World Development Report 1984 PUB5003 Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? Population Change and Development Population Data Supplement World Development Indicators World Development Report 1984 Published for The World Bank Oxford University Press Oxford University Press NEW YORK OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON HONG KONG TOKYO KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN © 1984 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank l8l8HStreet, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. First printing July 1984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may he reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Manufactured in the United States of America. The denominations, the classifications, the boundaries, and the colors used in maps in World Development Report do not imply on the part of The World Bank and its affiliates any judgment on the legal or other status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of any boundary. ISBN 0-19-520459-X cloth ISBN 0-19-520460-3 paperback ISSN 0163-5085 The Jibrary of Congress has cataloged this serial publication as follows: World development report. 1978- tNew York] Oxford University Press. v. 27cm. annual. Published for The World Bank 1. Underdeveloped areasPeriodicals. 2. Economic development Periodicals I. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. HC59. 7. W659 330. 9'l 72 '4 78-67086 Foreword This Report is the seventh in this annual series that governments and their peoples have a wide assessing development issues. This year the focus range of views on this subject. is on population change and its links with develop- Even with success in efforts to slow population ment. Population growth does not provide the growth, future population growth will still be drama of financial crisis or political upheaval, but heavily concentrated in what are now the poorer as this Report shows, its significance for shaping areas of the globe. Thus the average level of the world of our children and grandchildren is at human welfare will depend largely on the degree least as great. What governments and their peo- of economic and social transformation in those ples do today to influence our demographic future areas. The poverty of those areas cannot be blamed will set the terms for development strategy well on rapid population growth alone; the causes of into the next century. Failure to act now to slow poverty go well beyond population change. Nor growth is likely to mean a lower quality of life for will reducing population growth alone ensure their millions of people. In the poorest countries of the economic transformation. But this Report shows world, and among the poorest groups within that slowing the pace of population growth can countries, poverty contributes to high mortality make a differenceand that the ingredients for and even higher fertility. It thereby creates a doing so are also those that will increase economic vicious circle: the slow pace at which development growth. reaches the poor contributes to rapid population The analysis of the population situation follows growth, making the elimination of poverty increas- our annual review of global economic develop- ingly difficult. Slowing population growth is a dif- ments, which as in previous years occupies the ficult challenge to humanitybut a challenge that first part of the World Development Report. It might must and can be successfully addressed. be argued that the general public remains insuff i- On the one hand, the situation is grave: this ciently aware of the growing links among nations Report concludes that in some countries develop- over the past few decades, and of the extent today ment may not be possible at all unless slower pop- of international economic interdependence. In an ulation growth can be achieved soon, before increasingly interdependent world, low growth, higher real incomes would bring fertility down fiscal and labor market problems, and resulting spontaneously. On the other hand, there is reason inflation in industrial countries have taken a heavy for hope: the experience of the past decade shows toll in developing countries. Exports have suf- that education, health, and other development fered, fear of protectionism has increased, and measures that raise parents' hopes for their chil- high real interest rates have made debt servicing a dren, along with widespread access to family plan- costly burden. If the industrial countries fail to ning services, create a powerful combination in regain the growth rates they managed in the 1950s reducing fertility. and 1960s, many countries in the developing The discussion of population places special world will have great difficulty making progress in emphasis on the role of public policy in an area the years ahead. Indeed, the prospects for much of where fundamental human values are at stake. sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly grave. Population is a subject that touches issues central But it is also apparent that even in a harsh inter- to the human condition, including personal free- national climate, the developing nations can take dom and the very definition of economic and social actions to improve their own economic perfor- progress. This Report tries to do it full justice, in a mance. Developing countries share the problems sensitive and thought-provoking way, recognizing of the developed, from fiscal deficits to distorted III labor markets. And they have a vested interest in As its predecessors, this year's World Develop- reducing their own trade protectionism and adopt- ment Report is a study by the staff of The World ing outward-oriented policies. Bank, and the judgments in it do not necessarily Although recovery, at least in the industrial reflect the view of our Board of Directors or the nations, is now on a firmer footing, the outlook for governments they represent. the years ahead is full of uncertainties. The outlook would brighten considerably if every nation took steps to improve its own domestic economic per- formance. But development assistance is also criti- cal, in reviving the global economy and in address- ing many of the fundamental development issues of our era, including population. Especially for the poorest countries, a substantial increase in conces- A. W Clausen sional flows of funds is needed to secure develop- President ment momentum. And although the direct costs of The World Bank programs to reduce population growth are not large, a greater commitment by the international community is sorely needed to assist developing countries in the great challenge of slowing popula- tion growth. May 25, 1984 This Report was prepared by a team led by Nancy Birdsall and comprising Martha Ainsworth, Rodolfo Bulatao, Dennis Mahar, William McGreevey, Nicholas Prescott, and Gurushri Swamy, and assisted by Jill Armstrong. Deepak Lal and Martin Wolf contributed to Part I. The Economic Analysis and Projections Department, under the direction of Jean Baneth, prepared the statistical materials on which Part I is based, as well as supplied data for the whole Report. Peter Miovic coordinated the work of the Economic Analysis and Projections Department on Part I. Ramesh Chander supervised the preparation of the World Development Indicators, assisted by David Cieslikowski. Staff of the Population, Health, and Nutrition Department provided extensive help on Part H. The authors would like to thank these and the many other contributors and reviewers. Thanks also go to the production staffChristine Houle, Pensri Kimpitak, Jeanne Rosen, and Gerald Martin Quinn (who also designed the cover)and especially to the support staff headed by Rhoda Blade-Charest and including Ban- jonglak Duangrat, Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones. The work was carried out under the general direction of Anne 0. Krueger and Costas Michalopoulos, with Rupert Pennant-Rea as principal editor. iv Contents Definitions and data notes ix Glossary x Demographic terms x Acronyms and initials xi I Introduction The economic outlook I Population and demographic change 2 Part I Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? 2 Recession in retrospect 11 Industrial countries in the past two decades 12 Developing countries after 1973 23 3 Prospects for sustained growth 34 A ten-year perspective 34 The Low case and developing countries 35 The High case and developing countries 37 Policy requirements of the High case 39 Capital flows and debt 42 Poverty and low-income countries 47 International action 48 The links with population 50 Part II Population Change and Development 4 Demographic change and public policy 51 The setting for high fertility 51 The need for public policy 54 Lessons from history 56 Current demographic change in developing countries 63 Demographic prospects and goals 73 5 The consequences of rapid population growth 79 Differences among countries 81 Macroeconomic effects of rapid population growth 81 Constraints on agricultural production 90 Population and the environment 94 Urban population growth and internal migration 96 Population growth and the international economy 100 Conclusions 105 6 Slowing population growth 106 Socioeconomic factors and fertility 108 Marriage, breastfeeding, and contraception 112 Incentives and disincentives 121 7 Family planning as a service 127 The use of contraception 128 Supplying family planning services 136 Financing family planning 148 Obstacles to program expansion 152 V 8 The policy agenda 155 Population policy 155 Policy priorities in developing regions 161 Donor assistance policies 178 9 Ten years of experience 182 Economic adjustment 182 Population change: success and new challenge 183 Population data supplement 186 Bibliographical note 202 World Development Indicators 207 Text tables 2.1 Population, GDP, and GDP per capita in 1980, and growth rates, 1960-83 11 2.2 Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for the manufacturing sector and the aggregate economy, by country, 1962-78 16 2.3 Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP, 1961-81 17 2.4 Real rates of return on corporate capital, by country, 1962-76 17 2.5 Percentage of industrial countries' imports covered by nontariff barriers 18 2.6 Net savings and savings by sector in industrial countries, 1964-81 22 2.7 Change in export prices and in terms of trade, 1965-83 24 2.8 Consumption, savings, and investment indicators for developing countries, 1970-81 24 2.9 Exports from developing countries, 1965-83 28 2.10 Current account balance and its financing, 1970-83 30 2.11 Debt indicators for developing countries, 1970-83 31 3.1 Average performance of industrial and developing economies, 1960-95 35 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-95 36 3.3 Change in trade in developing countries, 1965-95 36 3.4 Current account balance and its financing in developing countries, 1983 and 1995 38 3.5 Growth of GDP in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95 41 3.6 Growth of trade in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95 42 4.1 Percentage decline in crude birth rates and in total fertility rates, selected countries, 1965-82 65 4.2 Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries, 1980 67 4.3 Rural and urban population growth, 1950-2000 67 4.4 Permanent emigration as a percentage of increase in populations of emigrants' countries 69 4.5 Projections of population size in selected countries, 2000 and 2050 77 4.6 Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions, 1982-2050 78 5.1 Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, 1955-80 82 5.2 Malawi: projected primary-school costs under alternative fertility and enrollment assumptions, 1980-2015 85 5.3 Potential savings in primary-school costs under rapid fertility decline, selected countries, 2000 and 2015 86 5.4 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker, selected countries, 1980 87 5.5 Kenya: projections of employment by sector, under two scenarios, 1976-2050 89 5.6 Growth rates of food output by region, 1960-80 90 5.7 Cereal yields and fertilizer use, selected countries, 1969-81 94 5.8 Export structure and human capital 103 6.1 Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinants of fertility, selected countries and years 114 7.1 Percentage of currently married women aged 15 to 49 using contraception, by region and for selected countries 127 7.2 Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among those who want no more children 134 vi 7.3 Discontinuation of contraception, recent surveys 136 7.4 Public expenditure on population programs, selected countries, 1980 149 7.5 Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands 151 7.6 Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures, 1980 and 2000 153 8.1 Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more 156 8.2 Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries 162 Population data supplement tables Population projections 192 Population composition 194 Contraceptive use and unmet need 196 Factors influencing fertility 197 Status of women 198 Family planning policy 200 Text figures 1.1 Past and projected world population, A.D. 1-2150 3 1.2 Indicators of standard of living, selected countries and years 5 1.3 Developing countries' share of population and production, 1800-1980 6 2.1 Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial countries, 1961-83 12 2.2 Growth, inflation, and unemployment in seven major industrial countries, 1966-83 12 4.1 Fertility and mortality transition in developed and developing countries, 1860-1982 59 4.2 Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region, 1950, 1965, and 1980 64 4.3 Urban agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants: 1950, 1975, and 2000 68 4.4 Fertility in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 70 4.5 Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 70 4.6 Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the world's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 75 4.7 Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 75 4.8 Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility and mortality 75 4.9 Brazil's age pyramid, 2020 78 5.1 Index of school-age and working-age populations, selected countries, 1950-2000 84 5.2 When will the number of agricultural workers start to decline? 88 5.3 Foodgrains and population in India, 1950-83 93 6.1 How government decisions influence family decisions 106 6.2 Relation between fertility and income per person 109 6.3 Total fertility rate by education group in selected countries 110 6.4 Average timing of reproductive events in selected types of societies 113 6.5 Accounting for fertility decline, selected countries and years 115 6.6 Fertility decline within female education groups in selected countries 120 7.1 Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 1970-83, selected countries 130 7.2 Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception, selected countries, 1977-81 131 8.1 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 1972 and 1982 162 8.2 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 1972 and 1982 168 8.3 Gross enrollment ratios by sex: selected countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 1960 and 1980 169 8.4 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1972 and 1982 171 8.5 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in South Asia, 1972 and 1982 173 8.6 Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, 1975-83 174 8.7 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia, 1972 and 1982 177 8.8 External assistance for population programs in developing countries 179 vii Boxes 1.1 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum 4 2.1 Administered protection and the open international trading system 19 2.2 Comparisons between the 1930s and the 1980s 20 2.3 Adjustment to external shocks, 1974-81 25 2.4 The oil syndrome: deficits in oil-exporting countries 27 2.5 Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors 29 3.1 Costs of protection in textiles and clothing 40 3.2 Trade as an engine of growth 43 3.3 Delinking from the world economy? 44 3.4 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from the experience of developing countries 45 3.5 IDA 49 4.1 The isolation paradox 55 4.2 The Maithusian case: changes in labor supply, wages, and population growth in preindustrial England 57 4.3 The European fertility transition 62 4.4 Alternative measures of fertility and mortality 66 4.5 Is the rise in life expectancy slowing too soon? 72 4.6 Three views of population change 76 5.1 Consequences of population growth: conflicting views 80 5.2 Prospects for poverty and population growth, 1980-2000 83 5.3 Food supplies for a growing world population 91 5.4 Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds 95 5.5 Indonesia's transmigration program 99 5.6 The brain drain and taxation 102 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China 104 6.1 Landholding and fertility 109 6.2 Women's use of and control over their time 111 6.3 Measuring the value of children 122 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme in Bangladesh 126 7.1 Family planning for health 128 7.2 Birth planning technology 132 7.3 Measuring unmet need for family planning 132 7.4 Management information systems for improved service delivery 138 7.5 Family planning fieldworkers 141 7.6 The impact of service quality: Matlab Thana, Bangladesh 144 7.7 Military versus social expenditure 150 8.1 Pronatalist policies l57 8.2 China's census: counting a billion people 158 8.3 Demographic policy objectives 159 8.4 Africa: how much land, how many people? 164 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa 166 8.6 Teenage pregnancy 167 8.7 Changing policies and attitudes toward family planning in Brazil 172 8.8 Family planning and women's credit cooperatives in Bangladesh 175 8.9 China's one-child family policy 178 Maps Distribution of product among selected countries, 1982 14 Contraceptive prevalence 189 Births and total fertility 190 VIII Definitions and data notes The principal country groups used in this Report Sub-Saharan Africa comprises all thirty-nine are defined as follows: developing African countries south of the Sahara, Developing countries are divided into: low- excluding South Africa, as given in Accelerated De- income economies, with 1982 gross national product velopment in Sub-Saha ran Africa, World Bank, 1981. (GNP) per person of less than $410; and middle- Middle East and North Africa includes Afghani- income economies, with 1982 GNP per person of stan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, $410 or more. Middle-income countries are also Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi divided into oil exporters and oil importers, identified Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen Arab below. Republic, Yemen (PDR), and the United Arab Middle-income oil exporters comprise Algeria, Emirates. Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, East Asia comprises all low- and middle- Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, income countries of East and Southeast Asia and Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Syria, Trinidad the Pacific, east of, and including, Burma, China, and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela. and Mongolia. Middle-income oil importers comprise all other South Asia includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, middle-income developing countries not classified India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. as oil exporters. A subset, major exporters of manu- Latin America and Caribbean comprises all factures, comprises Argentina, Brazil, Greece, American and Caribbean countries south of the Hong Kong, Israel, Republic of Korea, Philippines, United States. Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Billion is 1,000 million. Yugoslavia. Tons are metric tons (t), equal to 1,000 kilograms High-income oil exporters (not included in de- (kg) or 2,204.6 pounds. veloping countries) comprise Bahrain, Brunei Growth rates are in real terms unless otherwise Darussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi stated. Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Dollars are US dollars unless otherwise specified. Industrial market economies are the members of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and All tables and figures are based on World Bank Development (OECD, identified in the glossary) data unless otherwise specified. apart from Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, which Data from secondary sources are not always are included among the middle-income develop- available through 1983. The numbers in this World ing economies. This group is commonly referred to Development Report shown for historical data may in the text as industrial economies or industrial differ from those shown in previous Reports countries. because of continuous updating as better data East European nonmarket economies include the become available, and because of recompilation of following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslo- certain data for Part I for a ninety-country sample. vakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, The recompilation was necessary to permit greater Poland, Romania, and USSR. This group is some- flexibility in regrouping countries for the purpose times referred to as nonmarket economies. of making projections. Growth rates for spans of years in tables cover The World Development Indicators uses the the period from the beginning of the base year to same groups but includes only countries of 1 mil- the end of the last year given. lion or more. In Part II of this Report, regional groupings of countries are defined as follows: ix Glossary Demographic terms information about, and services for, use of contra- ception. Fecundity. The physiological capacity of a woman, Amenorrhea. Absence or suppression of menstrua- man, or couple to produce a live birth. tion. Fertility. The reproductive performance, measured Child death rate. The number of deaths of children by number of births, of an individual, a couple, a aged one to four in a given year per 1,000 children group, or a population. in this age group. Infant mortality rate. The number of deaths of Cohort. A group of people sharing a common tem- infants under one year old in a given year per 1,000 poral demographic experience who are observed live births in that year. through time. For example, the birth cohort of Life expectancy at birth. The average number of 1900 would be the people born in that year. There years a newborn would live if current age-specific are also marriage cohorts, school class cohorts, mortality were maintained. Life expectancy at later and so on. ages is the average number of years a person Completed fertility rate. The number of children born already at a given later age will live. Life expect- alive per woman in a cohort of women by the end ancy at age five and above can exceed life expect- of their childbearing years. ancy at birth substantially if the infant mortality Contraception. The conscious effort of couples to rate is high. avoid conception through rhythm, withdrawal, Married women of reproductive age. Women who are abstinence, male or female sterilization, or use of currently married, or in a stable sexual union, gen- contraceptives: intrauterine device (IUD), oral con- erally between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine. traceptives, injectable contraceptives, condom, Some analysts count only women between the spermicides, and diaphragm. ages of fifteen and forty-four. Contraceptive prevalance rate. The percentage of mar- Maternal mortality rate. The number of deaths of ried women of reproductive age who are using (or women due to complications of pregnancy and whose husbands are using) any form of contracep- childbirth per 100,000 live births in a given year. tion. Mortality. Deaths as a component of population Crude birth rate. The number of births per 1,000 change. population in a given year. Net reproduction rate. The average number of Crude death rate. The number of deaths per 1,000 daughters that would be born to a woman (or population in a given year. group of women) if during her lifetime she were to Dependency ratio. The ratio of the economically conform to the age-specific fertility and mortality dependent part of the population to the productive rates of a given year. This rate takes into account part; arbitrarily defined as the ratio of the young that some women will die before completing their (those under fifteen years of age) plus the elderly childbearing years. A net reproduction rate of 1.00 (those sixty-five years and over) to the population means that each generation of mothers is having in the "working ages" (those fifteen to sixty-four exactly enough daughters to replace itself in the years of age). population. Family planning. Conscious effort of couples to reg- Parity. The number of children previously born ulate the number and timing of births. alive to a woman. Family planning programs. Programs that provide Population grozvth rate. The rate at which a popula- x tion is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, due to natural increase and net migration, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether- expressed as a percentage of the base population. lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer- Populat ion momentum. The tendency for population land, United Kingdom, United States, and Com- growth to continue beyond the time that replace- mission of the European Communities. ment-level fertility has been achieved because of EC The European Communities comprise the large and increasing size of cohorts of child- Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of bearing age and younger, resulting from higher Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, fertility and/or falling mortality in preceding years. Netherlands, and United Kingdom. Postpartum. Refers to the time immediately after FAO Food and Agriculture Organization. childbirth. GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Rate of natural increase. The rate at which a popula- IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and tion is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year Development. due to a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths. IDA International Development Association. The rate of natural increase equals the crude birth IMF International Monetary Fund. rate minus the crude death rate per 100 people. It IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federa- also equals the population growth rate minus emi- gration. tion. Replacement-level fertility. The level of fertility at NGO Nongovernmental organization. which a cohort of women on the average is having ODA Official Development Assistance. only enough daughters to "replace" itself in the OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-opera- population. By definition, replacement level is tion and Development members are Australia, equal to a net reproduction rate (see above defini- Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, tion) of 1.00. Replacement-level fertility can also be France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ice- expressed in terms of the total fertility rate. In the land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether- United States today a total fertility rate of 2.12 is lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, considered to be replacement level; it is higher Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, than 2 because of mortality and because of a sex and United States. ratio greater than 1 at birth. The higher mortality OPEC The Organization of Petroleum Exporting is, the higher is replacement-level fertility. Countries comprises Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Total fertility rate. The average number of children Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, that would be born alive to a woman (or group of Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, women) during her lifetime if during her child- United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. bearing years she were to bear children at each age UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. and Development. Urbanization. Growth in the proportion of the pop- UNDP United Nations Development Pro- ulation living in urban areas. gramme. UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, Acronyms and initials and Cultural Organization. UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population CPS Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Assistance. DAC The Development Assistance Committee of WFS World Fertility Survey. the OECD (see below) comprises Australia, Aus- WHO World Health Organization. xi 1 Introduction The past few years have produced so much turbu- mature into sustained and rapid growth of the lence in the world economy that governments and kind the world enjoyed for twenty-five years after businesses have naturally been preoccupied with World War II. the short term. Now that recession is giving way to That much is clear from a review of the past, recovery, they can start to take a longer view. For which is the subject of Chapter 2. It concludes that developing countries in particular, the shift is wel- the 1980-83 recession was not an isolated event come: development is quintessentially long term, caused, for example, by the second oil price rise of yielding its best results when policies and pro- 1979-80. Its roots went back farther, to the rigidi- grams can be designed and sustained for years at a ties that were steadily being built into economies time. from the mid-1960s onward. The rising trends in Long-term needs and sustained effort are under- unemployment and inflation were the manifesta- lying themes in this year's World Development tion of increasingly inflexible arrangements for set- Report. As with most of its predecessors, it is ting wages and prices and for managing public divided into two parts. The first looks at economic finances. performance, past and prospective. The second The chapter emphasizes that policy failings have part is this year devoted to populationthe causes characterized both the industrial and the develop- and consequences of rapid population growth, its ing countries. Because of the industrial countries' link to development, and why it has slowed down predominance in the world economy, the conse- in some developing countries. The two parts mir- quences of their economic failure have weighed ror each other: economic policy and performance heavily on the developing countries. In particular, in the next decade will matter for population the much publicized debt difficulties of the past growth in the developing countries for several two years came to a head because of the unusual decades beyond; population policy and change in combination in 1980-83 of recession and high real the rest of this century will set the terms for the interest rates in the industrial countries. Industrial whole of development strategy in the next. In both countries provide a market for about 65 percent of cases, policy changes will not yield immediate ben- the developing world's exports. Their buoyancy efitsall the more reason for starting to act imme- or lack of itand the amount of trade protection diately. Delay will reduce the room for maneuver they choose to employ have a critical influence on that policymakers will have in years to come. the foreign exchange earnings of developing coun- tries. These earnings in turn will largely determine The economic outlook whether the "debt crisis" gradually subsides, or seriously retards the growth prospects of develop- The recession of 1980-83 was the longest in fifty ing countries for many years to come. years. It increased unemployment, reduced invest- That is one of several contrasting alternatives ment, and undermined social programs in almost highlighted by the scenarios presented in Chapter every country in the world. It put great strain on 3. These scenarios look ahead as far as 1995, but the international trade and financial systems and they are not intended as forecasts of what will hap- caused friction between governments everywhere. pen. They merely illustrate what might happen, But it provided many valuable lessons for eco- depending on the policies pursued by govern- nomic policy because it highlighted longstanding ments and the effectiveness of governments in weaknesses in every economy and in international tackling economic problems. They show, for exam- arrangements. Unless policymakers learn from its ple, that GDP in the developing world could grow lessons, the recovery now under way will not at 5.5 percent a year in 1985-95 if the industrial 1 countries regain their momentum of the 1960s, but until well into the twentieth century, the world's at only 4.7 percent a year in that period if the population grew at the then unprecedented rate of industrial countries do no better than in the past about 0.5 percent a year, faster in today's devel- ten years. That would make the difference oped countries, slower elsewhere. World popula- between almost every country in the world raising tion size doubled again, this time in about 150 per capita incomes and people in many of the years; it had reached about 1.7 billion by 1900. In world's poorest countries growing steadily poorer. the twentieth century, growth continued to accel- Chapter 3 also explores the gains that develop- erate, from 0.5 to 1 percent until about 1950 and ing countries could make by improving their own then to a remarkable 2 percent. In just over thirty economic policies, irrespective of what happens in years, between 1950 and today, world population the industrial countries. It concludes that, if they nearly doubled againgrowing from 2.5 billion to make such improvements, some countries might almost 4.8 billion (see Figure 1.1). be able to add close to an extra percentage point to Since 1950 population growth has been concen- their economic growth rates. None of these trated largely in the developing countries. Though improvements can be regarded as unachievable, a postwar baby boom combined with falling mor- since they have already been achieved by some tality in the industrial countries, the population developing countries. The chapter stresses the growth rate never exceeded 1 percent in Europe valuable contribution that appropriate pricing poli- and seldom exceeded 1.5 percent in North Amer- cies can make to faster economic growth. In partic- ica. At its peak, fertility in the United States meant ular, it contrasts the record of countries that have that families had on average little more than three adopted outward-looking trade policies with those children; in Europe and Japan postwar families that have concentrated on import substitution. were even smaller. By the 1970s, in most devel- The predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is a oped countries fertility had fallen to a level near or recurring theme throughout this Report. Though even below "replacement' 'about two children its total GDP growth was not much slower than in per couple being the level which, over the long other regions in the 1970s, Africa's population run, holds population constant (demographic grew faster; for the region as a whole, GDP per terms are defined in the glossary). capita fell during the 1970s. It could well do so The postwar experience of developing countries again in the years up to 1995. Of the policy failings was not only different but historically unprece- that contributed to slow growth in other develop- dented. Driven by falling mortality and continued ing countries, all can be found in more or less high fertility, their population growth rate rose chronic form in many African countries. The scope above 2 percent a year. It peaked at 2.4 percent in for raising growth rates by improving policies is the 1960s. It is now around 2.0 percent a year, therefore greatest in Africa. In addition, however, because of a slightly greater decline in birth rates many of Africa's weaknesses require extra conces- than in death rates (see Figure 1.1). Further decline sional aid if they are to be tackled effectively. in population growth will not come automatically. Much of the slowdown so far can be attributed to Population and demographic change China, where fertility is already low, close to an average of two children per family. Most families While the causes of poor economic performance in other developing countries now have at least can be traced back twenty years, the links between four children, in rural areas five and more. In a few demography and development can be understood countries in which fertility fell in the 1970s, there is only by going back even farther into the past. In evidence that it has leveled off recently. For parts the long run of history, the second half of the of South Asia and the Middle East, forecasts of a twentieth century stands out for its remarkable lower rate of population growth are based more on population growth. Consider that in the year 1 the hope than on present trends. For much of Africa world had about 300 million people. Its population and Central America, population growth rates are then took more than 1,500 years to double. rising and could rise still further. In Africa couples Though the general trend was rising, population say they want more children than in fact they are growth was not steady; the balance of births over having, while mortalitythough highcan be deaths was tenuous, and crises such as war or expected to decline. plague periodically reduced populations in parts of Furthermore, population "momentum" means the world. Only in the eighteenth century did the that growth rates in developing countries will number of people start to rise steadily. From 1750 remain high for several decades even if couples 2 FIGURE 1.1 Past and projected world population, A.D. 1-2150 Population (billions) 12 11 10 Birth and death rates, 1950-80 Crude rate Crude rate (per thousand) (per thousand) 9 Developed countries AL 8 p Developing countries 2 .8 Births -7 Deaths -6 1960 1970 1980 2000 -5 -4 -3 -2 Total world populn I Developed countries' population AD. I 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 Sources; Durand, 1977; UN, 1966. 3 Box 1.1 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum Rates of population growth among coun- fertility (between four and eight births ard World Bank country projection for tries tend to fall into two main groups: per woman) but by the "momentum" Senegal (the broader pyramid); and fer- rapid growth countries of Africa, Asia, created by the high fertility and falling tility instantaneously falls to replacement and Latin America, with annual growth mortality of the past three decades. Past level (the narrower pyramid). The rates for most between 2.0 and 4.5 per- high fertility and falling mortality mean broader pyramid for 2020, which cent; and slow growth countries, primar- women entering childbearing age now assumes some, though gradual, fertility ily the industrialized nations, with constitute a large proportion of the total decline, is shaped like the 1980 pyramid growth rates below 1 percent. In a few population. In most developing coun- but is almost three times larger. The nar- tries, the next generation of women will rower pyramid for 2020 shows the outnumber the previous one. Thus, even growth that is generated by momentum Age sfructure in Senegal, 1980 and 2020 if the number of births per woman alone, It has a different shape than the declines rapidly, the birth rate can stay 1980 pyramid; its base has not expanded, high and the total number of births can yet it is 1.6 times larger. be greater than it was. But the smaller pyramid for 2020 does Male In some countries of Asia and Latin not even show the full effect of momen- America, even with recent fertility tum, which would not have run its full decline (Chapter 4), birth rates remain course by 2020. By the time Senegal's high and average annual increases in population would become stationary population size are larger now than they (assuming instantaneous replacement were in 1965. Brazil's fertility rate fell fertility), the pyramid would be 2.2 times from 5.8 in 1965 to about 4.0 in 1980, a hrgcr in area than the pyramid for 1980 decline of almost 30 percent. Yet the birth In other words, the population of Sene- 2020 rate has fallen by only 19 percent and the Assuming total number of births has increased from fertility about 2.9 million a year in the late 1950s Distribution of countries with 1982 immediately populations exceeding 1 million by latls to to about 3.7 million in the early 1980s. average 1980-85 growth rate replacement The World Bank now projects that fertil- ity in Brazil will fall to 2.1 by 2025. Yet by Percentage of total population 30 that year the total number of births will Assuming fertility gradually declines have increased further, to nearly 3.9 mil- lion a year. 20 800 600 400 200 0 200 400 600 800 To see how much of total population Thousands growth is due to momentum alone, imagine a population in which the fertil- 10 ity rate declines instantaneously to countries, including China, the growth replacement levelthe level at which rate falls between I and 2 percent (see each couple has only enough children to first chart). Because of compounding, replace themselves (the exact number 0 US N in "S small differences in annual growth rates will he more than two, varying from 9 rci over long periods make a big difference country to country and from period to Annual growth rate (percent) in population increases. An average period, because of different mortality Includes Includes Includes growth of 1 percent over a 100-year rates). The top population pyramid in USSR, USA, China, Korea, Brazil, India, Japan Argentina Indonesia, Nigeria period would cause a population to mul- the second chart shows the distribution tiply 2.7 times. A rate of 2 percent in the of the actual 1980 population of Senegal same period would bring an increase of by sex and by five-year age groups. The about 7.4; 3 percent an increase of 20; pyramid for 1980 has a wide base and a gal would increase 2.2 times from the and 4 percent an increase of 55. Today's narrow top. Each five-year group is force of momentum alone, even if fertil- population of Zambia, 6 million, would exponentially larger than the one preced- ity rates there dropped to replacement grow to more than 120 million in 100 ing it. The bottom pyramid is actually level now. The corresponding ratio of years were growth to continue at the two pyramids, which show the popula- stationary to current population for the present rate of 3.4 percent. tion distributions for the year 2020 under United States would be 1.3. Table 19 of Today's high growth rates in develop- two different assumptions: fertility grad- the 1984 World Development Indicators ing countries are caused not only by high ually declines, in keeping with the stand- provides numbers for other countries, 4 have fewer children (see Box 1.1); absolute annual FIGURE 1.2 increases will be close to or more than 80 million Indicators of standard of living, selected countries people a year in developing countries well into the and years next century. The baby "bulge" that resulted from Primary school enrollment rate (percent) the trends of high fertility and falling mortality that Singapore started twenty years ago is now entering child- 100 Chile Malaysia bearing age. In China, for example, the number of Brazil United States Korea women aged twenty to thirty-four almost doubled England and Wales India between 1950 and 1980; throughout the 1980s, as Sweden Bangladesh Pakistan the children born in the 1960s enter their twenties, 50 Japan Sudan Ethiopia the number of women marrying and bearing chil- dren will continue to increase. To reduce popula- tion growth to 1 percent a year by the early 1990s, couples in China would need to have fewer than 0 two children on average. 1900 1960 1980 These considerations should not obscure the Literacy rate central fact that the world's population growth (percent) rate is falling. The latter part of the twentieth cen- Sweden Un ted States tury has been a demographic watershed, the high 75 England and Chile Wales point of several centuries of accelerating growth Korea and the beginning of what demographers project Brazil Malaysia to be a continuous decline, until world population 50 stabilizes sometime in the twenty-second century. India Though absolute numbers will continue to 25 Sudan Bangladesh increase for several decades, the issue now is how Pakistan Ethiopia quickly the rate of increase can be slowed down 0 and how individual countries (and the interna- 1900 1960 1980 tional community) are to cope with continued growth in the meantime. Life expectancy at birth (years) The rise in living standards 60 Chile Brazil Korea Until the seventeenth or eighteenth century, life 091 Sweden Malaysia India expectancy had probably changed little, and few United States Pakistan Bangladesh ) England and Wales people were literate. Since 1850, however, while 40 Sudan Ethiopia world population size has more than tripled, Japan income per person has increased perhaps six times in real terms, life expectancy has risen dramati- cally, and education has become widespread. Pro- 20 gress in education and life expectancy in develop- 1900 1960 1980 ing countries has been especially notable since GNP per capita 1950. Even in today's poorer developing countries, (constant 1980-82 dollars) primary school enrollment rates and life expec- United States tancy are above the levels achieved by richer coun- 3,000 tries eighty years ago, though income per person and adult literacy are not (see Figure 1.2). 2,000 Chile But these averages can be misleading. Though England and Wales most people are better off today, for many the Sweden Singapore Brazil gains have been small. Since 1950 it has been the 1,000 Sudan Malaysia Pakistan countries with lower levels of income per person Korea India Bangladesh that have had much faster population growth. In Japan Ethiopia those countries absolute increases in income have 1900 1960 1980 been much smaller than in the countries which Sources: Tan and Haines, 1984; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960; Keyfitz began the period already richer. Consider a simple and Fleiger, 1968; Mosk, 1983; Johansson, 1977; Zimmerman, 1965. 5 example. Between 1955 and 1980 income per per- Such comparisons raise several statistical diffi- son in the United States grew at an average 2.0 culties. They exaggerate differences between poor percent a year. In 1980 dollars, average income and rich countries because not only incomes but increased from $7,030 to $11,560. Meanwhile, in also prices, especially for services, are lower in India, income per person grew at about 1.7 percent poor countries, and this is not reflected in official a yearbut only from $170 to $260 (in 1980 dol- exchange rates. But even with appropriate adjust- lars). What had been a $6,860 income gap between ments (based on the UN International Comparison Americans and Indians in 1955 had almost dou- Project), the income gap between India and the bled to $11,300 in 1980; America's average income, United States is still estimated to have increased some forty-one times India's in 1955, had become from almost $5,000 to almost $8,000 between 1955 forty-four times larger by 1980. Large absolute dif- and 1980. The general conclusion is inescapable: ferences in average income between developed much of the world's output is produced and con- and developing countries have persisted and have sumed by relatively few of its people. even increased since 1950 (see Figure 1.3). Among and within developing countries, differences in The demographic future education and life expectancy also persist. By 1980, 79 percent of the world's total output World Bank population projections are shown in was produced in the developed countries, where Table 19 of the World Development Indicators at about 25 percent of the world's people live. The the back of this Report. These, and alternative pro- remaining 21 percent was shared by the other 75 jections prepared for this Report and shown in the percent of people. Only 5 percent was shared Population Data Supplement, are explained in among the 47 percent living in low-income coun- Chapter 4. The projections should not be treated as tries such as Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, predictions, but as illustrations of what can hap- and most countries of tropical Africa. pen given reasonable assumptions. If the assump- FIGURE 1.3 Developing countries' share of population and production, 1800-1980 Total world $11,720 billion production $970 billion $2,630 billion $230 billion . Developing countries' 19 share-44 percent percent share 2,417 million Total world 1,673 million population 944 million 1800 1900 1950 1980 Source: McGreevey, 1984. 6 tions underlying the "standard" projections in some countries it is not already too latewhether Table 19 are correct, world population would stabi- rising unemployment and increasing landlessness lize around the year 2150, having risen from will overwhelm social and political institutions; almost 4.8 billion to more than 11 billion (see Fig- whether fragile administrative systems will be ure 1.1). It would reach 9.8 billion by the year 2050. unable to maintain health programs; whether, in The population of today's developed countries countries that are already crowded and still heavily would grow from about 1.2 billion today to 1.4 reliant on agriculture, mortality will rise to check billion in 2050, while that of those countries now further population growth. classified as developing would grow from over 3.6 Such speculative pessimism needs to be set billion to 8.4 billion. By the time world population against the concrete reasons for optimism. The stabilized, the population of India would be 1.7 experience of the past two decades shows that eco- billion, making it the most populous nation on nomic growth and social development are possi- earth. Bangladesh, a country about the size of the ble, even starting at low initial income levels, and state of Wisconsin in the United States, would that developing countries can take conscious steps have a population of 450 million. Nigeria, Ethio- to influence their demographic futures. Both mor- pia, Zaire, and Kenya, among the most populous tality and fertilitythe latter matters much more countries in Africa, would have populations of 620 for population growthcan be brought down million, 230 million, 170 million, and 150 million, more quickly than projected. Declines need not respectively. As a group, sub-Saharan Africa and rely, solely or even primarily, on per capita income South Asiatoday's poorest countries, with the growth. Educational change can occur rapidly; fastest population growthwould account for 50 policy effort can make a difference. Moreover, the percent of the world's people, compared with 30 actions that would speed the demographic transi- percent today. tion are also those which would increase economic Even allowing for some error in such projec- growth. tions, it is clear that future population increases will be concentrated in what are now the poorer Causes, consequences, and cures areas of the globe; the average level of human wel- fare will depend largely on the degree to which Part II of this Report discusses three themes. economic and social transformation occurs in these Rapid population growth is a development prob- areas. lem. Although population growth does not provide Are the assumptions that produce these projec- the drama of financial crisis or political upheaval, tions realistic, and what do they imply for future its significance for shaping the world is at least as human welfare? The critical assumptions are that great. In the past three decades many developing the decline in mortality will continue until life countries managed to raise average income even as expectancy of about eighty years is reached, and their populations grew rapidly. In that strict sense, that fertility will decline to replacement levelin rapid population growth has been accommodated. developing countries between the years 2005 and But the goal of development extends beyond 2045, depending on recent mortality levels, fertility accommodation of more people; it is to improve trends, and family planning efforts; and in most people's lives. The cost of rapid population developed countries in the year 2010. (In the sev- growth, at least for the world as a whole, may not eral developed countries in which fertility is now be a catastrophewith luck sudden famine, war, below replacement level, it is assumed to rise and political or environmental collapse can be avoided. then stabilize at replacement.) But continuing rapid growth on an ever larger base In some respects these assumptions are optimis- is likely to mean a lower quality of life for millions tic. Consider the poorer countries of Africa and of people. The main cost of such growth, borne South Asia. Even with rapid income growth and principally by the poor in developing countries, advances in literacy in the next two decades, they has been and will be faltering progress against are not likely to reach the income and literacy lev- what is still high mortality, and lost opportunities els that triggered fertility declines in such countries for improving people's lives. as Brazil, Korea, and Malaysia in the 1960s (see Why does rapid population growth slow devel- Figure 1.2). Yet their fertility is projected to decline opment? First, it exacerbates the awkward choice significantlyand even with those declines their between higher consumption now and the invest- populations will more than double in the next fifty ment needed to bring higher consumption in the years. A pessimist might wonder whether for future. Economic growth depends on invest- 7 mentall the more so if human skills are scarce slowing population growth later more difficult, as and technology limited. But if consumption is low today's children become tomorrow's new parents. already, the resources available for investment are Population policy has a long lead time; other limited; faster population growth makes invest- development policies must adapt in the meantime. ment in "population quality" more difficult. Sec- Inaction today forecloses options tomorrow, in ond, in many countries increases in population overall development strategy and in future popu- threaten what is already a precarious balance lation policy. Worst of all, inaction today could between natural resources and people. Where mean that more drastic steps, less compatible with populations are still highly dependent on agricul- individual choice and freedom, will seem neces- ture and the potential for increasing production sary tomorrow to slow population growth. through extending cultivation is limited, continu- There are appropriate public policies to reduce fer- ing large increases in population condemn many tility. Proposals for reducing population growth households to continuing poverty. Such increases raise difficult questions about the proper domain can contribute to overuse of limited natural of public policy. Family and fertility are areas of life resources, mortgaging the welfare of future gener- in which the most fundamental human values are ations. Third, rapid increases in population make at stake. This Report considers two reasons for it hard to manage the adjustments that accompany public policy to reduce fertility. First, in the transi- and promote economic and social change. The tion from a traditional to a modern economy, the growth of cities in developing countries, largely private gain from having many children may due to high rates of natural increase, poses serious exceed the social gain. This gap occurs for several management problems; so too does continued reasons. For any family there are obvious rewards rapid growth that in some rural areas threatens from many children. But poor parents especially permanent environmental damage. have other reasons for high fertility. They rightly These costs of rapid population growth differ fear the risks of infant mortality because, in the among countries. Where education levels are absence of pensions or public support, they look to already high, investment in transport and commu- their children to support them in old age. For nications is in place, and political and economic women who are poor and for whom other oppor- systems are stable, countries are in a better posi- tunities may be limited, security and status are tion to cope with the strains of rapid growth linked to childbearing. Yet these private rewards whether their natural resources are limited or they are achieved at great social cost because part of the are already "crowded." But countries in that cate- responsibilities for educating and employing chil- goryColombia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, dren falls on society at large. Second, during a Singapore, and Thailandalso tend to be those in country's transition to a modern economy, some which population growth is already declining. In couples have more children than they want. This countries where the population is still largely gap also occurs for several reasons. Information dependent on agriculture, and the amount of new about family planning may be scarce or the costs of land or other resources is limitedincluding contraception high. Couples may not realize that Bangladesh, Burundi, the Arab Republic of Egypt, mortality rates are falling, so that fewer births are India, Kenya, and Nepalprogress in the face of needed to ensure that the number of children they continuing rapid population growth will be want will survive to become adults. Couples may extraordinarily difficult. Agricultural moderniza- not be fully aware of the health risks of large fami- tion and diversification into manufacturing will lies. Where young women marry early, couples do require large new investments in both human and not discuss sexual matters, and parents pressure physical capital, and considerable administrative new couples to have children, there may be social and political skill to ensure efficient allocation of as well as financial costs in controlling fertility. scarce investment resources. Even in countries Thus tradition can combine with lack of infor- with untapped natural resourcesBrazil and Ivory mation about birth control to contribute to high Coast, for instancerapid population growth fertility. makes it harder to effect the investments in com- Where there is a gap between private and social plementary inputs (roads, public services, drain- gains, a main reason for it is poverty. Poverty age, and other agricultural infrastructure) and in means not only low income but also lack of eco- the human skills needed to tap such resources. nomic and social opportunities, an insecure future, The costs of rapid population growth, moreover, and limited access to services such as education, are cumulative. More births now make the task of health, and family planning. The gap requires 8 public policy to provide alternative ways of secur- ity must not mean a willingness to achieve it at any ing the benefits that many children provide for cost. In fact, the successful experience of many their parents. Measures to improve income oppor- countries already indicates it need not. tunities, broaden social insurance and pension Experience shows that policy makes a difference. schemes, and extend services all provide new sig- The experience of the past two decades of popula- nals to households, encouraging individuals to tion policy is encouraging. Many countries have want smaller families. Social efforts to expand edu- shown that effective measures can be taken to slow cation and employment opportunities for women population growth. Such measures are affordable: do the same. In short, there is a particular strategy family planning programs, for example, have been of development in which the signals transmitted to successful in reducing fertility at very low cost. parents encourage them to have fewer children in Such measures also respect human rights, and their own private interests. they complement other development efforts in But experience shows that all this takes time to enhancing welfare. have an effect. Population growth can be slowed Fertility has fallen most dramatically in China, more directly, and in ways that also benefit the where a public policy to slow population growth poor. Governments can do more to encourage includes public education, social pressure, and breastfeeding and later age of marriage, which economic measures other governments might be reduce population growth by lengthening the reluctant to consider. But large declines have also average interval between generations. Through occurred in other low-income areas: Sri Lanka and support for family planning programs, govern- several states of India (Kerala, Karnataka, and ments can spread information about the advan- Tamil Nadu), where education is widespread; and tages of planning family sizemaking it as easy as Java in Indonesia, where there is an active family possible for individuals to choose the number and planning program. timing of their children and helping to close the Within regions, countries differ. Fertility has gap between the number of children parents have fallen faster and to lower levels in Colombia, and the number they want. Finally, governments where family planning programs received govern- can use incentives and disincentives to signal their ment support starting in the late 1960s, than in policy on family size. Through incentives, society Brazil, a richer country where central government as a whole compensates those couples willing to involvement is minimal. It has fallen more in forgo the private benefits of an additional child, Egypt and Tunisia, countries with demographic helping to close the gap between private and social objectives, than in their richer neighbor, Algeria. It gains to high fertility. has fallen more in India than in Pakistan; per cap- The size of the two gaps, and hence the policy ita income is low in both, but in Pakistan popula- actions needed, vary among countries and among tion policy has received less sustained support different groups within each country. When cou- over the past two decades. The pattern of decline ples have two or even three children, it is much shows that differences in income, religion, and cul- less likely that the social costs of each child exceed ture do not tell the whole story. Education, access the private costs parents are willing to bear. But to family planning services, the status of women, if each couple has four or even six children, in a and economic and social policies that bring oppor- society with only limited ability to finance the tunities to the majority of people all make a differ- education of a growing population, then it is more ence. likely that the social optimum is being exceeded The specific policy agenda for each country and that both social and private interests would be depends on its political culture, on the nature of better served by smaller families. While there are the problem it faces, and on what it has already distinctions between different types of policies to accomplished. But to illustrate what is possible, reduce fertility, in virtually every country there is this Report provides examples of the implications some appropriate combination of development for population growth of "rapid" mortality and policies geared to the poor, family planning, and fertility declines. These declines are for most coun- incentives. tries more rapid than those shown in the standard The ultimate goal of public policy is to improve World Bank projections, but comparable to what a living standards, to increase individual choice, and few countries have already achieved. For most to create conditions that enable people to realize countries these declines would mean fertility rates their potential. Lower fertility is only an intermedi- of between two and three children per couple in ate objective; a commitment to achieve lower fertil- the year 2000 and population growth rates of 9 between 1 and 2 percentmoderate compared tality and fertility give only a rough guide to what with rates today. For some countries, the declines is possible. For some countries, they may be too imply eventual large differences in population size ambitious; others have already set even more compared with the standard projectionfor ambitious fertility targets. In the longer run, some Kenya, about 70 mfflion rather than 120 million in countries may wish to move to even lower or zero 2050 (compared with a population of 18 million rates of population growth. But the alternative today) and for Bangladesh, 230 million rather than paths illustrate an important point: the course of almost 360 million (compared with 93 million future population growth and its effects on social today). and economic progress are well within the realm of These alternative paths of rapid declines in mor- conscious human choice. 10 Part I Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? 2 Recession in retrospect The world has now had two major recessions in also more severely affected. Their GDP grew by the past ten years. The recession of 1974-75 was only 2.5 percent in 1980, 2.4 percent in 1981, 1.9 sharp but short in industrial countries, where GDP percent in 1982, and an estimated 1 percent in 1983 rose by 6.1 percent in 1973, then by only 0.8 per- (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). They had fared bet- cent in 1974, before falling by 0.4 percent in 1975. ter in the first recession not only because it was In 1976, however, GDP growth in industrial coun- shorter but also because, for a time, their heavy tries was back up to 4.7 percent. Developing coun- borrowing allowed them to grow. In the second tries were less badly affected. Their GDP growth recession, however, the availability of foreign capi- was 7.4 percent in 1973 and 5.9 percent in 1974; it tal declined abruptly after 1981. This change fell only modestly to 4 percent in 1975 before rising imposed substantial pressure on those countries to 6.3 percent in 1976. which had come to rely on foreign loans as a prin- The recent recession of 1980-83 was not so sharp cipal way of escaping recession. but it lasted longer. In the industrial countries GDP The recent recession had two proximate causes: grew by 3.3 percent in 1979, then 1.3 percent in the rise in oil prices in 1979, stemming from supply 1980, and 1.3 percent in 1981. It fell by 0.5 percent disruptions in Iran, and the disinflationary policies in 1982 and is estimated to have risen to only about of governments in most major industrial countries 2.3 percent in 1983. The developing countries were after 1980. Both the need to reduce inflation and TABLE 2.1 Population, GDP, and GDP per capita in 1980, and growth rates, 1960-83 1980 1980 GDP growth rates GDP 1980 GDP (average annual percentage change) (billions population per capita Country group of dollars) (millions) (dollars) 1960-73 1973-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 Developing countriesL 2,118 3,280 650 6.3 5.2 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.0 Low-income 549 2,175 250 5.6 4.8 5.9 4.8 5.2 4.7 Asia 497 1,971 250 5.9 5.2 6.3 5.2 5.6 5.1 China 284 980 290 8.5 5.7 6.1 4.8 7.3 5.1 India 162 675 240 3.6 4.3 6.9 5.7 2.9 5.4 Africa 52 204 250 3.5 2.1 1.3 1.2 0.5 -0.1 Middle-income oil importers 915 611 1,500 6.3 5.6 4.3 0.9 0.7 0.3 East Asia and Pacific 204 183 1,110 8.2 8.6 3.6 6.7 4.2 6.4 Middle East and North Africa 28 35 800 5.2 3.0 4.2 -2.4 5.5 2.0 Sub-Saharan Africac 37 60 610 5.6 3.7 5.5 3.9 1.1 0.3 Southern Europe 201 91 2,210 6.7 5.0 1.5 2.3 0.7 -0.9 Latin America and Caribbean 445 241 1,840 5.6 5.0 5.8 -2.3 -0.4 -2.2 Middle-income oil exportersd 654 494 1,320 6.9 4.9 -2.4 2.4 0.9 -1.7 High-income oil exporters 228 16 14,250 10.7 7.7 7.4 0.0 Industrial market economies 7,463 715 10,440 4.9 2.8 1.3 1.3 2.3 Not available. Estimated. Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. Does not include South Africa. The estimated 1983 data exclude Angola, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq. 11 FIGURE 2.1 directionswith a lag in each case of about a year. Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial The present marked downturn in the rate of infla- countries, 1961-83 tion is the third since 1970. The rate of unemploy- Percent ment has not shown any significant downturns 8 but has had three marked upturns since 1969. The progressive deterioration from cycle to cycle is also evident. GDP growth in the industrial coun- 6 tries has not matched its rate of 1973 in any subse- quent year. The cyclical peaks and troughs in unemployment have risen from 2.9 and 2.7 per- cent in the first of the cycles shown in Figure 2.2 to 4 8 and 5 percent in the most recent. In the case of inflation, the peaks and troughs have risen from 5.7 and 2.7 percent in the first cycle shown in Fig- 2 ure 2.2 to 12.2 and 7.1 percent in the most recent. Inflation has, however, fallen below its previous cyclical trough. This might be taken as a break in Industrial countries\ 0 the tendency toward progressive deterioration, 'I but the conclusion is not warranted. In order to lower inflation to a level still well above the aver- 2 age for the 1960s, unemployment rates have risen 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 198Y to three times the level of the 1960s. a. Estimated. Sources: For developed countries, OECD, 1983; for developing countries, Policy-induced problems World Bank data. One explanation of why stop-go cycles have the severity of the resulting recession can be tended to be sharper in recent periods is that as understood only as a manifestation of a long-term deterioration in the economic performance of FIGURE 2.2 industrial countries. This deterioration may be Growth, inflation, and unemployment in seven major explained in part by past policy choices as well as industrial countries, 1966-83 by underlying economic and social conditions. In Percent an interdependent world economy, growth in 14 developing countries is significantly affected by what happens in industrial countries (see map). To 12 assess the prospects of developing countries, it is therefore important to consider the extent to which 10 poor policies in the industrial world were to blame for their difficulties. To the extent that they were, 8 improved policies in industrial countries could contribute to faster future growth in developing 6 countries. 4 Industrial countries in the past two decades 2 Figure 2.2 illustrates the experience of seven majof GOP growth rate industrial countries since the mid-1960s. It shows 0 that they have had marked cycles in GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation andmore seri- ouslyadverse underlying trends. Since 1968 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 GDP growth has experienced three downturns, Countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United and the present recovery appears to be the third Kingdom, and United States. a. Estimated. strong upswing. Inflation and unemployment Source: OECD, 1983. have tended to follow GDP growthin opposite 12 soon as it is widely believed that governments are slow growth. The oil price rises of 1973-74 and embarked on an inflationary course, nominal 1979-80 aggravated these difficulties and required wages rise and bond prices and exchange rates fall. adjustments which the industrial economies found The result, especially under floating exchange difficult to make efficiently. rates, is that inflation rises more quickly than antic- LABOR MARKET RIGIDITIES. In the late 1960s real ipated and, in turn, the authorities are forced to wages in manufacturing in many industrial coun- choke off the expansion with monetary restraint tries were rising at a rate faster than warranted by sooner than would have been necessary with less underlying productivity growth. By the early 1970s sensitive markets. the trend was marked, except in Canada (see Table The tendency toward slower growth can be 2.2). Although there are forms of labor-using tech- explained in part by changes in underlying condi- nical progress that could justify such a develop- tions. By the late 1960s the opportunities for catch- ment, the tendency toward rising unemployment ing up with the technology of the United States (especially in manufacturing) suggests that that is had been largely exploited by both Japan and west- not what was happening. ern Europe, so one source of exceptional growth If real wages are above the level at which all declined in significance. Another sourcethe shift those who seek work can find it, there are three of workers from low-productivity agriculture to solutions: to let unemployment rise; to let inflation high-productivity manufacturinghad also largely rise if wages are not indexed to prices, either for- been exhausted. A third sourcetrade liberaliza- mally or informally; or to try to control wages tion and reintegration of the industrial economies through incomes policy. Governments attempted after World War TIthough it had boosted growth a combination of all three. The early 1970s, in par- for at least two decades, was no longer providing ticular, witnessed efforts by several governments the stimulus it did earlier. Finally, the increasing to achieve the required stability in the labor market share of service industries in GDP may have through some form of incomes policy, combined slowed the growth of GDP since the growth of with fiscal and monetary expansion. In some coun- productivity has traditionally been lower in serv- tries, such as Austria, Japan, and the Federal ices than in manufacturing. Republic of Germany, formal or (more usually) Although such fundamental factors played a informal policies based on voluntary self-discipline part in slowing down GDP growth, they cannot among workers have had some success. In other entirely explain the deterioration in economic per- countries, such as the United Kingdom and the formance. To begin with, some forces were work- United States, formal incomes policies achieved ing in favor of faster growthrapid innovations in only temporary success. In general, real wage key industries such as electronics, for example. inflexibility in the industrial countries contributed Countries might also have exploited the potential to "stagflation"continuing inflation at relatively for shifting labor out of unemployment and declin- high unemployment. ing "smokestack" industries to new areas, and the PUBLIC SPENDING AND DEFICITS. For the industrial opportunity to expand trade with developing countries as a whole, public spending rose from countries, especially by importing more labor- 29.3 percent of GDP in 1961 to 40.9 percent in 1981 intensive goods in return for exports of machinery (see Table 2.3). Its structure also changed signifi- and other sophisticated products and services. cantly. Among the seven major industrial coun- Furthermore, although underlying changes in eco- tries the share of government expenditure on nomic opportunities may explain a tendency defense, general administration, and economic toward lower growth, they have little to do with services fell from 16.4 to 10.9 percent of GNP the stop-go pattern of cyclical disturbances com- between 1954 and 1980. Meanwhile, the share of bined with rising unemployment and inflation. spending on education, health care, income main- That pattern can be explained only by the eco- tenance, and old-age security rose from 10.5 to nomic policies followed in industrial countries. 23.4 percent of GNP. Most of the increase was con- Two policy-induced developments deserve par- centrated on health care (where prices were rising ticular attention: first, the increasing rigidity of the rapidly) and old-age security. labor market and the resulting strong upward The rising share of spending on health care and pressure on real wages; and second, the growth old-age security partly reflects increases in the pro- and pattern of public spending, taxation, and fiscal portion of old people, but increases in coverage deficits. The links between these are at the root of and benefits were more important. Between 1960 the problems of inflation, unemployment, and and 1975 demographic change contributed about 13 Distribution of product among selected countries, 1982 Canada United States Mexico Tunisiu Arab Ret of Guatemala I Honduras Egypt I Trinidad and Jamaica El Salvador I Nicaragua Tobago Maurptania Costa Rrcat Guinea U.pervui IPanama Senegal S U Colombia Venezuela E 0 00 El 0 0 Cam- eroon IEcudor Peru o o Congo 0 > Brazil Bourd MaFa Bolivia Lesoth Ijuruua Argentina I- Groups of economies Low-income economies Middle-income economies Nigh-income oil exporters Industrial market economies East European nonmarket economies Gross domestic product 1 percent - 0.05 percent 14 Norway Sweden Denmark Japan Netherlands Fed Rep Germasy Belgium a a Switzerland AaStfla 0) I E 0 a Rep ot Korea Yugoslavia China Turkey Italy Greece JNepal Pakistan India -tong Kong (UK) a Syrian Arab Rep a a a a Malaysia Kuwait Saudi Arabia Singapore Papua New Guinea it a United Arab B Emirates 0 0 B Australia [ Countries are drawn in proportion to their share of total GNP. Those for which data on GNP are not available, as New Zealand well as those with fewer than 1 million inhabitants, are excluded. 15 TABLE 2.2 Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for the manufacturing sector and the aggregate economy, by country, 1962-78 (average annual percentage change) Sector, measure, Germany, United United and period Canada France Fed. Rep. Italy Japan Kingdom States Manufacturing Real product wage 1962-69 5.0 4.8 5.6 7.4 10.8 4.6 3.4 1969-73 3.6 7.0 7.5 9.7 12.6 5.6 3.6 1973-75 0.1 6.2 6.8 4.4 0.6 4.6 0.1 1975-78 4.8 5.4 2.0 8.9 -1.4 3.0 Labor productivity 1962-69 4.5 6.3 5.9 6.8 11.2 4.5 3.1 1969-73 4.4 5.4 4.8 6.9 8.7 4.1 3.2 1973-75 -0.4 2.8 5.2 0.4 -1.8 -1.3 -0.3 1975-78 4.5 6.1 5.0 4.1 7.3 1.2 3.0 Aggregate economy Real product wage 1962-69 3.6 5.1 5.0 7.8 8.5 3.2 3.1 1969-73 2.0 5.5 6.3 7.9 12.2 3.7 2.6 1973-75 1.5 5.1 4.8 6.0 8.6 4.9 0.2 1975-78 1.8 5.2 2.7 1.2 2.7 1.5 2.3 Labor productivity 1962-69 3.3 5.2 5.3 7.4 9.9 3.1 2.7 1969-73 3.2 5.7 5.2 6.6 9.1 3.9 2.6 1973-75 0.7 2.6 4.0 3.0 3.9 0.7 0.3 1975-78 2.0 5.0 4.5 1.3 4.1 2.0 2.1 Note: Real product wage is defined as the ratio of the nominal wage to the price of commodities produced. Not available. Source: Sachs, 1979. 20 percent of the growth of spending on social to high interest rates, they drive up the cost of services and income maintenance, while changes borrowing, not only within the country, but in eligibility and improvements in benefits contrib- worldwide. uted 80 percent. Between 1975 and 1981 changes in eligibility had ceased to be significant. Demo- Effects on the industrial countries graphic change then contributed 17 percent of the growth, and improved benefits 78 percent. Pressures in the labor market and on public finance To pay for the growth of spending, taxes rose in industrial countries have contributed to four from 28.7 percent of GDP in 1961 to 37.5 percent in major problems since the late 1960s: inflation, 1981. That increase did not cover all the rise in unemployment, declining profitability, and a spending, however; public sector deficits also broadly defined protectionism. increased as a proportion of GDF'. The significance Inflation may be seen as the result of accom- of the general rise in public sector deficits is contro- modation to labor market pressures and the result versial, in part because of the difficulty of separat- of deficit financing. One main effect of inflation is ing the effects of business cycles and inflation from that it heightens uncertainty about the future-evi- those of structural trends in these deficits. It can be denced, for example, by the high inflation premi- argued that the deficits may sometimes have acted ums demanded in long-term interest rates. This as a valuable support for demand during a period has significant implications for developing coun- of recession. It is undeniable, however, that, tries, which have an interest in securing medium- depending on the method of financing, deficits and long-term loans to match the long gestation have caused difficulty in some countries at particu- period of some of their development projects. Per- lar times. Where large countries such as the United haps the most important aspect of uncertainty, States are concerned, deficits can have important however, is created by the inflationary cycle itself. global consequences. Insofar as they contribute Experience that expansion breeds inflation 16 TABLE 2.3 Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP, 1961-81 (percent) Country 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 Canada 30.0 30.1 36.6 39.6 41.4 France 35.7 38.5 38.3 44.0 48.9 Germany, Fed. Rep. 33.8 36.9 40.2 48.1 49.3 Italy 29.4 34.3 36.6 42.2 50.8 Japan 17.4 20.3 20.9 27.8 34.0 United Kingdom 33.4 35.6 38.4 46.2 47.3 United States 29.0 29.2 32.3 34.5 35.4 Average for all industrial countries 29.3 30.6 33.3 37.9 40.9 Source: OECD, 1983. and then policy-induced contraction is itself an a natural reaction, but one that contributed to important constraint on long-term investment sharply rising unemployment. Among the coun- and growth in both developed and developing tries where profit rates fell were Germany, Japan, countries. the United Kingdom, and the United States. The rise in unemployment has been related to With real-wage rigidities, declining profitabil- real-wage pressures, exacerbated by the productiv- ity in the corporate sector, and rising unemploy- ity slowdown of the 1970s. The effect of the pro- ment, governments were under great pressure to ductivity slowdown was to lower the rate of protect specific industries. Often protection is increase of the real wage that was compatible with viewed in terms of trade measures alone-tariffs full employment. In the United States real wages and quotas-and its costs are seen in terms of what appear to have adjusted rapidly to the new trend- it does to prevent other countries' exports. But they rose little after 1973 and adjusted quickly to protection can take many forms, including subsi- the 1973-75 recession (see Table 2.2). In western dies, and can be viewed more broadly as the Europe, however, the same was not true until the attempt to prevent or slow change by preserving late 1970s. In the 1970s employment grew by about outmoded industries and firms. 20 million in the United States; with a similar size Because it has taken covert and obscure forms, labor force, countries in the European Community the evidence on the growth of protection is poor. expanded employment by only 2 million. Probably the most important protectionist policy in The effects of real-wage pressures on employ- practice has been open-ended subsidies for specific ment have been exacerbated by the emergence in a firms in, for example, steel, chemicals, motor vehi- number of industrial countries of both rising capi- cles, and shipbuilding. In western Europe the tal-output ratios and falling rates of profit, at least share of public spending on subsidies was rising in the corporate sector (see Table 2.4). Faced with by the late 1960s and grew larger in the late 1970s the higher costs of employing labor, firms shifted and early 1980s. Also important have been quanti- to more capital-intensive methods of production- tative restrictions in the form of "voluntary" TABLE 2.4 Real rates of return on corporate capital, by country, 1962-76 (percent) Germany, United United Period Canada France Fed. Rep. Italy Japan Kingdom Stales Average 1962-64 7.9 9.7 19.3 10.4 28.2 11.9 12.0 1965-69 9.6 10.0 19.5 11.4 27.9 10.6 12.2 1970-73 9.0 11.6 15.0 10.3 21.9 8.3 8.6 1974-76 9.2 8.0 11.4 13.5 3.7 7.1 Not available. Source: Sachs, 1979. 17 export restraints and orderly marketing agree- earlier rise had amounted to an annual transfer of ments, which violate the principles and rules of about 2 percent of GDP from the industrial coun- GATT. Estimates of the percentage of imports tries, or roughly half a year's growth. But much of affected by nontariff barriers are shown for this could, at least initially, be borrowed back (and selected industrial countries in Table 2.5. The more as the surplus available for borrowing fell between effective the nontariff barrier the less the actual 1975 and 1979 so did the real price of oil). Although value of imports that enter a country. Thus esti- the oil price increase was damaging to industrial mates are only illustrative of the relative degree of countries, it alone does not explain subsequent protection. There has also been a growing use of problems of slow growth, unemployment, and "less than fair value" provisions of trade law as a inflation except in the context of already existing form of harassment (see Box 2.1). economic rigidities. Quite apart from the threat to developing coun- Consider the labor market. The rise in the price tries, protection damages the industrial countries of energy lowered the real wage that was com- themselves. First, efficiency is reduced by actions patible with full employment. It also led to an that cut the link between domestic and interna- incentive to shift away from energy- and capital- tional prices. Second, there is an important added intensive forms of production toward more labor- source of uncertainty with potentially serious intensive methods. This substitution explains a effects for long-term, trade-oriented investment part of the observed slowdown in labor productiv- and thus for returns on investment. ity growth. Where the required reductions in real wages and real wage growth did not occur-as in Impact of rising oil prices some countries in western Europe-the productiv- ity slowdown was small, but the oil price rise gave To understand the impact of the 1979-80 rise in oil a permanent upward boost to unemployment. prices, it is necessary first to consider the policy In industry some capital stock had become reactions to the jump in prices in 1973-74. That redundant as expectations for higher growth were punctured. The changing price of energy also accelerated the obsolescence of significant parts of TABLE 25 the capital stock, especially in such industries as Percentage of industrial countries' imports steel, shipbuilding, chemicals (including petro- covered by nontariff barriers chemicals), and motor vehicles. Governments Imports from then responded with increased attempts to prop Developed Developing up such industries with protection and subsidies. Importer countries countries Despite the failure of real wages to adjust and the declining rates of return on corporate capital, United States 13.0 5.5 Japan 19.2 5.4 investment demand and then economic activity Switzerland 22.6 48.8 were partially sustained for nearly a decade by low Sweden 1.0 7.0 and sometimes negative real rates of interest. The Norway 8.2 10.9 economic conditions of the late 1970s and the Austria 15.0 8.1 "debt crisis" which subsequently emerged in the EC' 15.1 11.8 Denmark 9.4 19.2 1980s can be understood only in terms of the pecu- Ireland 15.0 9.5 liar relationship through much of the 1970s France 20.1 7.1 between real wages, which tended to rise faster United Kingdom 14.9 14.3 than productivity, and real rates of interest, which Italy 12.5 7.0 stayed low. Germany. Fed. Rep. 12.6 8.5 Netherlands 16.1 19.8 Negative real rates of interest spurred a rapid Belgium and Luxembourg 19.2 29.7 growth of borrowing, especially by the non-oil Note: This table is based on detailed information on nontariff developing countries. Although in the 1950s and barriers available in UNCTAD. The figures measure the value of 1960s the shares of different groups of countries in imports affected by nontariff measures in relation to total international lending changed only gradually, in imports. Import figures are from 1980, whereas the information on nontariff barriers applies to 1983. If a country's import the 1970s the non-oil developing countries' share restrictions are rigorous, it imports little and few of its imports rose sharply. The great increase in lending was are affected by restrictions. Thus these figures provide little largely the result of the oil producers' surplus. The basis for comparison among countries in the total amount of restrictions. industrial countries were not large net borrowers a. Weighted average; excludes Greece. themselves; investment growth was sluggish in 18 Box 2.1 Administered protection and the open international trading system An intention of the initial framers of the are shifting to the less open, less trans- safeguards cases were brought in 1983, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade parent, forms of complaint and import but eighty cases alleging unfair trade (GATT) was that a GAIT contracting restraint procedures. In 1982 and 1983 a practices. In addition, there were party could legitimately escape" from total of 5 safeguards investigations were twenty-five instances of imports of a par- its commitment to keep its market open initiated in the United States compared ticular product from a particular country only through the use of specified excep- with 262 cases alleging unfair trade prac- or group of countries coming under tions such as the Article XIX safeguards tices. Under GATT, investigations into "surveillance." Surveillance involves no provisions. Although the safeguards unfair trade practices can result in dis- directly restrictive measures but is a clear clause would allow a country to impose criminatory import controls (not in con- warning that, if imports continue to import restrictions, two important princi- formity with the most favored nation grow, restrictions might be imposed. It pies would be retained. principle) or duties on products from discourages exporters from expanding Restrictions could not be discrimina- individual countries found to have sales by creating uncertainty about mar- tory. They had to be applied to imports engaged in unfair trade practices. ket access. from all countries, not just a particular Furthermore, among the various sorts Since 1981 the Japanese government one. of cases alleging unfair trade practices, has enforced several policy measures to They had to be transparent. They there has been a shift away from the anti- open its markets to imports. And in the could be imposed only after a finding dumping complaintthe most transpar- past, Japan has not pursued safeguards that increased imports had significantly ent onetoward antisubsidy cases and or antidumping investigations and has injured domestic production. other sections of US trade law, Some of brought only one antisubsidy case. But The recent record shows, however, a these sections involve questions of fair- the Japanese government has used dis- shift toward forms of 'escape" that, ness, such as patent infringement or pol- cretionary authority to restrict imports in although not inconsistent with GATT, icies or practices of a foreign govern- order to prevent the import of new prod- tend to go against both these principles. ment, that by US interpretation are ucts until Japanese firms have had the For example, in both the United States inconsistent with an international agree- opportunity to develop competitive vari- and the European Community, safe- ment or are otherwise "unreasonable or eties. These past policies have left a resi- guards procedures are now used less fre- discriminatory." Such cases do not due of uncertainty for foreign producers quently than unfair trade practice laws. involve an injury test and are not as well about market access in Japan. Once the The annual number of administered pro- defined by administrative regulation and new policies have been implemented for tection cases or investigations has been precedent as are the more traditional some time, this uncertainty, which tends twice as high in the 1980s as it was in types of trade remedies. to shield Japanese firms from foreign 1975-79, and administrative caseloads In the European Community only two competition, should recede. industrial countries after 1973, despite the need for bility, and slow growth. There is considerable dis- expanded investment to adjust to changes in the agreement about the degree of disinflation needed world economy. Increased investment would have to reduce inflationary pressures at any point in implied more rapid structural transformation, time. But the effects of the disinflation actually which the advanced industrial economies found undertaken were not surprising. It is difficult to hard to undertake. Indeed, uncertainty about reduce inflation of the magnitude experienced in the future course of inflation discouraged long- the 1970s without experiencing some loss of out- term investment in favor of projects having shorter put and employment. pay-back periods. The latter offered greater liquid- The extent of the losses, however, depends on ity but were less effective for restructuring the several factors. One is the economy's flexibility in economy. the face of reduced demand. To the extent that labor contracts take time to renegotiate and wages Consequences of disinflation do not adjust quickly, reduced demand tends to produce unemployment. There is evidence that The disinflation of the early 1980s has its roots in over time the rate of rise of nominal prices, espe- the events and policies of the previous decade. It cially of labor but also of some goods, has come to may be seen not only as a stage in the inflationary respond more slowly to recessions. This is not a cycle but also as a determined attempt by some recent phenomenon. It has merely become worse countries to break out of the vicious spiral of labor and more general over time, requiring greater market rigidities, inflation, macroeconomic insta- losses of output and employment for each percent- 19 Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 1930s and the 1980s The world depression of 1929-32 was nisms that transmitted the depression private investment. The flows were then much bigger and more widespread than from the industrial world to developing reversed: in 1930-38 inflows to industrial any other in history. Between 1929 and countries were the fall in export volume, countries averaged $540 million a year. 1932 the aggregate GDP of the advanced the deterioration in the terms of trade, a Though much less dramatic, a similar countries fell 17.1 percent and world perverse reverse flow of capital to the reverse flow has begun in the early trade by 26.8 percent. By contrast, in the advanced countries, and the fall in the 1980s, though this time because of servic- 1970s the corresponding falls were only general price level. ing of commercial bank debt. The coun- 0.4 percent and 5.0 percent in 1974-75. In Exports. Data for nine developing tries in the 1930s (and 1980s) most 1981-82, GDP of industrial countries rose countries show that the decline in the affected by this reversal are mostly in slightly and world trade fell by only 1 value of their exports in the 1930s Latin America, which had received the percent. The depression of 1929-32 was accounted for an average fall of 5.3 per- bulk of the earlier outflows of capital triggered by a collapse of the US money cent in their GDP. Worsening terms of from industrial countries. supply. In the 1980s there is no such dan- trade produced an additional income loss Falling prices. In both industrial and ger of a monetary collapse in the United of 4.5 percent of GDP, so that change in developing countries the cyclical price States, partly because of the safeguards export purchasing power amounted to fall from 1929 to 1932 averaged 6 percent now built into the US banking system. 9.8 percent of GDP. Since their total a year. Even though nominal rates on There are, in addition, better mecha- income loss was 13 percent on average, a government bonds generally went as low nisms for international coordination, residual effect not "explained" by the as 3 percent they were fixed, not varia- through such institutions as the Interna- direct export shocks accounted for 3.2 ble; the fall in prices therefore created tional Monetary Fund. percent of GDP. This residual reflects the serious debt service problems for bor- In nine major developing countries, efficiency of policy in withstanding the rowers. In the 1980s high real interest accounting for 70 percent of the popula- impact of depression. It varied across rates have contributed to servicing prob- tion of the developing world, the average countries, with positive residuals in lems; ironically, high interest rates repre- peak to trough GDP decline over 1929-34 China, India, Indonesia, and Colombia sent in part insurance for creditors was 12.1 percent, with an average of 15.8 and large negative ones in Peru, Mexico, against inflation. percent in Latin America and 4.9 percent and Argentina. By comparison, the real The combination of a drying up of capi- in Asia. By contrast, except for low- value of exports from many developing tal inflows, the rising cost of servicing income Africa in the 1974-75 recession, countries, including Brazil, India, Korea, the existing debt, and the absence of GDP continued to grow, though at a and Turkey, rose during the recent reces- international institutions and coopera- slightly slower rate (4 percent in 1975). In sion and for several others remained con- tion at the governmental level led to the 1981-82 recession there was a sub- stant. Exports of manufactures in volume frequent defaults. Many countries de- stantial slowdown in rates of growth; but terms rose 6.9 percent a year from 1980 to faulted on (but did not repudiate) their even in Latin America and the Carib- 1983. official debt obligations in the 1930s Of bean, where GDP fell in each year Capital. In the 1920s net capital out- the $5.3 billion of Latin American securi- between 1981 and 1983, the fall since flows from industrialized to developing ties outstanding in 1938, $3 billion were 1980 was only about 5 percent. countries were more than $700 million a in default. China went into default in the In the 1930s, the four main mecha- year, primarily in the form of bonds and 1920s when civil disturbances reduced age point reduction in the rate of inflation. This not anticipated, the result was the worst recession problem is then superimposed on the real-price since the 1930s (see Box 2.2). rigidities, which have generated longstanding ten- Although disinflation was a major reason for the dencies toward underemployment of resources. rise in real interest ratesespecially short-term A second factor is the degree to which the gov- ratesit was probably not the only one. With ernment's commitment to reduce inflation is credi- growing budget deficits in the United States and in ble. If people do not believe that the authorities several European countries, and with the decline will do what they say, they can be convinced only in the surplus of oil-exporting countries after 1980, by experience. The more deeply rooted is their dis- the supply of real savings also declined. This itself belief, the more protracted and painful their expe- would be expected to lead to a rise in real interest rience may need to be. Thus, if the extent and rates, other things being equal. persistence of the monetary tightening had been Savings rates in the industrial countries peaked fully anticipated, nominal interest rates would in 1973 when net savings rates were 14.1 percent of have declined as inflation declined. Since it was GDP. Since then net savings rates have hovered in 20 the revenues earmarked for servicing its The contracting spiral of foreign debt. Thereafter, China's credi- world trade, 1929-33 January tors periodically wrote down or rolled over their loans, encouraged by occa- Total imports of 75 countries December 1929 February (monthly values in terms of sional repayments. The penalties old U.S. gold dollars 1930 incurred for debt default in the 1930s in millions). were rather small. The creditor countries November March (mainly the United Kingdom and the United States) were already writing down their domestic farm and mortgage 3,000 debt. War debts and reparations had ear- 2 lier been reduced or rescheduled, which October April set a precedent for temporary default (as distinct from repudiation) by other borrowers. A good deal of the defaulting in the 1930s was ultimately accepted by the September creditors in wartime and postwar debt settlements. But it contributed to the col- lapse of the international capital market. The world managed recovery from August June 1932 to 1937. The developing countries July expanded their GDP by 34 percent, but trade expansion is estimated to have con- Soi' ro. Kmdleberger, 1973. tributed only 6.6 percentage points of this growth. The reason for its minimal forced by quantitative restrictions and the developing to the developed coun- impact was the collapse of the liberal exchange controls that were also applied triesthe magnitude of events in recent international trading system in the 1930s. in a discriminatory way. World trade fell years bears no resemblance to what hap- Though tariffs in 1929 were somewhat in a spiral (see chart). Developing coun- pened in the 1930s. Nor has there been higher than they had been in 1913, they tries, particularly in Latin America, any similar breakdown of the trading were nondiscriminatory and the only adopted the same trade restrictions that system that was reconstructed after the barrier to trade. had become the norm in the developed war. In addition, international coopera- The Hawley-Smoot tariff, instituted by Countries. tion both through the Bretton Woods the United States in 1930, led to a wave Though there are obvious similarities institutions and among governments has of protectionism. Virtually every country between the 1930s and 1980srecession, permitted a much more effective defense raised tariffs. New discriminatory trad- a fall in world trade, the growing prob- against the spread of some of the worst ing blocs were created. Tariffs were rein- lem of debt, a reverse flow of capital from problems of the recession. the range of 9 to 10 percent (see Table 2.6). House- Disinflation was successful in its immediate hold savings rates held up well in the 1970s, while objective (see Figure 2.2). Among major industrial corporate and government savings rates were countries, the reduction in consumer price infla- strongly pro-cyclical. In recessions profit shares tion was particularly sharp in the United Kingdom fall and governments run larger deficits. Thus a (from 18 percent in 1980 to 5.4 percent in 1983), the principal reason for the decline in gross and net United States (from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 4.2 per- savings rates was simply slow and unstable cent in 1983), and Japan (from 8 percent in 1980 to growth. It is as yet unclear whether there has also 0.7 percent in 1983). With few exceptions, how- been a fundamental underlying trend toward ever, even in the trough of the cycle, rates of infla- lower rates of gross savings. But the high real rates tion remained above the average for the 1960s. At of interest in the early 1980s do suggest that the the same time, there were serious adverse effects credit market has become very tight and, in the for world trade and the world trading system and event of increased demand for private investment, equallyif not still moreserious effects for the is likely to get still tighter. international financial system. 21 TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominated in dollars, the appre- Net savings and savings by sector in industrial ciation of the dollar greatly increased debt servic- countries, 1964-81 ing costs for all, including the developing (percentage of GDP) countries. Net In the ten years preceding 1979, in the context of Year savings Corporate Government Household general world inflation, the US dollar depreciated 1964 10.8 3.4 2.0 5.4 about 50 percent against the German mark and 1971 12.0 2.6 1.9 7.6 about 60 percent against the Japanese yen. This 1973 14.1 2.7 2.8 8.7 tended to raise the rate of increase of dollar- 1974 11.9 0.7 2.1 9.2 denominated prices, and thus doubly helped 1975 9.0 0.8 -1.3 9.6 debtors with dollar-denominated debts. The 1976 9.6 1.4 -0.3 8.5 1977 10.4 1.9 0.4 8.2 switch to global disinflation in the 1980s was 1978 11.4 2.4 0.4 8.6 accompanied by a strengthening of the dollar; 1979 10.9 2.1 0.9 8.0 between 1979 and 1982 it appreciated by 33 percent 1980 9.5 1.2 0.3 8.1 against the German mark and 14 percent against 1981 8.8 0.6 -0.2 8.2 the Japanese yen. While national prices continued Notes Based on seven major OECD countries, including to rise (albeit more slowly), the average of interna- Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Numbers may not add to totals because tional prices, converted into dollars, was actually of rounding. falling. This greatly increased the burden carried Sources Hakim and Wallich, 1984. by debtors with dollar-denominated debts; because of the tightness of international credit markets, they faced interest rates well into double World trade grew by just 1.5 percent in 1980, figures as well as principal repayments whose real stagnated in 1981, and then fell by 3.6 percent in purchasing power was actually rising. 1982. The main reason was the sharp fall in the The second reason for difficulty was more deep- volume of trade in fuels. World exports of manu- seated. During 1960-73 the real interest rate in the factures did better in terms of growth but still Eurocurrency markets (three-month dollar rate worse in relation to previous performance. They deflated by the US GDP deflator) averaged 2.5 per- rose by 5.0 percent in 1980 and 3.5 percent in 1981 cent; during 1973-79 it averaged only 0.7 percent before falling by 2.3 percent in 1982. While the and at various times was negative. In such an envi- decline in the growth of world trade was largely ronment, provided it lasts, it is almost impossible the result of the recession itself, protection proba- to owe too much. The tendency toward increased bly had some effect as well. New protectionist indebtedness was a general feature of economic actions and agreements after 1980 largely con- life, and in no way unique to developing countries. cerned trade among industrial countries, espe- Corporations and some governments in industrial cially imports into Europe and North America countries tended to go increasingly into debt, as from Japan. There were, however, several devel- did the governments of a number of developing opments that harmed developing countries, countries. When real interest rates jumped to including a somewhat more restrictive renegotia- almost 7 percent in 1981 and 1982, serious diffi- tion of the Multifibre Arrangement in 1981, subse- culty was bound to follow. quent restrictions on textiles and clothing, and The difficulties were most conspicuous in the further development toward comprehensive case of developing countries, particularly those restrictions on imports of steel into the United which had borrowed heavily from commercial States and the European Community. banks in the previous ten years. Although official There are two reasons the disinflation of the transfers and direct foreign investment had been early 1980s created such severe problems for the major form of capital flows to developing coun- the international financial system. The first was the tries in the 1950s and 1960s, they were overtaken mix of fiscal and monetary policies pursued by the by commercial bank lending in the 1970s. At the United States. Because of a growing budget deficit time, this seemed a benign vehicle for recycling the financed by borrowing in a country with a rela- large surpluses of oil-exporting countries, and an tively low savings rate, interest rates rose. They effective way of obtaining higher investment in attracted a substantial capital inflow and helped developing countries than could be financed produce a large real appreciation in the dollar's through their domestic savings alone. But it also exchange rate. Since the bulk of international resulted in a huge buildup of commercial debt in 22 several countries. The rise in nominal and real achieved between 1960 and 1973. India also main- interest rates in the past few years and the slow- tained its growth. Other regions did less well, down--even haltingof new lending have made it especially sub-Saharan Africa. (The low growth of difficult for some countries to service their com- oil exporters shown in Table 2.1 is somewhat mis- mercial debt and raise the threat of a global finan- leading since there were large increases in income cial crisis. because of improvements in the terms of trade.) Population growth rates in developing countries Developing countries after 1973 during the 1970s continued to be high and in some regions (notably sub-Saharan Africa) increased. In Thus the international environment had become per capita terms, growth in many countries was less favorable to developing countries in the period therefore even less impressive; in sub-Saharan after 1973 and became even less favorable after Africa, per capita incomes actually fell during 1979-80. The slowdown in industrial-country 1973-83 (see Chapter 5). growth hurt all developing countries, although the For the purpose of assessing economic welfare, effect was not the same for all. Those which were the growth of gross domestic income (GDY) is exporters neither of oil nor of manufactures suf- more relevant than the growth in GDP. By allow- fered most. The effect on oil exporters was at first ing for changes in the terms of trade, GDY takes more than offset by the rise in petroleum prices. account of changes in the rate at which national Inflation in the 1970s helped to some extent all output can be converted into national consump- debtors. The sharp rise of real interest rates after tion. All oil-importing countries experienced some 1979 hurt most large middle-income borrowers, worsening in the terms of trade in the 1970s. most of them in Latin America. Most important, Recent improvements have not restored the terms the rise in instability in the 1970sof prices, of of trade to their levels of the 1960s (see Table 2.7). exchange rates, and of interest ratescomplicated The effects of the terms of trade for oil-importing the tasks of decisionmakers (both public and pri- countries should not be exaggerated, however. For vate) everywhere. example, between 1973 and 1979 the rate of GDP However, interest rates and capital flows are growth of middle-income oil importers of 5.6 per- only one determinant of growth in the developing cent a year was only a little above the GDY growth countries. A second is their own policies; last rate of 5.3 percent. Only for oil exporters have year's World Development Report focused on their changes in the terms of trade been important; their management of economic policies and institutions. rate of GDY growth was 9.0 percent a year com- A third influence is that of foreign trade. The main- pared with 4.9 percent GDP growth. tenance of high growth and near full employment Where oil-importing countries performed well, in industrial countries provides a boost to world they did so for two basic reasons. First, they main- trade. It also reduces the political pressures in tained or increased savings and investment rates industrial countries for tariffs, quotas, and other (see Table 2.8); second, they maintained or forms of protection for declining industries. More increased the growth of export volumes, especially trade and less protection in turn enable developing manufactured exports (see Box 2.3). These perfor- countries to develop efficiently in line with their mances in turn were made possible by the kind of own comparative advantage. domestic and trade policies that permitted an effec- The changing balance between these three fac- tive adjustment to external conditions. Middle- tors explains the performance of developing coun- income developing countries were not uniformly tries, first in coping with the 1974-75 recession, successful in these areas; some may have relied too then in achieving a sustained expansion until 1979, much on borrowing without adjustment. In gen- and most recently in struggling through the 1980- eral, though, the 1970s was a successful decade for 82 recession from which they have yet to recover. It them. also explains why some countries have done better That was not true of low-income countries in than others. Africa. Production was held back by adverse exter- nal conditions in combination with a series of Differences among developing countries domestic policies: poor incentives to farmers, costly and inefficient agricultural marketing sys- The middle-income countries of East Asia and the tems for both inputs and outputs, and the mainte- Pacific achieved GDP growth rates of 8.6 percent a nance of overvalued exchange rates. Between 1973 year between 1973 and 1979, comparable to that and 1982, countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Tan- 23 TABLE 2.7 Change in export prices and in terms of trade, 1965-83 (average annual percentage change) Count ry group 1965-73 1973 -80 1981 1982 1983a Change in export prices Developing countries Food 6.6 7.8 -16.1 -14.1 5.2 Nonfood 3.7 10.1 -14.6 -9.4 10.3 Metals and minerals 1.6 5.6 -12.0 -8.0 -2.2 Fuels 6.7 24.7 10.5 -2.6 -14.5 Industrial countries Manufactures 4.7 10.9 -4.2 -1.8 -3.2 Change in terms of trade Low-income Asia -0.5 -1.4 -0.1 -1.6 -0.6 Low-income Africa -0.1 -1.5 -9.9 -0.9 4.6 Middle-income oil importers -0.6 -2.2 -5.5 -1.9 3.0 Middle-income oil exporters 1.1 8.1 9.0 -0.4 -7.0 Developing countries 0.4 1.6 -0.5 -1.2 -0.6 Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. a. Estimated. zania, Uganda, and Zaire experienced an apprecia- ducer prices have been increased in many cases, in tion of their real exchange rates, because relatively real terms they were lower in 1982 than in 1980 in high rates of domestic inflation were not fully off- Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Togo. In some set by falls in their nominal exchange rates. Even other countries-Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia, countries such as Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta- and Somalia, which did depreciate their nominal although the prices of a few agricultural commodi- exchange rates, ended up with a higher real effec- ties have been raised, those for many others have tive rate or only a small devaluation. fallen in real terms. The same phenomenon affected pricing policies, Governments in sub-Saharan Africa also let their particularly in agriculture. Although nominal pro- public finances deteriorate. In countries such as TABLE 2.8 Consumption, savings, and investment indicators for developing countries, 1970-81 (percentage of GDP) Country group 1970 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 All developing countries Consumption 78.9 76.5 76.7 75.3 74.4 76.8 Investment 22.7 23.8 26.3 26.1 26.9 27.0 Savings 21.1 23.5 23.3 24.7 25.6 23.2 Low-income Asia Consumption 77.1 75.0 75.7 75.5 74.2 76.2 Investment 23.7 25.6 25.7 25.1 27.7 25.8 Savings 22.9 25.0 24.3 24.5 25.8 23.8 Low-income Africa Consumption 86.6 88.6 92.5 91.0 91.5 94.1 Investment 15.5 15.1 16.4 17.9 16.9 16.6 Savings 13.4 11.4 7.5 9.0 8.5 5.9 Middle-income oil importers Consumption 79.5 77.5 79.1 77.1 77.9 79.2 Investment 23.6 24.4 26.7 25.4 25.7 25.3 Savings 20.5 22.5 20.9 22.9 22.1 20.8 Middle-income oil exporters Consumption 79.1 74.6 72.6 70.8 67.5 72.1 Investment 20.5 21.7 27.0 28.9 29.2 31.4 Savings 20.9 25.4 27.4 29.2 32.5 27.9 24 Box 2.3 Adjustment to external shocks, 1974-81 External shocks affect a country's bal- role in a number of East Asian countries; Third, a few countries (for example, ance of payments in three ways: adjustment through significant import Kenya) adjusted through a combination The terms of trade effect on the bal- substitution occurred in some Latin of import substitution and an enhanced ance of payments. When measured American and Caribbean countries and public savings effort, while exports rose against a 1971-73 base as a percentage of in southern Europe. Increased saving less rapidly than they would have, based GNP, the effect of changes in the prices was important in a number of East Asian on their 1963-73 experience. For this of exports in relation to imports on the countries. A slowdown in investment group as a whole, the deterioration in balance of payments over the 1974-81 (which lowers imports) was common in public savings accounted for 40 percent period ranged from an unfavorable aver- sub-Saharan Africa. And a large number of external shocks. Most of these coun- age of 6 to 7 percent a year for some of developing countries borrowed more tries also increased their real foreign bor- middle-income Latin American primary as a way to adjust in 1974-81. rowing, which exceeded external shocks producers, to a favorable 10 percent or In reality, countries adopted a mixture by more than 20 percent, and raised the more a year for some oil-exporting devel- of these methods, and can be classified share of investment in their GNP. oping countries. on the following lines. Import substitution and deteriorat- The recession-induced effect. The Export expansion and an enhanced ing public savings. In this group of coun- impact on the balance of payments of public savings effort. For this group, trieswhich includes Jamaica, Portugal, developing countries because of reces- including Korea and Singapore, the aver- and Yugoslaviathe adverse balance of sion in their main trading partners was age shock was highest at 4.8 percent of payments impact of deteriorating public uniformly unfavorable. As a percentage GNP a year. The effects of export expan- savings ratios was more than one-and-a- of GNP it ranged from an annual average sion eventually exceeded their external half times greater than that of external of 0.05 to 2 percent or more. shocks by one-third. Their extra savings shocks. Import substitution played a The net interest rate effect. In 1974- averaged 20 percent of external shocks dominant role in all of them, with 81 the impact on the developing coun- over the period as a whole. These coun- exports rising less rapidly compared with tries balance of payments of an increase tries also managed to economize on 1963-73. All these features, present in in real interest rates ranged from an imports, which rose less per unit of GNE' 1974-78, became more pronounced in unfavorable 2 percent or more of GNP to as time went on. While some borrowed 1979-81. Real external financing was a favorable 0.5 percent. The figures were heavily from abroad and increased more important than in the first two generally much higher in 1979-81 than investment as a proportion of their GNU', groups, but with marked differences they had been in 1974-78. Korea sustained an investment boom between countries. As the sum of these different effects, with comparatively limited additional More real foreign borrowing. external shocks during 1974-81 ranged real foreign borrowing. By contrast, Morocco, Pakistan, and Spain relied from an unfavorable annual average of 7 Singapore cut the share of investment in overwhelmingly on external borrow- to 9 percent of GNP to a favorable 10 GNP and repaid large amounts of its real ing, making only a limited domestic percent. In a sample of thirty-three external debt. adjustment. developing countries, twenty-four suf- Export expansion or an enhanced Favorably affected countries. A few fered adverse external shocks in this public savings effort. Within this group, countries (Colombia, Indonesia, Ivory period. three patterns of adjustment may be dis- Coast, and Nigeria) benefited from exter- Their responses varied considerably, tinguished. First, countries such as nal changes because they exported petro- measuring actual performance against Argentina and Uruguay expanded their leum or other primary commodities what it would have been, based on their exports and their imports while reducing whose prices boomed in the mid-1970s. 1963-73 experience. They had four basic their public savings effort significantly On average, adjustment to favorable ways of responding: trade adjustment more in 1979-81 than in 1974-78. Second, shocks took the form of an import boom (export expansion and import substitu- other countries, including Malawi, Thai- which intensified in 1979-81 compared tion); an enhanced savings effort; that is, land, and Turkey, relied on a combina- with 1974-78, a stepping up of the share higher savings in relation to GNP (public tion of export expansion and import sub- of investment in GNP, a slackening of and private); less investment in relation stitution, but a reduced public savings public savings, and substantial addi- to GNP; and external borrowing. effort aggravated the balance of pay- tional real external financing toward the Export expansion played a prominent ments impact of external disturbances. end of the period. 25 Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and Sierra Leone, countries did not worsen in the 1970s (see Table public expenditure has increased despite budget- 2.8). In some countriesIndia being a prominent ary constraints. In many countries domestic sav- examplethey even improved. Nonetheless, dis- ings collapsed in the 1970s. In Ethiopia the savings tortions in the domestic financial system made the rate declined from about 12 percent to 3 percent problems of domestic adjustment to external pres- (1973-82); Tanzania from 16 percent (1967) to 9 per- sures more difficult. Thus Turkey in 1977-79 main- cent (1981); Sudan from 10 percent (1970) to about tained fixed nominal deposit rates in the face of 3 percent (1978); Ghana from about 15 percent accelerating inflation. Brazil reduced monetary (1970) to 3 percent (1981); Kenya from about 15 correction on financial assets in 1980. percent (early 1970s) to 9 percent (1981); and Zim- babwe from about 20 percent in the early 1970s to Effects of the recent recession about 10 percent in 1981. Despite foreign capital inflows, the rate of capital accumulation also fell In 1974-75 many developing countries were able to considerably in sub-Saharan Africa. compensate for the deterioration of trading oppor- For oil exporters, the rise in oil prices consider- tunities by exploiting the better opportunities for ably increased their incomes. But the volume of the migration of labor and for importing capital. their exports grew very slowly and the booming Between 1979 and 1983, by contrast, most develop- energy sector had a depressing effect on other ing countries initiallyand virtually all ulti- parts of the economy. After 1982, when it became matelyfound their external circumstances deteri- clear that the predictions of their oil revenues had orating in all significant respects. been too optimistic, their relatively slow GDP Weak demand in the industrial countries during growth of the 1970s was compounded by general 1980-82 was the main cause of falling export prices deflation in an attempt to reduce imports (see for developing countries (see Table 2.7). Prices for Box 2.4). industrial raw materials fell for the additional rea- As with the industrial countries, harsher exter- son that high interest rates discouraged storage, nal conditions in the 1970s exacerbated the conse- while food prices dropped because of bumper quences of various policy-induced distortions in world harvests. Overall, the prices of primary many developing countries. A common response products in relation to those of manufactures in many middle-income countries (Brazil, Korea, reached a post-1945 low in 1982. In 1983, as eco- Philippines, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) to the 1973- nomic recovery began in industrial countries, and 74 rise in oil prices was to stimulate demand as some supplies were limited by unfavorable through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies weather, raw material prices started to rise again. and then to finance the resulting current account Nevertheless, they remained lower than in 1979, deficits through commercial borrowing. While and almost all developing countries faced worse much of this borrowing went to finance invest- terms of trade by 1983 than they had in 1980. ment, the rates of return to both public and private In volume terms, the developing countries' investment were declining. Among the major bor- exports of raw materials and fuels fell absolutely rowers, incremental capital-output ratiosthe during the recession. Exports of food, always rela- amount of extra investment needed to produce an tively insensitive to income, continued to grow extra unit of outputrose, for example, from less (see Table 2.9). Exports of manufactures, having than 3 in Brazil in 1970-75 to nearly 4 in 1975-80, grown at 10.6 percent a year between 1973 and and from 3.6 to 4.5 in the Philippines. Inefficiency 1980, rose at only 6.9 percent a year between 1980 increased for a variety of reasons: shifts toward and 1983. Given the sluggish GDP growth in capital-intensive industry, low capacity utilization industrial countries, however, developing coun- in various sectors, and inefficient use of resources tries did manage to increase their share of world in expanding the public sector. markets for manufactures. Countries which saw an improvement in their Among developing countries, one of the differ- terms of trade in the early 1970s also expanded ences that weighed even more heavily in the their public spending. But since the improvement recent recession than in the two preceding decades was transitory, the extra public expenditure was between inward- and outward-looking trade increased public sector deficits and exacerbated policies. Previous World Development Reports have balance of payments and debt servicing problems. suggested that outward-looking policiesthose in Apart from low-income Africa, the trends in sav- which there is rough equality between the incen- ings and investment rates in most developing tives for exporting and import-competing activi- 26 Box 2.4 The oil syndrome: deficits in oil-exporting countries Developing countries with only a limited total cost of $27.4 billionequivalent to With their improved creditworthiness, range of exportstypically primary about 60 percent of its GNP in 1979 or some oil exporters also borrowed heavily productsface potentially greater oscilla- three times its annual oil income. abroad after 1974. Algeria boosted the tions in their terms of trade than more National oil companies in exporting impact of increased oil revenues by about diversified, advanced economies. The countries were major sponsors of large one-half through foreign borrowing. conduct of fiscal policy can be critical in projects. The downturn in world oil markets determining the gains they obtain from Many countries experiencing windfall after 1981 revealed how fragile were favorable, but frequently temporary, gains created or expanded programs of the development patterns of the oil movements in their terms of trade. transfer payments and subsidies. The oil exporters. The prime impact of state-led With the exception of the small group producers did not raise domestic fuel demand growth had been felt by the con- of capital-surplus oil exporters (Kuwait, prices but chose to pass part of the wind- struction and service industries. These Libya, Saudi Arabia), the quadrupling of fall on to domestic consumers directly; as industries expanded their share of non- oil prices in 1973-74 boosted real income, domestic oil consumption soared, the oil GDP in most cases during 1974-80, in countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia, implicit fiscal burden of this transfer while non-oil industry and agriculture and Venezuela by the equivalent of about rose. In Trinidad and Tobago subsidies lagged. In a number of countries real 20 percent of nonoil GDP. World oil rose sharply to around 7 percent of GDP exchange rates had appreciated by 20 prices fell slightly in 1975-78, then redou- by 1981, not including the subsidies percent or more. This reduced the incen- bled in 1979-80, peaking at around $35 involved in loans to loss-making (and tive to develop or maintain non-oil per barrel. As the world economy moved sometimes nationalized) firms. By 1983 it exports and encouraged domestic pro- into recession, conservation measures in was estimated that the production costs ducers to increase their dependence on the major consuming countries began to of Caroni Sugar in Trinidad were five imported intermediate and capital affect the demand for energy (particu- times those of producers elsewhere. goods. These shifts in the pattern of larly oil). New supply sources came on Some 2.5 percent of the labor force was resource allocation and relative prices stream. Prices fell by some $6 per barrel, employed on public works, at wages proved hard to reverse. The massive and the sales of traditional exporters con- twice as high as those available in infrastructural investments did not tracted sharply, in many cases to around agriculture. themselves constitute an autonomous half of their peak levels. A study of about 1,600 large projects source of demand. More seriously, the These swings in the availability of for- (that is, those worth more than $100 mil- global outlook changed for many of the eign exchange brought changes in fiscal lion) in developing countries in the 1970s sectors in which investments had been revenues and then in public spending. found that the larger and more complex concentrated. On steel, for example, in There are considerable differences in the projects had a greater tendency to over- 1980 the OECD was forecasting global level of development and economic run both in terms of cost and time. Of consumption doubling to 1,400 million structure of oil-exporting countries. projects costing between $100 million tons by the year 2000. More recent fore- Nonetheless, virtually all oil exporters and $250 million, 21 percent had signifi- casts project a 20 percent rise to only 900 saw an unparalleled growth in the size cant delays or cost overruns averaging 30 million tons. As demand slackened, the and role of the public sector over this percent. Of billion-dollar plus projects, transient boom of the late 1970s was fol- period, even in countries which had tra- 47 percent had delays or overruns aver- lowed by rapid deceleration in the non- ditionally emphasized the role of the pri- aging 109 percent. Delays of between oil part of economies, surplus domestic vate sector. In addition to expanding one and two years plagued half the trou- capacity, and slack labor markets. In the their traditional functions, governments bled projects; a further 25 percent had early 1980s, most of the oil exporters' channeled their windfall gains into delays of three to four years. non-oil economies were far smaller than industry, including petrochemicals, The momentum of accelerated public they would have been had their growth heavy metals, and other large-scale and investment and growing subsidies trends in 1967-72 simply been extrapo- capital-intensive ventures, and into proved hard to curb when oil revenues lated. In several countries contraction improvements in their transport and fell. To take one example, Ecuador's pub- was accentuated by private capital out- communications systems. Among a sam- lic sector ran surpluses equivalent to flows. Venezuela may have experienced ple of the top nineteen developing coun- around 2 percent of GDP in 1973-74. But an outflow equivalent to almost 10 per- tries with investments in projects exceed- these turned into deficits of some 5 per- cent of GDP in 1982; in 1979-82 its non- ing $100 million each, all but five were oil cent of GDP in 1977-78, which declined oil economy virtually stagnated despite exporters. Venezuela was responsible for with the second oil price rise, but then massive investments and labor force twenty-seven of such projects with a rose to some 8 percent of GDP in 1982. increases. 27 TABLE 2.9 Exports from developing countries, 1965-83 Change in export volumes Value of exports Commodity and (bill,ons of current dollars) (average annual percentage change) developing-country group 1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982 1983a 1965 1981 Commodity Manufactures 14.9 10.6 16.3 -1.6 6.0 7.1 134.6 Food 1.3 6.0 19.7 5.0 0.9 13.3 74.8 Nonfood 3.7 1.5 2.5 -6.1 1.7 5.4 24.5 Metals and minerals 6.3 5.9 2.6 -2.1 -1.9 4.5 26.9 Fuels 6.4 -1.3 -21.9 5.1 6.1 7.3 165.1 Developing-country group Low-income Asia 2.9 7.6 17.2 -3.8 4.6 5.2 36.0 Low-income Africa 4.0 -1.3 -2.6 10.6 0.2 1.9 6.6 Middle-income oil importers 8.1 7.6 12.5 -0.5 3.2 18.5 219.0 Middle-income oil exporters 5.7 -0.8 -17.0 5.2 5.7 12.0 150.5 All developing countries 6.3 3.1 0.4 1.1 4.1 37.5 412.1 Note: Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. a. Estimated. ties-are preferable to inward-looking policies that debt to GDP and almost uniformly lower ratios of emphasize import substitution. To the extent pos- debt service to exports. sible, this equality needs to be achieved through For low-income developing countries, the deteri- the maintenance of appropriate exchange rates. oration in their terms of trade was perhaps more Where some protection is imposed, export and serious than the effects of the debt problem itself. other subsidies can offset the resultant disincentive However, low-income countries in Asia (and espe- to export producers. But export subsidies can be cially China and India) embarked in the 1970s on costly to the budget. Moreover, they introduce reforms that introduced greater flexibility in their other potential distortions and may lead to coun- economic structure through greater integration tervailing action by industrial countries. into the world economy, and helped raise their The benefits of outward-looking policies are felt domestic savings rates. China has been success- in terms of higher growth rates in the long run and fully promoting its manufactured exports, while in a greater ability to adjust to external shocks. India has significantly increased its commercial This is confirmed by a study of twenty-two oil- borrowing since 1980-81. These policy reforms, importing developing countries between 1979 and combined with an improved institutional infra- 1982. It found that countries with strong export structure, allowed them to maintain their eco- growth had GDP growth of 3.8 percent a year, nomic growth. Sub-Saharan Africa was much less compared with 2.8 percent a year where export successful in adjusting, because of a legacy of poor growth was average and 1.3 percent a year where performance and policies. In per capita terms, it was weak. In the same sample, those countries income is estimated to have fallen every year pursuing active trade policies (including elements since 1980 in low-income African countries (see of both export promotion and efficient import sub- Table 2.1). stitution) grew faster, at 3.2 percent a year; than Contrary to expectations, the recession in the those which relied mainly on import restrictions. industrial economies did not bring down interest The benefits of outward-looking policies may be rates substantially. Because two-thirds of develop- gleaned from the different rates of recovery from ing-country debt was denominated in dollars and the recession. The middle-income developing much of it at variable interest, the rise in real rates countries of Asia had a much stronger recovery meant a fundamental change in their finances. It during 1983 than those of Latin America, and have greatly increased the costs of borrowing and of had a generally superior performance since 1980. postponing domestic adjustment. Thus the impact They did not use borrowing to postpone adjust- of the recession on developing countries came in ment to the same extent, partly because the costs two distinct phases. The first-when adjustment of adjustment in their dynamic economies were was postponed by many developing countries- lower. They had generally lower ratios of public ended in the middle of 1982; the second-a period 28 Box 2.5 Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors Latin America's debt and growth prob- increased from $1.8 billion in 1973 to $5.5 GDP fell by almost 6 percent in 1983. For lems drew renewed international atten- billion in 1980; Mexico's from $1.4 billion a number of countries (Argentina, tion in August 1982, when Mexico could in 1972 to $5.8 billion in 1980; Venezue- Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, most of Central not service its debt. But the problems la's from a surplus of $3.0 billion in 1973 America, and the Caribbean), and for the had been brewing for some time. Since to a deficit of $2.7 billion in 1978. In region as a whole, 1983 was the third 1979 when the industrial countries Argentina much of the public spending consecutive year of stagnation or decline entered what was to become the longest was financed by direct or indirect bor- in per capita CDI'. The region's per cap- recession of the postwar period, the rowing from the central bank. In Mexico ita output has now fallen to about the countries of Latin America have experi- it was only with the onset of the debt 1976 level. enced a slowdown in economic activity crisis in 1982 that the government began The challenge which now faces the and growing financial crisis. Expansion- to rely more heavily on central bank Latin American countries is to shift from ary domestic fiscal policies, the persist- financing. This need not have been infla- import- and output-cutting adjustment ence of high real rates of interest on the tionary if the resources transferred to the to growth-oriented, export expanding region's variable rate debt (which government had not exceeded the nor- adjustment, since this alone is compati- accounts for over two-thirds of the mal growth in demand for reserve ble with rising investment, output, and region's total external debt), rapid money. However, many Latin American employment and is required in the face growth of total debt, and a decline in countries relied heavily on fiscal drag of continued rapid population growth export earnings after 1981 placed enor- the process by which revenues rise auto- (2.2 percent) and even faster labor force mous pressure on the external positions matically in line with inflationand on growth (3.0 percent). Strong recovery of of countries throughout the region. the yield to the government of the "infla- the world economy and maintenance of Growth of external debt accelerated tion tax" levied on holders of money. an appropriate level of trade finance by after 1973 as countries initially borrowed During 1975 and 1976, the inflation tax commercial banks will be necessary if to compensate for higher oil prices or to accounted for more than 25 percent of exports are to expand. Recovery will he finance ambitious development pro- Argentina's GDP (and half or more of accelerated to the extent that the massive grams. In real terms (deflating by the the total resources available to the gov- outflows of private capital which dollar price of tradable goods), the debt ernment). Some countries relied less on occurred since 1980 are repatriated; poli- of the major Latin American borrowers the inflation tax because they could read- cies to attract and hold these private sav- rose only slightly in the mid-1970s. But ily borrow abroad. As foreign loans ings are a necessary component of world inflation later led to a sharp rise in slowed down, they resorted to the infla- adjustment programs. interest rates and a shortening of maturi- tion tax again. Even if more efficient adjustment poli- ties on the commercial debt. Real interest This combination of events culminated cies are followed, the fiscal and trade sur- rates, which had been negative during in a generalized debt crisis throughout pluses required to service the debt will, much of the 1970s, rose abruptly to a the region unlike anything experienced in current financial conditions, be daunt- level of 15 to 20 percent for many coun- since the 1930s. Since 1981, sixteen of the ing. By historical standards even Chile's tries. The resulting debt service rates twenty-eight countries in Latin America foreign debt-GDP ratio of around 85 per- (interest plus amortization) have have been forced to seek emergency bal- cent would not be abnormal. But Latin increased by an amount that more than ance of payments support from the IMF. American countries are paying nominal offsets the earlier inflation-induced Most of these have also had formal interest rates in excess of 10 percent and decline of the real value of external debt. rescheduling agreements with their amortization rates in excess of 20 per- At the same time, the dollar prices of creditors. cent, which for the worst case implies major exports fell for many countries in Confronted with an external resource debt service obligations as high as 25 per- the late 1970s and early 1980s. constraint which became acute after 1981 cent of CDI'. In several countries overly ambitious as a result of terms of trade deterioration To reestablish creditworthiness over public investment programs, reduction and a sharp drop in capital flows, most the longer term, these countries' exports of domestic savings incentives, and Latin American countries cut imports must grow more rapidly than the nomi- adoption of trade and exchange policies and investments drastically. Domestic nal rate of interest which they pay on which had an antiexport bias exacerbated austerity programs aimed at restoring their external debt. While this is a neces- external imbalance and increased exter- external balance, compounded by the sary condition for recovery, it is not suffi- nal borrowing requirements. This is illus- decline in demand for the region's cient. In the near term net capital flows trated by the experience of three large exports, resulted in the sharpest decline will also have to increase over the low Latin American debtorsMexico, Argen- in output and employment that Latin 1983 level. tina, and Venezuela. Their fiscal deficits America has experienced in the past fifty rose rapidly in the 1970s. Argentina's years. For the entire region, per capita 29 of rapid and painful adjustment for some-has account deficit. Nevertheless, in 1982 oil-importing continued since then (see Box 2.5). developing countries did manage to borrow more than they were paying their creditors in capital and The pressures of international debt interest, notwithstanding the capital flight occur- ring in some of them. In 1983, however, the flow From the beginning of the 1980-83 recession, oil- was reversed, at least with respect to commercial importing developing countries as a group were finance. forced to start curbing the volume of their imports. For oil exporters the experience in the early part Nevertheless, their combined current account defi- of the recession was markedly different from that cits did grow-from $29 billion in 1978 to $70 bil- of oil-importing developing countries, although lion in 1980 and $82 billion at their peak in 1981 the denouement turned out to be similar. In 1980 (see Table 2.10). One reason for these increases oil exporters ran current account surpluses and was the rapid rise in interest payments. In 1982, increased the volume of their imports. The higher for example, interest due from all developing oil prices were not sustained, however, and the countries, including that on short-term debt, was volume of their oil exports fell. In 1981 they, too, $66 billion-more than half of their total current slipped into deficit-of $26 billion followed by $32 TABLE 2.10 Current account balance and its financing, 1970-83 (billions of current dollars) Country group and item 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983' Developing countries Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -9.8 -55.2 -80.5 -57.1 -10.9 Net factor income -3.6 -16.4 -30.0 -43.2 -48.3 Interest payments on medium- and long-term loans -2.7 -32.7 -41.2 -48.4 -49.0 Current account (excludes official transfers)" -12.7 -69.6 -107.8 -97.6 -56.2 Financing Official transfers 2.4 11.6 11.7 10.8 11.1 Medium- and long-term loans Official 3.7 21.5 21.2 21.4 17.6 Private 4.6 35.7 49.6 33.5 39.9 Oil importers Net exports of goods and nonf actor services -8.9 -69.3 -70.5 -46.9 -26.0 Net factor income -1.5 -4.3 -14.4 -21.8 -23.0 Interest payments on medium- and long-term loans -2.0 -21.3 -26.7 -31.7 -32.3 Current account (excludes official transfers) -9.8 -70.3 -81.8 -65.6 -46.1 Financing Official transfers 1.8 9.6 9.4 9.0 8.9 Medium- and long-term loans Official 2.9 16.9 16.5 15.9 13.9 Private 3.7 24.6 30.8 22.0 11.1 Oil exporters Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -0.9 14.2 -10.0 -10.1 15.1 Net factor income -2.1 -12.1 -15.6 -21.4 -25.3 Interest payments on medium- and long-term loans -0.7 -11.5 -14.5 -16.7 -16.7 Current account (excludes official transfers) -2.9 1.7 -26.1 -32.1 -10.0 Financing Official transfers 0.6 2.2 2.3 1.8 2.2 Medium- and long-term loans Official 0.8 4.6 4.7 5.5 3.6 Private 0.9 11.1 18.8 11.6 28.9 Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. Estimated. Current account does not equal net exports plus net factor income due to omission of private transfers. Financing does not equal current account because of omission of direct foreign investment, other capital, and changes in reserves. 30 TABLE 2.11 Debt indicators for developing countries, 1970-83 (percent) Indicators 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983' Ratio of debt to GNP 13.3 14.0 15.4 16.6 18.1 19.3 19.5 19.2 21.9 24.9 26.7 Ratio of debt to exports 99.4 63.7 76.4 79.6 84.7 92.9 83.7 76.1 90.8 108.7 121.4 Debt service ratio5 13.5 9.5 11.1 10.9 12.1 15.4 15.0 13.6 16.6 19.9 20.7 Ratio of interest service to GNP 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.2 Total debt outstanding and disbursed (billions of dollars) 68.4 141.0 168.6 203.8 249.8 311.7 368.8 424.8 482.6 538.0 595.8 Official 33.5 61.2 71.6 83.5 99.8 120.1 136.0 157.5 172.3 190.9 208.5 Private 34.9 79.8 96.9 120.3 150.0 191.6 232.8 267.3 310.3 347.1 387.3 Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. Estimated. Ratio of interest payments plus amortization to exports. billion in 1982 (see Table 2.10). In both years the to some extent caused by imprudent decisions by oil-exporting countries drew down reserves, as did both borrowers and lenders. In some cases, this the oil importers. Their creditworthiness, too, was was no doubt true. But the scale of the overall being questioned. strains of indebtedness was the result of an unex- Concern about creditworthiness is related both pected mixture of circumstances-prolonged reces- to the likelihood that debtors, if necessary, will be sion in industrial countries, the strong dollar, and willing to service their debt out of income (rather high rates of interest. This unexpected mixture than extra borrowing) and to the economic cost of made debt servicing more difficult, even for coun- debt service. That cost depends on several factors: tries such as Korea and Indonesia, although they the ratio of debt to wealth (in the case of a country, were able to avoid rescheduling. the present value of future national income); the For African countries, the "debt crisis" had a real rate of interest; the ease with which the neces- different meaning. Though the overall indebted- sary adjustments to spending in relation to output ness of low-income Africa is relatively low ($22.6 can be made; and the cost of making transfers in billion of outstanding medium- and long-term debt foreign exchange. In almost all these respects, in 1983), the fall in net disbursements of external creditors saw that the position of developing coun- finance from a peak of $3.9 billion in 1980 to $1.7 tries as a group was deteriorating. Between 1979 billion in 1982 has posed problems. The ability of and 1982 ratios of debt to GNP had risen from 19.3 many countries to service their debt is weak, and to 24.9 percent, of debt to exports from 84 to 109 this is reflected in the large number of debt re- percent, and of debt service to exports from 15 to schedulings in low-income Africa. Nearly half of 20 percent (see Table 2.11). In effect, debt accumu- all reschedulings between 1975 and 1983 were by lation was on an explosive path. African countries, with Zaire alone accounting for If any single event can be isolated as the turning six, Togo for five, and Liberia for four. Most serious point in the attitude of the lenders, it probably of all is the decline in official lending from $2.6 occurred in August 1982 when Mexico got into dif- billion in 1980 to $1.7 billion in 1982, which will be ficulties over its debt service obligations. In the exacerbated by the reduction in the size of the sev- context of a debt structure with short maturities enth replenishment of the International Develop- and high nominal interest rates, the reduced will- ment Association (IDA). ingness to refinance meant that these difficulties quickly spread to other borrowers. Because of the Adjustment in developing countries number of lenders involved, the immediate resolu- tion of the problem also involved support by the To restore their balance of payments, developing central banks of the industrial countries and a countries need to make some external adjustments degree of involuntary lending. Subsequently, a to raise exports in relation to imports. This has its number of countries faced debt servicing difficul- direct counterpart in an internal adjustment that ties. In 1983 there were thirty-six reschedulings reduces real spending in relation to real output. A involving $67 billion of debt. key question facing developing countries is the It is possible to argue that the "debt crisis" was pace of the adjustment they need to make. 31 In many countries internal adjustments had to bound to improve. However, experience shows start with the public sector. Borrowing abroad had that there are more and less efficient ways of helped finance internal public deficits. Even when achieving this result. Adjustment involves a reduc- the public sector was not the only borrower, it tion of spending in relation to output. But reduc- often guaranteed foreign loans contracted by pri- tions in output itself provide no contribution to vate borrowers. In a number of countries, public adjustment and represent pure waste. Countries sector deficits had reached 10 percent of GNP by therefore need to switch output into exports and 1982; in certain cases, they were as large as 15 per- efficient import substitution. If they fail to make cent of GNP. Given the undeveloped state of that switch, deep cuts in spending are bound to domestic capital markets, such deficits could be reduce output. As a result, the attempt to reduce financed (even in the short term) only by inflation spending in relation to output also creates a or by borrowing abroad. recession. The extent of those liabilities can be gauged from Since 1982 developing countries have substan- a few figures. In 1982 the developing countries as a tially improved their trade balances. For oil- group had $715 billion of foreign debt. More than importing developing countries the current three-quarters was medium- and long-term. Some account deficit (excluding official transfers) fell 60 percent of the total was owed to commercial from $82 billion in 1981 to $66 billion in 1982 and an banks; another 30 percent was due to official credi- estimated $46 billion in 1983 (see Table 2.10). For tors, nearly half of which was concessional aid. oil-exporting developing countries the deficit fell More than half of total outstanding debt had been from $32 billion in 1982 to an estimated $10 billion incurred by only ten countries. Their need to in 1983. Indeed, the combined deficit in 1983 was adjust was the most urgent of all developing coun- only a little larger than the interest due in that year. tries, but others were to varying degrees facing In many countries these declines have resulted balance of payments difficulties. largely from cutting imports in relation to output The strains increased enormously in 1982. Net and from recession-induced reductions in demand disbursements of medium- and long-term private for imports. Between 1980 and 1982 the volume of loans to developing countries fell from $50 billion imports fell by about 50 percent in Argentina and in 1981 to $34 billion in 1982, with most of the drop 20 percent in Brazil; it fell by 35 percent in Mexico occurring in the second half of the year. In the first in 1982. In Brazil imports as a proportion of GDP quarter of 1983 net private lending was only $2.6 fell from about 10 to 6 percent between 1980 and billion; most of this consisted of involuntary lend- 1983 and in Chile from 30.4 to 21.3 percent. In ing under the auspices of IMF rescheduling agree- many cases imports have been cut to the point of ments. Thus the increase in medium- and long- consisting only of industrial raw materials and term private lending shown in Table 2.10 is almost essential foodstuffs with little even for investment. entirely due to the rescheduling of existing short- Furthermore, the import restrictions employed in term debt. many indebted countries to curb imports threaten Internally, the required adjustments to this sharp a long-term deterioration in the efficiency of trade decline in lending have taken two forms: an overt regimes and a reduction in future growth. attempt to reduce the size of the public sector defi- Only a few countries have managed to expand cit and a de facto increase in taxation through a rise exports enough to avoid serious domestic reces- in the inflation tax. Indeed, the acceleration in sion. Korea and Turkey, for example, had sizable inflation that has occurred in a number of the prin- foreign debts; but by following effective adjust- cipal debtor countries is not an accident. It is one ment policies, they succeeded in expanding both way for existing public sector deficits to be their real imports and exports during the 1980s. By financed in the context of the decline in foreign contrast, the real value of exports declined in lending. Closing the deficits by increased taxation Argentina and Venezuela between 1981 and 1983, (whether overt or covert) has often led to a was stagnant in Brazil, and rose by about 20 per- squeeze on the private sector with potentially cent in Mexico. adverse consequences for long-term investment Adjustment has meant a sharp decline in per and growth. The same adverse effects on long- capita consumption. During 1980-83 it fell by 2 to term growth will occur when it is public sector 10 percent a year in countries as diverse as Argen- investment that is cut. tina, Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast, and Yugoslavia. In Given a large enough cut in real spending, the all these countries, per capita consumption had current account of the balance of payments is grown between 1970 and 1981. 32 In many countries private investment suffered indeed outlast the resolution of the current debt from weak domestic demand and high interest problems. There is evidence that government rates. In Brazil capacity utilization has fallen by spending on social programs has fallen by less about 13 percent since 1980. In the Ivory Coast than spending on production and infrastructure. industrial value added fell by 3 percent in 1980 and But much of social spending undoubtedly goes to 1981, and investment (excluding petroleum) by 20 maintain staff salaries, so the materials and sup- percent. As for employment, the number of manu- plies necessary for maintaining health and educa- facturing jobs in greater Sao Paulo fell by 13 per- tional standards may be falling much more. cent between mid-1980 and 1982; in the Ivory The consequences of austerity are dramatic for Coast industrial employment has fallen by 10 per- the country concerned. But they go further than cent since 1980. Distress borrowing by private that because cuts in imports affect the entire world firms, bankruptcies, and government takeovers economy. As a group, developing countries are have become common. In Argentina bankruptcies larger markets for the European Community, the and judicial interventions increased from 52 in United States, and Japan individually than any 1977 to nearly 300 in 1981. In Chile several hun- one of the three is for the other two. Developing dred bankruptcies were reported in 1982. countries are also of great importance to one Cuts in public spending have often been another. This is a particularly serious problem in achieved by reducing or eliminating subsidies Latin America where a long history of import sub- not only for parastatals but also for food, educa- stitution and schemes for regional trade integra- tion, and health. The short- and long-term conse- tion have led to significant intraregional trade, quences can be far-reaching. At one level, a especially in manufactures. In the case of Brazil, reduction in food subsidies, along with devalua- the reductions in imports by the rest of Latin tion, reduces real incomes. At another, a decline in America (as well as by other developing countries) spending on education and health detracts from has seriously harmed its exports. Consequently, building human capital, while less spending on the required external adjustments are more diffi- infrastructure may damage a country's growth cult and the corresponding internal adjustments potential in the medium term. These effects may more painful. 33 3 Prospects for sustained growth With economic growth reviving, attention shifts to basic scenarios. Designated the Low case and High the prospects for sustaining the recovery. Looking case, these scenarios should not be viewed as pre- further ahead, governments are assessing the dictions; the outcomes depend on the policies chances of raising long-term growth rates above adopted in developed and developing countries. their average in the 1970s. That task, as Chapter 2 They also do not consider or allow for any exoge- made clear, depends on overcoming certain deep- nous shocks to the world economy that could seated problems that were revealed and exacer- result from, for example, a severe disruption of bated by two sharp rises in oil prices. The indus- energy supplies. trial countries have been slowed by the growing The Low case indicates what might happen if the inflexibility of their economies, especially in labor industrial countries were to do nothing to improve markets, and by the upward pressures on public their performance of the past ten years (see Table spending and the associated tendency toward 3.1). Their GDP growth would then average 2.5 higher taxation and periodic bouts of inflationary percent a year in 1985-95, nearly the same as financing. The results have included falling returns between 1973 and 1979. Governments of industrial on investment; a declining investable surplus; countries would find it hard to control inflation, defensive policies of protection and subsidization; and their budgetary deficits and unemployment and, in consequence, slow growth and stubborn would remain high. Protectionist sentiment would inflation. Many developing countries face difficul- be strong, threatening the exports of developing ties which are not dissimilar to those of the indus- countries and their ability to service their debt. But trial countries, especially policy-induced distor- protectionist actions would increase no more rap- tions in the economy and problems in controlling idly than in the past several years, and developing public spending and deficits. countries would still have the potential to increase This chapter begins by examining some sce- penetration of markets in industrial countries. narios for growth in the years up to 1995, exploring The Low case is based on an average inflation the policies and conditions that would bring them rate in the industrial countries of 6 percent a year, about. In particular it looks at what has to be done in dollars at unchanged exchange rates. This is to restore the growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s, close to 7 percent in current dollars because of a considering both the choices facing industrial presumed depreciation of the dollar after 1985 of countries and the benefits that developing coun- 13 percent. This inflation rate is likely to be the tries could reap, even in unfavorable world condi- average of widely divergent rates over successive tions, by changing their own policies. The chapter cycles. With real interest rates at 3.5 percent then discusses the implications of the different sce- because of the large budget deficits, the nominal narios for international debt, along with the interest rate would average 9.5 percent. This rate related policy issues for both the industrial and the too would probably fluctuate considerably over developing countries. Finally, it stresses the poten- time. tial for international collaboration, especially over Competition for funds from the governments of trade liberalization and capital flows. industrial countries would keep real interest rates up, and so would discourage lending to many developing countries. The ratio of official develop- A ten-year perspective ment assistance to GNP in the industrial countries To illustrate the range of possibilities for the world is presumed to remain at its historical average, so economy in 1985-95, this chapter describes two development assistance would grow at 2.5 percent 34 TABLE 3.1 Average performance of industrial and developing economies, 1960-95 (average annual percentage change) 1985-95 High Low Country group 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 case case Industrial economies GOP growth 4.9 2.8 1.9 4.3 2.5 Inflation ratea 6.1 9.9 2.3 4.3 6.8 Real interest ratet" 2.5 0.7 5.2 2.5 3.5 Nominal lending ratec 5.8 8.4 11.6 6.0 9.5 Developing economiesd GDP growth 6.3 5.2 2.8 5.5 4.7 Low-income Asia 5.9 5.2 5.8 5.3 4.6 Africa 3.5 2.1 1.7 3.2 2.8 Middle-income oil importers Major exporters of manufactures 6.7 5.8 1.6 6.3 5.2 Other 5.3 4.3 1.9 4.3 3.8 Middle-income oil exporters 6.9 4.9 2.4 5.4 4.7 Export growthe 6.3 3.1 5.5 6.4 4.7 Manufacturese 14.9 10.6 8.1 9.7 7.5 Primarye 5.0 0.9 4.0 3.4 2.1 Import growth C 6.4 5.9 3.2 7.2 5.1 Note: Projected growth rates are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. Inflation in the United States is 3.5 percent a year in the High case and 6 percent in the Low case. But for the industrial countries as a whole, it is higher in dollars because of an assumed depreciation of the dollar of 13 percent between 1985 and 1990. Average of three-month US dollar Eurocurrency rates for the periods 1960-73 and 1973-79, deflated by the rate of change in the US GDP deflator. Average annual rate. Does not include South Africa. Historical growth rates are for the periods 1965-73 and 1973-80. a year in real terms, with bilateral aid increasing its unemployment eases, protectionist measures sub- share if present trends in the reduction of multila- side, so developing countries would find it easier teral aid, evidenced by the recent cut in the IDA to expand their exports and to ease their debt serv- replenishment (see Box 3.5 below), continue. In all icing burden. Investment confidence would rap- their forms, capital flows to developing countries idly improve, which, along with larger aid pro- would therefore grow quite slowly. grams, would lead to an expansion of the flows of The High case, by contrast, offers industrial capital to developing countries. economies a path of sustained and steady expan- sion, with GDP growing at 4.3 percent a year in The Low case and developing countries 1985-95 (see Table 3.1). Unemployment would then fall steadily. Inflation would average 3.5 per- In the Low case, slow growth in the industrial cent a year, in dollars at present exchange rates countries would limit GDP growth in developing (and 4.3 percent in current dollars), varying only countries to an average of only 4.7 percent a year, modestly from year to year. Budget deficits, partic- and to only 2.7 a year in per capita terms (see Table ularly in the United States, would gradually be 3.2). This supposes that developing countries, reduced-first as a percentage of GDP, then in despite slower growth of their imports in relation absolute terms. With deficits being brought under to GDP, escape the full effects of slow growth in control, the real interest rate is projected to fall to industrial countries. 2.5 percent a year, giving nominal interest rates of Given considerable differences among countries, only 6 percent. the Low case means for some little or no growth. With lower domestic interest rates and smaller Per capita income in low-income Africa would budget deficits, investment would increase. As decline; among some middle-income oil importers, 35 TABLE 3.2 Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-95 (average annual percentage change) 1985-9 5 High Low Increased Improved Country group 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 case case protection policies All developing countries 3.7 2.0 0.7 3.5 2.7 2.3 3.1 Low-income 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 3.0 Asia 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.0 2.6 3.3 Africa 1.0 -1.0 -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 Middle-income Oil importers 3.8 3.3 -0.6 3.6 2.6 1.9 3.1 Major exporters of manufactures 4.4 3.6 -0.3 4.4 3.3 2.4 3.8 Other 2.6 1.7 -0.9 1.5 1.0 0.7 1.2 Oil exporters 4.3 2.3 -0.4 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.3 Industrial countries 3.9 2.1 1.5 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 per capita income would grow at only 1 percent a cent a year over the ten years. Middle-income oil year. China and India would grow at 4.6 percent a exporters would have a GDP growth of 4.7 percent year, India at only 2.5 percent a year in per capita a year, 2.0 percent in per capita terms. As oil prices terms. Countries such as Korea and other major rise, however, their GDY would grow much faster exporters of manufactures, affected only by the because of the continued improvement in their slower growth of their world markets, would get terms of trade. the capital they need to keep growing at 3.3 per- The trade outlook would mirror growth for the cent or more a year in per capita terms, for a total different groups of developing countries. Exports growth of 5.2 percent. by all developing countries would grow at 4.7 per- Other less creditworthy countries, such as Brazil cent a year during 1985-95 (see Table 3.3). Manu- and Mexico, would grow less, especially in the late factured exports would expand at about 7.5 per- 1980s, while their adjustment continued; in the cent a year compared with 9.7 percent in the High early 1990s their growth would speed up. With case. The reduction in growth rates of manufac- their populations growing at 2.3 percent a year, per tured exports would be proportionately much capita income of middle-income oil-importing smaller than that of industrial-country growth vis- countries as a group would grow at only 2.6 per- a-vis the High case because, even with some addi- TABLE 3.3 Change in trade in developing countries, 1965-95 (average annual percentage change) Merchandise exports' Exports of manufactures 1985-95 1985-95 High Low High Low Country group 1965-73 1973 -80 1980-85 case case 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 case case All developing countries 6.3 3.1 5.5 6.4 4.7 14.9 10.6 8.1 9.7 7.5 Low-income 3.3 5.4 5.0 6.8 5.2 6.4 6.9 8.2 9.3 7.1 Asia 2.9 7.6 5.4 7.5 5.7 6.6 7.4 8.5 9.3 7.2 Africa 4.0 -1.3 3.5 3.3 2.2 4.5 0.5 0.9 8.9 6.6 Middle-income Oil importers 8.1 7.6 6.6 7.5 5.7 18.2 11.5 8.1 9.7 7.6 Major exporters of manufactures 10.5 9.6 7.2 8.2 6.3 18.6 12.1 8.4 9.8 7.6 Other 4.8 3.7 4.1 4.0 2.8 15.6 7.1 5.0 9.0 7.3 Oil exporters 5.7 -0.8 4.1 4.1 2.4 12.7 7.9 7.4 10.5 7.7 Note: Projections are based on a sample of ninety countries. Not available. 36 tional protection in industrial countries, manufac- 1995. The more successful would see their devel- tured exports would still grow largely in line with opment proceed as Korea's did in the 1960s and the supply capacity of developing countries. As in early 1970s. They would begin to rely more on the past, exports of primary commodities, how- markets and less on government directives for the ever, would grow more slowly than growth in the allocation of resources. And they would pursue industrial economies. more outward-oriented trade policies. Others Under the Low case, net loan disbursements would not, so there is likely to be considerable (private and official) plus official transfers to the dispersion around the average of 5.7 percent developing countries would fall in real terms, from growth for the middle-income group. Oil $68 billion in 1983 to $63 billion in 1995, while importers other than the major exporters of manu- developing countries would pay $58 billion in factures would grow at only 4.3 percent a year, and interest (see Table 3.4). oil exporters at 5.4 percent a year. Under the High case, the poorest countries The High case and developing countries would grow at 3.2 percent to 5.3 percent a year, with several Asian countries doing better. Low- In the High case, the prospects for developing income African countries would still do badly; countries would greatly improve. Their GDP even in the High case, per capita income would fail would grow at about 5.5 percent a year, almost as to rise. This is in part because the market outlook fast as it averaged in the 1960s (see Table 3.1), and for these countries' commodity exports is not very at 3.5 percent in per capita terms. They would good. The volume of such exports is projected to receive somewhat higher real prices for a larger increase only slightly. At the same time, these volume of exports, and credit would be available at countries' weak financial position means signifi- lower interest rates. cant increases in commercial lending to them are The major exporters of manufactures would do unlikely, so they must continue to rely on conces- best, with GDP growth at 6.3 percent a year; some sional assistance for the bulk of their capital countries could manage 8 percent or more. Such transfers. rapid growth would imply that they were moving World trade would grow at about 7 percent a into more technology-intensive products-as is year in real terms, given global GDP growth of already happening in Korea with heavy engineer- about 5 percent. In a world of freer trade, trade ing, for example, and in Singapore with precision would grow faster in relation to GDP than it did in engineering. the 1960s. Exports of manufactures from develop- Some of the middle-income countries-such as ing countries would grow at 9.7 percent a year, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey-could exports of primary products at 3.4 percent (see also make major structural progress in the years to Table 3.3). Exports of primary goods Merchandise imports 1985-95 1985-95 High Low High Low 1965-73 1973 -80 1980-85 case case 1965-73 1973 -80 1980-85 case case Country group 5.0 0.9 4.0 3.4 2.1 6.4 5.9 3.2 7.2 5.1 All developing countries 1.8 4.5 2.6 4.1 3.1 0.6 6.4 3.5 5.9 4.1 Low-income 0.3 7.9 2.1 4.6 3.6 -0.6 8.7 4.1 6.4 4.6 Asia 4.0 -1.4 3.8 2.8 1.9 3.5 0.1 1.1 3.6 1.6 Africa Middle-income 4.4 4.5 4.5 3.2 2.4 7.7 4.6 2.2 7.6 5.6 Oil importers Major exporters 5.2 6.0 4.8 3.8 2.9 9.7 5.3 2.8 8.4 6.3 of manufactures 3.7 3.0 3.9 2.0 1.2 4.6 3.2 -0.3 3.9 1.9 Other 3.6 -1.1 3.9 3.3 1.8 6.6 9.3 5.4 7.1 4.5 Oil exporters a. Projections include exports and imports of nonfactor services. 37 TABLE 3.4 Current account balance and its financing in developing countries, 1983 and 1995 (billions of constant 1980 dollars) All developing countries Low-income Asia High Low High Low case case case case Item 1983 1995 1995 1983' 1995 1995 Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -10.8 -69.5 -29.0 -8.9 -17.4 -14.0 Interest on medium- and long-term debt -48.7 -52.1 -58.0 -1.7 -3.1 -3.1 Official -9.7 -16.0 -17.5 -0.9 -2.4 -2.4 Private -39.0 -36.1 -40.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 Current account balanceb -55.8 -109.5 -78.1 -1.3 -12.1 -9.3 Net official transfers 11.0 16.6 14.3 1.7 2.4 2.1 Medium- and long-term loansc 57.2 74.0 49.1 4.1 8.1 6.0 Official 17.5 35.0 26.6 3.9 7.3 5.8 Private 39.7 39.0 22.6 0.2 0.8 0.2 Debt outstanding and disbursed 592.0 914.9 656.2 47.5 89.6 67.9 As percentage of GNP 26.7 21.9 17.1 8.7 8.9 7.2 As percentage of exports 121.4 80.3 71.3 99.5 85.0 78.7 Debt service as percentage of exports 20.5 12.7 13.7 9.9 7.0 7.1 Note: The table is based on a sample of ninety developing countries. The GDP deflator for industrial countries was used to deflate all items. Details may not add to totals because of rounding. Net exports plus interest does not equal the current account balance due to omission of net workers' remittances, private transfers, and investment income. The current account balance not financed by official transfers and loans is covered by direct foreign investment, other capital (including short-term credit and errors and omissions), and changes in reserves. Ratios are calculated using current price data. The major exporters of manufactures, already and investment needed to service loans on com- accounting for 80 percent of the developing coun- mercial terms is particularly painful. Yet, provided tries' exports of manufactures, would see their policies are reasonable, the returns to investment manufactured exports grow at about 10 percent a in poor countries can be very large indeed. Con- year. Some of them-such as the Philippines and cessional assistance is needed partly to finance the Thailand-could do much better than others. development of human capital and to strengthen Other middle-income oil importers would expand institutions-programs for which economic their manufactured exports at about 9 percent a returns are high but delayed. Because the potential year. Meanwhile, low-income Africa would have of the low-income countries will not be realized its manufactured exports grow at about 9 percent a until these programs are in place, the role of con- year, starting from a very low base (see Table 3.3). cessional aid in promoting development is vital. To do this, however, it would have to reduce its Moreover, because the returns to these invest- reliance on western European markets and to ments are high, aid can contribute significantly to diversify its exports, expanding into manufactured development in the low-income countries and help products. to raise the global efficiency of investment. The contrast between the Low and the High case Under the High case, loan disbursements plus is not merely quantitative. It amounts to a qualita- official transfers to developing countries would tive difference as well, because the apparently rise from a peak of $83 billion in 1981 to $91 billion insurmountable obstacles of the past ten years in 1995 (in constant 1980 dollars-see Table 3.4), a would steadily diminish if High-case growth were rise in real terms of only 2.5 percent a year from achieved-or, under the Low case, would become 1983-slower than the projected rate of growth of even more entrenched. With a continuation of industrial countries. slow growth, millions of people in many develop- Low-income countries would also obtain a grow- ing countries will become progressively poorer; ing inflow of capital in the High case, largely with faster growth, almost everybody in the world through the expansion of concessional loans from will enjoy some increase in real income. The prize governments and international institutions. With that the High case offers is considerable. The ques- low income levels, the sacrifice of consumption tion is how to win it. 38 Middle-income countries Major exporters Other oil-importing Oil-exporting Low-income Africa of man ufactu res countries countries High Low High Low High Low High Low case case case case case case case case 1983' 1995 1995 1983 1995 1995 1983 1995 1995 1983 1995 1995 -4.3 -7.1 -5.2 -0.6 -18.8 -1.5 -12.2 -16.7 -9.9 15.0 -9.6 1.5 -0.8 -1.3 -1.3 -22.2 -22.6 -25.5 -7.4 -7.3 -8.8 -16.6 -17.9 -19.3 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -3.5 -5.1 -5.9 -2.2 -3.6 -3.9 -2.7 -3.9 -4.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -18.7 -17.5 -19.6 -5.2 -3.7 -4.9 -13.9 -14.0 -15.0 -4.3 -7.0 -5.8 -22.8 -40.5 -26.7 -17.5 -17.8 -14.3 -10.0 -32.1 -21.9 1.8 2.8 2.4 3.1 5.0 4.3 2.3 3.2 2.9 2.2 3.1 2.7 1.4 3.4 2.7 11.8 27.7 17.1 7.5 12.5 9.5 32.3 22.3 13.8 1.6 3.2 2.6 4.3 8.6 6.1 4.0 8.0 6.1 3.6 7.9 6.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 7.5 19.2 11.0 3.5 4.6 3.4 28.7 14.3 7.8 22.2 38.3 30.1 224.9 350.6 245.4 97.6 142.8 112.4 199.7 293.7 200.6 42.2 50.2 41.4 26.3 20.5 16.0 39.8 35.0 29.2 38.9 30.4 22.3 242.0 234.7 224.1 99.6 59.0 50.7 177.5 145.4 137.2 133.0 90.1 78.7 24.8 19.1 20.6 20.0 10.5 11.4 28.7 20.2 22.9 21.4 16.0 17.0 Estimated. Excludes official transfers. Net disbursements. Policy requirements of the High case demand for money and greater investment, the prospect is that both short-term and long-term real The difference between this basic Low case (vari- rates of interest will remain high in comparison ants of which are discussed below) and the High with those of the 1970s. case hinges on the performance of the industrial Inflationary expectations have not disappeared. countries. If they could regain the productivity In the major industrial countries, the "core" rate growth and high employment they managed in of inflation-measured by the rise in the GDP the 1950s and 1960s, the High case would be deflator-is running at between 1 percent a year in achieved. There is little sign that they would be Japan and 9 percent a year in France; in the United prevented from doing so by some fundamental States it is about 4.5 percent. While low by recent deterioration in the rate of technological progress. standards, these are not rates that can be ignored, On the contrary, in some fields-telecommunica- especially in the light of past experience of the tions, electronics, biotechnology-the pace of tech- inflation cycle. nical change appears to be accelerating. It there- Given the unfavorable context, neither higher fore seems probable that faster growth depends on employment nor lower interest rates is likely to be tackling the problems that dogged the industrial brought about in any durable way merely by countries in the 1970s. increasing nominal demand. Moreover, in the long run, the financing of public spending will probably Deficits, savings, and interest rates become still more difficult in developed countries. In many, the political will to increase taxation is Economic recovery is likely to stimulate higher limited, but the pressures for more spending saving in industrial countries. But since the oil remain strong. exporters' surplus has disappeared and the United If they are to avoid a resurgence of inflation, States is running a large budget deficit, global sav- most industrial countries will need to maintain ings rates are unlikely to regain their level of the tight monetary policies. Given the fiscal pressures, early 1970s, at least not in the immediate future. To the real cost of borrowing is likely to remain high. the extent that industrial-country recovery in the For that reason alone, budget deficits will tend to context of lower inflation leads to increased grow as the real interest burden is compounded 39 over time. The main focus of industrial countries in the real incomes of certain groups, they also pre- the years ahead should be on developing ways to vent the adjustment to a country's emerging and reduce budget deficits. changing comparative advantage, which alone can ensure growing real incomes of all groups in the Microeconomic flexibility economy. The maintenance of an open trading sys- tem is, therefore, an important means of reducing In several areas of their economiessubsidies to microeconomic distortions. For example, protec- obsolescent firms and industries, wage and other tion is costly to the country using it. The cost of policies affecting labor costsindustrial countries "saving" jobs is higher consumer prices and ineffi- need to introduce greater flexibility in the way they ciencies in production (see Box 3.1), as well as loss accept and promote economic change. Though of potential jobs in export industries, particularly if protectionist policies might temporarily maintain other countries increase protection as a response. Box 3.1 Costs of protection in textiles and clothing Motivated by a desire to "save" jobs, women it was fifty weeks. They often $1 for every 7 cents gained by workers governments of industrial countries have found jobs paving as much as or more whose jobs were preserved. introduced many restraints against than before. The present value of the The Canadian studies estimated the developing countries' exports of manu- losses borne by each worker who perma- costs of all the controls on the clothing factures. The most important of these nently lost his (or her) original job was trade, which were much higher than affect textiles and clothing and have been $10,800 before government welfare bene- those of tariffs alone. The cost per job implemented under the Multifibre fits, $5,600 after those benefits. saved by permanent controls was esti- Arrangements. In Canada at least two-thirds (and mated to be C$390,000 in the late 1970s. That such restraints are undesirable for probably close to three-quarters) of dis- Because the individual worker lost only developing countries is widely under- placed workers in the clothing industry C$14,000 (before welfare benefits), the stood. Textiles and clothing constitute found new jobs. They were unemployed net cost to society was about C$375,000. almost 30 percent of the manufactured from an average of twenty-one weeks This was needed to save each worker exports of developing countries. They (men) and thirty-one weeks (women). C$5,000, a ratio of over 70 to 1. For every have been an essential step on the ladder The present value of the losses varied one and a half cents by which the worker of development for many countries, from from a high of C$14,000 for the average would be better off, one Canadian dollar the United Kingdom in the nineteenth woman in one survey, to a gain for a would be wasted. century to Japan in the early twentieth twenty-five year old man in the other, Developing countries also use various and Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. While both before welfare benefits. The highest tariffs and quantitative restrictions (along export restraints can benefit large suppli- loss found in either of the two surveys with foreign exchange controls and ers who are able to raise their export was C$5,000 after welfare benefits for the broader measures such as industrial prices, they are a disaster for countries average female workerclose to the licensing and investment incentives) to such as Sri Lanka and Mauritius that are losses found for the United States. protect local industries. Generally, such starting to enter the market, only to find The cost of preserving a job to society measures have favored production for the route barred. as a whole is created by the inefficiencies home markets over production for export Much less well known are the high in production and consumption. Based markets, and manufacturing over agri- costs borne by the industrial countries on tariffs alone, that cost for clothing and culture. Protection and other measures themselves. For the United States, stud- textiles was estimated to be $426 million lead to distortions in the structure of pro- ies of workers in the clothing industry for the United States in 1977. To preserve duction, consumption, and trade; these who have benefited from the Trade jobs indefinitely, protection must con- are costly to economic growth. Studies of Adjustment Assistance program fol- tinue indefinitely. The present value of the "costs" of such protection, such as lowed their experience over several these costs would then be over $10 bil- those for the United States and Canada, years. In the late 1970s the majority of lion. At the same time, the tariffs were have not been done in developing coun- redundant workers were able to find a estimated to save 116,000 jobs. Thus the tries. But among developing countries, new job within a year; of those who did Cost of permanent protection per job those with lower and more uniform and not, many were over the age of fifty-five saved would be about $80,000, while the neutral patterns of incentives have per- and opted to leave the labor force. The private benefit to the individual worker formed better in terms of economic mean duration of unemployment for would be $5,600, a ratio of 14 to 1. In growth and ability to cope with external men who subsequently moved to a new other words, a permanent policy of tariff shocks. job was thirty-eight weeks and for protection would cost the United States 40 An open trading system is also a way of capturing terms. Low-income Africa grows at 2.6 percent a the potential for increased integration between year, -0.7 in per capita terms. Even major exporters developed and developing countries. And, last but of manufactures manage GDP growth of only 4.4 not least, it is a sine qua non of a resolution of the percent a year, while growth of GDP in the other debt problem. middle-income oil importers falls to 3.5 percent a For the more advanced developing economies, year. the next stage in their progress will carry them into Overall, developing-country exports grow by 4.0 industries that have hitherto been the preserve of percent a year under Low I compared with 4.7 per- the industrial countries. Unless the industrial cent in the Low case; manufactures grow by 6.1 countries keep their markets open, they will percent compared with 7.5 percent; and primary thwart the newcomers' progress. By seeking to commodities, 2.2 percent as in the Low case. As a retain a monopoly of such industries, the indus- result, the developing countries reduce the growth trial countries will also be holding back their own in their imports, from 5.1 percent a year in the Low economic growth. case to 4.3 percent in Low I. All regions are affected: exports by the major exporters of manu- The threat of increased protectionism factures grow at only 5.2 percent a year, by other middle-income countries at 2.3 percent a year, and Slow growth in the industrial countries is the most by low-income Africa at a disastrously low 2.1 per- likely trigger for a significant increase in protection cent a year (see Table 3.6). directed against developing countries. It is also in this context that the adverse effects on the devel- The benefits of improved policies in developing countries oping countries would be most serious, since a fur- ther decline in their exports would slow their over- Just as industrial countries might make matters all growth even more. To illustrate these worse (even within the Low scenario) by resorting implications, the Low case contains a variant (Low to protection, so developing countries can partly I) which assumes that governments in industrial offset the effects of slow growth in the industrial countries step up protection against imports from world by improving their own policies. This is developing countries (see Table 3.5). In other illustrated in Low Il-a second variant of the Low respects, the industrial countries' policies and per- case which assumes slow growth in the industrial formance are assumed to be unchanged. Under world but an improved performance by the devel- these circumstances, low-income Asian countries oping countries. They would achieve faster GDP grow at 4.2 percent a year, only 2.6 in per capita growth by raising savings and investment rates, by increasing and diversifying their exports, and by using imports more efficiently as well (see Box 3.2). TABLE 3.5 As Table 3.5 shows, the improved policies of Growth of GDP in developing countries, Low Low II would allow GDP to grow in developing scenario and variants, 1985-95 (average annual percentage change) countries at an average rate of 5.1 percent a year, recovering half of the difference between the Low Increased Improved and High cases. Low-income Asian countries industrial- developing- Low country country would grow at 4.9 percent a year as against 5.3 Counfnj group case protection isrn' policyb percent under the High case, low-income Africa at 3.0 percent as against 3.2 percent in the High case. Developing countries 4.7 4.3 5.1 Low-income Major exporters of manufactures would manage Asia 4.6 4.2 4.9 5.7 percent a year, and other middle-income oil Africa 2.8 2.6 3.0 importers 4 percent. Middle-income oil Developing-country exports of primary com- importers modities would grow at 2.4 percent a year, but Major exporters exports of manufactures would grow at 8.0 percent of manufactures 5.2 4.4 5.7 Other 3.8 3.5 4.0 a year (Table 3.6). That would give the developing Middle-income oil countries overall export growth of 5.1 percent a exporters 4.7 4.6 5.0 year compared with 6.4 percent in the High case, a. Low I. but 4.7 percent in the Low case; adding inflation, h. Low II. export earnings would rise at more than 13.0 per- 41 TABLE 3.6 Growth of trade in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95 (average annual percentage change) Exports of goods Imports of goods and nonfactor Exports of Exports of and non factor services manufactures primary goods services Low Low Low Low Country group case LowP Lowlib case Lowl' LowIV' case Low I' Low JJh case Low I' Low II All developing countries 4.7 4.0 5.1 7.5 6.1 8.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 5.1 4.3 5.4 Low-income 5.2 4.3 5.6 7.1 5.6 7.6 3.1 3.1 3.3 4.1 3.4 4.4 Asia 5.7 4.7 6.1 7.1 5.6 7.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.6 3.9 5.0 Africa 2.2 2.1 2.5 6.5 5.0 7.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.8 Middle-income Oil importers 5.7 4.7 6.2 7.6 6.1 8.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 5.6 4.5 6.0 Major exporters of manufactures 6.3 5.2 6.8 7.6 6.2 8.1 2.9 2.9 3.2 6.3 5.2 6.8 Other 2.8 2.3 3.2 7.2 5.8 7.8 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.4 2.1 Oil exporters 2.4 2.2 2.7 7.6 6.1 8.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 4.5 4.2 4.7 Note: These projections are based on a sample of ninety countries. Increased protection by developed countries. Slow growth in developed countries but improved policies in developing countries. cent a year. Many of the big debtors would experi- Capital flows and debt ence growth of export earnings above that aver- age-major exporters of manufactures would have The discussion thus far has considered the effects the value of their exports grow at close to 15 per- of the performance of industrial countries and of cent a year-comfortably above the interest rate on developing-country policies on trade and the their debt of above 10 percent. growth of GDP. Almost as important as trade in What is needed to achieve these improvements? the long term, however, and far more critical in the The developing countries-and the industrial short to medium term, are the interrelated issues world-will suffer from any action that reduces of capital flows and debt. It is through borrowing trade (see Box 3.3). They therefore need to avoid from abroad that developing countries are able to overvalued exchange rates, to provide attractive supplement their own saving as well as to offset incentives for exports, and to promote efficient shortages of foreign exchange. Borrowing is an import substitution. Such policies would be twice opportunity; but in certain circumstances it is also blessed. Faster growth of exports and GDP would a snare. also generate a larger inflow of foreign capital. This Under the Low case and its variants, interest would supplement the extra saving that improved rates would be higher and the growth of exports policies would bring, all of which would then be and GDP lower than in the High case. If lenders invested more efficiently. The key to more saving wish to avoid debt expanding beyond the servicing and better investment lies in maintaining positive capacity of the borrower's economies, net lending real interest rates in the developing countries. would then be lower while the real cost of borrow- It is also imperative that developing countries ing would be higher. For the indebted sovereign increase the flexibility of their budgets-another borrower, the service of debt is a matter of political close parallel with the industrial countries. Many will, and strength of will depends on the cost of of the difficulties faced by middle-income coun- exercising it. The long-term prospect of receiving tries in the past decade have been due to height- capital inflows that are not large enough to cover ened public spending commitments, financed interest payments, combined with slow growth of either through external borrowing or through export earnings (as is threatened by the Low case), windfall gains from higher commodity prices. implies that the service of debt is economically, When these sources of finance diminish or dry up, and therefore politically, costly. For this reason the it is politically difficult to cut public spending, and long-term prospects for the world economy, and inflation results. hence for capital flows, depend heavily on creating 42 Box 3.2 Trade as an engine of growth Foreign trade can be an engine of growth exports (see Chapter 5), but even among Export structure of selected developing in developing countries through its effect countries that traditionally specialized in countries (percent) on improved resource allocation and a single primary export, manufactures increased productivity. But developing are gaining a significant share. A group 10 countries' exports are not mechanically of eleven such countries, including linked to the growth and level of pros- India, which account for about two- perity in advanced countries. thirds of developing-country population 46 Manufactures In the nineteenth century in the United (excluding China) has managed to raise States changes in exports lagged behind the share of manufactures to about 50 changes in the rest of the economy. percent of nonfuel exports (see chart). Exports remained a small and relatively Africa is the only region in which 13 Other constant share of GNP (6 to 7 percent). In dependence on a single primary export 18 primaries Australia, too, growth was dominated by has not diminished. internal factors. Although Argentina This diversification away from primary 13 2nd and 3rd largest export enjoyed rates of export growth roughly products does not mean that foreign 43 similar to those of the United States and demand no longer matters. Developing exported similar products in the last half countries depend on developed-country Largest single 23 primary export of the nineteenth century, it grew little. markets for their manufactured exports; In the three or four decades preceding short-run fluctuations in the demand for 1960 1980 World War I, trade of developing coun- their exports due to fluctuations in tries grew almost as fast as that of devel- growth in industrial countries can still be Excludes major exporters such ,is Korea, I-Tong oped countries (36 percent a decade com- important. But the diversification of Kong, and Singapore. Includes India, Mexico, Brazil, and Egypt. pared with 40 percent). In relation to exports toward manufactures has 5cs,' Rx'del, 1984. GNP, foreign trade was rising more rap- changed the medium- and long-run com- idly in the developing countries than in petitive position of developing-country developed ones. exports in developed-country markets. income in developed countries in the The experience of developing countries Their manufactured exports account for 1960s and 1970s. Developing-country since World War II further suggests that less than 5 percent of apparent consump- exports increased twice as fast in relation simple links between developing-coun- tion in developed countries, and are sub- to developed-country income in the try exports and income growth in the stitutes for goods produced within 1970s; for each 1 percent change in real industrial countries do not adequately advanced countries. As long as markets income in developed countries, the vol- explain export performance. The engine for developing countries' manufactured ume of developing-country exports of growth concept is based on the prem- exports remain relatively free of protect- increased by only 0.9 percent in the ise that developing-country exports are ive barriers, external demand constraints 1960s, but by 1.7 percent in the 1970s. primary products and therefore grow in will not limit developing-country Manufactured exports from developing line with advanced-country income. But exports. countries increased at twice the rate of manufactures today account for about The experience of the 1960s and 1970s income of the developed countries in the half the value of nonfuel exports from bears this out. There has been no stable 1960s, but had almost five times the rate developing countries. A few Countries statistical relation between the volume of of income of developed countries in the account for a large proportion of these developing-country exports and real 1970s. and maintaining cooperation on debt problems, rowers. While adjustment requires action by the rather than confrontation. indebted country itself, the degree of retrench- In the short term, the position is somewhat dif- ment and its cost to the country also depend on the ferent. Given the effects of the recession and the external environment in the next few years. growth of debt, debtors have to show that they are Because of the large current account deficits of prepared to pay interest out of their own income. many developing countries in the early 1980s, sub- This is necessary not only to anchor the value of stantial adjustments have been required to cover debt in the willingness to service it but alsoin the interest obligations. The best way to have adjusted context of high real interest rates and of low would have been to combine cuts in spending with growth in indebted countriesto avoid explosive policies to switch production into exports and into growth of capitalized interest in relation to GDP. efficient import substitution. Switching usually An adverse world environment, however, makes requires a real depreciation in the exchange rate more costly the adjustments required of many bor- (see Box 34). The process is less costly if it does 43 Box 3.3 Delinking from the world economy? Having an open trading and payments more unstable, its position will still be virtually none in 1962 to more than $15 regimen encourages optimal use of avail- better than under autarky. Some of the billion in 1980. In the same period India's able investment resources. This is a instability experienced by developing manufactured exports rose from $0.6 bil- stronger argument for integrating into countries which chose fuller integration lion to only $4.1 billion. India and Korea the world economy than that which into the world economy was unavoid- were different in several respects: claims that demand from industrial able, but many consequences were exac- Korea's literacy rate in 1960 was more countries provides an 'engine of erbated by inappropriate domestic poli- than twice that of India; foreign capital growth" for the developing world. All cies. Overvalued exchange rates, flows to Korea were larger; and, of countries have to trade to some extent. unsustainable public spending, and inef- course, India is a much bigger country More inward-looking economies are not ficient pricing policies all accentuated the with a larger domestic market, so its less buffeted by external shocks than are short-run domestic costs of coping with a exports as a percentage of total GNP outward-looking ones. The more volatile world. would not be expected to be as high as inward-looking an economy, the higher To achieve stability of domestic Korea's (though they might well be in the proportion of capital goods in incomes by delinking from a volatile absolute terms). imports and the greater the costs to out- world economy can lead to lower aver- Nevertheless, there were important put of compressing imports. Similarly, age income than if the world economy similarities: for example, in 1960 the the more difficulty such an economy has rollercoaster is ridden efficiently. For share of manufacturing in GDP was 14 in expanding exports, because the instance, despite constraints on its devel- percent in both countries, and the share smaller the proportion of output that is opment, by keeping the economy rela- of the labor force in agriculture was 66 readily tradable. For these reasons, tively insulated from international com- percent in Korea and 74 percent in India inward-looking countries have generally petition, India has maintained a trend in Both countries hid followed an inward had not only lower growth but also growth rate of income of about 3.5 to 4.0 looking development strategy in the greater difficulty in adjusting to shocks percent a year over three decades. But 1950s. For countries with pressure of and more serious debt problems than the this stability was bought at a cost: not population on land and a rapidly grow- more outward-looking economies. The reaping the gains from integration in the ing labor force, labor-intensive manufac- contrast between Latin American and world economy during the early period turing is a major means for providing East Asian middle-income countries in when the world economy was growing. employment. The relatively poor perfor- the 1980s is instructive. As an illustration of this loss, in 1960 the mance of India in increasing its manufac- Although the gains to a country from absolute size of Korea's manufacturing tured exports meant that employment an outward-oriented strategy will obvi- sector was a quarter of India's; in 1980 it outside agriculture has grown mui.h less ously diminish if trade restrictions was more than 60 percent of India's. than it could have increase or external financing becomes Korean manufactured exports rose from not occur too swiftly, if a large proportion of ing-country trade balances, the amount required to domestic output is easily tradablethat is, if meet debt service payments, is equivalent to only 5 domestic and international prices are reasonably percent of world exports. Some of the exports of closely alignedand if it is easy to expand exports debtor countries, however, face actual or potential rather than necessary to compress imports. Unfor- restrictions in foreign markets. Equally important, tunately, many of the principal debtor countries the domestic system of incentives is biased against got into difficulties just because these conditions exports in many of the developing countries, did not exist: their exchange rates had become seri- which makes it more difficult for them to exploit ously overvalued; their producers were heavily the opportunities for exports that do exist. protected, often by import controls that reduced Partly because of the difficulty of expanding the incentive to sell abroad; export industries were exports and partly because of this domestic policy relatively underdeveloped and, in addition, faced bias against exports, imports have been cut dra- growing restraints in foreign markets. matically instead, with adverse implications for Because the major debtors account for only a growth. Moreover, there is a difference between small fraction of world trade, the transfer of reducing imports by reducing domestic spend- resources abroad needed to improve their current ingpainful though that isand reducing imports accounts should in theory be accomplished reason- by imposing direct restrictions on imports. The lat- ably smoothly. A shift of $100 billion in develop- ter is likely not even to produce the needed exter- 44 Box 3.4 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from the experience of developing countries Most governments intervene in setting By 1981 imports had risen by 14.8 per- slumped from more than 8 percent to exchange rates. The results are far-reach- cent and exports had fallen by 5.2 per- less than 2 percent, as shown in the ing. Severely overvalued real exchange cent. The imbalance was temporarily table, It cost the Yugoslav economy rates (here defined as the ratio of domes- financed by large capital inflows that almost twice as much in terms of domes- tic prices to foreign prices converted at responded to capital market deregula- tic resources to earn $1 of foreign the prevaling nominal exchange rate) tion. But in 1982 capital flows reversed, exchange through import substitution shift resources toward less easily traded and GNP fell by 12.9 percent. Too late, than through exports. sectors and induce excess demand for the preannounced exchange rate policy Turkey represents another interesting imports. The resulting shortage of for- was abandoned. case. By 1977 a severe foreign exchange eign exchange may cause higher protec- Exchange overvaluation may also crisis and other difficulties brought eco- tion against imports and additional occur when governments follow the nomic growth to a halt. Rapid increases measures to ration foreign exchange. (quite common) policy of holding the real in the price level had far outpaced the These policies reduce efficiency by creat- exchange rate constant in the presence of rapid depreciation of the exchange rate ing incentives (1) to shift resources to adverse external shocks. These imply after 1975 and continued to do so until import substituting activities, which some depreciation of the underlying early 1980. To compound matters, the require more domestic resources to save equilibrium real exchange rate, although country is an oil importer and the oil a unit of foreign exchange than does there is no simple relation between the price increase of 1979 represented an exporting; and (2) to spend scarce magnitude of external shock and the adverse change in the terms of trade domestic resources on 'rent seeking".-.- degree of equilibrium exchange deprecia- equivalent to some 2.7 percent of GDP. the privately profitable activity of appro- tion. During 1976-79 Yugoslavia main- Starting in January 1980, reforms were priating part of the rent from access to tained a constant real exchange rate, but instituted to correct the situation. As cheap, but rationed, sources of foreign the underlying equilibrium rate was fall- shown in the table, the nominal exchange. ing. In 1977 the Yugoslav exchange rate exchange rate depreciated sharply in the Overvalued exchange rates can arise in was some 10 percent overvalued; by 1979 years 1980 and 1981, reducing the degree several ways. In Chile the nominal dollar overvaluation had reached 42 percent, of overvaluation to well below its 1978 exchange rate was preannounced and and exchange rates had surpassed 8 per- level (even taking into account the fixed in June 1979. At the same time, cent of GDP. In 1980 the country experi- change needed because of the oil price wages were indexed to provide full com- enced a severe foreign exchange short- increase). By 1981 Turkish growth pensation for past changes in consumer age in response to adverse external resumed, and exports began growing prices. With falling but still high domes- shocks, which amounted to some 3.6 rapidly with the exchange rate at a realis- tic inflation, the real exchange rate rose. percent of GDP during 1979-81. Growth tic level. Exchange rates and GDP growth in Yugoslavia and Turkey, 1976-83 Country and item 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Yugoslavia Exchange rate = dinars/dollars 18.2 18.3 18.6 19.0 24.7 35.0 50.3 42.8 Market clearing rate 22.3 20.4 22.6 26.9 33.5 Overvaluation (percent) 23.0 10.0 21.0 42.0 34.0 . . Import rentslGDP (percent) 8.3 4.3 6.4 8.2 8.6 . . . . Real GDP growth rate (percent) 5.3 8.4 8.5 6.3 2.3 1.4 0.8 --.1.3 Turkey Exchange rate = Lira/dollars 16.1 18.0 24.3 31.1 76.1 111.2 162.6 225.5 Market clearing rate 38.3 72.4 103.9 112.6 Overvaluation (percent) 57.6 98.9 40.0 3.4 . . Market clearing rate without oil price rise 38.3 60.0 57.3 63.0 . . . Real GDP growth rate (percent) 8.7 4.3 2.8 -0.9 -0.7 4.4 4.7 3.1 Note: Estimates of market clearing rates, percentage overvaluation, and ratio of import rents to GDP are based on modeling exercises which simulate the Yugoslav and Turkish economies during 1976-80 and 1978-81, respectively. Not available. 45 nal surplus. The resulting rise in protection intro- 33 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1995. duces a further bias against exports but does not Under the Low case they fall by 7 percent. In 1995 do anything to cut spending in relation to output, net exports of goods and nonfactor services to as is required. Most of the major debtors have, developing countries are $70 billion under the unfortunately, adopted this second method of High scenario, a real increase of 544 percent over reducing imports. 1983; under the Low case they are only $29 billion, Adjustment also needs to be accompanied by a real increase of 169 percent. Net disbursements changed financial attitudes. In dealing with of medium- and long-term loans less interest pay- debtors, commercial lenders tend to push for more ments are $22 billion in 1995 under the High case. rapid repayment. This preference arises from their In the Low case the figure is negative: developing perception of risks and perhaps from their failure, countries pay in interest $9 billion more than they acting as individual lenders, to associate a higher receive in net loan disbursements. Finally, debt probability of default with fast repayment. At the outstanding and disbursed rises at 3.7 percent a other extreme, governments try to postpone year in real terms in the High case and at less than adjustment as long as possible, to minimize con- 1 percent in the Low case. sumption losses now even if this means larger In the Low case, the nominal interest rate is 9.5 repayment humpsand hence consumption percent; but because this is the rate for prime bor- lossesin the future. rowers, many developing countries would face a The achievement of an adjustment "package" higher rate. With a spread of 1.5 percent, for exam- implies the recognition by both parties of an inter- ple, the interest rate for many borrowers would be mediate solution that does not jeopardize either 11.0 percent a year. Developing countries' exports the probability of repayment or the consumption in the Low case are expected to grow at only 4.7 of future generations. One important means of percent a year in real terms, at 12.8 percent taking achieving this solution would be to increase the into account the projected increase in export flow of equity investment to developing countries. prices. It is assumed that developing countries Next year's World Development Report will examine reduce their debt service ratios from the high levels capital flows to developing countries, including of the mid-1980s to the 1980 level by the end of the direct private investment. forecast period. But because export revenues grow Many developing countries have been meeting only slightly more rapidly than the interest rate, their interest obligations and are likely to go on the growth of net disbursements must be doing so. If this process is too protracted, how- restrained to meet the target debt service ratio. ever, it might affect their willingness to persevere This restraint on net borrowing means that with their adjustment. They start from low levels imports can grow only slightly more rapidly than of income and face a period of slow income and exports (5.1 versus 4.7 percent). consumption growth because of their need to use Under the Low case, the developing countries current output to service past debts. That is why would fall into three categories. the longer-term prospects for the world economy Low-income African countries. Having little will help determine whether the present ad hoc prospect of commercial borrowing, they would combination of rescheduling by creditors and aus- depend almost completely on official aid. Much of terity by debtors proves to be the prelude to a har- the aid would have to go directly into consump- monious resolution or the prologue to a disaster. tion; the private debt they now carry would have The effect of world economic growth on devel- to be rolled over. Low-income Africa would receive oping economies is revealed in Table 3.4, which only $2.7 billion of net disbursements of medium- shows the balance of payments of the developing and long-term loans in real terms. Their interest countries under the High and Low scenarios. In payments in 1995 would be $1.3 billion. Net official both cases it is assumed that lenders will wish to transfers would be $2.4 billion. Debt outstanding see debt service indicators return to their levels of and disbursed would be only 36 percent higher in 1980. The slower the growth of exports and GDP real terms after twelve years. of the borrowing countries, and the higher the real Countries that would be hurt least by a weak interest and inflation rates in the world economy, world economy. Middle-income countries such as the smaller the amount developing countries can Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore would boom com- borrow. pared with the rest of the world and would be Under the High case the loan disbursements and creditworthy as a result. China and India depend official transfers to the developing countries rise by little on international borrowing, although slow 46 growth in the industrial countries would squeeze in real terms between 1983 and 1995. the amount of concessional assistance they would To sum up, there are two major differences receive. between the High and Low cases: net lending and A group of countries that would be in and out export growth. In the High case, substantial extra of financial difficulties for the rest of the 1980s and borrowing is compatible with improved debt serv- possibly beyond. Some of their difficulties would icing for developing countries partly because the be dealt with through debt renegotiations, the nominal interest rate is lower than in the Low case, most problematic of which would be with the big and because export revenues grow at a higher rate. Latin American borrowers. Having run austerity Mutual cooperation between lenders and borrow- programs for years, some might effectively impose ers is reasonably assured. In the Low case, export their own schedule for debt repayment. The major revenues grow only slightly more rapidly than the exporters of manufactures shown in Table 3.4, (higher) interest rate and net lending falls over the which include many of these countries, would period to meet target debt service ratios. As a have only 9.1 percent more debt outstanding in result, in the Low case, many developing countries real terms in 1995 than in 1983. Net disbursements end up transferring resources to the industrial to them of medium- and long-term loans in 1995 world year after year. If there is, in addition, would be $8.4 billion less than their interest pay- greatly increased industrial-country protection, ments. Other middle-income oil importers would then sustained cooperation becomes unlikely. be in a similar position: by 1995 their outstanding Improved developing-country performance on its debt would rise by 15 percent in real terms, and own would make the picture brighter. Neverthe- their net medium- and long-term borrowing would less, the slow growth of industrial countries in the be less than $1 billion more than their interest pay- Low cases would balance the world economy on a ments. knife's edge. The main difference between the Low case and the variant Low I (increased industrial-country Poverty and low-income countries protection) is that the main debtor nations would find it more difficult than ever to service their The implications of the scenarios are best under- debts. They would pay a nominal interest rate of stood if their GDP growth rates are adjusted for 11.0 percent, as in the Low case, but the growth of the widely differing population growth rates of the exports would now average only 4.0 percent (Table various regions. Between the High and the Low 3.6), with nominal growth in export earnings of 12 case, per capita income growth falls from 3.5 per- percent. Even a developing country exporting only cent a year to 2.7 percent for developing countries manufactures might find its export earnings grow- (see Table 3.2). Increased protection makes pros- ing at less than the nominal interest rate. Most pects still worse, with per capita income growth developing countries would be starved of external for all developing countries 34 percent below the capital. Debt outstanding and disbursed to devel- level of the High case. In all scenarios the major oping countries in 1995 would be only slightly exporters of manufactures grow fastest, leaving larger than in 1983 in real terms. Loans disbursed the rest of the developing world further and fur- would be $42 billion (compared with $49 billion in ther behind. the Low case.) Interest payments of $55 billion It is in the low-income countriesespecially would exceed disbursements as creditworthiness those of Africathat slow growth does most to falls because of the protection-induced decline in perpetuate and accentuate poverty. In low-income exports. Lower growth of imports would also con- Asia, however, prospects look brighter, especially tribute to lower overall growth. This scenario, in as population growth continues to slow. Domestic effect, is untenable. If the situation described policy improvements are essential in enhancing began to unfold, the prospect for growth in devel- the prospects of low-income countries. Like the oping countries would surely be worse than that middle-income countries, they would benefit from implied by these projections. policy changes that reduce the bias against export- The improved developing-country policies in ing in favor of inefficient import substitution. Pre- Low II help, although the real growth of outstand- vious World Development Reports have emphasized ing debt remains low for the highly indebted major the importance of prices in determining how well a exporters of manufactures and for the middle- country uses its resources. Because they are so income oil exporters. For developing countries as a poor, low-income countries have special reason to whole, debt outstanding grows by only 1 percent make the best possible use of their resources. 47 Because the public sector in low-income coun- without excessive cost to themselves, they will tries is large in relation to GDP, cutting imports need to expand their exports rather than just usually means cutting public spending. Although reduce imports. Any worsening of global pros- governments may have scope for reducing spend- pects in terms of increased protectionism and fur- ing without damaging long-term growth, budget ther rises in dollar interest rates would erode the cuts too often damage programs with the greatest ability and perhaps even the willingness, of bor- capacity for raising the economy's growth poten- rowers to service their debt. tial. Some of them may be classified as current As in trade, so in finance there is a need for spending; but education and health budgets are concerted international action. The success of better seen as investments in human capital. developing countries' efforts to deal with the rigid- Most human development programs have long ities and distortions in their own economies gestation lags. Their output is not directly tradable depends in part on the actions of official and pri- and often is not even marketable. Commercial vate suppliers of finance. For the poorer countries financing of such investments is therefore unrealis- the main challenge for the international commu- tic. A real increase in concessional assistance is nity is to find ways of supporting policy reform needed, and has been for several years. Yet, at through additional flows of concessional assist- times of their greatest difficulty, low-income coun- ance. This has been the challenge in the negotia- tries have found that official aid has been falling in tions for the seventh IDA replenishment (see Box real terms. This trend must be reversed if low- 3.5), the discussions for possible supplemental income countries are to make any progress in the budgeting to IDA, and the extension of the Lome years ahead and the lot of the poorest people is not Convention. to deteriorate any further. For the middle-income countries the actions of a wide range of private and public institutions are International action important. Commercial banks have typically relied on borrowing countries' agreements with the This chapter has shown that the world economic International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a basis for outlook would brighten considerably if every restructuring existing claims and, in selected cases, country took steps to improve its own domestic for committing additional funds. Increases in vol- performance. The onus on the industrial countries untary lending by the commercial banks in the is greatest, because growth prospects throughout long term is an important ingredient in the restora- the world would be transformed if they overcame tion of growth momentum in middle-income the rigidities and inflationary fears that slowed developing countries. But the transition back to them down in the past ten years. Even without fully voluntary lending requires prudent manage- such benefits, the developing countries could do ment on the side of both borrowers and lenders. much to help themselves through policy changes Official institutions, particularly the IMF, the that increase the flexibility of their own economies. World Bank, and the regional development banks That said, some measures need to be taken at an can be helpful in this regard both by assisting in international, not purely domestic, level and in a the design of more effective developing-country coordinated way. A trade-liberalization initiative policies and by expanding their own lending in that concentrated on the newer and proliferating support of policy reforms (see Box 3.5). Efforts by forms of protectionismvarious nontariff barriers, these institutions to encourage private direct especially those affecting developing countries investment should also continue. Finally, it is would make an important contribution to restoring important that official export-financing institutions the momentum of the world economy. It is also adjust to the greater risks of lending to developing essential to start liberalizing trade in agriculture. countries in a nondisruptive fashion. What is Just as the liberalization of trade in manufactures required need not be very dramatic for any single provided a once-for-all but sizable boost to produc- institution, provided they all act constructively. tivity growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so Measures that would result in increased financial the same approach to agricultural trade, combined flows to developing countries to help them under- with the reversal of the recent protectionist meas- take structural adjustment and maintain long-term ures on industrial products, could boost productiv- financial viability will help make trade liberaliza- ity in the 1980s. tion easier by improving their short-term balance Freer trade is also vital for solving the debt crisis. of payments outlook. In turn, liberalization would For the developing countries to service their debt expand exports and would tend to strengthen 48 Box 3.5 IDA The International Development Associa- While the terms of IDA are conces- cancellation, but at the cost of preempt- tion (IDA) was established in 1960 as an sional, its projects are generally identical ing further expansion in future IBRD affiliate of the International Bank for in scope and rigor to IBRD projects. lending. India also had to resort to bor- Reconstruction and Development Rates of return on IDA projects have rowing from commercial markets; by (IBRD), to provide concessional assist- been on average as high as on IBRD proj- 1986, borrowing on market terms may ance to low-income countries. Govern- ects, but they are decidedly lower in account for over half of disbursements to ments in the industrial world recognized Africa than elsewhere: the average on India. But concessional assistance would that low-income countries could not eighty-eight IDA projects in Africa was still have an essential role to play in mod- afford to take on commercial loans carry- nevertheless about 14 percent. Since its erating India's debt burden and in con- ing high interest rates and short maturi- inception, twenty-seven countries have solidating the effects of recent policy ties (even if they were forthcoming) to graduated from IDA to the IBRD, and shifts toward liberalizing imports, prices, finance projects that had long payback thirteen countries, including India, re- and industrial licensing. periods and earned little foreign ceive a blend of IBRD and IDA financing. China's allocations will increase some- exchange. In the years since IDA's incep- Constraints on IDA lending have what over those of IDA-6, as earlier IDA tion, the predicament of low-income recently increased. In 1961-82 commit- activities were limited. But China's low countries has not eased significantly; ments grew at 8 percent a year in real incomes (about $310 per capita) and the indeed, the recent recession in industrial terms. However, because of slower-than- large number of its people living below countries has made it worse. anticipated contributions from the sixth the poverty line (150 million, equal to IDA has met a large share of external replenishment of IDA (IDA-6), lending three-fourths of the entire population of financing of low-income countries. IDA in 1982 declined in current dollars to a low-income sub-Saharan Africa) suggest lending, however, has not on average level 30 percent below that of 1980, and tha a suitably broad spectrum of sectors exceeded 2 percent of gross domestic in 1983 it was still 13 percent below the and provinces can be covered only if a investment in recipient countries. In 1980 1980 level. At $9 billion, the seventh large amount of finance is available. in India and Pakistan, currently the first replenishment of IDA (IDA-7) represents Sub-Saharan Afrian countries are fac- and third largest borrowers, it was less a major reduction in the concessional ing some of the most adverse external than 2 percent. Only in Bangladesh was resources available to the world's poor- circumstances in recent history. Between it as much as 13 percent; it was 8 percent est countries. It is 25 percent lower in 1973 and 1981, low-income Africa lost as in Ethiopia and 3 to 4 percent in Tanzania nominal terms and 40 percent lower in much as 23 percent in the purchasing and Sudan. Disbursements per person in real terms than the IDA-6 agreement power of its exports to buy manufac- 1980 in the recipient countries averaged reached in 1979. Partly because of Chi- tures. Per capita incomes declined. $1.33 in IDA countries and 40 cents in na's membership, this reduction also Large-scale reschedulings of official debt countries receiving a blend of IDA and represents a 70 percent cut in real per have taken place. Essential domestic IBRD money, including India and Paki- capita terms. reforms are being undertaken, but they stan. In 1980 official development assist- Some of the consequences of a decline need to be supported by concessional ance (ODA) financed 65 percent of the in IDA lending are already being felt but flows. current account deficit of low-income will be intensified under IDA-7. Strict Africa's share in IDA has risen, from 25 Countries, and IDA contributed 16 per- application of IDA's allocation criteria percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1983, but cent of development assistance. would result in allocations for India and even increasing Africa's share by a fur- During 1961-82, 81 percent of total IDA China of more than three-quarters of ther 5 percent over IDA-6 levels would commitments, which were $43 billion in IDA-7 resources. In order to prevent an yield less in additional resources from a constant 1982 dollars, went to countries imbalance in IDA's lending program, a $9 billion IDA than would maintaining with per capita incomes below $410 in ceiling will need to be placed on lending its present share in a $12 billion IDA. 1980, compared with only 8 percent of to these two countries (for similar rea- With a $9 billion IDA, Africa would have IBRD lending. Because IDA countries are sons, a ceiling had to apply on lending to a 21 percent reduction in real terms com- the poorest, nearly 40 percent of IDA India and Pakistan in the past). Resource pared with commitments made in the funds went to agriculture and rural constraints on IDA have already induced IDA-6 period. So would thirteen coun- development, compared with 22 percent the Association to restrict lending to tries outside Africa, including Bangla- of IBRD funds. Human development, India. IDA lending to India declined desh (where IDA lending declined by 6 program lending, and technical assist- from a peak of $1.5 billion in 1980 to percent in the past year), Burma, Sri ance received about 25 percent of IDA about $1 billion since then. During IDA- Lanka, and Pakistan. lending, compared with 16 percent of 6, IBRD lending had to substitute parti- IBRD lending. ally for IDA lending as projects risked 49 developing-country creditworthiness, thus in- slow growth, many millions of poor people will by creasing the developing countries' capacity to definition get poorer. Moreover, lower GDP obtain and service additional capital flows. In growth makes it more difficult for countries to short, trade liberalization, enlarged flows of exter- finance programsin education and family plan- nal finance, and improved economic policies in all ning, for examplethat reduce population countries are mutually reinforcing actions in sup- growth. Thus short-run difficulties have long-run port of restoring the growth momentum of devel- consequences. oping countries. Important as these simple facts are, they do not begin to capture the links between population The links with population growth and economic development. Understand- ing those links requires much more than the mere Modest growth in the GDP of industrial countries counting of heads. It requires consideration of means modest growth in their per capita incomes. education, health, employment, incomes, culture, For the developing countries there is no such easy and personal beliefsaspects of everyday life that equation. Their populations are growing by 2 per- explain why parents choose to have a particular cent a year, in many countries by much more. GDP number of children and what their choices add up growth of 2 percent or so is merely a preliminary to. Part II of this Report is about population step before they can start to improve their per cap- change in developing countries. As will soon ita incomes. Governments throughout the devel- become apparent, it is also about development in oping world cannot ignore the literal sense in its widest sense. It is affected by the macroeco- which population growth affects the economic per- nomic perspective of Part I, and it gives that per- formance that really mattersthe average incomes spective richer meaning. of their people. If the world is to have ten years of 50 Part II Population Change and Development 4 Demographic change and public policy Most families in developing countries now have at of children are low, the economic (and other) bene- least four children, in rural areas five and more, fits of children are high, and having many children enough to ensure rates of population growth makes economic sense. above 2 percent a year. To cut population growth First, where wages are low, the difference means to reduce the number of children in an aver- between children's and mother's earnings will be age family, which many governments are trying to small; income lost by the mother during a child's do. India adopted a formal population policy in infancy may be easily recouped by the child later 1952, Korea in 1961. China, Indonesia, and Mexico on. In poor rural areas, especially, children can have developed comprehensive policies in the past help a lot. Nepalese village boys and girls of six to ten to fifteen years. But other governments have eight years work three to four hours a day caring been more tentative. In much of Latin America for farm animals and helping with younger sib- political support for family planning is ambiguous; lings. Javanese teenagers work eight to ten hours a most countries in Africa have no particular demo- day. Many Bangladeshi children work even longer graphic objectives. Should there be public concern hours; children in the Philippines and in Sri and governmental action to reduce population Lanka, where fertility is lower, work somewhat growth? Along with public efforts to reduce mor- less. Sometimes children may also earn cash tality, should governments try to reduce fertility, incomes. In the Philippines those in their late teens and if so, what are appropriate policies to do so? contribute as much to household cash income as To answer these questions requires an under- do adults. And much of women's traditional standing of, first, why fertility is high and, second, workin farming, crafts, and petty retailingcan why the resulting rapid population growth slows be combined with looking after children. Other development. Part II of this Report will show that family members, including older siblings, are read- it is the poor, with little education, low and inse- ily available to help. cure income, and poor health and family planning In developed countries, by contrast, a major cost services, who have many children; yet it is also the of children to parents is time lost from workusu- poor who lose out as rapid population growth ally by the motheror the cost, inconvenience, hampers development. It is this seeming paradox and uncertainty of finding child care. Nor do chil- that provides the starting point for designing pub- dren contribute much to household chores and lic policies to reduce fertility. income as they grow up. One study of an Ameri- can city and its suburbs found that children twelve The setting for high fertility to seventeen years old spend one hour a day doing housework, those aged six to eleven just half an Why do the poor have many children? Consider hour. the issue from the point of view of parents and A second reason that having many children can potential parents. All parents everywhere get plea- make economic sense is the lack of schooling sure from children. But children involve economic opportunities, particularly from the age of twelve costs; parents have to spend time and money or so. For young children of primary-school age, bringing them up. Children are also a form of school can often be combined with work in the investmentproviding short-term benefits if they house or on the farm, especially if there is a school work during childhood, long-term benefits if they in the village. But the choice between school and support parents in old age. There are several good work becomes harder as children grow up. If they reasons why, for poor parents, the economic costs do not go to secondary school, they can work more 51 themselves and, by caring for younger siblings, today's production into consumption many years allow their mothers to work more. The apparent hence that is less risky than are bank accounts, disadvantages of secondary schooling are com- credit instruments, and precious metals, all of pounded if children must live away from home or which are subject to theft, inflation, and the jeal- travel long distances to get to school. ousies of neighbors. Even land has to be managed As parents' income rises, as schooling opportu- to provide income and, in any case, may require nities improve, and as education becomes more children to work on it and make it a secure asset. clearly the key to future success for children, par- Fifth, in some developing countries family sys- ents everywhere send their children to school and tems may encourage high fertility. Early marriage keep them there longer. In turn they often have and childbearing are easier if the new couple can fewer childrenbecause schooling itself and the begin married life in the household of the hus- loss of children's help are costly, and because hav- band's parents. For young women who have few ing two or three educated children becomes a other options, early marriage and many children better "investment" (for the parents and for the may be the safest route to a satisfying adulthood children too) than having many who cannot be and a relatively secure old age. In Africa, support educated. from many relatives for children's education High infant and child mortality are a third reason reduces the high economic burden of raising chil- for having many children. Although mortality has dren that potential parents would otherwise bear. fallen, in many parts of the developing world it is A sixth factor encouraging high fertility among still high. One out of five children dies before the poor is their limited information about, and reaching the age of one in some parts of Africa; access to, effective and safe means of contracep- one out of seven in much of Bangladesh, India, tion. The very idea of birth control may be and Pakistan. Parents may feel the need to have unknown or frowned upon. Modern contracep- many babies to be sure that a few survive. Where tives may be unknown or simply not available. If boys are more important than girlssay, for secu- available, they may be expensive, particularly in rity in old ageparents may need to have five chil- relation to the incomes of the poorand especially dren to be sure that one son survives. Yet in poor if they must be bought from private doctors. For a families many births, especially if they are close poor family, limiting the number of children may together, may increase the probability of infant therefore mean sexual abstinence, illegal abortion, deaths by weakening both mother and babies. infanticideor, at best, ineffective and difficult tra- Fourth, poor parents are worried about who will ditional contraception. In some circumstances, the take care of them when they are old or ill. In Indo- psychological or financial costs of avoiding preg- nesia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Tur- nancy may exceed the costs of having another key 80 to 90 percent of parents surveyed said they child. expect to rely on their children to support them in Discussion of children as an "investment" their old age. In Egypt, especially in rural areas, should not imply that parents in developing coun- poor and uneducated parents are much more tries are influenced only by economic consider- likely to expect to live with (and be supported by) ations. In every society children bring parents sat- their children when they are old than are rich and isfaction and pleasure. In poor settings, economic educated parents. For many adults, the need for gain (where there is any) need not be the main support in their old age outweighs the immediate cause of high fertility; it is more likely that eco- costs of children. nomic gain (or a small economic loss) simply pre- One reason parents look to children for help in vents any interest in having fewer children. The disability and old age is the lack of safe alterna- social and political functions of large families are tives. In developed countries there are trusted also important, especially in poor rural areas. For institutions (banks, pensions, government bonds, better-off farmers in Bangladesh, children repre- insurance, and mutual aid societies) that help indi- sent opportunities for the family's occupational viduals to earn today and to save and spend diversification and hence for expansion or consoli- tomorrow. In poor countries, capital markets are dation of its local power; a large family also has an not nearly so well developed. In parts of South advantage in land disputes. In Latin America, by Asia, there is no tradition of community support; the tradition of corn padrazgo, or ritual coparent- elsewhere, community support is weakening as hood, families serve as godparents to the children mobility increases. For the rural poor, children are of allies and friends, securing ritual bonds that are the best possible annuity, a way to transform as important as blood ties in cementing alliances. 52 Consequences for parents poorer parents on average. But in Nigeria most children contemplating secondary school would Despite the apparent advantages of many chil- not come from very poor households, so family dren, it is not clear that, from a strictly economic size probably has some independent influence on point of view, parents gain. Children may end up educational performance. costing parents more than they expected. In some In developing countries, a disproportionate countries girls may require a dowry and thus be an share of children grow up in large families that are economic burden. For households close to subsis- least able to take advantage of increased educa- tence levels, food, clothing, and housing for chil- tional opportunities and health services. In Brazil dren may be a burden; such costs are in fact the more than 60 percent of all children live in the chief concern parents voice, even in the poorest poorest 40 percent of households, households settings, when asked about the disadvantages of which between them have just 10 percent of total having children. How much of an economic gain income. In Malaysia and Thailand about half of all children provide may depend on circumstances children live in households that receive just 15 per- that parents cannot easily predictwhether they cent of total income. In Colombia and Malaysia in gain or lose access to land, whether their children 1974, government subsidies for education and are healthy, whether they have the right balance of health were approximately equal across house- sons and daughters. Even old-age support is not holds. But because fewer children lived in rich guaranteed. Some children do not survive; daugh- households, subsidies per child were twice as ters who marry may move to another village; sons great for children in the richest fifth of households who go far to find work may be less supportive as for those in the poorest. Evidence from urban than was hoped. Children willing and able to help areas in Colombia also shows that parents them- may themselves face difficulties in finding well- selves, at all income and education levels, spend paying work. So although parents can reasonably less on each child's education once there are more hope to be better off by having many children, in than four children. Thus children from large fami- the end some may not be. lies receive less from both public and private spending on education. Consequences for children In general, children have the most to gain from family income spent on health and education. Yet Even when parents seem to gain from large fami- family budget studies consistently show that big- lies, children may lose. This is obviously true ger families spend proportionately more on food. when births are closely spaced; the resulting harm Even then they may not avoid malnutrition: in one to the health and nutrition of mothers can cause Colombian town studied, malnutrition in pre- low birth weight, early weaning, and poor health school children was directly related to the number of children in the critical early years. Older chil- of children in the family. Of course, high fertility dren may also be handicapped. Even in developed may not be the direct cause of malnutrition; low countries, studies show that children in large fami- income might be responsible for both high fertility lies and those born close together tend to be physi- and malnutrition. In either case, however, children cally and intellectually inferior to other children. from large, poor families are clearly disadvan- For middle-class families in the United Kingdom taged. and Czechoslovakia, where food is abundant, the So early difficulties in providing enough good number of children does not affect their physical food interact with later difficulties in supporting growth. But in poor families, children with many schooling. As will be shown in Chapter 6, those siblings tend to be smaller. In France, the United who receive less schooling will, as adults, tend to States, and the Netherlands, a large number of have more children than parents who had more children in the family has a negative effect on class- schooling. From one generation to the next, an room performance and test scores. unequal distribution of income is caused by and The same pattern is found in developing coun- contributes to an unequal distribution of opportu- tries. In Nigeria, among a sample of children tak- nities and skills, as large family size and low ing the secondary school entrance exam, children investments in children reinforce each other. from large families scored systematically lower If parents have many children in the hope of than those from small families. In both sets of economic gain, the first step in reducing fertility is countries, some of this effect may be due to chil- to relieve their poverty and uncertainty about their dren from large families having less educated or own future. In this sense, the persistence of high 53 fertility in a changing world is a symptom of lack of efits to other families' children and grandchildren? access: to health services, which would reduce the Even when each couple decides to have many need for many births to insure against infant and children, and achieves its wish, it might have been child mortality; to education, which would raise happier with fewer children if it could have been parents' hopes for their children and would sure that other couples would have done the same. broaden women's outlook and opportunities; to Poor couples who hope their children will support social security and other forms of insurance for old them in their old age may rightly fear that, because age; to consumer goods and social opportunities other couples are having so many children, any that compete with childbearing; and to family one of their own children has less chance of going planning services, which provide the means to to school and eventually of finding a good job. limit births. Assured that each child would have a better chance of school and work in a less crowded The need for public policy world, each couple might be happy with fewer children. There are two broad justifications for government In this setting, people will not be confident that action to encourage people to have fewer children. provision of contraceptives by private suppliers The first is the gap between the private and social will alone lead to widespread reduction in fertility. gains from having many children. Suppose that, Only through the public sector can people make, even as each couple hopes to benefit from many in effect, a contract with each other: "If each of us children, it wishes its neighbors would have fewer, has fewer children, we can rely on government so that its children would face less competition for support for nationwide measures (to improve land and jobs. In other words, the couple's wish access to family planning services and to create for society as a whole is different from its wish for incentives for their use) to ensure that everybody itself. One reason private and social gains differ is makes the same decision. That way, we and our the existence of "externalities": parents do not children will all enjoy a better chance in life." By internalize the costs of their children to society as a developing a social contract, the government frees whole. For example, one family's children will each individual couple from its "isolation para- have little effect on the availability of land; but the dox," from its need to decide alone to have more children born of many families will. The same is children than it would want if others were limiting true of the effects on forests or pasture. To narrow their family size (see Box 4.1). this gap between private and social perceptions, Private and social gains from children also differ governments can act as custodians of society. They in the developed countries, although usually in the are meant to have longer time horizons than their opposite direction. As public social security sys- individual constituents, and to weigh the interests tems develop and people have many ways to save of future generations against those of the present. for their old age, the private economic benefits of Where natural resources are abundant, so-called children diminish. At the same time their private congestion costs caused in part by externalities costs rise. Thus many couples choose to have only may not be great, at least at the national level. But one child or even none. In some countries govern- in most countries there is another source of differ- ments use financial and other incentives to encour- ence between the private and social gains from age higher fertility; this too is a population policy many children. Health and education costs of chil- to achieve a common goal (see Chapter 8). dren are heavily subsidized by the public sector, as Private and social gains also differ in areas other are roads, communications, and other public serv- than fertility. For the common good, legislation ices that boost jobs and income. The result, dis- requires that children go to school and that every- cussed in the next chapter, is that high fertility con- body be vaccinated against contagious diseases. strains the amount of resources available for Limits, often backed by financial penalties, are investment and hence for future income growth. placed on automobile speeds, chopping down for- Even as some couples have many children because ests, and polluting air and water. Government pro- of a lack of health services and schooling opportu- duces social goods and services, the benefits of nities, their large families make it more difficult for which individuals cannot capture and will not pro- the public sector to extend health and schooling to duce on their own: police protection, clean water all. Yet why should one couple, on its own, give up to protect health, parks for common enjoyment. the possible private benefits of children, when its The second justification for government action to sacrifice alone would provide only minuscule ben- reduce fertility is that people may have more chil- 54 dren than they want, or would want had they as rhythm and withdrawal, which are less effective more information about, and better access to, eas- in preventing conception, or on abortion, which, if ier fertility control. For example, couples may lack primitively performed, puts the mother's life at (or disbelieve) information about falling child mor- risk. talityor about their chance to reduce the risks to In this situation, the role of the government is their existing children by keeping numbers critical. As a start, it can encourage parents in their downand thus have more children than needed desire to have fewer children simply by providing to reach desired family size. They may not know more informationabout changing mortality and that by stopping breastfeeding they risk more the health benefits of controlling fertility. It can closely spaced births. They may not be fully aware encourage wider provision of modern contracep- of the health risks, to mothers and children, of tives. This can be achieved by private suppliers, Box 4.1 The isolation paradox In a small village in Asia or Africa a large family to build up his wealth seems well-being_and even then individuals father of two sons and a daughter to have few risks and many possible may not act in the public interest them- dreams of having two or three more chil- benefits. selves. If parents had their way, many of dren. He believes that enough land This is not just one man's plan. it is them would wish to limit the fertility of might be available for each of his sons if shared by almost every man in the vil- others; if children had their way, many of only he could get more help in clearing, lage. Some may succeed; the majority them would wish to limit their own par- preparing, and harvesting the land he will not, simply because the amount of ents' fertility. already owns. Other families, particu- land in the village is limited. If all families Despite the rise in population, commu- larly those with few children, seem try to have five or more children, popula- nities can and do adjust. People move to barely able to use the land they have; at tion will double in less than a generation. the cities. Technology increases land pro- the right price, he could buy patches of it Most children will have less land than ductivity. (Indonesia offers an example from them. He could then amass enough their fathers. If the villagers cannot coor- where population expanded slowly but land to give some to all his sons. In his dinate their decisions, they will leave steadily for more than a century after the old age they could work the land and their children worse off than they were. institution of wet-rice cultivation, with- support him. Economists devote considerable atten- out notable decline in levels of living but Children cost that father little. They tion to how the hidden hand of the mar- without much improvement either.) In feed at the breast for two years or more. ket makes the sum of individual deci- their greater poverty, young people may Older ones care for the toddlers and also sions taken for private benefit add up to defer marriage and thus bring fewer chil- tend animals, carry water and wood, and the general good. They also recognize dren into subsequent generations. Par- help in the busy times of clearing and other cases in which the pursuit of pri- ents may arrange to put children in rela- harvesting. If the older children should vate gain can make most people worse tives' homes away from their village. All become a burden, a cousin will take them off. One term for this phenomenon is the these adjustments help to share poverty in and give them work to do. Moreover, isolation paradox. Individuals in isola- and to lessen its burden. But shared with recent improvements in health in tion act to the detriment of each other povetty is hardly the objective of the village more of the children born now unless they know that their fellows will development. vill survive. His strategy of having a act in a manner that serves the general [ many and closely spaced births. The very idea of especially in towns and, for some methods (such planning pregnancies may be unknown, especially as condoms), in rural areas as well. But private if social norms dictate early marriage for young suppliers are unlikely to provide the full range of women and if couples do not discuss sexual family planning services, especially in remote matters. areas. Many modern means of contraception can Even if they know about family planning, cou- be made available only with medical backup, and ples may not know how to practice it. They may be there is little profit in disseminating information reluctant to ask questions, especially if their par- and contraceptives where distribution systems are ents pressure them to have many children. Or they poor, health care is limited, and demand is may lack ready access to modern contraceptives unknown and possibly limited. In many countries and be forced to rely on traditional methods such government may need to subsidize or even orga- 55 nize contraceptive services. As will be shown in agree on the precise nature of that balance, but Chapter 7, substantial "unmet need" for family every society needs to consider it. planning information and services does exist in many countries. The case is strong for support of programs to assist the poor to achieve their repro- Lessons from history ductive goals more efficiently and humanely. This would increase the welfare of parents and improve Public concern with population growth is a recent the chances of their children having greater educa- phenomenon. The transition to low mortality and tional opportunities, and eventually better job low fertility in today's developed countries opportunities. occurred without any explicit public policy. But cir- The distinction between these two justifications cumstances in developing countries today are dif- for a public population policythe gap between ferent, and for several reasons that point to the private and social gains, and unmet need for fam- need for policy action. ily planning serviceshas not been important in practice. Support for family planning is usually how governments try to reduce fertility, a sensible The agricultural age and before first step so long as there is unmet need for infor- mation about family planning and unsatisfied For much of human history, prosperity and popu- demand for services. Government's role in devel- lation growth went hand in hand. In the preindus- oping and enhancing a social contract to lower fer- trial age, population growth was periodically tility provides the basis for public subsidies to fam- spurred by increases (often temporary) in the sup- ily planning; family planning programs have been ply of food and declines in disease. In fact disease subsidized most where a public policy to reduce kept the number of people well below a level at fertility is strongest. In fact, family planning pro- which starvation would have become a major grams have become an important vehicle for infor- cause of death. Fertility in normal times was well mation about the private and social costs of high below its biological potential, but it could rise fertility, and for incentives to encourage individ- quickly if mortality rose. Over long periods the uals to reduce family size. world's population increased slowly (by far less than 1 percent a decade, compared with 25 percent Such governmental involvement has expanded a decade today). in the past decade, since the Bucharest World Pop- Settled agriculture permitted a rise in popula- ulation Conference in 1974. There, governments tion, some concentration in urban centers, and the adopted a Plan of Action which recognized the emergence of a small nonagricultural class. In the basic human right to choose "freely and responsi- sixteenth century population declined in the bly" the number and spacing of children. There Americas because of new diseases contracted from has since been substantial progress in assuring Europe. In other parts of the world, population freedom of choice through family planning pro- growth rates increased between about 1450 and gramsabout 95 percent of people in the develop- 1650to rates higher than 1 percent a decade in ing world live in countries that support this China, South Asia, and Europe. Even these principle. increases were tiny by modern standards; over Should governments not only ensure procre- time and among regions, population growth con- ative freedom but also encourage social responsi- tinued to be irregular and vulnerable to fluctua- bility? The answer in this Report is a firm yes, with tions in mortality. Moreover, life expectancy was renewed attention to the ethical implications of probably little higher in 1600 than it had been 2,000 incentives and other policies that go beyond family years earlier. Everyone's health was threatened planning. A dilemma arises whenever pursuit of more or less constantly by disease. Only a tiny one set of valuesimprovement of material wel- proportion of people were literate or numerate. fare through lower population growth, reduction Between 100 and 1850, the percentage of the of inequality, insurance of future securitythreat- world's population living in towns and cities of ens other values, such as freedom of choice and 5,000 people or more probably never exceeded 6 pronatalist customs and beliefs. But there is a bal- percent. In England between the thirteenth and ance between the private right of procreation and eighteenth centuries, there is evidence that when social responsibility. As discussed more fully in mortality fell so that labor supply increased, wages Chapter 8, different societies will not necessarily fell and food prices rose (see Box 4.2). 56 Box 4.2 The Malthusian case: changes in labor supply, wages, and population growth in preindustrial England Research has brought to light new infor- Changes in selected variables in England Life expectancy at birth, mation on living standards, food prices, from the thirteenth to the both sexes, 1280-1911 and mortality and fertility change in twentieth century Years England over six centuries. 50 The data before 1800 fit a Malthusian model. An exogenous fall in mortality or All classes 40 an increase in productivity raises popula- tion growth; the increased labor supply then lowers real wage rates and raises the relative price of food and the rental returns on land. As wages fall, fertility falls and population growth slackens. Population size, 1250-1911 Millions 30 20 I Upper classes Fertility change was more variable 30 10 and more responsive to economic condi- 1200 1400 1600 1800 tions than was previously believed. Until 20 toward the end of the nineteenth cen- tury, in good times more people married and married younger, thus raising fertil- 10 Real wage index (wage-rate of craftsmen), ity. 1264-1911 (1451-1475 = 100) The start of the Industrial Revolu- tion in the late eighteenth century --- 120 brought a break in this Malthusian cycle. 1200 1400 1600 1800 By the mid-nineteenth century fertility 90 no longer rose along with real incomes. English rent-wage ratio: number of days of common labor (craftsmen) required to rent And the rise of living standards no an acre of farmland, 1510-1911 60 longer proved self-checking in the ways Days per acre Malthus feared, because productivity 6 was advancing so rapidly. 30 Both before and after the Industrial Revolution income differentials widened during periods of fast population 4 Ji / L 1200 1400 1600 Ratio of food prices to prices of other goods, 1800 growth. 1400-1900 2 The accompanying charts show the 4 long-run movements of key variables from 1250 to the early twentieth century. 0 3 The Black Death in the fourteenth cen- 1200 1400 1600 1800 tury brought a decline in life expectancy. Total population fell and wages rose. By Total fertility rate, 1540-1911 the middle of the sixteenth century life Total fertility rate expectancy and total population size were recovering and wages were declin- ing. Rents were rising in relation to 0 6 wages, which redistributed income from 1200 1400 1.600 1800 tenants to landowners. Late in the seven- teenth century, when population growth slowed again, wages rose and food Income distribution: share of top 20 percent prices fell. of households, 1600-1913 4 In the eighteenth century fertility Percent rose as nonagricultural opportunities 65 increased and marriage rates rose. Wages 1200 1400 1600 1800 failed to rise despite the gains in overall productivity associated with the begin- 60 ning of the Industrial Revolution. But life expectancy did increase gradually from 55 the early eighteenth century. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the share 50 of income of the richest groups fell, 1200 1400 1600 1800 wages rose, and fertility eventually Source: Lindert, 1984. began a sustained decline. 57 Economic transformation: Europe, Japan, areas of many developing countries, where educa- and North America tion beyond a few years is not available, extended family systems permit earlier marriage. The new In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the couple often lives with the husband's parents for early phase of modern economic growth in north- some time, and the family's assets are shared. west Europe, population and income increases What would be the financial burden of marrying accelerated together. Populations grew due to young and having children is reduced in the larger gradual declines in mortality and, in some areas, to household (though even today marriage does increases in marriage rates as new economic come later and fertility is lower among the truly opportunities opened up. Europe's rate of popula- destitute in developing countries). tion growth rose from 0.5 to 1.5 percent a year. No country in northwestern Europe had a crude Even that was low by modern standards, for sev- birth rate above forty per thousand in 1800; in sev- eral reasons. First, when the industrial age began eral (Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden) in the late eighteenth century, fertility was lower birth rates were nearer thirty per thousand. The than it is in developing countries today because crude birth rate in England was thirty-four per marriage rates were low and because those who thousand in 1850, before marital fertility began to married did so in their mid-twenties to late twen- decline, compared with forty-seven per thousand ties or even in their thirties. In the past two in Colombia in 1960 and more than fifty per thou- decades historical demographers have used sand in Kenya today (see Figure 4.1). By contrast, church registers to compile new and detailed infor- in the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth cen- mation on marriages, deaths, and births in parts of tury, crude birth rates are estimated to have been Europe. These studies indicate that as many as 15 between fifty and fifty-five per thousand. to 20 percent of women in northwest Europe never Another reason for slow population growth in married and that at any given time only 45 to 50 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that percent of women between the ages of fifteen and mortality, although gradually declining, was high fifty were married. The mean age at marriage in by today's standards. At the beginning of the nine- the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was teenth century infant mortality rates exceeded 200 about twenty-five in Belgium, England, France, per thousand live births in many communities of Germany, and Scandinavia. Newly married cou- Europe. They were about 250 per thousand in ples had to set up their own households and thus Sweden, and were more than 300 per thousand in had to postpone marriage until they were finan- what is now Germany, compared with an average cially independent. A common arrangement was of 100 per thousand in low-income developing for older couples to pass land to the young in countries today. The crude death rate in France exchange for a guarantee of retirement support; and England was about thirty per thousand at the such contracts occurred between different families beginning of the nineteenth century. It was as well as between parents and children. twenty-three per thousand in England in 1841, The poor in particular were forced to postpone twenty-eight per thousand in Germany in 1867, marriage; young adults often worked as servants and more than thirty per thousand in Sweden in to the better-off until they could marry. In England 1870, compared with about thirteen per thousand and Sweden the landless married later than those in India today. who owned land, except where cottage industry As a result of low fertility and high mortality, the opened up new opportunities to earn a living. natural increase in population seldom exceeded 1.5 Marriage occurred particularly late in Ireland. In percent a year. In England it peaked at about 1.6 1871 half the Irish women aged twenty-five to percent in the 1820s; in France it never exceeded 1 twenty-nine were still unmarried (compared with percent during the nineteenth century. 36 percent of English women). Ireland's poverty Finally, these natural increases were themselves led to late marriage and often to spinsterhood. But partly siphoned off in emigration. About 50 million religious beliefs prohibited birth control, so marital people left Europe for Australia, Canada, the fertility was high. Nevertheless, the birth rate and United States, and New Zealand. At its peak population growth were relatively low. (1881-1910) emigration was equivalent to 20 per- The contrast with fertility patterns today is cent of the increase in Europe's population. For marked. Now the key to high income is education. particular countries, it was much higher. Nearly 45 The rich send their children to school, so marriage percent of the increase in the population of the is delayed and fertility is restricted. In the rural British Isles during 1846-1932 emigrated, about 40 58 FIGURE 4.1 Fertility and mortality transition in developed and developing countries, 1860-1982 Crude rate (per thousand) England and Wales Kenya 60 Births 50 40 Births 30 Deaths Deaths 20 10 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 1982 Crude rate (per thousand) France Colombia 60 50 Births 40 30 Births 20 Deaths Deaths 10 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 1982 Sources; Easterlin, ed., 1980; Habakkuk and Postan, 1965. percent of the mid-period population. For Ireland dren were shared neither within an extended fam- annual gross emigration averaged 1.9 percent of ily nor by the community. Nor did parents need mean population in 1851-61 and 1.3 percent for the Sons to secure the line of descent; they could adopt rest of the century. This was more than the natural Sons from outside the family, an acceptable and growth of population, so Ireland's population fell frequently used option. between the 1840s and the end of the century. Detailed religious records of four villages in rela- More than 7 percent of Scandinavia's population tively affluent regions of Japan show that crude emigrated to the United States between 1880 and birth rates rarely exceeded thirty per thousand, a 1890; and between 30 and 40 percent of the figure lower than would be expected in a premod- increase in population of Italy, Portugal, and Spain em society. Death rates tended to move in line emigrated between 1846 and 1932. with birth rates, assuring slow but steady growth Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in each village. As in Europe, mean age at mar- presented a similar picture. Fertility was not high, riage was high, between twenty-two and twenty- population grew very slowly, and economic five. About 40 percent of women aged fifteen to growth, although uneven, exceeded population forty-four were not married. Marriage rates fluctu- growth so that living standards gradually rose. ated with economic conditions: for people in their One explanation for low fertility was the Japanese early twenties, from as low as 14 percent to as high "stem family": when they grew up, children out- as 80 percent when times were good. Couples had side the line of descent were forced to leave the an average of just over three children, and mothers household by marrying into another family or sup- tended to be between thirty-two and thirty-eight porting themselves elsewhere. The costs of chil- when their last child was bornevidence of con- 59 scious control of family size, probably by abortion only in an arithmetical ratio." Population growth, and infanticide. If it is assumed that parents did he suggested in his first essay, could be checked not report the births of infants killed, birth rates only by a shortage of food and a resulting increase may have been higher than measured. Baby girls in deaths. The proposition rested on two assump- were probably the main victims, since there is evi- tions: technological change could not increase food dence that more boys than girls survived. supply faster than population, and population Compared with Europe and Japan, North Amer- growth (at least of the poorer classes) would not be ica, rich in natural resources and with good eco- limited by fewer births, only by more deaths. On nomic opportunities, experienced faster popula- the second assumption, Malthus later modified his tion growth in the nineteenth century. Fertility views; universal education, he noted in later edi- was relatively high, mortality was low; these con- tions of his Essay, could give people the foresight ditions, together with heavy immigration from to limit childbearing, and improved living stand- Europe, boosted the rate of population growth ards could lead to "new ... tastes and habits" well above 2 percent in the early years of the cen- before rising income induced a self-defeating rise tury. But fertility began to decline earlier than in in population. His first assumption also proved Europe, so the population growth rate fell well incorrect. The Industrial Revolution, beginning below 2 percent by the early twentieth century. just before Malthus wrote, brought to Europe, and About one-third of total growth in population dur- later to other economies, a new age of technologi- ing 1850-1910 came from immigration of working- cal change, geometrical increases in agricultural age people. and industrial production, and what has come to The demographic situation of today's developed be called the "demographic transition": the transi- countries in the nineteenth century differed from tion from high to low fertility and mortality rates. what is happening in today's developing countries What are the lessons for developing countries in in several other respects. During the nineteenth what caused fertility to decline in today's devel- century rural population growth in today's devel- oped world, especially in what encouraged cou- oped countries averaged less than 1 percent a year. ples to choose smaller families? Three decades ago By 1850 fewer than half of England's population the reasons fertility declined in today's developed lived in rural areas. By the 1880s Japan's agricul- world might have been stated quite simply. With tural labor force was already declining. In contrast, economic growth, living conditions improve, so the rural population in most parts of Asia and mortality begins to fall. Contrary to what Malthus Africa today is still growing by more than 2 percent feared, fertility responds to falling mortality and a year, despite substantial migration to towns and adjusts downward, eventually producing the cities. Technology was less advanced in the nine- slower rate of population growth that prevailed teenth century, so people did not need to be well before economic conditions started to improve. educated (as they now do) to work in the modern There is a lag between falling mortality and falling economy. Nor did technology displace labor, as it fertility, but one follows the other quickly enough now tends to do, especially if it is supplied by the so that economic gains are not eaten up by a larger capital-intensive developed countries. Where pop- population, and real incomes rise continuously. ulation growth was most rapid, in North America, In fact the story is not so simple. In Europe, and land was plentiful. later in Japan, the pattern of declining mortality All these factorscombined with low birth rates, and fertility was not so orderlynor is it today in death rates that declined slowly as a consequence developing countries. In a few places fertility of economic and not merely medical advance, and decline preceded mortality decline; in others, fer- the safety valve of emigration, at least for Europe tility did not start falling soon after mortality did. meant that population growth never represented And economic growthif narrowly perceived as the burden that it now does for developing industrialization, urbanization, and the shift from countries. family to factory productionwas neither neces- sary nor sufficient for demographic transition. The transition to low fertility In England fertility within marriage did not begin to fall until the 1870s, almost 100 years after In 1798 the English parson Thomas Malthus wrote the start of the Industrial Revolution and at least as in the Essay on Population his now-familiar proposi- long after a sustained decline in mortality had tion that "Population, when unchecked, increases begun. Why the delay? Average real incomes rose in a geometrical ratio . . . Subsistence increases by more than 1 percent a year in the nineteenth 60 century. But, although unskilled workers and farm During the nineteenth century, the idea of con- laborers (only a small fraction of the rural popula- trolling fertility spread quickly in France. It did so tion owned their own land) enjoyed some increase also in other parts of Europe, though within lin- in wages, at least after 1820, it was the upper- and guistic and cultural boundaries and not quickly middle-income groups that captured most of the across them (see Box 4.3). By the 1830s the French income gains. birth rate had fallen below thirty per thousand. In addition, the early phase of England's indus- Apart from Ireland in the 1840s, during its great trialization permitted earlier marriage, which famine, no other European country went below caused an initial rise in birth rates as rural industry that level until Belgium and Switzerland in the provided job opportunities outside agriculture. 1880s, followed by England and Wales in the (Such new opportunities similarly provide a 1890s. France never experienced a long period of rationale for early marriage and high fertility in falling death rates and high birth rates, which else- transitional societies today.) Rural industry may where produced a surge of population growth. Its not have increased the income of any one family, population, once large compared with its neigh- but it increased the number of families by giving bors, is now unexceptional. Perhaps as a result, a more young people the chance to set up a house- large body of French opinion has been persistently hold. Finally, for most of the nineteenth century pronatalist. As discussed in Chapter 8, former the costs to parents of educating children were French colonies in West Africa still bear that legacy. confined to those at the top of the income scale. In Sweden the demographic transition followed Only 8 percent of school-age children were the classical pattern more closely. Average incomes enrolled at school in 1851; despite much progress, were rising from at least the 1860s. The death rate still only 59 percent were enrolled in 1891. When had started falling in the 1830s; the birth rate fertility started to decline, it did so first among the started falling in the 1860s due to later age at mar- professional middle class, which felt most keenly riage. Fertility within marriage decreased in the the need to educate its children. Only as education 1890s. When fertility began to decline, Sweden's spread did fertility decline in all groups. economy was still largely rural, with 74 percent of Though urbanization and industrialization came the work force in the late 1880s engaged in agricul- later to France than to England, fertility began to ture, forestry, and fishing. Nonetheless, the econ- fall in France as early as the 1790s, when mortality omy was changing. Farm productivity had been was still high. Parish records show that families in rising rapidly from the 1860s. The percentage of some villages were small enough to indicate that farm owners in the agricultural work force rose parents were deliberately controlling fertility. Most from 42 to 57 percent between 1880 and 1930. As in women continued to have their first two babies France, fertility fell among landowners. Those within the expected interval of two to three years. without land of their own left for the cities or emi- Soon after the French Revolution in 1789, how- grated to America. Women's wage rates were ris- ever, the intervals between the second birth and ing especially fast. Education was more wide- the third, and especially between the third and the spread than in England; in 1870 almost 60 percent fourth, lengthened substantially. of children were in school. The decline in fertility could not have been con- fined to the educated. In the seventy-nine French Similarly, in Hungary and Poland peasant land- departments for which data are available, only one owners began in the nineteenth century to limit in four people marrying was able to sign the parish their families so that their children could inherit a register in 1786-90. But the French Revolution pro- workable piece of land, The fertility of landowners moted what French demographers call social capil- was consistently lower than that of landless farm larity, the belief that one's children can rise in workers. social status. It brought new aspirations (perhaps Japan provides still another story. During much including the education of children), reduced alle- of the twentieth century, fertility declined gradu- giance to religious norms, and made individual ally as marriage age rose. But fertility within mar- choice (as opposed to family and communal riage was as high in 1950 as it had been in 1930. authority) more legitimate. It also changed inheri- Then, by about 1960, it dropped by half. There was tance customs. French farming, unlike British, pronatalist opinion between the 1920s and 1945 in consisted mainly of small peasant holdings; under support of Japan's expansionist policies. After equal inheritance, fewer children made it easier to 1945 the national mood changed and public policy keep family landholdings intact. started to favor small families. Abortion laws were 61 Box 4.3 The European fertility transition Before 1880 fertility in Europe often felt some provinces in Denmark, Germany, Starting dates of fertility transition in 700 where infant mortality was still high and Latvia, Servia, the Swedish island of European provinces, 1780-1969 populations were still largely rural. Fer- Gotlands; and St. Petersburg in Russia. Number of provinces tility fell first in France (see map). This Despite early variation, 60 percent of 160 was followed, between 1830 and 1850, by all European provinces began their mari- declines in provinces in what are now tal fertility declines in the thirty years Spain (Catalonia), Switzerland (Geneva between 1890 and 1920, a period of and other French-speaking cantons), and unprecedented economic growth in Belgium (Wallonia)areas that were cul- Europe. Researchers have been unable to turally and linguistically close to the establish which levels or combinations of French provinces where fertility had education, income, and life expectancy already fallen. Some 90 percent of the were critical to those fertility declines provincial variation of marital fertility in that had occurred earlier (the same is Spain in 1910 was between regions (most true for developing countries today). But of which were former kingdoms with dif- by the beginning of the twentieth cent 1800 1850 1900 1950 ferent political histories and different dia- tury, economic and social progress, lects) and only 10 percent within regions. which had spread throughout Europe, Source: Van de Waite and lKnodet, 1980. Aside from France and neighboring brought declines in fertility regardless of provinces, marital fertility had fallen religious and cultural differences. before 1880 in only a few other places- 1840 and earlier 1840-1890 1890-1920 1920 and later No data Map after Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe, to be published and ° 1985 by Princeton University Press. Adopted by permission of Princeton University Press. 62 liberalized, and contraception, especially use of uted little. But in the early years of the twentieth condoms, spread. century, medical science found ways to combat What are the lessons for developing countries? infectious disease. As a result, by the 1920s and Fertility can decline in largely rural popula- 1930s mortality decline was spreading from tions; it did so in France, Hungary, Japan, and Europe and North America to Japan, India, and Sweden. In France, Hungary, and Japan social parts of Central and South America. With the aspirations and land ownership help explain why introduction of antibiotics, antimalarial spraying, smallholders chose to limit their families. In Swe- and the increased use of vaccination, the decline den fertility decline was associated with rapid pro- accelerated in the 1950s and spread to all develop- ductivity gains in agriculture and with an increase ing countries. Improved communications, the con- in the share of landowners among all agricultural solidation of political and administrative systems, workers. and cheaper transport all made it easier to transfer Economic and social opportunities for the the new advances between and within countries. majority of people matter, Fertility decline was Not only did this mortality decline occur rapidly; delayed in England, where the real wages of farm it began from higher initial levels (see Figure 4.2) laborers and unskilled workers rose only slowly, and in societies where fertility levels were higher. and where education was confined to the middle At least initially it was not followed by fertility class through most of the nineteenth century. Fer- decline. tility fell as education spread and became more The current demographic condition of develop- necessary to earn a living. ing countries can be summed up in seven state- The mere idea that it is legitimate to limit ments. births matters, but it does not spread automati- 1. The postwar rate of population growth in develop- cally. In France and some other European coun- ing countries is without precedent. Though in the past tries fertility declined rapidly within cultural and two decades rates of population growth in some countries linguistic boundaries, but was slow to do so farther have been falling because of birth rate declines, rates of afield. The spread of the idea that fertility control is growth are still unusually high, and birth rates are not legitimate occurs more quickly as transport and declining everywhere. communication become easiera potentially pow- erful force now in developing countries compared In 1984 the world's population will increase by with Europe before the twentieth century. about 80 million. Most of the increase, about 73 Low fertility is possible, but much more diffi- million, will occur in developing countries, now cult, without sophisticated modern methods of comprising about three-quarters of world popula- birth control. In today's developed countries, late tion. The combination of continued high fertility marriage and celibacy were important contribu- and much-reduced mortality has led to population tors; so, probably, were withdrawal and absti- growth of between 2 and 4 percent a year in most nence, abortion, and possibly infanticide, But once low- and middle-income countries, compared with economic and social conditions are favorable, 1 percent and less in most developed countries. modern contraception speeds the decline in fertil- Growth at 3 percent a year means that in seventy ity, as the Japanese experience has proved. years population grows eightfold; at 1 percent a year it merely doubles. Current population growth Current demographic change in developing in the developing economies is a phenomenon for countries which economic and demographic history offers no real precedent. Only in a few developing countries have popula- For developing countries as a group, population tion growth rates fallen below 2 percent a year in growth rates rose from 2.0 percent in 1950 to 2.4 the past two decades. In many, population is still percent in 1965, largely because of falling death growing by more than 3 percent a year. In general, rates (see Figure 4.2). Since then, death rates have growth is fastest in the poorest countries. This continued to fall but birth rates have declined even delinking of population growth and prosperity in more, so that growth has slowed somewhat. The what is now the developing world began after rate of natural increase (and of population growth) World War I, when mortality began to decline, in developing countries is now about 2 percent a Mortality had already been falling slowly in year. Europe and the Americas, largely because of The fall in the average growth rate is due almost improved living standardsmedicine had contrib- entirely to the birth rate decline in China, which 63 FIGURE 4.2 Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region, 1950, 1965, and 1980 42.5 42.1 Crude birth rate 40 (per thousand) Births Rate of natural increase 1.5 (percent) Crude death rate 30 Deaths (per thousand) 20 10 East Asia 10.5 (excluding China) 1950 1965 1980 64 alone accounts for a third of all the people in devel- TABLE 4.1 oping countries and where the birth rate has fallen Percentage decline in crude birth rates and in by over 50 percent since 1965 (see Table 4.1 and total fertility rates, selected countries, 1965-82 Figure 4.2). Birth rates have also fallen in other Crude birth Total fertility countries of East Asia-in Hong Kong, Korea, rate decline rate decline Thailand, and Singapore by more than 30 percent, Region and country 1965-82 1965-8 2 in Indonesia and elsewhere by 20 to 30 percent. In Sub-Saharan Africa these generally middle-income economies, a Ethiopia 5.6 3.0 demographic transition to low fertility is clearly Kenya +0.2 0.0 under way. Nigeria 3.7 0.0 In the middle-income countries of Latin America Sudan 1.4 1.5 Zaire 3.8 +3.3 as well, birth rates have fallen more than death Middle East and North Africa rates, which has slowed the rate of population Algeria 6.0 5.4 growth. In Brazil and Mexico birth rate declines Egypt 16.3 22.0 have been more modest than in East Asia but have Iran 7.7 18.8 still been rapid, especially in the past decade. In Morocco 20.0 18.3 Colombia, Cuba, and Jamaica birth rates have also Tunisia 26.5 28.6 Turkey 24.8 30.5 fallen. But in the poorer countries, including El Latin America and Caribbean Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, Bolivia 6.1 4.6 birth rates are still more than thirty-five per thou- Brazil 18.6 30.4 sand and population growth rates close to or Colombia 31.4 42.9 greater than 3 percent a year. In Bolivia and Peru Cuba 51.5 55.6 the growth rate is still about 2.5 percent. Guatemala 17.6 21.2 Honduras 12.5 10.8 In South Asia the birth rate has fallen barely Jamaica 29.1 37.1 enough to offset some further decline in the death Mexico 23.8 31.3 rate. Sri Lanka is the only country of the region Nicaragua 8.7 12.5 with a birth rate less than thirty per thousand. Peru 24.4 30.8 India's birth rate has fallen markedly in some South Asia states, but much less in others, and is now about Bangladesh 9.6 14.9 India 19.9 18.7 thirty-four per thousand; as death rates have Pakistan 15.8 22.7 fallen, population growth has increased, from just Sri Lanka 20.2 30.6 above 2 percent a year in the early 1960s to 2.1 East Asia and Pacific percent in 1982. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the China 54.0 61.3 birth rate has barely fallen and exceeds forty per Indonesia 22.4 25.9 thousand; population grows at about 3 percent a Korea, Rep. of 35.4 43.8 Philippines 32.0 38.2 year. In Africa and much of the Middle East (with Thailand 34.0 42.9 the exception of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey), birth rates are above forty per thousand and have changed little or not at all; population growth rates are generally above 3 increase in the proportion of women of marriage percent. and childbearing age, the birth rate would have In most countries where the crude birth rate has risen by 1.1 points from 1971 to 1981, from 36.9 to fallen, the total fertility rate has fallen even more 38.0, had there been no change in the marriage (see Table 4.1); the total fertility rate is the number rate and marital fertility. (In fact, it fell by 3 points of children a woman would have if she experi- as marriage age rose and married couples had enced current age-specific fertility rates of all fewer children.) women (see Box 4.4). The total fertility rate has fallen more because high fertility and declining 2. The high fertility and falling infant mortality of mortality in the 1950s and 1960s mean that a large the mid-i 960s mean that in developing countries today proportion of today's population in developing about 40 percent of populations are aged fifteen or countries is now of childbearing age. Until this younger. group has completed its childbearing years, overall In countries such as Kenya, where fertility has birth rates will remain high, even if actual family declined little or not at all, more than 50 percent of size is small. In India, for example, because of the the population is younger than fifteen, compared 65 Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fertility and mortality Crude birth and death rates per thou- by combining at one point in time the ing. For example, because the proportion sand population provide an idea of the current fertility of women of different of women of childbearing age has been components of population growth. How- ages. Total fertility rates in the develop- high in most developing countries in the ever, crude rates do not indicate the fre- ing world are between three and eight. last two decades, crude birth rates have quency of births and deaths at the house- Like the total fertility rate, life expect- fallen less than total fertility rates in that hold or individual level. Alternative ancy at birth is a synthetic measure. It period and understate the change in fer- measures that serve this purpose are the indicates the number of years a newborn tility behavior of couples. The same is total fertility rate and life expectancy at baby could be expected to live if its mor- true for mortality. The crude death rate birth. tality pattern exactly paralleled that of all in the Netherlands is higher than the The total fertility rats for the current age groups in the current year. crude death rate in Syria (8.4 versus 7.2 year is the sum of the birth rates specific The total fertility rate and the life per thousand), essentially because the to each age group of women, It may be expectancy at birth of a population are proportion of the population over sixty- interpreted as the total number of births not affected by its age structure. Crude five is four times as great in the Nether- a woman would have if her fertility in birth and death rates are. Crude birth lands. Life expectancy for women how- each year of her reproductive life exactly rates will be higher if the reproductive ever, is ten years longer in the paralleled the current fertility of women age groups are a large proportion of the NJetherland than in 'vria (sex''ntv-six in her own and other age groups. This total population; crude death rates will years as against sixt'. rate therefore does not re ent the life be higher if the elderly are a large propor- time experience of any ticular age tion. group or cohort of womer ohtane Crude rates can theretore be nosiead- with only 20 to 25 percent in developed countries Colombia, for example, the working-age popula- (see Table 4.2). Although the proportion of old tion will increase from 15 million in 1980 to almost people is smaller in developing countries, the 25 million in 2000. In Bangladesh it will almost dependency ratiothe proportion of the popula- double, from 48 million to 84 million. The eco- tion under fifteen and over sixty-four to those nomic implications of this growth are discussed in between ages fifteen and sixty-fouris on average the next chapter. higher. In Japan, for example, there are roughly In other age groups as well, population growth two people of working age to support one who is in developing countries will be higher than in either too old or too young to work; in Kenya, the developed countries. The number of people older ratio is less than one-to-one. Other things being than sixty-five will almost double between now equal, if income per worker were identical in Japan and 2000 in developing countries. In developed and Kenya, income per person in Japan would countries the number will increase by about a third nevertheless be at least 30 percent higher. Even (but by about 85 percent in Japan). within the same country there are comparable dif- 3. Neither internal nor international migration offers ferences in age structureand hence in depen- real solutions to population growth. High rates of natu- dency burdensamong families. In urban ral population increase account more for the rapid Maharashtra state (India), about half the people in growth of cities in developing countries than does rural- the poorest 10 percent of households are younger urban migration. Despite extensive rural-urban migra- than fifteen; in the richest 20 percent, only one in tion, population growth in rural areas of low-income five is younger than fifteen. Asia and Africa still averages 2 percent or more a year. The age structure in developing countries means The present scale of international migration, both per- that birth rates will remain high for some time inanent and temporary, constitutes a small proportion of even if each mother has fewer children. It also the populations of developing countries. means the number of young people entering the labor force will continue to increase for the next Cities in developing countries are growing at two decades. For countries where fertility began to almost twice the rate of overall populations (see fall in the mid-1960s, the rate of growth of the labor Table 4.3). More than half the increase is due to the force is now just starting to decline, though the balance of births over deaths; the rest is due to absolute number of new workers will continue to migration from rural areas and the reclassification increase until after the end of this century. In of rural areas to urban status. Historically, the 66 TABLE 4.2 Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries, 1980 Total Age distribution (percent) fertility Country group 0-4 5-14 15-64 Over65 All ages rate All developed countries 7.6 15.5 65.6 11.3 100.0 1.9 Japan 7.3 16.1 67.7 8.9 100.0 1.8 United States 7.9 15.0 66.3 10.7 100.0 1.9 Hungary 8.0 13.7 64.9 15.9 100.0 2.1 All developing countries 13.6 25.5 57.0 4.0 100.0 4.2a Korea, Rep. of 10.6 22.7 62.7 4.0 100.0 3.0 Colombia 14.0 25.4 57.1 3.5 100.0 3.8 Bangladesh 17.9 24.9 54.6 2.6 100.0 6.3 Kenya 22.4 28.6 46.1 2.9 100.0 8.0 a. Weighted average. urban populations of some of today's developed today's developed countries only in 1950. Low- countries have grown even faster-for example, income Asia and Africa are still overwhelmingly the urban population of the United States rural; their current urbanization level of about 25 increased at about 6 percent a year between 1830 percent was reached in the developed countries and 1860. But today's developing countries have before 1900. started from a much larger base, so the absolute The world's biggest cities are increasingly in the increases are much greater. From 1950 to 1980 the developing countries. Between 1950 and 1980 the urban population of all developing countries proportion of urban dwellers in developing coun- (excluding China) increased by 585 million-com- tries in cities of more than 5 million increased from pared with a total urban population in the devel- 2 to 14 percent, growing at a rate of 15 percent a oped countries in 1950 of just over 300 million. year. Sao Paulo, which by the year 2000 could well Latin America is the most urbanized of develop- be the world's second largest city (behind Mexico ing-country regions. In 1980 about two-thirds of its City), was smaller in 1950 than Manchester, people were urban dwellers, a level reached in Detroit, and Naples. London, the world's second TABLE 4.3 Rural and urban population growth, 1950-2000 Average annual percentage growth Percentage urban population 1950-80 1980-2000 Country group 1950 1980 2000 Urban Rural Urban Rural All developing countries 18.9 28.7 3.4 1.7 Excluding China 22.2 35.4 43.3 3.8 1.7 3.5 1.1 Low-income Asia 10.7 19.5 31.3 4.4 2.0 4.2 0.9 China 11.2 13.2a 2.5 1.8 India 16.8 23.3 35.5 3.2 1.8 4.2 1.1 Africa 5.7 19.2 34.9 7.0 2.5 5.8 1.5 Middle-income East Asia and Pacific 19.6 31.9 41.9 4.1 1.8 3.1 0.9 Middle East and North Africa 27.7 46.8 59.9 4.4 1.6 4.3 1.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 33.7 49.4 55.2 3.1 1.0 2.9 1.7 Latin America and Caribbean 41.4 65.3 75.4 4.1 0.8 2.9 0.4 Southern Europe 24.7 47.1 62.3 3.8 0.5 2.9 -0.2 Industrial countriesL 61.3 77.0 83.7 1.8 -0.7 1.0 -1.1 Not available. Government estimate for 1979. Excludes East European nonmarket economies. 67 largest city in 1950, will not even rank among the two decades, and the urban population could twenty-five largest by the end of the century (see increase by 170 million, the rural population will Figure 4.3). still increase by 130 million. The rural population Despite the rapid growth of cities, the urban of all developing countries is likely to increase by share of today's developing-country populations is another billion people by the middle of the next not increasing especially fast. This is because not century. Both the rates of growth and the increase only urban but also rural populations are growing in numbers greatly exceed those of today's devel- rapidly, and in low-income countries from a large oped countries in the nineteenth century, the base, so that a considerable growth of numbers period when overall population growth in those will continue in the countryside for the rest of this countries was highest. decade and beyond. In India, for example, though Compared with rates of intercontinental migra- urban rates of population growth are likely to be tion from Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth about four times higher than rural rates in the next centuries, present-day permanent emigration rates are small: between 1970 and 1980 emigration absorbed about 3 percent of population growth in Europe and Latin America, less than 1 percent in FIGURE 4.3 Urban agglomerations with more than 10 million Asia and Africa (see Table 4.4). For India, a large inhabitants: 1950, 1975, and 2000 low-income country, the emigration rate was only 0.2 percent. Only for a few countries are perma- nent emigration rates high, and these tend to be Developing countries the relatively better-off, middle-income countries: Greece, Hong Kong, and Portugal. Developed countries Permanent emigration has only a limited effect on reducing the work force in developing coun- tries. To take a simple example, even if 700,000 immigrants a year were admitted to the major host countries up to the year 2000, and all came from low-income countries, less than 2 percent of the projected growth in population in the low-income countries between 1982 and 2000 would have emi- grated. By contrast, such immigration would 1950 1975 2000 account for 22 percent of the projected natural 1950 (millions) (millions) increase in population of the industrial market New York, northeast economies and 36 percent of the projected increase New Jersey 12.2 London 10.4 in the main host countries: Australia, Canada, 1975 New Zealand, and the United States. New York, northeast New Jersey 19.8 London 10.4 The past three decades have seen a marked Tokyo, Yokohama 17.7 Mexico City 11.9 increase in temporary migration. By 1974, tempo- Shanghai 11.6 Los Angeles, Sao Paulo 10.7 rary foreign workers in Europe, numbering about Long Beach 10.8 6.5 million, constituted 30 percent of the work 2000 force in Luxembourg, more than 18 percent in Mexico City 31,0 San Paulo 25.8 Switzerland, and about 8 percent in Belgium, Tokyo, Yokohama 24.2 New York, northeast France, and Germany. They came mostly from Shanghai 22.7 New Jersey 22.8 Beijing 19.9 Rio de Janeiro 19.0 nearby, middle-income countries. In the major Greater Bombay 17.1 Calcutta 16.7 labor-importing countries of the Middle East, Jakarta 16.6 Seoul 14.2 about 2 million foreign workers constituted more Los Angeles, Cairo, Giza, Imbaba 13.1 than 40 percent of the employed work force in Long Beach 14.2 Manila 12.3 Madras 12.9 Bangkok, Thonburi 11.9 1975. Ghana and the Ivory Coast employed about Greater Buenos Aires 12.1 Delhi 11.7 1 million foreign workers in 1975, mostly from Karachi 11.8 Paris 11.3 Mali, Togo, and Upper Volta. Argentina and Vene- Bogota 11.7 Istanbul 11.2 zuela had about 2 million workers from Bolivia, Tehran 11.3 Osaka, Kobe 11.1 Paraguay, and Colombia. Baghdad 11.1 But, as with permanent emigration, temporary Source: United Nations, 1980. emigrants constitute only a small proportion of the 68 TABLE 4.4 some of the countries that achieved relatively large Permanent emigration as a percentage of reductions in fertility between 1972 and 1982. At increase in populations of emigrants' countries the other extreme, fertility rose slightly in a few African countries. Latin The association across countries also tends to Period Europe Asia' Africa' America' hold within countries. In an individual country, 1851-80 11.7 0.4 0.01 0.3 those with higher income tend to have more edu- 1881-1910 19.5 0.3 0.04 0.9 cation, better health, and-for women-more 1911-40 14.4 0.1 0.03 1.8 opportunities to work in modern sector jobs. As 1940-60 27b 0.1 0.01 1.0 Chapter 6 emphasizes, these characteristics are all 1960-70 5.2 0.2 0.10 1.9 1970-80 4.0 associated with lower fertility and mortality. 0.5 0.30 2.5 It is wrong to conclude, however, that countries Note: Numbers are calculated from data on gross immigration in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. must get richer before they can lower fertility and The periods from 1850 to 1960 pertain to emigration only to raise life expectancy. Average income is only one the United States. of the factors involved. As Figure 4.4 shows, some Emigration only to the United States. Source: Swamy, 1984. countries have significantly lower fertility than the norm for those with their income level. Examples include China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. By contrast, countries labor force in developing countries. The total num- with relatively high fertility (given their income) ber of temporary workers abroad in 1980 was include Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco, most coun- between 13 and 15 million. For some countries in tries of sub-Saharan Africa, Venezuela, and even the Middle East, southern Europe, and Africa, with its recent decline in fertility, Mexico. China, temporary workers are a large proportion of the Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka have relatively high life emigrant country's labor force. But for Bangladesh expectancy. These exceptions demonstrate the and India as a whole, the proportion is less than 1 importance of the availability and distribution of percent. The same is true even of illegal migration. health and educational services, the extent to About 2 to 4 million immigrants were living ille- which adult women enjoy a status independent of gally in the United States in April 1980, about half childrearing, and the access of the poor to family of them from Mexico. At most they would have planning services. The reasons for the importance constituted 8 percent of Mexico's total labor force of these other factors, and how they interact, are in that year. discussed in Chapter 6. 4. More often than not, current fertility and mortal- 5. The relation between income and life expectancy, ity rates are inversely related to income-but this rule and between income and fertility, has shifted over time. has many significant exceptions. As Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, the same average The relation between average income and the income is associated with lower fertility and higher total fertility rate in developing countries is shown life expectancy in 1982 than in 1972. Since the in Figure 4.4, and between income and life expect- 1920s, and especially since the end of World War ancy in Figure 4.5. In general, the higher a coun- II, the main reasons for rising life expectancy in try's average income, the lower its fertility and the developing countries have been better public higher its life expectancy. Some of the 100 coun- health systems, educational advances, and the tries used in the analysis are identified in the greater political stability that permitted these. For figures. example, a quarter of Sri Lanka's decline in mortal- Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent ity after 1945 is attributable solely to the control of (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) have the highest malaria. Rising incomes and associated improve- levels of fertility and mortality and the lowest ments in nutrition and sanitation have in general incomes; fertility averages five to eight children played a lesser role. As a result, life expectancy is per woman, and life expectancy is as low as fifty higher in developing countries than it was in years. Countries of East Asia and Latin America today's developed countries at the turn of the cen- have lower fertility (three to five children), higher tury, despite income and education levels that in life expectancy (about sixty years), and higher many countries are still lower. Life expectancy in incomes. Some countries have moved, faster than India was fifty-five in 1982, yet India's per capita others: Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and Thailand are income is still below $300 a year and its literacy rate 69 FIGURE 4.4 Fertility in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate S Kenya Jordan U 1972 U Bangladesh U 1982 7 Morocco an Algeria Sudan Nigeria Mexico - Tanzania \1El Salvador - 6 Nepal - \-philippines Zaire Peru India __Turkey I 5 Venezue lndonesia Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972 4 Thailand Sn Lanka Colombia' Costa Rica 3 Trinidad and Tobago Korea China Greece / 2 Hong Kong Yugoslavia Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982 1 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) FIGURE 4.5 Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 Life expectancy at birth 80 Costa Rica Greece Mataysia Singapore 70 : China Philippines / Yugoslavia Trinidad and Tobago 60 Sri Lanka I'- - Mexico Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972 Korea Thaitand Egypt e Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982 Kenya Algeria India Jordan Morocco 50 Indonesia Ethiopia 1972 N Tanzania Nigeria 1982 Sudan 40 Upper Volta 30 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) 70 below 40 percent. Life expectancy in England, than 2 since. Sweden, and the United States was still below fifty The reasons fertility has stalled vary from coun- in 1900, although average income (in 1982 dollars) try to country. In Korea fertility is already lowa was more than $1,000 and the literacy rate rate of 2.7 in 1982. Fertility fell as women married exceeded 80 percent in all three countries. One later, especially in the 1960s, but the marriage age analysis indicates that life expectancy in the devel- for women now averages twenty-four and is oping countries in 1970 would have been about unlikely to rise further. This cause of lower fertility eight years lower had it not been for the improve- may therefore now be exhausted. Marriage is uni- ments in public health. versal, and most Korean couples want at least one Fertility, too, has been declining in many devel- son. Until that attitude changes, actual fertility will oping countries faster than it did in today's devel- not fall to replacement level even if the ideal num- oped countries. For Austria, England, and the ber of children falls to two. Some couples will have United States it took about fifty years to go from two girls and go on to another pregnancy. birth rates of thirty-five to twenty per thousand, an In Costa Rica the total fertility rate fell dramati- average decline of 0.3 per year. Birth rate declines cally from 7.0 in 1960 to 3.7 in 1978. But it has in China, Colombia, and Costa Rica have exceeded fluctuated around that level since. The use of con- one point per year, Education and income growth traception has not increased since 1976, although have been rapid; modern communication has knowledge is widespread: 98 percent of married increased the speed with which the idea and legiti- women know of a source of modern contraception. macy of fertility control can spread; and modern The fertility of uneducated women has fallen, but contraceptives have lowered the costs and each still has about five children. The family plan- increased the effectiveness of individual fertility fling program has flagged recently for lack of polit- control. ical support. More important, parents still want Fertility is also declining at lower levels of more than three childrenan average of 3.6, say income. Marital fertility started falling in most women in their early twenties, while older women European provinces between 1880 and 1930, when favor even more. average income already exceeded $1,000 (in 1982 Sri Lanka's initial decline in fertility was partly dollars), compared with half that figure when fer- due to increases in marriage age. But since 1974 the tility decline began in Latin America and much of total fertility rate has remained the same or even Asia. Between 1972 and 1982 there was a further risen, from 3.4 to an estimated 3.7 in 1981. The downward shift in the income-fertility relation. country's marriage patterns are sensitive to eco- These long-term changes encourage optimism. nomic conditions, especially male employment, so Lower mortality and fertility can be achieved even an economic revival in the late 1970s may have in the poorest countries. But there is also a new been the cause. But Sri Lankan women have one cause for concern. child more than they want, on average, so 6. Mortality has declined everywhere, and fertility improved contraceptive services could reduce fertility. has started to decline in many countries. But there is In India the total fertility rate in 1982 was 4.8, considerable variation, and in some regions and coun- down from about 6.5 in the 1950s. It has continued tries the declines now seem to be stalled at relatively high levels. to fall, but very slowly. Except for the northern state of Punjab, where the Green Revolution has Almost all countries outside Africa have experi- brought agricultural modernization, most of the enced some fertility decline in the past two decline has occurred in a few southern states in decades. But since 1975 the decline seems to have which female literacy rates are higher, infant mor- slowed and even stopped in countries such as tality lower, and family planning services better Costa Rica, India, Korea, and Sri Lanka, where run than in other parts of India. fertility levels are still relatively high (though low In many countries fertility continues to fall with- given income levels in these countries). In con- out interruption. But in most, rates are still high, trast, once fertility started falling in today's devel- and the barriers to continued declines may not yet oped countries, it went on falling more or less con- have been reached. Indonesia's total fertility rate tinuously. Though fertility rose in Europe and the fell from 5.5 in 1970, when the government began United States for two decades after World War II, a vigorous family planning program, to 4.3 in 1982. total fertility rates rose only a little above 3 even It is lowest in Java, where the program has been during this baby boom and have declined to less most active. But even there it is still about 4.0; the 71 government goal is a nationwide rate of 2.7 by 1990. thousand and the death rate thirteen per thou- It is of course possible that the stalling may be sand, so Indonesia's population is growing at 2.1 temporary. In Korea fertility decline was checked percent a year. In countries in which desired family for a while in the 1960s and then resumed. Yet size is four or more, fertility will fall further only stalling could also mean that initial, easily met with more social and economic change, along with demand for contraception has been largely satu- greater efforts to bring better family planning serv- rated at a level of fertility that is lower than it was, ices to more people. but a level that is still relatively high. Judging from There is also some evidence that improvements recent research on desired family size in many in life expectancy are slowing down. In developed developing countries, this may well be the case. In countries, life expectancy rose steadily until it the late 1970s parents still wanted about four chil- reached about sixty; beyond that, rises are natu- dren, even in those countries in which fertility had rally slower in coming. But in some developing initially declined. The average, for example, was countries, progress has not been so steady (see Box 4.1 in Colombia and Indonesia, 4.4 in the Philip- 4.5). Much of the gain in life expectancy has come pines, and 3.7 in Thailand. Yet if each couple in a from various public health programs such as vacci- country has four children, population growth will nation and antimalarial spraying, which generally remain rapid. Take the example of Indonesia, made a bigger difference in the 1950s and 1960s where the fertility rate of 4.3 is close to the desired than in the 1970s. This is especially true in Latin family size. The crude birth rate is thirty-four per America. In Asia, and particularly in East Asia, Box 4.5 Is the rise in life expectancy slowing too soon? The curve in the chart represents the The available data suggest similar slow- to be sure. Some slowdown could also trend in life expectancy in developing downs elsewhere in Latin America and have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa; countries, It shows that it takes about the Caribbean, most pronounced in a in Asia any slowdown was probably eighty years on average to raise life few countries such as Argentina, Barba- modest. The chart does indicate that expectancy from forty-two years (about dos, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. gains fell slightly short of the standard in the level in Laos or Chad today) to sev- Did this slowdown occur in other Sri Lanka in the 1960s, but they were enty-five (about the current level in most regions? Because the mortality data are greater in China and probably also in industrial countries). The rise is initially much sketchier elsewhere, it is difficult India. slow, picks up speed, and then gradually slows again. The slowdown is particu- Trends in life expectancy: three developing countries and the mean trend larly marked as life expectancy rises above age seventy or eighty, as in the Life expectancy developed countries today, because 80 many of the diseases that kill people in Data years: affluent countriessuch as heart disease and canceryield only slowly to expen- Colombia: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1978. sive medical research. 70 Mexico: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1975. During the 1950s many developing Sri Lanka: 1941,, 953, 1963, 1971. countries registered substantial gains in life expectancy. Some, such as Colombia, Mexico and Sri Lanka, outperformed the 60 standard represented by the curve. The record for the 1960s and 1970s was much more mixed. During the 1960s Mexico gained 0.28 years in life expectancy 50 annually, and from 1970 to 1978 Colom- bia gained 0.33 years annually. Even 'ilowing for slower gains at higher 1ev- k, their progress was disappointing; if 40 le two countries had matched the 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 andard, they would each have gained Years 48 years annually over these periods. 72 economic development has been rapid enough to tries, has already fallen considerably. But there are offset the declining contribution of public health other reasons. Mortality declines affect population improvements, so life expectancy has gone on ris- growth less when fertility is falling, as is and will ing steadily. In India in the past decade, however, be the case in most countries. Long-range popula- poverty and illiteracy in rural areas of the north tion growth is less dependent on the addition of seem to have kept infant mortality high, slowing people whose lives are saved than on the number any further rise in rural life expectancy despite eco- of children they subsequently bear. When fertility nomic growth. In Africa slower economic progress is high, saving a baby's life adds a great deal of (in some countries, even regression) has slowed reproductive potential. To save the lives of an the rise in life expectancy. Rural mortality tends to infant girl and boy who will go on to have 6 chil- exceed urban mortality, so a slightly slower pace of dren is to add those people plus (perhaps) their 36 urbanization in the late 1970s may also have grandchildren, 216 great grandchildren, and so on. slowed progress against mortality. By contrast, the But as fertility declines, so does the amount of remarkable gain in life expectancy in Chinafrom extra reproductive capacity. The infant girl who forty-one in 1960 to an estimated sixty-seven in survives, grows up, and gives birth to 3 instead of 1982shows what can be achieved, even by a 6 children has 27 rather than 216 great grand- largely rural society, through a combination of children (assuming that each of her children will education, income gains, and a strong health care follow her pattern). Furthermore, as mortality program. declines, more and more deaths are shifted from For the future, increasing life expectancy seems younger to older ages. To extend the life of some- likely to depend more than ever on improved liv- one sixty years old is to keep the population just ing conditions, education for women, and better one person larger than it would otherwise be, not health care for the poor. Three indicators lend sup- to boost it by that person plus descendants. port to this view. In addition, as Chapter 6 will indicate, lower Mortality from diarrhea in the developing mortality contributes directly to lower fertility. For world is two to three times higher than it was in the individual family, fewer deaths usually mean today's developed countries when overall mortal- fewer births (though the net effect is a somewhat ity levels were similar. Diarrhea is a disease of the larger family on average). Finally, because further poor, primarily of poor children. It accompanies mortality declines depend more than before on malnutrition and is exacerbated by poor sanitation, progress in women's education and on improved lack of elementary health services, and lack of the living conditions and health care, programs that basic education that might allow parents to take reduce mortality are likely to reduce fertility as the necessary precautions to prevent it. well. Infant and child mortality, the major contribu- tors to low life expectancy in developing countries, Demographic prospects and goals are closely linked to economic and social welfare. In Latin America infant and child mortality rates Demographic projections should not be treated as are five times greater among children whose moth- forecasts. The purpose in making projections is to ers have no schooling than among those with illustrate what the future could be, given certain mothers having ten or more years of schooling. assumptions. It is the assumptions that determine In countries with life expectancy higher than whether the projections will match reality. Some might be expected from their average incomes projections have been wide of the mark; for exam- Costa Rica, Cuba, Korea, and Sri Lankaincome ple, the size and duration of the baby boom after tends to be more equally distributed than in other 1945 in the United States was unexpected. But developing countries. Illiteracy is also lower and since the 1950s, when the United Nations began health services more widespread. producing systematic projections of world popula- tion, demographers have done well in predicting 7. Further declines in mortality rates will boost popu- future trends. In 1963 the United Nations pro- lation growth much less from now on than they did in jected a 1980 population of 4.3 billion, only a shade the 1950s and 1960s. off the 4.4 billion suggested by the latest estimates, For most of the developing world, the time when and projections of world population in the year declining mortality produced surges in population 2000 have hardly changed since 1963. is passing rapidly. In part this is because mortality, But projections for particular regions and coun- though still high compared with developed coun- tries have varied. The 1980 UN projection for 73 North America's population in 2000 is 16 percent 1950 and the present by eleven developing coun- below the 1963 projection because fertility is lower tries, including Colombia, Korea, Singapore, and than expected; the 1980 projection for Asia as a Thailand, where at times the total fertility rate whole is 3 percent above the 1963 projection declined by almost 0.2 a year. Similarly, rapid mor- because fertility has fallen less than expected (even tality decline is based on the experience of fourteen though the projection for one country, China, countries, including Costa Rica, Cuba, Hong where fertility has fallen more than expected, is Kong, and Kenya, where life expectancy increased below the 1963 projection). by at least one year every two years between 1950 Two critical assumptions guide the World Bank and 1980 (and at a faster rate where initial life projections of each country's population. expectancy was lower). Mortality will continue to fall everywhere Three points are clear from these projections. until life expectancy for females is eighty-two Even with rapid fertility (and mortality) years. As Figure 4.6 shows, these projections decline, the developing world's population would essentially continue the trends that are already more than double by the year 2050, rising to 6.9 well established in the ten largest developing billion. The population of Indonesia would still countries. They ignore the possibility of any major increase from 153 million to about 300 million, that catastrophe, such as war or virulent disease. of Bangladesh from 93 million to about 230 million, Fertility will eventually reach and stay at and that of India from 717 million to 1.4 billion (see replacement level everywhere. When that will Table 4.5). For countries of Africa, Central Amer- occur obviously varies from country to country, ica, and the Middle East, where the proportion of depending on current fertility levels, recent young people is higher and where fertility is still trends, and family planning efforts, For most high and would take longer to decline to replace- developing countries, replacement level is pro- ment level, the increases would be much greater. jected to be reached between 2005 and 2025; for Even with rapid fertility decline, Kenya would not most countries in Africa and the Middle East, it is reach replacement-level fertility until 2015, and projected to be reached later. For most of the larg- today's population of 18 million would increase to est developing countries, the projections of declin- almost 70 million by 2050. Under the standard ing fertility essentially extend declines that have declines, replacement-level fertility would not be been happening for several years. However, a few attained until 2030, and Kenya's population would countries, for example Nigeria, have yet to experi- grow to 120 million by 2050. With rapid fertility ence fertility declines; for those countries projected decline, El Salvador's population would still grow declines are assumed to start in the near future from 5 million to 12 million. (see Figure 4.7). Population growth beyond the year 2000 The consequences of these "standard" assump- depends critically on falling fertility in the next tions for the population of all developing countries decade or two. As Table 4.5 shows, the difference are shown in Figure 4.8. As shown in the figure, in population size between the standard and rapid the increases still to come are likely to exceed what declines is not great in 2000less than 20 percent has happened so far. This is naturally a cause for in most countries. Under any assumption, the concern, but not for despair (see Box 4.6). The pace populations of most developing countries are of population growth need not be taken as given likely to increase by 50 percent or more by 2000; a it also depends on policy. And the way societies few, including Kenya and Nigeria, will almost cope with a growing population depends on eco- double. By the year 2050, however, the differences nomic and social policy as well as on how fast they will be huge. If fertility falls sooner rather than grow. later in Kenya, population there in 2050 will be The potential effect of policy can be illustrated by reduced by about 50 million compared with what it comparing population projections under the would otherwise be, against today's total popula- standard assumptions with two other paths: tion of 18 million. "rapid" fertility decline (with standard mortality In determining the ultimate size of world pop- decline), and "rapid" mortality decline added to ulation, fertility matters more than mortality. rapid fertility decline. Country projections and the Rapid mortality decline combined with standard assumptions behind the standard and rapid paths fertility decline would produce population in are explained in detail in the Population Data Sup- developing countries 7 percent larger in the year plement. Rapid fertility decline is at a rate equiva- 2050 than that resulting from the standard mortal- lent to that achieved in certain periods between ity decline. In contrast, rapid fertility decline 74 FIGURE 4.6 FIGURE 4.7 Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's ten world's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 largest countries, 1950-2100 Life expectancy at birth Total fertility rate 8.0 80 China India Indonesia Brazil Pakistan 6.0 Nigeria Bangladesh 60 United States Chusa India USSR Japan Indonesia Brazil 50 Pakistan 4.0 Nigeria Bangladesh United States 40 USSR Japan 2.0 30 1950 2000 2050 2100 1950 2000 2050 2100 The Countries shown were the world's largest in 1980. Source: Adapted from Demeny, 1984. The Countries shown were the world's largest in 1980. Source: Adapted from Demeny, 1984. FIGURE 4.8 Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility and mortality Billions Billions 3 10 All developing countries - 2 8 / , / -- --- 6 0 19S0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 3 4 Fertility decline Mortality decline Rapid 2 Standard - Standard 2 Rapid Rapid - - Standard 1 0 0 1900 1950 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 75 Box 4.6 Three views of population change The charts in this box provide three dif- supportable by hunting and gathering. ferent perspectives on past and present World population With the adoption of farming and animal 9000 B.C-AD. 2000 population growth. Although each looks Population (millions) husbandry, a second burst of population different, all are based on the same facts. 6000 growth began. Eventuallythough The top chart shows the change in the 5000 much more quickly than in the first absolute size of world population from 4000 casethe technological limits were again about 9000 B.C. (the beginning of the Agricultural age begins reached, and population stabilized at 3000 9000 B.C. agricultural age) to the end of the present around 300 million in the first millenium 2000 century. The middle chart shows popula- Industrial age begins AD. From the late eighteenth century 1000 late 18th century tion growth rates from A.D. 1750 to 2000. the industrial age triggered a third burst 0 The bottom chart, like the top one, 9000 B.C. AD. 1 2000 of population growth. It began from a shows change in the size of the human much higher base and has covered a population, but over a longer period World population much shorter period, but on a logarith- 1750-2000 hack to I million B.C.and on a logarith- mic scale it appears no more rapid or Growth rate (percent) mic scale. unusual than earlier growth spurts. 2.0 The three charts suggest strikingly dif- Which chart best portrays the past and ferent impressions of population growth. the prospects for the future? The top one 5 The top one conveys the impression of emphasizes the special character of an enormous population explosion recent population growth, setting cur- beginning sometime after 1750 (the 1.0 rent experience apart from thousands of beginning of the industrial age). It points years of earlier history. It conveys a sense upward at the year 2000 with no appar- 0.5 of crisis. The middle chart highlights the ent limit. The middle chart indicates that substantial acceleration in growth rates, these recent dramatic increases have 0 especially in the past quarter century, been produced by relatively small, 1750 1800 1851) 1900 1950 2000 that produced this expansion, and the though accelerating growth rates. World population current downward trend in those rates. Annual growth was about 0.4 percent 1 million B.C-Al). 2050 It suggests that managing population between 1750 and 1800, crept up steadily l'opulation growth is possible. The bottom figure 1012 until it reached 0.8 percent in 1900-50, underlines the likelihood of an eventual and then rose sharply to 1.7 percent equilibrium between population and 108 between 1950 and 1975. The line for resources, achieved either by a decline in growth rates points upward, but shows a 1(3 birth rates or an unwelcome rise in death recent dip, and is therefore not as dra- rates. It calls attention to the need to matically threatening as that in the top io achieve equilibrium by a decline in birth chart. rates. 102 The bottom chart shows that popula- tion has grown from somewhat less than IOU I 10 million on the eve of the agricultural 1 million B.C. A.D.l 2050 age. In the first rise in the curve, popula- Source: Durand, 1977. tion expanded gradually toward the limit would produce a population 25 percent smaller in is already low and fertility has fallen, the popula- the year 2050 than that resulting from the standard tion in 2050 would be only 2 to 3 percent greater if fertility decline. Combined with rapid mortality rapid mortality decline were added to rapid fertil- decline, the population would still be 20 percent ity decline. But where mortality and fertility smaller (see Figure 4.8). Insofar as mortality and remain highas in sub-Saharan Africa and South fertility declines are linked, the combined rapid Asiarapid mortality decline combined with path for both is more realistic; it illustrates the rela- standard fertility decline would produce a popula- tively small effect that rapid mortality decline tion in 2050 about 10 percent greater. But even that would have on population size, especially if fertil- difference is much smaller than the difference ity is falling. However, the implications of a faster between rapid and standard fertility decline: mortality decline are not the same for all regions. South Asia's population would be more than 20 In Latin America and in East Asia, where mortality percent smaller and Africa's about 50 percent 76 TABLE 4.5 Projections of population size in selected countries, 2000 and 2050 (millions) Population in 2000 Population in 2050 Rapid fertility Rapid fertility Standard decline and Rapid Standard decline and Rapid fertility and standard fertility and fertility and standard fertility and 1982 mortality mortality mortality mortality mortality mortality Country Population decline decline decline decline decline decline Bangladesh 93 157 136 139 357 212 230 Brazil 127 181 168 169 279 239 247 Egypt 44 63 58 58 102 84 88 El Salvador 5 8 8 8 15 12 13 India 717 994 927 938 1,513 1,313 1,406 Indonesia 153 212 197 198 330 285 298 Kenya 18 40 34 35 120 69 73 Korea, Rep. of 39 51 49 50 67 63 65 Mexico 73 109 101 101 182 155 160 Nigeria 91 169 143 147 471 243 265 smaller with a rapid rather than a standard decline standard fertility decline is assumed, the number in fertility (see Figure 4.8). of people under twenty would be 31 percent of the These differences between rapid and standard population instead of 32 percent in the year 2020 declines in fertility have far-reaching conse- (see Figure 4.9). In absolute numbers, there would quences. To take the example of Bangladesh, Table be almost as many young people as there are today 4.6 shows what would happen to its population because of the momentum effect of today's young density and the size of its school-age and working- people becoming parents in the next two decades. age population under the standard and rapid As for old people, their proportion does increase assumptions about declining fertility. Under both, rapidly, but it does so in both projections. With population and average density will increase for rapid declines in both fertility and mortality, the the next seventy years. But the pressure on land elderly, now about 4 percent of the population, (reflected in the projections of agricultural densi- would constitute 9.2 percent of the population in ties), already high, would more than double by the 2020, compared with 7.7 percent under the stand- year 2050 under the standard assumption; under ard declinesin either case still less than the 12 the rapid assumption, it would be higher than now percent obtaining in the United States today. in the year 2000 but would then begin to fall. The The rapid paths of mortality and fertility decline number of school-age children would almost dou- would be difficult but not impossible to attain. For ble under the stajidard fertility decline by the year India a rapid decline implies a total fertility rate of 2000; were fertility rates to decline rapidly, the 2.2 in the year 2000 (compared with 2.9 under the number would still increase by 50 percent by the standard assumption and about 4.8 today); for Bra- year 2000 but would then stop increasing. Though zil it implies a rate of 2.1 (compared with 2.6 under the number of people of working age would con- the standard assumption and about 3.9 today). tinue to rise under both scenarios, far fewer new These rates are below those in China (now about jobs would need to be created if fertility declined 2.3) and Korea (2.7) today. They require that girls rapidly; in the year 2050 there would be 100 million who are now growing up in families of about four fewer people of working age. Of course, Bangla- children have only two children themselves, desh is just one example. And since its current whereas their grandmothers had five or six. Rapid fertility is high, the differences between the two mortality decline would mean, for Brazil, life projections are especially large. expectancy in the year 2000 of 73, compared with The effects of a rapid fertility decline on the age 69 in the standard projection. In India life expect- structure of a country could, in principle, be a con- ancy would be 65 in 2000 instead of 61. cern. It is often thought that rapid fertility decline The implied declines still produce relatively high causes a sharp rise in the ratio of old people to annual rates of population growth in the year 2000: young, or a shrinking of the work force. In fact, 1.6 percent in Brazil, 1.2 percent in India, and 2.6 this does not happen. In Brazil, if rapid rather than percent in Kenya (compared with 3.9 percent in 77 TABLE 4.6 Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions, 1982-2050 2000 2050 Standard Rapid Standard Rapid Indicator 1982 decline decline decline decline Population density Persons per square kilometer 646 1,090 944 2,479 1,472 Rural population per hectare of farmland a 9 13 12 22 9 Population size (millions) Total population 93 157 136 357 212 Urbanb 11 35 30 157 134 Rural 82 122 106 200 78 School-age (5-14 years) 23 43 33 55 30 Working-age (15-64 years) 51 84 85 246 139 Urban and rural population (from the table above) Urban Millions Rural 200 150 100 50 0 50 100 150 200 1982 2000 Standard decline. J Rapid decline J 2050 Standard decline Rapid decline L I Farmland is defined as arable land plus land under permanent crops; the area is assumed to remain constant throughout the projection period. Urban population is assumed to grow at a constant rate of 3 percent a year between 2000 and 2050. Sources: FAQ, 1981; World Bank data. the standard projection; because fertility is very FIGURE 4.9 high in Kenya and other African countries, it will Brazil's age pyramid, 2020 probably take more than two decades for popula- tion growth rates to fall to 2 percent). In the long Age group Male Female run many countries may wish to reduce popula- 75 + Fertility decline tion growth to less than 1 percent, already a goal in 70-74 Standard China. But for the next several decades most 65-69 Rapid developing countries will need to make a con- 60-64 certed effort just to reduce population growth to a 55-59 rate closer to 1 percent. 50-54 Some countries have chosen to set quantitative 45-49 targets based on feasible target declines in mortal- 40-44 ity and fertility (see Chapter 8). Bangladesh has already adopted a goal of a total fertility rate of 2.0 35-39 in the year 2000, lower than the rate assumed for it 30-34 under a rapid path of fertility decline. Thailand is 25-29 aiming for a total fertility rate of 2.6 by 1986, and 20-24 Indonesia for a rate of 2.7 by 1990. India is aiming 15-19 for a crude birth rate of 21 per thousand by 1996. 10-14 The rapid declines in mortality and fertility pro- 5-9 vide only one possible set of goals. They take no 0-4 real account of national differences in the serious- ness of the population problem, or of the social, 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 political, and administrative possibilities in dealing Millions with it. These are the subjects of the following chapters. 78 5 The consequences of rapid population growth This chapter shows that rapid population are experiencing growth that, by historical stand- growthat rates above 2 percent, common in most ards, is faster than that. Even in uncrowded coun- developing countries todayacts as a brake on tries, the long-term benefits of having more people development. Up to a point, population growth must be weighed against the immediate costs of can be accommodated: in the past three decades coping with rapid growth. In those few countries many countries have managed to raise average lacking the people to exploit their natural re- income even as their populations grew rapidly. In sources, immigration from neighboring countries, that strict sense, population growth has been if politically feasible, would be less costly and more accommodated. But the goal of development effective than a fast natural rate of population extends beyond accommodation of an ever larger growth. And the economic success of many small population; it is to improve people's lives. Rapid countriesDenmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, and population growth in developing countries has Switzerlandshows that urbanization and trade resulted in less progress than might have been provide other means to achieve the scale econo- lost opportunities for raising living standards, par- mies of a large population. ticularly among the large numbers of the world's There are several reasons why population poor. growth in developing countries is today a greater The conclusion that rapid population growth has economic burden than it once was in today's slowed development is by no means straightfor- developed countries: ward or clearcut (see Box 5.1). Under certain condi- Population growth is now much more rapid. tions moderate population growth can be benefi- As Chapter 4 showed, in industrializing Europe it cial. As Chapter 4 showed, in Europe, Japan, and seldom exceeded 1.5 percent a year, compared North America economic growth has been accom- with the 2 to 4 percent that most developing coun- panied by moderate population growth, which tries have averaged since World War II. may have stimulated demand, encouraged techno- Unlike nineteenth century Europe, large-scale logical innovation, and reduced investment risks. emigration from today's developing countries is Moderate labor force growth, combined with extra not possible. spending on education, can also mean continuous Compared with Europe, Japan, and North upgrading of the labor force with better educated America in their periods of fastest population workers. In sparsely populated countries, faster growth, income in developing countries is still population growth shortens the time required to low, human and physical capital are less built up, reach the population size that provides economies and in some countries political and social institu- of scale in transport, communications, social ser- tions are less well established. vices, and production. Some developing countries Many developing countries whose economies could benefit from such economies of scale, espe- are still largely dependent on agriculture can no cially in rural areas. And a big population can longer draw on large tracts of unused land. increase a country's economic as well as political This chapter begins by emphasizing that the and military power; in a world of economic and implications of population growth differ consider- political uncertainty, countries such as India and ably among countries, depending on their current China can seem to benefit from the sheer size of social, economic, and political conditions. Next it their domestic markets. reviews how rapid population growth affects the But these benefits derive from a moderate economy as a whole through savings and invest- increase in population. Most developing countries ment. It then considers the experience of countries 79 Box 5.1 Consequences of population growth: conflicting views The traditional Malthusian concern is resource limits, because population human knowledge. Per capita measures that population growth will sooner or growth itself brings the adjustments that of income should not be used to imply later run up against the limits of the continually put off doomsday. To quote that the denominator, people, contrib- earth's finite stock of resources. In his from Julian Simon's book, The Ultimate utes nothing to the numerator, total First Essay on Population, Maithus argued Resource: "The ultimate resource is peo- income. Nor is population growth in and that the inherent capacity of population pleskilled, spirited, and hopeful peo- of itself the main cause of natural to grow exceeds the earth s capacity to plewho will exert their wills and imagi- resource problemsair pollution, soil yield increases in food, because of limits nations for their own benefit and so, degradation, even food availability. to the supply of cultivable land. Unre- inevitably, for the benefit of us all." This Report therefore takes a position strained population growth eventually Simon argues that natural resources are that is neither hopeless nor overly opti- leads to falling wages and rising food not limited; that scarcity is revealed by mistic. The difficulties caused by rapid prices because, as the labor force prices; and that prices of resources are population growth are not primarily due expands, a rising ratio of labor to land not rising, at least not as a proportion of to finite natural resources, at least not for leads to smaller and smaller increments the income of the United States. More the world as a whole. But neither does in output per worker. Population growth people implies more ideas, more creative rapid population growth itself automati- is ultimately checked by rising mortality. talent, more skills, and thus better tech- cally trigger technological advance and In the twentieth century this argument nology; in the long run population adaptation. If anything, rapid growth has been extended to the availability of growth is not a problem but an slows the accumulation of skills that energy and minerals, the effects of rising opportunity. encourage technological advance, and environmental pollution, and so on. In These different viewpoints each con- insofar as there are diminishing returns The Limits to Growth, Club of Rome tain important truths. Some resources to land and capital, is likely to exacerbate researchers built a simulation model on are finite; even if prices have not income inequalities. This is most obvious the assumption that the pace of techno- increased (and they may have done so in at the family level, where high fertility logical change would be insufficient to relation to incomes outside the United can contribute to a poor start in life for overcome diminishing returns arising States), there have been fundamental children. But it is also true for countries from limited supplies of essential structural changes in the balance as a whole. resources. Falling standards of living and between population and resources. Moreover, the costs of rapid popula- increasing levels of pollution would lead Human ingenuity might be a match for tion growth differ greatly from country to a population collapse within 100 years. these changes, but it might be able only to country. Those differences are not A related view is that some resources to maintain income, not to lift millions of confined to differences in natural land, forests, fisheries.though fixed, are people out of poverty. Or it may reduce resources. In countries heavily reliant on renewable, but that their sustainable poverty very slowly: even with the agriculture, a scarcity of natural yields do have a maximum limit. Some assumption of technological change built resources does matter. But the underly- harvests may exceed this maximum, but into Simon's model, there are "short- ing problem is low income and low levels they lead to a permanent reduction in the run" difficulties. His short run is thirty of education, which are sources of rapid long-run productivity of land. A popula- to eighty years, and in that period he population growth and simultaneously tion whose needs (subsistence and com- finds even moderate population growth make the required adjustments to it more mercial) exceed sustainable yields will to be detrimental to human welfare. In difficult. Much of the world's population have lower per capita incomes in the the short run, ideas may be lost and lives without the benefit of clear signals long run. Einsteins go undiscovered if many chil- to encourage smaller families; yet these The claim of diminishing returns to dren receive little schooling. Policy- are the families and the nations in the resources can easily be criticized for its makers and poor people live in the short worst position to make the adaptive failure to recognize that, as resources are run; they do not wish to go through a responses that rapid population growth depleted, rising prices reduce consump- period of greater deprivation to adapt requires. That is why rapid population tion and speed the search for substitutes, eventually to rapid population growth. growth is, above all, a development stimulating technological change. This At the same time, there is little doubt problem. criticism, extended, leads to the argu- that the key to economic growth is peo- ment that there are no real natural ple, and through people the advance of in coping with rapidly growing populationstheir discussion of the effects of population growth on efforts to achieve food security, the effects on their countries, this chapter will touch on a theme intro- natural resources, the pressures of internal migra- duced in Chapter 4: the implications of high fertil- tion and urban growth, and the options that the ity for poor people and for income inequality. international economy provides. Throughout this Because the poor are usually last in line for jobs, 80 school places, and public health services, they are population growth itself helps to bring about tech- more likely to be penalized by rapid population nological change: in agricultural societies it may growth. help spur the development of new farming meth- The chapter does not treat a reduction in the rate ods needed to maintain per capita output. In ear- of population growth as a panacea for develop- lier centuries it may even have helped provide the ment; macroeconomic and sectoral policies matter minimum population required to support a small at least as much. But it does show that within most religious or artistic elite. countries, for any given amount of resources, a But throughout the modern technological era, slower rate of population growth would help to there is no evidence that a large or rapidly growing promote economic and social development. population has itself been influential in promoting new technology. The money and research skills Differences among countries needed for important advancesthe Green Revo- lution, for exampleare overwhelmingly in the The implications of population growth differ con- rich countries where population growth is slow. If siderably among developing countries. Countries anything, these advances have brought labor- where education levels are already high, where saving, not labor-using, innovations. Although much investment in transport and communica- adjustment and technical progress can accompany tions systems is in place, and where political and population growth, slower population growth economic systems are relatively stable, are well would permit them to raise average incomes all the equipped to cope with rapid population growth. faster. This is true whether or not their natural resources are limited or their countries already "crowded," Macroeconomic effects of rapid as in the fast-growing East Asian economies such population growth as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and more recently Malaysia and Thailand. But these tend In a crude arithmetical sense, differences in popu- also to be countries where population growth is lation growth rates since the 1950s have helped to now slowing. perpetuate international differences in per capita Countries with untapped natural resources incomes. Between 1955 and 1980, GNP grew at could in the long run support more people. But about 4 percent a year in the low-income countries. rapid population growth makes it hard for them to This growth in general produced modest increases develop the human skills and administrative struc- in income per person (see Table 5.1). However, in tures that are needed to exploit their resources. In many of the poorest countriesBangladesh and Brazil, Ivory Coast, and Zaire, for example, the most of sub-Saharan Africaeconomic activity development of unused land will require large slowed considerably in the 1970s. Coupled with complementary investments in roads, public ser- rapid (and in some cases, accelerating) population vices, and drainage and other agricultural infra- growth, this economic slowdown resulted in stag- structure. Natural resources are not by themselves nating or declining per capita incomes. sufficient (or even necessary) for sustained eco- In most middle-income countries GNP growth nomic growth. has been much fasterbetween 5 and 6 percent a Where the amount of new land or other exploit- yearso that even with rapid population growth, able resources is limitedas in Bangladesh, per capita income grew by about 3 percent a year. Burundi, China, Egypt, India, Java in Indonesia, Industrial countries achieved only sluggish GNP Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, and Rwandathe short- growth during the 1970s, but their low population run difficulties are more obvious. In some areas growthi percent a year or lessmeant that their crop yields are still relatively low, leaving room for increases in per capita income were in general rapid growth in agricultural production; in others, almost as large as in the high-growth, middle- the expansion of manufacturing industry could income countries. These increases came on top of provide exports to pay for extra food imports. But much higher initial incomes, so that the absolute both solutions require costly investments, devel- gulf between them and the rest of the world wid- opment of new institutions, and numerous eco- ened considerably. nomic and social adjustmentsall easier if popula- The middle-income countries have shown that tion is growing only slowly. rapid population growth can go hand in hand with In any society, change becomes easier if technol- substantial gains in per capita income. But the ogy is advancing rapidly. From one point of view, long-run relation is more complex than that 81 implied by a simple division of total income by though its effects on monetized savings are small. numbers of people. Indeed, that simple division First, the bulk of monetized household savings in implies, wrongly, that people are the problem. developing countries is produced by relatively few One question is how population growth affects the wealthy families. They tend to have few children, distribution of income within countries, and espe- so their savings are little affected by the burden of cially growth in income of poorer groups (see Box their dependents. In contrast, the majority of fami- 5.2). More generally, the question is whether a lies are poor and save little. Parents have no choice rapid pace of population growth helps or harms but to pay for what their children consume by economic growth. There are several ways popula- reducing their own consumption or by "dissav- tion growth can affect economic growth: through ing"-for example, by farming their land more its influence on savings per person, on the amount intensively than can be sustained in the long run. of capital invested per person, and on the effi- If parents have more children than they want, ciency with which the economy operates. their ability to make best use of the resources they TABLE 5.1 Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, 1955-80 (average annual percentage change) Population GNP GNP per capita Country group 1 955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80 All developing countries 2.2 2.2 5.4 5.3 3.1 3.1 Low-income 2.1 2.1 3.7 4.5 1.6 2.4 China 2.0 1.8 3.3 6.0 1.3 4.1 India 2.2 2.1 4.0 3.4 1.8 1.3 Other 2.4 2.7 4.4 2.7 2.0 0.0 Middle-income 2.4 2.4 6.0 5.6 3.5 3.1 Industrial market economies 1.1 0.8 4.7 3.2 3.6 2.4 Europe 0.7 0.2 4.8 2.6 4.1 2.4 Japan 1.0 1.1 10.3 5.4 9.2 4.2 United States 1.4 1.0 3.4 3.1 2.0 2.1 World' 1.9 1.9 5.1 3.8 3.1 1.9 a. Includes high-income oil exporters and industrial nonmarket economies. Population growth and private savings do have is harmed. Whether they are restricting investment in their farm, or in their children's edu- A country's savings are generated by households, cation, or in security for their old age, their high businesses, and the public sector. Corporate and fertility contributes to their poverty. But even with government savings do not seem to be related in fewer children, poor parents might not increase any systematic way to variations in population their savings. Instead, they might simply consume growth; governments can, within limits, use fiscal a bit more themselves. and monetary measures to change a country's sav- A second reason for the apparently weak link ings rate, irrespective of demographic conditions. between savings and dependency burdens is that Theory suggests, however, that household sav- banking and credit systems are not well estab- ings-usually the largest component of domestic lished in developing countries. Poor families (and savings-should be reduced by the high depen- even the not-so-poor) are unlikely to have financial dency burdens associated with rapid population savings that show up in national accounts; they growth. At any given level of output per worker, are more likely to "save" by accumulating land, greater numbers of dependents cause consump- tools, or other assets. Even if families wanted to tion to rise, so savings per capita should fall. save in good times (say, before children are born or Recent empirical studies find only minor support after children are old enough to work) and borrow for this view. But many factors account for the in difficult times, they probably could not without weak link between dependency burdens and sav- paying a steep price in terms of low real interest ings in developing countries; all point to the prob- rates for saving and high rates for borrowing. A ability that high fertility is indeed a burden, third reason, as explained in Chapter 4, is that 82 Box 5.2 Prospects for poverty and population growth, 1980-2000 I-low would a faster decline in popula- sizing. Economic prospects are so limited income than assumed in the projections, tion growth affect the number of poor in sub-Saharan Africa that all projections and a more rapid elimination of poverty. people in the year 2000? Many other eco- point to an increase in poverty. If fertility nomic, political, and social factors, in decline occurs only as in the standard addition to population, will influence projectionand even that implies con- Estimated number of poor in the year 2000 levels of poverty in the next fifteen years. siderable declinethe number of people under different fertility assumptions, by But some simple assumptions allow illus- living in poverty at the end of the cen- region trative estimates. In a World Bank study, tury will still increase by nearly 70 per- Sub-Saharan Africa the poor were defined as those with cent. With a rapid fall in fertility, the annual per capita incomes below $135 (in Index (1980= 100) number of poor would increase by less constant 1980 dollars). Based on the than 20 percentin the circumstances, a Standard fertility decline 150 experience of many countries, projected substantial achievement. income growth in each of forty countries In South and East Asia, excepting 100 Rapid fertility decline (comprising 80 percent of the population China, economic prospects are better, so 1980 2000 of developing countries) was used to that a small reduction in the number of compute the change in income for the poor can be anticipated even assuming Middle East, North Africa, poorest groups. The findings were com- Latin America the standard fertility decline. Poverty 100 bined with World Bank country projec- could be reduced by almost 40 percent, tions of population growth to simulate however, with a rapid fall in fertility. future shifts in income distribution. Grouping together Latin America, the 50 The exercise showed that the predicted Middle East, and North Africawhere s;standard fertility decline share of income going to the poorest 40 the poor are fewer than in Asia and in Rapid fertility decline 1980 2000 percent would hardly change, from 14 the rest of Africarapid fertility decline Asia (excluding China) percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 2000. The could help to reduce the number in pov- 100 estimated number of poor people would erty by 70 percent. As for China, where Standard fertility decline fall, however, because of income growth. fertility is already low, the number of 50 * Rapid fertility decline Using the population growth rate based poor can be expected to decline by 1980 2000 on a "standard" decline in fertility between 80 and 90 percent by the year China (described in Chapter 4), the number of 2000. 100 poor in these forty countries would fall The exercise probably understates the from 630 million in 1980 to 410 million in effect of rapid fertility decline in reducing 50 2000. With a "rapid" decline in fertility, poverty. A faster reduction in fertility is the number could be almost 100 million likely to be associated with a narrowing "Standard and feweralthough at 321 million, it would of differences in educational investment rapid fertility decline still exceed the total number of people in by socioeconomic class, and an increase 1980 2000 Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan today. in wages in relation to rents and profits. For explanation of assumptions of population projections, see Population Data Supplement. Regional differences are worth empha- These imply a more equal distribution of poor people may see children themselves as a way Capital widening of "saving" for old age. Although rapid population growth does not seem These reasons explain why high dependency to influence the supply of financial savings, it burdens reduce household savings rates in indus- clearly affects the demand for savings. To maintain trial countries but not in the developing world. In income, capital per person (including "human developing countries, though there is no direct capital," that is, a person's education, health, and link from fertility to household savings, they do skills) must be maintained. And as populations become indirectly linked as development pro- grow, "capital widening" is needed to maintain ceeds. For example, as more women work in the capital per person. But slower population growth modern sector, family savings tend to rise and fer- releases investable resources for "capital-deepen- tility falls; as urbanization proceeds and financial ing"that is, increasing capital per person. Of markets improve, monetized savings rise and fer- course, there may be economies of scale in the pro- tility falls. vision of schooling, health, and jobs in factories 83 and on farms. But the evidence on education sug- because fertility had started to fall in the late 1960s. gests that capital-wideningspreading resources This allowed enrollment rates to rise; as the chil- over more and more peoplecan be counterpro- dren of poor parents were least likely to have been ductive. enrolled before, the poor probably benefited most from the spread of education. SCHOOLING REQUIREMENTS AND CAPITAL WIDEN- For high-fertility countries, the situation could ING. In industrial countries, school-age popula- not be more different. Countries such as Kenya tions are expected to grow slowly, if at all, over the face a doubling or tripling of their school-age pop- next two decades (see Figure 5.1). The same is true ulation by the end of the century. The main impli- of those developing countries, such as China, cation is clear. More school-age children require Colombia, and Korea, where fertility has already more spending on education, even if the objective fallen substantially. In Colombia, the number of is just to maintain current enrollment rates and school-age children doubled between 1950 and standards. As most developing countries want to 1970. But it increased only slightly in the 1970s, improve their schools quantitatively and qualita- tively, they will have to generate more national savings or curtail other investments in, for exam- FIGURE 5.1 ple, power and transport. If a country is unwilling Index of school-age and working-age populations, or unable to make these sacrifices, spending must selected countries, 1950-2000 be spread over a larger group of school children (to Index the detriment of the quality of education); other- (1950=100) wise a growing number of children have to be 700 excluded. \\/i/ Kenya These awkward choices come after a period of 600 considerable progress. Over the past twenty years, School-age enrollment rates have increased at the primary, population 500 secondary, and university levels in almost all developing countries. (The enrollment rate is the 400 number of students enrolled in schools as a per- centage of the school-age population.) In some Colombia 300 cases, progress has been remarkable. Education tends to spread as per capita income rises, but 200 Korea some of the lowest-income countriesSri Lanka, Tanzania, Viet Namhave already achieved, or are China 100 fast approaching, universal primary education. Hungary / Such achievements have substantially raised the 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 fiscal burden of education. For the developing countries as a group, public spending on educa- Index tion increased from 2.3 percent of GNP in 1960 to (1950 = 100) 3.9 percent in 1974, and from 11.7 percent to 15.1 600 percent of government budgets. But the propor- tion of GNP allocated to education declined 500 slightly over the 1970s, as did the share of educa- Working-age tion spending in government budgets, especially 400 population in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Colombia and Latin America. 300 The budgetary downgrading of education, coup- led with slower economic growth, has reduced the 200 quality of education in many developing countries. One study showed that in Latin America public 100 spending per primary student fell by almost 45 percent in real terms between 1970 and 1978. As a share of educational budgets, spending on non- 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 wage itemschalk, maps, textbooks, and so on fell in eight out of ten Latin American countries. In 84 twenty-five of fifty-four developing countries sur- rapid decline in fertility would decrease the size of veyed, student-teacher ratios at primary schools the age group eligible for Egypt's secondary have risen; of those twenty-five countries, seven- schools and universities starting in the late 1990s. teen were in Africa. Increases in class size often Less rapidly growing enrollment produces con- make sense as they raise the productivity of teach- siderable financial savings; these can be used to ers. But in the urban areas of Malawi and Kenya, improve school quality. One projection, for class size frequently exceeds sixty students. Com- Malawi up to 2015, started with the assumption bined with a lack of teaching materials, large that recurrent costs (essentially teachers' salaries) classes make learning difficult. were held constant at their 1980 level of $12.50 per Developing countries have little scope to reduce student. With unchanged fertility, the budget for educational quality any further. The quality gap primary education would double about every fif- between low- and high-income countries is already teen years, even if nothing were done to improve enormous. Bolivia, El Salvador, Malawi, and the the coverage and quality of primary schools. Thus Ivory Coast, for instance, spend less than $2 a year the education budget's share in GDP would on classroom materials for each child at primary increase from 0.7 percent in 1980 to about 1 percent school-compared with more than $300 per stu- in 1995 if the economy of Malawi were to grow at dent in Scandinavian countries. This gap seems to about 3 percent a year. The financial savings from be widening. In 1960, on average, an OECD coun- lower fertility would accrue slowly at first, but try spent fourteen times more per primary school build up considerably (see Table 5.2). Costs student than did any of the thirty-six countries excluded from the projections-for instance, out- with per capita incomes below $265 (1975 prices). lays for teachers' training and school buildings- By 1977 the ratio had risen to 50:1. would also fall and thus boost these savings. These differences in educational quality are With the money saved by lower fertility, the clearly reflected in student achievement. Research Malawi government could afford to enroll the on twenty-five countries has shown that, after country's total school-age population in 2005 for approximately the same number of years in school, less than it would cost to enroll 65 percent if fertil- schoolchildren in low- and middle-income coun- ity did not fall. If the government chose to main- tries have learned significantly less science than tain a 65 percent enrollment rate, its spending per those in industrial countries. Quality can also pupil could be doubled in real terms by 2015 with- make a considerable difference within developing out increasing the share of the primary school bud- countries. In a study of Brazil, Colombia, India, and Thailand, the quality of schools and teachers- measured by a large number of indicators- TABLE 5.2 explained more than 80 percent of the variance in Malawi: projected primary-school costs student scores on standardized science tests. The under alternative fertility and enrollment poor are more likely to attend schools of lower assumptions, 1980-2015 quality (and to leave school sooner); so rapid (millions of 1980 dollars) expansion of school systems to accommodate Saving growing populations often means that the differ- Standard Rapid with ences in skills between rich and poor, though fall- rapid fertility fertility fertility ing in terms of years of schooling, are persisting decline decline decline because of school quality differences. Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (percent)a As lower fertility slows the growth of the school- 1980 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 na. age population, it can ease the pressures on the 1995 19.2 26.9 17.9 25.1 7 education system. In Egypt, for example, if fertility 2000 22.5 34.6 17.6 27.1 22 does not fall, the number of children of primary 2005 26.6 40.9 17.6 27.0 34 school age would double by the end of the century. 2010 31.0 47.8 17.3 26.6 44 2015 35.3 54.3 15.3 23.5 57 With the standard decline in fertility described in Chapter 4, the number would increase by 65 per- na. Not applicable. Note: Columns 1 and 3 assume a constant enrollment rate of cent; with the rapid decline, by only 20 percent. 65 percent. Columns 2 and 4 assume the enrollment rate The difference between a standard decline and a increases and is 100 percent by the year 2000. rapid one would be about 2 million fewer children a. The percentage cost savings are the same under both assumptions regarding enrollment rates. Absolute cost savings a year enrolled in primary schools in the years 2000 are greater under the assumption of universal primary to 2015. Fewer births in the early 1980s due to a education by the year 2000. 85 get in GDP. Alternatively, all or part of the savings capital widening. For most countries the same is could be used to increase spending per pupil or to true of jobs. In contrast to school-age populations, increase the enrollment rate in Malawi's secondary whose rate of growth starts to slow five or six years schools which in 1980 stood at only 4 percent. The after a decline in fertility, the growth of working- returns to using the resources saved on account of age populations is more or less fixed for fifteen to lower population growth for improving school twenty years. People born in 1980-84 will be enter- quality are likely to be higher than the returns to ing the labor force in 2000 and will still be there forced rapid expansion of the system if population almost halfway through the twenty-first century. growth does not slow. But improving quality will High-fertility countries face large increases in be difficult until a larger share of the population their labor forces. As an example, Nigeria's high has access to basic education, which itself is fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its working- delayed if the numbers of school-age children are age population will double by the end of this cen- constantly increasing. tury. Kenya can expect an even larger increase. The potential for cutting educational costs Where fertility has fallen in the past two decades, through lower fertility is obviously largest for the increases will be smaller (see Figure 5.1). China those countries with the highest fertility rates. will experience a rise of no more than 45 percent. Four African countriesBurundi, Ethiopia, Korea's working-age population has already fallen Malawi, Zimbabwecould save between 50 and 60 substantially and will change little between now percent of their educational spending by 2015 (see and the year 2000. In all these countries the actual Table 5.3), whereas a rapid fertility decline would labor forcepeople who are working or looking for reduce educational costs by only 5 percent in jobswill grow even faster if, for example, more Colombia, by 1 percent in Korea, and by even less women start looking for paid employment. in China, where there is virtually no difference In countries with growing labor forces, the stock between the rapid and standard fertility assump- of capital (both human and physical) must contin- tions. But these lower-fertility countries have ually increase just to maintain capital per worker already gained considerably from slower popula- and current productivity. Unless this happens, tion growth. For example, if Korea's fertility rate each worker will produce less using the reduced had remained at its 1960 level, the number of pri- land and capital each has to work with. Productiv- mary school-age children in 1980 would have been ity, and thus incomes, will then stagnate or even about one-third (2 million) larger than it was. fall. Wages will fall in relation to profits and rents, Applying actual 1980 costs per student ($300) to and thus increase income inequalitiesanother that difference gives a saving in a single year of example of how rapid population growth harms $600 million, about 1 percent of Korea's GDP. the poor. For incomes to rise, investment needs to grow GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE AND CAPITAL WIDENING. faster than the labor force, to ensure capital deep- Keeping up with schooling needs is only one way ening. Capital deepening involves a growing whereby rapid population growth contributes to demand for spending on education, health, roads, energy, farm machinery, ports, factories, and so forth. These requirements have to be traded off TABLE 5.3 against extra consumption. Of course, if educa- Potential savings in primary-school costs under tional levels are rising quickly, rapid restocking of rapid fertility decline, selected countries, 2000 the labor force with young, better-educated people and 2015 can be an advantage. But, as shown above, it is also difficult to increase educational spending per Cost savings (percent) child if population growth is rapid. Total fertility Even when developing countries manage to Country rate (1981) 2000 2015 raise investment in line with the growth in their Korea, Rep. of 3.0 12 1 labor force, the contrasts with developed countries Colombia 3.7 23 5 are striking. The gap in educational quality has Egypt 4.8 27 23 already been described. Investment in physical Burundi 6.5 26 56 Ethiopia 6.5 25 60 capital per new worker is also much larger in Kenya 8.0 22 50 industrial countries because their labor-force Zimbabwe 8.0 19 48 growth is slower and their GDP per capita is so a. Compared with standard fertility assumption. much higher. Even a middle-income country such 86 as Korea, with a high investment ratio of 31 per- It is likely to exacerbate income inequalities, cent in 1980, could provide only $30,000 of gross particularly if many new young workers have little investment per new worker, compared with education. When a large proportion of workers are $189,000 in the United States, which had an invest- young and inexperienced, their productivity tends ment ratio of only 18 percent. (The investment to be lower. Except for those who have more edu- ratio is gross domestic investment as a percentage cation than older workers, their starting wages will of gross domestic product.) If all investment in tend to be lower, and they must compete with each countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nepal, other. Relatively few will receive employer training and Rwanda had been allocated to potential new to upgrade their skills. Over time, the weight of workers during 1980, each person would have had numbers of the unskilled will hold down their less than $1,700 invested on his or her behalf (see wages in relation to those of skilled workers. A Table 5.4). At the other extreme, new workers in World Bank study of what determines income Japan would have had about $535,000 of gross growth among countries found that as overall investment available. Countries with the lowest income rises, the average contribution of individ- absolute levels of investment per potential new ual workers without education falls-uneducated worker tend to be those also facing the fastest workers contribute (and probably earn) relatively growth in their working-age populations. Just to less than they once did. maintain the current small amount of investment It increases various forms of unemployment. per potential new worker, they will have to Although population growth has had a relatively increase their investment rapidly. In contrast, small effect on open unemployment in developing developed countries can increase the capital avail- countries, this fact does not demonstrate any able to each potential new worker in 2000 even if demographic stimulus to job creation. It simply investment grows by less than 1 percent a year. indicates that unemployment is not a feasible Rapid growth in the labor force has two other option for most people. Open unemployment is effects. typically found most among educated urban TABLE 5.4 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker, selected countries, 1980 Gross domestic Projected Gross Increase in investment increase in domestic working-age per potential working-age Investment investment populationh new worker population ratio (billions 1979-80 (thousands of 1980-2000 Count ry group (percent) of dollars) (millions) 1980 dollars) (percent) Developing countries Bangladesh 17 1.90 1.70 1.09 74 Ethiopia 10 0.37 0.24 1.53 76 Nepal 14 0.26 0.21 1.26 78 Rwanda 16 0.18 0.11 1.66 99 Kenya 22 1.31 0.28 4.70 134 Egypt, Arab Rep. 31 7.12 0.80 8.96 68 Thailand 27 9.03 0.65 10.66 73 Colombia 21 6.21 0.62 10.10 66 Korea, Rep. of 31 18.06 0.61 29.85 45 Brazil 22 52.35 1.30 40.36 65 Industrialized countries Japan 32 332.80 0.62 535.04 11 Australia 24 35.53 0.16 219.35 19 France 23 149.94 0.33 461.34 13 Germany 25 204.79 0.43 481.33 I United States 18 465.68 2.46 188.99 15 Note: Countries are listed in ascending order of their GNP per capita in 1982. Gross domestic investment as percentage of gross domestic product. Age cohort 15-64 years. 87 youths, who are presumably able to draw on fam- high. The two principal reasons for this structural ily support while seeking work commensurate transformation of the labor force are well known: with their qualifications or expectations. Many As incomes rise, people spend a smaller pro- others are underemployed: "invisible underem- portion on unprocessed agricultural produce and ployment" (including part-time and low-produc- a larger proportion on industrial products and tivity workers whose skills would permit higher services. earnings if better jobs were available) is estimated Increases in agricultural productivitymade to range from 20 percent in Latin America to about possible by technological innovations and accumu- 40 percent in Africa. In urban areas of most poor lated investmentallow output to grow with a countries, occupations that require little or no capi- constant or even declining farm labor force. talhandicraft production, hawking, and personal As average incomes increase in today's develop- services of all sortsare highly visible areas of the ing countries, and as population growth rates so-called informal sector. These occupations have slow, the number of workers in agriculture should the advantage of using scarce financial capital effi- eventually decline. In some upper-middle-income ciently, but the incomes they produce are often countries in Latin America, including Argentina, extremely low. Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, already less than 20 percent of the labor force is employed in agricul- STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR ture. But the transfer of labor out of agriculture has FORCE. As shown in Chapter 4, both urban and proceeded much more slowly in much of low- rural populations will increase rapidly into the next income South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. There century in the low-income countries of Asia and are two reasons: their high rates of growth of the Africa. Thus, while the general concern with the total labor force and their low initial shares in mod- provision of productive employment for urban ern sector employment. dwellers is well founded, many countries will also In 1980 the share of the labor force in agriculture face the task of absorbing considerably more work- averaged 73 percent in low-income countries ers into the rural economy. This double challenge (excluding China and India); in most countries of differs from the historical experience of today's sub-Saharan Africa it was between 80 and 90 per- industrialized countries. Their economic growth cent. During the 1970s the total labor force in these was helped by a massive shift of labor from agri- countries grew at 2.3 percent a year. The rate of culture, where the amount of capital per worker growth will increase to 3 percent a year between and average productivity was relatively low, to 1980 and 2000. The effects on the future growth of industry and services, where they were relatively the agricultural labor force can be illustrated with some hypothetical calculations. Figure 5.2 portrays a country in which 70 percent of the labor force is in agriculture and in which FIGURE 5.2 nonagricultural employment is growing at 4 per- When will the number of agricultural workers start to decline? cent a year. It shows, for different rates of growth of the total labor force, the time required for the Annual growth rate of total labor force size of the agricultural labor force to start to decline Kenya 4 "worst case" in absolute numbers. For example, if it is assumed Nonagricultural employment annual growth rate that the annual growth of the total labor force is 2.5 3 percent (which, combined with a 4 percent growth in nonagricultural employment, is a fairly typical combination in low-income countries), the agricul- tural labor force would continue to grow in abso- lute size (though declining slowly as a share of the total) for about fifty years (point x). If the total 1 labor force were to grow by 3 percent a year Japan, instead, the time required for the agricultural labor approximately 1890 0 force to start to decline would nearly double to 0 50 100 150 200 ninety-five years (point y). Although this example Years until the agricultural labor force starts to decline oversimplifiesfor instance, it does not admit the Assumes 70 percent of labor force in agriculture. possibility of massive urban unemploymentit Sourcn Johnston and Clark, 1982. does seem clear that the size of the agricultural 88 labor force in most of today's low-income coun- tureabsorbed more than 80 percent of the tries will go on increasing well into the twenty-first increase in the labor force. century. Agricultural output and jobs must continue to In western Europe and Japan, by contrast, the grow rapidly in Kenya: the effective demand for number of farm workers began to fall when the food is rising at about 4 percent a year, so that labor force was still largely agrarian, so there were domestic productionor other agricultural exports never any significant increases in the size of the to pay for food importsmust grow at least at the agricultural labor force. In Japan, for example, the same pace to avoid draining foreign exchange from share of agriculture in the labor force in the mid- other sectors (if constant terms of trade are 1880s was about 75 percentmuch the same as in assumed). And the rest of the economy has only a today's low-income countries, and nonagricultural limited capacity to absorb labor. The public sector employment grew at between 2 and 3.5 percent a accounted for about two-thirds of the growth in year in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In these two wage employment during 1972-80the number of respects Japan was similar to many low-income schoolteachers rose by more than the increase in countries today. But the total labor force was grow- manufacturing workersbut its growth is con- ing at less than 1 percent a year, much slower than strained by fiscal limits. Industry is relatively small in developing countries today (see Figure 5.2). So and capital intensive, so its work force is unlikely only modest rises in nonagricultural employment to expand much. were necessary to absorb the rise in the rural work These constraints are highlighted by the projec- force. Between 1883-87 and 1913-17, the share of tions in Table 5.5. In the "worst" caseessentially the labor force in agriculture fell by twenty per- a continuation of recent trends, with the labor centage points and the absolute number of farm force growing at 3.5 percent a year and nonagricul- workers fell by some 1 million. tural employment at 4 percentKenya's agricul- Kenya provides a dramatic contrast with the Jap- tural work force would still be increasing in abso- anese case. Only about 14 percent of the Kenyan lute size even 100 years from now (see also Figure labor force is in wage employment in the "mod- 5.2). In the "best" case, which assumes the same ern" economy and about half of them are in the growth in nonagricultural employment but slower public sector. Between 1972 and 1980 employment growth in the labor force after 2000 (implying a in the modern sector grew at 4.3 percent a year, decline in fertility starting in the mid-1980s), struc- higher than in Japan in the late nineteenth century tural transformation proceeds at a faster pace. but somewhat slower than the growth of GDP (4.9 Even so, agriculture must absorb more than 70 per- percent). But the rate of growth of the total labor cent of the growth in the labor force for the rest of force was very rapid-3.5 percent. There was some this century. It is only after 2025 that the number of shift of the labor force into the modern economy, workers in agriculture starts to decline. In the since growth in modern sector employment was meantime, how to absorb these extra farm workers faster than in the total labor force. But the shift was productively is a critical issue in Kenya and in small. Nonwage employmentmainly in agricul- many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. TABLE 5.5 Efficiency: allocating limited capital Kenya: projections of employment by sector, under two scenarios, 1976-2050 Capital deepening (and associated absorption of (millions of workers) labor into the modern sector) is not the only con- Employment sectora 1976 2000 2025 2050 tributor to economic growth. Last year's World Development Report highlighted the importance of Nonagricultural employment1' 1.2 3.0 8.0 21.8 making better use of existing resources, as well as Agricultural employment of innovation and entrepreneurship. Promoting "Worst" casec 3.8 9.9 24.1 56.9 "Best" cased efficiency often requires policy reform. For exam- 3.8 9.9 12.4 4.5 ple, many developing countries have a history of Unemployment held constant in all years and in both cases (about 1.2 million workers). subsidizing capital; subsidies have discouraged Increases at 4 percent a year in both scenarios. labor-intensive production and led to inefficient Labor force grows at a constant 3.5 percent a year. use of scarce capital. Even with reform, efficiency Growth of labor force slows from 3.5 percent a year in 1976-2000, to 2.5 percent a year in 2001-10, to 1.5 percent a year may not come easily; many technological innova- in 2011-25, and to 1 percent a year in 2026-50. tions available to developing countries are labor- 89 saving because they come from the capital-rich Constraints on agricultural production industrial world. But efficiency is even harder to achieve when population growth is rapid. For Food production in developing countries has example, social and political pressure to employ increased rapidly in recent decades but has still young people has undoubtedly contributed to the just kept pace with population growth (see Table large government sector in many developing coun- 5.6); in the 1970s it failed to do so in many low- tries, and in some countries to regulations income countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal, designed to stop private employers from reducing and twenty-seven of thirty-nine countries in sub- their work force. Selective government concern for Saharan Africa. Other African countries-includ- educated young people in urban areas has led to ing Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Upper Volta- policies such as Egypt's that guarantee employ- managed only a slight increase in per capita food ment to all university graduates. As well as being production. The output of food in China and India inefficient, this policy hurts people who are not has also exceeded population growth since the educated because scarce public spending is mid-1960s, but by only a narrow margin. In the past, increases in food production were mainly due to bringing more land under cultiva- tion: this is still the case in sub-Saharan Africa and TABLE 5.6 in parts of Latin America. About 25 percent of the Growth rates of food output by region, 1960-80 world's land-some 3.4 billion hectares-is (average annual percentage change) thought to be of agricultural potential. Of this, only about 1.4 billion hectares (40 percent) is being Total Per capita Region or cultivated, so there is little evidence of a global count ry group 1960-70 1970-80 1960-70 1970-80 land shortage (see Box 5.3). Developing countries 2.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 For developing countries as a whole, however, Low-income 2.6 2.2 0.2 -0.3 increased acreage accounted for less than one-fifth Middle-income 3.2 3.3 0.7 0.9 of the growth in agricultural production over the Africa 2.6 1.6 0.1 -1.1 past two decades. In part this is because land recla- Middle East 2.6 2.9 0.1 0.2 mation is often more costly than intensifying use Latin America 3.6 3.3 0.1 0.6 of existing land; in part it is because further expan- Southeast Asia a 2.8 3.8 0.3 1.4 sion of the land frontier is constrained in many South Asia 2.6 2.2 0.1 0.0 parts of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, for Southern example, the development of vast areas is pre- Europe 3.2 3.5 1.8 1.9 cluded because of such diseases as river blindness Industrial market economies 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.1 (onchocerciasis) and sleeping sickness (trypanoso- Nonmarket industrial miasis). The latter renders livestock production economies 3.2 1.7 2.2 0.9 virtually impossible on some 10 million square World 2.7 2.3 0.8 0.5 kilometers of higher rainfall areas, 45 percent of all Note: Production data are weighted by world export unit prices. the land in sub-Saharan Africa. Major campaigns Growth rates for decades are based on midpoints of five-year averages except that 1970 is the average for 1969-71. have been undertaken to free parts of the Suda- a. Excludes China. nese savanna country from sleeping sickness, but Sources: FAQ; World Bank, 1982b. it has not always been possible to prevent a resur- gence of the disease. Moreover, insecticides used to control tsetse flies, which spread sleeping sick- ness, have had undesirable effects on the environ- diverted for the benefit of those who are relatively ment. For that and other reasons, some countries well off. Youth unemployment may also contribute in Africa are reaching the limits of their land (see to crime and instability and the resulting large Box 8.4 in Chapter 8). amount of service employment as police and pri- In Asia, too, further expansion of agricultural vate guards in some cities of developing countries. land does not appear to be an option for several None of these, of course, adds to national income. countries. For example, in India between 1953-54 Crime is tied primarily to poverty and social disor- and 1971-72, a 66 percent increase in the number der, but tends to increase wherever there are large of rural households was accompanied by only a 2 cohorts of young people who are unemployed percent increase in the cultivated area. As a result, (including in developed countries). the number of marginal holdings of less than one 90 Box 5.3 Food supplies for a growing world population The food crisis of 1972-74 created an widen in the developing countries, par- national production but because of atmosphere of impending disaster and a ticularly because of continued rapid higher food prices, which they cannot renewed interest in Maithusian pessi- growth in population and income. Cen- afford, or because of inadequate arrange- mism. More recent views point to the trally planned economies may also con- ments for marketing food. Their diet will success of technological change in agri- tinue to have a shortfall. Production in improve only when their general eco- culture and to the conclusion that the the industrial world is projected to rise, nomic state does. world as a whole is capable of producing albeit more slowly than in the past, while Some research on the global food situa- enough food for future generations well the growth in its demand is projected to tion has looked well beyond the end of into the next century. The main issue is level out. this century. Bernard Gilland, for exam- not the worldwide availability of food, On a national and household basis, the ple, estimates the maximum global out- but the capacity of nations, groups outlook is even more varied. A number put of food to be 7,500 million tons grain- within nations, and individuals to obtain of industrial countries do not produce equivalent (tge) a year. This figure was enough food for a healthy diet. enough grain or food to satisfy domestic obtained by multiplying a "realistic" In most countries, particularly low- demand. But their national food security maximum yield of 5 tge per hectare (from income ones, the staple food is cereals or is assured because the value of their non- the present average of 2 tge per hectare) coarse grains; they account for about half food exports is usually more than ade- by 1.5 billion hectares, allowing for a of total food consumption in developing quate to finance food imports. These slight increase over the estimated 1.4 bil- countries. Over the past thirty years countries also have effective methods of lion hectares of land currently used for global grain production has doubled distributing food, though their poorest food production. An additional 500 tge and, according to the FAQ report Agricul- people may be vulnerable. For some of was added for rangeland and marine ture: Toward 2000, could double again by the developing countries the situation is production. Presently, gross consump- the year 2000. An American study, The less secure. Estimates by the FAQ sug- tion of plant energy for all purposes Global 2000 Report to the President, agrees gest that in the year 2000 twenty-nine food, seed, and animal feedranges with this assessment. A doubling of developing countries may be unable to from 3,000 calories per person per day in world grain production over twenty feed themselves from their own land South Asia to 15,000 calories in North years or so amounts to an annual growth with inputs of fertilizers, seeds, and so America, Australia, New Zealand, and rate of about 3.5 percent. on at an "intermediate" level of technol- France. (Consumption of meat raises On the demand side, earlier projec- ogy (a basic package of fertilizers, consumption of "plant energy" because tions indicated that demand for cereals improved seed, and simple conservation the conversion of grain to meat through and grains for both human consumption measures). Many of these countries are feeding of livestock is inefficient com- and livestock feed would rise at between in Africa, where technology is probably pared with direct consumption of grain.) 3.0 and 3.5 percent a year, depending on below the "intermediate" level (see also Gilland selects a "completely satisfac- assumptions for population and income Box 8.4). Outside Africa, the group tory" average daily per capita allowance growth. More recent projections suggest includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, El of 9,000 calories of "plant energy" a much slower growth of global demand. Salvador, Haiti, and Jordan. (implying some meat consumption), and For example, the International Wheat Increasing domestic production of food concludes that the earth has the capacity Council's recent Long-Tenn Grain Outlook is not the only solution. Many develop- to support about 7.5 billion people. This puts global cereal demand up 50 percent ing countries with a chronic food deficit population will probably be reached in by 2000, equivalent to a rise of about 2.3 have other options, the main one being the second decade of the next century. percent a year; a report published by the to increase exports of nonfood goods so On a daily per capita allowance of 6,000 US Department of Agriculture came to as to finance food imports. For those calories of plant energythe current similar conclusions. Both of these assess- countries with transitory food deficits, a world averagethe earth would be capa- ments included projections of grain that combination of more exports and better ble of supporting about 11,4 billion per- would be fed to animals. A World Bank arrangements for storing food may be sons. That number is roughly equal to study projects an average growth in the the answer. For some countries in Africa, the projected world stationary popula- demand for grains of about 2.6 percent a to avert a food crisis will require external tion. Cultivated land could be increased year. aidto finance food imports in the short more, and land-saving technological ad- This optimism for the global Situation run and to expand investment in devel- vances, especially deriving from genetic stands in sharp contrast to the assess- oping long-run potential for food and engineering, would transform the Out- ments for groups of countries, individual nonfood production. look, allowing for better diets even as countries, and households. Various stud- Ultimately it is not countries but indi- population grows. But there are also ies suggest that the gap between domes- viduals who suffer from a shortage of downside risks (new crop diseases, soil tic supply and demand is projected to foodnot because of fluctuations in erosion, and climate change). 91 acre increased from 15.4 million to 35.6 million and Easing constraints their average size fell from 0.27 to 0.14 acres. To take another example, the average land-man ratio Multiple croppingmore than one crop a year in Bangladesh is estimated to have declined from from the same piece of landis a typical way for 0.40 acres in 1960-61 to 0.29 acres in 1979-80. More societies to cope with rising populations. In Asia, people have been absorbed into agriculture, but where the proportion of potential land under culti- incomes have risen little if at all. More people are vation was an estimated 78 percent in 1975, about 7 probably having to earn a living as landless labor- percent of the cultivated land is cropped more than ers. As their numbers have increased, their wages once. For some Asian countries the proportion is have tended to fall in relation to those who own (or much greater. In the late 1960s 52 percent of culti- even rent) land. The agricultural system has vated land was cropped more than once in Korea. adapted, but in ways that have probably increased In Bangladesh in the late 1970s, 43 percent of the income inequalities in the countryside. land was cropped more than once. Another constraint on the use of potential Multiple cropping increases production and uses agricultural land is shortage of water. In many more labor, so that the chief resource required to developing countries, any large expansion of agri- feed the growing populations of developing coun- cultural production would require some form of tries is provided by the people themselves. Farm irrigation. Worldwide, the area under irrigation studies in Africa and Asia show that, on average, a expanded by almost 6 million hectares a year dur- 10 percent increase in farming intensity (defined as ing the 1960s. India has shown the most dramatic the percentage of time in the rotation cycle that is growth, with the irrigated area increasing from 28 devoted to cropping) involves a 3 to 4 percent million hectares to 55 million hectares over the past increase in the amount of labor per hectare. Labor two decades, an average of more than 1 million input per hectare increases because, under inten- hectares a year. In the 1970s, however, worldwide sive farming systems, the extra hours required for expansion of irrigation slowed to just over 5 mil- land preparation, sowing, weeding, and plant pro- lion hectares a year. This slowdown occurred tection more than offset the reduction of hours because some countries, such as Pakistan, started essentially for land clearingassociated with to run out of land that can be irrigated at an accept- shorter fallow periods. able cost. But the combined benefits of more employment Shortage of water in many parts of India, in the and more food do not come automatically. Without Nile Basin, in Brazil, and in most of the developing modern technical packagesincluding purchased countries is constraining irrigation development, inputs such as fertilizers and improved seedsand and water transfer projects are being planned on effective price incentives, the amount of labor used an even bigger scale than those recently built in can increase faster than output. Less fertile land Pakistan. Countries are also putting more empha- may be brought under cultivation; good land may sis on groundwater development, on the com- be given less time to regain its fertility. Research bined use of ground and surface waters, on water into farming systems and increased use of agricul- economy, and on more advanced methods of tural extension services can help ensure that new water management. Poor water management is farming methods are compatible with available considered by many specialists to be the most resources, including labor. But population pres- important single constraint to irrigated crop pro- sure is likely to continue. In parts of Africa, and in duction. Bilateral and multinational agencies are China, Bangladesh, and Java in Indonesia, popula- now trying to arrest the decline in management tion pressure has already forced people to work standards, and an International Irrigation Manage- harder just to maintain income in traditional ment Institute has recently been established to agriculture. promote better use of water. The challenge will, In most developing countries, however, labor however, remain formidable, especially in some productivity has been maintained. To forestall countries of sub-Saharan Africa, where little or no diminishing returns to labor, intensification of land irrigation has been used in the past. This is particu- use has usually been accompanied by better farm- larly true for the Sahelian countries, where pro- ing methods, the use of fertilizers, investments in gress has been limited mainly because of high con- irrigation and drainage, and mechanization. How- struction costs ($10,000 to $15,000 per hectare ever, such measures are possible only where rain- compared with $2,000 to $5,000 in Asia), low fall is favorableor where water is available for farmer response, and poor project management. irrigationand where topography and soils do not 92 impose constraints that cannot be eased at accept- rural Bangladeshone of the most crowded areas able costs. in the worldtransport, marketing and storage Higher population density, by permitting econo- facilities, as well as extension services, are all mies of scale in the provision of infrastructure and inadequate. services, can sometimes help to induce improve- From one point of view, it is no small achieve- ments in agriculture. In the United States, for ment to sustain an increase in population on the instance, rising population densities stimulated scale that has occurred, and continues to occur, in the development of the transport system during many developing countries. But keeping the pro- the nineteenth century. An improved transport duction of food up with (or even ahead of) growth system, in turn, greatly facilitated the growth of in population is no guarantee that people have a agriculture by lowering transport costs and by rais- healthy diet. Where incomes are low and une- ing the farmgate prices of agricultural products. qually distributed, and increases in food produc- But the potential benefits to be gained from higher tion are just barely ahead of increases in popula- population densities are not always realized. In tion size, poor people may not be able to afford the FIGURE 5.3 Foodgrains and population in India, 1950-83 Population (millions) 700 Average annual 600 growth rate 2.1 percent 500 400 300 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Production of foodgrains (millions of tons) 130 Output trend: average annual growth rate of 110 2.7 percent 90 I 70 50 -U' 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Production of foodgrains (kg. per capita) 0.20 0.15 0 10 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Years shown are end years for the agricultural season. Data for 1983-84 are estimates. Sources World Bank data; adapted from Cassen, 1978. 93 food they need. Although the amount of labor matching what was achieved in Japan. Because used in farming has risen in most developing these countries also use land intensively, they countries, many families have had little or no need larger inputs of fertilizer to increase food pro- increase in their income. They are particularly vul- duction. A second group of countries are likely to nerable when harvests are poor. As Figure 5.3 go on importing food indefinitely because of con- shows, India has managed to expand its food pro- straints on land, irrigation, and so on. For a third duction faster than its population has grown. But group, although the constraints appear less output per person has varied considerably, and in severe, the process of agricultural modernization bad years when food prices have risen, the land- may take several decades. In the meantime, they less poor probably went hungry. may need to increase their food imports. Most developing countries still have potential for yield increases (see Table 5.7). But in some land- Population and the environment scarce countries-for instance, Egypt, China, and Korea-yields are already high. Paddy yields in Rapid population growth can contribute to envi- Egypt in 1979-81 averaged 5.6 tons per hectare, ronmental damage, especially when combined TABLE 5.7 Cereal yields and fertilizer use, selected countries, 1969-81 All cereal yields (tons per Fertilizer use (kilograms per hectare of harvested area) hectare of harvested area) Country group 1969-71 1979-81 1969-71 1978-80 Industrialized countries United States 3.50 4.20 172.4 192.5 Denmark 3.85 4.02 331.0 331.0 Netherlands 4.02 5.69 868.0 1,121.5 Japan 5.04 5.27 426.2 532.6 Developing countries Africa Burundi 1.04 0.99 0.6 1.1 Cameroon 0.89 0.89 7.9 11.6 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.85 4.01 115.0 188.5 Kenya 1.47 1.50 18.4 18.4 Malawi 1.00 1.18 6.6 16.1 Zimbabwe 1.08 1.36 54.3 64.2 Tanzania 0.78 0.70 3.3 6.1 Zambia 0.76 0.74 25.4 47.5 Asia Bangladesh 1.66 1.96 10.7 31.9 Sri Lanka 2.40 2.42 53.3 70.2 India 1.11 1.34 12.5 31.7 Korea, Rep. of 3.50 4.77 193.1 354.5 Malaysia 2.39 2.82 45.3 102.3 Pakistan 1.21 1.61 23.1 61.2 Philippines 1.30 1.59 23.5 30.7 Thailand 2.01 1.94 9.9 20.1 Latin America Argentina 1.71 2.20 3.3 4.4 Brazil 1.33 1.50 24.0 72.6 Colombia 1.72 2.46 43.0 69.0 Chile 1.86 2.12 106.2 84.2 Costa Rica 1.55 2.25 141.9 177.9 Ecuador 1.04 1.61 17.5 48.5 El Salvador 1.57 1.72 104.2 105.3 Guatemala 1.12 1.51 25.8 65.2 Mexico 1.52 2.11 38.7 79.8 Note: Harvested area covers all cropped areas including tree crops. Sources: FAO, 1982; World Bank. 94 with certain nondemographic factors. For exam- areas such as in Nepal (see Box 5.4). Forests also ple, an unequal distribution of farmland, by protect power production from hydroelectric restricting access to better soils, can help to push schemes. When watersheds are cleared, dams growing numbers of people onto ecologically sen- often start to silt up. Less electricity can be gener- sitive areaserosion-prone hillsides, semiarid ated (because less water can flow through the savannas, and tropical forests. One example is the turbines); thus the economic life of the investment migration to the Amazon rainforests from rural is reduced. For example, the useful life of the areas of northeastern Brazil, where 6 percent of the Ambuklao Dam in the Philippines has been cut landholdings account for more than 70 percent of from sixty to thirty-two years because of the land area. Social changes can also bring eco- deforestation. logical threats: in Kenya and Uganda pastoral Satisfying the demand for firewood is a major groups, whose political power was destroyed cause of deforestation, particularly in the drier and under colonial rule, have seen their closed system higher regions where trees grow slowly. To meet of communal management converted into open their daily energy needs, an estimated 1.3 billion access to their land. With added population people must cut firewood faster than it can be growth, overgrazing and severe environmental replaced by natural growth. Unfortunately, those damage have followed. Population pressure is not who are exhausting the forest seldom recognize always the main culprit, but it almost always exac- what they are doing. The depletion becomes erbates the problem. apparent only when obtaining adequate supplies Of course, the environmental problems of the requires more physical effort or greater expense. In developing countries are not confined to the coun- the Gambia and Tanzania population growth has tryside. Industrialization and urbanization have made wood so scarce that each household spends already led to severe air, water, and noise pollution 250 to 300 worker-days a year gathering the wood in some cities. Although such pollution is a hazard it needs. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the price of to public health, it does not pose as immediate a wood increased tenfold during the 1970s and now threat to the economic life of low-income countries claims up to 20 percent of household income. as does deforestation and desertification. In dry The scarcity of wood has profound implications countries, these two threats are closely linked. for everyday life in developing countries. When there is not enough fuel to heat food and boil Deforestation water, diseases spread more rapidly. In China more than 70 million rural householdsabout 350 Forests are central to the economic and ecological million peoplesuffer serious fuel shortages for life of many developing countries. They help to up to six months a year when crop residues are control floods and thus protect roads in mountain- exhausted and wood is unavailable in deforested ous and wet areas. Floods and landslides have areas. In much of West Africa, families tradition- become serious problems in steep, deforested ally cooked two meals a day. Now, because wood -n Box 5.4 Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds The Ganges river, which flows through has forced many people to live too close denu . It will also encourage India and Bangladesh, floods every year, to the river, in the path of the annual stall feeding 0! stock to help alleviit causing millions of dnllars of damage floods. As testimony to the effects the damage dooc by roaming anini.- and incalculable human suffering. But population growth, the severity of flood- Farmland will be te' the floods and the resulting damage are ing has increased exponentially over the erosion. At the sai much worse than they need be. In the past twenty years, even though the ments of Banglade'. mountainous watersheds of northern annual rainfall has hardly changed. are pursuing poliu India and Nepal, population growth has To help combat the flooding, the World population growth, led to severe deforestation, which has Bank is funding a pilot project in the to deforestation as well as high pop caused the area's heavy rains to run off Indian state of Uttar Pradesh to develop tion density in the flood-prone areas (s' rather than soak into the soil. In the low- nine small watersheds covering 312,000 Chapter 8). land areas surrounding the Ganges, pop- hectares. By planting trees over a wide ulation growth and competition for land area the project will attempt to reclaim 95 is so scarce, they can do so only once a day or once nutrients and organic matter, thereby exposing it every other day. A more specific example is that of to erosion from the sun and wind. These direct soybeans in Upper Volta. They are a new crop, are causes themselves spring from the pressures of exceptionally nutritious, and have grown well, but rapid population growth. In trying to obtain more they are not popular because they have to be food for themselves and their livestock, growing cooked a long time. Similar experiences have been numbers of people frequently overstretch the car- reported in Haiti. rying capacity of semiarid areas: keeping produc- Managed village woodlots, fuelwood planta- tion high during drought reduces the land's natu- tions, or more efficient wood stoves could do ral resilience and sets it on a course to permanent much to ease shortages. For example, a well-man- degradation. aged woodlot planted with fast-growing trees can Although some 100 countries are affected by yield as much as twenty cubic meters of wood per desertification, the process is most serious in sub- hectare annually, six times the yield of an unman- Saharan Africa (particularly the Sahel), northwest- aged natural forest. However, these and other ern Asia, and the Middle East. Every year an addi- measures are not easy to introduce. They require tional 200,000 square kilometersan area larger local testing and adaptation, large numbers of than Senegalare reduced by desertification to the trained staff, and adequate economic and institu- point of yielding nothing. And the process is accel- tional incentives. But the returns from forestry erating: more than 20 percent of the earth's sur- development can be high. In Ethiopia, where fuel- facenow populated by 80 million peopleis wood shortages have become critical in some directly threatened. The human costs of desertifi- regions, estimated rates of return on investments cation often include malnutrition, threat of famine, in rural forestry are on the order of 23 percent. and dislocation of people who must abandon their Another major cause of deforestation is the lands to seek employment elsewhere. expansion of agriculture. According to the FAO, agricultural growth involves clearing more than 11 Urban population growth and internal migration million hectares of forest a year, primarily in response to population pressures. Unless these Beyond a common concern, perceptions of the marginal lands are given much commercial atten- problem of the distribution of population vary con- tionfertilizers, irrigation, and so onthey soon siderably among developing countries. Some see tend to become eroded and infertile. When this the countryside as overpopulated in relation to its happens the settlers clear more forest, a destruc- natural resources. Others complain of labor short- tive and unsustainable process. Fertilizers are ages in remote but resource rich areas. Most com- often an uneconomic remedy, being expensive and monly, however, maldistribution is described in ineffective in the soil and rainfall conditions of terms of "overurbanization" caused by "exces- many tropical areas. sive" migration. In some developing countries, rapid urban growth has undoubtedly caused seri- Desertification ous administrative difficulties. Urban life requires a complicated set of serviceshousing, traffic, The effects of gradually spreading desert are often sewerage, water, and so onthat cannot quickly confused with those of drought. But droughts, no be scaled up as population grows. City administra- matter how severe, are ephemeral; when the rains tions are usually short of money, and may anyway return, the land's inherent productivity is lack the managerial skill to cope with a city that restored. With desertification, even normal rainfall doubles its size in a decade. Where this happens, cannot fully restore the land. In extreme cases, the results are familiar: unemployment, substand- land may remain unproductive for many genera- ard housing, deteriorating public services, conges- tions unless costly remedies are taken. tion, pollution, crime, and so forth. While drought can help to turn land into desert An overriding concern with the negative aspects and make the effects more obvious to people living of urban growth, however, has often led policyma- there, most scientists agree that changes in climate kers to overlook some of the benefits to be gained are not responsible for the vast areas of semiarid from internal migration and urbanization. As a land going out of production each year. The direct result, many governments have chosen to carry causes of desertification include overcultivation, out costlyand often economically inefficient overgrazing, and deforestation. These practices programs to redistribute population. They would strip vegetation from the topsoil and deprive it of have done better to have concentrated on rural 96 development in areas already settled, on improve- interest loans to promote capital-intensive indus- ments in urban policies and management, on elim- try, for examplemay also exacerbate urban ination of price distortions (such as keeping food problems by encouraging rural-urban migration prices low) that encourage urban population without creating enough new urban jobs. growth, and on development of effective family Whatever the cause, the drift from countryside planning programs to reduce rates of natural pop- to city is a concern to governments. A 1983 UN ulation increase. survey of 126 governments of developing coun- Projections of urban growth (which were shown tries found that only 3 considered the distribution in Table 4.3) are not meant to predict what will of their populations "appropriate." Moreover, all actually happenmerely what would happen if three were governments of small island nations: historical trends continued. As such, projections Barbados, Malta, and Nauru. Concern was great- are sensitive to small changes in trends. There is est in Africa, the Middle East, and low-income evidence that the rate of urban growth in develop- Asia: virtually all governments in these regions ing countries slowed slightly after 1973 in response considered population distribution either "parti- to the world economic slowdown. That decrease ally appropriate" or "inappropriate." As a rem- could produce a much smaller urban population edy, more than three-quarters of all respondents than shown by the projections. Though this would stated that they were pursuing policies to slow make urban growth easier to cope with, it would down or reverse internal migration. (without a compensating decline in the overall Between 1925 and 1950 at least 100 million peo- population growth rate) imply faster rural growth. ple in the developing countriesabout 10 percent of their rural population in 1925migrated from The benefits and costs of urbanization the countryside to towns and cities. During the following twenty-five years, the numbers rose to Urban growth gives rise to economies of scale. an estimated 330 million, equivalent to almost a Industries benefit from concentrations of suppliers quarter of the rural population of the developing and consumers, which allow savings in communi- countries in 1950. Population movements within cations and transport costs. Large cities also pro- rural and urban areas, and temporary migration, vide big, differentiated labor markets and may have undoubtedly involved even more people, help to accelerate the pace of technological innova- although their numbers are not reliably known. tion. They also allow economies of scale for such services as water supply and electric power to be The role of internal migration exploited. Evidence from India suggests that sub- stantial economies of scale are found in cities of up Current high rates of urban growth in developing to 150,000 inhabitants. The point at which dis- countries are only partly due to rural-urban migra- economies creep in, because cities are too big, has tion. Natural population increase is estimated to not been clearly demonstrated. account for 60 percent of the rise in urban popula- Against these benefits, unemployment tends to tions, according to a UN sample of twenty-nine be higher in urban than rural areas. In a survey of developing countries. Perhaps another 8 to 15 per- fourteen developing countries, only one (the cent is attributable to the reclassification of rural Islamic Republic of Iran) had a higher rural unem- areas to urban status. Additional evidence from ployment than urban unemployment rate; in six India, Kenya, and several West African countries countries the urban unemployment rate was more confirms this pattern. than twice the rural rate. Surveys confirm that air Although fertility rates are on average lower in pollution, congestion, social disturbances, crime, urban than in rural areas, differences within coun- and similar problems also increase disproportion- tries between urban and rural fertility tend to be ately with city size. But these problems are often small (see Chapter 6). Thus the effect of urbaniza- aggravated by poor urban management. Typically, tion on aggregate fertility is limited in the short governments reduce the absorptive capacity of cit- run, especially because migrants tend to be of ies by intervening in labor markets (for instance, childbearing age, raising the number of births in through minimum wage legislation, and licensing cities even when the rate of fertility is lower. Natu- requirements and restrictions on small busi- ral increase in urban areas is therefore substantial. nesses), and by pursuing inappropriate pricing Migration then puts even greater strain on the policies for public services. National economic pol- capacity of cities to cope with rapidly growing icieswhich provide fiscal incentives and low- numbers. In broad perspective, the shift of people 97 from rural to urban areas mainly reflects the proc- source of innovation, but only if opportunities ess of industrialization and the changes it brings in exist to exploit their ideas. Studies in Guatemala, the demand for labor. Certain conditions in rural Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Tanzania, for exam- areasunequal land distribution, landlessness, ple, have shown that returning migrants can intro- agricultural mechanization, natural calamities, duce new crops and techniques. Other studies and, in the past, forced labor migrationshave have found that experience gained in modern fac- strongly influenced population movements in tories is largely irrelevant to the needs of small many countries. But, by and large, people move to villages. towns and cities for higher incomes and better job opportunities. Redistribution policies For individual families, these attractions can be considerable. Once in the city, perhaps three out of Governments have employed many different four migrants make economic gains. A move from approaches to the task of slowing down rural- the rural Northeast of Brazil to Rio de Janeiro, for urban migration, ranging from direct controls on example, can roughly triple the income of an population mobility to efforts to improve economic unskilled worker; the family income of a manual conditions in the countryside. Few of these poli- laborer in Sao Paulo is almost five times that of a cies have achieved their demographic objectives, farm laborer in the Northeast. The higher cost of and their social and financial costs have been high. urban living may narrow rural-urban wage differ- Moreover, they have often been undermined by entials in real terms, but urban dwellers also gen- national policies in agriculture, industry, and for- erally have much better access to basic public eign trade. services. To take one example, in rural areas of Direct controls on mobility have been most com- sub-Saharan Africa only about 10 percent of the mon in centrally planned economies. China, for population has access to a safe water supply, com- example, has employed controls since the early pared with 66 percent of the urban population. 1950s in an attempt to stabilize its urban popula- Most studies conclude that migrants are assets to tion. These controls have taken the form of travel the urban economy. They are mostly between the permits and food ration cards that can be used ages of fifteen and twenty-nine and are better edu- only in specified areas; also, restrictions have been cated and more motivated than those who stay placed on labor recruitment in rural areas by urban behind in the countryside. Evidence from Brazil, industrial enterprises. In some cases large num- Colombia, Kenya, Korea, India, and Malaysia bers of city dwellers have been exhorted to move shows that migrants with long urban residence to the countryside. The "rustication" program, for compare favorably with urban-born people in instance, resettled some 10 to 15 million urban sec- terms of employment and income. A World Bank ondary school graduates in rural areas between study of Bogota, Colombia, found that migrants 1969 and 1973. Administrative measures have earned more than nonmigrants at all educational probably helped to slow urban population growth: levels. Overall, income and employment levels are the proportion of the population in urban areas more a function of age, sex, and education than of has changed only slightly over the past thirty whether a person has migrated or not. years. But the costs were high to individuals, and Evidence about the impact on rural areas of emi- the economy also suffered from misallocations of gration is mixed. Emigration seldom causes a drop labor. in farm output. In villages of East Kalimantan, Less stringent controls have been used in Indo- Indonesia, for instance, women have adjusted to nesia and in the Philippines. Starting in 1970, the departure of male emigrants by working migrants to Jakarta had to comply with an array of harder at rice and vegetable production. Other bureaucratic requirements, including cash reactions include shifts to less labor intensive crop- deposits and licenses for various business activi- ping patterns, increased use of wage labor, and ties, however informal. To limit the growth of agricultural mechanization. Manila, the city government in 1963 decided to Urban-rural remittances clearly benefit rural charge migrants a sizable fee to enter the public households. Village studies in India, Malawi, and school system; free education was available only to Thailand, however, show that net remittances bona fide residents. In both cases, the controls migrants receive as well as send moneyusually proved hard to enforce, gave rise to petty corrup- account for only a small proportion of rural tion, and failed to slow urban growth significantly. incomes. Returning migrants can be an important A variant of such controls has been periodic expul- 98 sions of unemployed migrants from cities, a prac- tion. But costs have been high (about $15,000 per tice that has been attempted in parts of Africa, family in the 1970s), and "second generation" notably the Congo, Niger, Tanzania, and Zaire. problemsincreasing social differentiation in set- They too have had little visible impact. tlement areas, and renewed pressures on land as Population redistribution is commonly a major settler families increase in sizehave begun to objective of land-settlement schemes. The transmi- appear. Although land settlement may have gration program in Indonesia, for example, aims to important political and social objectives, a review ease population pressures in rural Javawith only of World Bank-assisted schemes concluded that, in limited success, it seems (see Box 5.5). Similarly, economic terms, it is usually more efficient to Brazil's TransAmazon Program did little to further intensify production in already settled areas than the goal of reducing population growth in the to move people elsewhere. semiarid Northeast. Evidence suggests that the Governments have also tried to modify popula- Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) tion distribution by making small and medium- settlement scheme in Malaysia has succeeded in size towns an attractive alternative to the major slowing down intrarural and rural-urban migra- cities. Evidence from India, Peru, Thailand, and Box 5.5 Indonesia's transmigration program Indonesia's populationestimated at 153 pared with 28 percent of the rural popu- Java's natural population increase, the million in 1982is unevenly distributed lation of the other islands. island's rate of population growth actu- over 13,600 islands, covering about 1.9 The big demographic and economic ally increased slightly from 1.9 percent a million square kilometers. A single differences among the islands of Indone- year in 1961-71 to 2 percent a year in island, Java, accounts for about two- sia have prompted many programs for 1971-80. thirds of the country's population but moving people from Java to the other Of course, the transmigration program only 7 percent of the land area. java has islands. The Dutch began a resettlement should not be judged solely on its ability an average of 690 people per square kilo- program in 1905, moving 155 families to ease population pressures in Java. meter (higher than Bangladesh); in irri- from central Java to Lampung province Emigrants have been drawn from the gated areas the density rises to 2,000 peo- in Sumatra. By 1932, some 27,000 people poorest groups in Java and from the most ple per square kilometer. In contrast, (roughly 1,000 per year) had been ecologically vulnerable areas. Reviews of large areas of the other islands, including moved. Between 1932 and 1969 the pro- the program carried out by the World Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and gramwhich became known as "Trans- Bank found that these settlers were bet- Irian Jaya, are sparsely populated. migration" in 1950slowly gathered ter off in most transmigration sites than Java has fertile volcanic soils, which momentum. By 1969, about 580,000 more they had been in Java. Nevertheless, allow intensive agriculture without people (about 15,000 per year) had been average crop yields and incomes in heavy applications of fertilizer. Some 70 resettled. But since Java's population upland areas have been low and variable. percent of the island is cultivated. The grew by some 35 million over this period, Of 592 farmers surveyed in communities other islands, however, have generally the transmigration program had only a dependent on rainfed agriculture, only 9 poor tropical soils. Over the years, much minor impact. percent reported paddy yields of more of the population growth in rural Java With the First Five-year Plan (1969-74), than one ton per family. has been absorbed through "agricultural the transmigration program became a The Indonesian government has set involution," a process through which national priority and was further ambitious targetsto move some 13 mil- land productivity is raised by adding expanded. The World Bank has sup- lion families from Java over a twenty- more and more workers. But growing ported this expansion with four loans year period. For the immediate future, population pressures have contributed to and one credit, totaling about $350 mil- the government intends at least to match ecologically harmful farming practices, lion. Since 1969, 479,000 families the target it set in the Third Five-Year such as the clearing and cultivation of (approximately 2.4 million people) have Plan (1979-84) of 100,000 families a year. steep hillsides. More than 23 million been settled outside of Java at an average Costs are likely to increase as more and hectares have already been degraded. cost per family varying between $4,000 more remote areas are opened up, and Labor productivity and rural incomes and $8,000. The program has also this could constrain the program's devel- have declined in parts of the island, and encouraged some spontaneous migra- opment. Nevertheless, transmigration landlessness and rural underemploy- tion, estimated at 1 million people since will continue to receive a high priority ment are widespread. In 1980 an esti- 1969. Although the transmigration pro- among government programs, not least mated 47 percent of rural Javanese were gram has in recent years succeeded in because of what it can do to alleviate below the absolute poverty line, com- resettling the equivalent of a quarter of poverty. 99 other developing countries suggests that this a cause of migration. objective is seldom achieved. One exception is Despite the growing income gap between rich Korea: through the introduction of special tax and and poor countries and the widening gap in the credit incentives in the early 1970s, industrial activ- size of the labor force, the scale of present-day ity and people were successfully attracted to migration is relatively small and unlikely to smaller cities. One result was that population increase dramatically (see Chapter 4). The most growth in Seoul slowed from 9.8 percent a year in important reason is the immigration policies of the 1960s to 4.5 percent a year in the 1970s. But this host countries. Their policies vary according to achievement was helped considerably by a combi- their economic needs, but they generally place nation of circumstances possibly unique to Korea: some limits on immigration because of the effects a rapidly declining rural population, a stable gov- on the wages of natives and because of social and ernment, a wide range of social services, and a political tensions that are often created by large- booming economy. scale immigration. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RECEIVING COUNTRY. In Population growth and the international economy general, immigration becomes controversial when Demographic change is tending to increase eco- new workers reduce wagesusually because the nomic disparities between developed and develop- demand for urban labor is not rising fast enough to ing countries. Between now and the year 2000, for ensure that an added supply of labor will not cause example, the number of people aged twenty to wages to fall. For example, increased resistance to forty will increase at about 2.6 percent a year in the immigration in the United States after the 1890s developing countries, roughly ten times faster was partly the result of a decline in the growth of than in developed countries. In absolute terms, the farmland, retardation of capital accumulation, and difference is even more striking. Numbers in the technological change that favored capital- and twenty to forty age group will increase by 19 mil- skill-intensive sectorsall of which reduced the lion in developed countries, less than one-third of growth of demand for unskilled labor. More the increase from 1960 to 1980. In developing recently, restrictions on the use of migrant labor in countries the increase will be 600 million, one and western Europe increased when the 1974-75 reces- a half times the 1960-80 increase. The size of the sion began. working-age population in China and India Host countries generally benefit from immigra- which was about 60 percent larger than the total tion; in the Middle East migrants form an indis- for industrial countries in 1960will be more than pensable part of the labor force. Host countries can 150 percent larger by 2000. Even if per capita also select immigrants whose skills and qualifica- income grows faster in developing than in indus- tions suit their pattern of demand (see Box 5.6). trialized countries, the absolute income gap will Immigration, often from developing countries, not decrease significantly because the initial differ- thus provides a flexible source of supply, enabling ence in per capita income is, for many developing receiving countries to adapt more quickly to countries, so large. To what extent can interna- changes in demand than they could do without tional migration and trade reduce these disparities immigration. But the economic gains to host coun- and alleviate the problem of rapid population tries must be balanced against social costs. Immi- growth in developing countries? gration can create social tensions, often concen- trated locally: whole neighborhoods exist in International migration European countries and in the United States where adults are predominantly first-generation The motivation for most international migration is immigrants. Of France's 4 million foreigners, 40 the same as for internal migrationhigher wages. percent live around Paris; in some sections of the Historically, some migration may have been city, more than half the primary-school children directly related to population pressure, but today have foreign parents. wage differences are the main driving force. For One response of host countries has been to example, in the late 1970s, an unskilled emigrant shorten the stay of immigrants through temporary worker from Bangladesh earned up to ten times recruitment rather than permanent immigration. more in the Arab gulf states than he did in his own These efforts are not always successful: in western country. To the extent that population growth Europe, for example, the same workers returned, affects those differences, it is, of course, indirectly and the average length of stay increased. 100 As immigrants increase as a proportion of the to $27 billion in 1980. In 1980, remittances pro- population, they receive increasing attention and vided almost as much foreign exchange as exports public resources. In the long run, these factors are did for Pakistan and Upper Volta; they were more likely to be more important than purely economic than 60 percent of exports for Egypt, Turkey, and factors in maintaining limits on immigration. Portugal, and about 40 percent for Bangladesh and Yugoslavia. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SENDING COUNTRY. A Many countries have special schemes to attract substantial part of recent migration has involved remittances. India and Yugoslavia allow foreign unskilled workers. Migrant workers from the currency accounts, with interest and capital with- Yemen Arab Republic (constituting more than 30 drawable in foreign currency. Bangladesh issues percent of the national work force in 1981) were import permit vouchers, which carry a special practically all unskilled. So were a large proportion exchange rate and may be freely negotiated. of emigrants from other countries that sent labor to China, Korea, and the Philippines have mandatory the booming Middle East in the 1970sranging remittance requirements. from about 30 percent for Bangladesh and Jordan Migrant workers tend to save a lot. The average to about 50 percent for Egypt. About 50 percent of propensity to save by Turkish emigrants was 35 immigrants into Ghana and the Ivory Coast are percent in 1971 (compared to a gross domestic sav- employed in agriculture, usually as laborers. ings rate of 16 percent), and as high as 70 percent Unskilled laborers in western Europe and the for Pakistanis in 1979 (compared to a gross domes- United States may be more skilled than those in tic savings rate of less than 10 percent). The aver- the Middle East, but they comprised 30 percent of age propensity to remit, which may be more rele- migrant manual workers in Germany and more vant to the emigrant country, was lower, but still than 40 percent of temporary workers admitted to 11 percent for workers from Turkey and about 50 the United States in recent years. Illegal workers in percent for workers from Pakistan. the United States are largely uneducated and With this new source of income, the living stand- unskilled. ards of many families improve significantly. A In some countries emigration has contributed to large part of remittances (about 60 percent, accord- substantial increases in wages of the unskilled at ing to one survey in Pakistan) is spent on food, home. For example, real wages of unskilled con- clothing, rent, and other standard household struction labor in the largest cities of Pakistan items. Many of the consumer durables are increased at an annual rate of more than 15 percent imported. Beyond using remittances to increase a year between 1972 and 1978 (faster than the rate their current spending, families tend to repay debt of growth of wages of carpenters or masons), after and invest their extra income, mostly in urban real remaining stagnant for several previous years. In estate, and in agricultural land and housing. A sur- the Yemen Arab Republic, which experienced vey conducted in 1977 in the Indian state of Kerala heavy international as well as rural-urban migra- showed that land and buildings accounted for an tion, real wages of agricultural labor increased average 75 percent of the value of assets owned by almost sixfold between 1972 and 1978. During emigrant households. In Pakistan 63 percent of 1975-79, they rose from 56 to 63 percent of urban investment from remittances went into real estate, wages; urban wages rose from 45 to 67 percent of including agricultural land; in Turkey 58 percent of those in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt the rate of increase migrants' savings went into housing and land. of real wages in construction was about 6 percent a Investment in equipment and financial assets has year during 1974-77, after stagnating in the pre- been relatively small, although in Mexico and Tur- vious ten years. Considering the low wages that key some remittances have been invested in the unskilled earn (for example, less than $2 a day family-owned commercial and manufacturing in Pakistan in construction in 1977-78, less than $5 businesses. How remittances are used depends on a day in Egypt in 1977), these wage increases must the same factors that determine other private con- be considered beneficial, particularly since there is sumption and investment decisions. no evidence that output declined. In short, emigration by the unskilled generally An additional benefit is the money that emi- leads to no loss in production, and if there is a grants send back home. It serves not only to scarcity premium on savings and foreign exchange increase the incomes of their families but also to (generated from remittances), then net benefits help finance their country's trade deficit. Workers' from emigration are likely to be large. In fact, it remittances increased from about $3 billion in 1970 may even be beneficial for countries to facilitate 101 emigration by providing information to potential form a large part of both temporary and perma- emigrants and organizing recruitment on an offi- nent migration (see Box 5.6). cial basis. Many countries, including Bangladesh, Korea, and the Philippines are in fact doing this. International trade: growth and limits However, emigration is not totally costless. Tem- porary migrants and their families often suffer Trade offers more opportunities for reducing inter- long periods of separation, although there is evi- national disparities and absorbing labor in devel- dence that women left behind efficiently manage oping countries than does international migration, the household and family assets, including agricul- but the effects of increased trade on labor absorp- tural land. Emigration has led to a rapid rate of tion have, until now, been limited to only a few mechanization in Yemen Arab Republic without a countries. significant increase in productivity, and neglect of Unlike international migration, world trade has infrastructure has led to a collapse of farm terraces. grown rapidly in the past three decades, at 6.7 per- In Oman underground water channels have dete- cent a year, compared with less than 4 percent a riorated. Emigrant countries may also lose when year in 1800-1913, and only 1.4 percent in 1913-50. skilled and professional workers emigrate; these Trade has provided developing countries with Box 5.6 The brain drain and taxation Between 1969 and 1979, the United They included as much as 44 percent of ured solely by the loss of the money States admitted nearly 500,000 profes- Sudan's engineers, scientists, and medi- value of their services. Emigration also sional and technical workers. Three- cal practitioners. During the 1970s pro- prevents "internal diffusion' 'skilled quarters of them were from developing fessionals from the Philippines who emi- people moving to backward areas within countries, nearly 50 percent from Asia. grated to the United States constituted a country. During the 1970s they accounted for 12.3 percent of the increase in their num- These costs are hard to quantify and nearly 30 percent of the rise in the bers at home; for Korea the figure was 10 depend on each economy's institutional employment of physicians and related percent. In Bangladesh professional and features. Some of them can be reduced practitioners in the United States, for 12 technical personnel constituted 17 per- or avoided by a change in the policies of percent of the increase in engineers, and cent of total emigration during 1976-78, the sending countries. There is, for for 8 percent of the increase in scientists. and their departure is believed to have example, little justification in subsidizing Countries that import skilled man- contributed to a shortage of several types higher education when the beneficiaries power gain on two counts: of professionals. In other countries pro- are the richer elite, or when the probabil- Since professional education is sub- fessional emigration has been large in ity of their emigrating is high. Govern- sidized (about 45 percent of revenues of absolute numbers but not necessarily in ments may also feel that they have a institutions of higher learning in the relative terms. Professional and technical right to tax the incomes of skilled emi- United States, for example, come from workers who left Egypt for the United grants, especially if emigrants remain cit- government), receiving countries save States during 1969-79 were less than 2 izens of their home country. The United on such public subsidies. percent of the increase in their numbers States and Philippines, for example, tax Since countries can select immi- at home (although professional emigra- their citizens when they live abroad. grants, they can adjust more quickly to tion to the Middle East may be larger). There are few estimates of how much changes in demand. For example, the Indian professional emigration to the revenue would be raised by taxing emi- share of physicians (and related prac- United States formed about 1 percent of grants. If it is assumed, however, that 90 titioners) in professional immigration the stock in 1971. percent of all professional immigrants into the United States from developing The governments of many sending admitted to the United States during countries was 12 percent in 1969, rose to countries feel that emigration is harmful 1969-79 were still there in 1979, and that nearly 25 percent in 1973, but dropped because they subsidize the emigrants' within each major occupation they to 11 percent in 1979 as the number education but lose the opportunity to tax matched the average earnings of Ameri- of domestically trained physicians their incomes. When skilled workers can workers, their total earnings in 1979 increased. leave, unskilled workers may become would have been about $6 billion. A 10 Certain developing countries have unemployed. A country may also put a percent tax would thus have yielded experienced heavy brain drain. Some high social value on the services of $600 millionsome 13 percent of Offi- 36 percent of temporarily recruited professional emigrants, such as doctors cial Development Assistance from the migrants from Sudan, for example, were and nurses, so that their emigration United States in that year. professionally and technically trained. involves a bigger loss than can be meas- 102 extra jobs, directly in the export sector and indi- by inward-looking trade policies and price distor- rectly as demand for inputs and services has tions. Ironically, employment has suffered as a increased. In Korea an estimated half a million jobs result: there is now ample evidence that industries in 1970 (about 60 percent of them in manufactur- geared to import substitution create fewer jobs ing) were attributed directly and indirectly to than do export industries. Evidence from Brazil, exports. For all developing countries, however, Indonesia, and Thailand, for example, shows that manufacturing exports have added few jobs in labor employed per unit of value added was twice relation to the increases in the size of the labor as high in export industries as in import-substitu- force. Most of the increase in manufactured tion industries. In Korea in 1968 manufactured exports (and thus in total exports, since nonfuel exports were 33 percent more labor intensive than primary exports have grown less rapidly) has been domestic manufactures, and 50 percent more labor in the (now) middle-income countries. Between intensive than import-competing industries. The 1965 and 1980 manufactured exports of all devel- unskilled labor component in export industries is oping countries increased by $128 billion, but also generally high-50 to 100 percent higher than middle-income oil-importing countries, with a in import-competing ones. population of 600 million (out of 3 billion in all The accumulation of human (and physical) capi- developing countries), accounted for 80 percent of tal necessary to expand export capability is, as that increase. Five countries-Brazil, Hong Kong, shown above, made more difficult if population is Korea, Singapore, and Yugoslavia, with 200 mil- growing rapidly. Even simple manufactures such lion people-accounted for 55 percent of the as textiles and clothing (the commodities that increase. Manufactured exports of low-income developing countries typically export to start with) countries, with a population of 2.2 billion in 1980, require skilled workers and versatile managers and increased by only $14 billion, and those of low- entrepreneurs who can keep up with changing income Africa by $0.5 billion (see Table 5.8). Total fashions and preferences. Modern textile plants exports of low-income countries also grew slowly, tend to use expensive equipment: fixed capital per reflecting (with a few exceptions such as India) employee in Indian firms using nonautomatic their dependence on primary exports, which grew power looms in 1963 was $1,600, more than seven at only 6.8 percent a year in volume. To the extent times the per capita income in that year. that export revenues determine imports, primary Table 5.8 gives some indication of the differences exporters have gained little, particularly in the face in human capital between low-income Africa, the of large increases in population. least successful exporter of manufactures, and middle-income oil importers, the most successful. EXPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT. Export success does In both groups the labor force has grown at about 2 not rely solely, or even necessarily, on a large labor percent a year. But in 1960 the (now) middle- force and low wages. Of greater importance are an income countries had, on average, a higher adult outward-looking trade policy and a relatively literacy rate, a higher index of human skills skilled labor force. As discussed in Chapters 2 and (defined as the secondary-school enrollment rate 3, exports of many countries have been inhibited plus five times the enrollment rate in higher educa- TABLE 5.8 Export structure and human capital Percentage of Value of manu- inanufactu res in Rate of factu red exports Adult Index of growth of Exports GDP (billions of dollars) lit eracg rate human skills labor force Count rt group 1965 1980 1960 1981 1965 1980 1960 1980 1960 1979 (1960-81) Low-income Africa 9.8 9.3 6.2 8.7 0.2 0.7 15 39 2.4 19.0 2.0 Low-income Asia 37.4 41.8 13.0 170d 1.9 15.4 36 53 30.0' 58.4d 1.8 Middle-income non-oil 23.0 51.6 22.0 25.0 4.3 108.9 58 72 38.0 109.0 2.2 Industrialized countries 69.6 73.5 30.0 25.0 86.9 902.3 96 99 144.0 274.0 1.3 Defined as the secondary school-enrollment rate plus five times the enrollment rate in higher education. Based on a limited sample. Secondary-school enrollment rate. Excludes China. 103 Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China Slower population growth can help but the proportion older than sixty-five The most severe burden will be created developing countries raise living stand- would be 21 percent, by then about 308 by the large cohorts of the late 1960s and ards more quickly. But a rapid transition million people. This level of elderly early 1970s who are now beginning to to slow growth does require adjust- dependency is unprecedented even in enter the labor force. Pension funds to mentmost importantly in providing the developed countries, where the pro- cover the retirement of these workers, security to the elderly. China's official portion aged sixty-five and over ranges with opportunities to earn interest and demographic target calls for a population from about 8 percent in Japan to 18 per- reinvest the substantial net income that of 1.2 billion by the year 2000, requiring cent in Sweden in 1980, and is about 11 such funds would receive in their early that the total fertility rate stay below 2 for percent in the United States (see chart). years, are urgent if present population the rest of this century and that many The much larger proportion of the policies continue; indeed, they may well couples have only one child. elderly would be somewhat offset by a be necessary to sustain the desired fertil- What are the economic implications of decline in the numbers of young people, ity decline. But they will be difficult to lowering fertility well below replacement from 36 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in finance at China's still relatively low level? During the remainder of this cen- 2050. Young adults would then have income level. In developed countries, tury there would be some economic fewer children to support, but, for those with income per worker ten to thirty advantages but they are not dramatic. If from one-child families, no siblings to times greater than in China, each worker the total fertility rate is reduced to an help support their parents. Consump- in 1980 supported only half as many average of 1.7 between 1985 and 2000 tion requirements of the elderly are pensioners as a worker in China would (which would keep population to 1.2 bil- about double those of children, and at have to in the future if present demo- lion in 2000, according to World Bank present few Chinese workers (only about graphic goals are to be met. Yet even now projections), the school-age population 15 percent of the labor force) are covered in developed countries, there are prob- would decline to about two-thirds of its by pension schemes; very few of those lems with public financing of old-age 1980 level by the year 2000. The declines covered are in rural areas. security systems. would be greater in those regions where many couples have already pledged to Population pyramids, China and United States, 1980 and 2050 have no more than one child (See Box 8.9). Savings could be allocated to some- Age group Chin United States what more rapid expansion of secondary 75+ I Male Female Male Female education. But, in the long run, the decline in the 70-74 1980 __. proportion of young people would be offset by a large increase in the propor- 60-64 2050 tion of the elderly. Assuming fertility 1 rises again to replacement level after 50-54 2000, the proportion of persons in the working-age group would not fall and 40-44 the overall dependency ratio would not increase in the next century. But the 30-34 structure of dependency would be mark- edly differentwith the labor force Sup- I 20-24 porting the dependent old rather than the dependent young. In 1980, 60 per- 10-14 cent of the population was of working age (fifteen to sixty-four years) and only 0-4 J 5 percent (about 45 million people) was aged sixty-five and over. In the year 6 I liii 4 2 0 11111 24 6 1111 6 42024 6 111111 2050when today's fifteen-year olds are Percentage of total population Percentage of total population aged eightythe proportion of the work- 980 million, 1980 230 million, 1980 1,450 million, 2050 291 million, 2050 ing-age group would still be 61 percent, 104 tion), and a larger share of manufactures in output large families, and because they benefit less from than low-income Africa. Low-income Asia occu- government spending on the programs they use pies an intermediate position on most indicators; mosthealth and education, for examplewhen in 1960 it had a nearly comparable level of human public services cannot keep pace with population skills and a higher share of manufactures in growth. At the societal level, as this chapter has exports than middle-income countries. The com- emphasized, it weakens macroeconomic perfor- paratively slow increase in exports of manufac- mance by making it more difficult to finance the tures from low-income Asia is as much attributable investments in education and infrastructure that to inward-oriented policies in the two largest coun- ensure sustained economic growth. tries (China and India), at least until recently, as to Population growth eventually slows as parents any lack of export capabilities. decide to have fewer children. The factors behind These simple correlations should not be carried parents' decisions, discussed in the next chapter, too far. Even among the successful exporters, then work their way through to benefit society as a some countries have fared better and others worse whole. But it does not follow that slower popula- than their skill index in 1960 might suggest. Never- tion growth will be an immediate panacea for theless, these comparisons show that factors such developing countries. Declines in fertility, for as a literate and educated labor force, accumula- example, will cut the growth of the labor force only tion of physical capital, and economic diversity are after fifteen to twenty years. important for growth of manufactured exports. In the meantime, there are various nondemo- graphic measures by which countries can ease Conclusions those development problems made more difficult by population growth. The adoption of trade and Population and development are intertwined in exchange rate policies that do not penalize labor many ways, not all of them fully understood. and the dismantling of institutional barriers to cre- Moreover, the effects of population growth may ating jobs would ease the employment problem. vary widely, depending on the institutional, eco- Pricing policies in agriculture and more resources nomic, cultural, and demographic setting. Slow allocated to rural credit, agricultural research and population growth itself requires new adjustments extension, and so forth, would increase agricul- to support the growing burden of dependent tural output. elderly (see Box 5.7). The complexity of the subject In short, policies to reduce population growth makes it tempting to be agnostic about the conse- can make an important contribution to develop- quences of rapid population growth. Neverthe- ment (especially in the long run), but their benefi- less, the evidence discussed above points over- cial effects will be greatly diminished if they are not whelmingly to the conclusion that population supported by the right macroeconomic and sec- growth at the rapid rates common in most of the toral policies. At the same time, failure to address developing world slows development. At the fam- the population problem will itself reduce the set of ily level, as Chapter 4 showed, high fertility can macroeconomic and sectoral policies that are possi- reduce the amount of time and money devoted to ble, and permanently foreclose some long-run each child's development. It makes it harder to development options. tackle poverty, because poor people tend to have 105 6 Slowing population growth Experience has shown that as development pro- fertility declines of the 1960s, which were largely gresses fertility falls. Yet, because current rates of confined to the industrializing economies of Korea, population growth are so much greater in the Singapore, and Hong Kong. But fertility declines developing world than they were at comparable beginning in other developing countries in the late income levels in today's developed countries, 1960s, and spreading to more in the 1970s, have many developing countries cannot afford to wait been related to a different kind of development: for fertility to decline spontaneously. This message education, health, and the alleviation of poverty. is not without hope, however, because some Birth rate declines have been much more closely developing countries have already shown that fer- associated with adult literacy and life expectancy tility can be brought down significantly. This chap- than with GNP per capita. Despite high average ter examines the forces behind their success and incomes, rapid industrialization, and fast eco- considers. the role of public policy in strengthening nomic growth, birth rates fell less in Brazil and such forces. Venezuela between 1965 and 1975 than in Sri It was once assumed that reducing fertility in Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey, where income gains developing countries would require a typical and social services have been more evenly sequence of economic advance: urbanization, distributed. industrialization, a shift from production in the This association is not surprising. When their household to factory production, and incomes ris- children have a better chance of surviving and of ing to levels enjoyed by today's developed coun- enjoying a wider range of opportunities, parents tries. This view seemed to be confirmed by the are willing to devote more money and time to edu- FIGURE 6.1 How government decisions influence family decisions Family decisions Government decisions Socioeconomic o Timing of marriage environment o Number of children o Children's education Policy and laws Spending Tax programs o Saving and consumption O Marriage age o Education 0 Family allowances O Educational o Work time within o Breastfeeding o Primary health care 0 User fees for opportunities and outside home o Women's status o Family planning larger families o Availability of family planning o Children's o Incentives for and health services Proximate education and work fertility control determinants o Women's status o Old-age security o Financial and of fertility labor markets o Marriage age o Breastfeeding o Abortion 0 Contraception Fertility 106 cating them. The gap between the private and for example, for health and educationhas great social costs of children narrows where income potential for affecting such decisions. Education gains are widely shared, credit and labor markets and primary health care account for between a fifth are working well, and people are receiving a fair (Malawi) and a third (Tunisia) of public budgets in return to effort and skills. Income gains often coin- low-income and middle-income countries. Taxes cide with an increase in opportunities for women similarly affect behavior through, for example, tax- outside the home and for the poor, and associated free allowances for children and fees or subsidies changes substitute for the benefits of having many on services that children use. The effects of taxes children. and subsidies can differ depending on the situa- But such changes come only gradually. Educa- tion. Tuition and book charges might discourage tion, for example, cannot be transformed over- parents from sending children to school and so night. Nationally, literacy rates today are strongly indirectly contribute to higher fertility. But once it influenced by their level in the past; in house- is clear that education is valuable, such charges are holds, children are more likely to attend school if likely to encourage people to have fewer children their mothers did, regardless of family income in order to give them a better education. level. Expanding opportunities for women relies in Some of the ways in which government can part on educating womenbut this occurs more influence family decisions are illustrated in Figure slowly where parents see only limited opportuni- 6.1. The influence can be directgovernment can ties for their daughters. In rural areas, credit and make laws and issue proclamations, for example, labor markets cannot be transformed overnight. that clarify social goals about marriage age and All the more reason, therefore, to act nowespe- children's schooling. But government influence is cially because some of these changes also take time likely to be stronger and more enduring when it is to lower fertility. indirect; for example, through various entitlement Other complementary policies can have more and tax programs, government can affect the social immediate effects. Promotion of later marriage and and economic environment, which in turn affects longer breastfeeding can reduce the birth rate at people's decisions about marriage, children, and the same time it raises welfare. And the experience education. These indirect effects are so powerful of many developing countries shows that public because fertility itself is but one of a set of interre- support for family planning programs, by narrow- lated household decisions: saving, consuming, ing the gap between actual family size and what working, raising children, and sending them to couples would want if they could more easily school. Many of the signals sent out by govern- choose, can lower fertility quickly. Where family ment affect fertility by altering the decisions about planning services are widespread and affordable, children's education, mother's work, and the rela- fertility has declined more rapidly than social and tive attractiveness of spending now or saving for economic progress alone would predict. Some one's old age. Figure 6.1 also shows that all these examples are Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Thai- influences alter fertility through what demogra- land, Tunisia, and, more recently, Indonesia and phers call the proximate determinants of fertility- Mexico. breastfeeding, age at marriage, contraceptive use, and abortion. By taxing and spending in ways that provide The complexity of these relationships is both a couples with specific incentives and disincentives virtue and a drawback. It is a virtue because spe- to limit their fertility, government policy can also cific government programs can have multiple affect fertility in the short run. Government can effects that enhance their overall impact on family offer "rewards" for women who defer pregnancy; behavior. This is clearly true of family planning it can compensate people who undergo steriliza- programs and other development programs. Such tion for loss of work and travel costs; and it can efforts work best in concert; they work only halt- provide insurance and old-age security schemes ingly when they work alone. When various pro- for parents who restrict the size of their families. grams all work together, they make possible the Each of these public policies works through sig- steep declines in fertility achieved by countries nals which influence individual and family deci- that have simultaneously benefited from rapid eco- sionswhen to marry, whether to use contracep- nomic growth, improvements in education, rising tion, how long to send children to school, and life expectancy, and expanding family planning whether and how much family members work. programs. But the complexity is also a disadvan- The level and pattern of government expenditure tage; no one program or policy is enough to reduce 107 fertility; nor is it easy to judge the importance of tality. As shown in Chapter 4, many of the less diffi- one program compared with another. cult ways to reduce mortalitythrough antimalarial campaigns, for examplehave already been Socioeconomic factors and fertility exploited; further progress against mortality requires changes in people's behavior. Family planning serv- One possible remedy for population growth can be ices are an obvious example. Though primarily seen ruled out at the start: accepting a rise in death as a way to reduce fertility, family planning can be a rates, or even a slower decline than is possible. major contributor to lower mortalityboth of infants High death rates do slow population growth. But and of mothers (see Box 7.1 in the next chapter). The the main reason for wanting slower growth is to same is true for the education of women; women's improve people's well-beingto move quickly education can lower fertility by delaying marriage, by toward a balance of low death and birth rates, thus increasing the effectiveness of contraceptive use, and completing the demographic transition. by giving women ideas and opportunities beyond childbearing alone. Women's education is also a major contributor to lower mortality. Reducing infant and child mortality High infant mortality is part of the setting that pro- Raising income motes high fertility (Chapter 4). Parents who expect some children to die may insure themselves Since children are a source of satisfaction, one by giving birth to more babies than they want or might expect richer parents to have more of them. expect to survive. High infant mortality can cause Within the same socioeconomic group, this is often high fertility for biological reasons as well: breast- so: among small farmers, for example, those with feeding delays the return of regular ovulation, so more land often have higher fertility (although the interval between a birth and the next concep- their fertility is lower than the fertility of the land- tion may be shortened if a baby dies. lesssee Box 6.1). Rising incomes are also associ- In the short term, the prevention of ten infant ated with decreased breastfeeding, which raises deaths yields one to five fewer births, depending fertility unless contraceptives are used. Where on the setting. Thus lower infant and child mortal- marriages are delayed by the need for a dowry, or ity leads to somewhat larger families and faster by the costs of setting up a household, rising rates of population growth than otherwise. But incomes permit earlier marriage and earlier child- effects in the long term are more important. With bearingand thus higher fertility. But these effects improved chances of survival, children receive are transitory and may be avoided altogether. They more attention from their parents, and parents are can be offset by the social changes that accompany willing to spend more on their children's health economic growthsuch as education and family and education. Lower mortality not only helps planning programsand that work to lower parents to achieve their desired family size with fertility. fewer births, it leads them to want a smaller family This relation adds up to a well-established fact: as well. in the long run, people with more income want The 1980 World Development Report reviewed poli- fewer children. Alternative uses of timeearning cies and programs to improve health and reduce money, developing and using skills, enjoying lei- mortality. This Report focuses on measures to surebecome more attractive, particularly to speed the decline in fertility for three reasons: women who are primarily responsible for bringing Fertility will henceforth have a much stronger up children. Parents start to want healthier and influence than mortality on population size; this was better-educated but fewer children. Education of discussed in Chapter 4. A rapid fall in fertility is all children becomes more attractive as job opportuni- the more urgent to ensure slower population growth ties depend less on traditional factorsclass origin without compromising efforts to reduce mortality. or family backgroundand more on education and High fertility and unplanned births contribute to associated skills. And children's work becomes high infant (and child) mortality. Many children, less important to family welfare. Higher income born close together, weaken the mother and the baby means an increased surplus to invest in land or and make it harder for the family to afford health care other assets, a greater awareness of alternative and food. investments, and the spread of social security and The policies and programs that reduce fertility pension schemes that guard against destitution in are more than ever those which will also reduce mor- emergencies or in old age. In short, it is not higher 108 Box 6.1 Landholding and fertility Land reform provides farmers with large landholdings cited children's help of the Mexican agricultural communities greater security, improves income distri- as an advantage of having many chil- called ejidos, farmers were granted usu- bution in rural areas, and lays the base dren, compared with only 4 percent of fruct rights instead of ownership. This for subsequent agricultural progress. But families with no farm or business. led to higher fertility, not only because careful studies of fertility behavior in A tenant who becomes a landowner their landholdings increased, but also rural areas suggest land reform can have gains extra income from ownership that because of the uncertainty over future two contradictory effects on fertility. is not dependent on his being able to use of the land and the advantages of With more land, farmers need more work or manage the farm. This gives him having a large family in order to retain labor to work it, so the contribution of some security for old age, making him control. children becomes more valuable. With less dependent on his children. One A study in southern Egypt showed the higher incomes, farmers are also able to study in northwestern Iran found that conflicting effects of land reform. The afford larger families. Studies in Bangla- landowners wanted smaller families and number of children was estimated by desh, India, Iran, Nepal, the Philippines, had had fewer children than villagers ownership status and farm size, making and Thailand all show that fertility rises who owned no land. Wives of land- allowance for wife's age (the mean was as farms get bigger. In an anthropological owners had married earlier, but they thirty-five), age at marriage, education, study in Guatemala, farmers with irri- were also more inclined to use contracep- and employment. The number of chil- gated landwho were usually engaged tives, so on balance their fertility was dren was high for all groups (at least five in multiple cropping, with high labor lower. The same conclusion was reached per family) and increased with farm size. demandshad higher fertility than by studies in Thailand and the Philip- But it was lower, at each level of farm farmers with rainfed land. In a survey in pines. But arrangements short of owner- size, among those who owned their land Thailand, 50 percent of families with Iiip do not have the same effect. In some than among tenants. income itself, but the changes it brings to people's in breastfeeding not offset by greater use of contra- lives, that lowers fertility. ceptives. The association of income and fertility varies In time, however, the effect of education in according to absolute levels of income. Below reducing fertility becomes increasingly clear. In all some minimum income, increases in income are countries, women who have completed primary associated with higher fertility (see Figure 6.2). In school have fewer children than women with no the poorest countries of Africa and South Asia, education, and everywhere the number of children many families are below that threshold. Above declines regularly (and usually substantially) as that threshold, further increases in income are associated with lower fertilityfor a given increase in income, the reduction is greater for low-income FIGURE 6.2 groups. Raising the incomes of the rich (be it of Relation between fertility and income per person rich countries or of rich groups within countries) reduces fertility less than does raising the incomes of the poor. There is, however, no good evidence that the distribution of income has an independent Threshold ,\ effect on fertility; it is influential only to the extent that poor households usually have higher absolute Increasing Declining incomes if their share of the total is higher. fertility fertility Fertility Educating parents More education for women is one of the strongest factors in reducing fertility. It is true that, in poorer countries, women with a few years of primary At diminishing rate schooling have slightly higher fertility than do women with no education at all, especially in rural Income per person areas. Some education may be associated with a Source Birdsall, 1980. lower rate of sterility, and it often leads to a decline 109 the education of mothers increases above the pri- Women's employment and status mary-school level. The differences can be large about four children between the highest and low- To women in developed countries it may seem that est educational groups in Colombia, for example employment leaves little time for childcare. This is (see Figure 6.3). seldom true for peasant women in developing Studies also show that educating women makes countries. Family agriculture and cottage indus- a greater difference than does educating men in tries keep women close to the home and allow con- reducing family size. There are several plausible siderable flexibility in working arrangements. In reasons for this. Children cost women more than addition, village life often ensures that there are they do men, in time and energy (see Box 6.2). The many other people, young and old, who can look more educated the woman, the more opportuni- after babies while mothers are working. But these ties she gives up if she chooses to stay at home to conveniences do little to modernize a woman's raise children. Education delays marriage for outlook or to develop a commitment to continued women, either because marriage is put off during employment that would discourage high fertility. schooling or because educated women are more In towns and cities women have less scope for likely to work or to take more time to find suitable resolving the conflict between childcare and work. husbands. In ten out of fourteen developing coun- Although there are many exceptions, research tries studied, a woman with seven or more years of tends to show that urban women who work full education marries at least 3.5 years later than a time, particularly in "modern" jobs, have fewer woman who has never been to school. children. They restrict fertility in part by using con- Educated women are also more likely to know traceptives. But of equal significance is that they about and adopt new methods of birth control. In delay marriageby one and a half to two years, Kenya 22 percent of those with nine or more years according to one study of five Asian countries. of education use contraception, as opposed to only Delay seems to affect even informal unions: a 7 percent of those with five or fewer years of edu- study of Jamaica confirmed that women who expe- cation. In Mexico the comparable figures are 72 rienced no prolonged unemployment on leaving percent and 31 percent. Such differences among school entered informal unions later than did other education groups are only slightly reduced when women. Even if they eventually end up with the other socioeconomic characteristics are taken into same number of children (which is generally not account. The contrast between these countries is the case), the delay in the start of childbearing due to other factors, including access to family reduces population growth by extending the inter- planning methods. The differences in contracep- val between generations. tive use among education groups tend to be small Although employment seems to have an inde- in countries where average use is either very low pendent effect on fertility only for women in well- (Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan) or very paid, modern jobs, more job opportunities should high (Costa Rica, Fiji, and Korea). affect the fertility of all women indirectly, by FIGURE 6.3 Total fertility rate by education of wife, selected countries Years of education of wife Total fertility rate 8 0 1-3 4-6 n7+ 6 4 2 Kenya, 1978 Colombia, 1976 Philippines, 1978 Korea, 1974 Source: Adapted from Casterline and others, 1983. I 10 Box 6.2 Women's use of and control over their time Women with young children face consid- day. Childcare does not cut into other erable demands on their time. In one vil- Daily time allocation for women household work and reduces market in Laguna, Philippines, by age lage in Bangladesh, women spend nine of youngest child work only when the child is under one. to ten hours every day of the week doing What it does do is reduce the time a housework or market work. Having to woman has to herself, by three to four care for a young child reduces the time child hours a day, as long as the child is under nder one available to earn income, particularly seven. Similarly, when a woman works among poorer women. The first baby is outside the home, the time required does an especially heavy burden. Once chil- dren reach the age of nine or so (and par- 'IJYoungest one to six child not come out of housework or child care, but out of her leisure time. The average ticularly if they are daughters), they free a woman from some responsibilities at eYoungest working woman in this sample had four hours less leisure time than the average home and increase the time she can work nonworking woman. in the market. Market LJ work The greatest demands are made by Food children under one. Women in rural preparation Laguna in the Philippines average an General housework Youngest child hour a day of market work if they have a over six (or no Childcare child at home) child under one at home, as opposed to two hours a day among all other women. Sleep and free time The chart shows how women in Laguna Source: Ho, 1979. divide the twenty-four hours in their increasing the incentive to educate girls. The pro- Economic dependence on men entails special portion of girls enrolled in school is low in many risks for these women, risks that go beyond the countries of the Middle East, where employment natural disasters or the process of aging to which and other activities outside the home are extremely both men and women are exposed. Widowhood, limited for women. In other Muslim countriesfor divorce, separation, incapacitating illness of the example, Indonesiafemale education and female husbandthese are serious threats when women employment tend to rise together. Once they are have few ways to provide for themselves. The able to earn an income, women may acquire higher most obvious insurance against the risk of losing status in the home, thus enabling them to talk the economic support of a husband is to have sev- more openly about birth control with their hus- eral sons. Such a preference is likely to raise fertil- bands. Although a significant number of women ity, particularly if a target number of sons is con- use contraception without the knowledge of their sidered essential. husbands, open discussion leads to longer and In addition to encouraging better education and more effective contraceptive use. work opportunities for women, each government The "status of women" is a phrase covering can lay the groundwork for improvements in numerous social and economic characteristics that women's status by guaranteeing women certain affect a woman's life. In northern India, Pakistan, rightsof inheritance, marriage, divorce, litiga- Bangladesh, and many countries of the Middle tion, and property. In other areas, toosuch as the East, a woman is separated from her own family at right to participate in the choice of a husband marriage and required to develop new allegiances much remains to be done to reshape deep cultural to her husband's family. This ensures that she will beliefs so that women can play their full part in the not become a liability to her own family. Her per- economic and social life of their countries. In the sonal contacts and relations with strangers are lim- process, much will be done to reduce fertility. ited. Typically, she cannot inherit property from her husband's family, nor can she pass it on. Urban residence Often, her chief role is to produce Sons; in that way she most effectively secures her own position Urban dwellers generally enjoy many advantages in her new family. over their rural counterparts. They have access to 111 better education and health services, a wider range charge exorbitant rates are undersold by banks and of jobs, and more avenues for self-improvement credit unions so that the price of credit comes and social mobility. They also face higher costs in down. Trustworthy institutions gradually establish raising children. As a result, urban fertility is lower themselves and offer means to save and borrow. than rural fertility, on average by between one and The benefits of education in leading to higher two births per mother. This is true of migrants income emerge; contacts and kin matter less as from rural areas as well as of long-term urban resi- guarantors of jobs and of help with the harvest. dents. Indeed, recent evidence shows that Greater market efficiency affects fertility in sev- migrants in Colombia, Korea, and Thailand (and eral ways. First, the logic of investing in children, immigrants in the United States) often have even especially in their education, becomes clearer. Sec- lower fertility than that of their urban counterparts ond, children become less important as safeguards of comparable education, perhaps because they in times of disaster and as old-age security. Their are particularly interested in providing education greater regional mobility makes them less depend- for their children. able as a source of support, and other instruments Apart from these advantages, is there a purely for old-age security, such as provident funds and urban effect on fertility? One feature of urban life is social insurance, come into the picture. A study of wider and more varied personal contacts. These a rural area of southern Mexico where a social encourage people to search more widely before security program was extended to cover sugarcane opting for a marriage partner. In ten out of four- workers demonstrated that program coverage of teen developing countries studied, the urban half the working population led to a 10 percent woman marries on average at least one and a half decline in fertility. In India participation in a provi- years later than does the rural woman; the gap is dent fund is associated with later marriage and, in shortened, but not eliminated, when socioeco- nuclear households, with lower fertility. In both nomic differences between urban and rural women India and Malaysia, women more so than men are taken into account. In addition, in urban areas look to children for support in old age. Information the idea of controlling fertility and the means of about programs to provide insurance and security doing so is spread more quickly. And, by being should probably be directed more to women than exposed to new consumer goods, urban people are it is currently. encouraged to delay or limit their childrearing to There is little question that socioeconomic increase their incomes. change in the long run lowers fertility and slows But living in towns and cities is certainly not a population growth. At the same time, the evidence sufficient condition for lower fertility. Nor is it is that socioeconomic gains from a low level do not even necessary, to judge by the declines in fertility slow population growth muchand can even raise in rural areas of China, Colombia, Indonesia, and it. A small drop in infant and child mortality Sri Lanka. The changes that do lower fertility results in more mouths to be fed. In some settings, increased education, better opportunities for chil- a couple of years of primary education lead to dren, and so forthcan occur just as well in the slightly larger families. Employment of women in countryside. In largely agricultural countries, dif- cottage industries or in other low-paying part-time ferences in fertility between urban and rural areas jobs permits households to support additional chil- are small anyway. In much of Africa and South dren. Living in small towns does less to reduce Asia, which are largely rural, it is clearly futile to fertility than does living in larger cities. That many wait for urbanization alone to reduce fertility. It is of these changes take time to have an effect only only in the already more urbanized societies of underlines the need to begin them now. At the Latin America and East Asia that further urbaniza- same time, other measures that complement and tion will lower fertility quickly. speed socioeconomic change can hasten a decline in fertility. Markets, security, and fertility Marriage, breastfeeding, and contraception One feature of development is that markets become more efficient. Markets for labor, for capi- Where fertility has fallen significantly, it has been tal, for land, and for many goods enlarge and regulated significantlyby methods that have diversify. Better transport helps this process along, included contraception and abortion. In the early as does the increasing scale and interpenetration of stages of falling fertility, however, marriage timing rural and urban life. Local moneylenders who and breastfeeding practices can reduce fertility. 112 FJGURE 6.4 measured), delayed marriage contributes little, Average timing of reproductive events in selected types and contraception virtually nothing. In Bangla- of societies desh, Pakistan, and Nepal the pattern is similar. Bangladesh has the longest period of breastfeeding Type of Conception Birth (twenty-nine months) and the youngest average society rReturn of Onset of Marriage r ovulation r sterility age at marriage for women (sixteen years). In other Modern countries, such as Thailand, Korea, and Mexico, developed breastfeeding does not last so long, but later mar- riage partly compensates. In Costa Rica and Sri Lanka delayed marriage accounts for a substantial Historical European part of the low fertility rates, which are below four; in Sri Lanka breastfeeding is also important. Over time, reductions in breastfeeding have Traditional slowed the decline in fertility in India, Indonesia, developing Korea, and Thailand. Delays in marriage have con- tributed to the decline, roughly offsetting the effect Theoretical of less breastfeeding. The major factor in fertility maximum decline in all four countries, however, has been an fertility I I I I increase in contraceptive use. Averaging indices for many countries provides a composite picture of 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 change over a long period (see Figure 6.5). Of the Woman's age reduction in total fertility of almost 5 children over Sourcn Bongaarts and Potter, 1983. the whole period, delay in marriage contributes a reduction of about 1.4 children; reduced breast- feeding works in the opposite direction, raising fertility by about 1.5 children. Increased use of Even without directly altering desired family size, contraception contributes the most, about 4.5, and they can help make the goals of individuals more increased abortion contributes about 0.5. compatible with those of society at large. Breast- feeding reduces fertility by suppressing fecundity; Raising age at marriage it also reduces high infant mortality. Later mar- riage reduces population growth by lengthening The younger women marry, the earlier they start the interval between generations; it also fosters a childbearing and the longer they are exposed to climate that encourages women to expand their the risk of conception. They lose the chance of horizons beyond the family. longer schooling and of employment, and they Figure 6.4 illustrates how the childbearing span enter marriage with less motivation and fewer per- is affected by age at marriage, breastfeeding, and sonal resources to plan their families successfully. fertility regulation. Traditional developing societies In addition, early marriage means a shorter gap achieve high fertility through marriage that is rela- between successive generations, significantly tively early and waiting times to conception that increasing the birth rate. are mostly short. Fertility would be even higher In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa about half except for lengthy breastfeeding, complemented in of all women aged between fifteen and nineteen some instances by sexual abstinence. Today's are, or have been, married; in the Middle East and developed economies achieve low fertility by later North Africa the proportion is close to a quarter. It marriage and long periods between births, made falls to less than 20 percent in Latin America and in possible by contraception and abortion. East Asia, and to less than 5 percent in Hong Kong All these factors have played some part in reduc- and Korea. Still, variations among the countries in ing the number of babies per mother from the the- each region are considerable. In Tunisia only 5 per- oretical maximum of seventeen. Their respective cent of women aged fifteen to nineteen have been contributions have been calculated for twenty-nine married, in Libya more than 70 percent. In Bangla- countries covered by the World Fertility Survey desh the mean age at marriage for women is six- (see Table 6.1). In the five African countries, where teen; in Sri Lanka it is twenty-five. If Bangladesh total fertility is high, breastfeeding accounts for the could immediately adopt the Sri Lankan marriage bulk of forgone fertility (sexual abstinence was not pattern, with no other change in fertility practices, 113 TABLE 6.1 Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinants of fertility, selected countries and years Reduction from total fecundity due to Total fertility Marriage Breast- Contra- All other Country and year rate delay feeding ception factors Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana (1979-80) 6.22 2.16 4.31 0.86 3.45 Kenya (1977-78) 7.40 2.69 4.22 0.67 2.02 Lesotho (1977) 5.27 3.05 4.34 0.47 3.87 Senegal (1978) 6.90 1.72 4.65 0.20 3.54 Sudan, North (1979) 5.93 2.88 3.87 0.44 3.99 Latin America and Caribbean Colombia (1976) 4.27 4.71 1.53 4.20 2.29 Costa Rica (1976) 3.17 4.70 0.83 6.92 1.52 Dominican Republic (1975) 5.39 3.72 1.63 3.60 2.55 Guyana (1975) 4.78 2.93 1.10 3.18 5.01 Haiti (1977) 5.15 4.38 3.20 1.42 2.84 Jamaica (1975-76) 4.67 2.59 1.60 4.19 3.95 Mexico (1976-77) 6.27 3.43 1.82 3.43 2.04 Panama (1976) 3.84 4.21 1.45 6.71 1.18 Paraguay (1979) 4.56 4.48 1.99 3.23 2.74 Peru (1977-78) 5.35 4.66 2.68 2.80 1.51 Trinidad and Tobago (1977) 3.18 2.90 0.97 4.70 5.25 Venezuela (1977) 4.36 4.17 1.39 5.06 2.02 South Asia Bangladesh (1975-76) 5.96 1.21 6.84 0.77 2.32 Nepal (1976) 6.12 1.74 6.09 0.22 2.83 Pakistan (1975) 6.24 2.26 4.52 0.43 3.55 Sri Lanka (1975) 3.70 5.05 4.26 2.26 1.73 East Asia and Pacific Fiji (1974) 4.14 3.47 1.67 3.60 4.24 Indonesia (1976) 4.51 2.62 5.25 2.50 2.12 Korea, Rep. of (1974) 4.23 4.72 3.32 2.55 2.17 Malaysia (1974) 4.62 4.33 0.99 2.97 4.09 Philippines (1978) 5.12 4.99 2.61 2.97 1.31 Thailand (1975) 4.55 3.98 3.86 3.49 1.12 Middle East and North Africa Jordan (1976) 7.63 3.28 2.53 2.62 0.94 Syria (1978) 7.46 3.43 2.77 2.10 1.24 Source: Computed from WFS data. families would have an average of 2.2 fewer typically transitional stages preceding legal mar- children. riage; while in such unions, women tend to have Marriage practices vary widely from country to few children. country. Parentally arranged child marriages, still Among developing regions in the recent past, common in parts of South Asia, contribute to age at marriage has changed most in Asia. Korea higher fertility; though consummation is often provides a striking example. Between 1925 and delayed and fecundity is lower among very young 1975 the average age for a woman at marriage rose girls, the long-run effect of these arranged mar- from 16.6 to 23.7 years. This rise started slowly and riages is to reduce young women's exposure to gradually picked up speed, especially in the years opportunities outside the family and to encourage between 1955 and 1966, when mean age at mar- them to have many children. Polygamy, practiced riage was rising at a rate exceeding two months a in parts of Africa, has a mixed effect on fertility. year. In Korea the tradition of early marriage was Informal unions, common in the Caribbean, are substantially undermined by considerable migra- 114 tion into and out of the country and from rural to These changes were accompanied by legal and urban areas, as well as by the social unrest con- social measures affecting women: polygamy and nected with World War II, liberation, the partition- repudiation of wives were outlawed, family plan- ing of Korea, and the Korean War. Increasing edu- ning services were gradually provided, and educa- cational opportunities for both men and women tional opportunities for women were expanded, so and compulsory military conscription also played a that the proportion of girls enrolled in primary and part. Manufacturing has provided more and more secondary schools rose from 27 to 47 percent dur- jobs for women, in a society where factory work ing the 1960s. The president was a strong sup- has been considered incompatible with marriage porter of these reforms and a stern critic of keeping but quite compatible with continuing to live at women in seclusion. These and other factors, such home to contribute to the support of parents. as heavy emigration of male workers, contributed Development itself serves to raise the age of mar- to a decline from 42 percent in 1956 to 6 percent in riage, as does improvement in the status of 1975 in the proportion of women married in the women. Those governments which have tried to age group fifteen to nineteen. raise the legal minimum age for marriage have China legislated minimum ages for marriage of usually done so in conjunction with other meas- eighteen for women and twenty for men in 1950 as ures that would work in that direction anyway. part of an overhaul of marriage laws and an Tunisia introduced legal minimums of fifteen for attempt to provide equal rights for men and women and twenty-one for men in 1956 and raised women. The Chinese considered raising the mini- the minimum age for women to seventeen in 1964. mums again in 1957 but, recognizing the limited FIGURE 6.5 Accounting for fertility decline Composite of 31 countries Total Reduction in fertility fertility rate Percentage of reduction by contributing factor rate 7 80 60 40 5 20 0 20 -40 Higher age Reduced More use of More induced All other at marriage hreastfceding contraception abortion factors 1 0 initial Final fertility fertility Selected countries and years Percentage of reduction by contributing factor Initial Final Higher Reduced More use More A!! Country fertility fertility age at breast- of contra- induced other and period rate rate marriage feeding ception abortion factors India (1972-78) 5.6 5.2 41 58 114 3 Indonesia (1970-80) 5.5 4.6 41 77 134 2 Korea (1960-70) 6.1 4.0 50 38 53 30 4 Thailand (1968-78) 6.1 3.4 11 17 86 16 4 not available Sos rce Bulatao, 1984 b. 115 effectiveness of existing laws, instead increased declines in breastfeeding in the last three decades institutional and community pressure for later slowed the decline in infant mortality. marriage. In 1980 the government raised the legal At least 70 percent of women in developing minimum ages to twenty and twenty-twoless countries initially breastfeed their children, than the widely and officially propounded mini- although this proportion is falling. How long they mums of twenty-three and twenty-five. This was continue to do so varies widely, from two months interpreted as a relaxation of controls on marriage, in metropolitan Malaysia to twenty-nine months in and it may have contributed to a recent increase in rural Bangladesh. The trend is toward less breast- marriage and a spurt in the birth rate. feeding: in Thailand, for example, between 1969 With the possible exception of China, efforts to and 1979 mothers reduced the average length of raise the age at marriage by persuasion and edict breastfeeding from 22.4 to 17.5 months in rural have not been particularly successful. Legislation, areas and from 12.9 to 8.4 months in the cities. In however, is a way for governments to encourage Malaysia the percentage of infants initially social support for later marriage; and governments breastfed dropped from 89 to 74 percent between can link the idea to specific programs, especially 1960 and 1974, and the percentage breastfed more schooling for girls, which affect fertility indirectly. than three months dropped from 75 to 53 percent. In countries where early marriage is common, gov- Some decline in the duration of breastfeeding is ernments need to go further, giving women more a natural consequence of economic development rights and encouraging men and women to sup- and may be a reasonable choiceif for example, a port expanded women's opportunities within the working mother's income more than compensates household as well as in society at large. in improved health care and nutrition for the fam- ily. Studies show that mothers' employment in itself does not affect whether mothers initiate Providing information about breastfeeding breastfeeding, but employment may affect how long they continue to breastfeed. Malaysian Full breastfeeding and frequent suckling are good women who had recently been employed off the guarantees that resumption of menstruation will farm tended to wean their children completely at be delayed, though protection decreases with each an earlier age. Filipino women in a semiurban set- month after childbirth. Failure to menstruate is a ting breastfed if they worked close to home, but good, but not an absolute, guarantee against preg- started mixed feeding earlier if they worked in a nancy; about 7 percent of women conceive without different area. In addition, employment may having resumed menstruation. As a basic form of lengthen periods between sucklings, leading to a contraception, breastfeeding has a well-estab- briefer amenorrheic period. But especially where lished reputation in developing countries. In one breastfeeding is being shortened only moderately study three-quarters of Guatemalan mothers knew from long periods, say, of a year or more, the that it could postpone conception; in another, 60 mother's and infant's health is unlikely to suffer percent of Malaysian women knew it made con- as long as families can afford proper nutrition and ception more difficult, and 20 percent thought it couples can use contraception to avoid an made it impossible. Women who breastfeed and unwanted immediate pregnancy. who want to avoid pregnancy are 10 percent of all But evidence shows that in many cases breast- married women in Mexico, 15 percent in Peru, and feeding is being curtailed simply because mothers 16 percent in Honduras. Only ten years ago breast- do not know how to do it; the chief reason given feeding provided more months of protection for stopping breastfeeding is insufficient milk, yet against conception in the developing countries that is biologically implausible for all but a few than did family planning programs. women. Some mothers switch to bottlefeeding Aside from its effect on fecundity, breastfeeding because they lack guidance and information about avoids the considerable health risks connected the health benefits of breastfeeding, and they with bottlefeedingparticularly where the pow- believe bottlefeeding is more "modern." In Malay- dered milk may be improperly prepared, adequate sia women who live with parents, in-laws, or other sterilization is not possible, and families cannot adult relatives are less likely to abandon breast- afford an adequate supply of powder. Though feeding. after four to six months mother's milk should be Evidence that behavior will change in the light of supplemented with other food, continued breast- information comes from the industrialized coun- feeding still benefits a baby's health. In Malaysia tries, where medical opinion did not clearly favor 116 breastmilk until the late 1960s. As the advantages abortion, physical well-being. Moreover, except of breastfeeding became better known, breastfeed- for complete abstinence and infanticide, they do ing increased among better-educated women. In not always work. Under these circumstances, risk- the United States, for example, college-educated ing an additional child may seem less costly than women are now most likely to start breastfeeding preventing a birth, and even the stated "desired and continue it for the longest periods. family size" may be higher than it would be if birth Apart from providing more information on the control were easier. advantages of breastfeeding, medical authorities in It follows that programs to provide publicly sub- developing countries can restructure hospital and sidized information and access to modern methods clinic routines that discourage breastfeeding by of contraception can reduce fertility. They do so in separating mother and child and offering unneces- several ways: by making it easier for couples to sary supplementary bottlefeedings. In Malaysia have only the children they want; by spreading the government family planning clinics that encourage idea of birth control as something individuals can breastfeeding have a positive effect; women who do; and by providing information about the pri- give birth in nearby private maternity clinics are vate and social benefits of smaller families, which less likely to breastfeed, all other things being may itself alter desired family size. The next chap- equal. Legislation to control the promotion of pow- ter looks at how family planning programs can be dered milk can also be effective. In Port Moresby, run to best meet people's needs for safer and more Papua New Guinea, changes in hospital practices effective contraception. The rest of this chapter and restrictions on the advertising and distribution examines the evidence that support for family of powdered milk increased the proportion of planning services (delivered by both public and breastfed children under two years old from 65 to private agencies) has helped to reduce fertility. 88 percent in just two years, between 1975 and 1977. EFFECTS OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS ON Without such efforts, breastfeeding seems likely FERTILITY. Measuring the impact of family planning to go on declining. In this caseunless contracep- programs is less straightforward than it seems. To tives are used more widelyfertility will rise. As distinguish the specific impact of a program, ana- an example, reducing the duration of breastfeed- lysts must estimate how fertility would have ing from an average of three years to one month changed in its absence. That requires systemati- could double a mother's fertility from five to ten cally eliminating other possible causes of a coun- children. In the mid-1970s, if all mothers in Thai- try's fertility declinesuch as increases in income, land had started menstruating three months after education, and life expectancy in the same period. each baby was born, contraceptive use there In addition, information on the change in the avail- would have had to double to prevent fertility from ability of family planning services is needed (not on rising. In Indonesia, contraceptive use would have change in the use of services, since use is related to had to more than double; in Bangladesh it would people's fertility goals and does not indicate the have had to increase sixfold, and in Pakistan difference services alone would make to people eightfold. who now have no access to them). Such informa- tion has, until recently, been patchy and inade- Making contraception easier quate. Given these analytical difficulties and the lack of As shown in Figure 6.5, fertility declines every- good information, it was not surprising that a where have been eventually tied to increasing use decade ago policymakers and planners could not of contraception. Use of contraception is partly a completely agree on the relative importance to a function of a couple's wish to avoid (or to post- fertility decline of the supply of family planning pone) additional children; the number of children services versus the "demand" factorsincreasing desired is related to the social and economic factors education, lower infant mortality, and the like. discussed above. But use of contraception is also Early family planning programs in Korea, Hong related to its costs, that is, to the costs of limiting or Kong, and other areas of East Asia had been estab- postponing births. People have regulated family lished in countries where a marked fall in fertility size for centuriesthrough abortion, withdrawal, was already in progress; some of the continued sexual abstinence, and even infanticide. But these decline might have occurred even without official methods are all costly in terms of reduced emo- programs. In other countries (such as India and tional, psychological, and, in the case of traditional Pakistan), where programs were also established 117 in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility was changing little 1977 rather than levels at one point in time during during the late 1960s. the period. But family planning programs spread rapidly in One objection to this type of study is that the the late 1960s and early 1970s, and more systematic family planning index may itself be the result of a information on them is now available. demand for contraception that already existed as a A country-level family planning index was byproduct of development. In this case, family developed in the mid-1970s. It was based on coun- planning services provided by the government tries' performance in 1972 on fifteen criteria, such may simply displace traditional methods of contra- as the availability of many contraceptive methods, ception or modern methods already available either through government programs or commer- through the private sector. Indeed, analysis does cially; inclusion of fertility reduction in official poi- show that in the early 1970s family planning pro- icy; adequacy of the family planning administra- grams were more likely to be instituted and were tive structure; and use of mass media and more successful where demand for contraception fieldworkers. The index has been updated for this already existed: Korea, Hong Kong, and Singa- Report to 1982; countries are classified into groups pore. The existence and strength of early programs by this index as of 1972 and 1982 in Table 6 of the is closely related to the proportion of educated Population Data Supplement. women (itself a measure of demand for services), Household and community surveys con- and to the degree to which fertility had declined in ducted within countries during the 1970s provided the late 1960s. But these factors do not completely information on the distance and travel time to explain differences in the family planning index; to services for household members. Those carried out some extent, indices were stronger or weaker as part of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) project because of other factorspolitical leadership, for in over forty countries, and of the Contraceptive example. And the change in country effort between Prevalence Survey (CPS) project in about fifteen 1972 and 1982 is not at all related to earlier declines countries, have several advantages: most are rep- in fertility or to levels of development; it has been resentative, nationwide samples and, because sim- more clearly the result of government initiatives. ilar questions were asked everywhere, are largely Furthermore, although family planning programs comparable among countries. are in part a response to preexisting demand, These two sources, supplemented by the results recent studies show that such programs do have of small experimental field studies, have provided an independent effect on fertility. Cross-country the basis for careful analyses of the effects of family analysis shows that, for the average country, pre- planning programs. They leave little doubt that the vious fertility decline accounted for 33 percent of programs work. the total fall in fertility between 1965 and 1975; socioeconomic change accounted for 27 percent; CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES. Using the family plan- the family planning index accounted for more than ning index, along with indicators such as literacy, either: 40 percent. life expectancy, and GNP per capita in about 1970, research in the late 1970s found that birth rates STUDIES WITHIN COUNTRIES. The cross-country declined most (29 to 40 percent) between 1965 and studies are complemented by several examples of 1975 in countries such as Costa Rica, Korea, and apparent family planning success in individual Singapore, where socioeconomic development countries. In China and Indonesia, per capita was relatively advanced and family planning pro- income is low and the population still overwhelm- grams were strong. There was a modest decline in ingly rural, but governments have made a con- birth rates (10 to 16 percent) where development certed effort to bring family planning services to was relatively strong but the family planning index the villages. In China the birth rate at the end of was weak, as in Brazil and Turkey. There was also 1982 was estimated to be nineteen per 1,000 peo- a modest decline where development levels were ple, down from forty in the 1960s. The current fig- low but the family planning index was moderately ure, based on birth registrations rather than on a strong, as in India and Indonesia. (Indonesia's census, may slightly understate the actual birth family planning program, now one of the world's rate; but it would still be well below current rates strongest, had been operating for only two years in South Asia, Africa, and most of Latin America. by 1972, the reference year for the family planning Up to 70 percent of Chinese couples of childbear- index.) The same results emerged from using mea- ing age are estimated to be using modern contra- surements of socioeconomic change from 1970 to ceptives. The government believes that its family 118 planning program is critical to reducing fertility. adopted economic incentives to reduce fertility; Indonesia's current birth rate is estimated at family planning services have provided couples thirty-four per 1,000 people, which is a notable with the means to respond. In Colombia and Mex- drop from an estimated forty-four in 1960. In Java ico work opportunities and household incomes of and Bali, the two most densely populated islands women with little education were probably of the country, the percentage of married women increasing in the 1960s and 1970s, which also of reproductive age currently using modern con- encouraged the use of contraception. traception more than doubled between 1974 and In several low-income countries family planning 1976 (11 to 24 percent), nearly doubled again to 42 programs have not been effective in reducing fer- percent by 1980, and by 1983 had reached an esti- tilityfor example, Ghana, Kenya, and Pakistan. mated 53 percent. Lack of demand has been a factor, but so has lim- Other developing countries and regions have ited availability of services and weak government also had remarkable increases in contraceptive use support for the programs. Comparisons within and rapid fertility declines, even among women countries show the difference actual availability with little or no education. In Colombia a strong can make. In Mexico, Korea, Thailand, and India private family planning program was under way contraceptive use is higher in communities with by the late 1960s, and the government began sup- more sources of family planning supplies, even porting family planning in 1969. In urban areas the when differences in development levels are taken proportion of married women using contraception into account. In one district in India a 10 percent increased from 43 to 53 percent between 1969 and increase in the number of clinics per hundred 1976, with a big switch from less effective meth- thousand people was associated with a 3 to 4 per- ods, such as rhythm and withdrawal, to pills and cent increase in the combined acceptance rates of IUDs (although the increase since then has slowed); intrauterine devices (IUDs) and sterilization; simi- in rural areas the proportion doubled, from 15 to larly, a 10 percent increase in the number of exten- 30 percent. As Figure 6.6 shows, the drop in fertil- sion workers raised acceptance rates by 4 to 6 ity for Colombian women with little schooling has percent. paralleled that of better-educated women, although fertility levels are still higher among FIELD PROJECTS. Experiments conducted in those with less education. Fertility had begun to widely different communities have also revealed fall by 1965, before family planning services numerous examples of the effectiveness of family became widely available, but it declined faster in planning programs. Colombia in the early 1970s than it did in Brazil or In Matlab, a largely inaccessible part of Mexico, where family planning services were less Bangladesh, trained local women provided com- widely available. (Colombia has a somewhat lower prehensive family planning services in seventy vil- per capita income than does Brazil or Mexico, and lages. For the four years prior to the project, fertil- similar literacy and urbanization rates.) ity rates for these villages were comparable with In Mexico, as in Colombia, fertility began to fall a those for seventy-nine other Matlab villages; over few years before the establishment of extensive the two subsequent years, rates were 22 percent family planning programs, both private and gov- lower (see Box 7.6). ernment-sponsored; but as those programs gained In San Pablo Autopan, Mexico, maternal and momentum, the fall in fertility accelerated. The child health services and contraceptives were government adopted a policy to reduce population delivered to individual households in 1976-77. growth at the end of 1973an abrupt shift from its Contraceptive use rose from 5 to 9 percent in the earlier pronatalist position. Rates of contraceptive surrounding areas, and from 7 to 25 percent in the use among married women aged fifteen to forty- area covered by the project. nine more than doubled between 1973 and 1976, On the island of Cheju, Korea, family plan- from 11 to 29 percent; by 1982 they had reached an fling staff distributed oral pills and condoms estimated 48 percent. Public programs accounted through home visits in 1976-79 and also referred to for virtually all of the increase. The total fertility clinics women who wanted lUDs and subsidized rate fell from 6.7 in 1970 to about 4.6 in 1982. sterilization. Over the period, fertility in the sur- Of course, the availability of family planning rounding areas fell by 29 percent; in Cheju it fell by services has not been the only reason for falling 35 percent, mainly because of sterilization. fertility in these countries. In China the govern- In some parts of the island of Bohol, Philip- ment has exerted considerable social pressure and pines, village workers (including midwives and 119 FIGURE 6.6 Fertility decline within female education groups in selected countries Completed Total family fertility size Jordan rate Colombia 9 Illiterate 9 Primary and secondary school 6 Did not complete Secondary primary school school 3 Completed primary 0 0 1970 1972 1976 1978 1967-68 1972-73 1978 1974 Total Total fertility Brazil fertility Brazil rate (rural) rate (urban) 9 9 No education 6 6 No education 1 or more years 1-4 years 3 3 5 or more years 0 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 Total Total marital India marital India fertility rate (rural) fertility rate (urban) 9 9 /llliterate 6 6 Literate below / Illiterate secondary-school Literate below level secondary-school Completed level secondary 3 3 Completed secondary 0 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 Sources: Cochrane, 1983; Birdsall, 1980; Merrick, 1984; Zachariah, 1984. 120 traditional birth attendants) provided maternal reducing infant mortality and of providing more and child health care, as well as family planning schooling for children can be rapidbut these cost services in 1974-79. In those areas, fertility de- more in most settings to produce the same effect clined by 15 percent; elsewhere on the island, it fell on fertility. With respect to the single goal of by 9 percent. reducing fertility, one study concluded that family A comprehensive rural health program was planning programs were at least seven times as undertaken in an area in Maharashtra, India, from cost effective in reducing fertility as were nutrition 1971 to 1978. In a nonprogram area, fewer than 10 programs or education schemes for rural women. percent of eligible couples used contraceptives in In Bangladesh, Korea, and the Philippines family 1976, and the crude birth rate was thirty-seven per planning programs are estimated to be five times thousand. In the program area, contraceptive use as cost effective as health programs that reduce rose from 3 to 51 percent, and the crude birth rate fertility through reducing mortality. But where in 1976 was twenty-three per thousand. mortality is high and demand for family planning Unfortunately, experiments such as these are is limited, as in Kenya, reducing infant mortality is difficult to replicate. They often cost more than a a more cost-effective way to lower fertility. government could spend on a nationwide effort; Emphasis on the cost effectiveness of family more important, they may work because of the planning should not obscure the third point noted intense involvement of research and other staff. above: that family planning and social develop- Indeed, not all field projects work well; effects of ment complement each other. Analysis of fertility projects were small in a condom-marketing change across countries done for this Report scheme in Kenya, and nonexistent in one in Rio de shows that between 1972 and 1982 family planning Janeiro, Brazil (the only project conducted exclu- programs have had minimal effect where female sively in an urban area, where contraceptives were education is low, in part because it is difficult to easily available). But the results still suggest that operate such programs without some educated good services reduce fertility significantly, by clos- women to staff them, and in part because of lack of ing the gap between actual and desired family size. demand for contraception. Equally, female educa- tion has had minimal effect where family planning COST EFFECTIVENESS OF FAMILY PLANNING PRO- services have been unavailable. However, the GRAMS. By increasing the supply of services, fam- effect of the two together has been powerful. The ily planning programs reduce the cost of using decline in fertility in Kerala, India, provides a good contraception to potential users. By contrast, illustration. Education levels have been higher in increased education, lower mortality, and other Kerala than in most other Indian states for many social changes increase the demand for contracep- years, and infant and child mortality rates have tion. For the single goal of reducing fertility, been lower. Around 1980 the literate proportion of spending on family planning services turns out to Kerala's population was twice that of India's as a be more cost effective (that is, it leads to the same whole, and the infant mortality rate less than half fertility reduction at lower cost) than does spend- the national rate. The fertility rate fell from 4.1 to ing on education, health (which reduces fertility by 2.7 between 1972 and 1978 in Kerala (compared reducing infant mortality), and other programs. Of with a fall from 5.8 to 4.9 for India as a whole), in course, this comparison does not take into account part because investment per capita in family plan- (1) that education and health programs have other ning in Kerala has been high, at times almost as objectives in their own right, independent of great as in Hong Kong. But this investment would effects in fertility; (2) that family planning has have had much less impact in less favorable condi- other benefitsincluding reducing mortality; and tions of education and health. (3) that these different approaches are not really alternatives but complement and reinforce each Incentives and disincentives other. At low levels of education and high levels of mortality, the underlying demand for family plan- To complement family planning services and social ning will be low. The same amount spent on a programs that help to reduce fertility, govern- program in a high-education, low-mortality setting ments may want to consider financial and other will induce a greater increase in contraceptive use. incentives and disincentives as additional ways of One reason family planning is cost effective is encouraging parents to have fewer children. that it has an immediate impactat least where Incentives may be defined as payments given to an there is underlying demand. Similarly, the effect of individual, couple, or group to delay or limit child- 121 Box 6.3 Measuring the value of children Potential parents trying to estimate the cent of the total. The remaining 54 per- In considering a second child, parents cost of children would need to consider cent, the net cost of a child, is equivalent emphasize more the desire for a compan- the following: to about 6 percent of a husband's annual ion for their first child. They also place Goods and services (food, shelter, earnings. weight on the desire for a child of the clothing, medical care, education, and By contrast, a study of an urban area of opposite sex from the first. Similar val- the like) needed in raising children, and the United States in 1960 showed that ues are prominent in relation to third, specifically the amount required in each almost half of the costs of a third child fourth, and fifth children; emphasis is future year, and the expected prices, year are time costs. Receipts from the child also given to the pleasure derived from by year, for goods and services. offset only 4 percent of all costs. watching children grow. The amount of time they will put Only economic costs and benefits are Beyond the fifth child, economic con- into caring for children, year by year, and taken into account in these calculations. siderations predominate. Parents speak the expected wages they will thereby To investigate social and psychological of sixth and later children in terms of lose. costs, other researchers have examined their helping around the house, contri- The amount of time children would how individuals perceive children.. The buting to the support of the household, put into earning for the household, and figure shows the variety of values and and providing security in old age. For the wages the household can expect to drawbacks of children mentioned by first to third children, the time taken receive. mothers in the Philippines, Korea, and away from work or other pursuits is the The probability that children will the United States. Economic contribu- main drawback; for fourth and later chil- survive to any given age, which should tions from children are clearly more dren, the direct financial burden is more be used to weight the probable costs for important in the l'hilippines, where fer- prominent than the time costs. Like the each year. tility is higher than in the Korea or the economic evidence, this account high- The weight to attach to future costs United States; concern with the restric- lights the economic contributions that and benefits from children, such as secu- tions children impose on parents, on the children in large families make and, once rity for old age, in contrast to immediate other hand, is clearly greatest in the family size has declined somewhat, the costs and benefits. United States. significance of time costs in producing Few parents explicitly make such cal- In all three countries, however, couples one- and two-child families. culations, but illustrative examples sug- demonstrate a progression in the values These studies focus on the advantages gest what the results of such calculations they emphasize as their families grow. and disadvantages to couples of having would be. The first child is important to cement the one or more children. But society as a For a rural sample in the Philippines, marriage and bring the spouses closer whole bears many of the costs of popula- three-quarters of the costs involved in together, as well as to have someone to tion growth. Do couples limit their own rearing a third child come from buying carry on the family name. Thinking of childbearing for essentially altruistic rea- goods and services; the other quarter the first child, couples also stress the sons? One small study, conducted a comes from costs in time (or lost wages). desire to have someone to love and care decade ago in the Philippines, suggests But receipts trorn child earnings, work at for and the child's bringing play and fun they might. home, and old age support offset 46 per- into their lives. About 300 people from Manila and sur- bearing or to use contraceptives. They extend fur- and may therefore affect desired family size (see ther the subsidy governments provide when they Box 6.3). Incentives offer alternative ways to use public resources to deliver family planning ensure the benefits children might otherwise pro- services. Disincentives are the withholding of vide; disincentives raise the costs of children. social benefits from those whose family size Where large families are not in the interests of soci- exceeds a desired norm. ety as a whole, society may benefit more by pro- Incentives and disincentives serve three main viding incentives that lower fertility than by bear- purposes. ing the social costs of high fertility. They encourage birth control by calling atten- They help inform people about society's pop- tion to family planning, spreading information ulation goals and the damaging effects of rapid about its availability, motivating individuals to population growth and large families. consider it more seriously, and compensating for Payments to people who volunteer for steriliza- costs and inconvenience that might discourage tion are usually meant to compensate for travel potential users. and work time lost; like incentives and free family They alter the costs and benefits of children planning services, they provide a subsidy that 122 Philippines Korea United States 1975 1976 1975 Perceived value of children in selected countries Economic, practical assistance; help in housework, in old age Family name; religious and social obligations; adult status; social norms Companionship, love, happiness, play; marital bond; fulfillment, achievement Perceived drawbacks of children in selected countries Financial costs Emotional strain Other childrearing demands: more work; discipline; child's sickness Restrictions on parents: tied down; cannot work; marital strains Overpopulation rounding rural areas were asked ques- This question was also posed: order to help solve the problem? tions about various hypothetical crises Supposing the government deter- Eighty-four percent of respondents that might arise and how they would be mined that the population was growing said they would be willing to stop at two willing to respond to them. For example, too fast and there were not enough jobs children (if they had none to begin with), in the case of a severe rice shortage, 60 for the adults, not enough schools for the and 86 percent said they would be will- percent said they would be "very will- children, not enough hospitals for every- ing to stop at the number they had. The ing" or "moderately willing" to eat corn one, and not enough money to pay for social costs of population growth, for this instead of rice at least once a day. In case these things. Would you be willing to small sample, appeared real enough to of an invasion, 82 percent would be will- stop having children (and to stop at two generate some sacrifice from almost ing to send a son into the army. children, if you had no children yet) in everybody. encourages smaller family size (though they are Examples and experience usually offered to all clients regardless of family size), Some population programs also provide Although various forms of incentives and disin- bonus payments as incentives to family planning centives now exist in over thirty countries in the workers; they are meant not to increase demand developing world, it is still not possible to estimate for services but to improve supply, and are dis- exactly how much influence they have had on fer- cussed in the next chapter. tility. In countries in which they have been tried, Incentives and disincentives give individuals a they have been accompanied by social change, choice. They provide direct and voluntary trade- family planning services, and (in the case of China) offs between the number of children and possible various social pressures that make it impossible to rewards or penalties. But choice will be preserved distinguish their separate effects. only if programs are well designed and carefully Disincentives built into benefit or tax systems are implemented. The ethical questions raised by the most common. Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan, incentives and disincentives are touched on here and the Philippines limit income tax deductions, but discussed more in Chapter 8. child allowances, and maternity benefits beyond a 123 few births; to encourage spacing, Tanzania allows normal fifty-six days of paid maternity leave. Since working women paid maternity leave only once 1979 the central government has been encourag- every three years. But these policies affect only the ing, even requiring, each area and province to small minority who are public employees or who draw up its own rewards and penalties. Sichuan, pay taxes. Singapore has disincentives which for example, provides for a monthly subsidy to affect more people because of the country's higher one-child families of five yuan (8 percent of the income, comprehensive health services, urbanized average worker's wage) until the child is fourteen setting, and extensive public housing. Singapore's years old. The child will have priority in admission disincentives include limitation of income tax relief to schools and in obtaining a factory job. In rural to the first three children, restriction of paid mater- areas in Hunan, parents of only one child receive nity leave to the first two pregnancies and an annual bonuses until their child is fourteen years increase in childbirth costs after the first two deliv- old and private plots and housing lots big enough eries. Singapore also gives children from smaller for a two-child family. In some urban areas, a sin- families priority in school admission and ignores gle child is allotted adult food rations. Most factor- family size in the allocation of state housing, so ies and other work units give preference in the smaller families enjoy more space per person. Atti- allocation of scarce housing to single-child fami- tudinal studies suggest that these disincentives, lies. In some cases, medical and educational enti- particularly the school admission policy, are much tlements are granted preferentially to parents more influential in Singapore than are the more whose only child is a girlone way, the govern- common tax disincentives. Disincentives were ment hopes, of overcoming the preference for introduced gradually in Singapore beginning in Sons. 1969, more than a decade after fertility had started Penalties for excessive fertility also vary by area to fall. The timing and pattern of the fertility in China. In some places, couples who have a sec- decline thereafter suggests that they have had ond child must return any bonuses obtained for some impact. the first child. A couple having a second child may In 1984 the Singapore government shifted the be required to pay for the privilege. (In one brigade emphasis of its population policy. While it still in Beijing studied by foreign researchers, several encourages most women to have only two chil- couples have been willing to pay more than twice dren, women university graduates are encouraged the annual collective income distributed to each to have more. If graduates have more than two, brigade member in order to have a second child.) the government will now give their children prior- Parents may have to pay a higher price for grain ity admission to state schools. This approach is that they buy for a second child whose birth has based on a belief that highly educated parents are not been authorized under the planned-birth pro- more intelligent than those with less education, gram. Some areas and provinces impose taxes, and that children inherit intelligence from their which can be as high as 10 percent of family parents. Were this the casesince better-educated income, only on third and later-born children. parents have typically had fewer children, at least Similarly, mothers may not be entitled to paid for the past 100 yearsthe average intelligence of maternity leave for a third child, and parents may humankind would be falling. But it does not have to pay all its medical expenses. In 1983 the appear to be. In any event, local newspaper polls State Family Planning Commission proposed a tax indicate that the policy is not popular, even among of 10 percent of family wages on urban dwellers women who could benefit from it. Many such with two or more children, unless one or the other women have said that priority in school admission partner is sterilized. is not enough to persuade them to have more than In addition to China and Singapore, Korea is the one or two children. only other country with a national system of China has the most comprehensive set of incen- rewards and penalties for individuals to encourage tives and disincentives, designed (most recently) parents to have few children. Korea offers free to promote the one-child family. Since the early medical care and education allowances to two- 1970s women undergoing various types of fertility- child families provided one of the parents has been related operations have been entitled to paid leave: sterilized. in urban areas fourteen days for induced abortion; Incentives do not have to be provided just by the ten days for tubal ligation; two to three days for state. A private group in Thailand offers technical insertion or removal of an IUD; and in the case of assistance in farm production and marketing to postnatal sterilization, seven extra days over the contraceptive users or to those who commit them- 124 selves to birth control. Rates of contraceptive use an incentive, yet they cannot be stopped from have risen to as high as 80 percent in some villages claiming it; and they may be those least in need of that receive, or hope to receive, the benefits of this an incentive. Disincentives that work through tax program. Qualifiers have been given credits for and benefits systems affect only a few people, yet livestock, feed, and construction materials, and broader disincentives might unfairly burden the have been offered lower prices for fertilizer, seed, poor, who gain most from children. Disincentives garlic, dressmaking, hairdressing, and medical tied to school admissions may affect children who treatment. Some communities have also been have no control over parental decisions. Verifica- allowed to use a "family planning bull" for servic- tion (was a child born and not reported?) can be ing their cattle. The scheme also offers pig-rearing administratively difficult, and the money to contracts: a woman acceptor gets a piglet to fatten reward compliance may be improperly used. Pay- over a period of eight to nine months and is given ments for sterilization have little impact on fertility a share of the profits. Should she become preg- if families have already had four or more children. nant, the pig is not taken away, but she may lose The cost of incentives is also a consideration in the opportunity to get another one in the future. judging their effectiveness. From a national In the past decade, a few countries have started accounting point of view, incentives are transfer offering small-family incentives to communities. payments and in themselves do not use up The Indonesian program gives prizes and popular resources. Their economic impact will depend on recognition for meeting fertility targets or for per- the savings and consumption patterns of those forming better than other communities. In Thai- who are taxed and those who receive payments. land the government rewards villages that achieve The principal question is likely to be a budgetary certain targets with anything from a biogas plant to one for the government: is money available and a cooperative store. Community incentives work might it be better spent in other ways? If conven- where there is a well-organized, community- tional incentive schemes absorb funds that might based family planning system and where the vil- better go to investments, the cost to an economy in lage or hamlet is an important social or political terms of long-run investment and growth may also unit. matter. This is clearly a problem in China, where Several other countries, including Bangladesh, incentives large enough to ensure one-child fami- India, and Sri Lanka, have offered rewards to peo- lies would become a heavy burden on the econ- ple who volunteer to be sterilized, primarily to omy, unless those who received them in turn used compensate them for the cost of travel and loss of the incentives for saving, say, for their own old work time. These programs are easier to adminis- age. ter than incentive systems tied directly to lower family size. In most cases, volunteers have been Deferred incen fives carefully screened to avoid any possibility of coer- cion or of changing their minds when it is too late. Deferred incentive schemes overcome some, In Sri Lanka, for example, the couple must have at though not all, of the difficulties of conventional least two children, the youngest at least a year old. incentives. They have not been tried on a national These facts must be certified by the village head level, but two local experiments demonstrate their and reviewed by a medical officer at the clinic feasibility. A township in China began a deferred where the operation will be performed. The volun- bonus scheme in 1971, offering to pay the high- teer must sign a statement of consent; he or she school education of children of two-child families. receives the equivalent of $20. At their peak in No specific family planning service was involved, 1980-81, sterilization payments cost an amount but parents had to show that they agreed with the equal to 3 percent of total government spending on terms of the entitlement when their children were health; that much could easily have been saved in ready to enter high school. Two-thirds of families the costs associated with abortion and unwanted enrolled in the program; its effects on fertility births. could not, however, be differentiated from a gen- eral decline in fertility. Unresolved issues A no-birth bonus scheme developed on three tea estates in India also provided a deferred payment. Payments and penalties raise a host of issues not Each woman worker had an extra day's pay cred- yet resolved. Some people may be willing to defer ited to an account for every month she was not pregnancy or to have fewer children even without pregnant. Her benefits were suspended for a year 125 Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme in Bangladesh The government of Bangladesh is consid- small trade. The maturity value of the bearing age in these areas were to join ering two new schemes to reduce fertility bonds would be between $275 to $425. the bond scheme by 1985, the govern- and simultaneously provide economic The scheme has several attractive fea- ment would have to Set aside $3.6 million assistance to families. The first would be tures. It provides for old-age security, the now to pay out these bonds eventually. If open to those who volunteered for steril- lack of which is one reason the poor have 20 percent of couples of childbearing age ization and had only two or three living many children. By providing a mortgage- in these areas were to join the delayed children; men would have to be aged able bond, the scheme increases access to pregnancy scheme by 1985, the cost forty or less, women aged thirty-five or credit for the poor. Yet its immediate would he about $1.5 million. The cost of less. They would be given nonnegotiable financial costs are small. these schemes together would represent bonds worth $80 to $120, depending on The government is also considering 0.2 percent of 1982 83 government the number of children they already had. awarding three-year and five-year certifi expenditure. It would cost the govern- The bonds would mature, with interest, cates of about $20 to couples ss ho delay a ment roughly fifty times more, or about after twelve years. At any time during first birth for three years after marriage, 10 percent of 1982-83 expenditure, to this period, the bondholder would be or who delay second and third births for extend the schemes to cover the entire able to obtain a loan for an amount up to at least five years. population. This would clearly require an 50 percent of the bond's value, for pro- Both schemes would initially be imple- increase in foreign assistance for the pop- ductive purposes such as purchase of fer- mented in only a few areas (covering ulation program. tilizers, installation or rental of irrigation about 2 percent of the country's popula- pumps, poultry farming, fish culture, or tion). If 10 percent of all couples of child- for each pregnancy and she forfeited a part of her about it. If many people were do this, they might account for each birth beyond two. She could provoke a general reaction against sterilization. claim the proceeds when she retired. An evalua- The second merit of a system with delayed pay- tion conducted several years after the start of the ments is that it avoids the need for a large number program showed that it had helped to accelerate of cash payments to be made by junior officials and the declining trend in fertility. thus minimizes the potential for corruption. Both these programs were designed to cover Deferred incentives, however, are not without their costs and to produce some savingthrough their own problems. For example, it is not certain lower educational expenses in the first case, and that potential recipients would trust the govern- through lower child care, medical, and work-loss ment's ability and willingness to provide benefits expenses in the second. in the future. The administrative requirements of a Deferred incentives have an immediate financial deferred system are also considerable. For advantage: the payments by government to bond- schemes not tied to sterilization, individuals holders come in the future, at the time when the would have to be registered and their births moni- saving to society from fewer births is being reaped. tored. For many developing countries, keeping However, they can still be costly. For example, an track of all births in circumstances where parents incentive scheme proposed in Bangladesh would may wish to conceal them would require a more provide a bond for all couples who agreed to steril- effective administrative system than now exists. ization and who had only two or three living chil- Despite these possible shortcomings, deferred dren. To fully fund the scheme nationwide, the incentives have much potential. If they could be government would have to set aside a substantial made to work, they could provide for a transfer of proportion of its budget now (see Box 6.4). income to the poor that would reduce fertility. There are also practical arguments in favor of Nepal is trying deferred incentives in a few areas, deferred schemes, especially for sterilization. The and Bangladesh is now considering such schemes. first, alluded to above, is that a d'eferred payment They could also be tried in those rural areas of avoids the risk of people volunteering simply India and Indonesia where family planning serv- because they need money immediately. If they ices and administrative systems are adequate. later regret their decision, they can do nothing 126 7 Family planning as a service Some eighty-five countries in the developing who are often caught in a vicious circle in which world, representing about 95 percent of its popula- too many children mean too few opportunities for tion, now provide some form of public support to other kinds of activity, and vice versa. By enabling family planning programs. Tremendous progress women to control their fertility, family planning has been made in improving couples' access to frees them to become better educated and to information and services. But in all countries more increase their own and their children's contribu- could be done. Nearly all programs still fail to tion to development. reach most rural people; even in the towns and Family planning offers the greatest potential cities the quality of services is often poor and dis- benefits for the poorest people, whose mortality continuation rates high. In many countries the and fertility rates are usually the highest of any potential of the private sector to provide family group. planning services has hardly been tapped; in oth- For all these reasons, programs to support family ers the gap in services provided privately can be planning deserve a central role in the social and filled only by enlarging public programs. Twenty- economic strategies of governments throughout seven countries have yet to introduce family plan- the developing world. Properly designed, pro- fling programs. Almost half of these are in Africa, grams need not be particularly expensive. But lack where incomes are the lowest in the world, popu- of finance is one of the reasons family planning is lation growth is the highest, and the potential ben- efits from family planning may be greatest. The benefits of family planning, moreover, TABLE 7.1 do not depend on the existence of demographic Percentage of currently married women aged 15 to objectives. 49 using contraception, by region and for selected Family planning improves the health of moth- countries ers and children. Both infant and maternal mortal- Region and country Total Urban Rural ity in developing countries could be substantially reduced if pregnancies were spaced at least two Sub-Saharan Africa (6) a years apart, and if pregnancies among teenagers Ivory Coast (1980-81) 3 4 2 Kenya (1977-78) b 7 12 6 and women over forty were prevented (see Box Middle East and North Africa (22) 7.1). Couples with access to family planning serv- Egypt (1980) 24 40 12 ices can prevent unwanted pregnancies that might Syria (1978) 20 34 5 otherwise result in poorly performed abortions East Asia (65) and the risk of serious, even fatal, complications. Philippines (1978) 36 47 31 Family planning services were recognized as one Thailand (1981) 57 64 55 of eight essential components of primary health Latin America and Caribbean (4)a care by the International Conference on Primary Colombia (1980) 49 54 37 Mexico (1979) 39 51 27 Health Care in Alma-Ata in 1978. South Asia (25) Family planning makes responsible parent- Bangladesh (1983-84) 19 36 17 hood easier. Parents can have the number of chil- Sri Lanka (1982) 55 57 54 dren for whom they know they can provide ade- Note: Numbers are based on recent surveys, except for India quate food, health care, and education. and Indonesia, which are based on recent program statistics. Family planning enlarges the choices available Average weighted by population for all countries in region with recent surveys. to people, a central purpose of economic and social Ever-married women aged 15 to 50. development. This is particularly true for women, Source: World Development Indicators, Table 20. 127 Box 7.1 Family planning for health Early and frequent childbearing contrib- child mortality would decline by 16 per- Infant mortality per 1,000 live births, Peru utes substantially to illness and death of cent. In Pakistan infant mortality (cur- infants, young children, and mothers in rently 140 per thousand) would fall by 30 Spacing interval (years) developing countries. Family planning percent if all birth intervals of less than programs can tackle these problems <2 thirty-six months could be lengthened to through four main mechanisms: thirty-six to forty-seven months. 2-3 87 Lengthening the interval between Preventing births for women under pregnancies (child spacing) The interval 4+ 55 twenty and over thirty four years of age. between pregnancies is an important In these age groups, women who determinant of survival for both the new- Birth order become pregnant carry a grelter risk of born baby and his or her older sibling. illness and death, both for themselves 8] Infants and children at highest risk of and their children. Infant and maternal death are those born less than two years 2-3 90] mortality are highest among teenage apart (see first chart). This relation holds mothers. In Pakistan, for example, 4-6 102 babies born to teenage mothers have a 50 even when allowance is made for birth order, mother's age, mother's education, percent greater chance of dying than do 7+ 138 urban or rural residence, and the sex of those whose mothers are aged twenty to the child. Mother's age twentvnine; in Peru the chance is 15 There are two main explanations for percent greater. There were 860 maternal the link between mortality and spacing. deaths per 100,000 live births among The first is that the youngest and next teenage mothers in Matlab Thana, youngest child must compete for the Bangladesh in the mid-1970s, compared resources of the family and for the atten- with 450 for women aged twenty to tion of the mother. When a woman twenty-nine (see second chart). Part of becomes pregnant again soon after giv- the explanation for these contrasts is that 0 50 1011 150 ing birth, the young child may be prema- teenage mothers may not he physically turely weaned, increasing the risk that Source Rutsten, 1982. mature enough br a safe pregnancy; in he or she will suffer from malnutrition, addition, most of their births are first gastrointestinal infection, diarrhea, and in the newborn baby. One study of births, which often carry a higher risk of other illnesses, Second, a rapid succes- twenty-five developing countries sug- infant and maternal death. As for moth- sion of pregnancy, breastfeeding, and gested that, if births were spaced two to ers over thirty-five years old, their babies then another pregnancy weakens the six years apart, infant mortality would run an increased risk of congenital mother and is linked to low birth weight decline by an average of 10 percent, and defects such as Down's syndrome, cleft being neglected in some countries and is making about 25 percent. Contraceptive use is lowest in only slow progress in others. Aid donors have a sub-Saharan Africa, at less than 10 percent of mar- major contribution to make in ensuring that family ried women, and this estimate excludes many planning programs receive the money they need to countries in which use is negligible but data are be effective. unavailable. Contraceptive use varies widely within countries The use of contraception as well. In most, a higher proportion of urban than rural couples use contraception; the distinction is Surveys of married women of reproductive age particularly stark in Syria, where 34 percent of (fifteen to forty-nine) show wide variations in con- urban, but only 5 percent of rural, women were traceptive use among developing regions (see using contraception in 1978. In the Ivory Coast, Table 7.1). In East Asia nearly two-thirds of the Kenya, and Mexico, contraceptive use in rural married women in that age group use contracep- areas is roughly half the rate in urban areas, and in tion; in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore the Egypt it is less than a third. Regional differences proportion is 70 percent or more, as high as in the are also great: in Indonesia, contraceptive use United States and western Europe. Latin America ranged from 53 percent of couples on the islands of has reached about 40 percent, whereas the propor- Java and Bali to only 16 percent in some of the tion in the Middle East and South Asia is only outer islands in 1983. In Maharashtra and Gujarat 128 palate, and heart disorders. Infant and maternal mortality is potentially greater. trained personnel in sanitary conditions. maternal mortality also increase for A study in the mid-1970s estimated that But in most developing countries the mothers in their thirties and forties. maternal mortality would be reduced by procedure is illegal, and therefore more Because most births are already to 24 percent in the Philippines, by 23 per- likely to be self-induced or performed women in the twenty to thirty-four age cent in Colombia and France, and by 19 unhygienically by untrained people. group, confining all births to that group percent in Mexico, Thailand, Venezuela, Such abortions carry with them a high would have only a modest effect on over- and the United States. The effect on incidence of complications, such as all infant and child mortality rates. For maternal and child illness has not been incomplete abortion, pelvic hemorrhage, example, both rates would decline by estimated, but it would certainly be lacerations of the cervix, perforation of only 2 to 6 percent in Indonesia, Paki- greater than on mortality. the uterus, and tetanus. These complica- stan, and the Philippines. The effect on Allowing couples to have fewer chil- tions may require hospitalization and dren. Depending on the country, the may damage the mother's fertility; in the Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births, risks of infant and maternal mortality worst cases, they can kill her. Matlab, Bangladesh increase rapidly after the third, fourth, or Because abortion is illegal in many fifth child. In El Salvador, for example, countries, the number of women affected Birth order infant mortality for fifth and later chil- is difficult to estimate. In twenty-four 2-3 254 dren is more than twice the level for the countries during 1970-78 complications second and third child. In Matlab Thana, of abortion were cited as a cause of 4-5 456 Bangladesh, maternal mortality is about between 6 and 46 percent of all regis- 558 250 per 100,000 live births for the second tered, maternity-related deaths. Scat- and third births but is about 450 per tered evidence from Africa suggests that 8+ 741 lO()U00 for the fourth and fifth births. hospital admissions for complications These relations hold even when allow- after induced abortion are increasing, Mother's age ance is made for differences in the age of and that a disproportionate number of e 20 860 mothers. If all births of fourth and later admissions are teenagers. The Interna- children were prevented, infant mortal- tional Planned Parenthood Federation 20-29 450 ity would decline by between 5 and 11 (IPPF) estimated in the late 1970s that 30-39 580 percent in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Phil- 84,000 women die annually from compli- ippines, and Sri Lanka. cations of abortion in sixty five develop 40-49 670 Preventing illness and death result- ing countries. Provision of safe, effective, 0 200 400 6t+ ing trom unsafe abortion. Abortion is and convenient contraception could pre- extremely safe when performed in the vent many unwanted pregnancies that Chen and others, 1974. first three months of pregnancy by ire aborted states of India, 35 percent of couples were using These survey-based estimates may underesti- contraception in 1981-82, compared with only 11 mate contraceptive use because they do not percent of couples in the states of Uttar Pradesh include use among unmarried men or women and and Jammu and Kashmir. sometimes exclude use among couples in informal Among countries for which more than one sur- unions. There may also be underreporting by vey estimate is available, contraceptive use has some women of the use of contraception by hus- increased fastest in East Asia and Latin America bands, and some respondents may be reluctant to (see Figure 7.1). In Thailand, for example, the pro- admit to using contraception themselves. At the portion of married women aged fifteen to forty- same time, these figures may overstate the number four using contraception rose from 15 percent in of people protected by contraception because not 1970, the year the official family planning program all couples using a method are equally protected was launched, to 59 percent in 1981. Progress in from the risk of pregnancy. Some are using "effi- South Asia has been slower, with contraceptive cient" contraceptive methods such as sterilization, use increasing by about 1 percent of couples a year the pill, the IUD, injectable contraceptives, con- in Nepal, more quickly in Bangladesh, but not at doms, spermicidal foam, and the diaphragm. But all in Pakistan. In Egypt and Kenya contraceptive others are using less effective methods, such as use has remained unchanged, despite longstand- douche, rhythm, and withdrawal, or are abstain- ing public programs. ing (see Box 7.2). In Peru, 53 percent of those using 129 FIGURE 7.1 88 in Romania (1979). Resort to both legal and ille- Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 1970-83, gal abortion often results from lack of information selected countries about, and access to, safe and effective contracep- Percentage of married women aged 15-49 using contraception tive methods. 60 Thailand Unmet need 50 Colombia In the surveys from which data on contraceptive Korea use have been drawn women were also asked 40 Mexico whether they would like to have more children. Forty to 75 percent of married women of childbear- 30 ing age in East and South Asian countries and in Latin American and Caribbean countries want no Egypt 20 more children. In a few countries women were also asked whether they wished to delay their next Bangladesh pregnancy for a year or more. Nineteen percent of 10 women of. childbearing age in Bangladesh and Nepal Thailand, 25 percent in El Salvador, and 32 percent Pakistan 0 in Guatemala said yes. In countries where both 1970 1975 1980 1983 questions have been asked, from 50 to 90 percent of women want either to limit or to space births. Wife aged fifteen to forty-four. Ever-married women. In virtually all countries surveyed, the number of Sources; For Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan, UN 1983; for others, CPS and women of childbearing age who want no more WFS data. children exceeds the number using some kind of contraception. Some of the women who want no more children or who wish to delay a pregnancy are not using a method because they are currently rhythm or withdrawal had an unwanted preg- pregnant or because they have been breastfeeding nancy within three years after a birth, compared for less than one year and therefore are afforded with only 29 percent of women who used the pill, some (but not total) protection. Others are unable the IUD, or injectable contraceptives. The 1978 to conceive, or their husbands are away. These Philippines Fertility Survey found that 36 percent women are not "exposed" to the risk of preg- of married women of reproductive age used some nancy, so they do not need contraception, at least method, but only 16 percent used an efficient not immediately. method. In contrast, in the Dominican Republic in The remaining womenthose who would like to 1975, contraceptive use was 32 percent for all space or to limit births, who are not using contra- methods and 26 percent for efficient methods. ception, and who are exposed to the risk of preg- Contraception is not the only method of birth nancyare said to have "unmet need" for contra- control. Induced abortion is widespread, even ception. By this definition, 6 to 12 percent of where it is illegal. There may be as many as 30 women of childbearing age in Egypt, Kenya, and million to 50 million induced abortions performed the Philippines have unmet need for contraception annually worldwide; this wide range is due to to limit births (see Figure 7.2, low estimate). In uncertainty about the number of illegal abortions. Bangladesh, Korea, and Peru, where both limiting Illegal abortion carries with it a high risk of compli- and spacing questions were asked, 16 to 33 percent cations and death and can affect future fertility. In of women of childbearing age have unmet need for many developing countries abortion is illegal contraception. If women who are breastfeeding under any circumstances or is permitted only to and those using inefficient methods of contracep- save the life of the mother; China and India are tion are also considered to have unmet need, more major exceptions. Elsewhere legal abortion is an than 40 percent of women in Bangladesh and Peru important method of birth controlin Cuba, have unmet need for limiting and spacing births; Japan, Korea, the USSR, and eastern Europe. 22 percent of women in Egypt, 10 percent in Legal abortion rates per thousand women of child- Kenya, and 29 percent in the Philippines have bearing age range from 11 in Canada (1981) and 25 unmet need for contraception only to limit births in the United States (1980) to 84 in Japan (1975) and (Figure 7.2, high estimate). Estimates for other 130 FIGURF 7.2 Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception, selected countries, 1977-81 Unmet need for The charts on this page show unmet need for contra- limiting births ception among married women aged 15 to 49. In the top pie and bar chart, unmet need for contraception to limit births is shown among women who want no more children. In the bottom pie and bar chart unmet need is shown for women who want no more children or who want to postpone a birth. In each case, the low estimate of unmet need is the percentage of women using no contraception. The high estimate is the percentage using an inefficient method (withdrawal, rhythm, and the like), breastfeeding (within a year of a birth), or using no method. Estimate of unmet need (percent) Percentage of married women aged 15-49 High Low Egypt 22.4 12.3 (1980) Kenya (1977-78) 9.9 5.9 Philippines (1978) 29.0 11.1 0 10 20 30 40 Unmet need for limiting and spacing births Key Efficient Inefficient Breastf ceding No method method (first year) method High Estimate of unmet need Estimate of unmet need (percent) Percentage of married wonten aged 15-49 -. High Low Bangladesh 41.3 32.6 (1979) Korea (1979) 26.2 16.1 Peru (1981) 46.2 [6.3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Source; Boulier, 1984b. 131 Box 7.2 Birth planning technology Several methods of birth control have pIes of childbearing age. The major tions of controlled studies in developed been practiced throughout human his- exceptions to this pattern are Spain, countries, existing methods can be toryabstinence, abortion, prolonged Italy, and the Eastern European countries highly effective in preventing pregnancy: breastfeeding, and coitus interruptus (except Hungary), where withdrawal, nearly 100 percent for sterilization, the (withdrawal)but with uncertain effec- rhythm, or abstinence are still the most pill, and injectables; 98 percent for the tiveness, and psychological and health prevalent methods. IUD; and as much as 97 percent for the damage. Contraceptive research in the Among developing countries, steriliza- condom and the diaphragm after one past thirty years has made possible a tion is the most common modern year of use. But outside these controlled much greater variety of more effective method in Bangladesh, El Salvador, studies, some methods can be signifi- methods. Combined estrogen and pro- India, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, cantly less effective owing to incorrect or gestin oral contraceptives (the 'pill") Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Tunisia. The inconsistent use. In the United States, and various intrauterine devices (HiD) pill is the most favored method in Egypt, one in 100 couples using the pill will have were the first major breakthroughs in Jordan, Syria, much of Latin America, a pregnancy within one year, more than the late 1950s and early 1960s. Since then Malaysia, and Indonesia. Injectable con- two couples using the IUD, twelve using other methods have been developed: traceptives are widely used in Jamaica the condom or diaphragm, and twenty injectable contraceptives effective for two (11 percent of eligible women), Thailand using rhythm. In the Philippines more to three months; more effective copper (7 percent), Trinidad and Tobago (5 per- than three women out of 100 using either and hormone-releasing IUDs; menstrual cent), and Mexico (3 percent); this the IUD or the pill and thirty-three using regulation (vacuum aspiration of the method is convenient to use for rural rhythm will become pregnant within a uterus within seven to fourteen days of a women and, unlike the pill, does not year. The motivation of couples to pre- missed period); male sterilization; sim- interfere with lactation. Both the World vent pregnancy is important in the effec- plified female sterilization by laparos- Health Organization and IPPF have tiveness of contraceptives. Couples who copy and minilaparotomy; low-estrogen approved injectableslegal in more than want no more children are likely to use pills with fewer side effects; and a pro- 100 countriesbut greater use in devel- methods more effectively than those gestin-only "minipill." Barrier methods, oping countries is partly constrained by who are spacing births. such as the condom, diaphragm, and the method's limited availability. The Side effects. Physical side effects are a spermicides, have also been improved. United States, the major contraceptive main reason that people switch, or stop In 1980 the most commonly used meth- donor worldwide, cannot donate inject- using, contraceptives. For some meth- ods of birth control worldwide were ster- ables because US assistance policy pro- ods, the long-term health risks of pro- ilization and the pill. Among developed hibits supply of drugs not approved for longed use are unknown. Methods such countries the pill is the most used domestic use. as the IUD and injectables, which alter method, but sterilization has gained in Despite the greater variety of contra- bleeding patternsby spotting between popularity in the United States and in ceptive methods now available, all have periods, increased or decreased flow, or Great Britain, where it accounts for about shortcomings: amenorrheamay be culturally unac- a quarter of total use among married cou- Effectiveness. Under the ideal condi- ceptable or restrict the activities of users. Box 7.3 Measuring unmet need for family planning The concept of "unmet need" used in risk of pregnancy, some said yes. Of family size ("If you could choose exactly this Report is based on two questions them, those who were not using any the number of children you have in your asked of married women in representa- contraceptive method were defined as life, how many would that be?") These tive nationwide surveys during the past having unmet need for spacing births. questions contain significant hypotheti- decade. In more than forty countries Some investigators have suggested cal components, since women cannot women were asked, "Do you want addi- that responses to such questions are costlessly choose family size, cannot tional children?" Among women who meaningless or, at best, unreliable. They have fewer children than they already were exposed to the risk of pregnancy argue that many women in developing have, and must imagine alternative life (that is, they were neither pregnant nor countries are not accustomed to planning cycles involving different family sizes. infertile), some said that they did not their families or are uninformed about Responses to such questions are not con- want more children. Of them, those who how to affect the number of births they sistent even when women are asked the were not using any contraceptive will eventually have. These criticisms same question at different dates. For method were defined as having unmet apply most strongly to questions on pre- example, in Indonesia only 46 percent of need for limiting births. In some surveys ferred family size ("Suppose you were women reinterviewed four months after (in fewer countries), women were also recently married and were able to have an initial survey gave an identical asked, "Do you wish to delay pregnancy just the number of children you wanted, response to a question on desired family for a year or more?" Among women at how many would that be?") and desired size. In a similar study elsewhere, only 132 Worldwide expenditure on reproductive are completely reversible but delay the nonsurgical chemical sterilization for research and contraceptive development, return to fertility for several months. men and women, a male "pill," and an 1965-79 Acceptability. To some couples, abor- antipregnancy vaccine for women. Some tion and sterilization are religiously or of these new methodssuch as the hor- Millions of dollars culturally unacceptable; some may monal implant (in the arm), improved 160 regard only abstinence or rhythm as IUDs, the vaginal sponge, cervical cap, 140 acceptable. and diaphragms which release spermi- Delivery. Sterilization (of both men cidemay be widely available in the near 120 Current dollars! and women) requires skilled medical or future. Others, such as new male meth- paramedical staff, who are often scarce in ods and an antipregnancy vaccine, re- 100 developing countries. The IUD, inject- quire much more research and are ables, and the pill require medical unlikely to be marketed before the end of 80 backup for treatment of complications this century. Constant 1970 dollars and side effects. Programs which pro- Compared with the past few decades, 60 mote the condom, pill, and spermicidal the pace of technological development is 40 foam require a good network of supply slowing. Worldwide funding for contra- points. ception-related research was $155 million 20 No single method of contraception is in 1979, but hcs been declining in real appropriate to the needs of all people nor terms since 1972-73 (see chart). About 30 0 is there one that is completely safe, percent of the total is spent on contracep- 1965 69 71 73 75 77 79 reversible, effective, and convenient. tive development and safety studies; the Nor is such an "ideal" method likely to rest goes to training and basic research Source Atkinson and others, 1980. be developed in the next twenty years. on human reproduction. Some 72 per- Family planning programs will have to cent of the total was spent in the United rely on a mix of existing methods and a States. Over 80 percent of the total was few new ones whose development is financed by the public sector; industry's Inconvenience. Barrier methods (con- already well advanced. share has shrunk from 32 percent in 1965 dom, diaphragm, spermicides) have to Research is being concentrated in two to less than a tenth. Special testing and be used each time couples have inter- areas: improving the safety, conven- regulatory requirements, combined with course. In households in developing ience, and life span of existing methods, product-liability problems, have length- countries, pills and diaphragms are diffi- such as the IUD, pill, injectables, and ened the time between product develop- cult to store and condoms difficult to dis- female barrier methods; and developing ment and marketing, increased the cost pose of. new methods, such as a monthly pill to of developing new products, and made Reversibility. Sterilization is highly induce menstruation, long-lasting biode- the future profitability of research more effective but rarely reversible. Injectables gradable hormonal implants for women, uncertain for private firms. 67 percent of those reinterviewed after World Fertility Survey, contraceptive use surveys inquire only about women's, not one month gave an identical response to among women who said they wanted no men's, attitudes. Where both spouses a question on preferred family size. more children consistently exceeded use have been interviewed, the difference In contrast, women respond consis- among women wanting more children. between them tends to be small, but tently over time to a question on whether Obviously, not all women who want there are differences. Third, growing or not they want additional children, and no more children use contraception, and experience with children, plus unantici- their replies are reasonably good predic- not all women who want to limit their pated eventsa child dying, illness of tors both of contraceptive use and of family size cease bearing children. Sev- husband or wifemay lead couples to future fertility. (The Population Data eral factors may account for these dis- alter their plans. Fourth, even modern Supplement gives country-level informa- crepancies between attitudes and behav- contraceptive methods can fail, so that tion on responses to this question.) In ior. First, some women may not consider some women will have more babies the study in which two-thirds of the costs of birth control in answering despite their intention not to increase responses to a question on preferred questions on family size. If the benefits family size. family size were inconsistent, 90 percent of avoiding births are small in relation to of women were consistent in answering the costs of contraception, women who a question about wanting additional chil- want no more children have little motiva- dren. In countries surveyed as part of the tion to use contraception. Second, the 133 TABLE 7.2 Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among those who want no more children Residence and education Urban Rural Seven years' Seven years' Country and family No education No education planning index" education or more education or more Strong or very strong Korea, Rep. of, 1979 58 62 61 63 Colombia, 1980 35 69 30 52 Moderate Malaysia, 1974 37 27 49 Thailand, 1981 72 83 53 58 Philippines, 1978 22 45 15 38 Tunisia, 1979 50 60 45 Bangladesh, 1979 21 55 16 37 Mexico, 1978 40 71 17 53 Weak or very weak Nepal, 1981 40 71 15 45 Egypt, Arab Rep., 1980 53 72 24 70 Ecuador, 1979 17 60 6 58 Pakistan, 1975 17 35 6 17 Venezuela, 1976 53 67 18 54 Kenya, 1977-78 13 44 12 32 Honduras, 1981 53 58 15 49 Ghana, 1979-80 11 30 8 25 Note: Efficient contraception includes male and female sterilization, pills, IUD, injectables, diaphragm, and condoms. Women who are pregnant or infecurmd are excluded from this table. Not available. a. Family planning index is interpolated from 1972 and 1982 data to year shown. See notes for Table 6 of the Population Data Supplement. Sources: CPS and WFS data; Lapham and Mauldin, 1984. countries are shown in the Population Data Sup- percent of married women of childbearing age in plement, Table 3. 1976. These high and low calculations of unmet need The concept of unmet need is not static. Unmet provide rough estimates, given existing prefer- need may decline as more people have access to ences for family size, of the potential for additional contraception or as the nature of services changes. contraceptive use. Some analysts, however, have It may increase as people want fewer children, or questioned the validity of estimates based on the as the better availability of services raises interest responses of married women to survey questions in regulating fertility faster than new services can (see Box 7.3). Others have noted that even women meet new need. Many women who say they want who are pregnant may have had unmet need in more children might be potential users of services the past that resulted in an unplanned pregnancy, if given the chance to plan their births. To some and that such women may shortly be in need extent family planning programs do more than again. Nor do these surveys include unmet need simply satisfy unmet need; they actually generate among unmarried people. Clearly, use of contra- and then fill such need. In this sense "demand" ception depends not only on accessibility and cost, for contraceptive services is not easily measured; it but also on how intensely a couple wishes to avoid is partly a function of their supply. a birth. This factor is difficult to measure in sur- In most countries women in rural areas and with veys. Whether unmet need can ever be completely less education are less likely to want to stop child- satisfied is debatable. But in the United States, bearing than are urban and more educated where contraception is widely available, unmet women. But of the former, those who do want to need for limiting births was estimated at only 4 to 8 stop are less likely than their urban and educated 134 counterparts to be practicing contraception. Gov- restrict their activities. Some methods increase the ernment plays a central role in narrowing these risk of developing serious health problems; higher gaps, especially between urban and rural areas risk of pelvic inflammatory disease among IUD (see Table 7.2). In Colombia and Korea, which users and of cardiovascular disease among users of have strong family planning programs, rural the pill have been reported. (These risks, however, women who want no more children are as likely as are small compared with those associated with urban women to be practicing contraception. In pregnancy and childbirth.) Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan, which have weaker Social disapprovalthe private nature of fam- programs, the contrast between rural and urban ily planning and the difficulty of discussing it with areas is much greater. providers of services or even with spouses. Family planning may violate personal beliefs, create mari- Reasons for not using contraception tal disharmony, or be socially, culturally, or reli- giously unacceptable. Couples who wish to plan their families face cer- Surveys of contraceptive use in ten countries tain costsfinancial, psychological, medical, and asked married women not practicing contraception time-related costs. If these exceed the net costs of why they were not doing so. Unless they wanted additional children, couples will not regulate their another child or were pregnant, their reasons fertility, even if, ideally, they would prefer to post- included lack of knowledge of a source or method pone or to prevent a pregnancy. To individuals, of contraception, medical side effects of methods, the costs of contraception include: religious beliefs, opposition from husbands, and Informationthe effort to find out where con- financial costs. In Nepal lack of knowledge of a traceptive methods can be obtained and how they source was the main reason. In Honduras, Mexico, are properly used. In Kenya 58 percent of married and Thailand half of the women who did not prac- women aged fifteen to forty-nine who are exposed tice contraception but were exposed to the risk of to the risk of pregnancy do not know where they pregnancy either knew of no source of contracep- can obtain a modern method of contraception; in tion or feared side effects. In Bangladesh, Barba- Mexico the figure is 47 percent. dos, and Nepal as much as a quarter to a third of Travel and waiting timethe money and time all married women were not using contraception needed to go to and from a shop or clinic and to for these reasons. Contraceptive prevalence clearly obtain family planning services. Average waiting could be increased by better information and serv- times are as high as three hours in hospitals and icesdirected to men as well as to women. family planning clinics in El Salvador. Family plan- Discontinuation rates tell a similar story. Accord- ning programs in Bangladesh, India, and Sri ing to surveys in thirty-three countries, as many as Lanka compensate sterilization clients for their 30 percent of married women of childbearing age transport costs and lost wages. have used contraception in the past but are no Purchasethe financial cost of either contra- longer doing so (see Table 7.3). When contracep- ceptive supplies (condoms, pills, injections) or tion is being used to space births, some discontinu- services (sterilization, IUD insertion and periodic ation is normal. But many who discontinue contra- checkups, menstrual regulation, and abortion). ceptive use do not want more children. As the Most public family planning programs provide second column of Table 7.3 shows, as many as 10 supplies and services free of charge or at highly percent of all married women are discontinuers subsidized rates. Purchase costs from private sup- who want no more children and are at risk of get- pliers and practitioners may be substantially ting pregnant. In Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, higher. Korea, and Pakistan, the proportion exceeds one- Side effects and health risksthe unpleasant third (column 3). Follow-up surveys of women and sometimes medically serious symptoms that who have accepted contraception typically find some women experience while practicing contra- that much discontinuaton is due to medical side ception. Users of the pill may gain weight or feel effects. In a follow-up survey in the Philippines, ill. The IUD may cause excessive menstrual bleed- for example, this reason was cited by 66 percent of ing, persistent spotting, and painful cramps. In those who stopped using the pill and 43 percent of addition, in some countries women are forbidden those who stopped using the IUD. Reducing dis- for religious or cultural reasons from cooking dur- continuation among women who want no more ing their menstrual periods; spotting and heavier children could increase contraceptive use by at menstrual flow caused by the IUD can further least one-fifth in eight countries (column 4). 135 TABLE 7.3 Discontinuation of contraception, recent surveys Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 Percentage of all Discontinuers who Used contraception Discontinued use, discontinuers who are are exposed and want but are not exposed' and exposed and want no more children (2), current users want no more no more children as a percentage ("discontinuers") children (2 divided by 1) of current users Country (1) (2) (3) (4) Sub-Saharan Africa Cameroon (1978) 6 (.) 1 2 Ghana (1979-80) 30 2 7 23 Kenya (1977-78) 25 2 7 24 Lesotho (1977) 18 2 10 33 Sudan (1979) 8 I 8 15 Middle East and North Africa Egypt (1980) 17 4 25 18 Jordan (1976) 22 3 12 10 Syria (1978) 14 1 9 6 Tunisia (1978) 15 3 18 9 South Asia Bangladesh (1979) 9 3 30 21 Nepal (1981) 2 (.) 8 2 Pakistan (1975) 5 2 43 42 Sri Lanka (1975) 14 4 29 12 East Asia Indonesia (1976) 12 2 16 7 Korea, Rep. of (1979) 24 8 33 16 Philippines (1978) 23 4 19 12 Thailand (1981) 21 5 26 9 Latin America and Caribbean Barbados (1981) 28 10 36 21 Colombia (1980) 20 4 22 9 Costa Rica (1980) 23 3 14 5 Dominican Republic (1975) 18 3 17 8 Ecuador (1979) 20 4 20 12 Guyana (1975) 22 8 34 22 Haiti (1977) 17 3 15 14 Honduras (1981) 15 2 10 6 Jamaica (1975-76) 26 9 36 24 Mexico (1978) 15 3 20 8 Panama (1976) 21 4 17 7 Peru (1981) 20 3 14 7 Paraguay (1979) 21 3 12 7 Trinidad and Tobago (1977) 27 8 28 14 Venezuela (1977) 20 4 19 8 Note: Figures in columns 1 and 2 were rounded after computing columns 3 and 4. (.) Less than half of 1 percent. a. Not pregnant or infecund. Source: Ainsworth, 1984. Supplying family planning services ing for government support. Once persuaded, governments typically provide family planning Family planning programs have evolved in various through the public health system. But because ways, but a typical pattern begins with services health care is often underfinanced and concen- being provided only by private family planning trated in urban areas, and because family planning associations and a few concerned doctors and competes with other medical priorities, the quality nurses. These groups gradually show that family of services is uneven and available to only a small planning is feasible and acceptable and start press- proportion of people. Eventually programs are 136 extended to the countryside, often by paramedical examplehave long-established programs to and semiskilled staff with backup support from reduce fertility. About half the countries in the health centers. More attention is paid to increasing Middle East provide family planning to improve the range of contraceptive methods, providing fol- child spacing and to promote health; only Turkey's low-up services to clients, and working with com- program seeks to reduce fertility. In a few Middle munity leaders to encourage local support. Com- Eastern countries, contraception is illegal. In oth- mercial organizations are also encouraged to ers, cultural practices often confine women to their provide family planning. Private associations are households, which makes it difficult for them to delegated major responsibilities within the seek out family planning services. Programs that national program for certain services or target include home visits by family planning workers groups and continue to test new ways of providing are not well developed. services. Sub-Saha ran Africa. Of forty-one governments Public family planning programs are now at dif- for which data are available, only nine have demo- ferent stages of development in different regions. graphic objectives. Most governments that sup- East Asia. Governments have a longstanding port family planning do so for health reasons, and commitment to reduce population growth. They twelve countries still provide no official backing for have been extremely successful in improving family planning. Where services exist, they are access to family planning services and in widening provided through health care systems that have the range of contraceptive methods available. only limited coverage, particularly in rural areas. Large numbers of field workers have been Throughout Africa couples want large families, recruited to provide family planning, and some- and infant mortality is high. There is some times basic health care, in villages in China, Indo- demand for family planning but it is poorly met by nesia, and Thailand. Contraceptive use has existing programs. As traditional ways of child increased dramatically during the past decade. spacing (prolonged breastfeeding and sexual absti- South Asia. Official commitment to reduce fer- nence) erode, the demand for modern contracep- tility is strong, but results have been mixed. Con- tion increases. Private organizations have helped traceptive use is highest in Sri Lanka and several to demonstrate that demand and to press for gov- states in southern India, and is lowest in Nepal ernment support. and Pakistan. The demand for contraception is still constrained by high infant mortality and by a pref- The management of family planning programs erence for large families. At the same time, recent surveys have revealed substantial unmet need for Perhaps more than any other social programs, both limiting and spacing births. Most programs family planning programs can be effective only to have yet to achieve the rural spread found in East the extent that they meet the needs of individuals, Asia and have tended to emphasize sterilization. both for better information about the benefits of Other methods have been largely supplied controlling fertility and for better services to facili- through subsidized commercial outlets. tate doing so. At the same time family planning Latin America and the Caribbean. At first, wide- programs, like all public programs, operate within spread demand for family planning was met certain constraints: the availability of manpower largely by private doctors, pharmacies, and non- and finance, the capacity for training and supervi- profit organizations, primarily in urban areas. sion, and the transport and communications infra- Government support was weak, in part because of structure. Medical backup is necessary to deliver opposition from some religious authorities. The some contraceptive methods. The challenge for 1970s saw a growing interest on the part of govern- family planning managers is to address individual ments and a greater tolerance by religious authori- needs within the confines of these constraints, and ties. Most governments now support family plan- in the longer term to ease such limitations. fling services for health and humanitarian The personal nature of family planning services purposes; Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican has several important implications for designing Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, and managing programs. First, programs must be Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago do so to reduce able to accommodate local and individual needs fertility as well. In rural areas, access to services is and a variety of users. Potential clients include still inadequate in most countries. men and women; those who are married and un- Middle East and North Africa. Some countries married; those of different social, economic, cul- in North AfricaEgypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, for tural, or religious backgrounds; and those who 137 may be delaying a first pregnancy, spacing effects are assured, resupply is convenient, and between children, or preventing additional preg- the opportunity to switch methods is available. nancies. Staff must be discreet, sensitive to the Medical backup and referral is critical, as is the individual needs of clients, and familiar with local capacity to follow up on clients. Managers need customs and beliefs. This requirement has been information not only on new acceptors but also on addressed in several ways: by selecting staff from continuing users, dropouts, and nonparticipants local communities, by training staff in the environ- (see Box 7.4). Indonesia is one country with an ment in which they will work, and by making spe- effective monitoring system, including acceptor cial efforts to hire female workers. Special services records, quarterly follow-up surveys of acceptors, have also been targeted for specific client groups: and periodic sample surveys of households in adolescents, women who have just given birth, which information on fertility and contraceptive and mothers with young children. use is collected. Second, programs must encourage clients not Third, because information about the benefits of only to accept a method of contraception but also family planning and of small families may not be to use it effectively and continuously. In societies widespread, programs must create an awareness in which people marry young, couples who are of services and their benefits, as well as spread spacing and limiting births may have to use contra- information about the proper use of methods. ception for twenty years. Prolonged, effective use Information and education activities are necessary is easier if information and support regarding side both within and outside the system for delivering Box 7.4 Management information systems for improved service delivery The arrangements for providing family health and family planning services were reports forwarded to program managers planning services in many countries are spending as much as 60 percent of their were replaced by a single monthly report plagued by lack of reliable information time on activities not directly related to by each fieldworker, a single report by on which to base management decisions. delivering their services. Keeping rec- each supervisor, and a single report from Requirements for data collection are ords and attending meetings were the each primary health center. Family plan- imposed on overburdened staff and most common extraneous activities. A fling staff were told immediately how supervised by medical or other technical total of forty-six registers were main- they were measuring up to predeter- personnel untrained to make use of the tained by five types of fieldworkers, mined targets. To encourage competi- information. Much time is spent collect- relating to a range of subjects (family tiofl, feedback reports from the district to ing information that is never used. planning, maternal and child health, the primary health centers also ranked A management information system immunization, malaria control) and with centers on the basis of ten indicators, (MIS) is any system which organizes the considerable overlap of the data they such as the number of immunizations collection and interpretation of data recorded. An assistant nurse-midwife and the number of sterilizations as a per- needed by managers to make decisions. alone maintained twenty-two records centage of annual targets. The rural health supervisor reviewing a and prepared twelve reports a month. In three districts in the state of Andhra workers records to assess performance, The information was not used by super- Pradesh where this system was intro- and the health minister reviewing infor- visors and managers, nor did workers duced, the time spent on recordkeeping mation on hiring and deployment of staff receive any systematic feedback on their and reporting has been reduced consid- are both using an MIS. For a family plan- performance compared with others. erably. An assistant nurse-midwife, for ning program, an MIS could include There was little incentive to maintain example, now spends only about half an information on target group size and good records and to report regularly and hour a day with the new system com- characteristics, new and continuing on time. pared with two hours before. Reports are acceptor rates and characteristics, num- Following a review of the system, complete and are submitted on time (in bers and types of follow-up visits, birth recordkeeping and reporting were other districts reporting is about three rates, staffing patterns, and availability streamlined. The number of registers months behind schedule), and managers of supplies. These data allow managers kept by fieldworkers was reduced from are responding better to local needs. to make decisions based on up-to-date forty-six to six: a register of eligible cou- Steps to expand the system for statewide and reliable information that is collected ples and children, a maternal and child use are now being taken in Andhra as a matter of routine. health register, a report on blood smears Pradesh, and the government of India is Studies in two states in India, Karna- for malaria, a birth and death register, a recommending that all states adopt the taka and Uttar Pradesh, in the mid-1970s stock and issue register, and a diary of new MIS. showed that fieldworkers providing daily activities. The various separate 138 services. Program staff recruit potential clients and of family planning services, and medical staff may offer information on proper use of methods. The give priority to curative rather than preventive mass media can be used to inform people of the services. Multipurpose workers who are over- benefits of small families and how to obtain contra- loaded with responsibilities will do none of their ceptive methods. Instruction on human reproduc- tasks well. If an integrated delivery system tion, family planning, responsible parenthood, employs single-purpose workers, friction may and problems of rapid population growth as part arise over differences in training, seniority, sala- of school curricula can inform young people before ries, and promotion. For example, in addition to they marry; such instruction can also be offered their salaries, family planning workers have some- through nonformal education, such as adult liter- times received incentive payments based on the acy programs. These efforts complement other number of acceptors they recruit, whereas health economic and social policies, discussed in Chapter workers receive only salaries. In Kenya family 6, to create demand for smaller families. health field educators (with family planning Because of the need for medical services for pro- responsibilities) were paid more than the enrolled vision or follow-up of many contraceptive meth- community nurses to whom they were to report. ods, most family planning programs are linked to These personnel issues can seriously affect worker the public health system. The nature of these links morale and performance. varies among countries and has often changed. In Although family planning programs need some some programs, family planning workers provide link with health systems, family planning services services through clinics administered by the minis- need not be confined to them. When services are try of health, but are responsible to some other provided through a maternal and child health pro- body. In Pakistan primary responsibility for family gram, important client groups may be overlooked: planning lies with the Population Welfare Division men, adolescents, unmarried women, and non- of the Ministry of Planning and Development, pregnant women. Ministries of health may be using the division's own specialized facilities and poorly equipped to organize social marketing workers. Elsewhere family planning is directly schemes (for subsidized commercial distribution of administered by the ministry of health, through a contraceptives, discussed below), to develop mass special department of family planning (as in media programs, or to coordinate public, private, Egypt) or as part of preventive or maternal and nongovernmental, and commercial activities. child health services (as in Botswana, Kenya, and Some of these responsibilities are often delegated, Malawi). Staff may specialize in family planning for example, to information or education minis- (that is, as "single-purpose" workers), as in Kenya, tries. Many programs have boards within or out- Pakistan, and Indonesia; or they may be responsi- side a ministry to coordinate the wide range of ble for general health or maternal and child health family planning activities. In Mexico the semi- services in addition to family planning (that is, as autonomous Coordinacion General del Programa "multipurpose" workers), as in Bangladesh, Bot- Nacional de Planificacion Familiar monitors and swana, and India. coordinates all family planning activities; it is There have been obvious advantages in integrat- located within the Ministry of Health but has direct ing health and family planning in the delivery of access to the president and works closely with the services. The health benefits for mothers and chil- National Population Council (CONAPO), a sepa- dren of spacing and limiting births clearly establish rate body responsible for population policy. In family planning as a valuable component of mater- Indonesia the National Family Planning Coordi- nal and child health services. For both services the nating Board (BKKBN) is an autonomous body main target groupmarried women of childbear- that collects data, produces information and edu- ing ageis the same. Joint delivery can reduce unit cation programs, coordinates activities, and has its costs, and in countries where family planning is own fieldworkers who promote family planning, controversial, integrated services make the pro- refer clients, and set up community distribution gram more acceptable. points. In some countries these family planning But integrated services also present difficulties. boards are also responsible for overall population Health ministries are often understaffed and policya role discussed more fully in Chapter 8. underfunded; they cannot always mobilize the In conclusion, there is no simple formula for the political and administrative wherewithal to imple- best organization of family planning programs. ment an effective family planning program. Heavy Programs that differ widely in structure can be demands for health care may eclipse the provision equally successful. Workers in India deliver both 139 family planning and maternal and child health duras, and 62 percent in Nepal live more than an services and are under the general guidance of the hour away from the source of supply. These barri- Division of Family Welfare within the central Min- erslack of information and distanceare particu- istry of Health and Family Welfare. Indonesia pro- larly high in sub-Saharan Africa: more than half vides family planning as part of maternal and child the eligible women in Senegal and Sudan are health services within the health system, but also unaware of modern contraceptive methods, and in uses single-purpose fieldworkers responsible to most African countries contraceptives are available the BKKBN. The Chinese program relies on joint only in urban areas. personnel in the health system but has a separate To reach the rural areas, family planning pro- policymaking body for family planning and overall grams have placed special emphasis on extending population policy. No matter how service delivery the work of health centers into communities and is organized, all programs need some health households through the use of fieldworkers and backup. other outreach staff. Access has also been in- Other significant factors in the success of pro- creased in many countries by encouraging the pri- grams are the degree of political commitment and vate sector to provide family planning services. the overall administrative capacity of government to coordinate the deployment, training, supervi- EXTENDING PUBLIC SERVICES THROUGH OUT- sion, and availability of staff. These influence the REACH." Until a decade ago almost all public family effectiveness of three program strategies for planning programs provided services from cen- expanding contraceptive use: increasing access to tersusually clinicsand relied heavily on medi- services, improving service quality, and ensuring cal staff. Because health services were not well social acceptability. established in rural areas and medical staff were scarce, access to family planning as well as to med- Increasing access ical care was limited. Today many large family planning programs Perhaps the greatest achievement of family plan- have succeeded in using their health centers as a fling programs in the past decade has been to springboard for taking services and supplies into make information and services more accessible to the villages. those who need them. In twenty-three of twenty- Paramedical workers have been trained to nine developing countries in which surveys have provide many methods formerly provided only by taken place, more than 80 percent of married physicians. In Thailand, for example, auxiliary women are aware of at least one effective method midwives insert IUDs and administer injectable of contraception. In urban areas of almost all of contraceptives. Elsewhere nonmedical workers thirty-six countries examined by the World Fertility distribute the pill; they receive careful training on Survey (WFS), family planning methods are avail- screening for contraindications, proper use, how able within an hour's travel from home. In Costa to deal with side effects, and referral procedures. Rica and Thailand most people in rural areas are Staff based in clinics have been supplemented also less than an hour away from services. Further- with fieldworkers who provide a link between more, most public programs provide services free the clinic and the community (see Box 7.5). of charge or at heavily subsidized rates. Fieldworkers periodically visit homes and outlying But there are still many countries and areas in communities to refer clients to service outlets; to which information and travel costs are major distribute nonclinical methods such as the pill, obstacles to satisfying the unmet need of clients. condom, and spermicidal foam; and to reassure According to household surveys in Guatemala and users. In some cases fieldworkers also supervise Piaui State, Brazil, 15 percent of married women of local volunteers. childbearing age said that they would like to use Official outlets have been increased by orga- contraceptives but did not know where to get nizing local supply depots for nonclinical meth- them. In Nepal half of married women do not ods. Such local outlets in Mexico and Indonesia know of a method of contraception; about 15 per- assist the work of field staff and reduce costs to cent know of a method but not of an outlet. In clients. Honduras about a quarter of women are unaware The advantages of outreach are considerable: of either method or outlet. Of those women in fieldworkers take less time and money to train rural areas who know where to obtain contracep- than do medical professionals; health staff can tives, 32 percent in Colombia, 42 percent in Hon- spend more time on health care than they other- 140 Box 7.5 Family planning fieldworkers Outreach systems using fieldworkers health committees to provide pills, con- female volunteersincluding satisfied have been a key to success in effective doms, and other basic health services to clients, barbers, and teachersto inform national family planning programs villages. Volunteers are supervised by couples about available services, teach overcoming the relative inaccessibility of paid workers attached to local health them the advantages of family planning, physicians and lowering the costs of con- centers. Contraceptive prevalence has encourage breastfeeding and childspac- traceptive use by bringing services reached 28 percent, compared with a rate ing, distribute nonclinical methods, and directly to beneficiaries. Experience in of 7 percent in the rest of the country. refer clients to family welfare centers for different countries illustrates a diversity Korea. Full-time paid family plan- other methods. The volunteers are of approaches to the training, duties, and ning fieldworkersnurses, midwives, trained and supervised by one male and coverage of fieldworkers. and nurse aidesare assigned to health one female worker at the family welfare india. Family planning services are subcenters from which they spend at center. delivered by male and female multipur- least fifteen days each month making Philippines. About 3,000 outreach pose workers. Female workers provide home visits and organizing group meet- workersone to every 2,000 eligible cou- pre- and post-natal services to mothers, ings to recruit eligible couples. They also pleswork as full-time government spread family planning information, dis- distribute condoms and pills and refer employees. Each worker recruits, trains, tribute condoms, and deliver babies. The IUD and sterilization clients to desig- and supervises about sixteen community government has recently sanctioned the nated family planning clinics. Coverage volunteers who provide information to distribution of oral contraceptives by averages one fieldworker per 2,600 mar- couples, supply condoms and pills to female workers; workers are trained to ried women of reproductive age nation- current users, and make referrals to gov- screen clients for contraindications, and wide but is greater in rural areas (one per ernment health clinics. Some 50,000 vol- each acceptor must be examined by a 1,200 couples), than in urban (one per unteers serve almost three-quarters of doctor within three months. Male work- 6,900 couples) because of greater dis- the nation's eligible couples. The future ers concentrate mainly on environmental tances in rural areas. of the outreach program is uncertain sanitation but also provide family plan- Mexico. The national program pro- because external funding will terminate ning information and distribute con- 'ides outreach services through four dif- in 1985 and local governments have not doms. Between them they are expected ferent government agencies. The Secre- been able to absorb the cost of the to cover a population of 5,000 (3,000 in tariat of Health and Welfare trains fieldworkers' salaries as rapidly as remote hilly and tribal areas), although multipurpose fieldworkers who concen- expected. in many parts of India, this coverage has trate mainly on family planning. They Thailand. Until recently, the Thai not yet been achieved. are local volunteers who receive small national program has been clinic based. Indonesia. On the islands of Java and incentive payments. The Social Security Now multipurpose village health volun- Bali, there is about one family planning Institute runs a program to reach isolated teersserving nearly half of the nation's fieldworker to every 2,000 eligible cou- areas by training traditional midwives villageshave been trained to provide ples. The fieldworkers, who are normally and other local volunteers to provide family planning information and are secondary school graduates, recruit new information and supplies in exchange for authorized to resupply pill and condom acceptors, provide door-to-door sup- a modest payment. The Secretariat of acceptors. They also serve as referral plies, and provide the managerial link Agrarian Reform and the National Sys- agents for a mobile sterilization service. between health clinics and part-time tem for Integrated Family Development Zimbabwe. The Child Spacing and local volunteers who run village and sub- also provide services through outreach Family Planning Council, a parastatal village contraceptive resupply centers. workers. under the Ministry of Health, provides Financing constraints have precluded Pakistan. In 1981 the government many of the services and has about 300 reliance on paid fieldworkers in recent reorganized its program to include a sys- full-time, single-purpose outreach work- extensions of the program into the other tem of fieldworkers and community vol- ers who supply oral contraceptives to islands. unteers. The earlier system was based rural couples through regular home vis- Kenya. The privately run Chogoria entirely on paid fieldworkers, which its. A new project will train another 500 hospital project in the Meru district has proved costly and ineffective. The new to 600 fieldworkers by 1987. used volunteer workers selected by local program uses locally recruited male and wise would; and community-based fieldworkers to maintain the quality of services. They should are often most aware of local needs. But the exten- concentrate on a few main tasks; additional res- sive use of fieldworkers requires regular, support- ponsibilities must be introduced only gradually. ive supervision. They must be trained well at the Fieldworkers also require a good medical backup outset and must receive periodic refresher courses and referral system so that any side effects that 141 clients may develop can be promptly treated. quarter of couples who used contraception in 1983: Finally, supervisors and fieldworkers must travel it accounted for 67 percent of total condom use, 12 frequently, and contraceptive supplies must be percent of oral contraceptive use, and 70 percent of made available in an increasing number of remote spermicide use. In 1981 about half of all pill users outlets. Money for transport is often first to be and 80 percent of condom users in Sri Lanka sacrificed when budgets are cut, yet the whole obtained supplies from the social marketing pro- strategy depends on extensive travel and good gram. logistics. Reliance on commercial distributors does not lift all the burden off the public sector, however. The ENCOURAGING PRIVATE SUPPLIERS. Another way in public sector still has to provide advertising, pro- which governments have increased access to fam- motion, contraceptive supplies, distribution, and ily planning services is by encouraging wider pri- medical backup. Some training is necessary for vate involvement. This strategy makes fewer commercial suppliers to dispense oral contracep- demands on scarce public funds and on adminis- tives and to advise clients how to use them prop- trative capacity. Policies include subsidizing erly, as has been done in Jamaica, Korea, Nepal, commercial distribution of contraceptives, coordi- and Thailand. Failing that, some system of referral nating with and encouraging private nongovern- or prescriptions must be developed. mental organizations (NGOs), and removing legal Although government subsidies to the commer- and other barriers to private and commercial provi- cial sector are usually provided for contraceptive sion of contraception. supplies only, some governments also subsidize Subsidized provision of contraception through IUD insertion, abortion, and sterilization by pri- commercial outletsoften called social market- vate physicians. In Korea more than 2,300 physi- inghas been tried with some success in at least cians have been trained and authorized by the gov- thirty countries. Social marketing programs use ernment to provide family planning services. The existing commercial distribution systems and retail government pays the entire cost of sterilization, outlets to sell, without prescription, contraceptives but the cost of IUD insertion is sharedtwo-thirds that are provided free or at low cost by govern- by the government, one-third by the client. The ments or external donors. The first social market- involvement of private physicians has been a cru- ing scheme was in India, selling subsidized cial factor in the success of the Korean program, "Nirodh" condoms. Almost all countries with although in 1978 about 60 percent of rural town- such schemes sell condoms, and at least seventeen ships still had no authorized physician. are known to sell oral contraceptives, sometimes Access to services has also been increased by col- several brands. Spermicides, in the form of sup- laborative efforts between government and NGOs. positories, creams, pressurized foam, and foaming This collaboration has taken many forms: subsidi- tablets are also commonly sold. Until recently, zation of or grants to NGO services, coordination social marketing schemes have been limited to of NGO and government services to assure maxi- methods that do not require clinical services for mum coverage and allocation of responsibilty for distribution. But Egypt now sells subsidized IUDs critical functions or services in certain regions to through private doctors and pharmacies. And in NGOs. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, for example, Bangladesh there are plans to test-market inject- government services are allocated to rural areas, able contraceptives through social marketing leaving NGOs to provide a large share of urban arrangements. services. Since 1973 the Brazilian Family Planning Social marketing makes family planning sup- Association (BEMFAM) has worked with the gov- plies more easily accessible by increasing the num- ernments of several states in Brazil to establish ber and variety of outlets through which they can community-based programs for low-income be obtained: pharmacies, groceries, bazaars, street groups in the Northeast. The private nonprofit hawkers, and vending machines. In Sri Lanka some program in Thailand acts as an extension of the 6,000 commercial outlets sell subsidized condoms government's rural health service and recruits and pillsmore than five times the number of gov- local distributors to promote family planning and ernment family planning outlets. In the late 1970s sell subsidized contraceptives donated by the gov- social marketing schemes accounted for more than ernment and international agencies. By mid-1978 10 percent of total contraceptive use in Jamaica, there were some 10,000 distributors covering one- Colombia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh quarter of the 600 districts in Thailand. In Kenya in the social marketing program supplied about one- 1980, NGOs were operating 374 out of 1,204 rural 142 health facilities. But less than 1 percent of the forty years old, who smoke and are over thirty-five NGO facilities offered daily family planning serv- years old, who are breastfeeding, or who have a ices, and only 7 percent offered part-time services. history of stroke, thromboembolism, cancer, liver A new project is creating family planning service damage, or heart attack. The IUD is undesirable delivery points in at least thirty of the NGO facili- for women with pelvic infection or a history of ties. In addition, both government and NGO rep- ectopic pregnancy. Some women cannot be prop- resentatives will sit on a National Council on Pop- erly fitted with diaphragms. ulation and Development that will coordinate If the side effects of one method cannot be national efforts in population information, educa- tolerated, the availability of other methods tion, and communications. improves the chance that couples will switch Governments have also removed legal and regu- rather than stop using contraception altogether. latory obstacles that restrict commercial distribu- For example, in Matlab Thana, Bangladesh, 36 per- tion. In Egypt the sale of oral contraceptives cent of women had switched methods within six- through private pharmacies does not require a teen to eighteen months after initial acceptance. physician's prescription, although their provision And a study in the United States showed that mar- through government clinics serving rural areas ried white women aged twenty-five to thirty-nine does. Several countriesincluding China, Mexico, had used an average of more than two methods; Morocco, the Philippines, and Thailandallow more than a third of those aged twenty-five to pills to be distributed in facilities other than phar- twenty-nine had used three or more. macies or health centers. Other options for stimu- lating the private sector include removal of import Couples' preferences are influenced by their tariffs on contraceptive supplies (Korea recently fertility goalspostponing a first birth, spacing between children, or limiting family size. Women eliminated a 40 percent tariff on raw materials for domestically produced contraceptives); active gov- using the pill tend to be younger and to have had ernment promotion of condoms, spermicides, and fewer births than those protected by sterilization; pills that can be easily supplied through commer- many of the former are spacing births, while the cial outlets; and training of private pharmacists latter have completed their families. and physicians who frequently have little knowl- Some methods of fertility control may be reli- edge of modern family planning methods. giously or culturally unacceptable. Two-fifths of the world's countries, comprising 28 percent of its population, either prohibit abortion completely or Improving quality permit it only to save the life of the mother. For The quality of family planning services matters in religious reasons, sterilization is illegal in several all phases of program development. In the early countries. When couples regard periodic absti- stages services are new, and contraception still nence as the only acceptable form of birth control, lacks social legitimacy. Once programs are well programs should provide information on proper established and accessible, quality counts because timing of abstinence, although this method carries other costs of family planningsuch as physical higher risks of unwanted pregnancy. side effectshave replaced access as the factor lim- Due to sheer lack of alternatives, early family iting the success of the program. Three ingredients planning programs offered only a limited range of of qualitythe mix of contraceptive methods, the contraceptive methods. In the late 1950s and early information and choice provided, and program 1960s, the Indian program had to rely on rhythm, follow-uphave contributed much to program the diaphragm, and the condom. Today, most success (see Box 7.6). national programs offer a wider variety of meth- ods, although the number available at any given THE METHOD MIX OF PROGRAMS. The number and outlet is often fewer than that implied by official characteristics of available contraceptive methods statements. Some governments still promote a sin- affect the ability and willingness of clients to prac- gle method because such an approach is easier to tice birth control. Additional options are likely to administer or because certain methods, such as increase acceptance, permit switching, and reduce sterilization and the IUD, are viewed as more discontinuation rates. "effective" and require less follow-up over the Some women have medical conditions that long run than do other methods. For example, rule out certain methods. Oral contraceptives India, Korea, and Sri Lanka continue to emphasize should not be prescribed for women who are over sterilization. Until recently, Indonesia had almost 143 Box 7.6 The impact of service quality: Matlab Thana, Bangladesh Matlab Thana is an administrative divi- Comparison of the cumulative contraceptive acceptance and user rates in the first 18-24 sion of 280,000 people in a rural area of months, for the simple household Contraceptive Distribution Project (CDP) and the Bangladesh. Its population density is Family PlanningHealth Services Project (FPHSP) 2,000 people per square mile. Transport is difficultmostly by boatand incomes Percentage of eligible women Percentage of eligible women are low. Fishing and farming are the main activities. Between 1975 and 1981 the Interna- 40 30 CDP , Acceptors 40 FPHSP / . Acceptors Users 30 tional Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh conducted two experiments in Matlab Thana to measure the effect that availability, access, and 20 20/ quality of family planning services had on contraceptive use. Before 1975 family 10 10 planning services were based in a gov- Users ernment-run center in Matlab town. A 0 0 small staff provided a conventional range of contraceptives and HiD insertions but, 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 3 6 9 12 15 18 with the exception of two brief house-to- Oct. 75 Months Oct. 77 Months house campaigns conducted nationally, Source: Reprinted with the permission of the Population Council from Shushum Bhatia and others. "The made little attempt to reach out to the Matlab Family Planning-Health Services Project," Studies in Family Planning 11, no. 6 Oune 1980): 210. villagers. Throughout Bangladesh, unmet need for contraception clearly existed. A national survey in 1968 showed toms, expected side effects, and simple recruit acceptors, resupplying users, and that 55 percent of rural married women treatments for them. These workers were advising on side effects. wanted no more children and that mostly elderly, widowed, and illiterate The impact of the CDP was great but 13 percent would consider using contra- women, with almost no personal experi- shortlived. Contraceptive use in the proj- ception, but that only 1.9 percent were ence of contraceptives. Beginning in ect area jumped from 1.1 to 17.9 percent currently using a method. October 1975, they visited each house- in three months, but declined to 11 per- The Contraceptive Distribution Pro- hold in the project area of 150 villages. cent after two years. During the same ,'rn,,:nIe (CDP). The first of two experi- During a 5-10-minute visit, women were period, the rate of contraceptive use Out- ments, from 1975 to 1978, tested the told about the benefits of spacing and side the project area increased from 2.9 effect of house-to-house distribution of limiting births, proper use of the pill, and to 3.8 percent. After a year, 34 percent of oral contraceptives and, one year later, of possible side effects. Those who were married women in the project area had condoms. Female workers were given six interested were given a six-month sup- accepted contraception, but only 42 per- half-days of training on the proper use of ply of pills. For thirty months, workers cent of these women were continuing to the condom and the pill, adverse symp- were responsible for continuing to use it (see chart). Some ten to fourteen exclusively promoted the pill but now is giving approved for use in the United States. Because of more emphasis to the IUD. the limited number of donors that supply inject- Supply constraints also limit the availability of able contraceptives, Thailand almost exhausted its different methods. Most contraceptives are supplies in 1982, raising the prospect that many imported and are often provided free or cheaply by clients would have to switch methods or discon- donors; China, India, and Korea, which produce tinue altogether. Difficulties can also arise if donors most of their own contraceptives, are major excep- change suppliers, since the hormonal makeup of tions. Heavy reliance on one donor can cause oral contraceptives varies from one manufacturer problems, since some donors can supply only cer- to another. Other factors restricting method mix tain types of contraceptives. The United States include shortages of trained staff to perform sterili- Agency for International Development (USAID) is zations, poor transport and logistics for timely legally prevented from financing abortion training resupply, and the great distances that clients must or services and does not finance Depo-Provera, an travel to obtain some methods. injectable contraceptive, because it has not been To improve the method mix of programs, male 144 months into the program, fertility had visited once a fortnight, regardless of tive use in field conditions typical of rural declined by 11 to 17 percent, but this whether couples were using contracep- Bangladesh. But it may be hard to repli- effect lasted only one year. The project's tives. Side effects were managed cate on a larger scale because the FPHSP limited impact was attributed to poor through reassurance, frequent method- was able to draw on extra resources management of side effects, inadequate switching, and medical referral for treat- unavailable to the national family plan- training of staff, insufficient information ment. Workers also offered aspirin, vita- ning program. For example, although provided to clients, the narrow range of mins, and iron tablets, thereby gaining fieldworkers in the project receive sala- contraceptive methods (which discour- access to households that had previously ries equivalent to workers in the national aged method switching), and too little rejected family planning. program, their supervisors' salaries are supervision. In the first three months contraceptive much higher. The project also used costly The Family Planning-Health Services Proj- use in the pro)ect area rose from 7 to 21 speedboats to move supervisors and ect (FPHSP). In October 1977 a second percent. Unlike the trend in the CDP, research staff around the area. And man- experiment also tested house-to-house however, the rate continued to climb agement was decentralized to an extent distribution of contraception, but with slowly to 34 percent. Continuation rates rarely found in national programs. The much better quality of services. Female were dramatically improved: after a year, managerial and organizational structure village workers were recruited locally 39 percent of eligible women in the that guaranteed close, supportive super- and received seven weeks of preservice FPHSP had accepted contraception and vision, worker accountability, continu- training and weekly in-service training 81 percent of these women were continu- ous training, good recordkeeping, and sessions. They were literate, married ing to use it (see chart). During the first continuous feedback to workers should with children, had contraceptive experi- two project years, fertility declined by 22 take much of the credit for the project's ence, and came from respected families. to 25 percent compared with villages out- success. Eighty workersone per 1,000 people side the project area. After a three-year The government of Bangladesh and received technical supervision and medi- plateau at 34 percent, contraceptive use the International Centre are now cal backup from four clinics staffed by began to rise and now stands at 41 per- embarking on an extension project to qualified women paramedics, and admin- centalmost exclusively modern meth- transfer some of the management tech- istrative supervision from a male senior ods. The injectable, Depo-Provera, niques of the Matlab project to govern- health assistant. accounts for almost half of contraceptive ment health and family planning work- The FPHSP provided comprehensive use. In the rest of the country in 1983, ers in several thanas in North Bengal and services for the special needs of each cur- modern methods account for only 14 per- to measure the impact of these changes rent and prospective client. The methods cent of contraceptive use. Tetanus, tox- on fertility, mortality, and contraceptive offered included not only pills and con- oid, and oral rehydration therapy have use. The project will make minimal doms, but foam tablets and injectables. been added to the Matlab project's ser- changes in the existing program struc- In addition, women were referred to cen- vice package hut were apparently not ture and there will be no special inputs ters where tubectomy, IUD insertion, responsible for increased contraceptive other than for training, organization- and menstrual regulation could be per- prevalence. building, and research. formed, and where their husbands could Replicahility. The FPHSP has been get vasectomies. All households were highly effective in increasing contracep- and female sterilization and IUDs can be made short supply or that cannot be offered by the offi- more readily available through mobile facilities cial program. Finally, governments can sponsor (such as sterilization vans in Thailand) or periodic local research on the effectiveness, side effects, "camps" (such as vasectomy and tubectomy and acceptability of methods that might be intro- camps in India and IUD "safaris" in Indonesia). duced into the national program. Careful attention must be paid to providing follow- up services in the case of complications, however. INFORMED CHOICE. Although family planning Paramedical workers can be trained to provide the workers may know more about the advantages IUD and injectable contraceptives in clinics and and disadvantages of each method, clients are best even in homes. Referral procedures can be equipped to choose what suits themprovided strengthened so that clients are informed about all they have information on effectiveness, side methods available from public, private, and com- effects, reversibility, and proper use. In the early mercial sources. Private suppliers can be encour- stages of the Indian and Pakistani programs, the aged to offer contraceptive methods that are in side effects of the IUD were not fully explained, a 145 medical examination was not always conducted who attracts and retains the most clients for a vari- before insertion, and there was little in the way of ety of different methods. treatment or referral for side effects. For years afterward, IUDs were shunned. With a fuller FOLLOWING UP ACCEPTORS. In their early stages, explanation of side effects and greater care paid to family planning programs devoted much time to screening and medical backup, the IUD is now recruiting new clients. It is now obvious that sus- regaining popularity. When private pharmacies in tained use cannot be assumedfollow-up support Colombia provided their customers with pam- is needed. Follow-up support includes medical phlets explaining effectiveness, proper use, and backup and referral for side effects; encouraging side effects, sales of contraceptives increased. clients to change contraceptive methods if their ini- Virtually all family planning programs provide tial choice has caused problems or if their needs some information to clients about methods, but have changed; reassuring them that they are using fully informed choice is still only an ideal in many contraceptives properly; and reminding them of countries. Family planning workers still tend to the benefits. doubt the ability of couples to use effectively meth- ods such as the condom and pill, thereby discour- Follow-up is most important in the first few aging their use. Staff may also fail to mention months after acceptance, since this is when side effects are first experienced, when clients are learn- methods of which they disapprove, such as the pill, abortion, or sterilization. When incentives are ing to use methods properly, and when they need offered to staff for recruiting acceptors of some reassurance in the face of social disapproval. A study in Calabar State, Nigeria, found that 11 per- methods but not of others, the information pro- vided to clients may be biased. Sometimes clients cent of pill acceptors never took even the first month's allotment of pills, and only 53 percent are given inaccurate or incomplete information were using the pill three months later. A lack of because family planning staff are themselves not concern with follow-up is believed to be the major properly informed about methods and their side contributory cause of the low continuation rates effects. A survey of the Dominican Republic, among IUD and pill users in Korea. According to a Kenya, and the Philippines by the United Nations survey of contraceptive acceptors, only 24 percent Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in the mid-1970s found that workers felt that their train- were followed up at home or returned to health centers for consultation on side effects. Korea's ing in methods had been inadequate. A study in program sets targets for the number of acceptors, India, Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey demon- but none for follow-up work. strated the strong influence of providers of serv- ices on clients' choice of method: clients given a Follow-up cannot be left to clients, who are likely thorough explanation of all available contraceptive to return to the family planning center only if they methods chose a very different mix of methods are living close by or if they experience severe side than did those prior to the study, who had not effects that they cannot correct even by abandon- been given this information. ing contraception. Follow-up is best provided by From the manager's viewpoint, what are the crit- fieldworkers and by community-based services. ical requirements for better information? First is But in areas in which family planning is still appropriate training. Workers must be trained to regarded with suspicion, some clients would like explain properly the methods available to clients to be spared the embarrassment of a follow-up and to encourage them to participate in the choice. visit from a family planning worker. Some pro- Informal explanation works better than formal pre- grams have managed this by having fieldworkers sentations that use technical or anatomical terms. deliver health services as well. As new contraceptive methods are included in With or without an extensive field network, fam- programs, staff must receive prompt training. Sec- ily planning programs can improve follow-up. ond is more and better supervision of workers to They can change policies that encourage staff ensure that they are not holding back information to recruit new acceptors but not to follow up on on methods because of their own prejudices or them. Targets and incentives can be offered to staff because they are receiving financial incentives for on the basis of the number of current users of con- encouraging some but not all methods. The incen- traception or of the number of checkups, rather tive structure might also be altered by offering than only on the basis of the number of new accep- financial or other awards (such as educational tors. Training must also emphasize follow-up opportunities or additional training) to the worker procedures. 146 Where the burden of follow-up rests on cli- ment schemes of the Federal Land Development ents, programs can experiment with various ways Authority in Malaysia and through women's rural of encouraging clients to seek appointments. For credit cooperatives and vocational training in example, financial incentives might be offered to Bangladesh. Profamilia, the private family plan- clients who return for a follow-up visit within a ning organization in Colombia, extended its serv- specified period of time, just as South Asian pro- ices to the countryside through the National Fede- grams offer compensation to acceptors of steriliza- ration of Coffee Growers. In China, India, and the tion for the costs of transport, food, and work time Philippines family planning services are organized lost. The media can also be used to reassure accep- in factories. Both the Indonesian and Chinese pro- tors about side effects and to encourage them to grams have used strong political organizations, return for checkups. which extend into rural areas, to provide many The quality of follow-up can be monitored by economic and social services, including family periodic sample surveys of acceptors. planning. Private family planning associations are well Ensuring social acceptability suited to implement these approaches: they are small, decentralized, well staffed, highly moti- To be successful, family planning programs must vated; have greater control over service quality; have the support of the clients and communities and are less confined by the bureaucratic con- they serve. But in communities in which modern straints of government. But many of these family planning has never been provided, there approaches have also been tried on a larger scale. may be little evident demand because potential cli- For example, the Planned Parenthood Federation ents are not aware of the benefits of the service, of of Korea pioneered the highly successful mothers' smaller families, or of longer child spacing inter- club program. At first these clubs served as vals. Services introduced by an "outside" agency sources of contraceptives, of reassurance for accep- with few local links and little appreciation of local tors, and of information on the benefits of family customs and needs may not be readily accepted. planning. They now have merged with the The absence of links to the local community can be Saemaul Women's Association and are also a weakness for family planning in particular, involved in agricultural cooperativs and commu- because it is a personal matter and may conflict nity construction projects. Mothers' clubs have with social norms that favor high fertility. also been used by programs in Indonesia and Private family planning associations and NGOs Bangladesh. The national program in Indonesia have led in experimenting with new ways to has successfully involved village headmen, reli- involve clients and communities. Their strategies gious leaders, and local volunteers on the islands have included consultation with local leaders, of Java and Bali, where more than two-thirds of training local people as paid or volunteer workers, Indonesia's population lives. In the Philippines consulting and training traditional midwives and some outlets for contraceptives are organized and healers, establishing local management or review run by local volunteers. committees, encouraging local contributions of Where communities and clients are involved, money and labor, and organizing groups of family they are less likely to see family planning as being planning acceptors to reinforce effective use and to imposed by outsiders. Use of traditional midwives engage in other community development projects. and volunteers, and local contributions in cash or In communities where there is no apparent in kind also reduce the cost of services. But these demand for family planning, it can be introduced strategies require certain managerial qualities not jointly with services in greater demand. The Hon- always found in larger public programs: decentral- duras Family Planning Association includes a ized decisionmaking; technical and organizational planned parenthood theme in its community- expertise to support local organizations, volun- based adult literacy program. In Awutu, Ghana, teers, and clients; skilled managers and field- family planning is promoted for child spacing as workers who can identify local leaders, stimulate part of a maternal and child health project. Family community activities, supervise volunteers, and planning is provided with agricultural extension to reconcile local needs with program capabilities; a population of 100,000 in Allahabad (in the state and, sometimes, workers who are technically com- of Uttar Pradesh, India) and as part of the nation- petent in more than one field. Finally, social accep- wide Integrated Rural Development Project in tance of family planning takes time and is a contin- Pakistan. It has been offered through the resettle- uous process. There is no benchmark for 147 measuring social acceptability, or easy formula for the amount spent by its formal layers of govern- ensuring it. mentcentral, provincial, prefectural, and countyon providing contraceptive supplies free Financing family planning to users;. reimbursing service fees for sterilization, abortion, and IUD insertion; and providing train- Public family planning programs, like programs in ing and information on family planning. These education and health, are heavily subsidized, and costs amount to $213 million annually, about $0.21 services are often offered free of charge. Although per capita. In addition, the rural collective system the private sector makes a significant contribution finances the family planning staff at the commune to providing services in some countries, public or brigade level (at an estimated cost of $0.34 per finance will continue to be critical, especially in capita) and pays incentives, in the form of food low-income countries and in backward regions, supplements and reimbursement of travel costs, to where contraceptive demand is limited and health holders of one-child certificates ($0.25 per capita) services are weak. and to individuals undergoing sterilization ($0.15 per capita). Finally, additional time is spent by Public spending barefoot doctors on family planning work (though not much: in Shandong Province they allocate an China and Indiathe two most populous coun- average of 1.5 percent of their time to family plan- tries in the developing world, with approximately ning, valued at approximately $3 million). Health half its populationspent roughly $1.00 and $0.30 workers and midwives probably spend more time per capita, respectively, on population programs in on family planning. Adding all these contributions 1980. In most of three dozen developing countries together produces a figure for family planning for which rough estimates are available, spending expenditure in China of nearly $1 per capita. fell within this range (see Table 7.4). If other devel- Although governments finance a large share of oping countries with programs were spending their population programs, the amounts spent are equivalent amounts, the total spent on population still trivialboth in absolute terms and in relation activities in all developing countries in 1980 must to other government outlays (see Box 7.7). In have been about $2 billion. China the state budget for the family planning pro- Practically all spending on population in China, gram absorbs only 0.4 percent of total current and close to 80 percent of the total in India, is spending, compared with 5.2 percent for health financed from domestic resources. For all other and 13.1 percent for education. In India and developing countries combined, government and Mauritius spending on family planning in 1981 foreign donors each contribute about 50 percent. accounted for only 0.5 percent of total government The government share tends to rise the longer a expenditure. The figures are even lower in Korea program has been in existence. Three out of four (0.2 percent) and in Malaysia (less than 0.1 countries with programs less than five years old percent). were contributing less than 10 percent of the costs Foreign donors spent an estimated $491 million of their programs, in contrast to an average of 54 for population programs in developing countries percent among twenty-seven countries with pro- in 1981; about two-thirds of this amount was for grams at least ten years old. Nepal is one of the family planning and related programs. In real rare exceptions: the share of domestic government terms, population assistance grew at almost 6 per- financing fell from 80 percent of its spending on cent a year during the 1970s but fell 3 percent in population in 1975 to 40 percent in 1980. 1980 and 6 percent in 1981. The prospects for Even among well-established programs there is increased assistance are not good: UNFPA, a major wide variation in government spending. Domestic channel for population assistance, expects its budgetary outlays in 1980 are estimated to have spending to rise by barely 1 percent over the next been $0.42 per capita in Sri Lanka, about $0.71 per four years. Population assistance from donors is capita in Korea, and $1.45 per capita in Costa Rica. discussed further in the next chapter. But these estimates probably understate the true government contribution. The cost of health work- Private spending ers, whose functions often include family plan- ning, is not always imputed to the population pro- Important constraints limit the growth of private gramnor are contributions by local government. suppliers of family planning, especially in rural The estimate for China of $1 per capita includes areas. The most severe constraint is the need for 148 TABLE 7.4 Public expenditure on population programs, selected countries, 1980 Expenditure Total Per ca pita per current public public contraceptive expenditure expenditure user Region and country (millions of dollars) (dollars) (dollars) Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana 2.8 0.24 16 Kenya 11.8 0.71 68 Liberia 2.3 1.22 a Mauritius 1.7 1.81 24 Sierra Leone 1.5 0.44 a Swaziland 1.8 2.89 a Tanzania 3.3 0.18 a Zaire 1.8 0.06 a Zimbabwe (1978) 1.9 0.27 13 Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Arab Rep. 34.1 0.81 22 Iran, Islamic Rep. (1976) 50.6 1.30 38 Jordan 2.5 0.78 21 Morocco 13.3 0.66 a Tunisia 8.3 1.31 32 South Asia Bangladesh 45.1 0.51 26 India 226.9 0.34 10 Nepal 10.6 0.72 69 Pakistan 24.5 0.30 33 Sri Lanka 6.2 0.42 7 East Asia China 979.6 1.00 10 Hong Kong 2.0 0.40 3 Indonesia 86.2 0.59 11 Korea, Rep. of 27.1 0.71 9 Malaysia 16.4 1.18 19 Philippines 37.6 0.78 11 Singapore 1.8 0.74 7 Thailand 28.1 0.60 7 Latin America and Caribbean Bolivia (1977) 0.1 0.03 a Brazil 10.6 0.09 a Colombia 8.1 0.31 4 Costa Rica 3.3 1.45 15 Dominican Rep. 3.8 0.70 11 Ecuador 6.3 0.75 15 El Salvador 8.1 1.77 35 Guatemala 9.3 1.28 47 Haiti 3.9 0.77 27 Honduras 3.0 0.81 20 Jamacia 4.8 2.19 27 Mexico 61.3 0.88 15 Panama 4.4 2.42 26 Paraguay 2.1 0.69 13 Peru 5.3 0.32 5 Note: Expenditure includes funding from domestic and foreign sources on population activities, including (but not limited to) family planning services. a. Contraceptive prevalence rate unavailable or close to zero. Source: Bulatao, 1984a. 149 Box 7.7 Military versus social expenditure Military spending is not easy to measure. Expenditures on defense, education, and Average government per capita expenditure What estimates there are indicate that health as a percentage of GNP, 1980 on defense, education, and health, 1980 global military expenditure in constant Percent Constant 1982 dollars 1982 dollars has risen from $300 billion. to 10 600 more than $600 billion in the past twenty years. The amount spent in the develop- Defense ing world quadrupled from $30 billion to Education more than $138 billion. In 1981 devel- Health oped countries spent more than 4.9 per- cent of GNP on defense, and about 0.3 percent of GNP on aid to deeloping countries. In 1980 the United States spent 5.6 percent of its GNP on defense, almost $170 billion, and 0.28 percent ($8.2 billion) on aid. In developing coun- iA/orld Des eloped Developing World Developed Developing tries almost as much is spent on defense as on education and health combined Sourcn Sivard, 1983. (see chart). medical backup for providing contraceptives. the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil (a country with some Although prescription regulations have been liber- state, but no central government, programs), the alized in nineteen countries, making condoms and proportion is as high as 63 percent. oral contraceptives available through nonclinical Private spending on family planning services as suppliers such as pharmacies, the demand for a consequence equals about a fourth of public IUDs, male and female sterilization, and abortion spending on these services in the developing can be met only by trained health workers. Very world. In some regions private spending is few of them work in the private sector. In addition, greater: in Latin America it may in fact be slightly the cost of providing family planning services is above public spending. high in rural and marginal urban areas, whereas In urban areas some commercial suppliers may the ability to pay for commercial services is low. be displaced by publicly subsidized contracep- Private suppliers cannot appeal to the national tives: half of the initial users of an official program interest the way governments can to stimulate of oral contraception in Piaui State, Brazil, in 1979 demand for contraception and cannot use commu- had shifted over from the private sector. Yet pri- nity institutions and pressures to spread family vate suppliers do benefit from family planning planning. Finally, the development of private sup- advertising financed by the government. It is prob- ply is often inhibited by a combination of govern- ably not a coincidence that they flourish in several ment policies, including price controls; prohibition countries, such as Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, of, or tariffs on, the import of contraceptives; and where government strongly supports birth con- restrictions on certain kinds of family planning ser- trol. vices, especially sterilization and abortion in Mus- The activities of private suppliers demonstrate lim and Catholic countries. that many people in developing countries are will- Despite these constraints, private suppliers pro- ing to pay for contraceptive services. Although vided more than 20 percent of all family planning charges for publicly subsidized services are usually services in more than two-thirds of the countries low or nonexistent, data for twenty developing studied in recent surveys (see Table 7.5). In some countries show that private sector prices can be countries private suppliers play a major or even high enough to absorb a significant fraction of dominant role, especially among urban con- household income. The cost of a year's supply of sumers. In Korea 42 percent of all contraceptive oral contraceptives averaged $25 in 1980, ranging users are supplied by pharmacies or physicians; in from $5 in Mexico and $6 in Egypt to as much as 150 $90 in Nigeria. Across countries, the various forms 300,000 users of commercial sources of contracep- of contraception cost an average of $20 to $40 a tion spent an average of $30 each in 1981, their year. total outlay being several times what the govern- In the better-off developing countries, the cost of ment spent. Private spending on this scalewhich buying commercially available contraceptives is understates the total because it excludes access small in relation to average income per capita costsis not typical of all developing countries, (although even in those countries the cost may be but it shows a widespread willingness to pay for relatively large for the poor). For example, the contraception. retail price of a year's supply of oral contraceptives in 1979 was equivalent to only 0.3 percent of per Allocation of public expenditu res capita income in Mexico and to 0.5 percent in Brazil. But in low-income countries the cost can be The bulk of public spending on population prohibitiveequivalent to 17 percent of per capita almost 50 percent in seventeen countries reporting income in Bangladesh, for example, and 18 percent details of expendituresgoes directly to providing in Zaire, or about 3 percent of total income for the contraceptive services. Progressively smaller average household. All these figures understate shares are taken up by general program adminis- the real cost of obtaining family planning services, tration, information-education-communication whether private or public, because people also activities, research and evaluation, and personnel have to pay for the time and travel needed to training. obtain their contraceptives. With all public spending on family planning In Korea some 1.2 million users bought contra- taken into account, expenditure averages about ceptives commercially in 1979 at an average annual $0.70 per capita across all developing countries. cost of about $12a total outlay of $15 million, For each contraceptive user, spending is much about $0.40 per capita for Korea's entire popula- higheraround $21 a year. But most users are in tion, and roughly equivalent to the $0.42 per capita China and India, where programs spend less per spent on the domestic government budget, exclu- user, so the weighted average is lower at $11. Add- sive of foreign donor contributions. In Peru about ing private expenditures could easily double the TABLE 7.5 Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands (percentage distribution of current contraceptive users) Government Other publicly funded or Private No source or Region and country programs subsidized programs sector other' East Asia Korea, Rep. of (1979) 36 0 42 22 Thailand (1978) 37 35 18 10 Latin America and Caribbean Brazil Piaui (1979) 59 0 23 18 Sao Paulo (1978) 16 0 63 21 Bahia (1980) 27 1 48 24 Rio Grande do Norte (1980) 57 0 22 21 Colombia (1978) 21 27 33 19 Costa Rica (1978) 57 0 28 15 El Salvador (1978) 73 8 12 6 Guatemala (1978) 44 11 26 18 Jamaica (1979) 63 27 7 3 Mexico (1978) 42 2 36 20 Panama (1979-80) 71 0 19 10 Paraguay (1977) 41 8 28 22 North Africa Tunisia Jendouba (1979) 91 0 5 4 a. Applies to rhythm or withdrawal; other may include contraceptives obtained from a friend or in a foreign country. Sources: Morris and others, 1981; Merrick, 1984. 151 costs per user. Public cost per user varies among cent. For the projections of a "rapid" decline in countries, as Table 7.4 shows, depending on many fertility, which imply a total fertility rate of 2.4 in factors, including local salaries and program eff i- 2000, contraceptive use would need to reach 72 ciency and quality. percent. Cost per user tends to be very high in the first How much would this cost? To achieve the few years of a family planning program; it then standard decline in fertility, and assuming 1980 falls sharply as the rate of contraceptive use rises costs per user, total public spending on population above 5 percent. At higher rates the cost per user programs would need to reach $5.6 billion (in con- tends to stabilize, or perhaps to rise slightly. stant 1980 dollars) by the year 2000a rise in real Between 1965 and 1980, while contraceptive use in terms of 5 percent a year. To ensure the rapid Korea rose from 12 to 30 percent, cost per user decline, spending would need to total $7.6 billion fluctuated (with little apparent trend) between $7 by 2000, a rise of 7 percent a year in real terms. and $13 (in constant 1982 dollars). Growth in spending will have to be much In any country with contraceptive use of at least greater in some regions than in others. Average 5 percent, current cost per user is a conservative real increases in spending of 2.5 percent a year guide to costs at higher levels of use. Marginal would be enough to meet targets in East Asia as a costs could rise if new users are in inaccessible whole (though not for individual countries), and 5 rural areas with high delivery costs, though they percent would be enough for Latin America and could also fall if services are more intensively used. the Caribbean. In South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, however, Future financial requirements population spending would have to grow 8 to 10 percent every year to achieve a standard decline in What would it cost to satisfy the unmet need for fertility, and in sub-Saharan Africa as much as 16 limiting births? Some idea can be obtained by percent every year to support a rapid decline. extrapolating levels of unmet needthe propor- Because spending on population currently repre- tion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy sents less than 1 percent of government budgets, who want no more childrenin thirty-five devel- small increases could go a long way toward meet- oping countries in the mid-1970s to cover the ing the requirement for higher spending. The developing world as a whole. That extrapolation same is true for external assistance. Only about 1 suggests a possible increase in the rate of contra- percent of official aid now goes for population ceptive use of 13 percentage points. If the public assistance (and only a part of that for family plan- cost for each additional user were the same, coun- ning). Increasing spending by 50 percent could fill try by country, as the cost per user in 1980, such an "unmet need" today, but larger increases will be increase would require another $1 billion in public needed in the future. In many countries the spending (see Table 7.6). required increase in public expenditure for family In the next two decades total spending for family planning would be more than offset by reductions planning programs will need to increase because in public expenditure in other sectors. With con- of the growing number of women of childbearing stant enrollment rates, rapid fertility decline would age and the increasing proportion of them who are generate per capita savings in education expendi- likely to want modern contraceptives. World Bank ture in the year 2000 of $1.80 in Egypt, $3.30 in projections indicate that the number of married Kenya, $6.00 in Korea, and $6.60 in Zimbabwe. women of reproductive age in all developing coun- tries will increase from about 500 million to more Obstacles to program expansion than 700 million between 1980 and 2000. About 40 percent of these women used contraception in If the financial resources to expand family plan- 1980. ning services were made available, could they be The "standard" projections in Chapter 4 imply put to good use? Program expansion may be diffi- an average total fertility rate of 3.3 in developing cult for a variety of reasons, including administra- countries in the year 2000. If it is assumed that the tive and logistical obstacles, scarcity of personnel, fertility effects of later marriage and of shorter and limited demand. These tend to limit the rate at breastfeeding will largely cancel each other out which a good program can be expanded, but not and that the abortion rate will stay constant, expansion itself. achieving this fertility decline will require an The administrative and logistical obstacles increase in the rate of contraceptive use to 58 per- include many of the same constraints that hamper 152 TABLE 7.6 Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures, 1980 and 2000 Expenditures Fertility targets Total Total Contraceptive (millions of fertility prevalence Per capita constant Region and scenario Year rate (percent) (constant 1980 dollars) 1980 dollars) All developing countries Current estimate 1980 4.36 39 0.62 2,016 With unmet need filled 1980 3.54 52 0.90 2,961 Under standard decline 2000 3.30 58 1.14 5,569 Under rapid decline 2000 2.32 72 1.66 7,591 Sub-Saharan Africaa Current estimate 1980 6.59 11 0.29 112 With unmet need filled 1980 6.03 20 0.76 297 Under standard decline 2000 5.81 24 1.07 791 Under rapid decline 2000 2.69 73 3.72 2,353 Middle East and North Africa Current estimate 1980 5.70 24 0.66 142 With unmet need filled 1980 4.98 35 1.04 222 Under standard decline 2000 3.73 59 1.94 726 Under rapid decline 2000 2.39 74 2.43 812 South Asiab Current estimate 1980 5.22 20 0.35 315 With unmet need filled 1980 4.15 38 0.77 688 Under standard decline 2000 3.43 51 1.10 1,517 Under rapid decline 2000 2.42 67 1.50 1,873 East Asia Current estimate 1980 3.02 61 0.87 1,238 With unmet need filled 1980 2.27 72 1.04 1,480 Under standard decline 2000 2.28 75 1.09 2,022 Under rapid decline 2000 2.16 74 1.08 2,015 Latin America and Caribbean Current estimate 1980 4.28 40 0.59 209 With unmet need filled 1980 3.53 51 0.77 274 Under standard decline 2000 2.80 63 0.95 513 Under rapid decline 2000 2.17 72 1.07 538 Note: The fertility targets and per capita expenditure figures are population-weighted means. Because of lack of data on contraceptive prevalence for many countries, regional estimates include country rates which were estimated based on various social and economic data. Includes Republic of South Africa. Includes Afghanistan. Source: Bulatao, 1984a. other development programs. For example, a fam- services on a larger, national scale. In areas where ily planning program requires a system for obtain- health services are scant or nonexistent, a family ing, storing, and distributing contraceptives. If a planning program will be extremely difficult to program attempts to provide a mix of methods, implement. this system can become complicated; it may The personnel requirements for an extensive require more than one distribution network-com- family planning program are not large in relation mercial, clinical, and nonclinical. Where overall to the supply of educated people. Desirable ratios government administration is weak, roads are are about 1 fieldworker to 300 families, and 1 poor, and communications slow, even the best-run supervisor for every 8 fieldworkers. For Upper programs will appear inefficient and incapable of Volta, a country with extremely low literacy, a pro- sustained expansion. These limits may not be evi- gram could be fully staffed at these ratios by about dent in small pilot projects, but they can become a tenth of a single year's primary and secondary important when an attempt is made to extend school graduates. The conclusion becomes less 153 sanguine, however, as soon as one takes into some years much less. Despite the unpromising account specific requirements for fieldworkers: for conditionsper capita GNP between $100 and instance, they should be village-based rather than $300, adult literacy rates as low as 20 percent, and city-based, belong to the appropriate ethnic, lin- infant mortality rates as high as 150 per thou- guistic, or caste group, and be favorably disposed sandspending on family planning was effective to contraception. The Pakistani program has faced and economical. recruitment problems of this sort. In the late 1960s Furthermore, many of the factors that hamper only a seventh of the midwives assigned as effectiveness can be overcome as a program fieldworkers believed in the efficacy of modern develops. Culturally acceptable solutions to contraceptives. In the early 1970s they were administrative and personnel problems, and to replaced by a group including many unmarried limited public interest, take time to develop, as do women from urban areas who did not have the the quality improvements discussed above. But in confidence of the villagers. If finding appropriate every part of the world where an effort has been fieldworkers in each area is difficult, finding made, there has been progress. higher-level supervisors can be even more of a Foreign funding has been largely absent in the problem. early stages of some family planning programs, as Program expansion also depends on the demand it continues to be in China. In other programs it for contraceptive services. A principal task of pro- has played a catalytic rolefor instance, through grams is to generate some of this demand itself, stimulating pioneering research of demographic but where initial interest is low or nonexistent this problems. Local finance, however, eventually task can take time. becomes critical; most of the older, more effective Taken together, these limits to rapid expansion programs in 1980 had 40 percent or less foreign might seem to suggest that programs could not funding. For one thing, local finance demonstrates make good use of more money. But such a view political commitment to family planning, the sub- would be wrong. During the 1970s India, Pakistan, ject of the next chapter. Many of the obstacles to Bangladesh, and. Sri Lanka were spending as expansion of family planning can be overcome much as $2.50 per married woman on family plan- with sufficient commitment, and most of them fling programs and were still producing contracep- cannot be overcome without it. tive users at acceptable costunder $20 each, in 154 8 The poiicy agenda "Population policy" is the province of govern- change the signals that otherwise induce high fer- ment. By choosing how many resources and how tility. Effective policy requires action by many min- much political authority to invest in a policy, a gov- istries, and thus an interministerial approach to ernment determines the policy's effectiveness. In setting policy and monitoring its results. And it its broadest sense, population policy is concerned requires clear direction and support from the most with population distribution as well as with popu- senior levels of government. lation growth. This chapter discusses population Family planning programs and other socioeco- policy to reduce population growth. In the area of nomic policies that can reduce fertility are often fertility reduction, inaction is itself a choice which pursued by governments to achieve overall devel- has implications for both future policy and the opment objectives, irrespective of their effect on room for maneuver that a government will later fertility. What distinguishes countries with a popu- have. Religious and cultural conditions cannot be lation policy from those without one is an explicit ignored in designing an effective policy to reduce demographic objective and the institutional mech- fertility; actions culturally and politically accept- anisms to translate that objective into effective able in one country might be rejected in others. But policy. religious and cultural characteristics do not rule out effective action. In every part of the developing Policy steps world during the past decade some governments have made significant progress in developing a Table 8.1 summarizes the current state of popula- policy to reduce population growth. tion policy in twenty-six developing countries with Choosing from policy options is a matter for local 15 million people or more. In the table, an x shows decision. But foreign aid for population programs those countries which have already taken a partic- can help developing countries meet their popula- ular policy step. Countries are listed by region, tion policy objectives and can increase the impact and within regions in order of their 1982 family of aid in other parts of the economy. This chapter planning "index," explained in Chapter 6. examines the elements of an effective population Developing a population policy takes time. policy, the main policy issues in each region of the Countries in which the policy to reduce population developing world, and how aid donors can com- growth is recent tend to have taken fewer of the plement the efforts of developing countries. policy steps listed in the table. OthersChina, India, Korea, and Sri Lanka, for instancehave Population policy had longstanding policies and tend to have taken more steps. But there are important exceptions. A population policy to lower fertility needs to be Countries such as Indonesia and Mexico have distinguished from public support for family plan- developed strong programs in a short period. In ning services. Family planning support has wider contrast, programs in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and social goals than fertility reduction but more lim- Pakistan have made little progress for more than a ited pqpulation goals than overall population pol- decade. Progress can also be reversed. In five icy. Family planning programs provide informa- countries not shown in the tableChile, Costa tiari an4 services to help people achieve their own Rica, Fiji, Jamaica, and Panamafamily planning fertility objectivs. By contrast, population plicy indices have declined by as much as half in the involves explicit demographic goals. It employs a past decade. In some countries population policy wide range of policies, direct and indirect, to aims to increase population growth (see Box 8.1). 155 TABLE 8.1 Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more Policy indicators Incentives Demo- Politi- and Family graphic cal coni- Inst itu- disincen- Birth planning TFR data mitment tions Family planning tives quotas index Region and country 1982 1982 A B CD EFGHI JKL M Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya 8.0 Li x x x xx Tanzania 6.5 Li xx Nigeria 6.9 Li x Zaire 6.3 Li Sudan 6.6 Li x x Ethiopia 6.5 Li Middle East and North Africa Egypt 4.6 Li x x x x Morocco 5.8 Li x x Turkey 4.1 Li x x Algeria 7.0 Li x Latin America and Caribbean Colombia 3.6 x x x Mexico 4.6 x x x x Brazil 3.9 x Venezuela 4.3 Li x Peru 4.5 Li x x x South Asia Sri Lanka 3.4 X x xx India 4.8 X x xx Bangladesh 6.3 x x xx Pakistan 5.8 x x xx Nepal 6.3 x x xx East Asia China 2.3 x x xx xxx xxx x Korea, Rep. of 2.7 x x xx xxxx xx Indonesia 4.3 x x xx xxxx x Malaysia 3.7 Li x xx xxxx Thailand 3.6 x x xx xxxx Philippines 4.2 Li x x xx xxxx x Note: The following countries with greater than 15 million population were omitted because of lack of data: Afghanistan; Argentina; Burma; Islamic Republic of Iran; Democratic Republic of Korea; South Africa; Venezuela; and Viet Nam. TFR = Total fertility rate. Key: = very strong index; = strong; Li = moderate; Li = weak; Li = very weak or none. For explanation of index, see Population Data Supplement Table 6 and notes. A Published census data and data from other household surveys on fertility, mortality, and contraceptive use (such as WFS or CPS) less than ten years old. B Official policy to reduce population growth expressed by high officials and in a national development plan, sometimes including specific demographic targets. C Existence of a population planning unit that integrates demographic projections into current economic plans and considers the effect of policies on demographic parameters. D Existence of a high-level coordinating body, such as a population commission, to set population policy, oversee implementation, and evaluate results of multisectoral policies. E Government financial support of private family planning associations. F Public family planning services. G Family planning outreach, including community-based distribution systems and/or fieldworkers. H Active use of mass media for information and education to promote family planning and small family norms. I Publicly subsidized commercial sales of contraceptives. J Elimination of all explicit and implicit subsidies that encourage large families (tax reductions for each child, family allowances, free or subsidized health and education services). K Incentives to individuals or communities to have small families. L Strong disincentives to discourage more than two births per woman, such as reduced services or an income tax for third and later-born children. M Policy to set quotas on the number of births permitted annually in a community under which couples must obtain permission to have a child. 156 Box 8.1 Pronatalist policies In some countries governments feel ing age were using contraception and 71 Fertility and abortion in Romania, that fertility rates are too low. This is percent of all people practicing contra- 1965-78 so in several European countries such ception were using an efficient method Crude as France, Hungary, and Romania, as such as the pill and IUD. birth rate Maternal well as in Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Hungary's pronatalist policies have per 1000) deaths Chile, Guinea, Israel, Ivory Coast, and affected the timing but not the number of Kampuchea. births: couples are having the same num- ber of children, but sooner. The total fer- Hungary tility rate increased from 1.8 in 1965 to 2.4 All causes" / Hungarian leaders have set a target of in 1975, the year after abortion was restricted. But it had fallen back to 1.9 by replacement-level fertility by 2000. They 1980. Economic incentives evidently do e are relying on economic incentives that reduce the private costs of children. The not offset the increased private costsin incentives for childbearing are numer- money and timeof larger families, ous: monthly payments for children Incentives have created a fiscal burden, (with a larger increase for the second however. In 1982, maternity payments child; in 1981 payment for each child was and family allowances amounted to 2.4 (Abortion-related percent of GDP. equivalent to 11.7 percent ol the average wage); five months' maternity leave at Romania full pay and up to two and a half years at / Abortion made illegal one-third of the average wage; a birth Romania has attempted to raise fertility 969 973 j'I77 bonus equal to about one month's salary, by placing limits on both abortion and 1965 1966 provided the mother attends prenatal contraception. Abortion on demand was consultations; unlimited sick leave legalized in 1957 and was an important a, Deaths due to complications in pregnancs and (which is always at 75 percent of salary) backup to withdrawal and rhythm, since delivery, and abortion-related deaths Snu ru" UN, t966 and 1981) for child care for the first year, sixty days no other contraceptive methods were up to the third year, then thirty days up available. By 1965 there were four times to the age of six; partial downpayment more abortions than live births. In shortest of any country in central or east- for a house, depending on the number of November 1966 the government limited ern Europe. However, part-time work is children planned; subsidies on children's access to abortion to women over age being made more readily available to clothing, milk, baby-care products, and forty-five, those with four or more chil- mothers of young children and creche school supplies; two additional paid holi- dren, those whose life was endangered, facilities are being expanded. days a year for one child under fourteen, and those whose pregnancy was the The immediate effect of limiting access five days for two, and nine days for result of rape. Restricted abortion was to abortion in Romania was to increase three; and guaranteed job security for not accompanied by improved access to total fertility from 1.9 in 1965 to 2.9 in mothers. contraception. Modern contraceptives 1970; the birth rate rose from 14 to 27 per Hungary placed restrictions on legal are available only for medical reasons. thousand between 1966 and 1967. But abortion in 1974, allowing it only for sin- According to the 1978 World Fertility total fertility had gradually declined to gle, divorced, separated, and widowed Survey, 58 percent of Romanian couples 2.5 by 1980 and the birth rate to 19. Fertil- women, married women over the age of are using a method of family planning, ity is now above replacement level, hut forty, those who have had three chil- almost all rhythm and withdrawal. Eco- on a falling trend. As in Hungary, prona- dren, and those without adequate hous- nomic incentives for childbearing are rel- talist policies in Romania have not been ing. These restrictions occurred when atively limited. In 1979 the child allow- without cost; the cost, however, is not so access to modern methods of contracep- ance was about 9 percent of the average much in financial as in health terms. tion had been much improved and their wage, the maternity grant of $85 was Maternal mortality due to illegal abortion use had been encouraged. In 1977, 74 paid only for third and later births, and in 1977 was triple the rate of 1966 and percent of married women of childbear- maternity leave of sixteen weeks was the continues to rise (see chart). The development of population policy includes [ions of its consequences. This information is criti- the following steps: cal to generating and sustaining the political com- mitment of leaders to slower growth. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS. Reliable data on Demographic data are also vital inputs for eco- population size, fertility, and mortality document nomic planning, policy formulation, and evalua- the existence of rapid growth and allow projec- tion (see Box 8.2). Data needs include published 157 Box 8.2 China's census: counting a billion people China is rich in historical population sta- assistance of UNFPA, the government percent between 1940 and 1968, with ups tistics, having fairly good estimates expects to publish complete results for and downs in famines and recoveries, stretching back to the Zhou dynasty, a local administrative units before the end before beginning the transition to lower thousand years before the Roman cen- of 1984. fertility in 1969. Fertility had reached a suses. But census taking deteriorated in With such a large undertaking some low of about 2.2 in 1980, then rose by 18 the modern era. There was a head count compromises had to be made between percent in 1981. In that year more than a of just over 600 million Chinese in 1953. rapid feedback of results and complete third of women were not using contra- Data from the 1964 census, only recently coverage. For example, census takers did ception and, despite the one-child policy, released, showed a population of just not visit residences but relied instead on over half of all births were second or under 700 million. responses at places of work and other higher order. The survey thus identified In the first two weeks of July 1982, the central locations, a less satisfactory data possible problems with the execution of Chinese government marshalled a force collection method. A subsequent survey population policy. of 6.3 million census takers and their (see below) suggests that about 17 mil- The above-mentioned findings from supervisors to carry out a new census, lion women may have been missed in the the census and the survey complement the largest ever executed anywhere in census count. each other and provide overall policy the world. With rapid hand-processing, In September 1982, less than three guidance for Chinese population policy. the government published initial results months after completing the census, the These data collection efforts are remark- in October 1982, far more quickly than Chinese government conducted a retro- able achievements, in part because China most census organizations in low-income spective fertility survey of over one mil- lacks the many years of experience that countries. Total population exceeded one lion persons, many of whom were vis- countries such as India have in such billion persons. By using advanced com- ited in their homes by interview teams. activities. puter technology supplied with the The survey found that fertility rose by 25 and analyzed census data not more than ten years experience of countries shown in Table 8.1 sug- old and other national sample surveys document- gests the importance of institutionalizing two func- ing current fertility, mortality, and contraceptive tions: use at more frequent intervals (item A in Table 8.1). Relating demographic targets to the policies Lack of reliable demographic data has hampered and resources necessary to achieve them. A popu- the growth of political support for population poli- lation policy should include consideration of the cies in sub-Saharan Africa. Data collection and demographic benefits of a wide range of social p01- analysis is a continuous process, necessary to icies, in education, health, and social security, as monitor trends and the effect of policies over time. well as in family planning. It should also consider the complementarities among these policies. This POLITICAL COMMITMENT. Support for slowing is fundamentally a planning function, one which population growth has been expressed in public relates demographic variables and policy alterna- statements by the head of state and other national tives (item C). It is usually the responsibility of a leaders, and in written statements of national pri specialized unit within a planning ministry, such orities, such as a national development plan (item as the Manpower Board of the Ministry of Finance B). These statements can range from a general and Plan in Ghana, and the Population Planning commitment to reducing population growth to Section within the Planning Commission in specific demographic targets (see Box 8.3). Coun- Bangladesh. tries with strong policies have been able to mobi- Coordinating and evaluating the irnplementa- lize visible and sustained political commitment, tion of population policy. This may require few not only at the highest levels of government but new institutional arrangements if the scope of pop- throughout the political and administrative hierar- ulation policy is limited to, say, wider provision of chy, down to those who are in immediate touch family planning. In this case, the policy coordinat- with the public. This comnUtment helps to forge ing body may be the one that also coordinates cooperation among the numerous sectors and ntin- multisectoral family planning activities. But as istries involved in popuJatipn policy. population policy becomes more cçrnplex, i is likely to involve the joint efforts of other minis INSTITUTIONS. The role of institutions is to trans- tries: education (for population education ad late political commitment into effective policy. The female literacy); information (to encourage breast- 158 Box 8.3 Demographic policy objectives At least forty-two developing countries- pares them with the demographic out- growth rate of 2.0 percent in 2000; for comprising more than three-quarters of comes implied by projections using Uganda a growth rate of 2.6 percent in the total population of developing coun- World Bank estimates of standard and 1995; the official target in China is a pop- tries-have adopted official policies to rapid declines in fertility (see Chapter 4). ulation size of 1.2 billion in 2000. For reduce the rate of population growth. The policy targets are expressed in terms these countries the TFR or CBR given in Some countries have quantitative targets of the total fertility rate (TFR) or the the table approximates what would be in terms of achieving a particular total crude birth rate (CBR). required to attain these objectives. In fertility rate, crude birth rate, net repro- Five of the countries shown have speci- most countries the government's official duction rate, rate of population growth, fied their targets in different ways. policy objectives are comparable to, or or population size in a given year. The Bangladesh and Jamaica hope to achieve even more ambitious than, those table summarizes current demographic a net reproduction rate of I by the year required to achieve a "rapid" decline in targets for sixteen countries and com- 2000; for Ghana the goal is a population fertility. Demographic targets and projections of fertility declines, selected countries and years Fertilitty decline Policy target Standard Rapid Year TPR" CBR5 TFR" CBR5 TFR CBR5 Asia Bangladesh 2000 2.5 . . 4.9 36 2.8 23 China 2000 2.0 . . 2.0 . . 2.0 India 1996 . . 21 3.5 28 2.5 21 Indonesia 1990 2.7 22 3.7 30 2.9 24 Korea, Rep. of 1988 2.1 . . 2.6 24 2.2 20 Nepal 2000 2.5 . . 5.3 38 2.9 24 Pakistan 1988 . . 36 6,4 45 5.2 38 Philippines 1987 . . 28 4.0 31 3.5 28 Thailand 1986 2.6 . . 3.4 28 3.0 25 Africa and Middle East Egypt 2000 . . 20 3.1 25 2.3 20 Ghana 2000 3.3 . . 6.0 43 3.2 27 Mauritius 1988 2.3 . . 2.7 25 2.3 21 Tunisia 2001 . . 22 3.1 25 2.2 20 Uganda 1995 5.0 . . 6.7 49 4.3 34 Latin America and Caribbean Haiti 2000 . . 20 3.4 29 2.4 22 Jamaica 2000 2.1 . . 2.2 20 2.1 20 Mexico 1988 . . 25 4.1 32 3.6 29 Not available. a. TFR equals total fertility rate. b. CBR equals crude birth rate. feeding and use of family planning); justice (age at pendent base in the government (item D), separate marriage, incentives and disincentives); women's from the delivery system for family planning. The affairs, rural development, and cooperatives (inte- institutional arrangements vary: a unit within an grated population and development projects). For existing ministry of health or planning but with example, very few countries now give much prior- representatives from many ministries (Tunisia, ity to raising the legal age of marriage as part of Panama); an extraministerial committee (Egypt, demographic policy-more likely because the insti- Mexico); or a separate ministry devoted entirely to tutional framework to do so is poor than because multisectoral population policies (Indonesia). the costs of implementing such a policy are high. There is no consensus on what works best; sus- As the task of coordination becomes more com- tained political commitment seems to matter more plicated, the responsible body may need an inde- to the outcome than organizational structure. 159 FAMILY PLANNING. In many countriessuch as of countries, even among those with the strongest Brazil, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzaniasubsidized programs, have more broad-ranging incentives family planning is provided as a basic health mea- and disincentives. sure for mothers and children although the gov- ernment has not formally adopted a policy to BIRTH QUOTAS. China is the only country to have reduce population growth. But once the objective implemented a system of assigning to communi- of reduced population growth has been estab- ties (sometimes employees of a particular factory) lished, support for family planning services inten- a quota of births to be permitted each year (item sifies. As noted in Chapter 7, family planning poli- M). Individual couples within communities are cies tend to evolve in similar ways. Government then given permission to have a child, with prior- programs are often preceded by private family ity given to couples who have followed the recom- planning organizations which eventually receive mendations for marrying only after a certain age, government financial support (item E). As political and who are older. The system of quotas, and the commitment increases, government assumes a accompanying pressure to have an abortion when bigger role, providing public services (item F), a woman becomes pregnant without permission, family planning outreach (item G), educational are an additional policy "step" over and above the and informational activities (item H), and subsi- extensive system of incentives and disincentives. dized commercial distribution of contraceptives (item I). Policy and ethics Policy steps E to I help couples have the number of children they want. Virtually all countries in the Birth control is not just a technical and demo- table could reduce their fertility by increasing the graphic issue; it has a moral and a cultural dimen- availability and quality of family planning services. sion. Becoming a parent is both a deeply personal Countries with moderate and weak programs have event andin virtually all societiescentral to yet to generate any outreach services; many with community life as well. Procreation is held by stronger programs, including outreach, fail to many to be a right which is personal and funda- cover the entire population. Subsidized commer- mental, superior to any "good" which might be cial distribution of contraceptives is not widely bought and sold, and subject to challenge only by used, even among countries with relatively strong some other right. The tradeoff between the rights programs. Based on estimates of "unmet need" and welfare of the current generation and those of described in Chapter 7, there are about 65 million future generations, insofar as a tradeoff exists, will couples in developing countries who want to limit differ in different settings. But regardless of set- or space births but do not have effective access to ting, a public policy to reduce fertility must be sen- family planning services. sitive to individual rights today as well as to long- run social goals, and must recognize the INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES. By ensuring that distinction between encouraging lower fertility (by people have only as many children as they want, changing the "signals" which influence people) governments can slow population growth. How- and coercion. Governments need to recognize that ever, this might not be enough to bring privately once they are actively involved in reducing fertil- and socially desired fertility into balance. If a pri- ity, the methods they use require careful and con- vate-social gap still exists, it cannot be reduced tinuous scrutiny. simply by providing more family planning. Eco- Virtually all the programs to lower fertility rec- nomic and social policies are indispensable to ommended in this Report would also improve reduce this gap in the long run. They may take individual welfare; they pose no obvious tradeoff some time to have an impact on fertility, however. between present and future welfare. Programs to Items J to L are policies that close the gap more raise education and reduce mortality raise welfare. quickly: eliminating all implicit subsidies for large Family planning programs expand the options families (item I), offering financial or other incen- available to people, allowing couples to realize tives for small families (item K), and imposing dis- their own fertility objectives and improving the incentives for large families (item L). A large num- health of mothers and children. In many countries ber of countries have disincentives built into their current fertility exceeds desired family size; within tax system and their benefits system for public most countries, there is "unmet need" for family employees, but these are generally mild and affect planning. Incentives and disincentives, carefully only a small part of the population. Only a handful designed, can also meet the criteria of improving 160 welfare and allowing free choice. Incentives com- grams, disincentives alter the balance of costs and pensate individuals for the economic and social benefits of having children. Rather than raise the losses of delaying births or of having fewer chil- benefits of having fewer children, however, they dren. Those who accept payment for not having increase the cost of having many. They have there- children do so because they find this tradeoff fore the disadvantage that they might unfairly worthwhile; they are compensated for some of the penalize the poor. The rich will find it easier to public savings from lower fertility. Similarly with accept the additional costs of more children, yet disincentives: those who elect to pay the higher the poor may have greater need of children. And costs of additional children compensate society as children, who have no choice in the matter, bear a whole for the private benefits of more children. the costs of certain disincentivesthose which But incentive and disincentive programs require give preference in schooling to the first born and extra care to avoid unfairness and abuse, not only which heavily tax family income. It is essential to in their implementation but also in their design. design disincentives so that they avoid inequality; Some benefits from an incentive program are with care, however, they need be no more objec- bound to go to people who would have deferred tionable than any other taxes or subsidies. pregnancy or limited births anyway; public subsi- Even policies that are theoretically voluntary can dies may therefore benefit the rich unnecessarily. be implemented in a coercive fashion if not prop- When payments are offered as an inducement to erly monitored. Many countries set performance sterilizationwhich is usually irreversiblecare targets for family planning workers in recruiting must be taken that the poor are not being tempted new acceptors. While some criteria for evaluating to act out of short-term economic necessity con- workers' performance are clearly necessary, exces- trary to their long-term interests. Such payments sive pressure to achieve unrealistic targets threat- are usually quite small, since they are meant to ens the voluntaristic nature of programs. This is compensate for time and travel costs. Govern- the lesson of the Indian Emergency of 1976-77, ments that offer them have generally established when workers were subject to extreme pressure to procedures that make written consent mandatory, achieve high sterilization quotas and many people and have imposed criteria that potential clients were pressured to be sterilized against their will. must fulfill (such as having several children Consequently, the party in power lost the next already). A waiting period between the decision, election. In more recent years, this program, oper- the sterilization, and the payment can also be a ating on a strictly voluntary basis, has proved very safeguardthough in inaccessible rural areas a successful. waiting period may be impractical, since those To repeat an important point noted in Chapter 1, seeking sterilization may find it hard to make even the ultimate goal of public policy is to improve one trip to a clinic. Deferred incentives, as in the living standards, to enhance individual choice, case of educational bonds or an old-age security and to create conditions that enable people to real- payment, have the advantage of building in such a ize their potential. Lower fertility is only an inter- safeguard. mediate objective; a commitment to achieve lower Incentives that offer schools, low interest loans, fertility must not mean a willingness to achieve it or a tubewell to communities where contraceptive at any cost. The successful experience of many use is high also directly link lower fertility to countries already indicates that it need not. increased welfare. To the extent that all members can benefit from community incentives, individual welfare is improved. Care must be taken that the Policy priorities in developing regions benefits of community incentives are distributed equitably, however. There is the danger that, in The differences among developing countries, both closely knit communities, some couples will be in their demographic situation and in the evolution pressured to use contraception against their will. of their population policies, are profound. In sub- But community pressure always exists, and usu- Saharan Africa, few countries have yet to take the ally influences couples to have many children even first steps in developing a population policy. At the when they would prefer not to. In Indonesia and other extreme, in East Asia family planning serv- Thailand community incentives are only loosely ices are accessible, political commitment is high, tied to actual use of contraception and are thus and governments offer incentives for couples to primarily promotional. have small families. In all regions there is scope for Like incentives and various socioeconomic pro- reducing mortality, increasing literacy, and 16 improving the availability of family planning serv- FIGURE 8.1 ices. But in taking the next steps in population Fertility in relation to income: selected developing policy, each region faces a different set of issues. countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 9 Sub-Saha ran Africa: how to increase public commitment U 1972 Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest population Kenya 1982 8 growth rate and the highest fertility in the 'orld. S Between 1970 and 1979 population increased at 2.7 Ethiopia percent a year, up from 2.5 percent a year during 7 I Upper Volta the 1960s. In a few East African countries popula- Sudan S tion is growing at 4 percent or more a year. Of the U. Nigeria Tanzania thirty-three sub-Saharan countries with more than 6 Za e 1 million people, thirty have a total fertility rate of Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972 6 or more. Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have 5 fertility rates of 8 or more. Probably fewer than 10 percent of married women of reproductive age are using modern contraception. Sub-Saharan Africa 4 is the only region in which fertility has not begun Norm for 98 developing counlries, 1982 to fall, and in which population growth is expected to accelerate in the next decade. 3 Africa is also the poorest region, with a per cap- 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 ita income averaging only $482 in 1982or $354 if Income per capita (1980 dollars) Nigeria is excluded. During the 1970s per capita income grew in real terms by just 0.8 percent a year; if Nigeria is excluded, it declined. The region's gross domestic product stagnated in 1981 The poor economic performance of sub-Saharan and 1982, while population rose 2.7 percent in each Africa cannot be blamed on rapid population year. Fertility in most countries is higher than growth alone, nor will slower population growth income alone would predict (see Figure 8.1). But solve all its economic problems. External economic when Africa's high mortality, low literacy, and shocks, as well as inappropriate domestic policies, largely rural population are taken into account, fer- have contributed to the region's economic crisis. tility is not unusually high. About a third of the But rapid population growth is creating severe adult population are literate in sub-Saharan coun- strains in some countries and, throughout the tries, compared with half of adults in all low- region as a whole, it is holding back improvements income countries and two-thirds in all middle- in living standards. income countries (see Table 8.2). Life expectancy at The strains are acute in a few countries and areas birth is forty-nine years, ten years less than in that are already overcrowdedBurundi, Kenya, other countries at the same income level. Malawi, eastern Nigeria, Rwanda, and parts of the TABLE 8.2 Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries Per capita Adult Life Primary-school in conic literacy expectancy enrollment rat iii, female' 1982 1980 1982 1981 Country group (dollars) (percent) (years) (percent) Sub-Saharan Africa Low-income 249 38 49 57 Middle-income 777 35 50 70 All low-income countries 280 52 59 81 All middle-income countries 1,520 65 60 95 Note: Averages are weighted by 1982 population. a. Number of females enrolled in primary school as a percentage of all females of primary-school age. 162 Sahelian countries (see Box 8.4). These and other lation policy in sub-Saharan Africa? Population countries, such as Ethiopia and Upper Volta, have control is a sensitive political issue wherever reli- neither the physical capital nor the skills to com- gious and tribal groups are competing for pensate for a shortage of natural resources. A few resources. And much of the pressure for smaller countriessuch as Angola, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, families has come from (or is perceived to come Zaire, and Zambiaare rich in natural resources, from) western aid donors; this pressure can cause but need extra skills, as well as heavy investment local resentment. in roads and storage and distribution systems to Even if these factors were less important, politi- exploit those resources. cians would still be hesitant to propose smaller In all sub-Saharan countries, the labor force is families when the demand for children is growing rapidly, by more than 3 percent a year in extremely high. Recent surveys in six countries most countries, meaning a doubling about every found that women wanted between six and nine twenty years. Government revenues are growing children in their completed families. Depending slowly as a result of slow or no economic growth, on the country, only 4 to 17 percent of currently so countries have had to struggle not only to pro- married, fecund women wanted no more children, vide jobs but to provide basic services such as edu- and most of them had already had at least six. In cation. In 1978 education was taking 16 percent of much of the region the concept of self-determined national budgets, but reached less than two-thirds family size is unknown. Modern contraception is of primary-school-age children. Only a tiny frac- poorly understood and lacks social legitimacy. In tion of the people can obtain modern medical care. this atmosphere couples who wish to use family Human development in all its forms is essential to planning services are discouraged from doing so. future economic progress but, as Chapter 5 And, compared with other regions, infertility showed, population growth makes it hard to affects a disproportionate number of Africans, achieve. These difficulties will remain, because tragically depriving some women of any children sub-Saharan Africa's current population of 385 (see Box 8.5). The threat of infertility discourages million seems set to double by the year 2005. That couples from controlling their childbearing much is almost inevitable. The real question is through modern contraception. whether populations will merely triple in size in Policy development and political commitment the next half-century or increase even more rap- are constrained throughout the region by a lack of idly, to five or six times their current size. recent and reliable demographic data needed to Few sub-Saharan countries have explicit policies demonstrate the magnitude and consequences of to reduce rapid population growth. Kenya was the rapid population growth. Many African countries, first to adopt such policies in 1967, Ghana followed particularly in Francophone Africa, do not have a in 1969, and Mauritius in the early 1970s. There are long history of census-taking. In some countries recent indications of heightened concern about where censuses have been conducted, the results rapid population growth in Burundi, the Comoros, have never been published because of political Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. About controversy. As a result, the size and growth rate half the governments in sub-Saharan Africa pro- of population for countries such as Ethiopia, vide family planning services for health and Guinea, Nigeria, and Zaire are not known within a human rights reasons, but without any explicit reasonable degree of certainty. demographic purpose. Limited services are pro- Yet census results are important in demonstrat- vided by a few private associations and through an ing to political leaders the need for population pol- already overstretched public health system, with icy. The results of the 1976 Senegalese census poor coverage of rural areas. Twelve sub-Saharan implied a population growth rate of 2.9 percent a countries neither have population policies nor sup- year, much higher than the 2.2 percent annual rate port family planning. Most are in Francophone in the 1960s. This prompted the president to create AfricaChad, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mada- the National Population Commission in 1978 to gascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta consider a population policy and family planning where anticontraception laws from the colonial services. The 1960 census was a catalyzing factor period are still in effect. These countries have no for population policy in Ghana. The World Fertility tradition of private family planning associations, Survey, conducted in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, which are elsewhere active in lobbying govern- the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, ments for public involvement. Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan, has made an impor- What explains the limited development of popu- tant contribution to improving demographic data 163 Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how many people? Africa is often portrayed as an underpop- ulated region with vast acres of un- tapped land. It is true that its average population density is lowless than one- fifth of Asia's. But considering the rudi- mentary farming practices in most of Africa, some countries are becoming crowded, at least in the sense of limited food production potential. This is one of the main findings of the FAO's recently completed project, Land Resources for the Future. Of course, the goal of self-sufficiency in food production cannot be recom- mended for all countries. But those which do not manage it must generate enough EGuin foreign exchange outside of agriculture Ratio of population- to import food (or face the prospect of supporting capacity to continuing dependence on food aid or actual population rising malnutrition). For many African density, 1975 countries nonagricultural exports are Less than 1.0 unlikely to provide a viable short-term 1.0-5.0 source of foreign exchange. The FAO compared potential popula- 5.1 and above tion-supporting capacitiesdetermined Data not available by soil and climatic conditions and levels of farm technologyto actual and pro- jected populations. The calculations for Africa as a whole confirm the conven- tional wisdom: even at subsistence farm- ing levels (that is, no use of fertilizers or pesticides, traditional seed varieties and in the region, but periodic sample surveys have child. The principal aim is to protect the health of generally not been institutionalized. children and maximize the number who survive. In the long run, social developmentespecially Throughout Africa, there is potential demand for the education of womenis essential to reduce contraception to space births in both urban and desired family size. More and better schooling for rural areas. But spacing practices appear to be women will help to lower infant mortality, reduc- declining most rapidly in :urban areaswhere ing the uncertainty about child survival which desired family size is likely to fall first. In Senegal, keeps family size high. An all-out attack on infant for example, both breastfeeding and postpartum and child mortality and on infertility is imperative; amenorrhea are six months shorter in the capital as long as fate seems to govern family size, prona- city of Dakar than in rural areas. In Lagos, Nigeria, talist norms will be reinforced and individual traditional childspacing practices are in decline and choice discouraged. intervals between births are shortening. Unless In the short run, family planning services could contraception becomes a more readily available do more on two fronts, even in the face of rela- substitute, total fertility may increase and the tively little unsatisfied demand for birth control: health of mothers and children may worsen. Childs pacing. Extended breastfeeding and sex- Programs in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire have ual abstinence have long been practiced in Africa recently been set up to promote contraception for to guarantee two to three years between each childspacing. In Zimbabwe, the Child Spacing and 164 cropping patterns, and no conservation more intensive farming methods, based for accommodating population growth measures), there is enough land to allow on higher and higher labor inputs. But through international migration do have food self-sufficiency for a population 2.7 the remoteness of the countries and their limits political and social factors intro- times larger than the actual population in terrain make it expensive to use duce uncertainty even where economic 1975. When the results are tabulated by advanced technologies; they also limit benefits for both sending and receiving country, however, a much more complex agricultural and nonagricultural export countries could be great. The recent picture emerges. opportunities, and thus the scope for expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria Of forty sub-Saharan countries (exclud- importing food. Low rainfall and remote- provides an example. ing Djibouti and the smaller island ness also create considerable problems Throughout Africa, traditional meth- nations), fourteen do not have enough for Sahelian countries like Niger. ods of farming require more land per landassuming subsistence level farm- Nevertheless, there are eleven coun- capita than in regions such as Asia, ingto support on a sustainable basis tries, largely in central Africa, still pos- where irrigation and double-cropping are populations as large as those already sessing extensive areas of underused more common. To avoid a fall in agricul- reached in 1975. The fourteen are Bot- land. According to the FAQ, the land of tural output per worker, land-scarce swana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Congo and the Central African countries will require new technologies Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Republic is capable of supporting popu- fertilizers, improved seed, and different Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Soma- lations more than twenty times larger farming techniquessupported by pric- lia, and Uganda (see map); as a group, than they had in 1975; in the case of ing policies to encourage production. But they account for one-third of the land Gabon, the multiple reaches almost 100. such measures alone might not be area of sub-Saharan Africa and about Together, the land-abundant countries of enough. According to the FAQ's calcula- half of its 1981 population. sub-Saharan Africa occupy about 30 per- tions, seven sub-Saharan countries In some areas of these countriesparts cent of the region's land, but account for Burundi, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, and only one-fifth of its 1981 population. Niger, Rwanda, and Somaliawould not much of Rwanda and Burundihigher As populations increase further in the achieve self-sufficiency in food in the levels of inputs in denser areas mean land-scarce countries of sub-Saharan year 2000 (when their combined popula- more people are being supported. But Africa, the pressure for people to migrate tion is expected to reach about 80 million) these countries will face increasing diffi- to land-abundant countries will mount, even if their agricultural techniques were culties as populations double again in the particularly where they share a common to match those now found on commer- next twenty to thirty years. Small land- border. Migration already brings mutual cial farms in Asia and Latin America. locked countries such as Rwanda and benefits to countries such as the Ivory Burundi face particularly serious prob- Coast and Upper Volta. As pointed out lems. Population pressure has led to in Chapter 5, however, the opportunities Family Planning Council provides 40 percent of effects will be critical. Such programs also provide national childspacing services, in addition to in- an opportunity to encourage breastfeeding, which service training and contraceptive supply procure- is still almost universal in Africa but declining in ment for the Ministry of Health's childspacing urban areas. program. Among women of childbearing age, con- Adolescents. In many countriesnot just in traceptive use is estimated at 15 percent. Formerly Africathere has been a sharp rise in premarital a private association, although heavily subsidized adolescent pregnancy, abortion, and sexually by government, the Council recently became a transmitted disease (see Box 8.6). Family planning parastatal under the Ministry of Health and is services and advice can avert these unwanted intensifying its activities with funding from births, abortions, and health risks. In Ghana edu- LJSAID; a doubling of field staff, recruitment of a cation about family life is now part of the school full-time information and education staff, and curriculum. Eight other sub-Saharan countries are expanded research capability are planned. considering this step. The emphasis on spacing means that programs throughout Africa must offer effective, reversible Middle East and North Africa: methods of contraception. Since most people will rural outreach and expanding women's opportunities never have tried modern contraception, careful explanation, reassurance, and treatment of side The countries of the Middle East and North Africa 165 Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa Surveys in the 1950s and 1960s found eventual fertility decline. ners being infertile in the remaining 20 that an average of 12 percent of women What causes high levels of infertility? percent of cases. When the infertility is who had passed their childbearing years Sexually transmitted diseases, particu- caused by sexually transmitted disease, it in eighteen sub-Saharan countries were larly gonorrhea and syphilis, are major is essential that both partners be medi- childless, compared with a rate of 2 to 3 causes of both primary and secondary cally treated. Other causes of infertility percent in other developing countries. infertility. Gonorrhea, if left untreated, can be prevented by improving the qual- Childlessness' 'primary" infertility can lead to irreversible blockage of the ity of obstetrical care, such as by training was greatest in the Central African fallopian tubes in women and of the vas traditional midwives, and by increasing Republic (17 percent), Cameroon (17 per- deferens in men. Because the symptoms the availability of contraception so that cent), Zaire (21 percent), Congo (21 per- are not readily noticeable in women, it couples can prevent unwanted pregnan- cent), and Gabon (32 percent). In parts of may go for several years without treat- cies that might result in abortion. Zaire, as many as 65 percent of women ment. Syphilis causes miscarriage and There are few specialists or centers for aged forty-five to forty-nine were child- stillbirth. Poor obstetrical care and unhy- diagnosis and treatment of infertility in less. Childlessness in younger age gienic abortion are additional causes of sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1973 infertility groups is less common (presumably due secondary infertility. Malnutrition, con- clinics have been set up in Cameroon, to improved medical care) but still high. genital defects, genital tuberculosis, and Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Programs In Cameroon 10 percent of women aged various uterine, vaginal, and urethral to control the spread of sexually trans- thirty to thirty-four are childless; in the infections also contribute. mitted disease have been launched in the Congo the figures are 12 to 13 percent. In Treatment for infertility is costly and Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and addition, large numbers of people suffer difficult; even then, the outcome is Zambia. The Association for Voluntary from "secondary" infertilitythe inabil- uncertain. Depending on the cause, only Sterilization has provided grants for ity to conceive or give birth again follow- one-quarter to one-half of couples research, treatment, training, and public ing an earlier birth. Studies in Kenya treated may subsequently have a live education on infertility in Nigeria, Sierra have shown that primary and secondary birth. Three ma)or causessexually Leone, and Sudan. infertility occur with approximately transmitted disease, poor obstetrical Resources are needed for research into equal frequency, while in much of West care, and illegal abortioncan be pre- the causes and treatment of infertility, as Africa secondary infertility accounts for vented at less cost. Public campaigns can well as for better data on its prevalence. up to two-thirds of diagnosed cases. Sec- inform couples of the causes of infertility, About $4 million of a total of $6 million ondary infertility afflicts 14 to 39 percent the symptoms of sexually transmitted spent by the public sector on infertilty of women aged fifteen to fifty in different disease, its prevention through limiting research worldwide in 1982 went for regions of Cameroon. sexual partners and use of barrier meth- research into unexplained causes of The consequences of infertility are par- ods of contraception (especially con- infertility; the bulk of this work was con- ticularly severe for women, who may be doms), and the availability of treatment. ducted by the Center for Population ostracized, abandoned, or divorced. Fear These informational efforts need to be Research in the United States. Total of infertility makes couples reluctant to directed to men in particular, since they spending on infertility research by the practice modern contraception. Thus, are more reluctant to submit to infertility World Health Organization in 1982 was although high infertility keeps fertility tests and treatment. Though women are only $900,000. The United Nations De- lower than it otherwise would beevery usually held responsible for childless- velopment Programme has proposed 9 percent increment in childlessness ness, in fact they account for about 40 increasing this amount to $2-4 million a reduces total fertility by about 1it also percent of infertility cases. Men account year over the next five to seven years. inhibits contraceptive use and slows for another 40 percent, with both part- are quite diverse, ranging from one of the world's percent a year; the total fertility rate in 1982 was poorest (Afghanistan) to five of the wealthiest 5.4. Migration is common, both into and out of the (Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the region and among countries within it. United Arab Emirates). But 90 percent of its 260 In most countries fertility is higher than would million people live in thirteen middle-income be expected given per capita income (see Figure countries. All share a common cultural heritage 8.2). Five high-income oil exporters, with per cap- and are predominantly Islamic. Countries in the ita incomes of $14,820, had a fertility rate of 6.9 in Middle East and North Africa have the second 1982. In the past decade incomes in Jordan, Syria, highest rates of population growth and fertility in and Algeria have risen strongly but total fertility the world, after sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1970 has remained at more than 7. Income growth in and 1982 their population grew at an average 2.9 these countries is recent and social development 166 has come more slowly. Low literacy (particularly Government family planning programs began in among women) and high infant mortality help to 1964 in Tunisia, in 1965 in Egypt and Turkey, and explain high fertility. Also responsible are cultural, in 1966 in Morocco. According to recent surveys, religious, and legal pressures that confine women 24 percent of married women of childbearing age to the home and restrict their property rights, in Egypt, 38 percent in Turkey, and 41 percent in rights within marriage, and ability to seek work Tunisia are practicing contraception. Later mar- outside the home. riage has also contributed to fertility decline. The Three countries in Figure 8.2Egypt, Tunisia, change has been most dramatic in Tunisia, where and Turkeyhave had a marked fall in fertility in the proportion of women aged fifteen to nineteen the past decade; in all three, fertility is now below who are married fell from 42 percent in 1956 to 6 what would be expected for their income levels. In percent in 1975. In Egypt the proportion fell from Morocco, fertility has declined more modestly. 32 percent in 1960-61 to 21 percent fifteen years Unlike most other countries in the region, these later; in Turkey, the decline was from 33 percent to four have policies to reduce population growth. 22 percent. Box 8.6 Teenage pregnancy Teenage pregnancy is common in both shown in Box 7.1, postponing giving one-parent households, and they are developed and developing countries, birth until the age of twenty or older more likely themselves to have children accounting for about 10 to 15 percent of would significantly reduce maternal and while still adolescents. Lirths worldwide. And this understates infant mortality rates. Teenage pregnancy can be averted. the problem since many teenage preg- Many teenage pregnanciesparticu- When family planning services are com- nancies are terminated by legal and ille- larly when outside marriageend in bined with maternal and child health gal abortion. Because coupLes in develop- abortion. If poorly performed, abortion programs, information about family ing countries tend to marry earlier, most is highly risky and may impair future fer- planning may reach only married teenage pregnancy is within marriage. In tility. Nearly 40 percent of adolescent women who already have children. lo developed countries, with later age of pregnancies in the United States ended have an impact on teenage pregnancy marriage, more teenage pregnancy in legal abortion in 1978. young peoplewith and without chil- occurs outside marriage. In 1979, for Pregnancy and childbirth disrupt dren, male and female, in and out of example, almost two-thirds of live births the education and career opportunities of schoolmust also be reached. Family life to American teenagers were to unwed young women. Teenage mothers fre- education, including human reproduc- mothers. As the age at marriage rises and quently do not complete primary or sec- tion, family planning, and responsible urbanization loosens traditional social ondary school. The time demands of parenthood, is taught in schools in the restraints on sexual activity, the inci- childrearing can restrict their current Dominican Republic, Ghana, Korea, dence of premarital teenage pregnancy employment possibilities, while limited Mexico, and the Philippines. Kenya and may increase in developing countries. In education affects their future income- Sierra Leone are developing similar cur a Bombay hospital in the early 1970s, 12 earning potential. ricula. Posters, radio, and television mes- percent of women admitted for abortions The children of adolescent mothers sages can be used to reach out-of-school were younger than eighteen; of these, 92 are also worse off. Teenage couples are youth. percent were unmarried. In a major likely to have fewer economic assets than For teenagers who are already preg- Lagos hospital the number of teenage are somewhat older couples to support nant the consequences can be minimized pregnancies and abortions increased children, and single teenage mothers by providing continued educational and over a recent five-year period; 93 percent have even less. It is believed that many employment opportunities. A women's of the teenagers admitted were single abandoned childrenin Brazil, an esti- center run by the Jamaican Women's girls of school age. mated 16 million children or one-third of Bureau provides support and classroom Teenage pregnancywithin or outside its youthhave young mothers who are instruction for pregnant women aged marriagehas adverse consequences for unwed or in unstable unions. Studies in twelve to sixteen with the goal of return- mothers and children: developed countries show deficits in the ing them to school. Of the students regis- Childbirth poses greater health dan- cognitive development of children of tered at the center in 1978-79, almost gers for teenage mothers than for older adolescent mothers that are partly attrib- two-thirds were placed in secondary women, and for their children. Children utable to the social and economic conse- schools, high schools, or vocational of teenage mothers are more likely to be quences of early childbearing; children of training schools, and 92 percent had not premature, have low birth weight, and teenage mothers are likely to spend a become pregnant again by the end of have a greater risk of death. As was considerable part of their childhood in 1981. 167 FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more children but are not Fertility in relation to income: selected developing using contraception, and that more than half of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 1972 these women would like to use a method. In Jen- and 1982 douba, Tunisia, 46 percent of women who were Total fertility rate not using contraception wanted no more children, 8 and 22 percent said that they would like to space the next birth. When women in Marrakech, Jordan Algeria Morocco, were offered supplies of oral contracep- 7 N tives through home visits, the rate of contraceptive use rose from 18 to 43 percent. In the Sfax region of Tunisia, household distribution increased the rate 1972 from 7 to 18 percent. 1982 Tunisia Continued progress in reducing fertility in these 6 countries will depend both on better family plan- ning services and on measures to improve the sta- Norm for 92 developing tus of women. countries, 1972 Family planning programs. Access to services in 5 rural areas is still restricted. The Tunisian program has had difficulty reaching a dispersed rural popu- Egypt lation, which includes half of the married women of reproductive age. Services in Morocco and 4 Turkey Egypt rely heavily on physicians and are clinic- based with little outreach. In Egypt only physi- Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982 cians may prescribe the pill and insert the IUD. The few outreach workers in place are not permit- 3 0 ted to distribute contraceptives and are supposed $1000 $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) to motivate only women who already have three children. In Morocco, nurses were only recently authorized to insert lUDs, and nonclinical distribu- tion of the pill is still frowned upon. Yet experience in South and East Asia as well as in Latin America Despite these achievements, population growth indicates that carefully trained paramedical remains rapid and acceptance of family planning fieldworkers can deliver many methods and slow. Total fertility, although reduced, is still 4 to 5 increase contraceptive prevalence dramatically. in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey, and about 6 in Use of the media to promote family planning and Morocco. In Egypt and Tunisia, an increase in the small families has been limited in Morocco: not proportion of women of childbearing age has kept until 1982 were the Ministry of Public Health and the birth rate high. Mortality has declined, and the the private family planning association permitted rate of population growth has changed little. Pop- to broadcast family planning messages and show ulation pressure has been eased in both countries films. by emigration, but poor economic conditions in The limited range of contraceptives available Europe have reduced emigration from Tunisia and in Egypt and Morocco also restricts their use. caused many emigrants to return. The rate of con- Although the IUD and condoms are theoretically traceptive use has remained at about 25 percent in available, both programs favor the pill. Only one- Egypt for several years; increases have been slow quarter of outlets in Egypt are staffed or supplied in Turkey and Morocco. The number of new accep- to provide IUD insertions. Only one brand of pill is tors of family planning has barely risen in Tunisia offered. Sterilization is legal but not promoted by for about five years. the official program; abortion is prohibited. In con- There is ample evidence of unmet need for fam- trast, the Tunisian program has made the pill, IUD, ily planning services. Low and high estimates in female sterilization, and abortion (in the first three Egypt ranged from 12 to 22 percent of married months of pregnancy) more widely available. women of childbearing age in 1980. In certain areas The status of women. Increasing the number of unmet need is even higher. One study found that educated women could do much to reduce fertility 82 percent of married women in rural areas of in the region. Enrollment rates for girls in 1980 168 FIGURE 8.3 Gross enrollment ratios by sex: selected countries in the Middle East Enrollment ratio Enrollment ratio and North Africa, 1960 and 1980 120 120 Egypt Morocco Mr 80 M, 80 Males, primary enrollment Females, primary enrollment F,, Males, secondary enrollment 40 40 F, Females, secondary enrollment M, F, 0 0 1960 1980 1960 1980 Enrollment ratio' Enrollment ratio Enrollment ratio 120 120 120 Tunisia M, Jordan 80 80 80 M 40 40 40 M, F, 0 0 0 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Enrollment ratio equals the number enrolled as a percentage of a particular age group. It can exceed 100 percent because some pupils are below or above the official primary-school age. Mean weighted by 1960 and 1980 population (includes high-income oil exporters(. Source: UNESCO, 1983; World Development Report 1982. were still only two-thirds the rates for boys at both other legal changes are under discussion: the primary and secondary schools (see Figure 8.3); in repeal of a husband's automatic status as head of twenty years the gap has not narrowed. An impor- the family in favor of a system of "joint responsi- tant exception is Jordan, where primary-school bility of spouses" and abolition of a husband's education is now universal and about three-quar- right of consent for his wife to be gainfully ters of secondary-school-age children of both sexes employed. are enrolled. In Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia universal primary schooling for girls has yet to Latin America and the Caribbean: be achieved. Female primary enrollment has reducing social inequities increased steeply in Tunisia, and the male-female gap has been somewhat reduced. In Egypt the Almost all of the countries in Latin America and increase in primary-school places has barely kept the Caribbean are middle-income, but with great pace with population growth; the primary-school demographic diversity. In four countries with per enrollment rate has remained low and access is capita incomes exceeding $2,500Argentina, particularly limited in rural areas, where fertility is Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguaypopu- high. At the same time, much has been invested in lation growth has slowed to below 2 percent a year expanding secondary schooling. and total fertility is nearing replacement level. The Women's status can also be improved by raising highest fertility in the region is in six lower-mid- the minimum age of marriage and by changing dle-income countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salva- laws that restrict women's social and financial dor, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Total rights. The legal minimum age of marriage for fertility in these countries exceeds 5 and popula- women in Tunisia was raised to fifteen in 1956, and tion growth ranges from 2.5 to 3.4 percent. Fertility then to seventeen in 1964. The legal minimum age is high in the Caribbean, with the exception of in Morocco and Turkey is still fifteen. In Turkey Cuba, but emigration moderates population 169 growth. Fertility has declined in the three largest percent, compared with 78 percent in the towns countriesBrazil, Colombia, and Mexicobut and cities. population will still double in about twenty-five Provision of family planning services is also years in Mexico and in about thirty years in the greater in urban areas, especially in Brazil. The others. national government has not assisted or promoted In short, population growth is rapid throughout family planning services, so most users rely on pri- Latin America and the Caribbean and will remain vate suppliers. In the well-to-do southern state of so until the 1990s at least. Populations are pro- Sao Paulo, 63 percent of women obtain contracep- jected to grow by at least 2 percent a year in most tives through a private doctor or a drugstore. This countries, closer to 3 percent in much of Central is difficult or impossible in rural areas. The Brazil- America. Only in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay ian Family Planning Association (BEMFAM), a pri- will growth rates be lower. The labor force will vate nonprofit organization, does provide services grow by more than 2 percent a year until the end of to the poor. In the poor states of Rio Grande do the century. Urbanization will slow somewhat Norte and Piaui, where BEMFAM is active, almost from its recent fast pace, but in some countries 60 percent of women use contraceptives. In Bahia, (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) 80 where BEMFAM does not operate, only 40 percent percent of the people are already living in cities. use contraceptives. No single issue is so important in Latin America How is population growth related to inequality as the manner in which opportunity and access are in these countries? Fertility is consistently and shared. Because of inequalities of income and inversely related to household income and to edu- wealth, and despite rapid economic growth in the cation. Surveys in Brazil indicate that poor rural past quarter century, millions of people still live in women bear twice as many children as do women poverty. As economic growth accelerated after from the upper 40 percent of urban households. 1950, some areas and socioeconomic groups bene- Brazilian women who neither have paid jobs nor fited more than others, widening income and have completed primary school have more than wealth differentials. As development proceeds, twice as many children as working women who those differences may start to narrow. One aim of completed secondary school. Similar differentials public policy, particularly in health and education, occur in Mexico and Colombia. The well-to-do are is to promote equality of opportunity. Population able to spend more per child than are the poor and programs have a related role to play: they can they have fewer children. improve the chances of the poor by making it pos- The extent of these differences was described in sible for them to devote more resources to each Chapter 4. In both Brazil and Colombia, the poor- child. est 20 percent of households have almost one-third Three countries, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, of all childrenbut only 4 percent of total income account for 60 percent of the region's 370 million in Colombia and 2 percent in Brazil. The richest 20 people. Economically and demographically they percent of households, in contrast, have 10 percent are more advanced than the northern Andean of the children and 60 percent of the income in countries, most of Central America and the Colombia, 8 percent of the children and 64 percent Caribbean, but (except for central and southern of the income in Brazil. These differences are far Brazil) less advanced than Argentina, Chile, and greater than those in such countries as India, Thai- Uruguay. land, and Malaysia. As is true elsewhere in Latin America, a major Population policies have helped to reduce fertil- characteristic of these countries is their urban-rural ity in Latin America. In 1966 Colombia's Ministry contrast. In Colombia health facilities are concen- of Health signed an agreement with a private med- trated in the urban areas; per household, public ical association to provide a program of training subsidies to rural health are less than one-seventh and research that included family planning. By the national average. Life expectancy for urban combining low-key public support with private Colombians is sixty-four compared with fifty-eight family planning programs, the Colombian govern- for those in the countryside. In Brazil current ment has helped facilitate a rapid fertility decline. spending on education is as much as ten times The Mexican government adopted a population greater per child in urban than in rural areas; policy to reduce fertility in 1973 and began provid- urban teachers have on average more than eleven ing family planning services in 1974. By 1976 con- years of education, compared with six years for traceptive use had doubled, almost entirely rural teachers. Literacy rates in rural Brazil are 48 because of public programs. Between 1970 and 170 FIGURE 8.4 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 8 1972 1982 7 Mexico 6 5 Colombia Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972 4 3 Argentina Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982 2 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) 1980 fertility fell in both Mexico and Colombia by 1965 and 1975; in the 1980s the number of children about one-third; in contrast, it declined by less in the primary-age group will grow by less than a than 20 percent in Brazil, a country in which the million, easing the strain on the education budget. national government had not committed itself to a By 1990 the Colombian labor force will be growing population policy or program (see Box 8.7). by 2.2 percent a year, well below the 3.5 percent This contrast becomes even sharper when it is rate of the 1970s. With fewer new entrants to the noted that per capita real incomes nearly doubled labor force, a larger proportion of them can expect in Brazil but were up by only 50 percent in Colom- to qualify for high-wage jobs. bia and Mexico. Whereas Colombia and Mexico Looking ahead, Colombia and Mexico need to managed a sharp decline in fertility in relation to extend public family planning programs to the income growth, Brazil's fertility decline was more rural poor, and to do more to integrate population modest (see Figure 8.4). If Brazil had followed the policy into the overall framework of development pattern of Colombia and Mexico, its total fertility planning. Brazil's popular private sector pro- rate would have fallen to 3.0 by 1982 given its grams, long tolerated by the government, do not income growth; in fact it was 3.9. With a popula- have adequate resources. There is significant tion policy no more vigorous than that of Colombia unmet need for family planning in the poor North- and Mexico during the 1970s, Brazilian fertility east. Brazil spends more than 4 percent of its GDP might now be one-quarter lower than it is. Most of on health; by devoting a tiny share of that budget the difference would come from lower fertility to family planning, it could extend family planning among the poor, since it is they who would be coverage to the 40 million people of its poorer assisted most by a public policy. regions. The advantages of lower fertility are already Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are not the only becoming apparent in some Latin American coun- countries in Latin America where population poli- tries. In Colombia the number of enrolled primary- cies could be effective against poverty and inequal- school students increased by 1.6 million between ity. Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and the Central 171 Box 8.7 Changing policies and attitudes toward family planning in Brazil Official Brazilian policy on population ployment and falling real incomes. fifteen-minute program in prime televi- was, until 1974, implicitly pronatalist. In March 983 Brazil's president told sion time on a Sunday evening in The traditional official view, dating from Congress that the country's rapid popu- December 1983. A recent poll in the city colonial times, had been that Brazil lation growth was capable of causing of Sao Paulo found that 75 percent of would benefit from a large growing pop- "social, economic, cultural and political those interviewed believed that couples ulation to complement its vast territory imbalances" and proposed opening a should plan the number of children that and natural resources. broad debate which could lead to specific they have. Civilian politicians in both The first perceptible change from a policy measures to deal with this threat. opposition and government parties pronatalist to a laissez-faire stance Fifteen days later, a Parliamentary Com- increasingly express the strong social occurred during the 1974 World Popula- mission of Inquiry on problems associ- demand for "democratization of access tion Conference, and at about the same ated with Brazil's population growth was to family planning" and some opposi- time in the Second National Develop- established in the Senate, and in mid- tion parties have called for legalization of ment Plan. Official statements main- May the Ministry of Health sent the pres- abortion. (It is estimated that between 3 tained that Brazil's 2.5 percent annual ident a preliminary document on the million and 5 million illegal and clandes- rate of population growth was not a seri- proposed health program for women. tine abortions are performed every year ous threat to economic development, but A recent military report showed that in Brazil, or roughly one for each live they went on to recognize the responsi- half of the young men who enrolled for birth.) bility of the government to provide fam- military service in 1982 were rejected for A growing number of Brazilian politi- ily planning services to those who want, medical reasons, and of these, 60 percent cians belong to an association of legisla- of their own free choice, to plan their were likely to be unfit for service in the tors favoring an active family planning families but are too poor to pay for the future because their physical and mental policy, which hosted the first "Western services that are available privately. Fed- capacity had been permanently stunted. Hemisphere Conference of Parliamentar- eral authorities gave tacit approval to a Statements by the Chief of Staff of the ians on Population and Development" in number of state-level family planning Armed Forces, in a newspaper interview Brasilia in December 1982. A private programs organized by the Brazilian in June 1983, differed from the traditional organization, Pro Familia, recently orga- Family Planning Association (BEMFAM), military view that Brazil needed rapid nized a three-day "First National Confer- the Brazilian affiliate of the International population growth to fill up its vast terri- ence on Maternal and Child Protection Planned Parenthood Federation. tory. Noting that the quality of recruits and Family Planning" with some 1,200 In 1977 the federal government took had been falling for some time, he said, participants (80 percent of them women) the first step to provide family planning "What we need in this country is a well- in the auditorium of the federal senate. services for the poor. It announced that qualified and capable population. We do The conference recommended that fam- the 1978-81 plan for maternal and child not need numbers of people. . . . A child ily planning should cease to be a privi- health would include family planning who is not well fed in the first year of life lege of the well-to-do, and that the state, services for women for whom pregnan- suffers permanent mental damage, can complemented by private institutions, cies would involve a high health risk. never again be productive, and will should provide family planning informa- Then in October 1983 the minister of always be dependent on society." tion and services. The conference also health announced that a broad new The official position of the Catholic recommended the creation of a new health program for women would he Church is to promote responsible parent- agency to coordinate a National Family implemented beginning in 1984, with hood only by natural means. But at least Planning l'rogram, revision of existing family planning assistance being in- one theologian has publicly argued that laws to allow the use of all means of con- cluded as part of a full range of maternal 'only the couple has the right to choose traception approved by the international and child health care. the means most appropriate for practic- scientific community, and inclusion in Underlying this more active involve- ing responsible parenthood." Increasing primary and secondary school curricula ment in family planning are three trends, concern with social justice is likely to of material on human sexuality and the not entirely unrelated: growing public weaken further the church hierarchy's physiology of reproduction. The closing awareness of Brazil's population prob- opposition to government-supported session of the conference was attended lem, including among important elites family planning programs, as long as the by the president of Brazil, the ministers formerly opposed to family planning state does not try to dictate how many of social welfare and the interior, the act- programs; a growing social demand for children a couple should have or the ing minister of health, a number of fed- (and practice of) family planning; and means to be used to achieve their goal. eral senators and deputies, and the chief the economic recession, which has The taboo on public discussion of fam- of staff of the armed forces. heightened social tensions because of ily planning in Brazil has now ended. A growing unemployment and underem- report on vasectomy was featured in a 172 American countries could all benefit from stronger FIGURE 8.5 policies. Rapid population growth in El Salvador Fertility in relation to income: selected developing has been identified by many as a partial cause of its countries in South Asia, 1972 and 1982 civil war. In Bolivia and Haiti, the poorest coun- Total fertility rate tries in the region, initiatives to slow population 8 growth are among the most urgent policy needs to combat poverty. U 1972 U 1982 7 Bangladesh South Asia: expanding and improving programs Pakistan The 930 million people of Bangladesh, India, 6 Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka comprise one-fifth of world population and one-quarter of the popu- lation of developing countries. Although incomes in South Asia are among the lowest in the world, 5 the region's fertility has already fallen substan- India tially (see Figure 8.5). In Sri Lanka, for example, Iri Lanka the total fertility rate fell from 5.5 in 1960 to 3.5 in 4 1974; in India it dropped from 6.5 in the 1950s to 4.8 in 1982. The rate of contraceptive use (both Norm for 98 develop modern and traditional methods) is 55 percent in 3 Sri Lanka, the highest in the region. About 28 per- 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 cent of couples in India use modern contracep- Income per capita (1980 dollars) tives. No other country at India's level of socio- economic developmentmeasured by low literacy and per capita income and high infant mortality has a lower level of fertility. Bangladesh and Paki- Progress in South Asia has not been uniform, stan have had more modest declines. In Bangla- however, and rapid population growth is a source desh 19 percent of couples use either modern or of continuing concern. In India and Sri Lanka mor- traditional methods (see Figure 8.6). tality has declined as fast as, or faster than, fertil- What accounts for this impressive record? Con- ity. As a result, population growth has increased in tinued progress in raising female literacy and low- Indiaits population is now increasing by 16 mil- ering infant mortality, as well as a concerted effort lion a year, more than in any other country, includ- to expand access to family planning, have both ing China. India's birth rate has remained at 33 to been important. Within India there is wide varia- 34 per thousand since 1976; contraceptive use, tion in fertility and in contraceptive use, a variation steady at 23 to 24 percent since 1976, has only which closely corresponds to patterns of social recently begun to rise again. Total fertility has development. For example, in the state of Kerala, stopped falling in Sri Lanka, and has been fluctuat- which has the lowest total fertility (2.7 in 1978), 75 ing between 3.4 and 3.7 since 1974. In Bangladesh percent of rural women are literate, infant mortal- contraceptive use increased from 8 percent in 1975 ity is 47 per thousand live births, and 32 percent of to 19 percent in 1981, but appears to have made couples are protected by modern contraception. In slow progress since then (though the share of contrast, in the state of Uttar Pradesh total fertility modern methods has apparently risen). In Paki- was 5.6 in 1978, infant mortality is almost four stan only about 5 percent of couples practice con- times higher (171 per thousand), and female liter- traception, and in Nepal only 7 percent. Both of acy and contraceptive use are, respectively, one- these countries lag behind others in providing seventh and one-third the levels found in Kerala. health and family planning services, although both The experience in Sri Lanka is similar. Despite a show signs of a renewed political commitment to per capita income of only $320 in 1982, infant mor- curb population growth. tality had been reduced to 41 per thousand and The experience in Sri Lanka and in some Indian virtually all primary-school-age girls were enrolled states suggests that much more could be done to in school. Of a contraceptive use rate of 55 percent, bring about fertility decline. In every country there almost two-thirds comprised modern methods; is considerable scope for reducing infant mortality, total fertility had declined to 3.4. raising the legal marriage age, and increasing 173 FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have unmet need for contracep- Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh, India, and tion to limit or space births. Pilot projects there Sri Lanka, 1975-83 have achieved rates of contraceptive use of 35 to 40 Percentage of married women aged 15-49 percent with modern methods, three to four times 60 the prevalence of these methods nationwide. In Sri Lanka 44 percent of women of childbearing age who want no more children are nevertheless not 50 practicing contraception. To satisfy unmet need, family planning pro- grams must resolve important issues of access and 40 quality. Access. Better family planning outreach could go a long way to increase contraceptive use 30 throughout the region. Access is most restricted in Nepal and Pakistan. In Nepal there is unmet need for contraception among 22 to 27 percent of eligible 20 women. About half of currently married women in Nepal are unaware of a modern contraceptive 10 method, and an additional 15 percent who are aware do not know where a method can be obtained. In Pakistan, three-quarters of married 0 women of childbearing age knew of a modern 1975 1983-84 1975-76 1982-83 1975 1982 method in 1975, but only 5 percent were using Bangladesh India Sri Lanka one. A quarter to a half of these women had unmet need for contraception to limit births. Since then contraceptive use has stagnated. The government Method plans to meet the need for contraception by greatly Traditional (rhythm, abstinence, withdrawal, other) JUD expanding and upgrading services. Injectable contraceptives and Pill Method mix. Family planning programs in vaginal methods South Asia have continued to emphasize steriliza- Sterilization (male Condom and female) tion to the neglect of reversible methods of contra- ception, particularly in India and Sri Lanka (see Figure 8.6). Sterilization accounts for more than three-quarters of modern contraceptive use in female educationall of which would have a pro- India and Nepal, two-thirds in Sri Lanka, and found effect on fertility. In Bangladesh family plan- about half in Bangladesh. Sterilization is clearly in ning and greater economic independence of demand among couples who want no more chil- women are jointly promoted through credit coop- dren. But other forms of contraception are used eratives for women (see Box 8.8). A few countries less, largely because they are not widely available. are moving beyond schemes that compensate Given the high rate of child mortality in South those who adopt contraception to consider posi- Asia, reversible contraceptive methods may be tive incentives for small families. Bangladesh has more desirable for couples who have had two or contemplated offering bonds to sterilization clients three children but who do not wish to be sterilized with two to three children and to couples who immediately. To maximize contraceptive use, both postpone a first pregnancy or space children at reversible methods and sterilization need to be long intervals (see Box 6.4). India is considering a made available. scheme to give "green cards" to couples sterilized The only widely available reversible method in after two children; these cards would entitle them India is the condom, which is provided through to preferential access to social services. 400,000 retail outlets in the social marketing pro- Desired family size in Bangladesh is now about gram as well as in family planning program out- four; actual size averages about 5.5. Sri Lankan lets. The pill, important in countries such as Indo- women are having on average one child more than nesia, is not offered through social marketing they want. According to a 1979 survey in Bangla- arrangements, and in 1981-82 was being distrib- desh, as many as 41 percent of married women of uted through only 4,500 rural and 2,500 urban out- 174 Box 8.8 Family planning and women's credit cooperatives in Bangladesh The Bangladesh Rural Development turn, take their members' problems and women who want to be sterilized or need Board has been sponsoring credit coop- questions to the training session. other medical help. eratives for rural women since 1975, As of July 1983 the program had estab- A study by the Bangladesh Planning funded by IDA and bilateral cofinanciers lished 1,215 cooperatives with 49,368 Commission in 1978 compared the as a component of two population proj- members, share capital of about $50,000, knowledge and practice of family plan- ects. By providing training and income- and savings of about $104,000. The ning among cooperative members and earning opportunities, the program demand for loans far outstrips the nonmembers with similar socioeconomic seeks to reduce women's dependence on amount available, although the Sonali backgrounds in the project area. In both childbearing for their short- and long- Bank has recently agreed to provide new groups, most women had positive atti- term security. Cooperatives have also capital. The repayment rate has been tudes to family planning. But coopera- been used to transmit information about extremely high, always over 90 percent, tive members knew more about the dif- family planning. They provide a social often near 100 percent. Women have ferent methods and a larger proportion setting that encourages acceptance and taken loans for processing paddy, muri, were practicing contraception. Among continued use of contraception. turmeric, mustard oil, dal, chili, fish, and all members, regardless of age, preg- Membership is open to all women who peanuts; for buying livestock to raise and nancy, or marital status, 31 percent were purchase a share in the cooperative, at sell; for small enterprises, such as pot- using family planning. Of those who ten taka (roughly $0.40). Members must tery, jute goods, or bamboo mats; and in would otherwise be at risk of pregnancy save regularly and attend weekly cooper- a few cases for buying water to irrigate a (married, exposed, in the childbearing ative meetings in their village. In some rice crop or lease land for cultiva\tion. Ini- ages), two thirds were using a method. societies all members are loaned the tially, most loans have gone to individ- In contrast, about 19 percent of married same amount; in others the amount var- uals to generate an immediate return on women of childbearing age were practic- ies, depending on the number of shares, a traditional skill (such as paddy process- ing contraception in Bangladesh as a total savings, or length of membership. ing). As time passes, however, a higher whoLe in 1981. Credit is offered to individuals as well as proportion is going to groups of mem- Another project combining work for to group enterprises. Loans carry an bers for activities that provide a longer- women and family planning is in Maros interest rate of 12.5 percent. Thana-level run return, such as fish breeding, com- Regency, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. It project officers review each cooperative's mercial poultry, and market gardening. has generated income from poultry rais- loan program. All deputy project officers Family planning is on the agenda of ing and tripled contraceptive use among are women who have received 4 to 6 cooperatives' weekly meetings: the members. Private family planning associ- months' special training. methods available, side effects to be ations in thirteen African countries Each cooperative sends one woman to expected, and how to obtain contracep- (Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, a weekly thana-level training and devel- tives and medical attention. Those inter- Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, opment center several miles from the vil- ested in receiving services are referred to Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, lage. These representatives are trained in local family planning and health clinics. and Zaire) are also sponsoring pilot proj- poultry raising, horticulture, health and Cooperative leaders keep track of the ects that promote planned parenthood family planning, loan policy, and cooper- contraceptive status of members, prob- alongside development programs for ative law and procedure. They pass on lems they may have in common, the women. this new information to society members need to switch methods, and special during their weekly meetings and, in arrangements that need to be made for lets. There are plans to train health and family fertilty regulation (rhythm, withdrawal, and so on) planning workers to insert IUDs; they are not yet in 1981, a doubling of the percentage since 1975. permitted to prescribe pills. Although access to Such an increase in use of traditional methods abortion was liberalized as a backup service for attests to growing unmet need for more effective contraceptive failure more than ten years ago, safe spacing methods. Only 664 centers offer the IUD; abortion is still difficult to obtain. An estimated 4 public health midwives have not yet been trained million to 6 million abortions were performed ille- to perform insertions. Injectable contraceptives are gally by unauthorized persons in 1981, compared popular in rural areas because of their conven- with 376,000 performed legally. ience, but are available at only 120 centers. In Sri Lanka 25 percent of married couples of Although Bangladesh continues to stress sterili- childbearing age were using traditional methods of zation, its social marketing project has made avail- 175 able several types of condoms, pills, and spermi- East Asia: incentives for small families cides. And the program has recently put more emphasis on IUDs by offering financial incentives The countries of East Asia have experienced to staff and compensation for travel and lost wages marked declines in fertility in the last decade (see to acceptors. There are plans to train more Figure 8.7). Total fertility (less than 3) and rates of fieldworkers in IUD insertions and menstrual reg- natural increase (about 1.5 percent a year, 2.2 per- ulation, but not all fieldworkers are in place, and cent excluding China) are the lowest of any devel- not all of those who are have received adequate oping region. For the most part, recent declines in training. Injectable contraceptives have proved fertility have occurred in countries where fertility popular in pilot projects, but are available on was already lower than would be expected, given only a limited basis under the supervision of a the region's income. The most dramatic reductions physician. have been in China: total fertility dropped from 7.5 Follow-up. As South Asian programs try to to 2.3 over the past two decades, despite a per meet the demand for a wider range of reversible capita income of only $310 in 1982. Indonesia, the methods, following up acceptors will become even Philippines, and Thailand have also experienced more critical. The emphasis on sterilization has remarkably rapid falls in fertility with only modest meant that staff have had little continuing contact increases in income. with clients. Lack of follow-up services greatly Population policy is more developed in East Asia reduced the acceptability of the IUD throughout than in any other region. In most countries, politi- South Asia in the 1960s; it has only recently cal commitment to reduce rapid population regained public approval. At present, family plan- growth is high. Family planning programs are well ning staff are judged (and are rewarded) according established, with outreach to rural areas and a rea- to the number of acceptors they recruit, not by the sonable mix of contraceptive methods. Many gov- number of users they assist. Programs will have to ernments, irrespective of level of income, have adopt new performance criteria and incentive been highly successful in improving socio- arrangements to stress regular contact with clients. economic conditions favorable to fertility decline. Certain administrative and operational difficul- Ninety percent or more of all girls of primary- ties also need to be resolved. Family planning serv- school age are enrolled in China, Hong Kong, ices have undergone major reorganization in some Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, countries. In Bangladesh, for example, health and Singapore, and Viet Nam. Overall, secondary- family planning services were initially separate, school enrollments are also high in a few coun- then integrated, then divided, and are now reinte- tries-53 percent in Malaysia, 63 percent in the grated. The program in Pakistan has also recently Philippines, and 85 percent in Korea. Life expect- undergone a major reorganization. Whenever ancy in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore has there are such upheavals, staff morale and perfor- risen to seventy years or more and in most other mance suffer. Other problems are manifest in all countries exceeds sixty. In almost all countries, programs. In some cases salaries are so low that infant mortality has been reduced by half or more staff have to take on other work to support their over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, further families. Inadequate training, incomplete staffing substantial reductions could be made in Indonesia patterns, and lack of supervision have also low- (where the rate exceeds 100 per thousand live ered morale and performance. Where it exists, births), China (with a rate of 67), and Thailand, the supervision takes the form of enforcing account- Philippines, and Viet Nam (about 50). ability and targets rather than supportive training Despite dramatic declines in fertility, population and advice. in the region will double in about forty-five years. Program managers have tried to overcome prob- Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thai- lems of morale and supervision in two ways: by land, and Viet Nam all have annual rates of popu- paying workers according to their performance in lation growth of at least 2 percent a year. At its recruiting acceptors, but this system carries the current growth rate of 2.4 percent a year, the popu- risk that follow-up services will be neglected; and lation of the Philippines will increase by half (25 by setting high program targets. But neither incen- million people) by 2000. Even in China, with an tives nor targets can substitute for better training annual increase of 1.2 percent, population will and supervisionthe two requirements that are continue to grow rapidly for a long time because of critical to improving the performance of family the momentum of past growth. According to the planning programs in South Asia. standard projection, China's population will 176 FIGURE 8.7 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia, 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate U 1972 1982 7 6 5 4 3 2 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) increase by almost half, to 1.45 billion by 2050. half the level on Java and Baliin some places Replacement-level fertility is still a long way off for much less. There are also marked regional dispari- Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thai- ties in access to services in the Philippines. land and Viet Nam, with total fertility rates of at In addition, some countries have overlooked least 3.6; total fertility in Korea, at 2.7, is also still potentially important methods. The Indonesian above replacement level. program, for example, does not offer sterilization. Though contraceptive use is higher in East Asia Yet this method has been very popular in South than in most other developing regions, there is still Asia, Korea, Thailand, and some Latin American considerable unmet need for contraception. Low countries. Injectable contraceptives have been and high estimates of unmet need are 19 to 49 much favored in Thailand but are only recently percent of married women of childbearing age in gaining ground in Indonesia. The Korean program the Philippines (1978), 20 to 31 percent in Indone- has emphasized sterilization; wider promotion of sia (1976), 15 to 26 percent in Thailand (1981), and spacing methods might also lower fertility. The as much as 30 percent in Korea (1979). Actual fam- potential demand for spacing methods is demon- ily size exceeds desired family size by one child in strated by the high resort to abortion in Korea. In the Philippines. More than half of eligible couples the Philippines, improving the effectiveness of tra- who want no more children are not using any ditional methods and promoting more effective method of birth control. And among the 36 percent alternatives could have a substantial effect. of Filipino couples using a method, more than half Given the relatively advanced state of popula- are using less effective methods such as with- tion policies, more use could be made of incentives drawal and rhythm. In some countries family plan- and disincentives. Among the countries of East ning programs have not achieved complete geo- Asia, China, Singapore, and to a lesser extent graphic coverage. In Indonesia, for example, Korea, have made greatest use of measures to pro- contraceptive use in the outer islands, where one- mote small families. Sometimes they have relied third of the country's population lives, is less than on individual incentives (such as giving priority in 177 housing schemes to parents with only two chil- same bias in favor of sons exists in Korea, and has dren). Some countries have also offered incentives been partly responsible for keeping total fertility, to whole communities that reach specific targets now at 2.7, from declining to replacement level. To for contraceptive use. Some governments also counteract this bias, governments need public penalize those who have more than a certain num- information campaigns and legal reforms of inheri- ber of childrenfor example, by the withdrawal of tance, property rights, and employment. Incen- maternity benefits. tives might also be offered to one- or two-child China has a complex structure of incentives, dis- families with girls, such as lower educational and incentives, and birth quotas to promote a one-child medical costs or preferred access to schooling. family (see Box 8.9). Most governments have not chosen to promote such drastic measures as those Donor assistance policies in China. And few have the administrative control necessary to implement national schemes of International aid for population programs has two deferred payments or social security to promote major objectives: to assist governments and pri- smaller families. vate organizations in providing family planning, In China the one-child policy has been chal- information, and services, and to assist govern- lenged by an apparent preference for sons. The ments in developing population policies as part of Box 8.9 China's one-child family policy Birth control has been a national priority portion of first births exceeded 80 per- Persistent cia/c A prefer- in China since 1971 when the govern- cent in each of the three large urban ence for sons is a strong cultural impedi- ment launched a new program to pro- municipalitiesBeijing, Shanghai, and ment to having only one child. A 1980 mote later marriage, longer spacing Tianjinand in five other provinces. survey of one-child families in Anhui between births, and fewer children. In But several factors are working against Province found that 61 percent of the the late 1970s it became clear that, with the one-child policy. children of one-child certificate holders the large number of women entering Old-age security. A compulsory pen- were boys. The pressure to have one childbearing age as a result of past high sion system applies only to employees of child (and the desire for a boy) may have fertility and falling mortality, even com- state enterprises in urban areas, who led to a revival of the practice of female pliance with a two-child family norm constitute at most 15 percent of the labor infanticide, about which the Chinese would not reduce the rate of population force. A 1982 survey of rural production government has expressed considerable growth enough to meet the national goal brigades in eleven provinces and munici- concern. The 1982 census data on births of 1.2 billion people by the year 2000. In palities found that only 1 percent of men in 1981 showed that there were 108.5 1979 Sichuan province instituted a policy over sixty-five and women over sixty boys for every 100 girls at birth, an designed to persuade married couples to received monthly pensions paid by wel- abnormally high figure. have no more than one child. This policy fare funds. For the rural majority, chil- Financing incentives. Responsibility was backed by a system of economic dren remain the main source of old-age for financing incentives falls on local rewards to parents with more than one security. areas, not the central government. As a child who committed themselves to have The responsibility system. The wide- result there is great variation in the type no more, and penalties for those who spread introduction of the production and value of incentives. In a model had more than two. This soon became a responsibility system has given families a county in Jilin Province in 1981 families national policy and individual provinces direct economic incentive to have more pledging to have only one child were are all expected to implement such sys- children, for two reasons. In some areas granted annual bonuses of almost fifty tems. In 1980 the vice-premier stated as land for household use is allocated on yuanequivalent to 7 percent of average specific goals that 95 percent of married a per capita basis, so more children rural incometo last for fifteen years, couples in the cities and 90 percent in the ensures access to more land. In addition, and received a double-size private plot. countryside should have only one child. whatever security for the elderly is pro- For their single child they received an By 1982 most provinces and municipali- vided on a collective basis will be adult grain allowance and a special ties had introduced incentives and disin- reduced as collective income declines. In health care allowance. Yet in Hofei city in centives to promote the one-child norm. an effort to combat this, some brigades Anhui province, bonuses paid to parents Early results of the one-child campaign have introduced a double contracting were much lowera one-time payment seem striking. The proportion of first system under which households are of ten or twenty yuan, a few towels, a births out of total births increased from required both to deliver their quota of thermos bottle, some toys, a wash basin, 21 percent in 1970 to 42 percent in 1980 farm output to the state and to refrain or even nothing at all. and 47 percent in 1981. By 1982 the pro- from having an unauthorized birth, 178 their overall development strategy. Population FIGURE 8.8 assistance now amounts to nearly $500 million a External assistance for population programs in year, equal to about 1.9 percent of OECD aid and developing countries about 1.5 percent of OPEC aid. At its peak, the Dollars per capita Current dollars (1982 constant prices) population assistance share of aid was consider- 500 0.20 ably larger-2.2 percent of OECD aid. Since Sweden's first population grant in 1968, donors have transferred more than $7 billion in 400 population aid (in 1982 prices). In terms of per cap- ita receipts in the developing countries, assistance for population programs was lower in 1981 (the 300 0.15 latest year for which complete data are available) than in 1974, the year of the World Population Conference in Bucharest (see Figure 8.8). The 200 United States remains the biggest supporter of population programsits government, along with private American foundations, provides about 40 100 0.10 percent of all aid for population. But its contribu- 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 tion has been falling in real terms since 1972. Japan is the second largest donor. Japan and other Source: UNFPA, 1983. donors, including Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, have increased their share of the total. All gave $10 million or more in population assistance in 1982. The main role of donors has been to provide sup- vide a local base for social and economic research plies and training for family planning and related as well as for contraceptive research. health programs; about two-thirds of population Donor assistance is provided both directly to aid is devoted to family planning and related country programs and through multilateral and maternal and child-health programs. Donors also nongovernmental organizations. The two largest support basic data collection, operations and social organizations are: and economic research, information and education The United Nations Fund for Population Activities activities, and policy and institutional develop- (UNFPA). More than 130 countries contribute to its ment. In Asia and the Middle East, over 80 percent annual budget of about $140 million. About 100 of assistance goes toward family planning services, developing countries have requested and received in Latin America and Africa about 60 percent. In UNFPA assistance. To guide its programming, sub-Saharan Africa, almost a fifth of assistance is UNFPA has assessed the needs of more than sev- used to finance data collection; as Table 8.1 enty countries. It receives requests for assistance showed, data development is often an early step in that far exceed the money it has available. heightening consciousness about population The International Planned Parenthood Federation issues. As shown in Chapter 7, program develop- (IPPF). A nongovernmental body of more than one ment is often constrained by limited training, the hundred national family planning associations, absence of local institutions, and poor demo- IPPF had a 1983 program budget of $90 million, graphic information. Development of local capabil- over half of which came as contributions from ity must continue to be a priority for donors. OECD countries. About one-third of its budget About $150 million is spent by donor govern- support is raised by member associations in their ments for research on reproductive biology and own countries. Countries receiving its largest contraceptive technology; such research contrib- grants in recent years are Brazil, Colombia, India, utes to methods that can be adopted in developing Mexico, and Korea. countries as well. Developing countries could ben- About one-quarter of the population aid from efit from larger sums spent on research and prod- the US government is administered through more uct development. Support by donors is critical than twenty nongovernmental organizations in since spending by the private sector in developed the United States, particularly universities and countries has fallen (see Box 7.2). Donor support research institutions. They cooperate with organi- could hasten development of institutions to pro- zations in developing countries in service delivery 179 and training, data collection and analysis, special extremely important for effective use of population projects, and biomedical and operations research. assistance. Family Planning International Assistance, a branch One sign of the success of international assis- of The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, tance is that many local governments now help the American affiliate of IPPF, provides population pay for programs that only a few years ago were assistance in more than forty countries. The Popu- supported by international grants. Colombia, lation Council, with a budget of $16 million from Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are picking up a both public and private sources, provides technical progressively larger share of the costs of their pop- assistance and supports social science and contra- ulation programs. India has for many years paid ceptive research. The Pathfinder Fund is an exam- for a large share of its program, and China has ple of smaller nongovernmental organizations. always completely financed its own program. This Pathfinder manages about $7 million in public and trend toward self-financing makes it possible to private funds, which are spent on innovative fam- reallocate aid budgets to countries that are only ily planning services, women's programs, and starting to develop their population programs. For population policy development. These small pro- example, the share of the UNFPA's budget going grams, and similar programs in other countries, to Africa rose from about 12 percent during the add to the flexibility and responsiveness of popula- 1970s to 23 percent in 1983. tion assistance. Asia continues to receive the bulk of population The World Bank supports population activities assistance (51 percent of the total), followed by through IDA credits and loans to borrowers. Over Latin America (20 percent), Africa (15 percent), a period of fourteen years, the Bank has committed and the Middle East (14 percent). Given the $355 million for population projects, and had dis- emerging pattern of needs described in Chapter 7, bursed $215 million by the end of 1983 (including a substantial increase in assistance is needed, espe- $38.4 million in fiscal year 1983 itself). World Bank cially for Africa and South Asia. To meet unmet finance is not available on terms as easy as most need in all regions in 1980 would have required population assistance, much of which is given in spending $3 billion rather than the $2 billion that the form of grants; nonetheless, Bank operations was actually spent (see Chapter 7, Table 7.6). By grew in real terms by more than 5 percent a year the same yardstick, spending for population pro- between 1977 and 1983. Over the past three years grams in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia the largest disbursements have gone to Bangla- should have been more than double what it was. desh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Since Africa and South Asia are the poorest and Thailand, which together accounted for more regions and most in need of external assistance, than 90 percent of Bank lending for population. the bulk of the extra program support would have The World Bank also supports an active program had to have come from international aid. of economic and sector work aimed at enhancing The analysis in Chapter 7 led to two estimates of understanding of how population growth affects required public spending for population programs development prospects and how population pro- by the year 2000. If developing countries are to grams can contribute to overall development. The achieve a "rapid" decline in fertility, $7.6 billion Bank cooperates with other UN organizations, (in 1980 dollars), almost a quadrupling of 1980 especially UNFPA and the World Health Organiza- spending, would be needed. The "standard" tion, in research and analysis requested by mem- decline would require $5.6 billion. With two-thirds ber governments. of external population assistance going to support The predominance of foreign assistance within family planning, foreign aid now supports about the population sector in many countries means 25 percent of all family planning costs in develop- that the attitudes and priorities of donors become ing countries. Assuming these proportions do not significant. At the same time, the great number of change, population assistance will need to triple donorsprivate, official, bilateral, and multila- (standard decline) or quadruple (rapid decline) its teralmeans that their priorities may not always current level. A quadrupling would raise popula- coincide. They may send conflicting signals to tion assistance to an annual level of $2 billion (1980 host governments, fueling internal controversies. dollars) by the year 2000. With no other changes in Further, their numerous activities may not be official development assistance, total aid for all complementary or represent the most efficient assistance programs would increase by 5 percent, allocation of resources. Coordination among by no means an unmanageable addition to aid donors and with the host government is therefore budgets. With the expected growth of industrial 180 countries as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, and aid from donors can, given effective policies in recipi- as a constant share of their GNP, expanded popu- ent countries, make a big difference in population lation assistance would by the year 2000 need to change. Sustained progress, however, requires not equal 3.3 percent (to achieve standard fertility just donor funds; it also requires a commitment by decline) or 4.3 percent (to achieve rapid fertility the international community to population pro- decline) of total concessional assistance. grams as a critical part of the effort to improve Thus, small differences in financial assistance people's lives. 181 9 Ten years of experience Much that is new about the two themes of this another group of middle-income countries. Many Report has been revealed in the past ten years. In of them, principally in East Asia, have managed to 1974, with oil prices quadrupled and the world maintain rapid economic growth without running sliding into recession, there was pessimism about into serious balance of payments difficulties. The the economic prospects of the non-oil developing most successfulKorea and Hong Kong, for exam- countries. In 1974, at the World Population Confer- plehad GDP growth of more than 10 percent a ence in Bucharest, there was debate about the rela- year in 1974-79, slowing down to about 6 percent a tive merits of development and family planning year in 1980-83. Although they increased their programs as alternative ways of slowing down external debt in the past ten years, they expanded population growth. Today, both these issues are their exports so rapidly that their debt service viewed in a different light; neither economic pessi- ratios never rose as much as did some in Latin mism nor the development-family planning America. dichotomy captures what has actually happened in The contrasting performance of these two developing countries. The achievements of the groups of middle-income countries is the result of developing countries have been much more var- their contrasting policies. East Asian countries ied, but they do point to one general conclusion of have in general adopted policies to promote great importance. In both economic growth and exports, largely by maintaining competitive population, differences among countries are exchange rates. This has enabled them to expand largely attributable to differences in policy. their exports rapidly, has restricted imports on the basis of price rather than by quota, and has not made foreign loans seem attractively cheap in Economic adjustment domestic currency terms. East Asian countries Much attention has been paid to the difficulties of have also tended to maintain positive real interest developing countries that borrowed heavily in the rates, which have encouraged domestic saving and 1970s but then found that they could not service have ensured that investment has been directed to their debts. Many of those countries have had to the areas of highest return. Their future prospects seek the support of the IMF and the collaboration depend largely on their maintaining the same suc- of banks and governments in rescheduling debts cessful mix of policies. But those policies will and arranging new credits. Most have also cut achieve their full potential only if the industrial back on imports, a reduction that has improved countries eschew the trade barriers that would their external accounts but at considerable cost to hold back exports. economic growth, investment, and employment. A third group of developing countries has expe- This short-term cost has underlined the priority of rienced only slow economic growth in the past ten their longer-term taskto redirect their economies years, and its future looks little brighter than its to earn more foreign exchange so that growth, past. This group includes many of the poorest along with external accounts, can be restored to countries in the world, mainly in sub-Saharan healthy levels. Their efforts deserve the support of Africa. These countries have been badly affected the international community, both in providing aid by slow growth in the industrial world, which has and trade credits and, above all, in resisting any weakened the prices of many of the primary com- protectionist measures that would hamper the modities on which they still depend for about 90 debtor countries' exports. percent of their export earnings. They have had Prominent though they are, the problems of big difficulties in servicing the little commercial debt debtors should not obscure the achievements of they have; their capital inflows are largely in offi- 182 cial aid, which has risen in real terms at only 6.5 end of the scale, middle-income major exporters of percent a year in the past ten years, not much manufactures would enjoy GDP growth averaging above the rate of growth of population. 6.3 percent a year in 1985-95. The diversity that The problems of sub-Saharan Africa are of a dif- has been such a prominent feature of the world ferent order from those faced by the middle- economy in the past ten years seems likely to income countries. Most African countries still lack persist. the institutions and human skills that are prerequi- sites for rapid economic growth. These resources Population change: success and new challenge need to be developed as a matter of urgency, and substantial foreign assistance must be forthcoming The accumulating evidence on population change to finance the effort. Nevertheless, African coun- in developing countries underscores the strong tries could do much to improve their prospects by link between fertility decline and the general level reforming their policies. Even among the poorest of socioeconomic development, and the contribu- countries, some have done better than others, tion that family planning programs can make to largely by raising producer prices to farmers, by slowing population growth. Differences in fertility maintaining competitive exchange rates, and in among and within countries are related less to general by using prices rather than government income per person than to life expectancy, female directives to allocate resources. literacy, and the income of poorer groups. They The need for adjustment is not confined to the are also related to availability of family planning developing countries. Part I of this Report argued services. Thus Sri Lanka has lower fertility than that many of the failings in the world economy India, and India has lower fertility than Pakistan. have their roots in the industrial countries, whose Colombia has lower fertility than Brazil, and Brazil financial and economic weight greatly influences has lower fertility than Peru. Egypt has lower fer- economic prospects in the developing world. To tility than Morocco. Countries which have made a varying degrees, the industrial countries have substantial and sustained effort in family planning been unwilling to tackle the rigidities in their econ- have achieved remarkable success; where educa- omies. They have maintained capacity in obsoles- tion is widespread, the success is even more strik- cent industries, by subsidies or by restricting ing. The evidence accumulated in the past decade imports. Their macroeconomic policies caused, is especially convincing. Contraceptive use tripled first, a rapid inflationary buildup in the 1970s and and fertility fell by 30 percent in Mexico between then, in the past three years of disinflation, high 1974 and 1979. In Java, Indonesia, contraceptive real interest rates resulting from the conflict use rose from 11 percent to more than 50 percent between monetary restraint and relative fiscal and total fertility fell from almost 5 to about 4 laxity. between 1974 and 1980. In Kerala state of India, Until the industrial countries correct these the total fertility fell from 4.1 in 1972 to 2.7 in 1978; underlying weaknesses, the prospects for the per capita income is low, but female literacy is high world economy will remain clouded. Some sce- and family planning services are widespread. narios presented in Chapter 3 suggest that, with- But there is also evidence that further fertility out an improvement in the performance of the decline, and the initiation of decline where it has industrial countries, GDP in the developing world not begun, will not come automatically. There are as a whole would grow at only 4.7 percent a year in two points to bear in mind. One is that in most 1985-95. Within that total, growth in sub-Saharan developing countries desired family size is about Africa would be as low as 2.8 percent a year. This is four. It is higher in rural areas and among the less less than the likely rate of population growth, so educated. Without sustained improvements in liv- that people in many of the world's poorest coun- ing conditions, desired family size could remain tries would get steadily poorer. Among developing around fourimplying population growth rates at countries as a group, improvement in domestic or above 2 percent. The second is that family plan- policies could raise growth to 5.1 percent a year if ning programs, successful as they have been, have industrial-country growth is weak. Even with by no means reached their full potential. In virtu- faster growth in the industrial countries (and no ally every country surveyed, many couples who change in domestic policies), Africa's prospects say they want no more children do not use contra- would not brighten much; GDP growth of 3.2 per- ceptionusually because they have poor access to cent a year in that region in 1985-95 would not be modern services. In many areas where services are enough to raise per capita incomes. At the other available, discontinuation rates are highoften 183 because few effective methods are offered, and which in turn means new investments just to because follow-up services are limited. maintain per capita output. In cities, rapid popula- It has been almost two decades since the peak of tion growth heightens the organizational and population growth in developing countries was administrative difficulties of managing urban passed. But the turnaround to slower growth has growth; redistribution policies offer little relief at been slow and has not occurred everywhere. high cost. Increases in population size are projected to mount Population growth would not be a problem if for another two decades, and in many countries of economic and social adjustments could be made the developing world, populations will triple in fast enough, if technical change could be guaran- size by the year 2050, even assuming substantial teed, or if rapid population growth itself inspired declines in fertility. Two decades after the turn- technical change. But rapid population growth, if around, the slow pace of change and its uneven anything, makes adjustment more difficult. It incidence point more than ever to rapid population brings at best only the gradual adaptation that is growth as a central development concern. typical of agriculture, maintaining but not increas- ing per capita output. The money and research A development problem skills needed for modern technological change are overwhelmingly in the rich countries, where pop- The focus of this Report has been different from ulation growth is slow. If anything they produce neomalthusian descriptions of population as a labor-saving, not labor-using, innovations. In problem. World population has grown faster, to today's developed countries fertility was never as higher numbers, than Malthus would have imag- high as in developing countries now, and mortal- ined; world production and income have grown ity fell more slowly. Population growth rarely too. The future may be more difficult; in the very exceeded 1.5 percent a year; rural population long run, history may seem to vindicate Malthus growth had virtually ended by the beginning of and the problem of population may indeed be one the twentieth century. of numbers outrunning world resources. But for the next five or six decades, the problem goes Appropriate policies beyond one of global resources and is less easily amenable to any technological fix. It is a mismatch Part II of this Report dwells at length on the mean- between population and income-producing ability, ing and implications of a paradox. On the one a mismatch that leaves many of the world's people hand, the social costs of large families are high, in a vicious circle of poverty and high fertility. In and in some families children suffer directly from this Report rapid population growth is associated, having many siblings. On the other hand, poor at household and national levels, with slower parents make a reasonable choice in having many progress in raising living standards, especially of children. High infant and child mortality and poor the poor. At the national and the family level, educational and job opportunities mean that par- rapid population growth exacerbates the difficult ents with few children cannot feel secure about choice between higher levels of living now and their own future until they have had four or five investment, for example in children's schooling, to babiesincluding, in some settings, two or three bring higher levels of living in the future. It is the sons. The very idea of planning pregnancies may poor who have many children; caught by the pov- be unknown, and modern contraceptives may be erty of their parents, those children carry their dis- unavailable or expensive. In such a context, each advantages into the next generation. Still rapid individual family's decision to have another child population growth in most countries-2 percent to seems rational. Yet added together, these separate more than 4 percent a yearmeans up to 50 per- decisions make all families, and especially chil- cent of populations are under age fifteen, so job dren, worse off in the end. There is a gap between creation for many years will be a formidable task. the private and social gains to large families. The For some countries and many rural families, high gap is caused in large part by poverty and the fertility means extra resources must go into agri- resulting lack of access to opportunities that would culture just to keep pace with food requirements. encourage small families. In many countries still largely dependent on agri- The process of economic development itself gen- culture, there is little or no unused land that can be erates new signals that lower fertility. Decisions cheaply brought under cultivation; raising produc- change as women become more educated, as more tion means increasing yields on existing land, children survive childhood disease, as children 184 become less valuable as workers and sources of As Chapter 7 showed, if current public expendi- old-age security, and as information about the pos- tures on family planning in developing countries sibility of birth control spreads. Parents time the were increased by 50 percent, it would be possible births of children, have fewer of them, and spend to meet the need that more than 65 million couples more on their health and schooling. now have for family planning services. Quadru- The gap between the private and social gains to pling the funds by the year 2000 is necessary to high fertility provides additional justification for bring the "rapid" fertility decline described in governments to act in areas that already merit gov- Chapter 4. These targets are ambitious but not ernment action. This Report has emphasized pol- hugely expensive: quadrupling the foreign aid icy measures to increase people's welfare as well spent on population programs would mean spend- as (and as a means) to reduce fertility: education ing a total of about $2 billion (in 1980 dollars), (particularly for girls) and more primary health equivalent to about 5 percent of all aid programs in care for mothers and children. But it has also noted 1982. A new generation of programs is now build- that measures to raise living standards take time to ing on the past, emphasizing easier access through lower fertility. On the one hand, this underscores outreach programs, and, to reduce discontinua- the need to act now to improve education, to tion, greater choice of methods, follow-up of cli- reduce mortality, and to improve women's oppor- ents, and better communication between pro- tunities, so that a sustained decline in fertility can viders and clients. These programs are not be realized in the long run. On the other hand, it expensive but will require new financing to reach also means that other actions with a more immedi- growing numbers of users. ate payoff are desirable. Virtually no developing This Report has shown that economic and social country is yet doing all it might to promote later progress helps slow population growth; but it has marriage and to inform people of the health and also emphasized that rapid population growth fertility benefits of breastfeeding. And in countries hampers economic development. It is therefore in which parents have only as many children as imperative that governments act simultaneously they want, but the desired number of children is on both fronts. For the poorest countries, develop- still high, carefully designed financial incentives ment may not be possible at all, unless slower pop- provide an additional mechanism to encourage ulation growth can be achieved soon, even before lower fertility. higher real incomes would bring down fertility At the same time, new data on fertility and con- spontaneously. In middle-income countries, a con- traceptive use show that many couples still have tinuation of high fertility among poor people could more children than they want and do not benefit prolong indefinitely the period before develop- from adequate family planning services. The gap ment significantly affects their lives. No one would between actual and desired family size means that argue that slower population growth alone will a public policy to provide family planning informa- ensure progress; poor economic growth, poverty, tion and services will bring fertility closer to and inequality can persist independently of popu- socially desirable levels at the same time that it lation change. But evidence described in this helps couples have the number of children they Report seems conclusive: because poverty and want. Though the private sector might be expected rapid population growth reinforce each other, to fill this need, and has done so to some extent in donors and developing countries must cooperate urban areas, it cannot make much progress in rural in an effort to slow population growth as a major areas, where backup health systems are poor and part of the effort to achieve development. information about birth control spreads only slowly. 185 Population data supplement The six tables and two maps in this Supplement culated by applying a schedule of age-specific fer- provide demographic and policy-related data in tility rates, scaled to agree with the given total addition to those presented in the World Develop- fertility rate, to the female population, classified ment Indicators, Tables 19-25. In the tables of this by age group, for the period. These births enter Supplement, countries are listed in ascending the population as the youngest cohort; each cohort order of 1982 income per capita, except for those grows older in accordance with assumed mortality for which no GNP per capita can be calculated. conditions. These are listed in alphabetical order, in italics, at The fertility assumptions were entered in the the end of the per capita income group into which form of total and age-specific fertility rates, and they probably fall. An alphabetical listing of coun- mortality assumptions in the form of expectations tries and the reference numbers indicating this of life at birth or mortality levels based on stan- order can be found in the key to the Indicators. dardized Irfe tables. Migration assumptions were Tables 1 and 3 through 6 include only low- and entered in the form of the number of net migrants middle-income countries for which data are avail- in each five-year period by sex and age; the age able. In Tables 3 through 6, countries with fewer distribution of migrants was obtained from a than one million inhabitants are listed under a sep- model on the basis of their overall sex ratio. Migra- arate heading in ascending order of 1982 income tion assumptions do not vary for alternative fertil- per capita, except for those for which no GNP per ity and mortality scenarios, but for most countries capita can be calculated. The latter are listed in net migration was assumed to reach zero by 2000. alphabetical order, in italics, at the end of the table. The sources of data for base-year population esti- Figures in the colored bands are summary mea- mates are discussed in the technical note to Table sures for groups of countries. The letter w after a 19 of the World Development Indicators. summary measure indicates that it is a weighted For the standard projection, the future path for fer- average, the letter t that it is a total. Figures in tility is based on the experience of a group of coun- italics are for years other than, but generally tries for which a judgment regarding the future within, two years of those specified. The symbol year of reaching replacement-level fertility could (.) indicates less than half the unit shown, . . not be made with relative confidence. The assumed available, and n.a. not applicable. All data are sub- year for replacement-level fertility in these coun- ject to the same cautions regarding reliability and tries was regressed on several predictors: the cur- cross-country comparability that are noted in the rent total fertility rate for each country, the change World Development Indicators. in this rate over the previous ten years, the propor- tion of couples using contraception, and the cur- Table 1. Population projections rent female life expectancy. On the basis of this regression, a year for reaching replacement-level The population projections here as well as in Table fertility (constrained to fall between the years 2000 19 of the World Development Indicators were and 2050) was calculated for every country. (Fertil- made on the basis of a World Bank computer pro- ity in industrial countries already below replace- gram that uses a modified cohort-component ment level was assumed to rise to replacement by method to simulate the effects of various fertility, 2000.) For each country a curve was mathemati- mortality, and migration assumptions on future cally fitted for the course of the total fertility rate population size and age structure in successive between the current year and the year of replace- five-year periods. Births for each period were cal- ment-level fertility. The curves were chosen to pro- 186 vide accelerating decline early on (in some cases Table 2. Population composition after a few years of constant fertility), followed by decelerating decline as fertility approaches replace- The dependency ratio is the combined population ment level. Fertility is assumed to remain at under fifteen and over sixty-four years as a per- replacement level once it has been reached. centage of the population between those ages. The The future path for mortality is based on the dependency ratio for 2000 is derived from the assumption that increments to life expectancy standard World Bank population projections used depend on the level reached. Changes in female in Table 1 of this Supplement and in Table 19 of the life expectancies between 1965-69 and 1975-79 World Development Indicators. were regressed on the initial life expectancies, sep- arately for two groups of countries: those with female primary-school enrollment percentages Table 3. Contraceptive use and unmet need under 70, and those with percentages of 70 or more (including developed countries). Estimates Current use of contraception is expressed as the per- of one-year increments were obtained by dividing centage of currently married women aged 15-49 the estimated ten-year increments from these two using each method of contraception. For El Salva- equations by ten. dor, Thailand, Guatemala, Jamaica, Korea, Pan- Alternative projections build in more rapid fertil- ama, and Venezuela the base is currently married ity and mortality decline. For rapid fertility decline women aged 15-44; for Kenya and Sudan it is the future path of fertility is based on the experi- ever-married women aged 15-50. Sterilization ence of eleven developing countries, including includes both male and female sterilization. Vaginal China, Colombia, and Thailand, that have had methods include spermicides and the diaphragm. rapid fertility decline since World War II. Once fer- Other methods include rhythm, withdrawal, absti- tility decline began in these countries, the total fer- nence, and in some cases douche and folk meth- tility rate fell by a roughly constant amountabout ods. The sum of prevalence for each method may 0.2every year. A constant linear decline at the not add to the total because of rounding. average pace of these eleven countries provides Low and high estimates of unmet need for contra- the path for rapid fertility decline, with the added ception are calculated only for women who want proviso that decline ends when replacement level no more children; they do not include women who is reached and fertility thereafter stays at replace- wish to delay a birth. The low estimate includes ment level. married women of reproductive age who want no Summary measures for country groups may dif- more children, are not using any method of contra- fer from those in Table 19 of the Indicators because ception, and are exposed to the risk of pregnancy projections were not computed for all countries. (that is, are fecund, not pregnant, not breastfeed- For rapid mortality decline, a logistic curve was ing, or breastfeeding more than a year). The high derived to represent the trend in life expectancy estimate includes, in addition to the above, those among developing countries between 1960 and who are using less effective contraceptive methods 1980 (see the chart in Box 4.5). Fourteen countries (rhythm, withdrawal, and the like), as well as that substantially outperformed this curve (and those breastfeeding less than one year. had initial life expectancies above forty) were used Data for contraceptive prevalence and unmet to derive a second logistic curve. This second curve need are all from nationally representative World provided the time path for rapid mortality decline. Fertility Surveys (WFS) and Contraceptive Preva- The rate of natural increase is the difference lence Surveys (CPS) for the years specified. The between births and deaths per hundred popula- figures for contraceptive use may differ from fig- tion. Summary measures are weighted by popula- ures in Table 20 of the World Development Indica- tion in 1982. tors because more recent estimates, based not on The total fertility rate represents the number of surveys but on family planning program statistics, children that would be born to a woman if she are included there. Figures in italics refer to earlier were to live to the end of her childbearing years years than stated: Bangladesh (1979), Sri Lanka and were to bear children at each age at prevailing (1975), Tunisia (1978), Jamaica (1975-76), Panama age-specific fertility rates. The rate for 2000 is given (1976), and Mexico (1978). Surveys in three coun- under the assumptions of both standard and rapid tries did not achieve national coverage: Sudan fertility decline. Summary measures are weighted (northern population only); Mauritania (sedentary by 1982 population. population only); and Malaysia (peninsula only). 187 Table 4. Factors influencing fertility percentage of males aged fifteen and over who can read and write divided by the percentage of The mean number of living children includes children females aged fifteen and over who can read and living at the time of the survey. Desired family size is write. Data are from UNESCO, WFS, and CPS. based on the response to the question: "If you The percentage aged 15-49 ever enrolled in primary could choose exactly the number of children to school was estimated by assigning past primary- have in your whole life, how many would that school enrollment rates to five-year age groups of be?" Figures are the means for survey respondents the 1980 population aged 15-49 and weighting who gave numerical answers. these rates by the proportion of each five-year age Both the number of living children and desired group in the total 1980 population aged 15-49. family size generally pertain to all ever-married The singu late mean age at marriage is the mean age women aged 15-49, with the exception of Sudan at first marriage among people who marry by age and Kenya (aged 15-50), Costa Rica and Panama 50. It is calculated using data on the proportion (aged 20-49), Venezuela (aged 15-44), and Mauri- ever married in each age group of the current pop- tania (aged 12-50). Desired family size figures for ulation, and thus does not reflect the experience of Ghana and Turkey are for currently married any particular age cohort. The sources for this women, and for Barbados for all women of child- column are Smith (1980) and Balkaran and Smith bearing age. Living children data for Barbados, (forthcoming), as cited in the notes for Table 4, and Kenya, and Nigeria are for all women of childbear- various WFS country reports. ing age. The economically active population includes the The percentage of women aged 15-19 ever married armed forces and the unemployed but excludes includes common-law and consensual unions, as housewives, students, and other inactive groups. well as legal marriages. Data are from the US Bureau of the Census. Mean duration of breastfeeding is the number of months a woman would breastfeed, on average, if Table 6. Family planning policy she followed current practice. It is derived using life-table techniques and survey data on current Support for family planning exists if a government breastfeeding status for all births. subsidizes family planning services. Governments Sources for this table are WFS and CPS surveys are characterized as providing support for demo- for the years specified, as reported in country graphic and other reasons (that is, specifically to reports and in the following publications: Maryson reduce population growth, as well as for other rea- Hodgson and Jane Gibbs, "Children Ever Born," sons), support for health and human rights reasons, WFS Comparative Studies no. 12, 1980; Robert E. or no support. Lightbourne and Alphonse L. MacDonald, "Fam- Indicators of support and year the official family ily Size Preferences," WFS Comparative Studies no. planning program started are based on the following 14, 1982; Benoit Ferry and David P. Smith, "Breast- sources: Dorothy Nortman and Joanne Fisher, Pop- feeding Differentials," WFS Comparative Studies no. ulation and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium 23, 1983; Hazel Ashurst and John B. Casterline, of Data through 1981 (New York: Population Coun- "Socioeconomic Differentials in Current Fertility," cil, 1982); John A. Ross, ed., International Encyclope- WFS Comparative Studies: Additional Tables, forth- dia of Population (New York: The Free Press, 1982); coming; David P. Smith, "Age at First Marriage," United Nations, Department of International Eco- WFS Comparative Studies no. 87, 1980; and Sundat nomic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Balkaran and David P. Smith, "Marriage Dissolu- "Population Policy Briefs: Current Situation in tion and Remarriage," WFS Comparative Studies: Developing Countries and Selected Territories, Additional Tables, forthcoming. Figures in italics are 1982"; and World Bank sources. for years other than those specified: Bangladesh The family planning index for 1972 and 1982 is (1975-76), Indonesia (1979), Korea (1974), and adapted from the background paper by Robert Tunisia (1980). The figure on percentage of women Lapham and W. Parker Mauldin. They assigned a aged 15-19 ever married for Indonesia is from the numerical index to countries on the basis of 1979 National Socioeconomic Survey. responses to detailed questionnaires of individuals familiar with family planning activities in each Table 5. Status of women country. An average of three respondents per country assessed such factors as official political The ratio of adult male to adult female literacy is the commitment, availability and quality of family 188 planning services (public and commercial), the maximum possible index are recorded as A, 60 method mix, outreach, use of mass media, local to 79 percent as B, 40 to 59 percent as C, 20 to 39 financial support, and record keeping and evalua- percent as D, and 0 to 19 percent as E. tion. Countries that received 80 percent or more of Contraceptive prevalence 0-9 percent Colors on this map represent the per- which also gives prevalence rates by centage of women of reproductive age type of contraception, and Table 20 of 10-34 percent (15 to 49 years) who use any type of the World Development Indicators. 35-59 percent contraception. Countries colored yel- The range of contraceptive prevalence 60-100 percent low, for example, have fewer than 10 for Brazil has been estimated, based percent of married women using con- on data from private sources and sur- Data not available traception. The data are from Table 3, veys in several states. These charts show the prevalence of Colombia Sri Lanka Thailand Sterilization 1978 1982 1978 specific contraceptive methods in three developing countries. The method mix Female varies greatly across countries, though Male effective modern methods generally predominate. Similar variability exists Pill across developed countries. Condom Injectables. diaphragm, spermicide Rhythm, withdrawal, and other 189 Births and total fertility Iceland Canada Ireland - NorwaE United Kingdom.. Sweden_ Fin land Denmark United Staten Nether- Fed Rep. Poland USSI lands Germany Belgium France Czechoslovakia Switz us Hun- Spain rria gary Ronrarria Bahamas Yugoslavia Italy Meruco L1Cuba1 L1incan Rep Bul- Albania paris Turkey 1-i rjHaiti Jamaica Puerto Rico (US) Greecej lslai St. Kitts-Nevis Malta Cyprus Lebanon Syrian D Martinique (Fr) Arab Rep of I Tunisia Libya Is aek.. St. Lucia Jordan Iraq Guatemala 0 Barbados Morocco Arab Rep 0 Saudi St. Vincent and - the Grenadinen Egypt Kuwsit El Salvador Honduras Grenada Arabia Algeria Nicaragua Yemen Unite Costa Rica 1 Trinidad and Tobago Arab Rep Arab Mau itania Panama I Mali / Emirv suriname hGuyana Cape Verdeo Senegal Niger Chad Sudan Yvrnen. PDR Oman Venezuela The Gambia Upper Colombia Volta Guinea-Bissas Guinea Ivory Ecuador Ghana Sierra Coast Somalia Leone Nigeria Ethiopia Brazil Liber aj 0 0) Pe U 0 Bolivia Paraguay Central African Rep Kenya Chile Equatorial Gaineao uruguay Cameroorr Uganda GabonL...J entina Peoplen Rep. Congo Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Angola Zaire Corrroros Mozam Zambia Malawi bique J Namibial Botswvna. Zimbabwe ED L Swazi- land Tota fertility rate under 3 South Africa ri Lesotho 0 3 to 4.4 4.5 to 5.9 6 or more Number of births - 1,000,000 P 50,000 190 Mongolia Gem. Rep L Korea China Rep ot Korea Nepal Rh ut an Ihan 1st an Pakistan Japan Bangladesh 0 /_ (UK) 5- Burma 0 Hong Kong India Thailand 1 EE Guam (US) Viet Nam Singapore [__J Papua New Guinea Sri Lanka Western Samoa Fiji ONew Caledonia Australia (Fr) Countries on this map are drawn in proportion to the number of births in UNew Zealand 1982. Thus India, with more than 24 million births, appears as the largest country, and China, with about 21 million births, is slightly smaller. The colors represent each country's total fertility rate, which corresponds to the number of births a woman would have if during her childbearing years she were to bear children at each age in accord with current age-specific fer- tility rates. 191 Table 1. Population projections Rate of natural Total fertility Projected population (millions) increase, 2000 rate, 2000 Population Standard Rapid fertility Rapid fertility and Rapid Rapid (millions) projection decline only mortality decline Standard fertility Standard fertility mid-1982 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 projection decline projection decline Low-income economies 76 t 3,107 t 5,092 t 2,917 t 4,021 t 2,931 4,225 t 1.6w 3.0 2.3 u China 1,008 1,196 1,450 1,196 1,450 1,185 1,462 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 Other low-income 1,268 t 1,911 t 3,642 t 1,721 t 2,571 t 1,746 2,763 2.0w 1.2w 3.9 w 2.6 c 1. Chad 5 7 17 6 8 6 9 2.4 1.0 5.6 2.7 2. Bangladesh 93 157 357 136 212 139 230 2.6 1.3 5.1 2.8 3. Ethiopia 33 57 164 48 77 50 84 3.0 1.3 6.1 2.9 4. Nepal 15 24 54 21 31 22 35 2.4 1.1 5.3 2.8 5. Mali 7 12 31 10 16 10 17 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.9 6. Burma 35 53 99 48 73 48 77 2.0 1.2 3.6 2.3 7. Zaire 31 55 136 45 73 46 79 3.1 1.4 5.8 2.7 8. Malawi 7 12 35 10 17 10 19 3.3 1.9 7.1 4.0 9. Upper Volta 7 10 25 8 13 9 15 2.9 1.3 6.0 2.9 10. Uganda 14 25 67 21 35 21 39 3.3 1.7 6.4 3.2 11. India 717 994 1,513 927 1,313 938 1,406 1.5 1.1 2.9 2.4 12. Rwanda 6 11 34 9 17 9 19 3.8 2.2 7.6 4.5 13. Burundi 4 7 20 6 10 6 11 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.9 14. Tanzania 20 36 93 31 51 31 55 3.2 1.5 5.8 2.8 15. Somalia 5 7 16 6 8 6 10 2.5 1.1 6.1 3.1 16. Haiti 5 7 13 7 10 7 10 1.9 1.4 3.4 2.4 17. Benin 4 7 18 6 9 6 10 3.1 1.5 5.9 2.9 18. Central African Rep. 2 4 10 3 5 3 5 2.7 1.1 5.6 2.5 19. China 1,008 1,196 1,450 1,196 1,450 1,185 1,462 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 20. Guinea 6 9 20 7 11 8 12 2.4 1.0 6.1 3.1 21. Niger 6 11 29 9 15 9 16 3.1 1.5 6.4 3.2 22. Madagascar 9 16 42 14 22 14 24 3.0 1.4 5.9 2.8 23. Sri Lanka 15 21 31 20 28 20 28 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.1 24. logo 3 5 13 4 7 4 7 3.1 1.4 5.9 2.9 25. Ghana 12 24 66 20 36 21 39 3.5 1.9 6.3 3.2 26. Pakistan 87 140 302 120 181 122 197 2.5 1.2 4.8 2.5 27. Kenya 18 40 120 34 69 35 73 4.1 2.7 7.1 4.2 28. Sierra Leone 3 5 11 4 6 4 7 2.4 1.0 6.1 3.1 29. Afghanistan 17 25 55 24 38 25 42 2.1 1.5 5.6 4.2 30. Bhutan 2 3 2 2 2 2 2.0 0.9 5.1 2.9 31. Kampuchea, Dem. 7 10 17 9 12 9 13 1.4 0.7 3.9 2.7 32. Lao PDR 4 6 14 5 8 5 8 2.9 1.3 5.9 2.9 33. Mozambique 13 24 63 20 33 20 35 3.1 1.5 5.9 2.8 34. Viet Nam 57 88 154 81 125 81 130 2.0 1.4 3.1 2.1 Middle-income economies 1,120 t 1,695 t 3,144 t 1,542 t 2,321 1,556 t 2,437 2.0w 1.4 cv 3.5 w 2.4 w Lower-middle-income 673 t 1,023 t 1,993 t 927 t 1,406 t 937 t 1,490 t 2.1 w 1.4 w 3.7w 2.5 w 35. Sudan 20 34 86 29 46 30 50 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.9 36. Mauritania 2 3 6 2 3 2 3 2.8 1.1 5.9 2.7 37. Yemen, PDR 2 3 9 3 5 3 5 3.2 1.5 6.3 3.1 38. Liberia 2 4 10 3 5 3 6 3.2 1.6 6.2 3.1 39. Senegal 6 10 26 9 14 9 15 2.8 1.3 6.0 2.9 40. Yemen Arab Rep. 8 12 32 11 17 11 19 3.0 1.4 6.2 3.1 41. Lesotho 1 2 5 2 3 2 3 2.7 1.2 5.2 2.4 42. Bolivia 6 9 18 8 13 9 14 2.2 1.4 4.2 2.7 43. Indonesia 153 212 330 197 285 198 298 1.5 1.2 2.8 2.3 44. Zambia 6 11 29 10 16 10 18 3.3 1.6 6.1 3.0 45. Honduras 4 7 14 6 11 6 12 2.6 1.7 4.1 2.7 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 63 102 58 84 58 88 1.7 1.2 3.0 2.3 47. El Salvador 5 8 15 8 12 8 13 2.2 1.5 3.3 2.2 192 Rate of natural Total fertility Projected population (millions) increase, 2000 rate, 2000 Population Standard Rapid fertility Rapid fertility and Rapid Rapid (millions) projection decline only mortality decline Standard fertility Standard fertility mid-1982 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 projection decline projection decline 48. Thailand 49 68 102 64 89 64 92 1.5 1.3 2.6 2.2 49. Papua New Guinea 3 5 8 4 6 4 7 2.0 1.3 3.6 2.4 50. Philippines 51 73 116 68 100 68 103 1.7 1.4 2.7 2.1 51. Zimbabwe 8 16 49 14 28 14 30 4.0 2.7 7.1 4.2 52. Nigeria 91 169 471 143 243 147 265 3.3 1.7 6.3 3.1 53. Morocco 20 31 59 29 45 29 49 2.2 1.4 3.8 2.5 54. Cameroon 9 17 50 14 23 14 25 3.4 1.5 6.4 2.8 55. Nicaragua 3 5 10 5 8 5 8 2.5 1.7 4.0 2.6 56. Ivory Coast 9 17 44 15 23 15 26 3.0 1.5 6.4 3.2 57. Guatemala 8 12 22 11 17 11 18 2.2 1.4 3.4 2.2 58. Congo, People's Rep. 2 3 8 3 4 3 5 3.3 1.5 5.7 2.5 59. Costa Rica 2 3 5 3 5 3 5 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.1 60. Peru 17 26 44 23 34 24 36 1.9 1.3 3.2 2.2 61. DominicanRep. 6 8 14 8 12 8 12 1.8 1.5 2.7 2.2 62. Jamaica 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.1 63. Ecuador 8 13 24 12 19 12 19 2.2 1.4 3.5 2.2 64. Turkey 47 65 101 60 86 61 89 1.6 1.2 2.7 2.2 65. Tunisia 7 10 17 9 14 9 15 1.9 1.3 3.1 2.2 66. Colombia 27 38 57 35 49 35 51 1.6 1.3 2.6 2.2 67. Paraguay 3 5 8 4 6 4 7 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.1 68. Angola 8 13 32 11 17 12 19 2.7 1.2 6.0 3.0 69. Cuba 10 12 14 12 15 12 15 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.1 70. Korea, Oem. Rep. 19 27 42 25 36 25 37 1.6 1.3 2.6 2.1 71. Lebanon 3 3 5 3 5 3 5 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.1 72. Mongolia 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 2.0 1.4 3.1 2.1 Upper-middle-income 447 672 t 1,151 t 615 t 915 t 619 t 947 t 1.8 w 1.3w 3.1 w 2.3 u' 73. Syrian Arab Rep. 10 17 37 17 32 17 33 2.7 2.3 4.0 3.4 74. Jordan 3 6 14 6 10 6 11 3.2 2.4 5.2 3.6 75. Malaysia 15 21 31 19 28 19 28 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.1 76. Korea, Rep. of 39 51 67 49 63 50 65 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.1 77. Panama 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.1 78. Chile 12 15 20 14 19 14 19 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.1 79. Brazil 127 181 279 168 239 169 247 1.5 1.3 2.6 2.2 80. Mexico 73 109 182 101 155 101 160 1.9 1.5 2.8 2.1 81. Algeria 20 39 97 33 58 34 62 3.5 1.9 6.1 3.2 83. Argentina 28 36 50 34 43 34 44 1.0 0.8 2.5 2.1 84. Uruguay 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 0.7 0.6 2.2 2.1 85. South Africa 30 52 106 44 67 44 69 2.6 1.2 4.4 2.1 87. Venezuela 17 26 43 24 36 24 37 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.1 89. Israel 4 5 8 5 7 5 7 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.1 90. Hong Kong 5 7 8 7 8 7 8 0.7 0.7 2.1 2.1 91. Singapore 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 0.8 0.8 2.1 2.1 92. Trinidad & Tobago 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1.4 1.1 2.4 2.1 93. Iran, Islamic Rep. 41 70 139 61 97 62 102 2.5 1.4 4.2 2.3 94. Iraq 14 26 57 23 39 23 41 2.9 1.8 4.9 2.9 High-income oil exporters 17 t 33 t 77 t 30 t 46 t 30 t 49 t 3.0 so 1.7 w 5.7 i' 3.2 s 95. Oman 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 2.1 1.7 4.0 3.3 96. Libya 3 7 17 6 10 6 11 3.4 1.9 6.3 3.4 97. Saudi Arabia 10 19 49 17 27 17 29 3.3 1.7 6.3 3.3 98. Kuwait 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 1.9 1.4 3.0 2.3 99. United Arab Emirates 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2.2 1.0 4.8 2.4 193 Table 2. Population composition Index numbers for relative sizes of age groups (size of age group in 1980=100) Dependency ratio Aged 65 (percent) Aged 0-14 Aged 15-64 and over 1960 1980 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 Low-income economies 1. Chad 76 78 87 64 151 71 171 66 178 2. Bangladesh 90 83 86 63 159 58 191 74 184 3. Ethiopia 87 93 95 63 167 66 198 64 209 4. Nepal 74 85 85 59 147 68 178 75 205 5. Mali 86 100 99 56 158 64 186 57 196 6. Burma 69 82 71 61 137 70 173 47 188 7. Zaire 89 93 99 61 170 62 207 67 222 8. Malawi 92 96 108 56 [91 59 200 35 134 9. Upper Volta 84 96 95 65 147 70 173 69 183 10. Uganda 86 102 104 55 172 60 215 53 208 11. India 84 78 60 64 116 61 162 97 204 12. Rwanda 89 94 114 55 208 56 203 56 223 13. Burundi 83 89 96 69 164 73 191 67 200 14. Tanzania 84 99 100 51 178 59 212 55 212 15. Somalia 87 88 87 58 158 57 164 58 187 16. Haiti 81 89 63 68 123 75 160 81 157 17. Benin 87 99 102 57 188 62 194 55 201 18. Central African Rep. 73 83 95 66 164 74 179 63 189 19. China 78 68 41 82 75 64 141 64 203 20. Guinea 81 89 86 68 145 73 170 69 157 21. Niger 90 92 101 50 182 54 196 54 211 22. Madagascar 81 96 98 60 170 65 196 61 202 23. Sri Lanka 84 70 56 78 117 61 155 58 200 24. Togo 87 98 101 55 169 61 207 57 215 25. Ghana 89 101 106 56 188 62 230 57 238 26. Pakistan 93 89 82 53 146 57 191 87 178 27. Kenya 101 117 120 47 231 51 245 53 229 28. Sierra Leone 82 82 86 66 146 73 172 71 175 29. Afghanistan 82 89 82 58 143 66 175 81 183 30. Bhutan 79 77 77 74 135 77 167 80 170 31. Kampuchea, Dem. 89 55 71 . . . . . . . . . 32. Lao PDR 77 98 91 60 135 77 194 63 215 33. Mozambique 78 90 100 50 179 58 207 51 217 34. VietNam 87 68 133 . . 185 175 Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. Sudan 88 91 93 58 164 59 191 65 207 36. Mauritania 87 88 99 61 161 67 172 62 183 37. Yemen, PDR 91 95 98 63 151 67 207 74 237 38. Liberia 92 81 102 52 180 53 214 54 260 39. Senegal 84 90 93 59 175 63 188 66 207 40. Yemen Arab Rep. 84 96 97 55 147 63 200 60 212 41. Lesotho 76 83 92 61 161 67 182 68 185 42. Bolivia 83 88 74 59 140 64 179 65 187 43. Indonesia 78 82 60 66 124 64 157 65 199 44. Zambia 90 103 102 54 194 59 207 54 214 45. Honduras 91 102 80 50 152 56 210 42 226 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 83 76 62 65 120 59 166 54 202 47. El Salvador 92 95 71 53 132 54 198 52 222 48. Thailand 90 77 55 62 107 55 172 51 207 49. Papua New Guinea 77 90 67 62 134 67 166 57 177 50. Philippines 91 82 58 57 117 56 179 56 180 51. Zimbabwe 93 113 121 50 207 54 261 56 278 52. Nigeria . . 99 103 58 177 64 219 59 240 53. Morocco 90 96 72 59 133 63 187 49 185 54. Cameroon 75 91 106 58 174 65 216 57 194 55. Nicaragua . . 99 78 53 145 53 215 56 222 56. Ivory Coast 86 87 94 41 186 42 218 55 339 57. Guatemala 96 88 69 58 141 52 185 49 222 58. Congo People's Rep. 79 95 108 54 200 63 210 59 230 59. Costa Rica 102 73 55 69 117 48 173 46 228 60. Peru 92 85 65 60 133 56 172 72 175 61. Dominican Rep. 103 88 61 59 120 53 182 61 206 62. Jamaica 85 87 62 77 101 76 155 54 137 63. Ecuador 92 92 70 58 137 58 193 60 190 64. Turkey 81 76 61 65 113 61 167 49 195 65. Tunisia 91 82 67 69 115 63 183 75 224 66. Colombia 99 75 57 78 115 51 159 54 213 194 Index numbers for relative sizes of age groups (size of age group in 1980 = 100) Dependency ratio Aged 65 (percent) Aged 0-14 Aged 15-64 and over 1960 1980 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 67. Paraguay 97 86 59 62 126 58 180 59 191 68. Angola 80 89 91 60 160 67 185 59 200 69. Cuba 64 63 49 76 94 73 133 50 151 70. Korea Dem. Rep. 89 78 59 64 122 56 170 54 191 71. Lebanon 87 84 62 71 102 67 143 83 149 72. Mongolia 84 86 66 54 115 57 197 70 224 Upper-middle-income 73. Syrian Arab Rep. 93 102 82 48 162 55 233 53 180 74. Jordan 94 111 100 55 172 59 246 89 260 75. Malaysia 95 74 55 65 105 55 176 63 205 76. Korea, Rep. of 86 60 49 82 103 57 144 56 206 77. Panama 93 79 54 64 109 57 169 60 191 78. Chile 77 61 50 82 103 62 143 55 189 79. Brazil 86 72 58 63 123 58 165 46 212 80. Mexico 96 93 63 54 123 53 186 52 187 81. Algeria 91 104 104 53 178 62 237 63 184 82. Portugal 59 57 54 99 101 90 116 72 126 83. Argentina 57 62 58 81 109 74 132 48 181 84. Uruguay 56 59 58 91 101 89 116 66 150 85. South Africa 81 75 83 61 179 60 184 62 197 86. Yugoslavia 58 52 50 102 101 78 113 59 155 87. Venezuela 95 82 60 53 135 45 188 39 247 88. Greece 53 57 57 100 102 88 108 56 127 89. Israel 69 72 53 59 116 55 151 32 148 90. Hong Kong 78 46 48 88 120 52 133 27 200 91. Singapore 83 45 42 101 102 56 127 31 191 92. Trinidad and Tobago 89 65 59 101 112 67 150 66 225 93. Iran, Islamic Rep. 96 91 81 52 141 52 216 71 190 94. Iraq 94 97 89 51 160 52 224 51 256 High-income oil exporters 95. Oman . . 87 70 49 154 54 202 50 214 96. Libya 90 96 94 42 193 47 265 80 336 97. Saudi Arabia 85 86 92 42 180 46 233 41 239 98. Kuwait 59 79 55 16 168 26 227 34 506 99. United Arab Emirates 45 58 183 241 200 Industrial market economies 100. Ireland 73 70 55 84 105 83 136 85 111 101. Spain 55 58 55 85 101 83 116 63 138 102. Italy 52 55 52 100 95 91 103 64 118 103. New Zealand 71 58 49 89 96 70 118 72 124 104. United Kingdom 54 56 53 103 100 95 101 75 108 105. Austria 52 56 50 99 96 96 104 74 97 106. Japan 56 48 48 103 90 76 109 54 174 107. Belgium 55 53 51 106 98 92 102 80 111 108. Finland 60 52 46 137 97 85 102 58 121 109. Netherlands 64 51 46 108 96 75 109 65 123 110. Australia 63 54 50 82 106 67 125 65 150 111. Canada 70 46 46 105 110 66 121 63 153 112. France 61 55 52 100 99 82 110 74 111 113. Germany, Fed. Rep. 47 51 49 101 95 92 98 66 104 114. Denmark 56 55 48 107 94 89 104 68 104 115. United States 67 51 48 108 105 72 116 68 125 116. Sweden 51 56 53 100 97 92 104 68 103 117. Norway 59 58 51 101 96 87 108 68 103 118. Switzerland 51 49 55 99 94 84 101 64 113 East European nonmarket economies 119. Hungary 52 55 52 111 97 93 102 64 116 120. Romania 57 59 55 93 100 83 115 58 145 121. Albania 86 73 52 64 110 55 164 62 177 122. Bulgaria 51 52 56 105 99 89 103 57 141 123. Czechoslovakia 56 58 52 103 99 90 113 62 112 124. German Dem. Rep. 53 54 51 109 101 105 106 88 94 125. Poland 65 52 51 115 104 76 116 49 141 126. USSR 60 52 52 100 105 77 114 58 147 Not available. 195 Table 3. Contraceptive use and unmet need (Percentage of currently married women aged 15-49) Current use of contraception Percentage Unmet need for Condom and who want contraception Sterili- Pill and vaginal Other no more Low High Year zation injectables IUD methods methods Total children estimate estimate Low-income economies 2. Bangladesh 1983-84 7 4 1 2 5 19 50 25 28 4. Nepal 1981 5 1 (.) (.) (.) 7 41 22 27 16. Haiti 1977 (.) 4 (.) 1 14 19 50 13 30 17. Benin 1981-82 (.) (.) (.) (.) 17 17 . . . 23. Sri Lanka 1982 21 4 3 3 25 55 67 18 31 25. Ghana 1979 1 3 (.) 2 4 10 20 5 8 26. Pakistan 1975 1 1 1 1 1 5 50 17 27 27. Kenyaa 1977-78 1 3 1 (.) 2 7 25 6 10 Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. Sudan 1979 (.) 3 (.) (.) 1 5 27 6 9 36. Mauritania 1981 . . . . . . . . . . I 39. Senegal 1978 (.) (.) (.) (.) 3 4 . 40. Yemen Arab Rep. 1979 (.) 1 (.) (.) (.) 1 29 8 12 41. Lesotho 1977 1 1 (.) (.) 3 5 26 5 9 43. Indonesia 1976 (.) 15 6 2 3 26 49 10 15 45. Honduras 1981 8 12 2 1 3 27 48 9 21 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 1 17 4 1 1 24 58 12 22 47. El Salvador' 1978 18 9 3 2 2 34 . . . 48. Thailand 1981 23 27 4 2 3 59 68 13 17 50. Philippines 1978 6 5 2 4 20 36 59 11 29 52. Nigeria 1982 . . . . . . 6 53. Morocco 1980 . . . . . . . . . . 19 . . . 54. Cameroon 1978 (.) (.) (.) (,) 2 2 23 1 1 56. Ivory Coast 1980-81 (.) (.) (.) (.) 2 3 12 2 3 57. Guatemala" 1978 6 7 1 1 3 18 . . . 59. Costa Rica 1981 18 23 6 10 9 65 55 6 11 60. Peru 1981 5 6 4 2 24 41 75 13 41 61. Dominican Rep. 1975 12 8 2 4 6 32 56 21 12 62. Jamaica" 1979 10 35 2 7 1 55 67 21 25 63. Ecuador 1979 8 10 5 3 8 34 59 13 26 64. Turkey 1978 (.) 7 3 3 25 38 . . . 65. Tunisia 1983 14 5 13 3 6 41 56 10 19 66. Colombia 1980 11 19 8 3 8 49 69 7 24 67. Paraguay 1979 2 14 5 2 12 36 39 9 17 Upper-middle-income 73. Syrian Arab Rep. 1978 (.) 12 1 2 5 20 44 7 15 74. Jordan 1976 2 12 2 1 7 25 48 7 17 75. Malaysia 1974 3 16 1 3 10 33 51 15 23 76. Korea, Rep. of" 1979 20 7 10 6 11 54 77 . . 23 77. Panama" 1979-80 30 20 4 3 4 61 66 9 18 80. Mexico 1979 9 16 6 2 6 39 61 14 22 87. Venezuela" 1977 8 16 7 6 12 49 56 10 22 90. Hong Kong 1977 19 25 3 17 9 72 . . . 92. Trinidad and Tobago 1977 6 18 3 20 6 52 58 14 19 Countries with less than one million population Guyana 1975 9 9 6 (.) 7 31 62 23 29 Fiji 1974 16 8 5 6 5 41 55 10 15 Barbados 1981 14 18 4 8 2 46 53 . . 19 Note: Figures in italics are for earlier years than specified; see technical notes, Not available. (.) Less than half of 1 percent. a. Age or marital status differs from that specified; see technical notes, 196 Table 4. Factors influencing fertility Among ever-married women of Total fertility rate childbearing age Percentage Mean among women with Mean number Desired of women duration of Seven years' of living family aged 15-19 breastfeeding No schooling Year children size ever married (months) schooling or more 2. Bangladesh 1981 3.0 4.1 63 29 6.1 5.0 4. Nepal 1976 2.4 3.9 59 25 . . 16. Haiti 1977 2.7 3.5 16 16 6.1 2.9 17. Benin 1981-82 2.5 . . 44 19 7.3 4.3 23. Sri Lanka 1975 3.5 3.8 7 21 25. Ghana' 1979 . . 6.1 31 18 6.8 5.5 26. Pakistan 1975 3.2 . . 38 19 6.5 3.1 27. Kenya' 1978 3.2 7.2 28 16 8.3 7.3 die-income .mies wee-middle-income 35. Sudan" 1979 3.5 6.3 23 16 6.5 3.4 36. Mauritania" 1981 3.1 9.2 39 16 39. Senegal 1978 2.9 8.8 59 7.3 4.5 40. Yemen Arab Rep. 1979 . . . . 61 11 8.5 41. Lesotho 1977 2.6 5.9 32 20 6.2 4.8 43. Indonesia 1976 2.8 4.1 29 24 . 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 3.1 4.1 22 19 48. Thailand 1975 3.4 3.7 16 19 . 50. Philippines 1978 4.1 4.4 7 13 5.5 3.8 52. Nigeria" 1982 2.5 . . 44 18 . 53. Morocco 1980 22 15 6.4 4.1 54. Cameroon 1978 2.7 . . 53 . . 6.4 5.2 56. Ivory Coast 1980-81 56 17 7.5 5.8 59. Costa Rica" 1976 3.8 4.7 15 5 4.5 2.5 60. Peru 1977-78 3.7 3.8 14 13 7.3 3.3 61. Dominican Republic 1975 3.5 4.6 28 9 7.0 3.0 62. Jamaica 1975-76 3.3 4.0 27 8 6.2 4.8 63. Ecuador 1979 19 12 7.8 2.7 64. Turkey' 1978 3.1 3.0 16 . . . 65. Tunisia 1983 3.8 . . 5 14 . 66. Colombia 1976 3.7 4.1 15 9 7.0 2.6 67. Paraguay 1979 3.5 5.1 17 11 8.2 2.9 Upper-middle-income 73. Syrian Arab Rep. 1978 4.2 6.1 23 12 8.8 4.1 74. Jordan 1976 4.7 6.3 19 11 9.3 4.9 75. Malaysia 1974 3.8 . . 11 6 5.3 3.2 76. Korea, Rep. of 1979 3.1 3.2 3 16 5.7 3.3 77. Panama" 1975-76 3.7 4.2 20 7 5.7 2.7 80. Mexico 1976-77 4.0 4.5 19 9 8.1 3.3 87. Venezuela" 1977 3.3 4.2 20 7 7.0 2.6 90. Hong Kong 1976 2.9 . . 4 .. . . 92. Trinidad and Tobago 1977 2.9 3.8 20 8 4.6 3.2 Countries with less than one million population Guyana 1975 3.6 4.6 28 7 6.5 4.8 Fiji 1974 3.5 . . 12 10 . . Barbados 1981 1.7 2.4 52 . . Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified; see technical notes. Not available. a. See technical notes. 197 Table 5. Status of women Percentage Number enrolled Percentage aged economically Ratio of in secondary 15-49 ever active among urban adult male to school as enrolled in Sin gulate mean population adult female percentage of primary school age at marriage aged 10-64 age group, 1981 1980 1977 1978 literacy, 1980 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Low nomie 2. Bangladesh 24 6 68 32 24 16 3. Ethiopia . 16 8 21 9 . 4. Nepal 6.3 33 9 40 9 21 17 5. Mali 61 6. Burma 1.4 7. Zaire 2.0 8. Malawi 2 23 9. Upper Volta 4 2 15 8 10. Uganda 7 3 11. India 1.9 39 20 84 48 12. Rwanda 1.6 3 1 75 49 13. Burundi 1.6 4 2 32 14 14. Tanzania 1.1 4 2 47 32 15. Somalia 3.7 16 6 17 7 16. Haiti . . 13 12 17. Benin 2.4 26 10 50 22 18 18. Central African Rep. 2.5 20 7 70 26 19. China 53 35 . 20. Guinea . . 23 9 44 19 21. Niger 2.3 ri 23. Sri Lanka 1.1 49 54 100 92 28 25 24. Togo 46 16 85 39 . 25. Ghana 44 27 . . . . 27 19 26. Pakistan 27 7 54 19 25 20 27. Kenya 1.7 23 15 74 48 . . 20 29. Afghanistan 5.5 17 4 30. Bhutan . . 2 1 32. Lao PDR 1.4 22 14 33. Mozambique 1.9 9 4 34. Viet Nam 53 43 Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. Sudan 20 15 42 23 .. 21 36. Mauritania 16 4 19 7 28 19 37. Yemen, PDR 24 11 . . 38. Liberia 29 II 58 27 . 39. Senegal 16 8 40. Yemen Arab Rep. 18.0 9 2 22 17 41. Lesotho 0.7 13 20 . . . . 25 20 . . 42. Bolivia 37 31 84 58 . . . 65 25 43. Indonesia 36 24 89 68 24 19 63 25 44. Zambia 21 11 45. Honduras 29 30 '9 79 . 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.3 64 39 84 55 27 21 47. El Salvador 19 21 83 80 . . . . . . 48. Thailand 30 27 25 23 66 46 49. Papua New Guinea 17 8 . 50. Philippines 58 68 26 25 73 45 51. Zimbabwe 1.3 18 13 . 52. Nigeria 2.0 .. .. .. .. .. 53. Morocco 31 20 71 34 26 21 . . . 54. Cameroon 25 13 26 18 56 22 198 Percentage Number enrolled Percentage aged economically Ratio of in secondary 15-49 ever active among urban adult male to school as enrolled in Singulate mean population adult female percentage of primary school age at marriage aged 10-64 literacy, age group, 1981 1980 1977 1978 1980 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 55. Nicaragua . . 38 45 76 78 . 56. Ivory Coast 1.9 25 9 . . . . 27 18 57. Guatemala 17 15 57 46 . . . 59. Costa Rica 44 51 100 100 26 23 71 31 60. Peru . 62 52 100 86 26 23 . 61. Dominican Rep. . . . . 98 98 25 21 62. Jamaica 54 62 . . 19 63. Ecuador . . 39 41 . . . . 26 22 64. Turkey 1.6 57 28 100 77 . 65. Tunisia 37 23 100 63 28 24 66. Colombia . . 45 51 96 97 26 22 72 38 69. Cuba 1.0 72 77 71. Lebanon 60 56 72. Mongolia 85 92 Upper-middle-income 73. Syrian Arab Rep. 59 37 95 53 26 22 74. Jordan . . 79 76 . . . . 26 22 75. Malaysia 56 53 99 84 . 76. Korea, Rep. of . . 89 80 100 97 . . . . 74 36 77. Panama 1.0 60 69 100 99 26 21 78. Chile . . 53 62 100 100 79. Brazil 1.1 . . . . . . . . . 80. Mexico 1.1 54 49 97 92 24 22 81. Algeria 42 29 79 51 83. Argentina . . 54 63 84. Uruguay 54 61 100 100 . . . 87. Venezuela 41 38 . . . . . . 89. Israel 69 80 . . . . . . 63 34 90. Hong Kong 62 68 100 97 . 91. Singapore 1.2 65 65 100 100 . 93. Iran, Islamic Rep. 54 35 64 9 94. Iraq 78 40 62 8 High-income oil exporters 95. Oman 30 13 97. Saudia Arabia 2.9 37 24 98. Kuwait 80 71 99. United Arab Emirates 57 66 Countries with less than one million population Guinea-Bissau 1.9 33 7 Comoros 33 17 Gambia 2.4 19 8 Guyana 57 61 20 Botswana 21 25 Swaziland 41 40 Mauritius 1.2 52 49 Fiji 60 64 Barbados 81 90 Bahrain 1.1 61 54 Qatar . . 63 75 Suriname 1.1 Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified; see technical notes. Not available. 199 Table 6. Family planning policy Support for family planning Demographic Health and Year official Family planning and other human rights family planning index" reasons reasons only No support program started 1972 1982 Low-income economies 1. Chad na. E E 2. Bangladesh x 1971 E C 3. Ethiopia x 1981 E E 4. Nepal x 1966 D D 5. Mali x 1972 E E 6. Burma na. E E 7. Zaire x 1973 E E 8. Malawi na. E E 9. Upper Volta na. E E 10. Uganda x 1971 E E 11. India x 1952 B B 12. Rwanda x 1981 E D 13. Burundi n.a. E F 14. lanzania x 1970 E D 15. Somalia x 1977 E E 16. 1-laiti x 1982 E D 17. Benin x 1969 . 18. Central African Rep. x 1978 E E 19. China x 1962 A A 20. Guinea n.a. E E 21. Niger na. E E 22. Madagascar n.a. E E 23. Sri Lanka x 1965 C B 24. logo x 1975 E E 25. Ghana x 1969 E E 26. Pakistan x 1960 D C 27. Kenya x 1967 D D 28. Sierra Leone x 1978 E E 29. Afghanistan x 1970 E E 30. Bhutan x 1979 31. Ka?npuchea, Dern. x 1977h E E 32. Lao PDR x 1976b E E 33. Mozambique x 1977 E E 34. Viet Nam x 1977 B C Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. Sudan 1970 E E 36. Mauritania x na. E E 37. Yemen, PDR 1973 E E 38. Liberia 1973 E D 39. Senegal x 1976 E E 40. Yemen Arab Rep. x na. E E 41. Lesotho 1974 E E 42. Bolivia x 1976k E E 43. Indonesia x 1968 C B 44. Zambia 1974 E E 45. Honduras 1966 D D 46. Egypt, Arab Rep. x 1965 D D 47. El Salvador x 1974 C B 48. Ihailand x 1970 D C 49. Papua New Guinea 1968 F D 50. l'hilippines x 1970 C C 51. Zimbabwe 1968 E D 52. Nigeria 1970 E F 53. Morocco x 1966 E D 54. Cameroon x na. E E 55. Nicaragua x 1967 E E 56. Ivory Coast x na. E E 57. Guatemala x 1975 D D 58. Congo, People's Rep. x 1976 E E 59. Costa Rica x 1%8 B D 200 Support for family planning Demographic Health and Year official Family planning and other human rights family planning index' reasons reasons only No support program started 1972 1982 Peru x 1976 E 0 Dominican Rep. x 1968 C C Jamaica x 1966 B C Ecuador x 1968 0 C Turkey x 1965 0 0 Tunisia x 1964 C C Colombia x 1970 C B Paraguay x 1972 E E Angola x na. Cuba x Korea, Dem. Rep. x Lebanon x 1970 Mongolia x na. Upper-middle-income Syrian Arab Rep. 1974 E E Jordan 1976 E E Malaysia x 1966 C B Korea, Rep. of x 1961 A A Panama 1969 C B Chile x 1979b C C Brazil 1974 E C Mexico x 1974 F B Algeria 1971 E D Argentina x na. Uruguay x na. South Africa 1966 . 87. Venezuela 1968 D 0 Israel . . . . S Hong Kong x 1973 B B Singapore x 1965 A A Trinidad and Tobago x 1967 C C lran,lslamic Rep. . . . Iraq x 1972 E E High-income oil exporters Oman n.a. . Libya n.a. E E Saudi Arabia na. . Kuwait na. E E United Arab Emirates na. Countries with less than one million population Guinea-Bissau x 1976 Cape Verde x 1978 Gambia x 1969 0 St. Vincent and Grenadines x 1972 Solomon Islands x 1970 Guyana x 1977 D St. Lucia x 1975 Grenada x 1974 Botswana x 1970 Swaziland x 1975 Mauritius x 1965 B B Fiji x 1962 B C Barbados x 1967 Cyprus x na. D Gabon x n.a. Set,'chelles x 1975 Western Samoa x 1970 Not available. na. Not applicable. A = very strong; B = strong; C = moderate; 0 = weak; E = very weak or none. For explanation of the index, see technical notes. Year in which previously existing program was canceled. 201 Bibliographical note This Report has drawn on a wide range of World Bank documents and Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Bank work as well as on numerous outside Report on Development Prospects and Programs. sources. World Bank sources include ongoing eco- Quantitative analysis of the link between budget nomic analysis and research, as well as project, deficits in industrial countries and global "crowd- sector, and economic work on individual coun- ing out" is in Lal and van Wijnbergen. Alternative tries. Outside sources include research publica- views on macroeconomic stabilization are sur- tions and the unpublished reports of other veyed in Haberler. For a review of public expendi- organizations working on global economic and tures and budget deficits in OECD countries, see population and development programs and Hakim and Wallich. issues. Selected sources are briefly noted by chap- Box 2.1 comparing the 1930s to the present ter below and listed alphabetically by author in draws on Maddison. Box 2.2 on protection in two groups. The first includes background papers industrial countries is based on UNCTAD data. commissioned for this Report; these reports syn- The analysis for Box 2.3 is in Mitra. Box 2.4 and thesize relevant literature and Bank work. Most Box 3.3 are based on Bank macroeconomic model- include extensive bibliographies; the sources cited ing work summarized in Sanderson and William- in these papers are not listed separately. Those son. Box 2.5 on Latin American debt problems issued as World Bank Staff Working Papers are made use of the background papers by Sjaastad available from the Bank's Publications Sales Unit. and others, and by Lawrence. Box 3.1 is based on The views they express are not necessarily those of Wolf and others. Box 3.2 on the engine of growth is the World Bank or of this Report. The second based on Riedel and on Lal. Box 3.3 is based on Lal group consists of selected other sources used in and unpublished work by Srinivasan. The discus- the preparation of this Report. sion of IDA lending in Box 3.4 draws on the Bank report IDA in Retrospect. Selected sources, by chapter Chapter 4 Chapter 1 The description of the setting for high fertility is from Birdsall (1980). For additional sources and Historical population data are based on Durand evidence on the advantages of children in poor and, for this century, United Nations data to 1950 communities, see Cain. and World Bank data thereafter. Historical data on The historical discussion is based on sources income are reviewed in McGreevey; demographic cited in Cassen and in McGreevey. The discussion and social data are from Tan and Haines. of present trends is based primarily on World Bank Chapters 2 and 3 and United Nations data. Mortality trends are analyzed in Hill; Preston; and Bulatao and Elwan. Data used in these chapters draw on GATT, IMF, Work on causes of mortality decline includes OECD, and UNCTAD publications as well as DaVanzo and Habicht; and Cochrane and others. World Bank data. For analysis of the extent and The stall in fertility decline in selected countries is effects of labor market rigidities in the economic analyzed in Gendell. The evidence on interna- performance of OECD countries; the causes of the tional migration is surveyed in Swamy. productivity slowdown; and the effects of protec- Box 4.1 on the isolation paradox draws on the tion, see Lal and Wolf. The discussion of debt writings of Sen and of Cassen. Box 4.2 was assem- problems is based on papers by Kindleberger, bled with the help of Peter Lindert and members of Lawrence, and by Sjaastad and others. The discus- the Graduate Group in Demography at the Uni- sion of the problems faced by developing countries versity of California, Berkeley and Davis. Box 4.3 in a volatile world economy is based on internal draws on data assembled by the European Fertility 202 Transition project at Princeton University, which China, on Jacobsen, and on the 1974 World Bank resulted in the book edited by Coale and Watkins. publication by King and others. Boxes in this chap- ter discuss articles by Stokes and Schutjer (Box 6.1), Chapter 5 Ho (Box 6.2), Lindert, and Bulatao, 1981 (Box 6.3). The literature on macroeconomic effects of popula- Chapter 7 tion growth, including effects on income distribu- tion, is surveyed and reviewed in McNicoll. On On contraceptive use and unmet need see the the relation between fertility and savings, see papers by Ainsworth and by Boulier (a). Data used Hammer. Projections of schooling costs are based in this section are from World Fertility Survey and on Bank data on current costs and a projection Contraceptive Prevalence Survey data tapes pre- model of The Futures Group. The structural trans- pared for this Report. Some of the information is formation discussion is based on Porter and on available in publications of the World Fertility Johnston and Kilby. The discussion of food and Survey (published by the International Statistical agriculture is based on the FAQ study Agriculture: Institute, The Netherlands). Program issues Toward 2000; Bank work on Africa; Porter; and management, access, and qualityare discussed Pingali and Binswanger. Kirchner and others ana- in Ainsworth and in Jones. Bulatao analyzes the lyze the links between population and natural costs of family planning programs. Examples resources; for related discussion, see Muscat. throughout the chapter come from World Bank Urban population growth and migration are dis- sector reports, other background papers, and cussed in Linn and in Standing. Redistribution materials furnished by the International Planned policies (including Box 5.5) are analyzed in Mahar. Parenthood Federation, the Pathfinder Fund, and Work on the international economy as it relates to the United States Agency for International population is in Sapir and in Swamy. Development. Box 5.1 discusses the works of Meadows and Box 7.1, on the health benefits of family plan- others, who prepared the book ascribed to the ning, is based on Trussell and Pebley and other Club of Rome, and of Simon. The analysis used for analyses surveyed in Ainsworth. Sources for Box Box 5.2 is described in Kamin. 7.2, on contraceptive technology, include Atkinson and others; and the US Congress Office of Tech- Chapter 6 nology Assessment study. Sources for Box 7.6, on the Matlab projects, are cited in Ainsworth. Box The discussion of socioeconomic and proximate 7.7 on military expenditures is based on Sivard determinants of fertility is based on recent and World Bank data. reviews, including the background paper by Bulatao; the compilation of Bulatao and Lee; Chapter 8 unpublished papers produced by the Fertility Determinants Group at Indiana University; and This chapter draws heavily on Bank operational Birdsall, 1980. Important conceptual contributions experience and sector work. The discussion of include those of Becker, Bongaarts, Easterlin, population policy uses information gathered and Freedman, and Schultz. Essential data were summarized by Lapham and Mauldin. The African obtained from the World Fertility Survey Com- section is based in part on the papers by Ascadi parative Studies series, especially the paper by and Johnson-Ascadi; and by Faruqee and Guihati. Casterline and others. The links between fertility The background papers by Gendell, Jones, and and mortality are reviewed in Bulatao and Elwan Zachariah contributed to the section on South and in Gwatkin. Cain analyzes the link between Asia, and that of Merrick to the section on Latin the status of women and fertility. Policy recom- America. Herz summarizes information on donor mendations affecting marriage are discussed espe- assistance. cially in Henry and Piotrow and on breastfeeding Box 8.1, on pronatalist policies, is based on in McCann and others. For analyses of the effects Denton. Demographic policy objectives in Box 8.2 of family planning on fertility see Boulier; are drawn largely from official government state- Wheeler; and Lapham and Mauldin. Merrick ments and development plans. The FAQ report by presents evidence on family planning and other Higgins and others is the main source for Box 8.3. factors influencing fertility for Latin America, and Studies on infertility in Africa (Box 8.4) include Zachariah presents such evidence for India. The that of Frank. Box 8.7 was prepared with help from incentives section draws on Bank sector work on Judith Bruce of The Population Council. 203 Background papers Note: Source references to these papers carry the publication year 1984. * An asterisk after a citation indicates a background paper that will be published in a volume provisionally entitled "Perspectives on the Global Economy." A dagger after a citation indicates a background paper that is forthcoming as a World Bank Staff Working Paper. Ainsworth, Martha. "Family Planning Programs: The Client's Perspective." In Ainsworth and Jones. Ainsworth, Martha, and Huw Jones. "Family Planning Programs: Client and Management Perspectives.' ' Birdsall, Nancy, ed. "Three Cross-country Analyses of the Effects of Organized Family Planning Programs on Fertility. " Boulier, Bryan. a. "Family Planning Programs and Contraceptive Availability: Their Effects on Contraceptive Use and Fertility." In Birdsall, ed. Boulier, Bryan. b. "Unmet Need for Contraception: Evaluation of Measures and Estimates for Thirty-six Developing Countries. " Bulatao, Rodolfo A. a. "Expenditures on Population Programs in Major Regions of the Developing World: Current Levels and Future Requirements."t Bulatao, Rodolfo A. b. "Reducing Fertility in Developing Countries: A Review of Determinants and Policy Levers. Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and Ann Elwan. "Fertility and Mortality Transition in Developing Countries: Patterns, Projections, and Interdependence."t Cain, Mead. "On Women's Status, Family Structure, and Fertility in Developing Countries."t DaVanzo, Julie, and others. "Quantitative Studies of Mortality Decline in the Developing World. " DaVanzo, Julie, and Jean-Pierre Habicht. "What Accounts for the Decline in Infant Mortality in Peninsular Malaysia, 1946-75?" In DaVanzo and others. Denton, Hazel. "The Declining Growth Rates of the Population of Eastern Europe. " Gendell, Murray. "Factors Underlying Stalled Fertility in Developing Countries.' Gwatkin, Davidson. "Mortality Reduction, Fertility Decline, and Population Growth." Haberler, Gottfried. "The Slowdown of the World Economy and the Problem of Stagflation: Some Alternative Explana- tions and Policy Implications." * Hakim, Leonardo, and Christine Wallich. "OECD Deficits, Debts, and Savings: Structure and Trends, 1965-80." * Hammer, Jeffrey S. "Population Growth and Savings in Developing Countries."t Herz, Barbara. "Official Development Assistance for Population."t Hill, Ken. "The Pace of Mortality Decline since 1950." In DaVanzo and others. Jones, Huw. "National Family Planning Programs: A Management Perspective." In Ainsworth and Jones. Kamin, Steve. "New Poverty Projections for the Developing Countries." Kindleberger, Charles. "Historical Perspective on Today's Third-World Debt Problem."t King, Timothy, and Robin Zeitz. "Taking Thought for the Morrow: Prospects and Policies for Aging Populations."t Kirchner, J. W, and others. "Two Essays on Population and Carrying Capacity."t "Carrying Capacity, Population Growth, and Sustainable Development." In Kirchner and others. Lal, Deepak, and Martin Wolf. "Debt, Deficits, and Distortions: Problems of the Global Economy." * Lal, Deepak, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. "Government Deficits, the Real Interest Rate, and LDC Debt: On Global Crowding Out." * Lapham, Robert J., and W. Parker Mauldin. "Conditions of Fertility Decline in Developing Countries, 1965-80." In Birdsall, ed. Lawrence, Robert. "Systemic Risk and Developing Country Debt.' Lluch, Constantino. "Investment Cycles, Saving, and Output Growth." * Maddison, Angus. "Developing Countries in the 1930s: Possible Lessons for the 1980s. Mahar, Dennis. "The Settlement of Tropical Frontiers: Some Lessons from Brazil and Indonesia."t McGreevey, William. "Economic Aspects of Historical Demographic Change."t McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview and ' Merrick, Thomas W. "Recent Fertility Declines in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico."t Muscat, Robert. "Carrying Capacity and Rapid Population Growth: Definition, Cases, and Consequences." In Kirchner and others. Porter, Ian. "Population Growth and Agricultural ' Prescott, Nicholas. "Financing Family Planning Programs."t Preston, Samuel H. "Mortality and Development Revisited." In DaVanzo and others. Sanderson, Warren C., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "How Should the Developing Countries Adjust to External Shocks in the 1980s? Looking at Some World Bank Macromodels. ' ' Sapir, Andre. "Some Aspects of Population Growth, Trade, and Factor Mobility."t Sjaastad, Lawrence, Aquiles Almansi, and Carlos Hurtado. "The Debt Crisis in Latin America. Standing, Guy. "Population Mobility and Productive Relations: Demographic Links and the Evolution of Policy."t Swamy, Gurushri. "Population, International Migration, and Trade."t Tan, Jee-Peng, and Michael Haines. "Schooling and Demand for Children: Historical Perspectives."t Trussell, James, and Anne R. Pebley. "The Impact of Family Planning Programs on Infant, Child, and Maternal Mortality. " Wheeler, David. "Female Education, Family Planning, Income, and Population: A Long-run Econometric Simulation Model." In Birdsall, ed. Zachariah, K. C. "Determinants of Fertility Decline in India."t 204 Selected bibliography Ascadi, George T., and Gwendolyn Johnson-Ascadi. 1983. "Demand for Children and Spacing in Sub-Saharan Africa." Background paper for the "Report on Population Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa." Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Atkinson, Linda, and others. 1980. "Prospects for Improved Contraception." Family Planning Perspectives 12, 4. Becker, Gary S. 1980. "An Economic Analysis of Fertility." In Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. Universities-National Bureau Conference Series, no. 11. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Bhatia, Shushum, and others. 1980. "The Matlab Family Planning-Health Services Project." Studies in Family Planning 11, 6. Birdsall, Nancy. 1980. "Population Growth and Poverty in the Developing World." Population Bulletin 35, 5. (Also available as World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 404, 1980.) / Bongaarts, John. 1978. "A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility." Population and Develop- ment Review 4: 105-32. Bongaarts, J., and R. G. Potter. 1983. Fertility, Biology and Behavior: An Analysis of the Proximate Determinants. New York: Academic Press. Bulatao, Rodolfo A. 1981. "Values and Disvalues of Children in Successive Childbearing Decisions." Demography 18:1-25. Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and Ronald D. Lee, eds. 1983. Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. 2 vols. New York: Academic Press. Cassen, Robert H. 1978. India. New York: Holmes and Meier. Casterline, John B., and others. 1983. "The Proximate Determinants of Fertility." Unpublished paper. World Fertility Survey, London. Chen, L. C., and others. "Maternal Mortality in Rural Bangladesh." In Studies in Family Planning 5, 11:334-41, November 1974. Coale, Ansley, and Susan Watkins, eds. 1984. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Cochrane, Susan H. 1983. "Effects of Education and Urbanization on Fertility." In Rodolfo A. Bulatao and Ronald D. Lee, eds., Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. New York: Academic Press. Cochrane, Susan H., Donald J. O'Hara, and Joanne Leslie. 1980. "The Effects of Education on Health." World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 405. Washington, D.C. Deevey, Edward. 1960. "The Human Population." Scientific American 203, 3:195-204. Demeny, Paul. 1984. "A Perspective on Long-term Population Growth." Center for Policy Studies Working Paper no. 104. New York: The Population Council. Durand, John D. 1977. "Historical Estimates of World Population: An Evaluation." Population and Development Review 3, 3:253-96. Easterlin, Richard, A. 1975. "An Economic Framework for Fertility Analysis." Studies in Family Planning 6:54-63. Easterlin, Richard, A., ed. 1980. Population and Economic Change in Developing Countries. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Faruqee, Rashid, and Ravi Gulhati. 1983. "Rapid Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Policies." World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 559. Washington, D.C. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1981. Agriculture: Toward 2000. Economic and Social Development Series no. 23. Rome. 1981. FAO Production Yearbook 35. Rome. Frank, Odile. 1983. "Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa." Center for Policy Studies Working Paper no. 97. New York: The Population Council. Freedman, Ronald. 1979. "Theories of Fertility Decline: A Reappraisal." Social Forces 58, 1:1-17. Gilland, Bernard. 1983. "Considerations on World Population and Food Supply." Population and Development Review 9, 2:203-11. Habbakuk, H., and M. Postan. 1965. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henry, Alice, and Phyllis T. Piotrow. 1979. "Age at Marriage and Fertility." Population Reports, Series M, no. 4. Higgins, G. M., and others. 1982. Potential Population Supporting Capacities of Lands in the Developing World. Rome: FAO. Ho, Teresa J. 1979. "Time Costs of Child Rearing in the Rural Philippines." Population and Development Review 5:643-62. Jacobsen, Judith. 1983. "Promoting Population Stabilization: Incentives for Small Families." Worldwatch Paper 54. Wash- ington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. Johansson, E. 1977. "The History of Literacy in Sweden in Comparison with Some Other Countries." Educational Reports Umea, 12. Johnston, Bruce F., and William C. Clark. 1982. Redesigning Rural Development: A Strategic Perspective. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Johnston, Bruce F., and Peter Kilby. 1975. Agriculture and Structural Transformation. New York: Oxford University Press. Keyfitz, N., and W. Flieger. 1968. World Population: An Analysis of Data. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. World in Recession. Berkeley: University of California Press. King, Timothy, and others. 1974. Population Policies and Economic Development. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lal, Deepak. 1983. The Poverty of "Development Economics." Hobart Paperback 16. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Lindert, Peter H. 1983. "The Changing Economic Costs and Benefits of Having Children." In Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. Rodolfo A. Bulatao and Ronald D. Lee, eds. New York: Academic Press. 205 1984. "The Maithusian Case: Preindustrial England" (unpublished bibliographical note). Linn, Johannes. 1983. Cities in the Developing World: Policies for Their Equitable and Efficient Growth. New York: Oxford University Press. McCann, Margaret F., and others. 1981. "Breastfeeding, Fertility, and Family Planning." Population Reports, Series J, no. 24. Meadows, Donella H., and others. 1972. The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Mitra, Pradeep. 1983. "Accounting for Adjustment in Selected Semi-industrial Countries." Discussion Paper 70. Wash- ington D.C.: Development Research Department, World Bank. Morris, Leo, and others. 1981. "Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys: A New Source of Family Planning Data." Population Reports, Series M, no. 5. Baltimore, Md.: Population Information Program, Johns Hopkins University. Mosk, Carl. 1983. Patriarchy and Fertility: Japan and Sweden, 1880-1960. New York: Academic Press. Nortman, Dorothy, and Joanne Fisher. 1982. Population and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium of Data through 1981, 11th ed. New York: The Population Council. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1983. OECD Economic Outlook. Paris. Page, Hilary J., and Ron Lesthaeghe, eds. 1981. Child-spacing in Tropical Africa. New York: Academic Press. Pingali, P. L., and Hans P. Binswanger. 1983. 'Population Density, Farming Intensity, Patterns of Labor Use and Mechanization." Discussion Paper 11. Washington D.C.: Agriculture and Rural Development Department, World Bank. Riedel, James. 1984. "Trade as the Engine of Growth in Developing Countries Revisited." Economic Journal 94, 373. Rostow, W. W. 1978. The World Economy: History and Prospect. Austin, Tx.: University of Texas Press. Rutstein, Shea Oscar. 1982. "Infant and Child Mortality: Levels, Trends, and Demographic Differentials." WFS Com- parative Study no. 24 (London, November 1982). Sachs, Jeffrey. 1979. "Wages, Profits, and Macroeconomic Adjustment: A Comparative Study." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:269-320. 1983. "Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing." Working Paper 1189. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Schultz, T Paul. 1981. Economics of Population. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley. Sen, Amartya. 1967. "Isolation, Assurance, and the Social Rate of Discount." Quarterly Journal of Economics 81, 1. Simon, Julian 1982. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Sivard, Ruth. 1983. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities. Stokes, C. Shannon, and Wayne A. Schutjer. 1983. "Access to Land and Fertility in Developing Countries." Paper prepared for the Conference on Rural Development and Human Fertility, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. Mimeo. Tien, H. Y. 1983. "China: Demographic Billionaire." Population Bulletin 38, 2. Tietze, Christopher. 1983. Induced Abortion: A World Review 1983. 5th ed. New York: The Population Council. UN Department of International, Economic and Social Affairs. 1966. World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963. Population Studies no. 41. New York. 1966 and 1980. Demographic Yearbook. New York. 1980. Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth. Population Studies no. 68. New York. Forthcoming. World Population Trends and Policies, 1983 Monitoring Report. New York. UN Department of International, Economic and Social Affairs and UN Fund for Population Activities. Various years. "Population Policy Compendiums." New York. UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 1983. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. Paris. UN Fund for Population Activities. 1983. Report on Population Assistance, 1981. New York. US Bureau of the Census. 1960. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1982. World Population and Fertility Planning Technologies: The Next 20 Years. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. Van de Walle, E., and J. Knodel. 1980. "Europe's Fertility Transition, New Evidence and Lessons for Today's Developing World." Population Bulletin 34, 6:3-43. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau. Wolf, Martin, and others. 1984. Costs of Protecting Jobs in Textiles and Clothing. Thames Essay no. 38. London: Trade Policy Research Centre. World Bank. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saha ran Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington, D.C. World Bank. 1982a. IDA in Retrospect: The First Two Decades of the International Development Association. New York: Oxford University Press. 1982b. World Development Report 1982. New York: Oxford University Press. World Bank. 1983. Sub-Saha ran Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and Programs. Washington, D.C. Zimmerman, L. J. 1965. Poor Lands, Rich Lands: The Widening Gap. New York: Random House. 206 Annex World Development Indicators Contents Key 212 Introduction 213 Maps 214 Table 1. Basic indicators 218 Population E Area L GNP per capita Inflation Life expectancy Table 2. Growth of production 220 GDP E Agriculture E Industry E Manufacturing E Services Table 3. Structure of production 222 GDP E Agriculture Industry U Manufacturing U Services Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment 224 Public consumption U Private consumption LI Gross domestic investment Table 5. Structure of demand 226 Public consumption Private consumption U Gross domestic LI investment L Gross domestic saving Exports of goods and nonfactor services LI Resource balance Table 6. Agriculture and food 228 Value added U Cereal imports U Food aid U Fertilizer consumption LI Food production per capita Table 7. Industry 230 Share of value added in food and agriculture U in textiles and clothing in machinery and transport equipment U in chemicals in other manufacturing Value added in manufacturing Table 8. Commercial energy 232 Growth of energy production U Growth of energy consumption U Energy consumption per capita U Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports Table 9. Growth of merchandise trade 234 Export values u Import values U Growth of exports U Growth of imports U Terms of trade 209 Table 10. Structure of merchandise exports 236 Fuels, minerals, and metals Li Other primary commodities Li Textiles and clothing Li Machinery and transport equipment Li Other manufactures Table 11. Structure of merchandise imports 238 Food Li Fuels Li Other primary commodities Li Machinery and transport equipment Li Other manufactures Table 12. Origin and destination of merchandise exports 240 Industrial market economies L East European nonmarket economies Li High-income oil exporters Li Developing economies Table 13. Origin and destination of manufactured exports 242 Industrial market economies Li East European nonmarket economies Li High-income oil exporters Li Developing economies Li Value of manufactured exports Table 14. Balance of payments and reserves 244 Current account balance Li Receipts of workers' remittances L Net direct private investment Li Gross international reserves Li in months of import coverage Table 15. Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capital 246 Gross inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Li Repayment of principal Li Net inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Table 16. External public debt and debt service ratios 248 External public debt outstanding and disbursed Li as percentage of GNP Li Interest payments on external public debt Li Debt service as percentage of GNP Li of exports of goods and services Table 17. Terms of public borrowing 250 Commitments Li Average interest rate Li Average maturity Li Average grace period Table 18. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members 252 Amount in dollars Li as percentage of donor GNP Li in national currencies Li Net bilateral flow to low-income countries Table 19. Population growth and projections 254 Population growth Li Population size Ti Hypothetical size of stationary population Li Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1 Li Population momentum Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related indicators 256 Crude birth rate Li Crude death rate Li Total fertility rate Li Percentage of married women using contraception 210 Table 21. Labor force 258 Population of working age Labor force in agriculture E in industry E E in services L Growth of labor force, past and projected Table 22. Urbanization 260 Urban population as percentage of total population fl Growth of urban population Percentage in largest city E in cities of over 500,000 persons Number of cities of over 500,000 persons Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancy 262 Life expectancy fl Infant mortality rate E Child death rate Table 24. Health-related indicators 264 Population per physician per nursing person E Daily calorie supply per capita Table 25. Education 266 Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group in secondary school in higher education Table 26. Central government expenditure 268 Defense E Education E Health L Housing and community amenities; social security and welfare Economic services Other Total expenditure as percentage of GNP Overall surplus/deficit as 11 percentage of GNP Table 27. Central government current revenue 270 Tax revenue E Current nontax revenue Total current revenue as percentage of GNP Table 28. Income distribution 272 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households Technical notes 274 Bibliography of data sources 286 211 Key In each table, economies are listed in their Figures in the colored bands are . Not available. group in ascending order of GNP per cap- summary measures for groups of economies. The letter w after a (.) Less than half the unit shown. ita except for those for which no GNP per capita can be calculated. These are listed in summary measure indicates that it is All growth rates are in real terms. alphabetical order, in italics, at the end of a weighted average; the letter m, their group. The reference numbers below that it is a median value; Figures in italics are for years or periods reflect the order in the tables. the letter 1, that it is a total. other than those specified. Afghanistan 29 Hong Kong 90 Paraguay 67 Albania 121 Hungary 119 Peru 60 Algeria 81 India 11 Philippines 50 Angola 68 Indonesia 43 Poland 125 Argentina 83 Iran, Islamic Republic of 93 Portugal 82 Australia 110 Iraq 94 Romania 120 Austria 105 Ireland 100 Rwanda 12 Bangladesh 2 Israel 89 Saudi Arabia 97 Belgium 107 Italy 102 Senegal 39 Benin 17 Ivory Coast 56 Sierra Leone 28 Bhutan 30 Jamaica 62 Singapore 91 Bolivia 42 Japan 106 Somalia 15 Brazil 79 Jordan 74 South Africa 85 Bulgaria 122 Kampuchea, Democratic 31 Spain 101 Burma 6 Kenya 27 Sri Lanka 23 Burundi 13 Korea, Democratic Republic of 70 Sudan 35 Cameroon 54 Korea, Republic of 76 Sweden 116 Canada 111 Kuwait 98 Switzerland 118 Central African Republic 18 Lao People's Democratic Republic 32 Syrian Arab Republic 73 Chad 1 Lebanon 71 Tanzania 14 Chile 78 Lesotho 41 Thailand 48 China 19 Liberia 38 Togo 24 Colombia 66 Libya 96 Trinidad and Tobago 92 Congo, People's Republic of the 58 Madagascar 22 Tunisia 65 Costa Rica 59 Malawi 8 Turkey 64 Cuba 69 Malaysia 75 Uganda 10 Czechoslovakia 123 Mali 5 Union of Soviet Socialist Denmark 114 Mauritania 36 Republics 126 Dominican Republic 61 Mexico 80 United Arab Emirates 99 Ecuador 63 Mongolia 72 United Kingdom 104 Egypt, Arab Republic of 46 Morocco 53 United States 115 El Salvador 47 Mozambique 33 Upper Volta 9 Ethiopia 3 Nepal 4 Uruguay 84 Finland 108 Netherlands 109 Venezuela 87 France 112 New Zealand 103 Viet Nam 34 German Democratic Republic 124 Nicaragua 55 Yemen Arab Republic 40 Germany, Federal Republic of 113 Niger 21 Yemen, People's Democratic Ghana 25 Nigeria 52 Republic of 37 Greece 88 Norway 117 Yugoslavia 86 Guatemala 57 Oman 95 Zaire 7 Guinea 20 Pakistan 26 Zambia 44 Haiti 16 Panama 77 Zimbabwe 51 Honduras 45 Papua New Guinea 49 212 Introduction The World Development Indicators, a by-product are in constant prices and were computed, unless of the World Bank's statistical and analytical work, noted otherwise, by using the least-squares provide information on the main features of social method. Because this method takes all observa- and economic development. Most of the data col- tions in a period into account, the resulting growth lected by the World Bank are on its developing rates are not unduly influenced by exceptional val- member countries. Because comparable data for ues. Table entries in italics indicate that they are for industrial market economies are readily available, years or periods other than those specified. All these are also included in the indicators. Data for dollar figures are US dollars, derived by applying nonmarket economies, a few of which are mem- the official exchange rates, with the exception of bers of the World Bank, are included if available in the GNP per capita figures, which are derived by a comparable form. applying the World Bank Atlas method described Every effort has been made to standardize con- in the technical note to Table 1. Conversion of cepts, definitions, coverage, timing, and other national currency values in this manner results in characteristics of the basic data to ensure the great- some inevitable distortions; the technical note to est possible degree of comparability. Nevertheless, Table 1 also discusses this problem. care must be taken in how the indicators are inter- Some of the differences between figures shown preted. Although the statistics are drawn from in this year's and last year's editions reflect not sources generally considered the most authorita- only updating but also revisions to historical tive and reliable, many of them are subject to con- series. siderable margins of error. In addition, variations The economies included in the World Develop- in national statistical practices mean that most data ment Indicators are classified by GNP per capita. are not strictly comparable. The data should thus This classification is useful in distinguishing econ- be construed only as indicating trends and charac- omies at different stages of development. Many of terizing major differences among economies. the economies included are also classified by domi-' The indicators in Table 1 give a summary profile nant characteristicsto distinguish oil importers of the economies. The data in the other tables fall from oil exporters and to distinguish industrial into the following broad areas: national accounts, market from industrial nonmarket economies. The agriculture, industry, energy, external trade, exter- groups used in the tables are 34 low-income devel- nal debt, aid flows, other external transactions, oping economies with a GNP per capita of less demography, labor force, urbanization, social indi- than $410 in 1982, 60 middle-income developing cators, central government finances, and income economies with a GNP per capita of $410 or more, distribution. The table on central government 5 high-income oil exporters, 19 industrial market expenditure is an expanded version of an earlier economies, and 8 East European nonmarket econ- table, and is complemented by a new table on cen- omies. Note that because of the paucity of data and tral government current revenue. differences in the method of computing national Most of the information used in computing the income, estimates of GNP per capita are available indicators was drawn from the data files and publi- only for those nonmarket economies that are mem- cations of the World Bank, the International Mone- bers of the World Bank. tary Fund, and the United Nations and its special- The format of this edition generally follows that ized agencies. used in previous years. An important difference, For ease of reference, ratios and rates of growth however, is that economies for which no GNP per are shown; absolute values are reported only in a capita figure can be calculated are listed in italics, few instances. Most growth rates were calculated in alphabetical order, at the end of the appropriate for two periods: 1960-70 and 1970-82, or 1970-81 if income groups. All other economies are listed by data for 1982 were not available. All growth rates group in ascending order of GNP per capita. The 213 same order is used in all tables. The alphabetical measures are separately shown for China and list in the key shows the reference number of each India and for other low-income economies. And economy; italics indicate those economies placed because trade in oil affects the economic character- at the end of a group due to the unavailability of istics and performance of middle-income econo- GNP per capita figures. Countries with popula- mies, summary measures are also shown for oil tions of less than a million are not reported in the importers and for oil exporters. Moreover, the tables, largely for lack of comprehensive data. The group of middle-income economies is divided into technical note to Table I shows some basic indica- lower and upper categories to provide more mean- tors for 34 small countries that are members of the ingful summary measures. United Nations, the World Bank, or both. The weights used in computing the summary Summary measurestotals, median values, or measures are described in the technical notes. The weighted averageswere calculated for the econ- letter w after a summary measure indicates that it omy groups only if data were adequate and mean- is a weighted average; the letter m, that it is a ingful statistics could be obtained. Because China median value; the letter t, that it is a total. The and India heavily influence the overall summary median is the middle value of a data set arranged measures for the low-income economies, summary in order of magnitude. Because the coverage of Groups of economies The colors on the map show what group a country has been placed in on the basis of its GNP per capita and, in some instances, its distinguishing economic characteristics. For example, all low-income economies, those with a GNP per capita of less than $410, are colored yellow. The groups are the same as those used in the 28 tables that follow, and they include only the 126 countries with a population of more than I million. Low-income economies Middle-income oil importers Middle-income oil exporters High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies East European nonmarket economies Not included in the Indicators Tokeluu )NZ) 0 Wallis and Fctsna Western Samoa r Amer,can Samoa French - Bolivia Polynesia .Niue(NZ) .Toriga (Fr) Repubic Puerto Rico Cile Paraguay (US) St. Kitto.Neurs Virgin Islands ./Antrgua and Borbudo (US) ..irMcntserrat (UK) drgentinu tGuadeloupe (Pr) QDominmco Uru a lntherlarcds dirt lies 5Morhrnque )Fr) (Neth) / St. Lucia Barbados St. Vincent and the Grenada Grenadines .,Tr,nrdad airS Tobago .__Tn_ Venezuela 214 economies is not uniform for all indicators and gross domestic product (GDP). The Eckert IV pro- because the variation around central tendencies jection has been used for these maps because it can be large, readers should exercise caution in maintains correct areas for all countries, though at comparing the summary measures for different the cost of some distortions in shape, distance, and indicators, groups, and years or periods. direction. The maps have been prepared exclu- The technical notes should be referred to in any sively for the convenience of the readers of this use of the data. These notes outline the methods, Report; the denominations used, and the bound- concepts, definitions, and data sources. The bibli- aries shown, do not imply on the part of the World ography gives details of the data sources, which Bank and its affiliates any judgment on the legal contain comprehensive definitions and descrip- status of any territory or any endorsement or tions of concepts used. acceptance of such boundaries. This year's edition includes four world maps. The World Development Indicators are prepared The first map shows country names and the under the supervision of Ramesh Chander. groups in which economies have been placed. The maps on the following pages show population, life expectancy at birth, and the share of agriculture in oeenland (Den) Iceland Finland Faeroe Islands - Nrw Union at SoaieI Socialist Republicn Sweden m rn Gem Rep Isle of Mr Denmark __:Uooakia Ch:eltslaindsI_I Mongolia Belgsrnn- Luxembourg Fed Rep of Gennarry apan Portupai Spent - Tarkey rnia n-ce - Syrian China (UK) TnwaMita Islanrir Yep AtghanistaO Algeria Qat.0 .5 Saudi Emira ci C VSAlomg Kong (UK) Oman Macao)Png) Cape Verde Lao People Peopls Dent, Rep. of Yemen em. Rep. Se ,Goam (US) Upper Arab Rep. el Sam The Gambia Volta Guinea-Brssau Guinea Trust Territory of the Pacifio Islands Sierra Leone Co0arr (US) Maldiaes Ghana Kiribali Toga Renin Equatorial Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Peoples Rep at the Congo Seyohelles 215 Population 0-15 million 15-50 million The colors on the map show the gen- lation for each of 125 countries; the 50-100 million eral size of a country's population. For technical note to that table gives data 100+ million example, countries with a population for 34 more countries with a popula- of less than 15 million are colored yel- tion of less than I million. Data not available low. Note that Table 1 gives the popu- The bar chart at right shows population Population by country group, by country group for the years 1960 and 1960, 1982, 2000 Shares of total population, 1982 1982 as well as projected population for the year 2000. The country groups are those used in the map on the preceding 2000 pages and in the tables that follow. Millions 3000 The pie chart at right shows the propor- tion of total population, excluding coun- tries with populations of less than I Industrial million, accounted for by each country economies group. "Other" refers to high-income 1882 oil producers. 2000 East European OtIser nonmarket economies 1000 economies 216 Life expectancy 0-49 years 50-59 years The map classifies countries by life cx- pectancy at birththat is, by the num- 60-69 years ber of years a baby born in 1982 can 70+ years expect to live. For example, life expectancy at birth is less than fifty Data not available years in countries colored yellow. Share of agriculture in GDP 0-9 percent The value added by a country's agri- are colored dark green. The shares say 10-19 percent cultural sector divided by the gross nothing about absolute values of pro- domestic product gives the share of duction. For countries with high levels 20-39 percent agriculture in GDP. The map classifies of subsistence farming, the share of 40+ percent countries by those shares. For exam- agriculture in GDP may be underesti- ple, countries whose shares of agricul- mated due to difficulties in assigning Data not available ture in GDP range from 0 to 9 percent subsistence farming its proper value. 217 Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per capitaa Average Life Area annual Average annual expectancy (thousands growth rate rate of inflatione at birth Population (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) mid-i 982 kilometers) 1982 1 960_82b 1 960_70c 1 970_82d 1982 Low-income economies 2,266.5 29,097 280 w 3.0w 3.2in 11.5w 59w China and India 1,725.2 12,849 290 w 3.5w 62 w Other low-income 541.3 16,248 250 w 1.1 u' 3.2w 11.7w 51 w 1 Chad 4.6 1,284 80 -2.8 4.6 7.8 44 2 Bangladesh 92.9 144 140 0.3 3.7 14.9 48 3 Ethiopia 32.9 1,222 140 1.4 2.1 4.0 47 4 Nepal 15.4 141 170 -0.1 7.7 8.9 46 5 Mali 7.1 1,240 180 1.6 5.0 9.8 45 6 Burma 34.9 677 190 1.3 2.7 9.7 55 7 Zaire 30.7 2,345 190 -0.3 29.9 35.3 50 8 Malawi 6.5 118 210 2.6 2.4 9.5 44 9 Upper Volta 6.5 274 210 1.1 1.3 9.7 44 10 Uganda 13.5 236 230 -1.1 3.2 47.4 47 11 India 717.0 3,288 260 1.3 7.1 8.4 55 12 Rwanda 5.5 26 260 1.7 13.1 134 46 13 Burundi 4.3 28 280 2.5 2.8 12.5 47 14 Tanzania 19.8 945 280 1.9 1.8 11.9 52 15 Somalia 45 638 290 -0.1 4.5 12.6 39 16 Haiti 5.2 28 300 0.6 4.0 9.2 54 17 Benin 3.7 113 310 0.6 1.9 9.6 48 18 Central African Rep. 2.4 623 310 0.6 4.1 126 48 19 China 1,008.2 9,561 310 5.0 .. .. 67 20 Guinea 5.7 246 310 1.5 1.5 3.3 38 21 Niger 5.9 1,267 310 -1.5 2.1 12.1 45 22 Madagascar 9.2 587 320 -0.5 3.2 11.5 48 23 Sri Lanka 15.2 66 320 2.6 1.8 13.3 69 24 Togo 2.8 57 340 2.3 1.3 8.8 47 25 Ghana 12.2 239 360 -1.3 7.5 39.5 55 26 Pakistan 87.1 804 380 2.8 33 12.7 50 27 Kenya 18.1 583 390 2.8 1.6 10.1 57 28 Sierra Leone 3.2 72 390 0.9 .. 12.2 38 29 Afghanistan 16.8 648 .. . . 11.9 .. 36 30 Rhutan 1.2 47 .. .. ,. 43 31 Kampuchea, Oem. .. 181 .. . . 32 Lao PDR 3.6 237 .. .. .. .. 43 33 Mozambique 12.9 802 .. .. .. .. 51 34 VietNam 57.0 330 .. .. .. .. 64 Middle-income economies 1,158.3 f 43,031 1,520w 3.6w 3.0 w 12.8w 60 ii Oil exporters 519.5 15,036 1,260 w 3.6w 3.0w 13.9w 57 w Oil importers 638.8 27,995 1,710w 3.5 ii' 3.0 w 12.7 in 63 ii' Lower middle-income 669.6 20,952t 840w 3.2 w 2.9 in 11.7w 56w 35 Sudan 20.2 2,506 440 -0.4 3.9 15.2 47 36 Mauritania 1.6 1,031 470 1.4 2.1 8.7 45 37 Yemen, PDR 2.0 333 470 6.4 .. . . 46 38 Liberia 2,0 111 490 0.9 1.9 8.5 54 39 Senegal 6.0 196 490 (.) 1.8 7.9 44 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 7,5 195 500 5.1 . 15.0 44 41 Lesotho 1.4 30 510 6.5 2.7 11.4 53 42 Bolivia 5.9 1,099 570 1.7 3.5 25.9 51 43 Indonesia 152.6 1,919 580 4.2 .. 19.9 53 44 Zambia 6.0 753 640 -0.1 7.6 8.7 51 45 Honduras 4.0 112 660 1.0 2.9 8.7 60 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 44.3 1,001 690 3.6 2.6 11 9 57 47 El Salvador 5.1 21 700 0.9 0.5 10.8 63 48 Thailand 48.5 514 790 4.5 1.8 9.7 63 49 Papua New Guinea 3.1 462 820 2.1 4.0 8.1 53 50 Philippines 50.7 300 820 2.8 5.8 12.8 64 51 Zimbabwe 7.5 391 850 1.5 1.1 8.4 56 52 Nigeria 90.6 924 860 3.3 4.0 14.4 50 53 Morocco 20.3 447 870 2.6 2.0 8.3 52 54 Cameroon 9.3 475 890 2.6 4.2 10.7 53 55 Nicaragua 2.9 130 920 0.2 1.8 14.3 58 56 IvoryCoast 8.9 322 950 2.1 2.8 12.4 47 57 Guatemala 7.7 109 1,130 2.4 0.3 10.1 60 58 Congo, People's Rep. 1.7 342 1,180 2.7 4.7 10.8 60 59 CostaRica 2.3 51 1,430 2.8 1.9 18.4 74 60 Peru 17.4 1,285 1,310 1.0 10.4 37.0 58 61 Dominican Rep. 5.7 49 1,330 3.2 2.1 8.8 62 62 Jamaica 2.2 11 1,330 0.7 4.0 16.2 73 63 Ecuador 8.0 284 1,350 4.8 6.1 14.5 63 64 Turkey 46.5 781 1,370 3.4 5.6 34.4 63 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 218 GNP per capitaa Average Life Area annual Average annual expectancy Population (thousands growth rate rate of inflation0 at birth (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) mid-1982 kilometers) 1982 1960_82b 1960_70c 1970_82d 1982 65 Tunisia 6.7 164 1,390 4,7 3.6 8.7 61 66 Colombia 27.0 1,139 1,460 3.1 11.9 22.7 64 67 Paraguay 3.1 407 1,610 3.7 3.1 12.7 65 68 Angola 8.0 1,247 .. . 43 69 Cuba 9.8 115 . . .. . .. 75 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 18.7 121 . . .. 64 71 Lebanon 2.6 10 .. .. 1.4 .. 65 72 Mongolia 1.8 1,565 .. .. .. .. 65 Upper middle-income 488.71 22,079 t 2,490 ii' 4.1 w 3.0 in 16.4 'i 65w 73 SyrianArabRep. 9.5 185 1,680 4.0 2.6 12.2 66 74 Jordan 3.1 98 1,690 6.9 .. 9.6 64 75 Malaysia 14.5 330 1,860 4.3 -0.3 7.2 67 76 Korea, Rep. of 39.3 98 1,910 6.6 17.5 19.3 67 77 Panama 1.9 77 2,120 3.4 1.5 7.5 71 78 Chile 11.5 757 2,210 0.6 33.0 144.3 70 79 Brazil 126.8 8,512 2,240 4.8 46.1 42.1 64 80 Mexico 73.1 1,973 2,270 3.7 3.5 20.9 65 81 Algeria 19.9 2,382 2,350 3.2 2.7 13.9 57 82 Portugal 10.1 92 2,450 4.8 3.0 17.4 71 83 Argentina 28.4 2,767 2,520 1.6 21.4 136.0 70 84 Uruguay 2.9 176 2,650 1.7 50.2 59.3 73 85 SouthAfrica 30.4 1,221 2,670 2.1 3.0 12.8 63 86 Yugoslavia 22.6 256 2,800 4.9 12.6 20.0 71 87 Venezuela 16.7 912 4,140 1.9 1.3 12.4 68 88 Greece 9.8 132 4,290 5.2 3.2 15.4 74 89 Israel 4.0 21 5.090 3.2 6.4 52.3 74 90 Hong Kong 5.2 1 5,340 7.0 2.4 8.6 75 91 Singapore 2.5 1 5,910 7.4 1.1 5.4 72 92 Trinidadandlobago 1.1 5 6,840 3.1 3.2 17.8 68 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 41.2 1,648 . . . . -0.5 . . 60 94 Iraq 14.2 435 . . . . 1.7 . . 59 High-income oil exporters 17.0! 4,3121 14,820 ii' 5.6 ii' 16.0 in 58 ii' 95 Oman 1.1 300 6,090 7.4 .. .. 52 96 Libya 3.2 1,760 8,510 4.1 5.2 16.0 57 97 Saudi Arabia 10.0 2,150 16,000 7.5 .. 22.5 56 98 Kuwait 1.6 18 19,870 -0.1 .. 15.6 71 99 United Arab Emirates 1.1 84 23,770 -0.7 .. .. 71 Industrial market economies 722.9 1 30,935 I 11,070 u' 3.3w 4.3 in 9.9 in 75 zi' 100 Ireland 3.5 70 5,150 2.9 5.2 14.3 73 101 Spain 37.9 505 5,430 4.0 6.8 16.0 74 102 Italy 56.3 301 6,840 3.4 4.4 16.0 74 103 NewZealand 3.2 269 7,920 1.5 3.6 13.1 73 104 United Kingdom 55.8 245 9,660 2.0 4.1 14.2 74 105 Austria 76 84 9.880 3.9 3.7 6.1 73 106 Japan 118.4 372 10,080 6.1 5.1 6.9 77 107 Belgium 9.9 31 10,760 3.6 3.6 7.1 73 108 Finland 4.8 337 10,870 3.6 6.0 11.7 73 109 Netherlands 14.3 41 10,930 2.9 5.4 7.4 76 110 Australia 15.2 7,687 11,140 2.4 3.1 11.4 74 111 Canada 24.6 9,976 11,320 3.1 3.1 9.3 75 112 France 54.4 547 11,680 3.7 4.2 10.1 75 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 61.6 249 12,460 3.1 3.2 . 49 73 114 Denmark 5.1 43 12,470 2.5 6.4 9.9 75 115 UnitedStates 231.5 9,363 13,160 2.2 2.9 7.3 75 116 Sweden 8.3 450 14,040 2.4 4.3 9.9 77 117 Norway 4.1 324 14,280 3.4 4.4 9.0 76 118 Switzerland 6.4 41 17,010 1.9 4.4 4.8 79 East European nonmarket economies 383.3 23,422 f .. . . . , .. 70 119 Hungary 10.7 93 2,270 6.3 3.2 71 120 Romania 22.5 238 2,560 5.1 71 121 Albania 2.9 29 72 122 Bulgaria 8.9 111 . 72 123 Czechoslovakia 15.4 128 72 124 German Oem. Rep. 16.7 108 . . .. .. .. 73 125 Poland 36.2 313 .. .. .. .. 72 126 USSR 270.0 22,402 .. . . .. .. 69 a. Seethe technical notes. b. Because data for the early 1960s are not always available, figures in italics are for periods other than that speci- fied. c. Figures in italics are tori 961-70, not 1960-70. d. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82. 219 Table 2. Growth of production Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1 960_70a 1 g70_82b 1 960_70a 1 970_82b 1 960_70a 1 970_82b 1 960_708 1 970_82b 1 96O-7O 1 970_82b Low-income economies 4.5 w 4.5w 2.2 in in 6.6 in 4.2in 5.5w 3.4w 4.5 in China and India 4.5 ri 4.9 w 1.8 in 2.3 in 8.3 in 6.3 in 4.9 in Other low-income 4.5 w 3.4 w 2.7 in 2.3 in 6.6 in 4.Orn 6.3w 3.2w 4.2 ii 4.5 in 1 Chad 0.5 -2.6 -10 -2.0 -3.2 -5.5 2 Bangladesh 3.7 4.1 2.7 2.3 8.0 8.7 6.6 10.4 4.2 5.5 3 Ethiopia 4.4 2.2 2.2 0.9 7.4 2.0 8.0 2.9 7.8 4.1 4 Nepal 2.5 2.7 5 Mali 3.3 4.3 3.8 2.1 5.4 6 Burma 2.6 5.0 4.1 5.0 2.8 5.8 3.4 4,7 1.5 5.6 7 Zaire 3.4 -0.2 .. 1.5 .. -0.9 -2.3 -0.4 8 Malawi 4.9 5.1 . . 4.1 . 5.4 . 5,4 6.0 9 Upper Volta 3.0 3.4 .. 1.4 .. 2.9 3,4 5.4 10 Uganda 5.6 -1.5 -0.6 -8.7 . . -8.9 1.3 11 India 3.4 36 1.9 1.8 5.4 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 5,5 12 Rwanda 2.7 5.3 13 Burundi 4,4 3.5 2.3 8.6 6.4 4.0 14 Tanzania 6.0 4.0 2.8 1.5 0.5 5.8 15 Somalia 1.0 38 -0.6 3,4 4.0 4.2 16 Haiti 0.2 34 -0.6 1.2 0.2 7.3 -0.1 7.5 1.1 3.3 17 Benin 2.6 3.3 18 Central African Rep. 1.9 1.4 0.8 2.3 5.4 4.0 -4.3 18 0.3 19 China 5.2 5.6 1.6 2.8 11.2 8.3 5.7 4.3 20 Guinea 3.5 3.8 21 Niger 2.9 3.4 3.3 -2.4 13.9 10.8 (.) 6.9 22 Madagascar 2.9 0.2 0.3 -0.7 0.4 23 Sri Lanka 46 4.5 3.0 3.2 6.6 4.2 6.3 24 4.6 5.2 24 Togo 8.8 3.0 1.7 5.5 -10.0 2.9 25 Ghana 2.2 -0.5 -0.2 -2.4 -1.5 -7.5 26 Pakistan 6.7 5.0 49 2.7 10.0 5.9 9.4 5.0 7.0 6.2 27 Kenya 5,9 55 .. 4.1 . 8.1 . 9.0 5.6 28 Sierra Leone 4.3 20 .. 2.5 . -3.1. 3.9 4.5 29 Afghan/stan 2.0 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 31 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam 3.8 Middle-income economies 6.0 ii' 5.4w 3.5 in 3.0 in 7.4 In 5.8 in 7.3 in 5.5 in 5.5 ni 5.5 in Oil exporters 6.3 w 6.0 ii' 2.9 in 3.0 in 7,4 Hi 7.6 in 7.1 in 9.6 in 4.8 in 6.8 ni Oil importers 5.8 w 5.1 w 3.5 in 2.8 in 7.0 in 5.5 in 7.5 in 5.3 in 5.7 in 5.2 in Lower middle-income 4.9 w 5.3w 3.0 in 3.1 in 6.2 in 5.8 in 6.5 iii 5.5 in 5.2 in 5.4 in 35 Sudan 0.7 6.3 4.1 .. 5.8 .. 6.0 8.5 36 Mauritania 6.7 2.0 1.4 3.4 14.1 -3.5 9.2 5.2 7.4 5.2 37 Yemen, PDR 38 Liberia 5.1 0.9 3.5 .. -0.7 .. 4.5 1.0 39 Senegal 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.3 4.1 3.8 6.2 0.8 1 ; 2.8 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 8.5 3.6 13.6 13.1 11.2 41 Lesotho 5.2 66 0.3 21.1 13.4 5.5 42 Bolivia 5.2 3.7 3.0 3,7 6.2 23 5.4 4,4 5.4 4.4 43 Indonesia 39 7.7 2.7 3.8 5.2 10.7 3.3 13.4 48 9.3 44 Zambia 5.0 0.9 1.9 0.4 1.4 1.3 45 Honduras 52 4.2 5.8 2.4 5,3 5,7 4,5 5.8 4.6 4,7 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.3 8.4 2.9 3.0 5.4 8.3 4.8 9,3 4.7 11.7 47 El Salvador 5.9 2.2 3.0 2.0 8.5 2.0 8.8 1.1 6.5 2.4 48 Thailand 8.4 7.1 5.6 4.4 11.9 9.3 11.4 9,9 9.1 7.4 49 Papua New Guinea 6.7 2.0 2.6 4.9 5,5 50 Philippines 5.1 6.0 4.3 4.8 6.0 8.0 6.7 6.6 5.2 5.2 51 Zimbabwe 4.5 2.2 1.8 -1.9 -4.1 2.9 52 Nigeria 3.1 38 -04 -06 14.7 '4.8 9.1 12.0 2.3 6.7 53 Morocco 4.4 50 4.7 0.1 4.2 5.3 4.2 4.9 4.4 6.3 54 Cameroon 3,7 7.0 3.4 12.2 8.4 7.2 55 Nicaragua 7.3. 0.6 7.8 2.5 10.4 1.7 11.4 2.5 5.8 -09 56 Ivory Coast 8.0 5,7 4.2 4,5 11.5 8.6 11.6 5.4 9.7 5,4 57 Guatemala 5.6 50 43 3.9 78 67 8.2 5.3 5..5 5.0 58 Congo, People's Rep. 3.5 6.8 1.8 1.9 7.4 12.0 3,3 2.8 5.1 59 Costa Rica 6.5 4.5 5.7 2.3 9.4 6.1 10.6 6.0 5.7 4.6 60 Peru 4.9 3.0 3.7 0.7 5.0 3.3 5,7 2.5 5,3 3.4 61 Dominican Rep. 4.5 6.0 2.1 3.3 6.0 6.9 5.0 5.9 5.0 6.5 62 Jamaica 4.4 -1.1 1.4 -0.2 4.9 -3.5 5.7 -2.3 4.6 0.1 63 Ecuador 8.1 2.9 11.3 9.9 8.4 64 Turkey 6.0 5.1 2.5 3.2 9.6 5.6 10.9 5.2 6.9 5.9 Note: For data comparability and coverage seethe technical notes. 220 Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1 960_70a 1 970_82b 1 96O7O 1 970_82b 1 960_70a 1 970_82b 1 960_70a 1 970_82b 1 96O7Oa 1 970_82u) 65 Tunisia 4.7 7.0 2.0 3.6 10.9 8.0 7.8 11.6 2.6 7.6 66 Colombia 5.1 5.4 3.5 4.5 6.0 4.4 5-7 5.2 5.7 6.5 67 Paraguay 4.2 8.5 6.7 10.7 7.8 8.8 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Bern. Rep. 71 Lebanon 49 63 45 50 48 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 6.4w 5.4w 4.0 in 2.6 in 9.1 in 5.7 m 8.4 in 5.8 in 7.2 in 6.3 in 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 4.6 8.8 74 Jordan . 9.3 .. 0.2 13.5 .. 10.9 .. 9.4 75 Malaysia 6,5 7.7 . . 5.1 9.2 .. 10.6 .. 8.4 76 Korea, Rep. ot 8.6 8.6 4.4 29 17.2 13.6 17.6 14.5 8.9 7.8 77 Panama 7.8 4.7 5.8 2.0 9.9 4.4 105 2.7 7.7 5.3 78 Chile 4.4 1.9 3.1 3.1 4.4 0.6 5.5 -0.4 4.6 2.7 79 Brazil 5.4 7.6 . 45 . . 82 . . 7.8 . . 77 80 Mexico 7.6 6.4 4.5 34 9.4 7.2 10.1 6.8 7.3 65 81 Algeria 4.3 6.6 0.1 3.9 11.6 7.0 7.8 10.9 -1.1 6.4 82 Portugal 6.2 4.5 1.3 -0.8 88 44 8.9 4.5 5.9 6.1 83 Argentina 4,3 15 1.8 2.2 5.8 10 5.6 -0.2 3.8 1.7 84 Uruguay 1.2 3.1 1.9 1.2 1.2 4.2 1.5 3.4 1.1 2.8 85 South Africa 6.3 3.6 .. .. .. .. .. 86 Yugoslavia 5.8 5.5 3.3 3.1 62 7.2 5.7 8.2 6.9 4.5 87 Venezuela 6.0 41 5.8 3.0 4.6 2.4 6.4 4.8 7.3 53 88 Greece 6.9 4.1 3.5 1.9 9.4 3.9 10.2 4.8 7.1 4.9 89 Israel 8.1 31 .. .. .. 90 HongKong 100 9.9 .. . . .. .. .. . . 91 Singapore 8.8 85 5.0 1.6 125 8.9 13.0 9.3 7.7 86 92 TrinidadandTobago 4.0 5.5 .. -1.8 .. 4.0 .. 1.3 . . 6.9 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 11.3 4.4 . . 13.4 12.0 . . 10.0 94 Iraq 6.1 5.7 . . 4.7 5.9 . . 8.3 High-income oil exporters 16.7 ii' 5.0w 5.6 in . . -2.8 in 9.5in . . 12.4 in 95 Oman 19.5 5.8 96 Libya 24.4 24 10.5 -3.1 14 7 17.3 97 Saudi Arabia 9.8 5.6 8.9 6.8 12.4 98 Kuwait 5.7 2.1 5.5 -2.8 9.5 9.6 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 5.1 w 2.8 ii' 1.4 in 1.8 in 5.9 in 2.3 in 5.9 m 2.4 in 4.5 in 3.2 in 100 Ireland 4.2 3.8 0.9 6.1 .. .. . . 4.3 101 Spain 7.1 3.1 .. 2.0 3.4 .. 4.1 .. 3.9 102 Italy 5.5 2.8 2.6 1.2 6.6 2.7 8.0 . . 5.1 3.2 103 New Zealand 3.6 1.8 104 United Kingdom 2.9 1.5 2.2 1.9 3.1 02 3.3 -0.8 2.8 2.4 105 Austria 4.6 3.3 1.2 1.5 5,4 30 52 3.2 4,4 3.8 106 Japan 10.4 4.6 2.1 -0.2 13.0 5.6 13.6 6.6 10.2 4.1 107 Belgium 4.7 2.7 -0.5 1.5 5.5 2.2 6.2 2.3 4.6 31 108 Finland 4.3 3.0 0.5 (.) 5.2 3.3 61 3.8 5.0 3.5 109 Netherlands 5.2 2.4 2.8 4.3 6.8 1.2 6.6 1.9 5.1 2.9 110 Australia 5.6 3.1 2.0 2.5 5.9 1.6 5.5 1.5 4.0 4.1 111 Canada 5.6 3.4 2.5 2.0 6.3 2.3 6.8 2.5 5.5 4.0 112 France 5.5 3.2 1.6 0.8 7.1 2.4 7.8 2.8 5.0 3.9 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.4 2.4 1.5 2.2 4.8 2.0 5.4 2.0 4.2 3.2 114 Denmark 4.5 2.1 0.1 3.1 5.2 0.9 5.2 2.9 4.6 2.5 115 United States 4,3 2.7 0.5 1.7 4.6 1.9 5.3 2.4 4.4 3.2 116 Sweden 4.4 1.7 0.8 -0.8 6.2 0.7 5.9 0.5 3.9 2.6 117 Norway 4.3 4.3 0.7 1.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 1.1 5.0 4.1 118 Switzerland 4.3 0.7 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungaryc 5.3 4.8 3.2 3.2 6.2 55 6.5 5.7 6.0 4.8 120 Romaniad 8.6 7.6 1.7 5.1 12.8 8.6 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 1 23 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1961-70, not 1960-70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82. c. Services include the unallocated share of GDP. d. Based on net material product 221 Table 3. Structure of production GDPa Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) (millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)" Services 1960c 1982d 1960C 1982d 1960C 1982d 1960c 1982d 1960c 1982d Low-income economies 49w 26 u 32 w 13w 14w 25 w 31 w China and India 48 w 36 w 28 35w 24 w 29 w Other low-income 48 w 44 w 13 16w 9w 9w 39 w 40 w 1 Chad 180 400 52 64 11 7 4 4 37 29 2 Bangladesh 3,170 10,940 57 47 7 14 5 7 36 39 3 Ethiopia 900 4,010 65 49 12 16 6 11 23 36 4 Nepal 410 2,510 .. .. 5 Mali 270 1,030 55 43 10 10 5 5 35 47 6 Burma 1,280 5,900 33 48 12 13 8 9 55 39 7 Zaire 130 5,380 30 32 27 24 13 3 43 44 8 Malawi 160 1,320 50 .. 10 .. 5 .. 40 9 Upper Volta 200 1,000 55 41 16 16 9 12 31 43 10 Uganda 540 8,630 52 82 12 4 9 4 36 14 11 India 29,550 150,760 50 33 20 26 14 16 30 41 12 Rwanda 120 1,260 80 46 6 22 1 16 14 32 13 Burundi 190 1,110 .. 56 . . 17 . . 10 . . 27 14 Tanzania 550 4,530 57 52 11 15 5 9 32 33 15 Somalia 160 .. 71 .. 8 3 21 16 Haiti 270 1,640 . . . . . . .. . . 17 Benin 160 830 55 44 8 13 3 7 37 43 18 CentralAfricanRep. 110 660 51 35 11 19 3 8 38 46 19 China 42,770 260,400 47 37 33 41 .. 20 22 20 Guinea 400 1,750 .. 41 .. 23 2 .. 36 21 Niger 250 1,560 69 31 9 30 4 8 22 39 22 Madagascar 540 2,900 37 41 10 15 4 .. 53 44 23 Sri Lanka 1,500 4,400 32 27 20 27 15 15 48 46 24 logo 120 800 55 23 15 29 8 6 30 48 25 Ghana 1,220 31,220 41 51 10 8 .. 5 49 41 26 Pakistan 3,500 24,660 46 31 16 25 12 17 38 44 27 Kenya 730 5,340 38 33 18 22 9 13 44 45 28 Sierra Leone 1,130 .. 32 .. 20 .. 5 48 29 Afghanistan 1,190 .. .. .. .. 30 Bhutan .. .. .. 31 Kampuchea, Oem 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 24w 1511) 30w 38w 21 w 27 47w Oil exporters 27w 1411) 25 w 40 11' 1411' 17 w 46w Oil importers 23 zt' 17w 32 w 35 11) 22 w 23 5 11' 48 middle-income 37 w 23 w 22 w 35 w 15w 17 'I w 42w 35 Sudan 1,160 9,290 .. 36 .. 14 .. 7 .. 50 36 Mauritania 90 640 44 29 21 25 3 8 35 46 37 Yemen, PDR .. 630 .. 12 .. 27 .. .. .. 61 38 Liberia 220 950 .. 36 .. 28 .. 7 .. 36 39 Senegal 610 2,510 24 22 17 25 12 15 59 53 40 YemenArabRep. .. 3,210 . . 26 .. 17 .. 7 56 41 Lesotho 30 300 23 .. 22 .. 6 55 42 Bolivia 460 7,160 26 17 25 27 15 14 49 56 43 Indonesia 8,670 90,160 54 26 14 39 8 13 32 35 44 Zambia 680 3,830 11 14 63 36 4 19 26 50 45 Honduras 300 2,520 37 27 19 27 13 17 44 46 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,880 26,400 30 20 24 34 20 27 46 46 47 El Salvador 570 3,680 32 22 19 20 15 15 49 58 48 Thailand 2,550 36,790 40 22 19 28 13 19 41 50 49 Papua New Guinea 230 2,350 49 13 .. 4 38 50 Philippines 6,960 39,850 26 22 28 36 20 24 46 42 51 Zimbabwe 780 5,900 18 15 35 35 17 25 47 50 52 Nigeria 3,150 71,720 63 22 11 39 5 6 26 39 53 Morocco 2,040 14,700 23 18 26 31 16 16 51 51 54 Cameroon 550 7,370 . . 27 31 11 .. 42 55 Nicaragua 340 2940 24 21 21 32 16 26 55 47 56 IvoryCoast 570 7,560 43 26 14 23 7 12 43 51 57 Guatemala 1,040 8,730 . .. .. .. .. 58 Congo, People's Rep. 130 2,170 23 6 17 52 10 5 60 42 59 Costa Rica 510 2,580 26 25 20 27 14 20 54 48 60 Peru 2,410 21,620 18 8 33 39 24 24 49 53 61 Dominican Rep. 720 7,230 27 18 23 28 17 16 50 54 62 Jamaica 700 3,180 10 7 36 32 15 16 54 61 63 Ecuador 970 12,330 26 11 20 40 16 12 54 49 64 Turkey 8,810 49,980 41 21 21 31 13 22 38 48 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 222 GDP° Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) (millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)r Services 1960' 1982d 1960c 1982d 1960C l982d 1960c 1982d 1960C 1982d 65 Tunisia 770 7,090 24 15 18 36 8 13 58 49 66 Colombia 3,780 34,970 34 26 26 31 17 21 40 42 67 Paraguay 300 5,850 36 26 20 26 17 16 44 48 68 Angola .. . .. .. 69 Cuba .. .. .. .. 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 830 . 1 ii .. 20 . 13 .. 69 72 Mongolia Up middle-income 18w 11 iv 41 ii' . 22 II' 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 890 15,240 .. 19 .. 31 .. .. .. 50 74 Jordan .. 3,500 .. 7 .. 29 .. 14 .. 64 75 Malaysia 2,290 25,870 36 23 18 30 9 18 46 47 76 Korea, Rep. of 3,810 68,420 37 16 20 39 14 28 43 45 77 Panama 420 4,190 17 . . 18 .. 10 .. 65 78 Chile 3,910 24,140 9 6 35 34 21 20 56 60 79 Brazil 14,540 248,470 16 . . 35 .. 26 .. 49 80 Mexico 12,040 171,270 16 7 29 38 19 21 55 55 81 Algeria 2,740 44,930 16 6 35 55 8 10 49 39 82 Portugal 2,340 21,290 25 12 36 44 29 35 39 44 83 Argentina 12,170 64,450 16 .. 38 .. 32 .. 46 84 Uruguay 1,120 9,790 19 8 28 33 21 26 53 59 85 SouthAfrica 6,980 74,330 12 .. 40 .. 21 . 48 86 Yugoslavia 9,860 68,000 24 13 45 45 36 32 31 42 87 Venezuela 7,570 69,490 6 6 22 42 .. 16 72 52 88 Greece 3,110 33,950 23 19 26 29 16 18 51 52 89 Israel 2,030 20,490 11 5 32 35 23 .. 57 60 90 Hong Kong 950 24,440 4 .. 39 26 .. 57 91 Singapore 700 14,650 4 1 18 37 12 26 78 62 92 Trinidad and Tobago 470 6,970 8 2 45 52 24 13 47 46 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 4,120 . . 29 . . 33 . . 11 . . 38 94 Iraq 1,580 .. 17 .. 51 .. 10 .. 32 High-income oil exporters 1 iv . . 74 ii' . . 4 iv . . 25 iv 95 Oman 50 7,110 74 .. 8 .. 1 .. 18 96 Libya 310 28,360 .. 2 .. 68 .. 3 . . 30 97 Saudi Arabia . . 153,590 .. 1 .. 77 4 .. 22 98 Kuwait .. 20,060 .. 1 .. 61 .. 7 38 99 United Arab Emirates .. 29,870 .. .. .. .. .. Industrial market economies 6w 3w 40 u' 36 iv 30 u' ?4 iv 54 u' 61 iv 100 Ireland 1,770 17,180 22 .. 26 .. .. .. 52 101 Spain 11.430 181,250 .. 6 .. 34 .. 22 . . 60 102 Italy 37,190 344,580 12 6 41 41 31 29 47 53 103 NewZealand 3,940 23,820 .. 10 .. 33 .. 25 .. 57 104 UnitedKingdom 71,440 473,220 3 2 43 33 32 19 54 65 105 Austria 6,270 66,640 11 4 47 39 35 27 42 57 106 Japan 44,000 1,061,920 13 4 45 42 34 30 42 54 107 Belgium 11,280 85,240 6 2 41 35 30 25 53 63 108 Finland 5,010 48,930 17 8 35 35 23 24 48 57 109 Netherlands 11,580 136,520 9 4 46 33 34 24 45 63 110 Australia 16,370 164,210 12 6 40 35 28 20 48 59 111 Canada 39,930 289,570 6 4 34 29 23 16 60 67 112 France 60,060 537,260 11 4 39 34 29 25 50 62 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 72,100 662,990 6 2 53 46 40 35 41 52 114 Denmark 5,960 57,000 11 5 31 24 21 17 58 71 115 United States 505,300 3,009,600 4 3 38 33 29 22 58 64 116 Sweden 13,950 98,770 7 3 40 31 27 21 53 66 117 Norway 4,630 56,080 9 4 33 41 21 15 58 55 118 Switzerland 8,550 96,730 .. .. .. .. East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary1 .. 20,710 28 21 39 45 .. .. 33 34 120 Romania .. 53,020 .. 18 . . 57 .. .. .. 25 121 Albania . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . 123 Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 German Oem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. See the technical notes. b. Manufacturing is a part of the industrial sector, but its share of GDP is shown separately because it typically is the most dynamic part of the industrial sector. c. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. d. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. e. Based on net material product. f. Based on constant price series. Services include the unallocated share of GDP. 223 Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 1960_70a 1970_82b 1 960_70a 1 g70_82b 1 96O7Oa 1 970_82b Low-income economies 4.5w 5.Om 3.2 rn 3.3 in 4.9m - 3.3 in China and India 3.2 in 3.7 in 7.3 In 5.9 in Other low-income 4.6 iii 4.2 in 3.2 in 3.3 iii 4.6 in 3.2 in 1 Chad 4.4 -3.8 -0.7 -1.8 2.3 -5,4 2 Bangladesh c c 3.4 4.2 11.2 2.9 3 Ethiopia 81 77 4.3 2.7 5.7 07 4 Nepal .. 5 Mali 6.2 6.5 2.8 4.4 4.9 3.1 6 Burma c c 2.8 4.5 3.6 9.4 7 Zaire 8.5 1.0 3.5 -3.3 9.6 5.7 8 Malawi 4.6 8.0 3.7 4.1 15.4 2.0 9 Upper Volta .. 8.7 28 3.2 10 Uganda c c 5.6 -4.0 7.5 -8.0 11 India -0.2 7.3 3.9 2.2 4.8 5.3 12 Rwanda 1.1 11.8 4.3 3.2 3.5 14.9 13 Burundi 19.2 4.2 3.2 3.3 4.3 15.0 14 Tanzania C C 66 4.4 9.8 3.4 15 Somalia 3.7 . . 0.4 . . 4.3 16 Haiti c c -1.0 4.7 1.7 8.0 17 Benin 1.7 2.6 4.9 3.1 4.2 12.2 18 Central African Rep. 2.2 -2.9 30 ' 2.7 1.3 -7.5 19 China c c 2.5 5.1 98 64 20 Guinea .. . 21 Niger 2.0 24 3.9 3.4 3.0 6.6 22 Madagascar 3.0 2.0 1.9 -05 5.4 -1 4 23 SriLanka c c 2.1 26 6.6 11.0 24 Togo 6.7 9.4 7.6 4.0 11.1 6.3 25 Ghana 7.2 5.7 1.7 -0.4 -3.1 -5.1 26 Pakistan 7.3 4.0 7.1 5.3 6.9 3.3 27 Kenya 10.0 8.4 2.9 5.9 10.3 2.1 28 Sierra Leone .. -2.2 3.5 -1.1 29 Afghanistan c 2.0 -1 a 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Dem 2.6 3.2 . . 0.3 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies 6.2 in 6.3 iii 5.2 in 5.2 in 7.6 in 6.6 in Oil exporters 6.3 in 9.6 in 4.8 iii 7.3 Ui 4.2 Ui 10.7 in Oil importers 6.0 UI 6.2 in 5.4 in 4.6 in 8.2 Ui 5.6 Ui Lower middle-income 5.9 1U 6.4 in 4.8 in 4.8 Ui 7.6 Ui 6.6 Ui 35 Sudan 12.1 2.3 -25 7.8 3.2 90 36 Mauritania (.) 8.1 2.6 3.1 -2.0 6.6 37 Yemen, PDR 38 Liberia 56 2.5 0.7 3.1 -3.9 2.1 39 Senegal -0.2 6.4 3.3 3.3 1.1 1.8 40 YemenArabRep. . . 12.3 .. 8.7 . . 22.2 41 Lesotho (.) 15.5 6.5 8.0 20.7 19.6 42 Bolivia 8.9 5.3 3.8 4.8 9.6 -1.9 43 Indonesia 0.9 11.9 4.1 9.0 4.6 13.7 44 Zambia 11 0 1.0 6.8 3.0 10.6 -10.5 45 Honduras 5.3 6.4 4.8 4.3 10.2 4.7 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. c c 6.7 6.6 3.1 15.5 47 El Salvador 6.4 5.0 5.7 2.4 3.5 1.4 48 Thailand 9.7 9.1 7.0 6.1 15.8 6.4 49 Papua New Guinea 6.0 -1.3 57 3.3 23.2 -3 2 50 Philippines 5.1 6.2 4.7 49 8.2 9.3 51 Zimbabwe , , 9.9 . . 2.9 2.5 52 Nigeria 10.0 11.7 0.6 5.6 7.4 8.8 53 Morocco 4.4 .. 4.1 8.8 54 Cameroon 6.1 47 2.7 6.1 93 9,4 55 Nicaragua 2.2 106 7.6 (,) 10.9 -2.1 56 Ivory Coast 11.8 9.8 8.0 5.3 12.7 10.1 57 Guatemala 4.7 6.5 4.7 4.6 7.9 5.6 58 Congo, People's Rep. 5.4 63 1.9 0.3 1.1 12.2 59 Costa Rica 8.0 5.3 60 3.5 7.1 2.9 60 Peru 6.3 48 7.1 3.1 1.0 3.4 61 Dominican Rep. 1.9 4.8 6.3 5,9 114 7.1 62 Jamaica 8.6 5.4 3.0 -1.5 78 -7.6 63 Ecuador 12.4 7,3 88 64 Turkey 6.7 5.9 5.1 3.6 88 5.6 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 224 Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 196O-7O 1970_82b 1960_70a 1g70_82b 196O-7O 1970_82b 65 Tunisia 5.2 8.7 23 85 4.2 109 66 Colombia 5,5 5.7 5.5 5.3 4.5 6.7 67 Paraguay 6.9 7.1 5.3 7.6 6.8 17.2 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 5.9 4.4 .. 6.2 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 7.0w 6.3w 5.5w 6.1 in 7.6m 7.3rn 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 74 Jordan 10.6 .. 8.8 21.6 75 Malaysia 75 10.5 4.2 72 7.5 11.4 76 Korea, Rep. of 5.5 7.4 7.0 6.8 23.6 11.0 77 Panama 7.8 52 64 46 12.4 1.0 78 Chile 5.1 1.7 37 1.0 9.9 0.4 79 Brazil 3.7 7.1 5.4 8.0 6.1 6.5 80 Mexico 8.8 82 7.0 5.9 9.9 8.0 81 Algeria 1.5 10.8 2.3 9.3 -0.2 11.0 82 Portugal 7.7 8.2 5.5 3.8 7.7 2.3 83 Argentina 1.1 3.4 4.5 1.2 4.0 1.0 84 Uruguay 4,4 39 1.3 1.4 -1.8 10.6 85 South Africa 70 6.2 9.4 86 Yugoslavia 0.6 3.6 9.5 5.2 4.7 6.3 87 Venezuela 6.3 6.0 5.0 8.5 7.6 4.9 88 Greece 6.6 6.3 7.1 42 104 09 89 Israel 13 8 2.7 7.3 52 57 -0.7 90 Hong Kong 8.6 10.3 8.6 10.0 6.9 13.6 91 Singapore 12.6 6.2 5.4 6.2 20.5 8.7 92 Trinidad and Tobago c c 4.8 8.3 -2.3 10.5 93 Iran Islamic Rep. 16.0 10.0 .. 12.2 94 Iraq 8.1 4.9 .. 3.0 High-income oil exporters . . 12.9 iii 18.7 in . . 17.5 in 95 Oman . . .. . . . 96 Libya .. 15.6 . . 187 . . 10.7 97 SaudiArabia ,. c .. 19.6 . . 35.5 98 Kuwait . . 10.1 , 13.1 , 17.5 99 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. Industrial market economies 4.2 in 3,2w 4.3 iii 2.7w 5.8 in 0.6w 100 Ireland 3.9 5.4 3.8 2.5 9.0 4.2 101 Spain 38 5.1 7.0 3.3 11.3 0.7 102 Italy 4.1 2.6 6.1 2.7 3.7 0.6 103 New Zealand 3.6 2.9 3.3 1.5 3.2 -0.1 104 United Kingdom 22 2.1 2.4 1.4 5.1 0.3 105 Austria 3.3 3.7 43 3.3 5.9 2.0 106 Japan 62 4.5 9.0 4.1 14.6 3.3 107 Belgium 5.7 3.9 3.8 3.4 6.0 0.2 108 Finland 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.7 4.1 0.1 109 Netherlands 2.8 2.6 5.9 2.9 74 -1.3 110 Australia 7.1 5.0 5.0 2.7 6.7 1.1 111 Canada 6.2 2.3 49 39 5.8 3.3 112 France 4.0 3.1 5.3 3.8 7.7 1.3 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.1 3.2 4.6 25 4.1 1.1 114 Denmark 5.9 4.0 4.1 1.7 5.9 -2.0 115 U nited States 4.2 1.0 4.4 3.4 5.0 1.3 116 Sweden 5.4 3.2 3.5 17 5.3 -0.8 117 Norway 6.2 4.0 3.7 4.8 5.0 -0.3 118 Switzerland 4.8 1.7 4.3 1.4 3.9 -0.6 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary c 4.0 3.1 3.8 7.8 4.1 120 Romania . . . . . . . . 11.2 7.4 121 Albania . . . . . . . . . . 122 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . 123 Czechoslovakia , , . , . . .. . . . 124 German Gem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1961 -70, not 1960-70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82. c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption, which is therefore included in private consumption. 225 Table 5. Structure of demand Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 196O 1982b 1960a 1982b 196O 1g82b 1960a 1982b 196O 1g82b 1960a 1982b Low-income economies 8w 11 w 78w 73w 19w 24w 18w 21 to 7w 9w -311' China and India 77 w 69 w 21 w 27 U' 20 w 27 U' 4 to 8 to (.) U' Other low-income 10 U' 11 to 86 w 13 U' 13 U' 10 w 5 to 17 U' 1 1 U' -3U' -8w 1 Chad 13 23 82 102 11 9 5 -25 23 35 -6 -34 2 Bangladesh 6 8 86 95 7 14 8 -3 10 8 1 -17 3 Ethiopia 8 16 81 81 12 11 11 3 9 12 -1 -8 4 Nepal . c . 91 .. 15 .. 9 11 -6 5 Mali 12 25 79 79 14 15 9 -4 12 19 -5 -19 6 Burma c c 89 85 12 23 11 15 20 6 -1 -8 7 Zaire 18 c 61 90 12 16 21 10 55 29 9 -6 8 Malawi 17 16 87 71 10 20 -4 13 18 21 -14 -7 9 Upper Volta 10 20 94 89 9 15 -4 -9 9 14 -13 -24 10 Uganda 9 c 75 95 11 8 16 5 26 5 5 -3 11 India 7 11 79 67 17 25 14 22 5 6 -3 -3 12 Rwanda 10 17 82 75 6 22 8 8 12 12 2 --14 13 Burundi 3 13 92 86 6 14 5 1 13 9 -1 --13 14 Tanzania 9 22 72 70 14 20 19 8 30 11 5 -12 15 Somalia 8 86 10 . . 6 .. 13 . . -4 16 Haiti c C 93 98 9 11 7 2 20 15 -2 -9 17 Benin 16 13 75 87 15 37 9 (.) 12 30 -6 -37 18 Central African Rep. 19 12 72 97 20 9 9 -9 23 18 -11 --18 19 China c c 76 70 23 28 24 30 4 10 1 2 20 Guinea .. 17 .. 66 .. 13 .. 17 28 ,. 4 21 Niger 9 9 79 79 12 26 12 12 9 21 (.) -14 22 Madagascar 20 15 75 81 11 14 5 4 12 13 -6 -10 23 SriLanka 13 8 78 80 14 31 9 12 44 27 -5 --19 24 Togo 8 17 88 78 11 26 4 5 19 28 -7 -21 25 Ghana 10 7 73 92 24 1 17 1 28 2 -7 (.) 26 Pakistan 11 10 84 85 12 17 5 5 8 10 -7 -12 27 Kenya 11 19 72 64 20 22 17 17 31 25 -3 -5 28 Sierra Leone 9 . . 92 . . 12 . . -1 . . 14 . . -13 29 Afghanistan c 87 .. 16 .. 13 . . 4 . . 3 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 11 to 14 U' 70 w 68 u' 20 to 24 to 19 to 21 U' 17 U' 23 to - 1 to --3 to Oil exporters 11 to 13 to 70 to 64 to 18 to 25 to 19 U' 24 U' 21 U' 24 U' 1 U' -- 1 U' Oil importers 11 to 15 to 70 U' 71 w 20 to 23 to 19 to 19 to 1 5 to 22 U' - 1 U' --4 to Lower middle-income 10 to 13 to 76 U' 70 to 15 to 23 to 14 to 1 7 to 15 to 20 o' - 1 ti' -6 U' 35 Sudan 8 13 81 89 9 16 11 -2 15 9 2 -18 36 Mauritania 25 31 71 64 38 41 4 5 15 43 -34 -36 37 Yemen, PDR .. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 Liberia 7 23 58 57 28 22 35 20 39 46 7 -2 39 Senegal 17 20 68 74 16 20 15 6 40 31 -1 -14 40 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 27 . - 95 .. 43 .. -22 .. 10 . . -64 41 Lesotho 17 31 108 146 2 29 -25 -77 12 14 -27 -106 42 Bolivia 7 13 86 73 14 14 7 14 13 14 -7 (.) 43 Indonesia 12 10 80 71 8 23 8 19 13 22 (.) -4 44 Zambia 11 30 48 65 25 17 41 5 56 27 16 -12 45 Honduras 11 13 77 72 14 16 12 15 21 27 -2 -1 46 EgyptArabRep. 17 21 71 64 13 30 12 15 20 32 -1 -15 47 ElSalvador 10 15 79 80 15 11 11 5 20 22 -4 -6 48 Thailand 10 13 76 66 16 21 14 21 17 25 -2 (.) 49 Papua New Guinea 28 27 71 66 13 29 1 7 16 36 -12 -22 50 Philippines 8 9 76 70 16 29 16 21 11 16 (.) -8 51 Zimbabwe 11 20 67 59 23 27 22 21 . . . . -1 -6 52 Nigeria 6 13 87 71 13 25 7 16 14 19 -6 -9 53 Morocco 12 22 77 70 10 23 11 8 24 20 1 -15 54 Cameroon .. 8 . - 65 . . 25 .. 27 . - 31 .. 2 55 Nicaragua 9 24 79 69 15 19 12 7 24 15 -3 -12 56 IvoryCoast 10 18 73 58 15 24 17 24 37 39 2 (.) 57 Guatemala 8 8 84 82 10 14 8 10 13 15 -2 -4 58 Congo, People's Rep. 15 15 97 37 53 56 -12 48 21 55 -65 -8 59 CostaRica 10 15 77 58 18 23 13 27 21 43 -5 4 60 Peru 9 15 63 71 25 17 28 14 20 19 3 -3 61 Dominican Rep. 13 10 68 74 12 21 19 16 24 14 7 -5 62 Jamaica 7 23 67 69 30 20 26 8 34 40 -4 -12 63 Ecuador 11 13 78 63 14 25 11 24 16 21 -3 -1 64 Turkey 11 11 76 73 16 22 13 16 3 11 -3 -6 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 226 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 1960 lg82 1960 1g82b 1960 1982b 1960 1982b 1960 l982 1960 1982b 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 17 6 16 9 76 73 61 69 17 21 33 26 7 21 23 22 20 16 37 11 10 10 4 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 8 7 76 78 17 26 16 15 18 8 1 (.) 11 . .. .. .. .. .. 69 Cuba .. .. .. .. 70 Korea, Bern Rep. 71 Lebanon 10 85 .. 16 27 11 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 12 w 15 u' 67 w 67 u' 22 w 24 w 21 a' 23 a 18 w 24 w - 1 u' - 1 U' 73 Syrian Arab Rep. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. 74 Jordan 25 86 46 11 49 57 75 Malaysia 11 . . 21 62 . . 54 14 . . 34 27 . . 25 54 . . 51 13 . . 9 2 76 Korea, Rep. of 77 Panama 78 Chile 15 11 9 13 21 15 84 78 79 63 56 77 11 16 14 26 29 10 11 12 1 24 23 8 3 31 14 39 40 22 5 10 2 6 2 79 Brazil 12 c 67 81 22 19 21 19 5 9 1 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 6 11 76 61 20 21 18 28 10 17 2 17 (.) 7 82 Portugal 15 11 15 16 60 77 46 76 42 19 38 27 25 12 39 8 31 17 30 27 7 19 1 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 9 9 9 18 13 70 79 64 60 75 .. 22 18 22 19 15 21 12 27 22 12 10 15 30 13 15 63 1 5 3 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 19 14 16 14 49 53 51 61 36 21 34 26 32 33 33 25 . 14 32 23 25 . . 412 1 1 88 Greece 89 Israel 12 18 18 34 77 68 69 60 19 26 23 21 11 14 13 6 9 14 18 37 8 10 12 15 90 Hong Kong 7 8 87 67 18 29 6 25 82 100 12 4 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 8 9 11 c 95 61 48 69 11 28 46 34 3 30 41 31 163 37 196 36 14 5 3 2 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 10 .. 69 .. 17 .. 21 .. 18 . 4 94 Iraq 18 . . 48 . . 20 . . 34 . . 42 . . 14 High-income oil exporters 2 . . 27 U' . . 26w . . 53 i' . . 65 w . . 27 U' 95 Oman ,. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . 96 Libya . 25 .. 29 32 .. 46 .. 57 14 97 SaudiArabia . . 19 .. 24 .. 25 .. 56 .. 68 31 98 Kuwait .. 20 .. 50 23 .. 30 .. 59 7 99 United Arab Emirates .. . .. .. .. Industrial market economies 15 a' 18 U' 63 ii' 62 U' 21 U' 20 t' 22w 20 t' 12 a' 19 i' 1 U' (.) U' 100 Ireland 101 Spain 12 7 21 12 77 72 57 70 16 18 27 20 11 21 22 18 32 10 62 18 5 3 .5 2 102 Italy 13 18 63 62 25 20 24 20 14 27 1 103 NewZealand 104 UnitedKingdom 11 17 18 22 68 66 61 58 23 19 25 18 21 17 21 20 22 21 29 27 2 2 (.) 4 2 105 Austria 13 19 59 57 28 23 28 24 25 42 () 1 106 Japan 8 10 59 59 33 30 33 31 11 15 107 Belgium 108 Finland 13 12 19 20 69 60 67 55 19 28 17 24 18 28 13 25 33 23 69 32 1(.) 4 1 1 (.) 3 2 2 109 Netherlands 13 18 59 61 27 18 28 21 48 58 1 3 110 Australia 10 18 65 62 28 22 25 20 15 15 111 Canada 14 21 65 56 23 19 21 23 18 27 4 112 France 113 Germany Fed. Rep. 13 13 16 21 62 57 67 55 23 27 21 22 25 30 17 24 15 19 21 31 2 3 4 2 114 Denmark 13 28 62 55 26 17 25 17 32 36 1 (.) 115 United States 116 Sweden 17 16 19 29 64 60 66 54 19 25 16 18 19 15 17 5 9 1(.) 1 1 24 23 33 117 Norway 118 Switzerland 13 9 19 13 59 62 49 62 30 29 26 24 28 29 32 25 41 29 46 35 2 6 1 . (.) East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary c 10 74 61 28 29 26 29 .. 38 . . 1 120 Romania .. . . ,. .. . . 29 .. .. . . 23 . . 4 121 Albania . . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . 122 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 German Dem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1961 not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. c. Separate figures are not available br public consump- tion, which is therefore included in private consumption. 227 Table 6. Agriculture and food Value added Food aid Fertilizer consumption Average index of in agriculture Cereal imports in cereals (hundreds of grams of food production (millions of (thousands of (thousands of plant nutrient per per capita 1975 dollars) metric tons) metric tons) hectare of arable land) (1969-71 =100) 1970 1982 1974 1982 1974/75b 1g81/82b 1970C 1981 1980-82 Low-income economies 774 t 29,260 5,611 3,885 184w 581 zi' 110 ii' China and India 14,437 t 22,767 494 230 ii' 772 zi' 114 ii' Other low-income 8,337 t 6,493 4,029 3,391 85 ii' 187 zi' 97 w 1 Chad 246 211 50 57 13 25 7 13 95 2 Bangladesh 9,475 11,027 1,719 1,375 2,130 1,076 142 436 94 3 Ethiopia 1,128 1,286 118 273 59 178 4 33 82 4 Nepal 1,012 1,183 19 23 0 10 30 94 83 5 Mali 260 369 281 143 114 67 29 64 83 6 Burma 1,479 2,671 26 14 14 5 34 165 113 7 Zaire 397 479 343 323 (.) 93 8 12 87 8 Malawi 181 311 17 88 (.) 2 52 106 99 9 Upper Volta 217 262 99 98 0 82 3 19 95 10 Uganda 1,926 1,952 37 68 16 49 13 86 11 India 28,962 33,565 5,261 2,402 1,582 416 114 338 101 12 Rwanda 394 3 21 19 13 3 3 105 13 Burundi 239 291 7 20 6 9 5 8 96 14 Tanzania 842 1,058 431 360 148 254 30 56 88 15 Somalia 357 42 406 110 175 31 12 60 16 Haiti 83 197 25 90 4 65 85 17 Benin 231 8 115 9 8 33 15 100 18 Central African Rep. 120 152 7 29 1 2 11 6 104 19 China 44,235 65,540 9,176 20,365 78 418 1,501 124 20 Guinea 647 63 110 49 41 18 18 89 21 Niger 440 327 155 120 75 71 10 88 22 Madagascar 691 729 114 392 7 78 56 23 94 23 Sri Lanka 841 1,178 951 481 271 195 496 769 154 24 Togo 145 183 6 61 0 5 3 24 89 25 Ghana 2,358 2,279 177 211 43 46 9 112 72 26 Pakistan 3,258 4,406 1,274 361 619 368 168 531 105 27 Kenya 706 1,247 15 194 2 115 224 344 88 28 Sierra Leone 192 236 72 124 10 29 13 19 81 29 Afghanistan 5 75 10 93 24 46 96 30 Rhutan 23 32 0 (.) 11 107 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 223 75 226 44 13 62 55 32 Lao PDR 53 27 13 (.) 4 45 122 33 Mozambique 62 298 34 126 27 117 68 34 VietNam 1,854 322 6 41 512 409 114 Middle-income economies 41,418t 66,303t 2,390 4,463 206 ri 425 zv 111 U' Oil exporters 17,941 f 30,522 1,074 2,225 145 U' 330 zr 104 zr Oil importers 23,477 f 35,781 1,316 2,238 238 zr 470 0' 116 zr Lower middle-income 16,901 t 27,423 t 1,541 t 3,924 1 167 ii' 375 zr 108 zr 35 Sudan 1,367 2,127 125 611 50 185 31 60 87 36 Mauritania 117 152 115 219 48 86 6 (.) 73 37 Yemen, PDR 149 271 38 25 (.) 88 92 38 Liberia 142 205 42 109 3 42 55 92 88 39 Senegal 491 625 341 492 28 77 20 47 93 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 221 401 158 560 0 13 43 93 41 Lesotho 48 46 49 111 14 34 17 151 84 42 Bolivia 348 550 207 293 22 44 13 20 100 43 Indonesia 7,896 12,593 1,919 1,912 301 107 119 744 117 44 Zambia 278 325 93 225 100 71 166 87 45 Honduras 312 422 52 89 31 34 160 176 79 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,683 3,878 3,877 6,703 610 1,952 1,282 2,475 85 47 El Salvador 328 374 75 179 4 132 1,048 1,220 97 48 Thailand 3,591 5,837 97 133 0 5 76 177 138 49 Papua New Guinea 345 466 71 164 76 326 99 50 Philippines 3,682 6,342 817 1,287 89 54 214 324 124 51 Zimbabwe 451 685 56 3 (.) 466 682 87 52 Nigeria 9,061 8,563 389 2,280 7 1 3 70 92 53 Morocco 1,725 1,836 891 1,913 75 465 130 239 84 54 Cameroon 732 1,134 81 117 4 11 28 60 102 55 Nicaragua 265 367 44 70 3 103 184 480 77 56 Ivory Coast 876 1,421 172 592 4 71 132 107 57 Guatemala . 138 105 9 11 224 537 114 58 Congo, People's Rep. 93 108 34 81 2 (.) 112 8 81 59 Costa Rica 338 436 110 164 45 1,086 1,514 100 60 Peru 2,232 2,417 637 1,524 37 76 297 375 87 61 Dominican Rep. 667 1,022 252 302 16 59 354 471 104 62 Jamaica 199 196 340 405 78 886 718 90 63 Ecuador 628 914 152 327 13 5 123 262 101 64 Turkey 7,691 11,442 1,276 546 70 (.) 166 454 115 Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 228 Value added Food aid Fertilizer consumption Average index of in agriculture Cereal imports in cereals (hundreds of grams of food production (millions of (thousands of (thousands of plant nutrient per per capita 1975 dollars) metric tons) metric tons) hectare of arable land) (1969-71 =100) 1970 1982a 1974 1982 1974/75b 1981/82b 1970C 1981 1980-82 65 Tunisia 480 816 307 946 1 96 82 180 128 66 Colombia 2,848 4,593 503 886 28 3 310 504 124 67 Paraguay 419 821 71 38 10 1 58 48 111 68 Angola 149 311 0 68 45 35 77 69 Cuba 1,622 2,241 1,539 1,872 113 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 1,108 585 1,484 3,486 132 71 Lebanon 354 529 21 11 1,279 1,006 134 72 Mongolia 28 100 18 112 95 dIe-income 24,517! 38,880! 849 i391 24J 470 a' 115 iv 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 595 339 426 47 8 67 232 168 74 Jordan 92 132 171 668 63 73 20 53 70 75 Malaysia 2,049 3,738 1,017 1,447 436 923 150 76 Korea, Rep. of 3,995 5,812 2,679 5,538 234 429 2,466 3,513 125 77 Panama 193 248 63 110 3 3 391 521 103 78 Chile 440 565 1,737 1,425 331 18 317 202 98 79 Brazil 8,737 13,429 2,485 4,492 31 3 169 375 133 80 Mexico 8,501 12,538 2,881 2,194 246 666 104 81 Algeria 952 1,375 1,816 3,831 54 5 174 262 75 82 Portugal 2,242 2,025 1,860 3,504 0 0 411 767 73 83 Argentina 3,523 4,676 0 0 24 27 122 84 Uruguay 387 425 70 122 31 0 392 333 109 85 South Africa 127 302 425 904 193 86 Yugoslavia 3,584 5,493 992 1,267 766 1,284 126 87 Venezuela 1,362 1,861 1,270 2,575 165 388 95 88 Greece 2,851 3,711 1,341 717 858 1,335 131 89 Israel 1,176 1,599 53 (.) 1,394 1.996 107 90 Hong Kong 171 166 657 879 71 91 Singapore 100 123 682 1,819 (.) (.) 2,667 6,714 91 92 Trinidad and Tobago 80 65 208 272 640 417 62 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3,739 2,076 3,183 76 423 111 94 Iraq 1,172 870 2,510 35 141 87 High-income oil exporters 1,379 t 7,371 58 w 467 o' 42 a' 95 Oman 52 217 (.) 395 95 96 Libya 126 388 612 849 64 375 127 97 Saudi Arabia 331 616 482 5,584 44 602 9 98 Kuwait 20 30 101 439 (.) 5,000 99 United Arab Emirates 132 282 (.) 2,812 dustrial market economies 65,494! 66,103! 985 a 114 100 Ireland 631 386 3,573 6,094 103 101 Spain 7,945 9,689 4.675 7,402 595 672 126 102 Italy 14,093 15,430 8,100 6,506 962 1,633 109 103 New Zealand 92 22 8,875 10,241 114 104 United Kingdom 5,386 7,297 7,541 3,943 2,521 3,296 126 105 Austria 1,806 2,325 165 93 2,517 2,393 129 106 Japan 24,218 25,012 19,557 24,336 3,849 3,872 91 107 Belgium5 1,854 2,120 4,585 6,370 5,686 4,902 107 108 Finland 3,188 3,017 222 1,030 1,931 1,938 107 109 Netherlands 3,173 5,313 7,199 4,843 7,165 7,674 120 110 Australia 4,351 5,107 2 9 246 279 98 111 Canada 6,743 8,770 1,513 904 192 419 119 112 France 17,077 20.459 654 2,482 2,424 2,984 121 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 11,567 15,924 7,164 4,977 4,208 4,184 118 114 Denmark 1,641 2,618 462 377 2,254 2,330 125 115 United States 46,300 55,400 460 399 800 1,024 119 116 Sweden 3,133 3,219 301 112 1,639 1,639 119 117 Norway 1,409 1,676 713 726 2,471 3,033 127 118 Switzerland 1,458 1,156 3,842 4,122 127 East European nonmarket economies 18,543t 50,406! 635 a' 1,098 o' 107 a' 119 Hungary 1,619 2,551 408 24 1,485 2,793 147 120 Romania 1,381 1,305 559 1,541 152 121 Albania 48 12 745 1,114 104 122 Bulgaria 649 397 1,446 2,506 127 123 Czechoslovakia 1,296 681 2,402 3,327 120 124 German Dem. Rep. 2,821 3,313 3,202 3,442 129 125 Poland 4,185 4,566 417 1,715 2,481 93 126 USSR 7,755 40,108 437 826 101 a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. b. Figures are for the crop years 1974/75 and 1981/82. c. Average for 1969-71. d. Includes Luxembourg. 229 Table 7. Industry Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices) Machinery Value added Textiles and in manufacturing Food and and transport Other (millions of agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1975 dollars) 19818 19810 19818 19810 19810 1970 1981 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 49 34 17 37 21 2 Bangladesh 30 38 16 12 647 1290 3 Ethiopia 27 27 2 44 236 349 4 Nepal 5Mali .. 44 55 6 Burma 31 14 1 4 50 287 456 7 Zaire .. .. .. 186 163 8 Malawi 54 10 .. 36 44 81 9 Upper Volta 74 7 11 8 67 96 10 Uganda 54 25 .. 21 222 87 11 India 13 18 20 14 35 10,232 16190 12 Rwanda 58 2 40 106 13 Burundi .. 23 44 14 Tanzania .. .. .. 190 202 15 Somalia .. .. .. 42 16 Haiti 35 17 1 47 17 Benin S 56 18 Central African Rep 66 21 (.) 11 44 29 19 China 20 Guinea 26 21 Niger .. .. .. .. 54 172 22 Madagascar 27 39 2 10 22 295 272 23 Sri Lanka 46 10 44 556 714 24 Togo 50 28 .. 22 30 14 25 Ghana 28 .. .. 72 591 505 26 Pakistan 46 14 7 16 17 1,492 2,496 27 Kenya 24 10 33 6 27 167 531 28 Sierra Leone 25 37 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan .. 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 32 Lao POR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 253 421 36 Mauritania 21 36 37 Yemen, PDR 59 38 Liberia 22 78 25 39 39 Senegal 43 15 34 276 298 40 Yemen Arab Rep. .. .. .. 25 102 41 Lesotho 3 10 42 Bolivia .. .. .. .. .. 237 390 43 Indonesia 28 8 7 12 45 1,517 5,998 44 Zambia 16 22 10 14 38 319 444 45 Honduras 47 14 1 7 31 138 254 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 20 22 14 10 34 1,835 4,544 47 El Salvador .. .. .. .. 252 270 48 Thailand 31 26 15 3 25 1,675 4,636 49 PapuaNewGuinea .. .. .. .. 71 132 50 Philippines 40 11 10 7 32 2,816 5,706 51 Zimbabwe 19 19 10 11 41 564 969 52 Nigeria 33 18 12 11 26 1,191 4,020 53 Morocco 31 12 9 10 38 1,138 1,960 54 Cameroon 41 .. 2 7 50 199 477 55 Nicaragua 52 15 .. 33 262 360 56 Ivory Coast .. .. .. .. 398 706 57 Guatemala .. .. .. .. .. 58 Congo, People's Rep. 37 5 7 51 73 104 59 Costa Rica .. . . .. . 261 531 60 Peru 27 14 10 11 38 2,911 4,038 61 Dominican Rep. 72 4 1 5 18 483 956 62 Jamaica .. .. .. .. . . 429 359 63 Ecuador 27 14 10 7 42 322 887 64 Turkey 24 11 15 12 38 3,678 6,532 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 230 Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices) Machinery Value added Textiles and in manufacturing Food and and transport Other (millions of agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1975 dollars) 19818 19818 1981 19818 19818 1970 1981 65 Tunisia 20 20 8 16 36 222 820 66 Colombia 32 15 11 12 30 1,800 3,260 67 Paraguay 34 14 10 4 38 183 430 68 Angola .. .. 69 Cuba 36 16 1 17 30 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia 23 29 .. 5 43 Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 27 32 4 4 33 575 1,318 74 Jordan ., . ., . . .. 91 286 75 Malaysia 21 8 18 6 47 941 2,918 76 Korea, Rep. of 16 23 18 11 32 2,346 10,542 77 Panama 51 12 2 6 29 204 280 78 Chile 15 5 14 12 54 1,881 2,161 79 Brazil 15 10 24 13 38 18,819 40,673 80 Mexico 19 8 20 12 41 14,592 31,115 81 Algeria 24 16 10 3 47 1,068 3,125 82 Portugal 12 18 22 14 34 3,496 6,109 83 Argentina 12 11 23 13 41 10,693 10,612 84 Uruguay 26 23 11 8 32 726 960 85 South Africa 14 11 18 11 46 86 Yugoslavia 15 14 20 9 42 4,832 12,605 87 Venezuela 27 6 8 8 51 3,419 5,531 88 Greece 20 26 9 9 36 2,540 4,540 89 Israel 15 12 25 8 40 90 Hong Kong .. .. 1,620 4,966 91 Singapore 5 3 55 4 33 827 2,556 92 Trinidad and Tobago 14 4 9 7 66 404 434 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14 20 10 .. 56 2,601 94 Iraq 22 22 .. 56 522 High-income oil exporters 95 Oman .. . . . . .. 96 Libya 14 .. . . 21 65 154 544 97 Saudi Arabia 4 .. . . .. 96 1,726 3,568 98 Kuwait 9 .. . . 17 74 368 986 99 United Arab Emirates . .. .. .. Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 23 10 13 15 39 101 Spain 13 14 17 10 46 18,331 28,734 102 Italy 10 15 29 8 38 103 New Zealand 24 11 16 4 45 104 United Kingdom 13 8 34 10 35 58,677 52,963 105 Austria 15 9 24 7 45 9,112 13,355 106 Japan 7 5 39 8 41 118,403 252,581 107 Belgium 18 8 27 12 35 14,386 19,164 108 Finland 12 8 25 8 47 5,636 8,919 109 Netherlands 19 4 28 13 36 18,684 23,760 110 Australia 17 7 22 8 46 20,206 25,379 111 Canada 14 7 23 7 49 25,748 36,978 112 France 17 7 33 7 36 75,800 104,907 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 10 5 37 10 38 149,113 182,717 114 Denmark 24 7 25 8 36 5.858 8,139 115 UnitedStates 11 6 33 12 38 328,200 446,700 116 Sweden 10 3 35 7 45 16,743 18,138 117 Norway 16 4 27 7 46 5,322 6,309 118 Switzerland 20 8 21 13 38 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 11 10 29 10 40 3,244 5,984 120 Romania 12 15 33 12 28 . 121 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Bulgaria 25 16 16 6 37 .. 123 Czechoslovakia 7 9 38 8 38 .. 124 German Oem. Rep. 18 10 34 9 29 125 Poland 5 19 32 9 35 126 USSR 12 11 29 6 42 a. Figuresinitalicsarefor 1980, not 1981. 231 Table 8. Commercial energy Energy consumption Energy imports Average annual energy per capita as a percentage growth rate (percent) (thousands of kilograms of merchandise Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) exports 1960_74a 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 1960b 1981 1960 1981 Low-income eco (V 5.8w 5.5 w 14011 253 ii' 1111' 61w China and India 5.7w 5.9w 5.7w 14811 307 iv Other low-income 6.5 w 4.5w 3.7w 52 iv 80 ii' 42w 1 Chad 9.8 3.8 7 20 23 2 Bangladesh 11 8.2 35 17 3 Ethiopia 14.1 5.6 14.2 6.2 7 23 11 44 4 Nepal 26.9 7.8 12.6 5.9 3 10 10 5 Mali 41.2 7.0 6.3 5.1 10 21 13 6 Burma 5.6 10.2 4.3 5.5 41 59 4 7 Zaire 3.0 12.2 5.0 2.0 65 76 3 8 Malawi 32.8 9.5 4.5 46 15 9 Upper Volta 78 13.1 3 22 38 71 10 Uganda 5.2 -3.2 9.2 -8.0 27 23 5 11 India 4.9 5.4 5.4 5.6 79 158 11 81 12 Rwanda 23.7 2.3 7.0 10 18 13 Burundi 30.5 10.6 6 15 14 Tanzania 10.6 6.7 10.8 2.4 30 50 50 15 Somalia 10.2 19.2 11 90 2 16 Haiti 27.1 11.0 3.7 8.3 29 55 17 Benin 10.0 -1.5 26 38 16 18 Central African Rep. 14.1 3.7 7.7 7.3 20 33 12 19 China 6.2 5.7 6.0 5.3 191 412 20 Guinea 15.9 (.) 3.4 1.3 35 54 7 21 Niger 15.1 10.9 3 31 6 23 22 Madagascar 7.2 -5.8 11.4 -5,4 27 41 9 13 23 Sri Lanka 10.1 7.4 4.4 1.7 122 123 8 45 24 Togo 24.2 13.2 16.1 15 125 10 18 25 Ghana 3.0 12.3 -0.1 72 161 7 26 Pakistan 9.2 9.1 48 7.8 97 179 17 52 27 Kenya 96 15.0 6.4 2.5 114 147 18 63 28 Sierra Leone 68 -0.5 74 121 11 29 Afghanistan 38.9 - 4.7 10.3 2.3 16 48 12 30 Bhu fan 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 59 9 32 Lao PDR 24.6 13.5 10.1 11 65 33 Mozambique 3.2 29.5 6.4 -0.5 76 85 11 34 VietNam 5.3 -0.2 103 Middle-income economies A -3.8w 8.0 iv 5.4u' 317'u' 721 u' 9 iv 27 Oil exporters .511' -5.6 ii' 6.9 6.5 ii' 257 ii 593 11' 5w 7 Oil importers .611' 4.5 ii' 8.4 ii' 4.8 ii' 357 ii' 824 iv 13 ii' 37 iv Lower middle-income 21 8 v 2.3 ii' 8.4 ii' 5.5 w' 146w 362w 8 w' 27 11' 35 Sudan 29.7 9.6 13.1 -39 40 70 8 44 36 Mauritania 20.9 4.2 12 131 39 37 Yemen, PDR 8.5 791 38 Liberia 31.9 -0.9 198 1.6 66 373 3 24 39 Senegal 1.9 -2.0 381 206 8 77 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 17.1 57 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 17.1 -0.1 68 8.2 122 326 43 Indonesia 8.5 5.1 4.4 8.7 88 191 44 Zambia 4.5 0.2 443 45 Honduras 29.4 8.1 92 3.5 102 206 10 18 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 9.3 20.4 2.6 10.8 197 448 12 10 47 El Salvador 5.1 19.8 7.3 5.9 98 210 6 27 48 Thailand 28.0 8.1 16.5 7.3 44 284 12 43 49 PapuaNewGuinea 12.3 14.9 17.1 4.6 37 240 7 50 Philippines 2.9 25.2 9.9 5.6 109 281 9 45 51 Zimbabwe -25 1.4 578 52 Nigeria 36.6 -23 9.2 17.2 20 143 7 53 Morocco 2.0 4.7 7.9 7.4 118 283 9 50 54 Cameroon 1.1 55.4 4.7 85 61 122 7 13 55 Nicaragua 265 53 104 0.3 125 271 12 41 56 Ivory Coast 9.7 35.1 14.9 79 50 191 5 21 57 Guatemala 9.9 20 9 6.6 5.0 124 199 12 62 58 Congo, Peoples Rep. 158 9.3 5.9 18.5 89 139 25 7 59 Costa Rica 9.5 8.2 10.8 5.5 208 592 7 21 60 Peru 3.5 15.1 6.3 2.4 315 534 4 1 61 Dominican Rep. 1.8 -7.0 14.0 -1.2 108 349 40 62 Jamaica -07 -0.1 9.6 0.2 449 1,182 11 51 63 Ecuador 19.1 3.8 8.5 13.6 151 571 2 1 64 Turkey 8.4 4.6 10.4 5.0 170 569 16 83 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 232 Energy consumption Energy imports Average annual energy per capita as a percentage growth rate (percent) (thousands of kilograms of merchandise Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) exports 1960_74a 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 l960 1981 1960 1981C 65 Tunisia 72.2 5.5 9.8 10.0 119 497 15 31 66 Colombia 3.5 2.5 6.3 4.7 355 690 3 25 67 Paraguay .. 10.4 9.0 7.8 54 172 3 68 Angola 35.5 -1.8 13.0 5.2 46 210 69 Cuba 21.2 5.3 4.7 4.1 624 1051 6 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 9.4 3.0 9.6 3.7 833 2,054 71 Lebanon 12.7 0.9 7.6 -1.9 512 812 68 72 Mongolia 10.4 10.9 11.1 364 1,161 Upper middle-income 9.3 n' -5.9w 7.8u' 5.3w 540w 1,209w 27w 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 86.6 2.2 9.0 13.1 218 771 16 74 Jordan . . . . 6.8 16.1 130 706 79 101 75 Malaysia 37.5 19.6 95 8.3 222 689 2 18 76 Korea, Rep. of 5.9 4.2 14.7 10.4 143 1,104 70 37 77 Panama 14.7 53.6 18.5 4.6 306 2,192 . . 125 78 Chile 4.0 0.8 6.2 1.1 569 754 10 20 79 Brazil 8.3 8.4 9.1 5.9 264 740 21 52 80 Mexico 5.8 17.6 7.4 9.3 540 1,340 3 81 Algeria 11.2 5.1 8.0 17.6 221 931 14 2 82 Portugal 4.5 0.7 7.8 4.3 363 1,145 17 58 83 Argentina 6.5 4.7 5.5 3.0 808 1,445 14 11 84 Uruguay 3.7 9.3 2.2 2.2 703 853 35 44 85 SouthAtrica 3.6 10.0 5.2 5.0 1,512 2,392 9 (.) 86 Yugoslavia 4.2 4.0 6.7 5.0 659 1,844 8 35 87 Venezuela 1.1 -2.3 3.7 4.4 2,176 2,439 1 (.) 88 Greece 13.5 7.3 11.3 5.0 361 1,699 26 46 89 Israel 41.8 -39.4 9.3 2.1 932 1,847 17 36 90 Hong Kong .. .. 10.4 5.5 443 1,314 5 9 91 Singapore .. .. 9.4 1.6 1,448 4,492 17 44 92 TrinidadandTobago 2.8 2.3 1.1 7.8 4,420 6,378 35 32 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14.6 -19.7 11.0 -1.7 522 808 1 94 Iraq 5.0 -2.9 5.1 11.8 411 855 (.) High-income oil exporters 17.1 iv 0.9 71 7.1 zi' . . 3,367 iv 1 zv 95 Oman 44.0 -1.0 .. -2.6 .. 914 .. 7 96 Libya 29.1 -1.0 15.4 20.9 198 2,309 288 1 97 SaudiArabia 14.0 4.0 14.6 7.6 874 3,326 1,271 (.) 98 Kuwait 4.5 -6.8 .. 1.9 .. 6,261 .. (.) 99 United Arab Emirates 37.9 -0.5 .. 18.1 .. 4,985 .. 5 Industrial market economies 4.0w 2.2 ii' 5,3w .1 ii' 3,141 iv 4,985 iv 12 iv 30 iv 100 Ireland -0.4 10.8 5.3 4.6 1,218 2,480 17 20 101 Spain 2.9 4.7 8.5 2.5 667 1,902 22 67 102 Italy 23 -0.2 8.1 0.8 1,003 2,558 18 41 103 NewZealand 4.0 5.1 5.2 2.0 2,083 3,673 7 20 104 United Kingdom -0.9 10.8 2.2 -0.8 3,295 3,541 14 14 105 Austria 1.4 1.5 5.5 1.9 1,685 3,398 12 25 106 Japan -1.4 5.9 11.3 1.5 880 3,087 18 48 107 Belgium -7.2 2.8 5.1 0.3 2,790 4,636 11 23 108 Finland 3.3 20.6 9.4 5.7 1,304 5,793 11 40 109 Netherlands 16.9 -1.4 9.8 0.1 2,114 4,908 15 25 110 Australia 12.1 4.6 6.5 2.8 2,576 4,908 12 15 111 Canada 8.7 1.8 5.9 2.6 5,151 9,208 9 11 112 France -1.4 5.3 5.7 1.7 1,964 3,619 16 33 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. -0.6 0.8 4.4 1.4 2,645 4,342 7 23 114 Denmark -21.6 36.1 5.9 1.0 1,914 3,616 15 26 115 United States 3.3 1.2 4.0 0.7 5,863 7,540 8 36 116 Sweden 3.6 8.5 5.2 1.9 3,122 6,138 16 25 117 Norway 6.8 19.4 6.0 3.9 3,400 8,305 15 13 118 Switzerland 4.2 5.3 6.2 1.7 1,841 3,755 10 14 East European nonmarket economies 5.2 ii' 3.6ii' 5.3w 3.5 iv 1,983 iv 4,442w 119 Hungary 1.6 1.7 3.8 3.6 1,354 2,863 13 17 120 Romania 5.9 1.9 78 4.7 1,056 3,289 121 Albania 9.7 5.7 7.9 6.4 362 899 122 Bulgaria 3.3 4.8 9.7 4.6 935 4,164 19 1 23 Czechoslovakia 1.1 0.9 3.2 2.4 2,765 4,773 124 German Oem. Rep. 0.6 1.6 2.2 2.5 3,173 5,398 125 Poland 4.0 1.0 4.4 3.7 1,756 3,198 20 126 USSR 5.8 4.2 5.5 3.5 2,029 4,736 4 a. Figures in italics are for 1961 -74, not 1960-74. b. Figures in italics arefor 1961, not 1960. c. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. 233 Table 9. Growth of merchandise trade Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (percent) Terms of trade (millions of dollars) Exports Imports (1980=100) Exports Imports 1982b 1960-70 1970_82c 1960-70 1970_82c 1979 1982b 1982 Low-income economies 42,619 56,205 5.4w 08w 7m China and India 30,321 33,097 Other low-income 12,298 23,108 5.7w 02w 5.8w 0.7w 108w 87w 1 Chad 101 132 6.0 -8.6 5.1 -3.6 100 99 2 Bangladesh 769 2,300 8.1 -0.8 7.0 5.5 96 98 3 Ethiopia 404 787 3.7 1.3 6.2 0.2 139 74 4 Nepal 46 252 .. .. .. 5 Mali 146 332 2.9 6.6 -0.4 6.6 107 102 6 Burma 380 408 -11.6 1.9 -5.6 -2.3 99 86 7 Zaire 569 480 -1.7 -5.6 5.4 -12.4 113 81 8 Malawi 262 314 11.7 5.1 7.6 1.2 111 106 9 Upper Volta 56 346 14.5 9.1 8.1 6.7 113 97 10 Uganda 371 339 6.9 -9.2 6.2 -7.9 103 74 11 India 8,446 . 14,088 4.7 4.7 -0.9 26 118 96 12 Rwanda 90 286 16.0 2.4 8.2 11.5 88 63 13 Burundi 88 214 . . . . . . . . . 14 Tanzania 480 1,046 3.8 -5.8 6.0 -1.5 105 86 15 Somalia 317 378 2.5 9.1 2.7 3.8 116 111 16 Haiti 380 525 . . . . . . . . 17 Benin 34 889 5.2 -4.4 7.5 5.2 115 75 18 Central African Rep. 106 91 9.6 2.6 4.5 -0.2 99 90 19 China 21,875 19,009 .. .. .. 20 Guinea 411 296 . . . . . . . . . 21 Niger 333 442 5.9 20.8 12.1 11.0 112 89 22 Madagascar 433 522 5.4 -3.6 4.1 -3.4 103 80 23 SriLanka 1,015 1,771 4.6 0.1 -0.2 1.8 126 85 24 Togo 213 526 10.5 0.3 8.6 8.6 108 112 25 Ghana 873 705 0.1 -4.7 -1.5 -4.8 136 61 26 Pakistan 2,403 5,396 9.9 4.7 5.4 3.9 119 93 27 Kenya 979 1,683 7.5 -3.3 6.5 -2.7 108 87 28 SierraLeone 111 298 2.5 -66 1.9 -2.6 121 84 29 Afghanistan 373 776 2.7 7.1 0.7 8.1 99 96 30 Bhutan . . . ., 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 40 62 32 Lao PDR 24 83 33 Mozambique 303 792 6.0 -13.3 7.9 -14.5 104 84 34 VietNam 188 637 Middle-income economies 329,558 t 380,209 5.4w 2.6w 5.9w 3.9 w 99w 91w Oil exporters 149,540t 144,301 4.4m -1.3w 3.6 m 8.7 rn 74w 104w Oil importers 180,018t 235,908t 6.7w 4.0w 7.4 m 1.5w 102w 85w Lower middle-income 97,855 t 119,668 5.3w 1.6w 6.8w 3.3 rn 98 in 89 in 35 Sudan 499 1,285 2.1 -5.1 0.5 3.5 98 85 36 Mauritania 232 273 53.8 -0.1 4.6 3.0 101 97 37 Yemen, PDR 580 1,193 .. . , . . 38 Liberia 531 477 18.5 0.5 2.9 -2.4 121 92 39 Senegal 477 974 1.4 -1.8 2.3 1.3 110 89 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 44 1,987 .. . . .. .. 41 Lesotho1 . . . . . . . . .. . . . 42 Bolivia 832 496 9.7 -3.9 8.1 3.8 77 76 43 Indonesia 22,294 16,859 3.5 4.4 1.9 12.3 73 108 44 Zambia 1,059 831 2.3 -0.5 9.7 -6.8 118 72 45 Honduras 654 712 10.9 3.4 11.7 0.8 100 81 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,120 9,078 3.9 -0.3 -0.9 9.6 95 105 47 El Salvador 704 883 6.2 2.6 6.4 1.2 99 69 48 Thailand 6,945 8,548 5.2 9.1 11.3 4.3 121 78 49 Papua New Guinea 799 1,029 .. .. .. . . 50 Philippines 5,010 8,229 2.3 7.9 72 2.1 112 83 51 Zimbabwe 663 704 .. . . .. .. 81 105 52 Nigeria 19,484 20,821 6.6 -1.6 1.5 17.2 67 103 53 Morocco 2,059 4,315 27 -0.3 3.3 4.7 98 98 54 Cameroon 998 1,205 7.1 4.0 9.2 5.2 119 71 55 Nicaragua 406 776 9.9 1.6 10.4 -1.3 103 64 56 IvoryCoast 2,235 2,090 8.9 2.6 10.0 4.6 119 91 57 Guatemala 1,120 1,362 9.3 5.4 7.2 3.3 92 71 58 Congo, People's Rep. 923 970 6.4 1.4 -1.0 9.1 74 110 59 Costa Rica 872 887 9.6 4.5 10.1 0.1 97 88 60 Peru 3,230 3,787 2.1 4.8 3.6 1.6 99 89 61 Dominican Rep. 768 1,256 -2.1 4.0 9.9 1.3 83 82 62 Jamaica 726 1,372 4.8 -3.3 8.2 -6.1 107 85 63 Ecuador 2,341 2,189 2.8 -1.3 11.6 8.6 70 98 64 Turkey 5,685 8,812 .. 4.0 .. 2.0 125 89 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 234 Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of trade Exports Imports Exports Imports (1980=100) 1982L 1982b 1960-70 1970_82c 1960-70 1970_82c 1979 1982b 65 Tunisia 1,960 3,294 4.4 -0.1 2.3 8.7 79 99 66 Colombia 3,095 5,478 2.6 2.2 2.4 7.3 90 92 67 Paraguay 330 581 5.4 5.8 7.4 6.7 133 87 68 Angola 1,730 1,001 9.7 -15.8 11.5 0.0 74 104 69 Cuba 1,328 1,415 3.9 2.9 5.5 1.4 90 68 70 Korea, Dem. Rep. 843 899 .. .. . 71 Lebanon 923 3,567 15.2 1.0 5.2 3.9 96 92 72 Mongolia 37 29 .. . . .. pper middle-income 231,703 t 260,541 5.4 in 7.1 rn 5.5 in 7.4m 100 in 96m 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 2,026 4,015 3.5 -4.0 4.1 11.3 73 107 74 Jordan 753 3,241 10.8 17.7 3.6 13.5 102 101 75 Malaysia 11,789 12,543 6.1 3.8 2.4 7.3 97 83 76 Korea, Rep. of 21,853 24,251 34.7 20.2 19.7 9.8 127 95 77 Panama 309 1,569 10.4 -7.3 10.5 -3.9 94 84 78 Chile 3,822 3,529 0.7 9.5 4.8 1.5 120 74 79 Brazil 18,627 19,936 5.3 8.8 5.0 1.4 114 84 80 Mexico 21,006 15,042 3.4 8.6 6.4 8.7 77 106 81 Algeria 12,533 10,937 3.7 -0.3 -1.2 10.8 64 106 82 Portugal 4,111 9,313 9.6 .. 14.2 . . . 83 Argentina 7,798 5,337 3.8 8.3 0.4 1.6 102 90 84 Uruguay 1,023 1,042 2.8 5.9 -3.0 1.9 119 80 85 South Africad 17,597 18,956 5.4 8.2 101 86 Yugoslavia 10,265 13,346 7.7 8.8 101 87 Venezuela 16,443 11,670 1.1 -7.2 4.4 9.2 67 112 88 Greece 4,297 10,023 10.8 9.4 10.8 4.5 98 103 89 Israel 5,017 7,960 13.6 8.8 8.7 1.7 118 93 90 Hong Kong 20,985 23,554 12.7 9.4 9.2 11 9 100 95 91 Singapore 20,788 28,167 4.2 .. 5.9 .. 102 92 Trinidad and Tobago 3,072 3,697 4.9 -6.4 3.2 -5.3 95 97 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 16,379 11,231 12.5 -13.8 11.5 7.5 60 98 94 Iraq 11,210 21,182 5.4 -4,8 1.7 24.1 69 118 High-income oil exporters 133,379 f 76,211 f 33.5 in -2.9 in 10.9 in 19.3 in 68 in 114 in 95 Oman 4,421 2,682 96 Libya 16,391 15,414 66.9 -8.1 15.6 12.9 67 105 97 Saudi Arabia 79,123 40,654 10.8 2.3 11.0 32.3 67 125 98 Kuwait 16,561 8,042 5.2 -11.2 10.8 15.2 68 115 99 United Arab Emirates 16,883 9,419 56.1 2.4 5.2 23.3 73 113 Industrial market economies 1,148,808 t 1,212,975 t 8.5 in 5.6 in 9.5 in 4.3 106 ii; 99 in 100 Ireland 7,982 9,618 7.1 8.1 8.3 5.9 92 86 101 Spain 20,522 31,535 11.5 9.4 18.5 4.4 117 92 102 Italy 73,490 86,213 13.6 5.8 9.7 3.1 107 95 103 NewZealand 5,539 5,825 4.6 3.9 2.9 1.8 112 98 104 United Kingdom 97,028 99,723 4.8 6.0 5.0 3.5 102 97 105 Austria 15,685 19,557 96 7.0 9.6 6.1 104 99 106 Japan 138,911 131,932 17.2 8.5 13.7 3.5 125 106 107 Belgiume 52,381 58,037 10.9 4.6 10.3 4.5 104 94 108 Finland 13,132 13,387 6.8 4.7 7.0 24 112 100 109 Netherlands 66,322 62,583 9.9 4.5 9.5 3.1 102 103 110 Australia 22,022 24,187 6.5 3.8 7.2 5.2 103 100 111 Canada 68,499 55,091 10.0 4.0 9.1 4.3 99 94 112 France 92,629 115,645 8.2 6.1 11.0 6.2 107 98 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 176,428 155,856 10.1 5.6 10.0 5.1 106 100 114 Denmark 15,527 17,162 7.1 4.8 8.2 2.1 107 99 115 United States 212,275 254,884 6.0 5.6 9.8 3.8 111 107 116 Sweden 26,817 27,591 7.7 3.2 7.2 2.3 100 99 117 Norway 17,595 15,479 9.1 6.7 9.7 4.3 86 115 118 Switzerland 26,024 28,670 8.5 3.9 9.0 4.3 109 112 East European nonmarket economies 160,258 150,004 t 9.4 in 6.7 in 8.6 in 6.0 in 119 Hungary 8,767 8,814 9.7 7.4 9.1 5.0 99 97 120 Romania 11,714 9,836 9.4 .. 8.8 .. 121 Albania 267 246 . . .. .. . . 122 Bulgaria 1,969 2,281 14.4 11.4 12.9 7.8 . 123 Czechoslovakia 15,637 15,403 6.7 6.1 7.0 4.3 . 124 German Dam. Rep. 21,743 20,196 8.3 . 86 125 Poland 13,249 15,476 -0.3 6.7 -0.4 6.0 99 126 USSR 86,912 77,752 9.7 5.6 7.1 8.3 a. See the technical notes. b. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. c. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82. d. Figures are for the South African Customs Union comprising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component territories is excluded. e. Includes Luxembourg. 235 Table 10. Structure of merchandise exports Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals, primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 196O 1981b 1960 1981b 196O 1981b 1960a 1981b 1960a 1981b Low-income economies 19 Zr' 7 31 w 21 w (.) ri 4w 6w 25 u' China and India 20 w 26w 22w 6w 26w Other low-income 8a 81 54 21 w (.) Zr) 1 Zr' Sw 8w 1 Chad 3 94 0 0 3 2 Bangladesh (.) 32 56 1 11 3 Ethiopia 0 8 100 91 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 1 4 Nepal .. (.) .. 69 .. 24 .. 0 7 5 Mali 0 96 .. 1 1 . 2 6 Burma 4 95 . 0 .. 0 . . 1 7 Zaire 42 57 . . 0 0 . . 1 8 Malawi (.) . . 93 . . 5 . (.) 9 Upper Volta 0 (.) 100 85 0 2 0 6 (.) 10 Uganda 8 92 .. 0 .. 0 . . (.) 11 India 10 8 45 33 35 23 1 8 9 28 12 Rwanda . . .. . .. .. .. . 13 Burundi . . . . 14 Tanzania (.) 10 87 76 0 9 0 (.) 13 5 15 Somalia 0 5 88 94 0 (.) 8 (.) 4 1 16 Haiti 0 . . 100 . . 0 0 . . 0 17 Benin 10 . 80 7 . (.) 3 18 Central African Rep. 12 (.) 86 74 (.) (.) 1 (.) 1 26 19 China . . 24 . . 23 . . 21 5 . . 27 20 Guinea 42 .. 58 .. 0 . . 0 .. 0 21 Niger . . 81 100 17 0 1 0 (.) 0 1 22 Madagascar 4 13 90 79 1 4 1 1 4 3 23 Sri Lanka (.) 14 99 65 0 16 0 (.) 0 5 24 Togo 3 52 89 33 3 1 0 1 5 13 25 Ghana 7 .. 83 . . 0 .. 0 10 26 Pakistan 0 7 73 40 23 41 1 1 3 11 27 Kenya 1 36 87 52 0 (.) 0 1 12 11 28 Sierra Leone 15 20 . . 0 .. 0 . . 65 29 Afghanistan (.) 82 . . 14 . . 3 . . 1 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 0 100 .. 0 .. 0 .. 0 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 100 .. 0 6 0 34 VietNam Middle-income economi Zn 0- Oil exporters Oil importers 68 14 wer middle-income 76 w 39 35 Sudan 0 5 100 94 0 0 (.) 0 (.) 36 Mauritania 4 .. 69 . I .. 20 . . 6 37 Yemen, P08 38 Liberia 45 67 55 31 0 (.) 6 1 0 39 Senegal 3 52 94 29 1 4 1 4 1 11 40 Yemen Arab Rep. (.) .. 49 .. 6 .. 25 .. 20 41 Lesothoc 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 33 83 67 13 (.) (.) 44 Zambia 45 Honduras 5 6 93 83 0 2 0 (.) 2 9 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 4 69 84 23 9 7 (.) (.) 3 1 47 El Salvador 0 7 94 56 3 14 (.) 3 3 20 48 Thailand 7 8 91 65 () 10 0 5 2 12 49 Papua New Guinea 0 92 .. 0 0 8 50 Philippines 10 16 86 39 1 7 0 3 3 35 51 Zimbabwe 71 . . 25 . . 1 . . (.) . . 3 52 Nigeria 8 .. 89 .. 0 .. 0 .. 3 53 Morocco 38 44 54 28 1 10 1 1 6 17 54 Cameroon 19 33 77 64 0 1 2 (.) 2 2 55 Nicaragua 3 2 95 88 0 1 0 (.) 2 9 56 Ivory Coast 1 8 98 82 0 3 (.) 2 1 5 57 Guatemala 2 2 95 69 1 5 0 2 2 22 58 Congo, People's Rep. 7 90 84 4 () (.) 5 (.) 4 6 59 Costa Rica 0 1 95 67 0 4 0 4 5 24 60 Peru 49 64 50 19 0 8 0 2 1 7 61 Dominican Rep. 6 2 92 79 0 (.) 0 1 2 18 62 Jamaica 50 81 45 13 2 1 0 1 3 4 63 Ecuador 0 .. 99 .. 0 .. 0 .. 1 64 Turkey 8 7 89 56 0 19 0 4 3 14 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 236 Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals, primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 1960a 1981b 65 Tunisia 24 57 66 10 1 15 1 2 8 16 66 Colombia 19 2 79 70 0 8 (.) 3 2 17 67 Paraguay 0 100 .. 0 .. 0 0 68 Angola . . . . . 69 Cuba 2 5 93 90 1 0 (.) 70 Korea, Dem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income w 46 zo 18 ' 12 n' 2w 14w w 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 0 . 81 . 2 .. 0 .. 17 74 Jordan 0 33 96 24 0 6 0 2 4 35 75 Malaysia 20 36 74 44 (.) 3 (.) 12 6 5 76 Korea, Rep. of 30 2 56 8 8 30 (.) 22 6 38 77 Panama .. 24 67 . 3 .. (.) 6 78 Chile 92 65 4 25 0 (.) 0 2 4 8 79 Brazil 8 14 89 45 0 4 (.) 18 3 19 80 Mexico 24 64 4 .. 1 . . 7 81 Algeria 12 99 81 1 0 (.) 1 (.) 6 (.) 82 Portugal 8 9 37 20 18 27 3 13 34 31 83 Argentina 1 8 95 72 0 1 (.) 5 4 14 84 Uruguay (.) 1 71 69 21 13 (.) 2 8 15 85 South Africac 29 14 42 13 2 1 4 2 23 70 86 Yugoslavia 18 6 45 15 4 11 15 29 18 39 87 Venezuela 74 97 26 (.) 0 (.) 0 1 (,) 2 88 Greece 9 18 81 28 1 20 1 5 8 29 89 Israel 4 2 35 17 8 6 2 19 51 56 90 Hong Kong 5 1 15 2 45 42 4 18 31 37 91 Singapore 1 29 73 15 5 4 7 26 14 26 92 Trinidad and Tobago 82 90 14 2 0 (.) 0 3 4 5 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 88 .. 9 . 0 .. 0 .. 3 94Iraq 97 .. 3 .. 0 0 .. 0 High-income oil exporters . 98 u' . . (.) u' . (.) 1 111 . . 1 11' 95 Oman .. 94 .. 1 .. (.) .. 4 . 1 96 Libya 100 100 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 97 Saudi Arabia 95 99 5 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 1 98 Kuwait 84 .. 1 1 .. 5 .. 9 99 United Arab Emirates .. . .. .. .. 'istrial market omies 12 n' 23w 15w 7w 4w 29w 37 w 30o' 32u' 100 Ireland 5 3 67 35 6 8 4 22 18 32 101 Spain 21 9 57 20 7 5 2 26 13 40 102 Italy 8 8 19 9 17 11 29 32 27 40 103 NewZealand () 5 97 74 0 3 () 4 3 14 104 United Kingdom 7 23 9 9 8 4 44 33 32 31 105 Austria 26 5 22 11 10 10 16 27 26 47 106 Japan 11 1 10 2 28 4 23 57 28 36 107 Belgiumo 15 14 9 12 12 7 13 22 51 45 108 Finland 3 8 50 20 1 7 13 21 33 44 109 Netherlands 15 27 34 24 8 4 18 16 25 29 110 Australia 13 33 79 42 (.) 1 3 6 5 18 111 Canada 33 26 37 22 1 1 8 28 21 23 112 France 9 8 18 19 10 5 25 34 38 34 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 9 7 4 7 4 5 44 45 39 36 114 Denmark 2 5 63 39 3 5 19 25 13 26 115 United States 10 7 27 23 3 2 35 44 25 24 116 Sweden 10 9 29 12 1 2 31 42 29 35 117 Norway 22 60 34 9 2 1 10 13 32 17 118 Switzerland 2 3 8 4 12 7 30 34 48 52 East European nonmarket economies 18 33w .. 3w 3411 . . 21 11' 119 Hungary 6 8 28 27 7 7 38 31 21 27 120 Romania .. .. .. .. . . .. .. 121 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 122 Bulgaria 3 .. 75 .. 12 .. 6 .. 4 123 Czechoslovakia 20 5 11 8 (.) 6 45 52 25 29 124 German Oem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 125 Poland 17 . . 8 . 7 . . 47 . 21 126 USSR 24 .. 28 .. 1 .. 21 .. 26 a. Figures in italics are tor 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. c. Figures are for the South African Customs Union com- prising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component countries is excluded, d. Includes Luxembourg. 237 Table 11. Structure of merchandise imports Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b Low-income economies 22w 14 w 26w 22 w 27w 31 w China and India 13w 21 w 14w 21 w 31 Other low-income 24 w 16 n' 8 u' 21 w 4 u' 6w 21 w 26 w 43 u' 31 11 1 Chad 19 12 4 19 46 2 Bangladesh 20 .. 8 .. 11 21 40 3 Ethiopia 9 .. 23 4 35 29 4 Nepal 4 . . 18 2 . 32 44 5 Mali 20 .. 5 . 4 18 .. 53 6 Burma 14 . 4 .. 9 17 .. 56 7 Zaire . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 Malawi .. 8 15 .. 2 . . 34 .. 41 9 Upper Volta 21 25 4 16 1 3 24 24 50 32 10 Uganda 6 .. 8 .. 8 .. 25 . . 53 11 India 21 9 6 45 28 8 30 13 15 25 12 Rwanda .. .. .. . . .. 13 Burundi S S . . . . . S 14 Tanzania .. 13 .. 21 . . 3 . 35 .. 28 15 Somalia 27 33 4 1 0 4 18 35 51 27 16 Haiti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 Benin 17 . 10 . . 1 . . 18 . . 54 18 Central African Rep. 15 21 9 2 2 3 26 34 48 40 19 China . . 16 . . (.) . . 20 . . 27 . . 37 20 Guinea .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . 21 Niger 24 23 5 15 4 4 18 26 49 32 22 Madagascar 17 14 6 11 3 3 23 40 51 32 23 Sri Lanka 39 19 7 25 5 3 15 23 34 30 24 Togo 16 26 6 8 3 3 32 21 43 42 25 Ghana 19 .. 5 .. 4 .. 26 .. 46 26 Pakistan 22 14 10 28 2 8 27 23 39 27 27 Kenya 12 8 11 34 8 2 27 28 42 28 28 Sierra Leone 23 . . 12 . . 5 . . 15 . . 45 29 Afghanistan 14 . . 7 .. 4 .. 14 .. 61 30 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozarnbi qua 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 1511' 12w 9w 21w 13w 611' 28w 29u' 35 11' 32 Oil exporters 19w 17w 7w 9w 8w 5 11' 27w 37w 39 32 Oil importers 14w lOw lOw 25w 16w 711' 29w 27u' 31 w 31 Lower middle-income 16 w 14 w 7w 21w 9w 5w 28 w 29 w 40 u' 31 35 Sudan 17 19 8 19 3 3 14 22 58 37 36 Mauritania 5 .. 3 .. 3 .. 39 .. 50 37 Yemen, PDR ., .. .. .. ., .. .. .. 38 Liberia 16 22 4 27 7 2 34 25 39 24 39 Senegal 30 28 5 30 2 1 19 18 44 23 40 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 28 .. 7 , , 1 .. 28 . . 36 41 Lesothoc . . . . . . . . 42 Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 43 Indonesia 23 11 5 13 10 6 17 36 45 34 44 Zambia . . .. .. .. .. .. . 45 Honduras 13 10 9 16 3 2 24 27 51 45 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 23 34 11 3 16 6 25 28 25 29 47 El Salvador 17 17 6 21 6 4 26 12 45 46 48 Thailand 10 4 11 30 11 8 25 26 43 32 49 Papua New Guinea 30 . . 5 .. 4 .. 23 .. 38 50 Philippines 15 8 10 30 5 4 36 23 34 35 51 Zimbabwe .. . .. , , , . .. .. . 52 Nigeria 14 .. 5 .. 6 . . 24 .. 51 53 Morocco 27 23 8 27 7 9 19 19 39 22 54 Cameroon 20 9 8 12 3 2 17 34 52 43 55 Nicaragua 9 18 10 20 5 1 22 21 54 40 56 Ivory Coast 18 20 6 22 2 2 27 22 47 34 57 Guatemala 12 6 10 38 7 3 26 16 45 37 58 Congo, People'sRep. 18 19 6 14 1 2 31 23 44 42 59 Costa Rica 13 9 6 16 6 4 26 22 49 49 60 Peru 16 19 5 1 5 4 37 49 37 27 61 Dominican Rep. .. 18 .. 33 . . 3 .. 20 26 62 Jamaica 22 19 8 33 9 3 24 15 37 30 63 Ecuador 13 9 3 1 9 4 33 49 42 37 64 Turkey 7 3 11 44 16 6 42 22 24 25 Note; For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 238 Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 196O 1981b 1960a 1g81b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 196O 1981b 65 Tunisia 20 14 9 21 4 8 23 27 44 30 66 Colombia 8 10 3 14 15 6 43 37 31 33 67 Paraguay . . .. . . . . .. . . 68 Angola . .. .. .. .. 69 Cuba .. .. .. 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 1 5 it' 11 ii' 9 iv 22 ii 15w 7w 28w 29w 33 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 24 . . 8 .. 5 .. 15 .. 48 74 Jordan 17 . . 17 . . 3 .. 33 . . 30 75 Malaysia 29 13 16 17 13 5 14 37 28 28 76 Korea Rep of 10 12 7 30 25 15 12 23 46 20 77 Panama 15 10 10 31 1 1 22 21 52 37 78 Chile .. 15 18 .. 4 33 . 30 79 Brazil 14 9 19 51 13 4 36 18 18 18 80 Mexico 4 . 2 . 10 52 . 32 81 Algeria 26 21 4 2 2 5 14 38 54 34 82 Portugal 15 16 10 24 28 9 26 27 21 24 83 Argentina 3 5 13 11 11 6 44 43 29 35 84 Uruguay 5 7 24 32 46 5 17 32 8 24 85 South Africac 6 4 7 () 9 4 37 42 41 50 86 Yugoslavia 11 6 5 24 25 12 37 28 22 30 87 Venezuela 18 17 1 1 10 4 36 43 35 35 88 Greece 11 11 8 22 16 7 44 28 21 32 89 Israel 20 12 7 26 18 7 28 24 27 31 90 Hong Kong 27 12 3 8 16. 5 10 23 44 52 91 Singapore 21 7 15 34 38 5 7 28 19 26 92 Trinidadandlobago 16 13 34 37 7 3 18 22 25 25 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14 . 1 1 . . 23 . . 61 94 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. High-income oil exporters . . 14w 5w .. 2w 39 ii' .. 40 ii' 95 Oman . . 13 .. 13 . 2 .. 39 33 96 Libya 13 18 5 1 10 2 40 38 32 41 97 Saudi Arabia .. 14 .. 1 .. 2 .. 40 43 98 Kuwait . 14 . . 1 . 2 . . 41 42 99 United Arab Emirates . . 11 . . 11 . 2 36 . 40 Industrial market economies 22 ii' 11 ii' 11 U' 28 ii' 24 ii' 9 ii' 16w 23w 27u' 31w 100 Ireland 18 13 12 15 11 4 21 27 38 41 101 Spain 16 12 22 43 25 9 22 17 15 19 102 Italy 20 12 14 35 31 11 13 20 22 22 103 NewZealand 8 6 8 20 16 5 29 32 39 37 104 UnitedKingdom 36 14 11 14 27 10 8 26 18 36 105 Austria 16 7 10 19 20 9 29 27 25 38 106 Japan 17 13 17 51 49 16 9 7 8 13 107 BeIgium 15 12 10 20 26 10 21 22 28 36 108 Finland 13 7 10 31 20 7 33 27 24 28 109 Netherlands 18 15 13 26 14 6 22 19 33 34 110 Australia 6 5 10 14 16 4 31 39 37 38 111 Canada 12 7 9 12 12 6 36 47 31 28 112 France 25 10 17 29 25 8 14 22 19 31 113 Germany Fed Rep. 26 12 8 24 28 9 10 20 28 35 114 Denmark 18 12 12 24 11 7 23 21 36 36 115 UnitedStates 24 8 10 31 25 7 10 26 31 28 116 Sweden 13 7 14 25 13 6 26 27 34 35 117 Norway 12 7 9 15 13 7 36 34 30 37 118 Switzerland 18 9 8 12 13 6 21 26 40 47 East European nonmarket economies . lOw . . 22 ii' . . 16 ii . . 29 ii' . . 23 ii' 119 Hungary 8 9 12 17 28 11 28 28 24 35 120 Romaria . 3 .. 28 .. 27 . 28 14 121 Albania .. .. ., ,. .. 122 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . 123 Czechoslovakia .. 10 .. 23 . 14 35 .. 18 124 German Oem. Rep. 125 Po/and 18 . 20 10 .. 31 21 126 USSR 12 4 .. 18 . 30 36 a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. c. Figures are for the South African Customs Union com- prising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component territories is excluded, d. Includes Luxembourg. 239 Table 12. Origin and destination of merchandise exports Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Industrial East European market nonmarket High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies Origin 1960 1982a 1960 1982 1960 1982a 1960 1982 Low-income economies 52 iv 21 w 4 iv China and India 39 iv 48 w 36 w 6w ,.)w 4w 25 42 Other low-income w 60w 3w 4w 2w 6w 29 30 1 Chad 73 44 0 0 0 7 27 49 2 Bangladesh 38 . 10 .. 1 .. 51 3 Ethiopia 69 66 1 3 6 7 24 24 4 Nepal 50 0 (.) 50 5 Mali 93 62 0 1 (.) (.) 7 37 6 Burma 23 35 3 2 (.) 3 74 60 7 Zaire 89 92 (.) (.) (.) (.) 11 8 8 Malawi .. 74 . . 0 .. 0 26 9 Upper Volta 4 64 0 0 0 0 96 36 10 Uganda 62 88 0 0 0 2 38 10 11 India 66 61 7 11 2 8 25 20 12 Rwanda 61 0 (.) .. 39 13 Burundi .. 76 .. 0 . 0 . 24 14 Tanzania 74 57 1 4 0 1 25 38 15 Somalia 85 16 . . () (.) 68 15 16 16 Haiti 98 97 (.) (.) 0 0 2 3 17 Benin 90 82 2 (.) 0 0 8 18 18 Central African Rep. 83 83 0 (.) 0 (.) 17 17 19 China 14 43 61 4 (.) 2 25 51 20 Guinea 63 87 8 (.) (.) (.) 19 13 21 Niger 74 76 0 0 0 0 26 24 22 Madagascar 79 57 1 6 0 (.) 20 37 23 Sri Lanka 75 46 3 4 0 4 22 46 24 Togo 74 63 0 1 0 (.) 26 36 25 Ghana 88 77 7 10 (.) (.) 5 13 26 Pakistan 56 40 4 4 2 19 38 37 27 Kenya 77 53 0 1 (.) 4 23 42 28 Sierra Leone 99 80 0 0 0 (.) 1 20 29 Afghanistan 48 30 28 50 0 1 24 19 30 Bhutan .. .. . . .. . . 31 Kampuchea, Oem. .. .. . .. .. 32 Lao POP .. 15 .. 0 (.) .. 85 33 Mozambique 29 54 (.) 0 (.) 3 71 43 34 Viet Nam .. 28 .. 7 .. (.) .. 65 Middle-income economie ii, 65 iv 7 iv (.)w 3 iv 25 iv Oil exporters ii' 70 ii 4 iv iv 20' 28 iv 27 Oil importers 0' 61 w 9 iv 6 ii (.)w 5w 23 iv 28 Lower middle-income 73 iv 69w 7 2w 1 iv 2w 19 iv 27 35 Sudan 59 38 8 7 4 22 29 33 36 Mauritania 89 95 0 0 0 (.) 11 5 37 Yemen, PDR 42 53 (.) (.) 2 27 56 20 38 Liberia 100 64 0 1 0 (.) (.) 35 39 Senegal 89 65 0 (.) 0 (.) 11 35 40 Yemen Arab Rep 46 27 18 (.) (.) 23 36 50 41 Lesothoi . . 42 Bolivia 88 34 0 4 0 0 12 62 43 Indonesia 54 75 11 (.) (.) (.) 42 25 44 Zambia . . 74 1 .. 0 .. 25 45 Honduras 77 87 0 0 0 (.) 23 13 46 Egypt,ArabRep. 26 53 33 13 2 3 39 31 47 El Salvador 88 74 0 (.) 0 0 12 26 48 Thailand 47 55 2 3 3 4 48 38 49 Papua New Guinea . . 89 . . (.) (.) . . 11 50 Philippines 94 73 0 2 (.) 1 6 24 51 Zimbabwe .. 49 .. 1 . . 1 .. 49 52 Nigeria 95 89 1 2 0 (.) 4 9 53 Morocco 74 68 3 7 (.) 2 23 23 54 Cameroon 93 89 1 (.) (.) (.) 6 11 55 Nicaragua 91 68 () 6 0 (.) 9 26 56 IvoryCoast 84 71 0 3 0 (.) 16 26 57 Guatemala 94 55 0 (.) 0 3 6 42 58 Congo, Peoples Rep. 93 81 0 (.) 0 (.) 7 19 59 Costa Rica 93 68 (.) 2 (.) (.) 7 30 60 Peru 84 72 (.) 2 0 (.) 16 26 61 Dominican Rep. 92 70 0 11 1 (.) 7 19 62 Jamaica 96 75 0 5 0 (.) 4 20 63 Ecuador 91 50 1 1 0 (.) 8 49 64 Turkey 71 42 12 5 (.) 12 17 41 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 240 Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Industrial East European market nonmarket High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies Origin 1960 1982a 1960 1982a 1960 19828 1960 19828 65 Tunisia 76 73 3 2 2 4 19 21 66 Colombia 94 73 1 4 0 (.) 5 23 67 Paraguay 61 41 0 0 0 0 39 59 68 Angola 64 67 2 (.) 0 0 34 33 69 Cuba 72 43 19 10 (.) 3 9 44 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71 Lebanon 21 14 8 1 32 55 39 30 72 Mongolia .. .. .. .. .. Upper middle-incom. 67 w 63 w 6w '+ (.) w 4w .. 29 w 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 39 55 19 18 11 9 31 18 74 Jordan 1 5 11 11 26 23 62 61 75 Malaysia 58 51 7 3 0 1 35 45 76 Korea, Rep. of 89 65 0 (.) 0 10 11 25 77 Panama 99 76 0 (.) 0 1 1 23 78 Chile 91 72 (.) 1 (.) 1 9 26 79 Brazil 81 60 6 6 (.) 1 13 33 80 Mexico 93 91 (.) (.) 0 (.) 7 9 81 Algeria 93 93 0 1 () () 7 6 82 Portugal 56 81 2 2 (.) 1 42 16 83 Argentina 75 43 5 22 (.) (.) 20 35 84 Uruguay 82 39 7 8 0 2 11 51 85 South Afric&' 71 82 1 (.) (.) 0 28 18 86 Yugoslavia 48 27 31 50 1 3 20 20 87 Venezuela 62 56 0 (.) 0 (.) 38 44 88 Greece 65 60 21 8 1 11 13 21 89 Israel 76 66 1 1 0 0 23 33 90 Hong Kong 54 77 (.) (.) 1 3 45 20 91 Singapore 38 40 4 1 1 5 57 54 92 Trinidad and Tobago 80 69 0 (.) (.) (.) 20 31 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 62 55 3 () 1 10 34 29 94 Iraq 85 47 1 (.) (.) (.) 14 53 gh-income oil exporters 83 u' 56w (.) ?i 1 0) 0 o' 11 w 17w 35 ii' 95 Oman .. 11 .. 0 .. 70 .. 19 96 Libya 67 80 7 4 0 0 26 16 97 Saudi Arabia 74 66 0 (.) 0 (.) 26 34 98 Kuwait . . 44 . . 1 . . 5 .. 55 99 United Arab Emirates 91 12 0 (.) 0 45 9 43 Industrial market economies 67 w 66w 3w 3w (.) a 4w 30w 27w 100 Ireland 96 87 (.) 1 (.) 2 4 10 101 Spain 80 58 2 2 (.) 5 18 35 102 Italy 65 64 4 3 2 8 29 25 103 NewZealand 95 65 1 6 (.) 2 4 27 104 United Kingdom 57 70 3 2 2 5 38 23 105 Austria 69 69 13 11 (.) 3 18 17 106 Japan 45 47 2 3 2 8 51 42 107 Belgiumc 79 83 2 2 1 2 18 13 108 Finland 69 60 19 29 (.) 1 12 10 109 Netherlands 78 83 1 2 1 2 20 13 110 Australia 75 49 3 4 1 3 21 44 111 Canada 90 84 1 3 (.) 1 9 12 112 France 53 66 3 3 (.) 4 44 27 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 70 73 4 4 1 4 25 19 114 Denmark 83 79 4 1 (.) 3 13 17 115 United States 61 54 1 2 1 5 37 39 116 Sweden 79 79 4 3 (.) 3 17 15 117 Norway 80 88 4 1 (.) 1 16 10 118 Switzerland 72 69 3 3 1 5 24 23 East European nonmarket economies 19w . . 59w . . (.)w . 22w 119 Hungary 22 24 61 52 (.) 2 17 22 120 Romania 20 66 .. (.) .. 14 121 Albania 1 . . 93 . . 0 . . 6 122 Bulgaria 13 .. 80 . . (.) .. 7 123 Czechoslovakia 16 19 67 64 (.) 2 17 34 124 German Dem. Rep. 19 .. 68 .. (.) . . 13 125 Poland 29 27 54 49 (.) 2 17 22 126 USSR 18 .. 51 .. (.) .. 31 a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. b. Figures are for the South African Customs Union comprising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Bot- swana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component territories is excluded. c. Includes Luxembourg. 241 Table 13. Origin and destination of manufactured exports Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) manufactured Industrial East European exports market nonmarket High-income Developing (millions economies economies oil exporters economies of dollars) 1962a 1981b 1962a 1981b 1962a 1g81b 1962 l98l 1962a 1981b Origin Low-income economies 57ii 50w 14w 8w 28w China and India Other low-income 61 48w 1w 6w 1 u' 8w 37 w 38 w 1 Chad 19 0 6 75 1 2 Bangladesh 36 .. 8 1 .. 55 .. 448 3 Ethiopia 47 37 2 12 1 7 50 44 2 1 4 Nepal 73 .. 0 .. (.) 27 29 5 Mali 33 1 .. 0 66 (.) 6 Burma 58 (.) .. 0 42 .. 3 7 Zaire 93 0 .. U 7 . . 12 8 Malawi 33 (.) (,) 67 .. 18 9 Upper Volta 19 19 0 0 0 0 81 81 1 11 10 Uganda 15 .. 0 0 85 (.) 11 India 56 51 5 18 2 7 37 24 630 4,424 l2Rwanda 90 .. 0 .. 0 10 (.) 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 93 60 0 (.) 0 1 7 39 16 75 15 Somalia 61 58 0 3 4 11 35 28 (.) 1 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 R2 (.) 18 Central Atrican Rep. 78 69 20 31 3 29 19 China 12,298 20 Guinea 21 Niger 7 30 0 (.) 0 0 93 70 1 10 22 Madagascar 87 73 0 1 0 (.) 13 26 5 25 23 Sri Lanka 63 83 2 (.) (,) 1 35 16 6 218 24 Togo 44 9 0 1 0 0 56 90 1 32 25 Ghana 39 . . 11 . . (.) 50 . . 12 26 Pakistan 46 51 (.) 8 1 13 53 28 97 1,439 27 Kenya 22 12 0 (.) 2 7 76 81 11 210 28 Sierra Leone 98 . . 0 . . 0 . . 2 . . 21 29 Afghanistan 96 .. 1 .. 0 .. 3 .. 9 30 Bhutan . . . . .. .. .. . . . . .. 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 30 . . 1 . . (.) . . 70 . . 1 32 Lao POR 35 . U .. 0 . . 65 .. (.) 33 Mozambique 31 . . 0 .. 0 .. 69 .. 3 34 VietNam 10 . . 0 . . 0 .. 90 .. 1 Middle-income economies 50 w 57 Ii' 5w 711 1 LI' 5 II' 43w 31w Oil exporters 61 LI' 57 50 3 11' 1 LI' 3 II' 27 zo 37 LI' Oil importers 48 w 57 ii' 5w 7 II' 1 II' 5 Li' 4611' 3lzi' Lower middle-incom' 53 n' 52 II' 8w 3 II' 1 II' 6 zi' 38 11' 39 zi' 35 Sudan 37 50 1 16 3 22 59 12 (.) 4 36 Mauritania 98 . . 0 . . 0 . . 2 . . 2 37 Yemen, PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 Liberia 94 47 (.) 0 0 6 53 3 13 (.) 39 Senegal 76 24 0 1 0 (.) 24 75 5 110 40 Yemen Arab Rep. . . 59 .. 0 . . 7 .. 34 .. 12 41 Lesothoc 42 Bolivia 82 , , 0 . 0 .. 18 .. 4 43 Indonesia 52 33 1 (.) 1 5 46 62 2 733 44 Zambia . . , , .. .. . , . .. 45 Honduras 1 33 0 0 0 0 99 67 2 83 46 Egypt. Arab Rep, 23 37 35 42 3 6 39 15 69 276 47 El Salvador 1 7 0 0 0 0 99 93 11 181 48 Thailand 51 59 (.) (.) (.) 7 49 34 21 1,869 49 Papua New Guinea 97 0 . 0 . 3 .. 4 50 Philippines 91 78 0 (.) (.) 1 9 21 26 2,552 51 Zimbabwe 44 .. 0 .. 0 .. 56 . . 31 52 Nigeria 91 . . (.) , . (.) . . 9 . . 34 53 Morocco 52 45 2 9 (.) 9 46 37 28 655 54 Cameroon 25 77 0 0 0 0 75 23 4 50 55 Nicaragua 55 2 0 (.) 0 0 45 98 2 47 56 Ivory Coast 61 34 0 (.) 0 (.) 39 66 2 262 57 Guatemala 46 4 0 0 0 (.) 54 96 8 325 58 Congo, People's Rep. 88 88 0 0 0 0 12 12 14 64 59 Costa Rica 78 11 0 (.) U (.) 22 89 9 322 60 Peru 53 45 0 2 0 () 47 53 5 386 61 Dominican Rep 98 80 0 0 0 0 2 20 4 186 62 Jamaica 73 74 0 8 0 1 27 17 20 611 63 Ecuador 46 . 0 .. 0 54 , 2 64 Turkey 73 40 17 3 (.) 21 10 36 4 1,748 Note. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 242 Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) manufactured Industrial East European exports market nonmarket High-income Developing (millions economies economies oil exporters economies of dollars) Origin 1962a 1981b 1962 1951b 1962a 1981b 1962a 1981b 1962a 1981b 66 Tunisia 64 68 0 2 7 7 29 23 10 835 66 Colombia 57 33 0 1 0 (.) 43 66 16 838 67 Paraguay 84 0 0 16 4 68 Angola 34 4 0 62 21 69 Cuba 1 83 .. 0 .. 16 6 319 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 22 14 60 .. 11 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 50 w 58 w S a' 8 a' 1w 5w 44 a' 31 a' 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 17 .. 7 .. 1 .. 75 .. 9 74 Jordan 12 13 10 () 32 36 46 51 1 201 75 Malaysia 11 62 0 (.) (.) 2 89 36 58 2359 76 Korea, Rep. of 83 62 0 0 0 10 17 28 10 19,188 77 Panama 24 11 0 (.) 0 1 76 88 1 31 78 Chile 45 29 0 () 0 2 55 69 20 737 79 Brazil 60 43 3 1 0 1 37 55 39 9465 80 Mexico 71 .. 0 .. 0 .. 29 122 81 Algeria 50 58 0 36 0 (.) 50 6 23 49 82 Portugal 56 79 (.) 2 (,) 1 44 18 205 2961 83 Argentina 62 45 3 5 0 1 35 49 39 1,800 84 Uruguay 75 45 13 6 0 (.) 12 49 7 363 85 SouthAfricac 54 . . (.) . . (.) . . 46 . . 317 15,317 86 Yugoslavia 31 25 30 53 1 4 38 18 344 8,574 87 Venezuela 94 59 0 (.) 0 (.) 6 41 158 417 88 Greece 52 53 6 4 3 15 39 28 27 2,266 89 Israel 66 66 3 (.) 0 0 31 34 184 4,590 90 Hong Kong 63 77 0 (.) 1 3 36 20 642 20,076 91 Singapore 4 49 0 1 2 4 94 46 328 11,712 92 Trinidad and Tobago 39 72 0 (.) 0 (.) 61 28 13 315 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 45 . . 1 3 51 44 94 Iraq 26 . (.) 8 66 2 High-income oil exporters 13 a' 25 a' 0 a' (.) a' 30 a' 23 a' 57w 52 a' 95 Oman . 18 .. 0 .. 70 .. 12 .. 229 96 Libya 68 68 0 (.) 0 () 32 32 (.) 58 97 Saudi Arabia 64 12 0 (.) 12 18 24 70 3 721 98 Kuwait (.) 28 0 (.) 35 21 65 51 11 2,453 99 United Arab Emirates 76 .. 0 .. 3 .. 21 .. 33 Industrial market economies 63 a' ' a' 3w 3w 1 a' 5 a' 33 a' 29 w 100 Ireland 76 91 0 (.) (.) 1 24 8 134 4,820 101 Spain 57 53 1 2 (.) 6 42 39 205 14,320 102 Italy 65 61 5 3 2 10 28 26 3,490 62,769 103 NewZealand 90 72 0 (.) 0 1 10 27 23 1,096 104 United Kingdom 58 62 3 2 2 7 37 29 8,947 70,115 105 Austria 67 67 18 12 (.) 3 15 18 931 13,255 106 Japan 45 47 4 3 1 7 50 43 4,340 146,635 107 Belgiumd 83 83 2 2 1 2 14 13 3,257 40,574 108 Finland 56 57 31 31 (.) 1 13 11 608 10,052 109 Netherlands 78 79 2 2 1 4 19 15 2,443 33,738 110 Australia 62 30 (.) (.) (.) 1 38 69 263 5,268 111 Canada 89 88 (.) (.) (.) 1 11 11 1,959 35,573 112 France 63 63 4 3 (.) 4 33 30 5,317 73,675 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 74 70 4 4 1 4 21 22 11,623 151,043 114 Denmark 76 74 8 2 () 2 16 22 627 8,888 115 UnitedStates 48 54 (.) (.) 1 6 51 40 13,957 157,217 116 Sweden 76 74 6 3 (.) 4 18 19 1,958 22,694 117 Norway 81 73 2 3 (.) 1 17 23 442 5,533 118 Switzerland 74 69 3 3 1 4 22 24 2,005 24,697 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary .. 23 . . 56 .. 1 . 20 .. 5,591 120 Romania . .. .. .. .. .. . 121 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Czechoslovakia . . 14 . . 68 . . 2 . . 16 . . 12,971 124 German Oem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 125 Poland . . 17 .. 56 .. 2 .. 25 .. 9,983 126 USSR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. a. Figures in italics are for 1963, not 1962. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. c. Figures are for the South African Customs Union com- prising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component territories is excluded. d. Includes Luxembourg. 243 Table 14. Balance of payments and reserves Receipts Gross international reserves Current account of workers' Net direct In months balance remittances private investment Millions of of import (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) dollars coverage 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982 1982a Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 2 19 1 (.) 2 18 2.0 2 Bangladesh .. -632 329 207 0.9 3 Ethiopia -32 -196 4 .. 72 277 3.6 4 Nepal .. -86 94 268 6.5 5 Mali -2 -113 39 2 1 25 0.7 6 Burma -63 -317 . . .. . . 98 328 3.9 7 Zaire -64 -375 2 .. 42 189 312 1.8 8 Malawi -35 -78 . . .. 9 29 29 0.9 9 Upper Volta 9 .. 18 .. (.) .. 36 67 10 Uganda 20 -256 .. 4 .. 57 73 0.1 11 India -394 -2,696 113 2,293 6 .. 1023 8,109 5.4 12 Rwanda 7 -90 1 1 (.) 21 8 128 4.3 13 Burundi . . . . . . . . . . .. 15 37 14 Tanzania -36 -268 . . 9 .. . . 65 19 0.2 15 Somalia -6 -177 20 5 -1 21 15 0.3 16 Haiti 2 -93 17 95 3 13 4 12 0.3 17 Benin -1 . . 2 . . 7 . . 16 10 18 Central African Rep. -12 -39 (.) .. 1 9 1 52 2.3 19 China .. 5,608 . . .. ,, . . . . 17,142 9.4 20 Guinea .. . . .. .. .. 21 Niger (.) 1 . . 19 35 22 Madagascar 10 -369 10 .. 37 20 0.3 23 Sri Lanka -59 -574 290 (.) 64 43 380 1.9 24 Togo 3 -152 1 . . 35 173 5.6 25 Ghana -68 83 68 21 58 318 4.0 26 Pakistan -667 -811 . - 2,580 31 65 194 1.813 3.0 27 Kenya -49 -509 .. .. 14 60 220 248 1.4 28 Sierra Leone -16 -158 . . 8 6 39 8 0.4 29 Afghanistan .. .. . . .. .. .. 49 699 30 Bhutan .. .. .. . .. .. 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 32 Lao POP 6 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam 243 Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan -42 -248 . 131 22 21 02 36 Mauritania -5 -252 1 2 15 3 144 2.7 37 Yemen, PDR -4 -221 60 411 59 271 3.4 38 Liberia .. -79 8 0.2 39 Senegal -16 . . 3 22 25 40 Yemen Arab Rep. .. -610 . . 1,118 .. 24 .. 558 2.9 41 Lesotho .. -50 .. .. .. 4 . . 48 1.2 42 Bolivia 4 -92 (,) 1 -76 37 46 563 6.4 43 Indonesia -310 -737 .. .. 83 133 160 6,248 3.0 44 Zambia 108 -252 .. .. -297 .. 515 157 1.5 45 Honduras -64 -228 .. .. 8 14 20 120 1.4 46 Egypt,ArabRep. -148 -2,216 29 2,074 .. 650 165 1,809 1.9 47 El Salvador 9 -250 .. 4 .. 64 277 2.6 48 Thailand -250 -1,144 .. 616 43 185 912 2,674 3.0 49 PapuaNewGuiriea . . -487 .. .. .. 84 .. 374 2.9 50 Philippines -48 -3,356 .. 240 -29 253 255 2,573 2.7 51 Zimbabwe .. -706 .. 2 .. 7 59 320 1.7 52 Nigeria -368 -7,324 . . . . 205 358 223 1,927 1.1 53 Morocco -124 -1,876 63 849 20 79 141 540 1.1 54 Cameroon -30 -525 (.) 21 16 1 81 81 0.5 55 Nicaragua -40 . . . . .. 15 .. 49 171 56 IvoryCoast -38 15 . . . . 31 . . 119 23 0.1 57 Guatemala -8 -379 .. .. 29 76 79 351 2.4 58 Congo, People's Rep. .. -320 .. .. . . 31 9 42 0.3 59 CostaRica -74 -200 .. 26 33 16 250 2.3 60 Peru 202 -1,644 .. .. -70 59 339 1,987 4.0 61 DominicanRep. -102 -442 25 190 72 -1 32 171 1.1 62 Jamaica -153 -403 29 75 161 -16 139 109 0.7 63 Ecuador -113 -1,002 . . .. 89 60 76 797 2.4 64 Turkey -44 -849 273 2,187 58 150 440 2,645 3.1 Note; For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 244 Receipts Gross international reserves Current account of workers' Net direct In months balance remittances private investment Millions of of import (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) dollars coverage 1970 1982° 1970 1982a 1970 1982° 1970 1982a 1982° 65 Tunisia -53 -657 29 372 16 339 60 692 2.1 66 Colombia -293 -2,265 6 39 268 207 5,605 9.0 67 Paraguay -16 -388 4 44 18 699 7.2 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 405 6,822 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 5.1 73 Syrian Arab Rep. -69 -493 7 140 57 579 1.5 74 Jordan -20 -336 1,084 258 1,378 38 75 Malaysia 8 -3,445 5 94 1,230 667 4,833 3.3 76 Korea, Rep. of -623 -2,679 33 126 66 -77 610 2,946 1.1 77 Panama -64 -454 67 13 33 37 16 101 0.2 78 Chile -91 --2,382 -79 365 392 2,597 3.9 79 Brazi -837 -16,332 .. 6 407 2,551 1,190 3,997 1.2 80 Mexico -1,068 -2,778 123 216 323 868 756 1,777 0.6 81 Algeria -125 85 211 447 45 352 5,915 4.6 82 Portugal -3,227 . . 2,607 136 1,565 10,540 10.7 83 Argentina -163 -2,505 6 41 11 266 682 4,504 4.5 84 Uruguay -45 -235 -14 186 1,422 8.8 85 South Africa -1,215 -2,855 318 -573 1,057 3,944 2.0 86 Yugoslavia -372 -465 441 4,350 143 1,625 1.0 87 Venezuela -104 -3,456 .. (.) -23 254 1,047 11,815 6.1 88 Greece -402 -1,891 333 1,019 50 437 318 2,630 2.8 89 Israel -562 -2,103 40 10 452 4,335 3.5 90 Hong Kong 21 215 91 Singapore -572 -1,278 93 2,093 1,012 8,480 3.3 92 Trinidad and Tobago -109 283 83 258 43 3,369 13.3 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. -507 25 217 94 Iraq 105 24 472 High-income oil exporters 6.3 ?V 95 Oman 358 43 134 129 1,532 4.8 96 Libya 645 -2,977 139 -765 1,596 10,425 6.9 97 Saudi Arabia 71 45,125 (.) 20 3,376 670 34,051 5.9 98 Kuwait 5,786 (.) -222 209 7,073 7.5 99 United Arab Emirates 2,589 Industrial market economies 5.6w 100 Ireland -198 -2,147 32 204 698 2,794 2.7 101 Spain 111 -4,150 469 1,124 179 1,280 1,851 14,328 4.3 102 Italy 902 -5,635 446 1,187 498 -318 5,547 44,552 5.1 103 New Zealand -29 -1,499 209 22 233 258 646 0.9 104 United Kingdom 1,975 9,391 -439 -2,576 2,919 21,083 1.9 105 Austria -75 386 13 201 104 93 1,806 14,949 6.5 106 Japan 1,980 6,977 189 -260 -4,085 4,877 34,404 2.4 107 Belgium 717 -2,912 154 389 140 1,652 2,947 19,544 2.8 108 Finland -239 -943 -41 -230 455 2,098 1.5 109 Netherlands -483 3,460 -15 -1,696 3,362 30,208 4.4 110 Australia -837 -8,447 785 1,979 1,709 9,995 3.6 111 Canada 821 2,470 566 -1,658 4,733 12,258 18 112 France 50 -12,152 130 322 248 -1,248 5,199 53,928 3.9 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 850 3,544 350 2,323 -290 -2,429 13,879 88,251 5.1 114 Denmark -544 -2,255 75 55 488 3,010 1.5 115 United States 2,320 -11,504 283 -6,130 13,491 15,237 143,445 4.9 116 Sweden -265 -3.547 -104 -718 775 6,286 2.0 117 Norway -242 798 11 32 -22 813 7,414 3.4 118 Switzerland 72 3,623 23 84 .. .. 5,317 53,511 18.0 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary -25 -397 2 1,449 1.6 120 Romania 1,040 2,073 2.2 121 Albania 122 Bu/garia 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Oem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. 245 Table 15. Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capital Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans (millions of dollars) Repayment Gross inflow of principal Net inflowa 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 Low-Income Economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 6 (.) 2 (.) 3 (.) 2 Bangladesh 656 .. 63 .. 593 3 Ethiopia 27 122 15 33 13 89 4Nepal 5 Mali 21 1 71 127 2 3 3 2 21 68 124 (.) 6 Burma 7 Zaire 16 31 402 175 18 28 68 65 2 3 334 110 8 Malawi 38 72 3 33 36 39 9 UpperVolta 2 78 2 13 (.) 65 10 Uganda 26 96 4 57 22 39 11 India 890 2405 307 675 583 1730 12 Rwanda (.) 28 (.) 3 (.) 25 13 Burundi 1 52 (.) 3 1 49 14 Tanzania 50 241 10 20 40 221 15 Somalia 4 124 (.) 9 4 114 16 Haiti 4 58 4 11 1 48 17 Benin 2 92 1 19 1 73 18 Central African Rep. 2 21 2 2 1 19 19 China . . . . . . . . 20 Guinea 90 88 10 55 79 33 21 Niger 12 116 1 66 10 50 22 Madagascar 10 278 5 70 5 208 23 Sri Lanka 61 484 27 68 34 416 24Togo 5 50 2 11 3 39 25 Ghana 40 94 12 38 28 56 26 Pakistan 484 893 114 326 370 567 27 Kenya 30 16 178 212 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 34 8 390 57 .. 10 15 8 . . 2 15 19 49 30 Bhutan ,, ., . . . . 31 Kampuchea, Oem, 32 Lao POP 33 Mozambi'que 34 V/etNam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 60 419 22 68 39 351 36 Mauritania 4 215 3 16 1 199 37 Yemen, PDR 172 40 132 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 15 1 7 59 212 (.) 12 5 19 38 4 10 1 41 174 40 YemenArabRep. .. 261 . 45 . . 216 41 Lesotho (.) 42 (.) 4 (.) 38 42 Bolivia 54 162 17 95 37 68 43 Indonesia 441 4250 59 1,148 382 3102 44 Zambia 351 311 33 97 318 214 45 Honduras 29 202 3 51 26 151 46 Egypt,ArabRep. 302 2702 247 1487 55 1215 47 El Salvador 8 156 6 24 2 132 48 Thailand 51 1420 23 306 27 1114 49 Papua New Guinea 25 171 (.) 31 25 139 50 Philippines 1,880 494 56 1387 51 Zimbabwe 52 Nigeria 128 (.) 62 517 1,864 72 36 5 51 618 5 26 466 1,246 53 Morocco 163 2,178 36 779 127 1,399 54 Cameroon 28 181 4 143 24 38 55 Nicaragua 44 302 17 168 28 134 56 IvoryCoast 77 1,309 27 499 50 810 57 Guatemala 37 344 20 34 17 310 58 Congo, People's Rep. 35 523 6 181 29 342 59 Costa Rica 30 184 21 54 9 129 60 Peru 148 2,105 101 982 47 1,123 61 Dominican Rep. 38 395 7 141 31 254 62 Jamaica 15 259 6 115 9 144 63 Ecuador 42 273 16 539 26 267 64 Turkey 328 2,196 128 886 200 1,310 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 246 Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans (millions of dollars) Repayment Gross inf low of principal Net inflowa 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 65 Tunisia 87 620 45 290 42 330 66 Colombia 252 1,218 78 305 174 913 67 Paraguay 15 276 7 39 7 237 68 Angola .. .. 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Dern. Rep. 71 Lebanon 12 15 45 9 30 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 59 410 30 281 30 129 74 Jordan 14 374 3 132 12 242 75 Malaysia 76 Korea, Rep. of 43 2883 45 241 1 2,642 441 3982 198 1,829 242 2,153 77 Panama 67 731 24 282 44 449 78 Chile 397 1,296 163 482 234 814 79 Brazil 886 7,915 255 4,007 631 3,908 80 Mexico 772 11,163 476 3,073 297 8,090 81 Algeria 292 2,238 33 2893 259 654 82 Portugal 18 3,112 63 798 45 2,314 83 Argentina 487 2,422 342 1,070 146 1,353 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 38 574 47 71 9 503 86 Yugoslavia 180 826 168 380 12 445 87 Venezuela 224 1,924 42 1,593 183 331 88 Greece 164 1,695 61 596 102 1,100 89 Israel 410 2,108 25 1,118 385 990 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore (.) 58 19 267 (.) 6 27 52 (.) 7 146 92 Trinidad and Tobago 8 39 10 121 37 2 1 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 940 .. 235 .. 705 94lraq 63 .. 18 .. 46 High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 231 78 . . 153 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 1,203 978 . . 225 120 Romanra 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Oem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Gross inflow less repayment of principal may not equal net inflow because of rounding. 247 Table 16. External public debt and debt service ratios External public debt Interest payments outstanding and disbursed on external Debt service as percentage of: Millions of As percentage public debt Exports of dollars 0fGNP (millionsofdollars) GNP goodsandservices 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982 Low-income economies 17.0w 18.9 1.1 ii' 1.1 ii' 1.3 ii' 8.8 iv China and India Other low-income 20.9 w 28.7:. 1.5W 1:i: 5.7w 99w 1 Chad 32 189 11.9 59.0 (.) (.) 1.0 0.1 3.9 0.4 2 Bangladesh .. 4,353 .. 38.6 .. 48 .. 1.0 .. 8.3 3 Ethiopia 169 875 9.5 19.8 6 22 1.2 1.2 11.4 9.5 4 Nepal 3 297 0.3 11.6 (.) 3 0.3 0.2 .. 2.3 5 Mali 238 822 88.1 79.4 (.) 5 0.2 0.8 1.2 3.5 6 Burma 101 1,960 4.7 33.5 3 52 0.9 2.1 15.8 22.0 7 Zaire 311 4,087 17.6 78.4 9 72 2.1 2.6 4.4 8 Malawi 122 692 43.2 48.8 3 32 2.1 4.5 7.1 22.8 9 Upper Volta 21 335 6.3 29.3 (.) 7 06 1.7 40 10 Uganda 138 587 10.6 8.0 4 10 0.6 0.9 2.7 22.3 11 India 7,940 19,487 149 11.4 189 476 0.9 0.7 20.9 7.1 12 Rwanda 2 189 0.9 13.5 (.) 2 0.2 0.2 1.3 3.2 13 Burundi 7 201 3.1 17.0 (.) 2 0.3 0.4 . 14 Tanzania 248 1,659 19.4 32.7 6 33 1.2 1.1 4.9 5.1 15 Somalia 77 944 24.4 78.4 (.) 10 0.3 1.6 2.1 7.2 16 Haiti 40 405 10.3 25.0 (.) 8 1.0 1.2 5.8 5.1 17 Benin 41 556 16.0 57.5 (.) 28 0.7 4.8 2.2 18 Central African Rep. 24 222 13.7 34.6 1 2 1.7 0.7 4.8 2.9 19 China .. .. .. .. .. ., .. 20 Guinea 314 1,230 47.4 76.8 4 24 2.2 4.9 , 21 Niger 32 603 8.7 40.2 1 44 0.6 7.3 3.8 22 Madagascar 93 1.565 10.8 56.8 2 42 0.8 4.1 3.5 23 Sri Lanka 317 1,969 16.1 41.8 12 68 2.0 2.9 10.3 8.3 24 Togo 40 819 16.0 104.5 1 22 0.9 4.3 2.9 25 Ghana 489 1,116 22.6 3.6 12 27 1.1 0.2 5.0 6.8 26 Pakistan 3,059 9,178 30.5 31.5 76 213 1.9 1.8 92 27 Kenya 316 2,359 20.5 39.2 12 147 1.8 5.4 5.4 20.3 28 Sierra Leone 59 370 14.3 29.8 2 2 2.9 0.9 9.9 20.8 29 Afghanistan 547 . . 58.1 9 2.5 30 Bhutan .. .. . .. 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 32 Lao POR 33 Mozamb/que 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 12.3w 24.5w 1.5w 4. Oil exporters 12.7w 25.9w 1.7w 4.8u Oil importers 12.1w 23.7w 1.5 w 3.8w Lower middle-income 15.4 iv 27.2 ii' 1.6 iv 3.7 ii' 9.2 v' 6.8 ii' 35 Sudan 319 5,093 15.8 47.7 13 11 1.7 0.8 10.7 7.5 36 Mauritania 27 1,001 13.9 146.5 (.) 24 1.7 5.8 3.1 11.8 37 Yemen, PDR 1 761 . . 80.2 (.) 8 . . 5.0 (.) 6.2 38 Liberia 158 641 49.6 68.1 6 14 5.5 3.5 . . 51 39 Senegal 98 1,329 11.6 55.0 2 64 0.8 4.2 2.7 40 Yemen Arab Rep. . . 1,312 . . 36.1 10 . . 1.5 . . 3.8 41 Lesotho 8 123 7.8 20.4 (.) 3 0.4 1.2 .. 2.0 42 Bolivia 479 2,556 47.1 39.1 6 165 2.3 4.0 11.3 28.2 43 Indonesia 2,443 18,421 27.1 21.1 24 1,160 0.9 2.6 6.9 8.3 44 Zambia 623 2,381 37.0 66.3 26 88 3.5 5.1 5.9 17.4 45 Honduras 90 1,385 12.9 53.2 3 97 0.8 5.7 2.8 18.8 46 Egypt,ArabRep. 1,644 15,468 23.8 52.8 38 391 4.1 6.4 28.7 20.2 47 ElSalvador 88 801 8.6 22.2 4 27 0.9 1.4 3.6 4.6 48 Thailand 324 6,206 4.9 17.4 16 483 0.6 2.2 3.4 8.4 49 Papua New Guinea 36 748 5.8 32.8 1 63 0.1 4.1 .. 10.2 50 Philippines 572 8,836 8.1 22.5 23 535 1.4 2.6 7.2 12.8 51 Zimbabwe 233 1,221 15.7 19.1 5 95 0.6 2.3 . . 92 52 Nigeria 480 6,085 4.8 8.7 20 722 0.6 1.9 4.2 9.5 53 Morocco 711 9,030 18.0 60.8 23 615 1.5 9.4 7.7 36.8 54 Cameroon 131 1,912 12.1 26.8 4 121 0.8 3.7 3.1 15.6 55 Nicaragua 155 2,810 20.7 100.1 7 120 3.2 10.2 11.0 56 IvoryCoast 256 4,861 18.3 74.3 11 476 2.8 14.9 6.8 36.9 57 Guatemala 106 1,119 5.7 13.0 6 54 1.4 1.0 7.4 6.6 58 Congo, People's Rep. 135 1,370 50.4 67.5 3 92 3.3 13.4 . . 22.6 59 CostaRica 134 2,475 13.8 111.7 7 82 2.9 6.2 10.0 12.5 60 Peru 856 6,900 12.6 33.5 44 548 2.1 7.4 11.6 36.7 61 DominicanRep. 212 1,620 14.5 21.2 4 109 0.8 3.3 4.1 18.7 62 Jamaica 154 1,511 11.5 49.9 8 128 1.1 8.0 2.5 16.8 63 Ecuador 217 3,912 13.2 34.3 7 561 1.4 9.7 9.1 30.8 64 Turkey 1,854 15,933 14.4 29.7 42 932 1.3 3.4 16.3 19.6 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 248 External public debt Interest payments outstanding and disbursed on external Debt service as percentage of: Millions of As percentage public debt Exports of .dollars 0fGNP (millionsotdollars) GNP goodsandservices 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 65 Tunisia 541 3,472 38.2 42.2 18 196 4.5 5.9 17.5 15.1 66 Colombia 1,293 6,004 18.8 15.4 44 569 1.8 2.2 11.9 17.5 67 Paraguay 112 940 19.2 16.1 4 41 1.8 1.4 11.9 10.3 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. . .. .. . 71 Lebanon 64 213 4.2 . 1 19 0.2 72 Mongolia .. . .. .. .. .. Upper middle-income 10.8 iv 23.2w 1.5w 4.4 w 10.7w 16.9w 73 SyrianArab Rep. 232 2,616 12.8 151 6 92 2.0 2.2 10.8 14.2 74 Jordan 118 1,686 22.8 42.9 2 61 0.9 4.9 3.6 6.1 75 Malaysia 390 7,671 10.0 305 21 479 1.7 2.9 3.6 5.1 76 Korea, Rep. Of 1,797 20,061 20.4 28.3 70 1,887 3.0 5.2 19.4 13.1 77 Panama 194 2,820 19.5 70.6 7 332 3.1 15.4 7.7 13.8 78 Chile 2,066 5,239 25.8 23.7 78 551 3.0 4.7 18.9 18.8 79 Brazil 3,236 47,589 7.1 16.9 133 5,896 0.9 3.5 12.5 42.1 80 Mexico 3,206 50,412 9.1 31.1 216 5,892 2.0 5.5 23.6 29.5 81 Algeria 937 13,897 19.3 31.9 10 1,368 0.9 9.8 3.2 24.6 82 Portugal 485 9,598 7.8 43.9 29 904 1.5 78 .. 20.0 83 Argentina 1,878 15,780 8.2 29.5 121 1,272 2.0 4.4 21.5 24.5 84 Uruguay 269 1,829 11.1 20.2 16 156 2.6 2.5 21.6 13.4 85 South Africa . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . 86 Yugoslavia 1,198 5,626 8.8 9.4 72 519 1.8 1.5 8.4 4.6 87 Venezuela 728 12,122 6.6 17.8 40 1,557 0.7 4.6 2.9 15.6 88 Greece 905 6,783 8.9 17.3 41 588 1.0 3.0 7.1 13.3 89 Israel 2,274 14,900 41.3 64.6 13 1,001 0,7 9.2 2.7 20.8 90 Hong Kong 2 267 0.1 1.0 (.) 22 (.) 0.2 (.) (.) 91 Singapore 152 1.423 7.9 10.0 6 114 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.8 92 Trinidad and Tobago 101 651 12.2 8.9 6 63 1.9 1.4 4.4 2.9 93 /ran, Islamic Rep 2,193 .. 20.8 85 .. 3.0 .. 12.2 94 Iraq 274 .. 88 .. 9 . . 0.9 .. 2.2 High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 677 . . 11.5 . . 30 . . 1.8 . . 2.2 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 6,739 .. 30.0 .. 808 80 .. 17.0 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. 249 Table 17. Terms of public borrowing Average interest Average Average Commitments rate maturity grace period (millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years) 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982 Low-income economies 3,008t 10,0461 2.8 zv 4.9w il i, .30 ii' 9 I a' China and India Other low-income 2,074 t 6,362 3.0 w 3.7 w 29 a' 32 w 9a 8w 1 Chad 4 21 4.8 0.8 7 49 2 9 2 Bangladesh .. 1,036 . . 1.5 .. 39 9 3 Ethiopia 21 107 4.3 38 32 26 7 5 4 Nepal 17 107 2.8 1.4 27 40 6 10 5 Mali 30 234 0.3 2.0 27 40 11 9 6 Burma 57 662 4.3 3.3 16 30 4 8 7 Zaire 257 268 6.5 2.3 13 39 4 8 8 Malawi 13 51 3.8 3.5 30 34 6 7 9 Upper Volta 9 168 2.3 1.8 37 36 8 8 10 Uganda 12 251 3.7 3.6 28 33 7 7 11 India 933 3,684 2.4 7.0 35 27 8 7 12 Rwanda 9 80 0.8 1.2 50 45 11 9 13 Burundi 1 90 2.9 5.4 5 23 2 6 14 Tanzania 283 234 1.2 2.5 40 32 11 8 15 Somalia 2 84 (.) 1.7 4 22 4 5 16 Haiti 5 64 6.7 2.4 9 43 1 9 17 Benin 7 140 1.8 7.2 32 21 7 4 18 Central African Rep. 7 75 2.0 3.5 36 32 8 7 19 China , , , . . . . 20 Guinea 158 86 2.6 3.4 15 27 6 7 21 Niger 18 164 1.2 5.9 40 22 8 5 22 Madagascar 23 218 2.3 5.0 39 23 9 6 23 Sri Lanka 79 642 3.0 7.0 27 26 5 6 24 Togo 3 12 4.6 4.7 17 30 4 8 25 Ghana 41 48 2.4 3.2 39 29 10 8 26 Pakistan 935 965 2.8 4.2 32 33 12 8 27 Kenya 41 524 3.0 5.9 36 30 8 7 28 Sierra Leone 24 50 3.5 2.4 27 25 6 5 29 Afghanistan 19 .. 1.7 . . 33 .. 8 30 Bhutan . . .. , , . . . . . 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Vietnam Middle-income economies 10,585 76,755 1 6.0w 11.7w 17 ii' 12 a' 4 a' 4 a' Oil exporters 4,013 34,1971 6.0w 12.3w 16 a 11 4 a' 4 ii' Oil importers 6,572 42,558 1 6.0w 11.2w 15 ii' 14 a' 4w' 4w' Lower middle-income 3,7101 32,8871 4.5 a' 9.8 ii' 22 a' 16 a' 6w 4 a' 35 Sudan 118 701 1.9 3.6 16 21 7 6 36 Mauritania 7 204 6.5 2.6 11 20 3 4 37 Yemen, PDR 62 100 (.) 1.8 21 28 11 6 38 Liberia 11 126 5.4 4.4 19 32 5 7 39 Senegal 8 441 4.4 4.3 28 32 8 8 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 9 313 5.2 3.4 5 18 3 4 41 Lesotho (.) 10 5.1 8.3 25 23 2 5 42 Bolivia 13 145 3.7 8.9 26 18 6 7 43 Indonesia 518 5,777 2.7 9.4 34 15 9 5 44 Zambia 555 420 4.2 6.8 23 21 6 6 45 Honduras 23 147 4.1 6.4 30 29 7 7 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 246 2.869 5.6 8.1 14 24 3 3 47 ElSalvador 12 325 4.7 5.3 23 19 6 5 48 Thailand 106 2,094 6.8 9.4 19 19 4 6 49 PapuaNewGuinea 58 166 6.0 13.5 24 14 8 6 50 Philippines 158 2,118 7.4 11.3 11 16 2 5 51 Zimbabwe . . 715 .. 8.9 .. 16 . . 5 52 Nigeria 79 2,753 5.8 13.9 17 9 6 4 53 Morocco 182 1,794 4.6 10.2 20 11 4 3 54 Cameroon 41 347 4.7 9.2 29 18 8 5 55 Nicaragua 23 334 7.1 5.9 18 14 4 3 56 lvoryCoast 71 1,253 5.8 12.7 19 12 5 4 57 Guatemala 50 194 5.2 6.4 26 13 6 4 58 Congo, People's Rep. 43 497 3.0 10.4 17 8 6 2 59 Costa Rica 58 265 5.6 4.9 28 20 6 7 60 Peru 125 2,746 7.4 11.9 13 10 4 3 61 Dominican Rep. 20 406 25 55 28 17 5 4 62 Jamaica 24 317 6.0 8.8 16 17 3 5 63 Ecuador 78 407 61 88 20 18 4 7 64 Turkey 487 1,577 3.6 11.3 19 13 5 4 Note. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 250 Average interest Average Average Commitments rate maturity grace period (millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years) 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 65 Tunisia 141 566 3.4 7.7 27 18 6 4 66 Colombia 362 2,371 5.9 10.7 21 14 5 5 67 Paraguay 14 383 5.6 9.1 25 16 6 4 68 Angola .. 69 Cuba .. .. . .. ,. 70 Korea, Bern. Rep. . . . .. 71 Lebanon 7 13 2.7 11.1 21 13 72 Mongolia .. .. .. Upper middle-income 6,875 t 43,8681 6.9w 13.2w w lOw 4w 4w 73 SyrianArabRep. 14 218 4.4 6.4 9 17 2 4 74 Jordan 33 245 3.9 6.0 12 20 5 5 75 Malaysia 83 2,863 6.1 11.9 19 12 5 6 76 Korea, Rep. of 677 3,759 60 11.5 19 13 5 4 77 Panama 111 552 6.9 13.1 15 11 4 4 78 Chile 343 1,432 6.9 14.4 12 8 3 4 79 Brazil 1362 10,712 7.1 13.0 . 14 11 3 3 80 Mexico 826 10799 8.0 14.8 12 6 3 3 81 Algeria 288 1,964 6.5 8.9 10 8 2 2 82 Portugal 59 2,446 4.3 11.3 17 8 4 3 83 Argentina 488 1,010 7.4 11.9 12 11 3 3 84 Uruguay 72 450 7.9 14.1 12 8 3 2 85 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Yugoslavia 198 490 7.1 14.5 17 10 6 4 87 Venezuela 198 2,591 8.2 17.6 8 8 2 2 88 Greece 242 1,442 7.2 12.6 9 10 4 4 89 Israel 439 2,316 7.3 136 13 20 5 5 90 Hong Kong (.) 1 (.) 7.9 (.) 12 (.) 4 91 Singapore 69 432 6.8 10.9 17 11 4 3 92 Trinidad and Tobago 3 148 7.5 13.1 10 9 1 6 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1,342 . . 6.2 . . 12 . .3 94 Iraq 28 . . 3.3 .. 11 .. 2 High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungaryb 1,117 . . 11.7 4.1 . . 1.8 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem. Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. b. Includes only debt in convertible currencies. 251 Table 18. Official development assistance from OECD & OPEC members Amount 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983a OECD Millions of US dollars 102 Italy 77 60 147 182 376 273 683 666 814 827 103 New Zealand 14 66 55 68 72 68 65 61 104 United Kingdom 407 472 500 904 1,465 2,156 1,852 2,191 1,792 1,601 105 Austria 10 11 79 154 131 178 314 354 157 106 Japan 105 244 458 1,148 2,215 2,685 3,353 3,171 3,023 3,761 107 Belgium 101 102 120 378 536 643 595 575 501 477 108 Finland 2 7 48 55 90 111 135 144 153 109 Netherlands 35 70 196 608 1,074 1,472 1,630 1,510 1,474 1,195 110 Australia 59 119 212 552 588 629 667 650 882 754 111 Canada 75 96 337 880 1,060 1,056 1,075 1,189 1,197 1,424 112 France 823 752 971 2,093 2,705 3,449 4,162 4,177 4,028 3,915 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 223 456 599 1,689 2,347 3,393 3,567 3,181 3,163 3,181 114 Denmark 5 13 59 205 388 461 481 403 415 394 115 United States 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 5,663 4,684 7,138 5,782 8,202 7,950 116 Sweden 7 38 117 566 783 988 962 919 980 779 117 Norway 5 11 37 184 355 429 486 467 559 584 118 Switzerland 4 12 30 104 173 213 253 237 252 318 Total 4,628 6,480 6,968 13,847 19,992 22,820 27,265 25,635 27,845 27,531 OECD As percentage of donor GNP 102 Italy .22 .10 .16 .11 .14 .08 .17 .19 .24 .24 103 New Zealand .23 .52 .34 .33 .33 .29 .28 .28 104 United Kingdom .56 .47 .41 .39 .46 .52 .35 .43 .37 .36 105 Austria .11 .07 .21 .27 19 23 .48 .53 .23 106 Japan .24 .27 .23 .23 .23 .27 .32 .28 .29 .33 107 Belgium .88 .60 46 .59 .55 .57 .50 .59 .60 .59 108 Finland 02 .06 18 .16 .22 .22 .28 .30 .33 109 Netherlands .31 .36 .61 .75 .82 .98 1.03 1.08 1 08 .91 110 Australia .37 .53 .59 .65 .55 .53 .48 .41 .57 .49 111 Canada .19 .19 .41 .54 .52 .48 .43 .43 .42 .47 112 France 1.35 .76 .66 .62 .57 60 .64 .73 .75 .76 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 31 40 .32 .40 .37 45 44 .47 .48 .48 114 Denmark 09 13 .38 58 .75 77 .74 .73 .77 .73 115 United States .53 .58 .32 .27 .27 20 .27 .20 .27 .24 116 Sweden 05 19 .38 .82 .90 .97 79 .83 1.02 .88 117 Norway .11 .16 .32 .66 90 .93 .85 .82 99 1.10 118 Switzerland .04 .09 .15 .19 .20 .21 .24 .24 .25 .31 OECD National currencies 101 Italy (billions ot lire) 48 38 92 119 319 227 585 757 1,101 1,255 103 New Zealand (millions of dollars) 13 54 53 66 74 78 86 92 104 United Kingdom (millions of pounds) 145 169 208 407 763 1,016 796 1,080 1,024 1,055 105 Austria (millions of schillings) 260 286 1,376 2,236 1,751 2,303 5,001 6,039 2,813 106 Japan (billions of yen) 38 88 165 341 466 588 760 699 753 893 107 Belgium (millions ot francs) 5,050 5,100 6,000 13,902 16,880 18,852 17,400 21,350 22,891 24,364 108 Finland (millions of markkaa) 6 29 177 226 351 414 583 694 854 109 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 133 253 710 1,538 2,324 2,953 3,241 3,768 3,936 3,412 110 Australia (millions of dollars) 53 106 189 421 514 563 585 566 867 844 111 Canada (millions of dollars) 73 104 353 895 1,209 1,237 1,257 1,425 1,477 1,755 112 France (millions of francs) 4,063 3,713 5,393 8,971 12,207 14,674 17,589 22,700 26,474 29,837 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. (millions of deutsche marks) 937 1,824 2,192 4,155 4,714 6,219 6,484 7,189 7,675 8,123 114 Denmark (millions of kroner) 35 90 443 1,178 2,140 2,425 2,711 2,871 3,458 3,599 115 United States (millions of dollars) 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 5,663 4,684 7,138 5,782 8,202 7,950 116 Sweden (millions of kronor) 36 197 605 2,350 3,538 4,236 4,069 4,653 6,201 5,975 117 Norway (millions of kroner) 36 79 264 962 1,861 2,172 2,400 2,680 3,608 4,258 118 Switzerland (millions of francs) 17 52 131 268 309 354 424 466 512 667 OECD Summary ODA (billions of US dollars, nominal prices) 4.63 6.48 6.97 13.85 19.99 22.82 27.27 25.64 27.85 27.53 ODA as percentage of GNP .51 .49 .34 .36 .35 .35 .38 .35 38 .37 ODA (billions of US dollars, constant 1980 prices) 16.41 20 19 18.15 21.60 24.09 24.89 27.27 25.82 2831 2737 GNP (trillions of US dollars, nominal prices) .90 1.30 2.00 3.90 5.70 6.50 720 7.30 7.24 7 52 GDP deflatorb .28 32 .38 64 .83 .92 1 00 .99 .98 1.01 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 252 Amount 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982C OPEC Millions of US dollars 54 Nigeria 14 83 50 26 29 33 141 58 81 Algeria 41 54 42 41 281 103 97 128 87 Venezuela 31 108 24 87 107 125 67 216 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 593 753 169 240 -19 -90 -157 -178 94 Iraq 215 231 62 172 847 876 148 96 Libya 259 94 101 139 105 382 293 43 97 Saudi Arabia 2,756 3,028 3,086 5,464 4,238 5,943 5,664 4,428 98 Kuwait 946 531 1,292 978 971 1,140 1,154 1,295 99 United Arab Emirates 1046 1021 1,052 885 970 909 811 563 Qatar 338 195 189 98 287 269 248 251 Total OAPECd 5,601 5,154 5,824 7,777 7,699 9,622 8,415 6,708 Total OPEC 6,239 6,098 6,067 8,130 7,816 9,690 8,466 6,804 OPEC As percentage of donor GNP 54 Nigeria .04 .19 .10 .05 .04 .04 .20 .08 81 Algeria .28 33 21 .16 92 .26 .24 .29 87 Venezuela .11 34 .07 .22 .22 .21 .10 .32 93 Iran, Islamic Rep 1.12 116 .22 .33 . . . . . 94 Iraq 1.62 1.44 .33 .76 2.53 2.39 .40 96 Libya 2.29 .63 .57 .79 .43 1.18 1.11 .18 97 SaudiArabia 7.76 6.46 524 8.39 5.55 509 3.58 2.82 98 Kuwait 7.40 363 8 10 5.46 350 3.40 3.55 4.86 99 United Arab Emirates 11.68 8.88 7.23 6.35 5 09 3.30 2.88 2.06 Qatar 15.58 7.95 7.56 3.38 6.18 4.03 3.75 3.80 Total OAPECd 5.73 4.23 3.95 4.69 3.54 3.44 2.87 2.42 Total OPEC 2.92 2.32 1.96 2.47 1.86 2.21 1.93 1,65 Net Bilateral flow to low-income countries 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 OECD Percentage of donor GNP 101 Italy .03 .04 .06 .01 .01 .01 .01 02 .04 102 NewZealand ,. .. .. .14 .03 .01 .01 .01 .00 104 UniledKingdom .22 .23 .15 .11 .15 .15 .12 .13 .07 105 Austria .. .06 .05 .02 .01 .02 .03 .03 .01 106 Japan .12 .13 .11 .08 .07 .08 .07 .06 .11 107 Belgium .27 .56 .30 .31 .23 .27 .24 .25 .21 108 Finland .. .. .. .06 .04 .06 .08 .09 .08 109 Netherlands .19 .08 .24 .24 .34 .26 .32 37 .29 110 Australia .. .08 .09 .10 .08 .06 .04 .06 .08 111 Canada .11 .10 .22 .24 .17 .13 .11 .12 .13 112 France .01 12 .09 .10 .08 .07 .08 .11 .10 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. .13 .14 .10 .12 07 .09 .09 .11 13 114 Denmark .. .02 .10 . .20 .21 .28 .28 .20 .22 115 United States .22 .26 .14 .08 .04 .03 .03 .03 .03 116 Sweden .01 .07 .12 .41 .37 41 .34 31 .36 117 Norway .02 .04 .12 .25 .39 33 28 25 .33 118 Switzerland . . .02 .05 .10 08 .06 .08 .07 .09 Total .18 .20 .13 .11 .09 .08 .07 .08 .08 a. Preliminary estimates. b. See the technical notes. c. Provisional. d. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 253 Table 19. Population growth and projections Hypothetical Assumed Average annual growth size of year of of population Population stationary reaching net Population (percent) (millions) population reproduction momentum 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 1982 1990a 2000 (millionst rateof 1 1980 Low-income economies .9 iv 1.7 iv 2,269 t 2,621 t 3,097 China and India 2.3w 1.7 iv 1.3w 1,725! 1,938! 2,190 Other low-income 2.5 w 2.6 iv 2.9 iv 544 t 683 t 907 1 Chad 1.9 2.0 2.5 5 6 7 22 2040 1.8 2 Bangladesh 2.5 2.6 2.9 93 119 157 454 2035 1.9 3 Ethiopia 2.4 2.0 3.1 33 42 57 231 2045 1.9 4 Nepal 1.9 2.6 2.6 15 19 24 71 2040 1.9 5 Mali 2.5 2.7 2.8 7 9 12 42 2040 1.8 6 Burma 2.2 2.2 2.4 35 43 53 115 2025 1.8 7 Zaire 2.0 3.0 3.3 31 40 55 172 2030 1.9 8 Malawi 2.8 3.0 3.4 7 8 12 48 2040 1.9 9 Upper Volta 2.0 2.0 2.4 7 8 10 35 2040 1.7 10 Uganda 3.0 2.7 3.4 14 17 25 89 2035 2.0 11 India 2.3 2.3 1.9 717 844 994 1,707 2010 1,7 12 Rwanda 2.6 3.4 3.6 6 7 11 47 2040 1.9 13 Burundi 1.4 2.2 3.0 4 5 7 27 2040 1.9 14 Tanzania 2.7 3.4 3.5 20 26 36 117 2030 2.0 15 Somalia 2.8 2.8 2.4 5 5 .7 23 2045 1.8 16 Haiti 1.6 1.7 1.8 5 6 7 14 2025 1.8 17 Benin 2.6 2.7 3.3 4 5 7 23 2035 2.0 18 CentralAfricanRep. 1.6 2.1 2.8 2 3 4 13 2040 1.9 19 China . 2.3 1.4 1.0 1,008 1,094 1,196 1,461 2000 1.7 20 Guinea 1.5 2.0 2.4 6 7 9 28 2045 1.8 21 Niger 3.4 3.3 3.3 6 8 11 40 2040 1.9 22 Madagascar 2.2 2.6 3.2 9 12 16 54 2035 1.9 23 SriLanka 2.4 1.7 1.8 15 18 21 32 2005 1.8 24 Toga 3.0 2.6 3.3 3 4 5 17 2035 2.0 25 Ghana 23 3.0 3.9 12 17 24 83 2030 2.0 26 Pakistan 2.8 3.0 2.7 87 107 140 377 2035 1.9 27 Kenya 3.2 4.0 4.4 18 26 40 153 2030 2.1 28 Sierra Leone 1.7 2.0 2.4 3 4 5 16 2045 1.9 29 Afghanistan 2.2 2.5 2.3 17 20 25 76 2045 1.9 30 Bhutan 1.3 2.0 2.2 1 1 2 4 2035 1.8 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 2.5 . . . . . . .. . . 32 Lao PDR 1.9 2.0 2.6 4 4 6 19 2040 1.8 33 Mozambique 2.1 4.3 3.4 13 17 24 82 2035 2.0 34 V/etNam 3.1 2.8 2.5 57 70 88 171 2015 1.9 Middle-income economies 2.6 ii' 2.4w 2.2 ii' 1,163! 1,404t 1,741 Oil exporters 2.6 ii' 2.7w 2.5 ii' 521! 641! 819f Oil importers 2.5 a' 2.3w 2.0 a' 642! 763! 922! Lower middle-income 2.5 iv 2.5 ii' 2.4a' 673! 816t 1,023! 35 Sudan 2.2 3.2 2.9 20 25 34 112 2035 1.8 36 Mauritania 2.3 2.3 2.6 2 2 3 8 2035 1.8 37 Yemen, PDR 2.2 2.2 3.1 2 2 3 12 2040 1.9 38 Liberia 3.2 3.5 3.5 2 3 4 12 2030 1.8 39 Senegal 2.3 2.7 3.1 6 8 10 36 2040 1.9 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 2.3 3.0 2.9 8 9 12 43 2040 1.9 41 Lesotho 20 2.4 2.8 1 2 2 7 2030 1.8 42 Bolivia 2.4 2.6 2.4 6 7 9 22 2030 1.8 43 Indonesia 2.1 2.3 1.9 153 179 212 370 2010 1.9 44 Zambia 2.6 3.1 36 6 8 11 37 2030 2.0 45 Honduras 3.1 3.4 3.1 4 5 7 17 2025 2.0 '16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.5 2.5 2.0 44 52 63 114 2015 1.8 47 El Salvador 34 3.0 2.6 5 6 8 17 2015 1.9 48 Thailand 3.1 2.4 1.9 49 57 68 111 2010 1.8 49 Papua New Guinea 2.2 2.1 2.2 3 4 5 10 2030 1.8 50 Philippines 3.0 2.7 2.1 51 61 73 127 2010 1.8 51 Zimbabwe 3.6 3.2 4.4 8 11 16 62 2030 2.1 52 Nigeria 2.5 2.6 3.5 91 119 169 618 2035 2.0 53 Morocco 2.6 2.6 2.5 20 25 21 70 2025 1.9 54 Cameroon 2.0 3.0 3.5 9 12 17 65 2035 1.9 55 Nicaragua 26 3.9 3.0 3 4 5 12 2025 2.0 56 lvoryCoast 3.7 4.9 3.7 9 12 17 58 2035 2.0 57 Guatemala 3.0 3.1 2.6 8 10 12 25 2020 1.9 58 Congo, People's Rep. 2.4 3.0 3.8 2 2 3 10 2025 1.9 59 Costa Rica 3.3 2.5 2.2 2 3 3 5 2005 1.9 60 Peru 2.9 2.8 2.2 17 21 26 49 2020 1.9 61 Dominican Rep 2.9 3.0 2.2 6 7 8 15 2010 1.9 62 Jamaica 1.4 1.5 1.4 ' 2 3 3 4 2005 1.6 63 Ecuador 2.9 2.6 2.6 8 10 13 27 2020 1.9 64 Turkey 2.5 2.3 2.0 47 55 65 111 2010 1.8 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 254 Hypothetical Assumed Average annual growth size of year of of population Population stationary reaching net Population (percent) (millions) population reproduction momentum 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 1982 1990 2000 (millions) rate of 1 1980 65 Tunisia 2.0 2.3 2.3 7 8 10 19 2015 1.8 66 Colombia 3.0 1.9 1.9 27 32 38 62 2010 1.8 67 Paraguay 2.6 2.6 2.3 3 4 5 8 2010 1.9 68 Angola 2.1 2.5 2.8 8 10 13 44 2040 1.9 69 Cuba 2.1 1.1 1.0 10 11 12 15 2010 1.6 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 2.8 2.5 2.1 19 22 27 46 2010 1.8 71 Lebanon 2.9 0.5 1.3 3 3 3 6 2005 1.6 72 Mongolia 3.0 2.9 2.4 2 2 3 5 2015 1.9 Upper middle-income 2.6w 2.3w 2.1 w 4901 588 I 718 73 SyrianArabRep. 3.2 3.5 3.5 10 13 17 42 2020 2.0 74 Jordan 3.1 2.5 3.9 3 4 6 16 2020 2.0 75 Malaysia 2.8 2.5 2.0 15 17 21 33 2005 1.8 76 Korea, Rep. of 2.6 1.7 1.4 39 45 51 70 2000 1.7 77 Panama 2.9 2.3 1.9 2 2 3 4 2005 1.8 78 Chile 2.1 1.7 1.4 12 13 15 21 2005 1.7 79 Brazil 2.8 2.4 2.0 127 152 181 304 2010 1.8 80 Mexico 33 3.0 23 73 89 109 199 2010 1.9 81 Algeria 2.4 3.1 3.7 20 27 39 119 2025 1.9 82 Portugal 0.3 0.8 06 10 10 11 14 2000 1.4 83 Argentina 1.5 1.4 1.3 28 32 36 54 2010 1.5 84 Uruguay 1.0 0.4 0.7 3 3 3 4 2005 1.3 85 SouthAfrica 2.4 2.8 3.1 30 39 52 123 2020 1.8 86 Yugoslavia 1.0 0.9 0.6 23 24 25 29 2010 1.4 87 Venezuela 3.8 3.6 2.6 17 21 26 46 2010 20 88 Greece 0.6 1.0 0.4 10 10 11 12 2000 1.3 89 Israel 3.5 2.5 1.6 4 5 5 8 2005 1.7 90 Hong Kong 2.5 2.4 1.4 5 6 7 8 2000 1.6 91 Singapore 2.3 1.5 1.0 3 3 3 3 2000 1.6 92 TrinidadandTobago 2.1 0.5 1.7 1 1 2 2 2010 1.7 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.4 3.1 3.1 41 53 70 159 2020 1.9 94 Iraq 3.2 3.5 3.4 14 19 26 68 2025 2.0 High-income oil exporters 4.2w 5.0 a' 3.8 zv 171 241 33 95 Oman 2.6 4.3 2.9 1 1 2 4 2020 1.9 96 Libya 3.9 4.1 4.3 3 5 7 21 2025 2.1 97 SaudiArabia 3.5 4.8 3.7 10 14 19 62 2030 1.9 98 Kuwait 9.9 6.3 3.5 2 2 3 5 2010 21 99 UnitedArabEmirates 9.3 15.5 3.7 1 2 2 4 2015 1.6 Industrial market economies 1.1 w 0.7w 0.4 w 723 I 749! 780! 100 Ireland 0.4 1.5 1.1 4 4 4 6 2000 1.5 101 Spain 1.0 1.0 0.7 38 40 43 51 2000 13 102 Italy 0.7 0.4 0.1 56 57 58 57 2010 1.2 103 NewZealand 1.8 1.0 0.6 3 3 4 4 2010 1.4 104 UnitedKingdom 0.6 0.1 0.1 56 56 57 59 2010 1.2 105 Austria 0.5 0.1 0.1 8 8 8 8 2010 1.2 106 Japan 1.0 1.1 0.4 118 123 128 128 2010 1.2 107 Belgium 0.6 0.2 0.1 10 10 10 10 2010 1.2 108 Finland 0.4 0.4 0.1 5 5 5 5 2010 1.3 109 Netherlands 1.3 0.7 0.4 14 15 15 15 2010 1.3 110 Australia 2.0 1.5 1.0 15 16 18 21 2010 1.5 111 Canada 1.8 1.2 1.0 25 27 29 33 2010 1.5 112 France 1.1 0.5 0.4 54 56 58 62 2010 1.3 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 0.9 0.1 -0.1 62 61 60 54 2010 1.1 114 Denmark 0.8 0.3 0.1 5 5 5 5 2010 1.2 115 UnitedStates 1.3 1.0 0.7 232 245 259 292 2010 1.4 116 Sweden 0.7 0.3 0.1 8 8 9 8 2010 1.1 117 Norway 0.8 0.5 0.2 4 4 4 4 2010 1.2 118 Switzerland 1.5 0.1 0.1 6 6 6 6 2010 1.0 East European nonmarket economies 1.1 a' 0.8w 0.6 a' 384 t 407 I 431 119 Hungary 0.3 0.3 0.1 11 11 11 12 2010 1.2 120 Romania 0.9 0.9 0.7 23 24 25 31 2000 1.3 121 Albania 2.8 2.5 1.8 3 3 4 6 2000 1.8 122 Bulgaria 0.8 0.4 0.3 9 9 10 10 2010 1.2 123 Czechoslovakia 0.5 0.6 0.4 15 16 17 20 2000 1.3 124 GermanDem. Rep. -0.1 -0.2 02 17 17 17 18 2010 1.2 125 Poland 1.0 0.9 0.7 36 39 41 49 2000 1.4 126 USSR 1.2 0.9 07 270 288 306 377 2000 1.4 Totalb 4,556 5,205 6,082 a. For the assumptions used in the prolections see the technical notes. b. Excludes countries with populations of less than 1 million. 255 Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related indicators Crude Crude Percentage Percentage of birth death change in: married women rate per rate per Crude Crude Total of childbearing thousand thousand birth death fertility age using population population rate contraceptiona rate rate 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960-82 1960-82 1982 2000 1970 1981 Low-income economies 44w 30w 24 w 11w -34.2w -54.7w 4.1w 3.2w China and India 43w 25w 24 w 9w -42.6w -61.5w 3.4 w 2.4w Other low-income 47w 44w 24 w 16w -7.2w -32.8w 6.1 w 5.2w I Chad 45 42 29 21 -6.6 -27.7 5.5 5.6 2 Bangladesh 47 47 22 17 0.2 -24.7 6.3 5.1 19 3 Ethiopia 51 47 28 18 -7.0 -35.9 6.5 6.1 4 Nepal 46 43 26 19 -6.5 -27.3 6.3 5.3 7 5 Mali 50 48 27 21 -3.2 -23.0 6.5 6.0 6 Burma 43 38 21 13 -11.3 -37.9 5.3 3.6 7 Zaire 48 46 24 16 -4.1 -34.2 6.3 5.8 8 Malawi 56 56 27 23 0.2 -15.7 7.8 7.1 9 Upper Volta 49 48 27 21 -1 5 -20.1 65 6.0 10 Uganda 49 50 21 19 1.4 -11.6 7.0 6.4 11 India 48 34 24 13 -28.3 -46.8 4.8 2.9 12 28 12 Rwanda 53 54 27 20 0.9 -27.4 83 76 13 Burundi 45 47 25 19 2.9 -23.7 6.5 6.0 14 Tanzania 47 47 22 15 0.8 -33.4 6.5 5.8 15 Somalia 48 48 29 25 0.2 -12.3 6.5 6.1 16 Haiti 39 32 19 13 -17.4 -35.7 4.6 3.7 19 17 Benin 51 49 27 18 -2.5 -32.2 6.5 5.9 17 18 Central African Rep. 43 41 26 17 -3.9 -35.4 5.5 5.6 19 China 39 19 24 7 -52.8 -71.9 2.3 2.0 69 20 Guinea 48 49 35 27 1 .8 -22.6 6.5 6.1 21 Niger 52 52 27 20 0.7 -24.5 7.0 6.4 22 Madagascar 47 47 27 18 -0.1 -33.0 6.5 5.9 23 Sri Lanka 36 27 9 6 -25.7 -34.8 3.4 2.3 55 24 Togo 51 49 23 19 -2.7 -17.6 6.5 5.9 25 Ghana 50 49 20 13 -1.8 -35.7 7.0 6.3 10 26 Pakistan 49 42 23 15 -13.6 -34 3 5.8 4.8 6 27 Kenya 55 55 24 12 0.2 -47.9 80 7.1 6 28 Sierra Leone 49 49 34 27 -0.2 -206 6.5 6.1 29 Afghanistan 50 54 31 29 7.4 -6.5 8.0 5.6 30 Bhutan 43 43 25 21 -0.2 -15.3 6.2 5.1 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 45 .. 21 32 Lao POR 44 42 23 20 -4.7 -12.0 6.4 5.9 33 Mozambique 49 .. 16 6.5 5.9 34 VietNam 47 35 21 8 -24.9 -62.3 5.0 3.1 Middle-income economies 43 w 35 lv 17w lOw -22.0w -39.6w 4.7w 3.6w Oil exporters 47 w 38 w 21w 12w -19.1w -42.9w 5.3w 4.0w Oil importers 40 w 31w 15w 9w -24.5w -37.0w 4.2w 3.3w Lower middle-income 46w 37w 20w 12w -21.2w -42.0w 5.0w 3.9w 35 Sudan 47 45 25 18 -3.4 -29.9 6.6 6.0 5 36 Mauritania 51 43 27 19 -14.3 -28.3 60 5.9 37 Yemen, PDR 50 48 29 19 -5.6 -33 9 6.9 6.3 38 Liberia 50 50 21 14 -0.3 -30.6 6.9 6.2 39 Senegal 48 48 26 21 (.) -22.5 6.5 6.0 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 50 48 29 22 -2.8 -25.1 6.8 6.2 41 Lesotho 42 42 23 15 (.) -35 8 5.8 5.2 5 42 Bolivia 46 43 22 16 -7.2 -28.7 6.3 4.2 43 Indonesia 44 34 23 13 -23.9 -43.2 4.3 2.8 53 44 Zambia 51 50 24 16 -2.2 -36.5 6.8 6.1 45 Honduras 51 44 19 10 -14.2 -45.1 6.5 4.1 27 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 35 20 11 -22.1 -44.6 4.6 3.0 24 47 El Salvador 48 40 17 8 -17.4 -52.1 5.6 3.3 34 48 Thailand 44 28 15 8 -36.2 -48.1 3.6 2.6 15 59 49 Papua New Guinea 44 34 23 13 -22.3 -43.1 5.0 3.6 50 Philippines 47 31 15 7 -34.0 -53.4 4.2 2.7 15 36 51 Zimbabwe 55 54 17 12 -1.8 -250 8.0 7.1 15 52 Nigeria 52 50 25 16 -4,7 -35.6 6.9 6.3 6 53 Morocco 50 40 21 15 -19.8 -30.7 58 3.8 19 54 Cameroon 38 46 21 15 21.2 -30.7 6.5 6.4 2 55 Nicaragua 51 45 18 11 -11.3 -39.8 6.3 4.0 56 Ivory Coast 49 48 24 17 -2.7 -28.2 7.0 6.4 3 57 Guatemala 48 38 18 9 -21.0 -49.1 5.2 3.4 18 58 Congo, People's Rep. 40 43 18 10 6.8 -46.0 6.0 5.7 59 Costa Rica 48 30 8 4 -36.8 -51.3 3.5 2.3 65 60 Peru 47 34 19 11 -27.4 -42.1 4.5 3.2 41 61 Dominican Rep. 49 34 17 8 -31.1 -54.0 4.2 2.7 42 62 Jamaica 42 27 9 6 -35.0 -36.4 3.4 2.3 55 63 Ecuador 47 37 17 8 -20.5 -49.3 5.4 3.5 34 64 Turkey 43 31 16 9 -28.0 -43.4 4.1 2.7 32 38 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 256 Crude 'Crude Percentage Percentage of birth death change in: married women rate per rate per Crude Crude Total of childbearing thousand thousand birth death fertility age using population population rate rate contraceptiona rate 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960-82 1960-82 1982 2000 1970 1981 65 Tunisia 47 34 19 9 -27.0 -51.9 4.9 3.1 41 66 Colombia 47 29 17 7 -38.8 -57.5 3.6 2.6 .. 49 67 Paraguay 43 31 13 7 -27.2 -44.6 4.2 2.7 .. 36 68 Angola 50 49 31 22 -1.8 -28.6 6.5 60 69 Cuba 31 16 9 6 -46.7 -36.7 2.0 2.0 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 41 30 13 7 -25.9 -42.0 4.0 2.6 71 Lebanon 43 29 14 9 -33.2 -40.2 3.8 2.4 53 72 Mongolia 41 34 15 7 -17.0 -52.7 4.8 3.1 Upper middle-income 40w iw 13w 8w -23.2w -36.4w 4.2w 3.1w 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 47 46 18 7 -1.5 -62.1 7.2 4.0 .. 20 74 Jordan 47 45 20 8 -5.5 -59.3 7.4 5.2 22 25 75 Malaysia 44 29 15 6 -34.1 -57.0 3.7 2.4 33 76 Korea, Rep. of 43 23 14 6 -467 -53.3 2.7 2.1 25 54 77 Panama 41 28 10 5 -31.9 -476 3.5 2.3 .. 61 78 Chile 34 23 13 7 -32.8 -468 2.7 2.2 79 Brazil 43 31 13 8 -26.9 -37 4 39 2.6 80 Mexico 45 34 12 7 -25.3 -41.5 4.6 2.8 .. 39 81 Algeria 51 47 20 13 -7.8 -36.7 7.0 6.1 82 Portugal 24 18 11 10 -26.4 -8.3 2.3 2.1 . . 66 83 Argentina 23 25 9 9 6.5 3.4 3.4 2.5 84 Uruguay 22 18 10 9 -17.4 -5.2 2.6 2.2 85 South Africa 39 40 15 9 1.3 -43.2 5.1 4.4 86 Yugoslavia 24 15 10 9 -36.6 -10.1 2.0 2.1 59 55 87 Venezuela 46 35 11 6 -24.4 -509 4.3 2.7 .. 49 88 Greece 19 14 7 9 -24.3 19.2 2.3 2.1 89 Israel 27 24 6 7 -12.3 193 3.1 2.3 . 90 Hong Kong 35 18 7 5 -47.2 -20.9 2.1 2.1 42 72 91 Singapore 39 17 6 5 -55.3 -16.1 1.7 2.1 60 71 92 Trinidad and Tobago 38 29 8 7 -22.1 -172 3.3 2.4 44 52 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 53 41 19 10 -23.8 -48.7 5.6 4.2 94 Iraq 49 45 20 11 -9.2 -46.2 6.7 4.9 14 High-income oil exporters 49 42 w 22 ii' 11 w -12.9 w -49.8 iv 6.9 iv 5.8 iv 95 Oman 51 47 28 15 -7.0 -47.1 7.1 4.0 96 Libya 49 45 19 11 -7.1 -42.9 7.2 6.3 97 SaudiArabia 49 43 23 12 -11.2 -45.8 7.1 6.3 98 Kuwait 44 35 10 3 -21.4 -65.2 5.7 3.0 99 United Arab Emirates - 46 28 19 3 -39.1 -82.1 6.0 4.8 Industrial market economies 20w 14w lOw 9w -31.4w -5.4w 1.7w 2.0w 100 Ireland 21 20 12 9 -5.1 -18.3 3.2 2.1 101 Spain 22 15 9 9 -29,5 1.1 2.2 2.1 .. 51 102 Italy 18 11 10 11 -37.0 94 1.6 1.9 . . 78 103 NewZealand 27 16 9 8 -40.4 -8.0 1.9 2.0 104 United Kingdom 18 13 12 12 -27.4 3.5 1.8 2.0 69 77 105 Austria 18 13 13 12 -30.2 -5.5 1.6 1.9 106 Japan 17 13 8 7 -25.4 -13.2 1.7 1.9 56 - 107 Belgium 17 12 12 12 -28.4 -4.8 1.6 1.9 108 Finland 19 14 9 9 -25.9 . . 1.6 1.9 77 80 109 Netherlands 21 12 8 8 -42.3 6.5 1.4 1.8 110 Australia 22 16 9 8 -28.1 -9.3 2.0 2.0 111 Canada 27 15 8 7 -43.4 -11.5 1.8 2.0 . 112 France 18 14 11 11 -23.5 -3.5 1.8 2.0 64 79 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 18 10 12 12 -42.3 (.) 1.4 1.8 . 114 Denmark 17 10 10 11 -38.0 13.7 1.5 1.9 67 115 United States 24 16 10 9 -32.5 -9.5 1.8 2.0 65 68 116 Sweden 14 11 10 11 -19.0 9.0 1.7 1.9 . 117 Norway 17 12 9 10 -28.3 9.9 1.7 1.9 . . 71 118 Switzerland 18 11 10 9 -35.2 -3.1 1.9 2.0 . East European nonmarket economies 23 iv 18 iv 8 iv 10 iv -20.5 iv 34.4 iv 2.3 iv 2.1 iv 119 Hungary 15 13 10 14 -15.0 32.4 2.0 2.0 67 74 120 Romania 19 17 9 10 -9.4 11.5 2.4 2.1 .. 58 121 Albania 43 28 10 6 -35.9 -47.1 3.6 2.2 122 Bulgaria 18 15 8 10 -18.0 28.4 2.1 2.1 . - 76 123 Czechoslovakia 16 15 9 12 -4.4 27.2 2.2 2.1 . . 124 GermanDem. Rep. 17 15 14 13 -14.7 -6.6 1.9 2.0 125 Poland 23 19 8 9 -14.2 21.1 2.3 2.1 60 75 126 USSR 25 19 7 10 -23.7 42.3 2.4 2.1 a. Figures include women whose husbands practice contraception. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 257 Table 21. Labor force Percentage of population of Average annual growth working age Percentage of labor force in: of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1982 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 Low-income economies .. 59 zt' 77:. 72 u' 15w 2.0 u' China and India 56 w 61 w 69w . 17w 14w .711' 1.8 u' Other low-income 54 u' 53 w 82 w 73 11' 7u' un' 16w l.8u' 3.0 u' 1 Chad 57 54 95 85 2 7 3 8 1.5 1.8 2.6 2 Bangladesh 53 55 87 74 3 11 10 15 2.1 29 3.0 3 Ethiopia 53 52 88 80 5 7 7 13 2.0 1.7 3.0 4 Nepal 57 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.3 2.4 2.7 5 Mali 54 51 94 73 3 12 3 15 2.1 2.1 2.9 6 Burma 59 55 .. 67 .. 10 .. 23 1.1 1.5 2.3 7 Zaire 53 52 83 75 9 13 8 12 1.4 2.3 3.2 8 Malawi 52 50 92 86 3 5 5 9 2.4 2.5 3.2 9 Upper Volta 54 52 92 82 5 13 3 5 1.6 1.6 2.5 10 Uganda 54 52 89 83 4 6 7 11 2.6 2.1 3.5 11 India 54 57 74 71 11 13 15 16 1.7 2.1 2.1 12 Rwanda 53 52 95 91 1 2 4 7 2.2 3.2 3.5 13 Burundi 55 53 90 84 3 5 7 11 0.9 1.6 2.8 14 Tanzania 54 51 89 83 4 6 7 11 2.1 2.6 3.4 15 Somalia 54 54 88 82 4 8 8 10 2.1 2.9 2.0 16 Haiti 55 53 80 74 6 7 14 19 0.6 1.3 2.0 17 Benin 53 51 54 46 9 16 37 38 2.1 2.1 2.8 18 Central African Rep. 58 55 94 88 2 4 4 8 1.1 1.5 2.4 19 China 56 63 . . 69 . . 19 . . 12 1.7 1.8 1.6 20 Guinea 55 53 88 82 6 11 6 7 1.1 1.3 2.3 21 Niger 53 51 95 91 1 3 4 6 3.0 3.0 3.4 22 Madagascar 55 53 93 87 2 4 5 9 1.7 2.1 3.0 23 Sri Lanka 54 60 56 54 14 14 30 32 2.1 2.1 2.1 24 Togo 53 51 80 67 8 15 12 18 2.5 1.8 3.2 25 Ghana 53 51 64 53 14 20 22 27 1.6 2.3 3.9 26 Pakistan 52 51 61 57 18 20 21 23 1.9 2.7 31 27 Kenya 50 47 86 78 5 10 9 12 2.7 3.3 4.2 28 Sierra Leone 55 53 78 65 12 19 10 16 1.0 1.6 2.4 29 Afghanistan 55 52 85 79 6 8 9 13 1.9 2.1 2.6 30 Bhutan 56 56 95 93 2 2 3 5 0.3 2.1 2.3 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 53 . . 82 .. 4 .. 14 .. 2.0 32 Lao PDR 56 51 83 75 4 6 13 19 1.1 0.8 2.7 33 Mozambique 56 53 81 66 8 18 11 16 1.8 34 3.1 34 VietNam . . 54 81 71 5 10 14 19 . . . 2.7 Middle-income economies 55 u' 56 11' 6211' 4611' 1511' 21 u' 23u' 34u' 2.1 2.4 2.6w Oil exporters 54 11' 54 11' 66 u' 48 n' 13 u' 20 u' 22 n' 32 2.1 2.6 2.9w Oil importers 55 11' 57 11' 60w 44w 1611' 21 u' 2411' 35w 2.1 2.3 2.4 n' Lower middle-income 54w 55u' 71 u' 56n' 11 u' 1611' 1811' 2811' 1.911' 2.4 u' 2.6 35 Sudan 53 53 86 78 6 10 8 12 21 2.8 3.0 36 Mauritania 53 51 91 69 3 8 6 23 1.9 2.0 2.4 37 YemenPDR 52 52 70 45 15 15 15 40 1.7 1.7 3.6 38 Liberia 52 51 80 70 10 14 10 16 2.4 3.0 35 39 Senegal 54 52 84 77 5 10 11 13 17 2.0 2.7 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 54 52 83 75 7 11 10 14 16 2.0 3.4 41 Lesotho 57 55 93 87 2 4 5 9 16 1.9 2.7 42 Bolivia 55 53 61 50 18 24 21 26 17 2.3 2.9 43 Indonesia 56 57 75 58 8 12 17 30 1,7 2.5 1.9 44 Zambia 53 50 79 67 7 11 14 22 2.1 2.3 3.2 45 Honduras 52 50 70 63 11 20 19 17 2.5 3.2 3.5 46 Egypt, Arab Rep 55 57 58 50 12 30 30 20 2.2 25 2.4 47 ElSalvador 52 52 62 50 17 22 21 28 3.0 28 3.5 48 Thailand 53 56 84 76 4 9 12 15 2.1 2.8 2.2 49 Papua New Guinea 57 55 89 82 4 8 7 10 1.7 17 2.0 50 Philippines 52 53 61 46 15 17 24 37 2.1 2.5 2.7 51 Zimbabwe 52 50 69 60 11 15 20 25 3.1 2.3 4.5 52 Nigeria 52 50 71 54 10 19 19 27 1.8 1.8 3.5 53 Morocco 53 51 62 52 14 21 24 27 1.5 2.8 3.5 54 Cameroon 57 54 87 83 5 7 8 10 1.5 22 3.2 55 Nicaragua 50 50 62 39 16 14 22 47 2.3 38 3.9 56 IvoryCoast 54 53 89 79 2 4 9 17 3.6 4.1 3.3 57 Guatemala 51 54 67 55 14 21 19 24 2.8 3.2 2.9 58 Congo, People's Rep. 56 52 52 34 17 26 31 40 1.8 2.2 3.9 59 Costa Rica 50 59 51 29 19 23 30 48 3.3 38 2.8 60 Peru 52 54 53 40 20 19 27 41 2.1 28 2.9 61 Dominican Rep. 49 53 67 49 12 18 21 33 2.2 3.6 3.0 62 Jamaica 54 54 39 35 25 18 36 47 0.4 2.3 2.8 63 Ecuador 52 52 57 52 19 17 24 31 2.7 2.8 3.4 64 Turkey 55 59 79 54 11 13 10 33 1.4 2.0 2.3 Note: For data comoarability and coverage see the technical notes. 258 Percentage of population of Average annual growth working age Percentage of labor force' in: of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1982 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 65 Tunisia 52 56 56 35 18 32 26 33 0.7 3.1 3.1 66 Colombia 50 60 51 26 19 21 30 53 3.0 3.3 2.4 67 Paraguay 51 53 56 49 19 19 25 32 2.3 2.9 3.0 68 Angola 55 53 69 59 12 16 19 25 1.6 2.0 2.9 69 Cuba 61 61 39 23 22 31 39 46 08 1.8 1.8 70 Korea, Dem. Rep. 53 56 62 49 23 33 15 18 2.3 2.9 2.8 71 Lebanon 53 56 38 11 23 27 39 62 2.1 1.1 2.2 72 Mongolia 54 54 70 55 13 22 17 23 2.1 2.5 3.1 Upper middle-income 55w 57 ii' 49w 30w 20w 28w 31 w 42w 2.3o' 2.3o' 2.5 u' 73 SyrianArabRep. 52 49 54 33 19 31 27 36 2.1 3.3 4.4 74 Jordan 52 51 44 20 26 20 30 60 2.8 2.5 4.4 75 Malaysia 51 56 63 50 12 16 25 34 2.7 2.9 3.0 76 Korea, Rep. of 54 62 66 34 9 29 25 37 3.1 2.6 2.1 77 Panama 52 56 51 33 14 18 35 49 3.4 2.4 2.5 78 Chile 57 62 30 19 20 19 50 62 1.4 2.1 2.1 79 Brazil 54 55 52 30 15 24 33 46 2.7 2.3 2.6 80 Mexico 51 52 55 36 20 26 25 38 2.8 3.2 3.3 81 Algeria 52 49 67 25 12 25 21 50 0.5 3.5 4.8 82 Portugal 63 63 44 28 29 35 27 37 0.4 0.6 08 83 Argentina 64 63 20 13 36 28 44 59 1.3 1.3 13 84 Uruguay 64 63 21 11 30 32 49 57 0.8 0.3 0.9 85 South Africa 55 55 32 30 30 29 38 41 3.0 29 3.3 86 Yugoslavia 63 67 63 29 18 35 19 36 0.6 0.6 0.6 87 Venezuela 51 55 35 18 22 27 43 55 3.1 4.1 3.3 88 Greece 65 64 56 37 20 28 24 35 0.0 0.8 0.5 89 Israel 59 58 14 7 35 36 51 57 3.6 2.4 2.1 90 Hong Kong 56 66 8 3 52 57 40 40 3.3 3.5 1.4 91 Singapore 55 66 8 2 23 39 69 59 2.7 2.6 1.2 92 Trinidad and Tobago 53 63 22 10 34 39 44 52 25 1.8 2.2 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 51 52 54 39 23 34 23 27 3.1 2.9 3.8 94 Iraq 51 51 53 42 18 26 29 32 2.9 3.1 3.9 High-income oil exporters 54w 52w 62w 4611' 1311' 19 o' 25 35u' 3.8o' 4.5u' 3.8w 95 Oman 54 52 .. .. . . . .. ,, . . . 96 Libya 53 51 53 19 17 28 30 53 3.6 3.6 4.4 97 SaudiArabia 54 52 71 61 10 14 19 25 3.3 4.7 3.7 98 Kuwait 63 52 1 2 34 34 65 64 7.0 4.8 34 99 United Arab Emirates . .. .. .. .. .. . . Industrial market economies 6311' 6611' 18w 6w 38o' 38w 44' 56w 1.2w 1.2 u' 100 Ireland 58 59 36 18 25 37 39 45 0.0 1.3 1.5 101 Spain 64 63 42 14 31 40 27 46 02 1.2 0.8 102 Italy 66 65 31 11 40 45 29 44 -0 1 0.6 0,3 103 NewZealand 58 64 15 10 37 35 48 55 2.2 1.7 1.0 104 United Kingdom 65 64 4 2 48 42 48 56 0.6 0.4 0.2 105 Austria 66 65 24 9 46 37 30 54 '-0.7 0.9 0.3 106 Japan 64 68 33 12 30 39 37 49 1.9 1.3 07 107 Belgium 65 66 8 3 48 41 44 56 0.3 0.7 02 108 Finland 62 68 36 11 31 35 33 54 0.4 0.9 0.3 109 Netherlands 61 67 11 6 43 45 46 49 1.6 1.3 0.5 110 Australia 61 65 11 6 40 33 49 61 2.6 1.8 1.1 111 Canada 59 67 13 5 34 29 52 66 2.5 2.0 1.1 112 France 62 64 22 8 39 39 39 53 0.7 1.0 0.6 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 68 67 14 4 48 46 38 50 0.2 0.8 (.) 114 Denmark 64 65 18 7 37 35 45 58 1.1 06 0.4 115 UnitedStates 60 66 7 2 36 32 57 66 1.8 1.7 0.9 116 Sweden 66 64 14 5 45 34 41 61 1.0 0.3 0.4 117 Norway 63 63 20 7 37 37 44 56 0.5 0.7 0.6 118 Switzerland 66 67 11 5 50 46 38 49 2.0 0.4 0.2 East European nonmarket economies 63 ii' 66 ii' 42 u' 18 u' 30 o' 44 ii' 28 zn 39 ii' 0.8 in 1.1 ii' 0.6 ii' 119 Hungary 66 65 39 21 34 43 27 36 0.5 0.3 0.1 120 Romania 64 64 65 29 15 36 20 35 0.9 0.6 0.7 121 Albania 54 58 71 61 18 25 11 14 2.3 2.7 2.4 122 Bulgaria 66 66 57 37 25 39 18 24 0.7 0.2 0.2 123 Czechoslovakia 64 64 26 11 46 48 28 41 0.8 07 0.6 124 German Dem. Rep. 65 64 18 10 48 50 34 40 -0.2 0.5 0.3 125 Poland 61 66 48 31 29 39 23 30 1.7 1.4 08 126 USSR 63 66 42 14 29 45 29 41 0.7 1.2 0.6 259 Table 22. Urbanization Urban population Percentage of urban population Number of As percentage Average annual In cities of cities of of total growth rate In largest over 500,000 over 500,000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1982a 1960-70 1970-82 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Low-income economies 17w 21 w 4.1 w 4.4 w 10w lb 31 w 55 f 145 China and India 18w 22 w 7w 6 33 w 5i 49 114 Other low-income 12w 20 w 5.2 w 5.2 w 25 w 28 19w 4( 6t 31 1 Chad 7 19 6.8 6.4 39 0 0 0 2 Bangladesh 5 12 6.2 6.0 20 30 20 51 3 3 Ethiopia 6 15 6.5 5.6 30 37 0 37 0 4 Nepal 3 6 4.2 6.7 41 27 0 0 0 0 5 Mali 11 19 5.4 4.7 32 24 0 0 0 0 6 Burma 19 28 3.9 3.9 23 23 23 23 2 7 Zaire 16 38 5.2 7.6 14 28 14 38 2 8 Malawi 4 10 6.6 6.4 19 0 0 0 0 9 Upper Volta 5 11 5.7 6.0 41 0 0 0 0 10 Uganda 5 9 7.1 3.4 38 52 0 52 0 11 India 18 24 3.3 39 7 6 26 39 11 36 12 Rwanda 2 5 5.4 64 0 0 0 0 0 13 Burundi 2 2 1.3 25 0 0 0 0 14 Tanzania 5 13 63 8.5 34 50 0 50 0 1 15 Somalia 17 32 5.7 5.4 34 0 0 0 0 16 Haiti 16 26 3,9 4.0 42 56 0 56 17 Benin 10 15 5.4 4.4 63 0 63 18 Central African Rep. 23 37 4.7 3.5 40 36 0 0 0 19 China 18 21 6 6 42 45 3 78 20 Guinea 10 20 4.9 5.2 37 80 0 80 21 Niger 6 14 7.0 7.2 31 0 0 0 22 Madagascar 11 20 5.0 5.2 44 36 0 36 23 Sri Lanka 18 24 4.3 2.5 28 16 o 16 24 logo 10 21 5.8 6.6 60 o o 0 25 Ghana 23 37 4.6 5.0 25 35 0 48 2 26 Pakistan 22 29 4.0 4.3 20 21 33 51 2 7 27 Kenya 7 15 64 7.3 40 57 0 57 0 28 Sierra Leone 13 23 4.9 3.9 37 47 0 0 0 0 29 Afghanistan 8 17 5.4 5.8 33 17 0 17 0 30 Bhutan 3 4 3.3 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 10 3.7 32 Lao PDR 8 i4 3.8 4.7 69 Li 0 0 0 33 Mozambique 4 9 6.5 8.1 75 83 0 83 0 34 Vief Nam 15 19 5.3 3.2 32 21 32 50 4 Middle-income 33 w 46 w 4.4w 4.2w 28 w 29 w 35 w 48 54 128 Oil exporters 27 zt' 40 w 4.2w 4.4w 27 w 30 w 32 w 48 zn 15 42 Oil importers 37 w 52 w 4.5 U' 4.1 w 28 U' 28 w 36 w 48 U' 39 86 Lower middle-income 24 w 34 4.4w 4.4w 27 U' 32 U' 28 u' 47 U' 22 58 35 Sudan 10 23 6.8 5.8 30 31 0 31 0 36 Mauritania 3 26 155 8.1 39 0 0 0 0 37 Yemen, PDR 28 38 3.5 3.7 61 49 0 0 0 0 38 Liberia 21 34 5.6 5.7 0 0 0 0 39 Senegal 23 34 4.9 3.7 65 0 65 0 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 3 14 10.2 8.3 25 0 0 0 0 41 Lesotho 2 13 7.5 15.4 0 0 0 42 Bolivia 34 45 4.1 3.3 47 44 0 44 0 43 Indonesia 15 22 3.6 4.5 20 23 34 50 3 9 44 Zambia 23 45 5.2 6.5 35 0 35 0 45 Honduras 23 37 5.5 5.5 31 33 0 0 0 0 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 38 45 3.5 2.9 38 39 53 53 2 2 47 El Salvador 38 42 3.6 3.4 26 22 0 0 0 0 48 Thailand 13 17 3.6 4.3 65 69 65 69 49 Papua New Guinea 3 17 15.2 6.6 25 0 0 0 0 50 Philippines 30 38 38 3.8 27 30 27 34 2 51 Zimbabwe 13 24 6.7 6.0 40 50 0 50 0 52 Nigeria 13 21 4.7 4.9 13 17 22 58 2 9 53 Morocco 29 42 4.2 4.1 16 26 16 50 4 54 Cameroon 14 37 5.8 8.0 2 21 0 21 0 55 Nicaragua 41 55 4.0 5.0 41 47 0 47 0 56 Ivory Coast 19 42 7.3 8.2 27 34 0 34 57 Guatemala 33 40 3.8 4.0 41 36 41 36 58 Congo, People's Rep. 30 46 5.0 4.4 77 56 0 0 0 0 59 Costa Rica 37 43 4.0 3.2 67 64 0 64 0 60 Peru 46 66 5.0 3.7 38 39 38 44 2 61 Dominican Rep. 30 53 5.6 5.3 50 54 0 54 0 62 Jamaica 34 48 3.5 2.6 77 66 0 66 0 63 Ecuador 34 46 4.2 3.8 31 29 0 51 0 2 64 Turkey 30 44 3,5 4.7 18 24 32 42 3 4 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 260 Urban population Percentage of urban population Number of As percentage Average annual In cities of cities of of total growth rate In largest over 500,000 over 500,000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1982 1960-70 1970-82 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 65 Tunisia 36 54 3.8 4.0 40 30 40 30 1 1 66 Colombia 48 65 5.2 2.7 17 26 28 51 3 4 67 Paraguay 36 40 2.9 3.3 44 44 0 44 0 1 68 Angola 10 22 5.7 5.8 44 64 0 64 0 1 69 Cuba 55 68 2.9 2.1 32. 38 32 38 1 1 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 40 63 5.0 4.2 15 12 15 19 1 2 71 Lebanon 40 77 6.9 2.8 64 79 64 79 1 1 72 Mongolia 36 53 5.3 4.2 53 52 0 0 0 0 Upper middle-income 45 iv 63 iv 4.4 iv 3.9 iv 28 iv 29 ii 38 iv 51 32 f 70 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 37 49 4.8 4.4 35 33 35 55 1 2 74 Jordan 43 60 4.7 4.0 31 37 0 37 0 1 75 Malaysia 25 30 3.5 3.4 19 27 0 27 0 1 76 Korea, Rep. of 28 61 6.5 5.0 35 41 61 77 3 7 77 Panama 21 53 11.1 3.2 61 66 0 66 0 1 78 Chile 68 82 3.1 2.4 38 44 38 44 1 1 79 Brazil 45 69 5.0 4.1 14 15 35 52 6 14 80 Mexico 51 68 4.7 4.2 28 32 36 48 3 7 81 Algeria 30 45 3.5 5.4 27 12 27 12 1 1 82 Portugal 23 32 1.8 2.5 47 44 47 44 1 1 83 Argentina 74 83 2.1 1.9 46 45 54 60 3 5 84 Uruguay 80 84 1.3 0.6 56 52 56 52 1 1 85 South Africa 47 50 2.6 3.2 16 13 44 53 4 7 86 Yugoslavia 28 44 3.2 2.8 11 10 11 23 1 3 87 Venezuela 67 84 5.1 4.3 26 26 26 44 1 4 88 Greece 43 64 2.6 2.5 51 57 51 70 1 2 89 Israel 77 90 4.3 3.1 46 35 46 35 1 1 90 Hong Kong 89 91 2.6 2.4 100 100 100 100 1 1 91 Singapore 100 100 2.3 1.5 100 100 100 100 1 1 92 Trinidad and Tobago 22 22 1.8 0.7 .. .. 0 0 0 0 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 34 52 5.3 5.1 26 28 26 47 1 6 94 Iraq 43 70 5.8 5.3 35 55 35 70 1 3 1-tigh-income oil exporters 28 ii' 67 zr 8.5 iv 8.6 zv 29 iv 28 iv 0 iv 34 iv 0t 3 95 Oman 4 20 6.3 15.6 .. .. .. 96 Libya 23 58 8.4 8.0 57 64 0 64 0 1 97 SaudiArabia 30 69 8.4 7.6 15 18 0 33 0 2 98 Kuwait 72 91 10.1 7.4 75 30 0 0 0 0 99 UnitedArabEmirates 40 79 14.9 14.4 . . . , Industrial market economies 6811' 7811' 1.9w 1.3 iv 18 zv 18 u' 4811' 55w 104! 152! 100 Ireland 46 59 1.6 2.5 51 48 51 48 1 1 101 Spain 57 76 2.6 2.1 13 17 37 44 5 6 102 Italy 59 70 1.5 1.1 13 17 46 52 7 9 103 NewZealand 76 85 2.3 1.5 25 30 0 30 0 1 104 United Kingdom 86 91 0.9 0.3 24 20 61 55 15 17 105 Austria 50 55 0.9 0.7 51 39 51 39 1 1 106 Japan 63 78 2.4 1.8 18 22 35 42 5 9 107 Belgium 66 73 1.2 0.4 17 14 28 24 2 2 108 Finland 38 64 3.2 2.4 28 27 0 27 0 1 109 Netherlands 80 76 1.0 0.6 9 9 27 24 3 3 110 Australia 81 89 2.5 2.0 26 24 62 68 4 5 111 Canada 69 76 2.7 1.2 14 18 31 62 2 9 112 France 62 79 2.4 1.4 25 23 34 34 4 6 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 77 85 1.4 0.5 20 18 48 45 11 11 114 Denmark 74 85 1.6 0.8 40 32 40 32 1 1 115 UnitedStates 70 78 1.8 1.5 13 12 61 77 40 65 116 Sweden 73 88 1.8 1.0 15 15 15 35 1 3 117 Norway 32 54 3,5 2.6 50 32 50 32 1 1 118 Switzerland 51 . 59 2.2 0.8 19. 22 19 22 1 1 East European nonmarket economies 48 ii' 62 ii' 2.6 cv 1.8 cc' 9 cv 7 cv 23 ii' 32 cc' 36 65 119 Hungary 40 55 2.1 1.4 45 37 45 37 1 1 120 Romania 32 51 3.4 2.7 22 17 22 17 1 1 121 Albania 31 38 3.8 3.4 27 25 0 0 0 0 122 Bulgaria 39 66 3.8 23 23 18 23 18 1 1 123 Czechoslovakia 47 64 2.1 1.8 17 12 17 12 1 1 124 German Oem. Rep. 72 77 0.1 0.2 9 9 14 17 2 3 125 Poland 48 58 1.8 1.7 17 15 41 47 5 8 126 USSR 49 63 2.7 1.8 6 4 21 33 25 50 a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 267 Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancy Life expectancy at birth Infant (years) mortality rate Child death rate Male Female (aged under 1) (aged 1-4) 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 Low-income economies 42w 41 60 w 165 to 87 w 11 iv China and India 42w 61 41 w 62 w 165 iv 78 w 26 w 9w Other low-income 42 w 50 43 w 52 w 163 iv 114 iv 31 iv 19w 1 Chad 33 42 36 45 210 161 60 37 2 Bangladesh 45 48 42 49 159 133 25 19 3 Ethiopia 35 45 38 49 172 122 42 25 4 Nepal 39 46 38 45 195 145 33 22 5 Mali 36 43 39 47 179 132 45 27 6 Burma 42 53 45 56 158 96 25 12 7 Zaire 38 49 42 52 150 106 32 20 8 Malawi 36 43 37 46 206 137 58 29 9 Upper Volta 36 43 39 46 234 157 71 36 10 Uganda 41 46 45 48 139 120 28 22 11 India 43 55 42 54 165 94 26 11 12 Rwanda 38 45 41 48 167 126 40 25 13 Burundi 37 45 40 48 143 123 31 24 14 Tanzania 40 51 43 54 144 98 31 18 15 Somalia 32 38 36 40 213 184 61 47 16 Haiti 44 53 45 56 182 110 47 17 17 Benin 38 46 41 50 173 117 42 23 18 CentralAfricanRep. 37 46 40 49 170 119 41 23 19 China 41 65 41 69 165 67 26 7 20 Guinea 31 37 34 38 222 190 65 50 21 Niger 36 43 39 47 178 132 45 27 22 Madagascar 36 46 39 50 177 116 45 23 23 Sri Lanka 62 67 62 71 71 32 7 3 24 Togo 41 45 41 49 201 122 55 25 25 Ghana 43 53 46 57 132 86 27 15 26 Pakistan 44 51 42 49 162 121 25 17 27 Kenya 45 55 48 59 112 77 21 13 28 Sierra Leone 29 37 32 38 235 190 72 50 29 Afghanistan 33 35 34 37 233 205 41 35 30 Bhutan 33 43 31 42 243 163 43 26 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 41 42 44 45 146 22 32 La0PDR 39 42 42 45 180 159 29 25 33 Mozambique 40 49 43 52 154 105 34 20 34 VietNam 42 62 45 66 163 53 26 4 Middle-income economies 49 ii' 58 ri 52 w 62 U' 126 w 76 ti 23 lOw Oil exporters 45 U' 55 ii' 47 ii' 59 ii" 146 U' 90 iv' 28 zi' 12 U' Oil importers 52 ii' 61 w 56 U' 65 ii' 110 ii' 64 ti 19 ii' 8 U' Lower middle-income 44 ii' 55 ti' 47 U' 58 U' 144 ti 89 u' 29w 13w 35 Sudan 38 46 40 49 168 119 40 23 36 Mauritania 36 43 39 47 178 132 45 27 37 Yemen, PDR 35 45 37 48 210 140 59 28 38 Liberia 43 52 45 56 173 91 42 16 39 Senegal 36 44 39 46 178 155 45 34 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 35 43 36 45 212 163 60 38 41 Lesotho 41 51 44 55 137 94 29 17 42 Bolivia 41 49 45 53 167 126 40 22 43 Indonesia 40 52 42 55 150 102 23 13 44 Zambia 38 49 41 52 164 105 38 20 45 Honduras 45 58 48 62 145 83 30 8 46 EgyptArabRep. 46 56 47 59 128 104 23 14 47 El Salvador 49 62 52 66 136 72 26 7 48 Thailand 50 61 55 65 103 51 13 4 49 PapuaNewGuinea 41 53 40 53 165 99 26 13 50 Philippines 51 62 54 66 106 51 14 4 51 Zimbabwe 47 54 51 58 100 83 19 14 52 Nigeria 37 48 40 52 190 109 50 20 53 Morocco 46 51 48 54 161 125 37 22 54 Cameroon 41 52 45 55 134 92 28 16 55 Nicaragua 46 56 48 60 144 86 30 9 56 Ivory Coast 37 46 40 49 167 119 40 23 57 Guatemala 46 58 48 62 92 66 10 5 58 Congo, People's Rep, 47 59 49 62 118 68 23 10 59 Costa Rica 60 72 63 76 74 18 8 1 60 Peru 47 57 49 60 163 83 38 8 61 Dominican Rep. 49 61 53 65 120 65 20 5 62 Jamaica 61 71 65 75 52 10 4 (.) 63 Ecuador 49 61 52 65 140 78 28 7 64 Turkey 49 61 52 66 184 83 47 9 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 262 Life expectancy at birth Infant (years) mortality rate Child death rate Male Female (aged under 1) (aged 1-4) 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 65 Tunisia 48 60 49 63 159 65 36 6 66 Colombia 49 62 57 66 93 54 11 4 67 Paraguay 54 63 58 67 86 45 9 3 68 Angola 32 42 35 44 216 165 63 39 69 Cuba 62 73 65 77 35 17 2 1 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 52 63 56 67 78 32 9 2 71 Lebanon 58 63 62 67 68 39 6 3 72 Mongolia 51 63 54 67 109 51 14 4 Upper middle-income 55w 63w 58w 67w 101 iv 58w 15w 6w 73 SyrianArabRep. 49 65 51 69 132 58 25 5 74 Jordan 46 62 48 65 136 65 26 6 75 Malaysia 52 65 56 69 72 29 8 2 76 Korea, Rep. of 52 64 56 71 78 32 9 2 77 Panama 61 69 63 73 68 33 6 2 78 Chile 54 68 59 72 119 27 20 2 79 Brazil 53 62 57 66 118 73 19 8 80 Mexico 55 64 59 68 91 53 10 4 81 Algeria 46 55 48 59 165 111 39 17 82 Portugal 61 68 66 74 78 26 9 1 83 Argentina 62 66 68 73 61 44 5 2 84 Uruguay 65 71 71 75 51 34 4 2 85 South Africa 51 60 55 65 92 55 16 5 86 Yugoslavia 61 69 64 74 88 34 10 2 87 Venezuela 55 65 60 71 85 39 9 2 88 Greece 67 72 70 76 40 14 3 1 89 Israel 70 72 73 76 31 16 2 1 90 Hong Kong 61 74 69 78 37 10 2 (.) 91 Singapore 62 70 66 75 35 11 2 (.) 92 TrirvdadandTobago 62 66 66 70 45 26 3 1 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 50 60 50 60 163 102 26 13 94 Iraq 47 57 50 61 139 73 28 8 High-income oil exporters 43 ii 56 iv 45 iv 60 w 175w 96 iv 44 ii 13u' 95 Oman 38 51 39 54 193 123 52 21 96 Libya 46 56 48 59 158 95 36 11 97 Saudi Arabia 42 54 45 58 185 108 48 16 98 Kuwait 58 69 61 74 89 32 10 1 99 UnitedArabEmirates 51 69 54 73 135 50 26 3 Industrial market economies 71w 73 iv 78 iv 29 ii' 10 iv 2 iv (.) ii' 100 Ireland 68 70 71 76 29 11 2 (.) 101 Spain 67 71 71 78 44 10 3 (.) 102 Italy 67 71 72 78 44 14 3 1 103 NewZealand 68 70 74 77 23 12 1 (.) 104 United Kingdom 68 71 74 77 23 11 1 (.) 105 Austria 66 69 72 77 38 13 3 1 106 Japan 65 74 70 79 30 7 2 (.) 107 Belgium 67 70 73 77 31 12 2 (.) 108 Finland 65 69 72 78 22 7 1 (.) 109 Netherlands 71 73 75 79 18 8 1 (.) 110 Australia 68 71 74 78 20 10 1 (.) 111 Canada 68 71 74 79 27 10 2 (.) 112 France 67 71 74 79 27 10 2 (.) 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 67 70 72 77 34 12 2 (.) 114 Denmark 70 72 74 78 22 8 1 (.) 115 UnitedStates 67 71 73 78 26 11 1 (.) 116 Sweden 71 75 75 80 17 7 1 (.) 117 Norway 71 73 76 79 19 8 1 (.) 118 Switzerland 69 77 74 81 21 8 1 (.) East European nonmarket economies 65 ii 66 iv 72 w 74 ii' 38 iv 21 iv 3iv 1 iv 119 Hungary 66 68 70 75 48 20 4 1 120 Romania 64 68 67 74 76 29 8 2 121 Albania 61 69 63 73 83 44 9 3 122 Bulgaria 67 70 70 75 45 20 3 1 123 Czechoslovakia 67 68 73 75 24 16 1 1 124 German Dam, Rep. 67 70 72 76 39 12 3 (.) 125 Poland 65 68 70 76 56 20 5 126 USSR 65 65 72 74 33 .. 2 263 Table 24. Health-related indicators Daily calorie supply per capita Population per: As percentage Physician Nursing person Total of requirement 196O 1980a 196O 198O 1981 l98l Low-income economies w 5,772 7,226w 4,841 w 97 u China and India 7,019w 2,591 6,734w 3,315w 2,262 98 w Other low-income 37,092w 15,931 : 9,759w 9,716w 2,082 w 91 w 1 Chad 72,190 47,530 5,780 3,850 1,818 76 2 Bangladesh .. 10,940 .. 24,450 1,952 84 3 Ethiopia 100,470 58,490 14,920 5,440 1,758 76 4 Nepal 73,470 30,060 .. 33,420 1,929 86 5 Mali 64,130 22,130 4,710 2,380 1,621 72 6 Burma 15,560 4,660 8,520 4,750 2,303 113 7 Zaire 79,620 14,780 3,510 1,920 2,135 94 8 Malawi 35,250 40,950 12,940 3,830 2,138 94 9 Upper Volta 81,650 48,510 3,980 4,950 2,008 95 10 Uganda 15,050 26,810 10,030 4,180 1,778 80 11 India 4,850 3,690 10,980 5,460 1,906 86 12 Rwanda 143,290 31,510 11,620 9,840 2,194 88 13 Burundi 98,900 45,020 4,640 6,180 2,152 95 14 Tanzania 18,220 17,560 11,890 2,980 1,985 83 15 Somalia 36,570 14,290 4,810 2,330 2,119 100 16 Haiti 9,230 8,200 4,020 2,490 1,879 96 17 Benin 23,030 16,980 2,700 1,660 2,284 101 18 CentralAfricanRep. 51,170 26,430 3,410 1,720 2,164 96 19 China 8,390 1,810 4,050 1,790 2,526 107 20 Guinea 33,770 17,110 4,040 2570 1,877 75 21 Niger 82,170 38,790 8,460 4,650 2,489 102 22 Madagascar 8,900 10,170 3,110 3,660 2,474 109 23 Sri Lanka 4,490 7,170 4,170 1,340 2,250 102 24 Togo 47,060 18,100 5,340 1,430 1,889 83 25 Ghana 21,600 7,630 5,430 780 1,995 88 26 Pakistan 5,400 3,480 16,960 5,820 2,313 106 27 Kenya 10,690 7,890 2,270 550 2,056 88 28 Sierra Leone 20,070 16,220 2,880 1,890 2,053 101 29 Afghanistan 28,700 16,730 19,590 26,000 1,758 72 30 Bhufan .. 18,160 .. 7,960 .. 103 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 35280 .. 3,980 1,998 95 32 Lao PDR 53,520 20060 4,950 3,040 1,986 97 33 Mozambique 20,390 39,110 4,720 5,600 1,881 70 34 VietNam .. 4,190 2,930 1,961 90 Middle-income economies 17,257w 5,414w 3,838 w 1,886w 2,607 w 111 u' Oil exporters 30,075 w 6,997w 4,188w 1,966w 2,508 108 ZL' Oil importers 7,161 w 4,083 w 3,560 w 1,812w 2,686 w 11 3 w Lower middle-income 28,478w 7,765w 4,697w 2,462 w 2,454w 107w 35 Sudan 33,230 8,930 3,010 1,430 2,406 99 36 Mauritania 40,420 14,350 5,430 2,080 2,082 97 37 Yemen, PDR 13,270 7,200 .. 830 2,067 86 38 Liberia 12,600 9,610 1,410 1,420 2,510 114 39 Senegal 24,990 13,800 3,150 1,400 2,434 101 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 130,090 11,670 .. 4,580 2,239 76 41 Lesotho 23,490 18,640 6,540 4,330 2,535 111 42 Bolivia 3,830 4,170 . . 2,179 91 43 Indonesia 46,780 11,530 4,510 2,300 2,342 110 44 Zambia 9,540 7,670 9,920 1,730 2,094 93 45 Honduras 12,620 3,120 3,110 700 2,171 96 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,550 970 1,930 1,500 2,941 116 47 ElSalvador 5,330 3,220 . . 910 2,146 94 48 Thailand 7,900 7,100 4,830 2,400 2,303 105 49 Papua New Guinea 19,320 13,590 .. 960 2,323 92 50 Philippines 6,940 7,970 1,440 6000 2,318 116 51 Zimbabwe 4,790 6,580 1,000 1,190 2,025 90 52 Nigeria 73,710 12,550 4,040 3,010 2,361 91 53 Morocco 9,410 10,750 .. 1,830 2,643 115 54 Cameroon 45,230 13,990 3,080 1,950 2,439 102 55 Nicaragua 2,690 1,800 1,250 550 2,184 99 56 IvoryCoast 29,190 21,040 2,920 1,590 2,670 112 57 Guatemala 4,640 8,610 9,040 1,620 2,045 93 58 Congo, People's Rep. 16,100 5,510 1,300 790 2,199 94 59 Costa Rica 2,740 1,460 720 450 2,686 118 60 Peru 1,910 1,390 3,530 970 2,183 98 61 Dominican Rep. 8,220 2,320 .. 2,150 2,192 106 62 Jamaica 2,590 2,830 420 630 2,643 119 63 Ecuador 2,670 760 2,360 570 2100 97 64 Turkey 2,800 1,630 16,300 1,130 3,019 122 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 264 Daily calorie supply per capita Population per: As percentage Physician Nursing person Total of requirement 1960 1980a 1960 1980a 1981 1981 65 Tunisia 10,030 3,690 .. 890 2,782 116 66 Colombia 2,640 1,710 4,220 800 2,521 108 67 Paraguay 1,810 1,710 1,380 1,100 3,005 139 68 Angola 14,910 . 6,650 . 2,096 83 69 Cuba 1,060 710 950 360 2,766 121 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. .. 430 .. .. 3,009 129 71 Lebanon 1,210 540 2,080 730 2,476 99 72 Mongolia 1,070 450 300 240 2,691 111 Upper middle-income 2,532 w 2,021 w 2,752 zi' 1,024 w 2,816 iv 117 a' 73 SyriariArabRep. 4,630 2,270 10,850 1,410 2,908 120 74 Jordan 5,800 1,700 1,930 1,180 2,260 102 75 Malaysia 7,060 7,910 1,800 940 2,662 121 76 Korea, Rep. of 3,540 1,440 3,240 350 2,931 126 77 Panama 2,730 980 760 420 2,271 103 78 Chile 1780 1,930 640 450 2,790 114 79 Brazil 2,210 2,810 .. 2,529 107 80 Mexico 1,830 3,650 .. 2,805 121 81 Algeria 5,530 2,630 . 740 2,433 89 82 Portugal 1,250 540 1,420 650 2,675 110 83 Argentina 740 430 760 . . 3,405 125 84 Uruguay 960 540 800 190 2,912 110 85 South Africa 2,180 480 . . 2,825 118 86 Yugoslavia 1,620 550 630 280 3,662 144 87 Venezuela 1,500 990 2,830 380 2,642 107 88 Greece 800 420 800 600 3,748 150 89 Israel 400 370 360 130 2,946 115 90 Hong Kong 3,060 1,210 2,910 790 2,920 129 91 Singapore 2,380 1,150 650 320 3,078 133 92 Trinidad and Tobago 2,370 1,360 670 380 2,694 121 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3,860 6,090 7,690 2,520 2,795 114 94 Iraq 5,280 1,800 3,040 2,160 3,086 127 High-income oil exporters 14,738 a' 1,355 w 4,996w 836w 2,969w 124 a' 95 Oman 31,180 1,900 .. 500 96 Libya 6,580 730 1320 400 3,459 147 97 SaudiArabia 16,370 1,670 5,850 1,170 2,895 116 98 Kuwait 1,210 570 270 180 99 United Arab Emirates .. 900 .. 340 'dustrial market economies 816w 554 470 ii' 180w 3,396w 132 w 100 Ireland 950 780 190 120 3,495 135 101 Spain 850 460 1,300 330 3,142 127 102 Italy 640 340 1,330 . . 3,716 150 103 New Zealand 850 650 .. 120 3,480 129 104 United Kingdom 940 650 210 140 3,322 132 105 Austria 550 400 440 230 3,539 134 106 Japan 930 780 310 240 2,740 117 107 Belgium 780 400 520 120 3,916 160 108 Finland 1,570 530 170 100 2,799 103 109 Netherlands 900 540 . . 130 3,588 133 110 Australia 750 560 . . 120 3,210 119 111 Canada 910 550 170 90 3,321 126 112 France 930 580 530 120 3,360 133 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 670 450 370 170 3,538 133 114 Denmark 810 480 220 210 3,567 133 115 UnitedStates 750 520 340 140 3,647 138 116 Sweden 1,050 490 100 60 3,196 119 117 Norway 900 520 330 90 3,173 118 118 Switzerland 740 410 350 160 3,561 133 East European nonmarket economies 683w 349 a' 358w 131 a' 3,351 w 131 a' 119 Hungary 720 400 330 150 3,509 134 120 Romania 790 680 420 270 3,337 126 121 Albania 3,620 960 530 310 2,701 112 122 Bulgaria 710 410 550 190 3,644 146 123 Czechoslovakia 620 360 230 130 3,472 141 124 German Oem. Rep. 1,180 520 .. .. 3,780 144 125 Poland 1,070 570 460 240 3,210 123 126 USSR 560 270 340 100 3,328 130 a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 265 Table 25. Education Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education as percentage of age group school as as percentage percentage of of population Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 1960 1981 1960 1981a 1960 l981 1960 1981 1960 1981k Low-income economies 80w 94w 69w 107w 34w 81w 18w 34w 2w 4w China and India 90w 102w 115w 40 w 89 a' 21w 38w 4w Other Iow-come 38 w 72 w 51 ii' 84w 25 w 58 w 7w 19w 1 ii' 2 a' 1 Chad 17 35 29 51 4 19 3 (.) 2 Bangladesh 47 62 66 76 26 47 8 15 1 3 3 Ethiopia 7 46 11 60 3 33 . 12 (.) 1 4 Nepal 10 91 19 126 1 53 6 21 1 3 5 Mali 10 27 14 35 6 20 1 9 . . 1 6 Burma 56 84 61 87 52 81 10 20 1 4 7 Zaire 60 90 88 104 32 75 3 23 (.) 1 8 Malawi 62 . . 73 . 51 1 4 . . (.) 9 Upper Volta 8 20 12 26 5 15 1 3 . . (.) 10 Uganda 49 54 65 62 32 46 3 5 (.) 1 11 India 61 79 80 93 40 64 20 30 3 8 12 Rwanda 49 72 68 75 30 69 2 2 . . (.) 13 Burundi 18 32 27 40 9 25 1 3 (.) 1 14 Tanzania 25 102 33 107 18 98 2 3 . . () 15 Somalia 9 30 13 38 5 21 1 11 (.) 1 16 Haiti 46 69 50 74 42 64 4 13 (.) 1 17 Benin 27 65 38 88 15 42 2 18 . . I 18 Central African Rep. 32 68 53 89 12 49 1 13 . . 19 China 109 118 .. 130 . . 106 21 44 . . 20 Guinea 30 33 44 44 16 22 2 16 . 5 21 Niger 5 23 7 29 3 17 .. 6 .. (.) 22 Madagascar 52 100 58 . . 45 .. 4 14 (.) 3 23 Sri Lanka 95 103 100 106 90 100 27 51 1 3 24 Togo 44 111 63 135 24 87 2 31 . . 2 25 Ghana 38 69 52 77 25 60 5 36 (.) 1 26 Pakistan 30 56 46 78 13 31 11 17 1 2 27 Kenya 47 109 64 114 30 101 2 19 (.) 1 28 Sierra Leone 23 39 30 45 15 30 2 12 (.) 29 Afghanistan 9 34 15 54 2 13 1 11 (.) 2 30 Bhutan 3 21 .. 25 . 17 3 3 . . (.) 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 64 .. 82 . . 46 .. 3 . (.) 32 Lao PDR 25 97 34 105 16 89 1 18 (.) (.) 33 Mozambique 48 90 60 102 36 78 2 6 . . (.) 34 VietNam .. 113 .. 120 .. 105 .. 48 . . 3 Middle-income economies a' 102w 83w 106 U' 68 a' 95 a' 14 a' 41 a' 3 a' 11 a' Oil exporters 64 a' 106w 75 a' 111 U' 52 a' 95 a' 9 a' 37 a' 2 a' 8 a' Oil importers 84 a' 99 a' 90 a' 102 U' 80 a' 95 U' 18 a' 44 a' 4 a' 13 a' Lower middle-income 66 a' 101 a' 76 ii' 106 a' 56 a' 91 a' 10 w 34 a' 3 a' 9 a' 35 Sudan 25 52 35 61 14 43 3 18 (.) 2 36 Mauritania 8 33 13 43 3 23 .. 10 37 Yemen, POR 13 64 20 94 5 34 5 18 . . 2 38 Liberia 31 66 45 82 18 50 2 20 (.) 2 39 Senegal 27 48 36 58 17 38 3 12 1 3 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 8 47 14 82 .. 12 .. 5 .. 1 41 Lesotho 83 104 63 84 102 123 3 17 (.) 2 42 Bolivia 64 86 78 93 50 78 12 34 4 12 43 Indonesia 71 100 86 106 58 94 6 30 1 3 44 Zambia 42 96 51 102 34 90 2 16 .. 2 45 Honduras 67 95 68 96 67 95 8 30 1 8 46 EgyptArabRep. 66 76 80 89 52 63 16 52 5 15 47 El Salvador 80 61 82 61 77 61 13 20 1 4 48 Thailand 83 96 88 95 79 93 13 29 2 20 49 PapuaNewGuinea 32 65 59 73 7 58 1 13 . . 2 50 Philippines 95 110 98 111 93 108 26 63 13 26 51 Zimbabwe 96 126 107 130 86 121 6 15 (.) (.) 52 Nigeria 36 98 46 94 27 70 4 16 (.) 3 53 Morocco 47 78 67 97 27 60 5 26 1 6 54 Cameroon 65 107 87 117 43 97 2 19 . . 2 55 Nicaragua 66 104 65 101 66 107 7 41 1 12 56 IvoryCoast 46 76 68 92 24 60 2 17 (.) 3 57 Guatemala 45 69 50 74 39 63 7 16 2 7 58 Congo, PeoplesRep. 78 156 103 163 53 148 4 69 1 6 59 Costa Rica 96 108 97 109 95 107 21 48 5 26 60 Peru 83 112 95 116 71 108 15 57 4 19 61 Dominican Rep. 98 109 99 . . 98 . . 7 41 1 10 62 Jamaica 92 99 92 99 93 100 45 58 2 6 63 Ecuador 83 107 87 109 79 105 12 40 3 35 64 Turkey 75 102 90 110 58 95 14 42 3 5 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 266 Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education as percentage of age group school as as percentage percentage of of population Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 1960 1981° 1960 1981° 1960 1981° 1960 1981° 1960 1981° 65 Tunisia 66 106 88 119 43 92 12 30 1 5 66 Colombia 77 130 77 129 77 132 12 48 2 12 67 Paraguay 98 102 105 106 90 98 11 26 2 7 68 Angola 21 .. 28 .. 13 .. 2 .. (.) (.) 69 Cuba 109 107 109 110 109 104 14 75 3 20 70 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. 116 .. 118 .. 114 .. . 71 Lebanon 102 118 105 123 99 114 19 58 6 28 72 Mongolia 79 105 79 107 78 102 51 89 8 9 Upper middle-income 88 w 104 w 93 w 107 w 83 iv 10110 20w 51w 4w 73 SyrianArabRep. 65 101 89 112 39 89 16 48 4 18 74 Jordan 77 103 94 105 59 100 25 77 1 27 75 Malaysia 96 92 108 94 83 91 19 53 1 5 76 Korea. Rep. of 94 107 99 108 89 105 27 85 5 18 77 Panama 96 111 98 113 94 108 29 65 5 27 78 Chile 109 115 111 115 107 114 24 57 4 13 79 Brazil 95 93 97 93 93 93 11 32 2 12 80 Mexico 80 121 82 122 77 120 11 51 3 15 81 Algeria 46 94 55 106 37 81 8 36 (.) 5 82 Portugal .. 103 . . .. .. . . . . 56 4 11 83 Argentina 98 119 98 120 99 119 23 59 11 25 84 Uruguay 111 122 111 124 111 120 37 70 8 20 85 South Africa 89 .. 94 . . 85 .. 15 . . 3 86 Yugoslavia 111 99 113 100 108 98 58 83 9 22 87 Venezuela 100 105 100 105 100 104 21 40 4 20 88 Greece 102 103 104 103 101 102 37 81 4 17 89 Israel 98 95 99 94 97 96 48 74 10 26 90 Hong Kong 87 106 93 108 79 104 20 65 4 10 91 Singapore 111 104 121 106 101 103 32 65 6 8 92 Trinidad and Tobago 88 94 89 93 87 95 24 61 1 5 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 41 95 56 111 27 78 12 45 1 5 94 Iraq 65 113 94 117 36 109 19 59 2 9 High-income oil exporters 29 iv 83 IL' 44 it' 93 w 12 u' 73 IL' 5 11' 43 ii' 1 ii' 8w 95 Oman .. 74 .. 90 .. 57 . . 22 96 Libya 59 123 92 128 24 119 9 67 1 6 97 Saudi Arabia 12 64 22 77 2 51 2 30 (.) 8 98 Kuwait 117 94 131 96 102 93 37 76 . . 14 99 United Arab Emirates . . 127 . . 127 . . 127 .. 61 (.) 4 Industrial market economies 11410 101 Lv 107u' 103 iv 112 iv 103w 64w 90w 16w 100 Ireland 110 102 107 101 112 102 35 93 9 21 101 Spain 110 110 106 110 116 109 23 88 4 23 102 Italy 111 101 112 102 109 102 34 73 7 27 103 NewZealand 108 102 110 103 106 101 73 81 13 26 104 United Kingdom 92 103 92 103 92 103 66 83 9 20 105 Austria 105 99 106 99 104 98 50 73 8 24 106 Japan 103 100 103 100 102 100 74 92 10 30 107 Belgium 109 100 111 100 108 101 69 90 9 26 108 Finland 97 96 100 96 95 96 74 98 7 31 109 Netherlands 105 100 105 99 104 101 58 95 13 31 110 Australia 103 110 103 110 103 110 51 86 13 26 111 Canada 107 106 108 106 105 104 46 93 16 37 112 France 144 110 98 112 143 111 46 86 10 26 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 133 100 132 100 134 100 53 94 6 28 114 Denmark 103 97 103 97 103 98 65 105 10 29 115 UnitedStates 118 100 .. 100 .. 100 86 97 32 58 116 Sweden 96 98 95 98 96 98 55 85 9 37 117 Norway 100 100 100 100 100 100 57 97 7 26 118 Switzerland 118 . . 118 . . 118 . . 26 . . 7 18 East European nonmarket economies 101 iv 105 it' 101 iv 99 iv 101 iv 9911' 45 ii' 88 ii' 11w 20 ii' 119 Hungary 101 99 103 99 100 99 23 42 7 14 120 Romania 98 103 101 104 95 103 24 68 5 11 121 Albania 94 106 102 109 86 103 20 65 5 5 122 Bulgaria 93 99 94 100 92 99 55 83 11 15 123 Czechoslovakia 93 90 93 90 93 91 25 46 11 18 124 German Oem. Rep. 112 95 111 95 113 97 39 89 16 30 125 Poland 109 100 110 100 107 99 50 77 9 17 126 USSR 100 107 100 .. 100 .. 49 96 11 21 a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 267 Table 26. Central govermnent expenditure Percentage of total expenditure Housing and Overall community Total surplusl amenities; expenditure deficit social security Economic (percent of (percent of Defense Education Health and welfare services Othere GNP) GNP) 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b meeconomies 6.2w 2.9w . 7w 34.5w 42.2w ;Jw 15 i.4w-5.6w 3ana arid India .. . . . .. .. Otherlow-income 11.4w 15.4w 16.4w 11.5w 6.2w 4.4w 4.7:, 6.1w 26.8w 29.0w 34.5w 33.6w 21.0w 171 Aw-5.0w 1 Chad 24.6 .. 14.8 .. 4.4 .. 1.7 . . 21.8 .. 32.7 .. 18.1 .. -3.2 2 Bangladesh .. .. . . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . 3 Ethiopia 14.3 14.4 .. . . 5.7 .. 4.4 . . 22.9 .. 38.3 .. 13.8 . -1.4 4 Nepal 7.2 6.5 7.2 9.7 4.7 4.1 0.7 1.5 57.2 57.1 23.0 21.0 8.5 13.4 -1 2 -2.5 5 Mali . . 11.1 . . 15.7 . . 3.1 .. 3.0 .. 11.4 .. 55.6 . . 25.9 . -5.6 6 Burma 21.7 . . 10.1 . . 6.1 . . 9.2 . , 35.5 . . 17.3 . . 16.5 . , 1.7 7 Zaire .. .. .. .. . 386 33.8 -7.5 -5.9 8 Malawi 3.1 8.4 15,8 11.1 5.5 5.2 5.8 2.9 33.1 38.2 36.8 34.3 221 353 -6.2 -12.0 9 Upper Volta .. .. .. 146 10 Uganda 23.1 34.5 15,3 109 5.3 4.0 7.3 2.8 12.4 13.7 36.6 34.1 21.8 3.2 -8i -2.5 11 India .. 20.4 1.9 18 .. 4.2 . 23 3 . 48.4 . . 14.0 -6 0 12 Rwanda . . 13.1 18.8 .. 4.5 . . 4.1 .. 41.4 .. 18.0 . . 14.4 -18 13 Burundi . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 -5.0 14 Tanzania 11.9 11.2 17.3 12.1 7.2 5.5 2.1 2.4 39.0 37.4 22.6 31.5 19.7 33.3 -50 15 Somaha 23.3 5.5 7.2 .. 1.9 .. 21.6 . . 40.5 . 13.5 0.6 16 Haiti 14,5 19.4 .. -5.0 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep. 9.3 . 16.9 .. 49 .. 61 . 18.8 .. 43.9 . 23.5 -4,5 19 China 20 Guinea 21 Niger .. 3.8 .. 18.0 . 4.1 .. 3.8 . 32.4 .. 38.0 .. 25 9 -66 22 Madagascar 3.6 . . 9.1 .. 4.2 .. 9.9 . . 40.5 .. 32.7 . . 20.8 . -2.5 23 Sri Lanka . . 1.7 .. 7.2 . . 3.5 .. 13.7 . 13.6 .. 60.3 .. 33.9 , . -128 24 Togo . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. , .. .. 35.3 .. -2.2 25 Ghana 8.0 3.7 20.1 22.0 62 7.0 41 6.8 150 20 7 466 398 195 10.1 -5.8 -62 26 Pakistan 28.5 .. 3.1 . . 1.6 7.2 . . 32.4 . . 27.2 17.7 . . -5.4 27 Kenya 60 10.7 21.9 206 7.9 7.8 3.9 0.8 30.1 30.0 30.2 30.0 21 0 28.4 -3.9 -68 28 Sierra Leone 27.2 , -9.2 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Dem. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 15.2w 9.6w 12.4w 14.3w 6.6w 5.3w 20.3w 13.8w 24.5w 27.0w 21.0w 30.0w 19.6w 24.5w -3.0w -3.8w Oil exporters 16.3w 6.2w 15.4w 16.6w 5.7w 5.6w 11.1w 8.7w 29.0w 30.7w 22.5w 32.2w 17.2w 27.8w -2.8w -3.9w Oil importers 14.7w 15.8w 11.0w 10.0w 6.9w 4.6w 24.5w 23.2w 22.4w 20.2w 22.0w 27.0w 20.7w 21.8w -3.lw-3.8w Lower middle-income 17.4w 14.1w 18.8w 14.2w 4.8w 4.2w 5.1w 4.9w 30.2w 26.3w 23.7w 36.3w 16.6w 20.8w -2.3w-3.6w 35 Sudan 24.1 13.2 9.3 9.8 5.4 1.4 1.4 0.9 15.8 19.8 44.1 54.9 19.2 19.1 -0.8 -3.2 36 Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Yemen, PDR .. .. . .. .. . 38 Liberia .. 11.3 .. 16.0 .. 7.6 . . 3.3 .. 33.0 .. 28.8 . . 33.7 ,. -11.5 39 Senegal .. 15.6 .. 21.3 .. 43 . . 9.9 . . 20.6 . . 28.1 17.4 29.3 -0.8 -3.3 40 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 32.6 .. 14.0 . . 3.6 . . .. . . 13.6 .. 36.2 . . 41.8 -19.7 . . 41 Lesotho .. . . 19.5 . 8.0 . . 6.5 .. 24.5 .. 41.5 . 16.6 . . -0.9 42 Bolivia 16.2 22.7 30.6 24.4 8.6 7.2 2.9 2.7 12.4 17.2 29.3 25.8 9.2 12,7 -1.4 -4.1 43 Indonesia .. 12.7 .. 7.9 .. 2.5 . . 1.2 .. 29.4 .. 46.2 16.2 27.3 -2.6 '-2.2 44 Zambia . 190 11.9 7.4 6.1 1.3 06 26.7 21.9 45.7 59.6 354 398 -144 -14.0 45 Honduras 12.4 .. 22.3 .. 10.2 .. 8.7 . . 28.3 .. 18.1 .. 15.4 . . -2.7 46 Egypt. Arab Rep. . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . , .. .. .. , , , 47 ElSalvador 6.6 16,8 21,4 17.9 10.9 8.4 7,6 5.4 14.4 24.7 39.0 26.9 12.8 18.5 -1.0 -7.4 48 Thailand 20.2 20.6 19.9 19.3 3.7 43 70 56 25.7 23.3 23.5 27.0 172 185 -4.3 -3.5 49 PapuaNewGuinea . 4.0 . . 17.7 .. 9.1 .. 3.2 .. 19.6 . . 46.5 . . 398 .. _5.5 50 Philippines 109 14.2 16.3 14.2 3.2 5.0 4.3 5.8 176 55.3 47.7 5.5 13.5 12.8 -2.0 -4.0 51 Zimbabwe . . 19.9 . . 19.5 . . 6.9 .. 7.5 .. 19.5 . . 26.6 . . 31.3 .. -7.3 52 Nigeria 40.2 . . 4.5 .. 3.6 0.8 . . 196 . 31,4 .. 9.9 . . -0.9 53 Morocco 12.3 16.2 19.2 16.5 48 3.0 8.4 5.6 25.6 28.0 29.7 30.7 22.4 39.8 -3.8 -13.6 54 Cameroon . . 5.1 . . 7.5 . . 2.7 . . 5.1 . . 10.0 . . 69.6 . . 21.6 -3.4 . . 55 Nicaragua 12.3 11.0 16.6 11.6 40 14 6 16.4 7.4 27.1 206 236 34 9 15.5 30.2 -40 -6.8 56 IvoryCoast .. 3.9 16.3 . . 3.9 . . 4.3 . 13.4 . . 58.1 . . 32.2 -11.0 . . 57 Guatemala 11.0 . 19.4 9.5 .. 10.4 .. 23.8 25.8 .. 9.9 16.2 -2.2 -6.2 58 Congo, Peoples Rep. .. . . . , .. . . .. . . . .. .. . 54.6 .. -5.8 59 CostaRica 2.8 2.6 28.3 23.7 3.8 29.7 26.7 12.6 21.8 15.2 16.7 16.2 18.9 23.7 -4.5 -3.2 60 Peru 14 8 13.8 22.7 11.3 6.2 5.3 29 11 303 23.1 68 5 17 1 20 2 -1.1 -3.5 61 DominicanRep. .. 8.9 .. 13.9 .. 9.7 . . 13.5 37.3 .. 16.8 18.5 17.0 -0.2 -2.7 62 Jamaica . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. . . . . 44.9 . -16.6 . 63 Ecuador . . 11.8 . . 30.1 . . 7.9 . . 1.3 . 19.4 . . 29.5 . 17.1 . . -5.1 64 Turkey 15.4 15.2 18.2 16.8 3.3 2.1 3.3 8.9 41.9 25.7 17.9 31.3 21.8 23.3 -2.1 -1.8 Note: For data comparability and coveraqe see the technical notes. 268 Percentage of total expenditure Housing and Overall community Total surplus/ amenities; expenditure deficit social security Economic (percent of (percent of Defense Education Health and welfare services Othera GNP) GNP) 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 l98l 1972 1981k 1972 l9slb 1972 lg8lb 1972 1981k 65 Tunisia 4.9 8.3 30.5 15.3 74 7.7 8.8 13.6 23.3 34.0 25,1 21.1 22.5 32.4 -0.9 -2.5 66 Colombia 13.3 .. -2.6 67 Paraguay 13.8 13.2 12.1 11.8 3.5 4.5 18.3 22.8 19.6 19.0 32.7 28.8 13.1 10.7 -1,7 -1.5 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Oem, Rep. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 14.6w 8.8w 10.8w 14.3w 7.0w 5.5w 24.2w 15.4w 23.0w 27.1 20.4w 28.9w 15.0w 20.6w -2.4w -3.1 w 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 37.2 37.7 11.3 7.1 1.4 1.1 3.6 11 4 399 309 6.7 11.8 28.1 41.3 -3.4 -68 74 Jordan . . 25.3 . . 7.6 . . 3.8 .. 14.5 . 28.3 .. 20.6 . . 35.8 .-7.6 . 75 Malaysia 18.5 15.1 23.4 15,9 6.8 4.4 4.4 10.5 14.2 29.0 32.7 252 27.7 40.8 -9.8 -15.8 76 Korea, Rep. of 25.8 35.2 15.9 17.9 1.2 1.3 5.8 6.7 256 14.4 25.7 24.5 18.6 19.0 -4.0 -3.7 77 Panama . . . . . 12.8 . . 13.2 . 12.8 184 . . 42.8 36.1 . . -9.1 78 Chile 6.1 12.0 143 14,4 8.2 64 39.8 42.6 153 11 4 163 13.3 423 31.0 -13.0 27 79 Brazil 8.3 3.4 6.8 3.8 6.4 74 36.0 34.8 246 24,1 17,9 26.5 16.6 19.5 -04 -2.4 80 Mexico 4.2 2.5 16.6 18.2 5,1 1.9 24.9 18.8 34.3 36.4 150 22.3 12.1 20.8 -3.1 -69 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 8.8 11.4 8.8 7.3 2.9 1.4 23.5 34.2 14.7 17.9 41.2 278 16.5 23.6 -3.4 -8.5 84 Uruguay 5.6 12.9 9.5 7.7 1.6 3.8 52.3 51.7 9.8 13.3 21.2 10.7 25.0 24.4 -2.5 -1.5 85 South Africa , . , , . 21.9 22.7 -4.2 -2.4 86 Yugoslavia 20.5 50.4 .. 24.8 .. 356 72 120 16.6 7.0 258 21,1 8.5 -0.4 -0,1 87 Venezuela 103 39 18,3 18.3 11 7 7.3 82 68 25.8 32.8 25.7 309 21 3 28.9 -1.0 -2.6 88 Greece 14.9 . 90 .. 7.3 .. 30.7 . 27.9 . 10.3 . 275 344 -1.7 -48 89 Israel 39.8 39.8 9.0 9,4 3.5 35 7.8 19.2 16.3 3.9 23.5 24.1 44.1 78.4 -16.3 -18.6 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 35.3 21.7 15.7 19 1 7,8 7.2 3.9 8.4 9.9 152 27.3 28.5 16.8 25.2 1.3 0.1 92 Trinidad and Tobago 2.0 . . 11.2 . . 5.9 . 17.3 311 . . 32.4 . . 31.0 . . 3.3 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 24.1 11.7 10.4 15.9 3.6 5.4 6.1 11.5 30.6 22.9 25.2 32.6 30.8 . . -4.6 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 12.9w 28.0u' 13.5w 9.2w 5.5w 5.5. 12.5w 9.5 in 1.16.2w 37.9zi' 31.6w 36.6w 26.3w 14.7w 17.7w 95 Oman 39.3 50.8 3.7 5.3 5.9 3.0 3.0 1.6 24.4 23.8 23.6 15.4 62 1 51.9 -15.3 2.4 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 84 98 15.0 9.0 5.5 4.9 142 15.2 16.6 19.3 40.1 41.9 34.4 28.9 17.4 340 99 United Arab Emirates 24.5 47.5 16.2 117 4.5 79 6.4 3.9 182 6.1 30.2 22.9 18.1 .. 23 Industrial market economies 23.4w 13.0 5 1 i' 9.9w 11.4 36.4w 41.7w 11.6w 9.9w 14.4w 18.2w 21.7w 28.3w -0.9w -2.7w 100 Ireland 33.0 51.7 -5.5 -14.5 101 Spain 6.5 4.4 8.3 7.9 09 0.7 49.8 58.5 17.5 13.7 17.0 14.9 19.8 27.3 -0.5 -4.3 102 Italy 3.4 . . 9.2 . . 11.0 . . 32.0 . . 7.5 . 369 . . 47.3 . . -129 103 New Zealand 5.8 5.4 16.9 13.5 14.9 14,4 255 28.9 164 15.7 20.4 22 2 28.5 39.6 -3.8-76 104 United Kingdom 16 7 2.6 .. 12.2 . . 265 . . 11.1 30.8 .. 32.7 40.8 -27 -4.7 105 Austria . . 2.9 . . 9.5 . . 12.9 , , 48.4 .. 127 . 13.6 . . 39.4 .. -2.9 106 Japan . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 12.7 19.0 107 Belgium 67 55 15,5 14.8 1.5 1.7 41.0 45.0 18.9 18.4 16,4 14.6 39.2 558 -4.3 -11.7 108 Finland 6.1 5.1 15.3 14.5 10.6 11.2 28.4 28.8 279 26.9 11.6 13.5 248 29.9 1.3 -1 0 109 Netherlands . . 5.6 . . 12.6 . 11.8 . 40.2 . . 11.2 .. 18.6 55.5 .. -6.6 110 Australia 14,1 9.6 4.4 8.2 82 10.1 21.0 29.4 13.1 81 39.2 34.6 19.5 246 -0.3 -0.7 111 Canada . . 7.8 . 3.5 .. 6.2 . . 34.1 . 18.4 .. 29.9 233 .. -2.6 112 France . 7.5 . . 8.7 . . 15.0 . 47.5 . . 6.9 . . 14.3 325 42 1 0.7 -2.7 113 Germany, Fed Rep. 12.4 9.2 15 0.8 17.5 185 469 51 8 11 3 6.6 104 13.1 242 31 0 0.7 -2.3 114 Denmark 7.2 , 15.9 .. 10.0 .. 41.3 . 11 8 . . 13.8 .. 329 438 27 -6.3 115 United States 32.2 21.8 3.2 2.5 8.6 10,7 35.3 36.9 10.6 9.8 10 1 183 19.4 23.4 -1.6 -27 116 Sweden 12.5 7.3 14.8 10,5 36 2.0 44.3 49.6 10.6 10,5 143 20.2 28.0 437 -1.2 -9.2 117 Norway 9.7 . . 9.9 . . 12.3 .. 39.9 . . 20.2 . . 80 . 35.0 38.9 -1.5 2,1 118 Switzerland 15.1 10.6 4.2 3.3 10.0 127 39.5 49.0 18.4 13.3 128 11.1 13.3 18.3 0.9 (1 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Oem, Rep 125 Poland 126 USSR a. See the technical notes. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. 269 Table 27. Central government current revenue Percentage of total current revenue Tax revenue Total Taxes on Domestic Taxes on Current income, Social taxes international Current revenue profit, and security on goods trade and nontax (percent of capital gain contributions and services transactions Other taxesa revenue GNP) 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981' 1972 1981b Low-income economies 19.8 24.1 iv 38.6w ?5.3w 7.4w 0 .ii' 14.3w China and India Other low-income 21 24.1w 34.8w 35.2w 30.3w 7.4w 1.4w 11.7w .. 18.4 16.7w 1 Chad 167 12,3 .. 45.2 20.5 53 .. 131 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 23 0 27.8 .. 325 5.6 .. 111 105 4 Nepa 4.1 61 265 368 36.7 344 190 8.7 13.7 14,0 5.2 81 5 Mali 18,8 39,7 20.7 , 13,2 7,6 144 6 Burma 2.7 39.0 16,7 41 7 17 1 7 Zaire 22.2 34,9 22 10 127 15.3 57.9 30.1 14 37 3.7 15.0 27.9 21 5 8 Malawi 31 4 28.5 242 303 200 23.1 05 04 238 178 16.0 195 9 Upper Volta . . .. . . . . . 10 Uganda 22.1 197 .. . 329 36.6 36.2 37.8 03 03 85 57 13.7 0.7 11 India 194 41.0 . 22,1 06 169 128 12 Rwanda . 17.8 4,1 19.3 . . 42.4 2.4 140 12.9 13 Burundi . 22.4 2.9 28.7 . . 24.0 . 11 2 108 . 11.9 14 Tanzania 29.9 31,1 . . 29.1 506 21.7 10.2 0.5 0.9 188 7,2 158 196 15 Somalia 107 . . . 24,7 . 45,3 .. 52 140 13.7 16 Haiti 13.9 . ., 15,5 , . 48.4 96 12.6 . 113 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep. 16 1 .. 6.4 . . 208 .. 398 7.8 91 169 19 China , , 20 Guinea . . .. . . . . . . 21 Niger 238 4.0 . 18.0 36.4 2.6 . 153 20.3 22 Madagascar 130 72 298 336 54 109 184 23 Sri Lanka 13.3 32.5 . . 47.0 18 . . 53 183 24 Toga 34.4 58 . . 15.3 . . 31.8 ,, -1.7 . 14.4 34 8 25 Ghana 182 24.8 291 391 408 279 04 01 114 8.2 151 42 26 Pakistan 15.6 332 . 34.0 . 0.3 . . 17.0 15 1 27 Kenya 35.6 29 1 199 38.2 24.3 22.0 14 0.6 18.8 10.0 18.0 23.1 28 Sierra Leone 23 9 20.4 . . 44.4 . 15 . 98 . 168 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Dem 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 VietNam Middle-income economies 24.9w 43.4w 14.5w 8.2w 27.6w 21.8w 14.0w 11.9w 3.3w 0.Szv 15.7w 14.2w 19.6w 26.3w Oil exporters 33.2 ii' 62.9 iv 8.5 iv 5.2 iv 23.4w 10.9 iv 14.5 iv 12.2 iv -0.4 iv -3.1 iv 20.8 iv 11 .7 iv 18.1 iv 27.7 iv Oil importers 20.6w 20.6w 17.5w 11.5w 29.7w 34.5w 13.8w 11.5w 5.3w 4.7w 13.1w 17.2w 20.2w 23,8w Lower middle-income 27.5w 38.4w . . . . 29.3w 25.3w 20.5w 17.5w 10.5w 5.6w 12.2w 13.2w 15.9w 21.8w 35 Sudan 11.8 144 304 26.0 40.5 42.6 1,5 0.7 15.7 163 180 134 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen, PDR 38 Liberia 324 . . 24.2 . . 36.3 . 3.3 . 3.8 227 39 Senegal 17.6 174 . . 3.9 245 18.8 309 189 238 244 3.2 16.6 168 25.9 40 Yemen Arab Rep 8.8 100 49,2 125 195 220 41 Lesotho 14.3 2.0 629 9.5 . 11 3 11 7 42 Bolivia 145 152 28.4 378 460 294 5.3 37 5.7 139 78 8.5 43 Indonesia 45 5 72.5 22.7 7.8 175 4.8 3.6 1.0 10.6 139 144 26.4 44 Zambia 49 7 35.2 202 46.8 143 7.7 0.1 3.3 15.6 69 24,2 25 1 45 Honduras 192 242 3.0 33.8 25.9 282 42.4 2.3 1.9 13.5 57 126 14.8 46 Egypt. Arab Rep 47 El Salvador 152 209 .. 25.6 352 36.1 298 172 4.9 60 92 11.6 124 48 Thailand 12.1 196 . . . . 463 455 28.7 228 1.8 1.8 11.2 10.2 12.9 144 49 PapuaNewGuinea 58.0 12,3 18.1 .. 10 106 . 235 50 Philippines 138 21.7 24.3 41,9 23.0 22.3 297 28 9.3 11,4 12.5 11 7 51 Zimbabwe 47.7 . 30.5 . 91 . 12 . . 11.5 263 52 Nigeria 430 263 . 175 0.2 130 113 53 Morocco 16.4 18.5 59 54 45.7 31 6 13.2 20.9 61 70 126 16.6 18.1 25.8 54 Cameroon 282 62 .. 160 .. 341 44 11.2 .. 183 55 Nicaragua 9.6 7.8 14.0 89 37.4 37.3 24.3 25.2 89 10.7 58 10.1 126 23.1 56 Ivory Coast 129 . 5.7 250 428 .. 60 75 23.4 57 Guatemala 12 7 120 .. 11.2 36.1 29.5 26 2 19,9 15.6 149 94 12 5 8.9 10.4 58 Congo, PeoplesRep. 193 487 . 44 40.3 7.6 26.5 13.0 6.4 2,7 7.4 23.5 18.4 39.0 59 CostaRica 177 14.6 13.4 25.2 38.1 257 18.0 273 16 1.8 11.1 5.3 15.8 201 60 Peru 17.5 15.8 .. 32.2 41 8 157 292 22T1 5.2 12.4 81 160 16.6 61 Dominican Rep. 179 190 39 37 19.0 256 403 286 18 17 170 215 179 141 62 Jamaica 63 Ecuador 43 7 193 268 1.4 89 120 64 Turkey 308 51.7 311 19.9 145 5.3 61 67 17.6 16.4 19,7 220 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 270 Percentage of total current revenue Tax revenue Total Taxes on Domestic Taxes on Current income, Social taxes international Current revenue profit, and security on goods trade and nontax (percent of capital gain contributions and services transactions Other taxese revenue GNP) 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 1972 1981b 65 Tunisia 15.9 15.3 7.1 88 31.6 23.4 21.8 25.5 7.8 3.2 15.7 239 23.0 31.8 66 Colombia 37,2 . . 13.9 16.0 20.3 ,. 7.2 .. 5.5 .. 10.8 67 Paraguay 8.8 16.2 10.4 14.6 26.2 16.5 24.8 21.0 17.0 22.5 12.8 9.2 11.5 10.3 68 Angola .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. 69 Cuba . .. .. . .. 70 Korea, Oem. Rep. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income .3.8w 46.4w 20.4w 10.3w 26.9w 21.0w 11.5w 10.6w 0.3w -2.8w 17.1w 14.5w 20.7w 27.0w 73 SyrianArabRep. 6.8 12.5 .. .. 10,4 6.2 17.3 14.6 12.1 6:1 53.4 60.7 24.5 24.2 74 Jordan . . 13.7 .. .. .. 7.5 .. 42.2 .. 9.9 26.7 .. 19.2 75 Malaysia 25.2 36.9 0.1 0.5 24.2 15.4 27.9 28.3 1.4 1.8 21.2 17.0 21.2 29.1 76 Korea, Rep. of 29.2 23.0 0.8 10 41.7 44.7 10.7 13.9 5.2 3.7 12.3 13.7 13.6 20.1 77 Panama . . 24.9 .. 18.9 .. 16.7 . . 10.7 . . 9.2 ,, 19.7 ., 28.1 78 Chile 12.9 16.9 271 15.3 286 40.9 100 5.5 43 47 17.1 16.8 30.2 31 8 79 Brazil 18.3 13.2 27.4 25.7 37.6 27.5 7.0 3.0 3.7 4.8 6.0 25.8 17.7 23.5 80 Mexico 36.5 37.1 19.4 14.4 32.4 31.8 13.1 29.1 -9.9 -18.6 8.4 6.2 10.4 15.7 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 7.4 5.4 25.9 15.8 14.8 44.0 18.5 10.7 -3.7 5.3 37.0 18.9 13.1 17.7 84 Uruguay 4.7 7.3 30.0 24.6 24.5 43.9 6.1 11.7 22.0 5.7 12.6 6.7 22.7 23.2 85 SouthAfrica 54.8 55.8 1.2 1.1 21.5 23.8 4.6 3.3 5.0 3.2 12.9 12.8 21.3 24.1 86 Yugoslavia . . .. 52.3 .. 24.5 68.2 19.5 30.1 .. . . 3.7 1.7 20.7 8.4 87 Venezuela 53.8 75.0 5.9 3.6 6.7 2.9 6.1 5.7 1.1 0.8 26.4 12.0 21.9 33.3 88 Greece 12.0 .. 23.5 . . 34.9 .. 6.7 .. 11.9 .. 11.0 .. 26.9 89 Israel 36.2 41.4 . . 10.3 23.0 25.0 21.6 3.6 6.8 7.3 12.4 12.3 32.0 55.1 90 Hong Kong .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 91 Singapore 24.4 35.6 .. .. 17.6 14,1 11.1 5.6 15.5 15.5 31.4 29.2 21.6 28 0 92 TrinidadandTobago . . 700 . . 2.0 . . 4.1 .. 6.5 . . 0.6 16.8 44.1 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 7.9 11.7 27 73 64 30 14.6 8.2 4.9 3.9 63.6 659 26.2 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 71.1 28.9 0.3 3.0 1.1 2.3 0.2 23.6 69.4 47.4 54.2 96 Ljbya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 68.8 24 19.7 0.5 15 1.1 0.2 0.1 9.9 959 55.2 71.1 99 United Arab Emirates 0.2 Industrial market economies 45.2w 41.2w 26.8w 30.8w 17.1w 15.8w 2.0w 1.5w 2.6w 2.0w 6.3w 8.7w 24.6w 30.1 a' 100 Ireland 28.1 34.7 8.9 13.6 32.6 25.1 16.6 13.5 3.2 2.1 10.5 11.1 30.6 39.8 101 Spain 15.9 23.9 38.9 47.1 23.4 16.8 10.0 6.0 0.7 -0.8 111 7.0 20.0 24.8 102 Italy . . 34.2 .. 32.9 . . 23.2 .. 0.2 .. 2.7 . . 6.9 .. 35.3 103 New Zealand 61.4 66.8 .. .. 20.0 18.4 4.1 3.6 4.5 1.4 10.0 9.7 27.3 349 104 Unitedkingdom 39.4 39.7 15.1 15.6 27.1 26.4 1.7 (.) 5.6 5.9 11.2 12.4 33.5 36.3 105 Austria . . 20.6 .. 35.3 .. 25.1 1.4 .. 8.7 .. 8.9 36 8 106 Japan . . .. .. .. 107 Belgium 31.3 37.4 32.4 30.6 28.9 250 10 () 3.3 2.2 3.1 4.9 35.0 44.8 108 Finland 30.0 30.5 10.7 9.7 47.7 48.0 3.1 1.5 2.9 2.9 5.5 7.3 27.1 29.7 109 Netherlands .. 28.3 .. 37.4 .. 19.1 (.) 2.3 .. 12.8 508 110 Australia 58.3 62.4 .. .. 21.9 23.1 5.2 5.2 2.1 0.2 12.5 9.0 21.4 24.4 111 Canada . . 47.5 .. 11.1 .. 12.0 . . 6.1 .. 10.0 .. 13.4 . . 22.1 112 France 16.9 18.0 37.1 42.5 37.9 30.1 0.3 (.) 2.9 3.5 4.9 5.9 33.6 40.5 113 Germany Fed. Rep 19.7 17.6 46.6 55.2 28.1 22.7 0.8 (.) 0.8 0.1 4.0 4.4 25.2 29.0 114 Denmark 400 35 5 51 27 42 0 46.6 3.1 08 3.0 2.7 68 11.8 35.5 36.2 115 United Stales 59.4 54.2 23.6 28.0 7.1 6.4 1.6 1.3 2.5 1.1 5.7 9.1 18.0 21.7 116 Sweden 27.0 16.0 21.6 38.7 34.0 29.7 1.5 1.2 4.6 1.2 11.3 13.2 32.5 37.9 117 Norway 22.5 28.7 20.5 22.0 47.9 38.2 1.6 0.7 1.0 1.1 6.6 9.3 37.0 44.1 118 Switzerland 13.9 14.3 37.3 48.2 21.5 19.4 16.7 9.1 2.6 2.3 8.0 6.7 14.5 18.4 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Oem, Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. See the technical notes. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. 271 Table 28. Income distribution Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of househoidsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 2 Bangladesh 1973-74 6.9 11.3 16.1 23.5 42.2 274 3 Ethiopia .. .. 4 Nepal 1976-77 4.6 8.0 11.7 16.5 59.2 465 5Mali .. .. 6 Burma .. . 7 Zaire . . . . . . . . 8 Malawi 1967-68 10.4 11.1 13.1 14.8 50.6 40.1 9 Upper Volta .. .. .. 10 Uganda . . .. 11 India 1975-76 7.0 9.2 13.9 20.5 494 33.6 12 Awanda 13 Burundi . . . . . . 14 Tanzania 1969 5.8 10.2 13.9 19 7 504 356 15 Somalia . . . . . . . 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep. 19 China 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 1969-70 7.5 11.7 15.7 21.7 43.4 28.2 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 1976 2.6 6.3 11.5 19.2 60.4 458 28 Sierra Leone 1967-69 5.6 9.5 128 19.6 525 37.8 29 Afghanistan 30 Ahu fan 31 Kampuchea, Oem. 32 Lao POR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 1967-68 4.0 8.9 16.6 20.7 49.8 346 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen, PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 1976 66 7.8 126 236 494 340 44 Zambia 45 Honduras 46 Egypt, Arab Rep. 47 El Salvador 48 Thailand 1975-76 5.6 9.6 139 211 498 341 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Philippines 1970-71 5.2 9.0 12.8 19.0 54.0 385 51 Zimbabwe .. .. .. 52 Nigeria . . . . . 53 Morocco .. .. .. 54 Cameroon .. .. .. 55 Nicaragua . . 56 Ivory Coast . . . . . 57 Guatemala . . . ,. 58 Congo, Peoples Rep . 59 Costa Rica 1971 33 87 13.3 199 548 395 60 Peru 1972 19 51 11 0 21.0 61 0 42.9 61 Dominican Rep .. .. . . 62 Jamaica . . . . . . . . . 63 Ecuador .. .. .. .. 64 Turkey 1973 35 8.0 12.5' 195 565 40.7 Note. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. 272 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of householdsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea, Oem Rep 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 1973 35 7.7 124 20.3 56.1 39 8 76 Korea, Rep, of 1976 57 11.2 154 22 4 45.3 27.5 77 Panama 1970 2.0 5.2 110 20.0 61.8 44.2 78 Chile 1968 44 9.0 13.8 21.4 51.4 34.8 79 Brazil 1972 20 5.0 9.4 170 66.6 50.6 80 Mexico 1977 29 7.0 12.0 20.4 57.7 40 6 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Agenlina 1970 4,4 97 14.1 21.5 503 35.2 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 1978 66 12 1 187 23.9 387 22.9 87 Venezuela 1970 3.0 73 12.9 228 54.0 35.7 88 Greece 89 Israel 1979-80 6.0 120 17.7 24 4 399 22.6 90 Hong Kong 1980 54 108 15.2 21.6 470 31.3 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 1975-76 4.2 9.1 13.9 22.8 500 31 8 93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 1973 7.2 13.1 16.6 237 39.4 25.1 101 Spain 1974 6.0 11.8 16.9 23.1 42 2 26 7 102 Italy 1977 6.2 113 15.9 22.7 43.9 28.1 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 1979 7.0 11.5 17.0 248 39.7 23.4 105 Austria 106 Japan 1979 8.7 132 17.5 231 36.8 21.2 107 Belgium 1974-75 77 12.4 17.0 23.1 39 8 24.3 108 Finland 1977 6.8 128 18.7 24.9 36 8 21 2 109 Netherlands 1977 8.1 137 17.9 23.3 37.0 22.1 110 Australia 1975-76 5.4 10.0 150 22.5 47.1 30 5 111 Canada 1977 38 10.7 179 25.6 42 0 26 9 112 France 1975 5.3 11.1 16.0 21.8 45.8 30.5 113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 1978 7.9 12.5 17.0 23.1 39 5 24 0 114 Denmark 1976 7.4 12.6 183 242 37 5 22 4 115 United States 1978 4.6 8.9 14.1 22.1 50.3 33.4 116 Sweden 1979 7.2 12.8 17.4 25.4 37.2 21 2 117 Norway 1970 6.3 12.9 18.8 24.7 37 3 22.2 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 1 23 Czechoslovakia 124 German Oem Rep. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. These estimates should be treated with caution. See the technical notes. 273 Technical notes This edition of the World Development Indicators which the conversion of GNP proceeds in the fol- provides economic indicators for periods of years lowing manner. The first step is to convert the and social indicators for selected years in a form GNP series in constant market prices and national suitable for comparing economies and groups of currency units to one measured in constant aver- economies. The statistics and measures have been age 1980-82 prices. This is done by multiplying the carefully chosen to give a comprehensive picture original constant price series by the weighted- of development. Considerable effort has been average domestic GNP deflator for the base period made to standardize the data; nevertheless, statis- (that is, by the ratio of total GNP in current prices tical methods, coverage, practices, and definitions to total GNP in constant prices for the 1980-82 differ widely. In addition, the statistical systems in period). The second step is to convert the series many developing economies still are weak, and measured in constant average 1980-82 prices in this affects the availability and reliability of the national currency to one in US dollars by dividing data. Readers are urged to take these limitations that series by the weighted-average exchange rate into account in interpreting the indicators, particu- for the base period. The weighted-average larly when making comparisons across economies. exchange rate is the ratio of the sum of GNP in All growth rates shown are in constant prices current prices to the sum of the GNP divided by and, unless otherwise noted, have been computed the annual average exchange rate in national cur- by using the least-squares method. The least- rency per US dollar for 1980, 1981, and 1982. The squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a third step is to convert the series measured in con- least-squares linear trend line to the logarithmic stant average 1980-82 US dollars to one measured annual values of the variable in the relevant period in current US dollars by multiplying that series by using the logarithmic form: Log X, = a + bt + e,, the implicit US GNP deflator for 1980-82. This pro- where X, is the variable, a is the intercept, b is the cedure was followed for most economies. slope coefficient, t is time, and e, is the error term. The GNP per capita figures were obtained by Then r is equal to [antilog fri - 1, the least-squares dividing GNP at market prices in US dollars by the estimate of the growth rate. population in mid-1982. The use of the three-year base period is intended to smooth the impact of Table 1. Basic indicators fluctuations in prices and exchange rates. As the base period is changed every year, the per capita The estimates of population for mid-1982 are pri- estimates presented in the various editions of the marily based on data from the UN Population Divi- World Development Indicators are not compara- sion. In many cases the data take into account the ble. results of recent population censuses. The data on Because of problems associated with the avail- area are from the computer tape for the FAQ Pro- ability of data and the determination of exchange duction Yearbook 1982. rates, information on GNP per capita is shown Gross national product (GNP) measures the total only for East European nonmarket economies that domestic and foreign output claimed by residents. are members of the World Bank. The World Bank It comprises gross domestic product (see the note has a research project under way to estimate GNP for Table 2) and factor incomes (such as investment per capita for nonmarket economies that are not income, labor income, and workers' remittances) members. But until a broadly acceptable method is accruing to residents from abroad, less the income prepared, figures will not be shown for the GNP earned in the domestic economy accruing to per- per capita of such economies. sons abroad. It is calculated without making For Romania the GNP per capita figure has been deductions for depreciation. derived, following the World Bank Atlas method, by The GNP per capita figures were calculated using adjusted official Romanian national accounts according to the World Bank Atlas method, under data and converting them into US dollars at the 274 effective exchange rate for foreign trade transac- tions, in particular for the oil-producing countries tions in convertible currencies. during the period of sharp increases in oil prices. It The World Bank, for its own operational pur- is used as an indicator of inflation because it is the poses, attempts to estimate internationally compa- most broadly based deflator, showing annual price rable and consistent GNP per capita figures. This movements for all goods and services produced in task is made difficult, however, by conceptual and an economy. coverage as well as quality differences in the basic Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of data and by the fact that prevailing exchange rates years newborn children would live if subject to the do not fully reflect the rate at which transactions mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section of take place. Recognizing that these shortcomings population at the time of their birth. Data are from affect the comparability of the GNP per capita esti- the UN Population Division, supplemented by mates, the World Bank recently initiated a process World Bank estimates. aimed at revision of the World Bank Atlas methodol- The table on this page shows basic indicators for ogy described above. It is systematically evaluating 34 countries that have a population of less than a the GNP estimates of its member countries, focus- million and are members of the United Nations, ing on the coverage and concepts employed, and the World Bank, or both. For most of these coun- where appropriate will make adjustments to tries, comprehensive data are not available. increase comparability. This evaluation of national The averages in this table are weighted by popu- accounts data will be based on documentation on lation. the sources and methods underlying the compila- tions, obtained either directly from national gov- ernments or from other international agencies Tables 2 and 3. Growth and structure of such as the UN Statistical Office, OECD, and the production Statistical Office of the European Communities. The World Bank is also undertaking a systematic Most of the definitions used are those of the UN review to improve the conversion factors. For 1983 System of National Accounts. on, GNP per capita for a specified year in US dol- Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total lars will be estimated by converting GNP in final output of goods and services produced by an national currencies using a mean of the official economythat is, by residents and nonresidents, exchange rate for that year and the two preceding regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign years, adjusted for relative price changes between claims. It is calculated without making deductions the economy in question and the United States. for depreciation. For many countries, GDP by An alternative conversion factor will be used when industrial origin is measured at factor cost; for the official exchange rate is judged to be egre- other countries without complete national giously different from the rate effectively applied accounts series at factor cost, market price series to foreign transactions. were used. GDP at factor cost is equal to GDP at GNP per capita estimates calculated using the market prices, less indirect taxes net of subsidies. new methodology will be published in the next The figures for GDP are dollar values converted editions of the World Bank Atlas and the World from domestic currency by using the average Development Indicators, together with detailed annual official exchange rate for the year in ques- technical notes. tion: that is, they were not calculated by using the Given the data and conversion factor consider- World Bank Atlas method described in the note for ations discussed above, this year's GNP per capita Table 1. Because of these differences in concept figures must be interpreted with great caution. and in method of conversion, the figures in these The average annual rate of inflation is the least- tables are not comparable with the GNP-based squares growth rate of the implicit gross domestic numbers in Table 1. product (GDP) deflator for each of the periods As in Table 1, data are shown only for East Euro- shown. The GDP deflator is first calculated by pean nonmarket economies that are members of dividing, for each year of the period, the value of the World Bank. GDP in current market prices by the value of GDP The agricultural sector comprises agriculture, for- in constant market prices, both in national cur- estry, hunting, and fishing. In developing coun- rency. The least-squares method is then used to tries with high levels of subsistence farming, much calculate the growth rate of the GDP deflator for of the agricultural production is either not the period. This measure of inflation has limita- exchanged or not exchanged for money. Due to 275 difficulties in assigning subsistence farming its 1970 dollars. The average sectoral shares in Table 3 proper value, the share of agriculture in GDP may are weighted by GDP in current dollars for the be underestimated. The industrial sector comprises years in question. mining, manufacturing, construction, and electric- ity, water, and gas. All other branches of economic activity are categorized as services. Tables 4 and 5. Growth of consumption and National accounts series in domestic currency investment; Structure of demand units were used to compute the indicators in these tables. The growth rates in Table 2 were calculated GDP is defined in the note for Table 2. from constant price series; the sectoral shares of Public consumption (or general government con- GDP in Table 3, from current price series. sumption) includes all current expenditure for pur- The average growth rates for the summary mea- chases of goods and services by all levels of sures in Table 2 are weighted by country GDP in government. Capital expenditure on national Basic indicators for UN/World Bank members with a population of less than 1 million GNP per capita Average Life Average annual Area annual expectonci, rate of inflation Population (thousands growth rate at birth (percent) (millions) of square Dollors (percent) (i,ears( UN/World Bank member mid-I 982 kilometers) 1982 1960-82 1960-70 1970-82 1982 Guinea-Bissau 0.8 36 170 -1.7 7.1 38 Comoros 0.4 2 340 0.9 3.4 11.7 48 Cape Verde 0.3 4 350 11.9 61 Gambia, The 0.7 11 360 2.5 2.2 9.7 36 Sao Tome and Principe 0.1 1 370 1.2 7.5 62 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 (.) 620 0.6 4.0 12.9 Solomon Islands 0.2 28 660 1.3 3.0 8.3 Guyana 0.8 215 670 1.7 2.4 9.9 68 Dominica 0.1 1 710 -0.8 3.8 16.5 58 St. Lucia 0.1 1 720 3.4 3.6 11.0 St. Kitts-Nevis 0.1 (.) 750 1.1 5.5 9.8 Grenada 0.1 (.) 760 1.6 3.4 15.0 69 Botswana 0.9 600 900 6.8 2.4 11.5 60 Swaziland 0.7 17 940 4.2 2.4 12.8 54 Belize 0.2 23 1,080 3.4 3.4 9.5 Mauritius 0.9 2 1,240 2.1 2.2 15.0 66 Antigua and Barbuda 0.1 (.) 1,740 -0.2 3.1 14.0 Fiji 0.7 18 1,950 3.2 2.5 11.7 68 Barbados 0.3 (.) 2,900 4.5 2.3 13.8 72 Malta 0.4 (.) 3,800 8.0 1.5 4.9 72 Bahamas 0.2 14 3,830 -0.4 3.4 7.4 69 Cyprus 0.6 9 3,840 5.9 1.3 7.3 74 Gabon 0.7 268 4,000 4.4 5.4 19.5 49 Bahrain 0.4 9,280 68 Iceland 0.2 103 12,150 3.2 12.2 38.2 77 Luxembourg 0.4 3 14,340 4.0 3.7 6.8 73 Qatar 0.3 11 21,880 2.6 29.4 71 Djibouti 0.4 22 50 Equatorial Guinea 0.4 28 3.4 43 Maldives 0.2 (.) 1.0 47 Seychelles 0.1 (.) 66 Suriname 0.4 163 65 Van uatu 0.1 15 Western Samoa 0.2 3 65 a. Because data for the early 1960s are not available, figures in italics are for periods other than that specified. b. Figures in italics arefor 1970-81, not 1970-82. c. Figures in italics are for years other than 1982. See the technical notes. 276 defense and security is regarded as consumption arable land, defined as comprising arable land and expenditure. land under permanent crops. This includes land Private consumption is the market value of all under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are goods and services purchased or received as counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or income in kind by households and nonprofit pastures, land under market and kitchen gardens, institutions. It includes imputed rent for owner- land temporarily fallow or lying idle, as well as occupied dwellings. land under permanent crops. Gross domestic investment consists of the outlays The figures on food and fertilizer are from the for additions to the fixed assets of the economy, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): from plus changes in the net value of inventories. computer tapes for Production Yearbook 1982, Trade Gross domestic saving shows the amount of gross Yearbook 1982, and Fertilizer Yearbook 1982; and from domestic investment financed from domestic out- Food Aid Bulletin, October 1980 and July 1983. In put. Comprising public and private saving, it is some instances data are for 1974 because they pro- gross domestic investment plus the net exports of vide the earliest available information. goods and nonfactor services. The index of food production per ca pita shows the Exports of goods and nonfactor services represent the average annual quantity of food produced per cap- value of all goods and nonfactor services sold to ita in 1980-82 in relation to that in 1969-71. The the rest of the world; they include merchandise, estimates were derived from those of the FAO, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactor which are calculated by dividing indices of the services. The value of factor services, such as quantity of food production by indices of total pop- investment income, labor income, and workers' ulation. For this index, food is defined as compris- remittances from abroad, is excluded. ing cereals, starchy roots, sugar cane, sugar beet, The resource balance is the difference between pulses, edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegetables, live- exports and imports of goods and nonfactor serv- stock, and livestock products. Quantities of food ices. production are measured net of animal feed, seeds National accounts series in domestic currency for use in agriculture, and food lost in processsing units were used to compute the indicators in these and distribution. Given the weaknesses in agricul- tables. The growth rates in Table 4 were calculated tural production statistics, caution should be exer- from constant price series; the shares of GDP in cised in interpreting them. Table 5, from current price series. The summary measures in Table 4 are weighted Table 7. Industry by country GDP in 1970 dollars; those in Table 5, by GDP in current dollars for the years in question. The percentage distribution of value added among manufacturing industries was calculated from data Table 6. Agriculture and food obtained from the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), with the base values The basic data for value added in agriculture are from expressed in 1975 dollars. the World Bank's national accounts series in The classification of manufacturing industries is national currencies. The 1975 value added in cur- in accord with the UN International Standard rent prices in national currencies is converted to Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities US dollars by applying the official exchange rate (ISIC). Food and agriculture comprise ISIC Major for 1975. The growth rates of the constant price Groups 311, 313, and 314; textiles and clothing 321- series in national currencies are applied to the 1975 24; machinery and transport equipment 382-84; and value added in US dollars to derive the values, in chemicals 351 and 352. Other manufacturing gener- 1975 US dollars, for 1970 and 1982. ally comprises ISIC Major Division 3, less all of the Cereal imports and food aid in cereals are measured above; however, for some economies for which in grain equivalents and defined as comprising all complete data are not available, other categories cereals under the Revised Standard International are included as well. Trade Classification (SITC) Groups 041-046. The The basic data for value added in manufacturing are figures are not directly comparable since cereal from the World Bank's national accounts series in imports are based on calendar-year and recipient- national currencies. The 1975 value added in cur- country data, whereas food aid in cereals is based rent prices in national currencies is converted to on crop-year and donor-country data. US dollars by applying the official exchange rate Fertilizer consumption is measured in relation to for 1975. The growth rates of the constant price 277 series in national currencies are applied to the 1975 are in dollars at prevailing exchange rates. Note value added in US dollars to derive the values, in that they do not include trade in services. 1975 US dollars, for 1970 and 1981. The growth rates of merchandise exports and imports are in real terms and are calculated from quantum (volume) indices of exports and imports. Quantum Table 8. Commercial energy indices are the ratios of the export or import value index to the corresponding unit value index. For The data on energy generally are from UN sources. most developing economies these indices are from They refer to commercial forms of primary energy: the UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and petroleum and natural gas liquids, natural gas, Development Statistics and supplementary data. For solid fuels (coal, lignite, and so on), and primary industrial economies the indices are from the UN electricity (nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and Monthly power)all converted into oil equivalents. Figures Bulletin of Statistics. The summary measures are on liquid fuel consumption include petroleum median values. Note again that these values do not derivatives that have been consumed in non- include trade in services. energy uses. For converting primary electricity The terms of trade, or net barter terms of trade, into oil equivalents, a notional thermal efficiency of measure the relative level of export prices com- 34 percent has been assumed. The use of firewood pared to import prices. Calculated as the ratio of a and other traditional fuels, though substantial in country's export unit value index to the import some developing countries, is not taken into unit value index, this indicator shows changes account because reliable and comprehensive data over time in the level of export prices as a percent- are not available. age of import prices. The terms-of-trade index The summary measures of growth rates of energy numbers are shown for 1979 and 1982, with 1980 = production are weighted by volumes of production 100. The unit value indices are from the same in 1974; those of growth rates of energy consump- sources cited above for the growth rates of exports tion, by volumes of consumption in 1974; those of and imports. energy consumption per ca pita, by population in 1974. Energy imports refer to the dollar value of energy importsSection 3 in the Revised Standard Inter- Tables 10 and 11. Structure of merchandise national Trade Classification (SITC)and are trade expressed as a percentage of earnings from mer- The shares in these tables are derived from trade chandise exports. The summary measures are values in current dollars reported in UN trade weighted by merchandise exports in current dol- tapes and the UN Yearbook of International Trade Sta- lars. tistics, supplemented by other regular statistical Because data on energy imports do not permit a publications of the UN and the IMF. distinction between petroleum imports for fuel Merchandise exports and imports are defined in the and for use in the petrochemicals industry, these note for Table 9. The categorization of exports and percentages may overestimate the dependence on imports follows the Revised Standard Interna- imported energy. tional Trade Classification (SITC). In Table 10, fuels, minerals, and metals are the com- Table 9. Growth of merchandise trade modities in SITC Section 3, Divisions 27 and 28 (minerals, crude fertilizers, and metalliferous The statistics on merchandise trade are from UN ores), and Division 68 (nonferrous metals). Other publications and the UN trade data system, sup- primary commodities comprise SITC Sections 0, 1, 2, plemerited by statistics from the UN Conference and 4 (food and live animals, beverages and on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Inter- tobacco, inedible crude materials, oils, fats, and national Monetary Fund (IMF), and in a few cases waxes) less Divisions 27 and 28. Textiles and clothing World Bank country documentation. represent SITC Divisions 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns, Merchandise exports and imports cover, with some fabrics, and clothing). Machinery and transport exceptions, all international changes in ownership equipment are the commodities in SITC Section 7. of goods passing across customs borders. Exports Other manufactures, calculated as the residual from are valued f.o.b. (free on board), imports c.i.f. the total value of manufactured exports, represent (cost, insurance, and freight), unless otherwise SITC Sections 5 through 9 less Section 7 and Divi- specified in the foregoing sources. These values sions 65, 68, and 84. 278 In Table 11, food commodities are those in SITC quited transfers to the rest of the world. The cur- Sections 0, 1, and 4 and in Division 22 (food and rent account estimates are primarily from IMF data live animals, beverages and tobacco, and oils and files. fats). Fuels are the commodities in SITC Section 3 Workers' remittances cover remittances of income (mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials). by migrants who are employed or expected to be Other primary commodities comprise SITC Section 2 employed for a year or more in their new econ- (crude materials excluding fuels) less Division 22 omy, where they are considered residents. (oilseeds and nuts) plus Division 68 (nonferrous Net direct private investment is the net amount metals). Machinery and transport equipment are the invested or reinvested by nonresidents in enter- commodities in SITC Section 7. Other manufactures, prises in which they or other nonresidents exercise calculated as the residual from the total value of significant managerial control. Including equity manufactured imports, represent SITC Sections 5 capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital, through 9 less Section 7 and Division 68. these net figures also take into account the value of The summary measures in Table 10 are weighted direct investment abroad by residents of the by merchandise exports in current dollars; those in reporting country. These estimates were compiled Table 11, by merchandise imports in current dol- primarily from IMF data files. lars. Gross international reserves comprise holdings of gold, special drawing rights (SDR5), the reserve Table 12. Origin and destination of position of IMF members in the Fund, and hold- merchandise exports ings of foreign exchange under the control of mon- etary authorities. The data on holdings of Merchandise exports are defined in the note for Table international reserves are from IMF data files. The 9. Trade shares in this table are based on statistics gold component of these reserves is valued on the value of trade in current dollars from the throughout at year-end London prices: that is, UN and the IMF. Unallocated exports are distrib- $37.37 an ounce in 1970 and $456.90 an ounce in uted among the economy groups in proportion to 1982. The reserve levels for 1970 and 1982 refer to their respective shares of allocable trade. Industrial the end of the year indicated and are in current market economies also include Gibraltar, Iceland, dollars at prevailing exchange rates. Due to differ- and Luxembourg; high-income oil exporters also ences in the definition of international reserves, in include Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, and Qatar. the valuation of gold, and in reserve management The summary measures are weighted by merchan- practices, the levels of reserve holdings published dise exports in current dollars. in national sources do not have strictly comparable significance. Reserve holdings at the end of 1982 Table 13. Origin and destination of are also expressed in terms of the number of manufactured exports months of imports of goods and services they could pay for, with imports at the average level for The data in this table are from the UN and are 1981 or 1982. The summary measures are weighted among those used to compute special Table B in by imports of goods and services in current dol- the UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. lars. Manufactured goods are the commodities in SITC (Revised) Sections 5 through 9 (chemicals and Table 15. Flow of public and publicly related products, manufactured articles, and guaranteed external capital machinery and transport equipment) excluding Division 68 (nonferrous metals). The data on debt in this and successive tables are The economy groups are the same as those in from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System. Table 12. The summary measures are weighted by That system is concerned solely with developing manufactured exports in current dollars. economies and does not collect data on external debt for other groups of borrowers. Nor are com- Table 14. Balance of payments and reserves prehensive comparable data available from other sources. The current account balance is the difference Data on the gross inflow and repayment of principal between (1) exports of goods and services plus (amortization) are for public and publicly guaran- inflows of unrequited official and private transfers teed medium- and long-term loans. The net inflow and (2) imports of goods and services plus unre- is the gross inflow less the repayment of principal. 279 Public loans are external obligations of public final repayment of principal. The grace period is debtors, including the national government, its the interval between the agreement date and the agencies, and autonomous public bodies. Publicly date of the first repayment of principal. guaranteed loans are external obligations of pri- The summary measures in this table are vate debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by weighted by the amounts of loans. a public entity. The data in this table and in successive tables on Table 18. Official development assistance from debt do not cover nonguaranteed private debt OECD and OPEC members because comprehensive data are not available; for some borrowers such debt is substantial. The debt Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net contracted for purchases of military equipment is disbursements of loans and grants made at conces- also excluded because it usually is not reported. sional financial terms by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Commit- tee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co- Table 16. External public debt and operation and Development (OECD) and of the debt service ratio members of the Organization of Petroleum Export- External public debt outstanding and disbursed repre- ing Countries (OPEC) with the objective of pro- sents the amount of public and publicly guaran- moting economic development and welfare. It teed loans that has been disbursed, net of includes the value of technical cooperation and repayments of principal and write-off s at year-end. assistance. All data shown were supplied by the In estimating external public debt as a percentage OECD. of GNP, GNP was converted from national curren- Amounts shown are net disbursements to devel- cies to dollars at the average official exchange rate oping countries and multilateral institutions. The for the year in question. The summary measures disbursements to multilateral institutions are now are weighted by GNP in current dollars. reported for all DAC members on the basis of the Interest payments are those on the disbursed and date of issue of notes; some DAC members previ- outstanding public and publicly guaranteed debt ously reported on the basis of the date of encash- in foreign currencies, goods, or services; they ment. Net bilateral flows to low-income countries include commitment charges on undisbursed debt exclude unallocated bilateral flows and all dis- if information on those charges was available. bursements to multilateral institutions. Debt service is the sum of interest payments and The nominal values shown in the summary for repayments of principal on external public and ODA from OECD countries were converted into publicly guaranteed debt. The ratio of debt service 1980 prices using the dollar GNP deflator. This to exports of goods and services is one of several deflator is based on price increases in OECD coun- rules of thumb commonly used to assess the ability tries (excluding Greece, Portugal, and Turkey) to service debt. The average ratios of debt service measured in dollars. It takes into account the par- to GNP for the economy groups are weighted by ity changes between the dollar and national cur- GNP in current dollars. The average ratios of debt rencies. For example, when the dollar depreciates, service to exports of goods and services are price increases measured in national currencies weighted by exports of goods and services in cur- have to be adjusted upward by the amount of the rent dollars. depreciation to obtain price increases in dollars. The table, in addition to showing totals for OPEC, shows totals for the Organization of Arab Table 17. Terms of public borrowing Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The Commitments refer to the public and publicly guar- donor members of OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq, anteed loans for which contracts were signed in Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United the year specified. Arab Emirates. ODA data for OPEC and OAPEC Interest rates, maturities, and grace periods are aver- were also obtained from the OECD. ages weighted by the amounts of loans. Interest is the major charge levied on a loan and is usually Table 19. Population growth and computed on the amount of principal drawn and projections outstanding. The maturity of a loan is the interval between the agreement date, when a loan agree- The growth rates of population are period averages ment is signed or bonds are issued, and the date of calculated from midyear populations. The sum- 280 mary measures are weighted by population in has declined to replacement level because past 1970. high growth rates will have produced an age distri- The estimates of population for mid-1982 are pri- bution with a relatively high proportion of women marily based on data from the UN Population Divi- in, or still to enter, the reproductive ages. Conse- sion. In many cases the data take into account the quently, the birth rate will remain higher than the results of recent population censuses. death rate and the growth rate will remain positive The projections of population for 1990 and 2000, for several decades. A population takes 50-75 and to the year in which it will eventually become years, depending on the initial conditions, before stationary, were made for each economy sepa- its age distribution fully adjusts to the changed rately. Starting with information on total popula- fertility rates. tion by age and sex, fertility rates, mortality rates, To make the projections, assumptions about and international migration rates in the base year future mortality rates were made in terms of 1980, these parameters were projected at five-year female life expectancy at birth (that is, the number intervals on the basis of generalized assumptions of years a newborn girl would live if subject to the until the population became stationary. The base- mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section of year estimates are from updated computer print- population at the time of her birth). Economies outs of the UN World Population Prospects as Assessed were first divided according to whether their pri- in 2982, from the most recent issues of the UN mary-school enrollment ratio for females was Population and Vital Statistics Report and International above or below 70 percent. In each group a set of Migration: Levels and Trends, and from the World annual increments in female life expectancy was Bank, the Population Council, the US Bureau of assumed, depending on the female life expectancy the Census, and recent national censuses. in 1980-85. For a given life expectancy at birth, the The net reproduction rate (NRR) indicates the annual increments during the projection period are number of daughters that a newborn girl will bear larger in economies having a higher primary- during her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific school enrollment ratio and a life expectancy of up fertility rates and a fixed set of mortality rates. The to 62.5 years. At higher life expectancies, the incre- NRR thus measures the extent to which a cohort of ments are the same. newborn girls will reproduce themselves under To project the fertility rates, the first step was to given schedules of fertility and mortality. An NRR estimate the year in which fertility would reach of 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level: replacement level. These estimates are speculative at this rate childbearing women, on the average, and are based on information on trends in crude bear only enough daughters to replace themselves birth rates (defined in the note for Table 20), total in the population. fertility rates (also defined in the note for Table 20), A stationary population is one in which age- and female life expectancy at birth, and the perform- sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over ance of family planning programs. For most econo- a long period, while age-specific fertility rates have mies it was assumed that the total fertility rate simultaneously remained at replacement level would decline between 1980 and the year of reach- (NRR=1). In such a population, the birth rate is ing a net reproduction rate of 1, after which fertil- constant and equal to the death rate, the age struc- ity would remain at replacement level. For most ture also is constant, and the growth rate is zero. countries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, total Population momentum is the tendency for popula- fertility rates were assumed to remain constant tion growth to continue beyond the time that until 1990-95 and then to decline until replacement replacement-level fertility has been achieved; that level was reached; for a few they were assumed to is, even after NRR has reached unity. The momen- increase until 1990-95 and then to decline. Also for tum of a population in the year t is measured as a a few countries in Asia and the Middle East, the ratio of the ultimate stationary population to the rates were assumed to remain constant for some population in the year t, given the assumption that years before beginning to decline. In several indus- fertility remains at replacement level from the year trial economies, fertility is already below replace- onward. In India, for example, in 1980 the popu- ment level. Because a population will not remain lation was 687 million, the ultimate stationary pop- stationary if its net reproduction rate is other than ulation assuming that NRR = 1 from 1980 onward 1, it was assumed that fertility rates in these econo- was 1,195 million, and the population momentum mies would regain replacement levels in order to was 1.74. make estimates of the stationary population for A population tends to grow even after fertility them. For the sake of consistency with the other 281 estimates, the total fertility rates in the industrial able, program statistics are used; these include economies were assumed to remain constant until India, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe. Program statis- 1985-90 and then to increase to replacement level tics may understate contraceptive prevalence by 2010. because they do not measure use of methods such International migration rates are based on past as rhythm, withdrawal, or abstinence, or of contra- and present trends in migration flow. The esti- ceptives not obtained through the official family mates of future net migration are speculative. For planning program. The data refer to a variety of most economies the net migration rates were years, generally not more than two years distant assumed to be zero by 2000, but for a few they from those specified. were assumed to be zero by 2025. All summary measures are weighted by popula- The estimates of the hypothetical size of the sta- tion. tionary population and the assumed year of reach- ing replacement-level fertility are speculative. They Table 21. Labor force should not be regarded as predictions. They are included to provide a summary indication of the The population of working age refers to the popula- long-run implications of recent fertility and mortal- tion aged 15-64. The estimates are based on the ity trends on the basis of highly stylized assump- population estimates of the World Bank for 1981 tions. A fuller description of the methods and and previous years. The summary measures are assumptions used to calculate the estimates is weighted by population. available from the Population, Health, and Nutri- The labor force comprises economically active per- tion Department of the World Bank. sons aged 10 years and over, including the armed forces and the unemployed, but excluding house- Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related wives, students, and other economically inactive indicators groups. Agriculture, industry, and services are defined in the same manner as in Table 2. The The crude birth and death rates indicate the number estimates of the sectoral distribution of the labor of live births and deaths per thousand population force are from International Labour Office (ILO), in a year. They are from the same sources men- Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000, tioned in the note for Table 19. Percentage changes and from the World Bank. The summary measures are computed from unrounded data. are weighted by labor force. The total fertility rate represents the number of The labor force growth rates were derived from the children that would be born per woman, if she Bank's population projections and from ILO data were to live to the end of her childbearing years on age-specific activity rates in the source cited and bear children at each age in accord with pre- above. The summary measures for 1960-70 and vailing age-specific fertility rates. The rates given 1970-82 are weighted by labor force in 1970; those are from the same sources mentioned in the note for 1980-2000, by estimates of labor force in 1980. for Table 19. The application of ILO activity rates to the The percentage of married women of childbearing age Bank's latest population estimates may be inap- using contraception refers to women who are prac- propriate for some economies in which there have ticing, or whose husbands are practicing, any form been important changes in unemployment and of contraception. These generally comprise male underemployment, in international and internal and female sterilization, intrauterine device (IUD), migration, or in both. The labor force projections condom, injectable contraceptives, spermicides, for 1980-2000 should thus be treated with caution. diaphragm, rhythm, withdrawal, and abstinence. The figures for Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland, and Table 22. Urbanization Romania, however, as well as the 1970 figures for the United Kingdom, exclude sterilization. Women The data on urban population as a percentage of total of childbearing age are generally women aged 15- population are from the UN Patterns of Urban and 49, although for some countries contraceptive Rural Population Growth, 1980, supplemented by usage is measured for other age groups. data from the World Bank and from various issues Data are mainly derived from the UN Monitoring of the UN Demographic Yearbook. Report and publications of the World Fertility Sur- The growth rates of urban population were calcu- vey and the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. For lated from the World Bank's population estimates; a few countries for which no survey data are avail- the estimates of urban population shares were cal- 282 culated from the sources cited above. Data on The daily calorie supply per capita was calculated by urban agglomeration are also from the United dividing the calorie equivalent of the food supplies Nations. in an economy by the population. Food supplies Because the estimates in this table are based on comprise domestic production, imports less different national definitions of what is "urban," exports, and changes in stocks; they exclude ani- cross-country comparisons should be interpreted mal feed, seeds for use in agriculture, and food lost with caution. in processing and distribution. The daily calorie The summary measures for urban population as requirement per capita refers to the calories needed a percentage of total population are weighted by to sustain a person at normal levels of activity and population; the other summary measures in this health, taking into account age and sex distribu- table are weighted by urban population. tions, average body weights, and environmental temperatures. Both sets of estimates are from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancy The summary measures in this table are Life expectancy at birth is defined in the note for weighted by population. Table 1. The infant mortality rate is the number of infants Table 25. Education who die before reaching one year of age, per thou- sand live births in a given year. The data are from a The data in this table refer to a variety of years, variety of sourcesincluding issues of the UN generally not more than two years distant from Demographic Yearbook and Population and Vital Statis- those specified, and are mostly from UNESCO. tics Report; and UN, "Infant Mortality: World Esti- The data on number enrolled in primary school refer mates and Projections, 1950-2025," Population to estimates of total, male, and female enrollment Bulletin of the United Nations, 1982and from the of students of all ages in primary school; they are World Bank. expressed as percentages of the total, male, or The child death rate is the number of deaths of female populations of primary-school age to give children aged 1-4 per thousand children in the gross primary enrollment ratios. Although pri- same age group in a given year. Estimates were mary-school age is generally considered to be 6-11 based on the data on infant mortality and on the years, the differences in country practices in the relation between the infant mortality rate and the ages and duration of schooling are reflected in the child death rate implicit in the appropriate Coale- ratios given. For countries with universal primary Demeny Model life tables; see Ansley J. Coale and education, the gross enrollment ratios may exceed Paul Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables and Stable 100 percent because some pupils are below or Populations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University above the official primary-school age. Press, 1966). The data on number enrolled in secondary school The summary measures in this table are were calculated in the same manner, with second- weighted by population. ary-school age generally considered to be 12-17 years. Table 24. Health-related indicators The data on number enrolled in higher education are from UNESCO. The estimates of population per physician and nursing The summary measures in this table are person were derived from World Health Organiza- weighted by population. tion (WHO) data, some of which have been revised to reflect new information. They also take Table 26. Central government expenditure into account revised estimates of population. Nursing persons include graduate, practical, The data on central government finance in Tables assistant, and auxiliary nurses; the inclusion of 26 and 27 are from the IMF Government Finance auxiliary nurses enables a better estimation of the Statistics Yearbook, IMF data files, and World Bank availability of nursing care. Because definitions of country documentation. The accounts of each nursing personnel varyand because the data country are reported using the system of common shown are for a variety of years, generally not definitions and classifications found in the IMF more than two years distant from those specified Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics. Due the data for these two indicators are not strictly to differences in coverage of available data, the comparable across countries. individual components of central government 283 expenditure and current revenue shown in these iture on the general administration and regulation tables may not be strictly comparable across all of relevant government departments, hospitals economies. The shares of total expenditure and and clinics, health and sanitation, and national revenue by category are calculated from national health and medical insurance schemes. currencies. Housing and community amenities, and social secu- The inadequate statistical coverage of state, pro- rity and welfare cover (1) public expenditure on vincial, and local governments has dictated the use housing, such as income-related schemes; on pro- of central government data only. This may seri- vision and support of housing and slum clearance ously understate or distort the statistical portrayal activities; on community development; and on of the allocation of resources for various purposes, sanitary services; and (2) public expenditure for especially in large countries where lower levels of compensation to the sick and temporarily disabled government have considerable autonomy and are for loss of income; for payments to the elderly, the responsible for many social services. permanently disabled, and the unemployed; and It must be emphasized that the data presented, for family, maternity, and child allowances. The especially those for education and health, are not second category also includes the cost of welfare comparable for a number of reasons. In many services such as care of the aged, the disabled, and economies private health and education services children, as well as the cost of general administra- are substantial; in others public services represent tion, regulation, and research associated with the major component of total expenditure but may social security and welfare services. be financed by lower levels of government. Great Economic services comprise public expenditure caution should therefore be exercised in using the associated with the regulation, support, and more data for cross-economy comparisons. efficient operation of business, economic develop- Central government expenditure comprises the ment, redress of regional imbalances, and creation expenditure by all government offices, depart- of employment opportunities. Research, trade pro- ments, establishments, and other bodies that are motion, geological surveys, and inspection and agencies or instruments of the central authority of regulation of particular industry groups are among a country. It includes both current and capital the activities included. The five major categories of (development) expenditure. economic services are fuel and energy, agriculture, Defense comprises all expenditure, whether by industry, transportation and communication, and defense or other departments, for the maintenance other economic affairs and services. of military forces, including the purchase of mili- Other covers expenditure for the general admin- tary supplies and equipment, construction, istration of government not included elsewhere; recruiting, and training. Also falling under this cat- for a few economies it also includes amounts that egory is expenditure for strengthening the public could not be allocated to other components. services to meet wartime emergencies, for training Overall surplus/deficit is defined as current and civil defense personnel, and for foreign military capital revenue and grants received less total aid and contributions to military organizations and expenditure less lending minus repayments. alliances. The summary measures for the components of Education comprises public expenditure for the central government expenditure are weighted by provision, management, inspection, and support central government expenditure in current dollars; of preprimary, primary, and secondary schools; of those for total expenditure as a percentage of GNP universities and colleges; and of vocational, tech- and for overall surplus/deficit as a percentage of nical, and other training institutions by central GNP are weighted by GNP in current dollars. governments. Also included is expenditure on the general administration and regulation of the edu- Table 27. Central government current revenue cation system; on research into its objectives, organization, administration, and methods; and Information on data sources and comparability is on such subsidiary services as transport, school given in the note for Table 26. Current revenue by meals, and medical and dental services in schools. source is expressed as a percentage of total cur- Health covers public expenditure on hospitals, rent revenue, which is the sum of tax revenue and medical and dental centers, and clinics with a current nontax revenue, and is calculated from major medical component; on national health and national currencies. medical insurance schemes; and on family plan- Tax revenue is defined as all government revenue ning and preventive care. Also included is expend- from compulsory, unrequited, nonrepayable 284 receipts for public purposes, including interest col- from data gathered by the World Bank from lected on tax arrears and penalties collected on national sources but not adjusted. The estimates nonpayment or late payment of taxes. Tax revenue for Sri Lanka are from the results of a joint project is shown net of refunds and other corrective trans- of the World Bank and the Economic and Social actions. Taxes on income, profit, and capital gain are Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The esti- taxes levied on the actual or presumptive net mates for Latin American countries other than income of individuals, on the profits of enter- Mexico come from the results of two joint projects prises, and on capital gains, whether realized on of the World Bank, one with the ILO, the other land sales, securities, or other assets. Social Security with the Economic Commission for Latin America. contributions include employers' and employees' Those for Mexico are the results from the 1977 social security contributions as well as those of Household Budget Survey. self-employed and unemployed persons. Domestic Data for Australia, Belgium, the Federal Repub- taxes on goods and services include general sales, lic of Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, turnover, or value added taxes, selective excises on the United Kingdom, and the United States are goods, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use from national sources. Data for industrial market of goods or property, and profits of fiscal monopo- economies other than those listed are from Sawyer lies. Taxes on international trade and transactions 1976; the joint project of the ILO and the World include import duties, export duties, profits of Bank; and the UN Survey of National Sources of export or import marketing boards, transfers to income Distribution Statistics, 1981. government, exchange profits, and exchange Because the collection of data on income distri- taxes. Other taxes include employers' payroll or bution has not been systematically organized and manpower taxes, taxes on property, and other integrated with the official statistical system in taxes not allocable to other categories. many countries, estimates were typically derived Current nontax revenue comprises all current gov- from surveys designed for other purposes, most ernment revenue that is not a compulsory nonre- often consumer expenditure surveys, which also payable payment for public purposes. Proceeds of collect some information on income. These sur- grants and borrowing, funds arising from the veys use a variety of income concepts and sample repayment of previous lending by governments, designs. Furthermore, the coverage of many of incurrence of liabilities, and proceeds from the sale these surveys is too limited to provide reliable of capital assets are not included. nationwide estimates of income distribution. The summary measures for the components of Thus, although the estimates shown are consid- current revenue are weighted by total current reve- ered the best available, they do not avoid all these nue in current dollars; those for current revenue as problems and should be interpreted with extreme a percentage of GNP are weighted by GNP in cur- caution. rent dollars. The scope of the indicator is similarly limited. Because households vary in size, a distribution in which households are ranked according to per cap- Table 28. Income distribution ita household income rather than according to total The data in this table refer to the distribution of household income is superior for many purposes. total disposable household income accruing to per- The distinction is important because households centile groups of households ranked by total with low per capita incomes frequently are large household income. The distributions cover rural households whose total income may be relatively and urban areas and refer to different years high. Information on the distribution of per capita between 1966 and 1981. household income exists, however, for only a few The estimates for developing economies in Asia countries. The World Bank Living Standards Mea- and Africa are from the results of a joint project of surement Study is developing procedures and the World Bank and the International Labour applications that can assist countries in improving Organisation (ILO). Those for Turkey, Hong Kong, their collection and analysis of data on income dis- Malaysia, Israel, and the Republic of Korea are tribution. 285 Bibliography of data sources National International Monetary Fund. 1974. Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics. accounts and Washington, D.C. economic 1983. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Vol. VII. Washington, D.C. indicators Sawyer, Malcolm. 1976. Income Distribution in OECD Countries. OECD Occasional Studies. Paris. UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. New York. 1968. A System of National Accounts. New York. 1981. A Survey of National Sources of Income Distribution Statistics. Statistical Papers, Series M, no. 72. New York. FAO, IMF, and UNIDO data files. National sources. World Bank country documentation. World Bank data files. Energy UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. World Energy Supplies. Statistical Papers, Series J. New York. World Bank data files. Trade International Monetary Fund. Various years. Direction of Trade. Washington, D.C. Various years. International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C. UN Conference on Trade and Development. Various years. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. New York. UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York. Various years. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York. United Nations trade tapes. World Bank country documentation. Balance of International Monetary Fund. 1977. Balance of Payments Manual, 4th ed. Washington, D.C. payments, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Various years. Development capital flows, Co-operation. Paris. and debt IMF balance of payments data files. World Bank Debtor Reporting System. Labor force International Labour Office. 1977. Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000, 2nd ed. Geneva. International Labour Organisation tapes. World Bank data files. Population UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Demographic Yearbook. New York. Various years. Population and Vital Statistics Report. New York. 1980. Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth. New York. 1982. "Infant Mortality: World Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025." Population Bulletin of the United Nations, no. 14. New York. Updated printout. World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1982. New York. Forthcoming. World Population Trends and Policies: 1983 Monitoring Report. New York. US Bureau of the Census. 1983. World Population: 1983. Washington, D.C. World Bank data files. Social Food and Agriculture Organization. October 1980; July 1983. Food Aid Bulletin. Rome. indicators 1982. Production Yearbook 1982. Rome. UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Demographic Yearbook. New York. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. New York. UNESCO. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. Paris. World Health Organization. Various years. World Health Statistics Annual. Geneva. 1976. World Health Statistics Report, vol. 29, no. 10. Geneva. World Bank data files. 286 The World Bank World Development Report 1984 examines population change in developing countries and its links with development. The Report shows why continuing rapid population growth on an ever larger base is likely to mean a lower quality of life for millions of people. It concludes that in some countries development may not be possible at all unless slower population growth can be achieved soon, before higher real incomes would bring fertility down sponta- neously. The Report outlines public policies to reduce fertility that are humane and afford- able and that complement other development efforts, placing special emphasis on education for women and increased family planning services. The successful experience of many countries in implementing population policy, particularly in the past decade, shows how much can be accomplished and how quickly. The Report also analyzes the underlying causes of the 1980-83 world economic recession, concluding that its roots go back beyond the oil price rise of 1979-80 to rigidities being built into economies from the mid-1960s onward. In reviewing prospects for the next decade, the Report concludes that sustained recovery requires economic reforms in developed and developing countries alike, as well as concerted international action to roll back protection- ism and increase capital flowsboth commercial bank lending and, especially for low- income countries, concessionai flows. A Population Data Supplement and multicolor maps and graphics supplement the text. The final portion of the Report comprises "World Development Indicators," 28 two-page tables containing economic and social profiles of 126 countries. World Development Report has been published annually by the World Bank since 1978. Each edition examines the current world economic situation and prospects as they relate to development and offers a detailed analysis of a particular topic or sector of importance in economic and social development. ISBN 0-19-520460-3 ISSN 0163-5085