



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P120960	<b>Project Name</b> BF Donsin Transport Infrastructure Proj	
<b>Country</b> Burkina Faso	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Transport	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-52510	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 30-Jun-2018	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 80,887,030.24
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 16-May-2013	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 30-Apr-2019	
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	85,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	85,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	80,887,030.24	0.00

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The project development objective (PDO) in the Financing Agreement (page 4) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 4) was "to improve road access to the Donsin area to facilitate its development as a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou."

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?



No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

**Component A – Upgrading and construction of road infrastructure to connect Ouagadougou to the Donsin area** (appraisal estimate US\$ 78.3 million; actual cost US\$ 69.3 million). The project financed the following activities (note sub-component estimates are appraisal estimates):

- Upgrading of NR3 from Ouagadougou to Loumbila, 17.5 km. (US\$ 38.0 million);
- Construction of a new 24.3 km two-lane paved link road, with two additional paved lanes for two-wheeled vehicles, from the Loumbila NR3 junction to the Nionogo NR22 junction. This was intended to form a link road connecting NR3 and NR22 while at the same time connecting the Donsin area to Ouagadougou (US\$ 33.0 million);
- Rehabilitation/spot improvement of about 40 km of unpaved rural roads in the Donsin area (US\$ 3.0 million);
- Consulting services to supervise the road infrastructure works (US\$ 3.3 million); and
- Implementation of the Environment and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for the planned road infrastructure works (US\$ 1.00 million).

**Component B – Technical Assistance to the Donsin Airport Project Management Entity (Maitrise d'Ouvrage de l'Aéroport de Donsin - MOAD) and for project management** (appraisal estimate US\$ 6.7 million; actual cost US\$ 6.1 million). The component supported the following activities:

- Consulting services to assist MOAD develop and put in place a public private partnership (PPP) framework to operate the existing and future Ouagadougou-Donsin international airports (US\$ 1.2 million);
- Technical assistance to strengthen MOAD capacity to manage the project (US\$1.08 million);
- Technical studies (US\$ 0.58 million);
- Acquisition of goods and equipment (about US\$ 1.80 million);
- Training and capacity building in project management (about US\$ 0.50 million);
- Operating costs (about US \$1.25 million); and
- Technical and financial audits (US\$ 0.29 million).



**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** The total project cost was estimated at appraisal at US\$ 85 million. At closure the amount disbursed was US\$ 80.88 million and US\$ 4.12 million was cancelled. Because of the impact of the exchange rate deterioration between the CFA franc and the US\$, the actual equivalent was US\$ 75.49 million as indicated in section (d) above.

**Financing:** The project was financed by a Credit to the value of US\$ 85 million (IDA-52510).

**Borrower Contribution:** There was no Borrower contribution.

**Dates:** The project was originally intended to close on June 30, 2018. It was extended by 10 months to April 30, 2019 in order to complete the civil works. This was necessary as the initial contractor failed to complete the works and left the country. A new contract was agreed with a different contractor to finish the works. At the same time, the extension allowed the client to continue the dialogue with a private operator for the airport concession.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

##### *Development Context:*

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa, which at appraisal had a predominantly rural population of 16.5 million. It ranked at appraisal 183rd out of 187 countries covered by the United Nations Development Program Human Development Index and had a poverty rate of 46%. Its main exports are cotton and gold and it is highly vulnerable to weather conditions and commodity price fluctuations. A deterioration in the regional security situation in 2016 had negative repercussions on Burkina Faso, threatening peace and long-term stability. The World Bank Group 2017 Systematic Country Diagnosis suggested that top priorities were improving natural resource management, promoting skills development and reducing the gender bias against women.

##### *Transport Context:*

Over the previous two decades, Burkina Faso invested significantly in its transport infrastructure network. The Government of Burkina Faso's (GOBF) Transport Sector Development Strategy (TSDS), 2011-2025, was developed after extensive consultations with stakeholders and development partners and focused on the long-term development of road transport infrastructure to improve both inter and intra-regional connectivity. The total road network of Burkina Faso at appraisal was about 61,000 km, of which 3,100 km were paved. Burkina Faso had one of the lowest road densities in West Africa and a Rural Access Index (RAI) of only about 25 percent compared to the average RAI for Sub-Saharan of 34 percent. Since the creation of a Road Fund in 2007, 70 percent of available funds have been used to maintain the classified road network.

The main air transport development priority for the 2011-2016 Priority Investment Program drawn from the TSDS, was the decommissioning of the existing airport at Ouagadougou and the development of a new



airport near Donsin to replace the current one, which though close to the city was inconsistent with the recommended standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). GOBF identified a site approximately 35 km north of Ouagadougou in the Donsin area to build the new airport, which would handle the long-term air transport needs for the whole country and which had advantages in terms of environmental aspects, safety, and urban decentralization. To develop the proposed airport at Donsin, GOBF planned to create a public-private company. The main purpose of this company was to operate the existing Ouagadougou airport until the new airport at Donsin became fully operational; to fund part of the investments required to construct the new airport; and operate the new airport at Donsin (*Evaluation of the Proposed Ouagadougou-Donsin Airport Development, Mott MacDonald for World Bank Group, 2010*).

The project as appraised was aligned with the objectives of the 2010-2012 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). Specifically, the project supported two strategic themes - to minimize economic vulnerability and promote growth through economic transformation, accelerated diversification and increased exports; as well as improved access to regional and international markets. When the project closed, it was aligned to the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the period 2018-2023, in which objective 1.3 “*improve connectivity for better access to markets*” was strengthened given that urban mobility and linkages with rural hinterlands were improved. The increased connectivity was also intended to benefit the rural population of this area in their daily movements and the project included provision of some socio-economic infrastructure such as school rehabilitation, provision of solar panels and water supply equipment.

The overall project was designed to support the development of the Donsin area through improved road infrastructure and selection of a private operator for the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport. The road infrastructure to support the proposed project was selected not only to connect the new airport to the capital city Ouagadougou, but also to connect villages in the Donsin area and to maximize benefits to people living in the northern part of Ouagadougou, north-eastern and northwestern Burkina Faso as well as neighboring Niger by establishing a transport hub. Thus, the relevance of objectives is rated substantial.

## Rating

Substantial

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### OBJECTIVE 1

#### Objective

To improve road access to the Donsin area to facilitate its development as a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou

#### Rationale

The **Theory of Change** for the project was to improve road access to the Donsin area together with technical assistance to select a private operator for the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport to facilitate the development of a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou. This is underlined by the PAD (page



4), which states that the PDO was to be achieved by (a) improving road infrastructure to better connect Ouagadougou to the Donsin area; and (b) providing the MOAD (Donsin Airport Project Management Entity) with technical assistance to select a private operator for the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport. The inclusion of “selection of a private operator” as a PDO indicator implies that this was an integral part of facilitating the development of a transport hub for Ouagadougou.

## Outputs

The outputs in respect of road access to the Donsin areas were as follows:

- Non-rural roads constructed in the project impact area: Baseline 0.0 km; target 24.3 km; actual 24.3 km. *Target achieved.*
- Non-rural roads rehabilitated: Baseline 0.0km; target 17.5 km; actual 17.2 km. *Target nearly achieved.*
- Unpaved rural roads rehabilitated/spot improvements in the project impact area: Baseline 0.0 km; target 40.0 km; actual 42.5 km. *Target exceeded.*
- Average daily traffic increase on the new link road connecting NR3 to NR22: Baseline 400; target 530; actual 641. Target exceeded - the traffic on the new section increased more than expected.
- Average daily traffic increase on the NR3: Baseline 2,375; target 3,560, actual 4,383. *Target exceeded* - the traffic increased more than expected.

Outputs with respect to Technical Assistance to MOAD and for project management were:

- Consulting services were undertaken to supervise the road infrastructure works, and implement the ESIA, ESMP and RAP.
- Legal and financial documents were completed for selection of a private partner to operate the existing and future Ouagadougou-Donsin international airports.
- Planned technical studies were completed.

## Outcomes

Indicators relating to access to the Donsin area were as follows:

- Travel time between the village of Loubila and the Kossodo traffic circle in Ouagadougou. Baseline 23 minutes; target 14 minutes; actual 15 minutes. *Target nearly achieved.*
- Travel time between the village of Donsin and the Kossodo traffic circle in Ouagadougou. Baseline 50 minutes; target 25 minutes; actual 25 minutes. *Target achieved.*



- Share of the rural population with access to an all-season road. Baseline 22.3%; target 33.3%; actual 34.3%. Target achieved

**Selection of private operator**

At project completion, validation of the negotiation for the selection of a private partner to exploit the current and future Ouagadougou international airport had not been achieved. No agreement for the selection of a concessionaire had been signed and discussions with potential investors were still ongoing. (ICR para 31). An update from the TTL (via email dated February 3) confirms that the status remains broadly the same.

While outcomes relating to road access to the Donsin area have been substantially achieved, there is little overall movement towards facilitating the development of a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou. Several months beyond project completion, there is no tangible evidence of progress in the selection of a private operator for developing the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport. Taking all these aspects into consideration, efficacy for the PDO is rated *modest*.

**Rating**  
Modest

**OVERALL EFFICACY**

**Rationale**

As stated above, while road access to Donsin area was improved, there is no tangible evidence of progress in the selection of a private operator for developing the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport, and therefore low overall progress towards facilitating the development of a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou. Overall objective, efficacy is rated modest.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**  
Modest

**Primary Reason**  
Low achievement

**5. Efficiency**

*Economic Efficiency:*

The ex-ante economic analysis for the RN3 improvement was conducted by the MOAD as part of the technical feasibility studies. This analysis showed an economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 14.3% based mostly on traffic forecasting and construction cost estimates using the HDM4-economic model.

Even with a higher investment cost of 10% and the new airport construction delayed, the ex post EIRR of the project was estimated at 15.3%, compared to 14.3% at appraisal. This result was significant because the economic analysis was robust even without a new airport in place or even if the construction was delayed for



many years. However, the question of whether this would have been the highest road improvement priority in the absence of the new airport is moot.

*Operational and administrative efficiency.*

A 10 month extension of project duration was necessary to complete the civil works as the initial contractor failed to complete the works and abandoned the construction site with 96 percent of the works completed. Project management according to the ICR (page 13) was in general inefficient, with poor oversight of contract execution and advancement, with significant delays in addressing contract amendments, including those concerning extensions. The delays in relation to contract management issues led to the expiration of the execution guarantee and inability of the initial contractor to renew it. This failure, in addition to poor performance of the contractor and final abandonment of the works site led to the contract cancellation and the appointment of another contractor to complete the works.

**Efficiency Rating**

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	14.30	92.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	15.30	92.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

**6. Outcome**

Relevance of project objectives is rated substantial. Regarding the overall objective, while road access to the Donsin area was improved, there has been little tangible progress towards selecting a private operator for developing the existing and future Ouagadougou international airport, and therefore low overall progress towards facilitating the development of a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou. Efficiency was modest due to delays from the poor performance of the initial contractor for roads construction and rehabilitation. Overall, the project development outcome is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

**a. Outcome Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

**7. Risk to Development Outcome**



The main risk relates to concluding a concession agreement with a private operator for the Ougadougou and Donsin airports. This is particularly important because if the new airport is not built any time soon it is highly probable that it will lose some of its political appeal.

The other risk relates to the adequate maintenance of the roads constructed through project financing. For this, the newly constructed main road should be transferred from MOAD to the Ministry of Infrastructure in order to be classified and maintained during its life-cycle. The transfer process has been initiated by MOAD taking into account that the contractor gave a one-year guarantee following project completion. The transfer arrangement was expected to be finalized by March 2020. The Bank team informed MOAD of the priority of this transfer in order to ensure the road was maintained adequately.

The project preparation anticipated the need for routine maintenance for rural and non-rural roads, suggesting the use of a multi-annual contract for road maintenance. However, at the closure of the project, there was no formal agreement regarding such maintenance in place for these roads.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

Technical design and economic appraisal were prepared in a satisfactory manner. The fiduciary and safeguards instruments were also addressed although not satisfactorily detailed in the ICR.

Risks identified and assessed during project preparation, included (a) the limited experience of MOAD in implementing a World Bank-funded project; (b) delays and possible cost overruns of civil works; (c) delays or failure in the airport concession process; (d) complexity in coordinating several development partners supporting GOBF in transforming the Donsin area; and (e) delays or inadequate implementation of social and environmental mitigation measures. Mitigation measures were prepared and included in the legal covenants. It was not clear that MOAD was the best choice as the implementing agency, since the PIU was staffed based on its experience and responsibility for the proposed new airport project rather than a roads project.

### Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

### b. Quality of supervision

The project team conducted regular missions during project implementation to supervise the project activities and raised issues regarding potential sources of delays and problems, in particular the construction company involved in the rehabilitation of the RN3. Experienced TTLs supervised the project and the project team remained relatively unchanged for most of the project duration.



The project implementation suffered from client's poor contract management performance and the road works were delayed, with the main contractor for the road construction and rehabilitation underperforming. This situation required a project extension of 10 months because of the failure of the contractor, which created a considerable risk for project completion. The project team clarified that during supervision, significant effort was deployed by the Bank team to overcome this issue. The Bank provided guidance and the contract was cancelled and a new contractor was rapidly recruited to complete the works.

At mid-term review (December 2016), the implementation progress was marginally satisfactory, and some activities were behind schedule. After the mid-term review, the implementation progress of the most important activities (rehabilitation of RN3 and construction of the new road) regressed substantially and the Bank's ISR#10 pointed out different options including contract termination, (although this was only implemented by MOAD as a last resort in November 2018).

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The indicator "selection of a private operator for the new airport)" was inadequate to measure the development of the Donsin area as a transport hub and was more related to the higher-level objective of the Government (i.e. construction of a new airport at Donsin) through improving government capacity to deal with PPPs. The selection of a private sector operator was, moreover, ambiguous as this vague wording did not define the condition accurately. It could have meant a loose agreement or the signing of a concession agreement for the new airport.

Although not indicated in the PAD, two PDO indicators related to Component A (decreased travel time and the share of the rural population with access to an all-season road) and both contributed to measuring improved access to the Donsin area.

### **b. M&E Implementation**

Data collection for component A indicators was relatively easy to carry out, and was implemented in a timely manner. During project implementation, the definition of indicators (in French) was clarified to allow for a better understanding and collection of results.

### **c. M&E Utilization**



The M&E framework could have been utilized in a more extensive way, focusing on the achievement of component A, and should have guided the implementing agency in its decision making (e.g. termination of contractor's contract for instance).

## **M&E Quality Rating**

Modest

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project was category A, triggering three safeguard policies: OP/BP 4.01 (environmental assessment), OP/BP 4.11 (physical cultural resources) and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary resettlement). ESIA, ESMP and RAP documents were prepared, reviewed, approved and disclosed publicly. Mitigation measures were implemented and regularly reported by the project implementation unit. According to the ICR (page 17) for Component A the final review approved the dismantling of the construction sites (management of oils, solid waste and other pollutants) and the transfer of responsibility to the country's Environmental Agency.

According to the appraisal report there were 20 tombs and two sacred tree patches to be relocated under physical cultural resources. The ICR does not give specific details about this, but the TTL confirmed the matter was addressed. The recruitment of an NGO to assist in the implementation of environmental and social safeguards (sanitation, infrastructure management, conflict management, etc.) and monitoring/control of the implementation of measures by the National Bureau of Environmental Assessments (BUNEE) was carried out and performed its intended services appropriately, including training in environmental monitoring of projects and development programs for the benefit of MOAD and the BUNEE.

In terms of social safeguards, the project's civil works involved land acquisition, involuntary resettlement, an influx of workers from outside the area, and other social risks. The RAP for the connector roads and rural roads under the project was completed, and Project Affected Persons were resettled and compensated accordingly. However, the process of delivering property titles has not been fully achieved and the Bank team was continuing to monitor the situation after project closure. Overall, about 942 households living in the future airport vicinity and 20 others in the right of way of the access roads were compensated. All the claims and complaints were handled, and the Bank is not aware of any outstanding complaints at the time of project closing, (except for the entitlement process).

The resettlement and compensation claims of people impacted by the proposed airport were all completed except for the property entitlement process that is still underway. Since the future airport is not financed under this project, the Bank advised the Government to implement a separate RAP for its construction. A side impact was the rise in land prices in the vicinity of the proposed new airport area. MOAD informed the ICR mission that all complaints have been cleared, including those linked to land for agriculture for project affected persons. According to the appraisal report, there were 61 hectares of farmland involved and 327 mobile street vendor kiosks with potential claims to be addressed but details were not provided in the ICR. However, there was a statement to the effect that the implementation



of safeguards was considered to have been satisfactorily handled and the TTL confirmed that the street vendors did receive compensation.

**b. Fiduciary Compliance**

Due to an apparent oversight, this section appears not to have been completed in the ICR. There is no discussion of the financial management arrangements such as how they were supervised, the quality of financial monitoring reports, the delivery and auditing of financial statements. Similarly, the quality of the procurement activities has not been addressed, although under efficiency there is mention of the low efficiency of procurement and contract management. Under lessons, there is a statement to the effect that better due diligence of the procurement cycle could have helped avoid this situation.

The TTL acknowledged that these matters should have been addressed in the ICR. The financial management was rated satisfactory throughout project implementation. All the financial management reports were produced on time and were validated without reservation by the external auditors.

Project procurement was rated moderately satisfactory for the duration of the project. Slow procurement initially was due to a lack of management capacity. Some procurement training did take place and additional specialists were hired to strengthen the procurement department. A "double review" of bid evaluations and approvals was identified as unnecessary. The Ministry of Finance issued a directive that any procurement document reviewed by the Bank did not need to be further reviewed by the client.

**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

The improved connectivity and accessibility of the project area as well as the prospect of a new airport development has led to an increase in local land values.

**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Relevance of project objectives is rated substantial. Regarding the overall objective, while road access to the Donsin area was improved, there has been little tangible progress towards selecting a private operator for developing the existing and



future Ouagadougou international airport, and therefore low overall progress towards facilitating the development of a transport hub for greater Ouagadougou. Efficiency was modest due to delays from the poor performance of the initial contractor for roads construction and rehabilitation. Overall, outcome is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial

## 12. Lessons

The following lessons and a recommendation were adapted from the ICR:

**A better formulation of the PDO would have allowed a more realistic assessment of what the project was expected to achieve vis-a-vis the government’s vision (the new international airport outside Ouagadougou).** The Bank recognized the risks of the airport development being delayed or cancelled and helped formulate a PDO that emphasized the road connectivity and accessibility as a standalone project that could be justified on its merits. The technical assistance provided support to the Government to improve its capacity regarding PPPs.

**Strong due diligence to identify potential risks and close supervision of the procurement cycle are essential to avoid contract management challenges and project delays.** This lesson is consistent with many similar cases experienced by IEG.

**It is recommended that the Government of Burkina Faso transfers the new road from MOAD (the Donsin Airport Project Management Entity) to the Ministry of Infrastructure as soon as possible to ensure it receives appropriate life cycle maintenance.** In the event that the construction of the new airport is delayed or cancelled, this road should still be able to function effectively. The Bank has experienced in the past many similar situations in Sub-Saharan Africa where, after rehabilitating or constructing new roads, the maintenance has been neglected and the infrastructure deteriorated quickly.

## 13. Assessment Recommended?



No

#### **14. Comments on Quality of ICR**

The ICR was fairly concise but still exceeded the recommended length of 15 pages. It was unnecessary to divide the objectives into two. For review purposes it would also have been helpful to have included more details on the physical cultural resources addressed and the actions taken regarding the compensation of the roadside vendors. A more serious omission was the section on fiduciary issues. Due to an apparent oversight, this section appears not to have been completed in the ICR. There was no discussion of the financial management arrangements such as how they were supervised, compliance with financial covenants, the quality of financial monitoring reports or the delivery and auditing of financial statements. Similarly, the quality of the procurement activities had not been addressed, and the extent to which Bank procurement guidelines were followed, given that there were some problems in this area.

This missing information was, however, provided by the TTL and hence the final rating for the quality of the ICR was upgraded to substantial. Under the section on lessons and recommendations there was some good material. However, unfortunately the ICR text was written in the form of findings rather than lessons or recommendations.

**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial