolls; and to improve public services and simplify procedures through e-government. Actions (2009–10) • To increase the efficiency of budget management, public invest- ment execution rates were increased, performance audit capacity was built, and accounting information was made more reliable and transparent. • Institutional governance was strengthened by improving e-gov- ernment productivity as measured by the number of public online banking transactions and by making public procurement procedures more transparent with online applications and by sim- plifying procedures. A–86 Country: West Banka and Gaza Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: Municipal Development Project Areas of Engagement: Audits; Capacity Building; Disclosure; Participatory Budgeting A1.73. Enhancing Financial Management and Planning Capacities of Middle East and North Africa Municipalities to Deliver Better Services Context Results (in progress) The key issue facing Palestinian local governments is ensuring the • Municipalities disclose budget information. Since the proj- adequate provision of municipal services to citizens in the face of an ect began, 68 percent of municipalities disclosed information eroding revenue base and a crippling financial and economic crisis. in at least two of three areas: financial data and municipal bud- Since 2000, municipal revenues have steadily declined and a large gets, municipal ranking, and projects and achievements. This part of the existing municipal budgets are spent on operating costs was achieved through publicly available SDIPs, annual external with limited resources for development investments. Nearly 90 per- audits, project related data, municipal budgets, and performance cent of their own municipal budgetary resources are allocated to the rankings. operating budget, which makes budgetary allocations for munici- • Investments identified in municipal SDIPs. 100 percent of invest- pal development, such as economic and social infrastructure, fairly ments financed were identified in the municipal SDIPs for those limited (11.63 percent). By international standards, this constitutes municipalities that have a SDIP. an insufficient allocation for local public services. In the Palestinian context, this gap is bridged by the donor community. Improved Implications for Project Teams municipal service provision and the sustainability of these services In fragile environments where state institutions are weak and tech- are dependent on sound municipal finance that includes principles nical capacity is low, it is important to think carefully about the of planning, budgeting, and transparency. demand side of transparency and how best to integrate it with the supply side. In short, a multipronged approach that strengthens both Actions (2009–present) is more critical in such contexts. Under one of four main windows that deal with capacity building for municipalities, the Municipal Development Project (MDP) has References provided and continues to provide technical assistance to munici- West Bank and Gaza—Municipal Development Program P111741–Implementation Status Results Report: ISR8725, December 26, 2012, World Bank. palities to: West Bank and Gaza—Municipal Development Program, Project Appraisal • Improve their financial management, including a roll out of the Document, Report No. 48515, August 13, 2009, World Bank. municipal budgeting procedures developed under the previous project—the Local Government Capacity Building Project—to all municipalities. In addition, fixed assets registration guidelines have been issued and implemented in at least 32 municipalities, a financial policies and procedures manual has been developed and is being used in at least 96 municipalities, and promotion of municipal external audits is ongoing; • Improve planning capacities with a specific focus on commu- nity participation. In an effort to prioritize investments over the medium term, MDP has supported 84 municipalities in prepar- ing Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs). These have occurred with the participation of communities and rele- vant stakeholders. • Improve overall management, especially for operations and maintenance plans. A–87 Country: Afghanistan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organizations: Integrity Watch Afghanistan; International Budget Partnership Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Citizens Budgets A1.74. Using the Open Budget Index to Make Progress on Budget Transparency Context • The ministry also began the process of raising awareness about Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, suffers the budget among civil society organizations (CSOs) by holding from widespread corruption, including the embezzlement of pub- workshops and by including these organizations in budget prepa- South Asia lic resources. Prior to 2008, efforts to reform the budget system in rations. At the request of the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan largely focused on internal documentation, improving in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the ministry of finance, two CSO fiduciary controls, and making data available to donors and the coun- representatives began attending the government policy and bud- try’s decision makers. Little attention was devoted to whether budget get meetings. In the meantime, a limited number of CSOs and documents were accessible to the public. The International Budget Open Budget Initiative researchers engaged with the Ministry Partnership (IBP), an international nongovernmental organization, pub- of Finance on budget-related issues published their analyses lished a 2008 budget transparency evaluation for Afghanistan, which of the budget and organized public awareness campaigns. For found that the government provided the public with “scant” informa- instance, IWA organized workshops in Herat for 80 local monitors tion on its budget documents during the year. This situation, along who were tracking the budget at the grassroots level and also with most aid being off-budget, made it difficult for Afghans to hold trained between 30 and 40 local public officials. the government accountable for its management of public funds. Results • Budget information made publicly available. Following the pub- Actions (2008–11) lication of the 2008 survey, the government of Afghanistan took • In its 2008 Open Budget Survey for Afghanistan, the IBP estab- measures to increase budget transparency that helped lift its OBI lished a framework for a pragmatic analysis of the impact of score from 8 in 2008 to 21 in 2010. This improvement stems largely budget transparency measures in Afghanistan as well as a base- from the fact that the government started publishing more com- line that made it possible to monitor progress. After the release prehensive in-year reports and a mid-year review and made the of the 2008 survey, the IBP and its local partner Integrity Watch audit report publicly available. Most of the documents that had Afghanistan (IWA) held follow-up meetings with senior represen- previously been published only in English plus one national lan- tatives and fiscal policy unit staff from the ministry of finance. guage are now published in English and both national languages These meetings revolved around discussions on budget transpar- (Dari and Pashtu). ency, particularly as it relates to the Open Budget Index (OBI). • Donor commitment to disburse aid on budget. Based on the IWA established a relationship with the ministry of finance that Open Budget Index recommendations, in 2010, donors made allowed them to engage in ongoing discussions about budget a commitment to channeling up to 50 percent of their funds transparency and public engagement. through the budget on the condition that the government make • Because the survey provided a simple and easy strategy for its budget more transparent, as measured by the OBI, and that it improving budget transparency in addition to a means to assess increase its spending capacity. progress, the government took note of the OBI and put mea- • Shift in government policy. The consensus about the importance sures in place to improve its ranking. These measures included of the OBI ranking measure resulted in a shift in government bud- identifying the budget documents it should be publishing and get policy in 2010. At the Kabul International Conference in June the key deadlines for making them public, improving the content 2010, the government drew up the Public Financial Management of these documents, establishing an internal monitoring process, Roadmap, which focused on “strengthening the budget in driv- assigning a liaison officer to communicate with the Open Budget ing effective delivery of key priority outcomes; improving budget Initiative, and regularly reporting to the committee of ministers, execution; and increasing accountability and transparency.” It also the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board—a high-level board made an action plan to improve its OBI score to 30 by June 2011. In that includes donors, and the government through the National 2011 the government published a Citizens Budget and in the 2012 Priority Program’s quarterly updates. Open Budget Survey Afghanistan scored 59. (continued) A–88 (continued) Implications for Project Teams • Budget information is difficult to access, partly because there is • Measures to improve budget transparency have not yet been no integrated unit in the ministry of finance—or in any other min- applied to “off-budget” allocations. A recent IWA report suggests istry—that is responsible for providing it on request. The World that donors share less than 35 percent of the information on their Bank could support the creation of such units in client countries. activities within Afghanistan with the Afghan people. The World Bank could influence other donors to adhere to principles of References South Asia budget transparency when disbursing international aid funds too. IWAWEB Website: http://www.iwaweb.org. Bizhan, Nematullah. 2012. “Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State.” Open Budget Survey Case Study, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–89 Country: India Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice and Social Protection Levels: Local; National Implementing Organization: The National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis Monitoring; Disadvantaged Groups; Dissemination; Legislatures; Litigation A1.75. Tracking Misuse of Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan Funds to Improve Budget Implementation Context media reports made the public and journalists aware of the mat- The Government of India’s Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan (SCSP) requires ter, which created pressure from the electorate and an opening South Asia the government to ensure that a pro rata proportion of over- for opposition parties to raise the issue in parliament. all plan funds is specifically used for Dalits, one of the scheduled • The NCDHR assisted parliamentarians through background re- castes that has traditionally been outcast and has contended with search and documentation so that they could raise targeted ques- deep-rooted educational, social, and economic discrimination for tions in Parliament, and reached out to the Planning Commission centuries. Unfortunately, the implementation of the SCSP has been of India, the Finance Ministry in Delhi, and the office of the beset by several challenges. Expenditures were neither binding nor Comptroller and Auditor General of India to activate Code 789. clearly earmarked, and most importantly, they could not be tracked • The campaign mobilized citizens to organize the “Check Bounced because their allotted budget code (Code 789) was not operational. Rally” in May 2008, which increased public awareness about the In 2008, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a SCSP issue and highlighted how the Dalits were being “cheated” secular platform advocating for Dalit rights, launched the Dalit Ardhik of resources that were rightfully theirs. Adhikar Andolan (campaign for economic rights, or DAAA). DAAA led the campaign against the diversion of SCSP funds and tracked Results Code 789 in collaboration with the Housing and Land Rights Network • Implementation of Code 789. The Delhi government imple- (HLRN) as well as other networks in Delhi. mented Code 789 in 2010, and the government made use of Code 789 mandatory in the 2011–12 budget. Actions (2007–10) • Public admission of misuse of funds. The Home Minister admit- This campaign influenced government and associated decision mak- ted to parliament that SCSP funds were diverted and made a ers in a number of ways: commitment to return the funds. • Revision of planning commission guidelines. The campaign also • In 2007, the NCDHR filed public interest litigation (PIL) on the triggered a serious discussion on how to ensure more effec- grounds that the government of the state of Delhi had not allo- tive implementation of the SCSP. For example, in June 2010, the cated the funds stipulated for scheduled castes, which contra- planning commission set up a taskforce to reexamine and revise venes the guidelines issued by the government of India (GOI). The the extant guidelines issued by the planning commission for the GOI, the Delhi state government, and the planning commission implementation of SCSP. The revised guidelines included provi- were named as respondents in the litigation. When the Delhi state sions that only 25 ministries or departments would be respon- government responded with notional (and not actual) allocations sible for implementing SCSP and that unutilized funds could that were in excess of the stipulated percentage of the scheduled be transferred to the Nonlapsable Central Pool of SCSP Funds caste population in Delhi, NCDHR realized that Code 789 was not (NLCPSF), which could in turn be allocated to the Ministry of operational and filed a right-to-information application with the Social Justice and Empowerment to implement schemes for the Delhi government to uncover the reasons for this. When it did not scheduled castes. get a satisfactory response, the NCHDR filed an appeal. • Lack of implementation of planning commission guidelines. • After determining that INR 7.44 billion (approximately The 2012 Union Budget reflected that the planning commission’s US$137,243,023) of SCSP allocations had been diverted to fund revised guidelines were not being implemented and that Dalits the 2010 Commonwealth Games, DAAA launched a media cam- were being deprived of about Rs 26,233 crore (approximately paign that included press releases, press conferences, and the US$4,860 million) worth of development funds in fiscal 2012–13. education of individual journalists on the issue. Subsequent (continued) A–90 (continued) Implications for Project Teams References • Small, incremental institutional measures like the operationaliza- NCDHR Website: http://ncdhr.org.in/daaa-1/daaa. tion of a code to track budgeted funds can serve as stepping Ramachandran, Vimal, and Sapan Goel. 2011. “Tracking Funds for India’s Most stones toward bringing about more transformational changes to Deprived: The Story of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights’ Campaign 789.” IBP Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, No. 6 (August), International increase the transparency of budget implementation. Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. • Judicial intervention, when made possible by right-to-information South Asia Economic Times. 2013. “States show high budget allocation but spend less on SC/ legislation, can help acquire information regarding budget alloca- ST.” February 22. tions and expenses when it is not readily available from the exec- utive branch. A–91 Country: India Sector: Health Levels: National; Local Implementing Organization: Support for Advocacy and Training to Health Initiative Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Monitoring; Procurement A1.76. Civil Society Monitoring of Drug Procurement and Disbursement to Address Inefficiencies Context Results The lack of essential medicines in public health facilities in Maharashtra • Deficiencies in the existing procurement and distribution sys- South Asia is a serious problem and a major reason for the low utilization of the tem revealed. The details of medicines purchased, rate of pur- public health system. Despite evidence about this, there is limited chase, selected manufacturer, and the like were not publicly knowledge of the drug procurement system, supply chain, and bud- displayed. Moreover, the procurement and distribution system’s get allocations. In response to this gap, the Support for Advocacy external monitoring mechanisms were lacking at all levels. Finally, and Training to Health Initiative (SATHI), an organization that was because of the absence of a procurement manual, there is lack of established in 1998, initiated a project that looked into medicine pro- clarity among staff about terms and conditions related to the pro- curement, the distribution process, and the budgetary allocations for curement process, leading to a dilution of standard procedures. and the overall availability of essential medicines in primary health • Major difference between budgetary allocations for medicines centers (PHCs) from the Pune district of Maharashtra. in Maharashtra versus other states demonstrated. In 2010–11, 18.7 percent of total health expenditures in Maharashtra was for medi- Actions (2007–present) cines; in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, it was 65 percent and 73.2 percent, • SATHI worked to build coalitions at both the local and national respectively. level to advocate for universal access to appropriate health • Additional resources pooled in by government. Based on these services. findings, the government is planning to establish two warehouses • To assess the availability of essential medicine, 64 select medi- at the state level, eight at the regional level, and 33 at the district cines at two select PHCs from Pune district of Maharashtra were level, all of which will have computerized systems and will man- monitored, selected from the list of around 112 essential medi- age their budget data online; they will also follow a daily stock cines for PHC prepared by the directorate of health services. Data reporting system. were collected during six rounds of monitoring at both the PHCs from April 2010 to September 2010. It was discovered that there Implications for Project Teams was no stock of several essential medicines. Since data collection is often a problem, and officials involved in • In addition to the monitoring of medicine stock, a case paper irregular practices can create obstacles at every stage of the data- audit and exit interviews were conducted. Data regarding medi- gathering process, it is important to work through an organization cines prescribed for 122 patients at both the PHCs were noted. with gravitas and influence, especially in a sector with very little Approximately 48 exit interviews were conducted using a short transparency. In this particular case, SATHI is the lead organization interview schedule in both districts. in the state under the National Rural Health Mission, and this unique • Information regarding procurement, the distribution system, position allows the organization to solicit data related to the pro- and budgetary allocations was gathered through a review of curement of medicines. existing literature and discussions with health officials from the state and district level. The study revealed a number of gaps. References • As part of its Maharashtra Health Equity and Rights Watch Project, SATHI Website: www.sathicehat.org. SATHI also conducted a household survey in 10 districts in the Marathe, Shweta, Deepali Yakkundi, and Nilngi Sardeshpande: “Study of state. In this survey, information on illnesses treated on both an Procurement and Distribution System of Medicines and Availability of and Budgetary Provisions for Medicines in Maharashtra.” SATHI supported by inpatient and outpatient basis were gathered from 1,659 house- International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. holds (8,373 persons). A–92 Country: India Sectors: Public Administration, Law, and Justice; Social Protection Level: Provincial Implementing Organization: Developing Initiatives for Human and Social Interaction Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; Disadvantaged Groups; Monitoring A1.77. Advocating for Changes in Government Budget Priorities in Favor of Disadvantaged Groups Context Results The western state of Gujarat, India, has seen several major catastro- • Sole legitimate source of detailed publicly-available budget South Asia phes in the past decade—from a devastating earthquake to periodic information. Because the Gujarat government only presents a droughts and cyclones to sectarian riots—all of which have had a summary of the budget on its website, DISHA is the sole source significant impact on state finances. Amid this storm, the priorities of of publicly-available budget information. The media and legisla- marginalized groups, particularly the tribals, have received declining tors also rely on DISHA’s analysis for reporting purposes. attention from the state. Developing Initiatives for Human and Social • Regular use of data by MLAs. MLAs are highly satisfied with the Interaction (DISHA) is a leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) information provided by DISHA in terms of its timeliness, accu- engaged in budget analysis and advocacy work in Gujarat dedicated racy, and relevance; MLAs use their analyses in budget debates. to the political and economic empowerment of the poorest citizens, • Identification and dissemination of news on corruption. When predominantly in the eastern tribal belt. Complementing its efforts tracking expenditures, DISHA has identified examples of mis- to mobilize tribals and dalits to demand their rights, the organization used public funds or delayed implementation. These analyses are uses budget analysis to ensure that successive state governments actively used by newspapers in Gujarat—both by the vernacular adhere to their constitutional mandate of providing resources and Gujarati press as well as the English language daily papers. services to the most marginalized communities. • Rise in pro-poor budgetary allocation. When DISHA began its work, funds allocated to the tribal subplan were significantly Actions (1995–present) underspent. However, the level of execution of funds consis- • DISHA advocates for changes in government budget priorities tently increased since 1993, with an average overspend of 15 per- in favor of disadvantaged groups, with a particular focus on trib- cent above initial estimates, an improvement directly linked to als and agricultural labor. DISHA’s work. • DISHA analyze government spending commitments and expen- diture outcomes in areas that are of greatest concern to the poor. Implications for Project Teams • Since 1995, DISHA has conducted more than 40 training events in Independent budget work can gain legitimacy when linked to social budget work and conducted workshops for NGOs and elected movements for the rights of the poor, and it can be an effective tool representatives in local panchayats (local village-level decision- in the arsenal of advocacy and campaign approaches deployed by making bodies) such movements. Furthermore, in contexts where the government • Provides information and budget analysis data to members is nonresponsive to transparency measures, engaging and provid- of legislative assemblies (MLAs), the media, and NGOs on the ing budget information to nonstate actors is crucial. On the other state government’s budget priorities and the implementation of hand, simultaneously engaging the government bureaucracy is also expenditure commitments with a view to improving the transpar- necessary to ensure that recommendations from the outside lead to ency of the budget process. improvements in public expenditure management. Reference Malajovich, Laura, and Mark Robinson. 2006. “Budget Analysis and Social Activism: The Case of DISHA in Gujarat, India.” Lessons from Civil Society Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives research project case study, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. A–93 Country: India Sectors: Public Administration, Law, and Justice; Social Protection Levels: Local; Provincial Implementing Organization: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan Areas of Engagement: Budget Audits; Advocacy; Analysis; Disadvantaged Groups; Disclosure; Monitoring A1.78. Pioneering a Participatory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Context • They also launched a series of rallies to compel the state to The work of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a commu- make its development-fund records public, culminating in a nity-based organization in Rajasthan—one of the most economically 53-day protest in Jaipur; the movement soon took on India-wide South Asia and socially backward states in western India—demonstrates how a dimensions. grassroots movement in which the community demands to know the details of public expenditures can eventually lead to the enactment Results of legislation guaranteeing the right to information (RTI). The MKSS, • Social audits pioneered. MKSS was one of the first organizations whose members are mostly from lower socioeconomic classes, to pioneer social audits as an accountability method in the 1990s. including marginal farmers and landless laborers, was founded in 1990 Despite fierce resistance by local officials that included threats, with the stated objective of using constructive action to change the assaults, and appeals, and despite a refusal to comply and sub- lives of the rural poor so that they could live with dignity and jus- mit themselves to an audit by nonofficials, the public hearings tice. Since land and minimum wages have always been the two major continued, and soon the campaign of hearings became a broader issues affecting the rural landless poor, the MKSS initiated struggles campaign for transparency in government. on issues of land redistribution and minimum wages. • Corruption revealed. The Jan Sunvais helped identify different types of corruption in rural development practices in all Sectors: Actions (1995–06) purchase overbilling, sale overbilling, fake muster rolls, underpay- • Villagers, under the aegis of MKSS, used traditional forms of pro- ment of wages, ghost works and workers, and so on. Many villagers test such as hunger strikes and sit-ins to demand payment of the also discovered that they had been listed as beneficiaries of anti- legal minimum wage. They sought access to official expendi- poverty schemes but had never received any benefits. ture documents that could be verified and investigated. They • Public hearings by state government institutionalized. The gov- demanded copies of official records of expenditures incurred in ernment of Rajasthan has institutionalized social audits for all the name of panchayats—the village-level local self-government development works. The state government has started organizing institutions in India. Jan Sunvais in villages, sometimes under the supervision of MKSS, • The secured documents were scrutinized and subject to col- especially where large amounts of money have been spent. lective verification in Jan Sunvais (literally “people’s hearing”), • Legal changes at local level scaled up. MKSS succeeded in get- a process of participatory social auditing, that was held in the ting the state government to change the local government act to concerned panchayats. This was one of the most important inno- include local residents directly in auditing official development vations introduced by the MKSS in which a public hearing is orga- schemes. Moreover, the movement soon took on India-wide nized independently in a public place, not through the official dimensions as intellectuals, politicians, and the media joined, even- village assembly; official data on amounts sanctioned and spent tually giving rise to the National Campaign for the People’s Right to on local development projects is analyzed and information on Information. suspected corruption in these projects generated by volunteers is made public; and villagers, particularly laborers, speak out and Implications for Project Teams verify if they received the money owed to them or whether or The work of MKSS on social audits in India was more successful when not construction took place as claimed; officials are encouraged it decided to campaign for the RTI legislation as well as amendments to provide clarifications or to defend themselves. to the state’s local government law (the Panchayati Raj Act) to create • Encouraged by the results of the Jan Sunvais (outlined below), mandatory legal procedures for the investigation of corruption and in 1996, the MKSS launched a dharna (literally “sitting”), put- to officially institutionalize the public hearing audit method at the ting forward an immediate demand for an amendment to the village assembly level. An integrated approach to promoting social Panchayati Raj (local self-governance) law that would allow citi- accountability can be particularly powerful when it involves both zens to obtain certified photocopies of any document in local demand- and supply-led factors and moves from being introduced government offices, especially records on expenditures like bills, as part of a stand-alone intervention to one that is institutionalized. vouchers, and muster rolls. At the same time, demands were made to pass a comprehensive RTI law for all spheres of governance. References MKSS Website: www.mkssindia.org. International Budget Partnership. 2008. “MKSS Undertakes Social Audits in India.” In Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditure edited by Vivek Ramkumar, International Budget Partnership. A–94 Country: India Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Coalition Building, Monitoring, Participatory Budget Planning A1.79. Using a People’s Charter of Demands to Highlight Budget Priorities Context • PBI also monitored the government’s commitment to make the In response to the fact that the budget-making process in India has Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) proposal avail- been closed and opaque, a number of civil society organizations able to all. This scheme sought to ensure nutritional security South Asia formed the People’s Budget Initiative (PBI) in 2006. This coalition has through Anganwadi centers (government-sponsored centers for facilitated the involvement of civil society in the budget process of the care of mothers and children) by 2012, by providing food and the Union government every year by creating a platform where civil preschool education to all children under six years old. Its analy- society activists articulate key demands and expectations from the sis concluded that making the ICDS universally available would forthcoming Union budget. The coalition is comprised of people’s require an investment of approximately US$9.2 billion to US$16 movements, grassroots organizations, national and international billion—significantly higher than the actual 2010–11 budget alloca- development organizations, academics, and the media. The Centre tion of approximately US$1.8 billion. for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) serves as the Secretariat of PBI. Results • Decentralization of budget advocacy process. The process of Actions (2006–present) civil society participation in the formulation of the Union bud- • The PBI organizes a national convention on the Union budget get has been decentralized and carried out using a bottom- every year to build a common understanding among different up approach; it has also opened up to include various new stakeholders on critical gaps in the provision of important public stakeholders. goods and for arriving at a common set of prioritized policy and • Parliamentary endorsement of inclusion of civil society input in budgetary demands for different sectors. In addition to academ- the Union budget. In response to CBGA’s door-to-door advocacy ics and policy analysts working on various sectors, this convention in 2009–10, members of parliament endorsed the PBI’s appeal to includes a significant number of participants with grassroots-level the Union finance minister to hold civil society consultations experience. before the Union budget is tabled. • During this national convention, these stakeholders prepare a • Replication at provincial level. The efforts to open up the Union charter of demands that forms the basis of their advocacy with budget’s formulation have been replicated at the state level by the policymakers and members of the legislature in the ensuing the members of the PBI. months. • The PBI monitored the government’s commitment in the 11th Implications for World Bank-Sponsored Five Year Plan (2007–12) to establish one model school in every Operations block throughout the country and an additional model school Working with a wide network of institutions that focus on budget in every block over the next five years. In 2009, CBGA calculated policy can be useful because: that the total cost of this commitment was about US$8.6 bil- • Key representatives of the network can engage with governments lion, far above the US$2.7 billion allocated in the plan. But CBGA’s and succeed in influencing budget policy at both the national and research also showed that the cost of setting up the 6,000 model subnational level. schools required to achieve the government’s goal could be met • These types of networks also encourage mentorship of new by reducing the revenue lost from tax exemptions in one year groups and cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on a variety by only 10 percent (approximately US$8.9 billion for 2008–09). To of fiscal issues. bolster the impact of its research findings, in 2009–10, the CBGA experimented with “door-to-door” advocacy, discussing differ- Reference ent budget and public policy issues with more than 100 mem- International Budget Partnership. 2011. “Profile of Centre for Budget and bers of parliament. Governance Accountability (CBGA)—India People’s Budget Initiative.” IBP Case Study, International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. http:// internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Profile-of-CBGA-India-2011.pdf. A–95 Country: Nepal Sector: Education; Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Levels: Local; National; Provincial Name of Project: Budget Transparency Initiative Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Disclosure; Legislatures; Monitoring A1.80. Improving Budget Literacy to Empower Citizens Context and lack of information at the community level to enable full Nepal embarked on a process of decentralization, first through the understanding of different stakeholders’ responsibilities. 1999 Local Self Governance Act, which introduced major policy • The BTI included a training program for master trainers and South Asia reforms to devolve decision-making power to local bodies, and later social audit facilitators. In turn, these facilitators strengthened through its 2007 interim constitution, which abolished a feudal state the capacity of the social audit committees and collected data structure and established a federal system of governance that made at the school level. A series of other tools and information materi- local government its priority. These reforms presented an important als were developed to support training efforts and the dissemina- opportunity, not only to improve efficiency, but to engage citizens tion of information to school stakeholders, including “My School at the subnational level. However, the reforms have not yet trans- At-a-Glance,” a simplified template that outlines school-level lated into a more efficient use of budget resources at the subnational demographics and resources; “School Governance Assessment level or an enhancement of understanding by citizens of budget Tool,” a template combining information on the social audit pro- processes. In this context, the Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) cess with information on the management of school finances piloted an innovative approach in 2011 in three pilot districts—Kaski, and the conduct of the school management committee; and Dolakha, and Nawalparasi—to simplify, analyze, and disclose budgets two “Frequently Asked Questions” to inform school stakeholders at the subnational level and to build the awareness and capacity of about the principles of school good governance and social audits. government officials and citizens that, hopefully, would promote a public dialogue around public expenditures. The BTI also promoted Results budget transparency and better governance in schools. Some of the • Creation of a cadre of social audit facilitators. A three-day pro- approaches piloted under this initiative are expected to be replicated gram for social audit facilitators trained 30 social audit facilita- and scaled-up by a recently-created Public Financial Management tors, strengthening the capacity of social audit committees in 60 multidonor trust fund. schools. • Improvements in school social auditing practices. A postca- Actions (2010–12) pacity building assessment in 20 schools in one district found • At the national level, a “Budget Literacy Handbook” was devel- that one iteration of social audit trainings mentioned above sig- oped to enhance budget awareness and literacy, and workshops nificantly improved community-level capacity to monitor and were conducted for constituent assembly members. At the improve over 50 percent (22 of 39) of the indicators in the social subnational level, budgetary allocations were disclosed, simpli- audit guidelines. fied, and disseminated to key stakeholders (e.g., village devel- • Increase in demand for budget transparency. Discussions with opment councils, district development councils, and civil society stakeholders at all levels have revealed a high demand for budget organizations). simplification and disclosure, and they agreed that these activi- • A study analyzed how and when funds are released for educa- ties will help prevent misuse of funds, enhance transparency, and tion programs and how these allocations can be better aligned increase community participation. The latest discussions with with district priorities. Analysis revealed several gaps between partner nongovernmental organizations and government officials policy and practice in subnational budget formulation and execu- confirm ongoing enthusiasm for the initiative and positive feed- tion processes, such as the predominance of a top-down pro- back from local communities. cess, lack of cost-benefit analyses in budget allocation decisions, delays in communication of budget ceilings and release of alloca- Implications for Project Teams tions, and capture of user committees. Comprehensive training and capacity-building efforts at all levels • A series of capacity-building interventions for constituent assem- (from policy makers down to the community level) have strength- bly members and district-level officials around budget processes ened the relationship between the demand and supply sides of bud- were undertaken to address the demand for training in this area. get transparency and, consequently, the feedback loop between the • At the community-school school level, a Social Audit Gap Analysis two. was conducted in 60 schools to identify gaps between the guide- lines of the mandated school social audits and their implementa- Reference tion. Gaps in implementation were mainly due to poor capacity “Using Budgets to Empower People: The Budget Transparency Initiative in Nepal.” Social Accountability Case Examples: Public Financial Management, Social Development, World Bank. A–96 Country: Pakistan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: Provincial and Local Implementing Organization: Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Coalition Building; Monitoring A1.81. Tracking Earthquake Reconstruction Funds to Ensure they Reach Intended Beneficiaries Context Results In October 2005, a devastating earthquake shook the Hazara region • Improved reconstruction and provision of prioritized services. South Asia and the Azad Kashmir province in Northwest Pakistan, destroying After the sit-in in front of parliament and the president’s office, shelters, livelihoods, and lives in an already-marginalized region of the reconstruction data showed a rapid increase in activity for the country. The magnitude of the destruction led to a flood of housing compensation, health, water supply, and sanitation—all donor money for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the affected of the sectors included in the coalition’s demands to the ERRA. areas. But three years later, owing to the slow pace of reconstruction • Increase in the completion rate of projects from 9 to 29 per- and contrary to the claims of the government’s earthquake recon- cent in 14 months. Prior to June 2008, 9 percent of all projects struction and rehabilitation authority (ERRA), many people were still were completed, 12 percent were under construction, and 52 per- without adequate housing or critical public infrastructure. It was in cent were in the tender or planning stages; by August 2009, 28.5 this context that a large coalition of civil society organizations and percent were completed, 31.6 were under construction, and 39.9 citizens embarked on a campaign in 2007 to realign rehabilitation were at the tender or planning stages. assistance with the people’s priorities and ensure that resources were • Increase in the percentage of affected citizens receiving subsi- equitably distributed. The campaign was led by the Omar Asghar dies. Among earthquake-affected people eligible for the fourth Khan Development Foundation (OAKDF), which engages people in tranche of Rs. 50,000, by June 2008, only 39.1 percent had received the Northwest region in efforts to secure their human and livelihood subsidies; this figure rose to 81.2 percent by August 2009. rights. • Increase in the rate of completion of health projects from less than 1 to 59 percent. Actions (2007–09) • Increase in the rate of completion of water and sanitation proj- The OAKDF coalition adopted the following campaign tactics to ects from 23 to 59 percent in 14 months. meet its goals: Implications for Project Teams • It enlisted technical experts to analyze and identify inconsisten- Including advocacy organizations as executing agencies for various cies in ERRA’s earthquake reconstruction data. It also engaged projects can help them increase the effectiveness of their monitor- 150 activists from the quake-affected communities to help peo- ing efforts and thus serve as a catalyst for the better use of funds ple in the 57 villages of the Hazara region identify their needs, to more generally. check the truth of ERRA’s claims on the ground, and to deter- mine whether or not the agency’s priorities matched those of the References villagers. These efforts demonstrated that, even after accounting OAKDF Website: http://www.oakdf.org.pk. for opportunity costs and inflation, there was a significant short- International Budget Partnership. Unpublished “Earthquake Reconstruction fall in effective reconstruction and housing subsidies that earth- in Pakistan: The Case of the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation’s quake victims received. Campaign.” IBP Case Study Series: From Analysis to Impact, International Budget • It formed the People’s Coalition of Hazara, which is comprised Partnership, Washington, DC. http://www.oecd.org/gov/38983242.pdf of 300 people’s organizations from the quake-impacted area, the lawyer’s campaign, journalists, and other citizen groups. In October 2008, it also organized a sit-in in Islamabad in front of parliament and the president’s office to draw attention to the problems with the reconstruction efforts and effectively utilized electronic media to highlight them. • The OAKDF made a strategic decision to become an executing agency for the ERRA in one union council. This provided use- ful insights into the implementation policies of the ERRA, greatly benefitting campaigns strategies and tactics. A–97 Country: Sri Lanka Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization) Level: Local Name of Project: ANSA-SAR funded Center for Policy Alternatives Areas of Engagement: Budget Simplification; Capacity Building, Dissemination; Participatory Budgeting A1.82. Introducing Participatory Budgeting to Enhance Accountability of Pradeshiya Sabhas Context Results In the local government sector of Sri Lanka, local authorities are • Citizen participation in the budget formulation stage. Through South Asia divided into three different groups: municipal, urban, and regional the workshops funded by ANSA-SAR, CPA was able to get citizen councils (pradeshiya sabha or PS). All of the PSs are income-generat- committees involved in the formulation, approval, and execution ing units that have the power to spend public money on the provi- of the PS budget. During a formulation phase, each elected mem- sion of services and local infrastructure through an annual budget ber conducts group discussions with village groups to identify approved by its members. It is therefore important that the citizens issues and projects in their localities that must be financed out of have a say in the budget process and can ensure that the income the PS budget. Following the village-level discussions, concerned generated from them is spent in a rational and responsible manner. citizens, eminent personalities, and CSO and CBO representa- The Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) set up its Governance and tives put together a wish list, which is then narrowed down to a Anti-Corruption Program with the explicit aim of increasing citizen priority list. A budget proposal is formulated for each prioritized awareness of the budget process, encouraging participation and activity and discussed at the Sabha level. Activities selected are contributing to the development programs of the PSs. Supported included in the main budget. by the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability, an initiative of • Bridging of the language gap in budgets. Prior to the interven- the World Bank Institute to globally promote, strengthen, and sustain tion, it was found that copies of even the Pradeshiya Sabha Act the concepts and practices of social accountability, the project stud- were not available from the government. Through active dissemi- ies PS budget processes and awareness and supports newly-elected nation of trilingual, user-friendly publications on relevant subject members and officials of the PSs as well as community members in areas and analytical studies, the program was able to bridge the understanding and participating in the budget process. gap of budget information in local languages. Actions (2011–present) Implications for Project Teams • Since January 2011, CPA has held 22 one-day interactive dialogues Initiatives that go beyond a simple participatory exercise of giving on budget transparency for local authorities and community voice to citizens in the budget process, and move towards integrating leaders in 10 PSs across the country. This is the first time such their voice in the actual formulation, approval and execution of the a dialogue series has been conducted with PSs. Following the budget can have a transformative impact that goes beyond the dis- awareness workshops, more work was done with civil society tribution of specific goods. These forums can become (as in this case) organization (CSO) and Community Based Organization (CBO) schools of active citizenship, where communities come together for representatives of the areas to educate them about the open the first time, are informed of their rights and responsibilities, and budget process itself and ways they can become involved in the learn how to act on it. budget process of the Sabhas. • CPA also prepared budget timetables, a reader-friendly booklet Reference on the functions of the PS, and a booklet entitled “Tax Payers’ Governance and Anti-Corruption Program and Center for Policy Alternatives. 2011. “Improving Transparency and Accountability Through Participatory Budgeting in Sri Budget,” which is to be used by the PS and shared with the public. Lanka: Final Report,” ANSA-SAR case study. These were discussed in detail and each PS was encouraged to study and follow it. In many cases, it was the first time that com- munity leaders were made aware that by law their input should be obtained in the budget process. A–98 Country: Canada Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Agencies: House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance; Ministry of Finance Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Participatory Budget Planning A1.83. Consulting with the Public to Develop Budget Policies and Priorities Context Results Although not legally prescribed, the communications policy of the • Citizen engagement with the department of finance. In 2006, government of Canada states that the government should con- an estimated 7,000 Canadians responded to the department of sult the public and listen to and take account of people’s interests finance’s invitation to submit advice, ideas, and insights for the Others and concerns when establishing priorities, developing policies, and 2007 budget. planning programs and services. In this spirit, in April 2006, Canada’s • Citizen engagement with the House of Commons Standing federal government urged Canadians to provide their views to the Committee on Finance.Since the launch of the pre-budget con- government online during the pre-budget consultation period. Key sultations, each year, more than 500 organizations have submit- questions posed by the government included: what would the pub- ted their suggestions on what the budget should include, and the lic like to see in the 2006 and future budgets; in which areas should submissions are available on the committee’s website. Since 2007, the government cut expenditures if tax cuts or spending increases these submissions are translated and shared with members of are proposed; and what suggestions can they propose for how the parliament on the committee, who then call on certain groups to government could deliver programs more efficiently and effectively? make presentations in Ottawa. • Public reporting on citizen feedback on the budget. More Actions (2006–present) recently, in December 2012, the committee reported publicly on The government’s pre-budget consultation process includes three its own public consultations held across the country. For the 2013 elements: budget, committee members submitted 60 recommendations based on the feedback they heard from well over 600 individuals, • The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, which businesses, and organizations. is required by standing order of parliament to conduct pre- budget hearings in both Ottawa and across the country and Implications for Project Teams then report back to parliament on what it has heard. Providing support to Ministries of Finance and the Committees on • The minister of finance conducts his own pre-budget consulta- Finance to better engage with citizens ahead of the formulation of tion sessions with key stakeholders. These consist of face-to-face the budget and at the time of debating the draft budget can be an roundtables in Ottawa and, schedules permitting, similar sessions effective way to help open the budget process to citizen input and in communities across the country. oversight. Online consultations are another powerful way to engage • The department of finance stages its own pre-budget consulta- large swathes of the population, especially in countries with a high tions where individual branches meet with key stakeholders. At rate of Internet coverage. the same time, the department conducts public opinion research and focus groups as part of the budget preparation process. The References submissions are analyzed, sorted into categories, and forwarded Ministry of Finance Website: www.fin.gc.ca and www.parl.gc.ca. to relevant departments. Caddy, Joanne, Tiago Peixoto, and Mary McNeil. 2007. “Beyond Public Scrutiny: • More recently, both the House of Commons Standing Committee Stocktaking of Social Accountability in OECD Countries.” WBI Working Paper, on Finance and the Department of Finance launched pre-budget World Bank Institute, Washington, DC. consultations on their websites. The web-consultation page pro- vides information about how to make submissions by email, by fax or snail mail. A–99 Country: Canada Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Organization: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Areas of Engagement: Alternate Budgets; Budget Analysis A1.84. Proposing Alternative Federal Budgets to Demystify Budget Formulation Context AFB developed an online tool that allowed Canadians to convey Founded in 1980, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) how they would like to see the money spent on the various pro- is an independent, nonpartisan research institute concerned with gram choices. issues of social, economic, and environmental justice. Among other Others activities, CCPA, with the participation and support of researchers, Results activists, and leadership from a broad spectrum of civil society orga- • Increased federal spending toward social investment. AFB has nizations (CSOs), has been publishing the annual alternative federal come to be regarded as representing one side of the national budget (AFB) since 1994. The AFB program emerged as a response debate on broad budgetary priorities. Since the year 2000, it had to the neoliberal vision of Canada’s federal government.. The pri- a significant impact on the slow shift back toward social invest- mary focus of the program is economic literacy: to demythologize ments in federal program spending. budget-making and hence public accountability. The AFB has now • Established as a credible voice in public debates. CCPA has suc- been produced for several provinces, including British Columbia, ceeded in establishing itself as an important public voice about Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. government finances; it has helped shape the public debate over the budget for the past two decades. Actions (1994–present) • Promoted unity of policy analysis. The idea of alternative • AFB is a valuable vehicle for coalition building. It brings together budgeting has spread across almost half of Canada’s provinces. progressive CSOs and other stakeholders to collectively Effectively, AFB has promoted collaborative policy-related bud- develop tax and spending measures, and create a sophisticated get transparency work among labor researchers and fostered and workable alternative budgetary framework within which closer links with policy researchers from nonlabor organizations. the measures can be met. This framework acknowledges political Many nongovernmental organizations—from childcare and anti- and economic realities but still produces a dramatically different poverty advocates to environmental groups—have helped shape result than the federal government’s budget. AFB spending proposals and used them as an analytical frame- • CCPA released the 2013 AFB in March in response to the govern- work from which to advance their own proposals. ment signaling that the tabled budget would be short on details about spending cuts. The AFB called on the government to Implications for Project Teams deliver a transparent budget that protects the services relied on In order to remain credible over a long period of time, it is important by Canadians; eliminates costly programs such as new prisons and to take a multipronged approach to budget transparency—one that fighter jets; and shows how the government can increase invest- maintains a good balance between myth-busting through research, ments in job creation, public programs, and infrastructure, and coalition-building through debate, and working on solutions through still balance its budget. The AFB is released at a national press the government. conference 2–3 weeks before the Finance Minister’s budget is held in April, and a host of meetings, workshops, conferences, References and roundtables are organized by CCPA during this period. CCPA Website: http://www.policyalternatives.ca. • AFB strongly believes that the federal government could do a Dobuzinskis, Laurent, Michael Howlett, and David Laycock. 2007. Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. much better job involving Canadians in the budget process and thus more accurately reflect their priorities. Currently, the only channels for citizen feedback on the budget are the pre-budget consultations; the suggestions derived from these rarely make it to the actual federal budget. Because of this, AFB created a health care innovation fund worth US$2 billion over two years with a goal to allow communities to decide how money is spent on the priorities that matter to them. As part of the process, the A–100 Country: Germany Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Transparency International Germany Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; Budget Monitoring; Procurement A1.85. Using Integrity Pacts to Keep Corruption at Bay in Public Sector Contacting Context • FBS invested a significant amount of time and effort to commu- In 2001, the proposed building of a new international airport near nicate about the Schönefeld Airport IP. It was included in regular Berlin was marred by corruption allegations, forcing several modifi- presentations about the project to the local chamber of com- cations of the project’s administrative and financial structures and merce and other industry associations. Others finally a cancellation of all project agreements reached by that time. • Because of the large volume of contracts and the ensuing diffi- By 2004, the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of Berlin and culty of negotiating the IP content with all bidders, the Schönefeld Brandenburg had determined to go ahead with the project, albeit on Airport IP was used as a standard mandatory document. Since a more modest scale than originally envisaged. For that purpose, they the terms of reference were clear in requiring the signature as a formed a private sector company, the Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld condition for participating in the procurement process, the few GmbH (FBS), a limited liability company owned by the three public bidders who refused were not allowed to participate. After five authorities, with the Mayor of Berlin as Chairman of the Board of years of implementation, there were no new cases of reluctance Supervisors. In view of the earlier corruption allegations and under to sign the IP. instructions from the mayor of Berlin to various state authorities to • FBS used the IP as a project implementation and communica- seek new ways to avoid corruption risks in large investment projects, tions tool. In FBS’s view, the IP complemented the partnership FBS and Transparency International Germany (TI-D) joined efforts to agreement that the contractors signed, where they agreed with introduce a no-bribes Integrity Pact (IP) to prevent corruption and FBS to general terms of behavior towards FBS and their own illegal transactions in the course of a major expansion that included employees, some risk management measures, information shar- turning FBS into the Berlin Brandenburg International Airport (BBI). ing, and so on. At the time, this was the largest infrastructure project in eastern Germany, anticipating investments of ca. EUR 2 billion (US$2.6 billion) Results between 2005 and the planned opening of BBI airport in 2010. Successful IP implementation with zero corruption. By June 2009, the project had entailed 338 individual bidding processes and 900 Actions (2004–10) signed contracts, including design, construction, and supplies, worth • TI-D and FBS managers and staff worked together to develop a more than €1.5 billion (approximately US$1.9 billion). The moni- model IP adapted to Germany’s legal context. In light of TI-D’s tor reviewed a good portion of these contracts and there were no suggestion that an independent external monitor should be reports of corruption. appointed to effectively shield FBS management against potential efforts to undermine correct procedures, both parties selected Implications for Project Teams an IP monitor. In addition to signaling that an extra effort was being made to curb • Sanctions for breaching the Schönefeld Airport IP were insti- corruption in the procurement process by instituting an IP, key fea- tuted. These included setting a liquidated damages clause at tures that make these pacts successful included getting the basics three percent of the contract value, up to an amount of €50,000. right—such as procurement procedures, law, the monitoring system, In addition, FBS was entitled to exclude the bidder from the bid- and communication about the IP—and involving the stakeholders. ding process and, in case of serious violations, from future bids as well. The amount was increased to the equivalent of five percent References of the contract value in case of violation of the IP provisions after Transparency International Website: www.transparency.org. the contract was awarded. In this case, FBS reserved the right to Olaya, Juanita. 2010. “The Implementation of an Integrity Pact in the Berlin Schonefeld Airport Project.” Case Study, Transparency International. cancel the contract and, again, in the case of a serious violation, to exclude the contractor from future bidding processes. Because special conflict resolution mechanisms already existed under German law that were applicable to the Schönefeld Airport Project and to FBS, they were not included in the IP. A–101 Country: Israel Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Adva Center Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Alternate Budgets; Analysis; Gender Budgets; Legislatures; Monitoring A1.86. Using Budget Analysis and Training to Restore Emphasis on the Social Sector in the National Budget Context • Adva also focused its energy on lobbying within the Knesset. A nonpartisan, action-oriented policy analysis center, Adva estab- Staff distributed Adva’s full budget report as well as shorter budget bulletins, met with legislators, testified at various Others lished the Budget Analysis Project in 1995, which is designed to promote a broader public debate on national priorities and a more Knesset committee meetings, and held an “alternative budget” equitable distribution of government resources. The project analyzes debate attended by members of the Knesset and representatives the social service allocations of the national budget of Israel via a from dozens of NGOs. These venues provided Adva the oppor- series of reports entitled “Looking at the Budget.” The budget pre- tunity to educate legislators on the impact of the proposed bud- sented by Israel’s government in 1998 contained deep cuts in social get and bolster opposition to the proposed social spending cuts. spending, with the avowed hope of stimulating economic growth. • More recently, the Adva Center has assumed leadership of the The cuts included reducing child allowances and old-age pensions, Women’s Budget Forum, a coalition of over 30 feminist and abolishing the uniform health care package, and limiting eligibility for human rights organizations, which seeks to promote changes in unemployment compensation. Adva took the position that the pro- government programs with new legislation and regulations that posed cuts would result in serious harm to the welfare state and the are more friendly toward women and minorities. people who depended on it. Results Actions (1998–present) • Restored social sector considerations in the 1998 budget. • Before the 1998 budget proposal was even finalized, the organiza- Adva’s efforts were very effective at highlighting the social sector tion distributed two “Budget Bulletins” in response to the gov- implications of the 1998 budget and helping to generate a well- ernment’s proposed spending cuts to document the negative informed debate on the issues. The budget was not approved implications for the Israeli welfare state. by the standard December deadline, and the Foreign Minister • Adva promptly brought into the debate a broad spectrum of David Levy resigned in opposition to the proposed cuts in social organizations whose constituencies would be affected by the services. Eventually, even though the bill was ultimately passed, budget decisions. Through meetings and information sessions, three important aspects of the social services budget were Adva worked to increase awareness within the nongovernmen- restored: the universal package of health services was preserved, tal organization (NGO) community, establish a common agenda, cutbacks in teaching hours and government housing assistance and present a united voice to the government. Adva provided program were reduced, and the deep cuts in child allowances and information that was both timely and useful, and strategically dis- old-age pensions were nullified. seminated it to select audiences. Longer, more in-depth reports • Reference to Adva’s reports. Throughout the course of the and short, easily digestible issue briefs were sent to a broad spec- Knesset debates in 1998 and since, Adva’s reports on the econ- trum of NGOs, legislators, health ministry officials, and other key omy and the national budget were read regularly by executive players; the reports were also widely publicized in the media. and legislative officials and were utilized in Knesset committees • When the 1998 budget was published, Adva released three spe- and plenary debates. They were reported extensively by the mass cialized budget reports, one on the implications of the proposed media and utilized by social advocacy organizations. They pro- budget for women, another for Arab citizens, and the third for resi- vided the impetus for changes in legislation, regulations, and gov- dents of Jewish development towns. These reports were widely ernment planning. circulated within the government and among civil society to bring more attention to the issue and to raise the level of debate. (continued) A–102 (continued) • Increased focus on gender budgeting. In November 2011, the Implications for Project Teams Adva Center released a report entitled “Gender Mainstreaming Bank TTLs can encourage civil society organizations that are providing Calls for Gender Breakdowns Case Study: The Ministry of training and technical assistance to legislatures in order to expand the Industry, Trade, and Labor,” which positions the advocacy work parameters of the budget debate and establish legitimacy with gov- of the Women’s Budget Forum. The report was presented to the ernment officials and the public by adopting a nonpartisan approach. Minister of Industry, Trade, and Labor as well as to department heads at a meeting held in March 2012. Following an Adva Center References Others presentation, the minister instructed the director of his research Adva Website: http://www.adva.org. department to submit a plan for collecting data by gender within International Budget Partnership. 2000. “Analyzing and Affecting Budget Policy: two months for the purpose of promoting women’s employment. The Adva Center, Israel.” In A Taste of Success: Examples of the Budget Work of NGOs, International Budget Partnership. A–103 Country: Italy Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organization: Sbilanciamoci! Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Alternate Budgets; Analysis A1.87. Using Budget Analysis to Propose Alternative Budget Approaches Context Results In Italy, the finance law vests the national government with the • High volume of activity. During ten years of activity, the cam- power to choose where to take public money from and how it paign has elaborated research tools and advanced critical analysis, should be spent in the following year. Unfortunately, too often the both of which are an essential part of its activity on disseminat- Others law is discussed, negotiated, and drawn according to special inter- ing information, exerting political pressure, and mobilizing mul- ests, and its implications are presented as inevitable. Furthermore, it tiple stakeholders. Sbilanciamoci! has published 20 reports: 10 on is shrouded in figures and graphs that should represent the collective Italy’s State Budget; 8 on QUARS, the regional index on alterna- welfare but which seem of little importance to the uninitiated reader. tive quality-of-life indicators elaborated by Sbilanciamoci!; 1 on Sbilanciamoci! is a campaign involving 51 associations, nongovern- the war in Iraq, 4 on development cooperation; and 2 on military mental organizations, and networks that has proposed several alter- expenditures. It has also organized over 20 national conferences natives to Italian budget policies, arguing and advocating for social and conventions, promoted 256 local initiatives, such as seminars and environmental priorities. and debates, has collected more than 30,000 signatures in sup- port of the state budget alternative proposals; and helped table Actions (September 1999–present) 57 amendments to laws with the support of members of parlia- • One of the key initiatives of the campaign is the Other State ment supporting the campaign. Budget Project. One of the outputs of this project was “The • Uptake of several recommendations from the proposal in Other Budget Report,” in which, after a thorough review of the government programs. Some proposals in “The Other Budget budget law and the state budget, alternative proposals on how Report” have been directly incorporated into government pro- to use public expenditures for society, the environment, and grams—for example, the construction of 3,000 crèches and the peace are developed. implementation of green accountability in the political decision- • Annual meetings (counter cernobbio) with mass media visibility making process; were organized at which policy makers, government delegates, • Setting up of working groups. A working group has been estab- and civil society organization representatives are invited to dis- lished by the ministry of the treasury that will systematically cuss alternative economic policies and proposals published in review and verify the uptake of alternate budget proposals by “The Other Budget Report.” Some their suggestions included the government. abolishing the tax reform module II, which took away resources • Uptake of the regional development indicator by politicians. from public policies in favor of welfare; increasing resources for QUARS is now being used to make politicians aware of alternative the national fund for social policies through the introduction of a indicators to the conventional economic ones and to establish capitation rate; allocation of additional resources to the national and guide priorities, particularly with regard to the way budgets health fund to be transferred to the regions to sport the dynamic are allocated. growth of health expenditures; and the promotion of fair trade and social public procurement. Implications for Project Teams • Since 2002, Sbilanciamoci! has also been calculating a composite In countries where civil society organizations have high capacity and regional development quality indicator (Qualita Regionale dello technical expertise, it is effective to take a multipronged, radical, and Sviluppo, or QUARS), which was devised under a consultative holistic approach to budget analysis, advocacy, and reform analysis and participatory process. This composite indicator is geared at by encouraging relevant nongovernmental organizations to create identifying and linking up the components of development in the coalitions that can collectively propose pragmatic alternatives to the Italian regions on the basis of 41 indicators. existing budget while at the same time galvanize support from mul- tiple stakeholders. Reference Sbilanciamoci Website: www.sbilanciamoci.org. A–104 Country: Japan Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National and Local Implementing Organization: Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis, Audits; Coalition Building; Monitoring A1.88. Citizen Activists Work Together to Monitor the External Auditing Process Context provision that the local government must pay the JCOA attorney The Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association (JCOA) is a network fees. JCOA’s lawyers also sometimes donate part of their fees to whose members include a large number of lawyers and longtime the association. activists who have organized and coordinated disclosure request Others campaigns about falsified business trips, entertainment expenses Results for bureaucrats, and unaccountable granting of subsidies to auxiliary • Increased disclosure of information. Among the first gains of organizations. It grew out of several citizen initiatives in various parts the association was to learn from each other’s experiences on of the country during the 1980s and 1990s in response to numer- how to investigate local governments, particularly with regard to ous cases of bribery and malfeasance. Initially established in Osaka, demanding disclosure of information. This enabled association Nagoya, and Sendai, citizen ombudsman groups continued to pro- members to retrieve a lot of information that was not previously liferate in other prefectures and big cities, including Tokyo. In 1994, open to the public. In 1995, the association discovered numerous these groups convened and formed the Japan Citizen Ombudsman entertainment expenses and fake official travel by government Association (JCOA). officers paid for with taxpayer money. This prompted the asso- ciation to demand the disclosure of information in each of Japan’s Actions (2000–present) 47 prefectures. Composed of 85 suborganizations and 6,000 members, JCOA has • Addition of an external audit system. In 1996, the JCOA exposed worked on disclosure request campaigns on entertainment expenses inappropriate business trip expenses by the supervisory auditor. incurred by the bureaucracy, bid collusion practices, public works, In response, the government amended the law in 1999 to add “fake duty” trips, and bribery of the police. It has adopted the fol- an external audit system for local governments that includes a lowing techniques and approaches: lawyer, an accountant, and a tax accountant who are required to draft audit reports. • Since 2000, JCOA has been monitoring the external auditing process by making audit reports prepared by external auditors Implications for Project Teams available to the public and the news media in a “Report Card of • A countrywide network of citizen groups that advocate for via- External Audits.” In order to curtail repetition of delinquencies ble change and to back up their efforts with evidence can have a that characterized earlier local audit committees, JCOA keeps a resounding impact on policy. However, these networks take time close watch on external auditors. For example, when the external to grow and expand, and quick wins in the beginning can help audit mechanism first began, one audit report consisted of only consolidate a network’s mission and hone its techniques. six pages, for which the external auditors received a payment • The active involvement of a national network to monitor the of 11.55 million yen (US$120,000). JCOA protested and sued the external auditing process can serve as a constant deterrent to the external auditors to return the money. misuse of public resources. • Since the 2001 legal amendment that requires ceiling prices of construction bids be disclosed, JCOA writes annual reports that References rank local governments based on successful bid ratios for pub- Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association Website: www.ansa-sar.org. lic construction projects. It also calculates the successful bid “Situation of Corruption in Japan and its Anti-Corruption Measures.” Lecture ratio for 47 prefectures, 17 large cities, and 33 medium-sized cities. for the Staff of Indonesian Ministry of Finance at GSID, Nagoya University on It calculated that local governments may have overpaid up to 1.16 September 11, 2008, Japan Citizens’ Ombudsman Association. trillion yen (US$12 million) in public work budgets in fiscal 2005 alone because of big rigging. • JCOA works to maintain its financial independence by not entering into financial relationships of any kind with local and central government agencies or with private companies. Every time JCOA wins a court case against a local government involving overcharging in government contracts, the settlement includes a A–105 Country: South Korea Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Level: National Implementing Agencies: Board of Audit and Inspection; Budget Office; Special Committee of Budget Areas of Engagement: Budget Disclosure; Dissemination; Participatory Budget Planning A1.89. Using Citizen Participation Mechanisms to Verify Fiscal Priorities Context local governments regarding the budget and the adjusted MTEF. The introduction of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) The inputs are then reported at the cabinet meeting before the by South Korea’s fbudget office allowed budget allocations to be submission of the budget to the national assembly. based on multiyear expenditure ceilings, but concerns remained that • When the national assembly receives the draft budget from the Others without credible and legitimate mechanisms for setting the ceilings, government, a special committee on budget opens a public the rationale for them could be undermined and enforcement by hearing of assembly experts. This hearing evaluates the overall line ministries made difficult. To resolve this issue, budget authorities economic and tax forecasts, fiscal stance, and the need to amend decided to establish mechanisms through which stakeholders could any expenditure programs. Should questions arise from the hear- provide feedback at different stages of the budget cycle, enabling ing, the special committee on budget requests a query session the government to assert that a realistic expenditure ceiling had been with the government and makes adjustments to the draft budget established and that attempts to renegotiate it would be ineffective. if it is necessary. • Citizens can use the website of the ministry of strategy and Actions (2002–present) finance budget waste report center or the budget waste hotline Korea’s public participation mechanisms are closely aligned with the to report suspected cases of budget waste or suggest creative formulation and execution cycle of the annual budget and the MTEF. ways to save resources. Retired budget office officials with bud- geting or budget implementation experience manage the hotline. • During the process of setting budget ceilings, the budget office • The board of audit and inspection (BAI) posts the names of agen- organizes open discussions for the public (ODP) about any cies to be audited along with the respective audit dates on its potentially expensive project with a direct impact on the qual- website and opens it for citizen feedback. Citizens are encour- ity of life of citizens. At the ODP, each major sector, such as aged to suggest what public entity operations or expenditures social welfare and health, infrastructure, and the environment, should be audited. Additionally, citizens can request the BAI to is allotted a 90-minute session for deliberation and discussion, examine any reports of impropriety or inspect certain budgets which concludes with questions and comments from the floor. throughout the budget implementation phase. To ensure a balanced perspective, each sector convenes a panel • In July 2012, the budget office launched its first nationwide con- consisting of Public Financial Management experts, high-level test to gather creative ideas from the public on new fiscal proj- government officials from line ministries and the budget office, ects. The objective of the contest was to encourage the public to budget execution entities, and civil society organizations. The provide input on what and how projects should be designed. hearings are televised to ensure transparency. • Since 2009, the budget office has arranged meetings with local Results governments in major provinces and cities to learn about their • Inclusion of ODP inputs in policy process. Based on ODP needs and to get updates on projects being implemented at the requests, the childcare budget has increased at an average annual local level. In turn, local governments voice their opinions on rate of 27.2 percent from 2005 to 2013, surpassing the 8.5 per- projects, grants, and subsidy programs. cent annual growth rate of the social welfare sector as a whole. • Before finalizing and submitting the budget to the national assembly, the budget office consults with the fiscal policy advi- (continued) sory council comprised of line ministries, outside experts, and Reports Received from the Public and BAI’s Acceptance Rate 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Number of reports 72 124 142 163 143 144 181 183 137 182 190 1,661 Acceptance rate (percent) 48.2 66.7 61.3 56.9 57.3 32.5 23.8 20.0 35.5 28.4 39.9 39.1 Source: Board of Audit and Inspection. A–106 (continued) The target group expanded from low-income households to all power and reduce costs; and a mentoring program through which households with children under age five. The government intro- college students guide and teach children from low-income duced a monthly childcare allowance in 2009. households. • Improved oversight of budget waste. From 2006 onward, the number of reports received on budget waste has increased in Implications for Project Teams direct proportion to the resources devoted to awareness cam- In addition to using various mechanisms to solicit feedback on the paigns by the ministry of strategy and finance. This system has budget during different phases of the budget cycle, project teams Others been so effective that local governments adopted it as well. could also consider encouraging governments to “close” the feed- • Adoption of citizens’ suggestions for new fiscal projects. Twelve back loop and to indicate which public suggestions and how many of the 866 suggestions—both new project ideas and ideas that they have incorporated into their programs and processes. expanded on ongoing projects—were reflected in the budget. Some of the ideas highlighted as creative and reasonable include Reference the establishment of a network for small- and medium-sized Open Budget Survey Website: http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/ open-budget-survey. companies by function or by region for better coordination and information-sharing and to improve the companies’ bargaining Public Participation in the Budget and MTEF Formulation Processes MTEF and annual budgeting cycle Public participation mechanisms 1 MTEF preparation (LMs) 2 MTEF Draft (BO) • Coordination (BO and LMs) 3 • Cabinet meeting Open discussion for the public 4 • Ceilings communicated to LMs (public hearing) Budget Formulation 5 Budget draft • MTEF by LMs taskforce Meeting with local governments 6 teamwork and field trips 7 • Budget • Finalize formulation MTEF 8 • Submit to Fiscal policy advisory meeting with LMs, • Submit to the assembly the assembly experts, and local governments 9 10 Assembly review and Assembly experts hearing 11 finalization 12 Budget Implementation Budget waste report center Budget Settlement and Audit Public participation on audit by BAI A–107 Country: South Korea Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: Local; National Implementing Organization: Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Coalition Building A1.90. Encouraging Citizen Participation in Audits to Uncover Waste of Public Resources Context • In 2003, CCEJ began an investigation and issued an open inquiry In South Korea, several schemes have been introduced by the national against NTS, citing unfair audit practices, preferential taxation, omitted taxes amounting to 6 billion Korean Won (US$5,434,525), Others supreme audit institution—the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)—to encourage citizen participation in audits. A citizens’ audit and retaliatory actions against whistleblowers. When, in response request system, introduced under the Anticorruption Act of 2001, to CCEJ’s request, the BAI conducted an investigation of the tax allows citizens to request from the BAI special audits on public agen- collection practices of the NTS and found no fault with them, cies suspected of corruption or legal transgressions. Applications are CCEJ opted for another system of government redress and took made under this scheme to a citizen audit request screening commit- the case to the committee in charge of coordinating the Korean tee, comprised of citizens and audit officials and designed to screen government’s anticorruption policies. requests to identify frivolous complaints and decide which merit a • CCEJ used the media strategically as a tool to highlight these full audit. A Korean citizen movement called the Citizen’s Coalition cases and to motivate the government to address the concerns for Economic Justice (CCEJ) established the Citizens Against Budget of citizens. It declared March 3 as “Taxpayers’ Day,” which was Waste (CABW) as one of its divisions. CABW identifies issues within originally the day on which the National Tax Administration was the administrative affairs of government and requests the Korean BAI established in 1966. It tried to show cases of budgetary waste to audit agencies or programs of concern. (including the NCC case) and celebrate the excellent govern- ment officials who implemented efficient budgets; each year Actions (1999–2003) it announced the ten worst cases and gave taxpayers’ “friend” CCEJ requested the BAI to conduct audits in two cases. awards to efficient officials. When the worst cases were related • The first was that of ballooning construction costs and delays in to a specific ministry, the minister and high-level officials were building the National Cancer Center (NCC) that the government embarrassed because the president criticized the ministry. had begun in 1991. Rather than the originally estimated cost of • It organized classes on the government budget for citizens to 41.9 billion Korean Won (approximately US$58 million), by 1999 the increase the average Korean citizen’s basic knowledge on fiscal construction budget for the NCC had increased to over 200 bil- matters. lion Won (approximately US$180 million), with completion more than three-and-a-half years behind schedule. • It developed close relationships with local organizations. Each • Before requesting that the BAI conduct an audit of the NCC, CCEJ of CCEJ’s 40 local chapters established a division for budget moni- utilized its wide network of experts and volunteers to under- toring, which led to better collaboration with the CABW. take research and compare the budgets of cancer wards at other university hospitals with the government’s budget plan for the Results NCC and found that the latter was excessive. CCEJ also consulted • Determination of budget waste. In the case of the NCC, the BAI with professors and government officers who corroborated determined that insufficient planning, unsystematic construction, their suspicions and confirmed that a power struggle between and a lack of human resources had contributed to budget waste. two government ministries over control of the NCC had inflated It also found that overlapping and unclear investments between the NCC’s budget even further. the NCC and a university hospital had caused inefficiency. The BAI informed the ministry of health and welfare that it should The second case involved an audit official who informed CCEJ in 2003 harmonize the functions of the two hospitals and provide a firm that the National Tax Service (NTS) had provided three companies plan for acquiring the human and material resources necessary to with unfair tax cuts totaling 6 billion Korean Won (approximately get the NCC open as soon as possible. The NCC was operational US$5,434,525), and that he had been demoted because of his opposi- by 2001. tion to those policies. (continued) A–108 (continued) • Prosecution of whistleblower’s demotion. In case of the NTS, References the anticorruption committee accepted the arguments by the CCEJ Korea Website: http://www.ccej.or.kr/English. audit official and CCEJ, and transferred the case to a local pros- International Budget Partnership. 2006. “Audit Institutions Can Be Strengthened ecutor who in turn decided that the official’s demotion had Through Cooperation With Civil Society Organizations: Examples from the been unfair and the tax exemption had been unlawful. The pros- Philippines, South Korea and Tanzania.” International Budget Partnership e-Newsletter 36 (November-December). ecutor ordered that the required tax payments of 6 billion Won Ramkumar, Vivek. 2008. “Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide (US$5,434,525) be collected. Others to Monitoring Government Expenditure.” International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. Implications for Project Teams You, Jong-Sung, Wonhee Lee. Unpublished Draft. “Budget Transparency and National Supreme Audit Institutions can be useful allies, both in Participation—Korean Case Study.” April 2011. terms of conducting timely and comprehensive audits of World Bank-supported projects as well as collaborating with the public to monitor satisfactory implementation of ongoing projects. A–109 Country: United States Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Levels: National; Provincial Implementing Organization: The State Fiscal Analysis Initiative Network Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Capacity Building; Coalition Building A1.91. Promoting Progressive Budget and Tax Policies to Advance Equity and Prosperity Context provides a sounding board for fiscal policy and organizational Created in 1993, the State Fiscal Analysis Initiative (SFAI) network is a questions, alerts members to field developments, and offers opportunities to share successful strategies. Groups also mentor Others unique national network of 42 diverse public policy organizations in 41 states and the District of Columbia. Coordinated by the Washington- new members to reduce the start-up time necessary to launch based Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (the Center), the SFAI successful groups. network promotes progressive budget and tax policies at the state level and seeks to shape tax, budget, and related debates to foster a Results more equitable and prosperous society. The SFAI’s work is particularly The SFAI network has significant impact on state policy. Some of relevant in the face of the unprecedented challenges that states face SFAI’s key policy victories include: today, including a devastating, recession-driven decline in revenue, • Established earned income tax credits in numerous states. The severely weakened services for low-income and vulnerable families, earned income tax credit (EITC) is the nation’s most effective regressive state tax systems, and insufficient transparency, account- policy tool for reducing child poverty. However, prior to SFAI’s ability, and civic engagement. involvement, few states had their own versions of this successful federal program. Today, 25 state-level EITCs provide US$2.4 billion Actions (1993-present) per year to help more than 9 million working families make ends • SFAI’s work begins with credible, timely, and accessible research meet and to lift many of them above the poverty line. and analysis. This fact-based approach drives thoughtful and • Defeated crippling limits on state revenues and services in over practical policy ideas that SFAI groups and their partners then two dozen states. Strict, arbitrary spending or revenue limits can promote in their states. SFAI groups strategically assess opportu- force damaging cutbacks to education, health care, and other vital nities and threats when choosing which topics to address. Their services. When such measures are proposed in states, SFAI groups work plans—often developed in coordination with allies that are sound the alarm about the consequences that would result. For prepared to organize around policy change—respond to fast- example, SFAI and Center researchers have documented the dev- moving legislative developments. astating effects that these proposals would have on education, • The Center and SFAI members focus on communicating effec- health care, and human services; they disseminated those findings tively to a wide range of audiences. SFAI groups are major to journalists, policymakers, and community groups. sources of information for journalists and opinion leaders, and • Safeguarded services by building state revenue coalitions in 30 they help to shape coverage of key budget and policy issues in states. State cutbacks in services due to the 2007–09 recession their states. In some states, newspapers have reached out to SFAI would have been even deeper without the leadership of SFAI groups to partner on interactive tools aimed at helping readers members, who have been instrumental in creating coalitions to better understand state budgets and the tradeoffs involved in rally support against cuts-only budget proposals that damage developing them. economic growth and hurt struggling families. Nearly all SFAI • SFAI groups expand state budget and fiscal policy debates by groups have either launched or strengthened broad-based reve- helping and partnering with a diverse range of constituencies. nue-enhancing coalitions. They assist other nonprofits in raising awareness of specific issues, formulating policy solutions, developing effective messages, and Implications for Project Teams refining legislative strategies. Often a group involved in a par- It can be useful to work with a countrywide network of institutions ticular issue—for example, mental health or K–12 education— that focuses on budget policy because: will have expertise in one part of the budget but will need the broader information an SFAI group can provide to consider the • Key representatives of the network can engage with national overall budget context. and subnational-level governments and can succeed in impacting • Though budgets and political dynamics in the states differ, the budget policy at the national and subnational levels Center and SFAI members regularly share policy ideas, written • Such networks also encourage mentorship of new groups and reports, op-eds, messaging strategies, and tactical approaches. cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on different fiscal issues. SFAI groups have developed a robust peer-to-peer network that Reference State Fiscal Analysis Initiative Network Website: www.statefiscal.org. A–110 Country: Multi-Country (Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen) Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Public Finance) Levels: Local; National Implementing Organization: Partners Jordan Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Analysis; Participatory Budgeting A1.92. Building Participatory Budgeting Coalitions to Improve Municipal Budgets Context in consolidated reports that were distributed to local communi- Traditionally, in Jordan, citizens are unaware of their right to give ties and discussed with the leadership of the municipalities. • They also organized “learning conferences” to review the imple- Multi-Country input on municipal budgets, and they have never been provided with opportunities to provide feedback on budget allocations about what mentation of project activities in Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, and they believe are key priorities for their municipalities. Because of this Bahrain, to compare successes and challenges, and to discuss pos- lack of knowledge and engagement, citizens tend to request services sible next steps. from municipalities that are either outside of their mandate or for which there is no budget. To encourage citizens to understand the Results financial capacities of their local government and participate in the Incorporation of local priorities in municipal budgets. In Jordan budget process, Partners-Jordan, a nonprofit organization, launched and Yemen, the 2010 municipal budget was approved based on pri- the Arab Initiative for Equitable Budget project with a regional coali- orities identified by local citizens. For instance, residents of the two tion comprised of the countries of Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, and selected municipalities in Jordan had identified the construction and Lebanon. maintenance of roads, street cleaning, waste collection, and street lighting as pressing issues, and the 2010 budget for these municipali- Actions (2008–10) ties reflected those priorities. • Each partner of the participatory budgeting coalition project from Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen identified and selected Implications for Project Teams core coalition team members for their respective country Supporting regional coalitions to promote budget transparency to coalitions. Organized and implemented by Partners Jordan, the initiate pilot projects may complement rather than adopt country- regional training program for coalition members worked with 15 or sector-wide approaches in certain contexts. participants from the core coalition team of each country on cooperative planning, advocacy skills, and best practices in draft- Reference ing local government budgets. For more information please contact Noor Zada at Partners Jordan (mediation@partners-jordan.org). • Coalition members organized focus groups in these countries with respective groups of local government officials, national- level government officials, and members of the economic and financial committees of parliaments involved in drafting the budget. • In addition to developing training materials, Partners-Jordan organized “awareness workshops” that introduced the concept of participatory budgeting, how budgets are planned and alloca- tions determined, and trained attendees on how to participate in drafting the government budget. • Coalition members in Jordan, Yemen, and Lebanon conducted quantitative field research in selected municipalities to assess needs and rank community priorities. The results were published A–111 Country: Multi-Country (80 countries) Sectors: Environment; Health; Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Implementing Organizations: AccessInfo Europe; Centre for Law and Democracy; International Budget Partnership Areas of Engagement: Budget Advocacy; Budget Analysis; Budget Disclosure A1.93. Engaging in a Cross-Country Exercise to Demand Budget Information Context Results The “Ask Your Government!” initiative began in January 2010, when • Documentation of the availability of budget information on Multi-Country 100 civil society organizations (CSOs) launched an ambitious effort to thematic issues gathered. Responses to the questions posed document public access to budget information in 80 countries. The by the campaign provided a wealth of information on maternal goal of this campaign was to showcase the real-life experiences of health, the environment, and foreign aid. citizens going through the process of requesting budget information • Documentation of processes for dealing with public informa- from their governments and to offer concrete evidence on the prob- tion requests. This includes the different kinds of responses to lems they face in accessing it. The initiative was jointly coordinated the requests, how long it took to respond, and which countries by the International Budget Partnership (IBP), Access Info Europe or groups of countries, performed better or worse in terms of (AIE), and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), and involved openness. international and local CSOs in 80 countries. – Only one country—New Zealand—substantively answered all six requests by providing budget information that clearly Actions (January-September 2010) answered the questions posed. Requests to the New • The “Ask Your Government!” partners identified six specific Zealand government only had to be submitted once, and pieces of budget information that relate to established inter- the responses were provided promptly and in a succinct and national development commitments on maternal health, the easy-to-understand format. environment, and foreign aid. In order to guide local partners – An additional 22 countries offered official answers to all six through the process of formally submitting information requests information requests but with varying degrees of compre- for each question to the responsible government agencies, IBP, hensiveness (e.g., India, South Africa, Germany, and Serbia). AIE, and CLD designed a protocol based on international best – In the majority of countries (46), government agencies practices and established standards regarding the right to answered some questions but failed to provide any answer access public information. This protocol provided options for to at least one of the questions posed. procedures in countries with and without access to information – In 11 countries, government agencies did not respond to laws as well as guidelines for following up on each request and any of the six information requests: Algeria, Bangladesh, keeping detailed records of the process and experience for each Cameroon, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, participating organization.  Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and Yemen. These included • One local organization in each country assumed the responsibil- cases in which access to budget information was explicitly ity for submitting and following up on the information requests denied as well as requests that were simply ignored. with the respective government. Over a course of three-and-a- Implications for Project Teams half months, governments were given as many as three oppor- Developing functional protocols and procedures for countries to tunities to respond to the information requests from citizens, facilitate requests for budget information can increase access to which were submitted through letters, phone calls, and visits to budget information. government offices. • Once the results of a total of 1,061 requests for information were References compiled, IBP, CLD, and AIE jointly produced a comparative anal- Website for Ask Your Government Campaign: http://internationalbudget.org/ ysis of the results of this exercise. IBP produced an “Ask Your what-we-do/major-ibp-initiatives/international-advocacy/ask-your-government. Government!” radio series, which documented the experiences Tools: of local researchers as they repeatedly requested budget infor- Request for Information Protocols: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/ mation from the government. Because the six questions also uploads/Ask-Your-Government-Request-Protocol.pdf. referred to issues linked with Millennium Development Goals Model Information Requests: http://www.access-info.org/documents/6QC/6QC_ (MDG) 5—on improving maternal health, 7—on ensuring environ- Sample_Requests.pdf. mental sustainability, and 8—on developing a global partnership for development, the coalition also created a petition to demand that governments that were going to attend the 2010 MDG sum- mit adopt requirements for greater budget transparency. A–112 Country: Multi-Country Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: Parliamentary Strengthening Program Areas of Engagement: Capacity Building; Legislatures A1.94. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight and Government Accountability Over Budgets Context Actions (1993–present) Multi-Country Parliaments are typically entrusted with ensuring that public funds The budget is a forecast of revenue and planned expenditures. A pre- are properly used and spent in the public interest, yet in many leg- condition to constructive participation by citizens and parliaments in islatures, budget research capacity is negligible or nonexistent. the budget process is the availability of independent budgetary anal- Oversight by parliaments and other accountability institutions can ysis of both budget estimates and appropriations. The World Bank help guarantee that the decisions and actions of governments stay Institute (WBI) enhances the capacity of PBOs globally as part of its within the bounds of the law, thereby strengthening open and trans- broader open budgeting programming aimed at empowering par- parent democracies. A challenge to effective oversight is the lack liaments to promote open budgeting processes through enhanced of credible, timely, nonpartisan analysis that can be used by par- participation, transparency, and demand for accountability. PBO liamentary committees to hold government officials accountable. capacity is strengthened using a number of interrelated tools and A growing number of legislatures are exploring the idea of setting strategies, including: up independent nonpartisan parliamentary budget offices (PBO) to provide independent policy analysis on budget documents, fiscal • The Global Network of Parliamentary Budget Offices (GN-PBO) is policy, and financial implications of proposals in to assist parliaments a global community of practice consisting of officers and staff of in constructively engaging in the budget process. When made pub- PBOs. It provides a platform for PBO practitioners to convene lic, the nonpartisan analysis provided by PBOs can also benefit other (virtually and face-to-face) to share experiences, identify best demand-side actors, including civil society. In addition, the nonparti- practices, and enhance technical capacities. The community san analysis has the potential to strengthen government reform pro- members provide ongoing peer assistance on an ad hoc basis. posals and the national budget by providing additional data points • Technical training opportunities are provided to PBO practitio- in the debate and verifying government assumptions made during ners and parliamentary staff through face-to-face clinic training policy formulation. and online modules delivered through the e-Institute portal on a periodic basis. Collectively, PBOs and fiscal councils are considered independent • WBI collaborates closely with the Organization for Economic fiscal institutions. PBOs are similar to fiscal councils in that they Cooperation and Development (OECD) and GN-PBO to design independently scrutinize fiscal policy but are distinct in that their applied research processes aimed at capturing practice and principals are parliaments. The primary end user of their analyses experience. This informs good practice guidelines and pedagogic are parliaments and civil society, and there is a greater emphasis on and training materials used for structured learning activities. In analyses relevant to parliamentary functions, such as contributing to addition, WBI is collaborating with the Office of the Canadian the estimating process through economic and fiscal forecasting, bud- Parliamentary Budget Officer in order to develop the content get analysis, and costing proposals and bills. The first such office was of the global e-PBO portal, an interactive virtual knowledge plat- established in the State of California in 1941, three decades before the form for parliamentary budget analysts. United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1974. While the CBO is the largest of its kind, such offices also exist in the Philippines, Results (achieved and anticipated) Mexico, Dominican Republic, Uganda, and South Korea. More recently • Enhanced parliamentary capacity to engage in the budget pro- Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa, Austria, Seychelles, and Australia cess. By establishing and working with PBOs and parliamentary have established PBOs and many other jurisdictions at the national audit committees, WBI aims to enhance the capacity of par- and subnational level are considering doing the same. Fiscal councils liaments to play constructive roles during the formulation of exist in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, France, Sweden, and national budgets and to oversee the implementation of projects Finland. funded under national budgets. (continued) A–113 (continued) • Strengthened ability of parliaments to use knowledge. By Implications for Project Teams delivering targeted training to members of parliaments and their Although their experience is predominantly working with fiscal staffs, including facilitating demand-driven action planning pro- councils, the International Monetary Fund has been promoting the cesses, WBI aims to strengthen their ability to use the data and establishment of independent fiscal institutions, including PBOs, in technical knowledge that is at their disposal, and thereby bolster client countries. The WBG has supported the establishment of these Multi-Country the effectiveness of specific oversight committees. organizations as well. To best provide capacity support to emerging • Preliminary evidence of uptake of PBOs in few countries. There and nascent institutions, it is important for WBG operations to link is a strong trend toward the establishment of PBOs in develop- local institutions with regional and international experience in order ing countries. The primary drivers for this institutional reform are to overcome the inherent challenges of establishing a nonpartisan parliaments seeking access to nonpartisan analysis to enhance institution embedded in a political environment. their role as independent actors in national budget processes. Over 15 countries have implemented these reforms in the last 10 Reference years. There is a growing trend for these institutions to be estab- Website for Parliamentary Strengthening Program: http://moodle. lished in Africa and Asia, but parliaments in Latin America are also parliamentarystrengthening.org. beginning to explore hybrid models. A–114 Country: Multi-Country (Armenia; Azerbaijan, Belarus; Brazil; Bulgaria; Guatemala; Kenya; Kiribati; Kygryz Republic; Latvia; Moldova; Paraguay; Peru; Poland; Romania; Serbia; Solomon Islands; Tajikistan; Togo; Uganda; Ukraine) Sector: Public Administration, Law, and Justice Level: National Name of Project: BOOST Budget Analysis and Transparency Areas of Engagement: Budget Analysis; Disclosure; Capacity Building; Dissemination A1.95. Giving a BOOST to Budget Analysis and Country Capacity for Budget Transparency Context • Support provided to annual budget cycle and public expen- Multi-Country Launched in 2010, the BOOST initiative is a World Bank-wide col- diture reviews. BOOST databases are being developed in coun- laborative effort to facilitate access to budget data and to promote tries where the client agrees to use the data actively to support its effective use to improve decision-making processes, transparency, the annual budget cycle, public expenditure analytics, or both. and accountability. Engagements with client on BOOST activities BOOST databases provide updated expenditure datasets that have been launched in approximately 40 countries. BOOST data- support a series of programmatic public expenditure reviews bases collect, compile, and present detailed information on public that are integrated into the short- and medium-term expenditure expenditures from national treasury systems in a simple, user-friendly dialog. format. BOOST is constructed to support budget analysis and deci- • Expansion of BOOST program to all regions. By mid-2013, sion making within the government, but it also has the potential to engagements with client countries had been launched in some be a powerful tool for building open budgets by making budget 40 countries, with databases in about 20 countries delivered in data accessible to key users in a consistent and readily-understood support of Bank analytical work. The initial focus of the BOOST framework. This provides a key asset for improving budget alloca- program has been on Europe and Central Asia as well as Latin tions toward priority areas and seeking efficiency savings in order America, while scale-up of BOOST activities in Africa and other to reduce budget deficits. BOOST also helps enhance accountability, regions are expected in the next couple of years. Once databases regardless whether it is used by the executive in improving the qual- are delivered, if a government agrees, these may be posted on ity and clarity of budget planning and preparation, by the legisla- the government’s own public data portal, or on the Open Budget ture, or by civil society organizations more interested in holding the portal, which the Bank will be launching in October 2013. With executive to account for budget performance and service delivery. a view to sustain BOOST databases, the World Bank intends to expand BOOST trainings to government officials and civil society, Actions (2011–15) showcasing that superior policy advice can be generated when • A typical database contains the approved and revised budgets detailed data is placed in the hands of policy analysts. as well as on actual expenditure amounts broken down by government level (central or local); administrative unit (ministry, Implications for Project Teams department, agency, university, hospital, or school); subnational BOOST is an excellent tool to facilitate the provision of budget data spending unit (district, municipality, town, or village); economic in formats that can be used for analysis by a wide audience. It is classification (e.g., wages, goods and services, or capital expense); a tool that both projects supporting Public Financial Management functional classification (sector and subsector); program classifi- reform and projects that support civil society efforts to monitor cation (if program-based budgeting is being used); and financing expenditures should consider integrating to increase the transpar- source (e.g., budget revenue, aid, domestic, or foreign borrowing). ency of budget data and help its dissemination. • Once constructed, BOOST provides a significant opportunity for government officials to have easier access to budget data and References gives civil society the means to participate in monitoring public Country Examples and Websites: Kenya: http://www.opendata.go.ke. spending. To this end, web-based applications are developed, Moldova: http://data.gov.md/data/?did=107. allowing citizens easy access to public data that supports advo- Togo: http://www.togoreforme.com/fr. cacy efforts or participation in public budgeting. World Bank’s BOOST Website: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ Results EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:23150652~ • High-quality and disaggregated budget data made available pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:286305,00.html to policymakers. BOOST provides policymakers with the infor- mation necessary to how well—or poorly—spending units and regions are performing with available resources. For example, BOOST was used to prompt debate on primary-education spend- ing efficiency in Poland and Moldova with significant variations in outcome and spending patterns across municipalities. Results from BOOST served as the starting point for an analysis of the underlying causes of the outcomes. A–115  dditional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Annex 2. A Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms In addition to projects currently under implementation, this list also includes projects that have ended but for which results were unclear because they were solely based on desk-based research. This type of project is denoted by an asterisk (*). Government-led and/or World Bank-supported initiatives CSO-led initiatives Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities AFRICA 1 Kenya National Public Budgeting for International In June 2012, International Budget Partnership and Administration, Land Reforms: Budget Hakijamii produced a report on Kenya’s land reform and Law and Justice Ensuring People’s Partnership andbudget allocations to provide information about civil Participation Hakijamii society organizations (CSOs) working on land issues to relevant committees (department committee on lands and natural resources and the budget committee) in par- liament during the fiscal 2012 budget process. This report contains analysis of the budget for fiscal 2012–13 and the medium-term expenditure framework to ascertain whether the government has set aside or is planning to set aside the requisite funds to implement land reforms as envisaged by the Kenyan constitution. They have also provided recommendations for parliament and the executive branch. 2 Mali Provincial Health Monitoring the Coalition des As a continuation of its work on monitoring the alloca- Allocation and Alternatives tion and use of debt relief funds for health, Coalition des Use of Debt Africaines Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement–Mali is Relief Funds for Dette et the process of: Health Développement— • Undertaking an exhaustive study on the impact of the Mali budget on the Koulikoro region’s midwife workforce in order to understand the relationships between current budget allocations and the distribution of midwives, the condition of health infrastructure, and health personnel training. Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement–Mali will broadly disseminate the findings of the study among its partners, the government, donors, and members of parliament. • Building the capacity of local monitoring committees to engage in budget analysis and advocacy through a series of workshops with the national and regional staff of Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement–Mali, the Independent Budget Partnership and its advocacy partners. • Planning to lead a broad advocacy campaign to allo- cate greater resources to the Koulikoro region. (continued) A–117 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 3 Mozambique Local Public Working Centro de As a follow up to the results of its earlier efforts to Administration, with Local Integridade implement a local government monitoring project in six Law and Justice Communities Pública. The districts and uncovering the disconnect between the to Track Center for Public stated goals of district development plans and the actual Expenditures Integrity budget of local governments, the Center for Public Integrity is in the process of: • Renewing and expanding its local government moni- toring program. It will work in 30 districts in 9 prov- inces across Mozambique, training citizens to conduct expenditure tracking at the community level. It will compile and analyze data collected by the community monitors, comparing it to national- and local-level development plans. This method of analysis seeks to create linkages between budget processes at the national, provincial, and district level by tracking the flow of resources at all levels of government and then auditing their execution. 4 Madagascar National, Public Adopting a The World The objective of this Public Management Capacity Provincial Administration, Comprehensive Bank and the Building Project was to support the Ministry of Finance Law and Justice Approach Government of and budget and the Ministry of Economy and Planning, to Budget Madagascar which were charged with budget preparation, implemen- Transparency tation, and monitoring. To date this project has: for Better • Helped implement budget reforms at the central and Governance regional levels through the Ministry of Finance and Budget. These reforms provide an accurate picture of how resources were actually spent and included ways to achieve better budget formulation and improved expenditure controls. • Supported the efforts of the Ministry of Economy and Planning’s Directorate for Public Investment to improve sectoral policy design, expenditure manage- ment, and implementation of the public investment and public expenditure programs; the public expen- diture programs were designed to ensure consistency between sector strategies and multiyear consolidated public expenditure programs. (continued) A–118 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 5 Nigeria Provincial Public Monitoring The World The Economic Management and Capacity Building Administration, Public Bank and the (EMCAP) project includes the following activities: Law and Justice Expenditure and Government of • The project works to improve and monitor public Dissemination Nigeria expenditures by strengthening the prioritization, of Fiscal allocation, and monitoring of public expenditures. Information Technical assistance to the national planning commis- to Strengthen sion and the budget office formed the basis for an Economic annual public expenditure review exercise, which will Governance be tied to the budget cycle within the context of a rolling three-year public investment program and a medium-term expenditure framework. • The technical assistance supports oversight institu- tions to promote transparency and accountability in the public sector, including the dissemination of data on fiscal operations. It provided assistance in the areas of accounting, internal and external auditing, and budget monitoring activities of the national assembly. • The technical assistance will review procurement practices at the federal and state level (including some government-sponsored enterprises) as well as financial accountability systems (i.e., the state of accounting and audit practices). 6 Uganda National Public Building the Advocates Through its Citizens Budget Tracking and Information Administration, Demand Side Coalition for Centre, Advocates Coalition for Development and Law and Justice of Budget Development Environment is working to build the demand side of Accountability and budget accountability so that citizens are mobilized by Mobilizing Environment around budget issues with access to appropriate Citizens information and analyses on government revenues and resource allocation and utilization. The principal activi- ties of Citizens Budget Tracking and Information Centre include: • Producing budget information and assisting other CSOs in conducting budget tracking and generating information about their communities and sectors. • Conducting sectoral Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys and Quantitative Service Delivery Studies in health, education, the environment, roads, and agriculture. • Working with mass membership organizations (e.g., businesses and farmers), other CSOs, the media, and information and communications technology profes- sionals to increase awareness of budget information in Uganda. 7 Zimbabwe* National Public Institutional Center for Implemented between 1999 and 2008, this project Administration, Strengthening of International aimed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Law and Justice Parliament Development; Zimbabwean parliament. Its activities included: State University • Provision of technical assistance in analyzing the bud- of New York get to the various portfolio committees. • Dissemination of budget information to members of parliament through workshops, special sessions in committees, and face-to-face sessions. • Conduct research on the adequacy of the budget and provide recommendations to members of parliament about how to prioritize activities within ministries, given the limited resources available. (continued) A–119 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities East Asia and the Pacific 8 Cambodia National Public Raising NGO Forum The NGO Forum’s Development Issues Program launched Administration, Awareness of the National Budget Project in late 2006. Its activities are Law and Justice Budget Issues comprised of the following: • It has established a website to gather, consolidate, and disseminate all publicly-available budget informa- tion that had been scattered across different libraries, ministries, and websites of government institutions involved in the budgeting process. • It is coordinating a media strategy to raise awareness about budgeting issues. For instance, it organized several radio talk shows in 2010 to discuss agricultural financing and services. 9 Philippines National Public Citizen Philippines The project aims to increase transparency, accountability, Administration, Participatory Commission on and citizen participation in the audit process by working Law and Justice Audit Project Audit, Affiliated with individual citizens, CSOs, the private sector, and Network for Social the media to conduct value-for-money or performance Accountability in audits of selected government programs. East Asia and the Pacific and the Australian Agency for International Development 10 Philippines International Public Collaborating The Reality of Aid The Reality of Aid Network is the only major North- Administration, with North/ South international nongovernmental initiative focusing Law and Justice South Networks exclusively on analysis and lobbying for poverty eradica- to Reform Aid tion policies and practices in the international aid regime. Policies and Its activities are comprised of: Practices • Publishing the biennial “Reality of Aid” thematic report, “Reality of Aid” regional reports, and the Reality Check newsletter. • Facilitating the country level implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action through CSO capacity building, multistakeholder dialogue, and promotion of good practices. • Commissioning case studies and research initiatives to document CSO involvement in aid policy reforms. Eastern Europe and Central Asia 11 Azerbaijan National Public Monitoring The National Established in 2003, the Public Finance Monitoring Administration, Public Finances Budget Group’s Center engages in the following activities: Law and Justice Public Finance • Monitoring of oil revenues and financial activities of Monitoring Center state-run enterprises. • Issuing quarterly information on the national budget. • Organizing policy roundtables and dialogues. (continued) A–120 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 12 Croatia* Local Public Measuring Institute of Public In 2010, in order to assess and measure different aspects Administration, Budget Finance of subnational budget transparency in Croatia, the Law and Justice Transparency Institute of Public Finance examined the budget pro- and Openness cesses and systems of the 33 largest cities in the country. of Budget • It developed the Croation Open Local Budget Index Processes at the by adapting the Independent Budget Partnership Local Level Open Budget Index to the local context. This mea- sured the quantity and quality of publicly-available local budget information and the extent to which local budget processes are open to the public. • The project’s findings were released in June 2011 and an award was presented to the mayor of the city with the highest combined Croation Open Local Budget Index score. The study also received widespread media coverage in local and national newspapers, on radio programs, and on online news sources. 13 Romania National Public Strengthening The World Bank In addition to other sectors, the World Bank’s Romania Administration, Public Financial and Government Development Loan (DPL) aimed to support the gov- Law and Justice Management of Romania ernment’s reforms in cross-sector Public Financial To Strengthen Management (PFM) and PFM in the health and education Budgets in Post- sectors. Financial Crisis • The DPL supported fiscal consolidation through better Phase management of the budget, and its actions anchored the budget within the medium-term expenditure framework, set binding constraints on the composi- tion of expenditures, limited deviations from the par- liament-approved budget, and set in motion multiyear management of investments. It also enhanced skills and competencies in public administration through a more transparent and fair unitary pay system. • The DPL supported PFM reform in the education sector. Through the DPL, the government introduced per-student financing, which will offer incentives to local governments managing pre-university education toward school and staff rationalization and consolida- tion, and it will allow a reallocation of resources to priority programs to enhance the quality of education. Latin America and the Caribbean 14 Dominican National Public Working with Independent In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership’s Mentoring Republic* Administration, the Ministry Budget Government Program undertook the following activities: Law and Justice of Finance and Partnership • It mentored the Ministry of Finance in designing the Supreme Audit Fiscal Transparency Portal and organizing a consulta- Institution to tion process with potential users in order to improve Improve Budget its content, format, and accessibility. Transparency • Produced and disseminated a draft of the citizen version of the 2010 audit report to public officials in collaboration with the Cámara de Cuentas. • Organized a Social Audit workshop in collaboration with the Cámara de Cuentas to train public servants, members of CSOs, and members of the media on dif- ferent issues regarding social audits. • Shared a proposal with the government and CSO partners to conduct a social audit pilot in collabora- tion with CSOs and Cámara de Cuentas. (continued) A–121 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 15 Ecuador National Health Helping to Fundación • As a follow-up to its monitoring of El Salvador’s Eliminate Maquilishuatl healthcare program, Fundación Maquilishuatl will Health Service continue to monitor the healthcare system through User-Fees in El policy analysis and social audits to ensure that these Salvador reforms become a reality—not only on paper but also in practice. • Fundación Maquilishuatl is in the process of incorpo- rating new budget analysis and expenditure-tracking techniques into their existing community-level health policy monitoring programs and will advocate for reforms that will regulate prescription drug prices in the public sector. Such reforms would help control high out-of-pocket healthcare expenses and would ensure that all Salvadorans have continued access to healthcare, regardless of income. 16 El Salvador National Public Helping to Make National • The National Foundation for Development is currently Administration, El Salvador More Foundation for working with the administrators of the FISDL (Social Law and Justice Transparent Development Investment Fund for Local Development) program to strengthen the capacity of local councils to monitor contracts, the execution of projects, and the disburse- ment of conditional cash transfers in their districts; it also facilitate the flow of information between the councils and policymakers at the national level. • The National Foundation for Development is piloting technical training and capacity-building exercises with councils in six highly marginalized municipalities. These activities will be scaled up to include additional dis- tricts, and the National Foundation for Development will implement its subnational plans in the context of a broader national-level strategy to promote citizen engagement with and oversight of government institutions. 17 Honduras* National Public Working with Independent • In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership’s Mentoring Administration, Government and Budget Government Program prepared a first draft of the Law and Justice Civil Society to Partnership Citizens Budget that was shared with public officials Produce Citizens of the ministries of the presidency and finance for Budgets comments. The Ministry of Finance used this draft to produce two versions of the Citizens Budget (a Word document and a PowerPoint presentation) that were published on its website. • The program organized a two-day consultation work- shop to provide technical assistance to CSOs and the media on preparing the Citizens Budget for 2012. • The program organized a high level workshop on budget transparency to communicate the importance of budget transparency, access to information, and public participation from an international perspective; introduce the Open Budget Index methodology and review the results of Honduras’s 2010 Open Budget Index score; review the contents and main features of a Citizens Budget; and introduce the methodology of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment. (continued) A–122 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 18 Nicaragua* National Public Nicaraguan Center for Between 1997 and 2000, the Center for International Administration, Legislative International Development, State University of New York sought Law and Justice Strengthening Development. to enhance the capacity of the Nicaraguan National Project State University Assembly (NNA) to enact legislation, provide oversight of New York of the national budget, and build mutually-accepted channels for citizen input into national legislation and debate. Program activities included the following: • Technical assistance was provided to the budget analysis office and the local government affairs committee. • The Center for International Development, State University of New York upgraded the infrastruc- ture used by the NNA with the installation of new electrical and fiber-optic cabling for its computer system. Deputies and staff were trained in the use of computer applications and software. A new, state of the art computer network was provided for the NNA. Staff members were trained in the use of the new legislative information system. • An upgraded website was developed that received 35,000 visitors in the first six months of its operation. 19 Paraguay Local Public Working with Federación A national nongovernmental organization (NGO), one of Administration, Neighborhood de Entidades Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay’s key Law and Justice Associations to Vecinalistas del activities is monitoring the Special Projects Fund that Monitor “Special Paraguay supports the building of community infrastructure and Project” Funds generates employment using the money that it receives from the real estate tax (currently about 10 percent). Its activities include: • Training members from neighborhood associations on their legal rights under municipal law on the city’s special project fund and on topics such as information access, project development, accountability, transpar- ency, and effective mechanisms that promote effec- tive citizen oversight. • Working with Radio Viva 90.1 FM to produce short radio spots in Spanish and Guarani that explain how the special project fund works. • Establishing a special project fund information and complaint hotline for the public to get more informa- tion about the fund or to lodge complaints. • Establishing a committee that included representa- tives from neighborhood associations, Asociación Trinidad, Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay and the Municipality of Asuncion to monitor the efficiency and transparency with which the fund is implemented by the municipality and the neighbor- hood commissions. (continued) A–123 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 20 Peru* Provincial Public Measuring Grupo Since 2003, Grupo Presupuesta Ciudadana has been Administration, Subnational Presupuesta engaged in monitoring the fiscal decentralization pro- Law and Justice Budget Ciudadana cess. As part of this work, Grupo Presupuesta Ciudadana Transparency, and some of its partner organizations undertook activi- Participation, ties to monitor and evaluate regional budget transpar- and ency and accountability mechanisms. Their activities Accountability included: • Preparing a research study that involved an evaluation of regional transparency portals provided between 2007 and 2009 by all of Peru’s regional governments as well as and a detailed assessment of the budget management practices and processes of three regional governments through case studies. • Organizing a number of public events to share the results of the study and disseminating the information through newspapers, radio programs, and online news sources at both the regional and national level. 21 Uruguay Local Public Mobilizing Rural Agencia de This project aims to strengthen farmers’ participation Administration, Community Desarrollo through the development and strengthening of com- Law and Justice Members to Productivo munity councils “mesas zonales” to increase transpar- Engage in the Consejo ency and participation of rural community members in Participatory Económico the participatory budgeting process. It is the process of Budgeting Social implementing the following activities: Process • Providing training and technical assistance to mesa zonales to strengthen them and to help them under- stand their rights and solicit funds from the local government for projects prioritized and development by the community. • Mobilizing rural community members to meet, plan, and negotiate solutions to address community issues through the establishment of mesas zonales. • Assisting mesas zonales to manage subgrant funds to support activities that they have identified to address health, education, infrastructure maintenance, and other needs. • Facilitating the replication of this model to engage citizens at various stages of budget implementation in other parts of Uruguay. Middle East and North Africa 22 Egypt National Public Budget The Egyptian Initiated in January 2013, the Egyptian Center for Administration, Monitoring Center for Economic and Social Rights Budget Monitoring and Law and Justice and Advocacy Economic and Advocacy initiative seeks to advance public access of Initiative Social Rights budget information in Egypt and call for an accountable and transparent budget system. It will be comprised of the following: • Publication of simplified handbooks focused on spe- cific budget topics. • Publication of research papers on health budget allo- cations and other topics. • Organization of an “Egypt Group for Budget Monitoring.” • Organization of an “Arab Network Group for Budget Monitoring.” (continued) A–124 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 23 Egypt and National Public Working to Independent The Independent Budget Partnership’s work in Egypt Tunisia Administration, create a national Budget and Tunisia seeks to create a national multistakeholder Law and Justice multistakeholder Partnership platform for access to information and budget transpar- platform for ency. This network would potentially include high-level access to officials of the Ministry of Finance as well as CSOs. information • In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership, with the and budget Ministry of Finance, organized a two-day workshop transparency on budget transparency and the Open Budget Index methodology. 24 Jordan National Public Enhancing Partners Jordan Begun in November 2012, this project aims to enhance Administration, Opportunities opportunities for public participation in the budget- Law and Justice for Public ing process and to improve public access to timely and Participation accurate information in municipal budgets and expendi- in the Budget tures in six municipalities. Its activities consist of: Process • Organizing three awareness-raising trainings to intro- duce participatory approaches in preparing municipal budgets. • Preparing needs assessments and priority rankings in conjunction with municipality members. • Organizing consultation meetings with municipal offi- cials to incorporate community priorities into the 2014 budget. • Organizing a conference on lessons learned that involves all stakeholders engaged in the project. It will focus on evaluating the project, highlighting successes and best practices, and identifying difficulties and resolution strategies. 25 Lebanon National Public Using Budgets Lebanese Physical Founded in 1981, the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Administration, to Promote Handicapped Union designs its intervention with civil society partici- Law and Justice the Interests of Union pation and transparency in mind, aiming for budgets Minority Groups that are inclusive of the interests of minority groups in Lebanon. Its activities include: • Empowering potential partners to become capable and knowledgeable of budget-related issues and processes in order to influence the budget process. • Collaborating with stakeholders in the Ministry of Finance, local and international economic and financial experts, and development agencies and networking to learn from relevant best practices that have been undertaken in other countries. • Collecting data about the budget process and explor- ing the relevant political economic circumstances surrounding this process. • Exploring possible entry points for intervening in the process of each annual budget. • Organizing national awareness campaigns to introduce the perspective of the project and to promote the concept of transparency, inclusion, and diversity at the budgetary level within the Lebanese society (continued) A–125 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities Others 26 Canada National Public Alternative Green Budget The Green Budget Coalition is comprised of 21 of Administration, Green Budgets Coalition Canada’s leading environmental and conservation organi- Law and Justice zations and, since 1999, has made annual budget recom- mendations regarding ecological fiscal reform. SOUTH ASIA 27 Afghanistan Provincial Public Integrity Watch Integrity Watch Launched as a pilot in 2011, this program aims to train Administration, Afghanistan Pilot Afghanistan local monitors in basic budget literacy and then support Law and Justice Budget Tracking them to track the implementation of the set budgets in Program the health and education sectors at the local level. Its ongoing activities include the following: • Selecting districts and developing a budget literacy training material. • Mobilizing communities and conducting budget literacy trainings. • Facilitating community-based budget monitoring activities. • Gathering feedback on this process through personal testimonies and learning workshops. 28 Afghanistan* National Public Working with Center for Beginning in 2010, the Afghanistan Parliamentary Administration, Parliaments to International Assistance Program project aimed to strengthen the Law and Justice Improve Budget Development. budget oversight capacity of Afghanistan’s legislature. Its Oversight State University activities included the following: of New York • Assisting all 29 legislative committees with law draft- ing, bill reviews, and the exercise of their oversight functions. • Providing in-depth analysis of the executive budget and expenditures. • Providing assistance to the Department of Information and Public Relations and developing outreach to citizens, CSOs, and the international com- munity. This team also publishes the APAP Newsletter, a valuable English language resource. • Assisting parliament in improving rules of procedure, staffing and human resource structures, and support services. • Providing training to ministers of parliament and staff on the skills necessary for the efficient operation of all legislatures. 29 India National, Local Public PAISA: Planning, Accountability PAISA is Accountability Initiative’s flagship project that Administration, Allocations and Initiative works to develop innovative models to track social sec- Law, and Justice; Expenditures, tor programs by developing practical, scalable, people- Education Institutions: friendly tools and using them to collect data on fund Studies in flows, expenditures, and implementation processes. Accountability PAISA’s key activities include: • The production of annual district-level and national-level reports on fund flows and program impleåmentation. • The capacity-building program involved a year-long course offered to individuals selected from PAISA states to assist in the design and implementation of PAISA and PAISA-like efforts. • PAISA aims to disseminate data collected in an easy- to-use, accessible format at the district, block, and village level. (continued) A–126 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities 30 Nepal National, Public Using Public The World Bank The Program for Accountability in Nepal supports social Provincial, Administration, Financial accountability activities in three focal areas: (1) Public Local Law and Justice Management to Financial Management; (2) municipal governance; and (3) Improve Social public service delivery. Its activities include: Accountability Public financial management • Conducting independent budget analysis (by CSOs, think tanks, research institutes, and the like) • Demystifying and disseminating budget information and raising levels of public awareness and budget literacy. • Facilitating participatory expenditure tracking. Municipal governance • Forming civic unions to interface with municipal authorities and establishing social contracts between municipal authorities and citizens. • Creating mechanisms for regular dialogue between citizens and municipal governments and for enhanced municipal transparency and downward accountability. • Promoting participatory municipal planning and budgeting. Public services • Promoting community management and the use of community scorecards as well as other participa- tory monitoring and evaluation methods to monitor services. • Encouraging the public posting of entitlements and fees by service providers. • Promoting the use of citizen charters and social audits. • Introducing effective mechanisms for complaints. 31 Nepal Local Water and Using Budget Federation of Since April 2005, FEDWASUN coordinating with Sanitation Tracking to Drinking Water WaterAid Nepal has been implementing the Citizens’ Improver and Sanitation Action Program in several districts to improve water and Governance Users sanitation governance through citizen action and budget in the Water tracking. Its key activities include: and Sanitation • Organizing status reviews of the water and sanitation Sectors situation through orientation trainings for district branch members on the legal aspects of water and sanitation governance. • Conducting a budget analysis and monitoring of allo- cations for water and sanitation. • Providing assistance to communities for participatory analysis and prioritization of governance issues on water and sanitation. • Presenting user experiences to district-level service providers through interactive workshops. • Preparing participatory action plans with representa- tives of water and sanitation user committees and service providers. • Implementing and monitoring participatory action plans in close coordination with FEDWASUN district branches. (continued) A–127 Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms Level of Implementing Country Government Sector Initiative Organization Activities Multi-Country 32 Global Multi-Country Public E-Learning World Bank World Bank Institute’s e-learning course on social Administration, Courses Institute and accountability tools focuses on the “how-to” of social Law and Justice on Social Affiliated Network accountability by introducing to civil society practitio- Accountability for Social ners some of the most commonly used tools. The course Tools Accountability, is organized into four modules that present the key SAR and AFR concepts and provide opportunities to apply and discuss the social accountability tools, including Budget Work, Participatory Budgeting, Participatory Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, and Performance Monitoring. 33 Global Multi-Country Public Media Program World Bank World Bank Institute’s media program is forging coali- Administration, Institute tions of media practitioners around priority areas Law and Justice identified by the journalists themselves, including Public Financial Management and procurement. It works with partners and media practitioners to: • Facilitate both South-South and North-South knowl- edge exchanges by serving as a space for experts and practitioners to share investigative journalism practices and strategies. • Connects media practitioners with expertise from local and global centers of excellence to work on challenges facing media sectors around Africa and the Middle East. • Run “just in time” journalism training courses on PFM and economic journalism for a core group of North and South Sudanese journalists at the request of the World Bank’s Sudan office. A–128  udget Transparency in World Bank Development Annex 3. B Policy Lending Operations Prior Action/ Country Year Project Name Benchmark Activities AFRICA 1 Burundi 2007 Economic Reform Prior Action Adoption of an emergency action plan to improve competition and transparency in Support Grant public procurement. 2 Burundi 2010 BI-ERSGIII-Dev. Prior Action Finalization of public expenditure tracking surveys with respect to the 2005 and 2006 Policy Loan DPL3 budgets in the education, health, and justice sectors, and publication of related reports in accordance with paragraph 35 of the Letter of Development Policy. 3 Central 2007 CF-Development Prior Action Ministerial order by the minister in charge of mines compelling the publication on African Policy Operation the government’s website of: (1) a summary of all mining agreements containing the Republic DPO FY07 key clauses (including financial and tax-related terms and conditions, duration, and amounts received as signature bonuses and equity shares); and (2) documents evidenc- ing the transfer of the amounts received (as bonuses or equity shares) in the public accounts as well as an indication of how the funds were used. For agreements already signed, effective publication of this information is an integral part of the prior action. 4 Central 2008 Economic Prior Action In order to strengthen its treasury operations, accounting, and reporting systems, the African Management government has adopted, by decision (arrêté) no. 515/MFB/DIR-CAB/DGTCP.08 of Republic and Governance April 2, 2008, a new chart of public accounts finalized after extensive consultations Reform Grant and workshops with stakeholders, including civil society, donors, and government officials. 5 Chad 2005 Instututional Prior Action Completion and publication of an audit for the 2002 procurement contracts and Reform Support system; continued publication of the quarterly procurement bulletin and monthly Credit publication of the report on the execution of the budget distinguishing between com- mitment, order to pay, and payment by ministry. Publication and wide dissemination of the government’s 2003 Budget law. 6 Congo 2005 Economic Prior Action Internet publication of information on management of oil resources, including the Recovery Credit audit report on the SNPC. 7 Ghana 2009 GH-EGPRC Prior Action Commencement of regular publication of comprehensive and detailed quarterly fis- (fast-track) cal outturns with no more than one quarter lag in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 49 of the Letter of Development Policy. 8 Ghana 2006 PRSC III Benchmark Improvement of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity by increasing resources available for it and the implementation of participatory M&E activities, such as expen- diture tracking surveys and Citizen Report Cards. 9 Guinea 2002 SAC IV Prior Action Implementation of a public information campaign to disseminate data on budgetary allocations for schools and primary health care centers in its fiscal 2001 Budget Law, beginning with the publication of relevant data relating to the capital city of Conakry and the administrative region of Kindia. 10 Kenya 2001 Economic & Public Prior Action Submission of a progress report on the implementation of the plan to enhance fidu- Sector Reform for Future ciary transparency involving public resources and improve the quality and timeliness of Tranche audit reports. 11 Rwanda 2010 PRSG VI Prior Action Submission, to the ministry of finance and economic planning by at least 80 percent of the agencies involved in procurement, of a procurement plan consistent with their allocated budget, and publication by the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority of at least 60 percent of such plans on its website. 12 Senegal 2009 SN-DPO fast-track Prior Action Publication on the website of the ministry of finance of monthly budget execution reports from SIGFIP, including the January, February, and March monthly reports. 13 Senegal 2006 PRSC II Benchmark Conducting participatory semiannual monitoring exercises of budget and performance at all levels of the health system and publishing their results. 14 Sierra Leone 2007 SL-GRGG (DPG) Prior Action Adoption of an implementation plan for revision of regulations in conformance with (FY07) new Government Budgeting and Accountability Act. (continued) A–129 Annex 3. Budget Transparency in World Bank Development Policy Lending Operations Prior Action/ Country Year Project Name Benchmark Activities East Asia and the Pacific 15 Cambodia 2008 DPG-1 Prior Action Fortification of decentralized procurement by strengthening the 1995 procurement subdecree and the 1998 implementing regulations to promote economy, efficiency, and transparency. 16 Papua New 2000 Governance Prior Action Publication by DFT of budget reconciliations and projections according to a schedule Guinea Promotion for Future agreed with the Bank, and the completion of additional measures to improve fiscal Adjustment Loan Tranche transparency and accountability. 17 Philippines 2007 PH-Development Benchmark Continuing implementation of procurement reforms including sustained joint inspec- Policy Loan - DPL I tion/monitoring with civil society of medicine and textbook procurement and school building construction. 18 Vietnam 2001 VIETNAM - Prior Action Improved transparency and reliability of national budgetary information by designating POVERTY REDUC. for Future the borrower’s state treasury as the agency responsible for a comprehensive manage- SUPPORT CREDIT Tranche ment information system for government expenditures and by publishing sectoral breakdowns of at least 75 percent of total government spending. Eastern Europe and Central Asia 19 Azerbaijan 2002 SAC 2 Prior Action Adoption of a governance and management framework for the oil fund, that provides for professional fund management under appropriate oversight, includes prudential investment rules and guidelines for desired risk-return combinations, and requires publication of the audited annual accounts and the 2002 Oil Fund budget. 20 Azerbaijan 2002 SAC 2 Prior Action Appointment of oil fund supervisory board with appropriate representation of parlia- ment nominated by parliament itself and of civil society. Proposed oil fund expendi- tures are subject to review and endorsement of the supervisory board. 21 Bosnia and 2004 Economic Benchmark Preparation of a framework law on fiscal responsibilities by the state ministry of Herzegovina Management SAC finance and treasury that defines fiscal management principles across levels of govern- ment in order to ensure fiduciary accountability and transparency. 22 Croatia 2002 SAL Prior Action Implementation of a program under which the government: (1) issues a resolution to require the official publication of the quarterly financial accounts (balance sheet and profit-and-loss statements) of the ten public enterprises as well as three government agencies prepared according to International Accounting Standards; (2) officially pub- lishes the accounts of ten public enterprises as well as three government agencies of Q1 2001, which are to be published before the end of Q2 2001 and then subsequently publishes the accounts for each quarter before the end of the following quarter; (3) ensures that all government purchases from these enterprises are paid for through cash mechanisms (i.e., no mutual offsets, barter, or other noncash forms of transac- tions) as of July 1, 2001; and (4) officially publishes a quarterly report on its payables to and receivables from these ten enterprises (the first quarterly report to be published shall be for the payables and receivables for Ql 2001, which is to be published before the end of Q2 2001). 23 Georgia 2006 PRSC I Prior Action Report on procurement procedures and performance published on website of State Procurement Agency (SPA), including indicators of procurement efficiency and trans- parency and modalities for monitoring progress. 24 Yugoslavia, 2003 SAC Benchmark The ministry of finance has prepared a “Citizen’s Guide to the Budget.” Fed (MONTENEGRO) Latin America and the Caribbean 25 Ecuador 2003 EC Fiscal Prior Action MEF has completed a transparency plan with three components: (1) a SIGEF-based Consolidation and system to produce monthly, timely, and reliable reports on executed expenditures Equitable Growth beginning in mid-2003 and consolidated NFPS financial statements through the gov- ernment’s website (portal) beginning in 2004; (2) an e-government system to develop public procurement; and (3) a public investment system that allows monitoring and evaluation of public investments. (continued) A–130 Annex 3. Budget Transparency in World Bank Development Policy Lending Operations Prior Action/ Country Year Project Name Benchmark Activities 26 Ecuador 2005 Second Fiscal Prior Action MEF has implemented the transparency plan satisfactorily. Outcomes include: (1) a Consolidation MEF website; (2) posting of disaggregated monthly central government expenditures and Competitive and subnational accounts; (3) posting of the external audits of 2002 fiscal accounts Growth SAL on the comptroller’s website; and (4) publication of tax and expenditure earmarks, oil subsidies, and off-budget activities in the 2005 budget law. 27 Ecuador 2003 EC Fiscal Benchmark MEF has started implementing the Fiscal Transparency, Stability, and Responsibility Consolidation and Law (FTSRL) with the issuance of the Reglamento (Executive Decree No. 121) contain- Equitable Growth ing the norms for the following key components of the law: (1) multiannual budgeting; (2) quantitative benchmarking of fiscal management; (3) public debt reduction plan; (4) investment by public enterprises; (5) management of the oil stabilization fund; and (5) fiscal transparency and citizen control. 28 El Salvador 2009 SV Public Finance Prior Action The borrower has issued regulations to enable and promote public access to fiscal and Social Sector for Future information redesigned and launched an effective fiscal transparency portal, including DPL Tranche user-friendly applications to access information. 29 El Salvador 2009 SV Public Finance Prior Action The borrower has increased the transparency and efficiency of its public procurement and Social Sector system by implementing the public procurement dissemination module MODDIV of DPL COMPRASAL in at least 172 governmental agencies and municipalities. 30 Guatemala 2006 Broad Based Prior Action Integrated financial management system (SIAF) operational in 43 central government Growth DPL entities, including congress, 20 decentralized agencies, and 46 municipalities; and fiscal transparency portal launched to enhance public access to budget data. 31 Guatemala 2009 GT Fiscal and Prior Action Under the borrower’s national transparency and anticorruption agenda, the fol- Institutional DPL I lowing actions have been implemented: (1) creation of the Vice Ministry for Fiscal Transparency and Evaluation at the ministry of finance (with responsibility for improv- ing public access to information, enhancing the regulatory framework for financial and fiscal transparency, and strengthening budgetary institutional capacity); and (b) incor- poration of mechanisms to enhance the control and transparency of regular monthly financial reporting of public trust funds in the 2009 budget submitted to congress. 32 Guyana 2006 Poverty Reduction Prior Action Improvement in the monitoring and evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy activi- and Public ties as evidenced by the issuing of the first semiannual publication of executed current Management and capital public expenditures by sector and priority poverty-related programs; Operation publication of a summary of the 2002 census; launching of household income and expenditure survey; and completion of the mapping of access to basic services. 33 Haiti 2007 Economic Prior Action Regular publishing of summaries of civil society organizations’ quarterly monitor- Governance for Future ing reports on the MEF website, through circulation to the media by transmitting to Reform Operation Tranche parliament. II 34 Haiti 2007 Economic Prior Action Establishment of adequate mechanism for monthly monitoring of government Governance resources allocated to the electricity sector as evidenced by the publication on the Reform Operation MEF website of reports presenting at least three months of data reflecting govern- II ment spending on fuel. 35 Nicaragua 2004 Nicaragua PRSC I Benchmark Approval by presidency of regulations to the municipal law establishing a methodol- ogy for participatory municipal investment planning satisfactory to IDA and KfW. 36 Nicaragua 2007 NI PRSC II Benchmark Presidency has approved regulations to the Municipal Law establishing a methodology for participatory municipal investment planning, satisfactory to IDA and KfW. 37 Peru 2003 PE-Programmatic Prior Action Policy guide issued for the implementation of an electronic government procurement Social Reform system to raise transparency and efficiency in public contracting (Supreme Decree No. Loan II 031-2002-PCM). 38 Peru 2007 REACT DPL Prior Action Following a consultation with civil society, the 2007 budget law has specified 11 priority areas for improving the quality of social sector expenditure through results-based management, and requires the establishment of physical goals for each of these prior- ity areas at the national, regional, and local level. The 2007 budget law includes a pilot on participatory monitoring of expenditures of subnational governments (continued) A–131 Annex 3. Budget Transparency in World Bank Development Policy Lending Operations Prior Action/ Country Year Project Name Benchmark Activities Middle East and North Africa 39 Egypt 2006 Financial Sector Prior Action Agreement action plan for enhancing transparency and compliance with accepted DPL standards for management of public funds including the budget process; control over revenues; consolidated government budget and accounts; cash management; and internal auditing. SOUTH ASIA 40 Afghanistan 2009 Afghanistan Prior Action The recipient has issued a presidential decree approving an amendment to the Strengthening procurement law providing for, inter alia, the reinstatement of transparency in the Institutions DPG procurement process with respect to low-value procurement. 41 Bangladesh 2007 DSC-IV Prior Action Enhancement of effectiveness and transparency of public procurement by estab- lishing a complaints mechanism for procurement, including independent review panels that meet standards stipulated in the procurement regulations; and publishing quarterly procurement management information systems results on CPTU’s website on a pilot basis, with performance indicators for key implementing agencies in the infrastructure and power sectors. 42 India 2001 KARN SAL I Prior Action Karnataka has completed the first phase of its public financial accountability and management improvement program satisfactory to the association, consisting of the establishment of a controller’s office and task force to lead the program, the post- ing of monthly financial accounts on the Internet, and commencement of treasury computerization. 43 India 2001 KARN SAL I Prior Action Karnataka has enacted the Karnataka Transparency in Procurement Act 1999, which requires all government departments to follow more transparent procurement prac- tices and the Karnataka Right to Information Act 2000, aimed at making government documents more accessible to the public. 44 India 2004 AP SAL II Prior Action Initiation with a firm timetable of the second (revised) procurement review and action plan. Initiation of recommended measures, including inter alia: strengthening of trans- parency in the bidding process, publishing of large tenders on the Internet, improving the system for handling complaints, and increasing government’s value for money in state procurement 45 India 2007 Orissa Socio- Prior Action Beginning of implementation of action plan to strengthen financial accountability, Economic DPL 2 including enhanced level of disclosure of financial information in budget documents and updated month-end accounts of rural local bodies posted on the government’s website. 46 Pakistan 2003 Sindh Structural Prior Action The Government of Sindh has increased accountability, access, and quality of educa- Adjustment Credit tion through the expansion of the role of the school management committees chaired by parents/citizens community board members to monitor teacher performance and school budget implementation; redeploying and recruiting teachers to make viable schools functional; and setting up the monitoring and evaluation cell of the Department of Education and initiated the monitoring of schools. 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