76603


           Cofinanced Public Extension
                  in Nicaragua


                   Gabriel Keynan • Manuel Olln • Ariel Dinar

 How effective is agricultural extension? Is it worth the vast sums governments spend
 to provide it, mostly as a free service, to farmers worldwide? Relatively Jew studies
 exist that measure and compare the benefits of extension activities against their costs.
In the absence of such data, this pilot activity concentrated instead on demand
 'Would demand far extension services be high if they were no longer free? The exis-
 tence of solid demand would presuppose some benefits from the service. Further,
 might chargingfarthe service actually improve its quality and sustainability?
     The pilot program in Nicaragua described here set out to test whether a truly
 demand-driven extension system aimed at farmers with small- and medium-size
 holdings could be developed The principal mechanism was a contribution by the
fanner paid as a bonus to the extensionist: the aim was to introduce incentives for
providers to improve the service through rewards linked to the quality oftheir work
and to establish direct accountability ofextensionist to client. The outcomes showed
 that the cofinancing concept can be successful The article describes the design, imple-
 mentation, and results in the expectation that the lessons learned may be ofinterest
elsewhere.



Governments have spent large sums providing agricultural extension as a free
service to farmers—some US$6 billion worldwide in 1988 alone, according to
estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization (1990). Is expenditure
on that scale justified by commensurate benefits?
   Evidence does exist that extension has increased productivity and income
(Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder 1991; Bindlish and Evenson 1993; Bindlish,
Evenson, and Gbetibouo 1993), but it is not dear diat die investigated cases are
typical. Evaluation of die cost-benefit relationships has been surprisingly thin.
As Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder (1991, p. 643) observe: "Given diat an
extension organization exists in almost every country and in view of die large
volumes of public funds directed to extension, diere is scope for much more
Tie WerU Btnk Raatnh Oherver, POL 12, no. 2 (August 1997). pp. 225-47
O 1997 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK    HI
empirical work on this issue." In the same vein, Purcell (1994, p. 10) notes (of
World Bank—financed projects) diat "quantification of the impact of extension
investments in economic terms is normally not undertaken in either ex-ante or
ex-post analysis."
     In the absence of data, unsatisfactory results are frequently assumed: °.. . die
poor performance of many public extension programs..." (Umali 1996, p. 2),
and "the public sector extension services in which developing countries often at
the behest of donors have invested large sums are achieving only limited im-
pact . . . " (Farrington 1994, p. 1). Nonetheless, diere is a common conviction
dial, whether universally successful or not, extension is the only means avail-
ableforincreasing production "given the limits on land and irrigation and likely
breakthroughs in technology, future increases are apt to . . . come from techno-
logical improvements derived from identifying, developing and applying more
efficient practices" (Antholt 1994, p. 4).
     Anodier way of deducing the value of extension services would be to find out
whether farmers have expressed demand for them. Pressure from interest groups
in the form of petitions or strikes when die service has been discontinued would
be a fair indicator of demand (Guttman 1980; Rose-Ackerman and Evenson
 1985). It is instructive, for example, diat no strike took place in Nicaragua in
December 1995 when die government announced a substantial cut in public
expenditures that would affect the extension budget, whereas the concurrent
announcement of a corresponding cut in financial support to universities was
met widi a very violent strike.
     The farmers' lack of reaction suggests limited interest, even apathy toward
the service and obviously dierefore calls into question its impact on farmers'
economic condition. Because failure to react to removal or reduction of exten-
sion is common to most extension services in die developing world, it is likely
that die services provided often leave farmers' indifferent to diem.
     An extension service should be designed to make the outcome of its actions
advantageous to both the farmer and the extension institution. Without a stake
in die outcome, the extensionist will make litde effort: "The amount of effort
. . . depends on the value of a reward and the probability of receiving die re-
ward. The perceived effort and probability of actually getting a reward are, in
turn, also influenced by the record of actual performance" according to die
Porter and Lawler model of motivation (Koontz and Weihrich 1990, p. 326).
    Accountability, which Kessides (1993, p. 17) defines as "die ability of service
providers to serve die interests of users and odier financiers," also needs to be
built into the design of the service. "Competitive markets meet this criterion of
accountability in diat the profit-oriented suppliers have an incentive to satisfy
the demands of dieir customers" (Kessides 1993, p. 17). In standard extension
organizations, diese incentives are lacking. Data on performance are rarely col-

1*6                                   The WorUBtnk Research Observer. voL 12. IU. 2 (August 1997)
lected, so potential reward cannot be related to any record of performance, and
public institutions in any case rarely offer performance-based incentives to their
employees. Consequendy, little effort is likely to be expended toward satisfying
clients' needs.
   This article describes die methodology applied in establishing and delivering a
demand-<lriven, accountable, and possibly sustainable extension system. A pilot
activity to test the system was carried out in Nicaragua in 1995 in the context of die
Agricultural Technology and Land Management Project (ATLMP),financedby die
World Bank and the Swiss government. The intention of die project was to make
the extensionist accountable to the client through incentives directly related to me
client's satisfaction with die service. A key mechanism is me client's power to influ-
ence die quality of the service through "exit" and "voice" (Hirschman 1970)—
dissatisfied farmers will cease to be clients (exit) or demand a replacement of the
service provider (voice). In dus design the drop in the extensionist's income that
would result from exit or the threatened decline that would result from voice may
be expected to induce a corrective or recuperative action. Such mechanisms do not
exist in a standard extension organization.
   To put the account in context, the article first reports on extension experi-
ences in countries odier than Nicaragua in which farmers share in the cost of
the service and goes on to provide some background on the extension service in
Nicaragua as a whole. Subsequent sections discuss die methodology used in the
pilot, die results and lessons learned, and authors' conclusions.


Cofinanced Public Extension in Various Countries
Farmers now share the costs of extension services to varying degrees in several
industrial and developing countries, a shift in policy intended primarily to re-
duce costs (see "The Public and Private Sector in Agricultural Extension" by
Dina Umali-Deininger in this issue, pp. 203 to 24).
   Wilson (1991) reports on several models of cost sharing in Latin America. In
Chile INDAP (die National Agricultural Development Institute) has contracted
with consulting firms to provide extension services for a period limited to three
to five years. In this plan farmers in higher income categories are required to
pay 15 percent of the cost, financed by a credit provided by INDAP. In Mexico
fanners at higher income levels are currently required to pay 15 percent of the
cost of extension services, a share scheduled to increase gradually until it reaches
50 percent. In the Imbabura region of Ecuador, the extension agents purchase
inputs and sharecrop with the farmers; die extentionist's share covers the inter-
est on die loan for the purchase, the risk involved in the enterprise, and a pay-
ment for the services provided.

Ktjtum, Olin, and Dhur                                                             117
   In Colombia responsibility for providing extension has been devolved to the
municipalities,financedmainly by the central government with a share covered
by the municipality (Garfield, Guadagni, and Moreau 1996). In Costa Rica a
pilot project, planned to evaluate trade in extension vouchers, awards vouchers
for extension services to farmers on the basis of the type of farm and level of
technology; farmers may trade vouchers based on their needs (Ameur 1994). In
Argentina groups of voluntarily formed and self-supporting neighboring farm-
ers and ranchers organize to promote their common interests. Each group hires
and pays for the services of an agricultural advisor (Garcia Tobar 1996). In
China individual farmers or farmer associations contract with research institu-
tions, universities, and individual scientists to provide technical assistance (Ameur
1994).
   In Europe cost sharing is common. About three-quarters of the operating
extension budget in France is collected at the farm level through direct pay-
ments, contributions of agricultural organizations, and other direct and indi-
rect taxes on agricultural inputs and products (Ameur 1994). The U.K. exten-
sion agency, which remains partly government-funded, now charges for some
services, originally offered free of charge, on a time-cost basis (Dancey 1993;
Ingram 1992, pp. 51-58). The Dutch Extension Service began a privatization
process in 1993 in which die share of the extension budget to be funded by the
farmers increased from nodiing in 1993 to 60 percent in 1996; in 1998 farmers
are expected to cover 80 percent of the budget (Tacken 1996).
   Since 1990 extension in Queensland, Australia, has been project-based, with
up to 30 percent of the budget funded by die clients. The cost-sharing formula
for die cofinanced projects is set in negotiations; the government typically pays
fixed costs such as salaries and equipment, while the farmers provide in-kind
contributions such as die use of farm equipment, demonstration sites, and live-
stock (Coffey and Clark 1996).


Extension in Nicaragua
In 1994 agriculture accounted for about one-fourth of Nicaragua's gross do-
mestic product and employed about one-third of the labor force (Banco Cen-
tral 1996). The total number of farmers was estimated at some 250,000 (Centro
de Investigaciones 1988). Agricultural products, mainly coffee, sugar, and beef,
account for as much as three-fourths of the country's total exports.
   Public agricultural extension in Nicaragua dates back to at least 1942, when
die U.S. Department of Agriculture under cooperative agreements established
two experimental stations in the country (Hernandez 1991). The extension
service underwent numerous conceptual and organizational changes over die

                                      Tbt WorU Btnk Ratanb Observer. voL 12, no. 2 (August 1997)
years, but at all times remained highly dependent on external financing. Al-
though public extension was funded dirough the public budget, the government's
financial contribution was always limited. In 1996, for example, almost 60
percent of the basic extension budget was financed from external sources (of
this, 80 percent was from a World Bank loan and the rest from Canada, Hol-
land, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the European Community). Extension
activity waxed and waned according to the fluctuations in foreign aid
   The Institute Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA) was created
in 1993 as a semi-autonomous institution, primarily to remove it from political
influences in staffing and to define it as a professional organization serving
agriculture. It is divided geographically into five regions with its headquarters
in Managua. The regions are all located in the west (Pacific) and center of
the country where economic and agricultural activity have traditionally been
concentrated.
   In 1996 INTA employed some 160 extensionists throughout the country,
serving some 21,500 farmers in its five regions (iNTA 1996). Another 47
extensionists provided service to 5,400 farmers through a private technical as-
sistance (PTA) program cofinanced by the government and contributions from
the farmers, who are expected eventually to undertake most of the cost. In total,
INTA'S various programs reach about 27,000 farmers (about 11 percent of the
country's total).
   INTA'S service is free, with the exception of the program described in this
article and the one provided through five private firms in the PTA. Under the
PTA program the farmers were to cover some 20 percent of the cost in the first
year (1996), and their contribution was scheduled to rise to cover most of the
costs of the service within five years. In 1997 no farmer was paying more doan
30 percent of the cost. An estimate of the average cost of public extension pro-
vision in Nicaragua (based on the INTA budget for 1995) suggests a cost per
farmer of $115 a year.
   Extension is also provided to a very limited extent by other bodies such as
UNICAFE, the coffee growers association; UNAG, an association of primarily small
farmers; and numerous nongovernment organizations (NGOs). In December
1995 UNICAFE reported employing fifteen full-time extensionists, while APENN
(a national NGO) employed three. UNAG employed only two technicians in 1994,
but alsofieldeda larger number of promoters in their "Campesino a Campesino"
(farmer-to-farmer) program. (The promoters have very limited training.) NGOs
generally provide extensionfreeof charge. UNAG's program requires die farmers
to offer a meal to the visiting promoter. The UNICAFE program is financed
dirough a charge on coffee exports and is in effect a tax on production. Exten-
sion services of all types reach only a small proportion of the farmers of the
country.

Ktjnsn, Olin, snJDintr                                                      %%9
Designing and Planning Coflnanced Public Extension
in Nicaragua
In 1994 INTA'S budgetary difficulties forced the agency to rethink its relation-
ships with its clients and die way it provided extension services. In particular,
die agency thought it necessary to create accountability in die service and to
institute payments by farmers that would make it possible to reward extensionists
who delivered good results.

The Concept
With diose objectives in view, die ATLMP sponsors—the World Bank and die
Swiss government—sought to develop a demand-driven extension system. The
principal shortcomings of the existing extension service to be corrected were:
  • Unclear objectives: extensionists did not have a clear sense of what diey
    were expected to accomplish.
  • Poorly motivated workers and management: tiiere were no incentives to
    produce results.
  • No accountability to clients.
  • Litde consumer interest in obtaining quality service.
  The design of a delivery system for demand-driven extension services was
based on die following assumptions:
  • Extension is an economic input.
  • Extension generates new income.
  • Farmers, even if poor, will be willing to pay for an input whose expected
    value is greater dian its cost.
   The objective of extension in this concept is to help fanners who receive die
service to increase incomes derived from agricultural activities by increasing
yields, reducing losses in die field and after harvest, reducing costs, improving
exploitation of available resources, and designing a better mix of products.
   The principal mechanism proposed by die sponsors to achieve die objectives
and correct die shortcomings was to charge for die service, on the rationale that
payment serves the following purposes:
  • Extension stafFbegin to regard fanners as clients to whom they are accountable.
  • When their remuneration is linked to economic results, extensionists have
    a stake in the farmer's success.
  • People are committed to a service they payfor;they are careless of a service
    they get free.


ISO                                 The World Bank Raetrcb Observer. vcL 12, no. 2 (August 1997)
Promoting the Concept of Cottnanclng
When paymentforpublic extension service wasfirstbroached in February 1994,
 the Nicaraguan authorities and the leadership of die major agricultural associa-
tions rejected it as unworkable, unfair, and contrary to tradition. Implement-
ing a payment system over such objections would clearly have been impossible,
so a discourse with all the various interest groups was initiated to persuade
diem to withdraw their opposition. Project sponsors approached leading offi-
cials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the board of directors of
INTA, and die leaders of the major agricultural associations individually, in each
case presenting the rationale for payment, accompanied by many examples re-
lated to the work of the institution being visited. Free discussion generally led
 to grudging acceptance and finally to agreement. Ultimately, this campaign
was so successful that cofinanced public extension is now accepted by all sec-
tors, including the associations of small farmers.
    The next step was to determine the reactions of die principal players—the
extensionists and the farmers—and to identify, understand, and deal with any
reservations and qualms that they might have. Formal and informal discussions
widi extensionists and other staff in INTA extension districts revealed that
extensionists lacked self-confidence and conviction about die effectiveness of
extension and its impact on farmers' income. They doubted that any farmer
would be willing to pay for it.
   To help build confidence and to deepen their understanding of extension
objectives and performance, extensionists were invited to participate in group
discussions with INTA management and sponsors in their regions. Using actual
cases suggested by die extensionists diemselves, diey were guided on how to
identify benefits from their service and to calculate die value of die advice they
had given to farmers. Directed questioning helped diem think through a pro-
cess and assign a value to their work. These discussions succeeded in increasing
their confidence and reducing opposition to the concept.
   At the same time, meetings were held with small groups of farmers through-
out die country. Following die same format and process as the meetings with
the extensionists, these discusions helped farmers identify some benefits of the
extension that they had received and place an economic value on die service. At
die conclusion of these meetings, they were asked if they would be willing to
pay for a service diat increased their income. Although none evinced enthusi-
asm, in all but one case the fanners agreed diat they were. These discussions
served several purposes simultaneously, they helped farmers to place an eco-
nomic value on extension; diey showed extensionists (who attended the meet-
ings) diat farmers would not reject the idea of payment; and diey sent a message
to farmers that payment for the service was being considered. These discus-


Ktyrum, OUn, tnd Diiur                                                         231
sions, which set the stage for implementation, were carried out intermittently
over several months before the concept was tested in the field.
   Concurrently, INTA management, prodded by the sponsors to reflect on die
probable economic situation in which the institution would no longer have
access to external loans, generally acknowledged that the government could not
maintain funding at the current rate, and diat payment by farmers for exten-
sion services might help to fill die gap.


The Field Test
The field test was carried out in 1995 in die postrera season (die second of
Nicaragua's two agricultural seasons: primera, which begins about May, and
postrera, which begins in August). The purpose of the field test was to find out
whether fanners would in practice pay for agricultural extension services—diey
had accepted the concept in theory in die previous round, but no one was asked
to "put your money where your mouth is." The objects of the exercise were to
test farmers' reaction, to show diat extension has economic value, to gain fanner
confidence by delivering on promises, and to establish die principle that the
service is not free. It was decided to test die principles on four farmer groups in
two regions.
   In preparation for die test, a workshop was held with staff from die two
regions, Esteli and Matagalpa. After die concept was presented, virtually all
participants declared diat it could never work. Although all had participated in
the earlier discussions, the direat of actual implementation on dieir own turf
again raised opposition. By die end of die day's discussion, however, diere was
actual enthusiasm for die idea and a genuine willingness to test it. The turning
point was the clarification diat die extensionists would retain all die money
received from die farmers.
   Because farmers would join die program voluntarily, die concept would have
to be "sold" to diem. They would have to be convinced that it was to dieir
benefit to pay for die service. The guiding principles for die test were voluntary
participation, no threats diat existing services would be discontinued, negotia-
tion on services to be given and received, and negotiation on price and terms of
payment. Because only these four farmer groups would be paying, the package
offered for payment had to be superior to die package given free of charge to all
odier farmers.
   The workshop identified potentially interested groups, a short outline of
what diey would be offered, and how much diey would be asked to pay (table
1). All agreed diat die farmers most open to such a program would be those


Ml                                  TbtWerU Bank Rattnb Observer, veLl2.no. 2 (Aupat 1997)
Table 1. Field Test, 1995: Payment Scale fir Major Crops
                                                Ptymtnt taUe             Durtaon
                                           (cirdobas pernuntoou          oftfsm
                    Crop                        per month)*              (months)

                    Tomatoes                        10                       3
                    Beans                            6                       3
                    Maize                            4                       4
  a. At the tune of the field ten, US$ 1.00 = 7 cordobas, one manrana - 0.7 hectares.
  Source: Data collected by INTA staff and processed by the authors.



who raised a cash crop, who had access to some credit, and whose yields could
readily be increased by better farm management.
   The prices set had to meet the following criteria: the sum had to be one to
which a farmer would not be indifferent; and the total income expected (the
sum of all payments) had to be a sum that would constitute an incentive to an
extensionist. The prices were unrelated to eidier costs or benefits. Radier diey
were based on the sum paid mondily by low-income families for electricity.
This was felt to be an indicator both of dieir ability to pay and of how much
diey would be willing to payfora service promising some benefit
   Each region was permitted a great deal of latitude on the services offered and
the rate charged. Cost recovery was not an objective either of the test or of die
concept in general. Each region was free to propose any program within die
scope that INTA thought to be attractive to die farmers, provided diat die ser-
vices offered did not go beyond diose diat extension traditionally provides. The
essence of die package offered was greater frequency of visits of extensionists to
farmer groups and included the right to a few visits to the plots of individual
farmers. Extensionists would not offer advice on what crops to grow unless
specifically requested, and not before gaining die confidence of the farmers by
helping diem to achieve better results dian they traditionally obtained.
   The selling process consisted of meetings widi the farmer groups originally
targeted, as well as odiers added later. The farmers accepted die idea of pay-
ment with relative ease. They generally claimed to have no access to credit,
however, and maintained diat without credit diey would be unable to pay for
die service; it soon became dear that they would not participate widiout being
given access to credit. In Matagalpa die groups approached were also targeted
by a local NGO dedicated to the export of nontraditional crops. This NGO of-
fered intensive extension along widi credit, land preparation, and marketing.
The farmers rejected INTA'S offer as inferior. No alternative groups were located
in Matagalpa, probably because the INTA team felt weak in comparison widi the
"competition" and was demoralized by die failure of its first attempt.


Keynsn, Olin, aUDintr                                                                   233
   In Esteli die farmers also conditioned dieir participation in the scheme on
access to credit. INTA's regional director took the initiative of directing die funds
for seed production, which he had available from another NGO, to groups of
farmers diat would agree to participate in the test. Two groups accepted die
offer and entered into an agreement with INTA.
   The agreement was basically between die farmers and the extensionist: INTA
backed it. The farmers wanted a weekly visit to die group (rather dian die
customary biweekly visit) and askedforvisits to individual fields on demand.
Because the groups were centrally located and readily accessible, diis request
was easy to accommodate. INTA required the extensionist to devote some per-
sonal time to this service, including visits on Saturdays and Sundays.
   Payment would be on the basis of the crop rates suggested above (see table
1), but only half die sum collected would go to die extensionist. The farmer
groups had decided to use diis opportunity to build up dieir own capital by
retaining die odier half in a fund. They also requested diat payment be based
only on some of dieir crops; diey did not feel die needforadvice on the farm as
a unit. These changes were not desirable but were approved to get afieldtest of
die system up and running.
   A meeting to evaluate the experience was held by INTA managers and die
sponsors at die end of die season to hear reports by the farmers and die
extensionist. The farmers reported diat die extensionist had visited even more
dian once a week. They also readily acknowledged diat die test had been a
success and diat diey were satisfied with die results. The most notable improve-
ments were in tomatoes. They reported harvesting about 800 boxes of toma-
toes per manzana instead of die 600 boxes diey traditionally harvested, a differ-
ence diey ascribed to extension. The extensionist, however, was not content
widi die returnforhis efforts. He had devoted a great deal of his own time to
die test and had assumed diat he would earn a higher sum dian he ultimately
did—die equivalent of about one week's salaryfordie three-mondi season (table
2). He acknowledged, however, diat die field test was a preparatory phase and


Table 2. Amounts Paid to Extensionist
                                                         Duration                        Pud to
                           Art*             Rote         ofseason       Total ptid     octentionitt
      Crop              (msnzdtus)    (cordobas/month)   (months)       (ahdobas)       (cMobds)

      Tomatoes              12              10              3             360             180
      Beans                 18               6              3             324             162
      Maize                  6               4              4              96              48
      Total                n.a.            n.a.            n.a.           780             390
 n.a. Not applicable.
 Source: Data collected by INTA naif and processed by the authors.


334                                         The World Bank Research Observer, tnL 12, no. 2 (August 1997)
 showed promise for the future. He was also proud of the reputation he had
 gained among his clients and of his status among his peers.
    The farmers were asked how they had arrived at the decision to pay the sum
 of 5 c6rdobas per manzana per month and whether they did not feel that a
 higher sum was justified. They replied that they were too poor to spend more
 on the service. Upon further questioning, they reported that the average price
 received was about 15 cordobas per box of tomatoes, giving a gross additional
 income of about 3,000 aSrdobas per manzana. They calculated their additional
 costs (mainly for boxes and transportation) at some 1,800 cordobas, leaving
 them with a net income of about 1,200 c6rdobas per manzana. They had earned
 this sum in return for an expenditure of about 15 cdrdobas per manzana (three
 months at 5 c6rdobas). When presented with this calculation, they were sur-
 prised at the extent of the economic benefit and agreed that it was far in excess
•of what they had paid.
    In proving that the approach was feasible, albeit on a very small scale, the
 positive results of the test gave a strong impetus to the program. When it was
 announced that the trial would be expanded and a pilot carried out during the
 following season on a larger scale, extensionists throughout the country were
 eager to participate.


The Pilot
The pilot program was launched in the primera of 1996, after completion of
the test, building on the lessons learned to apply the concept on a larger scale.

Strategy
Before broadening the scope, a strategy had to be developed for introducing
cofinancing into forward planning for public extension as a whole. The plan
defined three classes of service: free (traditional); participative (cofinanced, car-
ried out by INTA'S staff); and private (cofinanced, carried out by private consult-
ant firms). The essence of the strategy was that future extension would end up
in one of the two cofinanced modes after a process of transfer from free to
cofinanced extension. Free extension was to be limited to a maximum period of
two to three years, after which the farmer would either transfer to cofinanced
extension or would cease to receive the service.
   Free extension was to be viewed as a "free sample" to interest new clients in
the service and would at anyrimein the future be only a small percentage of the
total clientele. For current clients,freeextension would also be phased out and
the service either transferred to one of the cofinanced modes or discontinued,

Krputn, Olin. tndDinsr                                                           S3S
but a decision as to die date was postponed until more experience with die
concept could be gained.

Tools
Extensionists were trained to use tools developed for use in die pilot, princi-
pally die preparation of contracts, forward planning of bodi farm and exten-
sion activities, measurement of results, and monitoring of progress.
   The contractformalizesdie arrangement between a group of farmers and die
extensionists: what services are to be provided at what price. The contract es-
tablishes die seller-buyer relationship between die extensionist and die farmer.
It contains an oudine of die services diat a group of farmers might want and die
price diought acceptable. It is meant to be revised after negotiation.
    Rapid analysis of die farmers' resources and constraints, to be based on infor-
mation about die fundamental features of die farm, gadiered using a standard
data collection form, is a tool for extensionists to use in planning and advising
farmers.
   Farm planning in diis context does not imply a farm plan in die normal
sense; radier, it is a means of setting objectives in order to create a "promise" on
die part of die extensionist and an "expectation" on die part of the farmers, as
well as a benchmark for measuring die success of die service. The form used
places die "traditional" yield and die "promised" yield side by side.
   Plansforthe extensionists activities must be relevant to die farm plans and not
general to die extension service. On diis basis die extensionist selects and plans
die subjects to instruct in, die types of field demonstrations relevant to die
farmer groups, and where and when to carry diem out.
   The farmers diemselves must measure results because die extensionist cannot
be present at all harvests and all times of production. Measurement by die
farmer includes both products sold and those used in home consumption and
must be continuous or intermittent, depending on die crop. Extensionists are
advised to check regularly to see whether theformsare being filled in and whedier
die farmer has encountered any difficulties in diis activity. After all harvesting
is concluded, die farmer and extensionist should joindy estimate die value of
increased yields, calculate and deduct any additional costs associated with the
recommendations, and finally calculate die outcome.
   An intense program of support and monitoringwas prepared, to be carried out
by die pilot promotion team and a person assigned to provide support in each
region, selected because of his or her dynamism and enthusiasm for die pro-
gram. This support person would maintain regular contacts widi the extensionist
and die groups. The promotion team would visit each region once a mondi,
and die support persons from all regions would congregate once a month in a

                                    The WoHd Bdnk Ratarcb Oherver, ooL 12, ne. 2 (August 1997)
different region, coinciding with one of the promotion team's visits. The meet-
ings would include sessions with the extensionists and with the farmer groups.
In addition a workshop was programmed for the end of the season.



Results
Eighteen groups signed up to participate in the pilot by early 1996. Of diese,
seventeen remained and received extension services throughout the season (the
eighteenth dropped out because of earlyfloodingof its fields). Some individual
farmers who had misinterpreted the payment for extension as meaning that it
was a credit program, dropped out of the groups. Ultimately, 280 farmers were
served. Several changes and adjustments occurred during the pilot. Many of the
agreements changed after signing, partly because early losses of crops obliged
the farmers to revise their original farm plans late in the season. Although such
revisions may be common, their design and the provision of advice for the new
plans constituted an important part of extension work. Another element of the
original design, the rapid analysis form, was dropped because it proved so time
consuming to complete.
   A breakdown of the area grown by different crops and by farmer groups is
shown in table 3; the results, reported in terms of yields and net benefits to
farmers, are presented in tables 4 and 5; and sums payable to extensionists and
the actual payments (by June 1996) appear in table 6.
   Table 3 shows that more than 50 percent of the area was devoted to beans, a
crop grown by ten of the seventeen farmer groups. The three major crops—
beans, corn, andrice—covered85 percent of the total area of the pilot.
   Table 4 shows the data on basic crops reported by twelve of the seventeen
groups. Four others specialized in cattle raising or, less commonly, in vegetables.

Table 3. Crops Contracted
                                             Pattnttgt               Number ofgroups
                      Crop                    oftrtd                  with this crop

                      Beans                     54                         10
                      Corn                      22                          8
                      Rice                       9                          2
                      Tomatoes                   6                          6
                      Sesame                     4                       . 2
                      Sorghum                    3                          4
                      Other crops                2                          4
                      Livestock                n.a.                         4
  n.a. Not applicable.
  Stunt: Data collected by INTA naff and processed by the authors.



Ktjtuat, Olin, toulDitur                                                               337
Table 4. Net Incremental Income by Regions and Crops
                                                                                                                                        Farm
                                                                                                  Farm        Priteper       Grots    Incremental       Net
                                                                                               incremental     unit ef   intremenud   production    incremental
                            Number of                    Art*             TteU (quintalhraj       jieU         yield       income        costs        income
Rtpvnfgroup                   pUTHtrS        Crop      (mdnamas)       Traditional    Actual    (quintal)    (drdobas)   (drdobas)    (drdobas)     (drdobas)
A-1/Quetzalguc                  23          Corn            6            20.0         10.0      -60.0           55        -3300         -690         -2,610
A-2/Masaya                      27          Beans          27             9.0         10.0       27.0          220          5,940      4,430           1,510
A-2/Carazo                      16          Beans          15            12.0          9.8      -33.0          500       -16,500        1,530       -18,030
A-2/Ticuantepe                  16          Beans          18             9.0         13.9       88.2          250        22,050       3,714          18,336
                                            Corn            1            20.0         20.0         —           100              0         205          -205
A-2/Caxdcnas                    19          Rice           26            64.0         68.9      127.4          140         17,836     11,401           6,435
B-3/Jalapa                      24          Beans          24             8.0          6.0      -48.0          180        -8,640       2,760        -11,400
B-3/Ocotal                      25          Beans           4             6.5         10.0        14.0         150          2,100         137          1,963
                                            Corn           22            26.0         41.1      332.2           55         18,271      3,713          14,558
B-3/Condcga                     22          Beans          15             8.0          3.0      -75.0          150       -11,250       3375         -14,625
B-5/Bano                        31          Beans          21            12.0           8.6     -71.4          200       -14,280       5,607        -19,887
                                            Corn           19            15.0         14.2      -15.2           60          -912       2,701         -3,613
B-5/Cebadilla                   15          Beans          17             8.0           5.3     -45.9          200        -9,180       3,288        -12,468
                                            Corn           12            12.0          7.1      -58.8           40        -2352       -4,106         -6,458
C-6/Boaco Vicjo                 16          Beans          12            15.0         19.1       49.2          200          9,840         143          9,697
                                            Corn           10            15.0         18.5       35.0           40          1,400         120          1,280
C-6/La Iibertad                   9         Corn            2            20.0         18.7       -2.6           80          -208          400          -608
  Note: Com, beans, and rice only.
  Source: Data collected by INTA staff and processed by the authors.
One group in Region C-6 did not provide information on its results. Of the
sixteen groups reporting, eight recorded net gains and eight net losses. Three of
the groups that had losses, reported increased income in one or more of the
crops. Table 5 summarizes the results reported by all groups by region.
   The quality of the data received from the fields was questionable. Some
data on yields and income were inconsistent and had unexplained variations
among fanners. For example, in some cases the yields and the net benefits
with extension were reported to be lower than without this service. This
would be a very unfortunate fact indeed, if true. But, because almost all farmers
reported their satisfaction with the service and signed contracts for the fol-
lowing season, it could not have been true. The more likely conclusion is
that farmers were not aboveboard, overestimating traditional yields and
underreporting actual yields; they probably also inflated their traditional costs
of production. The potential for such misreporting revealed a weakness in
the reporting system as well as a professional weakness among the extensionists,
who were themselves unfamiliar with traditional yields and unable to esti-
mate visually the expected yields by observing the fields during the season.
   Some data on drop in yields, however, were correct. On some farms a variety
of beans was promoted that was not suitable to the prevailing conditions. Also,
in some areas flooding and late planting because of heavy rains clearly affected
the yields.
   The farmers paid more than 60 percent of their fees within a reasonable time
(June 1996, see table 6), indicating that they were willing and able to pay.
Recovery might have been higher, but many extensionists were reluctant to
collect, feeling uncomfortable with this activity. Most of the remaining farmers
ultimately paid their outstanding balances, because all were informed that ful-

Table 5. Net Incremental Income by Farmer Groups
                                                                          Incremental           Net
                             Are* of       Number          Value of       production       incremental
            Number of         crops           of          difference           costs          income
Region       farmers        (manzona)      livestock     (cdrdobasf        (cirdoUsf        (c&rdebas)

A-1              55             21           95          -13,710             -170           -13,540
A-2             78              88           —            28,808           21,389             7,419
B-3             75              77          —             22,457           14,789             7,668
B-5             46              77          —            -38,488           16,062           -54,550
C-6             26              35          362          114,288           14,836            99,452
Total          280            298           457          113,355           66,906            46,449
   a. Difference between previous season yields (primera 1995) andpostrera's 1995 yields, multiplied by
market price.
   b. Additional production costs in the postrera 1995 compared with the situation before the ten (i.e.,
primera 1995).
   Source: Data collected by INTA stafTand processed by the authors.


Keynan, Olin, ana" Dinar                                                                              939
Table 6. Payments for Extension Services, Postrera 1995
                                             Total
                         Total              paid by                                  R**p of
                        agrttd            June 1996            Perctntagt           percttutge
      Region          (ctrdobas)           (drdehu)              paid             paid by group

      A-1               3,258               1,457                 44.7           20.7-61.5
      A-2               2,056               1,594                 77.5           47.8-100.0
      B-3               3,970               2,820                 71.0            0.0-100.0
      B-5               1,410               1,410                100.0               —
      C-6               1,061                 158                 14.9            0.0-27.0
      Total            11,755               7,439                 63.3
  — Not available.
  Source: Data collected by INTA staff and processed by the authors.



filling their payment agreements was a condition for receiving the service in
the following season.


Lessons Learned
Several preliminary lessons drawn from the pilot were applied in the subse-
quent season and may guide other countries interested in similar application of
cofinanced extension.

The System Works
Farmers agreed to pay for the service, and most of them paid as agreed. They
uniformly voiced their satisfaction in discussion with INTA staff and the pilot
sponsors and voted with their feet by signing new contracts for the following
season. The most common comment was that the extensionist was much more
attentive and responsive to their needs than in the past. This had indeed been
the primary objective of the concept.
   The additional income extensionists earned in the course of the pilot in-
stilled both a desire to seek out more clients and to serve existing clients better.
A notable expression of this spirit was pressure by the extensionists to decrease
the number of days devoted to training (which was reduced by management to
a maximum of two days per month), whereas previously they had pleaded to be
included in all training and workshops offered regardless of how this would
afreet their visits to the farmers.
   The principal indicator of the success of the method is that all seventeen
original groups have continued and by the postrera of 1996 (one year after the


MO                                           Tbt WcrU Bank Ratarcb Observer, voL 12, no. 2 (August 1997)
testing of the pilot was initiated), the number had increased to 135 groups with
1,737 farmers.

The Process of Persuasion Is Critical
The sponsors proposed a concept that held high promise but that was also
contrary to tradition and unpopular politically. Identifying the sources and
reasons for the opposition, understanding the nature of die objections, resolv-
ing problems, and making allies of the opponents, all before any action was
taken, were crucial steps to success. Actors at all levels, including farmers, par-
ticipated in discussions and in developing the practical aspects and tools of the
system. Many of their ideas were accepted and integrated, even when serious
doubts existed about their viability or desirability, as long as they were not
contrary to the basic principles. As long as the idea did no damage and could be
corrected later, die support of the participants was considered to be paramount.
Care was taken to ensure that die staff never felt that the concept was being
imposed on them but rather that they were part of it.
   It was also essential to avoid pushing too hard or too fast. Ideas are absorbed
gradually, and even when understood intellectually, diey are not truly assimi-
lated until they become reality. Quantitative goals projected more than one
season ahead appeared too outlandish and only indicated to INTA's staff and the
farmers that the speaker did not have his feet on die ground. In the event, later
goals were easily achieved and even surpassed.
   The deep commitment and conviction of die sponsors and their persever-
ance was another element critical in the success. A high percentage of the time
devoted to this pilot went into jawboning. Sponsors resisted the temptation to
rush headlong into field testing, delaying implementation until die entire stage
was properly set.

Start with a Comprehensive Strategy
From the outset the philosophy underlying the pilot was clearly articulated and
concentrated on a small number of principles. Although die pilot was small,
the sponsors and INTA management regarded it as a test of the methodology of
die future, and consequendy of interest to all—never as an activity affecting
only a few staffers and a few clients. INTA management agreed to a strategy for
full implementation of the concept, even while the pilot was litde more than an
idea. Thus the pilot was always part of the big picture and staff members knew
where they were heading.
   Staff at all levels participated in discussions on the whys and wherefores of
die approach. No one was asked to do anything without first receiving explana-

Ktjium. OUn, tnJDirur                                                          241
tions of the logic behind it. Furthermore, detailed tools for all the major stages
were developed and training given in them, even though the pilot was small.
Many more staffers were trained dian would actually participate in the pilot.

Key Issues
The pilot proved that the concept was feasible and accomplished its purposes.
But die pilot also highlighted problems and issues that needed to be dealt with
in order to refine die concept and make it more generally applicable.

ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE INITIATIVE AND TO ADAPT.              Although in-
formed that die typical contract was a model and had to be adapted to the
specific agreement negotiated between the extensionist and the farmer group,
virtually no extensionist modified a contract. More accustomed to following
instructions than to adapting to the specific needs of their clients, they retained
die original form down to B . . . visiting every odier Thursday . . . , " not even
changing die day. This is a big problem, with implications far beyond its mani-
festation in die issue of contract modification, and requires both better staff
selection and training to make extensionists capable of showing more initiative.

PRICING POLICY, PRICE OF SERVICE, AND TIMING OF PAYMENT.            The matter of
pricing was approached pragmatically and allowed for many variations. The
only firm requirement was that some payment be made for die service. There
was never any intention to charge by cost of service. The sponsors had set out to
test whether farmers would pay for extension, and whether this would make
extensionists responsive to dieir clients, not whedier the full cost could be re-
covered from the clients. It was felt that realistic prices could be defined only
after sufficient experience had been gained, and any price set at die outset would
be no more than a "bargaining price." Payment was set by crop and area during
the course of the growing season, because the growing season sets the cycle of
farm expenditure and earning and die policy would therefore be explicable and
acceptable to farmers; farmers never questioned this policy.
   Payment was divided into two categories: by crop and time (payable through-
out the season); and as a percentage of increased yield (payable at die end of the
season). The payment as a percentage of incremental yields is problematical,
because the greater the increase in yield, the greater the payment. The farmer
dien has good reason to withhold information on higher yields and, because
die extensionist cannot be present at every harvest, a potential for misreporting
is introduced. The sponsors agreed to include this form of payment despite
reservations; in the event, this was probably partly responsible for the
misreporting of yields.

                                    The WBTU Bdnk Raetnb Observer, veL 12, ne. 2 (August 1997)
   Pricing the products also presented some problems. Many products are sold
over a period of time during which prices vary, the farmer does not necessarily
keep accurate track of the prices received nor of the quantities sold at each
time—and is unlikely in any case to share this information with the extensionist.
And how to deal with products stored and sold later? Those who sell immedi-
ately upon harvest receive a lower price than those who have invested in storage
facilities and are able to hold on until the price rises. Should the extensionist
share in the increased profit?
   Having decided what to charge for the service, the question remained when
the payment should be made. To offset the risk of default, the sponsors wanted
payment to be made throughout the season, not only at the end. Initially there
was someresistanceto this, but ultimately more than half of the sums were paid
during the season. It is expected that as both farmers and extensionists become
more accustomed to the system, the bulk of the payments will be made during
the season (with the exception, obviously, of the portion based on yield
increases).

MEASUREMENT AND REPORTING.           The method of measurement applied in this
pilot was oversimplified and inaccurate, but it did accomplish its main objec-
tives. It made the farmers aware of the need to measure the value of the service,
put pressure on the extensionists to perform, and served as an important exer-
cise in analyzing information and trying to learn from the results. The method
deliberately ignored the fact that, insofar as extension delivers a previously un-
familiar technology that increases yields and income, the flow of benefits con-
tinues for many years—in other words, that the actual value gained by the
farmer is far in excess of the net benefit gained in one season. Only those ben-
efits that could be measured easily and only improvements in the "cofinanced
crops" themselves were measured. More complex, difficult-to-measure phenom-
ena and benefits gained as a by-product in other activities were excluded. There
is then a strong downward bias of the value. Farmers are reminded that the
benefit is "at least such and such a sum."
   One weakness identified in the reporting system was that management was
undemanding about the quality of the data, primarily because of inexperience
in actually using the data in its decisionmaking. Extensionists were aware of
this laxity and therefore tended to supplyfigureswith little basis in fact. Strong
action was taken to correct this. Cavalier reporting will probably be a problem
in other places as well and should be dealt with early.

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.     In the course of the pilot, the promotion team
focused only on the method of delivery and on its management and organiza-
tion. It was assumed that the extensionists were already equipped with know-

Ktynmn, Olin, enJDintr                                                         343
ledge on a range of agricultural technologies, farm problems, and their solu-
tions, and had the necessary ability and experience to diagnose problems ad-
equately and to suggest remedies. These assumptions were found to be only
partially sound. Farmers expect die extensionists to be at a very high profes-
sional level. Extensionists cannot simply be conveyors of messages to farmers.
They must be able to provide advice on more complex farm management is-
sues. Farmers' expectations are important both in evaluating dieresourcesnec-
essary to provide such a service and in calculating its cost. The service cannot
work with poorly trained technicians.
   As well as training in farm management and basic economic analysis, train-
ing for extensionists in elementary marketing skills to sell die service to poten-
tial clients was also found necessary. When establishing a new system,
extensionists should be selected according to their training, experience, and
proven abilities to analyze and diagnose. Well-trained people are likely to be
available in any given country.

PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN. Women constituted some 21 percent of die cli-
ents in this pilot. (No special effort was made to target women.) Although INTA
does not collect data on die number of women it serves under its regular pro-
gram, indirect indicators show diat die pilot served about die same number of
women as die regular program. The potential impact on women in a demand-
driven extension system is a subject diat merits further study.

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG SUPPORTING STAFF. The scope of die pilot
was too small to apply all elements of a fully operational system. Distributing
die small sums collected among the staff would have nullified die incentive
effect; consequendy, die entire payment remained with the extensionist. The
long-range plan, however, is to distribute the income widely among the staff
members who contribute to die effort, as more clients are added and income
increases. The extensionists depend on subject-matter specialists for problem
solution, on administrative staff for transport, and on odiers to enable diem to
provide a satisfactory service to dieir clients. Aformulahas been developed for
distribution as income increased, to be applied in subsequent stages.



Conclusions
The sponsors of the pilot set out to test whedier a truly demand-driven exten-
sion system aimed at farmers with small- and medium-size holdings could be
developed. Central to the design was the principle of accountability of
extensionist to client: the farmer would be charged for services received, and

344                                 The World B*nk Resetnb Observer, voL 12, no. 2 (August 1997)
the extensionist would benefit in direct relation to this payment. The incentive
system thus introduced proved effective: by the end of die season, 60 percent of
farmers had paid for die service, and all of die rest had agreed to pay their debts
as a condition for receiving die service in die following season. The principal
indicators of success are the repeat contracts with all participating groups, and
die continuing expansion of the service (from 17 groups and 280 farmers in die
1995 pilot to 135 groups widi 1,737 farmers in 1996). Critical to die project's
viability was the period of intense activity before field testing dedicated to per-
suading die various actors of die viability of die concept, identifying and ana-
lyzing opposition, and making necessary corrections and adaptations. Widiout
diis careful stage-setting, a cofinanced system would have had litde chance of
getting off die drawing board.
   The success—albeit on a small scale—of the pilot shows promise diat the
concept could contribute to die sustainability of extension activities in general.
Ideally, agricultural extension services should continue to be offered as long as
diere is demand for them, even after World Bank-financed project funding is
terminated. Given the notorious unreliability of government funding, die only
sound basis for sustainable operations is demand, in the form of willingness to
pay, and die returns for supplying a service, in die form of payment. The test
did not set out to discover whether a demand for extension exists at a market
price, but die results do indicate that fanners will pay something for die service.
In most European countries, farmers pay about half die cost of extension, widi
government covering die other half (Ameur 1994). Clearly die prospects for
sustainability are much improved if farmers are willing to pay a 50 percent
share.
   In sum, the results of die pilot operation in Nicaragua suggest that cofinanced
agricultural extension could contribute to die quality and sustainability of the
service elsewhere. If die lessons learned are absorbed, die process described in
die article could befollowedto apply the concept successfully in a wide variety
of situations in developing countries to the benefit of die farmers served by the
extension service.


Notes
Gabriel Keynan is a consultant with the Sector Leadership Group of the Latin America and
Caribbean Region of the World Bank. Manuel Olin is a consultant to, and Ariel Dinar is a
senior economist with, die Agriculture and Natural Resources Department at die Bank. Funding
for die study wat provided by die Swiss Trust Fund for Special Studies, in the context of
implementing the Agricultural Technology and Land Management Project in Nicaragua. The
authors benefited from many comments and suggestions from Charles Ameur, Charles Andiolt,
Gershon Feder, Miguel Gomez, Dennis Purcell, Andrew Spurling, John Stemp, and Willem
Zijp. Assistance in the field was provided by Julio Ricardo Hernandez.

Ktjrum, Olin, nUDintr                                                                     i45
References
The word "processed" describes informally reproduced works that may not be commonly
available through library systems.
Ameur, Charles. 1994. Agricultural Extension: A Step Beyond the Next Step. World Bank Tech-
    nical Paper 247. Washington, D.C.
Antholt, Charles H. 1994. Getting Readyfarthe Twenty-First Century: Technical Change and
    Institutional Modernization in Agriculture. World Bank Technical Paper 217. Washington,
    D.C.
Banco Central de Nicaragua. 1996. Indicadores Economicos. Managua, Nicaragua.
Bindlish, Vishva, and Robert E. Evenson. 1993. Evaluation ofthe Performance of T&v Exten-
    sion in Kenya. World Bank Technical Paper 208. Washington, D.C.
Bindlish, Vishva, Robert E. Evenson, and Mathurin Gbetibouo. 1993. Evaluation of the Per-
   formance of T&v Extension in Burkina Faso. World Bank Technical Paper 226. Washing-
    ton, D.C.
Birkhaeuser, Dean, Robert E. Evenson, and Gershon Feder. 1991. "The Economic Impact of
   Agricultural Extension: A Review." Economic Development and Cultural Change
    39(April):607-50.
Centra de Investigaciones Economicas dc la Reforma Agraria. 1988. Gobierno de Nicaragua,
    Managua.
Cofrey, Shaun, and Richard Clark. 1996. "Reengineering an Extension Service." Paper pre-
   sented at the Extension Workshop on Alternative Mechanisms for Funding and Delivering
   Extension. World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, Washington,
    D.C. Processed.
Dancey, R. J. 1993. "The Evolution of Agricultural Extension in England and Wales: Presi-
   dential Address." Journal of Agricultural Economics 44 (September) :375—93.
Farrington, John. 1994. "Public Sector Agricultural Extension: Is There life after Structural
   Adjustment?" ODI. Natural Resources Perspectives No. 2 (November).
Food and Agriculture Organization. 1990. Report of the Global Consultation on Extension.
   Rome.
Garcia Tobar, Julio. 1996. "CREA-AACREA: Associative Private Agricultural Extension in Ar-
   gentina." Paper presented at die Extension Workshop on Alternative Mechanisms for Fund-
   ing and Delivering Extension. World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Depart-
   ment, Washington, D.C. Processed.
Garfield, Elsie, M. Guadagni, and Daniel Moreau. 1996. "Decentralization of Agricultural
   Extension Services in Colombia." Paper presented at the Extension Workshop on Alterna-
   tive Mechanisms for Funding and Delivering Extension. World Bank, Agriculture and
   Natural Resources Department, Washington, D.C. Processed.
Guttman, J. M. 1980. "Villages as Interest Groups: The Demand for Agricultural Extension
   Services in India." Kyklos 33:122-141.
Hernandez, Julio Ricardo. 1991. Economiay Cambio Tecnologico en la Agricultura Nicaraguense.
   Managua, Nicaragua: INCAE (Central American Institute for Enterprise Administration).
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
   Press.
Ingram, Paul. 1992. "The United Kingdom Experience in the Privatization of Extension." In
   Jock R, Anderson and Cornelis de Haan, eds., Public and Private Roles in Agricultural



946                                    The WorUBtni Research Observer, voL 12, tu. 2 (August 1997)
   Development: Proceedings of the Twelfth Agricultural Sector Symposium. Washington, D.C.:
   World Bank.
INTA (Instituto Nicaraguense de Technologia Agropecuaria). 1996. Plan Opcraxivo AnuaL
   Managua
Kessides, Christine. 1993. Institutional Options for the Provision oflnfrastructure. World Bank
  Discussion Paper 212. Washington, D.C.
Koontz, Harold, and H. Weihrich. 1990. Essentials of Management. 5th ed. New York: McGraw
  HilL
Purcell, Dennis. 1994. "Agricultural Extension: Lessons from Completed Projects." World
  Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, Washington, D.C. April. Processed.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Robert E. Evenson. 1985. "The Political Economy of Agricul-
  tural Research and Extension: Grants, Votes, and Reapportionments." American Journal of
  Agricultural Economics 67:1-14.
Tacken, Willem. 1996. "The Dutch Extension Service: The Change from a Publicly Funded
  Extension Service to a Privatized, Client-Oriented Organization.'' Paper presented at the
  Extension Workshop on Alternative Mechanisms for Funding and Delivering Extension.
  World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, Washington, D.C. Pro-
  cessed.
Umali, Dina. 1996. "New Approaches to an Old Problem: The Public and Private Sector in
  Extension." Paper presented at the Extension Workshop on Alternative Mechanisms for
  Funding and Delivering Extension. World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources De-
  partment, Washington, D.C. Processed.
Wilson, Mark. 1991. "Reducing the Costs of Public Extension Services: Initiatives in Latin
  America." In William M. Rivera and Daniel J. Gustarson, eds. Agricultural Extension World-
  wide: Institutional Evolution and ForcesforChange. Amsterdam: Elsevier.




Kejium, Olin. txdDiw                                                                         247