Public Disclosure Authorized 45302 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency （SERC）, P.R. Public Disclosure Authorized China Public Disclosure Authorized 国家电力监管委员会 中华人民共和国财政部 编著 世界银行 State Electricity Regulatory Commission, P.R.China Ministry of Finance, P.R. China World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized 本报告提供的行业分析与研究成果，旨在鼓励进行中国电力监管机构能力建 设和电力市场化改革的讨论和评论，为决策提供咨询参考，并向对电力行业改革 感兴趣的其他国家有关各方分发。 报告中的阐述和结论与中国政府及其下属机构、世界银行及其附属机构和执 行董事会成员或他们所代表的国家无关。中国政府和世界银行对本出版物中数据 的准确性不予保证，并且对使用它们产生的任何后果不负责任。 《中国电力监管机构能力建设》研究项目 咨询机构及主要专家名单 国际咨询机构 NERA 公司及其联合体 主咨询人 NERA 公司 联合咨询人 中国国际工程咨询公司 诺顿罗斯律师事务所 主要咨询专家 丹尼斯·克纳特 NERA 咨询公司 萨莉·亨特 NERA 咨询公司 乔恩·斯特恩 NERA 咨询公司 奥斯卡·阿尼迪罗 NERA 咨询公司 费尔南多·巴雷拉 NERA 咨询公司 理查德·麦考夫 诺顿罗斯律师事务所 刘树杰 国家发展改革委员会经济研究所 高世楫 国务院发展研究中心发展战略和区域经济部 冯 飞 国务院发展研究中心产业部 张昕竹 中国社会科学院规制与竞争研究中心 黄 峰 中国国际工程咨询公司能源项目部 陈青达 中国国际工程咨询公司 魏 玢 国家电网北京经济技术研究院 李 琼 国家电网北京经济技术研究院 赵九斤 国家电网北京经济技术研究院 中方咨询专家协调人 陈 栋 中国国际工程咨询公司国际业务部 黄洪波 中国国际工程咨询公司国际业务部 出 版 说 明 《中国电力监管机构能力建设研究》是世界银行第四期对华技术援助项目的子项 目，该项目由世界银行提供软贷款，中华人民共和国财政部（以下简称“财政部”） 负责资金管理，中国国家电力监管委员会具体组织实施。 根据财政部的要求和世界银行采购导则的有关规定，国家电力监管委员会会同财 政部和世界银行通过国际公开招标方式选定以 NERA 咨询公司为核心的咨询联合体 （联合体另两家机构分别为中国国际工程咨询公司、英国 NORTON ROSE 律师事务所） 承担该项目研究咨询工作。项目咨询服务合同于 2004 年 5 月正式生效。 在研究过程中，咨询方对中国电力行业进行了深入调研，并与中国电力监管机构、 相关政府部门和电力企业开展了研讨交流，分阶段提交了项目研究初始报告、中期报 告、最终报告初稿。国家电力监管委员会在每一个阶段组织召开相应的研讨会，对项 目研究的阶段成果进行充分讨论，提出修改意见。 作为项目工作内容的一部分，2006 年 9 月 19～20 日，国家电力监管委员会会同财 政部、世界银行在北京召开以“电力市场化改革与中国电力监管机构能力建设”为主题 的大型国际研讨会。会议初步展示了本项目的研究成果，并邀请国内外著名专家、学 者发表演讲和评论，引起政府有关部门和电力行业与会代表的广泛兴趣，取得了较好 的交流成效。国际研讨会结束后，咨询方对报告进行了修改定稿，并将最终报告提交 国家电力监管委员会。 为完整介绍项目研究成果，借鉴国外电力市场化改革及电力监管的经验，深入探 讨中国电力市场化改革及电力监管的重要问题，国家电力监管委员会、财政部和世界 银行决定共同出版该项目研究报告中英文对照本。 编 者 2007 年 2 月 目 录 致谢 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 缩略语 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 2 内容概述 ……………………………………………………………………………………4 第1章 引言 ………………………………………………………………………………12 1.1 课题研究的背景…………………………………………………………………12 1.2 中国电力监管机构能力建设需要解决的主要问题……………………………14 1.3 本报告的结构……………………………………………………………………15 第2章 电力监管的目的、地位和作用……………………………………………………16 2.1 电力监管的目的和要求……………………………………………………16 2.1.1 为什么要监管……………………………………………………………16 2.1.2 为什么要对电力行业实施专业化监管 ……………………………………17 2.2 电力监管的对象……………………………………………………………18 2.3 电力监管的三个主要内容…………………………………………………18 2.3.1 价格 …………………………………………………………………… 18 2.3.2 质量 …………………………………………………………………… 19 2.3.3 投资 …………………………………………………………………… 19 2.4 电力监管的目标和原则——平衡各方利益………………………………20 2.4.1 用户利益…………………………………………………………………20 2.4.2 公用事业投资者利益 …………………………………………………… 20 2.4.3 政府政策目标……………………………………………………………20 2.5 有效监管体系的设计——国际经验………………………………………21 2.5.1 顶层目标…………………………………………………………………21 2.5.2 独立性 ………………………………………………………………… 21 2.5.3 经费来源…………………………………………………………………22 2.5.4 中央和地方的监管权限 ………………………………………………… 23 2.5.5 监管机构的管理………………………………………………………… 23 2.5.6 监管的标准程序………………………………………………………… 23 2.5.7 监管机构的监管对象 …………………………………………………… 24 2.5.8 监管机构的主要职责 …………………………………………………… 24 2.6 监管产业范围——是否仅限于电力………………………………………24 第3章 中国电力监管职能的合理配置 …………………………………………………26 3.1 现状评述……………………………………………………………………26 3.1.1 电力体制改革工作小组 ………………………………………………… 26 3.1.2 国家发展改革委员会 …………………………………………………… 26 3.1.3 财政部 ………………………………………………………………… 27 3.1.4 省级经贸委………………………………………………………………27 3.1.5 国资委 ………………………………………………………………… 27 3.2 目前中国电力监管职能配置存在的问题…………………………………27 3.2.1 政策制定和监管职能不分 ……………………………………………… 28 3.2.2 规划审批与投资监管职责混淆……………………………………………28 3.2.3 电价监管职责配置不当 ………………………………………………… 28 3.3 相关问题的国际例证………………………………………………………29 3.3.1 监管职能横向配置的国际例证……………………………………………29 3.3.2 监管职能纵向分配的国际例证……………………………………………29 3.4 对中国电力监管职能横向配置的建议……………………………………29 3.4.1 建立专门的能源政策制定机构……………………………………………30 3.4.2 界定投资监管责任 ……………………………………………………… 30 3.4.3 逐步调整电价和成本监管职责的配置 ……………………………………30 3.4.4 协调反垄断（竞争政策）的职能分工………………………………………31 3.4.5 落实技术和质量监管责任 ……………………………………………… 31 3.5 对中国监管职权纵向分配的建议…………………………………………31 3.5.1 中国监管职权纵向分配的重要意义 ……………………………………… 31 3.5.2 对中国监管职权纵向配置的具体建议 ……………………………………32 第4章 电力行业监管的基本方法 ………………………………………………………34 4.1 价格和成本监管……………………………………………………………34 4.1.1 价格监管的目标………………………………………………………… 34 4.1.2 良好的电价制度的主要特点………………………………………………34 4.1.3 电价监管的基本方法 …………………………………………………… 35 4.1.4 总收入监管………………………………………………………………36 4.1.5 国外各环节电价及其监管 ……………………………………………… 38 4.2 质量监管……………………………………………………………………39 4.3 投资监管……………………………………………………………………40 4.3.1 发电投资监管……………………………………………………………40 4.3.2 输电和配电投资监管 …………………………………………………… 41 4.3.3 议定的投资标准和责任 ………………………………………………… 41 4.3.4 对中国现阶段系统规划和投资监管协调机制的建议 ………………………42 4.4 电力企业（运营）许可证制度……………………………………………42 4.4.1 许可证可以是简单的或详尽的……………………………………………42 4.4.2 许可证是针对具体业务的 ……………………………………………… 43 4.4.3 豁免和例外………………………………………………………………44 4.4.4 许可证的颁发、变更和吊销程序…………………………………………44 4.4.5 通用核心条款……………………………………………………………45 4.4.6 不同许可证类型的专用条款………………………………………………46 4.5 对国有电力企业的监管……………………………………………………47 4.5.1 监管国有企业的困难所在 ……………………………………………… 47 4.5.2 监管国有电力企业的特殊方法……………………………………………48 第5章 竞争性电力市场的建立与监管 …………………………………………………50 5.1 电力体制的几种模式………………………………………………………50 5.1.1 模式 1——垂直一体化垄断………………………………………………51 5.1.2 模式 2——单一购买者……………………………………………………51 5.1.3 模式 3——趸售竞争………………………………………………………52 5.1.4 模式 4——零售竞争………………………………………………………53 5.2 模式 2——单一买方中的监管问题………………………………………53 5.2.1 模式 2 中监管者的作用……………………………………………………54 5.2.2 单一购买者模式下的电网公司……………………………………………54 5.2.3 单一购买者模式下的发电采购……………………………………………55 5.2.4 单一购买模式中的调度问题………………………………………………55 5.3 模式 3——趸售竞争中的监管问题………………………………………56 5.3.1 模式 3 中监管者的作用 ……………………………………………… 56 5.3.2 监管交易安排（市场规则）………………………………………………58 5.3.3 促进发电市场的竞争 …………………………………………………… 58 5.3.4 模式 3 中的“容量支付”…………………………………………………59 5.4 供需平衡的责任……………………………………………………………62 5.4.1 模式 2 中的投资监管……………………………………………………62 5.4.2 模式 3 中的投资监管……………………………………………………63 第6章 中国电力监管机构的近期能力建设 ……………………………………………64 6.1 加快电力体制改革…………………………………………………………64 6.2 大力推进区域电力市场建设………………………………………………65 6.3 将“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”作为重点工作领域……………66 6.4 进一步构建电力监管法规体系……………………………………………66 6.5 与政府有关部门加强协作，共同开展有关监管工作……………………67 6.6 完善并落实电力监管费的征收措施………………………………………68 6.7 尽快研究建立电力监管基层组织…………………………………………68 6.8 申请授权采用特殊方法对国有电力企业实施有效监管…………………69 6.9 及时准确掌握电力企业相关信息，建立与外界进行 有效沟通和交流的机制………………………………………………… 69 6.10 加强员工培训，制定工作人员行为规范…………………………………69 附录 A 各国电力监管和监管机构情况对比……………………………………………71 A.1 案例研究 1：定价权和监管独立…………………………………………80 A.2 案例研究 2：监管权力的垂直划分——印度、美国和俄罗斯…………84 附录 B 中国电力行业现状研究…………………………………………………………94 B.1 行业概况 ………………………………………………………………… 94 B.2 改革计划 ………………………………………………………………… 98 B.3 业务拆分的进程 ………………………………………………………… 99 B.3.1 发电 ……………………………………………………………………99 B.3.2 输电 ……………………………………………………………………99 B.3.3 配电 ………………………………………………………………… 101 B.4 电价………………………………………………………………………101 B.4.1 电价现状 …………………………………………………………… 101 B.4.2 价格监管权力和程序 ………………………………………………… 103 B.5 电力行业现状……………………………………………………………104 B.6 电量交易的发展计划……………………………………………………105 B.7 目前进展…………………………………………………………………106 B.7.1 系统运行 …………………………………………………………… 106 B.7.2 电量交易 …………………………………………………………… 106 B.7.3 零售竞争 …………………………………………………………… 107 B.8 地区行业和市场安排的监管…………………………………………………107 附录 C 有效监管的主要特征…………………………………………………………109 C.1 地位和目标明确…………………………………………………………109 C.2 自治性……………………………………………………………………110 C.3 可问责性…………………………………………………………………110 C.4 参与性……………………………………………………………………110 C.5 透明度……………………………………………………………………111 C.6 可预见性…………………………………………………………………111 C.7 适当的监管能力…………………………………………………………112 参考资料 ………………………………………………………………………………… 113 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 致 谢 本报告是在史玉波先生（中国国家电力监管委员会副主席）领导下完成的。中国 国家电力监管委员会为本合作项目专门成立了工作组，该工作组由谭荣尧先生（中国 国家电力监管委员会总监）、刘宝华先生（中国国家电力监管委员会市场监管部主任）、 严晓路女士（中国国家电力监管委员会国际合作部副主任）负责。本报告由 NERA 咨 询公司的丹尼斯·克纳特、萨莉·亨特、乔恩·斯特恩以及前文所列的国内著名专家所组 成的核心咨询小组共同完成。NERA 咨询公司的奥斯卡·阿尼迪罗和费尔南多·巴雷拉也 为报告的起草提供了咨询意见。本报告的完成是我们与中国国家电力监管委员会有关 人员长期密切合作、共同研讨和修改的结果。 本报告的撰写得到了向海平先生（中国国家电力监管委员会市场监管部副主任） 的全面协助，在此，我们对他表示特别感谢。同时我们也想对吴晔女士（中国国家电 力监管委员会市场监管部助理调研员）给予我们的重要帮助表示感谢。我们同样要对 中国国家电力监管委员会国际合作部王丽芬女士、华北电力监管局熊平女士表示感谢， 她们在翻译工作和其他重要辅助工作上的不懈努力也为项目的成功作出了贡献。 中华人民共和国财政部国际司、经济建设司以及世界银行对本项目提供了大力支 持，世界银行驻中国代表处赵建平博士对本报告的撰写提出了许多有价值的意见。在 此我们表示衷心感谢。 对本项目作出贡献的还有陈群先生、常建平先生、俞燕山先生、钱锐先生、陈大 宇先生、何洋先生、赵学顺先生、汪洋先生、张渝先生、舒安杰先生、蒋德斌先生、 钟建华先生、张迪女士、孙英文女士、郏斌先生、周波先生、高楠女士、胡宁晖先生、 柴高峰先生、魏光耀先生、张粒子女士、徐涵初女士、吴晓华女士、王冬容先生、管 永生先生等，东北电力监管局、西北电力监管局及中国南方电网公司、中国电力投资 集团公司、中国华能国际电力股份公司、中国华电国际电力股份公司、华东电网公司、 华中电网公司、东北电网公司、阳光时代律师事务所对本项目给予了大力协助。在此 一并表示感谢。 ·1· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 缩 略 语 AER 澳大利亚能源监管机构 ANEEL 巴西国家电力监管机构 BETA 取代 NETA 的英国电力交易安排，现适用于英格兰、苏格兰和威尔士 BST 趸售供电价格 CERC 印度中央电力监管委员会 CNE 西班牙国家能源委员会 Distco 配电公司 DoE 美国能源部 ENRE 阿根廷国家电力监管机构 EPACT 美国能源政策法案 ETC 经济和贸易委员会（中国） FEK 俄罗斯联邦能源委员会 FERC 美国联邦能源监管委员会 FPA 美国 1935 年联邦电力法案 GNP 国民生产总值 Gridco 电网公司 GW 百万千瓦 IPP 独立发电商 kWh 千瓦时 LSE 负荷服务商 MME 巴西矿产和能源部 MO 市场运营机构 MOF 财政部（中国） ·2· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 MW 兆瓦 NARUC 美国国家公用事业监管者协会 NDRC 国家发展和改革委员会（中国） NEM 澳大利亚国家电力市场 NETA 以前用于英格兰和威尔士的新电力交易安排 NVE 挪威水资源和能源监管局 OFGEM 英国电力和天然气监管机构 PJM 对美国宾夕法尼亚、新泽西和马里兰州运行的联合电力市场的缩写 PPA 购售电合同 PRC 中华人民共和国 PSRWG 电力体制改革工作小组（中国） PUC 公用事业委员会（美国） PUHCA 公用事业控股公司法案（美国） REK 地区能源委员会（俄罗斯） RoR 收益率 RTO 地区输电组织（美国） SASAC 国有资产监督管理委员会（中国） SC 国务院（中国） SERC 中国国家电力监管委员会 SGC 国家电网公司（中国） SO 系统运营商 SOE 国有企业 SPC 国家电力公司（中国） UK 英国 USA 美国 ·3· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 内 容 概 述 引言 本报告是 NERA 咨询公司在中国国家电力监管委员会（以下简称电监会）“中国 电力监管机构能力建设咨询项目”（世界银行技援项目）合同项下的工作内容。本报 告的撰写经历了一个与电监会及其他中介机构密切合作、深入研讨和修改的过程。在 此过程中，中外专家组与电监会的有关人员进行了卓有成效的合作，不仅调查研究了 中国本土的情况，同时还借鉴了其他国家的监管实践。 在过去的 20 年里，中国电力工业取得了巨大成就。作为世界上第二大电力工业， 中国电力工业经历了令人难忘的发展：到 2005 年底全国装机容量超过 5 亿 kW；2005 年中国一年新增装机容量 6600 万 kW，全国发电量 24747 亿 kWh（同比增长 12.3％）。 中国电力行业同样经历了重大改革：大部分电厂已从电网分离，中央发电资产和电网 资产进行了重组；区域电力市场正在建设；成立了专业的电力监管机构。此次中国电 力体制改革的核心是推进电力工业发展和运营的市场化，同时对电力行业实行有效的 经济监管。 虽然有这些成就和进步，但中国电力行业的现状并不令人十分满意：相对于经济 社会的持续发展，电力行业的效率较低已经成为一个突出问题；电力行业发展、资源 利用和环境保护之间矛盾日益突出；供电设施装备水平较低，可靠性水平相对较低， 服务质量不高；政策和行政体制滞后于改革，电力供应与经济社会发展需要不够协调。 所有这些问题都会对电力工业结构的理性调整，对整个国民经济的健康可持续发展及 社会进步产生影响。 基于我们的研究，要使中国电力行业的绩效明显提高，必须尽快在市场化、企业 改革和建立现代监管 3 个方面同时取得实质性成效。本报告所要解决的，是建立现代 监管的核心问题，即如何从内部和外部两个方面提高中国电力监管机构的能力，同时 深入研究中国竞争性电力市场的建立和监管问题。 ·4· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 电力监管的目的、地位和作用 本报告的重点是经济监管，也就是对价格、其他商业条件、投资和服务质量的监 管。本章通过讨论经济监管的主要原理，以及对国际上相关监管经验的广泛评论，为 研究和运用电力行业经济监管做好准备。如果中国从一个价格完全由政府控制的体制 转变成市场经济体制的话，那么首先碰到的问题是：为什么从根本上说实行经济监管 是必需的？该章通过阐述电力行业经济监管的主要目的和作用来说明这个基本问题。 为实现这些目的，就需要平衡用户利益、公用事业投资者利益和政府政策目标之间的 关系。 保障用户利益的最好方式就是使其以最低的价格获得可靠的电力供应。但用户利 益的满足并非单纯依靠低廉的价格，因为这可能损害到未来电力的稳定供应。公用事 业投资者会追求投资收益的最大化，但同时也会关注市场的稳定性和确定性。政府可 能对电力行业有着政策层面的考虑，比如农村电气化、供电安全和减少污染排放。因 而，监管者有责任在实施政府政策的同时，确保其他利益相关方不受损害。 竞争性的市场可以带来高效的生产水平、最小化的成本和高品质的充足的产品供 应与服务。相反，垄断会导致价格上升、产出下降或者质量、服务得不到保障。所以， 我们通常要尽可能避免垄断，在垄断不能避免的情况下，要加以监管以制约垄断，将 垄断的负面效应减少到最低。 经济监管的必要性主要源于以下 3 个理由： （1）控制自然垄断行为，限制企业随意提高价格和降低服务质量。 （2）促进公平有效竞争。 （3）实现公共利益目标。 从根本上讲，强有力的监管制度与放松管制并不矛盾，前者主要强调监管的效率， 后者强调减少微观干预的范围和发挥市场配置资源的基础性作用。实际上，现代管制 经济学通过很多实证研究，从正反两个方面证明了，无论是在发达国家还是发展中国 家，作为强政府的一个组成部分，强监管（管制）是经济健康发展的重要保证。 概括地讲，监管是一种解决市场失灵、弥补市场缺陷的制度安排。电力监管机构 的角色就是在由垄断企业提供服务的地方监管价格、投资和服务，在竞争环节负责审 查批准市场设计和价格形成机制，并监控市场的有效运行。 电力行业是一个重要的网络性行业，存在垄断经营的基础，而且也是一个普遍存 在需要监管的领域。此外，电力的其他一些特点也决定了对该行业进行专业化监管的 ·5· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 必要性。 监管行为通常以监管价格、质量和投资为基础。对那些自然垄断的企业，比如输 配电网，监管者主要控制价格；对那些竞争性环节，比如发电和零售电，监管者将试 图建立竞争以通过供求关系的相互作用来确定价格。本报告对上述各领域分别做了详 细的阐述。质量监管同样非常重要，这是因为当市场发出减少成本的信号时，垄断行 业可能会通过降低质量而非提高效率来作出响应。 不能将电价监管同经济宏观调控混为一谈。在对象、目标、手段上，电价监管同 经济宏观调控均有本质的区别。 中国电力监管职能的合理配置 本章主要研究了中国电力行业监管职能的分配。在中国，这些职能由不同的机构 行使，但各个监管实体的监管权力缺乏清晰界定，这就是目前存在的一个明显困难。 国家发展和改革委员会（以下简称国家发改委）负责投资和价格监管。财政部在制订 财务规则和成本标准方面拥有决策权。国有资产监督管理委员会具有监督国有企业的 职能，尤其是委派和监督高级管理人员。 目前中国电力行业监管职能配置很不合理，主要表现在以下几个方面： （1）政策制定和监管职能不分。 （2）规划审批与投资监管职责混淆。 （3）电价监管职责配置不当。 就这些问题，我们研究了全球各地不同的经验并提出了改进建议。我们建议出台 一部新的电力法，在其中对各项职能进行清晰、合理的界定。对职能重新界定应包括 以下几点： （1）尽快建立一个电力行业政策制定部门——能源部。可在改革国家发改委能源 局、价格司等机构职能配置的基础上，统筹设计建立，保证政策制订和监管职能可以 清晰分离。 （2）清晰界定电监会的角色和权力，应赋予电监会完整的监管职能。 （3）逐步调整价格制定职能，使该职能的实施主体逐步从国家发改委过渡到电 监会。 （4）将重要的反垄断（竞争政策）职能也分配给电监会，如果必要的话，成立专 门的反垄断机构与电监会联合办公。 （5）电监会应具有制订技术和质量方面规章的主要职能。 ·6· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （6）电监会应建立高效精干的区域、省级和市县办事机构，以便在地方层面履行 其必要的监管职能。 我们同时建议，财政部负责制订各行业均适用的财务成本政策、通则和标准等， 电监会根据这些政策、通则和标准制订电力行业具体的成本准则、规则等，并具体负 责监督电力企业实施。 必须强调的是，电力企业尤其是电网企业价格监管与成本监管不可分割，目前中 国由国家发改委和财政部分头实施具体监管的状况必须尽快改变。我们建议电力行业 具体的价格与成本监管职责由电监会统一承担。 我们还建议，随着天然气消费的增长以及其对经济社会发展影响的逐步加大，中 国应该借鉴国际经验（特别是英国和美国的经验），考虑将电力工业和天然气行业的 监管机制整合，并逐步建立一个更为全面的能源监管机构。 电力行业监管的基本方法 监管垄断业务和监管市场应该是并行的，所以我们认为电监会应在电力行业同时 履行这两个方面的职能。只有通过这样的方式，才能实现行业运行的透明和可预测， 实现高效、有效监管。 电力行业中的输电和配电领域存在很强的自然垄断，电监会应负责许可和监管， 包括为这些垄断企业制定价格，实行质量和投资监管等。本章详细论述了电监会所能 够采用的对自然垄断行业的监管机制，并讨论了不同的措施。比如，计算成本和制定 价格等一系列不同的方式，报告对此进行了说明和讨论。但我们应强调的是无论采用 哪种方法，关键的规则都应该是统一、透明和可预见的。此外，规则还应为电力行业 高效运作和投资决策以及为垄断经营者合理预期成本回收提供激励。 在价格监管上，我们强调存在两项重要的不同性质的职能：制定价格政策、设定 价格制定方法的职能与计算、执行价格的职能。从长远来看，制定价格政策、设定价 格制定方法的职能应由国家宏观部门承担，计算、执行价格的职能应由电监会承担； 电监会初期应主要负责价格执行监管，关键的价格制定方法和过渡时期的电价应由国 家发改委和电监会（以及其他参与改革进程的相关部门或机构）共同参与制定。 除监管价格外，监管者还在监管垄断服务的质量（技术服务和客户服务）、投资、 规划以及许可等其他方面扮演重要角色。在上述各个方面，报告强调在执行监管中， 电监会应该担任主要角色。报告还讨论了电监会在履行电力行业监管职能时应该采用 的各种机制和方法。 ·7· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 竞争性电力市场的建立和监管 本章针对竞争性环节的监管问题进行研究。报告强调监管的职能与行业的结构特 点相适应。在电力行业的竞争性领域，监管者依然扮演极其重要角色。我们在报告中 建议在所有可能引入竞争的环节，电监会应该在设计、促进、发展和实现竞争中发挥 主要作用。应保证有效的市场设计、保证新机组自由进入市场，保证输电网和配电网 无歧视开放，对竞争者行为不满所提出的投诉要进行调查。 本章介绍了电力体制的 4 种主要模式，即垂直一体化垄断模式、单一购买者模式、 趸售竞争模式和零售竞争模式。我们还重点介绍了不同市场模式的监管问题。４种模 式之间的区别在于保留垄断的程度不同。 监管者的角色取决于所选择的竞争模式。竞争模式可以从仅在发电领域竞争、电 力依然为单一买方所收购这一有限竞争模式变化到发电和零售都是竞争性的、只有输 电和配电依然保持垄断这一完全竞争模式。另外，监管者的角色也会随着改革进程的 加速发生转移和变化。本章我们分析了中国不同市场模型的特性和它们的监管内涵。 我们的总体建议是：中国应该尽快从一个区域电力市场单一买方的模式转变到批发市 场竞争模式，建立拥有多买方多卖方的真正的区域电力市场。同时为推动在电力市场 中创建公平有效的批发市场竞争，还应加快对产权制度改革和电力市场运作者恰当定 位的研究。 一旦选定市场模型，监管者将会在交易安排或者市场规则的设计上扮演非常重要 的角色。基于国际经验，我们期望交易规则能由电网公司具体设计后交由电监会审核 修改后批准。中国存在许多不同的电力市场，并不是所有区域都需要同时遵循同样的 竞争模式（单一买方或者批发市场竞争等），尽管如此，我们建议使用相同模式的区 域应适用相同的规则。美国及欧洲因不同州或县适用不同规则已经阻碍了电力市场的 进一步发展。FERC（美国能源监管机构）最后采用的是一种基于 PJM 市场的标准设 计规则，而欧洲则在符合电力调度指令的条件下允许存在有很大差异的不同规则。 中国电力监管机构的近期能力建设 中国电力监管机构长期能力建设及与之相关的问题的解决要有一个过程，实现目 标模式可能需要较长时间。除此之外，电监会应进一步改善和加强近期能力建设，这 一点与长期能力建设同样重要，它关系到有关方面对电监会现实价值的理解。我们认 为，近期能力建设的内容，包括外部条件和内部基础建设两个方面，应按轻重缓急和 ·8· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 自身力所能及的程度进行选择和实施。 （1）加快电力体制改革。切实推进以市场化为基本取向的电力体制改革，是提高 中国电力监管机构能力最基本的前提条件。电力体制改革迟滞，则现代电力监管制度 很难建立，甚至很多已确立的监管职能也无法有效履行。 我们建议，电力体制改革工作小组应该有明确的工作目标及时间表。 我们也建议，电力体制改革工作小组应利用中国电力供需矛盾缓解的有利时机， 加强领导，加强协调，加快决策，加大改革力度；电力体制改革工作小组办公室应加 强工作力量，明确责任目标，加快实施改革决策。 需要指出的是，在任何一个市场经济国家或地区，电力体制改革都被执政党和政 府视为重大的政治决断，因而都由其最高领导层或其授权的高层决策人物亲自领导和 强力推动。中国电力体制改革的重要性、复杂性起码不亚于其他先期改革的国家和地 区。因此，尽管目前中国已经进入电力体制改革的有利时期，但根据国际经验和中国 的实际情况，要保证电力改革的进度、力度并取得预期的成功，电力体制改革工作小 组必须及时获得最高领导层或其授权的高层决策者强有力的领导、决策和推动。 我们同时建议，电力体制改革近期应加快实施主辅分离，以避免交叉补贴和关联 交易，搭建电力市场基本平台，培育合格的市场主体；尽快核定输配电电价，尽快逐 级、批量开放大用户向发电厂直接购电，尽快研究实施输配分开，以尽快实现区域电 力市场从单一购买者模式到趸售竞争模式的转变，建立起多卖方和多买方模式的真正 意义上的区域电力市场。 （2）大力推进区域电力市场建设。电监会要大力推进区域电力市场建设，逐步发 挥市场配置资源的基础性作用，促进形成与市场经济体制相适应的新的电力调控和监 管制度，新的制度将宏观调控、市场调节和有效监管结合起来，提高国家管理电力工 业的有效性和科学性。这样，电力监管能力将随着电力市场的发展而逐步得到提高。 从某种意义上讲，这是一项根本性的工作。 （3）将“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”作为重点工作领域。在现行电力体制 和职能配置状况下，电监会的工作要想取得较为明显的成效，获得社会各界的认同和 支持，可考虑将“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”作为近期重点开拓的工作领域。 近期一定要突出行业秩序和社会公共利益及用户利益维护者的职责，寻找机会，在“规 范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”方面办好若干有影响力的“大事”。为震慑潜在的违 规者，鼓励消费者树立依靠电监会维权的意识，对违规者，在予以经济处罚的同时， 还可予以“通报”或登报处罚。 ·9· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （4）进一步构建电力监管法规体系。首先是要推动加快《中华人民共和国电力法》 （以下简称《电力法》）的修改工作，在新《电力法》中确认电力监管机构的法定职 责和权力，再依据新《电力法》，修改《电力监管条例》等行政法规。 （5）与政府有关部门加强协作，共同开展有关监管工作。电监会可以从区域电力 市场建设、规范电力市场秩序、保护消费者利益等工作需要出发，与政府有关部门（主 要是国家发改委）加强合作甚至配合国家发改委，开展相关监管工作。在合作中出成 效，在协作中显作用，在实践和发展中逐步改革传统审批方法并完善职能配置。政府 有关部门履行电力监管职责的人手较少，力量远远不够，在这种情况下，电监会与之 加强协作，对双方都是需要的。 当然，即使今后电监会具备了电价监管、投资监管等重要职能，政府宏观部门与 电监会实现了“政监分离”，由于工作需要，电监会也应加强与政府部门的工作沟通， 而在目前情况下，这种协作更显必要和重要，这是一项务实的措施。 （6）完善并落实电力监管费的征收措施。电力监管机构经费来源于对电力企业的 监管收费，符合“责任者负担”的原则，这是市场经济国家的通行做法，公平且有效 率。电监会（也包括其他政府有关部门）应充分认清电力监管费的意义，落实得越早， 对监管工作越有利，对政府形象的损害就越少。 （7）尽快研究建立电力监管基层组织。当前阻碍中国电力监管能力提高的主要障 碍之一是很多监管事项（比如服务质量、消费者保护）没有相应的一线监管机构去执 行和落实，这使得行业监管的整体效果大打折扣。近期监管能力建设的重要任务之一， 就是要使分支机构的合理框架得以确定，并尽快实施。 电监会各级分支机构组建，初期的重点是 “布局 ”，即先把基层组织建立起来，以 使政令得以统一并有效执行。 此外，电监会要有效行使监管职能，目前的人手也明显不够。关于这方面的国际 经验，我们在附录 A 中有详细描述，其中的一些数据可供参考。 总体上讲，电力监管人员必须大幅增加。但各级机构用人均应坚持“宁缺勿滥” 的原则。特别需要强调的是，电力监管机构人员的增加，并不一定相应增加政府员工 总量。随着一些职责从政府其他部门转移到电监会，电监会增加的员工可以来自政府 这些部门。 （8）申请授权采用特殊方法对国有电力企业实施有效监管。中国电力监管机构监 管国有电力企业的情况大量存在，但是由于我们在报告第 4 章中讨论的原因，只有采 取特殊的方法，才能有效监管这些企业。因此，我们建议电监会可以向国务院申请授 ·10· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 权采用第 4 章所推荐的特殊方法对国有电力企业实施有效监管。 （9）及时准确掌握电力企业相关信息，建立与外界进行有效沟通和交流的机制。 电监会必须有更加健全的与外界进行沟通、交流的机制。 （10）加强员工培训，制定工作人员行为规范。由于电力监管手段和方法不同于传 统的行政管理方式，因此电监会要履行职能，一般性的公务员培训远远不够，其员工 应具备基于市场经济的现代监管理念和系统的监管专业知识。我们建议电监会设计和 实施更全面的培训内容。 在人员聘用和培养上，电监会要考虑的一个重要方面是，必须致力于避免聘用不 合适的人员，并通过建立适当的行为规范来进一步培养员工良好的职业行为。 ·11· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第1章 引 言 1.1 课题研究的背景 根据中华人民共和国国家电力监管委员会（以下简称“电监会”）“中国电力监 管机构能力建设咨询项目”（世界银行技援项目）合同的约定，完成本报告。在准备 本报告的过程中，我们作了大量的研究，反复论证，并与电监会进行了密切的合作。 撰写时，项目外国专家组与当地专家和电监会的有关人员保持了经常的联系，并对中 国的国情和其他有关国家的监管实践进行了认真的考察。 在过去的 20 年里，中国电力工业取得了巨大进步。电力装机容量及年发电量已连 续 10 年居全球第二（2005 年底超过 5 亿 kW）。2005 年，中国新增装机容量 6600 万 kW， 全国发电量 24747 亿 kWh（同比增长了 12.3％）。预计未来相当长的时期内，中国将 继续保持较高的增长速度（详见本报告附录 B）。 中国的电力体制也处于巨大变革之中。2002 年中国国务院发布的《电力体制改革 方案》（以下简称“5 号文”）是又一个重要的里程碑。根据“5 号文”而进行的新一 轮电力体制改革，实施了厂网分开、重组中央发电资产和电网资产、进行区域电力市 场建设、组建专业化的电力监管机构等重大改革措施。此次中国电力体制改革的核心 是推进电力工业发展和运营的市场化，同时对电力行业实行有效的经济监管。 中国的电力监管制度在这次改革中有了很大进步。成立了专业化的电力监管机构 ——电监会，现代监管的理念得到迅速的传播，相关的规则逐步建立，电力市场交易 模式初步得以实践，电力监管分支机构建设也有较大进展。 尽管取得了这些成绩和进步，但是目前中国电力行业的绩效还不能令人十分满意， 主要有以下几点。 （1）效率较低。中国电力工业“高投入、高消耗、低效率”问题较为突出。目 前，中国每千瓦时平均煤耗比发达国家高 50 克标煤，线损率比发达国家高 2％～3％， 火电厂耗水率每千瓦时比国际先进水平高 40％多，主要电力企业劳动生产率不到世界 ·12· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 先进水平的 1/3。此外，电力企业主辅事实上不分的问题普遍存在，成本模糊、笼统， 不能有效控制，交叉补贴和关联交易不可避免，极大地降低了效率。 （2）电源结构不合理。中国截至 2005 年底的发电总装机容量中，火电、水电、核 电分别为 38413 万 kW、11652 万 kW、685 万 kW，分别占 75.6％、22.9％、1.35％。 核电、风电、太阳能发电等非化石能源所占比重很小。火电装机中，煤耗（油耗）较 高、污染较大的 13.5 万 kW 及以下的燃煤、燃油机组约 1.5 亿 kW，占全国总装机容量 的近 30％。这样的电源结构使电力发展与资源、环境的矛盾日趋突出。 （3）供电设施装备水平较低，供电可靠性不高，服务质量较差。中国城乡供电设 施特别是农村供电设施装备水平普遍较低，供电服务由于缺乏竞争压力的约束和必要 的行为监管，随意性较大，导致供电可靠性不高，服务质量较差。 （4）发展机制不顺。电力法律法规建设滞后，行业规划和产业政策薄弱，电力供 应时而过剩，时而严重短缺，与经济社会发展需要不够协调，影响了经济社会的健康 可持续发展和电力产业结构的合理调整。 根据我们的观点，造成上述问题的原因主要有 3 个。 （1）电力市场化程度低。市场化和民营化程度的不足导致电力行业结构与调节机 制不协调。尽管在发电环节已经形成投资主体多元化和分散决策的竞争性市场的结构， 许多调节机制仍是政府集中控制。因此，电力供求的失衡和大起大落不可避免。总体 上讲，中国电力行业发展和经营基本依靠政府部门传统的行政手段。由于企业外部市 场压力不够，内部深化改革、挖掘潜力、提高服务质量和水平的动力明显不足。 （2）企业改革不到位。中国电力企业以国有独资为主体，没有降低成本、提高效 率的自觉性和主动性。而国有企业改革至今未能取得突破性进展。其他行业因企业改 革不到位而产生的缺乏活力、资金浪费、短期行为、责任不落实等问题，电力行业同 样存在。 （3）基于市场经济的现代电力监管尚未有效建立。中国电力行业已经实行商业化 运营，但多数电力企业为国有独资，事实上具有相当的行政级别，企业行为或多或少 扭曲，行业监管不仅必要，而且复杂性和难度远高于其他行业。但中国对电力行业的 经济监管一直未能有效实施，特别是此轮政府机构改革和电力行业重组后，旧的管理 体系已被打破，新的监管构架由于机构间的既有职责划分未能进行系统设计和相应整 合，政府的监管能力未能形成合力发挥出来，监管“缺位”和“错位”的问题无法从 根本上得到解决。所以，中国电力体制改革的内容不仅仅是引入竞争机制，政府管理 电力投资、成本、价格和服务质量的能力也必须随之及时调整和改善。相比之下，建 ·13· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 立现代电力监管更为紧迫。 因此，要使中国电力行业的绩效明显提高，必须尽快在市场化、企业改革和建立 现代监管 3 个方面同时取得实质性成效。本报告所要解决的，是建立现代监管的核心 问题，即如何提高中国电力监管机构的能力。 1.2 中国电力监管机构能力建设需要解决的主要问题 如前所述，中国已经建立起了专业化的电力监管机构——电监会，但到目前为 止，电监会还不具备与监管一个庞大电力行业和快速发展的电力市场相适应的职能和 手段，内部的基础能力建设也有待进一步加强。导致电监会监管能力不足的因素有外 部的，也有内部的，概括起来，大体包括： （1）现代监管的理念尚未深入人心。基于市场经济的监管在中国还是一个较新的 概念，人们容易把它与计划经济的直接控制相类同。有关各方（包括政府、企业和消 费者）更新认识要有一个过程。 （2）相关立法特别是与机构职能有关的立法极不完备。长期没有《电力法》层次 的法律作依据，电监会这样一个执法监管机构难以获得必要的法定职责并受到相关各 方的重视。 （3）与其他政府部门间的职责划分问题迟迟未得解决。电监会是作为专业的监管 者而设立的，但目前电力监管的核心职能却不在电监会。这不仅严重限制了电力监管 机构的能力，而且又加剧了政府机构间职能的交叉、重叠和牵制，进一步抑制了政府 作为一个整体的监管能力的发挥。 （4）电监会的纵向组织体系也极不完备。层级设置和人员数量远远不能适应中国 地域广阔、人口众多、电力规模庞大、电力服务量大面广、地区间电力发展和改革进 展不平衡的特殊国情，以至政府部门间“错位”问题还未解决，又出现了严重的监管“缺 位”问题。 （5）履行监管职能所必需的规则和程序设计难以到位。与随意性较大的传统行政 管理方式相比较，现代监管是基于规则的监管。基于前述原因，电监会很难设计科学、 合理且行之有效的电力监管规则和程序，而如果没有完整的规则和程序，就根本谈不 上现代监管，人们也无法理解电监会与原来的政府主管部门有何本质区别。 （6）电监会及其派出机构的人才结构和整体素质与监管工作的需要不尽相符。其 他国家的经验表明，电力监管机构要想取得政府的信赖和投资者、用户及其他利益相 关者项目的尊敬，自身组织能力和基础建设极其重要。由于很多现实的原因（比如与 ·14· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 被监管的国有电力企业收入差距过大，监管职能相对虚化），与大型国有电力企业相 比，电力监管机构在吸引电力专业优秀人才方面处于明显劣势。 上述 6 个方面问题的解决，就是本项目所指能力建设所要完成的主要任务。 1.3 本报告的结构 本报告共分 6 章和 3 个附录： 第 1 章是引言。 第 2 章讨论经济监管的一些基本理论，包括经济监管的主要内容、为什么要监管 电力行业、谁监管及监管什么等。 第 3 章对长期能力建设中政府相关职责分工及哪些职责需要从其他机构移交给电 监会提出建议。 第 4 章详细阐述如何对电力的自然垄断环节进行监管。 第 5 章进一步探讨如何实施对竞争性发电领域的监管。 第 6 章主要对中国电力监管机构近期能力建设提出建议。 3 个附录分别是：美国、英国等 9 个国家电力行业监管体制的介绍和评论；中国电 力行业发展概况；有效监管的主要特征。 ·15· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第2章 电力监管的目的、地位和作用 首先需要特别强调的是，本报告所讨论的监管是指经济性监管，即政府对价格、 投资、服务质量以及其他商业活动的监管，它与社会性监管如对生产安全、土地使用 和环境问题的监管相对应。后一类监管的问题不在本研究范围之内。 2.1 电力监管的目的和要求 电力监管的核心目标是提高本行业的经济和技术效率，控制电价和改进供电电能 质量和服务质量。中国正在从过去的完全价格控制向市场经济过渡，产品价格将逐渐 由“市场”形成而不是由政府决定，那为什么要在这个阶段引入经济监管？监管的目 的是什么？本章将回答这些问题。 2.1.1 为什么要监管 人们广泛的共识是，竞争性的市场可以带来高效的生产水平、最小化的成本和高 品质的充足的产品供应与服务。相反，垄断会导致价格上升、产出下降或者质量、服 务得不到保障。所以，我们通常要尽可能避免垄断，在垄断不能避免的情况下，要加 以监管以制约垄断，将垄断的负面效应减少到最低。 经济监管的必要性主要源于以下 3 个理由。 （1）控制自然垄断行为，限制企业随意提高价格和降低服务质量。 （2）促进公平有效竞争。由于种种原因，即使是非自然垄断企业或者本应是竞争 性的企业也可能表现不佳。有些行业由于其特有的技术经济特征，使其引入竞争比较 困难，市场结构、竞争模式也比较独特，或者即使引入了竞争也有可能重新变成垄断。 在此情况下需要专业化的监管来构建其独特的竞争平台，规范市场秩序，促进公平有 效竞争。我们将在第 5 章讨论对可竞争环节的监管问题。 （3）实现公共利益目标。如果一个特定的行业肩负了实现公共利益的任务，政 府就会要求它按照一定的方式运行以达到某个具体的政策目标。例如，由于电信行 业与现代经济的有效运转和高速发展息息相关，许多国家的政府都感到要密切介入 ·16· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 这个行业。这些问题可以由一个反垄断机构联合相关部门如信息产业部、财政部和 经济发展部等进行处理。但是，大多数国家都选择建立一个单独的监管机构，它既 独立于行业本身，同时也独立于其他各政府部门，从而能够集中关注行业的需求和 平衡各方的利益。 从根本上讲，强有力的监管制度与放松管制并不矛盾，前者主要强调监管的效率， 后者强调减少微观干预的范围和发挥市场配置资源的基础性作用。实际上，现代管制 经济学通过很多实证研究，从正反两个方面证明了，无论是在发达国家还是发展中国 家，作为强政府的一个组成部分，强监管（管制）是保证经济发展的重要保证。 2.1.2 为什么要对电力行业实施专业化监管 电力行业是一个重要的网络性行业，存在垄断经营的基础，而且也是一个普遍存 在需要监管的领域。此外，电力的其他一些特点也决定了对该行业进行专业化监管的 必要性： （1）电力是现代物质文明的基础，电力系统的安全及电力价格、质量（包括服务 质量）等对经济社会发展影响巨大。 （2）电力需要输、配网络传送，而电网投资巨大，专业性强，重复建设成本高昂。 因而电力输、配经营具有自然垄断性，其价格、投资和服务质量必须由政府监管。 （3）电力供应是一个紧密而复杂的系统，发、输、配、售各环节在安全和效益上 互相依存。因此，即使发电和售电环节引入了完全的竞争机制，其价格和投资无需监 管，但由于它们在技术上与输电、配电紧密的、复杂联系，其竞争方式必须合乎整个 系统的安全和效率要求。因而发电和售电环节引入竞争后，为确保电力市场的有效运 行，对发电和售电环节也仍需要监管。 （4）电力市场具有瞬间平衡性、技术复杂性，比一般意义上的商品交易市场专业 技术性强得多。电力市场竞争模式和运营方式特殊，电力市场的设计和监控必须符合 电力行业的特点。 所以，监管者的角色取决于行业的竞争程度，需要不断调整。在垄断环节，监管 机构控制价格和投资，并确定服务质量；在竞争环节，市场决定价格，而价格引导投 资，监管机构只需审查批准交易安排和监控市场运行以保证有效竞争。概括地讲，监 管是一种解决市场失灵、弥补市场缺陷的制度安排。电力监管机构的角色就是在由垄 断企业提供服务的地方监管价格、投资和服务，在竞争环节负责审查批准市场设计和 价格形成机制，并监控市场的有效运行。 所有上述情形既适用于大多数其他国家，也适用于中国。因此按照我们的观点， ·17· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 电力行业的专业化监管是非常重要、合理的。 尽管从政府和全社会的角度看，电力行业对专业化监管的需求是非常明确的，但 我们还必须强调，中国电力行业的监管改革必须根植于中国总体的市场化改革进程中。 最重要而又最艰难的任务是要深化改革，使竞争和市场的力量能够尽可能地被释放出 来。监管体系的建立，必须与一个竞争性的电力市场和电力投资主体多元化相匹配。 2.2 电力监管的对象 电力行业中的所有企业都应该受到某种形式的监管，它们都需要获得运营许可， 都需要同意遵守相关的规则以保证行业的有效运行。这些企业必须满足监管机构所规 定的一些基本的准入条件才能从事相关业务。第４章描述了哪些交易行为应该受到监 管，但对垄断环节和不完全竞争环节，监管的主要领域包括价格、质量和投资。 2.3 电力监管的三个主要内容 如上所述，监管的目的是在自然垄断或者竞争不充分的领域，对公用事业性质的 企业行为进行控制，从而平衡用户、公用事业投资者和政府的利益。在实施监管时， 监管主要对公用事业性质的企业在 3 个方面的行为起作用：价格、质量、投资。投资 监管主要源于对价格控制的需要。 2.3.1 价格 在自然垄断环节，控制价格是经济监管的基本内容。电价监管的方法论特别复 杂，我们在第 4 章讨论。目前中国的电力监管机构基本没有价格监管的权力。但我 们应该假定监管机构最终将获得制定价格的权力，或监管机构提出实质性价格建议 以获得价格政策部门的批准为必经程序，或监管机构同价格管理部门密切合作。不 管在哪种情况下，掌握“合法且合理的电价”定价原则应该成为电监会职员专业技 能的一部分。 经济监管要确保价格合理，要促进公用事业提高运行效率，这可以通过激励公共 事业企业尽可能高效运行来实现。这里我们要强调，用户的利益不仅仅在于低廉的价 格。电力行业中监管者在价格监管中的角色不是一成不变的。 （1）如果服务是由垄断性公司来提供，监管者必须直接控制价格。 （2）如果服务是从竞争性市场获得，监管者必须保证这个市场没有扭曲或垄断 行为。 由于中国仍然处于体制转轨过程之中，人们对电价监管的理解不可避免地仍存有 ·18· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 旧体制的痕迹，比如将电价监管同经济宏观调控混为一谈。其实，在对象、目标、手 段上，电价监管同经济宏观调控均有本质的区别： （1）对象不同。宏观调控关注经济总量的调节，而电价监管只涉及到电力行业或 其中的部分企业。 （2）目标不同。宏观调控追求宏观经济的稳定性，而电价监管注重电力生产、消 费各相关主体间的利益平衡，以提高电力资源的配置效率。 （3）手段不同。宏观调控的主要手段是货币和财税政策，相关政策将影响所有经 济主体。电价监管的主要手段则是相关规则的确定，及据此对电力企业改善绩效提供 激励、对违规行为进行处罚。 （4）知识结构和专业技能不同。宏观调控需要政策制定者有关财政、税收和货币 政策等宏观经济学的知识和相关技能。对电力价格监管而言，监管机构更需要的是具 有微观经济学、法学、相关行业工程技术知识和分析能力的专业人才。 2.3.2 质量 如果电力价格是受控制的，垄断企业就有通过省钱来保持或提高其利润率的倾 向，如减少工厂维护、减少雇员和减少服务，这样供电的可靠性就受到影响。由于企 业垄断产品供应服务，消费者不能选择其他供应商，因此，企业没有必要的市场压力， 无法通过相互竞争来提高供应服务的质量。所以，在控制价格的同时，监管机构必须 同时使服务质量得到保障。这意味着要收集数据、建立标准，并处罚那些供电质量差 的企业。 在电力行业，质量一词包括多项指标，分为技术质量（包括电压和频率的稳定性 以及避免供电中断等）和服务质量（包括计费的及时和准确、及时周到的服务和对投 诉的反应能力）。有关质量的问题将在第 4.2 节中详细讨论。 总体上讲，进行质量监管有下面 2 方面原因。 （1）因为电力行业的输配电环节具有自然垄断属性，因而输配电企业就有一种 自然的倾向：对质量的反应不像竞争性市场中的企业那样积极，所以需要监管来加 以弥补。 （2）另外，某些形式的价格监管可以激励公共事业公司不断提高效率，降低成本， 但这种效率压力可能导致质量下降，所以需要质量监管来进行平衡。 2.3.3 投资 近年来中国的经验说明，保持电力供应的稳定性非常重要。消费者真正的长期利 益是通过能够有效地平衡供给和需求的监管来达到的。特别地，这就意味着要有一个 ·19· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 适当的价格，能刺激投资者建设达到满足需求的容量。监管要起到激励本行业投资的 效果。同时，投资要有效率，不能过度，达到满足用户需要的程度即可。这就意味着 当投资过度、并很可能损害消费者利益时，监管机构要能够采取措施及时干预： （1）如果服务是由垄断性公司来提供，监管者必须通过确定需求而控制投资。 （2）如果服务是从竞争性市场获得，监管者必须保证这个市场没有扭曲或垄断行 为，并由市场引导投资。 我们会在第 4 章再回到这 3 个方面，把电力监管的普遍原则应用于中国的实践。 2.4 电力监管的目标和原则——平衡各方利益 监管的目标和原则通常表述为平衡 3 个主要方面的利益，这 3 方面分别是用户、 公用事业投资者和政府。我们的假设是，中国的情形也是如此。另外，在中国还有一 些其他特殊的利益需要平衡，特别是不同地区之间的利益平衡。 2.4.1 用户利益 用户的主要利益就是以最小成本获得稳定的电力供应。一般强调的是低价和优质 （包括服务质量），但同时也要考虑用户的长期利益。例如，通过减少对新设施投资， 可以在短期内维持较低水平价格，给用户带来短期利益。但从长期看，对用户可能是 不利的，因为减少投资会导致供电匮乏，供电质量下降。因此，监管者需要在用户的 短期利益和长期利益之间取得平衡。在中国，有时侯消费者宁可以较高的价格获得稳 定的电力供应，也不愿价格较低但电力短缺。 2.4.2 公用事业投资者利益 投资者感兴趣的自然是利润最大化，监管者要在投资者追求最大利润和用户追求 最低价格之间进行平衡。另外还要强调，投资者追求的往往不仅仅是最大利润，而且 还要求收入的稳定性和确定性。如果监管者能创造一个稳定、可预见的监管环境，投 资者就会认为该行业风险比较低，从而愿意接受较低的利润水平，因而对用户也比较 有利。因此，监管者需要同时关注投资者的回报率和投资风险两个方面。 2.4.3 政府政策目标 政府显然在电力行业有其合法的政策利益，以及可能追求某些具体的政策目标， 如降低排放、提高农村用电普及率，或者对某些类型的用户保证低价电力供应。然而， 政府常常利用电力行业来满足宏观政策的需要（例如，由于考虑通货膨胀的原因，推 迟必要的电价上涨的时间）。监管者的任务就是要保证政府能够达到其政策目标，同 时又不会不当地损害其他各方的利益。 ·20· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 2.5 有效监管体系的设计——国际经验 中国首次在电力领域系统地设计监管机构。无论是在监管的一般概念层次，还是 在监管程序和监管方法的实际应用层次，国际专家们对于良好监管的标准有基本一致 的看法。本报告附录 A 中详细介绍了英国、美国、澳大利亚、挪威、俄罗斯、巴西、 阿根廷和印度等国家电力监管机构的一些典型特征。 2.5.1 顶层目标 监管机构的顶层和概念框架设计包括监管机构的职责、目标、独立性、可问责性 等基本问题。比如：监管机构的运行是公开还是保密？它对行业运行的监管参与到什 么程度，是否只需制定规则？许多国际经验表明对这些问题的不同选择会如何影响监 管效率。例如，NERA 在 1998 年给亚洲开发银行的报告中提出的标准和 2003 年世界 银行专家 Kessides 所作调查中提出的标准就有很多一致之处。在此基础上，我们提出 以下标准来衡量监管水平： （1）监管机构的地位和监管目标。 （2）独立性。 （3）可问责性。 （4）利益相关者的参与。 （5）监管程序和监管决策的透明度。 （6）可预见性。 （7）充分的资源，特别是专业的监管人员。 这些标准对本报告研究的问题和提出的相关政策建议非常重要，对此我们将在附 录 C 中详细论述。但是，这里需要强调的最重要的两点是：①监管机构应当取得行业 监管的明确授权，并且不受其他政府机构的日常干预；②监管机构从事监管活动时必 须采取清晰透明的方式，使民营企业的投资者对监管机构的活动充满信心。 2.5.2 独立性 成熟的市场经济国家比较关注监管机构的独立性。因为这些国家的监管实践表明， 监管机构的可信度对吸引私人投资进入受监管的行业非常重要。影响公司投资决策的 是一系列的规则，而当政府部门形成对行业监管机构的不当压力，进而对这些规则的 制定或执行产生实际的影响时，监管机构的独立性就会丧失。影响监管机构独立性的 体制性因素主要有： （1）政策目标和监管目标界定是否清晰。不清晰将可能产生监管机构行为不可预 ·21· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 测的问题（该问题的国际经验将在下一部分详细讨论），这对投资者无疑是一个非常 严重的问题。 （2）监管机构的经费来源是否会影响其立场。由谁来支付监管费用以及谁来批准 监管机构的预算，这也是一个非常重要的问题。一般认为，监管机构的独立性应该建 立在监管经费来源相对独立的基础之上。 （3）监管机构的人事任免。谁能任命监管机构的负责人？任命者是否同时有权罢 免？这显然也明显会影响到监管机构的行为方式。 附录 A 表明，英国的法律对电力和天然气监管机构 OFGEM 和相应政府部门的职 能有非常严格的界定，从而监管机构可以很好地抵制来自政府部门的各种压力。澳大 利亚、西班牙和巴西也有类似的规定。 在美国，尽管联邦能源监管委员会是能源部的一部分，但它的职能是依法明确界 定的。联邦能源监管委员会通过对垄断环节价格进行控制或对竞争环节的市场价格进 行监督，确保电力行业的价格是合理和公正的。在实践中，能源部从不干涉联邦能源 监管委员会的程序或决定。 在挪威，尽管监管机构 NVE 只是部委所属的一个机构，但在法律上和实际监管工 作过程中具有很大的独立性。 而在俄罗斯，由于监管机构的独立性缺乏法律上的保证，这在监管实际中导致了 诸多问题。由于这些问题的存在，那些潜在的投资者在进行投资时非常谨慎，或者要 求很高的风险贴水，从而导致成本和价格的上升。不论是公司还是政府，这种结果都 是不利的。 2.5.3 经费来源 监管机构的组织结构、资金以及其他组织方面的具体情况各国不同，各自反映了 本国的具体情况和特点。从实例来看 ，挪威、俄罗斯的监管机构都依赖政府提供资金， 英国、美国、阿根廷、巴西、西班牙主要从被监管企业收取费用，而印度监管机构的 经费部分来源于政府拨款、部分来源于企业收费。但无论是来自政府正常预算还是来 自企业收费，这些国家都遵从收费和预算收支两条线的严格程序，监管机构的预算必 须得到国会的批准和受到相关的审计监督。1 电力监管费的主要作用，一是保证监管机构的决策和基础建设不会因为经费问题 而受到干预和影响；二是保证经费的数额和稳定性，以吸收有能力的专业人员，获得 见本报告附录 A 表 A.2。 ·22· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 需要的有偿咨询服务或信息；三是使此项公共支出由直接责任人（电力企业）而不是 所有纳税人负担，更公平和更有效率。 电力监管费的征收对象，原则上包括电厂和电网公司在内的所有电力企业。 2.5.4 中央和地方的监管权限 从附件 A 提供的数据可以看出，在监管机构的职责和权力方面，绝大多数情况下， 监管机构（无论是联邦还是地方）都对电力行业行使全面的监管权力 。例外的只有俄 罗斯，俄罗斯的监管机构在很大程度上是从属于政府政策部门的。2 至于联邦和地方监管机构的职权划分情况，通过分析几个国家的情况我们可以 看出 ：3 （1）其中 5 个国家（即阿根廷、英国、挪威、西班牙和巴西）的监管机构仅设国 家一级，没有垂直方向的监管权力分配，这反映了政府采用集中的监管方式。 （2）另外 4 个国家（即澳大利亚、印度、俄罗斯和美国）在联邦和地方都设有监 管机构，也反映了各国的政治组织形式。各国联邦一级的监管机构都与地方一级的监 管机构在组织上截然不同。总的来说，各国电力监管的具体权力都主要由地方监管机 构行使，联邦一级监管机构主要负责跨地区事务，或者负责制定政策或提出有关监管 的一般方法。 2.5.5 监管机构的管理 在监管组织的高级管理方面，我们研究的部分国家的监管组织体系具有以下特征： （1）9 个国家中有 8 个国家的监管组织采取委员会制，委员人数 3～15 人不等。至 少 7 个国家中，委员的任期至少 5 年，从而确保其独立性。 （2）所有国家中，这些监管委员都由政府任命，有些是由总统直接任命、有些则 由政府部长任命。 （3）多数国家对委员没有特别的资格要求；但有些国家有基本要求，如有相关领 域（如电力工程、法律和经济）的工作经验或能力。 （4）大多数国家中，委员享有免于被解职的保护，如只有经国会批准，或者在明 确地不能履行职责或有不当行为的条件下才能被免职。 2.5.6 监管的标准程序 决策过程和被监管主体的上诉权利方面，这些国家的监管体系有如下特征： 见本报告附录 A 表 A.3。 见本报告附录 A 表 A.4。 ·23· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （1）一般而言，对监管程序很少有特别限制。尽管有些国家确定了一些基本原则 或一般的行政程序，监管机构有权设置自己的程序和规则。 （2）在大多数国家，被监管者可以通过明确的正式途径对监管机构的决定进行上 诉，有些是上诉到法庭，有些是上诉到部长，有些是上诉到指定的调解委员会。 2.5.7 监管机构的监管对象 研究发现，这些国家的监管机构都负责电力行业所有环节的监管，即： （1）输电。 （2）系统运行。 （3）市场运营。 （4）配电。 （5）零售供电。 （6）发电。 适用于垂直结构、很少竞争甚至没有竞争的行业的监管形式和适用于分散的、竞 争激烈行业的监管形式截然不同。但是，国际惯例是，即便存在竞争性市场、电力行 业的不同环节有不同的监管需求，仍由一个监管机构负责统一监管。 我们在第 4 章将会讨论电力行业不同环节的不同监管方法，并分析一些国家的监 管经验。 2.5.8 监管机构的主要职责 国外的电力监管机构究竟负有哪些方面的职责？我们的分析发现： （1）所有国家的监管机构都有广泛的价格监管权力，尽管在有些国家中这项权力 被联邦监管机构和地方监管机构共同分享。 （2）所有国家的监管机构都拥有对投资的间接监管权力，但主要是配合控制价格 和质量，而不把干预某个项目的投资决策作为主要目的。 （3）除了俄罗斯的联邦监管机构以外，我们研究的其他所有国家的监管机构都拥 有质量监管权。 从行业监管的效率看，由电力监管机构统一负责电力行业的所有环节的经济性监 管，能够更有效地平衡各方利益，促进行业发展。 2.6 监管产业范围——是否仅限于电力 从国际经验来看，对网络型产业或公用事业的监管，存在多部门统一监管和单部 门分别监管的不同模式。考虑到能源监管在所监管领域公用事业或网络性质、技术手 ·24· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 段等方面的一些共性特征，许多国家的能源监管机构同时负责监管电力、天然气，甚 至石油、热力等产业，这样能够发挥监管的协同效应和监管知识与技能的共享。 在上面所讨论的 9 个典型国家案例中，有 6 个国家的监管部门实行能源领域的综 合监管，只有阿根廷、巴西和印度两个国家是建立单独的监管机构负责电力行业监管。 从历史的演进看，英国在 1990 年代实行国有企业民营化改革时，设立单独的监管机构 分别负责电力和天然气的监管，在 2000 年后，电力监管机构和天然气监管机构合并为 综合的能源监管机构——天然气和电力市场监管办公室（OFGEM）。 建议随着天然气使用范围的逐步扩大，天然气对经济社会发展的影响逐步显现时， 中国可以考虑借鉴英国、美国等国家的模式，将电力和天然气监管体制一体化设计， 或者今后逐渐发展为能源监管。 本报告的附录 A 为电力监管的国际经验和案例分析。在这一部分中我们将重点讨 论不同监管机制之间的区别，包括监管机构的独立性，监管权力的横向分配，以及集 中监管和分散监管的比较。附录 A 同时也对各监管领域不同监管模式的监管绩效进行 了描述。 ·25· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第3章 中国电力监管职能的合理配置 3.1 现状评述 在中国，除电监会外，目前还有多个政府机构负责电力监管，但影响程度和方式 有所不同。本章中我们将对各机构及整体情况进行分析。首先我们对这些机构及其对 电力监管的影响作些评述。由评述可以看出，当前监管体制的主要问题是缺乏一个统 一的监管机构集中行使明确的监管权力。根据其他国家的经验，当前监管权力的分散 和不明确等问题无疑对民营投资者投资该领域构成了障碍。 3.1.1 电力体制改革工作小组 国务院电力体制改革工作小组于 2001 年成立，其成员来自政府多个部门，“5 号 文”明确规定了其职能。 电监会成立后，电力体制改革工作小组组成人员有所变动。现在的组长由国家发 改委主任担任，改革工作小组办公室主任由电监会副主席担任，办公室也设在电监会。 这种将电力体制改革工作小组组长单位和电力体制改革工作小组办公室主任单位分属 不同部门的安排，可能使政策制定和执行的效率不会很高。 虽然电力体制改革工作小组办公室设在电监会，但似乎电监会在电力体制改革中 不具主导地位，除电力市场设计外，电监会不负责设计和领导整体改革进程，也不负 责电价改革等核心内容的改革设计和执行。 “5 号文”正式实施 3 年多以来，电力体制改革工作小组似乎也不太活跃。不清楚 改革的领导机构是否还会有新的变动，但无论是否有新的安排，电力体制改革领导机 构的构成和作用，将从根本上影响中国电力监管机构的能力建设。 3.1.2 国家发展改革委员会 国家发展改革委员会（简称“发改委”）于 2003 年改组成立，是负责宏观经济调 控的部门。但与其他多数国家不同，中国目前没有能源部或类似的专业部级机构负责 能源工业，这一职能主要由国家发改委的能源局和价格司负责。就电力工业而言，发 ·26· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 改委能源局不仅负责长期规划，还批准所有重要的投资项目，包括发电和输电项目。 国家发改委还履行其他一些通常由政府能源部（或类似的专门政策机构）履行的职责， 包括制定中国总体的能源政策、预测需求、提供能源选择指导意见等。 国家发改委同时还具有微观经济监管机构的一些核心职能。如发改委价格司不 仅主导电力体制改革的核心内容——电价改革，还审批发电公司、电网公司的电力 销售价格。 3.1.3 财政部 我们理解，目前对电力企业某些财务准则、财务成本标准等与电力企业相关的事 项，财政部有决策权。这意味着一些应该属于电监会的职能与财政部的部分职能可能 会出现重叠。不过，我们也了解到，在实际工作中，由于财政部有着广泛的工作职责， 难以顾及行业特点十分突出的电力财务成本（主要指垄断环节财务成本）监管问题。 对于这种部分职能重叠的问题，财政部与电监会可以按照工作的性质以分工协作的方 式加以解决。 3.1.4 省级经贸委 国家经济贸易委员会（以下简称“经贸委”）已经于 2003 年改组为国务院国有资 产监督管理委员会（以下简称“国资委”），而许多省还保留有经贸委，充当着履行 地方工业监督和协调的角色。 在实践中，他们似乎在许多方面都履行着应由当地监管机构履行的职能。其中的 一个原因是，国家电监会当时还没有开始省级监管办公室的建立工作，现在也只在少 部分省设立，市县级监管办公室的建立工作更是遥遥无期。而地方经贸委填补了这一 空缺。从长期来看，电监会在各地区分支机构建立起来后，如果省经贸委继续在电力 工业发挥作用的话，职能冲突不可避免。 3.1.5 国资委 国资委是 2003 年成立的一个委员会，负责行使国有资产所有者的职责。国资委的职 能包括监督国有企业业绩，任命和撤销企业高管人员，建立审计要求，批准重大决策等。 由于中国大多数电力企业（包括所有的电网公司）都是国有独资公司，对于电监 会而言，国资委的影响不可忽视。在企业并购、业绩评价和高管人员任免等问题上， 这两个机构的看法可能会不一致。 3.2 目前中国电力监管职能配置存在的问题 目前中国电力行业监管职能配置很不合理，主要表现在以下几个方面。 ·27· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 3.2.1 政策制定和监管职能不分 如前所述，很多国家设有能源部（或同等部门），它负责制定电力工业的上层 政策和决定市场结构，包括行业竞争的程度。这些部门通常还负责需求预测和市场 分析，并就燃料及电源结构、能源和环境平衡发展等问题做出规定和提出指导意见。 这些部门还对监管机构提出政策指导意见，如推进行业市场化的步伐、公共补贴和 电价政策等。 在那些已成立了专责电力监管机构的国家，过去政府部门履行的监管职能如运营 许可证管理、电价监管、质量监管等，都转移到了监管机构。在有些国家，虽然监管 职能已转移到了监管机构，但政府相关部门还保留制定监管规则的责任。 中国已经有了专责的电力监管机构，但中国没有专门负责制定能源或电力行业综 合政策的部级机构。目前，国家发改委似乎承担着制定能源或电力行业综合政策的职 能，但它同时还承担电力监管机构的核心职能如电价监管职能等，政策制定能力明显 受到影响。结果是政策和监管职能的界限比较混乱，直接导致： （1）电力工业宏观政策制定和行业规划能力严重弱化。 （2）国家发改委与国家电监会职能交叉重叠，降低监管效率。 3.2.2 规划审批与投资监管职责混淆 如上所述，在中国，除了国家发改委外，没有相关的“政府部门”或其他类似机 构专门负责制定能源或电力行业综合规划和政策。同样的，电网公司也没有制定和执 行系统扩展规划的责任。而国家发改委的主要精力并未用于政策制定和规划审批方 面，因为它负责具体项目的投资核准，后者琐细且面广量大，当然要占用主要甚至全 部精力。其实，具体项目的投资核准因与电力成本、系统可靠性等用户利益直接相关， 通常被看作是监管的一个主要内容，可由监管机构负责执行。特别是在有了专责的电 力监管机构后，仍由同一个政府机构既管规划审批又管投资项目具体核准，结果不只 是规划管不好，投资核准也因不能与监管整体内容及目标有效协调，而起不到应有的 作用。 3.2.3 电价监管职责配置不当 在中国，虽然已经成立了专责的电力监管机构，但在电价监管方面，这个机 构在绝大多数事项上只能提参考性建议，而国家发改委几乎保留着所有的电价监 管权力。 在很多国家，相关的政府部门（也包括财政部）与监管机构一起参与电价监管方 法的确定。对于新成立监管机构的国家来说，这确实是一种行之有效的制度安排。但 ·28· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 在这些国家，只要建立了专责的监管机构，具体的电价监管决策通常由监管机构负责。 因为正如前述，就对垄断性电力企业的监管而言，电价监管是各项监管的核心内容。 专责的监管机构没有电价监管决策权，在逻辑上难以想象。所以，像中国目前这种做 法，导致对监管理解的混乱及部门间争执不断的现象是很正常的，因为它显然违背了 “避免职能重叠”、“责任明确”等行政体系设计的一般规律。 3.3 相关问题的国际例证 3.3.1 监管职能横向配置的国际例证 在成熟的市场经济国家，电力监管机构有内设于政府相关部门的，也有独立设置 的，还有与能源或其他公用事业监管机构和在一起设置的。这主要与各国政体、国土 面积、文化传统及电力体制改革进展等因素有关。但不论是采取哪种设置方式，有一 点是共同的，就是：监管的主要职能由同一机构承担，特别是诸如电价监管这类核心 职能，不存在与其他机构分担的安排。 3.3.2 监管职能纵向分配的国际例证 在我们研究的诸多国家中，包括美国和印度，由于联邦宪法的存在，监管职能 按照联邦和州进行纵向分配。比如，在美国就同时存在两个层次的电力监管机构： 联邦监管机构（ FERC）和州监管机构（公用事业委员会）。这种机制已经存在相当 长的一段时间，1992 年的能源政策法案（ EPACT）对联邦能源监管委员会和州公用 事业委员会的关系和相应职能做出了明确的规定。根据该法案的规定， FERC 对电 力的批发交易市场拥有监管执法权，而电力零售服务的竞争则由各公用事业委员会 负责监管。 与之类似，与宪法的规定相一致，印度也存在明确的联邦和各州之间的监管职能 界定。印度 2003 年的电力法决定建立一个中央监管委员会，并在各州分别建立各州委 员会，将电力行业政策、电价政策和电力规划的职能在两级监管机构之间进行了划分。 这些案例表明，与各国现存的联邦制相对应，各州政府均在决定州内部的行业发展上 拥有显著的权力。在俄罗斯，协调问题则显得非常突出。在中国，由于不是联邦体制， 相应地如何协调纵向分权问题将非常重要。 3.4 对中国电力监管职能横向配置的建议 在本章前述分析讨论的基础上，本节我们将对中国电力监管职能的横向配置提出 一些建议。 ·29· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 3.4.1 建立专门的能源政策制定机构 在改革国家发改委能源局、价格司等相关机构职能配置的基础上，统筹考虑，尽 快成立一个能源政策机构——能源部，其主要责任是： （1）为中国能源部门的可持续发展制定相关政策、发展战略和规划。 （2）协调电力与一次能源如煤炭、石油及天然气的发展，保障能源供应安全。 （3）负责起草有关电力法规，制定电价政策等有关指导电力监管的政策。 但是应当强调的是，该机构不能既制定基本规章，又作为这些规章的具体执 行者。 只要能与中国实践相兼容，也可以采取其他不同的机构组织形式，但基本原则是 相对集中监管职能，“政监分离”、责任明确。 3.4.2 界定投资监管责任 目前，电力行业的全部新增投资都由国家发改委归口管理，理由是它负责经济发 展。应建立一个恰当的协调机制，使政府能源主管部门同电监会、地区电网公司（购 电公司）进行有效的协调和互动。为此，要更明确地界定发展规划与投资监管各自的 责任（关于电力投资监管的协调机制，我们将在第 4 章中详细叙述）。从监管功能的 角度看，电监会应被赋予如下的职责： （1）规定电网企业在其专营区的义务，要求其为用户提供安全、可靠的基础设施 和相关服务。 （2）要求被监管企业设立合理的预测、计划和执行程序，使他们能够以符合经济 社会发展目标需求的方式履行其职责。 （3）要求被监管企业投资的项目支出必须讲求效率，不能由此形成不必要的成本 增加。 （4）要求被监管企业承担提供电力充足供应的义务，并监督这一义务的履行。 （5）如果需要，通过其他方式强制执行投资义务。 3.4.3 逐步调整电价和成本监管职责的配置 如前所述，电价监管是电力监管的核心内容，电价监管也不属宏观经济调控的范 畴，而且中国已经成立了专责的电力监管机构，从政府职能配置规范化、合理化要求 出发，价格监管职责显然应划归电监会。 我们也理解，价格监管职责的全面转移，不仅仅是国家发改委与电监会两个机构 之间的事情，可能涉及中国整个政府行政体系的调整。因此确实需要一个统筹安排的 过程。随着电力体制和政府行政体制改革的深入，相关的政府能源主管部门（目前是 ·30· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 国家发改委）可以逐渐放弃对电力行业进行具体定价的监管角色，而将其职能转换为 制定包括价格政策在内的能源政策、发展战略和宏观规划。与此同时，电监会应逐渐 承担电价监管的主要责任。 我们也建议，即使将来电监会已承担起电价监管的主要责任，主要的监管方法和 价格传导路径，应该会同国家发改委（或新成立的能源主管部门）、其他相关部门、 参与改革的其他机构（包括我们建议的工作小组）共同规划。 我们建议财政部负责制定各行业均适用的财务成本政策、通则和标准等，电监会 根据这些政策、通则和标准制定电力行业具体的成本准则、规则等，并具体负责监督 电力企业实施。 必须强调的是，电力企业尤其是电网企业价格监管与成本监管不可分割，目前中 国由国家发展改革委和财政部分头实施具体监管的状况必须尽快改变。我们建议电力 行业具体的价格与成本监管职责由电监会统一承担。 3.4.4 协调反垄断（竞争政策）的职能分工 如果政府成立一个专门的竞争监管部门，电监会有责任与之相协调，在其竞争政 策的指导下实施监管工作。 但由于电力系统运行的整体性很强，在建立了竞争性电力市场后，电监会不仅要 监管垄断性企业，对电力部门中有关竞争政策的事务，也应该起主导作用： （1）对于潜在的竞争领域（发电和零售供应），电监会应制定有助于促进竞争的 规则，防止任何公司滥用市场支配力，以确保向竞争性电力市场的有序过渡。 （2）电力企业间的购并问题，电监会也应有权予以干预，如由电监会和专门的竞 争监管部门两家联合处理，电监会也应具有主导权。 3.4.5 落实技术和质量监管责任 目前，在技术和质量监管职权配置方面，部门间尚无大的争议，而服务质量监管 “缺位”的问题很严重，这是电监会短期内能够发挥作用、树立良好形象和体现其价 值的一个平台和机会。电监会应尽快制定相关的规章和法规，同时要建立一个电力企 业和消费者都能真正参与的公开程序。 3.5 对中国监管职权纵向分配的建议 3.5.1 中国监管职权纵向分配的重要意义 从第 2 章所述的国际实践和附录 B 的内容可以看出，在联邦制国家，中央和地方 监管机构的职权分工非常明确。从中国的实际情况看，大部分一线监管任务尤其是配 ·31· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 售电监管任务不可能由国家电监会及其 6 个区域派出机构就能完成，因为： （1）中国不仅幅员辽阔、地理区分非常大，而且电力行业规模及经济总量也相当 庞大，很显然，单靠中央一级及其 6 个区域派出机构不可能行使有效监控。 （2）中国是典型的地区间差异性突出的国家，不同地区电力企业的运行条件大不 相同，要做到“因地制宜”，必须要让地方的监管机构承担较大的责任。 （3）配电（目前包括售电）为垄断经营，电力供应的价格、供电可靠性、电能质 量、服务质量等都需要有效监管，这些业务分散在众多甚至远离省会城市的市县，电 力行业监管的最终效果将在这一环节体现，国家电监会及其区域派出机构（即便是省 级监管机构）往往鞭长莫及。目前这些具体的监管职责大都分散在市县政府有关部门， 不仅职责分散，而且这些部门监管手段和方法与市场经济体制和现代电力监管的要求 有很大差距，有的监管职责甚至还是缺位的。 3.5.2 对中国监管职权纵向配置的具体建议 图 3.1 是我们设计的中国电力监管机构纵向设置框架，它包括本部、区域、省级、 市县四个层级。 图 3.1 中的市县办公室执行和强化对当 地电力企业的监管。考虑到中国的实际情 况，在地域范围较广、人口较多的省份（自 治区），非常有必要设置这些市县监管办公 室。此外，这些办公室还是电监会在基层的 图 3.1 中国电力监管机构纵向设置框架建议 代表机构。根据我们的观点，这些市县办公 室的规模可以相对较小，只需配备 3～5 名经验丰富的合格监管人员即可。 我们强调，根据上面和其他类似的框架安排，国家电监会制订通用的监管方法、 框架和市场规则时，应该有区域和省级监管机构的普遍参与，并要有开放的讨论程序 和过程。 详细的职责分配应该针对不同区域、不同省份的具体环境来制定。例如，在已运 行或者在积极筹划中的区域性电力市场中，区域办公室应负责市场和输电系统的监管 工作。在没有区域电力市场时，区域办公室的权力要小一些。这时，省级和市县办公 室应该在省内输配电系统和售电市场的监管中起作用。 一般而言，配售电监管应由省级办公室根据国家规定进行监督。执行可以由省级 来完成，但若由市县执行可能会更有效。同样，质量监管的具体执行也应该由市县来 进行。 ·32· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 详细的职责划分，如图 3.2 所示。 图 3.2 建议的电力监管具体职能分配 ·33· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第4章 电力行业监管的基本方法 在讨论了什么是监管、监管什么以及由谁监管后，我们还应该知道怎样监管。对 垄断业务的监管和促进竞争这两项任务之间有很大差别，需要分别阐述。为此，我们 在本章主要讨论电力行业监管的基本方法，包括电价监管（或价格控制）、业务许可、 质量和投资监管等，以及如何监管国有企业的特殊问题。监管者在竞争性市场中的作 用将在第 5 章介绍。 在讨论监管方法的时候，有必要再次强调我们在前述章节中提到的关于政策的明 确性和一致性的问题。那些潜在的民营投资者希望监管机构的行为是透明、可预测的， 并且能够提供赚取投资回报的机会。一个赋予了恰当监管职能的单一的国家机构，如 国家电力监管委员会，可以保证这种透明度和可预测性。 4.1 价格和成本监管 4.1.1 价格监管的目标 价格的一个基本功能是引导资源的合理配置。但是，处于垄断地位的公司，特别 是当其产品已经不可缺少而使消费者别无选择时，往往可以通过提高价格来获取超额 利润，或者大幅增加不合理的成本造成浪费，因而导致效率下降，形成资源的不合理 配置，增加消费者负担。这是世界各国对电力价格实施控制的最初动因。 但是，对电价的监管也不是使之越低越好。过去，有的国家为了限制通货膨胀， 政府往往把零售电价控制在非常低的水平，造成资金短缺，电力匮乏。目前世界各国 的主流观点认为，电价既不应该受政治的操纵，也不能任凭垄断者摆布，而应该基于 合理的成本确定，以实现资源的合理配置。 4.1.2 良好的电价制度的主要特点 电价是电力企业资金的来源。“好的”价格监管是保证电力工业生存和保护消费者 利益的基础。即使私有发电商以购售电合同（ PPA）形式参与市场，价格监管对于保 证投资者信心仍是至关重要的，因为它可以影响 PPA 合同购买方的执行能力。因此， ·34· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 良好的价格监管对加强投资者和消费者对交易安排的信心是至关重要的。其主要的特 征如下。 （1）透明性、连贯性和可预见性是好的价格体制的最重要特性。对于投资者来说， 经营的长期性意味着他们必须知晓，是否可以期待价格监管长期保持合理性。这需要 监管过程的透明性和合理行为的一致性的保证。这对于避免监管者采取任意的或机会 主义行为尤为重要。理想状况下，法律上应该要求价格过程必须透明，而且根据明确 规定的规则来操作。保持灵活性可能具有一定的好处，但是在建立对于监管制度的初 步信心时，过程的透明是很重要的。 （2）企业有收回合理成本的权利。只要有效、合理地运营，投资者有权回收成本。 因此，建立收回合理成本权利的机制并使之不会轻易更改，这一点非常重要。同时也 应该明确，不合理的成本不能回收。理想的处理方式是在法律中界定这个权利，也在 许可证里面加以规定，但前提是许可证不能轻易变更。 （3）“激励兼容”。对效率的激励应该是监管要求的一部分。监管机构有责任保 证在制定电价和进行质量监管时，监管规则应该具有“激励兼容”特性（这意味着通 过电价监管可以鼓励效率提高）。 4.1.3 电价监管的基本方法 电价监管分电价平均水平（总收入）监管和电价结构监管两个方面。 对一个电力企业的财务状况而言，电价水平（每千瓦时电量的平均收入）是至关 重要的，它决定了“合理的成本回收”这个标准是否能够达到。每千瓦时电量的平均 收入乘以总销售电量就是企业的总收入。确定电价时，计算总允许收入是第一步（在 美国被称为“收入要求”）。允许收入通常取决于公司的资产基础、折旧和公司被允 许获得的资产回报，以及合理的运行成本。如果该公司被允许满足其收入需求，它就 能生存，并能进一步投资和成长。整体电价水平过低会导致用电浪费，太高则会制约 经济发展。 收入要求的金额一旦确定，就必须将总收入分解到各类用户或各种服务。电力各 类用户或各种服务的价格称为电价结构。既然电价应该反映成本，电价的各个组成部 分也应该反映各自的成本，尤其是边际或增量成本——增加该种服务所需增加的成本。 合理的电价结构使得电价激励和谐高效。例如： （1）因为高压供电成本较低，零售电价应该按照电压进行区分，以鼓励高压连接。 （2）高峰时段和低谷时段电价应该有所区别，以反映成本的不同，鼓励避开高峰 用电。 ·35· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （3）输电电价应该反映利用输电网络的边际成本（输电阻塞和损耗）以及建立输 电网络的成本。由此产生了“位置电价”，这是有效利用输电网络的一个很大的激励 因素。 很多不同的价格结构可能都可以满足公司的收入需求，从某种程度上说，价格结 构是公司需要考虑的次要问题。但是，即使价格水平满足全部的收入需求，如果价格 结构的组成不能反映成本，就会产生很多严重的扭曲。 4.1.4 总收入监管 决定电力企业的许可收入主要有两种价格监管方法，一般认为，下面两种方法具 有替代性： （1）收益率监管。 （2）价格上限或绩效监管。 这是我们这节要讨论的内容，我们的结论是将两种方法结合起来是最优选择。在 这两种方法下，都必须单独考虑价格结构问题。 4.1.4.1 收益率监管 美国确定电价的方法是收益率监管方法。此种监管方法下，被监管企业可以从用 户处获得足够的收入，补偿其合理投资所引致的成本并获得适度的收益，因此，该方 法也常被称为成本加成监管。一般而言，该方法根据下式确定企业可以获得的收入 RR = [RB ×RoR] + ED + EO&M + T 式中 RR——企业可获得总收入； RB——企业的收益基数（必需投资）； RoR——投资的许可收益率（债务和资本成本）； ED——年度折旧； EO&M——年度运行和维护管理开支； T——企业年度税收。 在这种监管机制下，企业必须向监管机构证明，确定的收入公式中的每一项都是 为了满足公众电力需求所必须的合理成本。比如，为了将主要电厂的投资包括进投资 基数中的部分，企业必须证明该项投资的合理性和其在提供电力服务上的必要性。同 样，为了将各项运行成本（包括购电成本）包括进 EO&M 项中，企业也需要证明这些成 本的合理性和其在提供电力服务中的必要性。 在确定被监管企业可获得收入时，公式中各项的数值一般采用基准年度的数据。 基准年度一般是指上一年度。当成本发生了可测度的显著成本，并足以影响企业的收 ·36· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 入时，需要及时对价格进行调整，以补偿企业成本支出。 收益率监管具有以下几个优点： （1）该方法在确定价格时采取“基准”年度的数据，并在下一次调整前的期间内 保持不变。价格确定后，监管企业的实际收益率将随着成本、销售和企业可控成本的 变化而发生改变。 （2）由于上述的价格相对固定性，在下一次价格调整前的一段期间内，企业具有 最小化各项成本的经济激励，以增加该段时间内的利润。价格调整间隔期越长，该激 励强度越大。 （3）该监管方式下，最易实现对特定用户实行价格优惠等各种非经济目标。 （4）价格调整听证会等可以增加消费者参与评价被监管企业绩效的机会。 该监管方法也有一些缺点： （1）该监管机制削弱了企业最小化长期成本的激励。存在着对投资项目过分包装 的倾向，使投资总额大大超过需要的规模。一个电力企业的高层领导曾经这样说：“甚 至我的办公桌都有投资收益率，那当然我会买非常豪华的办公桌了。” （2）当许可收益率低于实际资本收益率时，电力企业将缺乏激励机制去建设足够 的电厂。反之亦然。 （3）由于担心效率过高，在今后的价格调整时会提出更高的效率目标，棘轮效应 降低企业提高生产效率的激励。 （4）在该监管方法下，为了审查企业的各项成本，监管机构可能需要付出相当高 的管理费用，并陷入大量耗时的行政性听证过程中。 如果将收益率和英国式的价格上限监管（有时被称为绩效监管方法 PBR）结合使 用，这些不足可以得到弥补。 4.1.4.2 价格上限或绩效监管 价格上限监管是对收益率监管的修正，该监管方法的各种变化形式在许多不同的 监管体系中得到了应用。在价格上限监管机制下，费率调整的时间间隔（也称“监管 时滞”）被延长，以便为被监管企业提供更强的激励。在事先确定的监管时段（3～10 年），监管机构根据收益率监管方法对基准费率进行调整。而在基准费率不进行调整 的期间内，价格调整按照预先确定的公式，根据企业绩效、成本指数等的变化进行调 整。价格上限监管取消了收益率监管下监管机构的直接命令和控制，而代之以对被监 管企业的绩效进行奖励和惩罚，这种奖惩是根据在较长一段时间内成本和价格的偏离 程度来执行的。 ·37· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 良好的价格限制的一个优势，就是这种制度本身明确了成本最小化和提高服务质 量的激励方向。其次，有效的价格限制可以减少频繁的价格变动的备案，从而降低管 理成本。 4.1.5 国外各环节电价及其监管 根据国外的经验，可以确定 5 类典型的受到监管的电价。 1．发电价格 （1）中国的发电价格在国际上是比较少见的。当存在充分的电力市场竞争时，不 存在管制价格，只有一般不受管制的市场价格。最终用户或配售电公司是买者，卖者 是发电公司。 （2）在单一购买者市场中，发电价格一般由长期合同价格来决定，该合同是通过 竞争采购的。这些价格一般不受管制，但是合同签订之前的采购程序要受监管。 2．趸售供电价格 在单一购买者模式中，经常有一个独立的趸售供电价格（ Bulk Supply Tarrifs ， BST），是单一购买者向输电企业或大用户趸售支付的价格。其中的原则是，BST 应 反映满足购买者负荷的成本。由于 BST 一般是由垄断的单一购买者开出的，对其进行 监管很正常。BST 可能包括，也可能不包括输电的成本，但无论如何，基本的监管原 则是，BST 仅仅允许在单一购买者的购电成本基础上，加上一个弥补自己成本的合理 金额。 3．输电价格 如果竞争的发电市场存在，而且可以自由接入输电系统，使用输电系统就必须支 付单独的输电价格。即使发电市场不是竞争性的，电网公司仍然需要自己的收入：他 们需要一个向配电公司和发电公司收取的价格。输电价格的结构随国家的不同而不同， 因为运用了不同方法来反映各国市场类型的不同及该国的其他特殊环境。另一方面， 根据运行成本和资本成本来确定允许收入的基本方法已经得到越来越多的认同。国与 国的区别在于是进行回报率监管，或者制定价格上限。 4．配电价格 配电价格和输电价格有一些类似的地方，经常需要研究如何确定允许收入，但对 于配电价格结构的问题则有较一致的认识。与输电收入类似，根据运行成本和资本成 本来确定允许收入的基本方法越来越得到认同，国与国的区别在于是否进行回报率的 监管，或制定价格上限。与输电类似，如果不存在自由接入的系统，就没有必要单独 确定一个向最终用户收取的电价，但是仍然需要度量配电成本，并把这些成本反映在 ·38· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 最终价格中。 5．零售电价 零售电价是向最终用户收取的电价。这是电力行业发生的各项成本的集合，包括 发电、输电、配电和零售成本。假设所有产生的外部成本都已在某个阶段受到价格监 管，那么原则上应该允许将这成本转移给最终用户。 4.2 质量监管 如前所述，如果价格受到管制，作为减少成本的一种方式，通常其质量就会下降。 这种可能性是非常大的，而且监管行业的专家也已经认识到了这个问题。因此，质量 监管与价格监管密不可分，因为质量和价格是可以相互替代。所以，在竞争性行业， 质量竞争通常是竞争的一项主要内容。在自然垄断条件下，几乎没有什么市场压力促 使企业维持较高的产品质量和服务质量，价格控制对于网络性行业产生的效果也主要 是降低成本，而成本降低完全可以通过质量下降实现。 所以，没有质量要求的价格监管是没有任何实际意义的，价格监管和质量监管必 须同步进行。在本节中，我们将探讨常用的质量监管措施，以及采取这些措施所需要 的机构框架。 在电力行业，质量问题涉及多个方面，需要考虑技术质量和服务质量。为了保证 用户的利益，下面列出了有必要采取的措施。 （1）技术质量。可以实施下面两套措施： 1）规定输电、配电和发电的规划标准和投资义务，以确保新增容量的规划和建设 达到基本要求。 2）制定运行规则，尤其是引入电网和配电规则，使电网的运行可以满足最基本的 运行和维护标准，包括向最终用户供电的技术参数。 （2）服务质量。可以制定企业给用户提供服务的基本要求，比如中断、新用户接 电的时间、对投诉的反应能力等。监管机构一般采用以下 3 种质量措施。 1）整体服务标准：这是针对服务的整体水平而不是某个具体用户提出的标准。 例如，这种措施可以用损失负荷的形式规定最高的用户断电水平。如果达不到这些标 准，就可能受到经济上的处罚，处罚的方式主要是减少企业的允许收入。 2）保证服务标准：这些是针对单个用户的标准，例如，每次断电的最长时间。 因为面向每个用户，因而可以规定处罚标准，例如在达不到标准时向用户支付赔 偿金。 ·39· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 3） 行为规范：适用于很多方面，例如，用户意见的处理、切负荷管理规则，以 及必须向特殊用户群体提供的服务。 尽管在一般服务标准和保证服务标准的条件下，我们在上面提到可能使用各种类 型的经济处罚和补偿，在使用这些措施时还是需要慎重。主要目标是要达到满意的服 务标准，如果对一家企业的处罚过重，就可能妨碍企业投资于改善服务。 （3）服务义务。一些国家规定了普遍服务义务。也就是说，一个公共事业企业的服 务范围内的所有用户，只要提出要求，都有权获得服务。根据行业的特点，这种义务 可能恰当，也可能不恰当。在中国，有必要考虑这种义务适用的范围。 4.3 投资监管 4.3.1 发电投资监管 对于谁应该决定发电投资的争议比输电和配电领域更为激烈。在世界各国也各不 相同。在纵向结构的体系中，主要是确定以取得一定程度安全性为目标的发电规划标 准，并要求企业遵循这些标准。这些标准也适用于单一购买者模式。在那些引入发电 竞争的国家，做法各不相同。例如，在英国，投资类型和规模的决策完全由市场力量 决定，没有其他因素刺激或限制新的发电投资规模。在其他地方，例如美国的部分地 区，出于对发电投资是否充足的考虑，针对“负荷承担主体”，即零售商，引入了发 电容量需求。 在中国那些发电仍然是垄断业务的地区，上面有关输电和配电的规划和批准方面 的论述是适用的。在竞争情况下，围绕容量需求或容量支付的有关问题将在第 5 章进 行讨论。这里提出关于发电投资具体核准的几点意见。 （1）在完全竞争的条件下，发电企业仍然要遵从技术标准，并同意遵守市场规则 （交易安排）。 （2）发电企业仍然需要取得许可，这样，如果他们没有遵守规则，许可证就会被 吊销。 （3）他们还需要取得厂址（土地使用）批准、环境批准、水资源批准等。 但在竞争条件下，应该不需要审查投资的经济性。竞争性市场的存在就应 该确保发电企业自我决策，即如果认为自己能够盈利才进入市场，竞争压力也 会使发电企业确保发电质量，而且不会过度支出。但是，这要求交易安排的定 价机制可以发出需要投资的信号。这就是“容量支付”的问题，我们将在下一 章进行讨论。 ·40· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 4.3.2 输电和配电投资监管 理论上，输电和配电投资也可以实行竞争，但是实施起来非常复杂。集中统一进 行网络扩展仍是所有国家或多或少使用的方法。 其他国家监管投资的典型的做法是，针对维护公共利益所必需的新设备，系统运 行机构或网络所有者（常常和监管者一起）拟定一套鉴别、评估、建设和收费的规则。 在英国，对输电企业实行输电规划标准，这些标准所要求的投资计划在价格监管中得 到确认。在阿根廷，私人投资者可以建设输电线路；在美国，有几条已经提出建议书， 一条已经实际建成，但私人建设输电线路不是主流趋势。在这两个国家，监管者都需 要很高程度地参与扩建计划和价格制定。 对于网络领域的投资监管，有 2 个单独的方面需要讨论：决定必要投资的过程和 批准具体投资建议的过程。因为我们在第 3 章已经讲过投资核准的程序，我们这里只 讨论决定什么是必要投资的过程。 4.3.3 议定的投资标准和责任 明确垄断企业投资项目的监管方式以及他们应当履行的义务是很有必要的。由于 他们是垄断企业，因此为了保证消费者能获得符合标准的服务，非常有必要使网络的 运营符合一定的行为标准。这些方式方法包括： （1）可以建立一些指标如允许停电时间，或者频率波动区间以及电压限制等。这 些业绩指标是输电和配电企业的义务，并且应在许可证中明确（根据不同地区电气化 的程度和类型，可以允许不同地区有不同的标准）。 （2）在新的市场环境下，确保发电和输电投资之间的协调。发电投资者可以决定 何时何地建设新电厂，电网公司有责任为这些投资者提供必要的输电网架的支持。 但是，仅仅有这些义务和业绩标准要求，对于保证适度投资来说并不够，必须通 过监管投资计划来加以补充，这将需要： （1）议定的规划方法和标准，遵循系统发展的需要。 （2）对有关整体和各地区经济增长速度、利率和通货膨胀变化等的宏观经济预测 要达到一致看法。 （3）公认的评价方法，决定进行哪些明确的投资，该方法适用于宏观经济预测。 这种方法可能采取标准的成本收益分析的形式，通过其避免的缺电状况和减少输电阻 塞和线损而节约的燃料成本来对提出的投资建议进行评价。可能面临的问题是如何提 出并证实哪些投资比较经济，应该予以实施，以及如何将成本分摊给市场参与者。 （4）按照以上规则和方法，监管机构修改和审核投资项目和计划。 ·41· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （5）实施这些计划，对特殊部分按照预先准备的进行投资审核。 4.3.4 对中国现阶段系统规划和投资监管协调机制的建议 从中国的实际出发，关于系统规划和投资监管，我们建议采取以下的分工和协调 方式。 （1）由于电监会负责电力安全，投资所需达到的安全水平的决定权应归国家电监 会，但需要与国家发改委协商。 （2）电监会应制定与许可有关的义务和运行标准。 （3）国家发展改革委制定的宏观经济预测应当成为编制电力发展规划的依据。 （4）电网公司在国家发改委制定的宏观经济预测的基础上编制电力发展规划。 （5）政府能源主管部门负责电力发展规划的最终审批，包括听取其他行业和政府 部门意见。 （6）一旦能源主管部门审批电力发展规划之后，电力发展规划将在电监会的监督 下，由电力企业负责实施。 4.4 电力企业（运营）许可证制度 给所有电力行业的主体颁发运营许可证，这是一种普遍使用的监管手段，使监管 者可以对参与主体的市场准入和退出进行监管，并控制他们的行为。这是一种强有力 的工具，因为： （1）没有许可证，任何主体都不能在行业内合法运营，而且许可证只能由监管者 颁发，且不遵守这些条件将意味这许可证可能会被监管者吊销，这足以督促这些企业 遵守规定。 （2）毫无疑问，监管者作为本行业的负责机构，应该享有颁发许可证的最终权力， 这是国际上通行的做法。 （3）有时候可能存在管理上的要求，许可证必须由一个政府部门来颁发（例如希 腊），但即使这样，监管者仍然保留对许可的内容、发放和实施的控制权。 但是，这种方法并不是普适的。例如在美国，私有公用事业被监管了几十年，通 过一般立法权力进行监管控制，而不是许可证监管。在中国，电监会的许可证颁发权 力已经在《电力监管条例》和国务院文件中进行了规定，这样，许可证制度的设计有 一系列问题需要考虑，在此将对这些问题进行讨论，并提出建议。 4.4.1 许可证可以是简单的或详尽的 许可证的形式和内容有两种方式： ·42· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （1）简单的许可证（不超过一两页纸）。授予被许可人一般性权利，这些权利受 其他条件和条款的限制，这些条件和条款在相关监管文件中加以规定，例如规定有义 务遵循所有的行业标准。 （2）详尽的许可证。写明适用于被许可人的大多数或全部条件，因此在某些情况 下文件可能很长。这些具体条件中最重要的就是电价的确定——对于详尽的许可证而 言，允许电力企业收取的价格是许可的一部分；对于简单的许可证而言，价格可在其 他地方规定，但许可也会提到一些其他企业不承担的具体义务。 在国际上，第二种方式更普遍一些，它的优势在于在一个文件中把所有适用的条 件都写清楚，因而增加了透明度。我们建议中国逐步采用这种方式。如果这种方式将 被采纳，我们建议电监会开始研究起草适用于电力行业各个主要领域的这种许可证的 “范本”。合同通用条款和特定条款的内容将在后面介绍。 4.4.2 许可证是针对具体业务的 由于对自然垄断环节（输电和配电）和潜在竞争行业（零售和发电）的主体所采 用的监管手段是截然不同的，不同环节的不同情况决定了许可的内容将有所不同，因 此建议对下列环节分别实行许可制度：一个企业如果经营多项业务，就会有多个许可。 （1）发电——此类许可应该比较宽松，理想的是向所有具备资格并想获得准入的 企业颁发许可证，以鼓励竞争。 （2）输电——此类许可应与发电许可有显著区别，因为：①输电许可证有可能仅 颁发给既存企业；②应该有很严格的监管控制，包括价格和质量方面的条件。输电许 可证通常包含以下内容。 1）明确提出接入和使用许可证持有者的电网系统的条件。是一个保证发电领域实 现竞争的条件。 2）制定电网运行规则。假设存在一个电网运行规则来管理输电系统的使用情况， 就需要有条款来规定电网运行规则的编制和修改程序。（对于其他被许可企业而言， 应要求其遵守电网运行规则中适用于该企业的条款。） 3）系统规划和安全措施：要有一条来规定被许可企业的系统规划、扩充和运 行，以确保符合一定的系统和安全标准。 需要对输电系统扩充和发展的责任作出 明确规定。 （3）配电——此类许可与输电许可类似，因为具有自然垄断属性，并且： 1）配电许可可能只颁发给既存企业。 2）应该有很严格的监管控制，包括价格和质量方面的条件。但对于配电，应该有 ·43· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 更多的条款针对用户服务和其他问题。 （4）零售——从长远看，此类许可可能相对比较宽松，即为了鼓励竞争，可以给 所有具备资格并想获得准入的企业颁发许可。但在中短期，这种宽松的方式不太恰当， 因为只存在有限的竞争。 如果一个企业的业务横跨上面几个领域，应该分别颁发许可证；或者颁发一个许 可证，比如在英国，配电和零售许可证最开始合并为供电许可证，随着零售业务从配 电业务中逐步分离，相应许可证也逐步分开。 4.4.3 豁免和例外 大多数采用许可证制度的国家，除了正常的许可规定以外，都有一些豁免情形， 例如： （1）向多用途建筑供电，其中业主只向住户进行二次售电。 （2）很小的发电机组（例如容量小于 1MW），如果仅把电销售给当地有许可证的 配电企业，应该属于一般许可的豁免情形。 （3）发电方如果仅向自身供电，在一定的规模限制之下，也应该符合发电许可的 豁免情形。这时，规模限制可以宽松一些（如 50MW 或者 100MW），只要他们不向 外部系统售电，或不对电网产生负面影响。 给出必要的豁免许可是非常重要的，这可以避免监管机构处理和实施大量的小许 可申请而增加过多的成本。为了保持一定的灵活性，我们不建议在法律中规定详细的 豁免情形。 豁免可以选择下列方式进行规范。 方式 1：赋予电监会一定的自由裁量权，使其有权在适合的情况下（在界定得非常 宽泛的框架内）决定豁免。 方式 2: 在《电力法》中赋予相关政府机构，制订“豁免条例”或许可规则，其中 规定电监会只能在严格限定的范围内决定豁免。 总的来说，有些观点认为监管的自由裁量权应该限制到最小，因而更倾向于上面 的第 2 种方式。《电力法》应该明确规定哪些业务需要进行监管（因而需要许可）， 并且规定豁免的具体条件。 4.4.4 许可证的颁发、变更和吊销程序 为了保证监管工作的透明度和可预测性，颁发、变更和吊销许可证的程序应该明 确规定并公开。例如，关于颁发许可证的程序，最好在《电力法》的实施细则中作出 下列规定。 ·44· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （1）申请条件和要求——要求申请企业填写详细的申请表，说明自己的行业经验、 财务状况（审计过的账目）和企业信息（至少最简略的）等。 （2）清晰、有条理和公开的申请程序，包括： 1）申请的公示，例如，在行业报刊或全国性/当地报纸上。 2）申请提交后，由监管机构在规定时间段内征求意见（以征求意见或听证会的 形式）。 3）通知申请企业颁发许可证或不颁发许可证的决定，并说明理由。 （3）还应该公布需要收取的各项费用。 同样，在公共利益需要的情况下，监管者应该有权在必要时按照法律法规的规定 修改许可的条件。 对于许可证的变更也应该有一些相应规定，确保在需要时可以加以变更，但也提 供一定程度的保护，防止任意变更。许可通常可以应被许可企业的要求进行修改，或 由监管者提出。 当许可证持有者提出修改许可证建议时，监管机构有责任考虑其要求并在规定的 时间内给予答复，或者监管机构启动修改程序。不论是应哪一方要求进行修改，监管 机构有义务公布变更许可证的意图，而且对任何人在规定时间内提出的异议给予考虑。 在任何情况下都需要考虑监管机构的监管程序（很可能包括公众听证），而且监管机 构应该公布其决定和相应的解释。 4.4.5 通用核心条款 尽管不同类型企业的许可条款不同，所有的许可证都应包含的通用核心条款有： （1）范围——将规定企业被授权进行的活动，以及活动的地理区域。 （2）许可期限——这一条很重要，一般来说，期限应该足够长，给企业提供一定 的商业确定性，而且应该规定延期的条件，或者自动批准，或者需经详细审查，或者 重新提起申请。 （3）变更和吊销——这一条应该是指电监会变更或者吊销许可证的权力。 （4）对电监会提供信息的条款——由于电监会具有重要的监管职责，要确保持有 许可证的企业遵守许可条件。因此，应该有一条明确规定，在必要的保密条款约束下， 企业必须向电监会提供它所要求的任何信息。 （5）不同业务财务分离——获得许可的电力企业应该遵守财务完全分离的要求， 以避免不同业务之间产生歧视、交叉补贴以及“相互依赖”等问题。这一条要求如果 被许可企业的业务涉及电力行业几个领域（输电、配电、发电或零售），必须准备和 ·45· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 提交分开的财务信息。这些业务的财务还必须与非能源或非监管领域的业务分开。 （ 6）禁止交叉补贴——明确要求被许可企业保证其被许可业务和任何其他业务（无 论对该业务是否进行监管）之间不存在交叉补贴现象。 （7）许可证费——如果这是电监会的合法收入来源，应该有条款来规范对许可企 业的收费问题。 （8）控制权的委派和转让——许可证需要规定，如果进行企业兼并或合并，被许 可企业有义务将许可证的转让或资产所有权的转移情况通知电监会，并获得批准。 （9）资产处置——为了保证服务的延续性，有必要规定不经监管机构的事先同意， 禁止处置重要资产。为此需要设定一个恰当的门槛，使企业有合理的商业自由，并防 止不正当的官僚行为。 （10）服从行业标准的业务——将规定服从相关行业标准的一般义务，例如电网或 市场标准。 如果采用我们建议的详尽许可的形式，许可就会有很多章节，其中包括有关定价 的章节。垄断企业的许可证可以包括电价和一些具体的数字。 4.4.6 不同许可证类型的专用条款 除了上述的一般条款以外，针对不同类型的许可证，还有很多专用条款。 主要有： （1）配电许可证。因为配电对于最终用户的影响巨大，因而对配电企业有很多专 用条款： 1）价格控制。价格控制对于配电企业来讲是不可避免的，这一条款将明确价格控 制如何决定电价结构和价格水平，也可能规定监管者批准价格的权力。我们认为还应 依据政府颁布的政策，禁止价格歧视。 2）补贴。将规定允许补贴的环境，例如，法律可以规定政府在一定条件下提供补 贴，要确保公司弥补成本，公司盈利不受影响。该条件对要求公司在电价中提供补贴 的程序作出详细规定。 3）接入义务。本条款规定企业提供新接入的义务，包括政府要求企业承担农村地 区电气化或者其他非营利活动的程序，同时明确相应的补偿机制。 4）社会义务。规定要求企业承担任何重大社会义务的程序。 5）服务质量条款。规定制定和实施任何供电和用户服务标准的程序。包括用户投 诉处理程序。 6）系统运行和供电安全标准。为了保障适当的安全和供电标准，这一条款将规定 许可企业系统的日常运行，短期和长期系统规划，以及系统稳定性和供电质量的维护。 ·46· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （2）输电许可证。对于输电企业的附加条件也很重要，我们建议，这种许可证的 专用条款应当包括： 1）输电系统的开发和接入。需要明确输电系统的扩容和开发责任及申请新接入的 步骤。 2）接入系统和使用系统的允许收入。对企业的价格控制对应着趸售供电价格， 也就是全部成本，包括输电成本。因而需要建立一个程序，来确定输电企业的允许 收入。 3）输电系统安全标准和服务质量。包括规划、开发、运行和维护输电系统，建立 一套标准，来衡量和报告输电系统运行和服务质量的情况。 （3）趸售供电许可证。对于趸售供电商，例如区域输电公司，我们建议如下的附 加条件： 1）供电义务。即保证满足用户需求的义务，其中包括确保获得许可的企业与其 有义务供电的所有其他许可证持有者一起，制定运营计划和长期规划，确保满足用 户需求。 2）购电的经济性。这项义务的内容是，向发电商购电应确保以最经济的方式。这 一规定特别强调，购电应按照监管者的要求，尽可能采取竞争性采购的方式。 3）趸售供电价格。将涉及对趸售供电价格的监管。 （4） 发电许可证。在市场环境或单一购买者的环境中，发电许可证无需增加特殊 内容。 （5）其他许可证类型。根据情况不同，可能还有其他类型的许可证，例如： 1）市场运行商许可证，有时可能要与输电系统运营商许可证共同使用。 2）零售许可证，针对那些不经营系统，只向最终用户供电的单位。 4.5 对国有电力企业的监管 如前所述，就其历史起源和在大多数国家的实践情况看，经济监管的对象主要是 私有的公用设施企业。原则上，监管机构对公、私两类企业都应该而且能够公平对待， 但国有企业因其激励机制不同而对同样的监管措施会有不同的反应。 4.5.1 监管国有企业的困难所在 监管控制一般是通过经济激励和制约发挥作用。私有企业希望利润最大化，这一 假设是现代经济学的基础，也是主张竞争能够提高效率和更好地利用资源的逻辑基 础，进而构成了引入市场经济的充分理由。原则上讲，监管机构可以通过对价格的监 ·47· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 管或施加财务惩罚而影响一个企业的盈利，从而激励和制约企业按照理想的方式运作， 这是因为私有的公用事业一般会对监管机构的决策做出较为敏感的反应，以使其在满 足一定条件下获利最大化。 但是，国有企业可能并不在乎利润最大化，他们的经理人可能更愿意追求其他目 标，例如： （1）浪费资金，不适当地将成本做大。 （2）短期行为，忽视长远目标。 （3）盲目投资，把企业人为地“做大”而不是“做强”。 （4）经理人仅对上级任免者负责，过分重视上级对个人职位的任免，不重视企业 效率，不重视行业监管机构对所任职企业实施的经济监管。 国有企业的这些问题在几个国家都出现了。当然，这不是说对国有公共事业企业 不需要进行监管，而是说如果没有意图或者不可能将这些国有企业转化为私有性质， 就必须认识到，监管机构的权威性将大受影响，监管的效果可能大打折扣。 4.5.2 监管国有电力企业的特殊方法 国有企业的上述问题还说明，要实现有效的电力监管，仅仅考虑标准教科书中所 给出的方法是不够的，还必须针对国有企业的特殊情况使用其他一些手段。如： （1）把成本或其他参数与“基准”数据进行对比，或者限制收回成本的程度，而 不是直接用利润激励来提高效率。在难以对国有企业成本进行审计、特别是某些国有 电力企业的关联交易比较隐蔽时，这种方法比较有效。 （2）对违规的企业予以公开通报。一般情况下，由于国有企业经理人对于个人声 誉比经济处罚更为在意和关注，因此可以有效地使用这一措施影响企业的行为。这一 措施使用得好，可能直接影响经理人的任免，因此可能很有效。 （3）对被监管国有企业高级管理人员进行资格认定，参与其职务任命。从衡量专 业能力和经营绩效的角度来看，监管机构可能更直接地了解什么人适合被监管企业的 高级管理职位，更直接地了解有关人员管理企业的才能、专业能力和经营绩效，因此 建议监管机构对上级任命制的被监管企业高级管理人员进行资格认定，参与其职务任 命。比如在被监管电力企业高级管理人员的任命程序中，可规定必须符合监管机构规 定的任职资格要求，听取监管机构的建议或征求监管机构的意见。 （4）监管被监管国有企业高级管理人员的报酬水平。如在第 2 章所述，监管的目 标和原则通常表述为平衡 3 个主要方面的利益，这 3 方分别是用户、公用事业投资者 （国有企业当然包括其经营者）和政府。在价格与成本监管中，为合理确定和控制成本， ·48· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 避免消费者不合理的负担，平衡电力企业经营者和用户之间的利益关系，监管机构应 该对被监管的国有电力企业员工尤其是高级管理人员报酬的最高额度做出限制。 现阶段，国有企业作为中国电力监管主要对象在所难免。但长期看，要想使电力 监管完全发挥效力，明显提高电力行业的效率和服务水平，必须在电力领域引入包括 私人资本在内的多种成分的投资，优化电力企业和投资结构，实现产权多元化。 ·49· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第5章 竞争性电力市场的建立与监管 监管者的任务取决于电力行业的结构，即它具有一定程度的竞争还是完全垄断。 从中期来看，中国电力行业在一定程度上引入竞争是可能的，而从长期看来可以更大 程度地引入竞争，这与其他国家竞争市场发展的情况类似。对于垄断行业的监管，本 报告的其他章节已有详细讨论。本章主要讨论有效监管竞争性环节、或有竞争潜力环 节的具体监管方法，以及在竞争的电力行业中输电公司角色的转变。 如果引入竞争，例如在发电侧引入竞争，监管的透明度和可预测性就变得更加重 要。如果监管不透明或不可预测，投资者将面临来自市场和监管的双重风险。监管机 构的运作方式必须在保持可接受的风险度的同时，不减少企业有效运作所需的激励。 由一个监管机构如国家电监会，根据一套透明和可预测的规则来运作，将可以实现上 述目标。 监管者还需要向决策机构提出有关电力改革速度、进程以及应在多大程度上引入 竞争的建议，这些内容在本报告中没有涉及，这里我们只考虑不同市场模式下的监管 要求。但是，在中国目前似乎存在这样一种认识，那就是电力短缺时不能引入竞争。 这种认识是不正确的。阿根廷在电力严重匮乏时引入了竞争，以非常快的速度解决了 缺电问题，使得电厂提高了效率，降低了损耗，新电厂也建立起来。在中国存在这样 一种担忧，那就是如果电力短缺，电价就会上升，就会出现社会动荡。这种担忧是正 常的。解决过高电价的方法就是利用授权合同，将基本发电量的价格限定在历史水平， 而对增量支付更高的（市场）价格。这样就可以鼓励现有电厂增加发电量，保持高效 运行，并不断扩容，而最终价格反而会下降。 5.1 电力体制的几种模式 电力体制有 4 种主要的模式，它们之间的区别在于保留垄断的程度不同。在 4 种 模式中，输电、配电和系统运行调度这 3 个环节的运行都继续保持垄断。正如上一章 所述，无论发电环节如何，监管者都必须对这些垄断因素进行监管。但不同模式意味 ·50· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 着不同的交易安排、不同的购电和控制价格的程序，以及对竞争行为给予不同的关注 程度。这 4 种模式中竞争依次逐步增加，垄断范围逐步缩小。 4 种不同的体制模式（最初在 NERA 与中国合作的中国电力体制改革项目中提出）， 在其他著作中有详尽的论述。这里我们仅进行简单介绍，而重点放在每种模式的监管 问题上。这 4 种模式在世界不同地区被采用，各有优劣。 5.1.1 模式 1——垂直一体化垄断 模式 1 是 1985 年以前中国所采取的垄断模式，电力行业的所有职能都集中在一个 部门。在此模式下，不存在相互竞争的发电商。图 5.1 给出了这种模式的两种主要形式。 整个行业的各个环节捆绑在一起并受到严格管制。世界电力体制采用这种模式长达 100 年之久，如今部分地区仍继续沿用。整个行业相当于一个或几个垄断企业（每个地区 一个），相关的监管手段已经在前一章进行了论述。本章我们将更多地讨论其他 3 种 模式。 图 5.1 模式 1——垂直一体化垄断 （a）垂直一体化；（b）单独的零售商/配电商 5.1.2 模式 2——单一购买者 该模式下，一个地区只允许一个主体从竞争的发电商中购电，如图 5.2 所示。 中国过去是模式 2 的“集成版”，省电力公司向竞争的发电商购电，并拥有自己 的发电能力。这就引起了利益冲突。近来电力行业的改革将发电分离出来，使电网公 司成为单一买方。因此，目前中国的“分解版”模式就是标准模式 2，各地区的单一买 方是电网公司，并有很多卖方。 ·51· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 模式 2 中监管电价的方法与前一模式不同，因为发电成本由合同决定。这些发电 成本向下环节转移，输电、配电和零售电价是监管的对象。 图 5.2 模式 2——单一购买者 (a)分解模式（北爱尔兰）；(b)标准模式（美国和公益事业管理政策法） 5.1.3 模式 3——趸售竞争 如图 5.3 所示，模式 3 允许配电企业和大用户向竞争的发电商购电。这一模式几乎 被所有实现竞争的国家（除美国以外）所采用，或作为过渡阶段，或作为计划达到的 目标。 图 5.3 模式 3——趸售竞争 ·52· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 在这一模式中，监管的主要对象是输电和配电电价，以及市场行为，包括缔约行 为的监管。监管者还要根据这些成本的总和制定零售电价。 5.1.4 模式 4——零售竞争 模式 4 允许所有的用户自由选择供电商，因此相互竞争的发电商可以向任何人售 电，不过小用户通常还是通过联营体或零售公司购电，如图 5.4 所示。在美国，模式 4 被理解为“零售准入”或“用户选择”。目前英国、新西兰、澳大利亚、阿根廷、挪 威、瑞典、西班牙、加拿大阿尔伯达省和美国的许多州都已采用该模式。 图 5.4 模式 4——零售竞争 与模式 3 一样，模式 4 要求建立新的批发交易制度和竞争性批发市场。模式 4 的 特殊要求包括（零售环节的）结算、计量、记账程序等，这些都是比模式 3 增加的内 容，还要对广大用户进行相关培训，这些都是耗资大而且十分复杂的事情。尽管很多 发达国家实行了模式 4，但在运行上出现了很多问题。 由于中国电力行业已基本实现“厂网分开”，也没有迹象表明中国在近期内采用 模式 4 的意图，所以我们模式 1 和模式 4 中的监管问题，这里可暂不讨论[《电力竞争》 （S. Hunt 2002）一书中有详细介绍]。而模式 2 是中国目前现行的体制，模式 3 是近期 可能普遍实行的体制，因而下面将重点讨论模式 2 和 3 中的监管问题。 5.2 模式 2——单一买方中的监管问题 目前很多国家，尤其是亚洲国家都采用单一买方模式，把它作为迈向电力自由 ·53· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 化的第一步，同时把它作为以独立发电商（ IPP）形式吸引投资的一种途径。中国采 用这种模式已经长达 20 年。该模式的特点是只允许独立发电商向单一买主（在中国， 即各区域或省电网公司）售电，而后者仍完全垄断了所有的电力最终用户。单一买 方模式是一种有限竞争模式。仅在电厂的建设和运行上存在竞争。由于只有一个买 主，合同必须涵盖所有的电量以及电厂的整个寿命期，因为没有其他买主会来购买 剩余电量。 5.2.1 模式 2 中监管者的作用 模式 2 中的电价监管可详见图 5.5。 图 5.5 模式 2 的电价监管结构图——独立的输电和/或配电 在模式 2 中，监管者主要关注以下几方面： （1）设定垄断的输电和配电业务电价。 （2）通过批准单一买者的购电合同，降低发电成本，包括：①合同形式（例如两 部制合同，电厂的寿命期）；②缔约方法（特别是竞争性招标程序）；③合同条款（例 如优先顺序调度条款）。 （3）要求电网公司公布投资预测。 （4）根据购买发电的合同成本加上输电和配电成本制定零售价格。 （5）监督质量。 在模式 2 中，监管者仍要控制垄断性环节（输电和配电）的价格和成本，而且还 要监管购电合同的签订过程。 5.2.2 单一购买者模式下的电网公司 模型 2 有一个非常重要的新参与者——单一购买者，还存在一个电网公司，为避 免调度电厂过程中的利益冲突，要求其与发电分离。目前，中国的情况是，电网公司 同时也是单一购买者，是一个非常有影响力的实体，它具有 3 个主要职能，这些职能 可能会产生利益冲突。 ·54· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （1）发电量的购买（作为单一购买者）。 （2）制订（提前）调度计划和实施（实时）调度。 （3）对电网进行投资和商业运营。 另外，在中国仍有些发电企业由电网公司拥有，这将产生严重的利益冲突。 这些职能在运行中应当是分离的。区域性电网公司对不同业务的进一步分离可以 在一定程度上解决这些问题，但所有这些领域都需要有效监管。它们应该财务独立， 有独立的收入来源。 5.2.3 单一购买者模式下的发电采购 在中国，每个区域或省电网公司是该地区的“单一购买者”，通过签订合同购电。 但是，电网公司所签订合同的过程不是竞争性的，发电企业的价格是政府给定的。这 个价格不能反映成本状况，且效率低，严重地扭曲了发电采购行为。 在这方面有许多关于如何进行有效监管的国际经验可以借鉴（以及应该避免犯什 么错误）。作为惟一买主的公用事业公司应该负责进行采购，但要执行监管者规定的 程序，监管者应该监督整个采购活动的进行。 有效的竞争性采购包括下列方面： （1）电监会应要求每个单一购买者定期预测负荷需求并制定发电规划，指出未来 需要的新增发电容量。这些规划应该得到电监会及国家有关部门的批准，并在电监会 的监督下执行。只有规划中有需求，才批准新容量的采购。 （2）采购程序应该由电监会规定，具体内容包括采购的时间安排、采购机会的发 布、招标文件的格式、材料的发售、评标、联系投标人或者潜在投标人、合同谈判等。 （3）所使用的购电合同的格式应由电监会批准，而且应该是标准格式，适用于所 有发电投资者。 （4）评标方法应该经电监会同意，而且事先制定，这样才能保证透明度。评标的 程序应该经电监会同意。 （5）只有电监会确认一切遵照程序进行，才能将合同授予中标企业。 一些国家（例如美国和泰国）的经验证明，采用适当的采购程序可以取得低成本 发电的良好效果。相反，一些国家，例如印度和一些亚洲国家的教训也告诉我们，如 果不采用这些竞争性程序，通常的结果就是迟缓、低效，而且价格较高。我们建议， 电监会作为电力行业监管者，应该在这方面起领导作用。 5.2.4 单一购买模式中的调度问题 调度工作对于电力系统的高效运转，以及竞争的发展都是至关重要的。由于众多 ·55· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 原因，调度在中国没有真正实现按成本优先顺序调度。如果是基于成本优先顺序调度， 向单一买者或向更具竞争性模式的转变都将容易得多。竞争性的市场促使调度按优先 顺序进行，而竞争性较弱的市场依靠监管机构监管，调度机构按照成本优先顺序进行 调度。模式 2 应该按照成本优先顺序进行调度，因此，合同采取两部制形式，明确燃 料成本。 优先顺序是短期成本的顺序，成本最低的电厂应该运行最长的发电小时数。数十 年经验证明，这种方法确保了已建成的发电厂以最低成本方式运行。结合着保证最低 成本系统扩张的投资标准的执行，整个行业可以获得最大效率。 我们建议这种按照成本优先顺序进行的调度应该尽早实施。 监管机构应保证调度计划的制定和实时调度在公平的基础上进行，因此，调 度的规则和程序应获得监管者的批准，调度过程也要接受评估，特别是在对调度 决定有争议的时候。当负责调度的机构同时也拥有发电厂的情况下，这些措施更 为重要。 中国目前没有实行成本优先顺序调度，客观上有几个方面因素的限制：一是政府 计划安排电量，规定每个电厂的年基准合同电量和电价；二是上网电价基本上实行单 一制电价，由政府制定，没有鼓励购电机构按照电厂成本优先顺序调度的激励机制； 三是政府对基准合同电量之外的电量规定了统一上网电价，缺乏鼓励发电厂在需求紧 张的时候提高可用性的机制。 5.3 模式 3——趸售竞争中的监管问题 模式 3 允许（实际上是要求）配电企业从相互竞争的发电企业购电；电网公司不 再是该地区的单一购买者——应成立足够数量的配电公司来保证竞争性采购。 模式 3 允许大用户自由选择供电商，但小用户几乎或根本没有“用户选择”或零售 准入（而模式 4 则允许所有用户自由选择供电商），仍然由配电公司垄断供电，模式 3 的配电公司以趸售方式购电，也可能拥有一些自己的发电能力。如果它以趸售方式购 电，就应该要求它以最低成本购电。 在这种竞争模式中，交易可能以各种形式进行，包括电力期货交易。电力期货交 易允许买方和卖方在一定时间内规避价格风险。这样的市场，如果受到合理监管，可 以提高电力市场的整体效率，并改善有关市场价格趋势的信息状况。 5.3.1 模式 3 中监管者的作用 模式 3 中的电价监管详见图 5.6。 ·56· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 5.6 模式 3 中的电价监管结构图 模式 3 中监管者的作用包括： （1） 为输电和配电垄断业务制定价格。 （2） 保证市场的竞争性以控制发电成本。 1）控制市场操纵力。 2）发电商的自由准入。 3）需求侧响应。 4）市场监督。 （3）要求电网公司公布投资需求和预测。 （4）要求电网公司投资于输电。 （5）要求配电公司以最低成本购买电力，合同招标采购和现货采购。 （6）根据输电和配电成本及发电的市场价格，确定小用户的零售电价。 （7） 监督质量。 “5 号文”中提到了竞争性趸售市场的发展。随着行业的发展，引入竞争性发电市 场成为可能，监管机构应在确保有效竞争方面继续起到领导作用。其他国家的经验又 一次证明，有效的监管和控制对竞争作用的发挥至关重要。根据其他国家的经验，电 监会应该行使的职能如下： （1）确保竞争性市场——众多供电商、购电商，供电商的反应和需求侧响应。 （2）监管市场交易安排（市场规则）。 ·57· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （3）监督电网公司的投资和输电业务模式。 （4）监督配电公司的竞争性采购。 下面将更详细地描述。 5.3.2 监管交易安排（市场规则） 对交易安排实施监管是保证交易安排高效和公平的必要手段。电力市场交易安排 （市场规则）应该由电监会组织电网公司与其他相关各方共同起草，由电监会审批。 并非中国所有的省份或区域必须遵循同样的竞争模式（垄断、单一购买者、趸售 竞争等）。但是采用模式 3 的地区最好使用相类似的交易安排。事实上，电监会应该 设计交易安排的标准模式。美国和欧洲都鼓励交易安排的地方化，结果是阻碍了更广 泛的市场发育。FERC 最终根据 PJM 模式采用了标准设计，但是没有能够坚持下去。 电监会必须监督电力市场的运行，应该有权在必要的时候对市场进行干预，或者 要求修改市场规则。没有电监会的批准，不允许修改市场规则。 例如，这些规则可能包含了一些为水力发电厂考虑的因素，水力发电厂启动运行 快，不需要提前一天的市场，事实上市场可以由竞标拍卖方式来实时运作，挪威就是 一个例子。但燃煤电厂启动时比较慢，启动成本也比较高，电厂需要了解是否会被调 用。这就导致对提前一天市场的需要。监管者必须坚持这一点，以确保公平竞争。 国际经验表明，监管机构应该对交易安排拥有控制权，确保其高效、避免歧视。 在英国，原英格兰和威尔士市场有一套市场规则，存在一些问题，但不在电力监管机 构（OFGEM）的管辖之下，也就是说 OFGEM 没有改变市场交易规则（ POOL）以提 高其效率的权力。最终是通过立法变更对 POOL 进行了重大修改，引入了新的交易安 排（NETA）。如果以前的市场交易规则可以由 OFGEM 控制，就有可能避免这样的 剧变。 5.3.3 促进发电市场的竞争 如果监管机构不再制定发电价格，它必须保证价格是由竞争性市场决定的，竞争 性的市场需要众多发电商和众多买者，而且买卖双方能够对价格作出反应。还需要确 保通过公平接入输配电系统，可以将电力从发电商传送到买方。 （1）确保发电企业的自由准入。发电商应该对价格作出反应，在价格较高的时候 进入市场。对于一个有效运作的发电市场来说，很重要的一点就是发电企业应该可以 无歧视地自由进入。电监会需要通过颁发许可证和制定其他一些规定能够确保新加入 的企业不受到歧视。 同样，应该要求电网公司每年发表滚动的多年负荷预测，说明各个地区对电量的 ·58· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 需求，在什么地方正在建设或规划新电厂，哪里计划建设新的输电线路。这将使潜在 竞争者能够获得尽可能多的信息。 （2）确保非歧视性输电和配电电网使用条件。这包括： 1）制定发电厂接网和系统接入规则。 2）制定系统维护和运行的监管规则，确保发电企业不会受到歧视。 3）对电价和其他输电、配电网连接的条款的执行情况进行监管，确保不存在 歧视。 4）建立输电和配电公司的成本会计制度，尤其是要确立财务分离，确保在发电、 输电和配电之间不存在交叉补贴。 （3）监督操纵市场行为。电监会要对市场参与主体（包括市场运行者）的行为进 行监督，确保没有妨碍竞争的行为。当市场上只有少数几个竞争发电商时，不可避免 地会怀疑可能发生反竞争的行为，因此监管应： 1）有权向市场参与者和市场运行机构收集常规的投标数据、价格数据、利润数据， 以寻找反竞争行为的证据。 2）电监会应该有权收集这些信息，尽管是否公布这些信息一直存在着疑问，因为 公布了信息似乎就更容易造成串通。 在接到发生了该行为的申诉时有权进行调查。当市场运营机构在其他业务环节还 有利益，尤其是在发电和供电环节还存在利益的时候，必须有强有力的监管来避免这 种利益冲突。理想的目标是，将市场运营机构与这些利益彻底分开，避免利益冲突的 发生。为了消除反竞争行为，具有强有力的监管执行力是很重要的。经验告诉我们， 对于反竞争行为最后的办法就是强迫这些公司向其他市场参与者出售发电容量，降 低市场集中度。然而，这需要有非常强的权力。 5.3.4 模式 3 中的“容量支付” 中国的社会主义市场经济可以使价格发挥良好的投资信号的作用。价格信号理论 在发电市场同样适用。价格反映供需平衡的关系，依靠单一的价格机制来获得足够的 容量和可接受的可靠性是完全可行的。但是，这的确意味着应该有这样的机制，使大 用户可以了解现货价格，可以对其作出反应。大用户超过合同的耗电量应该按小时计 量，按每小时的现货价格计费。大用户应该能以现货价格出售合同电量，这样有助于 缓解缺电问题。长远来看，这在中国也是可行的。然而，允许由市场引导投资，这意 味着必须允许价格产生波动。也就是发电商和大用户之间的合同价格必须自由协商， 而且合同必须是有执行力的。同时，现货市场价格时高时低。现货价格的波动是很关 ·59· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 键的，因为它能平衡供应和需求。 电力市场的价格常常随着备用容量的变动而波动，许多发电市场就是按照这一方 式来运作的。这就意味着在容量短缺的时候，电力的价格就会比较高。由于这个原因， 用户参与市场定价十分重要，也就是说配电公司和大用户应当安装按照小时计量的电 表，并且在高电价时暂停用电，节约成本。 尽管以上描述的市场模式在理论上是正确的，而且在条件合适时运作较好，但是， 在实践中有很多的例子表明，这样的市场机制难以有效运作，而且可能不会吸引足够 的发电投资。 （1）在价格受到监管约束的地方，价格可能不会允许变化到可以足够提供市场激 励必须的水平。 （2）投资者会关心更高的监管或政治方面的风险，特别是在新的和没有经验的市 场或监管制度的地方。 （3）即使是在价格信号能够在长时期引入足够的发电容量的地方，短期价格的波 动和临时短缺导致的断电也是不能被政策制定者接受的。 （4）可靠性是所有消费者都关心的，在实践中，当容量短缺必需中断供应时，不 可能在消费者之间加以区分；除非有足够的小时计量设备，使用户可以在价格较高时 不用电。 （5）在很多电力系统的环境里，消费者的电价不能有效反映消费者的购买意愿， 或者不能有效地指导可用容量的分配。 由于这些原因，政策制定者在实际中常常认为，需要一些特别的机制来确保足够 的容量富裕。通常，在引入了这些机制的地方，存在以下原因，或是为了确保供电可 靠性，或是为了避免容量短缺带来的价格波动或是因为决策者确信广泛使用小时计量 设备是一项过于复杂的工作。 通常在实践中为保证有足够的发电装机，会采用 3 种方法： （1）现货市场价格中包含容量付费。 （2）容量义务。 （3）签订容量合同。 这 3 种选择的实践操作可以在不同的国家找到，第一种类型在不同的国家又有些 不同，下面我们讨论每一种机制的主要特征。 5.3.4.1 现货市场价格中包含容量付费 在这种方式下，市场自身会在支付电量电价之后对可调度的或可用的电厂的价格 ·60· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 作出安排。各市场的机制可能不同，但总体来说，这种机制的特征是： （1）价格上涨，尤其是容量紧张时价格可能会很高。这将鼓励发电机组保持可用 状态。 （2）存在一些机制防止价格上升得过高，利用实际用户反应或模拟用户反应制订 价格上限。 1）模拟用户反应制订价格上限：在英国、澳大利亚、阿根廷和其他一些国家的早期 模式中，模拟用户反应是由负荷损失值时的价格上限（最后一个用户愿意支付的价格）来 大致估计，由监管者确定。监管价格上限如果在负荷损失值以下，则是毫无意义的。 2）实际用户反应：确定最高上限的较好方式是直接由最终用户的支付意愿来确定， 通过实际用户投标的方式确定。这种方法在 PJM 和纽约州市场中有应用。这至少需要 大用户有小时计量表计。 如果没有实际或模拟用户的响应，还可以选择“容量义务”或者“容量合同”的方式。 美国加州在改革中没有任何保护，没有用户响应，无论是实际用户还是模拟用户， 没有容量义务，没有容量合同，什么都没有。最终加州市场价格在电力短缺时以 10 为 倍数上升。加州的市场是一场灾难，吓坏了每个人，但是这一切实际上可以不发生。 5.3.4.2 发电容量义务 一些市场（如 PJM，纽约和安大略）采用的机制是：所有向用户售电的市场主体 （即所谓的负荷服务商，或称为 LSE）必须能够证明其签订了足够的合同容量满足用户 的负荷需求。 这就是说这些市场主体必须自己拥有电厂，或者与相应电厂签订容量合 同来履行容量义务。不能履行这种义务就会被罚款，如果设定的水平高于新增发电容 量的成本，就应该能确保新电厂的建设。 可惜，要求足够的合同来应对负荷是针对未来的需求起作用，例如，1 月份 LSE 表明他们有足够的合同容量来应对 7 月份的预测需求。但事实上这不能防止 7 月份发 生缺电的情况。特别是中国这样负荷一直在增长的国家，“容量需求义务”看似不错， 但实际上不会起什么作用。如果需求是按小时的需求，LSE 有了足够的合同容量来满 足实际需求，那么短期容量合同的价格就将提高到惩罚性的水平。如果惩罚的水平是 根据负荷损失值来设定的，我们又回到了依靠模拟价格的情况。 我们认为，发展具有需求反应能力的市场远比依靠“容量需求义务”好得多，PJM 和纽约都在向这个方向发展。 5.3.4.3 为所需发电签订容量合同 在这种安排中，有一个主体，如独立系统运行机构、市场运营机构或一个关键的 ·61· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 公用事业机构等，组织邀请投标人对预定的新建容量进行竞标，合同授予出价最低者。 到目前为止，短期采用这种签订合同方法的惟一的例子是澳大利亚。不过，国际上电 力市场的不确定性、需要安排供应来解决过渡期风险问题等，已有许多国家在使用这 种方法方面已有发展，尤其是爱尔兰、希腊等。 与此同时，这种（容量招投标）机制引入了长期合同（通常是 10～12 年），这样， 以独立系统运营商或市场运营机构作为合同一方，基本上可以防止产生沉淀的合同。 在最大权限范围内，独立系统运营商或市场运营机构可以通过向所有用户征收额外费 用的手段来保证所有成本都能回收。 采用这种合同方法的潜在的好处是： （1）可预见。 通过让投标人就规定数量的新投资进行投标，保证了投标者的技术 资质，则所需新的装机就可以在适当的时间范围的完成。 （2）重点考虑新进入者。这种机制限于运用在新进入的发电商，这样可以避免向 现有电厂支付费用从而控制成本。 但是，这种保证长期有多余容量和较低市场价格的做法可能彻底摧毁市场。模式 2 中，电网公司明确负责购电，所有合同成本全部转嫁给了用户，这种类型的市场可能 要优于模式 3 的这种部分竞争市场 ，因为在这个市场中准政府机构充当了一个不负责 任的竞争者角色。 5.4 供需平衡的责任 如果在计划经济体制下政府负有保证电力供需平衡的责任，那么在真正的市场经济体 制下由谁来承担这个责任？答案是显然的——由市场机制来负责。价格机制被认为是可以 促进有效供给和合理需求的，但是在很多市场中这种作用并不是总能有效发挥。而且，电 力市场比大多数市场更复杂，所以政府总是担心市场调节的过程中会出现电力短缺。 吸引新的投资的问题通常出现在新的或过渡期的电力市场中，而且已建立了一些 机制可以解决这一问题。我们目前所知的是，中国的电力市场试点中还没有采用这些 机制。不过到目前为止，看上去在中国投资新建发电机组的兴趣不是问题，而且有很 多投资者希望继续投资建设比政府愿意批准还多的容量。但从另一方面来看，事实上 所有那些投资者都是国有公司，如果是私有部门投资的话，就不会有如此高的投资热 情。因此，从长期考虑来看，应该考虑采取一个可行的过渡性的容量机制。 5.4.1 模式 2 中的投资监管 基于其他地方的一些实践经验，在模式 2 中电力行业对于投资监管的长期安排应 ·62· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 该是这样的： （1）发电容量规划由相关电网公司在国家发改委发布的宏观经济预测的基础上进 行编制。 （2）规划的批准发改委协同电监会负责。 （3）电网公司在电监会的监督下负责实施规划。 （4）新的发电容量通过竞争招标的方式签订新合同，招标工作应该由购电机构（在 中国应该是电网公司）按照电监会明确的程序、在电监会的监督下来执行。电网公司 根据对输电成本的测算指出哪里需要建设电厂。 （5）这些购电合同在向模式 3 转变的过渡期可以继续存在，这些合同可能销售给 新的投资者（大电力公司），但是这些合同电量必须向市场报价，或者是由新的投资 者来报价，或者是由电网公司或者合同的购买者来报价。 5.4.2 模式 3 中的投资监管 在该模式下，确保具有充足投资的机制将可能不同。在未来可能存在的更加市场 化的环境中，保证发电和输电投资决策之间的协调是非常重要的。 （1）从长期看，理想化的方式是市场决定系统所需的容量，但是应该考虑，是否 需要容量机制来保障市场有足够的容量。 （2）在模式 3 中对于电网公司来说最难的规划问题是，如果发电公司不遵循一个 集中的发电规划，电网公司难以计算出未来需要多少装机容量。理想的做法是，发电 公司必须承担其连接到电网的所有费用，以及该部分新增装机容量所引起的需要加强 电网的全部费用。但是由于电网中所有电厂的电力流相互作用，很难确定这些费用。 （3）不同的地方解决这个问题有不同的方法。在大多数地方，电网公司公布 3 年、 5 年或 7 年预测，包括发电容量的增长以及不同地区新建电厂需建设新的输电线路的费 用等。电网公司在发电公司的要求下，有义务提供新发电厂的接网价格的报价。该报 价必须根据经确认的成本计算，并经过监管机构的批准。 ·63· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 第6章 中国电力监管机构的近期能力建设 前面几章重点阐述了中国电力监管机构长期能力建设及与之相关的问题，这些问 题的解决要有一个过程，实现目标模式可能需要较长时间。除此之外，电监会应进一 步改善和加强近期能力建设，这一点与长期能力建设同样重要，它关系到有关方面对 电监会现实价值的理解。我们认为，近期能力建设的内容，包括外部条件和内部基础 建设两个方面，应按轻重缓急和自身力所能及的程度进行选择和实施。我们已经在本 报告的其他部分强调了一个良好的监管机构所应具备的条件，并且已经阐述了近期电 监会应当建立起监管机构所需的公信力，建立这种公信力要求有明确的授权、不受其 他政府机构的日常干预、监管行为遵循透明和公开的原则。 下面我们将讨论开展近期监管能力建设的具体措施。 6.1 加快电力体制改革 切实推进以市场化为基本取向的电力体制改革，是提高中国电力监管机构能力最 基本的前提条件。如前所述，在中国，现代监管制度的建立，是电力体制改革的有机 组成部分。电力体制改革迟滞，则现代电力监管制度很难建立，甚至很多已确立的监 管职能也无法有效履行。比如主辅不分离，则输配电成本规则难以实施，科学合理的 输配电价格监管机制不可能建立；政府职能转变滞后，则电力监管机构与其他政府部 门的关系很难理顺。 中国电力体制改革近年的进展状况似乎不尽如人意，似乎处于“半生不熟”的停 滞状态。据我们观察，原因是多方面的，但最主要的还是近年中国全国性长时间缺电， 转移了电力工作的重心，增大了中国情况下电力改革的难度。此外，现行电力体制改 革工作机构的运转效果也不太理想。 我们建议，电力体制改革工作小组应该有明确的工作目标，包括： （1）制定电力体制改革的整体规划，并且这个规划不仅是一个基本思路，而应是 ·64· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 可操作的，有明确的改革时间表。 （2）及时就取得的进展和进一步改革面临的重要问题向国务院汇报并提出工作 建议。 （3）负责新电力法的起草，并要有明确的时间表。 我们也建议，电力体制改革工作小组应利用中国电力供需矛盾缓解的有利时机， 加强领导，加强协调，加快决策，加大改革力度；电力体制改革工作小组办公室应加 强工作力量，明确责任目标，加快实施改革决策。 需要指出的是，在任何一个市场经济国家或地区，电力体制改革都被执政党和政 府视为重大的政治决断，因而都由其最高领导层或其授权的高层决策人物亲自领导和 强力推动。中国电力体制改革的重要性、复杂性起码不亚于其他先期改革的国家和地 区。因此，尽管目前中国已经进入电力体制改革的有利时期，但根据国际经验和中国 的实际情况，要保证电力改革的进度、力度并取得预期的成功，电力体制改革工作小 组必须及时获得最高领导层或其授权的高层决策者强有力的领导、决策和推动。 我们同时建议，电力体制改革近期应加快实施主辅分离，以避免交叉补贴和关联 交易，搭建电力市场基本平台，培育合格的市场主体：尽快核定输配电电价，尽快逐 级、批量开放大用户向发电厂直接购电，尽快研究实施输配分开，以尽快实现区域电 力市场从单一购买者模式到趸售竞争模式的转变，建立起多卖方和多买方模式（模式 3） 的真正意义上的区域电力市场；抓紧研究电力市场交易运营机构的合理定位和电力企 业产权制度改革问题，以期进一步形成公平、有效的市场竞争格局。 6.2 大力推进区域电力市场建设 电力市场化改革是一项系统性很强的工程。从国际经验来看，不仅包括电力企业 组织结构和产权结构的调整，还包括国家对电力工业管理方式的创新。中国确定了建 立区域电力市场的改革战略，这是中国借鉴国际经验并结合了中国实际的选择。 区域电力市场是中国优化电力资源配置、提高电力行业效率的有效手段，同时将 有力地促进政府电力管理职能向适应市场经济的方向转变，提高政府在市场经济条件 下管理电力工业的能力。因此，电监会要大力推进区域电力市场建设，逐步发挥市场 配置资源的基础性作用，促进形成与市场经济体制相适应的新的电力调控和监管制度， 新的制度将宏观调控、市场调节和有效监管结合起来，提高国家管理电力工业的有效 性和科学性。这样，电力监管能力将随着电力市场的发展而逐步得到提高。从某种意 义上讲，这是一项根本性的工作。 ·65· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 6.3 将“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”作为重点工作领域 如果现行的电力体制和职能配置没有明显改变，电监会发挥作用的空间确实受到 了很大抑制，但这并不意味着电监会就不可以有所作为。电力监管机构的建立顺应了 电力体制演进的规律，合乎中国电力行业发展和改革的要求。电监会要努力使其获得 社会各界的认同和支持，这是电监会的领导和员工应该承担的历史责任。 在现行电力体制和职能配置状况下，电监会的工作要想取得较为明显的成效，从 而获得社会各界的认同和支持，可考虑将“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”作为近 期重点开拓的工作领域。因为： （1）“规范市场秩序”是国务院赋予电监会的基本职责。营造良好的电力市场秩 序，对于保障电力系统安全稳定运行、维护市场主体和消费者的合法权益至关重要。 厂网初步分开以后，电网企业与发电企业包括发电企业之间成为不同的市场主体和利 益主体，过去的内部问题外部化，隐性矛盾显性化，急需监管机构化解矛盾，协调利 益关系，规范市场行为。 （2）“保护消费者”本来就是监管机构的基本职责。虽然监管机构的职责是平衡 各利益相关者间的利益关系，但相对于被监管的电力企业，消费者始终处于弱势地位， 监管机构必须对消费者的权益予以特别的维护。因此，把“消费者保护”作为近期重 点开拓的工作领域，可与电监会长远的发展很好地结合起来。 （3）中国的电力消费者急需保护。如前述，中国电力行业的服务质量较差。而自 从政府电力专管部门——电力部撤销后，供电服务质量基本处于监管真空状态。 （4）“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”的正面意义容易理解，影响大，对各界 认识电力监管机构的特点和价值效果明显。 因此，近期电监会一定要突出行业秩序和社会公共利益及用户利益维护者的职责， 寻找机会，在“规范市场秩序”和“保护消费者”方面办好若干有影响力的“大事”。 据我们所知，电监会成立以来，在规范发电市场和调度运行秩序等方面采取了一些重 要的措施，顺应了改革的需要，取得了较好的效果，今后应保持延续性，并尽快扩展 到保护电力消费者领域。为震慑潜在的违规者，鼓励消费者树立依靠电监会维权的意 识，对违规者，在予以经济处罚的同时，还可予以“通报”或登报处罚。 6.4 进一步构建电力监管法规体系 根据国务院“5 号文”对电监会的授权，自 2003 年以来，电监会颁发了电力市场 ·66· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 运营基本规则、电力市场监管办法、电力市场技术支持系统功能规范、关于区域电力 市场建设的指导意见、促进公开、公平、公正调度办法、发电厂并网运行管理意见、 购售电合同示范文本、并网调度协议示范文本、电力用户向发电企业直接购电试点暂 行办法等相关规则，但要使电监会真正有能力完成其使命，这些规则还远远不够。 首先是要推动加快《电力法》的修改工作，在新《电力法》中确认电力监管机构 的法定职责和权力，再依据新《电力法》，修改《电力监管条例》等行政法规。该法 须强调以下内容： （1）电力监管机构。包括定义其构成，一般及特殊法律权力和责任，以及其应具 有拟定相关法规和其他法律文件的能力。 （2）确立电力监管机构和新的政府能源政策制定部门的关系。 （3）定义新的电力体制，包括电力的行业结构、市场结构、各相关主体的基本权 利和义务。 此外，还要尽快建立以下规则： （1）电监会的一般规则程序。 （2）监管决策的咨询程序。 （3）许可证工作程序、许可证范本等等。 （4）市场规则申请的批准程序，包括市场管理，这些将促使市场规则的颁布。 （5）价格监管程序，包括会计成本标准的规则、信息需求标准的规则和价格检查 程序。 （6）电力采购程序的规章，包括标准合同。 （7）质量监管规章，包括投诉处理程序。 （8）投资监管和系统规划的规章或规则。 6.5 与政府有关部门加强协作，共同开展有关监管工作 如前所述，目前电价监管、投资监管等主要监管职能没有授予电监会，这些职能 仍然保留在政府有关部门之中，电监会在这些方面仅有次要职能或者一般性建议权， 但这并不意味着电监会在这些方面就无所作为。电监会可以从区域电力市场建设、规 范电力市场秩序、保护消费者利益等工作需要出发，与政府有关部门（主要是国家发 改委）加强合作甚至配合国家发改委，开展相关监管工作。在合作中出成效，在协作 中显作用，在实践和发展中逐步改革传统审批方法并完善职能配置。据我们了解，政 府有关部门履行电力监管职责的人手较少，力量远远不够，在这种情况下，电监会与 ·67· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 之加强协作，对双方都是需要的。 当然，即使今后电监会具备了电价监管、投资监管等重要职能，政府宏观部门与 电监会实现了“政监分离”，由于工作需要，电监会也应加强与政府部门的工作沟通， 而在目前情况下，这种协作更显必要和重要，这是一项务实的措施。 6.6 完善并落实电力监管费的征收措施 如前所述，电力监管机构经费来源于对电力企业的监管收费，符合“责任者负担” 的原则，这是市场经济国家的通行做法，公平且有效率。但据了解，中国电力监管费 的征收方案还很初步，实施比较困难。目前电监会大量的业务经费（比如区域电力市 场建设经费）无稳定来源。这种局面继续下去，或者产生“不作为”问题，或者像其 他一些政府部门那样，很多专项工作经费直接由企业承担。无论是前者还是后者，都 将对电监会履行职责造成长久的损害，也会损害电监会乃至整个政府在公众中的形象。 因此，电监会（也包括其他政府有关部门）应充分认清电力监管费的意义，落实 得越早，对监管工作越有利，对政府形象的损害就越少。 6.7 尽快研究建立电力监管基层组织 当前阻碍中国电力监管能力提高的主要障碍之一，是很多监管事项（比如服务质 量、消费者保护）没有相应的一线监管机构去执行和落实，这使得行业监管的整体效 果大打折扣。很显然，电监会的分支机构不能只设置到区域电力监管局和部分省“专 员办”，省和省以下必须建立完整的电力监管组织体系，才能确保有效、高效监管和 电力体制改革的顺利推进。因此，近期监管能力建设的重要任务之一，就是要消除争 议，使分支机构的合理框架得以确定，并尽快实施。 电监会各级分支机构组建，初期的重点是“布局”，即先把基层组织建立起来， 以使政令得以统一并有效执行。此外，电监会要有效行使监管职能，目前的人手也明 显不够。关于这方面的国际经验，我们在附录 A 中有详细描述，其中的一些数据可 供参考。 （1）在英国，OFGEM 拥有约 300 名员工。它同时负责监管电力和天然气的事务，作 为一个独立的办公室运作，它所监管的电力工业的规模只相当于中国一个中等规模的省。 （2）在美国，联邦能源监管委员会（FERC）的员工超过 1200 人。尽管 FERC 同 时也监管其他能源工业，但是除了联邦机构之外，全国还有 5 个 FERC 的区域监管分 支机构，各州有公用事业委员会监管电力等能源工业。 ·68· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 因此总体上讲，电力监管人员必须大幅增加。但各级机构用人均应坚持“宁缺勿 滥”的原则。特别需要强调的是，电力监管机构人员的增加，并不一定相应增加政府 员工总量。随着一些职责从政府其他部门转移到电监会，电监会增加的员工可以来自 政府这些部门。 6.8 申请授权采用特殊方法对国有电力企业实施有效监管 如第 4 章第 4.5 节所述，中国电力监管机构监管国有电力企业的情况大量存在，但 是由于我们在 4.5 节讨论的原因，只有采取特殊的方法，才能有效监管这些企业。因此， 我们建议电监会可以向国务院申请授权采用第 4.5.2 节所推荐的特殊方法对国有电力企 业实施有效监管。 6.9 及时准确掌握电力企业相关信息，建立与外界进行有效沟通和交流的 机制 一方面是因为电力监管机构是新机构，另一方面也因为电监会的性质与目前的多 数政府部门不同，它工作的基本内容就是解决各种错综复杂的利益冲突。电监会必须 有更加健全的与外界进行沟通、交流的机制，我们推荐采用如下方式建立顺畅的交流 机制： （1）充分利用掌握电力行业信息的优势，加强与外界的行业信息交流。 （2）邀请或组织国内、外专家对电力改革及监管重大课题进行深入研讨。 （3）考虑发布“中国电力监管年度报告”，提高监管行为的透明度和电监会的政 策推动能力。 （4）与各级政府及有关部门加强工作沟通和协调，取得支持与配合。 （5）积极向国务院提出推进电力改革的重大政策建议，提高政策的推动能力。 （6）与国外其他电力（能源）监管机构建立经常性联系，以便及时学习他们的成 功经验,避免他们已经犯过的错误，少走弯路。 （7）与国内其他监管机构如电信、证券、银行、保险等监管部门建立经常性联 系，它们所面临的一些共性的问题及解决中的经验教训，对电监会的发展肯定也会 有所助益。 6.10 加强员工培训，制定工作人员行为规范 在培训方面，电监会已经做了大量的工作，如邀请了一些领导和有关专家做专题 ·69· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 讲座，安排了部分员工出国学习或考察。这些工作对于员工快速适应电力监管工作的 需要起到了积极作用。 由于电力监管手段和方法不同于传统的行政管理方式，因此电监会要履行职能， 一般性的公务员培训远远不够，其员工应具备基于市场经济的现代监管理念和系统的 监管专业知识。因此，我们建议电监会设计和实施更全面的培训内容，包括： （1）现代经济学特别是管制经济学的基本原理。 （2）法学特别是有关经济立法的基本原理。 （3）项目评价及企业财务管理常识。 （4）与电力监管相关的专业技术知识。 （5）公共关系理论和技巧。 （6）其他先期电力改革国家的经验和教训。 在中国的一些公共部门里面，在行为标准、公共服务和其他事务方面，存在着工 作质量不高和缺乏效率的问题。如果电监会要完全履行其职责、获得电力公司和公众 的信心，那么，电监会避免受到这些恶习的“污染”是非常重要的。因此，在人员聘 用和培养上,要考虑的一个重要方面是，必须致力于避免聘用不合适的人员，并通过建 立适当的行为规范来进一步培养员工良好的职业行为。 ·70· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 附录 A 各国电力监管和监管机构情况对比 在附录 A 中，我们将对 9 个不同国家的电力行业监管情况进行对比。对比部分采 用表格形式，将数据和特征加以比较，部分内容采用案例形式进行分析，探讨以下两 方面的具体情况： （1）定价权和监管独立程度。 （2）在联邦制国家中，监管权力的垂直划分。 表 A.1 给出了监管机构的基本情况；表 A.2 给出了监管机构的组织形式；表 A.3 给出了监管机构的组织结构；表 A.4 给出了监管权力的垂直划分。 依据附录得出的结论在主报告的相关章节中已有阐述。 表 A.1(1) 监管机构的基本情况 国 家 英 国 挪 威 俄罗斯（联邦） 西班牙 机构名称 天然气和电力市场 挪威水资源和能源 联邦物价局（以前甚 国家能源委员会 权力机构 (GEMA)，负 理事会（NVE） 至现在也经常被称为 （CNE） 责管理天然气和电力 FEK- 联 邦 能 源 委 员 市场办公室(OFGEM) 会） 成立时间 1989 年 成立于 1921 年，其 成立于 1995 年，称 成立于 1998 年，起 职权于 1990 年最后 1 为联邦能源委员会 初名为“国家电力系 次修改 （FEK） 统委员会”，后改名 为“电力系统国家委 员会”，其监管权力 扩展到天然气行业以 后，改名为“国家能 源委员会” 委员人数 最少 3 人，目前 15 人 1人 最多 7 人（每个被监 9 人，此外还有一 管的自然垄断企业 1 位没有投票权的秘书 名委员） 任期 最长 5 年 6 年，可连任 1 次 未规定 6 年（避免与选举 周期一致，从而使委 员会的独立性最大 化，可连任 1 次，且 连任应当错开，使委 员会的半数可以每 3 年重新考虑 1 次） ·71· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.1（1） 国 家 英 国 挪 威 俄罗斯（联邦） 西班牙 资历要求 没有特别要求 没有特别要求 未规定 具备公认的技术 和专业才能 任命机构 贸工部 石油和能源部提名，国 俄联邦政府任免 工业部长提名，于 王任命 FTS 的主席和副主席 国会公示后，由政府 颁布法令任命 免职理由 不能胜任或行为 由 1983 年公务员法第二 未规定 不能胜任、不适 不轨 节确定：服务期限两年以 职、犯罪、严重不履 下时，挪威公务员（例如 行职责，此外，如果 NVE 的总理事）可在合理 理由下解雇，服务期限 2 工业部长提出合理 年以上时，公务员可在因 请求，政府可以免职 病永久不能履行职务时， 以令人满意的方式解雇， 或者如果该公务员不再具 备其职位所必须的资格， 或者由于其他原因使该公 务员永久不适合其职位 委员/高级 不详 不详 不详 不详 官员薪酬水平 独立于政 受议会监督， 但不 隶属于石油和能源部， 独 立 性 很 小 —— 形式上独立，工业 府的程度 受政府部 门的 明显 NVE 的决定要接受该部 FTS 主席对其权力的 部负责监督委员会 控制 的审查 行使和国家政策的贯 活动的成效 彻实施负有个人责任 表 A.1（2） 监管机构的基本情况 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚（联邦） 巴 西 阿根廷 印度（联邦） 机构名称 联邦能源监管 澳大利亚能源 巴西国家电力监 阿根廷国家 中央电力监 委员会（FERC） 监管组（AER）， 管机构 电力监管机构 管 委 员 会 AER 是澳大利亚 （CERC） 竞争和消费者委 员 会 （ ACCC ） 的组成部分 成立时间 1977 年 10 月 1 2005 年 7 月开 1996 年，由 1996 1991 年 ， 1998 年 7 月 日（取代成立于 始运作 年 12 月 26 号通过的 （ENRE 由 1991 1920 年的联邦电 第 9427 号 法 案 启 年 12 月通过的 力委员会 FPC） 动， 是国家水利电力 24065 号法案创 部的组成部分 立） 委员人数 最多 5 位委员 3人 ANEEL 由一个理 5 人，1 名主 5 人，包括主 （目前 4 位） 事会管理， 包括 1 名 席，1 名副主席 席 1 人，委员 4 总理事和 4 名理事， 和 3 名委员 人， 其中中央电 其中有 1 名监察长， 力局主席作为 ANEEL 的行政职能 当然的委员会 由 20 名主管负责， 委员 总法律事务长办公 室在法律上代表 ANEEL ·72· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.1（2） 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚（联邦） 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 任期 5年 5年 4年 5 年，但可以 再任命一个不 最长 5 年 确定任期 资历要求 没有特别要求，仅 没有特别要求， 没有特别要求 没有特别要 有工程、法 规定“主席及委员 其中１名成员必须 求，按照 1398/92 律、经济、商业、 会委员应该是具有 为 ACCC 的委员 号法令的规定， 金融、管理等某 所需能力、背景、训 每次任命成员时 一个领域的经 练或经验的个人，即 由政府能源部长 验/在任或退休 可以公平地衡量受 确定 的最高法院法 联邦能源政策影响 官或高等法院 的各方的利益” 首席法官 任命机构 经参议院建议并 2 名成员由代表 共和国总统 主席、副主席 选举委员会推 通过，由美国总统 AER 负 责 监管的 （ 但 以 前 由 巴 西 和第 1 名成员由 荐，中央政府任 任命 每 个 州 或 地 区 的 参议院任命） 包含行业代表在 命。选举委员会 部长推荐任命，第 内的遴选委员会 由负责能源行业 3 名由 ACCC 主席 选举，其余 2 名 的计划委员会委 推荐任命 成员在由一个议 员任主席 会委员会通过 后，由联邦能源 委员会任命 免职理由 可以由于低效、 不能胜任或行 行为不轨；未 仅在由一个 破产、不能胜 玩忽职守或渎职而 为不轨； 尽职责；刑事定罪 议会委员会通 任、因道德沦 被总统免职 破产； 过后，由政府合 丧、滥用职权而 未能遵守披露 理决定 被定罪、被证明 权益的规定； 行为不端、有财 务或其他利益 全职成员不能 影响其行为 担任 AER 以外的 受薪职务； 兼职成员不能 担任 与 其在 AER 的职责相冲突的 受薪职务 委员/高 根 据 美 国 Code 不详，由薪酬委 不详 由政府法令 由中央政府 级官员薪酬 Title 5，FERC 主席 员会决定 决定 确定 水平 的工资为 3 级， 其他 委员的工资为 4 级 独立于政 独立，总统或议 独立，不受制于 ANEEL 是一个 ENRE 是 经 济 除政策指导 府的程度 会无权审查 FERC 政府部门或者政策 准政府组织，依 部 能 源 局 内 部 的 和预算拨付外， 做出的决定 的指令 赖于矿产和能源 一个独立机构， 但 不受政府部门 部（MME），但 是，ENRE 受经济 的明显控制 是，ANEEL 享有 部和国家总工会 财务独立、管理 的审核， 后者直接 自治，以及在考 依赖政府 虑技术问题而非 政治问题的基础 上享有决策过程 独立 ·73· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 表 A.2（1） 监管机构的组织形式 国 家 英格兰和威尔士 挪 威 俄罗斯（联邦） 西班牙 资金来源 向持有许可证的 国家拨款 政府预算 费用来自能源 企 业收 取 的 许 可 证 定价机构，由政府 费用和其他费用， 但 规定一个百分比 须经议会批准 组织机构（参 参见图 A.2 参见图 A.4 参见图 A.5 参见图 A.8 见组织机构图） 年度预算 2003~2004 年 度 2003 年为 2.28 亿克 不详 2004 年度 财务 为 0.373 亿英镑 朗(约合 0.32 亿美元) 报 告 收 入 ： 0.221 亿英镑 成本：0.143 亿英镑 雇员数量 2003~2004 年度为 2004 年为 414 人 能源行业约 200 人， 2004 年 12 月 31 291 人 其他行业不详 日为 178 人 州/省办事机 在苏格兰设有一 NVE 总 部 设 在 奥 斯 俄联邦各地区（约 马德里是惟一 构情况（参见表 个地区办事处 陆，5 个地区办事处分别 80 个地区）都设有自 地点，但目前考虑 A.4） 设 在 Tønsberg, Hamar, 己的地区能源委员会 迁移至西班牙北 Førde, Trondheim and （REK），负责本地区 部 Narvik 最终用户电价的监管 决策程序 没有特别规定， NVE 应当遵守《公共 无规定 有权自己制定 GEMA 可以自己决 管理法》第三章和第四 程序规则 定 章的具体规定 上诉程序 仅限于向独立的 对 NVE 的决定不服 理论上由反垄断局 向工业部长上诉 竞争委员会提出，以 可以向石油和能源部提 处理，实践中这样的问 及司法审查 起复议。此外，NVE 的 题通常以政治途径解 决定要受司法审查 决 表 A.2（2） 监管机构的组织形式 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚（联邦） 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 资金来源 向被监管企 联邦拨款 ANEEL 向发电、 主要来自发 中央政府的 业收取年度费 输电和配电公司 电、配 电和输 电 拨款和贷款，以 用和备案费， 收费，该项收费占 企业每 年向监 管 及持有许可证 预算须经过国 每个企业年度收 机构交 纳的监 管 的企业的收费 会批准 益的 0.5 ％，其余 税（其 他来源 还 和其他收入，但 资金来自政府预 包括补贴、捐款、 须经议会批准 算转移、出版物和 罚款、 没收、 自 其他材料的销售、 有资金 的利息 和 财务经营回报、其 收入） ，预算 须 他合同收益、有形 经议会批准 资产出售等 组 织 机 构 参见图 A.3 分为三组，参 参见图 A.9 参见图 A.6 参见图 A.7 （参见组织机 见图 A.10 构图） ·74· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.2（2） 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚（联邦） 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 年度预算 2003 ( 实 际 ): 0.123 亿澳元 2004 年， ANEEL 2002 年为 0.23 约 60 万英镑 $0.19 亿 （2006 年 7 月） 的 预 算 达 到 亿美元 219040668 R$ ， 2004 ( 预 计 ): （74852687 US$）， $0.204 亿 ANEEL 的预算及 2005 ( 要 求 ): 其执行都是公开 $0.210 亿 ANEEL 每年都 的， 必须向联邦审计法 院公布 1 份年度报 告，表明其管理的 透明（该报告称为 年度编送账目） 雇员数量 2003 ( 实 际 ): 2006 ～ 2007 不详 2002 年为 151 2003~2004 年 1214 年度具有获得 人（其 中两个 级 度为 68 人 2004 ( 预 计 ): 资金支持的永 别为技术人员） 1250 久职位 77 个 2005 ( 要 求 ): 1280 州/省办 5 个地区办事处， 总部位于墨 ANEEL 没有州/ 设有省监管机 总部设在新德 事机构情况 分别设在亚特兰 尔本，其他办事 省级办事处，但目 构（已有 13 个， 里，没有地区或 （ 参 见 表 大、芝加哥、纽约、 处 位 于 阿 德 莱 前正在与地区管 4 个正在建设中） 其他办事机构 A.4） 波特兰和旧金山 德、堪培拉、悉 理机构签署合作 尼和布里斯班 协议，分散某些职 权和职能 决策程序 有权根据行使 目前决策需 ANEEL 通过决 第 24065 号法 通过程序和 职权的需要制定 要成员出席投 议制定自己的程 案中有一些非 书面指令 序，但有几项一般 程序和管理制度 票 并 一 致 通 常宽泛的原则 原则如下：合法、 过，但 AER 希 性规定 客观、道德、公开 望在 2007 年 1 和程序高效， 月承担全国配 ANEEL 的理事会 电和零售监管 须至少三名成员 职能时将投票 出席才能开会，其 规则修改为简 中必须有总理事 单多数 或者其授权代表 出席，理事会的决 定至少需要三名 理事的同意才能 通过 ·75· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.2（2） 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚（联邦） 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 上诉程序 司法审查（美国 决策受制于 对 ANEEL 的任 ENRE 的 决 定 可以向电力 上诉法院和最高法 司法审查，对天 何一项决定不服 受到以 下审查 ： 上诉法庭提起， 院） 然气的决策受 必须向 ANEEL 的， ①行政 上的（ 向 受到裁定官员 制于《天然气管 本身提起行政复 能源部 提起） ； 或中央委员会 道法》下的司法 议，ANEEL 有权 ②司法 上的（ 向 裁定的限制 审查 废止或者撤回其 国家上 诉法庭 提 自身的决定， 起）；③巡视员， ANEEL 理事会的 巡视员 可以主 动 决定将终结行政 或应一 方请求 ， 程序，但并不阻止 对 ENRE 可能有 任何机构寻求司 违法、 不当、 不 法途径，并且可在 合常规 或滥用 职 提起行政诉讼前 权的任 何行为 展 寻求司法解决 开调查 ANEEL 已制定 某些为客户服务 的质量标准（根据 2000 年 6 月 13 日 总统法令第 3507 号，该法令指示为 国家级政府机构 提供的服务建立 质量标准和质量 评价的固定程序） 表 A.3（1） 监管机构的组织结构 国 家 英格兰和威尔士 挪 威 俄罗斯（联邦） 西 班 牙 监管行业 电力和天然气 水和能源 电力、热力（地区供 电力、天然气和液化 热）、天然气、石油管 石油气、石油 道、铁路运输、港口和 机场、破冰服务、邮政、 电信和其他产品 监管对象 主要是私营企业， 主要是地方和 / 或 自然垄断企业，大部 私营企业 但也包括国有核电 地区的企业 分还是国有控股企业 企业 电力监管范围 负责发电、输电 主要负责电网监 负责发电、输电（包 政府的咨询机构、 竞 （包括系统运行）、 管和电力企业的许 括系统运行）、配电和 争监管、 受到监管的电 配电和供电的监管 可。另外，NVE 负 供电的监管 力行业成本的结算、 技 责监控国家的能源 术监督、电力行业仲 行业，包括发电、 销 裁、 对被监管企业的管 售、输送和使用， 预 理机构予以绝缘防范 测发电和输电的未 （ring-fencing） 来需求 ·76· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.3（1） 国 家 英格兰和威尔士 挪 威 俄罗斯（联邦） 西 班 牙 是否有价格 有，对价格有完全 有，NVE 为配电 监管一系列电力价 没有，虽然 CNE 有义 监管权力 的权力 企业设定收入上限， 格和收费， 包括发电电 务为每项价格建议起草 并批准电价 价、系统运行电价、市 一个不具约束力的决 场服务、辅助服务、输 定，欧洲委员会要求国 电电价和零售电价的 家监管机关确定价格或 上限 者至少确定定价方法， 但是该项要求尚未成为 西班牙的立法 是否有市场 对 NETA 有完全 仅对整体系统运 没 有 —— 这 是 政 府 没有，虽然绝大多数 设计权力 设计权力 行制定指导原则 的权力。 各邦控股的电 情况下需要 CNE 的不 力企业（RAO UESR） 具约束力的决定 主导着电力市场的设 计，但经济发展和贸易 部（MEDT）具有政策 监督的权力 是否有投资 通过价格监管间 通过价格监管间 电价基于预计的现 没有，虽然能源规划 监管权力 接调整 接调整 金支出 —— 包括投资 过程中需要 CNE 的不 需求 具约束力的决定 是否有质量 有 有（新的对服务质 实践中——没有 没有，但 CNE 监管 监管权力 量的监管于 2005 年 服务质量 1 月生效） 表 A.3(2) 监管机构的组织结构 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 监管行业 天然气、石油 国家 电 力市 场 仅有电力 电力 电力 和电力 （ NEM ） 的 电 力 批发市场、输电 电网； 天然气输送 网络和在除澳 大利亚西部地 区以外实施天 然气准入法； 从 2007 年 1 月 起 AER 负 责 配电和零售的 国家监管 监管对象 私 营 企 业 私营和国有企业 特许经营企 特许经营企 中央政府的 （ FERC 对 公 共 业，包括私营和 业，均为私营 发电企业，以 部门企业只有有 国有企业（巴西 及为 1 个以上 限的管辖权） 电力行业曾为国 的邦联合发电 有，最近几年逐 的企业和跨州 渐私有化） 输电企业 ·77· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 A.3（2） 国 家 美国（联邦） 澳大利亚 巴 西 阿 根 廷 印度（联邦） 电力监管范围 监管跨州输 电力和天然气 监管发电、输 定价；安全和 主要负责中 电、转售和企业 准入 定价和输电 电、配电和电力商 技术、计量和计 央发电企业和 合并 收入 监管决策、 业化，处理机构和 费、测量、联接 跨州输电企业 服务 标准、绝缘 消费者的投诉，调 问题、服务质量 的电价监管，以 防范 的准则、对 停电力行业各机 等的监管；反托 及输电和电力 输电 投资发布监 构之间和机构与 拉斯监管；特许 交易的许可证 管问 卷、实施国 消费者之间的冲 权授予；罚款 家电 力法律法规 突，许可、批准电 和天 然气管道法 力设施和服务，提 和天然气法规 高合理电价，保证 服务质量，通过机 构进行电力投资， 鼓励运营商之间 的竞争，保证服务 准入的广泛普及 是否有价格 对输电价格 有，对电力和 有，正如 ANEEL 有，ENRE 规 有，对价格 监管权力 天然 气准入定价 所述，ANEEL 负责 定最高输电和配 有完全的权力 和输 电收入监管 制定电价，保证终 电价格 决策负有职责 端用户支付合理电 价，保证配电特许 经营企业获得健康 的经济—金融状 况，使其能够提供 优质、可靠和稳定 的服务 是否有市场 有， FERC 对 没有，该权利 仅在矿产和能 没有 市场设计由电 设计权力 电力批发市场有 属于 部级能源会 源部（MME）的 力法规定，引入 完全的管辖权 议（MCE）和/或 一 般 准 则 框 架 的时间和阶段 澳大 利亚能源市 （ ANEEL 实 施 由电监委决定 场 委 员 会 MME 的一般政策 （ AMEC ，负责规 决定）和电力行业 则制定） 法律的规定下 是否有投资 通过价格监管 有，通过对输 通过价格监 通过价格监管 通过价格监 监管权力 间接调整 电投 资发布国家 管、特许经营权 间接调整 管间接调整 电力 法规中提及 投标（发电、输 的监 管问卷和监 电和配电）和特 管问卷评估争 许经营合同条款 议， 此外还根据 间接调整 天然 气法规批准 天然气输送投资 是否有质量 与北美电力可靠 有 ， 在收入上 有，ANEEL 设 有 有 监管权力 性 委 员 会 限决策的服务激 定服务质量标准 (NERC) 共 同 行 励 体 制 下 ， 某些 并监管其实施 使权力 技术 标准由州的 监管机构决定 ·78· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 ·79· 表 A.4 监管权力的垂直划分 美 国 俄 罗 斯 澳 大 利 亚 印 度 国 家 联邦 地方 联邦 地方 联邦 地方 中央 地方 中 央 和 地 能源部和联 州公用事业委员会 联邦监管机构由 俄联邦各地区 澳大利亚能源 州能源监管 中央委员会由 由邦政府成 方 监 管 机 构 邦 能 源 监 管 委 （PUC） 联邦政府成立，有 （“oblast 州”或地区） 监管组 机构 中央政府成立， 与 立，不受中央 的关系 员会（FERC） 权对地区能源委员 都 设 有 地 区 能 源 委 邦 委 员 会 没 有 直 委员会的控制 会设定的电价进行 员会（REK） 接联系 和监督 限制 地方监管机 联邦之下是 州以下没有相关机 单一层次，没有 仅设在 “oblast 州 ” 单一联邦层次 州一级， 没有 单一层次，没有 仅设在邦一 构的级别 州的机构 构，有些州有不止一 地方机构 一级，没有更低一级 更 低 一 级 的 机 地方机构 级，没有更低 个机构 的机构 构 一级的机构 中央和地方 FERC 监管跨 州 公用 事 业委员会 负责：输电线路 负责由综合区域 经济监管 技术标准， 负责中央政府 全权负责邦 权力划分（价 州输电、 转售和 监管发电、配电、最 跨越地区边界时的 电力公司（Energos） 安全，测量， 拥 有 的 和 为 多 个 内所有监管事 格、投资等） 企业合并 终用户服务和价格、 输电电价； “联邦电 收 取 的 最 终 用 户 电 配电和地理服 邦联合发电的发 务 输电选址和环境问题 站” （典型的是大型 价 务区域的零 电企业及跨邦输 凝汽式电厂）和核 售，服务可靠 电企业的电价监 电站及大型水电站 性和性能标 管，输电和交易许 的发电价格；给 准，小客户的 可证的发放，规定 REK 制定的最终用 特殊需要等 电网运行规则和 户电价确定上限 服务标准——除跨 （一般按百分比增 邦电量流动外，在 长） 邦内没有管辖权 人员数量 1250 人( 2004 各州不同（有些州 约 200 人 约5人 2006~2007 年度 尚待决定， 68 人 各邦不同， 年) 不止一个 PUC） 例如: 获 得 资 金 支 持 的 2007 年 1 月之 在 75~100 人之 · 科罗拉多州 PUC， 永久职位有 77 个 前，AER 仅负 间 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究 95 人； 责配电和零售 ·缅因州 PUC，61 的国家监管 人； （在此之前这 ·新罕布什尔州 些监管职责属 PUC，73 人； 于州一级监管 ·爱达荷州 PUC， 机构，而相关 49 人； 人员尚未移 ·得克萨斯 PUC， ·79· 交） 210 人； ·俄勒冈州 PUC， 124 人 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 A.1 案例研究 1：定价权和监管独立 在这个案例中，参考以上研究的监管机构，我们主要讨论监管者的定价地位独立 于其他政府组织的问题。 这是价格监管独立的需要 新兴的组织机构经济学和其他国家监管制度的例证都在强调监管信用和信誉的重 要性，以保证垄断行业中的私营投资的利益。政府由于其多重的，甚至相互矛盾的政 治、经济目标，很难公布可信的情况。 企业是在一套可能发生变化的规则下开展投资活动，变化的原因是由于政府会在 必要时，利用自己对监管行业的控制而达到行业、就业或社会目标。私营公用事业企 业考虑到这种机会主义的行为，就会减少投资，或要求较高的风险回报。由此导致的 结果既对企业不利，也对政府不利。这种情况不利于形成正面激励，除非采取一些改 革措施进行补充。 对于信用问题，各国有两种不同的（有时也是相辅相成的）解决方式，包括： （1）进行体制改革。 （2）签订长期合同。 长期合同一般会规定投资者的义务，包括质量、范围、投资计划，以及履行这些 义务后将获得的回报。这些合同通常直接和所在的州/邦签订，争议解决一般采取国际 仲裁的方式。 这种长期合同的主要问题是不可能很完备。在签订合同时不可能预测到未来发生 的各种情况，特别是期限很长的合同。结果，现实中这些合同都可能重新谈判，如果 对此规定不明确，可能导致双方的各种机会主义行为，降低长期合同的有效性。 即便合同作为监管框架的一部分，有些国家仍然要成立独立的监管机构。这些机 构可以通过减少当权者和电力行业之间联系的办法来解决合同承诺问题。相对于长期 合同，分析家们称这些改革在用户、企业、政府和监管机构之间形成了默认的协议。 独立监管机构的主要优点是它独立于政治过程，因而可以不受政治的影响做出决 定。但是，即使是监管程序也很难完全消除监管决定的自由裁量的性质，尤其对定价 问题，很有必要建立一个规定明确而且透明的框架，以减少这种自由裁量。监管者的 独立和自治需要有一套限制其行为的规则来配合。 表 A.2（1）和表 A.2（2）显示大多数国家的监管机构具有完全的价格监管权。下 面举的例子是挪威和阿根廷的配电监管以及美国输电价格的联邦监管。这三个例子都 ·80· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 是独立（或多或少）监管者负责定价，以解决政府行为的不一致性问题。我们也考察 了印度和俄罗斯的例子。在印度，尽管存在法律赋予的权力，国家监管委员会行使其 独立定价权仍有困难。在俄罗斯，监管机构没有法律赋予的价格监管权。下面分段简 要介绍上述国家监管机构制定价格的程序，特别是它们在规定收入和电价方面所享有 的自由裁量权。 挪威的配电定价——NVE 的地位 在挪威，为了减少政治的影响，配电电价由独立监管机构——挪威水资源和能源 管理局（NVE）——来制定。正如 NVE 自己表述的，它的主要职能是“确保输电的价 格能够反映电网的高效运营和维护以及电网投资的成本”。 这包括两项主要活动：首先，NVE 确定收入上限，保证电网的高效运行和对用户 的合理收费；其次，决定电价形成的框架。 NVE 监管的企业共有 200 多家。在确定电价方面，NVE 享有很大的自由裁量权， 因为立法没有关于监管类型（服务成本加成价格，或是收入上限）、监管期限或者投 资回报率方面的任何规定。 电网业务的回报经过两个阶段的发展：1992～1997 年采用的是服务成本模式，从 1997 年 1 月开始采用以激励为基础的模式，直到 2001 年。2002～2006 年，基本还是 这个模式，只有少量变化。电网公司从政府获得特许经营权，必须允许电网使用者以 监管机构确定的价格接入电网。 NVE 根据影响该地区服务成本的因素：例如气候、地形和结算模式等，为每家电 网公司确定一个收入上限。公司的收入绝对不能高于 NVE 确定的数额。收入上限一旦 确定，至少维持 5 年，每年根据通货膨胀因素加以调整。 收入构成依据每个设施的实际成本水平，以及各自的效率要求（依据基准效率制 定）。效率较高的企业只需达到一般效率要求，而效率较低的企业必须达到为其单独 设定的要求。 收入上限每年以一个比例上调，这个比例是供电增长百分比的一半。这种模式的 目的是为了鼓励电网公司提高效率，考虑除投资新增输电容量以外的其他选择。供电 量的降低并不导致收入上限的下调。 阿根廷的配电定价——ENRE 的地位 在阿根廷，国家电力监管局（ENRE）是一个独立机构，负责给国内的各个配电和 输电公司确定最高监管电价。理论上，电价应该每 5 年确定一次（第一个监管期是例 外，期限长达 10 年），这是配电公司签订的特许权合同的一个内容。 ·81· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 在对配电公司的监管中，ENRE 的自由裁量权较小，因为第 24065 号法律规定了 监管期的年限和允许的回报率，并规定被监管企业的收益将包含一个效率调整因数。 输电企业 Edenor 公司和 Edesur 公司的第一个监管期在 2002 年 9 月结束，Edelap 公司则在 2000 年 12 月结束，电价调整工作（包括配电企业向 ENRE 提交电价审查方 案，以待批准）在数月前就已经开始。 2000 年 5 月，ENRE 下达（以第 265 号决议的形式）了调整电价的时间表。为确 定 2002～2007 年期间的电价调整方案，还做了以下工作：①ENRE 聘请了一些独立咨 询师，提出配电电价的其他方案，与配电企业提出的方案一起，供监管机构最终决定； ②解决一些方法上以及某些与定价有关的问题；③提出了供电企业的电价方案应该遵 循的标准。 但是，由于阿根廷面临的经济危机，经济部长在 2002 年第 38 号决议中要求监管 机构中断所有电价调整的工作。 因此，虽然 ENRE 作为独立监管机构，被赋予了确定配电价格的权力，并且其自 由裁量权受立法限制，但 ENRE 还是难免受到来自政府的干预。 美国的输电定价——FERC 的地位 根据《1977 年原能源部（DOE）组织法》的规定，FERC 负责监管跨州输电公司 的收益情况。但是，该法案没有规定监管方式、监管期限或者允许的投资回报。 美国立法甚至没有对“输电”公司和“配电”公司加以区分。两者之间的区别是 在 1996 年批准的 FERC 第 888 号决议中正式提出的。在此之前，输电公司通常只以额 定电压来划分。在第 888 号决议中，FERC 设计了一系列实验（七因素实验），用来确 定哪些设施过去划为输电设施，而现在需要重新划为配电设施，并由所在州进行管辖。 因此，FERC 看起来在确定输电收入方面享有很大的自由裁量权，但实际上，遵循 先例和公开征询意见以及召开听证会大大减小了不确定性。 FERC 对美国的输电企业一直采用服务成本模式进行监管，允许它们以 FERC 制定 的地区输电价格的形式获得一定的投资回报。在某些情况下，州监管机构会额外设定 一个州附加价。 FERC 负责批准各输电公司和地区输电组织（RTOs）的输电价格目录。输电公司 和 RTOs 向 FERC 提出方案，以待批准。输电公司也提出建议电价的有效期间，有时 候在 RTOs 的成立过程中，几家公司会要求一个较短的期间，以便过渡。 尽管仍然是以 FERC 在 1994 年发布的输电价格政策为基础，输电收入的监管在近 年来有一些调整。主要的变化是为了达到开放接入的非歧视性输电价格（FERC 第 888 ·82· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 号决议，允许公用事业公司收回搁浅成本，并提供开放接入），以及鼓励成立 RTOs （FERC 第 888 和 2000 号决议） 印度的定价权和监管独立 印度的电力行业监管主要是依照 2003 年本国电力法。该法律规定应成立中央电力 监管委员会，各邦成立邦电力监管委员会。而且还规定两个或多个邦政府之间，或者 在中央政府和邦政府之间，在必要时可以成立联合委员会。 对于定价问题，2003 年电力法规定，中央政府应在与州政府和中央电力部协商基 础上，制定电价政策。法律还规定中央电力监管委员会应当就电价政策给中央政府提 出建议。 该法律特别提到，电价应该按照国家电价政策来制定，并采用多年期电价原则。 它强调电价应逐步反映服务成本，交叉补贴必须在一定时间内取消，并鼓励可再生能 源发电。 在定价方面，中央电力监管委员会有下列权力： （1）监管中央政府拥有或控股的发电企业的电价。 （2）监管上述规定以外的发电企业的电价，前提是这些发电企业在一个以上的州 有发电和售电业务。 （3）决定跨州输电的电价。 相应地，邦电力监管委员会具有以下职能： （1）决定邦内的发电、供电、输电和电力转运、批发、趸售和零售的价格，前提 是如果批准某一类用户自由接入，邦电监委只能决定该类用户的转运费及附加费。 （2）监管邦内配电商的购电和采购程序，包括向发电企业或通过其他渠道协议购 电的电价。 在中央和邦政府的国家电价政策的指导下，中央和邦电力监管委员会对电价制定 享有完全的自主权。 俄罗斯的定价权和监管独立 与其他大多数例子相反，俄罗斯没有“独立监管”。电价受政府的有效控制，仍 然是政治问题，电价制定缺乏独立性是俄罗斯电力行业的一个重要问题。经济发展和 贸易部对各种电价实施强有力的控制，作为实施经济管理的重要方面。 因此，在实践中，FTS（FEK）和 REK 的职能仅限于确定具体的电价测算方法及 进行具体的电价测算。 ·83· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 A.2 案例研究 2：监管权力的垂直划分——印度、美国和俄罗斯 在下列案例中，我们将探讨在三个联邦体制国家中，如何对监管的职能和权力进行 垂直划分。在表 A.1~表 A.4 中我们还考察了第 4 个例子，同样有着联邦政府形式的澳大 利亚。但是，中央有更大权力并且处于演变过程中的监管安排，在此并未详细探讨。 印度——联邦和邦结构 2003 年，印度议会通过了一项新的法案——2003 年电力法。这个法案综合了印度 电力行业现行的五六个法律。 2003 年电力法为电力行业的发展设计了一个模式：在最高层次，中央政府制定国 家电力政策和国家电价政策，中央电力局制定国家电力规划。国家电力政策和电力规 划在整体考虑能源利用、环境问题的基础上，对发电电源问题进行原则性规定。该法 案决定成立中央电监委，在各邦成立邦电监委，依据上述电力政策、电价政策和电力 规划行使职权。电监委应以透明的形式，鼓励电力行业提高效率和经济性，鼓励竞争 和投资，并为电力行业各个环节制定合理的电价结构。 中央电力监管委员会：中央电监委成立于 1998 年 7 月，以准司法的模式运行，具 有民事法庭的权力。中央电监委的职权包括： （1）监管中央政府拥有或控制的发电企业的电价。 （2）监管上述中央发电企业以外的发电企业的电价，前提是这些发电企业在一个 以上的邦有发电和售电业务。 （3）监管跨邦输电。 （4）决定跨邦输电的电价。 （5）给跨邦经营的企业发放输电和电量交易许可证。 （6）对发电企业或输电许可证持有者有关上述(1)～(4)的争议进行裁决，并提起仲裁。 （7）依法进行收费。 （8）制定有关电网标准。 （9）制定和监督实施有关持有许可证企业的服务的质量、连续性和可靠性的标准。 （10）在必要时设定跨邦交易的差额。 中央电监委还在以下方面给中央政府提出建议：①国家电力政策和电价政策的制 定；②改进电力行业的竞争、效率和经济；③鼓励投资电力行业。 邦电力监管委员会：印度的大多数邦（共 28 个）都成立了邦电力监管委员会。 对于较小的邦和联邦领地，电力法规定几个邦之间或者邦与联邦领地之间成立联合电 ·84· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 监委。 目前，邦电监委行使以前邦政府在邦电力管理委员会中行使的大部分权力，除了 制定政策以外。邦电监委的职能如下。 （1）决定邦内的发电、供电、输电、电力转运、批发、趸售或零售的价格，前提 是如果批准某一类用户自由接入，邦电监委只能决定该类用户的转运费用和附加费。 （2）监管邦内配电商的购电和采购程序，包括向发电企业或通过其他渠道协议购 电的电价。 （3）促进跨邦输电和电力转运。 （4）给在邦内经营的企业发放输电、配电和电力交易许可证。 （5）通过提供适当方式接入电网和销售电量，鼓励热电联产和可再生能源发电， 确定某个配电许可经营范围区域内从上述电源购电的比例。 （6）对被许可企业和发电企业之间的争议进行裁决，并提起仲裁。 （7）依法进行收费。 （8）制订与国家电网标准相统一的邦电网标准。 （9）制订和实施有关持有许可证企业的服务的质量、连续性和可靠性的标准。 （10）必要时设定跨邦交易的差额。 邦电监委还在以下方面给邦政府提出建议：①改进电力行业的竞争、效率和经济； ②鼓励投资电力行业；③邦电力行业的重组和改制；④邦政府交由邦电监会处理的有 关发电、输电、配电、电力交易的事项及任何其他事项。 上述中央和邦之间的监管权力的垂直划分是与印度的政治体制相关的，是合理的。 美国——垂直组织结构 美国有联邦宪法，因此，部分原属于州的权力被赋予给更高一级机构行使。这就 是公用事业监管的整体模式，电力行业也是如此。 1935 年的公用事业控股公司法案（PUHCA）和联邦电力法案（FPA）确立了州和 联邦政府分别行使权力的电力监管模式。 因此，同时存在两级电力监管主体：联邦监管主体（FERC）和州监管主体（公用 事业委员会，PUC）。 美国目前的电力监管结构是近 200 年来监管发展的结果：州监管委员会在 19 世纪 30 年代开始发展，到了 20 世纪 70 年代，数量增加，权力扩大。这些监管委员会结合 了立法、司法和管理职能，对公用事业实施全面和灵活的管理。1907 年以后，州监管 委员会的数量急剧增加，到 1920 年，美国三分之二的州都设立了监管委员会。 ·85· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 各州的公用事业监管委员会联合成立了国家公用事业监管者协会（NARUC）。这 是一个非盈利性组织，其宗旨是：“通过研究和探讨公用事业企业和运营商的运行和 监督来推动监管；推进公用事业企业和运行商监管的一致性；推进各州监管的协调行 动，保护人民的共同利益；以及推进各州监管委之间的合作，以及与联邦监管委之间 的合作”（NARUC 章程第二款）。因此，NARUC 不是监管主体，而是一个智囊团和 协调机构。 第一个联邦监管委员会是成立于 1887 年的州际商务委员会。20 世纪 30 年代，大 部分监管权力从州转移到了联邦政府，因此联邦监管权扩大了。1935 年，联邦电力委 员会，也就是现在的联邦能源监管委员会，被赋予监管州际电力销售的权力。1938 年， 它的权力又扩大到州际天然气销售的监管。 多数情况下，联邦政府监管州或地区之间货物和服务流动，而州或地方机构监管 州内的货物和服务流动。有时候，零售和批发定价也有区别，例如 FERC 负责监管电 力的批发价格，而州和地方机构负责监管零售价格。 电力监管的权力划分 FERC 负责监管跨州输电、以转售为目的的电量销售和电力企业合并，而州公用事 业委员会负责监管发电、配电、终端用户的服务和价格，输电选址以及环境问题等等。 联邦监管主体的职能由能源部的组织法案（1977）确定，该法案决定成立 FERC， 并在第 7172 款（委员会管辖权）中进行了详细规定。该条款援引了其他法规，例如对 于输电定价问题，援引了 1935 年联邦电力法（FPA），其中规定“输送和销售电能以 最终向公众供电的业务影响公共利益，在这种情况下需要对发电业务实施联邦监管， 这些业务中的跨州输电业务和跨州电力趸售业务涉及公众利益，因此，必须由联邦来 监管这些业务，而不是由各州自己负责监管”（FPA 政策申明）。 能源部法案也确定了联邦监管主体和州监管主体之间的关系，它规定“如果能源 部提议的任何事项与州能源规划相冲突，能源部应该对州的需要给予考虑，在可能的 情况下，应该通过与州有关官员协商的方式解决这些冲突。任何情况下，州监管主体 对其权限内事项的决定权都不应受到影响。”（能源部法案 1977，结论和目的宣言） 1992 年的能源政策法案（EPACT）进一步明确了联邦能源监管委员会和州公用事 业委员会之间的关系。根据该法案，FERC 对电力批发市场有完全的管辖权，而州公用 事业委员会负责电力零售竞争的监管。 对于电力企业的合并，FERC 与司法部和联邦贸易委员会共同行使权力。 美国电力行业的联邦和州两级监管的关系如图 A.1 所示。 ·86· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 A.1 美国电力监管垂直划分 俄罗斯——联邦和地方结构 在俄罗斯，联邦电价局（以前的联邦能源委员会—— FEK）负责监管所有的地区 间和跨地区电价——输电线路及“联邦电站”（典型的是大型凝结式电厂）和核电站 及主要水电站的发电电价。同时也为地区能源委员会（REK）制定的最终用户电价确 定上限（为实现政策目标）。 REK 为综合性（发电、配电和供电）地区电力公司（称为 Energos）制定最终用 户电价。各地区 REK 的能力和客观性有很大差距，但所有的 REK 都受各方力量的 限制： （1）来自 Energos 的压力是提高电价、以收回成本的要求——特别是在近来燃料 价格大幅上涨的情况下。 （2）来自地区政府的压力是保持电价低廉的要求，这主要是因为社会和政治方面 的原因。 （3）来自当地工业企业的压力是降低交叉补贴水平，从而降低电价的要求。 俄罗斯的交叉补贴水平是很高的，这也是电力行业改革的最大障碍。有人估计一 些地区的电价需要提高 6 倍才能收回成本。 较大的工业用户逐渐不再向 Energos 购电，而是直接从联邦批发市场上购电，或 者建设自备发电厂——特别当企业需要蒸汽的时候。为了保证蒸汽供应，自备电厂的 规模甚至可以更大。由于工业用户购电模式发生了这样的变化，Energos 越来越难以维 ·87· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 持——REK 不得不面对这个现实。 从短期来看，成立 REK 使电价改革实行中央决策更加困难，尤其是在消除交叉补 贴方面。从长远角度，REK 在引导当地民众理解电价需要收回成本这一理念——以确 保电价改革所需要的社会支持机制，将发挥重要作用。 图 A.2～图 A.10 给出了各国一些电力组织机构图。 图 A.2 英国 OFGEM 组织机构图 （来源: OFGEM 的网站） 图 A.3 美国 FERC 组织机构图 （来源: FERC 的网站） ·88· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 A.4 挪威 NVE 组织机构图 （来源: NVE 的网站） ·89· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 俄罗斯 FTS 组织机构图 图 A.5 ·90· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 A.6 阿根廷 ENRE 组织机构图 （来源: ENRE 的网站） 图 A.7 印度 CERC 组织机构图 （来源：CERC 的网站） ·91· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 A.8 西班牙 CNE 的组织结构图 （来源：CNE 的网站） ·92· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 图 A.9 巴西 ANEEL 的组织结构图 （来源：ANEEL 的网站） 图 A.10 澳大利亚 AER 的组织结构图 （来源：AER 的网站） ·93· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 附录 B 中国电力行业现状研究 B.1 行业概况 近几十年来，中国的能源和电力的使用有了很大发展，这种趋势将持续下去，如 表 B.1 所示。 表 B.1 中国的初级能源需求 （单位：百万 t 标准煤） 年 份 能 源 类 型 1971 2002 2010 2030 2002～2030 煤 192 713 904 1354 2.3％ 石油 43 247 375 636 3.4％ 天然气 3 36 59 158 5.4％ 核能 0 7 21 73 9.0％ 水力 3 25 33 63 3.4％ 生物能和垃圾 164 216 227 236 0.3％ 其他可再生资源 0 0 5 20 — 合计 405 1242 1622 2539 2.6％ 来源：国际能源署（IEA）：世界能源概况 2004，巴黎，表 8.6，第 264 页。 如表 B.2 所示，近年来发电能力也有显著增长。表 B.3 是 2005 年发电能力分别按 地区和燃料类型划分的情况。 表 B.2 发电能力按燃料类型分类 （单位：万 kW） 年 份 能源类型 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 水电 7297 7935 8301 8607 9490 10524 11650 火电 22343 23751 25301 26555 28977 32948 38413 核电 210 210 210 447 619 684 685 其他 0 36 37 48 55 82 93 合计 29877 31932 33849 35657 39141 44239 50814 来源：中国国际工程咨询公司。 ·94· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 表 B.3 2005 年 总 装 机 容 量 （单位：万 kW） 地 区 合 计 水 电 火 电 核 电 风力发电 合计 50847 11652 38414 685 96 华北电网 9320 275 9043 0 2 北京 492 106 384 0 2 天津 617 1 616 0 0 河北 2187 85 2102 0 0 山西 2298 78 2220 0 0 山东 3726 5 3721 0 0 东北电网 5625 660 4935 0 30 辽宁 1757 140 1602 0 15 吉林 1026 377 639 0 10 黑龙江 1252 85 1162 0 5 内蒙古 1590 58 1532 0 0 华东电网 12303 1599 10382 307 15 上海 1302 0 1302 0 0 江苏 4326 14 4306 0 6 浙江 3749 701 2738 307 3 安徽 1189 74 1115 0 0 福建 1737 810 921 0 6 华中电网 10793 4770 6022 0 1 河南 2848 256 2592 0 0 湖北 2747 1795 951 0 1 湖南 1498 780 718 0 0 江西 900 280 620 0 0 四川 2296 1495 801 0 0 重庆 504 164 340 0 0 西北电网 3667 1198 2438 0 31 陕西 1072 188 884 0 0 甘肃 985 395 576 0 14 青海 531 442 89 0 0 宁夏 422 37 381 0 4 新疆 657 136 508 0 13 南方电网 9095 3109 5591 378 17 广东 4800 873 3533 378 16 广西 1075 592 483 0 0 云南 1320 861 459 0 0 贵州 1688 725 963 0 0 海南 212 58 153 0 1 其他（西藏等） 44 41 3 0 0 来源：中国国际工程咨询公司。 ·95· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 电力行业将继续发展。表 B.4 是对总发电量和发电结构的未来增长的预测。表 B.5 提供了以发电能力为代表的一种相应的预测。 表 B.4 中国的发电结构预测 （单位：TWh） 年 份 能 源 类 型 1971 2002 2010 2030 2002~2030 煤 98 1293 2030 2910 4035 石油 16 50 59 65 53 天然气 0 17 55 196 315 核能 0 25 82 180 280 水力 30 288 383 578 734 生物能和垃圾 0 2 31 58 84 其他可再生资源 0 0 13 31 72 合 计 144 1675 2653 4018 5573 来源：国际能源署（IEA）：世界能源概况 2004，巴黎，表 8.7，第 268 页。 随着发电能力的增长，输电能力也在不断增长，表 B.5 是 2005 年各电网的输电 能力。但对比 2004 年， 2005 年的数据为： 500kV， 62866km； 330kV， 13059km； 220kV， 177617km；此外还有 141km 的 750kV 输电线路。 表 B.5 2005 年 输 电 线 路 长 度 （单位：km） 110kV 项 目 合 计 750kV 500kV 330kV 220kV 35kV (含 66kV) 全国合计 973596 141 62866 13059 177617 339587 380327 华北电网 154714 11826 30732 45645 66512 北京 8000 896 2208 2721 2176 天津 7394 524 1727 2136 3007 河北 50363 4064 9188 15798 21313 山西 33425 3062 6635 10118 13610 山东 55532 3279 10975 14872 26406 东北电网 126600 8546 33709 68360 15985 辽宁 34037 2923 9295 21794 25 吉林 23125 1213 6752 15086 76 ·96· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 续表 B.5 110kV 项 目 合 计 750kV 500kV 330kV 220kV 35kV (含 66kV) 黑龙江 35616 1999 7941 13975 11701 内蒙古 33822 2411 9722 17505 4183 华东电网 162149 13525 34962 45988 67674 上海 7125 577 2201 725 3622 江苏 56784 6335 12591 15923 21935 浙江 37847 3696 8661 11661 13829 安徽 32141 1566 6213 8144 16218 福建 28252 1351 5297 9535 12070 华中电网 233028 13568 50 41423 74642 103344 河南 43618 2057 50 8392 14171 18948 湖北 41922 4629 7634 13524 16134 湖南 50232 1913 8304 16119 23896 江西 26166 704 5185 8064 12211 四川 19487 1279 3417 6597 8194 重庆 51603 2986 8490 16167 23961 西北电网 112575 141 13009 7162 42481 49782 陕西 27935 4557 825 12152 10401 甘肃 33765 128 4955 1189 11511 15983 青海 10323 13 2227 4688 3395 宁夏 8898 1270 1838 3207 2582 新疆 31654 3310 10923 17421 华南电网 172984 7639 29429 60811 75105 广东 49246 3575 11550 22270 11851 广西 38117 644 5996 8864 22613 云南 46417 1880 5415 14132 24990 贵州 33239 1539 5194 13195 13311 海南 5965 1274 2350 2340 西藏 3584 1660 1924 跨区 7961 7762 200 来源：中国国际咨询公司。 ·97· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 根据这些数据，从技术角度来看，中国的电力行业显然处于世界领先地位，但同 时也面临着扩容和需要大量资金投入的问题。这一形势更强调了中国电力行业需要高 效的法律、体制环境和电力监管。 B.2 改革计划 国务院关于电力行业改革“5 号文”（2002 年）决定成立电监会，并明确了改革 的指导原则和目标。电力行业改革主要在以下几个方面进行： （1）厂网分离：国家一级已经完成，原国家电力公司的发电资产已与电网分开， 成立独立的发电公司。一些调峰电厂，例如水电站和抽水蓄能电站，仍归电网公司所 有或持股，这些电厂目前不参加市场竞价。 （2）国家电力公司（SPC）的发电资产将划分给 4~5 个发电公司，每个发电公司 的装机能力不能超过该地区电力系统总装机的 20％（第 8 条）——这项工作已经完成。 （3）将成立一个完全国有的国家电网公司，国家电网公司成为国家电力公司电网 资产的所有人，解散国家电力公司。国家电网公司负责跨区域电力交易和运行以及跨 区域电网的建设和运营——该公司已经成立。 （4）将建立 6 家股份制的区域电网公司（对应前面第 1 部分提到的 6 个地区）， 负责该区域电网的拥有、维护和运营。省电网公司将作为地区电网公司的分公司或子 公司——这项工作已经完成。（目前地区电网公司还不是股份制公司，其中 5 家是国 家电网公司（SGC）的全资子公司，将在未来进行股份制改造） （5）区域电网公司将负责区域电网的建设和运营、调度以及电力市场的培育—— 这项改革已经开始，但是还有大量工作要做，尤其是在区域电力市场建设方面。 （6）区域电网公司在“十五”期间还可以拥有配电资产，但要求输电和配电财务 独立核算——这项改革还没有进行，输配电的财务分开核算基本没有实行。 （7）在其他改革措施完成以后，逐步试点进行输电和配电的分离，在零售层面引 入竞争——这项改革还没有进行。 （8）将在各区域电网公司的辖区内建立电力交易中心，电厂将竞价上网——这项 改革还没有进行。 5 号文还明确国家电网公司、区域电网公司以及发电公司应该在一年内成立。国家 电网公司（SGC）、中国南方电网公司（CSG）以及发电公司在 2002 年 12 月成立。 其他的地区电网公司在 2003 年成立。 ·98· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 B.3 业务拆分的进程 如前所述，近期的 4 项组织结构分离的主要工作已经完成： （1）厂网分离。 （2）成立国家电网公司，促进区域间电量交易。 （3）区域优先于省份——六大区域电网公司现已成立。 （4）成立五大国家发电公司。 最终将配电分离出来的工作也正在计划当中。开展了一项大用户选择供电试点， 但是电力市场的发展以及竞价上网仍然处在示范阶段。 虽然新成立了发电公司和电网公司，但它们都仍然为国有控股，在国有资产监督 和管理委员会（SASAC）的直接领导和控制之下。国资委目前负责 189 家大型国有企 业，包括国家电网公司（SGC）和五大发电集团。 B.3.1 发电 原来的国有电厂成立了五大发电集团，分别是：华能电力集团、大唐电力集团、 华电电力集团、国电电力集团和中国电力投资集团。这五大集团控制的发电能力约达 32GW，不到中国发电总能力的一半，其余的掌握在 40 多家地方政府的发电投资公司、 30 多家上市公司，以及外国投资公司和私营公司的手中。大部分发电公司采取有限责 任公司或者股份有限公司的形式，拥有各类投资者。电力法规定，政府鼓励和引导国 内和国外经济组织和个人依法投资发电，建立发电公司。目前，非国有公司拥有的发 电能力占总量的 8％。 B.3.2 输电 按照国务院“5 号文”，目前已经成立了六大电网公司，分别是：华北、东北、华东 1、 华中、南方和西北电网。除了南方电网以外，其他五家都是国家电网公司的子公司。这些 地区电网公司的特点在本部分的结尾处进行了总结。目前，西藏电力公司是一家独立的公 司，但 SGC 代表所有权人负责它的经营。综上所述，发电和输电已经进行了分离。 目前，省电网公司依然是省内电厂和其他省电网公司电力的惟一买主。在区域电 力市场上，区域电网公司和省电网公司都是买主。这就使电网公司既是发电计划和调 度机构又是购电者。这两重功能需要分离，因为其中有内在利益冲突。 我们在开题调研中访问了一些（地区）电网公司，他们抱怨自己除了购电（上网 华东电网是最大的电网，2004 年底的发电能力达到 96970 MW。实际上它可能是世界上最大的电网。 ·99· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 电价）和售电（用户电价）之间的价差以外，没有单独的收入来源。显然，他们需要 以成本为基础的输电电价。 在每家区域电网公司之下（并由该地区电网公司拥有和控制），都有几家省电力 公司，拥有和经营输电线路。电力法保证开放输电网，但事实上目前没有人利用这一 规定。从目前进行的大用户从发电企业购电的试点项目来看，开放输电网使用权以及 相应的电价问题都被提出来了。以下简要介绍各区域电网公司的电网构成。 华北地区 这个区域主要是火力发电，电网由两部分组成：华北地区和山东。主要的负荷中 心是北京、天津和唐山。山东是一个独立的省网，全部是火力发电，可以达到自给自 足，不与其他地区进行购、售电交易。在该区域，华北电网由京—津—唐电网、山西 省网、河北南部电网，以及内蒙古西部电网组成，构成 500 kV 电网主网架。 京—津—唐电网是以北京—天津为中心的 500kV 回路电网，它将山西省网、河北 南部电网和内蒙古西部电网连接起来。 东北地区 东北电网包括辽宁、吉林和黑龙江省网，以及内蒙古东部电网，负荷中心位于该 地区南部。网内的电量流动是从西向东，从北向南。东北电网与华北电网相连，电量 主要从东北向华北流动。 华东地区 华东地区有下列 5 个省级电网： （1）江苏； （2）浙江； （3）安徽； （4）福建； （5）上海市。 供电区域覆盖中国最发达的地区，负荷中心集中在长江三角洲地区。华东电网的 主干线路是 500kV 双回路，呈“8”字形，于 2002 年建成，通过葛洲坝和三峡输电项 目与华中电网相连。位于该地区以外的山西的阳城电厂通过高压交流输电线连接到华 东电网，向该地区供电。 华中地区 华中地区主要由华中电网和四川—重庆电网构成。华中电网包括河南、湖北、湖 ·100· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 南和江西省网。四川—重庆电网与华中电网通过三峡输电工程的高压直流输电线相连。 华中地区的水电比例比其他地区高，通过葛洲坝水电站向华中和华南地区供电。 三峡输电工程使华中电网与华南电网相连，并增强了华中与华东电网的连接。 南方地区 南方电网与香港和澳门相连，由以下 5 个省网组成： （1）广东； （2）广西； （3）贵州； （4）云南； （5）海南。 海南仍然是独立的省网，但是其他 4 个省网都连接到华南电网上。主要的负荷中 心位于珠江三角洲地区，电量通过两条高压交流输电线路和一条高压直流输电线路， 自西向东流向广东。到 2005 年年底，电量输入预计将达到 7000 MW。 西北地区 西北电网由陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏和新疆省网组成。东部主要是火电，西部主 要是水电，共同构成完整的电力系统。 B.3.3 配电 省电力公司继续经营地方输电、配电电网，并负责通过自己的当地分公司向最 终用户供电。他们在配电和售电方面在当地处于垄断地位。这是依据 1996 年电力法 的规定。 省网的输电和配电的资产分离目前没什么进展，但将逐步引入会计上的分离。据 我们了解，财政部目前正在研究成本分配的会计规则，但是目前还没有官方文件发布。 对于配电的第三方准入，目前尚无规定。电网没有义务向其他方提供服务。但如 果对输电以下的零售用户引入竞争，这一状况需要改变。 B.4 电价 B.4.1 电价现状 B.4.1.1 发电电价 目前，所有的上网发电企业售电都按照物价机构确定的“电价”，这个电价一般 在电厂最初建立的时候就确定了。最初，电价是在以下基础上确定的： （1）对于电厂的总发电量有一个每千瓦时的单价，以电厂最小运行小时数为基础， ·101· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 后者确保收回固定成本。 （2）在相对短的时间内收回投资成本，之后电价就会下降。 过去，这种电价被认为是电厂整个生命周期的“合同”，但是，近几年来，这种 定价出现了两个变化，动摇了把电价当作准合同的依赖： （1）对于新成立的发电企业，设定的电厂经营期延长，因而投资回收期也延长了。 （2）有些电厂电价提高，以反映煤价的大幅度上涨。 （3）因为缺电导致了运行时间增加，对最小运行小时以外发电量的价格进行特别调整。 最近，国家发改委制定了新的电价文件（据了解于 2004 年 6 月 15 日发布），改 变了新建发电企业的定价基础，对区域电网的新增能力实行统一电价，并对每个省份 规定了统一的电价标准。这种定价方法仍然建立在“正常”发电小时数的基础上，但 根据电厂的边际成本，对于正常发电小时数以外的发电量规定了较低的电价。 与此同时，一些新的电量交易规则也使发电企业除了直接向区域电网公司售电以 外，有了其他收入来源。从目前的规定看，没有关于这些收入的具体规定。但据称这 些交易规则（例如华东月度市场）对发电企业竞价上网的报价有效设置了限价。 对于实际电价水平，不同类型的发电企业使用不同的电价，以下是 2005 年的数字： （1）核电企业平均电价为 0.41 元/kWh。 （2）火电为 0.36 元/ kWh。 （3）水电为 0.30 元/ kWh。 B.4.1.2 用户（零售）电价 2005 年全国平均零售电价为 0.50 元/ kWh，基本是东高西低。下面举例说明 2005 年不同省份的电价差异。 （1）最终用户平均电价最高的省份是：海南、上海和广东，均超过 0.6 元/ kWh。 （2）最终用户平均电价最低的两个省份是：贵州和青海，约为 0.35 元/ kWh。 省内的零售电价也随不用类型的用户有很大差别。例如，以下是 2002 年各类用户 的平均电价： （1）商业 0.7 元/ kWh。 （2）非居民照明 0.6 元/ kWh。 （3）非一般工业 0.45 元/ kWh。 （4）居民，大工业企业 0.4 元/ kWh。 （5）农业 0.33 元/ kWh。 （6）贫穷区县的灌溉和排污用户 0.16 元/ kWh。 ·102· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 根据以上数据，很显然居民、农业、灌溉和排污用户的电价低于成本。实际上， 不同类型的用户价格之间存在交差补贴。零售电价还有其他一些特点： （1）目前，针对一些地区的大用户存在分时电价，但是分时电价使用的范围较窄。 另外，也没有实行可中断电价。 （ 2）同样没有规定零售电价随不断发展的电量交易安排中产生的价格信号而变化。 B.4.1.3 电网使用费 到目前为止，无论是输电还是配电，都没有专门的电网使用价格。实际上，电网使 用费是向用户售电的收入减去支付给发电企业以后的剩余部分。大体来说，这个电价表 明，2002 年发电企业得到总收入的 66％，而电网公司得到 34％。我们调研过的企业一 致认为，这样取得的收入不足以维持目前电网的运营和维护，以及电网的进一步扩充。 B.4.1.4 未来定价结构的预测 近期（未来 12 月内）的定价呈现以下趋势： （1）由于近期电力需求增加，燃料（特别是煤）价格持续上涨，发电电价将有一 定程度的继续上涨，各省存在差异。 （2）零售电价的平均水平将整体上升，尽管不同季节、不同时段会有差别。这主 要是因为过去的零售电价中发电成本占了很大比例，而电网所占比例有限。但根据新 的电价政策，预计电网公司的利润将有所增加。 （3）根据有关价格调整政策，消费者价格应更反映成本，零售电价的结构也将发 生变化。 至于远期的电价，国家发改委的官员告诉我们，他们认为，政府决定的发电容量 电价和市场决定的电量电价两者相结合的改革仅仅适用于过渡阶段，从长远来看，两 个因素都可以由市场来决定。 B.4.2 价格监管权力和程序 中国现行的价格法规定，国务院的政府价格部门是主要负责价格管理和监督的法 律机构。与此相一致，从“7 号文”中可以明显看出电监会在价格监管方面的地位有限， 在“5 号文”中对此有详细的阐述。 B.4.2.1 价格批准过程 国家发改委负责制定、检查、批准和设立电价，以及监督和检查电价的实施。它 的电价监管的责任包括检查和批准发电价格，检查和批准省目录电价，以及检查和批 准所有的电力附加费和建设基金。国家发改委电价监管系统的执行程序： （1）企业一般向当地物价局提出申请，物价局经过协调，上报到上级物价部门批准。 ·103· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （2）省物价局向国家发改委申请批准。 正如“5 号文”中所述，电监会可以： （1）向政府物价管理部门提出电价调整的建议。 （2）监督和检查电价以保证实施。 据我们了解，国务院已经制订和批准了电价改革计划，但至今只有零售价格部分 得到了实施。另外，这一计划主要由国家发改委负责实施。 B.4.2.2 程序问题 依据我们对价格监管权力和过程的理解，目前的价格监管存在着明显的不协调， 主要有： （1）尽管国家发改委不是电力行业的专业监管机构，它仍然在电力行业的价格制 定方面行使主要权力。 （2）电监会行使其他一些与电价有关的职权，由于电监会不能在价格方面作决定， 可能会给这些职权的行使带来严重困难。 B.5 电力行业现状 在考虑市场和竞争的发展的时候，有必要强调目前电力行业的现状。在过去几年 里，中国面临越来越严重的电力短缺。供需缺口越来越大，2004 年的缺电状况比 2003 年还要严重。 2004 年的供需缺口预计在夏季用电高峰期为 30GW，全国 26 个省份可能面临缺电 状况。面对这样的现实情况，政府认为竞价上网必然导致很高的发电价格，如果不允 许提高零售价格，电网公司作为惟一的买主就会破产（像加利福尼亚那样）。如果将 价格上涨转嫁给用户，这显然不公平，发电企业就会富起来。也就是说，电力短缺已 经成为电力行业改革实施的巨大障碍。 来自不同方面的意见使我们确信，电力短缺主要是由于中央政府计划决策的失误。 1997～1999 年，GNP 的增长出现停滞，国家计划部门决定减少火力发电容量的增长。 当时过剩的发电容量，以及可以保证 5000h 运转的合同或电价安排，导致出台鼓励用 户购买耗电设备的政策。因此，当 GNP 继续增长时，电力短缺开始明显起来。我们还 得知，投资所需资金并不是问题，新的电厂如雨后春笋般在华东开工；发电企业认为 审批程序应当简化，过程应当加快。但是，因为省级政府认为发电投资应由那些具备 丰富的大型机组建设和运营经验的大型电力企业来进行，当时的新增发电容量大部分 由国有发电公司或者上市公司投资和控制。尽管有些人通过购买上市公司的股票间接 ·104· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 涉入，仍只有非常少量的私人投资者参与到这个市场中来。由于市场规则并不明确， 未来政策存在一些不确定性，外国投资者很少参与这个市场。 B.6 电量交易的发展计划 如前所述，国务院的改革计划 2将建立电力市场（交易安排） 3作为改革的一部分： （1）在国家一级，国家电网公司将负责跨区域交易。从各方面看，这是现阶段最 重要的活动，因为把大量电能以合理的价格从一个地区转移到另一个地区，这最有可 能提高电力系统的整体效率。 （2）在区域一级，电量交易的主体主要是区域电网公司。区域电力市场的市场模 式正在试点中，电监会负责在考虑区域电力系统具体特点的基础上，确定市场模式。 （3）发电企业竞价上网 4，电量交易在调度中心形成，且这些交易是在区域电网公 司的参与下形成的。 （4）支付给发电企业的电价（“上网电价”）可以有两种方式：一种是电价包含 一个政府确定的固定的容量电价和一个市场决定的电量电价 5，另一种是只有一个电量 电价。 （5）到第十个五年计划结束时（2005 年末），各区域的主要发电企业都应该参与 竞价上网 6。 电监会发布了“关于建立区域电力市场的指导意见 7”的文件，在华东和东北地区 在实行试点，按月度进行模拟市场运行，但不结算，也不按照竞价系统作出的计划进 行电量调度。 我们认为，对于这些“市场”（用我们的术语称为“电量交易安排”）的角色以 及它们应如何影响发电电价以及电量调度，存在一些模糊认识。对于它们的功能是否 能与诸如需求响应、市场自由准入等市场正常运转需要解决的其他结构性问题相联系 也不清楚。另外，对于这些交易安排中的价格和销售电价之间的关系，也有些混乱。 第 20 条。 注意，我们提到交易安排是指物理上电力的短期交易安排。我们使用市场安排这个术语时是指包括电力 合同（物理上的和金融上的）和直接向最终用户售电在内的更大的安排。 第 17 条。 第 21 条。 第 25 条。 电监会 2003 年第 21 号文。 ·105· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 B.7 目前进展 我们在本部分阐述对电力交易发展现状的理解。首先讨论系统运行，然后讨论电 量交易安排。 B.7.1 系统运行 总体看来，国家电网公司负责全国范围的系统运行，其中南方电网是个例外，由 南方电网公司负责系统运行。因此，国家电网公司作为系统运行商和惟一的买家，负 责电网的运营、电量安排和调度，以及购电和售电。 如前所述，在每个地区电网公司下面，都有几个省电力公司，拥有和运营输电线 路和配电电网。 对于系统运行，1993 年发布的《电网调度管理条例》对调度中心、中央和省政府、 发电企业和电网/电力公司，以及用户的权利和义务作出了规定。其中调度的主要原则 是“集中管理，分五级运行”。也就是说，调度中心分为 5 个等级，有各自的范围、 权利、义务，这 5 个等级为：国家、地区、省、市和县。 在实践中，调度中心根据负荷预测和政府（省经贸委）分配给发电企业的发电量 制订出一个计划。在中国从来就没有实行过优先顺序调度（按单位边际成本的顺序进 行调度），尽管这是世界各地的普遍实践。因此，系统调度人员到底在哪些方面进行 了优化，以及怎样给发电企业分配运行时间，这些都很不清楚。 目前，大多数发电企业都与电网公司签订了“上网协议”。协议中约定发电企业 有义务按照电网运营者的要求供电。总地来说，除了 1993 年的《规定》和上网协议以 外，没有其他有关调度程序的规范或规则，尽管每个区域以及每个省的电力系统都有 自己的调度规则。 B.7.2 电量交易 目前，电量交易主要在政府的指导下进行。也就是说，政府批准价格，给发电企 业分配发电量。交易的电量很小，由双方协商，主要形式是两个省电力公司之间的交 易。对于输电损耗或者辅助服务等问题没有特别规定。 但是，电监会目前正在建设区域电力市场，其中东北、华东区域电力市场已分别 进入试运行阶段，南方电力市场进入模拟运行阶段，华中、华北、西北电力市场正在 按计划推进市场建设。这些将在后面做详细阐述。 B.7.2.1 省内电量交易 ·106· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 目前，大多数交易是在发电企业和省电力公司之间进行，后者是惟一的买主，并 且拥有省内大多数输电和部分配电电网。年度和月度交易量基本由省政府决定（省经 贸委），每天的发电计划由省电力公司根据限额制定。 B.7.2.2 省间交易 通常两个省之间的电量交易由相关的省电力公司和区域电网公司安排。跨区域交 易由相关的区域电网公司和国家电网公司安排。到目前为止，只有少数几个发电企业 向所在地以外的区域售电，而且都经过国家发改委的批准。但是，西部地区一些大项 目将会大量增加电量的跨区域流动，例如三峡工程。 B.7.2.3 价格、交易时段和表计 目前，交易价格需要有关物价局的批准。在未来的区域电力市场上，电量交易将 通过集中招标方式形成，并按照交易安排进行调度。 目前大多数电量交易都是按年度或月度进行，仅仅在某些地区有很少一部分是按 小时交易。我们了解到这种按小时交易主要是省电力公司之间，部分是区域电力公司 之间，根据自己的需要共同协商在较短的时间内采取这样的方式。华东和东北地区新 成立的区域电力市场还是模拟运行，不进行按日竞价或实际结算。 B.7.2.4 华东和东北区域建议的交易安排 我们了解到，华东和东北区域将建立竞争性电力市场（交易安排），目前的模拟 运行是以月度为基础，发电企业需要配备小时计量表，以支持市场运行。另外，交易 安排将考虑到输电阻塞问题，也就是说，由于特殊地理位置而受到输电堵塞的电厂将 会在交易安排中给予特别对待。 我们还了解到在未来的区域电力市场上，输电损耗的影响将在竞价交易中给予考 虑，将会在损耗参数中得以反映。 我们还了解到，根据电监会第“21 号文”，在新的交易安排中，辅助服务将分为 两类：一类是必须由发电企业提供的强制性服务；另一类是可以补偿成本或得到“市场 价”而提供的商业服务。 B.7.3 零售竞争 目前，用户不能选择供电商。电监会和国家发改委最近发布了关于“大用户直接 向发电企业购电暂行管理办法”的文件。其中规定了此类试点项目的一般原则和目标， 但是没有对具体做法制订详细计划。吉林省准备开展一个大用户的试点项目。 B.8 地区行业和市场安排的监管 ·107· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 从上面的阐述可以清楚地看出，电监会对全国范围电力市场的监管行使中央职权。 具体来说，根据国务院“5 号文”，电监会行使下列职责： （1）发展电力批发市场，包括制定电力市场整体发展规划，提出区域电力交易的 市场设计，决定交易安排。 （2）监控电力市场的运行以确保有序和公平竞争，监管输电、配电和非竞争性发 电业务。 （3）给在电力行业运营的公司发放营业执照。 电监会的“21 号文”是这一过程的重要开端，因为它提出了区域市场发展的基本 框架。 电监会目前监管权力的主要限制是在定价方面。根据现行法律，电价是由政府物 价部门（国家发改委）来决定，尽管电监会有权审查电价水平和对电价调整提出建议。 但是，电监会在决定辅助服务收费标准方面有特殊的权力。 ·108· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 附录 C 有效监管的主要特征 正如本报告第 2 章所述，专家们对于有效监管所提出的标准是基本一致的，例如， NERA 在 1998 年给亚行 8的报告中提出的标准和 2003 年 Kessides 公司执行的世界银行 调查中提出的标准就有很多一致之处。在此基础上，我们提出以下标准来衡量监管水平： （1）地位和目标的明确。 （2）自治性或独立性。 （3）可问责性。 （4）参与性。 （5）透明度。 （6）可预见性。 （7）监管能力 9。 我们将逐一讨论这些标准。 C.1 地位和目标明确 这里指的是监管机构的职能与政策制定机构以及被监管企业的职能区分到什么程 度，包括： （1）监管机构是否拥有一致的授权。 （2）监管机构的职责是否同政策机构和被监管的企业明确分开。 （3）主要的立法（例如电力法）是否清楚地界定了监管机构的职权和职责。 （4）监管机构在实施决策时有多大的权力。 （5）如果没有，这些职权和职责是否在其他法律法规和/或其他文件中有明确规定。 （6）对什么样的问题监管机构处于顾问地位（例如向部长提供建议）而不是决策 地位，这一点是否很清楚。 另参见 J.Stern 和 S.Holder, (1999)，监管权力：监管系统性能的评判标准，在亚洲发展中国家基础设 施行业的一个应用。《公用事业政策》卷 8，第 33～50 页。 能力一词指的是资源的容量，尤其是监管机构可获得的人员以及专业人员。 ·109· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （7）是否存在一些职权是和相关的政府部门共同行使，或者职权划分不清晰。 （8）立法是否清晰无误地规定哪个机构行使什么监管职权。 C.2 自治性 自治性主要是指监管机构的独立程度，包括： （1）监管机构和政府之间是什么关系，例如，监管机构： 1）是否部委的一个部门； 2）是否一个独立于任何部委的机构； 3）是否一个独立于政府的机构，或者其他形式。 （2）监管机构的决策成员（例如委员、主席、董事等）是如何任命的。 （3）监管机构的决策成员是否以及如何被撤职。 （4）监管机构的资金从何而来，以及需要经过谁的批准。 C.3 可问责性 可问责性主要指监管机构的正式的审计、报告和上诉程序，例如： （1）是否有一个机制允许被监管企业（或第三方）质疑监管机构作出的决定。 （2）对于诸如监管机构滥用程序之类的问题是否有权诉诸法律。 （3）监管机构向谁正式负责（例如向政府、议会或法庭）。 （4）监管者是否必须回答议会的质询。 （5）监管者如果没有履行职责是否能被解职。 （6）宪法是否规定了司法审查的机构。 C.4 参与性 参与性是指对监管决定的后果有法定利益的各方（例如被监管企业、大小用户、 投资者等）对监管机构作出监管决定之前和之后的决策过程的参与程度。包括以下各 方面： （1）在作出以下决策时，监管者是否以及在多大程度上使被监管企业、其他行业 的企业、用户和其他各方参与进来： 1）重大决定； 2）实施重大决定所采取的方法。 （2）监管机构是否把征求到的公众意见公开（全部公开或公开主要内容）。 ·110· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 （3）监管机构是否对公众意见集中的问题作出公开回答，公众意见如何（或者有 没有）影响最终的决策。 （4）有没有其他方式表明公众意见是否影响了最终决策。 （5）有没有其他途径使行业的主体（包括企业和用户）参与到监管决策和程序中来。 C.5 透明度 透明度主要是指监管程序的公开性，包括： （1）重要监管文件（例如许可证）是否向公众开放。 （2）监管者是否公布重大决定（和建议）。 （3）监管者是否公布重大决定背后的推理过程。 （4）如果公布了决定/原因，这是强制的（例如这是使决定生效的法定要求）还是 完全出于自愿。 （5）如果没有公布决定/原因，参与者（例如被监管企业）是否被告知重大决定背 后的原因。 （6）监管机构是否为监管决定的作出或执行召开听证会。 （7）被监管企业或第三方能否通过非正式渠道（例如直接向部长或者通过媒体提 出异议）对监管决定进行评论（甚至质疑）。 C.6 可预见性 可预见性主要指的是监管者和它的职责、措施及决策过程中涉及到的其他各方之 间互相理解的程度，包括以下方面： （1）改变监管者的职权和职责的难易程度。 （2）改变重要监管文件（例如许可证、授权、特许权协议等等）的难易程度。 （3）监管原则（例如电价审查程序、费率基础或者企业回报率的界定）在公布的 文件中明确规定的程度。 （4）监管者的决定是否以及在多大程度上反映出方法的一致性。 （5）是不是每年公布出一个监管事项的时间表（例如在监管机构发布的计划中列 出来）。 （6）电力行业的监管安排是否以及多大程度上遵循一致的监管方式（例如在其他 基础产业如电信和铁路方面的影响），与其他基础产业监管相比特殊程度如何（例如 制度结构上的不同）。 ·111· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 实现有效监管的其他重要问题包括： （1）信息和报告要求，以及监管者向被监管企业索取信息的有效权力。 （2）明确规定程序、公开征求意见和有关方面的提议，以及召开听证会的重要性。 （3）要有强有力的实施权力。 C.7 适当的监管能力 适当的监管能力主要包括下述几个方面： （1）是否有充足的监管预算。 （2）监管人员薪酬是否有竞争力。 （ 3）监管机构具有什么能力把一些技术工作向外部专家外包和采取其他必要行动。 ·112· 中国电力监管机构能力建设研究报告 参 考 资 料 1 中国：社会主义市场经济下的电力行业监管.世界银行讨论文件 1997 年第 361 号，1997 2 中华人民共和国电力法，1995 3 .世界能源概况 2004.法国：巴黎，2004 国际能源署（IEA） 4 国发[2002]5 号.国务院关于印发电力体制改革方案的通知，2002 5 NERA 公司给亚洲银行的报告，1998 6 J.Stern 和 S.Holder.监管权力：监管系统性能的评判标准，在亚洲发展中国家基础设施行业 的一个应用.公用事业政策.1999(8)：33～50 7 国中发[2003]7 号.国务院办公厅关于印发国家电力监管委员会职能配置内设机构和人员 编制规定的通知，2003 8 能源部（DOE）组织法.美国，1977 9 能源政策法（EPACT）.美国，1992 10 电力法.印度，2003 11 中华人民共和国价格法，1997 12 Sally Hunt，Graham Shuttleworth·Competition and Choice in Electricity,Wiley，1996 13 Sally Hunt. Making Competition Work in Electricity，Wiley，2002 14 电监市场[2003]22 号.关于印发《电力市场运营基本规则（试行）》、《电力市场监管办 法（试行）》、《电力市场技术支持系统功能规范（试行）》的通知，2003 15 第 265 号决议.阿根廷，2000 16 第 38 号决议.阿根廷，2002 17 美国联邦能源监管委员会第 888 号令 18 美国 1935 年公用事业控股公司法和联邦电力法 19 美国国家公用事业监管者协会章程第二条 20 Ofgem 网址：www.ofgem.gov.uk 21 FERC 网址：www.ferc.gov 22 NVE 网址：www.nve.no 23 ENRE 网址：www.enre.gov.ar 24 电监市场[2003]21 号.关于印发区域电力市场建设指导意见的通知，2003 ·113· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Knowledgements This report has been completed under the leadership of Mr. Shi Yubo, Vice Chairman of SERC. A workgroup was specially set up by SERC for this co-operation project, which was in the charge of Mr. Tan Rongyao, Chief Administrative Officer of SERC, Mr. Liu Baohua, Director General of the Power Market Regulation Department of SERC, and Ms. Yan Xiaolu, Deputy Director General of the International Cooperation Department of SERC. This report has been prepared by a core consultant team consisting of Dennis Colenutt, Sally Hunt and Jon Stern of NERA, and the distinguished local experts listed earlier. Other inputs have been provided by Oscar Arnedillo and Fernando Barrera of NERA. This report has resulted from an intensive process of debate, discussion and revision, in cooperation with SERC staff over a lengthy period of time. Without their extensive comments and suggestions, this report could not have been completed. Special thanks are due to Mr. Xiang Haiping, Deputy Director General of the Power Market Regulation Department of SERC, for his overall assistance in the preparation of this report. We are also indebted to Ms. Wu Ye, Assistant Consultant of the Power Market Regulation Department of SERC. Similarly, we would like to thank Ms. Wang Lifen in the International Cooperation Department of SERC and Ms. Xiong Ping in SERC North China Bureau for their contributions to the success of the project through their untiring efforts on translation and other important preparatory works. The International Department and the Economic Construction Department of the Ministry of Finance of China and the World Bank have provided great support for this project. Dr. Zhao Jianping in the World Bank Office Beijing has offered many valuable ideas for the preparation of this report. We wish to express our sincere thanks to all of them. In addition, those who have made contributions to this project include Mr. Chen Qun, Mr. Chang Jianping, Mr. Yu Yanshan, Mr. Qian Rui, Mr. Chen Dayu, Mr. He Yang, Mr. Zhao Xueshun, Mr. Wang Yang, Mr. Zhang Yu, Mr. Shu Anjie, Mr. Jiang Debin, Mr. Zhong Jianhua, Ms. Zhang Di, Ms. Sun Yingwen, Mr. Jia Bin, Mr. Zhou Bo, Ms. Gao Nan, Mr. Hu Ninghui, Mr. Chai Gaofeng, Mr. Wei Guangyao, Ms. Zhang Lizi, Ms. Xu Hanchu, Ms. Wu Xiaohua, Mr. Wang Dongrong, Mr. Guan Yongsheng. SERC Northeast China Bureau, SERC Northwest China Bureau, China Southern Power Grid Co. Ltd., China Power Investment Corporation, China Huaneng Power International Inc., China Huadian Power International Inc., East China Gird Co. Ltd., Central China Grid Co. Ltd., Northeast China Grid Co. Ltd., and Zhejiang Sunshine Law Firm have also provided a lot of assistances for the project. All of their contributions and assistance are greatly appreciated. Author Jan,2007 ·115· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Abbreviations and Acronyms AER Australian Energy Regulator ANEEL Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica, Brazil BETA British Electricity Trading Arrangements, that superceded NETA and now apply to England, Scotland, and Wales BST Bulk Supply Tariff CERC Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, India CNE National Energy Commission, Spain Distco Distribution Company DoE Department of Energy, USA ENRE Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad, Argentina EPACT Energy Policy Act, USA ETC Economic and Trade Commission, PRC FEK Federal Energy Commission, Russia FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, USA FPA Federal Power Act 1935, USA GNP Gross National Product Gridco Grid Company GW Giga Watt IPP Independent Power Producer kWh Kilo Watt Hour LSE Load Serving Entity MME Ministry of Mines and Energy, Brazil MO Market Operator MOF Ministry of Finance, PRC MW Mega Watt NARUC National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, USA NDRC National Reform and Development Commission, PRC NEM National Electricity Market, Australia NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements, previously applying to England and Wales NVE Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, Norway OFGEM Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, United Kingdom PJM An accepted abbreviation for the electricity market operating in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland area of the USA. ·116· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China PPA Power Purchase Agreement PRC Peoples Republic of China PSRWG Power Sector Reform Working Group, PRC PUC Public Utility Commission, USA PUHCA Public Utility Holding Company Act, USA REK Regional Energy Commission, Russia RoR Rate of Return RTO Regional Transmission Organisation, USA SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, PRC SC State Council, PRC SERC State Electricity Regulatory Commission of China SGC State Grid Company, PRC SO System Operator SOE State Owned Enterprise SPC State Power Corporation, PRC UK United Kingdom USA United States of America ·117· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Executive Summary Introduction This Report has been prepared as the final part of the work under NERA’s contract for Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency (SERC), P.R. China (a Technical Cooperation Project supported by the World Bank). It has been prepared through an intensive process of research, discussion, and drafting in close collaboration with SERC and other agencies. The team of foreign experts has worked closely with local experts and SERC staff in its preparation. The research carried out has examined both the conditions in China and also regulatory practices in other countries. In the past 20 years, China has made great achievements in its electricity sector. As the second largest electricity sector in the world, the Chinese electricity sector has undergone impressive growth. Total installed generating capacity exceeded 500 GW by the end of 2005; in 2005 China added over 66 GW of new installed capacity, and the national electricity production was 2474.7 billion kWh (an increase of 12.3％on a year-on-year basis). China’s electricity system has also undergone major reforms: ownership of most of the electricity plants has been separated from electricity grids; the central generation assets and electric network assets have been restructured; regional electricity markets are being developed; and a professional electricity regulatory institution has been established. The core objectives of this electricity system reform of China are to promote the role of the market in the development and operation of the electricity sector, and to apply effective economic regulation to the electricity sector. However, despite these achievements and progress, the current position of China’s electricity sector is not wholly satisfactory: low levels of efficiency in the sector have become an outstanding problem relative to the sustainable development of economy and society; conflicts between electricity sector development, resource use, and the environment are more and more evident; electricity supply facilities are poorly equipped, with low reliability of electricity supply and poor service quality; policy and administrative mechanisms are lagging behind the reform, and electricity supply cannot reach an efficient and harmonious codevelopment with the economy and society. All these impact on the rational adjustment of the electricity sector structure and on the health and sustainable development of the entire economy. Based on our research we believe that, in order to improve significantly the performance of the electricity sector in China, it is necessary to achieve substantial progress in respect of ·118· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China the introduction of market disciplines, enterprise reform, and the introduction of modern regulation as soon as possible. This Report focuses on the core issue of the creation of modern regulation, that is how to improve the capacity of the electricity regulatory institutions in China from both internal and external perspectives. As part of that work, this Report also conducts an in-depth research on the issue of the establishment and regulation of a competitive electricity market in China. Purpose, Role and Functions of Electricity Regulation The focus of this Report is on economic regulation, that is regulation of prices and other commercial terms, investment, and service quality. Chapter 2 of the Report sets the scene for considering and introducing electricity sector economic regulation by discussing the basic principles behind it, and presenting an extensive review of relevant international experience. An initial issue, given that China is moving away from a system of almost complete price control by governments towards a market economy, is why it is necessary to institute economic regulation at all? This Chapter addresses this basic issue by examining the central purpose and function of economic regulation in the electricity sector. To achieve that purpose, it is necessary to balance the interests of consumers, the utility investors, and the government. The interests of consumers are best ensured by obtaining reliable supplies at the least cost. Consumers’ interests are not best served solely by low prices, if it is to the detriment of the future reliability of supplies of electricity. Utility investors will be seeking to maximize the profit from their investment, but are also interested in stability and certainty in the market. Governments may have policy issues for the electricity sector such as rural electrification, security of supply or reducing emissions. The regulator has a role in balancing legitimate government policy issues, while ensuring that the other stake holders are not harmed. Competitive markets can provide efficient production levels, minimum cost, adequate supplies, and high quality of service. In contrast, monopolies are able to raise prices, reduce output and compromise quality and service, and that is why it is generally considered economically desirable to avoid monopolies where possible, and to regulate them where they are unavoidable. The negative effects of monopoly can then be reduced to the minimum. There are three main reasons why it may be important to introduce economic regulation in a sector: （1）Control the behavior of “natural monopolies”, in order to prevent the monopoly enterprises from raising the prices at will while reducing the electricity supply services. （2）Promote fair and efficient competition. （3）Promote the public interest. Fundamentally speaking, a powerful regulatory system is not in contradiction with the ·119· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China concept of deregulation. The regulatory system places emphasis on regulatory effectiveness, while deregulation pays more attention to reducing the sphere of micro-interference and exerting the fundamental roles of market allocation of resources. In fact, both international practice and research findings prove that, as part of strong government, regulation is an important guarantee of economic development whether in developed countries or in developing countries. In general, regulation is a system designed to solve market failures and limitations. The electricity regulatory institutions play a role of regulating the price, investment and service where monopoly enterprises provide services; and also approve the market designs and price-setting mechanisms and monitor the efficient operation of the market when there is competition. The electricity sector is a key network sector where problems of monopoly have been found to arise, and so is a sector to which regulation is commonly applied. In addition, other characteristics of the electricity sector make it necessary for the execution of professional regulation. Regulatory actions are usually based on regulating prices, quality and investment. Where companies are natural monopolies, such as transmission networks, the regulator generally sets the prices; where companies operate in potentially competitive activities, such as generation or retail supply, the regulator will try to establish competition so that the interaction of supply and demand can be left to set prices. This Report deals separately with each of these areas in more detail. Quality regulation is also important because, where incentives are placed to cut costs, monopoly businesses may respond by reducing quality rather than improving efficiency. Electricity tariff regulation should not be confused with economic macro-regulation. In fact, electricity tariff regulation has essential differences from economic macro regulation in terms of its subjects, targets and measures. Reasonable Allocation of Electricity Regulatory Responsibilities in China Chapter 3 examines the allocation of responsibilities for electricity sector regulation in China. Currently in China, these responsibilities are split between a number of different organisations, and the regulatory powers of each of them is lacking in clear definition. That is an obvious difficulty at present. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible for planning and price regulation. The Ministry of Finance has some decision-making powers relating to certain financial rules and cost standards; and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission exercises a supervisory role over state-owned enterprises, in particular in appointing and supervising senior executives. The existing distribution of regulatory functions for the electricity sector in China is ·120· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China inefficient and inconsistent, mainly in the following aspects: （1）First, policymaking and regulatory functions are mixed. （2）Second, planning approvals and investment supervision functions are confused. （3）Third, tariff regulation functions are not allocated effectively. In the light of these problems, we have reviewed relevant international experience and developed recommendations for improvement. On this basis, we recommend that a new Electricity Law be introduced that provides a clear and consistent definitions of responsibilities. This redefinition of responsibilities should include the following points: （1） An electricity sector policy-making entity, like Ministry of Energy, should be established in China as soon as possible, based probably on the restructuring of the existing institutions including the Bureau for Energy and Department of Price of NDRC and some other institutions. （2）SERC’s roles and powers should be clearly defined, and it should be given the responsibility for the full range of regulatory responsibilities. （3）There should be gradual adjustment of the responsibilities for tariff setting, so that they are progressively transferred to SERC from NDRC. （4）Significant antitrust (competition policy) responsibilities should also be allocated to SERC, and if necessary a special antitrust institution should be set up to work in collaboration with SERC. （ 5 ） SERC should have the prime responsibility for setting technical and quality regulation issues. （6）SERC should be able to establish the regional, provincial, and branch offices with high efficiency, so that it can carry out necessary regulatory responsibilities at the local level. We suggest that the Ministry of Finance should be responsible for specifying general financial rules, accounting rules and cost standards for all sectors, and SERC should have the responsibility for developing specific rules and standards for electricity sector within MOF’s general rules and standards, and for ensuring that these rules are observed by electricity companies. It should be emphasised that bringing tariff regulation and cost regulation together is critical for the development of effective economic regulation. The current situation in China, where the responsibilities are split between NDRC and MOF, who are carrying tariff regulation and cost regulation into execution separately, should be changed as soon as feasible. We recommend that the responsibility for these functions should be unified and assigned to SERC. We also suggest that, with the expansion of natural gas consumption and its growing impacts on the development of economic society, China could take account of this ·121· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China international experience, in particular from Britain and the United States, and consider integration of the regulatory mechanisms respectively for the electricity sector and the natural gas sector, so as gradually to develop a more comprehensive energy regulatory body. Basic Methods of Electricity Sector Regulation The tasks of regulating monopolies and regulating markets go together, and we believe SERC should carry out both functions for the electricity sector. Only by this means can the transparency, predictability and efficiency of electricity sector regulatory operations be realized. There are extensive natural monopolies in transmission and distribution in the electricity sector, and SERC should be responsible for licensing and regulation, including setting prices for these companies and implementing quality and investment regulation. Chapter 4 deals in detail with regulatory mechanisms for natural monopoly sectors that may be adopted by SERC, and discusses different approaches. For example, there are different approaches to calculating costs and setting tariffs, but we emphasise that in all cases the rules should be transparent, consistent and predictable. In addition, the rules should have incentives for efficiency in operations and investment decisions, as well as a reasonable prospect of cost recovery for the monopoly. In this context of price regulation, we believe that there is an important distinction to be made between the role of setting the price policy and methodology, and the role of calculating and enforcing the prices. We have recommended that, in the long term, the function of setting price policy and methodology should be borne by the government’s macro section, while the function of calculating and enforcing the prices should be borne by SERC. SERC should have primary responsibility for implementing price regulation, but the key methodologies and transitional tariffs could be developed jointly by NDRC and SERC (and any other relevant ministries or agencies involved in the reform process). In addition to regulating prices, regulators have an important role in regulating other aspects of the monopoly’s service such as quality (technical and customer service), investment and system planning and licensing. The Report emphasises that in each of these areas, SERC should play the major role. The Report also discusses various mechanisms and approaches to be adopted by SERC for the electricity sector regulation. Establishment and Regulation of Competitive Electricity Markets Chapter 5 focuses on the issue of regulation in competitive areas. The Report emphasizes that the regulation function should be suitable for the specific structures and characteristics of the electricity sector. In competitive areas of the electricity sector the regulator still has an important role to play. We recommend in the Report that in all the areas where the ·122· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China competition mechanism could be introduced, SERC should play an important role in competition design, promotion, development and realization. It should be ensured that markets are effectively designed, there is freedom of entry for new generators, transmission and distribution access is non-discriminatory, and investigations are conducted on complaints about competitors’ behaviour. Chapter 5 describes four basic models of the electricity sector structure, which are vertically integrated monopoly, single buyer, wholesale competition, and retail competition, and we also put emphasis on the regulatory issues with different market models. The four basic models are differentiated by how much monopoly is retained. The role of the regulator will depend on the competitive model chosen, which can vary from limited competition where the only competition is to build new generation under contract, to a single buyer, through to full competition where generation and retail are competitive and only transmission and distribution remain as monopoly activities. In addition, the role of the regulator will vary with the speed of the reform process. In Chapter 5 we review the characteristics of the different market models relevant to China, and review their implications for regulation. Our general recommendation is that China should aim to achieve as soon as possible the transition of regional electricity markets from a single buyer model to a wholesale competition model, and create genuine regional electricity markets with multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Research on the proper positioning of the electricity market operator should also be speeded up, and the issue of property system reform should be addressed, to facilitate the creation of fair and effective wholesale competition in the electricity market. Whichever market model is chosen, the regulator will have a very important role in the design of the trading arrangements or market rules. According to international experience, we would expect the grid company to design the rules, which would then be ratified by SERC. As China has such diverse electricity markets, not all regions need to follow the same model of competition (single buyer, wholesale competition etc) simultaneously, but we suggest that where the same model is applied, then the same rules should also apply. The wider development of electricity markets in the USA and Europe has been hampered by divergent market rules being put in place in different states or countries. FERC (the USA federal regulator) has finally adopted a standard design based on the PJM market, but Europe continues to allow widely differing arrangements under the terms of the electricity directives. Capacity Building in the Near-Term It is likely to be a lengthy process to build the long-term capacity of electricity regulatory institutions in China and solve its present issues. However, it may need further time still to achieve the targets for regulation of the sector in the long term. Meanwhile, and in parallel ·123· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China with the longer-term efforts, SERC should further improve and strengthen the capacity building in the near-term. This is as important as the long-term capacity building, and it will affect the relevant parties’ understanding of the practical value of SERC. From our perspective, this capacity building in the near-term includes two principal aspects, improving external conditions, and building internal capabilities, and these should be identified and performed in accordance with their importance and urgency and the existing conditions and capabilities. In Chapter 6 we discuss the specific near-term steps that we believe should be carried out in parallel with the longer-term changes, and these are summarized below. （1）Speed up electricity sector reform. Promoting the market-oriented electricity sector reform is the most fundamental prerequisite to improving the capacity of electricity regulatory institutions in China. In the situation where electricity sector reform has slowed down, it would be hard to set up a modern electricity regulatory system, and it would probably be impossible to execute effectively many of the standard regulatory functions. As an important element of this, we suggest that there should be clear objectives and a timetable given to the Power Sector Reform Working Group (PSRWG), to continue and develop the reform process. It is also suggested that PSRWG should use the opportunity while the imbalance between supply and demand is easing to strengthen its leading position, improve its coordination with other departments, speed up the decision-making process and promote electricity sector reforms. The office of PSRWG should be given clearer objectives and a stronger capability to speed up the implementation of reform decisions. It should be pointed out that in any market economy countries or regions, electricity sector reform has been regarded by the party in power and by government as an important political decision, and has thus received direction from, and has been promoted by, senior political leaders or their authorized senior decision-makers. The importance and complexity of the electricity reforms in China is no less than in the other countries that have carried out successful electricity reforms. Therefore, although China has now entered into a period favourable for electricity reform, we still have to suggest, based on international experience and the real situation in China, that for securing the progress, strength and expected success of the electricity sector reform, the PSRWG should be given strong support from the senior leadership group, and that the work of the PSRWG should be directed and promoted by them or by a leading decision-maker authorised by them in a timely manner. We also suggest that the electricity sector reform in the near-term should speed up the execution of separating non-core businesses of the grid companies, so as to avoid cross subsidization and connected transactions, to create an electricity market basic platform, and to promote competent market-based entities. It should set and implement separate transmission ·124· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China and distribution system tariffs, speed up the work on allowing large consumers to buy directly from generators (differentiated by size or voltage level and by other groupings). Alongside this, the reform should pursue research on separating the electricity transmission and distribution functions so as to achieve as soon as possible the transition of regional electricity markets from a single buyer model to a wholesale competition model, and create genuine regional electricity markets with multiple sellers and multiple buyers. （2）Energetically promote construction of regional electricity markets. SERC should energetically promote construction of regional electricity markets, gradually exerting the fundamental roles of market allocation of resources, and promote and create new electricity sector control and regulation systems that are suitable for a market economy system. The new system would combine macro-control, market regulation and effective supervision to improve effectiveness and techniques for the regulation of the electricity sector. In this way, electricity sector regulatory capacity will be gradually improved along with the development of electricity markets. In a sense, that is a fundamental work to be done. （3）Focus on regulating markets and protecting customers as the key near-term areas of work. In the present situation, if SERC wants to have a clear impact on the sector, then we suggest that SERC put regulating markets and protecting customers as its key short-term areas of work, to obtain acceptance and support from all sectors of society. SERC therefore needs as soon as possible to place emphasis on market regulation and on its function as the protector of public interests and users’ interests. It should look for opportunities to implement several big cases that have major impacts in respect of regulating markets and protecting customers. In order to deter potential violators and encourage customers to rely on SERC to defend their rights, violators could be punished by way of “naming on bulletin” or being named in newspapers, in addition to other economic punishment. （4）Pursue further development of the legal framework for electricity regulation. The existing Electricity Law and other regulations are far from sufficient for SERC to be able to become an effective national regulator. As a first priority, SERC should therefore work to speed up the amendment of the Electricity Law, confirm the lawful duties and powers of the electricity regulatory institutions in the new law, and then revise the administrative regulations such as the regulations on electricity regulation according to this new law. （5）Strengthen cooperation with relevant departments of the government and jointly execute relevant regulatory tasks. In the present situation, SERC may only carry out some areas of regulation in conjunction with other responsible departments. It is therefore important for SERC to strengthen cooperation with the relevant departments of the government (mainly the NDRC), or even to assist the NDRC, to meet the needs of implementing the functions of regional electricity market building, regulating ·125· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China electricity market behaviour, and protecting customer interests. SERC may perform efficiently and play important roles during this cooperation, and gradually reform traditional approval processes so as to improve functional allocation problems. There are not many staffs in these other relevant departments of government to perform electricity regulation functions, and the numbers are insufficient to perform these roles adequately. In this circumstance, it is useful to both sides that SERC should strengthen its cooperation with those other departments. Of course, even though SERC may be given the responsibility for major functions in the future, such as electricity price regulation, investment regulation, etc, the separation of administration and regulation between macro-departments of government and SERC means that other macro departments would still play an important role. SERC should therefore also strengthen its communications with those other governmental departments according to the requirements of the work. However, in the current circumstance, this cooperation is a pragmatic measure that is necessary and important. （6）Improve and implement measures on electricity regulation fee collection. The key source of income for regulatory institutions is often regulation fees collected from the electricity enterprises themselves. This form of funding complies with the principle of costs being covered by the responsible parties, and is common practice in other market economy countries because of its fairness and efficiency. However, at present, many of the administrative expenses of SERC have no stable source of income to cover them, which is clearly problematic. SERC (and other relevant departments of the government) should fully understand the need to establish a system of electricity regulatory fees. The earlier it is put into effect, the more beneficial it will be for the execution of regulatory tasks, and the less damage it is likely to cause to the image of the government. （7）Urgently establish SERC at regional, provincial, and local levels. One of the current key problems that prevent the improvement of electricity regulation capacity in China is that there are no basic regulatory institutions in place to execute and fulfil many regulatory tasks (e.g. service quality and customer protection). This greatly reduces the overall effectiveness of the sector regulation. One of the important tasks for short-term regulatory capacity building is therefore to identify and execute a reasonable structure of branch institutions as soon as possible. Early work should focus on the framework of subordinate institutions of SERC, i.e. to set up the basic unified organizations able effectively to execute regulatory instructions. In addition, current staffing levels are obviously not enough for SERC to execute its regulatory functions effectively. We provide detailed descriptions of relevant international experience in this respect in Appendix A, with tabulated data useful for reference. The report concludes that there needs to be a large increase in staff for electricity regulation. However, each level of institution has to follow the principle of “better few than ·126· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China worse”. What needs to be particularly emphasized is that the increase of SERC personnel that is needed would not add substantially to the total numbers of government personnel. As some functions are transferred from other departments of the government to SERC, the additional personnel for SERC may come from these departments. （8）Apply for authority to regulate state-owned electricity enterprises through specific methods. It is quite common for regulatory organizations to have to regulate state-owned enterprises within the electricity sector in China. However, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 4 of the Report, specific mechanisms are required to regulate these entities effectively. We therefore recommend that SERC apply to the State Council for authority to use the specific range of measures proposed in Chapter 4 to enable effective regulation of the relevant state-owned electricity enterprises by SERC. （9）Keep well informed about electricity enterprises and establish mechanisms for effective communication and exchange with external entities. To establish and maintain good relations with other bodies and to improve understanding of its role, SERC should have more robust mechanisms of communication and exchange with external entities. This applies to entities within the electricity sector, in other regulated sectors in China, and to relevant international organizations. （ 10 ） Strengthen personnel training, and establish regulations for the behaviour of personnel. As electricity regulation measures and methods are different from most traditional administrative and management activities, a programme of standard personnel training is far from adequate to enable SERC staff to execute their functions effectively. Its personnel should be equipped with modern regulatory ideas relevant to the market economy and wide-ranging and systematic professional regulatory knowledge. So we suggest that SERC should design and implement a more comprehensive training programme. Important aspects that need to be considered in respect of personnel recruitment and training are that SERC must try hard to avoid appointing unsuitable personnel, and that it should cultivate professional ethics into its personnel through establishing proper regulations on behaviour. ·127· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background to the Study This Report has been prepared as the final part of the work under NERA’s contract for Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency (SERC), P.R. China (Sub-project A12 of Technical Cooperation Project (04) supported by the World Bank). Earlier written deliverables under this project have included the preparation of a number of Issues Papers, a Mid-term Report and a Policy Paper, but much of that material is not repeated here. This Report has been prepared through an intensive process of research, discussion and drafting in close collaboration with SERC. The team of foreign experts has worked closely with local experts and SERC staff in its preparation. The research carried out has examined both the conditions in China and also regulatory practices in other countries. In the past 20 years, China has made great achievements in its electricity sector. The installed electricity capacity and annual electricity production have remained the second in the world for ten consecutive years (installed capacity exceeding 5000 GW by the end of 2005). In 2005, China added 66 GW of new installed capacity, with a national electricity production of nearly 2474.7 billion kWh (an increase of 12.3％ on a year-on-year basis). China is expected to maintain a high rate of increase of both demand and production for a very long period in the future (see Appendix B of this report for more detailed information). China’s electricity system is quite clearly undergoing great changes. The Plan for the Reform of the Electricity System (referred to as Document No.5 in this Report) promulgated by the State Council of China in 2002 set an important milestone. A new series of electricity sector reforms have been carried out in accordance with this Document No 5. Major reform measures have been executed to separate electricity plants from electricity grids, to restructure the central generation assets and electric network assets, to construct regional electricity markets, and to set up professional electricity regulatory institutions. The core objectives of this electricity system reform of China are to promote the role of the market in the development and operation of the electricity sector, and to apply effective economic regulation to the electricity sector. China has achieved great progress in the reform of the electricity regulatory system. It has set up a professional electricity regulatory institution—the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC)—with modern regulatory practices being adopted rapidly and relevant regulations gradually being established. The initial arrangements for electricity markets have ·128· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China been put into practice, and there has also been great progress in the development of regulatory branch offices. However, despite these achievements and progress, the current position of China’s electricity sector is not wholly satisfactory, for the reasons described below: Low Electricity Sector Efficiency. China has a serious problem of high investment needs, high consumption and low efficiency in its electricity sector. Currently, the average coal consumption per kWh in China is reported still to be 50g of standard coal higher than that in developed countries, and the line loss rate is 2 to 3 percentage points higher than developed countries. The water consumption rate of thermal-electricity plants per kWh is around 40％ higher than developed country levels, while the labour productivity of major electricity enterprises is less than one third of the developed country level. In addition, there are still widespread problems of overlapping of core and supplementary functions of the electricity enterprises. All these factors result in costs being difficult to calculate clearly and to control effectively, cross subsidization and connected transactions are unavoidable, and so all these factors have resulted in low levels of efficiency. Poor Electricity Generation Mix. The total installed electric capacity by the end of 2005 in China, broken down between thermal-electricity generation, hydro-electricity generation and nuclear-electricity generation, were respectively 384 GW, 116 GW and 6.85 GW, i.e. about 75.6％, 22.9％ and 1.35％ respectively. Non-fossil energy resources such as nuclear electricity, wind electricity, and solar electricity accounted for a very small proportion of the total. Within thermal-electricity generation capacity, there are 150 GW of coal-fired generation units smaller than 135 MW that have high coal consumption and cause severe pollution, accounting for approximately 30％ of the country’s total installed capacity. Such a structure of generating capacity creates conflicts between electricity sector development, resource use, and the environment. Electricity supply facilities are poorly equipped, with low reliability of electricity supply and poor service quality. Electricity supply facilities in smaller urban areas and rural towns in China are particularly poorly equipped. The electricity supply service is often operated without any competition or necessary regulation, and this results in low reliability of electricity supply and poor service quality. Erratic policy and administrative mechanisms. Preparation of electricity laws and regulations is lagging behind reform, sector planning and industrial policy making are weak. The development of the electricity sector is alternating between situations where electricity supply is sometimes subject to serious shortages and then in surplus, so that it cannot develop efficiently and in harmony with the economy and society. All these factors impact on the health and sustainable development of the economy and the rational adjustment of the electricity sector structure. ·129· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Based on our review, we believe that these problems have three major causes: （1）Market involvement in the electricity sector is low. The low level of private sector or market involvement in the electricity sector structure causes conflicts with the regulatory mechanism. Despite an unbundled sector structure, with many separate entities in the generation sector, much of the regulatory mechanism is still under the centralized control of the government. It has therefore been inevitable that a severe imbalance of the electricity supply and demand has occurred. In general, the development and management of the electricity sector in China have depended on traditional government political measures. External market pressures encountered by the enterprises have been weak, and there has been little obvious motivation to promote internal reform or to explore the potential to improve service quality. （2）Reforms of electricity sector enterprises have not been executed in full. Electricity enterprises in China are mainly state owned, and so lack the understanding or incentive to lower costs and increase efficiency. There has been no significant progress in the reform of state-owned enterprises generally so far. The electricity sector also has the same problems such as lack of vigour, waste of resources, short-term behaviour, neglect of responsibilities etc., that have occurred in other industries because the reforms have not been fully executed. （3）Modern electricity regulation based on the market economy has not yet been effectively implemented. China has carried out major investments with the introduction of commercialisation in its electricity sector, but most electricity enterprises are still state owned, and are in effect part of the administrative system. Enterprises’ behaviour is to some extend or even significantly distorted. Effective electricity sector regulation is not only necessary, but also needs to be far more sophisticated and tough than other industries. However, China has not yet carried out effective economic regulation to its electricity sector. After the restructuring of government administration and the electricity sector restructuring, the former management system has been broken up, while a new regulatory structure has not yet taken its place. The regulatory structure has not been systematically designed and revised because of problems with the existing division of responsibilities between the present institutions. The government has not yet exercised its combined regulatory powers, and the problems of absence of regulation and the need to update it have not yet been effectively settled. Thus, in addition to introducing the competitive mechanism into electricity system reform of China, the government should also revise and improve its capacity to regulate electricity investment, cost, and price and service quality in appropriate ways. In relative terms, it has now become even more urgent to establish modern electricity regulatory arrangements. In order to improve significantly the performance of the electricity sector in China, it is necessary to achieve practical changes in respect of introducing market discipline, enterprise reform, and the introduction of modern regulation, as soon as possible. This report will focus on the core issue for the creation of modern regulation, that is how to improve the capacity of ·130· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China electricity regulatory institutions in China. 1.2 Key Issues to be Solved for Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Institutions of China As mentioned above, China has set up a new professional electricity regulatory institution—SERC—but, so far, SERC has not been charged with the functions and powers that are appropriate for regulating a large electricity sector and the rapidly growing electricity market. Building of SERC’s fundamental capacity needs to be further strengthened. There are both external and internal factors contributing to SERC’s deficiencies in regulatory powers, and these include: （1）The idea of modern regulation has not been widely accepted. Regulation based on the principles of a market economy is still a new concept in China, and it is easy for people to confuse this with direct control of the planned economy. It needs a process for all parties concerned (including government, enterprises and customers) to update their knowledge. （2）Relevant legislation, especially legislation relating to electricity sector regulation, is relatively immature. In particular, the absence of a new Electricity Law means that SERC has still not been given the necessary legal duties and so does not command the necessary authority with the regulated enterprises. （3）The problem of allocation of responsibilities between SERC and other governmental subdivisions is being resolved only very slowly. SERC was set up as a professional regulator. However, the core functions of electricity regulation have not so far been allocated to SERC. This not only severely limits the capacity of SERC to regulate the electricity sector effectively, but also intensifies the functional overlaps and conflicts between government institutions. The result is that the government institutions as a whole are prevented from executing their regulatory powers efficiently. （4）The vertical organizational system within SERC is also still relatively undeveloped. The vertical division of functions and numbers of personnel are far from being adequate for the specific situation of a country like China that has a vast geographical spread, a large population, and a huge electricity system with a large and diverse sphere of electricity services. The unbalanced pattern of regional electricity sector development and the uneven reform progress further complicate the issue. This results in a situation where some necessary aspects of regulation are absent, while at the same time conflict of regulatory functions occur because of horizontal overlaps of powers. （5）Regulations and implementation programs that are necessary for the execution of regulatory functions are not in position. Compared with some of the traditional approaches to administrative management, modern economic regulation needs to be based on clear legislation and associated rules. For all these reasons, it is very difficult at present for SERC to design a ·131· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China scientific, reasonable, and effective electricity regulatory framework and program. Without this clear legislative framework and clear rules, effective regulation of the electricity sector will be out of the question, and the public will not understand the essential differences between the SERC and the administrative government departments previously responsible for the sector. （6）The personnel structure and quality within SERC also present problems for the execution of the key regulatory tasks. Experience from other countries indicates that it is extremely important for electricity regulatory institutions to strengthen their organizational structure and build their capabilities so as to obtain trust from the government, investors and consumers, and gain to respect from other interested parties. For many practical reasons (for example the large income differences between SERC staff and staff in the regulated state-owned electricity enterprises, and the fact that regulatory functions are not well defined), the electricity regulatory institutions are in a relatively inferior position in terms of attracting high quality and talented staff within the electricity sector, compared with large state-owned electricity enterprises. The potential solutions of these six problems are the primary focus here in terms of regulatory capacity building. 1.3 Structure of This Report This report is divided into six Chapters and three Appendixes. The Chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 1 is this Introduction. Chapter 2 discusses some basic issues of economic regulation, including the main contents of economic regulation, why we should regulate the electricity sector, who should regulate and what should be regulated, etc.. Chapter 3 presents suggestions on the long-term functional divisions of the government in capacity building and suggests what new functions are required and what functions need to be transferred from other institutions to SERC. Chapter 4 expands in detail on how to regulate the natural monopoly areas of the electricity sector. Chapter 5 discusses further how to perform regulation in competitive electricity markets. Chapter 6 then makes suggestions on the near-term capacity building of the electricity regulatory institutions in China. The contents of the three Appendixes are: Appendix A provides an introduction and commentary on the regulatory mechanisms of the electricity sectors in nine countries, including the U.S.A. Russia, and Britain. Appendix B provides a review of the development situation of the electricity sector in China. Appendix C discusses some of the basic characteristics of effective regulation. ·132· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 2 The Purpose, Role and Functions of Regulation It is important to emphasise that we are referring in this study to economic regulation. In this context “economic” regulation means regulation of prices and other commercial terms, investment, and service quality, as opposed to the rules for safety, or for land use, or for environmental aspects.These other issues,of safety regulation, and land use and environmental regulation, are not within the scope of this study. 2.1 Purpose of Electricity Regulation The central purpose of electricity regulation is to achieve economic and technical efficiency in the sector, to control the price of electricity, and to improve the electricity supply quality and service quality. Given that China is moving away from a system of almost complete price control towards a market economy, where the prices of products are determined by the “market”, and not by the government, why institute economic regulation at this time? What is it supposed to do? This Chapter of the Report attempts to answer these questions. 2.1.1 Why Regulate Anything There is wide-spread agreement that, in general, competitive markets can provide efficient production levels, minimum cost, adequate supplies, and high quality of service. In contrast, monopolies are able to raise prices, reduce output and compromise quality; and that is why it is generally considered economically desirable to avoid monopolies where possible, and to regulate them where they are unavoidable. The negative effects of monopoly can then be reduced to the minimum. （1）There are three main reasons why it may be important to introduce economic regulation in a sector: （2）First, is the need to control the behaviour of “natural monopolies”, in order to prevent the monopoly enterprises from raising the prices at will while reducing the quality of electricity supply and service. （3）Second, is the need to promote fair competition. It may be that, for various reasons, a sector performs badly even if it is not a natural monopoly and is supposedly competitive. The specific technological and economic features of the specific industries make it quite hard both ·133· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China to introduce competition (especially where the market structure and competition model are also unique), and also to stop a sector from becoming remonopolised. In this case, professional regulation is needed to construct a platform for competition, to regulate market operation and to promote fair and effective competition. The regulatory requirements of such a competitive sector are discussed in the Chapter 5. （4）Third, is to promote the public interest. If a particular sector is heavily clothed with the public interest, the government needs to require it to behave in certain ways to further particular policy goals. The telecommunications industry, for example, is so important for the efficient functioning of a modern economy and for economic development that most governments feel the need to stay close to the industry’s activities. These issues could be dealt with by an anti-monopoly body, together with a Ministry of Communications, a Ministry of Finance, and a Ministry of Economic Development, meeting together to ensure coordination. However, most countries have chosen to establish a separate regulator, independent of the industry and of the various departments of government, to concentrate on the needs of the industry and to balance the various interests. Fundamentally speaking, a powerful regulatory system is not in contradiction with the concept of deregulation. The regulatory system places emphasis on regulatory effectiveness, while deregulation pays more attention to reducing the sphere of micro-interference and exerting the fundamental roles of market allocation of resources. In fact, both international practice and research findings prove that, as part of strong government, regulation is an important guarantee of economic development regardless of whether it is in developed countries or in developing countries. 2.1.2 Why Should We Implement Professional Regulation in the Electricity Sector The electricity sector is a key network activity where problems of monopoly have been found to arise, and so is a sector to which regulation is commonly applied. In addition, other characteristics of the electricity sector make it necessary for the execution of professional regulation: （1）The electricity sector is the base for modern material civilization. The safety, price, quality (including service quality) and so on of the electricity sector have a major impact on the general development of the economy. （2） The electricity sector needs to strengthen its electricity transmission grid and distribution systems, and these require large investment projects, strong management, and major capital expenditures. The transmission and distribution activities of the electricity sector are natural monopolies, and their prices, investment and service quality have to be regulated. （3）The electricity sector is a tightly integrated and complex system, in which the ·134· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China separate activities of generation, transmission, distribution and sales are connected to achieve safe and effective operation. Therefore, even though a competitive mechanism may be introduced into electricity generation and electricity sales, and their prices and investments need not be regulated, the competitive model must be in compliance with the requirements of safety and efficiency of the whole system due to their close and complex technical connections with electricity transmission and distribution. So even after competition is introduced into electricity generation and electricity sales, some form of regulation is still needed on these the transmission and distribution activities to guarantee the effective operation of the electricity market. （ 4 ） The electricity market is characterised by instantaneous balance and technical complexity. It has greater technical complexity than other commodity exchange markets. And because the electricity market is special in its competition model and its operation method, it has to be designed, monitored, and controlled in a way that recognises the special characteristics of the electricity sector. The role of the regulator depends upon the degree of competition in the sector, and needs to be adjusted constantly. In monopoly sectors the regulator generally controls prices and investment, and determines the acceptable service quality. In the competitive sectors the market sets the price, and the price induces the investment—the regulator’s role is to approve the trading arrangements and monitor the workings of the market, to ensure that competition is maintained. In general, regulation is a system designed to solve market failures and limitations. The electricity regulatory institutions play a role of regulating the price, investment and service where monopoly enterprises provide services; and to approve and monitor the market designs and mechanisms (by which the price is set) when there is competition. All of these circumstances apply as much in China as in most other countries, and there is therefore no doubt in our view that regulation of the electricity sector is an important and justifiable requirement. When viewed from the perspectives of government and the whole society, the electricity sector’s requirements for professional regulation are very clear, but what needs to be emphasised is that regulatory reform in China must be firmly rooted in the market-oriented economic reform process. The first and foremost task is to deepen the reform so that competition and market forces will be empowered wherever possible, and unleashed from tight government control. Construction of the regulation system should therefore be in compliance with a competitive electricity market and diversification of the electricity sector entities. 2.2 Entities to be Subjected to Electricity Regulation All the entities operating in the electricity sector should normally be subject to some form of regulation. They will all need to be licensed, and they will all need to agree to abide ·135· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China by the rules set up to ensure coordination in the sector. These entities should be required to meet certain minimum conditions set out by the Regulator in order to do business at all. Chapter 4 elaborates the aspects of their activities that should be regulated, but in essence this will be prices, quality, and investment for the monopoly or not fully competitive elements. 2.3 Three Key Areas of Electricity Regulation As noted above, the objective of regulation is to control the activities of utilities where there is natural monopoly or inadequate competition, so as to balance the interests of the consumer, the utility investors, and the government. In carrying this out, regulatory actions are usually based on exercising controls in three main areas of activity of a utility: Prices, Quality and Investment. Investment regulation originates from the requirements for price control. 2.3.1 Prices In the monopoly activities, control of prices is the basic rationale for economic regulation, and in most other countries the regulator is in charge of setting tariffs. The methodologies for tariff regulation are quite complex, and are left to Chapter 4. In China at present the regulator does not have tariff regulation authority. Nonetheless, we should assume that regulatory organizations finally obtain the authority to determine the price, or it is the necessary process for regulatory organizations to propose material suggestions to obtain approvals of price policy departments, or will work closely with the agency that does set the tariffs. In any event, the principles of setting “just and reasonable tariffs” need to be part of the expertise of the staff of SERC. Economic regulation needs to ensure that prices are as low as is consistent with the functioning of a reasonably efficient utility, and this can be achieved by giving incentives to the utility to operate as efficiently as possible. It is important to emphasise here that consumers’ interests are not simply a matter of obtaining electricity at low prices. In the electricity sector, a regulator’s role in relation to price varies across the sector: （1）If the service is provided by a monopoly, the regulator must control the prices directly. （2）If a service is provided in a competitive market, the regulator must ensure that the market is free of distortion or monopoly practices. As China is still in the process of system transition, there are inevitably impacts from the old system to people’s understanding of electricity tariff regulation. For instance, people confuse electricity tariff regulation with economic macro-regulation. In fact, electricity tariff regulation has essential differences from economic macro regulation in subjects, targets, and measures: ·136· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （1）Subjects are different. Macro regulation focuses on the regulation of economic aggregates, while electricity tariff regulation only deals with the electricity sector or some of its enterprises. （2）Targets are different. Macro regulation is in pursuit of macro-economic stability while electricity tariff regulation focuses on the balancing of interest between the electricity sector producers and consumers, so as to improve the distribution efficiency of the electricity sector resources. （3）Measures are different. The main measures of macro regulation are currency and fiscal policies, and these policies impact on all economic subjects. The main measure of electricity tariff regulation is the determination of relevant regulations according to which encouragement for performance improvement and penalisation of inefficient or anticompetitive behaviour can be imposed. （4）Knowledge structure and special skills are different. Macro regulation requires that policy makers have relevant macro-economic knowledge and relevant skills on finance, taxation and currency policies, etc.. But for electricity sector tariff regulation, regulatory organizations require detailed technical knowledge and analytical capability on micro-economics, accounting, laws and the relevant industries. 2.3.2 Quality If the price is controlled, profits will fall, and monopolies will generally attempt to find ways to reduce costs somewhere, to maintain their profitability. The first sources of cost reduction are usually reductions in maintenance of physical plant, staffing and services. These cost reductions mean that reliability suffers. The customers cannot choose a more reliable supplier, since we are dealing with a monopoly. So there is no necessary market pressure for enterprises, and competition cannot help improve the service quality. So, as part of the responsibility to regulate the price, the regulator must also ensure that quality is maintained. These efforts to ensure good quality will mean collecting data on quality, setting quality standards, and disciplining those companies that fail to deliver acceptable quality. In the electricity sector, the term quality covers a range of issues, and needs to take account both of technical quality (including voltage and frequency stability and absence of supply interruptions) and of quality of service (including promptness and accuracy of billing, and responsiveness to requests for service calls and complaints). Detailed issues of quality are dealt with in more detail in sub-section 4.2. As a whole, regulatory focus on quality is therefore important for two reasons: （1）Because certain aspects of the sector are natural monopolies, there may be a natural tendency for electricity companies not to respond to quality issues as would be the case in a ·137· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China competitive market, and regulation needs to compensate for this. （2） In addition, some forms of price regulation provide incentives to utilities to improve efficiency and cut costs, and these efficiency pressures can lead to declining quality, which needs to be counter balanced by quality regulation. 2.3.3 Investment As recent events in China have shown, availability of reliable supplies of electricity is of vital importance, and consumers’ true long-term interests are best met by regulation that ensures an efficient balance between supply and demand. In particular, this means prices that are sufficiently remunerative to provide incentives to investors to invest in capacity adequate to meet demand. An important outcome of regulation should be incentives for the required investment in the sector. At the same time, this investment should be carried out efficiently and only to the extent that it is required to meet the needs of consumers. This means that regulation should also be able to intervene where investment is excessive and likely to operate to the detriment of consumers: （1）If the service is provided by a monopoly, the regulator must control the investment by establishing that there is a need for it. （2）If a service is provided in a competitive market, the regulator must ensure that the market is free of distortion or monopoly practices, which would tend to reduce investment to efficient levels. These three key areas or prices, quality and investment will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, regarding to how to apply general economic regulation principles to electricity sector reform practice in China. 2.4 Targets and Principles of Electricity Regulation—Balancing Various Interests It is common to describe the general objective of regulation as being to balance the interests of the three main groups of stakeholders, which are consumers, utility investors and government. Our assumption is that this would be true in China. In addition, in the case of China we believe that there may be other interests that need to be balanced, particularly between the different localities. 2.4.1 Consumers’ Interests The main interest of the customers is in obtaining reliable supplies at minimum costs, and this emphasises the need for low prices and good quality. It is, however, important to emphasise that we should take into account the long-term interests of consumers. For example, in the short term prices can be kept low by reducing the funds invested in new facilities, and this will give consumers short-term benefits. However, this would not be in the long-term ·138· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China interests of consumers because it would lead to inadequate supplies and poor quality. A regulator therefore needs to strike a balance between the short-term and long-term requirements. Sometimes in China, customers would rather obtain stable electricity supply at a higher price than have to cope with electricity shortages at a lower price. 2.4.2 Utility Investors’ Interests Investors will naturally be interested in maximising their profits, and a regulator needs to balance this against the desire of consumers for low prices. It is also important to emphasise that investors are generally not just looking for the highest possible profits , they are also very interested in stability and certainty. If a regulator can achieve a stable and predictable regulatory environment, the investor will see the sector as low risk, and that generally means that it is willing to accept a lower rate of profit, which is beneficial to consumers. A regulator therefore needs to have regard to both the return and risks for investors. 2.4.3 Government’s Legitimate Policy Interests Governments clearly have legitimate policy interests in the electricity sector, and may wish to pursue certain policy objectives, such as reducing emissions, increasing the extent of rural electrification, or ensuring low cost supplies to certain types of consumers. However, governments frequently use the electric sector to meet the needs of macro-economic policy (for example, necessary tariff increases are postponed because of inflationary considerations). The task of the regulator is to strike a balance in allowing the government to achieve its legitimate policy objectives, without unduly harming the interests of the other stakeholders. 2.5 Design of Effective Regulation—International Experience China is systematically designing regulatory institutions in this sector for the first time. There is considerable agreement among international regulatory specialists about the key general features of good regulatory design, both at the level of overarching concepts and at the practical level of procedures and methodologies. Additional detail on these aspects of typical regulatory institutions for a number of electricity sector regulatory bodies including Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Norway, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and India can be found in Appendix A of this report. 2.5.1 High Level Objectives High level, conceptual, design issues include the fundamental questions of roles and objectives, independence, accountability etc. Should the agency be secretive or open? How much participation should it encourage, or should it just issue rules? There is significant international experience of how these choices affect the effectiveness of regulation. For example, there is close agreement between what is stated in a 1998 NERA report to the Asian ·139· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Development Bank and a recent survey for the World Bank by Kessides (2003), and on this basis we have identified the following criteria that we believe define good regulation: （1）Clarity of roles and objectives. （2）Autonomy or independence. （3）Accountability. （4）Participation of stakeholders. （5）Transparency of process and decision making. （6）Predictability. （7）Adequate resources, particularly professional staff. Since these features are central to the issues and recommendations presented in this report, the features are elaborated in more detail in Appendix C. But probably the most important points to emphasise here are，①that the regulatory body needs to have clear authority for sector regulation, independent from day-to-day interference by other government agencies; ②that the regulatory body must have clear and transparent methodologies to follow in its regulatory activities, so that private-sector investors will have confidence in its actions. 2.5.2 Independence Countries with mature market economies generally pay more attention to the issues of a regulator’s independence. This is because regulation experience in these countries shows that reliability of the regulatory institutions plays a very important role in attracting investment into a regulated utility sector. It is the quality of regulation that impacts to a large degree on the companies’investment decision-making processes. It is recognised that if governmental organisations apply improper pressure on the sector regulation institutions and impact on the development or implementation of their regulation, then regulatory organizations will lose their independence and reputation. Major systematic factors that impact on the independence of regulatory organizations are： （1）Whether the policy targets and regulation targets are clearly defined. Lack of clarity will probably cause unpredictable problems for regulatory institutions (the international experience on this issue will be discussed in detail in the next part). Lack of clarity will undoubtedly cause severe problems for investors. （2）Whether sources of funding for the regulatory institutions are likely to impact their actions. It is therefore a very important question to decide who will actually fund the regulator and who will approve the regulator’s budget. It is widely agreed that independence of regulatory institutions should be built on the base of comparatively independent sources of regulatory funding. （3）Methods of appointment and removal of the senior personnel of the regulatory ·140· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China institutions. It is a crucial issue who will appoint the head (or heads) of the regulatory institutions, and what are the appointer’s rights of termination. This issue can clearly impact on the conduct of regulatory institutions. Data in Appendix A indicates that British laws strictly define the functions of the electricity and natural gas regulatory organization, OFGEM, and relevant governmental departments, so that the regulatory institution is able to resist inappropriate pressure from other government subdivisions. The situation is similar in Australia, Spain, and Brazil. In the United States, although it is part of the Department of Energy (DoE) the functions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are clearly legally defined. FERC ensures that prices in the electricity sector are “just and reasonable” either by controlling the prices of monopoly elements, or by supervising the markets that establish prices in the competitive parts. In practice the DoE virtually never intervenes in FERC procedures or decisions. In Norway, even though it is an arm of the Ministry, the regulatory institution NVE enjoys very large independence in law and in its actual execution of the regulatory process. In Russia, deficiencies in regulation cause many problems, as the independence of regulatory institutions is not guaranteed in law or in practice. Partly because of these problems, potential investors have been inhibited in committing investment funds, or have sought a risk premium. This result is not good for either the utilities or the government. It is very hard in these circumstances to provide correct incentives unless relevant reforms are carried out. 2.5.3 Funding Details of the organisational structures, funding and other organisational aspects of the regulatory bodies vary by country in a way that reflects the specific circumstances in those countries. We can see from the examples reviewed in Appendix A 1 that regulatory institutions in Norway, Australia and Russia all rely on governmental finance. Those in Britain, the United States, Spain, Brazil and Argentina collect their revenues mainly from the regulated enterprises 2, while expenses of Indian regulatory organizations partially come from governmental appropriation funds and partially from enterprises. However, regardless whether funding is notionally from a normal governmental budget or from enterprises, these countries all strictly follow established programs for collection of revenues and budgeting of expenses. Budgets of the regulatory institutions have to be approved by the relevant government processes, and See Table A.2 in Appendix A of this report. Though in the case of the UK, the revenue flows via the Treasury (Finance Ministry). ·141· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China their expenditures have to go through relevant auditing processes. The key role of establishing a sound legal basis for the regulatory body’s revenue is as follows: （ 1 ） To guarantee that decision-making and fundamental operation of regulatory institutions cannot be interfered with and impacted by withholding of revenues. （2）To guarantee its annual revenue, and provide financial stability, so as to be able to attract talented professionals to the organisation and obtain necessary consulting services or information. （3）Because it is seen as fairer and more efficient, to focus revenue collection directly on the responsible parties (i.e. electricity enterprises), rather than all tax payers. The sources of the electricity regulator’s revenues, in principle, can include all electricity enterprises, such as electricity plants and electricity grid companies. 2.5.4 Central or Local Regulation Our review of the areas of responsibility and powers of the regulatory bodies in Appendix A indicates that in most cases the regulatory bodies (whether federal or local) have the full range of regulatory powers for the sector 3.It is only in the case of Russia that the regulatory organizations are to a substantial degree subservient to the government. As regards the split of responsibilities between Federal and local level, review of a 4 sample of countries shows that: （1）In five cases (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, England Spain and Norway) the bodies operate on a single national level 5, with no vertical allocation of responsibilities—these reflect the centralized governmental organisations in each case. （2）In four cases (i.e. Australia, India, Russia and USA) there are separate federal and local regulatory entities, again reflecting the political organization in each case. In all cases, the federal level bodies are organisationally quite distinct from the local level bodies; broadly, in all cases the main regulatory powers remain at the local level; and the federal level bodies mainly have responsibilities for inter-regional issues, and for setting or recommending general policy. 2.5.5 Governance As regards the senior managements of the regulatory organisations, the regulatory See Table A.3 in Appendix A of this report. See Table A.4 in Appendix A of this report. Brazil represents a partial exception, in that ANEEL has a number of agreements with local bodies to carry out some regulatory functions on its behalf. ·142· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China systems of the countries surveyed are characterized as follows： （1）In eight out of the nine cases, the organisation is headed by a committee of members, ranging from 3 up to 15, and that in at least seven of the cases the positions of members are protected by security of tenure of at least 5 years, as a means of protecting their independence; （2）In all cases the members are appointed by government, in some cases in the form of the President and in other by government Ministers. （3）In most cases, no specific qualifications are required of members, though in some cases general qualifications are specified, in terms of experience or capability in a range of relevant areas, such as engineering, law, or commerce. （4）In most cases, the members have some form of protection from dismissal, for example in terms of dismissal having to be approved by Parliament or justified only on very narrowly defined grounds of incapacity or misbehaviour. 2.5.6 Standard Processes In terms of decision making processes and rights of appeal by the regulated entities, our review indicates: （1）In general there are few specific restrictions on processes, and the regulatory bodies have authority to set out their own rules of procedures, though in some cases some basic principles or general administrative procedures are specified. （2）In most cases there is a formal route specified for appeals against the decisions of the regulatory bodies, in some cases to the Courts and in others through appeal to the Minister or to some form of designated tribunal. 2.5.7 Areas of Regulation of the Regulatory Institutions For all the countries surveyed, the regulatory bodies have responsibilities for the regulation of all parts of the electricity sector. That means that their regulatory responsibilities cover: （1）Transmission. （2）System operation. （3）Market operation. （4）Distribution. （5）Retail supply. （6）Generation. The form of regulation that should be applied to a vertically integrated sector with little or no competition differs from the regulation that needs to be applied to a disintegrated sector with extensive competition. However, the standard international practice is that, even though ·143· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China there are some competitive markets and different activities within the electricity sector have different regulatory requirements, one regulatory institution is still be in charge of regulation across all the activities. The different approaches that are appropriate to the regulation of these different parts of the electricity sector are discussed in Chapter 4, where we refer to international experience in a number of relevant countries. 2.5.8 Major Functions of Regulatory Institutions We have also addressed the question of what kind of functions do overseas electricity regulatory institutions have? We have found through our analysis that: （1）All have extensive price regulatory powers, though in some cases this is shared between the federal and local levels of regulation. （2）All have indirect powers of regulation over investment, though generally this is through their powers to control prices and regulate quality rather than through specific powers of regulation over individual investment decisions. （3）In all cases, except the Russian federal level regulator, the organisations have at least some powers in respect of quality regulation. From a sector regulation perspective, it is more effective to balance the interests of the various parties and promote industrial development through a process where the electricity regulatory institutions are responsible for unified economic regulation of all the activities in the electricity sector. 2.6 Extent of the Regulatory Body’s—Whether It is Limited to the Electricity Sector Internationally, there are different models of regulation over the network industries and public utilities, such as unified regulation of several sub-sectors by a single regulatory entity, and separate regulation of individual sub-sectors by different regulatory entities. However, taking account of the common characteristics of the public utilities and networks within the sphere of energy regulation, energy regulatory institutions in many countries regulate the electricity sector, the natural gas sector, and in some cases the oil and district heat sectors. This combined regulation of the energy sector benefits from synergies and staff are able to share knowledge and skills in the solution of similar regulatory issues. In the nine surveyed countries, there are 6 countries whose regulatory authorities carry out regulation in more than one area of the energy sector. Only Argentina, Brazil, and India have individual regulatory organizations for regulation of the electricity sector. Reviewing the history, one can find that Britain set up separate regulatory organizations to supervise the electricity sector and the natural gas sector during the original privatisation and reform of ·144· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China state-owned enterprises in the 1990’s. But, after 2000, the electricity and natural gas regulatory institutions were combined to create the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). It is suggested that along with the expansion of natural gas consumption and its growing impacts on the development of economic society, China may take account of this international experience, in particular from Britain and the United States, and consider integration of the electricity and natural gas regulatory mechanisms, so as gradually to develop a more comprehensive energy regulatory body. Appendix A of this report contains the analysis of international experience and examples of electricity regulation. It emphasizes and discusses the differences between various regulatory mechanisms, including independence of regulatory institutions, horizontal distribution of regulatory powers, and comparisons between centralised regulation and decentralised regulation. Appendix A also describes the regulatory performance of different regulatory modes in various regulatory spheres. ·145· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 3 Allocation of Electricity Regulatory Responsibilities in China 3.1 Review of Current Situation Aside from SERC, there are now many government organizations in China that have some responsibility for electricity regulation. However, their powers and methods of approach are different, and in this chapter we review each body and the overall situation. We will first comment on each of these organizations and their impacts on electricity regulation. It will be seen from this review that a key difficulty with the present arrangements is the lack of clearly defined regulatory powers in the hands of a single regulatory entity. Based on experience in other countries, there is no doubt that the present diffuse and unclear allocation of regulatory powers is potentially a major obstacle for private-sector investors when considering entry to the sector. 3.1.1 The Power Sector Reform Working Group The Power Sector Reform Working Group (PSRWG) was established by the State Council in 2001, and the members of the PSRWG were drawn from many government departments. The PSRWG and its role were specified in the State Council Document No.5. After the SERC was founded, the membership of PSRWG changed. The Director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is now the group leader. SERC’s Vice Chairman plays the role of office director of PSRWG, while the PSRWG’s office is established in the SERC’s premises. This arrangement of separating the group leader and the office director of the same working group to different departments may have implications for the efficiency of policy making and execution. Though the office of PSRWG is now established in SERC, it seems that SERC does not play a dominant role in the reform of the electricity system. Besides designing the electricity market, SERC is not responsible for designing or leading the reform process, or for its general implementation, or for price regulation. The PSRWG does not seem to have been active recently. It is unclear whether there will be further changes to the organizations leading the reform, but regardless whether there are new arrangements or not, it is clear that the constitution and functions of the leading organization in the reform of the electricity sector will fundamentally impact the capacity building of electricity regulation institutions in China. ·146· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 3.1.2 The National Development and Reform Commission The NDRC was formed by a reorganization in 2003, and is responsible for regulation and control of macro-economy. But in contrast with most other countries, China does not have a department of energy or similar department that is in charge of the energy industry. The Energy Bureau and Pricing Department of NDRC mainly performs this function. With respect to the electricity sector, the Energy Bureau is charged with the work of long-term development planning. It approves all major investment projects, be it in generation or in transmission. NDRC also performs some other functions that in other countries are executed by the Department of Energy (or similar specialist policy organisations), including the making of general energy policies of China, forecasting demand, providing directive suggestions for energy selection, etc. NDRC also has responsibilities as a micro-economic regulatory agency. The Department of Prices of NDRC dominates pricing issues in electricity sector reform and approves the prices that can be charged and revenues that can be received by generation companies and grid companies. 3.1.3 The Ministry of Finance We understand that in some matters, for example certain financial rules and cost standards for electric enterprises, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has decision-making powers relating to the electricity sector. Potentially this could mean there is some partial overlapping of some of the roles that should be solely in the hands of the SERC. However, MOF has wide-ranging responsibilities across all sectors of the Chinese economy, so that it is limited in the extent to which it can focus on issues specific to the electricity sector. We recommend that this partial overlapping of responsibilities should be addressed, for example by MOF-SERC joint work to improve co-ordination and co-operation relating to the electricity sector. 3.1.4 Provincial Economic and Trade Commissions The State Economic and Trade Commission was reorganized as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council in 2003, but many provinces continue to have Economic and Trade Commissions (ETCs) that provide a local sector supervision and co-ordination role. In practice, in some respects the ETCs appear to be carrying out many of the functions of a local regulatory agency. One of the reasons for this is because SERC has not yet rolled out its provincial and local office program. SERC is established in only a small number of provinces, and as construction of SERC regulation offices at city/county level is not yet anticipated, the ETCs are filling the gap. In the longer term, as more SERC Provincial and local offices become established, there will be a major potential conflict—assuming that the ·147· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China ETCs continue to have some role for the electricity sector at provincial and local level. 3.1.5 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) SASAC is a recently established Commission in 2003, which exercises ownership responsibilities over state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SASAC’s functions include the supervision of the performance of SOEs, the appointment and removal of senior executives, setting out auditing requirements, approval of key decisions, etc. As most enterprises operating in the electricity sector in China are SOEs (this includes all grid companies), the role of SASAC could be important for SERC and these two organizations may have different opinions over issues of enterprises mergers and acquisitions, performance evaluation, appointment and removal of high-level management staff, and so on. 3.2 Current Problems of the Functional Distribution of Electricity Regulation in China The existing distribution of regulatory functions for the electricity sector in China appears inefficient and inconsistent at present. The main inconsistencies and their consequences are discussed below. 3.2.1 Policy Making and Regulatory Function are Confused Most countries have a Ministry of Energy (or equivalent), which is responsible for making high-level policy decisions on electricity sector and market structure, including the degree of competition in the sector. These agencies are usually also responsible for fuel use and generation mix, the provision of forecasts and market analysis, and for energy and environmental trade-offs and guidelines, etc. The Ministry also gives policy guidance to the regulatory agency, e.g. on issues such as the desired pace of liberalisation, and subsidy and tariff policy. For countries that now have separate electricity regulatory agencies, some of the quasi-regulatory functions that Ministries carried out in the past normally go to the regulatory agency (e.g. licensing, tariff regulation, quality regulation, etc). However, in some countries, the relevant Ministry maintains the responsibility for setting regulatory methodologies. China has set up specific responsible electricity regulatory agencies, but there is no equivalent comprehensive policy-making entity for energy or electricity. NDRC seems to be responsible for the making of policies for the energy or electricity sectors. At the same time, it carries out some core functions of the electricity regulation agency, such as the key regulatory function of electricity pricing, so its policy establishment capacity is obviously impacted. The consequence is that there is a very confused boundary between policy and regulation as reflected in: （1）The capacity for making macro policies for the electricity sector and for sector planning activities is seriously weakened. （2）The overlap in regulatory functions between SERC and NDRC will inevitably reduce ·148· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China regulatory efficiency. 3.2.2 Planning Approvals and Investment Supervision Functions are Confused In China, there is no “Ministry” which is responsible for making policy for the sector beyond the limited NDRC function. Similarly, the grid companies do not seem to have the clear responsibility either for planning or for implementing system expansion plans. NDRC is more concerned with approvals of individual investment projects than system expansion plans. It is responsible to approve investment for specific projects; the latter involves much detailed analysis, which will of course occupy much of its attention. In fact, in China investment approval for specific projects is often regarded as a major part of regulation because of its direct connection with users’ interest such as electricity sector costs, system reliability, etc. Even after the establishment of SERC with specific responsibilities for electricity sector regulation, NDRC still handles both planning approvals and specific approvals of investment plans. This has confused regulatory roles, and has meant that NDRC can neither manage the planning nor exert its own functions of project approval effectively due to the unavoidable inconsistency between general investment supervision objectives and the specific issues and targets in the sphere of electricity sector regulation. 3.2.3 Tariff Regulation Functions are not Allocated Properly Though a specific electricity sector regulation institution has been established in China, in the form of SERC, this institution can only provide suggestions in most cases in respect of tariff regulation. NDRC maintains almost all the regulation powers over the regulation. In many countries, relevant Ministries (often including the Ministry of Finance) are involved, jointly with the regulator, in constructing tariff making methodologies. This is particularly helpful in countries where new regulatory agencies are being established. But in these countries, concrete decision-making on tariff regulation is usually performed by regulatory organizations that have specific responsibilities in this area. As mentioned above, tariff regulation is the core of regulation in respect of monopolistic electricity enterprises regulation. It is logically inconceivable that the specific responsible regulatory organizations would have no decision-making power over tariff regulation. So, it is natural that China has encountered misunderstandings over regulation, and that disputes regarding the present operations continue. Splitting the responsibility for carrying out price regulation and other related activities runs contrary to the general rules of administrative system design, for example the need to avoid functional overlapping and to define responsibilities clearly. ·149· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 3.3 International Examples of Relevant Issues 3.3.1 International Examples of Horizontal Allocation of Regulatory Function In most countries with mature market economies, there are electricity regulation institutions that are either set up within relevant departments of the government, or are separately established as electricity sector regulators, or are established jointly with energy or other public utility regulation organizations as multi-utility regulators. The precise arrangements are often related to country-specific factors such as political framework, land area, social and cultural traditions, and the reform progress of the electricity sector. But no matter what the precise set-up arrangements are, there is one common point to emphasise: all the functions of regulation are generally covered by the same institution, especially the core functions such as electricity tariff regulation. There are generally no other regulatory institutions to share the responsibility. 3.3.2 International Examples of Vertical Distribution of Regulatory Functions In several of the countries that we surveyed, including the US and India, there are federal constitutions, and the regulatory bodies are divided on federal/state lines. Thus, for example, in the USA there is the coexistence of two distinct levels of electricity regulatory bodies: a federal regulator the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state regulators (the Public Utility Commissions). This relationship has developed over a long period, and the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 further clarified the relationship between FERC and state Public Utilities Commissions. Under the Act, FERC has complete jurisdiction over the inter-state wholesale electricity marketplace, while electricity competition at the state level would remain within the jurisdiction of the various state public utilities commissions. Similarly, in accordance with stipulations of the constitution, India also defines the federal and inter-state regulatory functions. In 2003, India changed its electricity sector law to set up a central regulation commission, in addition to state commissions. It separated functions of electricity sector policies, electricity tariff policies and electricity sector planning between the two level regulation organizations. These cases indicate that, along with the existing federalism, every state government has obvious power to decide on the development of interior industries within the state. In Russia, central coordination of this issue seems very prominent. How to coordinate vertical power decentralization would become very important in China, as China does not have a federal constitution. 3.4 Recommendations for Horizontal Allocations of the Electricity Regulation Functions in China In the light of the discussion earlier in this Chapter, in this section we put forward a number of preliminary recommendations for the allocation of electricity sector regulatory ·150· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China responsibilities in China. 3.4.1 Create an Energy Policy-making Function in China A specialist electricity sector policy-making entity should be established in China as soon as possible, after all factors to be taken into consideration and overall plans have been made. This entity should be based probably on the restructuring of the existing institutions, including the Bureau for Energy and Department of Prices of NDRC and other relevant institutions. This new policy-making entity should concentrate on: （1）Establishing relevant policies and development strategy and planning, for sustainable development of the energy sector in China. （2）Ensuring the security of primary energy supplies and fuel diversity in generation. （3）Coordinating the development of the electricity sector and primary energy sources such as coal, oil and gas. （4）Drafting relevant electricity sector regulations, and establishing relevant policies directing electricity regulations such as electricity tariff policy, etc. It is important to emphasise that this institution should not be both a maker of policy and a practical implementer of the regulation that results. As long as they are compatible with normal practice in China, a number of different organization forms would be possible for this policy-making institution. But the basic principle should be to centralize regulatory functions, separate administration and regulation functions, and define relative responsibilities clearly. 3.4.2 Establish Responsibilities for Investment Regulation Currently, the overall responsibility for new investment in the sector rests with NDRC, and we suggest that this needs to be remedied with the establishment of a proper“Ministry” policy-making entity with which SERC and the regional network companies (who are also currently the electricity purchase companies) can interact. In this way, these responsibilities should be more clearly established, and such a coordination mechanism of investment regulation responsibilities is spelled out in more detail in Chapter 4. In particular, we recommend that SERC’s roles and powers in this are be clearly defined. We would recommend that SERC be given the responsibility for: （1）Defining electricity grid enterprises’responsibilities in their exclusive areas, requiring that they should provide safe and reliable infrastructure and relevant service standards to the users. （2）Requiring the regulated enterprises to set up reasonable forecasting, planning, and execution programs, so that they can execute their functions in the way that is in compliance with development targets and the demands of the economy. ·151· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （ 3 ） Regulating investment expenses of the regulated enterprises, so as to ensure efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary cost increases. （4）Imposing responsibility for procurement of adequate electricity where relevant, and monitoring the procurement process. （5）Enforcing the implementation of these investment obligations by other means if necessary. 3.4.3 Gradually Adjust the Allocation of Electricity Tariff and Cost Regulation Functions As mentioned above, electricity tariff and cost regulation is a core component of electricity regulation, and tariff regulation should not be within the sphere of macro-economy policy and control. China has established specific responsible electricity sector regulatory institutions, and tariff regulation functions shall obviously be the responsibility of SERC, in order to normalise and rationalise the distribution of government functions. We also understand that the complete transfer of tariff regulation functions is not just an issue between the NDRC and SERC. It may also involve some adjustment to the whole government administrative system of China, including some specific electricity sector cost responsibilities exercised by MOF. In consequence a considered and careful transition process is needed. As the overall economic reform proceeds, the relevant government department (which is currently NDRC) should gradually give up its role of making individual and detailed pricing decisions in the electricity sector, and instead take the role of developing high-level policy on pricing issues. As this takes place, SERC should gradually take over the primary responsibility for price regulation in the electricity sector. In a situation where SERC assumes major responsibilities for electricity tariff regulation in the longer term, we would also recommend that in the shorter term the key methodologies and price transition paths be developed jointly by SERC with NRDC (and any new Ministry function) and other relevant Ministries or other agencies involved in the reform process, including the proposed Steering Group. MOF has been, and should continue to be, responsible for specifying general financial rules, accounting rules and cost standards for all companies; and the SERC should make detailed cost standards and rules for the electricity sector within MOF’s general rules and standards, and be responsible for supervising their implementation by electricity enterprises. This means that SERC should have the responsibility for: （1）Ensuring that these general rules are observed by electricity companies; and （2）Developing and enforcing any specific rules for electricity enterprises within MOF’s general rules and standards. It should be emphasised that bringing tariff regulation and cost regulation together is critical for the development of effective economic regulation. The current situation in China, ·152· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China where the responsibilities are split between NDRC and MOF, who are carrying tariff regulation and cost regulation into execution separately, is very unsatisfactory and should be changed as soon as feasible. We recommend that the responsibility for these functions should be unified and assigned to SERC. 3.4.4 Coordinate Anti-trust (Competition Policy) Responsibilities If a specialist competition body is created, SERC should coordinate with it in respect of the electricity sector, and operate within general competition policy guidelines. But the electricity sector operates within a closely integrated framework, so after establishing a competitive electricity market, SERC shall not only supervise the monopolistic enterprises, but also continue to carry out a leading function in respect of competition policy across the electricity sector: （1） For the potentially competitive activities (generation and retail supply), SERC should safeguard the orderly transition to a competitive electricity market by developing rules to prevent the abuse of market power by any companies. （2）SERC should also be authorized to play a leading role in dealing with mergers and acquisitions among electricity enterprises. For instance, SERC could play a leading role in joint handling of such cases with the relevant competition supervisory authorities. 3.4.5 Clarify Responsibility for Technical and Quality Regulation At present there is no particular controversy about the responsibility for technical and quality regulation. However, the absence at present of service quality regulation is a very serious omission, and this is an opportunity for SERC to exercise an important new function, allowing it the opportunity to build up a positive image and realize its value within a relatively short time. SERC should establish relevant regulations as soon as possible, and at the same time build up an open program of technical and quality regulation that electricity enterprises and customers can participate in. 3.5 Recommendations for the Vertical Allocation of Regulatory Powers in China 3.5.1 The Importance of the Vertical Distribution of Regulatory Power in China It can be seen from the international experience surveyed in Chapter 2 and Appendix B that in other countries there is generally a clear division of powers between central and local supervisory organizations in federalist countries. Viewed in the context of China, the most basic regulatory tasks, especially the electricity distribution and sales regulation tasks, cannot be completed by SERC and its six regional agencies under present conditions because: （1）China is a very large and geographically diverse country, and the electricity sector’s ·153· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China scale and economic size are very large. It is clear that it would be impossible to exercise effective control from a central office and six regional agencies, and a more comprehensive range of offices spread around the country is therefore essential. （2）China has very sharp differences between regions. Different regional electricity enterprises operate in different conditions. It is therefore necessary to authorize local regulatory institutions with responsibilities so as to be able to adjust measures to local conditions. （ 3 ） Electricity distribution (including electricity sales at present) is a monopolistic operation. The price, reliability of supply, electricity quality, service quality etc. of the electricity sector are all in need of effective regulation. These matters all apply on a local basis, often across more remote cities and counties. Some specific regulatory functions are currently split among government departments at county level. Even though their regulatory methods and measures often fail to meet the needs of modern regulation in a market-oriented economic system, sometimes through a complete failure to regulate, this emphasises the need for local offices. With improved procedures and SERC local offices, the results of electricity sector regulation will eventually be apparent in the outcome of this process in these local areas. As organized at present, SERC and its regional agencies (even through provincial regulatory organizations) are generally too remote from consumers to be able to help with these matters. 3.5.2 Concrete Suggestions for the Vertical Allocation of Regulatory Powers in China Figure 3.1 shows an outline of our proposed outline for the vertical allocation of electricity regulatory institutions in China, involving four levels, that is the Head Office, Regional Offices, Provincial Offices and City and County offices. The Local Offices at City and County level envisaged in Figure 3.1 would help execute and strengthen the regulation of local electricity enterprises. Considering Chinese circumstances, these local offices are important given the large geographic and demographic size of Provinces. In addition, their existence should ensure that SERC has adequate representation at local level. These local offices can, Figure 3.1 Proposed General Framework in our view, be relatively small and might typically for SERC Offices have between 3 and 5 suitably qualified and experienced staff members per office. We emphasize that, in following the above or other similar structures, SERC should invite regional and provincial regulatory organizations to participate extensively in an open discussion program and process when it formulates general regulatory methods, regulatory frameworks, and market regulations. It will be important that the detailed allocation of functions reflects the specific ·154· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China circumstances region by region, and province by province. Thus, for example, in regions where a regional electricity market is in operation or under active design, the regional office would take the lead in the regulation of the market and the transmission system. In other cases where there is no regional electricity market, the regional office would have a smaller role, probably limited to establishing policies and guidelines. In these cases, it would be the provincial offices that would play a more leading role in the regulation of local markets and provincial transmission system. The scope of the activities of provincial offices would also be affected by the existence of provincial electricity markets. Where a province-level market exists, the provincial office would handle its regulation, subject to national policy and guidelines. In general, electricity sales regulation would be overseen at the provincial level, subject to national guidelines. Implementation could be at the provincial level, but generally is probably more efficiently carried out at the local level. Similarly, much of the detailed implementation of quality regulation would be carried out at the local level. For the transition period, the proposed detailed allocation of functions is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 Proposed Detailed Allocation of Functions ·155· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 4 Basic Methods for Electricity Sector Regulation After discussing what regulation is, what is to be regulated, and who will execute regulation, we now turn to the issue of how to regulate. Regulation of the monopolistic parts of the sector and promotion of competition are really quite different activities, and it is convenient to separate the discussions of them. In this Chapter 4 we describe the main approaches that are suitable for regulation of the monopoly activities, including price control (or tariff regulation), licensing of businesses, quality and investment regulation, and also the special problems of regulating a state-owned enterprise. Chapter 5 discusses the role of the regulator in the competitive activities. In this discussion of methodologies, it is again important to emphasise the point made in previous Chapters about the need for clarity and consistency. Potential private sector investors need to see regulatory processes that are transparent and predictable, and that provide a reasonable opportunity to make a return on investments. A single national agency like SERC, equipped with suitable regulatory mechanisms, can provide this transparency and predictability. 4.1 Tariff Regulation in Economic Regulation 4.1.1 The Importance of Tariff Regulation in Economic Regulation One of the basic functions of prices is to guide reasonable and efficient allocation of resources. However, companies with monopoly positions, and especially those which sell a product that has become an essential commodity, can obtain excessive profit by way of excessive prices, or allow costs to increase to unreasonable levels, causing waste. This results in efficiency declining, and in an inefficient allocation of resources, with an increased burden to customers. That was the initial impetus for regulation of electricity prices all over the world to restrain the monopoly power of the utilities. However, tariff regulation does not mean “the lower the better”. Since the electricity sector is so large and important, retail electricity prices are sometimes controlled by the government at too low a level, in order to restrain inflation. This can starve the sector of investment funds, and lead to shortages. The position that has emerged is that tariffs should not be constrained by political considerations, nor left to the monopolist, but that they should ·156· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China be based on cost to achieve reasonable and efficient allocation of resources. 4.1.2 Key Features of a “Good” Tariff Regime Tariff regulation is the source of funds for the sector. It is fundamental to the commercial viability of a electricity sector and to protecting consumers’ interests. Even where private generators participate on the basis of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), tariff regulation is vital for investor confidence, as it will affect the viability of the PPA purchaser. “Good” tariff regulation is therefore vital in promoting the confidence of investors and consumers in the regulatory arrangements, and its key features are. （1）Transparency, consistency, and predictability are the primary features of successful tariff regimes. Long-term investors need to know that they can expect reasonable regulation of tariffs in the long term. That requires transparency of process and a guarantee of consistently reasonable behaviour. It is particularly important to avoid the possibility of arbitrary or opportunistic behaviour by the regulator. Ideally there should be a legal requirement that tariff regulation processes are to be conducted transparently and according to clearly specified rules. There may be a trade-off with flexibility, but in establishing initial confidence in the regulatory regime, transparency of process is important. （2）The right to reasonable cost recovery. Investors have a right to expect cost recovery, providing they operate efficiently and reasonably, and so it is important to establish this right to reasonable cost recovery in a way that cannot easily be over-turned. At the same time, there needs to be clear powers on the part of SERC to disallow any costs that are found to be unreasonable. Ideally, this right would be made clear either in the law, or in the licence, providing the licence cannot be easily changed. （3）“Incentive compatible”. Use of incentives for efficiency should be part of the mandate of the regulator: It should be the regulator’s responsibility to ensure that in establishing tariffs or regulating quality, the rules are “incentive compatible” (by this we mean that the incentives that are imposed on the sector by the tariff regulation encourage efficient behaviour). 4.1.3 Basic Methods of Electricity Price Regulation Tariff regulation is divided into two distinct aspects: regulation of average electricity price levels (total income), and the structure of electricity prices: The level of the tariff (the average revenue per kWh) is crucial to the financial viability of the companies. It is what enables the criterion of “reasonable cost recovery” to be met. The average revenue per kWh multiplied by total sales of kWh is the total company revenue: in setting the tariffs the determination of total allowable revenue is the first step (in the USA this is known as the “revenue requirement”). It is usually determined by the utility’s asset base, ·157· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China the depreciation and rate of return that the utility is allowed to earn on this asset base, and its reasonable operating costs. If the utility is allowed to recover this revenue requirement then it will be viable and will be able to invest and grow. If the overall level of the tariff is too low, it will induce wasteful consumption; if it is too high it will impede economic growth. The tariff structure is also important to a utility, but for different reasons. Once the total amount of money in the revenue requirement is set, it has to be allocated to different customers and different services. The components of the tariff are called the tariff structure. Just as the overall tariff should reflect cost, the components of the tariff should reflect the component costs, and particularly the marginal or incremental cost—the amount that additional amounts of this particular service will cost. This is what makes tariffs incentive compatible and efficient. For example: （1）The retail tariff should be structured by voltage level, since it costs less to provide electricity at a higher voltage, to encourage high voltage connections. （2）It should be differentiated by time of use to reflect cost differences between peak hours and low use hours, to encourage off-peak use. （3）The transmission tariff should reflect the marginal cost of using the transmission system (congestion and losses) as well as the cost of building the system. This leads to “locational energy prices” that are a big incentive to use the transmission system efficiently. A number of different tariff structures may all be quite capable of allowing recovery of the utility’s revenue requirement, and to that extent the structure may seem of secondary concern to the utility. But even where the tariffs allow full revenue recovery, if the components of the tariff structure are not cost reflective then important distortions are introduced. 4.1.4 Principal Methodologies There are two principal methodologies of tariff regulation that are widely recognised as competing approaches to the problem of determining a utility’s permitted revenue: （1）Rate of Return Regulation (RoR). （2）Price Cap or Performance Based Regulation. These are described in turn in this section, where we conclude that a combination approach is optimal. In both cases, the question of tariff structure needs to be dealt with separately. 4.1.4.1 Rate of Return Regulation The traditional US framework for setting electricity prices is RoR regulation, which is sometimes referred to as cost-plus regulation because the regulated entity is able to collect from its customers all its prudently incurred costs plus a regulated return on its prudent investment. In general, this method sets the total allowed revenues (or revenue requirement) ·158· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China of the utility according to the following formula: RR = [RB×RoR] + ED + EO&M + T Where: RR = the total annual revenue requirement of the utility; RB = the rate base (required investment) of the utility; RoR = the allowed rate of return (debt and equity) on investment; ED = annual depreciation expense; EO&M=annual operation & maintenance (O&M) expense; T = annual taxes paid by the utility. Under this general framework, the utility has the burden of proving to the regulatory body’s satisfaction that each proposed element of the revenue requirement formula is a prudently incurred cost required to serve the public’s electricity needs. For example, investments made in capital plant must be shown to be “prudent” and to be “used and useful” in the provision of electric service, in order to be included in the RB term. Similarly, individual operating expense items (including purchased electricity costs) must be shown to be prudent and necessary for the provision of service in order to be included in the EO&M term. The revenue requirements of the regulated company are set based upon the values for the terms in the formula during a Test Year, usually a past year adjusted for known and measurable changes so as to reflect conditions expected to prevail during the time the proposed tariff will be in effect. There are several advantages of RoR regulation: （1）This approach fixes prices based upon a “test” year and they are unchangeable until the next tariff review. After prices are set, the regulated entity’s actual rate of return will vary, depending upon variations in costs and sales, and upon the company’s ability to control those costs which can be controlled. （2）And as a result of the first, there is some incentive for the utility to minimize costs between tariff reviews, as this will increase its profits for the period before the next review. This incentive will be higher the longer the period between those proceedings. （3）Non-economic goals (from the electricity sector point of view), such as price relief for some categories of consumers, are easiest to meet using this system. （4）The hearings on tariff changes provide consumers with frequent forums to present their views regarding the performance of the regulated utility. This approach also has several disadvantages: （1） Its cost-plus nature blunts the incentive for the utility to minimize cost in the long run. There is a tendency to “gold plate” investments, and make them more expensive than they need to be. One utility executive explained “I even get a rate of return on my office desk, so ·159· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China of course I have a very nice desk”. （2）If the allowed rate-of-return is less than the actual cost of capital then there will be a disincentive for the utility to build plant which is essential, and vice versa. （3）Because the regulated firm may worry that high performance may lead to more strict regulation of profit, its incentive will be distorted, i.e. a ratchet effect lowers incentives to perform well. （4）There can be fairly high administrative costs associated with frequent regulatory scrutiny of all utility costs in this system, and the hearings can be time-consuming. These disadvantages can be minimized when RoR regulation is combined with elements of the UK-style Price Cap Regulation (sometimes called Performance Based Regulation or PBR). 4.1.4.2 Price Cap or Performance-Based Regulation Price Cap is a modification of RoR regulation, and many variants on it have been adopted in different jurisdictions. Under a Price Cap system, the period between regulatory reviews (sometimes known as “regulatory lag”) is extended, in order to provide better incentives for the regulated entity. At pre-set intervals (3～10 years), baseline rates are reset using Rate of Return principles. Between these baseline tariff cases, tariffs are adjusted based on specific formulae that include as variables measures of the utility’s performance, cost indexes, etc. Price Cap seeks to eliminate some of the regulator command and control aspects of Rate of Return regulation and substitute for it a system of incentives or penalties for performance based on de-linking costs and prices for a longer period. An advantage of a good Price Cap regime is that a definite incentive for cost minimisation, and improving service quality can be built into the system. Secondly, an effective Price Cap system may reduce the need for frequent tariff filings which would lead to reduced administrative costs. 4.1.5 Types of Tariff and Their Regulation Based on experience abroad it is possible to identify four distinct tariff components that are typically regulated: 1. Generation Tariffs （1）Generation tariffs such as those that exist in China are relatively rare. Where electricity markets exist there are no generation tariffs, but market prices which ideally are not subject to regulation. Buyers are the final consumers or Distribution companies; sellers are the generation companies. （2）If there is a single buyer there are usually Power Purchase Agreements (buyer is the single buyer, sellers are the generators) which are long-term contracts; these may have different prices depending on when they were made. The prices are usually determined by a competition (auction, or public bidding) for the PPAs. The regulator would monitor and ·160· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China approve the fairness of the auctions. 2. Bulk Supply Tariffs There is often a separate bulk supply tariff (BST). The seller is the single buyer, and the buyers are the distribution entities or large consumers. The BST should reflect the costs of meeting the purchaser’s load. Because the BST is generally charged by a monopoly single buyer, it is normal for it to be regulated. The BST may or may not include the transmission cost, but the general principle of regulation is that the BST should allow the reasonable costs of the single buyer to be recovered in the BST. 3. Transmission Tariffs Where there is a competitive generation market, and so there is open access to the transmission system, separate transmission tariffs must be charged for the use of the transmission system. But even if the generation markets are not competitive, the transmission companies need revenues of their own; they need a tariff which can be charged to the distribution companies and to the generators. The structure of transmission tariffs differs widely from country to country, as different methodologies are applied to reflect the type of market in operation and other specific circumstances in the country. On the other hand, there is a much greater convergence of views on the general approach to determining allowed revenues, based on the approach to operating costs and capital costs that has been described above. What differs from country to country is whether rate of return regulation or price cap regulation is applied. 4. Distribution Tariffs There are some similarities between transmission tariffs and distribution tariffs in the way that allowed revenues are often determined, but there is more convergence of view on the structure of the distribution tariffs. As with transmission revenues, there is significant convergence of views on the general approach to determining allowed revenues, based on the approach to operating costs and capital costs that has been described above, with differences from country to country is whether rate of return regulation or price cap is applied. As with transmission, in circumstances where there is no open access, it will not be necessary for a separate tariff to be charged to the customers, but the costs of distribution must be measured and incorporated into the final price. 5. Retail Tariffs Retail tariffs, that is tariffs charged to final consumers, are a combination of the components of cost incurred by the distribution company i.e. generation, transmission, and distribution costs. Providing all the external costs incurred have already been subject to price regulation at some point, then the norm would be to allow the costs to be passed through, regulation to end users. ·161· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 4.2 Quality Regulation As noted earlier, when prices are subject to regulation there will likely be a tendency for quality to decline, as a way of reducing costs. This likely effect is clear and generally accepted by specialists in regulation, and it is therefore recognised that the regulation of price needs to go hand in hand with quality regulation. In competitive industries, competition based on quality is usually one of the main elements of competition. In natural monopolistic conditions, there is almost no market pressure for enterprises to maintain high product and service quality; price control will encourage the network sector to reduce costs, and this can be achieved by way of quality reduction. Price regulation therefore makes no sense if there is no requirement for quality. In this section we discuss the nature of the measures that are typically applied, and also the institutional framework that might be used to apply it. In the electricity sector, quality is a multi-faceted issue, and needs to take account both of technical quality and of quality of service. To ensure that the interests of customers are protected, a range of measures are likely to be necessary, and these are outlined below. （1）Technical quality. The imposition of two sets of measures is commonly used to ensure technical quality, that is: 1）Planning standards and investment obligations in respect of transmission, distribution, and generation to ensure that new capacity is planned and installed to a minimum standard. 2）Operating codes, and in particular the introduction of a Grid and Distribution Codes, that require the systems to be operated in ways that are aimed to ensure certain minimum standards of operation and maintenance, including the technical specification of the supply to final consumers. （2）Service quality. Here it is common to impose minimum standards of service to consumers in such matters such as interruptions, time to connect new service etc. Three sets of quality measures are commonly applied by regulatory bodies: 1）Overall service standards: These are service standards that are specified in terms of the overall level of service, rather than the service to specific consumers. Such a measure might, for example, specify a maximum level of consumer interruptions in terms of lost load. Failure to achieve these standards could be punished by financial penalties, through reductions in the utility’s allowed revenues. 2）Guaranteed service standards: these specify the standards that individual consumers can expect, for example in terms of maximum length of interruption on any occasion. Because these apply to individual consumers, it is possible to provide for penalties, in the form of compensation payments to individual consumers for failure to meet the standards. 3）Codes of practice: these can be applied to a range of matter, for example in respect of ·162· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China complaints handling procedures, rules governing disconnections, or services that must be offered to special consumer groups. Though in the case of the overall service standards and the guaranteed service standards we mentioned the possible use of different types of financial penalties or compensation payments, care needs to be taken in the application of such measures. The principal objective is to achieve a satisfactory standard of service, and if a utility is penalised to an excessive extent these penalties may prevent the utility from being able to invest to make improvements in service. （3）Obligations to Serve. The third issue regarding quality is service obligations. In some countries there are “universal service obligations”, where all consumers within a utility’s service area have a right to receive a connection or supply if they require it. Depending on the characteristics of the sector, such an obligation might or might not be appropriate. In the case of China it will be necessary to consider the extent to which such obligations can be applied. 4.3 Investment Regulation 4.3.1 Investment Regulation for Electricity Generation The issues of who should decide about investment in generation are much more contentious than those in Transmission and Distribution, and practices vary widely across the world. In vertically-integrated systems, the norm has been to specify generation planning standards that are aimed to achieve certain standards of security, and the utility will be expected to comply with such standards. Standards of this sort would also commonly apply where there is a single buyer arrangement. In countries where generation competition has been introduced, practice varies widely. For example, in the UK decisions about the quantity and type of generation investment are left wholly to market forces and no other measures are applied to either incentivise or limit the quantity of new generation investment. In other areas, for example parts of the US, concerns about adequacy of generation investment have led to the introduction of generation capacity requirements being imposed on the so-called “load serving entities”, that is retailers. In those parts of China (if any) where generation is still run as a monopoly, the planning and approval considerations outlined in this report for transmission and distribution will apply. In the competitive cases the issues surrounding capacity requirements or capacity payments are considered in the Chapter 5. But the main point about investment approvals for generation can be briefly raised here. （1）In the fully competitive case there will still be a need for generators to sign up to technical standards and to agree to follow the rules of the market (the trading arrangements). ·163· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （2）The generators will still need to be licensed, so that if they fail to obey the rules their licenses to operate can be revoked. （3）They may also need to get siting approvals, environmental permits and so on. But in the competitive case there should be no need for analysis of financial viability of investment. The existence of competitive markets should ensure that generators enter the market if they think they can make a profit; it should ensure that quality is maintained, and that expenditures are not excessive. However, this involves ensuring that the pricing mechanisms in the trading arrangements are capable of doing the job of signalling the need for investment. This also raises the issue of “capacity payments”, which we discuss this further in the next chapter. 4.3.2 Transmission and Distribution Investment In principle, Transmission and Distribution investment could be competitive, but it turns out to be very complicated to do so. The centralised approach to network expansion is still used more or less everywhere. Typically, the procedure for regulating investment in other countries will be that the system operator or network owner (often with the regulator) draws up a set of rules for identifying, evaluating, building and charging for required new facilities that are necessary in the public interest. In the UK, transmission planning standards are imposed on the transmission utility, and the investment programme that those standards require are recognised in the price regulation that is imposed. Similar systems apply in many other countries. In Argentina, private investors may build transmission lines; in the USA several have been proposed and one line has actually been built, although privately built lines are not expected to be a major trend. In each case the regulator has to be heavily involved with the expansion plans and pricing. There are two separate aspects to the regulation of investment in these network areas: the process of deciding what investments are necessary, and the process of approving specific investment proposals. Since we have discussed the investment approval process in Chapter 3, here we concentrate only on the process of deciding what is needed. 4.3.3 Agreed Investment Criteria and Obligations It is desirable to establish a clear regulatory approach towards the investment programme of the monopoly utilities and the obligations they must meet. Because they are natural monopolies, an underlying assumption is that it will be necessary to apply performance standards to the operation of the networks, to ensure that customers receive an adequate standard of service. Such an approach could consist of: （1）The performance standards, which might be set up as allowable hours of outage, or ·164· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China deviations from a frequency band, or voltage limits. The would be obligations on the transmission and distribution companies and specified in their comprehensive licenses (which would allow for different standards in different regions, according to the type of terrain and the extent of electrification). （2）In this new more market-orientated environment it is also important to ensure that there is effective coordination between generation and transmission investment decisions. If investors in generation are able to make their own decisions about timing and location of new plants, it is important that grid companies are given obligations to respond to the requirements of these investors and provide the necessary transmission infrastructure. However, these obligations and performance standards alone may not be sufficient to ensure adequate investment, and they may need to be supplemented with regulation of investment plans, to ensure adequate investment. This will require: （1）Agreed planning methodologies and technical standards that should be followed in the development of the system. （2） An agreed source of macro-economic assumptions about the rate of economic growth in the economy as a whole and by region, and the course of interest rates and inflation. （3）An agreed evaluation methodology to be followed in determining whether specific investments should be proceeded with. The methodology might take the form of a standard cost-benefit analysis that evaluates the proposed additions by the amount of outage they avoid and the savings in fuel costs through the reduction of congestion and line losses. The problems that may arise are those of identifying and verifying which investments are cost effective and should be undertaken, and also of deciding how to allocate the costs to the market participants. （4）Following from the above, a regularly updated and agreed investment program and plan. （5）Implementation of the plan, with investment approvals for specific elements as they are prepared. 4.3.4 Suggestions for a Coordination Mechanism for the Existing System Planning and Investment Regulation in China Based on the practical situation of China, we suggest that it would be appropriate to introduce the following work division and approach to coordination for system planning and investment regulation: （1）As it is responsible for electricity system security, decision-making powers for security levels and the required investments should belong to SERC, though this needs to be ·165· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China carried out in consultation with NDRC. （2） Obligations and performance standards should be developed by SERC in conjunction with the licenses. （3）Macro-economic forecasts developed by NDRC would be used in the drawing up of electricity development plans. （4）The grid companies to continue to draw up electricity system development plans, based on macro-economic forecasts developed by NDRC. （5）The Government energy administrative department in charge would be responsible for final approvals of electricity development planning, including listening to views from other industries and governmental subdivisions. （6）Once approved in accordance with this process, implementation of the network development plans would be the clear responsibility of the electricity enterprises, under the oversight of SERC. 4.4 Licensing of Operations of Electricity Sector Entities Licensing of all operations of electricity sector entities is a common tool for enabling a regulator to control the entry and exit of participants in the sector, and to control their behaviour. It gives the regulator a powerful enforcement tool because: （1）No entity can function legally in the sector without a license, and that can only be granted by the regulator; and Failure to comply with the conditions would mean revocation of the license by the regulator. （2）This approach should normally be sufficient to enforce compliance from the entity. There is no doubt that the regulator, as the entity responsible for the sector, should have the ultimate authority over the issue of licenses, and that is the commonest approach internationally. （3）In some cases there may be an administrative requirement that the license formally be issued by a government department (for example in Greece), but even in such cases it is still important that the regulator retains control over the content, issuing, and enforcement of the licenses. Their use is not universal, however, and, for example in the USA where private sector utilities have been regulated for many decades, general legislative powers rather than licensing are used as the means of exerting regulatory control. In China, SERC’s power to issue licenses has been defined in Electricity Regulations and documents of the State Council. There are a series of questions to consider on the design of a license system in this way, and we will discuss these questions here and propose suggestions. ·166· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 4.4.1 Licenses Can be Short or Comprehensive There are two main options for the form of licenses: “Short licenses” or “Comprehensive licenses”. （1）Option 1. “Short licenses” are no more than a page or two, and simply grant the licensee general rights, these rights being subject to substantive conditions that will be specified in other relevant regulatory documents, such as secondary laws, regulations, rules, etc., such as a condition to comply with all sector codes; （ 2 ） Option 2. “Comprehensive licences” contain most or all of these substantive conditions that will apply to the particular licensee; these are likely to be lengthy documents, particularly in some cases. The most important of these specific conditions is the tariff determination for a particular company—in a comprehensive licence the prices the company is permitted to charge are part of the license; in a short license these prices appear elsewhere. But the licenses will also contain references to specific duties not imposed on other companies, etc.. Internationally, Option 2, the Comprehensive License, is the more common choice of regulators, and it has the significant advantage that it brings together in a single document the terms that apply, so adding to the transparency of the system. We recommend that Option 2 should be followed in the case of China. If this option is followed, we recommend that SERC start work on the development of “model” licenses that would be used in each of the main sub-sectors. Examples are of common core conditions and specific conditions are given later in this section. 4.4.2 Licensing is Specific to the Activity An important distinction is between the different licensing processes that need to operate in the natural monopoly sectors (transmission and distribution), compared to the potentially- competitive sectors (retailing and generation). The content of licenses will differ between sectors, and it is therefore recommended that licensing should apply separately to the following four sectors: （1）Generation—this type of licensing would be relatively light-handed, and ideally the licenses should be offered to any qualified company wishing to enter, in order to facilitate competition. （2）Transmission—this type of license would be substantially different from generation licenses, as (i) the issue of transmission is likely to be limited to the incumbent companies, with no new entry, and (ii) there would need to be very tight regulatory controls, including price and quality regulation conditions. The transmission license normally covers such issues as: 1）Duty to offer definite terms for connection and use of the licensee’s system—this will ·167· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China be a necessary obligation to ensure competition in generation; 2）Grid Code Preparation—if it is anticipated that a grid code will be in place to regulate the use of the transmission system, then provisions will be needed to set out the process for preparation and modification of a Code. (Note for other licensees there will also need to be a requirement for the licensees to comply with the Code in so far as it is applicable to the license holder). 3）System planning and security arrangements：provisions need to be made for the planning, development and operation of the licensee’s system which should comply with given system and security standards. This needs to make clear responsibility for the expansion and development of the transmission system. （3）Distribution—this type of license would have some similarities to the transmission license, in that this also is a natural monopoly function, and (i) the issue of distribution licenses is likely to be limited to the incumbent companies, and (ii) there would need to be very tight regulatory controls, including price and quality regulation conditions. However, in the case of distribution there will need to be more extensive conditions dealing with customer service and other matters. （ 4 ） Retailing—in the longer term, this type of licensing could also be relatively light-handed, with licenses available to any qualified company wishing to enter, in order to facilitate competition. However, in the short and medium term this light-handed approach will not be appropriate, with only limited competition being possible. Where a company covers more than one of these sub-sectors, it will need to be issued with separate licenses or a combined license covering the sub-sectors separately. For instance, in the UK the electricity distribution and retail license were originally combined in a single license for electricity supply, but with increasing unbundling these have now been separated into separate licences. 4.4.3 Exemptions and Exceptions In most countries where licensing applies, there are some exemptions from the normal licensing provisions. Specific examples of where exemptions could be granted include: （1）The supply of electricity in multi-occupancy buildings where the building owner resells electricity only to tenants. （2）Very small generators (for example less than 1 MW capacity) that sell only to a local licensed distribution entity, could be exempted from the normal licensing rules. （3）Generators that produce only for consumption within their own premises could, subject to size limits, be defined as exempt from generation licence requirements. In this case, larger size limits could apply (for example 50 MW or 100 MW), providing they do not sell to ·168· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China the system, or operate in a way that affects the system adversely. The need to grant exemptions can be very important in order to avoid a regulator being overwhelmed with large numbers of small licence applications that would not be cost effective to process or enforce. To retain flexibility, we would not recommend that the details of the exemptions themselves be specified in the law. However, these exemptions could be handled by: Option 1: Giving certain discretion to the SERC to grant exemptions where it considers it desirable to do so (within a very broadly defined framework). Option 2: In the Electricity Law empowering the relevant government entity to make an “exemption regulation” or rules on licensing, in which the scope for granting of exemptions by the SERC in strictly defined and limited circumstances. In general, there are arguments in favour of keeping regulatory discretion to a minimum, which would favour Option 2. The Electricity Law should say clearly what activities need to be regulated (and hence licensed) and should specify the conditions for exemptions to be granted. 4.4.4 Processes for Issuing, Amending and Revoking Licences In the interests of transparent and predictable regulation, it is important that the processes for issuing, amending, and revoking licences be clearly set out, and be as open as possible. For example, for issuing licences, the process should as far as possible set out the following, ideally in detailed rules made under the Electricity Law: （1）Application criteria and requirements—these could require the applicant to fill in a detailed application form with details of its sector experience, financial status (audited accounts) and corporate information (at the least), etc. （2）An application process that is clear, structured and public, indicated by: 1 ） Publication of the application, for example, in sector press or national/local newspapers. 2） Consultation with the sector (either by way of inviting comments or by open hearings) by the Regulatory Commission for a given time period after submission of an application. 3）Giving notice of the decision to grant a license or withholding the granting of the license with reasons. （3）A common scale of fees to be levied in all cases should also be published. Similarly, the Regulator should have the power to amend conditions of licenses as necessary and in accordance with the provisions of the law and regulations where it is in the public interest to amend them. There should be rules relating to license amendments that are evenly balanced, so as to allow the licenses to be amended where required but also to provide a degree of protection for ·169· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China the licensee from arbitrary changes. Licenses can normally be amended either at the request of the licensee, or at the instigation of the Regulator. Where the licensee puts forward a proposal to amend a license, the Regulator should have a duty to consider it and reply within a definite timescale. Or, the Regulator can begin the process of amendment. In either case, whoever is the instigator; the Regulator should be obliged to publish notice of its intention to amend a specified licence, and should be obliged to consider representations made within a specified time by any person. The consideration should in all cases be in accordance with the regulator’s procedures (preferably involving a public hearing) and the regulator should publish its decision, with explanations. 4.4.5 Common Core Conditions Though licenses differ for different types of entity, there are a number of common core conditions that will be found in all licences, such as: （1）Scope—this condition would refer to the activities which the licensee is authorized to conduct, and the geographic area in which it may be conducted. （2）Duration of the license—this is an important issue, as in general it will be desirable for the term to be long enough to provide some commercial certainty for the licensee, and for renewal to be permitted either automatically or subject to a detailed review, or by means of a reapplication procedure. （3）Modification and revocation—if appropriate, this would refer to the SERC’s powers to modify or revoke the licence. （ 4 ） Provision of information to the SERC—as the SERC will have an important monitoring role to ensure that license holders comply with the terms of their licenses, it should be made clear in a licence condition that the licensee must provide any information to the SERC requested, subject to any necessary confidentiality conditions. （5）Separate accounts for separate businesses—it is important that electricity licensees are subject to a requirement for total separation of accounts in order to avoid discrimination, cross-subsidization and “inter-dependability” of the businesses. This condition would reiterate that where a licensee operates in more than one sub-sector of the electricity sector (that is transmission, distribution, generation or retail), separate accounting information must be prepared and submitted. These accounts must also be separate from any accounts for activities in other non-energy or non-regulated areas. （6）Prohibition of cross subsidy—it also needs to be made explicit that the licensee must ensure that there is no cross-subsidy between the licensed activity and any other activity of the licensee, whether or not regulated. （7）Licence Fees—if that is an appropriate means of funding SERC then there will need to be a condition regarding levies or fees on licensees. ·170· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （8）Assignment/transfer/change of control—the licence will need to ensure that the licensee has an obligation to notify the SERC and seek approval for assignment/transfer of licenses or change of control of the utility following a merger or a corporate acquisition. （9）Disposal of assets—to ensure continuity of service, it is likely to be desirable to forbid the disposal of significant assets without prior approval of the Regulatory Commission. A suitable threshold will need to be inserted here, in order to allow reasonable commercial freedom and avoid undue bureaucracy. （10）Obligation to comply with sector Codes—this would impose a general obligation to comply with relevant sector Codes, for example Grid or Market Code that is in operation. If the license is a comprehensive license as we have suggested, it will also have substantive sections, including a pricing section specific to the company. A monopoly company’s licence may contain its tariff, including specific numbers. 4.4.6 Specific Conditions for Different License Types In addition to the general conditions that we have described above, a range of different specific conditions would be relevant to different types of licenses, and below we summarize these by main license type. （1）Distribution License. Because of the importance of distribution in the impact that it has on final consumers, it is normal for extensive license conditions to apply to distribution licensees: 1）Price Control. Price controls are inevitable for a distribution utility, and this condition would need to define how the price controls apply to the structure of tariffs and the level of prices, and possibly set out the powers of the regulator with regard to approving prices. We would also envisage that there would be a prohibition on price discrimination, subject to any policy requirements issued by the Government. 2）Subsidies. This would define the circumstances in which subsidies could be permitted. For example, the law could provide for the Government to request subsidies in certain cases, subject to it covering the costs to ensure that the company’s profitability is not affected. This condition would elaborate the procedure where the company is required to provide subsidies in its prices for supply of electricity. 3）Obligation to Connect. This would deal with the exact extent of the obligations on the enterprise to provide new connections, including the procedure where the government requires the company to undertake rural electrification or other non-remunerative activities. 4）Social Obligations. This needs to spell out the process where any significant social obligations are to be imposed. In the meantime, it is necessary to clarify the compensation mechanism. 5）Quality of Service Provisions. This needs to spell out the process for developing and ·171· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China imposing any supply or customer service standards. This would include compliant handling processes. 6）System Operation and Supply Security Standards. In order to ensure adequate security and supply standards, this condition would deal with the licensee’s day-to-day operation of the system, short-tem and long-term system planning, and maintenance of system stability and supply quality. （ 2 ） Transmission license. Additional conditions are important for the transmission licensee, and we envisage that typically the additional areas to be addressed in such licenses would be: 1 ） Transmission System Development and Connections: This needs to make clear responsibility for the expansion and development of the transmission system, and the process for dealing with requests for new connections. 2）Permitted Revenues for Use of System and Connection to System. The price control applying to this company will be in respect of the bulk supply tariff, which will need to cover all costs including transmission costs. It will therefore be important to establish a procedure under which the licensee’s revenue requirement for the transmission activity is determined. 3）Transmission System Security Standards and Quality of Service. This will cover planning, developing, operating, and maintaining the transmission system, establishing criteria by which the performance of the transmission system and quality of service may be measured, and reporting. （3）Bulk Supply License. For a bulk supplier like a regional transmission company, we would envisage that the main additional conditions would be: 1）Obligation to Supply. This would deal with the obligation to ensure that demand from customers can be satisfied, and as part of this ensuring that the licensee undertakes, in collaboration with all other Permit holders which it is obliged to supply, operational planning and longer term planning which may be necessary to ensure that demand can be met. 2）Economic Purchasing. This would deal with the obligation to conduct its purchasing activities with generators so as to ensure that its requirements for electricity are satisfied in the most economical way possible. In particular, this would be aimed to ensure that wherever possible such purchasing shall be through competitive procurement in accordance with the requirements of the regulator. 3）Bulk Supply Tariff. This will deal with the regulation of the bulk supply tariff. （4）Generation license. Whether it is in a market environment or in a single buyer environment, a generation license will generally contain little beyond the general conditions that have been outlined above. （5）Other License Types. Depending on the circumstances, there may be other licence ·172· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China types, for example: 1）A Market Operator license, though in some circumstances this would be combined with the transmission system operator license. 2）A Retail license for an entity that does not operate any system but only supplies to final consumers. 4.5 Regulation of State-owned Electricity Sector Utilities As mentioned above, both the origin of economic regulation, and the practical situations in most countries today, indicate that the subjects of economic regulation are mainly intended to be private infrastructure enterprises. In principle, regulatory organizations should and can fairly treat both public and private enterprises. However, state-owned enterprises are likely to show different responses to the same regulatory measures because of the different incentive mechanisms that exist in each. 4.5.1 Difficulties in Regulating State-owned Enterprises Regulatory control mechanisms generally exert their influence through economic incentives and restrictions. Private enterprises hope to maximize their profit. This assumption is the basis for much modern economics; it is the logical base for the idea that competition can improve efficiency and make better use of resources, and justifies the introduction of a market economy.In principle, regulatory institutions may affect a company’s profit by way of tariff regulation, or financial penalties to encourage and restrict enterprises to operate in a planned way. This is because private-sector utilities would generally response to actions by regulatory organizations so as to maximize their profitability under the conditions imposed on them. However, state-owned companies may not be so interested in profit maximisation, and their managers may be more interested in pursuing other behaviour or targets, for example： （1）Using resources and finance inefficiently, and allowing unreasonable cost increases. （2）Adopting short-term behaviour, neglecting long-term targets. （3）Undertaking “blind” or unremunerative investment, artificially enlarging the company without strengthening it financially. （4）As public-sector company managers are only subject to appointment and removal from officials at a superior level (rather than shareholders), they may pay excessive attention to the operation of the appointment and removal processes, neglecting enterprises’efficiency and the proper supervision of the enterprises they work in. These special problems of state-owned enterprises have happened in several other countries. Of course, it does not mean that state-owned public enterprises are not in need of regulation. But that if there is no intention or possibility of privatising these state-owned ·173· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China enterprises, then we must recognize that regulatory institutions will be hindered, both in the authority they can exercise and in the regulatory results that they can achieve. 4.5.2 Specific Methods for Regulation of State-owned Electricity Enterprises Such problems with state-owned enterprises may also mean that it is not enough to consider regulatory methods offered by standard textbooks. We must take some other measures in accordance with the specific circumstances of the state-owned enterprises, i.e.: （ 1 ） Cost or other parameters could be “benchmarked” in order to try to achieve efficiency improvements, or to limit the extent of cost recovery, rather than imposing straightforward profit incentives to improve efficiency. These measures are effective when it is hard to audit on state-owned enterprises cost, especially when connected transactions of some state-owned electricity enterprises are concealed. （2）Publicize in bulletin and the press those enterprises that violate the regulations. In general circumstances, company managers of state-owned enterprises pay more attention to their own reputation than to economic punishment. So such measures can be executed effectively to affect the behaviour of enterprises. Its efficient use may also directly impact appointment and removals of company managers and may be very effective. （3）Specify the qualification of high-level management staff in regulated state-owned enterprises and participate in their appointment.Viewed from the point of evaluating professional capacity and operation performance, regulatory institutions may directly recognize what kind of people are suitable for advanced management positions of regulated enterprises, and more directly understand managerial capacity, professional capacity and operation performance of relative staff. So we suggest regulatory institutions should approve the minimum qualifications of the advanced management staff in regulated enterprises whose management staff is appointed from superior level. For instance, appointment programs of advanced management staff in regulated electricity enterprises may be defined closely in compliance with requirements relating to the required level of competence of appointees. This can be done in consultation with the relevant supervisory institutions. （ 4 ） Regulation of the income level of high-level management staff in regulated state-owned enterprises. As stipulated in Chapter 2, the targets and principles of regulation are usually defined as balancing interests of three major parties, which are users, public utility investors (state-owned enterprises of course includes its operator) and government. In tariff and cost regulation, regulatory institutions should place limits on regulated state-owned electricity enterprises’personnel, especially the maximum incomes of high-level management staff, in order to control costs, prevent customers from unreasonable expenses, and balance the interests of the operators and users of electricity enterprises. At the current stage, it is inevitable for state-owned enterprises to be the major subjects ·174· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China of electricity regulation in China. However, from a long-term point of view, it will be important to introduce multi-component (including private) investment into the electricity sector, optimize electricity enterprises and investment structure, and achieve greater diversification. This will allow the exercise of electricity regulation to the fullest extent, and improve efficiency and service levels of the electricity sector in the longer term. ·175· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 5 Establishment and Regulation of Competitive Electricity Markets The job of the regulator depends upon the structure of the sector—whether it has elements of competition or is a complete monopoly. To some extent in the medium term, and to a larger extent in the long term, it may be possible to introduce competition into the electricity sector in China, and this will likely be on similar lines to the development of competition in other countries. Regulation of monopoly sectors is discussed in the previous chapter, but in this section we consider the types of detailed regulatory approaches that are necessary to deal effectively with the generating sector that is potentially competitive. Where competition can be introduced, as in the generation sector, the importance of transparent and predictable regulation is even greater. In these circumstances, investors will face a combination of both market and regulatory risks, and the regulatory body needs to operate in a way that maintains an acceptable degree of risk, without removing the incentive for efficient operation. A single regulatory entity, like SERC, operating under a set of transparent and predictable rules, has the greatest chance of achieving this. The regulator may also need to advise the decision-making body on the speed of reforms, and how much competition should be introduced—these are issues not covered in this paper, where we consider only the regulatory requirements of each model. However, there does seem to be in China a conviction that competition cannot be introduced in the face of shortages. This is not really correct. Argentina introduced competition in the sector in the face of massive shortages. In doing so it solved the shortage problem quite fast: plants became more efficient and more available; less was wasted, and new plants were constructed. The fear in China is that if there are shortages, prices will rise and there will be public unrest; this is a reasonable fear. However, the way to solve the problem of excessively high bills is by using 6 Vesting Contracts that set the price of a base amount of output at the historic level, while paying more (market prices) for the increases in output. This encourages additional output from the existing plants, and retains the incentives to operate efficiently, and to add capacity, but keeps the final average prices down. The details of Vesting Contracts are not covered in this paper. ·176· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 5.1 Some Models for Electricity Sector Structure There are four basic models of sector structure, differentiated by how competitive they are and much monopoly is retained. All the models assume continued monopoly over transmission, distribution wires, and system operations. The regulator has to regulate these monopoly elements as described in the previous chapter no matter what happens to the generation. But the different models imply different trading arrangements, different procedures for purchasing electricity and for controlling prices, and different amounts of attention to competitive behaviour in the sector. There is gradually increasing competition in these four models, and the extent of monopoly gradually grows smaller. The four different models of competition (which were originally developed by NERA in connection with the Chinese Electricity Sector Reforms) have been extensively discussed elsewhere 7. Here we describe them briefly and concentrate on the regulatory implications of each. The four models progressively expand the extent of competition, and they each have their merits and difficulties. 5.1.1 Model 1: Vertically Integrated Monopoly Model 1 is a monopoly of the kind that existed in China before 1985, with all the functions of the sector integrated into one company. In Model 1 there are no competitive generators, and the two main variants of the model are illustrated in Figure 5.1. All functions in the sector are “bundled” together, and regulated. This model served the sector well for 100 years, and is still the model in existence in most places. Since the whole sector is run as one or more monopolies (one per area) the relevant techniques of regulation have been discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter we will give more attention to regulatory techniques required by the alternative models. Figure 5.1 Model 1：Vertical Integrated Monopoly Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth, Competition and Choice in Electricity Wiley 1996 and Sally Hunt Making Competition Work in Electricity, Wiley 2002, available in Chinese from the World Bank. ·177· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China (a)Vertical in tegration；(b)Separate Retailer/Distributor 5.1.2 Model 2: Single Buyer In this model, only one entity in any area is permitted to buy from the competing generators, and this is illustrated in Figure 5.2. China used to be an example of the “integrated version” of model 2, with the provincial companies purchasing from competing generators, and also owning their own generation. This causes conflicts of interests. The recent reforms separated the transmission, and made the grid companies the single buyer. At present in China, therefore, the “disaggregated version” is the standard model—the single purchaser in each region is now the grid company, and there are many sellers. Figure 5.2 Model 2：Single Buyer (a)Disaggregated Version(Northern Ireland) ；(b)Integrated Version(US and PURPA) The approach to regulation of tariffs is different in model 2 compared to model 1, as the generation costs are determined by contracts. For model 2, these generation costs are passed through, and the transmission, distribution, and retail tariffs are subject to regulation. 5.1.3 Model 3: Wholesale (Generation) Competition Model 3 allows distribution companies and large customers to purchase from competing generators, as is shown in Figure 5.3. This has been the model adopted in almost all countries that have introduced competition (except the USA) either as a transition or as the planned destination. In this case, as Figure 5.3 shows, the main focus is on regulation of the transmission and ·178· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China distribution tariffs, and regulation of market behaviour, including contracting. The regulator also sets retail tariffs, based on these combined costs. Figure 5.3 Model 3：Wholesale Competition 5.1.4 Model 4: Retail Competition Model 4 permits small customers, as well as large customers, to choose their suppliers; so a competing generator can sell to anyone, although small customers usually buy through aggregators or retailers，as is shown in Figure 5.4. Model 4 is known in the USA. as “retail access” or “customer choice”. It is the model now in place in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Alberta, and many states of the USA. Figure 5.4 Model 4：Retail Competition Model 4 requires the same wholesale trading arrangements and competitive wholesale ·179· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China markets as Model 3. The main additional requirements in Model 4 are the settlement process, meter reading and billing, which are greatly expanded from Model 3, and education of millions of customers. These are expensive and complicated. Although many of the developed countries have instituted Model 4, there have been substantial operational problems. The electricity sector in China has basically achieved “separate plants from grid”, and there is no evidence indicating that China would use model 4 in the foreseeable future. As for the regulatory requirements of model 1 and model 4, we will not develop their regulatory aspects in detail in this document, as they have been further elaborated in Making Competition Work in Electricity (S. Hunt 2002). As noted above, model 2 is the active system in China at present, and model 3 is the system that may be widely performed in the next phase of restructuring. We will therefore focus on the discussion of regulation in models 2 and 3. 5.2 Model 2—Regulation of Single Buyers The Single Buyer model is being followed in many countries, in Asia particularly, as a first step to liberalization and as a way of attracting investment by Independent Power Producers or IPPs. China has been following this model for nearly 20 years. The defining feature is that IPPs may only sell to the single buyer (in China’s case, the grid company in each region), which still have a complete monopoly over all further sales. The single buyer model is a limited form of competition. It is only competition to build plants and operate them. Since there is only one buyer, the generating contracts have to cover all the output and the entire life of the plant, since there is no other buyer to take any extra un-contracted output. 5.2.1 The Role of the Regulator in Model 2 Figure 5.5 Tariff Regulation with Model 2, with separate transmission and/or distribution In the case of Model 2, the main focus of the regulator is in the following areas: （1）Setting the tariffs for the transmission and distribution monopolies. （2）Minimising the generation costs by approving the single buyer contracts: 1）Form of the contract—for example, two-part contracts, life of plant; ·180· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 2）Methods of contracting—in particular the competitive bidding process; 3）Conditions of the contracts—for example conditions on merit order despatch. （3）Requiring Grid companies to publish investment forecasts. （4）Setting retail price by way of adding purchase contract cost of electricity generation and electricity transmission and electricity distribution costs. （5）Monitoring quality. In Model 2 the regulator still controls prices and costs for the monopoly elements (transmission and distribution) but also has to oversee the contracting process for generation. 5.2.2 The Grid Company in a Single Buyer Model Model 2 has one really important new player compared to model 1— the single buyer. But it also has a grid company separated from the generation, to avoid conflicts in the dispatching of plant. Where the grid company is also the single buyer, as in China at present, it is a very powerful entity, and may have conflicts of interest. It has three major functions, and some conflicts may arise in all of them: （1）Purchasing of generation (as single buyer). （2）Scheduling (in advance) and dispatching plants (in real time). （3）Investing in the transmission grid and running it as a business. Also, some generating plants in China are still owned by the Grid Companies (Gridcos), which is a serious conflict of interest. These functions should be kept operationally separate. Further unbundling of some of the regional grid companies’ activities would go some way to addressing these problems, but effective regulation will also be important in all these areas. They should have separate accounts and separate sources of revenue. 5.2.3 Procurement of Generation in the Single Buyer Model In China, each regional grid company is the “single buyer” for its region and procures generation under contract. However, the process used by the Gridcos is not a competitive one, and generators are in effect offered a tariff. This tariff is not cost reflective and is not efficient, and so it seriously distorts procurement. There is extensive international experience to show how the procurement function should be carried out efficiently (and also to show the mistakes that should be avoided). The utility that is the single buyer should remain responsible for carrying out the procurement, but the processes followed should be specified by the regulator, and the regulator should oversee the whole activity. The key elements of an efficient competitive procurement programme that SERC could implement would be as follows: ·181· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （ 1 ） Each single buyer would be required by SERC to undertake regular demand forecasting and generation planning exercises, to verify the future needs for new generating capacity. These planning exercises should be approved by SERC and the responsible national departments, and would be carried out under the supervision of SERC. Procurement of new generation would only be permitted where the planning exercise indicated a need. （2）The procurement process to be followed would be specified by SERC, and this would cover matters such as timetable for procurement, advertising of opportunities, form of bidding documents, issuing of documentation, treatment of bids, contact with bidders or potential bidders, negotiations, etc. （3）The form of generation contract to be used would be subject to the agreement of SERC, and this would be a standard format that would apply to all bidders. （ 4 ） The methodology for evaluation of bids would be agreed with SERC and pre-specified so that it is transparent to all bidders. The evaluation itself would be carried out according to processes agreed with SERC. （5）Contract award could only be made providing the SERC confirms that the processes have been correctly followed. Evidence from other jurisdictions (e.g. the USA and Thailand) show that a properly run procurement process can produce very good results in terms of low cost generation. On the other hand, some experience, for example in India and some other Asian countries, shows that failure to follow such competitive procedures often results in slow and ineffective procurement at high prices. We recommend that SERC, as sector regulator, should take the lead role in this. 5.2.4 Dispatching Generating Plant in a Single Buyer Model The work of the dispatch operator is crucial to the efficient functioning of the electricity system, and to the development of competition. The dispatch in China now is not based on Merit Order, for various reasons. If it had been, the transition both to the single buyer and to the more competitive models would be much easier. Competitive markets induce merit order dispatch: less competitive markets rely on the regulator to require it. Model 2 should dispatch the contracts in merit order, and should therefore write the contracts in the two part form that specifies the fuel cost. Merit order is the order of short run costs; plants should be dispatched with the lowest cost plants running the longest number of hours. It has been known for decades that this method ensures lowest cost operation for plants already built. Together with investment criteria that ensure minimum-cost expansion, the sector can achieve maximum efficiency. We recommend that merit order dispatch be instituted as soon as possible. ·182· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China The regulator should ensure that scheduling and dispatch is carried out on a non-discriminatory basis. Despatch rules and procedures need to be subject to approval by the regulator, and operations subject to review, particularly in the event of disputes about dispatch decisions. Such measures are of particular importance in circumstances where the utility carrying out despatch is also the owner of generating plants. As mentioned above, China has not executed despatch on a least-cost basis up to now. Objectively there are several limits to this being implemented at present: （1）Government plans to arrange the pattern of electricity generation, and define annual contract electricity generation for each electricity plant and electricity price; （2）The electricity price for plants connected to the grid is basically a single price established by the government, and there is no mechanism to encourage electricity purchasing institutions to despatch in accordance with the merit order of the electricity plants; （3） Government has set a unified electricity price for any electricity produced beyond the basic contract electricity production. This lacks any incentive for electricity generation plants to improve availability in times of high demand. 5.3 Regulatory Issues in Model 3 —Wholesale Competition Model 3 permits (indeed requires) distribution companies (Distcos) to purchase from a competitive generating sector; the grid company is no longer the single buyer in the area – a sufficient number of distribution companies should be created to enable competitive purchasing. Model 3 allows larger customers to choose their suppliers. All small customers have little or no “customer choice” or retail access (whereas Model 4 permits all customers a choice of supplier), and are still supplied by monopoly electricity distribution companies. The Distco in Model 3 might purchase all its needs at wholesale or it might own some of its own generation. If it purchases at wholesale it should be required to purchase at minimum cost. In this type of competitive model, trading can take place on a variety of bases, including trade in electricity futures. Such trading allows the opportunity for purchasers and sellers to hedge their price risks over a range of time horizons, if they wish. Such markets, if properly regulated, can increase the efficiency of electricity markets generally, and improve the information available about market price trends. 5.3.1 The Role of the Regulator in Model 3 In the Model 3 case, the main activities of the regulator will be: （1）Setting the tariffs for the transmission and distribution monopolies. （2）Controlling the generation costs by ensuring the market is competitive: ·183· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 1）Control of market power; 2）Freedom of entry for generators; 3）Demand response; 4）Market monitoring. Figure 5.6 Tariff Regulation with Model 3 （3）Requiring Gridcos to publish investment needs and forecasts. （4）Requiring Gridcos to invest in transmission. （5）Requiring Distcos to purchase electricity at minimum cost – eg contractual auctions and spot purchases. （6）Setting retail prices for small customers, based on transmission and distribution costs and market prices of generation. （7）Monitoring quality. Document No.5 (2002) envisaged the development of competitive wholesale markets. As the sector develops, the regulator would continue to have to play a lead role to ensure effective competition. Once again, evidence from other countries indicates that effective regulatory oversight and control is essential to ensure that competition functions correctly. On the basis of experience elsewhere, the functions that SERC would need to carry out are as follows: （1）Ensuring competitive markets—many suppliers, many buyers, supply response and demand responsiveness. （2）Regulating the trading arrangements (the market rules). ·184· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （3）Overseeing the grid company’s investments and the transmission business model. （4）Overseeing the competitive procurement of electricity by the Distcos. These are developed in more detail below. 5.3.2 Regulating the Trading Arrangements (the market rules) in Model 3 This is necessary to ensure that the trading arrangements are efficient and non-discriminat -ory. The trading arrangements (market rules) should be drafted by the grid companies, in consultation with relevant parties, and be subject to the final approval of SERC. Not all provinces or regions of China need to follow the same model of competition (monopoly, single buyer, wholesale competition etc). But it would be very useful to have identical trading arrangements for those areas that do go to Model 3. In fact it would be useful for SERC to develop a standard design for trading arrangements. Both Europe and the United States encouraged local design of trading arrangements, which in both cases prevented a wider market developing. FERC, the USA federal regulator, finally adopted a standard design, based on the PJM model, but has not been able to insist on its adoption. SERC must also oversee the operation of the trading arrangements, and have powers to intervene and require changes to the rules where that is necessary; no changes should be made to the rules without SERC approval. For example, the rules may have some elements designed with hydro plants in mind— these can be run with little advanced notice, so do not need day-ahead markets, in fact the market can be run by an auctioneer in real time, as in Norway. But coal plants are much slower to start up, and have substantial costs of doing so; they need to know if they will be called upon or not. This would lead to a need for day-ahead markets. The regulator must be able to insist on this, for fair competition. International experience shows the importance of the regulatory body having adequate powers over the trading arrangements to ensure that they are efficient and non-discriminatory. In particular, in the UK the original England and Wales Pool operated under a set of Pool Rules that turned out to have some problems, but which were not under the control of OFGEM. This meant that OFGEM was powerless to make the changes that it considered necessary to have the trading arrangements (the Pool) operating more efficiently. Finally, the Pool was largely revised by means of changing the legislation and introducing new trade 8 arrangements (NETA) . If the original Pool Rules had been more under the control of OFGEM, it is possible that much of the upheaval could have been avoided. The NETA arrangements originally applied only to England and Wales and have now been superceded by the British Electricity Trading Arrangements (BETA), which include Scotland. ·185· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 5.3.3 Promoting Competition in the Generating Markets in Model 3 If the regulatory body is to cease setting the prices for the generating sector, it must ensure that the markets that set the prices are competitive. This involves having many generators, many purchasers, and both buyers and sellers need to be able to react to prices. They also need to be able to get the product from generators to buyers over a transmission and distribution system that allows non-discriminatory access. （1） Ensuring freedom of entry for generators. The generators should respond to prices by entering the market when the price is high. It is essential for an efficiently functioning generation market that generators are able to enter reasonably freely and on non-discriminatory terms. SERC would need to ensure that the licensing and other requirements can allow this, and in particular that they do not discriminate against new entrants. Also the grid company should be required to publish annually a rolling multi-year load forecast showing its view of how much electricity will be required, area by area, and its best information as to where new plants are being built or planned, and where new transmission is planned. This enables potential competitors to have as much information as incumbents. （2）Guaranteeing service conditions for non-discriminatory electricity transmission and distribution grids. This would include ensuring that rules are established for the granting of generator connections and system access: Rules for, and monitoring of, system maintenance and operation, to ensure that generators are not discriminated against; Regulating the tariffs and other terms and conditions for transmission and distribution connection and use, to ensure they are non-discriminatory. Accounting rules for transmission and distribution utilities, and in particular the establishment of separate accounting, to ensure that there are no cross- subsidies between generation, transmission, and distribution. （3）Supervising market behaviour. SERC will need to monitor the behaviour of the market participants (including the market operator) to ensure that there is no anti-competitive behaviour by them. Where the number of competing generators is small, there will inevitably be suspicions that anti-competitive behaviour will take place, and careful monitoring and supervision will be necessary. This would probably have to include: 1）powers for regular collection of bidding data, price data, and profitability data from the participants and the market operator, to look for evidence of anti-competitive behaviour; 2）SERC should have the right to collect the information, although there is always some question as to whether publishing the information simply makes collusion easier. Where the market operator also has interests in other parts of the sector, in particular generation or supply, strong regulatory action will be necessary to avoid problems arising from conflicts of interest. Ideally, complete separation of market operation from any such interests should be the aim, to avoid any conflicts from arising. Strong enforcement powers ·186· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China would also be essential to eliminate anti-competitive behaviour where it occurs. Experience suggests that the only lasting solution to such behaviour can be to enforce the sale of some capacity to other participants, to reduce the degree of ownership concentration in the market. However, this will require very strong regulatory powers. 5.3.4 Generation Investments and “Capacity Payments”: Models 1 and 3 China’s move to a socialist market economy has been able to take advantage of the power of prices to do the job of signalling investment. The theory of generation markets is the same: where they function effectively and price is allowed to reflect the balance between supply and demand, it is possible to rely on the price mechanism alone to deliver adequate capacity and acceptable reliability. However, this does mean having some mechanism for large customers at least to know the spot price and be able to respond to it; they should have hourly meters and pay hourly spot prices for consumption above their contracts. They should be able to sell back contracted electricity at the spot price, which helps relieve shortages. In the long term, this could operate in China. However, allowing these markets to do the work of inducing investment means that prices must be allowed to fluctuate. This means that prices of contracts between generators and large customers must be freely negotiated, and the contracts must be enforceable; and that spot market prices may sometimes be very high or very low. This volatility in the spot market is essential, because it balances supply and demand. Some generation markets operate in a way that is consistent with the model of electricity markets in which market prices for energy fluctuate to reflect the level of spare capacity. This means there are periods of high energy prices during capacity shortages, providing the opportunity for the capacity costs of plants to be recovered. For this to work it is essential that the market price be set with customer participation—the distribution companies and large customers should be fitted with hourly metering and should be able to save money by not consuming when prices are high. Though such a market model is theoretically correct, and would work where circumsances are suitable, in many cases in practice there are significant concerns that this market mechanism may not work efficiently, and that sufficient generation investment may not be forthcoming: （ 1 ） Where prices are subject to regulation, prices may not be allowed to change sufficiently to provide the necessary market incentives. （ 2 ） Investors may be concerned about high levels of regulatory or political risk, especially where markets or regulatory arrangements are relatively new and untried. （3）Even where price signals would result in adequate generating capacity in the long term, short-term price fluctuations and outages caused by temporary shortages may be judged ·187· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China as unacceptable by policy makers. （4）Reliability is something shared by all consumers on a system, as in practice it is not possible to discriminate between consumers when interruptions are necessary as a result of inadequate capacity, unless there is adequate hourly metering allowing customers to disconnect themselves when the prices are high. （5）In the circumstances of many electricity systems, the consumer price does not work effectively to reflect consumers’ preferences or to allocate the available capacity. For these reasons, in practice policy makers often think that there should be some specific mechanism that will help to ensure an adequate capacity margin. Generally, where such mechanisms have been introduced it has been for reasons of ensuring reliability of supplies and/or to avoid some of the price volatility that comes with capacity shortages, or because decision makers have convinced themselves that widespread hourly metering is too complicated. Broadly, three types of approach are adopted in practice to ensure sufficient generating capacity: （1）Capacity payments incorporated into the spot market price. （2）Capacity obligations. （3）Contracts for capacity. All three options can be found operating in practice in different countries, and a number of variations of each exist in. Below we discuss the main features of each type of mechanism. 5.3.4.1 Generation Capacity Payments Incorporated into the Spot Market Price In this approach, the market itself incorporates arrangements for making payments to plants that are despatched or available, in addition to the payments for energy provided. Schemes vary, but in general the features of this type of mechanism are that: （1）The price rises, and can rise quite high when capacity is tight. That is the point—to encourage generators to get their plants back on line. （2）There is some mechanism for preventing it from rising too high—establish upper price limit by using actual response or simulated response of users. 1）In early schemes in the UK, Australia, Argentina and other places, the simulated customer response was approximated by a price cap set at the Value of Lost Load, (what the last customer would have been willing to pay) as determined by the regulator. A regulatory price cap below the Value of Lost Load is virtually useless. 2）Actual response of consumers. A better scheme is for the maximum price to be set directly at what the last customer is willing to pay, by means of actual customer bids; this is being incorporated in the PJM and New York markets. This requires hourly metering of at least the large customers. If there is no actual or simulated customer response there has to be an alternative ·188· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China “capacity obligation” or “capacity contract”. California went naked into reforms, with no customer response, actual or simulated, no capacity obligation, no capacity contracts, no nothing. And as a result the prices rose by a factor of 10 when there was a shortage. This was a disaster, and scared everyone; but it does not have to happen. 5.3.4.2 Generation Capacity Obligations A number of markets (for example PJM, New York, and Ontario) operate schemes where all entities selling electricity to consumers (the so called Load Serving Entities or LSEs) must be able to demonstrate that they have contracted for sufficient capacity to meet their consumers’loads. This means that all LSEs must own or contract for plant, Penalties for failure to meet the obligations, if set at above the level of new plant capacity costs, should ensure that the plant will be built. Unfortunately, the requirement to have enough contracts to cover load applies to future demand; in January the LSEs show they have enough contracts to cover next July’s expected requirements. But this does not actually prevent them from running short next July. Especially in a place like China with growing load, the “Capacity requirement” may look good but it will actually do nothing. If the requirement were an hourly requirement, to show that the LSE had contracted sufficient to meet the actual demand, then the price of short term contracts would rise to the level of the penalty. If the penalty were set at the Value of Lost Load, we would be back to relying on a simulated price. In our view it would be far better to develop markets with demand responsiveness than to rely on “capacity requirements.” PJM and New York are both moving this way. 5.3.4.3 Contracts for Required Generation Capacity In arrangements of this sort an appropriate entity, such as the System Operator, the market Operator, or a key utility, organises a tender under which bids for the provision of new capacity are invited and contracts granted on the basis of the lowest bids received. Until recently, the only available examples of such an approach were of short-term contracting, for example in Australia. However, recent uncertainties in electricity markets internationally, and the need to make provision for transitional risks, have seen the development of schemes of this type in a number of situations, in particular Ireland and Greece. While a mechanism of this sort involves the signing of long-term contracts (typically 10 to 12 years), in general the “stranding” of the contracts is avoided by the System Operator (SO) or Market Operator (MO) being the counterpart. In most jurisdictions, the SO or MO is able to ensure that the costs are recovered by means of surcharge on all consumers. The potential benefits of this contracts approach are: （1）Predictable. By calling for tenders for specific quantities of new investment, and ensuring the technical qualifications of bidders, the necessary new capacity can achieved over an appropriate timescale. ·189· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （2）Focused on new entry. The scheme can be limited to new entrant generators, and this limits the cost of the scheme as payments to existing generators can be avoided. However, such schemes can destroy the market entirely by ensuring long term over-capacity and low market prices. A Model 2 market, where the grid company was explicitly responsible for purchasing, and all contract costs were passed on to customers would be preferable to a partially competitive Model 3 market where a quasi government organisation could act as an irresponsible competitor. 5.4 Responsibilities for the Supply/Demand Balance in Models 2 and 3 If the government is responsible for ensuring supply/demand balance in a planned economy, who is responsible in a market economy? The answer of course is the markets. The price mechanism is what is supposed to elicit supply and ration demand, and it does do efficiently in hundreds and thousands of markets all the time. However, electricity markets are more complex than most markets, and there is always a concern on the part of government that there will be shortages while the markets adjust. Problems of new investment commonly arise in new or transitional electricity markets, and a range of mechanisms have been developed to deal with this. But so far, it seems that there is no doubt about China’s interest in investing to construct new electricity generation plants. Indeed, it appears that up to now interest in investment in generation capacity has been very strong, with investors wishing to proceed with more capacity than the authorities were willing to authorise. On the other hand, virtually all those investors are publicly-owned companies, and it may be that private-sector investors would not be so enthusiastic. It may therefore be that in the long term consideration will need to be given to transitional capacity mechanisms that could be adopted. 5.4.1 Investment Regulation in Model 2 Based on practice elsewhere, the long-term arrangements for regulating investment in the sector in the current Model 2 phase are likely to be that: （1）Planning for the required generation capacity would be carried out by the relevant grid company, based on macro-economic forecasts produced by NDRC. （2）Approval of the plans would be carried out by SERC, in collaboration with NDRC. （3）Implementation would also be the responsibility of the grid company, under the supervision of SERC. （4）New capacity is brought in on the basis of competitive tendering for new contracts, the tendering to be carried by the purchaser (in China, the Gridcos) on the basis of procedures specified by SERC, under the supervision of SERC; The grid company specifies where it ·190· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China wants the plants on the basis of its internal computations of transmission costs. （5）These PPA contracts would survive the transition to Model 3; they might be sold to new owners (large companies), but would be bid into the market by the owners, either the grid companies or the purchasers of the contracts. 5.4.2 Investment Regulation in Model 3 In this model, the mechanisms to be implemented for ensuring adequate investment in generation would be likely to differ. In the more market-orientated environment that is expected to exist in the longer term, it is important to ensure that there is effective coordination between generation and transmission investment decisions. （1） From a long-term view, the ideal model is that the market will determine the capacity needed by the system. But it would be necessary to consider what, if any, “capacity mechanism” is required in the trading arrangements to provide assurances that there will be adequate generating capacity. （2） In Model 3 the most difficult planning problem is for the grid companies to be able to work out how much capacity they will need, if the generators do not have to follow a central plan for generating stations. Ideally, the generating companies should have to pay whatever it costs to connect them to the grid, plus all costs of reinforcing the grid that are attributable to the new generating plant. But this is not always easy to ascertain, because of the electrical interactions of all the generators on the grid. （3） This problem has been solved in different ways in different places. In most places the grid companies publish a 3, 5, or 7 year forecast of what they expect the increases will be in generation, together with estimates of how much it would cost to provide new transmission to various places on the grid. The grid company is obliged to quote specific connection prices to new generators, at the request of the generators. The quotes must be based on verifiable costs, and the regulator has to approve. ·191· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Chapter 6 Capacity Building for SERC in the Near-term In the earlier chapters we have placed particular emphasis on the long-term capacity building of electricity regulatory institutions in China and its relevant issues. However, it is likely to be a lengthy process to solve these issues and it may need further time still to achieve the targets for regulation in the long term. Meanwhile, and in parallel with the longer-term efforts, SERC should further improve and strengthen the capacity building in the near-term. This is as important as the long-term capacity building, and it will affect the relevant parties’ understanding of the practical value of SERC. From our perspective, this capacity building in the near-term includes two principal aspects, improving external conditions, and building internal capabilities, and these should be identified and performed in accordance with their importance and urgency and the existing conditions and capabilities. We have emphasised the properties of good regulation elsewhere in this report, and even in the near term SERC should be working towards establishing its credibility as a regulatory body that will have clear authority for sector regulation, independent from day-to-day interference by other government agencies, and that will follow clear and transparent methodologies in its regulatory activities. Here we discuss specific near-term steps that we believe should be carried out, in parallel with the longer-term changes. 6.1 Speed up Electricity Sector Reform Promoting the market-oriented electricity sector reform is the most fundamental prerequisite to improving the capacity of electricity regulatory institutions in China. As was mentioned above, an integral part of electricity sector reform is to establish a modern regulatory system in China. In the situation where electricity sector reform has slowed down, it would be hard to set up a modern electricity regulatory system, and it would probably be impossible to execute effectively any of the standard regulatory functions. For instance, if the non-core businesses are not separated from the core businesses, it would be difficult to execute regulations on electricity transmission and distribution costs, and therefore impossible to set up precise and reasonable regulatory mechanisms on electricity transmission and distribution prices. If the transformation of government functions lags behind, it would be hard to harmonize the work of electricity regulatory institutions and other government departments. ·191· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China The current progress status of the electricity reform in China seems less than satisfactory, and is currently in a logjam situation, with reform measures half completed. Based on our understanding of the position, there are many reasons for this situation, but a key reason appears to be that China has been suffering severe nation-wide electricity shortages during the past few years. This has diverted attention from the electricity reform process and, in the circumstances of China, this has made pursuing reform more difficult. In addition, the present institutional arrangements, including the organization and work of the Power Sector Reform Working Group（PSRWG）, are in many respects inconsistent and not ideal. We also suggest that there should be clear terms of reference given to the PSRWG, which is formed by representatives from government departments and other institutions. These terms of reference could include: （1）Setting up an overall plan for electricity sector reform, and ensuring that the plan should be not only a general plan, but also a detailed practical schedule with a clear reform time table. （2）Making timely reports and suggestions to the State Council on the progress achieved and the main problems encountered in further reform. （3）Responsibility for the drafting of the new Electricity Law within a clearly defined timeframe. It is also suggested that the PSRWG should seize the opportunity while the imbalance between supply and demand is easing to strengthen its leading position and to improve its coordination with other departments. This would speed up the decision-making process, and make a major contribution to the promotion of electricity sector reforms. To help accomplish these goals, the office of PSRWG should be given clearer objectives and a stronger capability. This would help it carry out its responsibilities for electricity sector reform design and implementation. It should be pointed out that in any market economy countries or regions, electricity sector reform has been regarded by the party in power and by government as an important political decision, and has thus received attention from, and has been promoted by, senior political leaders or their authorized senior decision-makers. The importance and complexity of the electricity reforms in China are no less than those in the other countries that have carried out successful electricity reforms. Therefore, although China has now entered into a period favourable for electricity reform, we still have to suggest, based on international experience and the real situation in China, that the PSRWG should be given strong support from the senior leadership group, and that the work of the PSRWG should be directed by them or by a leading decision maker authorised by them. Finally, we also suggest that the electricity sector reform in the near term should speed up the execution of separating non-core businesses of the grid companies, so as to avoid cross ·192· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China subsidization and connected transactions, to create an electricity market basic platform, and to promote competent market-based entities. It should: （1）Set and implement separate transmission and distribution system tariffs. （2）Speed up the work on allowing large consumers to buy directly from generators （starting with the largest users）through the development and implementation of open and regulated open access transmission arrangements. （3）Pursue research on separating the electricity transmission and distribution functions. At the same time, work should continue so as to achieve as soon as possible the transition of regional electricity markets from a single buyer model to a wholesale competition model, and create genuine regional electricity markets with multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Research on the proper positioning of the electricity market operator should also be speeded up, and the issue of property system reform should be addressed, to facilitate the creation of fair and effective wholesale competition in the electricity market. 6.2 Energetically Promote Construction of Regional Electric Electricity Markets Electricity market reform is a wide-ranging and integrated project. International experience indicates that it includes not only the adjustment of the organizational structures and property structures of electricity enterprises, but also evolution away from the model where the government manages the electricity sector. China has learnt from international experience and decided to set up a reform strategy for regional electricity markets, taking account of its own actual situation. Establishing regional electricity markets will be an effective measure for China to optimize electricity resources allocation and improve electricity sector efficiency. It would strongly promote the transition of the management functions of the government, to adapt to the market economy and improve the government’s capability of managing the electricity sector in the market economy. So, SERC should energetically promote construction of regional electricity markets, gradually extending the role of markets on resource allocation, and promote and create new electricity sector regulation systems that are suitable for a market economy system. The new system would combine macro-control, market regulation, and effective supervision to improve effectiveness and techniques for the regulation of the electricity sector. In this way, electricity sector regulatory capacity will be gradually improved along with the development of electricity markets. 6.3 Focus on Regulating Markets and Protecting Customers as the Key Near- term Areas of Work If there are no significant changes to the present electricity sector and allocation of ·193· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China functions among the government entities, then SERC will be greatly restrained in exerting its functions. However, this does not mean that SERC cannot make a valuable contribution. The establishment of new electricity regulatory institutions is fully in compliance with the normal evolutionary pattern of electricity sector reform, and meets the development and reform requirements of the electricity sector in China. SERC should try hard to obtain acceptance and support from all sectors of society. This is the historical responsibility for SERC leaders and its staff. In the present situation, if SERC wants to have a clear impact on the sector, then we suggest that SERC puts regulating markets and protecting customers as its key short-term areas of work, to obtain acceptance and support from all sectors of society. We suggest this because: （1）Regulating markets is the basic function authorized by the State Council to SERC. Well-operated electricity markets are extremely important for guaranteeing the stable operation of the electricity system and maintaining the legitimate interest of market participants and customers. As the plants and electricity grids are initially separated, the grid enterprises and generation enterprises are separate entities with different interests. The former internal problems become external, and previously-hidden contradictions become apparent. It is urgent for regulatory organizations to solve these problems, harmonize relationships between entities, and regulate market behaviour. （2）Protecting customers is in fact one of the basic functions of regulatory organizations. Though the function of regulatory organizations is to balance the interests of various parties, customers are often in a disadvantageous position in comparison with regulated electricity enterprises. Regulatory organizations must therefore offer special protection to the customers’ interest. So, regarding protecting customers as a key work area may usefully be combined with SERC’s longer-term development. （3）Electricity sector customers in China are in urgent need of protection. As above mentioned, the Chinese electricity sector has relatively poor service quality. Since the removal of the special administration department of the government electricity sector—the Ministry of Power Industry—the issue of electricity supply service quality has basically been in a regulatory vacuum. （ 4 ） It is easy to understand the positive meanings of regulating markets and protecting customers. They are likely to have major impacts and it is relatively easy for all sectors of society to understand the characteristics of the regulatory institutions and their valuable effect. So, SERC needs as soon as possible to place emphasis on market regulation and on its function as the protector of users’ interests. It should look for opportunities to implement ·194· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China several big cases that have major impacts in respect of regulating markets and protecting customers. Since its establishment, as we know, SERC has taken some important measures in respect of regulating the electricity generation market and dispatching order, etc., which are in accordance with the reform requirements and have achieved good effects. This progress needs to be maintained, and extended to protect customers of the electricity sector as soon as possible. As a means of raising its profile with consumers, and in order to deter potential violators and encourage customers to rely on SERC to defend their rights, violators could be punished by way of “naming on bulletin” or being named in newspapers, in addition to other economic punishment. 6.4 Further Development of the Legal Framework for Electricity Regulation With the authorization in Document No.5 from the State Council, SERC has promulgated a number of relevant regulations since 2003 such as: Basic Rules for Electricity Market Operation; Rules on Regulating Electricity Markets; Functional instructive rules for Technical Support System of the Electricity Market; Guideline on Regional Electricity Market building; Rules for Promoting Open, Fair, Just Dispatching; Suggestions for the Management of Operation of Electricity Generation Plants connected and synchronized with the grid; Model Contract to Purchase Electricity; Model Agreement for Electricity Generation Plants connected and synchronized with the grid and for Dispatching; Tentative rules for Direct Pilot Purchase of Electricity Users from Electricity Generation Enterprises. However, these regulations are far from sufficient for SERC to be able to complete its mission, and SERC needs to take further action. First, as noted above, SERC should work to speed up the amendment of the Law of Electric Power, confirm the lawful duties and powers of the electricity regulatory institutions in the new law, and then revise the administrative regulations such as Regulations on electricity regulation according to this law. The amended Law of Electric Power needs to emphasize the following features: （1）Establishment of electricity regulatory institutions, including the definition of their constitution, their general and specific legal powers and responsibilities, and their capacities for making relevant regulations and other laws. （2）Determining the relationship between the electricity regulatory institutions and the new government department for energy policy making. ·195· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （3）Defining a new electricity sector framework, including sector structure, market structure, and the basic rights and obligations of the various relevant subjects. Second, SERC needs to build up a number of additional regulatory rules as soon as possible, including the following: （1）General regulation procedures for SERC. （2）Advisory procedures for regulatory decision-making. （3）License procedures, licence models, etc.. （4）Approval procedures for implementation of market rules, including market governance and transparency. （ 5 ） Price regulation procedures, including regulations on accounts, cost standards, regulations for information request standards, and price monitoring programs. （6）Rules for the procedures for electricity purchase, including standard contracts. （7）Service quality regulation rules, including complaint handling procedures. （8）Regulations or stipulations for investment regulation and system planning. 6.5 Strengthen Cooperation with Relevant Departments of the Government and Jointly Execute Relevant Regulatory Tasks As above mentioned, up to now SERC has not been authorized with the major regulatory functions of electricity price regulation, investment regulation, etc. These functions still remain in other departments of the government. SERC only has general rights to make proposals, as a subordinate entity in these aspects. But this does not mean that SERC has no useful role in these areas. It is still important for SERC to strengthen cooperation with relevant departments of the government （ mainly the NDRC ）, to meet the needs of implementing the functions of regional electricity market building, supervising electricity market order, and protecting customer interests. SERC may perform efficiently and play important roles during this cooperation, and gradually reform traditional approval processes in practice and so improve functional allocation problems. As we understand it, there are not many staff in these other relevant departments of government to perform electricity regulation functions, and the numbers are insufficient to perform these roles adequately. In this circumstance, it is useful to both sides that SERC should strengthen its cooperation with those other departments. Of course, even though SERC may be given the responsibility for major functions in the future, such as electricity price regulation, investment regulation, etc., macro-departments of government would still play a role on the basis of the separation of administration and regulation. SERC should therefore also strengthen its communications with those governmental departments according to the requirements of the work. However, in the current ·196· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China circumstance, this cooperation is a pragmatic measure that is necessary and important. 6.6 Improve and Implement Measures on Electricity Regulation Fee Collection As mentioned earlier, the key source of income for regulatory institutions is often the electricity enterprises themselves. It complies with the principle of costs being covered by the responsible parties, and is common practice in other market economy countries because of its fairness and efficiency. However, it is clear that this method for collecting electricity regulation fees in China is at a preliminary level and it will be hard to implement. In the meantime, many of the administrative expenses of SERC（e.g. construction expenses for regional electricity markets）have no stable source of income to cover them. If this situation continues, it may produce problems of non performance, or some expenses may have to be covered indirectly by enterprises or other governmental departments. Either outcome would cause lasting damage to SERC in its role of implementing electricity reforms, and it may also damage the image of SERC or perhaps the government as a whole in the eyes of the public. SERC （ and other relevant departments of the government ） should therefore fully understand the need to establish a system of electricity regulatory fees. The earlier it is put into effect, the more beneficial it will be for the execution of regulatory tasks, and the less damage it is likely to cause to the image of electricity sector regulation. 6.7 Urgent Need for Establishment of SERC at Regional，Provincial and Local Levels One of the current problems that prevent the improvement of electricity regulation capacity in China is that there are no basic regulatory mechanisms in place to execute and （e.g. customer protection and service quality） fulfil key regulatory tasks . This greatly reduces the overall effectiveness of the sector regulation. Obviously, branch offices of SERC should not only exist at the regional level as regional bureau, but also in provinces. There must be a complete organization system of electricity regulation at provincial and lower levels, so as to guarantee effective and efficient regulation and the smooth promotion of electricity sector reform. One of the important tasks for short-term regulatory capacity building is therefore to deal with disputes on this matter, and to identify and execute a reasonable structure of branch institutions as soon as possible. Early work should focus on the framework of subordinate institutions of SERC, i.e. to set up the basic unified organizations able effectively to execute regulatory instructions. In addition, current staffing levels are obviously not enough for SERC to execute its regulatory functions effectively. We provide detailed descriptions of relevant international experience ·197· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China in Appendix A, but the following data is useful for reference: （1）In Britain，OFGEM has about 300 personnel. It is responsible for supervision of both the electricity sector and natural gas. It is an independent office, and the scale of the electricity sector it supervises is only about as big as a medium-sized province in China. （2）In the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission （FERC）alone has more than 1200 personnel. FERC covers the whole energy sector and has 5 regional offices. However, its responsibilities are largely limited to inter-state matters, and each state has a public utility commission to carry out detailed regulation of utility industries like the electricity sector within their state boundaries. This supports the conclusion that there needs to be a large increase in staffing for electricity regulation. At the same time, each level of institution has to follow the principle of “better few than worse”. What needs to be emphasized is that the increase of SERC personnel would not necessarily add substantially to the total numbers of government personnel. As some functions are transferred from other departments of the government to SERC, the additional personnel for SERC may come from these departments. 6.8 Apply for Authority to Regulate State-owned Electricity Enterprises through Specific Methods As discussed in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, it is not uncommon for regulatory organizations to regulate state-owned enterprises within the electricity sector. However, for the reasons discussed in Section 4.5, specific mechanisms are required to regulate these entities effectively, principally because of the different incentives that operate on them. We therefore recommend that SERC applies to the State Council for authority to use the specific range of measures proposed in Section 4.5.2 to enable effective regulation of the relevant state-owned electricity enterprises by SERC. 6.9 Improve Communication Channels with Other Government Agencies, and with Regulatory Bodies in China and Worldwide Electricity regulatory institutions are relatively new in China, and at the same time SERC is different from most current governmental entities. One of its basic functions is to settle various complicated disputes over interests. SERC must therefore have more robust mechanisms of communication and exchange with external entities, to establish good relations with other bodies and improve understanding of its role. In particular, we recommend that it should: （ 1 ） Make full use of available electricity sector information, and strengthen the communication of sector information with the outside world; ·198· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （2）Invite or arrange domestic and overseas experts to make detailed research on electricity sector reform and regulation; （3）Consider publication of an Annual Report on China Electricity Regulation, in order to improve transparency of regulatory activities and help SERC to promote its role and policies; （ 4 ） Strengthen communication and cooperation with government and the relevant departments at various levels to win support and collaboration; （5）Actively propose important policy recommendations to the State Council on the promotion of electricity sector reform, and improve its ability to promote policy making; （6）Set up regular communication with overseas electricity regulatory institutions, to learn about their successful experiences and avoid their mistakes; （7）Set up regular communication with other regulatory authorities responsible for regulation of domestic sectors such as telecom, stocks, banks, insurance companies, etc.. The problems, experience, and lessons they have encountered or dealt with will have many common characteristics and so will also be helpful to SERC’s development. 6.10 Strengthen Personnel Training, and Establish Regulations for the Behaviour of Personnel SERC has carried out a lot of staff training since its establishment, such as inviting some leaders and relevant experts to take seminars, and arranging for some personnel to study or visit aboard. These play an active function in helping the personnel to understand the work of electricity regulation as rapidly as possible. As electricity regulation measures and methods are different from most traditional administrative and management activities, a programme of standard personnel training is far from adequate to enable SERC staff to execute their functions effectively. Its personnel should be equipped with modern regulatory ideas relevant to the market economy, and wide-ranging professional knowledge. So we suggest that SERC should design and implement a more comprehensive training programme, including training in: （1）Modern economics, especially the basic theory of regulated economics. （2）Laws, especially the basic theory of economic and legislation. （3）Standard theory and techniques of project evaluation and management of enterprise finance. （4）Technical knowledge relating to electricity regulation. （5）Public relations theory and practice. （6）Experience and lessons from other countries that earlier carried out electricity sector reform. ·199· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China In some areas of the public sector in China, there exist some problems of poor work quality and deficiencies in standards of behaviour, in terms of public service and other matters. If SERC wants to fulfil its functions and achieve the trust of electricity companies and the public, it is important for SERC to avoid being tainted by these bad practices. So, important aspects that need to be considered in respect of personnel recruitment and training are that: SERC must try hard to avoid appointing unsuitable personnel; and it should cultivate professional ethics into its personnel through establishing proper regulations on behaviour so as to inspire SERC staff to behave competently and prevent SERC staff from developing the undesirable trends that can possibly occur in this respect. ·200· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Appendix A International Comparisons of Regulatory Bodies and Practices In this Appendix we present an international comparison of the electricity sector regula- tory arrangements in nine different countries. This is presented partly in table format, com- paring specific data and characteristics, and partly in case study format, looking at two spe- cific aspects of regulation: （1）Tariff setting powers and the degree of regulatory independence; and （2）The vertical split of regulatory authority in those cases where the country is organ- ized on a federal basis. Conclusions based on the data presented in this Appendix are contained in the relevant parts of the main report. Table A.1（1） Fundamentals of Regulatory Bodies Country Great Britain Norway Russia （Federal） Spain Name of Gas and Electricity Norwegian Water Re- Federal Tariffs Ser- National Energy Commission Body Markets Authority sources and Energy （previously called vice (CNE) （ GEMA ） , re- Directorate (NVE) and still often referred sponsible for the to as the FEK — the Office of Gas and Federal Energy Electricity Markets Commission） (OFGEM) Date Es- 1989（as OFFER） 1921, competences 1995 as the Federal Created in 1998 as “Commission tablished were last modified in Energy Commission for the National Electricity Sys- 1990 （FEK） tem”,was later renamed “National Commission for the Electricity System” and later, when its powers were expanded to include the gas sector was renamed “National Commission for Energy” Number Minimum 3 One Maximum 7 （ one 9 Members （ in addition to a of Mem- Members, cur- board for each regu- non-voting Secretary） bers rently 15 Members lated natural monop- oly） Term of Maximum 5 years 6 years,renewable once Not defined 6 years （ to reduce coincidence Office with elections calendar cycle and maximise independence of the commission ）， renewable once （renewals are staggered with half of the board being reconsidered every three years） ·201· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 续表 A.1（1） Country Great Britain Norway Russia （Federal） Spain Required No specific No specific require- Not defined Recognized technical and profes- Qualifications requirements ments sional competence Members Department for Proposed by the Min- Government of the Proposed by the Minister of Indus- Appointed Trade and istry of Petroleum and Russian Federation try. Appointed through a Govern- by Industry Energy and appointed appoints and re- ment decree, after appearance in by the King moves the Head and Congress Deputies of the FTS Grounds for Only incapacity or Established by the Not defined Permanent incapacity, removal misbehaviour Civil Service Act incompatibility, legal offence, 1983 （ section 2 ） : serious non-compliance with its below two years of functions. In addition, they can be service, a civil servant dismissed by the Government after in Norway （such as the a reasoned request by the Industry Director General of Minister NVE ） “may be dismissed when there are proper grounds for doing so” and after two years of service, he “may be dismissed if as a result of illness he is permanently unfit to carry out his duties in a satisfactory manner, if he no longer has the qualifications that are necessary for the post, if for other reasons he is permanently unfit for the post” Salary Not available Not available Not available Not available levels of bers/Senior Mem- Officials Degree of Subject to NVE is subordinated Very little - The head Formally independent. The Independence Parliamentary to the Ministry of of the FTS bears the Ministry is responsible for from oversight, but no Petroleum and Energy. personal monitoring the efficacy of the Government significant control NVE’s decisions are responsibility for Commission activities Government by reviewed by the performance of the Departments Ministry powers assigned to it by the government and the realisation of state policy in the sectors Table A.1（2） Fundamentals of Regulatory Bodies Count United States Australia Brazil Argentina India （Federal） ry （Federal） （Federal） Name Federal Energy Australian Energy Agência Nacional de Energia Ente Nacional Central of Regulatory Regulator（AER）. Elétrica （ANEEL） Regulador de Electricity Body Commission NB: the AER is a la Electricidad Regulatory （FERC） constituent part of （ENRE） Commission the Australian Co- （CERC） mpetition and Con- sumer Commission （ACCC） Date October 1 1977 The AER 1996 （by means of Law 9427 1991 （ Law July, 1998 Establ （substituting the commenced opera- of 26 December 1996）, as a 24065, ished Federal Power tions in July 2005 substitute of the National creating Commission, Department of Waters and ENRE ， was FPC,which was Electric Power approved in established in December 1920） 1991） ·202· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 续表 A.1（2） Count United States Australia Brazil Argentina India （Federal） ry （Federal） （Federal） Number Up to five Three ANEEL is managed by a 5 members: a Five （ 5 ） , of commissioners collegiate Board of Directors, president, a consisting of a Mem- （cur-four） rently composed of the vice-president irperson and four Cha- bers Director-General and four other and three co- other Members directors, among them,the mmissioners including the Director-Ombudsman. The Chairman, Cen- executive functions of ANEEL tral Electricity are under the responsibility of Authority as the twenty superintendents. The ex-officio Office represents the Agency in Attorney-General Member legal matters Term 5 years Up to five years 4 years 5 years, but Maximum 5 of can be reelect- years Office ed for an indefiniteterm Requir No specific No specific No specific requirements No specific Having ed requirements, it qualifications. requirements. experience in Quali- is only stated One member must To be defined any of engineer- fications that “the be a Commissioner by the Energy ing, law, Chairman and of the ACCC Secretary of economics, merce, com- finance, members of the the Governm- management/sit- Commission ent each time ting or retired ju- dividuals shall be in-who, a member of dge of Supreme by demonstr- the Board has Court or Chief ated ability,bac- to be appoint- Justice of High kground, ed（Decree Court training,or ex- 1398/92） perie- nce, are speci- ally qualified to assess fairly the needs and concerns of all interests af- fected by Federal energy Memb policy” Appointed by Two of the Presidente da República （but In the case of Central Govt on ers the President of members are to be previously approved by the President, recommendations Appoi the United Sta- recommended for Brazilian Senate） Vice-president of selection nted tes with the appointment by and first committee headed by advice and Ministers commissioner, by Member of consent of the representing each public election Planning Senate of the States and by a Selection Commission in Territories that Committee charge of Energy Sector, as have elected to be including per Act subject to the representative jurisdiction of the s of the sector. AER, the third is to The other two be recommended mmissioners co- for appointment by are appointed the Chair of the by the ACCC Consejo Federal de la Energia, after the approval of a Parlia- mentary Com- mission ·203· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 续表 A.1（2） Count United States Australia Brazil Argentina India （Federal） ry （Federal） （Federal） Grounds May be Incapacity or Misbehaviour, failure to fulfill Only by Insolvency, for removed by misbehaviour; his duties, criminal conviction justified incapacity, convicted removal the President Bankruptcy; decision of of offence involving only for ineffi- Failure to comply the moral turpitude, ciency, neglect of duty, with disclosure of Government abusing his position, or malfeasance interest require- and after the approval of a guilty of proved in office ments; Full-time Parliamentary misbehaviour, having members are not Commission financial or other to take paid interests prejudicing employment his actions outside the AER; Part-time members are not to take paid employment in conflict with their responsibilities at the AER Salary The Chairman Not available. Not available The As prescribed by levels of of FERC is Subject to remuneration Central Government Memb- compensated decisions of the of the of the members from time to time ers/ Sen- at level III and Remuneration board is ior other members Tribunal established by Officials at level IV, as Government stated in the Decree US Code Title 5 Degree Independent. Independent Not ANEEL is a semiautonomous ENRE is and No significant of There is no subject to government organisation which independent control by Indepe- review of ministerial or depends on the Ministry of institution Government ndence FERC’s deci- policy direction Mines and Energy (MME). In inside the Departments,except from sions by the particular, ANEEL enjoys Energy policy guidelines and Govern- President or financial independence, Department of budgetary Congress autonomy of its management the Economics allocations ment and independent Mi- nister. decision-making process However,it is based on technical issues as opposed to political subject to issues auditing by the Economics Mi- nister and the Sindicato Gen- eral de la Nac- ión,which de- pends directly from the Gov- ernment ·204· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Table A.2（1） Organisation of Regulatory Bodies England and Country Norway Russia （Federal） Spain Wales Source of Licence fees and State funding Government Budget Service fees paid out Funding other income of energy tariff from Licensees, entities as a but subject to percentage defined by Parliamentary the government approval Organisational See Figure A.2 See Figure A.4 See Figure A.5 See Figure A.8 （refer to Structure organigrams） Annual Budget £37.3 million in kr 228 million （ aprox. Not available 2004 Financial Stat- 2003～2004 $32 million ） in year ements Revenue: 2003 € 22.1 million Costs: €14.3 million Number of 291 in 2003 ～ 414 in year 2004 Approximately 200 for 178（at 31-12-2004） Employees 2004 Energy – other sectors unknown State/Provincial 1 regional office, NVE is based in Oslo Each local area（around 80 Based exclusively in Offices?（see in Scotland and has 5 regional “oblasts” or regions）of the Madrid.However, Table A.4） offices in Tønsberg, Russian Federation has its consideration is being Hamar, Førde, own Regional Energy given to moving the Trondheim and Narvik Commission（REK）which CNE’s central offices regulates end-user tariffs to northern Spain within its region Decision No specific NVE has to follow the Undefined Allowed to establish Making requirements for process detailed in the its own procedural Processes proceedings, and Public Administration rules GEMA can Act(Chapters decide III and IV） Appeals Appeals limited Appeals against NVE’s The Antimonopoly Service Appeals to be made Procedures to reference to decisions are submitted is likely theoretical route, before the Minister the independent to the Ministry of but in practice such issues Competition Petroleum and Energy. are dealt with through the Commission and In addition, NVE’s political process judicial review decisions are subject to judicial review Table A.2（2） Organisation of Regulatory Bodies United States Australia India Country Brazil Argentina （Federal） （Federal） （Federal） Source of Annual charges Federal funding ANEEL is mainly funded by a Mainly from anGrants & Funding and filing fees charge applied on generation, inspection and control loans made levied on the transmission and distribution tax that generators, by the regulated companies (this charge amounts distributors andCentral companies. to 0.5％ of the annual benefits of transmission companies Govt., and Budget has to each utility)Other sources of must pay the regulator fees and be approved funding are government’s budget each year (other sourcesme from other Li- inco- by Congress transferences, sales of of funding are subsidiescensees, but publications and other material, and donations; fines andsubject to financial operations’returns, other confiscations; interestsParliamenta contracts’revenues, and sales of and revenues from own ry tangible assets） resources). approval Budget has to be approved by Congress Organisati- See Figure Divided into three See Figure A.9 See Figure A.6 See Figure onal A.3 groups, see Figure A.7 Structure A.10 （ refer to oganigram s） ·205· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 续表 A.2（2） United States Australia India Country Brazil Argentina （Federal） （Federal） （Federal） Annual 2003（actual） : A$12.3 million in In 2004, ANEEL’s budget amou- $ 23 million in 2002 Around Budget $190 million; 2006～2007 nted to 219040668 R$ £0.6 million 2004（estimate） : (74852687US $）The budget of $204 million; ANEEL and its execution are 2005（request） : public ANEEL has to publish $210 million annually a report to the Federal Court of Accounts showing that its administration has been transparent（this report is called Annual Rendering of Accounts） Number of 2003（actual） : Funded for 77 Not available （out of which 68 during 151 in2002 Employees 1214; permanent two tiers are technical 2003～2004 2004（estimate） : positions in staff） 1250; 2006～2007 2005（request） : 1280 State/Pro- 5 regional Head office: ANEEL does not There are provincial Only one vincial offices in located in havestate/provincial offices,but regulatory institutions office at Offices? Atlanta, bourne.Other Mel- it is in the process of (currently 13 plus 4 headquart （see al- Chicago, offices are decentralizing some of its being developed) ers in New so Table New York, located in powers and operations, by Delhi, A.4） Portland and berra, Sydney Adelaide,Can- signing Cooperation Agreements India.No San Francisco and Brisbane with regional regulatory agen- regional or cies other office Decision FERC is Currently, decis- ANEEL decides its own Some very broad Through pr- Making authorized to ions required the procedures, by means of principles of processes oceedings Processes establish unanimous agree- Resolutions. However, several are set by Law 24065 and written such ment of the mem- general principles are orders procedural bers present and established as follows: and voting.However, lawfulness, impersonality, administrativ it is intended morality, publicity, procedural e rules as are that the AER efficiency;It has to be noted also necessary to voting rule will that for the Board of Directors the exercise change to a of ANEEL to meet, at least three of its requirement for directors （ including the functions simple majority Director-General or its legal decisions when substitute）have to be present. the AER assum- The decisions of the Board of es responsibility Directors need the agreement of for national reg- at least three members ulation of distribution and retailing in January 2007 Appeals Judicial revi- Decisions are Any administrative appeal to a ENRE’s decisions are Appeals to Procedures ew (U.S. Co- subject to decision by ANEEL has to be subject to the the urts of Appeals judicial review. forwarded to ANEEL itself, following controls： “ Appella and Supreme Decisions on gas which has powers to annul and (ⅰ) Administrative te Tr- for ibunal Court） are also subject revoke its own decisions. The control（appeal to the Electricit- to merits review decision by ANEEL’s board Energy Department）; y” ,limited under the gas exhausts the administrative (ⅱ) Judicial control against the pipelines law. stage. However, this does not (appeal to the Cámara orders of There is also prevent any agent from resorting Nacional de Apelacio- the likely to be to the courts, even before the nes）; adjudicatin merits review for submission of an administrative ( ⅲ )Ombudsman’s f cer or giof- electricity in It is remarkable that ANEEL has appeal appeal. The om- the future, under a defined several quality standards budsman can ask, on Central proposed new for services provided to his own initiative or at Commissi administrative customers（in compliance with the request of one of on, under rule Presidential Decree 3507, of the parties, for the the Act June 13, 2000, which sets investigation of any directives for the establishment act, fact or failure to of quality standards and of a act of ENRE, that may permanent process of quality represent an evaluation of services delivered illegitimate, defective, by governmental organizations irregular or abusive at the national level） exercise of ENRE’s rights ·206· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Table A.3（1） Organisation of Regulatory Bodies Country England and Wales Norway Russia （Federal） Spain Sectors Regulated Electricity and natural Water and energy Electricity;Thermal Electricity, natural and gas Energy（district heat）; liquefied petroleum Natural Gas; Oil gases and oil Pipelines; Railway Transportation;Ports & Airports; Ice-breaking services; Post; Telecommunications and certain other prod- Types of Entities Mainly Private Sector Entities mostly own- ucts Natural monopolies,wh- Private entities Regulated companies, but also ed by local and /or ich in general are still State-owned nuclear regional authorities majority state-owned generator companies Range of Responsible for Mainly network reg- Responsible for Advisory body for Electricity regulation of ： ulation and licensing regulation of ： the Government,com- Sector Responsibilities transmission （including generation, of electric utilities. generation, transmission（including petition supervision, system operation ） , In addition, NVE system operation） ， settlement of the distribution, and supply monitors the distribution，and supply regulated costs of the sector country’s energy sector electricity system, systems, including technical inspection, generation, sales, arbitration between transmission and energy sector parties, energy use; and as- ring-fencing sesses future needs supervisory body for in the generation and regulated entities Price Regulation Yes, full authority on transmission Yes, NVE sets system A wide range of No, although it is Powers prices income limits for electricity prices and compulsory for the distribution charges are regulated, CNE to draft a companies and including generation non-binding decision approves their tariffs tariffs, tariffs for of each tariff system operation, proposal.European market services, Com- mission requires ancillary services, national regulators to transmission, and define the tariffs or al limits for retail tariffs least the tariff methodology. However, this re- quirement has not yet been transposed into Spanish legislation Authority over Yes, full powers over Only setting No — this is the No,although Market Design NETA guidelines for responsibility of the non-binding decisions overall system operation Government.The State- by CNE are required controlled electricity in most issues company (RAO UESR) is leading electricity market design, but the Ministry of Economic Development & Trade (MEDT) has policy oversight Investment Indirectly through price Indirectly through In so far as tariffs are No, although non- Regulation regulation price regulation based on budgeted cash binding decision by Powers costs — including any CNE is required in investment requirement the energy planning process Quality Yes Yes(new regulations In practice— No No, but it monitors Regulation on quality of service quality of service Powers to enter into force in January 2005) ·207· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Table A.3（2） Organisation of Regulatory Bodies Uniteds tates Country Australia （Federal） Brazil Argentina India （Federal） （Federal） Sectors Natural gas, Wholesale electricity Only electricity Electricity Electricity Regulated oil and market and electricity electricity transmission networks in the National Electricity Market Gas (NEM); transmission networks and enforcing the gas access code in all jurisdictions except Western Australia; AER assumes responsibility for national regulation of distribution retailing and 2007 in January Types of Private Both Private Sector and Concession com- Concession Generating Entities entities （ F State-owned companies panies, both companies, all Companies owned Regulated ERC has only private and of which are by Central Govt limited stateowned privately plus those having jurisdiction (Brazil used to owned composite generation scheme over entities have a for more than one owned by the stated-owned ctricity ele- system, state, and Inter-state public which is being Transmission sector） progressively pri- Utilities vatised over the last years) Range of FERC Electricity and gas Its powers and re- Tariff setting; Responsible Electricity regulates access pricing and sponsibilities are: regulation on essentially for Sector interstate transmission revenue to regulate and security, regulation of tariff Responsibilities electricity regulatory decisions; supervise the gen- technical of Central transmission, service standards; eration, transmi- aspects, meas- Generating the sale of guidelines for ssion, urement and Companies and electricity for ring-fencing; distribution and metering, billing, Inter-state resale and promulgating the commercializa- connexion is- licenses for Transmission mergers regulatory transmission test for tion of electric sues, quality transmission Utilities, and& issue electricity investment; enforcing power, of service; trading of the National Electricity addressing the antitrust Law and Rules and the complaints from regulation; Gas Pipelines Access agents and concession Law and Gas Code consumers; to assignment; mediate fines conflicting interests among agents of the se agents sector electrical and and between the- consumers;to gra- nt, permit and authorize electricity facilities and services; to promote rates; ctricity to fair ele- ensure the quality of ser- vices; to enforce investment by agents; to encourage com- petition among the operators and to ensure universal access to services ·208· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China 续表 A.3（2） United States Country Australia （Federal） Brazil Argentina India （Federal） （Federal） Price On transmission Yes, responsible for Yes, as stated Yes, ENRE sets Yes, full authority Regulation prices electricity and gas by ANEEL maximum tran- on prices Powers access pricing and itself, ANEEL smission and transmission revenue “is distribution regulatory decisions responsibility prices to establish electricity rates ensure payment that of a fair price by end-consu- mers, as well as to ensure the economic- financial health of the distribution concessionaire so it may offer a service with the necessary quality, reliability and Authority over Yes, FERC has No.This is the continuity” Only in the frame- No Market design Market Design complete responsibility of the work of MME’s determined by jurisdiction Ministerial Council on general Elec- tricity Act. Time over the Energy (MCE) and/or guidelines[ANE and phases of wholesale the Australian Energy plements EL im- the ge- introduction to be electricity Market Commission neral policy dec- decided by marketplace (which is responsible AEMC isions of the Commission for rulemaking) Ministry of Mi- nes and Energy (MME)],and the stipulations of the electricity sector regulations Investment Indirectly Yes,through Indirectly thro- Indirectly Indirectly through Regulation through price promulgating the ugh price through price price regulation Powers regulation regulatory test for regulation, regulation transmission concession bids investment referred to (for generation, Electricity Rules and in the National tra- nsmission, and disputes regarding distribution)and regulatory test concession assessments. contract terms Also approves gas transmission investments under the Gas Code Quality Together with Yes, under the service Yes,ANEEL sets Yes Yes Regulation North incentive regime in quality of Powers American revenue cap service Electric determinations. standards for Reliability Some technical the electricity （NERC） Council standards are the sector and responsibility of state supervises its regulatory agencies fulfilment ·209· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Table A.4 Vertical Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities United States Russia Australia India Country Federal Federal ·210· Level Local Level Federal Level Local Level Level Local Level Central Level Local Level Central/Local Department State Public Utility Comm- The Federal body There is a Regional Australian State regulatory Central Commission is These are es- Organisational of Energy issions is established by Energy Commis- Energy agencies established by the Cen- tablished by Link and Fed- the Federal Gov- sion(REK)for each Regulator tral Government and State Govern- eral Energy ernment and has local area(“oblast” (AER) has no direct links to ments,and are Regulatory powers to set or region)of the State Commissions not subject to Commiss- bounds on the tar- Russian Federation control or ion(FERC) iffs set by Regional oversight by Energy Commis- the Central sions Commission Level of Local Below the No relevant entities be- Single organisation Exist only at Oblast Single State level, with no Single organisation Exist only at Organisations Federal level low the State level, with no local level, with no of- Federal body lower level bodies with no local represen- State level, are the State though some states have representation fices or representa- tation with no of- organisations more than one entity tion at more local fices or rep- levels resentation at more local levels Central/Local FERC State public utility com- Responsible for: Responsible for Economic Technical standards, Responsible for regulation Full respon- Allocation of regulates missions regulate genera- transmission tariffs end-user tariffs that regulation safety, metering, of tariff of Generating sibility for all Responsibilities interstate tion, distribution, service where lines cross re- can be charged by distribution and Companies owned by regulatory (prices, transmission, and prices to end-users, gional boundaries; integrated regional retail geographical Central Govt plus those matters investment, sale of transmission siting, and generator tariffs for electricity compa- service areas, ser- having composite genera- within States etc.) electricity environmental concerns so-called “ Federal nies（Energos） vice reliability and tion scheme for more than for resale stations ” (typically performance stan- one State and Inter-state and mergers very large condens- dards, special re- Transmission Utilities, is- ing stations)plus nu- quirements for small sue of licenses for trans- clear stations and customers mission & trading, specify major hydro stations; Grid Code and standards setting limits (typi- of performance – no juris- cally on the ％ in- diction within States ex- crease)on end-user cept in matters relating to tariffs that REKs can inter-state transfer of set electricity Relative Staff 1250 (year Depends on each State Approximately 200 Approximately 5 Funded for 77 Yet to be deter- 68 Varies from Numbers 2004) (some States have more permanent mined. state to state; than one PUC). Some positions in AER only assumes but in the examples are: 2006～2007 responsibility for range of 75～ Colorado PUC, 95 national regulation 100 employees; of distribution and Maine PUC, 61 retailing in January employees; 2007(until then, New Hampshire PUC, 73 these are the re- employees; sponsibility of the Idaho PUC, 49 State regulatory employees; agencies and the Texas PUC, 210 relevant staff have employees; not transferred) Oregon PUC, 124 employees Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China ·211· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China A.1 Case Study 1：Tariff Setting Powers and Regulatory Independence In this case study we consider, with reference to these regulatory bodies studied here, the issue of independence of the regulator from other governmental organizations in its tariff setting role. The Need for Regulatory Independence in Tariff Setting The new institutional economics and the examples of regulatory regimes around the world have emphasised the importance of regulatory credibility and reputation to ensure private investment in monopoly industries. Governments have great difficulty to issue credible statements because of their multiple opposing political economy objectives. Companies invest under a set of rules that are may change because of the pressures on governments to use their control over regulated sectors to achieve industrial, employment or social objectives when the need arises. Anticipating this opportunistic behaviour, private utilities will likely invest less than is optimal or demand high-risk premiums. The result is bad for the companies and bad for the government, but this temptation is unlikely to provide the right incentives unless complemented by some reform. Countries react to the credibility problem in two different （ and sometimes complementary）ways. They may resort to: （1）Institutional reform. （2）Entering into long-term contractual arrangements. Long-term contracts tend to specify the obligations of the investor in terms of quality, coverage, investment plans and the remuneration expected from the fulfillment of these obligations. These contracts are usually signed with the host state directly and tend to be subject to international arbitration. The main difficulty of these contracts is that they tend inevitably to be incomplete. Predicting every single future contingency is not possible especially in contractual relationships that may last a long time. As a result, forced contract renegotiations are a real possibility and when the rules to conduct them are not clear the scope for opportunistic behaviour from either party could reduce the effectiveness of long-term contracts. Even when contracts are part of the regulatory framework, some countries resort to the creation of independent regulatory commissions. These institutions tend to solve the commitment problem by reducing the link between elected politicians and the electricity sector. By contraposition to long-term contracts, analysts refer to these reforms as the creation of implicit contracts between consumer, companies, government and the regulatory commission. The main virtue of an independent regulatory commission is that it is detached from the ·211· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China political process and can take decisions that are not affected by political considerations. But even the regulatory process is unlikely to completely eliminate the discretionary nature of regulatory decisions, and with tariff setting in particular it is necessary to create a properly specified and transparent framework to reduce the exercise of this discretion. The independence and autonomy achieved by the regulator needs to be complemented with a set of rules that constrain its behaviour. Tables A.2（1）and A.2（2）show that in most of the countries surveyed the regulatory entities have full responsibility for tariff regulation. The cases of electricity distribution in Norway and Argentina and the federal regulation of transmission tariffs in the US, presented below, have been chosen as three particularly interesting examples of the existence of （more or less）independent regulators in charge of price setting in order to overcome the problem of governmental inconsistency. We also review the cases of India and Russia. In the Indian case, despite the existence of legal powers, the state regulatory commissions have struggled to exercise their independent tariff setting powers. In the Russian case, the regulatory entities have no legal powers to carry out tariff regulation. The following paragraphs include a brief description of the process of tariff setting of each of the regulators considered, making special reference to the degree of discretion that the regulator enjoys in setting revenues and tariffs. Distribution Tariff Setting in Norway—The Role of NVE In Norway, distribution tariffs are set by the independent regulator, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration（NVE）, in order to reduce the possibility of political discretion. As stated by NVE itself, its main responsibility is “to ensure that tariffs for transmission of electricity reflect the cost of efficient operation and maintenance of the network and of investments in the network”. This involves two main activities. First, NVE determines revenue caps to ensure efficient development of the grid and reasonable charges for customers. Second, the regulator determines the framework within which the tariffs must be developed. NVE regulates around two hundred network companies. The regulator enjoys a high degree of discretion in the way tariffs are established, since the legislation does not include any provision in relation to the type of regulation（cost-of-service versus price or revenue cap）, the length of the regulatory period, or the allowed return of invested capital. The remuneration of the grid activities has evolved through two clear phases: a cost of service system between 1992 and 1997 and an incentive based system of regulation implemented in January of that year（1997～2001）and maintained with few changes for the period 2002～2006. Grid companies operate under concession from the government and are ·212· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China required to allow access to their network at tariffs set by the regulator. NVE determines a revenue cap for each grid company, based on factors that influence costs in the area served, such as climate, topography and settlement patterns. The company’s income must not be higher than a figure determined by NVE. Revenue caps are set for a minimum of five years and are corrected annually for inflation. The revenue formula depends on the actual level of costs of each utility and on individual efficiency requirements （based on benchmarked efficiency measurements）. The more efficient grid companies are only required to achieve the general efficiency requirement, while less efficient companies must also achieve individual requirements. The revenue cap is increased annually by a factor equivalent to half the percentage increase in energy supplied. The formula is intended to encourage grid companies to operate more efficiently, and to consider alternatives to investments in increased transmission capacity. A reduction in the quantity of energy supplied does not result in a reduction in the revenue cap. Distribution Tariff Setting in Argentina—The Role of ENRE （ENRE） In Argentina, the Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad is the independent agency in charge of establishing maximum regulated electricity prices for each of the distribution and transmission companies in the country. Theoretically, tariffs should be established every 5 years （with the exception of the first regulatory period, which was foreseen to last 10 years）, and are part of the concession contracts signed by the distribution companies. ENRE enjoys a low degree of discretion in the regulation of distribution companies, because Law 24065 establishes the length of the regulatory period, the allowed rate of return and provides that remuneration of regulated companies will include an efficiency correction factor. The first regulatory period ended in September 2002 for distribution companies Edenor and Edesur and in December 2000 for Edelap, and the revision （including the submission of a proposal for the review of tariffs by the distributors to ENRE, seeking for approval）was initiated months before. In May 2000, ENRE communicated （by means of Resolution No.265）the timetable of the proposed revision. Other steps conducted in order to develop the tariff revision for the period 2002～2007 were ① the hiring by ENRE of a group of independent consultants to provide the regulator with an alternative proposal of distribution tariffs, that would be used together with the distributor’s proposal for the definitive resolution; ② the development of certain methodological aspects and certain issues related to tariff setting; ③ the establishment of the criteria that the distributors should follow in their tariff proposals. ·213· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China However, due to the economic crisis Argentina was suffering, the Economy Minister issued in 2002 Resolution No. 38, by which it required the regulators to interrupt any tariff revision process. Therefore, even if the regulation in Argentina assigns ENRE, as independent regulator, the power to define electricity distribution tariffs, and the legislation limits its discretion, the regulator is not completely free from the interference of the government. Transmission Tariff Setting in the US — The Role of FERC As established by the Department of Energy’s（DOE）Organization Act 1977, FERC regulates the remuneration of inter-state transmission companies. However, the Act does not set the method of regulation, the length of the regulatory period nor the allowed return allowed for the invested capital. The US legislation does not even establish the difference between “transmission” and “distribution” companies. The distinction between transmission and distribution companies was officially set by means of FERC Order 888, approved in 1996. Before its approval, transmission companies were normally defined only in terms of their nominal voltage. With Order 888, FERC developed a series of tests （ the Seven Factor Test ） to use in the determination of what facilities historically classified as transmission facilities could be reclassified as local distribution facilities and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Therefore, FERC seems to have a high degree of discretion in setting transmission revenues, however, precedents and an open process of consultation and public hearings reduce uncertainty for regulated companies. Transmission owners in the US have traditionally been subject to cost of service regulation and are allowed a certain return on equity in the form of a regional transmission tariff, determined by FERC. In some circumstances there is in addition a state jurisdictional component of that tariff set by state regulatory commissions. FERC has approval responsibility for transmission rate schedule for individual transmission companies but also for regional transmission organizations （ RTOs ） . Transmission companies and RTOs present their proposals to FERC for their approval. Transmission companies also propose the validity period of the proposed tariffs, even in cases when the process of creation of RTOs lead to several companies asking for shorter periods for transitional purposes. The regulation of transmission revenues has been modified in recent years, although its basis is still the Policy on Transmission Pricing issued in 1994 by FERC. The main changes were designed by FERC to achieve open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs （FERC Order 888, which also permits public utilities to seek recovery of stranded costs ·214· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China associated with providing open access）and to encourage the creation of RTOs（FERC Orders 888 and 2000）. Tariff Setting Powers and Regulatory Independence in India The electricity sector in India is currently regulated under “The Electricity Act, 2003”. This Act stipulated that there should be a Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions in each state. There is also provision for Joint Commissions between two or more Governments of States, where the states want it; or between Central Government, in respect of one or more Union territories, and one or more Governments of States. With regard to tariff setting, the Electricity Act., 2003 mandates that the Central Government shall prepare a Tariff Policy in consultation with the State Governments and the Central Electricity Authority. The law also requires that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission shall advise the Central Government on the Tariff Policy. The Act specifically mentions that tariffs be set according to the national tariff policy and allows a multi-year tariff principle. It emphasizes that the tariffs should progressively reflect the cost of service and that cross-subsidies have to be eliminated in a specified time frame. It also seeks to encourage generation of electricity from renewable sources of energy. With regard to tariff setting, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has the following powers: （1）To regulate the tariff of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government. （2）To regulate the tariff of generating companies other than those owned or controlled by the Central Government specified in clause（1）, if such generating companies enter into or otherwise have a composite scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State. （3）To determine tariff for inter-State transmission of electricity. Correspondingly, the State Electricity Regulatory Commissions have the following powers with regard to tariff setting: （1）Determine the tariff for generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity, wholesale, bulk or retail, as the case may be, within the State: Providing that where open access has been permitted to a category of consumers, the State Commission shall determine only the wheeling charges and surcharge thereon, if any, for the said category of consumers; （2）Regulate electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution licensees including the price at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies or licensees or from other sources through agreements for purchase of electricity for distribution and supply within the State. Subject to the national tariff policy and the policy guidelines issued by Central and State ·215· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Governments from time to time, the Central and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions have full independence on tariff setting. Tariff Setting Powers and Regulatory Independence in Russia In contrast to most of the other examples given, in Russia, there is no “independent regulation”. Tariffs are effectively controlled by the Government, and this lack of independence of tariff setting in Russia, is seen as a major weakness of the system, as tariffs remain a political issue. The Ministry of Economic Development & Trade continues to exercise strong control over the level of all tariffs as an important part of its management of the economy. In practice, therefore, the FTS（FEK）and the REKs are limited to determining and applying detailed methodologies to calculate the precise tariffs. A.2 Case Study 2: The Vertical Split of Regulatory Authority — India，the United States and Russia In this set of cases studies, we look at how regulatory responsibilities and powers are split vertically in three of the cases where there is a federal system. In Tables A.1 to A.4 we also review a fourth case where there is a federal form of government, Australia. However, the regulatory arrangements there are in the process of transition with greater powers now allocated to the centre, and it is not therefore reviewed here in detail. The Indian Case—Federal and State Structure During the year 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a new Act, the Electricity Act, 2003. This Act combined all the five or six existing Acts relating to electricity sector in India, in force at that time. The Electricity Act, 2003 envisages a co-ordinated approach towards the development of the Indian electricity system. At the highest level, the Central Government is required to specify the national electricity policy and national tariff policy, and the Central Electricity Authority is required to specify the national electricity plan. The national electricity policy and the national electricity plan broadly decide the sources of electricity generation keeping in view overall optimum resource realisation, environmental concerns, etc. The Act envisages establishment of a Central Commission and State Commissions in each State, who will discharge their functions according to the above electricity policy, tariff policy and electricity plan. The regulatory commissions are expected to promote efficiency, economy, competition and investment in the electricity sector in a transparent manner and formulate a rational tariff structure for different components of the electricity sector. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission: The Central Commission was set up in July 1998. It functions in a quasi-judicial manner, and has the powers of civil courts. The Central ·216· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Commission has the responsibility to discharge the following functions: （1）To regulate the tariff of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government. （2）To regulate the tariff of generating companies other than those owned or controlled by the Central Government specified in clause（1）, if such generating companies enter into or otherwise have a composite scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State. （3）To regulate the inter-State transmission of electricity. （4）To determine tariff for inter-State transmission of electricity. （5）To issue licenses to persons to function as transmission licensee and electricity trader with respect to their inter-State operations. （6）To adjudicate upon disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensee in regard to matters connected with clauses（1）to（4）above and to refer any dispute for arbitration. （7）To levy fees for the purposes of the Act. （8）To specify Grid Code having regard to Grid Standards. （9）To specify and enforce the standards with respect to quality, continuity and reliability of service by licensees. （10）To fix the trading margin in the inter-State trading of electricity, if considered, necessary. The Central Commission also advises the Central Government on ① formulation of national electricity policy and tariff policy; ② promotion of competition, efficiency and economy in activities of the electricity sector; ③ promotion of investment in electricity sector. State Electricity Regulatory Commissions: Most of the states in India, totalling to 28, have already set up State Electricity Regulatory Commissions. For smaller States and Union Territories, the Act formulates establishment of a Joint Commission for more than one States or between one or more States and Union Territories. These Commissions now assume most of the roles that the earlier State Governments were exercising on the State Electricity Boards, except formulation of policy guidelines. The State Commissions are required to perform the following functions: （ 1 ） Determine the tariff for generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity, wholesale, bulk or retail, as the case may be, within the State: Providing that where open access has been permitted to a category of consumers, the State Commission shall determine only the wheeling charges and surcharge thereon, if any, for the said category of consumers. ·217· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （2）Regulate electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution licensees including the price at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies or licensees or from other sources through agreements for purchase of electricity for distribution and supply within the State. （3）Facilitate intra-state transmission and wheeling of electricity. （4）Issue licences to persons seeking to act as transmission licensees, distribution licensees and electricity traders with respect to their operations within the State. （5）Promote cogeneration and generation of electricity from renewable sources of energy by providing suitable measures for connectivity with the grid and sale of electricity to any person, and also specify, for purchase of electricity from such sources, a percentage of the total consumption of electricity in the area of a distribution license. （6）Adjudicate upon the disputes between the licensees, and generating companies and to refer any dispute for arbitration. （7）Levy fee for the purposes of the Act. （8）Specify State Grid Code consistent with the National Grid Code. （9）Specify or enforce standards with respect to quality, continuity and reliability of service by licensees. （10）Fix the trading margin in the intra-State trading of electricity, if considered, necessary. The State Commissions also advise the State Governments on: ① promotion of competition, efficiency and economy in activities of the electricity sector; ② promotion of investment in electricity sector; ③ reorganization and restructuring of electricity sector in the State; ④ matters concerning generation, transmission, distribution and trading of electricity or any other matter referred to the State Commission by that Government. The Vertical Split of Regulatory Authority between the centre and states, as described above, is quite relevant to the political structure in India, and is seen as sensible. The Case of the US — Vertical Organisation Structure The United States has a federal constitution, and as such, some of the powers of the States that form part of the Federation have been delegated into a higher supra-state organisation. This is the case of some aspects of the regulation of utilities in general and of electricity sector companies in particular. The Public Utility Holding Company Act（PUHCA）and the Federal Power Act（FPA） of 1935 established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gave specific and separate powers to the states and the federal government. This fact leads to the coexistence of two levels of electricity regulator bodies: a federal ·218· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China regulator（FERC）and state regulators（the Public Utility Commissions）. The current structure of the regulation of electricity utilities in the US is a consequence of the developments of regulation that occurred during the last two centuries: state regulatory commissions began to develop in the 1830s and increased in number and power in the 1870s. These commissions combined legislative, judicial and administrative authorities and made possible a more comprehensive and flexible regulation of public utilities. The number of state commissions grew rapidly after 1907 and by 1920 more than two-thirds of the states had created regulatory commissions. The Public Utility Commissions of each state have joined to form the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners（NARUC）, as a non-profit organisation whose objectives are “the advancement of commission regulation through the study and discussion of subjects concerning the operation and supervision of public utilities and carriers, the promotion of uniformity of regulation of public utilities and carriers by the several commissions, the promotion of coordinated action by the commissions of the several States to protect the common interests of the people with respect to the regulation of public utilities and carriers, and the promotion of cooperation of the commissions of the several States with each other and with the Federal commissions represented in the Association”（article II, NARUC Constitution）. Therefore, the NARUC is not a regulatory body, but a think-tank and a coordination organisation. The first federal commission with regulatory powers was the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887. Federal regulation was expanded in the 1930s when much of the regulatory responsibility shifted from the states to the federal government. In 1935 the Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, was empowered to regulate interstate sales of electricity, and in 1938 it was expanded to govern the regulation of interstate natural gas sales. In most cases, the federal government regulates the transmission of goods and services between states or regions, while the state or local agencies regulate the flow of goods and services within the state. In some instances, the distinction is also made between retail and wholesale pricing such as in the case of FERC, which regulates the wholesale rates of electricity, while the state and local agencies regulate the retail rates. The division of powers in electricity regulation. FERC regulates interstate transmission, sale of electricity for resale and mergers, while state public utility commissions regulate generation, distribution, service and prices to end-users, transmission siting and environmental concerns. The functions of the federal regulator are listed in the Department of Energy’s（DOE） （Jurisdiction of Organization Act.1977, which creates FERC, and in particular in section 7172 ·219· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Commission）. This article refers to other regulations, such as the Federal Power Act（FPA） 1935 for the case of transmission pricing, which provides that “it is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters relating to generation to the extent provided and of that part of such business which consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States”（FPA Declaration of Policy）. The DOE Act also defines the relationships between the federal regulator and the states’ regulators. In particular, it establishes that “whenever any proposed action by the Department conflicts with the energy plan of any State, the Department shall give due consideration to the needs of such State, and where practicable, shall attempt to resolve such conflict through consultations with appropriate State officials. Nothing […] shall affect the authority of any （DOE Act 1977, Declaration of Findings State over matters exclusively within its jurisdiction” and Purposes）. The Energy Policy Act（EPACT）of 1992 further clarified the relationship between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utilities commissions. Under the Act, FERC would have complete jurisdiction over the wholesale electricity marketplace while electricity competition at the retail level would remain within the jurisdiction of the state public utilities commissions. In relation to mergers, the powers of FERC are shared with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The relations between both levels of regulation of the electricity sector in the US, federal and state, are summarised in the following figure. The Russian Case — Federal and Local Structures In Russia, the Federal Tariffs Service（previously the Federal Energy Commission – FEK）is responsible for regulating all inter-region and cross-region tariffs – transmission lines, （typically very large condensing stations） generator tariffs for so-called “Federal stations” plus nuclear stations and major hydro stations. It also establishes limits （ to apply policy objectives）on the end-user tariffs that the Regional Energy Commissions（REKs）can set. The REKs set the end-user tariffs that can be charged by integrated （ generation, distribution and supply）regional electricity companies（called Energos）. The capability and objectivity of REKs varies significantly between regions, but all REKs are subjected to conflicting pressures: （1）From the Energos, the pressure is to increase tariffs to cover costs – especially in ·220· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China view of the recent significant increases in fuel costs; （2）From the Regional Government, the pressure is to keep tariffs for the population low for social and political reasons; Figure A.1 The Vertical Split of Electricity Regulators in the US Figure A. 2 Organisation Chart of OFGEM, Great Britain （Source: Ofgem’s web page） （3）From local industries, the pressure is to reduce the level of cross-subsidies and hence their tariffs. The level of cross-subsidy in Russia is very substantial, and is likely to prove to be the greatest obstacle to electricity sector reform. There are estimates that in some cases the tariffs for the population need to increase by 6 times, in order to cover costs. ·221· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Larger industrial consumers are moving away from buying their electricity from the regional Energos, and are either buying direct from the Federal Wholesale market or are building their auto-generation plant — especially if they have a requirement for process steam. The level of auto-generation construction would be even greater if more gas supply could be assured. As a consequence of this shift in the buying pattern of industrial consumers, the regional Energos are finding it more and more difficult to cover their costs and the REKs are having to face up to economic realities. Figure A.3 Organisation Chart of FERC, USA （Source: FERC’s web page） Figure A.4 Organisation Chart of NVE, Norway ·222· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （Source: NVE’s web page） Organisation Chart of FTS, Russia Figure A.5 ·223· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China ·224· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China In the short term, the establishment of the REKs has made it much more difficult to apply centrally determined policies on tariff reform, in particular removing cross-subsidies. In the longer term, the REKs are expected to play a key role in educating the local population on the need for tariffs to cover costs – and potentially in supporting the implementation of the social support mechanisms necessary to accompany tariff reform. Figure A.6 Organisation Chart of ENRE, Argentina （Source: ENRE’s web page） Figure A.7 Organisation Chart of CERC, India （Source: CERC’s web page） ·225· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Figure A.8 Organisation Chart of CNE, Spain （Source: CNE’s web page） Figure A.9 Organisation Chart of ANEEL, Brazil （Source: NERA elaboration from ANEEL’s web page） ·226· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Figure A.10 Organisation Chart of AER, Australia （Source: AER’s web site） ·227· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Appendix B Detailed Review of the Current Situation in the Chinese Electricity Sector B.1 Overview of the Sector Recent decades have seen very substantial growth in energy use and electricity use in China, and this is expected to continue, as Table B.1 shows. Table B.1 Primary Energy Demand in China （Unit: Mtoe） Year Energy type 1971 2002 2010 2030 2002～2030 Coal 192 713 904 1354 2.3％ Oil 43 247 375 636 3.4％ Gas 3 36 59 158 5.4％ Nuclear 0 7 21 73 9.0％ Hydro 3 25 33 63 3.4％ Biomass and waste 164 216 227 236 0.3％ Other renewables 0 0 5 20 - Total 405 1242 1622 2539 2.6％ Source: International Energy Agency（IEA）: World Energy Outlook 2004, Paris, 2004, table 8.6, p. 264. Growth in electricity generation capacity has also shown substantial growth, as Table B.2 shows for the recent period. Table B.3 shows the breakdown of the generating capacity, both by region and by fuel type, for 2005. Table B.2 Generation Capacity by Fuel Type （Unit：10 thousand kW） Year Energy type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Hydro 7297 7935 8301 8607 9490 10524 11650 Thermal 22343 23751 25301 26555 28977 32948 38413 Nuclear 210 210 210 447 619 684 685 Others 0 36 37 48 55 82 93 ·228· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Total 29877 31932 33849 35657 39141 44239 50814 Source: CIECC. Table B.3 Total Installed Capacity（2005） （Unit: 10 thousand kW） Region Total Hydro-power Thermal-power Nuclear-power Others Total 50847 11652 38414 685 96 North China Grid 9320 275 9043 0 2 Beijing 492 106 384 0 2 Tianjin 617 1 616 0 0 Hebei 2187 85 2102 0 0 Shanxi 2298 78 2220 0 0 Shandong 3726 5 3721 0 0 North East China Grid 5625 660 4935 0 30 Liaoning 1757 140 1602 0 15 Jiling 1026 377 639 0 10 Heilongjiang 1252 85 1162 0 5 Inner Mongolia 1590 58 1532 0 0 East China Grid 12303 1599 10382 307 15 Shanghai 1302 0 1302 0 0 Jiangsu 4326 14 4306 0 6 Zhejiang 3749 701 2738 307 3 Anhui 1189 74 1115 0 0 Fujian 1737 810 921 0 6 Central China Grid 10793 4770 6022 0 1 Henan 2848 256 2592 0 0 Hubei 2747 1795 951 0 1 Hunan 1498 780 718 0 0 Jiangxi 900 280 620 0 0 Sichuan 2296 1495 801 0 0 Chongqing 504 164 340 0 0 North West Grid 3667 1198 2438 0 31 Shanxi 1072 188 884 0 0 Gansu 985 395 576 0 14 Qinghai 531 442 89 0 0 Ningxia 422 37 381 0 4 Xinjiang 657 136 508 0 13 South China Grid 9095 3109 5591 378 17 Guangdong 4800 873 3533 378 16 Guangxi 1075 592 483 0 0 Yunnan 1320 861 459 0 0 Guizhou 1688 725 963 0 0 Hainan 212 58 153 0 1 ·229· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Other （Tibet,etc） 44 41 3 0 0 Note: All data from other reliable resources. Source: CIECC. The growth in the sector is expected to continue, and Table B.4 provides a recent forecast of the expected growth in total generation and in the mix. Table B.5 provides a corresponding forecast in terms of generating capacity. Table B.4 Forecast: Electricity-Generation Mix in China （Unit: TWh） Year Energy type 1971 2002 2010 2030 2002～2030 Coal 98 1293 2030 2910 4035 Oil 16 50 59 65 53 Gas 0 17 55 196 315 Nuclear 0 25 82 180 280 Hydro 30 288 383 578 734 Biomass and Waste 0 2 31 58 84 Other renewables 0 0 13 31 72 Total 144 1675 2653 4018 5573 Source: International Energy Agency（IEA）: World Energy Outlook 2004, Paris, 2004, table 8.7, p. 268. In parallel with the growth in generating capacity, transmission capacity has also grown, and Table B.5 shows the breakdown on capacity in 2004.But in comparison with 2004 the totals for 2005 were: 500kV, 62866km; 330kV, 13059km; and 220kV, 177617 km; plus 141km of 750kV line. Table B.5 Transmission Lines in 2005 （Unit:km） 110kV Total 750kV 500kV 330kV 220kV 35kV (including 66kV) Total 973596 141 62866 13059 177617 339587 380327 North China Grid 154714 11826 30732 45645 66512 Beijing 8000 896 2208 2721 2176 Tianjin 7394 524 1727 2136 3007 Hebei 50363 4064 9188 15798 21313 Shanxi 33425 3062 6635 10118 13610 Shandong 55532 3279 10975 14872 26406 North-east China Grid 126600 8546 33709 68360 15985 Liaoning 34037 2923 9295 21794 25 Jilin 23125 1213 6752 15086 76 Heilongjiang 35616 1999 7941 13975 11701 Inner Mongolia 33822 2411 9722 17505 4183 East China Grid 162149 13525 34962 45988 67674 Shanghai 7125 577 2201 725 3622 Jiangsu 56784 6335 12591 15923 21935 Zhejiang 37847 3696 8661 11661 13829 ·230· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Anhui 32141 1566 6213 8144 16218 Fujian 28252 1351 5297 9535 12070 Central China Grid 233028 13568 50 41423 74642 103344 Henan 43618 2057 50 8392 14171 18948 续表 B.5 110kV Total 750kV 500kV 330kV 220kV 35kV (including 66kV) Hubei 41922 4629 7634 13524 16134 Hunan 50232 1913 8304 16119 23896 Jiangxi 26166 704 5185 8064 12211 Sichuan 19487 1279 3417 6597 8194 Chongqing 51603 2986 8490 16167 23961 North-west Grid 112575 141 13009 7162 42481 49782 Shanxi 27935 4557 825 12152 10401 Gansu 33765 128 4955 1189 11511 15983 Qinghai 10323 13 2227 4688 3395 Ningxia 8898 1270 1838 3207 2582 Xinjiang 31654 3310 10923 17421 South China Grid 172984 7639 29429 60811 75105 Guangdong 49246 3575 11550 22270 11851 Guangxi 38117 644 5996 8864 22613 Yunnan 46417 1880 5415 14132 24990 Guizhou 33239 1539 5194 13195 13311 Hainan 5965 1274 2350 2340 Tibet 3584 1660 1924 Trans-region 7961 7762 200 Source: CIECC. Taking together these overview data on the Chinese electricity sector, it is clear that the sector is in technical terms one of the leading electricity sectors in the world, but also faces major expansion and the need for very substantial capital investment. This situation further emphasises the need for efficient legal, institutional, and regulatory arrangements. B.2 Reform Plans The State Council Notification on Power Sector Reform Document No5, 2002, provided for the setting up of the SERC, and also laid out the guiding principles and objectives of the reform. The main structural elements of the proposed reforms in the plan are: （1）Separation of generation from the network activities — this has been completed at the state level, with the separation of generation assets owned by former State Power Corporation from network activities to create independent generating company. The grid ·231· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China company still owns or held the share of some regulating electricity plants, such as hydro-electricity plant, pump storage electricity plant. These electricity plants will not participate in the biding market at present. （2）Generation assets owned by the State Power Corporation（SPC）to be separated in 4～5 generation companies, with the condition that the share of installed capacity in the hands of each generation company should not generally exceed 20％ within each regional electricity system - this has been completed. （3）A state grid company（to be wholly state owned）will be established and become the owner of the SPC grid assets, and the SPC will be dismissed. It will be responsible for inter-regional trading and for operation and development of inter-regional grids—the creation of this new company has been completed. （4）Six regional grid companies will be established（corresponding to the six regions mentioned in section 1 above）as joint stock companies, with responsibility for ownership, maintenance, and operation of the grid assets in their regions. The provincial companies will become branches or subsidiaries of the regional companies — this has been completed. The regional grid companies presently have not been established as joint stock companies; five of them now are solely owned by the State Grid Company（SGC）, and will be reformed to joint stock companies in the future. （5）The regional grid companies will be responsible for development and operation of regional grids, dispatch, and fostering of electricity markets—this development has been started, but much work remains to be done especially on creation of regional electricity markets. （6）The regional grid companies will be permitted to own distribution assets during the th 10 plan period, but will be required to achieve accounting separation between transmission and distribution—this remains to be done, with little if any progress in development of accounting separation. （7）That after completion of other reform measures, the separation of transmission from distribution should be gradually piloted and implemented, and competition introduced at the retail level - this remains to be done. （8）Electricity trading centres will be established within the jurisdiction of the regional grid companies, and generators will be expected to bid to be dispatched—this remains to be done. The Plan document also specified that the national grid company, the regional grid companies, and electricity generation companies should be established within about one year. The SGC, China Southern Grid Company（CSG）, and the electricity generation companies were established in Dec 2002. The other regional grid companies were established in 2003. ·232· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China B.3 Progress with Unbundling As noted above, the four main structural separations envisaged for the near term have been completed: （1）Separation of transmission from generation. （2）Creation of a State grid company to promote inter-regional trading. （3）Priority of regions over provinces — six regional grid companies now created. （4）Five national generating companies. Plans are underway for the eventual separation of distribution assets. A pilot is envisaged to test consumer choice for large consumers; however the development of electricity markets and bidding systems is still in a demonstration stage. Although all the new generation and grid companies have been created, they all remain majority state owned and under the direct ownership and control of the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission（SASAC）, which is currently responsible for 189 large State-owned Companies, including SGC and the five electricity generating groups. B.3.1 Generation Five generating groups have been established out of the State owned electricity plants, including Huaneng Power Group, Datang Power Group, Huadian Power Group, Guodian Power Group, and China Power Investment Group. The generating capacity controlled by these companies is around 32GW, more or less. This is less than half of all generating plant in China, the rest being controlled by more than 40 generating investment companies owned by local governments, and more than 30 companies with the stock market listings, as well as foreign investment companies and private companies. Most of the generating companies are Limited Liability Companies and Joint Stock Limited Companies with diversified investors. It is stated in “Electricity law” that the government encourages, and inducts domestic and foreign economy organizations and individuals to invest in generation and establish generating companies according to the law. At present, the generation owned by non-state-owned companies is understood to be about 8％of total capacity. B.3.2 Transmission Six regional electricity grid companies have now been established, for Northern China, North eastern China, Eastern China , Central China, Southern China, and North-western China, as envisaged in the Plan. All except the Southern Grid Company are subsidiaries of the State Grid Company; the Southern Grid Company remains a separate state-owned enterprise. The characteristics of these regional companies are summarised at the end of this sub-section. Tibet’s electricity company now is an independent company, but the SGC is responsible for its operation on behalf of the owners. It is clear therefore that there has been ·233· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China significant separation of transmission from generation. 1 At present, the provincial grid company remains as the single buyer to purchase electricity from the generators within the province and other provincial grid companies. On regional electricity markets, the regional grid company and the provincial companies are all purchasers. This puts the grid company in the position of being the scheduling and dispatch agent, as well as the purchaser of electricity. These two functions need to be separated, since there is an intrinsic conflict of interest. The（Regional）Grid companies we visited during our Inception visit complained that they have no separate source of revenue, other than the difference between what they purchase（at the grid tariff）and what they sell（at the retail tariff rate）. Clearly they need a cost-based transmission tariff. Under each regional grid company（and owned and controlled by the respective regional grid companies）there are a number of provincial electricity companies which own and operate the transmission lines. The law guarantees open access to the transmission wires, but virtually nobody takes advantage of this provision at present. In the trial project for the big consumers to purchase electricity from generator that is under way at present, the problem of the access to transmission wires and related price has been raised. Northern China Within this area there is mainly thermal generation, and the grid consists of two parts: Northern China region and Shandong. The main load centres are located in Beijing, Tianjin and Tangshan city. Shangdong is an isolated provincial grid with pure thermal generation and maintains its own supply and demand balance without any energy trade with other areas. In the region, the Northern China grid is made up Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan grids, Shan’xi provincial grid, Southern Hebei grid and western Mongolia grid hooking up to the 500kV main electricity grid skeleton. The Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan grid is a 500kV circuits grid centred on Beijing-Tianjin, and it interconnects Shan’xi provincial grid, Southern Heibei grid, and western Mongolia grid. North-eastern China The North-eastern regional electricity grid includes Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang provincial grids, and eastern Mongolia grid with load center locateed south of the region. The main energy flows in the grid are from west to east, and from north to south. The North-eastern regional grid is interconnected with the Northern regional grid, with transfers of East China is the biggest power grid with 96970 MW Generation capacity by the end of 2004. In fact it is probably the largest power grid in the world. ·234· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China energy mainly occurring from the former to the latter. Eastern China There are five provincial electricity grids in the Eastern China region: （1）Jiangsu； （2）Zhejiang； （3）An’hui； （4）Fujian； （5）Shanghai provincial（city） . Its supply area covers the most developed region in China and load focuses on the Changjiang River Delta area. The Eastern regional electricity grid has a strong main skeleton, with two circuits looking like a figure“8”at 500 kV level completed in 2002, which hooked up the Central China regional electricity grid by Gezhouba and the Three-gorges transmission projects. Yangcheng electricity plant in Shanxi outside of the region is connected to the grid through a HVDC link through which it delivers energy to the region. Central China This regional company includes the Central China electricity grid and Sichuan-Chongqing electricity grid. Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi provincial electricity grids are part of the Central China electricity grid. The Sichuan-Chongqing electricity grid is connected with the Central China HVAC grid via the Three-Gorges transmission project. There is a larger proportion of hydro generating plant than in other regions, and it exports electricity to Eastern and Southern China from the Gezhouba Hydro Plant. The Central China regional electricity grid has been connected up with Southern China regional electricity grid and enhanced interconnection with Eastern China because of the Three-Gorges transmission project. Southern China The Southern China regional electricity grid is linked with Hong Kong and Macao, and includes five provincial grids: （1）Guangdong； （2）Guangxi； （3）Guizhou； （4）Yunnan； （5）Hainan. ·235· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Hainan is still isolated from the main grid, but the other four are connected to the grid. The main load centres are located in the Zhujiang River delta in the region and energy flows from the west to Guangdong by two HVAC circuits and a HVDC circuit. Exports are expected to reach 7000 MW by the end of 2005. North-western China The North-western regional electricity grid is made up Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang provincial grids. There is substantial thermal generation in the eastern part of the grid, and hydro in west, and together these form an integrated electricity system. B.3.3 Distribution The provincial electricity companies continue to operate their local transmission and distribution networks, and remain responsible for supplying electricity to the end consumers through their branch local companies. They have monopolies over distribution and electricity sales within those areas. This is based on the provisions of the 1996 Electricity Law. There has been no progress towards the physical separation of the distribution activities from transmission activities in the provinces, though accounting separation is to be introduced gradually. We understand that the Ministry of Finance is currently studying the accounting rules for the allocation of costs, but that no official document about it has yet been issued. There are no provisions for third-party access on distribution networks, and distributors have no obligations to provide system service to others. This will need to be changed if retail competition is ever introduced for customers below the transmission level. B.4 Electricity Tariffs B.4.1 The Current Tariff Position B.4.1.1 Generator Tariffs Currently, all the generators connected to the grid sell their energy at a “tariff” that is determined by the pricing authorities, generally at the time the plant was built. Originally, these tariffs were set on the basis of: （1）A single per-kWh price for the plant’s output, based on a minimum number of operating hours for the plant, over which fixed costs would be recovered; （2）Depreciation of capital costs over a relatively short timescale, with the tariffs then reduced at the end of that time. Historically, these tariffs have come to be regarded as equivalent to “contracts” for the lives of the plant. However, over the last few years, there have been two changes to these basic arrangements and these appear to diminish the reliance that can be placed on the tariffs as quasi-contracts: ·236· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （1）For new generators, the assumed plant life has been lengthened, so that capital costs are recovered over a longer period; （2）In some cases the tariffs for existing plants have been increased to reflect the significant rise in the price of coal; （ 3 ） Because the shortage has resulted in increased running hours, ad hoc price adjustments were applied for output above the minimum hours level. More recently, the NDRC has promulgated a new pricing document（understood to be dated 15 June 2004）that changes the basis for new generator prices, unifies the price for the new capacity in the regional grid, and set up one standard of price for each province. It is still based on the concept of “normal” generating hours for each plant, but specifically provides for a lower price for output above those hours, based on plant marginal costs. Alongside these tariff arrangements, newly-developing trading arrangements mean that generators have a further potential source of revenue, other than selling direct to the regional grid company. There is no specific provision for these revenues in the arrangements existing up to now, though it is understood that these trading arrangements（for example in the case of the East China monthly market）effectively impose a price cap on bids by generators. Regarding actual tariff levels, different tariffs applied for different types of generators, the 2005 figures being: （1）Nuclear generators had an average tariff of around 0.41 yuan/kWh. （2）Thermal generators had an average tariff of around 0.36 yuan/kWh. （3）Hydro generators had an average tariff of around 0.30 yuan/kWh. B.4.1.2 End User （Retail）Tariffs The average retail tariff across the country was 0.50 yuan/kWh in 2005, with a tendency for higher tariffs in the east and lower in the west. Examples of the different tariffs that applied in different provinces in 2005 are: （1）The average end-user tariffs in Hainan, Shanghai, and Guangdong are relatively higher than other provinces, and reach above 0.6 yuan/kWh. （2）The average end-user tariffs in Guizhou and Qinghai are relative lower than other provinces, at around 0.35 yuan/kWh. Even within provinces, retail prices varied significantly between different categories of consumer. For example, in 2002 the averages for different customer categories were: （1）Commercial 0.7 yuan/kWh. （2）Non-residential lighting 0.6 yuan/kWh. （3）Non-general industry 0.45 yuan/kWh. （4）Residential, and large industrial 0.4 yuan/kWh. ·237· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （5）Agriculture 0.33 yuan/kWh. （6）Irrigation and drainage consumers in poor counties 0.16 yuan/kWh. On the basis of this data, it seems clear that the prices for residential, agricultural, and irrigation and drainage consumers are somewhat lower than could be justified on the basis of costs. There are, in effect, cross subsidies between user classes. Other features of these retail tariffs are: （1）At present, there exist time-of-day tariffs for the larger consumers in some area, but time-of–day tariffs have not been in operation more broadly. Neither is there any pricing based specifically on interruptability of supplies; （2）There is no provision for any retail prices to change in response to the pricing signals that arise from the developing trading arrangements. B.4.1.3 Use of Grid System Tariffs Up to now there are no specific use of system tariffs in use, either for the transmission or the distribution systems. In effect the grid “tariff ” is the residual revenue that is left from receipts from sales to consumers after payments to generators have been made. Overall, we understand that the effect of these tariffs means that, in 2002, generating companies received around 66％, and the grid companies 34％ of total revenues. It was generally agreed by the companies we spoke to that these arrangements yield revenues that are not adequate to operate and maintain the current system, and do not provide adequate revenues for system expansion. B.4.1.4 Expectations on Future Pricing Structures The general trends in pricing that are expected in the near term（that is within the next 12 months）are: （1）Generation price tariffs are expected to continue to rise to some degree, with differences between provinces, due to the recent rapid increase in demand and continuing high prices of fuel, especially coal; （2）The average level of the retail tariff will go up, though with variations by different seasons and different hours. This is because in the past the generating cost occupied a larger portion of the retail price, while the portion for grid was limited, but this is now expected to change on the basis of new policy on tariffs that will allow grid company profits to increase; （3）The structure of retail tariffs is also expected to change, as part of a policy to make major adjustments to bring consumer prices more into line with costs. For the longer term, officials from NDRC told us that they envisage that the change to a government determined capacity price and a market determined energy price is intended only for the transition. In the longer term, both elements could be determined by the market. ·238· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China B.4.2 Price Regulation Powers and Procedures The existing Price laws of the PRC specify that the governmental price department of the State Council（SC）is the legal agency primarily responsible for price management and supervision. Consistent with this, it is clear from several parts of Doc 7 that SERC has a relatively limited role in price regulation, and details of this were given in Issues Paper 5. B.4.2.1 The Price Approval Process The National Development & Reform Commission（NDRC）has been responsible up to now for setting, checking, ratifying and establishing electricity price, as well as looking over and inspecting the implementation of electricity price. Its responsibilities on electricity price regulation have included checking and ratifying the generation price, checking and ratifying the provincial list sale price, and checking and ratifying all electric add-ons and construction fund. This NDRC regulation operates through a tiered system where: （1）In general the enterprise would submit the price application to the local pricing bureau, which would co-ordinate it and pass it to the upper level pricing bureau for approval. （2）The provincial pricing bureau would apply to the NDRC for approval. As noted in Issues Paper 5, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission（SERC）may: （ 1 ） Give its suggestion on electricity pricing adjustment to governmental price management department. （2）Supervise and inspect the related electricity price for enforcement purposes. It is understood that there is a plan of pricing reform that has been prepared and approved by the State Council, but so far only the retail price components are implemented. It is also understood that it is the responsibility of NDRC to carry out this implementation. B.4.2.2 Process Issues On our current understanding of the situation with regard to price regulation powers and processes, there seem some significant inconsistencies with the existing price regulation arrangements, in that: （1）The NDRC continues to have the lead responsibility for pricing in the electricity sector, although it is not a regulatory organisation that specialises in electricity sector issues; （2）SERC has other responsibilities for which pricing is a key issue, and where its inability to make decisions on pricing could introduce serious difficulties in exercising these other responsibilities. B.5 The Electricity Sector Context In considering the development of markets and competition, it is important to emphasise ·239· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China the current context of the electricity sector. In the last few years, China faced a serious electricity shortage. The gap between supply and demand continued to widen, so that in 2004 the shortage of electricity was much more serious than in 2003. The gap between supply and demand in 2004 is estimated to be 30 GW at the peak period in summer, and about 26 provinces were expected to experience electricity shortages. Because of this situation, we understand that the government believes that bid-based markets would inevitably lead to high generation prices; if the retail price were not allowed to increase, （as happened in California） the grid company, as single buyer, would be bankrupt . If the price increases were passed to customers, this would not be fair, and the generators would just get rich.This means that the electricity shortage became a significant obstacle for the implementation of electricity sector reform. We were, however, assured several times by different groups that the shortages are mainly due to bad planning decisions in central government. This occurred in the period 1997～1999, when GNP growth faltered and the State Planning Department decide to reduce the expansion of thermal generating capacity. Excess generating capacity at that time, along with contracts or tariff arrangements that guaranteed 5000 hours running, led to a policy of encouraging consumer expenditures on electricity–using equipment. So as soon as the GNP growth resumed, shortages became evident. We were also told that availability of capital for investment is not the problem — metaphors referring to new plants being like “mushrooms” and “Bamboo shoots” indicate how fast new plants are springing up all over east China. We were told that generators think the approval procedure should be simplified and the process should be speeded up. But because the provincial governments prefer that the generation capacity should be invested and constructed by the larger electricity companies with abundant construction and operation experience on large units, at the moment most new capacity is invested by the State-owned generating companies or the listed stock companies controlled by them. There are very few private investors participating in the market, though some are involved indirectly by purchasing the share of the listed stock companies. Because the market rules are not clear and there exists some uncertainty over future policy, there few foreign investors participating in the market. B.6 Plans for Development of Trading Arrangements As noted above, the State Council’s reform plan envisaged the development of trading arrangements as part of the reform: 2 Note that when we refer to trading arrangements we refer to short-term arrangements for trading of physical electricity. We use the term market arrangements to refer to the wider set of arrangements that includes contracting for electricity (both physical and financial) and for sales direct to consumers. ·240· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （1）At the state level, the state grid company would be responsible for inter-region trading. In many ways this is the most important current activity, since moving large quantities of electricity from one region to another, at a fair price, is most likely to increase the overall efficiency of the electric system; （2）At the regional level, trading arrangements would be under the auspices of the regional grid companies; The market model of regional electricity market is under examination, and SERC is responsible for deciding the market model taking account of the detailed feature of the regional system. （3）That generators will bid for dispatch, that trading would be developed around dispatch centers, and that this will be developed under the auspices of the regional grid companies. （4）The price paid to the generators（the “on grid price”）would include two kinds of arrangements, in one arrangement price consists of a government-determined fixed capacity price and a market determined energy price; and with the other kind of arrangement there is single energy price. （5）That by the end of the 10th plan period （that is the end of 2005）, the main generation companies in each region should participate in bidding for dispatch. SERC has issued a document entitled “Instructions for Establishing Regional Electricity Markets”; also there are demonstration bidding systems in place in East China and in North Eastern China, operating simulations on a monthly basis, but without settlement and without dispatching based on the schedule produced by bidding system. It seems to us that there is some confusion about the role of these “markets”（which in our terminology we refer to as “trading arrangements”）and how they should interact with the generator tariffs, and with the dispatch. It is also not clear whether their role is being integrated with the other structural things that need to be done to make a market workable such as demand responsiveness, problems of free entry to the market, and so on. There is also confusion as to how the price in these trading arrangements would relate to the tariffs. B.7 Progress to Date In this section, we review our understanding of the current situation with the development of electricity trading. We begin first with system operation and then with operation of the trading arrangements. B.7.1 System Operation In general, the State Grid Company is responsible for system operation on a nation-wide basis, except in the Southern electricity system, in which the Southern grid company is responsible for the system operation. Thus, it is the state grid company that acts as system ·241· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China operator and the single buyer. It operates the grid, and is responsible scheduling and dispatching, as well as purchase and sale of electricity. As noted above, under each regional grid company, there are several provincial electricity companies who own and operate the transmission lines and distribution networks. In the aspect system operation, “the Regulation of net work dispatching and management” which was issued in 1993, sets out the power and duties of the dispatching centres, central and provincial government, related generation companies and grid companies, as well as consumers. The main principle of dispatching in these regulations is called “integrated management, operated in five levels”. This means there are five levels of dispatching centre, with their own ranges, powers, and duties, including state level, regional level, provincial level, city level and county level. In practice, the dispatching centre creates a schedule based on the load forecast and the amount of generation allocated to the generators by the government（the provincial economic and trading commissions）. There has never been a general principle of merit order dispatch （dispatch in order of unit marginal costs）in China, although it is almost universal elsewhere. It is not clear quite what is being optimised by the system schedulers, or how the allocation of generator hours is arrived at. At present, most of the generators have signed contracts with the grid company called “Agreement on connection to the grid”. In this contract, there are some terms to stipulate the obligations for the generators to follow the instructions of the grid operator. In general, there are no other code or rules in respect of dispatch procedures, other than the 1993 Regulations and the connection agreement, though each regional and provincial electricity system has its own dispatching rules. B.7.2 Electricity Trading At the present time, electricity trading in China is mainly carried out under the direction of the government. This means that the government approves the prices and allocates the amount of generation among generators. Only some trading involving small quantities of energy takes place, and this is on the basis of bilateral negotiation, mainly in the form of trading between two provincial electricity companies. No special treatment is given to the issues of transmission losses or ancillary services. However, SERC is now developing regional electricity markets, and two regional electricity markets, the North-eastern China and the Eastern China regional markets are under simulation this year. These arrangements are described in more detail below. B.7.2.1 Trading within Provinces At present, most of the trading that takes place is between the generators and the provincial electricity companies, which act as single buyers and own most of transmission and ·242· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China part of distribution grids within the province. Basically the yearly and monthly amounts of the trades are determined by the provincial government（the economic and trade commissions）, and the daily schedule of generation is made by the provincial electricity company in a way consistent with the limit. B.7.2.2 Trading between Provinces Usually the electricity trading between provinces is arranged by the relevant provincial electricity companies and the regional grid company. Inter-regional trading is arranged by the relevant regional grid company and the state grid company. Up to now, there are only a few generators that sell electricity outside their own regions, and this needs the approval from the （NDRC）. But the planned development of major projects in the west will involve enormous increases in inter regional flows, as the Three Gorges Dam already has. B.7.2.3 Prices, Periods, and Meters At present, the prices for trading need the approval from the relevant pricing bureau. In the planned regional markets, it is expected that the trading arrangement would be organized through centralised bidding and despatch arrangements. Most of the existing electricity trading takes place on a yearly or monthly basis, with a very small part of electricity trading on an hourly basis in some regions. We understand that this hourly trading is mainly trading between provincial electricity companies, and some trading between regional electricity companies, who negotiate such trading within short time scales according to their needs. The newly established regional electricity market in the East and North-east are still under simulation, with no daily bidding or actual settlement. B.7.2.4 The Proposed Trading Arrangements in the Eastern and North-eastern Regions It is understood that for the competitive electricity markets（trading arrangements） planned to be established in the Eastern and North-eastern regions the current simulation is on the basis of monthly bidding, and that the generators would be equipped with hourly meters to support the market operation. It is also understood that the trading arrangement would take account of constraints in the transmission grid. That means that plants that would be constrained on or constrained off for special locational reasons would be dealt with specially within the trading arrangements. It is also understood that in the planned regional electricity markets, the impact of transmission losses would be considered when arranging the trades based on bidding prices, and that there would be loss factors to take account of these. For ancillary services, it is understood from SERC Document No.21 that in the proposed new arrangements these would fall into two categories: obligatory services that must be provided by the generators; and commercial services that are provided in return for cost recover or payment of a“market”price. ·243· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China B.7.3 Retail Competition At present, no choice of supplier is available for consumers, SERC and NDRC recently issued a document“Temporary management rules for the big consumers purchase electricity from generators directly” . This stated some general principles and goals for pilot projects of this sort, but contained no detailed plan for the progress. A pilot project with a single large customer is planned to begin in Jilin province. B.8 Regulation of the Regional Sectors and the Market Arrangements It is clear from what was noted earlier, that SERC now has the central responsibility for regulation of electricity markets throughout China. Specifically, under State Council Document No.5, SERC has responsibility for: （1）Developing wholesale markets, including for drawing-up the overall development plans for electricity markets, proposing market designs for regional electricity exchanges, and deciding electricity exchange arrangements. （2）Monitoring electricity market operations to ensure orderly and fair competition, regulating transmission, distribution and non-competitive generation businesses. （3）Issuing business licenses for companies operating in the electricity sector. SERC’s Document No.21 is an important start to this process, as it sets out the basic framework for regional market development. The main limit on SERC’s existing regulatory powers is in respect of pricing. Under existing laws, it is the government pricing authority（NDRC）that determines tariffs, though SERC has responsibility for reviewing tariff levels and proposing tariff adjustments. The SERC does, however, have specific responsibility for deciding fees and charges for ancillary services. ·244· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China Appendix C Elaboration of Key Features of Effective Regulation As noted on Chapter 2, there is considerable agreement among specialists on the subject of the key features of good regulation. For example, there is close agreement between what is stated in a 1998 NERA report to the Asian Development Bank and a recent survey for the World Bank by Kessides（2003）, and on this basis we have identified the following criteria 3 that we believe define good regulation: （1）Clarity of roles and objectives. （2）Autonomy or independence. （3）Accountability. （4）Participation. （5）Transparency. （6）Predictability. （7）Proper regulatory capacity . We discuss each of these criteria in turn below. C.1 Clarity of Roles and Objectives This refers to the extent to which the responsibilities of the regulatory agency are clearly separated from those of policy-making bodies and from regulated companies. It includes issues such as: （1）Does the regulator have a coherent mandate? （2）Are the responsibilities of the regulatory agency clearly separated from those of policy making bodies and from regulated companies? （3）Whether and how far the primary legislation（e.g. the Electricity Act）sets out a clear definition of the regulator’s functions and duties. （4）How much power does the regulator have to enforce decisions? See also J.Stern and S.Holder, (1999) “Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems. An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia”, Utilities Policy, Vol. 8, pp.33-50. The term“capacity”refers to the volume of resources, particularly staff and professional staff available to the regulatory agency. ·245· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China （5）If not, whether these functions and duties are formally set out in legal instruments and/or other documents. （6）How clear it is on which issues the regulator has an advisory role（e.g.to the Minister）rather than a decision making role? （7）Whether there are any functions carried out jointly, or any that are ambiguous, between the regulator and those of the relevant Minister（s）. （8）Whether the legislation establishes unambiguously which entity is responsible for what regulatory functions. C.2 Autonomy This relates primarily to the degree of formal independence of the regulatory body and covers issues such as: （1）What the relationship is between the regulatory body and the government e.g. whether the regulator is: 1）A separate division of a Ministry; 2）A body independent of any Ministries; 3）A body independent of government, or some other. （2）How the decision making members of the regulatory body（e.g. commissioners, chairmen, board members, etc.）are appointed? （ 3 ） Whether and how decision making members of the regulatory body can be dismissed? （4）How the regulatory body is financed and who has to approve the funding? C.3 Accountability This relates primarily to the formal audit, reporting and appeals processes faced by the regulatory agency such as: （1）Whether there is a formal mechanism for regulated firms（or other parties）to challenge regulatory decisions? （2）Whether there is also a legal right of redress to the law courts e.g. over abuse of process by the regulatory agency? （ 3 ） To whom the regulatory body is formally accountable （ e.g. to government, parliament, courts） ? （4）Whether the regulator has to answer questions before parliament? （5）Whether the regulator can be dismissed for failing to fulfil his duties? （6）Whether there is a facility for judicial review under primary law? ·246· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China C.4 Participation This covers the degree to which parties with a legitimate interest in the outcome of regulatory decisions（e.g. regulated firms, large and small consumers, investors, etc.）are involved in the regulatory decision making process before and after the regulator makes its decisions. This covers issues such as: （1）Whether and how far the regulator formally involves regulated firms, other industry firms, consumers and others on: 1）Major decisions; 2）The proposed approach to taking major decisions. （2）Whether the regulatory agency makes public the consultation responses（either in full or in a summary of responses） ? （3）Whether the regulator comments publicly on points made in consultation responses, and how（if at all）the consultation responses affected the final decision? （4）Whether there are any other indications of whether or not consultation responses influence the final decision? （5）Whether there are other ways sector participants（including firms and consumers） are involved in regulatory decision making and processes? C.5 Transparency This relates primarily to the openness of the regulatory process and covers issues such as: （1）Whether major regulatory documents（e.g. licences）are in the public domain? （2）Whether the regulator publishes major decisions（and advice） ? （3）Whether the regulator publishes the reasoning behind major decisions? （ 4 ） Whether, if decisions/reasons are published, this is compulsory （ e.g. a legal requirement to justify decisions）or just voluntary? （5）Whether, if decisions/reasons are not published, participants（such as the regulated firms）are told of the reasons for major decisions? （6）Whether the regulatory agency holds public meetings either in consultation over regulatory decisions and/or for the taking of regulatory decisions? （7）Whether firms or other parties can comment（or even challenge）decisions through informal channels（such as direct representations to Ministers, or through the media）? C.6 Predictability This relates primarily to the degree of understanding between the regulatory agency and ·247· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China other parties on the regulator’s duties, approach and decision making process. It covers issues such as: （1）How easy/difficult it is to change the regulator’s functions and duties. （2）How easy/difficult it is to change key regulatory documents （ e.g. licences, authorisations, franchise contracts, etc.）. （3）The extent to which regulatory principles（e.g., on the procedural approach to tariff reviews, the definition of the rate base or the rate of return which a firm should be allowed to earn）are set out formally in published documents. （4）Whether and how far the regulator’s decisions demonstrate a consistent approach? （5）Whether there is a published timetable of regulatory events every year（e.g. set out in a forward plan issued by the regulatory agency）. （6）The extent to which regulatory arrangements in the electricity sector are part of a coherent approach（i.e. echoed in other infrastructure sectors such as telecoms and railways） and to what extent are they ad hoc （ i.e. different in institutional structure from other infrastructure sectors） . Other issues that are important for effective regulatory governance are: （ 1 ） Information and reporting requirements, and effective powers of regulators to demand information from regulated entities. （2）The importance of clearly defined procedures, public consultation and submissions from interested parties, and open hearings. （3）The need for strong enforcement powers. C.7 Proper Regulatory Capacity This relates to the following matters: （1）Is there an adequate regulatory budget? （2）Is there competitive pay for regulatory staff? （3）What ability does the regulator have to outsource some technical work to external experts and take other necessary actions? ·248· Study of Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency（SERC），P.R.China References 1 “China: Power Sector regulation in a Socialist Market Economy”, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 361, 1997 2 Electric Power Law, adopted by the People’s Congress, PRC, December 1995 3 International Energy Agency（IEA）: World Energy Outlook 2004, Paris, 2004 4 State Council Document No. 5, issued in 2002 5 1998 NERA report to the Asian Development Bank 6 J.Stern，S.Holder,（1999）“Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems. An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia”, Utilities Policy, Vol. 8, pp.33-50 7 State Council Document No. 7, July 2003 8 Department of Energy’s（DOE）Organization Act. 1977（USA） 9 Energy Policy Act（EPACT）of 1992（USA） 10 Electricity Act. India，2003 11 The Price Law of the PRC，1997 12 Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth. Competition and Choice in Electricity. Wiley，1996 13 Sally Hunt. Making Competition Work in Electricity. Wiley，2002. available in Chinese from the World Bank 14 Document No.22,2003（PRC） 15 Resolution No. 265（Argentina）,2000 16 Resolution No. 38（Argentina）,2002 17 FERC Order 888（USA） 18 （PUHCA） Public Utility Holding Company Act. （FPA） and the Federal Power Act. （USA） of 1935 19 Article II, NARUC Constitution（USA） 20 Ofgem’s web page: www.ofgem.gov.uk 21 FERC’s web page: www.ferc.gov 22 NVE’s web page: www.nve.no 23 ENRE’s web page（Argentina）: www.enre.gov.ar 24 Instructions for Establishing Regional Power Markets, SERC Document No. 21, 2003 ·249·