89069 LEARNING FROM MEGADIS ASTERS LESSONS FROM T~GREAT t:· , EAST JAPAN EARTH- --~;~UAKE ~ ,. . __ -- - v. J'. ~- ·- Learning from Megadisasters Learning from Megadisasters Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari, editors Washington, DC © 2014 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 17 16 15 14 This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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CONTENTS Forewords xiv Acknowledgments xvii Abbreviations xxi Overview: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake 1 PART I: STRUCTURAL MEASURES 23 Chapter 1: Structural Measures Against Tsunamis 25 Chapter 2: Building Performance 33 Chapter 3: Hydrometeorological Disasters Associated with Tsunamis and Earthquakes 43 Chapter 4: Multifunctional Infrastructure 49 Chapter 5: Protecting Significant and Sensitive Facilities 55 PART II: NONSTRUCTURAL MEASURES 63 Chapter 6: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management 65 Chapter 7: Disaster Management Plans 71 Chapter 8: The Education Sector 77 Chapter 9: Business Continuity Plans 83 Chapter 10: Tsunami and Earthquake Warning Systems 91 Chapter 11: Evacuation 99 Chapter 12: Urban Planning, Land Use Regulations, and Relocation 109 Chapter 13: Green Belts and Coastal Risk Management 117 v PART III: EMERGENCY RESPONSE 123 Chapter 14: Mobilizing and Coordinating Expert Teams, Nongovernmental Organizations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Volunteers 125 Chapter 15: Emergency Communication 133 Chapter 16: Management of Logistics Chain for Emergency Supplies 143 Chapter 17: Supporting and Empowering Municipal Functions and Staff 149 Chapter 18: Evacuation Center Management 155 Chapter 19: Ensuring Sensitivity in Response and Equity in Recovery 161 PART IV: RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING 169 Chapter 20: Infrastructure Rehabilitation 171 Chapter 21: Reconstruction Policy and Planning 181 Chapter 22: Transitional Shelter 193 Chapter 23: Debris Management 203 Chapter 24: Livelihood and Job Creation 211 PART V: HAZARD AND RISK INFORMATION AND DECISION MAKING 221 Chapter 25: Risk Assessment and Hazard Mapping 223 Chapter 26: Risk and Damage Information Management 233 Chapter 27: Risk Communication 241 PART VI: THE ECONOMICS OF DISASTER RISK, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND RISK FINANCING 247 Chapter 28: Measuring the Cost-Effectiveness of Various Disaster Risk Management Measures 249 Chapter 29: Earthquake Risk Insurance 257 Chapter 30: Economic Impact 269 Chapter 31: Financial and Fiscal Impact 283 Chapter 32: Strategies for Managing Low-Probability, High-Impact Events 297 PART VII: RECOVERY AND RELOCATION 305 Chapter 33: Relocation in the Tohoku Area 307 Chapter 34: Reconstruction in the Tohoku Area 317 Chapter 35: Cultural Heritage and Preservation 323 Chapter 36: The Recovery Process in Fukushima 331 Chapter 37: Spreading the Word: Raising Capacity for Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries 345 Index 351 vi | CO N T E N T S BOXES Box 1.1 The enormous tsunami walls of Taro, Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture 26 Box 2.1 A simple technical guideline and its dissemination through the building permit process in Indonesia 40 Box 2.2 Tsunami evacuation shelters applying the Japanese technical guideline 41 Box 4.1 Evacuation stairs to the East Sendai Expressway 52 Box 5.1 An angel’s voice 56 Box 5.2 The tsunami’s impact on the Onagawa nuclear power station 59 Box 8.1 Kamaishi Miracle 78 Box 9.1 Accident at a microchip plant 84 Box 9.2 How the GEJE affected payment and settlement systems and financial institutions 87 Box 10.1 Tsunami warnings in Japan 93 Box 10.2 Community-based warning in Sri Lanka 97 Box 11.1 Stone monuments transfer local knowledge to the next generations 100 Box 11.2 Tsunami evacuation routes for schools 101 Box 11.3 The Okawa tragedy 101 Box 13.1 Takatamatsubara and the hope of recovery 118 Box 15.1 Ringo (“apple”) radio of Yamamoto Town, Miyagi Prefecture 139 Box 16.1 The negative effect of goods sent with goodwill 146 Box 18.1 Information is both critical and comforting 158 Box 19.1 Single Father Japan 164 Box 19.2 Save the Children 166 Box 20.1 Rapid rehabilitation of sewerage system in Rikuzentakata City 177 Box 21.1 Basic guidelines for reconstruction after the GEJE 183 Box 21.2 Land-use and population relocation strategies 186 Box 22.1 The case of community centers at transitional shelter sites after the Kobe earthquake 197 Box 22.2 International examples of creative, temporary-to-permanent housing 199 Box 23.1 Preliminary findings of the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) expert mission on Japan’s earthquake waste 209 Box 24.1 Livelihood options in humanitarian assistance 214 Box 25.1 Principles for selecting large-scale earthquake scenarios and the actual earthquakes selected 224 Box 26.1 Crowd-sourced damage assessment using remotely sensed data in Haiti and New Zealand 237 Box 29.1 Innovative catastrophe risk financing: Capital markets protect Japanese farmers against earthquake 260 Box 29.2 Agriculture and fishery insurance 262 Box 30.1 Government of Japan’s estimates of the economic impact of the GEJE 270 Box 30.2 Measures to address the double-debt problem 275 Box 35.1 Symbol of reconstruction: Storehouse of Eiichi Homma family, Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture 326 Box 35.2 Kimura family documents washed ashore, Onagawa City, Miyagi Prefecture 327 Box 35.3 Collecting and preserving disaster materials 328 CO N T E N T S | vii FIGURES Figure O.1 Summary of findings and lessons learned from the project 3 Figure O.2 The many roles of the community in multihazard DRM 6 Figure O.3 Dikes in Sendai before and after the tsunami of March 11, 2011 9 Figure O.4 Otsuchi’s mayor was in front of town hall when the tsunami struck 12 Figure O.5 Broadcasting at RINGO Radio 14 Figure O.6 Community rehabilitation facilitator 19 Figure 1.1 Inundation area in Fudai Village, Iwate 27 Figure 1.2 No tsunami inundation in Hirono Town, Iwate 27 Figure 1.3 Effectiveness of the Kamaishi tsunami breakwater 28 Figure 1.4 Countermeasures against level 1 and level 2 tsunamis 29 Figure 1.5 Structure of a highly resilient breakwater 29 Figure 2.1 Share of houses that collapsed in the 1995 Kobe earthquake, by year of construction 34 Figure 2.2 Houses and cars were washed away by the tsunami 35 Figure 2.3 The tsunami destroyed the outer walls of steel structures 35 Figure 2.4 Reinforced concrete building withstood tsunami even though submerged 36 Figure 2.5 Reinforced concrete building damaged by buoyancy 36 Figure 2.6 Reinforced concrete building scoured by the tsunami current 36 Figure 2.7 Overturned building of reinforced concrete with pile foundation 36 Figure 2.8 Fallen ceiling panels in school gymnasium 37 Figure 2.9 Subsidence of houses from liquefaction 37 Figure 2.10 Houses damaged by failure of retaining walls 37 Figure 2.11 Revised design load requirements against tsunamis 38 Figure 2.12 Collapsed school building in which furniture is still standing (Yogyakarta province, following Central Java Earthquake, 2006) 39 Figure 2.13 Flowchart illustrating the Japanese building permit process 40 Figure 3.1 Countermeasures taken against hydrometeorological disasters following the GEJE 44 Figure 3.2 Damage to river dikes at Narusegawa 44 Figure 3.3 Rehabilitation of coastal dikes 46 Figure 4.1 East Sendai Expressway 50 Figure 4.2 The Sanriku Expressway was built with tsunamis in mind 51 Figure 4.3 Self-defense force at a roadside station 51 Figure 4.4 Evacuation stairway at the Omoto Elementary School 51 Figure 5.1 Relocation of municipal buildings after the GEJE 56 Figure 5.2 Otsuchi Town Hall 56 Figure 5.3 The Rikuzentakata City gymnasium 57 Figure 5.4 Hospitals affected by the GEJE in Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate prefectures 57 Figure 5.5 Leaked LPG catches fire at a refinery 57 Figure 5.6 Broken braces led to collapse of LPG tank 58 Figure 5.7 Retrofitting Jokoji Temple 58 viii | CO N T E N T S Figure 5.8 Cause of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 60 Figure 5.9 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 60 Figure 6.1 Historical timeline of community-based organizations 66 Figure 6.2 Left: Damaged Hashikami area of Kesennuma; right: Kesennuma Fukkou Yatai Mura (community recovery restaurant) 67 Figure 6.3 Toni Bay area of Kamaishi City (top), Sakura Festival (bottom) 68 Figure 6.4 Wakabayashi ward (top), and local community activities (bottom) 69 Figure 7.1 Structure of the Central Disaster Management Council 72 Figure 7.2 Outline of Japan’s disaster management system 73 Figure 8.1 Categorization of schools by level of damage 77 Figure 8.2 Kamaishi-higashi Junior High School (top) and Unosumai Elementary School (bottom) are located near the sea 78 Figure 8.3 Location of schools in various areas 79 Figure 8.4 Schools and locations 80 Figure 9.1 The business continuity plan concept 84 Figure 10.1 Information flow in the tsunami-warning system 92 Figure 10.2 New methods for tsunami warnings 94 Figure 10.3 Earthquake early warning system 95 Figure 10.4 Earthquake early detection system 96 Figure 11.1 The relationship between evacuation and other DRM measures 99 Figure 11.2 Evacuation map and information on past tsunamis 100 Figure 11.3 Evacuation signs 100 Figure 11.4 Evacuation timing 102 Figure 11.5 Evacuation pattern and encounter with the tsunami 102 Figure 11.6 Pictographic signs: Safe place from tsunamis, tsunami evacuation shelter, and tsunami risk area 103 Figure 11.7 Number of evacuees moved to other prefectures, June 2011–January 2012 105 Figure 12.1 Building communities resilient to tsunamis 113 Figure 13.1 The forest captures a floating ship 119 Figure 13.2 Condition of the green belt before and after the tsunami in Natori City 119 Figure 13.3 Changing approaches to managing the green belt 120 Figure 14.1 The Japan Self-Defense Forces in action 126 Figure 14.2 An interprefectural emergency rescue unit in action 126 Figure 14.3 TEC-FORCE activities in response to the GEJE 127 Figure 14.4 TEC-FORCE equipment 128 Figure 14.5 Volunteer effort in Tohoku through January 2012 130 Figure 15.1 Number of affected fixed lines 134 Figure 15.2 Number of affected mobile base stations 134 Figure 15.3 Disaster emergency message traffic during GEJE and Kobe earthquakes 136 Figure 15.4 Most viable source of information as perceived by message sender group in the GEJE 137 Figure 16.1 Information and transportation flows in the official relief goods delivery system 144 CO N T E N T S | ix Figure 16.2 Badly organized inventory in an initially assigned depot (Iwaki Civic Hall, March 23, 2012) 145 Figure 16.3 Well-organized inventory in a municipal depot (Taira bicycle race track at Iwaki City, April 6, 2012) 145 Figure 17.1 The municipal office in Otsuchi Town was damaged by the tsunami 150 Figure 18.1 Number of evacuees after the GEJE 155 Figure 18.2 Number of evacuation centers 156 Figure 18.3 Number of times people in Fukushima had to evacuate 156 Figure 18.4 Evacuation center at the Ofunato Junior High School 157 Figure 19.1 Age distribution of people killed in the GEJE 161 Figure 19.2 An evacuation center, one month after the earthquake 163 Figure 20.1 Securing emergency transportation 172 Figure 20.2 Sendai Airport after the tsunami 173 Figure 20.3 Manhole raised by liquefaction in Urayasu City 173 Figure 20.4 Steps in infrastructure rehabilitation 174 Figure 20.5 Clearing of roads 175 Figure 20.6 Clearing of navigation passages 176 Figure 20.7 Water works rehabilitation 177 Figure 20.8 Electricity rehabilitation 178 Figure 21.1 Chronology of key policy and planning measures after the GEJE 182 Figure 21.2 Recovery plans after the GEJE 183 Figure 21.3 Community involvement in recovery planning in Minamisanriku Town (Miyagi Prefecture) 184 Figure 21.4 Recovery concept of Minamisanriku Town 185 Figure 21.5 Population decrease in disaster areas and survey of population and businesses in Minamisanriku (December 2011) 187 Figure 21.6 Coordination framework for the Reconstruction Agency in Japan 188 Figure 22.1 The housing recovery process in Japan 194 Figure 22.2 Characteristics of transitional shelters used after the GEJE (as of December 27, 2011) 194 Figure 22.3 Typical prefabricated temporary houses 195 Figure 22.4 Number of temporary houses completed 196 Figure 22.5 Improvements to temporary housing—adding insulation to the walls and double-pane windows 198 Figure 22.6 Multiple-story temporary housing made with stacked containers 199 Figure 23.1 Separation and treatment of disaster waste 206 Figure 24.1 Minamisanriku shopping village 215 Figure 24.2 A poster promoting the friendship bracelet (tamaki ) 215 Figure 24.3 Recovery process of labor markets in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures 216 Figure 24.4 New-job-opening ratios of the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures 216 Figure 24.5 Ratio of employment sustained by government policy: March 2011–February 2012 217 Figure 25.1 Hazard map usage patterns 230 Figure 26.1 Commercial per-building exposure data set (left) and post-3.11 aerial photograph of the same area (right) 237 x | CO N T E N T S Figure 26.2 Online interface of Geospatial Disaster Management Mash-up Service Study (GDMS) 238 Figure 27.1 The concept of holistic learning: Narrowing the gap between local and specialist knowledge 242 Figure 27.2 The risk communication framework 242 Figure 27.3 Reasons given by people in Toni Village for participating in the hazard mapping exercise before the GEJE 243 Figure 27.4 Designated evacuation building (left) and evacuation road (right) in Kamaishi 244 Figure 27.5 Flat area in Sendai Plain offering no possibility of evacuating to higher ground 244 Figure 28.1 Disaster deaths in Japan, 1945–2011 250 Figure 28.2 Change in DRM spending, 1963–2011 250 Figure 28.3 Comparison of damage from four tsunami events 251 Figure 28.4 MLIT public works project evaluation process, based on Government Policy Evaluation Act (2002) 252 Figure 28.5 Seacoast works: From planning to implementation 253 Figure 29.1 Japanese earthquake reinsurance program (as of May 2011) 259 Figure 29.2 Economic and insured losses of the Great East Japan Earthquake 261 Figure 29.3 Estimated GEJE insured residential losses, by earthquake insurance program 264 Figure 30.1 The extent of economic activity in the municipalities along the Pacific Coast 271 Figure 30.2 Japanese tourism demand, 2011–12 272 Figure 30.3 Nikkei Index, January 2011–June 2012 273 Figure 30.4 Indices of all industry activity (seasonally adjusted), 2011 274 Figure 30.5 Impact of the GEJE and Thai flood on the global automobile industry 274 Figure 30.6 Trilateral trade-offs in global resilience 276 Figure 31.1 Central government funding allocation for the GEJE, FY10–FY12 286 Figure 31.2 The GEJE financial allocations and timing, FY10–12 288 Figure 31.3 Design of commemorative coin by elementary school student 290 Figure 31.4 Sovereign credit rating of Japan by major rating agencies, 2000 to current 290 Figure 31.5 Accumulated GoJ bonds outstanding, FY1965–FY2012 291 Figure 32.1 Magnitude of earthquakes in Japan 298 Figure 32.2 DRM using structural and nonstructural measures 304 Figure 33.1 The relocation process 308 Figure 33.2 Land pooling scheme 311 Figure 33.3 Community rehabilitation facilitators 311 Figure 33.4 Consultation at Nobiru District 312 Figure 34.1 Public housing in Sendai City 318 Figure 34.2 Construction of public housing: A three-step process 319 Figure 34.3 Managing public housing 320 Figure 35.1 Rehabilitating a whale specimen 324 Figure 35.2 Rescue activities at the home of Eiichi Homma in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture 327 CO N T E N T S | xi Figure 36.1 Chronology of key policy and planning measures for recovery from the GEJE, in general and in Fukushima 334 Figure 36.2 Odagaisama Center 336 Figure 36.3 Farmers monitoring radiation 338 Figure 36.4 Radiation map 338 Figure 36.5 Fukko (“revitalization”) Marche 339 Figure 36.6 Supporting children affected by the disaster 339 MAPS Map O.1 The tsunami struck a wide area of Japan 1 Map O.2 Actual inundation areas were much larger than predicted 17 Map 1.1 Determining dike height 27 Map 1.2 Tsunami inundation area along the Kitakami and Kyu-Kitakami rivers 29 Map 3.1 Subsidence caused by the earthquake increased inundation risks 45 Map 5.1 Nuclear power stations near the epicenter and their emergency shutdown modes 59 Map 10.1 Timeline of revised tsunami warnings on March 11, 2011 94 Map 11.1 Evacuation areas 104 Map 13.1 GEJE tsunami damage to the green belt in four prefectures 118 Map 15.1 Damage to NTT East and NTT Docomo 135 Map 20.1 Status of expressways and national highways immediately after the earthquake 172 Map 20.2 Operation Toothcomb 175 Map 21.1 Tsunami simulations 185 Map 21.2 Gap between people moving in and people moving out as a share of the population 187 Map 21.3 Land-use planning and projects in Minamisanriku 188 Map 22.1 Predominant transitional shelter in affected areas 195 Map 25.1 Five mega-earthquakes used as basis for risk assessment 224 Map 25.2 Historical occurrence of trench-type earthquakes in the vicinity of the Japan and Chishima trenches 225 Map 25.3 Potential earthquakes in Japan: their probability of occurrence, magnitude, and location 226 Map 25.4 Actual versus predicted seismic intensity distributions 227 Map 25.5 Actual versus predicted tsunami height 227 Map 25.6 An example of a tsunami hazard map, Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture 229 Map 25.7 Inundation area: Hazard map versus actual 230 Map 26.1 Interface of the MLIT hazard map Web portal 234 Map 26.2 The interface of Shinsai.info (based on the Ushahidi platform) 238 Map 27.1 Hazard map produced by the village of Toni in Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture 242 Map 28.1 Simulated inundation areas 254 Map 33.1 Relocation project in Sendai City 309 Map 36.1 Rearrangement of evacuation zoning 335 xii | CO N T E N T S TABLES Table O.1 The Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 in figures 2 Table 2.1 Comparison of three major disasters in Japan 34 Table 2.2 Damage to buildings following the GEJE 35 Table 4.1 “Road stations” used in the aftermath of the GEJE 51 Table 6.1 Community-based organizations engaged in disaster risk management in Japan 66 Table 14.1 Expert teams organized by the government 126 Table 14.2 Crime in the disaster-affected areas 127 Table 15.1 Dominant types of information and how they were shared 138 Table 17.1 Beneficiary and supporting prefectures 151 Table 22.1 Advantages and disadvantages of various types of transitional shelter 200 Table 23.1 Segregation of disaster waste and recycling and treatment methods 208 Table 25.1 Comparison of estimated and actual damage 227 Table 25.2 Methods for defining inundation risk areas 229 Table 26.1 Excerpts from survey of end users on the use of satellite-based remotely sensed data carried out by JAXA, 2011 235 Table 26.2 Examples of the difference between estimates of the affected population in municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture using two different estimates of the extent of inundation 236 Table 29.1 The dual residential earthquake insurance system in Japan 258 Table 29.2 Reserves under the earthquake insurance program 259 Table 29.3 Comparative analysis of the Tohoku (GEJE), Canterbury, and Maule earthquakes 264 Table 30.1 Direct economic impact of the GEJE 269 Table 30.2 Damage caused by the GEJE 271 Table 31.1 Key laws framing the GoJ’s contingent liability in the case of disaster 284 Table 31.2 Approved central government spending on the GEJE, FY10–FY12 285 Table 31.3 Estimated costs of the GEJE to the central Government of Japan 285 Table 31.4 Explanation of central government funding allocations for the GEJE 287 Table 31.5 Special tax measures in response to the GEJE 288 Table 31.6 Special reconstruction taxes: Schedule and projected revenues 289 Table 36.1 Budget of the Fukushima Prefecture for flagship programs in FY 2013 335 CO N T E N T S | xiii Foreword Yoshiki Takeuchi T he Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on mainstreaming DRM in their development policies. It is March 11, 2011, is a tragic reminder that no country clear that financial resources alone are not sufficient to or community is totally safe from natural disasters. deal with disasters and to spur development. Technical The earthquake measuring a staggering 9.0 on the Richter assistance and capacity building are equally important. scale hit the Tohoku region along the Pacific coast of Ja- In Japan’s case, we learned how communities can play pan. While the damage from the earthquake itself was a critical role in preparing for and coping with natural minimal because people were prepared and had learned disasters. Communities can help prevent damage from from previous disasters, the subsequent tsunami caused spreading, maintain social order, and provide support to extreme devastation to life and property, which shows the vulnerable. Only through technical cooperation can that even the best prepared country will experience ex- such know-how be passed on to other countries and be ceptional disasters. We express our sincere condolences adapted to their local circumstances. to those affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake and The Sendai Statement, a joint statement on mainstream- Tsunami, and admire the courage and efforts of people for ing DRM issued by the World Bank Group president and recovery and reconstruction. Japan’s finance minister in October 2012, emphasized the At least 80 countries around the world are consid- need to increase both technical and financial assistance ered vulnerable to natural disasters. Large-scale natural for DRM in developing countries. It recognized that DRM disasters, once they occur, take a heavy toll on the lives is an essential part of enhancing sustainable development. of people. They can also destroy years of development Therefore, we urge the World Bank and other develop- efforts in an instant. Disaster risk management (DRM) ment assistance agencies to mainstream DRM into their should be taken into account as a major development operations. Japan, on its part, will spare no effort in build- challenge because the poor and the vulnerable are the ing a more disaster resilient world in cooperation with the most exposed to the risks of natural disasters. Therefore, World Bank and other partners, by leveraging its exper- the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the World tise, technology, and staff. We expect a newly established Bank Group, has repeatedly advocated the importance of Disaster Risk Management Hub of the World Bank in integrating DRM into development agenda. We believe it Tokyo to play a leading role to serve to match developing important to take advantage of lessons learned from the countries’ needs with our technologies and expertise, and disaster and the reconstruction efforts in Japan as global also disseminate the knowledge to the world. public goods for future development policy. We hope that Learning from Megadisasters will help This report, Learning from Megadisasters, consoli- development partners explore how to best integrate DRM dates the set of 36 Knowledge Notes, research results of into development policies and programs. the joint study undertaken by the Government of Japan and the World Bank. It summarizes the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and Yoshiki Takeuchi is Deputy Director-General of the provides guidance to other disaster-prone countries for International Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan xiv Foreword Sanjay Pradhan H aiyan, the typhoon that struck the Philippines in The world must shift from a tradition of response to a November 2013, was thought to be the strongest culture of prevention and resilience. While not all natural tropical storm ever to have made landfall in hu- disasters can be avoided, their impact on a population can man history. It has caused untold damage and suffering. be mitigated through effective planning and prepared- Physical damages from the storm are estimated at $14.5 ness. These are the lessons to be learned from Japan’s own billion. What the numbers do not show, of course, is the megadisaster: the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, devastation faced by people who have lost their homes, the first disaster ever recorded that included an earth- livelihoods, savings, and loved ones. Picking up the pieces quake, a tsunami, a nuclear power plant accident, a power is harder when you have little to begin with, and poor supply failure, and a large-scale disruption of supply communities are often hardest hit and take the longest to chains—with global consequences for several industries. recover from disaster. Japan has an advanced DRM system that has evolved If the world warms 4 degrees Celsius by century’s over nearly 2,000 years as the country has coped with nat- end, as most scientists predict, the change will mean pro- ural risks and hazards. The loss of life and property during longed droughts and heat waves, intensified precipitation, the Great East Japan Earthquake might have been much and the death of coral reefs, nature’s barrier against storm greater if the nation’s policies and practices had been less surges. Urbanization, too, has increased the poor’s vulner- effective. Following the disaster, these policies and prac- ability to disasters, as migrants crowd into unregulated, tices were reviewed, and recommendations for improve- unsafe housing. Over the past three decades natural disas- ment were proposed to make DRM even more effective. ters worldwide have caused close to $4 trillion in eco- The World Bank and the Government of Japan jointly nomic losses, much of that in the developing world. Given created a set of searchable online Knowledge Notes to these trends, disasters of the magnitude of Haiyan can no enable DRM practitioners and policy makers to learn longer be viewed as once-in-a-century events, but rather from Japan’s experience. This set of 36 Knowledge Notes, as probabilities. In the era of climate change and mass which highlight key lessons learned in seven DRM the- urbanization, they will continue to affect in a major way matic clusters—structural measures; nonstructural mea- the developing world’s long-term prosperity and safety. sures; emergency response; reconstruction planning; More than three-quarters of global fatalities from natural hazard and risk information and decision making; the disasters occur in developing countries. economics of disaster risk, risk management, and risk Evidence shows that mainstreaming disaster risk man- financing; and recovery and relocation—have been con- agement (DRM) into policies, strategies, regulation, and solidated in this report, Learning from Megadisasters. building codes can save lives and assets when adverse This report contains crucial information on DRM and natural events hit. While ex post initiatives, such as disas- lessons learned from Japan’s terrible ordeal in 2011. Our ter response strategies, have been formulated in several hope is that this experience will help developing coun- regions and preparedness in some countries is more tries weather their own megadisasters. advanced than in others, the general level of ex ante ini- tiatives through prevention, mitigation, and preparedness Sanjay Pradhan is Vice President of Change, Knowl- across countries is still low. edge and Learning at the World Bank Group. xv Acknowledgments T his book represents the outcomes of the Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), the Inter- “Learning from Megadisasters” project national Recovery Platform, CTI Engineering, of the Government of Japan and the and prominent academic institutions. Several World Bank Group. The manuscript was pre- departments at the World Bank contributed to pared by a team led by Federica Ranghieri (se- the work; namely, the Global Facility for Disas- nior urban specialist, World Bank) with Mikio ter Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the Ishiwatari (senior disaster risk management Social Development Department (SDV), the specialist, World Bank), under the guidance of Tokyo Development Learning Center, the East Bruno Laporte (former director for knowledge Asia and Pacific Region, and the External and and learning, World Bank Institute), Abha Corporate Relations (ECR) Vice-Presidency, Joshi Ghani (director of knowledge and learn- all under the coordination of the World Bank ing, World Bank Institute), Akihiko Nishio (di- Institute. rector of operations, South Asia Region, World The authors of the individual chapters are, Bank), and Christine F. Kessides (manager for in  alphabetical order and including several urban practice, World Bank Institute). organizational authors, as follows: Bianca Co-coordination of the project was pro- Adam (World Bank), Masaru Arakida (ADRC), vided by Japan’s Ministry of Finance with Margaret Arnold (World Bank), Mitsuhiro support and advice from other agencies. Fukao (Keio University), Nobuaki Hamagu- Contributing agencies of the Japanese gov- chi (Kobe University), Kenzo Hiroki (Inter- ernment include the Cabinet Office; the Min- national Centre for Water Hazard and Risk istry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Management), Akihiko Hokugo (Kobe Uni- the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans- versity), Ai Ideta (Kyoto University), Makoto port and Tourism; and the Financial Service Ikeda (ADRC), the International Recovery Agency. Other contributors include the Japan Platform, Hideki Ishii (Fukushima Univer- International Cooperation Agency, the Asian sity), Mikio Ishiwatari (World Bank), Toshiaki xvii Keicho (World Bank), Olivier Mahul (World DRM specialist, Sustainable Development Bank), Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Department, Latin America and the Carib- Communications, Satoru Mimura (Fukushima bean), Mr. Prashant (senior DRM specialist, University), Shingo Nagamatsu (Kansai Uni- GFDRR), Christoph Pusch (lead DRM spe- versity), Tatuo Narafu (Japan International cialist, GFDRR), Sahar Safaie (DRM special- Cooperation Agency), Yusuke Noguchi (Kyoto ist, Middle East and North Africa), and Satoru University), Kenji Ohse (Fukushima Uni- Ueda (lead water management specialist, Sus- versity), Hiroshi Okumura (Kobe Univer- tainable Development Department, Africa). sity), Makoto Okumura (Tohoku University), Among the advisers and reviewers who Takashi Onishi (University of Tokyo), Taka- provided guidance and contribution at vari- hiro Ono (ADRC), Yasuaki Onoda (Tohoku ous stages of the work were Prof. Yoshiaki University), Yukie Osa (Association for Aid Kawata (Kansai University and chair of the and Relief ), Brett Peary (Kyoto University), project’s advisory committee), Prof. Masahisa Junko Sagara (CTI Engineering), Keiko Saito Fujita (Research Institute of Economy, Trade (World Bank), Yoko Saito (Disaster Reduc- and Industry), Toshio Arima (Fuji Xerox), tion and Human Renovation Institute), Shin- Prof. Mitsuhiro Fukao (Keio University), Prof. ichi Sakai (Kyoto University), Kazuko Sasaki Fumio Imamura (Tohoku University), Yuki- (Kobe University), Daisuke Sato (Tohoku Uni- moto Ito (Sendai City), Prof. Toshitaka Katada versity), Motohiro Sato (Hitotsubashi Univer- (Gunma University), Hideaki Oda (United sity), Rajib Shaw (Kyoto University), Hironobu Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Board), Shibuya (Save the Children, Japan), Yoshim- Yukie Osa (Association for Aid and Relief, itsu Shiozaki (Kobe University), Akira Takagi Japan), Prof. Rajb Shaw (Kyoto University), (Fukushima University), Yukiko Takeuchi and Prof. Toru Takanarita (Sendai Univer- (Kyoto University), Yasuo Tanaka (Kobe Uni- sity). Advice and reviews were also received versity), Masato Toyama (CTI Engineering), from Prof. Antonis Pomonis (Cambridge and Emily White (World Bank and Financial Architectural Research, Ltd., and principal Service Agency). investigator of the Global Earthquake Model’s The document also reflects technical Earthquake Consequences Database Project); inputs from the World Bank team, which Prof. William Seimbeida (California Polytech- included Abigail Baca (Disaster risk manage- nic State University and Kyoto University); ment [DRM] specialist, East Asia and Pacific Prof. Costanza Bonadonna, Prof. Chris Gregg, [EAP]), Sofia Bettencourt (lead operations Dr. Franco Romerio, and Dr. Corine Frisch- officer, Africa), Laura Elizabeth Boudreau knecht (CERG-C [Specialization Certificate (DRM analyst, Finance and Private Sector for the Assessment and Management of Geo- Development [FPS]), Wolfgang Fengler (lead logical and Climate Related Risk], University economist, World Bank, Nairobi), Abhas K. of Geneva); Prof. Mehedi Ahmed Ansary (Ban- Jha (lead urban specialist, EAP), Josef Leit- gladesh University of Engineering and Tech- mann (program manager, multidonor trust nology); Muralee Thummarukudy (United fund for Haiti), Markus Kostner (sector leader, Nations Environment Programme); Karen Social, Environment, and Rural Development, Sudmeier-Rieux (Commission on Ecosystem EAP), Daniel Warner Kull (DRM specialist, Management of the International Union for GFDRR), Olivier Mahul (program coordinator, Conservation of Nature and University of Lau- FPS), Robin Mearns (lead social development sanne); Prof. Reinhard Mechler (International specialist, SDN), Niels Holm Nielsen (senior Institute for Applied Systems Analysis); Prof. xviii | ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Charles Scawthorn (SPA Risk LLC and Kyoto Marjorie Greene, Polat Gulkan, Kenzo Hiroki, University); and the Earthquake Engineering Luxin Huang, Marshall Lew, Eduardo Research Institute’s (EERI) Global Technical Miranda, Robert B. Olshansky, Mimi Sheller, Expert Review Group. The EERI team was Alpa Sheth, Gavin Smith, Emily So, Steven L. chaired by Farzad Naeim and included Ser- Stockton, and Balbir Verma. gio M. Alcocer, Mohsen Ghafouri-Ashtiani, Steven Kennedy edited the manuscript. Jay Berger, Marcial Blondet, Lori Dengler, ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | xix Abbreviations ACA Agency for Cultural Affairs APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations B/C benefit-cost ratio BCM business continuity management BCP business continuity plan BOJ Bank of Japan BRI Building Research Institute BRR Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias CAO Cabinet Office (Japan) Cat catastrophe bonds CBA cost-benefit analysis CBO community-based organization CEA cost-effectiveness analysis CFW cash for work CoP Community of Practice CSO civil society organization DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team DRM disaster risk management EEW Earthquake Early Warning EIRR economic internal rate of return EMT Emergency Mapping Team ESD education for sustainable development FDMA Fire and Disaster Management Agency FFW food for work FTTH fiber to the home xxi FURE Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revitalization FY fiscal year Gal galileo [unit of acceleration] GCNJ Global Compact Network Japan GDLN Global Development Learning Network GDP gross domestic product GEJE Great East Japan Earthquake GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GDMS Geospatial Disaster Management Mashup Service Study GIS geographic information system GoJ Government of Japan GPEA Government Policy Evaluations Act GPS global positioning system GSI Geospatial Information Authority of Japan GW gigawatt ICOMOS International Council on Monuments and Sites ICT information and communication technology IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IMF International Monetary Fund IRP International Recovery Platform IT information technology JANIC Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation JER Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Company JGB Japanese Government Bond JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JMA Japan Meteorological Agency JRCS Japanese Red Cross Society JRI Japan Research Institute JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces JSMCWM Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste Management JWWA Japan Water Works Association LPG liquefied petroleum gas MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries MCA multicriteria analysis MCU micro control unit METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry MIC Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications MLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism NAB National Association of Commercial Broadcasters NGO nongovernmental organization NHK National Broadcasting Corporation (Japan) NIED National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention NILIM National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management NPO nonprofit organization NPV net present value xxii | A B B R E V I AT I O N S OSM Open Street Map PCB polychlorinated biphenyl POP persistent organic pollutant ppm parts per million PPP public-private partnership RAHA Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas programme RC reinforced concrete RDC Reconstruction Design Council RIA regulatory impact analysis SME small and medium enterprise SPV special-purpose vehicle TEC-FORCE Technical Emergency Control Force TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company TSE Tokyo Stock Exchange UKG Union of Kansai Governments UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UN-WB United Nations−World Bank VAT value added tax VSATs very small aperture terminals WBI World Bank Institute WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council Note: All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars (US$) unless otherwise indicated. A B B R E V I AT I O N S | xxiii OVERVIEW Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake On March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 occurred in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Japan’s Tohoku region. The quake shook the ground as far away as western Japan and lasted for several minutes. A half-hour later, a tsunami of unprecedented force broke over 650 kilometers (km) of coastline (map O.1), toppling sea walls and other defenses, flooding more than 500 square kilometers (km2) of land, and washing away entire towns and villages. The devastation left some 20,000 people dead or missing, with most of the deaths caused by drowning (table O.1). The tsunami leveled 130,000 houses and severely damaged 270,000 more. About 270 railway lines ceased operation immediately following the disaster, and 15 expressways, 69 national highways, and 638 prefectural and municipal roads were closed. Some 24,000 hect- ares of agricultural land were flooded. The areas worst hit were the Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures. Map O.1 The tsunami struck a wide area of Japan Source: The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group, http://www.coastal.jp/ tsunami2011/index.php. 1 Table O.1 The Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 postdisaster reconstruction with countries in figures vulnerable to disasters. The Bank and the Japa- CASUALTIES AS OF NOVEMBER 8, 2013 nese government hope that these findings (see Dead 18,571 figure O.1) will encourage countries to main- stream DRM in their development policies and Missing 2,651 planning. Injured 6,150 Japan had not foreseen an event of this mag- BUILDING DAMAGE AS OF NOVEMBER 8, 2013 nitude and complexity: Total collapse 126,602 • It was a high-impact event with a low prob- Half collapse 272,426 ability of occurrence. Because of enormous Partial damage 743,089 damage from the tsunami and moderate EVACUEES but widespread geotechnical damage, the Maximum 470,000 (March 14, 2011) GEJE event was the costliest earthquake Current 282,111 (October 10, 2013) in world history. Japan’s Cabinet Office has estimated the direct economic cost at Estimated economic ¥16.9 trillion damage ($210 billion) ¥16.9 trillion, or $210 billion. Buildings ¥10.4 trillion • It was a highly complex phenomenon, the Public utilities ¥1.3 trillion effects of which cascaded to sensitive facili- Social infrastructure ¥2.2 trillion ties. The earthquake and ensuing tsunami provoked fires at damaged oil refiner- Other (agriculture, forests, ¥3.0 trillion fisheries) ies and a potentially catastrophic nuclear accident. The effects of the accident at the Debris 26.7 million tons (October 2013) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station Source: Cabinet Office and Reconstruction Agency. have compromised Japan’s energy supply, imperiled its environment, and threatened public health. • Direct damage to major Japanese indus- WHAT THE DISASTER TAUGHT tries rocketed through supply chains around JAPAN—AND WHAT IT CAN TEACH the world. In the second quarter of 2011, OTHER COUNTRIES Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) dipped 2.1 percent from the previous year, The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) was while industrial production and exports the first disaster ever recorded that included dropped even more sharply—by 7.0 percent an earthquake, a tsunami, a nuclear power and 8.0 percent, respectively. Japan expe- plant accident, a power supply failure, and a rienced a trade deficit for the first time in large-scale disruption of supply chains. 31 years. In the wake of the tsunami, busi- Learning from Megadisasters, a knowledge- nesses that relied on Japanese electronics sharing project sponsored by the World Bank and automotive parts faced disruptions and the government of Japan, is collecting and and delays in production, distribution, and analyzing information, data, and evaluations transportation; they had to scramble to performed by academic and research institu- find alternate supply lines and manufac- tions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), turing partners. government agencies, and the private sector— all with the objective of sharing Japan’s knowl- In coping with the GEJE, Japan’s advanced edge on disaster risk management (DRM) and DRM system, built up during nearly 2,000 2 | O V E RV I E W years of coping with natural risks and hazards, are particularly important and are singled out proved its worth. The loss of life and property here (as well as being included in the section could have been far greater if the country’s pol- on lessons learned that appears further on): icies and practices had been less effective. The • Spreading a better understanding of the main elements of that DRM system are nature and limitations of risk assessment • Investments in structural measures (such as among local authorities and the popula- reinforced buildings and seawalls), cutting- tion at large would improve collective and edge risk assessments, early-warning sys- individual decision making, especially in tems, and hazard mapping—all supported emergencies. Communication about the by sophisticated technology for data collec- unfolding disaster could and should have tion, simulation, information, and commu- been more interactive among local com- nication, and by scenario building to assess munities, governments, and experts. Dis- risks and to plan responses (such as evacua- tributing hazard maps and issuing early tions) to hazards warnings were not enough. The magnitude of the tsunami was underestimated, which • A culture of preparedness, where training may have led people to delay their evacua- and evacuation drills are systematically tion, if only for a fatal few minutes. If local practiced at the local and community lev- governments and community members els and in schools and workplaces had been more aware of DRM technolo- • Stakeholder involvement, where the gies and their margins of error, fewer lives national and local government, communi- might have been lost. ties, NGOs, and the private sector all know • Coordination mechanisms on the ground their role should be agreed on before the fact. Dur- • Effective legislation, regulation, and ing the GEJE, coordination among various enforcement—for example, of building groups, such as governments (national, pre- codes that have been kept current fectural, and local), civil society organiza- tions (CSOs), and private entities was often • The use of sophisticated instrumenta- poor—or at least not optimal. Local govern- tion to underpin planning and assessment ments, whose facilities in some cases were operations. wiped out by the disaster, had little experi- Certain improvements would have made the ence working with other organizations on Japanese reaction even more effective. Three a large scale, and they received insufficient Figure O.1 Summary of findings and lessons learned from the project L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 3 support from the central government in The project delivered a set of 36 “Knowl- managing the new forms of cooperation. edge Notes” (now chapters) grouped into As it turned out, coordination with inter- seven thematic clusters (now parts): national relief agencies and donors offer- • Structural measures ing exceptional assistance was simply not up to the unprecedented task. • Nonstructural measures • Vulnerable groups must be not only pro- • Emergency response tected but also engaged. Understanding and • Reconstruction planning meeting the challenges of the elderly, chil- dren, and women, both during the emer- • Hazard and risk information and decision gency and in its aftermath, are priorities making for effective postdisaster response. Cultur- • The economics of disaster risk, risk man- ally sound solutions that take account of agement, and risk financing special needs among segments of the pop- ulation should be planned in advance to • Recovery and relocation enhance resilience and facilitate recovery The notes analyze the response to the March and reconstruction. 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami—and synthe- size what worked, what did not, and why, offer- SHARING EXPERIENCES WITH ing recommendations for developing countries DEVELOPING COUNTRIES that face similar risks and vulnerabilities. The notes were prepared by more than 40 Other countries can protect themselves from Japanese and international experts, assisted by major disasters by adopting—and adapting 50 advisers and reviewers. The team included as necessary—some of the measures taken by developing country practitioners, academic Japan, and by understanding the strengths experts, and government officials. The chap- and weaknesses of Japan’s response to the ters provide a basis for knowledge sharing and GEJE. To help them do that, the Learning exchanges with developing country experts from Megadisasters initiative provided data, and practitioners. analysis, and insight in printed and Web- Key lessons derived from the 36 notes are based formats (including e-learning), in offered in the four pages that follow, after face-to-face activities, in seminars presented which the thematic clusters are reviewed through the good offices of the Global Devel- in turn. opment Learning Network (GDLN),1 and through a dedicated community of practice— all designed to build the capacities of govern- KEY LESSONS LEARNED ment decision makers and other stakeholders FROM THE PROJECT in developing countries. A searchable set of online materials at various levels of depth and The successes of Japan’s DRM system, as well detail serves as a focal point for this com- as the ways in which that system could be munity of learning and practice on DRM. improved, are reflected in the lessons drawn The knowledge base will grow as practition- from the GEJE and presented in the initial ers from around the world contribute their reports from the Learning from Megadisasters insights and expertise. project. 4 | O V E RV I E W Extreme disasters underscore the GEJE, however, exceeded all expectations and need for a holistic approach to DRM predictions in the extent of its ensuing tsu- Single-sector development planning cannot nami, demonstrating that exclusive reliance address the complexity of problems posed by on structural measures will ultimately prove natural hazards, let alone megadisasters, nor ineffective and must be supplemented with can such planning build resilience to threats. nonstructural measures and a basic under- Faced with complex risks, Japan chose to build standing of the uncertainties surrounding the resilience by investing in preventive struc- estimation of events such as earthquakes and tural and nonstructural measures; nurturing tsunamis. a strong culture of knowledge and learning Because it is not practical—from a financial, from past disasters; engaging in wise DRM environmental, or social perspective—to build regulation, legislation, and enforcement; and tsunami dikes 20–30 meters high, Japan’s promoting cooperation among multiple stake- government intends to accelerate the current holders, between government agencies and paradigm shift in its thinking about disaster ministries, between the private sector and the management, complementing its structure- government, and across multiple levels of gov- focused approach to prevention with soft ernance, from local to national to international. solutions to achieve an integrated approach to Today, Japan is placing even heavier disaster risk reduction. Understanding that the emphasis on recognizing and respecting com- risks from natural hazards can never be com- plexity and residual risk, designing and man- pletely eliminated, the new, balanced approach aging systems that “fail gracefully”—that is, incorporates community-based prevention that mitigate damage to the greatest extent and evacuation and other nonstructural mea- possible before succumbing to overwhelming sures such as education, risk-related finance force. The essence of the approach is to design and insurance, and land-use regulation. and maintain resilient infrastructure capable of absorbing damage from natural disasters to Learning from disaster is key, as Japan has some extent, even when an event exceeds all shown for the past 2,000 years feasible and affordable measures. In the wake Japan has used the lessons of past disasters to of the GEJE, Japan also recognized that addi- improve its policies, laws, regulations, invest- tional efforts were required to plan and design ment patterns, and decision-making processes, measures capable of countering events of low as well as community and individual behav- probability but high impact. iors. Investing in preparedness and a strong culture of prevention made all the difference in Preventive investments pay, but be the Tohoku region when the GEJE struck. The prepared for the unexpected Meiji-Sanriku Tsunami of 1896 killed 40 per- Japan’s extensive structural precautions were cent of the population in the affected zone, very effective in protecting buildings and peo- whereas the GEJE claimed 4 percent.2 Evacu- ple from the earthquake. Although 190 km of ation drills and DRM education, staples of the the 300 km of dikes in the area collapsed, those country’s schools, kept children safe in Kamai- dikes decreased the force of the tsunami and, shi City. The famous “Kamaishi Miracle” was in some areas, delayed its arrival inland. All not really a miracle at all, but rather the result bullet trains stopped safely without casualty, of a sustained effort to instill a culture of resil- thanks to a cutting-edge system of detecting ience and prevention based on continuous the earliest sign of ground movement. The learning. L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 5 DRM is everyone’s business systems underestimated the height of the Japan’s disaster management system addresses tsunami, local communities and their volun- all phases of disaster prevention, mitigation, teer organizations were front and center in and preparedness; emergency response; as well responding to the disaster. The GEJE showed as recovery and rehabilitation. It specifies the that each community needs to explore and roles and responsibilities of national and local identify its best defense, mixing various soft government and enlists the cooperation of rele- and hard measures, policies, investments, edu- vant stakeholders in both the public and private cation initiatives, and drills, through sound sectors. This comprehensive approach secured analysis and stakeholder consultations. a quick and effective mobilization of forces at The role of the community goes far beyond multiple levels after the 2011 tsunami struck, evacuation, especially in multihazard DRM while also revealing certain problems of coor- (figure O.2). Successful evacuations depend dination that are discussed further on. Since on prior measures such as hazard mapping, the tsunami, the capacity of local DRM plan- warning systems, and ongoing education, all of ning systems to prepare for and react to large- which proved essential in the evacuation that scale disasters has been assessed, and revisions followed the GEJE. During the GEJE, local have been proposed through new legislation. governments and communities in affected Japan’s central government plays a lead- areas served as first responders, managed ing role in mitigating the risks of disaster evacuation centers, and promptly began post- across the country, but local governments disaster reconstruction. Partnerships with the have the principal responsibility for manag- private sector were also critical. Rehabilita- ing the country’s DRM systems. The central tion could begin the day after the earthquake government encourages local governments because agreements with the private sector to promote structural measures by providing were already in place. Quick payment of insur- financial support, producing technical guide- ance claims allowed individuals and businesses lines and manuals, and conducting training for to contribute fully to the rehabilitation effort. technical staff in planning, design, operation, and maintenance. Japan’s tradition of community participa- tion in preparedness was a key factor in mini- Planning mizing the number of lives lost to the GEJE. Hazard map Relocation Community-based DRM activities are well integrated into the daily lives of most Japa- nese, ensuring that awareness of natural haz- ards is never far from their mind. The national Education Community Land-use regulation and local governments formally recognize and support the involvement of the community in DRM through laws and regulations that define Evacuation roles and commitments, through linkages with Drill shelter and route local institutions (such as jichikai, or neighbor- Warning hood associations), and through participation in meetings at which decisions are made. Although dikes and communication sys- Figure O.2 The many roles of the community in tems suffered partial failures and forecasting multihazard DRM 6 | O V E RV I E W Assessing risks and communicating Better management of information and them clearly and widely helps citizens communication is crucial in emergencies make timely decisions to protect and recovery operations themselves The GEJE points to two common information Accurate risk assessment and interactive com- problems: (1) the lack of real-time information munication systems that connect local commu- on conditions and on coordination among par- nities, government agencies, and experts make ties (that is, on who is doing what); and (2) the people less vulnerable and more resilient. But loss of critical public records vital to reconstruc- although risk assessments and DRM technolo- tion. With regard to the first point, during the gies (including prediction systems) can add GEJE the national government collected infor- enormous value, governments and community mation from municipal governments, while members should be aware of their limitations additional information was crowd-sourced and and never stick to a single scenario. channeled through social media and the Inter- net. On the second point, even though some Hazard maps can give the public a local governments lacked a formal backup false sense of safety, if not properly system, data on land ownership were restored communicated fairly quickly, thanks to other official and pri- Although hazard maps showing risk areas vate backups. Nevertheless, health records in and evacuation shelters had been distrib- some cities were destroyed, and new policies to uted before the disaster to households in the avoid a recurrence are needed. tsunami-stricken areas, only 20 percent of the Many postdisaster situations are made people had seen them. Still, 57 percent (which worse by the lack of a communications strategy is a relatively high number by international that makes use of appropriate media to deliver standards) left immediately after the earth- critical messages. Good information enables quake tremors. In some areas, the tsunami of individuals and communities not only to stay 2011 proved far greater than indicated on the safe, but also to contribute more effectively to hazard maps. Warnings that underestimated relief and recovery. It also ensures that citizens the size of the earthquake and tsunami may have a realistic set of expectations about relief have caused people to delay their evacua- and reconstruction. If communication is to help tion, prolonging their exposure to danger. people stay safe and minimize the disruption to Because the magnitude of the GEJE and tsu- their lives, those people must be able to trust the nami far exceeded the predisaster estimates, information and its source. During the GEJE, the Japanese government has been revising communication about evacuation, temporary its methods of assessing earthquake and tsu- shelters, and emergency food distribution was nami hazards, combining historical evidence, handled fairly well, but confusion about the topographical and geological studies, and scope and extent of the nuclear accident led to predictions and forecasts based on scenarios public dissatisfaction, as noted in a report from for events of low probability but high impact. Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. Manufacturers and other companies are rethinking their strategies for business conti- Coordination mechanisms must be nuity. Many Japanese companies are already developed and tested in normal times, so investing in redundancy and diversification that they are ready for use in an emergency within their supply chain, despite the expense Although the national government estab- of such measures. lished the rescue headquarters very quickly, L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 7 and interprefectural emergency and rescue DETAILED FINDINGS AND units and technical forces were deployed in RECOMMENDATIONS record time, mechanisms for formal coor- dination among the various stakeholders The chapters that make up the main body (government agencies at all levels, CSOs, of this report were built around the disci- and private entities) were inadequate. The plines employed in the traditional DRM cycle. GEJE drew an unprecedented level of assis- Grouped into seven thematic clusters that tance from 163 countries and 43 international track that cycle, the chapters treat structural organizations. In all, Japan received $720 measures (part 1) and nonstructural measures million from other countries, almost half of (part 2) as preventive options. They also cover all humanitarian disaster funding dispensed the emergency responses put in place after around the globe in 2011. The weakness of March 11 (part 3) and describe the planning coordination observed on the ground dur- behind the reconstruction process (part 4). ing the GEJE demonstrates that coordination The handling of risk assessment and commu- mechanisms should be established through nication before and after the disaster are the advance agreements and clear definitions of subject of part 5. Part 6 deals with risk financ- responsibility. ing, insurance, and fiscal and financial manage- ment; part 7 with the progress of recovery and Vulnerable groups must be protected— relocation. and engaged This section of the Overview provides the Culturally appropriate services and social reader with additional information and details safety nets for vulnerable groups are needed about the main findings of the project and the in times of emergency and during reconstruc- lessons learned from it, following the scheme tion. They should be planned in advance. of thematic parts used in the chapters. Those Two-thirds of the deaths during the GEJE chapters may be downloaded from http://wbi occurred among people over the age of 60, .worldbank.org/wbi/megadisasters. who accounted for just 30 percent of the pop- ulation in the affected areas. At evacuation Part 1: Structural measures centers, the needs of women and the disabled Dikes are both necessary and effective in pre- were not fully met. New measures are under venting ordinary tsunamis, which are relatively consideration to assure privacy and secu- frequent, but they are of limited use against rity for women, maternal care and gender- the extreme events that occur less frequently. balanced policies, and better nursing care Japan’s Tohoku region built 300 km of coastal for the disabled at evacuation centers. These defense over the course of 50 years. National measures call for empowering marginalized and local governments invested a total of $10 groups for long-term recovery and including billion to build coastal structures and break- a gender perspective in planning and manag- waters in major ports. During the GEJE, the ing shelters, which will require women to be defensive structures along the coast suffered more deeply involved in shelter management. unprecedented damage: 190 of the 300 km of Women should be encouraged to participate coastal structures collapsed under the tsunami in DRM committees, center management, and (figure O.3). In some areas those structures did risk assessment. National and local DRM poli- serve to delay the arrival of the waves, buying cies and strategies should be reviewed from a extra minutes for people to evacuate. Because gender perspective. many tsunami gates designed to reduce 8 | O V E RV I E W Figure O.3 Dikes in Sendai before and after the tsunami of March 11, 2011 Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011. flooding along rivers were toppled, the govern- Earthquake of 1923, the government has made ment of Japan launched a structural assess- regular revisions in light of experiences with ment to better understand the causes of failure. a range of natural disasters. During the GEJE, The assessment concluded that construction most damage to buildings was caused by phe- standards and stability performance under nomena other than the earthquake itself. Liq- worst-case scenarios should be further inves- uefaction occurred on building lots that had tigated. Structures should be able to withstand not been treated against it and in reclaimed waves that exceed their design height, reduc- lands and on riverbanks, damaging small build- ing the force of the water before they collapse ings that lacked pile foundations. and thereby mitigating damages. Tsunami damage to crucial facilities, includ- Reinforced infrastructure and buildings ing the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power sta- erected according to current codes were not tion, had cascading effects in several sectors, seriously damaged. Thanks to Japan’s strict such as power and energy, petroleum refining, and rigorously enforced building codes, steel production, the automobile industry, fish- earthquake-related losses from the March ing, health and medicine, farming, and tele- 2011 disaster were limited, with most of the communications. Critical facilities should be deaths and economic damage being caused by built in safe locations and secured by the most the ensuing tsunami. Since Japan’s first build- sophisticated disaster management plans. The ing code was adopted after the Great Kanto sea wall protecting the Fukushima Daiichi L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 9 nuclear power station had not been designed Over the years, the country’s investments in to withstand the enormous force of the GEJE disaster preparedness have been wide rang- tsunami, because the worst-case scenario had ing, covering seismic and tsunami detection, not been taken into account, as stated by the early-warning systems, multichannel systems official committee formed to investigate the for disseminating warnings, hazard mapping, accident. evacuation planning (routes and shelters), The Interim Report of the Government regular disaster training and drills in schools Investigation Committee on the Accident at and at workplaces, and improved signage. the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station iden- Municipal governments have the main respon- tified three main causes of failure: (1) DRM sibility for disaster management, including plans were focused on earthquakes and not formulating and implementing local disaster tsunamis; (2) complex scenarios with multiple management plans based on the national plan, hazards consisting of earthquakes and tsuna- establishing community-based organizations, mis, compounded by simultaneous transport distributing hazard maps to the public, raising and communication failures, had not been public awareness, and developing evacuation foreseen; and (3) the complex systems at the procedures. nuclear power station had not been managed in an integrated way. The generally accepted Early warnings and communication myth that nuclear power stations are “safe” The risk of underestimating a disaster’s impact had led to an underestimation of certain can be extremely costly. The warnings issued important risks. The analysis has prompted a on March 11 underestimated the tsunami’s reevaluation of risk assessment methods and height and likely caused people to delay their DRM planning and countermeasures. That evacuation. Warning systems were effective reevaluation is likely to shape future policies in mitigating damage, but experience showed and procedures. that they have to be better aligned with the A multilayered approach to DRM is needed, communities’ evacuation procedures. More employing both structural and nonstructural than half of the fleeing population evacuated measures. Defensive infrastructure alone is by vehicle, and a third of them got stuck in traf- not enough to cope with infrequent disasters fic jams before reaching emergency evacuation of high impact. Nonstructural measures also shelters. Many people and their vehicles were need to be established, including early-warning swept away by the tsunami. Although the gen- systems, rigorous planning and regulation, eral rule is to evacuate on foot, vehicles are also prompt evacuation of residents, and a variety needed, particularly to move the elderly and of institutional and financial measures—among disabled. New measures to facilitate evacua- them insurance, rehabilitation funds, and tion by vehicle—for example, rules to mitigate emergency teams. traffic jams and training for drivers on evacu- ation during disasters—should be considered. Part 2: Nonstructural measures The early earthquake detection system saved Japan has had a disaster management system thousands of passengers in the Shinkansen. in place since the Disaster Relief Act of 1947 Nineteen bullet trains (Shinkansen) were run- and has long used disasters as opportunities ning when the GEJE occurred, including two to continuously improve that system. The ini- at 270 km per hour, almost top speed. All were tial emphasis was on disaster response, later able to stop safely thanks to early earthquake complemented by prevention, mitigation, detection systems. The Japan Meteorological and preparedness; emergency response and Agency issues earthquake information based recovery; and rehabilitation and rebuilding. on nationwide seismography and observations 10 | O V E RV I E W of seismic intensity. The agency operates an 90 percent of medium-sized and large compa- earthquake early-warning system that quickly nies indicated that their BCPs had been effec- estimates an earthquake’s focus and magni- tive during the response and recovery phase. tude and forecasts seismic intensities and the arrival time of ground shaking. Relocation and new regulations Land-use regulations, including those that How communities and the private sector relocate houses to higher ground, are suc- saved lives and assets cessful but sometimes difficult to implement. Community-based organizations saved lives For that reason, alternative measures need to and need to be nurtured. When the tsunami be considered. Relocation deeply affects the overwhelmed coastal defenses, local communi- livelihoods and daily lives of many people. ties were forced to use their own knowledge and Houses that had been relocated after the previ- resourcefulness to survive on March 11. Fortu- ous tsunami to hit Yoshihama Village were not nately, throughout the Tohoku region, com- affected by the GEJE. But in the coastal village munities had been intently engaged in tsunami of Taro, identifying suitable relocation sites preparedness. Given the unreliability of predic- proved problematic, since its economic activi- tions and the limitations of defensive structures, ties were situated on the coast. The case of community engagement should be put at the Touni-hongo perhaps best illustrates the ben- center of the disaster-response system. efits of relocation and the challenges of land- The “Kamaishi Miracle” was not a miracle use regulation. Houses that had been relocated at all. Evacuation drills and DRM education to higher ground after an earlier tsunami were are fixtures in Japan’s schools. In Kamaishi unharmed by the GEJE tsunami, whereas City, where the tsunami claimed 1,000 mem- newly constructed houses in the unregulated bers of the population of 40,000, the casualty lowlands were hard hit. These examples high- rate among school children was low: only 5 out light the importance of alternative measures of 2,900 primary and junior high school stu- when relocation is not a realistic option— dents lost their lives, a rate 20 times lower than measures such as disaster-preparedness edu- for the general public. Regular practice drills, cation, evacuation drills, accessible evacuation education in the schools, and hazard maps routes, and appropriately designed structures. are the keys to preparedness. DRM education Japan’s Basic Disaster Management Plan, saves the lives of children and other members as revised after the GEJE, aims to rigorously of the community. enforce earthquake and tsunami countermea- Well-prepared business continuity plans sures. Addressing a new set of scenarios that prevent disruptions. A business continuity plan take into account the largest possible disaster (BCP) identifies an organization’s critical oper- and multiple simultaneous hazards, the plan ations and the potential effects of a disaster, calls for the development of disaster-resilient specifying the response and recovery measures communities, the promotion of disaster aware- the business can take to avoid or minimize ness, increased research and scientific observa- disruptions and continue operations at an tion, and stronger systems to warn of tsunamis acceptable level. The GEJE caused 656 private and deliver evacuation information. companies to go bankrupt within a year. Fully 88 percent of those businesses were located Part 3: Emergency response outside the Tohoku region and failed because Prompt rehabilitation of infrastructure of supply-chain problems. A BCP is essen- The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans- tial regardless of where a business is based. port and Tourism (MLIT) set up its emergency According to a recent survey, between 80 and headquarters at 15:15 (about 30 minutes after L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 11 the quake). Thanks to the dedicated service local governments in areas hit by the GEJE of well-trained and experienced government tsunami have faced difficulties in responding to staff, prior agreements with the private sector, the disaster. The GEJE affected 62 municipali- and advance financial arrangements, the roads ties in six prefectures in northeastern Japan. leading to towns on the affected coast were Among them, 28 municipalities in the three cleared in less than a week. Also, by March worst-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and 15, all 14 ports were either entirely or partially Fukushima) suffered serious damage to their usable and began accepting vessels delivering office facilities. Computer servers in some of emergency supplies and fuel. By April 29, the these municipalities were seriously damaged entire Tohoku Shinkansen line was in opera- or destroyed, resulting in a loss of data essen- tion, as were most of the other railways except tial for the provision of municipal services. To for those along the coast. Water supply ser- make matters worse, many municipalities lost vices were resumed for about 90 percent of their public officials: 221 officials died (see fig- residents within a month, while electric power ure O.4) or remain missing from 17 municipali- was 90 percent restored within a week. ties in the three hardest-hit prefectures. Fukushima’s case was unique. Nine munici- Governance in time of emergency palities near the crippled Fukushima Daiichi The GEJE revealed institutional and legislative nuclear power station had to relocate their features of Japan’s governmental system that offices relatively far from the plant (but mostly enabled it to take speedy action toward recov- within the same prefecture) because of con- ery in coordination with various agencies. In cerns about radiation levels in their jurisdic- many developing countries, rapid recover- tions, even where the physical damage from ies are more challenging owing to shortages the earthquake and the tsunami were very of dedicated agencies and highly skilled and limited. experienced staff. Despite Japan’s strengths, Many prefectures and municipalities out- side Tohoku took the initiative to quickly send their own public officials to help the locali- ties deal with postdisaster relief activities and other emergency operations. About 79,000 local government officials were dispatched from all over Japan to the affected prefectures and municipalities until the end of 2011. A year later, many of them were still serving there in capacities ranging from civil engineering and urban planning to social work and finance. Partnerships to facilitate emergency operations Twinning arrangements between localities in disaster-affected areas and their counterparts in unaffected areas proved to be effective in dealing with the emergencies. Some of these Figure O.4 Otsuchi’s mayor was in front of town hall when the tsunami arrangements were based on formal agree- struck ments, while others were based on goodwill. Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari (April 2011). Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. Where local governments are concerned, it is 12 | O V E RV I E W advisable to formalize such mechanisms before management support from local governments disasters strike, obtaining the necessary legal in unaffected areas. backing and clarifying cost-sharing arrange- ments. In a large-scale disaster, this kind of Evacuation centers and temporary housing counterpart system—in which an unaffected At the peak of the relief effort, more than local government provides support to another 470,000 people were housed in evacua- local government that has been affected by the tion centers. After the disaster struck, nearly disaster—allows support and assistance to be 2,500 evacuation facilities were established provided to all affected areas. For obvious rea- in the Tohoku region, with additional shelters sons, it is essential that the linked prefectures located outside Tohoku. Most facilities, such as and municipalities be geographically distant. schools and community centers, were publicly Support agreements with localities in the same owned and had already been designated as region may not be effective, particularly in a evacuation centers. After the GEJE, however, large-scale disaster like the GEJE that affected private facilities, such as hotels and temples, almost an entire region. were enlisted, because the need for centers far Coordination among government, CSOs, exceeded expectations. Many evacuees stayed and other stakeholders to deal with the emer- with relatives or friends. As construction of gency on the ground was an overwhelming temporary housing progressed, evacuees grad- challenge. Expert teams, CSOs, volunteers, and ually moved out of the centers. Four months military forces from around the world mobi- after the disaster, about 75 percent of the evac- lized to help those of Japan, with 163 countries, uation facilities had closed, although some in 43 international organizations, and countless Tohoku stayed open as long as nine months. CSOs offering aid and relief. Foreign assistance Because a megadisaster is likely to interrupt far exceeded that provided in the wake of the essential services such as water and power, it is Kobe earthquake in 1995. Considering the critical to install alternatives such as portable difficulties faced by local governments after toilets and power generators. Sendai City plans the GEJE, coordination mechanisms should to equip its shelters with solar panels and other be established in the central government, or renewable energy options for backup power. under an umbrella organization. In Fukushima, many had to relocate from The system for delivery of relief goods one evacuation center to another as the gov- encountered several problems, but measures ernment expanded the mandatory evacuation have been identified to address them. The zone. Some 82 percent of evacuees changed main problems in the delivery of relief goods centers at least three times, and one-third were fuel shortages, interruption of telecom- changed more than five times. People in Fuku- munication services, and mismatches between shima have continued to migrate to other areas supply and demand that caused goods to be in and out the prefecture. At the end of 2011, stockpiled in prefectural and municipal depots more than 150,000 people had been evacuated, instead of being delivered promptly to people at least 60,000 of whom relocated to other pre- in need. Several measures can be taken to fectures across the country. address these issues, including prior surveys At many centers, a self-governing body of depots, advance estimation of the quanti- emerged, with leaders and members of various ties of emergency goods that will be required, committees selected by the evacuees them- guidelines on relief goods that are not likely selves. Although managing evacuation centers to be culturally acceptable, support from pro- is a municipal responsibility, most municipali- fessional logistics specialists, and logistics ties in the disaster-affected areas suffered staff L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 13 losses, seriously weakening their capacity to shelters. The earthquake and tsunami left cope with the emergency. At the beginning, children feeling frightened, confused, and most centers were supported by local teach- insecure. Following the GEJE, the number ers, volunteers, and other civil society groups. of incoming calls to Childline, a free counsel- As the evacuation period lengthened, evacuees ing service for children, increased fourfold in themselves started taking initiatives to manage Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate prefectures. their communities. The government plans to send some 1,300 One of the problems cited at many shelters mental health counselors to public schools in was lack of gender sensitivity. There was not the affected areas. But the experience points to enough privacy for anyone, but particularly the importance of bringing in professional staff not for women, many of whom did not have to care for the disabled and vulnerable. private spaces where they could change their Japan has learned many lessons about tem- clothes or breast-feed their babies. Many shel- porary housing from past experience with ters eventually installed partitions, but these disaster recovery. In Kobe, for example, large improvements often were late in coming. It tracts of temporary housing were built too far has also been reported that relief goods deliv- from the city center. The housing was allo- ered to the shelters were biased in favor of cated through a lottery system that created male evacuees. The lack of gender sensitivity more hardship for those residents (especially has been attributed to the fact that men were the elderly) who wound up far from their old largely responsible for managing the shelters, neighborhoods and suffered from the loss whether in facilities owned by municipalities of community. The housing should be easily or those managed by the evacuees themselves. accessible, and complementary care services In Japan, the overwhelming majority of the should be provided. Community-based orga- leaders of community organizations are male. nizations (such as Japan’s jichikai) can help The special needs of vulnerable groups— community members cope with the stresses of including the elderly, children, and the extended stays in transition shelters. disabled—need to be included in transition- shelter initiatives. The disabled often were New crowd-sourced information and the use not provided with proper care at evacuation of social media and FM radio Social media were extensively used for searches, rescues, and fundraising. Social media are Web-based applications that use the Internet to connect people (prominent exam- ples are Twitter and Facebook) as well as web- sites and computer applications that enable users to collaborate and create content, such as Wikipedia and YouTube. Emergency FM radio also played a crucial role in the aftermath of the GEJE (figure O.5). When the emergency com- munication systems in many cities broke down because of power failures and lack of emer- gency backup power, community radio stations were able to send useful information out to residents. In fact, about 20 emergency broad- Figure O.5. Broadcasting at RINGO Radio casting stations dedicated to disseminating Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. disaster information were set up in the Tohoku 14 | O V E RV I E W area. In the immediate aftermath of the disas- At the municipal level, most of the disaster- ter, these community radio stations began to affected municipalities developed recovery provide information about times and locations plans based on the pertinent policies of the for the distribution of emergency food, water, national and prefectural governments. Munici- and goods. In the following months they grad- palities have focused on land-use planning to ually shifted to providing other information to build more resilient communities, including help victims in their daily lives or to raise the relocation, reconstruction projects, and con- spirits of people in local communities. Radio sensus building among residents on relocation was particularly appreciated by the elderly, and reconstruction plans. Reports on some who were less likely than younger people to outcomes of these planning efforts are offered have access to Internet information. in cluster 7. With the relatively high levels of mobile- Special reconstruction zones will be identi- phone penetration in developing countries, fied based on proposals by local governments social media could be very useful during disas- in the disaster-affected areas, where conces- ters, at least to the extent that they are already sions and incentives (regulatory, fiscal, budget- used in normal times. They can also serve to ary, and financial) will be granted to companies link up with communities outside the stricken that set up new facilities. areas to facilitate the acquisition and alloca- tion of aid and assistance. In many develop- Hastening recovery and reconstruction ing countries, lack of physical accessibility to through cooperation between communities disaster-affected sites is a key issue. Mobile and local and national governments networks and social media can be used to col- Communities should be involved from the lect and share localized information to improve outset in planning reconstruction. In the areas access. Reliability or trustworthiness of infor- affected by the GEJE, consultations between mation is an extremely important factor in the governments and communities were the rule, use of social media. Local governments and and community representatives were invited relevant national government agencies should, to serve alongside experts on recovery plan- therefore, consider using social media in their ning committees from the earliest stages. The public relations activities during normal times. most common ways of collecting residents’ When disasters occur, those channels can be opinions were surveys and workshops. The used to share disaster-related information central government and local governments with the public. outside the disaster-affected area helped affected municipalities plan their recovery by Part 4: Reconstruction planning conducting research, seconding staff, and hir- A new law for reconstruction ing professionals to provide technical support. Based on the recommendations of Japan’s University faculty members, architects, engi- Reconstruction Design Council, the national neers, lawyers, and members of NGOs partici- government issued the Basic Act for Recon- pated in the municipal planning process. struction and the Basic Guidelines for Recon- struction. The Reconstruction Agency, which Debris and waste management the prime minister heads, was established There was an urgent need to dispose of 20 mil- under the oversight of the cabinet to promote lion tons of debris left behind by the GEJE and and coordinate reconstruction policies and tsunami, some of it contaminated by radioac- measures in an integrated manner. At the pre- tivity. The debris was an enormous obstacle to fectural level, the three disaster-affected pre- rescue, and it still impedes reconstruction. The fectures developed their own recovery plans. amount of tsunami-related debris in Iwate was L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 15 11 times greater than a normal year’s waste. tsunami risk. The official hazard map depicted In Miyagi, it was 19 times greater. To has- risk areas that were smaller than the areas ten recovery, local governments across Japan actually affected by the GEJE. Given the uncer- worked together to remove debris. Among tainties associated with hazard prediction and the many issues that arose were the availabil- risk assessment, earthquake and tsunami risks ity and selection of storage sites,3 methods of should be assessed based on multiple sce- incineration, decisions about recycling, and narios, taking into account every conceivable waste treatment and disposal. Under Japan’s eventuality and utilizing all the tools science Local Autonomy Act, municipal governments has to offer. They should also be informed by are expected to treat disaster-related waste historical records going back as far as possible, in accordance with the prefectural govern- combined with a thorough analysis of the liter- ment’s waste-management plan, and different ature in the field, topographical and geological treatment and disposal methods must be used studies, and other scientific findings. depending on the composition of the debris. All districts along the Tohoku coast had pre- The possibility of recycling should be consid- pared tsunami hazard maps prior to the GEJE, ered. In general, authorities should prepare but the extent of flooding experienced in some for disasters by designating temporary storage areas far exceeded the maximum extent of sites, traffic routes for transporting waste, and inundation predicted on the maps (map O.2). so forth. The role of the private sector in debris Hazard maps are used by local governments management, as well as cooperation with orga- in their disaster-preparedness plans to raise nizations and government bodies outside the awareness of the risks of disaster among local affected areas, should be explored. residents. The hazard map is a crucial tool for communicating information on risks and Livelihood and job creation countermeasures. Involving the community Maintaining existing sources of income and in its preparation helps raise awareness and creating jobs are crucial during the reconstruc- maximize engagement when a disaster strikes. tion phase. When reconstruction is delayed, The sharing of information among govern- income normally generated by neighborhood ments, communities, and experts left much to shops or restaurants will be lost. Under the be desired. For example, only 20 percent of the “Japan as One” work project, local govern- population had seen the hazard maps before the ments in priority areas can avail themselves March 11 disaster. Effective risk communication of job-creation funds. The town of Minami- does not necessarily require a sophisticated sanriku, for example, received financial sup- communication system. Although science- port for fiscal year 2011. As of January 2012, based early-warning systems are important it had undertaken 47 job-creation projects during a disaster, regular sharing of predisaster employing 460 people. The town will likely information at the local level is equally impor- receive more financial support for additional tant. The sharing should be accompanied—over employment and livelihood projects. time and with the community’s involve- ment—by disaster drills, community mapping, Part 5: Hazard and risk information and and other measures. In recent years, remote- decision making sensing data has been used around the world to The limitations of predictive and risk- rapidly map the damage resulting from natural assessment technologies need to be under- disasters. Japan has a well-established track stood. In Miyagi, the government predicted a record in disaster mapping: as early as 1995, high probability of an earthquake occurring remotely sensed data were used to map the but underestimated its size and the ensuing damage from the Kobe earthquake. 16 | O V E RV I E W Map O.2 Actual inundation areas a. Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture b. Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture were much larger Actual inundation Inundation predicted than predicted on hazard maps Source: Cabinet Office. Part 6: The economics of disaster risk, risk forced to suspend production, as the impact management, and risk financing of supply-chain disruptions triggered by the Prompt government intervention to keep disaster spread through the globe’s networked damage from spreading across sectors production system. A dense network of supply and countries chains runs throughout Japan, enabling manu- In 2011, the GEJE contributed to a 0.7 percent facturers to engage in highly efficient produc- contraction of Japan’s GDP. But the full extent tion while keeping inventory to a minimum. of the GEJE’s economic impacts will not be But this efficiency-oriented management of known for some time. Manufacturing and ser- supply networks backfired in the wake of the vices suffered significant direct and indirect earthquake. Although Japanese companies impacts. Direct damage to buildings has been were remarkably responsive, restoring supply estimated at approximately ¥10.4 trillion, chains and getting production almost back to or 62 percent of total damages. The amount normal by the end of summer 2011, the need of damage to the capital stock (asset base) remains to create more resilient supply chains of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries is esti- both inside and outside Japan. mated as ¥2.34 trillion, while damage to the The auto industry recorded the greatest fall tourism industry amounts to approximately in production but recovered rapidly as facilities ¥0.7 trillion. reopened and vital transport networks were Although the Tohoku and Kanto regions repaired. After an initial 15.0 percent drop in were the most directly affected by the earth- March, industrial production rebounded from quake, the entire manufacturing sector in April onward, with growth of 6.2 percent in Japan and some industries abroad were May and 3.8 percent in June. L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 17 Because of the accident at the Fukushima Part 7: Recovery and relocation Daiichi nuclear power plant and damages to Relocation and new regulations for land use other power plants, the government had to cut in at-risk areas in the wake of megadisasters power consumption in the Tohoku and Kanto Since the GEJE, the Japanese government regions in the summer of 2011. The govern- has strengthened DRM systems based on les- ment ordered large-scale users to cut their con- sons learned from that event. One of those les- sumption by 15 percent and called on smaller sons is that relocation is effective in mitigating electricity users and individual households to disaster damage. However, managing reloca- curb their consumption voluntarily. tion projects—and consulting with affected The government played an important role in communities—is challenging. It is difficult to alleviating the disaster’s impact on households achieve a consensus among community mem- and businesses through measures to ensure the bers on any rehabilitation plan. For example, stability of the financial system, timely approv- while some prefer to rebuild their hometowns als of supplementary budgets, and provisions on the original sites, others want to move to for rapid disbursement of disaster assistance, safer areas. all of which helped citizens and firms jump- Governments should examine various start their recovery processes. The financial recovery schemes, such as relocation to safer resources for recovery and reconstruction are areas, and reconstruction at the original sites. being funded by taxes to avoid leaving the cost When planning a recovery scheme, it is cru- to future generations. cial to consider community needs. But there Earthquake insurance helps people get is a trade-off between speed and quality in the back on their feet. Dual earthquake insurance recovery process. A government can promptly programs, consisting of private nonlife insur- rehabilitate towns by taking a top-down ers and cooperative mutual insurers, cover approach. On the other hand, community con- about four in ten Japanese households. These sultation requires more time. programs do not provide a one-size-fits-all Local governments should establish a par- solution, however. They offer a range of cov- ticipatory mechanism, since community par- erage based on level of risk and other factors. ticipation is essential in promoting recovery. Data on natural disasters by country show One lesson from the humanitarian response that both industrialized and developing coun- systems used after the Indian Ocean tsunami tries have the same probability of suffering in 2004 is the importance of striving to under- a disaster. The difference is that developed stand local contexts and working with and countries tend to have more comprehensive through local structures. Experts and CSOs and effective central government policies and are expected to play a role in assisting recov- better-developed insurance markets, which ery, for example, by organizing and facilitat- protect lives and preserve economic assets. ing workshops or consultation meetings and A functioning market in catastrophic risk working with government and other experts insurance requires major investments in risk (see figure O.6). models, exposure databases, product design, A cross-sectoral approach is required pricing, and other basic infrastructure of the to rehabilitate people’s daily lives. Organi- system. Governments can play an important zations should harmonize recovery plans role in fostering the growth of this kind of among all sectors concerned, such as roads, infrastructure, thereby enabling the private DRM, and urban planning. Coordination insurance industry to offer cost-effective and among local governments, the ministries of affordable insurance solutions. the central government, and reconstruction 18 | O V E RV I E W members to assume responsibility for rebuild- ing their lost dwellings. This approach is desir- able because it allows people to rebuild to suit their needs and because it lightens the load on government. Some groups, however, such as the low-income and the elderly, cannot rebuild on their own because of financial constraints. Local governments in the Tohoku area are pro- viding these groups with public housing. Support from experts and private sector involvement are useful. Because completing Figure O.6 Community rehabilitation facilitator large tracts of public housing in a short time is Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency. a difficult task, local governments responsible for reconstruction works should accept assis- agencies is crucial for effective planning and tance from other organizations and experts, implementation. and through public-private partnerships. Local governments should lead recovery, Local governments are well advised to take but support from the national government is advantage of the private sector’s experience essential. Since local governments can more with project management. closely respond to the varied needs of affected Local governments should formulate a plan people on the ground, they should take the to operate and maintain public housing. While principal responsibility for recovery planning the central government provides financial sup- and implementation. The national government port for construction, local governments and should support local governments’ efforts by the affected population will have to operate creating legislation and new project schemes, and maintain public housing. Local govern- providing subsidies, and providing technical ments should consider operation and mainte- support (such as conducting tsunami simula- nance at the design stage. tions and dispatching technical staff ). Preserving cultural heritage The relative merits of “self-reconstruction” In Japan, earthquakes and tsunamis have and public housing in postdisaster damaged an enormous number of cultural reconstruction properties—for example, 744 designated cul- An essential task of government is to help peo- tural properties were damaged by the GEJE. ple affected by natural disasters, particularly A country’s cultural heritage is fundamen- the most vulnerable groups, to reconstruct tal for national and community pride and for permanent housing. Local governments must social cohesion. Historical monuments are strive to identify the best way to provide such regarded as national and community treasures. assistance. Close communication between gov- Since these properties are deeply connected to ernment and affected communities is an essen- people’s lives and communities’ history, their tial aspect of any effective response. disappearance is equivalent to losing part of a Governments should establish support nation’s identity. mechanisms for housing reconstruction, in Governments should embrace the impor- particular, for vulnerable and low-income tance of preserving cultural heritage. Protect- groups. Wherever possible, local govern- ing and preserving cultural properties and ments should encourage affected community historical buildings are often considered low L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 19 priorities in disaster management. The DRM live. To date, those affected do not have a clear plans of governments rarely cover the preser- vision of when they can return to their origi- vation of cultural heritage. nal communities. Even in areas where living It is important to prepare for disasters restrictions have been lifted, there are few job by conducting collaborative activities with opportunities, educational opportunities, and local communities during normal times. The medical and other social services. In addition, owners of historical records, local residents, the fear of radiation has not yet dissipated. government officials, and experts should be Many displaced people continue to reside in involved in creating a mechanism for preserva- transition shelters, perpetuating the possibility tion. Without systems for preserving histori- of conflict between the host community and cal records, records in private collections are temporary residents. at a high risk of disappearing during disasters. Nuclear disaster can divide a society. The Digital copies should be made of original his- affected population of Fukushima has been torical records. These copies are crucial when divided by differences in radiation exposure, original records are lost to disaster for their risk perception, age, and income. Follow- contribution to the preservation and rehabili- ing adjustments to evacuation zoning, some tation process. affected people have begun to return to their Museums should produce a database of hometowns. More than 20,000 people in four properties. Information on properties is cru- municipalities, however, will not be able to cial in conducting preservation work after return to their communities for at least five disasters. At a museum in Rikuzentakata City, years because of high levels of radiation. Some it was quite difficult for experts to address groups, in particular families with children, are the property and materials they encountered, seriously concerned about radiation and have since the staff had died in the disaster and all moved outside the prefecture, while others stay information was lost. on. In general, younger people tend to move away and start new lives, while older people Recovering from damage to the Fukushima seek to return to their home communities. Peo- Daiichi Nuclear Power Station ple with higher incomes are more likely than The recovery process following the nuclear poorer people to relocate voluntarily. accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Prolonged evacuation causes conflict Power Station on March 11, 2011, presented between communities. Conflicts have emerged challenges different from those faced in the between evacuees and host communities. recovery of areas damaged by the tsunami Towns and villages in the prefecture that suf- waves and tremors of the GEJE. The nuclear fered from the earthquakes and tsunamis are accident left communities concerned with the hosting evacuees from areas affected by the serious effects of radiation exposure, reloca- nuclear accident. Because the evacuees occupy tion, the dissolution of families, the disruption housing and use public services (such as health, of livelihoods and lifestyles, and the contami- education, and transport facilities) in the host nation of vast areas. communities, natives encounter shortages, Following the nuclear accident, people in leading to resentment, which is exacerbated Fukushima were removed to municipalities by the fact that evacuees from the nuclear acci- and prefectures outside their home communi- dent are being compensated by the operator of ties. There they faced difficulties finding hous- the nuclear plant. ing, jobs, and schooling in unfamiliar places. Developing “temporary towns” is an enor- Many families separated in the process of seek- mous challenge. Developing temporary sites ing employment and uncontaminated places to for evacuees in other municipalities is more 20 | O V E RV I E W complicated than the normal practice of about the risks and consequences of devastat- building resettlement shelters in the disaster- ing events, and by making informed decisions affected area. It is necessary to clarify respon- to better manage both. Disaster management sibilities and cost-sharing arrangements is increasingly important as the global econ- among the affected and the host municipalities omy becomes more interconnected, as envi- and with the national and prefectural govern- ronmental conditions shift, and as population ments. The question of how to use the facili- densities rise in urban areas around the world. ties and buildings of the temporary towns after As the GEJE showed, proactive approaches evacuees return to their hometowns will have to risk management can reduce the loss of to be studied and resolved. human life and avert economic and financial Radiation monitoring requires participation setbacks. To be maximally effective, and to from various stakeholders (such as communi- contribute to stability and growth over the ties, governments, and academia) to produce long term, the management of risks from natu- an accountable database. Merely providing ral disasters should be mainstreamed into all risk information on radiation is not enough to aspects of development planning in all sectors prevent rumors or to overcome their influence. of the economy. CONCLUSION NOTES 1. The GDLN is a network of video-conferencing The global cost of natural hazards in 2011 has facilities in many locations around the world that been estimated at $380 billion—resources that can be mobilized on short notice for real-time could have been used in productive activi- meetings and workshops. ties to boost economies, reduce poverty, and 2. The Meiji tsunami occurred at night, whereas the raise the quality of life. No region or country GEJE struck during the day. 3. Waste treatment outside the affected area is usu- is exempt from natural disasters, and no coun- ally required but difficult to arrange. Previous try can prevent them from occurring. But all experience in Tohoku suggested that finding can prepare by learning as much as possible dumping sites would be a problem. L E S S O N S F RO M T H E G R E AT E A S T J A PA N E A RT H Q U A K E | 21 PART I Structural Measures CHAPTER 1 Structural Measures Against Tsunamis Structures such as dikes play a crucial role in preventing disasters by controlling tsunamis, floods, debris flows, landslides, and other natural phenomena. But structural measures alone cannot prevent all disasters because they cannot mitigate damages when the hazard exceeds the level that the struc- tures are designed to withstand. The Great East Japan Earthquake demonstrated the limitations of Japan’s existing disaster management systems, which relied too heavily on dikes and other structures. Damage can be kept to a minimum by multilayered approaches to disaster mitigation that include structural and nonstructural measures and that ensure the safe evacuation of residents. Dikes, dams, and other structures are regarded damage had substantially decreased because as core measures in disaster risk management of concentrated investment in structural mea- (DRM) in Japan. Japan has constructed dikes sures (chapter 28). to mitigate flooding for nearly 2,000 years. Surrounded by seas, Japan has an extremely The first dike system was constructed in the long, geographically complex coastline of Yodogara River in Osaka in the 4th century. approximately 35,000 kilometers (km). People, The Japanese used dike systems to protect cru- productive assets, and social capital are concen- cial areas, such as castles and residential areas, trated on small coastal plains over a limited land in the middle and early modern periods. The area. Not only are Japan’s coastal areas situated government established after the Meiji Revo- where earthquakes are exceptionally common, lution in the late 19th century has promoted but they are also subject to harsh natural events, structural measures to control floods, high such as typhoons and winter ocean storms. His- tides, landslides, and tsunamis by employing torically, the country has suffered severe dam- modern technology introduced from the Neth- age from tsunamis, storm surges, ocean waves, erlands and other Western countries. Disaster and other natural phenomena. To protect life 25 BOX 1.1 the cost), built 270 km of the total, with the national government building the remain- The enormous tsunami walls of Taro, Miyako City, ing 30 km. The national government also had Iwate Prefecture developed technical standards, guidelines, and manuals for use in the design and construction The people of the Tohoku region have built and maintained tsunami dikes of coastal structures. In response to the eco- for decades. Following the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami of 1896, the village of Taro was hit by a 15-meter tsunami that washed out 285 houses and killed nomic damage caused by the Great East Japan 1,447 people. The 7.6-meter Showa Sanriku Tsunami of 1933 also hit Taro, Earthquake (GEJE)—¥300 billion ($3.75 bil- washing out all 503 houses and killing 889 of the village’s 2,950 residents. lion) in destroyed dikes—the government has Because insufficient high ground could be found for 500 houses, the vil- invested several hundred billion yen in dike lage chose to build dikes. Construction began in 1934 using borrowed mon- construction in the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- ey and took more than three decades to complete. The largest dike was shima prefectures. It has also invested ¥400 2,433 meters long and 7 meters high (10.65 meters above the sea level). It was 3 meters wide at the top and as much as 25 meters wide at the base. billion ($5 billion) in constructing bay mouth The March 11 tsunami swept over this dike before destroying it, leaving a breakwaters in major ports, such as Kamaishi, path of death and destruction across the community. Kuji, and Ofunato, to protect them from tsu- namis. A cost-benefit analysis of these invest- ments appears in chapter 28. The disaster-affected region had frequently sustained devastating damage from tsunamis, including the Sanriku tsunamis of June 1896 and March 1933, and a tsunami caused by a massive earthquake off the coast of Chile in May 1960. The 1933 Showa Sanriku Tsunami was the first disaster to provoke modern tsu- nami countermeasures at the initiative of the central and prefectural governments. Those Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari/World Bank. Used with permission. Further permission countermeasures included mainly relocation required for reuse. to higher ground and the building of dikes, albeit at just five sites (box 1.1). The Chilean Earthquake Tsunami of 1960 and property concentrated near its coastline, prompted extensive construction of coastal the country has been developing coastal and dikes in the region. The dike height was ini- port facilities for the last half century. tially based on the height of the 1960 tsunami but was revised several times thereafter to take into account other major tsunamis that had FINDINGS occurred in the previous 120 years, as well as predictions of future storm surge levels. These Coastal structures in the region affected dikes are designed to withstand the largest by the Great East Japan Earthquake of the predicted tsunami heights and storm When the tsunami hit eastern Japan in March surge levels. In Iwate and northern Miyagi, 2011, 300 km of coastal dikes, some as high as the heights were based on historical records, 15 meters high, had been built (map 1.1). Pre- whereas in southern Miyagi and Fukushima fectural governments, which have the main they were based on the predicted storm surges. responsibility for building the dikes (supported Methods of risk assessment are explained in by national subsidies that cover two-thirds of chapter 25. 26 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES 20 How structures performed against the 25 10 15 5 1 (meters) Hirono GEJE tsunami Kuji Some towns in the region were well protected Noda Fudai by the structures in place, even though the tsu- Tanohata Design heights were Iwaizumi nami caused by the earthquake far exceeded decided based on Tarou their design height. In Iwate’s Fudai Village, historical records. Miyako Yamada the 15.5-meter floodgate, built in 1984, pro- Otsuchi tected the village and its 3,000 inhabitants. The Kamaishi Ofunato village was severely damaged by the Meiji San- Rikuzentakata riku Tsunami of 1896 (height 15.2 meters), the Kesennuma Minamisanriku Showa Sanriku Tsunami of 1933 (11.5 meters), Ishinomaki and the Chilean Earthquake Tsunami of 1960 Onagawa Higashimatsushima (11.5 meters). The mayor of the village in the Matsushima Shiogama early 1980s was convinced that a 15-meter Shichigahama tsunami would hit the village again at some Sendai Natori point, and built the 200-meter-wide floodgate Iwanuma about 300 meters inland from the mouth of Watari Yamamoto the Fudaigawa River, which runs through the Shinchi village. Although the 20-meter-high GEJE Soma Minamisoma tsunami did top the floodgate, the gate kept Design heights were Namie the water from reaching the town center (fig- decided based on storm Futaba surge predictions. Okuma ure 1.1). The topography of Fudai Village, being Tomioka Naraha surrounded by cliffs with a narrow opening to Hirono the sea, was a major factor in enabling the con- Iwaki struction of such a high gate. Dike design height The dikes also served to protect communi- Dike height constructed ties in areas where the tsunami was lower than GEJE tsunami height the dike (northern Iwate, Aomori, Ibaraki, and Map 1.1 Determining dike height Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). others), as shown in the example of Hirono Town (figure 1.2). Photo taken No inundation on March 28. Town center Inundated area Fudai Levee height T. P.+12.0m Figure 1.2 No tsunami inundation Figure 1.1 Inundation area in Fudai Village, Iwate in Hirono Town, Source: MLIT. Tsunami height Iwate T. P.+9.5m Source: MLIT. Note: T.P. = tidal plane. 27 Certain breakwaters were also effective delayed its arrival by some six minutes, allow- in mitigating damage from the tsunami. The ing more time for people to evacuate to higher breakwater at the mouth of Kamaishi Bay in ground (figure 1.3). Kamaishi City, Iwate, was completed in 2009, The GEJE tsunami destroyed many coastal at a total cost of some ¥120 billion ($1.5 bil- structures. Of the 300 km of dikes along the lion). It was the world’s deepest breakwater. 1,700 km coast of the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- Although destroyed by the GEJE tsunami, the shima prefectures, 190 km were destroyed or breakwater reduced the tsunami’s force, and badly damaged. In many cases the tsunami therefore its height, by about 40 percent and was twice the height of the dikes (map 1.1). All 21 ports along the Pacific coast in the Tohoku region (from Aomori to Ibaraki) sustained Without breakwater Run-up height Tsunami height 20.2 m extensive damage to their breakwaters, quays, 13.7 m 6.7 m and other coastal facilities, suspending all port functions. 204 m Tsunami overtopped 4-meter seawall Run-up from the tsunami caused signifi- 20 km 28 min. after the cant damage along major rivers in the region. earthquake Traces of the run-up were found as far as With breakwater Run-up height 49 km upstream from the mouth of the Kita- Tsunami height 10 m Tsunami height 10.8 m 8m kami River. Ishinomaki City in the Miyagi 6.7 m Prefecture, where the Kitakami flows out to Tsunami Tsunami overtopped the sea, experienced severe tsunami run-up breakwater 4-meter seawall 36 min. after the in addition to the direct attack along the coast. earthquake Approximately 73  square kilometers (km2) along the river, or about 13 percent of the entire city, were inundated (map 1.2). The city suffered badly, with 3,280 dead and 539 miss- ing (as of March 11, 2012); 20,901 houses were Without breakwater With breakwater completely destroyed, and 10,923 houses badly 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 damaged (as of October 21, 2011). Tsunami height (m) New thinking about structural measures 6-minute delay in arrival in light of the GEJE of tsunami (tsunami height of 4 m) The GEJE exposed the limitations of DRM 15 Tsunami height strategies focused disproportionately on struc- Water surface elevation (m) 13.7 m → 8.0 m tural measures. Dikes and breakwaters built 10 before the GEJE were designed to protect against relatively frequent tsunamis, and were 5 effective in preventing damage from those 0 of limited height. In the GEJE, however, the height of the tsunami far exceeded predictions. –5 Although the structures helped to reduce water 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Time after earthquake (min.) levels, to delay the arrival of the tsunami, and With breakwater Without breakwater to maintain the coastline, many of them were Figure 1.3 Effectiveness of the Kamaishi tsunami breached, resulting in enormous inland damage. breakwater Planning for the largest possible event is Source: MLIT. a significant policy shift in Japan’s thinking 28 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES about DRM. Building 20- or 30-meter tsunami dikes is neither realistic nor financially, socially, Pacific Ocean Kitakamigawa River or environmentally practical. But lives can and must be protected by other means, notably multilayered approaches that combine struc- tural and nonstructural measures to ensure the safe evacuation of residents (chapter 32). Nonstructural measures are discussed in the Kyu-Kitakamigawa River chapters of cluster 2. Planning for the new generation of multilayered DRM approaches is based on a comprehensive assessment of his- torical records, documents, and physical traces CBD of Ishinomaki of past tsunamis, and by drawing on the latest seismological research and simulations. Since the GEJE, the Japanese govern- Ishinomaki Bay ment has taken a two-level approach. Level 1 Map 1.2 Tsunami inundation area along the Kitakami and Kyu-Kitakami rivers includes tsunamis that occur as frequently as Source: MLIT. Note: CBD = central business district. every 100 years and that cause significant dam- age, whereas level 2 covers the largest possible tsunami, which has an extremely low probabil- Level 1 tsunami Level 2 tsunami ity of occurrence (once every 1,000 years) but has the power to cause devastating destruction Highly resilient (figure 1.4).1 Conventional structural measures structure such as dikes and breakwaters protect human lives and property, and stabilize local economic activities, in the face of level 1 tsunamis. To withstand level 2 tsunamis, however, coastal Figure 1.4 Countermeasures against level 1 and level 2 tsunamis Source: MLIT. structures must be improved to be more resis- tant to collapse and to reduce the likelihood of their complete destruction through scour- (Outside port) ing (figure 1.5). Some 87 percent of dikes that Scoring of foundation Overflow Overflow had been reinforced against scouring were not is prevented by mass. damaged in the GEJE, although the tsunami Caisson is held in Tsunami wave spilled over them. force place by raised Caisson The government has issued new guidelines foundation mound. Height for rebuilding river and coastal structures, tak- increase ing into consideration their appearance as well as local characteristics, ecosystems, sustain- Figure 1.5 Structure of a highly resilient breakwater ability issues, and financial feasibility. Source: MLIT. Operation of floodgates the case of the GEJE tsunami this operation and inland lock gates could not be completed in time, and a number Although floodgates and inland lock gates can of volunteer firefighters and other workers protect against tsunamis, their operation posed were killed in the process. In addition, many problems during the GEJE. Such gates should gates were left open because equipment failed be closed before the tsunami arrives, but in or because operators were caught in traffic 1: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES AGAINST TSUNAMIS | 29 jams and could not reach the site. Other gates An appropriate combination of structural became nonfunctional owing to power losses. and nonstructural measures is required In December 2011, the Flood Prevention Act in order to achieve maximum mitigation was amended to require local governments to of damage. Structural measures should be ensure the safety of volunteer firefighters and designed to prevent damage to human lives other workers who operate floodgates, inland and property caused by level 1 events and lock gates, and similar facilities. In March to mitigate damage from level 2 events. 2012, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, • Building design can mitigate damage if Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Fire not prevent it. Though it is unrealistic to and Disaster Management Agency issued the build structures large enough to protect following recommendations to local govern- against the largest conceivable events, ments and other concerned organizations: the resilience of conventional structures • Remove unnecessary floodgates and ensure must be enhanced. These should be built that the remaining floodgates can be oper- to mitigate damage even when the haz- ated automatically, semiautomatically, or ard level exceeds their design specifica- by remote control. tions. It is possible for structures to “fail gracefully” (meaning that they do not fail • Keep inland lock gates closed at all times. completely or collapse), thereby delaying Introduce automatic floating gate systems the onslaught and reducing the energy of or install ramps or steps. tsunamis. The concept of failure should be • Install emergency power supplies and incorporated into the design to take into make facilities earthquake-resistant. account unforeseen events. • Power failure and other emergency con- ditions need to be considered in structure LESSONS design. Coastal facilities such as flood- gates should be designed so that they can • Structural measures alone cannot prevent be properly managed even in the event of tsunami disasters. The enormous tsunamis power failure and in the absence of opera- experienced in the GEJE have revealed tors. Standardized guidelines should be the limitations of DRM measures that rely established for their safe operation in too heavily on structures. Many dikes and emergencies. breakwaters were destroyed by the GEJE tsunami. They were nevertheless effec- tive to some extent in reducing inundation RECOMMENDATIONS FOR areas and mitigating damage. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES • It is important to learn from past disasters and to revise countermeasures accordingly. Prepare for disasters by integrating structural In the GEJE-affected areas, various struc- and nonstructural measures. DRM measures tural measures had been implemented in should account for two levels of hazard. Level 1 light of historical disasters, and they were events are relatively frequent and produce major successful in mitigating damage until the damage; level 2 events, the largest possible GEJE. Scenarios that envision the greatest disasters, have an extremely low probability but possible hazard should be taken into con- produce a devastating impact. Every possible sideration when designing DRM measures. structural and nonstructural measure should be 30 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES employed to protect against level 2. Structural they cannot be operated under extreme condi- measures should be designed to protect people, tions, such as power failures and the absence of property, and socioeconomic activities against operators. Multiple layers of operation should level 1 and to mitigate damages at level 2. be assured. A sufficient number of qualified Provide technical and financial support operators should be available during disasters, for local governments. The central govern- but not necessarily onsite. Developing manuals ment plays a crucial role in reducing disaster and conducting regular drills are required dur- risks across the country. The central govern- ing normal times. The danger to which opera- ment should encourage local governments tors are exposed should be minimized. to promote structural measures by providing financial support and guide them in meet- ing minimum requirements for structures by NOTES producing technical guidelines and manuals. Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank, and Junko Also, the central government should provide Sagara, CTI Engineering. the local governments with technical sup- 1. The two-level approach has already been adopted port, such as conducting training for techni- in the design of other key infrastructure, such as cal staff in planning, design, operations, and dams and flood-prevention dikes. Dams typically consider the maximum probable flood or a flood maintenance. with a 10,000-year return period when designing Consider designs and improvements to structural safety, and a 100- to 200-year return enhance the resilience of structures and to pre- period for flood-control operations. For flood- vent sudden and complete failure. Extraordi- prevention dikes to protect some critical areas of Tokyo and other locations, the government has nary external loads caused by earthquakes, increased design standards beyond the norm of floods, and other events should be considered 100- to 200-year floods. in designing structures such as dams and dikes, which should be designed in such a way so that they will mitigate damage even when the BIBLIOGRAPHY hazard level exceeds their design levels. Their Ishinomaki City. 2011. Ishinomaki wo osotta ootsunami effectiveness in mitigating damage should be to fukkoukeikaku [Ishinomaki City’s mega tsunami ensured even in the event of their technical attack and reconstruction plan]. http://www .thr.mlit.go.jp/iwate/kawa/seibi_keikaku/dai6 failure. /image/dai6_02.pdf. Raise dike levels in a phased manner, consid- Ishiwatari, M. 2012. “Review of Countermeasures in ering the country’s financial and social condi- the East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.” In East tions. Safety standards and structural design Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Evacuation, Com- upgrades against level 2 events should reflect munication, Education and Volunteerism, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singapore: Research the concentration of population and economic Publishing. assets in the protected areas. Although it may MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and not be possible to build dikes capable of with- Tourism). 2011a. Kowan ni okeru sougouteki na tsu- standing level 2 disasters, appropriate and fea- nami taisaku no arikata [Comprehensive tsunami countermeasures in ports]. Interim report. sible targets for dike design safety should be http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000149434.pdf. identified. ———. 2011b. “Higashinihon daishinsai wo fumaeta seki Assure reliable operation of key facilities dur- suimon nadono sekkei sousa no arikatanitsuite” ing emergencies. The safe and reliable operation [Design and operation of weirs and gates in light of the lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake]. of infrastructure must be ensured in emer- http://www.mlit.go.jp/river/shinngikai_blog gency situations. Structural measures such as /kakouzeki_suimon/arikata/arikata110930.pdf; floodgates cannot provide reliable protection if http://www.jice.or.jp/sonota/t1/pdf/02arikata.pdf. 1: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES AGAINST TSUNAMIS | 31 ———. 2011c. Kasen heno sojou tsunami taisaku ni kan- committee on weirs and gates following the earth- suru kinkyu teigen [Emergency proposal on quake off the pacific coast of Tohoku]. Documents countermeasures for tsunami run-up along rivers]. of the 4th meeting. http://www.mlit.go.jp/river http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000163992.pdf. /shinngikai_blog/kakouzeki_suimon/dai04kai ———. 2011d. Kasen kaigan kouzoubutsu no fukkyu ni /dai04kai_siryou3-1.pdf; http://www.mlit.go.jp okeru keikan hairyo no tebiki nit suite [Guidelines /river/shinngikai_blog/kakouzeki_suimon/dai04 for preserving landscapes during rehabilitation of kai/dai04kai_siryou3-2.pdf. river and coastal structures]. http://www.mlit Technical Committee on Tsunami Countermeasures. .go.jp/river/shinngikai_blog/hukkyuukeikan 2011. Kaigan teiboutouno fukkyunikansuru kihon- /tebiki/tebiki.pdf. tekina kangaekata [Basic approach for rehabilitat- ———. 2011e. Tohokuchiho taiheiyo oki jishin wo humaeta ing dikes damaged by GEJE]. http://www.mlit.go kakouzeki suimon tou kentou iinkai [Technical .jp/common/000182993.pdf. 32 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES CHAPTER 2 Building Performance The strong main shock of the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, caused little damage to buildings. Buildings designed under the current building code and those with base isolation fared well. However, seismic design guidelines for nonstructural members had not been considered ade- quately, which resulted in problems such as the collapse of ceiling panels. Soil liquefaction occurred in reclaimed coastal areas along Tokyo Bay and riverside areas. The key lessons of the event are that seismic-resistant building design prevents collapse of buildings and protects human lives, that retro- fitting vulnerable buildings is essential to reduce damage, that seismic isolation functioned well, and that nonstructural building components can cause serious damage. When applying these lessons to developing countries, local technical and socioeconomic conditions should be taken into account. FINDINGS Building code updates following major earthquakes History of building codes in Japan After every major earthquake, Japan’s national The world’s first national seismic design code government and academic community carry Due to its location and tectonic settings, Japan out detailed surveys of building damage, and is prone to large earthquakes. The Great Kanto the building code is revised accordingly. Tech- Earthquake in 1923 caused some of the most nical recommendations are based on the most serious damage in Japanese history, as fires recent lessons. The Tokachi-oki earthquake in consumed a large part of Tokyo, killing more 1968 caused serious damage to reinforced con- than 100,000 people (table 2.1). Based on the crete (RC) buildings and inspired a major revi- lessons learned from the disaster, a seismic sion of the building code in 1981. Until 1981, the design code was introduced in the building building code required buildings to withstand code of 1924, the first national seismic design a lateral force of 20 percent of the total weight code applied anywhere in the world. of the building without damage to structural 33 Table 2.1 Comparison of three major disasters in Japan DISASTER GREAT KANTO EARTHQUAKE GREAT HANSHIN-AWAJI (KOBE) GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI Year 1923 1995 2011 Magnitude 7.9 7.3 9.0 Location Tokyo and surrounding area Kobe and surrounding area Extended area. Tsunami affected 1,000 km of coastline Casualities (dead and missing) 105,385 6,437 19,845 (as of September 26, 2011) Main cause of deaths Fire Collapse of old houses Tsunami (drowning) Conditions Noon. Residents were using Before dawn. Sleeping residents Mid-afternoon. People were at stoves to cook lunch. Strong were killed when their houses school or work, where evacuation winds spread fire, which burned collapsed. Few were killed on protocols were put into effect. for three days. Fire created trains or highways. tornados and whirlwinds. members. The revised code, part of which is After 1981 3% still in use, requires that buildings be strong enough to withstand a lateral force equal to 1971–81 100 percent of the building’s weight. Damage 21% to the building is permissible as long as human lives are not threatened. Current building code (1981) in Japan The main aspects in the current building code of 1981 are as follows: Before 1971 76% • Within their lifetime, buildings should be Figure 2.1 Share of houses that collapsed in the 1995 able to withstand several large earthquakes Kobe earthquake, by year of construction without structural damage. Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). • Building should be able to endure, with- 97 percent were built before 1981 (figure 2.1). out collapse or other serious damage, an extremely large earthquake with a return Based on this finding, the government imple- mented a new law in 1995 to promote retrofit- period of 500 years. ting of old buildings. Technical guidelines for assessing and Under the Act for Promoting Seismic Retro- retrofitting existing RC buildings constructed fitting of Existing Buildings (1995), the national under building codes in effect prior to 1981 and local governments offer incentives to pri- were produced. vate homeowners, such as Initiative to retrofit buildings following the • Subsidies for assessments of structural Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe soundness earthquake) in 1995 • Subsidies for the cost of retrofitting The 1995 Kobe earthquake caused heavy dam- • Reductions in income tax and property tax age, 6,437 casualties, and economic losses estimated at more than $120 billion. Of the • Low-interest loans to cover the cost of buildings that collapsed in the Kobe quake, retrofitting 34 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES Some 80 percent of local governments have was relatively high). Damage to buildings established subsidy programs to encourage constructed under the 1981 and later building owners to assess the structural integrity of their codes was limited and within the range antici- homes, and, as of April 2011, some 64 percent pated by the design code. of the local governments had programs that subsidized retrofitting work. The government’s Serious damage from the tsunami target is to increase the ratio of earthquake- The cause of most of the damage to houses resistant houses to 95 percent before 2020. In was the tsunami that followed the main shak- 2008 the ratio was 79 percent, with some 10.5 ing. Most wooden houses in deeply inundated million houses still requiring retrofitting. In areas were washed away or totally destroyed spite of efforts to promote retrofitting, only (figure 2.2). Many steel structures were also 300,000 houses were retrofitted between 2003 severely damaged (figure 2.3). By contrast, and 2008. These numbers show that it is diffi- buildings of RC performed well against the cult to motivate homeowners to retrofit. tsunami. Although many were completely Damage to buildings from the Great East Figure 2.2 Houses Japan Earthquake and cars were washed away by Minimal damage from earthquake the tsunami Table 2.2 shows the summary of the dam- Source: © Yamada-machi. age caused to buildings following the Great Used with permission. Further permission East Japan Earthquake (GEJE). Most of the required for reuse. collapsed residential buildings were washed away or destroyed by the tsunami rather than the earthquake. The death toll from the earth- quake itself is estimated to be less than 200. The earthquake produced violent shaking over a very wide area. The strongest peak accel- eration of 2,933 galileo (Gal) was recorded in Tsukidate, Miyagi Prefecture, but 18 observa- tion stations in six prefectures observed accel- eration greater than 1,000 Gal. In spite of the strong acceleration, damage from shaking was minimal, owing partly to the characteristics of the ground motion (the dominant frequency Table 2.2 Damage to buildings following the GEJE CATEGORY NUMBER Residential buildings Total collapse 107,779 Partial collapse 117,019 Burned 263 Partial damage 434,327 Nonresidential buildings 32,445 Source: NILIM (National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Figure 2.3 The tsunami destroyed the outer walls of steel structures Management) and BRI (Building Research Institute) 2012. Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. 2: BUILDING PERFORMANCE | 35 Figure 2.4 Reinforced concrete building withstood tsunami Figure 2.5 Reinforced concrete building damaged by buoyancy even though submerged (note car on roof) Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. Figure 2.6 Reinforced concrete building scoured by the Figure 2.7 Overturned building of reinforced concrete with tsunami current pile foundation Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. submerged, they did not suffer structural dam- the structures or to mechanical and electrical age (figure 2.4). Those RC buildings that were facilities inside the buildings. No fittings or damaged tended to be small and without a furnishings fell. The dampers and the cover pile foundation (figures 2.5 and 2.6). Figure 2.7 over the slits between the isolated and noniso- shows a damaged building where the probable lated parts were damaged as expected. causes of the damage were a combination of weak connections between piles and footings, Enhanced seismic design and retrofitting of strong water pressure from the tsunami cur- transportation infrastructure facilities rent, and liquefaction.1 A major campaign to reinforce key infrastruc- ture such as bridges following the Kobe earth- Effectiveness of building countermeasures quake in 1995 was undertaken by highway and Good performance of seismic base railway companies and governmental agen- isolation system cies. As a result, serious structural collapses Japan’s Building Research Institute (BRI) of infrastructure were avoided following the reported that the seismic base isolation2 sys- GEJE. The East Japan Railway Company tems in all 16 buildings in Miyagi Prefecture had reinforced more than 17,000 bridge piers performed well, reducing lateral motion by under the Shinkansen (bullet train) lines, and 40–60 percent. No damage was observed to the central government had retrofitted 490 36 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES Figure 2.8 Fallen ceiling panels in school gymnasium Figure 2.9 Subsidence of houses from liquefaction Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. Source: NILIM and BRI 2012. bridges in the Tohoku region. Because of these not been treated for liquefaction were affected works, some 1,500 bridges on national routes (figure 2.9). Existing building codes cover in the region were spared serious damage. Five countermeasures against liquefaction for RC bridges collapsed under the force of the tsu- and other buildings, but not for the detached nami. Because damage was generally limited, wooden houses owned by most ordinary it was possible to repair the main highways and people. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, roads to the affected areas within one week Transport and Tourism has now produced of the event. However, serious damage in the technical guidelines to fill these gaps. Some coastal areas affected by the tsunami took lon- local governments have provided liquefaction ger to repair. Shinkansen service to the Tohoku risk maps to encourage building owners to take region resumed after 49 days (chapter 20), a countermeasures. huge improvement over the situation after the Kobe earthquake, when reconstruction of the Damage from failure of retaining walls roads required more than 18 months and repair In Sendai City, more than 4,000 houses were of the Shinkansen line took 82 days. damaged by landslides caused by the strong ground shaking (figure 2.10). Since 1961, to Areas for improvement Damage to nonstructural Figure 2.10 Houses building components damaged by failure of retaining walls Much of the damage observed in buildings fol- Source: NILIM and BRI lowing the GEJE involved nonstructural com- 2012. ponents attached to structures, such as ceiling panels, nonstructural walls, and finishing materials (figure 2.8). To date, no guidelines or codes cover the wide variety of materials and designs used on nonstructural components. In Japan, few engineers have devoted attention to the matter. Liquefaction Liquefaction occurred on reclaimed lands and river banks over a wide area. Small buildings without pile foundations built on plots that had 37 Building z prevent landslide disasters, the city govern- 2005 guideline Design wave ment has regulated housing in hilly areas under pressure qz 3h the Act on the Regulation of Housing Land qz = r g (3h – z) Development. Most locations that experienced Design water depth: h landslides following the GEJE were developed before the act came into effect. In 2009, in 3r gh 2011 guideline response to landslides caused by earthquakes qz = r g (a h – z) ar gh (a = 1.5–3) since 2000, the central government established a subsidy mechanism whereby local govern- Figure 2.11 Revised design load requirements against tsunamis ments were tasked to carry out geotechnical Source: BRI and NILIM. work to stabilize the ground for large-scale housing projects in high-risk areas. However, stabilization work had not started by the time be smaller under the revised guideline than the March 2011 disaster struck. under the previous guideline (figure 2.11). Effect of ground motion of long periods LESSONS on skyscrapers The potentially devastating effect of quaking • The importance of retrofitting buildings is and tremors over long periods on skyscrapers demonstrated by the fact that buildings and seismically isolated buildings has been designed under the 1981 building code and recognized in recent years. New skyscraper retrofitted buildings performed well in the designs take this into account. Some sky- GEJE, whereas most of the damaged build- scrapers had been retrofitted before the GEJE ings were constructed before 1981 and had with devices to control deformation or absorb not undergone any retrofitting. Further energy. On March 11 strong and sustained efforts to retrofit are required, including ground motion of long periods reached Tokyo more attractive incentives for those who (approximately 400 kilometers [km] from the cannot afford to invest in safety or are epicenter) and even Osaka (800 km), affecting reluctant to do so (as are many elderly peo- the skyscrapers in both of these metropolitan ple). More affordable retrofitting methods areas. Recognizing the importance of counter- should be developed. Partial retrofitting, measures against the risks of sustained ground safety shelters inside the home, and beds motion, the Japanese government released a covered by safety frames are examples of draft of a new technical guideline that revises affordable options. structural design procedures, safety measures • The GEJE demonstrated the need to con- for furnishings and fittings, and a screening sider nonstructural elements when think- method to identify skyscrapers that need to be ing about earthquake safety. The materials, examined in detail. design, and construction of nonstructural components vary greatly. Technical guide- Technical guideline for tsunami lines are needed to ensure that such com- evacuation shelters ponents are earthquake-resistant. Japan’s first technical guideline for tsunami shelters was published in 2004. A revised • Even when structures withstood ground guideline was released in November 2011, shaking and saved the lives of their inhab- based on detailed surveys of the areas affected itants, inhabitants could not reoccupy their by the GEJE. Where the risks from tsunami dwellings because of deformation of walls pressure are less serious, the tsunami load can and doors. Substantial sheer cracks in 38 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES nonstructural walls also made inhabitants wary of returning. In addition to ensuring structural safety, it is recommended that efforts to achieve the functional continuity of buildings—with minimum disruption to everyday lives—are made. • Countermeasures against liquefaction and landslides need to be enhanced in Japan. Following the GEJE, the Japanese govern- ment has reviewed the method of assessing the risk of liquefaction. Developing more Figure 2.12 Collapsed school building in which effective and affordable anti-liquefaction furniture is still standing (Yogyakarta province, treatments is needed. The government is following Central Java Earthquake, 2006) considering a requirement that homebuy- Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). ers be notified of the risk from liquefaction. The government is also providing subsi- to mitigate risks from earthquakes is to build dies for projects to stabilize slopes with structures that are resilient to ground shaking. landslide potential near houses. Many buildings in developing countries are • Increasing buildings’ capacity to absorb extremely vulnerable to collapse (figure 2.12). energy reduces structural deformation. The Use appropriate technologies. Various seis- GEJE demonstrated the possibility of a mic design guidelines have been developed gigantic earthquake occurring as a result around the world. Direct application of such of three large earthquakes (Tokai, Tonan- guidelines may not be appropriate in develop- kai, and Nankai) occurring in short succes- ing countries because of their costs, the limited sion. Such a series of earthquakes would be knowledge and skills of builders, and limited likely to produce strong ground motions tools and facilities on construction sites. What of long periods. Structural and retrofitting are needed are seismic design guidelines that measures should be performed according are suited to local conditions and capable of to the new guideline, lowering the risk of enhancing the resilience of buildings. long-period ground motions by preventing Knowledge and lessons should be adapted and their amplification. Increasing buildings’ customized to local conditions. In Indonesia a capacity to absorb energy reduces struc- simple technical guideline that is consistent tural deformation. with local technical capacities and other condi- • Buildings with isolated bases performed well tions was developed and is being disseminated during the GEJE, enabling them to be used with help from the Japan International Cooper- without interruption even immediately ation Agency (JICA) (box 2.1). Knowledge based after the main shock of the earthquake. on detailed surveys of construction sites and motivation on the part of engineers, workers, government officials, and owners of buildings RECOMMENDATIONS FOR can improve safety. Pilot buildings may include DEVELOPING COUNTRIES emergency centers, fire stations, hospitals, or evacuation shelters. These can demonstrate the Improving the seismic resilience of buildings benefits of advanced seismic resilience while is the most effective risk mitigation measure. enhancing the knowledge and skills of techni- One of the most basic and effective measures cians through on-the-job training. 2: BUILDING PERFORMANCE | 39 BOX 2.1 Preparation of building plan A simple technical guideline and its dissemination through the building permit process in Indonesia Building confirmation Inspection The Central Java Earthquake in 2006 caused heavy damage and killed some Concurrence of construction Building 6,000 people, mostly as their houses collapsed. During reconstruction, the officials provincial government developed a technical guideline for small, one- story houses. The guideline, simple enough to be illustrated in a poster, has or Interim inspection Inspection been well accepted by the population. The central government decided to apply it across the country through the building permit system. Designated confirmation Completing inspection Inspection body Confirmation certificate Issuance Utilization Figure 2.13 Flowchart illustrating the Japanese building permit process Source: MLIT. officials and inspectors with access to techni- cal information. Japan’s Building Standard Law mandates the implementation systems shown in figure 2.13. Local government officials (or designated confirmation bodies) conduct examination/ inspections before, during, and after construc- tion. If conformity with building standards is confirmed, a confirmation certificate is issued. An interim inspection is performed on build- ings that have certain structural characteristics or purposes. Multifamily dwellings, multisto- ried buildings, and public buildings are gener- ally subject to this type of inspection. Source: JICA. Retrofit historical buildings. In countries with many vulnerable historical buildings, retrofit- ting is a priority. Retrofitting should be consid- Implement building codes. Another impor- ered in the context of striking a balance between tant issue is how best to implement building affordable and effective retrofitting methods, a codes and how to monitor their implementa- balance that motivates both private owners and tion. Legislation should include provisions government officials and politicians. related to the issuance of building permits, Secure the safety of nonstructural compo- inspection of construction, and enforcement nents. The issue of nonstructural building of building codes. Enforcement requires suf- components is common in developing coun- ficient numbers of trained and equipped tries, although the critical elements may be 40 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES different. Nonstructural walls, roofing mate- BOX 2.2 rials, and ornamental attachments such as pediments and signs are examples observed Tsunami evacuation shelters applying the Japanese in field surveys in affected areas. Complicating technical guideline this issue are the large variety of materials and designs and the scarcity of engineers. Materi- Banda Aceh was severely damaged by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. als that provide shelter and the curtain walls of Despite the devastation wrought by the tsunami, local people are return- ing to coastal areas because their livelihoods are tied to the sea. Because outside buildings must be regulated first, given no suitable evacuation areas are found along the coast, evacuation shelters the risks they pose to pedestrians. To resolve are being constructed. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) the issue of roofing materials, manufacturers is supporting the construction of vertical evacuation shelters that embody and engineers should be involved in improv- Japanese technical guidelines. The shelter shown below was used for ing construction methods and materials. Also, emergency evacuation in 2012. construction workers should be trained to install such materials in safer ways. Prevent large deformation of structures. Jap- anese experts are examining ways to minimize structural deformation. This could be useful to countries whose seismic design codes allow larger deformation than Japan’s. Prepare for tsunamis. Japan’s experience and knowledge with tsunami evacuation shelters is useful to other countries exposed to tsunamis, such as Indonesia. The tsunami evacuation shelter in Banda Aceh is an example of Japa- nese technical cooperation (box 2.2). Source: JICA. Promote seismic base isolation. Buildings with seismic base isolation features suffered very little damage from the GEJE. More key public buildings, particularly those that will be used for emergency relief activities and emer- gency response—that is, evacuation shelters BIBLIOGRAPHY and fire stations—should be built using base Architectural Institute of Japan. 2011. Preliminary isolation. Simple and affordable techniques for Reconnaissance Report of the 2011 Tohoku-Chiho Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake [in Japanese]. Ministry base isolation should be developed for use in of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. developing countries. http://www.mlit.go.jp/. BRI (Building Research Institute). http://www.kenken .go.jp/english/index.html. NOTES Cabinet Office. http://www.bousai.go.jp/. Prepared by Tatsuo Narafu, Japan International Coop- JMA (Japan Meteorological Agency). http://www.jma eration Agency, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. .go.jp/jma/indexe.html. Mizutani, T. 2012. Emergency Evacuation and Human 1. In an earthquake, soil behaves like a liquid, losing Losses from the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami its strength and bearing capacity. off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku [in Japanese]. 2. Isolated structures damp the effects of earthquake Research Report on the 2011 Great East Japan ground motion through decoupling of horizontal Earthquake Disaster, Natural Disaster Research components. Isolation systems may be laminated Report (48), National Research Institute for steel with high-quality rubber pads, or other Earthquake Science and Disaster Prevention, energy-absorbing materials. Japan. 2: BUILDING PERFORMANCE | 41 Narafu, T., H. Imai, S. Matsuzaki, K. Sakoda, F. Mat- NILIM (National Institute for Land and Infrastructure sumura, Y. Ishiyama, and A. Tasaka. 2008. “Basic Management). http://www.nilim.go.jp/english Study for Bridge between Engineering and Con- /eindex.htm. struction Practice of Non-Engineered Houses.” In NILIM and BRI. 2012. “Summary of Field Survey and Proceedings of the 14th World Conference on Earth- Research on the 2011 Earthquake off the Pacific quake Engineering, Beijing, China. Coast of Tohoku.” Technical Note of NILIM No. National Research Institute for Earth Science and 647/BRI Research Paper No. 150. NILIM and BRI, Disaster Prevention. http://www.bosai.go.jp/e/. Tokyo, Japan. 42 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES CHAPTER 3 Hydrometeorological Disasters Associated with Tsunamis and Earthquakes Earthquakes and tsunamis increase the risks of hydrometeorological disasters. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, disaster-prevention structures such as coastal and river dikes were quickly reha- bilitated. A phased process of rehabilitation work made it possible to address urgent needs for protec- tion against frequently occurring floods and storm surges, while at the same time meeting longer-term targets for protection against megadisasters. The deterioration of levels of protection against hydro- meteorological disasters was quickly assessed after the event in order to identify priority areas for rehabilitation, revise standards for the issuance of warnings, and raise public awareness about the increased risks of hydrometeorological disasters. FINDINGS in place (figure 3.1). According to the Min- istry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and The Great East Japan Earthquake Tourism (MLIT), 426 coastal units (including and tsunami increased the risks of coastal dikes and revetments extending along hydrometeorological disasters 190 kilometers [km]) out of a total of 515 units The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) with a total length of some 300 km, sustained caused extensive damage to coastal and river damage in the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima infrastructure and diminished the level of pro- prefectures. tection they provided against floods and storm The MLIT began, on the day of the earth- surges, thereby increasing the risk of hydro- quake, to assess the safety of dams and struc- meteorological disasters. Countermeasures tures in some 30 rivers. Slope failure and against these risks have been successfully put subsidence of dikes were observed at 2,115 sites 43 APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT Flooding period Snow melt/flood Rainy season Typhoon season Period when spring tide is relatively high Assessment and Overview assessment announcement of secondary Assessment and announcement of risks disaster risks * Subsidence in the Sendai Plain, Miyagi, and Iwate coastal areas has already been announced Discharge of water from Emergency discharge inundated area * River, coastal, agriculture, and sewerage departments collaborate to implement emergency protection of coastal lowlands and continue necessary measures (water removal by discharge pump vehicles, etc.) Measures against storm Emergency measures Temporary measures surges (stacking sandbags to high tide level) (reinforcement of foreside of sandbags, etc.) Restoration of coastal dikes, 3 prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima etc. Total Fully/partly Temporary destroyed measures * Completed Coastal dike protection (km) approx. 300 approx. 190 approx. 50 approx. 19 * Section where important public Implement as many facilities exist measures as possible Full restoration (restoration of damaged embankments and dike protection) Measures Warning/ Lowering of standards for call-out of flood fighters, or announcement standards for river flood forecasting against evacuation warnings, communication to residents, etc. heavy rains measures and floods (emergency rehabilitation of dikes Temporary measures by embankments) Implement as many measures as possible River dikes/ Damaged sites Temporary Full restoration (state managed) measure Completed Damaged sites Full restoration (state managed) by end of by end of structures Tohoku 1,195 29 29 June 2011 June 2012 (weirs/gates) Kanto 920 24 24 Tohoku 1,195 993 202 Total 2,115 53 53 Kanto 920 733 187 Total 2,115 1,726 389 Measures Warning/ Detailed assessment (inspection of sediment disaster risk areas) against evacuation sediment measures Deformation Total Inspected identified Strengthen warning level by lowering of announcement disasters standards for sediment disaster warning information or Inspection sites 33,301 32,302 1,143 installation of mudslide sensors * Inspection completed in areas other those inaccessible for inspection (no transportation, nuclear accident affected areas, etc.) Sediment Temporary measures (stacking sandbags, etc.) management Construct sediment control dams as emergency measures in area where failure occurred facilities Before rainy Before typhoon *1 Areas where failure was caused by the earthquake season *1 season *2 *2 Areas where there are risks of failure Construction of sediment control dams 18 24 Figure 3.1 Countermeasures taken against hydrometeorological disasters following the GEJE Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Figure 3.2 Damage in eight rivers managed by the MLIT, mainly to river dikes at in the Tohoku and Kanto regions (figure 3.2). Narusegawa Local governments reported damage to a total Source: MLIT. of 1,627 sites in the rivers they manage. Many river dikes were also damaged by liquefaction caused by earthquakes. The MLIT confirmed that none of the country’s dams suffered struc- tural problems, except for minor leaks and cracks. One irrigation dam failed, killing seven and leaving one person missing in Fukushima Prefecture. 44 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES Increased inundation risks from subsidence Before the After the The earthquake caused extensive subsidence earthquake earthquake in some areas. Rikuzentakata City in Iwate Prefecture, for example, saw subsidence of 84 centimeters, which led to flooding of coastal areas and roads at high tide, often hampering recovery and rehabilitation efforts. The level of protection against storm surges and flooding was significantly diminished in the Sendai Plain. The area below mean sea level more than tripled (from 3 square kilo- meters [km2] to 16 km2) after the earthquake Below average sea level (map 3.1), as revealed in the MLIT’s laser pro- 3 km2 16 km2 (×5.3) filing survey. The MLIT produced subsidence Below high tide level at maps and revised downward the water levels the time of spring tide at which it issues flood warnings. For manage- 32 km2 56 km2 (×1.8) ment of spatial data and their use in mapping, Below largest recorded sea level see chapter 26. 83 km2 111 km2 (×1.3) Landslides caused by the earthquake 0 1 2 3 4 km The earthquake caused 141 landslides, as a result of which 19 people lost their lives (as of Surveyed in 2005 and 2008 Surveyed in 2011 February 2012). Immediately after the earth- Map 3.1 Subsidence caused by the earthquake quake, the MLIT began inspecting 1,952 sedi- increased inundation risks ment control facilities managed by the ministry, Source: MLIT. while the prefectural governments inspected 4,324 facilities. The MLIT conducted emer- the relationship between the amount of pre- gency inspections of about 32,000 sites with cipitation after an earthquake and the prob- potential risks of sediment disasters such as ability of a sediment disaster. debris flows and landslides in 220 municipali- ties where the Japan Meteorological Agency Rehabilitating coastal and river dikes to (JMA) had observed seismic intensity of 5+ or prevent secondary disasters larger. Significant deformation was found at After the GEJE, emergency measures were 66 locations; minor deformation at 1,077. The implemented to restore coastal dikes to pre- MLIT shared this information with munici- vent coastal flooding from storm surges. Emer- palities so that they could take the necessary gency rehabilitation was first implemented measures. along about 50 of the 190 km of damaged coast- With the higher risk of sediment disaster line. Those 50 km were selected because of the since the earthquake, triggers for the issuance important facilities and properties in the area, of sediment disaster warnings were temporar- or because of the urgency of restoring liveli- ily lowered. Local meteorological observato- hoods, industrial activities, transportation, and ries and prefectural governments jointly issue agricultural activities. warnings about such disasters. Prefectural gov- The emergency rehabilitation work was ernments and the JMA reviewed the standards implemented in three phases determined for the issuance of warnings by investigating by climatic conditions and the seasonal 3 : H Y D RO M E T E O RO LO G I C A L D I S A S T E R S A S S O C I AT E D W I T H T S U N A M I S A N D E A RT H Q U A K E S | 45 Step 1: Emergency rehabilitation 1 completed before onset of their predisaster height before the rainy season flood season began in June. Emergency rehabilitation work Large sandbags was conducted at the 53 heavily damaged sites: (weatherproofed) 29 in the Tohoku region and 24 in the Kanto ∇ high-tide protection level Levee washed out (T.P. + 2.0m) region. These works were completed by July 11, by tsunami Existing levee 2011. The standard for flood warnings was low- ered during the flood seasons. The MLIT and Step 2: Emergency rehabilitation the prefectural governments measure rainfall 2 completed before onset of and the water level in rivers, using automatic typhoon season monitoring equipment and telemeter systems. Large sandbags ∇ high-wave protection level (T.P. + 3.8–6.2m) The ministry and the governments then issue (weatherproofed) ∇ high-tide protection level flood forecasts and warnings through the mass (T.P. + 2.0m) media, the Internet, and mobile phones. Existing levee Complete restoration of the river dikes to their predisaster condition began after the Step 3: Full rehabilitation to be completed in about five years typhoon season and was completed by the time the 2012 rainy season began in June. Counter- ∇ high-wave protection level measures against liquefaction have also been (T.P. + 3.8–6.2m) ∇ high-tide protection level implemented. The final step will be to improve (T.P. + 2.0m) dikes on the major rivers in the Tohoku Existing levee region—the Abukumagawa, Narusegawa and Kitakamigawa—to protect against floods and Figure 3.3 tsunamis. Rehabilitation of coastal dikes occurrence of natural disasters (figure 3.3). Source: MLIT. The first step was to reinforce and raise the Measures to mitigate inundation risks in Note: T.P. = Tokyo Peil. height of the damaged dikes up to the high-tide disaster-affected areas protection level. This work was done before Inundation risks from heavy rain have the June–July flood season. The second step increased in the disaster-affected lowlands of was to raise the dike height to the high-wave the Sendai Plain, where river dikes and drain- protection level, which was completed by Sep- age pump stations were damaged or destroyed tember, before the typhoon season. and where extensive subsidence occurred. Full-scale restoration, the third step, started Temporary emergency measures were taken to in fiscal 2012 in accordance with reconstruction reduce the risk of flood damage. Thirty-three plans and other rehabilitation projects. The drainage pump vehicles, provided by other works will be carried out over about a five-year regional bureaus of the MLIT around the period so as not to disrupt community develop- country, were deployed in the disaster-affected ment and industrial activities. On the Iwanuma area. A risk map showing inundation levels Coast and in other coastal areas with facilities from daily precipitation of 100 millimeters and that are critical to recovery and reconstruction, 200 millimeters provided information for local such as wastewater treatment plants, full resto- residents and municipalities. Inundation sen- ration was completed by the end of fiscal 2013, sors were installed in areas with a high risk of in March 2014. flooding, and the information they collect is Rehabilitation of river dikes began directly published on the Internet. Measures have been after the earthquake as the first step in prepar- taken to send timely notifications automati- ing for heavy rain and floods. One of the most cally to relevant municipalities and local resi- urgent tasks was to reconstruct the dikes to dents when there is a high risk of flooding. 46 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES LESSONS by quickly collecting relevant information. To make the most efficient use of resources, the • Disaster prevention structures such as areas to be rehabilitated should be dealt with coastal and river dikes need to be rehabili- in order of priority. Expert emergency teams tated quickly to prevent secondary disas- should be formed during normal times by ters. Rehabilitation work should ideally drawing on national networks (chapter 14). be completed before the next rainy season Advance agreements can be made to allow the and typhoon season. organizations concerned to mobilize private sector resources without going through the • In the aftermath of a disaster, it is important usual procurement processes (chapter 20). to identify the priority areas for rehabili- Rehabilitate crucial structures before the tation and for protection against hydro- next disaster. A staged approach is appropriate, meteorological disaster. Priorities can taking into account time constraints before the be determined based on the existence of onset of the next season susceptible to hydro- important facilities or commercial pro- meteorological disaster. Rehabilitation works duction centers and their significance for should be prioritized. Practical works, such recovery and reconstruction activities. as temporary structures made of sand bags or • Rehabilitation work should take place in gabion boxes, need to be set up quickly. phases. This is an effective way of meeting Consider financial mechanisms. Financial communities’ most urgent needs for pro- arrangements, in particular the responsibilities tection against frequently occurring floods of the central and local governments, should and storm surges, while at the same time be made in advance during normal times meeting longer-term targets for protection (chapter 20). from megadisasters. Share risk information with the community. “Post-disaster risks” should be shared with • Deterioration in levels of protection against local communities that may be affected. Non- hydrometeorological disasters needs to be structural measures such as warnings should quickly assessed, and the relevant agencies, be strengthened in at-risk areas, since the organizations, and the public should be effectiveness of countermeasures will have informed. Damage information should be been diminished by the disaster. collected and disseminated as soon as possi- ble (chapter 26). Warning standards should be revised according to the assessment. NOTE Prepared by Junko Sagara, CTI Engineering. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BIBLIOGRAPHY Following any disaster, protective measures MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport against collateral damage and secondary disas- and Tourism). 2012a. Doshasaigaiheno taioujyo- ters are essential. The following actions are kyo, zokuho [Follow-up report on countermea- recommended. sures for sediment disasters]. River 788: 59–61. Conduct an assessment immediately follow- ———. 2012b. “Kasenteibotouno fukyujyokyo” [Reha- bilitation of river dikes]. River 788: 50–54. ing the disaster. Damage to disaster-prevention Sato, Y. 2012. “Kaiganteibotouno fukyufukojyokyonit- facilities and the risk of ensuing disasters suite” [Rehabilitation of sea dikes damaged in the should be assessed immediately after a disaster Great East Japan Earthquake]. River 788: 55–58. 3 : H Y D RO M E T E O RO LO G I C A L D I S A S T E R S A S S O C I AT E D W I T H T S U N A M I S A N D E A RT H Q U A K E S | 47 CHAPTER 4 Multifunctional Infrastructure Public facilities and infrastructure can be built in such a way as to reduce disaster risks and serve as disaster risk management facilities. Roads, expressways, and other public facilities helped reduce damage and loss in the Great East Japan Earthquake by providing protection against flooding, and by serving as evacuation routes and base stations for emergency operations. Organizations for disas- ter management and other public sector organizations should coordinate to ensure that their public works are multifunctional whenever possible, and cost-sharing mechanisms should be developed to ensure that the financial burden is shared equitably. FINDINGS Many expressways were built on high ground, providing routes for evacuation as well Expressways served as disaster as for rescue operations. Many coastal towns management facilities and communities were isolated immediately Expressways and roads mitigated damage after the disaster because roads were flooded resulting from the Great East Japan Earth- or covered with debris. Expressways built on quake (GEJE). The East Sendai Expressway, a higher ground served to connect otherwise 24.8-kilometer (km) toll road running through isolated towns and communities (figure 4.2). the Sendai Plain, about 4 km off the coast and The Sanriku Expressway, a 224-km express- at an elevation of 7 to 10 meters, acted as a sec- way that runs along the Pacific coast through ondary barrier or dike and prevented tsunamis the Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, is still under from penetrating further inland (figure 4.1). construction. About 51 percent of the express- It also prevented debris from flowing into the way was open for public use when the area was inland urban areas. The embankment served as hit by the GEJE; it helped save many lives. an evacuation shelter for nearby residents, and Expressways constructed on higher ground about 230 people escaped the tsunami by run- were not damaged by the tsunami. In the ning up to the expressway. aftermath of the GEJE, they provided an 49 When the tsunami hit the area, about 60 resi- dents managed to escape from the tsunami by Coastline climbing up the expressway embankment. The Kamaishi–Yamada Road, a 23-km section of the Sanriku Expressway that was Inundation opened only six days before the GEJE, served as a disaster management road. It was built to ease traffic congestion on Route 45, the main road connecting the coastal communities. East Sendai Expressway Since Route 45 was prone to flooding from typhoons and tsunamis, the new road was expected to provide an alternative route if No inundation Route 45 were cut off in an emergency. In the Unosumai District of Kamaichi City, about 570 residents and school children escaped the tsu- nami. Because the road that led to the evacua- tion shelter had been destroyed, they climbed up to the Kamaishi-Yamada Road and managed to reach the evacuation shelter safely. Service stations and parking areas along highways served as disaster management bases Roadside service stations, service areas, and parking areas along highways also helped in the disaster management effort, providing bases of operation for rescue teams and evacu- ation shelters for local residents (table 4.1). The roadside service stations and rest areas Sea side Inland side along roads and highways, called Michi-no- eki (road stations), are equipped with toilets, restaurants, and shops and are also intended to promote local tourism and business. These Figure 4.1 East Sendai Expressway facilities are developed jointly by the Min- Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). istry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) in cooperation with local evacuation route for residents and enabled the municipalities. In April 2012, there were 987 self-defense forces and other emergency relief such stations nationwide. During the GEJE, teams to get to the coastal municipalities that road stations were turned into disaster man- had been heavily affected. It also served as an agement bases equipped with electric power. important emergency route for transporting They were available to the public around the food, medical supplies, fuel, and other relief clock when the neighboring area experienced materials going to local disaster management power failures (figure 4.3). bases and evacuation centers. In Minamisanriku City, sports facilities near Miyako Road, a 4.8-km section of the San- a highway exit were used as a disaster manage- riku Expressway, opened in March 2010. ment center, evacuation shelter, drop-off site 50 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES for emergency supplies, and operating base for the local government, medical institu- tions, police, and volunteer workers. The local Route 45 government even moved its office to the site, because its official building had been destroyed by the tsunami. Sanriku Expressway Evacuation stairs to expressways saved school children When Iwaizumi Town in the Iwate Prefecture was severely hit by the massive tsunami, an evacuation stairway constructed at the Omoto Elementary School two years before saved the Figure 4.2 The Sanriku Expressway was built with tsunamis in mind lives of 88 children (figure 4.4). Because there Source: MLIT. was no escape route from the school, since it was surrounded by steep cliffs, some of the Table 4.1 “Road stations” used in the aftermath of the GEJE children suggested how improvements might be made during a tsunami evacuation drill. ROAD STATION LOCATION SERVICES DURING GEJE In response to their suggestions and those of Sanbongi Osaki, Miyagi Open for 24 hours with power. Supplied food to evacuees. local residents, a MLIT field office completed the approximately 30-meter evacuation stair- Tsuyama Tome, Miyagi Used as a base for self-defense forces and rescue teams and as an evacuation center. way with 130 steps along Route 45, which runs right behind the school. Fukushima-Touwa Nihonmatsu, Provided food, water, and toilets for Fukushima evacuees. Used by 1,500 evacuees. Kita-no-sato Kitakata, Provided water and food. The hot-spring Fukushima facility was made available to the affected residents. Minamisoma Minamisoma, Used as an evacuation center and Fukushima emergency support base. Hirata Hirata, Provided power and water to evacuees Fukushima and food to local hospitals and evacuation centers. Source: MLIT. Figure 4.4 Route 45 Evacuation stairway at the Omoto Elementary School Source: MLIT. Figure 4.3 Self-defense force at a roadside station Source: MLIT. 4 : M U LT I F U N C T I O N A L I N F R A S T R U C T U R E | 51 LESSONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES • Embankment structures used to raise the elevation of highways and expressways can Infrastructure and public facilities such as roads, effectively prevent penetration of tsunami highways, and railways can be used as disaster water and debris further inland. They can management facilities in the event of floods, also be used as disaster management facili- tsunamis, mudflows, and landslides. Facilities ties (box 4.1). that are multifunctional are a particularly cost- effective approach to disaster management. • Roads, highways, and expressways pro- Integrate various facilities into planning for vided safe evacuation sites and escape disaster risk management (DRM). DRM plans routes because they were designed with should include a range of public facilities. For earthquakes and tsunamis in mind. It pays example, playgrounds and parking areas can to take disaster reduction into account become rescue team bases or spaces for tran- when designing transport and other sition shelters. Expressway embankments infrastructure. can become evacuation sites in the event of • Public facilities such as roadside stations cyclones, floods, and tsunamis. and highway parking areas were used by Develop cost-sharing mechanisms. Cost- various teams and organizations as base sharing mechanisms should be established stations for rescue and emergency opera- between DRM organizations and public works tions. They were also used as evacuation organizations. The latter cannot be expected centers because they were equipped with to bear all the DRM-related costs of a project, electricity, food, and water supplies. since those costs affect the project’s financial feasibility. In Japan the cost of adding height to an expressway is shared by the DRM organiza- BOX 4.1 tions (chapter 12). Coordinate with other sectors. Coordination Evacuation stairs to the East Sendai Expressway with other sectors, such as transportation, is required to develop multifunctional facilities. Recognizing that the embankment of the East Sendai Expressway had Platforms to coordinate planning, construc- served as an effective evacuation site for local residents, evacuation stairs tion, and operation and maintenance should were temporarily installed at five locations along the embankment in May be established. In Japan, prefectural gover- 2011. They are intended to facilitate evacuation in case of a tsunami. nors designate the multifunctional facilities, allowing concerned organizations to initiate coordination under a new tsunami DRM law (chapter 12). Consider negative effects. High structures such as bridges and highways may have nega- tive effects, such as water logging. They may isolate or separate communities and impose obstacles to the passage of people and animals. These effects should be assessed, and coun- termeasures or diversion channels and routes developed. In Japan, permission from DRM Source: MLIT. organizations is required before highways and bridges can be built. 52 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES NOTE MLIT, Shikoku Regional Development Bureau. 2011b. Higashinihon daishinsai kara manabu mono Prepared by Junko Sagara, CTI Engineering. [Lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake]. http://www.skr.mlit.go.jp/kikaku/senryaku /pdf/1-kaigi/110609%E3%80%80siryou-1.pdf. MLIT, Tohoku Regional Development Bureau. 2011c. Higashinihon daishinsa no taiou ni tsuite [Efforts BIBLIOGRAPHY during the Great East Japan Earthquake]. MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/road/ir/shouiinkai and Tourism). 2011a. Higashinihon daishinsai ni /pdf/110825/03_siryou1.pdf. oite fukujiteki na bousaikinou wo hakkishita jirei Okumura, Y. 2011. Higashinihon daishinsai deno tori- [Cases where structures provided added functions kumi [Efforts in the Great East Japan Earthquake during the Great East Japan Earthquake]. of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport http://www.mlit.go.jp/road/ir/ir-council/hw_ and Tourism]. http://www.jari.or.jp/resource arikata/teigen/t01_data04.pdf. /uploads/Symposium2012-01.pdf. 4 : M U LT I F U N C T I O N A L I N F R A S T R U C T U R E | 53 CHAPTER 5 Protecting Significant and Sensitive Facilities The Great East Japan Earthquake was a multihazard event. A massive quake triggered a series of tsunamis of unprecedented dimensions, as well as the subsequent nuclear accident. Sensitive facilities need to be protected against low-probability and complex events because damage to such facilities can have a cascading effect, multiplying the destruction and leading to irreversible human, social, economic, and environmental impacts. FINDINGS destruction of sensitive facilities—such as a nuclear power station and industrial facilities— Important facilities were seriously led to cascading damages and serious social, damaged by the complex disaster economic, and environmental impacts. The cas- The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) cading effects of the GEJE revealed the weak- was a massive disaster triggered by the larg- ness of Japanese disaster risk management est earthquake ever recorded in the history (DRM) systems in the face of low-probability, of Japan. But it was not only an earthquake high-impact events, and highlighted the impor- disaster. The quake triggered a series of haz- tance of protecting sensitive facilities against ards and events including tsunamis of unprec- disasters of any scale. edented dimensions, as well as a subsequent nuclear accident. Damages to critical disaster- Government buildings response facilities—such as public buildings, Local municipalities in Japan have the primary hospitals, and schools—hindered local capaci- responsibility of saving and assisting people in ties for response and recovery. Furthermore, the event of disasters. However, in the GEJE, 55 many coastal towns and villages were devas- Relocated 13 tated by the earthquakes and tsunamis, suffer- Partially relocated 15 ing great damage to their buildings, facilities, and personnel, and losing their capacity to take response measures promptly. Based on a survey by Japan’s Cabinet Office, of the 237 municipalities that responded and that experienced seismic intensity of 6- or more, about 28 percent had to relocate their No relocation buildings either fully or partially (figure 5.1). 209 In Otsuchi Town in Iwate Prefecture, a mas- sive tsunami swallowed up the municipality building, destroying it and taking the lives of Figure 5.1 Relocation of municipal buildings after town officials, including the mayor, who was the GEJE at the time directing the disaster-response Source: Cabinet Office. BOX 5.1 An angel’s voice A woman on the municipal staff in Minamisanriku City was urging residents over the radio to evacuate to higher ground. Although tinged with fear and apprehension, her voice gave people courage and helped save count- less lives. She continued broadcasting to the very end before being en- gulfed by the tsunami. She never returned home. She had planned to be married in September 2011. In all, 39 staff members were declared dead or missing. The 12-meter-high building was located in a risk area that was sub- merged by 2.4 meters of water during the 1960 Chilean Tsunami. Figure 5.2 Otsuchi Town Hall Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari/World Bank. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. operations (figure 5.2). The town was without a mayor for five months. Disaster management and evacuation facilities Disaster management and evacuation facili- ties are critical to protecting people in times of disaster. Many of these facilities were dev- astated by tsunamis (box 5.1). In the 11 coastal municipalities of Iwate Prefecture, 48 out of 411 emergency evacuation shelters (designated shelters to which people are to evacuate imme- diately after an earthquake, as distinct from Source: Prime Minister’s Office and Fire and Disaster Management Agency. evacuation centers) were inundated by tsuna- mis; and in Rikuzentakata City, one of the cities 56 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES other vulnerable groups—were damaged by the disaster (see chapter 16). Industrial facilities Six out of nine oil refineries in the Tohoku and Kanto regions had to suspend operations; fire broke out at two of the nine facilities. At an oil refinery in Chiba, the structure holding one of the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tanks failed, Figure 5.3 The Rikuzentakata City gymnasium and the tank collapsed, leading to LPG leak- Source: © CTI Engineering. Used with permission. Further permission age. The leaked LPG caught fire and caused an required for reuse. explosion, spreading the fire from one tank to another (figure 5.5). Six people were injured with the highest casualty rates, more than half and all 17 LPG tanks were damaged, along with the evacuation shelters were inundated. The pipelines and roads. The fire and debris from city’s gymnasium was designated as a primary the explosions damaged the surrounding build- evacuation shelter, and more than 80 people ings and vehicles. Nearby residential areas also were there when the tsunami hit (figure 5.3). suffered as the blasts damaged windows, shut- Only a few survived. ters, slate roofs, and more. The explosions at the oil refineries are believed to have been among Health and social welfare facilities the factors that accounted for the fuel shortage Hospitals and social welfare facilities also immediately after the disaster, which disrupted need to be protected, because without medical people’s lives and hindered emergency recov- response capabilities the number of casualties ery operations in the disaster-affected areas. will increase and health hazards will spread. The collapsed tanks had met all the require- According to the Ministry of Health, Labour ments for earthquake-proof structures; how- and Welfare, almost 80 percent of hospitals ever, at the time of the earthquake the tank were either destroyed or severely damaged was temporarily filled with water, instead of by the earthquakes and tsunamis (figure 5.4). the lighter-weight LPG, in preparation for a Furthermore, more than 12 percent of social welfare facilities—such as homes for the elderly, children, people with disabilities, and Fire broke out near tank No. 364 Fukushima Miyagi Iwate 0 50 100 150 200 Number of hospitals Not damaged Completely destroyed Patially destroyed Figure 5.4 Hospitals affected by the GEJE in Figure 5.5 Leaked LPG catches fire at a refinery Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate prefectures Source: © CTI Engineering. Used with permission. Further permission Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. required for reuse. 5 : P ROT E C T I N G S I G N I F I C A N T A N D S E N S I T I V E FAC I L I T I E S | 57 Cultural properties According to the Agency for Cultural Affairs, more than 700 nationally designated cultural Broken braces properties (such as monuments and historic buildings and landscapes) were heavily dam- aged by the earthquake and tsunami (see chap- ter 35). Many national treasures, important cultural properties, and special historic sites were also affected. Fortunately, few cultural Figure 5.6 Broken properties of national importance were dam- braces led to aged. However, several properties will take a collapse of LPG long time to recover, and some have been lost tank forever. Disasters that result in irreversible damage or regular inspection. The braces supporting the losses of important cultural properties can have legs that held the tank up could not bear its a severe negative effect on local businesses, such weight during the earthquake, leading to its as those that depend on the tourism industry, collapse (figure 5.6). and can also undermine people’s pride in their In light of this accident, a government com- communities. A culture-sensitive approach to mittee that conducted a technical review of restoration, in which original or local materi- LPG facilities recommended: als are used, is required to maintain the cultural value of historical buildings (figure 5.7). Retro- 1. Revision of the technical guideline for fitting work should not be carried out in a way the tank braces that destroys the historic value of a monument 2. Confirmation of the facilities’ safety by or building. If retrofitting cannot be carried out private companies, and government without compromising the structure’s cultural monitoring of the confirmation value, the area should be closed to visitors rather than altered in a way that changes its character. 3. Risk assessment and countermeasures Following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake against liquefaction to be undertaken by in 1995, the Japanese government established private companies guidelines for protecting cultural properties 4. Reassessment of earthquake risks fol- against earthquakes and began implementing lowing the government review. seismic assessments and retrofitting structures associated with national treasures and impor- tant cultural properties. Figure 5.7 Retrofitting Jokoji Temple Source: Agency for Cultural The cascading effect of the accident at the Affairs. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Four nuclear power stations comprising 14 units were located close to the epicenter of the March 11 earthquake (map 5.1). The earth- quake caused all operating units to shut down automatically (box 5.2). Large tsunamis hit all sites within an hour of the main shock, dam- aging several of them. The worst affected sites Reinforced pile were Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini. 58 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES Automatic Cold Unit Output, commission year shut down shut down Onagawa Unit 1 524 MW, 1984 Unit 2 825 MW, 1995 Unit 3 825 MW, 2002 Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 460 MW, 1971 Unit 2 784 MW, 1974 Unit 3 784 MW, 1976 Unit 4 784 MW, 1978 Periodic Unit 5 784 MW, 1978 inspection Unit 6 1,100 MW, 1979 Map 5.1 Nuclear Matsushima Fukushima Daini power stations Sendai Unit 1 1,100 MW, 1982 near the Unit 2 1,100 MW, 1984 epicenter and Unit 3 1,100 MW, 1985 their emergency Unit 4 1,100 MW, 1987 shutdown modes Tokai Daini Source: Office of the Unit 1 1,100 MW, 1978 Prime Minister of Japan. Fukushima Daini lost some safety-related BOX 5.2 equipment, but off-site and on-site power remained available, although not at optimal The tsunami’s impact on the Onagawa nuclear levels. On the other hand, Fukushima Dai- power station ichi lost much of its safety-related equipment The Tohoku Electric Power Company’s Onagawa Nuclear Power Station is because of the tsunami and almost all off-site located about 120 kilometers west of the epicenter of the March 11 earth- and on-site power (figure 5.8). This led to a quake. Although the tsunami was about 13 meters high at the Onagawa loss of cooling to the operating reactors, and nuclear power station, the station’s structures and equipment were not the ensuing nuclear meltdowns and release of severely damaged. When the first unit was built in the 1970s, the site elevation of the sta- radioactive materials. tion was set as 14.8 meters above sea level. A literature review and inter- The failure of the Fukushima Daiichi view surveys revealed that the maximum tsunami height at the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station has had severe social site was estimated to be about 3 meters, but the 14.8-meter site elevation consequences (see chapter 36). About 160,000 was considered appropriate. people in Fukushima were evacuated, of whom Since then, the tsunami hazard assessment has been reviewed many more than 60,000 were taken outside Fuku- times, using up-to-date findings and cutting-edge tsunami simulations and, every time, the safety of the facility against tsunamis has been confirmed. shima Prefecture. Many were unable to return The most recent tsunami design standard was set as 13.6 meters. Even to their homes for a long time because of unsafe though the Onagawa site experienced a subsidence of 1 meter, the March levels of radioactivity. 11 tsunami did not submerge the main facility. Some agricultural products were found to At the second unit, however, the intake unit for the seawater pump sta- contain high levels of radiation, resulting in tion was built as a pit-structure, and the pump was situated below the rest of local products being stigmatized as unsafe. the facility. This caused the seawater to enter the pump room through the tide gauge, submerging an emergency generator and rendering it inoperable. There was also an incident in which radioactive In the aftermath of the disaster, the main building of the nuclear pow- gravel from Fukushima was mixed into the con- er station was used as an evacuation center for about 400 local residents crete used for construction of a new apartment whose houses had been washed away. These people stayed at the power building, exposing the residents to radiation. station for about three months. The Japanese government has taken deci- Source: Matsuo 2012 and Tohoku Electric Power Co., Ltd. 2011. sive steps to clean up contaminated areas 5 : P ROT E C T I N G S I G N I F I C A N T A N D S E N S I T I V E FAC I L I T I E S | 59 Partly The interim report of the committee pointed damaged to three factors: 1 Loss of off-site power due to the earthquake • Lack of preparedness for serious accidents caused by tsunamis. Neither Tokyo Elec- Reactor building tric Power Company, the operator of the About Turbine About 44 m nuclear stations, nor the regulatory author- Tsunami (inundation height 14–15 m) building 25 m ities had prepared for accidents as serious Elevation: Emergency diesel generators as those caused by the enormous tsunamis about 10 m 2 Emergency diesel generator Seawater level inoperable due to the tsunami that followed the GEJE. Countermeasures Seawater pump must be put in place to address high-impact 3 Loss of all cooling functions events, even those with low probability. All Figure 5.8 Cause of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power concerned organizations must recognize Station Source: Office of the Prime Minister of Japan. these risks. • Lack of appreciation for the effects of com- plex disasters. Securing nuclear stations and ensuring the safety of people in the neighboring communities against unfore- seen complex disasters is a serious issue. Existing countermeasures for dealing with complex disasters must be reviewed and revised. • Lack of a holistic understanding of complex disaster scenarios. Existing countermea- sures to address nuclear power accidents do not reflect a thorough understanding of the complexity of nuclear power sta- tion systems. The excuse that the event was “beyond assumption” is unacceptable. Serious problems existed in the DRM sys- Figure 5.9 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Source: TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company). tem for nuclear accidents. around Fukushima and to minimize health LESSONS risks. It has set aside about ¥1.15 trillion for decontamination and disposal of contaminated • Important facilities were in most cases well waste between fiscal years 2011 and 2013. The protected against large-scale earthquakes long-term environmental and health effects of thanks to seismic reinforcement and other the nuclear incident are unknown; the Japa- measures. nese government will be monitoring the health status of residents of Fukushima Prefecture • Crucial facilities or facilities sensitive to over the next 30 years. disasters should be designed to withstand The Government Investigation Commit- extreme events. Although tsunami hazards tee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear were taken into account in the site evalu- Power Stations stressed that a paradigm shift ations and design of facilities, the hazard is required in DRM for catastrophic events. level had been underestimated. 60 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES • Nuclear power stations and other disaster- on recent hazards but also historical records sensitive facilities should be carefully evalu- of past disasters as well as future projections, ated against the risks of all natural hazards, if possible. Such assessments and assessment and these assessments should be periodi- methodologies should be periodically updated. cally revised based on the latest knowledge Protect critical facilities. Critical facili- and technologies. The failure of a sensitive ties should be protected against the risks of facility, as in the case of the Fukushima all natural hazards. The possibility of multi- Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, can cause hazards should be considered in their design. not only short-term consequences but also Enforcement of building codes should be a long-term social, economic, and environ- high priority for buildings and other important mental problems. structures. Prepare for complex disasters. High-risk plants and facilities need to be included in RECOMMENDATIONS FOR disaster management plans. Plans for quick DEVELOPING COUNTRIES recovery and rehabilitation after a disaster of unexpected scale should be made. Evacuation The cascading effects of the GEJE disaster drills should be conducted based on various highlight the importance of protecting sen- disaster scenarios. sitive facilities against disasters of any scale. Establish enforcement mechanisms. Regular The following are recommended as important inspections of critical facilities by firefighters steps to lower risks for crucial facilities and to and other disaster management organizations prevent high and irreversible impacts of com- should be established. Responsibility for safety plex disasters. guidelines, monitoring, and enforcement Identify critical facilities. Critical facili- needs to be clearly established in land-use pro- ties need to be identified and well protected cedures, building codes, fire inspections, and against extreme events. These include hos- so on. Effective enforcement requires appro- pitals, government offices, evacuation shel- priate legislation, organization, and human ters, schools, and other facilities to be used resources. for rescue operations, evacuations, and other disaster management activities. Also, facili- ties, such as nuclear power stations and oil NOTE refineries that may cause cascading effects in Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank, and various sectors should be identified. Disaster Masato Toyama and Junko Sagara, CTI management plans should include informa- Engineering. tion on the functions of these facilities and the risks they may pose. Assess critical facilities. Facilities that are BIBLIOGRAPHY required to function as bases for disaster- Agency for Cultural Affairs. 2011. Damages to Cultural response activities should be “stress tested” Properties in the Great East Japan Earthquake. http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/pdf/2011_ for disaster resistance. Even simple assess- Tohoku_ver14.pdf. ments, such as confirming a facility’s safety Central Disaster Management Council. 2011. Report against recorded disasters, is useful in prepar- of the Committee for Technical Investigation on ing for disaster. The risk of all natural haz- Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis Based on the Lessons Learned from the “2011 off the ards, including that of multihazard events, Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake.” http://www should be carefully evaluated. Risk assess- .bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/chousakai/tohokukyokun ment should incorporate not only statistics /pdf/Report.pdf. 5 : P ROT E C T I N G S I G N I F I C A N T A N D S E N S I T I V E FAC I L I T I E S | 61 Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety— Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations. 2011. Interim Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Report. Stations. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan Matsuo, A. 2012. “Genshiryoku anzenwo sasaeru /topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html. dobokugijutsunituite” [Civil engineering tech- Tohoku Electric Power Co., Ltd. 2011. Ongawa gen- nologies that support nuclear safety based on a shiryoku hatsudensho ni okeru tsunami hyoka site survey of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station of taisaku no keii nitsuite [Tsunami assessment and Tohoku Electric Power Co., Ltd.]. Journal of Japan measures at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station]. Society of Civil Engineers 97 (4): 95–97. http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/jishin Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. /jishin4/siryo4-2.pdf. 2011. Report of Japanese Government to IAEA 62 | I: STRUCTURAL ME ASURES PART II Nonstructural Measures CHAPTER 6 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Local communities play a key role in preparing for disastrous events such as the Great East Japan Earthquake, and are normally the first responders to take action. On March 11, 2011, community- based organizations were active in the disaster response and saved countless human lives. Recogniz- ing the role of communities and providing them with central and local government support is critical to maintaining and strengthening important community-based functions. Local communities have been responding to management (DRM) activities at the com- and managing disaster risk for centuries. Before munity level. Many of them collaborate with the creation of Japan’s formal state system, neighborhood associations (Jichikai) and local local communities carried out disaster-related governments, and sometimes with local aca- activities as volunteers; community-based demic institutions. organizations (CBOs) have existed for cen- How the government and CBOs coordinate turies. They include: Suibo-dan for flood risk around DRM has evolved over two centuries, dating from the 17th century, Syobo-dan for shaped by major events and trends. These firefighting from the 18th century, and Jisyubo include the Meiji Restoration at the end of the for earthquake disasters from the 1970s (see 19th century, which prompted modernization table 6.1). and centralization; democratization following In addition, various nongovernmental World War II; and the miracle of economic organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organi- development in the 1960s. Traditional com- zations (NPOs) are involved in disaster risk munity structures were eroded over time as 65 Table 6.1 Community-based organizations engaged in disaster risk management in Japan ORGANIZATION HAZARD LEGAL ACT SUPERVISING DATE NUMBER OF STAFF GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED OR GROUPS ORGANIZATION Suibo-dan Flood Flood Fighting Ministry of Land, 17th century 900,000 staff in (Suibo) Act Infrastructure, two organizations Transport and Tourism Syobo-dan Fire Fire Defense Fire and Disaster 18th century Organization Act Management Agency (FDMA) Jisyubo Earthquake Basic Act on Cabinet Office, FDMA 1970s 140,000 staff Disaster Reduction NPO All Act to Promote Cabinet Office After the Kobe over 2,000 groups Specified Nonprofit earthquake in Activities 1995 Source: Ishiwatari (2012). Japanese society modernized and urbanized. FINDINGS As depicted in figure 6.1, this has resulted in a decrease in spontaneous and autonomous The role of community-based community-based engagement in DRM with organizations in the Great East a corresponding increase in government sup- Japan Earthquake port to these activities. The government’s rec- A key factor in reducing the number of lives lost ognition of and support to community-based in the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) was DRM has been key to keeping these efforts the long tradition of CBOs around risk reduc- alive and well. tion and preparedness. The tsunami waves Hanshin-Awaji Great East Meiji End of (Kobe) Japan Restoration WWII Earthquake Earthquake (1868) (1945) (1995) (2011) 17C 18C 19C 20C 21C 1960s 1970s Miracle Tokugawa Shogunate Centralization Decentral- economic ization development Autonomous Suibo Act Decline of activity in Suibo-dan Emerged (1949) body government involvement Under Under local Syobo-dan Organized Decline of activity police government Jisyubo Organized NPO, NGO NPO Act (1998) Figure 6.1 Historical timeline of community-based organizations Source: Ishiwatari (2012). 66 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S brought on by the GEJE overwhelmed coastal • Six members, on the way back from clos- defenses, and warning systems underestimated ing gates, tried to save a bedridden elderly the height of the waves. CBOs played critical woman from her residence. Five of the six roles in responding to the event. members and the woman died in the tsu- nami (Otsuchi Town). The volunteer fire corps (Syobo-dan) Based on lessons learned from the GEJE, The volunteer fire corps traces its history to the Fire and Disaster Management Agency the 18th century. Corps members have regu- requested local governments to reinforce lar jobs but, when disaster strikes, they take the volunteer fire corps in October 2011 with part in disaster management activities in their equipment, increased allowances up to the own communities, such as firefighting, issuing level stipulated by law, and the recruitment of warnings, assisting evacuations, conducting new members. search and rescue operations, and operating facilities. There are currently some 890,000 Neighborhood associations ( Jichikai ) active volunteers across Japan, which is almost Communities were generally very well pre- six times the number of career firefighters. The pared for the GEJE. Most had participated in Fire Defense Organization Act and its bylaws regular disaster drills and knew what to do stipulate the corps’s roles, organizational when the tsunami warning was issued. structures, members’ status as part-time gov- For example, in Kesennuma City, a televi- ernment staff, and compensation and allow- sion program broadcast in 2007 urged neigh- ances. The local government has principal borhoods to prepare themselves. The program responsibility for the corps, while the central provided a detailed simulation of a tsunami hit- government subsidizes their facilities. ting Kesennuma. This simulation was shown to The Syobo-dan responded to the GEJE at the local residents, and the neighborhood asso- the risk of their own lives. Some 250 mem- ciations (Jichikai) subsequently undertook to bers were killed or are missing, including 51 in identify key evacuation routes. Regular disaster Rikuzentakata City. Some examples follow: drills were also conducted. These preparations • A corps member quickly guided all the peo- helped local residents to evacuate safely and ple in a community to an evacuation shelter quickly to higher ground immediately after the preventing any casualties. Corps members GEJE, thus saving many lives (figure 6.2). supported the evacuation of 30 handi- In the Toni village of Kamaishi City, com- capped and elderly persons, and persuaded munity members participate in annual disaster three other people to move who were insist- evacuation drills conducted by the Jichikais. ing on staying at home (Shiogama City). • Members closed the tsunami gates by hand, since they could not be operated automati- cally because of power failures (Miyako and Ofunato cities). • Members died closing the tsunami gates in Kamaishi and Ishinomaki cities. • One member died ringing a fire bell to Figure 6.2 Left: Damaged Hashikami area of Kesennuma; right: warn people of the tsunami right up until Kesennuma Fukkou Yatai Mura (community recovery restaurant) the tsunami hit (Otsuchi Town). Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. 6 : CO M M U N I T Y- B A S E D D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T | 67 The drills are conducted every year on March includes local information about which areas 3 to mark the anniversary of the Meiji Sanriku were flooded in the Meiji Sanriku and Showa- Tsunami of 1896. Participation rates in the Sanriku tsunamis, evacuation sites, evacuation disaster drill vary from neighborhood to neigh- routes, and dangerous areas. These maps are borhood, with more people participating in the distributed to all families in the town of Toni smaller, more cohesive communities. Accord- (chapter 27). Finally, a number of community ing to the head of the Jichikai, the participa- festivals are used as opportunities to engage tion rate in Kojirahama is low, while in Kerobe local schools in disaster awareness and pre- most people participate in the drill. In Kerobe paredness activities (figure 6.3). and Oishi, community members have a strong In the Wakabayashi ward of Sendai City, sense of solidarity, as the population is much the local community forged a very strong rela- smaller than in Kojirahama and they have lived tionship with the elementary school to edu- there for decades. Toni residents have written cate people in disaster preparedness. At the books about the effects of past tsunamis, which initiative of the Jichikai, regular drills were are used by the communities as an awareness- conducted in cooperation with the school. raising tool. In addition, there are two tsunami A handbook was prepared on managing the maps: one issued by the Kamaishi City govern- evacuation centers. After the 2010 Chilean ment and the other developed by the commu- earthquake, a tsunami warning was issued for nity members themselves. The former includes the Tohoku coast, and tsunami waves of up to the expected flood area, expected height of the 1.5 meters reached some areas. This prompted tsunami, and expected arrival time. The latter communities in Wakabayashi to reexamine their evacuation plans. They found that it would take longer than expected for school children in the coastal school, Arahama Ele- mentary, to evacuate to the designated school, which was 4 kilometers from the coast. The local community therefore decided to take shelter in Arahama Elementary School, and emergency food supplies were increased to feed 800 instead of 300 people and were stored on the top floor of the school building. During the GEJE, Arahama Elementary served as the shelter for more than 300 adults from local communities, in addition to 70 school chil- dren. They remained in the school overnight, and the food supplies were well protected on the top floor during the emergency (figure 6.4). LESSONS The GEJE experience yielded several impor- tant lessons about the need to empower com- munities to understand and reduce the risks Figure 6.3 Toni Bay area of Kamaishi City (top), Sakura Festival (bottom) they face, to be prepared, and to act as first Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. responders to hazard events. It also pointed 68 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S to important ways that their roles can be strengthened. Specific lessons include: • The volunteer fire corps plays a critical role in DRM for several reasons: – Since the volunteers come from the community, they have local knowledge of the context and are familiar with those residents who may need special assistance to evacuate, such as the dis- abled or bedridden. – The total number of volunteers is some six times that of the professional fire- Figure 6.4 Wakabayashi ward (top), and local fighting staff, providing a cost-effective community activities (bottom) way of mobilizing large-scale emer- Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission gency response capacity. required for reuse. – The members receive regular training and can respond immediately because Raise awareness. Strong and effective they are locally based. community-based DRM requires grassroots • Community-based DRM activities are well support and linkages to the day-to-day life of integrated in the daily lives of the residents, the community. Linking disaster risk aware- ensuring that awareness of natural haz- ness and preparedness activities to local cul- ards is maintained, for example, by mark- tural events can be extremely effective in ing the anniversary of a large catastrophe maintaining a culture of preparedness. with disaster drills, and linking awareness- Support community organizations. In addi- raising activities with local festivals. tion to grassroots support, building effective and sustainable capacity for community-based • The role of communities in DRM is formally DRM requires the formal recognition and recognized and supported by local and support of local and national authorities. In national authorities through linkages with addition to providing financial and technical local institutions. assistance, local and national governments should develop legislation on and institution- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR alize the role of CBOs. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NOTE Empower community members. Most people Prepared by Rajib Shaw, Kyoto University, and Mikio saved from major disasters are rescued by rela- Ishiwatari and Margaret Arnold, World Bank. tives and neighbors within the first 24 hours— before professional responders can get there. Statistics show that in the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji BIBLIOGRAPHY (Kobe) earthquake, 80 percent of those res- Ishiwatari, M. 2012. “Government Roles in Community- cued were saved by their neighbors. So, while Based Disaster Risk Reduction.” In Community- local and national authorities have key respon- Based Disaster Risk Reduction: Community, Envi- ronment and Disaster Risk Management, edited by sibilities for civil protection in hazard events, R. Shaw. U.K.: Emerald Group Publishing. communities are always the first responders MAG (Neighborhood Disaster Volunteers Founda- and should be empowered in that role. tion). http://www.mag.org.tr/eng/mag.html. 6 : CO M M U N I T Y- B A S E D D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T | 69 CHAPTER 7 Disaster Management Plans Following its devastating experience with recent disasters, Japan has been strengthening and drawing up new disaster management plans at the national and local levels. The Great East Japan Earthquake revealed a number of weaknesses in planning for complex and extraordinary disasters. Central and local governments have been revising their plans to reflect what they learned from the disaster. FINDINGS Revisions have been proposed, based on the lessons learned on March 11. Japan’s disaster management system addresses all phases of disaster prevention, mitigation Disaster management systems in Japan Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. In the and preparedness, and emergency response, as 1940s and 1950s Japan was repeatedly ravaged well as recovery and rehabilitation. It specifies by typhoons and earthquakes. In particular, the the roles and responsibilities of national and Isewan Typhoon in 1959 caused tremendous local governments, and enlists the coopera- damage; in 1961 the Disaster Countermeasures tion of relevant stakeholders in both the public Basic Act was passed. and private sectors. Following the Great East The act established the following: Japan Earthquake (GEJE), assessments have been made of the capacity of existing disaster • The Central Disaster Management Coun- risk management (DRM) planning systems to cil was established to formulate the over- prepare for and react to large-scale disasters. all policy for DRM and to function as the 71 national coordinating body for disaster houses, which have continued to monitor management. The council was chaired by governmental DRM initiatives. the prime minister, and its members came In 1995 the occurrence of the Hanshin- from line ministries, semipublic organi- Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake forced a revision of zations (such as Public Broadcasting, the the 1961 Act to focus more on countermeasures Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross, and and prevention, resulting in a new Disaster a telecommunications company) and rep- Countermeasures Basic Act in 1995. resentatives from academia (figure 7.1). The Central Disaster Management Council • Roles and responsibilities regarding disas- retained its leading role in conducting the fol- ter reduction were clearly defined at the lowing activities: national, prefectural, and municipal gov- • Formulating and coordinating the imple- ernment levels, as well as for community mentation of the Basic Disaster Manage- organizations and citizens; and the three ment Plan levels of governments were required to draw up master plans for DRM. Also, all • Formulating and coordinating the imple- the ministries and semipublic organiza- mentation of contingency plans for tions were asked to prepare disaster man- emergencies agement plans for their sectors. • Advising the prime minister or the minister • The cabinet submitted an annual report of state for disaster management on impor- to the National Diet covering the status of tant issues relevant to disaster management DRM, and specifying the budgetary alloca- • Fostering consultations on important tions for DRM programs. The National Diet issues surrounding disaster management, formed special committees for disaster in response to inquiries from the prime management in both its lower and upper minister or the minister of state for disas- ter management Prime Minister Minister of State for Disaster Management The Cabinet Office is the secretariat for Inquiry Report Offer Opinion this council. The Minister of State for Disas- ter Management, who is assisted by the staff Central Disaster Management Council of the Cabinet Office, has a mandate to oversee Chair Prime Minister the planning and central coordination of basic Members Minister of State Heads of Designated Public Corporations (4) Academic DRM policy and large-scale disaster counter- of the for Disaster • Governor of the Bank of Japan experts (4) Council Management and • President of the Japanese Red Cross measures. The minister is also responsible for all Cabinet Society Ministers • President of NHK integrated information gathering and other • President of NTT disaster emergency measures. Secretary Organization The Basic Disaster Management Plan is the Committees for Technical Investigation Chair Parliamentary Secretary of the master plan and the basis for DRM activities • Nationwide movement for Cabinet Office disaster management in Japan. It is prepared by the Central Disas- Adviser Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for • Tonankai and Nankai Crisis Management ter Management Council in accordance with earthquakes Vice-Chair Director-General for Disaster Management, • Tokyo Inland Earthquake, Cabinet Office, Deputy Manager of Fire the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. The etc. and Disaster Management Agency plan clarifies the duties of the central govern- Secretary Relevant director-generals of each ministry and agency ment, public corporations, and local govern- Figure 7.1 Structure of the Central Disaster Management Council ments in implementing measures. The plan Source: Cabinet Office. also describes the sequence of disaster coun- Note: NKH = Japan Broadcasting Corporation; NTT = Nippon Telephone and Telegraph. termeasures such as preparation, emergency 72 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S response, recovery, and reconstruction for var- – Communication tools such as tsu- ious types of disasters. nami early warning systems to be Based on the Basic Disaster Management strengthened Plan, every designated government organiza- – Additional reinforcement and retrofit- tion and public corporation draws up a Disas- ting of homes and buildings to reduce ter Management Operation Plan, and every earthquake damage prefectural and municipal disaster manage- • Revision of countermeasures, such as tak- ment council prepares a Local Disaster Man- ing gender into consideration at evacua- agement Plan. tion shelters, and improvement of warning The council has the right to establish tech- messages nical committees to study technical matters. After the GEJE, the council recommended Revising local disaster management plans specific evaluations to identify whether any The municipal government plays a fundamen- revisions or additions to the 1995 Disaster tal role in disaster management: according to Countermeasures Basic Act were required. the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, it is The Expert Committee on Earthquake and responsible for establishing a local disaster Tsunami Disaster Management prepared a management plan, emergency operations such report to document facts and findings from the as warning systems, issuing evacuation rec- GEJE experience. In response to this report, ommendations and orders, and flood fighting the Japanese government amended the Basic and relief activities (figure 7.2). In cases where Disaster Management Plan on December 27, a municipality is so widely and heavily devas- 2011, aiming to enhance countermeasures tated that it cannot carry out many of its pri- against multihazard, high-impact events. mary roles, the prefectural government shall Major revisions to the plan included: • Addition of a new section on tsunami disaster management [National level] Prime Minister Central Disaster Management Council Formulation and promoting • Fundamental improvements in disaster implementation of the Basic Disaster Designated Government Organizations Management Plan management for tsunamis and earthquakes Designated Public Corporations Formulation and implementation of the in the light of the GEJE: Disaster Management Operation Plan – Requirements to prepare for low- [Prefectural level] Governor probability and large-scale earthquakes Prefectural Disaster Management Council Formulation and promoting and tsunamis implementation of the Local Disaster Designated Local Government Organizations Management Plan – More careful consideration of multihaz- Designated Local Public Corporations ard and multilocation disasters [Municipal level] – Mandatory inclusion of DRM in urban Mayors of Cities, Towns, and Villages land use Municipal Disaster Management Council Formulation and promoting implementation of the Local Disaster – Raising of public awareness about evacu- Management Plan [Residents level] ation, DRM measures, and hazard maps – Additional investments nationwide Designated Government Organizations: 24 ministries and agencies for capacity building of each counter- Designated Public Corporations: 56 organizations including independent administrative measure agencies, Bank of Japan, Japanese Red Cross Society, NHK, electric and gas – More resources to be invested in under- companies and NTT standing disaster risk, and develop- Figure 7.2 Outline of Japan’s disaster management system ing innovative systems for monitoring Source: Cabinet Office. earthquakes and tsunamis Note: NKH = Japan Broadcasting Corporation; NTT = Nippon Telephone and Telegraph. 7 : D I S A S T E R M A N AG E M E N T P L A N S | 73 issue evacuation recommendations and orders taken by local governments in the GEJE and instead of the municipality. (b) support local governments in revising their A local disaster management plan shall pro- local disaster management plans, which are the vide for the following: foundation for local disaster management and reduction measures. In particular, emergency • Specification of the roles of government measures, including evacuation measures, and organizations, designated public corpo- emergency training have been emphasized. rations (such as public utilities and the The committee made the following key rec- Red Cross), and other relevant public ommendations for revising local disaster man- organizations agement plans: • Plans by category of activity, including: • Develop action plans with concise descrip- development or improvement of DRM tions and measurable results by setting facilities, investigation and research, edu- quantitative targets. cation, drills and other preventive mea- sures, collection and dissemination of • Plan the timing of initial actions to be taken information, issuing and disseminating of in the event of a disaster (manuals and forecasts and warnings, evacuation, fire- so forth). fighting, flood fighting, rescue, hygiene, • Be sure to specify emergency measures for and other emergency measures and reha- evacuating local residents (issuing of evac- bilitation efforts uation orders and other communications • Plans for coordination, stockpiling of food with residents). and supplies, procurement, distribution, • Establish procedures in case local disas- shipping, communication, facilities, equip- ter management capabilities are lost; for ment, materials, funding, and so on example, prefectures must quickly provide When a prefectural disaster management appropriate alternative measures or assis- council wishes to formulate or revise a local tance to municipal governments. disaster management plan for the prefecture, • Clarify the basic principles, including poli- the council is required to consult the prime cies and standards, for developing disaster minister in advance, who in turn shall consult management systems. the Central Disaster Management Council. When the prefectural disaster management • Make full use of emergency disaster man- council has formulated or revised its local pre- agement and reduction programs (imple- fectural disaster management plan, the council mented by individual communities) to is required to release and disseminate a sum- further strengthen evacuation measures. mary of the plan or revision. Following the GEJE, local governments Specific actions to review local across Japan have started reviewing their disaster management plans disaster management and risk reduction sys- Local governments in the affected areas have tems to strengthen countermeasures for mul- started enhancing their disaster management tihazard, high-impact events. systems. For example, at an informal meet- The Fire and Disaster Management Agency ing of municipal mayors in January 2012, the set up a Review Committee on Improvement of government of Iwate Prefecture proposed Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in amendments to its disaster management Local Disaster Management Plans. This com- plan based on its experience in the GEJE. mittee aimed to (a) assess countermeasures These amendments aim to improve disaster 74 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S countermeasures by taking into account sce- issuing and transmitting of information and narios involving the largest possible earth- warnings; evacuation and rescue activities quakes and tsunamis. and primary goods supply and distribution in The amended plan includes procedures emergency situations; and overall coordination that allow the prefecture to provide support of reconstruction and restoring livelihoods to municipal governments during large-scale during the recovery phase. The central govern- disasters before they request it. It also provides ment provides substantial funding for emer- for a communications security program for set- gency response and reconstruction. ting up multiple telecommunications systems, The lessons learned from the Great including satellite mobile phones, in prefec- Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995 had tural and municipal government offices. These already prompted improvements to Japan’s amendments were prompted by the experi- DRM legislation and government policies. ence of damaged or suspended administra- In recent years, high priority has been given tive functions after March 11 because of power to developing countermeasures for large- failures and destruction of offices. According scale earthquake disasters. Legislation has to the amended plan, when contact with the been passed on countering large-scale ocean- affected municipalities cannot be made, the trench-type earthquakes, plans for large cit- prefecture will automatically dispatch a survey ies where damage is likely to be wide-ranging team. The plan also authorizes the governor to have been established, and the overall legisla- provide support to municipalities in the event tive framework on DRM and disaster coun- of a large-scale disaster. termeasures has been improved. After the After the GEJE, many local government GEJE, these kinds of countermeasures have organizations across Japan, in addition to the been emphasized even more, and the Disas- Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures, ter Countermeasures Basic Act was revised in started reviewing their local disaster manage- June 2012. ment plans. For example, Kawasaki City is in The main drivers of the latest revision the process of adding tsunami countermea- were the need to account for low-probability, sures, which are hardly mentioned in the cur- high-impact, and multilocation hazards and to rent plan, and Saitama Prefecture has decided strengthen the local government’s role in pro- to review measures for dealing with commut- viding training and planning emergency mea- ers who can’t get home, emergency supply pol- sures and evacuations. icies, and widespread radiation contamination. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LESSONS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES National and local governments in Japan have Keep plans up to date. Plans at the national distinct and complementary roles in DRM and local levels should be revised frequently, planning. The national level is in charge of based on lessons learned from other disasters defining the overall DRM strategy, coordina- in and outside the region. It could be helpful tion and legislation, allocation of funds, and to set up a committee at the national level to deployment of the government budget. In coordinate the timing and content of revisions local-level disaster management plans, govern- at the national and local levels. Consultations ments are focusing on coordination of admin- between national and local government repre- istrative and operational functions; preventive sentatives could assure complementarities and measures, such as education, safety drills, and synergies across roles and activities. 7 : D I S A S T E R M A N AG E M E N T P L A N S | 75 Keep plans local. A local disaster manage- NOTE ment plan is useful in specifying countermea- Prepared by Makoto Ikeda, Asian Disaster Reduction sures against future natural disasters, as long Center. as clear roles and responsibilities are assigned to each tier of government regarding preven- tive measures, emergency response and rescue, REFERENCES and recovery and reconstruction activities. It is Cabinet Office, Japan. 2004. “White Paper on Disaster also useful to identify capacities that may need Management.” Tokyo. to be strengthened. ———. 2011. Disaster Management in Japan. Tokyo. Agreements made during normal times Fire and Disaster Management Agency. 2011. Report ensure quick postdisaster responses. Agree- of Review Committee on Improvement of Earth- ments could be designed and signed at the local quake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Local Disaster Management Plans [in Japanese]. level with key sectors, specifying responsibili- http://www.fdma.go.jp/disaster/chiikibousai_ ties for emergency response measures, rescue kento/houkokusyo/index.pdf. operations, and evacuation plans. Private com- Nishikawa, S. 2010. “From Yokohama Strategy to panies, as well as community-based organiza- Hyogo Framework: Sharing the Japanese Experi- ence of Disaster Risk Management.” Asian Journal tions entering into those agreements, could of Environment and Disaster Management 2 (3): develop services (in coordination with local 249–62. governments) that can be delivered as soon as a Tanaka, S. 2008. Local Disaster Management and disaster strikes, even without a formal request Hazard Mapping. Tsukuba, Japan: International or authorization from the local government Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management, Public Works Research Institute. (chapter 20). 76 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S CHAPTER 8 The Education Sector Although the education sector sustained considerable damage in the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), it also played a key role in protecting lives. Importantly, it provided both civil protection “hardware” and “software”: school buildings served as evacuation shelters and transition shelters, and the school curricula ensured that children knew how to prepare for and react in emergencies. The performance of schools in responding to the GEJE provided a number of important lessons about the role of the education sector in disaster risk management. DAMAGE TO THE EDUCATION Level 1 193 SECTOR 3% Level 2 747 13% The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) caused severe structural damage to schools. In total, 6,284 public schools were damaged. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology classified the schools Level 3 5,064 into three categories according to the level of 84% damage they sustained: 193 schools were com- pletely destroyed (level 1); 747 schools sus- Total 6,284 tained heavy damage and needed structural repairs (level 2); and over 5,000 schools had minor, mostly nonstructural damage (level 3) Figure 8.1 Categorization of schools by level of damage (figure 8.1). Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) 77 Seven hundred and thirty-three students from many years of experience with disasters, and teachers were killed or are missing. The and is based on a strong mutual understanding proximity of the schools to the coastline was and trust that family members will also evacu- a contributing factor. The students and teach- ate to safety. ers in the Okawa Elementary School building Kamaishi City has been conducting DRM in Ishinomaki City died tragically because they education programs since 2005 in coopera- did not evacuate to higher ground (box 11.3). tion with Gunma University. The programs are Where students in coastal schools survived, not mandatory, but are being implemented in the school structure, disaster risk management selected schools in vulnerable coastal areas. (DRM) education, and linkages to community Two such schools are Unosumai Elementary preparedness played critical roles. and Kamaishi-Higashi Junior High School (figure 8.2). The program engages the local community in preparing disaster risk maps THE ROLE OF DRM EDUCATION IN and holds evacuation drills four times a year— COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS one joint drill with the elementary and junior high school and one annual drill with the local DRM education conducted effectively and in community. cooperation with other local community pre- Kesennuma City provides another excel- paredness efforts saved many lives after the lent example of how DRM is integrated into GEJE. For example, in Kamaishi, where the number of casualties reached 1,000, there were 5 deaths reported among 2,900 school chil- dren, and not a single child present in school that day was killed. The so-called Kamaishi Miracle is attributed to strong DRM educa- tion, including a longstanding local tradition of teaching children the culture of tendenko, which means to evacuate to higher ground on their own without searching for relatives or friends (see box 8.1). This practice resulted BOX 8.1 Kamaishi Miracle When the earthquake hit on March 11, students of the Kamaishi-Higashi Ju- nior High School evacuated together with the children of the Unosumai Elementary School. They had conducted joint evacuation drills. They reached the first evacuation point located 700 meters from the school, where they noticed a cliff had collapsed. A resident stated that she had never seen this happen there before and advised the students to move to a safer place. They moved to another point that was 400 meters higher, where they at first felt safe. However, when they heard the tremendous roar Figure 8.2 Kamaishi-higashi Junior High School (top) of the tsunami 30 minutes after the earthquake, they decided they should and Unosumai Elementary School (bottom) are go to an even higher evacuation point, a decision that saved their lives. located near the sea Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. 78 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S school curricula, where education for sustain- able development (ESD) has taught students for years about local environmental issues and how to value and protect natural resources, the environment, and cultural heritage assets. ESD also includes a strong focus on DRM. In Kesennuma, students at the Hashikami Junior High School are taught DRM as part of the ESD program. The school served as an evacuation center for more than 1,500 people after the GEJE, which occurred just before graduation. A graduation ceremony took place in the gymnasium, and was attended by the evacuees. During the ceremony, a student gave a speech in which he honored two students who had lost their lives in the tsunami: “People are talking about Hashikami Junior High School as the ‘School of disaster prevention education,’ and we are being praised around the world. We trained ourselves thoroughly and have been doing disaster prevention drills regularly. But our power as human beings was dwarfed by nature’s violence, and nature deprived us merci- lessly of some of our most important things. This disaster was too cruel to simply be called a trial sent from heaven . . . I feel angry and hardened. But our future lies not in blaming God but in helping each other and persevering, as difficult as that may be.” Figure 8.3 Location of schools in various areas His words reflect the anguish of the com- Source: Kyoto University. munity, and at the same time the recognition, Note: ES = elementary school; JHS = junior high school. gained from the ESD curriculum, that the com- munity’s responsibility is not to despair, nor to consider the disaster an “act of God,” but to arrows represent the evacuation routes that rely on one another for support and to improve people followed. Balancing the need to pro- their risk management capacity. vide evacuation centers for communities and the need to reconvene classes for students has been a challenge, particularly where limited THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL availability of suitable land has made housing FACILITIES IN DISASTER RESPONSE reconstruction difficult, and the move from AND RECOVERY transitional shelter to permanent housing has been delayed. As noted earlier, schools played a critical role in Another challenge relates to the future role the immediate response to the GEJE (as evac- of school buildings in civil protection as demo- uation shelters) and in the recovery process (as graphics shift. While schools have tradition- transition shelters) as shown in figure 8.3. The ally been the most important public facilities 8 : T H E E D U C AT I O N S E C TO R | 79 in local communities, declining birth rates and be situated away from the coast, and be a rapidly aging population make it difficult to kept stocked with emergency supplies. justify rebuilding them in the same numbers Since the disaster, a large proportion of the and sizes. The following examples illustrate local community has relocated elsewhere these issues in more detail: because of a lack of jobs, adequate hous- ing, and infrastructure. These issues will • In the Arahama area, a school building need to be examined before rebuilding the served as an important evacuation shelter school (figures 8.3 [a] and 8.4 [a]). because of the flatness of the surround- ing terrain and the building’s height. The • In the Toni area, both the elementary and reconstructed school building should be junior high schools need to be rebuilt. able to withstand future earthquakes, have However, it is difficult to justify the con- a flat rooftop to which people can evacuate, struction of new schools of the same size because of the decrease in the number of school-aged children. Therefore, a single Arahama Elementary School building will be developed, jointly hous- ing the elementary school, the junior high school, and other public community facili- ties. The security of school children also needs to be ensured given that the school building will be shared with the general (a) public, and anyone can access it (figure 8.3 [b] and [d], and figure 8.4 [b] and [d]). • Although Shishiori Elementary School is not located on the coast, the tsunami flooded the ground floor as it moved upstream along the river. While it only Toni Elementary School reached the ground floor, the school was (b) nevertheless evacuated as there was no way Shishiori Elementary School of telling whether the upper level would be affected (figures 8.3 [c] and 8.4 [c]). • Hashikami Junior High School was used as an evacuation shelter following the disas- ter and is still being used for transition shelters. Since the school gymnasium has (c) not been available for more than a year, Toni Junior High School the quality of educational services is being affected (figure 8.3 [e]). The loss of teachers who died in the tsunami has created a shortage of staff in many schools, posing an additional challenge for the continu- (d) ity of education. Finally, counseling services Figure 8.4 Schools and locations for school children suffering from posttrau- Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. matic stress disorder must also be provided. 80 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S Considerable resources are required if the development. This issue needs to be education sector is to recover fully. Funds need considered in future school-level con- to be allocated for temporary schools, followed tingency planning. by site selection and construction of new • Human resources and training. In the after- schools, and repairs to buildings that remain math of the GEJE, schools face a shortage of structurally sound. An aging population and teachers, which has affected the continuity declining numbers of students presents a spe- of education. Students from the education cial challenge, as communities balance using faculties of local universities have tried to school facilities for both education and civil fill this gap; however, this also needs to be protection purposes. addressed in planning for educational con- tinuity in postdisaster situations. – New role of schools and multistakeholder LESSONS dialogue. Given the changing demo- graphic conditions, schools need to play Key lessons from the GEJE experience for the a bigger role as community facilities. education sector are as follows: Therefore, a broader range of stakehold- • Importance of DRM education. As exem- ers, including community members, plified by the “Kamaishi Miracle,” DRM needs to be included in reconstruction education played an important role in decision making. determining the students’ evacuation behavior. The role of teachers in imple- menting DRM in schools should be RECOMMENDATIONS FOR emphasized. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – Structure, location, and layout of schools. The location of school buildings is a The education sector plays an important dual crucial issue. In most cases, the build- role in the provision of civil protection hard- ings were located in close proximity ware and software. School buildings serve as (within 100–200 meters) of the coast- evacuation shelters and transitional shelters, line. Newer schools have slanted roofs and school curricula help instill a culture of to avoid water logging and structural DRM and preparedness in the community. decay. However, this prohibited people The recovery of the education sector is directly from taking shelter on rooftops. Also, linked to the recovery of the entire community. it has been observed that schools that DRM education saves lives, as the “Kamaishi were parallel to the coast sustained Miracle” shows. Students save their own lives greater damage than those set perpen- and the lives of others when they lead evacu- dicular to the coastline. ations in communities. DRM in the education – Function of schools and educational con- sector should not be limited to the education tinuity. While schools were to be used as curriculum, but should also include related evacuation centers, in several cases peo- issues such as structural and nonstructural ple from local communities remained safety measures; legislative measures sup- sheltered in schools for more than porting the integration, implementation, and six months. This has serious implica- funding of DRM in the education sector; risk tions for the restoration of educational assessments and early warning systems; and services and children’s educational DRM training for school staff. 8 : T H E E D U C AT I O N S E C TO R | 81 Include community members in planning. BIBLIOGRAPHY The postdisaster reconstruction process offers Fernandez, G., R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi. 2012. an opportunity for communities to reconsider “School Damage in Asian Countries and Its their future needs regarding both the educa- Implications for the Tohoku Recovery.” In tion of their children and their community East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singapore: Research facilities. A multistakeholder dialogue can Publishers. help determine the optimal arrangements and Gwee, Qi Ru, R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi. 2011. “Disaster design reconstruction plans accordingly. Education Policy: Current and Future.” In Disas- ter Education, edited by R. Shaw, K. Shiwaku, and Y. Takeuchi. Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group Publishing. NOTE Takeuchi, Y., and R. Shaw. 2012. “Damage to the Edu- Prepared by Rajib Shaw and Yukiko Takeuchi, Kyoto cation Sector.” In East Japan Earthquake and University; Margaret Arnold, World Bank; and Masaru Tsunami, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Sin- Arakida (box 8.1), Asian Disaster Reduction Center. gapore: Research Publishers. 82 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S CHAPTER 9 Business Continuity Plans A business continuity plan (BCP) identifies the potential effects of disruptions to an organization’s critical operations if a disaster were to occur, and specifies effective response actions and quick recov- ery measures. In the Great East Japan Earthquake, BCPs served their purpose to some extent, but cer- tain weaknesses were identified. While BCPs helped to keep critical operational functions going, and then to rehabilitate general operations, most small- and medium-size enterprises had, unfortunately, not even prepared BCPs. Since the private sector plays a major role in creating jobs and supporting local economies, it should be required to prepare BCPs, but with support from the government. INTRODUCTION • Disruption of public utilities, such as electricity, water, transport, and Why is private sector preparedness telecommunications important? • Disruption of citizens’ daily livelihoods Because social functions and stakeholders in modern developed societies are highly inter- • Disruption of local government adminis- connected and interdependent, any disruptive trative functions incident can affect an entire region. A single • Reduced supplies of daily goods and incident can have an extensive impact both services domestically and internationally, by under- mining supply chains and value chains (chap- • Bankruptcy of private companies, lost eco- ter 30). nomic opportunities, and income loss Examples of direct and indirect negative • Unemployment and economic downturns effects include the following: The private sector plays a major role in cre- • Loss of human life and injury ating employment and supporting the local • Damage to physical assets, the environ- economy, thereby ensuring regional sustain- ment, and natural resources ability (chapter 24). In the event of a disaster, 83 the role of the private sector becomes even Effective cooperation among disaster-resil- more important in this respect. In each phase ient private sector players helps ensure a resil- of disaster risk management (DRM), the pri- ient and sustainable civil society. One lesson vate sector: learned from past catastrophic events such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake, • Provides evacuation shelters and relief Hurricane Katrina, the Great East Japan goods Earthquake (GEJE), and the Thailand flood is • Ensures employment so that victims can that when the private sector is well prepared, regain their livelihoods quickly it plays an important role in reducing national and regional economic damage. • Provides labor, services, and products essential to the speedy recovery of social What is a business continuity plan? functions, roads, transportation, supermar- A business continuity plan (BCP) identifies the kets, schools, hospitals, and other functions critical operational functions of an organiza- tion and the potential impacts of a threat prior to its occurrence. It specifies effective ways BOX 9.1 of responding and quick recovery measures Accident at a microchip plant so that a business can continue to operate at acceptable levels and avoid disruptions for a In 2000, lightning struck a Philips microchip plant in New Mexico, in the specified period of time (box 9.1). The process United States, causing a fire that contaminated millions of mobile phone of developing and deploying a BCP strategi- chips. Nokia and Ericsson, Philips’s biggest customers, reacted differently cally within the organization is referred to as to their supplier’s plight. Nokia’s supply-chain management strategy al- business continuity management (BCM). lowed it to switch suppliers quickly; it even reengineered some of its phones to accept other types of chips. Ericsson took no action and waited BCM is a risk management strategy that for Philips to resume production. That decision cost Ericsson more than focuses on maintaining the continuity of criti- $400 million in annual earnings and, perhaps more significantly, some of its cal operations to ensure the supply of goods and market share. By contrast, Nokia’s profits rose by 42 percent that year. services, and thereby the organization’s sur- vival. Figure 9.1 shows the concept of business Figure 9.1 The Before After (initial response & BCP response) business continuity plan concept Occurrence of 1 To continue business at the level Continue Source: Cabinet Office. disaster over the permissible limit prior operations (supply of products, etc.) 100% Recovery Capacity utilization 2 To recover capacity utilization within the permissible time 3 Variance between target and recovery capacity to current condition Target Permissible limit Time Target Permissible limit Present anticipated recovery curve 4 Variance between target and Recovery curve after implementation of BCP recovery time to current condition 84 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S continuity and the recovery curve of an organi- area in the event of a strong inland earthquake. zation’s level of service before, during, and after A magnitude 7.3 earthquake with an epicen- a disaster. Developing a BCP helps an organiza- ter in the northern part of Tokyo Bay has been tion identify what preparations must be made forecasted and one scenario assumes extensive before a disaster strikes to secure its employees, damage, including a death toll of approximately assets, information technology (IT) systems, 11,000 people, the total collapse of 850,000 and information, as well as its reputation. buildings, and a maximum economic loss of ¥112 trillion (more than $1 trillion). After the Business continuity plans GEJE, governments are currently revising this in the Asia-Pacific region damage estimate to verify if even worse figures The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation are possible or probable. (APEC) region accounts for approximately In 2005 the council established the Policy 40 percent of the world’s land area, more than Framework for Tokyo Inland Earthquakes 40 percent of the world’s population, and to ensure the continuity of functions in the around half of global gross domestic product capital, and to establish countermeasures for (GDP). And yet, regrettably, it sustains almost reducing the death toll by 50 percent and eco- 70 percent of the world’s natural disasters. As nomic losses by 40 percent. It also set strategic the APEC region’s supply chains are closely goals that included increasing the earthquake- intertwined, and a single disaster can affect proof rating of houses and buildings to 90 the economic activities of the entire region, percent, increasing the fixed furniture rate to it is essential and urgent that efforts be made 60 percent, and increasing the BCP adoption to strengthen the private sector’s capacity for rate to 100 percent for large companies and 50 disaster preparedness and recovery by pro- percent for medium-size companies within a moting BCP development among APEC mem- 10-year period. In addition, it published busi- ber economies. A survey was conducted in 2011 ness continuity guidelines to help companies to better understand the current level of BCP develop their BCPs. Forty-six percent of large awareness and adoption in the private sector. companies and 21 percent of medium-size Substantial differences were found in the enterprises had developed BCPs in 2011. level of BCP development between small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large com- Damage and recovery after the GEJE panies, listed and unlisted companies, and The GEJE caused 656 private companies, between companies that have actually expe- which employed 10,757 workers, to go bank- rienced disaster-related disruptions and those rupt within one year. But only 79 companies of that have not. The level of BCP development them, 12 percent, were located in the Tohoku varies greatly by firm size: only 15.9 percent of region while the others were located all over SME respondents have a written BCP, while Japan. The reason for bankruptcies among 52.0 percent of large company respondents the latter group was indirect loss or damage have one. Also, there are considerable differ- caused by disruptions in their supply chains. ences among APEC economies. The BCPs functioned to some extent but with some problems. The ratio of companies FINDINGS without a BCP was still high at the time of the GEJE and differed according to company Business continuity plans in Japan size. Among large companies, 40 percent had The Central Disaster Management Council prepared BCPs before March 11, while only chaired by the prime minister has carried out 12  percent of medium-size enterprises had damage estimates for the Tokyo metropolitan done so. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the 9 : B U S I N E S S CO N T I N U I T Y P L A N S | 85 medium-size and large companies indicated which suffered from the GEJE. The com- that their BCPs were effective in the response- pany equipped itself with satellite phones and-recovery phase after the March 11 disaster. and standby generators, and conducted train- All SMEs indicated that their BCPs were effec- ing and drills based on a BCP formulated in tive to some degree, while the ratio of SMEs that 2008. The emergency center was established produced BCPs was low. Workers’ capacities at 3:30  p.m., 45 minutes following the earth- had been developed by formulating BCPs, so quake on March 11. Two days later the com- they were able to respond to even unexpected pany resumed the critical operation of treating events. SMEs were able to start alternative pro- medical waste from dialysis. Other companies duction by collaborating with companies in took over the waste management operations. other prefectures and were willing and able to collaborate in BCPs, because they do not com- How payment and settlement systems pete with one another on a national scale. and financial institutions responded The main reasons that BCPs did not func- to the GEJE tion are as follows: Financial services are a basic lifeline in a soci- ety, supporting many kinds of economic activi- • The damage was much greater than predicted, ties. The failure of payment and settlement because the companies followed govern- systems could prevent customers from mak- ment scenarios that underestimated reality. ing deposits, cash withdrawals, and payments, • Not enough training was conducted. Work- thereby intensifying public anxiety in times ers who had not seen the BCP documents of disaster. The financial sector was seriously could not take the necessary actions. affected by both the physical damages and the indirect effects of the disaster. Nevertheless, Practices following the GEJE even in the aftermath of the earthquake, the The case of a large distribution company nation’s payment and settlement systems and Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd. operates conve- financial institutions, including the Bank of nience stores, general merchandise stores, Japan, continued to operate in a stable manner department stores, and supermarkets. The and, on the whole, managed to function nor- company had revised its BCPs seven times mally (box 9.2). since the Kobe earthquake in 1995. A super- market in Ishinomaki City, one of the most devastated cities, started selling foods and LESSONS other goods outside its own buildings start- ing at 6 p.m. on March 11. On the next day, all The private sector in Japan has made substan- 10 supermarkets opened in the Tohoku Region. tial efforts to adopt BCPs, which proved to The decision to reopen in times of disaster was be useful when put into action following the delegated to the individual shops, which could GEJE. At the same time, however, some les- assess the situation quickly. Multiple logistics sons were learned that could make corporate routes were secured and 400 workers were BCPs even stronger and more effective. Until brought from other areas to support the stores recently there had been an attitude of toler- in the devastated areas. ance toward business disruptions caused by disasters of a certain scale, as they were con- The case of an SME sidered to constitute force majeure. Public The Suzuki Kogyo Co. is a waste management opinion has shifted since March 11. Now, even company with 67 employees in Sendai City, if the scale and intensity of a disaster exceeds 86 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S BOX 9.2 How the GEJE affected payment and settlement systems and financial institutions The Bank of Japan (BOJ) responded to the disaster by • Major bill and check clearing houses expanded their areas of coverage, so that participating financial institutions • Supplying a massive amount of cash to financial institu- could bring in bills and checks that normally would be pro- tions. The cash paid out by BOJ branches and local offices cessed by the clearing houses that were not operating. in the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan in the first week after the earthquake amounted to approximately ¥310 bil- • Payment and settlement systems as well as financial insti- lion, about three times the amount paid out over the same tutions across Japan generally continued to operate sta- period in the previous year. bly. There were also procedures and systems in place to ad- dress the temporary inability of affected financial institutions • Exchanging damaged banknotes and coins for clean ones to participate in the payment and settlement systems. through the Bank’s branches in the Tohoku region and a spe- cial window in Morioka City, which amounted to ¥2.42 bil- • Marketwide business continuity arrangements developed lion starting after the earthquake up through June 21. in the money market, and the foreign exchange market and the securities market functioned smoothly. • Ensuring the stable operation of the BOJ-NET, which is used for funds transfer and services related to Japanese • The stock market infrastructure was able to provide government bonds as well as the BOJ’s market operations. smooth and uninterrupted processing with a high level of operational capacity despite the surge in trading volume • The minister for financial services and the BOJ governor following the earthquake. jointly requested financial measures, such as allowing with- drawals of deposits upon the verification of the depositor’s Lessons identity even in cases where deposit certificates or bank passbooks had been lost. • Payment and settlement systems and financial institutions need to review the severity and scope of the scenarios used • Arranging treasury funds services and government bond in designing their business continuity arrangements, to see services at its head office and branches, where treasury whether they address potential stress events sufficiently in agents were unable to continue those services. light of the recent disaster. • Gathering information, in cooperation with the Financial • It is crucial to enhance business continuity arrangements in Services Agency, on damage to and the actions taken by line with the identified scenarios. This includes enhancing payment and settlement systems as well as financial institu- backup arrangements for computer systems and headquar- tions, and providing accurate and timely information to ters functions, increasing in-house power-generating capa- domestic and overseas markets on the operational status bilities against potential long-term constraints on the elec- of the Japanese financial infrastructure. tricity supply, enhancing arrangements for securing The private sector responded as follows: necessary staff in the event of prolonged disruption of public transportation services, and securing system- • To meet the needs of depositors and borrowers, financial processing capacity to withstand a surge in trading activity. institutions opened temporary offices and then opened windows on Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13, 2011, • Implementing and enhancing “streetwide exercises,” with the weekend immediately after the earthquake. Of the to- participation of the overall financial industry, and eventu- tal of about 2,700 offices of the 72 financial institutions ally with the cooperation of nonfinancial firms such as the headquartered in 1 of the 6 prefectures in the Tohoku re- providers of social infrastructure, ensures the consistency gion or Ibaraki Prefecture in the Kanto region, some 310 of- of arrangements across institutions. fices (11 percent of the total) were closed as of March 16. For details, see Bank of Japan (2011). • The financial institutions worked in close coordination, such as by delivering cash to other institutions that needed additional cash. 9 : B U S I N E S S CO N T I N U I T Y P L A N S | 87 assumptions and predictions, disruptions are RECOMMENDATIONS FOR deemed to constitute negligence, and top man- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES agers are expected to be able to take appro- priate measures to ensure the continuity of If well prepared for disasters, the private sec- critical operations. Companies should tor can play an important role in reducing local and regional economic damage. BCPs are an • Ensure BCP effectiveness through regular effective tool for strengthening the private sec- drills and continuous education. These drills tor’s disaster resilience. and training must target specific depart- ments in the company and should address • Raise public awareness. Private companies specific capacities and skills; generic train- and organizations do not always recognize ing is of no use. The plan should list spe- the importance and usefulness of BCPs. cific activities and give detailed directions Efforts should be made to raise awareness to be followed in emergencies and to facili- about BCPs and develop effective BCPs to tate recovery. These should be explained in achieve greater regional resilience. Prac- detail to those officials and employees who tices and lessons from disasters should be are expected to implement them. Drills widely shared with private companies and and training should be regular and ongo- organizations. ing, and some coordination at the sectoral • Start from a small disaster. Private compa- level is recommended. nies could begin with a small hazard sce- • Radically shift from a “disaster-based” to a nario as the first step in formulating BCPs, “consequence-based” approach to strategy and then add greater or different kinds development. Private companies should of hazards. For example, in Japan, since formulate their BCPs to reflect the results earthquakes are a very familiar hazard, or outcomes they expect from implemen- most companies start by preparing BCPs tation, rather than specific measures to for earthquakes, which are considered counter specific disasters. They should easier to produce. They then proceed to identify key services, and examine how develop BCPs for more complicated disas- long the service will be disrupted and how ters, such as pandemics. they can shorten the disruption time. • Mobilize government support. Govern- • Focus more on supply chain disruption risk ments may feel that providing support by knowing more about the situations of to BCPs for the private sector is not their stakeholders. In addition to the company’s role. But securing livelihoods and the local own operations, BCPs should address sup- economy is certainly a relevant public sec- ply chain issues that affect other companies tor concern. Governments should provide and markets. To facilitate this, meetings private companies with the necessary should be held regularly with companies information such as risk assessments and in the same sector and with supply chain guidelines for producing BCPs. Also, gov- companies, first to assess the potential risks ernments should collaborate with cham- and then to develop concerted measures to bers of commerce and other industrial ensure business continuity throughout the associations that provide support to these supply chain. companies. 88 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S NOTE Cabinet Office, Cabinet of Japan. 2009. BCP Guidelines [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/MinkanTo Prepared by Takahiro Ono, Asian Disaster Reduction Shijyou/guideline02.pdf. Center and Mitsubishi Corporation Insurance, and ———. 2011. Survey on BCPs [in Japanese]. http://www Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. .bousai.go.jp/kigyoubousai/jigyou/keizoku12 /kentoukai12_05.pdf. Financial Times. 2008. “The Fire That Changed an Industry: A Case Study on Thriving in a Net- BIBLIOGRAPHY worked World.” http://www.ftpress.com/articles /article.aspx?p=1244469. Asian Disaster Reduction Center. 2011. BCP Status Teikoku Data Bank. 2012. Higashinihon daishinsai kan- of the Private Sector in the APEC Region 2011. ren tosan no doukou chousa [Survey of bankrupt- http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail cies caused by GEJE]. http://www.tdb.co.jp .php?pub_id=1234. /report/watching/press/pdf/p120303.pdf. BOJ (Bank of Japan). 2011. Responses to the Great East Tokyo Marine Nichido. 2011. Survey on GEJE and BCP Japan Earthquake by Payment and Settlement [in Japanese]. http://www.tokiorisk.co.jp/cgi-bin Systems and Financial Institutions in Japan. BOJ /risk_info/page.cgi?no=753. Report and Research Papers, Payment and Settle- ment Systems Department, Bank of Japan, Tokyo. 9 : B U S I N E S S CO N T I N U I T Y P L A N S | 89 CHAPTER 10 Tsunami and Earthquake Warning Systems Warning systems can mitigate the damage caused by tsunamis and other natural events, and prevent the loss of human life and properties. Countermeasures, such as evacuation to higher ground and the stopping of trains, depend on getting the right information and disseminating it in a timely manner. Warning systems must also be aligned with community response. While Japan has developed the most sophisticated tsunami-warning system in the world, the system underestimated the tsunami height on March 11, 2011, and may have misled the evacuees and increased human losses. FINDINGS (see chapter  6)—used various tools such as handheld loud speakers, fire bells, sirens, Community-based tsunami-warning and fire engine loudspeakers to warn com- systems munities throughout the affected areas. In Before March 11, 2011, Japan had already Katsurashima, Shiogama City, all community developed sophisticated high-technology members including 30 disabled people were tsunami-warning systems that included sat- safely evacuated because the fire corps went ellite communications and hundreds of real- door to door to every house, helping com- time monitoring stations. But on March 11 the munity members move to higher ground. In community-level response (and community- Otsuchi Town and Natori City, some mem- based warnings) was the key that saved bers of the corps kept ringing fire bells or giv- countless human lives. The volunteer fire ing directions on their loud speakers right up corps—which are community-based organiza- until the tsunami hit—some at the expense of tions (CBOs) trained in disaster management their own lives. 91 Tsunami warnings on a national scale of the tsunami’s height likely contributed to Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) monitors the delay in people’s evacuation. The agency seismic activity throughout Japan around the at first estimated tsunami heights of 3 to 6 clock. The agency can quickly calculate the meters in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima pre- hypocenter and magnitude (M) of an earth- fectures, well below the actual heights. This quake, and issue a tsunami warning within was because the agency underestimated the three minutes after the earthquake. The infor- earthquake magnitude as Mj (JMA magni- mation is immediately disseminated to the tude) 7.9, while the actual magnitude was public by disaster management authorities, Mw (moment magnitude) 9.0.1 The agency local governments, and the mass media (fig- could not calculate the Mw within 15 min- ure 10.1 and box  10.1). The JMA has recently utes, as with a normal operation, because of invested some ¥2 billion in tsunami and earth- the scaling-off of most broadband seismo- quake monitoring and warning systems. graphs. Cable-type offshore hydraulic gauges, On March 11, 2011, the JMA issued the first which provide useful forecasting information, tsunami warning at 14:49, three minutes after were not installed to revise tsunami informa- the earthquake. People started evacuating and tion. Also, the JMA issued information on a organizations concerned started preparing for 0.2-meter-height tsunami 13 minutes after the the tsunami. earthquake. The agency revised the estimated Critical problems were found in estimat- height to 6 to 10 meters at Iwate, Miyagi, and ing the tsunami’s height and getting infor- Fukushima prefectures 30 minutes after the mation out to the public. Underestimation quake, and then to more than 10  meters in Figure 10.1 Information flow in the tsunami-warning system Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). Local governments Loudspeakers, sirens Dedicated Police, fire officers Residents in coastal telephone line areas at risk TV broadcasting JMA Central government Radio stations, etc. 92 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S BOX 10.1 Tsunami warnings in Japan The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) conducted tsunami com- and tsunami advisories. Warnings are further divided into two puter simulations for various earthquake scenarios and stored the classes: tsunami and major tsunami. results (which included tsunami arrival times and heights) in a data- The JMA has improved the warning systems following the es- base. Since the simulation takes some time, the agency cannot tablishment of a tsunami-warning unit for the Sanriku coast in 1941. promptly issue warnings using real-time simulation following an The agency expanded it into a nationwide service in 1952, and after earthquake. When a large earthquake occurs, the operating system the 1960 Chilean earthquake tsunami, the system started covering quickly calculates the hypocenter and magnitude, searches the tsu- long-distance tsunamis as well. In the Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earth- nami database for this hypocenter and magnitude, and selects the quake of 1993, the tsunami arrived before any warning was issued. most appropriate simulation results from the database. Based on The JMA improved the system, and started issuing estimated tsu- the estimated height of the tsunami, the JMA issues a tsunami fore- nami heights in 1999. cast. Tsunami forecasts fall into two categories: tsunami warnings Earthquake early warning Earthquake Tsunami warning 1.5 min. Seismic intensity information Tsunami information 2–3 min. (estimated tsunami heghts and arrival times) Earthquake information (hypocenter and magnitude) 5 min. Earthquake and seismic intensity information Seismic intensity information at Tsunami information each site (observed tsunami heghts and arrival times) Tsunami forecast Tsunami height Tsunami Major tsunami 3m, 4m, 6m, 8m, over 10m warning Tsunami 1m, 2m Tsunami advisory 0.5m Source: JMA 1 0 : T S U N A M I A N D E A RT H Q U A K E WA R N I N G SYS T E M S | 93 14:49 15:14 15:30 Map 10.1 Timeline 3 minutes following earthquake 28 minutes following earthquake 44 minutes following earthquake of revised tsunami • Observed Mj 7.9 • Observed rapid rise of offshore • Tide gauges scaled out. warnings on March • Issued tsunami information: 3 meters tsunami height by global positioning • Revised information: over 10 meters 11, 2011 in Iwate and Fukushima, and system (GPS) buoys. in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. Source: JMA. 6 meters in Miyagi. • Revised information: 6 meters in Iwate and Fukushima, and over Note: Mj = JMA 10 meters in Miyagi. magnitude. Determination of 45  minutes (map  10.1). The revised informa- hypocenter and Mj tion, however, did not reach everyone since they were evacuating, and power and com- Mj may be Mj is not munication systems had failed due to the underestimated underestimated Evaluation of Mj earthquake. According to interview surveys by the Japa- 3 minutes nese government, almost half of the population Tsunami warning based on the Warning received no tsunami information or evacuation maximum credible magnitude assuming around the area (in case reliable Tsunami warning the worst orders in the affected areas, and 60–70 percent based on Mj case M can be obtained by the did not receive the revised information about evaluation tool, it may be used) tsunami heights. Tsunami observations (offshore and coastal area) Based on lessons learned from the Great Estimation of Estimation of tsunami height tsunami height East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), the JMA plans and arrival time and arrival time to take the following approach while issuing a Qualitative expression warning (figure 10.2): conveying emergency situation • Issue tsunami information that is useful Mw (CMT solution) in making decisions about evacuation; the information should be clear and timely, 15 minutes Estimation of emphasize crucial messages, and encour- tsunami height age evacuation. and arrival time • Issue the first warning quickly, within Upgrade of tsunami warning based on Mw Estimation of tsunami height three minutes following an earthquake, Upgrade of tsunami warning based and arrival time and revise it according to observed data. on offshore/coastal observations • Provide tsunami height predictions quali- Revising tatively, instead of numerically in the first Figure 10.2 New methods for tsunami warnings warning for possible megatsunamis caused Source: JMA. by earthquakes greater than M8, consider- Note: CMT = centroid-moment-tensor; M = magnitude; Mj = JMA magnitude; Mw = moment magnitude. ing the uncertainty of tsunami estimates. 94 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S • Raise public awareness of the principle providing a lead time to slow down trains, stop that people should take the initiative on elevators, and give people time to take protec- their own to escape from tsunamis when tive measures (figure 10.3). The JMA quickly they feel any quakes. determines the hypocenter and magnitude of an earthquake based on real-time monitoring • Improve the accuracy of warnings about data. The agency estimates the distribution frequently occurring tsunamis to better of strong ground shocks, and issues warnings inform people’s evacuation decisions by to government officials and the mass media, improving confidence. such as radio, television, and communica- NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, or Japan tion companies before the shocks reach them. Broadcasting Corporation) reviewed programs For example, gas and railway companies use during the GEJE and found that the tones of this warning to control their operations. Also, the warning announcers on television were warnings are issued to the public through rather flat and lacked urgency. The corpora- SMS (short message service) alerts. The JMA tion is revising the warning methods issued launched this EEW service in 2007. through television to encourage evacuation by During the GEJE, the JMA issued the first announcements that are persuasive. EEW 8.6 seconds after detecting the first pri- mary wave (P-wave) at the nearest seismic sta- The Earthquake Early Warning system tion. There were 15 to 20 seconds of lead time The Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) sys- after the warning and before the main shock tem aims at mitigating earthquake damage by hit Sendai. At Seisho High School, Kanagawa Estimating the focus, magnitude, and seismic intensities using data from one seismograph Focus, magnitude & seismic intensities An earthquake occurs JMA P-wave Immediately after S-wave Estimating the focus, magnitude, and occurrence seismic intensities using data from two or three seismographs More Focus, magnitude & accurate seismic intensities JMA estimate After 10 seconds Preliminary tremors S-wave P-wave Estimating the focus, magnitude, and Principal seismic intensities using data from three motion to five seismographs More Focus, magnitude & After 20 accurate seismic intensities seconds JMA estimate Principal Preliminary motion tremors S-wave P-wave Figure 10.3 Earthquake early warning system Source: JMA. Note: JMA = Japan Meteorological Agency; M = magnitude; P-wave = primary wave; S-wave = secondary wave. 1 0 : T S U N A M I A N D E A RT H Q U A K E WA R N I N G SYS T E M S | 95 Prefecture, students used this time to get between one and two seconds. The number of under their desks or leave at-risk spots. Also, at earthquake monitoring and detection stations a primary school where teachers and students has also increased to 239 across the country. had conducted practice evacuation drills, they calmly began evacuating as soon as they got the warning. LESSONS According to a JMA survey, over 80 per- cent of people believe the EEW information The following lessons should help inform the helps them protect themselves. Some 60 per- development of warning systems: cent took action, such as taking shelter under • Japan’s earthquake warning systems were desks, upon receiving the EEW. Although some able to reduce economic damages and loss of 40 percent of EEWs have been incorrect and life by shutting down bullet trains and pro- underestimated the actual size of quakes, over viding lead time for people to take protec- 80 percent of respondents want to keep using tive measures. Japan has developed new the system. The JMA is improving the accuracy technologies to improve these systems. of the EEW by upgrading prediction models. • Using warning systems to trigger timely Bullet trains’ earthquake detection system community response is the key to disaster On March 11, 19 bullet trains (including two management. No matter how advanced traveling close to the maximum speed of 270 technology becomes, the guiding principle kilometers per hour) were running on the is that people should take the initiative Tohoku Sinkansen Line. All trains were able to to escape from a tsunami on their own as stop safely soon after the earthquake occurred soon as they feel any quakes. without incurring any casualties. The system • Inaccurate or inappropriate information detected the P-wave and stopped the trains by in a tsunami warning could mislead, delay automatically cutting their electricity supplies evacuation, and increase the loss of lives. (figure 10.4). The railway companies started Warning information should be issued on using the system in 1992, and have improved the side of safety, considering the possible it since then. During the Chuetsu Earthquake inaccuracy of estimates and the limitations in 2004, a bullet train derailed because it was of the forecasting technology. traveling right above the epicenter, although no casualties were reported. The companies short- • Multiple methods of information sharing ened the lead time between detecting a P-wave must be secured. While warnings must be and issuing the warning, from three seconds to delivered to everyone at risk, only half of the affected residents actually received the information following the GEJE. It was dif- Cutting power transmission ficult to provide people with revised infor- Warning signal Emergency mation during the evacuation because of to cut power transmission brakes Coastal seismometer power and communication system failures. Substation • Disaster risk communication must be prac- P wave ticed regularly, so that people are able to S wave better understand the information, and Epicenter messages and agencies can better under- Figure 10.4 Earthquake early detection system stand the mechanisms that local people use Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).. to cope with disasters (chapter 27). 96 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BOX 10.2 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Community-based warning in Sri Lanka Warning systems can save people’s lives and reduce economic damages from natural disas- In Sri Lanka the Disaster Management Center and National Building Research Organization are promoting community-based landslide warning ters such as floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, systems. Simple rain gauges, which are bottles for measuring rainfall or landslides, and other events. People can take bottles equipped with an automatic buzzer (Type OI) were delivered to countermeasures, such as escaping to higher at-risk communities. When the water level in the bottle reaches the risk ground, protecting themselves from falling level, a warning is issued to community members. debris, and stopping trains before they are overtaken by these events. Start with low-cost systems. Warning sys- tems can start with simple methods. Low-cost equipment, such as fire bells and sirens, were widely utilized as warning tools during the GEJE. Observers in communities once moni- tored water levels in rivers and sent informa- tion to concerned organizations by phone until a decade ago in Japan. Warning systems can evolve by replacing equipment, such as auto- Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. matic monitoring equipment and telemeter systems, based on these basic systems. Link with community-based activities. understand communities’ response to disasters Actions at the community level are crucial as to design warning systems. demonstrated by the volunteer fire corps that Understand communities’ coping mecha- issued warnings and saved lives on March 11. nisms. Since warning systems are meant to ben- Warning systems and other measures organized efit communities on the ground and to inform by communities may be particularly relevant in their actions, the responsible organizations developing countries where government capac- should understand how local people cope with ity and resources are limited (box 10.2). and respond to disasters. Community mem- Develop technology, and understand its limi- bers decide on their own when, where, and tations. Although various technologies, such how to escape. The organizations should tailor as flood prediction, tsunami simulations, com- the contents of warning messages to the users’ munication systems, and earthquake monitor- needs and points of view. Such messages need ing are all needed to develop effective warning to be simple, timely, and encourage evacuation. systems, their limitations must be taken into Establish end-to-end systems to ensure account. On March 11, underestimating the that warnings reach the communities at risk. tsunami height likely caused people to delay Multiple communication channels should be their evacuation and led to greater losses. established so that information keeps flowing Conduct interactive risk communication. in case of power and communication failures. Communities, governments, and experts should Ensure services are available 24/7. Since exchange information and ideas about poten- natural events can happen at any time, the tial risks (chapter 27). Communities should be organizations concerned are required to func- able to understand the information delivered in tion around the clock—24 hours a day, 7 days a the warning, while also being aware of the sys- week. Staff rotation should be arranged in the tem’s limitations. Also, government staff must organizations. 1 0 : T S U N A M I A N D E A RT H Q U A K E WA R N I N G SYS T E M S | 97 NOTES Communication, Education and Volunteerism, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singapore: Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. Research Publishing. JMA (Japan Meteorological Agency). 2002. Survey on 1. The JMA magnitude has the advantage of being Utilization of EWE [in Japanese]. Tokyo, Japan. calculated quickly within three minutes, but tends http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1203/22c/23 to underestimate the magnitude of earthquakes manzokudo_data.pdf. over M8. The moment magnitude is utilized world- wide but takes around 10 minutes to calculate. ———. 2011. Improvement of Tsunami Warning in Light of Tsunami Disaster Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake [in Japanese]. Tokyo, Japan. http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1109/12a BIBLIOGRAPHY /torimatome.pdf. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Goto, M., and N. Aihara. 2012. “Development of Edu- Technology. 2011. Interim Report of an Expert cation for Natural Disaster Preparedness and Panel on Disaster Education and Disaster Manage- Reduction at School Linking to the Community.” ment Based on GEJE [in Japanese]. http://www In East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Evacua- .mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/sports/012 tion, Communication, Education and Volunteerism, /attach/1310995.htm. edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singapore: Ohara, M., K. Meguro, and A. Tanaka. 2011. “Compre- Research Publishing. hensive Study on People’s Awareness of Earth- Ishiwatari, M. 2012. “Review of Countermeasures quake Early Warning before and after the 2011 in the East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.” In Earthquake Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku” East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Evacuation, [in Japanese]. Seisan Kenkyu 63 (6): 811–16. 98 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S CHAPTER 11 Evacuation Community evacuation measures should be the centerpiece of disaster risk management systems. Because the Sanriku region has suffered from frequent tsunamis, its local communities have passed their knowledge from generation to generation, mainly by constructing commemorative monuments and by conducting education and drills. Nevertheless, about 20,000 people died or are missing as a result of the catastrophic tsunami on March 11, 2011. Various factors, such as underestimating tsu- nami heights in warnings and on hazard maps, as well as a lack of awareness, influenced the number of human lives lost. Since neither the local governments nor the electric power company had pre- pared properly for possible nuclear accidents, evacuation from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station was chaotic. FINDINGS Planning Preparing evacuation measures Hazard map Land-use Because predictions and other measures to regulation foresee or prevent potential disasters are often unreliable, community evacuation measures Community- Evacuation should be at the center of disaster risk man- Evacuation based of the shelter & agement (DRM) systems (figure 11.1). Other organization Community route measures, such as hazard maps, education pro- grams, practice drills, and warning systems all contribute to successful evacuation. Education Warning Since the Sanriku region has often sustained Drill severe tsunami damage, its local governments and communities have developed a high level of disaster preparedness. The Meiji Sanriku Tsu- Figure 11.1 The relationship between evacuation and nami of 1896, with a maximum run-up height other DRM measures 99 of 38.2 meters (the highest point that a tsu- each of these disasters, the local governments nami reached inland), killed over 22,000 peo- revised their DRM plans accordingly, designat- ple; the Showa Sanriku Tsunami in 1933 with ing shelters, procedures, and other mechanisms a maximum run-up height of 23 meters killed to facilitate speedy evacuation (chapter 7). approximately 3,000; and a tsunami following Communities in the Sanriku region have the Chilean earthquake in 1960 killed 142. After built 150 monuments to raise public aware- ness among future generations (box 11.1). Community-based organizations, such as the BOX 11.1 volunteer fire corps and disaster management Stone monuments transfer local knowledge organizations, conduct training and regularly to the next generations schedule practice drills (chapter 6). Schools give classes on local experiences with past In Aneyoshi District, Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture, villagers who followed disasters and on disaster preparedness (chapter the practices of their ancestors survived and saved their properties from 8). Earthquake and tsunami evacuation drills the tsunami. A stone monument, set up after the 1933 Showa Sanriku Tsu- are also conducted, and local governments des- nami, is 60 meters above sea level—20 meters higher than the level of the ignate evacuation routes and shelters at higher 1933 tsunami. The inscription reads as follows: elevations based on past tsunami heights. “Living on higher ground will make the lives of our descendants more Tsunami hazard maps including the locations peaceful. Remember the catastrophic tsunami. Never build houses below this point. The tsunamis of 1896 and 1933 reached this point, and the vil- of evacuation shelters are displayed on sign lages were completely destroyed, leaving only 2 and 4 survivors. Be careful boards in town (figure 11.2) and distributed to now, even after many years.” every household. Past tsunami water levels and When the tsunami occurred on March 11, villagers working on the coast the places of evacuation shelters are posted on immediately ran up the winding path toward this monument. A huge, black electricity poles and elsewhere on the roadside wave rushed up from the port, stopping 70 meters short of the monument. (figures 11.2, 11.3). Evacuation routes have been developed to reduce evacuation times, even if only by a few minutes (box 11.2). Local governments conduct tsunami evacu- ation drills every year on days commemorating past large-scale tsunamis, and residents learn how to evacuate safely and quickly from their own houses to designated shelters. Volunteer organizations and private companies also par- ticipate, demonstrating, for example, how to assist people with disabilities, how to guide Figure 11.2 Evacuation map and information on past tsunamis evacuees, and how to close tsunami dike gates. Source: © Masaru Arakida. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. In sightseeing areas, tourists are also encour- aged to participate in these drills. Certain issues had been identified in evacu- ation measures even before the March 11 disas- ter. Public awareness about the possibility of a tsunami disaster had decreased since large- scale damage had not been sustained in many years. It was mainly the elderly and children who took part in the drills, while other age Figure 11.3 Evacuation signs groups assigned them a lower priority. The Source: © Masaru Arakida. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. number of participants in the drills had also 100 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S BOX 11.2 Tsunami evacuation routes for schools The evacuation bridge. The tsunami nearly reached the roof of The evacuation stairway. The Omoto Elementary School in the three-story Okirai Elementary School in Ofunato City, Iwate the town of Iwaizumi, in Iwate Prefecture, is located right in front Prefecture, but all students got away safely over the evacuation of a cliff more than 10 meters high. To evacuate to safer ground, bridge. The bridge had been built in October 2011, connecting the children had to take a roundabout route, so an evacuation stair- school building with a nearby road on higher ground. It shortened way 30 meters long was built in March 2009. The school building the evacuation route from 250 meters to 110 meters, and the evac- and the gymnasium were inundated by the March 11 tsunami. uation time from 6 minutes to 3 minutes. Source: Cabinet Office (CAO) and MLIT. been decreasing every year. Also, local organi- BOX 11.3 zations exhibited varying degrees of evacua- tion preparedness (box 11.3). The Okawa tragedy Seventy-four of the 108 students (70 percent) in the Okawa Elementary Evacuation scenarios on March 11 School, Ishinomaki City, died or went missing after the tsunami. The Of the approximately 602,000 people in the school is located about 5 km from the mouth of the Kitakamigawa River. inundated areas, 582,000 escaped the tsunami, Following the earthquake on March 11, teachers led the children from the with 20,000 dead or missing. The Japan Mete- school buildings to the playground as they had been trained to do. Since orological Agency’s (JMA) underestimation tsunami evacuation sites had not been identified before the disaster, they headed toward an elevated bridge not far away. The tsunami engulfed the of the tsunami’s height issued three minutes students and teachers on the way to the bridge. after the earthquake is likely to have delayed the evacuation. Although the agency revised Source: © World Bank. Used with permission. its warnings later through real-time monitor- Further permission ing of the tsunami, all local governments and required for reuse. communities did not receive them because of power and communication failures (see chap- ter 10). Others, believing that the coastal dikes would protect them, may have delayed evacu- ations. A survey of evacuees conducted by the government at the evacuation centers revealed the following points. Not all people evacuated immediately after Residents with a high level of awareness are the earthquake likely to evacuate immediately Fifty-seven percent of the residents evacu- Half of the residents who evacuated immedi- ated immediately (immediate evacuation), ately (immediate evacuation) thought that the 31 percent evacuated after doing chores, such tsunami would reach them, while 70 percent of as clearing debris (delayed evacuation), 11 per- urgent evacuees didn’t think it would or were cent left only when the tsunami was in sight not concerned about it. (urgent evacuation), and 1 percent of the resi- dents did not evacuate as they lived on higher Over half the residents evacuated by vehicle ground (figure 11.4). Many wanted to leave with their family mem- bers, or thought that the tsunami would catch Early evacuation is the key to staying safe up to them if they left on foot. One-third of Most residents who evacuated immediately them were stuck in traffic jams. The average after the earthquake (immediate evacuation) evacuation distance on foot was 450 meters, were safe. But half of residents who did not while the average distance to evacuate by car evacuate immediately (urgent evacuation) had was 2 kilometers (km). While evacuation on to contend with the tsunami (figure 11.5). foot is the general rule, vehicles are also needed to carry the elderly and disabled. Measures for evacuating by vehicle need to be improved. Figure 11.4 1% 57% Evacuation timing 11% Some designated evacuation shelters Source: CAO. were submerged Some 40 percent of the evacuees went to shel- ters that had been designated by the local gov- ernments. Among them, some 30 percent of the evacuees were submerged at the shelters 31% by the tsunami. N = 870 Immediate Evacuation: Evacuated immediately after earthquake shaking People’s behavior is influenced by group Delayed Evacuation: actions—during the Great East Japan Evacuated after chores, such as clearing debris Earthquake (GEJE), residents were Urgent Evacuation: influenced by their neighbors’ decisions Evacuated only when tsunami was in sight People escaped as a group, though they Did not evacuate were encouraged to escape the tsunami independently—tendenko. A survey found that some families were saved with their adjacent 5% 93% 2% Immediate families, but others were not in Yuriage village evacuation in Natori City. In New York City on 9/11, too, 7% 90% 3% people escaped from the World Trade Center Delayed evacuation with their office colleagues or in groups. 49% 41% 10% Urgent evacuation Commuters and school children stranded in Tokyo Encountered tsunami Not encountered: SAFE Others On March 11, 5.15 million people in the national Figure 11.5 Evacuation pattern and encounter with the tsunami capital region, including Tokyo, could not get Source: CAO. home from schools, offices, and other venues 102 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S because of traffic disruptions. In Tokyo, some Fifty patients evacuated from the Futaba 94,000 people stayed in about 1,030 facili- Hospital died by March 31. One of the main ties, including a city hall building. In Sen- reasons for the confusion was that neither the dai City, 50,000–100,000 people, including central government nor the electric power tourists, had to stay at evacuation shelters. companies had prepared well enough. In November 2011, local governments asked The governments issued six different evacu- private companies to shelter their employ- ation directives within 24 hours: four revisions ees for three days following future disasters. for the Daiichi Station and two for the Daini This promises to facilitate response activi- Station, as follows: ties by keeping people off the streets. Com- panies are required to store emergency food The Daiichi Station rations, water, and other amenities for a MARCH 11 three-day stay. 20:50 Fukushima’s governor gives an order Safety for tourists and visitors to evacuate the area within a 2-km Tourists and other visitors do not have enough radius of the station. information on tsunami risks and emergency 21:52 The chief cabinet secretary gives evacuation centers in unfamiliar places. The another order at a press conference Japanese government proposed pictographic to evacuate the area within 3 km, and signs of tsunami disasters to the International in-house evacuation within 10 km. Organization for Standardization, based on MARCH 12 global and national standards (figure 11.6). 09:35 The chief cabinet secretary gives an order at a press conference to evacu- THE ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA ate the area within 10 km. DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER STATION 20:32 The prime minister gives another The first stage order at a press conference to evacu- As the Government Investigation Commit- ate from within 20 km. tee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (2011) explains, The Daini Station [e]vacuation instructions from the central gov- MARCH 12 ernment did not reach all the relevant local gov- 07:45 Evacuation order within 3 km, and ernments in a timely manner; and there was a great deal of confusion during the evacuation. in-house evacuation within 10 km. Moreover, the instructions were not specific or 17:39 Evacuation order within 10 km. detailed enough. With insufficient information the local governments had to make decisions In addition, at a press conference at 11:00 hours about whether to evacuate and evacuation pro- on March 15, the prime minister issued an in- cedures, locate evacuation sites, and so forth. house evacuation order within 30 km. Figure 11.6 Pictographic signs: Safe place from tsunamis, tsunami evacuation shelter, and tsunami risk area Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 1 1 : E VAC U AT I O N | 103 Long-term evacuation • Deliberate evacuation area. The area where On April 22, 2011, the government defined the the cumulative dose of radiation might following evacuation zones (map 11.1): reach 20 mm Sievert within one year. Some 10,000 residents were requested to evacu- • Restricted area. The area within a 20-km ate within a month. radius where some 78,000 people live. Map 11.1 Restricted area, deliberate evacuation area, evacuation-prepared area in case of emergency, and regions including Evacuation areas specific spots recommended for evacuation (as of August 3, 2011) Source: METI. Note: mSv = millisievert (radiation). Deliberate Evacuation-prepared area in evacuation area case of emergency Restricted area Evacuation-prepared area in case of emergency 20km Restricted area Deliberate evacuation area 30km Evacuation-prepared Regions including specific spots area in case of recommended for evacuation emergency 104 | II: NONSTRUCTURAL MEASURES • Evacuation-prepared area in case of an 70,000 emergency. The area where a directive of 60,000 Number of evacuees either “stay in-house” or an evacuation 50,000 might be required in case of an emergency, 40,000 affecting some 58,500 people. This was 30,000 lifted on September 30, 2011. 20,000 People in the affected areas experienced 10,000 all kinds of difficulties during the evacuation. Updated information is recorded in chapter 36. 0 Jun Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan They were forced to change shelters as the gov- 2011 2012 ernment expanded the evacuation zone. Some Figure 11.7 Number of evacuees moved to other prefectures, June 2011– 82 percent of the evacuees changed shelters January 2012 Source: Fukushima Prefecture. more than three times, and one-third of them changed more than five times. The death toll enough knowledge about earthquakes and among the elderly who were evacuated from tsunamis, some failed to survive because they long-term care facilities increased substan- waited too long to evacuate. Public awareness tially in 2011. It was also reported that demen- programs must be designed to encourage evac- tia worsened among the elderly. uation. Without practice drills and trainings People in the Fukushima Prefecture had during normal times, people fail to evacuate continued to be evacuated for the first year properly and in a timely manner. (figure 11.7). More than 150,000 people were Public awareness programs should include evacuated, of whom over 60,000 were located practical knowledge. The programs should in other prefectures across the country as of the include the following messages: end of 2011. Also, nine city governments moved to other locations. This evacuation scenario is • Don’t stick to past experiences. No one expected to continue, since detailed plans for knows how big a tsunami can be, and every relocation back to hometowns have not been tsunami is a new event. If someone says, “It formulated. According to an interview survey, is safe here because no tsunami has ever one-fourth of the evacuees say they are “unwill- in my lifetime come this far up,” this only ing to return” to their towns of origin, and reflects a few decades of experience. another one-fourth say that they would “return • Don’t wait for your family to return. Some only after others have returned.” Younger peo- people went to meet their children or ple show less willingness to go back. waited for family members to get home. These people lost valuable evacuation time. LESSONS • Don’t wait for others to decide. Some people couldn’t decide whether to evacuate. They Japan has experienced many tsunamis and waited and watched what their neighbors has made ongoing efforts for over a century to were doing. strengthen evacuation measures and mitigate • Don’t stay in your car. Some people evacu- damages. Japan has already started modifying ated in vehicles and got stuck in heavy traf- its DRM plans and developing new systems to fic jams; they didn’t leave their vehicles prepare for the next tsunami by incorporating until the tsunami caught up with them. the following lessons: Public awareness programs must be sup- • Keep up to date with tsunami evacua- ported by action. Although most residents had tion information. Designated tsunami 1 1 : E VAC U AT I O N | 105 evacuation sites are sometimes changed Investigation Committee on the Fukushima based on recent scientific tsunami simu- Accident (2011) stressed that “organiza- lations or new developments in cities. tions concerned had not prepared because of Participating in evacuation drills in your the myth that all nuclear power stations are own community, school, or company is an perfectly safe, and they therefore ignored important way of keeping up to date with the risks.” The committee recommended new information the following: • Don’t try to figure out for yourself what will • Activities to raise public awareness are or will not happen next, as tsunami waves needed to provide residents with a basic come repeatedly. knowledge of how radioactive substances are released during a major nuclear acci- • Never go back home to pack an evacuation dent, how they are dispersed by wind and bag before leaving. Some people returned to other agents, and how they fall back to their houses to retrieve valuables and other earth; also, the harmful health effects of household items, and the second tsunami radiation exposure should be made known. came and swept them away. • Local governments need to prepare evacu- • Update information after evacuation. After ation plans that take into account the the quake, blackouts occurred in most of exceptionally serious nature of a nuclear the affected areas and telephone lines were accident, to conduct evacuation drills peri- congested. Portable radios are useful for odically under realistic circumstances, and staying abreast of the latest information to encourage residents to participate in and local news. those drills (chapter 36). The limitations of various technologies must • During normal times, there is a need to make be understood. People who believed that tide preparations, such as drafting detailed walls and seawalls would hold off the tsunami plans for choosing and arranging of trans- delayed their evacuation. Also, some people felt portation, establishing of evacuation sites secure because they believed that the tsunami in outlying areas, and ensuring water and levels estimated by the JMA would be lower food supplies at evacuation shelters, con- than the walls, but at many points the tsunami sidering that evacuees may number in the exceeded the estimated heights (chapter 10). thousands or tens of thousands. It is espe- People who lived in areas that were indicated cially important to develop measures for as being safe on hazard maps also delayed leav- the evacuation of the disadvantaged, such ing (chapter 27). Others evacuated to shelters as the seriously ill or disabled, including that appeared on the hazard maps, which had those in medical institutions, homes for the been officially designated as safe by the gov- aged, and social welfare facilities. ernment, but were nevertheless engulfed by the tsunami. • The types of measures listed above also need Evacuation by vehicle should be considered to actively involve prefectural and national only if needed. The elderly cannot walk for long governments to draw up and adminis- distances, and in flat areas, it is difficult to walk ter evacuation and disaster management several kilometers. Measures for evacuation by plans, in the event that a nuclear emer- vehicle should be improved. gency were to affect a large area. These Procedures for evacuation from nuclear precautions should not be left up to local accidents should be prepared. The Government municipal governments alone. 106 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NOTE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Prepared by Masaru Arakida, Asian Disaster Reduc- tion Center, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. Promote evacuation measures as the heart of DRM. Evacuation, along with other non- structural measures, is relevant to any other BIBLIOGRAPHY country, while the more sophisticated com- munication systems are costly and need many Arakida, M., A. Koresawa, and Y. Kawawaki. 2011. “Damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake years to develop. Other measures, such as edu- and the Contributions of Space Technology.” In cation and warnings, should be developed as 32nd Asian Conference on Remote Sensing 2011 support to the evacuation measures. (ACRS 2011) (3-7 October 2011). Tapei, Taiwan: Support the community. Governments Asian Association on Remote Sensing. Cabinet Office (CAO). 2011. Report on the Evacuation should support communities to prepare evac- from the Great East Japan Earthquake [in Japa- uation measures by providing hazard maps nese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/ and warnings, mobilizing drills, constructing higashinihon/7/1.pdf. shelters and evacuation routes, and conduct- Committee for Technical Investigation on Preserva- ing education programs at school as explained tion of Lessons Learned from Disasters. 2005. Report on 1896 Meiji Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami in figure 11.1 (chapter 6). Also, governments [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/ should formulate DRM plans by incorporating chubou/kyoukun/rep/1896-meiji-sanriku these measures (chapter 7). JISHINTSUNAMI/index.html. Transfer memory to next generation. Memo- ———. 2010. Report on 1960 Chile Earthquake Tsu- nami [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/ ries and experiences of dealing with disasters jishin/chubou/kyoukun/rep/1960-chile%20 should be passed from generation to genera- JISHINTSUNAMI/. tion. In Japan local communities constructed Fukushima Prefecture. 2011. Preliminary Draft of 6th stone monuments recording tsunami disas- Fukushima Prefecture Elderly Welfare Plan and 5th Fukushima Prefecture Nursing Care Insurance ters. Simeulue Island, northwest of Indonesia’s Support Plan [in Japanese]. Fukushima, Japan. Sumatra Island, had less damage than other Fukushima University Reconstruction Institute. 2012. areas after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Survey on Recovery Situation of Eight Futaba The local residents evacuated as soon as they Towns [in Japanese]. Fukushima, Japan. felt the earthquake, because they knew that Hirose, H. 2012. “Perceptional Behavioral Biases of Evacuees in Emergencies” [in Japanese]. Civil after a quake, sea water would come rushing Engineering 97 (6). in. They have passed along their tsunami expe- Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fuku- riences to the next generation through chil- shima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric dren’s songs. Also, they had already relocated Power Company. 2011. Interim Report. http:// their towns from the coast to higher ground icanps.go.jp/eng/interim-report.html. Mizushima, T. 2011. Review of the Behavior of People after the 1907 tsunami. during the Great East Japan Earthquake. The Sec- Raise public awareness. DRM education in ond Expert Group Meeting on GEJE—Learning schools, including evacuation drills, is essen- from the Mega-Tsunami Disaster. http://www tial to ensure successful tsunami evacuation at .bousai.go.jp/kyoryoku/Session/Session1/01.pdf. the community level. Children will bring back Mizutani, T. 2012. “Emergency Evacuation and Human Losses from the 2011 Earthquake and and share their knowledge with their families, Tsunami off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku.” Natural which will help educate the whole neighbor- Disaster Research Report of NIED 48: 91–104. hood (chapter 8). 1 1 : E VAC U AT I O N | 107 Nakahara, S. 2011. “Lessons Learned from the Recent Report for Session 1. The Second Expert Group Tsunami in Japan: The Need for Epidemiologi- Meeting on the Great East Japan Earthquake— cal Evidence to Strengthen Community-based Learning from the Mega-Tsunami Disaster. Preparedness and Emergency Response Plans.” http://www.unescap.org/idd/events/2011- Injury Prevention 17: 361–64. December-Japan-Earthquake/Report-of-the- Nakajima, N., and A. Tanaka. 2011. “Past Tsunami Thematic-Session-1.pdf. Disasters and Reconstruction Planning in the San- Yun, N., and M. Hamada. 2012. “A Comparative Study riku Region.” Urban Planning 291: 45–48. on Human Impacts Caused by the 2011 Great East Sotooka, H. 2012. 3.11 Complex Disaster [in Japanese]. Japan Earthquake and Disaster Mitigation.” In Iwanami Shinsyo, Tokyo. Proceedings of the International Symposium on UNESCAP (UN Economic and Social Commission Engineering Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great for Asia and the Pacific). 2011. Thematic Session East Japan Earthquake (1666–79), Tokyo, Japan. 108 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S CHAPTER 12 Urban Planning, Land Use Regulations, and Relocation Reconstruction should include a range of measures to enhance safety: disaster prevention facilities, relocation of communities to higher ground, and evacuation facilities. A community should not, how- ever, rely too heavily on any one of these as being sufficient, because the next tsunami could be even larger than the last. Communities also need to rebuild their industries and create jobs to keep their residents from moving away. The challenge is to find sufficiently large relocation sites on high ground, and also to regulate land use in lowland areas. FINDINGS several hundred years, some affected people wanted to reconstruct their houses at suit- Reconstruction after able new locations instead of the damaged the March 2011 disaster sites. Although the rubble has been removed, Reconstruction after the Great East Japan full-scale reconstruction has not yet begun. Earthquake (GEJE) has been slow compared Planning and local consensus-building for to the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earth- relocating communities to high ground has quake that hit the city of Kobe and killed been attempted. It takes time to find places 6,400 people in 1995. The seismic shocks to live and to reach agreement as a commu- experienced during the GEJE affected a much nity to move together to a safer place. Since it broader area. A  number of characteristics of takes several years to rebuild completely, it is the GEJE made reconstruction more difficult unclear whether local employment and popu- and lengthy. lation levels can be sustained (see chapter 33). First, since tsunamis tend to hit the same Second, the radiation contamination from areas repeatedly over several decades or even the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 109 Power Station will last a long time and prevent the damages. Sometimes we cannot predict, the local people from returning to their homes. or even imagine, the severity of future natu- Reconstruction projects may be delayed since ral hazards and so we will be unprepared. it is still unclear when or if people will be able Although many breakwaters and tsunami dikes to return to their places of residence. There were built in the stricken areas, the tsunami is also a concern that many people, especially nevertheless destroyed or overtopped most of younger families, may choose not to go back to them, and poured into the towns and villages their hometowns (chapter 36). behind them. Reducing damages means first While the nuclear accident in Fukushima and foremost preventing the loss of human was a bit less serious than in Chernobyl, it was lives; however, property damage to houses, ranked the same on the International Nuclear infrastructure, and various manmade facilities Event Scale. No major emissions of radio- may be unavoidable. active material from the collapsed nuclear In regards to building relocation and recon- power plants have been observed since April struction, disaster risk management (DRM) 2011. A ban or restriction on land use will be consists of three components: disaster pre- introduced to prevent exposure to high levels vention facilities, community relocation to of radiation. The government plans to reclas- safer ground, and evacuation facilities. This sify the Warning Zone and Planned Evacua- approach was reflected in the government’s tion Zone into three new categories: long-term basic policy on reconstruction, after the GEJE habitation difficult zone (more than 50 milli- Reconstruction Council’s report recom- sieverts [mSv] of annual radiation exposure), mended a shift in DRM from prevention to risk prioritized decontamination zone, and decon- reduction. tamination and possible to return zone. All the Disaster prevention facilities included tsu- nuclear power plants in Japan were shut down nami breakwaters or dikes. It is important to in May 2012 for maintenance and evaluation, recognize both their usefulness and their limi- and two units started operation in June 2012. tations (as explained in chapter 1); damages There are two tiers of local government in would have been even worse without them. At Japan, prefectures and local municipalities, the same time, the facilities could not prevent which are responsible for disaster response the huge tsunami from destroying areas behind and reconstruction. Municipal governments them. Most of the breakwaters and dikes will play the most important role because they are be rebuilt to be even stronger and larger, but closest to the victims and the stricken areas. these facilities can only resist tsunamis of lim- The prefectural governments are grappling ited size. with broad reconstruction issues. For example, Community relocation and redesign are they have supported municipal governments also important ways of reducing damage. in debris management by coordinating solid Clearly, when communities are located on suf- waste management facilities in the prefectures ficiently high ground, the tsunami can’t reach (chapter 23). them. This was well known in areas that had been repeatedly hit. After the Showa Sanriku Managing disaster risk: Tsunami in 1933, which killed about 3,000 peo- A three-pronged approach ple, the government promoted reconstruction All reconstruction plans aim at rebuilding on higher ground; but this policy could not be towns and communities that are resilient to fully implemented since it was difficult to find major disasters. The most important lesson suitable locations. from the GEJE is that there are many disas- Evacuation facilities consist of escape ters we cannot prevent; all we can do is reduce routes and shelters. Escape routes should be 110 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S easy to follow and clear of debris. Although assistance from the government. The village evacuation drills and instructions discourage began moving to higher land following the the use of vehicles, escape routes must nev- Meiji Sanriku Tsunami in 1896, which washed ertheless accommodate both pedestrians and away almost the entire village. The residents cars (chapter 11). Evacuation shelters should found and developed the relocation site them- be multilevel structures to accommodate evac- selves, and the relocation was completed with uees safely as water levels rise. government financial support after the Showa All three components must be used together Sanriku Tsunami in 1933. Fortunately, there in a holistic system. Using only one or two ele- was a hill above the old village that sloped ments is not enough. While disaster preven- gently to the beach. The villagers moved all tion facilities and the location of communities their houses to the hill and turned the low- are based on forecasts and estimates, the actual lands, where they had lived, into farmland. hazard may be larger; life-saving evacuation A 3-meter high tsunami dike was built in the facilities will also be required. 1970s. On March 11, the tsunami hit the village, Although these strategies are being applied flooding most of the farmland but not the resi- in the reconstruction of tsunami-stricken dential zone. Only a couple of houses, located areas, experience has shown that relocating lower down, were washed away, and one per- communities to higher ground has been dif- son was killed. ficult to implement. And while relocation of communities and construction of evacuation Half-measures do not suffice facilities may be possible in newly recon- Another example is the Touni-hongo village in structed areas, people are also worried about Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture. This is a well- areas that are under threat of being hit by known village that relocated after the Showa tsunamis in the near future. In these areas, Sanriku Tsunami in 1933 to a newly developed construction of disaster prevention facilities site on hilly ground nearby. One of the commu- takes longer and the relocation of communi- nity leaders, who owned the land, donated it to ties to higher ground is more difficult than in the community. The Iwate prefectural govern- those areas destroyed by the GEJE: compensa- ment developed the relocation site with finan- tion has to be paid for the existing buildings, cial support from the central government. One and consensus has to be established among hundred houses were moved to the new site affected residents. and the old location was turned into farmland. The GEJE tsunami flooded and washed Learning from past tsunami reconstruction away all 50 houses located on lower ground, The following three examples illustrate the but it didn’t reach the houses relocated to challenges of reconstruction. Dikes alone can- higher ground. not protect communities, so locating com- The houses on the lower level were built munities at higher elevations is key. But it is after the 10-meter-high tsunami dike had difficult to find suitable locations and to sus- been constructed. The dike was expected to tain people’s livelihoods. protect the hinterland. But the tsunami broke into the village at a point beyond the dike, and Building on higher ground saves lives another tsunami wave came in through a tun- and property nel behind the village that connects it with The Yoshihama fishing and farming village the neighboring village. One of the reasons for in Ofunato City, in the Iwate Prefecture, was building houses on lower ground is to make successfully relocated to available land close daily life easier for the elderly, who have a hard to the original residential area, with financial time on steep slopes. In many similar cases, 1 2 : U R B A N P L A N N I N G , L A N D U S E R E G U L AT I O N S , A N D R E LO C AT I O N | 111 communities were partially damaged on low disaster in the coastal municipalities ranging ground. Constructing large dikes may even from the Iwate to the Fukushima prefectures. have encouraged building on lower ground. According to residential statistics, the same area lost 57,000 people between March and A low-lying community destroyed November 2011, including about 15,000 peo- The final example is Taro, Miyako City, Iwate ple who were taken by the disaster. If people Prefecture. Taro was once known around the are not strongly induced to stay in these areas world for its long tsunami dikes (chapter  1). through economic incentives such as industrial Taro was hit by the 1896 Meiji Sanriku Tsu- recovery and job creation, even more residents nami, losing 1,867 people—about 83 percent of may leave in spite of physical reconstruction its population of 2,248. It was then hit again in (chapter 24). 1933 and lost 911 residents, or 32 percent of the The urgent need for development requires population. After the Showa Sanriku Tsunami that part of the huge national reconstruction in 1933, Taro considered following the central budget be used to develop new job-creating government’s recommendation and relocating industries and to attract entrepreneurs from the entire community to higher ground. They outside the region. could not, however, find a suitable site where The first step is to rebuild existing enter- the people could see the fishing port or build prises, especially in the fishing and marine- their houses facing south, among other impor- product-processing industries, including ship- tant conditions. Because Taro was a large vil- building, freezing, and warehousing. But these lage, the residents finally gave up looking for a cannot be relied on alone, since they have been new site; they decided to build a dike around gradually losing jobs to heavy international the residential area, and paid for it themselves. competition. After the first year of construction, the cen- A second important initiative is setting tral and prefectural governments approved the up new industries that may increase future project as a disaster prevention public work employment. All local government recon- and provided the rest of the funding. A second struction plans include activities such as dike with almost the same dimensions as the tourism, renewable energy production, and first one was built after the 1960 Chilean earth- manufacturing of products that respond to quake tsunami, to prepare for larger tsunamis. local demand. But even with these two dikes, Taro, this In Fukushima the outlook is worse. The time, was utterly destroyed. An estimated 200 government announced that certain parts of out of 4,400 residents perished. The newer Fukushima will not be habitable for a long time dike closest to the beach was destroyed and because of high radiation levels. The govern- the other was overtopped. There were several ment must therefore help people relocate. cases in Sanriku where previously stricken communities had not moved but had simply Toward building communities resilient added landfill. All of these incurred severe to disaster damage. Local governments did not effectively regu- late land use in the affected areas. Lowlands Recovering industries and jobs had been developed for residential, com- Another serious problem came up while plan- mercial, and industrial purposes. Meanwhile, ning for reconstruction: out-migration. A sur- economic development, urbanization, and vey showed that the population had decreased population growth increased residents’ vul- by 46,000 between 2005 and 2010 before the nerability to tsunami damage along the coast. 112 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S The population in the coastal areas of Iwate • Instituting practical measures for quick Prefecture tripled over the past century: from and safe evacuation (chapter 11) about 76,000 at the time of the Meiji Sanriku • Assessing tsunami risks based on local con- Tsunami in 1896 to some 274,000 in 2011. ditions, such as industry, commercial activ- The Japanese government is reinforcing ities, history, and culture (chapter 25) DRM systems by introducing land-use regula- tions based on lessons learned from the GEJE. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, The Act on Building Communities Resilient Transport and Tourism has formulated basic to Tsunami was legislated in December 2011 guidelines on tsunami countermeasures for to prepare for low-probability, high-impact prefectures and municipal governments. The tsunamis (figure 12.1). The goal of the act is to guidelines specify that prefectural governors protect human lives at all costs. The following should categorize risk areas as “yellow zone,” approaches have been adopted: “orange zone,” and “red zone.” In municipali- ties, mayors formulate countermeasure action • Multiple lines of defense, combining struc- plans. The governors and mayors designate tural and nonstructural measures (see part structures such as highways as disaster man- I, and chapters 6, 7, and 13) agement facilities. • Shifting from a “single line of defense” In yellow zones, where residents are likely based on tsunami dikes to a “zone defense” to lose their lives, evacuation measures such as using roads and other structures such as evacuation shelters, drills, and hazard maps, secondary dikes, and land-use regulation are required. In the orange zones, where Figure 12.1 Building Act on Building Communities Resilient to Tsunami communities resilient to Tsunami mitigation structure Tsunami mitigation tsunamis Protected area Protected area (inland lock gate) structure (existing road) Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Evacuation building Evacuation Evacuation tower Evacuation route Tsunami mitigation building evacuation site structure (multipurpose) Land raising of residential area Tsunami evacuation Tsunami risk area tower Tsunami disaster special protection zone Tsunami disaster special protection zone (orange zone) (1) For example, hospitals have floor levels above tsunami height Tsunami protection zone (yellow zone) (2) Regulate development (1) Planning evacuation (facilities, routes, drills, information delivery, etc.) Tsunami Zone designated by ordinance (red zone) (2) Hazard maps dike Living Living space (3) Agreement on evacuation facilities under tsunami space over (4) Evacuation plan and evacuation drills tsunami 1 2 : U R B A N P L A N N I N G , L A N D U S E R E G U L AT I O N S , A N D R E LO C AT I O N | 113 residents are highly likely to lose their lives, businesses and job opportunities, people key facilities such as hospitals are to be set up will leave their disaster-stricken commu- in tsunami-resilient structures. In red zones, nities. Simply rebuilding houses will not where residents cannot escape a tsunami, all induce people to stay; industrial recovery buildings including residences must be tsu- policies must also be strengthened (chap- nami resilient, such as having multiple stories ter 24). that rise high enough to evade the tsunami • Public-private partnerships are crucial. waters. Enormous sums of public money are being Cost sharing and various incentives are used spent on reconstruction projects and to in implementing these measures. Local gov- stimulate the local economy. But this will ernments may provide the private sector with end in several years. It is important to cre- incentives to secure evacuation facilities. Addi- ate as many business activities as possible tional floor-space ratios for evacuation spaces to promote economic growth and opportu- on high floors are given as bonuses. They may nities in the long term. also be exempted from paying 50 percent of the building tax on evacuation space. Participating • Relocation effectively mitigates damage and organizations share the costs of multipurpose loss of life, but implementation is a challenge. structures. For example, DRM organizations Three examples from past tsunamis illus- will share the additional construction costs for trate that although relocation measures roads used as secondary dikes. are effective, they are not easy to imple- The central government and local govern- ment. In the village of Yoshihama, houses ments provide financial assistance for devel- that had already been relocated following a oping safe relocation sites on high ground. tsunami did not suffer from the GEJE. But Community members must reach a consensus finding suitable relocation sites around the on relocation before it begins. The community mountainous coastal village of Taro was bears the cost of building new houses, while difficult, and in the village of Touni-hongo, local governments are responsible for develop- where houses had been relocated to higher ing the infrastructure associated with the relo- ground following a tsunami, lowland use cation sites. could not be properly regulated. LESSONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES • Tsunami-prone areas must be ready for recurring disasters. Reconstruction must Understand and manage disaster risk. The include three key safety measures: disaster Japanese experience illustrates that improper prevention facilities, relocation of com- land-use regulation leads to increased damage munities to higher ground out of reach of from disasters. Urbanization in lowland areas tsunamis, and evacuation facilities. The has made the eastern coast of Japan more vul- community must not rely too heavily on nerable to tsunamis. Disaster risks must be any one of these, since the next tsunami properly understood and managed in urban may be much larger than the last and planning. require a broader range of precautions. Develop facilities, live in safe places, and pre- • Industrial recovery is indispensable for pare for evacuation. The approach of integrat- economic sustainability. In the absence of ing three elements—setting up proper facilities, 114 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S settling in safe areas, and properly planning and sharing the costs of multipurpose infra- evacuations—can be used to manage disaster structure (chapter 4). risk in developing countries. Since every coun- Promote relocation where feasible, acknowl- try has its own geographic, socioeconomic, edging difficulties. As Japan’s experiences with and budgetary characteristics, and also faces tsunami disaster recovery illustrates, reloca- hazards of different dimensions, practical tion to safer sites and land use regulations in approaches will differ from country to country. risk-prone areas are effective but challenging Since most developing countries have limited to implement (chapter 33). Even though peo- resources for constructing facilities, people ple may be ready to relocate to higher ground should focus on living in safe areas and putting right after a disaster, they may also change rigorous evacuation measures in place. their minds, preferring to live in the lowlands Protect by zone and multiline. “Zone because it is more convenient for daily life. defense” and “multiline” approaches can be After the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the effective against tsunamis, as well as other Indonesian and Sri Lankan government tried disasters such as floods, landslides, and mud to introduce similar regulatory approaches, flows. Infrastructure, such as highways and but they did not succeed because of opposition railways, help mitigate disaster risks in both from the communities and limited enforce- rural and urban areas. In the Philippines, ment mechanisms. a megadike constructed to protect against lahars (volcanic mud flows) from Mount Pina- tubo is also used as a highway. Disaster man- NOTE agement organizations and infrastructure Prepared by Takashi Onishi, University of Tokyo, and organizations should coordinate in planning Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. 1 2 : U R B A N P L A N N I N G , L A N D U S E R E G U L AT I O N S , A N D R E LO C AT I O N | 115 CHAPTER 13 Green Belts and Coastal Risk Management For more than four centuries Japan has been developing forested green belts to mitigate coastal haz- ards such as sandstorms, salty winds, high tides, and tsunamis. Although Japan’s green belts were severely damaged by the March 11 tsunami, they did reduce the impact of waves and protected houses by capturing floating debris. Local governments are planning to reconstruct the green belts as a coun- termeasure against tsunamis. While local communities have traditionally taken charge of maintain- ing green belts, their role has been weakened because of changes in society brought about by economic development and urbanization. FINDINGS Another benefit of the green belt is that it is a scenic landscape called hakusa-seisyou in Japa- Japan is surrounded by the sea; its coastline nese, which means “beautiful coast with pine measures approximately 34,000 kilometers trees and sandy beach.” Its role as a tourist (km), with 1,640 km2 of a forested green belt attraction has become increasingly important distributed along its sandy coast. For more than as Japanese society has become more affluent. four centuries Japan has been developing this In the Sendai Plain, a 200- to 400-meter- green belt. Composed mainly of Japanese black wide swath of pine forests along Sendai Bay, pine (box 13.1), it serves various functions. It has for the past four centuries mitigated disas- reduces the impact of coastal hazards such as ters and provided beautiful scenery consisting blown sand, salty winds, high tides, and tsuna- of green forests, white sands, and blue ocean. mis. Japan’s Forest Law stipulates that disas- Masamune Date, a distinguished feudal lord, ter risk management (DRM) forests should started to plant Japanese black pines along be planted in coastal areas to prevent dam- the Teizan Channel on the Sendai Plain in ages from wind, airborne sand, and tsunamis. 1600. The people who lived on the dunes along 117 BOX 13.1 wood as energy sources for people. The com- munity’s role in managing the green belt Takatamatsubara and the hope of recovery diminished, and governments took over its maintenance. In the disaster-affected areas of Tohoku, there were several famous coast- al forests. Takatamatsubara of Rikuzentakata City was a 21-hectare coastal Damage to the green belt forest, 2 kilometers long and 200 meters wide, consisting of some 70,000 pine trees. In the 17th century, a wealthy merchant started planting pine In the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) of trees in the barren coastal areas to protect agricultural lands from heavy 2011, 3,660 hectares (ha) of the green belt were winds and salt water. Another merchant began planting in the 18th century. damaged by the tsunami, at a cost of ¥55 bil- The local communities developed and maintained the forests for some lion (over $540 million). In the four affected 350 years, conducting annual festivals to commemorate the two mer- prefectures, 2,825 ha of the green belt were chants. These coastal forests had also been a tourist attraction where a flooded, and 1,069 ha of the green belt were million or so people came to bathe or enjoy nature every year. After the GEJE disaster only a single pine tree remained—a meager symbol of hope damaged more than 75 percent (map 13.1). of recovery. The green belt of the Miyagi Prefecture was severely damaged—trees were uprooted or bent, or their trunks were broken. The green belt reduced the impact of the tsunami, delayed its arrival time, and protected houses by capturing drifting debris. Several ways in which the green belt reduced damages Sources: (left) Ministry of Environment. (right) © Mikio Ishiwatari. Used with permission. 0.3% Further permission required for reuse. 9.0% 90.7% Aomori prefecture the coast had suffered from sandstorms and Affected area: 612.9 ha tidal disasters that damaged their agricultural products, and the pine forests protected their fields. Masamune allowed the people to sell 25% wood from branches that were trimmed or had Iwate prefecture 61% Damage >75% 14% fallen to cover the expense of maintaining the 164.1 ha Damage 25%–75% green belt. Damage –25% In the late 19th century, the Japanese gov- ernment designated Reserved Forests, main- 13% taining their DRM function. In 1933 the green Miyagi prefecture 43% belt mitigated damages from the Showa San- 44% riku tsunami. In 1935 the government started an afforestation program to mitigate tsunami 1753.3 ha damage and again promoted afforestation 19% following the Chilean earthquake tsunami Fukushima prefecture 7% 74% in 1960. The green belt became less important after 294.8 ha the rapid economic growth of the 1970s, as Map 13.1 GEJE tsunami damage to the green belt in other more effective DRM measures were four prefectures developed, and electricity and gas replaced Source: Forest Agency. 118 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S Before tsunami After tsunami Pine trees protected by sand embankment Pine trees damaged without protection Figure 13.1 The forest captures a floating ship Source: Forest Agency. have been reported. In Hachinohe City, Aomori Prefecture, a forest caught 20 ships washed inland by a 6-meter tsunami, thereby pro- Pine trees tecting the houses located behind the trees Figure 13.2 Condition of the green belt before and protected by after the tsunami in Natori City tidal dikes (figure 13.1). Although these houses were inun- Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission dated by over 3 meters of water, they were not required for reuse. washed away. In past tsunami disasters, the following benefits have been confirmed: Local governments are planning to restore DRM coastal forests as one of their struc- • The energy and speeds of the tsunamis tural countermeasures, along with dikes and decreased. mounds. The Forest Agency suggests that the • Floating wreckage was blocked. forests should be at least 50 meters wide, and • People washed away by the tsunami were preferably 200 meters, for effective DRM in able to save their lives by clinging to trees. coastal areas. DRM effects can be increased with building mounds, and debris, which is a • The trees helped preserve sand dunes, serious obstacle to rehabilitation, can be used which in turn mitigated the force of the for building mounds. tsunami. The Miyagi prefectural government rec- Natori City was hit by a tsunami of 8.5 ommended the following actions to help the meters. Almost all of the green belt was recovery of DRM forests: flooded and 106 ha (more than 80 percent) was • Coordinating with other rehabilitation damaged. Figure 13.2 shows the condition of works, such as coastal dikes and debris the green belt in Natori City before and after management the tsunami. The extent of the damage dif- fered by location depending on the geographic • Selecting tree species that conform to local conditions on the ocean side. In the northern conditions and support biodiversity part, which had sand embankments from port • Collaborating with nonprofit organiza- construction, the green belt was preserved; in tions, volunteers, and the private sector the middle portion, which had no barrier, the green belt was washed away or knocked down; Maintenance and in the southern part, the presence of tidal Community action is essential to maintain- dikes preserved the green belt. ing the coastal green belt. Local communities 1 3 : G R E E N B E LT S A N D CO A S TA L R I S K M A N A G E M E N T | 119 had historically developed and maintained the LESSONS green belt to protect their houses and agri- cultural lands from coastal hazards. Proper • Green belts can be effective against small maintenance is required to preserve the for- tsunamis, sea winds, or sands, but not est’s DRM function: trees should be planted against a huge tsunami like that of March with moderate density, and frequent thinning 11. Combining green belts with dikes and is required otherwise the trees will not develop embankments can strengthen their effec- to their full size. tiveness (chapter 12). Since the late 1960s, the community’s role in managing the green belt diminished as Japan • Green belts reduce tsunami damage by experienced rapid economic growth; as pre- reducing wave energy, delaying water viously noted, governments took over their arrival time, and protecting houses by cap- management (figure 13.3). Growth led to the turing floating debris. development of infrastructure such as dikes • Coastal zone protection. Green belts also and new energy installations, while the fish- provide other important benefits recog- ing and agriculture industries lagged behind. nized by communities, such as protection Dikes replaced the green belt in coastal haz- from coastal storms, salt damage, and sand ard prevention, and communities started using and provide spaces for recreation and wild- coal instead of pine trees as a fuel source. life. Forests may also provide psychological Community-based organizations that had safety and augment well-being. managed the green belt broke up as commu- nities lost interest and the government was • Green belts require several decades to develop unable to manage and maintain such vast for- properly. Japan has had over four centuries ested areas. Moreover, damage caused by the of experience in their development. pine weevil became a serious problem from • Local communities can play important the 1990s. roles in green belt maintenance. Mainte- nance mechanisms should be modified as society changes. In Japan the government 1960s Plantation/ expanded its roles as the economy grew. management Participation RECOMMENDATIONS FOR Management/ Wage Community collecting DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Local government Conservation Association Prevent coastal hazard, Green belt Tsunami Forest projects can be effective countermea- blowing sand, sures against tsunamis, floods, and other salt damage 1960s ~ Rapid economic growth water-related disasters. Forested green belts Management can decrease disaster risks by reducing the force of natural hazards. Not only in Japan, but also during the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Local government Community mangroves and other coastal green belts miti- Depression Prevent gated potential damages due to the disaster. of fishery blowing sand, Degradation dike salt damage Understand the DRM function of the green Figure 13.3 Changing approaches to managing the green belt belt. Public awareness of the DRM func- Source: Kyoto University. tion of the green belt should be raised. Also, 120 | I I : N O N ST R U C T U R A L M E A S U R E S information should be shared with decision NOTE makers to promote green belts. Prepared by Rajib Shaw and Yusuke Noguchi, Kyoto Utilize the forest as a means of livelihood. In University, and Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. Japan forests have been used along rivers to mitigate floods, and farmers use bamboo from the green belts to produce handicrafts that provide them with additional income. Farmers BIBLIOGRAPHY can also earn from fuel woods and nontimber Haraguchi, T., and A. Iwamatsu. 2011. Detailed products, such as fruits, flowers, and medicinal Maps of the Impacts of the 2011 Japan Tsunami plants. [in Japanese]. Tokyo: Koko Shoin Publishers. Foster participatory maintenance. Restor- Investigative Committee on Revitalization of Coastal Forests Associated with Great East Japan Earth- ing the green belts includes two major activi- quake. 2012. Kongoniokeru kaigan bousairinno ties: cultivation and sustainable management, saiseinitsuite [Revitalization of coastal forest]. which should involve several stakeholders. Forest Agency. Plantations can be jointly implemented by the Miyagi Prefecture. 2012. Kaigan bousairin ni tekishita shokusaijyu shu ni kansuru chousa houkokusho government and civil society, including the [Report on the survey on appropriate species for community. Community participation in cul- plantation of coastal forest]. Miyagi Prefecture, tivation leads to a sense of ownership. Com- Japan. munities can continue using the green belt as Natori City. 2011. Report on Tsunami Damage in Natori City. Natori City. a space to learn skills and as a way of maintain- Noguchi, Y., R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi. 2012. “Green ing relationships with external organizations. Belt and Its Implication for Coastal Risk Reduc- Support community. Local governments tion: The Case of Yuriage.” In East Japan Earth- and civil society organizations play an impor- quake and Tsunami: Evacuation, Communication, tant role in increasing awareness and engag- Education and Volunteerism, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singapore: Research Publishing. ing the local community. DRM education in Yuriage-kyoudoshikenkyukai. 1977. Records of the Cul- schools will also raise awareness and encour- ture and Geography of Yuriage (Yuriage Fudoki) age participation. [in Japanese]. Natori: Syouhei Ono. 1 3 : G R E E N B E LT S A N D CO A S TA L R I S K M A N A G E M E N T | 121 PART III Emergency Response CHAPTER 14 Mobilizing and Coordinating Expert Teams, Nongovernmental Organizations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Volunteers In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), domestic and international assistance initia- tives were launched by a large number of public and private sector organizations; meanwhile, various emergency teams were mobilized through national and international networks. The GEJE served as a reminder that civil society organizations play an indispensible role in disaster management. These organizations have the advantage of flexibility and speed in reaching and caring for affected com- munities. But the GEJE also revealed that, without prearranged coordination mechanisms, even the best-prepared teams cannot function properly on the ground. Because of the complexity of disaster response operations and the large numbers of actors involved, coordination mechanisms must be established well in advance of any disaster. FINDINGS concerned had formed a variety of expert teams (see table 14.1) in light of the lessons Mobilizing the government’s expert teams learned from past disasters, in particular the Municipality and prefecture governments Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe earth- play a leading role in disaster response in quake) in 1995. The national government took Japan. But because of the magnitude of the action immediately by setting up a response March 11 earthquake and tsunami, local gov- office four minutes after the earthquake, and ernments were unable to respond alone. an Emergency Disaster Response Headquar- National agencies as well as prefectures and ters, headed by the prime minister, within 30 municipalities outside the affected region were minutes. Its mandate was to oversee and coor- quickly deployed (chapter 17). Organizations dinate all response activities. 125 Table 14.1 Expert teams organized by the government the GEJE, the emergency teams dispatched MINISTRY/AGENCY EXPERT TEAMS more than 30,000 firefighters from 712 fire departments in 44 prefectures nationwide Ministry of Defense Self-defense forces over a period of 88 days ending on June 6, 2011. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Disaster medical assistance team In cooperation with local fire departments, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Technical emergency control force, emergency teams rescued 5,064 people as of Transport and Tourism coast guard June 30, 2011. Most fire departments in dev- Fire and Disaster Management Agency Emergency fire response teams astated areas had lost their radio equipment and prefectural fire departments or base of communications. In light of this National Police Agency and prefectural Interprefectural emergency rescue experience, the Fire and Disaster Management police agencies units Agency decided to provide the teams with additional mobile communications equipment Japan Self-Defense Forces and a larger supply of fuel so that they could The total number of Japan Self-Defense Forces operate effectively over wider areas and for (JSDF) personnel in operation reached some longer periods of time. 107,000 people with about 540 aircraft and nearly 60 vessels. The JSDF rescued approxi- Interprefectural emergency mately 19,000 disaster victims, or nearly police rescue units 70 percent of those rescued in the Great East Interprefectural emergency police rescue Japan Earthquake (GEJE) event. They also units are police units that have been set up in provided transportation assistance to medical prefectures nationwide, based on the experi- teams, patients, and rescue units dispatched ence with the Kobe earthquake. In response to from various countries, and livelihood assis- the GEJE, these rescue units conducted such tance to disaster victims by providing water, activities as search and rescue and the securing food, and other necessities. The JSDF also of emergency transportation routes. A total of responded to the nuclear accident, engag- 750,000 person-days were spent working on- ing mainly in pumping water for cooling used site, with as many as 4,800 personnel working fuel pools, decontaminating personnel and per day (figure 14.2). A review of their opera- vehicles, and monitoring amounts of airborne tions during the GEJE revealed that the scale radiation (figure 14.1). was so large that some units could not manage Emergency fire response teams Following its experience with the Kobe earth- quake, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency created fire response teams to mobilize firefighting departments across Japan. After Figure 14.2 An interprefectural emergency rescue Figure 14.1 The Japan Self-Defense Forces in action unit in action Source: Ministry of Defense. Source: National Police Agency. 126 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E their operations on their own, while others Table 14.2 Crime in the disaster-affected areas had difficulty securing enough personnel. The MARCH 2011– MARCH 2010– CHANGE (%) National Police Agency plans to enhance its FEBRUARY 2012 FEBRUARY 2011 response capacity by setting up emergency Total crimes 42,102 51,305 –18 quick-response teams and long-term response Felonious 187 245 –24 teams numbering 10,000 personnel. Crimes such as theft were a major concern Violent 1,804 2,008 –10 since many houses had been left vacant after Larceny 31,894 38,484 –17 residents fled to evacuation centers. Accord- Burglary 5,729 5,690 0.7 ing to the National Police Agency, the number Vehicle 9,992 12,440 –20 of crimes committed in the disaster-affected Nonburglary 16,173 20,354 –21 areas in the year after the disaster decreased Intellectual, “white collar” 1,150 1,905 –40 significantly compared to the previous year, while the number of burglaries rose slightly Moral, sexual 375 404 –7 (bold in table 14.2). Many ATM machines were Others 6,692 8,259 –19 also destroyed. Police teams were deployed to Source: National Police Agency. ensure safety in the disaster-affected areas. FORCE) in 2008. The TEC-FORCE is a spe- The Disaster Medical Assistance Team cialized group made up of ministry staff that The Disaster Medical Assistance Team helps disaster-affected municipalities to (DMAT) is a specialized team of medical quickly assess damages, identify measures to doctors, nurses, and operational coordina- prevent additional damage, and provide tech- tors trained to conduct emergency operations nical assistance for rehabilitation and emer- during the critical period, normally within 48 gency response activities. In response to the hours, after a large-scale disaster or accident. GEJE, more than 18,000 person-days were The DMAT was established in 1995 after the dispatched, together with disaster manage- Kobe earthquake, when it was learned that 500 ment equipment and machinery (figures 14.3 more people could have been saved if medical support had been provided more promptly. In response to the GEJE, the DMAT sent about Information & communication 380 teams consisting of 1,800 staff from 47 team (satellite communication Supporting affected vehicle) prefectures for 12 days to provide support to municipalities Survey of disaster- hospitals and to rescue and transport patients. affected areas (technical assistance) Because the tsunami damage was so extensive and local medical centers had been washed out by the tsunami, the DMAT also had to provide care for people with chronic illnesses. Although the DMAT’s operations usually take place within 48 hours after a disaster, they had to operate for a much longer time. Local needs Disaster emergency The Technical Emergency Control Force Survey of disaster- survey response (emergency The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans- affected rivers flood removal) port and Tourism (MLIT) established the Figure 14.3 TEC-FORCE activities in response to the GEJE Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC- Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). 1 4 : M O B I L I Z I N G A N D CO O R D I N AT I N G | 127 Satellite communication Ku-SAT Tsunami responsible for filling in where governmental vehicles monitoring support is lacking. But this by no means implies that NGOs and NPOs are government subcon- tractors; they have broad autonomy in deciding their activities and are not subordinate to the Figure 14.4 TEC-FORCE equipment government. Their roles and responsibilities Source: MLIT. are far reaching, and they engage in a broad range of activities from awareness raising to and 14.4). The TEC-FORCE provided satel- fundraising, while also engaging directly in lite communication vehicles, enabling them to relief activities at disaster sites. connect to public lines and establish commu- The early responders can be categorized nications with other organizations concerned. into two groups: Japan-based (mainly Tokyo based) NGOs specializing in international The Japanese Red Cross Society relief operations even before the GEJE, and Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) is des- Japanese NGOs and NPOs based in different ignated as a public relief organization under parts of Japan that address domestic needs. disaster response law and is the biggest The Japan Platform, a platform for interna- humanitarian organization in Japan. It mobi- tional emergency humanitarian aid, mobi- lized relief resources to the affected areas from lized funding for relief operations within the onset of the disaster—within 24 hours, 55 three hours of the earthquake. Seven regis- medical teams (of which 22 teams were from tered organizations carried out initial needs the DMAT) were dispatched. Subsequently, assessments with ¥15 million in funding, 5 935 teams (or 6,700 personnel) were deployed organizations provided support to education for six months; they treated 87,445 persons and with ¥450 million, 2 organizations provided provided psychosocial support to the affected health-care and hygiene promotion with ¥210 population. million, 8 organizations engaged in rehabilita- tion work, and 12 organizations provided food Mobilization of Japanese and nonfood support with ¥3.12 billion. These nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations, experienced in providing emer- organizations gency humanitarian aid overseas, were able to Domestic nongovernmental organizations leverage international standards and exper- (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) tise. They played a pivotal role in mobilizing have played a significant role in carrying out experts in specialized fields. disaster management activities. As of January The Japanese NGOs and NPOs had been 20, 2012, there were 712 organizations partici- mainly involved in domestic emergency-relief pating in the Japan Civil Network for Disaster activities. Organizations based and operating Relief in East Japan. There is no limit either in the disaster-affected areas made long-term on the budget size of the organization that can commitments to sustaining activities such as join this network or its type (such as nonprofit, assessing people-centered needs and facilitat- public-interest, or religious). ing a seamless transition from emergency to In a disaster, the role of NGOs and NPOs is recovery support. to complement government actions. Since in The JRCS had pulled together ¥307 bil- Japan the government is indeed the primary lion in donations as of January 19, 2012, and agent obligated to initiate action in response its counterpart, the Central Community Chest to a natural disaster, NGOs and NPOs are of Japan, Red Feather Campaign, garnered 128 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E ¥38.8 billion in donations as of October 2011. Reconstruction Aid Information Portal in A Central Grant Disbursement Committee was cooperation with the Reconstruction Agency set up to ensure a fair allocation of the funds and Japan Civil Network, as the main contact collected by the JRCS and other designated points for people to apply for volunteering. fundraising organizations, to the affected pre- Over 280,000 people joined as volunteers in fectures. Each prefecture has established a the disaster response in the two months after prefectural-level grant disbursement commit- the earthquake. tee that sets criteria for eligible recipients as well as for the amounts to be distributed by the Support in Fukushima municipal authorities responsible for identify- Apart from the national budget, Fukushima ing individual beneficiaries and distributing Prefecture received ¥7.2 billion in dona- the cash. tions, which were used for activities such as The Japan Platform received ¥6.7 billion school reconstruction, support for children, from private companies as of July 2011, the and improvement of temporary shelters. Of Japan Foundation received ¥2.4 billion. The this, ¥1.3 billion was received and used to line separating fundraising organizations from provide for disaster orphans. In collabora- private companies has narrowed as private tion with governmental funds, the Japan Plat- companies actively collect funds and work in form supported eight projects in Fukushima, parallel with emerging NGOs such as Just Giv- funding five organizations with ¥1.8 billion. ing Japan, which uses the Internet to solicit Apart from the Japan Platform there were donations. several other organizations working sepa- Another important responsibility of NGOs rately on relief activities, though the number and NPOs is the coordination of relief efforts. A of NGOs working in Fukushima was much designated agency, in most cases a UN agency, smaller than in the Miyagi and Iwate pre- would function as the cluster lead for interna- fectures. According to the JANIC, between tional relief operations, but no central agency March and June 2011, the number of NGOs was assigned for overall coordination in Japan. working in the Fukushima Prefecture was 17, The prefectural offices or the disaster response whereas in Miyagi it was 40 and in Iwate it headquarters at the prefecture levels were the was 33. The contrast is made clearer by the first bodies to be assigned to disaster response, number of projects provided by NGOs: in but they did not function as a coordinating Miyagi Prefecture there were 292 projects, body for all NGO and NPO relief operations. 179 in Iwate, and 60 in Fukushima. In the The newly established prefectural coopera- early stages, these concentrated on delivering tion recovery centers functioned as network- emergency kits, including food and nonfood ing hubs and grew into a spontaneous coalition items. Following emergency activities, these for coordination. The Tokyo-based NGO—the organizations faced difficulties in supporting Japan NGO Center for International Coop- rehabilitation programs, which was a com- eration (JANIC)—which had already created a pletely new and unknown operation for them. network of NGOs, functioned as a provider of The experiences and lessons learned in Fuku- pooled information. shima should be passed on and shared with The third role of NGOs and NPOs in disas- the broader international aid community. ter response is enrollment and management To this end, it is advisable that the Japanese of volunteers. The Ministry of Health, Labour NGO community conduct timely and objec- and Welfare named the Japan National Coun- tive evaluations and studies of its March 11 cil of Social Welfare, Tasukeai Japan, the 3.11 operations. 1 4 : M O B I L I Z I N G A N D CO O R D I N AT I N G | 129 Volunteers material and monetary support, the Japanese The Japan National Council of Social Welfare government accepted relief supplies and dona- set up volunteer centers in the affected munici- tions totaling over ¥17.5 billion from 126 coun- palities. The social welfare councils in munici- tries and regions. By May 17, 2011, 43 overseas palities nationwide sent more than 30,000 NGOs from 16 countries had arrived in Japan. person-days of staff to operate the volunteer The scale of assistance was larger than for the centers. Kobe earthquake in 1995, when 67 countries As of January 2012 more than 900,000 and regions provided aid and relief, and the person-days had been used in volunteer work United Kingdom, Switzerland, and France dis- through volunteer centers in the three prefec- patched emergency teams. tures of Tohoku (figure 14.5). Considering that The JRCS received financial support more than 1 million volunteers were mobilized from 95 sister Red Cross and Red Crescent in the first month after the Kobe earthquake in national societies from all over the world, 1995, the number of volunteers mobilized dur- which amounted to around $700 million, plus ing the GEJE was relatively small. This was an additional $400  million from Kuwait and primarily because the affected areas were far €10 million from the European Commission. from large cities and were rural coastal com- According to a survey conducted by the Brook- munities dispersed over a wide area, making it ings Institution, Japan received $720 million difficult for the volunteers to gain access. from other countries, which accounted for almost half of the global humanitarian disas- International assistance ter funding in 2011 and some 0.4 percent of the As of November 1, 2011, 163 countries and planned reconstruction budget of the Japanese regions and 43 international organizations had government. offered aid and relief. Emergency assistance The United States dispatched approxi- squads, medical teams, and reconstruction mately 16,000 military personnel under teams had been dispatched from 24 countries Operation Tomodachi (“friends”). It provided and regions along with expert teams from various types of assistance, including search- five international organizations. In regards to and-rescue efforts, transport of supplies and people, and recovery and reconstruction of 200,000 the devastated areas. At the peak of the action, 180,000 approximately 140 aircraft and 15 vessels took 160,000 part in the operation along with the JSDF. 140,000 120,000 Coordination 100,000 There was no functional coordinating mecha- 80,000 nism among the various government organi- 60,000 zations, civil society, and the private sector, 40,000 to help avoid duplication and confusion in 20,000 relief-and-response activities. Coordination 0 was required at all levels and all phases. On the e July y r rch ril y t r er r be be be gus uar Ma Jun Ap tob ground, these organizations needed to coor- Ma tem vem cem Au Jan Oc dinate with community-based organizations, Sep No De Fukushima Prefecture Miyagi Prefecture Iwate Prefecture and with one another, to assess victims’ needs Figure 14.5 Volunteer effort in Tohoku through January 2012 and to carry out activities smoothly and effec- Source: Japanese government data. tively. The JSDF and NGOs did coordinate 130 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E emergency food distribution to the evacuation • Communication and transport equipment, shelters. fuel, food, and water should be stocked. The Coordination with municipal governments teams coming from outside need to inde- is crucial, since the municipalities have the pri- pendently engage in activities in the disaster mary responsibility for disaster management. field without support, often over a long term. Since the municipal governments have quite • Long-term commitment from experts is limited experience in working with civil soci- expected. During megadisasters such as ety organizations (CSOs), linkages between the GEJE, expert teams are expected to the municipalities and CSOs could not be eas- engage in activities for longer or unpre- ily established. Municipalities can provide dictable periods. Since an enormous num- support to evacuees in transition shelters, but ber of public facilities are damaged, expert not in their homes. This function was instead teams must have the capacity to work for carried out by CSOs. Coordination was also one month or more. lacking between the private sector and local governments outside the affected areas, and • Coordination mechanisms are essential, the overall coordination of international assis- since enormous numbers of different types tance was a challenge. of organizations are involved in disaster Coordination is required at all phases of management. There was no functional recovery since victims’ needs change as recov- coordination mechanism during the GEJE. ery progresses. While water and food delivery Without such a mechanism in place, mega- are key at the emergency phase, needs become disasters overstretch the capacities of more diverse, including sustaining livelihoods, local governments, and government staff education, and improving the living conditions and facilities in devastated areas suffer. at evacuation shelters or in transitional housing. In developing countries, UN cluster sys- Good practices could be found at specific tems serve as coordinating mechanisms. sectors at some sites. Ishinomaki Red Cross Considering the difficulties faced by local Hospital coordinated all medical teams from governments during the GEJE, simi- the JRCS and other agencies at the 330 evacu- lar mechanisms should be established in ation centers throughout Ishinomaki City. The the central government or under some hospital organized survey teams over a month umbrella organization of CSOs. to assess medical and nonmedical conditions, including water and sanitation. These formed the basis for planning and implementing RECOMMENDATIONS FOR response activities by various organizations DEVELOPING COUNTRIES and local governments. Prepare response teams. Specialized agencies, such as the police, fire departments, public LESSONS works, and hospitals should prepare during normal times for the mobilization of response • National networks should be used to mobi- teams. The following activities are required: lize experts, including search-and-rescue • Clarify the chain of command. teams, medical teams, and engineers. Orga- • Designate a secretariat function. nizations should prepare these teams dur- ing normal times, by compiling rosters and • Prepare a roster of emergency team conducting training. members. 1 4 : M O B I L I Z I N G A N D CO O R D I N AT I N G | 131 • Conduct emergency drills. NOTE • Keep the necessary equipment in stock. Prepared by Yukie Osa, Association for Aid and Relief; Junko Sagara, CTI Engineering; and Mikio Ishiwatari, Develop capacity. Expert teams are required World Bank. to develop capacities for working indepen- dently over the long term. Standby or rotat- ing teams, communication, and transportation BIBLIOGRAPHY should be arranged. Disaster Medical Assistance Team HP. http://www Establish coordinating mechanism. Various .dmat.jp/DMAT.html. types of organizations from inside and outside Ferris, E., and D. Pets. 2012. “The Year that Shook the the country engaged in response-and-recovery Rich: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2011.” Proj- ect on Internal Displacement, Brookings Institu- activities. Government agencies often have tion, London School of Economics. problems coordinating the enormous numbers Fire and Disaster Management Agency. Emergency of organizations carrying out a broad range of Fire Response Teams [in Japanese]. http://www activities. Once disasters happen specific teams .fdma.go.jp/neuter/topics/kinkyu/kinshoutai.pdf. should come from outside the devastated areas ———. 2011. White Paper [in Japanese]. http://www .fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h23/1-3.pdf. and start coordination among all organiza- Japan Civil Network HP. http://www.jpn-civil.net/ tions. The following actions are required: about_us/group/. Japan Platform HP. http://www.japanplatform.org • Preparedness. Establishing face-to-face /area_works/tohoku/action/ngojyosei20120111 relationships during normal times facili- .pdf. tates coordination in times of disaster. Japanese Red Cross. 2011. Six Months Report on the Great East Japan Earthquake Response. • Networking. Information, experts, and pri- http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files vate sector personnel should be networked /resources/August%20Report_FINAL_rev.pdf. to share information, to effectively col- National Police Agency. 2011a. White Paper [in Japa- laborate with one another, and to mobilize nese]. http://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h23 /honbun/index.html. diversified resources. ———. 2011b. Evaluation of Police Operation in GEJE • Consideration of vulnerable groups: Spe- [in Japanese]. Syakaifukusikyogikai HP. http://www.shakyo.or.jp cial care is required for vulnerable groups, /saigai/torikumi_01.html. such as the disabled, the elderly, and chil- Technical Panel on Emergency Medical Activity. dren. These groups are easily marginalized 2011. Report on Emergency Medical Activity (chapter 19). [in Japanese]. 132 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E CHAPTER 15 Emergency Communication The Great East Japan Earthquake caused immense damage to and congestion of telephone infrastruc- ture, including 1.9 million fixed-line services and 29,000 mobile-phone base stations. Government radio communication infrastructure was also seriously damaged. Voice messages were widely used to confirm whether family members and relatives were safe, and satellite phones played a crucial role in emergency communication during the response stage. Social media was extensively used for search and rescue, as well as for fundraising. FINDINGS effective in reaching the younger generation and, community radio, the older generation. Communication infrastructure is indispensable in securing government functions and protect- Telephone ing lives and property during disasters. Com- Damage and subsequent restoration of fixed- munication systems are used to disseminate line, mobile, and broadband services warnings to the public, to enable search-and- The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) rescue organizations to communicate among caused immense damage to both fixed-line and themselves, and to confirm the safety of family mobile-phone infrastructure, including flood- members and relatives. Social media is exten- ing of exchange facilities, damage to under- sively used for search and rescue, as well as fun- ground cables and conduits, destruction of draising. Community radios can provide local telephone poles and overhead cables, destruc- information such as times and locations where tion and loss of mobile-phone base stations, emergency water and food supplies or relief and draining of backup batteries during the goods will be delivered. Social media is most long power outages. In the Tohoku and Kanto 133 regions, an estimated 1.9 million fixed-line ser- Telecommunications carriers initially vices from Nippon Telegraph and Telephone deployed mobile power supply vehicles and (NTT) East, KDDI, and SoftBank Telecom mobile base stations to those areas with no were rendered inoperable, including sub- commercial power supplies, and set about scriber lines, Integrated Services Digital Net- rebuilding damaged facilities as quickly as pos- work (ISDN), and fiber to the home (FTTH), sible. The rapid response effort saw full ser- while 29,000 mobile-phone and personal vices restored to almost all affected areas, with handyphone system (PHS) base stations also some exceptions, by the end of April 2011 (fig- stopped functioning. ures 15.1, 15.2, and map 15.1). Figure 15.1 Number Number of affected fixed lines Number of blacked-out houses of affected fixed (x10,000 houses) 1,200,000 500 lines Main Earthquake Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 JST Communications (MIC). 1,000,000 9.0 magnitude 400 800,000 300 600,000 200 400,000 Aftershock (causing large-scale blackout) on April 7, 2011 at 23:32 JST 100 200,000 7.1 magnitude 0 0 3 6 4/6 4/7 4/8 4/9 0 8 4/29 0 4/2 1 4/22 4 6 4/26 6 5/2 5/6 1 2 4 5 7 3 5 4/2 5 8 9 0 3/2 1 2 3 4 5 3/2 7 8 9 0 1 4/1 4/4 4/5 1 2 4 4/2 3/1 3/2 3/3 4/1 3/1 4/1 3/2 3/1 3/2 3/1 4/1 4/1 4/2 3/1 3/2 3/1 3/2 4/1 4/1 4/2 3/1 3/1 3/2 4/1 3/1 3/3 4/1 3/2 NTT East KDDI Softbank Telecom Blacked-out houses in Tohoku electric power area Figure 15.2 Number Number of affected base stations Number of blacked-out houses of affected mobile (x10,000 houses) 6,000 500 base stations Source: MIC. Main earthquake on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 JST 5,000 9.0 magnitude 400 4,000 300 Aftershock (causing large-scale 3,000 blackout) on April 7, 2011 at 23:32 JST 7.1 magnitude 200 2,000 100 1,000 0 0 5 1 4 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 3/2 1 2 3 4 5 3/2 7 8 9 0 1 4/1 4/4 4/5 4/6 4/7 4/8 4/9 0 1 2 3 8 9 0 4/2 1 2 5 6 6 6 5/2 5/6 3/ 1 3/2 3/3 4/ 1 4/2 3/1 3/2 4/ 1 3/1 3/2 3/1 4/1 4/1 3/1 3/2 4/2 3/2 4/1 4/2 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/2 4/1 4/2 4/2 4/2 3/ 1 4/ 1 3/2 3/3 4/ 1 4/2 NTT Docomo KDDI (au) Softbank eMobile Blacked-out houses in Tohoku 134 Mobile electric power area Iwate Prefecture Miyagi Prefecture Fukushima Prefecture As of March 13 As of April 11 (1 month after) Map 15.1 Damage to NTT East and NTT Docomo Fixed-line Mobile Source: MIC. Voice messaging and other services Telecommunications carriers set up emer- The sharp increase in voice-call traffic imme- gency messaging services so that people could diately after the earthquake caused significant check on the safety and whereabouts of their congestion. Carriers restricted fixed-line traf- families, relatives, and other relevant people fic by as much as 80–90 percent and mobile (figure 15.3). These services were used some services by as much as 70–95 percent to allow 14 million times following the GEJE. Because emergency calls and other critical communi- of these emergency messaging services, traf- cations to go through. Mobile-phone packet fic congestion was cleared up on the same day communication services such as e-mail were the earthquake struck, in contrast to the Great generally not restricted.1 Even when carriers Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe earth- did impose restrictions, they were generally no quake) in 1995, when congestion continued more than about 30 percent and were only tem- for five days. porary. Thus, packet communications provided Some mobile-phone carriers introduced considerably easier access than voice services. an emergency messaging service whereby 1 5 : E M E RG E N C Y CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 135 Great East Japan Earthquake tsunami, as well as loss of electric power dur- Traffic controlled No traffic controlled ing sustained blackouts. Congestion only In the aftermath of a megadisaster such as 9 times the on the day of normal traffic the earthquake the GEJE, a key issue is how to deliver rel- The day 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days evant information such as public warnings and of the later later later later later evacuation instructions across wide areas in a earthquake timely and reliable manner. Local governments Kobe Earthquake are looking at advancing and multiplying ways 50 times the to deliver emergency information to residents, normal traffic Traffic controlled and improving their disaster resilience. Congestion ongoing for 5 days Satellite communications The day 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days of the later later later later later Compared with terrestrial communication earthquake infrastructure, satellite phones and satellite communication systems are less vulnerable. These systems have the advantage of being Playb k ack bac available for quick deployment in any region Disaster emergency Play Reco message dial center rd including regions with no land-based com- rd Reco Disaster-stricken area Play munication infrastructure, as well as in marine back back Other areas Play areas. Satellite phones, in particular, played a Reco ord rd Rec vital role after the GEJE in emergency com- Message recording munication among local governments and res- and playback Evacuation center cue organizations. Figure 15.3 Disaster emergency message traffic during GEJE and Kobe earthquakes Satellite mobile phones Source: NTT East. This system provided voice and Internet com- the terminal device converted voice record- munication capabilities for disaster manage- ings into voice files that could then be sent via ment organizations, evacuation shelters, and packet transmission. Other mobile-phone car- staff working on infrastructure rehabilitation riers are planning to follow suit. (among others), as well as local governments and communities isolated by typhoons and Disaster management radio heavy snowfall. In preparing for disasters, communications batteries and equipment should be stored for The disaster management radio communica- rapid deployment. tions networks of national and local govern- ments are generally considered to be more Very small aperture terminals robust and resilient than public fixed net- Very small aperture terminals (VSATs) provide works. In the GEJE, however, many towns voice and Internet communication capability and villages, particularly those located along by enabling access from multiple mobile ter- the Pacific coastline, suffered various levels minals via wireless local area network (LAN) of damage to their radio communications sys- technology. They are also used to provide con- tems, including both community announce- nection through portable and truck-mounted ment systems with loud speakers and mobile mobile-phone base stations for rapid restora- systems on emergency vehicles. The main tion of the communication infrastructure, and causes were damage to or loss of radio trans- to provide a temporary communication net- mission equipment from the earthquake and work for disaster relief organizations. 136 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E Portable and truck-mounted satellite This station was restored by March 2012. After earth stations the March 11 events, the Ministry of Internal These were used by disaster relief organiza- Affairs and Communications (MIC) requested tions and media entities to transmit video the NHK, the National Association of Com- images from disaster sites. The Heli-Sat sys- mercial Broadcasters (NAB) in Japan, and the tem, which enables video transmission through radio stations in the affected areas to increase satellite, will be introduced in the future. broadcasting disaster information, and on April 1, 2011, the MIC requested that NHK and Marine earth stations NAB provide accurate and detailed informa- This provided communication for rescue-and- tion as quickly as possible to the public. recovery activities by seagoing vessels in cases where land routes were disrupted. Social media Social media are a set of applications and ser- vices that use the Internet to connect peo- Disaster information broadcasting ple. They combine dynamic, collaborative After the earthquake occurred, broadcast- Internet-based tools, social networks, comput- ing companies including National Broad- ers, and, increasingly, mobile devices. Social casting Corporation (NHK; Japan’s public media consist of social networks such as Twit- broadcasting corporation) and local operators ter and Facebook that connect users, as well interrupted regular programming to provide as websites and computer applications that disaster-related information. For example, enable users to collaborate and create content, NHK delivered emergency earthquake warn- such as Wikipedia and YouTube. ings, followed by news reports, on a continuous Social media were used extensively during basis starting two minutes after the earthquake the GEJE for various purposes, such as search, occurred. These were carried on the com- rescue, and fundraising. Table 15.1 summarizes pany’s eight channels, including its general how they were used to meet different types of programming channel, educational channel, information-sharing needs during the disaster. and radio channels. The general programming A questionnaire survey was carried out to learn channel continued to provide news reports about the uses of social media by 250 different and programs related to the earthquake and types of responders: information senders, vol- tsunami for 12 days up until March 22, and unteers, managers of media groups, and so on the total time devoted to disaster-related news (figure 15.4). and reports was about 254 hours. People were able to watch many of those programs on their Manager mobile phones in areas where electricity sup- senders (n=5) ply had failed. The programs were delivered by Volunteer senders (n=32) one-segment broadcasting.2 Basic senders As many as 120 television relay stations (n=100) stopped functioning because of the loss of Non-senders commercial electricity during the initial period (n=25) Non-users of the disaster, and as many as 4 radio relay sta- (n=44) tions shut down. Master stations continued 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 broadcasting by generating their own power. Word of mouth Radio Email Social media All the stations within the area were restored Newspaper TV Internet by the end of May 2011, except for one radio Figure 15.4 Most viable source of information as perceived by message station within the evacuation zone around sender group in the GEJE Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Source: Kyoto University 1 5 : E M E RG E N C Y CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 137 Table 15.1 Dominant types of information and how they were shared TWITTER FACEBOOK MIXI SMS E-MAIL WIKIS WEB PAGES SMARTPHONE MAPS OR BLOGS APPLICATIONS General disaster O O O O O O O O O information Safety O O O O O O conformation Fundraising O O O O O Infrastructure O O O O status notification/ regional facility status Housing provision O O Goods provision O O O Moral support O O O O O Resource saving O O O O Volunteer O O O O O recruitment Special needs O O support Source: Kyoto University. Social media and the Internet were found level of participation in sharing information to be highly reliable regardless of the users’ through social media, the more likely an indi- role, location, or the extent to which they were vidual is to receive and share large amounts of affected by the disaster. Users found social information, and believe that the information media to be extremely beneficial to an over- comes from credible sources. whelming degree. For directly affected indi- viduals and people in the affected areas, the Emergency FM radio strongest reasons for using social media were Emergency FM radio also played a crucial role convenience and their mass dissemination in providing information to local residents. In capacity. The Google Person Finder let people the Tohoku area, 25 emergency broadcasting enter an inquiry about a missing person or pro- stations specializing in disaster information vide information for interested parties. In total were set up. Immediately after the disaster, the over 600,000 names were registered. communication systems developed by local Support for government use of social media governments did not work because of power in disasters is extremely high and during the failures and a lack of emergency backup power GEJE it was highest among directly affected supply. The MIC distributed 10,000 portable individuals, individuals in disaster-stricken radio receivers to evacuation shelters and areas, and those involved in disseminating requested equipment manufacturers, such as information to groups. Panasonic and Sony, to distribute over 40,000 A general note about social media is that portable radio receivers. the information is not always trustworthy, FM radio provided locally customized infor- especially about infrastructure. The higher the mation, such as information about aftershocks 138 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E or the availability of local services and activities BOX 15.1 related to people’s everyday needs. This kind of information was beneficial immediately after Ringo (“apple”) radio of Yamamoto Town, the disaster, while different information was Miyagi Prefecture required as reconstruction progressed. Some entertainment programs were presented six to A temporary emergency radio station was set up inside the Yamamoto nine months after the disaster (box 15.1). Town Hall with the help of FM Nagaoka of Nagaoka City, Niigata Prefec- ture. Ringo FM started broadcasting on March 21, from 7:00 a.m. to Several problems were identified. Ensur- 7:00 p.m. At first, it only announced information such as bathing times and ing sufficient human resources is a key issue. food rationing information for those living in the town. Later the content Immediately after the disaster, a significant became less about daily life and more about supporting and comforting number of volunteers provided the radio sta- the residents. According to the coordinator, “We will never be able to tions with various kinds of help, but over time completely eliminate the sadness of the victims, but we would like to the number decreased. A sustainable funding provide them with encouragement from the bottom of our heart.” source is needed to continue radio broadcast- ing. FM radio users in Natori City are keen on having local residents continue to participate in broadcasting activities, and on gradually changing over to community FM with funding from the community and subsidies from local governments. LESSONS • To reduce telephone network congestion, Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. packet communications and emergency message services should be expanded. The MIC is raising public awareness about in the aftermath of a disaster—from shar- using these services in times of disaster. ing information about the safety of family • Backup systems are needed. The GEJE and friends to disseminating information reminded us that resilient and redun- about relief goods and services and, gradu- dant communication systems should be ally, to livelihood-related information. established. Batteries and generators with • City and local governments should use social enough fuel should be acquired and stored media in emergencies for regular commu- in higher locations to avoid flooding. nication relating to city news and events, • Social media and FM radio have played a in order to enhance their effectiveness. In crucial role in providing information to Japan, the prime minister’s office launched local communities; they reached two dis- a new Twitter feed after the disaster. tinct age groups: while the former is used • For FM radio, sustainability is a key issue. more by the younger generation, the latter Off-air activities, in which communities is used mainly by the older generation. participate in producing radio programs, • Information through social media changes should be strengthened so that communi- over time. The way in which social media ties will be invested in supporting the con- and FM radio are used changes over time tinuation of FM radio. 1 5 : E M E RG E N C Y CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 139 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR Enhance reliability of social media. The DEVELOPING COUNTRIES trustworthiness of information is extremely important for users to trust social media. Local When disasters strike, communications infra- government or relevant national government structure should be used to disseminate warn- agencies should consider using social media ings to the public, to enable communication in their public relations activities during nor- among search-and-rescue organizations, and mal times. When disasters occur, those social to confirm the safety of family members and media channels can be used to share disaster- relatives. Immediately after the disaster, how- related information with the public. ever, communication systems often break down Utilize radio to share information in com- because of power failures, damage to infra- munities. FM radio is commonly used in structure, and congestion. developing countries to share information in Improve the reliability of communication communities. Community radio is a rather networks. The following actions are required: low-cost and effective means of reaching small groups that are usually not served by the • Reducing damage by developing backup national and international media. Radios can systems, such as batteries, generators, and provide information such as times and loca- backup trunk lines tions for provision of emergency water and • Mitigating congestion by increasing the food supplies or distribution of relief goods in capacity of facilities, such as switching the immediate aftermath of a disaster, and then equipment gradually shift to providing different informa- tion for daily living or to help lift the spirits of • Restoring services by deploying emergency people in the local communities. Radio is also facilities, such as portable switching equip- appreciated by the elderly who may not have ment and portable satellite stations access to Internet-based information. Utilize social media. The increasingly higher Enlist community participation to ensure levels of mobile-phone penetration in develop- sustainability. For FM radio to be effective, ing countries can allow for the effective use of there needs to be a balance between on-air and social media during disasters, provided they set off-air activities. Community participation is a precedent for use during normal times. Social the key to the long-term survival of FM radio, media can also provide information to commu- and therefore, off-air community activities, nities outside the disaster-stricken areas, and such as workshops, are very important. These facilitate the acquisition and appropriate alloca- activities can also be linked to local schools and tion of aid and assistance. Starting with the Haiti educational systems for greater sustainability. earthquake of 2010, the use of social media dur- ing disasters has significantly increased in other countries. There is a strong potential for culti- NOTES vating the use of social media among different Prepared by Rajib Shaw, Brett Peary, Ai Ideta, and groups and for developing a social-media-based Yukiko Takeuchi, Kyoto University; and Japan’s Minis- try of Internal Affairs and Communication. platform designed for emergency situations. Improve accessibility. Local accessibility is a 1. A data stream is divided into packets, or units, key issue in many developing countries. Using that are separately routed to a destination where the original message is then reconstituted. mobile networks and social media can help in 2. A mobile terrestrial digital audio video and data collecting and disseminating local information broadcasting service in Japan. People can watch before and during disasters. television programs by mobile phone. 140 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E BIBLIOGRAPHY Peary, B. D. M., R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi. 2012. “Role of Social Media in Japan Earthquake and Tsu- Ideta, A., R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi. 2012. “Post Disas- nami.” In East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: ter Communication and Role of FM Radio: Case Evacuation, Communication, Education and Volun- of Natori.” In East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: teerism, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singa- Evacuation, Communication, Education and Volun- pore: Research Publishing. teerism, edited by R. Shaw and Y. Takeuchi. Singa- pore: Research Publishing. 1 5 : E M E RG E N C Y CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 141 CHAPTER 16 Management of Logistics Chain for Emergency Supplies In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake disaster, relief goods were distributed and delivered through prefectural- and municipal-level depots. This delivery system faced several problems includ- ing fuel shortages, interruption of telecommunication services, and supply and demand mismatches, resulting in stockpiling of the goods in depots and delayed delivery to the people in need. Several mea- sures can be taken to address these issues, including prior surveys of depot facilities, advance estimates of the quantities of emergency goods that will be required, the enlisted support of professional logistics specialists, and the promotion of logistics information management in unaffected areas, among others. FINDINGS were the main causes of unnecessary stockpil- ing in depots. Telecommunications disruptions The damage from the earthquake and tsunami furthered mismatches between real needs and of March 11, 2011, was enormous; over 120,000 supplies. But the professional support of logis- houses were totally damaged, and more than tics specialists was effective in relieving the 470,000 people had to leave their home and bottlenecks in depots. evacuate to over 2,400 shelters. Delivery of relief goods was planned to The relief goods delivery system in Japan be executed through depots at two levels— In Japan delivery of relief goods is the respon- prefectural and municipal. Especially in the sibility of the prefectural governor, who first two weeks, fuel shortages made down- responds to requests from the municipalities. stream deliveries from prefectural depots very According to the postdisaster plan, delivery of difficult. Also, manpower shortages and the relief goods was to be executed using depots inconvenient building specifications of depots at two levels: prefectural and municipal, as 143 Companies, public bodies, inhabitants in other areas Reported Shipping Independent Shipping order offer by goodwill information, Request information request Internet information Cabinet Office and Collection points in national goverment shipping prefectures Shipping Shipping Request Transportation Transportation information information Inventory check Prefectural Disaster Prefectural (first level) Responding Office depot in affected area Order, arrival schedule Transport Request Transportation information Inventory check Municipal Disaster Municipal (second level) Responding Office depot in affected area Order, arrival schedule Transport Request Transportation information Evacuation shelters, hospitals Figure 16.1 Information and Request Supply transportation flows in the official Affected people and evacuees in affected area relief goods delivery system Information flow Transportation flow shown in figure 16.1. As illustrated in green in failures hampered local government efforts to the figure, the national government (Cabinet meet emergency needs. Office) was also included in the plan to facili- Although many believe that transportation tate nationwide distribution. By April 20, the problems were the critical factor, several other national goods distribution component had forces were at play. The workload spiked at the mobilized 26 million meals, 8 million bottles same time that many staff were being lost to the of beverages, and 410,000 blankets using disaster. Moreover, while the disaster counter- 1,900 trucks, 150 aircraft, 5 helicopters, and measure manuals state that the economic or 8 ships. industrial support branch of the local govern- Delivering several kinds of goods—such as ment is responsible for the delivery system, food, drinking water, clothing, and bedding— workers in that section did not have enough either to people’s homes or to more than 2,000 knowledge or experience with logistics and shelters, was a challenge, especially in the first supply chain management. They simply stored several weeks when fuel was in short supply. the goods in public buildings, with no logistics This was especially true for the smaller local management plan, so the space was quickly transport companies that did not have their filled (as shown in figure 16.2). own storage facilities. By the end of June, 1,800, The building specifications and design of 1,400, and 2,400 trucks were dedicated to the depots was also a contributing factor. The transporting goods from prefectural depots to depots require large storage and handling municipal depots in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- capacity as well as easy access to expressways, shima, respectively. Fuel shortages combined especially prefectural depots. Privately owned with power outages and telecommunications warehouses would have been ideal if they had 144 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E not been damaged. The space under view- ing stands in athletic fields, race courses, and indoor gymnasiums also served well as depots (figure 16.3). In Miyagi Prefecture, large ware- houses located near Sendai Port were severely damaged by the tsunami. Neither Yume Messe Miyagi, the conven- tion complex at Sendai Port, nor the Miyagi Prefectural Sports Park could be used as depots since they had already been designated as mortuaries. Telecommunications disruptions and information bottlenecks The disaster disrupted business operations Figure 16.2 Badly organized inventory in an initially assigned depot (Iwaki such as information aggregation; meanwhile, Civic Hall, March 23, 2012) the failure of some communications systems Source: © Makoto Okumura. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. hampered the evacuation of people to safe areas. Very little of the real-time information that was needed to ensure timely and accurate procure- ment of goods was available, including the loca- tion of the shelters, the correct addresses of the recipients of goods, or information about the type and amount of assistance that communi- ties needed. Information about whether relief goods had actually been received could not be easily communicated among depots for several weeks after the earthquake. LESSONS • Plan for logistics and design ahead. Suitably Figure 16.3 Well-organized inventory in a municipal depot (Taira bicycle designed depots with cargo-handling equip- race track at Iwaki City, April 6, 2012) ment such as forklifts are needed, along Source: © Makoto Okumura. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. with the support of logistics professionals. • Information on arrival times at each depot • Get back to normal soon. Emergency deliv- is crucial for planning storage and location ery systems should be closed down as soon management. as feasible to allow normal commercial distribution systems to take over. They are • Estimate needs ahead of time, based on capable of serving a variety of consumers demographics. Prior quantitative estimates and are more flexible and demand driven. of urgently needed goods should be carried out based on regional demographic statis- • Logistics need to be managed locally. At the tics. This helps arrange “push delivery,” intermediate stage, logistics management supply-driven deliveries, in the first few is best delegated to designated municipal days after the disaster. authorities in unaffected areas. 1 6 : M A N AG E M E N T O F LO G I S T I C S C H A I N F O R E M E RG E N C Y S U P P L I E S | 145 The need for specialized support private sector for specialized logistics manage- As stated earlier, local government officials ment services. without sufficient knowledge, training, or experience in logistics management per- Getting information from upstream formed the specialized functions of receiving, For distribution depots to operate smoothly, sorting, and dispatching emergency supplies local decision makers need to have real-time at distribution depots. This resulted in confu- information about the kinds of goods being sion and massive congestion of the delivery transported and the timing of shipments. This networks. information enables them to arrange for the In large-scale disasters, local government personnel and space needed to accommodate staff are called upon to discharge a variety of consignments. In normal times, this informa- functions related to emergency management. tion can be obtained from, for example, point The government should enlist business logis- of sales (POS) systems. tics professionals and draw on the capacity In the aftermath of the disaster, this kind of the private sector as much as possible, to of information about the emergency goods ensure properly integrated management of the ordered by the national government was not distribution depots. Many local public bodies available to prefectures and municipalities in hesitated to hire private companies for relief time. In addition, relief goods often arrived goods distribution and management because unexpectedly from various private companies, they were not sure that they would be able to nonprofit organizations, and individuals with pay them under the Disaster Assistance Law. no prior information, which seriously reduced In the future, a case can be made for putting the processing capacity of distribution depots in place agreements and contracts with the (box 16.1). Preparing a “push” logistics plan Since it is impossible immediately after a disas- BOX 16.1 ter to collect information about affected popu- lations and the extent of damages and loss, it is The negative effect of goods sent with goodwill helpful to design simulations of different sce- narios to generate data on the expected number The demand for different kinds of emergency supplies continued to of victims, including data on vulnerable groups change over time. There were many instances where in a certain area such as the elderly, disabled, women, children, emergency goods were in high demand one day, and no longer needed and so on. Based on these simulations, contin- after a few days. gent emergency stocks of basic goods—packages Relief goods resulting from a spontaneous outpouring of goodwill but sent without making any prior arrangements with the recipient municipal of water, food, household goods (such as table- bodies and without clearly marked declarations of contents did not meet ware, kitchen wrap, tissues, towels, tooth- people’s needs and further burdened an already strained distribution net- brushes, masks, and blankets) and emergency work with dead stock and inventory. medicines for the first three days following the Unpacking and sorting the emergency supplies sent by goodwill alone disaster should be stored locally, typically at was an enormous amount of work. As these kinds of donations mounted, community-level schools and centers. they clogged and undermined the efficiency of the distribution depots. Many such goods arrived in Onagawa City, in Miyagi Prefecture. Used Since the initial disaster response is invari- clothing was sent to the temporary shelters; however, 80 percent of the ably carried out rapidly without geographical clothes, or 200 cartons, were returned to the gymnasium of the junior high or population information from the affected school, which was the distribution center. About 7.7 tonnes of donated areas, data need to be gathered or forecast in goods were not used and had to be recycled. advance and stored in databases to implement “push delivery” of first-response aid. 146 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E Switching back to commercial systems payment methods for hiring logistics pro- National and local governments should use fessionals, machinery, and depot facilities. supply chain and logistics management as they • Engage local government officials in normal respond to victims’ changing needs. As many times. There should be prior identification victims move from shelters into temporary and training of local government staff who housing, and as normal distributors such as will be tasked with responding to large- shops, supermarkets, and convenience stores scale disasters. gradually recover, national and local govern- ments should facilitate the return to normal • Prepare lists and define delivery modes in commercial supply. normal times. There should be prior formu- More specifically, the early restoration of lation of a list of goods and a standard for- commercial demand and supply chains, the mat for shipments and orders for smooth rapid restoration of market dynamics, and the and seamless activation of the disaster speedy distribution of donations to increase response. local purchasing power and liquidity should be a priority for municipal and local authorities. Planning public facilities Job creation and conditional or unconditional Building specifications for new public facili- cash transfers are highly effective short-term ties, such as gymnasiums and meeting halls, postdisaster measures, and are often more should take into account their possible use important than continuing the supply and dis- as relief goods distribution depots. Floor tribution of relief goods by public agencies. strength, entry and exit widths, accessibility The speed and manner of the transition for cargo handling, as well their geographical from public to private supply logistics should locations, should be assessed. If private sector be determined by how dependent the affected warehouses already exist in the region, agree- population is on relief supplies, and on the ments for diverting their use in case of disaster, robustness and speed with which the private as well as for the provision of labor and for allo- sector networks can restore commercial opera- cating costs, should be signed in advance. tions. In the case of the Great East Japan Earth- Building a resilient information system quake (GEJE), delivery of relief goods lasted Information on the needs of affected popula- for 40–50 days after the disaster. Commercial tions must guide procurement agents in pur- businesses reappeared in about a month. chasing the right goods and quantities to be delivered to distribution depots. In the wake of a disaster, communication must be maintained RECOMMENDATIONS FOR between municipal offices, prefectural offices, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES and the national government. Communication networks can be made more resilient by using • Public facilities, such as gymnasiums and satellite communication systems and on-site community halls, can be used as logis- power generation equipment (chapter 15). tics depots as they are well designed Communication networks also need to sup- with strong-enough floors, wide-enough port two-way connectivity between distribu- entrances and exits, and good accessibility tion depots and those facilities that can be used for cargo handling. as evacuation shelters. • Prior agreements can be put in place between With respect to reliable road transportation, the government and logistics companies road status information gathered by probe cars specifying the terms and conditions and linked to a global positioning system (GPS) is 1 6 : M A N AG E M E N T O F LO G I S T I C S C H A I N F O R E M E RG E N C Y S U P P L I E S | 147 very helpful in determining delivery routes. To in the distribution depots. Thus, it is important provide real-time information for emergency to create a mechanism for responsible parties administrative and service-truck drivers, a sys- to properly collect and share this essential tem should be designed to integrate road status information. information from probe vehicles, road opening There is an equal case to be made for adopt- status from each road management authority, ing universal definitions of various items and and traffic regulations from the police. ensuring accurate and smooth information exchange about logistics by determining cor- Multiple execution systems and responding units among national and local paired administrations government agencies, logistics operators, pro- In the aftermath of the GEJE, the national viders of goods, and so forth. As the first step, government formed a special team to take standard order forms, transportation request charge of the logistics of relief supplies. Ideally, forms, and cargo transportation certifica- every disaster response unit—at the national, tions should be prepared and adopted across prefectural, and municipal levels—should do the board. the same. In each region, the division of roles, cost- Since the affected regions cannot be sharing arrangements among the related orga- expected to provide sufficient information nizations, as well as appropriate workflow, after large-scale disasters, municipalities should be discussed in an interdepartmen- outside the disaster area should initiate the tal council. In addition, training in logistics information management functions for relief management should be conducted regularly logistics. When municipalities are matched up to make sure that the workflow is smoothly in predetermined pairs based on their disas- implemented in the wake of disaster. ter profiles and spatial distribution, there are more chances of success. NOTE The need for information sharing and coordination Prepared by Makoto Okumura, Tohoku University. Information about goods, such as the volume, size, and weight of unit packages; number of individual items packed in a unit package; and BIBLIOGRAPHY the need for temperature control is indispens- Caunhyea, A. M., X. Niea, and S. Pokharelb. 2012. able for logistics managers to calculate the “Optimization Models in Emergency Logistics: type and number of trucks required and to A Literature Review.” Socio-Economic Planning determine where and how to store the cargo Sciences 46 (1): 4–13. 148 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E CHAPTER 17 Supporting and Empowering Municipal Functions and Staff A megadisaster can destroy government offices and kill public officials. In the Great East Japan Earth- quake, many municipalities in Tohoku suffered serious damage to their office buildings and incurred considerable staff losses, which hampered their disaster response timing and effectiveness. To compen- sate for this, many kinds of partnership arrangements were formed between localities in the affected areas and their counterparts in unaffected areas. Formalizing these partnership arrangements and building local government capacities to deal with emergency situations are key success factors for mitigating the effects of disasters in developed and developing countries alike. FINDINGS Ibaraki, and Chiba) in northeastern Japan were affected by the GEJE tsunami. Among Office damages and staff losses them, 28 municipalities in the three worst- A disaster can destroy government offices and affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- undermine government functions. Local gov- shima) suffered at least partial damage to their ernments are expected to play a critical leading office facilities. Sixteen of them had to relocate role in disaster response and relief activities. their administrative functions to other build- In the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake ings or temporary offices. Furthermore, com- (GEJE), many affected municipalities suffered puter servers in some of these municipalities serious damage to their offices and lost many were seriously damaged or destroyed, result- of their public officials, which initially pre- ing in a loss of information about residents vented them from undertaking relief activities and other data critical to providing municipal in a timely manner. services. A total of 62 municipalities in six prefec- Fukushima’s case was slightly differ- tures (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, ent. Nine municipalities near the crippled 149 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station had those local governments affected by the disas- to relocate their offices relatively far from the ter and those unaffected. Many prefectures and station (mostly within the same prefecture) municipalities outside Tohoku took the initia- because of concerns about radiation levels in tive to quickly send a large number of their own their jurisdictions, even in cases where the public officials to the disaster-affected areas to physical damages from the earthquake and the help them with postdisaster relief activities tsunami were very limited. and other emergency operations. To make matters worse, many municipali- According to Japan’s Ministry of Internal ties in the hardest-hit areas lost their public Affairs and Communications, some 79,000 officials: a total of 221 officials were reported local government officials were dispatched to dead or missing from 17 municipalities in the the affected prefectures and municipalities three hardest-hit prefectures. In particular, from all over Japan between March 11, 2011, the town of Otsuchi in Iwate Prefecture lost its and January 4, 2012. After a year, many had mayor and 32 officials including seven manag- been still serving there in every possible field— ers, out of a total of 139 staff (figure 17.1). The from civil engineering and urban planning to town was left without a mayor for five months. social work and finance. In fiscal year (FY) Rikuzentakata City, also in Iwate Prefecture, 2012, at least 1,200 officials from local govern- lost 68 officials out of a total staff of 295, while ments around Japan spent a significant period the town of Minamisanriku in Miyagi Prefec- working in the three hardest-hit prefectures as ture lost 39 out of 240 officials. part of the reconstruction effort. Most of the local governments outside Evolving partnerships among localities Tohoku did this out of altruism, but they also One of the most interesting developments to considered it an opportunity for their officials occur after March 11, 2011, was the evolution to gain experience in dealing with postdisas- of various partnership arrangements among ter situations. So, it is a win-win arrangement. Various kinds of partnership arrangements are described as follows. Rikuzentakata City, adopted by Nagoya City Rikuzentakata City lost about one-fourth of its officials in the disaster, which was a huge loss. Soon after March 11, Nagoya City, one of the biggest cities in central Japan, started explor- ing how it could best help the disaster-affected areas of Tohoku, and decided to adopt one of the most affected cities, Rikuzentakata. Nagoya City had sent 144 officials to Rikuzentakata, for a maximum term of one year before March 2012, and 13 officials from Nagoya were still working there as of March 2014. Nagoya sent a variety of experts such as urban planners, public health specialists, Figure 17.1 The municipal office in Otsuchi Town was damaged by the and statisticians. Rikuzentakata has gradually tsunami recruited more staff and become self-sufficient. Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. 150 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E Nagoya will continue to help and send officials were provided to the municipalities affected by to Rikuzentakata, but on a decreasing basis. the GEJE based on these agreements. Tono as a hub for tsunami relief The Union of Kansai Governments The inland city of Tono, in Iwate Prefecture, In the wake of a megadisaster such as the is located within 50 kilometers of many of the GEJE, mutual support among local govern- hardest-hit coastal cities and towns in Iwate, ments within the same region may not be avail- such as Miyako City, Yamada Town, Otsu- able if the entire region is severely affected, chi Town, Kamaishi City, Ofunato City, and and therefore local governments in unaffected Rikuzentakata City. Tono is about an hour by regions may need to play a bigger role. car from any one of these, and only 15 minutes A coalition of prefectural governments in by helicopter. Taking advantage of its strate- western Japan called the Union of Kansai Gov- gic location, Tono established itself rapidly ernments (UKG) quickly stepped in after the and effectively as a hub for tsunami relief by GEJE to help the three most affected prefec- making the city’s 144 facilities (schools, com- tures in Tohoku in an organized fashion. To munity centers, public parks, and so forth) distribute the UKG’s support equitably, each available for logistics supply and other relief UKG member prefecture was assigned to activities. As a result, 3,500 emergency relief assist only one of the hardest-hit prefectures workers from the Japan Self-Defense Forces (table  17.1). After being assigned a prefecture (JSDF), and police and fire departments to support, the UKG prefecture dispatched based themselves in Tono within 10 days of its personnel to gather information, identify the disaster and started their relief operations needs, and coordinate relief activities. from there. Furthermore, about 250 organi- This is a Japanese version of the “twinning zations and agencies used Tono as a base for arrangement” that was used in China during their relief activities, coordinated and sup- the recovery following the Sichuan Earth- ported by Tono City. Tono’s initiative was pos- quake of 2008. This type of partnership is sible because the city had been discussing this efficient and effective because it is facilitated kind of support mechanism with the tsunami- by local governments, which have a better prone coastal cities since 2007, and Tono’s grasp of the needs of their disaster-affected officials were trained and well prepared for counterparts. disasters. Among other advantages, the twinning arrangement avoids an overlap of support; Disaster relief agreements clarifies responsibilities; and achieves effi- During the past couple of decades, more and ciency, speed, continuity, and accountability. more local governments in Japan have signed disaster relief agreements with one another. A typical agreement involves two localities, located far enough apart so that both are not Table 17.1 Beneficiary and supporting prefectures affected by the same disaster; the understand- BENEFICIARY SUPPORTING ing is that if either party is affected by a disas- PREFECTURES PREFECTURES ter, the other is supposed to help. As of April Iwate Osaka, Wakayama 2010, 1,571 municipalities (or 89.8 percent of Miyagi Hyogo, Tottori, all) had signed such an agreement, of which Tokushima 820 were signed with a municipality outside Fukushima Shiga, Kyoto their own prefecture. Various kinds of support 1 7 : S U P P O RT I N G A N D E M P O W E R I N G M U N I C I PA L F U N C T I O N S A N D S TA F F | 151 Under this arrangement by the UKG, the LESSONS Hyogo Prefecture was assigned to assist the Miyagi Prefecture. The Hyogo Prefecture • City halls and municipal offices should be extended the following support: focal points for disaster response initiatives; • Provision of relief supplies (clothes, food, they also play a critical leading role in relief water, and so on). activities. Therefore, they must be located in safer areas, or built or retrofitted to be • Dispatch of its own officials (54,589, as of disaster resistant. December 1, 2011). • Define partnerships in normal times. Japan’s • Acceptance of evacuees. experience shows that partnership arrange- ments between localities in disaster- Recognizing that continuing support is needed affected areas and their counterparts in in the affected areas, Hyogo Prefecture is now unaffected areas were effective. Some of developing a mid- to long-term support plan. these arrangements were based on formal This plan includes assigning technical offi- agreements, but others on goodwill. It is cials such as urban development specialists, as advisable to formalize these mechanisms well as those who can share lessons from the among local governments before disasters experience of the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) strike in order to obtain the necessary legal Earthquake of 1995. backing and clarify cost-sharing arrange- ments. Right after the GEJE, the Japanese Fukushima’s problem central government decided to shoulder the While municipalities in the Iwate and Miyagi cost of dispatching local officials to disaster- prefectures mainly receive as many officials affected areas, which was believed to be as they ask for from the unaffected areas, instrumental in promoting the emerging municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture had partnerships among localities. difficulty filling their staffing needs because of concerns about radiation risks. According • Geography matters. When it comes to disas- to the Fukushima Prefectural Government, ter relief agreements, it is essential that the number of additional staff requested by partnering prefectures and municipali- its 21 disaster-hit municipalities was 178 for ties are geographically distant or in differ- FY 2012, but only about 40 percent of that ent regions. Agreements within the same demand was met. region may not be effective in a large-scale disaster such as the GEJE, which damaged Municipal data protection virtually the entire region. In addition to office damages and staff losses, • Fair and equitable allocations. In a large- some Tohoku municipalities lost residential scale disaster, it is important to allocate the information and other critical data because support fairly and equitably across affected their computer servers were damaged. One areas. The UKG’s initiative to assign its of these municipalities, the town of Otsuchi, member prefectures to support various which lost its on-site computer server, consid- individual localities was exemplary in this ered adopting cloud backup solutions for stor- regard. ing vital information and other key data. Cloud server backup solutions allow data to be trans- • ITC and databases protection. Disaster pre- ferred to an off-site location for secure stor- paredness by local governments should age, reducing the risk of losing data in times include a plan to minimize the damage of disaster. to their information systems and protect 152 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E critical databases so that they can continue NOTE to function and provide emergency services Prepared by Toshiaki Keicho, World Bank, and the to disaster victims and residents. International Recovery Platform (Union of Kansai Governments). RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BIBLIOGRAPHY Asahi Shimbun. 2012. “Accelerating Development of Enhance coordination across government levels. Cloud in Local Government” [in Japanese]. Feb- The roles that local governments play in the ruary 12. aftermath of a disaster are critical. Clear roles Fire and Disaster Management Agency. 2011. Enhance- and responsibilities must first be assigned to ment and Strengthening of Earthquake and Tsu- each tier of government (specifying what needs nami Countermeasures in the Regional Disaster Management Plan [in Japanese]. to be done and by which level in case of a disas- Imai, T., T. Kakimi, and S. Tateishi. 2011. Study on ter) and its capacities strengthened accordingly. Transferring Government Functions by Nuclear Review the location of government offices. In Accident [in Japanese]. http://gakkei.net disaster-prone developing countries, the loca- .fukushima-u.ac.jp/files/shinsai11.pdf. tions of municipal offices should be reviewed Kahokunippo. 2011. “Focus/14 Minutes Following the Earthquake Support Preparation as Center Hub along with their vulnerability to disasters. in Tono” [in Japanese]. August 12. http://www Relocating or retrofitting them should be con- .kahoku.co.jp/spe/spe_sys1071/20110816_01.htm. sidered if necessary, so that municipalities can ———. 2012. “Dispatch Staff by Avoiding Fukushima” continue to perform their roles in the wake of [in Japanese]. March 15. http://www.kahoku.co .jp/news/2012/03/20120315t61005.htm. a disaster. Mainichi Newspaper. 2012. “Writer’s Eye: One Coordinate support across locales. Partner- Year from GEJE: Whole Support by Nagoya ing with other localities to conduct emergency to Rikuzentakata” [in Japanese]. March 8. relief activities could work in many developing http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/eye/news /20120308ddm004070002000c.html. countries, particularly in relatively large coun- Takenaka, H., and Y. Funabashi. 2012. Lessons from tries. Such partnerships are, however, unlikely Japanese Mega-disasters [in Japanese]. Tokyo: to work effectively if carried out in an ad hoc Toyokeizai. manner. Formalizing these agreements and Technical Committee on Earthquake Disaster Man- building the emergency response capacities of agement in Rural Towns. 2011. Case of GEJE [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin local officials are the keys to successful part- /chubou/toshibu_jishin/7/sub2.pdf. nerships. Cost sharing under the partnerships Technical Committee on Emergency Response. 2011. also needs to be clarified up-front. Interim Report [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai Be sure to back up data. Municipalities in .go.jp/3oukyutaisaku/higashinihon_kentoukai developing countries should be aware of the /cyukan_torimatome.pdf. Union of Kansai Governments. 2011. The Emergency risk of losing their digital information and data- Proposal for the Great East Japan Earthquake bases in a disaster, and need to come up with a [in Japanese]. http://www.kouiki-kansai.jp cost-effective solution to minimize that risk. /data_upload/1315378856.pdf. 1 7 : S U P P O RT I N G A N D E M P O W E R I N G M U N I C I PA L F U N C T I O N S A N D S TA F F | 153 CHAPTER 18 Evacuation Center Management A megadisaster necessarily results in an enormous number of evacuees staying in evacuation centers for a significant time period. This note describes how Japan managed its evacuation centers after the Great East Japan Earthquake. It highlights important management issues including shortages of essential supplies and services, successful self-management practices initiated by the affected people themselves, good management practices by local governments, and the sensitivity required to accom- modate diverse groups of evacuees with special needs. FINDINGS 500 450 Number of evacuees (thousand) After the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), 400 nearly 2,500 evacuation centers were estab- 350 lished in the disaster-affected Tohoku region; 300 additional centers were also located outside of 250 Tohoku. At peak occupancy, more than 470,000 200 people were staying at these centers (see figure 150 18.1). Most facilities, such as schools and com- 100 munity centers, were publicly owned and had 50 been designated as evacuation centers even 0 0d 3d 1w 2w 3w 1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 7m before the GEJE. Right after the GEJE, a num- Number of days after GEJE ber of private facilities such as hotels and tem- All Iwate, Myagi, and Fukushima prefectures ples were also enlisted as the need for centers Figure 18.1 Number of evacuees after the GEJE far exceeded expectations (figure 18.2); also, a Source: Cabinet Office (CAO). number of evacuees stayed with their relatives Note: d, w, m = day, week, month, respectively. 155 3,000 This knowledge note will focus mainly on 2,500 the management of publicly owned centers, since collecting information on private centers Number of shelters 2,000 has been difficult. 1,500 Not enough supplies 1,000 Given the magnitude of the disaster and the 500 number of evacuees, most evacuation facili- ties lacked sufficient supplies of food, water, 0 1w 2w 3w 1m 2m 3m 4m clothes, and blankets. In the first days and Number of days after GEJE All Iwate, Myagi, and Fukushima prefectures weeks following the disaster, transporting these Figure 18.2 Number of evacuation centers essentials to the centers was hampered by dam- Source: CAO. aged roads and a shortage of vehicles and fuel (chapter 16). This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the many temporary facilities were or friends. Evacuees gradually moved out of the not formally designated centers and therefore centers as the construction of transition shel- had not been stocked with essentials. ters progressed. Within four months after the disaster, about 75 percent of evacuation centers Lack of water and power were closed, although some centers in Tohoku Furthermore, water and power supply systems stayed open as long as nine months. were damaged in most of the disaster-affected The evacuation pattern in Fukushima, where areas, and in some places were not restored the nuclear accident occurred after the GEJE, even after one month (chapter 20). These was very different from other disaster-affected problems made life miserable for the evacuees. areas in Tohoku. In Fukushima many people had For example, they had difficulty using toilets to relocate from one center to another, moving without water for flushing. The cold weather further from the crippled nuclear power plant in northeastern Japan and lack of electric as information became available on the risk of heating in the facilities made many evacuees radiation exposure. More than 10,000 people vulnerable to illness, especially the elderly. As had to change evacuation centers three or more the evacuation period became prolonged, the times, with some people moving as many as 10 inability to bathe was also a serious issue. times (figure 18.3 and chapter 11). People could not stay in their high-rise apartments in Sendai City because of water 1–2 times and power failures. Since they could not con- 3–4 times tinue to carry water and food upstairs to the 2,335 people 5 times or more higher stories, they moved to evacuation cen- 4,833 ters until public services were restored. people Self-management by evacuees 6,408 people Although managing evacuation centers is a municipal responsibility, most municipali- ties in the disaster-affected areas suffered badly from a loss of staff, seriously weaken- Figure 18.3 Number of times people in Fukushimaa had to evacuate ing their capacity to cope with the emer- Source: Fukushima University gency. At the beginning, most facilities were a. 8 towns and villages in Futaba region, Fukushima Prefecture. supported by local teachers, volunteers, and 156 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E other civil society groups. As the evacuation period became extended, evacuees themselves started taking a number of initiatives. At many shelters, a self-governing body emerged, with leaders and members of various committees selected by the evacuees themselves. For example, evacuees at the Ofunato Junior High School in Iwate Prefecture (figure  18.4) organized themselves into several groups for nursing, sanitation, food, facilities, supplies, and heating. At one school in Minamisanriku in Miyagi Prefecture, evacuees divided them- selves into 20 groups, based on the communi- ties they came from before the disaster, and assigned themselves roles and responsibilities for day-to-day activities. Figure 18.4 Evacuation center at the Ofunato Junior High School An event hall called the Big Palette in Kori- Source: © Inabe City. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. yama, Fukushima Prefecture, admitted more than 2,000 evacuees mainly from Tomioka Welfare shelters for those Town and Kawauchi Village, both affected by with special needs the nuclear disaster. These evacuees estab- Many experts have pointed out that evacuees lished a volunteer center at the hall, where vol- tend to suffer from tremendous stress, espe- unteers and the evacuees themselves helped cially children, and therefore need special organize activities such as opening three mental health care and counseling services as cafes, starting an FM radio station, organiz- evacuation periods extend. But the availability ing a gardening event, and undertaking a sum- of such services varied from center to center. mer festival. The volunteer center provided Taking care of the elderly and others who opportunities for the evacuees to help them- needed special attention was another big chal- selves and engage in productive activities, thus lenge. At many centers, all the special needs improving their daily well-being. groups had to share the facilities with the other evacuees. But Sendai City in Miyagi Prefecture Gender sensitivity had about 30 special centers called “welfare One of the problems cited at many of the cen- shelters” that provided nursing and other care ters was a lack of gender sensitivity (chap- for the elderly, the disabled, and other groups. ter 19). There simply wasn’t enough privacy for About 250 people and their families were anyone, particularly not for female evacuees— transferred to these from other centers. many did not have private spaces where they could change their clothes or breast-feed their Managing with a human face babies. Many centers eventually installed par- A close relationship should be established titions, but it was often too late. It has also been early on between evacuees and local officials reported that relief goods delivered to these who are responsible for managing the cen- centers were biased in favor of male evacu- ters. A good practice in this regard came from ees. This was mainly because it was mostly Hachinohe City in Aomori Prefecture. Right men who were managing the centers, whether after the GEJE, there were about 120 fami- they were run by municipalities or by evacuees lies at eight evacuation centers in Hachinohe. themselves. The city government assigned two officials to 1 8 : E VAC U AT I O N C E N T E R M A N AG E M E N T | 157 BOX 18.1 evacuees had to go beyond the prefecture’s jurisdictional boundaries because of radiation Information is both critical and comforting risks. In most cases, however, the evacuation centers were managed by the evacuees’ munic- Keeping evacuees informed is not only critical to their well-being but also ipalities rather than by the hosts’. comforting. In Rikuzentakata, in Iwate Prefecture, one of the city govern- ment’s public relations officers continued to publish a special edition of the city’s newsletter on a daily basis between March 18 and May 7, 2011, except for one day when a power cut prevented him from printing it. LESSONS About 2,400 copies were printed every day and distributed to evacuees in more than 70 evacuation centers in the city. He continued publishing the • Designate evacuation centers in safe loca- newsletter five times a week for a few more months after May 8, 2011. tions. While it may not be possible to be The newsletter initially contained information that evacuees really perfectly prepared for a megadisaster like needed, such as procedures to get a disaster victim certificate or be able the GEJE, it is nonetheless essential to des- to receive donations, the locations of temporary public offices and medi- ignate evacuation centers in safe locations cal facilities, schedules of school events, new public transportation routes and equip them with as many emergency and timetables, and so on. The type of information in the newsletter changed over time to meet the evacuees’ changing needs. Reading the supplies as possible. Many prefectures and newsletter became a routine at evacuation centers in Rikuzentakata, and municipalities all over Japan are conduct- evacuees looked forward to it every day. ing ex post evaluations to assess the loca- tion and number of evacuation centers and the adequacy of supplies at these centers. every seven or eight evacuated families with • Prepare for primary service interruptions. whom they could consult on any issue. For Since a megadisaster is likely to interrupt example, they had questions about subsidies essential services such as water and power, for future housing and livelihood recovery. it is critical to install alternatives such as The relationship established with the officials portable toilets and power generators. Sen- at the evacuation centers continued even after dai City is planning to equip its designated the evacuees had resettled in private or public facilities with renewable energies, such as rental houses. Although this arrangement was solar panels, as a backup power source. possible because of the relatively small number of evacuees in a relatively big city with more • Evacuees should take part in managing activ- than 2,000 officials, the city should neverthe- ities and services at evacuation centers. They less be commended for its initiative. are not guests who are simply receiving food and materials, but capable enough to man- Disaster relief agreement age the evacuation centers themselves. In 2006 two cities in Fukushima Prefecture • Anticipate different needs in evacuation cen- entered into a Disaster Relief Agreement: ters. Evacuees consist of diverse groups of Naraha City, which was affected by the nuclear people who have different needs and wants: disaster, and Aizu-Misato City (located rela- women and children, the elderly, the dis- tively far from the crippled plant), which was abled, and some foreigners. Those in charge not. When the nuclear disaster happened, most of managing evacuation centers should be evacuees from Naraha City went to evacuation sensitive to this diversity. It is also critical centers in Aizu-Misato City that were man- that women are included in management aged by local officials. This was a rare example and leadership positions at these facilities. of successful cooperation between two munic- ipalities, strengthened by their long-standing • Creative management pays. Some local gov- friendly relationship. In Fukushima most ernments have come up with innovative 158 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E arrangements for managing evacuation cen- Integrate gender considerations into plan- ters and supporting evacuees. These gov- ning. Gender sensitivity and an ability to serve ernments should share their experiences diverse groups of evacuees are required in any and learn from one another so that good country. Communication among these groups practices may be replicated in the future. and governments should be established at evac- uation centers. Developing countries would be • Providing the information that disaster vic- well advised to learn from the Japanese experi- tims need is not only critical to their well- ence, especially with respect to gender. being but also comforting. It is important to listen to evacuees to understand what kinds of information they need and want, NOTE and to continue listening as their needs Prepared by Toshiaki Keicho, World Bank. change over time. BIBLIOGRAPHY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR Committee of “Alive, Living and Life.” 2012. Alive, Liv- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ing, and Life: The 169 Days at the Fukushima Big Palette Evacuation Shelter. Amu Promotion. Most of the lessons described above are appli- Committee on Disaster Emergency Response in cable to developing countries. Evacuation the Great East Japan Earthquake. 2011a. Docu- ments from the 5th Meeting: Evacuation Center centers are needed after most natural and Operation [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go industrial disasters, including not only earth- .jp/3oukyutaisaku/higashinihon_kentoukai/5 quakes and tsunamis but also floods, land- /naikakufu.pdf. slides, volcano eruptions, and so on. ———. 2011b. Interim Report [in Japanese]. http://www Plan ahead. In disaster-prone develop- .bousai.go.jp/3oukyutaisaku/higashinihon_ kentoukai/cyukan_torimatome.pdf. ing countries, evacuation centers should be Committee for Technical Investigation on Earthquake safely located. Schools and community cen- Disaster Management in Regional Cities. 2011. ters should be designed and built to also serve Documents from the 7th Meeting: Examples from as evacuation centers. They should also be the Great East Japan Earthquake [in Japanese]. http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/toshibu_ stocked with essential supplies such as food jishin/7/sub2.pdf. and drinking water, and equipped with emer- Fire and Disaster Management Agency. 2011. Enhance- gency power generators. In developing coun- ment and Strengthening of Earthquake and Tsu- tries, rainwater harvesting systems in schools nami Countermeasures in the Regional Disaster Management Plan [in Japanese]. and other public facilities, and renewable ener- Fukushima University. 2012. 2011 Report of Basic Data gies such as solar panels may also serve well in Collection for Disaster Reconstruction Survey in emergency situations. Political and financial Futaba 8 Towns. 2nd ed. [in Japanese]. support for predisaster investment in evacua- Imai. 2011. “The Great East Japan Earthquake and tion centers and supplies should be mobilized. Public Policies of the Municipalities—Response to Nuclear Disaster.” Kokyoseisaku kenkyu [Public Support community organizations. One of the Policy Research] 11. biggest challenges to managing evacuation cen- Yomiuri Newspaper. 2011a. “Forty Shelters Receive ters in developing countries is weak local gov- Elderly and Disabled” [in Japanese]. April 2. ernment capacity. Evacuees should, therefore, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news get organized to help themselves as illustrated /20110402-OYT1T00745.htm. ———. 2011b. “Issuing Newsletter Everyday” [in Japa- by the Japanese experiences. In many develop- nese]. May 9. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/e-japan ing countries this effort could perhaps be sup- /iwate/feature/morioka1304174360304_02/news ported by nongovernmental organizations. /20110509-OYT8T00076.htm. 1 8 : E VAC U AT I O N C E N T E R M A N AG E M E N T | 159 CHAPTER 19 Ensuring Sensitivity in Response and Equity in Recovery As in every disaster, certain groups were more vulnerable than others to the effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake. Two-thirds of those who lost their lives were over 60 years old. Response efforts to the catastrophe reflected other existing inequities, including that of gender. The special needs of children and the disabled were not always met. Women, the elderly, and the disabled—and experts sen- sitive to the needs of all vulnerable groups—should be engaged in the planning, design, and implemen- tation of relief-and-recovery activities to ensure a more effective and efficient recovery. Such efforts promise to contribute to the sustainability and resilience of communities in the long term. FINDINGS 100 0–9 90 10–19 Vulnerability to the impacts of natural hazards 80 20–29 normally varies by social and demographic 70 30–39 group. The Great East Japan Earthquake 60 Percent Years (GEJE) was no exception, with the elderly 50 40–49 proving to be the most vulnerable. Two-thirds 40 50–59 of the deaths occurred among people over 60 30 years old, who accounted for some 30 percent 60–69 20 of the total population in the affected areas 10 70–79 (figure 19.1). They were physically weaker than 80+ other groups and could not run fast enough to 0 Deaths Age reach higher ground. Figure 19.1 Age distribution of people killed Nine hundred and eighty-five children and in the GEJE young people (0–19 years old) lost their lives in Source: Cabinet Office. 161 the GEJE (as of March 31, 2012). As of Octo- for Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures ber 31, 2011, 1,327 children had lost one parent were 11th, 27th, and 17th, respectively, out of and 240 children had lost both their mother 47 prefectures. The GEJE relief-and-response and father. Of these, 160 were adopted by rela- efforts reflected and reinforced these preexist- tives. A survey conducted by Ashinaga (“daddy ing inequalities. Most evacuation centers were longlegs,” a scholarship organization for managed by men. In fact, throughout Japan, orphaned students) revealed that households 96 percent of the leaders of neighbors associa- with disaster-affected children, in particular tions (Jichikai), many of whom served as the those headed by females, face difficulties pay- leaders of evacuation centers, are men. ing their bills. The details are as follows: Privacy and security • Half of the affected children are in female- Privacy for women was rarely available at evac- headed households. uation centers, which added greatly to their • Forty-five percent of the heads of house- stress (figure 19.2). A survey conducted by the holds have permanent full-time jobs, while Cabinet Office in April 2011 revealed that only 30 percent are unemployed or looking 26 percent of the centers had private spaces for for work. women; at many centers women had to change their clothes under blankets or in bathrooms. • Among female-headed households, 24 per- Women were hesitant to voice their needs cent are employed full time, while 47 per- to the male leadership of the centers, even cent are unemployed or looking for work. when basic needs relating to hygiene were • The homes of 70 percent were damaged; overlooked or handled in an insensitive man- 30 percent are living in their own homes, ner. For example, in one center, male staff dis- with the remainder living with relatives tributed a sanitary napkin to each woman and (29 percent) or in evacuation or transition said: “If you need another one, please let me centers. know.” In centers where women were engaged in management, those items were made read- ily available in bathrooms. Male leaders at CHALLENGES FACED DURING evacuation centers considered skin lotions and RESPONSE AND RECOVERY other cosmetic items to be luxury goods, while for women they contributed to a sense of nor- Gender malcy. When a cosmetic company sent makeup Women in Japan do not have the same socio- kits to several centers, women were able to put economic status as men, participate less in on makeup for the first time since the disas- decision making, and have less access to social ter, which raised their spirits and encouraged and economic opportunities. The relative pov- them to be more active. erty rate of women is higher than that of men It is difficult to obtain verifiable estimates (28.1 percent versus 22.9 percent in 2007). The of sexual harassment incidents since they average hourly wage rate in 2008 for female can take many forms—from sexual taunting full-time workers was 69 percent of the rate for to physical harassment—and often go unre- male workers, and the proportion of women ported. In May 2011, there were two reported in positions equivalent to or higher than sec- cases of rape confirmed in the three affected tion manager in private corporations was 6.5 prefectures after the disaster, compared to percent. The prefectures affected by the event nine reported incidents at the same time in belong to a medium range of gender equality in 2010. There were 13 reported cases of forcible Japan: rankings on the gender equality index indecency compared to 32 cases in the previous 162 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E year. The minister of state said these incidents did not occur in the affected areas. At evacua- tion centers, personal alarms were distributed to protect women and children, and they were cautioned to avoid going to the outdoor toilets alone, especially at night. In one center, a grievance desk was set up; however, since there were no partitions in the facility, everyone could see and hear who was registering a complaint. This made women reluctant to report any concerns or incidents. In another center, a private, soundproof space was set up where women felt more confident about reporting grievances. Domestic violence is also difficult to track, as it is typically considered a family matter and Figure 19.2 An evacuation center, one month after the earthquake seldom discussed or reported. Of the cases that Source: © Mikio Ishiwatari. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. police responded to in the three affected pre- fectures from March 11 to December 31, 2011, 98 were recognized as having a clear linkage Maternal care to the disaster. Many of these involved violent Many nursing mothers did not have privacy acts by husbands who had increased their alco- to breast-feed. Some went outside in the cold hol consumption after the disaster. in search of privacy and others gave up nurs- The Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabi- ing and changed to powdered milk. A num- net Office recognized that gender perspectives ber of maternal care clinics and hospitals were not sufficiently considered in managing offered temporary evacuation facilities free evacuation centers, and on March 16, 2011, of charge for families with pregnant women issued an ordinance on “Disaster Response and infants. But the Japan Primary Care Asso- Based on the Needs of Women and Women ciation reported that many pregnant women with Children” to provide guidance to relevant refused to move because they were concerned agencies. They also initiated consultation ser- that their neighbors would no longer consider vices for women dealing with distress or vio- them to be community members if they moved lence. But conditions on the ground made it to a separate place. difficult to reach the evacuees and people man- The Japan Primary Care Association set up aging the centers. several programs to support pregnant women At the Fukushima Big Pallet, a major evacu- and families with infants, and sent an obstetri- ation center accommodating more than 2,000 cian and gynecologist to the affected area. evacuees, spaces for women were set up in col- laboration with local women’s organizations. Workload and livelihoods The organizations provided advice to women Women in many evacuation centers were and referred them to experts when necessary. requested to prepare meals for the evacuees They provided a safe space for women to gather three times a day, in addition to caring for the and share their thoughts and concerns with elderly and children while the men were out others, and also held events such as cooking looking for work. This placed a heavy burden and handicraft classes. Women said that they on them. In some centers, a rotation system felt relaxed and comfortable in these spaces. was established to alleviate the pressure on 1 9 : E N S U R I N G S E N S I T I V I T Y I N R E S P O N S E A N D E Q U I T Y I N R E CO V E RY | 163 any specific person or group. Moreover, while the Fund for the Future of Children affected by men were engaged in cash-for-work programs the GEJE, started providing financial support cleaning up debris from the disaster, women or scholarships to orphans. were not compensated for their work in Because of the accident at the Fukushima the centers. Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, children in Fukushima Prefecture have stopped playing Men’s needs outside or swimming in pools, and have suf- Integrating a gender-sensitive approach to fered from the stress of remaining indoors. In relief-and-recovery efforts means understand- 74 percent of Fukushima households, children ing and addressing the needs of men and boys have decreased the time they play outdoors in addition to those of women and girls. While to 13  minutes per day to avoid the effects of data still need to be collected in the affected radiation. These children demonstrate signs area, there are indications of a need for coun- of increased stress, in many cases acting out seling for men to deal with alcoholism and twice as much as children in other areas. The domestic violence. Moreover, men may need government organized a few days of “refresh special counseling for child rearing if they have camp” where children can play sports and become single parents (box 19.1) or if they have engage safely in outdoor activities. Some 6,000 lost their means of livelihood. children participated in the program. Children The elderly and the disabled The GEJE left children feeling frightened, A lesson learned from the Great Hanshin- confused, and insecure. The number of incom- Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995 was that spe- ing calls to “Childline,” a free counseling ser- cial centers should be established for elderly vice for children, increased fourfold in the people and the disabled. In 2008 the Ministry Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate prefectures fol- of Health and Welfare issued guidelines stating lowing the event. The government made plans that welfare evacuation centers for special care to deploy some 1,300 mental health counselors needs should be established within seven days to all public schools in affected areas. of a disaster emergency, but only 20 percent of The government expanded its support to municipal governments in the three affected foster parents caring for relatives’ orphans, prefectures did so. Many disabled people faced and recommended that the children’s previous challenges accessing evacuation centers; there connections with friends and with their home were some reports of mentally ill and autistic region should be maintained. Governments and people leaving centers because they were not various organizations, such as Ashinaga and properly cared for. People over 60 made up 30 percent of the population in the affected area, but local BOX 19.1 authorities were unprepared to respond to their needs. The evacuation of elderly peo- Single Father Japan ple with dementia and their family members was challenging. While long-term care facili- Single Father Japan was established before the GEJE to support single fathers. After the disaster, the organization requested the Japanese gov- ties organize regular evacuation drills, local ernment to extend bereavement pensions for men who had lost their governments had limited knowledge about wives in the event. Their main activities are providing counseling and the elderly with dementia who lived in their open lectures, awareness raising, and research on single-parent families. communities and were not well prepared to See http://zenfushiren.jp (in Japanese). support them. Older people also faced accessi- bility issues at evacuation sites and temporary 164 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E housing sites. A number of older people in need Such bureaucratic mismatches resulted in cer- of soft food and diapers went with their needs tain groups falling through the cracks. unmet. Older people are prone to withdrawal In an effort to ease the burden on vulnerable when disconnected from friends and family, groups, the MHLW temporarily suspended the which is an issue for many people in temporary collection of national insurance system premi- housing who have lost their social networks. ums for long-term nursing care. It also simpli- The elderly residents in care facilities that fied procedures for claims, allowed affected were damaged in the GEJE were relocated to people to receive services without show- evacuation centers such as school gymnasi- ing their insurance identification cards, and ums, where they faced difficulties living with- reduced or waived service fees. out nursing care. Finding nursing care staff was a challenge because many of them had suffered from the GEJE: 52 out of 1,165 elder- EMPOWERING MARGINALIZED care facilities in the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- GROUPS FOR LONG-TERM shima prefectures were damaged by the event, RECOVERY and 173 staff members were reported dead or Recognizing its importance, a number of missing. In April 2012, the Ministry of Health, groups have acted to enable marginalized Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued an ordi- groups to participate meaningfully in medium- nance to local governments to prepare for large and long-term recovery efforts. disasters by arranging for the evacuation of the The first meeting of the Government’s elderly living in care facilities, supporting staff Reconstruction Design Council was held on sent to devastated areas, and providing support April 11, 2011. No mention was made of gender to the elderly who needed care at home. or of issues related to the disabled in the coun- One elder-care facility became an evacua- cil’s reconstruction principles, and only one tion site by default. Designed as a group home woman was appointed to the 15-member coun- for 20 people, the building was equipped with cil. This is a nationwide problem, reflected in an accessible kitchen, bathrooms, bedrooms, the following figures: and a living room for individuals with physi- cal and cognitive impairment. While large- • On the National Disaster Prevention Coun- scale multilevel elder-care facilities could not cil, only one out of the 25 committee mem- function without electricity and running water bers is a woman. because of the GEJE, this small-scale group • At disaster prevention councils at the pre- home was able to provide basic services and an fectural and municipal levels, the partici- accessible environment for over 100 people of pation rate of women is only 4 percent. all ages from the community. Coordination challenges among agencies In response to the GEJE, there was an may have hindered the collection of data and appeal led by several women leaders, includ- the provision of support to disabled people ing Akiko Domoto, former governor of Chiba affected by the GEJE. For example, disaster Prefecture, and Hiroko Sue Hara of Josai risk management (DRM) staff at local govern- International University, to establish the Japan ments could not have access to information Women’s Network for Disaster Reconstruction on the disabled in the affected area because and Gender. In June 2011, on the three-month of privacy policies, and a housing facility that anniversary of the disaster, the network held provided income-generation activities for dis- a symposium on gender equality in the GEJE abled people did not fall under the purview of reconstruction process. The network’s advo- the MHLW and so did not receive assistance. cacy efforts have been successful, and have 1 9 : E N S U R I N G S E N S I T I V I T Y I N R E S P O N S E A N D E Q U I T Y I N R E CO V E RY | 165 contributed to the inclusion of the following the GEJE, with the objective of coordinating text in the Basic Act for Reconstruction in among governments, CSOs, experts, and the response to the GEJE, which was passed on private sector. Through the network, informa- June 20, 2011: “Opinions of the residents in tion is shared on support activities, damages the disaster-afflicted regions shall be respected incurred, and the progress of recovery; also, and opinions of a wide range of people includ- children’s messages are issued to the public ing women, children and disabled persons and recovery policies are recommended. As of shall be taken into account.” There were also November 2011, 29 organizations were partici- accompanying guidelines issued on promot- pating in the network. ing the participation of women, children, and UNICEF is providing assistance to the chil- the disabled in all aspects of the reconstruc- dren of Japan for the first time in nearly half tion process. The real challenge in the coming a century with a budget of ¥4 billion. The months will be the implementation of the law assistance covers emergency support supplies; and guidelines, as so far the capacity and will health and nutritional support; educational to engage and address the needs of vulnerable support; psychosocial support (psychological groups and women has been quite limited. care); protection of children in harsh environ- A number of United Nations organizations ments, such as if they are orphaned, in need, and civil society organizations (CSOs) are also or in impoverished families; and child-friendly supporting children. Four organizations—the reconstruction plans. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Older people are more often thought of as Save the Children (box 19.2), the General a vulnerable group in need of care rather than Research Institute of the Convention on the as a resource to support younger generations. Rights of the Child, and Childline—established When marginalized, elders lose opportunities a network for supporting children affected by for interaction and the ability to contribute to society, and young people lose the wisdom and talents that elders can offer. After the GEJE, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) called BOX 19.2 Ibasho, which focuses on the issues faced in Save the Children aging societies, visited the affected area and heard many stories about elders who saved One key lesson Save the Children has learned over many years of re- younger people’s lives by telling them where to sponding to emergencies is that while children are more adversely affect- escape or by teaching them how to survive with ed by disasters, they also have a great capacity to recover quickly, provided extremely limited resources. Older people also they are given the proper support and are directly engaged in supportive expressed a great deal of gratitude for all the dialogues. Children can inform families, school officials, and local officials foreign aid they had received, and wanted to of their needs, and of how they can help their communities recover. When asked about what would be of most support to them, children generally give back. “I want to be useful to others but I expressed their desire to return to normal routines and living situations— do not know how,” was heard numerous times. and to help their communities recover. Save the Children surveyed more To empower elderly survivors of the than 11,000 children in the affected area on what type of role they would GEJE, Ibasho is building a café adjacent to a like to play in the recovery process, and how they would like to see their large temporary housing site in Ofunato City, towns rebuilt. Close to 90 percent said they wanted to contribute in some Iwate Prefecture. The Ibasho café is being way to rebuilding their communities. Save the Children is strengthening children’s participation in the recovery process by ensuring their views are designed in partnership with the commu- part of the planning for rebuilding their towns and communities, and as- nity as a place where people of all ages can sisting children to convey their thoughts and ideas to their communities gather and share conversation and refresh- and to local and national government officials. ments in an informal setting. It is envisioned that elders will plan, manage, and operate the 166 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E café. Everyone—including people with physi- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR cal disabilities or cognitive illnesses such as DEVELOPING COUNTRIES dementia—will be encouraged to participate to their fullest ability. It is hoped that this Plan for diverse needs. The needs and impacts intergenerational exchange and interaction of different groups can be quite varied. Assess will create stronger social capital in the com- and understand the different needs of women, munity, resulting in strengthened resilience to girls, boys, men, the elderly, the disabled, eth- natural hazards and the risks associated with nic groups, the very poor, and other margin- the rapid growth of an aging population. alized groups to respond effectively. Those working in the informal economy may face particular difficulties, for example, where LESSONS the loss of housing also means the loss of workplaces, tools, and supplies. It is impor- Lessons learned from the GEJE include tant to formally recognize and compensate such cases. • Data collection disaggregated by gender and Adopt rights-based approaches. Women age, and including the disabled, is needed to should be encouraged to participate in disaster understand the relief and recovery needs of management committees, camp management, all affected people, and particularly those and risk assessment. National and local disas- groups that have special needs. Arrange- ter management policies and strategies should ments and agreements to share data across be reviewed for their gender sensitivity. agencies in case of an emergency are key. Involve women and children in decision • Once an emergency occurs, it is already too making. Establish specific monitoring mecha- late to start advocating for gender-sensitive nisms (for example, Continuous Social Impact perspectives. It is crucial to involve women Assessments) to ensure that women and chil- in center management, and to make plans dren can access recovery resources, participate that ensure women’s privacy and safety. publicly in planning and decision making, and organize to sustain their involvement through- • The livelihoods of women also need to be out the recovery process. supported; opportunities for income gen- Protect the vulnerable. Sexual harassment eration during relief and recovery should and domestic violence comes in various forms. be provided to both women and men. It is necessary to create safe and secure spaces • Children are in particular need of support for women, children, and other marginalized in regaining a certain sense of security and groups. Protection shelters and consultation normality; they can also be meaningfully services for victims should be established in engaged in rebuilding their communities. collaboration with NGOs, governments, and the police. • Think of vulnerable people first. When plan- Support marginalized groups. For longer- ning evacuation sites, it may be beneficial to term recovery, support can be designed to help reexamine how care facilities for the elderly upgrade the living standards of the poor, to and disabled are designed and integrated enable the most marginalized to participate, into neighborhood and city planning. and to establish mechanisms that promote an • Engaging marginalized groups actively in inclusive, more resilient society. Supporting the design and implementation of recovery marginalized groups requires a solid under- efforts contributes to their recovery and to standing of the broader societal and policy the future resilience of the community. contexts (for example, labor market practices). 1 9 : E N S U R I N G S E N S I T I V I T Y I N R E S P O N S E A N D E Q U I T Y I N R E CO V E RY | 167 NOTE Viewpoint of Gender Equal Participation [in Japa- nese]. Cabinet Office, Tokyo. http://www.gender Prepared by Yoko Saito, Disaster Reduction and .go.jp/pdf/saigai_22.pdf. Human Renovation Institution, International Recov- ———. 2011b. Women and Men in Japan. Cabinet Office, ery Platform; Hironobu Shibuya, Save the Children Tokyo. Japan; and Margaret Arnold and Mikio Ishiwatari, ISS-GCOE. 2011. “Gender Equality and Multicultural World Bank. Valuable contributions were also pro- Conviviality in the Age of Globalization.” ISS- vided by Emi Kiyota, Ibasho; and Akiko Domoto and GCOE Research Series 4, ISS Research Series 46 Hiroko Sue Hara, Japan Women’s Network for Disas- [in Japanese]. ter Reconstruction and Gender. Japan Primary Care Association. 2011. Primary Care for All Team. Tokyo: Ground Publishing. http://www.pcat.or.jp. BIBLIOGRAPHY Kyodo Press. 2011. Supporting Affected Women Asahi Newspaper. 2012. “The Disaster for Women” from the Viewpoint of Women; Sending Make-Up [in Japanese]. February 28. Sets to Evacuation Shelters [in Japanese]. Ashinaga. 2012. “Report on the Status of 2,005 Chil- http://www.47news.jp/feature/woman/woman dren in 707 Households Who Lost Parents or eye/2011/05/post_20110523170949.html. Guardians in the Great East Japan Earthquake and Osawa, M., A. Domoto, and K. Yamaji, eds. 2011. Tsunami.” Press Release, February 28. http://www “Proceedings on Gender Equality and Disaster.” .ashinaga.org/en/news/press/entry-378.html. Rehabilitation 6.11 Symposium—Perspectives of Benesse. 2012. “Survey on Childcare: Effects of Gender Equality in Disaster and Rehabilitation GEJE.” Press Release, February 24 [in Japanese]. [in Japanese]. June 11, 2011. http://www.benesse.co.jp/jisedaiken/pdf/shinsai_ Yoshida, Hiroshi. 2010. “Development of Gender 311_release2.pdf. Equality Index in Japan: Referring Gender Equal- Cabinet Office. 2011. Reality Check for Evacuation ity Index of Norwegian Statistic Bureau” [in Japa- Centers in Three Prefectures [in Japanese]. nese]. GEMC Journal 3. http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/2-shien/6-zentyosa Yoshida, Honami. 2011. The Prenatal and Postpartum /1-result-1th.pdf. Care Support Project in Tsunami-Affected Areas Gender Equality Bureau. 2011a. In Response to Disas- after 311, Final Report Submitted to AmeriCares, ter Management and Rehabilitation from the Ground Publishing, Tokyo. 168 | I I I : E M E RG E N C Y R E S P O N S E PART IV Reconstruction Planning CHAPTER 20 Infrastructure Rehabilitation Social infrastructure and public utilities are critical for quick and effective disaster response and recovery. Japan’s rigorous seismic reinforcement of infrastructure has greatly reduced the effort required to restore essential facilities. Identification of priority infrastructure, legislation of financial arrangements for rehabilitation, and establishment of predisaster plans alongside the private sector have enabled prompt emergency response operations and facilitated a quick rehabilitation. FINDINGS Damage to infrastructure Since damage to the road network was limited, The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and rehabilitation work was efficient, (fig- caused tremendous damage to infrastructure ure 20.1) the main highways and roads to the and public utilities in the eastern region of affected areas were repaired within one week. Japan. According to the Cabinet Office, dam- Bullet train service was resumed within 49 ages to public utilities and social infrastruc- days of the event. These developments, in turn, ture were estimated to be about ¥1.3 trillion facilitated full-scale relief activities in the dev- (approximately $16  billion) and ¥2.2 trillion astated areas. All of this was a huge improve- ($27 billion), respectively (chapter 30). ment compared to the aftermath of the Great 171 1 day Expressway Opened to (Tohoku & Joban expressways) emergency traffic 7 days Operation Shutdown due to Disaster National highway National highway 45 (Routes 4 and 45) National highway 4 Clearing complete Secured function for emergency traffic 49 days Shinkansen Full recovery (Tohoku Shinkansen) Local railway 96% Recovery (As of 8/29) 4 days Airport Opened for (13 Airports) disaster response 13 days Port Opened for general traffic (15 Ports) 3/11 3/12 3/15 3/18 3/24 4/1 4/10 4/29 After 1 week After 1 month Figure 20.1 Securing emergency transportation Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe earthquake) in 1995, when it took over 1.5 years for highway Expressway reconstruction and 82 days for the bullet train Closure line to be repaired. National highway Closure Roads Some 15 expressway routes and 69 sections of the national highway system, mainly in the Tohoku region, were closed immediately after the earthquake. Many prefectural and munici- pal roads were also closed. Because they had been retrofitted, bridges on national high- ways or expressways were not damaged, but 20 bridges on prefectural and municipal roads collapsed or were severely damaged (chapter 2). The subsequent tsunami flooded approxi- mately 100 kilometers (km) of national highway, and submerged three expressway interchanges Map 20.1 Status of expressways and national and junctions. The tsunami also washed away highways immediately after the earthquake five national highway bridges. Massive amounts Source: MLIT. of debris brought in by the waves left many of the coastal roads unusable (map 20.1). facilities, prevented most of them from break- Railways ing down and causing fatalities. Some 325 km Railway facilities were also severely damaged, of railway were damaged, mostly by the tsu- but various earthquake countermeasures, nami. Damage included the displacement or including the seismic reinforcement of railway washing away of railroad tracks, power poles, 172 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G bridges, and stations; the collapsing of earthen embankments; and damage to platforms. Airports The Sendai Airport, the major airport in the Tohoku region, is located about 1 km from the Pacific coast at an elevation of 4 meters above sea level. The tsunami hit the airport and flooded the runway, the first floor of the ter- minal building, and the airport access railways (figure 20.2). Ports Fourteen international and other major ports and 18 local ports were severely damaged by Figure 20.2 Sendai Airport after the tsunami the tsunami and unable to function. Numerous Source: MLIT. ports that support the region’s fishing indus- try were also destroyed. The tsunami and the earthquake together destroyed much of the port infrastructure. Debris from the tsunami washed into the port area, preventing ships from entering. Damages to public utilities Public utilities were severely damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. About 2.3 million houses were left without water supply after the earthquake, and the sewerage systems were destroyed in the coastal cities and towns in an area spanning some 550 km. Wastewater treatment plants were dam- aged at 63 locations, 48 of which had to stop Figure 20.3 Manhole raised by liquefaction in Urayasu City operating because of tsunami inundation. The Source: © Urayasu City. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. condition of six wastewater treatment plants near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Power Company (TEPCO) was reduced by Station is still unknown because of access about 40 percent from 50 gigawatts (GW) to restrictions. In Urayasu city, Chiba Prefecture, about 30 GW, not enough to meet the typical sewerage systems were severely damaged by 40 GW peak demand for that season. liquefaction (figure 20.3). The number of houses left without elec- Infrastructure rehabilitation planning tricity reached 8.5 million. Several nuclear and implementation and conventional power plants, including the Concerned organizations were able to start Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, rehabilitation work immediately after the went offline after the earthquake, reducing earthquake and tsunami, to a large extent the region’s total power generation and supply subsidized by the national government under capacity. The capacity of the Tokyo Electric the National Government Defrayment Act for 2 0 : I N F R A S T R U C T U R E R E H A B I L I TAT I O N | 173 Reconstruction of Disaster Stricken Public local government’s share is covered by issuing Facilities (enacted in 1951). This act applies to local bonds. Thus, local governments actually a variety of transport systems and other infra- cover only 1.7 percent of the costs at most. This structure such as rivers, coastal facilities, sabo local government share decreases as the sever- facilities, roads, ports and harbors, parks, and ity of the disaster increases. In the case of the sewerage systems. The typical course of reha- GEJE, the costs were so large that the local bilitation project implementation is illustrated government share was minimal. in figure 20.4. In the aftermath of a disaster, To ensure the quick rehabilitation of infra- local governments report their infrastructure structure, the national government enters into damage to the national government, usually predisaster agreements with the private sec- within 10 days of occurrence, with a request tor, ensuring that in the event of a disaster, the for a national subsidy. Upon receipt of the needed workforce will be mobilized quickly, application, the national government con- without burdensome contracts and paper- ducts a disaster assessment within two months work. Such arrangements are made between of the disaster and approves the subsidy. To government field offices and private compa- ensure quick rehabilitation, local governments nies or private sector associations, and they can begin implementing their projects imme- cover such postdisaster activities as construc- diately after the disaster occurs, even before tion, engineering consulting, surveying, tele- applying for the subsidy. communications, and broadcasting. The national government subsidizes two- thirds of the project costs, and much of the Roads: Operation Toothcomb Transportation infrastructure is critical for delivering relief supplies. After the GEJE, Disaster roads were recovered early on to secure an emergency transportation network. Imme- Disaster emergency survey diately after the earthquake on March 11, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport Normally within 10 days and Tourism (MLIT) deployed a strategic ini- Damage reporting of disaster occurrence tiative to make sure that the entire length of Meeting the Tohoku Expressway and National High- On-site survey, preparation of design specifications Project implementation way 4 was passable to traffic. This major artery (no need to wait for runs south to north from Tokyo to Aomori disaster assessment to begin implementation) along the inland part of the region, which suf- Application for national subsidy fered relatively little damage. Next, 16 routes were opened up, stretching out from various Normally within points on this major north–south artery and Damage assessment 2 months of disaster (determination of construction cost) occurrence reaching east to the coastal areas that were worst hit by the tsunami. The plan was called Kushinoha Sakusen, or Operation Toothcomb, Issuance of national subsidy because of the shape of the road network (map 20.2 and figure 20.5). From the next day, Settlement of project cost the operation began clearing debris from the emergency roads that run eastward from the National government Project completion approval inland arterial highway—National Route  4 Local government Figure 20.4 Steps in infrastructure rehabilitation (running north–south)—connecting them to Source: MLIT. the Pacific coast. By March 15, four days after 174 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G the earthquake, 15 eastward access roads were First step Second step Third step usable, and by March 18, 97 percent of the March 11 Establish the March 15 March 18: National Earthquake vertical artery Establish the highway 45 & 6 were 97% national coastal highways were accessible. occurred horizontal lines rehabilitated (operation Furthermore, 13 days after the earthquake completed) Kuji the entire Tohoku Expressway, the main Miyako expressway connecting the Tohoku region to central Japan, was open to general traffic. Kamaishi Tohoku Expressway, Tohoku Expressway, Tohoku Expressway, National Highway 4 National Highway 4 National Highway 4 The quick rehabilitation of roads was pos- Ofunato Pacific Pacific Pacific sible for a number of reasons: Rikuzentakata • The seismic reinforcement of road struc- Kesennuma Minamisanriku tures had helped minimize damage. • There was a clear focus on opening up the Ishinomaki 16 eastward routes by concentrating the workforce on them first. • The authorities used their predisaster agreements to mobilize contractors imme- Available for traffic diately after the disaster. Closed Ports and navigation passages The MLIT requested contractors to begin clearing navigation passages so that disaster relief vessels could enter ports. The opera- tions began in 14 principal ports on March 14, the day after the lifting of the tsunami warn- ings. This included removing debris as well as ensuring the safe passage of emergency relief Map 20.2 Operation Toothcomb Source: MLIT. Figure 20.5 Clearing of roads Source: MLIT. 2 0 : I N F R A S T R U C T U R E R E H A B I L I TAT I O N | 175 allowing the U.S. Army to bring in emergency supplies. The airport was available for com- mercial services on April 13. Water supply systems Although water supply services were resumed Figure 20.6 Clearing for about 90 percent of residents within one of navigation month of the disaster, the aftershocks on passages April 7 and 11 temporarily increased the num- Source: MLIT. ber of households without water (figure 20.7). The Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) set up emergency headquarters to arrange for vessels (figure 20.6). By March 15, four days relief teams. The Ministry of Health, Labour after the earthquake, all 14 ports were either and Welfare; JWWA; and 400 water utilities entirely or partially usable and began accept- nationwide provided assistance to the affected ing vessels delivering emergency supplies and areas by dispatching emergency teams with fuel. At Sendai’s Shiogama Port in Miyagi Pre- water supply trucks and machinery. They also fecture, the first oil tanker entered 10 days after helped conduct investigations for the restora- the earthquake, reducing the fuel shortage in tion and reconstruction of water works. the disaster-affected areas. Sewerage systems Railways Of the 120 disaster-affected wastewater treat- The Tohoku Shinkansen (bullet train) re- ment plants, those with minor damage (95 facil- sumed operations between Tokyo and Nasu- ities) were rehabilitated and have recovered shiobara (the southern section) on March 15, their predisaster capacities. Sixteen treatment and between Shinaomori and Morioka (the plants are still inoperable because the tsunami northern section) on March 22. By April 29, the destroyed their infrastructure and equipment. entire Tohoku Shinkansen line was in opera- The 13 facilities that are accepting influent tion, as were most of the other railways except sewage have been providing primary treatment for those along the coast. The rehabilitation only, consisting of settlement and disinfection of the coastal railways, especially the Joban (box 20.1). Line that runs through an area 20 km from the The reconstruction planning for the sew- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, has erage systems is the responsibility of the local still not happened. Many are currently being municipalities. However, some 6,575 person- evaluated for possible rehabilitation along nel have been dispatched from national or with the reconstruction of the towns and cit- local municipalities in other regions to sup- ies. The Sanriku Railway, which runs along the port their rehabilitation efforts. Sanitation is coast, resumed its operation in April 2014. a major challenge in a disaster. Higashimatsu- shima City in Miyagi Prefecture did not have Sendai Airport enough toilets for the people staying at evacu- The Sendai Airport rehabilitation operation ation centers. The city installed “manhole” began two days after the earthquake, and by toilets, paid for by a national subsidy system March 15, four days after the earthquake, the for promoting earthquake proofing of sewer- airport was being used by rescue and emer- age systems across the country. These toilets, gency supply rotorcraft. Fixed-wing air- which can be easily and quickly installed, were craft were able to use it by the following day, well received, especially by the elderly. 176 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G 180 Nationwide M7.1 aftershock off the coast of Miyagi 160 (April 7, 11:32 p.m.) Households (tens of thousands) Max. seismic intensity: 6+ on the shindo scale 140 120 M7.0 aftershock in Hamadori, Fukushima (April 11) 100 Max. seismic intensity: 6- on the shindo scale 80 M6.4 aftershock in Nakadori, Fukushima 60 (April 12) Max. seismic intensity: 6- on the shindo scale 40 20 0 5/2 5/4 5/6 5/8 4/2 4/4 4/6 4/8 1 0 2 4 6 8 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 3 5 7 9 1 3 5 7 9 1 0 2 4 6 8 3/1 5/2 4/2 4/2 4/2 4/2 4/2 4/3 5/1 5/1 5/1 5/1 5/1 5/2 5/2 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/3 4/1 4/1 4/1 4/1 Figure 20.7 Water works rehabilitation 4/1 Source: Cabinet Office. Note: As a point of reference, in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, water supply was cut off to 1,270,000 households. Temporary recovery was completed 42 days after the earthquake, and water supply to all households resumed 91 days after the earthquake. Figure excludes areas located within the Fukushima restricted area where surveys could not be conducted. BOX 20.1 Electricity services Rapid rehabilitation of sewerage system About 90 percent of the power services were in Rikuzentakata City recovered within one week of the disas- In Rikuzentakata City in Iwate Prefecture, the wastewater treatment plant ter; however, the aftershocks on April 7 and was severely damaged by the tsunami. But within its service area, April  11 temporarily increased the outages 400 houses located on higher ground had survived the tsunami. When (figure 20.8). Because of its reduced power water supply services resumed, the sewage generated by these 400 houses supply capacity, TEPCO implemented rolling had nowhere to go. Following a proposal by a private company, the city decided to introduce a movable membrane bioreactor unit, which was blackouts in its service areas, including Tokyo, quickly installed and began operating within a month. between March 14 and 28. LESSONS • Act fast. Quick emergency response ini- tiatives, such as Operation Toothcomb, contributed greatly to the prompt rehabili- tation of transportation networks and the starting of relief activities. • Identifying the routes to be recovered first, and prioritizing resources and manpower accordingly, was an effective approach to rehabilitating transportation networks. • Pre-agreements with the private sector. Source: MLIT. Agreements, made with the private sector 2 0 : I N F R A S T R U C T U R E R E H A B I L I TAT I O N | 177 4.5 million households lost power Total 450 (March 11, 8:00 p.m.) Aomori Iwate 400 Recovery completed in Niigata and Yamagata Akita (March 12) Miyagi In tens of thousands of households 350 Yamagata M7.1 aftershock off the coast of Miyagi Fukushima 300 (April 7, 11:32 p.m.) Niigata Max. seismic intensity: 6+ on the shindo scale 250 Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Miyagi, Yamagata, and Fukushima experienced extensive About 120,000 households lost powerb power outages (May 20) 200 Recovery completed in Akita Recovery completed in Aomori, Akita, and Yamagata 150 (March 13) (April 8) 100 Recovery completed in Aomori Recovery completed in Fukushimaa (April 6) (April 25) 50 0 3/11 3/16 3/21 3/26 3/31 4/5 4/10 4/15 4/20 4/25 4/30 5/5 5/10 5/15 5/20 Figure 20.8 Electricity rehabilitation Source: Cabinet Office. Note: As a point of reference, in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, about 2.6 million households lost power and fully recovered 6 days from the earthquake, exclusing houses that were destroyed in the earthquake. a. Excludes cases where service was suspended despite recovery when safty of indoor wiring could not be verified due to absence of residents; where public infrastructures, houses, etc., had been lost due to tsunami or other damage; and where households were located within the Fukushima restricted area. b. The number of households without power, excluding a. above, totaled 1,452. before the disaster, to provide emergency be a major challenge. Resumption of water response operations were effective in supply services without adequate sanitation quickly mobilizing the needed workforce led to sanitation and hygiene problems. and resources. • Pre-agreements with national and other local governments. Experts and equip- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ment dispatched from national and local DEVELOPING COUNTRIES governments contributed to prompt rehabilitation. Effective emergency and rehabilitation opera- tions depend on social infrastructure and • Building codes enforcement reduced dam- public utilities. The following arrangements ages. Rigorous implementation of the are required if rehabilitation works are to be seismic reinforcement of infrastructure started and completed promptly. prevented excessive damage to structures, Establish financial arrangement mecha- minimizing the effort required to restore nisms. Budget-sharing mechanisms between their functions. local governments and the central government • Restoring utilities/service functions is a pri- should be established in advance (chapter 31). ority. At the time of a disaster, sanitation can Negotiating between governments only after a 178 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G disaster has occurred will delay rehabilitation Develop disaster-resilient infrastructure. If work. Such negotiations should cover infrastructure and utilities are planned and developed to mitigate potential disaster dam- • Procedures for applying for a subsidy to age, the effort and time required for rehabilita- the central government tion can be minimized. Retrofitting bridges can • The cost-sharing ratio of rehabilitation reduce both damage and rehabilitation efforts works, shared between national and local (chapter 2). governments Identify key infrastructure. Transportation or communication networks that are critical • Criteria for which types of disasters—and to emergency operations should be identified at what scale—require which mechanisms before the disaster and given priority during • Establishment of a body of experts and the rehabilitation efforts (chapter 5). responsible organizations at the central government level NOTE • Team formulation and procedures for Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank, and Junko damage assessment Sagara, CTI Engineering Arrange predisaster agreements with the private sector. Prearranged agreements with the private sector allow for quick mobiliza- BIBLIOGRAPHY tion of the needed rehabilitation workforce. Central Disaster Management Council. 2011. Report Government agencies can skip the procure- of the Committee for Technical Investigation on ment process and start work immediately. Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis These agreements should include (1) the des- Based on the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Earth- ignated responsibilities of governments and quake off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku. Cabinet Office, Tokyo. private companies for rehabilitation work, (2) East Japan Railway Company. 2011. Safety Report 2011 a government guarantee of payment for the [in Japanese]. Tokyo. work involved, and (3) procedures for project Ishiwatari, M. 2014. “Institution and Governance requests from the government. Related Learning from the East Japan Earthquake Arrange support teams. Emergency sup- and Tsunami.” In Disaster Recovery: Used or Mis- used Development Opportunity, edited by R. Shaw, port teams should be established during nor- 77–88. Tokyo: Springer Japan. mal times (chapter 14). Rehabilitation requires MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport enormous additional resources from local gov- and Tourism). 2011. Yuso chosei nitsuite, Higash- ernments, which are already burdened by the inihon daishinsai niokeru kotsuro no kakuho [Logistics coordination and securing of transpor- aftermath of disaster. Emergency teams from tation routes in the Great East Japan Earthquake]. other government agencies can assist those http://www.bousai.go.jp/3oukyutaisaku/ local governments affected by disaster. higashinihon_kentoukai/3/kokudokoutu2.pdf. 2 0 : I N F R A S T R U C T U R E R E H A B I L I TAT I O N | 179 CHAPTER 21 Reconstruction Policy and Planning The unprecedented damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake affected multiple locations, posing severe challenges for local governments. Based on advice from an independent council, the government acted quickly and issued a basic policy and regulation framework within four months, laying the foundation for an inclusive process of recovery and reconstruction. This note documents the interactive process of reconstruction planning, as conducted by various levels of government with the active engagement of affected people, experts, volunteers, and the private sector. FINDINGS the policy and planning process involved three stages: The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) • Stage I (0 to 4 months): The government was Japan’s first major multilocation disaster established a disaster headquarters, chaired in recent history. With over 200 municipali- by the prime minister and an independent ties affected, it required both a national-level Reconstruction Design Council (RDC). Basic response as well as inclusive and participa- guidelines and an act were issued within tory local planning. By adopting early policy 4 months, based on the council’s recommen- and regulatory guidance and releasing several dations. The first supplementary budget was budgetary supplements, the government sup- passed within 1.5 months of the disaster. ported the evolution of effective recovery and reconstruction plans, including coordination • Stage II (4 to 11 months): The provi- at the prefecture and municipal levels. Overall, sional reconstruction headquarters was 181 established. Prefectures and municipali- process can be seen as a model for other mega- ties prepared basic recovery plans in close disasters. Prior to the GEJE, Japan already had consultation with disaster-affected people. a sound institutional and policy framework for Two other supplementary budgets were disaster response and mitigation, based on les- adopted to fund the recovery. sons learned from past disasters. Building on this foundation, Japan acted rapidly to establish • Stage III (11 months to 10 years): A recon- a reconstruction planning framework based on struction agency and special zone for mutual trust, respect, and collaboration among reconstruction were formed, and a fourth stakeholders. At the same time, the fact that the supplementary budget was passed. The GEJE required a new agency and reconstruc- reconstruction was envisaged to last 10 tion act shows that megadisasters, by their very years and to be implemented through flex- nature, tend to overwhelm existing institu- ible grants and policies in support of the tional arrangements. The chronology of policy municipalities. and planning followed during the GEJE is sum- Although challenges remain—particularly marized in figure 21.1 and explained in further with respect to the role of the new reconstruc- detail below. tion agency—the GEJE reconstruction planning Basic principles, guidelines, and legal framework for reconstruction Great East Japan Earthquake (March to June 2011) 11 March The government set up headquarters for emer- 1 month Reconstruction Design Council gency disaster control less than an hour after the disaster. At the same time, building on les- 2 months Seven Principles for Reconstruction sons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction Earthquake (Kobe earthquake) in 1995, the gov- Basic Act for Reconstruction ernment sought to broaden the recovery strat- 3 months Reconstruction Headquarters egy by setting up an RDC. This advisory panel was composed of a team of highly respected Prefecture and municipality intellectuals, academics, religious figures, and recovery plans elected officials. Within two months of the disaster, the council issued “Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework,” a con- Law for Special Zone for Reconstruction sultative vision for the reconstruction. By the 10 months end of June 2011, a final report was given to 11 months Reconstruction Agency and Reconstruction Fund 1 year the prime minister, which in turn became the basis for the government’s Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction grant projects Reconstruction and Basic Act for Reconstruction (GOJ 2011a, 2011b), issued 3.5 months after the disaster. Thus, the initial process of national consultation set the stage for the entire recov- ery and reconstruction effort. The Basic Guidelines set in place several innovative policies (box 21.1). It placed munici- 10 years palities and residents at the center of the reconstruction; it promoted the concept of mul- Figure 21.1 Chronology of key policy and planning measures after the GEJE tiple defenses and people-oriented measures in 182 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G disaster reduction (departing from past reli- BOX 21.1 ance on defensive structures); and it encour- aged land-use planning as a way to balance Basic guidelines for reconstruction after the GEJE safety considerations with the need to preserve links between communities and infrastructure. Key policies The recovery and reconstruction period • Recognize the challenges of an aging and declining population by was estimated to last 10 years and cost ¥23 tril- promoting adequate public transportation and support services. lion (approximately $290 billion), with the • Promote a strategy of multiple defenses through both soft and bulk of the effort focused on the first 5 years. hard (structural) measures, putting people at the center of disaster reduction. The financial resources were to be secured through reconstruction bonds, reduction of • Promote a “new public commons” through social inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the reconstruction. public expenditures, increase in nontax rev- • Make municipalities in disaster areas the main actors accountable enues, and temporary taxation. As of early for reconstruction, aided by financial and technical support from February 2012, the government had passed the central government and prefectures. four supplementary budgets, worth a total of • Promote rapid reorganization of land use, to stimulate investment ¥21.9 trillion ($274 billion). The budgets were and prevent speculation. issued over a period of several months and • Prioritize providing stable residences for the affected, through served to support different stages of recovery favorable housing loans and low-rent public housing. and reconstruction. • Assist municipalities with reconstruction planning through external The Basic Guidelines also provided for the experts. establishment of a special zone for reconstruc- • Promote employment of affected people through recovery and tion containing financial and regulatory incen- reconstruction investments under the “Japan as One” project. tives, and a central one-stop reconstruction • Prioritize rehabilitation of key transport and logistics infrastructure agency to respond to, and help coordinate, the and revival of local economic activities. needs of local governments (see section below • Open reconstruction to the world through active international titled “Reconstruction”). cooperation and lesson sharing. • Create a special zone for reconstruction to support local projects Recovery planning process through flexible procedures and financing. (July 2011 to March 2012) Source: GOJ 2011a. Prefecture-level planning Based on the national guidelines, the most affected prefectures and municipalities— Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, with more Basic Act for Reconstruction Figure 21.2 National level Basic Guidelines for Recovery plans than 120 affected municipalities among them— (Prime Minister) Reconstruction after the GEJE developed their own recovery plans. These June plans were not intended to be comprehensive, Supplementary Budget but rather to reach consensus among residents May, July, Nov on the vision and key principles to be followed, Prefectural level Prefectural Recovery Plans the proposed land-use planning (including (Governor) potential relocation of communities), and the Aug–Oct implementation program (figure 21.2). It was Municipal level understood that the plans would evolve over (Mayors of cities, Municipal Recovery Plan towns, and villages) time through further consultations with minis- July–Dec tries and elected officials, and eventually result Basic vision and principals in more detailed reconstruction plans (and (relocation, level of dikes) Residents level Land-use plan cost estimates). Proposed time frame Consensus building amoung residents 183 The three most affected prefectures bene- restricted access to contaminated areas and fited substantially from a partnership arrange- led to the evacuation of large numbers of resi- ment supported by the Union of Kansai dents. The Miyagi Prefecture recovery plan, in Governments (a grouping of prefectural gov- turn, developed a detailed tsunami protection ernments in Western Japan), which provided plan, including structures resistant to a 100- expert personnel to assist with the emergency year tsunami, elevated structures, population and relief efforts. This twinning experience, relocation to higher altitudes, an accessible which also proved beneficial after the 2008 evacuation plan, and the promotion of a cul- Sichuan earthquake, is outlined further in ture of disaster prevention. chapter 17. To formulate the prefecture recovery plans, Municipal-level planning task force meetings were held with experts and Planning processes at the municipal level citizens to collect public comments. In general, tackled such issues as risk assessment, financ- prefectural-level plans allowed local stake- ing, land tenure and land use, transportation holders to make decisions on infrastructure infrastructure, and the role of the government and other issues (such as debris disposal) that in building consensus and providing relevant required intermunicipal coordination. information to communities. Recovery plans Fukushima, for example, faced a special had a positive tone, reflecting the municipali- problem due to the nuclear accident, which ties’ confidence in the nation’s ability to assist affected people in improving their lives. Similar to the prefectural recovery planning Minamisanriku Town Recovery Plan process, municipalities established recovery planning committees involving experts, resi- dents, and community representatives. Gen- erally, they used surveys and workshops to Experts from: Support •Miyagi University incorporate residents’ opinions into the plans. •DRI For instance, in Minamisanriku (in Miyagi), a residents’ committee played a key role in pro- Disaster recovery Disaster recovery planning residents’ posing “symbolic projects” that were then inte- planning committee engages academic committee grated into the town recovery plan (figure 21.3). experts does symbolic project selection Similarly, Ofunato City (in Iwate), held resi- dents’ workshops and students’ reconstruction meetings involving more than 3,000 residents. In Sendai (in Miyagi), the largest city in the Tohoku region, the mayor herself visited resi- dents’ workshops and talked directly with vic- Community gathering tims. About 80 workshops were held to share Town planning discusses community- Survey of all residents meetings at level town planning information between residents and the city gov- neighborhoods ernment, and residents submitted more than detailed discussion on 2,000 comments on the draft recovery plan. relocation and land compensation The central government supported munici- pal efforts by deploying two professional pri- Figure 21.3 Community involvement in recovery planning in Minamisanriku Town (Miyagi Prefecture) vate sector consultants per municipality to Source: International Recovery Platform (IRP). provide technical services linked to damage Note: DRI = Disaster Recovery Institute. assessment and engineering analysis. Experts 184 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G such as university faculty members, architects, engineers, lawyers, and members of nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs) also partici- pated actively and voluntarily in the municipal planning process, according to their field of expertise. Thus, the process of participatory planning was widely supported by govern- mental and nongovernmental actors across all administrative levels in Japan. Chapter 33 cov- ers updated information. Two issues were particularly challenging in recovery planning: land-use planning and demographic trends. Map 21.1 Tsunami simulations Land-use planning Source: Ofunato City. Municipalities used land-use planning as a tool to reach consensus on the strategy for Residence, industry, reconstruction. This was based on a tsunami Before tourist simulation conducted by the prefectural Mountain facilities Sea governments. The simulation assumed two different lev- els of a tsunami (map 21.1): a maximum-level tsunami such as the GEJE (a 1,000-year event) and a frequently occurring tsunami (a 100- year event). The height of the coastal seawall Future Industry, is usually planned to protect from a frequently Residence, Green tourist Mountain public facilities belt facilities Sea occurring tsunami. If a maximum-level tsu- nami hit the area, water may overtop the sea- Evacuate to heights wall and inundate the town. However, because of land-use planning—such as relocation of A B residential areas, land elevation, and multifac- eted protection using forests and/or roads—the A. Maximum level tsunami More than 10m water level is projected to be less than 2 meters B. Frequently occurring tsunami 8.7m high in residential areas (making it unlikely for Figure 21.4 Recovery concept of Minamisanriku Town houses to be washed away). Low-lying areas Source: Minamisanriku Town. would be reserved for parks, commerce, and industry (figure 21.4). In case of a maximum- level tsunami, people would have to evacuate, located adjacent to the coast were severely and early warning systems and evacuation affected by the tsunami and had to be relocated. routes would become crucial. However, residents wanted to live close to In the coastal areas of Iwate and the north- their original location and to the fishing port to ern part of Miyagi, there was not enough land maintain their livelihoods. A policy of separate space available for relocation since steep moun- relocation was therefore proposed, whereby tains line the coast. In Minamisanriku Town, each village would move to a small hillside for example, many fishing villages that were space close to its original location (box 21.2). 2 1 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P O L I C Y A N D P L A N N I N G | 185 BOX 21.2 Land-use and population relocation strategies There are generally three land-use strategies to address tsunami type of strategy was adopted in Otsuchi Town in Iwate and is pro- events (see upper figure): (1) avoiding risk, (2) separating risk, and posed for parts of Sendai. It requires knowing the optimal height (3) controlling risk. In the risk avoidance strategy, residential uses and location of multiple defenses. are prohibited or restricted in high-risk areas, although nonresiden- Population relocation can also follow different strategies (lower tial purposes (for example, recreational) may be allowed. This strat- figure). In a separate relocation plan, each community is relocated egy is being considered in several municipalities in Tohoku and has separately to a higher location. In a collective relocation, separate been adopted within 20 kilometers of the nuclear power station in (original) communities are relocated to a common (safer) area. Fukushima. It requires a relocation plan and identification and plan- A third combination strategy uses variants of the above. ning for the relocated infrastructure and population at the new site. In the wide coastal plains, such as near Sendai, the city govern- In a risk separation strategy, some areas are restricted, some ment adopted a controlled risk strategy, whereby house rebuilding are elevated, and others are used to divert the tsunami to con- would be restricted in areas where water levels could rise above trolled directions. The risk control strategy uses multiple defenses 2 meters. The government also intends to raise the height of the (such as elevated areas/infrastructure, seawalls, and levees). This roads to act as breakwaters, as well as use green belts. Type Avoid risk Separate risk Control risk Aim To protect lives and protect To protect lives and prevent (in the event of To protect lives and resources many resources catastrophic damage to resources a huge tsunami) Relocation to higher altitudes Regrading/relocation to higher altitudes Regrading/relocation to higher altitudes Railway Residential land development Rebuilt urban district Rebuilt Disaster prevention urban district facilities Road Image Damaged Damaged settlements Dispersion Disaster urban district Damaged urban prevention district facilities Suppression Tsunami energy Tsunami energy Tsunami energy Separate Relocation Plan Collective Relocation Plan Combination Relocation Plan Sources: Siembieda, Chen, and Maki 2011; and Minamisanriku Town. 186 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G Residents plan to establish community devel- By contrast, Sendai City experienced a net opment associations to facilitate relocation population inflow (6,633 in 2011). Urbaniza- planning. tion in Sendai has therefore accelerated and the population gaps between urban and rural Population movements areas are widening. Thus, preexisting trends of According to government statistics, a large aging and declining populations in rural areas number of people moved out of the affected and small towns have been exacerbated since municipalities following the disaster. The gap the disaster and must be taken into account in between out-migrants and in-migrants relative the reconstruction planning. to the total population in 2011 was particularly high for coastal municipalities—9.4 percent Reconstruction (2012–20) in Minamisanriku, 8.9 percent in Yamamoto, On February 10, 2012, 11 months after the and 8.5 percent in Otsuchi. That gap was also tsunami, the Japanese cabinet established a large among young people (less than 15 years national Reconstruction Agency for a period of old)—up to 14.6 percent in Minamisanriku and 10 years (figure 21.6). The agency—headed by 13.2 percent in Onagawa, further raising con- the prime minister—aims to promote and coor- cerns about the aging population. In Mina- dinate reconstruction policies and measures, misanriku, some residents gave up rebuilding and support affected local governments in altogether due to lack of funds and planned to the Tohoku region. It will serve as a “one-stop either leave town or move to public housing (figure 21.5 and map 21.2). Households Planning to leave town Undecided Not affected Don’t know 22% Morioka City 37% Iwate Prefecture Planning to relocate to higher ground Planning to move to 22% public housing 19% Companies Sendai City Not affected Miyagi Undecided 19% 22% 0% or more (excess moving in) Closed 0% to –2% (excess moving out) business 16% Already recovered –2% to –4% or preparing to recover –4% to –6% 43% –6% or less Figure 21.5 Population decrease in disaster areas Fukushima and survey of population and businesses in Map 21.2 Gap between people moving in and people moving out as a share Minamisanriku (December 2011) of the population Source: Ofunato City. Sources: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and Minamisanriku Town. 2 1 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P O L I C Y A N D P L A N N I N G | 187 Reconstruction Agency (National level) Coordination, control, and supervision Recommendation Relevant ministries Planning based Budget Earmark Implementation Distribute Budget on local demands request budget plan budget Branches (Prefecture level) Coordination Regional offices of ministries Projects under direct control of central government Special Zone for Reconstruction Reconstruction grant Receive • Authorize programs budget based on demands • Add special measures approved plans • Formulate reconstruction plan Afflicted municipalities • Apply for Special Zone for Reconstruction grant • Propose additional special arrangements Figure 21.6 Coordination framework for the Reconstruction Agency in Japan Source: Reconstruction Agency. shop” for local authorities. Although it is based municipalities were allowed to submit specific in Tokyo, it includes three regional branches in reconstruction plans and apply to the govern- the most-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, ment for funding, as well as a package of spe- and Fukushima). cial arrangements—such as concessions for As envisaged under the Basic Guidelines, land-use planning, creation of new systems the government also created a Special Zone related to land use, tax incentives, and special for Reconstruction, benefiting 222 munici- deregulation and facilitated procedures for palities in the disaster-afflicted zones. These housing, industry, and services. This strategy supports flexible implementation over time. Reconstruction grants and plans for special measures are submitted to the prime minister, whereas special arrangements for land use are subject to public hearings and inspections. The process of reaching an agreement on Residential area detailed project plans has just begun in most Residential area municipalities. In Minamisanriku, for exam- ple, total reconstruction costs are estimated at a few hundred billion yen, a vast sum compared Residential area to the annual budget of the town (¥8 billion a Parks year). Two projects are being proposed: a land Commercial area readjustment project for recovery and a group relocation project (map 21.3). An application Industrial area Dike for a Special Zone for Reconstruction will also be submitted to the central government to relax Map 21.3 Land-use planning and projects in Minamisanriku regulations and attract businesses. Implemen- Source: Minamisanriku Town. tation capacity remains a worry, however, as 188 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G 40 out of the 170 town officials (administrative became effectively dysfunctional in the posts) died or went missing during the disaster. aftermath of the disaster due to the destruc- The creation of the Reconstruction Agency tion of their offices and the large numbers and the Special Zone for Reconstruction are of dead or missing (a situation also faced in designed to respond to reconstruction time- Haiti). Such destruction is one of the main lines and facilitate a high number of recon- factors slowing recovery. Furthermore, the struction projects at increased speed. They implementation of a large number of proj- represent a major step forward; after the ects and the outpouring of volunteer sup- Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe port posed a significant burden for smaller earthquake) in 1995, a Reconstruction Agency municipalities, where financial and human and Special Zone were not put in place. But resources are constrained, even at the best it remains to be seen how these new systems of times. This has been one of the principal will be able to coordinate the various recov- justifications for the establishment of the ery plans, turn them into effective projects, Reconstruction Agency. and—significantly—overcome a highly sectoral • The large scale and diversity of the recov- government structure. Already there are indi- ery make information and communication cations that prefectures and municipalities management more challenging and more are finding ways to bypass the structures and critical to a successful recovery. Systematic access funds directly. To succeed, the system information on victims, for example, was a must be able to adapt and adjust. challenge for many smaller municipalities Similarly, it remains to be seen whether who lost both records and staff. As a result, the innovative policy of the Special Zones prefectures have begun to centralize such for Reconstruction will be able to help slow information for use by local governments. or reverse preexisting economic and demo- graphic trends, such as struggling industries • Support from experts contracted by the cen- and declining and aging rural populations in tral government for damage assessment and the affected areas. logistics. The affected municipalities also benefited from the support of expert consul- tants contracted by the central government, LESSONS who had the expertise to quickly carry out damage and needs assessments and provide • To be effective, recovery planning and poli- logistical support. Damage assessments cies must be based upon local conditions were completed quickly, as the central and culture. As such, the highly participa- government relied on private engineering tory recovery-planning process followed in companies who had readily available infor- Tohoku has proven to be a solid model for mation on infrastructure replacement costs. megadisaster recovery. • Twinning arrangements with local govern- • A role for independent institutions. In disas- ments. Similar to the provincial pairing ters of this magnitude, a well-respected and system employed in China after the Sich- independent advisory council can play a key uan Earthquake of 2008, and to staff sec- role in setting the blueprint for the recovery. ondments following the Nargis cyclone in • New reconstruction agencies are needed Myanmar, twinning arrangements with when a disaster compromises institutional local governments outside the disaster- functions. Even though municipalities were affected areas proved very effective for responsible for disaster response, they prefectures and municipalities facing a 2 1 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P O L I C Y A N D P L A N N I N G | 189 shortage of expertise and manpower (chap- agency depends on postdisaster governance ter 17). and coordination capacity. The Agency for the • While recovery projects may secure the safety Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh of residents’ lives, they will be costly. The and Nias (BRR), established 3.5 months after population of most disaster-affected areas the tsunami, was generally effective largely is sharply decreasing, and it will be a chal- due to a strong mandate, national commit- lenge to balance the needs of aging survi- ment, and external financial support. Con- vors with long-term financial efficiency. cerns about slow recovery, however, led the BRR to take over implementation responsi- • Pre-disaster recovery plans are useful. The bilities, posing a potential conflict of interest design of new residential areas could have with its oversight function. In later years, the been facilitated had a predisaster recovery BRR progressively devolved implementation plan been in place to preselect suitable areas. to local governments. Another example of an Taking into consideration the likelihood of agency with both coordination and opera- large-scale disasters in Japan, enactment tional functions (albeit not in a developing of new legislation should be considered to country) was the Victorian Brushfire Recov- not only facilitate postdisaster response, but ery and Reconstruction Authority established also predisaster recovery planning. after the 2009 brushfires in Australia. Using a successful model based on people, economy, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR environment, and reconstruction, the author- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ity completed its mandate in 30 months. In other disaster contexts, however, a hybrid Involve community members in planning. model may be more appropriate, where a cen- Megadisasters in developing countries often tralized agency coordinates reconstruction, involve a multiplicity of humanitarian agen- but implementation capacity continues to be cies, donors, and NGOs. As such, it is even delegated to government agencies. more critical to develop, early on, a shared Integrate many viewpoints into recovery vision for recovery and reconstruction that plans. In general, recovery planning is most recognizes local cultural and life values and effective when it uses participatory methods is perceived as legitimate by key stakeholders. and directly integrates the views of experts Failure to do so can result in a proliferation of with those of affected people. Response to external-driven plans and strategies, as seen numerous megadisasters (for example, the recently in Haiti. GEJE, 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, and 2010 Make recovery plans before disasters strike. Pakistan floods) attest to the merits of this Predisaster planning can help promote a approach. Community members’ participation more resilient recovery. This was the case in planning workshops should be arranged. following the 1995 Bangladesh floods, where Also, community leaders should be assigned as the response benefited considerably from members of planning committees. The 2008 the level of disaster preparedness introduced Wenchuan earthquake provides an alternative after the 1985 floods. In Gujarat, by contrast, a model, where centralized, top-down planning lack of proactive planning despite past disas- led to rapid reconstruction. At the same time, ters hampered recovery efforts following the there was a weak focus on local capacity build- 2001 earthquake. ing and community preparedness, issues that Balance central and local control of could hamper future disaster response. resources. Every megadisaster is different, and Use recovery to improve spatial planning in the necessity for a dedicated reconstruction general. Governments in developing countries 190 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G have a very narrow window of opportunity to have promoted the use of crowdsourcing and decide whether to rebuild in situ or relocate other open data platforms, often with great populations to safer areas. The government success. The challenge now is to mainstream of Thailand, for example, considered seri- such processes effectively into local planning, ously whether to relocate parts of the capital so that they can provide vulnerable people to higher grounds following the 2011 floods, with a greater voice in mitigating future disas- but this opportunity was quickly lost due to ters. The processes should be formulated con- social and political pressures. While moving sidering local conditions, since relationships entire cities has proven historically difficult between governments and civil societies vary to achieve, megadisasters can still provide from country to country. opportunities to improve spatial planning—as demonstrated after the 2011 tsunami in Samoa, when affected coastal communities NOTE agreed to relocate further inland. Prepared by International Recovery Platform; Yasuo Relocation may be needed to preserve public Tanaka, Yoshimitsu Shiozaki, and Akihiko Hokugo, safety, but it often removes people from their Kobe University; and Sofia Bettencourt, World Bank. sources of livelihood. In a disaster response, both safety and livelihood have to be well balanced, and nowhere is this delicate bal- BIBLIOGRAPHY ance more difficult than in developing coun- Beck, T. 2005. “Lessons Learned from Disaster Recov- tries. In such countries, affected people are ery: The Case of Bangladesh.” Disaster Risk Man- often poor and marginalized, having settled agement Working Paper Series 11, World Bank, in unsafe areas often because they offer the Washington, DC. only land available. When disaster strikes, Ge, Y., Y. Gu, and W. Deng. 2010. “Evaluating China’s land speculation and security problems are National Post-Disaster Plans: The 2008 Wench- uan Earthquake’s Recovery and Reconstruction often rampant; residents quickly rebuild in Planning.” International Journal of Disaster Risk their original neighborhoods out of fear that Science 1 (2): 17–27. someone else may move in. As house insur- GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction ance markets tend to be nonexistent, govern- and Recovery). 2010. “Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction—Knowledge Notes from the ments are left with very few instruments to DRM Global Expert Team for the Government promote relocation: they can resettle people of Haiti,” World Bank, Washington, DC. involuntarily (which is seldom successful), GOJ (Government of Japan). 2011a. “Basic Guidelines or they can promote voluntary relocation for Reconstruction, June 2011.” Reconstruction Headquarters in Response to the GEJE. by investing in alternative “growth centers” http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics (for example, by building social infrastruc- /2012/12/basic-act.html. ture in safer areas). Often, relocating people ———. 2011b. Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response as close as possible to their original homes to the Great East Japan Earthquake. June 24. and livelihood sources proves to be the most http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics /Basic%20Act%20on%20Reconstruction.pdf. sustainable solution. IRP (International Recovery Platform). http://www Open and transparent information sharing .recoveryplatform.org/. is a key prerequisite to successful planning. This Ramalingam, B., and S. Pavanelio. 2008. “Cyclone can be a major constraint in developing coun- Nargis: Lessons for Operational Agencies.” tries, where information on key issues such as Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. land tenure and historical exposure tends to http://www.alnap.org/. be scarce or inaccessible. Since Haiti, devel- Reconstruction Agency Web site. http://www opment partners working in megadisasters .reconstruction.go.jp/english/. 2 1 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P O L I C Y A N D P L A N N I N G | 191 RDC (Reconstruction Design Council). 2011a. “Seven Silva, J. 2010. Lessons from Aceh—Key Considerations Principles for the Reconstruction Framework.” in Post Disaster Reconstruction. Practical Action Resolution of the Reconstruction Design Council Publishing. in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Shiozaki , Y., Y. Tanaka, and A. Hokugo. 2012. “Recon- May 10, 2011. struction Policy and Planning.” Presentation. ———. 2011b. Towards Reconstruction: “Hope Beyond Tokyo Metropolitan Government Disaster Prevention. the Disaster.” Report to the Prime Minister of the http://www.bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/english/index Reconstruction Design Council in response to the .html. Great East Japan Earthquake, June 25, 2011. World Bank. 2012. “Current State of Reconstruction Siembieda, W., H. Chen, and N. Maki. 2011. Multi- and the Way Forward.” Presentation at the Work- Location Disaster: Shaping Recovery in the Great shop on Reconstruction, January 18, Kobe, Japan. East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March. International Association for China Planning (IACP) Conference, Wuhan, June 17–19. 192 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G CHAPTER 22 Transitional Shelter Transitional shelter can play a crucial role in housing reconstruction following a megadisaster. Recon- struction of permanent housing cannot move forward until a number of complex issues are settled, such as relocation planning and removal of debris. Even after plans are agreed on and reconstruction begins, it may take several years for permanent housing to be completed. In this context, affected peo- ple may need to rely on transitional shelter for extended periods of time, and this will have a significant effect not only on their housing, but also on their overall recovery, including livelihood rehabilitation. FINDINGS government to promote the concept of net- worked relocation following the GEJE, when The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) an attempt was made to preserve, to the extent led to the total collapse of some 108,000 resi- possible, existing social networks. The gov- dential houses. An additional 117,000 houses ernment also offered multiple options for suffered damage to more than half of their transitional shelter, depending on geography, structure (chapter 2). As a result, more than reconstruction planning, and local preferences. 450,000 people had to be evacuated to evacua- These included temporary housing, mostly tion centers. Within four months of the disas- prefabricated; government-owned accommo- ter, 75 percent of the centers had closed, as dations and public housing; and private rental people were moved gradually to transitional apartments, which proved popular due to lower shelters (chapter 18). prices, higher comfort, and greater versatility. Lessons learned from the Great Hanshin- Local governments, volunteers, and nongovern- Awaji Earthquake (Kobe earthquake) of mental organizations (NGOs) provided com- 1995 and other disasters led the Japanese plementary support, including counseling. As 193 Transitional Center Permanent Housing Evacuation Center Funded by central government, Survivors build their own houses Disaster Usually municipal buildings, organized by prefectural or live in public housing schools, gymnasiums government at discounted rent Figure 22.1 The housing recovery process in Japan relocation into transitional shelters proceeded, The Japanese framework for several innovations were introduced, including transitional shelter physical upgrades to improve comfort, wooden Prefectural governments are responsible for housing (easier to convert into permanent use), transitional shelter according to the provisions and multiple-story accommodations. Key chal- of the Japanese Disaster Relief Act (1947), with lenges have been the lack of sufficient land due funds allocated from the central government. to the volume of remaining debris, as well as The prefecture, outside of exceptional cases, logistical difficulties in keeping track of disas- can choose the type and form of housing as well ter survivors to ensure ongoing support. This as hire private construction companies. Munic- note discusses the GEJE experience and offers ipal governments coordinate with prefectures lessons learned with application to developing for the selection of sites, distribution of affected countries. people, and maintenance of shelters. Affected people are expected to move into permanent accommodations within a period of two years Rental housing (the time normally allowed by Japanese law), (private) 48% and at their own cost, although they receive up Government-owned to ¥3 million (approximately $37,500) in com- accommodations pensation from the government, depending on 7% the housing damage (chapter 34). Alternatively, Public housing they can rent public housing at subsidized 6% rates. The usual flow of the housing reconstruc- tion process is shown in figure 22.1. Temporary housing (mostly prefabricated) 39% Basic types of transitional shelters used after the GEJE Number of houses Number of houses Shelter type allocated or chosen supplied The government adopted three main programs Temporary housing of transitional shelters in the aftermath of the 52,182 52,620 (mostly prefabricated) GEJE (figure 22.2): Government-owned 9,832 38,464 accommodations • Newly constructed temporary hous- Public housing 8,238 24,505 ing (mostly prefabricated by private Private rental housing 65,692 — contractors) Total 135,944 115,589 • Private rental apartments Figure 22.2 Characteristics of transitional shelters used after the GEJE (as of December 27, 2011) • Existing public housing and government- Source: Reconstruction Agency. owned accommodations (previously built Note: — = not available. to house government officials) 194 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G The type of transitional shelter was influ- enced by geographic and demographic consid- erations (map 22.1). • Temporary housing was commonly used in the ria coastal areas north of Sendai (including part of the Miyagi Prefecture Iwate and most of the Iwate Prefecture), where Ria coastal areas most of the resident houses suffered major destruction. This area is characterized by Mostly temporary steep and fjord-like topography, and both Miyagi housing (prefabricated) small fishing villages and larger towns located near the ocean; there is little avail- Mostly private able land near the ocean fit for building. residential apartments • Private rental apartments predominated in Coastal plains Sendai City and urban areas in the coastal Fukushima Fukushima Daiichi plains, much of it undamaged. Nuclear Power Station • The towns in Fukushima Prefecture pre- sented a unique case: due to the radiation Inundated area 20 km from nuclear power plant hazard, residents had to be evacuated for an Restricted area uncertain length of time. Facing the prospect of having to provide long-term transitional Map 22.1 Predominant transitional shelter in affected areas Source: Kobe University. shelter (possibly for many years), the Fuku- shima Prefecture decided to construct more than 4,000 units of wooden temporary hous- ing, including larger-size units for larger families. As of March 2012, about 60,000 residents had evacuated the Fukushima Pre- fecture to other prefectures (chapter 36). Temporary housing Small group of temporary houses forms a new neighborhood Temporary housing, typically one-story prefab- ricated row houses built by private companies (29 square meters), is the most common type of transitional shelter used in Japan (figure 22.3). Typical construction costs have ranged from $5.7 million to $6.6 million (approximately $71,000–$80,500 per unit), slightly more than double the price of similar units during the Temporary houses in Ofunato, Iwate; and Onagawa, Miyagi 1995 Kobe earthquake. As of early 2012, some Figure 22.3 Typical prefabricated temporary houses 52,000 housing units have been built. Source: © International Recovery Platform (IRP). Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. Many prefectures have preexisting agree- ments with construction companies to build 2 2 : T R A N S I T I O N A L S H E LT E R | 195 prefabricated temporary housing during and the absence of noise or temperature insu- emergencies. But even with these agreements lation, shelves or storage areas, places to sit in place, it was not possible for construction outside, an awning or enclosure around the companies to build all the units needed imme- front door, and a veranda outside the slid- diately, due to shortages of construction mate- ing door (which made it dangerous for the rials and workers. Because of such shortages elderly hanging laundry, or small children). and a lack of coordination across companies, Moreover, as allocations were determined by the quality and level of construction of tempo- lottery, residents complained that they did rary houses varies across the disaster area. not know their neighbors and lost their com- Government policy requires that temporary munity connections. Some people preferred housing be built on publicly owned land, out- to stay in evacuation shelters as long as pos- side high-risk areas. This posed a significant sible because food and utilities were pro- challenge for much of the disaster area, partic- vided (a trend also observed following other ularly along the ria coastline north of Sendai, megadisasters). where there was almost no available land—a major reason for the initial delays in the con- Private rental apartments struction of temporary housing. The first resi- Although not widely used during the Kobe dents moved in April/May, one to two months earthquake, privately owned rental hous- after the disaster (figure 22.4). ing became the preferred form of transitional In many municipalities, however, a high shelter after the GEJE, with about 66,000 percentage of temporary housing remained units used by disaster victims. Rents were paid empty, as prospective residents found them directly by the government. Such apartments inconvenient (too distant from their original were widely used in the urban areas of Tohoku, villages), uncomfortable, and much smaller including Sendai City. than their original houses. The houses were As also observed in Haiti, private rental constructed using low-quality, bare-mini- units offer many advantages over conven- mum standards, and were not suited to the tional temporary houses: they are consider- cold climate of the Tohoku region. Problems ably cheaper—about ¥0.7 million–¥1.5 million included gaps between walls and roofs, drafts, ($9,000–$18,000) per year per unit or for a two-year average stay, which makes them Number of houses two to three times less costly than temporary started construction 50,000 housing. They also allow affected people to Number of houses completed move into transitional shelters quickly (people 40,000 started moving in less than a month after the disaster, compared to one to two months for the prefabricated units). In addition, regular 30,000 apartments are considered more comfortable and livable for residents. 20,000 Nonetheless, private rental apartments are not a viable option for areas that suffer exten- 10,000 sive destruction of existing housing stock. In addition, the fact that affected residents are 0 scattered across existing housing units makes 1 2 3 4 5 month months months months months it difficult for government and relief workers Figure 22.4 Number of temporary houses completed to track them to provide the necessary infor- Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). mation and support. It also makes disaster 196 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G survivors more prone to losing social connec- BOX 22.1 tions than when they are grouped together in conventional temporary housing. The case of community centers at transitional shelter sites after the Kobe earthquake Public housing and government-owned A total of 232 community centers were opened as bases to support resi- accommodations dents, established by an association of local organizations: Some disaster survivors moved into public • Volunteers and nonprofit organizations manage the centers. housing managed by government entities, as • Life support advisors visit each house to confirm safety and pro- well as into other government-owned residen- vide advice. tial facilities. Public housing shares many of • Events and gatherings are held by volunteers to promote commu- the positive features of private rental housing, nication among residents. although it can also lead to residents’ isolation, • Establishment of community-based organizations is supported. with limited access to the information and social networks found in the more aggregated temporary housing. Support systems Community building and emotional care Throughout the disaster region, local govern- ments, volunteers, and NGOs started numer- Source: © IRP. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. ous support initiatives to help disaster victims at transitional shelters. These included both physical (provision of furniture, building of additions or improvements, provision of com- families who moved to new but empty prefab- munity spaces, buses) and nonphysical sup- ricated houses and apartments. By June 2012 port (social events, counseling, health checks, the number of beneficiary families reached visits, shopping and support for elderly and over 130,000 throughout Japan, from Okinawa children). to Hokkaido, including those families dis- One example is the Disaster Victims Sup- placed by the Fukushima nuclear accident. port Center, started by the town government of Minamisanriku (Miyagi Prefecture) through Transportation the National Government Emergency Employ- One of the key difficulties faced by residents of ment Fund. The center hired about 100 disas- transitional shelters is the distance from work, ter victims to visit other affected people in schools, hospitals, and shopping. Providing temporary shelters, counsel them, and provide adequate transportation to support these resi- support to the most vulnerable. It also estab- dents is therefore an important challenge. lished one satellite location in each of the four regions of the town to be closer to the tem- Livelihood support porary housing residents. This initiative built Many support groups have started projects upon the earlier example of the community to assist residents of transitional shelters in centers established in the aftermath of the generating side incomes. Examples include Kobe earthquake (box 22.1). the friendship bracelet “Tamaki” produced by The Japanese Red Cross Society provided wives of fishermen, and hammocks produced six electric household appliances (televisions, by fishermen (both from fishing nets). Other refrigerators, washing machines, cooking pots, women’s groups have started making and sell- microwave ovens, and hot water pots) to those ing products such as key chains, fabric bags, 2 2 : T R A N S I T I O N A L S H E LT E R | 197 and slippers. The link between transitional community building and design group hous- shelter and livelihoods has proven important ing units that encouraged interaction between not only to help improve the socioeconomic neighbors. In Minamisanriku, therefore, two status of affected people, but also their psycho- models of temporary group housing were logical recovery (see chapter 24). adopted: large group sites built on public land (schools or athletic facilities) and smaller group The evolution of transitional shelters sites built on private land. On the larger group following the GEJE sites (built earlier), prospective residents were Networked (group) relocation chosen by lottery, which prioritized senior citi- Given the shortage of publicly available land zens, families with small children, and other in disaster-stricken areas, the government vulnerable residents. Affected people were allowed some temporary housing units to be also given the choice to go to a large group site built on privately owned land. sooner, or wait a little longer and be relocated Lessons were also learned from Kobe. Many collectively into one of the smaller group sites, elderly residents had died a “solitary death” closer to their former neighborhoods. Smaller (kodokushi) after being separated from their group sites were built specifically to support social networks by lottery systems that dis- collective group relocation from nearby neigh- persed them into transitional shelters. In the borhoods, to keep affected communities rela- GEJE, a lottery system was also used during tively intact. the initial stages of the recovery as the number of temporary houses were much fewer than Physical improvements the number of affected people wanting to move The close network of support to affected peo- out of the emergency shelters. In Minamisan- ple enabled local governments and NGOs to riku Town, for example, some 62 percent of the do some improvements to the poor physical temporary shelters followed the lottery system. condition of the temporary housing units by As more temporary houses became avail- adding awnings, balconies or verandas, and able, municipalities made an effort to support insulation or soundproof materials and by providing benches, shelves, and other indoor furniture (figure 22.5). But problems of basic construction persisted over the entire disaster area, and it was very difficult to improve the situation for all residents. Multiple-story temporary housing made from stacked containers was introduced in Onagawa Town to compensate for the scar- city of available land. Stacking the containers to form two- and three-story group temporary housing also helped reduce overall construc- tion time (figure 22.6). Wooden temporary housing has been used extensively in Fukushima Prefecture, where long-term, temporary residency is required, as well as in Sumita Town, Rikuzentakata Figure 22.5 Improvements to temporary housing—adding insulation to the City, and Tono City. The main advantage is walls and double-pane windows that it can be used for longer periods than the Source: © IRP. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. prefabricated houses, and can potentially be 198 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G converted and reused for the construction of permanent housing. It is also more comfort- able and warmer and has the advantage of being disposable. But it is not as standardized as the prefabricated type and cannot easily be produced in large quantities offsite. In addi- tion, in megadisasters such as that in Aceh, the extensive use of wood resources has con- tributed to deforestation of already fragile environments. Temporary to permanent housing In common with other megadisasters (for example, those in Haiti, Aceh and Yogyakarta in Indonesia, and Chuetsu and Kobe in Japan), it is expected that owner-built transitional Figure 22.6 Multiple-story temporary housing made with shelter will start to emerge. Like wooden tem- stacked containers porary housing, it can be reusable and con- Source: © IRP. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. verted to permanent use. In the 2006 Central Java earthquake in Yogyakarta, the government promoted a “roof BOX 22.2 first” concept to transitional shelter, allowing residents to incrementally finish the struc- International examples of creative, temporary- ture. The 2001 Gujarat earthquake in India to-permanent housing and the “Katrina Cottages” built following the The “roof first” concept of temporary shelter was adopted in Yogyakarta 2005 Hurricane Katrina (United States) pro- following the Central Java earthquake (2006). It prioritized putting a roof vide further examples where materials and/ over the heads of residents, who could then incrementally finish the or semipermanent structures were provided structure. For permanent housing recovery, a core house was used to pro- to residents to gradually rebuild their homes vide a structurally safe permanent shelter as soon as possible for a large (box 22.2). This process, however, needs to be number of beneficiaries, who could then expand their housing incremen- tally over time. carefully monitored to ensure that residents rebuild according to safer standards and do not settle on disputed land. A relatively unanticipated challenge to the general recovery and reconstruction has been the vast quantity of debris left by the tsunami. Collecting and disposing of such a large amount of debris requires time, large spaces, and resources—impeding other aspects of recovery (chapter 23). LESSONS • As discussed in this note, the GEJE expe- Source: © International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Used with rience demonstrates the importance of permission. Further permission required for reuse. providing multiple options for transitional 2 2 : T R A N S I T I O N A L S H E LT E R | 199 shelter. It also shows the importance of • Community-based organizations support allowing local governments and affected evacuees in transitional shelters. Community- communities to have a voice in the loca- based organizations (such as jichikai) and tion, type, and services provided. This support groups can play important roles in leads to flexible housing solutions that bet- assisting affected people to understand and ter match the needs of residents. Table 22.1 resolve issues by themselves during their summarizes some of the advantages and stay at transitional shelters. disadvantages of the various types of tran- • Transitional shelters must be designed with sitional shelter, based on the GEJE as well efficiency and sustainability in mind. The as international experience. design of transitional shelters should be • The design of transitional shelters was better from the start to promote efficient built upon experiences with past disaster recovery—for example, by taking into con- recovery in Japan. In Kobe a great deal of sideration climate conditions and trans- temporary housing was constructed far portation and livelihood needs. It is also from the city center and former neighbor- important to consider the special needs of hoods, with residency determined by a lot- vulnerable groups—including the elderly, tery system. These conditions exacerbated children, and disabled. Transitional shel- the feeling of loss for affected people, and ters need to be accessible to them, and there were many cases of “solitary deaths” complementary care services planned and (kodokushi), where no one even knew that provided. To facilitate this, local govern- the individual had passed away. The GEJE ments in highly vulnerable areas should model tried to prevent this to a certain select a suitable construction site for tem- extent by promoting group relocation and porary housing and coordinate the works preservation of improved social networks. and services needed before a disaster Table 22.1 Advantages and disadvantages of various types of transitional shelter TYPE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES Temporary housing • Standard specifications • Requires available, safe, and undisputed land (prefabricated) • Can be built in large quantities offsite • Slower relocation than rental units (needs to • Easy to keep track of relocated people be constructed) • Can be used for collective relocation • Low quality and lack of comfort (preserving social networks) • Often built in inconvenient locations, far from original homes • If use is prolonged, risks degrading to a slum Temporary housing • Can evolve to permanent housing • Requires available, safe, and undisputed land (owner built) • Flexibility in location, materials, style • Principles of “building back better” (or in nonrisk areas) may not be followed Private rental • Cheaper • May not exist in affected areas housing • Fast relocation (already constructed) • Difficult to keep track of and provide services • Flexibility and comfort for relocated people, who are more scattered • Can reinforce social isolation Public and • Cheaper • Can reinforce social isolation government-owned • Fast relocation • More difficult to preserve social networks and housing provide services than temporary housing • Comfort 200 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G occurs. Neighborhood groups should also (2010) and Wenchuan (2008), can promote be trained in network relocation. flexible solutions and allow families to pool resources and rebuild together. • A better information database of disaster Transitional shelters must be planned survivors is necessary in order to provide together with strategies supporting daily life suitable support to the affected population. (shopping, health care, social life, schools, For example, such data can help in the plan- infrastructure, psychosocial support) as well ning of how many houses to build as affected as livelihoods. To the extent possible, affected people move out of the area into surround- people themselves should participate actively ing cities, as well as help forecast demo- in these services, helping rebuild a sense of graphic changes over the long term. This community and a quick return to normalcy. information is also critical for more efficient The location of temporary housing is particu- and economic reconstruction planning. larly important, especially where land is scarce. Sites with uncertain tenure should be consis- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR tently avoided. The preparation of a “land DEVELOPING COUNTRIES bank”—preselected areas that can be quickly The timeline and costs of transitional shelters converted to be used as transitional shelters or must be considered carefully. In developing permanent relocation—should therefore be a countries, affected people often start rebuild- critical component of any predisaster contin- ing their homes immediately after a disaster, gency plan in highly vulnerable areas. In places and often according to poor safety standards. where public land is scarce, this may require As such, transitional shelters may not be that the government prenegotiate the use of needed for long periods (as was the case during the land with private landowners to prevent the 2010 Pakistan floods), and resources should subsequent land speculation. be shifted toward permanent reconstruction. To the extent possible, the distance between Long periods in transitional shelters may also transitional shelters and former homes should make it more difficult for beneficiaries to move be minimized to allow displaced people to to permanent housing (such as in the Marmara maintain social networks and livelihoods, and earthquake, Turkey) and encourage the growth protect their land and property. of slums or ghettos. Community cohesiveness should be ensured by In general, megadisasters in developing providing timing and site options for temporary countries require transitional shelters that are shelter. This, however, requires high levels of upgradable, reusable, and recyclable, allowing government capacity and costs, and could slow shelter materials to be gradually used for per- down shelter transitions. Community members manent housing. Salvageable materials from should provide one another mutual help. debris can often be used to build or comple- A systematic communication and monitor- ment shelters, and their salvage can be a tem- ing strategy is critical to avoid harmful rumors, porary boost to local livelihoods. keep affected people informed, and allow for Owner-built shelters or units built with beneficiary feedback. strong beneficiary participation are often best Governments have an important role to play. (for example, 2001 Gujarat, 2006 and 2008 Civil society and the private sector may not be Yogyakarta, and 2010 Haiti), but care must be robust and resilient enough to face the disas- taken to oversee the quality of the construc- ter, and may not have the necessary relations tion or provide incentives for better standards with their governments in some countries. (such as conditional cash transfers). Cash or In these countries, government initiatives are voucher programs, such as those used in Haiti crucial. 2 2 : T R A N S I T I O N A L S H E LT E R | 201 NOTE IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2010. Owner-Driven Housing Prepared by International Recovery Platform; Yoshi- Reconstruction Guidelines. http://www.ifrc.org mitsu Shiozaki, Yasuo Tanaka, and Akihiko Hokugo, /PageFiles/95526/publications/E.02.06.%20 Kobe University; and Sofia Bettencourt, World Bank. ODHR%20Guidelines.pdf. IRP (International Recovery Platform). Guidance Notes on Recovery: Shelter. http://www.recovery BIBLIOGRAPHY platform.org/resources/guidance_notes_on_ CRS (Catholic Relief Services). 2012. “Learning from recovery. the Urban Transitional Shelter Response in Shelter Center. Shelter after Disaster. http://www Haiti.” Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore. .sheltercentre.org/library/shelter-after-disaster. http://www.crsprogramquality.org/storage/pubs/ ———. Transitional Shelter. http://www.sheltercentre emergencies/haiti_shelter_response.pdf. .org/transitional-shelter. Dercon, B., and M. Kusumawijaya. 2007. “Two Years Trohanis, Z., and G. Read. 2008. “Housing Reconstruc- of Settlement Recovery in Aceh and Nias. What tion in Urban and Rural Areas. Knowledge Notes.” Should the Planners Have Learned?” 43rd ISO- Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the CARP (International Society of City and Regional Pacific Working Paper Series No 9, World Bank, Planners) Congress, September 19–23, 2007. ISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Frederica, L., J. Reed, and H. Gloor. Undated. Transi- Disaster Reduction), and GFDRR, Washington, tional Shelter Evaluation in Pakistan. International DC. Organization for Migration. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 2006. Early Recovery Assistance/ERA. Programme Recovery). 2010. Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction— for D.I. Yogjayakarta and Central Java—Call for Knowledge Notes from the DRM Global Expert Proposals for Small Grants for NGO/CSO Shelter Team for the Government of Haiti. http://www Activities. United Nations Development .gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/149. Programme. 202 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G CHAPTER 23 Debris Management Some 20 million tons of waste resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake. The amount of debris in Iwate Prefecture was 11 times greater than in a normal year, and in Miyagi Prefecture 19 times greater. Appropriate treatment and disposal depends on the type of debris or waste, while recycling should also be considered. Authorities should prepare for disasters by designating temporary storage sites and routes for transporting waste. Japan’s existing debris management plans are being revised to include methods for estimating the amount of disaster waste generated by tsunamis and appropriate measures for dealing with it. FINDINGS the cause of the disaster, types of local indus- try, building densities, and so forth. In other The many causes of disaster words, big differences exist and it is extremely Disasters have a variety of causes includ- difficult to generalize. ing earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, floods, and fires. Over the past decade, several major The amount of disaster waste disasters have destroyed social infrastructure and its classification all over the world: Sumatra’s Andaman earth- The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) gen- quake in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the erated large amounts of disaster waste. Japan’s Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, and the earth- Ministry of the Environment estimated 20 mil- quakes in New Zealand and Turkey in 2011, to lion tons of waste as of May 21, 2012. This num- name a few. Differences in the nature and geo- ber is very large even when compared with the graphical extent of the environmental effects, 15 million tons from the Great Hanshin-Awaji and other waste-related problems that may Earthquake (Kobe earthquake), the 20 million arise, are dictated by many variables including tons from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, or the 203 10 million cubic meters (m3 ) found in Indone- matter and oils in the seabed mud. Hexane sia alone following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsu- extracts exceeded 0.1 percent in a number of nami (Brown, Milke, and Seville 2011). samples, and on the high end oily mud was at Estimates for the Kobe earthquake in 1995, 9.8 percent. While tests for heavy metals did based on the unit waste generation intensity not detect much, lead was detected in many for totally destroyed structures, were 61.9 tons/ samples in the milligram per kilogram (mg/ household and 113 tons/building. Although kg) range. Leaching amounts of heavy metals there are few reports on the per-unit-floor- (using a method based on Ministry of the Envi- space amount, one value reported for the Kobe ronment Notification No. 46) were found in earthquake was 0.62–0.85 tons/square meter some instances to exceed environmental qual- (m2), and a more recent review put it in the ity standards for soil contamination from lead, range of 0.20–1.44 tons/m2 (Takatsuki, Sakai, arsenic, fluorine, and boron. In the cases of and Mizutani 1995). lead and arsenic, it is conceivable that natural sources were responsible for exceeding leach- Tsunami sediment deposits ing standards. Because concentrations of fluo- and their properties rine and boron are high in the seawater of this Tsunami sediment deposits consist mainly area, the influence of seawater is a possibility. of sand, mud, and other bottom material, There were no samples in which the content but their properties and compositions vary of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) such as widely. Some examples of deposits caus- dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), or ing concern are those mixed with the ruins pesticides exceeded the standards (for example, of homes crushed by tsunamis, those con- for PCBs the standard is the destruction target taining oils, and those that release offen- of 0.5 parts per million [ppm] for PCB treat- sive odors or dust due to putrefaction or ment, for dioxins it is the environmental quality drying. Deposits may also be mixed with standard for soil and for sediment in bodies of substances such as pesticides, acids, alkalis, water, and for other substances it is the estab- and other hazardous chemicals from indus- lished reference guidelines). The levels found tries in the disaster-stricken areas. Doing were generally the same as the results of envi- nothing about such substances raises pub- ronmental monitoring surveys of sediment and lic health concerns. The tsunami from this soil that were performed in recent years by the earthquake left heavy deposits. To estimate Ministry of the Environment in nearby water the amount, we multiplied the tsunami- and land areas. Because our investigation is inundated area by the average thickness of based on 62 samples and a limited study, a more the deposits and a volume-to-weight conver- detailed study may be carried out in the future, sion factor, and obtained a total estimated but it is safe to say that at this point no serious 11,990,000–19,200,000 m3 and 13,190,000– contamination in particular has been found. 28,020,000  tons for the six disaster- Essentially, the guidelines for disposing of stricken prefectures of Aomori, Iwate, tsunami deposits call for removing pieces of Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Chiba wood and other materials, detoxifying them, (JSMCWM 2011). The deposit height is and then using them as fill in landfills or for between 2.5 and 4 centimeters. embankments. In urban areas, where hydrau- The gist of the chemical analysis results is lic excavators are hard to use, removal is per- as follows. Ignition loss (600°C, 3 hours) had a formed by people with shovels or other tools. spread of 1.2 percent to 16.3 percent, and there After being gathered, deposits are carried away were some samples influenced by the organic by heavy machinery, while septic tank pumper 204 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G trucks can be used for sludge, which has a high LESSONS water content. After removal, the deposits are put in temporary storage sites; pieces of wood Basic framework for dealing and concrete, which can be used as civil engi- with disaster waste neering materials, are separated out. If the On April 5, 2011, the Science Council of Japan deposits contain hazardous substances, they issued the “Urgent Proposal Related to Mea- are detoxified by washing and/or physical/ sures for Earthquake Disaster Waste and chemical treatment, and then either likewise Prevention of Environmental Impact.” The used as material, or taken to a municipal solid proposal’s overall framework was drafted by waste disposal site if they cannot be effectively the JSMCWM, and then issued in collabora- used. It was decided that if tsunami deposits tion with the Japan Society of Civil Engineers contain no pieces of wood or other matter and and the Japan Society on Water Environment. are not contaminated with hazardous sub- The medium- and long-term response was also stances, they could be left in place after making taken into consideration in formulating a basic arrangements with landowners. policy for the disposal of earthquake waste and the minimizing of environmental impacts. The Hazardous waste separation and disposal essential points are given below: The types of waste that present dangers, and the methods of handling them, require various • Waste is to be treated and disposed of cautions, particularly if operations are on-site. quickly, while keeping in mind the secur- There are hazardous wastes such as gas cylin- ing of public health and the handling of ders, building materials containing asbestos, hazardous waste. Priority is to be given to and transformers and capacitors containing dealing with putrefied organic matter and PCBs. The Japan Society of Material Cycles quickly removing it from cities and streets, and Waste Management (JSMCWM) has pre- or—while taking measures such as spread- pared a disaster-waste quick reference chart, ing lime to delay putrefaction—to deter- and it is desirable that personnel performing mining locations of hazardous wastes such waste removal should use this (or others like as medical waste, asbestos, and PCBs, and it) to learn about hazardous wastes. trying to process each waste type in the Here is an example from Sendai City of how proper manner. to treat hazardous waste: such waste, rang- • Temporary storage sites are to be created ing from household cleaners, paints, lead-acid (which take the water environment into automobile batteries, and emergency power consideration) and waste is to be uni- supply systems used by industries, is all being formly separated. Waste collection loca- stored separately in a space about the size tions are to be decided on immediately, of a baseball field. Of these types of waste, a and putrefied materials including sludge- decision has been made only about gas cyl- type items, flammable materials, and haz- inders and fire extinguishers—which should ardous wastes should not be mixed. Care be treated by the related industries—while is to be taken not to create huge piles, to the treatment and disposal of other materi- prevent fires and other such events, and als is still undecided. A high level of caution is not to cause contamination of water, soil, needed in daily dealings with household haz- or groundwater. ardous waste, and further detailed measures are required to tackle this issue when estab- • Recycling should be considered to help lishing plans to deal with disasters. put resources to use in recovery and 2 3 : D E B R I S M A N AG E M E N T | 205 reconstruction. Concrete debris might be the disaster-stricken area in the Tohoku region recycled in the recovery and rebuilding comprises narrow coastal zones and also phases, wood scraps could substitute for because of the urgent need for land for tempo- fossil fuels in power generation and other rary housing and other purposes, it was not easy applications, and various other types of to secure land for temporary storage sites. In all recycling could be conceived. geographical areas, authorities should prepare for disasters beforehand by designating places • Local employment and wide-area coopera- for temporary storage sites, traffic routes for tion should be facilitated in disaster-waste waste transport, and other related needs. recycling. It was determined that in this In situations such as when a tsunami has case what is promoted internationally scattered individuals’ private possessions and as “cash for work” could be effective. On mixed them with disaster waste, removal and dealing with disaster waste in the Tohoku processing must proceed while also determin- region, even if wastes were to be recycled, ing who owns what. At the end of March 2011, the region would not have sufficient treat- the government issued “Guidelines on the ment and disposal capacity, which raises Removal and Other Treatment of Collapsed the possibility of widespread cooperation. Homes and Other Property after the Tohoku A case can be made for taking a nationwide Region Pacific Coast Earthquake” (Ministry of response: integrating industry, govern- the Environment 2011), which contained the ment, academia, and the citizenry. following three points: Figure 23.1 shows the basic flow involved • Make sure everyone knows in advance the in operating temporary storage sites and pre- plans for where operations will be con- liminary waste storage sites to facilitate the ducted, schedules, and other particulars. local management of municipal solid waste. These storage sites play a major part in the • Before removal, take photographs and smooth removal of debris from disaster areas. make other records of buildings, automo- For instance, it was known that since much of biles, motor scooters, and boats. Reuse/Recycle Temporary storage site Waste from separation (at disaster site) separation disaster area First waste Secondary waste separation (at disaster site) storage site storage site separation Collection/transport (municipality/private sector/individual) (at disaster site/outside of affected area can be considered if the damage is huge) Treatment Treatment Temporary (incineration) (crushing and shredding) incinerator Figure 23.1 Separation and Final disposal treatment of disaster waste 206 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G • For ancestral tablets, photo albums, and Although people tend to concern themselves other items that are valuable to owners and with removing disaster waste quickly, they other persons, as well as chattels, provide should from the outset consider how wastes opportunities to return them to the respec- could be recycled to reuse valuable resources tive owners and other persons. and preserve landfill space. Disaster waste and tsunami deposits gen- Valuables such as precious metals and safe erated in Sendai City were estimated to be boxes should be put into temporary safekeep- around 1.35 million tons and 1.3 million tons, ing. Efforts should be made to contact the respectively. As of April 2012, concrete, which owners or relevant parties in the event they accounts for about half of the 1.35 million tons are identified, and the valuables should be of disaster waste, could possibly be reused returned when the owners or relevant parties as material for reconstruction. Strategies for so request. When the owners or other relevant waste other than tsunami deposits were near parties are unknown, the guidelines call for the completion. valuables to be processed as directed by the The city had already estimated the amount Lost Property Act. of disaster waste only three weeks after the March 2011 earthquake, and set up a target of Separation and recycling: disposing of it within three years. Realizing The Sendai City model that it was impossible to treat the waste using Following is one conceivable classification only existing facilities, the city decided to set up scheme for the composition of disaster wastes additional temporary incinerators, which were from earthquakes and tsunamis: constructed in autumn 2011. Three temporary • Waste consumer electric appliances and incinerators (one stoker furnace and two rotary electronics, and various household effects kilns; 480 tons/day of total disposal capacity) • Waste wood, concrete rubble, tiles, and were installed in three designated temporary so on storage sites along the coastal area. The follow- ing items were separated and recycled: wood • Plants, trees, and other natural items lumber (for fuel use), metals, tires, four items • Large structures and so on designated in the Home Appliance Recycling Law, automobiles, and motorcycles. • Deposits (silt, bottom sediment, and so on) Including wastes that are supposed to be • Wrecked vehicles and boats landfilled, the amount of waste collected and moved to temporary storage sites is measured • Hazardous wastes (asbestos, pesticides, by a huge weighing scale, and in some cases the PCBs, and so on) results are recorded. • Evacuation center waste Financial support • Infectious waste, human corpses, and ani- To facilitate disposal of disaster waste, half the mal carcasses cost is covered by government subsidies, and Depending on the composition of each 80 percent of the remaining cost is covered by type, it is necessary to identify and carry out issuing municipality bonds (that is, a local gov- the appropriate treatment and disposal meth- ernment has to pay only 10 percent of the total ods, while keeping in mind the possibilities cost). Additional measures are being taken for recycling. Table 23.1 lists the specific types to reduce the burden on local governments, of waste that fall under the above categories, considering the size of the enormous damage and their recycling and disposal methods. caused by the GEJE. 2 3 : D E B R I S M A N AG E M E N T | 207 Table 23.1 Segregation of disaster waste and recycling and treatment methods CATEGORY OUTLINE TYPE OF WASTE RECYCLING AND DISPOSAL METHOD Waste from Household goods Valuables and mementoes Each item stored for return to owner household destroyed by earthquake Home appliances (TVs, refrigerators, air Home appliance recycling system goods and tsunami conditioners, washing machines) Other home appliances Metal recycled after dismantling and crushing; organic material incinerated, inorganic material disposed of in landfill Tatami mats, mattresses Shredded and used as fuel or incinerated Waste from Collapsed houses and Timber from houses, furniture Desalted if necessary. Potential usages include: collapsed buildings (including 1) particle board, charcoal, and reuse of material; houses furniture) destroyed by 2) use as fuel in cement kilns; 3) energy recovery earthquake and tsunami from incineration Concrete, asphalt, waste tiles Crushed and used as aggregate for roadbed material and in construction Asbestos-containing building materials Controlled management: disposed of in landfill, melted Plasterboard Controlled management: disposed of in landfill Wood Scattered and accumulated Garden trees, live trees, etc. Desalted if necessary. Potential usages after garden trees, pine wood, chipping include: 1) particle board, charcoal, reuse and other trees of material, papermaking material; 2) use as fuel in cement kilns; 3) energy recovery from incineration Bulky waste Large-size and unusual Tanks, power poles, feedstuffs, fertilizer, Crushed and separated and then recycled, waste from factories and and fishing nets that each require a specific incinerated, or disposed of in landfill infrastructure disposal method Caution is required for hazardous substances such as asbestos Deposits Gravel and mud left in Sediments mixed by the tsunami with the Used as fill for landfills or embankments after generated disaster area after the debris of collapsed houses and other removing woody debris and detoxifying. by the tsunami. Most is bottom debris. Some include oil. Odor and dust Detoxified by washing or incineration when tsunami sediment from water could arise on putrefaction or drying. material contains hazardous substances. bodies, but sometimes Hazardous chemicals such as acids, alkalis, Nonrecyclable items are taken to final disposal site organic materials and and pesticides from the disaster area could and disposed of as general waste. Where there is contaminants are included be included no wood debris and no contamination with a hazardous substance, they could be left in place after making arrangements with landowners Vehicles/ Automobiles/ships Automobiles, motorbikes, tires, ships, etc. Automobile recycling system. Tires chipped and ships used as a supplemental fuel. Ships are dismantled, recycled, and disposed of. Caution required for asbestos materials Hazardous Asbestos, PCBs, etc. Batteries, fluorescent lamps, fire Controlled management undertaken as necessary waste extinguishers, gas cylinders, waste oil, for each type of waste waste liquids, transformer oil, etc. 208 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BOX 23.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Preliminary findings of the United Nations Prepare a disaster waste Environment Programme’s (UNEP) expert mission on management plan in advance Japan’s earthquake waste It is essential to make disaster waste disposal plans beforehand to help reduce the need for • The contingency plans put in place by some prefectures before the earthquake allowed them to respond more quickly to the decision making with insufficient information waste management challenge (for example, in Sendai City, which in the wake of a disaster (box 23.1). Guidelines had contingency plans, three incinerators were already in place pro- on measures to manage disaster waste and on cessing 460 tons of waste a day). measures to treat waste from flooding were • While Japan has done much to advance global best practices on established in Japan in 1998 and 2005. Both handling disaster debris, there is still scope for substantial optimi- sets of guidelines require that any plan should zation so as to lower the costs of postdisaster debris management specify how to and reduce its environmental impacts. • Commendable emphasis has been placed on waste segregation • Establish basic policies for waste and recycling. Waste is divided into several categories such as management. wood, metals, electrical items, tatami mats, fishing nets, vehicles, plastics, and so on. Some segregated materials are already being • Construct and manage the system that reused: for instance, tree trunks are being sent to a paper mill, deals with waste management. shredded wood is being sent to a cement company for use as fuel in the manufacturing process, and building rubble is being recycled • Classify disaster waste and secure neces- as building material, landfill, or in road construction. sary equipment and temporary storage • Maximizing the possibilities for waste recovery and recycling while sites for disaster waste. minimizing the need for transportation are priorities for effective debris management. In 2010, 72 percent of municipalities across the country (a rather high rate), had disaster • Under Japanese law, the manufacturers of cars and white goods (refrigerators, washing machines, and so on) are responsible for the waste management plans in place. But they are final disposal of their products. But the volume of disaster debris now being revised to include the following: generated is likely to overwhelm their intake capacity, which may need to be expanded. • Estimation method for the amount of disas- ter waste generated by tsunamis, and coun- • Despite the magnitude of the challenges, and their own personal tragedies, the officials in the various Japanese cities are doing sys- termeasures for dealing with the waste tematic and dedicated work to manage the debris in a time-bound • Multiple predictions for disasters of differ- fashion. ent scales • Opportunities exist for learning from best practices in various cit- ies, and a systematic approach to capturing them and disseminat- Accordingly, periodic review of disaster ing them would be beneficial. waste management plans is indispensable. • The national guidelines produced for disaster debris management could be locally adapted, with input from academic experts to Build cooperative structures with various reflect local circumstances. This will lead to more environmentally organizations and institutions optimal outcomes. When disasters occur, cooperative ties with • There is scope for improved monitoring and communication of the waste management activities in the disaster-impacted areas, which various organizations and institutions are key will enable everybody to appreciate the challenges faced and the to the smooth management of disaster waste. efforts made. This is because many problems and adminis- Source: http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2676&ArticleID= trative needs arise, while the number of appro- 9067&l=en. priate policy experts is limited, and the waste disposal sites in the affected areas are often 2 3 : D E B R I S M A N AG E M E N T | 209 damaged. Above all, much more waste is gener- NOTE ated in these circumstances. Developing coop- Prepared by Shinichi Sakai, Kyoto University, and the erative relations between local governments in International Recovery Platform. the surrounding affected areas and with com- munities far from the stricken areas should be considered. Sendai City, for example, which BIBLIOGRAPHY was affected by the GEJE, over the course of Brown, C., M. Milke, and E. Seville. 2011. “Disaster a year received 58 staff members from eight Waste Management: A Review Article.” Waste Management 31: 1085–98. organizations to help promote its waste man- JSMCWM (Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste agement plans. For waste collection, the city Management). 2011. “Guidelines for Treatment of received help from 7,510 staff members from Tsunami Deposits” (proposed). July 5. http://eprc 10 organizations, as well as 88 vehicles. .kyoto-u.ac.jp/saigai/archives/files/Sediment ManagementGL%20by%20JSMCWM.pdf. In addition to cooperating with industries ———. 2012. Manual on Separation and Disposal of and local municipalities, building and mak- Disaster Waste: Based on Experience from the ing effective use of cooperative relationships Great East Japan Earthquake [in Japanese]. with academic organizations, other expert Gyosei. groups, and civil society organizations are also Ministry of the Environment. 2011. “Guidelines on the Removal and Other Treatment of Collapsed recommended. Homes and Other Property after the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake” [in Japanese]. Customizing the removal March 2011. http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/sisin process to local contexts 110326.pdf. Each country has its own environmental safe- Sendai City. 2012. “Disposal Processes of Disaster Waste in Sendai City” [in Japanese]. February. guards, technology, and recycling practices. Takatsuki, H., S. Sakai, and S. Mizutani. 1995. “Disas- Utilizing these local practices are crucial in ters and Waste Properties: Disaster Waste Inten- effective debris management. sity and Change in the Composition of Municipal Solid Waste” [in Japanese]. Waste Management Research 6 (5): 351–59. 210 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G CHAPTER 24 Livelihood and Job Creation Livelihood and job creation have long been critical challenges to disaster recovery. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Japanese government launched an innovative cash-for-work project, hir- ing more than 31,700 jobless people to work not only on reconstruction, but also on clerical and sup- port work for affected people. This allowed it to reach out to women and the elderly, vulnerable groups that were traditionally excluded from schemes focusing primarily on manual work. FINDINGS Record of livelihood and job creation in Japan following catastrophic disasters The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) Livelihood and job creation has long been a caused some 140,000–160,000 people to lose critical issue in disaster response and recovery, their livelihoods and jobs. By February 2012, both in Japan as well as worldwide. Funda- in part as a consequence of an innovative mentally, it plays three critical roles: emergency job-creation project initiated by • Economic. It serves as a key—and in some the government, 143,820 people had found cases the only—source of income for the employment in the three most affected prefec- population affected by disaster. tures. Of these jobs, 22 percent (31,700) were • Social. It encourages affected people to jobs directly created by the emergency job- participate in the recovery process, thus creation project. Despite gaps between sectors, strengthening their social ties. regions, and types of employment available, the government-initiated job-creation policy has • Psychological. It helps those who lose their generally been effective in sustaining employ- jobs regain their self-esteem and look for- ment in disaster-affected areas. ward to the future. 211 Historically, job-creation policies benefit- to earthquake and tsunami damage. Moreover, ing those affected by disasters have not been most of the tsunami-hit cities lost the bulk of particularly successful in Japan, despite their their infrastructure. recognized importance and long record—even Ishinomaki City, for instance, was one of dating back to the 1854 Ansei Nankai earth- the largest cities hit by the tsunami (popula- quake disaster. After the 1923 Kanto earth- tion 160,000). The Ishinomaki fishery port is quake, the Ministry of the Interior encouraged the third largest in Japan in terms of total land- local governments and private firms to hire ings. Fishery and seafood processing were the affected people for disaster response and main industries of the city, engaging hundreds recovery work; however, this attempt was of companies and employing several thousand unsuccessful, as the work provided was mainly people. manual while affected people aspired to non- The tsunami washed out nearly the entire manual, “white collar” labor. The national gov- central business district of the city. Aside from ernment instead encouraged jobless people damage to buildings and facilities, the earth- to move to suburban areas of the cities from quake lowered soil levels by approximately which they originated. 1.4 meters, allowing seawater to penetrate the Livelihood- and job-creation attempts were area at full tide. To restart the industry it will also unsuccessful following the Great Hanshin- be necessary to first elevate the soil, something Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake of 1995. As a result of very few companies can afford to do given the disaster, some 40,000–100,000 people were the burden of existing loans. Over three years left jobless. The national government issued a have passed since the earthquake and tsunami, law in March 1995 forcing public projects in and the national government has included the affected areas to reserve up to 40 percent of elevation costs under its third supplementary their workforce for affected people rendered budget (fiscal year 2011). But it will take several jobless by the earthquake. A year later, however, years to complete such a large reconstruction only 30 people had been hired under the policy. project and, therefore, job recovery in Ishino- Contractors continued to make employment maki City is expected to be slower than what decisions based on profitability and efficiency, followed the 1995 Kobe earthquake. and there were no penalties for noncompliance. In Fukushima, the national government As a result, the employment of affected people designated the area within a 20-kilometer was limited to simple and unskilled public work (km) radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear tasks. During the recovery process, 254 people Power Station accident as a restricted area, died in transitional shelters without the care affecting some 78,000 people. Areas with rela- of family members or neighbors. Some study tively high radiation levels, even outside the reports point out that most of the people who 20-km radius, were designated as Deliber- died alone (Kodokushi) were jobless, suggesting ate Evacuation Areas, affecting an additional that they were isolated from society and had no 10,000 people (most of whom lost their jobs). contact with others. Although the national government is plan- ning to remove restrictions in areas with rel- Damage caused by the GEJE and its atively low radiation levels, the recovery of impact on livelihoods and jobs livelihoods and jobs in these areas will be dif- The GEJE could be the most severe of recent ficult to address. A questionnaire of evacuees disasters in Japan. The Japan Research Insti- from these areas conducted by Fukushima tute estimates that 140,000–160,000 people University indicates that only 4 percent intend lost their livelihoods and jobs in May 2011 due to return to their homes immediately after the 212 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G lifting of the restrictions. Of the respondents, • Develop a system to match disaster victims 25 percent have already decided not to return with jobs at all, citing lack of jobs as one of the major rea- • Secure and maintain securing employment sons. Close to 46 percent of respondents under among disaster victims the age of 35 say they will not return. Since the power station was the main source of eco- The first policy objective built upon an ear- nomic activity in the area, there are now very lier emergency job-creation fund created in few job opportunities left. Thus, livelihood 2008 after the global financial crisis. Following and job creation will also be critical to recov- the GEJE, the government spent ¥50 billion ery in these areas. The survey results further ($625 million) to enlarge the fund, expanding indicate that 16 percent of the respondents say its eligibility to disaster-related job losses. that recovery of the infrastructure will be nec- Examples of activities supported by the essary, while 21 percent argue for a concrete project included: plan for radium decontamination (chapter 36 • Evacuation center management and admin- covers updated information). istration, such as food distribution, cleaning, procurement, and the delivery of food and Livelihood and job creation under the GEJE other materials Government initiatives • Safety management and life-support services Following the GEJE, the Japanese govern- such as patrolling, caring for the elderly and ment’s response involved both cash transfers disadvantaged, babysitting, supplementary to the most vulnerable, as well as an emergency lessons for students, and bus driving job-creation project. • Office-work support for local governments To help secure the well-being of the most such as issuing resident cards, operating vulnerable (such as the elderly and any handi- the call center, guiding visitors, distributing capped not regarded as employable), the gov- donations, and monitoring and performing ernment provided cash transfers through the needs assessments at evacuation centers regular social security system based on the Public Assistance Act, amounting to around • Reconstruction and recovery work such as ¥50,000 to ¥250,000 (approximately $550 to debris removal, the cleanup of houses of $26,000) per month. In addition, the Japanese the elderly, parks and public building main- disaster management system provided up to tenance, planting of flowers in parks, and ¥3 million (approximately $37,500) to house- public relations activities for sightseeing holds that lost their houses to assist them promotions with reconstruction efforts (chapter 20). Cash The basic thrust of this policy was very sim- was also individually distributed to the most ilar to that of a cash-for-work (CFW) program vulnerable people in the form of donations (see box 24.1), but it differed substantially from received from all over Japan. typical CFW programs in developing coun- To promote job creation, the Ministry tries. The range of work created by this project of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) was so diverse that women and elderly could launched the “Japan as One” Work Project also work, whereas other CFW programs have immediately after the earthquake. The project tended to provide mostly manual labor (for had three major policy objectives: example, infrastructure reconstruction). • Steadily create jobs through reconstruc- One of the constraints faced by the job- tion projects creation project was that employers had to 2 4 : L I V E L I H O O D A N D J O B C R E AT I O N | 213 BOX 24.1 scheme was very effective since the organi- zations involved did not have the burden of Livelihood options in humanitarian assistance paperwork or personnel management. Public-public partnerships were also used. International humanitarian assistance has typically used two instruments The CFW activity in Ofunato City was partially to promote livelihood recovery after disasters: cash transfer and public works programs cash-for-work (CFW) programs. undertaken by the Kitakami City government. Cash transfers are typically used to provide short-term assistance to Kitakami City received emergency job- the most vulnerable affected people. To be effective, cash grant pro- creation funding from the Iwate Prefecture grams must be well targeted (for example, aimed at the elderly, widows, government, and entrusted a private staffing refugees), be transparent, have sound mechanisms for monitoring and agency to hire affected people to care for those evaluation, and have a clear exit strategy. Typical programs implemented staying in transitional shelters in Ofunato City. during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and 2004 Sri Lanka tsunami involved a transfer of $50 per month per target household for a period of four to To meet the second policy objective of the six months. Often, cash transfer programs coexist with or graduate to be- “Japan as One” project—matching disaster vic- come CFW programs. tims with jobs—the government intended to Cash-for-work (CFW) programs have been common tools for human- fully activate and empower public employment itarian assistance. These programs provide cash to affected people in re- exchanges in the affected areas. This was effec- turn for their work on various recovery projects, such as debris removal tive to some degree but not adequate to the and the repair or reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. They have been used in many disaster situations, including the 2004 Indian Ocean significant burden of the aim, which was why tsunami, the 2008 Myanmar cyclone, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. (as mentioned above) private staffing agencies CFW programs were developed as an alternative to food-for-work played a significant role in job creation. (FFW) programs, in which affected peoples could receive food in return The third objective—to secure and main- for their disaster-recovery and mitigation work (during droughts and fam- tain employment among disaster victims—was ine). Cash has several advantages over food as a worker incentive: (1) re- supported by two activities. Some ¥727 billion lated logistics are less complex and management costs are lower; (2) work- ers can choose what they buy, thus empowering them; and (3) cash has a ($9 billion) was distributed as an employment large market impact when it is spent locally. At the same time, CFW pro- adjustment subsidy to affected industries, as grams must avoid crowding out the normal job market and, like cash trans- an incentive for them to secure employment. fers, require close monitoring. In addition, the government provided ¥294 billion ($3.7 billion) to extend benefit terms of unemployment insurance. This helped protect comply fully with domestic labor laws. For workers in the formal sectors. Without this example, employers had to compel workers assistance, the burden of the job-creation proj- to take compensation, employment, and social ect would have been much higher. insurance. Paperwork accompanying employ- ment procedures proved a bottleneck during Nongovernmental organizations job creation. Although many of the government and the private sector agencies, nongovernmental organizations NGOs and the private sector also played (NGOs), and private contractors were major important roles in the aftermath of the GEJE. sources of job opportunities, they were reluc- The International Volunteer Center Yamagata, tant to hire the jobless since they were other- for example, launched a CFW project in which wise occupied with the emergency response. jobless affected people were hired for debris Public-private partnerships were an effec- removal and cleaning activities. Their salaries tive solution to this problem. The Fukushima were financed by donations from all over Japan Prefecture government, for example, requested as well as overseas. The work was eventually private staffing agencies to hire affected people expanded to community-support activities. for the work of disaster-response organiza- The project ended on March 31, 2012, hav- tions (including municipal governments). This ing hired 112 jobless people. Although it was a 214 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G Figure 24.1 Minamisanriku shopping village Source: © International Recovery Platform (IRP). Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. typical CFW scheme, it was not as large as pro- grams seen in developing countries. Another example was the Sanriku-ni Shigoto-wo Project in the Sanriku area, driven by a nonprofit alliance of Iwate Hakuhodo Co. Ltd., Iwate Menkoi TV, and Sendai Television Inc. This project provided livelihoods to fish- Figure 24.2 A poster promoting the friendship ermen’s wives previously engaged in seafood bracelet (tamaki ) processing. While affected fishermen had ben- Source: Source: © Shingo Nagamatsu. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. efited from an emergency job-creation project promoted by the Fishery Agency for debris removal and fishing port clean-up efforts, their as much as ¥83 million ($1 million), according wives had been left jobless. to the project website. The success of this proj- Thirty new shops were opened in the Mina- ect triggered many other kinds of handicraft misanriku shopping village, inaugurated on production. February 25, 2011, for the purpose of temporary The Security Support Fund, operated by job creation following the disaster (figure 24.1). Music Securities Inc., was an e-commerce The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, citizen aid initiative that matched prospec- through its “Small Medium Enterprise Sup- tive investors with small businesses affected port, JAPAN Program,” facilitated the estab- by the GEJE to help restart them. Those who lishment of this temporary shopping village. needed financial support submitted propos- Souvenir items produced by local residents, als via the fund’s website. In turn, prospective particularly women, were sold in some shops. donors could visit the website and find proj- The project promoted a new handicraft ects for their potential investment. Thus, it made by women: a friendship bracelet called worked as a microfinance project where pro- tamaki (“ring”) made of fishing-net materials spective donors were matched directly to the (figure 24.2). Approximately 50 percent of the recipients. sales went to the women producers. This proj- This fund has two important features: ect was covered extensively by television and (1) one unit of investment can be as small the social media, and for several months pro- as ¥10,500 ($131) and (2) investors do not duction could not keep abreast of sales. As of expect an economic return from their invest- February 29, 2012, 298 producers had received ment. About half (¥5,000) of the single unit of 2 4 : L I V E L I H O O D A N D J O B C R E AT I O N | 215 100,000 2.0 80,000 Miyagi 1.5 Fukushima 60,000 1.0 40,000 Iwate 20,000 0.5 0 0.0 Mar 11 Apr 11 May 11 Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 Sep 11 Oct 11 Nov 11 Dec 11 Jan 12 r 11 r 11 y 11 11 11 g 11 11 t 11 v 11 c 11 12 12 Jun Jul Se p Jan Feb Ma Ap Oc Ma No De Au People who have New job New job Beneficiaries of obtained jobs applicants offers employment Figure 24.4 New-job-opening ratios of the Iwate, insurance Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures Figure 24.3 Recovery process of labor markets in Iwate, Miyagi, and Source: MHLW. Fukushima prefectures Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). investment is considered a donation. Most of two prefectures. Even within the Miyagi Pre- the investors enjoy communicating through fecture, job opportunities were concentrated the website with the businesses they are sup- in the Sendai metropolitan area (a new-job- porting. The fund had grown to ¥700 million opening ratio of 1.17 in February 2012), while (approximately $8.8 million), attracting more Ishinomaki and Kesennuma, both of which than 20,000 investors as of 2012. are located on the coastal areas severely affected by the tsunami, offered relatively Policy results and outstanding challenges scarcer job opportunities (ratios of 0.77 and Partially as a result of the government policy, 0.55, respectively). the labor market recovered rapidly in the Additional gaps are seen among job sectors. affected areas. The number of beneficiaries of With rising reconstruction demand, many new employment insurance leapt to 81,179 in June job offers come from construction and related 2011 from 29,931 the previous March. Since industries, with relatively fewer offers in the June 2011, moreover, job offers exceeded the manufacturing and distribution industries. number of new applicants, and this gap had Job applicants, on the other hand, appear to grown in 2011 (figure 24.3). be seeking occupations more focused on food Although the job situation is surely improv- processing and clerical work. ing in general terms, recovery is not yet com- A final gap is seen in employment patterns. plete, and there are gaps in four major areas: In spite of an increase in job offers, most involve (1)  differences between job offers and appli- part-time or short-term employment. The job- cants (mentioned above), (2) gaps among opening ratio for full-time, regular workers in regions, (3) gaps among sectors, and (4) gaps in Miyagi Prefecture in February 2012 was only employment patterns. 0.49. The situation for those who are looking In common with other disasters, job oppor- for regular, full-time work is therefore not as tunities have disproportionally been concen- favorable as the general statistics suggest. trated in urban areas. Figure 24.4 illustrates Part of the reason why a large proportion of trends in new-job-opening ratios by prefec- job openings involve so much short-term ture. Miyagi Prefecture—where Sendai City, employment relates to the government- the capital of the Tohoku region, is located— supported emergency job-creation project. has been attracting more jobs than the other Between March 2011 and February 2012, 31,700 216 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G Total 0.20 0.80 LESSONS N=143,820 Fukushima • Dedicated emergency job-creation programs, 0.27 0.73 N=47,338 complemented by cash transfers to the most Miyagi vulnerable, can be effective ways to assist 0.19 0.81 N=52,014 disaster-affected people during a recovery. Iwate 0.14 0.86 At the same time, they need to be adjusted N=44,468 progressively to emerging job markets, and 0% 50% 100% avoid cluttering them in the process. More Employment Others created by prolonged assistance may be needed when emergency job local economies are contracting. creation project Figure 24.5 Ratio of employment sustained by • The livelihood needs of disaster-affected government policy: March 2011–February 2012 people are diverse, and thus require diverse Source: MHLW. solutions. The most vulnerable may need cash transfers, whereas those already ben- efiting from pensions (for example, the workers—or 22 percent of all job offers in the elderly) may need primarily an occupation Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures— to make them feel needed. Others—such as stemmed from the emergency job-creation widows with young children—require reg- project (figure 24.5). ular employment with insurance benefits. This finding has key two implications. First, the government-initiated job-creation policy • The experience of the GEJE shows how is effective in sustaining the job market in learning from past disasters has been used disaster-affected areas. In its absence, unem- effectively to design the emergency job- ployment issues would have been far more creation project. Regulatory measures and severe. At the same time, the transition from market forces alone did not succeed in cre- CFW jobs to regular jobs is a difficult challenge ating jobs following the Kobe disaster. The for the economic recovery process. GEJE helped launch a more proactive gov- CFW programs in developing countries typ- ernment project, which promoted diverse ically assist in the process of economic recov- employment and partnerships with NGOs ery and even economic growth: this is plausible and the private sector, while retaining the since disasters in developing countries tend to means to monitor its overall progress. affect growth rates positively. As such, CFW • The GEJE job-creation program has been programs fill an important employment gap innovative in facilitating public-private and immediately following a disaster, after which public-public partnerships. In particular, economic growth creates sufficient permanent hiring staffing agencies helped reduce the jobs to take over. administrative burden, which would oth- But economic recovery in developed coun- erwise have prevented many employers tries does not necessarily follow this trend: the from engaging the victims of the disaster. populations of the three prefectures affected by the GEJE had been declining since before • Matching jobs with the needs of the jobless the earthquake. As an economy shrinks, it does is a very important but difficult task. Most not necessarily generate sufficient permanent of the affected areas have seen excess labor jobs to take over the role of emergency job- demand and labor supply simultaneously, creation programs. Japan could well be facing but in different sectors, and urban areas this problem. have clearly benefited over rural areas. 2 4 : L I V E L I H O O D A N D J O B C R E AT I O N | 217 Interventions such as continuous monitor- Consider the bigger picture. The balance ing of job supply and demand, job retrain- between quality and quantity needs to be ing, and further integration with municipal planned carefully in developing countries, plans are necessary to effectively complete where the primarily goal is often to provide the recovery. rapid cash relief to the poorest and most vul- nerable of the disaster victims. As a rule, the • Unemployment insurance can be effective proportion of labor to the total costs of the in securing the incomes of those affected. activity should therefore remain high (for But there are several limitations: (1) unem- example, 50–80 percent). CFW schemes also ployment insurance does not cover self- need to be designed with a view to providing a employed workers and those who run smooth transition to long-term jobs, and avoid private enterprises, and (2) the national attracting people back to vulnerable urban government has twice had to extend the areas. As such, prevailing wages should be set beneficiary period of insurance, allowing just below the market rate for unskilled man- even those covered for the shortest period ual labor, thus ensuring that programs attract to benefit from the program until January only those without other alternative means to 2012. Unemployment insurance therefore earn income, and do not crowd out more per- needs to be seen as part of a broader liveli- manent job creation. hood recovery program following a disaster. In the above context, CFW schemes in developing countries differ from those pro- moted under the GEJE. Under the GEJE, the RECOMMENDATIONS FOR beneficiaries of the job-creation project were DEVELOPING COUNTRIES paid market wages, as there was no possibility of circumventing minimum wage regulations. Match jobs with worker skills. To the extent fea- In addition, as they had the option of claiming sible, CFW and employment programs follow- unemployment insurance, it was important to ing a disaster should expand the range of work set the wages at levels sufficiently attractive to opportunities, from simple manual labor for motivate them to work. Statistics in the GEJE infrastructure reconstruction to nonmanual prefectures do not show that this approach—at work. While in developing countries most of least in Japan—caused wage inflation. Thus, those affected are poor and unskilled, mega- it was not supposed to prevent a transition to disasters such as the Haiti earthquake of 2010 normal employment. also affected skilled workers. It is important Integrate job-creation initiatives with other that all be given opportunities to contribute social protection systems. Similar to the expe- meaningfully to the recovery and reconstruc- rience of Japan, CFW programs in developing tion of their neighborhoods, although priority countries need to be part of a broader social for external assistance must naturally be given protection program which can include cash to the poorest and most vulnerable. In particu- transfers to the most vulnerable, such as was lar, the jobs created should be done in the aftermath of the Pakistan earth- • Appropriate to the workers’ skills and quake or Sri Lanka tsunami. If so, the eligibil- abilities ity, amount, and duration of payments and the cash-delivery mechanisms must follow trans- • Help boost the morale and self-esteem of parent procedures. those affected Continue evaluating progress. Periodic eval- • Build upon the workers’ skills, to help uations are essential to determine whether them secure their next occupation livelihood programs are reaching their goals, 218 | I V : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N P L A N N I N G and allow for corrections among program NOTE partners. In the case of Haiti, for example, Prepared by Shingo Nagamatsu, Kansai University, with preliminary evaluations pointed to the need to contributions from Sofia Bettencourt, World Bank. better target the most vulnerable, while avoid- ing prolonged aid dependency. A particularly neglected aspect tends to be seasonal competi- BIBLIOGRAPHY tion between CFW and agriculture or fishing Albara-Bertrand, J. M. 1992. Political Economy of Large Natural Disasters: With Special Reference occupations, as well as assistance to people to Developing Countries. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford who, while not direct victims of the disaster, University Press. may be under traditional obligations of shelter- Doocy, S., M. Gabriel, S. Collins, C. Robinson, and ing family members, with consequent strains P. Stevenson. 2006. “Implementing Cash for Work on food supplies. Programmes in Post-Tsunami Aceh: Experiences and Lessons Learned.” Disasters 30 (3): 277–96. Involve the private sector. Job-creation pro- Echevin, D., F. Lamanna, and A-M. Oviedo. 2011. “Who grams in Japan tend to be smaller than those Benefits from Cash and Food for Works Programs in developing countries—most hire fewer than in Post Earthquake Haiti.” MPRA Paper No. 35661, 100 people each. Although this model is not Munich Personal RePEC Archive, Munich. GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction necessarily an efficient way to maximizing and Recovery). 2010. “Haiti Earthquake employment, it helps integrate CFW programs Reconstruction—Knowledge Notes from the DRM with long-term job opportunities, as employ- Global Expert Team for the Government of Haiti,” ers are directly responsible for supervising and GFDRR, World Bank, Washington, DC. caring for employees. Harvey, P. 2007. Cash-based Responses in Emergencies. HPG Report 24, Overseas Development Institute. Use social media. The case of the Security Mercy Corps. 2007. Guide to Cash-for-Work Program- Supporting Fund in Japan proves the effective- ming. Portland, OR: Mercy Corps. ness of e-commerce in directly linking affected MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). people with potential benefactors. This has 2011. “Japan as One” Work Project. Conclusion on the countermeasures Phase 1, Ministry of Health, also been observed in other recent megadi- Labour and Welfare. sasters (for example, the Pakistan and Bang- Music Securities Inc. Web page for Japan Earthquake kok floods), where social media increasingly Security Support Fund. http://oen.securite.jp/. played an important role in disaster recovery Myanmar Red Cross Society. 2009. Myanmar: Cyclone (see also chapter 21). Nargis Operations, Cash for Work (CFW) Program Project Progress Report. Yangon, Republic of the Continue supporting regular employment. Union of Myanmar: Myanmar Red Cross Society. While CFW programs are effective schemes Recovery Research Institute. 2011. “Questionnaire for the short term, the transition from CFW Survey for Evacuees from Futaba 8 Municipali- jobs to regular jobs is a difficult challenge. Job ties” [in Japanese]. Fukushima University, Fuku- shima City. opportunities for construction works will com- Vishwanath, T., and X. Yu. 2008. “Providing Social plete within a few years. Government support Protection and Livelihood Support during for creating regular jobs—such as arranging Post-Earthquake Recovery.” Knowledge Notes jobs, building factories, rehabilitating facilities on Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific, Working Paper Series No. 15, World of irrigation and fishery harbors, and resolving Bank, ISDR (United Nations International Strat- double debt—is essential in devastated areas egy for Disaster Reduction), and GFDRR, Wash- (chapter 31). ington, DC. 2 4 : L I V E L I H O O D A N D J O B C R E AT I O N | 219 PART V Hazard and Risk Information and Decision Making CHAPTER 25 Risk Assessment and Hazard Mapping Hazard and risk assessments are the crucial first step in disaster risk management and the basis for formulating relevant policies. They must take into account worst-case scenarios in the event of the largest possible hazard, while recognizing that hazard assessments of earthquakes and tsunamis will always have their limitations and associated uncertainties. In Japan, so-called hazard maps, which combine hazard information with evacuation routes and locations of evacuation centers, are effec- tive tools for promoting evacuation procedures and risk awareness among the public. However, in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake, these hazard maps, created before the event, may have given people a false sense of security by underestimating the disaster’s potential impact. Hazard maps should be designed to guide and facilitate prompt evacuation. They should be easy to understand and readily available. Risk assessment involves estimating the hazard municipal entities assess risks properly and to levels of possible earthquakes and tsunamis to reflect these risks in DRM measures. be considered when formulating disaster man- agement policies. It is the first step in develop- ing disaster risk management (DRM) plans and FINDINGS countermeasures. In Japan, the responsibil- ity for risk assessment rests with government Megadisaster hazards considered in risk agencies at multiple levels. Implementing agen- assessment cies at the national, prefectural, and municipal In Japan, countermeasures against earth- levels normally conduct risk assessment to quakes and tsunamis have been based on the inform their planning and the design of pre- risks associated with five large earthquakes ventive measures. The national government that have occurred over the past several hun- is responsible for providing information and dred years (map 25.1, box 25.1). The Central technical assistance to help prefectural and Disaster Management Council has set up a 223 1. Tokai h nc Estimate (2003): 9,200 deaths; Tre governmental measures (2003); i ma ish strategy (2005) Ch 3. Japan and Chishima trenches 5. Chubu and Kinki Inland Estimate (2006): 2,700 deaths; ch governmental measures (2006); Japan Tren Estimate (2008), Uemachi dansou: strategy (2008) 42,000 deaths; Sanage-Takahama dansou: 11,000 deaths; governmen- tal measures (2009) 4. Tokyo Metropolitan 2. Tonankai/Nankai Estimate (2005): 11,000 deaths; ugh economic damage: ¥112 trillion; Estimate (2003): 18,000 deaths; ai Tro governmental measures (2005, 2010 nk governmental measures (2003); Na correction): strategy (2006) strategy (2005) Map 25.1 Five mega-earthquakes used as basis for risk assessment Source: Cabinet Office (CAO). committee to investigate and assess the poten- for preventive actions as well as postdisaster tial hazard levels and expected damages from response and recovery measures. DRM mea- each of these scenarios. The committee also sures implemented at the national, prefectural, developed DRM strategies and a master plan and municipal levels have traditionally been based on these strategies and plans. The March 11, 2011, disaster occurred in the BOX 25.1 vicinity of the Japan and Chishima trenches— the region where the Central Disaster Man- Principles for selecting large-scale earthquake scenarios agement Council’s committee had investigated and the actual earthquakes selected trench-type earthquakes. From the list of past • Repeated occurrence earthquakes in the region (map 25.2), eight • High probability of future occurrence were selected for consideration, based mainly on their intensity, frequency, and the possibil- • Possibility of occurring within the next 100 years ity of recurrence in the same area. The selected • Not considered if an active fault earthquake has occurred in the last 500 years historic earthquake scenarios included the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami of 1896, which gen- • A significant number of occurrences can be identified in historical records erated a giant 20-meter-high tsunami, and • Magnitude is between M 7 and M 8 Miyagi-ken-oki (Miyagi Prefecture) earth- quakes that have been occurring at 40-year • Consider the economic and social activities and central administra- tive functions to be protected intervals. On the other hand, earthquakes such (Earthquakes meeting the above criteria) as those off the coast of Fukushima Prefec- ture were not selected because their probabil- 1. Tokai earthquake (M 8.0) ity of occurrence was estimated to be low, at 2. Tonankai/Nankai earthquakes (M 8.6) 7 percent (map 25.3). Furthermore, the Jogan 3. Japan and Chishima trenches earthquake (M 7.6–8.6) Earthquake of 869, believed to have caused 4. Tokyo Metropolitan inland earthquake (M 6.9–7.5) massive tsunamis in the east Japan region, 5. Chubu and Kinki inland earthquake (M 6.9–8.0) was excluded because the available modeling techniques were unable to replicate its seismic 224 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G 1963 earthquake off Iturup Island (M 8.1) 1958 earthquake off Iturup Island (M 8.1) 1969 earthquake off the east coast of Hokkaido (M 7.8) 1994 earthquake off the east coast of Hokkaido (M 8.2) 1973 earthquake off the Nemuro Peninsula (M 7.4) 1993 earthquake off Kushiro (M 7.5) 1843 earthquake off Kushiro/Nemuro (M 7.5) 1894 earthquake off Nemuro (M 7.9) 1952 earthquake off Tokachi (M 8.2) 2000 earthquake off Tokachi (M 8.0) 1968 earthquake off Tokachi (M 7.9) 1994 offshore Sanriku earthquake (M 7.6) 1933 Showa Sanriku earthquake (M 8.1) 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake (M 8.25) 1897 earthquake off Miyagi Prefecture (M 7.7) 1897 earthquake off Miyagi Prefecture (M 7.4) 1978 earthquake off Miyagi Prefecture (M 7.4) 2005 earthquake off Miyagi Prefecture (M 7.2) 1936 earthquake off Kinkasan (M 7.4) 1938 earthquake off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture (M 7.5) 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tohoku (M 9.0) Map 25.2 Historical occurrence of trench-type earthquakes in the vicinity of the Japan and Chishima trenches. Source: CAO. intensity and tsunami height, and the probabil- Because the magnitude of the earthquake and ity of recurrence in the same area was consid- tsunami far exceeded the predisaster estimates, ered to be very low. the Japanese government has been revising its methods of assessing earthquakes and tsunami The magnitude of earthquake and tsunami hazards. The Basic Disaster Management Plan, hazards exceeded predisaster estimates revised after the Great East Japan Earthquake As illustrated in map 25.2, the March 11 earth- (GEJE), provides the following guidelines for quake had a very large epicentral and tsu- estimating earthquakes and tsunamis: nami source area, larger than any earthquake • Earthquake and tsunami countermeasures recorded in Japan’s history. Furthermore, its should be based on scenarios that take into magnitude of Mw (moment magnitude) 9.0 account the largest-possible earthquakes exceeded the hazard level of any earthquake and tsunamis, which should be considered in the country ever considered for purposes of from every possible angle using all scien- disaster management. Thus, the extent of the tific means. high seismic intensity area of the actual earth- quake was much larger than expected, and • Earthquake and tsunami scenarios should the area that experienced Japanese seismic be based on the most accurate earthquake intensity of 5+ or larger was about 10 times the records available, going as far back in his- estimate (map 25.4). Furthermore, the actual tory as possible, and created in combina- tsunami height was twice the height used in tion with an analysis of historical literature the predisaster tsunami hazard predictions and topographical and geological studies, (map 25.5). as well as other scientific findings. 25: RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD MAPPING | 225 As of October 2008 Northwestern Hokkaido-oki Nemuro-oki M 7.8 0.006–0.1% M 7.9 About 40% Northern Sanriku-oki Region name Simultaneous occurrence M 8.0 0.1–10% Earthquake occurrence with Tokachi-oki probability within 30 years M 8.3 Magnitude The Tokachi-oki Earthquake occurrence probability is based on January 1, 2008 earthquake in 2003 M 8.0 About 60% probability immediately before the occurrence of earthquake. This is the first case in which an earthquake that conforms to the long-term Tokachi-oki evaluation of earthquake occurrences made by the Akita-oki M 8.1 0.1–1% Simultaneous Headquarters for M 7.5 occurrence with Earthquake Research ≤ About 3% Nemuro-oki Promotion has actually M 8.3 occurred. Northern Sadogashima-oki M 7.8 3–6% Northern Sanriku-oki M 8.0 0.1–10% Interplate earthquake M 7.1–7.6 90% in Hyuganada M 7.6 About 10% Miyagi-ken-oki M 7.5 99% Simultaneous occurrence close to the trench in southern Sanriku-oki M 8.0 Sanriku-oki to Boso-oki along the Japan Trench Tsunami earthquakes Fukushima-ken-oki M 8.3 About 20% M 7.4 (6% for specific region) ≤ About 7% Normal faults type M 8.2 4–7% (1–2% for specific region) Nankai earthquake Presumed M 8.4 About 50% Tokai earthquake Ibaraki-ken-oki Simultaneous occurrence (Reference value) M 6.8 About 90% with Tonankai earthquake M 8.0 87% M 8.5 Other M 7 scale earthquakes in the Southern Kanto M 6.7–7.2 About 70% Interplate earthquake Tonankai earthquake Along the Sagami Trough in Akinada, Iyonada, M 8.1 60–70% (Kanto earthquake of and Bungosuido Simultaneous occurrence “1923 Taisho” type) M 6.7–7.4 About 40% with Nankai earthquake M 7.9 Nearly 0–1% M 8.5 Map 25.3 Potential earthquakes in Japan: their probability of occurrence, magnitude, and location Source: Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion. Note: -oki = offshore. 226 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G Estimating damage The damage caused by the GEJE far exceeded times the estimated amount, and the number any predisaster estimates. The number of of human lives lost more than seven times completely destroyed buildings was about six (table 25.1). The conventional methodology b. Estimation for trench-type Table 25.1 Comparison of estimated and actual damage a. Tohoku earthquake off earthquakes in the vicinity of the Pacific coast (2011) the Japan and Chishima Trenches ESTIMATION GEJE RATIO Area with seismic intensity of 3,540 34,843 9.8 5+ or larger (km2) Inundation area (km2) 270 561 2.1 Buildings completely destroyed 21,000 128,530 6.1 7 Disaster waste (tons) 1,400,000 24,900,000 17.8 7 6+ 6+ 6 Deaths (includes missing) 2,700 19,185 7.1 6 5+ Source: CAO. 5+ 5 5 Note: The estimated figures reflect the larger of the damage estimates for the Miyagi 4 4 offshore and Meiji-Sanriku earthquakes. Estimation of deaths uses the case of the 3 Meiji-Sanriku earthquake with a low disaster awareness level. Deaths from the GEJE are as of January 31, 2012. Map 25.4 Actual versus predicted seismic intensity distributions Source: CAO. Sendai Nakagawa River Kujigawa River Matsushima Bay Hachinohe Natorigawa River Abukumagawa River Tonegawa River Mangoku Bay Narusegawa River Takasegawa River Rikuzentakata Mabechigawa River Kitagamigawa River Miyako Ibaraki Fukushima Miyagi Iwate Aomori Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture 40 35 Mangoku Bay 30 Tsunami height (meters) Matsushima Bay 25 20 15 10 5 0 Inundation heighta Run-up heighta Sanriku offshoreb Miyagi offshoreb Meiji Sanriku typeb Map 25.5 Actual versus predicted tsunami height Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). a. Actual records on March 11, 2011. b. Simulation results before GEJE. 25: RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD MAPPING | 227 for estimating damages can be characterized basis of the estimated number of destroyed as follows: buildings, lifeline failure rates, and the num- ber of days required for restoration, for which • Quantitative estimates include direct phys- empirical relationships have been established ical damage, human loss, damages to life- based on previous disasters. line and transportation infrastructure, and The underestimation of damage in the economic losses (direct and indirect). case of the GEJE was largely due to an under- • Qualitative estimates include fires induced estimation of the magnitude of the hazards by tsunami; critical lifeline infrastructure involved. Also, it has been pointed out that facilities such as power plants, gas produc- some factors—such as evacuation rates—used tion plants, water and wastewater treat- for damage estimation purposes were higher ment plants, and so forth. than actual rates, which could have further contributed to an underestimate of human • Three scenarios were included, reflecting losses. At the time of this writing, the damage different seasons and times of day (winter estimation methodology is being revised. 5 am, summer 12 pm, winter 6 pm), which are likely to affect fire scale and incidence. Earthquake and tsunami simulation and hazard mapping • A facility is considered to have received no Hazard maps provide important information damage if it is equipped with enough miti- to help people understand the risks of natural gation measures against ground motion hazards and to help mitigate disasters. Haz- and fire. ard maps indicate the extent of expected risk A quantitative estimation of the impact was areas, and can be combined with disaster man- carried out using the relationship between the agement information such as evacuation sites, magnitude of the hazard (seismic intensity, evacuation routes, and so forth. In Japan, haz- maximum ground velocity, tsunami inunda- ard maps are prepared and made available for tion depth, and so on) and the actual damage various hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, (number of destroyed houses, human loss, and floods, landslides, liquefaction, and volcanic so on), which was established based on histori- eruption (chapters 26 and 27). cal earthquakes. For example, tsunami damage Japan’s prefectural governments con- to buildings was estimated using the assump- duct hazard mapping, and the hazard data tion that a building is completely destroyed they prepare, for example, expected inunda- if the inundation depth is 2.0 meters or more tion depth and extent, is in turn used by the based on empirical evidence. Human losses municipalities to prepare disaster manage- caused by tsunamis were estimated based on ment maps called hazard maps, which indi- the tsunami-affected population, historical cate not only the expected hazard but also records of death by tsunami inundation depth, information such as evacuation routes and and estimated evacuation rates (percentage of evacuation sites (map 25.6). The Act on Spe- people who can obtain warning information cial Measures for Earthquake Disaster Coun- and the time it takes for people to evacuate). termeasures, passed in 1995, mandates the These were calculated for 50-meter by 50- prefectural governments and local municipal- meter grid cells and overlaid on exposure data, ities to prepare these maps to promote aware- such as spatial sociodemographic data avail- ness of earthquake and tsunami risks in their able nationwide from the Geospatial Informa- respective jurisdictions. As of 2010, more than tion Authority of Japan (GSI). Furthermore, 80 percent of the prefectures had prepared infrastructure damage was estimated on the tsunami inundation maps and 50 percent of 228 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G coastal municipalities were equipped with Evacuation Tsunami inundation depth tsunami hazard maps. site/shelters Evacuation site (high-ground) The national government provides techni- 0.5 m Evacuation shelter cal assistance and guidelines to promote haz- 0.5–1.0 m 1.0–2.0 m Evacuation route ard mapping by local governments. In 2004, 2.0–4.0 m the central government prepared Tsunami and 4.0–6.0 m 6.0 m Storm Surge Hazard Map Guidelines to help the municipalities in creating hazard maps and to promote the use of hazard maps throughout the country. The guidelines provide infor- mation on the basic concepts of tsunami and storm surge hazard maps, and the standard Map 25.6 An example of a tsunami hazard map, Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture Source: Miyako City. methodology for preparing them. The guide- lines explain in depth the numerical simula- • Calibration and verification of the model tion methodology for identifying inundation risk areas, which is the principal means of tsu- • Predictive simulation nami hazard mapping. Alternative methodolo- Hazard maps in Japan have been used by gies, as shown in table 25.2, are also explained the municipalities to design evacuation pro- so that the best method can be selected accord- cedures. But they have not been utilized for ing to the resources and data available. The land use or development planning. The les- numerical simulation of tsunamis generally sons learned from the GEJE have prompted requires the following steps: the Japanese government to implement a new • Development of a fault model act to create tsunami-resilient cities. The new legislative framework calls for the prefectural • Topographic data governments to prepare an inundation risk • Setting of initial water level conditions map, which is to be used for regulating land (typically uses the vertical displacement use and mitigating the effects of a tsunami calculated by the fault model) (chapter 12). Table 25.2 Methods for defining inundation risk areas METHOD PROCEDURE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES Numerical Use numerical models to estimate inundation Precise assessment is possible and can take simulation in time area as well as inundation depth and flow into account the effects of the disaster series velocity, inundation time. mitigation structures. Resource intensive. Level-filling Calculate the inundation based on the height Not so resource intensive. Ignores the method and width of the tsunami and estimate the effects of structures and buildings and the extent of inundation based on the topographical momentum of water flow (tsunami run-up). data. Prediction based Define the risk area based on the inundation area Simple and low cost. Cannot be used for on past inundation of historical tsunami events. areas with no historical records. Cannot reflect changes such as construction of disaster reduction facilities. Estimation based Define high-risk areas as those areas lying lower Simple and low cost. Cannot take into on ground than the expected tsunami height. account the effects of structures and elevation buildings and the momentum of water flow (tsunami run-up). 25: RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD MAPPING | 229 9% sense of safety, and prevented people from 55% 11% evacuating, resulting in greater human losses. Used maps LESSONS 12% • Hazard assessment is critical since it serves as the basis for DRM policies. Earthquake 13% and tsunami hazard assessment is con- ducted extensively in Japan to raise public Had map on wall at home awareness and to prepare for disasters. Often referred to map at home Had map at home but didn’t use at all • Underestimation is frequent. Predisas- Did not have map at home, but knew it was available ter damage estimation was low due to Never saw nor heard of map the underestimation of hazard levels. Figure 25.1 Hazard map usage patterns Past assessments did not adequately con- Source: CAO. sider certain kinds of damage, including from long-period seismic waves, tsunami- induced fires, and nuclear accidents. Hazard maps in the disaster-affected areas • Recognizing the uncertainties associated All municipalities hit by tsunamis during the with hazard assessment, the largest-possible GEJE had prepared hazard maps before the hazard scenario should have been used, earthquake and tsunami. But surveys show drawing on all available information includ- that only 20 percent of the people used these ing not only seismological but also geologi- hazard maps (figure 25.1), and the extent of cal, archaeological, and historical studies flooding indicated on the hazard maps was in looking at tsunami deposits, ancient docu- many cases underestimated compared to the mentation, and so on. actual inundation area (map 25.7). It is likely that these maps provided residents with a false • Hazard maps were developed by all munici- palities in the disaster-hit areas and served as important tools for designing evacuation Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture procedures. • Hazard maps should facilitate and guide people’s evacuation efforts and should not contribute to a false sense of safety. Provid- ing information on inundation risk zones for multiple levels of hazards including low- frequency events, or information directly linked with tsunami warnings would be effective. The meaning of the information provided on the maps needs to be clear and adequately explained to the users. Inundated area • Risk information must be communicated Hazard maps to the public effectively. In the GEJE, only Map 25.7 Inundation area: Hazard map versus actual 20 percent of the people made use of hazard Source: CAO. maps. 230 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G RECOMMENDATIONS FOR be easy to understand and easy to use for pur- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES poses of prompt evacuation, and users should be aware of the limitations and uncertainties Assess risk. Understanding hazard and risk is of the information they contain. Considering a vital component of DRM. Quantitative esti- budget and technical constraints, risk estima- mation of potential damage is important as it tion methods can be selected as explained in informs the appropriate strategies and mea- table 25.2. sures to be taken. Risk exposure data should be Share hazard and risk data and information. collected, mapped, and shared as they are vital Data can be shared through central deposito- components of risk assessment. ries that are open to the public, among other Prepare for the worst case. While bearing means (see chapter 26). in mind that the hazard assessment of earth- quakes and tsunamis has limitations and uncer- tainties, the largest possible hazard should be NOTE investigated and considered in formulating Prepared by Junko Sagara, CTI Engineering, and DRM policies. Hazard assessment should not Keiko Saito, World Bank. rely solely on statistical analysis based on his- torically recorded earthquakes and tsunamis, because historical records may not account for the maximum-possible hazard levels that BIBLIOGRAPHY may occur in the future. Also, disasters have Cabinet Office. 2012. “Current Status of Efforts occurred for which there are no records avail- Toward Revision of Disaster Management Mea- sures in Light of Lessons Learned from the Great able. The level of hazard to be used in designing East Japan Earthquake” [in Japanese]. Cabinet structural measures should be selected based Office, Tokyo. on local conditions. Hazard and risk assess- Central Disaster Management Council. 2011. Report ment should be revised and updated periodi- of the Committee for Technical Investigation on Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis cally with the latest findings and in light of Based on the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Earth- more recently experienced disasters. quake off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku [in Japanese]. Prepare and promote hazard maps. Hazard Cabinet Office, Tokyo. maps are effective tools for promoting risk Study Committee on Tsunami and Storm Surge Haz- ard Maps. 2004. Tsunami and Storm Surge Hazard awareness, for designing evacuation proce- Map Manual [in Japanese]. http://www.icharm dures, and for deciding the locations of evacua- .pwri.go.jp/publication/pdf/2004/tsunami_and_ tion facilities and shelters. Hazard maps should storm_surge_hazard_map_manual.pdf. 25: RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD MAPPING | 231 CHAPTER 26 Risk and Damage Information Management In Japan, municipalities are responsible for producing hazard maps for floods, storm surges, volca- nic eruptions, tsunamis, stagnant water, and landslides to which the municipality may be exposed. By combining exposure data with satellite images and aerial photographs, postevent damage assess- ments can be carried out with reasonable accuracy. Japan’s experience with the disaster of March 2011 demonstrates that having exhaustive data on exposure expedites the damage assessment process, thereby reducing the time required for compensation payments and insurance payouts. Japan is known for its disaster prepared- East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and tsunami, ness. Less well known but no less important information on the damage caused by the disas- for disaster response is the country’s “data ter was collected rapidly and shared among preparedness.” responding agencies using a variety of top- Communities need to understand the risks down and bottom-up tools, including remotely they face and to have access to early warnings. sensed data, public and private data sets, and In Japan, maps that illustrate the likely extent online tools (such as the Ushahidi-based web- of hazards and the location of evacuation cen- site www.sinsai.info). The data-collection and ters and routes are distributed to households dissemination effort underpinned assistance and public institutions, such as schools and to the affected population, timely allocation of hospitals, in an effort to raise public awareness resources to areas in need, and effective recon- of disaster risk. Immediately after the Great struction planning. 233 FINDINGS following a major disaster event. In the case of the GEJE, helicopters were dispatched imme- Pre-event dissemination diately after the main shock. They transmit- of information on risks ted footage of the approaching tsunami live on In Japan, municipalities are responsible for national and global news channels, contribut- producing maps related to the following haz- ing to the quick mobilization of resources. ards: floods, storm surges, volcanic eruptions, In the immediate aftermath of a natural tsunamis, stagnant water, and geological haz- disaster, the collection of information on the ards (landslides). These hazard maps include damage allows appropriate resources to be not only information on the expected intensity allocated for response activities. Tradition- and extent of the hazard but also the location ally, data have been collected by people sent of evacuation centers and designated evacua- to the affected areas. During the past decade, tion routes (chapter 25). The hazard map Web however, the use of remotely sensed data has portal prepared by the Ministry of Land, Infra- become viable for damage data collection structure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) thanks to improvements in the spatial reso- includes a link to all available hazard maps, lution of such data (less than 1 meter with providing a one-stop shop where information optical satellite images) and reductions in on risks from natural hazards can be accessed acquisition costs. (map 26.1). Following a disaster, satellite data are the first to become available, followed by aerial Post-event collection of damage data photographs, which provide more detailed Learning from their experiences with past images. Aerial surveys are subject to logistical events, Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have delays, whereas satellites are already in orbit been upgrading their emergency response and can generally deliver data within 24 hours plans. One of the JSDF’s tasks is to capture video to a few days, depending on the satellite. With footage of the affected region immediately aerial surveys, by contrast, weather conditions Map 26.1 Interface of the MLIT hazard map Web portal Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Note: The interface shows (in green) the municipalities for which tsunami hazard maps have been published. Clicking on the municipality takes the user to the municipality’s website, where the actual hazard map can be accessed. 234 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G must be good, and the area that a single image of the extent of inundation from the tsunami can cover is smaller than the area covered by a to areas of liquefaction, spot checks in areas of satellite image, prolonging the time required to interest, and estimates of the volume of debris photograph a given area. (table 26.1). The International Charter organization provides member states with a unified system Public-private partnership between of space data acquisition and delivery. Mem- aerial survey firms and the Geospatial ber states can request satellite data at no cost Information Authority of Japan in the event of emergencies following natural Japan has been using remotely sensed data fol- or manmade disasters. Remotely sensed data lowing major natural hazard events for some are analyzed by predesignated value-adding time. In 1995, following the Great Hanshin- vendors to derive and deliver the information Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake, the National requested by the affected country. After the Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) flew heli- GEJE, the International Charter was activated copters with high-definition video cameras through the Cabinet Office of Japan, the desig- over Kobe city to capture the damage. Private nated authorized user in Japan. Products pro- aerial survey firms deploy aircraft to take aer- duced through the charter ranged from maps ial photographs and other types of remotely Table 26.1 Excerpts from survey of end users on the use of satellite-based remotely sensed data carried out by JAXA, 2011 END USER USE OF DATA Cabinet Secretariat Spot checks of areas of interest, for example, Sendai airport, Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. Pre- and postevent images. Maps of maximum inundation. Cabinet Office Overview map using ALOS postearthquake images. International Charter products. Imagery related to Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Maps of maximum extent of inundation. Data based on interpretation of PALSAR and AVNIR-2 taken on Transport and Tourism March 21, 25, and 30, 2011. Information on areas with stagnant water also continuously provided. Request to monitor 40,000 areas designated as being at high risk from landslide. Wildfire monitoring. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry Request for information on inundation and presence of stagnant water in agricultural areas. MAFF estimates and Fisheries (MAFF) inundated agricultural area to be 24,000 hectares in six prefectures. Information on inundation in the northern parts of Chiba and Ibaraki prefectures also requested. Data to be used by MAFF to validate ground surveys and for recovery planning. Fishery Agency Collaboration sought to assist in offshore search for lost ships. Ministry of Environment Request to assist in mapping debris floating off the coast of Sanriku. 560,000 m2 of debris already identified in vicinity of Rikuzentakata alone. Ministry of Education, Culture, Images of Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. Sports, Science and Technology Geospatial Information Providing all available imagery. Using electronic control points provided by GSI and InSAR data analyzed by Authority of Japan (GSI) JAXA; crustal deformation of 3.5 meters was identified in Oshika Peninsula. Miyagi Prefecture Sighting of an SOS sign in a park in Miyagi Prefecture was reported by the International Charter. Iwate Prefecture/University Monitoring of road accessibility. Kanto Regional Development Mapping of liquefaction areas provided through International Charter. Bureau Source: JAXA 2011. Note: ALOS = Advanced Land Observation Satellite; PALSAR = phased array type L-band synthetic aperture radar; AVNIR-2 = advanced visible and near infrared radiometer type 2; InSAR = interferometric synthetic aperture radar; JAXA = Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. 2 6 : R I S K A N D D A M AG E I N F O R M AT I O N M A N AG E M E N T | 235 sensed data (for example, LiDAR data, in the Although GSI’s inundation mapping was case of landslides or volcanic eruptions) fol- considered the official information, other orga- lowing every natural disaster event in Japan. nizations used various methodologies and data Currently the major aerial survey companies sources to map the extent of inundation (a list have a public-private partnership with the of these can be found in Earthquake Engineer- Geospatial Information Authority of Japan ing Field Investigation Team [EEFIT] 2011). (GSI) under which they jointly capture dam- For 30 municipalities the Statistics Bureau age information, thus avoiding duplication of of Japan compared the difference between the effort. The agreement has been in effect for estimate of the population affected by inunda- some years, resulting in an archive of records tion derived using GSI’s aerial photographs documenting the changes caused by natural with that produced by a private company. Some disasters in Japan. of the differences are shown in table  26.2. In Following the GEJE and tsunami, the part- most cases, the differences between the two nership spent a month taking aerial photo- estimates are negligible in relation to the total graphs of the entire Tohoku region coastline population in the respective municipalities. In (approximately 500 kilometers, [km]). a few cases, however, the difference amounted to more than 20 percent of the total popula- Tsunami inundation mapping using tion of that municipality. In Shiogama the dif- remotely sensed data ference between the estimates was more than As early as five days after the tsunami, the GSI 30  percent of the total population. The full announced the first estimate of the total inun- comparison results can be found on the Statis- dation area as 400 square kilometers (km2), tics Bureau’s website. based on manual interpretation of aerial pho- In an independent validation of the map- tographs taken on March 12 and 13. One month ping performed using Japan Aerospace Explo- after the event, on April 18, the government offi- ration Agency’s (JAXA) ALOS satellite image cially announced the total inundation extent to and GSI’s aerial photographs, Sawada (2011) be 561 km2. The increase reflected the avail- found a substantial difference in the area shown ability of additional aerial photographs and as inundated: interpretations based on aerial high-resolution optical satellite images of areas photographs reported twice as much inundated previously not covered. area as interpretations based on satellite images. Table 26.2 Examples of the difference between estimates of the affected population in municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture using two different estimates of the extent of inundation POPULATION WITHIN INUNDATED AREA DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE AS POPULATION AS ESTIMATED BETWEEN GSI PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL (2007 AS ESTIMATED BY PRIVATE AND PRIVATE TOTAL MUNICIPALITY CENSUS) BY GSI COMPANY COMPANY POPULATION Miyagino-ku 182,678 17,375 11,858 5,517 3.0 Wakabayashi-ku 129,942 9,386 8,700 686 0.5 Taihaku-ku 222,447 3,201 2,519 682 0.3 Ishinomaki 167,324 112,276 102,670 9,606 5.7 Shiogama 59,357 18,718 173 18,545 31.2 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 236 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G Spatial data preparedness in Japan Decision makers need spatial data to make informed decisions about disaster prepared- ness, post-event responses, and recovery plan- ning. Spatial data provide information on the location of key infrastructure, populations, agriculture, industrial facilities, education and health facilities, and so on. In Japan these data sets are freely available from the GSI website Figure 26.1 Commercial per-building exposure data set (left) and post-3.11 in both raster and vector formats. Building- aerial photograph of the same area (right) Source: All311 website. specific data on exposure levels are also com- Note: The open source platform (http://all311.ecom-plat.jp/) provides the ability to overlay the two. mercially available for the entire country. These maps can be accessed at volunteer centers in the Tohoku region. Local governments can Overlaying these data sets with the mapped apply to have the system installed at no cost in their areas. hazard (for example, the extent of tsunami inundation) permits a rapid damage assess- ment. Commercial building-specific data BOX 26.1 sets were made available at no cost to enable Crowd-sourced damage assessment using remotely response agencies to assist in the relief and sensed data in Haiti and New Zealand recovery activities (figure 26.1, box 26.1). When hazard information is combined with geocoded data on key infra- Quick determination of government structure and mechanisms to analyze “big data” (for example, crowd- compensation and insurance payments sourcing), it has the potential to provide damage information rapidly and through the use of aerial photographs with reasonable accuracy. In the case of the tsunami damage assessment Aerial photographs were used in an innova- following the GEJE, a binary damage-assessment system was used, in which building-level data on structures that had been geocoded before the tive way to determine compensation pay- event was overlaid on data on the extent of the disaster, permitting a ments from local governments and payouts high-confidence assessment of whether a building was destroyed. of earthquake insurance. Because the area Similar methodologies have been used and continue to be tested for of inundation was clearly visible from aerial earthquake damage assessment in Haiti and in Christchurch, New Zealand. photographs, and because the tsunami was so Large-scale crowd-sourced earthquake damage assessments have been powerful, it was deemed that structures located carried out with a view to operationalizing the methodology. Accuracy assessments are being performed to ascertain the level of accuracy that is within the coastal inundation zones were com- achievable using these tools. Remotely sensed data has also been used for pletely destroyed. The owners, therefore, were flood damage assessment. In all cases, it is clear that the accuracy of the eligible for full compensation. damage assessment increases where pertinent data on key infrastructure The innovation in these cases lies in the are available, making a strong case for data preparedness. fact that payouts were made without sending an inspector or a loss adjuster to the address— that is, the aerial photographs were the sole source of claim verification. This system expe- sites where data are available can be difficult. dited the claim-payment process, resulting in OpenStreetMap (OSM) is an international an average payout by the earthquake insurance volunteer technical community dedicated schemes of $250 million per day during the last to producing freely available, detailed topo- week of April 2011—1.5 months after the earth- graphic data for the entire globe. Local volun- quake (see chapter 29). teers donate their time to trace satellite images Although data preparedness is advanced made available for the purpose. To accommo- in Japan, some of the information is available date the international community’s need for only in Japanese, and navigating the web- topographic maps and English annotation, 2 6 : R I S K A N D D A M AG E I N F O R M AT I O N M A N AG E M E N T | 237 communities at risk from natural disasters by involving them in collecting data on their own communities. Online platforms to store and distribute spatial data following the earthquake and tsunami Much of the spatial data created following the GEJE is open data. Several online platforms have been created to host and distribute these open datasets to assist in damage assessment, to facilitate response and relief activities on Figure 26.2 Online interface of Geospatial Disaster the ground, and to help local communities. Management Mash-up Service Study (GDMS) Two such platforms are the Emergency Map- Source: GDMS website, http://gdms.jp. ping Team (EMT) and the Geospatial Disaster Management Mash-up Service Study (GDMS, OSM volunteers created detailed maps of the figure 26.2). Most of the platforms use a map entire Tohoku coastal region and began pub- interface, against which the data hosted on the lishing the resulting topographic maps online system are visualized spatially. just a few hours after the main shock. The OSM maps are open; that is, the data Use of social media for bottom-up can be used across different platforms and information sharing without any restrictions. Another charac- In recent years, the use of social media in post- teristic of the maps is that all annotations disaster settings has spread around the world. are available in the local language as well as Even after the tsunami, when the entire phone in English. Moreover, the styles used in the network and Internet were down, information maps are standardized, providing a consis- from the affected areas came through on social tent feel. In some countries, the OSM platform media such as Twitter and Facebook (chap- is being used as a tool to raise awareness in ter  15). Many families stayed in touch using these media in the immediate aftermath. Japa- nese mobile networks and telecommunication companies have well-established systems that allow subscribers to leave messages for their loved ones. Google set up an online person finder after the GEJE. Twitter, Facebook, and new types of social media such as Ushahidi are establishing themselves as a global standard for collecting information on needs in local communities. Ushahidi is an open source online interface that allows bottom-up information sharing. Map 26.2 The interface of Sinsai.info (based on the Ushahidi platform) Developed to ensure a fair election in Kenya Source: http://www.sinsai.info/. in 2008, the platform is designed to allow Note: The red circles show the number and locations of the requests from local communities. The anyone to upload information or requests for diameters of the circles are proportional to the number of requests logged at that location. OSM Japan, prepared following the event by local and international OSM volunteers, is used as the help, using Twitter or e-mail, which are visu- backdrop. alized on a map interface (map 26.2), thus 238 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G making them actionable items. Sinsai.info, • Crowd-sourced methods for collecting dam- a combination of Ushahidi and OSM Japan, age information have great potential. After was launched in the immediate aftermath of the GEJE, OSM volunteers were mobilized the GEJE, when OSM data was being used to create topographical maps of the region as the base map to display requests for help with annotations in English and Japanese. coming in from communities in the Tohoku • Online platforms were created to host and region. distribute spatial data useful for response All311 is another site that was launched and recovery. Sinsai.info and All311 are two immediately after the event. Hosted by the examples. National Research Institute for Earth Sci- ence and Disaster Prevention (NIED) and built using an e-community platform devel- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR oped by NIED, the site is a one-stop shop for DEVELOPING COUNTRIES information on ongoing activities, both top- down and bottom-up, in the recovery process. A one-stop online portal is a good way of dis- Information is provided in Japanese only. Its seminating hazard maps for a given country. e-community is an open source tool for devel- However, in countries where Internet access is oping information-sharing platforms with not readily available, an online portal may not spatial content. necessarily be optimal. Conventional methods, such as paper maps and booklets, should be utilized as well. LESSONS Data preparedness is a key ingredient for both pre-event disaster risk management and post- • Satellite images are available before aerial event damage assessment and reconstruction photographs, but they do not reveal as much planning. Data collection on key infrastructure detail. After the GEJE, a standing public- should be carried out during normal times and private partnership between the major kept up to date. The data can be used for other aerial survey companies and GSI captured purposes such as town planning. aerial photographs of the areas affected by Satellite images and aerial photographs the GEJE. GSI published an estimate of the are now routinely used for postevent damage inundated area five days after the event, assessment. Damage assessment can be car- based on manual interpretation of the aer- ried out with reasonable accuracy by com- ial photographs then available. bining data on infrastructure with exposure data. Collected data should have a specific, • The limits of technology for response activi- well-managed repository and be paired with ties should be recognized. In the GEJE, the appropriate tools to analyze the data for risk- inundation area mapped from aerial photo- assessment purposes. graphs was much larger than that mapped New information and communications tech- from satellite images. nology tools are increasingly being used in emer- • Aerial photographs expedited the claim- gency situations. Open source portals, such as payment process. By overlaying the tsunami the Ushahidi-based sinsai.info, are important inundation estimates with commercially tools that allow requests for help from local available building-level data sets, it was people to be logged and acted upon. Creating possible, for insurance purposes, to desig- protocols for how these volunteer-based com- nate structures that had been completely munities can work with official government destroyed by the tsunami. entities is increasingly important. 2 6 : R I S K A N D D A M AG E I N F O R M AT I O N M A N AG E M E N T | 239 NOTE Countermeasures in the Regional Disaster Man- agement Plan. http://www.fdma.go.jp Prepared by Keiko Saito, World Bank. Special thanks /disaster/chiikibousai_kento/01/shiryo_05.pdf. to the Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Team (EEFIT), United Kingdom. Recovery). 2011. Volunteer Technology Communi- ties Open Development. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites /gfdrr.org/files/documents/Volunteer%20 BIBLIOGRAPHY Technology%20Communities%20-%20Open %20Development.pdf. ALL311. 2011. http://all311.ecom-plat.jp/ [in Japanese]. GSI (Geospatial Information Authority of Japan). 2011. Corbane, C., K. Saito, E. Bjorgo, L. Dell’Oro, R. Eguchi, “Estimate of the Inundation Area” [in Japanese]. G. Evans, S. Ghosh, B. Adams, R. Gartley, F. Ghes- http://www.gsi.go.jp/kikaku/kikaku60001 quiere, S. Gill, T. Kemper, R. S. G. Krishnan, .html (version 1); http://www.gsi.go.jp/common G. Lemoine, B. Piard, O. Senegas, R. Spence, /000059939.pdf (version 5). W. Svekla, and J. Toro. 2011. “A Comprehensive JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency). 2011. Analysis of Building Damage in the January “Use of Satellite Based Data for the Great East 12, 2010, M7 Haiti Earthquake Using High- Japan Earthquake and Tsunami” [in Japanese]. Resolution Satellite and Aerial Imagery.” Photog- http://www.jaxa.jp/press/2011/04/20110406_ rammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, sac_earthquakes.pdf. Special issue on the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and EEFIT (Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Tourism). 2011. “Disaster Portal” [in Japanese]. Team). 2011. The Mw9.0 Tohoku Earthquake and http://disapotal.gsi.go.jp/. Tsunami of 11th March 2011—A Field Report by EEFIT. London, U.K.: EEFIT. http://www.istructe Sawada, H. 2011. “Remote Sensing for Emergency .org/resources-centre/technical-topic-areas/eefit Mapping.” PowerPoint presentation [in Japanese]. /eefit-reports. http://stlab.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~sawada/files/ GreatEarthquakePresentatio0425.pdf. Fire and Disaster Management Agency. 2011. “Disas- ter Management Measures of Municipalities Statistics Bureau. 2011. http://www.stat.go.jp/info and their Response to the Great East Japan /shinsai/zuhyou/sai.xls [in Japanese]. Earthquake,” slide 2 [in Japanese]. Paper pre- Ushahidi. 2011. http://www.ushahidi.com/. sented at the first meeting of the Enhancement ZENRIN. 2011. http://www.zenrin.co.jp/news/110415 and Strengthening of Earthquake and Tsunami .html [in Japanese]. 240 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G CHAPTER 27 Risk Communication Risk communication is an important component of disaster risk management because it shapes peo- ple’s perceptions of risk and influences their actions with respect to disaster preparedness and disaster response. It also influences the intervention decisions that are made throughout the disaster man- agement cycle. The credibility of the information source takes a long time to build and needs to be well established before a disaster strikes. In Japan, the level of trust in government and other official communications was sorely tested following the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Disaster preparedness is often perceived as planning for disaster preparedness, and people being mainly a governmental responsibility, took ownership of their own safety plans, they with information and directives traveling from were better prepared and better able to take the top down. That is the case to some extent, the necessary actions to protect themselves. since local communities generally lack the Successful risk communication occurs tools and skills needed to conduct scientific risk when there is holistic learning, facilitation, and assessments and fully understand the under- trust. In holistic learning, the gap in knowledge lying risk in their localities without expert between the information sender and receiver assistance. The problem with the top-down is minimal (figure 27.1). Hazard maps, book- approach is that policies may be imposed on lets, and videos can all help narrow that gap communities without taking local conditions when it comes to disaster education and risk into account, and communities may become communication. overly dependent on information coming from Normally, the information generators or the government. Recent experiences from the senders are government agencies, universities, Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) showed or research institutions that have the capac- that when the local community was involved in ity to assess risk and the political mandate to 241 In some cases, the underestimation of the height of the tsunami in the warnings that went out on March 11 likely delayed evacua- Knowledge level tion and possibly increased fatalities (chap- ter 7). Japan’s proposed new early warning scheme will not include any numerical values Holistic learning for tsunami height in the first warning but will use more descriptive expressions, such as Local people Specialists Local people Specialists “massive” or “very high” waves, in the event of earthquakes larger than magnitude 8. These Professional knowledge Local knowledge terms will be further qualified by expressions Figure 27.1 The concept of holistic learning: Narrowing the gap between such as a “tsunami height equivalent to the local and specialist knowledge GEJE is expected.” Information sender Information receiver Official risk communication tools: Needs and concerns Hazard maps Specialists Officers Two-way Local people In Japan, hazard maps indicate expected haz- INGOs Interactive NGOs ard levels and locations as well as the location Researchers Needs related risk of evacuation centers and routes (chapter 25). information Map 27.1 was prepared by the village of Toni Figure 27.2 The risk communication framework (Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture) in a local Source: Kikkawa 1999. implement disaster risk management (DRM) measures. The information receivers are the communities, businesses, and individu- als who have knowledge of the local area and are the ultimate users of the risk information (figure 27.2). FINDINGS The importance of trusting the information provider Early warnings greatly influence how people perceive and evaluate the risks from immi- nent hazard and their subsequent decision to evacuate. In this respect, the level of trust in and the credibility of the person, institution, or medium issuing the warning is of crucial importance. Furthermore, factors such as fatal- ism can affect evacuation decisions. People Map 27.1 Hazard map produced by the village of who have responded to too many false alarms Toni in Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture may not take the warnings seriously. Source: Kamaishi City. 242 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G workshop with community members. It I suffered from disaster in the past 42% includes predicted inundation depths indi- I felt danger 35% cated by colors, historical records of inundated in the past areas, lead times, evacuation shelters, and tele- I want to get information 59% about disaster phone numbers for warnings. The hazard map I want to get on with neighborhood 29% was printed and distributed to all families in Because I am an Toni before the GEJE. administrator of Jichikai 9% Developing this type of disaster map 7% Because I am a fighter through a participatory process is an effective way of communicating risk to the community Because I have an interest 40% at large. A postdisaster survey in the Toni area Others 2% identified citizens’ motivations for participat- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ing in the mapmaking process (figure 27.3). N=231 Percent Figure 27.3 Reasons given by people in Toni Village for participating in the Problems with the hazard maps in use hazard mapping exercise before the GEJE Source: Kyoto University. Mapping schemes differ in the colors and sym- bols used to convey hazard information. In the United States, efforts are being made to ensure the consistency of the content of hazard maps, as landslides or cyclones. A Web portal main- as well as their design. tained by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, While hazard maps are useful tools to help Transport and Tourism provides access to all communities understand the risks they face, hazard maps created throughout the country there are, nevertheless, uncertainties associ- (see chapter 26 for details). ated with the assessment of the hazard risk itself—future disasters may exceed the levels Informal tool: Local knowledge indicated on the maps. In addition to produc- along the Sanriku Coast ing and delivering the maps, their content The Tohoku region has two contrasting topo- should be presented to local communities, as graphic features. One is the Sendai plain, south was done in Toni Village. In the course of such of Sendai City, which is relatively flat and offers presentations, governments and experts must little access to higher ground close to the coast. explain the limitations of prediction technol- The other is the Sanriku-ria coast north of Sen- ogy. In the GEJE, the maps provided residents dai, where the mountains are near the coast. with a false sense of safety. Only 20 percent of These topographical characteristics influence residents utilized hazard maps for their evacu- the kinds of informal evacuation strategies ation in the GEJE (chapter 25). used in the respective areas. Another way of raising awareness of risk is Tendenko is a term used in the Sanriku coastal through evacuation drills carried out under as area, referring to self-evacuation without stop- many different scenarios as possible, for exam- ping to look for family members, neighbors, or ple, at night or in rainy weather (chapter 11). relatives. The assumption is that everyone will Education at school is also effective to prepare self-evacuate, and therefore there is no need to for disasters (chapter 8). be concerned about others. Depending on the Although risks from tsunamis are now location of an earthquake’s epicenter, the lead well understood in the wake of the March 11 time between the main shock and the arrival event, communities must also become aware of the tsunami can be short. In these cases it of the risks from other possible disasters, such is imperative that people self-evacuate without 2 7 : R I S K CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 243 affected by the accident at the Fukushima station nor the public at large believed that the government was providing truthful and accurate information in a timely man- ner. Examples include the government’s information about the status of the reac- tor cores—core meltdowns in particular— and the critical condition of unit 3, as well Figure 27.4 Designated evacuation building (left) and evacuation road as the unclear statement, repeated several (right) in Kamaishi times, that the radiation “will not immedi- Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. ately affect human bodies.” Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (2012) delay. This is practical in the coastal area of reported that “Seventy-four percent of people Sanriku because of the proximity of higher at the affected areas were dissatisfied with the ground (figure 27.4). information provided because: But the tendenko concept does not apply in the Sendai plain because there is no higher • The background and the reasoning behind ground nearby (figure 27.5). There, public the reports and recommendations com- buildings such as schools or community cen- ing from the official sources were not well ters are used as evacuation centers. explained and therefore could not be trusted. • The briefings did not include enough detail.” Risk communication following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Also, the government committee pointed Power Station out that “water contaminated by radiation was The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear discharged into the ocean without notifying Power Station highlighted the issue of risk neighboring countries. Although this did not communication in nuclear emergencies. The violate any relevant international conventions, Investigation Committee on the Accident at it may have led the international community to the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (2011) question Japan’s competence in responding to reported: nuclear disasters.” • Communication from the government had been far from ideal. The government delayed providing urgent information, LESSONS withheld press releases, and was unclear in its explanations. . . . Neither those directly Earthquake and tsunami risk communication Risk communication is meant to help people save their own lives. For communication to be effective, people must be able to trust the infor- mation and its source, and it takes a long time to build that trust. There are formal and informal tools for com- Figure 27.5 Flat area in Sendai Plain offering no possibility of evacuating to municating risk. Hazard maps and early warn- higher ground ings systems are the formal tools that Japan Source: © Kyoto University. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. has used, both of which are being revised in 244 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G light of the GEJE, since both underestimated mass media, the public, embassies, and local the actual risk. Hazard risk information should agencies. be continuously updated. Develop coordination capacity. Mechanisms Informal communication tools include local for information sharing should be established knowledge such as tendenko, practiced on the among relevant agencies such as the Office of Sanriku coast, where self-evacuation with- the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign out waiting for family members and others is Affairs. Communication equipment and manu- encouraged as soon as a large ground shaking als are also necessary. is felt. These types of approaches and local knowledge based on experiences with large tsunamis should be preserved and passed from RECOMMENDATIONS FOR generation to generation. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Participatory DRM planning by the local community is an effective way of communi- Establish trust between information senders cating risk. Different forms of communication ( for example, the government) and receivers may have to be used for different age groups. (local communities). Trust is a big part of effec- The local social structure can be leveraged to tive risk communication. If the information facilitate emergency planning, for example, by source cannot be trusted, real communication enlisting local leaders in their various roles and is impossible—and it takes a long time to estab- functions. lish trust. Complacency is also an issue. Over- Regular drills and education also have an reliance on early warnings, hazard maps, and important role in shaping the perception of incoming information should be discouraged. risk in local communities. Use a variety of tools to communicate risk. Complacency is a constant problem. Even Risk communication tools range from sophisti- people who have already experienced disas- cated communication systems to participatory ters need to be reminded of the importance of emergency planning, including community being prepared. People can also become overly hazard mapping, disaster evacuation drills, reliant on early warning systems. neighborhood watches, instruction in schools, and the passing of experience from generation Nuclear accident to generation based on previous events. Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, The way in which risk is communicated in a government regulatory body, has proposed the early warning system is also important. the following actions to improve risk commu- Although sophisticated early warning systems nication in the event of nuclear accidents. and technologies are important during a disas- Develop technical capacity. The techni- ter, the public should understand limitations of cal capacity of staff to analyze information on prediction technology. accidents and to implement countermeasures Leverage the interest that local leaders may should be enhanced through specialist training have in community preparedness and be aware programs. of social structures, which vary from country Develop communication capacity. Communi- to country and place to place. Work with local cation officers should be trained in disaster risk change agents to provide training and to develop communications. Preparing manuals, commu- an appropriate risk communication strategy. nication materials, and answers to frequently Take a multihazard approach. The differ- asked questions is also necessary. Communica- ence in Japan’s preparedness for the earth- tion channels should be established with the quake and tsunami versus its preparedness 2 7 : R I S K CO M M U N I C AT I O N | 245 for the nuclear accident following the GEJE BIBLIOGRAPHY demonstrates the importance of considering Committee on the Issuance Standards and Infor- all hazards, not just those that are most likely mation Statement of Tsunami Warnings. 2011. to happen (chapter 36). A good communica- Recommendations for Issuance Standards and tion strategy is one piece of an overall response Information Statement of Tsunami Warnings [in Japanese]. http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press plan, which was lacking for the nuclear acci- /1112/16a/teigenan.pdf. dent at Fukushima Daiichi. EEFIT (Earthquake Engineering Field Investiga- Update and monitor. Risks are dynamic and tion Team). 2011. The Mw9.0 Tohoku Earthquake change over time depending on population and Tsunami of 11 March 2011: A Field Report by EEFIT. London: EEFIT. http://www.istructe.org increases or decreases, the development of new /resources-centre/technical-topic-areas/eefit industrial facilities and commercial properties, /eefit-reports. the availability of new hazard information, and Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fuku- scientific innovations. Risk information should shima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric be updated regularly and reflected in risk com- Power Company. 2011. Interim Report. Tokyo. Kikkawa, T. 1999. Risk Communication: Aiming at munication strategies. Mutual Understanding and Better Decision Making [in Japanese]. Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan. Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. 2012. Issues NOTE Regarding Public Hearings and Public Relations Prepared by Rajib Shaw, Yukiko Takeuchi, and Shohei Activities On the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Matsuura, Kyoto University; and Keiko Saito, World Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Bank. Company and Future Effort [in Japanese]. Tokyo. 246 | V : H A Z A R D A N D R I S K I N F O R M AT I O N A N D D E C I S I O N M A K I N G PART VI The Economics of Disaster Risk, Risk Management, and Risk Financing CHAPTER 28 Measuring the Cost-Effectiveness of Various Disaster Risk Management Measures The Japanese experience shows that—if done right—preventive investments pay. The Japanese gov- ernment invested about 7–8 percent of the total budget for disaster risk management (DRM) in the 1960s, a move that most probably decreased disaster deaths. Cost-effectiveness analysis and cost- benefit analysis of DRM projects have been widely implemented both at national and local levels in Japan. Different procedures for such analysis have been followed according to the type of project, the funds, and the governing entity responsible. The Japanese experience shows that cost-benefit analysis is applicable to DRM-related projects and is a useful tool in choosing among different options and understanding the effectiveness of a project. The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and FINDINGS other recent disasters remind us of the impor- tance of early actions to implement adequate National budget for disaster prevention measures, mitigate risks, and risk management establish sound postdisaster financing mecha- Every year many people lose their lives and nisms to reduce human, economic, and finan- property in Japan due to natural disasters. Up cial impacts. Even if documented evidence is until the 1950s, numerous large-scale typhoons still lacking, there is a growing consensus that and earthquakes caused extensive damage and investing in disaster risk management (DRM) thousands of casualties (figure 28.1). In the is cost-effective, though measuring cost sav- 1960s, DRM spending represented 7–8 per- ings is difficult. Several lessons can be derived cent of the national budget (figure 28.2). As from the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and mechanisms to cope with disasters and miti- cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) conducted gate vulnerability to them have progressed (by in Japan. developing DRM systems, promoting national 249 16,000 Great East Japan Earthquake Mikawa Earthquake (2,306 people) and 15,854 confirmed dead (as of March 28, 2012) 14,000 Makurazaki Typhoon (3,756 people) Disaster deaths (persons) 12,000 Kathleen Typhoon (1,930 people) Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Fukui Earthquake (3,769 people) Earthquake (6,437 people) 10,000 Nanki Torrential Rain (1,124 people) 8,000 Toyamaru Typhoon (1,761 people) 6,000 Isewan Typhoon (5,098 people) 3,089 missing 4,000 2,000 0 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 Figure 28.1 Disaster deaths in Japan, 1945–2011 Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). 4,000,000 9 3,500,000 8 Share in national budget (%) Budget (¥ million) 3,000,000 7 2,500,000 6 2,000,000 5 1,500,000 4 1,000,000 3 500,000 2 0 1 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 DRM budget Share in national budget Figure 28.2 Change in DRM spending, 1963–2011 Source: MLIT. land conservation, improving weather fore- people lost their lives on March 11, the mor- casting technologies, and upgrading disaster tality ratio of the GEJE—which hit during the information communications systems), the daytime—was considerably lower compared to number of disaster-related casualties, espe- the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami of 1896 (nighttime) cially from floods, has been decreasing over the or the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 (which years with the exception of a few outliers. also hit during the day) (figure 28.3). Over the years, the Japanese government Comparison of damage with has invested in structural and nonstructural other tsunami disasters measures to prevent disasters and reduce their The GEJE is the strongest earthquake ever impacts. Around ¥1 trillion was invested in recorded in Japan; the destruction it caused coastal dikes and breakwaters just in the areas is staggering. But it is clear that if Japan were affected by the GEJE, and yearly investments not so well prepared, things could have been in earthquake monitoring and warning systems much worse. amounted to about ¥2 billion. Furthermore, a A longstanding tradition of effective disas- number of nonstructural measures—including ter prevention paid off. While almost 20,000 community-based DRM (chapter 6), DRM 250 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G GEJE Tsunami Meiji Sanriku Tsunami Indian Ocean Tsunami Chile Tsunami 2011 (daytime) 1896 (nighttime) 2004 (daytime) 2010 (daytime) 19,780 21,920 227,000 124 4% 43% 12% 2% 5,000 51,000 510,000 1,927,000 Tsunami (year) Dead + missing (a) Damaged houses Population in affected area (b) a/b (%) GEJE (2011) 19,780 259,415 510,000 4 a Meiji Sanriku (1896) 21,920 7,957 51,000 43 Figure 28.3 Indian Ocean (2004) 227,000 1,700,000 (in population) 1,927,000b 12 Comparison of Chile (2010) 124 1,500 5,000c 2 damage from four a. Number of damaged houses × average number of household members in lwate (6.38). tsunami events b. Dead + population lost houses. Source: Cabinet Office c. Number of damaged houses × average number of household members (3.5). and World Bank data. education (chapter 8), and business continu- time periods) from the perspective of society. ity plans (chapter 9)—have been further devel- But for most DRM projects there is a lack of oped over the years. information, especially regarding benefits and profits, making it difficult to accurately Measuring cost-effectiveness estimate the cost-effectiveness of measures It is essential to make sure that limited finan- (Mechler 2005). cial resources are used in a cost-effective way. Effective spending has high rates of return Cost-benefit analysis in Japan but is difficult in practice. There are variet- In Japan project appraisals, including CBA, ies of criteria being used for evaluating the are conducted for public works projects before cost-effectiveness of projects, such as CBA, they are adopted, and every three to five years CEA, multicriteria analysis (MCA), and so on. after adoption to evaluate project efficiency CBA is a well-known tool, particularly useful (figure 28.4). Committees for project appraisal for governments seeking to compare alter- (consisting of academic, business, or legal natives. CBA is used to organize and present experts) are established for national and local costs and benefits of measures and projects entities responsible for project implementa- and to evaluate cost efficiency. CBA was origi- tion, who evaluate the project efficiency of nally developed as a rate-of-return assess- adopted projects. The committees assess the ment and financial appraisal method to assess need, cost benefits, progress, possibilities for business investments. The main purpose was cost reduction, and the continuity of projects. to compare all the costs and benefits of an The appraisal results and associated docu- investment (even if accruing across different ments are made open to the public to ensure sectors, in different locations, and in different the transparency of decision making. 2 8 : M E A S U R I N G T H E CO ST- E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F VA R I O U S D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T M E A S U R E S | 251 Evaluation to adopt The GPEA calls for all government policies, a new project programs, and projects to be assessed before Adoption of a new project Evaluate necessity and validity their inception, to be evaluated after their of the project including CBA completion, and to be reassessed or subjected to interim evaluation when necessary. If the project Stop has not started Cost-benefit analysis for coastal projects after 3 years Under the Government Policy Evaluation Act Reevaluation of the project Continue in 2001, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Make a decision to continue or not from the following Transport and Tourism (MLIT) conducts CBA Start of the project 3 viewpoints: on every project based on the Technical Guide- (1) Necessity of the project: • Change of social and lines of CBA for Public Works Projects (2004). economic situation These guidelines set out the overarching prin- 5 years after • Cost effectiveness (CBA) Stop the adoption • Progress ciples to be followed by each individual depart- (2) Expected progress in future (3) Possibility of cost reduction ment (such as those overseeing rivers, roads, Continue or alternatives or urban development) of the MLIT. Main- 3 years tenance and management of existing infra- Stop after the reevaluation structure and disaster-rehabilitation works (every 3 years) are excluded. The Reconstruction Agency Continue has confirmed that post- GEJE rehabilitation Evaluation after the project Completion of the project efforts are not subject to CBA evaluation. Evaluate the effects, environmental impacts, and In 1987 the MLIT and Ministry of Agri- Feedback to social and economic benefits, culture, Forestry and Fisheries published the other projects and examine appropriate if necessary 5 years after measures to improve if “Guidelines for Cost Benefit Analysis in Coastal the completion necessary. The results are Works.” The guidelines were revised in 2004 reflected in future projects. following the inclusion of disaster prevention, Figure 28.4 MLIT public works project evaluation process, based on environmental conservation, and seacoast uti- Government Policy Evaluation Act (2002) lization considerations into the objectives of Source: MLIT. the Seacoast Act (figure 28.5). The guidelines Note: CBA = cost-benefit analysis. recommend that benefits from seacoast works A system for evaluating government poli- projects should be quantified into monetary cies was first introduced in Japan at the values as much as possible based on probabili- prefectural government level to reassess or ties and risks relevant to the following issues: conduct interim evaluations of ongoing proj- • Protection of inland properties from flood- ects. The first attempt at such evaluation was ing by tsunamis and storm surge (expected done by the Hokkaido prefectural govern- losses are estimated by multiplying the ment in 1997. damage ratio to the value of properties such The central government, recognizing the as buildings, crops, public infrastructure, importance of such a system, established the and so on) Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) in • Prevention or mitigation of damage to land 2001, to provide a legal framework for evalu- and properties from erosion (the same ating government policies. The GPEA aims method of protection of properties from to promote accountability; provide efficient, flooding) high-quality government services and projects; and ensure that the outcomes of these services • Prevention or mitigation of damage by and projects meet the needs of the nation. blown sands and sea spray on inland 252 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G properties and crops, and negative effects on daily life such as through additional labor Present situation (expected losses are estimated by evaluating the depreciated value of buildings, damaged Planning stage crops, and labor loads for cleaning) Project needs • Protection of natural environments such as ecosystems and water quality, and the Project planning development of better landscape planning • Draft project plan including alternatives (the values of natural landscapes and eco- • Coordination among stakeholders • Consistency with local development plans systems along the seacoast are estimated, as • Project implementation criteria are the benefits of implementing projects; the seawater purification function of the beach is also valued) Comprehensive evaluation of the project • Utilization of the seacoast for activities • Effectiveness of the project such as recreation and sea bathing (the val- (i) Cost-benefit analysis (ii) Analysis of nonmonetary impacts ues of the expansion of recreation activities, • Impartiality and urgency Analyzing stage fatigue recovery effects, land development, • Implementation environment and so on are estimated) Specific costs to implement a project— Yes Necessary to including major initial outlays for the invest- reexamine? ment effort and maintenance expenses—are estimated. The costs and benefits identified No have to be discounted to ensure that current Publication of plan and evaluation result and future effects are comparable. Finally, costs and benefits are compared under the economic efficiency decision criteria, such as net present Comprehensive and systematic evaluation value, benefit-cost ratio (B/C), or the economic internal rate of return (EIRR). Evaluation stage The breakwater construction project in Kuji Port, Iwate Prefecture—started in 1990 and To be adopted? Not adopted No scheduled to be completed in 2028—is a good Yes example of a CBA applied to a DRM project. The efficiency of the project was last reevalu- Adoption of the project ated in 2010, when the costs were estimated at ¥108.5 billion and the benefits at ¥136.5 bil- lion. The EIRR was calculated at 4.8 percent, Figure 28.5 Seacoast works: From planning to implementation and B/C at 1.3. In this evaluation, prevention of Source: MLIT. inland flooding and sea disasters were consid- ered as monetized benefits, while a decrease housing from 2,618 to 330 houses (map 28.1). in the affected population, improvement of Annual estimated benefits are moored vessels security, and stability and • Protection from inundation: ¥4.2 billion development of local industry were considered as qualitative benefits. The project is estimated • Protection from marine accident by storm: to reduce the potentially inundated area from ¥5.6 billion 377 to 50 hectares, and reduce the damage to • Residual value: ¥11.4 billion 2 8 : M E A S U R I N G T H E CO ST- E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F VA R I O U S D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T M E A S U R E S | 253 Without breakwater With breakwater The costs considered in the RIA include the costs associated with the approval processes for structures that contribute to tsunami evacuation; the costs of preparing evacua- tion plans or evacuation drills; and various administrative costs for approval, inspection, or monitoring of buildings or land use. The Inundation depth Inundation depth benefits, on the other hand, include preven- > 2m < 2m tion of inappropriate development, facilitation < 2m of prompt evacuation in case of tsunami disas- Map 28.1 Simulated inundation areas ters, and promotion of adequate maintenance Source: MLIT. of tsunami-disaster-mitigation facilities—all of which contribute to the protection of lives and the mitigation of damage in tsunami-risk Regulatory impact analysis assessing areas. These costs and benefits were consid- nonstructural measures in Japan ered qualitatively in the RIA. Assessing the cost-effectiveness of nonstruc- The MLIT has conducted approximately tural measures presents specific challenges. 50 RIAs since 2007. One was conducted, for In Japan, a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) example, when the Act on Promotion of Seis- is legally mandatory since 2007 to improve mic Retrofitting of Buildings was revised in objectiveness and transparency in the pro- 2005 to add schools, welfare facilities, and cess of regulatory establishment. RIAs are buildings for storage or treatment of hazard- applied to nonstructural countermeasures ous objects to those facilities under the guid- such as changes in land-use regulations. They ance of administrative offices, and to establish are designed to objectively assess the poten- “retrofitting support centers” nominated by tial impacts arising from the introduction of a the government. new regulation or the amendment or abolish- ment of an existing regulation. Each ministry New approach to evaluating the publishes guidelines to conduct RIAs, which effectiveness of dual-purpose include CBA requirements. infrastructure For example, an RIA was undertaken before The Sanriku Expressway being constructed the adoption of the Act on Building Com- along the seashore in the tsunami-affected munities Resilient to Tsunami in December Iwate and Miyagi prefectures contributed to 2011. The changes in regulations outlined in the recovery of this area (chapter 4). But the the act—including new land-use regulations evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of such and changes of floor-area-ratios for tsunami- redundant infrastructure (that is, a road used evacuation buildings in the designated as part of a DRM facility) has never been taken zone—were assessed through the RIA. It was into account before in Japan. The Japanese estimated that the benefits from these changes government is now trying to modify its evalua- could outweigh the costs of implementation, tion methodology to include the potential ben- as they develop more resilient urban areas efits of road projects from the perspective of through increased safety of housing and public disaster management and DRM. facilities in tsunami-exposed areas and con- Evaluation methodology is used when the struction restrictions for potentially dangerous MLIT selects a new road construction project buildings. (For more information on the act, that is expected to be a key route for rescue please consult chapter 12.) and relief supplies, materials, and resources for 254 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G emergency response, and to form a wide range a Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and of road networks for DRM. The evaluation of Recovery (GFDRR) study finds a wide varia- the disaster mitigation function encompasses tion in methodologies, assumptions, discount rates, and sensitivity analyses, suggesting that • Necessity. Clarify why the project is needed DRM analyses are highly context sensitive based on DRM considerations (for exam- (GFDRR 2007). ple, for transportation of rescue and relief CBA on infrastructure projects has been supplies, transportation to emergency widely implemented both at national and local medical facilities, and reaching core cities levels in Japan. Different procedures have been in and around the stricken area). identified according to the type of project, the • Efficiency. Numerically estimate the level of funds, and the governing entity responsible. improvement and evaluate its priority (for Different types of costs are included in the example, improvement of the disaster man- analysis, such as operational, maintenance, and agement function by securing transportation fiscal costs; also, different types of benefits are between core cities or within the regional accounted for, such as the protection of inland network, like shortening of travel time, dis- properties and the natural environment or rec- solution of isolated areas, and so on). reational utilization. The Japanese experience shows that CBA is • Effectiveness. Compare the effectiveness applicable to DRM structural projects and is of several alternative plans and similar a useful tool to help choose among different projects. options (higher B/C is one of the variables to be taken into account when making deci- LESSONS sions) and to understand the effectiveness of a project/measure. Nonstructural measures, CEA and, more in particular, CBA, has several such as land-use regulations and building limitations, including the difficulty of account- codes, can be evaluated as well. For example, ing for nonmarket values, the lack of account- administration costs and other necessary ing for the distribution of benefits and costs, costs can be compared when deciding among and the issue of choosing the correct discount alternative measures. rate. In addition, CBA of DRM presents addi- The use of CBA must be adapted to the tional challenges related to the fact that the type of measure that is being evaluated. Infra- planning horizon of DRM measures is typi- structure and soft measures require different cally longer than that of policy makers, and approaches—not only different procedures and that the occurrence of natural hazards needs to calculations, but also different objectives and be captured with stochastic methods (Mechler bottom-line evaluations. It is also important to 2005). Conducting probabilistic CBA often introduce clear guidelines about how, when, proves difficult because of the absence of reli- and where to implement CBA. The Japanese able hazard and vulnerability data. This is per- experience also proves that sectoral guidelines haps the greatest challenge faced by the DRM released by specific ministries are very helpful, community in conducting comprehensive eco- as they describe in practical terms each step to nomic studies of proposed DRM measures in be taken when implementing CBA. developing countries. Despite limitations, CBA While saving lives is the top priority, valuing remains the most commonly used tool to ana- such lives when assessing the potential benefits lyze the benefits and costs of DRM measures. of different measures is extremely challenging In a review of the existing literature on CBA and poses complex ethical and political ques- of DRM measures in developing countries, tions. But ignoring the value of life implicitly 2 8 : M E A S U R I N G T H E CO ST- E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F VA R I O U S D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T M E A S U R E S | 255 considers people “useless”—and it would be projects before their adoption, and then reas- unethical if property is protected but lives are sess their effectiveness to secure transparency not. For example, background work done for and accountability in decision making. the joint United Nations–World Bank (UN- WB) report Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disas- ters shows how, if the value of lives saved were NOTE ignored, retrofitting buildings in the Turkish Prepared by Masato Toyama and Junko Sagara, CTI district of Atakoy would not be cost-effective, Engineering. with a B/C lower than 1. Background work done for the report finds that including a value of life of $750,000 in the benefits, however, tips the BIBLIOGRAPHY scale toward retrofitting. And only by including Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2011. “White the value of lives saved (at $400,000 each) did Paper on Disaster Management 2011” (in earthquake-strengthening measures for apart- Japanese). ment buildings and schools in Turkey pass the Central Disaster Management Council, Japan. 2011. cost-benefit test (UN-WB 2010). This example Report of the Committee for Technical Investiga- tion on Countermeasures for Earthquakes and shows the limitations of CBA. Other techniques Tsunamis Based on the Lessons Learned from the such as MCA have been explored and could be “2011 Earthquake off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku.” more acceptable from an ethical perspective. Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Japan. 2011. MCAs do not at present offer much help for Report of the Study on Fulfillment and Improve- ment of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Reduc- practical decision making in Japan. tion in Regional Disaster Prevention Plans (in Japanese). GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and RECOMMENDATIONS FOR Recovery). 2007. “A Reference Paper on Benefit- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Cost Studies on Disaster Risk Reduction in Devel- oping Countries.” Mechler, R. 2005. “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Natural Despite its limitations the CBA can be a pow- Disaster Risk Management in Developing Coun- erful tool when deciding on and prioritizing tries.” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische DRM measures. It is useful when the issues Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). are complex and there are several competing MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan). 2009. “Guidelines for proposals, and particularly so when comparing Assessment of MLIT Policy on Regulatory Impact alternatives. Analysis” (in Japanese). It is important to set clear rules about when, MLIT and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish- how, and on what CBA should be performed. eries, Japan. 2004. “Guidelines for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Seacoast Works” (in Japanese). Regulatory frameworks, policy procedures, Onishi, T. 2012. “What Lessons We Should Learn from and specific guidelines (possibly at sectoral the Great East Japan Disaster?” Paper presented levels), overseen by specific ministries, can at the 5th GEOSS Asia-Pacific Symposium, Tokyo, certainly improve the implementation of CBA April 2. for DRM. UN–WB (United Nations–World Bank). 2010. Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics Connections between decision making and of Effective Prevention. Washington, DC: World CBA must be clear. CBA can be one informative Bank. input, or one of the main variables in decision Yamamoto, C., and K. Sato. 2007. “Feasibility Studies making. Any decisions should be transparent under the System for Evaluating Government Policies in Japan.” Paper presented at Improving and reviewed regularly. In the Japanese con- Public Expenditure Management for Large-Scale text, project appraisal committees consisting Projects: Focusing on a Feasibility Study, Seoul, of external experts and academics evaluate the May 22–23. 256 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G CHAPTER 29 Earthquake Risk Insurance The March 2011 earthquake that hit East Japan was the fourth-largest ever recorded. It was not only a human tragedy but an economic shock with losses estimated in excess of ¥16,900 billion, making it the costliest disaster in history. Despite this, the Japanese insurance industry is expected to emerge with- out significant financial impairment, thanks to a well-developed residential earthquake risk insurance dual program (with private nonlife insurers and cooperative mutual insurers) based on conserva- tive control of insurers’ liabilities (through insurance policy structures and reinsurance). Meanwhile, more than half of Japanese homeowners are still uninsured, creating a significant fiscal burden for the government. FINDINGS the scheme offered by the largest cooperative mutual insurer, the National Mutual Insurance Residential earthquake insurance: Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (also A dual program with carefully known as JA Kyosai).1 While the perils cov- controlled liabilities ered, assets covered, and extent of coverage are Residential earthquake insurance coverage in similar across the two programs, earthquake Japan relies on two major actors: private non- coverage is offered on a voluntary basis with life insurers and cooperative mutual insurers. risk-based premium rates by private insurers, Despite major differences in their financial and on an automatic basis with flat rates by management of earthquake risk, these two cooperative mutual insurers. insurance systems demonstrated their effi- Both programs are based on conservative ciency in claims settlements and their financial control of insurers’ liabilities. In both pro- viability after the Great East Japan Earth- grams, the claims payments are not intended quake (GEJE). Table 29.1 compares the resi- to provide complete coverage: the maximum dential earthquake insurance scheme offered coverage is limited to 50 percent of the fire by private nonlife insurance companies with insurance amount (subject to upper limits). 257 Table 29.1 The dual residential earthquake insurance system in Japan large share of the cooperative mutual insurer PRIVATE NONLIFE COOPERATIVE MUTUAL market, with 5.4 million households holding INSURERS INSURER JA KYOSAI building endowment policies covering resi- Perils covered Earthquake, volcanic Earthquake, volcanic dential earthquake risk (11 percent of total Jap- eruption, tsunami eruption, tsunami anese households). The cooperative mutual Assets covered Residential dwelling and Residential dwelling insurer Zenrosai has an additional 1.7  million content and content natural disaster policies covering residential Extent of coverage 30–50 percent of fire Up to 50 percent of earthquake risk, accounting for a further 3 per- insurance amount with limits fire insurance amount cent of total Japanese households. with limits Coverage purchase Optional endorsement to Automatically included Private nonlife insurance companies residential fire insurance in building endowment and the Japanese earthquake policy policy reinsurance company Premium rate Risk-based rates (by risk zone Flat rates (wooden/ Earthquake insurance offered by private non- and type of construction) nonwooden) life insurance companies is available as an Reinsurance Japan Earthquake International optional endorsement to fire insurance poli- Reinsurance Co. (JER) and reinsurance and capital Japanese government markets cies. Earthquake coverage is available at policy limits of 30–50 percent of the fire insurance Loss adjustment Three-step system Proportional system limit, with maximum limits of ¥50 million per Penetration of 25% 11% dwelling and ¥10 million for personal property. earthquake coverage (percent households) A three-step claims settlement allows for rapid damage assessment and claims settle- Source: World Bank compilation. ment. Payouts are not proportional to damage, but based on a three-step system: total loss, half Likewise, both programs rely on sophisticated loss, and partial loss—which allow for 100 per- reinsurance strategies. The reinsurance pro- cent, 50 percent, and 5 percent of the earth- tection of the private insurance scheme relies quake insurance policy limit, respectively. on a catastrophe insurance pooling mecha- The premium rates are risk based and vary nism, the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance according to the prefecture where the dwelling Co. (JER), backed by the government of Japan. is located (divided into eight risk zones) and In contrast, reinsurance protection for coop- type of construction (wooden or nonwooden). erative mutual insurers is provided by inter- For an insured amount of ¥10 million, the national reinsurance and capital markets, with annual premium varies between ¥5,000 for a no government intervention. In both cases, the nonwooden structure in Nagazaki Prefecture, use of reinsurance serves to limit the liability of and ¥31,300 for a wooden structure in Tokyo. the private or cooperative risk carriers. Discount rates of up to 30 percent apply when Penetration under the private nonlife insur- the building is earthquake resistant, accord- ance program is estimated at about 25 per- ing to the Japanese Housing Performance cent of Japanese households, with just under Designation Standards, including a 10 percent 13 million residential earthquake insurance discount for buildings constructed after 1981. policies in force: an estimated 48 percent of all The premium rates, calculated by the Non- fire insurance policies in force include earth- Life Insurance Rating Organization, consist of quake coverage. Cooperative mutual insurance the pure premium rate and a loading factor. It programs cover about 14 percent of Japanese should be noted that the rates do not include households, so that total penetration is esti- any loading for profit since the program is not mated at 39 percent.2 JA Kyosai holds a very for profit. Despite this rating and because of 258 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G Japan’s considerable earthquake exposure, ¥5,500 billion (220-yr return rates are still considered high. period) ¥115.75 The 1966 Earthquake Insurance Law billion (enacted after the Niigata earthquake of 1964) ¥4,397.55 billion established the JER, to whom private nonlife ¥115.7 insurers were obliged to offer earthquake insur- billion ance and cede 100 percent of the earthquake premium and liabilities. The JER thus acts as the sole earthquake reinsurer for the private ¥305.7 billion ¥871 billion ¥378 billion insurance market. The JER can be seen as an earthquake reinsurance pool, retaining a por- ¥72.3 billion tion of the liability and ceding the rest back to ¥115 billion ¥115 billion private insurers (based on their market share) and to the Japanese government through rein- Liability of government surance treaties. The reinsurance program is Liability of JER designed such that the liability of private insur- Liability of insurance companies ers and the JER itself does not exceed the accu- Figure 29.1 Japanese earthquake reinsurance mulated reserves from earthquake insurance program (as of May 2011) premiums. Figure 29.1 describes the Japanese Source: JER 2011a. earthquake reinsurance program as revised in May 2011 after the GEJE. The total claims- income) over time with separate resources to paying capacity of the program is currently pay claims, the size of which is based on the ¥5,500 billion, which is estimated to corre- probable maximum loss of the insurer’s portfo- spond to the scenario of the 1923 Great Kanto lio. Likewise, the government of Japan has set earthquake with a return period of 220 years.3 up a special account to accumulate its reserves. Should insured earthquake losses exceed this Table 29.2 shows the amount of reserves at amount, claims would be prorated. the end of fiscal year 2010—that is, before the The role of the Japanese government is GEJE. The GEJE wiped out about half of the central to the program. The maximum liabil- program’s earthquake reserves. ity of the government of Japan, JER, and pri- It is noteworthy that the total reserves sup- vate insurers is 87 percent, 10 percent, and porting the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance 3 percent, respectively. It should be noted Program, even before the GEJE, represent that under the previous reinsurance program only a fraction of the liability of all stakehold- (before May 2011), the government’s liability ers. The size of this potential gap is largely due was only 78 percent, and the rest was shared to the government’s reserve-to-liability ratio equally between the JER and private insurers. The revision of the reinsurance program, lead- Table 29.2 Reserves under the earthquake ing to an increase of the government’s liability insurance program share, is the direct consequence of a depletion RESERVE AT END OF FISCAL YEAR of the earthquake reserves of both the JER and 2010 ( ¥ BILLION) private insurers after the GEJE. Government 1,343 Japanese accounting standards allow the JER 424 insurers to build up pre-event catastrophe reserves (by accumulating the earthquake Private insurers 489 insurance premiums received, less expenses Total 2,256 and any underwriting gains and investment Source: JER 2011a. 2 9 : E A RT H Q U A K E R I S K I N S U R A N C E | 259 under the program, which appears low. In case insurers offer building endowment policies: of a major earthquake exceeding the reserves these policies offer more comprehensive cov- available, it would be critical to immediately erage than the policies available through the mobilize additional resources to ensure the private insurers and can therefore be seen as financial solvability of the program. a savings mechanism that provides funding for home repairs, whether caused by natural disas- Cooperative mutual insurers ters or other adverse events. The five-year (or Residential earthquake insurance is also avail- longer) term policy automatically covers resi- able through cooperative mutual insurers. dential dwellings and personal property from These insurers conduct insurance operations damage caused by fire, flood, earthquakes, and on behalf of Japan’s cooperative societies. other natural disasters. If the policy expires The largest of these cooperatives is JA Kyosai, and the policyholder has not claimed a total which holds an estimated 85 percent market loss, he or she is entitled to a partial refund of share of all the homeowners insurance written the premium. At the start of 2011, JA Kyosai’s through cooperative mutual insurers. Like any client base comprised more than 11 million cooperative, JA Kyosai operates on a nonprofit building endowment policies. basis. Its insurance products are different from Earthquake insurance is automatically those of private insurers. Cooperative mutual included in the building endowment policies offered by JA Kyosai. The policy limit is 50 per- BOX 29.1 cent of the fire insurance limit, up to ¥250 mil- lion. The average fire insurance amount is Innovative catastrophe risk financing: Capital markets ¥30  million; hence the average earthquake protect Japanese farmers against earthquake insurance limit is ¥15 million. Under the building endowment policy In 2008, Munich Re, a reinsurance company based in Germany, issued JA available through JA Kyosai, the claims settle- Kyosai’s second catastrophe (Cat) bond, a $300 million issue, through the ment process in case of an earthquake is pro- special-purpose vehicle (SPV), Muteki Ltd. portional: a loss assessor estimates the damage Cat bonds are index-linked securities that secure financial resources on the capital markets, to be disbursed in case of the occurrence of a pre- percentage of the house, and this rate is applied defined natural disaster. Cat bonds generally cover the highest level of risk to the earthquake policy limit. and are mainly issued for specific perils with an annual probability of oc- The premium rate is flat, that is, the same currence of 2 percent or less (that is, a return period of 50 years or more). wherever the dwelling is located. It only differs Unlike traditional reinsurance, Cat bonds are fully collateralized and offer according to whether the building is a wooden multiyear coverage (usually three to five years). or nonwooden structure. The three-year Muteki Cat bond provided fully collateralized protec- tion for Japanese earthquake exposure indirectly to JA Kyosai/Zenkyoren, Cooperative mutual insurers are not sub- through a reinsurance agreement with Munich Re, which served as coun- ject to the Earthquake Insurance Law and do terparty on the transaction. Like other Cat bonds in Japan, the Muteki Cat not participate in the JER. They work outside bond was parametric, triggered by the location and magnitude of an the nonlife insurance regulatory framework earthquake rather than the actual losses. Following the GEJE disaster, the and are instead accountable to their respective Muteki Cat Bond became the first Cat Bond to pay out on the occurrence ministries; for example, JA Kyosai reports to of an earthquake event. The instrument released the full coverage limit of $300 million in response to the event. the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish- In February 2012, Guy Carpenter and Company announced the place- eries. In contrast to private nonlife insurers, ment of a $300 million Cat bond, through the SPV Kibou Ltd., which would cooperative mutual insurers cede a significant ultimately benefit JA Kyosai. It provided protection on a parametric basis, portion of their liabilities to the international using earthquake data gathered from various recording stations from the reinsurance market. JA Kyosai is known to have Kyoshin-Net network of seismographs. one of the largest reinsurance programs in the world, with reinsurance capacity in excess of 260 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G ¥75 billion. Its large and well-diversified asset of total economic losses. Residential assets base also allows it to retain a significant portion represented 78 percent of insured losses. Fifty- of its liability. In addition to traditional reinsur- six percent of the residential insured losses ance, JA Kyosai has issued catastrophe (Cat) were covered by private insurers and the JER, bonds to better spread its risk. See box 29.1. and 44 percent were covered by cooperative mutual insurers (see figure 29.2). Industrial and commercial Despite significant differences, both private earthquake insurance and mutual residential earthquake insurance Traditionally, industrial and commercial earth- quake insurance has been issued as a reduced Figure 29.2 7% Economic and indemnity policy, which provides limited cov- 8% insured losses of erage on a proportional basis. The extent of the the Great East coverage depends on the location of the asset, 11% Japan Earthquake for which the country has been divided into 12 Sources: Cabinet Office 62% (CAO); JER 2011a and risk zones. The indemnity limit varies from 15 13% 2011b; JA Kyosai 2011. percent in Tokyo up to 100 percent in Niigata. Following the enactment of the Insurance Business Law in 1996, which largely deregu- Private Public Agriculture lated the insurance market in Japan, insurance buildings infrastructure policies on a first-loss basis were also offered, Lifeline Other which generated a significant increase in the infrastructure buildings sum insured (the maximum amount that could a. Economic losses by sector, as percentage of total loss (¥16,900 billion) be paid out). Loss of revenue and business interruptions caused by earthquakes have not traditionally been marketed and have low pen- Commercial/ etration rates. industrial 22% Other classes include earthquake fire expense insurance. This is a limited amount for fire following an earthquake, which is pro- vided automatically with some insurance poli- cies, such as the storekeepers’ comprehensive policy. The coverage is limited to 5 percent of Residential 78% the fire sum insured, up to certain fixed limits. b. Insured losses by sector, Other insurance policies that generally include as percentage of total insured losses (¥2,750 billion) earthquake coverage are cargo insurance, motor insurance, and engineering insurance. Mutual insurers 43.8% Economic and insured losses The GEJE caused major direct economic losses, with current estimates of ¥16,900 bil- lion (chapter 28; box 29.2). Private (residential, commercial, and industrial) buildings repre- sented 62 percent and public infrastructure Private represented 13 percent of the (direct) eco- insurers 56.2% nomic losses (see figure 29.2). Insured losses c. Insured residential losses by scheme, were estimated at ¥2,750 billion, or 16 percent as percentage of total insured residential losses (¥2,137 billion) 2 9 : E A RT H Q U A K E R I S K I N S U R A N C E | 261 BOX 29.2 Agriculture and fishery insurance Insurance schemes in agriculture and fishing helped farmers and fishermen. They were subsequently turned into voluntary mutual fishermen stabilize their businesses by compensating them for aid programs established by the government, which subsidizes the losses and damages caused by the GEJE. Insurance paid for some premiums paid by farmers and fishermen, covers part of the ad- level of damage sustained by almost all fishing boats. In Japan these ministrative costs, and reinsures the insurance associations. schemes began as cooperative activities by local farmers and Policies in force for agricultural, fishing boat, and fisheries insurance in 2009 NUMBER OF AREA UNDERWRITTEN VALUE COVERED PENETRATION HOUSEHOLDS (THOUSANDS OF (¥ MILLION) UNDERWRITTEN HECTARES) (THOUSANDS) Farm products Paddy rice 1,752 1,479 1,223,157 91% (area) Field rice 0.4 0.2 46 5% (area) Wheat and barley 49 252 83,277 95% (area) Fruit trees Harvest mutual relief 76 45 107,200 26% (area) Tree mutual relief 4 1 7,000 2% (area) Livestock 89 6.665 724,585 42% (number of livestock) (number of livestock) Field crops 82 259 140,400 62% Fishing boats 192 (boats) n.a. 1,028,517 >100% (number of boats) Fisheries 61 n.a. 394,155 52% (number of households) Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). Note: n.a. = Not applicable. Fishery insurance covering the loss of and damages to their fishing vessels. The sys- The earthquake and tsunami damaged some 25,000 fishing vessels, tem includes the following insurances: at a cost of ¥170 billion. Ninety percent of the vessels in Iwate, • Fishing vessel insurance covering basic damage caused by Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures were damaged, which had an accidents and disasters, and including special insurance for enormous effect on the fishing industry since these vessels were damage caused by war and seizure used for aquaculture as well as fishing. Before the tsunami, the three prefectures accounted for 10 percent of the total catch in • Protection and indemnity insurance covering compensa- Japan (excluding aquaculture). Aquaculture industries were also se- tion for the crew and damages incurred during navigation verely damaged, particularly in the Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, • Owner-operator insurance covering the death of where production of oysters and wakame, or seaweed, is wide- owner-operators spread. Damage to aquaculture amounted to ¥131 billion: ¥57 billion • Cargo insurance covering the loss of catches or cargo for production and ¥74 billion for facilities. • Pleasure boat insurance covering compensation, rescue The fisheries insurance system in Japan is well organized, providing costs, and damages essential insurance services at a reasonable cost to all fishermen including small-scale producers. The fishing vessel insurance sys- • Transshipped catches insurance tem, which was established in 1952 under the Fishing Vessel Dam- • Crew salary insurance covering crew salaries if vessels are age Compensation Law, aims at stabilizing fishing businesses by seized 262 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G The fisheries mutual insurance scheme, which was established Billion ¥ in 1964 under the Fisheries Disaster Compensation Law, aims at sta- FISHING FISHERIES TOTAL bilizing small- and medium-size fishing and aquaculture operations VESSEL MUTUAL by covering losses from poor catches caused by natural disasters. INSURANCE INSURANCE The system insures fish harvests, aquaculture, special aquaculture, SYSTEM SCHEME and fishing gear. The government subsidizes one-third to one-half of the pre- Government 72.7 (78%) 21.3 (77%) 94.0 (78%) mium. While fishing vessel insurance enjoyed a surplus of ¥16.5 bil- Reserve of 11.0 (12%) — 11.0 (9%) lion in 2010, the fisheries mutual insurance scheme suffered a defi- government cit of ¥28.9 billion. special The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries estimates account that total claims would amount to ¥120.4 billion, of which the cen- Associations 1.4 (2%) 3.0 (11%) 4.4 (4%) tral government will cover ¥94 billion (or 78 percent) for the GEJE at national as figure shows. As of March 13, 2012, ¥63.4 billion in claims have level been paid out: ¥47.5 billion under the fishing vessel insurance sys- tem, and ¥15.9 billion under the fisheries mutual insurance scheme. Associations 7.8 (8%) 3.2 (12%) 11.0 (9%) Sixty percent of vessels were insured under the vessel insurance Total 92.9 (100%) 27.5 (100%) 120.4 (100%) scheme, of which some 80 percent of boats were over 20 tonnes. Source: MAFF. Some 80 percent of the insured vessels were more than 15 years Note: — = not available. old. Since the schemes cover the residual value of the vessels, the claims paid out may not cover the replacement costs. Agriculture Insurance Fishing Vessel Insurance Fisheries Mutual Insurance Schemes Damage to agricultural production and facilities from the GEJE event amounted to ¥63 billion. Rice is Central Government an important crop in Japan, but because the GEJE General account happened before the rice-growing season, insur- ance almost did not cover rice production losses. 5,801 10,727 Since compensation related to the accident at the Special account Fukushima Nuclear Power Station has not yet been decided, the total payout on agricultural insurance Reinsurance Insurance is uncertain. In Miyagi Prefecture the agricultural in- 97 3,798 surance scheme has covered damages to green- Central Society National Federation houses in the amount of ¥1 billion. of Fishing of Fisheries Vessel Insurance Mutual Insurance The Farm Losses Compensation Law introduced Association Association the agricultural insurance scheme in 1947 to help Subsidy Subsidy for Re-mutual for farmers stabilize their businesses by covering dam- premium Reinsurance premium insurance ages caused by natural disasters; the scheme offers 5,801 10,727 insurance coverage for almost all major agricultural Fishing Vessel Fisheries Mutual products. It was started by local farmers as a coop- Insurance Insurance Associations Associations erative initiative to set up a reserve fund to pay for (45 associations) (20 associations) insurance premiums, which evolved into agricultural 16,089 18,036 mutual relief associations. The insurance scheme in- cludes rice, wheat, and barley insurance (mandatory Premium Claim Mutual insurance for paddy fields of more than 20 hectares); livestock 18,528 20,777 insurance; fruit and fruit tree insurance; field crop Fishers and horticultural insurance; greenhouse insurance; and insurance for houses and properties. The gov- Source: MAFF. ernment subsidizes half of the farmers’ premiums. Note: Numbers are millions of JPY in FY 2011 budget. Note: Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank. 2 9 : E A RT H Q U A K E R I S K I N S U R A N C E | 263 JER 12.8% Government Reinsurance Retention 45.2% 58% 42% Figure 29.3 Estimated GEJE insured residential losses, by earthquake Insurers 42% insurance program Sources: JER 2011a and 2011b; JA Kyosai 2011. a. JER earthquake insurance claims (¥1,200 billion) b. JA Kyosai earthquake insurance claims (¥830 billion) programs had adequate capacity to meet their government liability in the revised reinsurance claims obligations, thanks to efficient manage- program of 2012. Earthquake losses incurred ment of exposure to losses through a combina- by JA Kyosai were estimated at ¥830 billion, 90 tion of policy limits and reinsurance protection. percent of which were residential losses. It is The earthquake insurance program managed estimated that about 58 percent of those losses by the private nonlife insurance companies were reinsured. faced an estimated total loss of ¥1,200 billion, The three-step earthquake claims settle- with 42 percent retained by private insurers, ment system implemented by the private 13 percent retained by the JER, and 45 percent insurance companies allowed claims to be retained by the government (see figure  29.3). settled rapidly. Satellite images were also used This event, however, severely depleted the to identify total losses on buildings, which fur- earthquake reserves of both the private ther helped speed up claims settlements. In the insurers and JER, leading to an increase in aftermath of the disaster, the General Insur- ance Association of Japan designated specific total loss zones, based on satellite imagery Table 29.3 Comparative analysis of the Tohoku (GEJE), Canterbury, and Maule earthquakes (chapter 26). Any total loss claims filed within these areas did not require additional confir- TOHOKU, CANTERBURY, MAULE, mation of incurred losses, thereby speeding up JAPAN NEW ZEALAND CHILE the payout process. Out of ¥1,200 billion gen- Year 2011 2011 2010 erated by the 741,000 claim payments made Magnitude 9.0 6.3 8.8 after the GEJE, 60 percent was paid within two Estimated direct economic losses 225 15 20 months and 90 percent within five months. ($ billion) Estimated direct economic losses 4 9 9 Comparative analysis of the GEJE (% GDP) with other recent earthquakes Estimated direct losses borne by 8 11 n.a. It is interesting to compare the economic and government (as % of government fiscal impact of the GEJE with the impact of expenditures) other recent earthquakes: the 2010 earthquake Estimated insured losses (% of direct 16 80 40 in Chile and the 2011 earthquake in Canter- economic losses) bury, New Zealand. All three earthquakes were Estimated insured losses covered by 23 73 95 very large in magnitude and caused severe international reinsurance (%) economic losses in their countries. Table 29.3 Sources: Aon Benfield 2011; Swiss Re 2012; New Zealand Treasury 2011; RMS 2011; Ministry of Finance, Japan. summarizes this comparative analysis. While Note: Direct economic losses are defined as damage to physical assets (including infrastructure); n.a. = not applicable. the GEJE caused the largest economic losses 264 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G in absolute terms, losses as a percentage of insurance limit offered by JA Kyosai started gross domestic product (GDP) are lower than at 10 percent and has increased progres- those in Chile and New Zealand given the size sively to 50 percent currently. of the Japanese economy. The government’s • Rapid claims settlement can be achieved, portion of direct losses (that is, additional even after a major disaster. The three-step expenditures), expressed as a percentage of claims adjustment system implemented by total government expenditures, were esti- the private insurers allows for rapid damage mated at 8 percent for the GEJE and 11 percent assessment and claims settlement. It also for the Canterbury earthquake in New Zea- takes into account that, immediately after a land. Finally, the fraction of the insured losses major disaster, large numbers of loss asses- covered by international reinsurance was sors have to be deployed at the same time. estimated at 95 percent in Chile, 29 percent The simplicity of the three-step system in New Zealand (where the Earthquake Com- allows this to happen. mission retained a large fraction of the losses), and 23 percent in Japan. This last figure hides a • Insurance penetration in Japan is high, but large difference between the JER, which relies there is still considerable room for expansion. on public reinsurance and cooperative mutual About 40 percent of Japanese households insurers (such JA Kyosai) that purchase most have earthquake insurance coverage, leav- of their reinsurance capacity abroad. ing 60 percent of households without cover- age. International experience shows that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to increase LESSONS the penetration rate beyond a certain level on a voluntary basis. Compulsory earthquake Some key lessons can be drawn from the insurance could therefore be considered. review of Japan’s earthquake insurance pro- The GEJE also highlighted certain chal- grams in light of the GEJE: lenges of earthquake insurance programs run • There is no one-size-fits-all insurance pro- by private insurance companies: gram. The dual earthquake insurance pro- • The JER claims-paying capacity is limited grams in Japan illustrate that there is no in the aggregate. The aggregate limit was one-size-fits-all catastrophe insurance pro- initially set at ¥5,500 billion (increased to gram. Two very different schemes can coex- ¥6,200 billion in 2012), which would be suf- ist successfully within a country significantly ficient for a major earthquake such as the exposed to earthquakes, offering earthquake Great Kanto earthquake in 1923. But this coverage to about four households out of 10 does not take into account the occurrence of in Japan. consecutive major earthquakes, which could jeopardize the solvency of the program. • Resilience is critical for earthquake insur- ance programs. Both programs managed to • The government’s liability under the JER fulfill their obligations after the GEJE with- exceeds its ex ante financing arrangements. out difficulties, because of the sound man- The government’s maximum liability is agement of policy limits and conservative adjusted based on the balance of earthquake reinsurance coverage. The apparent resil- reserves of the private insurers and the JER, ience of the current setup does not mean, and the maximum defined liability under however, that there is no room for these the program. The government currently schemes to improve without compromising holds 87 percent of the total liability of the sustainability. For example, the earthquake program. Its current special account would 2 9 : E A RT H Q U A K E R I S K I N S U R A N C E | 265 not be sufficient to cover this level of liabil- can be made to disaster-prone developing ity and would require an immediate budget countries willing to promote catastrophe risk appropriation or reallocation in case of a insurance to help them promote viable and major disaster. affordable programs and clearly define the role of the government in public-private partner- • Limited policy coverage may not meet ships (PPPs). the needs of the insured. The program is Structure policies to allow for sustainable and designed to provide partial coverage (up affordable programs. Catastrophe risk insurance to 50 percent of the fire insurance cover- policies should be designed to enable insurance age limit) to “stabilize the livelihood of the companies control their liabilities and offer earthquake victims” (article 1 of the 1966 affordable coverage. The policy structure can Earthquake Insurance Law). There seems be revised over time to better respond to the to be a growing demand for higher cover- needs of the policyholders, while also ensuring age, but such an increase in coverage should the system’s resilience to major disasters. The be carefully evaluated to maintain the finan- partial coverage produced by both Japanese cial sustainability of the system. earthquake insurance programs and the sim- • The claims settlement process introduces plified loss adjustment process of the private significant basis risk and could be revised. insurer system helps to keep costs down. Although the three-step claims adjust- Price insurance premiums based on the ment process allows for rapid settlement of underlying risks. Insurance premiums should claims, there is a big gap between payouts reflect the underlying risks with respect to for partial loss (5 percent) and half loss the various risk zones and types of construc- (50 percent). This increases the risk that tion. Risk-based insurance premiums make payments will not match the needs of the policyholders aware of the underlying cost of insured party following the occurrence of risk, thereby providing financial incentives damage (basis risk). A fourth intermediate to engage in disaster risk mitigation. Even in step could be introduced to reduce this risk. cases where the full cost of cover is not passed • Catastrophe risk modeling for Japan is onto the policyholder, it is still possible to sig- sophisticated, but could be improved. State- nal the underlying cost of risk by making subsi- of-the-art catastrophe risk models have been dies transparent. developed for Japan, but need to be further Provide incentives to invest in disaster risk refined as secondary loss perils (such as tsu- mitigation. Additional financial incentives, namis, which caused about 30  percent of such as discounts on premium rates or lower the total losses from the GEJE) and lique- deductibles, can be offered to the policyhold- faction are not included as standard in all ers who invest in risk reduction. models. These models could also be used to Consider mechanisms for enforcing insurance further assess the catastrophe risk exposure purchase. Voluntary catastrophe risk insurance of public buildings and infrastructures. does not typically generate high penetration rates, even in highly developed insurance mar- kets. Some type of compulsory mechanism, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR such as an automatic catastrophe guarantee DEVELOPING COUNTRIES in fire insurance policies, may be necessary to ensure that a large proportion of the popula- Japanese earthquake insurance programs tion is insured against natural disasters. demonstrated considerable resilience after the Promote multiple-catastrophe risk insurance GEJE. From this experience, recommendations delivery channels. Catastrophe risk insurance 266 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G should leverage existing nonlife insurance earthquake insurance program. As the pri- delivery channels, such as private insurers or vate insurance sector brings its technical mutual insurers. The Japanese system demon- expertise and financial capacity to the table, strates that different segments of the popula- governments can support the development of tion may be best served by different delivery public goods and risk-market infrastructure channels, even for very similar products. Mul- to foster sustainable market-based insurance tiple distribution channels for catastrophe risk solutions. insurance should therefore be explored. Governments can play a role as the financier Develop detailed catastrophe risk models. of last resort. Governments may want to act as Detailed catastrophe risk models and data- financiers of last resort when private reinsur- bases are essential for detailed risk assess- ance capacity is unavailable or too expensive to ment, premium rate calculation, and efficient allow domestic insurers to offer cost-effective management of catastrophe risk insurance insurance solutions. Governments should not liabilities. In addition to a strong hazard compete with the private reinsurance mar- model, such assessments also require detailed ket but rather complement it. When needed, exposure databases of at-risk assets (buildings governments should make financial capacity and infrastructure) and detailed vulnerability available to domestic insurers through public functions to translate hazard values into dollar reinsurance or (contingent) credit. losses. These models are typically developed by private risk-modeling firms and licensed to the insurance industry. But for some less- NOTES developed insurance markets, governments Prepared by Olivier Mahul and Emily White, World and donors have funded or partially funded the Bank. development of such models as public goods to 1. Also known as Zenkyoren. support market development. 2. The number of households is estimated at about Develop catastrophe risk insurance market 51 million (Government of Japan, Statistics infrastructure. Catastrophe risk insurance mar- Bureau). Policy-in-force data from the Japanese Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization (2010), kets require major investments in basic infra- JA Kyosai Business Operations (2011), and Zenro- structure, such as catastrophe risk models, sai Annual Report (2010). Cooperative mutual exposure databases, product design and pric- insurer figures extrapolated based on an 85 per- ing, and the like. Governments can play a major cent estimate of the JA Kyosai market share. role in developing this kind of infrastructure to 3. The total claims-paying capacity of the program will increase to ¥6.2 billion in 2012 (Ministry of help the private insurance industry offer cost- Finance 2012). effective and affordable insurance solutions. Promote enabling legal and regulatory envi- ronments. Unlike traditional lines of insur- BIBLIOGRAPHY ance business such as automobile insurance, catastrophe risk insurance can generate large Aon Benfield. 2011. “Earthquake Insurance Business in Japan.” December 2011. Aon Benfield, London, correlated losses for insurers. The legal and England. regulatory framework should enforce adequate General Insurance Association of Japan. 2011. Annual pricing, reserving, and reinsurance buying to Report 2010–2011. Tokyo. ensure that insurers will meet their claims in JA Kyosai. 2011. Annual Report 2010, Business full in the event of a disaster. Operations. Tokyo. http://www.ja-kyosai.or.jp/ ebook/2010annual/index.html. Promote PPPs for catastrophe insurance Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd. 2011. “JCR Affirmed programs. Governments can play an important AAp/Stable on Japan Earthquake Reinsurance.” role in building an affordable and sustainable News Release, December 28. Tokyo. 2 9 : E A RT H Q U A K E R I S K I N S U R A N C E | 267 JER (Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Co., Ltd). 2011a. Wellington. http://www.treasury.govt.nz Annual Report 2011. Osaka, Japan. /economy/overview/2012/nzefo-12.pdf. ———. 2011b. “Response to the Great East Japan Earth- Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan quake by the General Insurance Industry.” Paper websites. http://www.giroj.or.jp/english/index presentation, World Forum, Jamaica, October .html. 25–26. RMS (Risk Management Solutions Inc.). 2011. McAllister, S., and E. Cohen. 2011. “Japanese Casualty “The M9.0 Tohoku, Japan Earthquake: Short- Insurers Show Resilience.” http://www Term Changes in Seismic Risk.” Newark, CA. .contingencies.org. http://www.rms.com/resources/publications Muir-Wood, R. 2011. “Designing Optimal Risk Mitiga- /natural-catastrophes. tion and Risk Transfer Mechanisms to Improve SCOR Global P&C. 2011. Technical Newsletters, the Management of Earthquake Risk in Chile.” December and October 2011. Paris, France. OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance Swiss Re. 2012. “Lessons from Major Earthquakes.” and Private Pensions No. 12, Organisation for Eco- Economic Research and Consulting. Zurich, nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Switzerland. Paris. Zenrosai. 2011. Annual Report 2010. https://www New Zealand Treasury. 2012. Economic and Finan- .zenrosai.coop/english/pdf/2010/annual_report_ cial Overview 2012. New Zealand Government, 2010.pdf. 268 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G CHAPTER 30 Economic Impact Following the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), the government of Japan responded promptly to stabilize markets and ensure a swift recovery. Economic activity has since started picking up, thanks in part to domestic demand driven by the massive reconstruction effort. Uncertainties remain, however, surrounding the restructuring of power supply and both national and global economic prospects. The year 2011 will be remembered for the severe challenges to the global supply chain posed by the GEJE and the Thai flood. As an important part of the networked production system, developing countries must share responsibility in making the supply chain more resilient under international cooperation. FINDINGS Table 30.1 Direct economic impact of the GEJE CATEGORIES DAMAGE SHARE OF TOTAL Following the Great East Japan Earthquake (¥ TRILLION) DAMAGE (%) (GEJE), the government of Japan initially esti- Buildings (housing, offices, plants, 10.4 62 mated the direct damages between ¥16 trillion machinery, and so on) and ¥25 trillion (see box 30.1). The Cabinet Lifeline utilities (electricity, gas, 1.3 8 Office (CAO) later put estimated damages at water, communication, and so on) ¥16.9 trillion (approximately $210 billion), Social infrastructure (waterways, 2.2 13 or about 4 percent of Japan’s gross domestic roads, harbors, drainage, airports, and so on) product (GDP). Before the disasters, approxi- mately two-thirds of nonfinancial assets were Others (including agriculture and 3.0 17 fisheries, and so on) held by the private sector. This was in line with the breakdown of the direct damage figures Total 16.9 released by the CAO (table 30.1). Source: Cabinet Office (CAO). 269 BOX 30.1 Government of Japan’s estimates of the economic impact of the GEJE The CAO released two different sets of estimated economic dam- The estimation of the economic impact from the GEJE (not in- ages (damage on capital stocks) of the GEJE (table B30.1.1). cluded in table B30.1.1) covers the same prefectures and is carried out for three fiscal years (table B30.1.2). Table B30.1.1. Estimated economic damages of the GEJE by the CAO1 Table B30.1.2. Estimated economic impact of the GEJE ¥ trillion ¥ trillion DISASTER ECONOMIC AND FY2011 REDUCTION SECTION FINANCIAL ANALYSIS FIRST SECOND SECTION HALF HALF FY2012 FY2013 CASE 1 CASE 2 Production loss –1.25 to –1.25 to –2.25 –2.25 to Buildings and 10.4 11 20 due to damages –0.5 –0.5 to –1.25 –1.25 houses Production loss –0.25 — — — Utilities 1.3 1 1 due to supply chain disruption Infrastructure 2.2 2 2 Production loss — — — — Others 2 2 due to limited Agriculture 1.9 power supply Others 1.1 Production gain 2 to 3 3 to 5 6 to 9.5 5 to 7.75 from recovery Total 16.9 16 25 and Source: CAO. reconstruction Note: Case 1 uses damage rates twice as high as the Kobe earthquake, while Case 2 employs even higher damage rates against buildings and houses for the Total 0.5 to 2.25 2 to 4.25 3.75 to 2.75 to tsunami-affected areas. 8.25 6.5 Source: CAO. The economic impacts are estimated separately for damages Note: — = not available. (on capital stocks) and losses (on flow). The estimation results for damages in table B30.1.1 are calculated by multiplying the existing The estimated production losses due to damages (first-order predisaster capital stock data (based on the CAO’s macroeconomic loss) by the GEJE are calculated based on the damages listed in ta- database) by damage rates twice as high as the ones observed for ble B30.1.1 using the production function of each sector. The pro- the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake for Case 1, and by even duction loss due to supply chain disruption (roughly equivalent to higher damage rates against buildings and houses for Case 2 to take a higher-order loss) is estimated with the calculated production into account the damages from the tsunami. In this estimation, the loss (the above first-order loss) and an interregional input-output damaged areas include the prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fuku- table (between Tohoku and the rest of Japan). While the produc- shima (the above-mentioned damage rates are applied to the tion losses due to limited (electric) power supply were considered, tsunami-affected areas in these prefectures, while damage rates they were not estimated due to the uncertainty of effects on pro- equivalent to the Kobe earthquake’s are used for the non-tsunami- duction (resiliency, conservation, or use of other adaptive mea- affected areas) and the surrounding prefectures of Hokkaido, Ao- sures). The production gains from recovery and reconstruction ac- mori, Ibaraki, and Chiba, for which damages are calculated by mul- tivities are derived by distributing the amount of estimated tiplying the capital stock data by damage rates modified based on damages in table B30.1.1 over three years (meaning it is assumed that the seismic intensity of each prefecture (details unknown). all the damaged capital stocks will be restored). Most of the damages were concentrated where agriculture and fishery are the main in three prefectures of the Tohoku region: activities, accounts for only 2.5 percent of the Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi. The sparsely total Japanese economy in terms of industrial populated Pacific Coast of the Tohoku region, production (figure 30.1). 270 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G 265.6 Table 30.2 Damage caused by the GEJE 250 SECTOR DIRECT DAMAGE MONETARY ¥ trillion (percentage of total) DAMAGE 200 (¥100 MILLION) 150 Fisheries Fishing vessels 25,014 1,701 Fishery harbor facilities 319 harbors 8,230 100 93.9 6.6 Aquaculture facilities — 738 2.1 50 (percent (percent Aquaculture products — 575 of total: of total: 2.5) 2.3) Common use facilities 1,725 facilities 1,249 0 Shipment value Gross value SUBTOTAL, FISHERIES 12,493 added Agricultural Damaged agricultural 17,456 areas 4,012 Municipalities along the Pacific Coast land, land All Japan facilities Figure 30.1 The extent of economic activity in the Damaged agricultural 21,866 facilities 4,290 facilities municipalities along the Pacific Coast Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). SUBTOTAL, AGRICULTURAL LAND 39,322 8,302 AND FACILITIES Agricultural Agricultural crops and — 140 Despite the relatively small extent of eco- crops, livestock livestock, nomic activities in the affected region, the and Agricultural livestock — 487 GEJE had severe and widespread economic production facilities production (mainly country impacts, partly due to the accident at the elevators, agricultural Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station warehouses, PVC and ensuing energy supply disruptions, and greenhouses, livestock barns, compost the supply chain disruptions (compounded by depots, and so on) widespread flooding in Thailand a few months SUBTOTAL, AGRICULTURAL CROPS 626 later). In the first quarter of 2011, Japan’s GDP Forestry Desolation of forest 429 areas 238 land contracted by 3.5 percent. According to the Damage of facilities 255 facilities 1,167 International Monetary Fund (IMF), GDP for maintaining forest contracted by 0.7 percent in all of 2011, and the Damage of forest road 2,632 areas 42 estimates for 2012 put GDP growth at 2 per- cent, stimulated by reconstruction work. Damage of forests (1,065 hectares) 10 There are approximately 80,000 businesses Processing and 112 facilities 508 in the tsunami-affected areas, 740,000 busi- marketing facilities nesses in the earthquake-affected areas, 8,000 Cultivating facilities for 473 facilities 25 businesses in the evacuation zones of the forest products Fukushima nuclear accident, and 1.45 million SUBTOTAL, FORESTRY 3,903 FACILITIES 1,989 businesses in the prefectures covered by the TOTAL 23,410 Tokyo Electric Power Company. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2011. Note: — = not available. Impacts on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries The amount of damage to agriculture, forests, and fisheries by the GEJE was estimated as ¥2.34 trillion (table 30.2). 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 271 Around 24,000 hectares of agricultural land 20 10 Domestic (approximately 80 percent of paddy fields 0 Annual growth (%) and 20 percent of farmland) were flooded by –10 Outbound the tsunami. Over 95 percent of the damaged –20 agricultural land was located in the three pre- –30 –40 Inbound fectures most severely affected: Iwate, Miyagi, –50 and Fukushima. –60 It is estimated that the area of agricultural –70 January April July October January land that will be restored and cultivated again 2011 2012 by 2012 could be less than 50 percent in Iwate Figure 30.2 Japanese tourism demand, 2011–12 and Miyagi prefectures, and only up to 20 per- Source: WTTC 2012. cent in Fukushima Prefecture as a result of the nuclear accident. more severely affected compared to outbound Many plywood-processing factories in international travel and domestic travel (fig- Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, where about ure 30.2). This trend reflects fears generated by one-third of plywood products are produced, the nuclear accident and loss of competitive- were damaged. ness as a result of the appreciation of the yen in The Fukushima nuclear accident further the months following the disaster. impacted the agriculture, forestry, and fisher- The WTCC estimates that the negative ies sectors. Based on the provisional regula- impact of the GEJE on the tourism industry tion on radiation (instated on March 17, 2011), amounts to approximately ¥0.7 trillion. shipping of food products containing radioac- tive iodine above a certain threshold has been Impacts on financial and currency markets restricted. In addition to the national regula- Financial and currency markets stabilized tion, some prefectures and local associations quickly after the earthquake. Equity markets set additional restrictions on the shipping of fell by over 15 percent in the first weeks after food products. the earthquake, but recouped roughly one- The accident also affected trade flows of third of their losses by mid-June 2011. food products with other countries. Import Figure 30.3 shows the Nikkei Index from controls for Japanese food products were January 2011 to June 2012. The Nikkei Index intensified in 43 countries, and Japanese is a stock market index for the Tokyo Stock exports declined. Exchange (TSE). It is a price-weighted aver- age (the unit is yen), which indexes 225 com- Impacts on the tourism industry panies in the TSE (components are reviewed The GEJE has severely affected the tourism once a year). industry in Japan, but according to a report The figure clearly shows the fall after by the World Travel and Tourism Council March 11 and the recovery until summer 2011. (WTCC), recovery has been more rapid than High volatility followed, but those values previously expected for both domestic and cannot be strictly connected to the recovery international tourism. process, as the international financial crisis Foreign visitor arrivals in the month imme- impacted the TSE. diately following the GEJE were 62 percent In the immediate aftermath of the earth- lower than the previous year. Recovery was quake, the yen appreciated sharply because swift and, by the fall of 2011, arrivals were of speculation around sizeable repatriation only 15 percent down compared to the previ- flows by insurance companies, corporations, ous year. Inbound international travel was and households. The value of the yen touched 272 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G a record ¥76.25 per dollar on March 17, before retreating to the 80-yen level. After concerted intervention in coordination with the Group of Seven (G-7), the yen/dollar rate has traded in a band of 80–84. Approximately a quarter of developing East Asia’s long-term debt is denominated in yen. For China, 8 percent of its external government debt is in yen; the figure for Thailand is about 60 percent; for Vietnam about 35 percent; for the Philippines about 32 percent; and for Indonesia about 30 per- cent. A 1 percent appreciation in the value of the yen translates into a $250 million increase in annual debt servicing on yen-denominated securities by East Asia’s developing countries. After the disaster, the Bank of Japan injected liquidity to ensure that there would Figure 30.3 Nikkei Index, January 2011–June 2012 be no shortage of cash or funds to lend and no Source: © Bloomberg.com 2012. Used with permission. Further permission required for reuse. spikes in Japan’s interest rates. Massive liquid- ity injections flattened the Japan Government interim report, the committee emphasized the Bond yield curve, with the 10-year rate moving need to reform the demand structure, includ- in a narrow range between 1.1 and 1.2 percent. ing energy conservation measures and controls One of the critical challenges for the Japa- on peak-time electricity demand. nese economy remains overcoming deflation In the short term, the shift toward other to return to a sustainable growth path with energy sources will boost imports from oil- price stability. The Bank of Japan and the and petroleum-exporting countries in the East government are working together to prevent Asia region, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, the economy from falling into a vicious cycle and Australia. between yen appreciation and deflation. Impacts on industrial production Impacts on energy supply The main economic activities in the affected The damage resulting from the earthquake region are agriculture (mainly rice paddy and tsunami is being compounded by the fields) and fisheries, but manufacturing resulting shortages in energy supply. Energy accounts for about a quarter of production supply disruptions have caused rolling black- in the region, and plants in the most severely outs that have disrupted Japan’s production damaged areas supply parts and products used capacity in its industrial heartland in the Kanto in manufacturing elsewhere in Japan and Asia. region, which accounts for about 40 percent of Damage to Japan’s industrial facilities national GDP. caused a sharp drop in production following The Fukushima nuclear accident has pushed the GEJE, but swift reconstruction has mini- the government to explore alternative energy mized the long-term impact on production. sources. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Japan’s METI reported that, as of August Industry (METI) established the Fundamen- 2011, restoration works had been completed for tal Issues Subcommittee under the Advisory 93 percent of the 91 production bases directly Committee for Natural Resources and Energy affecting Japan’s major manufacturing indus- to advise a new long-term energy plan. In the tries, including machinery, automotive, and 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 273 consumer electronics. The automotive indus- and business owners stricken by the GEJE try recorded the greatest fall in production, who need to borrow to rebuild their destroyed but recovered rapidly as facilities reopened houses and offices. But as they have existing and vital transport networks were repaired. loans on such premises, borrowing additional Industrial production rebounded from April money results in two debts on the same prop- onwards with a growth of 6.2 percent in May erty. The Japanese government as a whole and 3.8 percent in June. But this is still not suf- worked on policy responses and formulated ficient to fully offset the initial 15 percent fall the Policy for the Double Debt Problem, which experienced in March. Production in June was released on June 17, 2011 (as explained in remained lower than in 2010 and was 5 per- box 30.2). cent lower than in February, on a seasonally adjusted basis. Most affected industries have now reached almost predisaster levels of pro- GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS duction (figure 30.4). It’s a small (networked) world after all Double debt With the rapid progress of information and The “double debt problem” generally refers transport technology together with the pro- to the financial difficulties facing individuals motion of free trade, humans have developed an extensive network of production, trade, and investment throughout the world. Moreover, 105 99.1% Recovery (All industry) we have intensive agglomeration of produc- 100 tion and consumption in major cities through- 95 out the world, which are mutually connected Percent 93.6% (All industry) through a dense supply chain network. Today’s 90 global production system is a complex, net- 85 worked system that has operated efficiently (Feb=100) under normal conditions. Nevertheless, recent 80 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug megadisasters in Japan and Thailand have All industry Tertiary industry Industrial revealed the networked world’s vulnerability activity production to major disasters. Figure 30.4 Indices of all industry activity (seasonally adjusted), 2011 The magnitude of the Japanese economic Source: METI 2012. impact is partially attributable to supply chain network disruptions. The disaster-affected 40 areas served as major sources of the supply chain of goods (from procurement of parts to 20 the delivery of finished products) for Japan’s 0 Percent manufacturing industry. Failures of parts –20 and material deliveries from these areas have –40 forced many manufacturers nationwide to sus- –60 pend their operations. The automobile indus- –80 try, the electronic equipment industry, and the an g A d ia sia s ne on an US es Jap y pi ail ala on d metal industry were affected most severely ng ilip Th d M a In Ph Gu Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 because they particularly depended on key Figure 30.5 Impact of the GEJE and Thai flood on the global parts and basic materials produced in the automobile industry disaster-affected areas. Figure 30.5 shows that Source: Kobe University. Japanese automobile production in the first 274 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G BOX 30.2 Measures to address the double-debt problem Individual debtor guidelines for out-of-court workouts were almost entirely destroyed by the disaster. It is imperative to Guidelines for individuals on out-of-court debt restructuring, that maintain and strengthen the financial functions of banks and is, the Individual Debtor Guidelines for Out-of-Court Workouts other institutions to revitalize the regional economy. To that end, were released on July 15, 2011, and took effect on August 22, 2011. special provisions concerning the disaster have been added to The guidelines are aimed at individual debtors who are unable, the Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Func- or deemed certain to soon become unable, to repay their existing tions. First, special provisions for disaster-affected financial insti- loans—in other words, those who would in principle qualify to ini- tutions in need of the government’s capital injection to strength- tiate bankruptcy or civil rehabilitation procedures. The creditors en its financial functions have been added. For instance, when subject to the guidelines consist primarily of private sector banks, such a financial institution draws up a management enhancement cooperative financial institutions, government-affiliated financial plan, its top executives are not held responsible or required to set institutions, money lenders, and leasing companies. profitability and efficiency targets, on the grounds that the im- As of March 30, 2012, the accumulated total number of cases pact of the earthquake and tsunami is beyond their control. Fur- consulted was 1,850, of which 538 cases were in the process of thermore, the costs the financial institution bears for receiving restructuring loans. This system is the first of its kind in Japan and is capital injection are substantially lower than the costs needed unprecedented even in the world. under normal conditions. In addition, a much longer period is allowed for securing the repayment funds. In return for receiving Clearer application of financial inspection manuals this capital injection under very favorable conditions, the finan- In the case of a company resuming or continuing its operations while cial institution is expected to play its financial intermediary func- repairing damage sustained from the earthquake and tsunami, there tions in an even more active way. Second, special provisions have is a risk that its capital has been impaired due to the impact of the been incorporated for shinkin banks, credit cooperatives, and disaster. Capital augmentation is therefore urgently needed. other cooperative financial institutions to further ease the The Financial Services Agency introduced measures to apply requirements for capital injection. Under the amended law, the its financial inspection manuals in a clearer manner, aiming to pro- government and the central organization of a financial institution mote more active use of capital-eligible debt and thereby enable jointly inject capital, and the financial institution is required to undercapitalized companies to improve their balance sheets and conclude a management guidance agreement with the central management. organization. In the event that the injected capital is highly un- These measures are expected to yield a number of positive likely to be repaid by the set date, said capital will be liquidated effects. For example, even if a company’s capital has been impaired and the financial institution’s business restructured. The Deposit due to the impact of the disaster, the company is able to exchange Insurance Corporation’s funds are used as the source of capital its existing loans for new ones that satisfy the requirements for injection. The amendments also include a five-year extension to capital-eligible debt (that is, a debt-debt swap). As a result, its bal- the end of March 2017 of the time limit for applications for the ance sheet will become healthier, which will in turn lead to greater government’s capital injection. chances of obtaining new loans from financial institutions. As of March 30, 2012, the government has decided to inject capital (¥191.0 billion in total) into 10 financial institutions—three Measures for financial institutions banks, four shinkin banks, and three credit cooperatives— Some financial institutions located in the disaster-stricken area operating in the disaster-stricken areas in accordance with the Act sustained significant damage; some institutions’ operational bases on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions. and second quarter of 2011 were 25 percent not remain limited to Japan. Figure 30.5 shows and 33.8 percent less, respectively, than those that automobile output in China’s Guangdong in the same period the prior year. Province and Thailand declined by 17.3 per- Eastern Asia today, often called the “world cent and 11.5 percent, respectively, in the sec- factory,” is based on a supply chain network ond quarter. Other Asian countries such as centering around dozens of major cities and Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were industrial agglomerations. Consequently, the also affected. The impact extended beyond impact of the GEJE and tsunami disaster could Asia. In the United States—where automakers, 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 275 including those of Japanese origin, depend on with China. According to a market survey con- the supply of some crucial parts from Japan— ducted by Kakaku.com, compared to the begin- production growth plunged from 15.6 percent ning of October 2011, retail prices of popular in the first quarter to 2.3 percent in the second. hard disk drives (1 terabyte capacity and 7,200 These results reaffirm that disruption in a spe- rpm spin speed) in the Japanese market shot cific region affects the world through the sup- up 150–200 percent by mid-November before ply chain network. settling down, but remained about two times In the fourth quarter of 2011, when Japa- as high as the preflood level at the beginning of nese manufacturing industries had almost February 2012. recovered from the impact of the disaster, the East Asian supply chain was challenged again Disaster strikes when you least expect it by the great flood in Thailand—the worst in 50 Recent experiences remind us of the vulner- years. Automobile output in Thailand dropped ability of supply chain networks, which contain by 61.5 percent in the fourth quarter compared some critical nodes wherein the production to the same period of the prior year. Affected of particular parts and components is concen- by the shortage of parts supplies from Thai- trated among a few suppliers. Importantly, such land, Japanese automobile production was concentrations do not result from planning fail- limited to a 4.5 percent year-on-year growth ures. Rather, they are self-organized through in November after recording 20.3 percent market interactions. Because of scale econo- growth in October (although the impact was mies, production concentration is preferred short-lived and growth returned to 13.4  per- by both suppliers and customers. Although a cent in December). Being the local hub of the trade-off relation exists between scale econo- automobile supply chain in the Association of mies and transport costs to deliver products to Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Thai distant customers, lower transport costs make effect was felt more severely in Malaysia and the concentration of production more profit- the Philippines, while the impact on Indone- able, as shown in figure  30.6. Consequently, sia was sharp and short (year-on-year growth globalization (decline of broadly defined inter- rates dropped to 0.7 percent in November but national transport/transaction costs) tends showed greater than 20 percent growth in to enhance the formation of agglomeration October and December). within a global supply chain. Because of self- Thailand is also known as the global cen- organization, it is not feasible to eliminate ter of hard disk drive production—accounting potential risks by agglomeration in highly com- for almost 20 percent of world exports, on par plex supply chains. To complicate matters fur- ther, when a disruption occurs, it is impossible to find replacements from other suppliers, at Trade off Scale economies Transport costs least in the short run, because of a high degree of customization. An example from the 2011 disaster was the Renesas Electronics Corpora- tion’s Naka plant, located in Ibaraki Prefecture. Agglomeration/dispersion It produces a micro control unit (MCU) for high-quality motor vehicles that makes exten- sive use of electronic control technology. Over the years, Renesas has become a supplier of Risk customized MCUs for major automobile com- Figure 30.6 Trilateral trade-offs in global resilience panies throughout the world. 276 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G We might find other cases of dispersion Those disasters and their effects notwithstand- forces if concentration increases the poten- ing, critical nodes still widely persist. tial risk of disruption for the entire supply chain. Dispersions in this case might involve Better to be brisk and slapdash building sufficient safety stocks (dispersion of than slow and elaborate products), use of multiple suppliers, and dupli- Prompt measures to remove bottlenecks are cation of production facilities. These actions, undoubtedly necessary to avoid prolonged dys- which are components of so-called business function of supply chain networks. Agglom- continuity plans (BCPs), are aimed at increas- eration has a lock-in effect: that is, firms take ing redundancy and resiliency. They garner actions reflexively to restore the agglomera- great attention in the supply chain manage- tion after it is damaged by temporary shocks. ment literature. Collaboration among firms and/or government Individual firms are rarely capable of taking support of such efforts hasten rehabilitation. sufficient actions to mitigate the potential loss Auto production in Japan recovered nearly from supply chain disruptions because they are to a normal level in August, five months after generally reluctant to assume the loss of effi- the shock. We might consider that the rapid ciency derived through scale economies. High- recovery showed the high resilience of supply impact/low-probability events, such as huge chain networks in the Japanese automobile earthquakes and tsunamis, make our predic- industry. This was in part due to emergency tions more diverse and imprecise. Generally, relief measures taken by the private sector, although people’s awareness of risk is tuned to such as sending technical personnel from all a high level soon after experiencing an impor- rival customer firms collaborating to help tant natural disaster, heterogeneity in beliefs rehabilitate damaged suppliers’ factories. The will increase with the passage of time. More- rapid revival of transportation networks (high- over, uncertainty will be high in the decision- ways, railways, airports, and seaports) was also making process because the valuation of risks of fundamental importance. is difficult. In such a case, the market equilib- After the Thai flood, the government imple- rium can only reflect the opinion of the more mented some measures to support firms striv- optimistic firms, which avoids the costs of risk ing for continuing production. These measures management. Agency problems might also be included permission for temporary production an issue. A risk-conscious buyer might wish to relocation and outsourcing and the exemp- enforce a BCP on its supplier in the business tion of import tariffs on locally unavailable contract, but the supplier’s implementation parts, components, and industrial equipment. could be partial if monitoring costs are high. Additional corporate tax exemption was also Actually, the 2011 disaster was not the first given to flood-hit companies. For the automo- supply chain crisis in East Asia, even in recent bile industry, imports of assembled cars were times. A strong earthquake in Taiwan in March allowed free of tax. Entry of foreign experts to 2000 shut down large liquid crystal display engage in rehabilitation of factories was made factories agglomerated around the Hsinchu flexible. Science Park. The outbreak of the SARS epi- These measures were complemented by demic in southern China in 2002–03 sent international cooperation. The Japanese gov- ripples through the global supply chain. Japan ernment issued temporary work visas for six itself also suffered disruptions after the Great months to Thai workers employed by flood-hit Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake of 1995 factories of Japanese affiliates. By the end of and the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake of 2007. 2011 about 3,700 workers had participated in 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 277 the program. This program benefited Japanese are obtainable with smaller production firms who needed a quick start-up of backup volumes. production in Japan to mitigate the disruption 4. Coordinate standardization and sharing of the supply chain; it benefited Thai workers of parts and materials among companies. who might have lost jobs otherwise. The Bank Avoiding excessive company-specific of Thailand and the Bank of Japan launched a customization, such coordination pro- cooperative effort to provide Thai baht loans vides sufficient lot size to suppliers by to flood-hit Japanese affiliates backed by Japa- which dividing production facilities nese government bonds. becomes economically viable. Providing is preventing: Finding These strategies have already been put into opportunity in crisis practice to some degree. Regarding strategy (1), There is no time to lose in emergencies. At when the earthquake halted desktop computer the same time, it is necessary to consider production at the Fukushima plant of Fujitsu, whether returning to the predisaster situa- the company was able to restart production 12 tion is truly desirable if potential risks latent days later at a factory 740 kilometers away in in agglomerations become glaringly apparent. Shimane Prefecture in western Japan, which We now confront the urgent task of promot- usually produced notebook computers, as had ing global disaster risk management of highly been simulated many times. This operation networked supply chains while our memory enabled Fujitsu to minimize the disruption of 2011 is still fresh. period. Regarding strategy (2), Nissan has pur- sued a strategy of standardizing and sharing Individual firm/industry level parts and materials aggressively through its The main issue will be to enhance the resil- experience of partnership with Renault. In fact, iency of the supply chain while maintaining Nissan was able to recover production from the its efficiency. To minimize supply disruption, impact of the Thai flood quickly because it was each company can seek the best mix of the fol- able to switch to other suppliers of its global lowing strategies at the individual firm level: procurement network. For strategy (3), high global market-share companies have recog- 1. Elaborate a workable BCP that includes nized the importance of risk-averse dispersion remote backup production provisions. to maintain their market positions. One such Although this does not mean actual dis- company, Nidec-Shimpo Corp., which supplies persion of production under normal con- small motors used in various machine prod- ditions, repeated simulation training is ucts, boasts an 80 percent share of the global necessary. hard disk drive motor market (according to the company’s website). When its three plants in 2. Procure key parts and materials from Thailand were damaged by the flood, Nidec- multiple sources routinely, sharing the Shimpo reacted quickly by increasing produc- costs of dispersion between buyers and tion capacity in China by 50 percent and in the suppliers. Philippines by 60 percent to compensate for 3. Divide production and locate productive the loss of operations in Thailand. This action facilities in different locations, whether avoided the collapse of hard disk drive produc- interregionally or internationally, even tion. The company announced that the pro- under normal conditions. Innovative portion of the production in Thailand would production technology must be pro- be reduced from its original 60 percent even moted by which higher-scale economies after the rehabilitation of the factories, thereby 278 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G reducing the risk of concentration. As an and local governments, volunteers, and the example of strategy (4), companies are usually private sector is the Global Compact Network reluctant because they are concerned that the Japan (GCNJ). GCNJ joins the top corporate use of standardized parts would require com- management of leading Japanese companies in promises in product quality, leading to the loss a platform for linking corporate social respon- of competitiveness. After the GEJE, however, sibilities with business activities. GCNJ was METI took initiatives to coordinate parts shar- established in 2003 and currently has a mem- ing in the Japanese automobile industry, and it bership of more than 160 leading companies. is expected that more concrete measures will GCNJ has been providing a platform for the be taken as well. private sector to address issues such as climate change and water, and create an enabling envi- Local and national government level ronment for public–private partnerships. After As might be expected, local and national gov- the GEJE, GCNJ organized a collective action ernments have roles in areas where private program in which companies provided volun- initiatives cannot suffice. Typically, public teer assistance to several disaster-affected cities policies are expected to enhance the resilience in Miyagi Prefecture by utilizing and combining of infrastructure of all kinds supporting indus- the resources and strengths of each company. trial production and the daily life of people. For example, in Japan, earthquake-resistance stan- International cooperation dards for public facilities and infrastructure As we noted above, firms’ risk aversion func- were revised based on analyses of the damage tions to some degree as a dispersive force, but that occurred. Still, the 2011 disaster left us the this necessarily involves additional transport lesson to not mythologize safety: provisions in costs. Because dispersion will be international, land-use planning are necessary where there is we must recognize transport costs in a broad a tsunami risk because tide walls can never be sense including import tariffs and nontariff sufficiently high. Moreover, society must take barriers, customs clearance procedures, com- a hard look at the benefits and shortcomings munications costs, and even exchange rates. of dependence on nuclear power generation. Countries must join forces to mitigate widely Strengthening local infrastructure for preven- various costs related to cross-border transac- tion of urban flooding in developing countries tions. Such cooperation will increase connec- should be greatly emphasized. In this aspect, tivity to the global supply chain and thus the international cooperation is necessary; for chance of attracting investment. example, the Japan International Cooperation The 2011 earthquake and tsunami disas- Agency (JICA) will aid the Thai government in ter came as a further blow to the Japanese presenting a new master plan for flood mitiga- manufacturing sector, which had already been tion in the Chao Phraya Delta. threatened by high factor costs and a strong In broader perspectives, national spatial yen. But when firms were inclined to trans- planning must be readdressed to decentral- fer more production overseas, the Thai flood ize the overconcentrated economic-political occurred, compelling firms to revise their functions in capital cities (for example, Tokyo, risk assessments of excessive concentration Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta), and to develop of operations overseas. Given the existence a more resilient nationwide system of regions. of critical parts and material suppliers within There is a need for accelerating the inte- Japan, Japanese firms will find it attractive to gration of the private sector into existing plat- determine an appropriate mix of production forms and activities. One effective example of in Japan and overseas. That will seem prefer- partnership and cooperation among national able to accelerating the hollowing out of the 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 279 business environment for the improvement • When agglomeration is locked in, firms of taxation and expansion of free trade agree- promptly react to restore the original ment networks. structure against the damage of disaster. Recently, the Thai government proposed Cooperation among firms and supporting to Japanese local governments and industrial policies can accelerate the process. groups that small and medium-size firms in • Although quick restoration is necessary to local industrial clusters invest as a group and avoid exacerbation of a crisis through pro- establish sister clusters in Thailand. Sister clus- longed dysfunction of supply chains, struc- ters can operate with vertically linked special- tural changes must be provided to enhance ization at normal times, thereby realizing cost the resiliency of a supply chain, without reduction, while they can mutually back up mythologizing the safety of the status quo. production in cases of large natural disasters. Firms can thereby enjoy the same collective • Resilience of supply chains demands a certain efficiency overseas through familiar face-to- degree of geographical dispersion. To miti- face contacts as they do in Japan. This would gate the loss of efficiency by dispersion, the promote locational diversification of small previously described individual firm strate- firms, for which related costs are unaffordable. gies (1)–(4), government policies, and inter- national cooperation are in order. LESSONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR • Measuring the full extent of the GEJE’s eco- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES nomic impacts will take time. All industrial sectors as well as services suffered sig- Consider possible effects on supply chains. In nificant direct and indirect impacts. A lot today’s networked world, most countries are will depend on how the government will involved in the global supply chain, of which address the energy supply issues. developing countries are an important part. • The Bank of Japan’s swift intervention to A major disaster occurring in one country ensure immediate liquidity was instrumen- can have a global impact. Consequently, it is tal in mitigating impacts related to yen expected that developing countries will share appreciation and access to financing. the burden of strengthening the global resil- ience of supply chains. • Quick release of supplementary budget and Vulnerability is particularly high in many ad hoc regulations are key. The government developing countries because political and played an important role in alleviating the economic activities are excessively concen- impacts on households and businesses trated in capital cities. An urgent need exists for thanks to the subsequent approvals of sup- bold measures aimed at decentralization and plementary budgets and regulations such establishing backup systems for emergencies. as the Policy for the Double Debt Problem Furthermore, recent rapid urbanization during (chapter 31). economic growth has led to the destruction of • Unplanned concentration in supply chains natural systems of disaster prevention such as is self-organized because of agglomeration the water retention capacity of forests, thereby economies. The network of agglomerations increasing risks of flooding. Moreover, urban is efficient in normal times, but the global sprawl is occurring in marginal areas where production system is thereby vulnerable to the infrastructure is unprepared for severe natural disasters. natural events. 280 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G A pressing need exists to remedy such BIBLIOGRAPHY weaknesses under international cooperation. Fujita, M., and N. Hamaguchi. 2012. “Japan and Eco- Coordination among neighboring countries is nomic Integration in East Asia: Post-Disaster Sce- also necessary in such areas as cross-border nario.” Annals of Regional Science 42 (2): 485–500. transportation systems and water resource IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2011. Japan—2011 management. Policy makers should assess Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No. 11/182, Washington, DC. natural disaster risks in a new light—as a main- ———. 2012. World Economic Outlook. April 2012. Wash- stream issue that must be addressed by a coun- ington, DC: IMF. try to play a major role in global production METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). networks. 2012. Japan’s Challenges. Tokyo: METI. Consider widespread impacts. It is important Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2011. November 25. Tokyo. http://www.maff.go.jp/e that the impacts of a large-scale disaster such /quake/press_111125-2.html. as the GEJE are not assessed and addressed Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Agency for in isolation but also by taking into account Natural Resources and Energy. 2012. “Electricity potential regional and worldwide impacts. Supply-Demand Outlook & Measures in Summer Many countries in developing East Asia have 2012.” Tokyo. Nanto, D. K., W. H. Cooper, J. M. Donnelly, and strong ties with Japan and would be affected R. Johnson. 2011. “Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and by an appreciation of the yen. In the immedi- Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for ate aftermath of the earthquake, when the yen the U.S.” Congressional Research Service, Wash- appreciated sharply because of speculation ington, DC. about sizeable repatriation flows by insurance Schnell, M., E. David, and D. Weinstein. 2012. “Evalu- ating the Economic Response to Japan’s Earth- companies, corporations, and households, the quake.” Policy Discussion Paper Series 12-P-003, Japanese authorities and the G-7 undertook a Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Indus- concerted effort to stabilize the course of the try (RIETI), Tokyo. yen to avoid repercussions for the rest of the Sheffi, Y., and J. B. Rice Jr. 2005. “A Supply Chain View of the Resilient Enterprises.” MIT Sloan Manage- world, and East Asia specifically. Coordination ment Review 47 (1): 41–48. among countries is fundamental in mitigating World Bank. 2011. “The Recent Earthquake and Tsu- potential impacts of large-scale disasters. nami in Japan: Implications for East Asia.” East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, World Bank, Washington, DC. http://siteresources.worldbank .org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources NOTE /550192-1300567391916/EAP_Update_March Prepared by Masahisa Fujita, Research Institute of 2011_japan.pdf. Economy, Trade and Industry; Nobuaki Hamaguchi, WTTC (World Travel and Tourism Council). 2011. Kobe University (on global supply chain); Financial “The Tohoku Pacific Earthquake and Tsunami.” Service Agency (on the double debt problem); and December 2011 Update. London, U.K. Junko Sagara, CTI Engineering; and with contribu- ———. 2012. “The Tohoku Pacific Earthquake and Tsu- tions from Bianca Adam, World Bank. nami.” March 2012 Update. London, U.K. 3 0 : E CO N O M I C I M PA C T | 281 CHAPTER 31 Financial and Fiscal Impact The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred against the backdrop of a struggling economy and public finance system under stress, implying an exceptional fiscal cost and imposing a fiscal management challenge to the government of Japan (GoJ). In response, the government committed to a full-scale national initiative that has evinced its ability to quickly mobilize short-term liquidity but leaves in question its reliance on debt issuance and taxation measures to finance longer-term reconstruction. This note examines the fiscal costs of the event, the financial measures taken by the GoJ to fund these expenses, and the fiscal implications of these actions. Lessons learned and recommendations for devel- oping countries are distilled from this discussion. The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) burden on local governments, residents, and inflicted massive physical damage on pri- industry but significantly increased the finan- vate and public assets, destroyed livelihoods, cial burden of the central government, and and disrupted local and national economies. thus, indirectly, of the current and future Japa- In the aftermath of the event, the govern- nese population and economy. According to the ment of Japan (GoJ) announced a full-scale Cabinet Office (CAO), the GEJE was a “crisis in national response in which the government the midst of a crisis” for the Japanese economy would support (1) rebuilding disaster-resilient and its public finance (CAO 2011c). The GoJ regions, (2) restoring the livelihoods of the has had to balance financing and executing an disaster-affected population, and (3) reviving effective postdisaster response against plan- the local economy and industry. To finance ning how to spread the costs of this response this approach, the GoJ mobilized a portfolio across generations. of fiscal measures that minimized the financial 283 FINDINGS extend the scope of the government’s finan- cial responsibility. Additionally, a series of laws Understanding the GoJ’s postdisaster roles and that provide for government support to pro- responsibilities, as stated in Japanese laws and vision certain lines of insurance (earthquake, as evidenced by past disasters, helps to explain agricultural, fisheries, fishing boat, and forest; the GoJ’s expenditures and revenues related see chapters 28 and 29) establish a contingent to the GEJE. Japanese law clearly defines the liability of the government to pay its portion of roles and responsibilities, including financial, reinsurance payouts under these schemes. of the local and central governments in disaster response. A number of laws lay out a broad scope Cost of the GEJE to the GoJ for the GoJ’s legal contingent liability1 in the The GoJ estimates that the GEJE caused event of natural disasters, inclusive of respon- direct economic damages to private and pub- sibilities for disaster response, reconstruction lic capital and infrastructure in the amount of public and certain private assets, and social of ¥16.9  trillion (approximately $210 billion), and economic restoration. At the center of these 4 percent of Japan’s gross domestic product laws are the Disaster Relief Act and Disaster (GDP). The indirect costs of the event in the Countermeasures Basic Act (table 31.1). short, medium, and long term are difficult to Other laws—such as the Act on Special quantify but are likely much greater.2 Although Financial Support to Deal with Extremely originally forecasted to grow during 2011, Severe Disasters (1962) and the Natural Japan’s GDP contracted by 3.5 percent during Disaster Victims Relief Law (1998)—further the first quarter and by 0.7 percent for the full year (IMF 2011). While the public sector’s share of the direct Table 31.1 Key laws framing the GoJ’s contingent liability in the case and indirect losses from the GEJE is difficult of disaster to determine, it is undoubtedly significant. LAW(S) RELEVANCE TO THE GOJ’S CONTINGENT LIABILITY More easily analyzed are the fiscal costs of the IN NATURAL DISASTERS government’s relief, recovery, and reconstruc- Disaster Relief Act (1947) • Provides for disaster relief and welfare support tion measures after the GEJE. For short- to (including repair of private housing, cash transfers medium-term costs, government budgetary and/or loans, and so on) to affected populations. and cash-flow data (that is, disaster-related • Establishes subsidization of local governments’ expenditures and revenues) can be used. For measures by the central government. the assessment of longer-term fiscal impacts, • Mandates the establishment of a disaster relief projections are more difficult, as they embody fund for emergency relief activities by each a great deal of uncertainty due to possible vari- prefecture. ances in expected tax revenues, changes in the Disaster Countermeasures • Is the cornerstone of Japan’s disaster risk Basic Act (1961) management (DRM) system. Japanese bond market, and/or changes in the GoJ’s debt-management capacity. Further- • Sets out local and central governments’ responsibilities at all points in the DRM cycle, more, fat-tailed risks, such as the possibility of including levels and forms of the local and long-term impacts from the nuclear accident central governments’ postdisaster in Fukushima, could increase the fiscal costs of responsibilities. the disaster in the long run. • Embeds financial measures as one of the eight core components of Japan’s DRM system; this section defines disaster-expense-sharing fiscal Central government spending on the GEJE mechanisms that can be employed by the As of mid-2012, total central government fund- government post disaster (for example, subsidy, ing allocated to the GEJE totals ¥19.17 tril- tax, and debt measures). lion (table 31.2). This total includes spending 284 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G Table 31.2 Approved central government spending Table 31.3 Estimated costs of the GEJE to the central on the GEJE, FY10–FY12 Government of Japan DATE FISCAL FINANCING AMOUNT PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE OF FY11 YEAR MECHANISM (¥ BILLION) OF FY10 GDP INITIAL GENERAL 14-Mar-11 10 FY10 General 67.8 ACCOUNT BUDGET Contingency Total, FY10–12 4.0 20.7 Budget Total, FY11 3.2 16.6 19-Apr-11 11 FY11 General 50.3 Source: Based on data from the MOF and Cabinet Office (CAO). Contingency Budget 2-May-11 11 1st Supplementary 4,015.3 spending on the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Budget Earthquake of 1995 totaled about 1 percent of 25-Jul-11 11 2nd Supplementary 1,998.8 Japan’s GDP at the time (IMF 2011). Budget The GEJE reconstruction period is planned 21-Nov-11 11 3rd Supplementary 9,243.8 Budget for 10 years, with the first 5 years as the con- centrated reconstruction period. The latest 8-Feb-12 11 4th Supplementary 6.7 Budget GoJ figures for central and local government reconstruction expenditures (released July 29, 1-Apr-12 12 FY12 Bridge Budget 9.3 2011) estimate at least ¥19 trillion5 until the 6-Apr-12 12 FY12 Budget 3,775.4 end of FY15 and ¥23 trillion for the full 10 years TOTAL 19,167.4 (Reconstruction Agency 2011). As central gov- Total FY11 15,314.9 ernment spending through FY12 had already Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). exceeded ¥19 trillion, it is likely that total pub- Note: The Third Supplementary Budget included a ¥2,489.3 billion lic expenditures on the GEJE will run fairly allocation to repay the financing borrowed from FY11 pension funding. This repayment has been considered in this accounting of the GoJ above these levels. spending on the GEJE. The central government is also responsible for its portion of insurance payouts under the from the first contingency funding approved public-private insurance programs for earth- in Japan’s fiscal year (FY) 2010,3 through the quakes, agriculture, fisheries, fishing boats, and approved funding for FY12. While earlier forests (see chapter 29). Payments for the gov- funding (that is, up to and including the second ernment’s liability under the fisheries and fish- supplementary budget) was primarily for relief ing boat insurance, ¥93.9 billion, are included and recovery costs, the later budgets were pri- in the first supplementary budget. The central marily for reconstruction. Thus, a significant government’s share of payouts for the GEJE share of the later budgets may be disbursed for under the agricultural and forest insurance reconstruction projects over multiple FYs. programs is still undetermined.6 Its payment The GEJE imposed an exceptional cost under the earthquake insurance program, not on Japan’s central government: total central financed by the supplementary budgets, totals government funding for the event through ¥540 billion. mid-2012 represented 4 percent of FY10 GDP and 20.7 percent of GoJ’s initial FY11 general Allocation of central government account budget (table 31.3).4 Considering only expenditures on the GEJE the costs incurred during FY11 following the The most significant funding allocations by event, these represent 16.6 percent of the ini- the central government on the GEJE from tial general account budget and 3.2 percent of FY10 through FY12 are for economic and FY10 GDP. In comparison, central government social support programs and miscellaneous 3 1 : F I N A N C I A L A N D F I S C A L I M PAC T | 285 central and local government spending on Economic, social, and miscellaneous 4050.6 disaster relief may be greater than what is Repair and reconstruction of buildings 3605.2 captured here); similarly, the reconstruction and infrastructure (public and private) grants for local governments increase the total Local tax allocation grants to local governments 2878 amount spent on repair and reconstruction of Reconstruction grants for local buildings and infrastructure. 1848 governments Costs to local governments Public financing (loan) programs 1433.3 The fiscal impact of the GEJE on local gov- Contingency reserve 1200 ernments (prefectural and municipal) is much more difficult to assess, in great part Nuclear-related costs 1112.3 due to the very limited availability of infor- mation on disaster-related expenditures Debris management 1082.1 and revenues at local levels. The scale of the Disaster reduction measures 1057.9 disaster—primarily in the three most-affected prefectures—Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi— Disaster relief 773.2 suggests that it far exceeded the capacity of local public finance to fund a significant share Interest payments for 125.3 reconstruction bonds of reconstruction costs. 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 From the designation of the GEJE as an ¥ billion “extremely severe disaster” the day after the Figure 31.1 Central government funding allocation for the GEJE, FY10–FY12 event, the GoJ’s decisions and policies have Source: Based on data from the MOF. aimed to shift as much of the financial burden of Note: Due to rounding, the sum of these totals is not exactly equal to total central government expenditure, ¥19,167.4 billion. This categorization of allocations is based on that used by the GoJ. In the GEJE to the central government. For exam- some cases, two GoJ categories have been combined when funding is for similar activities. ple, under the Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law, which provides subsidies up to ¥3 million to affected households, the central and local expenditures, followed by repair and recon- governments equally share the liability. Follow- struction costs for public and private buildings ing the GEJE, however, the law was amended (figure 31.1 and table 31.4). If transfers to local with the central government’s share being governments under local tax allocation grants increased to 80 percent for the GEJE.7 The cen- for discretionary spending and reconstruction tral government budgeted ¥352 billion between grants are aggregated, however, these take the the first and second supplementary budgets to lead, being greater than ¥4.7 trillion. fund its additional liability under the program. While these figures are informative, they The role of the central government in fund- must be interpreted with care. Some catego- ing reconstruction is emphasized in the central ries provide estimates of close to final or final reconstruction policy—the Basic Guidelines for totals for allocations to the category; others, Reconstruction in Response to the Great East such as repair and reconstruction and interest Japan Earthquake. The Basic Guidelines pro- payments for reconstruction bonds, will con- mote a full-scale national response that will tinue to grow. In addition, because the local “make use of all possible measures to support tax allocation grants to local governments rep- reconstruction efforts of the disaster-afflicted resent a discretionary spending category, the local governments,” and establish a Special governments can allocate these funds across Zone for Reconstruction within which local the remaining categories (that is, the total of governments, residents, and industries are 286 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G Table 31.4 Explanation of central government funding allocations for the GEJE ALLOCATION CATEGORY AMOUNT ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION (¥ BILLION) Repair and reconstruction of buildings and 3,605.2 Repair and reconstruction of public and private buildings infrastructure (public and private) (airports, facilities, housing, schools, and so on) and infrastructure (sanitation, roads, railroads, and so on) Local allocation tax grants to local 2,878 Special tax allocation for discretionary spending governments Reconstruction grants for local 1,848 Program for municipalities in the Special Zone for governments Reconstruction Public financing (loan) programs 1,433.3 Loan programs for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), agriculture and education industries, homeowners, and so on Economic and social restoration measures 4,050.6 Support to economic restoration such as employment and miscellaneous expenses measures, measures for SMEs, agriculture-related industries, and so on. Support to social restoration such as housing grants, health-care support, education assistance, and so on. Miscellaneous costs such as self-defense and police forces; food, fuel, electricity, and natural resource supplies; international information sharing; and so on. Contingency reserve for recovery and 1,200 reconstruction from the GEJE Debris management 1,082.1 Disaster relief 773.2 Temporary housing, condolence money, and so on Disaster reduction measures 1,057.9 Earthquake-resistant building of schools (national) Reconstruction from nuclear damage 836.9 Compensation for damage by nuclear 275.4 Security money, investment accident Interest payments for reconstruction bonds 125.3 Source: Based on data from the MOF. eligible for tax reductions and incentives and Through FY12 the central government budget and financial subsidies. One of the provided ¥1.6 trillion in GEJE reconstruction most significant supporting subsidies is the grants and about ¥3 trillion in local allocation reconstruction grant program for local gov- tax grants to local governments. Restrictions ernments. Under this program, after having on the use of the special local allocation tax their reconstruction plans approved, munici- grants have been relaxed for the GEJE recon- palities receive grants worth 50 percent of struction, allowing for spending at the discre- project costs for infrastructure and asset tion of local governments. reconstruction and 80 percent for supporting projects. The remainder of the project costs Reduced tax revenues from can be financed by the special local allocation special tax measures tax provided by the central government, effec- The GoJ implemented a series of special tax tively eliminating any additional expenses to measures designed to increase the cost shar- the municipal government (Reconstruction ing of disaster recovery and reconstruction by Agency 2012). the Japanese population and private sector 3 1 : F I N A N C I A L A N D F I S C A L I M PAC T | 287 Table 31.5 Special tax measures in response to the GEJE tax base and raise tax revenue. In the short TARGET GOAL OF MEASURE(S) MEASURE(S) term, however, they reduced the tax revenues of the central and local governments. The cen- Japanese Encourage contributions • Increase of maximum population and to recovery and deduction from income tax for tral government, therefore, bore the full costs private sector reconstruction efforts contributions to the GEJE and compensated the local governments for • Income tax deduction for their decrease in revenues (Reconstruction investments in companies Agency 2012). contributing to the regional recovery GoJ’s short-, medium-, and long-term Disaster- Relieve financial and • Individuals: Special treatments disaster financing methods and their affected administrative burden for casualty losses, property fiscal impacts population and damage (housing, household enterprises assets, motor vehicles), pension Short-term financing mechanisms savings, and so on The GoJ moved with remarkable speed to • Firms: Special treatments for mobilize emergency relief funding following inventory and asset losses, the GEJE. Within three days, the CAO was withholding taxes, and so on determined to draw down on Japan’s FY10 Promote investment and • Tax incentives to promote general contingency budget8 to procure and growth in reconstruction investment, employment, and transport emergency relief supplies to the zones research and development in selected industries (for disaster-affected areas. A total of ¥67.8 billion example, renewable energy, was mobilized before the end of March; in April, agriculture, and medical) another ¥50.3 billion was drawn down from the Source: Based on information from the National Tax Agency 2011. FY11 general contingency budget for transi- tional shelter. This funding was quickly mobi- (table 31.5). Many tax incentive measures also lized because, unlike supplementary budgets, aimed to attract the development of priority prior parliamentary approval was not required.9 industries in the reconstruction zone. These Thus, the general contingency budget provided tax incentives were complemented by financial immediate bridge financing till more substan- incentives through subsidies in some cases. tial funding could be mobilized (figure 31.2). In the longer term, these tax measures would Within two months the GoJ approved a help to widen and deepen the government’s ¥4,015.3 billion supplementary budget for Figure 31.2 The 10,000 60 GEJE financial allocations and 8,000 50 timing, FY10–12 Source: Based on data 40 ¥ billion from the MOF 2012. 6,000 Percent 30 4,000 20 2,000 10 0 0 FY10 FY11 1st 2nd 3rd 4th FY12 Bridge & Contingency Contingency Supplementary Supplementary Supplementary Supplementary special account budget budget budget budget budget budget budgets 14-March-11 11-April-11 2-May-11 25-July-11 21-November-11 8-February-12 1-April-12 Amount (¥ billion) Percentage of total GEJE spending through FY12 288 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G relief-and-recovery costs. For this First Sup- reconstruction within this generation and not plementary Budget, the Ministry of Finance passing them on to future generations of Japa- looked within the existing budget for funding nese. Financial resources provisioned for use sources. The approved budget relied on a com- by the Basic Guidelines are as follows: bination of budget reallocation (¥660.6  bil- • Reduction of government expenditures lion), borrowing from the pension fund (¥2,489.7 billion), contribution from public • Selling of state-owned properties works projects (¥55.1 billion), and liquidation • Reviews of the special accounts and per- of the full FY11 allocation to the Contingency sonnel salaries of public servants Reserve for Economic Crisis Response and Regional Revitalization (¥810 billion). • Increases in nontax revenues This approach illustrates the GoJ’s resource- • Temporary taxation measures fulness, but also demonstrates the limitations of ex-post budget adjustments to finance disas- On November 30, 2011, the bill on special ters. Budget reallocation was used for the first measures to secure financing for the GEJE supplementary budget and again for the third reconstruction was passed. Its approval fol- (¥164.8 billion). In sum, though, less than 1 per- lowed a great deal of debate about what debt cent of the FY11 general account budget was and tax measures the government should take reallocated to the GEJE recovery efforts, and for the GEJE. Under the approved plan, issu- budget reallocation contributed only 5.4 per- ance of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) cent of current total central government spend- financed the majority of the estimated recon- ing on the event. Furthermore, more than half struction costs. The bulk of repayment costs the funding for the first supplementary budget for these bonds were secured through tax was borrowed from the pension fund, which increases. Personal income tax, in the form allowed the government time to mobilize addi- of a surtax, was raised for 25 years starting in tional resources that have to be repaid at a later 2013. A 5 percent corporate income tax cut date. Finally, the government redirected the full that was initially planned in 2011 was post- FY11 Contingency Reserve for Economic Crisis poned, and a ¥1,000 increase in per capita local Response and Regional Revitalization toward tax (currently ¥4,000 per year) was included. the disaster—the intent of this reserve, however, Table 31.6 provides details on the increases and was not for natural disasters but for economic their projected revenue generation. measures required to stabilize Japan’s economic While the tax measures will be phased in situation during times of financial crisis.10 starting in FY12, reconstruction bond issuance In late July, the smaller second supplemen- tary budget was passed. The GoJ was able to Table 31.6 Special reconstruction taxes: Schedule and projected revenues fund this budget with surplus from FY10, the TAX ITEM INCREASE PERIOD PROJECTED result of higher-than-expected FY10 tax rev- REVENUE enues and unused funds. Income tax 2.1% surtax 1/13–12/37 ¥7.3 trillion (25 years) Medium- to long-term financing mechanisms Corporation tax Delay of a planned 5% cut 4/12–3/15 ¥2.4 trillion The government’s short-term measures (effectively, a 10% surtax) (3 years) funded relief-and-recovery activities while it Individual inhabitant ¥1,000 per person (annual) 6/14–6/24 ¥0.8 trillion formulated its reconstruction policy. When tax (local tax)a (10 years) the Basic Guidelines policy document was Source: Based on data from MOF. a. Revenue from the local tax increase is not directed toward reconstruction in the disaster zone, released at the end of July, it set a conceptual but to finance urgent disaster mitigation projects, such as retrofitting public buildings to reduce framework of sharing the costs of the GEJE earthquake risks in individual localities. 3 1 : F I N A N C I A L A N D F I S C A L I M PAC T | 289 commenced in early December 2011. In total, maturities. A portion of these bonds are recon- slightly more than ¥14.2 trillion of JGBs were struction supporters bonds that facilitate issued: approximately ¥11.6 trillion for the financial support and solidarity from the Japa- third supplementary budget of 2011 and nearly nese public. These bonds offer the lowest pos- ¥2.7 trillion for FY12. Interestingly, about 25– sible interest rate for government bonds (0.05 30 percent of reconstruction bonds are being percent) for three years, before converting to sold to retail investors with 3-, 5-, and 10-year standard JGB rates. The GoJ has recruited Japanese celebrities to market the bonds and is offering gold and silver commemorative coins to purchasers (figure 31.3). Fiscal impacts of the GoJ’s financial measures Although the GoJ is endeavoring to minimize debt costs and tax increases, the financial mea- sures it has taken for reconstruction have had significant fiscal impacts. The GEJE was “a crisis in the midst of a crisis,” and the finan- cial burden of the event has placed significant additional strain on public finance. Even before the GEJE, Japan’s public finance was under stress, as budget deficits of the central and local governments grew. Cred- ibility of the JGBs and its sovereign debt rating was, and still is, declining—it is now rated at the Figure 31.3 Design of commemorative coin by elementary school student same level as China by each major rating agency Source: MOF. (figure 31.4). Compared to its accumulated cen- tral government debt-to-GDP ratio at the time of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, which was lower AAA/Aaa than one-half of GDP, the GoJ’s central govern- ment debt was about 140 percent and growing AA+/Aa1 at the start of FY11 (debt ratios of Hyogo prefec- tural and municipal governments doubled and AA/Aa2 remain higher than prior to the event). One of the factors driving the government’s AA-/Aa3 increasing dependence on debt has been A+/A1 Japan’s aging population and decreasing tax revenue. The population share aged 65 and Great East Japan Earthquake above is expected to increase from 21.5 percent A/A2 in 2007 up to 40 percent in 2050. Such aging is A-/A3 already increasing the fiscal burden on the gov- 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan ernment, as it needs to spend more on social 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Moody’s S&P Fitch expenditure. In addition, in recent years, tax Figure 31.4 Sovereign credit rating of Japan by major rating agencies, 2000 revenues have been declining due to the global to current financial crisis and tax cuts. While Japan still Source: Based on data from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. 290 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G can increase some tax forms, others, such as burden of repayment to future generations. For the corporate income tax, are already high.11 reconstruction bonds, though, the GoJ pro- In sum, at the time of the GEJE, the GoJ had posed that they be paid back within 10 years, little leeway in terms of either its ability to uti- with tax increases also within the redemption lize debt financing or taxation measures. Debt period to secure revenues to redeem them. issuance increases demand for fiscal recon- Ultimately, negotiation and compromise struction that further undermines confidence resulted in the final package of debt and tax in the creditworthiness of the JGBs. Regarding measures for the GEJE. A much-discussed tax increases, the government was relying on increase of consumption tax was left out of the existing room for tax increases to finance ris- package.12 The marginal increase of personal ing social expenditures. The aging of the popu- income tax was low, but the surtax was put in lation means that the government is less able to place for 25 years, placing the public debt bur- spread the costs of the GEJE intergeneration- den on the “shrinking,” relatively speaking, ally because there is already such a high burden younger generation. Furthermore, there is a risk placed on the young and future generations. that reconstruction tax revenues will not match While initial policy goals following the with expenditures for servicing reconstruction GEJE were to minimize debt issuance and to debt, which is being aligned with the broader keep taxation measures temporary, the plan plan for government debt issuance.13 In addi- finally agreed upon was somewhat different tion, long-term uncertainty about macroeco- than that initially proposed. Issuance of recon- nomic conditions increases the risk of mismatch struction bonds was widely accepted as a short- between projected and actual tax revenues. term measure to finance the reconstruction In the context of the government’s gross costs. Opinions differed, however, regarding outstanding debt, the additional reconstruc- their redemption period. Standard construc- tion bonds issued in FY11 and FY12 make small tion bonds have a 60-year maturity, leaving the contributions (figure 31.5). That said, they 800 As of end-FY2012 (percentage of GDP) 700 Government bonds outstanding Approx. ¥709 trillion (148%) (general bonds outstanding) Long-term debt outstanding of 600 Approx. ¥940 trillion (196%) central and local government 500 ¥ trillion 400 300 200 100 0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 Reconstruction bonds Construction bonds Special deficit financing bonds Figure 31.5 Accumulated GoJ bonds outstanding, FY1965–FY2012 Source: MOF 2011. 291 force a change in the government’s medium- public finance to manage, it provides an term fiscal policy to reduce debt issuance year opportunity to review and strengthen on year, as the total amounts issued in FY11 and the effectiveness of local governments’ FY12 are greater than the reduction in non- disaster-financing mechanisms. reconstruction debt issuance. This dynamic • The GoJ’s contingency budget allows it poses challenges for the government’s fiscal to quickly mobilize funding for an effec- consolidation target to halve the FY10 deficit- tive disaster response.14 The flexibility and to- GDP ratio by FY15 (CAO 2010). immediate availability of the GoJ’s contin- gency budget allowed it to approve funding within three days of the GEJE to finance LESSONS immediate emergency relief. Although relief costs represent a very small portion • The GoJ’s broad contingent liability to natu- of the overall amount spent on the disas- ral disasters results from its responsibilities ter, they serve an essential function in miti- explicitly defined in Japanese laws and the gating additional fatalities and damages implicit expectations of society, which can linked to a slow response effort. result in extraordinary fiscal costs, as evi- denced by the GEJE. The GoJ is expected • Tax measures can be used effectively ex ante not only to reconstruct assets, but to restore to incentivize investment in disaster preven- social and economic well-being following tion and ex post to facilitate cost-sharing of a major disaster. This role aligns with the reconstruction by the population and private Japanese values of solidarity and coop- sector. Japan has a series of laws that provide eration, but implies that the public finance tax incentives for investment in earthquake system is highly exposed to disaster risks. mitigation. Although difficult to quantify, The GEJE raised general account spending these incentives promote risk reduction and by nearly 16.6 percent in FY11—an earth- likely reduced losses from the GEJE in some quake striking Tokyo, for example, could areas. Following the event, the government stress the system much further. Quanti- immediately enacted tax relief measures for tative analysis of the government’s con- affected populations and industries, and it tingent liability to disasters would be an built tax incentives into its reconstruction important first step toward management of policy. It also offered special tax deductions its financial exposure to this type of event. to individuals and corporations that con- tributed to the reconstruction and recovery • Local governments are at the frontlines of effort, thus facilitating solidarity and cost- disaster response and reconstruction and sharing by the unaffected population and thus the most aware of local needs, but local private sector. public finance has limited capacity to cope with large-scale disasters. The liability of • Financial demands placed on the govern- the central government was expanded fol- ment by major disasters exacerbate the lowing the GEJE (for example, under the underlying structural problems of the fiscal Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law), and system. The GEJE forced the government to transfer schemes were designed to allow issue additional debt and pass tax increases the central government to fund locally in an economic and fiscal environment in designed reconstruction plans. While the which these actions were not only unfa- magnitude of the GEJE exceeded what vorable, but counter to fiscal management might be reasonably expected for local policy. The experience emphasized the 292 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G imperative of having a robust fiscal system Treat disaster risks as a contingent capable of absorbing large disaster shocks. liability of the government For Japan to achieve prompt and enduring Quantitatively assess the government’s contin- reconstruction, it should look beyond res- gent liability in the event of natural disasters. toration, which brings the Japanese econ- Identify the government’s explicit (that is, omy back to the predisaster state, and seek stated by law) and implicit (that is, socially and to strengthen the economy and society in a politically expected) contingent liabilities for broader sense to prepare for the future. disasters. Historical analysis, complemented with information from probabilistic risk mod- • A lack of ex ante financial planning for els, can provide a sense of the government’s disasters can contribute to disagreements recurrent financial needs as well as possible and possible delays around securing recon- major losses from catastrophic events related to struction funding. Although Japanese law these contingent liabilities. In addition, where allows for the government to secure fund- risks cannot be quantitatively assessed, they ing for disasters in broad terms, lack of a should be qualitatively identified and discussed. clear “blueprint” for how the government Clear definition of the government’s contingent would finance reconstruction opened liability helps to protect public finance from an space for prolonged deliberation on appro- open-ended financial liability to disaster events. priate measures. Alternative plans and road Develop a disaster-risk-financing strategy as maps for flexibly financing reconstruction part of the government’s broader fiscal risk man- under different scenarios, both in terms of agement strategy. The disaster-risk-financing the type and scale of disaster and the eco- and insurance strategy should combine ex post nomic and fiscal environment, could be and ex ante measures to optimize the timing, designed to prevent this from occurring in cost-efficiency, and effectiveness of disaster the future. funding. For short-term postdisaster liquid- ity needs, the strategy should rely on ex ante RECOMMENDATIONS FOR budgetary and possibly market-based instru- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ments, such as contingency budgets, reserve funds, and contingent credit. For the longer Japan’s public finance responsively provided term, major reconstruction costs, a “blueprint” financing for an effective relief effort, but was for mobilization of ex post financial resources stressed by the extensive burden of recovery (for example, debt issuance and tax increase) and reconstruction funding requirements. In should complement the ex ante measures. Sce- developing countries, where governments’ nario analysis should be conducted to ensure fiscal options to finance disasters are likely the robustness of the strategy for disasters of more limited—for example, due to structural varying type, magnitude, and location under weaknesses such as lack of income support, different macroeconomic and fiscal conditions. inadequate financial resources, and lack of Understand the roles and financial responsi- administrative capacity—fiscal impacts of bilities of the central and local governments in these events can be even more substantial. this process. Local governments should, to some The following recommendations could miti- extent, share financial responsibility for disas- gate the impacts of disasters on governments’ ters affecting their territories. But local and cen- long-term fiscal balances and increase their tral governments should agree together ex ante financial response capacity in the aftermath of whether and how sharing of these financial a disaster. responsibilities changes after severe disasters. 3 1 : F I N A N C I A L A N D F I S C A L I M PAC T | 293 Reduce the contingent liability of 6. The level of payout for the agricultural insurance program remains uncertain due to the nuclear the government in the long term accident at Fukushima. Use fiscal tools such as taxation and subsidiza- 7. This amendment applies only to the GEJE. Cost tion to encourage ex ante disaster risk manage- sharing remains 50/50 for all other disaster ment (DRM). The government could decrease events. residential and private sector dependence on 8. For the 23 years preceding 2010, Japan’s general contingency budget was allocated ¥350 million; in postdisaster government aid by using tax and/ 2010 this allocation was lowered to ¥300 billion, or subsidy tools to encourage ex ante DRM. representing about 0.3 percent of the central gov- Although the relative power and ease of use of ernment’s initial general account budget for 2010. tax versus subsidy tools varies across countries, 9. Retroactive parliamentary approval is allowed the government could achieve similar ends for expenditures from the general contingency budget. through either means by offering tax incentives 10. The Contingency Reserve for Economic Crisis or subsidies for investment in disaster preven- Response and Regional Revitalization was intro- tion. It could also promote minimum levels of duced in the budget in FY10 in response to the prevention by imposing tax penalties or fees for worsening economic situation caused by the global financial crisis. The contingency budget underinvestment in risk reduction and/or for had previously been used to support employment risk-increasing actions. programs for college graduates as well as other Promote the development of private catas- economic support programs. trophe risk insurance markets. The deepening 11. According to the IMF (2011), Japan’s consump- tion tax (value added tax, or VAT) is the lowest of private catastrophe risk insurance markets of advanced economies with a VAT, and its per- shifts more of the burden of postdisaster recov- sonal income tax structure allows much room for ery to specialized risk carriers. The government deductions and provides low marginal rates for can encourage the development of functioning the middle class. catastrophe risk markets by putting in place 12. The GoJ has proposed to increase the consump- tion tax rate by 5 percent to fund increasing social and enabling the legal and regulatory frame- expenditure costs until the mid-2010s as a part work, developing risk market infrastructure, of its “unified reform of tax and social spending” and facilitating risk-pooling mechanisms. initiative. 13. The Act for Special Measures for Securing Finan- cial Resources Necessary to Implement Measures for Reconstruction Following the GEJE does NOTES stipulate, though, that reconstruction bonds must Prepared by Motohiro Sato, Hitotsubashi University, be redeemed by 2037, within the term of income and Laura Boudreau, World Bank. tax increase (Article 71). 14. Equally as important, it was able to smoothly 1. As defined by the World Bank, a contingent execute these funds for reconstruction due to pre- liability is a spending obligation arising from past agreements with private sector firms. See chapter events that will be incurred in the future if uncer- 20 of this series for additional information. tain discrete future events occur. 2. Indirect losses are losses that result from physical damage, such as business interruption, reduced tourism, reduced tax revenue, and so on. BIBLIOGRAPHY 3. Japan’s fiscal year (FY) runs April 1 to March 31. The GEJE struck on March 11, 2011, toward the CAO (Cabinet Office). 2010. Fiscal Management Strat- tail end of FY10. egy. Tokyo: CAO. 4. FY10 GDP was ¥479.2 trillion and FY11 initial ———. 2011a. Disaster Management in Japan. Tokyo: general account budget was ¥92.4 trillion (Minis- CAO. try of Finance 2011). ———. 2011b. Medium-Term Fiscal Framework 5. This estimate includes the first and second (FY2012–FY2014). Tokyo: CAO. supplementary budgets, which had already been ———. 2011c. The Guidelines on Policy Promotion for the approved at that time. Revitalization of Japan. Tokyo: CAO. 294 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2011. Japan: 2011 National Tax Agency. 2011. National Tax Agency Report Article IV Consultation. Rep. no. 11/181, Washing- 2011. Tokyo: National Tax Agency. ton, DC. Reconstruction Agency. 2011. Basic Guidelines for Ministry of Finance. 2012. “Financial Budget for Each Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Fiscal Year.” Tokyo. http://www.mof.go.jp/bud- Earthquake. Tokyo. get/budger_workflow/budget/index.html. ———. 2012. “Reconstruction Process on Track.” Tokyo. Ministry of Finance, Financial Bureau. 2011. “High- lights of FY2012 Government Debt Management.” Tokyo. 3 1 : F I N A N C I A L A N D F I S C A L I M PAC T | 295 CHAPTER 32 Strategies for Managing Low-Probability, High-Impact Events Every country should develop strategies for managing low-probability, high-impact extreme events— strategies that reflect their own as well as global experiences with megadisasters. These strategies should integrate structural and nonstructural measures tailored to local conditions. Forecasting and early warnings, land-use planning and regulation, hazard maps, education, and evacuation drills are all vital. Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake can help improve these nonstructural practices, which in Japan have been shaped by trial and error after experiences with many natural disasters. The international community can play an important role in developing knowledge-sharing mechanisms to help countries prepare for low-probability, high-impact extreme events. FINDINGS Excessive reliance on structural measures proved to be ineffective, and even detrimental, National strategies to address low- when the forces of nature exceeded the struc- probability, high-impact extreme events tures’ design limitations (chapter 1). In some The Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) was towns, evacuation was delayed because people the first disaster in Japan’s modern history that did not expect a tsunami to overtop an embank- exceeded all expectations and predictions. Its ment as high as 10 meters or more. Some could dimensions were almost beyond imagination not escape the tsunami in time because they (chapter 25). Its enormous impact prompted had moved their homes to the lowlands along the government to seek a paradigm shift in the coast to be closer to their source of income. disaster risk management (DRM), moving They felt safe because high embankments had from structure-focused prevention to a strat- been built (chapter 11). egy of mitigation by integrating structural and Addressing low-probability, high-impact nonstructural measures. extreme events requires an integrated DRM 297 strategy, combining structural and nonstruc- shelters, and other facilities; and installing tural measures. Disasters should be cat- structures to delay and weaken the force of egorized into two levels: level 1 consists of waves. Education, practice drills, and mutual disaster events that occur with relatively high help mechanisms are extremely important. frequency (with a return period of around 100 Urban and land-use planners need to consider years or less) and level 2 consists of events mechanisms for speedy emergency evacuation that rarely happen (with a return period of and for sustaining social and economic activi- around 1,000 years or more). The GEJE was a ties. People’s participation is the critical factor level 2 event, as illustrated in figure 32.1. Level in the planning process. 1 events can be addressed mainly by disaster During the GEJE catastrophic damage was prevention structures, while level 2 events inflicted when structures were overtopped require an integrated DRM strategy. by the tsunami, reached their breaking point, Strategies for level 2 events should focus on and suddenly collapsed. Structures should be saving lives. Measures to be used in an inte- resilient enough to hold up, or succumb gradu- grated manner to ensure immediate evacu- ally, even when the natural forces exceed their ation include installing disaster forecasting structural design limitation. Nonstructural and early warning systems; land-use planning; measures such as land-use planning, forecast- designating and building of evacuation sites, ing and warning systems, evacuation drills, and public awareness-raising, should be designed with enough redundancy and flexibility to address different disaster scenarios. M9.0 (2×1010 J) Strategies should take into account the unexpected. In the GEJE, many plans did not specify the actions to be taken in the face of an 2011 off the Pacific Coast: Tohoku earthquake unexpected event, contributing to catastrophic Magnitude 9.0 damage to facilities, communities, and socio- economic systems. Converted earthquake energy (joule) Structural measures Interplate earthquake (M ≥ 9.0) Structural measures will continue to play a key Interplate earthquake (9.0 > M ≥ 8.0) role in managing low-probability, high-impact Interplate earthquake (8.0 > M) extreme events. Although many disaster pre- Intraplate earthquake (9.0 > M ≥ 8.0) Intraplate earthquake (8.0 > M) vention structures, such as tsunami defense dikes and gates, collapsed and were washed away in the GEJE, some withstood the waves even after they were overtopped, reducing the force of the tsunami and delaying its penetra- Keicho Sanriku Meiji Sanriku tion inland (chapter 1). In a number of cases ? earthquake earthquake M8.5 (3.5×1017 J) the dikes were not overtopped, and kept the hinterlands from being inundated. Postdisaster Eppou-Boso offshore earthquake computer simulations for the Kamaishi Port M8.0 (6.3×10 J) 16 ? indicated that the wave breakers around the M7.0 (2×1015 J) 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 port reduced the peak height of the tsunami by Year 40 percent: from 13.7 meters to 8 meters. Figure 32.1 Magnitude of earthquakes in Japan Damage by the tsunami of 10 meters Source: Cabinet Office. or higher to structures and buildings was 298 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G extensive and severe. Almost all buildings and and reconstruction materials. National routes structures made of wood were destroyed. Iron running along the coast served as embank- structures were left with only their skeletons. ments preventing the tsunami from advancing Most reinforced concrete buildings withstood inland. the tsunami, although they suffered internal damage (chapter 2). Nonstructural measures After the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hur- As Sanriku’s coastal areas have been repeatedly ricane Katrina, design standards for defensive hit by tsunamis, many towns and communities structures, such as dikes and water gates, have had developed both structural and nonstruc- been reevaluated. The conclusion is that using tural measures that mitigated the impact of the only preventive structures to defend against tsunami substantially. low-probability, extreme events is not an eco- In addition to information dissemination nomically, environmentally, or socially viable and evacuation measures, the following non- option. For example, it is not realistic to try to structural approaches were found to be effec- protect hundreds or even thousands of kilome- tive against extreme water disasters: ters of seacoast using embankments, even as • Moving residential areas and public build- high as 20 meters. ings to higher ground, while keeping com- Tsunamis should be classified into two mercial installations and activities based in or more categories. Level 1 tsunamis may the lowland coastal areas (chapter 12) occur once in a 100 years; level 2 tsunamis are extreme events that may occur once in a • Securing evacuation routes (such as roads 1,000 years or more. Disaster mitigation struc- and stairways) that connect public facili- tures such as wave breakers and dikes should ties (such as schools) to higher ground be designed to prevent inland penetration by (chapter 8) level 1 tsunamis, saving lives and properties. • Planting trees densely in coastal areas Although these structures could be overtopped (chapter 13) by a level 2 tsunami, they should be able to withstand complete collapse, thereby reduc- • Using tall concrete buildings (four to five ing the force of the tsunami and delaying its stories or higher) as evacuation places progress. In the case of level 2 tsunamis, the • Using highways and trunk roads as second- structure is not expected to achieve complete ary protective embankments (chapter 4) mechanical prevention, but rather to mitigate damage, in combination with other nonstruc- The Government of Japan enacted a tural measures. new law—the Act on a Tsunami Resilient Using infrastructure, such as highways and Community—to promote these nonstructural trunk roads, as defensive structures is also rec- measures in the tsunami-affected municipali- ommended. In the GEJE, coastal highways ties (see chapter 12). The act requires restrict- and trunk roads functioned not only as evacu- ing the construction of buildings in risk areas; ation routes but also as temporary evacuation introducing integrated tsunami mitigation sites and even as dikes (chapter 3). plans comprising evacuation routes and People in Kamaishi city’s Katakishi District facilities, hazard mapping, drills, and warn- fled to the Sanriku Expressway, which had ing systems; relaxing the floor-space ratio of opened on March 6, 2011, just six days before buildings to encourage the construction of the earthquake. The expressway, which was taller buildings; reducing property taxes on on a hill, first served as an evacuation area and designated evacuation sites; and relocating then as a main road for delivering relief goods houses to higher ground. 3 2 : S T R AT E G I E S F O R M A N AG I N G LO W - P RO B A B I L I T Y, H I G H - I M PAC T E V E N T S | 299 Evacuation produced a tsunami hazard map on their own Evacuation is the highest priority in low- by visiting hazard and evacuation areas within probability, extremely high-impact events the school district. (chapter 11). A large number of casualties can The students were also trained in key con- be expected not only because of the scale of the cepts, such as event, but also because • “Tsunami tendenko,” that is, “Everybody • The lead time is shorter because of the sud- should immediately evacuate without car- den or unexpected occurrence of the event. ing for anything or anybody else at tsunami onslaught.” • Information networks and tools tend to malfunction when sensors and communica- • Do not believe in human assumptions of tion lines are destroyed, constraining people disasters, even one in a hazard map, as to react without accurate information. nature behaves differently from human assumptions. • Evacuation options tend to be limited as the means of evacuation become fewer; for • Do your maximum when encountering example, roads become impassable, traffic disasters. Always think and be prepared for jams occur, and so on. the worst. • People base their actions on past expe- • Lead evacuation—you are saving others’ riences with less-severe disasters, lead- lives by showing that you are evacuating for ing them to underestimate the time they life and death. have to evacuate and the severity of the Although more than 90 percent of stu- consequences. dents were out of school when the earthquake Raising awareness, education, and prac- occurred on March 11 (whether they were tice drills are the keys to ensuring faster, more walking home, playing outside, or in their complete evacuation in extreme events. homes), almost all of them headed for higher, In Kamaishi City, where 1,000 people died safer areas on their own initiative and encour- out of a population of 40,000, the casualty rate aged the others to run with them to safety. among school children was low. Only 5 out Having already discussed it in their homes, of the 2,900 primary and junior high school children and parents alike knew and trusted students lost their lives. A survival rate of that they would all evacuate individually if a 99.8 percent for these school children is most tsunami hit Kamaishi. impressive in a city where 1 in 40 lost their Keeping individual, community, and institu- lives: the rate for school children was 20 times tional memory alive between disasters is critical higher than for the general public. According to successful evacuation. A number of monu- to one headmaster, “repetitive drills, school ments had been built in the coastal towns com- education, and hazard maps” were the reasons memorating past events and citing lessons such for the high survival rate (chapter 8). as: “Run to a hill if you feel a strong shake or the In Kamaishi city “a touch of disaster” is sea suddenly withdraws.” A nongovernmental built into various lessons. In mathematics, for organization (NGO) has called for the planting example, students may be asked, “If the speed of cherry trees to delineate where the tsunami of a tsunami is xx kilometers per hour when reached on March 11, so that future generations it hits land, how long will it take the tsunami would remember the extent of the flooding. to get from the coast to a house that is yy kilo- The elderly, the disabled, and foreigners meters inland?” In a field exercise, students or outsiders to the locality needed extra help 300 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G in evacuating. Sixty-five percent of those who main tremor nationwide on TV and other died in the GEJE were more than 60 years old, broadcasting systems, providing the public which raised the issue of how senior citizens with a little lead time (a few to 10 seconds) to can be safely evacuated. react (chapter 10). Although the earthquake and tsunami warn- Hazard maps ing system helped save many lives, there was Hazard maps are a useful tool for enhancing room for improvement and some key lessons the preparedness of local governments, munic- emerged. Because of the unprecedented size ipalities, and residents, but they can exacerbate and complexity of the event, the JMA’s first the damage if not prepared or used properly. announcement underestimated the maximum A number of cities and towns had produced tsunami height at 6 meters, while the actual and distributed hazard maps. In some of the height was more than 10 meters. Although the towns they contributed to faster evacuation, forecast was corrected 10–20 minutes later, but in others they actually provided misinfor- the original estimate may have caused people mation since the tsunami was far larger than to delay their evacuation, possibly leading to the hazard maps assumed. Casualties occurred increased casualties. This occurred even though because some of the designated evacuation Japan is equipped with one of the most advanced sites and buildings where people had fled to forecasting and warning systems. The interna- were totally submerged. Many people who tional community should invest not only in the were living in nonflooding zones, according to installation of existing disaster forecasting and the hazard map, had not evacuated when the warning systems, but also in the development tsunami hit (chapter 25). of new systems in combination with repetitive Both level 1 and 2 events should be drills and practices. Advanced off-the-coast accounted for in hazard maps so that people water pressure gauges and global positioning will have enough information to deal with system (GPS)-based wave sensors have been either category. Hazard maps should indicate effective in monitoring tsunami heights. all evacuation options. Just distributing these maps to citizens is not enough—evacuation Addressing “chain-of-events” effects practice drills should be conducted using these The disaster unleashed a chain of events that maps. Preparing hazard maps with people’s affected people and organizations beyond participation will also help ensure effective Tohoku, including national, regional, and evacuation. global economies. Following are a few exam- ples of the chain of events observed in Japan: Forecasts and warnings Accurate forecasting and early warning sys- • Earthquake and tsunami: nuclear accident: tems are vital for safe and quick evacuation power shortage: economic stagnation: social and disaster response. In the GEJE hundreds unrest of thousands of people evacuated in response • Earthquake and tsunami: dramatic increase to the warning by the Japan Meteorological in telecommunication activity: telecom- Agency (JMA) a few minutes after the earth- munication system failures: interruption of quake. The Earthquake Early Warning System social and economic activities (chapter 15) also enabled all the high-speed express trains, traveling at over 200 kilometers per hour, to • Earthquake and tsunami: damage to spe- come to a halt before the main tremor, which cific industries: interruption of parts sup- saved thousands of passengers. The emergency ply: global slowdown of industrial activities warning system announced the arrival of the (chapter 30) 3 2 : S T R AT E G I E S F O R M A N AG I N G LO W - P RO B A B I L I T Y, H I G H - I M PAC T E V E N T S | 301 Although it is impossible to foresee every • Structural measures should be included in eventuality, DRM strategies should include an integrated disaster mitigation strategy. contingency measures for preventing the • Highways and trunk roads along the coast knock-on effects of low-probability, high- should be used as secondary protective impact events (chapter 5). Providing for suf- embankments against tsunamis. ficient redundancy in various systems is one way of breaking the chain; business continuity Nonstructural measures planning is another (see chapter 9). Analyzing In addition to information dissemination and past examples of “chain-of-events” effects, and evacuation, the following nonstructural mea- sharing them with the public, the business sec- sures have been effective against water-related tor, and governments can help prevent them megadisasters: from recurring. • Moving entire residential areas and public buildings to higher ground while keeping LESSONS commercial enterprises and activities in the coastal areas Overall strategy • Securing the evacuation routes (such as • Use integrated disaster mitigation strategies, roads and stairways) that connect public rather than structure-focused disaster pre- facilities (such as schools) to higher ground vention measures, to address low-probability, • Planting trees in coastal areas high-impact extreme events. • Using tall concrete buildings (of four to five • Categorize tsunamis into level 1 events stories or higher) as places for evacuation (fairly frequent disasters) and level 2 events (low-probability, high-impact extreme dis- Evacuation asters). Level 1 can be addressed by preven- tive structures; level 2 requires integrated • Drills, education, and awareness-raising are measures. the keys to ensuring effective, more com- plete evacuation. • For level 2 events, prepare strategies that focus on saving lives. • Remember “tsunami tendenko,” that is, everybody should evacuate immediately • Use resilient disaster mitigation systems, without waiting for anything or anyone structural and nonstructural, in strategies else when the approach of the tsunami is to address level 2 events. assumed or feared. • Consider and discuss what should happen • Prior discussion at home and in communities if an event exceeds expectations. This is about evacuation helps ensure its success. critical in establishing effective, functional strategies. • Blind assumptions should not be made about any disaster, even those reflected in Structural measures hazard maps, as nature behaves differently from human assumptions. • Structural measures can mitigate low- probability, high-impact extreme events if • Individual and institutional memory about they are resilient and resistant to natural past disasters should be kept alive to facili- forces. tate successful evacuation. 302 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G Hazard maps systems relied heavily on structural measures and could not prevent damages from the tsu- • Hazard maps are a useful tool for enhanc- nami (figure 32.2d). The Japanese government ing the preparedness of local governments, is revising its tsunami DRM policies to better municipalities, and individuals. integrate structural and nonstructural mea- • Hazard maps should address both level 1 sures (figure 32.2e). Level 1 tsunamis will be and 2 events. prevented by structural measures and level 2 • A hazard map functions well only in combi- tsunamis will be mitigated by both structural nation with awareness-raising, community and nonstructural measures. education, and evacuation drills. It is advisable to develop integrated measures for both level 1 and 2 events. For developing Forecasting and warning countries, greater reliance on nonstructural measures may be the most realistic approach • Forecasting and warning systems pay off. even for level 1 events. But it is important to • Tsunami and disaster warning networks build structural measures to prevent loss of should be built and used globally. human lives and properties from frequent disasters. Disasters, especially high-impact • The international community should pro- events, tend to discourage people from invest- mote and invest in the use and development ing for the future. Governments and com- of new technologies to improve the accu- munities should keep repeating the message racy and timing of forecasts and warnings. that “prevention pays off,” to avoid creating a Addressing “chain-of-events” effects vicious cycle between poverty and disasters. Forecasting and early warning is funda- • The indirect effects of extreme events travel mental. Developing countries can and should far beyond the disaster-stricken areas; develop local networks for forecasting and hence, building redundancy into systems warning about disasters. Countries can also helps break these chains of events. join forces in building regional and interna- • Probable chain-of-events effects should be tional systems. For example, Sentinel Asia is a considered in business continuity planning. regional network for sharing satellite imagery and other observation data free upon requests • Experiences of these effects should be eval- by member countries. uated and shared to help prepare for future Hazard maps are useful tools to help people events. save their own lives. Developing countries should take legislative, administrative, and RECOMMENDATIONS FOR financial measures to ensure that hazard maps DEVELOPING COUNTRIES are provided to all the disaster-prone locali- ties. The international community should help Every country needs a national integrated DRM countries to develop hazard maps that reflect strategy. Many of the lessons from the GEJE the lessons described in this note. It would also are relevant for developing countries. Differ- be useful to create regional and global mecha- ent combinations of structural and nonstruc- nisms to share good practices and examples of tural measures may be used depending on a hazard maps. range of factors, such as socioeconomic con- Archiving disaster records and experiences ditions, budgetary constraints, geography, and in disaster databases is essential for designing the scale of the disasters. In the GEJE, DRM viable DRM strategies. The government should 3 2 : S T R AT E G I E S F O R M A N AG I N G LO W - P RO B A B I L I T Y, H I G H - I M PAC T E V E N T S | 303 Nonstructural measures Damage Damage Less damage 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 Less frequent Less frequent a. Disaster damage and frequency without countermeasures: b. Disaster damage can be mitigated by nonstructural Larger disasters occur less frequently than smaller disasters. measures: Cases in cyclone DRM in Bangladesh and flood management before the early modern period in Japan. Structural Structural measures Damage Damage measures No damage No damage GEJE 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 Less frequent Less frequent c. Structural measures can protect against frequent disasters: d. Structural measures protect against disasters that occur Cases in flood management in the early modern period every few decades: Cases of tsunami management at the in Japan GEJE and current flood management in Japan. Nonstructural measures been developed over time through trial and Damage error. But simply copying them exactly may Structural measures not be advisable in other, often more challeng- ing, circumstances. The first step is to evaluate, simulate, and test whether the Japanese mea- Figure 32.2 DRM 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 sures are congruent with local social and cul- using structural Less frequent and nonstructural tural practices and behaviors. e. Tsunami damage will be mitigated by reconstructing measures resilient dikes and strengthening nonstructural measures. Countries must learn from one another by sharing information and experience, since low- probability, high-impact extreme events hap- stress the importance of these less visible pen infrequently in any given country. The but critical activities and the people who are international community could facilitate regu- engage in them tirelessly. Regional data shar- lar dialogues and information-sharing mecha- ing would also benefit neighboring countries. nisms, for example, through the United Nations. Countries should put agreements in place to Regional cooperation mechanisms would serve share hydrological, meteorological, geological, not only to help disaster-affected countries but and other information. also to mitigate the negative interregional and Education, drills, and awareness raising are international effects of megadisasters. indispensable to avoid high death tolls in low- probability, high-impact extreme events, par- NOTE ticularly in countries where physical defenses Prepared by Kenzo Hiroki, International Centre for may be insufficient. The Japanese approaches Water Hazard and Risk Management, Public Works to education, drills, and awareness raising have Research Institute. 304 | V I : T H E E CO N O M I C S O F D I S A ST E R R I S K , R I S K M A N AG E M E N T, A N D R I S K F I N A N C I N G PART VII Recovery and Relocation CHAPTER 33 Relocation in the Tohoku Area Relocation and new regulations for land use in at-risk areas are often proposed in the wake of mega- disasters such as the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the 2008 earthquake in China’s Sichuan Province, and the 2009 earthquake in Haiti. Since the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, the Japa- nese government has strengthened disaster risk management systems based on lessons learned from that event. Steps to improve disaster risk management struck with full force, but the actions taken to (DRM) in Japan have included new land-use date offer many useful lessons. regulations and relocation programs as well as One of those lessons is that relocation is better integration of structural and nonstruc- effective in mitigating disaster damage but tural DRM measures (see chapter 12). Local managing relocation projects—and consulting governments in the affected areas have regu- with affected communities—is challenging. It lated housing development in at-risk areas and is difficult to achieve a consensus among com- are promoting relocation to higher ground. munity members on any rehabilitation plan. Because each local government has taken a For example, while some prefer to rebuild different approach to such programs, levels of their hometowns on the original sites, others recovery vary across the affected areas. The want to move to safer areas. recovery process is ongoing in Tohoku, where Despite the challenge, governments must the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) take a participatory approach and engage 307 communities in the recovery process. Experts consensus among community members, as and civil society organizations (CSOs) can sup- they could not implement it by force. Given port local governments in efforts to consult the limited financial capacity of local gov- community members. Meanwhile, a cross- ernments and the enormity of damages in sectoral approach—covering infrastructure, the Tohoku region, the national government urban planning, disaster management, and has covered the costs of relocation programs economic activities—is best. almost entirely, as an exceptional case. Each of the local governments in Tohoku took its own approach to recovery by utiliz- FINDINGS ing new as well as tested urban development schemes such as land pooling, readjustment, Government initiatives and redevelopment. Progress varies across cit- The Japanese government has enacted new ies in the affected areas. As of May 2013, local laws and created new schemes for managing governments had started on the construc- tsunami risks based on lessons learned from tion phase of 106 relocation programs (out of the GEJE. Government agencies are taking 328  planned) and 31 land pooling programs a holistic approach, integrating nonstruc- (out of 59 planned). Sendai City is promoting tural and structural measures to develop safe relocation projects as scheduled. On the other communities (see chapter 12). Local govern- hand, affected people in some communities in ments have designated tsunami-risk areas the cities of Ishinomaki and Natori have not where housing construction is prohibited. been willing to join recovery programs planned The national government has provided local by city governments. governments with financial support for relo- cating affected people to safer areas, includ- Relocation 1—the case of Sendai City ing for the development of residential sites The Sendai City government is promoting the and infrastructure (figure 33.1). Local govern- concept of “rebuilding better and safer.” To ments have promoted relocation by building this end, it has designated tsunami-risk areas where housing construction is prohibited and promoted relocation from risk areas to higher, safer ground. Also, the government is constructing public rentals for those who Group relocation New housing site cannot afford to build new houses. Some 57,000 houses were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake tremors and tsunami waves that struck on March 11, 2011. Tsunami-risk areas. In December 2011, the city government designated some 1,200 hect- ares as tsunami-risk areas, where some Risk area 1,500 families had lived before the GEJE. Res- idential development is prohibited in these risk areas. In the area, according to tsunami simulation, it is estimated that tsunami waves of the same scale as those that hit during the GEJE could cause floodwaters more than two Figure 33.1 The relocation process meters deep even with countermeasures in Source: Office of the Prime Minister. place (map 33.1). 308 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N The city government is promoting recovery programs for these 1,500 families, including • Individual relocation. Affected people indi- vidually purchase land in safe areas and build as they see fit. The city government purchases the land they formerly occu- pied in at-risk areas and provides subsidies Tsunami-risk area for moving and interest payments on new Prohibited housing housing loans. construction Support for relocation About 1,500 families • Group relocation. Affected people build houses in new sites developed by the gov- ernment. As noted previously, the city gov- Areas contiguous to risk area Support for relocation and Map 33.1 ernment purchases the land they formerly disaster management work occupied and provides subsidies for mov- About 2,300 families Relocation project in Sendai City ing and interest payments for new housing Source: Sendai City. loans. The government is planning to com- plete the development of group relocation sites by March 2016. housing lots. Alternatively, people may find a new plot and rebuild as they see fit. The city • Public housing. The city government pro- government provides subsidies for moving and vides public rental apartments for those interest payments for new housing loans. who cannot afford to build new houses. Public housing. The city government is build- As of May 2013, among families residing ing 3,000 public rental units for affected people in at-risk areas, 49 percent chose group relo- who cannot afford new houses. Before March cation, 27 percent individual relocation, and 2015, some 1,620 units of public housing will 23 percent public housing. Among the families be completed as conventional public works at who chose group relocation, 73 percent will 33 sites in the city. Meanwhile, the government rent land from the city government to con- has adopted the public-private partnership struct houses. The city government is encour- model and purchased 1,381 units from private aging those affected to join individual or group companies. It will acquire land from private relocation programs because public housing of companies (who have negotiated with land- standardized units cannot respond flexibly to owners), and these companies will construct people’s needs (chapter 34). housing and related facilities. The government Areas contiguous to at-risk areas. The city selected 17 companies for this partnership in government is supporting some 2,300 families March 2013 by assessing the unit costs of land living adjacent to at-risk areas whose homes and housing, the certainty of land acquisition, were flooded by the GEJE (map 33.1). In these the location, the support offered to communi- areas, a tsunami of the same scale as that of ties, and other aspects of proposals. the GEJE would produce floodwaters up to Housing in hilly areas. Some 5,500 houses two meters deep, despite structural measures were severely damaged by landslides caused by to counter the damage (according to simula- the ground-shaking of the GEJE, and they must tions). The government provides subsidies to be rebuilt (chapter 2). The city government is affected people in support of disaster man- planning to rebuild them through public works agement works—such as raising the level of or by providing subsidies. The government will the ground or constructing earth mounds on bear some 90 percent of the cost. 33 : R E LO C AT I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 309 Relocation 2—Ogatsu District, Ishinomaki of Ishinomaki City, where their workplaces City were located, and never joined the relocation Most people in the Ogatsu District, Ishino- program. maki City, have been unwilling to join a reloca- Relocation programs risk disrupting commu- tion program planned by the city government, nities already affected by demographic trends. which is taking a similar approach to the one The GEJE exacerbated the problem of an aging in Sendai City. In December 2012, the city gov- rural population that was already decreasing ernment designated certain areas as high tsu- before the disaster. In general, younger people nami risk—defined as floodwaters at least two tend to move to urban areas and older people meters deep in the event of a tsunami of the stay in their hometowns. same scale as that of the GEJE. The govern- ment has prohibited housing construction in Land pooling on site—the case of Natori these at-risk areas and will purchase land from The Natori City government has not been able affected property owners in these areas. The to achieve consensus with community members city government is promoting 47 relocation on a rehabilitation program or to start a scheme projects for some 7,000 families and is plan- in the Yuriage District. This district was the ning to construct 4,000 public rental units. most seriously damaged in the city. More than The city government and community mem- half of the affected people chose not to par- bers could not agree on a recovery plan in the ticipate in the program, moving on their own downtown area of the Ogatsu District, affecting instead. Some 25 percent of community mem- approximately 500 households. Because most bers showed a willingness to join the program downtown areas were flooded and designated in April 2013. The city government is currently as at-risk areas, the city government proposed reexamining the program to include relocation relocation to higher ground. The move prom- schemes. ised to protect community members against The city government planned a land pool- tsunamis but would have posed an enormous ing (or land readjustment) scheme for 2,000 budgetary burden on the government, which families on raised ground at the original sites. would have had to develop new residential Because it obviates the need for relocation, this areas and associated infrastructure. Initially, is a cost-effective approach. It saves the gov- a public survey indicated that many affected ernment the additional investment required people wanted to rebuild their houses on for new infrastructure on yet-to-be-developed the original site downtown. Though the city relocation sites. government announced a relocation plan to A land pooling scheme is a development pro- higher ground, only 12 percent of affected cess based on consensus among all members in households indicated their willingness to relo- a community (figure 33.2). Such a scheme was cate to the new site. Most decided not to join used in reconstruction following the Great the relocation program, citing inconvenience Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995 and because the government planned to relocate has been widely used for urban development public services and various other facilities at in Japan in normal times. Land parcels are scattered sites. Business and industrial areas, assembled and after developing infrastructure such as the fishing port and fishing industry and other public facilities in an assembled par- facilities as well as government offices, tour- cel, the land is returned to its original owners. ism spots, and residential areas, were to be Landowners equitably contribute a portion of scattered across different locations. Mean- their lands for developing infrastructure and while, right after the GEJE, some people public facilities. Thus, the reconstituted land moved from the Ogatsu District to the center lots are smaller than before the project started. 310 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N Management of nonresidential lands Before After How to use vast areas of nonresidential land designated as being at risk is becoming a crucial issue. For example, most people are no longer able to live in the coastal flatlands of the Mina- misanriku region. Other uses for such land are also unclear. Most local governments plan to use it for three main purposes: (1) parks, (2) tourism (developing facilities such as souve- nir shops and restaurants), and (3) fisheries Public facilities (developing fish-processing and related facili- (Road, park, etc.) ties). Some local governments are planning Replot Project finance to develop renewable energy projects to gen- Contribution (Reserve land) erate solar and wind power. The Miyagi Pre- Figure 33.2 Land pooling scheme fecture government, for example, is planning Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. to develop solar power plants in devastated coastal areas. Local governments may also let organized workshops starting at the early the land revert to nature by abolishing infra- concept phase, followed by careful consulta- structure, such as roads and sewerage sys- tion with communities to select proposals tems. However, cost-sharing and management for recovery projects. Chapter 21 outlines the mechanisms involving the private and public practice of Minamisanriku Town. The Tohoku sectors have yet to be established. Govern- Office of the Japan International Cooperation ments need to establish budgetary and insti- Agency (JICA) and Miyagi University began tutional mechanisms to manage these lands, a joint pilot program to facilitate the recon- secure financing to maintain them, and decide struction process in communities by assigning which institutions will do what. 10 community reconstruction facilitators (fig- ure 33.3). They have organized and facilitated Community participation While communities have been extensively involved in the recovery process, local gov- ernments face practical issues on the ground. Many local governments have limited experi- ence working with community members on planning and implementing projects. It is dif- ficult for communities to achieve consensus on recovery plans because community mem- bers have different backgrounds and views. Some prefer reconstruction at the original site; others, relocation to higher ground. Dis- agreements arise, and compromises can be challenging. Each government has chosen a different method of reconstruction, and out- comes vary among cities. Participation methods. Local governments Figure 33.3 Community rehabilitation facilitators and communities embarked on a variety of Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). participatory activities. Some governments 33 : R E LO C AT I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 311 consultation workshops to receive feedback on Communication across various locations. recovery plans from communities. In Nobiru Because many affected people live in tem- District in Higashimatsushima City, communi- porary housing at various locations (chap- ties took the initiative to recover by themselves ter 22), it is difficult to establish and maintain (figure 33.4). They established the Nobiru Con- communication, to share necessary informa- sultation Committee for Community Devel- tion, and to receive feedback. After the GEJE, opment in 2008, and conducted festivals and some local governments established informa- seminars before the GEJE. This committee tion centers, while others used e-mail and created a working group for recovery in July websites in addition to conventional printed 2012 to implement recovery activities by com- materials such as newsletters. Although munity members. The working group is for- information technology–based communica- mulating a development plan for relocation tion tools helped to promote communication sites and is in charge of implementing the plan. among unintentionally separated community In some cases, even after consultations, members to some degree, the digital divide community members’ views were not properly between the young and the elderly (and reflected in recovery plans. This may have been between those who can afford the use of per- because local governments, which had little sonal computers and those who cannot) has experience with community participation and remained an issue, particularly for the aging limited staff, had to formulate recovery plans rural population in the affected areas. within a limited time span. The Architectural Community representation. People’s opin- Institute of Japan strongly recommends that ions may not have been adequately reflected in local governments establish community-based municipalities’ planning processes if the mem- consultation organizations with financial sup- bers of planning committees were not prop- port to formulate community recovery plans. erly selected. Most local governments in Japan selected representatives from communities in a conventional way, choosing those who were the heads of community organizations or com- mercial associations, predominantly middle- aged or elderly males. But people’s views on recovery depend on various factors, such as occupation, generation, gender, and scale of damage. Local governments should conduct a stakeholder analysis to select community rep- resentatives and seek various ways of receiving feedback from communities, such as web- based surveys and workshops. How experts can help Experts and CSOs are expected to play a sup- porting role in formulating recovery plans. Many experts in architecture, civil engineer- ing, and urban planning voluntarily provided support to communities in the wake of the Figure 33.4 Consultation at Nobiru District GEJE. Local governments should also play Source: JICA. such a role, but they often face difficulties 312 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N supporting communities because of excessive governments should be established to workloads in times of crisis, limited capacity, ensure a win-win situation. By collaborat- and limited experience. Outside experts and ing with experts, governments can decrease CSOs can (1)  formulate and make presenta- the burden of consulting with communities tions of alternate recovery plans, (2) facilitate because experts can play roles of facilita- discussions and assist in building consensus in tors and consensus-builders. And experts communities, and (3) bridge the gap between can have their ideas realized on the ground. the government and communities by mod- Because it is difficult to create such rela- erating discussions. Chapter 21 explains the tionships in a short time frame immediately case of Minamisanriku Town, where univer- after a disaster, it is important to establish sity researchers supported the formulation them beforehand, as was demonstrated in of a recovery plan. In Ogatsu District, Ishino- Nobiru District. maki City, Tohoku and other universities have supported community organizations and the Government coordination efforts Ishinomaki City government in promoting Coordination among various sectors is cru- recovery programs. Researchers and students cial for recovery. A wide range of recon- have proposed rehabilitation projects such as struction projects (roads, tsunami dikes, public housing and community centers. schools, and houses) have been simultane- Three types of relationships involving out- ously implemented. The concerned organi- side experts are particularly important: zations require close collaboration to work efficiently. An integrated approach, such • Relationships with communities. Experts as a project combining roads with dikes, is should conduct a survey of community best. Without coordination, a public works members’ opinions, closely consult with department may build an embankment to community members, and build consensus. protect low-lying areas at a site that has been They should not only compile community marked out for housing by the urban devel- opinions and propose plans but also incor- opment department. The Sendai City govern- porate their own professional views into the ment established the Steering Committee for plans based on their understanding of the Disaster Recovery in May 2011 to make deci- potential demands and requests. sions and coordinate recovery policies, plans, and programs. The mayor chairs the commit- • Relationships with various experts. It is tee, which consists of 23 heads of organiza- important not only to work with experts on tions that are part of the city government. physical infrastructure, such as in civil engi- Thirty-six committee meetings have been neering, architecture, and urban planning, held over the past two years. but also with experts and CSOs in social In formulating urban plans, local govern- welfare, education, and health. To restore ments should consider various components, daily life to its predisaster rhythms, a range including DRM, quality of life, economic activ- of community activities must be carefully ities, and environmental impacts. Relocation examined. Experts and CSOs need to coop- to higher ground can provide affected people erate with each other and help formulate with safer housing but may interfere with recovery plans through coordination and livelihoods or cause adverse environmental teamwork. impact through development work. Land-use • Relationships with local governments. The regulations are usually required to implement relationship between experts and local recovery plans. 33 : R E LO C AT I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 313 LESSONS the disaster, where government agencies are overtaxed by recovery works. Where • Disasters exacerbate the existing problems affected people live in transition shelters, of an aging and dwindling rural population. communication with them poses an addi- The GEJE has aggravated demographic tional challenge. Experts from outside the issues that were serious even before the disaster-struck areas as well as CSOs can event. If the local government cannot for- support consultation processes and com- mulate recovery programs in a timely man- municate with the affected population. ner, communities can easily be disrupted. The elderly may refuse to relocate. Mean- while, younger people may be unwilling to RECOMMENDATIONS FOR return to their hometowns, instead moving DEVELOPING COUNTRIES elsewhere to restart their lives. Governments should examine various recov- • Relocation is effective, but implementing ery schemes such as relocation to safer areas, relocations can be challenging. Reconstruct- reconstruction at original sites, and land pool- ing towns on higher ground is regarded as ing. When planning a recovery scheme, it is an ideal approach for mitigating disaster crucial to consider community needs. But there damage. But some cities have faced difficul- is a trade-off between speed and quality in the ties owing to out-migration and the man- recovery process. A government can reha- agement of low-lying lands. People decide bilitate towns promptly by taking a top-down whether to participate in relocation proj- approach. Community consultation requires ects by examining their prospects for earn- more time. Following the Sichuan earthquake ing a living at the new sites, how long it will in 2008, Chinese governmental organizations take to relocate, and the convenience of the took a top-down approach with limited con- new sites. As cases show, local governments sultation with affected communities, rebuild- cannot “sell” some projects; community ing houses and infrastructure at a rapid pace. members have failed to reach consensus But tall residential buildings inconvenienced on some plans formulated by local govern- affected people who had lived in rural villages ments. In Ogatsu District, Ishinomaki City, before the disaster. People and local govern- the affected population preferred to rebuild ments have also had to share the unnecessarily the town in the original area—in opposition high costs of operation and maintenance of the to a relocation plan. On the other hand, the new facilities and housing. people of Natori City preferred to move to Local governments should establish a par- higher ground, even as the local govern- ticipatory mechanism because community par- ment was recommending rehabilitation of ticipation is essential in promoting recovery. homes at the original site. One lesson from the humanitarian response • Community participation is key to promot- systems used after the Indian Ocean tsunami ing recovery, but local governments face in 2004 is the importance of striving to under- practical issues. Community participation stand local contexts and working with and in the consultation process is needed to through local structures. Experts and CSOs are respond to a wide range of needs. Local expected to play a role in assisting recovery, for governments are required to organize vari- example, by organizing and facilitating work- ous events, such as workshops, but such shops or consultation meetings and working tasks are a burden for cities damaged by with the government and other experts. 314 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N A cross-sectoral approach is required to BIBLIOGRAPHY rehabilitate people’s daily lives. Organizations Architectural Institute of Japan. 2012. Recommenda- should harmonize recovery plans among all tion on Urban Development in Rehabilitating from sectors concerned, such as roads, DRM, and the GEJE (in Japanese). Tokyo. http://www.aij urban planning. Coordination among local .or.jp/scripts/request/document/20121115.pdf. governments, the ministries of the central gov- Nian, S. B. 2013. “The Vision of Social Governance: Implication of Wenchuan Experience on the Post ernment, and reconstruction agencies is cru- Disaster Reconstruction on Lushan.” In Proc. cial for effective planning and implementation. Forum on Post-Disaster Revival and International Local governments should lead recovery, Disaster Reduction, 25. May 14–15, 2013, Sichuan University. but support from the national government is Sendai City. 2013. 7th Report on Recovery in Sendai essential. Because local governments can more (in Japanese). http://www.city.sendai.jp/shinsai closely respond to the varied needs of affected /report/report7.pdf. people on the ground, they should take the Nobiru Town Planning Committee (in Japanese). principal responsibility for recovery planning http://mm.higashimatsushima.net/matsumng /introduction.do?id=00007. and implementation. The national government TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2006. Joint Eval- should support local government efforts by uation of the International Response to the Indian creating legislation and new project schemes, Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report, Key Messages. providing subsidies, and providing technical London: TEC. support (such as conducting tsunami simula- Ubaura, M. 2012a. “Are We Planning ‘Mistakenly Excessively Defended Cities and Towns’?” Sym- tions and dispatching technical staff ). posium on “Learning from Great East Japan Earthquake,” 603–06. March 1–2, 2012, Tokyo. ———. 2012b. “Land Use Plan and Regulation for NOTE Reconstruction of the Affected Area and its Prob- Prepared by Michio Ubaura, Tohoku University; lems.” Eighth APRU Research Symposium on Akihiko Hokugo, Kobe University; Mikio Ishiwatari, Multi-hazards around the Pacific Rim, 121–22. World Bank; and the International Recovery Platform. September 20–22, 2012, Sendai. 33 : R E LO C AT I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 315 CHAPTER 34 Reconstruction in the Tohoku Area It is best when those who have lost their homes to a disaster can assume responsibility for rebuild- ing their dwellings, so that they match their needs. In planning and administering disaster-recovery assistance, governments should endeavor to harness people’s natural interest in rebuilding as they see fit while also providing special support for the vulnerable, such as low-income households and the elderly. In addition to providing financial support for effective government assistance is particularly individual rebuilding efforts, local govern- important to them. In particular, measures are ments in the Tohoku region are constructing required to prevent so-called solitary deaths public rental housing and housing complexes (kodokushi) (chapter 22). for those who cannot afford to rebuild by themselves. Because completing large tracts of public housing in a short time is a difficult task, FINDINGS local governments responsible for reconstruc- tion works should seek assistance from other Rebuilding schemes organizations and experts and from public- In the aftermath of the Great East Japan private partnerships (PPPs). The needs of the Earthquake (GEJE), local governments affected population change as reconstruction have been promoting the reconstruction of progresses and as people age. The most vul- permanent housing through two schemes: nerable groups, notably people of low-income (1) self-reconstruction and (2) public housing. and the elderly, depend on public housing, and Wherever possible, local governments should 317 encourage affected community members to assume responsibility for rebuilding their lost dwellings. This approach is desirable because it allows people to rebuild in a way that suits their needs and because it lightens the load on government. Some groups, however, such as low-income households and the elderly, can- not rebuild on their own because of financial constraints. Local governments are providing these people with public housing. Figure 34.1 Public housing in Sendai City Source: Sendai City. Self-reconstruction In accordance with the Act on Support for Reconstructing the Livelihoods of Disaster loans on houses lost during the tsunamis can- Victims, Japan’s national government pro- not contemplate financing new housing (chap- vides up to ¥3 million to people who lost their ter 32). Others worried about risks such as land houses. Because this amount is not enough to subsidence, future tsunami risks, and contami- rebuild a house, local governments provided nation from radiation may resist rebuilding on additional financial support. Some members their original sites. According to surveys, the of the affected population had to supplement number of people choosing public housing is these resources with other sources of financ- increasing in Kamaishi City, while the num- ing, such as housing loans. ber of those choosing self-reconstruction is There are significant regional differences decreasing. in the amounts provided by the government, The Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefec- which affects the speed of recovery in each tures plan to complete their public housing prefecture. The percentage of people receiving by March 2016. Some 6,000 units are planned financial support is higher in the Miyagi and in the Iwate Prefecture; 15,000 units in the Fukushima prefectures than in the Iwate Pre- Miyagi Prefecture; and 3,700 units in the Fuku- fecture. There, people could not rebuild until shima Prefecture—a total of 24,700 units. Gov- development work on higher ground was com- ernments have acquired land for an additional pleted. As of October 2012, the national gov- 12,804 units and began construction of 2,152 ernment had provided a total of ¥248.2 billion units in the Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures in to 183,264 households. For people affected by May 2013. the nuclear accident, the government has not Public housing is not necessarily the best yet established a scheme for reconstructing option for affected communities. People accus- houses (chapter 36). tomed to living in spacious houses—in farm- ing villages, fishing villages, and rural towns, Public housing in particular—may find it difficult to adapt to Public housing provides a safety net to people small public housing units. Public housing is who have lost their homes. For vulnerable peo- also not always suited to the lifestyles of the ple who cannot afford to rebuild homes lost in people living in it. Housing units are usually the GEJE, local governments are constructing built according to a uniform design. People public rental housing complexes (figure 34.1). cannot change the floor plans or furnishings. Anyone who lost a home is eligible to apply for The locations of these housing units is usu- public housing. Some who would not other- ally determined by lottery, and people cannot wise be vulnerable but who are still repaying freely choose their units. In Sendai City, the 318 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N city government prioritizes groups consisting surveys, governments provide the most vulner- of more than five families that choose to join a able people with detailed information on hous- community. ing schemes in an effort to better understand their needs. Project management Local governments are trying to hasten the Constructing large tracts of public housing process of construction through flexible land quickly is a difficult task. Governments are acquisition, standardized materials, and PPPs. trying to accelerate the process through vari- They must coordinate the construction pro- ous measures, notably parnerships—such as cess with overall recovery plans, community PPPs—and with the help of a variety of outside needs, and project management procedures. organizations and experts. The public hous- Local governments have contracted with pri- ing construction process after the GEJE has vate companies to manage reconstruction included three main steps (figure 34.2). The works. Some governments have applied for first step is to collect the information needed design-build schemes to decrease project man- to understand where the best options lie, start- agement workloads (see chapter 33 for a PPP ing with existing land-use planning and relo- case in Sendai City). cation/reconstruction planning documents, Local governments require assistance with surveys of citizens, community consultations, project management because they are stretched and workshops. The second step relates to thin by various recovery tasks. In the Miyagi design and construction. Once the type of Prefecture, municipalities will construct all housing has been selected, the design phase public housing, and the prefecture will reduce begins (with the selection of designers, build- the municipal burden by taking over project ers, materials, and the selection of a manage- management. The Iwate and Fukushima pre- ment approach), followed by construction of fectures are undertaking the construction of the units and monitoring of progress and costs. some of the public housing. As of May 2013, the Local governments in the affected areas of government housing agency was also building Japan are considering the needs of community 2,143 units of public housing at 30 sites in three members while erecting public housing. Gov- prefectures. When completed, the units will be ernments are trying to ensure that residents transferred to local governments. of public housing are not isolated from their Local governments should plan the opera- communities. Through housing preference tion and maintenance of public housing units Disaster Housing Citizen Requests for Workshop Receipt of Workshop reconstruction preference information individual (management- information (design-related) plan survey session consultations related) Move in/ maintenance and management Basic/ Construction Selection Basic concept implementation Construction investigation of designer design Close Close examination of examination Site examination Site examination construction costs of terms Figure 34.2 Construction of public housing: A three-step process 3 4 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 319 at the design stage. Although the national gov- 1995, and some local governments in areas dev- ernment finances the construction of public astated by the GEJE have also begun to do so housing, local governments must operate and (chapter 22). maintain it. Ishinomaki City had 1,700 public housing units before the GEJE; it is now build- The situation on the ground: The case of ing another 4,000 units. Minamisanriku Town Shichigahama plans to construct 1,000 units, and Ofunato Shichigahama is a small scenic town with a City 900 units. Local governments must find population of about 20,000. It is located about ways to operate and maintain the new units 15 kilometers (km) from Sendai City, the larg- efficiently (figure 34.3). They must also plan est city in Tohoku. Most houses are built for the dismantling or reuse of empty units within a circle about 5 km in diameter. Some (for example, to make way for other public 46 percent of the city was flooded by the tsu- facilities). namis, and 1,323 homes were completely or A variety of services is typically required, partially destroyed. As of February 2013, 222 including nursing care for senior citizens. In public housing units were under construction, public housing, where people cannot expect accounting for approximately 3 percent of the help from large families or fellow community total 6,540 households in the town. (This fig- members, governments must provide these ure is smaller than the 6.9 percent in Ishino- services. The Kobe City government provided maki City that plans to construct 4,000 units.) services at transition shelters following the Housing complexes are to be developed on five Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in sites that suffered severe damage. In Shobuda, Figure 34.3 Managing public housing Private, Conversion hotel, to welfare (2) Dismantling boarding house corporation (3) Repurpose Disaster Transitional reconstruction Disaster shelter public housing Vacancies occur Inventory management of all public housing Existing public housing (1) Dilapidated public housing 320 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N the most severely damaged district, more than these workshops, participants could discuss 100 homes are being built, but in other sites the a wide range of issues, such as the manage- number is lower. ment of public spaces and formulation of new After close consultation with the affected communities. households, the number of planned units was decreased. The town government tried to decrease the number of public housing units, LESSONS citing difficulties in operation and maintenance. The government conducted two preference • Reconstructing permanent housing. An surveys in July 2011 and February 2012, among essential task of government is to help 1,000 affected families, to decide the proper people affected by natural disasters, par- number of public housing units and the scale ticularly the most vulnerable groups, to of other recovery schemes. While nearly one- reconstruct permanent housing. A large third of affected people indicated their willing- segment of the affected population can ness to live in public housing in the first survey, bear the responsibility of rebuilding homes the number decreased to less than one-fourth to match their needs with financial support in the second survey. Between the first and sec- from the government. Others, however, are ond surveys, the town government explained unable to reconstruct their own homes the details of self-reconstruction, group reloca- for one reason or another. Governments tion, and public housing in a series of interac- should be prepared to assist these vulner- tive consultations. Through the consultation able groups, including the elderly and low- process, some became convinced of the advan- income households. tages of self-reconstruction and group reloca- • Local governments should strive to iden- tion. Others continued to prefer public housing. tify the best way to manage the process of Local governments can sometimes better housing reconstruction. Completing a large manage the process of housing reconstruc- number of public housing units within a tion with outside assistance. It is important to short time frame is a difficult task. Local prepare for the particular needs of vulnerable governments should adopt PPPs and seek groups staying in these units. Most people liv- assistance from other agencies and organi- ing in public housing are more than 70 years old zations, domestic and foreign. and need barrier-free, easy-access structures. In Shichigahama, experts and researchers • Close communication between the gov- assisted the town government with planning, ernment and affected communities is an designing, project management, and public essential aspect of an effective response. consultation. The town government asked the Communicating with the elderly in pub- Miyagi Prefecture government to take over the lic housing can be especially challenging, tasks of designing buildings and selecting con- and plans should be made to meet that tractors. The town government also organized challenge. and coordinated meetings among designers, contractors, and government organizations. The challenge is to respond to people’s RECOMMENDATIONS FOR needs. Local governments should take into DEVELOPING COUNTRIES account community feedback regarding the design of public housing units. Ideally, every Governments should establish support mecha- designer should organize workshops to gather nisms for housing reconstruction, particu- feedback to then use in the design process. At larly for vulnerable and low-income groups. 3 4 : R E CO N S T R U C T I O N I N T H E TO H O K U A R E A | 32 1 Wherever possible, people affected by disasters support for construction, local governments should be permitted—even encouraged—to and the affected population will have to oper- assume responsibility for rebuilding their own ate and maintain public housing. Local gov- homes, with financial support from govern- ernments should consider operation and ments. Following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake maintenance at the design stage. in India and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, governments supported the reconstruction of core housing units with a cost of $2,000– NOTE $4,000 per family that could be expanded to Prepared by Yoshimitsu Shiozaki, Kobe University; meet family needs. For low-income and other Yasuaki Onoda, Tohoku University; Mikio Ishiwatari, vulnerable groups, governments must cre- World Bank; and the International Recovery Platform. ate social safety nets. In the aftermath of the GEJE, local governments have constructed rental units. In India and Pakistan, govern- REFERENCES ments provided additional financial support to low-income groups. Indrasafitri, D. 2012. “Yasuaki Onoda: Exiting His Comfort Zone.” Jakarta Post, February 10. Support from experts and private sector http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/10 involvement are useful. Experts can help local /yasuaki-onoda-exiting-his-comfort-zone.html. governments effectively consult with affected Onoda, Y. 2011. “From the Front Lines of Reconstruc- communities and advise on project implemen- tion Planning (2) Kameishi City, Iwate Prefecture: Toward Creative Reconstruction Plan Formula- tation. Local governments are well advised to tion.” Gekkan Jichiken [Local Government Studies take advantage of the private sector’s expe- Monthly] 53 (626): 5–58. rience with project management. The Sen- Onoda, Y., and S. Fukuya. 2011. “Students’ Skills Help dai City government has purchased housing to Forge a New Tohoku.” The Japan Times, Sep- tember 25, 7–8. where private companies acquire the land Onoda, Y., and Y. Kato. 2011. “Using the Wisdom of and manage construction (chapter 33). Gov- Architects in Reconstruction: The Activities of ernments should establish PPPs to promote ArchiAid (A Reconstruction Support Network of greater housing reconstruction within a lim- Architects in the Great East Japan Earthquake)” ited timeframe. [in Japanese]. Chiiki kaihatsu [Local Develop- ment] 564: 15–21. Local governments should formulate plans to Trohanis, Z., and G. Read. 2011. “Housing Recon- operate and maintain public housing. While the struction in Urban and Rural Areas.” EAP DRM central government should provide financial Knowledge Notes, World Bank, Washington, DC. 322 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N CHAPTER 35 Cultural Heritage and Preservation A country’s cultural heritage is fundamental to its national and community pride and for social cohesion; historical monuments are regarded as national and community treasures. Because these properties are deeply connected to people’s lives and communities’ histories, their disappearance is equivalent to losing part of a nation’s identity. The Japanese government and cultural heritage experts have recognized historical records and cultural properties as national and community treasures. Fol- lowing the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) and expert groups began rehabilitating and preserving cultural properties. Various organizations rescued and preserved a wide range of historical records and cultural properties damaged by the tsunami waves and earth- quake tremors. Over the last several years, natural disasters the government had designated as national have caused enormous losses to cultural heri- treasures collapsed or cracked. The Matsu- tage sites around the world, such as the dam- shima Islands, which were designated by the age done to the historical citadel of Bam in the national government as “special places of Islamic Republic of Iran by the 2003 earth- scenic beauty,” were also damaged. The stone quake to the Prambanan Temple Compounds walls of the Edo Castle in Tokyo, designated as in Indonesia by the 2006 earthquake to his- a special historic site, also collapsed. toric churches in L’Aquila in Italy by the 2009 To mitigate potential disaster damage to earthquake. cultural and historical heritage, governments, In Japan, earthquakes and tsunamis have museums, experts, researchers, property own- damaged an enormous number of cultural ers, and communities should devise collabora- properties—for example, 744 designated cul- tive mechanisms before disaster strikes. For tural properties were damaged by the Great example, databases with detailed information East Japan Earthquake (GEJE). Temples that on heritage properties (including images saved 323 as electronic files) are useful when rescu- future generations is essential to preserving ing properties following a disaster—and they these properties. Based on these recommen- become valuable records should the original dations, the government decided to protect properties be lost. cultural properties in local communities as well as those designated as significant cultural properties at the national level. FINDINGS National government schemes Preservation measures implemented after the GEJE by governments and experts The ACA started two schemes following the Historical records and cultural properties GEJE: (1) “cultural property rescue” to pre- are symbols of people’s lives. After the GEJE, serve historical materials and art objects, and the commissioner of the Agency for Cultural (2) “cultural property doctor” to preserve his- Affairs (ACA) delivered a public appeal high- torical buildings. Donations of some ¥270 mil- lighting the importance of rescuing nondes- lion were received from the public for these ignated cultural artifacts. Large volumes of activities during the year following the disaster. historical records are stored in local commu- Cultural property rescue. This scheme was nities, including old documents; antique works aimed at preserving or rescuing historical of art; and folk craft articles used in the agricul- materials and art objects such as documents, tural, fishing, and forestry industries as well as paintings, sculptures, and crafts. The ACA for- those used in securing food, clothing, and shel- mulated a rescue committee that consisted of ter. The quality and quantity of old documents research organizations, museums, libraries, created during Japan’s Edo period, from the the private sector, and civil society organiza- 16th to the 19th century, are greater than those tions (CSOs) throughout the country. Some of the same period kept in other countries. 4,900 experts had participated in the scheme After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake as of March 2012. In Miyagi Prefecture, expert (Kobe earthquake) in 1995, the government teams rescued dozens of properties at 58 loca- recognized the need to preserve cultural prop- tions consisting of museums, schools, private erties. In 2004, the Cabinet Office formed the houses, temples, and shrines. For example, at Committee to Protect Cultural Heritage Prop- the Ishinomaki Cultural Museum, which was erties from Disasters. The committee’s report severely damaged by tsunami waves, these highlights that public awareness of the need experts fumigated, cleaned, dried, or rehabili- to transfer historical heritage properties to tated folklore materials, arts, crafts, unearthed human bones, and historical maps. They Figure 35.1 then transported and stored these artifacts Rehabilitating a at other museums, universities, and private whale specimen warehouses in Sendai and Tokyo. The experts Source: National Museum of Nature and Science. rescued statues of the Buddha and scriptures from damaged temples. The scheme also cov- ered zoological and botanical specimens at natural history museums. Experts rehabili- tated a stuffed specimen of a whale measuring some 10 meters from a maritime museum in Rikuzentakata City, moving it to the National Museum of Nature and Science in Tokyo (fig- ure 35.1). The Japan Self-Defense Forces, a 324 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N significant presence in response works follow- accumulated experience in the Kobe Earth- ing the GEJE (chapter 14), helped to transport quake, now functions as a national secretariat these heavy materials. to coordinate networks at the prefectural level. Before the GEJE, the ACA was not well prepared for megadisasters. Rescue activities The case of the Miyagi prefecture began only after some 20 days had passed. In the Miyagi Prefecture, experts prepared for Damage to historical records from saltwater disaster by establishing networks of govern- and mold had already set in. Experts were ment entities, local communities, and property selected on an ad hoc basis. The organizations owners. They started identifying historical to which the experts belonged had to cover documents and recording materials by tak- travel costs at the initial stage because the ing photographs during normal times, which ACA did not have any extra travel budget for helped them preserve and rehabilitate cultural disasters. The procedures for requesting and properties following the GEJE. dispatching experts were confusing and the recovery processes complicated. To be most Predisaster: Activities begun eight effective, preservation projects must begin years before the GEJE immediately after a disaster. Experts began to rescue damaged historical Architects and building experts participated records following an earthquake in 2003, saving in the scheme, “Doctors for Buildings: Diag- some 200,000 historical records in five towns nosing and Treating Damage to Historic Build- affected by the disaster. These included some ings.” They assessed damages and provided 100,000 records from the family of Yonosuke technical advice for preserving and rehabilitat- Saito, the second-largest landowner in Japan ing historical buildings. In total, 467 experts before World War II. The Saito family had conducted activities on 3,936 buildings in 198 donated these records to Tohoku University. municipalities before March 2012. In the sec- The Miyagi Shiryo Net was established ond year, the experts provided building owners in 2004 to coordinate all organizations con- with detailed advice on methods and cost esti- cerned. Shiryo Net has been promoting the mates for preserving and rehabilitating works. preservation of historical records kept in com- munities in partnership with governments, The activities of nongovernmental owners, and local residents. In 2007, the orga- organizations nization gained the status of a nonprofit orga- Experts in historic preservation established nization in Japan. When the Iwate-Miyagi Shiryo Networks, a nongovernmental orga- Nairiku Earthquake struck in June 2008, it nization, following the Kobe Earthquake, began collecting information on the day of to protect historical records from disasters. the earthquake and began rescuing damaged These experts included university researchers, historical records from the affected areas graduate students, curators, local government two weeks later. The Shiryo Net calls for pre- staff, and private experts in the restoration of serving damaged historical records through cultural assets. They worked with community various media, including television news and members who had an interest in preserving newspapers. the historical culture of their own communi- Preservation in Miyagi involves two main ties. Groups have been established throughout activities: Japan; currently some 20 are working at the prefectural level. The networks not only meet • The first (undertaken in normal times) is when disaster strikes, but they also take pre- to identify historical records stored in com- ventive measures. Shiryo Net in Kobe, which munities. After creating a primary list and 3 5 : C U LT U R A L H E R I TAG E A N D P R E S E RVAT I O N | 32 5 BOX 35.1 • The other activity is to photograph all docu- ments. When large sets of documents are Symbol of reconstruction: Storehouse of Eiichi found, it is highly likely that they will not Homma family, Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture only include information about the owner’s ancestors, but also about the history of the The tsunami destroyed Mr. Eiichi Homma’s house, a landmark in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture. The two-story storehouse, built in 1897, held old community as a whole. This type of activity documents and other historical records. Although the storehouse was not only aims to collect materials based on a flooded, the historical documents were stored on the second floor and particular research area, but also to archive were spared the tsunami waves. About 50 cardboard boxes of materials all historical records. In Miyagi, 52 indi- were temporarily moved to the Tohoku History Museum in Sendai City on vidual surveys were conducted and some April 8, 2011. 350,000 digital images were captured. In Mr. Homma was initially planning on demolishing the storehouse but decided to repair and preserve it based on experts’ advice. An expert team Ogatsu and Kitakami districts in Ishino- led by Mr. Toshiro Sato, an architect in Fukushima, conducted a survey, and maki City, some 30,000 old documents found that the building had suffered no major structural damage and were destroyed by tsunami waves, but their could be preserved with minor repairs. images had been captured before the disas- The building serves as a symbol of reconstruction; the town associa- ter in more than 70,000 electronic files. tion’s emblem hangs on one of its walls. Local nongovernmental organiza- tions raised funds for its repairs. A workshop was held at the site on Sep- tember 24, 2011, to promote understanding of the significance of preserving During and following disasters: storehouses. Donations of more than ¥3 million were received from other rescuing historical records areas. The repair work started on March 1, 2012. The Miyagi Shiryo Net contributed greatly to the rescue and preservation of cultural prop- Workshop at Homma family storehouse erty during the earthquake that damaged the building of the secretariat of Shiryo Net at Tohoku University in Sendai City on March 11, 2011. The secretariat moved to another facil- ity on campus on March 15 and resumed its activities. Gathering damage information. The Miyagi Shiryo Net could not begin restoration until the end of March because of damage to trans- portation networks and a shortage of gaso- line. During this period, it collected damage information from property owners, local resi- Source: Daisuke Sato. dents, and government officials, making use of the networks of key stakeholders that it had established during the eight years prior to the getting an overview of the situation through disaster. It had collected information on more a literature survey, experts formulate than 500 damaged historical records by the detailed information on various objectives end of March. Because the coastal areas were in collaboration with government agencies the most severely damaged, the Shiryo Net and residents in the target communities. prioritized activities in those areas based on By 2003, the network had completed pri- aerial photos published online in mid-March. mary lists in 61 of the 73 local governments Temporary movement out of the affected in the Miyagi prefecture. Also, researchers areas. The Miyagi Shiryo Net conducted the surveyed detailed documentation kept by first survey of damage in Ishinomaki City, 415 families and organizations. Miyagi Prefecture, on April 3. It began its 326 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N rescue of historical records at the home of Figure 35.2 Rescue Eiichi Homma in Kadonowaki District on activities at the home of April 8 (figure 35.2 and box 35.1). As of Febru- Eiichi Homma in ary 15, 2013, 86 sets of historical records had Ishinomaki City, been temporarily moved out of the disaster Miyagi Prefecture area. Of these, 64 were moved to Sendai City Source: Shuichi Saito. and are still being processed. Of these, 50 sets, or about 80 percent, were from owners living in tsunami-affected areas. In 2013, nearly two years after the disaster, some records are still being moved out of the tsunami-affected areas. Emergency processing of damaged docu- BOX 35.2 ments. Documents were damaged by seawater, sand, sludge, and other substances brought in Kimura family documents washed ashore, by tsunami waves. Universities and research Onagawa City, Miyagi Prefecture institutions elsewhere in the country helped The Kimura family in Onagawa City in the Miyagi Prefecture is an old family to repair and preserve these documents. Vol- whose members served as Okimoiri (village heads) during the Edo period. unteers, university students, and local people Old documents, designated as the cultural properties of Onagawa City, were stored in three tea chests in the family’s storehouse. The Kimura fam- helped clean off sand and sludge, rinsing items ily house was destroyed by the tsunami, and the tea chests were washed to remove salt, and then drying them out. The away. But about a month after the disaster, someone found one of the Nara National Research Institute for Cultural chests in the Tsukahama District on the opposite shore of the bay and Properties, which excavates and preserves the delivered it to the Onagawa City office. Miyagi Shiryo Net retrieved these ancient capital of Nara, announced in April historical materials from the city office on May 12. Although two months 2011 that it would help repair and dry out had passed since the tsunami, the historical materials were still completely drenched. The documents were sent to the Nara National Research Insti- documents. Miyagi Shiryo Net sent old docu- tute for Cultural Properties. In August, after the documents had been suc- ments from the Kimura family in Onagawa cessfully dried, volunteers removed salt from the materials. Experts con- Town in the Miyagi prefecture (box 35.2) and tinue to repair them. large quantities of other damaged items to the One owner of the documents, who published an opinion in a local institute. Also, Miyagi Shiryo Net took pho- newspaper in December 2011, said “Having lost my parents in the tsunami, tos of damaged historical records that were as well as my home and all of my possessions, I was able to see some hope in the survival of these old documents.” undergoing emergency processing. As of Feb- ruary 15, 2013, about 150,000 digital images Rescued chest of Kimura family documents had been taken. Only 10 of the 64 collections of materials have been completely processed and returned to their owners. It may take years to finish processing all the records. LESSONS • It is important to prepare for disasters by conducting collaborative activities with local communities during normal times. The owners of historical records, local res- idents, government officials, and experts Source: Daisuke Sato. should be involved in creating mechanisms 3 5 : C U LT U R A L H E R I TAG E A N D P R E S E RVAT I O N | 32 7 BOX 35.3 should begin immediately after a disaster. Experts were selected on an ad hoc basis, Collecting and preserving disaster materials and the ACA did not have an adequate travel budget. Procedures for requesting Records on and materials related to disasters are useful in understanding and dispatching experts were confusing. disasters, for transfering knowledge to coming generations, and for pre- paring for future disasters. Following the Kobe earthquake in 1995, the • Museums should produce a database of Hyogo Prefecture preserved and collected disaster-related materials. Vol- properties. Information on properties is unteers, libraries, and local governments were involved in these activities. crucial for conducting preservation work “Earthquake materials” were not limited to conventional disaster data on after disasters. At a museum in Rikuzen- earthquakes, such as disaster scale and damage, but also included informa- takata City, it was quite difficult for experts tion on the recovery progress of the affected population, governments, CSOs, and others. to address the property and materials they With help from collection experts, the Hyogo Prefecture government encountered because staff had died in the collected a wide range of materials—such as books, memos of personal disaster and all of the information was lost. experiences and town meetings, leaflets, and wall posters—during the preservation and rehabilitation process. These cover information on (1) the • Governments should embrace the impor- earthquake itself, (2) the damage it caused, (3) the response to the event, tance of preserving cultural heritage. Pro- (4) the daily lives of affected people, and (5) the process of developing tecting and preserving cultural properties reconstruction plans and projects. The materials consisted of printed in- and historical buildings are often consid- formation, images, and voice recordings. Printed information included (1) ered low priorities in disaster manage- books, photos, newspapers, newsletters, maps, and so on; (2) private leaf- ment. The disaster risk management plans lets, fliers, wall posters, internal company memos, newsletters, volunteer information and diaries, and records of personal experiences; (3) research of governments rarely cover the preserva- reports, survey reports, and policy proposals; (4) lecture notes and seminar tion of cultural heritage. and symposium products; and (5) statistical data. Images included televi- sion images, media photos, videos, 8 mm film, and other photos as well as electronic materials on CD-ROM or other media and microfilm. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The national government should prepare for for preservation. Without systems for disasters by creating systems to preserve cul- preserving historical records, records in tural assets. These systems need a permanent private collections are at a high risk of dis- secretariat, a roster of experts, budgetary appearing during disasters. arrangements, and procedures for dispatching and requesting experts. Retrofitting is effective • Digital copies should be made of original his- in protecting historical buildings from earth- torical records. These copies are a crucial quakes (chapter 2). contribution to the preservation and reha- Museums should make individual prepara- bilitation process when original records tions for disasters. Each should develop a data- are lost to a disaster. base of properties so that preservation work • The national government plays a critical can proceed smoothly after a disaster strikes. role and needs to be prepared for disasters. Also, each museum should develop a priority Rescue and repair schemes functioned list of properties and identify areas for their well to preserve cultural properties after safekeeping. In Turkey, for example, authori- the GEJE disaster. It took some 20 days for ties developed a digital inventory of cultural these rescue activities to begin, however, heritage buildings in Istanbul (with support and damage from seawater and mold had from the World Bank) to be used in devising already set in. Ideally, preservation work countermeasures. 328 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N Governments at all levels should include the Investigate the Disclosure of Earthquake Materials preservation of cultural properties in disaster (in Japanese). Kobe. Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Associa- risk management plans. Preservation should be tion. 2001. Report from the Committee of Clas- recognized as an integral part of rehabilitation. sification and Disclosure Standards for Earthquake Community leaders should understand and Materials (in Japanese). Kobe. embrace their community’s historical culture Hirakawa, A. 2005. “Disaster Preparedness Mea- and develop the ability to conduct basic preser- sures Shift from Post-Disaster Preservation to Pre-Disaster Planning” (in Japanese). Rekishi vation efforts for the sake of cultural heritage. Hyoron, 666. Researchers, government organizations, pri- Historical Science Society of Japan, ed. 2012. The Role vate sector actors, and communities should be of Historical Science in the Face of Great Earth- involved in establishing networks to preserve quakes and Nuclear Disaster (in Japanese). Tokyo: Aoki Shoten. cultural assets and properties during normal Hyogo Prefecture. 1995. “Great Hanshin-Awaji Earth- times. Cooperation with international orga- quake Reconstruction Plan” (in Japanese). nizations is also useful. Following the Indian http://web.pref.hyogo.lg.jp/wd33/wd33_ Ocean tsunami in 2004, the National Commit- 000000043.html. tee of the International Council on Monuments Miyagi Shiryo Net. 2007. Miyagi Network for Preserv- ing Historical Materials (in Japanese). Research and Sites (ICOMOS) played a significant role report from the Project on Measures to Protect in the recovery of cultural sites in Sri Lanka Cultural Properties from Disasters conducted on and successfully advocated for the importance Behalf of the Agency of Cultural Affairs from 2005 of doing so by including cultural heritage val- to 2006, Sendai. Movable Cultural Property Rescue Manual Editorial ues in postdisaster recovery plans. Committee, ed. 2012. Movable Cultural Property Rescue Manual (in Japanese). Tokyo: Kubapro. Okumura, H. 2012. Major Earthquakes and the Pres- ervation of Historical Records: From the Great NOTE Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake to the Great East Japan Prepared by Daisuke Sato, Tohoku University; Hiroshi Earthquake (in Japanese). Tokyo: Yoshikawa Okumura, Kobe University; Kazuko Sasaki, Kobe Uni- Kobunkan. versity; Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank; and the Inter- Rescue Committee of Cultural Properties Damaged by national Recovery Platform. the Tohoku-oki Earthquake, Committee Secretar- iat. 2012. Activity Report on FY 2011 (in Japanese). Tokyo. Shiryo Net. 1999. “Kobe and Heike in History” (in Japanese). Kobe Shimbun Press Center, Kobe. BIBLIOGRAPHY Tohoku History Museum. 2012. Damaged Cultural Asahi Shinbun. 2011. “Old Documents and Diaries Property, Toward Recovery—Report of Cultural Restored at the Nara Research Institute, Supports Property Rescue (in Japanese). http://www.thm Affected Areas with a Massive Dryer, Great East .pref.miyagi.jp/topics/detail.php?data_id=385. Japan Earthquake” (in Japanese). April 21. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Insti- Cultural Organization). 2010. Managing Disaster tution. 2005. Report from the Committee to Risks for World Heritage. Paris: UNESCO. 3 5 : C U LT U R A L H E R I TAG E A N D P R E S E RVAT I O N | 32 9 CHAPTER 36 The Recovery Process in Fukushima The recovery process following the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Sta- tion on March 11, 2011, presented challenges different from those faced in the recovery of areas dam- aged by the tsunami waves and tremors of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The nuclear accident that followed the waves and tremors left communities concerned with the serious effects of radiation exposure, relocation, the dissolution of families, the disruption of livelihoods and lifestyles, and the contamination of vast areas. Following the nuclear accident, people in transition shelters, perpetuating the possibility Fukushima were removed to municipalities of conflict between the host community and and prefectures outside their home communi- temporary residents. Many of those who lived ties. There they faced difficulties finding hous- outside of evacuation zones left the Fukushima ing, jobs, and schooling in unfamiliar places. area voluntarily. These include mothers and Many families separated in the process of seek- children, for whom support programs are gen- ing employment and uncontaminated places to erally inadequate. live. To date, those affected do not have a clear The challenges of the recovery process in vision of when they can return to their origi- Fukushima are similar to those encountered nal communities. Even in areas where living following disasters in other parts of the world. restrictions have been lifted, there are few job After some natural disasters, such as volcano opportunities, educational opportunities, and eruptions, people cannot return to their origi- medical and other social services. In addition, nal communities because of prolonged events the fear of radiation has not yet dissipated. or drastic changes in geographical features. Many displaced people continue to reside in Also, in complex emergencies—such as those 331 spurred by armed conflicts in developing example, the mortality rate among residents countries—refugees and internally displaced evacuated from nursing homes following the persons are often forced to stay in unfamil- accident was 2.7 times higher than before it. iar environments outside their hometowns Some 160,000 people, approximately 8 per- or countries for a long period without future cent of the total population of the prefecture, prospects or hope. left their hometowns for transition shelters in To address the effects of such disruption the wake of the GEJE (as of December 2012). in Japan, the government, private sector, uni- Of this group, 111,000 are from restricted areas, versities, and civil society have worked with mainly Futaba County, where the nuclear sta- affected communities in Fukushima to sup- tion is located, while 49,000 people evacuated port their daily needs and future interests. The voluntarily. Approximately 60,000 are resid- purpose of this note is to outline what these ing outside the Fukushima Prefecture, most of organizations did and how they did it, and to them elsewhere in Japan but some overseas. recommend what other responders can do in More than 60 percent of the people feel iso- the face of similar events in the future. In the lated from other people in the country. case of Fukushima during the Great East Japan The Tokyo Electric Power Company Earthquake (GEJE), it was found that restor- (TEPCO) has been paying compensation to ing livelihoods, caring for children, rehabili- those affected by the accident. TEPCO began tating communities, and communicating risks with a lump-sum payment of ¥1 million per were crucial to the recovery process. family moved from the evacuation zones in April 2011, before the final compensation pay- ment. As of June 2013, TEPCO had paid some FINDINGS ¥2.5 trillion in compensation to affected peo- ple and companies. The company is also pay- How did the accident affect ing a ¥100,000 payment every month to each the people of Fukushima? evacuee as compensation for nonphysical Although more than two years have passed, damages (pain and suffering, stress and strain), the people of Fukushima are still struggling payable until the evacuee is able to return to with the effects of the nuclear accident that his or her hometown. But glitches in the pay- prompted a physical and mental health crisis ment process have been observed. Various for area residents. Many suffered the stress of organizations have requested that compensa- sudden displacement and prolonged evacu- tion payments be accelerated. The Japanese ation, fears over the possible health effects of government established the Nuclear Damage continued exposure to low-level radiation, an Liability Facilitation Fund in September 2011 exodus from the area, dissolving communities, to support TEPCO in paying compensation to and conflicts with host communities. affected people, and it has formulated compen- Prolonged evacuation. An enormous number sation guidelines. of people are still in transitional shelters and Fear of radiation. More than 80 percent of other locations that are not their homes. As of the population in Fukushima City fear radia- September 2012, 1,121 people had died in Fuku- tion; according to a city government survey, that shima from physical and mental exhaustion fear was growing even a year after the accident. caused by the accident. This number includes People, in particular families with children, are 35 who died in the six months between March trying to avoid radiation risks by checking the and September 2012, more than a year after the contamination level of foods, hanging laundry accident. Meanwhile, the risk of death among inside houses to dry, buying bottled water, and the elderly increased during evacuation. For avoiding highly contaminated areas. 332 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N The fear of radiation has disrupted fami- community bonds, the local government in the lies in the restricted areas because that fear is town of Tomioka has compiled a telephone unequally distributed in terms of generation, directory of evacuees from which residents gender, and living conditions. According to can obtain contact information for their home- a questionnaire conducted by researchers at town neighbors and friends. The government Fukushima University in September 2011, 98 also established an information system utiliz- percent of evacuees from Futaba County expe- ing electronic tablets for social workers. The rienced separation from family members. Most accumulated welfare and medical information typically, fathers continue to stay in Fukushima promises to help save the lives of residents. for livelihoods while mothers and children live Conflicts between communities. In March outside Fukushima to avoid radiation risks. 2013, Fukushima’s governor spoke of conflicts A dwindling and aging population. The acci- between evacuees and host communities. It dent and subsequent evacuation have exacer- was reported that evacuees in transition shel- bated preexisting problems, such as an aging ters were being harassed by graffiti painted on and declining population. Between the acci- vehicles or public buildings saying “evacuee, dent and January 2013, the population of the go home.” Conflicts between evacuees and prefecture decreased by 60,000 to 1.96 mil- their host communities have accompanied lion. In 2012, 13,348 residents left Fukushima, government support programs and compen- of which 3,009 were children younger than sation payments from TEPCO. People in host 14 and 4,030 were aged 25–44. In addition, communities, such as Iwaki City, who suf- because almost half of the younger generation fered from the tsunami waves and earthquake shows no intention of returning to their home- tremors but were not compensated resent the towns, it is expected that the population will evacuees of the nuclear accident from Futaba continue to dwindle. County who are being compensated. Even in areas where aerial radiation lev- Since the evacuees use hospitals, roads, els are relatively low, some displaced persons and other public facilities, people in host com- do not intend to return home because of the munities do not receive public services in the lack of public services. Although the mayor same way they did before the accident. Hous- of Hirono Town lifted evacuation orders in ing shortages have arisen in host cities as March 2012, and the town government reha- affected persons receiving government finan- bilitated most infrastructure, only one-fourth cial support rent private houses. The evacuees of the town’s residents had returned as of June pay local taxes to their original municipalities, 2013. The government has supported radiation not to the host municipalities that are provid- decontamination and debris removal and has ing them public services. rebuilt infrastructure; nevertheless, services Governments and other organizations pro- vital for daily life—such as those supplied by vide limited support to promote the peaceful local shops and medical facilities—have not coexistence of evacuees and their host com- fully resumed. Meanwhile, people are worried munities. Iwaki City, which suffered from about another accident at the nuclear stations. earthquakes and tsunamis and hosts some Fracturing of communities. Evacuees are dis- 24,000 evacuees from other affected munici- persed both within and outside of Fukushima, palities, has asked the national government to and it is critical for the municipality govern- provide it with additional financial support to ment to address their various needs in a timely strengthen the public services it provides to way. They are making every effort to maintain evacuees. community bonds. To help people affected Recovery progress. The progress of recov- by the GEJE stay in contact and maintain ery in Fukushima is lagging behind other 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 333 Great Specific policy and disaster-affected areas (figure 36.1). Munici- East Japan planning measures Key policy and Earthquake for Fukushima palities damaged by tsunamis produced planning measures 11 March 2011 Reconstruction recovery plans within a year of the GEJE Reconstruction 1 month (chapter 21), while municipalities in Fuku- Design Council shima needed two years because it remained unclear when people could return to their Seven Principles for 2 months Reconstruction Framework hometowns and when the towns would be free of radiation. Some plans in Fukushima Basic Act for Reconstruction 3 months still do not indicate when people can return Reconstruction Headquarters Recommendation by to their communities. 4 months Design Council Legislation has been enacted to support Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction affected people, and the government has for- 5 months Special Act on Evacuees mulated reconstruction guidelines. Various from Nuclear Accident Consultation Committee consultation processes among mayors, minis- Prefecture and Municipality 6 months on Fukushima Reconstruction ters, governors, and other key stakeholders to Recovery Plans promote recovery are ongoing. Yet compensa- 7 months tion and subsidies cannot restore original life- styles, which were deeply connected with the 8 months culture, natural environment, and human rela- tions of communities. 9 months Law for Special Zone Fukushima Prefecture Support for recovery from for Reconstruction Recovery Plan 10 months government and other sources The national and prefectural governments created a framework to support recovery. It Reconstruction Agency 11 months includes laws, guidelines, plans, consultation processes, and budget allocations. Universities Reconstruction Grant Projects 1 year Law for Special Measures and civil society organizations have provided for Rebirth of Fukushima 13 months additional support for the affected population. 14 months Government support Legislation and planning. A law for “special 15 months measures for the rebirth of Fukushima” was Law for Support to People Affected by Nuclear Accident enacted in March 2012, one year after the acci- 16 months dent. The cabinet adopted basic guidelines for Basic guidelines on Fukushima reconstruction Fukushima reconstruction in July 2012. These 17 months National Grand Design guidelines aimed to promote reconstruction 18 months and revitalization following the nuclear acci- Consultation Committee on Relocating Communities dent in a holistic way. The Fukushima prefec- for Long-term Evacuees tural government formulated a recovery plan in December 2011. Its basic concepts were to Recovery plans in 4 municipalities 2 years (1) build a safe, secure, and sustainable soci- ety free of nuclear power; (2) revitalize Fuku- 10 years shima by bringing together everyone who loves and cares about it; and (3) rehabilitate Figure 36.1 Chronology of key policy and planning measures for recovery from the GEJE, in general and in Fukushima towns so they can be a source of pride again. Table 36.1 Budget of the Fukushima Prefecture for flagship programs in FY 2013 The four municipalities of Namie, Okuma, SAFE DAILY LIVING 397.1 (¥ BILLION) Futaba, and Tomioka—where people cannot Rehabilitating the environment 281.2 return—formulated recovery plans from Sep- Supporting the rehabilitation of daily lives 72.2 tember 2012 to March 2013. Because it is not Protecting health 22.1 known when people will be able to return to Raising children 21.6 their home communities, the plans cover relo- Job opportunities 155.4 cation to other municipalities, but they do not Rehabilitating agriculture 32.6 include detailed rehabilitation of the original Rehabilitating small and medium enterprises 114.4 communities. Promoting renewable energy 4 Budget. The Fukushima government allo- Developing the medical industry 4.4 cated a budget of ¥1.5764 trillion in the finan- Urbanism and networking 89.6 cial year 2013 to fund activities detailed in Networking 1.1 the recovery plan. The government allocated Rehabilitating tourism 0.7 a budget for flagship programs as shown in Rehabilitating cities 58 table 36.1. Further, the government allocated a Rehabilitating transport 29.8 supplementary budget of ¥256.9 billion. Total 642.1 Consultation. Various consultation pro- Source: Fukushima Prefecture. cesses among mayors, ministers, governors, and other key stakeholders are ongoing. In August 2011, the national government created the Consultation Committee on Fukushima Reconstruction to examine recovery activities. Chaired by the reconstruction minister, the committee consists of concerned ministers and mayors of affected municipalities. The mayors of affected municipalities, Fukushima’s gover- nor, and ministers have met periodically since March 2012 to exchange views. The national government revised its evac- uation zoning regulations in April 2012, announcing that the residents of four munici- palities could not return home for a few years (map  36.1). With this step, relocating people to other municipalities became a crucial issue. Legend In September 2012, the national and Fuku- Area 1: Areas to which evacuation shima Prefecture governments jointly created orders are ready to be lifted the Consultation Committee on Relocating Area 2: Areas in which the Communities for Long-Term Evacuees in Sep- residents are not permitted to live tember 2012. The committee examines (1) the Area 3: Areas where it is expected that the residents will have period, scale, and other issues of relocation; and difficulties in returning for a long (2) public housing for those affected. The com- time mittee consists of the mayors of the receiving Restricted Area Deliberate Evacuation Area municipalities, the mayors of the four affected municipalities, and the reconstruction minister. Map 36.1 Rearrangement of evacuation zoning Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 335 Support from Fukushima University the public’s wishes. They gathered opinions of Fukushima University, the only national uni- more than 1,200 residents and compiled their versity in the prefecture, established the recommendations for Fukushima’s governor. Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revi- The university has supported the Odaga- talization (FURE) in April 2011. The purpose isama Center (loosely translated as the of the center is to conduct research on scien- Tomioka center for mutual support in rebuild- tific changes and damage caused by the GEJE ing town life) at a temporary housing complex and the ensuing nuclear accident. In addition, in Koriyama City. This center provides support FURE assists in the rehabilitation and revital- to the inhabitants and is a place for evacuees ization of Fukushima by supporting the for- to communicate and interact (figure 36.2). It mulation of action plans and implementing also operates a traditional handicraft work- recovery in consultation with affected com- shop, which provides training opportunities munities. The center consists of four support for residents who have lost their jobs due to the groups focused on (1) children and youth, accident. The center’s activities are based on (2) community support, (3) industrial restora- self-governance by residents exposed to risks tion, and (4) environment and energy. It signed caused by the separation from their original agreements with eight municipalities in Janu- communities and families. As of August 2012, ary 2012 to support the formulation of recovery 30 percent of the residents of Tomioka Town plans, to provide advice on decontamination, had left Fukushima, 18 percent lived in tran- and to conduct surveys of the affected popu- sition housing units, and 52 percent lived in lation. The center created two satellite offices rented apartments in Fukushima. in Kawauchi Village and Minamisoma City to support the affected population in those areas. Critical areas of support The center also supported the revision of a This section examines four issues identified recovery master plan for the Fukushima Pre- by experts at workshops. They are consis- fecture. One year after the disaster, the pre- tent with known features of disaster recovery fectural government began major work on a efforts in developing countries: (1) rehabilita- “Fukushima Master Plan” that sets goals from tion of the community, (2) communication of 2013 through 2021. In the review process, it risks, (3) caring for children, and (4) restora- was crucial to hear the voices of residents; tion of livelihoods. however, most residents were hesitant to voice their opinions or did not know what they Rehabilitation of communities in temporary should ask for. The university carried out an towns or migrant communities. Because decon- opinion survey on the master plan to ascertain tamination of radioactive areas takes a long time, at the end of 2011, the municipal govern- Figure 36.2 ments of Namie, Okuma, Futaba, and Tomioka Odagaisama began planning “temporary towns,” or migrant Center communities, for those ousted from their orig- Source: © Fukushima University. Used with inal municipalities. Municipal governments permission. Further and public facilities as well as residents were permission required for reuse. relocated to these temporary towns. Local governments have encountered dif- ficulties in planning these towns. The host municipalities cannot prepare for the towns without knowing the number of evacuees. Yet municipalities cannot calculate the numbers 336 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N because people will not declare their will- of the host cities may minimize conflict, but it ingness to move in the absence of a detailed makes it more difficult for them to maintain plan. Among the affected population of Namie bonds with home. Town, 19.5 percent have said they want to live In December 2012, the Iitate Village office in the temporary towns, while almost half say, agreed with the Fukushima City government “I don’t know,” because of the limited informa- to develop a “temporary town” in Fukushima tion available to them. City. Some 3,800 people (more than half the Among the several issues to resolve are population) and village offices have already the following: (1) conflicts over resources, job moved from Iitate Village to Fukushima City. opportunities, and other issues with host com- Public housing, a junior high school, a kinder- munities; (2) difficulties forming networks garten, agricultural facilities, and other nec- with other members of the home community; essary infrastructure have been constructed. (3) difficulty selecting sites for temporary Because this is the first case of an agreement towns through participatory planning; (4) dif- about a temporary town, the details of pro- ficulty defining the respective roles of the grams (such as cost sharing and responsibili- original local government, the local host gov- ties between the two municipal governments) ernment, the prefectural government, and the are to be determined later. national government; and (5) the possibility that temporary towns will become permanent. Rehabilitating credibility: Community- Affected people and municipalities are based monitoring and communication of examining two methods for developing tempo- risks. To produce a database that is account- rary towns: the concentrated community and able, various stakeholders (such as landown- the distributed community. ers, consumers, farmers, governments, and Concentrated community. A concentrated community-based organizations) are involved community is one in which affected people in monitoring radiation. Accurate and scien- will live in a specified area separate from the tific data on radiation are essential for reha- host community. Most housing, municipal bilitating agriculture by reducing radiation facilities, and other public functions will be risks, conducting decontamination works, and newly constructed. People in Namie Town call resuming agricultural activities. The govern- that planned town “Little Namie,” referring to ment organizations and academia lost credibil- it in the same way that Japanese communities ity due to inappropriate communication with in foreign countries are often referred to by the public during the accident (chapter 27). names such as “Little Tokyo.” These facilities Uncertain information that flooded the Inter- are intended to be used only for a few years. net also accelerated the decreasing confidence After evacuees return to their home commu- in these organizations. nity, operation and maintenance problems FURE is conducting community-based may emerge. Such concentrated communities monitoring with farmers and agricultural also have a huge impact on town planning in cooperatives to accumulate reliable data and the host communities because it is difficult to to produce detailed maps (100 meter mesh) find enough space for them. useful for rehabilitating agricultural activities Distributed community. A distributed com- and daily lives (figures 36.3 and 36.4). Through munity is one in which affected people blend joint monitoring by experts and farmers on a into the host communities. They use the exist- community scale, stakeholders share impor- ing facilities in the host municipalities, and tant information. By taking part in the mea- new schools and facilities are unlikely to be surement process, farmers and residents gain built. Having evacuees live alongside residents confidence in the process. Contamination 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 3 37 Figure 36.3 Chernobyl accident. University researchers Farmers teach farmers that radioactivity is transmitted monitoring to plant bodies. To revitalize agriculture and radiation recover food safety, the university is working Source: © Fukushima University. Used with with various stakeholders in four stages: permission. Further permission required Stage 1: Investigating the actual situation of for reuse. radioactive contamination • Mapping radiation of farmlands and resi- dential lands Stage 2: Countermeasures at the production stage • Testing cultivation in paddies and upland fields • Clarifying the mechanisms of cesium absorption and transfer and evaluating the effects of potassium and zeolite Figure 36.4 Radiation map • Providing guidance on farming appropriate Source: © Fukushima to the contamination level of fields University. Used with permission. Further Stage 3: Countermeasures at the marketing stage permission required for reuse. • Expanding and improving radiation mea- surement systems and facilities • Raising the capacity of measurement technicians • Advising on the development of measure- ment systems maps (which government agencies have pro- Stage 4: Countermeasures at the consumption duced by monitoring radiation by airplane, stage vehicle, and monitoring posts) are not helpful • Providing opportunities for communica- in rehabilitating farmers’ daily lives and agri- tion between producers and consumers, cultural activities. This is because their large such as Fukko (“revitalization”) Marche scale can provide an overview of contamina- (figure 36.5) tion but not information on the distribution of contamination on a community scale. • Surveying consumers Fukushima University is helping farmers promote safe agricultural products and pro- Rehabilitation for the future: Care for the cessed foods. The university conducts tests vulnerable, especially children. Communi- of paddy rice to measure the absorption and ties cannot be sustained without children and transfer mechanisms of cesium 134 and 137 young people. Some 90 percent of people in from soil and water. Researchers have also Fukushima City worry about their children’s applied their experience and knowledge future. Because children are especially vulner- of agriculture revitalization following the able to radiation, concerned governments and 338 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N organizations are focusing on efforts to care for becoming increasingly difficult for families to them, such as giving them emotional support, return to their original towns. Access to schools, counseling, and education (chapter 19). relationships with new friends, and fear of radi- Students have had trouble adjusting to their ation are bottlenecks preventing them from new schools. The temporary schools lack facili- returning to their hometowns. The Hirono pri- ties and accessibility, and students are sepa- mary school in Hirono Town resumed classes rated from their friends from home. As a result, in August 2012, but only 20 percent of students children at transition shelters are not receiving came back to the school. the same quality of education that they received The prefecture has introduced a variety of before the disasters. Approximately 30,000 measures that target children. The govern- children under 18 years of age lived at transi- ment provides free medical care for children tion shelters as of October 2012. Of this number, under 18 years of age and will be conducting some 17,000 had moved outside Fukushima. lifelong medical examinations of the thyroid Based on a survey of thyroid health, the glands of children who were under 18 at the Fukushima Prefecture and the national min- time of the accident. istry of the environment found no significant Fukushima University has initiated a “Chil- differences between children living within or dren Campus” program at the university. Chil- outside Fukushima. After the Chernobyl acci- dren who lived in different transition shelters dent, the greater scale of iodine 131 contami- can gather at the university, play with uni- nation over cesium 134 and 137 contamination versity students, and attend classes. The pro- caused many cases of thyroid cancer among gram also provides recreational space that young people. To avoid overdoses, countermea- children cannot find at the transition shelters sures such as evacuation, examination of food, (figure 36.6). and restrictions on food distribution immedi- ately after nuclear accidents are a priority. Figure 36.5 Fukko Parents and children who remain in Fuku- (“revitalization”) shima face difficulties in their daily lives, stem- Marche ming from stresses caused by the accident. A Source: © Fukushima Fukushima Prefecture survey found that 13 per- University. Used with permission. Further cent of children in evacuation areas suffered permission required for reuse. from mental health problems as compared with 9.5 percent in other areas in Japan. The prefec- ture provided mental care to a high-risk group composed of 7 percent of the children. A Fukushima University survey found that parents in areas where radiation levels are higher suffer from more stress than parents Figure 36.6 in other areas. Also, parents suffer more stress Supporting as children grow. Children are showing signs children affected of stress, such as fear, anxiety, and regression. by the disaster Source: © Fukushima They are restricted from playing outside, and University. Used with their physical inactivity causes obesity. In 2012, permission. Further permission required the obesity ratios of the children in Fukushima for reuse. Prefecture were the highest in Japan. As most students attend schools near their new residences and outside Fukushima, it is 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 339 Rehabilitating jobs: Livelihood restoration. Village, generating half the number of jobs lost. Before the accident, the main job opportuni- But for the reasons mentioned above, job offers ties in the affected areas were in the electric are not being filled. power industry, including the nuclear stations. The government provides private com- Some people who worked in these areas kept panies with high subsidies that cover 75 per- their jobs because the industries remained, or cent of the construction costs of factories. As because they found opportunities at other sta- of December 2012, it had decided to provide tions. In 2012, the ratio of job offers, including 291 private companies with subsidies, which temporary and permanent ones, to job seek- are expected to create more than 4,000 jobs. ers in the Fukushima Prefecture was 1.18, the In 2012, 102 new factories were built, 2.4 times highest of all the prefectures in Japan. Signifi- the number in 2010. These factories provided cant increases were seen in construction jobs more than 2,200 jobs. (including decontamination) and jobs nursing Students of Fukushima University have the elderly. organized Fukko Marche in Fukushima City There is, however, a mismatch between and Tokyo and are working with farmers asso- demand for labor and the preferences of the ciations, women’s groups, nongovernmental labor force. People prefer permanent jobs in a organizations (NGOs), and local agencies to service industry, whereas most available jobs promote agro-related industries (figure 36.6). are for temporary manual labor. The ratio of While Fukushima is famous for its agricultural permanent job offers to job seekers is just 0.72. produce (such as fruits, vegetables, mush- The number of job offers in the construction rooms, rice, and rice wines), their sales were sector was 3,616, but only 1,037 were accepted. affected by rumors after the nuclear accident. In the manufacturing industry, by contrast, The Fukko Marche offers demonstrations 6,249 people were looking for jobs, but there of radiation measurements of agricultural were only 3,776 offers. Job seekers who receive products. compensation from TEPCO tend to be more Women who had been engaged in agri- selective about salary and job conditions. businesses in the Abukuma region established In highly contaminated areas, the situa- a women’s organization called the Ka-tyan no tion is more severe than in other areas in the Chikara (“power of moms”) project in Octo- prefecture. While the ratio of job offers to job ber 2011, seven months after the earthquake, seekers is very high, at 2.42 in Futaba County, in Fukushima City, where they were tempo- job seekers have not returned because of fear rarily staying. A major part of the Abukuma of radiation or the inconveniences of daily life. region in the central and eastern part of the Some local businesses, such as retail stores, Fukushima Prefecture is now a restricted area cannot resume their services because of a labor for agricultural production because of the shortage and a dearth of customers. nuclear accident. The objectives of Ka-tyan no In the case of Kawauchi Village, from which Chikara are to contribute to the recovery of the all residents were evacuated, the village gov- nuclear-affected Abukuma region, build a net- ernment has been encouraging people to return work among women from the region, create home following the lifting of living restrictions employment, demonstrate the safety of prod- in January 2012. The lack of job opportuni- ucts from Fukushima, and build and sustain ties is one of the main challenges to returning. communities that include evacuees and resi- Some 250 people lost their jobs following the dents. The members of the network produce accident. The village office induced three various kinds of processed agricultural foods, companies to set up operations in Kawauchi such as rice cakes, pickles, sweets, and lunch 340 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N boxes. With support from Fukushima Univer- evacuees from the nuclear accident are sity and other agencies, all of their products being compensated by TEPCO. are examined for radioactivity and are sold • Developing “temporary towns” is an enor- with a certification that guarantees safe levels mous challenge. Developing temporary of radioactivity. sites for evacuees in other municipalities is more complicated than the normal prac- LESSONS tice of building resettlement shelters in the disaster-affected area. It is necessary • Nuclear disaster can divide a society. The to clarify responsibilities and cost-sharing affected population of Fukushima has been arrangements among the affected and host divided by differences in radiation expo- municipalities and with the national and sure, risk perception, age, and income. Fol- prefectural governments. The question of lowing adjustments to evacuation zoning, how to use the facilities and buildings of some affected people have begun to return the temporary towns after evacuees return to their hometowns. More than 20,000 to their hometowns will have to be studied people in four municipalities, however, will and resolved. not be able to return to their communities • People face an uncertain future. Those for at least five years because of high levels affected by the GEJE have mixed feelings. of radiation. People who live outside the They wish to return home, but cannot, nor evacuation zones and who have voluntarily can they lead their daily lives as they did evacuated out of fear of radiation receive before the accident. In addition to radiation, less government support than evacuees various factors, such as a lack of employ- from the evacuation zones. Some groups, in ment opportunities, make people hesitant to particular families with children, are seri- go home. Ways must be found to narrow the ously concerned about radiation and have huge gap between job offers and job hunters. moved outside the prefecture, while others Government financial incentives for private stay on. In general, younger people tend to companies and entrepreneurs can create move away and start new lives, while older good jobs. In addition to decontamination, people seek to return to their home commu- adequate social services (such as education, nities. People with higher incomes are more health, and transportation) will be required likely than poorer people to voluntarily to induce evacuees to return home. relocate. • Radiation monitoring requires participation • Prolonged evacuation causes conflict between from various stakeholders (such as commu- communities. Conflicts have emerged nities, governments, and academia) to pro- between evacuees and host communities. duce a database that is accountable. It will Municipalities in the prefecture that suf- be necessary to measure radiation levels on fered from the earthquakes and tsunamis individual farming plots and to set up a reli- are hosting evacuees from areas affected by able monitoring system. Merely providing the nuclear accident. Because the evacu- risk information on radiation is not enough ees occupy housing and use public services to prevent rumors or to overcome their (such as health, education, and transport influence. facilities) in the host communities, natives encounter shortages, leading to resent- • Providing support at various locations is ment, which is exacerbated by the fact that another challenge. People affected by the 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 341 nuclear accident have evacuated to other hesitant about expressing their feelings. Pro- areas in and around Fukushima, and com- grams for parents, such as counseling, should munities and families have been separated, accompany activities organized for children. which complicates efforts to reach them for Provide community-based monitoring. Com- the purposes of providing support and assis- munities can gain valuable information by tance and reaching consensus on recovery monitoring disaster situations that can be put plans. to use in managing disasters—for example, in understanding risks and the importance of evacuation plans. In Sri Lanka, community RECOMMENDATIONS FOR members are monitoring rainfall using simple DEVELOPING COUNTRIES equipment and warning other members when rainfall reaches the point where it could cause Provide national government support to host floods or landslides (chapter 10). municipalities. Conflicts between refugees and Collaborate with a wide range of stakehold- internally displaced persons, on the one hand, ers. Academic institutions can offer help with and their host communities, on the other, can risk communication, job creation, and tech- be avoided by lessening the burden on the lat- nical knowledge. Businesses can also play a ter. The host communities may well face diffi- crucial role in job creation. Private staffing culties in sharing public services and resources agencies can reduce the government’s burden with displaced persons. In prolonged situa- by hiring affected people (chapter 24). To cre- tions of displacement, conflict can become ate livelihoods for refugees, it is vital to engage severe. The presence in Pakistan of 3 million profit-oriented and commercial institutions Afghan refugees over the past 30 years has had and companies. In South Africa, the private profound social, economic, and environmental temporary recruitment agency matched skilled impacts for the host country. National govern- refugees to labor markets that had a shortage ments should support activities to promote of local talent. coexistence between the displaced persons Create jobs. Many evacuees from the GEJE and host communities. The Refugee Affected are hesitant to return home because job oppor- and Hosting Areas programme of the United tunities are scarce. Government support and Nations Development Programme aims to financial schemes that provide funds to the ensure refugees’ peaceful coexistence with private sector for starting businesses in these local communities. The program helps host areas are required. In addition to creating job communities train human resources, distrib- opportunities for heads of families, spouses ute food and water, and build facilities such as also need jobs. farm roads, water supply and sanitation infra- Have municipalities prepare evacuation structure, and medical stations. plans, especially those in which crucial facili- Make care for children a priority because ties, such as nuclear stations, are located. These children are particularly vulnerable to disas- municipalities should prepare for serious acci- ters. Mental health and education programs dents, knowing that residents may respond to are needed for affected children. Before the such accidents by migrating. They should raise accident in Fukushima, children in rural areas public awareness, prepare contingency plans, enjoyed living in spacious houses and play- and establish partnerships with the national ing outside. Children are very sensitive to the government (chapter 11). Also, municipalities anxiety and uneasiness of their parents. They should discuss arrangements for transition sometimes regard their parents’ anxiety and shelters with neighboring municipalities in the uneasiness as their own problem and tend to be event of accidents. 342 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N NOTE McCurry, J. 2012. “Japan’s Tohoku Earthquake: 1 Year on.” Lancet 379: 880–81. Prepared by Mikio Ishiwatari, World Bank; and Satoru ———. 2013. “Fukushima Residents Still Struggling 2 Mimura, Hideki Ishii, Kenji Ohse, and Akira Takagi, Years after Disaster.” Lancet 381: 791–92. Fukushima University. Nomura, S., S. Gilmour, M. Tsubokur, D. Yoneoka, A. Sugimoto, et al. 2013. “Mortality Risk amongst Nursing Home Residents Evacuated after the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: A Retrospective BIBLIOGRAPHY Cohort Study.” PLoS One 8 (3): e60192. Fukushima City. 2012. “Survey on People’s View Tokyoshinbun. 2013. “All People Died because of the on Radiation” (in Japanese). http://www.city Accident: Prolonged Evacuation in Fukushima” .fukushima.fukushima.jp/soshiki/7/kouchou1 (in Japanese). March 13. 2090501.html. Tsutui, Y., M. Tominaga, M. Takahara, and R. Takatani. Fukushima Governor. 2013. “Comments on Recovery 2012. “Stress on Parents and Children” (in Japa- Plan in Areas Lifting up of Restricted Area” nese). http://www.fukushima-u.ac.jp/press/H24/ [in Japanese]. http://www.cms.pref.fukushima pdf/34_03.pdf. .jp/download/1/tokusohou-keikakuikenn.pdf. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Fukushima Prefecture. 2013. “Panel on Survey on Pakistan. 2013. “Project Brief: Refugee Affected People’s Health” (in Japanese). http://www.cms and Hosting Areas Programme.” http://www .pref.fukushima.jp. .undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/CPRU/ Hokkaido Shimbun. 2013. “Two Years from 3.11: Diffi- Project%20Briefs/UNDP-PK-CPRU-RahaPB- cult Recovery” (in Japanese). February 23. 2013.pdf. http://www.hokkaido-np.co.jp/cont/tooifukkou/ UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for 188947.html. Refugees). 2012. “Livelihood Programming in Kahokushinpo. 2013. “Two Years from GEJE” (in UNHCR: Operational Guidelines.” http://www Japanese). March 5. .unhcr.org/4fbdf17c9.html. 3 6 : T H E R E CO V E RY P RO C E S S I N F U K U S H I M A | 343 CHAPTER 37 Spreading the Word: Raising Capacity for Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries The ultimate objective of the Learning from Megadisasters project is to share Japan’s knowledge of disaster risk management (DRM) and postdisaster reconstruction with other countries vulnerable to disasters and to help mainstream DRM policies in those countries. The first phase of the project produced the chapters that make up the bulk of this volume and formed a community of practice (CoP) capable of helping developing countries draw real benefits from the lessons encapsulated in the chapters. The key feature of the second phase of the project is the development of on-demand capacity- building programs for high-profile countries for which the lessons from the project have particular relevance. Successful implementation in those countries will pave the way for adoption of similar approaches in other countries. The capacity-development program is focused At the outset of Phase 2, the pilot countries on seven pilot countries: Armenia, Indone- identified the most important lessons learned sia, Kenya, the Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Sri from Japan’s experience. Country-specific Lanka, and Uganda. An additional capacity- capacity-building programs were designed building exercise was held in Sierra Leone in around those needs, comprised of workshops, October 2013. The goal of these programs is to learning sessions organized by the World Bank widen the dissemination and application of the Institute’s (WBI) Global Development Learn- knowledge generated in Phase 1 and to identify ing Network (GDLN), face-to-face meetings, a steps and measures to enhance disaster prepa- study tour in Tohoku, and follow-up efforts to ration and responsiveness in pilot countries identify plans for next steps, including further based on the Japanese experience. actions and activities for each country, such as 345 technical assistance, studies, and—especially— conferences have been organized in coop- the addition of specific topics and measures to eration with ministries, academic insti- existing or planned operations. The latter, of tutions, members of the United Nations course, is the definition of mainstreaming. system, and other important DRM actors. The program in each country was tailor- • In Armenia, the activities carried out under made to the needs and interests each country the capacity- development program tar- had identified. Part of the tailoring process geted the academic and research commu- involved the identification of specific groups nity and technical experts at the national of stakeholders whose roles in the disaster level. The focus was on structural mea- risk management (DRM) process made them sures and building codes, which is under- good candidates for capacity building. Specific standable because the country is at high activities were designed with the clients and in risk for earthquakes and is in the process consultation with knowledgeable staff within of developing structural and nonstructural the Bank and in partner institutions, including measures to mitigate earthquake damage. those engaged in ongoing or planned develop- ment operations, thereby amplifying the effect • In Sierra Leone, representatives of the of the capacity-building program. Some exam- national and provincial governments gath- ples of program activities follow: ered to learn about the effects of natural hazards on development and the contribu- • In Kenya, together with United Nations tion that effective DRM can make to devel- Development Programme (UNDP), two opment. The measures and tools that the workshops have targeted national govern- Japanese have designed and implemented ment officials and provincial and local offi- were presented to demonstrate that a cul- cials in an effort to advance the policy goal ture of prevention helps to sustain growth. of decentralizing DRM in the country. • In Uganda, preparatory meetings have been held with the Office of the Prime Min- A DYNAMIC COMMUNITY ister and other governmental departments. OF PRACTICE Because the country recently adopted comprehensive DRM regulations but lacks An important aim of Phase 2 is to engage cli- the institutional capacity to implement the ents and experts through the community of program, capacity-development activities practice (CoP) described below and to build focus on strengthening pertinent institu- capacity to address specific country needs and tions through measures adapted to the interests. Uganda contest. Two main training activi- To build developing countries’ capacity in ties have been organized. The first, aimed DRM, the WBI and its partners in the proj- at national government officials and sev- ect (through the platforms offered by the eral provincial representatives, focuses Tokyo Distance Learning Center [TDLC]) on specific tools and measures (including have designed a program to exchange and structural ones). The second—for mem- share knowledge and to deliver it through bers of parliament and chaired by the DRM blended-learning events and opportunities. minister—aimed to raise awareness among With additional content provided by units of decision makers. the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery [GFDRR], the Social • In Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Kyrgyz Development Department, and the East Asia Republic, several workshops and video and Pacific Region) and other organizations 346 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N (Japan’s Ministry of Finance and the Ministry the team polled members before updating the of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tour- community’s design and activities. ism [MLIT]; the Asian Disaster Reduction In March 2013, the Learning from Megadi- Center; the Japan International Cooperation sasters CoP won an award as the best “Collab- Agency [JICA]; the International Recovery oration 4 Development” (C4D) CoP. Member Platform [IRP]; and local research and aca- engagement was identified as the leading key demic institutions, such as Tohoku University to success. and Fukushima University), the Government of Japan and the World Bank developed the Learning from Megadisasters CoP. STUDY TOUR IN TOKYO Designed in Phase 1 of the project and AND SENDAI launched in October 2012 (at the World Bank’s annual meeting, held that year in Japan), the Policy makers and practitioners from five tar- CoP provides a virtual classroom environment, geted countries (Indonesia, Kenya, Maldives, allowing participants to register, access reading Sri Lanka, and Uganda) were invited to Japan materials, view presentations offered at video for a study tour designed to help these coun- conferences and webinars, and engage with tries mainstream DRM into their develop- other participants in live discussions as well as ment policies and operations. The tour, held through facilitated e-discussions and blogs. As in Tokyo and Sendai from June 24–27, 2013, of April 2014, the CoP serves as a venue where brought the visitors into contact with Japanese more than 1,000 DRM experts and practitio- organizations, academic institutions, and other ners from 83 countries share views, best prac- key organizations. They visited Sendai City to tices, and documents; make suggestions; and learn about Japanese disaster management engage in discussions, all in furtherance of the systems and absorb the lessons of the Great goal of disseminating the knowledge and les- East Japan Earthquake (GEJE). sons assembled in Phase 1. The delegation first visited the Japan Mete- The ultimate goal of the CoP is to foster a orological Agency, which is responsible for more responsive and effective DRM culture in monitoring earthquakes, tsunamis, and vari- developing countries by sharing best practices ous weather events, and for issuing warnings in DRM (notably from the earthquake and tsu- and alarms. nami of March 11, 2011), building the capac- An international technical workshop on ity of DRM practitioners, promoting DRM as DRM and postdisaster reconstruction was a critical component in development strate- organized by the World Bank, IRP, and JICA, gies and policies, and providing continuous and was held at the Tokyo Development Learn- DRM education (through webinars, discussion ing Center. At the workshop, the delegates forums, and blogs). from Indonesia, Kenya, Maldives, Sri Lanka, The CoP has carefully tested its interac- and Uganda joined Japanese and foreign gov- tion model. Before launching the community, ernment officials and practitioners of DRM. the team piloted it with a selected group of Participants invited from five countries DRM experts to assess the design, understand then traveled to Sendai to visit disaster sites, how to define roles and responsibilities, test including Arahama Elementary School, where the activities, refine the communication strat- the principal at the time of the GEJE explained egy, understand what types of professionals how students evacuated from the school and the community would attract, and learn what were later rescued. The mayor of Sendai City, motivates those professionals to be active Ms. Emiko Okuyama, explained the current members. After launching the community, progress of recovery and remaining challenges 37 : S P R E A D I N G T H E W O R D : R A I S I N G C A PA C I T Y F O R D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T I N D E V E LO P I N G CO U N T R I E S | 3 47 in her city. Sendai will be hosting the UN annual meetings, disaster experts, and other World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction stakeholders to build a global consensus on in 2015. the need to better prepare for disasters around The delegation then moved to Tohoku the world. University for a policy dialogue with academ- The Sendai Dialogue was an occasion to ics specializing in various areas of DRM and express solidarity with the people of Japan reconstruction. They heard presentations on and a unique opportunity to learn from the humanitarian logistics management, ground Japanese experience with DRM. The event motion characteristics and vibration damage, also drew on the experiences of other coun- mechanisms of destruction of coastal levees, tries that have faced large-scale disasters. A geographic information system (GIS) and report prepared by the partners for the event geodesign as a disaster reconstruction plan- argues that the practice of DRM is a defining ning tool, forward creative reconstruction, and characteristic of resilient societies and should medical management of large-scale disasters. therefore be integrated—or mainstreamed— The delegation also visited the Cabinet into all aspects of development. Natural haz- Office in Tokyo to meet with Mr. Yoshitami ards need not turn into disasters, the report Kameoka, Parliamentary Secretary for Disas- urges. By investing in DRM rather than merely ter Management, who stressed the impor- responding to disasters, lives, property, and the tance of international cooperation in DRM to expense of rebuilding can be saved. counter the increasing incidence of extreme A joint statement at the conclusion of the weather events. Sendai Dialogue highlighted that Japanese While in Tokyo, the delegation paid a visit to know-how and expertise should be utilized the MLIT to meet with officials and the tech- to help vulnerable developing countries build nical staff of the Water and Disaster Manage- their resilience to disasters, and that knowl- ment Bureau and the Policy Bureau. The key edge and partnerships should be expanded to message delivered by the Japanese hosts was support DRM policies and programs. It was the importance of taking advance action to then agreed to establish a DRM hub in Japan prevent and mitigate disasters before disaster to facilitate the connection between Japanese strikes so that the impact of disasters can be centers of excellence in government, civil soci- minimized. ety, the private sector, and academia with the The delegation concluded its visit at the international development community, giving MLIT’s Disaster Management Center. special attention to some particularly vulner- able countries. SENDAI POLICY DIALOGUE AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW DRM HUB CONCLUSION Government ministers from around the world The global cost of natural hazards in 2011 alone met in Sendai, Japan, for the Sendai Dialogue was estimated at $380 billion—resources that on October 9 and 10, 2012—a special event on could have been used in productive activities to managing disaster risk co-hosted by the Gov- boost economies, reduce poverty, and raise the ernment of Japan and the World Bank. Part quality of life. No region or country is exempt of the International Monetary Fund–World from natural disasters, and no country can pre- Bank Group annual meetings program, the vent them from occurring. But all can prepare dialogue brought together delegates to the by learning as much as possible about the risks 348 | V I I : R E CO V E RY A N D R E LO C AT I O N and consequences of devastating events and approaches to risk management can reduce by making informed decisions to better man- the loss of human life and avert economic and age both. Disaster management is increasingly financial setbacks. To be maximally effective important as the global economy becomes and to contribute to stability and growth over more interconnected, as environmental condi- the long term, the management of risks from tions shift, and as population densities rise in natural disasters should be mainstreamed into urban areas around the world. As was shown all aspects of development planning in all sec- by the GEJE of March 11, 2011, proactive tors of the economy. 37 : S P R E A D I N G T H E W O R D : R A I S I N G C A PA C I T Y F O R D I S A S T E R R I S K M A N AG E M E N T I N D E V E LO P I N G CO U N T R I E S | 349 Index Boxes, figures, tables, maps, and notes are indicated Building code, 3, 9, 33–35, 37–38, 40, 61, 178, 255, by b, f, t, m, and n following the page number. 346 Building Communities Resilient to Tsunami Act A (2011), 113, 113f ACA (Agency for Cultural Affairs), 324, 325 building performance, 33–42 adolescents. See children and adolescents areas for improvement, 37–38 aerial photographs, 234–236, 237, 239 lessons and recommendations, 38–41 age distribution of casualties, 161–162, 161f seismic design building codes, 9, 33–35, 36–37, Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA), 324, 325 39, 41 aging populations. See elderly populations building permits, 40, 40f agricultural industry, 262–263b, 271–272, 271t Building Research Institute (BRI), 36 airports, 173, 173f, 176 Building Standard Law, 40, 40f Aizu-Misato City, partnership with Naraha City, bullet trains, 10, 12, 36–37, 96, 96f, 176 158 business continuity management (BCM), 84 All311, 239 business continuity plans (BCPs), 83–89 Aomori prefecture, green belt damage in, 118, in APEC region, 85 118m, 119 development of, 84–85, 84f apartments, 196–197 lessons and recommendations, 86, 87b, 88 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), 85 private sector preparedness, importance of, Arahama Elementary School, as evacuation center, 83–84 68, 79–80f, 80 purpose of, 11, 84 Armenia, capacity-building programs in, 346 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 85 C assessment. See risk assessment Canterbury Earthquake (2011), 264–265, 264t automotive industry, 17, 274–276, 274f, 277, 279 capacity-building programs, 345–349 cash-for-work (CFW) programs, 213, 214, 214b, 217, B 218–219 Banda Aceh evacuation center (Indonesia), 41, 41b cash transfers, 214b Bank of Japan, response to GEJE, 86, 87b, 273, 280 casualties base isolation systems, 36, 41, 41n2 age distribution of, 161–162, 161f Basic Act for Reconstruction (2011), 15, 166, 182 children, 161–162, 161f Basic Disaster Management Plan, 72–73, 225 elderly populations, 161, 161f, 301 Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction (GoJ), 182–183, students and teachers, 78, 80, 101b 183b, 188, 286–287, 289 catastrophe bonds, 260b BCM (business continuity management), 84 CBA (cost-benefit analysis), 251–253, 252–253f, BCPs. See business continuity plans 255–256 breakwaters, 8, 26, 28, 28–29f, 29 CBOs (community-based organizations), 65–66, BRI (Building Research Institute), 36 66f, 66t bridges, 36–37, 101b, 172 Central Disaster Management Council, 71–72, 72f, budget for disaster risk management, 249–250, 85, 223–224 250f Central Java Earthquake (2006), 40b, 199, 199b 351 CFW (cash-for-work) programs, 213, 214, 214b, 217, cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 251–253, 252–253f, 218–219 255–256 chain-of-event effects, 301–302, 303 cost-effectiveness of DRM measures, 249–256 children and adolescents. See also education budget for DRM, 249–250, 250f sector; schools cost-benefit analysis, 251–253, 252–253f, casualties among, 161–162, 161f 255–256 counseling services for, 14, 80, 164 dual-purpose infrastructure, 254–255 empowerment of, 166, 166b lessons and recommendations, 255–256 at evacuation centers, 14, 157 nonstructural measures, 254 radiation concerns affecting, 164, 338–339 regulatory impact analysis, 254 “Children Campus” program, 339, 339f structural measures, 251–253, 252–253f Chilean Earthquake Tsunami (1960), 26, 27, 100 counseling services, 14, 80, 164 Chuetsu Earthquake (2004), 96 credit rating, 290, 290f civil society organizations (CSOs) crime in disaster-affected areas, 127, 127t emergency response efforts of, 13, 131 crowd-sourced damage assessments, 237b, 239 recovery and rehabilitation efforts of, 18 CSOs. See civil society organizations relocation efforts of, 312–313, 314 cultural heritage and preservation, 323–329 coastal forests. See green belts damage to properties, 58, 323 coastal projects, cost-benefit analysis of, 252–253, of disaster materials, 328b 253f government initiatives for, 324–325 collaboration. See local government partnerships importance of, 19–20 collective relocation, 186b lessons and recommendations, 327–329 commercial earthquake insurance, 261 measures for preservation, 324–325 communication. See emergency communication; in Miyagi prefecture, 325–327, 326–327b, 327f risk communication NGO initiatives, 325 community-based disaster risk management, cultural property doctors, 325 65–69 cultural property rescue, 324–325 DRM education, role in, 78–79, 81 culture of preparedness, 3 history of, 65–66, 66f, 66t currency markets, 272–273, 273f lessons and recommendations, 68–69 neighborhood associations, 6, 14, 67–68, 162 D recovery and rehabilitation efforts, 18–19, 19f damage information management, 233–240 relocation programs and, 311–312, 311–312f, 314 aerial photographs and, 234–236, 237, 239 roles and responsibilities, 6, 6f, 11 crowd-sourced assessments, 237b, 239 tsunami-warning systems, 91 estimating damages, 227–228, 227t volunteer fire corps, 65, 67, 69, 91 lessons and recommendations, 239 community-based organizations (CBOs), 65–66, online platforms for, 238 66f, 66t post-event collection of data, 234–235 community centers, at transitional shelters, 197, pre-event dissemination of information, 234 197b public-private partnerships in, 235–236 community of practice (CoP), 346–347 satellite images and, 234–235, 235t, 236, 239 community rehabilitation facilitators, 18, 19f, social media and, 238–239 311–312, 311f spatial data preparedness, 237, 237f concentrated communities, 337 tsunami inundation mapping, 236, 236t contamination maps, 337–338, 338f. See also dams, 43, 44 radiation contamination database protection, 20, 152–153 contingent liability, 284, 284t, 292, 293–294, 294n1 deaths. See casualties; solitary deaths controlled risk strategies for relocation, 186b debris and waste management, 203–210 cooperative mutual insurers, 257–258, 258t, challenges of, 15–16 260–261 financial support for, 207 coordination and mobilization of emergency framework for, 205–207, 206f response, 125–132 of hazardous materials, 205 expert teams, 125–128, 126–128f, 126t lessons and recommendations, 205–210, 208t, international aid and assistance, 8, 13, 130 209b lessons and recommendations, 131–132 local government partnerships for, 209–210 NGOs and NPOs, 128–129 personal property and, 206–207 volunteers, 130, 130f separation and recycling, 205–206, 207, 208t CoP (community of practice), 346–347 of tsunami sediment deposits, 204–205 352 | INDEX depot facilities, 143–145, 145f E dike systems early warning. See Earthquake Early Warning damage to, 8–9, 9f, 26b, 28, 43–44, 44f (EEW) system design and construction of, 26, 27m Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) system, 95–96, history of, 25, 26b 95–96f, 301 phased raising of, 31 earthquake insurance, 257–268 rehabilitation of, 45–46, 46f, 47 for agriculture and fisheries, 262–263b disabled populations cooperative mutual insurers, 257–258, 258t, empowerment of, 167 260–261 equity in response and recovery for, 164–165, industrial and commercial, 261 166–167 lessons and recommendations, 265–267 at evacuation centers, 8, 14, 157, 164–165 private nonlife insurers, 257–260, 258t Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (1961), 71–72, reinsurance program, 258, 259–260, 259f, 259t 73, 75, 284, 284t residential, 18, 257–261, 258t disaster management facilities, 49–51, 50–51f, 51t, settlement process, 237, 239, 264, 265, 266 52, 56–57, 56b earthquakes. See also disaster risk management disaster management plans, 71–76 (DRM); specific earthquakes lessons and recommendations, 75–76 damage estimates in event of Tokyo inland local, 73–75, 76 events, 85 structure of, 71–73, 72f historical magnitudes in Japan, 298, 298f disaster mapping, 16 trench-type, 224, 225m disaster materials, collection and preservation of, warning systems for, 10–11, 45, 95–96, 95–96f 328b East Japan Railway Company, 36 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), 127 East Sendai Expressway, 49, 50f, 52b Disaster Relief Act (1947), 10, 284, 284t economic impact, 247–295 disaster relief agreements, 151, 152, 158 on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 271–272, disaster risk management (DRM) 271t capacity-building programs for, 345–349 damage costs, 269–271, 269t, 270b, 271f community of practice for, 346–347 double-debt problem and, 274, 275b economic impact, 247–295. See also economic of DRM measures, 249–256. See also cost- impact effectiveness of DRM measures elements of, 3 earthquake insurance and, 257–268. See also emergency response, 123–168. See also earthquake insurance emergency response on energy supplies, 273 hazard and risk information, 221–246. See also financial and fiscal impact, 283–295. See also hazard and risk information financial and fiscal impact holistic approach to, 5 on global supply chains, 2, 11, 17, 274–280 importance of, 21 on industrial production, 273–274, 274f improvements needed in, 3–4, 7–8 lessons and recommendations, 17–18, 280–281 information and communications strategies in, 7 on tourism industry, 272, 272f for low-probability, high-impact events, education for sustainable development (ESD), 79 297–304 education sector, 77–82. See also schools nonstructural measures, 63–121. See also damage to, 77–78 nonstructural measures DRM education, role in community reconstruction planning, 169–219. See also preparedness, 78–79, 81 reconstruction planning lessons and recommendations, 81–82 recovery and rehabilitation, 305–343. See also response and recovery, role in, 79–81 recovery and rehabilitation student and teacher casualties, 78, 80, 101b structural measures, 23–62. See also structural EEW (Earthquake Early Warning) system, 95–96, measures 95–96f, 301 study tours, 347–348 elderly populations Disaster Victims Support Center, 197 casualties among, 161, 161f, 301 distributed communities, 337 empowerment of, 166–167 DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team), 127 equity in response and recovery for, 164–165, domestic violence, 163 166–167 double-debt problem, 274, 275b at evacuation centers, 8, 14, 157, 164–165 DRM. See disaster risk management electricity services, 12, 173, 177, 178f dual-purpose infrastructure, 49–53, 254–255 INDEX | 353 emergency communication, 133–141 vehicular, 10, 102, 105, 106 lessons and recommendations, 139–140 warning systems, coordination with, 10 marine earth stations, 137 evacuation bridges, 101b radio, 14–15, 14f, 136, 138–139, 139b, 140 evacuation centers, 155–159 reform needs in, 7 children at, 14, 157 satellite, 136, 137 damage to, 56–57 social media, 14–15, 137–138, 137f, 138t, 139, 140 disabled populations at, 8, 14, 157, 164–165 telecommunications, 133–136, 134f, 135m, 136f elderly populations at, 8, 14, 157, 164–165 television broadcasts, 95, 137 gender considerations in, 8, 14, 157, 159, 162–164 very small aperture terminals, 136 lessons and recommendations, 158–159 Emergency Mapping Team (EMT), 238 maternal care in, 163 emergency response, 123–168 newsletters for, 158b communication, 133–141. See also emergency number of, 155–156, 155–156f communication privacy and security concerns in, 162–163, 163f coordination and mobilization, 125–132. See also self-management by evacuees, 13–14, 156–157 coordination and mobilization of emergency supplies and utilities, lack of, 156 response technical guidelines for, 38, 38f, 41, 41b, 111 equity in, 161–168. See also equity in response welfare shelters, 157, 164–165 and recovery evacuation drills, 61, 100–101, 243 evacuation centers, 155–159. See also evacuation evacuation stairways, 51, 51f, 52b, 101b centers expert teams findings and recommendations, 11–15 mobilization of, 125–128, 126–128f, 126t local government partnerships, 149–153. See also relocation, role in, 312–313, 314 local government partnerships expressways. See roads relief goods, 143–148. See also relief goods emergency supplies. See relief goods F emotional care, in transitional shelters, 197 Facebook, 14, 137, 238 employment. See livelihood and job creation females. See gender considerations; women empowerment of marginalized groups, 165–167, FFW (food-for-work) programs, 214b 166b financial and fiscal impact, 283–295 EMT (Emergency Mapping Team), 238 for central government, 284–286, 285t, 286f, energy supplies, 273 287t equity in response and recovery, 161–168 on currency and financial markets, 272–273, 273f for children, 164, 166 debt, dependence on, 290–292 for elderly and disabled populations, 164–165, lessons and recommendations, 292–294 166–167 for local governments, 286–287 gender sensitivity and, 162–164 medium- to long-term financing mechanisms, lessons and recommendations, 167 289–290, 289t, 290f marginalized groups, empowerment of, 165–167, short-term financing mechanisms, 288–289, 166b 288f Ericsson, business continuity plan developed by, sovereign credit rating decline, 290, 290f 84b special tax measures, implementation of, ESD (education for sustainable development), 79 287–288, 288t evacuation, 99–108. See also relocation financial sector, response to GEJE, 86, 87b escape routes, 110–111 Fire and Disaster Management Agency from Fukushima nuclear disaster, 103–105, on emergency response teams, 126 104m, 105f on floodgates and inland lock gates, 30 lessons and recommendations, 105–107 on local disaster management plans, 74 in low-probability, high-impact events, 300–301, on volunteer fire corps, 67 302 firefighting departments, 65, 67, 69, 91, 126 pictographic signs for, 103, 103f fiscal impact. See financial and fiscal impact preparing for, 99–101, 99f fisheries, 262–263b, 271–272, 271t self-evacuation, 78, 102, 243–244, 245, 300, 302 floodgates, 27, 27f, 29–30 timing and patterns of, 102, 102f flooding for tourists and visitors, 103 actual vs. predicted, 230, 230m tsunami evacuation routes for schools, 51, 51f, forecasts and warnings, 46 101b methods for defining risk areas, 229, 229t of rivers, 28, 29m 354 | INDEX Flood Prevention Act (2011), 30 Fukushima University, 336, 338, 339 FM radio communications, 14–15, 14f, 138–139, FURE (Fukushima Future Center for Regional 139b, 140 Revitalization), 336, 337 food-for-work (FFW) programs, 214b forecasts. See warning systems G foreign aid and assistance, 8, 13, 130 garbage. See debris and waste management forestry, 271–272, 271t. See also green belts GCNJ (Global Compact Network Japan), 279 friendship bracelets, 215, 215f GDLN (Global Development Learning Network), Fudai Village, floodgates in, 27, 27f 4, 21n1, 345 Fujitsu, strategies for minimizing supply chain GDMS (Geospatial Disaster Management Mash- disruptions, 278 up Service Study), 238, 238f Fukko Marche, 338, 339f, 340 GEJE. See Great East Japan Earthquake Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. gender considerations. See also women See also Fukushima prefecture; radiation in evacuation centers, 8, 14, 157, 159, 162–164 contamination men’s needs, 164, 164b causes of failure at, 2, 9–10, 58–59, 60f in neighborhood associations, 162 evacuation from, 103, 104m, 104–105, 105f sensitivity in response and recovery, 162–164 location of, 59m in socioeconomic status, 162 recovery process following accident, 20–21, in workload and livelihoods, 163–164 331–343 Geospatial Disaster Management Mash-up Service risk communication following accident, 244 Study (GDMS), 238, 238f Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. See also Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI), radiation contamination 236, 239 damage to, 58–59 Global Compact Network Japan (GCNJ), 279 evacuation from, 103–105, 104m, 105f Global Development Learning Network (GDLN), location of, 59m 4, 21n1, 345 Fukushima Future Center for Regional global supply chains, 2, 11, 17, 274–280 Revitalization (FURE), 336, 337 GoJ. See Government of Japan Fukushima prefecture, 331–343. See also Google Person Finder, 138 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station; Government Investigation Committee on the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station; Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power radiation contamination Station, 10, 60, 103, 106 children, support programs for, 338–339, 339f Government of Japan (GoJ) chronology of policy and planning measures for allocation of expenditures, 285–286, 286f, 287t recovery, 334, 334f debt, dependence on, 290–292 community rehabilitation in, 336–337 legal responsibilities in disaster response, 284, dike systems in, 26 284t, 292 evacuation from, 13, 103–105, 104m, 105f, 156, medium- to long-term financing mechanisms, 156f 289–290, 289t, 290f Fukushima University, support from, 336, 338, short-term financing mechanisms, 288–289, 339 288f government support for recovery in, 334–335, special tax measures implemented by, 287–288, 335t 288t green belt damage in, 118, 118m spending on GEJE, 284–285, 285t hospitals, damage to, 57, 57f government partnerships. See local government lessons and recommendations, 341–342 partnerships livelihood and job recovery in, 212–213, 216, 216f, Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA, 2001), 340–341 252 NGO operations in, 129 Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE, 2011). nuclear accident, impact on population and See also disaster risk management (DRM); communities, 332–334 Tohoku Tsunami public housing in, 318, 319 actual vs. predicted seismic intensity, 225, 227m reconstruction planning in, 184 buildings affected by, 9, 35–37f, 35–38, 35t relocation of residents, 12, 20–21, 331 casualties, 78, 80, 101b, 161–162, 161f, 301 telecommunications damage in, 134, 135m coastal structures affected by, 26–28, 29–30 transitional shelters for, 195, 332 comparison with other events, 33, 34t, 250, 250f, volunteer efforts in, 130, 130f 264–265, 264t zoning regulations in, 335, 335m INDEX | 355 Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE, 2011), (cont.) highways. See roads costs of damage, 269–271, 269t, 270b, 271f Hirono Town, dike systems in, 27, 27f cultural and historical properties damaged by, holistic learning, 241, 241f 19, 58 Homma family storehouse, 326b, 327, 327f devastation caused by, 1, 2t, 33, 34t hospitals, damage to, 57 economic and insured losses, 2, 17, 261, 261f, 264, housing recovery. See transitional shelters 264t humanitarian aid, 8, 13, 214b findings and lessons learned from, 2–8, 3f hydrometeorological disasters, 43–47. See also humanitarian aid and foreign assistance flooding following, 8, 13 landslides, 37–38, 39, 45, 97b industries and facilities affected by, 2, 9–10, 11, lessons and recommendations, 47 55–60, 86, 87b risk following GEJE, 43–44, 44f infrastructure damaged in, 36–37, 171–173 subsidence, 45, 45m Great Hanshin Earthquake. See Kobe Earthquake Hyogo prefecture, collection and preservation of Great Kanto Earthquake (1923), 9, 33, 34t disaster materials in, 328b green belts, 117–121 damage to, 118m, 118–119, 119f I history of, 117–118 Ibasho organization, 166–167 lessons and recommendations, 120–121 ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments maintenance of, 119–120, 120f, 121 and Sites), 329 GSI (Geospatial Information Authority of Japan), IMF (International Monetary Fund), 271, 348 236, 239 Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), 18, 41b, 120, 204 indirect losses, 294n2 H Indonesia Hachinohe City, evacuation center management Banda Aceh evacuation center, 41, 41b in, 157–158 capacity-building programs in, 346 Haiti Earthquake (2010) housing guidelines for, 39, 40b crowd-sourced damage assessment in, 237b local knowledge of tsunami experiences in, 107 social media use during, 140 relocation, regulation of, 115 temporary housing following, 196 industrial earthquake insurance, 261 hakusaseisyou. See green belts industrial production, impact of GEJE on, harassment, sexual, 162–163 273–274, 274f Hashikami Junior High School, as evacuation information management, 20, 152–153 center, 79f, 80 infrastructure. See also public utilities hazard and risk information, 221–246 airports, 173, 173f, 176 assessment of, 223–231. See also risk assessment bridges, 36–37, 101b, 172 damage information management, 233–240. See damage to, 36–37, 171–173 also damage information management evacuation stairways and bridges, 51, 51f, 52b, findings and recommendations, 16 101b limitations of, 3, 7, 16 lessons and recommendations, 52, 177–179 risk communication, 241–246. See also risk multifunctional, 49–53, 254–255 communication ports, 173, 175–176, 176f hazard maps/mapping railway facilities, 172–173, 176 actual vs. predicted inundation, 230, 230m rehabilitation of, 11–12, 171–179, 172f, 174f community participation in, 243, 243f roads, 49–50, 50–51f, 52, 172, 172m, 174–175 examples of, 17m, 229m, 242m service stations and parking areas, 50–51, 51f, guidelines for, 229, 229t 51t, 52 limitations of, 243 inland lock gates, 29–30 for low-probability, high-impact events, 301, 303 insurance. See earthquake insurance purpose of, 16, 228, 242 international aid and assistance, 8, 13, 130 usage patterns, 230, 230f International Council on Monuments and Sites Web portal for, 234, 234m, 243 (ICOMOS), 329 hazardous materials, disposal of, 205 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 271, 348 health and social welfare facilities, 157, 164–165 Ishinomaki City heritage, cultural. See cultural heritage and emergency response in, 131 preservation livelihood and job recovery in, 212 high-impact events. See low-probability, high- public housing in, 320 impact events relocation programs in, 310, 313 tsunami run-up in, 28, 29m 356 | INDEX Iwate prefecture Japan Women’s Network for Disaster breakwaters in, 28, 28f Reconstruction and Gender, 165–166 debris in, 15–16 JER (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Co.), 258, dike systems in, 26, 26b 259, 265–266 evacuation centers destroyed in, 56 JGBs (Japanese government bonds), 289–290, floodgates in, 27 291–292, 291f green belt damage in, 118, 118m JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), hazard map of, 16, 17m 39, 40–41b, 41, 279 hospitals damaged in, 57, 57f jichikai (neighborhood associations), 6, 14, 67–68, livelihood and job recovery in, 216, 216f 162 local disaster management plan for, 74–75 JMA. See Japan Meteorological Agency NGO operations in, 129 job creation. See livelihood and job creation population numbers in, 113 Jokoji Temple, 58, 58f public housing in, 318, 319 JRCS (Japanese Red Cross Society), 128, 129, 130, reconstruction planning in, 184 197 subsidence in, 45 JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces), 126, 126f, 130, telecommunications damage in, 134, 135m 151, 234, 324–325 tsunami monuments in, 100b JSMCWM (Japan Society of Material Cycles and volunteer efforts in, 130, 130f Waste Management), 205 J K JA Kyosai, 257, 258, 260–261, 260b, 264, 265 Kamaishi City Japan. See also disaster risk management (DRM); disaster awareness in, 300 Government of Japan (GoJ); Great East Japan evacuation centers in, 244, 244f Earthquake (GEJE); Tohoku Tsunami; specific hazard map of, 242m cities, municipalities, and prefectures neighborhood associations in, 67–68, 68f building codes in, 9, 33–35 Kamaishi-Higashi Junior High School, DRM business continuity plans in, 85 education at, 78, 78b, 78f coastal geography of, 25, 117 “Kamaishi Miracle,” 5, 11, 78, 78b deaths caused by disasters in, 249, 250f Kamaishi–Yamada Road, 50 exports and domestic production affected by Kanto Earthquake (1923), 212 GEJE, 2, 17 Ka- tyan no Chikara (“power of moms”) project, Learning from Megadisasters project, 340–341 sponsorship of, 2, 4 Kenya, capacity-building programs in, 346 local government structure in, 110 Kesennuma City magnitude of earthquakes in, 298, 298f DRM education in, 78–79 relief goods delivery system in, 143–144, 144f neighborhood associations in, 67, 67f sovereign credit rating of, 290, 290f Kimura family documents, 327, 327b “Japan as One” Work Project, 16, 213–214 Kitakami City, livelihood and job recovery in, 214 Japanese Disaster Relief Act (1947), 194 Kitakami River flooding, 28, 29m Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Co. (JER), 258, Kobe Earthquake (1995) 259, 265–266 building collapses in, 34, 34f Japanese government bonds (JGBs), 289–290, community centers opened following, 197b 291–292, 291f disaster waste from, 203, 204 Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS), 128, 129, 130, emergency response in, 69 197 government spending on, 285 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), lessons learned from, 72, 75, 198 39, 40–41b, 41, 279 reconstruction following, 37, 212 Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) temporary housing following, 14, 200 earthquake-warning system, 10–11, 45, 95–96, kodokushi (solitary death), 198, 200, 212 95f, 301 Kuji Port breakwater project, 253, 254m magnitude calculation by, 92, 98n1 Kyrgyz Republic, capacity-building programs in, tsunami-warning system, 92–95, 92f, 93b, 94m, 346 94f Kyu-Kitakami River flooding, 28, 29m Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), 126, 126f, 130, 151, 234, 324–325 L Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste land banks, 201 Management (JSMCWM), 205 land pooling schemes, 310, 311f landslides, 37–38, 39, 45, 97b INDEX | 357 land-use planning, 18, 110, 112–114, 113f, 185–187, METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), 186b 273–274, 279 large enterprises, business continuity plans MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), among, 85–86 165 laws and regulations MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and for building permits, 40, 40f Communications), 137, 138 for disaster risk management, 3, 71–74 Michi-noeki (road stations), 50–51, 51f, 51t, 52 for land use, 18, 110, 112–113 migrant communities, 20–21, 336–337, 341 for reconstruction, 182–183, 183b, 187–189 migration of residents, 112, 187, 187m, 187f for relocation, 11 Minamisanriku Learning from Megadisasters project, 2, 4, 345, 347 disaster management facilities in, 50–51 level 1 and 2 disasters, 29, 29f, 30–31, 298, 299, 302 evacuation centers in, 157 liquefaction, 9, 36, 37, 37f, 41n1, 46 population decrease in, 187, 187f liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) facilities, 57–58, public housing in, 320 57–58f reconstruction planning in, 184, 184f, 188m, livelihood and job creation, 211–219 188–189 financial support for, 16 relocation programs in, 185, 311–312, 313 gender considerations in, 163–164 shopping villages in, 215, 215f government initiatives for, 213–214 temporary housing in, 198 historical background, 211–212 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), humanitarian assistance in, 214b 273–274, 279 lessons and recommendations, 217–219 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), NGO and private sector initiatives, 214–215, 219 165 out-migration, prevention of, 112 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in radiation-affected areas, 340–341 (MIC), 137, 138 results and challenges, 216–217, 216–217f Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and in transitional shelters, 197–198 Tourism (MLIT) Local Autonomy Act (1947), 16 cost-benefit analyses conducted by, 252, local disaster management plans, 73–75, 76 252–253f local government partnerships, 149–153 emergency response efforts of, 11–12 for debris management, 209–210 on floodgates and inland lock gates, 30 disaster relief agreements, 151, 152, 158 hazard map Web portal, 234, 234m, 243 evolution of, 150–151 on hydrometeorological disasters, 43–44, 45, 46 lessons and recommendations, 152–153 on infrastructure rehabilitation, 174, 175 twinning arrangements, 12–13, 151–152, 151t, 189 on liquefaction, 37 logistics management, in relief goods distribution, on livelihood and job recovery, 213 144, 145–148 regulatory impact analyses conducted by, 254 low-probability, high-impact events, 297–304 road station development, 50 chain-of-event effects of, 301–302, 303 subsidence mapping, 45 evacuation in, 300–301, 302 TEC-FORCE, establishment of, 127 forecasts and warnings for, 301, 303 on tsunami countermeasures, 113 hazard maps for, 301, 303 Miyagi prefecture lessons and recommendations, 302–304 building damage in, 36 national strategies to address, 297–298 cultural heritage and preservation in, 325–327, nonstructural measures for, 299, 302, 303, 304f 326–327b, 327f structural measures for, 298–299, 302, 303, 304f debris in, 16 LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) facilities, 57–58, dike systems in, 26 57–58f green belt damage in, 118, 118m hazard map of, 16, 17m M hospitals damaged in, 57, 57f marine earth stations, 137 livelihood and job recovery in, 216, 216f maternal care, 163 NGO operations in, 129 Maule Earthquake (2010), 264–265, 264t public housing in, 318, 319 medium enterprises, business continuity plans reconstruction planning in, 184, 184f among, 85–86 telecommunications damage in, 134, 135m Meiji-Sanriku Tsunami (1896), 5, 21n2, 26b, 27, tsunami run-up in, 28, 29m 99–100 volunteer efforts in, 130, 130f men, relief and recovery needs of, 164, 164b. See also gender considerations 358 | INDEX Miyako City nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dike systems in, 26b community participation of, 65 hazard map of, 229m historic preservation by, 325 tsunami monuments in, 100b livelihood and job creation by, 214–215 Miyako Road, 50 mobilization of, 128–129 MLIT. See Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, in reconstruction planning, 15 Transport and Tourism nonprofit organizations (NPOs) mobile-phone communications, 133–136, 134f, community participation of, 65 135m, 136f mobilization of, 128–129 mobilization. See coordination and mobilization of nonresidential lands, management, 311 emergency response nonstructural measures, 63–121 moment magnitude, calculation of, 92, 98n1 business continuity plans, 83–89. See also monuments, preservation of, 19 business continuity plans multifunctional infrastructure, 49–53, 254–255 community participation, 65–69. See also multihazard disaster risk management, 6, 6f community-based disaster risk management municipal buildings, relocation of, 12, 12f, 55–56, cost-effectiveness, assessment of, 254 56f, 149–150 disaster management plans, 71–76. See also Muteki Ltd., 260b disaster management plans education sector, 77–82. See also education N sector Nagoya City, partnership with Rikuzentakata City, evacuation, 99–108. See also evacuation 150–151 findings and recommendations, 10–11 Naraha City, partnership with Aizu-Misato City, green belts, 117–121. See also green belts 158 for low-probability, high-impact events, 299, National Government Defrayment Act for 302, 303, 304f Reconstruction of Disaster Stricken Public reconstruction planning, 109–115. See also Facilities (1951), 173–174 reconstruction planning national monuments, preservation of, 19 structural measures, integration with, 5, 10, 25, National Mutual Insurance Federation of 30–31 Agricultural Cooperatives, 257, 258, 260–261, warning systems, 91–98. See also warning 260b, 264, 265 systems National Research Institute for Earth Science and NPOs. See nonprofit organizations Disaster Prevention (NIED), 239 nuclear power stations. See also Fukushima Natori City Daiichi Nuclear Power Station; Fukushima green belt damage in, 119, 119f Daini Nuclear Power Station; radiation relocation programs in, 310 contamination natural disasters. See specific names and types of damage to, 58–60, 59b disasters evacuation preparedness and, 106 Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law (1998), 284, near epicenter, 58, 59m 286 Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters (United O Nations–World Bank), 256 Odagaisama Center, 336, 336f neighborhood associations, 6, 14, 67–68, 162 Ofunato City, public housing in, 320 networked relocation, 198 Ofunato Junior High School, as evacuation center, newsletters for evacuation centers, 158b 157, 157f NGOs. See nongovernmental organizations oil refineries, damage to, 57–58 Nidec-Shimpo Corp., strategies for minimizing Okawa Elementary School, student and teacher supply chain disruptions, 278–279 casualties at, 101b NIED (National Research Institute for Earth Okirai Elementary School, evacuation bridge at, Science and Disaster Prevention), 239 101b Nikkei Index, 272, 273f Omoto Elementary School, evacuation stairway at, Nissan, strategies for minimizing supply chain 51, 51f, 101b disruptions, 278 Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, 59m, 59b Nobiru Consultation Committee for Community OpenStreetMap (OSM), 237–238 Development, 312, 312f Operation Toothcomb, 174–175, 175m, 175f Nokia, business continuity plan developed by, 84b OSM (OpenStreetMap), 237–238 Otsuchi Town, municipal building damage in, 12, 12f, 55–56, 56f, 150, 150f INDEX | 359 P monitoring and communication of risks, 21, parking areas, as bases of operations, 50–51, 51f, 337–338, 338f, 341 51t, 52 resident concerns regarding, 19, 109–110, partnerships. See local government partnerships 332–333 payment and settlement systems, 86, 87b radio communications, 14–15, 14f, 136, 138–139, permits, building, 40, 40f 139b, 140 Philippines, multipurpose infrastructure in, 115 railway facilities, 172–173, 176 Philips microchip plant accident (2000), 84b RC (reinforced concrete) buildings, 33, 35–36, 36f pictographic signs for evacuation, 103, 103f RDC (Reconstruction Design Council), 181, 182 police rescue units, 126–127, 126f Reconstruction Agency, 187–188, 188f, 189, 252 Policy Framework for Tokyo Inland Earthquakes Reconstruction Design Council (RDC), 181, 182 (Central Disaster Management Council), 85 reconstruction planning, 169–219. See also recovery population movements, 112, 187, 187m, 187f and rehabilitation; relocation ports, damage and rehabilitation of, 173, 175–176, challenges of, 109–110 176f debris and waste management, 203–210. See also postdisaster reconstruction. See reconstruction debris and waste management planning; recovery and rehabilitation guidelines and legal framework for, 182–183, power services, 12, 177, 178f 183b, 187–189 PPPs. See public-private partnerships infrastructure rehabilitation, 11–12, 171–179, 172f, pregnancy care, 163 174f preservation of cultural heritage. See cultural land-use and, 18, 110, 112–114, 113f, 185–187, 186b heritage and preservation lessons and recommendations, 15–16, 114–115, private nonlife insurers, 257–260, 258t 189–191 private rental apartments, 196–197 livelihood and job creation, 211–219. See also private sector. See also business continuity plans livelihood and job creation (BCPs) population movements impacting, 112, 187, 187m, financial institutions, response to GEJE, 86, 87b 187f importance of preparedness in, 83–84 at prefectural and municipal levels, 183–184f, livelihood and job creation by, 214–215, 219 183–185 Promoting Seismic Retrofitting of Existing rebuilding schemes, 110–111, 317–320 Buildings Act (1995), 34 stages of, 181–182, 182f public awareness programs, 105–106, 107, 120–121 transitional shelters, 193–202. See also public housing, 19, 197, 309, 318–320f, 318–321 transitional shelters public-private partnerships (PPPs) records, preservation of, 20, 152–153 GSI and aerial survey firms, 235–236 recovery and rehabilitation, 305–343. See also importance for economic growth, 114 reconstruction planning insurance programs, 285 of coastal structures, 45–46, 46f, 47 for job creation, 214, 217 community participation in, 18–19, 19f for temporary housing, 19, 309 coordination mechanisms in, 18–19 public utilities. See also infrastructure cultural heritage and preservation, 323–329. See damage to, 171, 173 also cultural heritage and preservation electricity services, 12, 173, 177, 178f equity in, 161–168. See also equity in response evacuation centers, lack of, 156 and recovery rehabilitation of, 176–177 in Fukushima prefecture, 331–343. See also sewerage systems, 173, 173f, 176, 177b Fukushima prefecture water supply systems, 12, 173, 176, 177f of infrastructure, 11–12, 171–179, 172f, 174f. See public works projects, cost-benefit analysis of, also infrastructure 251–253, 252–253f lessons and recommendations, 18–21, 321–322 “push delivery” systems, 145, 146 public housing, 19, 197, 309, 318–320f, 318–321 relocation, 307–315. See also relocation R self-reconstruction, 19, 318 radiation contamination. See also Fukushima recycling, 205–206, 207, 208t Daiichi Nuclear Power Station; Fukushima Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas programme Daini Nuclear Power Station (UNDP), 342 children, effects on, 164, 338–339 regulations. See laws and regulations evacuation due to, 103–105, 104m, 105f regulatory impact analysis (RIA), 254 land-use regulations and, 110 rehabilitation. See recovery and rehabilitation maps of, 337–338, 338f reinforced concrete (RC) buildings, 33, 35–36, 36f 360 | INDEX reinsurance program, 258, 259–260, 259f, 259t for nuclear accidents, 244, 245 relief goods, 143–148 tools for, 242–245 delivery system for, 143–144, 144f trust and credibility of information providers in, depots for storage of, 143–145, 145f 242, 245 goodwill donations, 146, 146b risk control strategies for relocation, 186b lessons and recommendations, 145–148 risk information. See hazard and risk information logistics management in distribution of, 144, risk separation strategies for relocation, 186b 145–148 roads “push delivery” systems of, 145, 146 damage to, 172, 172m relocation, 307–315. See also evacuation as disaster management facilities, 49–50, 50–51f, building on higher ground, 111–112 52 challenges of implementation, 11, 18, 111, 114, rehabilitation of, 174–175, 175m, 175f 307–308, 314 road stations, as bases of operations, 50–51, 51f, community participation in, 311–312, 311–312f, 51t, 52 314 “roof first” concept, 199, 199b coordination mechanisms in, 313 expert teams and CSOs, role in, 312–313, 314 S government initiatives for, 308–311, 308f sanitation. See debris and waste management in Ishinomaki City, 310 Sanriku Expressway, 49, 50, 51f, 254, 299 land pooling schemes, 310, 311f Sanriku-ni Shigoto-wo Project, 214–215 land-use planning for, 18, 110, 112–114, 113f, Sanriku region, disaster preparedness in, 99–100, 185–187, 186b 100f lessons and recommendations, 314–315 satellite communications, 136, 137 of municipal buildings, 12, 12f, 55–56, 56f, satellite images, 234–235, 235t, 236, 239 149–150 Save the Children, 166, 166b in Natori City, 310 schools. See also education sector nonresidential lands, management of, 311 damage to, 37, 37f, 39, 39f, 77, 77f in Sendai City, 308–309, 309m DRM education in, 11, 78, 78b, 81 strategies for, 185, 186b, 198 response and recovery, role in, 68, 79–80f, 79–81 rental apartments, 196–197 structure and location of, 81 residential earthquake insurance, 18, 257–261, 258t tsunami evacuation routes for, 51, 51f, 101b retaining walls, failure of, 37–38, 37f seacoast works projects, cost-benefit analysis of, RIA (regulatory impact analysis), 254 252–253, 253f Rikuzentakata City Security Support Fund, 215 cultural property rescue in, 324, 324f sediment deposits, 204–205 evacuation centers destroyed in, 57, 57f seismic design building codes, 9, 33–35, 36–37, 39, museum in, 20 41 newsletters for evacuation centers in, 158b self-evacuation, 78, 102, 243–244, 245, 300, 302 partnership with Nagoya City, 150–151 self-reconstruction, 19, 318 sewerage system rehabilitation in, 177b Sendai City subsidence in, 45 airport damage in, 173, 173f, 176 Takatamatsubara forest in, 118b building damage in, 37–38 RINGO radio station, 14, 14f, 139b debris management in, 205, 207, 210 risk assessment, 223–231. See also hazard maps/ dike system damage in, 8–9, 9f mapping evacuation centers in, 13, 158 actual vs. predicted seismic intensity and neighborhood associations in, 68 tsunami height, 225, 227m population increase in, 187 basis for, 223–225, 224–226m, 224b public housing in, 318–319, 318f damage estimates, 227–228, 227t relocation programs in, 308–309, 309m, 313 lessons and recommendations, 230–231 topography in, 244, 244f risk avoidance strategies for relocation, 186b transitional shelters in, 195 risk communication, 241–246. See also hazard Sendai Dialogue event, 348 maps/mapping senior citizens. See elderly populations evacuation drills, 61, 100–101, 243 sensitive facilities, 55–62 framework for, 241–242, 242f cultural properties, 19–20, 58 holistic learning and, 241, 242f disaster management and evacuation facilities, lessons and recommendations, 244–246 56–57 local knowledge and, 243–244 government buildings, 55–56 INDEX | 361 sensitive facilities, (cont.) multifunctional infrastructure, 49–53, 254–255. health and social welfare facilities, 157, 164–165 See also infrastructure lessons and recommendations, 60–61 nonstructural measures, integration with, 5, 10, nuclear power stations, 58–60, 59b 25, 30–31 oil refineries, 57–58 sensitive facilities, protection of, 55–62. See also separate relocation, 185, 186b sensitive facilities service stations, as bases of operations, 50–51, 51f, for tsunamis, 25–32. See also tsunamis 51t, 52 students. See education sector; schools settlement systems, 86, 87b study tours, 347–348 Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd., business continuity subsidence, 45, 45m plan developed by, 86 supplies. See relief goods sewerage systems, 173, 173f, 176, 177b supply chain networks, 2, 11, 17, 274–280 sexual harassment, 162–163 support systems, in transitional shelters, 197–198 shelters. See evacuation centers Suzuki Kogyo Co., business continuity plan Shichigahama, public housing in, 320–321 developed by, 86 Shinkansen (bullet trains), 10, 12, 36–37, 96, 96f, 176 syobo-dan (volunteer fire corps), 65, 67, 69, 91 Shiryo Networks, 325, 326–327, 327b Shishiori Elementary School, rebuilding of, 79–80f, T 80 Takatamatsubara forest, 118b shopping villages, 215, 215f tamaki (friendship bracelets), 215, 215f short message service (SMS) alerts, 95 Taro Showa Sanriku Tsunami (1933), 26, 26b, 27, 100 destruction of, 112 Sichuan Earthquake (2008), 203–204 dike systems in, 26b Sierra Leone, capacity-building programs in, 346 teachers. See education sector; schools Single Father Japan organization, 164b Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC- sister clusters of firms, 280 FORCE), 127–128, 127–128f skyscrapers, technical guidelines for, 38 telecommunications, 133–136, 134f, 135m, 136f small and medium enterprises (SMEs), business television broadcasts, 95, 137 continuity plans among, 85–86 temporary housing, 195–196, 195–196f, 198–199, SMS (short message service) alerts, 95 198–199f social media temporary towns, 20–21, 336–337, 341 for damage information management, 238–239 tendenko (self-evacuation), 78, 102, 243–244, 245, function of, 14–15 300, 302 government use of, 139 TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company), 332 reliability of, 138, 140 Thailand, flood impacting supply chains in, 276, responder use of, 137, 137f 277–278 types of applications used in disaster, 137, 138t Tohoku Tsunami (2011). See also disaster risk social welfare facilities, 157, 164–165 management (DRM); Great East Japan solitary deaths, 198, 200, 212 Earthquake (GEJE) sovereign credit rating, 290, 290f actual vs. predicted tsunami height, 225, 227m spatial data preparedness, 237, 237f buildings affected by, 35–36, 35–36f Special Zones for Reconstruction, 188–189 coastal structures affected by, 8–9, 9f, 26b, 28, Sri Lanka 43–44, 44f capacity-building programs in, 346 map of affected areas, 1, 1m community-based warning systems in, 97b, 342 Tokachi-oki Earthquake (1968), 33 relocation, regulation of, 115 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 332 structural measures, 23–62 Tokyo inland earthquakes, damage estimates in building performance, 33–42. See also building event of, 85 performance Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), 272 cost-effectiveness, assessment of, 251–253, Toni Elementary School, rebuilding of, 79–80f, 252–253f 80 findings and recommendations, 8–10 Tono City, as base for relief activities, 151 for hydrometeorological disasters, 43–47. See Touni-hongo village, relocation of, 111–112, 114 also hydrometeorological disasters tourism industry, 272, 272f investments in, 3 tourists, evacuation measures for, 103 for low-probability, high-impact events, trade-off relations, 276, 276f 298–299, 302, 303, 304f trains, bullet, 10, 12, 36–37, 96, 96f, 176 362 | INDEX transitional shelters, 193–202. See also evacuation United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), centers 209b advantages and disadvantages of, 200, 200t United States, aid and assistance from, 130 community building and emotional care in, 197, Unosumai Elementary School, DRM education at, 197b 78, 78b, 78f evolution of, 198–199 urban planning, 18, 110, 112–114, 113f, 185–187, 186b framework for, 194 Ushahidi, 238m, 238–239 lessons and recommendations, 14, 199–201 utilities. See public utilities livelihood support in, 197–198 private rental apartments, 196–197 V public housing, 19, 197, 309, 318–320f, 318–321 vehicular evacuations, 10, 102, 105, 106 “roof first” concept for, 199, 199b very small aperture terminals (VSATs), 136 support systems in, 197–198 violence, domestic, 163 temporary housing, 195–196, 195–196f, 198–199, visitors, evacuation measures for, 103 198–199f voice messaging services, 135–136, 136f transportation needs in, 197 volunteers types and characteristics of, 194–197, 194f, 195m fire corps, 65, 67, 69, 91 transportation needs, in transitional shelters, 197 mobilization of, 130, 130f trash. See debris and waste management VSATs (very small aperture terminals), 136 trench-type earthquakes, 224, 225m TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange), 272 W Tsunami and Storm Surge Hazard Map Guidelines Wakabayashi ward, neighborhood associations in, (GoJ), 229 68, 69f tsunamis, 25–32. See also dike systems; disaster warning systems, 91–98 risk management (DRM); specific tsunamis for earthquakes, 10–11, 45, 95–96, 95–96f breakwaters for, 8, 26, 28, 28–29f, 29 evacuation, coordination with, 10 comparison of damage from, 250, 250f for landslides, 97b dams for, 43, 44 lessons and recommendations, 96–97 evacuation routes for schools, 51, 51f, 101b for low-probability, high-impact events, 301, 303 floodgates for, 27, 27f, 29–30 short message service alerts, 95 inland lock gates for, 29–30 on television, 95, 137 lessons and recommendations, 30–31 for tsunamis, 91–95, 92f, 93b, 94m, 94f sediment deposits from, 204–205 waste management. See debris and waste simulations of, 185, 185m, 185f, 229 management two-level categorization of, 29, 29f, 30–31, 31n1, water supply systems, 12, 173, 176, 177f 299, 302 welfare shelters, 157, 164–165 warning systems for, 91–95, 92f, 93b, 94m, 94f women. See also gender considerations Turkey, cultural heritage and preservation in, 328 on disaster prevention councils, 165 twinning arrangements, 12–13, 151–152, 151t, 189 empowerment of, 165–166 Twitter, 14, 137, 238 maternal care for, 163 privacy and security concerns of, 162–163 U socioeconomic status of, 162 Uganda, capacity-building programs in, 346 workload and livelihood concerns, 163–164 UKG (Union of Kansai Governments), 151–152 World Bank UNDP (United Nations Development capacity-building programs, 345, 346 Programme), 342, 346 community of practice, formation of, 346–347 unemployment. See livelihood and job creation Learning from Megadisasters project, UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), sponsorship of, 2, 4 209b Sendai Dialogue event, 348 UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), 166 World Travel and Tourism Council (WTCC), 272 Union of Kansai Governments (UKG), 151–152 WTCC (World Travel and Tourism Council), 272 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 166 United Nations Development Programme Y (UNDP), 342, 346 Yoshihama village, relocation of, 111, 114 INDEX | 363 ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits Statement The World Bank is committed to preserving endan- Saved: gered forests and natural resources. 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