



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 05/29/2001	
PROJ ID: P000303		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Food Security	Project Costs (US\$M)	12.8	13.7
Country: Burkina Faso	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	7.5	7.6
Sector(s): Board: RDV - Central government administration (100%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	3.8	5.2
L/C Number: C2414			
	Board Approval (FY)		93
Partners involved : Federal Republic of Germany, Kingdom of Norway , World Food Program	Closing Date	06/30/1999	04/30/2000
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
John R. Heath	Alice C. Galenson	Alain A. Barbu	OEDST
2. Project Objectives and Components			
a. Objectives			
At the <i>national level</i> , the project's objectives are to: (a) reduce the government's response time for reacting to national food emergencies; (b) improve the targeting of food security programs to concentrate on low -income groups in drought-prone provinces, and (c) provide a data base and logistic frame for rational decision -making on food security and nutritional issues .			
At the <i>household level</i> , the project aims to improve coping mechanisms by: (a) diversifying income sources of the rural poor for improved food security and nutrition, and (b) improve the efficient use of available household food to achieve better nutritional status for children below the age of three and lactating mothers .			
b. Components			
(a) Strengthen institutions, including establish a National Cereals Policy Coordinating Committee (US\$1.8 million); (b) Establish an Early Warning System and improve the data gathering and analysis capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture (US\$1.4 million); (c) Provide food for work and cash for work in drought -prone provinces during the dry season (US\$4.9 million); (d) Finance income-generating activities directed predominantly at women (US\$3.4 million); (e) Teach women beneficiaries better child feeding and weaning practices (US\$1.4 million).			
c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates			
The January 1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc to the French Franc (and the weakness of the French Franc against the U.S. dollar) made it possible to extend the project's coverage from four to seven provinces .			
3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:			
The ICR says that national-level objectives were achieved, and household -level objectives were partially achieved . A closer reading (by component, weighted by share of project cost) suggests that, at both levels, achievements were partial. Component (a): the Coordinating Committee was set up and played a key role in organizing response to droughts; but there is no evidence that the project raised the capacity of other institutions (NGOs, project implementing agency) targeted by this component. Component (b): the Early Warning System was rationalized but the intended reduction in the margin of error cannot be substantiated . Component (c): rated unsatisfactory by the ICR because there is no data to indicate number of beneficiaries and impact on household income; before mid -term correction, the contractor hired urban rather than rural workers, contrary to the objective of boosting rural employment in targeted areas. Component (d): this successfully provided loans and training to women for small-scale rural enterprises; but the ICR does not provide information on the scale of the credit subsidy and administrative overheads accounted for 21 percent of subproject costs. Component (e): a substantial nutritional training effort was carried out but the project failed to generate outcome data .			
4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:			
Response time to emergencies reduced from six months (before the project) to three months (1998 and 2000 droughts). Component (d) benefited 34,000 households, compared to an appraisal estimate of 17,600 households			

(although the ICR acknowledges that some beneficiaries benefited from more than one loan, raising the possibility of double counting). 84% of women receiving nutrition training (in 252 villages) changed the composition of the family diet, up from the appraisal target of 75%. Women beneficiaries saved money from their enterprises, allowing them to obtain loans outside the project. The strengthened Early Warning System may be expected to last.

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

The principal failing is the lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation. Given the nature of the project, the decision not to calculate economic and financial rates of return is legitimate. But in their absence it is all the more imperative that meaningful performance indicators be established and tracked. This is not an unreasonable expectation for a project that became effective in FY93; the ICR says that the logframe approach had not been adopted at that time, but this is not an adequate justification. The implementing agency failed to collate the available upper-arm measurements, making it impossible to assess nutritional impact. In this, and in other respects, the project management unit, performed poorly.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome:	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Given the lack of data on outcomes and impacts it is impossible to assess the project's development effectiveness, making it hard to justify a satisfactory rating.
Institutional Dev.:	Modest	Modest	
Sustainability:	Likely	Likely	
Bank Performance:	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Borrower Perf.:	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	The ICR rates as "marginally satisfactory"; a reading of the text suggests that "unsatisfactory" is closer to the mark: the borrower must share responsibility for the poor performance of the project management unit.
Quality of ICR:		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

(a) Implementation arrangements for each component need to be carefully thought out at the design phase. (b) As the ICR notes, "Well-defined input, output and impact indicators, and a robust system for real-time monitoring and evaluation is imperative as a tool for project management and to measure project achievements."

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR author probably did the best he could given the lack of data generated by the project. This is a clear and internally consistent account---although the rating of borrower performance is overly generous.