African Involuntary Population Resettlement in a Global Context

Michael M. Cernea

February 1997
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African Involuntary Population Resettlement in a Global Context

Michael M. Cernea

February 1997

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>The Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENV</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>Industry and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JESS</td>
<td>Juba Environmental and Social Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHR</td>
<td>Population and Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>Transportation, Water and Urban</td>
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The author expresses his thanks to Cynthia C. Cook, Dan Aronson, Cyprian Fisiy, Scott Guggenheim, Francois Falloux, and Thayer Scudder for their valuable comments on the earlier versions of this study, and to Warren van Wicklin who assisted with updating the data, commenting on, and editing the present paper. Sven Sandstrom, Ismail Serageldin and Andrew Steer provided support not only to the work that led to this study, but also to improving overall work on resettlement operations under World Bank-financed projects.

I am most grateful to countless people of Africa who shared with me their difficult, often very painful, experiences of involuntary resettlement. As I met them during my field analyses of displacement and resettlement in Togo, Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, and other African countries, they helped me gain a fuller understanding of the hard and complex human consequences of uprooting and relocation.

Finally, my thanks go to Gracie Ochieng and Kerry Brady, who processed several drafts of this paper, and to Cristy Tumale who desk-topped it.

Michael M. Cernea
1. Introduction

In Africa as well as worldwide, population settlement and resettlement processes are linked to the core of today's development agenda. This paper discusses several common characteristics and issues of involuntary resettlement processes resulting from development programs and offers an overview of involuntary resettlement in Africa in the context of similar processes worldwide. It also provides detailed data about resettlement under World Bank-financed projects in Africa. The analysis of the World Bank's experience in addressing involuntary resettlement in Africa, both at the policy and operational levels, provides important insights for understanding the complex socio-economic content of forced displacement and resettlement, as well as the policy dimensions of managing such processes.
2. Population Movements and Development

Around the world, involuntary resettlement processes caused by development projects are only a subset of much broader population movement processes. The latter are caused by economic mobility, industrialization and urbanization, or by war, ethnic strife, or natural calamities such as droughts. Africa is a continent rich in natural resources, but often the spatial distribution of its people and its resources do not coincide. Therefore, much of the impetus for population movements in Africa also comes from efforts to match the people with the resources they need for sustenance and growth (Cook and Falloux, 1994).

The challenges posed by mandated processes of involuntary resettlement epitomize some of the most complex problems involved in inducing, accelerating, and managing development. They raise core questions about the role of the state in population relocation decisions, the goals and the social actors of development, its costs, pathologies, and benefits.

The scale of human movements in Africa can be awesome. A World Bank study estimated in 1990 that the African continent contains some 35 million migrants—fully half of the world’s total (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley, 1990). The same study also found no evidence to suggest that the volume of international migration will be substantially reduced in the future. Traditionally, spatial mobility is a central feature of many African societies. For example, estimates from Somalia, before the collapse of the state and the civil war’s induced mass starvation, indicated that as much as 60 percent of the population was involved in one or another form of transhumance (JESS, 1990).

Warfare, famine, and natural ecological distress have all played their parts in forcing African populations to abandon their places and move. But so too have certain political or ethnic repression, urbanization, industrialization, and energy development.

Our topic here is a specific type of resettlement: involuntary or forced resettlement, which is distinct from voluntary (spontaneous or assisted) land settlement, or from usual rural-urban migration flows.
Involuntary resettlement shares with voluntary and spontaneous population movement certain common difficulties and challenges regarding economic development, food security, and environmental management. However, it also differs from voluntary processes in several significant ways.

First, involuntary resettlement is itself never the primary objective of a project that causes displacement; it is the by-product — often unavoidable — of urban programs or of the construction of dams, highways, industrial estates, ports, forestry, natural resource management projects, and so forth. Second, whereas other types of projects explicitly aim to increase agricultural productivity and people’s incomes, forced resettlement starts by taking away land, the main asset for family livelihood. Third, unless properly addressed by the state, involuntary resettlement operations are certain to degenerate into processes of massive impoverishment and social disarticulation (Cernea, 1990; 1996e).

Involuntary resettlement in Africa caused by various types of development projects should be seen in the context of similar involuntary relocation occurring elsewhere in the world, due to the same development-related causes. Table 1 shows some of the largest resettlement operations outside Africa, caused by the construction of major dams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dam</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of People Displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assad</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataturk</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargi</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungju</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>46,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cirata</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danjiangkou</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>383,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dongjiang</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>53,000</td>
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<td>Donpinghu</td>
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<td>Hirakud</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Hoa Binh</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itaipu</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Itaparica</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Kaptai</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Mangla</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narayanpur</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paulo Alfonso IV</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>52,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pong</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rengali</td>
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<td>Rihand</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Saguling</td>
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<td>Sammenxia</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Singur</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>65,000</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Srisailam</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Tarbela</td>
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<td>Victoria</td>
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<td>Wuqiangxi</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>85,000</td>
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<td>Xinanjiang</td>
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<tr>
<th>Dam</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of People Displaced</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almatti</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narmada Sardar Sarovar</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>127,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehri</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Gorges</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaolangdi</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>182,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yacyreta</td>
<td>Argentina &amp; Paraguay</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data from project documents and public sources.
Significantly, three of the largest countries in the world — China, India, and Brazil — which are currently engaged in massive industrialization and electrification programs, are precisely the countries with the biggest ongoing involuntary resettlement operations. In China, for instance, as a result of dam construction alone more than 10 million people were involuntarily resettled over a period of forty years. About 14 million were displaced by urban projects and over 7 million by transportation projects (World Bank, 1993, p. 2). In India, the aggregate numbers are of comparable magnitude — about 21.5 million people over four decades, which include displacement from reservoirs, urban sites, thermal plants and mines (Fernandes, Das and Rao, 1989). Two dams now under construction on the Krishna River in Karnataka state — the Almatti Dam and the Narayanpur Dam — will deprive over 220,000 people of either their homes, their land, or both. The highly controversial Narmada Sardar Sarovar Dam, together with its network of downstream irrigation canals and roads, will affect the land and/or houses of approximately 250,000 people, of which some 127,000 in the reservoir and about 125,000 in the downstream area. Latin America has had its own share of massive dam-induced resettlement programs — from Itaipu, Sobradinho, Xingu and others in Brazil, to Chixoy in Guatemala or Yacyreta in Argentina and Paraguay, and in other Latin American countries.

Voluntary resettlement programs, in turn, also occur on a large scale. These are epitomized by the transmigration program in Indonesia, or the mixed voluntary and involuntary resettlement programs like the well-known Mahaweli program in Sri Lanka. Comparable, even though different, processes are land colonization and rural-urban internal migration. Colombia, for instance, is a country which, during two decades of accelerated industrialization, has gone from being 35 percent urban to being 35 percent rural. This massive rural-urban migration was the result of a complex set of factors and, in turn, had many beneficial influences; it has been accompanied by more than a doubling of real per capita income in the country, a nearly 10 percent annual increase in gross national product, and a ten-year increase in life expectancy at birth.

Worldwide, all these large-scale spontaneous ebbs and flows of population, together with direct or forced resettlement, are part and parcel of the development process, and pose major challenges to governments trying to promote strategies for economic growth and social change.
3. Resettlement in Africa

The African continent, in turn, is the scene of massive population resettlement processes of all types, including painful involuntary displacements of people. Currently, however, Africa’s most important forced displacements are not those caused by development programs, but those triggered by social and political causes such as wars and civil wars, ethnic, racial and/or religious persecutions, or by natural causes such as droughts and famines. These result in more than 35 million of refugees — either “international refugees” (15 million) who cross international borders to find protection, shelter and food in another country, or “internal refugees” (20 million) who still remain within the borders of their countries but have abandoned their houses and lands (Cernea, 1993b; U.S. Committee on Refugees, 1996, pp. 4,6).

Displaced populations are not only themselves deprived of normal livelihood and pushed to the limits of poverty and starvation, but often represent an enormous burden on the host populations, thus compounding the complexity of the displacement-triggered problems. They may lower the hosts’ standards of living and tend to rapidly deplete the natural resources of the areas of refuge.

Even when the causes of forced displacements disappear or subside, return resettlement and reconstruction at the places of origin demands large resources from both the people and the state. Mozambique, for instance, had to face the daunting task of resettling some 4 million people who became refugees during the recent civil war that ravaged the country. But — surprisingly and fortunately — this was accomplished much sooner than expected through spontaneous return and self resettlement by the refugees themselves, with limited official assistance. The collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa has made possible the resettlement of many millions of black people who were displaced against their will; but desirable as such resettlement is, it is far from easy or painless (de Wet, 1995).

In Africa, planned land settlement has been tried in countries as diverse as Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Ethiopia (Chambers, 1973; Dieci and
Viezzoli, 1992; Lassailly-Jacob, 1992, 1994; Sørbo, 1994). While several of these schemes did in fact improve the well-being of participants, in general terms these efforts have fallen short of expectations. True, the expectations themselves may have been unrealistically high in many cases, given the resources available. Nonetheless, both tangible achievements and indisputable drawbacks to large planned settlement schemes exist, including their high cost, reliance on prolonged public sector intervention, and the constraints they have placed on the private initiative of resettlers. Yet such settlements have created new opportunities and have often met the motivations and immediate needs of many settlers. Complex political, social and economic forces have been involved in such programs and, as Pankhurst (1992) argued in his excellent monograph on Ethiopian resettlement, the “stereotypes of resettlement as either purely induced by famine or enforced by Government are equally misleading simplifications.”

More recent efforts to direct population movements have included investments targeted at infrastructure along agricultural frontiers. These aim to steer people toward suitable settlement areas while requiring less government intervention than full-fledged planned settlement schemes. Typical examples of this approach are the settlement models implemented in Africa (Sørbo, 1994; Chambers and Morris, 1973) or those being considered in the West African areas cleared of river blindness (as discussed by McMillan, Painter and Scudder, 1992; see also Scudder, 1973, 1988, 1990).
4. Relative and Absolute Size of Resettlement

Involuntary resettlement caused by government sponsored development programs has generated, and continues to generate, a distinct set of problems on the African continent (Cook and Mukendi, 1994). Construction of major dams in Africa, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s (Conac, 1995; Goodland, 1996; Cernea, 1997), has entailed population displacements of large magnitude in both absolute and relative terms.

The absolute numbers of people displaced by 13 major African dams are listed in Table 2.

The relative size of some dam-caused displacements reveals more about resettlement in Africa than the absolute numbers. Indeed, seldom is it realized that displacements such as those caused in Africa by the Akosombo, Kossou or Kariba Dams have affected a much higher proportion of the country's total population than the displacements caused in Asia by even the biggest dams of the continent — India or China included — vis-à-vis the total population of those countries (Lassailly-Jacob, 1980, 1990; Tomakloe, 1994). For example, Akosombo and Kossou alone displaced an astounding proportion — about 1 percent of the population of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire respectively. In comparison, Narmada Sardar Sarovar dam and Xiaolangdi dam will displace only 0.015 percent of the populations in India and China, respectively, which is 66 times less on a percentage basis. Furthermore, in terms of total land condemned, the impacts were some-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dam</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of People Displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akosombo</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan High Dam</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakolari</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabora Bassa</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadin Kowa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainji</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariba</td>
<td>Zambia/Zimbabwe</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiri</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kossou</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manantali</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangbeto</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roseires</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selingue</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on rounded data from project documents and public sources.
times even more disproportionate in Africa. Akosombo's reservoir covers 3.5 percent of the land area of Ghana, compared to Narmada's 0.01 percent share of India and Xiaolangdi's 0.003 percent share of China. Thus, they have strained the state's resources and affected those African nations in a much more profound way, notwithstanding the benefits to be eventually yielded by those projects (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert, 1990; Scudder, 1990, 1993). During the 1980s and 1990s, the construction of such gigantic dams has slowed down in Africa. However, the aggregate number of development projects causing displacements on a smaller scale, particularly urban displacements, has increased considerably.
Social anthropology as a discipline owes a considerable share of its general knowledge about involuntary resettlement to Africa’s early experiences with forced displacements caused by high dams. It was largely the disruption and sufferings endured by forcibly displaced African farmers that became the teaching grounds of several eminent anthropologists, enabling them to learn about the pains and arrows of development-caused displacement. They distilled this knowledge into concepts and theories about involuntary resettlement that were then confirmed elsewhere as well.

The Volta resettlement from Ghana’s Akosombo and Kpong Reservoirs, the resettlement of the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia at Kariba, or the relocation of the Egyptian Nubians from the Aswan Dam are the best known cases, virtually “classic” cases, studied by social scientists. Their research has yielded a vast body of writings — anthropological and sociological case-monographs, as well as of comparative studies (Adu-Aryee, 1991; Chambers, 1990; Colson, 1971; Fahim, 1981, 1983; Fernea, 1973; Geiser, 1986; Grimm, 1991; Horowitz, Koenig and Assoc., 1993; Lassailly-Jacob, 1980, 1992; Roder, 1994; Salem-Murdock, 1989; Scudder 1968, 1973, 1985, 1993).

Social geographers and other social scientists have focused on the Niger River displacements (Grove, 1985; Adams, 1992). Less widely known but good studies have been published on the displacement of the Tema fishermen to make room for the Tema port (Amartefio, 1966), from the urban relocation of the Yoruba evacuated because of the slum clearance project in Central Lagos (Achunine, 1992), and from the displacement of farmers from the Tana river valley (Mburugu, 1994; Odinga, 1979). Several African scholars have dedicated multi-disciplinary research to the adjustment of the people in the Kainji Lake Basin to their new resettlement sites (Oyedipe, 1983, 1987; Imerbore and Adegoke, 1975; Ayeni, Roder and Ayanda, 1994; Amaugo, 1977). The valuable lessons derived by many of these studies are, unfortunately, still far from being consistently used in practice by policy makers and planners as prescriptions against repeating tragic mistakes.
There is also a vast literature on African population displacements and resettlement caused by civil wars and ethnic strife, which are not the subject of this paper (see, in this respect, a vast bibliography in Tim Allen (ed.) *In Search of Cool Ground*).

Research on development-caused resettlement and land settlement schemes in Africa has also enabled social scientists to theorize about resettlement by several generalized “models” of such processes, applicable beyond Africa as well. Several such conceptual models have been in use in the social science literature over the last two decades.

The first model in the literature was Robert Chambers' (1973) conceptual representation of population land settlement as a three-phase process. This model was based largely on another’s study of the experience of Mwea and other population settlements in Africa.

Another conceptual framework was formulated by Scudder and Colson (1982) who distinguished four stages: recruitment, transition, adaptation, and incorporation. Scudder (1985) has argued that these four stages apply to both voluntary and involuntary resettlement processes. A good number of researchers have employed the Scudder-Colson framework in their investigations, with relevant findings. More recently, however, empirical evidence suggests that the validity of extending the “four stages” framework to involuntary relocations is in doubt, and Scudder concluded that findings from many unsuccessful involuntary resettlement operations demonstrate that not all the four stages take place.

Another conceptual model developed more recently, (Cernea, 1990, 1996a, 1996e), takes a different, complementary approach, aiming not at distinguishing the stages of resettlement, but at identifying the fundamental impoverishment risks intrinsic to resettlement and the key socio-economic processes critical for reconstructing the livelihoods of resettlers (for details, see Chapter 7).

Studying the ecology of resettlement in hydropower dam programs, anthropologists have also raised another major policy and planning issue, yet to little avail with African governments and project planners: the issue of integrated river basin development (Scudder, 1973, 1980, 1988; Newson, 1992). Indeed, about every single major river dam in the African continent has been planned and constructed as an insulated operation rather than as part of a pre-elaborated master plan for basin-wide development. The adverse environmental consequences and additional social and economic costs resulting from piece-meal, dam by dam, approaches are multiple: the potential of the river basin is not brought out in an integrated and harmonious manner; people resettled from one reservoir area to other sites adjacent to the river are sometimes displaced a second time, when a new
A dam on the same river is being built; the impact upon downstream agricultural systems — resulting from upstream systems — is overlooked. Dams which suddenly modify the pattern of annual water flows and of recessional agriculture — is overlooked.
6. World Bank Assisted Projects with Resettlement in Africa

when the ecology of the river basin as a whole is not taken into account (see also later in this paper). Little synthesized statistical information is available on resettlement at a global scale or at the scale of Africa as a whole. One way to partly overcome data scarcity and to outline a broader image over a longer period of time is to consider the data available from World Bank lending, including lending to Africa for development programs entailing involuntary resettlement. Of course, the overall population resettlement processes in Africa are much larger in scale and more diversified in content.

Development projects that build hydropower stations, irrigate arid lands, improve urban transportation or supply clean water to cities, aim at enhancing productive capacities and social services. Yet although these projects are necessary as means towards development, they also involve trade-offs. There are financial trade-offs: the money committed to a large dam is money that cannot be spent on schools. There are technical trade-offs: roads that are easy to build are often too costly to maintain. And there are social trade-offs: the projects needed by a growing economy must often displace people, at times large populations, from their homes and sources of livelihood.

Forced resettlement, therefore, should be a path not chosen lightly, and all efforts must be made to minimize it. But there are times when resettlement is unavoidable. There are only so many places to build a dam or site a road; only so many ways to construct an urban sewage treatment plant without acquiring land that is already inhabited. In these situations, resettlement may be a necessary element in the efforts to promote the common good.

The issue that we must face is when, and under what conditions, involuntary resettlement should proceed. If the public interest requires the expropriation of land necessary for projects that will help meet basic human needs, what can be done to minimize the problems caused by displacement?

To answer this question, we can begin to draw upon both Africa’s and the World Bank’s experiences with and research on the consequences of resettle-
ment. Much social research has found that resettlement is not going well in Africa or elsewhere. Increasingly we find that development projects that benefit the majority confer all too few benefits on those people who, as one of my Indian colleagues has put it, "gave their today so that we could have a better tomorrow."

A typical category of infrastructure projects that cause dislocation are dams and the reservoirs they form (Cernea, 1997). Since 1970, the Bank has provided financing for dams in more than 100 countries and supported the construction of about 350 large dams around the world. But dams are not the only cause of involuntary resettlement. It occurs in projects as diverse as widening a downtown road, expanding a port area, or even, as in a recent case in Mozambique, building a school. Table 3 shows involuntary population displacement being present in more than 200 Bank-assisted development projects over a sixteen year period (1980-1995). With about 3 million people to be displaced during that period alone, compulsory resettlement is clearly no small problem.

Within these overall numbers, the sectoral and geographic distribution of Bank-assisted projects with resettlement is far from even. By geographic region, the large majority of projects during this 1980-1995 period are in Asia (over 65 percent of projects and 87 percent of displaced people) followed by Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Population Displacement in Projects Assisted by the World Bank (Approved during FY80 - FY95*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>No. of Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the period FY80-85, this table refers only to two key sectors, agriculture and hydropower; it does not include some projects in the urban, mining, thermal and other subsectors that also entailed compulsory resettlement.

** The overall numbers of affected people that entered each year the cycle of displacement and relocation are derived, in some cases, from best mid-term or final assessments. These are more correct, and tend to be considerably higher than the initial estimates made at the project appraisal stage.

*** The much higher than average number in FY94 is due largely to one large scale resettlement project approved for China (Xiaolangdi Dam) which alone displaces over 180,000 people.
Table 4
Population Displacement by Sector in New Projects
Approved During FY80 - FY95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>No. of Affected People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (AGR)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,436,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Energy (IEN)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>684,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Water and Urban Dev. (TWU)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,003,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: -- Environment (ENV)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and Human Resources (PHR)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>225</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>3,147,437</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The total number of active projects with ongoing implementation of resettlement components during this period (FY80-95) was still higher, as some of these projects had been approved prior to FY80.

Sector diversity, as well as changes in the relative weight of resettlement in different sectors, are clearly reflected in this table. The global shift from dams to urban infrastructure projects as the leading cause of involuntary resettlement occurs visibly in Africa as well. In the early 1980s, dams, whether for power, water, or both, were the most frequent cause of displacement. By the 1990s, dams were a fairly infrequent cause, as portrayed in the two pie charts covering the two periods (Fig. 1). Whereas 67 percent of Bank assisted projects with resettlement in Africa from 1980 to 1986 were dams (in industry, energy, and agriculture), and displaced a total of 35,000 people, only 27 percent of the projects from 1987 to 1995 were dams, displacing just over 20,000 people. This reflected lower overall
### Table 5
Africa: Projects Entailing Involuntary Population Resettlement
Financed by the World Bank (FY81 – FY94)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>People Affected**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Gorgol Irrigation</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Power III</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>First Urban</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Fourth Rubber Prod.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Lilongwe Water I &amp; II</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Urban Development III</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Kiambere Hydro Power</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Nangbeto Hydro Power</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire—Burundi—Rwanda</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Ruzizi Hydro Power II</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Forestry Plantation Development</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Urban Development IV</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Northern Transport Corridor I</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>PHR</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Education and Manpower</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Mbali (Energy I)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Second Urban</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Agricultural Research</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Urban Rehabilitation</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Forestry Sector</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Urban II (Secondary Cities)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Second Urban</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Third Nairobi Water Supply</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Tana Plain Development</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Oyo State Urban Development</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Water Supply II</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Urban Development II</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Export Development</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Power III</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Kureimat Thermal Power</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Highlands Water Phase IA</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Power V</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Multi-State Water I</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Pr.</td>
<td>PHR</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Health and Education</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Land Development for Housing</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>INU</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Lagos Drainage and Sanitation</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>TWU</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Freetown Infrastructure</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>IEN</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Power VI</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In FY95 the new projects approved for Africa did not include any project entailing involuntary displacement and relocation.

** The numbers of affected people are either estimates at appraisal, or subsequently corrected/updated assessments. Most projects in this table are still under implementation.
Figure 1
Africa: Sectoral Distribution of Bank Projects with Resettlement

FY 80-86
Transportation, Water and Urban Development 33%
Agriculture and Natural Resources 22%
Industry and Energy 45%

FY 87-95
Transportation, Water and Urban Development 57%
Human Resources 10%
Agriculture and Natural Resources 13%
Industry and Energy 20%
capital investments in Africa in large
dams, during 1987 to 1995. On the other
hand, urban and transportation infra-
structure projects grew from 33 percent
in FY80-86 to 57 percent in FY87-95, thus
becoming in recent years the principal
cause of resettlement in Bank assisted
projects.

Urban involuntary resettlement seems
likely to grow even faster in the future.
United Nations data shows that world-
wide urban growth rates have exceeded,
on average, six percent per year. The
number of people living in large cities
has grown from 200 million in 1950, to
850 million today. By the year 2025
there will be more than two billion
people living in large cities of more
than one million inhabitants. In cities
such as São Paulo, Lagos, Douala,
Rabat, Shanghai, or Mexico City, mas-
sive investments in infrastructure for
transportation, rehousing, sanitation
and other services, are needed, and will
be increasingly needed, for improving
living standards and economic expan-
sion (Cernea, 1990b). Such urban invest-
ment will inevitably entail further land
acquisition and involuntary displace-
ment, thus keeping the issues of ade-
quate resettlement present on the
development agenda.
7. The Basic Goal: Avoiding Impoverishment and Restoring Livelihoods

To improve the handling of unavoidable resettlement operations, the World Bank formulated an explicit social policy, originally issued in 1980 (World Bank, 1980; Cernea, 1988, 1996d). This policy explains the basic criteria which every Bank financed project must meet. It defines its fundamental objective as restoring the income and livelihood of affected people, and improving living standards further whenever possible. The policy also requires minimizing displacement. It asks Bank staff, and recommends to borrowing agencies, to consider the economic and cultural characteristics of the people to be moved and how these affect their ability to cope in the new environment.

Since displacement and resettlement takes a number of years, during which there is a significant drop in income, simply restoring the resettlers' incomes at the pre-displacement level does not accomplish the policy goal of protecting the livelihoods of those resettled. It is very likely that the living standards of those people would, in any way, have grown during the project years, had there not been a project. Therefore, to genuinely attain the objective of simple income restoration implies to re-establish the resettlers at levels comparable to those that would have been reached without the project-induced resettlement (Cernea, 1988, p. 20). Further assistance is necessary to help in improving the livelihoods of the relocatees, above the income restoration level. These policy elements are often overlooked, but they are crucial. In China, for instance, the policy orientation for resettlement operations calls for "resettlement with development"; in other words, it explicitly formulates the goal of using the resettlement operation as an opportunity for improving, not only restoring, standards of living (Shi, 1996; Shi, Hun and Yu, 1996).

Over the last sixteen years, in every case when the Bank's resettlement policy has been applied to a new project consistently, it has led to specific improvements in planning, resource allocation, in execution and in outcomes. It is relevant to note that significant improvements have been achieved even in the cases (quite numerous) when the overall goal of income restoration has
not been fully accomplished for all displaced people. Yet the application of this policy by both borrowers and the Bank has not been consistent in all projects, as will be discussed further.

The central risk incurred in forced population displacement is impoverishment of people. In final analysis, the basic challenge in resettlement is the imperative of preventing and avoiding the impoverishment of people.

Many of the people subjected to forced displacement are poor even before displacement, or are in a marginal economic situation. They have already been working hard to overcome poverty and to improve their incomes, health and sanitation. Then, suddenly, a development program intended to bring benefits to many people (triggers a resettlement operation that is so inequitably designed and implemented that it fails to protect the affected people from a worsening of their situation. Such a program turns displacement into a weapon that aggravates rather than alleviates poverty. The paradox is as blatant as it is unjust and unacceptable.

The risk and reconstruction model summarized below (see, for more details, Cernea, 1990, 1996a, 1996e) highlights the main processes through which impoverishment tends to occur. It is derived from empirical data from many scholarly studies and operational field reports. These processes are interlinked in their effects, and compound each other. At the same time, the model serves as a guide for problem-resolution, and as a prescription for action to overcome the problems that resettlement causes.

The main impoverishment risks are:

- Landlessness;
- Joblessness;
- Homelessness;
- Marginalization;
- Food Insecurity;
- Loss of Access to Common Property Resources;
- Increased Morbidity and Mortality; and
- Community Disarticulation.

Conversely, beyond disguising the risks, this conceptual model also provides a compass for reconstructive strategies: for land-based resettlement, for employment-opportunity provisions, for house reconstruction programs, health care and nutrition safeguards, and community rebuilding.

Not every one of these processes necessarily occurs in each displacement operation. Nor do all affect every individual family simultaneously. But taken together, they capture what happens in resettlement operations that fail. It grimly warns about the likely risks and pitfalls that must be either avoided or mitigated, and reversed through reconstructing livelihoods. Therefore, this conceptual model is both a synthesis of past adverse experi-
ences and (more importantly) a productive and planning tool for improving resettlement. Field researchers of resettlement processes can also use this model in organizing empirical field work.

An experienced resettlement practitioner or researcher will instantly recognize these processes from his or her own field work. Thus, there is no need to further document them in detail here (see related studies in the bibliography). However, there is every possible need to address these risks at all times when resettlement is planned or implemented.
8. The Causes of Failure

The responsibility for effecting adequate resettlement is vested in the state that initiates it. For African governmental agencies involved in decisions causing displacement, it is essential to analyze why resettlement programs fail and to develop strategies to counteract resettlement's adverse impacts.

Social research on involuntary resettlement, in Africa and elsewhere, has identified the following as chronic causes of the most common problems that recur in resettlement operations:

- Planning has traditionally centered on removing (displacing) people from the site of the main project, and only addressed resettlers' reestablishment as a second priority.

- Estimates of the population to be displaced tend to undercount (sometimes deliberately, other times by imprecise on-the-ground measurements) the actual number of people whose land and/or house are condemned.

- Government agencies tend to conceive and execute resettlement as a last-minute salvage operation rather than an opportunity for socioeconomic development.

- People are forced to move when it suits the schedule of the civil works construction (e.g., the reservoir is about to be filled), and thus they are moved late, in a rushed, insufficiently prepared manner.

- Assistance to resettlers is typically short-term. Various subsistence and hardship allowances end before full reestablishment at the new site.

- Resettlement operations are underfinanced. Pre-move income levels are often not even known by planners, so investments necessary for reestablishment are often miscalculated.

- The productive capacities and incomes of those displaced are not restored within a reasonable transition period. The result is lasting impoverishment.

- State resettlement agencies often lack explicit policies, norms, and guide-
lines for reestablishing people productively, and focus primarily on expropriation. Without clearly stated livelihood restoration goals, planning fails.

- Resettlers and hosts are not informed and consulted in time. Their organizations are not invited to join in planning, negotiating and execution. Their knowledge is not used, and incorrect assumptions are made about resettler preferences.

- Development (or local) agencies charged with managing resettlement lack the skills, adequate staffing and organizational capacity.

- Evaluation and monitoring arrangements to correct deficient relocation programs are rarely set up.

- “Second generation” environmental effects from resettlement are not anticipated by preparation studies, affecting host populations as well.

- Lack of institutionalized grievance procedures and of legal means of seeking redress disempower the resettlers.

Worldwide experience shows that, however difficult resettlement problems are, these problems are not intractable if identified and responsibly addressed. Treating resettlement as a mechanism only to get people out of the way of a project, and at low cost, has proved to be the cause of untold human misery. Conversely, approaching unavoidable resettlement as a development opportunity is the way to mobilize the resources of the state, the donor agencies, the resettlers themselves and the host communities in relocation areas for sustainable development.

These two distinct perspectives lead to differences in the conceptualization, design, financing and implementation of resettlement programs.

The remainder of this paper will review, with specific examples, five main aspects: resettlement policies; baseline research; productive reestablishment; implementation of resettlement programs; and new issues on the involuntary resettlement agenda.
9. Strategies for Improving Resettlement

Formulating Resettlement Policies in Africa

In Africa, compulsory resettlement is carried out in most countries by government agencies largely in a policy vacuum (Cernea, 1996c; Lassailly-Jacob, 1992). These countries do have laws that empower the state to expropriate land “needed for the public good” and displace the owners of those lands. But sorely missing in most African countries are explicit policies and legal frameworks to compel relevant state agencies to effectively address the vital issues of livelihood restoration and productive reestablishment of those displaced (Okidi, 1993).

The expropriation laws generally lay down rules only for the type of financial compensation (relief) that must be paid for the expropriated land. However, the very notion of “compensation”—relief payment for land taken for public use—is a narrow concept that differs in substance from the more exacting principle that the state has the obligation to restore people’s economic well-being and capacities as productive agents. This distinction between mere compensation for losses, on the one hand, and resettlement on a productive basis, on the other hand, is a crucial one.

The World Bank recommends that its borrowing countries define and institute their own national policies and legal frameworks for guiding involuntary resettlement operations and for protecting the livelihood of the people affected by forced displacement. The Bank itself, as a development agency, formulated its resettlement policy in 1980 (World Bank, 1980) and expects that the countries which borrow for projects entailing resettlement design and implement those projects in a manner consistent with the policy.

Policy principles alone are never sufficient, however, and must gain their actual embodiment through a resettlement plan. The heart of this plan is the “development package.” This refers to the set of provisions that will reconstruct the productivity and social base of those relocated. The policy requires that resettlement plans are based on field surveys of the affected population, contain clear implementation timetables, and an adequate budget that
finances each necessary activity, before the Bank will agree to appraise and approve a project loan. The resettlement plan and the development package must be creatively adapted to local circumstances.

Despite many improvements, however, in some major projects with resettlement, old mistakes made during the initial poor planning of the projects proved difficult to redress: such cases include, for instance, the Douala urban resettlement in Cameroon, the Narmada and Singrauli projects in India, and Kedung Ombo in Indonesia. The disconnect between policy and performance in the country’s and the Bank’s activities in the Narmada projects was thoroughly criticized in 1992 by the independent report of the Morse Commission (Morse and Berger, 1992). The Bank accepted the essence of the Morse review’s criticism and decided to initiate an exhaustive internal review of all its ongoing projects with resettlement components, in order to identify and prevent any other “failures in the making”. Thus, in 1993-1994 a vast new study was carried out that covered all Bank-assisted projects involving resettlement which were active between 1986-1993. The review addressed policy and performance issues and led to the adoption of strategic measures that strengthened both the policy and operational activities (World Bank, 1996/1994).

Remarkable progress has been made recently in three Africa countries in terms of their policies for relocation operations: Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and the Central African Republic.

In 1996 the Central African Republic became the first African country to adopt a new involuntary resettlement
law. It was developed in connection with the joint preparation by CAR and the World Bank of the Malimaka Canal component of the Urban Environment Rehabilitation Project. Remarkably, although the law was adopted to meet World Bank standards for the Bank-financed projects that cause displacement, the CAR government decided that the new law should apply to all development projects in the country, the vast majority of which are not Bank-financed. The law is based on the principle of full compensation for lost assets, assistance during the period of relocation, and assistance to resettlers in income restoration and improving their living conditions at the new sites. Paralleling the Bank's resettlement policy, the CAR law requires careful plans, complete budgets, income recovery, and full consultation with affected households and communities. This legislative progress puts the onus now on improving implementation, consistent with policy.

In turn, the Uganda draft national resettlement policy was developed to fill a policy gap, not for a particular project. Uganda had severe problems resulting from forced population displacements, which occurred within a policy vacuum; for instance, the case of violent expulsion in 1992 of approximately 35,000 people from the Kibale game corridor and forest reserve (see Box 1). This forced eviction included brutalities and burning of houses, to compel inhabitants to depart. Displaced people were given only a few tools and some undeveloped land, and left to fend for themselves. The World Bank worked with the Government of Uganda to make certain that such unacceptable practices would not recur under any of the several projects the Bank was considering financing in Uganda. The draft policy was prepared through a consultative process, with various interested parties participating (Government of Uganda, 1995). The agreed upon text is (as of the date of this writing) under review in Uganda's Prime Minister's office. Closely modeled on the Bank's resettlement policy, Uganda's draft policy, when adopted, could become a major improvement over existing practice primarily by protecting the rights of involuntary resettlers. The draft policy requires resettlement to be conceived and executed as a development program; it provides for improvement of living standards, prompt compensation at full replacement cost, institution of grievance procedures, and states that the absence of formal title to land in areas where customary law is the rule should not be grounds for denying compensation and rehabilitation.

The World Bank proactively pursued the development of a resettlement policy for guiding the large scale Côte d'Ivoire Forestry project (see Box 1), to eliminate or minimize displacement and avoid a resettlement fiasco like Kibale in Uganda (World Bank, 1996/1994, p. 118). Through ongoing policy dialogue with the World Bank, the Forestry Department developed a resettlement policy statement for the forestry sector, entitled "Charte pour la
Box 1
Policies Make A Difference in Practice:
From Violent Expulsion to Reduced Displacement

Major differences exist between countries on how displacement’s social risks are treated and how relocation takes place. The difference is made primarily by policy. The two project cases described below show how these major risks — homelessness, landlessness, food insecurity, and increased morbidity — either become full-blown realities or can be prevented through decisive policy restrictions supported by alternative solutions.

Two ongoing projects in the forest sectors of two African countries, both of which seek to eliminate encroachment in gazetted forests, demonstrate this difference dramatically.

A forest management project financed by a multilateral European donor agency in Uganda proposed a few years ago the massive displacement of communities living in the Kibale game corridor and forest reserve, without offering a viable economic alternative. The population obviously refused to move. The country’s Forest Department, which had long threatened the local population with displacement, decided to implement the threat in 1992. The following is an excerpt from a field report written by a social anthropologist, Dan Aronson, who visited the site, about how expulsion took place:

On March 31, 1992 and for some days following, an attack without prior warning was launched by game wardens, foresters, local government officials, and perhaps prison labor. All houses were burned, and personal property and food stores were either destroyed or looted. A handful of people were killed on the spot. Patrols have kept people from returning since.

About 35,000 people were violently displaced and evicted in 1992 from the Kibale forest. After many weeks, plans were made to take the displaced people to new settlements 150 miles away, in the under-population county of Bugangaizi. From September 1992 to May 1993, the Ministry of Labor, with the aid of several NGOs, placed about 19,000 people in 22 village blocks. People were given only a few tools from relief agencies and virtually no government services, but were left to fend for themselves. They have struggled to build shelter and produce sufficient food, and have to cope with poor health and sanitary conditions. OXFAM has drawn international attention to this case and has spearheaded an effort to provide relief to those displaced and clustered in camps. Little is known by project authorities about the

continued on next page
many thousands of other people evicted from the Kibale forest.* (It has to be stated (see main text, further) that after 1992, and largely due to the lessons of the Kibale failure, Uganda took a turn towards adopting policy guidelines to prevent such disasters in the future).

In another country, a Bank-assisted forestry sector project in Côte d’Ivoire, resettlement was handled very differently. The project was intended to prepare and introduce forest management plans for several high priority areas. Before the project, the Forestry Department initiated a crash campaign to recover control of forests by using forestry staff trained as a paramilitary force, with no compensation and little concern for evicted forest communities. Learning at appraisal that the policy of the Forestry Department was to evict up to 200,000 residents in a similar manner, the Bank’s mission opposed and rejected this approach. The Bank sought and received agreement on a different approach, congruent with Bank policy, which will: reduce displacement from about 200,000 people to less than 40,000; provide better conditions for resettlers; consolidate existing scattered populations into “agroforestry zones” within the legal limits of classified forests; and integrate resettlers into forest management general plans. This approach is new for Côte d’Ivoire and was never considered before the Bank-assisted project. What could have been a massive and violent uprooting for tens of thousands of people was averted.

The Bank-assisted Côte d’Ivoire project is still very far from having solved all problems: the new government policy has been drafted but is not yet formally issued; the “forest-farmers” commissions are only partly active; and management plans are still in preparation. Because of this, the Bank has kept this project on its problem project list for some time and monitors it closely. Although forest authorities and the project’s executing agency have renounced violent, uncompensated displacement, they are still learning how to do constructive relocation, how to provide better conditions for the 20 percent of forest people scheduled to move to agroforestry zones, and how to integrate resettlers effectively into forest management plans. The Bank has increased its assistance to the project to help the country achieve its economic, social, and environmental objective in the forest sector and to set a precedent for reducing displacement in other sectors.

* This is not an isolated example: in a neighboring East African country, within a similar forest protection project financed by another bilateral European donor agency, several villagers were burned down in order to displace their inhabitants rapidly.
rehabilitation du domaine forestier de l’État”, which the Department adopted in June 1994.7 No involuntary resettlement had been carried out by 1996; the dialogue with the World Bank has prevented inadequate resettlement in the interim.8 A further step would be enactment of this policy statement as national law in Côte d’Ivoire.

Major efforts for evolving new policies for resettlement have been undertaken in the recent three years in South Africa, policies intended to revert and redress the injustice of past forced relocations and land dispossessions during the apartheid period in that country (Ngubane, 1995; de Wet, 1995; Dewar, 1996). South Africa is poised now to pursue profound processes of land reform and associated population relocations and the experience of this yet unchartered course will provide extremely interesting lessons.

These emerging laws and policies in many countries of the continent about various types of resettlement are just the beginning of what is needed in Africa. But they provide a worthwhile experience for close consideration and emulation for other African countries. It is noteworthy also that the Africa Development Bank started in 1995 work for formulating and adopting its own policy guidelines for the projects entailing resettlement that it finances — a step towards necessary improvements in its practices.

Baseline Research for Preparing Resettlement

A major problem in African countries is that many involuntary resettlement operations are planned without a good working knowledge of the size and nature of the population to be displaced. Census data and statistical work, as well as sociological assessments, have been unacceptably weak.

For example, the appraisal report for the tri-national Ruzizi Hydroelectric project involving Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi badly underestimated this number, assuming initially that fewer than 200 people would be displaced by the project (World Bank, 1983, p. 12). In the end, as many as 15,000 people were affected in one way or another. A recent field study on displacement entailed by the Funtua Dam in Nigeria has demonstrated that while local planners estimated that displacement will affect only about some 100 people, the real number of affected people will be more than 3,000 (Tamakloe, 1993). In 1983, project feasibility studies assumed that fewer than 1,000 people would be displaced by the Kiambere Reservoir on the Tana River in Kenya; three years later, after the project started, more accurate studies revealed that displacement would affect more than 6,000 inhabitants (Mburugu, 1994). This is even more distressing in light of the fact that prior experience with dam building in the
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Tana River’s upper and lower basins, such as Kamburu, Gtaru, Masinga and others, had certainly alerted the planners to the hazards of population displacement and impoverishment (Odinga, 1979).

Inadequate baseline research backfires in many ways, and undermines what is called the project’s “quality at the entry” as well as its implementation. The inadequacy of pre-project field research often goes beyond simple miscalculations regarding how many people will be displaced; one penetrating study (Adu-Aryee, 1991) shows how lack of in-depth understanding of local land tenure patterns created widespread opposition to Ghana’s Akosombo project’s resettlement program.

Africa is blessed with a long-standing tradition of applied social science, in particular rural sociology and anthropology, that understands well the social issues of involuntary resettlement. Developing successful resettlement programs is a difficult task that simply cannot be done without drawing on the skills of social researchers and other professions. Yet all too often, social scientists are only involved in reporting on the final outcome of resettlement operations, rather than in designing the resettlement program from the outset, and helping in prevention and problem-solving. Ascertaining local patterns of land tenure, identifying community potential for reconstructing livelihoods, learning who wants to be relocated with whom and who would welcome the chance to relocate away from neighbors and kin groups—this is the “bread and butter” of useful applied social science. It is obvious why such knowledge is needed for resettlement. It is far better to spend a little more time and money on research at an early stage to prepare a solid resettlement program than to “save” in the beginning, only to find that enormous sums must be allocated later to fix a faulty design that collapsed during implementation.

A Productive Basis for Resettled Groups

Because resettlement is too often viewed as a problem of getting people out of the way of a project, there is a recurrent failure to think of ways to tap their productive potential at the new sites. Yet this is the key to successfully reconstructing livelihoods.

Providing land as a productive basis is essential for rural resettlers, and often for urban resettlers too. This is as generally true in Africa as anywhere else. But compared to the rest of the developing world, Africa has a characteristic feature which may facilitate successful resettlement: its low population density, lower than in South Asia, East Asia, or Latin America. It is comparatively easier in Africa to resettle those involuntarily displaced on alternative lands—because available lands are easier to find—and thus help resettlers to reestablish themselves productively, socially and economi-
cally, in a relatively shorter period of time.

For irrigation projects that aim to facilitate more intensive cultivation, for instance, the most effective resettlement solution is often to introduce the resettlers to the command area through a planned assistance program that helps them take advantage of the new productive potential of irrigated fields. This approach was successfully applied for the resettlers in the Gorgol Dam and Irrigation Project in Mauritania.

Another all-too-often neglected resource is the reservoir itself, which our experience shows has substantial fisheries potential. After impoundment, fish have become a major product of Akosombo, Kariba, and Victoria reservoirs, among others. Traditionally, however, the development of reservoir fisheries has been left to Mother Nature, an expedient but also slow solution. Where fisheries based on scientific aquaculture have been planned prior to reservoir impoundment, the results have been spectacular. In Indonesia's Saguling reservoir, for example, fish production through basket and capture fisheries, processing plants, and cooperative transport is so high that the current economic value of the fish harvest exceeds several-fold the value of the harvest of the ricelands that were flooded by the reservoir (Soemarwoto, 1989).

Sometimes there is no command area or alternative land for re-establishing resettlers' land-based incomes. Alternative income generating strategies must be developed.

One example is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Tshabalala, 1994). Although very few people will be physically relocated by this project, several thousand will lose access to grazing lands being inundated by a reservoir supplying water to South Africa. In the interim, the project is supplying grain and fodder for a 15-year period to maintain the herds and herder incomes. This is not a long term sustainable solution, however, but rather a temporary damage limitation approach. Therefore the resettlement specialists working on this project took a proactive approach designed to transform loss of grazing land into a development opportunity financed by the revenues that water transfer from the reservoir will generate. Non-land based income generating alternatives were explored. A Highland Trust Fund has been recommended with prepayment of water transfer royalties, to be supplemented by ongoing royalties once the reservoir is completed. Among the activities it could fund are scholarships, training, tourism development (with resettler employment as guides, etc.), crafts knitting and sewing, market gardening, brick making, ferry services, spring water bottling, and other small enterprise, service, and trading activities.

In another case—Burkina Faso’s Ouagadougou Water Supply Project—other income-generating options consid-
erred as a basis for restoring resettlers' livelihoods include: support for artisanal fishing; promotion of women's production cooperatives; expansion of cultivation; and charcoal and fuel wood production.

Whatever specific income generating strategies are chosen, the important point is that resettlement can succeed, in Africa as elsewhere, only if it provides people with new sources of income and opportunities to use their labor productively. Resettlers should not be transformed into long-term passive recipients of grain and fodder handouts, because temporary relief, although needed will ultimately be phased out leaving resettlers with no means of self-sufficiency.

Implementation Challenges

There is little reason to be satisfied with the recent performance of resettlement under many development projects in Africa. For instance, both the Ruzizi Hydropower project (Zaire/Rwanda/Burundi) and Kenya's Kiambere project suffered from major design shortcomings and execution failures, and were not consistent with the Bank's policy guidelines in more than one respect. In turn, the Antananarivo Plain project in Madagascar, an urban redevelopment project that may eventually remove between 10,000 and 12,000 people from their lands, houses, or both, started without an adequate relocation plan. No surprise therefore—as I found out when I first reviewed this project in the field in 1993—that the resettlement component encountered serious execution difficulties soon after the project started, hampering the progress in achieving the project's basic goals.

When I made a field assessment, in 1985, of the resettlement from the reservoir of the Nangbeto Dam in Togo, it appeared that the sites for the villagers to be relocated were not well selected. They had neither sufficient land surrounding them, nor were they cleared ahead of time to receive the relocatees. I found that many resettlers from Nangbeto still practiced slash and burn agriculture, with significant areas left in fallow for several years. Yet, the land allocation at the new site were calculated by planners to approximately match the annually cultivated areas per family, but did not allow fallow land for adequate rotation. Nor were the resettlers assisted technically by the project for a gradual transition from slash and burn to stable cultivation. The implementation calendar of the relocation component fell behind the advance in dam construction. Some corrective measures were taken, but those were too little too late.

A few years after Nangbeto's completion, an evaluation study (Michard, Kolawole and Aziablé, 1992) made clear that: (a) cultivable land per family had decreased to about half the amount before relocation; (b) some of the new villages were sited on uneven platforms, with poor drainage; (c) the core housing units were poorly constructed...
with mud bricks, and soon started to collapse; and (d) the water supply and sanitation facilities for the new village settlements were missing or inadequate. Moreover, when some of the farmer representatives went to the authorities to protest and demand better conditions, they were arrested and imprisoned. This was in total disregard of their entitlements, as well as of the international legal agreement between the Bank and the country for implementing this project.

In cases in which the implementation of resettlement gets seriously out of compliance with World Bank resettlement policy and practice, the Bank is compelled to take more drastic measures. This can include project suspension. Such was the case with the urban sector project in Cameroon. The First Urban project (approved in 1983) closed June 30, 1998 without satisfactorily resettling 1,500 people, and therefore the responsibility for relocating those people was rolled over into the Second Urban project financed by the World Bank in Cameroon. The second project, however, was launched and implemented at a time when Cameroon's economy was contracting. The allocated local funds for the staff and operations of the resettlement unit were, again, not given. The lack of commitment from government agencies to good resettlement under this project led the Bank to suspend its financial assistance to the project and to decline to extend the closing date (June 1994) of the project. The Bank notified the government that future World Bank lending for the entire urban sector in Cameroon would be dependent upon the demonstration of satisfactory progress on the urban resettlement operations (World Bank, 1996, pp. 25-26).

Implementation is, of course, the ultimate test for resettlement programs. What makes for good implementation? And how do we know that a program is successful? These are not easy questions to address, but they can be answered.

To begin with, the implementation of a resettlement program needs a resettlement organization staffed with people who have social as well as technical skills. There are in Africa social scientists who are professionally trained to deal with settlement and resettlement and they must be invited by government agencies to contribute to good project designs and implementation. Ensuring that resettlement organizations have the capacity and commitment to establish a major field presence is a key element in resettlement success. In this regard, it is crucial that the resettlement units have the technical and financial resources, as well as the autonomy, needed to carry out their mission. We must not find at the last minute that the truck intended for transporting resettlers to their new sites has been commandeered to haul cement!

Equally important, a way must be created for the resettlers themselves to make their voices heard throughout the resettlement process. In Africa, commu-
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New Issues on the Resettlement Agenda

In addition to improving the standards of various ongoing involuntary resettlement operations, one must be aware of the new issues and concerns that are coming up in this difficult domain of development work in Africa.

First, it appears that the overall need for carrying out involuntary displacements and relocation is not likely to subside; on the contrary, in many African countries it is likely to increase. Confirming recent trends, the rise will be more pronounced in the urban than in the agricultural areas—specifically in urban infrastructure projects such as slum upgrading, road widening, water supply and sanitation.

Furthermore, in the longer run, the activation of Africa’s huge but yet unused potential for irrigated agriculture will entail a rise of involuntary relocation processes in rural areas as well. And as African countries are gradually overcoming the financial crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, they are likely to return to the construction of dams for increasing the supply of energy for industry and urban life (Cernea, 1997).

Further, a “new” variety of resettlement appearing on the development agenda is the involuntary resettlement of people out of forests and national parks in Africa. As state-driven efforts for
protecting tropical forests, establishing new parks and biosphere reserves, or preventing deforestation are increasing, and result in large-scale government programs (some co-financed by external donors), some forest agencies tend to take an overly simplistic approach and to pursue the forced displacement of communities, some of which have traditionally made a living in the forests (see Box 1, in prior section). Complex social and legal issues are involved in these situations, such as: customary rights of long-term forest inhabitants; illegal encroachment; population growth around and inside forests; lack of alternative income sources for many forest dwellers; and genuine conservation imperatives combined with inadequate problem-solving approaches of forest agencies. It will be increasingly important to monitor forthcoming forestry related programs in African countries for their displacement implications and to develop alternative strategies.

Another issue, closely related to the impacts of reservoir projects, has been raised by researchers focusing on the downstream impacts of dams on rivers whose annual floods have been long incorporated in local farming systems. For instance, studies on the Senegal River below the Manantali Dam (Horowitz, 1991; Horowitz and Salem-Murdock, 1991, 1993; Grimm, 1991) have pointed out that the termination of the annual flood would destroy much of the downstream production options, reduce food production, impoverish many farmers and degrade the environment. The studies recommended an operating regime for the dam that would incorporate controlled water releases for artificial floods, with trade-offs acceptable for irrigation and power generation. Extending such a regime of multipurpose water management to other rivers where it may be found adequate would greatly increase the flood plain’s capacity to sustain a dense human population and thus help partially solve some problems created by upstream displacement.

As in the recent past, however, development-caused displacement in Africa will in the near future continue in parallel with a currently much broader process — the resettlement of large groups of refugees involuntarily displaced by civil wars or ethnic and religious persecution. Since often different agencies deal with different kinds of resettlement, and people’s coping strategies tend to differ as well, it is important to understand both the similarities and differences between these various types of relocation and social reinsertion processes, and deliberately attempt to cross-exchange improved policy approaches and practical experiences in addressing the lasting and painful problems of resettlement (Cernea, 1996b; Allen and Turton, 1996).
10. Brief Conclusions

Summing up the main points above, it appears clearly, first, that resettlement is and remains an unavoidable side effect of necessary development programs. Its incidence will likely increase in the future, as the need for development projects, and for nature-conservation programs that involve some displacement, continues to rise while the alternatives to relocation diminish.

Second, both past and ongoing resettlement operations have suffered from lack of policy and legal frameworks. This vacuum undermines good implementation and adequate resource allocation. There is a need for urgent action on these fronts in all developing countries that seek to remedy failing resettlement.

Third, we can anticipate that private sector investments will put new issues on Africa’s resettlement agenda. The continent’s national economies are recovering now from the crises of the 1980s and early 1990s and start growing again; the pressures to carry out various involuntary resettlement operations will also multiply when urban areas are upgraded, and attempts are made to bring under control the largely unregulated growth of cities. Since much of further resettlements will be required by growth of the private sector, new balances will have to be struck between regulatory frameworks, private sector objectives, and the public interest. Eminent domain law—the state’s ability to acquire land for public utility purposes—will be an insufficient legal base for displacements caused by private investment, and the private sector will have to budget adequate resources to cover the costs of relocation without impoverishment.

Fourth, the measurements of outcomes on the ground are insufficient. They often fail to call high level attention to recurrent grave problems. The crucial question to ask is whether the central objective, the restoration of resettlers’ income, is achieved in each resettlement operation. In many domestic projects no performance indicators on resettlement are built into the overall project indicators. It is essential to shift all resettlement operations from a compensation-focused approach to a people-centered and livelihood reconstruction approach.
Fifth, there are certain fundamental goals and procedures that must be taken into account during any resettlement operation. For the Bank, these standards are codified in its policy on involuntary resettlement. In addition, the resettlement work being supported by IFC projects stands most clearly at the intersection between public and private interests. Based on lessons derived from past experiences (World Bank 1996/1994), the Bank will decline to finance large scale projects causing displacement that cannot meet its policy requirements. The Bank is prepared to assist borrowing governments in developing national or sectoral resettlement policies, legal frameworks, operational tools, and institutional capacities for carrying out resettlement adequately.

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Nobody has found the perfect solution to the resettlement dilemmas. But governments and their agencies will meet these challenges better by providing more opportunities for socially skilled professionals working on these problems around the world to get involved in the complex planning and execution of resettlement, share their experiences, and consistently pursue the goals of risk minimization and reconstruction of people’s livelihoods.
Notes

1. An earlier, much shorter, version of this paper was presented in an international conference in Uganda and was included in: *Involuntary Resettlement in Africa: Selected Papers from a Conference on Environment and Settlement Issues in Africa*, edited by Cynthia C. Cook. World Bank Technical Paper No. 227, 1994, Washington, D.C. The present paper was considerably revised, updated, and largely rewritten. It includes new data, collected after the Uganda conference, a broader review of the social science literature on resettlement in Africa, and substantial new information on specific projects during the last several years.

2. To estimate this, the Bank requires an economic analysis and projection of the "with-and-without-the-project" type, that is applied usually for assessing returns and compare investment opportunities. This kind of analysis must be applied also to define the resettlement project component and "packages", tailoring them so as to make possible resettlers' equitable reestablishment.

3. This overall Bankwide Resettlement Review was carried out by a central Task Force, led by the author of this paper. It became the most extensive internal review of a social issue in the history of the Bank and was published in full (World Bank, 1994, 1996; the 1996 reprinted version also contains a detailed summary in French and Spanish). Rather than being a desk-bound, static stock-taking exercise, the review was designed deliberately to become an in-depth analysis of resettlement in the field. The review process consisted of intensified field supervision; analysis of project preparation, appraisal, supervision, and implementation; on-site consultations with NGOs and displaced people; development of new technical tools; and a considerable number of joint remedial actions initiated by the Bank and the countries for projects that fell below established standards and objectives.

The Bank’s management adopted the Task Force’s recommendations and directed the Bank to carry out exten-
sive follow-up activities to remedy the problems signaled by the review. Management decided that the Bank will decline to finance projects that cause large scale displacement if the country does not have or does not adopt an adequate policy and legal framework for resettlement. In turn, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors mandated annual reports on progress in remedying projects with resettlement problems, as well as strategic actions to improve the Bank’s work on resettlement more generally. The first report covered the progress made over the first post-review year (World Bank, 1995). It showed that the Bank’s policy came out improved and strengthened from the iterative analysis of experiences in all its borrowing countries, including African countries.

4. In each of the three countries, the work for developing national resettlement policies was the result of extended efforts by World Bank staff and consultants, together with the countries’ government officials, interested NGOs, some scholars, etc., over a period of years, to solve specific project-related resettlement problems. From among the Bank’s resettlement specialists, the work on resettlement law for the Central Africa Republic was carried out by Kristine Ivarsdotter, later assisted by Eric Brusberg. The development of the Uganda draft resettlement policy was undertaken under the general supervision of Dan Aronson, principally by Martin Ter Woort and Nightingale R-Ngaiza. The ongoing policy dialogue between the World Bank and Côte d’Ivoire to achieve a forestry sector resettlement policy has been led initially by Cynthia C. Cook and then by Cyprian Fisiy. Of course, each of these efforts would not have been possible without the extensive efforts of specialists, civil servants and/or elected officials from the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, and Uganda.


6. Dan Aronson, personal communication.

7. Cynthia Cook, personal communication.

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