

Document of
the World Bank

Report No: ICR2591

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-40700 TF-58222)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE INITIAL AMOUNT OF

SDR 12.1 MILLION
(US\$ 18.2 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND

A RESTRUCTURED AMOUNT OF
SDR 10.34 MILLION
(US\$15.55 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Government of Cameroon

FOR A

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

February 26, 2013

Human Development: Education
Central Africa (AFCC1)
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 09/01/2012)

Currency Unit = FCFA
1.00 CFA = US\$ 0.00192
US\$ 1.00 = 521 Central African Franc

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CIP	Project Intervention Area (<i>Circonscription d'Intervention du Proj</i>)
CIRD	Inter-University Resource Documentation Center (<i>Centre Inter-Universitaire des Ressources Documentaires</i>)
CITI	Inter-University Information Technology Center (<i>Centre Inter-Universitaire des Technologies d'Information</i>)
CSR	Country Strategy Report
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
EFA	Education for All (Fast Track Initiative)
EMP	Environmental Mitigation Plan
ESS	Education Sector Strategy
FM	Financial Management
GDLN	Global Development Learning Network (<i>Réseau Mondial de Formation pour le Développement</i>)
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IDA	International Development Association
MINEDUB	Ministry of Basic Education (<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base</i>)
MINESEC	Ministry of Secondary Education (<i>Ministère des Enseignements Secondaires</i>)
MINESUP	Ministry of Higher Education (<i>Ministère d'Enseignement Supérieur</i>)
MOD	Delegated management arrangement (<i>Maitrise d'Ouvrage Délégué</i>)
NGO	Non Governmental Organization (<i>Organisations Non Gouvernementales</i>)
OMU	Operational Monitoring Unit
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAFAM	Project Accounting, Financial and Administrative Manual
PASE	<i>Projet d'Appui au Système Educatif</i>
PCU	Project Coordination Unit (<i>Unité de Coordination du projet</i>)
PDO	Project Development Objective

PPR	Post Procurement Review
PTR	Pupil-Teacher Ratio
QALP	Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio
RESEN	State Report on National Education
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UNESCO/UIS	UNESCO Institute of Statistics
ZEP	Priority Education Areas (<i>Zones à Éducation Prioritaires</i>)

Vice President: Makhtar Diop
 Country Director: Gregory Binkert
 Sector Manager: Peter Nicolas Materu
 Project Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale
 ICR Team Leader: Simon Thacker

Cameroon

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Cameroon	Project Name:	Education Development Capacity Building Project
Project ID:	P075964	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-40700,TF-58222
ICR Date:	02/25/2013	ICR Type:	Intensive Learning ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 12.10M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 8.99M
Revised Amount:	XDR 10.34M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB)			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	11/25/2003	Effectiveness:	10/28/2005	10/28/2005
Appraisal:	11/29/2004	Restructuring(s):		04/20/2010 08/23/2012
Approval:	05/31/2005	Mid-term Review:	03/28/2008	03/25/2008
		Closing:	09/01/2010	09/01/2012

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Moderately Satisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Unsatisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes

	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General education sector	55	45
General public administration sector	10	25
Health	10	5
Primary education	25	25

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Child health	14	5
Decentralization	14	20
Education for all	29	30
Gender	14	15
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	29	30

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director:	Gregor Binkert	Ali Mahmoud Khadr
Sector Manager:	Peter Nicolas Materu	Laura Frigenti
Project Team Leader:	Shobhana Sosale	Mourad Ezzine
ICR Team Leader:	Simon Thacker	
ICR Primary Author:	Simon Thacker	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The objective of the proposed project is to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The objective of the revised project was to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	ORIGINAL PROJECT development outcome indicators: 1. Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	56%	80%		83%
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded.			
Indicator 2 :	2. Lower Degree of Randomness in Teacher Allocation (primary education)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	45%	25%		42%
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target not met. This indicator was picked up in the "Cameroon: Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector" project.			

Indicator 3 :	3. Reduced Primary Repetition Rates			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	25.8%	15%		20%
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met by project restructuring and met one year later: the rate being 14.9 % for primary school for SY 2010/2011 (Country Status Report, 2012, p.88).			
Indicator 4 :	4. Improved female to male enrollment rates in target areas			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0.58	0.9		0.82
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target likely to be met.			
Indicator 5 :	REVISED PROJECT development outcome indicators: 1. Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	Budgets are prepared without accurate and relevant statistical data and analyses	Budgets are fully aligned with strategic goals of the sector and based on relevant statistical data.		Target partially met. Data verification and cleaning exercises have been undertaken.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met. The development of a methodological guide providing guidelines to better align budget with strategy continues to be a work-in-progress after the closing of the restructured project.			
Indicator 6 :	2. Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two years.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	The strategy is updated every 2 years but no reliable statistical data or analytical products are available to inform policy makers.	The revision of the ESS, based on analytical work launched over preceding months, was underway at project close and will inform the 2013 budget cycle.		The updated strategy is informed by reliable data and relevant analytical work.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met.			
Indicator 7 :	3. Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	45% of teachers in the teaching cadre at the primary education level are deployed arbitrarily and not according to schooling needs.	Only 25% of teachers in the teaching cadre at the primary education level are deployed arbitrarily and not according to		Government states that as a result of addressing the teacher deployment issue through the hiring of contract teachers at primary schools level,

		schooling needs.		the deployment issue is being progressively resolved.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met. Equitable teacher deployment remains a challenge.			
Indicator 8 :	4. Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the ZEP.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No or very little beneficiary participation is noted in the Education Priority Areas in the Far North.	Active participation.		Rehabilitation accomplished for 405 classrooms in 57 schools.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Rehabilitation of 25 school sites was undertaken by other development partners, and MINEDUB through the BIP (<i>Budget d'investissement public</i>).			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	ORIGINAL PROJECT Intermediate Outcome Indicators 1. Reduce standard deviation between the average number of teachers per school in the provinces from 1.0 to 0.5			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	1.0	0.5		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 2 :	2. Repetition rates decline in Anglophone and Francophone areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	25%	15%		28.1% in Francophone areas; 17.4% in Anglophone areas.
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met by project restructuring and met one year later: the rate being 14,9 % for primary school for SY 2010/2011 (CSR, p.88).			
Indicator 3 :	3. Improved female to male enrollment rates in target areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	1		0.82
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was close to being met.			

achievement)				
Indicator 4 :	4. Classrooms built or rehabilitated			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	N/A		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 5 :	5. Teachers trained pre-service to minimum qualifications and certification requirements			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	N/A		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 6 :	6. Teachers recruited into education system			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	N/A		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 7 :	7. Textbooks purchased			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	N/A		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 8 :	8. Textbooks distributed			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	N/A		N/A
Date achieved	05/31/2005	09/01/2010		04/20/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 9 :	REVISED PROJECT Intermediate Outcome Indicators			
	1. Regularly updated documentation used to support the development of the sector			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	The education sector lacks relevant and up-to-date analytical studies to guide the development of the education sector strategy.	Up-to-date documentation is produced and used to inform the strategy, including the following studies: Analysis of the post-basic ed. system;		Target met after project closing.

		Review of the impact of contract teachers program on the quality of education; Country Status Report (RESEN)		
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met. Although the work commenced prior to project closing, due to the complexities of: (i) government's focus on preparing a program budget for a three-year period; and (ii) coordination between multiple education ministries resulted in the process taking long.			
Indicator 10 :	2. Production of updated action plans for the education sector strategy.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Action plans are updated every three years.	Action plans are updated and validated annually for all 4 sectors.		Target to be met after project closing.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met. The preparation of action plans is underway and will be completed after project closing. These are being based on the Education Sector Strategy soon to be completed for the GPE project.			
Indicator 11 :	3. Production of analytical tools (ex. simulation models).			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	There is a lack of capacity to develop and use simulation models or other budget supporting tools.	Analytical tools are developed and used for budget preparation in each sub-sector.		Target to be met after project closing.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The work commenced prior to project closing and will be completed after project closing.			
Indicator 12 :	4. Production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation in the international dialogue on education through CITI and the GDLN.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Activities of CITI, CIRD, and GDLN are started but the centers are not operational.	1,000 documents consulted via these centers.		Target not met before project closing.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation international dialogue are yet to be instituted. The GDLN is operational, but not functioning yet (decree awaited).			
Indicator 13 :	5. Annual publication of statistical yearbook for three levels of education			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Delayed production of statistical data, sometimes not accompanied with analytical reports.	Annual publication of statistical yearbook for three levels of education.		The target has been met.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target has been met. Challenges remain for MINESEC where some years of the publication are missing.			

Indicator 14 :	6. School health card published for primary and secondary education.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No school health card	School health card finalized and validated.		Target not met.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 15 :	7. System of learning assessment at the primary education level.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No system exists.	Fully functioning assessment is used annually.		The target has been met: a summative evaluation of student achievement in primary education exists.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target has been met: early grade reading assessments are being administered through financing from other partners. These are proposed to be regularly administered over time.			
Indicator 16 :	8. Institutional audits prepared and evidence of the implementation of recommendations.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No evaluation of the implementation of the recommendations.	Action plan for implementing recommendations has been implemented.		The target has been partially met.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target has been partially met: the action plan for implementing recommendations is under preparation.			
Indicator 17 :	9. Institutional audits disseminated to a large audience.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Audit realized but report not finalized and results not disseminated.	5 original workshops organized to disseminate the results of the audits.		Target partially met.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target partially met: the audits have been completed and finalized though not yet disseminated.			
Indicator 18 :	10. Percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Operations manual for the allocation of subsidies developed but not enforced.	Subsidies allocated to private schools in compliance with the criteria laid out in the operations manual.		Not achieved.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target not met.			

Indicator 19 :	11. Number of projects implemented with the participation of beneficiary communities in the ZEP.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None	All projects should include this approach.		Target met
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The community sensitization work began in April 2012.			
Indicator 20 :	12. Direct project beneficiaries.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	75,000		93,761.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded. Number of direct project beneficiaries (students, teachers, parents, communities, education administrators) was exceeded, and is estimated to be at least around 93,761.			
Indicator 21 :	13. Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None	430 classrooms in 57 school sites.		Target met. 405 classrooms in 57 school sites rehabilitated.
Date achieved	04/20/2010	09/01/2012		08/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The estimate was 430. Through the project 405 schools were rehabilitated. The remaining 25 were completed through financing from other development partners. These 25 had been double counted in the original target set for IDA financing.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	07/12/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	01/17/2006	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.19
3	06/06/2006	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.37
4	10/30/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.63
5	04/20/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.91
6	12/20/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	2.94
7	06/18/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.69

8	08/31/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.38
9	05/06/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.23
10	12/28/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	6.47
11	06/27/2010	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	6.83
12	02/16/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.20
13	10/11/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	8.02
14	05/27/2012	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	9.24
15	09/09/2012	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	9.65

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
04/20/2010	N	MU	MU	6.76	To streamline implementation to adapt to new operating environment of multiple ministries of education.
08/23/2012	N	U	MU	9.65	Reallocation of Credit proceeds across the eligible expenditure categories to facilitate final disbursements for the project.

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1. Context at Appraisal

Country Issues

1. After having experienced substantial economic growth up until the early 1980s, Cameroon suffered an economic crisis that lasted nearly ten years and resulted in a decline of its GDP until 1994. From a social point of view, difficulties reached a climax when the salaries of civil servants were cut by one-half in 1993 and when the FCFA was devalued in early 1994. After that, the situation gradually improved: between 1994 and 2002, GDP increased regularly at a fairly strong rate of 4.6%, while the GDP per capita increased by 2% per year in real terms. Yet, in 2002, the GDP per capita was still 15% lower than that of 1990 when holding price constant.

2. In 2000, the high level of external debt had qualified the country to become a “Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)” and eligible for corresponding financial provisions. Since that time, macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment served to improve the fiscal situation and provided a framework for development. From 1996 to 2003, poverty declined by 13 percentage points; nevertheless, an estimated 40 percent of the population was below the poverty line. Cameroon graduated from the HIPC program in 2007.

Sector Issues

3. The education system performed well in the 1980s and then deteriorated significantly in the 1990s as a consequence of the economic crisis. This crisis caused significant erosion in teachers’ salaries and resulted in a failure by the Government to invest adequate resources in infrastructure and materials. This then played a role in generating widespread corruption among teachers and administration officials and led to a significant decline in enrollment in primary education.

4. In 1999, taking advantage of the HIPC initiative and in a bold effort to reverse this downward trend, the Government of Cameroon decided to remove primary education school fees and to implement an action plan to revitalize the sector. This action plan was described in an official paper entitled, *Stratégie du Secteur de l’Education 2000*, which called for a substantial increase in public funding to education, the stepping up of government efforts in the *Zones d’Education Prioritaire* (ZEP: North, Far North, East, and Adamawa and slums around Yaounde and Douala) and a crackdown on corrupt practices to which the loss of as much as 30 percent of the total sector resources had been attributed.

5. These measures allowed for significant progress as suggested by the following indicators. **Government recurrent expenditures on education.** After reaching an all-time low of CFAF 21,000 in 1995, expenditures per primary education student had increased to

CFAF 45,000 in 2001 (in 2001 CFAF). **Gross enrollment rates:** The primary education Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) increased from 87.7% in 2000 to 105.4% in 2002, signifying over-age students enrolling in the system. The elimination of primary education school fees in 1999 was partially instrumental in achieving this progress. **Regional equity.** The action plan in favor of the ZEP has contributed to a rapid increase of enrollment in the North, Far North and Adamawa, where virtually all 6 year old children currently start school.

6. Despite this encouraging recovery and despite the fact that universal access to grade 1 had virtually been achieved, only 63% of students completed six years of primary education.¹ This poor completion rate was attributable to repetition rates which, depending on the grades, hovered between 15% and 30%. This in turn resulted in high drop-out rates among children. These repetition rates were much higher than the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average. Further, the national ratio of girls to boys, that had been improving, slowed, and stabilized at about 85% in 2002.²

7. To meet the related Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the education system had to take three important steps to address existing challenges. It had to: (i) increase internal efficiency by reducing repetition and dropout rates, (ii) narrow social disparities between regions and gender in education outcomes, and (iii) strengthen administrative capacity and governance to ensure better and more transparent use of limited public resources. Moreover, the Government had become increasingly aware of the need to diversify post-basic education and make it more responsive to labor market demand by improving the quality and relevance of instruction and by further developing the capacity of local universities to generate knowledge.

8. The United Nations Development Indicators for Health revealed that Cameroon's Health Index (defined as life expectancy at birth expressed as an index using a minimum value of 20 years and observed maximum value over 1980-2010) for 1990, 2000, and 2005, was respectively .525, .475, and .464, and so was worsening, even if figures for infant mortality were improving (results for 1990, 2000, 2005 show that the deaths per 1000 were 90, 84, 80, respectively). Given this, action was needed to improve child health, so the project included School Health Cards which would be one way to act through schools.

9. Also of note here is that sector governance became fragmented at the time the project was being designed. Following the elections in December 2004, the Ministry of Education divided into three ministries: the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB), the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC), and the Ministry of TVET (MINEFOP). The Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP) remained unaffected. The consequences of this division will be discussed in detail in paragraphs 88 and on below, but it is enough to

¹ In comparison, completion rates for 2010-11 are 88.4 % (from RESEN 2012). For more information, see the RESEN 2012.

² In comparison, this ratio for 2010-11 remains at 86% (from World Bank Data).

mention here that coordination requirements, and therefore risks, increased as a result of this new configuration.

10. Finally, there was an FTI project prepared and launched (the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (P116437) of 08/25/2010 concurrently with the present project under review.

Rationale for Bank assistance

11. The rationale for IDA's involvement in the education sector resided in its capacity to help prepare sector analyses, develop new policies and improve coordination among donors. With respect to sector analyses, IDA played a key role in the development of the 2003 education sector Country Status Report (CSR) by a national team, which received technical assistance from France. The CSR became a key reference in policy decision-making and enabled the national team to gain a better understanding of sector-related analytical methods and to develop financial simulation and medium-term budget frameworks. With respect to policy development, IDA facilitated policy dialogue (from the year 2000 on) by organizing and funding workshops that brought together various branches of the Government, key stakeholders and donors. These activities contributed to the adoption of new policies and laws such as the private education law, the textbook publishing and distribution policy, and the school management and decentralization decrees. With respect to improving coordination among donors, in February 2005, IDA initiated a dialogue between the Government and the key donors which aimed to harmonize aid procedures in the education sector and coordinate future aid, with a view to move to a Sector-Wide Approach in the following years. As a result of this process, the Government launched the preparation of a long term sector strategy and investment program, which would build on the results of the CSR and would develop collaboratively all technical and financial partners in education. By adding a lending operation to its activities at that time, IDA believed it would be in a better position to pursue the above-mentioned activities, while focusing on capacity-building and assisting the Government in implementing reforms that had already been adopted.

12. At the same time, the Bank had not worked in the basic education sector in Cameroon for some time before this project (though it was working in tertiary education). By all accounts, corruption was acknowledged to be a major challenge in the country, one that would threaten the success of projects. To understand the rationale for Bank assistance, despite this threat, it is also important to see the project within the context of a 'new beginning': at the time, Cameroon had accepted to carry out a number of structural adjustments to obtain debt-relief in the context of the Highly Indebted Poor Country program (HIPC), a joint venture of the World Bank and the IMF. Some of these changes were in the education sector, where the elimination of school fees was perhaps the most notable. The Government's commitment to reform signaled to the donor community a 'new beginning' and provided the Bank with the assurance it sought to begin an education project in good faith.

1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

The objective of the project was “to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and to increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education” (from Project Appraisal Document (PAD) dated May 5, 2005).

Key Indicators

- A. Lower degree of randomness in teacher allocation from 45% to 25%;
- B. Primary repetition rates reduced from 25% to 15%;
- C. Female to male primary enrollment ratio in the Project Intervention Area ³ increased from 0.58 to 0.90.

1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

13. The objective of the revised project was “to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector.” (from Restructuring Paper dated April 6, 2010).

Key Indicators

- A. Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis;
- B. Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment;
- C. Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two years;
- D. Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the *Zone à Education Prioritaire* (Priority Education Areas).

Reasons for change

14. The revised PDO aimed to support strategies and actions of the new Education Sector Strategy (ESS) the objective of which was aimed at reinforcing management of the education system. The ESS, established by the Government in 2006, had four objectives, improvements in: (i) access and equity, (ii) quality and efficiency; (iii) private sector and partnership; and (iv) management and governance. The ESS aimed to reach this fourth goal through improved strategic management, evaluation capacity and planning of the education

³ These include primarily Education Priority Areas in the country (*zone à éducation prioritaire (ZEP)*) found in Adamaoua, the North, the Far North, and the East where most educational challenges, in terms of access, retention, equity and quality, are confronted.

system. The original project was restructured to better align the PDO with the new ESS, and to contribute to the fourth objective of the ESS.

15. Specifically, the restructured project aimed to provide tools, training and other forms of support to various key stakeholders including but not limited to education authorities, communities and the general public to: (i) continually hone the strategic vision for the education system through analysis, knowledge sharing and dissemination; (ii) improve the education information system to ensure greater accountability and better decision making; (iii) improve sector monitoring by education authorities, the government and the public; and (iv) provide opportunities for greater participation of beneficiaries in education decision making, thus increasing accountability.

1.4. Main Beneficiaries

Project Beneficiaries (by Component)

- Comp. 1** All key Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) officials at the central, provincial and departmental levels, and those officials working within each of these levels, who will have been trained to utilize and apply the manuals and guides intended to reinforce the capacity of the internal auditing division (*Inspection Générale des Services - IGP*) and the *Observatoire de la Gouvernance*.
- Comp. 2** Those staff in the MINEDUB HR unit, at the central and decentralized levels, concerned with teacher management who will receive training in improved teacher allocation methods. Indirectly, beneficiaries are also those who benefit from the improved allocation of teachers to available posts: that is, teachers, students and the communities concerned.
- Comp. 3** Those in the planning department who will receive training in improved planning methods.
- Comp. 4** The practitioners in the public sector, scientific professionals, especially those who operate between academia and the public sector, and those working for the private sector and NGOs.

Project Beneficiaries (Revised, by Component)

- Comp. 1** Those who will benefit from the improved management of the education sector, through: regularly updated documentation used to support the development of the sector; updated action plans for the education sector strategy; analytical tools; and tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation in the international dialogue on education (CITI and GDLN).
- Comp. 2** Those benefitting from regular data collection that will lead to improved monitoring of the system at every level via strengthening of the information systems and improved planning capacity, notably through the annual

publication of statistical yearbook for three levels of education and through school health cards for primary and secondary education.⁴

- Comp. 3** Those benefitting from improved internal monitoring from the preparation and dissemination of institutional audits.
- Comp. 4** Beneficiaries in 86 identified Priority Education Areas who will gain from improved participation in the education sector.

1.5. Original Components

- Comp. 1 Reinforcing administrative management**
The objective of this component was to improve the administrative management, personnel management, and planning of the education system. These planned improvements are founded on the Government's orientation in favor of decentralization in the sector.
- Comp. 2 Reinforcing pedagogic management**
The objective of this component was to improve pedagogic management in order to make the teaching and learning process more efficient. The key outcome was to reduce repetition from 25 percent to less than 15 percent, in addition to renovating the structure and curricula of secondary education.
- Comp. 3 Supporting enrollment and reducing the gender inequity in the Education Priority Areas (ZEP)**
This component aimed at increasing the demand for primary education and promoting gender equity in the Adamawa, Far-North, East, and North provinces. The main outcome of this component was to increase Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) from 84.4% to 100% and the Gender Parity Index from 0.58 to 0.90 in the target areas.
- Comp. 4 Building the Capacity of the higher education institutions**
The objective of this component was to raise the overall quality and relevance of teaching, research and professional development by improving the system's ability to internally generate a critical mass of high quality academics, researchers and professionals, particularly in disciplines critical to the country's development.

⁴ School health cards were introduced at the school level to help begin to counter the worsening health of the student population. See section 1, Sector Issues.

1.6. Revised Components

16. The project was restructured twice. On April 6, 2010, the project was restructured significantly, as explained below; secondly, on August 23, 2012, a level II restructuring took place to re-allocate funds across eligible expenditure categories. No other changes were made, and the closing date of September 1, 2012 also remained the same as the original project closing date.

Revised Project

17. The revised PDO focused on supporting the Education Sector Strategy (ESS) that aimed to strengthen and improve management of the education system. The restructured project included four components that target four key areas of education planning and management. All existing activities in the original design were reorganized under the restructured components to facilitate coherence in project design and to improve project monitoring. The revised project objective resulted in a significant shift in focus from the original project.

Comp. 1 Develop and update the strategic vision for the education sector.

Specifically, this Component aimed “to create capacity for continuous development of Cameroon’s Education Sector Strategy by supporting knowledge exchange and the production of relevant studies.” The activities planned under Component 1 include: (i) the preparation of studies relevant to the improvement of the education sector’s strategic vision; (ii) capacity building activities for the sector; and (iii) establishment of the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter-University Resource Documentation Centers (*Centre Inter-Universitaire des Ressources Documentaires*, CIRDC). The intended outcome of these activities is the capacity to continuously update the education sector strategy, based on the most recent qualitative and quantitative data and enhanced by international knowledge sharing.

Comp. 2 Strengthening the education information system and planning capacity.

The objective of Component 2 was: “to improve management of the education system at all levels by reinforcing the information systems and planning capacity for the production of timely and accurate statistical data and the production of sector action plans.” The activities under Component 2 include the development of management that improve the collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of statistics to support decision making and accountability of the primary, secondary and higher education levels of the education system. This includes the acquisition of equipment and training in relevant technical areas. The intended outcomes are the improvement in the efficiency of the education sector’s information system, production of education monitoring tools of current education status, and a school health map to inform the preparation of a new school health policy.

Comp. 3 Reinforcing sector monitoring. The objective of Component 3 was: “to reinforce sector norms, improve capacity to monitor compliance with norms and

regulations and to improve education resource management at the primary and secondary levels.” This component includes activities that reinforce the capacity to evaluate management reforms. They include training, workshops, and technical assistance. The component will also provide tools and instruments in the form of technical support to improve the implementation of the new private education law.

Comp. 4 Improving public participation. The objective of Component 4 was: “to increase the public accountability of the education system.” This component includes (i) public awareness campaigns and governance workshops to increase public accountability of the education system; and (ii) a school rehabilitation program in the Priority Education Areas (*ZEP, Zones d'éducation prioritaires*) regions aims to increase accountability of government financed actions to beneficiary communities

18. The restructured project was to have the following new outcome indicators: (i) preparation of budgets based on statistical analysis at every level of the education system; (ii) improved efficiency and equity in teachers' allocation; (iii) biennial update of the ESS on the basis of analytical studies; (iv) increased beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the Priority Education Area (*Zone à éducation prioritaire (ZEP)*).

1.7. Other significant changes

19. Three other complementary changes because of restructuring were also made: First, coordination structures were streamlined and strengthened. Two changes were made in the institutional arrangements of the project to improve the coordination between Ministries and the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). First, a representative of the Presidency was added to the Project Steering Committee. Second, the membership of the Operational Monitoring Unit (OMU) in each Ministry was streamlined. Second, new implementation arrangements for School projects under Component 4 came into effect. School projects under Component 4 were to be implemented through a delegated management arrangement (*Maîtrise d'Ouvrage Délégue – MOD*) in form and substance satisfactory to the Bank. Third, the project was required to follow/adhere to the provisions of the new Anti-corruption guidelines (“Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants”, dated October 15, 2006).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Lessons of earlier operations taken into account for the original project design

20. A health project in Cameroon that closed in 2001 (Health, Fertility and Nutrition Project (P000411)) provided some relevant lessons: (i) that it is important to be realistic concerning expectations and that systems must be in place for measuring performance; (ii) project design should be simple, especially in sectors without prior experience with Bank operations; and (iii) institutional assessments must be carried out on implementing bodies. The Higher Education Technical Training Project (LIL-Credit 3110), that was completed just prior to this project under review, also provided some worthy lessons: first, legal and institutional reforms can be derailed at the last moment, even when consensus exists and when they are technically sound. Consequently, major decrees -- such as those related to the creation of autonomous institutions under component 4 of the current project -- should be enacted before the start of the Project. Second, replication of high-quality technical institutions is hampered by the system's inability to replace human resources which are regularly lost through brain drain and lack of cost-efficient alternatives to studying overseas. All lessons above were considered useful and reflected in project design.

Quality Enhancement Review

21. The recommendations of various specialists were also sought during a Quality Enhancement Review (QER)⁵ in order to gather lessons relevant to the issues of repetition and dropout. Most OECD countries did not believe that repetition improves education outcomes and so have adopted automatic, or quasi-automatic, promotion policies. In Africa, there is a consensus among specialists that students who repeat a grade tend to drop out of school earlier than those who don't. However, while there are strong technical arguments in favor of curbing repetition rates (as most developed countries have), such policies are controversial in Cameroon. They tend to be rejected by both parents and teachers. The teachers worried that they will be sending students forward who are unprepared and will not succeed later.⁶ In this project, a compromise approach was adopted whereby only within-cycle repetition would be eliminated at first. More extensive changes were to be envisaged once a broader sharing of research evidence had been carried out, and parents and teachers were convinced of its validity.

⁵ Undertaken during project design period.

⁶ Note that this is also used as an excuse to charge students additional tuition for extra classes. It becomes a source of corruption, in other words.

Risks and mitigations

22. **In the original project design**, critical risks and possible controversial aspects (identified in the PAD) were the following.

23. **Political risk.** Although the government was already putting in place an impressive reform agenda, the concern was that the pace of the reform process would decline following the elections in December 2004, which had divided the Ministry of Education into three ministries: MINEDUB, MINESEC, and MINEFOP. The MINESUP existed as a separate entity. Coordination requirements, and therefore risks, increased as a result of this new ministerial configuration. However, steps were being taken to improve coordination, in essence through workshops associating donors and the government and the launch of the preparation of a sector-wide strategy.

24. **Economic risk.** The Government had increased its education expenditures from 1.7% of GDP in 1995 to 2.7% in 2002 and was planning for further increases reaching up to 4.0% by 2010. At the time, it was believed that it was perhaps not possible to reach this goal for expenditure if economic growth slowed as a result of exogenous risks, such as adverse terms of trade shock or lower-than anticipated levels of external financing. This risk was analyzed in the PRSP, and a scenario was developed. In it, the policy framework remained unchanged but the sector goals were no longer consistent with the MDG 2015 targets.

25. **Weak implementation capacity and shortcomings in financial management.** This risk was to be mitigated by ensuring that the PCU staff and the implementation manuals were in place before the project implementation commenced.

26. **In the revised project design**, no new risks were identified.⁷ While it seemed that no ‘new’ risks were identifiable because the risks identified in the original project appraisal document (PAD) continued to be pertinent, a reevaluation of the risks in the context of institutional changes was necessary, as were new measures to mitigate them in light of the critical assessments during the mid-term review, early aide-memoires, and the Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP).

Adequacy of participatory processes

27. Much emphasis was put into developing the Logical Framework for the original project and its translation into a Monitoring and Evaluation framework. The indicators were developed in a participatory manner with Government units and other stakeholders and were put in place early on to give each team an opportunity to revisit and change their targets if necessary.

⁷ see p.13, Restructuring Paper

2.2. Implementation

28. The original project was approved on May 31, 2005. Implementation was slow to begin. Although the first ISR ratings were optimistic, it became evident that there were difficulties in implementation of the project.⁸ The implementation rating in the second ISR of January 2006 was rated MU. Over the next year, disbursements rose very timidly, reaching just a little over 10% by Q2 2007, almost two years into the project implementation period. However, the ISRs 3 and 4 registered MS as the implementation rating.⁹ Disbursement continued on sluggishly, nevertheless, reaching just 36% by Q4 2009 – two and a half years later. As a result, both DO and IP ratings remained MU throughout that time (in five ISRs, #5-#10).

29. A significant restructuring of the project was approved on April 6, 2010,¹⁰ (discussed at greater length in section 5.1 below) which altered the PDO and revised the components, with the underlying idea of streamlining implementation and strengthening project monitoring. Outputs and targets were revised and there was a new results framework. The overall project cost remained, nevertheless, the same.¹¹ Despite the restructuring, the next two years, July 2010 – July 2012, saw an increase in disbursement of just 16.2%. However, with implementation picking up significantly over the April-September 2012 period, disbursements surged by 30 percent in the four months of grace period, finishing at 86.97%.

30. A hard line was taken as the project neared closing: no further extension was given,¹² although construction activities (notably latrines and wells) remained incomplete.¹³ Instead, these activities were transferred to another project in the portfolio that could accept them. It should also be mentioned that the CMU had to become involved at this point in the project.

⁸ These were due in large part to the suspension of the first project coordinator and the time required in replacing him, all of which created delays in project execution.

⁹ In ISR #3, the IP was upgraded from MU to MS due to completion by Government of a major strategy document and the launch of a large number of bids after March 2006. In ISR#4, the rating remained unchanged (MS) because there was evidence that disbursement would increase substantially when the bunching at the procurement level would have been cleared.

¹⁰ Even if restructuring was discussed as early as 2008 (see ISR #7), the decision to move to restructuring and the process of designing a new project took some time. This was because the Government was reluctant to entertain the idea at first, after having invested so much, politically, into the initial project design.

¹¹ Principally because the government was reluctant to give up any donor funding and, more particularly, because the different Ministries concerned were unwilling to allow any of their original funding to be reallocated to another Ministry.

¹² This refusal to extend was to demonstrate that the project could not drag on. It could be argued that the WB could have shown a little more flexibility here and offered a limited two month extension to allow just these construction activities to be finished. There may be good reasons why it didn't: it needed to send a firm message to Government that the project could not go on and on.

¹³ Misinformation from Plan Cameroon regarding the actual state of implementation of latrines and wells forced the team to hire a consultant to travel to the sites to establish the facts of the matter.

31. Weak disbursement characterized the project in its initial and restructured forms. 36 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively, are shown on the datasheet to have been disbursed in these two phases, for a total of approximately US\$10.2 million out of US\$18.2 million. In addition to this, however, approximately 34.7 percent not captured in the datasheet or the final ISR, was disbursed in the four month post-project close grace period, bringing the post-restructuring disbursement to approximately 51%. In all, the total project disbursement amounts to approximately 86.97 percent (as of Jan 24, 2013). Government agreed to cancel US\$2.65 million or approximately 14.6 percent of total funds.

32. Project disbursement delay flags were raised on several occasions (more than 5 times) during the life of the project. These implementation difficulties and delays can be explained in large part by three sets of factors, some subject to government, some to implementing agency, and some to World Bank control. A brief summary is given here, but these are also developed in other sections of the ICR.

33. First, in terms of factors subject to government control, endogenous ones of several kinds stand out. There was: (i) little or no unified *de facto* leadership of the project; (ii) poor ownership and commitment; and (iii) weak functional capacity caused by difficult inter-ministerial coordination, onerous administrative structures and procedures, and inefficient procurement and disbursement processes. These are discussed in section 5.2.

34. Another important confounding factor, subject this time to Implementing Agency Control, was weak project management.¹⁴ The first two project coordinators were replaced, due essentially to non-performance, while the mandate of the third cannot be characterized by proactive project management. Indeed, when the World Bank found that actively managing the execution of project activities on a week by week basis was helpful, this was still not adopted by the project management unit. It is not clear why. Rather, an in-country World Bank intermediary had to pursue project implementation serving as a *de facto* assistant to the PCU coordinator.

35. The factors the World Bank might have better controlled include project design (and re-design) and, arguably, project management and supervision. The project design had not anticipated, at least not realistically enough, the challenges of working with a newly fragmented Government (one with four newly created Ministries dealing with education) in a new sector-wide approach. Then, the project restructuring design did not manage to find a corrective measure for the challenges of working in this new administrative context and so disbursement continued to be slow and implementation difficult. In addition, there was high task team leadership turnover -- five in seven years -- which did not lend itself to finding the best approach to supervising the project. What was found to work, at the end of the project, was intensive hands-on supervision, with a focus on strict adherence to set deadlines, follow-up, and careful monitoring of implementation activities. This involved

¹⁴ Even the costly recruitment of an international procurement specialist did not lead to decreases in procurement delays.

significant effort on the part of the World Bank task team, which signaled ultimately an absence of adequate government commitment to and ownership of the project.¹⁵

2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

Original Design

36. The Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) rated the original project as Unsatisfactory with the most important criticism being that it was poorly designed, without clear links between activities, indicators and objectives and thus making the PDO unlikely to be met. The results framework was not appropriate for a project concerned for the greater part with technical assistance (TA) whose main objective was capacity-building. There were two additional confounding factors: (i) data were unavailable or unreliable (Plan Cameroon, for instance, as mentioned in footnote 15, furnished misleading information); and (ii) the distance from Headquarters made it difficult to obtain actual implementation progress.

Revised design after restructuring

37. The restructuring needed to pay significant attention to (i) improving project management; and (ii) ensuring that the project objectives and associated indicators were realistic, clear, and aligned with activities as well as ensuring appropriate linkages between activities to ensure synergies. The revised project's results framework was more in line with a TA project, although not all activities in it were purely TA-related and, because many activities were qualitative in form, they did not lend themselves to sharp monitoring and evaluation.

Capacity-building

38. An important intended outcome of the components of this project devoted to capacity-building was a more streamlined education administration better able to manage its mandate through more efficient procedures and a more effective agenda. While this was a crucial objective at the heart of the project, it is not clear how the capacity building program was organized logically- and pedagogically- speaking so that the numerous activities within it would work together to achieve the objectives. The absence of a coherent plan was apparent. There were a huge number of workshops, 114 in all, but it is unclear how these were meant to advance the capacity-building agenda. The training plans

¹⁵ The process also revealed that during the final three months of the project implementation period, with the growing certainty that the project would be closed as originally envisaged on September 1, 2012, project staff (especially fiduciary staff—financial management specialist and the accountant) resigned to take on longer term and more secure assignments. The attrition weakened the project secretariat's ability to ensure full compliance with the financial management and accounting requirements in a timely manner.

(*plan de formation*) that were submitted to the World Bank ¹⁶ list workshops of various sorts, but it is unclear to what extent these would be productive. For instance, it is difficult to know what could be accomplished in a ten-day workshop on language. The point is that these activities, perhaps of some importance in capacity building, needed to be monitored (over and above attendance being taken) to show what impact they have had in concrete terms.¹⁷ Otherwise it is not clear how they would result in behavioral change leading staff to work differently because of the new knowledge gained, and how capacity would have in fact been strengthened. During the last year of project implementation many of the activities were reviewed and rejected as being unnecessary. This came at a significant cost in terms of repeated negotiations to keeping *versus* eliminating activities.

2.4. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Safeguard Compliance

39. The initial project triggered safeguard policy OP 4.0 1 Environmental Assessment (with the safeguard screening category being S2, and the environmental screening category B). These ratings were due to the construction of the CITI and the provision of water wells and latrines within the compounds of existing, active schools. Potential safeguard-related issues also included soil and water pollution, soil erosion, noise, air pollution, loss of vegetation, and crop losses. An Environmental Mitigation Plan (EMP), prepared to address environmental and social impacts under components 3 and 4, was made available in Cameroon on November 19, 2004, and at the Bank's Infoshop on November 22, 2004. It was also determined that OP 4.12 would be triggered, even though there would be very limited social impact of the CITI construction. At restructuring, the proposed changes were deemed not to change the environmental category of the project or trigger new safeguard policies. A supplemental EMP was prepared to clarify actions needed to be taken to ensure compliance of school projects financed under Component 4, such as school rehabilitation, latrines and water wells.

40. The project was rated 'satisfactory' in these two areas -- compliance with the safeguards OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement -- a rating that did not waiver over the course of the project. No other safeguard was triggered by the project.

Fiduciary Issues

¹⁶ Submitted as Excel worksheets, these list the objectives of each workshop, their date and time, number of participants, costs and the per-diem expected, but no M&E of the activity.

¹⁷ The capacity development plans were not carefully directed to link up with specific outputs and outcomes that would pave the way for real change in the Ministries. The fragmentation in the plans clearly indicates that the activities were intended to placate individual Ministries and their staff to get a fair share of the external financing support. It is impossible to carry out impact evaluations on myriad small value capacity development activities. The sum of the parts does not add up to the whole.

41. Financial and procurement assessments were conducted as the initial project was prepared. All issues and risks related to procurement were identified and corrective measures were agreed upon. The overall project risk for procurement was considered high. A series of corrective measures were agreed on and included the recruitment of an additional part-time procurement expert, the provision of adequate procurement trainings to the members of the procurement commission of MINEDUB, MINESEC and MINESUP, improvement of procurement record-keeping and preparation of a procurement plan prior to negotiations. The project financial management risk was considered substantial. Financial management arrangements satisfied the World Bank's minimum requirements under OP/BP10.02 and an action plan to further improve these arrangements has been agreed upon, including the elaboration of an accounting procedures manual, the reinforcement of internal controls and the purchase of an integrated accounting and financial reporting software.

42. An intensive Post Procurement Review (PPR) was conducted in May 2009 to determine what needed to change in terms of procurement practice to process the government's request for restructuring. In October 2009 an assessment mission concluded that all major recommendations had been implemented, except for the recruitment of a new procurement specialist (who was hired in January 2010). A number of key changes¹⁸ were made to improve procurement.¹⁹ Furthermore, the government drafted a new procurement plan, which was approved by the task team.

43. Project supervision has shown that the (original and restructured) project's financial management arrangements, when found inadequate, were made to be compliant with the Bank's financial management requirements. There were nevertheless ongoing concerns regarding weak procurement. This weakness was due to a number of factors: (i) as discussed later in section 5.2(a), procurement was a complex and onerous affair²⁰; (ii) poor inter-ministerial communication and coordination caused delays and bottlenecks (dossiers sent between Ministries, for instance, were not easily traceable); and (iii) complications caused by missing staff or staff turnover hampered efficient procurement execution. The World Bank and the Project Secretariat teams remained flexible in the face of these challenges by restructuring the project substantively once and by reallocating funds across eligible expenditure categories a second time to try and refocus the project on essentials

¹⁸ The April 2010 mission included a senior procurement officer in order to improve procurement. The mission proposed significant changes in procurement processes, and some indicators linked to quality control inside the PIU. However, while these changes seemed logical, they have not been able to deeply improve the situation.

¹⁹ These included: (1) Better and more transparent processes for requesting price quotations from potential suppliers; (2) Regular publication of the results of bidding processes; (3) Implementation of a system for receiving and validating reports produced by consultants; (4) Recruitment of an internal auditor; (5) Acceleration of payment of overdue bills; (6) Better filing of documents, particularly with regards to cross filing of procurement and financial management documents.

²⁰ There was much back and forth between agencies, because National and Bank procedures seemed to those working with them in Government to be sometimes irreconcilable.

and to extend deadlines so that the implementing agencies could overcome accumulated delays.

Audits and Disbursements

44. Four kinds of audits were used in this project: internal, technical, external, and a final transactions-based audit. **Internal.** Following conditions laid out in the restructured project, an internal auditor, a private consultant, was hired to work with government. In rare cases where projects are at risk, like this one, the terms of reference call for internal audits to include recommendations to help improve the financial management of the project within government.²¹ These audits were late in 2012, judged to be unsatisfactory by World Bank review (as they too closely resembled external, not internal audits), and their recommendations were never acted upon by the project secretariat. **Technical.** Technical audits, used to ensure that construction projects were in fact completed, were undertaken by the World Bank team that closed the project within the framework of the restructured project. The technical audit was not part of the restructured project design. For reasons linked to difficulties in the procurement process, contracts for these kinds of audits had never before been signed. **External.** External financial audits were carried out throughout the project. As the record in the ISRs reveals, these were often qualified, occasionally having accounting issues, though in the last three ISR, no problem was highlighted. **Transactions-based audit.** In addition, as more than three times as much disbursement took place as the project ended than usual, the task team took steps to mitigate the risk of inefficient and/or inappropriate use of resources by having a third party transactions-based audit of project activities take place.

2.5. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

45. The follow-on project is not an IDA project. It is a Global Partnership for Education (GPE) project. It is the follow-on to the EFA-FTI project mentioned in paragraph 13 above), which closed on December 31, 2011. The link between the two projects is that the fiduciary due diligence for the EFA-FTI project was being undertaken by the EDCB Secretariat.

46. Preparation for the follow-on GPE project will commence around February or March 2013. The lessons from the EDCB project and the EFA-FTI ICRs, as well as the lessons from the design and implementation experience of the projects recently financed or in progress by other development partners (specifically, the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD)), will be taken into consideration in designing the new GPE operation.

²¹ Anecdotal evidence suggests that this audit arrangement was largely unsuccessful. The internal auditor was ineffective in passing recommendations on in a manner that elicited positive action from the project secretariat. Further, there appears to have been a clear lack of willingness in the project secretariat to act upon the recommendations of the heavily qualified internal audits.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Original Project

Relevance of Original Objectives

47. The original project was expected to contribute to putting Cameroon back on track to reach the MDG of ensuring that by 2015, all children, boys and girls alike, would be able to complete a full course of primary education (100 percent completion rate). It was grounded in the country Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that was presented to the Board in July 2003, which emphasized the dual role of human development as an engine for broader social development and a pillar for capital formation and growth. It was also consistent with the first pillar of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): “strengthening the institutional framework for improved pro-poor economic management and service delivery.” The Education Sector played a prominent role in this CAS, which covered the period from 2004 to 2006, and showcased policies intended to promote better governance and the sound use of public resources. The objectives were, in short, clear and important for the country and sector and furthered the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and MDG goals. And, it should be added, these remain important goals for the sector.²²

Relevance of Original Design

48. The project design exhibited several strong points. After arguing convincingly for the need to improve the management of the education sector, the design put forward a coherent framework that focused on a series of key objectives that, if successful, were likely to contribute in a significant way to the greater PDO (see below). In this sense, it was very ambitious. The PDO, however, was articulated quite broadly, which left room for interpretation. Being so defined in fact, it focused on an outcome for which the operation could not reasonably be held accountable. In addition, the design, being so ambitious, included numerous and, to some extent, diffuse activities and so was not responsive to borrower limitations.

²² The latest education sector CSR (2012) argues as much, repeating lessons put forward by its authors eight years earlier in the technical background report for the original project.

Relevance of Original Implementation

49. There is no doubt that it would have been difficult to anticipate how changes in governmental structure – the dividing up of the Ministries of Education -- would affect the project's implementation capacity. The functional capacity of the government was known to be weak, so working with one that was newly restructured must have been challenging. The Government and the Bank must be commended for tackling this project in this new context.

Revised Project

Relevance of Objectives

50. The PDO of the restructured project focused on those strategies and actions of the Education Sector Strategy of 2006 that aimed to improve the strategic management, evaluation capacity and planning of the education system, which was an excellent initiative as it concentrated on the central underlying problem confronting the sector. More specifically, it was expected to provide tools, training and other forms of support to education authorities, communities and the general public to: (i) continually hone the strategic vision for the education system through analysis, knowledge sharing and dissemination; (ii) improve the education information system to ensure greater accountability and better decision making; (iii) improve sector monitoring by education authorities, the government and the public; and (iv) provide opportunities for greater participation of beneficiaries in education decision-making, thus increasing accountability.

Relevance of Design

51. The strong point in the revised design is found in its introduction of strong financial management measures. What confounded the design however was the commitment to the restructuring of the project on the part of the Borrower. As explained elsewhere (see section 5 on Borrower Performance), the Government, having made pledges to several sets of stakeholders, was averse to changing the project and so, as a consequence, the revised design retained almost all the original design's activities, though classifying them differently under new components. It was inconsequential in reducing their burden, in other words, and since the restructured project was planned to be only two years in length, this left a questionably short period for so much activity. And indeed Government did take some time to change stride in order to find adequate traction to engage with the new contours of the project. Nevertheless, what the restructured design did achieve -- and this is something that should be underlined – is that it led to improvements in project execution, thanks to its insistence on focusing on accomplishing only the essential in the project. Proof of this comes finally at the end of the project when disbursement finally surged to 87 percent.

Relevance of Implementation

52. The revised design attempted to streamline the original project, but did not adequately assess the country's existing institutional capacity, most notably, the ministries' inability to effectively implement the project activities. Knowing what had already transpired in the initial phase of the project before restructuring, this was some oversight.

3.2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Original Project²³

53. The last measures of the PDO and Intermediate Indicators of the Original Project were taken in March 2009, revealing the following.

PDO Indicators

54. The Development Objectives of the original project – “to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education” – were achieved to some extent. Progress had been made in the sector.

55. In terms of **retention**, the target was exceeded. The primary completion rate attained 83 percent as of March 2009, already bypassing the September 2010 end of project target of 80 percent. The abolition of school fees at project onset most probably contributed significantly to this result. Primary Repetition Rates, which at baseline were 25.8 percent, had dropped to 20 percent by March 2009 and may have just reached the 15 percent target at end of project.

56. In terms of **equity**, the target was close to being met. Improvements in female to male enrollment rates in target areas were noted: from a baseline of 0.58, the rate had climbed to 0.82 by March 2009, 8 points shy of the end of project target of 0.9, and so it is likely the target would have been met.

57. In terms of **improved management**, the randomness in primary teacher allocation, estimated at baseline to be 45 percent, had dropped just three points to 42 percent by March 2009 (after four years), but was unlikely to attain the end of project target of 25 percent the next year, suggesting either that: (i) project interventions were having limited success in rationalizing the baroque process of teacher deployment; or (ii) the project target was too ambitious. For a more in-depth discussion of the teacher deployment issues, see the Implementation Completion and Results report (World Bank document No.00002369) for

²³ see ISR #9 for a summary.

the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector” project.

58. **Intermediate outcome indicators.** Only two of the eight intermediate indicators had been measured by March 2009. First, repetition rates, recorded at 25 percent at baseline, were expected to descend to 15 percent by project end. Instead, the rate climbed to 28.1 percent in Francophone areas, while it declined to 17.4 percent in Anglophone areas, by March 2009, (for an average of 20%), a reflection perhaps of differing interpretations and responses in these sub-systems of the policy changes related to repetition. Second, the ratio of girls to boys, targeted to be at .9, reached .82.

Revised Project

59. The Development Objectives of the revised project – “to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector” – were achieved in some measure, most markedly in the last stages of the project.

Revised PDO Indicators (There are four indicators)

60. **Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis.** The target was partially met. While the final target was for budgets to be fully aligned with strategic goals of the sector and to be based on relevant statistical data, challenges persisted in respect to the availability of reliable data, even if the data verification and cleaning exercises had been undertaken. The development of a methodological guide providing guidelines to better align budget with strategy continues to be a work in progress after the closing of the restructured project. The process, however, commenced prior to project closing.

61. **Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment.** The target is partially met. Government states that as a result of addressing the teacher deployment issue through the hiring of contract teachers at primary school level, the deployment issue is being progressively resolved. Equitable teacher deployment remains a challenge. Again, for a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see the Implementation Completion and Results report (World Bank document No.00002369) for the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector” project.

62. **Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two years.** The target has been largely met. The revision of the ESS, based on analytical work launched over preceding months, was underway at project close and will inform the 2013 budget cycle.

63. **Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the ZEP.** The target has been met. The activity was partially completed by the executing agency Plan Cameroon, though it is important to note that,

while the number of schools initially envisaged was 86, 29 were either being already rehabilitated by other development partners, or by the government through the BIP (*Budget d'investissement public*). The IDA project financed the sensitization program and rehabilitation of works in the remaining 57 schools.

Intermediate Indicators

64. There are eleven indicators: five of which were met or exceeded, three were expected to be met after project closing, while four were partially met. (Please note that in the datasheet at the beginning of this ICR, these indicators are given in the order found in the restructuring paper; here, they are grouped by achievement, so as to give a clearer idea of what has been accomplished).

Those that were met include:

1. **The publication of annual, statistical yearbooks for three levels of education.** This target has been met. However, some years of the publication for MINESEC are missing and challenges concerning data credibility and validity remain to some extent.
2. **System for learning assessment at the primary level.** The target has been met: a summative evaluation of student achievement/assessment system after primary education exists. Further, early grade reading assessments are being administered through financing from other partners. These are proposed to be regularly administered over time.
3. **The target number of direct project beneficiaries** (students, teachers, parents, communities, education administrators) of 75,000 was exceeded. As of project close it was estimated to be 93,761.
4. **Number of projects implemented with the participation of beneficiary communities in the PEA (ZEP).** The target number of 57 projects was met. The number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions was targeted to be 430. This was achieved to the extent that 405 were completed through the project while the remaining were completed through other partner-financed projects, and had been double counted towards the project target.
5. **The setting up of the infrastructure for GDLN.** Target met. The GDLN will be a means to facilitate higher education learning and policy dialogue.

Those expected to be met after project closing:

1. **Regularly updated documentation.** The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. Although the work commenced prior to project closing, due to the complexities of: (i) the government's focus on preparing a program budget for a three-year period; (ii) efforts being placed by government to complete a sector strategy linked to their vision document; and (iii) coordination between multiple education ministries resulted in the process taking far longer than anticipated to be completed.
2. **Production of updated action plans** for the education sector strategy. The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. In keeping with the intermediate indicator assessment above, the action plans will be produced after project closing since the analytical work has already commenced. These plans will be developed based on the completion of the revised education sector strategy in the context of preparing the follow-on Global Partnership for Education (GPE; formerly EFA-FTI) project.
3. **Production of analytical tools** (ex: simulation models). The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. This is due to the fact that the preparation of the program budget for three years took precedence over the completion of the simulation model for education. Through the project interventions, a team of representatives drawn from each ministry has been trained to produce and use this tool, and the preparation of the simulation model exercise continued after project closing. These tools will be used to inform the budget preparation in each sub-sector during the 2014 budget cycle, and towards preparing the follow-on GPE project.

Those partially met or not met include:

1. **Production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges** and participation in the international dialogue on education (CITI and GDLN). The target of having 1,000 documents consulted has only been partially met. Following some delays in the procurement of the GDLN equipment, the tools have now been received and are installed and await a Government decree putting the center into operation. With respect to the CITI, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the achievement of the target.
2. Institutional audits prepared and evidence of the implementation of recommendations. The target has not been met: the action plan for implementing recommendations is still under preparation. These institutional audits were to be disseminated to a large audience through 5 workshops.
3. Percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools in compliance with the criteria laid out in the operations manual. Target not met, because there is limited evidence on the percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools.

4. The publication of school health cards for primary and secondary education was not initiated.

3.3. Efficiency

65. **Unit costs.** Before the 2000/1 school year, fees were abolished for all students in primary school, leading to a surge in first grade enrolment. Fees were replaced by block grants paid to schools. However, these were insufficient to cover costs: parents had to pay for additional teacher recruitment, school functioning, and frequently contributed to school-related construction projects. Further, they still had to pay for textbooks, and sometimes for uniforms.

66. The CSR of 2012 offers a comparative perspective of unit costs for figures recorded in 2002 with those recorded in 2011.²⁴ Relatively significant changes are observed with an overall pattern moving downward over the period. Within that trend, however, primary education unit costs increase by +18% over the period. This appears to be the result of the removal of locally hired temporary teachers and their replacement with better (contractually) paid teachers. In general, this is a promising sign of reform because the Government has recruited i) better paid ii) better trained and iii) state-paid teachers instead of parent-paid teachers. In comparison, the first years of lower secondary education (post-elementary) saw a decline in unit cost of as much as 42% over the period, while there is a 17% increase in the unit cost of upper secondary schooling. This can be explained, ironically, by the massive recruitment of locally hired (parent paid) teachers in lower secondary school.

67. **Internal efficiency.** At project outset, the overall internal efficiency coefficient for the whole education system was estimated to be 0.71²⁵, indicating a waste of education resources of close to 30%.²⁶ It is the primary education system that is most severely inefficient, notably in the French speaking sub-system.

Overall internal efficiency coefficient per level of studies (Project Outset)			
	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary
Overall internal efficiency coefficient	0.63	0.81	0.75
French-speaking subsystem	0.79	0.89	0.84
English-speaking subsystem	0.80	0.91	0.90
	0.63	0.81	0.75

²⁴ Education sector CSR (2012), p.60

²⁵ Estimates given in the PAD.

²⁶ The coefficient compares the number of years all students graduating from a cycle would have needed to complete the cycle (assuming no repetition is necessary), with all the student-years produced by the system.

Overall internal efficiency coefficient			
Coefficient only taking into account repetitions	0.79	0.89	0.84
Coefficient only taking into account dropouts	0.80	0.91	0.90

Source: World Bank Project Appraisal Document (PAD), 2006

68. At project outset the frequency of class repetition (25.8% in the primary schools, 15.3% in lower secondary education and 26.2% in upper secondary education) was very high and was at the root of the inefficiency. Class repetition was much more noticeable in the French-speaking subsystem (28% in the French-speaking primary schools against 17% in English-speaking schools).

69. Meanwhile, at project end, estimates for internal efficiency are given in the latest education sector CSR²⁷: taking into account the cumulative frequency of repetition and drop-out in the current situation (for primary education in the school year 2010-11) leads to an estimate of the overall index of efficiency being 79.8 per cent. This means that about 20% of the resources mobilized for this level of education are in fact wasted. In terms of international comparisons, the waste in resources observed in Cameroon is more favorable than that observed on average in the francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa (33%). In terms of change over time, we note that the situation in the country has improved quite substantially. The internal efficiency coefficient, which stood at only 63% in 2003 and 71% at project outset, is now at project close, 79.8%, even if the comparability of the three figures is probably not perfect.

70. To what extent the EDCB Project contributed to these results is an important question. The objective of the original project was ‘to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education.’ However, as we saw in section 3.2, while progress was made on several counts (in terms of retention and equity), in terms of improved management, the target for reduced randomness in primary teacher allocation was not attained by project end. In the restructured project, the targets of ‘developing and applying management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector’ were met to some measure, though not altogether.

71. **Conclusion.** Over the project period, it is true that (i) the general pattern seen in unit costs is one that decreases (though the unit cost of primary has in fact risen²⁸); and that

²⁷ CSR, 2012, p. 84.

²⁸ Though, as we saw, this is a promising sign of reform because the Government has recruited i) better paid ii) better trained and iii) state-paid teachers instead of parent-paid teachers.

(ii) the internal efficiency of the system had improved. While the EDCB had contributed to this net positive effect, the full attribution of the results to the EDCB project alone would not be an accurate assessment. Therefore, the efficiency of the project can only be rated conservatively as having been **modest**.

3.4. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

72. The overall outcome rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory is meant to reflect contrasting aspects of this project: (1) The original and revised project were relevant because they were aligned with the Government’s overall education program, a fact borne out by the positive reactions found in the Beneficiary Survey (see Annex 5); (2) the PDOs were achieved *to some extent*; (3) project efficiency was modest -- due to two factors: (i) the improvements in internal efficiency of the system could not be wholly attributed to the project, while (ii) implementation, that was slow to begin, surged in the last year of the project.

Project Relevance	Achievement of PDO	Efficiency	Overall Rating
Substantial	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Modest	Moderately Unsatisfactory

3.5. Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

73. Satisfactory progress towards gender equity was seen in the Northern areas (the education priority areas) under the project through: (i) the sensitization of parent-teacher associations regarding girls’ attendance in school. The sensitization program was successfully implemented. The social development element was fully achieved. Parents have become more actively involved in the school management process in the project regions. A good proxy for measuring gender equity is access to latrines. The design of the restructured project, however, had not included the construction of latrines and wells. Therefore, these sub-activities were included in the school rehabilitation component about 6 months prior to project closing. However, by the end of project implementation, although the contract for the latrines had been signed, the Works was not completed by the executing agency. A fraction of the envisaged ³⁷ wells had been completed by that time. As a result, the gender impact of the project cannot be fully measured.

(b) Institutional Change / Strengthening

74. Institutional strengthening was only modestly achieved. As seen in section 2.3, an important intended outcome of this project was capacity-building, the objective being to

create a more streamlined education sector administration better able to manage its mandate through more efficient procedures and a more effective agenda. While this was a crucial objective at the heart of the project, it is not clear to what extent it was successful. One important point to underline is that this project did help to bring four newly-formed Ministries of Education together to work in a Sector Wide Approach. For instance, the activity of constructing the simulation model, like other activities in the project, seems to have had a net positive effect as it brought many governmental players together on a regular basis and so helped them coordinate their approaches.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

75. Combined with the positive impacts of the EFA-FTI project that resulted in financing contract teachers, the schools rehabilitation and the supply of school desks and chairs undertaken through the EDCB project is beginning to have some positive impact. School directors and teachers are reporting that classrooms are less crowded, students are attending schools more regularly, and that the overall schooling environment has improved.

3.6. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

Please refer to Annex 5.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: **Moderate**

76. The greatest risk to development outcome has been internal, related to the suitability of the operation's design to its operating environment. This operational context, characterized by imperfect Ministerial coordination and fluctuating project management by the implementing agency, has not been one in which the project could easily succeed. In the last eighteen months of the project, this environment began to improve through various initiatives, most notably through better governance offered by the selection of the Ministry of Economy, Planning, and Territorial Activities (MINEPAT) to help lead sector strategy. This will most likely have some impact on the operation's development outcomes materializing, and so the risk to development objectives is rated as **moderate**.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

77. As this project was significantly restructured, both in terms of PDO and components, Bank and Borrower performance will be assessed in the project's initial and restructured phases with each period being weighted following the calculations in Appendix B of the ICR guidelines. As 36% and approximately 51% were disbursed before

and after restructuring, respectively, the initial period will receive a weight of 3 while the restructured period a weight of 4.²⁹

5.1. Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

78. While it is more usual in an ICR to assess just the Quality at Entry at project inception, in this project it will be valuable to evaluate the Quality of Entry at restructuring as well because of the scope of that restructuring. The rating is calculated in the following way: as we will see, the Quality of Entry of the original project is determined to be **Moderately Unsatisfactory** (with weight of 3), while the Quality of Entry of the Revised Project is **Moderately Unsatisfactory** (with weight of 4), which together combines to give a final Quality of Entry rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

79. **Original Project.** As examined in detail in section 2.1., the Bank ensured quality at entry in the original project in the following four ways:

Soundness of background analysis. The background analysis supporting the project was generally good, lessons learned were incorporated into the project, and the rationale for Bank intervention was sound.

Assessment of project design: it could be said that the project design *was* and *was not* relevant in the following senses: while it was aligned with World Bank country and Government of Cameroon (GoC) strategy, it was not perfectly designed given the project context: it is true that in the original project, the choice of the four project components seemed logical. However, the design could not easily anticipate what the effect of the newly divided Ministries would be. With hindsight, the project now appears to have been ambitious: it was complex, calling on many actors to work in coordination on many activities carried out in a short implementation period of, initially, three years.

Adequacy of government commitment. The Government worked closely with donors to prepare the project, demonstrating evident commitment in doing so.

Assessment of risks. Three risks were identified in the PAD (see section 2.1). Although none were rated as substantial, two have proved to have been detrimental to the project (i) the political risk of poor government coordination (arising from the Ministerial restructuring) was meant to be mitigated by holding dedicated workshops; and (ii) the risk of weak implementation capacity and shortcomings in

²⁹ The ratio of 36 to 51 being roughly 3 to 4 (36 to 48).

financial management was to be mitigated by ensuring that the PCU staff and the implementation manuals were in place before the start of implementation.

80. For these reasons, the rating for Quality of Entry of the Original Project is **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

81. **Revised Project.** The Bank, proactive in urging the Government of Cameroon to restructure the project,³⁰ ensured quality at entry of the restructuring in the following four ways:

Soundness of background analysis. The restructuring paper reveals that (i) some background analysis was undertaken to support the restructuring, (ii) lessons learned from the original project implementation were presented, which were to be incorporated into the new project design, and (iii) the rationale for Bank intervention continued to seem sound.

Despite this, the greater question is why the project was restructured at all, given that implementation of the original project had proceeded so slowly. Why not close it? It took a long time to restructure the project because the Bank procurement and financial management staff expressed a number of concerns that required clearance from their managers before the project team could move to the next step. There were in addition some compelling reasons that resulted in the restructuring, not closing, of the project: (i) this was the only project the World Bank had in the basic education sector and the new design was intended to strengthen relationships with the different education Ministries; (ii) the government was putting into place an education council headed by the Ministry of Planning that was supposed to work on education strategy and planning (a key part of the project); and (iii) it was up to the Government to decide to restructure or to close. Given that the Ministries concerned all had stakes in the project, both material and political, there would have been considerable difficulty for the Bank project team to convince them to in fact close.

Assessment of project design: it could be said that the project design continued to be more or less relevant in the following senses: (i) while it continued to be aligned with World Bank country and Government of Cameroon (GoC) strategy, it was not perfectly redesigned given the new and emerging project context; (ii) the new design attempted to streamline the project, but it did not fully succeed in overcoming what were by then known difficulties, most notably the weak functional capacity of the Borrower; and (iii) it is also unclear why the restructured project did not take into account the procurement advances initiated through the Investment Lending reforms.

³⁰ As early as 12/20/2007, this was brought up (in ISR #6).

Adequacy of government commitment. Each Ministry worked to retain its original share of the project, but the Ministries did not re-engage together on this project in a unified and coherent manner; their commitment had in effect become diffused among the Ministries. There were no incentives for inter-ministerial cooperation.

Assessment of risks. No new risks were identified in the restructuring paper, as most of the risks had already been identified in the original PAD. Nevertheless, in hindsight the restructured project would have benefited from a re-articulated focus on risks and related mitigation framework given the new context of the restructuring and new measures introduced to help mitigate these.

Nevertheless, and in spite of these issues, project implementation was managed successfully, resulting in the disbursement of a significant amount in the final stages of the project. For these reasons, the rating for Quality of Entry of the Revised Project is **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

(b) Quality of Supervision

82. The Quality of Supervision is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**, which is calculated by combining the quality of supervision of the original project (**Moderately Unsatisfactory**) with the quality of supervision of the revised project (**Moderately Unsatisfactory**) and attributing to each the appropriate weights (of 3 and 4 respectively).

83. **Original Project.** In the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports covering the original project, comments about project supervision are of two sorts: (i) those that commend the Bank team for having addressed the various minor challenges to the project that cropped up; and (ii) those that encourage the Bank team to place particular emphasis on the supervision of certain aspects of the project. These latter comments, from Bank Management, are repeated occasionally (in four out of nine ISRs), but this is not to say that supervision was found wanting. The Bank proactively identified and resolved difficulties related to the achievement of the project development outcomes, as both the ISRs and the aide-memoires clearly demonstrate. Comments in these reports about poor project progress do not typically implicate project supervision as a single cause, but rather cite other factors to do with administrative procedures, the implementing agency or government. Seen within this logic, supervision was acceptable.

84. And yet, there could have been greater awareness and execution of collective responsibilities among the actors (the government, project implementing agency, the task team and Bank management). A set of factors can be cited for weak project performance in the absence of the right conditions for a successful operation. Supervision held a central place in this. So, for instance, there had been limited efforts up to 18 months prior to project closing to use the procurement plan as the principal tool to manage the number of project activities and, indeed, it is unclear if the procurement plans were systematically reviewed and approved. Further, project implementation delays were due in part to the

significant lag time in the provision of non-objections by the Bank for the myriad activities of the project. At any given time there might have been no less than 20 ongoing activities, both big and small, in various procurement stages. These needed to be reviewed and re-reviewed by procurement staff. In addition, there was high task team leadership turnover -- five in seven years -- which did not lend itself to finding the best approach to supervising the project.

85. **Revised Project.** After the slow disbursement rate following restructuring, during the final 18 months of the project implementation period there was recognition of the need to: (i) revise the procurement plan to retain only those activities relevant to address component objectives and action was taken to implement the activities; and (ii) supervise the project extremely closely in order to ensure greater project execution. It was understood that keeping track of all the procurement activities alone required dedicated staff. Commendably, the task team expended significant energy to devise innovative approaches and to enter into time-sharing agreements with the other Bank project TTLs who had hired the education project secretariat FM Specialist and the Project Accountant. What was found to expedite project execution at the end of the project -- the proactive daily management of the project through active and proactive support from full-time Bank staff members, and an in-country operations officer -- augmented the cost of supervision. However, this was a trade-off that the final Bank teams had to make, given the circumstances. (The amount the World Bank allocated to project supervision in the last year bears testimony to this. See Annex 3, the economic and financial analysis).

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

86. The rating for Overall Bank Performance is therefore **Moderately Unsatisfactory**, which is calculated by combining the rating for Quality at Entry of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** with the rating for Quality of Supervision of **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

5.2. Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

87. The rating is given for the following reasons. Aside from the back-loading of disbursement before project close, a post-project evaluation of implementation suggests several plausible explanations for the slow rate of project disbursement. Chief among these are the leadership, commitment, and functional capacity of the government.

88. Before 2004, there were two Ministries of Education: the Ministry of Education (*Ministère de l'éducation nationale*) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP). In 2004, a Presidential decree split the former into three to become the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB), the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC), and the

Ministry of Vocational Education and Training (MINEFOP); the MINESUP remained unaffected.

89. The EDCB project, which was designed to encompass the education sector in its entirety (all education sub-sectors), included transversal activities concerning two or more (or all four) of these Ministries. In such a case, the administrative procedure would call for three administrative levels in government to work together. In order of importance, these were (i) the Steering Committee, (ii) the Technical Steering Sub-committee, and (iii) the Subcomponent Management Unit. It also entailed the implementing agency, the Project Management Unit, which also added a fourth layer of bureaucracy to this.

90. For the project, leadership of the steering committee was given to the MINEDUB, as the project focused to a great extent on basic education. For other matters, a Ministry seen to be external to the four education Ministries, the Ministry of Economy, Planning, and Territorial Activities (MINEPAT) was chosen to lead the steering committee. So, for example, it is MINEPAT's Secretary General who leads the technical steering committee on questions of sector strategy. This demonstrated the readiness to take action and a commendable problem-solving attitude on the part of the Government.

91. For each transversal activity in the EDCB project, one unique set of terms of reference had to be agreed upon by all Ministries concerned. The inter-ministerial coordination required (at the various implicated administrative levels) did not lend itself to celerity – just convening meetings where every central actor was present was time-consuming. If a complication of some kind arose, which was quite possible and quite common, this already onerous process could then involve even greater delays. In addition, inter-ministerial meetings were at first very infrequent, as little as once a year at the beginning of the EDCB project, though with much encouragement from the Bank, they became more regular.

92. The division of the sector between four Ministries did not favor the adherence to and implementation of strategic directions for education policies,³¹ and the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the administration was often unclear. There was little accountability. This partition led to another significant consequence: weak government

³¹ Another serious consequence was the direct impact this state of affairs had on the drive for reform itself. Consider the hypothetical causal chain, on which reform was based: the Government's needs were expected to be translated into *terms of reference* meant to define an *activity* that would have an *effect* on a set of beneficiaries and in so doing produce the desired *reform*. However, given the project's ineffective *modus operandi*, the relevance of each of these steps became adulterated. For instance, if the Ministries had to negotiate the terms of reference of each activity, there was already some loss of exactitude in those terms. If the beneficiaries had to be picked by consensus, they, too, may not have been exactly the right ones, and so on, to the point where the intended reform may not have been accomplished fully, but only partially and out of sync with the initial conception of the reform. This, it could be claimed, occurs in all projects; but in this project, the desired impact was particularly out of line. In addition, the onerous character of the procurement process also led to a loss of greater vision because the project was lost in the details of the procurement procedure to a very significant extent and very often.

ownership of the project. The numerous project activities were perceived to be scattered across the Ministries and as little leadership was apparent -- even if some came from MINEDUB -- the project activities were not actively managed in each Ministry and so there was no clear alignment across Ministries. Put another way: had government commitment been greater, some way forward would have been found to drive all these activities forward in a concerted manner in all concerned departments.

Procurement

93. As Annex 10 (An Analysis of Project Procurement Activities) reveals, procurement assumed a significant place in this project. Not only did it cause fundamental delays, but the procurement-centric nature of the project itself, since it caused almost all stakeholders to be lost in some detail or another to do with procurement, caused them to lose sight of the bigger picture – the impact the project was meant to have. In the original project phase, there were numerous procurement activities of varying values ranging from small to large procurement that were all being undertaken at the same time, such that each activity was at a different procurement stage. This was challenging for all parties to follow-up consistently and in a timely manner. In addition, the elapsed time for each procurement activity was inordinately long. The agreed procurement plan could have been used as an effective tool to streamline implementation, but it was not. Rather than being an education project, the project became a set of procurement-centered activities (see foot note 33 for consequences). In the revised project phase, if the restructuring was ineffective at first in terms of improving disbursement, in large part due to weaknesses in procurement having not been addressed at restructuring, the approach of the final two Bank project TTLs – to lessen the onerous character of procurement procedures and to refocus only on the essential in project activities – led to a surge in disbursement in the run up to project close.

Other delays

94. Administrative delays also arose because of the technical weakness of evaluator's chosen by Government, a fact which can only be explained by the prevalent political economy in force. Some technical activities required particular kinds of expertise (for instance post-basic or education sector CSR studies), and yet the government frequently committed directors of government units to be these evaluators instead of true specialists, which lead to incoherent or low quality evaluations, systematically rejected by the Bank TTLs with critical comments.³²

95. By all accounts, the administrative procedures described here, combined with weak government ownership, and excessive procurement-centric activities slowed implementation significantly in the initial and restructured project. If this last point is

³² For instance, after a first poor evaluation for the CSR study, the World Bank had no choice but to insist on having an external evaluator from another development partner agency sit on the evaluation committee. The evaluation was thus reorganized. The PIA team received guidance, and a clear evaluation was eventually rendered to the Bank for Non-Objection.

underlined, it is to stress the fact that **the nature of the project design itself (suggested by the World Bank) contributed much to the delays on the part of the Borrower.**

96. The successive Bank teams' attempts to reduce the numbers of small value and largely tangential activities to the PDO demonstrate this. These attempts were, however, met with resistance from the Borrower. This was particularly the case for the capacity-development activities because these included per-diems, which were seen as supplemental income, an incentive of no small measure, for undertaking project implementation. Indeed, they largely served as a reason to multiply the number of capacity building activities (there were 114 in all). Consequently, the Project Secretariat made significant efforts to include small-value procurement that went around formal Bank non objection requirements for this reason. The TTLs were inundated with requests for non-objections; in addition, improving disbursements was not in the overall interest of the project secretariat that had assured counterpart financing.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

97. In the original phase of the project, this agency's commitment to achieving development objectives seemed to depend too heavily on the staffing challenges it was facing. As noted previously, the first two coordinators were replaced due in essence to non-performance. In addition, there were persistent fiduciary difficulties: supervision missions³³ indicated that the project unit should have been more diligent in terms of reporting, record-keeping and following procurement and financial management practices acceptable to the Bank. Indeed, it was recommended that a financial or a procurement specialist be hired. Another reason for delays was also given; there was a lack of communication and coordination between the agency and the various departments in the Ministries of Education.

98. At restructuring, the PCU significantly strengthened its implementation capacity by (i) streamlining the coordination structures to improve the coordination between Ministries and the PCU, (ii) hiring additional qualified personnel, in the areas of financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation and putting in place better tracking systems for procurement and financial reporting; and (iii) adopting new procedures to simplify the implementation of training activities (which represent a significant share of the project activities). However, despite these measures, disbursement remained extremely feeble. Of course, the government, project coordination team, the task team and Bank management all share a responsibility to ensure that the right conditions are brought together for a successful operation. Nevertheless, an assessment of this agency's commitment to achieving the PDOs remains guarded. It was only when project execution

³³ See ISR #7 & #9.

was closely monitored by the last two project teams towards the last year of the project that disbursement rose significantly at the end of the project.

99. Finally, a lack of transparency within the Project Implementing Agency was noted by its own members, a fact which also contributed to its relative inefficiency.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

100. As discussed in greater detail in earlier sections of this report, borrower performance was affected by issues to do with commitment, management, administrative procedures, procurement and disbursement, and M&E. In the PCU, these included questions to do with commitment and project management. However, that said, the multifaceted character of the project design itself contributed to the challenges faced by the Borrower, a design that compromised their effectiveness to some extent.

6. Lessons Learned

101. A systematic assessment of the political economy environment for project development and implementation is a *sine qua non* in countries where political decisions are likely to lead to the creation of multiple Ministries of Education resulting in weakening government commitment to full engagement with project implementation. The preparation of a risks and mitigation framework to accompany the political economy assessment is also important.

102. The rationale, timing, and the imperative to restructure rather than close a project need to be more closely examined. Criteria could be put in place for this. The World Bank should have reacted more forcefully, to the challenges encountered at project onset caused by Ministerial fragmentation, by insisting that restructuring take place rapidly.

103. The World Bank must find ways to deal with the challenges of implementing projects in contexts where multiple Ministries are involved, like those that will be found in Sector Wide approaches. This project did not know how to respond to this institutional landscape. The design should be simplified when the administrative context is complex.

104. In the future, a Permanent Technical Unit equipped with a minimum amount of resources and appropriate human resources should be put in place in country for the implementation of similar projects.

105. Adhering to an agreed-upon procurement plan is indispensable for the success of the project.

106. More prominence must be placed on the supervision of projects by the Bank. TTLs should be commended for designing projects but also in equal measure for staying with a project and seeing that its implementation is successful. Further reflection on how this might be carried out is required. The Bank could establish an “Exemplary Supervision” Award like VPU Team Awards, for instance.

107. Institutional capacity-building requires a coherent plan with measurable indicators. It must be pedagogically relevant in terms of learning objectives, designed in comprehensive, cumulative sequences over the life of the project, be output and outcomes based, and must include a robust monitoring system. Best practices and lessons learned from other projects should be sought.

108. Lending Instruments in relation to Project Context. Undertaking pilot interventions prior to instituting full-fledged lending would be most cost efficient in environments with political economy challenges. Further, disbursement linked indicators (DLI) bolstered with specific investment lending (SIL) for technical assistance would likely be the most appropriate instruments. Finally, appropriate governance and anti-corruption measures to accompany the lending instruments would enable timely and efficient monitoring of fiduciary challenges.

109. Using the private sector to execute certain activities may make good sense for two reasons. First, they may be more efficient. For example, the CMAs (MOD) used for construction activities in this project demonstrated that they have greater regional reach and experience than government, and so can do things quickly and cost-effectively. A second more general lesson is that they may be much more cost-efficient from a transactional point of view, as well. If, as we have seen, transactions between the World Bank and Government (especially when this involves working with more than one Ministry) have been onerous from a procurement point of view, it makes sense to avoid these whenever feasible.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

Borrower/implementing agencies

110. Towards January 2012 it had become apparent that project implementation was not progressing well. Decisions had to be taken to review the possibility of implementing the remaining activities within the very short time (8 months) prior to project closing in end-August 2012. The decision to include the construction of latrines and wells in the project was intended to serve a proxy for the outcome measure on improving gender equity. Extensive discussions had been held with the PCU to include or exclude them, timelines had been reviewed, and the feasibility within the remaining timeline for implementation

had been carefully assessed. It was on the basis of the assurances provided by the PCU and the executing agency that the activities were finally included in the project. Regretfully, the combination of delayed signing of contracts with decentralized agencies in the regions and more importantly, the onset of uncharacteristically inclement weather during the final month of project implementation that led to flooding in the project areas prevented the full implementation of the construction activities. Efforts were undertaken to accommodate the remaining activities as part of an ongoing World Bank sanitation project.

111. The Bank team's hesitation to provide non-objections during the final eight months of project implementation was directly related to: (i) the complexity of the project with myriad procurement activities, having to acquire a full understanding of the significant implementation problems that the project had suffered in the preceding six years; (ii) determining the best way forward to: (a) ensure that the remaining project financing could be disbursed fully based on a thorough assessment of what activities were feasible or not in the run up to the project closing date of August 31, 2012; and (b) ensure that sufficient due diligence was exercised in providing non-objections. The delays in granting non-objections were directly linked to these aspects.

112. Further, the request by the PCU to the Bank task team to make direct payments on the majority of the final activities forced the Bank team to exercise its due diligence responsibility towards making a sizeable payment. This included having to seek documentation, clarify complex spreadsheets with numbers that had significant errors in them, cross-checking information with the PCU and with executing agencies, and ensuring that a technical evaluation was undertaken for the school rehabilitation sub-activity. It was on the basis of the evaluation report that the direct payments were effected. The Bank task team's efforts were directed towards ensuring that the amount of ineligible expenditures was kept to a minimum.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Category	Category Description	Initial Allocation USD	Revised Allocation USD	Allocated USD	Disbursed USD
1	Works	105,492	17,516	17,906.97	10,795.13
2	Goods & Vehicles	2,432,346	1,667,979	1,705,189.88	1,844,731.57
3	Consultants' Services	4,242,289	3,204,130	3,275,609.86	3,274,720.24
4	Training, Workshops	4,766,736	3,430,906	3,507,445.33	3,438,553.19
5	Grants for Subprojects			0.00	0.00
5A	Consultants' Services PART D	678,164	434,644	444,340.41	285,823.90
5B	Goods, Works PART D	3,398,353	4,792,387	4,899,299.35	2,919,757.52
6	Operating Costs	1,900,365	1,261,574	1,289,718.17	1,320,139.95
7	Refund of PPF	678,164	678,164	693,292.50	456,793.03
8	Unallocated	33,155	93,605	95,692.85	0.00
DA-A	Designated Account			0.00	1,371.04
DA-B	Designated Account			0.00	300,243.91
	Totals	18,235,063	15,580,904	15,928,495.33	13,852,929.49

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower	Joint	4.00	0.00	0.00
International Development Association (IDA)	Joint	18.20	0.00	0.00

Annex 2. Outputs by Component (in detail)

Annex 2a. Initial Project Result by Component

Sub-component/ Result Indicators	Principal Activities of the Sub- Component	Initial Situation (Year)	Target	Date Expected	Progress	Observations
Component 1 : Management Capacity Building						
1.1 Strengthening monitoring and evaluation of administrative services (increase satisfaction of service users MINEDUB)	Technical assistance to develop manuals and guides in place to manage and evaluate service standards	No manual or guide exists (2005)	Manuels and guides drafted	2008 2010	In progress	Carried over to the restructured project
	Training programs for key personnel on the use of manuals and guides	No training programs (2005)	Manuals and guides available from all major officials at central, provincial and district	2008 2012	In progress	Carried over to the restructured project
	frequent internal audits using rigorous methods, with the assistance of private audit firms	No internal audit is used (2005)	key civil servants have been trained in the use and application of these manuals and guides	Throughout the project	Test audits are piloted	Followed up in the restructured project
	Awareness- building campaigns	No campaign is used (2005)	Increased satisfaction	2008	See survey results on expenses	
1.2 Capacity building for administrative staff (decrease of the standard deviation of the average number of teachers per school in the	Technical assistance to develop methods and standards appropriate management	Organizational decree of the Ministry of Education enacted in 2002	Standards for the allocation of teachers to schools and monitoring of pupil-teacher ratios developed	Throughout project	The regulations come into play	The training was designed and conducted by HR managers

provinces from 1.0 to 0.5)	Train concerned personnel	2005	Decentralized structures and processes of teacher management improved, Reduction in randomness in the allocation of teachers from 45% to 25% by the end of the project	Throughout the project	715 officials in charge of human resource management have received training on reducing the arbitrariness of allocations	Decentralization continues
	Develop appropriate office technology for central and decentralized levels of government.	Personnel management guide (2005)	Computerization of staff management at the central and regional level	Throughout the project	Management structures equipped at central and regional levels	Appropriate software training remains to be put in place.
1.3 Improving the performance of the planning system at both national and provincial levels (production of 10 annual provincial stat brochures; production of 10 provincial school boards)	Recruitment of a consultant	2006	Establishment of a data collection system in each province	2008 2009	Functional specifications developed	
	Training of planners in information systems and databases	Limited training in school maps exists (2006)	Capacity planning by competent technical personnel	2008 2011	Managers trained in planning and school boards; Managers trained in information systems and databases	Deadline extended due to the late recruitment of a consultant
	Purchase of appropriate technological equipment	Technical structures not equipped (2005)	Technical personnel better equipped	2008 2011	Central and regional structures equipped	
	Purchase planning software for planning structures	Operations outsourced to individuals(2005)	Timely publication of statistical reports to facilitate planning	2008 2012	Statistical yearbooks and analysis reports automatically generated	
1.4 Strengthening of private education (public subsidies to private educational	Hiring a consultant to support the development of a procedures	Process uncodified (2005)	Procedures manual developed, validated and applied	2008/2008	Grants distributed in accordance with the procedures manual	Private Education Act of 2004 paves the way for the provision of various forms

institutions are transparent and based on mutually agreed criteria)	manual					of subsidies to the private sector
	Study tours to learn from the experiences of other countries	2005	Report on Lessons Learned	2008	Activity not carried out	TTL decided against it
	Workshops and consultations with the private sector	Insufficient consultation (2005)	Participatory development of the regulatory framework	2008	Increased frequency of consultations	Validated documents after participatory and consensual study

Component 2 : Strengthening Educational Management

Develop new procedures for assessment and review to reduce the repetition rate (the rate from 28% to 15% or less among Francophones and 17.4% to 15% or less in English speakers)	National awareness campaign targeting parents, students, teachers and other stakeholders, to prepare opinions for a change of perception of repetition and dropout	Repetition rate of 25% (2005)	Reducing repetition rates from 25% to less than 15%	2008/2010	The repetition rate is 12% on average	Combined effect of the awareness campaign and application of new methods for assessment
	Hiring a consultant to train teachers to improve relevant methods in formative assessment, and encourage the use of assessment as a teaching tool for the improvement of learning and not a selection tool	Evaluation of sub-systems (2005)	Training of teachers and inspectors method of formative assessment and standardized tests as well as new testing instruments Development of new procedures for review and evaluation	2008/2010	Capacity building of actors throughout the chain of educational management - Completion of a study tour to Canada - Establishment of an item bank for exams	

2.2 Implement new structures and pathways for secondary education (the legal text on the restructuring of Sec. School adopted in year 1, the new programs are in place in all schools of by year 4	technical assistance to develop programs and training workshops for teachers	2005	all institutions both English and French, will run the new structure and introduce new programs	2008 2009	Programs in this observation sub-cycle are validated; programs developed	Due to the non-signing of texts devoted to the restructuring of cycles, programs are not introduced
	consensus-seeking consultations at the national level, awareness campaign at national level to achieve consensus	2005	secondary education in Cameroon must include two cycles of five plus the first including a two year observation sub cycle and an orientation cycle of three years of general or technical education	2008	Communication plan developed	
2.3 Improving the health of primary school pupils and secondary school (school health strategy is in place)	Hiring a consultant to support the health survey, the development of the card and the school health policy	No consultant (2005)	Survey conducted on the current state of health in schools and on existing national strategies for health education, adoption and implementation of school health policy in primary and secondary education.	2008 2011	Investigative Report of the INS; map and school health policy developed, validated and disseminated	
	Enrichment workshops, dissemination	2005	Workshop reports	2008 2011	Numerous consultations were held at	

	and validation				regional level	
	The development and dissemination of educational materials relevant	2005	Map of school health and school health policy duplicated and disseminated	2008 2012	Documents are duplicated and diffused	
Component 3: Support girls' education and reduce the lack of gender equity in the ZEP (Priority Areas of Education)						
3.1 Increase the demand for primary education and promote gender equity in Adamawa, Far North and North (gross enrollment in CIP is to increase from 84.4% to 100%, the repetition rate in the CIP are reduced to 15% and the gender parity index of 0.58 to 0.90)	Advocacy campaigns and advocacy for parents and the wider community	No campaign conducted (2005)	No campaigns carried out	2008/2012	Report on problems in enrollment carried out by a consultant	
	Micro-projects that help communities to build latrines and wells and acquire instructional materials, teacher guides, offices and desks and blackboards	2005	A number of micro-projects undertaken	2008/2012	Nothing done	Carried out in the restructured project
	Training to build capacity for planning and management of key members of school boards.	2005	Number of capacity building sessions conducted	2008/2012	Nothing accomplished	Carried out in the restructured project
Component 4: Strengthen the capacity of higher education institutions						
4.1 The set up a special fund to support research and professionalization (FARP)	Technical assistance and workshops	2005	Implementation through systematic funding university research ; Developing local capacity to undertake high quality research ; Increase collaboration with the private sector in conducting research and	2008	Nothing accomplished	The decree was not signed

			training			
4.2 Operationalization of the Interuniversity Centre for Information Technology (CITI)	Developing business plans and marketing CITI Strategic plans for ICT development in each university - Consultations with stakeholders and dissemination activities	First stages of ICT (2005)	Support capacity building for improving the management and use of ICT in national universities	2008/2011	Feasibility study available Procedures manual developed CITI staff trained and Universities	
	Technical assistance, workshops and study tours	2005	Conducting a study trip Participatory development of media with the support of Consultant recruited	2008/2011	- Study tour to Morocco Consultant-mission report available	
4.3 Capacity strengthening of the Inter-University Centre for Research and Documentation (HRTC)	Technical assistance to analyze the legal status of the HRTC and develop its business plan	2005	Improve access to documentation and sources of knowledge	2008/2011	-Feasibility study available -Procedures Manual developed -Staff trained HRTC and Universities -Study Tour in Morocco Consultant-mission report available	
4.4 Develop a Global Development Learning Network - GDLN	Costs associated with site development work GDLN	2005	Site developed	2008/2012	100% developed	
	Cost of equipment	2005	Equipment purchased, installed and tested, and found functional	2008/2012	100% developed	
	Operation during the first three years of the Centre	2005	Recruited staff, operating expenses provided	2008/2012	100% carried out over 2 years	

Annex 2b. Revised Project Result by Component

Sub-component/ Result Indicators	Principal Activities of the Sub-Component	Initial Situation (Year)	Target	Date Expected	Progress	Observations
Component 1: Development of a strategic vision of the education system.						
1.1 Development of studies and reflections (regular studies to support the development of the education sector)	CSR (Status Report of a National Educational System)	(June 2010)	Diagnosis backed by the DSCE	(Sept 2012)	Activity underway outside of the project	Implementation envisaged by the World Bank
	Analysis of technical and vocational training,	(June 2010)	Analysis validated	(Sept 2012)	Not realized within the project framework	
	Impact of the recruitment of Inspectors on the quality of primary education	(June 2010)	Production of reports and final diagnosis	(Sept 2012)	Reports available	
	Report of the annual review of the sector strategy	(June 2010)	Periodically updated reports	(Sept 2012)	Reports available	
1.2 Development and application of analytical tools (production plans of action priority ESS simulation models, standards and budget processes)	Training of 25 officials in the implementation SAS in the development and updating of simulation models	(June 2010)	Simulation models have been updated	(Sept 2012)	Training conducted in 3 sessions of 5 days each	
	Updating the state of the national education system	June 2012	Provide a status report of the education system (CSR) updated	(Sept 2012)	Activity underway outside of project	
	Assessment of Student Achievement	June 2012	Have at hand evaluation reports of students' knowledge	(Sept 2012)	Activity carried out by the <i>Cooperation française</i>	
	Analysis of the labor market	June 2012	Creation of a labor market observatory	(Sept 2012)	Not realized	
	Preparation of the budget on the basis of statistics	June 2012	Have standards and processes for preparing budgets for each sector level based on statistics	(Sept 2012)	Activity canceled	
1.3 Implementation of tools for the education sector	-Acquisition, installation and test of videoconferencing	June 2012	The Centre for Distance Education (CFD / GDLN) is	(Sept 2012)	Centre is 100% functional	

(production tools to facilitate exchanges and participation in international dialogue on education)	equipment -Site Facilities -completion of a feasibility study -development of a manual of procedures for managing -training of staff		functional			
	-Acquisition, installation and test of videoconferencing equipment -Site Facilities -completion of a feasibility study -development of a manual of procedures for managing -training of staff	(June 2010)	CITI becomes operational	(Sept 2012)	Activity is 100% complete	
	Completion of a feasibility study Development of a manual of procedures for managing Training of staff	(June 2010)	CITI is operational	(Sept 2012)	Activity is 100% complete	
Component 2: Strengthening of the information system and in planning capacity						
2.1 Conducting studies of information system at all levels	Recruitment of a Consultant	(June 2010)	Report	2011 2011	End of mission report available	
	Realization of a diagnostic master plan of MINESEC's information system	Dec. 2010	Diagnostic report of the existing system	March 2011 Jan. 2012	Diagnostic report produced	
	Proposal for Master plan of MINESEC's information system	Jan. 2011	Master Plan of MINESEC's information system	March 2012 August 2012	Master Plan available	
	Validation of various documents	2010	Diagnosis and proposed Masterplan	Throughout process	Completed	
2.2 Improving the performance of the planning system	Staff training in techniques and methods of planning	(June 2010)	The timely publication of yearbooks and analysis reports for primary, secondary	(Sept 2012)	-Training conducted at 100% -More regular	

(Publication timely statistical yearbooks and analytical reports for primary, secondary and higher education; Development of dashboards based on data and analysis of EMIS)			and tertiary		publication of yearbooks and analysis reports	
	Purchase of IT equipment and software for planning structures	(June 2010)	Planning structures well equipped with hardware and software	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
	Technical assistance to carry out studies	(June 2010)	Recruited consultant who produced a report at the end of mission	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
	Feedback workshops and training carried out	(June 2010)	Completion of workshop, reports, validation tools and training beneficiaries	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
2.3 Improving the health of primary school pupils and secondary school (school health card issued to primary and secondary Policy document approved by the school health ministries)	Technical assistance for studies and surveys	(June 2010)	Map of school health in primary and secondary performed on the basis of survey results	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
	Feedback workshops, dissemination and sharing	(June 2010)	School health policy document validated by MINEDUB and MINESEC.	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
Component 3: Strengthening internal controls						
3.1 Capacity building (IGS prepared audit reports and monitoring the implementation of recommendations; audit reports disseminated to the general public)	Technical assistance to develop manuals and guides appropriate	(June 2010)	Manuals and guides appropriate for audit produced Tracking the implementation of recommendations	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	Dissemination of audit reports to the public
	Training of key personnel in the use of audit manuals and guides and organization and methods	(June 2010)	Capacity of managers and executives of the Inspection service reinforced	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	Regulatory texts are submitted to the Heads of departments
	Feedback workshops	(June 2010)	Validation of documents	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	

3.2 The rationalization of human resources management of MINEDUB and MINESEC (tracking pupil-teacher ratios).	Feedback workshops and training on a variety of topics.	(June 2010)	The development of standards for the assignment of teachers in schools	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	The training was conducted by officials from the ministries in charge of Human Resource management
	Appropriate equipment for central and decentralized levels of government	(June 2010)	Improving the performance of structures	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
3.3 Rationalization of the management of state support to private education (Grants allocated to private schools in accordance with the criteria specified in the Manual of Procedures)	Technical assistance for the development of management procedures and manuals as state support to the private sector of education	(June 2010)	The validation of a manual of procedures Allocation of grants in accordance with procedures manual	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
	Workshops and consultations restitution	(June 2010)	Documents produced with a participatory approach	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	
Component 4: Strengthening public participation in support and monitoring of educational reforms						
4.1 Strengthening public participation in the support and monitoring of educational reforms (Number of advocacy campaigns and mobilization performed)	Conducting an awareness and mobilization campaign for those contractual Teachers currently working	June in 2010)	Reverse or at least reduce the tendency of absenteeism IC through the recruitment of a consultant and facilitator contracts with the media to produce a guide for teachers and public posters	(Sept 2012)	Activity completed	Recruitment
4.2 Capacity building and participation of beneficiary communities in priority education zones (Number of school projects assembled and made by school committees in a participatory approach ZEP)	Advocacy and mobilization for parents and communities in general, (ii) training to build capacity for planning and management of key school board members, (iii) the implementation of micro projects that help communities to rehabilitate and equip	(June 2010)	Number of advocacy and mobilization campaigns for parents and the community in general on new policies and regulations of the educational system (ii) the number of school projects mounted by ZEP school committees	(Sept 2012)		

	classrooms.		in a participatory approach			
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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. The project design, consisting of four main components in both its initial and re-structured forms, does not lend itself to cost-benefit analysis. This is because, in the initial project design, while cost estimates for each component were allocated, the relatively timid disbursement levels and, correspondingly, the weak results in terms of achievement of PDOs, do not allow a systematic evaluation of costs against benefits of each of these components. In addition, in the restructured project design, the components are essentially qualitative in nature and so difficult to quantify. Despite this, some of the components can nevertheless be evaluated for their efficiency, as we will see below.

Initial Project Design

Component 1 – reinforcing the administrative capacity and improving the governance of the education system.

2. At project outset, this component aimed to reduce randomness of teacher allocation in primary schools from 45 per cent to 25 per cent. Because teacher salaries represent 66 per cent of total expenditure in primary education, achieving this objective would represent significant economic benefits. Reducing the degree of randomness in the distribution of teachers would not only generate significant savings in terms of resources, it would also engender improvements in educational outcomes. Indeed, given that the degree of randomness in allocation in Cameroon is one of the highest of all Sub-Saharan African countries, it represents a major distorting factor in budget allocation.³⁴ However, just prior to restructuring of the project, the actual value achieved (as of 03/09/2009) represented an improvement of only 3 percentage points in this ratio.

Restructured Project

Components 1 & 3

3. The project targeted to improve the internal efficiency of the primary and secondary education systems. At project outset, the PAD estimated an internal efficiency of 0.71 at the primary level, indicating a waste of education sector resources of close to 30 per cent.³⁵ At the close of the project, the internal efficiency stood at 0.798, indicating close to a 10 per cent improvement in resource utilization, which represents significant savings. The benefits reaped from a more efficient utilization of resources are likely to be significant both in cost terms and educational outcomes. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the project contributed to these latter outcomes.

³⁴ PAD, pp. 5.

³⁵ PAD, pp. 60.

4. In its restructured format, continuous capacity building was a major objective of the project as evidenced through the establishment of the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter-University Resource Documentation centers to enhance education sector capacity through international knowledge sharing. While this upfront expenditure represents significant investment at the outset (sunk cost), benefits are likely to accrue in the medium- to long-term in terms of enhanced capacity in the education sector in the future.

Workshops and Seminars

5. Also as part of the capacity strengthening component of the project, workshops and seminars were organized, incurring a total cost of FCFA 1,239,475,825 (US\$ 263, 158.00)³⁶ over the course of the project cycle. A total of 114 training events and workshops were organized, bringing the approximate average unit cost for such workshops to FCFA 10,872,594.96 (US\$ 23,041.50).³⁷

6. The benefits for such workshops are difficult to assess empirically -- especially without good M&E to assess to what extent participants have learned skills that were meant to be acquired. With or without this, it should also be noted that capacity is likely to take a long time to build and costly to assess over a long period. The involvement of administration in terms of decision making capacity as well as planning for the sector could serve as subjective proxies for this purpose. For instance, staff from the Ministries could be assessed on the job to evaluate whether they were able to better execute program budgeting as a result over the course of the project.

Restructured Project

Component 4 -School Rehabilitation costs

7. The cost of school construction in Cameroon is expensive -- the highest in fact in comparison to costs in other Sub-Saharan African countries – to the point where it becomes a binding constraint. According to government estimates, the cost of constructing a classroom in the North-West and Adamaoua provinces³⁸ runs around US\$ 16,000.00 whereas the average unit cost in neighboring West African countries (Chad, Togo, Mali, and Niger) is around US\$ 10,250.00. As a result, the project opted for the alternative of rehabilitating some 405 schools in 57 different sites in Priority Education Areas (ZEP, *Zones d'éducation prioritaires*), which include the provinces of the North, Far North, East, and Adamawa as well as the slums around Yaoundé and Douala.

³⁶ Exchange rate used: 471.87 FCFA (average for 2008-2012); source: WDI.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Unit costs vary according to provinces in Cameroon.

8. The approximate unit cost of school rehabilitation under this project of FCFA 2,400,000 (approximately US\$ 5,086.00)³⁹ is similar to average unit costs of FCFA 2,500,000 (US\$ 5,298) - 2,800,000 (US\$ 5,934) for classroom rehabilitations carried out by the EU in the extreme north and north western provinces of Cameroon respectively.⁴⁰ It should, however, be noted that the comparison is probably imperfect due to lack of comparable data on unit costs from the Bank and other partners – as well as differing standards for construction/rehabilitation. Benefits from school rehabilitation are likely to accrue from higher quality of learning environment as well as lower maintenance cost in the future.

Project implementation/supervision Costs

9. Project implementation and supervision cost the bank a total of US\$ 1,189,128.01 in BB expenditures and complementary trust fund expenditures of US\$ 432,555.48, for a total of US\$ 1,612,683.49. This corresponds to 205.27 staff weeks, US\$ 612,119.71 in travel costs, and an additional US\$ 254,438.85 in variable costs.

Fiscal Year	Fixed Cost		Variable Cost (\$)		Total (\$)
	Staff Weeks	Labor (\$)	Travel	Other	
Fiscal Years 2005 - 2012	174.41	618,918.38	288,308.39	78,605.87	985,832.64
Fiscal Year 2013*	9.86	39,602.51	100,483.45	63,209.41	203,295.37
Total BB	184.27	658,520.89	388,791.84	141,815.28	1,189,128.01
TOTAL for all TFs	30,058.68	1,277,462.31	765,478.32	385,103.96	2,271,335.11
Total for BB and TFs	205.27	746,124.93	612,119.71	254,438.85	1,612,683.49

* Note that FY13 costs are as of 01/26/2013 only.

Source: RM databases

10. Disbursement levels prior to the restructuring of the project (i.e. in the first five years of the project) stood at 36 per cent and cost, in terms of supervision US\$985,832.64. Two years post-restructuring of the project saw 16.2 per cent in disbursement and then 35 per cent during the four-month project grace period. This period cost US\$203,295.37 in supervision costs.

Financial Analysis

11. Public spending (current expenditures) on the education sector in Cameroon experienced strong growth from FCFA 178.9 billion (2011-prices) in 2000 to FCFA 348.2 billion (2011-prices) in 2011, which corresponds to 95per cent increase (a near doubling) in

³⁹ Exchange rate used: 471.87 FCFA (average for 2008-2012); source: WDI.

⁴⁰ Data from Government.

budgetary allocation. Furthermore, per capita current expenditures on the population group of 6-16 year olds has increased from FCFA 47.105 (2011-prices) to FCFA 65.537 (2011-prices).⁴¹ So, in aggregate terms, public spending on education has kept an upward trend over the project period.

12. Whereas resource allocation to the education sector in the year 2011 accounted for close to 2.7 per cent of GDP (2011-prices), it made up 16.3 per cent of government expenditure (2011-prices) in the same year. This compares with a resource allocation in the year 2000 of 2.7per cent of GDP (2011-prices) and a 22.9 per cent share of total government expenditure (2011- prices) in the same year.⁴²

Table 2: Government Expenditure on Education

	2000	2007	2009	2011
Billions FCFA (2011 prices)	178.9	311.3	344.7	348.2
per cent of total Govt. expenditure	22.9per cent	20 per cent	20.8 per cent	16.3 per cent
per cent of GDP	2.7per cent	3.1per cent	3.3per cent	2.7per cent*

**GDP value is an estimation for the year 2011*

Source: RESEN 2012

13. The decline in percentage terms should however be viewed in the context of the overall budgetary repositioning which could occur following the debt relief that Cameroon received under the HIPC initiative. Total expenditure for the education sector has increased from FCFA 75 billion in 1995 to FCFA 383 billion in 2011 – a three-fold increase in constant terms. Prior to debt relief, almost fifty percent of the government’s budget was used to service debt.

⁴¹ RESEN, pp. 15-16.

⁴² Sourced from forthcoming RESEN, ch. 1

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit
Lending		
Mourad Ezzine	Lead Education Economist, TTL	AFTH3
Gilles Marie Veullot	Counsel	LEGAF
Wolfgang M.T. Chadab	Finance Officer	LOAG2
Shola Aboderin	Senior Education Specialist	WBIHD
David Tchuinou	Senior Economist	AFTP3
Myrina McCullough	Operations Analyst	AFTH3
Guro Nesbakken	Consultant Education Specialist	--
Henri A. Aka	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC
Kouami Hounsinou Messan	Procurement Analyst	AFTPC
Mwangi Wachira	Senior Economist Agriculture	WBIGD
Marc Jean Yves Lixi	Operations Officer	AFTKL
Richard Akoulouze	Consultant Education Specialist	--
Knut Vralstadt	Consultant Economist	--
Leif Jensen	Lead Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM
Emile Louis Rene Finateu	Senior Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM
Fridolin Ondobo	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM
Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt	Environmental Specialist	AFTS2
Mohamed Arbi Ben-Achour	Senior Social Scientist	AFTS1
Astania Kamau	Language Program Assistant	AFTH3
Lydie Yangouot	Language Program Assistant	AFMCM
Anne Anglio	Senior Program Assistant	AFTH3
Supervision		
<u>TTLs</u>		
1.Mourad Ezzine	Lead Education Economist	AFTH3
2.Jaap Bregman	Lead Education Specialist	AFTH3
3.Michel Welmond	Lead Education Specialist	AFTED
4.Fadila Caillaud	Education Economist	AFTED
5.Shobhana Sosale	Senior Operations Officer	AFTEW
Norosoa Andrianaivo	Language Program Assistant	AFTEW
Anne Anglio	Operations Analyst	CTRTF
Wolfgang M. T. Chadab	Senior Finance Officer	CTRLA
Prema Clarke	Senior Education Specialist	HDGPE
Nestor Coffi	Country Manager	AFMNE
Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt	Consultant	AFTTR

Laurence Hougue Bouguen	Program Assistant	AFCC1
Sekou Keita	Consultant	AFTME
Josiane M. S. Luchmun	Program Assistant	AFTSW
Myrina D. McCullough	Consultant	MNSED
Kouami Hounsinou Messan	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPW
Helene Simonne Ndjebet Yaka	Operations Analyst	AFCC1
Louis Steven Obeegadoo	E T Consultant	AFTH1 - HIS
Fridolin Ondobo	Financial Management Specialis	AFTME
Dung Kim Pham	Associate Investment Officer	CF1S4
Anselm Schneider	Human Development Specialist	AFTH3 - HIS
Natalie Tchoumba Bitnga	Team Assistant	AFCC1
Mercy Miyang Tembon	Country Manager	AFMBF
Gilles Marie Veuillot	Consultant	AFTTR
Lydie Yangouot	Language Program Assistant	AFMCM - HIS

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY02		108.31
FY03		67.32
FY04		252.25
FY05		158.44
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
FY08		0.00
Total:		586.32
Supervision/ICR		
FY02		0.00
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		1.63
FY06		132.38
FY07		144.01
FY08		175.05
FY09		128.76
FY10		112.55
FY11		145.32
FY12		146.14
FY13		203.30
Total		1,179.14

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

1. **Introduction.** The objective of the survey was to collect the views of beneficiaries of the Education Development Capacity Building (EDCB) project in order to gauge its impact on them. Specifically, this evaluation sought to: (i) test the awareness of communities regarding the project; (ii) collate their reactions to the various project components; and (iii) gauge the impact of it on them. As will be seen, the results are positive.

2. **Beneficiaries.** Several sets of beneficiaries were surveyed: as section 1.4 of the main ICR document reveals, there were different groups of beneficiaries in the original and the restructured project – and indeed some of the same groups in both. More particularly, the groups considered in this survey, chosen because they represented a solid cross section of the beneficiary population, are the following:

1. Administrators in Government having participated in capacity-building workshops;
2. Administrators of the Global Distance Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter-University Information Technology Center (*CITI, le Centre Inter-universitaire des Technologies d'Information*);
3. Communities in the Priority Education Areas (the *ZEP*) having benefitted from sessions that were part of the project's awareness campaigns in these areas.

3. **Methodology.** The survey involved a mixed methods approach. To reach a wider sample, generation of statistical data through closed-ended questions was favored, complemented by limited open-ended questions, some in-depth interviews, complemented as well by records kept of awareness campaigns sessions. The results are as follows.

1. Capacity-Building Workshops. A link to an online survey was sent to more than seventy government officials known to have recently participated in one of the 114 workshops given in the context of the capacity building component of the project. In addition, the same survey was given in hard copy form to a focus group that attended a dedicated survey session at the World Bank offices in Yaoundé. These two sets of responses were compiled and the results are given here.

- All respondents had participated in one or more EDCB workshop and had, in equal measure, been left with either a good or quite good general impression. Most (more than seventy per cent) felt it had been acceptably organized, if not well organized. Almost all felt the objectives had been met, except two who felt that few objectives were met and one that not enough objectives had been met at all.
- The presenter was found by all respondents to have been motivated and taken enough time to present the material acceptably (although two

respondents found that there had not been enough time). For some, more time for discussion was needed because the subject was new and rich.

- The majority of respondents (more than 64 percent) felt the workshop was very useful, while the rest felt it had been ‘quite useful.’ No respondent felt that it had not been useful or not useful enough. Almost universally, respondents felt that they had retained much from the sessions (though one said s/he had retained only ‘a little’).
- When asked how they used what they had learned, responses were almost unanimously positive (except for two discussed below). To give an idea of their tenor, these included for example: “the session was useful for my work as a teacher trainer”; ‘useful for my auditing work’; ‘very useful material that I use daily’; “I use what I learned in the administration I work in”; “useful information for whenever we work on World Bank projects.” The two discordant voices explained that they were disappointed because one found the material uninspiring and found that s/he returned to her/his usual ways of working after the workshop, while the other felt that whatever was gained was lost because only a little time after the workshop s/he was transferred.
- In general, almost all respondents had found the workshops useful professionally and one even added, “I found it satisfying professionally and personally, for are not the two domains linked?”
- Finally, when asked about the per-diem received for attending the workshop, forty percent felt it was sufficient, forty percent felt it was more or less sufficient, while twenty percent did not feel it was enough.

2. GDLN and CITI. The directors and staff of these institutions, who were beneficiaries of the project, also received links to online surveys. Their responses were compiled and the results are given here.

- In general, the capacity strengthening workshops for staff were appreciated when they were well organized and the presenter was dynamic and motivated. In most cases the objectives were attained and the respondents had the impression that the workshops had been useful since the takeaways continued to be of relevance after the sessions. This was not always the case. One respondent commented that the workshop s/he attended was poorly organized and few of the intended objectives were met, even if she/he did retain certain lessons from the session and continued to draw upon them in the work she/he did today. This respondent felt that the workshop was of some use, nevertheless.

- In a side note, one respondent added that he appreciated the workshops and looks forward to putting to use what he learned with the true beneficiaries of the GDLN – those who will use and profit from it -- when the decree legislating its opening comes into effect.

3. Education Priority Areas (ZEP). The objective of the EBCD component in the Education Priority Areas consisted of: (i) the rehabilitation and equipping of classrooms with benches; (ii) mobilizing and sensitizing the local communities (Children, Parents, School Communities); the reinforcement of capacity; and (iv) putting in place the Environmental and Social Management Plan. It is all these objectives that interest here, but most particularly the second and third.

- Two methodologies were exploited to gain an understanding of the impact on beneficiaries of the project in the Education Priority Areas (the ZEP). Given the imposing geographical area involved, (1) direct interviews were carried out with the twelve program facilitators working in the Education Priority Areas via email and/or telephone⁴³; (2) a comparative review of the facilitators' reports (written and submitted monthly) was undertaken. Their responses were compiled and the results are given here.

Interviews with facilitators

4. On average four meetings were held per month per school with the educational community (parents, school representatives, and students) with the objective of maintaining good relations, to carry out awareness within the schools and communities of the project goals, and to mobilize the community around the project.

5. Facilitators report that the communities as a whole were informed of everything that was happening, that most activities were very well received in each area, and that good relations were created and maintained. The communities were satisfied with the activities, especially the rebuilding of classes. Indeed, many communities were enthusiastic and participated (as they had traditionally done in the past) by setting to work themselves to help.

6. Many facilitators note that the project was necessary and has had an important impact. For instance, in this academic year (2012/13), the number of female pupils registered in the various schools has greatly increased. In addition, they are enthusiastic

⁴³ These EPAs are found in Adamaoua, the East, the North, and the Far North.

about going to school. The rehabilitated classrooms and new benches have had a great effect in this.

7. A few minor complaints were voiced: Delays occurred because rain made roads or river crossings impassable and so the community would have preferred building to have been done with this seasonal issue in mind. In a similar vein, another concern voiced by some communities was that they could not attend the meetings because they were busy with the imperatives of the manually-intensive agricultural cycle (planting or harvesting). One facilitator mentioned the poor effect on the community of the abrupt end at the project.

8. Fuller, more complete information offered to the beneficiaries regarding the project as a whole (start and end dates and so on) would have ensured a more comprehensive response from them.

Review of Facilitators Reports

9. The reports, submitted monthly to the regional level throughout the project life cycle by all twelve facilitators (from approximately January until September 2012), included an account of activities undertaken in each of the four sub-components, as follows.

10. **Supervision of rehabilitation.** Each monthly report details the progress of construction and rehabilitation, etc., and points out any current issues to be addressed. A common theme seen in the reports is that a respect for community authorities helps facilitate work on the ground. Always informing them, and the community, before any decision concerning them is taken is critical.

11. **Awareness campaign and social mobilization.** The approach Plan Cameroon uses is known as Child-Centered Community Development (CCCD). CCCD is Plan's right-based approach, in which children, their families and the communities are active and are leading participants in their own development. That is, they are involved in the identification, planning, implementation and evaluation of programs and projects. In this sub component, progress reports outline how the objectives of local workshop were attained, whether participation was good or not. In general, communities have drawn up school management plans for the improvement of their respective schools. A lesson repeated in many reports is that, in order to obtain desired goals, awareness campaigns touching on all issues (of the four sub-components) are essential. In addition, sensitization should not concern a select few, but should try to reach as many stakeholders as possible. Secondly, helping the community to draw up a calendar to help them coordinate school development is another useful recommendation.

12. **Capacity-strengthening.** Meetings were organized to sensitize communities to the importance of educating girls, protecting school infrastructure, and improving the school social and environmental setting. In general, communities understood the importance of these issues: parents promised to enroll their daughters in school, pledged to work in school

community organizations (PTAs) to improve their respective schools, and understood the importance of paying PTA fees. One important lesson drawn from the reports is that these meetings should respect community time tables.

13. **Social and Environmental.** To improve the school setting, trees and flowers would be planted. Most schools have carried this out, although one or two reports mention that the teak trees chosen were not always best suited to some school climates. Nevertheless, the growing sentiment understood by all is that the protection of the environment is essential for good school management as it provides a healthy learning context and in turn enhances student well-being and ultimately performance in school.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. A Stakeholder Workshop was convened in Yaoundé, Cameroon (and linked to Washington by audio connection) on February 12, 2013 to review the draft Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) of the Education Development Capacity Building (EDCB) project which closed on September 1, 2012 with the goal of gathering information, discussing the experience, and deriving lessons learned. It was chaired by Simon Thacker, Education Specialist, MNSHD, who also presented the ICR, being its principal author. The workshop was attended by Mr. Apollinaire Tchameni, Director, and Mr. Anton Bieteke, FM coordinator of the Project Management Unit; Shobhana Sosale, TTL of the project, and Mr. Vincent Perrot, consultant, both of the World Bank Africa Region. Representatives from Government were unfortunately not available to participate in the workshop due to scheduling issues. The results of a beneficiary survey carried out just prior to this workshop were also mentioned, thus allowing other opinions – in government and in communities -- to be presented nevertheless.

Presentation

2. Mr. Simon Thacker gave a general overview of ICRs, explaining how the project would be evaluated in terms of (a) the extent to which it had achieved its development objectives and produced the results specified in the program documentation; (b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) the prospects for its long-term sustainability; and (d) the performance of the Bank and the borrower, including compliance with applicable Bank policies. He also stressed how the ratings would be generated, following ICR guidelines, from the indicators established for the initial and restructured phases of the project and, to some extent, actual project disbursement levels.

3. Mr. Thacker first presented a graph of the level of disbursement over the life of the project, explaining how there had been 36% disbursement in the initial 5 year phase of the project followed by 16% disbursement in the restructured two year phase and 35% disbursement in the run up to project close and during the four month grace period. He then presented tables of Project Development Outcome indicators comparing baselines, goals, and actual achievements in the initial and restructured phases of the project, noting whether the targets had or had not been met and, where possible, why or why not. Finally, he summarized his main findings by presenting the strong and weak points of the Project and the roles of the World Bank, the Project Coordination Unit, and the Government. He explained how these informed his evaluation of the project in the ICR.

Main Observations of the Workshop

4. **The rating scale.** Participants asked for explanations about the ICR rating scale. Mr. Thacker explained the scales out of 4 and out of 6 for, respectively, project relevance and efficiency, and for PDO achievement and Overall Project evaluation. He also explained how restructured projects, such as this, were weighted according to ICR guidelines.

5. **Updating data.** Mr. Bieteke commented that more up to date data were now available for certain indicators, thanks in large part to the recently available Country Status Report. So, for example, repetition rates in primary school, which were targeted to fall to 15% in the initial project, had only reached 20% in March 2009. Two points were made: (i) reform may take some time to take effect and so (ii) rates should also be given for the end of project in September 2012 at which time the rate stood at 12%, demonstrating that the initiative was in fact bearing fruit. In addition, two comments were made about the second and fourth indicators in the restructured project: that these could also be nuanced now with updated information. In response, the ICR author thanked the participant for these observations and explained that he would indeed update the data, where possible, to reflect these changes.

6. **Strong and Weak Points.** A table, compiled by Mr. Thacker, proposing the strengths and weaknesses of the project and/or the roles of the actors involved (the World Bank, the PCU, and Government) was presented to the workshop for comments. These are listed in the table directly below.

	Project	World Bank	PCU	Government
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> √ ambitious √ successful on the level of communities, and in investment in infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> √ provided a unified approach to the sector √ working with government, the WB made a success of this project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> √ competent personnel √ after a slow and difficult beginning and despite inadequate human resources at times, the PCU found ways to make this project a success. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> √ found ways to eventually advance the project √ competent and industrious personnel
Weaknesses	<p>The project gave the perception that it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> X was too complex X included too many components X and so was a Christmas tree project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> X the WB proposed a design that was too complex X too many TTLs X appeared inflexible at times 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> X lack of transparency within the unit X 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> X lack of an adequate institutional environment to work with a complex project X poor leadership X weak capacity in management, coordination, and the execution of the project

There was general agreement with the table from most participants, though the following points were made during the ensuing discussion.

7. **Strong points.** The project was credited with bringing all actors in the sector together; it was an occasion that helped coordinate their efforts. Those working in government were not used to working in a sectorial manner, something that was exacerbated after the division of the Ministry of Education into three new Ministries as the project opened, but the project helped to formalize the new relationship that needed to exist between them.

8. **Weak points.** The mobility of personnel in government, the project coordination unit and the Bank was mentioned as a weak point. Legitimate or not, transfers of personnel away from the project caused delays in project execution. Turnover in government, in TTLs, in FM specialists assigned to the project was lamented. It is not clear how this can be resolved easily.

9. **Comments on behalf of other parties.** The question of the role of procurement in this project was raised on behalf of the Government. The project was overly dependent on procurement and indeed too much time and effort was spent on the procurement process, most notably in securing non-objections from the World Bank. The ICR author mentioned that this fact was commented on more than once in the ICR and that one lesson learned would be to try to limit reliance on this method of procurement in future development projects in Cameroon.

10. **Evaluation of the project in terms of ICR ratings.** Following the M.Thacker explained how he had attributed the rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory, in accordance with ICR guidelines, to the Bank and the Borrower and how the Overall Rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory had been calculated.

11. **Conclusion.** In concluding remarks, M.Tchameni expressed his hopes that after what he and others had added during the Stakeholders Workshop that the project might be rated 'Moderately Satisfactory' because, from where the project stood to where it stands today, this rating would reinforce the idea of the growing coordination between the WB, the PCU, and within Government, a point that needs to be encouraged in the new strategy.

12. **Next Steps.** M.Thacker explained that the next steps entailed an External Review of the ICR to be held on Feb 21, 2103, which would include the CMU, the Development Effectiveness Unit of AFTOS, and the Sector Leader. From there, the necessary revisions would be made before the document would be submitted.

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. The 15 page Government report on the project is divided into the following main parts: (1) Implementation issues; (2) Risks and mitigating measures; (3) Lessons learned and recommendations; and (4) The performance of stakeholders in Government and at the World Bank.

Implementation Issues

2. The implementation of the initial phase of this project encountered major difficulties due to the absence of a logical framework for preparation.

3. At the institutional level, the initial project was to be run by two departments: the Ministry of National Education (MINEDUC) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP). In December 2004, following a government reorganization, MINEDUC was divided into three new Ministries. It was suddenly imperative that the World Bank develop a sectorial education approach. In addition to this major change, before the preparation phase had finished, the project began to be implemented, which resulted in inconsistencies.

4. As the risks inherent in the implementation of complex projects had not been thoroughly anticipate, mitigation strategies were not always found in time. In general, the implementation of the project was hindered by:

- Difficulties in mobilizing funds from the government during the preparation phase and start-up activities;
- The absence of a local shelter for the Program Coordination Unit (PCU) resulting in a late start of activities. After implementation took place in 2005, the first activities were actually only started in 2006;
- Instability of the officials in charge of coordinating the program: three Coordinators General, three Technical Coordinators, four Procurement Specialists, three Administrative and Financial Managers, four Accountants succeeded one another in the past seven years of the program while five World Bank Task Team Leaders all of whom resided in Washington, DC changed as well;
- Mobility of officials in charge of implementing the project in the ministries, who were regularly transferred. This resulted in problems of ownership and in the understanding of the logic behind implementation of the program;
- Implementation of the activities of certain components and sub-components, which began to be delayed or lagged due to the absence of regulatory measures or the inappropriateness of planned activities, resulting in their removal with the consequent depletion of certain expenditure categories and the need for the reallocation of these funds by categories.

5. More specifically, problems of implementation were seen in three major areas of the project, namely: in (i) capacity building activities, (ii) the operationalization of the Continuing Education and Distance, (iii) micro-projects in Contract Management Agencies.

Risks and mitigating measures

6. Risks in the implementation of activities can be assessed through their impact on the achievement of objectives, the technical quality and operational results as well as the duration and cost of operations, and finally by measures used to mitigate their effects, as demonstrated in the following summary:

Event / Critical risk	Impact Assessment	Response
Unavailability of TTL	Delay in granting non objections	TTL appoint a resident in Yaounde
Implementation of cross-cutting activities	Extension of time for processing cases	Increase awareness, mobilization and exchange between Operational and Monitoring units, the project Coordination Unit and the World Bank. Provide workshops to create shared ownership
Mobility of stakeholders	Weak ownership of the project	Improve the ability to communicate and work together to promote a better flow of information
Instability of key personnel	No deadlines set out in the approved PPM	Seek to retain staff with attractive salaries and better working conditions
Late coding procedures	Procedures manual developed under the third PIA director who ran the project	
Absence of a resident education specialist	Delay in certain decisions	Appoint a World Bank "Education" counterpart in the WB resident mission in Yaoundé
Fiduciary risks in the implementation of capacity building seminars	Because of these risks, several essential seminars were either misunderstood or simply deleted	The production of a manual of procedures adapted to the management of training seminars for large groups; A manual was tried with success for the training of more than 13,000 primary school teachers
Weakness of the filing and archiving of procurement records	This caused personal mobility on the one hand -- trained staff left the project -- but also cramped offices and the lack of supplies for archiving	Make available computerized software archiving
Delay in granting non objections Quality of the procurement process Poor quality of ToRs	Compliance with procurement procedures could be measured by the number of rejections of submissions at screening or the number of comments made by the	Envisage the capacity building of stakeholders Implementation of a quality control record to be transmitted to the Bank for comments.

	Bank: No submission could receive a non-objection without comments either about the content or the procedure involved.	Institution of a weekly meeting between the cell and the coordination of procurement to ensure better follow-up.
Insufficient capacity of the CMAs	Poor mastery of World Bank procurement procedures Weak planning / programming of activities A mismatch between the planned project work schedule with the school calendar and the seasons.	Mobilize technical staff of Plan Cameroon and members of its Board of Administration in order to give special support to this project.
Resizing work with the addition of desks, latrines and boreholes at the instigation of newly recruited TTL under the project without undue risk analysis prior timetable for implementation, procurement , weather	Procrastination of World Bank project teams in monitoring additional work both in terms of their scope, approach to implementation and the granting of non-objections required to advance the timing of activities following preset schedules	Associate local authorities in the drafting of a simplified procedure for facilitating supervision and monitoring plan Mobilization of beneficiary communities
Too many tangentially unimportant (intangible) activities (seminars, study tours, training ...)		
Predominance of foreign consultants		MINEPAT combines industry experts and concerned officials of the Agency for Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) when negotiating contracts

Lessons learned and recommendations

- The project created a sector-wide approach and provided a framework for the meeting of all Education Ministers. It also supported the at-the-time new education sector strategy through specific activities in each of the various components. It also helped to create a culture of internal evaluation of the education system through audit training.
- Many procedures have been codified. This is thanks to the workshops and seminars that produced a more effective management of funds, specific procedures for the management of micro-projects and CMAs, and in the production of various media (instruments and evaluation guides, manuals procedures for managing audits, training materials on a variety of topics ...).
- Minimizing the risk of establishment of DCC equipment through AACED for the establishment of the first Centre for Continuing Education Distance Learning in Central Africa, which highlights the benefits of South-South cooperation in the design and monitoring, and the technical implementation of this technical solution.

- The formation of a national team for elementary and secondary school competence-based curriculums. This training has enabled the development of South-South cooperation.
- Specifically, the lessons learned during the implementation of CMAs micro-projects can be summarized as follows:
 - The constitution of the project team should focus on skills related to the construction of infrastructure and not on skills education;
 - The recommendation of the World Bank in collaboration with civil society organizations is essential for training procedures;
 - Resizing projects and reducing implementation time should be avoided;
 - Interference of any kind and influence peddling in the production of various reports are sources of errors and frustrations;
 - The flow of information is essential. Clear communication plans should be developed to ensure that all stakeholders are informed of the progress of the project, something which ensures transparency and avoids frustrations
 - The organization of a clarification meeting (at the start of technical work / activities) starting with the Enterprise and supervision consultants and communities, helps aligns all stakeholder views.
 - Effective communication between all stakeholders is also very important for tracking and project success
 - The involvement of local authorities in the beginning of the project is very important for the success and management of potential conflicts with the beneficiaries.
 - The requirement of guarantees from corporations can reduce the high number of companies submitting unreliable offers for projects.
 - In terms of the rehabilitation of classrooms:
 - a. technical evaluations of the work is crucial to the success of rehabilitation and should be closely monitored;
 - b. Despite assessments done before work begins, some problems appear only when the rehabilitation work has started. This can cause additional work which must be covered to be fair to businesses.

7. **The performance of stakeholders.** After a discussion of the roles of each unit, a brief appreciation of each is given.

8. **The Steering Committee** was chaired by the MINEDUB, MINESEC and MINESUP vice-presidents and included among its members, representatives of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and the Secretaries General and Focal Points in each Ministry of Education. The General Coordinator of PASE is the Rapporteur. The Steering Committee met six times in accordance with the timetable and three times in special sessions to consider specific issues. It fulfilled its mandate satisfactorily, using a given framework for addressing issues relating to the operation of the overall education sector.

9. **The Sub-Committee Technical Coordination and Monitoring** was restricted to the Project's Coordinator General and three Project Focal Points within ministerial departments. This unit suffered from the unavailability and lack of capacity of some of its members who were often conspicuous by their absence.

10. **Operational Monitoring Cells (COS)** were chaired by the Secretaries General of Ministries together the Heads of components and sub-components involved in the implementation of the project. COS experienced delays in implementation. In some departments, funds were budgeted annually for the operation.

11. **The Project Coordination Unit**, under the authority of a General Coordinator and comprising experts in project management, procurement and financial management, was responsible for fiduciary aspects and tasks of daily management of the project. It saw high turnover in key personnel, including the recruitment of some to other World Bank projects while their contract within the Project was still running, which broke the continuity of service and had a negative impact on the implementation of the project. The PCU accompanied the implementation of the project with happiness. In general, instances of supervision, coordination and implementation of the project had to be relegated behind the overwhelming imperatives of procurement and financial management. This was one of the weaknesses of the PCU management.

Performance of the World Bank

12. The Bank team included five Task Team Leaders. The first TTL had the foresight to bring all those responsible for the education sector to work together to develop a program. He helped the Government develop a vision for education in Cameroon. He was very active and did not hesitate to meet with the various Ministers to advance project implementation. Because of his determination to start the program even in the absence of a sectoral strategy, his only oversight was not developing a logical framework for the project. The second TTL started operations. However his unavailability to respond quickly to requests for non-objection was a hindrance to the progress of completion. The third TTL had the merit to have done an in-depth analysis of the problems in the project. In restructuring the project, he added a logical framework and removed activities that had no longer any link with the objectives assigned to the project. However, his availability created delays in the project (delays in non-objections). The strength of the fourth TTL was that she helped to monitor the project before taking office as TTL. Unfortunately, her leadership was of short duration. The fifth TTL monitoring activities were undermined by some hesitation in making decisions. However, it was during her tenure that the largest disbursements were made: those to do with the CMA and the equipment for the Distance Learning Center. However, it should also be noted that delays in the granting of non-objections did not favor the execution of a number of planned activities which had to eventually be removed.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N/A

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

World Bank and the Government of Cameroon. February 15, 2012. Education sector *Country Status Report for Cameroon*. Washington, D.C., USA and Yaoundé, Cameroon.

_____. 2011. *Implementation Completion and Results report*. No.00002369 for the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector” project. Washington, D.C., USA.

_____. *Various ISRs and Aide-Memoires* of the Education Development Capacity Building Project (P075964). Washington D.C., USA.

_____. May 2, 2005. *Project Appraisal Document of Education Development Capacity Building Project* (P075964). Washington. D.C., USA.

_____. April 6, 2010. Proposed Project Restructuring of the Education Development Capacity Building Project Credit (P075964). Washington, D.C., USA.

Annex 10. Analysis of Project Procurement Activities

Procurement Aspect	Impact on project implementation (building capacity to undertake better education development)				ICR Primary Author's assessment	Impact on project outcomes
	Implementing agency	Procurement analysis by the Bank	Implementing agency response	Contractors		
ORIGINAL PROJECT						
1. Quality of supervision/ implementation	<p>All procurement activities were initiated by the Borrower using the annual procurement plan.</p> <p>How did the Borrower fare in this regard?</p> <p>Poor timeliness in initiating procurement activities.</p> <p>Tendency to put off procurement. This resulted in very few activities being completed between 2007 and 2010 when the project was restructured.</p>	<p>The Bank's role was to provide no objections to the annual procurement plans.</p> <p>How did the Bank team fare in this regard?</p> <p>Generally speaking, Timeliness of providing non objections (though there were some complex issues to do with the procurement of consultants that did take much more time).</p> <p>If there were delays in providing non-objections, this was because there was a lack of dedicated project procurement specialist. Rather, there was an over-dependence on centralized procurement support with too few handling procurement for the country portfolio.</p>	<p>The implementing agency then goes through the various procurement steps.</p> <p>How did the Borrower fare in this regard?</p> <p>Timeliness of working through the various procurement stages.</p> <p>Poor follow-on response even after receiving timely non-objections from the Bank in some cases.</p> <p>Not careful about reviewing contract dates. Eg. See Mr. Zerbo's technical evaluation report on elapsed time for contractors to undertake the Works component.</p>	<p>The contractors are at the end of the procurement chain. They sign the contract after Bank's no objection.</p> <p>What was the effect on contractors? Eg. CMA (MOD) Executing agency promising more than their capacity to deliver. Contract delivery dates not reviewed at signing even though contract non-objection from the Bank was provided three months ahead. Eg. See Mr. Zerbo's technical evaluation report.</p>	<p>Numerous procurement activities of varying values ranging from small to large procurement were all being undertaken at the same time, so each activity at a different procurement stage.</p> <p>This was challenging for all parties to follow-up consistently and in a timely manner.</p> <p>The elapsed time for each procurement activity was inordinately long.</p> <p>The agreed procurement plan could have been used as an effective tool to streamline implementation, but it was not.</p> <p>Rather than being an education project, the project became a procurement-centered activity. See foot note 27 in ICR document.</p>	<p>Although the impact on project outcomes is very difficult to measure, the ineffective procurement observed during the original project phase, since it caused many delays, hindered project effectiveness as a whole and so likely played a role in weakening the achievement of project outcomes.</p>

Procurement Aspect	Impact on project implementation (building capacity to undertake better education development)				ICR Primary Author's assessment	Impact on project outcomes
	Implementing agency	Procurement analysis by the Bank	Implementing agency response	Contractors		
RESTRUCTURED PROJECT						
1. Quality at Entry (QAE)		It is the ICR team's belief that the onerous character of procurement should have been evaluated as a greater risk than it was in the revised project, and so addressed more aggressively.			Lost opportunity to streamline procurement. Numerous procurement activities of very small value ranging from \$5,000 to \$50,000. Intended to bypass procurement no objections from the Bank.	
2. Quality of Supervision/ Implementation	<p>There were an excessive number of small and only tangentially important activities requiring excessive numbers of non-objections submitted to the Bank.</p> <p>The PIA seemed to be lost in the details of these myriad procurement procedures.</p>	The last two TTLs, recognizing the detrimental effect that procurement procedures were having on the project, adopted measures to streamline several aspects of procurement in order to focus on only those matters that were central to the success of the project.	At restructuring, the PIU significantly strengthened its implementation capacity by (i) streamlining the coordination structures to improve the coordination between ministries and the PIU, (ii) hiring additional qualified personnel, in the areas of financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation and putting in place better tracking systems for procurement and financial reporting; and (iii) adopting new procedures to simplify the implementation of training activities (which represent a	The streamlining of procedures, and the close supervision by an in-country WB of all activities, improved contractors' ability to carry out contracts. Problems persisted, but this approach proved successful, as the significant rise in disbursement at the end of the project demonstrated.	If the restructuring was ineffective at first (in terms of improving disbursement), the approach of the final two project TTLs – to lessen the onerous character of procurement procedures and to refocus only on the essential in project activities – led to a surge in disbursement in the run up to project close.	Impact on project outcome is difficult to assess, once again.

			significant share of the project activities). However, despite these measures, disbursement remained extremely feeble.			
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Annex 11. Beneficiary Assessment: Questionnaire Used for Survey

1. Did you attend a workshop in connection with the PASE project?

- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Don't know
 - d. Comments:
-
-

2. What was your general impression of this workshop?

- a. Good
 - b. Quite good
 - c. No particular impression
 - d. Bad
 - e. Comments:
-
-

3. Was the workshop well organized?

- a. Well organized
 - b. Acceptably organized
 - c. Badly organized
 - d. Comments:
-
-

4. How many of the workshop objectives were met in your view?

- a. Many objectives
 - b. Few objectives
 - c. Not enough objectives
 - d. Comments:
-
-

5. How was the information presented at the event organized?

- a. Well organized
 - b. Acceptably organized
 - c. Badly organized
 - d. Comments:
-
-

6. Was the workshop presenter well prepared?

- a. Well prepared
 - b. Quite well prepared
 - c. Ill prepared
 - d. Comments:
-
-

7. Was the presenter motivated?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not sufficiently
 - d. Comments:
-
-
8. Did the presenter present the material too fast, too slowly or at the right speed?
- a. Too fast
 - b. Neither too fast nor too slowly
 - c. Too slowly
 - d. Comments:
-
-
9. Did the presenter take too much time, too little time or the right amount of time for his explanations?
- a. Enough time
 - b. Neither too much nor too little time
 - c. Not enough time
 - d. Comments:
-
-
10. Did the presenter take too much time, too little time or the right amount of time for the general discussion?
- a. Enough time
 - b. Neither too much nor too little time
 - c. Not enough time
 - d. Comments:
-
-
11. Did you feel comfortable asking questions at the event?
- a. Comfortable
 - b. Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
 - c. Uncomfortable
 - d. Comments:
-
-
12. Was the presenter concerned about how you, as a student, were learning?
- a. Yes, very concerned
 - b. Reasonably concerned
 - c. Not sufficiently concerned
 - d. Comments:
-
-

13. How useful was the training workshop professionally?
- a. Very useful
 - b. Quite useful
 - c. Of doubtful usefulness
 - d. Not useful enough
 - e. Comments:
-
-
14. What did you retain from this workshop?
- a. A great deal
 - b. A little
 - c. Very little
 - d. Not enough
 - e. Comments:
-
-
15. Did you improve your skills as a result of this training?
- a. Yes
 - b. A little
 - c. No
 - d. Comments:
-
-
16. Since the workshop, to what extent have you used what you learned?
- a. Comments:
-
-
17. What was the main interest of this workshop for you?
- a. Professional
 - b. Personal
 - c. Social
 - d. Other
 - e. Comments:
-
-
18. Was the per diem received for attending this workshop sufficient, insufficient or about right?
- a. Sufficient
 - b. About right
 - c. Insufficient
 - d. Comments:
-
-

19. Was the workshop better than you expected, worse than you expected or roughly what you expected?
- a. Better
 - b. Roughly what I expected
 - c. Worse
 - d. Comments:

20. On the whole, are you satisfied with the event, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, or dissatisfied?
- a. Satisfied
 - b. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 - c. Dissatisfied
 - d. Comments:

CAMEROON

- SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
- ⊙ PROVINCE CAPITALS
- ⊕ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES



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