Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 32206 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-28950 TF-29160 PPFI-P8720 PPFI-P8721) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$35.0 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT June 6, 2005 Transport Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective at Appraisal) Currency Unit = Leone (Le) Le 948 = US$ 1 US$ 1 = Le 2,500 at closing, December 2004) On average US$ 1 = Le 1,950 FISCAL YEAR Government of Sierra Leone & SLRA January 1 - December 31 SLAA - April 1 - March 31 SLPA - July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank ADT Average Daily Traffic CMU Coordination and Monitoring Unit of MOTC DfID Department for International Development (UK) EU European Union FMIS Financial Management Information System GDP Gross Domestic Product GOSL Government of Sierra Leone ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IDP Infrastructure Development Project (IDA ­ under preparation) MIS Management Information System MOF Ministry of Finance MSU Mechanical Services Unit of SLRA MTCE Ministry of Transport, Communications and the Environment (now MOTC) NCP National Commission for Privatization PERDIC Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture Committee RRMP Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (IDA) SLRTA Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority SLRTD Sierra Leone Road Transport Department SLAA Sierra Leone Airports Authority SLMA Sierra Leone Maintenance Authority SLNSC Sierra Leone National Shipping Company SLNTP Sierra Leone National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan SLPA Sierra Leone Ports Authority SLRA Sierra Leone Roads Authority SLRTA Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority SLRTC Sierra Leone Road Transport Corporation SLNA Sierra Leone National Airlines TA Technical Assistance TSP Transport Sector Project (IDA) UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone WFP World Food Program Vice President: Gobind T. Nankani Country Director Mats Karlsson Sector Manager C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Task Team Leader/Task Manager: David S. Rudge SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE TRANSPORT SECTOR PRO CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 2. Principal Performance Ratings 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 6. Sustainability 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 8. Lessons Learned 9. Partner Comments 10. Additional Information Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Annex 4. Bank Inputs Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Project ID: P002420 Project Name: SIERRA LEONE TRANSPORT SECTOR PRO Team Leader: David Stephen Rudge TL Unit: AFTTR ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 6, 2005 1. Project Data Name: SIERRA LEONE TRANSPORT SECTOR PRO L/C/TF Number: IDA-28950; TF-29160; PPFI-P8720; PPFI-P8721 Country/Department: SIERRA LEONE Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (56%); Ports, waterways and shipping (30%); Aviation (7%); Central government administration (7%) Theme: Small and medium enterprise support (P); Municipal governance and institution building (P); Other urban development (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 03/07/1994 Effective: 10/20/1996 01/17/1997 Appraisal: 03/13/1996 MTR: 11/16/1998 11/16/2001 Approval: 06/27/1996 Closing: 06/30/2001 12/31/2004 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE/MTCE/SLRA/SLPA/SLAA Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Gobind T. Nankani Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: Mats Karlsson Birger Frederiksen Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Alberto Harth Team Leader at ICR: David S. Rudge Nguyen Tin ICR Primary Author: Farida Khan; Yoshimichi Kawasumi 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: While the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) did mention the possibility of a deterioration of security in Sierra Leone, it could not have anticipated the events of the conflict that took place from 1997 to 2000. In May 1997 a military junta ousted the democratically elected government from power. On January 6, 1999 rebel forces attacked and over-ran the nation's capital Freetown. The resultant unstable political and security environment led to the abandoning of project activities. There was widespread destruction of transport infrastructure and assets, thus bringing virtually all socioeconomic activities to a halt. The agreed reform agenda was also implemented under these difficult circumstances with weak capacity, political instability and physical insecurity. Modest achievements were made in terms of overall project objectives. However, progress was uneven over time as well as across specific project objectives. The main objectives of the Project as stated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) dated May 30, 1996 were to assist the Borrower in: (a) transport policy: support the implementation of the new sector policy and strategy; (b) capacity building: expand the successful home-grown process of institutional reform and strengthening; and (c) employment generation: increase the use of labor-intensive methods in road works and road maintenance. The specific project aims were (a) sector/investment planning: further enhance planning and coordination through MTCE, and support a sector-wide approach to all investments financed by internal and external sources, (b) private participation: economically maintain the road network through private, small and medium size enterprises; (c) regulatory capacity: enhance management of road transport and alleviate urban traffic congestion; (d) maritime transport: preserve existing port capacity, reduce operating costs and promote coastal and river transport; and (e) civil aviation safety: preserve investments and enhance air traffic safety at Lungi International Airport. The objectives reflected essential priorities identified both by the Government and by the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy. 3.2 Revised Objective: Following the successive outbreaks of civil unrest and additional physical damage to the transport infrastructure and the related facilities and equipment, a one year interim program was agreed in May 2000. In this, project activities were restructured to support the immediate needs of the peace and reconciliation process, to directly address poverty concerns while focusing on "implementable" activities, in those parts of the country which were secure. Although the project was restructured, the overall development objectives in general remained the same, except for the cancellation of the coastal and river transport project component and thereby the related development objective. 3.3 Original Components: The project had three main components : Component 1: Capacity Building This involved: (i) building up the capacity of the Coordination and Monitoring Unit (CMU) of the Ministry of Transport, Communications and Environment (MTCE ­ MTCE was later restructured as Ministry of Transport and Communications: MOTC) for a period of three years, using contracted Sierra Leonean personnel (comprising a transport economist/technical coordinator, an accountant/financial analyst, an environmental/social development specialist, a statistician, and support personnel). While also supporting operating costs until such time arrangements were to be completed by MTCE to ensure the sustainable financing of CMU; (ii) support a new autonomous Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority (SLRTA) including studies for its creation; rehabilitation/construction of office facilities; provision of essential equipment; short-term technical assistance and training/workshops for - 2 - staff; and (iii) support the development of capacity among small and medium-size labor-based enterprises for road works, through the procurement of road maintenance and construction equipment for hire and leasing to SMEs through the commercialized Mechanical Services Unit (MSU) of the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA). Component 2: Parastatal Restructuring This had three sub-components: (a) Sierra Leone Road Authority (SLRA) -- improving the organizational structure of SLRA through establishment of a Finance Department; transformation of the Equipment Division to a first phase semi-autonomous profit center Plant Pool, operated on a commercial basis; and carry out a study of and implement the second phase of complete conversion of the Equipment Department to a commercially run concern. (b) Sierra Leone Port Authority (SLPA) -- carry out a study for the restructuring of SLPA and its non-core operations including plans and legal documents for the possible devolution and/or privatization of some of its functions, and restructuring of the Freetown-Tagrin ferry operations; and (c) Sierra Leone Road Transport Corporation (SLRTC), Sierra Leone National Airlines (SLNA), and Sierra Leone National Shipping Company (SLNSC) -- development and implementation of action plans for the privatization of these three parastatals. Component 3: Investments These included design, supervision and civil works in five sub-sectors: (a) Road Maintenance -- (i) overlaying of 15 km of Tagrin-Lungi Airport road; (ii) reshaping and regravelling of 62 km of Lungi - Port Loko Road; (iii) reshaping and regravelling of Gravel Main Roads: 312 km under the 1997 calendar program and 68 km under 1998 calendar program; (iv) spot improvements on 550 km of designated feeder roads in Western Sierra Leone; and (v) drainage repairs on 20 km of designated streets in the upcountry towns of Bo, Makeni, Kenema, Port Loko and Moyamba. (b) Traffic Management Measures in Freetown -- including improvement and/or provision of 20 major intersections, 16 lay-byes on three main arteries; a 40 car off-street parking lot, and traffic signs and markings for new one-way street operations. (c) Port Improvement -- (i) quay rehabilitation; (ii) pavement of the container stacking area; (iii) slipway repair; (iv) access roads, and minor improvements (drainage and lighting) of the new paved areas; and (v) works supervision. (d) Airport Improvement -- (i) runway repair and lighting; (ii) perimeter fencing; (iii) procurement of safety equipment; and (iv) terminal improvement works. (e) Coastal and River Transport Rehabilitation -- provision of 37 storage buildings and 9 piers suitable for pampers (local boats) at 35 selected landing locations and their detailed engineering and supervision. 3.4 Revised Components: At the time of project implementation the sites slated for jetty rehabilitation were considered to be insecure. Consequently, the Coastal and River Transport Rehabilitation sub-component was dropped and funds were reallocated to other urgent needs in feeder roads, the airport and port, which were practical to address. Due to security concerns, the planned overlaying of the Tagrin Point ­ Lungi Airport road was cancelled, together with the reshaping and regravelling of the Lungi ­ Port Loko road. In addition, regarding the reshaping and regravelling of the main trunk roads, different roads were selected (as shown in Annex 2) which were suitable for reshaping and spot regravelling only. The spot improvement of feeder roads was revisited and agreed as full rehabilitation, reflecting the needs. The urban road drainage works in 4 towns was revised to focus available funds on the rehabilitation of urban streets in 2 towns, with the EU funding the associated drainage. Three new activities were also added: (i) labor-based garbage removal in Freetown and other key urban areas; (ii) HIV/AIDS prevention for people involved in the transport sector; and (iii) reform of procurement laws and procedures. Areas for feeder road improvement were also shifted from rebel-controlled areas to the more secure South-Eastern parts of the country. In addition, the amended DCA refocused several institution strengthening activities, e.g. support to SLPA restructuring specified the privatization of non-core businesses. The details of the revised components are attached as Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing (Original and Restructured Project Components & Costs) - 3 - Throughout the project life, the Credit was extended 3 times and restructured once, as shown in Table 1, reflecting changes in the security situation, redefined project components and the progress of the individual subcomponents. Table -1: TSP Original and Restructured Credit Allocation Category SDR ­ DCA of SDR ­ DCA of SDR ­ DCA of SDR ­ DCA of January 1997 October 2000 February 2001 August 2003 (1) Civil Works (a) SLRA 8,660,000 7,316,000 7,000,000 6,300,000 (b) SLPA 4,510,000 5,020,000 5,200,000 5,160,000 (c) SLAA 970,000 1,020,000 1,126,000 1,230,000 (2) Equipment, Vehicles & Materials (a) MOTC 350,000 490,000 300,000 390,000 (b) SLRA 2,770,000 2,960,000 2,960,000 3,460,000 (c) SLAA 420,000 480,000 530,000 580,000 (d) SLPA - 1,350,000 1,100,000 980,000 (3) Consultant's Services & Technical Assistance (a) MOTC 910,000 1,200,000 1,150,000 1,852,000 (b) SLRA 1,740,000 1,790,000 1,790,000 1,990,000 (c) SLPA 420,000 700,000 700,000 865,000 (d) SLAA 140,000 200,000 250,000 290,000 (e) MOF (Proc. Reform) - 1,125,000 1,125,000 400,000 (4) Refunding of PPF 1,190,000 862,000 862,000 803,000 (5) Unallocated 2,220,000 207,000 207,000 Total (SDR) 24,300,000 24,300,000 24,300,000 24,300,000 The revised components were implemented through the Coordination and Monitoring Unit (CMU) of MOTC and the sector-specific implementing Agencies as summarized in the Table-2 below. Table 2: Implementation Matrix between Components and Implementation Agencies Implementing Part A: Capacity-Building Part B: Parastatal Part C: Transport Sector Agency Restructuring Investments -Strengthening of CMU Coordination and oversight Coordination and oversight of Sector -Coordination and oversight of of restructuring studies investments Coordination/ capacity-building activities CMU -Coordination with HIV/AIDS activities -Development of Domestic Improving organizational -Road Rehabilitation and Road Construction Industry SMEs structure of SLRA, periodic maintenance Infrastructure through establishment of including establishment of -Labor-based garbage removal SLRA commercially-run equipment Financial Management Unit pool (MSU) with associated TA and divesting of MSU Road Transport Establishment and development RTA of RTA - - Ports Training for SLPA -Restructuring Study Freetown Port Rehabilitation SLPA -Privatization of non-core - 4 - business transaction documents - SLPA privatization Action Plan study. Airports Training for SLAA -Restructuring Study Lungi Airport rehabilitation SLAA Procurement -Diagnostic Study of MOF Procurement System - Training of procurement - - officers The revised components were implemented through the Coordination and Monitoring Unit (CMU) of MOTC and the sector-specific Implementing Agencies as summarized in the Table-2 below. Table 2: Implementation Matrix between Components and Implementation Agencies Implementing Part A: Capacity-Building Part B: Parastatal Part C: Transport Sector Agency Restructuring Investments -Strengthening of CMU Coordination and oversight Coordination and oversight of Sector -Coordination and oversight of of restructuring studies investments Coordination/ capacity-building activities CMU -Coordination with HIV/AIDS activities -Development of Domestic Improving organizational -Road Rehabilitation and Road Construction Industry -- SMEs structure of SLRA, periodic maintenance Infrastructure -- through establishment of including establishment of -Labor-based garbage removal SLRA commercially-run equipment Financial Management Unit (-Improved traffic management pool (MSU) with associated TA and divesting of MSU work, however not funded by TSP) Road Transport Establishment and development RTA of RTA - - Ports Training for SLPA -Restructuring Study Freetown Port Rehabilitation SLPA -Privatization of non-core businesses transaction documents. - SLPA privatization Action Plan Study Airports Training for SLAA -Restructuring Study Lungi Airport rehabilitation SLAA Procurement - Diagnostic Study of MOF Procuremen System - Training of procuruement - - officers 3.5 Quality at Entry: The Quality Assurance Group (QAG) did not review the project at entry. With hindsight, the ICR has assessed the Quality at Entry as ambitious but satisfactory, based on: the approach and design appropriateness; Government ownership; technical aspects; economic and financial aspects; environmental aspects; poverty reduction and social aspects; institutional analysis; financial management aspects; readiness for implementation; and assessment of risk and sustainability. The project was a continuation of - 5 - IDA's involvement in the sector (Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project ­ Cr. 2895), which helped to advance preparation. Most of the studies (Port Restructuring Study, Assets Valuation study of Road Transport Department etc.) were done, under the Japanese Trust Fund (TF-29160) and PPF (P872). The project was prepared with active participation of the GOSL and all of its relevant agencies. Project institutional arrangements were in place, and an implementation/procurement plan was agreed during appraisal. Consistency with the CAS. The project objectives were consistent with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which was to establish a firm basis for sustained private sector-led economic growth and poverty reduction by helping to create a supportive environment for resumption of normal economic activity, develop the national construction industry, restructure or privatize the principal sector agencies and improve their management and operational efficiency, and support labor-intensive works. The project is also consistent with the present draft CAS (scheduled for Board in May 2005), which emphasized infrastructure, including transport, as a key element in promoting growth and employment generation, particularly in addressing the youth unemployment needs. The project was also consistent with the government's sector strategy aimed to improve the operational efficiency and service quality of the transport sector, through a re-engineering and privatizing of sector management. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The overall outcome of the Project objective is rated as Satisfactory based on the following outcomes: Fig.-1 Planned and Actual RF Revenue Trend $14 $12 $10 Fuel Levy $8 Registration Fees/Licenses million $6 Total Road Fund Revenue $4 Planned Road $2 Fund Revenue (SAR) $0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 year - 6 - (a) Transport Policy - support the implementation of the new sector policy and strategy: The outcome of this objective is rated as Satisfactory as per the following: The Letter of Transport Sector Policy was prepared which concluded that fundamental transport policy reforms were essential, and identified the areas of improvement, according to which reforms took place. (For details see (b) (c) & (d)). In brief, CMU was established and staffed as planned; capacity building of various types & levels were successfully completed in each of the entities concerned; private sector development was successfully conducted and a considerable number of jobs were created through labor-intensive contracting; RTA was established and the user fees collected were paid directly to the Road Fund; the National Commission for Privatization (NCP) cleared the de-linking of the non-core activities of the SLPA; and Lungi International Airport has been rehabilitated and is fully operational, with security and safety measures completed (perimeter fencing, CCTV, air/sea rescue boat and X-ray baggage scanner). One of the key sector reforms sought by the project was to establish a fuel levy for road maintenance and sustainability of the road infrastructure investments. The fuel levy rate at the time of the SAR was US$0.07 /Lt and at midterm review a rate of US$0.10/Lt was agreed, with further increases planned, with a view to eventually funding maintenance of the entire road network. However, GOSL never did introduce the agreed midterm rate of US$0.10/Lt and at project completion the fuel levy rate stood at US$0.06/Lt. (b) Capacity Building/Sector Reform - institutional reform and strengthening: The achievement of the capacity building/institutional reform is in general considered Satisfactory, despite the years of insecurity/conflict. Although, the extent of the achievements differs among entities/agencies, as follows: - Coordination and Monitoring Unit (CMU): The CMU was established as a small advisory unit (4 contracted TA experts; technical coordinator, financial director, data analyst, and environmental expert) within the MOTC, which focused on overall planning and coordination, while designating the implementation of various sub-sector functions to parastatal organizations. The CMU has played the key coordination, monitoring and reporting progress role in: the sector reforms, performance of the transport-related parastatals, safeguard issues, financial management, as well as the physical progress of the project components. The CMU staff have received project funded training and technical assistance in a number of areas, but for most of the implementation period the implementation capacity of CMU has been weak despite technical assistance support. CMU performance is therefore rated as Moderately Satisfactory. - Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA): The project supported three major capacity building components: (i) management skills for upper/middle management staff (rated Satisfactory); (ii) financial management (rated Satisfactory); and (iii) commercial-based management of MSU (rated Moderately Satisfactory). The first component has been achieved through training and EU Road Maintenance Management TA. The Financial Management achievements reflect project FMS supervision scrutiny, the procurement and installation of a Financial Management Information System (FMIS) with associated staff training and EU Financial Management TA. The commercialization of the MSU has been supported throughout the project by Bank funded TA. In addition, a computerized inventory and stock control system has been procured and installed with associated staff training. However, the independent management of the MSU as a commercial entity has been frustrated by SLRA's reluctance to transfer sufficient management autonomy to MSU and SLRA's non-payment of the agreed equipment hire charges has detracted from the viability of MSU as a commercial entity. The National Commission for Privatization (NCP) in its Strategic Plan for Public Divestiture 2003-2006 now plans privatizing of the MSU combined with the restructuring of SLRA ­ in conjunction with the establishment of independent Road Maintenance Fund. These developments are envisaged under the proposed Infrastructure Development Project (IDP). - Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority (SLRTA): The SLRTA was established under the project, with appropriate facilities and equipment, plus computerized driver and vehicle licensing and registration systems. As a result, the RTA is now collecting road user fees and remitting them directly to the Road Fund on a bi-weekly basis. The revenue collected by SLRTA represents approximately 30% of the total road - 7 - fund revenue (Ref. Section (a) Fig.-1), which is intended to ensure appropriate and timely maintenance of the road network SLRTA also conceived and implemented a traffic warden scheme in Freetown to improve and regulate road safety and traffic flow, while also being intended as a revenue earner. A number of capacity building and strengthening initiatives have been implemented, through overseas and in-country training, which contributed to improving the management capacity and effectiveness of the SLRTA. SLRTA, has also actively investigated other potential avenues regarding vehicle inspection safety and revenue potential which continue to be developed. The SLRTA institutional reform is rated Highly Satisfactory. - Airport and Civil Aviation Restructuring and Institutional Strengthening: A number of capacity building and strengthening initiatives were successfully implemented. These included overseas and in-country management and operational orientated training. The SLAA audits were uniformly unqualified and on time. With the increased security improvement in compliance with ICAO, the Sierra Leone Airport Authority (SLAA) is now an extremely well run airport authority, with a highly competent management. The physical improvements under the project, in conjunction with SLAA's own coordinated use of their revenue to complement the IDA funded interventions has provided an exceptionally constructive environment for coordinated development. The benefits of the terminal improvements have already aroused interest of potential international airlines. The SLAA institutional strengthening is rated Highly Satisfactory. - A National HIV/AIDS Council has been established, following an HIV/AIDS campaign to sensitize transport workers, which has been Satisfactory. The success of the HIV/AIDS pilot Program under TSP immediately led to the Bank sponsored SHARP Project for HIV/AIDS. - National Procurement Reform: Following a UNDP funded procurement needs assessment, a Short Term Action Plan was agreed with Government. This was then substantially implemented under project funding in conjunction with UNDP and cooperation with EU and DfID. The Procurement Law was drafted and this was ratified by the Government in December 2004, and the MOF procurement staffs have all been trained. The MOF institutional reform is rated Satisfactory. - Sierra Leone Ports Authority (SLPA): A number of capacity building and strengthening initiatives, including TA and installation of a computerized MIS, have been completed under the project. During project implementation, it was agreed with SLPA management that all 4 non-core activities (maritime slipway operation, ferry and health clinic operations and provision of port security) would be concessioned out, with SLPA having the Landlord Port role. This reached the stage where only a management decision was needed to proceed. This was cleared with the establishment of the NCP in August 2002, although NCP was not staffed initially nor did it become fully effective until end of 2003. As such, the transactions had not taken place by Credit closing date. The Government fully endorsed the restructuring initiative under the Credit, which will now be carried out under the proposed Infrastructure Development Project. This is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. - 8 - Fig.-2 Generated Employment & Trained/Qualified Contractors Accumulated No. of Trained/Qualified Contractors (Feeder Road Contracts) 2,000,000 500 Accumulated No. of 1,800,000 Trained/Qualified Contractors (Trunk Road Contracts) 1,600,000 400 Total Planned Accumulated 1,400,000 No. (SAR) 1,200,000 300 1,000,000 Actual Accumulated No. person-days (Feeder Road Contracts) 800,000 200 contractors of 600,000 No. Actual Accumulated No. genarated 400,000 100 (Trunk Road Contracts) 200,000 0 0 Total Actual Accumulated No. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 year (c) Employment Generation - through use of labor-intensive methods in road works and road maintenance. SLRA record data shows that the project provided a total of 1.8m person-days of employment by end December 2004 (Fig.-2) through labor-intensive contracts with small enterprises, for the trunk and feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance works under SLRA during TSP project period. The employment generated in the first effective year of the TSP (1997) was 20,800 person-days p.a., which reached its peak at 350,000 person-days p.a. in 2000, after which the level of the employment ranged between 200,000 and 340,000 man-days to project completion. Out of the 1.8m person-days approximately 35% were generated on labor-based feeder road contracts, with the 65% balance related to trunk road contracts. The 1.8m person-days of employment generated is way above the 288,000 targeted in the SAR. This is a result of the particular efforts which were made to employ as many ex-combatants as possible to re-engage them in useful work ­ using labor-based techniques. The employment generation figures being produced by SLRA through tracking average resource levels per activity. As such, the project achievements are rated Highly Satisfactory particularly when considering the repeated domestic conflict and the post conflict situation which prevailed in Sierra Leone. The specific project aims were: (i) Sector/Investment Planning - enhance planning and coordination through MOTC, and support a sector-wide approach to all investments financed by internal and external sources. The National Transport Strategy has been updated (including the 2003-2007 Investment Plan) and formally endorsed by Cabinet. A stakeholders and donors workshop was successfully conducted by CMU on the National Transport Strategy and the Transport Investment Program, in Paris, in April 2003 which obtained strong support from the donor community. The donor coordination in the sector has and continues at a high level, particularly with EU. DfID and UNDP. The achievements under the project are therefore rated as Highly Satisfactory. - 9 - (ii) Private Sector Participation - economically maintain the road network through private, small and medium size enterprises (SME): The domestic contracting industry has been strengthened under the project. 50 contractors for feeder roads and 231 trunk road contractors have been trained by SLRA and they are now working as viable contractors (Ref. Section (c), Fig.-2). Labor-based contracts were drawn up by SLRA and awarded, while local consultants were hired to prepare the bidding documents and to supervise and monitor the civil works contracts. All the Feeder Road Works were completed by these trained SMEs, which substantially contributed towards job generation, with the prospect of the local participants being empowered to maintain the roads in the future. Although, Government's delayed counterpart funding of the SME contractors' invoices affected the contractors' cash flow and the strengthening of the private sector participation. Even so, after taking this into consideration, this component is overall still considered to be Satisfactory. (iii) Regulatory Capacity - enhance management of road transport and alleviate urban traffic congestion: The project improved the traffic flow in Freetown by implementing new traffic signs and road markings for new one-way street operations, which started under IDA Credit 2451-SL (RRMP: Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project). The traffic wardens have been deployed since December 2003 at various critical locations in Freetown to assist police with traffic controls, and fining offenders causing obstruction of traffic. The Freetown Town Council has also created designated market areas for the street hawkers, all of which has facilitated better traffic flow. However, there is still a high level of congestion on the city streets due to the inadequate capacity of the narrow streets to accommodate current traffic levels and the massive influx of the rural population which occurred at the time of the rebel uprising. Regulatory capacity is therefore rated as Satisfactory. (iv) Maritime Transport - preserve existing port capacity, reduce operating costs and promote coastal and river transport: The first phase of the Freetown Port rehabilitation has been completed and the management strengthened. Non-core activities have been identified for selling off/privatizing. In cooperation with WFP, Port cargo handling and safety equipment and MIS equipment have been procured to address the immediate needs following the civil unrest. The Port is now fully operational. However, a preliminary review of maintenance costs (related to the container terminal) confirms that more needs to be done in terms of physical investment (particularly with completion of the quay wall rehabilitation and paving of the remaining container stacking area) and restructuring of the port's management and operational policies (see SLPA under (b)). An Action Plan has therefore been prepared under TSP TA services for the conversion of the Port to a Landlord Port, with the physical investments designed under an IDP PHRD grant. Following Governments approval of the Action Plan, it will be implemented under the IDP PPF preparation services. The physical investments are also scheduled for construction under IDP. The achievements are therefore rated Satisfactory. The coastal and river transport component was cancelled at Mid-Term Review due to security reasons. In the meantime, however, the Maritime Administration Act of 2000 was passed, creating the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration (SLMA). The SLMA benefited from a UNDP-funded technical assistance from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the fields of Maritime Legal Legislation and Maritime Safety Administration. (v) Civil Aviation Safety - preserve investments and enhance air traffic safety at Lungi International Airport: The Lungi International Airport rehabilitation program has been completed with all essential security and safety related items/measures provided (e.g. perimeter fencing, runway repairs and lighting, CCTV, air/sea rescue boat, X-ray baggage scanner, firefighting equipment) in conjunction with complementary developments funded directly by SLAA. The airport is now fully operational in compliance - 10 - with ICAO standards. The achievements are therefore rated Highly Satisfactory. 4.2 Outputs by components: The SAR broadly divided the 3 major components into 7 output-based sub-components (including the new component of procurement reform). The details and breakdown of the individual sub-components are shown in Annex 2. The achievements in respect of these sub-components are reviewed below. 1. Sector Coordination/CMU (SAR $2.06 m; Actual: $4.22 m): This component is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. It consisted of the following sub-components. (a) TA to CMU: The Project supported the establishment of the Coordination and Monitoring Unit (CMU) as the core unit for national transport planning and management, while designating the implementation responsibility of the various sub-sector functions to the parastatal organizations. The CMU comprised 4 TA experts, including a Technical Coordinator, a Financial Analyst, a Data Analyst (later trained as procurement officer) and an Environmental and Social Development Specialist. The CMU was originally intended to be funded by the Project for an initial two year period, assuming the stabilization of the post conflict situation, but it was extended throughout the Project life to allow its further establishment. The performance in respect of all safeguards has been moderately satisfactory, but coordination and cooperation with the implementing agencies has been strained, while monitoring and analysis of the project performance indicators has been poor. (b) Equipment: All the office equipment; e.g. office furniture, photocopier, fax machine, computers, printers, and e-mail facility, etc. were procured as planned. (c) Training: CMU staff received training and technical assistance in a number of areas, e.g., financial management, data and statistic management, procurement, environment and safeguard, transport management, computer operation & networking, etc. But the CMU is still far from 100% effective as a coordination and monitoring unit. CMU experienced difficulties in monitoring the separate special account maintained by SLRA and in fostering a good working relationship with the implementing agencies. (d) Studies: All of the sectoral studies (including PPF, PHRD studies) under CMU's oversight (e.g. transport pricing; establishment of SLRTA; the introduction of the MIS and computer network at the SLPA; the runway pavement evaluation study; the restructuring study of SLPA; were completed by 1997, except for the study for the rehabilitation of Freetown Port which was completed in January 2000). (e) Pilot STI/HIV/AIDS Prevention Activities: An HIV/AIDS pilot Education and Information (EI) campaign was conducted during the first quarter 2001 in three locations: Mile 91, Kenema and Bo in conjunction with the Sierra Leone Aids Secretariat, Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Information (MOI), with technical support from WHO. This component specifically targeted the transport workers through the Professional Drivers Association. GOSL has (with IDA assistance) since set up a National Secretariat for HIV/AIDS in the Office of the President. While CMU have continued conducting EI campaigns in the field to the civil works contractors and the local communities impacted. Due to its success, it was immediately followed up with a Bank sponsored SHARP Project for HIV/AIDS. 2. Road Infrastructure Component/SLRA (SAR US$15.54 m Actual US$13.44m): This component is rated as Satisfactory. It consists of the following sub-components. (a) Spot Regravelling/Reshaping of Gravel Main Roads (319 km): This sub-component consisted of 2 tranches, each further divided into lots. Tranche 1 Lot 1: Bo-Yele ­ Petifu Junction (65 km) & Lot 2: Blama ­ Geindama Ferry (94 km) were completed with substantial delays due to security reasons and - 11 - partly due to prolonged and heavy rainy season. Tranche 2 Lot 1: Bo ­ Sembehun ­ Mano ­ Taiama (70 km) & Lot 2: Sembehun ­ Sumbuya - Mattru ­ Bamba Junction (90 km) were completed in June 2003. The performance of the gravel trunk roads after the heavy and prolonged rains is commendable/highly satisfactory. (b) Feeder Road Rehabilitation Program (FRRP) (475 km): This sub-component originally consisted of 3 lots. However due to budgetary constraints, the 3rd lot was not executed. Lot 1 with a total length of 176 km of feeder roads was awarded in 8 contracts and was completed with exceptionally good results. Lot 2 with the total length of 299 km in the Bo and Kenema Region was awarded in 12 contracts between December 2001 and January 2002; and completed between November and December 2004. The rehabilitated roads greatly contributed to the access to markets, social services and development opportunities which are much appreciated by the local people. These contracts were all awarded to the SLRA trained SMEs. The results are outstanding/highly satisfactory. (c) Upcountry Town Streets in Bo and Kenema (9.8 km): Two contracts for the urban road rehabilitation (Bo and Kenema city) were awarded and the works were completed, with substantial delays. Most of the delays related to slow mobilization, but were also partly due to abnormal prolonged and heavy rainy seasons. The quality of the works was poor, reflecting a bad contractor, a bad consultant and ineffective SLRA oversight. Value for money was also uniformly poor at US$150,000 per km without drainage. Temporary displacement of people in business was initially anticipated during the pavement works, but no displacement was triggered as they all remained in business without interruption. The results are Unsatisfactory. (d) Garbage/Waste Cleaning: 6 contracts were awarded in September 2001 for emergency labor-based garbage removal in Freetown, Bo and Kenema. These were successfully completed in coordination with and the oversight of the Ministry of Health as a one-off emergency intervention in February 2002, cleaning the urban areas targeted. The results are Satisfactory. Due to its success, it was followed up by the Bank sponsored Water and Solid Waste Disposal project. (e) Training and Private Sector Promotion: SLRA received various TA and training funded under TSP. The training focused largely on management skills and tools for upper and middle management staff, and has laid the groundwork for future improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, which is an important step in the realignment of public and private sectors for road network management. During the project, various types of construction equipment and tools were procured for MSU. This equipment was leased to the SMEs, trained under the project, who were awarded the works contracts for gravel main roads and feeder roads. The results are Satisfactory. (f) SLRA Restructuring and Commercialization of the MSU: The SLRA restructuring under the project primarily focused on commercialization of the Mechanical Services Unit (MSU), supporting SLRA's training and increased use of SME contractors (as described elsewhere), plus strengthening of SLRA's financial management capacity. A Financial Department was set up under EU Financial Management TA. Major changes were affected in the form of introduction of normal accounting practices, together with key staff changes; while the new Head of the Department achieved his professional qualifications through external training. A project funded FMIS was also installed with associated staff training ­ and the FMIS system has been operational since April 2004. As a result, despite a number of qualified entity audits and investigations, by the end of the project the audits were unqualified and the Bank's Financial Management safeguards rated the Financial Management satisfactory. The rehabilitation of the MSU central workshop and the 4 MSU up-country depots was completed (under EU funding). The project and EU coordinated investments in the physical plant and equipment of MSU have been completed ­ and the MSU equipment has been hired-out at commercial rates to the SME contractors and SLRA. A commercial - 12 - orientation/awareness campaign has been conducted; and the MSU-TA (funded by TSP) was extended to the end of the Project - to further the commercialization process and to complete the MSU commercialization /privatization action plan. As a basis for the efficient commercial operation, a computerized inventory and stock control system was also installed, staff trained, and the system is now fully operational. However, the management of the MSU has yet to be transferred to the MSU management such that the release of funds for procurement of spares parts and lubricants remains under the direct control of the SLRA DG. The DG also dictates the release and deployment of equipment and has not paid the majority of the rental charges (approximately US$1.28 million) due to MSU. As such, the commercialization process has yet to become fully effective and is rated Unsatisfactory. 3. Road Transport Component/RTA (SAR US$3.00m Actual US$3.05m): This component is rated as Satisfactory. It consists of the following sub-components: (a) Traffic Management System Measures: The project erected the new traffic signs and applied road markings for new one-way street operations to improve the traffic flow in Freetown all as procured/designed under IDA Cr. 2451-SL. All were successfully completed. The results are Satisfactory. (b) SLRTA Establishment and Institutional Capacity Building: The rehabilitation/renovation of SLRTA's Freetown office complex was completed in 2000. The offices were furnished and equipped (including the purchase of computer hardware and software) and 3 vehicles were procured as planned. A study on the management development and training needs assessment was completed, according to which training programs of various levels, targeting mostly senior level staff and private sector stakeholders (in-house and abroad), were funded and training was completed as planned. The vehicle and driver registration and licensing systems have been computerized, resulting in accurate data collection of the user fees. The system also supports the issuance of vehicle identification certificates (VIC) and drivers card-sized IDs. A traffic warden study was also completed and 40 SLRTA traffic wardens were recruited and completed training (by the police). The wardens have been deployed at various critical locations in Freetown since December 2003. The SLRTA is now fully established and well managed, as such this sub-component is rated as Highly Satisfactory. 4. Port Rehabilitation Component/SLPA (SAR US$9.94m Actual US$10.83m): This component is rated as Marginally Satisfactory. It consists of the following two sub-components. (a) Port Rehabilitation and Priority Improvement: The first phase of the Freetown Port rehabilitation has been completed. The main elements of the work included rehabilitation of 13,300 m2of container stacking area, paving of some of the access roads within the port, repairs to berth 5 and the quay wall concrete coping, plus repair of corroded steel sheet piles at berth 1. Cargo handling equipment was also procured which included one 45 ton container handler, four 3 ton forklifts, two mafi trucks, four mafi trailers, a multi-purpose tug, and a fire-fighting truck; which augmented the equipment provided by WFP. This has addressed the immediate needs of the port following the civil war disturbances. MIS equipment was also procured. The transaction documents to de-link the ferry services and slipway operation have been prepared by the project funded TA legal expert. The 1st draft was presented in December 2004. In addition, a short term international port consultant has prepared an Action Plan for the conversion of SLPA to a Landlord Port. The Draft Final Report was presented in November 2004 for NCP/SLRA comment/adoption and implementation under the IDP PPF services. (b) Cline Town Slipway Repair: The rehabilitation of the slipway together with the winch and winch house was completed in December 2000. Unfortunately, problems later developed with the bearings on the cradle - 13 - outside the warranty period. However, the bearings were repaired successfully in September/October 2003 by SLPA after an initial delay due to contractual liability concerns. 5. Coastal & River Transport Component (SAR US$2.10m Actual US$0.0m): This component was cancelled at Mid-Term Review due to the security situation in the country, which precluded access to the sites slated for jetty rehabilitation. The funding was reallocated to other activities. 6. Air Transport Component/SLAA (SAR US$2.63m Actual US$3.14m): This component is rated as Highly Satisfactory. It consists of the following 4 sub-components. (a) Runway Improvement (civil works): Under the project the Lungi International Airport runway pavement repairs, runway lighting improvement, and perimeter fencing were successfully completed despite delays due to weather, security concerns and the breakdown of the Ferry. (b) Terminal Building Improvement: Terminal roof repairs were completed satisfactorily. These together with other non-project main terminal rehabilitation works (funded directly by SLAA) have all been completed to a commendably high standard and well coordinated effectiveness. (c) Aerodrome Service Equipment: The Foam Fire-Fighting vehicle was procured and delivered in May 2001. The Closed­Circuit TV (CCTV) security system was installed in December 2001; the Search and Rescue boat was delivered and the associated operational training was conducted in November 2003. The X-ray Baggage Scanner was also commissioned, staffs were trained, and is operational since November 2004. (d) Administration & Training: A number of capacity building initiatives were conducted primarily overseas together with in-country training. A Civil Aviation Study was also completed under the Credit, with the Final Report submitted December 2002. This recommended that SLAA take over responsibility for the provincial airstrips unconditionally from the CAA. This was approved by Cabinet in December 2003; but the means of funding and formal proclamation have yet to be finalized. SLAA have registered their formal objection, pointing out that their mandate requires them to operate as a commercially viable entity and this would be impossible unless the government directly funds the rehabilitation and operating costs of the domestic airstrips. 7. Procurement Reform/Ministry of Finance (MOF) (SAR US$0.00m, Actual US$0.48m): Following a UNDP needs assessment, in September 2003 IAPSO commenced the project's Procurement Management Reform Services and a consultant was selected May 2004 for implementing the services identified under the work plan. This included drafting of a new regulatory framework for public procurement, together with an initial interim procurement law and training of procurement staff. The services were Substantially implemented under project funding, in conjunction with UNDP, and cooperation with EU and DfID. The Procurement Law as drafted has now been passed into law by the Government in December 2004. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: Road Infrastructure Component. At appraisal, an ERR was computed for road sections by type of road and maintenance strategy. The benefits were approximated by savings in vehicle operating costs. The road component had an overall EIRR of 25% and NPV of US$8.0 million discounted at 12 %. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the overall EIRR would decrease to 22 % with a cost overrun of 10% and to 17% with an implementation delay of one year. Due to the ongoing rehabilitation of the road network and emergency works subsequent to the civil strife, the road agency's (SLRA) ability to conduct and collate traffic data has been stretched. Due also to a change in the components originally included in the project, it - 14 - is not possible to compute a comparable EIRR. The investment for spot regravelling and reshaping is likely to have yielded an acceptable rate of return. The project was initially delayed until June 1998, and then again until January 1999 (refer mid-term review, November 2001) due to security reasons. Further there was a 45% cost over-run in the feeder roads program. Port Component. There was a substantial delay at commencement due to the national security situation and the suspension of activities. This also delayed completion of this component which would have reduced the return on this component. However, the TSP included one part of the package of investments needed to improve port productivity, particularly in container handling operations. It is expected that this component will yield positive returns when the remainder of the container terminal is paved and the container handling operations are privatized under the proposed Infrastructure Development project. (For details see Annex 3). 4.4 Financial rate of return: (a) Port: Investments for the port component were completed as planned. A preliminary review of maintenance costs (related to the container terminal) does not seem to indicate savings in maintenance expenses, which was the main basis for the investments in the port. Although the fact that only part of the stacking area was paved has meant that equipment continues to operate over unpaved/rough/damaged areas. Further it is unclear that savings would be generated without a major restructuring of the port's management, and operations and maintenance policies. The port also does not seem to have generated the revenues forecast. This may be partly due to the conflict, though the port itself saw higher traffic for the war effort. Utilization of the marine slipway was also less than expected due to the bearings problem rendering it inoperable for almost 2 years, while the unreliable performance of the ferries and the emergence of private operators offering transport to and from Lungi Airport (private helicopters and a hovercraft operator) also adversely affected SLPA revenues. (b) Airport: The airport has been and continues to be used as a base by UNAMSIL forces, which has and continues to cause deterioration of the airport facilities and, to some extent, has constrained the routine maintenance efforts by SLAA. Usage of airport facilities, and pavement deterioration, was also greater than would otherwise have been as relief forces and humanitarian assistance were flown into the country using heavy aircraft. After relative peace was established and SLAA management was again in control of the airport, the project was implemented, using TSP funds in conjunction with SLAA's counterpart funding and SLAA's own funds for additional investments. The civil works under this component were well coordinated and are reported to have provided increased local employment in the area, over the project period. For details, please refer to Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project's impact on institutional development is Modest. (For details see paragraph 4.1) The sector reforms have included: the restructuring and strengthening of SLRA; the establishment of the road fund and fuel levy; the establishment and strengthening of SLRTA; preparation for commercialization/ privatization of MSU and the delinking of SLPA non-core activities; preparation of SLPA for conversion to a Landlord Port; establishment and strengthening of the CMU; and the training and utilization of private sector road maintenance contractors in the rehabilitation and maintenance works; while SLAA capacity building management training has been fully effective. The capacity of these entities has also been developed. Further institutional development will now be supported under the proposed Infrastructure Development Project. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome - 15 - 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: (a) Civil war: The implementation of the project was disrupted for almost 30 months due to civil war, at which time the project implementation was suspended between May 1997 and June 1998, and again from January 1999 until May 2000. This was clearly outside the control of government and the implementing agencies. (b) Adverse weather: A number of civil works contracts were delayed due partly to the civil war and related physical and financial constraints, but also due to substantially adverse whether conditions. Sierra Leone has experienced exceptionally prolonged and heavy rainy seasons in the last 2-3 years as global warming takes effect. (c) Macro-economy: Slower than expected economic recovery in the post conflict situation, and the global oil price hike impeded the increase of the road user charge revenue growth and restricted the promised periodical fuel levy increase. This hampered implementation of the programmed road maintenance works as forecast under the Credit. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: (a) Fuel Levy/Road User Charges: Despite the macro-economic situation, the Government could have at least maintained the fuel levy at its US$0.10 per liter as agreed at the Mid-Term review and thereafter could have periodically raised the fuel levy to a moderate level to better match road maintenance funding requirements. (b) Counterpart funding: Government failed to pay the counterpart funding to the road contractors on time. These delayed payments caused cash flow problems to the SME contractors. (c) UNAMSIL Landing Fees: SLAA's main costs relates to aircraft landing and its main source of revenues is landing fees. GOSL waived the application of all such fees when inviting UNAMSIL to assist in the security operations in-country. As a result, SLAA incurred considerable operating costs (standby generator operation, runway maintenance etc.) by maintaining and keeping the airport open for UNAMSIL use. However, the Government has yet to compensate SLAA for such costs (and the outstanding UNAMSIL landing fees up to end December 2004, amount to approx. US$1.4m including the fees for ECOMIL), despite repeated reminders by IDA and promises made by the Government, which constrained the financial autonomy of SLAA and use of the expected revenues for other development investment. (d) Emergency Maintenance Demands: Excessive Government demands on SLRA for emergency road maintenance interventions at the expense of programmed prioritized maintenance has substantially diverted maintenance funding away from essential core road asset sustainability to fire fighting on minor roads; to the detriment of the core roads. In addition, Government's prioritization of emergency maintenance demands, when no funding was available, has contributed to SLRA's non-payment of the equipment rental charges due to MSU ­ which has frustrated the achievement of the commercialization development objective for the MSU. The increased use of domestic contractors in maintenance of the road network has also taken second place to the emergency force account works. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: (a) Programmed maintenance of roads: The roads must be maintained in accordance with the respective technically justified priority of each road. SLRA have found it difficult to prioritize programmed maintenance and have continued responding to ad hoc demands for unplanned "emergency works", which were unbudgeted, under the road maintenance and rehabilitation interventions. This is detracting from the prioritized SLRA maintenance plans such that the core road network continues to deteriorate. It also results in continued use of force account resources at the expense of the private sector development planned. (b) Commercialization/Privatization of MSU: Under the project SLRA was envisaged as being restructured, with MSU reorganized to allow its operation on a commercial basis, in preparation for privatization. However, progress has been disappointingly slow due primarily to SLRA's reluctance to relinquish management controls and SLRA's non-payment of equipment rental charges - denying MSU the - 16 - necessary revenue to operate commercially, with enough spare parts and scheduled replacement of equipment. (c) Privatizing/Contracting-out Selected Port Activities: Following an extended period of lack of progress on de-linking of the SLPA non-core operations, the transaction documents were prepared supported by the project funded TA legal expert. The transaction documents are now at their 2nd Draft stage, with questions still arising over the Government's commitment to private sector participation and international competitiveness. The National Commission for Privatization (NCP), following completion of its medium and long term strategic plan, formally cleared the privatization initiatives in October 2003. 5.4 Costs and financing: At appraisal, the total project cost was estimated at US$41.0 million with a contribution by IDA of US$35.0 million (SDR 24.3 million) and US$6.0 million by the Borrower. By project closing, the completion cost for the project is put at US$35.16 million, with IDA contribution amounting to US$32.03 million (SDR 24.29 million) about 100% (precisely 99.98%) and the Borrower's to US$3.12. The project disbursement schedule was affected by civil unrest and severe security issues. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended on October 26, 2000 to reflect the project restructuring and changes were made in the component allocations. The details of the project components and the comparison of each of the components between the SAR stage and the actual are shown in Annex 2. 5.5 Procurement Performance Rating Overall, procurement management under the TSP was satisfactory. The procurement risks under the project were identified during the initial procurement capacity assessment and the subsequent procurement post reviews (PPRs) which were carried out during project implementation. The main issues identified included delays in processing procurement, relatively high prices for vehicles, computers and office equipment procured in accordance with national shopping procedures from Sierra Leonean suppliers and initial poor procurement records management. Other areas which were in need of improvement included contract supervision and management and cost control. Most of the actions which were agreed to improve procurement management were implemented by the implementing agencies, however, for sustainability, further capacity building is recommended. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: The project sustainability is rated as Likely but fragile, since it is dependent on: (i) macro-conditions remaining favorable for key economic activities; (ii) the collection of adequate road user fees and their use for prioritized/ programmed core road maintenance; (iii) the MSU's establishment as a self-financing commercial equipment rental entity ­ which will ensure a sustainable equipment pool is available to the SME contractors and SLRA; (iv) Government's continued commitment to conversion of SLPA to a Landlord port; and (v) productivity gains attained in other sectors under the project are not lost though inefficient management of resources. The new IDP project is to address all the outstanding sector reform issues, with those actions critical to sustainability as conditionalities, especially: continued support of SLRTA and its road user charge revenue collection; application of an appropriate level of road user charges; the separation from SLRA of the Road Fund with the establishment of an Independent Road Maintenance Fund and Board, mandated to use the funds only for prioritized and programmed maintenance of the core road network; and enhanced SME contractor participation. While the IDP will also support the conversion of SLPA to a Landlord port. The - 17 - sustainability should therefore have every chance of being attained through IDP implementation. Also, due to the ongoing peace process, macro-conditions are expected to improve, which should favorably contribute to the sustainability of the transport sector reforms and performance. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: An Infrastructure Development Project (IDP) is under preparation and scheduled to go to the Board in FY06. The project would support Sierra Leone's National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan (2003-2007) (SLNTP), which aims to rebuild and maintain the nation's basic transport infrastructure as a key element of the country's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and National Recovery Strategy. The SLNTP was developed under the IDA-supported Transport Sector Project (TSP). It recommends key policy reforms and strategies for achieving improved transport infrastructure, notably: (i) filling major gaps in the nation's transport infrastructure, to enable access to markets, social services and development opportunities; (ii) rationalizing road network management to ensure systematic and sustainable maintenance of the core network, with connectivity to rural areas; (iii) outsourcing of non-core functions in the Freetown Port and reorganization toward a "landlord port" model; and (iv) enhancing safety and service quality to international airport users. The Government's commitment and ownership of this strategy is evidenced by the cabinet's adoption of the SLNTP, which was formulated through a participatory process, including several regional stakeholder workshops. The IDP project would support the Bank's Transitional Support Strategy (TSS), under the "Accelerating Economic Growth" pillar in the lending program for FY 04 and the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy. The IDP project incorporates lessons learned from recovery assistance and previous projects in the transport sector, which underline the necessity to improve sector management and maintenance systems, so as to ensure that benefits of physical investments are sustainable. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Overall performance was "Satisfactory". The project was consistent with Government's overall policies to rehabilitate the seriously deteriorated transport sector in the post conflict emergency situation, while at the same time pursuing necessary sector reforms to establish the basis for the efficient transport sector operation/services and sustained economic growth. The Bank fielded several missions and coordinated well with the other donors, resulting in committed donor funding, totaling US$114 million at the time of project appraisal. The appraisal team had a comprehensive range of skills and was joined by representatives of the other major donors. 7.2 Supervision: Supervision was generally "Satisfactory" and, at times, "Highly Satisfactory". The Bank met its formal supervision requirements, providing timely and guiding responses and letters to various requests, meeting internal reporting deadlines, timely audit reviews, etc. TSP was a complex and ambitious project for a post conflict country. The intended sector reforms and capacity building were a major determinant of success, along with the high skill-mix and experience of quality supervision of civil works and consultancy services. During the Mid Term Review, the Bank's team incorporated lessons from past experience and, with government's agreement, promptly and proactively amended the project reflecting the emergency needs and the security situation of the country. Although, this was accomplished without relaxing the necessary sector reforms which were deemed critical for the sustainability of the transport sector developments - which was the core development objective of the project. As a result, sector reforms were mostly achieved and the credit was 100% disbursed. The Bank could have relaxed some of the sector reforms in the face of repeated domestic conflict/civil war, - 18 - and could have shifted its focus on emergency infrastructure restoration. However, the Bank decided to persevere with the initially agreed sector reforms. This was partly criticized by the QAG (October 2002). However, the team maintained its strong support to the Government, guiding and encouraging the Government to continue implementing the sector reform prescribed in the Letter of Sector Policy and succeeded to get the coordinated support of other donors. As a result, substantial progress in the transport sector reform was accomplished as repeatedly noted in this ICR. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The Bank responded quickly under the post conflict situation and emergency needs, but without loosing the fundamental focus on sector reforms for the sustainability of the accomplishment of the project's objectives. Given the difficulty of the post conflict situation with weakened Government capacity and scarce resources; the achievement of meaningful sector reforms and the physical infrastructure improvements; together with full disbursement of the credit; the overall performance by the Bank is rated as Satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower's preparation performance was Satisfactory. The Government prepared a new National Transport Sector Policy addressing the essential policy reforms. They then succeeded in obtaining extensive donor support, and maintained close cooperation with the Bank. 7.5 Government implementation performance: There were many positive aspects of Government's implementation performance. In particular: GOSL supported the project's institutional reforms and development objectives throughout, despite the conflict situation arising and worsening; GOSL approved the National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan (2003-2008) which focuses on prioritized programmed maintenance of the core road network, with dedicated maintenance funding through a Road Fund, plus increasing use of the private sector in the maintenance works and services; GOSL introduced and maintained the fuel levy and the road fund - and allowed its use exclusively for road maintenance works (excepting only administration costs); GOSL allowed all (except the administration costs) of the road user charge revenue collected by SLRTA to be transferred to the Road Fund - and supported the expansion of the revenue base through the establishment of the traffic wardens; GOSL established the National Commission for Privatization (NCP) to take charge of the privatization of Government Services and to ensure as far as possible that the individual entities did not resist change; GOSL also changed the management of SLPA and brought in external management to facilitate change; and GOSL have with effect June 2004 (with the public endorsement of the proposals by the President) now firmly committed to conversion of the Port Authority to a Landlord port - with concessioning of the container handling services and the licensing of all other cargo handling services; GOSL formally endorsed the recommendations of the project study into the Civil Aviation Authority; and GOSL supported the procurement reform process and initiatives under the project and passed into law the new National Procurement Law aimed at good governance. Despite the relevant accomplishments by the GOSL it failed to execute some of the fundamental measures (i) to sustain the improved infrastructure (through programmed prioritized maintenance funded by an agreed rate of fuel levy); and (ii) to ensure the autonomy of the parastatal organizations (i.e. compensate for the lost landing fees revenue due to SLAA from UNAMSIL). Also, the Government continued utilizing the road user charges to finance emergency works. However, considering the conflicts and the political sensitivity of the changes, the Government's implementation performance is rated as Satisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: (a) Project implementation under CMU is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. The CMU has functioned as - 19 - the core coordination entity, and has also been responsible for the environmental safeguards, as well as financial management of the credit funds. The FM safeguards review conducted by the Bank in September/October 2004 concluded that the CMU has done well in the management of the credit funds, by preparing the required withdrawal applications and maintaining adequate accounting records, and the credit is 100% disbursed. However, during the final ICR mission it was realized that some of the financial records were not fully reconciled showing a further need for financial management capacity building. In fact the CMU staffs have all received project funded training and technical assistance in a number of areas, but their implementation capacity in general still needs to be strengthened further. (b) SLRA succeeded in completing all of the extensive physical works as planned and generally to a high standard. SLRA also fully met its commitments in terms of training SME contractors and in successfully contracting-out a considerable quantity of the rehabilitation and maintenance works and services. However, SLRA did not meet all of its commitments in respect of equipment hire charge payments due to MSU and the delegation of management authority was deferred. This delayed the intended separation (commercialization and eventually privatization) of MSU. These shortcomings detract from the major physical achievements such that Project implementation under SLRA can only be rated as Moderately Satisfactory. (c) SLRTA has been fully established and equipped under the project. It is now well managed and focused. SLRTA has done all that could possibly have been expected of it. As such, the performance of SLRTA is rated as Highly Satisfactory. (d) SLPA oversaw the successful port rehabilitation works and the identification and procurement of the safety and cargo handling equipment ­ and the re-establishment of normal port operations. The partial paving of the container stacking area resulted in significantly improved handling efficiency, although equipment maintenance costs remained high, through the continued operation over unpaved areas. SLPA also completed the necessary preparation and arrangements to de-link non-core activities, which was cleared with the establishment of the NCP in August 2002, though the transactions did not happen due to delayed effectiveness of NCP. SLPA's audits were mostly qualified and were submitted late, with no effective action taken to remedy the auditor's comments until the end of the project. No project funds were effected by the audit qualifications. SLPA implementation is therefore rated as only Moderately Satisfactory. (e) SLAA, with the increased security improvement in compliance with ICAO, is functioning as an extremely well run airport authority. SLAA implementation is rated as Highly Satisfactory. They have done all that could have been expected of them. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall borrower performance was Satisfactory considering the sector reforms, capacity building, the infrastructure development, and the maintenance/sustainability issues. 8. Lessons Learned · In a risky/conflict environment there is a need for identifying "Plan B" (back-up activities that are consistent with the development objectives of the project). · Institutional reforms require a stable environment, in the absence of which there is need for simple and focused reforms only. · In a relatively unstable/conflict environment, extra vigilance is warranted in respect of audits and follow-up actions to address qualifications. 9. Partner Comments - 20 - (a) Borrower/implementing agency: REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE THE TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Objectives The main project objective was to support a four-year time slice (1996 ­ 1999) of Government's ten-year transport sector investment program that will comprise three main components: (a) Capacity building to: (i) build up the Coordination & Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Transport & Communications; (ii) establish and support a new autonomous Road Transport Authority (RTA) responsible for road transport regulations, vehicle registration and licensing and vehicle examination; and (iii) develop small and medium sized labor-based enterprises for road works. (b) Parastatal Restructuring and Privatization to: (i) improve the organizational structure of SLRA including the creation of a Finance Department; (ii) restructure SLPA, including possible devolution and/or privatization of some of its core functions, and restructure the Freetown-Tagrin Ferry operations; and (iii) privatize the Sierra Leone Road Transport Corporation (SLRTC), the Sierra National Airlines (SNA) and the Sierra Leone National Shipping Company (SLNSC). (c) Investment to include: (i) a program of periodic maintenance of 460km of trunk roads spot improvement of about 550km of feeder roads, and repair/overlaying of 20km of city streets; (ii) traffic management measures in Freetown; (iii) in the port, slipway repair, quay rehabilitation and pavement of container stacking area; (iv) in the Airport, runway repair and edge lighting, procurement of safety equipment and protective fencing; and (v) coastal and river transport, rehabilitation/provision of landing and storage facilities. Due to the two military interventions in 1997 and 1999, implementation was suspended and project operations only recommenced in 1999. The closing date of the credit was deferred to December 2004 with the following amendments to its objectives; (a) The coastal and river transport rehabilitation was cancelled as these areas were inaccessible to government and were mainly controlled by rebels. (b) 20km of repair/overlaying of city streets was reduced to 9km because of inaccessibility to the - 21 - northern province by government. (c) A pilot program for solid waste disposal for Freetown, Bo and Kenema was introduced. (d) A pilot program for HIV/AIDS sensitization became part of the new objectives. (e) A procurement reform program at the Ministry of Finance was also introduced. (f) Safety equipments for both the Sierra Leone Ports Authority and Sierra Leone Airport Authority. (g) Increased refurbishment of the SLAA Terminal Building. Achievements of Project Objectives: The Project achieved all its major objectives except for the Parastatal restructuring and Privatization which is still ongoing. a) The Coordination and Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Transport and Communications was established and is running. b) Road Transport Authority was set up and collection of licensing fees and regulation of road transportation is ongoing smoothly c) Small and medium sized contractors were trained by SLRA on labor based methods and which they are now employing on implementation of contracts awarded to them. d) The periodic maintenance of 460 km of truck roads; improvement of 550km of Feeder and repair/overlaying of 9km of City Street were all satisfactorily completed. e) Traffic management measures were installed in the Freetown City Business Zone. f) The Sierra Leone Airport components of runway repair and edge lighting; refurbishment of Terminal building; protective fencing of Airport and Procurement of Airport Safety equipment were satisfactorily completed g) The slipway repair, quay rehabilitation and pavement of container stacking including the procurement of safety equipment for the Sierra Leone Ports Authority were completed satisfactorily. h) The HIV/AIDS pilot Program was a huge success that immediately led to the World Bank sponsored SHARP Project for HIV/AIDS i) The Ministry of Finance now has a new Procurement law and a Secretariat for Procurement j) The pilot solid waste program was a success as it has now got a successor in the World Bank sponsored Project of water and solid waste disposal. - 22 - Major factors affecting implementation Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency One factor affecting the implementation and out of the project was the protracted time of 8 years instead of a 4 year time period and various movements over this period of the US$ against the SDR which led to a 10% reduction in project funds from $35 million to $32 million. The ten years civil war responsible for the protracted implementation period which was responsible for further deterioration of the roads and structures thereby increasing the amount of work to be done and increase in costs. Factors generally subject to government control Government's counterpart fund contribution to the project was very low and late thereby causing a lot of hardship and loss of capital base of small and medium size contractors who still have outstanding balances to be settled even though the project life ended 31st December 2004. Factors generally subject to implementing agency There were delays in awarding some roads contracts and the supervision of some of these contracts were not very effective and thereby causing delays in the completion of these contracts. Audited reports of some agencies within the sector were submitted later than the June 30th stipulated by IDA. Training for procurement staff of the project was late thereby creating a few procurement problems that would otherwise could have been awarded. (b) Cofinanciers: UNDP ­ Procurement Reform EU ­ SLRA TA (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N/A 10. Additional Information - 23 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate 1. Improve road conditions: (a) 10.8 ((a) 5.1 (a) Yearly Road Fund expenditures on maintenance on National Road System US$ equiv. (b) Yearlyt Road Fund expenditures on local (b) 1.6 (b) 0.8 roads (US$ equiv.) 2. Increase the use of private sector for maintenance - Percentage of maintenance works contracted out (Road Fund) (a) Routine maintenance (%) per year (a) 95 (a) 90 (b) Periodic maintenance (%) per year (b) 90 (b) 30 3. Strengthening and improving SLRA's Strengthened Strengthened management 4. Full privatization of SLRA plant pool Privatized Not privatized 5. Restructuring SLPA Restructured Not restructured 6. Creation of RTA Created Created 7. Increase the use of labor intensive methods in road maintenance. (a) No. of persons employed in Program on (a) N/A (a) 602,400 man-days ** labor-based feeder roads contracts (person/day) (b) No. of labor-based contractors qualified to (b) 50 contractors (b)281 contractorsf bid on contracts greater than US$50,000 (50 feeder roads & 231 trunk roads (No.) contractors) Output Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate Reconstruction/Rehabilitation (a) Trunk Roads Civil Works Contracts (a) 319 km (a) 319 km awarded/completed (km) (b) City Roads Civil Works Contract (b) 9.8 km (b) 9.8 km awarded/completeed (km) (c) Feeder Roads Rehabilitation Contracts (c) 475 (c) 475 awarded/completed (km) (d) Trunk Roads civil works contracts (d) 100 % (d) 100 % completed (%) (e) City roads civil works contract completed (e) 100 % (e) 100 % (%) (f) Feeder roads rehabilitation contract (f) 100 % (f) 100 % completed (%) Maintenance (a) 1447 km (a) 1771 km (a) Trunk roads under maintenance (km) (b) Feeder roads under maintenance (km) (b) 188 km (b) 188 km Road condition for National Road System--Class A) Paved Good % 56 68 Fair% 30 29 Poor% 14 3 Road condition for National Road System--Class A) Unpaved Good % N/A 45 - 24 - Fair% 36 Poor% 19 Road condition for National Road System--Class B) Paved Good % N/A 50 Fair% 38 Poor% 12 Road condition for National Road System--Class B) Unpaved Good % N/A 37 Fair% 31 Poor% 32 Road condition for National Road System--Class F) Unpaved Good % N/A 30 Fair% 40 Poor% 30 Employment Generation (a) Number of persons employed on Labor based Feeder Roads contracts (person-days) (a) 602,400 man-days** (a) + (b) 288,000 man-days (SAR) (b) Number of persons employed in Trunk (b) 1,202,883 man-days** Roads contracts (person-days) A. Roads N/A (a) Total number of vehicles (a) 29,364 (b) Vehicle ownership (per 1,000 inhab.) (b) 5.9 (c) Number of Vehicles Registered (c) 8,212 (d) Number of Driver License issued (d) 6,177 (e) Road User Fee Collected Le 000 (e) Le 25.64 million (f) % of projected Collection (f) 81 % (g) Cost of 1 km of paved road built (US$) (g) US$950,000 (h) Cost of 1 km of paved road maintained (h) & (i): (US$) US$ 1,500 (routine maintenance) (i) Maintenance costs (US$) US$40,000 (periodic maintenance) (j) Rehabilitation costs (US$) (j) US$220,000 1End of project ** Employment generation figures are produced by SLRA through tracking average resource levels per activity under trunk and feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance works. - 25 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million A. SECTOR ADMINISTRATION 2.06 4.22 202 B. ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 15.54 13.44 87 C. ROAD TRANSPORT 3.00 3.05 98 D. PORT REHABILITATION 9.94 10.83 108 E. COASTAL AND RIVER TRANSPORT 2.10 0.00 F. AIR TRANSPORT 2.63 3.14 121 G. Procurement Reform 0.00 0.48 Total Baseline Cost 35.27 35.16 Physical Contingencies 3.52 Price Contingencies 2.21 Total Project Costs 41.00 35.16 Total Financing Required 41.00 35.16 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 18.10 11.60 0.00 0.00 29.70 (13.90) (10.40) (0.00) (0.00) (24.30) 2. Goods 5.20 0.30 0.30 0.00 5.80 (4.60) (0.30) (0.30) (0.00) (5.20) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 5.50 0.00 5.50 (0.00) (0.00) (5.50) (0.00) (5.50) Total 23.30 11.90 5.80 0.00 41.00 (18.50) (10.70) (5.80) (0.00) (35.00) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 14.67 4.82 0.11 0.00 19.60 (13.13) (3.44) (0.10) (0.00) (16.67) 2. Goods 6.43 0.35 0.35 0.00 7.13 (6.43) (0.25) (0.25) (0.00) (6.93) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 8.43 0.00 8.43 (0.00) (0.00) (8.43) () (8.43) Total 21.10 5.17 8.89 0.00 35.16 (19.56) (3.69) (8.78) (0.00) (32.03) - 26 - 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes civil works and goods procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. A. SECTOR 2.01 0.05 4.18 0.04 208.0 80.0 ADMINISTRATION B. ROAD 14.16 1.38 12.75 0.69 90.0 50.0 INFRASTRUCTURE C. ROAD TRANSPORT 2.75 0.25 2.81 0.24 102.2 96.0 D. PORT 7.12 2.82 9.12 1.71 128.1 60.6 REHABILITATION E. COASTAL AND 1.92 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 RIVER TRANSPORT F. AIR TRANSPORT 2.14 0.49 2.70 0.43 126.2 87.8 G. Procurement Reform 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.0 0.0 Discrepancy may occur due to rounding. - 27 - Original and Restructured Project Components and Costs (US$ million) - 28 - Component Initial Budget ActualCost Actual/Initia(%) Total IDA GOSL Total IDA GOSL Total IDA GOSL A. Sector Administration 2.06 2.01 0.05 4.22 4.18 0.04 205% 208% 1 TA to CMU/DOTC 0.20 0.20 0.00 1.16 1.16 0.00 580% 579% 2 Equipment 0.50 0.45 0.05 0.58 0.54 0.04 116% 119% 3 Training 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 85% 85% 4 Studies 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.02 1.02 0.00 204% 204% 5 Studies-PPF 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.02 1.02 0.00 300% 300% 6 TA/Equip-PPF 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 50% 50% (New) HIV/AIDS prevention activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 - - B.RoadComponent 15.54 14.15 1.39 13.44 12.75 0.69 86% 90% 2 Paving of strategic gravel road 0.70 0.63 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 2.1 Lungi-Port Loko (regravel 62km) 0.70 0.63 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% Deferred periodic maintenance of paved 3 1.30 1.17 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% main roads 3.1 Tagrim Point-Lungi Airport (overlay 15km) 1.30 1.17 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 5 Reshaping/regaravelling gravel main road 3.75 3.38 0.38 2.54 2.30 0.24 68% 68% 5.1-23 1997 program (312km) 3.10 2.79 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 5.1-23 1998 program (68km) 0.65 0.59 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% (New) Spot rergravel/reshape Tranche 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.32 1.21 0.12 - - lot 1 Bo-Yele-Petifu Jct. (65km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.52 0.05 - - lot 1 Reconst. Abutments of 2 bridges of Bo- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 - - Yele road Koribundu-Blama-GeindamaFerryroad lot 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.65 0.07 - - (94km) (New) Spot rergravel/reshape Tranche 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 1.10 0.12 - - lot 1 Bo-Semebehun-Mano-Tiama (70km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.50 0.06 - - Sembehun-Sumbuya-Mattru-Bamba Jct. lot 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.60 0.07 - - (90km) 6 Feeder roads 2.20 1.98 0.22 2.06 1.86 0.20 94% 94% Spot improvement (550km in western part 6.4 2.20 1.98 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 of SL) (Revised) Feeder roads spot improvement 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 1.86 0.20 - - lot 1 8 labour based contracts (177km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.77 0.09 - - lot 2 12 labour based contracts (307km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 1.09 0.11 - - lot 3 labour based contracts (67km) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - unidentified/cancelled 7 Urban roads & street (excl.ROW) 1.60 1.44 0.16 1.93 1.74 0.19 121% 121% Major streets in Up-country towns (Bo, 7.3 Kenema, Mile91, & Port Loko: 1.60 1.44 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% rehab./reconst. 20km) (Revised) Major streets in Up-country towns (Bo & 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.49 1.34 0.15 - - Kenema: rehab./reconst. 9km) Labor-intensive waste removal (Freetown, (New) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.40 0.04 - - B0, & Kenema) 9 Special projects & TA 5.99 5.56 0.43 6.90 6.84 0.06 115% 123% Development of contractors (small & 9.1(a) 3.40 3.06 0.34 4.13 4.07 0.06 121% 133% medium)-equipment - 29 - 9.1(c) Workshop equipment 0.25 0.23 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 9.2 Expansion of training school facilities 0.66 0.59 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% - 30 - Component Initial Budget Actual Cost Actual/Initia (%) Total IDA GOSL Total IDA GOSL Total IDA GOSL C. Road Transport Component 3.00 2.75 0.25 3.05 2.81 0.24 102% 102% Traffic management civil works (improv. 20 1 intersections, 16 lay-byes, 40 parking lots) 2.00 1.80 0.20 1.93 1.76 0.18 97% 98% 2 Road Transport Authority (RTA) 1.00 0.95 0.05 1.12 1.05 0.07 112% 111% 2.1 Construction of RTA facilities 0.30 0.27 0.03 0.32 0.29 0.03 107% 107% 2.2 Vehicles & equipment for RTA 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.35 0.32 0.04 175% 175% 2.3 TA to RTA 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 100% 100% 2.4 Training for RTA 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 83% 83% D. Port Component 9.94 7.12 2.82 10.83 9.12 1.71 109% 128% 1 Rehabilitation & priority improvement (Phse- 8.16 5.83 2.33 9.19 7.82 1.37 113% 134% 1) 1.1(a) Deferred maintenance 2.28 1.60 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 1.1(b) Paving of roads & container area 4.00 2.80 1.20 6.77 5.41 1.36 169% 193% 1.1(c) Minor improvements 1.48 1.04 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 1.2 Supervision of port rehab. & deferred 0.40 0.40 0.00 1.15 1.15 0.00 288% 288% maintenance works (New) Tugboat, fire tender & MIS 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.26 0.01 - - 2 Cline Town slipway 1.78 1.29 0.49 1.64 1.30 0.34 92% 101% 2.1 Cline Town slipway repair 1.63 1.14 0.49 1.64 1.30 0.34 101% 114% 2.2 Supervision of Cline Town slipway 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% E. Coastal & River Transport Component 2.10 1.92 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 1 Coastal & inland river transport study 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 2 Phase-1 investments inland waterways 37 1.80 1.62 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% storage bldg, and 9 piers) F. Air Transport Component 2.63 2.14 0.49 3.14 2.70 0.43 119% 126% 2 Aerodrome & ground aids 2.54 2.05 0.49 2.99 2.55 0.43 118% 125% 2.1 Aerodrome civil works 0.93 0.76 0.17 1.78 1.46 0.32 191% 193% 2.1(a) Runway improvement 0.46 0.37 0.09 1.13 0.90 0.23 246% 245% 2.1(b) Perimeter fencing 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.42 0.33 0.09 105% 103% 2.1(c) Supervision of civil works 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.00 329% 329% 2.2 Buildings/Terminal Blg. improve. 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.43 0.34 0.09 226% 224% 2.3 Aerodrome electrical works/ air field 0.76 0.61 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% 0% Aerodrome service equipment/ foam 2.4 tender & rescue craft 0.66 0.53 0.13 0.57 0.55 0.02 86% 104% (New) CCTV, X-Ray scanner & baggage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.20 0.01 - - - 31 - 3 Administration & training/ technical 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 162% 162% training Note: The numbers in the first column refer to the reference numbers allocated to each component/sub-component under Annex 4-1 of the SAR. - 32 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Roads Component. Due to the continuing civil conflict in the country and destruction of transport infrastructure and assets, project activities were restructured. An interim program was agreed in 2000 to support the needs of the peace and reconciliation process and to focus investments in areas where the security situation allowed projects to be implemented. Funds were re-directed to roads where emergency works were needed for connectivity and security reasons. As a result, the paving of the Lungi-Port Loko road and rehabilitation of the Taagrin Point­Lungi Airport road were dropped from the project. Although works for the reshaping and regravelling of the main gravel roads have been completed, the capacity of the Road Authority to complete road condition and traffic surveys is stretched. These surveys are either not yet complete and /or the results have yet to be analyzed. The financial cost per km, based on the contract award prices for works on these roads is, on average, about 30 % less than estimated at appraisal. Though traffic estimates on these roads are not available, it is expected that the growth rates of 3 to 6 % estimated at appraisal are likely to have been achieved. This assessment is based on the growth of vehicles registered nationwide which showed a nearly three fold increase between 1997 and 2002, the growth of urban areas during and after the civil war, and economic growth (greater than 6 % per annum, since 2002) in the country. As the economic rate of return (ERR) at appraisal was 30% and the economic costs of construction per km were at least 30% less than estimated, it is reasonable to assume that this component of the project has yielded an acceptable rate of return. Traffic surveys are not available for the feeder roads component. The actual financial costs per kilometer were approximately 45% higher than estimated at appraisal and it is unlikely that the appraisal estimate of an economic return of 15% has been achieved. For the urban roads and streets component, only a part of the original investments were completed. A limited traffic count was completed in both Bo and Kenema in February 2005. Based on this, average daily traffic (ADT) appears to be slightly higher than the 1994 ADT. However, costs per kilometer are substantially higher and it is unlikely that the estimated 30 % return on investment has been achieved. While the ERR for this component as a whole is expected to be less than calculated at appraisal, the ERR would not capture the benefits of the component related to connectivity, national security and accessibility to services by rural populations still recovering from the civil war, due to works completed under the project. Employment generation. The road component generated between 200,000 to 340,000 person days of - 33 - employment per annum, for a total of 1.8 million person days over the life of the project. The employment impact of the roads component, based on these numbers, has been far greater than the estimated 288,000 person-days at appraisal (refer Annex 6-1 paragraph 18 of the SAR). Water Transport. This component was cancelled due to inaccessibility of the landing sites included for rehabilitation under this component. Port Rehabilitation Component. The deferred maintenance program as originally envisaged was built-in to the port rehabilitation contract at the time the project was restructured. The resultant civil works at the port were completed in September 2003. The works included in the project covered repairs to the quay wall, paving of access roads and block paving of roughly half the area set aside for container stacking at the port. The remaining half of the surface is planned to be completed under the proposed Infrastructure Development project. The latter is planned in tandem with the proposed privatization of the container handling operations. The benefits of reduced damage to container handling equipment and reduced maintenance of the unpaved area, and benefits associated with faster ship turn around times, related to paving of the container terminal area and improvements in container handling operations, are expected to be realized when all of these related actions are completed. Air Transport Component. Investments within this component went mainly towards security and safety related (perimeter fencing, runway improvement, fire tender and rescue craft, air field lighting) works and equipment; an economic justification would not be necessary for this component. - 34 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 12/15/1993 4 Sr. Transport Engineer (1); Highway Engineer (1); Rural Transport Specialist (1); Port Engineer (1) 06/30/1994 6 Economist (1); Port Specialist (1); Cons. Aviation Specialist (1); Cons. Public Transport Specialist (1); Highway Engineer (1); Sr. Transport Engineer (1) 03/16/1995 3 Economist (1); Cons.Airport Specialist (1); Highway Engineer (1) 06/30/1995 7 Pr. Operations Officer (1); Highway Engineer (2); Economist (1); Rural Transport Specialist (1); Financial Analyst (1); Division Chief 09/28/1993 2 Sr. Transport Engineer (1); Highway Engineer (1); 11/10/1994 7 Highway Engineer (1); Economist (1); Rural Transport Specialist (1); Pr. Operations Officer (1); Financial Analyst (2); & Ferry Specialist (Cons) 1. Appraisal/Negotiation 04/11/1996 5 Pr. Operations Officer (1); Highway Engineer (1); Economist (1); Financial Analyst (1); Cons. Port Management (1) Supervision 08/15/1996 2 Pr. Operations Officer (1); Economist (1) 12/14/1996 2 TECH. MANAGER, AFTT2 (1); HS HS PRINC. OPERATIONS OFF. (1) 03/09/1997 3 PRINC. OPER. OFFICER (1); HS HS FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) 12/09/1998 1 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) S U 06/05/1999 1 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1) U U 09/22/1999 4 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); U U MARITIME TRANSPORT SPE - 35 - (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); CONSULTANT (1) 12/01/1999 2 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); U U FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1) 05/04/2000 3 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (TL) S S (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); MARITIME TRANS. SPEC. (1) 11/01/2000 3 SR.HWY.ENGR.(TL) (1); S S MARITIME TRANSP.SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 04/02/2001 4 SR.HWY.ENGR. (TL) (1); S S MARITIME TRANSP.SPEC. (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 06/29/2002 2 SR.HWY.ENGR. (TTL) (1); S S FIN. MGMT. SPECIALIST (1) 11/11/2002 2 SR.HWY.ENGR. (TTL) (1); S S MARITIME TRANSP.SPEC. (1) 06/02/2003 3 TEAM LEADER (1); S S MARITIME TRANSP. SPEC. (1); SNR. SOCIAL DEV. SPEC. (1) 06/02/2003 4 SR. HWY ENGR (TTL) (1); S S MARITIME TRANSP. SPEC. (1); FIN. MGMT. SPECIALIST (1); SR. SOCIAL DEV. SPEC. (1) 11/13/2003 6 TTL (1); MARITIME S S SPECIALIST (1); CONSULTANT (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MGMT SPEC. (1); ENV. SPECIALIST (1) 03/18/2004 3 SR. HWY ENGR (TTL) (1); SR. U S SOCIAL DEV. SPEC. (1); SR. HWY ENGR (CONS) (1) ICR 12/15/2004 4 SR. HWY ENGR (TTL) (1); HWY ENGR (CONS) (1); SR. TRANS. ECONOMIST (1); SR. SOCIAL DEV. SPEC. (1) (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 131.8 429.6 - 36 - Appraisal/Negotiation 61.0 197.9 Supervision 175.6** 760.8 ICR Total 368.4 1,388.3 ** Includes time spent under ICR - 37 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 38 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 39 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Preparation Documents Mission terms of reference, Aide-Memoires and Back-to-Office reports. Staff Appraisal Report Implementation Documents Project Status Reports (PSRs). Aide-Memoires of supervision missions. Progress Reports Mid Term Review Report QAG Report: Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA5) Client's Project Evaluation Report - 40 - - 41 -